Sitting of 27 February 1885

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Waterworks (Local Authorities)* [75]; Public Health Acts Amendment (Improvement Expenses)* [76].
QUESTIONS.

  THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.
  MR. SERJEANT SIMONasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the International Conference on Foreign Judgments has arrived at any decision on the subject; if not, when the next meeting will take place?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Her Majesty's Government are not aware that any meeting of the Foreign Judgments Conference has taken place at Rome. They were informed by the Italian Government, in October last, that the sanitary condition of Italy at
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  that time, and the period which must necessarily elapse between the convocation and the meeting of the Conference, rendered it impossible that it should meet before February or March. No further information has reached them on the subject.

FISHERIES (IRELAND)—OYSTER BEDS.
MR. KENNYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he can state the number of oyster licences at present existing in Ireland, and the number of cases in which the holders of such licences are using no effort to cultivate the oyster beds; and, if the Inspectors of Fisheries will be directed to exercise their powers, and cancel the licences held by such persons?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: I am informed that there are 125 licences for oyster beds at present in existence in Ireland, and that the holders of about 80 of these are using no efforts to cultivate the beds. The Inspectors of Fisheries purpose holding inquiries as soon as their present engagements will permit, with the view of cancelling the licences held by such persons.

PEACE PRESERVATION (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—LICENCES TO CARRY ARMS—CASE OF JAMES LORD.
MR. BIGGARasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If a youth named James Lord has got a licence to carry arms in the district of Mount Nugent, county Cavan; and, whether Lord is a holder of land; and, if not, what special reason is there for his having a licence?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: From the Reports I have received I have thought it necessary to make further inquiries in this case, and would ask the hon. Member to put the Question on the Paper again for Monday next.

THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—MR. OLIVER S. NUGENT, CO. CAVAN.
MR. BIGGARasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether Mr. Oliver S. Nugent has recently been appointed a magistrate for county Cavan; what is the qualification of that gentleman for the office; and, does he reside in the county?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Mr. Oliver Nugent was placed in the Commission of the Peace for the county of Cavan in September last, on the recommendation of the Lieutenant of the county. He is a gentleman of considerable property in the county, and has a residence there; but is understood to be at present serving with his regiment.

THE IRISH LAND COMMISSION— SITTINGS AT NENAGH.
MR. JOHN O'CONNORasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, "Whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that the Land Commissioners Court abandoned its sittings at Nenagh on the 19th February, on the ground that a public meeting was to be held in the neighbourhood of the court-house, and has not since returned to the town or appointed a day for the hearing of more than twenty appeals which their departure interrupted; whether he has observed that Mr. Justice O'Hagan declared—
"For myself I should, in view of the great public inconvenience that will be caused, have preferred to adjourn only during the time of the meeting taking place. However, my colleagues are of the other opinion, and consequently after to-day the hearing of the remaining appeals on the list must be adjourned sine die;"
whether he is aware that Mr. George Posnett, official, held an inquiry under the Labourers' Act in the court-house upon the day of the meeting, and expressed himself satisfied with the arrangements for the inquiry; and, what steps will be taken to protect litigants from the expense and inconvenience entailed by the action of the Land Commissioners?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: The Land Commissioners found, on going to their Court at Nenagh on the 18th instant, that preparations were being made to hold a political meeting in close proximity to the Court. They at once communicated with the authorities of the town, pointing out the inconvenience that must arise to suitors and witnesses, as well as to the Commission itself, if the meeting were held in the place proposed, and suggesting that it should be held in some other part of the town; but the reply was that this could not be done, and it was suggested that the Commissioners should
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adjourn their Court for an hour or two while the meeting was going on, or, if they thought fit, for the day. The Commissioners declined to adopt this suggestion, and, for reasons which they publicly stated, adjourned the Court sine die, Mr. Justice O'Hagan stating that while he concurred with his colleagues as to the impropriety of a public meeting being held in the close neighbourhood of the Court, he thought that, under whatever circumstances, they should endeavour to hear and decide the cases in the list. I regret if any inconvenience or expense has ensued to litigants; but the responsibility lies with those who, by calling a public meeting, for which a platform was erected immediately in front of the Court House, and close to the railings, interrupted a sitting of the Court, which had been publicly announced so far back as the 11th of December Inst. I am informed that Mr. Posnett did hold an inquiry at Nenagh on that day; but he is absent from Dublin at present, and I have not been able to ascertain at what time he held his inquiry, or whether he expressed himself as satisfied with the arrangements.
MR. HEALY: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Home Secretary in this House completely justifies the holding of a meeting in the vicinity of the High Court of Parliament, although it inconvenienced 200 or 300 Members who were coming to the House?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: I am not aware that there was any meeting held close to, or under the windows of, the House of Commons in such a way as to interrupt its proceedings.
MR. JOHN O'CONNOR: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there was no other place available for the holding of the meeting except the place in front of the Court House; and that if they erected a platform in any other part of the town the promoters of the meeting would be liable to be prosecuted by the County Surveyor?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: I have already said that it was stated that there was no other place available; but there was an element behind that, and the promoters ought to have provided for the holding of a meeting some other day than the day on which the sitting of a Judicial Court had been announced.

PREVENTION OF CRIME (IRELAND) ACT—BOYCOTTING—MR. CUSACK.
MR. JOHN O'CONNORasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he has observed that Mr. Cusack, of Drangan, county Tipperary, has been sentenced to imprisonment, under the Prevention of Crime Act, for reading out, as secretary of the local branch of the Irish National League, the following resolution:—
"That, as land-grabbers are in our midst, we propose to hold no communication or dealings with them;"
whether the evidence of the police was that the resolution was handed to Mr. Cusack as secretary, according to the ordinary routine, by the gentleman who proposed it; and, upon what principle one officer of the branch was selected for punishment, while other officers and members were not summoned?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: The hon. Member has been misinformed if he would imply that Cusack was the only person summoned on this occasion, the fact being that four other members of this branch of the National League were included in the charge. The evidence showed that Cusack not only read out, but that he drafted and called on members present to propose and second two resolutions; the first being—
"Resolved that we condemn land-grabbing, and that we condemn the O'Briens of Coolquil, for taking a farm which was surrendered by Mr. Chadwick for being rack-rented;"
and the second—
"Resolved that, as land-grabbers are in our midst, we propose to hold no communication or dealing with them."
Cusack, and the proposer and seconder of each resolution, were accordingly summoned; and the Bench convicted Cusack and the proposer and seconder of the second resolution.
MR. JOHN O'CONNOR: Has the right hon. Gentleman read the report of the evidence; and is he aware that what he has now said is entirely at variance with the facts as reported in the papers? I beg to give Notice that I will call attention to this matter at the earliest opportunity.
MR. SEXTONasked, whether the right hon. Gentleman thought the-communication with land-grabbers would
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be increased by such prosecutions as these?
[No reply.]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (IRELAND)—AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS, BOROUGH OF ATHLONE.
MR. JUSTIN HUNTLY M'CARTHYasked the President of the Local Government Board, Why the fee charged for auditing the public accounts of the borough of Athlone amounts to so large a sum as £12 per annum, considering that the auditor merely spends one day in the year at the work?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN(who replied) said: The charge for this audit in 1873 and 1874 was £10 10 s., four days being returned as the time occupied in the audit. In 1875, in consequence of the appointment of an additional Auditor, the assessment had to be raised, and the charge on Athlone became £12 5s., which was altered to £12 in 1877, and has so continued since. There has been no application for a reduction until this month, when the Local Government Board stated, in reply to a letter from the Town Clerk on the subject, that they would bear the case of Athlone in mind when the next assessment is made.

LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—DISORDERLY LANGUAGE—CASE OF GEORGE BARKER, CLIFFONEY, CO. SLIGO.
MR. SEXTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether George Barker, a gamekeeper, being in a public house in the village of Cliffoney, county Sligo, on the evening of Friday last, the 20th instant, used language provocative of a breach of the peace, challenging "any Papist——to fight;" attempted to turn other persons out of the house; being then himself expelled, drew and brandished a revolver in the street, shouting that he "would blow the brains out of any Papist that dare come near him;" discharged one chamber of the revolver at a constable who arrested him; further violently resisted the arrest; and, upon being taken to the police station, drew a large knife on the constable in charge; what steps have been taken by the police in reference to this case; and, whether Barker holds a licence to have and carry

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arms; and, if so, whether it will be now revoked?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Very short Notice has been given of this Question; but, from the information I have received, it would appear that the hon. Member is not quite accurate in some particulars. Barker will be prosecuted at the next Petty Sessions on a charge of being drunk with loaded firearms; and, as is usual in such cases, the question of the revocation of his arms licence must await the result of these proceedings.
MR. SEXTONasked, whether the right hon. Gentleman considered the danger to the public peace of allowing this drunken firebrand to remain in possession of arms in the meantime?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANsaid, the case being sub judice, they could not do anything at present.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC— TREATY WITH THE GERMAN EMPIRE.
MR. STUART-WORTLEYasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true that a Treaty is being negotiated or has been concluded between the German Empire and the South African Republic; whether before entering upon such negotiations or concluding such Treaty the Transvaal Government asked for the consent of Her Majesty's Government; whether such consent was given or refused; whether, if given, such consent was subject to any and what conditions; and, whether, if such Treaty has been concluded, its provisions are known to Her Majesty's Government; and, if so, when the provisions of such Treaty will be made known to this House?
MR. EVELYN ASHLEY: We understand that on the 22nd ultimo a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Germany and the Transvaal Republic was signed at Berlin, preparatory to being submitted to the Federal Council, and to subsequent ratification. In a Protocol attached is an express declaration that this Treaty will only be ratified after the expressed or tacit approval of Her Majesty's Government has been obtained. This is in full and complete accordance with the stipulation of the London Convention of 1884. We have not yet received a copy of the proposed Treaty; but we know that its
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provisions are similar to those of other Commercial Treaties recently concluded by Germany. I apprehend there will be no objection to laying the Treaty on the Table of the House as soon as Her Majesty's Government have received and considered it.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—QUEEN'S SCHOLARSHIPS AT TRAINING COLLEGES.
MR. SCLATER-BOOTHasked the Vice President of the Committee of Council, Whether he will cancel or relax the rule of the Education Department under which pupil teachers, having failed in the examination for Queen's Scholarships at the training colleges, are not allowed to be made acquainted (as is freely done in other cases) with the particular subjects in respect of which they have been unsuccessful?
MR. MUNDELLA: It has been found impossible to inform the candidates for Queen's Scholarships of the subjects in which they have failed. It is probable that there are about 40,000 papers worked at the half-yearly examinations; and it is obvious that the Department could not undertake to answer questions as to each of them; and I am informed that it would be contrary to the practice of Examining Boards to do so.

THE IRISH LAND COMMISSION—SITTING AT ENNISKILLEN (APPEALS).
MR. TOTTENHAMasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he will represent to the Land Commissioners that their refusal to alter the day fixed for hearing appeals at Enniskillen of cases from the county of Lei trim, viz. 2nd March, is equivalent to a grave denial of justice to the appellants, who both themselves, their legal advisers, witnesses, and others concerned, are compelled to attend at the Assizes of the county Leitrim, which commence on the same day, and it is therefore impossible for them to be present at Enniskillen?
MR. GIBSONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If it is true that the Irish Land Commissioners have fixed the 2nd March for hearing the Leitrim appeals at Enniskillen; whether the Leitrim Assizes commence on the same day; and, whether this fixture may not cause great in-

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convenience and expense to suitors from the county Leitrim?
LORD ARTHURHILLasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether any representations have been made to the Land Commissioners as to the serious inconvenience and injustice to litigants which must follow their refusal to alter the date of hearing appeals from county Leitrim at Enniskillen from the 2nd March, on which day the Assizes for county Leitrim begin at Carrick on Shannon, and at which both the litigants and their legal advisers are obliged to attend?
MR. LEWISasked Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland, Whether it is not the case that the Land Appeal Oases from county Leitrim are fixed to take place at Enniskillen on the 2nd of March, the same day as the Assizes for county Leitrim at Carrick on Shannon; whether he is aware that such an arrangement will be greatly prejudicial to suitors, solicitors, and others; and, whether the Government will use its influence with the Land Commissioners to adjourn the Appeal Cases in the Land Court to a suitable day?
MR. BERESFORDasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he is aware that the Land Commissioners have appointed the 2nd of March for the hearing of Land Appeal Cases at Enniskillen from the Manorhamilton, Ballyshannon, and Bawnboy Unions, in county Leitrim; that the Assizes for county Leitrim commence at Carrick on Shannon on same date, and that it will be impossible for the solicitors and others engaged in these land cases to appear at Enniskillen as required; and, whether he will take steps to have these cases postponed until after the termination of the Assizes at Carrick on Shannon?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: I have communicated with the Land Commissioners in this matter, and have received the following reply:—
"The various sittings of the Court of Appeal of the Land Commission up to the middle of August next have been fixed and advertised since December 13 last. The sitting at Enniskillen was settled long before it was, or could be, known when the Leitrim Assizes would be held. Applications have been constantly made to the Commissioners to postpone their sittings at particular places or times on account of the sitting at the same times of other Courts; but the Commissioners have found that to yield to these applications, considering the number of
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other Courts, both of Quarter Sessions and Assizes, would involve such a total derangement of their business as would render the arrangement beforehand of sitting for appeals in any part of the country almost impossible. The Commissioners, however, are always disposed to yield to applications for postponement in particular cases where parties have public duties to perform elsewhere, and they will do so at Enniskillen whenever it may appear to be just; but to yield to the proposal now made would involve the abandonment of the sitting at Enniskillen, to the great inconvenience of a large number of the suitors."

EGYPT—THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN— THE FORCE AT SUAKIN.
MR. SCLATER-BOOTHasked the Secretary of State for War, What answer was received from Lord Wolseley to his telegram, No. 17 (Egypt, No. 2, 1885), dated February 9th 1885, 8 p.m.—
"Force proposed for Suakin.…about 9,000 all ranks. I apprehend difficulty in providing transport for so large a force. Give your opinion as between this and smaller force.…Indian brigade and cavalry demanded in your No. 55 is ordered."
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Lord Wolseley's reply entered into some details which I do not think it is desirable to publish; but it was to the effect that he did not think the proposed force too large, and that the larger the force the more likely were the tribes to help us with camels.

EGYPT—THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN— LORD WOLSELEY'S DESPATCH OF FEBRUARY
MR. BRODRICKasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the Despatch of the 5th February from Lord Wolseley to Sir E. Thompson, in which he says he "awaits decision of Government to give further orders," is in answer to a Despatch from the Secretary of State for War; and, whether he would have any objection to giving the Despatch to which it is an answer?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: The telegram from Lord Wolseley to which the hon. Member refers was in reply to a telegram from the War Office. So long as our troops were at Gubat and Abu Klea, military considerations rendered it inexpedient to give that despatch, or the first part of Lord Wolseley's reply. Those considerations have now ceased, and I have no objection to give

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the message which was sent from the War Office, and a further portion of Lord Wolseley's reply. The message sent from the War Office was whether Lord Wolseley's communications between Gubat and Korti were quite secure against any advance of the Mahdi? On the same day Lord Wolseley replied—
"The dangerous part of our communications is between Abu Klea and Gubat, distance 25 miles. I have ordered all wounded to be removed as soon as possible from Abu Klea and Gubat. I only await decision of Government to give further orders."
It would be inexpedient even at present to state the remainder of the message.

ARMY (AUXILIARY FORCES)—VOLUNTEER ADJUTANTS.
COLONEL SEELYasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, while so many officers are employed in Egypt, it would be desirable to relax the provisions of the Royal Warrant of the 28th July 1881, so as to allow Adjutants of Volunteer Corps to retain their posts for a time after they reach the ago of 55 years, when they are quite capable of performing their duties, and so avoid the necessity of removing officers of the Line from their regiments?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Only six Adjutants of Volunteers will be affected by the 55 years' Rule before the close of 1886. It is not considered necessary to mate any change in the Royal Warrant.

SOUTH AFRICA—DAMARALAND.
SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true that a Royal Commissioner has annexed Damaraland; and, whether Mr. Palgrave, the so-called Royal Commissioner, is in the service of the Cape or of the British Government?
MR. EVELYN ASHLEY: No, Sir; a Royal Commissioner has not annexed Damaraland, and Mr. Palgrave is only Resident Magistrate at Walfisch Bay, and is only in the service of the Cape Government. But as it is important there should be no misunderstanding, I will state shortly what has passed relative to Mr. Palgrave's presence at Walfisch Bay and neighbourhood. In November last we heard through the newspapers that he had been sent to
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Damaraland. We telegraphed at once to the High Commissioner to ascertain what were Mr. Palgrave's instructions. The Premier of the Cape was then away in Bechuanaland; but we received from the High Commissioner on December 18 a despatch inclosing a communication from the Cape Ministers, in which Mr. Palgrave's duties at Walfisch Bay were described, and in which the following important sentence appeared:—
"Palgrave has no authority to deal with Native territories beyond Border."
On January 14 the Secretary of State, in a despatch to the Cape, wrote as follows:—
"Seeing that there has been no Resident with the Chief Kamaherero since the end of 1880, the appointment of one now would have the appearance of an attempt to thwart the development of the German Protectorate which Her Majesty's Government has recently recognized, and such a measure, therefore, could not be ratified or defended by Her Majesty's Government; and, in these circumstances, I have no doubt your Ministers will perceive that even the presence of Mr. Palgrave in Native Damaraland would at the present moment be undesirable. I informed you, in a former despatch, that it would not be in accordance with international courtesy to annex the territory immediately adjacent to the existing German limit; and the same observation applies, although in a less degree, to placing a Resident with a Chief whose country Germany may legitimately desire to acquire if the Chief assents."
Mr. Palgrave had started on November 8; and if there is any truth in the present newspaper reports, I can only suppose that his instructions have not reached him. We adhere to what was said in the despatch above quoted, and have telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson to urge his Ministers to instruct Mr. Palgrave to act in accordance therewith, if they have not already done so.

POST OFFICE—ACCELERATION OF MAILS TO SCOTLAND.
MR. CRAIG-SELLARasked the Postmaster General, If he would state whether the arrangements for accelerating the mails to Scotland have been completed; and, if so, whether he would state generally what that arrangement is?
MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: I am glad to be able to say that I have been able to conclude the negotiations which have been going on for some time past with the London and North-Western and

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Caledonian Railways for the acceleration of the Scotch Mails, and for several other improvements. This will be secured partly by a special train to Perth every evening starting at 8.30, from which passengers will be excluded, and by means of additional trains both for mails and passengers. As an illustration, I may say that the mails will arrive at Aberdeen 40 minutes earlier than at present, and be despatched from thence more than two hours later; and nearly all the towns in Scotland will also benefit. The benefit will not be confined to Scotland, as it will admit of letters for Lancashire and North Wales being posted in London much later than at present. Substantially, there will be six mail trains from London to the North in lieu of two, as at present. I have every confidence that all the complicated arrangements rendered necessary by this can be completed about the end of June next, and will come into effect on the 1st of July. As many hon. Members will be interested in this matter, I will lay on the Table of the House a Paper giving the full details of the arrangements.
MR. BARRANasked the Postmaster General, Whether he has succeeded in making arrangements to facilitate the transmission of mails between the Continent and Yorkshire, in accordance with the request of the important deputation which waited on him a short time since, representing all the manufacturing towns of the county?
MR. SHAW LEFEVEEpromised to reply to the Question on Monday.
MR. SEXTON: I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman, Whether, when he replies on Monday to the Question of the hon. Member, he will undertake also to reply to a Memorial signed by a number of Members of Parliament with regard to the acceleration of the mail service between Dublin and the West of Ireland?
MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: The question of the acceleration of the mails to the West of Ireland is under consideration. I am sorry to say that the terms made by the Midland Railway Company are very high.
MR. HARRINGTON: Might I ask the right hon. Gentleman, Whether he is taking into consideration a Memorial from the inhabitants of Tralee and other portions of Kerry, seeing that he has in
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this case two Railway Companies to choose between?
MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: Perhaps the hon. Member will ask the Question on Monday.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—THE CONSTITUTION.
SIR JOHN LUBBOCKasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he proposed to act on the recommendations of the Committee appointed to consider the present constitution of the Education Department?
MR. GLADSTONE, in reply, said, he must refer the hon. Member to an answer he gave on the 6th of November to a Question put by the noble Viscount the Member for Barnstaple (Viscount Lymington), in which he explained that the solution of this question was connected with the arrangements to be made under the Secretary for Scotland Bill. He hoped to be able to make some announcement on the question before the Education Vote was taken.

VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES TO IRELAND.
MR. SEXTONasked the First Lord of the Treasury, If the Government will announce, before the visit of the Prince of Wales to Ireland, whether they intend to allow the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act to lapse, or mean to apply to Parliament to renew it; and, whether the occasion of the Royal visit will be signalised by the proclamation of an amnesty to political prisoners, and by the appointment of a Royal Commission to publicly inquire into the system of Dublin Castle rule, and especially into the cases of persons now enduring imprisonment or penal servitude as the result of judicial proceedings and Executive decisions impeached by Representatives of the Irish people in this House?
MR. GLADSTONE: With regard to the first part of the Question, I must reply that I have nothing to add to the answers which I have already given with respect to the Prevention of Crime Bill to Gentlemen who have put them from the other side, though not from the same quarter of the House. The visit of the Prince of Wales to Ireland is fixed upon; but I am not aware that the absolute date is fixed, or the plans determined upon in all particulars. With regard to the latter part of the

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Question, I hope the hon. Member will not think me disrespectful when I say that it is a matter of great importance and delicacy, and that it would be quite impossible to enter upon such matters in reply to a Question in the House.
MR. SEXTON: Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to ask him whether, supposing that he is next week responsible for the direction of public affairs, he will allow us the privilege of assisting him to make up his mind upon the policy of continuing the Prevention of Crime Act by giving a day for the discussion of the Motion for the appointment of a Select Committee standing in the name of the junior Member for Cork (Mr. Deasy)?
MR. GLADSTONE: Before answering that Question I had, perhaps, better wait and see whether I continue to be responsible for the direction of public affairs.

THE IRISH BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS—LETTER OF THE BISHOP OF RAPHOE.
MR. HEALYasked the President of the Local Government Board, If his attention has been directed to the letter of the Lord Bishop of Raphoe on the divisions of county Donegal by the Boundary Commissioners; if he is aware that His Lordship accuses the Commissioners of "lending themselves to a piece of sharp practice," and with having adopted the scheme put forward by the Conservative agents, "considerably improved in the Conservative interest," that he describes this as a "public scandal;" and, whether, as His Lordship declares the boundaries of Donegal "have been thrown into a state of discreditable confusion," the Government, in view of the position and influence of the Most Rev. Dr. Logue, will refer his letter to the Commissioners, and give them an opportunity of publicly justifying their conduct?
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: My answer to the first part of the Question is in the affirmative. With regard to the third Question, I cannot ask the Commissioners to hold any fresh inquiry into the subject. Her Majesty's Government have adopted, and intend to support, the decisions of the Boundary Commissioners in all cases.
MR. HEALY: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the important part of my Question either in the affirma-
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tive or in the negative. Will the Government give the Boundary Commissioners an opportunity of justifying their conduct, as this is a matter surely in which they were entitled to some consideration?
SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he intended to answer that part of the Question distinctly in the negative.
MR. HEALY: I beg to give Notice that on the Motion to go into Committee on the Parliamentary Elections (Redistribution) Bill I will move, as an Amendment, that the single seat system has been specially adopted as a swindle on the people.
MR. SPEAKER: The Notice just given by the hon. Member will not appear upon the Paper in that form. The expression is irregular, and ought not to have been used.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTONasked, Whether Mr. Patrick Gallaher, of Strabane, a prominent local Nationalist, spoke of the scheme put forward by the Nationalist as follows:—
"The question was, what was best for the Party—the national ticket. They did not care a twopenny ticket physical or geographical considerations provided they could jerrymander the country [laughter]. They could carry all the constituencies, supposing the divisions were left as they were; but they wanted to pulverise them [laughter]."
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: In answer to the noble Lord's somewhat argumentative Question, I wish to state that I would be prepared to discuss this matter in Committee. I am thoroughly aware of the facts of this case, and I had the advantage of going into it this morning with my right hon. Friend the Postmaster General (Mr. Shaw Lefevre), who takes a great interest in this Bill. The noble Lord may not be aware that the Commissioners did not reject all the schemes put forward by the Boundary Commissioners. They adopted the scheme put forward by the Bishop of Raphoe for the Southern portion of the country.
MR. HEALYremarked that the gentleman quoted by the noble Lord did not live in Donegal at all.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: I beg your pardon; he does.
MR. HEALY: Strabane is in Tyrone.

EGYPT—THE SOUDAN—MINISTERIAL POLICY.
MR. M'COANasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, after having

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"broken the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum," it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to wholly evacuate the Soudan, or to occupy any, and what, portions of it until "an orderly Government" has been established; and, if evacuation be intended, what, after that has been achieved, will be done with the Suakin and Berber Railway?
MR. GLADSTONE: The first part of the Question really opens up the subject-matter of the important debate on which we are now engaged. I do not think it would be wise for me, having already had an opportunity of expressing my views, to attempt, within the limits of an answer to a Question, to enter into the subject, the more especially as other Members of the Government will have an opportunity of taking part in the debate. With regard to the latter part of the Question, it refers to an important but comparatively narrow point. Upon that point I will only refer the hon. Member to what was said last night by my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board, as, in my judgment, a fair, adequate, and recent statement of the views of the Government.
SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, on the 23rd of April 1884, Mr. Wilfrid Blunt addressed to him a letter, in which there occurred the following passage:—
"Since then I have most opportunely received information which leads me to feel certain that, if properly approached, not only could there he obtained terms from the besiegers of Khartoum, which should include General Gordon's safe return from Khartoum, with such of his companions as might choose to accompany him, hut that a general pacification of the Upper Nile might, at the same time, and by the same means, be effected;"
whether, this letter having been submitted to the Cabinet, an answer was returned to Mr. Blunt on the 30th of April, in the following terms:—
"Mr. Gladstone desires me to thank you for your offer to act as mediator in the Soudan, of which, however, Her Majesty's Government are not able to make use, inasmuch as it must already be known throughout that region that they, in common with the Government of Egypt, have no other desire than to promote the evacuation of the country, and the restoration of its liberties;"
whether, on Christmas Eve 1884, Mr. Blunt, together with the President of the International Peace and Arbitration
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Association, and an Egyptian gentleman in full possession of the Mahdi's views, called on him, but were refused admittance; and, further, if he can state the reasons for which Her Majesty's Government, knowing Mr. Blunt's intimate experience of the Arab tribes, peremptorily dismissed his proposals, without first examining the proofs and details of the allegations he had made that it was possible, by peaceable means, to deliver General Gordon and his companions from the hands of the Mahdi and his adherents?
MR. GLADSTONE: I will answer this Question as well as I can, in view of the shortness of Notice that has been given by the hon. Gentleman. I have no doubt that the citations contained in it are correct. As far as I am able to recollect the circumstances of Mr. Blunt's proposed visit on Christmas Eve, a rather unusual method of proceeding was adopted. Instead of conforming to the conditions on which alone Public Business can be carried on by a man in my Office, and writing to make arrangements for an interview, Mr. Blunt telegraphed to me from Chester that he and others were coming to see me upon a subject involving grave difficulty. I thought it was my duty, whatever regret I might feel at the inconvenience those gentlemen had suffered in coming to Chester, to decline to receive this body of gentlemen in my private home, where I would, in a sense, be completely at their mercy with regard to an interview so irregularly arranged. I cannot undertake to state all the reasons which led me to decline the interview. The request, the House will observe, turns upon the citation from the letter of Mr. Blunt. Mr. Blunt, in his letter, said he had received information which led him to feel certain that, if properly approached, certain terms could be obtained from the besiegers of Khartoum. Well, Sir, I consider that the evident meaning of that letter was that the British Government were to go, cap in hand, to the besiegers of Khartoum, with the object of obtaining certain terms from them if they could. I do not think that that would have been a proper attitude for us to adopt. In my letter in answer to Mr. Blunt I stated that it was well known to the tribes that General Gordon had gone to the Soudan with a pacific object, and that

1615
those who spoke of the Mahdi's pacific intentions ought obviously to he in a position to give something of a positive substantive character to that statement, and that it was idle to ask the Government to go beyond General Gordon's declarations and assume an attitude of something like supplication. I have not the smallest doubt that Mr. Blunt is a man of most perfect honour, and would not wilfully commit an inaccuracy; but I must remind the House that last year an hour was spent in discussing a disputed account of an interview between Mr. Blunt and my Private Secretary, Mr. Hamilton. I think that, in such circumstances, persons should be very careful as to the certainty of the ground on which they stand; and that if the Government does enter into communication with anyone at all they should do so with very great care. That is all I have to say upon the subject.

GENERAL GORDON'S CYPHER.
MR. FINCH-HATTONasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether it is a fact that the cypher agreed upon between General Lord Wolseley and General Gordon was that despatches from Khartoum should be read as indicative of the reverse of their apparent meaning—e.g. that "Khartoum all right, can hold out for years," should mean "Khartoum in danger, can hold out only a very short while;" and, if so, when information to that effect first reached Her Majesty's Government?
MR. GLADSTONE: There is no foundation whatever for the statement.

EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)— KASSALA.
MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether his attention has been called to the perilous position of the great town of Kassala, which contains 20,000 inhabitants; and, whether Her Majesty's Government are taking steps to prevent the brave defenders of Kassala from sharing the fate of those of Sinkat, Berber, and Khartoum?
LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE(who replied) said: Yes, Sir; if the hon. Member will refer to the Papers before the House he will see that Kassala is specifically mentioned in Lord Wolse-ley's instructions. Colonel Chermside is
1616
authorized to make, so far as the means at his disposal allow, arrangements with the local tribes to endeavour to send aid in money and provisions to Kassala; but that town is outside the range of the present projected British military operations. The reported victory over the rebels near Kassala was confirmed by Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin on the 25th. The enemy's loss was estimated at 3,600.

AFRICA (THE RED SEA COAST)— MASSOWAH.
LORD CLAUD HAMILTONasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, before the despatch of the Italian Expedition to Massowah, any communication on the subject was made to Her Majesty's Government by the Government of Italy; if so, whether any and what reply was made by Her Majesty's Government to the Italian Government; and, whether any communication or Correspondence has taken place on the subject between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of any other European Power or Powers?
MR. GLADSTONE: I do not think there is much to add to what has been already stated on this subject. It was announced last night in this House, and by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs "elsewhere," that communications had taken place between the Italian Government and Her Majesty's Government on the subject to which the noble Lord refers. That is quite understood, and I made an answer to the same effect myself. There have also been communications from the Porte and other Powers to Her Majesty's Government on the same subject. The substance of these communications has been given; but a further statement will be made this evening more conveniently than I can make it now, by my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Papers will also be presented to Parliament.

EGYPT (AFFAIRS OF THE SOUDAN)— GOVERNORSHIP—PRINCE HASSAN.
MR. A. J. BALFOURasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether any hopes have been held out by Her Majesty's Government to Prince Hassan of obtaining the Office of Governor General of Khartoum?
MR. GLADSTONE, in reply, said, that he thought it had been clearly understood—and there was no doubt Prince Hassan understood—that Her Majesty's Government were not in any way committed to any course beyond what was known.

ARMY—ROYAL ARTILLERY AND ENGINEER OFFICERS—THE NEW HALFPAY RULE.
COLONEL NOLANasked the Secretary of State for War, If, during the present emergency, he would suspend the new rule which places on half pay Majors of the Royal Artillery and Engineers after seven years' service in that rank; and, if such a suspension of this rule would not save the Exchequer an appreciable sum of money?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: There is provision in the Royal Warrant for the temporary retention of officers under special circumstances, if their services are required; and, moreover, retired officers are available for employment up to specified ages in case of emergency. Under these circumstances, I do not see any necessity for suspending Rules which have been made in the interests of promotion of junior officers. I may add that no major of Royal Artillery now commanding a battery on active service is likely to be affected by the seven years' Rule; and that this Rule cannot apply at all in the Royal Engineers for nearly two years.

ARMY (AUXILIARY FORCES)—THE VOLUNTEERS AND GARRISON DUTY.
BARON HENRY DE WORMSasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he will lay upon the Table of the House a return of the various Volunteer Corps who have offered their services for garrison and other duties in the present emergency?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: We highly appreciate the spirit of patriotism which has prompted many corps to offer their services for garrison and other duties; but to publish such a Return as is called for by the hon. Member would establish an inconvenient precedent, and would be somewhat unfair upon other corps which have not thought it to be their duty to make such offers, but which are, I am confident no less willing to respond to any call upon them.

ARMY (THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN)— PROMOTION OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS.
COLONEL NOLANasked the Secretary of State for War, How many Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers who were engaged in the Tel-el-Kebir Campaign have received Commissions, other than those of Quartermaster or Riding Master; and, if, in the case of the vacant Commissions created by the deaths of Officers in action during the present Campaign, he will award a large proportion of these to the Non-Commissioned Officers engaged?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Of the Non-Commissioned Officers who served in the Egyptian Campaign of 1882, three have been promoted to lieutenancies, and two were offered the same promotion, but declined it. The utmost possible consideration will be given to the cases of any Non-Commissioned Officers who, during the present Campaign, may be brought to notice by their Commanding Officers.

EGYPT (THE NILE EXPEDITION)— DAMAGE OF WAR STORES.
DR. CAMERONasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether his attention has been called to the following extract from a letter of the special correspondent of The Morning Post, dated Gakdul, January 13th:—
"The groceries for this force have been taken entirely from the Nile boat stores, that is to say, from the whalers, and it has been discovered, with dismay, on opening these stores here, that from one-half to two-thirds of the tea and a large proportion of the rice and sugar have been hopelessly damaged by damp, and are unfit for use. These provisions were what is called 'trade packed,' that is, packed by the different firms who supplied them, and there should be no difficulty in discovering with whom the blame for this severe loss lies, and the sufferers may justly hope in exacting retribution. There is reason to fear that not the best exertions of the Commissariat Department, which has worked so well and succeeded so completely, will avail to avert from the hard worked force on the line between Korti and Metammeh a want of tea and other groceries, which in such a climate must be a severe suffering. The cause of the damage to the stores lies evidently in a neglect to solder the cases in which the stores wore packed;"
whether any information has been received as to the stores in question; if so, what was the amount of groceries received at Gakdul from the whalers, and

1619
how much of them were damaged; and, what official bought the stores in question; through whom were they bought; was any inspection made to see that they were properly packed; and, if so, who inspected and passed them?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Information up to the end of January has been received about the whaler supplies generally; but there is no precise information as to the quantities of groceries sent to Gakdul. The whole of the whaler groceries were packed in the Government establishments, none being in trade cases. The whaler supplies were originally intended for consumption in the boats after leaving Wady Haifa. The packages were made somewhat lighter than the ordinary field cases, in order to economize the carrying power of the boats; and two articles out of the five composing grooery rations—namely, salt and sugar—were for the same reason packed in bags instead of cases. The packages were settled by a Special Committee on Nile Boat Service. These supplies were, by local order, not consumed between Wady Haifa and Korti; but were kept in reserve for subsequent Nile or Desert routes. Bulk was broken 27 times between Alexandria and Korti, besides special portages, and the packages were thus exposed to extraordinarily severe usage beyond what was contemplated as incidental to their original purpose. The loss, on examination at Korti, is estimated at about 25 per cent on this particular portion of the supplies. The loss of sugar and salt was due to the submersion of bags in water, and to theft by Native boatmen and camel drivers. The loss on tea and pepper is supposed to have been due to the tops of the tins being secured by shellac instead of solder. Shellac has been used with perfect success in all climates since 1878, and the immediate causes of its failure on this Expedition are not yet ascertained. All tins are now soldered. The supplies were purchased by the Army and Navy Directors of Contracts, through brokers or contractors, and inspected at the Government establishments, a medical officer of special experience having been attached to Woolwich to assist in this duty. In the Report of the senior Commissariat officer, forwarded by the Chief of the Staff, it is stated that—
"There is no doubt that in the important respects of strength, size, and weight the
1620
packages sent out on this occasion are an immense advance in the direction of improvement on anything that has fallen to the lot of previous Campaigns."
As regards quality, the Report adds that while it is too soon to speak about the whaler rations, which were only beginning to be consumed, all were agreed that the quality of every article, without exception, was excellent, and better than had ever been supplied before. Considerable losses were inevitable in such a Campaign; and, in spite of those reported in a portion of the supplies, great credit seems due to the officers and others at the Government establishments at Woolwich and Deptford, who carried out this service under extraordinary pressure.

EGYPT—THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN— THE SUAKIN-BERBER RAILWAY.
BARON HENRY DE WORMSasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he will place in the Library of the House of Commons, so as to be open to the inspection of Members, the surveys and sections on which the calculations as to the cost of the Railway from Suakin to Berber, and the period within which it is to be completed, have been founded?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: The Suakin-Berber route has never been surveyed for the purposes of railway construction, and no estimate can be framed beyond the cost per mile of the permanent way, material, and plant. No definite date for the completion of the railway to Berber has yet been arrived at. It will depend on military contingencies, which cannot be foreseen.
BARON HENRY DE WORMS: How long will it take to survey the line?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: The line cannot be surveyed as long as the enemy is in possession of it.

INDIA—THE MEETING BETWEEN THE VICEROY AND THE AMEER OF AFGHANISTAN.
MR. ONSLOWasked the Prime Minister, Whether there was any truth in the report that the Ameer of Afghanistan was to meet the Viceroy of India; and, if so, whether the right hon. Gentleman would not, under present circumstances, impress on the Viceroy the necessity of holding the meeting as soon as possible?
MR. GLADSTONE, in reply, said, he was not at present in full possession

1621
of particulars; but there was no doubt that an interview had been arranged between the Viceroy of India and the Ameer of Afghanistan, and that the interview would take place at an early date. If the hon. Gentleman would give Notice of another Question upon the subject, he would be able to give further particulars.

ARMY—ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT— EXPLOSION AT SHOEBURYNESS.
LORD EUSTACE CECILasked the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, Whether he could give the House any further information as to the nature and cause of the terrible accident at Shoeburyness yesterday afternoon?
MR. BRAND: It is impossible for me to express adequately in words the sorrow which I feel, and the sorrow which must be universally felt, on account of the loss of valuable lives by the terrible catastrophe which occurred yesterday at Shoeburyness. Departmental experiments were being made by Colonel Lyon with the delay-action percussion fuses. At about 3.30 P.M. they were fixing a fuse in a 6-inch breech-loading live shell, when it exploded, the result being that several of those around were killed or wounded. Colonel Fox-Strang-ways has since died; Colonel Lyon, Superintendent, Royal Laboratory, has also succumbed; Captain Gould-Adams is also dead; Major Bally, E.A., Instructor in Gunnery, is severely wounded; Sergeant-Major Day kin has since died; Gunner Allen was killed; Gunners Underwood, Webb, and M'Annalla were severely wounded. Mr. Lowe, assistant manager of the Royal Laboratories, and also an employé (Mr. Rance), were wounded. The catastrophe is being inquired into by a Court at Shoeburyness, and a Report will be submitted as soon as it has been received. Since I have been in the House a note has been put into my hands, to the effect that the wounded officers and men are doing well.
COLONEL NOLANasked, whether the families of the officers and men killed yesterday at Shoeburyness would be treated in the same manner as if these officers and men had been killed in action?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: The families of the warrant' officers and men would be treated in the same way
1622
as if the men had been killed in action The families of officers killed in the execution of their duty otherwise than in action receive the intermediate scale of pension as laid down in the Royal Warrant.

EGYPT (MILITARY OPERATIONS)—THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN—SIR REDVERS BULLER'S FORCE.
SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he had received information from Lord Wolseley that Sir Redvers Buller's Force had arrived in safety at Gakdul?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Lord Wolseley telegraphs that the following message was received last night from General Wood:—
"Gakdul, Feb. 25.
"Buller has sent in Khasm El Mûs, and will be here to-morrow with his whole force. He has three wounded officers and 16 other ranks, and 15 sick; 34 invalids in all. Wounded, including Captain Walsh, doing as well as possible.
"Major Poë, Lieutenant Crutchley, and all wounded here are also doing well."

PARLIAMENT—ORDER OF BUSINESS— THE AMENDMENTS ON THE VOTE OF CENSURE.
MR. BRYCE: Mr. Speaker, I wish to ask you whether, in the event of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) being put and rejected, it would be open to myself and to my hon. Friend the Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) to move the Amendments which new stand upon the Paper in our names?
MR. SPEAKER: In reply to the hon. Gentleman I have to say that if the result of the Vote to-night—which is "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question"—be in the negative, then the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) would become the substantive Question. In the event of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member being rejected there would still remain the word "That," to which, in accordance with the practice, it would, of course, be competent to move that any addition should be made. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to move that any addition should be made he can take that course.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: May I inquire what course the Prime Mi-

1623
nister proposes to take with respect to the various Amendments?
MR. GLADSTONE: I presume that the Amendments will be moved in the order in which they stand upon the Paper; and it is my intention to vote in the negative in each instance upon the various Amendments as they are put in succession. The first division, as I understand, will be upon the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote), then upon the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), and in succession upon the other proposals.

MOTION.

  ORDERS OF THE DAY—BUSINESS FOR MONDAY.—RESOLUTION.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: May I ask what will be the Business on Monday?
  MR. GLADSTONE: We shall, of course, have to put that down to-night. We shall put down first the Queen's Message, and also a communication with respect to the Indian troops, and after that the Parliamentary Elections (Redistribution) Bill. I have now to move—
  "That the Order for resuming the Adjourned Debate on Egypt and the Soudan have precedence of other Orders of the Day."
  MR. DEASYsaid, that he wished to protest against the course which had been adopted by the Prime Minister in bringing the Motion for a second time before the House. He (Mr. Deasy) had, owing to his having been successful in the ballot, a question of the greatest importance down upon the Notice Paper for the evening. It was—
  "That a Select Committee he appointed to inquire into the administration of the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act."
  He and the other Irish Members of Parliament felt very strongly upon this matter that they had been unjustly treated. He had gained first place in the ballot, and was, therefore, entitled to bring forward the Motion which stood in his name; and, therefore, seeing that all the laws of the House were upon his side and that of the other Irish Members, he felt that they had abundant reason to complain of the manner in which they had been treated by the
  1624
  Government. By the Standing Orders Supply was directed to be put down as the first Order of the Day on Fridays; and he was the more anxious to bring forward his Motion, because as yet he had been unable to learn whether the Government intended to renew the Prevention of Crime Act or not. It was the gravity of the case which had induced him to put the Motion down for the first available evening, and his object was to obtain, if possible, from the Government an explanation of their intentions in regard to the renewal of the Act. He need scarcely say that had the Government given them the slightest intimation upon that day week of their intention to bring forward this Resolution, they would have chosen another day for the discussion of his most important Resolution. He did not intend at all to discuss the question of the administration of the Prevention of Crime Act in Ireland; for he was aware that such a course would be a breach of the Rules of the House. He would, however, ask the Prime Minister to afford them some facilities for the discussion of the subject. It seemed to him, however, that the Government did not wish any Irish question to be discussed in the House during the present Parliament; for if the Prime Minister would only carry a little further the course which he had adopted that week, it would be absolutely impossible for them to get any Irish question adequately considered before 12 o'clock, except upon the Estimates. It would be impossible, even after 12 o'clock, to bring these questions forward if the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General would pursue the course which he had adopted on the last day. Now, he would ask the Prime Minister whether it was his intention to give any opportunity for free debate to Irish questions? If it was the intention of the right hon. Gentleman to disfranchise Ireland altogether, it would be as well for the Irish Members to remain at home, and not put themselves to the trouble and inconvenience of coming over to England at all. He did not propose to occupy the attention of the House any longer; he only intended, as had his hon. Friend, to make a strong protest against the Notice of Motion given by the right hon. Gentleman, because the Irish Members were aware that no

  1625
  prolonged discussion on their part upon this occasion would bring them anything nearer the discussion of the subject which they desired to bring before the House upon the administration of the Prevention of Crime Act in Ireland. He would, therefore, content himself with protesting against the Motion, and appealing to the Prime Minister to give them some assurance that he intended to give the Irish Members some fair play.
  MR. PARNELL: I think that the request my hon. Friend (Mr. Deasy) has made is a very reasonable one, and should not be overlooked by the Government. I am sure that the Irish Members should not be denied by the present Government the opportunity, which they ask, of discussing the doings of the Irish Executive during the Recess in administering the very exceptional system of law which now prevails in Ireland. The question which I will put to the House and the Prime Minister is, whether private Members—and especially Irish Members—are to be deprived of the ordinary facilities which the Rules of the House give them for the purpose of discussing the grievances of their country as has been done to-night? If the matter is dealt with in this manner, this cause of disagreement will crop up in some irregular way; and the result will be that, instead of time being saved, it will be wasted. I should prefer to appeal to the right hon. Gentleman and to the House from another point of view. This is not the first time this Session that the Government have taken away the time which ought to be at the disposal of private Members; and it is feared that the Irish Members may have to face this Session with a probability of being completely shut out from all opportunity of discussing the acts of the Executive in Ireland. I would ask, is it fair to ask us to consent to that? It appears to me that it would come to that in the end, if we are to be deprived, by such a Motion as that now proposed, from the advantage which the chances of the ballot may have given us; and it would necessarily follow that Irish questions will be raised, either upon Motions for Adjournment, or on the consideration of the various items in the Estimates; so that, in addition to the doubtful position in which the House puts itself by refusing the
  1626
  immemorial privilege of discussing grievances on going into Supply, it will be found that no time has been gained in the long run. Taking it for granted that it is right to devote all the time at the disposal of the House, from day to day, to the prosecution of such Motions as that of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, and taking it also for granted that it is just the Government should have all the time at the disposal of the House after that Motion, for the prosecution of one of the stages of the Parliamentary Elections (Redistribution) Bill, I would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman and the House that after the Parliamentary Elections (Redistribution) Bill has passed through the Committee stage, in the necessary interval which must elapse before the Report stage, we might devote a night to such a discussion as that which the Irish Members desire to have—a discussion upon the acts of the Irish Executive. All legitimate objects for discussion are entitled to be brought before Parliament, and no more legitimate a one could be brought before it. You have an unprecedented system of law in Ireland at the present moment—a Coercion Act of the most extreme stringency—and it is most desirable that the House, for the sake of its reputation, should not lose its hold over the doings of the Irish Executive. On every ground, therefore, I submit that we are entitled to receive some of the Government time at the conclusion of the present pressure of Business, for the purpose of putting our views before the House.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I am not in a condition, at the present moment, to make any concession to the hon. Member (Mr. Deasy). I must, however, admit that the hon. Member has stated his case with moderation, and I think he is justified in taking up the position which he has taken up this evening, and in saying that he and his Friends should not be compelled to pass the Session over without being able to discuss the conduct of the Irish Executive in the administration of the Prevention of Crime Act. In making that admission, I cannot now go further in carrying out what would be desirable in the matter; but I have no doubt that he and his hon. Friends will exert themselves as regards the chances which they may

  1627
  have when we reach a certain stage of the Parliamentary Elections (Redistribution) Bill. Undoubtedly, I shall not forget the position in which they have been placed; but it is now out of my power to give them the facility which they seek. Should it ultimately become so, however, I shall be glad to do so.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Ordered, That the Order for resuming the Adjourned Debate on Egypt and the Soudan have precedence of other Orders of the Day.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

  EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN—VOTE OF CENSURE.—RESOLUTION.
  [ADJOURNED DEBATE.] [FOURTH NIGHT.]
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [23rd February],
  "That an humble Address be presented to the Queen, humbly representing to Her Majesty that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, has involved a great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure without any beneficial result, and has rendered it imperatively necessary in the interests of the British Empire and of the Egyptian people that Her Majesty's Government should distinctly recognise, and take decided measures to fulfil, the special responsibility now incumbent on them to assure a good and stable Government to Egypt and to those portions of the Soudan which are necessary to its security."—(Sir Stafford Northcote.)
  And which Amendment was,
  To leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House, while refraining from expressing an opinion on the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, regrets the decision of Her Majesty's Government to employ the forces of the Grown for the overthrow of the power of the Mahdi,"—(Mr. John Morley,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  Debate resumed.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, with the exception of a few halting, and somewhat unworthy, arguments from the Treasury Bench, there has been, so far as I know, in the whole course of this debate, no real attempt on the part of any one speaker to con-
  1628
  trovert the charge which has been made against the Government with respect to the capture of Khartoum and the loss of General Gordon. I take that charge to be this—that by declining to utilize the victories of General Graham for the relief of General Gordon the Government rendered necessary both the Expedition of Lord Wolseley and all that it may yet involve, and that General Gordon has perished and Khartoum been lost simply because the Government would not make up their minds to act in time. A more solemn pledge was never made by any Minister to any Parliament or country than the pledge given by the right hon. Gentleman opposite to this House in May last. He told us then that Parliament and the nation had covenanted to do all that might be necessary to rescue General Gordon. Sir, that covenant has not been kept. The responsibility for not keeping it must rest on the Government; and I think that the nation, while recognizing with admiration the great qualities of their hero, and mourning for his loss, will visit the conduct of the Government in this matter with that indelible disgrace, which the noble Lord the Secretary of State for War told this House in May would rest on the Government if they should neglect any means at the disposal of this country for the rescue of General Gordon. Can it be contended that there has been no such neglect? Why, what happened during those three months which passed between the debate in May and the date when the preparations for Lord Wolseley's Expedition were commenced? The Government knew that General Gordon was cut off from communication with the outer world; they did not know his actual position; and yet they spent more than three months, according to the statement of the Prime Minister, in examining the routes by which aid might be sent to him, and this statement is made although the right hon. Gentleman has told us that in August military operations had not been decided upon as necessary. How can this be reconciled with the words of the President of the Local Government Board, who said last night that by the 15th of July orders had been given to despatch certain steamers up the Cataracts of the Nile in readiness for the relief of General Gordon. The fact is, that the Govern-

  1629
  ment deliberately chose to run the chance of his being able to maintain himself for an indefinite time at Khartoum, or to escape without any assistance from them. They delayed the commencement of their Expedition until a date when it was absolutely certain that the state of the Nile towards the end of the year must inevitably delay the accomplishment of its object. And the result has been that they have been again too late. The only serious argument which has been brought forward by the Government in defence of their conduct in this matter is that it is probable that the fate of General Gordon was due to treachery, and that treachery would in any case have occurred on the near approach of British Forces. If that argument were carried out logically, it might be maintained that no British Force ought to have been sent at all. But is it not manifest that time was of the essence of the question? Can it be seriously argued that the risk from treachery would not increase with the length of a protracted and dangerous siege, marked by a growing scarcity of provisions, and by almost daily losses in engagements with the enemy? Would not also the risk increase in consequence of the repeated declarations of the Government that the country would be evacuated as soon as Gordon should have been rescued? I cannot conceive a state of affairs more calculated to encourage the inhabitants of Khartoum to commit those acts of treachery which Gordon himself anticipated, and against which we warned the Government. I do not think that anyone can believe that the death of Gordon was due to inevitable calamity, or to an unexpected visitation of Providence. I think it is clearly due to the apathy and procrastination of the Government, from whom a heavy penalty will be exacted by the country before long. What are you now going to do? To over throw the Mahdi at Khartoum, and to make a permanent railway from Suakin to Berber. Let me say a few words on the proposal to overthrow the Mahdi at Khartoum. Gordon told the Government, at a very early period of his mission, that it was essential that they should smash the Mahdi, and he added words which now seem prophetic—"Remember that when Khartoum once belongs to the Mahdi, the task
  1630
  will be far more difficult, yet you will, for the safety of Egypt, execute it." necessary to hold it. What was their reply? They rebuked him, saying that military operations against the Mahdi were beyond the scope of his commission, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan; and yet the Prime Minister comes down to this House and says that the policy of the Government has undergone no change. It has undergone a very serious change. I do not say that the change is not warranted by the change of circumstances; but I want to know what they intend that this Expedition shall do? The question has been asked over and over again, and the Government have failed to answer it—I believe for the simple reason that they do not know themselves what the Expedition is to do; they cannot make up their minds as to their future policy in the Soudan. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary told us last night that it was unreasonable and improper to ask questions of this kind, and the President of the Local Government Board told us that they were speculative questions, and that the Government ought not to be asked to pledge themselves to details. But no one asked them to do that. What the House is entitled to have an answer to is this—when they have overthrown the Mahdi, what are the principles which are to govern their policy in the Soudan? Speaking early after the catastrophe at Khartoum, the hon. Member for Bath (Sir Arthur Hayter) expressed the opinion that this Expedition was sent out to rescue or to avenge General Gordon. But the Home Secretary has utterly repudiated any idea of vengeance, and very properly. The right hon. Gentleman stated that the Government had no intention of occupying or annexing any portion of the Soudan for Egypt, or for England, and that the Expedition was sent solely for the purpose of evacuation. Why is it necessary for this purpose? The right hon. Gentleman says because it is the only means by which the evacuation of the Soudan can be accomplished consistently with the safety of Egypt. The Prime Minister, in addressing the House upon this subject, also stated his view of the intimate connection between this matter and the safety of Egypt when he said—

  1631
  "Our concern in the Soudan is dependent upon our concern and obligations for the safety and defence of Egypt."
  But at the very same time that the Home Secretary was defending this Expedition as necessary for the safety of Egypt, he took the opportunity of again proclaiming that over-mastering desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government to get out of Egypt as soon as possible with little regard to the future which has characterized their Egyptian policy from the very commencement, and which, I will venture to say, has been at the root of half our difficulties in Egypt. It is this which has made the best Decrees of the Khedive absolutely valueless, because no one could be certain that there would be any continued policy in their execution, and has compelled the Prime Minister himself, when he was attempting to inform the House the other day of what he was pleased to call the beneficial results of our occupation of Egypt, to give such a pitiful catalogue as he then presented to us. I should like to ask the attention of the House to this matter for a few minutes, because it seems to me to be an essential part of the Egyptian policy of Her Majesty's Government, and one with which the country ought to be acquainted. I should like to ask whether there really have been any beneficial results from the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt; and whether any of the abuses which exist in that country have been remedied? We were told by the Prime Minister that Her Majesty's Government had introduced representative government in Egypt. When that statement was made, it was received with the ridicule it deserved, for everybody knows that all the representative government that exists in Egypt is practically no more than a paper Constitution. I remember that last year a great deal was made by Her Majesty's Government of that important reform which had been effected in Egypt for the benefit of the Native population by making foreign residents liable to the house tax. If hon. Members have looked at the Papers recently presented, they will see that the execution of that Decree of the Khedive has been, I believe, indefinitely postponed. Then the Prime Minister brought forward the suppression of the kourbash. No doubt
  1632
  the use of the kourbash has been materially diminished; but it still exists to some extent in Egypt, as the Report of Sir Evelyn Baring shows. What, however, has been the result of its diminution? Sir Evelyn Baring says—
  "The change has greatly enhanced the difficulty of governing Egypt, the prisons being so comfortable as compared with the homes of the prisoners that imprisonment is little feared, and no other punishment having been substituted."
  Lord Northbrook says—
  "These changes have weakened the power of the local officers, and have thus contributed to the increase of crime."
  Then we heard a great deal last year of the New Code of Criminal Procedure, and of the wonderful effects it was to bring about. But what does Sir Evelyn Baring say with regard to it? He says that it is not well adapted to the circumstances of the country, or to the customs and manners of the people, and that some important modifications will have to be made in it. I really think that if hon. Members opposite would read that important despatch from Lord North-brook which appears in the Papers from which I am quoting, they would see how shadowy and flimsy are the claims of Her Majesty's Government to have brought about any beneficial results by their occupation of Egypt. According to Lord Northbrook, the indebtedness of the cultivators of the land still largely prevails in Lower Egypt, while land, in Upper Egypt is still over-assessed to taxation. He admits that the system of the corvée, sometimes enforced by the kourbash, still continues. There is a general impression that the official classes are still corrupt. Prisoners are still kept in confinement for a length of time without being brought to trial, and no great confidence is placed by most of the best authorities in the fighting qualities of the Egyptian Army. There is a very important sentence in Lord Northbrook's despatch upon this question of the Army. He says that it is his decided opinion that it would be neither safe nor wise to fix any definite time for the entire withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt. What a contrast is that to the light-hearted proposal for the evacuation of Egypt made by the Home Secretary last night, and to the extraordinary clause contained in the Anglo-French Agreement entered into last year, by which Her Majesty's

  1633
  Government fixed a definite time for the withdrawal of our troops. I would like also to know how the policy announced by the Home Secretary last night is consistent with another opinion expressed by Lord Northbrook in the despatch from which I have already quoted? Lord Northbrook looks for a prompt settlement of the finances of Egypt through the instrumentality of England, so that the difficulties in which the former country is now placed may cease, and the salutary influence of the English Government may be sustained. We do not know what were Lord Northbrook's recommendations in reference to that financial settlement, because his Report has never yet been presented to Parliament, and I dare say it never will be presented; but I should like to know how far they tally with that Financial Agreement which we understand is no won the point of being made by Her Majesty's Government with the other European Powers. I should like to know whether that Agreement contains any security for maintaining that salutary influence of England in Egypt to which Lord Northbrook attaches such immense importance? Or is that Agreement even worse than that uncertainty for the future which has paralyzed the action in Egypt of the friends of reform, while it has encouraged the efforts of its enemies? Is it true that that Agreement contains the idea of a Multiple Control, which is calculated absolutely to neutralize English influence in Egypt, and to work untold mischief in the country? The President of the Local Government Board last night made a very suspicious reference to that. He said that he hoped the control of Egypt over its own government would not be lessened by any steps which we were taking in this matter at the present time. But the Egyptian Government rests, as everybody knows, upon English influence. I suppose that nobody who has devoted a minute's thought to this question would consider that it is possible for this country to take any action in Egypt without having due regard to the rights and interests in that country of all the other European Powers and to the obligations of Treaties. But the Government certainly cannot deny that we have special interests in Egypt, and that we have made sacrifices to maintain those interests, and that by those sacrifices, and by our duty in the
  1634
  matter both to ourselves and to Egypt, we are bound to maintain a special influence in the future in the government of Egypt. What I fear is that in the Financial Agreement which I understand Her Majesty's Government have made there will be in place of that special influence of England an admission and perpetuation of that system of international interference in Egyptian affairs which has already been for so many years past such a curse to that unfortunate country, and which is absolutely incompatible with the influence which England does at this moment exercise over the government of Egypt. Let it not be said that an International Guarantee of an Egyptian loan does not mean international interference with the government of that country. Even the Turkish Government read us a lesson, in replying to the invitation to the late Conference in London, on the indissoluble connection between finance and administration; and it is perfectly obvious, both from what has passed on the subject and from what has been said with regard to it, that this is its intention and object. Such a Guarantee certainly forms a real liability to the Guarantors, because, by your own contention at the Conference of London, the Egyptian Revenues cannot bear the burden which will be imposed upon them, and the first Guarantor which has to meet its Guarantee will not only have the right, but will be forced, for the sake of its own subjects, to inquire into the administration of Egypt. That will mean a system of international supervision, which will certainly not sustain the influence of England, and may even end in a European war. I am quite aware that some hon. Members in this House do not think it necessary to interfere in Egypt for the sake of British interests; but I think I might appeal even to them as to whether we do not owe a duty to the people of that unfortunate country? We have suppressed the independence of their Government; we have, through what occurred at Alexandria, imposed upon them a vast liability; we have deserted—or allowed to perish, at any rate—their Armies and their garrisons. Now, can we in honour leave this country, after all that has passed, to be a field for the conflict of opposing nationalities, whose mandates, I suppose, whether we approved of them or not,

  1635
  whether they were or were not oppressive to the people of Egypt, would have to be practically executed by British soldiers? Sir, that appears to me to be a position in which this country ought not to be placed; and I cannot understand how it can be consistent with the immense liabilities which Her Majesty's Government are now about to undertake in the Soudan. Is it possible that Her Majesty's Government are going to incur all this vast expenditure of blood and treasure, and then to evacuate the Soudan, for no other purpose than to maintain the safety of a country whose interests they are doing their best to ruin by depriving themselves of all real power to protect them? I do not see how anyone can suppose that it is possible for Egypt to run alone. I wish I could think that it was possible for our real interest in Egypt is that it should be inhabited by a peaceful, friendly, and, as far as possible, self-governing people. I do not think that this country would desire to burden itself with the government, or even the protection, of Egypt unless such a step were absolutely necessary. The question is, Is it absolutely necessary? And that is a question which Her Majesty's Government decline to face, and which I do not think Members below the Gangway have really considered. If Her Majesty's Government really suppose that the action they have undertaken in the Soudan can be followed by the evacuation suggested by the Home Secretary, it appears to me as complete an illusion as that which the Prime Minister entertained last year regarding the intentions of the Mahdi. I do not think it is possible for Her Majesty's Government to adopt a policy of massacre and retire with safety to the interests of this country or Egypt. I am quite aware that this Expedition must be sent; but the people of this country will not support the policy of the Government if there is an intention that all which may be won by the bravery of our soldiers, and by the money of our taxpayers, shall be thrown away by the timidity and vacillation of the Government. I do not see how Her Majesty's Government can carry out in practice the policy of evacuating the Soudan. The Homo Secretary seemed to think that after the Mahdi was overthrown it would be possible to set up the
  1636
  local Chiefs in the various towns and villages as independent Governments. That was not the view of the President of the Local Government Board, who suggests that the difficulty is susceptible of an easier solution. He would protect a few of our more important friends, like the Mudir of Dongola, by taking them to Upper Egypt; but if Her Majesty's Government adopt that policy they will have to carry them a great deal further than Upper Egypt. Such suggestions are like that made by the Prime Minister with regard to the Chiefs in Bechuanaland, when he proposed that the Chiefs should be located elsewhere, and the people left to their persecutors. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster appeared to have some idea that it would be possible to utilize the Mahdi by negotiations for the pacification of the Soudan. And yet he does not, like the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), consider the Mahdi a highly respectable Mahommedan gentleman, who might attend a Soudanese banquet given by the National Liberal Club, and expound the indestructible principles of the Liberal Party to the great satisfaction of his audience. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster knows that the Mahdi is a fanatical Leader, who has proclaimed his intention to conquer Egypt, overthrow Turkey, and convert the world. How can he suppose that such a man would now be likely to accept the proposal to give up Khartoum and to retire to Kordofan, which was made to him by General Gordon at the outset of his mission, and which met with insulting rejection? But perhaps negotiation with the Mahdi is to take place after his overthrow. And does the Government really mean to repeat the experiment of the restoration of Cetewayo in Zululand? Do they think that a fanatical Prophet, who has been discredited by defeat, would have any authority over his followers? What is much more likely to happen after his overthrow is that he will retire where neither Her Majesty's Government, nor any other Government, would care to follow him. What happened in the case of Osman Digna? You defeated him, and when you retired he followed upon your footsteps. The idea of negotiation is based upon the idea of the Mahdi which was in the mind of the Prime Minister

  1637
  when he held him up to the House as the Chief of men fighting for their freedom. I think it will now be admitted that if we gave up the Soudan to the Mahdi, either anarchy or a slave trading despotism would be the future of the country; and I do not think the people of England will agree to that. With regard to the railway from Suakin to Berber, that work is to be of a permanent character. It may take a couple of years to make. The surveys have not yet been made, and it cannot be begun till Osman Digna's forces are disposed of. When once this railway is made it cannot be abandoned to be destroyed by the wild tribes, or used by their Rulers for the conveyance of slaves. It has been asked what is the policy embodied in my right hon. Friend's Motion? It is not possible for an Opposition, who are not in pos session of all the facts of the case, to expound with perfect accuracy of detail any proposals they might have to make on such a matter as this; but I think what I have said will show the House what, in our opinion, are the essential elements of this question. You cannot, when you have marched through this country, and made this railway, abandon the tribes who have assisted you and the railway you have made, and retire into Egypt again. You must retain the control of the Nile Valley, as far south as Khartoum; and you must see that there is established at Khartoum a Government, subject to your influence, in close connection with the Government of Egypt, ruling with a due regard to the habits and customs of the people, promoting trade with the interior of Africa by the channel of the Nile, and using its power at the most vulnerable point for the extinction of the Slave Trade. That appears to me a policy which is at least definite, and if followed would not impose on this country any such terrible burden as appears to be supposed. The Home Secretary spoke of 30,000 troops being required to protect the railway—
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: He quoted the opinion of the hon. Member, for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin).
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I thought that the right hon. Gentleman adopted it, and I cannot understand how a railway which is to be made
  1638
  under the protection of 6,000 or 7,000 men could require 30,000 to guard it when completed. The Prime Minister told us in more menacing language that the policy to which I have referred was in the teeth of common prudence, in the teeth of the forces of Nature, and that it would be like trying to chain the sands of the Desert when the tempest is howling over it. I do not think the country need be frightened by these terrible words. I remember when, last May, I said that it was necessary that the advance of the Mahdi should be stemmed, and that the longer the Government hesitated the more difficult would be the task, the Prime Minister told me that I was calling upon the Government to adopt schemes as wild, as impracticable, as ruinous in their consequences and unsound in their principle as any he had ever known propounded. My proposal, said the right hon. Gentleman, meant "the re-conquest of the Soudan," and a "war of conquest against a people rightly struggling to be free," which he was determined not to undertake. Yet, in spite of that language, the Prime Minister has undertaken it; and so I feel sure that the policy which has been suggested from this side of the House with reference to the future of the Soudan will be undertaken by a Government of this country, though it may not be the Government of the right hon. Gentleman. I do not believe that England will allow her lives and her treasure to be spent for nothing. Every fresh expenditure of this kind, such as the Government have now made up their minds to incur, ought to be, and must be, a fresh nail in the coffin of that wretched system of dual government in Egypt which deceives nobody but Her Majesty's Ministers, and the only use of which has been to thwart necessary reforms and impose unnecessary burdens upon an impoverished people. Well, then, Sir, I must say that I think the time has come when this country is bound to recognize that Egypt cannot stand alone. If we were to go out of Egypt to-morrow, as hon. Members below the Gangway desire, some other Power would take our place. They know that very well, and, knowing that, they propose such a Resolution as has been submitted to this House by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley). While we

  1639
  are in Egypt we are bound to do our duty to the people; and we cannot do our duty to the people without admitting and fulfilling those responsibilities which, though Her Majesty's Government will never remember it, are inseparable from the possession of power. I do not know whether I shall be charged by hon. Members opposite with propounding a policy which may lead to war; but I think they have seen in the past that what leads to war is vacillation, indecision, and procrastination, such as have characterized the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I do not know whether I shall be told that I am anxious to extend the responsibilities of this country. No, Sir; those responsibilities exist already. They certainly will be extended if they are not fulfilled. I do not think that I or my right hon. Friend shall be charged with desiring by this Motion merely to embarrass Her Majesty's Government. In the present position of affairs both at home and abroad—a position recognized as being most grave even by the hon. Member for Newcastle—such a course would be unpatriotic and unworthy. This Motion has been proposed because we desire to impress upon the House and the country the policy which we believe is the only wise and safe policy to pursue, and because we are convinced, both by their conduct in the past, and by their reticence in the present, that it will not be carried out by a Government whose only idea seems to be to reconcile differences of opinion between the fragments of their own Party. Sir, we are conscious of the responsibilities that attach to the action which we have taken. No one need be anxious, no one need desire, I am sure, to undertake the government of this country with such a heritage as will be left by the right hon. Gentleman; but, Sir, if we are required to do it, we shall to the utmost of our power endeavour to fulfil the undertaking.
  MR. COURTNEYsaid, that in the few remarks with which he should venture to trouble the House he proposed, as far as possible, to confine himself to the practical question what should be done now, and to examine the decision which Her Majesty's Government had taken under circumstances which afforded the country ground for a new departure. He would, therefore, refrain from following the right hon. Baronet
  1640
  in an examination of the interesting question how far Egypt could be internationalized, or how far its autonomy could be established. The question they had really to consider had reference to the necessity of the Expedition, and of the policy which had been resolved upon by the Government. He would endeavour to show that there was no necessity for that policy being adopted; and he would adduce what were the necessary consequences of the Expedition if the fatal first step was taken. His right hon. Friend at the head of the Government had observed that in what had hitherto happened there had been no choice at any moment as to what should be done; and Lord Derby used almost the same language, subject, however, to this considerable admission—that apparently, in his Lordship's opinion, the first step of all was not necessary. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was now disposed to think that our first intervention in Egypt was a mistake. But, whatever our opinion might be as to the past, we were now at a point where a new issue was presented to us, and where a new departure might be taken. He challenged the necessity of the policy which was about to be adopted, and which was said to depend on the circumstances immediately presented to us. What was this policy which he questioned? It was the policy of overthrowing the Mahdi at Khartoum. The first authority to whom we should refer, if we wished to inquire into the necessity of that resolution, would surely be Lord Wolseley himself. Had his authority been adduced to show that it was necessary? Did Lord Wolseley support Her Majesty's Government in declaring that that must be an inevitable consequence of the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon? To everybody who had heard the speeches of the Prime Minister and the President of the Local Government Board, it must be evident that Lord Wolseley insisted upon no such decision, and that he asked the Government to decide the political issue, declaring that he himself was willing to adopt the consequences which would be involved in whatever decision the Government might arrive at. Lord Wolseley was as ready to retire as to advance, and he represented the one course to be as easy as the other. There was, in fact, no military necessity requiring the

  1641
  decision which had been arrived at by Her Majesty's Government. They were entitled to ask—"How can we connect this decision to overthrow the Mahdi at Khartoum with the consequences which were going to flow after it?" If this decision were adopted, what did it entail? What was the further policy of Her Majesty's Government, for they must have some further policy? Here we had a most remarkable variety of declarations on the part of the Government. His right hon. Friend had said that the policy of the Government now was what it always had been—namely, the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt and its restoration to freedom; but afterwards he had said that he did not mention evacuation by England in that declaration; and the Home Secretary said last night that nothing could induce him to take any step which would lead to the annexation of any part of the Soudan, either by Egypt or by England. In the Home Secretary's opinion, the complete retirement of the English power and influence from the Soudan was to be the complement to the determination to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. We had, indeed, a different speech afterwards from the President of the Local Government Board, who appeared to have addressed himself to one section of the House, while the Home Secretary addressed himself to another. There had been a still more remarkable declaration made "elsewhere." The First Lord of the Admiralty, in a very able and elaborate speech, said that certain persons who had supported us—for example, the Mudir of Dongola—might be utilized hereafter at Khartoum—that was to say, that a person who was an Egyptian Turk, a representative of Egyptian influence, who was at present our ally, might remain in authority at Khartoum. How did that statement agree with the Home Secretary's speech last night? How did it agree with the statement of the Prime Minister? But, putting aside these questions, what did the First Lord of the Admiralty next say? The noble Lord, speaking of the action of the Government and its policy in respect to the Soudan, used these remarkable words—"As far as the Government are concerned, our policy is a clear one." That in itself was a very remarkable phrase. Let hon. Members remember the declaration
  1642
  of the Home Secretary, and observe the clearness—
  "We should hold our own," said Lord Northbrook, "in that country, and conduct its affairs for the benefit and advantage of the people, and in the best manner we could arrange with the people."
  Then our "clear policy" was to "hold our own" in this country, with which the Home Secretary said we would have nothing to do. First, we were to overthrow the Mahdi at Khartoum. Then, according to one, we were to "hold our own;" according to the other, to have nothing to do with the country. Then came the question of this extra ordinary railway from Suakin to Berber. On Thursday in last week the Prime Minister had said—
  "Among the necessary consequences of adopting the policy of overthrowing the Mahdi at Khartoum are, first, engaging in certain military operations along the Suakin-Berber route, and, secondly, making the Suakin-Berber railway."
  These were two distinct things. But in speaking on Monday, his right hon. Friend, having in view the possible adoption of the hon. Member for Newcastle's Amendment, said that whatever decision they had come to on the issue presented to them—whether to advance or retire—operations would be necessary on the Suakin-Berber route. Some Members thought the right hon. Gentleman was repeating then his declaration about the making of the railway, which he had stated to be a necessary consequence, whatever course was adopted. They remarked that the surveys had not been made on the route—that the railway could not be made in less than 12 months, probably not in less than two years. But, in point of fact, on Monday the right hon. Gentleman said nothing at all about the railway. His observations then were entirely directed to the necessity of opening operations along that route, supposing the Government were in favour of retreat. No doubt, some operations might, in that case, be necessary. Just as in the Mid Lothian contests, bogus contests were got up to divert the country from Mid Lothian, so, if Lord Wolseley were to retire, it would be necessary to have operations to amuse Osman Digna. Thus the necessity of the railway insisted upon last week was not insisted on this week. He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman still thought

  1643
  the railway important. It was simply tntended to facilitate the overthrow of the Mahdi at Khartoum, and was only to be justified, if at all, for that purpose. What was the policy of the Government in connection with that overthrow? How was the right hon. Gentleman's silence at one time to be reconciled with his speech at another? There was a good deal of mystery about it; but, after all, it was an open secret. The explanation was that when the terrible news of Gordon's death reached us, and the Cabinet met, they were under the influence of the idea that no Government could be maintained that did not determine to overthrow the Mahdi; and they arrived at that conclusion, and nothing more, and upon that, and nothing more, they were at present agreed. The Home Secretary, challenged last night about the policy of the Government, retorted by asking what Prince Bismarck would have said if he had been asked a similar question on the outbreak of the Franco-German War. But there was no analogy between the two cases, because Germany was repelling the attack of the foreigner, whereas we should be the aggressive party in the Soudan. Even if there wore such a parallel, he could not reconcile the language of the Home Secretary with his reply to the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) that the Prime Minister should not be changed to please Foreign Powers. But surely the dignity of that House required that the conduct of Ministers of the Crown towards Members of the House should not be guided by the conduct of Prince Bismarck towards Members of the Reichstag, and that a Minister should not stand in the face of the House and claim for himself, with respect to Members of Parliament, the liberty and licence that Prince Bismarck arrogated to the Reichstag. Surely it struck at the root of Parliamentary Government if, at a crisis of this kind, when a Resolution of a decisive character was being discussed, the Executive Government could not be asked what was their policy. Where, in that case, was the power of Parliament and the responsibility of the Government? The Government, at present, were not proposing defensive operations. This was an aggressive and forward movement, and not required by any military necessity, and it was undertaken for political reasons. Lord Wolse-
  1644
  ley, on receiving the terrible news, applied to the Government to ask on what policy he was to shape his measures—the policy of advance, or that of concentration. That in itself was sufficient evidence that the policy of the Government was not founded upon considerations of military necessity. Lord Wolsoley was ready, so far as he could understand, to accomplish the determination of the Government, whichever way it should tend. The President of the Local Government Board had fully admitted that Lord Wolseley expressed his ability to retire, taking concentration as his first step to retirement. But his right hon. Friend tried to justify the resolution of the Government by declaring that Lord Wolseley was too sanguine. Thus, instead of following the advice of their Commander in the field, that advice was disparaged by the suggestion that Lord Wolseley was too sanguine. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had said that the resolution of the Government was a military resolution. No doubt, it was; but it was not founded on military requirements. If a man determined to go on horseback, that was an equestrian determination; but it might be for purposes of business, pleasure, or health. To call this a military determination was to confuse the issue. It was a completely voluntary movement for a political object. He went back to the point from which he started. Here, at all events, it was possible to break the chain; there was a point of discontinuity. What the Government had determined on did not necessarily follow upon the past. We were entering upon a new path, full of danger and of important consequences for the future, and we could not justify this course except upon the political grounds of the supposed necessity of meeting the Mahdi. This was undoubtedly the case, having regard to the original instructions or to any instructions that were given to General Gordon. As it was supposed by some that he had elsewhere done General Gordon an injustice, he desired to say that his position was based wholly on the attitude of the Government. He was endeavouring to show what was the action to be taken now, having regard to their instructions in the past. No doubt, the instructions in the past did involve a duty now. General Gordon was instructed to do

  1645
  many things and permitted to do others. The permission terminated with his death, and we were not involved in any duty to do what he was permitted to do. But it might be necessary for us to carry out what he was instructed to do. The Government were making a new departure of a positive and aggressive kind. His speech, quoted by the Home Secretary on the previous evening, had been very much misunderstood by that right hon. Gentleman, and also Thy the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who wished to suggest that he (Mr. Courtney) wanted to retire post haste upon Cairo. What he said, perhaps, was not of very much importance. [Mr. WARTON: Hear, hear!] He agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman; but it was important the issue should not be misunderstood. Both he and the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) had been misunderstood by Members of the Government. When he and his hon. Friend spoke of retirement, they conceded that the mode of retirement must be determined by the Military Leader on the spot. We had to concentrate our troops and retire step by step, having regard to the necessity of keeping our face to the enemy if he advanced upon us. But retirement itself involved no suggestion of haste, and admitted the repelling of attack if we were pursued. It had been suggested that he and his hon. Friend did not assume that an attack was to be repelled, and that was not their position. All they wanted was that we should abstain from further aggressive movement, and that we should withdraw, as military considerations would allow us, from our forward position in the Soudan. Of course, it was not easy to do it; nobody thought that it was; but we had a choice of difficulties before us. Was it easy to go forward? As we retired we should have to remember our obligations to those who had assisted us, among whom was the Mudir of Dongola. But there was no such great danger to the mass of the people as had been suggested. Experience had shown that the fearful consequences that it was said would follow our retirement were, to a large extent, dangers that existed only in imagination. We had to compare the various and enormous evils that would accompany our advance with those which would attend our retreat.
  1646
  The right hon. Baronet the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) had said in his eloquent speech, with some exaggeration, that we were up to our ankles in blood; but because we were in the morass, ankle-deep in mud—[An hon. MEMBER: Blood!]—he preferred to say mud, because they were in that state—was that a reason why they should go and get up to their haunches? Yet the arguments used amounted to this—that, as we could not escaped unstained, we must be more deeply immersed. It was supposed by some that all the Moslem world was in unity with the Mahdi, and at one with the progress of the Mahdi; but were they certain that, if we retired, he would follow with an ever-increasing force? The apprehensions as to rousing the Moslem world against us were not shared by those who knew Egypt and India best. He had just received from a friend in India a paper written before the news of the death of General Gordon could have reached India, in which he recommended a settlement with the Mahdi as the only means of getting out of our difficulties; but the writer had no alarm whatever about the power of the Mahdi, nor had the people of Egypt. The Sultan was, as far as he could be, an enemy of the Mahdi. The Mahdi would have as much difficulty in following us as we should have in following him. He would find the country denuded of supplies by us, and he would have the greatest difficulty in crossing the desert. His power was great where he was; but it did not extend very far, and his power would be diminished as he followed us. At all events, let us try and see if it would not be so. What was the necessity for our advancing? There was no military necessity. The burden of proof was entirely upon the Government. They had adduced nothing to sustain a positive step, and every argument was against it. Yet a positive step might be fatal. If the railway was made from Suakin to Berber, our settlement in the Soudan was certain; and he hoped it was not yet too late to prevent it being made. But if that railway were made we were permanently lodged in the Soudan. It might be disconnected from Egypt, and Suakin might become the port of the Soudan; but we should be lodged in that country permanently. By making the railway

  1647
  we should cut off a great part of the Soudan from the Nile route. It was said we must destroy the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum; but suppose he did not stop there for us, should we follow him into the desert, thereby increasing his strength as we weakened our own? The moment we retired he would turn upon us. We must destroy him for our own security. Suppose our success was complete, what were we then to do? The Government appeared to have no plan; and the plan to which they would drift was that of setting up certain authorities in the Soudan. That was the plan of General Gordon. He hoped to set up the descendants of certain Sultans displaced by Mehemet Ali. That would be rather difficult, as would he manifest to those who understood the Mahommedan Law of Succession. When you had got these descendants, what kind of people were they likely to be? General Gordon picked up one and tried to keep him, but found him so drunken and dissolute that he sent him back at the end of the first stage of his journey. That was a specimen of the success likely to attend us. Moreover, there was one place for which there was not a dispossessed Sultan, and that was Khartoum. Here Gordon proposed that the non-existent Sultan should be represented by Zebehr. The Sultan at Khartoum would be the most powerful, and would swallow up all the rest. Was not this an exact reproduction, as the right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) had said, of what was attempted in Zululand—strange to say, by the same man who was now in the Soudan? Sir Garnet Wolseley set up his 13 Kinglets in Zululand, and now it was possible that he might set up some 13 Sultanets in the Soudan, John Dunn being represented by Zebehr. We swore that we would not interfere in Zululand, and that we would let it alone; we did not desire to annex a single bit of territory there; we said we would have nothing to do with the disputes there, and that the Natives should fight it out and come to some solution which the course of events would prove to be the ultimate one. But we have had to go there. A part of the territory had been reserved, and another part might possibly be annexed, and the whole scheme of settlement had proved to be an abso-
  1648
  lute dream. If we attempted to set up 13 Sultanets in the Soudan, precisely the same difficulty would arise. We should have to assist them on starting; there would probably be a British Resident who might have a guard; and if we established a railway we should have to watch it that it should not be used for the Slave Trade; and the whole fabric dreamed of now, as the consequence of overthrowing the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum, would turn out to be as baseless and insubstantial as any vision of the air. Was history written in vain? Our conquest of India showed the same thing We advanced, we overthrew the Native power, and we attempted to set up some puppet in its place, who could not stand because he had no inherent power of his own, and bit by bit we were drawn in to assert our authority. Tins was the inevitable consequence of the action which the Home Secretary approved, and it was vain for him to refuse to recognize the consequence, and threaten that he would never have anything to do with the annexation of any part of the Soudan either for Egypt or for England. It was the inevitable consequence of the first step which the Government were now taking, and he asked them to think before they made that step irrevocable. They had, fortunately, some hot months before them, which he hoped would be productive of thought. If the Government adopted the step they now proposed to take, we should have an African Empire to add to the responsibilities of our Indian Empire. Our power in this way would be drained, and our men and money exhausted, for what General Gordon had said had always been and would always be a worthless possession. It was in view of these momentous consequences that the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) had put his Motion on the Paper. His hon. Friend had told the Government that they had got to decide what they would do under the new circumstances, and the Government had decided that the thing to be done was to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. At that step his hon. Friend arrested the attention of the House, and called upon hon. Members to declare against that step of the Government. That was the issue. If hon. Members were not prepared to under-

  1649
  take all the consequences of the first step, they should not allow that step to be taken. If they allowed the first step to be taken, they must not flatter themselves that they could possibly avoid a further step. His hon. Friend, in his expression of regret that the Government had decided to employ the Forces of the Crown for the overthrow of the Mahdi at Khartoum, had nothing to say as to the past, because he had recognized the fact that they were at the opening of a new scene. A new epoch was about to be commenced, and new responsibilities were about to be incurred; and whatever hon. Members might have said and thought in the past, let them determine at this point that they would not sanction the new step. The hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) expressed nearly the same view. In his Amendment his words were—
  "That this House, while ready to support Her Majesty's Government in any steps which may he necessary to protect the dominions of Egypt from attack by the Mahdi, would regret the extension of offensive military operations beyond the limits which may be adopted as the permanent frontier of Egypt."
  That was a protest against any new offensive military operations beyond the Egyptian frontier and against the position of the Government, and it was identical in effect with the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle, opposing the policy of overthrowing the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. The Amendment of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) proposed—
  "That, in the opinion of this House, further military operations in the Soudan ought to be confined to the purposes of protecting the frontiers of Egypt, providing for the fulfilment of engagements already entered into, and securing the speedy and honourable withdrawal of British forces from the interior of the Soudan."
  The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) made a speech last night, he believed, in perfect agreement with the policy of the hon. Member for Newcastle and the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London, and in opposition to the forward movement; but the hon. Member preferred his own words. He would point out that the words of the hon. Member, however much he might dislike the forward movement, could be adopted by those who supported the forward movement. The
  1650
  hon. Gentleman did not secure his own idea; he wanted to prevent the forward movement, and yet he used words which the Government might adopt as justifying that movement. If it was necessary to protest against the forward movement, let them do it openly, and in no words which the Government might adopt as justifying their own plan. This was not a time to indulge in ambiguous words that might mean anything. They had before them in that House two combinations of Gentlemen. They had a Ministry who recommended the forward movement to Khartoum, involving the necessary consequences to which he had referred; and, on the other hand, they had right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite who were advocating those consequences by themselves. The right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) directly advocated the setting up of an orderly Government, supported by English power, at Khartoum, which was the necessary consequence of the step which Her Majesty's Government had resolved to take. The Home Secretary last night showed that if hon. Gentlemen opposite came into Office they would not be able to carry out their present policy. In fact, the two sides of the House were very much in the position of the two sons mentioned in the Scriptures, who were instructed by their father to go and work in the vineyard. One said, "I go," but went not; the other said, "I will not go," but afterwards went. His right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, and others were very much opposed to increasing our responsibility in the Soudan. But they could not prevent that increase if they took the first step. Hereafter it would be said of them, "They went, although they stated that they would not go." Having taken this first step of overthrowing the Mahdi at Khartoum, it was perfectly idle to talk of shrinking from their responsibility. It was self-deceit of the grossest character to do so, whether in the case of India, Zululand, or Egypt. It was the greatest self-deceit to try if they could avoid the consequences of their own acts. But the other side might say they would go, and yet they would not go. They would find considerable difficulty in carrying out their policy. He believed the right hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) shrank as much as anyone

  1651
  from increasing the responsibilities of the Empire, and in that he would find supporters among those behind him. But there was another point. If by a combination of persons Gentlemen opposite came into power, they would find themselves in a minority, and the majority of that House would be of an entirely different opinion then from what they were now, and public opinion would be entirely different. He asked hon. Members who read the newspapers and met Party managers, what answer they got when they inquired as to what was thought about this Egyptian matter? Was it not—"We wish we had never got into it. Nothing but our respect for the Prime Minister induces us to tolerate it." But if the opposite Party were in power that feeling would be intensified, and would be directed against them with far greater force. If the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) thought of accomplishing his object by bringing those Gentlemen into power he would find himself very much mistaken. On the other hand, let the present Ministry be retained in power, and there was great danger of that being done. The Home Secretary last night, from a feeling of delicacy which they all understood, did not refer to the fact that if he was out of power we should have his massive eloquence used against increasing the responsibilities of the Empire. No longer fettered by the ties of Office, his power would be directed, without reserve and without stint, against the policy of the Conservative Party. But a still more powerful voice on the same side—a voice which was foremost in condemnation of such enterprizes in the past, but which now pleaded in a faltering manner—might be heard denouncing the extension of responsibilities to which now he was a party. Awakening, as it were, from a frightful nightmare, his voice would be raised; and the attempts of the Party opposite to carry out the policy which they had now declared would be foiled by the opposition they would encounter. His right hon. Friend said just now, interjectionally, that if this contention was right, he and his Friends ought to alter the votes they intended to give in the division. Undoubtedly that was a question which would have to be considered, and much searchings of heart must follow. If they had regard to the present issue
  1652
  alone, and to the probable developments of policy in the Soudan, their purpose would apparently be better served by the introduction of Gentlemen opposite to Office than by the present Government. That was a very important thing, which would have to be considered; but the responsibility was not confined to them. He had thought frequently of late of an incident in our Parliamentary history which seemed applicable to the present day—an incident always to be remembered, because two of the most illustrious names in the Parliamentary history of England were engaged in it. Before the repeal of the Corn Laws, when a half-persuaded Minister was hesitating as to the step he should have to take in the near future with respect to those laws, Mr. Cobden in his place, speaking words of truth and soberness, said to the then Prime Minister—"Upon you and you alone rests the responsibility for the maintenance of this iniquity." The Prime Minister misunderstood what was said; he thought he was threatened with personal consequences, and we knew a painful scene followed. He would not dwell further on the incident; he should not have alluded to it, had he not felt deeply that precisely the same language might be used on this occasion. The issue before the nation now—and no more momentous issue had ever been presented—rested upon the decision of one man. At a whisper from him, a change of tone, a single utterance, the nation would be found rising to condemn what it now sullenly acquiesced in. The increase of our responsibility which had now arisen depended on the utterance of one man. This was a fact full of solemnity. He had not himself shrunk from recognizing the responsibility which rested upon each of them, especially upon hon. Members on the Ministerial side of the House; but there was this crowning responsibility to which he would draw attention, because, if it was fully realized, it might induce a half-reluctant Minister to do what a great Minister only could—retrace his steps, and undo the mischief which, so unwittingly and for so long a time, he had supported and carried forward.
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEsaid, that the right hon. Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), following the lines indicated in

  1653
  the speech and Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman, had brought against Her Majesty's Government three principal charges. He told the House, as it had been told by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General (Sir Hardinge Giffard) under the late Government and the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), that Her Majesty's Government had abandoned Gordon, and that they were guilty, chiefly because they had done nothing to rescue him between the 14th of May, the day on which the debate was raised by the right hon. Gentleman, and the Vote of Credit proposed on the 5th of August. He also brought forward by implication these charges—that they had done nothing to establish a stable Government in Egypt, and nothing also to establish a stable Government in the Soudan, which was necessary to the safety of Egypt. He would endeavour to follow the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman said that, by not utilizing the victories of General Graham, the Government had themselves rendered necessary the Expedition of Lord Wolseley. He should have thought that past debates had shown that it was absolutely impossible to send General Graham's Army to Berber after the victories referred to. It had been stated in some quarters that General Graham had himself expressed a contrary opinion; but he did not credit the statement. General Graham's Army could not have traversed the distance between Suakin and Berber, for at that season the difficulties connected with the questions of transport and water were too great to be overcome. General Hicks, it was true, accomplished the feat; but his transport had been organized beforehand for that special purpose, and the enemy was not at the time of his Expedition in possession of the road and the wells. It had been said that the Government remained inactive between May 14 and August. But was this statement correct? He asserted that it was not. After the debate of May 14, the Government gave their most careful consideration to the subject of the routes to Khartoum. They considered the route by Massowah, the Suakin and Berber route, and the Nile route. The first was very soon dismissed as undesirable. To the Suakin and Berber
  1654
  route the Government were themselves at first favourable, and certain preparations were made in the port and harbour of Suakin, which would now be of use in the debarkation of General Graham's Expedition. But many military authorities were in favour of the Nile route, and certain events occurred which led the Government to select that route. In the first place, measures had already been taken for facilitating the despatch of a Force up the Nile to control a certain portion of it. In the second place, hostile operations were threatened in Upper Egypt, which caused a certain movement of troops along the Nile; and then came the fall of Berber, when it became clear that the Suakin-Berber route was no longer of the same value, Berber being in the hands of the enemy. Lastly, that remarkable man, the Mudir of Dongola, appeared upon the scene, gained a victory over the allies of the Mahdi, and inspired confidence among the surrounding population. All these events, taken together, caused the Government to determine to operate by the Nile route. But other steps were also taken between May and August. The Foreign Office were given to understand that there was a reasonable hope of operating through the medium of the Kabbabish tribe for the relief of Gordon, there being a blood feud between them and the Mahdi; and Major Kitchener was accordingly sent to negotiate with them, an almost unlimited supply of money being placed at his disposal. This step had been productive of advantage, inasmuch as the tribe had since greatly assisted us; and for the courage and diplomatic skill which Major Kitchener had exhibited in establishing relations with them that officer deserved very great credit. Those who accused the Government of dilatoriness should bear in mind that as early as July 18 orders were given that measures should be taken to enable steamers to pass through the First Cataract of the Nile. He did not, however, wish to base the whole of his defence upon the preparations made by the Government. Whether preparations might have been made earlier or not, the fact remained that had it not been for treachery, which no preparations could avoid, Lord Wolseley's Expedition would have been in time to rescue Gordon. Had it not

  1655
  been that in Khartoum, as in Troy of old, someone was prepared to open the gates of the city to the enemy at the critical moment, the House would not then be engaged in a bitter Party debate, but would be rejoicing over the rescue of the hero whose loss all now deplored. As for the loss of life in connection with the fall of Berber, the number of 5,000 was given as that of the Mahdi's killed; but the accounts were by no means trustworthy. The right hon. Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) entered upon the financial question, and he further attempted to anticipate the arguments which, no doubt, from both sides of the House would have to be addressed to it, whenever they were able, as he hoped they would before long be able, to lay before it those Agreements which had been come to with the Powers of Europe with regard to the finances of Egypt. He (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had never been able to see that there was more than one of four policies at the very most which they could pursue. There was the policy which was generally known as the policy of scuttle—not merely of leaving the Soudan, but of leaving Egypt at once, irrespective of the consideration of what might happen when they left. That was not a policy which had ever recommended itself to Her Majesty's Government. It was a policy which would end not merely in disaster to those persons in Egypt to whom we were honourably pledged, but would end with discredit to the reputation of this country, and also with disaster to its material interests. Then there was the policy of assuming a Protectorate of Egypt. He could hardly imagine anything more impossible, more difficult to defend in that House, than the policy of those who would go to Egypt, and who would, at the same time, put England in the position of bringing herself practically into a sort of partnership with the existing Egyptian Government, obliged at every step to consult other Powers in regard to those ties which internationally bind the Egyptian Government. Then there was the policy of those who advocated a more violent course, who said—"Take a Protectorate of Egypt, and sweep aside at one fell blow all those institutions, all those Conventions, and all those International Agreements which now exist." Such a
  1656
  course would not merely imperil the reputation of this country for good faith among the nations of the world, but it would also, in all probability, at once produce complications which might bring about a European war. If they were to adopt none of those three policies there remained but one other, that one which the Government had adopted from the commencement, and to which, he contended, they had been faithful all through, the policy of scrupulous regard for the engagements—the international engagements—which bound us on the one hand to the great nations of Europe, and on the other to the Sublime Porte—engagements which maintained on one hand the liberties and privileges of Egypt, and also recognized the rights of the Porte, which were probably the best guarantee against the interference of any Foreign State—engagements which also bound us to such countries as France and Germany, and which the Government believed, if honourably fulfilled, would in the long run produce far less difficulty than any one of those violent courses which at times had found advocates in that House and in the country. Sneers had been levelled at the Government in regard to their internal reforms; but he asked, was it fair, in circumstances of such difficulty, and considering they only exercised a general control in Egypt in regard to its administration, to turn to ridicule and depreciate everything that had been done by the Government? He admitted there was a great deal yet to be done; but much had been accomplished already. No doubt the kourbash was still used, but there was a great diminution in its use; and although the corvée still existed, no doubt it had been found possible to diminish and almost to abolish its use. If witnesses who could be depended upon were examined, it would be found that a great deal had been done by Her Majesty's Government in Egypt, in spite of the condition of the country and the fact that they had been there a little more than two years. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) and the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had appealed to him for information with regard to the interference by Italy with Turkish possessions on the Red Sea. They said—"How can you reconcile that with any respect for the international position

  1657
  of Egypt and the Sublime Porte?" There was no mystery upon that question. An attempt had been made, but it had been an entire failure, to show that between his language and that of the Prime Minister of Italy in the Parliament of that country there was confliction. What struck him as very remarkable upon that was that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) professed to give to the House an account of what had passed in Italy in regard to that subject; but he unfortunately left out the most material part of the story. The right hon. Gentleman quoted his (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's) statement in the House, and a statement made in the Italian Parliament on this subject; but he entirely failed to quote a further statement made by the Italian Prime Minister in reply to a distinct challenge upon the question. An eminent Italian Member of Parliament brought up a debate on the question, and he accused the Italian Minister of having used language at variance with his (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's); but the Italian Prime Minister said that his (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's) language had been entirely consistent with his own. The course of proceedings had been this. On the 3rd of November the Italian Ambassador inquired whether Her Majesty's Government were in any way opposed to an extension of Italian jurisdiction to the north of their settlement at Assab, so as to include Beilul, in the same way as Raheita had already been included in the south. Lord Granville assured him that Her Majesty's Government felt no jealousy of the extension of Italian influence over that part of the Bed Sea coast, but would, on the contrary, welcome it. Her Majesty's Government could not, however, undertake to give away that which did not belong to them, and Lord Granville suggested the desirability of the Italian Government coming to an arrangement with the Porte on the matter. On the 22nd of December Count Nigra inquired in what manner Her Majesty's Government would view a provisional occupation of Zulla by Italian troops. Lord Granville informed him that the Egyptian Government, being unable to continue their hold on all the African littoral of the Red Sea, the ports naturally reverted to the Sultan, whom Her Majesty's Go-
  1658
  vernment had advised to retake possession of some of them. If the Italian Government desired to occupy some of these ports, it was a matter between Italy and Turkey. Her Majesty's Government, for their own part, had no objection to raise against the Italian occupation of Zulla, Beilul, or Massowah. On the 10th of January Musurus Pasha referred to the reports current as to the intentions of the Italian Government on the Red Sea, and Lord Granville stated that it was to be regretted that Turkey had not acted on the suggestions of Her Majesty's Goverment that she should herself occupy these ports. When the Porte protested subsequently against the Italian occupations, Lord Granville expressed a strong hope that Turkey and Italy should amicably arrange the matter, but informed the Turkish Ambassador that Her Majesty's Government must disclaim any responsibility, as their advice to the Sultan to occupy the ports had not been acted upon. He might add in regard to that matter that, although there was no special alliance or understanding in regard to this subject between Italy and Her Majesty's Government, there were relations of very great amity at this moment between this country and Italy. At this moment, which was undoubtedly one of difficulty, Italy had shown that, in regard to her relations with this country, the proverb "that there was no such thing as gratitude in politics," did not hold good. Italy had shown that she recollected the assistance and the sympathies given without hope or intention of obtaining any reward, given by us from our admiration of that country and the remembrance of its great past, given to Italy at the moment of her difficulty, when she was struggling to be free, in the days when the policy of this country was directed by Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, and inspired also, in no small degree, by the present Prime Minister. In reply to a Question put by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had to say that there was no intention of departing in any way from the 1st Article of the Abyssinian Treaty, by which the inhabitants of Abyssinia were secured free access to the port of Massowah, which was, he believed, a stipulation of very great value to the commercial development of Massowah,

  1659
  and for that reason to the prospects of that country, because a very considerable trade would flow into Abyssinia from Massowah. In the course of his speech the right hon. Baronet the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) had also made an extraordinary allegation with respect to a conversation between himself and Hassan Fehmi. He said Hassan Fehmi told him that Lord Granville had said certain things. When the right hon. Baronet had that interview with the Turkish Minister, did he first tell him, as he was bound to do, speaking to a man ignorant of English customs, that he was questioning him with the intention of quoting his answers in this House? He (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) could hardly conceive anything more unfair to a foreigner and a stranger than to speak to him in a moment of confidence, obtain from him a statement, and then quote it in this House, without having given him previous warning, or submitted the statement to him. Now, what were the facts with regard to the right hon. Baronet's quotation? It was entirely incorrect. No such statement was made by Lord Granville. He had the authority of Hassan Fehmi and of Lord Granville for saying that the right hon. Baronet entirely misunderstood the eminent diplomatist whom he quoted. It would be generally agreed that a right hon. Gentleman occupying his position ought not to have made such a statement until ho had fully satisfied himself of its accuracy. Ho would now refer to the main charge against Her Majesty's Government—namely, that they had made no clear statement of their policy in the Soudan. This point had been elaborated with great detail by the two able speakers who had preceded him. When the country was passing through a period of difficulty, it was easy for an Opposition to find fault with and make cheap capital if, at every moment of its career, interrogatories were piled on interrogatories as to every passing incident of every passing hour, and as to what they intended to do under such and such unknown circumstances. There was an old proverb which said "It is a rash thing to prophesy before you know." And for the Government to come forward and state beforehand everything they intended to do in the Soudan in the course of the present year would be an act of folly
  1660
  which no Government would commit. The policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Soudan was carefully set forth in the following instructions given to Lord Wolseley, and printed in the Blue Book [Egypt, No. 35 (1884), p. 113]—
  "You will use your best endeavours to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian troops which constitute the Khartoum garrison, and of such of the civil employés of Khartoum, together with their families, as may wish to return to to Egypt. As regards the future government of the Soudan, and especially of Khartoum, Her Majesty's Government would he glad to see a Government at Khartoum which, so far as all matters connected with the internal administration of the country are concerned, would be wholly independent of Egypt. The Egyptian Government would be prepared to pay a reasonable subsidy to any Chief or number of Chiefs who would be sufficiently powerful to maintain order along the valley of the Nile from Wady Halfa to Khartoum, and who would agree to the following conditions:—(1.) To remain at peace with Egypt, and to repress any raids on Egyptian territory. (2.) To encourage trade with Egypt. (3.) To prevent and discourage by all possible means any expeditions for the sale of and capture of slaves. You are authorised to conclude any arrangements which fulfil these general conditions. The main difficulty will consist in the selection of an individual, or of a number of individuals, having sufficient authority to maintain order. You will, of course, bear in mind that any Ruler established south of Wady Haifa will have to rely solely on his own strength in order to maintain his position. I have already mentioned that under certain conditions the Egyptian Government would be prepared to pay a moderate subsidy in order to secure tranquillity and fairly good government in the Valley of the Nile. Beyond the adoption of this measure neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Egyptian Government are prepared to assume any responsibility whatsoever for the government of the Nile Valley south of Wady Halfa.
  The general policy of the Government was still to be found in those instructions. What the Prime Minister stated the other night was that the fall of Khartoum only rendered more important that which was necessary before—namely, that the power of the Mahdi should be broken, and that some stable form of government should be established at Khartoum—a government as stable as circumstances of time and place admitted. The President of the Local Government Board had stated to the House that no pledge as to "the ultimate future" of the Soudan could be given. To do so would be to give details in regard to a position which must largely be influenced by the course of the mili-

  1661
  tary campaign. If the House would consider the statements made by Ministers in the two Houses, they would find that those were four clear statements as to the policy of the Government—namely, that the Soudan was to be separated from Egypt; that it would be placed under such stable government as the circumstances of the time would permit; that a railway was to be constructed from Berber to Suakin; and that Her Majesty's Government believed that the construction of that line would insure the independence of the Soudan from Egyptian interference, and be a guarantee for the permanence of any Government which it might be found possible to establish. The Suakin-Berber railway would develop the commerce and civilization of the Soudan. It would insure a considerable supply of English goods, and induce a wholesome trade to spring up that would give shape to the Soudan economically and commercially. It was not too much to say that no port of any importance existed on the East Coast of Africa between Zanzibar and Suakin; and, therefore, it was no rash thing to say that the Suakin-Berber railway would have a very great influence. The Government were told that when it was made they would abandon the country, and, no doubt, that was their policy; but it did not in the least follow that the railway would be abandoned, or that there would not be established a stable Government in the Soudan which would maintain that railway as an aid to civilization. The case of the Government was a clear one, and there was no discrepancy between the statements of the Prime Minister at different times. To ask them to say more would be to ask what no Government in their sound senses would consent to do. He would only further add that if, before long, it should be his fate to sit on the Benches opposite, he should not follow the example of those who were now in Opposition, but would carefully abstain from coming down and asking the Government of the day to make detailed statements of the policy they would pursue while military operations were going on, and when their policy must, to a great extent, depend upon military considerations. He thanked the House for having listened to a lengthy and, he feared, somewhat dry statement, in which he had been obliged to meet the successive arguments
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  by which the Government had been assailed.
  MR. TYSSEN-AMHERST: Mr. Speaker, I think it a great honour, Sir, to be allowed to make a few remarks in a debate at such an important crisis; but, though I do not wish to detain the House long, I feel it a duty to one's country, and to those who have gone out to fight for it, and also to those who from bereavement or anxiety for the future are sorrowing at home, to speak out plainly. I may say that it is incumbent on me perhaps to do so, as my constituents know that I am well acquainted with a large portion of that country to which all our eyes are turned. I speak, therefore, as one who has been on the border of the Northern Soudan, although it is many years since I stood on that rock near the Second Cataract, so well known to African travellers, and cast a longing eye towards the South, where then all was quiet, and the English name respected from Alexandria to Gondokoro; and I often think how ashamed I should be were I brought again face to face with those Nubians and Egyptians and black Soudanese who served me so faithfully for many months. As my object in rising is only to add my voice in denunciation of the conduct of the present Government, it is needles for me to weary the House with repetitions of the quotations from the Blue Books, alas! too well impressed upon our minds; but I will say this, knowing the country, and having been acquainted during several years with its people, from the Khedive then ont he Throne to the fellah at his shadoof, that if there had been honesty of purpose and a decided policy in the acts of the Government with regard to Egypt, there need never have been a war at all. But the fact is, the war was undertaken to cover the defects of the Government with a halo of what they hoped would be cheaply purchased glory; for they felt that the country could not sit quiet after such a disgraceful peace as had been concluded in South Africa. They thought they would try their hands at what has turned out to be a very spurious Jingoism upon a foe they were certain to vanquish. That being accomplished, the Egyptian Army being scattered, and most of them having laid down their arms and retired to their villages after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, I need not waste the time of the House

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  by pointing out by what blunder after blunder the present crisis has been brought about. Nor will I give the Cabinet the excuse of ignorance, for the country knows perfectly well that the Prime Minister and most of his Colleagues cannot have erred on that account. Therefore, this fearful state of things has been created, as the country well knows, by culpable negligence, and the day of retribution has come at last. The censure, not only of this House, but of the civilized world is upon them. I am one of those, Sir, who think the terms of the Resolution are not strong enough for the occasion. It is a mere matter of detail, and I feel it is, perhaps, almost presumptous on my part to take exception to a Resolution moved by the Leader of our Party in this House, who has, so deservedly, the respect and esteem of the whole Conservative Party; but I should like to explain my reasons. In former days the political honour of the Liberal Cabinet stood so high that it was more than likely it would take a mere protest as a Vote of Censure. In former days it was understood that the Government of the day would declare its policy in plain, unmistakable terms, and stand or fall by it; but now a Liberal Government pieces together its policy haphazard from day to day on the chance of what may turn up. Now, instead of submitting it to Parliament, a Liberal Minister merely announces a measure to the House, and waits for the comments of the newspapers before he dare trust himself to give any explanation of it. In fact, the reason, in my opinion, why this Vote of Censure is not strong enough is, that the political honour of the present Cabinet is so low, that it requires the strongest language to prevent their having the chance, by volubility of phrases and dexterity of eloquence, of avoiding the direct issue. I consider that I am fully confirmed in my opinion after hearing the speeches of right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench opposite, and especially those of the Prime Minister and the right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board. I consider such evasive statements, at a time like this, nothing less than an insult to this country, and not to this country only, but to the whole Empire. The Government are asked to declare their policy; but the phrases used by the Prime
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  Minister seem to admit of so many interpretations that it is utterly impossible for an ordinary mind to understand what is meant. It may be that, as one of the Members for an agricultural constituency, I am open to the charge, which I have heard used by a Minister in this House, of Arcadian simplicity; but I think that the manner in which the Government has conducted the Business of the country during the past painful five years may fairly be described as savouring of the Cretan. I say, they have already had too much latitude; they have had their last chance; they have been weighed in the balance and found wanting, and they have shown themselves utterly unworthy of the confidence of the country. For our Empire's sake let this Cabinet of all the talents be exchanged for one of honesty and common sense. No one can envy the Conservative Party having to take Office at such a time, with such a damnosa hereditas as this Liberal Government loaves behind it; but the country knows they will not shrink from the task, however great; and there can be no doubt now, after the speeches in this House, and especially after the speech of our great Leader in "another place," as to our policy; as much of which has been shadowed forth as it is possible for any Opposition to give. I should like to say one word about the letter from General Gordon on the 4th November. The expression he uses there is—
  "Your Expedition is for relief of garrison, which I fail to accomplish. I decline to agree that it is for me personally."
  No, Sir, General Gordon was not the man to wish that the blood of one single English soldier should be shed on his behalf alone. I wish also to allude to the Mahdi. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon has pretty well disposed of a "smashed Mahdi;" but I wish the House to consider seriously what a "smashed Mahdi" really means. There is no necessity to follow the Mahdi into the interior; if you drive him back, and he dares not come out and oppose you, ho is no longer a Mahdi; he is plain Mohammed Ahmed, or whatever his name may be. In fact, he retires into private life, just as a "smashed" Prime Minister; and I hope, for the sake of the whole British Empire, that we shall soon see such a thing. The Prime Minister will retire into private life; but he will

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  retire with the knowledge that he has harassed and shaken every institution in this country, and that it has been his fate to wither and blast everything he has touched. And now, Sir, before I sit down, allow me to say but a few words about those who are fighting for us in the far distant Soudan, or who have laid down their lives there, having fought for us ever since the first commencement of the war in Lower Egypt. I am only echoing the voice of the country when I say that every soldier, from the greatest General to the humblest private, has done his duty to maintain his country's honour. Many have fallen bravely on the banks of the Nile, or in the thirsty Desert in the hour of victory; but, I think I may specially allude to the death of one who, though wounded in a victorious fight, knew that the retreat was sounding as he died. I need hardly say that I allude to the gallant General, Sir Herbert Stewart. There is a strong resemblance in the circumstances of his death to one which occurred at the beginning of a great war, and which has, I think, already been alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy. I need hardly say that I mean the death of Sir John Moore. Sir Herbert Stewart and those brave men who have fallen rest with their comrades in their glory; and may the retreat that was sounded then be only, as it was at Corunna, a prelude to splendid victories such as rendered the British name so renowned throughout the Spanish Peninsula. But there is one hero who rests "alone in his glory," and upon his grave may be, alas! too truly written that an English Government left him "alone in his hour of danger;" and, while it is ringing through the world how nobly Gordon died, defending the honour of his country, it would remain an "indelible disgrace" to that country if it allows that Government who sent him out to save themselves, and to keep the Prime Minister in Office, to remain in existence one moment longer to complete the ruin of this great Empire.
  MR. RICHARD: I am glad to have the opportunity of saying a few words in this discussion, as I represent a small body of persons who probably approach the question from a point of view different from that taken by most of those who have hitherto borne part in
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  the debate. There is no doubt that we are in the midst of a grave national crisis; and if the projects advocated on both sides of the House are carried into effect, we may not be far from heavy national calamities, resulting entirely from that fatal, inveterate propensity to meddle in other people's affairs, which is the chronic malady of our race. It is natural enough that there should be a good deal of crimination and recrimination as to who is responsible for this state of things, each Party trying to make a scapegoat of the other. My contention is, that all those who promoted, who instigated, who sanctioned our unhappy armed intervention in Egypt must be held more or less responsible for all that has ensued. The Prime Minister said the other day that the first step taken in that direction led, as by an inevitable necessity, to all that followed. I am thankful that, for myself, I lifted up my feeble voice from the first against these Egyptian proceedings, and have not ceased to protest against them ever since by vote and voice, in this House and out of it. My hands are clean from any stain of the blood that has been so copiously shed. I am glad it is no part of my duty to defend either Party in this House as respects our Egyptian policy. I think they are both tarred with the same brush. I hold that both are equally guilty, or, rather, that the heaviest measure of guilt is at the door of the Party opposite, and that for two reasons. First, because the miserable complications in which we have been involved in Egypt have sprung from the course they took when they were in Office; and, secondly, because they have done their utmost to push the Government further and further into the policy of aggression and war. It is customary, on these occasions, to deprecate any reference to the origin of things. We are told that what is past is past, and cannot be recalled; and it is useless to discuss it. I was glad to observe that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, in his speech the other night, repudiated this doctrine. It is a very convenient doctrine for those who wish to draw a veil of forgetfulness over their own past errors and misdeeds. But it may be necessary to draw back that veil. Hon. Gentlemen opposite dislike any allusion to the Dual Control. They wince away from it as Sir John

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  Falstaff did from the men in buckram; j and yet it may be required, for a full discussion of this question, to cast a retrospective glance even so far back as that. For no man who has traced this wretched Egyptian imbroglio to its source can doubt that the fountain and origin of the evil was the policy established by Lord Salisbury, when he was at the Foreign Office. It was unfortunate that we should have ever got mixed up with the finances of Egypt; and I am bound to say that the mission of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) was attended with some mischievous consequences, for an attempt was made to give that mission something of an official or semiofficial character. The right hon. Gentleman himself, before setting out, wrote a letter to Lord Derby, who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, saying that—
  "He had been requested by 2,000 holders of Egyptian Stock to represent their interests in the existing crisis of Egyptian finance,"
  asking his Lordship, "in the interests of the English bondholders," to give him "such moral support" as he could afford, and to instruct Her Majesty's Consul General in Egypt to give him assistance. And the British Consul General did give the right hon. Gentleman moral support and assistance, telling the Egyptian Government that he "was a Member of the late Cabinet, and a person of high position and reputation in this country." And this led to the first establishment of the Dual Control, which afterwards became the source of so much oppression and misery in Egypt. I hope one good result that may flow from this miserable Egyptian business will be this—that we shall lay it down as a fixed principle, and adhere to it with inexorable rigour, that when British subjects enter into pecuniary speculations in foreign countries, as they do it for their own interests, so they should do it at their own risk, since it is neither just, nor wise, nor expedient, that the mural responsibility of this nation should be pledged on their behalf, still less that the blood and treasure of its people be expended in defending the interests and collecting the debts of money-lenders and usurers. But it was Lord Salisbury who saddled Egypt on our shoulders. It was Lord Salisbury who converted what was merely a private arrangement between
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  the Egyptian Government and certain English and French gentlemen, undertaken of their own free will, and upon their own exclusive responsibility, into a binding political engagement, which involved the British nation in heavy and lasting obligations as regards the affairs of Egypt. It was Lord Salisbury who compassed and effected the deposition of Ismail Pasha, the Khedive, whom General Gordon describes as "one of the ablest and worst-used men in Europe," and the substitution on the Throne of the present Khedive, expressly and avowedly as the protégé of the English and French Governments, with all the responsibilities and obligations which that act implied. What has been the primary reason assigned for our invading and occupying Egypt? "Was it not this—that we were bound to protect and to uphold the authority of the Khedive? The Prime Minister, a few days ago, said—
  "We have been bound from the time that we first covenanted to keep the Khedive upon his Throne, and at no point have we had before us the choice or the possibility of return."
  But by whom were we bound in this sinister obligation? By Lord Salisbury. I contend, further, that a large share of the blame for the present position of affairs lies at the door of hon. Gentlemen opposite, because they have used their utmost efforts to egg the Government on in all the fatal measures they have adopted. They approved openly of the armed intervention in Egypt, which was the source of all the mischief and misery that ensued. Did they object to the bombardment of Alexandria? Not at all. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), indeed, greatly to his honour, separated, himself from his Party, and did denounce it in a vigorous and eloquent speech. But the Party as a whole cheered the announcement, when made in this House, that the British Fleet was firing into the forts of that city. And what was the object of the meeting at Willis's Rooms, except to drive the Government, by sarcasms, taunts, and reproaches, to put down Arabi by force of arms? And did anybody join louder than they did in the glorification of the victory of Tel-el-Kebir? Did they raise their voice against the invasion of the Soudan and the Expedition under General Graham, which led to the slaughter of thousands of Arabs to no purpose what-

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  ever? Did they object to the mission of General Gordon, or the means that were taken to rescue him? No; in all these cases they did what they could to push the Government on, deeper and deeper, into the fatal policy of armed intervention. But I am not going to absolve the Government. They have sins enough on their own heads. Their first mistake, in my opinion, was that they did not cut themselves loose from the policy of their Predecessors in Egypt, as they did in Afghanistan, the Transvaal, and Zulu-land. Their plea has been that they were bound by some Convention with Prance. That is not a valid plea. When the Government of this country entered into a Convention with France—a most preposterous Convention—for conducting combined hostilities in Mexico, when they found that the Expedition was assuming proportions and taking a direction of which they did not approve, they did not hesitate to break away from that Convention. And they need not have been very scrupulous as respects the Egyptian Convention, since the French, when they found we were about to bombard Alexandria, in utter disregard of any agreement as to joint action, ordered their Fleet to sail out of port, and so avoided the shame and guilt of having any part in that transaction. The second false step the Government took was when, at the instigation of M. Gambetta, they sent British men-of-war into Egyptian waters. I call that a false step, among other reasons, for this—that when the movements of Armies and Fleets begin, the control of events passes out of the hands of statesmen into those of naval and military men, who can only do one thing, and that is to fight. And I should not very much wonder if, when the secret history of this business comes to be written, it will be found that the real author of the Egyptian War was the British Admiral. And verily he has had his reward. But a third false step taken by the Government was to depart from their policy of neutrality as respects the Soudan. Again and again did they declare that they had nothing to do, and would have nothing to do, with the Soudan. The Prime Minister said in this House—"It is no part of the duty incumbent upon us to restore order in the Soudan." And when the Egyptian Government was sending out the Expeditions under
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  Hicks and Baker, Lord Granville was never weary of disclaiming all responsibility for those acts. Would to Heaven the Government had adhered to their decision as respects the Soudan! But when the intelligence came that Hicks and Baker had been defeated with great slaughter, then there was a loud outcry raised by certain classes in the country, and the Government, most unhappily, yielded to that clamour, and, in spite of their protests, did meddle in the Soudan, and they did so in this singular way—by simultaneously sending General Gordon to one part of the Soudan, to proclaim the independence of the people, and an Army and Navy into another part of the Soudan to slaughter the Soudanese for their efforts to secure independence. No doubt, they meant the mission of Gordon to be a mission of peace—to effect the evacuation of the garrisons by pacific means. It was so recognized and so accepted by General Gordon himself, for, in writing to Sir Evelyn Baring, these were his words—
  "I understand your desire to be the pacification of the country without bloodshed, and the formation of Native Government; also that, on public grounds, I am to run no risks. I will fulfil your orders."—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 88.]
  For a short time he seems to have acted on this view of his duty. On his arrival, or, indeed, before his arrival, at his destination, he issued a Proclamation declaring that—
  "The Soudan and its Government have become independent, and will look after their own affairs, without interference by the Egyptian Government in anything whatever."
  But he very soon forgot this, and began to call the people and to treat them as "rebels." What right have we to call these people rebels? Against whom are they rebelling? Not against us, as they owe us no allegiance. Not against the Egyptian Government, since we have proclaimed, through the mouth of our chosen Representative, that they were absolutely independent of Egypt in every respect whatever. I ask what right had we, or have we, to fight the Soudanese? Why were these men in arms? Because, as the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) said in this House—
  "They had revolted against what was undeniably acknowledged to be an intolerable and oppressive Government."
  And, surely, there is evidence enough to

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  sustain this allegation of the noble Marques—evidence from our own countrymen and officials, who were most conversant with the state of the Soudan. Lord Dufferin said that—
  "Whatever might he the pretension of the Mahdi to a Divine mission, his chief strength was derived from the despair and misery of the Native population."
  Sir Samuel Baker, who knows the country well, and once acted as Governor of the Soudan, says—
  "If you had only seen what I have seen in that fertile region—whole tracts of territory left deserted and desolate because the soldiers were out collecting the taxes—that is to say, they were plundering the villagers, violating the women, maltreating the men, and generally making hell upon earth—you would not he astonished at the insurrection. If I had been a Native of the Soudan I would have rebelled long ago, and so would Gordon, and so would anyone; but they are a patient and long suffering people, and it has taken years of injustice and cruelty to force them into rebellion."
  And General Gordon said—
  "That the people were justified in rebelling, nobody who knows the treatment to which they were subjected will attempt to deny."
  And the Prime Minister himself, when certain people were urging him to prosecute further hostilities in the Soudan, used these words—
  "Are you quite clear that we are justified in going on fighting and subduing these people? Because, if you are, I am not. It appears to me that they are fighting for their freedom, and I am not clear that we are justified in going to fight them."
  And if all this be so, if these people are struggling to free themselves from an intolerable and oppressive Government, if they are fighting for freedom, what right have to go in there and slaughter them by the thousands while defending their own homes against an unprovoked invasion undertaken in the interest of their oppressors? There was one man in the Soudan who had acquired great influence and authority there, and with him, surely, we ought to have treated—and that was the Mahdi. It is the fashion now to stigmatize this man as a fanatic and a savage, and other uncomplimentary names. He may be all that; but our saying so does not prove it, for it is our invariable custom, when we invade or attack or wrong any people, to blacken and traduce their character as a justification of our own acts. So far as I know, no serious attempt has ever been made to negotiate with the Mahdi
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  for the peaceful surrender of the garrisons. We have no reason to assume that he would not have met such negotiations fairly. We have some facts which point in the other direction. Three of the garrisons—namely, Obeid, Barra, and Tokar—did surrender. They were obliged to do so without conditions, because their food supplies were absolutely exhausted; yet the treatment of the soldiers and inhabitants left no room for complaint. The noble Marquess told us in this House that when Tokar surrendered there were 700 persons within its walls, dwelling in apparent safety under the protection of Osman Digna's Army. Did Gordon ever try to treat with the Mahdi? We have a vague report, depending on the oral testimony of a Native, as to a letter sent by Gordon to the Mahdi. But he acted not in the spirit of a negotiator, but in that of a Dictator and King-maker. He sent him a robe of some sort, and offered to make him Sultan of Kordofan. But he could not have meant even that as a serious attempt at conciliation; because, on the 27th of February, nine days after his arrival in Khartoum, and three weeks before the return of the messenger he had sent to the Mahdi, he is writing home that the Mahdi must be smashed, he was sending troops to show his force, and that an expedition would start immediately to attack "the rebels." The fact is, that his military instincts proved too strong for him, and overpowered all sense of his proper mission; for within a very few weeks of his arrival at Khartoum we find him writing to Sir Evelyn Baring, deploring that his "lovely Krupp guns" were doing so little execution upon the Natives.
  "We see masses of the enemy," he said, "yet fail to do much. The enemy lost by shells yesterday 16 horses and 40 men killed and eight wounded."
  This he calls "awfully bad practice." The whole history of this war, among other things, proves the utter absurdity of putting any attempts at conciliation into the hands of naval and military men. Sir Evelyn Baring and Lord Granville instructed Admiral Hewett to make an announcement to the Chiefs, recommending them
  "To meet General Gordon at Khartoum, where, by accepting the terms offered, they might secure their independence, and be re-

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  lieved from the oppression and misgovernment they hare hitherto suffered."—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 55.]
  But Admiral Hewett would have nothing to do with such a suggestion.
  "He thought it undesirable to issue such a proclamation. The rebels must be defeated first."
  Similar instructions seem to have been sent to General Graham; and how did he fulfil them? Why, before the battle of Teb he sent a letter to the outposts, which, I believe, was affixed to a pole and stuck in the sand, addressed to the Sheikhs of the tribes, in which he said—
  "I summon you, in the name of the English Government, to disperse your fighting men before daybreak to-morrow morning, or the consequences will be on your own heads."—[Ibid. p. 181.]
  That was General Graham's notion of pacific negotiation. But what are we to do now? Well, let us start fair. What was the object of Lord Wolseley's Expedition? Here are his instructions—
  "The primary object of the Expedition up the Valley of the Nile is to bring General Gordon and General Stewart from Khartoum. When that object has been secured, no further operations of any kind are to be undertaken."
  As the safety of these distinguished men is no longer in question, why should we advance? I own that I was astounded and appalled by the policy developed in the speech of the Prime Minister on the first night of the Session. We were told that there should be immediate action from Suakin against Osman Digna; that we are to attempt no accommodation with the Mahdi, but we are to overthrow his power at Khartoum; that we are to construct a railway across 280 miles of desert, from Suakin to Berber; and to all this is now joined the ominous intelligence of the appointment of Prince Hassan to join Lord Wolseley as the Representative of the Egyptian Government. When I hear all this, it seems to me that we are about to launch into enterprizes so vast and so vague, involving inevitably such an enormous expenditure of money, and such a terrible waste of human life, and especially implicating us in such immense and illimitable consequences and responsibilities for the future, that I was fairly staggered to find such a policy coming from such lips. I do devoutly hope that the Government may yet be induced, before it is too late, to modify
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  this tremendous policy. I warn the Government that there is a great and growing feeling in the country against any further aggressive policy in Egypt or the Soudan. I have no difficulty as to the vote I shall give on the Motion of the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote). If the right hon. Gentleman had stopped at the first part of his Motion, I might have felt constrained to vote with him; though when I find the Party opposite stigmatizing the policy of the Government as one which "has involved great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure, without any beneficial result," it sounds to me very much like the Devil rebuking sin, for did not their policy in Afghanistan, in the Transvaal, and in Zululand, lead to a great sacrifice of valuable life, without any beneficial result? But when the right hon. Gentleman goes on, in the latter half of his Motion, to commit us, in vague and general terms, to indefinite responsibilities in the Soudan, I am obliged to part company with him. I shall vote unhesitatingly for the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), as that points to what seems to me the only true and safe policy—that is, the withdrawal, at the earliest practicable opportunity, of our troops from the Soudan. But when we speak of the withdrawal of the troops, nobody means a sudden and precipitate retreat without regard to the safety of our countrymen. Too many precious British lives have been already sacrificed in these unhappy Expeditions to make anyone desire that those who remain should be exposed to any further un-unnecessary hazard. But what we mean is—no more aggressive operations; no war for revenge or military prestige; no smashing of the Mahdi; no conquest of the Soudan; no attempt to impose Egyptian rule on the Soudanese; and, above all, no countenance to any insane projects permanently to occupy and govern those vast and worthless deserts.
  MR. A. J. BALFOURsaid, he thought it would be well if the hon. Member for Merthyr could manage to abstain in the future from introducing Party attacks upon the Opposition into his harangues in favour of peace. The hon. Member said that everything that occurred in Egypt was due to Lord Salisbury; and he alluded, in illustra-

  1675
  tion, to a financial undertaking which was the work of one of the most eminent statesmen of the Party opposite—Lord Derby. The hon. Member actually appeared to think that the cause of the bloodshed at Alexandria, Tel-el-Kebir, El Teb, and subsequent engagements, was the fact that the late Government, at a given period, insisted that in the affairs of Egypt England should not have a less important influence than France. With regard to the controversies before the House, he held that, whatever might be the result of the division, it would still remain true that the country had unanimously condemned the past policy of the Government. The Home Secretary himself adopted, on Thursday, a humble and deprecatory tone, which clearly showed that he did not believe that the acts of the Government could be substantially defended. Fortune did not declare itself systematically against a Government; but the present Government had failed all round, and, therefore, it was useless for them to blame their ill-fortune. The Government had been exceedingly well served by the Army, the Navy, and their Diplomatic Agents. Whatever had been done by their servants had been done well; but everything that the Government had themselves done had been done badly. The Government had also had good service from the Opposition. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, shortly before the Session began, asked, what had the Opposition done to assist the Government? He would answer that the Opposition had given the Government a very great deal of good advice, which had, unfortunately, been systematically neglected. Almost every misfortune that had happened to the Government had been prophesied in detail by Conservative or independent Liberal Members. The right hon. Member for Ripon asked the Government some very awkward questions. In reply, the Home Secretary also asked a number of questions, and then drew a series of parallels between himself and the First Napoleon, Prince Bismarck, Count Moltke, and, in fact, almost all the statesmen and generals of foreign countries. There seemed to be as little resemblance between the Home Secretary and Prince Bismarck as between the facts of the Franco-Prussian War and the circumstances of the present Egyptian War. The Go-
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  vernment professed to have a policy, I and for some time he thought he under-stood what their policy was. But doubts gradually arose in his mind, and now he was in a state of complete uncertainty on the point—the fact being that it was of the misty kind that lent itself to every variety of interpretation. The man who desired to see in it a peace policy must appeal to the speech of the Home Secretary. Anyone who wanted to find a forward or war policy must appeal to some of the speeches of the Prime Minister. For anyone who wanted to establish good government in the Soudan there had been some good phrases; and those who wanted to leave the Soudan after rescuing Wolseley would find that that was the main object of the Government. It was at once a peace policy and a war policy. At first Ministers produced this result by the use of ambiguous phrases; but yesterday a new device was adopted in debate. They were intelligible and consistent enough, each in their own way; but they absolutely contradicted each other. Thus, while the Home Secretary was saying that—
  "The only reason, in my opinion, that justifies our going to Khartoum is that that is the only manner in which the evacuation of the Soudan can be accomplished to the safety of Egypt,"
  Lord Northbrook was telling the House of Lords that—
  "Our policy is a clear one."
  Poor Lord Northbrook!
  "We shall hold our own in that country, and conduct its affairs for the benefit of the people, and of peace where we could arrange with the people."
  He quite admitted the efficacy of this system in catching votes; but he felt bound to protest against the novel principle of Members of the Cabinet airing their dissensions in that House. It only remained for the Secretary of State for War to get up and endeavour to assuage the doubts of that peculiar political machine, the Whig mind. When that was done, the new device of the Government would be carried out to perfection. In his (Mr. A. J. Balfour's) opinion, it would be well, when the Members of Her Majesty's Government appeared in public, that they should proclaim one particular policy, and adhere to it. The hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) had delivered that evening one of the

  1677
  ablest and most eloquent speeches he had overheard; and, curiously enough, the most damaging attacks upon a Government were always delivered by some hon. or right hon. Member who had just left it. The conduct attributed to Ministers by the hon. Member was, in the highest degree, flagitious. As a late Member of the Government, he, no doubt, knew them well; and if he said they were capable of such conduct, they, no doubt, were. He was entirely with the Government, as far as they were engaged in rescuing General Wolseley, who had been sent out to rescue General Gordon, who had been sent out to pacify the Soudan. But further than that he did not go with them. In the view of Her Majesty's Government, there was no blood-guiltiness in war as long as you got nothing by it, and merely wasted blood and treasure to no purpose; but the moment you fought for the sake of mankind, or of the country, and tried to get something for them, then the guilt of blood lay upon your head. He asked that we should not enter upon this gigantic operation, of which he was afraid we were only seeing the beginning, merely for the sake of destroying men who were fighting for their liberty, and then abandoning the Soudan; but that, when we called upon the country to make these enormous sacrifices, we should, at all events, gain something for England, for Egypt, and for civilization.
  MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, that, on the part of himself and of the hon. Member for Newcastle, he desired to enter their protest against Her Majesty's Government taking any single step in Egypt, or in the Soudan, which could be approved either by the Conservatives or by their allies, the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) and the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W E. Forster), who, he had no doubt, they would hear to-night take the same view of this question as the right hon. Member for Ripon. Holding the opinions they did, he and the hon. Member for Newcastle were naturally anxious to find out what was the real policy of the Government with regard to the Soudan. The hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour) had said that he had some difficulty in discovering what the policy of Her Majesty's Government was. For his part,
  1678
  he had no such difficulty. Although, doubtless, the statements of the different Members of the Cabinet on the subject were somewhat at variance, it was easy to see that the policy of the Government was to overturn the Mahdi, to make an aggressive campaign in the Soudan, and to build a railway from Suakin to Berber, or to somewhere else. A good many reasons, or rather excuses, had been put forward in support of this policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government. The relief of the garrisons, the necessity for putting down the Slave Trade, and their old friend prestige had been put forward at first as the reasons why we should continue the war; but those reasons for that act had gradually disappeared from view. They had been told that it was necessary, in order to defend Egypt, that we must smash the Mahdi. He failed to see what ground could be shown for such a proceeding on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Ethiopia had been attacked from the time of Cambyses; but he never heard of Ethiopia attacking Egypt. We might as well send a Fleet to attack St. Petersburg in order to prevent Russia attacking us in Afghanistan. The right hon. Member for Ripon had said that we ought to take a portion of the Soudan, and then make friends with the Mahdi, and leave him in the Western Soudan; but would it not be more difficult to deal with the Mahdi then than now? Would he not be sure, in such circumstances, to attack the Government we left in Khartoum after we retired? The right hon. Gentleman said that we must occupy Berber for military reasons. Where did the right hon. Gentleman get that idea from? Certainly not from Lord Wolseley's despatches. Lord Wolseley was sometimes called our only General; but if he had made an advance which required a railway and 10,000 more troops to enable him to retire, no military man would be able to accord him the title of a General at all. But the fact was that it was not Lord Wolseley, but Her Majesty's Government, who were responsible for the plan of the campaign. It was true that Her Majesty's Government, following their usual course of endeavouring to shift responsibility from themselves to somebody else, had sought to make Lord Wolseley responsible for any steps that might now be taken by him in the Soudan; but

  1679
  Lord Wolseley had declined to take the responsibility upon himself, and had said—"No; you, the Government, must tell me what I am to do." It was, therefore, Her Majesty's Government, sitting like an Aulic Council, who had determined that Lord Wolseley was to advance and overthrow the Mahdi. The right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board had told the House that his idea was that we ought to advance into the Soudan with the view of leaving peace and tranquillity behind us. But why should we undertake to do that in this particular part of the world at the sole expense of the people of this country? But what kind of peace and tranquillity should we leave behind us? Our troops conducted themselves well; but we had a number of Bashi-Bazouks with our Army, and they ravished women, burnt villages, and killed and murdered everyone they encountered. That was the sort of peace and tranquillity we were bringing upon the Soudan. The right hon. Gentleman said that unless the Government promised to remain in the Soudan he should vote against them. But it was precisely because the Government must remain in the Soudan unless they came back at once that he objected to their staying there any longer than could possibly be helped. Let them sweep away all this nonsense about taking one part of the Soudan and then making friends with the Mahdi. If our troops went to Khartoum and set up a Government there, how long would that Government last after they left? The truth was that if once we set up a Government at Khartoum our troops must remain to support it. The Prime Minister had said that he was not going to set up an Egyptian Government at Khartoum; but in that ease why had he sent Prince Hassan with Lord Wolseley? They knew the Prime Minister's opinion of the Turks, and therefore they might be sure that he would not set up a Turkish Government there. Would the country consent to Zebehr Pasha being set up at Khartoum? Then, if not, what sort of a Government did Her Majesty's Government intend to setup? Her Majesty's Government had frequently alleged that the Conservatives were responsible for all that had occurred in Egypt and the Soudan. They went on the "This is the house that Jack built" principle. Why,
  1680
  they might as well say that Adam was responsible, because if Adam had not existed we should not have been in the Soudan. But now, at all events, the Government were going to take a new departure, and they could never say that the Conservatives were responsible for this campaign in the Soudan. Her Majesty's Government had always complained of the Convention entered into between the Conservatives and Tewfik; but now they themselves were going to enter into a Convention with a new Tewfik in Khartoum; and if they were turned out of Office they would be able to go about the country protesting against everything that was being done in consequence by hon. Members opposite. What ought to be the proper policy in the Soudan? We ought to withdraw from the Soudan as soon as possible. Lord Wolseley should be told that it was his business not to march to Khartoum or to overthrow the Mahdi, but to withdraw within the Egyptian Frontier. What were we about to do? We were going to fight a little at Suakin and to kill a few thousand Arabs there; we were going to fight a little at Berber and to kill a few thousand more Arabs there; and then we were going to wait until the autumn before going to Khartoum and killing a few thousand more Arabs there. And then we were going to retire. The Prime Minister said that evening that the Mahdi must have known the pacific character of General Gordon's mission, and that we could not now negotiate with him, because he might have entered into some sort of a Treaty with General Gordon. It appeared to him that if a General said he was an Egyptian Governor and intended to smash up some other person, that other person was not very likely to consider the mission a pacific one. At the present moment where was the pacific mission? The Mahdi must have learnt that we were sending Lord Wolseley to overthrow him; and how, then, could he think that it was a pacific mission? Let us, if necessary, convey to the Mahdi as soon as possible the terms on which we were willing to withdraw from the Soudan; and then let us leave the Soudanese to themselves, free to have as prophet General Booth, or anybody else they might choose. As a sensible man, he would probably rest satisfied with

  1681
  being master in his own home, and would not, by pursuing us into Egypt, court his own destruction. He hoped the Prime Minister would seriously take into consideration whether he was really fulfilling the policy of the Mid Lothian campaign. If the right hon. Gentleman frankly declared that he was opposed to the policy of aggression, annexation, and war, the Radical and Liberal Party throughout the country would rally to him. It was the right hon. Gentleman who was responsible for what was going on, as he occupied an exceptional position in the country, where no one enjoyed so much popularity. [Ironical cheers and laughter from the Opposition.] Hon. Gentlemen opposite knew that he was speaking of facts. But the Liberals had a hard struggle at present to reconcile their desire to support the Prime Minister in the policy he was pursuing. The right hon. Gentleman had but to hold up his hand in order to make the whole Liberal Party rally and sustain him, not only against hon. Gentlemen opposite, but against the right hon. Members for Bradford and Ripon, and all those Whigs who had been the curse and the bane of the present Ministry. Radicals were told that they were impractical zealots and doctrinaires; but the truth was that it was in consequence of being in favour of the integrity and grandeur of the Empire that they were opposed to these useless, purposeless, and impolitic Expeditions. While he was opposed to Her Majesty's Government on the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle, he was still more opposed to hon. Gentlemen opposite. He might be a very simple-minded person; but he was not so simple-minded as to jump out of the frying-pan into the fire. Hon. Gentlemen opposite, with their Amendments, were throwing a fly to catch votes on that side of the House; but he trusted no Radical would rise to the fly. The meaning of all these Amendments was—"Turn out the Government and put us in." What would be gained by that? It was said that no speech ever turned a vote; but Lord Salisbury's speech on the previous night would have turned his vote against any Gentleman of the same way of thinking as his Lordship. If the Party opposite came in, what would happen to the Redistribution Bill? He had seen it stated that they would
  1682
  appeal to the present constituencies. ["No!"] He distrusted them, and thought it would be better for the Liberal Party to remain in power and get the Bill through anyhow. If the House had to choose between Lord Salisbury and the Prime Minister, he trusted the House would decide in favour of the latter. He had himself placed on the Paper an Amendment to that proposed by the hon. Member for Newcastle. The Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Newcastle asked them to refrain from expressing an opinion on the policy of the Government. He (Mr. Labouchere) never refrained; and no doubt the Prime Minister, when thinking the matter over, would say—"Why did I not follow the Member for Northampton? I should not have been in such a mess as I am now." The Prime Minister's opinions were his, for the right hon. Gentleman agreed with him in everything. For his own part, he stood by the policy of the Mid Lothian campaign, when the Prime Minister denounced the Jingo policy of annexation and war. If anyone had then said—"You will acquire power and become the most powerful Minister England has had for many a day; you will bombard Alexandria; you will massacre Egyptians at Tel-el-Kebir and Suakin; and you will go on a sort of wild-cat Expedition into the wilds of Ethiopia in order to put down a Prophet," the right hon. Gentleman would have asked, in the words of Hazael, the King of Syria—"Is thy servant a dog, that he should do this thing?" His complaint was that the right hon. Gentleman had not sufficient faith in the Radicals who brought him into power. The Radicals would stick to him now; but he was inclined to think the Whigs would not. In conclusion, the hon. Member said he was willing to make a sacrifice on the altar of simplicity; and therefore he proposed to withdraw his own Amendment, and support that of his hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle.
  MR. EDWARD CLARKE: It is making a great claim on the indulgence of the House to address it on a night of this kind, and at this hour; but I assure the House I will not interpose longer than 10 minutes between it and the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster). I do not know if any

  1683
  serious answer ought to be given to the speech which has been delivered to the House by that very impracticable politician, the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere). It is supposed to be a speech in defence of Her Majesty's Government; but it has been a characteristic in this debate that the only difference between us on this side and those who sit below the Gangway on the other side is this—whereas we attack Her Majesty's Government, those who sit below the Gangway on that side reserve all their attacks for the Prime Minister himself. We have heard speech after speech in which the Prime Minister has been denounced as a man who might, if he chose, have saved the country from a policy of wickedness and disgrace, and has not used his power to save the people from the wickedness and shame of this policy. The fact that there are four Amendments in the name of hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway shows that there is not one of the Liberal Party sitting there who can formulate a Motion with which any one of his neighbours will agree. With all the comment that is made upon the Resolution of the Leader of the Opposition, there is this about the Resolution. It is accurate, it is intelligible, and it will serve its purpose if it be passed. Her Majesty's Government could not continue to sit upon those Benches and still enjoy the respect of the only body of people who now respect them—I mean, of course, themselves. As to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), it is a sham Amendment. He knows perfectly well the sort of people among whom he is sitting. He knows they have not the courage for a real rebellion, so he proposes an Amendment in which he says—"We will refrain from expressing an opinion on the conduct of Her Majesty's Government." Why does he refrain from expressing that opinion? If, Sir, he could express an opinion in favour of Her Majesty's Government, and if he thought there were 50 Members of this House who would support him in that opinion he would be delighted to recognize the public and private ties of which he spoke so feelingly on Monday last. But if he, in fact, disapproves the conduct of the Government, why has he not the courage to say so? Because he knows the sort of Party by whom he is surrounded.
  1684
  The fact is, this is a sham Amendment. It is said, and I believe with some truth, that the intention of some Members of the Radical section is to vote for this Amendment, which they are quite sure will be defeated, and then to vote for the Government against the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet—one vote for their consciences, which they take care shall have no effect, and one for their Party; so that they will secure the continuance in power of a Government which, so far as we know, is committed to a course of wanton and objectless bloodshed, and, having by their votes made it possible that this course should be pursued, they can go down to their country constituents proudly claiming to be the friends of peace and freedom, and appeal for their justification to the Division List which records their votes on this futile Amendment. I said that if they take this course they will leave the Government to pursue a course of wanton bloodshed. I mean these words in the fullest extent. I believe that the course which has been indicated in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary would be a most disastrous, and, I think, a wicked course. If we are going to Khartoum, there to do the work of civilization, and put some Government there which may utilize the magnificent position and opportunities of that city, and establish an outwork of Western civilization—if you can do that without too great a sacrifice and expenditure then do it. But to go to Khartoum to fight the Mahdi, if he be there, and, if he be not there, then to abandon Khartoum to some imitation King that you may set up, whether in the person of an Egyptian Prince or anyone else, is a wild and wicked enterprize, and one to which I believe the country will never consent. Sir, this debate was relieved the night before last by a most interesting account by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster of his elementary studies in military science. He told us about the retreat of Sir John Moore, about the retreat of the Duke of Wellington on the lines of Torres Vedras, and he told us nobody should leave any position he was in until he had a perfectly safe place to fall back upon. Sir, he has taught a lesson to his Predecessor in one of the Offices he has occupied. The moral is that when a man is Chief Secretary to the

  1685
  Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, he should not leave that post unless he has the Chancellorship of the Duchy to fall back upon. But it is not here amongst ourselves that we can discuss the question of military strategy. The conclusive condemnation of the Government on this matter is this—they have declared that they are going to Khartoum for military objects, and they have not produced a syllable of evidence that either Lord Wolseley, or anyone else of capacity to judge military matters, has shown that that movement is necessary; and not having done that, I say that the movement upon Khartoum, unless they pledge themselves to utilize it for the establishment of a Government, is a movement nothing can justify. We have been told by the Prime Minister that great difficulties have been in the way of the Government. Well, Sir, to the feeble knees every hill is steep. These difficulties which have existed have been made by the Government. They have never had a policy with regard to Egypt since the death of M. Gambetta. They put in a Joint Note by advice of M. Gambetta, which was a fatal step, and the next step was that which led them into this mischief—a step which Lord Granville declared in his own name, and that of the Prime Minister, he believed to be a mistake. On the 15th of May, 1881, Lord Granville wrote a despatch to our Representatives abroad, announcing that the Fleets were going to Alexandria; and a curious departure was adopted from the ordinary practice in diplomatic documents. He mentioned the name of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. He said he and the Prime Minister alike thought it would have been desirable to have had the concert of the other Powers; but as France had gone so far with us in other matters this was not pressed. From that time to this it has been a course abounding in difficulties, which, if Ministers had gone forward with a clear eye and resolute step, I believe they would have trodden down; but they have been stumbling forward on the path, always with their eye turned back to see if a majority of the House of Commons was being led in a web behind them, following and supporting them. Sir, as I listened to the right hon. Gentleman on Monday evening, I wondered if his memory reminded him
  1686
  that it was the anniversary of a notable event in his life. On the 23rd of February, 1855, the right hon. Gentleman announced in the House of Commons the reason for which he had left the Cabinet of which he had been a Member. It was a Cabinet that is now remembered by Englishmen with neither gratitude nor respect. In the year 1854 the weakness of the Government led us into a wholly unnecessary war, and the mismanagement of the Government almost destroyed an English Army. And now I think there is no division of opinion among Englishmen as to the merits of that Government. All Englishmen reproach it for the feebleness and incompetence which involved us in such heavy sacrifices. Sir, I believe that 30 years hence all Englishmen, without distinction of Party, will look back with reproach and indignation upon the Cabinet of 1884, which used a brilliant soldier that his name might cover and shield an imperilled Ministry, and, directly he had served that Party purpose, refused his appeals, neglected, his counsels, and left him abandoned to perish. Sir, there is one man, and one man alone, upon whom the reproach of both these Ministries will fall. The Prime Minister shared the weakness of 1854. To him I believe are, in the main, attributable the disasters which we now deplore. But, Sir, there is one thing more, and it is the darkest line that can be added to this picture. The Prime Minister has more than once, here in this House, endeavoured to palliate the conduct of the Ministry by suggesting that the officer who, at their request, accepted the post of honourable danger, might, if he had so pleased, have found an opportunity to run away. In the debate of the 23rd of February, 1855, the right hon. Gentleman used these words—
  "The fault of our Constitution now, if it be a fault, is this—that public servants are, perhaps, not called to account with sufficient strictness."—(3 Hansard, [136] 1845.)
  Sir, I agree with those words. Loss of Office is too small a punishment for the betrayal of public duty and the neglect of public duty, and even that penalty may be evaded. The trained fidelity of Party, personal combinations we have heard something to-night of in a whisper or a tone, and the subtle instruments of Parliamentary influence, in the use of which the present Government is ex-

  1687
  perienced and skilled, may to-night prevent the expression by this House of the unhesitating condemnation which their fellow-countrymen have pronounced. But though Members may cling to the Office of which they are proved unworthy, they will not be unpunished. Personal humiliation, the discredit of their Party, the indignation and scorn of the people, will be a sure and severe, but still an inadequate, punishment.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: The hon. and learned Member who has just spoken (Mr. E. Clarke) has made a bitter and vehement attack upon the conduct of the Government. No doubt, some Member of the Government will reply to it. But what comes more home to us at this moment is their future policy; thereto, with regard to their past policy, I do not pretend to say that I approve of it. But I think the hon. and learned Member, when he reads his words, will come to the conclusion that the exceeding vehemence of his attack will not be justified by the opinion of the country or of the House. I will say little about the past, and that little will be in relation to General Gordon. I shall not dwell much upon his fate. I know very well that that great and noble and unselfish spirit would have revolted at the idea of a Party struggle over his dead body, or over the sufferings and anxieties of the last few weeks of his life. So far as he is concerned, I venture to hope that his self-sacrificing and patriotic spirit may have some influence over this debate. I cannot but believe that the Members of the Government—my old Colleagues—do feel quite as much as any of us his loss, and the circumstances connected with it. But I think it would have been better, from their own point of view and for their own feelings, if they had not been so anxious to justify themselves in every step they have taken, when, so far as I can see, such justification is impossible. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister evidently believes that the delay in the sending of the Expedition for his relief did not cause Gordon's death. He almost went so far as to suppose that this delay prolonged his life, because it had postponed that approach of the relieving Army which was to be the signal for treachery. I do not think that that is the opinion of the House or of the country. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of
  1688
  Derby) has made the same statement in "another place." One word with regard to this hypothesis. In order to secure the success of treachery, it was necessary that there should be not only treachery within the city, but also a strong force without the city. It was a very short time, only two or three weeks, before the last catastrophe, that the Mahdi, with his forces, took possession of that important place, Omdurman, just below Khartoum, the possession of which vastly increased his power, and prevented the escape of Gordon, if he had designed to attempt it with a few faithful followers, by the White Nile. I believe it was the possession of that place that gave the traitors encouragement and the means of carrying out their treachery; but how if the Expedition had arrived a month before? One word more. I wait, and all General Gordon's friends and admirers wait, for the publication of his diaries. We know there are six volumes of them, and I want to take this opportunity of saying that I trust, and cannot but believe, that the Government will take care that every word in these diaries comes before the public. I am not sure that the Government has the right to determine the matter. Unless they are official diaries, they belong to General Gordon's family. As it is sometimes suggested that his relations or friends might have some feeling on the subject, I take the opportunity of saying—and I am authorized to do so on behalf of his nearest relatives—that they are most anxious that every word in these diaries of public interest should be published. They will be the record of the agony of a noble soul, who cared not for his own life or what he suffered, but only for those who were trusting in him, whom he had in charge, and whose lives were getting day by day in more danger, and he did not know how to save them. My noble Friend the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) will, of course, close this debate. He will have much to say, and, therefore, it may seem hard to ask him further questions. But there is one question I should like to ask him. It was very late before the Expedition was resolved upon. It was August 20 before the despatches omitted the phrase "if it would be necessary" to send the Expedition. I want to ask this question, and it is fair that the

  1689
  House should have an answer. Were there no representations made by Lord Wolseley as to the delay of this Expedition? If so, why were they not attended to? Were the reasons political or military? Were they fully considered or not? My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gave a military reason. He said that when the possibility of its being right to send an Expedition had come into view, no doubt much time was spent in the examination of the question of the two routes. [Mr. GLADSTONE dissented.] Yes; that is so. Only this morning I took down from the report of my right hon. Friend's speech in The Times these words—
  "When the possibility of its being right to send an Expedition to relieve General Gordon had come in view, no doubt much time was spent in the examination of the question." [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] "I think I may say, for some months, the balance of evidence appeared to be in favour of the Suakin route. It was not until after that period had elapsed that at length, and with deliberation, and therefore in time, judgment appeared evidently to preponderate in favour of the Nile route."
  Now, I think this military reason requires some explanation from my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War. It was not merely that the life of Gordon was at stake, but also the success of the Expedition. We know that the result of his death and the fall of Khartoum has enormously increased the difficulties and dangers to be confronted by the Expedition. We have the right to ask—Are the affairs of the War Office so conducted that doubts with regard to these two routes could continue so long unsolved? Did this need for balancing advantages last so long as to make the failure of the Expedition, in any circumstances, so much more probable?" Again, I think we ought to know whether it was solely on military grounds that there was this long examination, or whether there were not also political and Parliamentary considerations? The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), in his remarkably terse and vigorous speech, made a remark about myself which gave me pain. He said that if one cause more than another had conduced to the final catastrophe and the death of General Gordon, it was the attitude taken by hon. Gentlemen opposite and by myself in the pressure they put
  1690
  upon the Government to prevent the appointment of Zebehr. Now, that was a very serious charge. I knew General Gordon. He was a personal friend. I am proud to say he was a distant relation of mine; I am in constant communication with his family; and when I am told that I caused his death, hon. Members will not be suprised that I feel the charge.
  MR. JOHN MORLEY: I desire to explain that nothing could have been further from my intention than to impute any such aim or object to my right hon. Friend. What I said was this. General Gordon applied for Zebehr to be sent to him from February 18 onward. So late as March 5 Lord Granville wrote that the question was still open. On March 10, my right hon. Friend, in an extremely powerful and vigorous speech, said he hoped Zebehr would not be sent without the House being consulted. On the very next day Lord Granville wrote the despatch stating that Zebehr could not be allowed to go. Surely, then, I may be permitted to say that my right hon. Friend was partly and gravely responsible for the non-sending of Zebehr.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: I did not for a moment suppose that my hon. Friend, or, indeed, any individual in the Three Kingdoms, could have charged me with having such an aim and object. But I would like to know how my hon. Friend would feel, under the same circumstances, if he were charged with having acted in such a manner as to cause Gordon's death. The hon. Member has described what happened. I objected strongly to the appointment of Zebehr Pasha. Afterwards, finding the Government had felt some objections, I said the House ought to be informed of the reasons why Zebehr should be sent, before he was sent. The Government thought the same, and they instituted inquiries; they got reasons from General Gordon, and they were not satisfied with the appointment. My hon. Friend says they were wrong; but I very much doubt whether he, in the same position, would have acted otherwise. Would he have been prepared, not merely to send Zebehr, with his antecedents, but to support him with the power of England after ho got to Khartoum? I will not dwell further

  1691
  upon this subject, except to say that I thank hon. Members for allowing me to defend myself from this charge—for I still think it a charge—and that I adhere to what I stated on May 13. If hon. Members will kindly refer to my speech of that date, they will there see that I stated, what I repeat now, that the Government were not so much to blame for refusing to send Zebehr, as for their lamentable refusal to take the consequences of their decision. Zebehr Pasha was not sent. General Gordon then said—"Let me retire." But he was not allowed to retire, nor was he helped to remain. I will detain the House no longer on this branch of the subject; but let me now turn to the future policy of the Government. What is the future policy of the Government? Nobody knows. I do not know. My hon. Friend, the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) said he did know; but, having discovered it, he did not like it at all. He began by saying that the object of his speech was to prevent the possibility of my views and the views of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) being carried out. But although he stated that to be the object of his speech, his attack was directed entirely against the Government. The hon. Member gave me a name which I have never been called before. Although I have been called by many names, both outside the House and in it, I do not remember ever before having been called a Whig. The hon. Member did not correctly state the view of my right hon. Friend. What my right hon. Friend stated—and I agree with him—was that if we go to Khartoum or anywhere else, and if we take upon ourselves responsibilities, then we must fulfil them. We must, therefore, be careful how we incur these responsibilities. I say we do not know what the policy of the Government is. We know that the Government have pledged themselves to use the power of this Empire to do a certain thing; but we do not know, nor can we discover, what is their policy or object in doing this thing. The Prime Minister, yesterday week, when he made his first careful statement—we have got it now by heart—said that, upon hearing of the fall of Khartoum, the Cabinet had a most momentous question before them, and had to decide what steps they should
  1692
  take. The question which seemed to be put before them—I cannot understand why it was the only alternative—was, whether or not they should proceed to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum? The Government decided that it was their duty to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum, and to use the Forces of this country for that purpose, and to send out this Expedition for that purpose. It is one thing to prevent the Mahdi from taking Khartoum, and another thing to pledge the country to the overthrow of the Mahdi at Khartoum. What does that pledge mean? If it be carried out—and it is a very serious matter before England, before Europe, and even before Africa to make this pledge, unless there be a most determined effort to carry it out—it means a most bloody and most costly war—hundreds and thousands of our brave men killed, and tens of thousands of brave Arabs. I have to answer to my conscience and to my constituents for the course I take in this matter. Some of my hon. Friends below the Gangway find no difficulty whatever in voting confidence in the Government. My hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney)—I do not know what he will do exactly—said that if he wished his views to be carried out—and anyone who heard his most powerful and eloquent speech will feel with what earnestness he holds his views—he should most certainly not vote with the Government, but with the right hon. Gentleman opposite. What are the reasons which the Government have given for the course they propose to take? Again, I must go back to the statement of yesterday week with reference to the Expedition, that any other resolution than the one for the overthrow of the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum would be an abandonment of the original objects of the Expedition. I wish that these objects had been as clearly stated months ago as they were yesterday week. I am not sure, if they had, that the Expedition would not have been far less costly, less large, and probably would have succeeded better. What are the objects now, when they do not appear to be so necessary as before Gordon's death? The first is to "rescue those to whom Gordon felt bound in honour, and for

  1693
  whose safety he was pledged." That object must be abandoned. Gordon is dead; those whom he had pledged himself to protect were killed with him, or they have fled, or they have joined the Mahdi; at any rate, they are not there to rescue. The next object is to rescue other garrisons in the Soudan. Again I say, if we bad made that our object a few months ago, it might have been more useful. But what garrisons? Khartoum is taken. Bahr Gazelle may be holding out; Kassala, according to the last accounts, was holding out with great bravery. But if the Government were to send an Expedition to rescue the garrisons of Kassala and Bahr Gazelle, it would probably march, not by way of Khartoum, but of Abyssinia. The next object is to establish some orderly Government at Khartoum, and the last is to check the Slave Trade. I take them together, because, if there be no orderly Government at Khartoum, there will be no check upon the Slave Trade. What does my right hon. Friend mean by the establishment of an orderly Government? I do not know, nor does the House know. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asks, as he has a right to ask, by the terms of his Motion—"Do you mean a good and stable Government?" I do not myself see the difference between the two. We all remember the eloquent fervour and indignation with which my right hon. Friend denounced the idea of establishing a good and stable Government. Then, what is the real difference between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition on this point, between establishing an orderly Government and a good and stable Government? I confess I do not understand the difference in the mere words themselves. But my right hon. Friend, as we all know, is the greatest master that ever existed of distinctions and differences. He convinces himself of them, as he does others; but he does not always convince facts. If a real attempt be made to establish an orderly Government, it will be much the same thing as trying to establish a good and stable Government. But then conies the question whether the Government are going to make such attempt or not. If they are going to overthrow the power of the Mahdi, what are they going to put in the place of it? My
  1694
  right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department hoped they would set up the power of the Native Sultans. Many remarks have been made about that. It is much the same as the policy which was adopted in Zululand. My right hon. Friend quoted the authority of General Gordon in favour of it. I wonder at that, because General Gordon, before his arrival in Khartoum, found that it was impossible and hopeless to attempt it. Are you going to put up at Khartoum a puppet to be knocked down when you leave it, or will you put up a man whom you will undertake to support? If the latter, then there is no difference between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, as far as Khartoum is concerned. But I must say that I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) that if you are to put up a puppet for the purpose of being knocked down when you leave, a war for such a purpose would be a useless war, costing men and money, and leading to no result, or, if to any result, to anarchy; and if I be asked by my constituents whether there is not blood-guiltiness in such a war, I shall be unable to reply. But other Members of the Cabinet have spoken. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) made a most interesting speech, full of the most delightful historic illustrations; but he took very good care, I observed, to say nothing about overthrowing the Mahdi at Khartoum. What he did say was that it was our duty to pursue the war. I suppose it is; I imagine that, if we do not pursue the war, the war will pursue us. Then came the speech of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, one of the most powerful speeches I ever recollect hearing in this House—a most eloquent speech, full of argument. But for whom? Not for the Government, but for my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle. What he wished to do—what he showed to be his great desire—was to get out, not only of the Soudan, but of Egypt. Not a word in his speech about establishing a stable Government at Khartoum. I suppose it might be included in the objects which the Head of the Government declared were not to be abandoned, but which he described as merely secondary objects. Then why

  1695
  does the Secretary of State for the Home Department go to Khartoum? Because it is, he says, the only manner in which the evacuation of the Soudan can be accomplished consistently with the safety of Egypt; but he gave not the slightest shadow of an argument for this opinion. Then came my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke). He gave this definition—"It is our intention to use all reasonable care to leave behind us in the Soudan a state of tranquillity." That is a now version of the Government policy. We are to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum, not because it is necessary for the safety of the Army, or conducive to the success of the military operations—not because it is necessary for the safety of Egypt—but because, having gone to Khartoum, and having left it, we may leave it with the comfortable conviction that we have taken every reasonable care to insure tranquillity. Yes; but what is reasonable tranquillity? It may be interpreted to mean putting up some puppet, and giving some verbal or written declaration that he will be supported, and then, after destroying the only possible Government at Khartoum—the Government of the Mahdi—which might secure tranquillity, although probably accompanied by cruelty, leaving the place really to anarchy. It might be that, but it will not be; because the British people would come forward, and, in spite of the prophecies of the hon. Members for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) and Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), would express the conviction, which is strong in their hearts, that if this country undertakes great responsibilities, even among barbarous nations, it must fulfil them. Not being able to obtain much information in this House, I read the debates of the other, where I found that the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook) had declared that the policy of the Government was clear, and that they would hold their own in the country, and conduct its affairs for the benefit and advantage of the people. But his policy is very different from that of the Home Secretary; and considering the power of that right hon. Gentleman in the Government, and everywhere else where he takes a part, I very much doubt whether
  1696
  the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to carry his policy out. Now comes the question, What are we to do? There are a large number of Motions before us, and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has no easy task before him when he has undertaken to say "No" to all of them. I cannot vote for the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle. What would the Amendment of the hon. Member mean, if there were a possibility of its being carried? I do not believe that he himself would have moved it if he had thought that it would be carried, though there are, I imagine, some Gentlemen who will vote for it, as ho would not do so, if they expected such a result. But what would it mean? It would mean retreat, acknowledgment of defeat, and, what is of more importance, a declaration that we do not intend to fulfil the responsibilities which we have already incurred. There is, however, in reality only one question before us; and that is whether we can repose confidence in the Egyptian and Soudan policy of the Government? It is impossible to separate the one from the other, for their Soudan policy is only an illustration of their Egyptian policy. My hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard, in his eloquent peroration, made an appeal to the Prime Minister, asking him to wake up and to dictate a policy to the country which would be right and consistent with the views of my hon. Friend. He gave the House to understand that he knew that was the real policy of my right hon. Friend. My hon. Friend is a man of great eloquence, earnestness, and great knowledge; but, if he will allow me to say it, with the belief that he has even more knowledge than he possesses. One way in which he shows this belief is by stating, as he has done in Cornwall and in this House, that he knows what are the real and inmost thoughts of the Government, although they have not been expressed. However, we cannot jump to the same conclusion, because we have no facts to warrant it. What are the facts which we have before us? My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made a most remarkable statement in his speech the other night. I do not know that I ever heard from him, or from any Prime Minister, such a speech. Replying to the charge of the hon. Member for New-

  1697
  castle, that they had not the courage of their convictions, he said—
  "We had no alternative in this Egyptian policy. Each step was inevitable; our decisions, sad and deplorable as they may have been in themselves, were yet inevitable in the circumstances, and at the moment when we were called upon to take them."
  Why this helpless position? Why this slavery to circumstances? Why is my right hon. Friend, with all his power, his wonderful faculties and popularity, such as no other Prime Minister in our days has ever possessed—why is he, with his Colleagues, who are also men of ability such as is rarely met with in the same number of men, forced to make this confession of helplessness? Why avowed policy of drifting? For this reason—because, in every step which they have taken, they have not looked forward to the next step. That has been the case from the beginning. When, by the power of our arms, we overthrew Arabi and the Egyptian Government, there was no acknowledgment for a long time afterwards by the Government, even in their own minds, of their responsibility for securing that there should be good government. When the Expedition of General Hicks was permitted to go to the Soudan, there was no thought of what might happen in the event of its probable failure and destruction. When the Egyptian Government were ordered to abandon the Soudan, no attempt was made to secure the retreat of the garrisons; and when Gordon came forward, with his devotion, to undertake his mission, there was an absolute and almost child-like refusal to face the responsibility of his possible failure. When our Government appointed General Gordon Governor General of the Soudan, they had no knowledge or comprehension of the responsibilities of that appointment; when his proposals were rejected—that of sending Zebehr among others—there was no suggestion of other plans; when he was ordered to remain at Khartoum, there was no attempt to secure his safety. The danger to him was at last realized, and then there were months of indecision as to whether he should be relieved, and how. And now, when we are asked to take this new departure, as my hon. Friends call it, and are asked to support the pledge of the Govern-
  1698
  ment to overthrow the Mahdi at Khartoum, there appears to be no consideration of what is to be the next step. Why, even in the matter of this railway we do not know what is to be done, There are different stories given by all of the Ministers as to what is to become of this railway. All I can find out is that it will be made, probably for military reasons, just about the time when the Nile will be full, and the troops could go by that route. There is no doubt the railway might do a great deal of good; but we cannot get from the Government any sort of definition as to what their object is. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister put this question, last Monday, upon very high grounds. He described it not merely as a Vote of Censure, but as a Vote of Confidence. He evidently wished us to understand that we were to give this vote, not as we often have to do, in Votes of Censure, in consideration of everything that might happen from their success, but upon the merits of the particular question. He was quite right. The merits of this question are so important that the vote must be given upon them. What did he say? He said that this was a serious crisis, and deprecated the spectacle, in the face of the world, of a disparaged Government and a doubtful House of Commons. There is, however, one thing worse than a disparaged Government, and that is a doubting Government. We have a doubting Government, because we have a divided Government. We often hear of differences in the Cabinet, and I know very well that such rumours are generally unfounded. But no one can have heard the speeches that have been made by Members of the Government, or watched the decisions that have been come to, and also the want of decisions, without being certain that rumour, in this case, has been right. It is clear there have been two parties and two voices in the Cabinet for months—on this Soudan and Egyptian policy—those who wished to fulfil the responsibilities we have undertaken, and those who have tried to evade their responsibilities. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department has shown clearly enough how difficult it must be for any Cabinet of which he is a Member, with his power and his

  1699
  energy, to fulfil those responsibilities. We have no right to incur responsibilities unless we intend to fulfil them. We have incurred responsibilities which we must fulfil, and therefore I cannot vote for the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon has been charged with saying that he goes further than the Government. What he really said, and I agree with him, is that whatever responsibilities we incur, whether we go forward or not, having incurred those responsibilities we must fulfil them, and that we should not incur them unless we intend to fulfil them. But although I will not vote with my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle, if these two policies are to go on in the Cabinet, neutralizing one another and making no policy a success—in fact, preventing any real policy from being carried out—I say that better than that would be even the policy of my hon. Friend. But, Sir, this doubt and vacillation have continued long enough. We have one more speech to hear to-night—namely, one from my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War. If it were not for the views expressed in the speech of the Home Secretary, I dare say we might have implicit confidence in the speech we are about to hear from my noble Friend. His earnestness of purpose is well known. No one disputes it; but what guarantee have we that he will have the power to give effect to his desires? I fear that this policy of doubt and vacillation will continue? If I thought it was at an end I would throw all considerations of the past to the winds, and not only vote for the Government, but support them with all my might; but I see every reason to believe that it will continue, and therefore I cannot record my vote in their favour.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Mr. Speaker, there are on the Paper tonight many Amendments to the Resolution which has been proposed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), who has just sat down, says there is only one issue before us. I cannot altogether agree with him in that statement, because, in my opinion, there are two very distinct and important issues upon which the House will have to decide to-night. One is
  1700
  placed before us by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley)—namely, whether we are to adopt the policy of retreat, or whether we are to go forward and break the power of the Mahdi, with whom we have been in conflict. The issue submitted by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, which, although a part of the Resolution, professes to lay down a policy for the future, is substantially whether, on account of the alleged shortcomings of the Government in the past, and the inadequacy of their present declarations of the policy in the Soudan and the conduct of the operations which are now in progress—in fact, that the policy of this country throughout the world should be placed in other hands. Well, Sir, both of these issues are, or certainly may be, of great and supreme importance. The first of them is of the most immediate and pressing urgency, although I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford that, for the present, it is an issue not in doubt. Probably, as has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) to-night, it may be an issue which may eventually come before the country, and it would be rash and imprudent at the present time to say that the country has absolutely made up its mind with regard to it; but it is not an issue before the House to-night. Whoever may sit on these Benches, the Expedition in the Soudan will proceed, and such help as he may demand will be given to Lord Wolseley in the enterprize in which he is now engaged. The issue may, in the future, involve larger issues than any that are in question at the present moment; but, as regards immediate action and policy, the vote of to-night can make no change. With the permission of the House I will say a few words on each of the issues which has been placed before us. With reference to the issue raised by the hon. Member for Newcastle, I would ask whether, under present circumstances, we intend to retreat from the Soudan? It is very easy for the hon. Members for Newcastle and Liskeard to make academical, and I dare say strictly logical, declarations as to the inexpediency of the course we have adopted in this matter. My hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard has, however, omitted one thing from his

  1701
  speech and argument to-night. He has said that the step we have recently taken in Egypt was the necessary and logical consequence of the steps we had previously taken there, and that it was impossible, having once commenced to interfere in Egyptian affairs, for us to have stopped short of anything which we have done up to the present time. But my hon. Friend says that we have now reached a point when it is possible to take a new departure; and, indeed, he says that the recent decision of the Government is, in fact, a new departure. I think that a mere statement of the facts and of the position in which we stand will show that my hon. Friend is mistaken in his assertion, and that the present step which we are called upon to take is the inevitable consequence of the previous steps which he himself approves. Let us see what is the position in which this country stands at the present moment. We sent General Gordon to Khartoum; we may have been wrong in coming to that decision; but I should like to ask any of the hon. Members who take that view to consider what was the state of public opinion on the subject in this House, in this country, and throughout the world, at the time that General Gordon was sent out. I will ask those hon. Members to say whether that public opinion was an unwise or an ignoble public opinion? That public opinion, although it did not desire to continue Egyptian rule in the Soudan, protested against the abandonment, without an effort at rescue, of those garrisons and those Egyptian subjects who, through no fault of their own, and many of them against their own will, found themselves in the Soudan, and who were exposed to the imminent danger of massacre or of slavery. In the circumstances, it was impossible for us to refuse to attempt to rescue the whole of those garrisons and those Egyptian subjects. We carefully considered the case of the different garrisons, and we took into account the enormous distances which separated some of the positions, together with the conditions of climate, and we found that it would be impossible to reach all those garrisons; but, at the same time, we felt that, in the opinion of the country, something ought to be done to relieve them. It was the opinion of the Egyptian authorities that something might be done by the mis-
  1702
  sion of General Gordon; and it was the opinion of General Gordon himself, as well as of many others in this country. It was also the opinion of the Government; and we felt that we were not entitled, in the circumstances in which we were placed, to refuse General Gordon's self-sacrificing offer, that if he could do something he would gladly go out. Well, then, Sir, what have we done further? We have sent out an Expedition to endeavour to relieve General Gordon and the garrison of Khartoum. Perhaps some hon. Members may think that we were not bound to send out such an Expedition; but here, again, I ask hon. Members to consider what was the state of opinion in this House and in this country upon that subject, and to consider whether it was possible, when the fact of General Gordon's imminent danger was made known, that public opinion would have been satisfied if no effort had been made to relieve him and the garrison of Khartoum? Now, we are in this position. First, in the form of a British officer, General Gordon, and next in the form of a British Army—a victorious British Army—the power of civilization has been brought face to face with the power of barbarism and anarchy. It might, in these circumstances, have been open to my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle, but it certainly is not open to my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard, to contend that we have been mistaken, and that we should have adopted a policy which, in our opinion, it would have been impossible for us to adopt, and which the sense of the country would unanimously have repudiated. After the gallant defence of Khartoum for a whole year by General Gordon, after the Relief Expedition has come into conflict with the forces which were besieging it, after they have uniformly triumphed in those conflicts, and have approached within a few days' march of Khartoum, not only to rescue Gordon, but to carry on his successful resistance against barbarism—I say that, in such a position as this, it is impossible that the march of that victorious Army should be stayed and converted into a retreat, owing to an act of treachery on the part of one of General Gordon's Army; but a lesson must be taught, not only to the people of Africa, but to the whole world, that the policy of the

  1703
  British Empire is not to be reversed by the single act of a traitor in General Gordon's camp. My hon. Friend has said that this is a new departure; but does he think the alternative he suggests would not be a now step and a new departure, and does he think that a step of that kind, converting a triumph into a retreat—a new step of most momentous importance, independently of the consideration whether it could be honourably adopted—would be a step of an authoritative or binding character that it would be politic or wise to take? Sir, that would be a lesson, indeed, which I hope we shall be slow to teach, either to the people of Africa or to the world. We owe something to the people of Egypt, for whose affairs we are responsible; and can it be supposed that so great an encouragement could be given to the forces of anarchy, which are opposed to civilization as it exists in Egypt, without inflicting a heavy blow upon all the prospects of the regeneration of that country? We owe something not only to the people of Egypt, but also to other Powers who have interests in Egypt. We owe something to our Ally, France, which has interests in Egypt. We owe something to our Mahommedan subjects. We also owe something to our Indian Empire. What would the Mahommedans of that Empire think if they beheld the spectacle of British civilization retiring before a barbarous form of Mahommedan fanaticism? Then, we owe something to every one of our own Colonies which are brought into contact with savage races; and we owe something to every Colony in the world to which the name, the credit, and the honour of England are dear. Then, Sir, if that would be, as I think it would be, a new departure, and a new step of a momentous and most disgraceful character, what was to be done? We came to the decision communicated by the Government to Lord Wolseley. I will not quarrel about words; but I maintain that it was only a political decision, in the sense that it was a decision between retreat and maintaining our position. Lord Wolseley required instructions; and we required information as to the resistance which he would meet. Lord Wolseley told us that if we abandoned all idea of going to Khartoum, and if we abandoned all intention of overthrowing the power of the Mahdi, he
  1704
  would take his measures accordingly. He said, on the other hand, that if we resolved not to retreat, but to prosecute the original object of his Expedition, as far as it could be prosecuted, he would also be prepared to take measures with that object. Well, Sir, we informed Lord Wolseley; and I doubt whether we had any alternative but to tell him that military measures were to be taken based on the necessity we recognized, that it would be necessary that the power of the Mahdi should be broken; that that object would probably involve an advance on Khartoum; and that his military measures were to be based upon that possibility. If the political circumstances change, the military measures must, of course, be changed also; but I cannot say that I see any probability of any such change, or that it will be possible for Lord Wolseley, and the Army at his disposal, either to maintain his position or to destroy the power of the Mahdi, which we told him was an essential condition, without making those preparations which are necessary to advance to and, if necessary, recapture Khartoum. As to the second issue before us, that is not a question of the immediate military policy of the country. I believe that the Opposition, if they accede to power, will carry it out. They will find that there are larger and wider issues involved than the issue which the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) has raised. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir William Harcourt) pointed out last night what some of these issues were, what tremendous responsibilities were involved, or might be involved, in a policy which is not distinctly stated, but shadowed out in the right hon. Gentleman's Resolution. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) has, tonight, spoken somewhat more definitely than his Predecessors in the debate of the policy of his Party in the Soudan. He has asked us to state, not the details, but the principles of our policy. He has taken exception to what was said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to whom he attributed the statement that the sole object of this Expedition was the evacuation of the Soudan. What I understood my right hon. Friend to say

  1705
  was that the measures which we are taking would be necessary if that were the case. But the Prime Minister has already stated other objects which would be sacrificed if we arrived at any other decision—objects which we were not prepared to sacrifice, but which we were prepared to make reasonable sacrifices to obtain. But when the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) attempted to define a policy himself, he proceeded a certain distance; but, to my mind, he stopped short of giving the House a clear and definite idea of what that policy was, just as we have been accused of doing. The right hon. Gentleman, it is true, said we must retain the control of the Nile Valley, at least, as far as Khartoum, and the route from Suakin to the Nile. Well, Sir, as far as the objects of that policy are concerned, that is definite enough. But he stopped short then, and did not tell us how all this was to be done—whether the control over the Nile Valley was to be retained by British troops, or Indian troops, or a Fellaheen Egyptian Army. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that it will be possible permanently to retain a large British Army in the Nile Valley, or to keep open the communication between Suakin and Berber. I do not know whether he has consulted the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. E. Stanhope), or the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton), whether, in their opinion, the employment of the Indian Army for such a service would conduce to the popularity or the efficiency of our Indian Army. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman supposes that the Fellaheen Army, which met the Arab Tribes at Teb, under Baker Pasha, can be trusted to retain for us the control of the Nile Valley and the communication between Suakin and Berber. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman contemplates the organization of Native levies. Is he certain that that policy can be carried out, and is he prepared to pledge himself as to the mode, and has he a distinct opinion how these objects, however desirable in themselves, can be accomplished? Is the House prepared to pledge itself to the policy described by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, of undertaking, in the heart
  1706
  of Africa, the government of a new India, in circumstances much more difficult than those which attend the present government of our Indian Empire? And, Sir, there is another question. Are right hon. Gentlemen opposite prepared, with a light heart, to undertake such a policy? Are they confident that the country will support them steadfastly and earnestly in their determination to carry it out? Why, Sir, what is the very first step, if they succeed in defeating us to-night? If they succeed in taking our places, of what will the majority which will produce that result be composed? Is it a majority which will be prepared to support them in carrying out that earnest and steadfast determination—that policy which has been indicated? Are you certain that a majority of this House, which may place you in power, will support you in that policy; and are you certain that the country—either the existing constituencies or those which are shortly to come into existence—will do so? Well, Sir, if right hon. Gentlemen opposite are so convinced, if the House is convinced, that the country is ready to support them in that policy, I have no more to say. I have only to say that they are the men, and not we, who ought to be entrusted with the execution of that policy. But that they have formed any such determination I greatly doubt. If they do not propose any great change in the policy which we set before them—if, in fact, it is only to be a change of men, and not of measures; if they are not prepared, any more than we are, to attempt to attain the object they aim at by all reasonable means, then, perhaps, I may be permitted for a short time to advert to some of the charges, retrospective, present, and prospective, which have been brought forward in this debate, as a reason why we should change the men and not the policy. It may be true that a Government must be judged by the results of its policy; but it is not to be always assumed that there is some way in which success could have been achieved, and that it is bound to be impossible that any combination of circumstances could ever occur in which the choice before the Government is anything but a choice of evils, and in which it was absolutely impossible that a satisfactory result could, in any case, have been obtained. Unless all assump-

  1707
  tions are to be made against the Government, I maintain that now, with all the knowledge that has been acquired after the event, and not before, it is impossible to show that there has been any other course open to the Government, at any period of these transactions, which would have insured success, or which might not have led to as great or greater misfortunes than those which have occurred. It cannot certainly be shown that it was any inevitable consequence of our policy that has prevented the relief of Khartoum. It has been pointed out that what has prevented the relief of Khartoum was an act of treachery—an accident, which no foresight could possibly have averted—an event which might have happened a week or a month after General Gordon reached Khartoum. It is quite true, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, that time was of the essence of this matter, and that it was probable that the time which elapsed before General Gordon was relieved greatly increased the chances of treachery; but we know, as a matter of fact, that treachery existed in General Gordon's camp from the time of his arrival. We know the severe measures he had to take in order to punish it; and I altogether dissent from the contention of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) that treachery could not be successful unless it was supported by a powerful enemy at the gates of Khartoum. Sir, as it happened in the present case, it appears to have taken the form of opening the gates to the enemy; but there were other forms which it might have taken. General Gordon might, without difficulty, have been assassinated in his Palace, and the defence of Khartoum would then have collapsed as effectually as by the opening of the gates. But for this act of treachery there is every reason to believe that the Force under General Stewart would have reached Khartoum, and would have raised the siege of the city, and that he would have enabled General Gordon to defeat the scattered Forces by which he had been so long beleaguered. The main object of the Expedition of Lord Wolseley would then have been accomplished; and this Resolution which is now before the House would never have been made, although I have not the smallest doubt that the ingenuity of
  1708
  right hon. Gentlemen opposite would have found some other equally satisfactory ground for moving a Vote of Censure on Her Majesty's Government. But, Sir, I have to ask whether the judgment of the British House of Commons is to be reversed; and whether that which is now made the subject of a Vote of Censure would not rather have been the subject of a Vote of Approval and of Confidence in the Government but for an act of treachery? Sir, what are the alternatives which are so lightly spoken of, and which, we are told, were within the reach of Her Majesty's Government throughout these transactions? We are told that we might have utilized General Graham's successes at an earlier period. As to that, I, for one, shall never cease to rejoice that we did not yield to the advice given us, as I think, on imperfect knowledge of the circumstances, that we should send a couple of squadrons at the time from Suakin to Berber. I do not deny that those squadrons might possibly have reached Berber; but we know that within a very short time of the date at which they could have reached it, Berber was beleaguered and surrounded; the tribes on all sides of it were in revolt; and there is no reason whatever to suppose that that little Force would not have been surrounded and beleaguered in Berber during the summer months; and that, in addition to the anxiety undergone on account of General Gordon and his gallant companions, in addition to sending an Expedition for his rescue, we should have had to send an Expedition to rescue the garrison at Berber, surrounded by hostile tribes, without any means of communication, and without any means of obtaining supplies. Then, Sir, we were told we might have sent General Graham's Force; but those who speak of the employment of General Graham's Force at the time overlook altogether the fact that this was absolutely impossible. General Graham's Force was not provided with transport. ["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Gentlemen opposite cheer that statement; but perhaps they do not remember that General Graham's Force was organized very rapidly, and for a special object. It was approved by the majority in this House that it should attempt the rescue of the Egyptian garrisons in the immediate neighbourhood of the Red Sea. It was not possible, in a

  1709
  short time, to bring together General Graham's Force with the amount of transport that would have enabled him to move any great distance into the interior; and when hon. Gentlemen speak so lightly of moving a large Force to Berber, in my opinion very few of them have considered what the difficulty of transport is. An hon. Gentleman asked me, the other day, whether I was aware that the whole of General Hicks's Army moved into the Soudan? Sir, I am perfectly aware that, in totally different circumstances, when the country was comparatively tranquil, that it was possible to move bodies of men along that route in very small detachments, and in a short space of time. But the circumstances at the time we have to consider were altered, and the country was not tranquil; and there is the strong probability, and even an absolute certainty, that a large Force would have to be encountered at the end of the march. Everyone knows that an Army on its march through a barren country must be accompanied by an enormous number of transport animals; that, in addition to the ordinary wants of the Army, water for that Army, water for the followers, and water for the transport animals themselves has to be carried on the backs of camels and other animals. It will, therefore, be seen that the number of animals required is almost past calculation; and I have not heard any competent authority put the number of camels necessary for sending any respectable Force across the Desert to Berber at less than between 40,000 and 70,000. Then, Sir, lam asked why were not earlier measures taken between April, or May and August, for the purpose of preparing an advance from Suakin, either by means of a railway, or by the Nile route? It is quite true that there were many and great difficulties to be considered and weighed very carefully. There were differences of opinion between the Military Authorities as to the best route to be taken. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford asked me a question to-night with reference to the advice given by Lord Wolseley on this subject. Sir, I not entitled—indeed, I think I am bound—not to give my right hon. Friend any information as to the advice given on this subject by Lord Wolseley to the Government. Lord Wolseley is one of the confidential Military Advisers of Her
  1710
  Majesty's Government; he was consulted at the very earliest period of these transactions by me, and I was throughout in confidential communication with him. There would be an end of confidential communication between a Government and its Military Advisers, if, on the demand of any Member of this House, a Minister of the Crown, who is alone responsible, were compelled to tell the House what was the advice given him from this quarter or from that with reference to operations. Although I say that the military difficulties were great, and although there was a difference of opinion between the Military Authorities, I have no hesitation in saying that the justi6cation, or excuse, or whatever term you prefer, of the Government has rested mainly on the fact—which we have never attempted to conceal—that the Government were not, until a comparatively late period, convinced of the absolute necessity of sending a Military Expedition to Khartoum. The grounds of that opinion were fully stated by my right hon. Friend and myself in the debate in this House in the middle of last May, and they were still more carefully and fully stated on the 5th of August last. My right hon. Friend reviewed at that time the evidence in our possession, and frankly and openly communicated to the House—and it was made the ground of Parliamentary action—that the Government were not satisfied, from the evidence in their possession, of the proved necessity of the relief of General Gordon by a Military Expedition. That opinion of the Government was never concealed. At that very time, when we came to the House to ask for a Vote of Credit, it was stated to the House that it was not a Vote for the despatch of an Expedition, of the military necessity of which we were not satisfied; but that it was a Vote to enable the Government to make certain preparations for the contingencies of such an Expedition, if the necessity of it were proved. With the experience we have since obtained of the difficulties and dangers attending any operation of that character, I think that the Government had a right to hesitate, and was bound to hesitate, before it involved the British Army in all those dangers and difficulties, unless and until it was beyond the possibility of doubt that the relief of General Gor-

  1711
  don could not be effected in any other manner. It is very easy to talk about the possibility and expediency of making preparations which would have enabled us to move when the necessity was proved; but, Sir, it is not so easy in practice to draw a distinction between the preparation for, and the initiation of, an Expedition. Take, for instance, the Berber-Suakin route, recommended by hon. Gentlemen opposite; nothing more could have been done than was done short of the absolute despatch of the Expedition to make preparations for an advance by that route. Not a step could be taken further than was taken for the preparation of a railway from Suakin without sending forward another Expedition and again attacking Osman Digna; and, in my opinion, the House of Commons and the country would not have supported the Government in sending another Expedition, unless it was adequately and conclusively proved that it was necessary for the rescue of General Gordon. Well, Sir, the circumstances were somewhat different as regards the Nile route; and, as regards that route, we did endeavour to draw a distinction between operation and preparation. But the moment preparation was made that distinction entirely vanished. We had not only to make preparations here—to order supplies, and so on—but we had to make preparations in Egypt, and beyond it. We had to secure the co-operation of the Mudir of Dongola, and of the tribes under his direction—the tribes on the Nile and in the Korosko and Bayuda Deserts, and beyond the Frontiers of Egypt Proper, whatever might have taken place at Khartoum; but once these measures had been taken with regard to those tribes, it was almost unavoidable that the movement should take place. I say, therefore, it was not so easy as hon. Members opposite probably suppose to make preparations in advance for an Expedition. It seems to be supposed that, because we have not succeeded in relieving General Gordon, no result has been accomplished. In my opinion, a very considerable result has been accomplished. The Province of Dongola has been secured; the movement of the Mahdi, which was rapidly extending towards the Frontier of Egypt, has been altogether checked; the Frontiers of Egypt itself have been
  1712
  made absolutely secure; the British troops have been successful in every encounter that has taken place; and no one can suppose that, in the prosecution of future operations, the successful conduct of those operations I have referred to will not be of great advantage, and tend to the success of whatever movement may hereafter be made. The Government have been asked to give further pledges with regard to the object of their policy in the Soudan. I can very well understand that that demand should be made by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), and by the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), who are altogether opposed to our policy; and I can understand that such demands should be made by hon. Gentlemen opposite, who, although they approve of the immediate steps which we are taking, have no confidence in our general policy, and distrust our ability to carry to a successful issue those measures to which we are absolutely pledged. But what I find more difficult to understand is that, with such pledges, such an additional assurance as this should be demanded of us by those who say that they desire to support Her Majesty's Government. I cannot understand how they can wish to support us, and, at the same time, to fetter us by pledges and engagements which would be made in ignorance of the circumstances under which those pledges were given, and which could not but hamper us greatly in future operations. Sir, in my opinion, we have already had not too little, but too much of declarations, which have been extracted from us, I must admit, with tolerable impartiality from all quarters of the House. Such pledges are, in my opinion, simply mischievous, and injurious to the public welfare in whichever direction they go. They are pledges which, to the best of my knowledge, were never before asked for from a Government about to enter upon such an undertaking as that which we are entering upon; and, in my opinion, they ought not to be given by any Government. I read the other day that the great Duke of Wellington made it a rule always to strive to ascertain what was on the other side of a hill. But I should be very much surprised to hear that the Duke of Wellington ever based his policy, or announced his

  1713
  plans beforehand, upon the forecast which he so made. It is all very well to endeavour to learn what is on the other side of a hill; but I think no wise man would base his policy beforehand upon a guess as to what lay on the other side—pledge himself to a policy which must necessarily be a forecast on circumstances which he cannot fully know. I have been asked personally to-night to give additional pledges, and to add something to the declarations which have been made by the Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) has stated that he would have confidence in the honesty of my intentions, but that he would doubt my power to carry into effect any pledges which I might give. I will set my right hon. Friend's mind at rest by assuring him that I have no desire or intention of giving him pledges in addition, or at all contrary, to those already given by other Members of the Government. I must ask the House to take the policy of the Government from the declarations of Ministers who have already spoken—from the declarations before the House—and more especially from the declarations of the Prime Minister himself. My right hon. Friend at the head of the Government yesterday week, in a very careful statement, told the House what were the objects which we had in view, and which were reasonable objects, and objects we were prepared to make reasonable efforts to execute. Among these objects he enumerated the security of Egypt, the protection of the tribes who had been friendly to us, the suppression of the slave traffic, and the establishment of an orderly Government at Khartoum. Well, as to the security of Egypt, my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) seems to think that it is our interference in Egypt that has brought us into all these troubles. We are told that it is very unfair to be continually telling the Opposition that it is in consequence of their policy that we are in Egypt. I do not know that we have said that it is the policy of the Opposition that has led us into Egypt; but I can say who contributed to the state of things which led us to Egypt, and that is the hon. Member for Northampton himself. In 1882 the hon. Member said, in the discussion on the Vote of
  1714
  Credit for the Expedition to Egypt, that—
  "He did not know that there was anyone more strongly opposed to intervention than he was, speaking of the general term; but he really believed this intervention was absolutely necessary."—(3 Hansard, [272] 2052.)
  I do not know whether additional pledges were asked for as to our intention to maintain the security of Egypt. I do not suppose any hon. Member in the House believes that we are more indifferent to the security of Egypt on account of the great sacrifices we have had of late to make. It is true that we have always professed, and that we still profess, that we have no intention of permanently occupying Egypt, and that we intend to maintain those pledges which we have given to Egypt and to the European Powers. But we have always said that we did not intend to retire from Egypt until the main objects of our intervention in that country were secured; and nothing, so far as I know, has been said by any Member of the Government during that debate that could in the slightest degree weaken that assurance. The protection of the tribes who have assisted us is one of our objects, as the Prime Minister has stated; and I do not think that if the policy of Her Majesty's Government is carried out, there need be any fear that that object will not be secured. Do hon. Members suppose—for what reason should they?—that there will be any great difficulty in defending the tribes who have befriended us after the overshadowing military power of the Mahdi has been broken—as the Government intend to break it, by the military operations under Lord Wolseley? It is difficult to say at this moment what measures will be taken by the Government; but there is no reason to believe that it would be a work of any special difficulty, or one that the Government would not be likely to undertake, to give adequate protection to the tribes when the military power of the Mahdi was broken. As to the suppression of the Slave Trade and the establishment of an orderly Government, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford seems to think there are insuperable difficulties in the way; and unless we are prepared to explain to him exactly the mode in which an orderly Government is to be established he refuses to give

  1715
  us his support. But what did General Gordon go to do? He went out with the intention of establishing an orderly Government at Khartoum; and what was it that prevented the accomplishment of that object? Why, the military insurrection of the Mahdi, by which he was confronted almost from the first moment of his arrival in Khartoum. Is there any reason to suppose that this end will be difficult or impossible of attainment after the military power of the Mahdi has been broken? At all events, what advantage would be gained by our attempting to describe the exact measures that may have to be taken? As to the railway from Suakin to Berber, it seems to be supposed that we alone, of all the Members of this House, are indifferent to the civilizing influences that can be served by a railway—such as the establishment and development of sound trading principles, as opposed to the fanatical, predatory, and plundering habits of the Arabs. I know of no reason why we should be supposed to be more indifferent than anyone else to these advantages. The House may rest assured that we shall use every reasonable effort to make the railway valuable not only—as it is absolutely necessary it should be—for the military purposes for which it is now being constructed, but for the civilization and permanent benefit of that part of the world. Sir, these are the objects which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has described, and which every Member of the Government, to the best of my belief, has in view. These are our objects, and all of them are similar to those General Gordon went to the Soudan to endeavour to accomplish. These are the objects which General Gordon failed to accomplish, though he was supported by such authority as the Egyptian Government could give him. We shall attempt to accomplish his objects with the assistance and the support of better, and I hope purer, means than were at his disposal. Though these are our objects, and though we hope earnestly that we may succeed in their accomplishment, I do not think we are called on, and I do not think we should be justified, on necessarily imperfect knowledge, in making absolute declarations of policy which it may be beyond the power even of this country to carry out without entailing sacrifices upon the people of this
  1716
  country greater than we have a right to demand. I regret that it should have been necessary for me to detain the House so long. I thank the House for the indulgence it has given to me; and, in conclusion, I have only to express a hope that the decision about to be taken will be clear, definite, and fixed in character, so that no doubt may remain as to what is the opinion of the House of Commons at a crisis so important as the present.
  LORD JOHN MANNERS: Mr. Speaker—Sir, at this hour of the morning I shall not presume to address the House for more than a few minutes. I congratulate the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) on the frank, manly, and open speech that he has just made; and if I am obliged to add that I do not think that the speech of the noble Marquess has carried the case of the Government much farther than those speeches which, in the course of the evening, we have heard from his Colleagues, I am convinced that it is due to no lack of ability on his part, but to the weakness of the case of the Government. He has told us, with reference to the past, how, in his opinion, the lamentable death of General Gordon was brought about. The noble Marquess asks how and why was General Gordon sent out; and goes on to say that General Gordon was sent out in deference to public opinion. I must say that I think that such a man should not have been made a mere sacrifice to public opinion. The noble Marquess told us how that public opinion had risen. The noble Marquess has told us how, because Her Majesty's Government had ordered the Egyptian Government to abandon the Soudan, the question arose as to how the garrisons were to be extricated from those fortresses in which, but for that announcement, they might have remained safely. Therefore, the Government hit upon the expedient of sending General Gordon upon that mission. But why, I ask, was it that the Government, in a moment of hasty panic, gave that fatal order for the Egyptian Government to abandon the Soudan? Why, because against the advice of Lord Dufferin and of General Hicks, against the opinion of everybody who knew the relations of the question of the Soudan to Egypt, the Government determined to take no note of what

  1717
  happened in the former country. Why, because turning a deaf ear and a blind eye to all that was passing in the Soudan, they permitted the only Army Egypt then possessed to be destroyed, after having first destroyed her best Army at Tel-el-Kebir because they permitted it to go to certain destruction under the leadership of the gallant but unfortunate Hicks Pasha. Following, then, the train of reasoning of the noble Marquess, I say that he has conclusively proved that the death of General Gordon, the capture of Khartoum, and the wider dangers and probable misery that are in store for us, are the direct product of that fatal act of folly on the part of the Government in refusing to listen to the advice tendered to them in regard to Hicks Pasha's ill-omened advance. Then the noble Marquess says—repeating what the Prime Minister, on a former occasion, said—that, after all, General Gordon's life would have been spared if it had not been for an unexpected act of treachery on the part of some of his garrison. I entirely dispute the right of the Government to set up that excuse for their laches and delays. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) pointed out—and pointed out with truth and accuracy—that this act of treachery could not, in all human probability, have been consummated previous to the fall of Omdurman, and its capture by the Mahdi. How long before the capture of Khartoum had Omdurman fallen? A very few weeks, at the outside. What does Lord Wolseley tell us in the last despatch with which we have been favoured from him? Why, he tells us how deeply he regrets being unable to leave England a month earlier than he did. That fatal month was lost by the apathy, by the indifference, or, if the noble Marquess pleases, by the over-caution of the Government, which, in all human probability, would have prevented the fall of Khartoum and the death of General Gordon. The noble Marquess said that time was taken in considering the military problems connected with the advance of an Army to Khartoum. But the noble Marquess did not shrink, with the frankness which characterizes him, from saying that one of the principal reasons that rendered the Expedition too late was the indecision of the Government
  1718
  as to the necessity of the Expedition itself. I maintain that at the end of February, when Her Majesty's Government rejected all the suggestions and proposals of General Gordon, it then became their primary duty to devise means of rescuing him from Khartoum. Instead of adopting that course, on the showing of the noble Marquess himself, they wasted month after month until, according to the right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) last night, it was the middle of July, or, according to the noble Marquess, the middle of August, before they took any practical steps to rescue the brave man whom they had so long left unaided to his own resources. Those are the grounds on which we say the Government are culpable in the eyes of this House, of the country, and of the civilized world for the terrible catastrophe which we all deplore. And now, Sir, one word only as to the future. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War has told us that he cannot—that he will not—add anything to the assurances for the future which have been given to the House by his Colleagues in their speeches. Well, Sir, we have listened to this debate, and we have heard men connected with every Party in this House say that the statements of the Prime Minister and his Colleagues are not satisfactory, and not such as would justify the vast expenditure of blood and money the policy of the Government calls on the House to maintain. The noble Marquess has not said anything which would beget confidence as to the course which the Government intend to pursue after their military operations are successful. There are three distinct policies before the House. There is the policy of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley); that is intelligible; it is clear; I think it is a mistake. There is the policy of the Government, explained as it has been by four or five Cabinet Ministers. What is it? What continuity do we find in the speeches of Ministers? There is nothing to give the House the slightest confidence that any one of the four objects quoted by the noble Marquess will be in existence six months after the military operations in the Soudan have terminated. Then there is the policy which my right hon. Friend (Sir Stafford Northcote) had indicated in his Resolu-

  1719
  tion. That is a policy, I venture to say, which clearly defines the permanent character of the good influences which we hope to derive from the military successes of the Expedition sent out by Her Majesty's Government—that is a policy which I trust the House will adopt. The noble Marquess has endeavoured to frighten the House by considerations extraneous to the question at issue. He asked us if we are certain that we shall have the support of the people—if we are certain that we shall have the subsequent support of the House, even if to-night we gain a majority? I am certain of neither of these things; but of this I am certain—that it is our duty to endeavour to carry this Resolution; and I am certain it is the duty of the House of Commons to carry it. Sir, I know not what the division may be—I know not whether the numbers in our Lobby may be great or small; but this I do know—that behind those numbers, be they great or small, there will be ranged the generous aspirations, the fixed resolve, and the firm determination of an indignant and sorrowing, but a courageous and an indomitable people.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 288; Noes 302: Majority 14.

  AYES.

  Alexander, Maj.-Gen. C.

  Bruce, Sir H. H.

  Allsopp, C.

  Bruce, hon. T.

  Amherst, W. A. T.

  Brymer, W. E.

  Archdale, W. H.

  Bulwer, J. R.

  Ashmead-Bartlett, E.

  Burghley, Lord

  Aylmer, J. E. F.

  Burrell, Sir W. W.

  Bailey, Sir J. R

  Buxton, Sir R. J.

  Balfour, A. J.

  Callan, P.

  Baring, T. C.

  Cameron, D.

  Barry, J.

  Campbell, J. A.

  Barttelot, Sir W. B.

  Carden, Sir R. W.

  Bateson, Sir T.

  Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.

  Beach, right hon. Sir M. E. Hicks-

  Chaine, J.

  Chaplin, H.

  Beach, W.W. B.

  Christie, W. L.

  Bective, Earl of

  Clarke, E.

  Bellingham, A. H.

  Clive, Col. hon. G. W.

  Bentinck, rt. hn. G. C.

  Close, M. C.

  Beresford, G. De la P.

  Coddington, W.

  Biddell, W.

  Cole, Viscount

  Biggar, J. G.

  Commins, A.

  Birkbeck, E.

  Compton, F.

  Blackburne, Col. J. I.

  Coope, O. E.

  Boord, T. W.

  Corbet. W. J.

  Bourke, right hon. R.

  Corry, J. P.

  Broadley, W. H. H.

  Cotton, W. J. R.

  Brodrick, hon. W. St. J. F.

  Courtauld, G.

  Cowen, J.

  Brooke, Lord

  Creyke, R.

  1720

  Crichton, Viscount

  Hay, rt. hon. Admiral Sir J. C. D.

  Cross, rt. hon. Sir R. A.

  Cubitt, right hon. G.

  Healy, T. M.

  Curzon, Major hon. M.

  Herbert, hon. S.

  Dalrymple, C.

  Hicks, E.

  Davenport, H. T.

  Hildyard, T. B. T.

  Dawnay, Col. hon. L. P.

  Hill, Lord A. W.

  Dawson, C.

  Hill, A. S.

  Deasy, J.

  Holland, Sir H. T.

  De Worms, Baron H.

  Home, Lt.-Col. D. M.

  Dickson, Major A. G.

  Hope, right hon. A. J. B. B.

  Dixon-Hartland, F. D.

  Douglas, A. Akers-

  Houldsworth, W. H.

  Dundas, hon. J. C.

  Hubbard, right hon. J. G.

  Dyke, rt. hn. Sir W. H.

  Eaton, H. W.

  Jackson, W. L.

  Eckersley, N.

  Johnstone, Sir F.

  Ecroyd, W. F.

  Kennard, Col. E. H.

  Egerton, hon. A. de T.

  Kennard, C. J.

  Egerton, hon. A. F.

  Kennaway, Sir J. H.

  Elcho, Lord

  Kenny, M. J.

  Elliot, G. W.

  Ker, R. W. B.

  Ellis, Sir J. W.

  Knight, F. W.

  Elton, C. I.

  Knightley, Sir R.

  Emlyn, Viscount

  Laing, S.

  Estcourt, G. S.

  Lalor, R.

  Ewart, W.

  Lawrance, J. C.

  Ewing, A. O.

  Lawrence, Sir T.

  Feilden, Lt.-Gen. R. J.

  Leahy, J.

  Fellowes, W. H.

  Leamy, E.

  Finch, G. H.

  Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.

  Finch-Hatton, hon. M. E. G.

  Legh, W. J.

  Leigh, R.

  Fitzwilliam, hon. C. W.

  Leighton, Sir B.

  Fitzwilliam, hon. H. W.

  Leighton, S.

  Fitzwilliam, hon. W. J.

  Lennox, right hn. Lord H. G. C. G.

  Fitz-Wygram, Sir F.

  Fletcher, Sir H.

  Lever, J. O.

  Floyer, J.

  Levett, T. J.

  Folkestone, Viscount

  Lewis, C. E.

  Forester, C. T. W.

  Lewisham, Viscount

  Forster, rt. hn. W. E.

  Lindsay, Sir R. L.

  Foster, W. H.

  Lloyd, S. S.

  Fowler, R. N.

  Loder, R.

  Fremantle, hon. T. F.

  Long, W. H.

  French-Brewster, R. A. B.

  Lopes, Sir M.

  Lowther, rt. hon. J.

  Freshfield, C. K.

  Lowther, hon. W.

  Galway, Viscount

  Lynch, N.

  Gardner, R. Richardson

  Macartney, J. W. E.

  Mac Iver, D.

  Gibson, right hon. E.

  Macnaghten, E.

  Giffard, Sir H. S.

  M'Carthy, J.

  Giles, A.

  M'Carthy, J. H.

  Goldney, Sir G.

  M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.

  Gooch, Sir D.

  M'Kenna, Sir J. N.

  Gorst, J. E.

  M'Mahon, E.

  Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.

  Makins, Colonel W. T.

  Grantham, W.

  Manners, rt. hon. Lord J. J. R.

  Gray, E. D.

  Greene, E.

  March, Earl of

  Greer, T.

  Marriott, W. T.

  Gregory, G. B.

  Martin, P.

  Grey, A. H. G.

  Marum, E. M.

  Gunter, R.

  Master, T. W. C.

  Halsey, T. F.

  Maxwell, Sir H. E.

  Hamilton, right hon. Lord G.

  Mayne, T.

  Meagher, W.

  Hamilton, Lord C. J.

  Miles, Sir P. J. W.

  Hamilton, I. T.

  Mills, Sir C. H.

  Harrington, T.

  Milner, Sir F.

  Harris, W. J.

  Molloy, B. C.

  Harvey, Sir R. B.

  Monckton, F.

  1721

  Moore, A.

  Ross, A. H.

  Morgan, hon. F.

  Ross, C. C.

  Moss, R.

  Round, J.

  Mowbray, rt. hon. Sir J. R.

  St. Aubyn, W. M.

  Salt, T.

  Mulholland, J.

  Sclater-Booth, rt. hn. G.

  Muntz, P. A.

  Scott, M. D.

  Newdegate, C. N.

  Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.

  Newport, Viscount

  Nicholson, W.

  Severne, J. E.

  Nicholson, W. N.

  Sexton, T.

  Nolan, Colonel J. P.

  Sheil, E.

  North, Colonel J. S.

  Small, J. F.

  Northcote, rt. hon. Sir S. H.

  Smith, rt. hon. W. H.

  Smith, A.

  Northcote, H. S.

  Smithwick, J. F.

  O'Connor, A.

  Stanhope, hon. E.

  O'Connor, J.

  Stanley, rt. hon. Col. F.

  O'Connor, T. P.

  Stanley, E. J.

  O'Donnell, F. H.

  Storer, G.

  O'Gorman Mahon, Col. The

  Strutt, hon. C. H.

  Sullivan, T. D.

  O'Kelly, J.

  Sykes, C.

  Onslow, D. R.

  Talbot, J. G.

  O'Shea, W. H.

  Thomson, H.

  O'Sullivan, W. H.

  Thornhill, A. J.

  Paget, R. H.

  Thynne, Lord H. F.

  Parnell, C. S.

  Tollemache, hon. W. F.

  Patrick, R. W. Cochran-

  Tollemache, H. J.

  Tomlinson, W. E. M.

  Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

  Tottenham, A. L.

  Pell, A.

  Tremayne, J.

  Pemberton, E. L.

  Tyler, Sir H. W.

  Percy, rt. hon. Earl

  Wallace, Sir R.

  Percy, Lord A. M.

  Walrond, Col. W. H.

  Phipps, C. N. P.

  Warburton, P. E.

  Phipps, P.

  Warton, C. N.

  Plunket, rt. hon. D. R.

  Watney, J.

  Power, P. J.

  Whitley, E.

  Power, R.

  Williams, General O.

  Price, Captain G. E.

  Wilmot, Sir H.

  Puleston, J. H.

  Wilmot, Sir J. E.

  Raikes, rt. hon. H. C.

  Wolff, Sir H. D.

  Rankin, J.

  Wortley, C. B. Stuart-

  Read, C. S.

  Wroughton, P.

  Redmond, J. E.

  Wyndham, hon. P.

  Redmond, W. H. K.

  Wynn, Sir W. W.

  Rendlesham, Lord

  Yorke, J. R.

  Repton, G. W.

  Ridley, Sir M. W.

  TELLERS.

  Ritchie, C. T.

  Thornhill, T.

  Rolls, J. A.

  Winn, R.

  NOES

  Acland, rt. hn. Sir T. D.

  Baring, Viscount

  Acland, C. T. D.

  Barnes, A.

  Agnew, W.

  Barran, J.

  Ainsworth, D.

  Bass, Sir A.

  Allen, H. G.

  Bass, H.

  Allman, R. L.

  Baxter, rt. hon. W. E.

  Amory, Sir J. H.

  Beaumont, W. B.

  Anderson, G.

  Biddulph, M.

  Armitage, B.

  Blennerhassett, Sir R.

  Armitstead, G.

  Blennerhassett, R. P.

  Arnold, A.

  Bolton, J. C.

  Asher, A.

  Borlase, W. C.

  Ashley, hon. E. M.

  Brand, hon. H. R.

  Baldwin, E.

  Brassey, Sir T.

  Balfour, Sir G.

  Brassey, H. A.

  Balfour, rt. hon. J. B.

  Brett, R. B.

  Balfour, J. S.

  Briggs, W. E.

  Barclay, J. W.

  Bright, right hon. J.

  1722

  Bright, J.

  Findlater, W.

  Brinton, J.

  Firth, J. F. B.

  Broadhurst, H.

  Fitzmaurice, Lord E.

  Brogden, A.

  Flower, C.

  Brooks, M.

  Foljambe, C. G. S.

  Brown, A. H.

  Foljambe, F. J. S.

  Bruce, rt. hon. Lord C.

  Forster, Sir C.

  Bruce, hon. R. P.

  Fowler, H. H.

  Bryce, J.

  Fowler, W.

  Buchanan, T. R.

  Fry, L.

  Burt, T.

  Fry, T.

  Buxton, F. W.

  Gabbett, D. F.

  Buxton, S. C.

  Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

  Caine, W. S.

  Gladstone, H. J.

  Cameron, C.

  Gladstone, W. H.

  Campbell, Sir G.

  Gordon, Lord D.

  Campbell, R. F. F.

  Gordon, Sir A.

  Campbell-Bannerman, right hon. H.

  Gourley, E. T.

  Gower, hon. E. F. L.

  Carbutt, E. H.

  Grafton, F. W.

  Carington, hon. R.

  Grant, Sir G. M.

  Cartwright, W. C.

  Grant, A.

  Causton, R. K.

  Grant, D.

  Cavendish, Lord E.

  Gurdon, R. T.

  Chamberlain, rt. hn. J.

  Hamilton, J. G. C.

  Chambers, Sir T.

  Harcourt, rt. hn. Sir W. G. V. V.

  Cheetham, J. F.

  Childers, rt. hn. H. C. E.

  Hardcastle, J. A.

  Clark, S.

  Hartington, Marq. of

  Clarke, J. C.

  Hastings, G. W.

  Clifford, C. C.

  Hayter, Sir A. D.

  Cohen, A.

  Henderson, F.

  Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

  Heneage, E.

  Collings, J.

  Henry, M.

  Collins, E.

  Herschell, Sir F.

  Colman, J. J.

  Hibbert, J. T.

  Colthurst, Col. D. la Z.

  Hill, T. R.

  Corbett, J.

  Holden, I.

  Cotes, C. C.

  Holland, S.

  Courtney, L. H.

  Hollond, J. R.

  Cowper, hon. H. F.

  Holms, J.

  Craig, W. Y.

  Hopwood, C. H.

  Cropper, J.

  Howard, E. S.

  Cross, J. K.

  Howard, G. J.

  Crum, A.

  Howard, J.

  Cunliffe, Sir R. A.

  Illingworth, A.

  Davey, H.

  Ince, H. B.

  Davies, D.

  Inderwick, F. A.

  Davies, R.

  James, Sir H.

  Davies, W.

  James, C.

  De Ferrières, Baron

  James, W. H.

  Dickson, J.

  Jardine, R.

  Dickson, T. A.

  Jenkins, Sir J. J.

  Dilke, rt. hn. Sir C. W.

  Jenkins, D. J.

  Dillwyn, L. L.

  Jerningham, H. E. H.

  Dodds, J.

  Johnson, E.

  Duckham, T.

  Jones-Parry, L.

  Duff, R. W.

  Kinnear, J.

  Earp, T.

  Labouchere, H.

  Ebrington, Viscount

  Lambton, hon. F. W.

  Edwards, H.

  Lawrence, Sir J. C.

  Edwards, P.

  Lawrence, W.

  Egerton, Admiral hon. F.

  Lea, T.

  Leake, R.

  Elliot, hon. A. R. D.

  Leatham, E. A.

  Errington, G.

  Leatham, W. H.

  Evans, T. W.

  Lee, H.

  Fairbairn, Sir A.

  Lefevre, rt. hn. G. J. S.

  Farquharson, Dr. R.

  Lloyd, M.

  Fay, C. J.

  Lubbock, Sir J.

  Ferguson, R.

  Lusk, Sir A.

  Ferguson, R. C. Munro-

  Lyons, R. D.

  Ffolkes, Sir W. H. B.

  Macfarlane, D. H.

  1723

  Mackie, R. B.

  Roundell, C. S.

  Mackintosh, C. F.

  Russell, Lord A.

  Macliver, P. S.

  Russell, C.

  M'Arthur, Sir W.

  Russell, G. W. E.

  M'Arthur, A.

  Ruston, J.

  M'Clure, Sir T.

  Rylands, P.

  M'Coan, J. C.

  St. Aubyn, Sir J.

  M'Intyre, Æneas J.

  Samuelson, B.

  M'Lagan, P.

  Samuelson, H.

  M'Laren, C. B. B.

  Seely, C. (Lincoln)

  M'Minnies, J. G.

  Seely, C. (Nottingham)

  Magniac, C.

  Sellar, A. C.

  Maitland, W. F.

  Shaw, T.

  Mappin, F. T.

  Sheridan, H. B.

  Marjoribanks, hon. E.

  Shield, H.

  Maskelyne, M. H. N. Story-

  Simon, Serjeant J.

  Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.

  Mason, H.

  Slagg, J.

  Maxwell-Heron, Capt. J. M.

  Smith, Lieut-Col. G.

  Smith, E.

  Meldon, C. H.

  Smith, S.

  Mellor, J. W.

  Stanley, hon. E. L.

  Milbank, Sir F. A.

  Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.

  Monk, C. J.

  Stanton, W. J.

  Moreton, Lord

  Stevenson, J. C.

  Morgan, rt. hon. G. O.

  Stuart, J.

  Morley, A.

  Summers, W.

  Morley, J.

  Sutherland, T.

  Morley, S.

  Talbot, C. R. M.

  Mundella, rt. hn. A, J.

  Tavistock, Marquess of

  Noel, E.

  Tennant, C.

  Norwood, C. M.

  Thomasson, J. P.

  O'Beirne, Colonel F.

  Thompson, T. C.

  O'Brien, Sir P.

  Tillett, J. H.

  O'Donoghue, The

  Tracy, hon. F. S. A. Hanbury-

  Otway, Sir A. J.

  Paget, T. T.

  Trevelyan, rt. hn. G. O.

  Palmer, C. M.

  Verney, Sir H.

  Palmer, G.

  Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.

  Parker, C. S.

  Vivian, Sir H. H.

  Pease, Sir J. W.

  Vivian, A. P.

  Pease, A.

  Waddy, S. D.

  Peddie, J. D.

  Walker, S.

  Pender, J.

  Waterlow, Sir S.

  Pennington, F.

  Waugh, E.

  Picton, J. A.

  Webster, J.

  Playfair, rt. hn. Sir L.

  West, H. W.

  Portman, hon. W. H. B.

  Whitbread, S.

  Potter, T. B.

  Whitworth, B.

  Powell, W. R. H.

  Wiggin, H.

  Power, J. O'C.

  Williamson, S.

  Price, Sir R. G.

  Willis, W.

  Pulley, J.

  Wills, W. H.

  Ramsay, J.

  Willyams, E. W. B.

  Ramsden, Sir J.

  Wilson, Sir M.

  Rathbone, W.

  Wilson, C. H.

  Reed, Sir E. J.

  Wilson, I.

  Reid, R. T.

  Wodehouse, E. R.

  Richard, H.

  Woodall, W.

  Richardson, T.

  Woolf, S.

  Roberts, J.

  Robertson, H.

  TELLERS.

  Roe, T.

  Grosvenor, right hon. Lord R.

  Rogers, C. C.

  Rogers, J. E. T.

  Kensington, rt. hn. Lord

  Rothschild, Sir N. M. de

  MR. SPEAKER: The Question is, that there be added to the word "That," in the Original Question, the following words:—
  1724
  "This House, while refraining from expressing an opinion on the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, regrets the decision of Her Majesty's Government to employ the forces of the Crown for the overthrow of the power of the Mahdi."
  The Question I have to propose is, those words be there added."
  Question proposed,
  "That the words 'while refraining from expressing an opinion on the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, regrets the decision of Her Majesty's Government to employ the forces of the Crown for the overthrow of the power of the Mahdi' be there added."—(Mr. John Morley.)
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: I have an Amendment to move, in the following words:—
  "To leave out all the words after the word 'this' in the first line of the Motion, to the end, in order to insert the words 'Government has failed to indicate any policy in reference to Egypt and the Soudan which justifies the confidence of this House or the Country."
  The words of the Amendment speak for themselves. As was stated in the early part of the Sitting, the Government propose to vote against every proposal. Therefore, I assume that, in the first division that will take place on these words, the Government will vote in support of my Amendment. I trust that I may be allowed to make it quite clear. They will vote for my Amendment for the purpose of getting rid of the Motion of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley); and, that Motion having been disposed of, they would then vote directly against my words.
  Amendment proposed to the proposed Amendment,
  To leave out from the word "this" to the end thereof, in order to add the words "Government has failed to indicate any policy in reference to Egypt and the Soudan which justifies the confidence of this House or the Country."—(Lord George Hamilton.)
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the said proposed Amendment."
  MR. GLADSTONE: What I stated early in the evening was, that I was not prepared to vote for the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. I voted against the words of the right hon. Gentleman, and they have been

  1725
  rejected. I now propose to vote against the words proposed by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Morley); but I by no means intend to support the Amendment of the noble Lord.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I only desire to say one word. It ought to be quite clear what the position is. It is a very unusual one. Generally speaking, when the policy of a Government is challenged by a Resolution, and an Amendment is put down which is not in favour of the Government, but which is also hostile to them, the practice has been hitherto for the Government to vote for the retention of the words of the Motion in order that they may afterwards vote against them. On the present occasion Her Majesty's Government have taken a different course, and they have found it better to vote against everything that is proposed, without coming to a direct issue on any one point, so that, if they obtain a majority in each division, the result will be; that nothing will be left on the Journals but the word "that" I am bound to j say that a more appropriate description of the policy of Her Majesty's Government I cannot imagine.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): The right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford North-cote) has stated that in cases of this kind, where a Resolution hostile to the Government has been proposed, and an Amendment is also submitted which the Government cannot accept, it has been the practice to go through the form, or farce, or whatever you like to call it, of voting for a Resolution of which we disapprove in the first instance. I believe that that has taken place in certain cases; but it is not the rule. It is quite as often the practice to vote against each Resolution of which we disapprove; and the result in this case will be that there will be no misunderstanding in the matter, as we shall vote straight, against the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet, against the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), and against the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton).
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 112; Noes 455: Majority 343.—(Div. List, No. 34.)
  Question proposed,
  "That the words Government has failed to indicate any policy in reference to Egypt and the Soudan which justifies the confidence of this House or the Country' he there added."
  MR. COURTNEY: Sir, before this Question is put I should like to say one word. If the proposition of the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton) were put in its entirety I should feel the greatest difficulty in giving a negative to it; but the proposition is, "That these words be here added," and to that I have no difficulty in giving a negative vote.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 277; Noes 299: Majority 22.—(Div. List, No. 35).
  MR. BRYCE: At this late hour (2.25), Mr. Speaker, I do not propose to press my Amendment.

MOTION.
  PIERS AND HARBOURS (IRELAND).

    MOTION FOR A PAPER.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That there he laid before this House, 'a Return of all Piers and Harbours built under the Board of Works in Ireland since the passing of the Act 9 Tic. c. 3:

    (1.) Date of completion;

    (2.) Whether built by contract or by the Board themselves, and giving the names of the contractors;

    (3.) The estimated and the actual cost, distinguishing the several separate works at the same places;

    (4.) The sources from which the funds were supplied;

    (5.)Description of any deviation since 1870 from the original design, as regards the distance the work was to be carried out into the sea, or otherwise;

    (6.) Statement of all works executed under the provisions of s. 11 of 16 and 17 Vic. c. 136;

    (7.) In cases since 1870 of deviations from original design, the estimated cost of deviation, and the purpose to which the said cost was applied.'"—(Mr. Thomas Lea.)

    MR. HEALYsaid, he had some reason to complain that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Donegal (Mr. Lea) should put down a Motion to obtain a Return which he (Mr. Healy), after great trouble, was promised by the Treasury last November. After he (Mr. Healy) had gone to the trouble of worry-

    1727
    ing the Treasury for weeks, in order to get the Return, the hon. Member coolly put down the Return in his own name. He (Mr. Healy) did not know how the Treasury communicated with the hon. Gentleman; perhaps they thought that, as he did not do a great deal in the House, it was as well he should have any little credit which attached to the making of such a Motion as the present. That the Government should have allowed any hon. Member to purloin his (Mr. Healy's) Motion was, to say the least, extraordinary. Only last autumn, Mr. Spring Rice told him in the Lobby that if he would make certain changes in his Return the Treasury would be happy to give it to him. He thereupon communicated with the gentleman in Ireland who was instructing him, to know whether he would accept Mr. Spring Rice's alterations. The hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) was then Secretary to the Treasury. He (Mr. Healy) was unable to attend Parliament on the day it re-assembled; indeed, not for a week after. When, however, he did return, he found the hon. Member for Donegal (Mr. Lea) was moving for a Return which he, to all intents and purposes, had obtained. He could not help thinking that the hon. Member had made this Motion at the instance of the Treasury.
    MR. LEAsaid, that if the hon. Member for Monaghan (Mr. Healy) would refer to the Records of the House, he would see that two or three years ago he put a Question respecting Bunna-troohan Pier, and the other piers to which the Return referred. The gentleman who, he believed, communicated with the hon. Member, also communicated with him last autumn, and desired him to urge on the Government the desirability of giving a Return similar to the one he had put on the Paper. He wrote to the Secretary to the Treasury, desiring that some such Return should be given. When the House resumed after the Winter Recess, he was informed the Return was ready if he would move for it; and consequently he gave Notice of it soon after receiving this intimation.
    MR. KENNYsaid, he asked the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Hibbert) the other day whether he could give him a Return something in the nature of the one now under consideration, but more inclusive
    1728
    of the piers which had been constructed according to the designs of the Board of Works, but which had given way, or fallen into disuse, owing to their defective construction. The report he obtained from the hon. Gentleman was that the Return of which Notice had been given by the hon. Member for Donegal (Mr. Lea) would cover what he (Mr. Kenny) wished. He was not in a position at the time to say whether it would or not, as he had not read the terms of the Return. He had, however, read them since, and he found that the Return would not cover the case of piers which had fallen into disuse, owing to faulty construction. He now desired to know whether the hon. Gentleman was prepared to give him a Return showing what piers—he believed there were a considerable number of them—had given way, owing to the manner in which the Board of Works had designed them?
    MR. HIBBERTsaid, he should be very glad to consider any proposal the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Kenny) made, either with a view of including the piers he spoke of in this Return, or in a separate Return. Of course, he could not promise off-hand that the Return should be given exactly in the way the hon. Member asked for it; but he should be very glad to consider the question. As to the point raised by the hon. Member for Monaghan (Mr. Healy), he believed that what happened was this. Mr. Spring Rice, whom the hon. Gentleman named, was his (Mr. Hibbert's) Private Secretary; and he was so anxious to serve the hon. Member in regard to this Return that he applied to the hon. Member for Donegal (Mr. Lea) to move for it.
    MR. HEALY: Why did he not apply to me?
    MR. HIBBERT: Because the hon. Member for Monaghan was not at that time in the House.
    MR. HEALY: I was only away a week.
    MR. HIBBERTsaid, he was sure that, had the hon. Gentleman been in attendance, he would have been applied to. In the absence of the hon. Member, the hon. Member for Donegal (Mr. Lea), who had taken an interest in the question, was told that if he chose to move for the Return it would be given. There was certainly no desire to take

    1729
    away from the hon. Member for Monaghan any credit which attached to the moving for the Return.
    MR. CALLANsaid, he would suggest that the Return should be postponed for the purpose of amendment. He was interested in the piers in his county, and yet this Return would not include the information he required concerning them. He was told that two piers in County Louth had been constructed by the Board of Works in such an imperfect and unworkman like manner that the Surveyor of the county had refused, on behalf of the Grand Jury, to take them over. He was told that another pier had been built with such a total want of scientific skill that the barony in which it was situated had been required to spend a large additional sum upon it. Under the circumstances—especially now that the gilt had been taken off his gingerbread by the facts disclosed by The hon. Member for Monaghan (Mr. Healy)—the hon. Member for Donegal (Mr. Lea) would do well to postpone his Motion. It was well that they should have a thorough and complete Return, and, therefore, if the hon. Gentleman persisted in his Motion, he (Mr. Callan) would certainly take a division.
    MR. HIBBERTsaid, he would also suggest that the hon. Member for Done-gal (Mr. Lea) should postpone his Motion for a few days, in order to afford the hon. Member for Monaghan (Mr. Healy) an opportunity for introducing in the Return the amendments he thought proper.
    MR. SPEAKER: The more regular course would be to withdraw the Motion.
    MR. HEALYasked the indulgence of the House to say that, when a Government Department entered into an arrangement with a Member, it was not right, because that Member happened to be opposed to the Government, and voted against them constantly, and hoped to do so in the future, or because he happened to be away from the House for a single week, that a Motion of which he had charge should be transferred to another hon. Member. He happened to be obliged, during the first week of the Session, to attend to private business; and therefore the Government went to one of their own supporters and suggested that he should move for the Re-
    1730
    turn, and have the credit of it. In a letter to him, Mr. Spring Rice said—
    "Mr. Courtney thinks such a Return would he useful and interesting; but some few modifications are desirable in the terms of your Motion, in order that it may be complied with;"
    and then Mr. Spring Rice made a series of suggestions. He (Mr. Healy) was not sorry the Government had given a leg-up to one of their own supporters; but he thought the least thing they could have done was to tell him what they were doing. He did not think that such treatment should be dealt out to him, simply because he happened to be a Parnellite; it was not the kind of treatment that ought to be dealt out by a Member of the Government to a Member of the House. He quite agreed that it would be well to withdraw the Motion. After the suggestions of Mr. Spring Rice, he communicated with his friends in Ireland; and, as a result of his communications, he had a series of proposals to make with regard to the piers. This was a matter in which hundreds and thousands of people were interested, and, therefore, it was desirable that a Return complete in every particular should be granted.
    MR. LEAsaid, he would postpone the Motion; or if the Speaker thought it would be more regular he would withdraw it. He thought, however, he was entitled to say that the gentleman who communicated with him held an official position in the county he represented, and that this Return related more especially to Donegal than to any other portion of Ireland. [Mr. CALLAN: No, no!]
    MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Gentleman has already spoken. Does the hon. Gentleman withdraw the Motion?
    MR. LEA: Yes, Sir; I withdraw the Motion, but as a matter of Privilege I desired the right to explain.
    MR. HEALY: Have it by all means.
    Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

    WATERWORKS (LOCAL AUTHORITIES) BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. DODDS, Bill to amend the Law relating to the rating of Waterworks Undertakings belonging to Local Authorities, ordered to be brought in by Mr. DODDS, Mr. BARBAN, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. CODDINGTON, and Mr. SLAGG.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 75.]

    PUBLIC HEALTH ACTS AMENDMENT (IMPROVEMENT EXPENSES) BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. DODDS, Bill to amend the Public Health Acts in relation to Private Improvement Expenses, ordered to he brought in by Mr. DODDS, Sir EDWARD REED, and Mr. ARNOLD MORLEY.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 76.]
    House adjourned at a quarter before Three o'clock till Monday next.

TURKEY—FEHMY PASHA.
  PERSONAL EXPLANATION.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, it is a wholesome practice not to answer here matters which are stated in debate in the other House of Parliament. But there are some exceptions, and there arise sometimes questions of a personal character. Tour Lordships all know that some time ago there arrived in this country a Special Envoy from the Porte—Fehmy Pasha. At the time of his arrival I made some inquiries, and from both Englishmen and foreigners I received, without exception, a high and flattering character of that gentleman. If I may say so with respect, the communications I have had with him have entirely confirmed the opinions previously given to me. But an old friend of mine, Sir Robert Peel—one of the most brilliant and lively speakers I know—appears to have made a rather more than usually amusing speech last night, and he gave the House of Commons an account of a conversation which took place between Fehmy Pasha and myself. I was a little puzzled at first, because I had not the slightest recollection of having said what I was stated to have said; and, in the second place, because I did not see how Sir Robert Peel could have known it if I had. That, however, was explained by Sir Robert Peel himself, who subsequently said that he was informed of it by Fehmy Pasha. I have taken the opportunity of communicating with Fehmy Pasha, who is quite in accordance with me in the opinion that Sir Robert Peel was under a misunderstanding in what he said. It is not an important matter, but I thought your Lordships would excuse me for mentioning it.
EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN—VOTE OF CENSURE.—RESOLUTION.

  ADJOURNED DEBATE.
  Order of the Day read for resuming the debate on the Lord Wentworth's amendment to the Marquess of Salisbury's motion to resolve—

  1523
  "That this House, having taken into consideration the statements that have been made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, is of opinion that—

  (1.) The deplorable failure of the Soudan expedition to attain its object has been due to the undecided councils of the Government and to the culpable delay attending the commencement of operations;

  (2.) That the policy of abandoning the whole of the Soudan after the conclusion of military operations will be dangerous to Egypt and inconsistent with the interests of the Empire."—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)

  Which Amendment was,
  To leave out from "That" to the end of the motion, and insert "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, humbly representing to Her Majesty that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan has involved a great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure without any beneficial result, and has rendered it imperatively necessary in the interests of the British Empire and of the Egyptian people that Her Majesty's Government should not employ British forces to occupy the Soudan or to prevent the exercise by the Egyptian people of their right to select their own government."—(The Lord Wentworth.)
  Debate resumed accordingly.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNsaid, that it was not his intention to take up their Lordships' time by a long discussion of the first part of the Resolution of the noble Marquess. Whatever might be their opinion with regard to the responsibility of the Government for the fall of Khartoum and the sad fate of the lamented General Gordon, and for the other grave losses which had happened, it was, at all events, too true that nothing that they could say or do now could bring back to us our great countryman who had gone. They could not undo what had happened; but they could look ahead at what was to come. He did not wish in any way to attenuate the gravity of recent events; but it seemed to him that the events to come were of more importance from a national point of view, because there was, at all events, time to exercise, or to attempt to exercise, some influence over them. In his judgment, the interests of the country demanded that they should ask and that the Government should give to them some frank and full statement of their policy with regard to Egypt and the Soudan in the immediate future. They knew that the Government had issued instructions to Lord Wolseley that he was to follow the Mahdi to Khartoum and break his
  1524
  power. In that policy he believed the Government would be supported in that House and by the general feeling of the country. In itself, perhaps, it was not a policy altogether desirable, because, to a certain extent, it was impossible not to feel admiration for the gallantry of the Arab Tribes, who had originally been under intolerable oppression. He had no desire whatever to see English power and English authority extended by means of the sword; but when they looked at a subject of this kind they must look at it as a whole, and on all the circumstances and the men with whom they had to deal. It must be remembered that they were an Oriental and fanatical people, who were perfectly incapable of understanding a policy of conciliation and concession, and who, if we had attempted to treat with them upon the fall of Khartoum, would only have accepted our action as a confession of weakness. The policy announced was, therefore, necessary under the circumstances. But he thought that they might ask the Government to tell them a little more of their plans. That the Mahdi's power would be overthrown might almost be regarded as a certainty, and he could not suppose that the Government had not contemplated such a result. He thought they might ask the Government to tell them plainly a little more of their plans. After the Mahdi had been overthrown, what did the Government intend to do next? Did they intend to remain until some settled form of Government was set up; and to give some assurance that England would stand by those friendly tribes who had stood by us? They might be told that they should wait till the event happened. He knew well that it was very difficult for the Government to speak out; but, unfortunately, they had not observed a policy of consistent silence. The Prime Minister had announced on more than one occasion that their policy was one of retreat from the Soudan, and it had been reasonably supposed that retirement from the Soudan was the leading point in the policy of the Government. It was true that the Prime Minister had limited his statement, and said that he had only made it with reference to Egypt, and not with reference to England. He would now only ask the noble Earl the Leader of that House to go a very little further. He did not want to

  1525
  ask what the Government did not mean; but he asked them to tell what they did mean. They wanted some plain and distinct words that they could all understand. He wished to raise a humble but firm protest against this system of long speeches and long sentences, which meant anything, or everything, or nothing, and which, in his judgment, had been prejudicial to the interests of this country on more than one occasion with respect to foreign affairs, and which, looking at the matter only from a Party point of view, had been injurious to the Liberal Party. He did not raise any complaint against the noble Earl who led them; when the noble Earl spoke they could all understand him; his only fear was lest the noble Earl should consider it his duty to be silent. He wished to appeal to him, and to ask him whether this was a time for reticence? He would ask him whether he could not say something to them that night which would encourage their friends and discourage their enemies instead of the reverse? Some announcement from him of an intention on the part of England to remain in the Soudan until something like a settled form of Government was established, and that the interests of the friendly tribes would be adequately protected, would double the strength of our Army and of the tribes who had assisted our troops, and take away half the strength of the Mahdi and Osman Digna. He would remind their Lordships of the lines—
  "Fama, malum quo non aliud velocius ullum,
  Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo."
  These Arab tribes were greatly influenced by rumours and reports, and, respecting as they did our bayonets and our squares, they would be strongly influenced by the report that we were going to remain till a settled Government was established. It was more than probable that half the troubles of the Government would be dispersed entirely by such an announcement. They were told that they ought to have confidence in the Government. They had confided in the Government—when it was proposed to censure the Government for the fall of Sinkat and Tokar they had supported the Government. Did anyone suppose that they on that side of the House did not feel bitterly with regard to the falling of those gallant garrisons? But they then had confidence in the Government, and
  1526
  the result now was that they had seen General Gordon sent to Khartoum without any support for a longtime, and without any apparent intention of supporting him. They had now heard of the fall of Khartoum and of the death of its heroic defender, and they now said it was the turn of the Government to have a little confidence in their supporters. If Her Majesty's Government would announce to them, in plain and distinct words, that they would remain only for a short time in the Soudan he was prepared to vote in their favour, even with the death of General Gordon present to his mind. But if Her Majesty's Government could not announce some clear and distinct policy he had no alternative left to him but to vote for the Resolution, as this was the only means open to him of expressing his deep regret that the Government was unable, from whatever cause, to announce a firm and decided line of policy at a moment which they all knew to be a critical one to the interests of the Empire.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My Lords, it is very much to be wished, both for the sake of their own supporters and for the general advantage of the House, that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary should lend an attentive ear to the appeal that has just been made to him from the Bench behind him. Whether or not the noble Earl will condescend to satisfy the doubts, and the not unreasonable doubts, that there are as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government I do not know; but my duty rather is to suggest to your Lordships some of the reasons, at all events, which may induce your Lordships to vote for the Resolution of my noble Friend behind me. It is so large, so vast a question, that I could spread my recommendations over a far longer period than your Lordships' patience would give to me. I could recommend this Resolution to you on the ground that there has been, from first to last, a consistent failure of every single attempt, of every single object, Her Majesty's Government have set before themselves. I could recommend it to you again on another ground, the absolutely useless expenditure of blood and money lavished upon the sands of the Soudan. I could again urge it on a ground, by no means the least, that Her Majesty's Forces are even now placed, I will not say in a dan-

  1527
  gerous, at all events in a most anxious, position, in consequence of their policy; and, lastly, I might again urge it on the ground that has been indicated by the noble Earl on the back Bench opposite, that we have had no policy declared to us—no certain indications given to us of the course Her Majesty's Government propose to pursue, and in which they propose to lead this country. But, my Lords, I shall not take any one of those grounds. I shall myself vote for the Resolution upon a narrower and much simpler issue, but one which, I believe, recommends itself to your Lordships and to the whole country—that narrow issue being the abandonment of General Gordon. Why, my Lords, do I say this? For two reasons. In the first place, I hold that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to General Gordon goes to the root of the whole policy which a Government ought to pursue towards its Agents abroad. If you mean to be well served abroad you must support your Agents so long as they serve faithfully and loyally, and discharge their duty to the Government, the Crown, and the country. There are some who sit on that Bench who have sat in the Cabinet of Lord Palmerston. What was the doctrine he always maintained? It was that which I have endeavoured humbly to express, and it was that which gave him his great strength over and over again in foreign policy. Secondly, I dwell on this point, because among all the melancholy records of the last few years I know of none so melancholy as the abandonment of General Gordon. My Lords, I do not like to express all that I feel on this subject. We know that Her Majesty's Government and those Members of it that I see opposite are kindly and courteous Gentlemen in private life. It is almost impossible to believe that in their public capacity they can so far depart from all the principles which I would safely trust them to apply in private life. Having said that, and having said it with pain, I repeat that I know of no record more shameful than the conduct that has been pursued towards General Gordon—no record more shameful, and none more dishonouring to the Crown and to the country. Let me for a moment recall the character of General Gordon. It is not my place to pass a fulsome eulogy upon the dead. I do
  1528
  not desire to say of him, now that he is dead, what I would not have said while he was living; but I do say that he represents one of the highest types of the old English character. I am afraid I must say old, for the type is dying out. Fearless almost to a fault—if such a thing be possible—full of resource, courage, and ingenuity, he had, over and above that, a strong sense of duty and fear of God. As to his mission, who does not remember that, when the Government were in great perplexity, they appealed to him at an hour's notice to undertake that mission? Casting aside the objects to which he had devoted his time and almost his life, he consented to undertake the mission, and on the very day he was requested to go he went. My Lords, I believe that at the last moment of starting some of those paltry and contemptible technicalities which are sometimes raised by the Treasury in respect of money were raised in his case, and General Gordon left this country obliged to borrow the money with which he travelled.
  EARL GRANVILLE: He came to this country from Belgium. General Gordon, as is well known, was a man who utterly despised money. In order to accomplish his journey, having none with him, the King of the Belgians lent him £25 to come here.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: It is not a very creditable or worthy story.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Not creditable!
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I rise to Order. Whatever observations the noble Earl has to make he will have an opportunity of making presently.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I say it is not creditable that a man of General Gordon's position and character should have been obliged to leave the country with borrowed money.
  EARL GRANVILLE: That is altogether an inaccurate description of the facts.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: The noble Earl can state his case afterwards; and it is the usual courtesy of Parliament to allow a noble Lord to proceed uninterruptedly with his speech.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I beg pardon. The noble Earl speaks of the courtesies of Parliament. It is not in accordance with the courtesies of Parliament, when an explanation has been made, for a

  1529
  noble Earl not to accept that explanation. I stated the circumstances to which he alluded when he said that General Gordon was in want of money; and I referred to his journey from Belgium to this country, when the King of the Belgians lent him £25. Then the noble Earl goes on to say that it was not creditable that General Gordon should have left this country without any money but that which he had borrowed. That is a perfectly different thing.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I will, at all events, so far conform myself to the usages of Parliament as to accept that explanation for the purpose of carrying on this debate. But I come back to a more important point in connection with this matter. General Gordon was sent to Khartoum. On that solitary figure posting across the Desert the eyes not only of this country, but of all Europe, were fixed; and when he reached Khartoum it is no exaggeration to say that there was a long-drawn sigh of relief throughout the Kingdom. We hoped and trusted that the worst was passed; but then there followed a long year of weariness, of watching, and of fighting—a year in which he and two Englishmen, who were his companions, bore the brunt of that terrible ordeal. It was not the first time that Englishmen had been placed in such circumstances. The House may remember how, at the outbreak of the Crimean War, three gallant Englishmen encouraged the garrison of Silistria and withstood the whole of the Russian Forces. You will remember, also, how my gallant friend, Sir Fenwick Williams, of Kars, animated the garrison of Kars, and inspired the most desperate resistance with which that fortress was maintained. And so it was, again, in General Gordon's day; so he maintained, so he endured, so he showed the most wonderful valour and resource; and, in the midst of all, let it never be forgotten that by that indomitable courage he succeeded in saving the lives of some 3,000 people in Khartoum. From time to time short letters and telegrams came out to us as to what was going on in Khartoum—letters and telegrams disconnected and fragmentary, but one and all indicating the invincible spirit of the writer; and with them came also requests to Her Majesty's Government. How were those requests answered? I
  1530
  will not go into details on this subject. My noble Friend last night dealt with them pretty fully; but how were those requests answered? At first, when General Gordon went out, there was an acclamation as it were of support to him on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Mr. Gladstone said—
  "As to General Gordon, we have no more to do than to say that we make ourselves responsible for all the measures he adopts."
  Sir Charles Dilke was not less emphatic. He said—
  "General Gordon is better able to form a judgment than anybody else: we have implicitly followed the advice that we have received from General Gordon."
  What said the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, who, after all, was the person to whom General Gordon would look as his official superior in these matters? He said there never was a mark of greater confidence shown by a Government to any man than by the mission given to General Gordon. The noble Earl went on to speak in that strain for a considerable time; and he gave us an anecdote about Henri Quatre, and made an allusion to Confucius, which I have no doubt, in the noble Earl's mind, had some reference to the matter in hand. I doubt, however, whether the French Monarch was altogether the man who would have withdrawn his confidence, or have allowed his Agents abroad to suffer, as has happened in the case of General Gordon. And as to Confucius, the reference to him may illustrate how the professions of philosophers often point one way, while their practice is in quite the opposite direction. For, in the very briefest space of time afterwards, the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary refused the request urged over and over again by General Gordon in the most emphatic language for the sending of Zebehr Pasha. I doubt whether Confucius would have recognized the noble Earl as his disciple. My Lords, the baneful and petty influences of Party came in; and General Gordon's requests, one and all without exception, were, upon some ground or another, refused by Her Majesty's Government. Out of the five or six requests enumerated by my noble Friend last night, there is not one that was complied with. They all fell dead on the ears of Her Majesty's Government. The Prime Minister was

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  busy, as he has said in "another place," on a comparison of the relative merits of the different routes by which succour could be sent. General Gordon was praised; he was refused; and he was told at last that he was exceeding his instructions. When one reads and knows bow large and full his powers were, it is difficult to understand what could have been in the mind of any man who could speak of General Gordon as exceeding his instructions. At last be was told to come away and to save himself. There is a letter which, I think, bas no parallel in any Blue Book of our day that I have ever read. It was quoted, I believe, last night; and, at the risk of wearying your Lordships, I must quote it again. It was a telegram from the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, and it was dated, singularly enough, on the 23rd of April, St. George's Day, the patron saint of England; that saint from whom you would expect the qualities of courage, of chivalry, and all that is best in the English character in its best days. And what was this telegram? It was addressed to Sir Evelyn Baring, and it directed him to communicate at once with General Gordon, telling him—
  "We do not propose to supply him with Turkish or any other force for the purpose of undertaking military operations, such being beyond the scope of the commission which he holds and the plans of our permanent policy in the Soudan; and if with this knowledge ho continues in Khartoum, he should state to us the cause and the intention with which he does so."
  I cannot, my Lords, remember any message so bard and so cruel ever being despatched by an English Government to an English Agent who was enduring such hardships, and was bearing the whole weight of such a burden in the face of the enemy. We know how General Gordon accepted this invitation or instruction to come away. The tacit promise that he made to the Khedive, and the one condition which he imposed, was that the safety of the civilians among the Natives should be cared for. That promise he strove to keep; and he said—
  "I have no option as to staying at Khartoum; it has passed out of my hands."
  And be wound up the whole of that most tragic correspondence by words which have been rarely addressed to the Foreign Minister of this country—
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  "I leave to you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Sennaar, Kassala, Berber, and Khartoum."
  I believe there is no parallel to the telegram that I am quoting. At length multiplied warnings came pouring upon the Government in such force and such numbers that they could not resist them; and an Expedition was organized; and it was launched. And if courage and skill on the part of officers and men could have in any degree countervailed the official delays, General Gordon might have been saved. But he fell at his post, and he died quite as much as any other knight of old died, giving up his soul to God and his life to the State. It is to be remarked that everything, or almost everything, that General Gordon has said has come true. It is said that the spirit of prophecy sometimes comes strongly upon men who are about to die; and so it would appear to have been in this case, for there was nothing that General Gordon noticed and recorded but has practically been fulfilled. He has warned you that if you refused to send a few troops now you would soon have to send many; that if you refused to spend a few pounds now you would soon have to spend vast sums of money; that if you allowed Berber to be taken you would have to go to Khartoum; and he warned you that if you allowed Khartoum to be taken you would have to struggle with the whole Mahommedan population. I now turn for a moment to something different. I think the case such as I have described it would justify me, and would justify any of your Lordships, in recording a vote on that single ground which I have just mentioned. But we are bound to ask whether the Government have any other arguments than those which they have brought forward, and how does the case stand? My Lords, the debate in this place last night and the debate in the other House, as seen by the ordinary channels of information to which we all have access, seem to have brought us somewhat nearer the point than formerly. The Government are now willing to confess, as I understand, their error with regard to Hicks Pasha; they are willing to confess the error they made as regards the Mahdi, and their want of appreciation of the formidable nature of his rising and of his power. They confess also, to a certain extent, to the delays that have

  1533
  taken place, and they meet this with the argument that "We have done the best we could in the circumstances." My Lords, we have heard it said that the virtue of penitence consists of two parts. It consists of sorrow for the act done, but also of an intention to adopt a better course in the future. Now I am afraid Her Majesty's Government are hopelessly impenitent, because I cannot detect in anything they said here, or in anything that I have read of "elsewhere," any indication or promise of amendment in the future. If we could find or ascertain any reasonable ground of hope in this respect, even at the eleventh hour, they might ask us to condone the errors of the past; but is there any hope? I frankly own that I see nothing but irresolution, obstinacy, and casuistry. The entreaties of their followers have not received much satisfaction. They have been urged over and over again to declare, not the whole of their policy, but enough of it to justify a vote. The oracle is dumb; the smallest answer has not been received. Meanwhile Moloch demands the sacrifices of fresh life and more blood. The only policy—if policy you can call it—which has been vouchsafed to us is that which is termed, in not very elegant English, "the policy of smashing the Mahdi and then retiring." It reminds me very much of the old lines—
  "A noble King of France,
  He had ten thousand men;
  He marched them up a hill,
  He marched them down again."
  If this is to be the end and the object of the policy enunciated it is, to say the least of it, a very unsatisfactory one. But your Lordships must observe that in this policy there are two parts. Torrents of blood have been shed; hideous scenes have been enacted at Tokar and at the other towns which have fallen. I can remember the scathing terms in which the Prime Minister spoke of those scenes of horror which occurred only a few years ago in Eastern Europe; and yet where is the difference between them and those which have taken place in the Soudan? You allowed those things to take place and secured nothing in return; and after the sacrifices which had already been made and the blood which had been shed I cannot conceive a Christian Government adopting such a monstrous view or a Christian nation sanctioning it.
  1534
  Assuming that you had taken Khartoum and had smashed the Mahdi, would your retirement then have been possible? I think it would have been perfectly impossible. I ground this belief, first of all, upon General Gordon's own statements. If one thing como3 out clearer than another from these Papers it is this—that General Gordon held it to be absolutely impracticable, and that you could not retire from the Soudan—at least, from all parts of the Soudan—in the manner now proposed. You have to remember what my noble Friend said just now as to the relations with and the conduct of the Northern Tribes. What is to be your conduct in relation to those tribes on whom we have to depend? You have to remember that you draw the greater portion of your supplies for the Army from those tribes; and the moment you announce the abandonment of the country they will at once withhold their supplies. For that reason, if for no other reason, it is impossible to carry out this extraordinary policy. I said just now that the military position was one which, though it need not create fear, at the same time is one which it is impossible to consider without anxiety. It needs no military genius to point to the serious nature of the case; there are, unquestionably, risks of health; they may be more, or they may be less, but they are very great. There are, again, equally unquestionable risks of the failure of supplies. You are in a country from which you must draw your supplies; and yet, by your perverse announcement of the intention to abandon that country, you are doing everything in your power to stop those supplies and to turn those tribes against us. More men are needed. It is admitted on all hands; and yet every man you send there, to a certain extent, increases the difficulty which I have just now referred to. Lastly, do not forget—do not let the country forget—that the 10,000 or 12,000 men who are now in the Soudan and in Egypt, the flower of the English Army, are locked up there for months and months to come; and I ask your Lordships to consider, in the anxious and critical position of European politics, how far such a result as this is wise, how far it is creditable to the sagacity of Her Majesty's Government? Is there any other argument which would induce us to say "No!" to the Resolution of

  1535
  my noble Friend? I can conceive of but one—that it is desirable that a Liberal Government should stay in, and that the Conservative Opposition should stay out. The meaning of this is that Party feeling must override every other consideration. Now, my Lords, Party government has existed in this country for about a century and a half. It has had brilliant periods; it has also produced great evils; and I think those of the present generation will be of opinion that during the last five or six years Party government has shown itself in no favourable light. Party government has, at least, had this one consolation—that when matters became bad, and when the Government has blundered in a course of consistent and hopeless failure, the common sense of the country, the moderate men on all sides, had drawn together, and an utterly incompetent Ministry has been displaced in order to make room for those who, at all events, are to be tried. That has been the case. It was the case in the last century, when the Government of Lord North was turned out. It was the case in our time, when the Coalition Government of the time of the Crimean War was reconstructed to such an extent that it practically became a new Government; it was the case again in 1874 when Lord Beaconsfield came into Office. The same thing has held good on the other side of the Atlantic. I cannot conceive that there is any man of sense on this side of the House who could desire to accept the Offices which noble Lords opposite hold. I can conceive no greater heritage of woe and anxiety than such Offices as they hold; but, at the same time, it has been the consistent maxim of the Conservative Party to do their duty and to carry on the Queen's Government, and I cannot doubt now, as on former occasions, such would be their conduct. As regards the question of policy, the answer of the noble Lord last night seems to me to be perfectly delusive. It is, of course, very difficult to define beforehand what should be the exact details of a policy. No one desires to retain the Soudan for itself; but it is necessary to see that the legitimate influence of England in Egypt is maintained, and it is clear that there may be points outside Egypt, which are necessary to the safety of Egypt, and which it is the duty of the Government for the
  1536
  time being there to hold. "We have spent blood and money in the Soudan, and it is right that we should obtain some return for it. We have destroyed the Government of Egypt; we have destroyed her institutions; and we are bound to place something on their ruins. Anyhow, our Government is bound, at least, to do this—to accept the responsibility of their acts; to put an end to their melancholy irresolution; to know their own mind, and to speak it plainly. They ought to have a policy, and, having announced it, to adhere to it.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I will not follow the noble Earl into his disquisition on the merits or demerits of Party government. I apprehend that his very unfavourable view of Party government during the last four or five years may possibly be somewhat influenced by the fact that during that period he has sat on the Opposition side of the House. For myself, I must say that I shall not despair of Party government, even though the Votes of Censure should to-night be carried in both Houses of Parliament. But, to turn to the important subject of the Motion now before the House, the noble Earl opposite says that he rests his speech principally upon an examination of the manner in which we have treated General Gordon. I cannot help thinking—and I hope he will forgive me for saying so—that while he, no doubt in common with all others, greatly admires General Gordon, that which was uppermost in his mind was the manner in which General Gordon could be best used to attack the Government. I am placed naturally in a position of difficulty with regard to a discussion of this point. After all that has been said in General Gordon's praise, it would be impertinent in me to detain the House with a eulogy of him. But General Gordon was not infallible. If I were to discuss in detail all the advice and suggestions which he gave the Government, I am conscious that, after his heroic death, it would have a grating effect on the House. Therefore, I hope I may have some excuse for not going into all the details that I otherwise would have ventured upon. On the other hand, I may be pardoned if I mention two or three points. Now, the essential part of the whole case is that a clear view should be taken of the original mission of General Gordon, and the grounds upon

  1537
  which it was approved by the Government. General Gordon's mission was in its initiative and conception, both on the part of the Government and on the part of General Gordon himself, essentially a pacific mission. General Gordon was of opinion that his influence in the Soudan was such that he might be able to accomplish the pacification of that country by his name and by his influence with the tribes. That in the case of any other man would have appeared a Quixotic idea; but in the case of a man who had displayed extraordinary powers over tribes of men, half-civilized, in all parts of the world, and not least in the Soudan, it did not appear an altogether impossible task; and, under the circumstances in which Her Majesty's Government were placed, they considered it wise, in the interests of Egypt and in the interests of this country, that they should accept General Gordon's offer to proceed to the Soudan. General Gordon, it is impossible not to say, was mistaken in his calculations; and it turned out unfortunately that the course he had hoped to pursue was one of which, after no long time, he came to doubt the success. He then completely changed his policy. Having gone out to the Soudan distinctly saying that he did not wish for nor expect the assistance of British troops, he then took another view, and came to the conclusion that nothing would be satisfactory unless a great Expedition of English troops was sent to the Soudan. He came slowly to that opinion, but he did arrive at it. Before he came to that conclusion he made a number of suggestions; but it did not imply any want of confidence in him that the Government could not accept them. Last year attacks were made on the other side of the House on General Gordon for having taken the singular step of issuing a Proclamation, in which he declared that he would not interfere with the Slave Trade. Undoubtedly it was a great mark of the confidence of Her Majesty's Government in General Gordon that they deferred to General Gordon's opinions on this subject, and I do not think that in the ease of any other man they would have done so. Take the suggestion, for instance, in regard to the appointment of Zebehr. General Gordon at Khartoum could not, and did not, know all the facts with regard to Zebehr
  1538
  which were in the knowledge of the Government; and if the Government had assented to his proposal General Gordon could subsequently have turned round and reproached them for having appointed Zebehr, with the information they had that Zebehr was not to be trusted. I never was more clear in my life upon any subject than that it was the absolute duty of Her Majesty's Government to refuse to send Zebehr. Then there was a suggestion made by General Gordon that Turkish troops should be sent to the Soudan. But that involved a number of considerations with which General Gordon was not acquainted, and the Government could not accede to it. The noble Earl has stated that our abandonment of General Gordon was shameful; but we deny that we abandoned General Gordon. The whole question was one of time and means. In a matter of this kind, those who do not succeed are always in an unfavourable position; but when great military operations are undertaken one has to consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of success. The result shows that we had a reasonable prospect of success. Supposing that Khartoum could not have been reached by General Wolseley, then the Expedition would have been a case of miscalculation; but, in point of fact, Lord Wolseley nearly succeeded in reaching Khartoum in time, and but for treachery he would have been in time. Therefore, the military operations were certainly not miscalculated. I wish, my Lords, to refer to another point upon which the noble Marquess who moved this Motion laid very great stress indeed. He said that our declaration that the Soudan would be evacuated by the Egyptian Government was a stupendous blunder. Such words as those, no doubt, sound very sonorous and exceedingly well in a speech; but in human affairs I venture to think that nobody would apply them to anything except what they very much disliked; and you often meet with such high flights of expression in rhetorical speeches and sensational newspaper articles. But if you look at the matter more closely, I rather think you will find that the mistake, if one has been made, was upon the other side. Just consider what the alternatives would have been. In the first place, General Gordon,

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  when, he was sent out, was distinctly of opinion that the Egyptian rule in the Soudan should cease.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The declaration was made before General Gordon was sent out.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: That does not affect the statement that General Gordon was of opinion that the Soudan ought to be evacuated by Egypt. The noble Marquess will see what the argument is which I was going to adduce. Her Majesty's Government were decidedly of opinion that the Soudan should be evacuated; and the point is whether we were right in announcing that policy? Now, supposing that holding that opinion, and having sent General Gordon, who also held that opinion, we had determined not to announce it, what would have been the effect of that? Either we must have left the people of the Soudan under the impression that we were going to restore the Egyptian Government in that country, or we must have declared to them that we intended to send an Expedition for the purpose of restoring the Egyptian Government there—one or the other. Of course, if we were going to substitute another Government, that would be another question; but I maintain that nothing more suicidal could have been done than to have left the people of the Soudan in a state of ignorance upon the point. They would then have regarded General Gordon, to begin with, as a man sent out to place upon their necks the yoke they had determined to shake off. I will just ask whether this declaration has been in the slightest degree dangerous to this country? On the contrary, what would have been the effect if we, when sending an Expedition to the Soudan, had announced that we, a Christian Government, and, therefore, looked upon with suspicion by the Mussulman population, had come there, not to free them, but for the purpose of riveting upon their neck a yoke which they detested? My Lords, I do not think such terms as "stupendous blunders" are wisely made use of in connection with these matters. The noble Marquess says that that declaration was one of the causes of all our misfortunes in Egypt. Another of the causes which he mentioned was that we had not sent English troops at once after General Gordon to support him.
  1540
  Well, I say again, my answer to that is simply this—that we sent Gordon on a pacific mission. The noble Earl behind me (the Earl of Camperdown) and the noble Earl on the other side of the House (the Earl of Carnarvon) both adverted to the question of the policy of the future, and said that, although with reference to the intentions of the Government it may be of importance to define what we have done in the past as regards this country, it is far more important to know what is to be done in the future. What we are continually told is that we have no decided policy. Now, a decided policy, although we do not hear it so plainly stated in this House, has, in fact, meant this—as regards Egypt, it has meant that we should pledge ourselves to hold it permanently. That is a decisive policy, which, out-of-doors, at all events, is entertained; and, as regards the Soudan, that we should pledge ourselves to remain there for some indefinite period. But, in point of fact, that would not be a decisive policy. A decisive policy means something more than that. There must be a definite period; and it is just that which, in the circumstances of the case, renders it impossible for any Government to have a decisive policy. Upon the subject of the evacuation of Egypt, I have always been, and still am, of opinion that Her Majesty's Government has been right, and that you should leave as soon as you have formed a Government that can stand there. It would be inconsistent with our pledges, and contrary to our interests, to remain in Egypt; or, even were it in accordance with our interests, looked at selfishly, it would be impossible to remain when we considered the interests of the European Powers. Therefore, the policy of remaining permanently in Egypt must be dismissed, as one which, I will undertake to say, could not be adopted by any Government in this country. We have always said that, having gone to Egypt, we could not leave unless we succeeded in settling the Government there, and in bringing about a state of things which might give some hope that a settled Government in the Soudan might be maintained; and it has always been our intention and policy to secure our own interests in Egypt. The policy of Her Majesty's Govern-

  1541
  ment in the Soudan is this—being, as we are, in Egypt, we are bound to provide for the security of Egypt. We found in the Soudan a growing danger—I say a growing danger, because, apparently, it has become much greater from the presence of this False Prophet, the Mahdi, who exercises such an extraordinary influence over these tribes—and we are agreed that it is absolutely necessary that this power should be checked. Suppose we succeed in giving a severe check to this power, it is obvious it would be to our interests to substitute a state of things that will keep this power in check; but no man can say at present in what manner that can be done. But, in point of fact, something else is asked of us. Some want us to declare that we are going to keep the Eastern Soudan; but I maintain that such a policy as that is utterly irreconcilable to the interests of this country. To say that, with all the engagements we have in other parts of the world, we are to take possession of the whole of the Eastern Soudan, on whatever pretext, is, to my mind, the most disastrous policy this country could possibly follow, and it could not be an object of any Government in this country. It is a country full of fanatical and hostile tribes, and must be held, if held permanently, with a large Army, placed in such a climate and at such a distance from us as to render such a policy most dangerous. That cannot be, to my mind, the permanent object of any Government. My Lords, we cannot give any further pledges than those we have given—namely, that our object is to check the Mahdi, and, having checked his power, to substitute, if possible, such a state of things as may reasonably be expected to prolong that security. The remark of my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) seemed to me to justify entirely this policy, because he said—"You have locked up 7,000 of your best troops in the Soudan, and have thus weakened this country." I entirely agree with the noble Lord that, in the face of European complications and the present state of affairs, it is a misfortune to this country that 7,000 of the best troops should be locked up in the Soudan; and I say it would permanently weaken this country, and weaken it to a very serious extent, if you were permanently to lock up a
  1542
  large body of your troops in the Soudan. Those who are responsible for the affairs of the country know only too well the entangled questions involved in the Soudan; and yet we are reproached because we say consistently, and again and again, that our policy, and the whole object of our policy, is to disentangle this country from the embarrassments in which it is involved in Egypt and the Soudan, and not to continue permanently in that position in which we find ourselves, and if it be possible to extricate ourselves from that position, and to return to a position in which our strength and our influence will be greater all over the world, and in which we shall be able to secure objects of other kinds which are, if possible, even more closely connected with, and of more importance to, the interests of this country. My Lords, the Motion made by the noble Marquess is one which I doubt not will be carried in this House. It strongly condemns Her Majesty's Government; but it does not, I think, really pledge noble Lords opposite to any precise and definite policy. It says, in effect, that the abandonment of the whole of the Soudan would not be conducive to our interests in those regions. My Lords, "abandonment of the Soudan" is an ambiguous expression. It may mean a great deal, or, as was said by my noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) last night, it may not mean very much. The abandonment of the Soudan—that is, to march in and then to march out again—is one thing. To retire from the Soudan after you have established some satisfactory state of things there is another thing. The permanent occupation of the Soudan is a third; and I do not by any means see, from the Motion or the speech of the noble Marquess, nor do I think that the noble Marquess and his Friends intend us to discover what course would be pursued if they came into power. My impression is that, practically, their policy would be found very much the same as that which Her Majesty's Government have pursued. I do not believe that any Government would be rash enough permanently to occupy the Soudan; but I do believe that any Government in power in this country would endeavour to bring about such a state of things as would secure our interests in Egypt, and as early a

  1543
  retreat from it as may be possible in the circumstances.
  LORD HARRISsaid, he had listened with the greatest attention to the speeches that had fallen from the Front Bench on the Ministerial side; and, while he viewed with respect the chivalrous manner in which the noble Lords had thrown themselves into the breach, the impression left on his mind was this—that if it were to be accompanied by so little skill in fence, so little vigour in the counter-attack, and supported by such lack of enthusiasm from the Benches behind them, their case must, indeed, be a weak one. While their Lordships would appreciate the readiness, twice repeated, of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) to retire from the cares of Office, they would not be so ready to admit the plaintive excuse he put forward in defence of Her Majesty's Ministers—that unprecedented circumstances had hampered the Government—as a valid one. He had no doubt that the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies would be appreciated at its proper value; but he did not think the noble Earl was justified in congratulating himself on the policy that had been pursued, because the converse or any other policy might have resulted in a European war, when they knew that at this moment the eyes of Europe were watching with anxiety the ring of clouds on the horizon, which might at any moment give out the flash of guns and the thunder of artillery. He congratulated the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) upon the Resolution he had brought forward. It was drawn in no doubtful terms; but he might say that his mind was not of such a character as to enable him to draw a distinction between that Resolution and the Resolution which had been brought before the other House. To his mind they were similar—if not in words, certainly in import—and amounted to a distinct impeachment not only of the Egyptian policy of Her Majesty's Government, but a distinct impeachment of the whole of their foreign policy. Their conduct of foreign affairs was remarkable only for its lack of foresight, and lamentable for its indecision until the moment for decision had passed. He contended that ever since the time
  1544
  that the Government were committed to action in Egypt their policy had been an inconsistent and an undetermined one. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for India contended that it was not inconsistent, for to be consistent it would be necessary to state a fixed time for the withdrawal of troops from the Soudan. But they had already fixed a date for the withdrawal of troops from Egypt, and had not adhered to it; and, therefore, he was justified in saying it was inconsistent. To his mind, a fair description of that policy would be, if it had not been so unfortunate and so unlucky, a happy-go-lucky policy, having in it a distinct element of kismet, of leaving things to chance, that they had no right to expect from a Cabinet of English gentlemen, and which would have been entirely inexcusable in a Cabinet in that country, whose assistance, he confessed, would have been of the greatest value to us now—he meant our old Ally, Turkey. The case of the Opposition was that the affairs of Egypt were in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, and that Her Majesty's Government had failed; and he challenged them to prove that they had adopted a particular line of policy; that they had now arrived at an expected point on that line, and that they would follow that line up to a definite issue. It was for them to show the people of this country that the charges made against them were groundless. If the vacillation or indecision which reigned in their Councils had affected their action, had it not also had an effect upon the Mahdi, and that in an entirely different direction? The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that they believed the Mahdi would be satisfied if his own Provinces were free. That was most characteristic of the policy of the Government. They could not conceive that anyone would advance; they could only conceive that everyone would retire. What was the result of that policy of vacillation? What was the result of the announcement of their intended retirement from the Soudan, which the noble Earl, who had just sat down, insisted was not a mistake? He found it in inclosure 108 in the Blue Book—
  "At the beginning of February, the Mahdi heard through one of Zebehr's messengers and Osman Digna that the British troops had been defeated, and that the Khedive and the English

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  Government had determined to give up the Soudan, and make Assouan the frontier town. The Mahdi and his troops were much pleased when they heard this.…The Mahdi said he would now go to Khartoum, take Gordon prisoner, and exchange him for Arabi Pasha."—[Egypt. No. 1 (1885), p. 109.]
  That was the result of their policy of vacillation. Some of their Lordships had to mourn friends and relatives who had fallen in the war; all England through there was mourning for those who had fought and died as soldiers should, and now lay buried beneath the sands of Africa; but these losses sank into insignificance in the face of the loss which the country had sustained by the death of General Gordon; and he thought he might say that the country laid his death at the door of Her Majesty's Ministers, for whom it was to answer the question why they did not keep up communications with him. The Government had sent General Gordon on a most perilous mission, and it was their duty to give him every support and all the information that was necessary. They had shown themselves ignorant of the first principles of modern military recognizance—having sent forward their advance guard, they had omitted to follow it up with a support, or to keep up connection between it and the reserve. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that Sir Evelyn Baring lost no opportunity of communicating with General Gordon; but Sir Evelyn appeared to he singularly unfortunate in getting his messages through, and was certainly not so successful in that respect as was General Gordon himself. Nothing was more plaintive than his message, saying that "this would never have happened if they had kept him better informed." He could not conceive what excuse the Government could put forward for not getting messages through. Gordon reported in one of his despatches that all the north side was free of Arabs; and this fact was clear from other reports. If General Gordon could get messages through, how was it the Government failed? They had also failed to support Gordon with military force. But Khartoum had now fallen, Gordon was dead, and it was for Ministers to answer the question why they failed to keep open their communications, or to pay the penalty. If they contemplated sending troops to Khartoum, they cer-
  1546
  tainly made a most extraordinary mistake for Ministers of a country which had more dealings with Eastern nations than any other nation, in failing to strike quickly. With regard to the future, he warned Her Majesty's Government to be careful that British interests did not fall into the gulf of Mahommedan fanaticism. If we were to retire, who was to take our place? Where was the Egyptian Army which might have taken their place? Destroyed. But as to those Egyptian troops, the First Lord of the Admiralty said they were very good if they would only stand, and they would make an efficient force with which to support—what did their Lordships think?—the police. It was evident that the protection of the Soudan could not be entrusted to Egyptian troops; and if we retired, where should we retire to? We might draw a line on the map; but would the Mahdi respect it? He had set the ball of fanaticism rolling, and the only way possible was to meet it. He considered that the bounden duty of England, for her own honour, and for the safety of Egypt, was to render secure that boundary which her most dangerous enemy threatened; but what assurance had the country that the Government would adopt such a course? The promises of the Government, such as they were, were utterly unreliable and deceptive. They were as delusive as the mirage of the Desert itself. In the vote he should give, he believed he was merely echoing the opinion of the people of England—that in the hands of Her Majesty's Government the foreign affairs of this country were no longer safe.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, he thanked the noble Lord who had just sat down (Lord Harris) for the admirable speech he had delivered; and he would also thank the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley) for the lucid way in which he had put forward his case. If the Government intended to exculpate themselves from blame, and to excuse their conduct, it was interesting to show to what extremities weakness might come; but what was more interesting and important was to make out what the policy of the Government in future was to be. Those who agreed with Her Majesty's Government were never tired of assuming that those who differed from them desired the occupation of

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  Egypt and the permanent occupation of the Soudan. The noble Earl had said the same thing that night. It was for exactly the opposite reason that he (the Earl of Dunraven) objected to the policy, or want of policy, of the Government. Their policy was inevitably leading towards the annexation of Egypt, and towards the permanent or indefinite occupation of the Soudan. The Government, by their action, or default of action, were going, step by step, to plunge this country into greater difficulties, and to make it more difficult for this or any other Ministry to with draw from Egypt or the Soudan. The House had heard nothing from the Government as to what form of Government was to be left at Khartoum. The noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty said they would be very glad to see some form of Government; but what the House wanted to know was, whether Her Majesty's Government attached such importance to that as to take measures to insure that it was established? It was not sufficient to be told merely that the Government would be very glad to see it. No doubt they would, if it were without any trouble on their part. Then the noble Earl said the one thing that was perfectly clear was, that Egypt, at any rate, was to have nothing more to do with the Soudan. It might be right or wrong; it might be wise or foolish. But if Egypt was not to be allowed to have anything to do, not only with the whole of the Soudan, but with Khartoum and the Eastern Soudan, at least the Government might have given them some indication as to what authority they intended to put there in the place of Egypt. He should also like to know what was the meaning and object of Prince Hassan's appointment, because it was rather peculiar that the brother of the Khedive should be appointed to an important post with the English Army, when, at the same time, the Government were reiterating their assurances that Egypt was to have nothing whatever more to do with the Soudan. The noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty went on to lay great stress upon the importance of the railway from Suakin to Berber. He (the Earl of Dunraven) entirely agreed with the noble Earl in that matter. A railway had, no doubt, a most civilizing influence, and would work a very great
  1548
  change in the country. But it was rather strange that the civilizing influence of a railway should have only just dawned upon the minds of Her Majesty's Government. He quite agreed that the railway would do much good. It was astonishing what an effect the rapid carrying of goods from one part to another had upon the minds of men. Those who acquired goods in that way wished to get more of them, and to get more of them they had to occupy themselves in the pursuits of peace. We made them a present of that railway; but, for the railway to be of the smallest benefit to the country, we should maintain our hold of the country until that railway had had time to effect its benevolent objects. To do otherwise was merely to waste the money the British people would have to pay for the construction of the line. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for India (the Earl of Kimberley) spoke about destroying the power of the Mahdi; and the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) spoke on the same subject. The object of the Expedition was the destroying of the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. But what was the use of doing that if we were immediately to go away? Had Her Majesty's Government forgotten the lesson of last year, when they sent an Expedition to Suakin, and killed 5,000 or 6,000 Arabs; and he ventured to say, if those men were killed without definite aim or object, that was not an act of warfare, but was an act of murder. He was told it was a necessary thing, and would break the power of Osman Digna. We knew that Osman Digna was just now as powerful as before, and had, in fact, a larger force than last year. It might be necessary to destroy the power of the Mahdi in order to occupy Khartoum; but were we to do so, and then to retire, it would be an absolute waste of money and waste of human life, because such a course could not, by any possibility, have the smallest practical or permanent good effect. Her Majesty's Government were not justified in spending the money of this country, and lavishing the lives of Englishmen, without definite aim and object. A large portion of the country was most fertile; and if we determined to remain there until a settled Government was set up, then Her Majesty's Government would be justified in shedding blood, if neces-

  1549
  sary, and spending money; but, if not, were they justified in causing the life of a single Englishman to be lost, or spending a single shilling of our money? He should like to know for what the Expedition was forming, because the original purpose, he was told, was the rescue of General Gordon? He was beyond the power of rescue now. He had saved Her Majesty's Government trouble in the way in which it was generally saved, their attempts to save having, unfortunately, been settled by slaughter before they could reach the objects. That part of the Expedition was gone. He did not know what their object was. When they got to Khartoum, were they going to use every effort for the relief of other garrisons still holding out in the Soudan? That was a question, and, surely, an important one, which no Member of Her Majesty's Government had touched upon in that debate. He wanted to know what was to become of these garrisons? He wanted to know whether Her Majesty's Government considered themselves in any way responsible for them? Last night the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) said the Government were not responsible for the position of these garrisons; but it seemed to him (the Earl of Dunraven) that we were as responsible as if there were English soldiers placed there under the direction of Her Majesty's Government, because Her Majesty's Government compelled the Egyptians to announce their intention of retiring from the Soudan, and thus, practically, to leave the garrisons to their fate. Therefore, Her Majesty's Government, he maintained, were as much responsible for the lives of these men as if they had been sent there by Her Majesty's Government. He did not know how far it was feasible to rescue some of these garrisons; but he wanted to know whether the Government felt this responsibility, and would take all the measures they could to carry it out? Last year, it was said, Lord Wolseley was to take measures to relieve the garrison of Sennaar, and was receiving his instructions. He would like to know if that noble and gallant General would be exceeding his instructions now if he took any measures for the relief of Sennaar? He would like to know if anything was to be done to relieve the gallant garrison at Kassala? Were they to be left to the same fate
  1550
  as the garrisons at Sinkat and other places? He understood, some time ago, that some Treaty arrangement had been made with Abyssinia. For this country to employ Native Abyssinians to operate in a religious war against fanatical Musulmen was, on the face of it, an injudicious act, and it was only excusable if some great object was to be gained by it. Then we knew that Italy was established in Massowah. The Government, he thought, might give the House some information on that point. The information required was, whether that had anything to do with either Suakin or the policy in the Soudan? As to the Mahdi, we knew, on very good authority, that not very long ago the Mahdi might have been disposed of very summarily with a force of, say, 500. That fact was used by a Member opposite as a proof of the insignificance of the movement. Now, it heavily taxed the British Army to put a force in the field against him, to say nothing of the enormous expense. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies seemed to have made an extraordinary and novel discovery, which he imparted to the House the previous night. He said he had discovered that the Mahdi was not a petty Chief, struggling to be free, but was at the head of a religious movement, and it was a movement that might have grave consequences. Her Majesty's Government might have had information from various sources which they could recognize as authentic by men well knowing the country. The ex-Khedive had given a strong opinion long ago as to the religious movement of the Mahdi; and similar opinions had been given by Mr. Broadley, who had defended Arabi, by Arabi himself, by Dr. Schweinfurth, by Sir Samuel Baker, by General Gordon himself, by Mr. Blunt, and by Mr. Villiers-Stuart. All these had borne testimony to the importance of this movement, and had all explained that it was a religious and political movement which, if not checked, would endanger Egypt. In spite of this they were told that Her Majesty's Government had not reason to suppose that the Mahdi was anything more than a petty Chief struggling to be free. That was a fair example of the ignorance which characterized Her Majesty's Government on matters of this importance; and he did not think that the feebleness of their policy could be better exemplified

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  than by the speech of the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty last night. He explained that, although evil consequences had happened, Her Majesty's Government were hoping that something would occur. Her Majesty's Government were constantly hoping that something would occur, and consequently took no measures to prevent the disasters which followed. The announcement that they would be glad to see a certain policy at Khartoum showed the greatest amount of ignorance concerning affairs going on in that part of the world—an amount of ignorance absolutely inconceivable. They had naturally heard a great deal about General Gordon, who had occupied the attention of everybody for a long time; and now Her Majesty's Government seemed anxious to show that he exceeded his instructions, and that he did not fulfil his mission in the way in which he undertook to do it. They also said that it was impossible for them to anticipate the danger he was in; and the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies went so far as to say that in one respect only had Gordon's wishes not been carried out, and that was on the Zebehr policy. As he (the Earl of Dun-raven) understood, the first and greatest considerations were for General Gordon to go out and ascertain the best means of evacuating the Soudan, supplemented by a distinct mission to evacuate the Soudan given him by the Khedive and accepted by Her Majesty's Government. Gordon went out, and let them see what he did on this matter. After General Gordon arrived at Khartoum, he sent some valuable and important Reports bearing upon the difficulties and dangers of his position. In a telegram in January, 1884, to Sir Evelyn Baring from Khartoum are these words—
  "I implore you, in view of the impossibility of relieving the garrison, to give orders to retreat, as one-third of the troops are disaffected, and cannot be depended upon for maintaining order in the town."
  General Gordon telegraphed from Berber on his way out, just at the time the Egyptian Forces were at Suakin. He said—
  "I would not, were I supreme, try again any Egyptian Forces at Suakin, but would engage 3,000 Turkish troops in British pay. That would settle the affair."—[Egypt. No. 12 (1884), p. 56.]
  Then Gordon arrived at Khartoum on
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  the 18th, and on the very same day telegraphed home to say that he would not be able to place a successor in his seat, because that would be a signal for general anarchy throughout the country. Yet the Prime Minister said the other day that General Gordon could have withdrawn at any time he liked. At a later date ho asked for 200 Indian troops to be sent to Wady Haifa. He (the Earl of Dunraven) did not think it necessary to repeat many of these telegrams, because it was distinctly stated last night that there was no reason to suppose that Gordon was in any danger and could not have returned himself at any time. In March he telegraphed—
  "I have no option about staying at Khartoum. It has passed out of my hands."—[Egypt. No. 12 (1884), p. 135.]
  Before that he said—
  "Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Haifa.…and then open up Suakin-Berber road by Indian troops."—(Ibid. 151.]
  On March 1, after his request was refused, he said—
  "I will do my best to carry out your instructions; but I feel conviction I shall be caught in Khartoum."—[Ibid. 152.]
  In face of this telegram, Her Majesty's Government came down there and affected to tell their Lordships that they were ignorant that General Gordon was in danger, and that they acceded to all his wishes. Then, as to his mission, that was said to be a mission of peace, and so it was a mission of peace; and General Gordon endeavoured to carry it out in a peaceful way. First of all he had wished to have a personal interview with the Mahdi. That had been absolutely forbidden by Her Majesty's Government. His next request had been that Zebehr should be sent to him as his successor, and that request was also vetoed by Her Majesty's Government. They had been told that General Gordon could not have been in a position to judge, and that Her Majeaty's Government at home knew better. But the Government seemed to have forgotten that Stewart had also said that Zebehr should be sent, as well as Nubar Pasha and Sir Evelyn Baring. Sir Evelyn Baring had said that he believed the best course would be to permit Zebehr to succeed General Gordon. He said—

  1553
  "I believe that Zebehr is the only possible man you can suggest to go there, and Nubar Pasha is strongly in his favour."
  Yet, whether they were right or not, the Government did put a distinct veto on the two means by which Gordon hoped to carry out his mission. First, by an interview with the Mahdi, and, secondly, by sending Zebehr Pasha. He asked for force, but force was invariably refused him. He asked for a British Force and he asked for a Turkish Force. All these requests were absolutely not only not complied with, but were refused in the strongest terms by Her Majesty's Government; and yet they came and said now that they did everything that Gordon asked them to do, The only thing that General Gordon did that Her Majesty's Government acceded to was his proclamation that the Slave Trade should not be interfered with. That was the one solitary instance in which Her Majesty's Government did not interfere with General Gordon. In every other respect, in attempts to carry out his mission, the refused him what he asked, and gave him absolutely nothing at all. Then they come and say General Gordon might have retired if he would. They entirely miscalculated their man if they thought it might be possible for him to leave behind him those who had trusted to him. He said he would not go, for the sufficient reason that the Arabs would not let him. "Evil communications," it was said, "corrupt good manners;" but the communications from Her Majesty's Government to General Gordon had not been sufficient to make him throw aside his responsibility, or to prevent him carrying out the mission he was sent there to fulfil. He would say nothing more on the subject of General Gordon. The noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty took exception to the points raised by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) in his most able speech. It was necessary to draw the line somewhere. To go back to the Dual Control was absolutely absurd. The result of the statement that we would interfere by force in Egypt, if necessary, was that we were obliged to send our ships to Alexandria. That step was protested against in the most vigorous way by the Sultan. He would not say whether Her Majesty's Government had become responsible for all that
  1554
  ensued. As a matter of fact, the forts were bombarded, the town was burnt, and a great massacre occurred, because Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to send troops. Her Majesty's Government said they could not find troops because of the political condition of the country. It was a strange thing, if they were able to bombard the town, that they were not able to find troops and prevent massacre, and prevent Alexandria from being burnt. England was alone in the matter; we had the entire responsibility on our shoulders. He would like to know whether Her Majesty's Government accepted it—whether they intended to remain there until they had put the Government of the country on a secure basis, and had reconstructed society? They did nothing of the kind. They made an attempt to withdraw their troops with the loss of General Hicks and 10,000 men. The natural consequence was that the Mahdi and his movement came to a head, and gathered great force. Another point was that we were obliged to undertake the Expedition to Suakin. Could any reasonable man doubt that if that Expedition had been planned in time, and sent out in time, it could have proceeded from Suakin to Berber, and the whole thing would have been ended there and then. There was a second point at which the Government could have averted all the consequences that followed from that date. If they had sent across from Suakin to Berber, there would have been an end of the Mahdi, and we should have been spared all the trouble that had occurred since. But Her Majesty's Government did nothing of the kind. Her Majesty's Government sent out General Gordon; and since they sent out General Gordon they might have interfered. Not only did they not interfere themselves, but they would not allow anyone else to interfere; and the whole responsibility rested with Her Majesty's Government. He maintained that there were three distinct occasions when a determined policy might have been adopted—first, before the bombardment; second, after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir; and, thirdly, after the destruction of Osman Digna's Force at Suakin, when an Expedition might have been sent to Berber. Even after General Gordon went to Khartoum, Her Majesty's Government might have

  1555
  averted all the disasters that had befallen us in Egypt. We were told the other night that we were not entitled to exile Arabi. He did not know in what light we looked upon Arabi; but some time ago Her Majesty's Government spoke of him as aiding a people who were struggling to be free. Who were the people who were struggling to be free? Were they the Egyptian traders, or the Arabs, or the Fellaheen Native population? Who were the people struggling for freedom in the Soudan? Were they the Arab slave hunters, the Arab conquerors of the country, or the Native negro tribes of the Soudan? Whenever Her Majesty's Government were seized with a violent desire to fight, and were anxious to kill somebody, then they said—"This man is a rebel, and he must be smashed;" but when they changed their mood, and did not wish to do anything, they turned round and said that the same people were "a gallant race struggling to be free," and that it was contrary to all their principles to interfere with them in any way. He remembered certain words that were used by Mr. Gladstone just before he came into Office. They were noble and excellent words; but unfortunately the were not carried out. The right hon. Gentleman said that we were both rich and strong, but that no people were rich and strong enough to disregard the priceless value of human sympathies; that at the close of the year, should an account be taken, he trusted that they might not find that they commanded a less meagre store of those human sympathies than they had at its beginning. Now, for himself, he (the Earl of Dunraven) might ask whether, since they took Office, the present Government had much increased the stock of those sympathies? When they succeeded to power the country enjoyed the friendship and respect of all foreign nations. That could hardly be said to be the ease still. Their policy had caused the deaths of 500 Englishmen and fully 50,000 Egyptians and Arabs; and that was not likely to increase the stock of human sympathies extended to them in North-East Africa. Before very long the Government would have to render an account not only to Parliament, but to the country. The people would audit that account, and he doubted very much whether they would consider the record a satisfactory one which was so disfigured
  1556
  by such frightful extravagance both of money and of human life.
  LORD ABERDAREsaid, that in a crisis like the present, if it could be shown that with safety and advantage to the country the Government could be replaced on the Treasury Benches by noble Lords opposite and their Friends, he should willingly vote for the Resolution that night. But he thought it seemed to him that the double indictment preferred against Her Majesty's Government by the noble Marquess in his Resolution had signally failed, and that, so far from the present dangerous condition of the country being improved, it would be greatly aggravated by the assumption of Office on the part of noble Lords opposite. The Government were made responsible for the failure to rescue General Gordon; but if there had not been one traitor in Khartoum and Sir Charles Wilson's Force had been able to relieve the place, ho believed that Her Majesty's Government, instead of being vehemently attacked, would have been held up to the country as a model of wisdom and vigour. All this came about because of an act of treachery 48 hours before the arrival of troops at Khartoum. It was known that Gordon's troops were not trustworthy, that they gave many excuses for desertion and abandonment, and yet up to this unhappy day his troops had proved themselves faithful enough to warrant him believing that he might depend upon them. The question, therefore, of the condemnation of the Government rested not upon their own actions, but upon the fact that a traitor took measures to betray his Leader 48 hours before the arrival of succour. It had been said that the Government had received telegrams from General Gordon announcing his danger, and pointing out the manner in which that danger might be overcome; but he asked if there was any person who would accept the recommendations with our knowledge of what had taken place in the country? One of General Gordon's propositions was that 200 troops should be sent to Wady Haifa; but was it to be supposed that this small force would really have been of any use? Another proposition was the sending of 500 Cavalry from Suakin after the victories of General Graham; but if these men had started on their journey it was improbable that any of them would have

  1557
  been alive. It was also said that General Graham's Force should have advanced after his victories in the Eastern Soudan; but no man who had the slightest knowledge of the means necessary for such a movement in such a country would advocate it. The wells on the route between Suakin and Berber were few; the population was hostile; and there were many other considerations against the adoption of military movements which contained a considerable element of rashness. If the noble Marquess was to succeed in putting out the Government and taking their place all his eloquence would not give him a majority in the other House unless he could obtain the support of the Irish Members. Within the last few days some steps had been taken by Her Majesty's Opposition in the House of Commons to secure that support. He had seen with the deepest regret the authority of the Speaker set at defiance, and that course had been supported by a considerable number of the Members of the Opposition. He saw in that an incident not unconnected with the proceedings of their Lordships' House that evening. It was of ill-omen, and if by such means the Government were displaced he was afraid great injury would be inflicted on the best interests of the country.
  EARL BEAUCHAMPrepudiated the insinuation of the noble Lord who had just spoken, and said that on the occasion referred to the power which the Speaker proposed to exercise was one which was to be employed for the first time in circumstances of great perplexity, and after the discussion it was proposed to close had not lasted more than two hours; and, under such circumstances, it was surely open to independent Members of the House of Commons to vote as they thought fit. If the only defence of the Government was that they had nearly succeeded in saving General Gordon, that defence was a very poor one. The noble Lord had endeavoured to show that the Government were not to blame on account of the recent Expedition being too late, because Sir Charles Wilson had reached Khartoum two or three days after it had fallen owing to treachery. But were the Government justified in running the time to so fine a point that it was necessary to make that most dangerous and unprecedented march across the Desert from Korti to
  1558
  the Nile, which had been so heroically performed, but at so great a loss of life? After all, that march had ended in failure. He considered that the conduct of the Government towards General Gordon had been characterized neither by generosity nor magnanimity. The noble Lord suggested that no reasonable man could have accepted General Gordon's suggestions such as those to send a few troops to Wady Haifa and two squadrons of Cavalry to Berber. But General Gordon did not base these suggestions on the material value of a small body of troops, but on the effect which they would have as an indication that the power of England was behind them and would be exerted if necessary. This suggestion of General Gordon's appeared perfectly reasonable. And the moral effect of such a demonstration might have been to prevent the disasters which subsequently occurred. As was well known, our advance upon the Nile had secured the Mudir of Dongola as an all and it was perfectly natural to believe, as General Gordon did, that the appearance of British troops at Wady Haifa would have secured great advantages to the garrison at Berber. Berber did not fall until June, and there had been ample time for a small detachment of British troops to march from Suakin to Berber to relieve the garrison there. On March 24 Sir Evelyn Baring recommended that this should be done, and quoted the opinions of Generals Stephenson and Wood to show that it was perfectly practicable. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a speech on the 19th of February, took great credit to the Government for having taken upon themselves the responsibility for everything Gordon did. But how were those brave words borne out? General Gordon invited the cooperation of Zebehr Pasha, and suggested that he should be appointed to succeed him as Governor General; but the noble Earl refused his permission. On the 19th of March the noble Earl made another speech about General Gordon; and he (Earl Beauchamp) thought he could detect a shadow of want of confidence. The noble Earl then said—
  "With regard to ourselves we have had confidence in General Gordon, and we hope and believe it was justified."
  Those were hardly such cordial terms

  1559
  as those used by the noble Earl on February 19. Again, on the 6th of March, Mr. Gladstone said that the Government made themselves responsible for the measures adopted by General Gordon; but how did the noble Earl carry out that promise of Mr. Gladstone? On the 21st of May the noble Earl in a despatch said—
  "Her Majesty's Government have been at all times ready to assist the Government of the Khedive with their advice as to the best means of with drawing from the Soudan the Egyptian garrisons…and for that purpose they consented to the mission of General Gordon; but…the presence of Egyptian garrisons in the Soudan…is in no way due to any act of Her Majesty's Government, and that they cannot hold themselves responsible for the measures which those on the spot may think fit to take with a view to facilitate their withdrawal."—[Egypt. No. 25 (1884), p. 50.]
  Who was meant by "those on the spot," but General Gordon? The despatch of the noble Earl of the 11th of March recognized the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government for that which, in this despatch of the 21st of May, he afterwards repudiated. It was true that a large part of the Soudan consisted of barren desert; but a great part also was a region of unbounded fertility. Both Lord Dufferin and Sir Samuel Baker recommended the retention of a part of the Soudan. Sennaar, Berber, Dongola, and Khartoum were all Provinces of great fertility, which, when General Gordon was in his former position of Governor General of the Soudan, were a source of great wealth and commerce; and even in the last few years of Egyptian finance—before 1882—were also a source of revenue. He wanted to know, therefore, what reason there was for abandoning those four fertile Provinces? When they spoke in Government despatches of "restoring to the inhabitants their former position of independence," he wanted to know whom they meant by the inhabitants, and what by independence? Did they mean the independence of the slave, or the independence of the slave-hunter? Were they going to abandon the people of the Soudan to the anarchy from which they were rescued by General Gordon 10 years ago? Was that their idea of a mission of mercy; or were they going to restore to them a peaceful and orderly Government in which life and property could be secure? If they really did mean to restore those Provinces to their
  1560
  former independence, they would make their last state far worse than the first. He characterized as a stupendous blunder the announcement of the abandonment of the Soudan at the time it was done. When there were garrisons and persons engaged in commerce in the country, it was the height of folly to announce that they would evacuate the Soudan before they had placed those persons in a position of safety. Anybody could see that such an action was not only insane in its idea, but likely to be disastrous in I its consequences. The noble Earl had referred to the growing power of the Mahdi; but why had Her Majesty's Government allowed it to grow? The Government had received many warnings; but they had deliberately disregarded them, and now the plea was I raised that the circumstances had I changed. But the charge against Her Majesty's Government was that the circumstances had changed, and that they knew that they would change. What was to become of the railway from Suakin to Berber? They had had some experience of difficulties in regard to; another highway—the Suez Canal; and he thought the House and the country ought to know what was to become of the railway after it was laid down. Who was to be responsible for its administration if it did not remain in the hands of England or Egypt? He did not think they were unduly trespassing upon the reticence of Her Majesty's Government in asking to be taken into their confidence, and to be informed with what objects and purposes this railway was to be constructed? In conclusion, the noble Earl spoke of General Gordon's death, and said that on the shoulders of the Government must rest the responsibility for the agonies with which his heart must have been filled.
  THE EARL OF DALHOUSIEsaid, he would not trespass on the time of the I House by any lengthened speech. The debate had already lasted nearly two days, and a remarkable feature of it had been the extraordinary vitality of certain of the arguments used, which were refuted over and over only to come to life again. The remark did not apply to the speech of the noble Earl who had just down, and who, in closing, had paid I a tribute to the late General Gordon—a tribute which everyone would agree with. General Gordon had only filled that place in their Lordships' mind

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  which, he was sure he now filled in the minds of all Englishmen, and which he would fill in the minds of Englishmen for many years to come. The noble Earl opposite, who had framed a careful indictment of the Government, had inquired as to the railway which was to be laid down. As to that, he could only reiterate what had already been stated, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, that it was to be undertaken simply and solely for military purposes. The only object for it being laid down was in order that they might safely withdraw Lord Wolseley from Khartoum. Lord Wolseley had himself specially asked for it and it was purely in deference to his request that it would be proceeded with. The noble Earl also asked why the Government did not long ago undertake to smash the Mahdi, because he would then have been easily smashed. The answer was simply this—that it never had been originally an object of the Government to smash the Mahdi; and it was only now, when his advance was likely to embarrass the policy of Her Majesty's Government, that they thought it necessary to adopt the policy of dealing with the Mahdi in that summary manner. Then, as to the issue of the Proclamation of the abandonment of the Soudan, on account of which some condemnation had been passed on Her Majesty's Government, that step had General Gordon's hearty sanction and approval. To have sent a White man and a Christian into that part of the world at a time of great confusion without some definite object of which the population were likely to approve would have been to commit him to a far greater danger than that upon which he voluntarily embarked. The one thing on which the entire population of that part of the world was agreed was the desire to be rid of all European control. Hatred of all Christians was a feeling common to all the Arab tribes in that neighbourhood. The noble Earl who spoke a short time ago (the Earl of Dunraven) stated that all the disasters that had fallen upon the Soudan were the result, not of the Dual Control, but of the Joint Note for the maintenance of the Khedive and the government of Egypt. Of course, it was quite true that the issue of the Note had affected all the subsequent events; but why was that Note issued? Simply and solely for the reason that
  1562
  this country was led by the action of the noble Marquess opposite into a joint partnership with France, which obliged us to consult, and in a great measure to follow, the wishes of that country. Practically, we had undertaken the government of Egypt in conjunction with France; and it was owing to the extreme urgency of keeping on friendly terms with France, and in order that this partnership might not be wrecked, that the Joint Note was issued. M. Gambetta, who was then at the head of the French Government, was a man of a strong will and of an enterprizing character; and he it was who urged the issuing of this particular Note. In fact, it rather appeared from the Blue Books that the Foreign Secretary himself objected to it, and that it was only when it appeared that our relations with France would be in danger that he yielded. Had Gambetta remained in power, it is not improbable that the understanding with France might have been successfully maintained; and if it had been, then Arabi would in all probability never have ventured to raise his standard of rebellion. Therefore, the Government were justified at the time in concurring in the presentation of the Joint Note. Then, as to the future, the Government had been asked to pledge themselves to a particular definite line of policy on the conclusion of the military operations in the Soudan. He did not see how they could have sufficient groundwork for arriving at any decision until the military operations were concluded. Nothing could be more rash than to announce a precise and definite plan of that kind. The Government had, however, intimated their desire to form something like an orderly Government at Khartoum before leaving it. The Government had gone as far as they could in intimating to the House and the country that they did not intend simply to smash the Mahdi and then leave the country. Of one thing he was confident, and that was that Her Majesty's Government fully intended to establish an orderly Government at Khartoum before troops were withdrawn from that capital, the ultimate object being to leave both Egypt and the Soudan entirely. The object of the Motion was to turn out the present Government and replace them by the opposite Party; but it seemed to him that, seeing that our

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  present difficulties had arisen not merely, as the noble Earl had suggested, from the Joint Note, but from the partnership with France in the government of Egypt which had made that Note a necessity, that would be an extremely illogical step to take merely because Her Majesty's Government had not yet been entirely successful in their attempt to undo the mischiefs which their Predecessors had created.
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKEtook credit for having initiated the interesting debate upon the sending out of General Gordon which took place in April last year. The fears then expressed had, unfortunately, been realized. He did not wish to underrate the difficulties the Government had bad to contend with during the time that they had been in Office; but he, nevertheless, thought they had brought upon themselves the indictment now urged against them by their determined obstinacy in rejecting advice, and indecision in adopting any course. He hoped that in the course of that debate they would have some explanation from Her Majesty's Government which would lighten the minds of many people as to the reason why General Gordon was ever sent to Khartoum at all, and why, when he was sent, the Government did not take the responsibility of his mission, and treat him as an Ambassador to any Foreign State. From first to last, the evil of the Government in Egyptian affairs had been vacillation in policy and indecision in action. The taunt of the Government had been that the present Opposition was responsible for the Dual Control he admitted it; but, had they been in power, none of the difficulties which had arisen would have occurred. He believed that if the late M. Gambetta had been alive and in power in France at the time the Egyptian Question arose, a much more vigorous and satisfactory policy would have been pursued. After the death of M. Gambetta, France had become one of the greatest difficulties in our negotiations. The Government had, unfortunately, given way to M. Freycinet. The policy of an English Government with regard to Egypt ought to have been linked with that of the Suzerain; but ever since the Russo-Turkish War the policy of this country had been changed towards Turkey, and now this country was beginning to feel some of
  1564
  the very serious difficulties which arose from attempting to conduct the affairs of a Mahommedan country without the assistance of the Caliph. If they had not made this change of policy, he believed that they would not have had to send an Army to defeat Arabi, or to send General Gordon to the Soudan. But whenever Turkey had proposed to do anything she had been thwarted by England and France. When an Envoy was sent to Turkey, they sent their ships to Alexandria, and after the Envoy had returned their ships remained. What had taken place? The revolt at Alexandria was in May, 1882, and lasted a month; a British squadron was there, but did nothing to quell the insurrection. In June the Government had instructed Sir Beauchamp Seymour to bombard Alexandria. In his opinion, that was one of the most atrocious acts ever committed by a British Government. There wore no troops landed to save Alexandria from bloodshed; but they waited till the end of August to put down Arabi Pasha. The whole of their Egyptian policy from that time had become an imbroglio and an incubus upon the English nation. The next step had been to send General Gordon to rescue the garrisons in the Soudan. The Government then sent an efficient Army to Suakin; but after having defeated Osman Digna, instead of making up their minds to open up the route to Berber, they had refused to do so, against every advice, and against the imploring demands of General Gordon himself; against the advice even of their own Minister at Cairo. It was perfectly possible to open up the Suakin-Berber route; and, at all events, it should have been attempted. But no arguments, no entreaties, no imploring demands in either House of Parliament or in the country at large, had had the slightest effect on Her Majesty's Government. They had been wrapped up in a policy of direct obstinacy. The blame entirely rested with Her Majesty's Government. They had from first to last warnings from persons whose opinions were worth having, that General Gordon was in the most imminent danger, and yet they disregarded them. He hoped that the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Napier of Magdala) would state to their Lordships what he thought of the march up the Nile. Whether

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  that House and the other House of Parliament would that night pronounce a verdict that would force the Prime Minister to place his resignation in the hands of the Queen remained to be seen. He did not, however, believe that if the Government had a majority in either House of Parliament it would in the least remove the imputation and slur which rested on them. The time would come when the country would be able to give their verdict. They would join hands round the grave of General Gordon; and they would then say, feeling the sorrow which overwhelmed them all, that the policy of vacillation and inaction was the murderer of General Gordon.
  LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA: My Lords, reference has been made to my former observations in this House, and I find it incumbent on me to revert to them. On the 4th of April, 1884, the question of the safety of General Gordon appeared to me very serious, and I had failed to learn that Her Majesty's Government were making any preparation for his relief. Knowing from experience how much preparation is required for even a small Expedition of a difficult nature, I gave Notice of a Question to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether any Expedition would be sent for General Gordon's relief; and whether the Scientific Departments had been requested to consider how such could be effected either from Suakin or Cairo? The Prime Minister having the previous day declared that he was not prepared to send an Expedition for the relief of General Gordon—which I only became aware of on entering the House—I confined my Question to asking whether the Government would be prepared with a plan in case it should be necessary. I beg permission of the House to read an extract from my remarks. I said—
  "The Government had declared that at present in their belief such an Expedition was not necessary; but the time might come when the opinion of the Government might change, and when General Gordon's position might not be so secure as it appeared to be at present; and, therefore, it would be a dreadful thing if General Gordon should escape—if it were possible to imagine that such a noble nature would attempt to escape—and leave behind him those who might suffer all the evils of an unfortunate war. It was possible the time would come when the Government might consider it necessary to relieve Khartoum; and if such relief
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  was to be carried out, it would certainly be carried out from either Cairo or Suakin, and it would be done with more effect if every step had been previously prepared by the Scientific Departments under the Government, whose resources were inexhaustible. Khartoum was about 445 miles from Suakin, and about 1,200 miles from Cairo. Of the distance between Khartoum and Suakin there were 200 miles of route by the Nile, and of the remaining 245 miles, 100 miles consisted of Desert, which might be divided into, and traversed in, two stages of 50 miles each. Then there came 145 miles of level country, between the Desert and the Rod Sea. There would be no difficulty at any season of the year in making a practicable route across those 145 miles; and then there would be those 100 miles of Desert to be crossed. Along the 145 miles, at every stage there was some water to be got, good or indifferent; and no doubt it would be in the power of the force occupying those halting places to get more water, and to sink more wells in the neighbourhood of the springs. No doubt the climate of Suakin was very severe indeed; but it was not unhealthy, and he believed that the country could be crossed by British troops, properly equipped, at any time of the year."—(3 Hansard, [286] 1612.)
  At that time the Mahdi's followers were not in possession of Berber, and therefore nothing would have been easier than for a force to have crossed over from Suakin, and given a hand to General Gordon. General Graham then had destroyed the power of Osman Digna; and although he was not at that moment in a position to advance because he had not transport camels they might have been got at many of the ports of the Red Sea. I concluded that if Her Majesty's Government decided on the Nile route of 1,200 miles they would at once begin vigorously to lay down rails to pass the difficult Cataracts to be connected by intermediate railways hereafter. I did not object to the Nile route under such circumstances, as there was convenience in having Cairo as a base, and any permanent opening of the way was removing a great evil, and the want of communication from Cairo to the extremities of the Empire. But such steps were indispensable, and also the provision of steamers and river transport for the navigation of the intermediate reaches of the river between the Cataracts. That appeared necessary then, and it appears to be necessary now. I did not enter into these details. General Wolseley requires support and better communication with Cairo. As long as he can rely on Dongola no doubt he has a great resource. No one had any right to cri-

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  ticize the action of Lord Wolseley in ordering the advance of General Sir Herbert Stewart. That was a most gallant and brilliant advance, with the view of extending a hand to General Gordon; but it was a great military risk. Lord Wolseley trusted, and justly so, to the valour of his troops; and if the movement had succeeded it would have been a brilliant achievement, which could not have been surpassed. There seems to be some anxiety as to the position of Lord Wolseley's Force; but I have no doubt whatever that it is perfectly safe under his command. Had Lord Wolseley's plan to advance on Berber and Khartoum been carried out, it would have been necessary to advance from Suakin to Berber, in order to meet him and effect the withdrawal of his troops from Suakin. That advance has, unfortunately, been suspended. I think that great misapprehension has prevailed with regard to the climate of the Soudan. I know by experience that troops have marched and fought in India in heat quite as great as that of the Soudan. The temperature recorded in the higher lands in the Soudan is from 110 degrees to 112 degrees in the shade. I have records in my possession from officers in camp at Mooltan, in India, showing a temperature of 120 degrees in the shade. The heat of the Soudan is not so trying as the heat of India, although it is very great; and although no one would wish to send troops to the Soudan in the hot weather, if it could be avoided, yet I believe it would be quite possible to conduct operations, if necessary, even in the hot season, provided they are supplied with Indian tents and proper means of assistance. Uneasiness has prevailed, because so large a body of troops has been blocked up in Africa; but if more troops are required, we have only to raise them. I am told that Lord Wolseley had already informed the Government that he required 10,000 more soldiers to carry out the short service system. Some apprehensions have been entertained regarding the Russian approaches to the Afghan Frontier. All the Russian officers whom I have met are extremely pleasant people, and I should be extremely sorry if we should ever be at war with Russia; but I do not believe that Russia would make war on England for a few miles of ethnographical frontier. I trust that the officers
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  in command of the troops in the Soudan, if they find that they are able to advance, to carry out the objects of the Government, will be permitted to do so in any season of the year.
  THE DUKE OF NORFOLKsaid, that at that stage of the debate he would certainly not go into a retrospect of the events which had led up to the present condition of affairs. There had not been a debate in their Lordships' House in which argument was less needed. During the whole period of this terrible tragedy the Members of the Opposition had plied the Government with arguments of every kind; but, as they all knew, the Government had turned a deaf ear to their warnings, and treated their arguments with scorn. Now, however, the justice of all they had said was abundantly proved, not merely by speeches on the Opposition or Ministerial side, but by the fact that the Government were now hurrying to do too late that which they had all along been urged to do while there was yet time. He knew they were told the circumstances were changed, and that those efforts which it was not right to call upon them to undertake in the way of risking troops and expending treasure for the life of one man and a handful of followers was justly called for by the grave circumstances of the present condition of affairs in the Soudan. But he thought that only proved again more fully still what the Opposition had always said and urged—namely, that Government must do in the end what they were now doing, and that they ought to have done it while General Gordon was alive, and not wait until he was dead. They must always remember that General Gordon was sent out in no ordinary way. They knew that the Ministers of the Crown never failed in pressing upon the House the fact that General Gordon was the central point of the whole policy of the Government, and the representative of all that England held most dear. If they did send out General Gordon in that way then it was their bounden duty to take every precaution to assure themselves that they would be able to bring him back again. The point which they had now to consider was what course they had to take. The Government had been taught a bitter lesson; but had they shown any sign whatever that they had learnt it? Had they had no lesson

  1569
  before? Could one have believed a short time ago that any Government could have received the news of the tragedy of Sinkat, and not, at all events, have provided that the safety of Gordon must be jealously guarded? Even now they heard that the interests of England were still jeopardized, and that the blood already spilt had been spilt in vain. They had gone to Egypt, and they should be determined not to leave it until they had bound her to them by such bonds of friendship that no unfriendly hand could loosen them. There were many reasons to justify the votes which they were about to give; and although the Secretary of State for the Colonies warned their Lordships that that House might do just as it pleased, because it was not on their votes the existence of the Government depended, but on those in "another place," he asked their Lordships whether during the last five years their action had been such as to warrant confidence being reposed in them? He had no doubt that the historian of the future would record a verdict against this Administration, that its career had been one of degradation and shame. He trusted that that might not be so; but he appealed to their Lordships to do their part, so that in that shame this House might have no part. They had often in that House to take a decision which exposed them to much censure and criticism out-of-doors. In proceeding to a division that night they had no such censure or criticism to face; for he believed that by carrying the Motion of the noble Marquess they would be recording on the pages of their country's history the verdict for which their country was indignantly calling.
  THE EARL OF DENBIGHtook a retrospect of the last five years, and of the different position which England occupied in 1879, when its destinies were intrusted to a Minister who recognized that in nations, as in individuals, noblesse oblige. She, by a display of determination, backed by her Fleet alone, saved Constantinople from the grasp of conquering Russia; and this assertion of her power at once placed her in her old position as one of the foremost European Powers. The present Government, on coming into power in 1880, proceeded, out of sheer perversity, to reverse all that their Predecessors had
  1570
  done; the consequeuce of which was humiliation and disgrace, so that we were now the scorn and laughing-stock of the world. Formerly, our alliance was courted; now, we were made of small account. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies explained last night what the Government policy in the present state of affairs was to be; but his explanation was characteristic of the noble Earl, whose policy always appeared to be to get as much as possible out of harm's way, to open his mouth and shut his eyes and see what Providence would send. It behaved us now to see that all the blood and treasure poured out in the Soudan should not be fruitless, but that at least some blessing should be left behind us, when we gave it up, in the establishment of some settled form of government, by which the blessings, of justice and civilization might be insured to the inhabitants.
  EARL CADOGAN: Whatever may be the opinion of your Lordships upon the question submitted to you in the course of this debate, one thing I think will be admitted by everyone—that this discussion has taken place under most unusual and exceptional circumstances. I have not been for many years a Member of your Lordships' House; but I do not believe that the oldest Member of this House can recall an instance in which a Vote of Censure such as the one now under discussion, involving charges of the gravest character and possibly the very existence of a Government, has been discussed almost entirely from one side of the House. Peer after Peer has risen on the Opposition Benches, and has arrayed the facts to be found in the Papers presented to the House, and scarcely any Peers but those who are Members of the Government have attempted to make a reply. If silence were to be taken as giving consent, I do not believe that at any time has a Vote of Censure been carried with so much unanimity, for that which we are now discussing might be taken as carried without any division at all. Under such circumstances, it will not be necessary that I should intervene for long between your Lordships and the statement of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville). The affairs of the Soudan have been laid before the House so completely that I am not disposed to go into them any further. I prefer to remind your Lordships that

  1571
  there is some fear that in the discussion of the special Expedition to 'which the Resolution of my noble Friend refers, the larger interests and principles of policy may be left out of sight altogether. My Lords, we must not forget that this Soudan Expedition is not merely one of those small wars or military operations, usually attended with defeat and disgrace, to which Her Majesty's Government have accustomed us in past years. It is the outcome of the general policy of Her Majesty's Government in their conduct of the affairs of Egypt; it is only an episode in one phase of that great Eastern Question which so vitally affects the interests of this Empire and the whole of the civilized world. The country laments, and your Lordships lament—and your grief has found eloquent expression during this debate—the sad scenes enacted at Khartoum, and the terrible fate that has befallen that hero of heroes, General Gordon. But these disasters mean more than humiliation, to which, unfortunately, we are becoming more and more accustomed. They mean a failure on the part of this country at a time of great difficulty and great crisis in Continental affairs; they mean the loss of the influence prestige of this country; they mean the weakening of our power before the world, and therefore they demand serious attention, and should be viewed, in my opinion, as a whole. My Lords, if you examine the Egyptian Question as a whole, and will look at the history of these affairs from beginning to end, you will find that Her Majesty's Government never had a policy at all. Their line of action has been invariably guided by the political exigencies of the moment. They appear always to be hindered by a dread of their responsibility, which to them appears a perpetual bugbear; and they are fettered, above all things, by the necessity of keeping together and consolidating that heterogeneous conglomeration of atoms which goes by the name of the Liberal Party. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) did well, last night, to remind your Lordships that the same vacillation and feebleness of purpose have marked the whole history of the conduct of Egyptian affairs by Her Majesty's Government. It was their undecided counsels which prevented their dealing firmly and with adequate strength with
  1572
  the rebellion of Arabi, that fons et origo mali of all their disasters. It was their undecided counsels which led to the massacre of the garrisons, to the despatch of General Gordon, and to the Expedition which was sent—too late, as usual—to effect his relief. Now, my Lords, the Prime Minister has told us that all these laches—all these iniquities, as I should prefer to call them—of the Government were condoned in the month of May last, when he obtained a mechanical majority of 28 in the other House of Parliament to approve the course his Government adopted; but at that time we had not the information to guide us to a decision on the merits of the policy of Her Majesty's Government which we now have fully at our disposal. The Government then told us that, although they had met with defeat and disaster, and although they had failed in rescuing the garrisons, they still had one trump card to play—they had sent General Gordon by himself to effect what they had been unable to attain by their armies and by their diplomacy and by their policy. If, under these circumstances, Parliament acquitted Her Majesty's Government last May, I do not see why they should be acquitted this year, after the result of Gordon's mission, now that that disastrous result is known. There is one point I should like to advert to which has not been touched upon in this debate, and that is, that the responsibilities we have now incurred in Egypt have been largely increased by the policy of Her Majesty's Government of incessantly and continually weakening the Egyptian Government. It is true they have, with a certain amount of loyalty, supported Tewfik; but they have never ceased to interfere in all the internal affairs of Egypt. They have dismissed some Ministers and appointed others, and have never lost an opportunity of humiliating the Governor of Egypt in the eyes of his subjects. Now, my Lords, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, last night, told us that they could not wish to treat Egypt as an English Province. But if it be possible to treat Egypt as a British Province, Her Majesty's Government have done it. What is the meaning of these perpetual sham appointments which are supposed to be made by the Khedive of Egypt, and which are decided upon

  1573
  by Her Majesty's Government? We have had an instance of it within the last few days. Sir Evelyn Baring writes that Lord Wolseley wished that Prince Hassan should be appointed on his Staff as Governor of the Soudan. After some correspondence Her Majesty's Government assented to the appointment; and although their policy at this moment is that Egypt shall quit the Soudan and have nothing whatever to do with it, the brother of the Khedive has just been appointed Governor of the Soudan. But there is another instance, and a more remarkable one, of this extraordinary conflict of authority in Egypt. When General Gordon was sent to the Soudan there was some difficulty felt in Parliament to understand the conditions under which he was sent; and from a conversation which took place in "another place" at that time it appears that it could not be ascertained whether he was appointed by Her Majesty's Government or the Khedive. Under these circumstances, my Lords, no one need be astonished that Her Majesty was advised to insert in her gracious Speech that memorable sentence, that "information from Egypt included painful uncertainties." But the noble Marquess yesterday said that the counsels of Her Majesty's Government were not only undecided, but also divided. The First Lord of the Admiralty took umbrage at that statement. It is difficult for us to prove that the Government are not a happy and united family. Our belief, however, is that the discussions in the Cabinet resemble more than anything that game which is indulged in at athletic sports called "a tug of war," than the friendly discussions which are usual in such a body. The scene which took place last night in the course of the debate also throws some light on the matter. My noble Friend the late Under Secretary of State for War (Viscount Bury), in the course of his able speech, was endeavouring to recapitulate some statements made by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The noble Earl was not then in his place; but immediately three Cabinet Ministers sprang to their feet in their anxious and earnest desire to correct the statements my noble Friend had just made, and to give the exact meaning which they thought attached to the words of the First Lord; but I was particularly interested to notice that
  1574
  the Members of the Government were each and all at total variance with one another. Then the noble and learned Earl sprang from the Woolsack and gave my noble Friend the "lie direct."
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, is it Parliamentary, is it in accordance with the usages of this House, to apply such language to anything that was said? I said that I understood the First Lord of the Admiralty to say the reverse of that which the noble Viscount had attributed to him.
  EARL CADOGAN: My Lords, if I have been guilty of saying anything which either offends the feelings of the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, or which is in any sense un-parliamentary, I beg, without hesitation, to retract it. Perhaps my language was rather more strongly descriptive of the statement of the noble and learned Earl than what I was entitled to employ; but I am in the recollection of the House, and I do not think that the words just quoted by the noble and learned Earl were exactly those which he used. I have, however, to apologize if I have, in any way, misrepresented him to the House. But with regard to this question of divided counsels, I do not quite understand why the noble and learned Earl should be so anxious to disclaim the accusation. It appears to me that the fact of their being divided is the only possible defence that can be offered for many transactions which we have so much deplored in the course of the last few years. I confess I should have thought it would have been impossibe for 14 men to sit round a Council Table and with complete unanimity to decide on the courses that Her Majesty's Government have adopted. One word as to the delay. The culpable delay, to which my noble Friend alludes, I suppose may be considered to have occurred from the moment when danger was seen actually to exist. Now, the moment, in my opinion, when the Government should have considered that General Gordon was in danger began from the moment when, to use the words in his despatch, he was "hemmed in;" and if they were cut off from communication with him they should have considered his danger and made preparations to meet the danger. The Prime Minister never would see the danger that existed.

  1575
  At the end of the month of April he solemnly told the House of Commons that no danger existed to the garrison of Berber; and before five weeks were over the whole garrison of Berber, consisting of 5,000 people, with the Governor of that fortress, had ceased to live. But, my Lords, the Prime Minister has now given a very different excuse for the delay which arose. He says he spent three months in discussing with his Cabinet as to the choice they should make of one of the two routes that are now both adopted. Now, it is my belief that if Mr. Gladstone had consulted the Intelligence Department at the War Office—a Department which, perhaps, does not exist within the Cabinet—he would within a much shorter space of time have been enabled to make up his mind as to which route to adopt. I believe the right hon. Gentleman ultimately chose the wrong one; but that I must remain an open question. But both the choice of routes and all other preparations should have been in time to meet the possible case of failure; and it seems to me that the chief weight of the charge that we have to make against the Government lies in this fact—that they never seem to have provided against possible failure and possible disaster. Apparently these chances never entered into their heads. And now they shelter themselves under the plea of treachery. Well, now, treachery is an Oriental weapon. It is probably the best, the sharpest, and the surest in Oriental hands, and it has various characteristics which might have prepared the Government for its use at the siege of Khartoum. In the first place, traitors almost always lean to the strong side. They are quick to detect signs of weakness on the part of anyone; and, I ask, is it possible to imagine any circumstance more likely to lead to such traitorous action as that which we are now deploring than the course adopted by the Government in their whole dealings in this matter? If they foresaw that the very fact of the appearance of an Expedition in the neighbourhood of Khartoum would lead to the tragedy, why did they ever send an Expedition at all? If, on the other hand, they did not foresee the probability of treachery, they are not entitled to allege this probability as a reason why they should have delayed their preparations. The fact is, there
  1576
  is abundant evidence in the Papers to show that the sending out of Gordon to the relief of Khartoum was a temporary expedient required by the political necessities in which Her Majesty's Government found themselves; and that the Expedition was also a temporary expedient, undertaken in the hurry of the moment, in one of those rushes which the noble Marquess so eloquently described. And now I come to the second part of the Resolution of my noble Friend. I agree that the difference between it and that presented in the other House of Parliament is a difference in form, but in meaning and scope there is very little difference, indeed, between them; and I believe if the Resolution in the other House is carried, it will be entirely and utterly impossible for the Government to retain the Office which they now hold. There is further a reason why these two Resolutions should have been different both in form and substance in the fact that the Resolution before the other House was laid on the Table before the framer of it had had the opportunity of seeing the Papers which were presented a day or two afterwards, and of hearing the explanations afforded in both Houses of Parliament. Is it to be wondered at, that, after we had had the advantage of seeing those Papers and of hearing the statements of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Resolution of my noble Friend was couched in stronger terms? Now, Mr. Gladstone says that he will not abandon the Soudan; but he has not told us how long he means to stay there. We know from the definition of policy sent by General Gordon on the 5th of February, and never contradicted by the noble Earl, that it is the intention of the Government to establish "a firm Conservative Government in the Soudan." But what we wish to know is, when you have created that Government, how you mean to make it a stable one, and to insure that it will remain stable after you leave? Before we make further sacrifices, and before we enter upon the expenditure of further blood and treasure, I think we have a right to demand that the objects for which we are going once more there are such as are likely to be permanent, and likely to benefit the country and fulfil our obligations to it. The statements of the Government are not sufficient. It is not

  1577
  enough to know that they will not abandon the Soudan. We want to know what they will do while they stay there. We want to know what they intend to do with the railway. It is, I consider, our solemn duty to challenge the Government and its policy. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies has told us that their policy has been the same—that there is to be no change, and that he is prepared to go on with the tactics which he has adopted ever since he has been at the Colonial Office. But there must be, in spite of the noble Earl, some change in the policy of the Government. There must be some change, not only in respect to the Soudan, but in the whole spirit which animates their policy in relation to home and foreign affairs. It has been said that we have been half-hearted in the action which we are now taking, and that, although prepared to censure, we are not ready to take responsibility. There is no doubt that the heritage which the Government leave to their Successors will be one of unmitigated woe, embarrassed finance, diminished prestige and authority, and an increased responsibility which would require some courage and some determination to face. There could be no personal ambition in the matter; but there are higher interests and duties than those of personal and Party feeling; and in no respect is the difference between the Opposition and the Government more clearly marked than when the Opposition show their willingness to subordinate their private feelings to the welfare of the country. I cannot believe that my noble Friend and those to whom we look for light and guidance in this matter will shrink from their obvious duty if this Motion is carried. It is absolutely necessary that a firm, simple, and honest policy should be announced, or that the present Government should cease to exist. I do not believe I am using language too strong for the occasion when I say that the continued existence of the Government has become a great danger and scandal to this country. The late Earl of Beaconsfield once likened a Liberal Cabinet to a row of extinct volcanoes. But the difficulty now is that the volcanoes are not extinct. Their dangerous and spasmodic characteristics remain; and, unless they can be controlled, may involve the country in still further degradation and ruin.
  1578
  There may be some who think that Party feelings and the existence of the Liberal Party are of more importance than this danger to the State, and they will probably obey the crack of the whip, and condone the various offences of the Government. We, at all events, will not share in that responsibility. We have appealed to Parliament to solemnly condemn the Government for its policy in Egypt and the Soudan; we believe that we have the opinion of the majority of the country at our back; and we trust to the verdict of the country.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, your Lordships were good enough to allow me last week to make a statement with regard to the subject of our discussion to-night; and, although this does not dispense with the duty of taking some part in the debate, I feel that it is a justification if I do not trespass now at too great length on your attention. I have listened to this debate, nearly the whole of it, with the interest which it deserves. One thing has struck me in connection with the brilliant and condensed speech of the noble Marquess who made the Motion (the Marquess of Salisbury). It was that he was much more sparing of strong epithets than he generally is on occasions of this sort. On the other hand, in the very able speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down (Earl Cadogan), he has rather departed from that persuasive moderation which generally characterizes his speeches, and he evidently thought he would try his hand at a little strong language. But I must do the noble Earl the justice to say that he most gracefully and courteously withdrew a word which appeared to your Lordships a little too strong. I have not, however, generally observed the same weakness in his illustrious Chief. My noble Friend (Earl Cadogan) has complained of the monopoly which his side of the House has had in the debate. I must admit that there has been speech after speech which appeared to me to repeat, not only what has been said by Peers in this House, but very much repeating language we have read and heard for some time past; and it is quite clear that in all this technical, detailed criticism of the Government, it is very difficult for other than official Members, who have followed the thing,

  1579
  to give answers when these particular criticisms are made. I entirely agree with what fell from my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) when he said that, though the Government differed from the Resolution, he had not one word to complain of the noble Marquess for bringing it forward. During the last two years we have had difficulties of a most complicated character; episode after episode has arisen, and whatever alternative was presented and adopted, offered occasion for criticisms, not only plausible, but which might very reasonably be made. Whether by the advantage which the Opposition have taken during those two years of constantly questioning, constantly criticizing, and of constant attacks, a great national question of this sort has been advanced or not, I must leave entirely to others to decide. But when they come forward with the avowed intention of dismissing the Government from Office as being incapable of holding it, and of replacing it with one of their own, I can only say that I think that that course is perfectly right and Constitutional. The noble Earl has been good enough to give your Lordships a description of what passed in the Cabinet. I am very sorry I have not seen the noble Earl in our Cabinet, for I should rather like to see him there. But when he complains of supposed dissensions in the Cabinet, I cannot help asking, are we the only Party who have dissensions? My noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook) the other night spoke about the great difference between the two Motions in this House and the other, and he happened to allude to a report in the newspapers describing what had occurred at a political meeting at the house of the noble Marquess.
  A noble LORD: At the Carlton Club.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Well, I do not know that there is much difference. The minute he said this, the noble Marquess sprang to his feet. I thought he was going to smash my noble Friend by indignantly denying the truth of the statement; but not a bit of it, he merely rose to explain that when the Members of the House of Commons of his Party came to the meeting to complain of the Leader of the Opposition in the other House and of the Motion he had framed,
  1580
  it happened on a Tuesday, and not on a Monday. The noble Marquess, in his opening speech, went back somewhat. He went back to the time of the rebellion of Arabi. He was perfectly justified in doing so. When taking the responsibility of a Vote of Censure on the Government in a great national crisis, I think he was bound to explain the grounds of his Motion as far as he could do. The noble Duke who spoke soon after him (the Duke of Richmond and Gordon) extended the charge very much. I may say, of all the speeches, the one which gave me the greatest pleasure was that of the noble Duke. His speeches are generally characterized by judicial, practical, good sense, and he confines himself closely to the points in hand. On this occasion, however, he claimed for General Stephenson a monopoly of the idea of the route from Suakin to Berber, and then the noble Duke went off at a tangent and surveyed mankind from China to Peru. He dropped in in India, he came down to the South of Africa, he went to Ireland, he followed Mr. Chamberlain to Birmingham and Ipswich, and he most ingeniously got back to Egypt by way of Berlin. But in that brief time, the noble Duke compared Her Majesty's Government with the Government to which he, the noble Duke, himself belonged; and he boasted of the immense success of their having maintained peace in all the world. If the noble Duke had a right to go back to 1874, I have a right to go back to 1874 too. Mr. Gladstone left Office with perfect peace everywhere, and the first official announcement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Conservative Government was, that he found our relations quite excellent with all foreign countries, and that there never had been a time when this country was held in higher respect by foreign countries. The noble Duke praised the admirable means which the late Government took in defending India. So far as I know, the means they took to strengthen our defences in India amount to this—that they utterly destroyed the stable and firm Government then existing in Afghanistan; and the end of all things, after bloody battles and the murder of Cavagnari, was that the late Government had to retreat as fast as possible from Cabul, without making any effort to establish a firm Conserva-

  1581
  tive Government in its place. When the noble Duke reproaches us with South Africa, does he pretend that the seed sown by the late Government was not the source of those difficulties? Does he imagine that the present difficulties have nothing to do with the measures of the late Government? With regard to Ireland, the noble Duke quoted Mr. Gladstone as to the state of that country, and said that he made an incorrect statement. But when Mr. Gladstone made that statement, it was at a time when he had no official information, which, however, the noble Duke went on to admit was not the case, as he, indeed, was bound to do, after the alarming letter which Lord Beaconsfield wrote to the Duke of Marlborough at the time. The only use of quoting this was to show how perfectly quiet Ireland was at the time. The noble Duke then went to Berlin, and quoted the remarks of Prince Bismarck, which were of an unfavourable character with regard to the Egyptian policy of the present Government. Now, Prince Bismarck is one of the most remarkable men of the time; he is a man of great ability, great will, and great intellect. Prince Bismarck is a man whose friendship is to be desired, and whose enmity is to be deprecated. He has rendered enormous service to that great country, Germany; he has united it; and the gratitude to him for that work is such that he has absolute power with regard to foreign affairs, and exercises great influence on the rest of the Continent. But, although that be the case, does the noble Duke pretend that we should abdicate all liberty of action with regard to the policy we pursue, either in Colonial or foreign matters? I must say that I have not the slightest right to complain of Prince Bismarck—of his expressing an unfavourable view of our Egyptian policy—for the simple reason that the policy of the Government has never yet been in accord with the advice with regard to Egypt which he gave to the late Government and to ourselves—namely, to take it. It was friendly advice; but when the noble Duke reproaches us for not having followed that advice, I have to ask him in return why it was not followed by Lord Beaconsfield, who, when the same advice was given to him, answered that he would not take Egypt at a gift?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Is that observation of Lord Beaconsfield to be found in any public document? I never heard of it before.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Do you dispute it? I heard it on the highest possible authority. It was mentioned at the time, and I believe it to be perfectly true. Unless the noble Marquess can say that the words were not used by Lord Beaconsfield, the objection he makes is of no use at all. Now, I come next to General Gordon; and no one can feel more regret that he was sent to Egypt than I do. But I do not know whether it is blindness on my part, I do not feel self-reproach for being one of those who were responsible for his having gone there. The noble Marquess yesterday said that General Gordon had gone out as a forlorn hope. That is not the case. If it had been the case, I am not quite sure that it would strengthen the argument. I can understand that in warfare, when a number of men volunteer for a forlorn hope and go, perhaps, to attack a fort, with a hundred chances to one that they will lose their lives, or be taken prisoners, there is no obligation in honour on the Commander of the Army to risk any more lives in saving that forlorn hope. ["Oh, oh!"] I believe I am quite right, speaking as I do in the presence of such great authorities. But General Gordon did not go out as a forlorn hope; he did not consider it so; he was confident of success. When we saw General Gordon, we asked his advice, and it was to send him out, and he thought he could be successful in his mission. When we did send him out, what were the criticisms made upon us? The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Waterford) said he did not approve it; but if he did not, he kept his reasons to himself, because the applause was almost universal in its favour. Indeed, only one criticism was made, and it was this—one in the phrase that has been so constantly applied, rightly or wrongly, to everything that we have done—"It is too late; he ought to have been sent two months before." That criticism, however, was made in ignorance of the fact that the Government had been considering the subject, though they believed that General Gordon had determined never to serve in Egypt again. Whenever we inquired of the Authorities in Egypt whe-

  1583
  ther he could be utilized the answer was in the negative. Therefore, the only criticism made upon us with regard to the despatch of General Gordon was perfectly unfounded. What would have been our responsibility, if a man showing everywhere such extraordinary power over Orientals, and who had had such conspicuous success in the Soudan, and told us he was able to assist in the work we had at heart, had been refused to be sent out? What would have been the language of the noble Marquess? A noble Lord said that we ought not to have sent him out alone, but should have given him a considerable Force. That, in my view, is a perfectly different question. That would have been a perfectly different course; and with the information then in our possession, I venture to say that if that had been the view of General Gordon we should not have sent him out at that particular moment to go to fight in the Soudan. Then, again, it has been said that we did not give an ample and sufficient discretion to General Gordon. I must say, in passing, that we entirely repudiate, with some indignation, the assertion that we sent out General Gordon merely to suit our convenience, and not for any public object we had in view. I declare that to be absolutely without foundation. When we sent him out, we were desirous of giving him our fullest support, and the most ample discretion as to the course, in the circumstances, which he should pursue. We sent him out with one set of instructions, which were cordially agreed to by him. When he got to Egypt those instructions were changed at his suggestion, and with the sanction of the Egyptian Authority, and we immediately approved the change. We asked him if troops sent to Suakin would be of any use, and he replied—"I do not want troops there." We were most unworthily attacked in consequence of the Proclamation he issued. Whether we entirely approved of the details or not, we supported and justified General Gordon; and we were quite prepared to take the consequence of his acts, and to approve of the details of any policy he might carry out within the scope of those instructions. Then the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) contrasted our policy with that of Lord Palmerston, who, he said, set a brilliant example
  1584
  of supporting a subordinate. Nobody knows that better than I do. If a man employed by Lord Palmerston did a foolish or a wrong thing, the private castigation he got was something fearful; but the fact once accomplished, Lord Palmerston took the responsibility on himself and defended the subordinate to the best of his ability. But does the noble Earl think that if Lord Palmerston had received a proposal from his subordinate, however distinguished, to entirely change the policy which he had been instructed to carry out, Lord Palmerston would have taken it as a mark of confidence in his own policy, and would immediately have changed his policy and followed that course? I do not complain in the slightest degree of any change which General Gordon made. He found circumstances on arriving at Khartoum different from what he expected; and, with the view of solving local problems, made certain suggestions, and instead of his pacific mission, he proposed, in a now familiar phrase, to "smash the Mahdi." Bat I beg to observe that that bears much upon the question of his application for any military force. It was not with the least notion of his own personal danger that he wanted it; but in order to carry out a policy, whether good or bad, which was not the policy with which he started, and not the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I do not understand, after what has been said by the Opposition as to the notion of sending Zebehr, how it can be possibly imputed to us as a fault that we did not send out Zebehr at his request. I believe that with the knowledge we had, apart from the political disadvantages we saw in it, the sending out of a first-rate General whom we did not trust, who was a great supporter of slavery—I believe it would have been a positive act of treachery to General Gordon, and that we should have been accomplices in the murder of General Gordon, which result would have amounted almost to a certainty. There are certain other things, such as the mission of only 400 men to go to Berber. Is it now thought that that would have been a safe, efficient, or wise measure to take? Still less would it have been so to send 200 men to Wady Halfa. That proposal was a perfectly new policy, and it was impossible to carry it

  1585
  out. Another question is with regard to the Turks. I believe that General Gordon was merely feeling that he would like some Turkish soldiers in his camp. The whole thing was impossible. The Turks would have been a long time in making up their mind. We know that the Turks do not move very rapidly. They are quite ready to have an Army in Egypt Proper, and then detach from that Army detachments to the Soudan and elsewhere, who will not interfere with local questions. A great many military questions have been argued here to-night, and I listened with great interest, to what was stated by the noble and gallant Lord the Field Marshal (Lord Napier of Magdala). Of course, I do not refer to him further than to say that, while he counsels us in one direction, some of our advisers counselled us in another. I have listened with some astonishment to the courage with which some noble Lords laid down the law as to what is the right military view to take, and what it is right not to do. My noble Friend who generally speaks on the Cross Benches (the Earl of Dunraven) was once, I believe, a brilliant war correspondent, and, of course, we all know that newspaper correspondents know all about military matters; but the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) has laid down the law on military matters as if he were himself a Field Marshal, and he, I have no doubt, would act as such. But I do not wish to go over what has been so fairly stated by my noble Friend by my side. I want to say something as to the future. I do not know that I have much to add to what I said the other night. It appears to me, from all that has fallen from noble Lords in this debate, there are certain things upon which there is more agreement than is generally supposed. It appears to me, with the exception of the noble Lord (Lord Wentworth), who, for reasons which I entirely appreciate, moved an Amendment, and possibly some other noble Lords who share his view, that the great majority of this House on both sides are of opinion that the safety of our Forces is a paramount consideration, and that that safety is best secured by active and vigorous action, however much we may deplore it at the present moment. That action is directed to-
  1586
  wards destroying the power of the Mahdi; and when we have destroyed the power of the Mahdi and are masters of the situation, as I hope and believe we shall be, I think on most questions there can be very little difference of opinion. I imagine that when we are masters of the situation we shall desire, all of us equally, to form the best Government that can be formed on the spot. I imagine that we shall be anxious to deal with the Slave Trade in a most effectual way. I may mention one thing on which we are all perfectly united—that the honour of this country is concerned in the defence of Egypt Proper. The noble Earl says that he must have a definite pledge as to what we are going to do with the railway to Berber. Its primary object is that we believe it to be the most efficient—and not only the most efficient, but also the most economical—way of conveying troops, with their provisions and stores, to the places where they are to be employed, and which we wish to occupy. If we find the circumstances favourable, would it not be perfectly obvious to any Government who was at that time in power, to make the best use and utilization of that railway which can possibly be to the best advantage of that country in whosoever hands it was? But if we are asked, though ignorant of the military and the political circumstances in which possibly for some months we may be placed, to define where we will apply the English Military Force for the purpose of defending the railway across the desert, that is a responsibility which I decline on the part of the Government. My noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Camperdown) made a very touching appeal to me. He said—"Why cannot you, at all events, confide in your personal followers?" I have the greatest confidence in the noble Earl; and if he will call upon me to-morrow, I will engage to tell him everything I know in connection with the subject. But I must decline to give to the whole world an answer to a question which, I believe, has never been put to any Government in any country before a war. I cannot conceive of anything more unstatesman-like, or anything that would more Betray the duty of an existing Government to the country, itself than to enter into those definite and clear pledges re-

  1587
  specting circumstances of which we have not cognizance. There is the first great difference between the two sides of the House. Th6 noble Marquess, in his great fertility of imagination, described our plan as an intention to lay an ostrich's egg in the sand, and then run away. If we are victorious, as we hope and believe we shall be, and are masters of the situation in Egypt, it is impossible not to believe that one of the first objects of the Government would be to do all that is possible for the safety of those Native tribes who have loyally and faithfully supported us during these disturbances. My own impression is this—when we do succeed in destroying the forces of the Mahdi, the particular request of the Natives will be that we ourselves should retire as soon as possible from their country, and let them govern themselves and it. The noble Marquess described the hatching of the ostrich egg, and the various stages of its infancy before it arrived at maturity. During all that time he said that this interesting fledgeling would have to be rocked and nursed by the British Army in that land so truly described by General Gordon and Colonel Stewart as "a land of fearful monotony and fatal climate." That is to be the position during this long education of the future Soudanese Government which the noble Marquess has deliberately laid before your Lordships. The noble Marquess wants us to occupy these districts of the Soudan, when, only yesterday, he stated, to my great surprise, that we have no interests in the Mediterranean, and that it is a matter of indifference to us what becomes of Tripoli and Morocco. My Lords, I can only say that this appears to me a most superfluous and unnecessary declaration to lay before your Lordships on the part of a man who wants to turn us out; and, while the one may not show much slumber on his part, the other shows a remarkable amount of dash. I can only say this with regard to this policy in the Soudan—this long or permanent retention of the Soudan by our troops. I know what the result of the Motion will be in this House to-night; but I do not know what the result will be in "another place;" but of this I am perfectly certain, that if that Motion is successfully carried in that place, and the noble Marquess succeeds to the responsibility of
  1588
  Office, he will look at it a little more carefully than he does when he makes those dashing Opposition speeches. I exceedingly doubt whether he will propose such a policy as that which he sketched out last night; and I am perfectly certain that if he does, he will be forced by the people of this country to wriggle out of it at the earliest possible moment.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the House is ready for the division, and I will not venture to interpose between it and that division for more than a very few minutes. I have not much to answer on the other side of the House. The remarkable point, as has been said, of this debate has been the smallness of the advocacy which the Government have received from their own side, or to put it epigrammatically, as I heard it mentioned in private by a distinguished supporter of the Government, my Motion is one that it is much easier to vote against than to argue against. I was rather interested to watch what the proved skill and tact of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) would do with the case that he had to deal with; and it was curious to notice that, although he was pleased to stand up at that Table, and gave us three-quarters of an hour of very pleasant, agreeable, and amusing speaking, he imitated his followers in this—that he carefully avoided arguing against my Motion. He said nothing to repel the charge of the desertion of General Gordon; he said nothing to explain the culpable delay which this Motion is intended to censure. The noble Earl did not take that course for any lack of time, for he had time to play pleasantly about a number of somewhat irrelevant subjects; and he told us some curious things in the course of that dissertation. He told us, for instance, that Mr. Gladstone did not know the state of Ireland, because he had not access to official documents, and so he entirely disposed of any comparison between the state of Ireland now and as it was then. My Lords, it is not necessary to have access to official documents to know that the state of Ireland is now unsatisfactory. Then the noble Lord's imagination took him to Berlin, and he told us a very pleasant story of Prince Bismarck, which he said he heard on the highest authority. I would advise him to put a

  1589
  mark against that authority, and not to believe its stories in future. I can only say that I never heard of Prince Bismarck having offered Egypt to Lord Beaconsfield, and it is needless to say that that which was not offered could not have been refused. The noble Earl points over his shoulder to a source of information as to what passed in the late Cabinet, which, of course, he exclusively possesses. What Prince Bismarck may have offered to that statesman who was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, and who is now Secretary of State for the Colonies under Mr. Gladstone, I cannot say.
  EARL GRANVILLE: The words I used were that Prince Bismarck advised the late Government to take Egypt.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I never heard that story before. There is only one other remark of the noble Earl to which I wish to refer. He spoke of his never having disregarded General Gordon's wishes; but he qualified that by saying that in asking for troops and contemplating military operations, General Gordon was entirely passing by the original object of his mission, and that, in that respect, the Government were in no way bound to regard his desire. I will not quote documents at this late hour; but it must be in the remembrance of all your Lordships that in the Report which General Gordon wrote on his way from Brindisi to Alexandria, and which he sent home the moment he landed in Egypt, he distinctly stated that, however defensive and pacific his action might be, military operations might become necessary, and that if he was attacked, he would not undertake not to defend himself, or not to press home any advantage which, in defending himself, he might obtain in military operations; and the Government were perfectly warned that such military operations might become necessary, and that such operations must demand the use of British soldiers. He did ask for British troops in small quantity; he did ask for Turkish troops, and for Indian troops. All these requests were denied him, and the Government knew, by the testimony of his brother Englishmen who were there in the month of April, that, unless British troops were sent, the situation of General Gordon was desperate. It seems to
  1590
  me to be impossible, in the face of those facts, to contend that the Government did not abandon General Gordon. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby), last night, defended the Government in his own peculiar manner. He said that General Gordon had received enormous praise for the danger of the mission on which he went; but the noble Earl went on to say that, if there had been no danger, of course there would have been no praise. He seemed to look upon it entirely as a commercial operation. The English people paid General Gordon a certain amount of praise, and General Gordon, like an honest man, in fulfilment of his contract, ran a certain amount of danger. The noble Earl would be an admirable political mathematician, if he did not strike out all questions of human sympathy from his calculations. There is no doubt that, whatever may have been the praise that was lavished upon General Gordon when he started, praise was not the motive that dictated the bold, the almost reckless, task which he undertook. He went forward in full confidence that he was serving his Queen; that he was fighting for the cause of humanity; that he was doing his duty to his country and his God; and he never asked whether men praised or blamed him for what he did. Nothing is more conspicuous, in all the utterances of his that we have, than his entire indifference to any opinion that might be passed upon that which, in his conscience, he thought it his duty to do. And it was precisely that sublime, heroic disinterestedness which attracted to him the affection and the sympathy of the English people in a measure that has scarcely ever been given to any of their servants. No public man, and no Military Commander in our history, has gone out on his mission bearing with him in such abundance the good wishes, the hearty prayers, and the deep sympathy of the whole people. In their minds there was no question of any commercial bargain. They did not ask whether the risk that he ran was commensurate with the praise which he received. They followed him, they loved him, they prayed for him, they hung upon his destiny, because they admired the splendid qualities which he displayed,

  1591
  and they appreciated the disinterestedness with which his sublime sacrifice was made. My Lords, the only noble Lord on the Treasury Bench who really undertook the task of repelling the censure conveyed in this Motion was the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook). He undertook, with great straightforwardness, to meet the charge of indecision, and he met it in this way. He said, there is nothing more untrue than that we showed indecision; from April to June we resolved upon the Suakin route; from June to August we changed our minds, and we resolved upon the Nile route; and then we did not act immediately, because we were possessed with a "profound reluctance" which induced us to wait and see whether something favourable in the circumstances might not turn up, and that reluctance it was which caused delay. But he seemed to think that nothing was more unreasonable than to apply to such conduct as that the reproach of indecision. These things are questions of definition. What do you mean by indecision? I take the most familiar example of indecision—an old woman crossing a street. She sees a hansom cab in front, nearly upon her; she goes back from it, and comes upon an omnibus coming from behind, and she goes forward; she has a "profound reluctance" to pass either of them; and she waits to see whether something will not turn up to help her, with the inevitable result that the old woman is run over, and an unsympathizing world says that her fate is due to her indecision. If this is the most decided, the most persistent, and resolute conduct, I only hope the Government will not give us such specimens of resolution for the future. I have only now to correct one or two misapprehensions which have been made with respect to what I ventured to say. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies appeared to me to entirely misunderstand what I said, or meant to say, when I characterized, as a stupendous blunder, the announcement of the intention to retire from the Soudan. The policy of retiring from the Soudan I think erroneous; but that is another question. That was not what I meant; but the blunder was, that while your garrisons were there, in the power of the enemy—garri-
  1592
  sons for which, as the event proved, you were in honour bound to fight, garrisons placed in the utmost difficulty to rescue—while they were in that position, that you should announce a policy which made all the tribes surrounding them into their desperate enemies, was as fatuous a policy as it was possible to conceive. As soon as you made up your minds that the Soudan was to be evacuated, your first course should have been to retire the garrisons as rapidly as you could; and, when that was done, then you might announce your policy as loudly as you pleased. But it was an unfortunate announcement when the men were in deadly danger—a policy of crass folly which almost amounts to a crime. A noble Lord imputes to me a wish to occupy the Soudan permanently, and to lock up a British Force there for an indefinite time. With respect to British troops, I said nothing. The noble and gallant Lord the Field Marshal (Lord Napier of Magdala) spoke this evening, and justly said that if 7,000 British troops were locked up in Egypt, and if it was for the public service, your best course was to raise 7,000 more. Without falling back upon that alternative, there is another course that might be pursued. I am ready to admit that the climate is unfavourable; but I also contend that there are other troops under British power within reach who could probably be made more effective for the purpose; but that is a military question on which I decline to dogmatize. I only wish it not to be understood that I lay it down, as a sine qua non, that it must be British troops who are to do all the work in the Soudan. As to the assertion that I said it is to be a permanent occupation, I do not know how long will be necessary to give to the Government which you leave in the Soudan the elements of security. This, however, I am certain of—that if you do not retain the Soudan in your power for a sufficiently long time to give security to the Government, so that it shall have a chance of existing and of acting, all the blood and the treasure you have expended will have been poured out in vain, and Egypt will be exposed, in all their acuteness, to all the dangers which you confess it is your duty to guard her against. I know not whether the task is heavy or light; but I know that if

  1593
  there had been a bold hand and a resolute will a little time ago, the task would have been much lighter than it is now. If the task is heavy or light, the only chance which the Government have of setting up a dyke, which shall keep from Egypt a flood of barbarian fanaticism, will be that you shall give the initial steps of that Government your powerful support, so that it may be able to stand upright by its own strength and to fulfil the functions which you propose to assign to it. That, my Lords, is the policy which I venture to lay before the House. That is the point upon which the statements of the Government have been haunted by a persistent weakness and vagueness, which I can only account for by the belief that what they are afraid of is not so much the Mahdi of the Desert as the Mahdi below the Gangway. It is that they may not lose the chance of Radical votes in the great inquest of to-night that a veil has been carefully thrown over that part of the policy as to what shall be done whenever the Mahdi has been smashed. They prefer to leave it in darkness. We know that a noble Earl (the Earl of Camperdown) has been invited to call at the Foreign Office, and the plan, duly drawn out, will be produced and presented to him. It is for Parliament to say whether the past conduct of the Government is such as to induce them to trust it with this unlimited power for an unknown plan; or whether all the precious blood which yet in that country unhappily must be risked, and possibly may be spilled in this unhappy war—whether this is to be risked on the chance that the future course of the Government may be more resolute, more consistent, more sagacious than it has been in the past. In the presence of the sacrifices, of which there are many in prospect, the issue is one of no light moment. It is an issue that Parliament has to decide to-night. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies tried to speak as if the decision of this House was uniformly opposed to a Liberal Government, and in that way to discount and depreciate its vote; but the noble Earl of all men knows that this is not the case. I can remember—I am going to appeal to decisions which were contrary to my own opinions—I
  1594
  can remember when the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was Leader of the House, as he is now, when the Danish policy of Lord Palmerston was impeached. This House agreed with the other House of Parliament in upholding the Danish policy of the Government, and in that were in accordance with the public opinion of the time. But I remember yet another precedent a few years before. I remember that Chinese question, which was a more distinguished instance than any other of that resolution to stand by his subordinates which so distinguished Lord Palmerston. In that case the House of Lords supported Lord Palmerston against the action of the Conservative Party. The House of Commons took the other view by a small majority. The people were consulted, and it turned out that, on this question of a foreign policy, the House of Lords had truly represented the judgment of the people, and that the House of Commons was wrong. I do not know which of those two precedents will be followed to-night. I believe that your Lordships will condemn the policy of the Government. What the action of the House of Commons may be, I do not know, and I believe that noble Lords opposite do not know; but I am quite sure of this—that if it should be that our recorded decision differs from that of the House of Commons, our decision, dictated far less by the pressure of political organizations, which have no weapons that they can use within the walls of this House, will, more truly, represent public opinion out-of-doors and the matured judgment of the people of this country.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I beg to state, with regard to the remarks of the noble Marquess, that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies was not my informant with respect to what I stated relating to Prince Bismarck and Egypt. But I am quite ready to refer the matter to Lord Derby for decision.
  On question that the words proposed to be left out stand part of the motion?
  Resolved in the affirmative.
  Original Motion put.
  Their Lordships divided:—Contents 189; Not-Contents 68: Majority 121.

  CONTENTS.

  Beaufort, D.

  Rosslyn, E.

  Leeds, D.

  Sandwich, E.

  Marlborough, D.

  Scarborough, E.

  Norfolk, D.

  Selkirk, E.

  Northumberland, D.

  Sondes, E.

  Portland, D.

  Stanhope, E.

  Richmond, D.

  Tankerville, L.

  Rutland, D.

  Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

  Wellington, D.

  Verulam, E.

  Abergavenny, M.

  Waldegrave, E.

  Ailsa, M.

  Wharncliffe, E.

  Bristol, M.

  Zetland, E.

  Cholmondeley, M.

  Exeter, M.

  Combermere, V.

  Hertford, M.

  Exmouth, V.

  Salisbury, M.

  Hardinge, V.

  Winchester, M.

  Hood, V.

  Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

  Abingdon, E.

  Bathurst, E.

  Melville, V.

  Beauchamp, E.

  Sidmouth, V.

  Belmore, E.

  Torrington, V.

  Bradford, E.

  Brownlow, E.

  Bangor, L. Bp.

  Cadogan, E.

  Liverpool, L. Bp.

  Camperdown, E.

  St. Albans, L. Bp.

  Carnarvon, E.

  Cawdor, E.

  Alington, L.

  Clarendon, E.

  Amherst, L. (V. Holmes-dale.)

  Coventry, E.

  Cowley, E.

  Ashford, L. (V. Bury.)

  Dartmouth, E.

  Aveland, L.

  Dartrey, E.

  Bagot, L.

  De La Warr, E.

  Bateman, L.

  Denbigh, E.

  Blackburn, L.

  Devon, E.

  Blantyre, L.

  Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queens-berry.)

  Borthwick, L.

  Boston, L.

  Botreaux, L. (E. Loudoun.)

  Eldon, E.

  Ellesmere, E.

  Brabourne, L.

  Essex, E.

  Brancepeth, L. (V. Boyne.)

  Feversham, E.

  Fitzwilliam, E.

  Braybrooke, L.

  Fortescue, E.

  Brodrick, L. (V Midleton.)

  Graham, E. (D. Montrose.)

  Chelmsford, L.

  Hardwicke, E.

  Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

  Harewood, E.

  Harrowby, E.

  Clements, L. (E. Leitrim.)

  Jersey, E.

  Kilmorey, E.

  Clifton, L. (E. Darnley.)

  Lanesborough, E.

  Clinton, L.

  Lathom, E. [Teller.]

  Cloncurry, L.

  Leven and Melville, E.

  Colchester, L.

  Lindsey, E.

  Colville of Culross, L.

  Lonsdale, E.

  Congleton, L.

  Lytton, E.

  De L'Isle and Dudley, L.

  Manvers, E.

  Milltown, E.

  de Ros, L.

  Mount Edgcumbe, E.

  De Saumarez, L.

  Nelson, E.

  Delamere, L.

  Northesk, E.

  Digby, L.

  Onslow, E.

  Dinevor, L.

  Orkney, E.

  Donington, L.

  Pembroke and Montgomery, E.

  Douglas, L. (E. Home.)

  Dunsany, L.

  Poulett, E.

  Egerton, L.

  Redesdale, E.

  Ellenborough, L.

  Romney, E.

  Forbes, L.

  1596

  Forester, L.

  Petre, L.

  Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

  Poltimore, L.

  Ranfurly, L. (E. Ranfurly.)

  Gage, L. (V. Gage.)

  Gerard, L.

  Rayleigh, L.

  Grantley, L.

  Romilly, L.

  Harlech, L.

  Ross, L. (E. Glasgow.)

  Harris, L.

  Rowton, L.

  Hartismere, L. (L. Henniker.)

  Sackville, L.

  Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

  Hastings, L.

  Hawke, L.

  Saltoun, L.

  Headley, L.

  Scarsdale, L.

  Heytesbury, L.

  Sherborne, L.

  Hopetoun, L. (E. Hopetoun.) [Teller.]

  Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)

  Hylton, L.

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

  Keane, L.

  Kenlis, L. (M. Headfort)

  Somers, L.

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  Kenry, L. (E. Dunraven and Mount-Earl.)

  Stewart of Garlies, L. (E. Galloway.)

  Ker, L. (M. Lothian.)

  St. John of Bletso, L.

  Kintore, L. (E. Kintore.)

  Strathnairn, L.

  Templemore, L.

  Lamington, L.

  Tollemache, L.

  Langford, L.

  Tredegar, L.

  Leconfield, L.

  Tyrone, L. (M. Waterford.)

  Londesborough, L.

  Lovel and Holland, L. (E. Egmont.)

  Walsingham, L.

  Watson, L.

  Lyveden, L.

  Wigan, L. (E. Crawford and Balcarres.)

  Manners, L.

  Massy, L.

  Willoughby de Broke, L.

  Middleton, L.

  Mostyn, L.

  Wimborne, L.

  Napier, L.

  Windsor, L.

  North, L.

  Worlingham, L. (E. Gosford.)

  Oranmore and Browne, L.

  Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

  Ormathwaite, L.

  Penrhyn, L.

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Selborne, L. (L. Chancellor.)

  Aberdare, L.

  Alcester, L.

  Blachford, L.

  Bedford, D.

  Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.) [Teller.]

  Grafton, D.

  Saint Albans, D.

  Braye, L.

  Westminster, D.

  Breadalbane, L. (E. Breadalbane.)

  Northampton, M.

  Carlingford, L.

  Ripon, M.

  Carrington, L.

  Clifford, of Chudleigh, L.

  Cowper, E.

  De Mauley, L.

  Derby, E.

  de Vesci, L. (V. de Vesci.)

  Ducie, E.

  Granville, E.

  Ettrick, L. (L. Napier.)

  Innes, E. (D. Roxburghe.)

  Fingall, L. (E. Fingall.)

  FitzGerald, L.

  Kimberley, E.

  Gwydir, L.

  Minto, E.

  Hammond, L.

  Morley, E.

  Herries, L.

  Northbrook, E.

  Kenmare, L. (E. Kenmare.)

  Saint Germans, E.

  Sydney, E.

  Leigh, L.

  Lyttelton, L.

  Canterbury, V.

  Meldrum, L. (M. Huntly.)

  Gordon, V. (E. Aberdeen.)

  Methuen, L.

  Hampden, V.

  Monk Bretton, L.

  1597

  Monson, L. [Teller.]

  Strafford, L. (V. Enfield.)

  Mount-Temple, L.

  Northbourne, L.

  Strathspey, L. (E. Seafield.)

  Ramsay, L. (E. Dalhousie.)

  Sudeley, L.

  Reay, L.

  Sudley, L. (E. Arran.)

  Ribblesdale, L.

  Suffield, L.

  Robartes, L.

  Thurlow, L.

  Rosebery, L. (E. Rosebery.)

  Tweedmouth, L.

  Vaux of Harrowden, L.

  Sandhurst, L.

  Vernon, L.

  Sefton, L. (E. Sefton.)

  Wentworth, L.

  Skene, L. (E. Fife.)

  Wolverton, L.

  Somerhill, L. (M. Clanricarde.)

  Wrottesley, L

  Resolved, That this House, haying taken into consideration the statements that have been made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, is of opinion that—
  1. The deplorable failure of the Soudan expedition to attain its object has been due to the undecided councils of the Government and to the culpable delay attending the commencement of operations;
  2. That the policy of abandoning the whole of the Soudan after the conclusion of military operations will be dangerous to Egypt and inconsistent with the interests of the Empire.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Twelve o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.