Sitting of 10 March 1884

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Public Accounts, Mr. Arthur O'Connor added.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—ARMY (SUPPLEMENTARY); NAVY (SUPPLEMENTARY).
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Working Men's Clubs Registration * [132]; Redistribution of Seats * [131]; University of Cambridge (Borrowing Powers) * [133].
First Reading—Law of Evidence Amendment * [130].
Second Reading—National Debt * [128].
Committee—Bankruptcy Appeals (County Courts) [118]—R.P.
Committee—Report—Valuation (Metropolis) Amendment [108].
Third Reading—Marriages Legalisation (Stopsley, Beds.)* [125], and passed,

QUESTIONS.

  POST OFFICE (TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT)—FEMALE CLERKS IN GENERAL POST OFFICE, DUBLIN.
  MR. O'DONNELLasked the Postmaster General, Why the Female clerks in the Telegraph Department at Dublin, receiving thirty shillings a week and upwards, were refused the annual holiday of three weeks enjoyed by Female clerks receiving a similar rate of salary in London; whether such "an anomaly," to use his words of the 26th of April of last year, will be remedied; and, if he could state why the petitions addressed by the Dublin clerks to that Department on May 1st 1883; October 16th 1883; and November 18th 1883, obtained no answer?
  MR. FAWCETT, in reply, said, that the subject referred to had been a long time under consideration. He was glad to be able to state that a decision had now been arrived at, and the female clerks in the Dublin Telegraph Department receiving 30 s. a-week and upwards would be placed in the same position as female clerks receiving a similar rate of salary in London.

  PEACE PRESERVATION (IRELAND) ACT—POLICE PROTECTION.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether a bailiff named Whiteside, in Glan, county Cavan, under police protection, is allowed money for two horses and cars his own property; if so, how much, and whether paid for by Government or charged to barony of Tullyhaw; is there any other similar case of allowance for vehicles the property of a protected party; what amount of extra pay is given monthly to the constabulary at the post; is it charged to the barony; and, is it true that half the fuel and light allowance is given to the bailiff; and, if so, on what conditions?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, the bailiff mentioned, Whiteside, is under police protection. Whenever he leaves home, otherwise than on foot, it is necessary for the police to follow him on a separate vehicle; and for this purpose the most convenient and economical arrangement is to employ his own second horse and car, there being no other vehicle within
  1016
  miles which could be hired. The payment for the use of the vehicle is made by the Government. The case is exceptional, but not altogether without precedent. The Constabulary employed on this duty receive no extra pay, except the usual allowance when absent from their station at night. This averages about 14 s. a-month for each man, and is not charged to the barony. It is not true that half the fuel and light allowance is given to the bailiff. It is paid to the men, who provide themselves.

  CRIME AND OUTRAGE (IRELAND)—DEATH OF FRANCIS M'GLONE, DUNGANNON.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If his attention has been called to the death of Francis M'Glone, on the 22nd February, from injuries received on the 16th February, near Dungannon, when he was attacked by a crowd of Orangemen near the Catholic Church; if he will state what was the political and religious composition of the coroner's jury; if instructions will be given to the police, where party murders occur in Ulster, to avoid summoning at inquests jurymen who might be alleged to be partisans; what steps the police have taken to bring M'Glone's murderers to justice; whether any persons have been made amenable; whether a reward for the conviction of the guilty parties has been or will be offered; whether extra police will be drafted into the locality; whether an inquisition into the murder under the Crimes Act will be held; if not, would he state on what grounds; and, whether M'Glone's dying depositions were taken, or any inquiry held, by the magistrates?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, I am not aware upon what grounds the hon. Member for Monaghan (Mr. Healy) states in so positive a manner that Francis M'Glone was "attacked by a crowd of Orangemen and murdered." If he is in possession of any information in support of the assertion, I trust he will not fail to communicate it to the proper authorities. The police have been, and still are, actively engaged in endeavouring to clear up the mystery which attaches to the case, but as yet without success. The Coroner's Jury was composed equally of Roman Catholics and

  1017
  Protestants, none of them known as partizans; and of the two medical men who were examined, and who agreed in their evidence, one was a Roman Catholic, and the other a Protestant. The jury's verdict was an open one—that death resulted from inflammation of the brain, brought on by a contused wound, which might have been caused either by a blow or a fall. In the course of the inquiries made in connection with this case three persons have been arrested. Two have been discharged, and a third is now in custody under remand. The police do not think the case is at present ripe for the offer of a reward, or an inquiry under the Prevention of Crime Act. There is no reason to suppose that extra police are required in the district. M'Glone's informations were taken, and the case has been inquired into by the Resident and local magistrates.

  INLAND REVENUE—EXCISE COLLECTIONS.
  MR. HEALYasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether there are at present sixty-five Excise collections in England, thirteen in Ireland, and thirteen in Scotland; whether it is true, as stated in The Civilian of 16th February, that Bandon and Kilkenny collections are to be broken up, thus reducing the number in Ireland from thirteen to eleven; whether a small increase has been recently made to the salaries of a class of Excise officers known as "Division" officers; whether the Treasury sanctioned this on condition that the Board of Excise effected such a saving in their department as would meet this increased expenditure; whether the breaking up of these Irish collections is for the purpose of saving, to meet this increase to the salaries of officers, the great majority of whom are employed in England; and, whether any similar reduction is proposed for Scotland?
  MR. COURTNEY: Sir, the numbers of Excise collections in the Three Kingdoms are correctly stated in the Question to be 65 in England, and 13 each in Scotland and Ireland. It has been found possible recently to reduce the numbers in Ireland by one—not two, as stated—and it is hoped shortly to reduce one in England; but the Board do not see their way to any reduction in Scotland at present. These reductions
  1018
  are made upon consideration of the Excise business of a district, and not for the purpose of meeting increases of expenditure in salaries. The recent improvement in the position of the divisional officers was not made conditional upon reductions in the collections.
  MR. HEALYsaid, that, on the Estimates, he would call attention to the treatment of Ireland in the matter.

  ARMY—EXAMINATIONS FOR PROMOTION—FAILURES OF OFFICERS.
  EARL PERCYasked the Secretary of State for War, How many Captains in the last examination for promotion in the Army failed to pass; whether of the five Captains of the Northumberland Fusiliers who failed to satisfy the examiners four are Adjutants of Militia and Volunteer battalions, and whether he will state how their regimental duties are to be performed during the summer months while they are preparing for the next examination; whether, although the general standard of the examination may not have been lately altered, it is not a fact that the marks have been given more sparingly, and the minimum number necessary to receive a pass has been raised; and, whether failure does not in some cases render officers of long service who have distinguished themselves in time of war liable to be superseded by juniors who have never been out of the United Kingdom?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, as I have already stated, 85 officers failed out of 227 who were examined. Of the five captains referred to in the Question, who failed in the Northumberland Fusiliers, one was adjutant in a Line battalion, one in a Militia battalion, and two in Volunteer battalions. If an officer who is an adjutant finds that preparation for an examination interferes with his duty as adjutant, there is no alternative for him but to resign his adjutancy. It is not a fact that marks have been given more sparingly, nor has the minimum necessary for obtaining a pass been raised since the year 1880. The examiners have invariably received the same instructions. Failure to pass may, of course, render an officer of long and distinguished service liable to supersession by a junior officer without foreign service.
  EARL PERCYsaid, that he would call attention to the matter on the Army Estimates.

  POST OFFICE—SORTING CLERKS AND TELEGRAPHISTS.
  MR. O'BRIENasked the Postmaster General, Whether, under the arrangement come to at the general revision of the rates of pay of telegraphists and sorters on 1st April 1881, all sorters and telegraphists were to receive extra pay for any duty done on Sundays in excess of two hours; whether all telegraphists and sorters employed in office duty have in fact received such extra pay since 1st April 1881; whether the men employed as sorters on the London and Holyhead Travelling Post Office are in receipt of extra pay for all duty performed on Sundays; why the men engaged as sorters in the Travelling Post Office in Ireland do not receive extra pay for excess duty on Sundays; and, whether he will give an order that they shall in future receive such extra pay, together with the arrears receivable since the date of the revision?
  MR. FAWCETT: Sir, in reply to the hon. Member, I have to state that since the 1st of April, 1881, sorting clerks and telegraphists have been granted extra pay for all extra duty in excess of two hours done on Sunday. A concession of much the same kind has been made to the sorters employed in the London and Holyhead Travelling Post Office since the 1st of October last. It is not intended that the mail sorters on the Irish railways should be in a worse position with regard to Sunday duty than those employed in England, and arrangements are being made to place them, as far as possible, on an equality.

  INDIA (TRADE, &c.)—EXPORT OF INDIAN WHEAT.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether any Reports have been received as to the bearing the large export of wheat has had on the food of the people; whether this export has stimulated the extension of cultivation, or the substitution of wheat for the other grains previously cultivated; and, whether the information and reports on the subject can be made accessible to individuals interested in the important questions involved in the wheat exports?
  MR. J. K. CROSS: Sir, in reply to my hon. and gallant Friend, I am sorry to say that I cannot give him any very definite information as to the effect of the large wheat export on the food of the population of India. But, from a careful examination of the price of food grains in the Punjaub and the Central Provinces during the last few years, I find that the large exports are coincident with, and doubtless stimulated by, the low prices of wheat and other food grains consequent on the abundant harvests of the last three years. The wheat export of the two years 1879 and 1880 was only 3,200,000 cwt. The price of Jowar and Bajra—the grain mostly used for food—was about 15 seers, or 301b., to the rupee. In the two years 1882 and 1883, with exports of nearly 34,000,000 cwt., the price of Jowar and Bajra was about 22 seers, or 44lb., to the rupee. The wheat production of the North-Western Provinces and Oude, the Punjaub, and the Central Provinces is estimated at 23,000,000 quarters. The difference between a good and bad crop will be at least 5,000,000 quarters, or a quantity equal to the greatest export yet reached. Much valuable iuformation respecting the wheat trade is contained in The Trade Statement of British India, this year's number of which is now ready for distribution, to which I must refer my hon. and gallant Friend.

  NAVY—ADMIRALTY DEPARTMENTS—HIGHER DIVISION CLERKS.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether it is in contemplation to abolish or modify the remainder or any portion of the Upper Division Class at the Admiralty?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Sir, I am somewhat at a loss to understand the meaning of the hon. Member's Question; but I may say that there is no intention to reduce the total number of higher division clerks in the Admiralty Departments.

  POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANK—MAXIMUM DEPOSIT.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Postmaster General, Whether it is the intention of the Government to raise the maximum sum which a de-

  1021
  positor may deposit in one year in the Post Office Savings Bank; and, if so, from what date?
  MR. FAWCETT, in reply, said, that in 1880 a Bill was introduced by his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Treasury, which, among other provisions, would have raised the limit of the amount which could be deposited in a savings bank in a single year above the present maximum of £30. The Bill, he regretted to say, had to be withdrawn in consequence of want of time and of the opposition it provoked. If the circumstances became more favourable to the passing of such a measure, the Government would, he thought, be very glad to reintroduce it.
  MR. COLERIDGE KENNARDsaid, that, in consequence of the answer of the Postmaster General, he would, on going into Committee of Supply, call the attention of the House to the increasing development of centralization in monetary affairs by the development of the Post Office Savings Bank—centralization which tended to contract the facilities hitherto extended to mercantile operations by banking and other institutions, and likewise placed the State, unguarded, at the mercy of a currency panic.

  POST OFFICE (TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT)—EXTENSION TO THE ISLAND OF BARRA.
  MR. D. CAMERONasked the Postmaster General, Whether it is proposed to extend telegraphic communication to the Island of Barra; and, if so, whether he will make an effort to lay down the submarine cable without delay, and before the commencement of the fishing season, so as to give the fishcurers and inhabitants dependent on that industry the same facilities for prosecuting their calling as are enjoyed by almost all other fishing communities in the United Kingdom?
  MR. FAWCETT: Sir, there has been some correspondence between the Post Office and the Fishery Board for Scotland with reference to an extension of the telegraphs to Barra and other remote places in Scotland. As the extensions referred to by the hon. Member would not be remunerative, the regulations now in force do not admit of their being carried out unless the parties interested are prepared to give a gua-
  1022
  rantee to secure the Department against loss. The terms of the guarantees have been stated, but they have not been accepted; and I am unable to say, therefore, what prospect there is of the extension being carried out.

  ARMY PAY DEPARTMENT—PAY-MASTERS.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether there has been for some time past a dearth of candidates for posts in the Pay Department; whether there were recently as many as forty regiments or regimental districts without the proper financial Officers; whether any representations have been made to the War Office authorities by the Officers of the Pay Department, asking to be placed upon a footing in respect of rank, pay, and retirement with Officers of the Commissariat; and, whether he proposes to accede to the request?
  SIR ARTHUR HAYTER: Sir, there were recently 22 regiments and one regimental district in which the pay duties were administered by a committee or acting paymaster. The number of candidates for the Pay Department has fallen off considerably since the re-organization of the Army in 1881 diminished the probability of captains having to retire compulsorily; but this incentive to accept paymasterships is likely to revive during the next few years. Representations have recently been made asking that officers of the Pay Department might be placed on the same footing as officers of the Commissariat and Transport Staff. My noble Friend the Secretary of State has under consideration some suggestions in connection with the retirement of officers in this Department; but he can hold out no hope that they will be placed on the same footing as the Commissariat in respect of rank, pay, and retirement.

  INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS (IRELAND).
  MR. DEASYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to a letter in the Cork newspapers of February 16th, complaining that the Catholic population of the city and county of Cork was not receiving its fair proportion of the benefits of the Industrial Schools Act; whether it is the case

  1023
  that the Protestant industrial school boys charged to the rates of Cork city are to the Catholic boys similarly circumstanced nearly as one to two; whether, in the county of Cork, the numbers of both are nearly equal; whether, in each of these cases, the number of Catholic boys is not entirely under its due proportion, considering the numerical strength of the Catholic community; whether this is due to the fact that the industrial school accommodation for the Catholic boys of the district is unduly restricted by the Treasury; whether the Catholic male industrial school at Greenmount, Cork, could accommodate over fifty boys in addition to those at present certified for; whether Sir John Lentaigne has endeavoured to induce managers of this and other Catholic industrial schools similarly circumstanced as regards accommodation to give him written admissions that their schools could only accommodate the number of children for which they were certified; and, whether, under the circumstances, he will consider it his duty to recommend an extension of the certificate of the male industrial school at Greenmount, Cork, so as to permit that institution to receive sixty additional children?
  COLONEL COLTHURSTsaid, he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman a further Question, of which he had given him private Notice—namely, Whether the recommendations of the Royal Commission, if carried into effect, would not remedy the inequalities spoken of by the hon. Member (Mr. Deasy), if such inequalities exist?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Deasy), in my opinion, is under a misapprehension in thinking that industrial schools are merely local institutions restricted to the admission of children from the district in which the school is situated, they being open for the admission of children from all parts of Ireland. In the County Cork there are five Roman Catholic schools with 418 inmates, and two Protestant schools with 107 inmates. In the City of Cork there are two Protestant schools with 145 inmates, and two Roman Catholic schools with 293 inmates. I have not been informed whether all the children in these schools are from Cork; but I am making inquiry. On the 1st instant
  1024
  there were, in industrial schools in Ireland chargeable to the Treasury Vote, 5,199 Roman Catholics, or one in every 761 of the Roman Catholic population, and 850 Protestants, or one in every 1,365 of the Protestant population, or nearly twice as many Roman Catholics as Protestants in these schools in proportion to the population. As regards the Greenmount School, Sir John Lentaigne reported some years ago that there was accommodation for 32 more children than at present, provided certain improvements were made; and this extension was, at the suggestion of Canon Neville, the principal manager of the Greenmount Schools, given to establish a separate school at Passage West. As regards the action of Sir John Lentaigne, referred to in the last paragraph but one of the Question, the rules limiting the accommodation were drawn up by legal advice, and Sir John Lentaigne was directed by the Irish Government to secure their adoption. This was done in 1874, and we are considering whether the form might not be altered to meet the objections of the hon. Member; but such alteration would have no effect upon the number for which the Treasury grant would be paid. In reply to the hon. and gallant Member for Cork County (Colonel Colthurst), there is a large number of applications for extensions from all parts of Ireland; but, pending any conclusion which may be come to by the Government upon the Report of the Royal Commission, which is at present under consideration, I cannot give any hope of any extension, nor pledge the Government to legislate on the subject this year; and as the inquiry was not alone for Ireland, but for the United Kingdom, I do not see that the Irish Government can act independently of the English Government.

  THE CENSUS—POPULATION OF IRELAND IN 1883.
  MR. GIBSONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the population of Ireland, up to middle of 1883, was correctly estimated at 5,015,328; and, what does the Registrar General for Ireland estimate will be the population of Ireland in the middle of the present year?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, the Registrar General states that the estimate quoted was made in the usual manner,

  1025
  and is believed to be accurate, and that the estimate for the middle of the present year, made upon such data as are at present available, is about 4,953,000.
  MR. CROPPERgave Notice to ask for corresponding figures for England and Scotland on Thursday.

  PUBLIC HEALTH (IRELAND) ACT, 1878—PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS—POWERS OF TOWN COMMISSIONERS.
  MR. LEAHYasked Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland, If by "The Public Health (Ireland) Act, 1878," Town Commissioners acting under "The Towns Improvement (Ireland) Act, 1854," have been deprived of all power to borrow for purposes of public improvement unless they are also urban sanitary authorities; whether, in that event, their borrowing powers are limited to the purposes of the Sanitary Acts; whether these purposes include the providing of a Town Hall or the repair or improvement of a Town Hall already existing; and, if he purposes to take steps to restore to Town Commissioners in Ireland the borrowing powers of which they have been so inadvertently deprived?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. WALKER): Sir, the effect of the Public Health Act, 1878, has been to deprive Town Commissioners who are not also the urban sanitary authority, of all power to borrow on the security of their rates for purposes of public improvement; where Town Commissioners are the sanitary authority, their borrowing powers are limited to the purposes of the Sanitary Acts, but those purposes include the providing, repair, or improvements of a Town Hall. Where Town Commissioners are not the sanitary authority, and do not, as they may, become such by application to the Local Government Board, the rural sanitary authority, which in such case is the sanitary authority over the town, has power to borrow for most of the purposes for which powers of borrowing were by the repealed section of the Towns Improvement Act, 1854, given to Town Commissioners, but those purposes would not include a Town Hall It is worthy of consideration whether Town Commissioners, not urban sanitary authorities, should not be restored to their powers
  1026
  of borrowing on rates for the purposes for which the rural sanitary authority cannot borrow, and if the opportunity for legislation arises I shall bring the matter before the Local Government Board and Treasury.

  SPAIN—GIBRALTAR—THE "MARIANNE NOTOBOHN."
  DR. CAMERONasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is true that, on the 22nd instant, the Marianne Notobohn, an American ship, petroleum laden, which had paid port dues at Gibraltar, and was anchored off that port by order of the port authorities, was boarded by a Spanish Revenue Cutter, which placed an armed guard on board, and took possession of the vessel until an assurance was given that she should be moved nearer the Rock; whether the spot at which the incident occurred is held by the British Government to be within British waters; if so, whether explanations have been demanded of the Spanish Government; and, if he will lay upon the Table Papers regarding the occurrence?
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEY, in reply, said, that the Government had telegraphed to the Governor of Gibraltar for information, and he stated in reply that a full report was on its way. If his hon. Friend would repeat his Question in a few days he should be able to answer it.

  SCOTLAND—THE SASINE OFFICE, EDINBURGH.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Whether, in ordering that the portion of Treasury Minute of December 1882, referring to the promotion, regardless of seniority, of those officers said to be instrumental in detecting the recent frauds in the Sasine Office, Edinburgh, to be read to the entire staff of the office, my Lords meant to reflect upon the integrity of the staff, or what meanings did my Lords seek to convey by such proceedings; whether the Head Keeper of said office made any communication to my Lords which would warrant them in taking that step; whether the officer who informed the head of the department, or his depute, about the frauds did so anonymously, and acting not upon any-

  1027
  thing discovered in the discharge of his duties; and, whether the Treasury Minute in question was based on the Report made by Mr. Monat and the Queen's and Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer for Scotland of their investigation into the frauds?
  MR. COURTNEY, in reply, said, the Treasury had no intention of reflecting upon the integrity of the Sasine clerks by its Minute of December, 1882. Their purpose was simply to notify the high value they attached to the zeal of the two officers who had been instrumental in detecting the recent frauds in that Office. The officers who gave the information did not do so anonymously. The Minute was written after the receipt of the Report of Mr. Mowatt and the Queen's and Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer.

  POOR LAW (IRELAND)—APPEALS OF BOARDS OF GUARDIANS AGAINST SURCHARGES.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been directed to the Resolution of the Boards of Guardians of Nenagh, Mountmellick, and other Unions in Ireland, protesting against the absence of any right or power of appeal from the surcharges of Local Government Board Auditors as enforced by the Local Government Board; and, whether he will consider the practicability of amending the Law in this respect?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, I am aware several resolutions have been adopted by Boards of Guardians on this subject. The Local Government Board are not of opinion that any action on the part of their Auditors has rendered such a change in the law necessary; but they are quite willing that the right of appeal shall be given.

  PRISONS (IRELAND) ACT, 1877—CONVEYANCE OF PRISONERS ON COMMITTAL.
  MR. EUGENE COLLINSasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether in England counties are relieved from the expense of conveying prisoners from the time the magistrate signs the warrant of committal to prison, either on remand for trial or on summary conviction, whereas in Ireland
  1028
  counties are only relieved from these expenses from the time a prisoner has been actually received into prison, when he has been brought there on a warrant committing him for trial or on summary conviction; whether Irish counties have been deprived of the relief accorded to English counties only by a trifling technical difference in the wording of the sections of the two Prisons Acts of 1877, referring to both countries severally; whether Irish counties are liable to annual charges amounting in the aggregate to about fifteen thousand pounds for expenses in the conveyance of prisoners, from which English counties have been relieved; and, whether he can facilitate any measure of legislation for the purpose of assimilating the Law in Ireland on the matter of the expenses of conveying prisoners with that in England?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. WALKER): Sir, my right hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) has requested me to answer this Question. The answer to the first part of the Question of the hon. Member is in the affirmative. There is a difference in the wording of the sections of the English and Irish Prisons Acts; and that difference was held sufficient in England, by the Court of Appeal reversing the Court below, to throw upon the Public Exchequer all expenses in respect of conveyance of prisoners incurred subsequent to the making of the order of committal. The annual charges to which Irish counties are liable, and from which English counties have been relieved, are considerably over-stated in the Question. The charge for the year 1883–4 is about £11,250; but this includes a very considerable sum not affected by the subject to which the Question refers. I think it would be very desirable that the law in England and Ireland should be assimilated on one basis or the other.

  THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—THE WICKLOW MAGISTRACY.
  MR. W. J. CORBETasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he has read a communication from the Town Commissioners of Wick-low, recommending the appointment of Mr. Joseph Smyth, Chairman of the Commissioners, as a Justice of the Peace; and, whether steps will be taken with that object?
  MR. M'COANsaid, he should like to know whether the communication referred to in the hon. Member's Question did not call upon the Government to dismiss the whole of the magistrates of Wicklow, 83 in number, because they expressed disapproval of the conduct of the Executive with regard to Lord Rossmore?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Yes, Sir; the communication did contain that request. The Town Commissioners forwarded a resolution in favour of the appointment of their Chairman to the Commission of the Peace, and they have been informed in reply that his name should, in the first instance, be brought under the notice of the Lord Lieutenant of the county.

  INDIA—MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF INTOXICATING DRINKS.
  MR. O'DONNELLasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether his attention has been called to the terms of certain official notices offering for public auction the right of manufacturing and selling intoxicating drinks among the people of India, especially to that relating to the district of Malabar:—
  "Notice is hereby given, that the exclusive privilege of manufacturing and vending arrack and toddy (fermented palm juice) in the several parts of the Malabar district for one year from 1st April 1884 to 31st March 1885, will be sold by public auction before the Collector of Malabar on the 22nd February 1884 at Calicut.
  "Renters or sub-renters may obtain on application to the Divisional Officer as many licences for distillation by shopkeepers of arrack at 60° under proof, as they may require within a limit to he fixed by the Collector for each Taluk, which will he notified at the time of sale. For the manufacture of arrack at 30° under proof in localities where strong liquor is in favour, Central distilleries must be established by the renters or sub-renters themselves.
  "Every shopkeeper licensed to vend arrack at 60° under proof will be required to hold a licence to distil at that strength also and to set up a still, the number of shops being increased to such an extent that each distiller will have a sufficient supply of toddy for distribution in his immediate neighbourhood without excessive cost on account of carriage to the still;"
  whether notices to a similar effect have been published to the number of many thousands throughout the districts of India; whether protests have been made on the part of the Native population in all parts of India against these measures; whether a petition signed by all the
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  leading inhabitants of Ahmedabad has been presented to the British Collector in that district, complaining that, through the action of the Government, the drink traffic has greatly increased during the past two or three years—
  "Destroying the morality and happiness of the people, so that, where there were only twelve liquor shops, at present more than thirty-two are in existence, and that the consumption of drink has more than doubled;"
  whether it is true that the successful bidders are authorized to
  "Open shops in the crowded parts of cities where a liquor shop had not existed for centuries, where numbers of the labouring classes collect together;"
  whether his attention has been called to the report in The Bombay Gazette that, in Gujerat, where the working population had been trained to habits of extreme sobriety by the temperance sect of the Swaminarayen—
  "The work of half a century has been upset by the activity of the Revenue Department since 1879; "
  whether, in Nadiab, a rising and prosperous town on the Baroda Railway, the united protests of the municipality and leading citizens have been ignored by the British authorities, and the contractor under the drink traffic auction has been allowed to open a manufactory of arrack and other intoxicating drink in the centre of the Brahminical quarter; and, whether this policy, being in direct contradiction to the resolutions of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, particularly the resolution passed in 1843 laying it down that
  "No officer should be allowed to believe that it forms part of his duty to throw temptations in the way of the people, with a view to increase the revenue of his district;"
  and to that of the 22nd June 1844, which laid down that "every opportunity be taken to diminish the number of liquor shops," what steps will be taken to remedy the recent practice?
  MR. J. K. CROSS, in reply, said, it was impossible to answer, within ordinary limits, the series of Questions which the hon. Member asked, and which related to details of administration which were under the control of the Local Governments in India. In reply to the last, and really the important, part of the Question, he had to state that the policy declared in 1843 and 1844 was still strictly adhered to. The number of liquor shops in

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  Bengal had been reduced from 9,155 in 1864 to 4,560 last year; and in the Bombay Presidency, they had been reduced from 2,976 in 1877 to 2,474 last year. In both Provinces, as generally throughout India, the excise of liquor had been very considerably enhanced during recent years.
  MR. O'DONNELLsaid, the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India had not answered any of the allegations contained in the Question. Would the hon. Gentleman give him an opportunity of bringing before the House the subject of the promotion of drunkenness in India for Revenue purposes?
  MR. J. K. CROSSsaid, it was not in his power to give a day for a discussion of the subject, as the disposal of the time of the House was not within his jurisdiction. The hon. Member's Question would be sent to the Governors of the Presidencies referred to in it for any remarks they might wish to make upon the matters contained in it.

  METROPOLITAN RAILWAY (PARK RAILWAY AND PARLIAMENT STREET IMPROVEMENT) BILL.
  MR. R. H. PAGET, who had a Question on the Paper addressed to the First Commissioner of Works, asking the right hon. Gentleman—
  "If he will be good enough to place in the Library of the House plans showing the proposed improvements in Parliament Street, King Street, and Charles Street, to which the sanction of his Department had been given, in connection with the Park Railway and Parliament Street Improvement scheme?"
  said, that since his Question had been placed on the Paper he had received from some persons a plan of the proposed scheme. He would now like to ask, Whether it is really a fact that the consent of the Commissioners of Works has been given to the plan which leaves Delahay Street at its present miserable width, and introduces a new street only 40 feet wide?
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: I believe the plan represents the improvements proposed. No doubt, Delahay Street remains at its present width; but that is no part of the improvement.
  MR. R. H. PAGET: This plan clearly shows a dealing with one part of Delahay Street, and it leaves it at its present width. Does the right hon.
  1032
  Gentleman intend that the consent of his Department shall be given to such a scheme?
  MR. SHAW LEFEVER: Certainly. The improvement in Delahay Street was suggested by the Government to the Metropolitan Board last year, and would have been carried on by them, if the funds had been at their disposal. No doubt, this scheme leaves Delahay Street at its present width. It could not have been widened except at a great additional cost.

  THE SUEZ CANAL—THE COMMITTEE OF BRITISH SHIPOWNERS.
  MR. W. H. SMITHasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, What authority the so-called Committee of British Shipowners possessed to represent the shipowners of the United Kingdom, and of the Colonies; whether they had any legal powers which entitled them to enter into an arrangement or convention with the Suez Canal Company which can be considered as binding on the general body of British shipowners and on the British Government as the largest shareholder; and, whether M. de Lesseps declined to accept the so-called Convention until a letter approving of it was transmitted from the Foreign Office on behalf of Her Majesty's Government?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): Sir, I will give all the information lean upon this question. As to the first part, what the right hon. Gentleman designates as the "so-called Committee of British Shipowners" is the "Association of Steamship Owners trading with the East." They do not pretend to act on behalf of any other body; but if the right hon. Gentleman will refer to Mr. Westray's letter of the 12th of October last, at page 16 of Egypt, No. 3 (1884), he will find that the members of the Association are "owners of at least three-fourths of the tonnage annually passing through the Suez Canal." As to the second part, the Association has no legal powers; and the agreement which they made with M. de Lesseps does not assume that they have. As to the third part, the request that Her Majesty's Government would express approval of the arrangements, came originally, not from M. de Lesseps, but from the Association, as the right hon. Gentleman will find on referring

  1033
  to Mr. Westray's letter of the 30th of November last—at page 50 of the Parliamentary Papers—forwarding to the Foreign Office the conditions agreed upon with M. de Lesseps. Her Majesty's Government always intended that the conditions of future management, the negotiation of which had been undertaken at their suggestion, should be carefully examined, and, if found satisfactory, that the Association and M. de Lesseps should be so informed. No one would, of course, expect M. de Lesseps to submit them to his shareholders until that information reached him. My noble Friend (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) has already declined to give any information as to confidential communications which may have passed between the Foreign Office and the official Directors on the subject, and I must adhere to his answer.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman, How it is that Her Majesty's Government have delegated to a Committee of Shipowners the right of dealing with property, half of which belongs to Her Majesty's Government; and, also, how far Her Majesty's Government, considering the promises given last year by the Prime Minister, are entitled to deal with the property of the nation without the consent of Parliament?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS), in reply, said, that that was a Question of argument which could be only dealt with in debate; and, when the debate arose, he should be quite prepared to take his part in it.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFgave Notice that, on the Motion to go into Committee of Supply, he should ask a Question with regard to the recent dealings of Her Majesty's Government with M. de Lesseps.

  POST OFFICE—THE POSTAL UNION (CIRCULARS AND PRINTED MATTER).
  MR. CAUSTONasked the Postmaster General, Whether he is aware that circulars can be posted in open envelopes in most countries of the Postal Union at prices varying from the one-fortieth to one-tenth of a penny per circular; that such circulars are received and delivered by the British Post Office when coming from abroad, but that they cannot be posted in this country; and, if so, could
  1034
  he remove such distinction, which is found to be detrimental to the commerce of this Country?
  MR. FAWCETT: Sir, my impression is that in most countries of the Postal Union no distinction is made between "circulars" and other printed matter. I am not aware of the precise inland rates for such matter in those countries; but the rate on book packets coming to this country from France, for instance, is practically the same as that on printed matter sent from here to France—namely, ½d. for each 2 ozs. in weight. Circulars in open envelopes are, I believe, received in small numbers from abroad, and are allowed to pass. The question of allowing in this country the use of open envelopes, as my hon. Friend proposes, instead of wrappers open at the ends, has been often and fully considered; but, amongst other objections to the adoption of this plan, the practical officers who are experienced in sorting tell me that the extra time which would be required to examine the packets would cause delay which might be serious in view of the extreme pressure under which sorting has to be carried on during the short interval between the time when the post closes and the despatch of the mails.

  POST OFFICE—POST CARDS.
  MR. CAUSTONasked the Postmaster General, What technical objection there is to pasting printed matter on the back of Post Cards, provided that the cutting so pasted does not exceed the size of the card, it being at present within the Postal regulations to enclose a card and loose printed slips in a halfpenny Book Post wrapper?
  MR. FAWCETT: Sir, there are objections to the adoption of the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Causton); because, if printed or other matter were allowed to be pasted on the back of a post card it would, I think, be difficult to maintain the distinction between a post card and a letter.

  NAVY—THE "GLLSLAND" TRANSPORT—EMBARKATION OF ROYAL MARINES.
  VISCOUNT LEWISHAMasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, with reference to the Gilstand, Whether it is a fact that the military authorities at Malta refused

  1035
  to permit a certain body of soldiers to proceed in that ship, in which the Marines were afterwards sent?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: No, Sir. We have heard nothing of any such occurrence; and it is in the highest degree improbable that the military authorities were consulted as to the embarkation of soldiers in the Gilsland, because, from the first, express directions were given by the Admiralty that she should convey Marines.
  CAPTAIN PRICEgave Notice that, on going into Committee of Supply, he would call attention to the matter, and ask, Whether it was not the case that the usual survey was not made?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANsaid, he could answer the Question at once. He did not think there would have been time to receive any such survey at the Admiralty before the Marines were embarked for Egypt.

  MERCHANT SHIPPING BILL—COMPULSORY PILOTAGE.
  BARON HENRY DE WORMSasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether, in view of the great interests involved by the thirty-first Clause of the Merchant Shipping Bill, entitled "Abolition of compulsory pilotage," he will consider either the advisability of striking that Clause out of the Bill, or of establishing a scale of compensation for the pilots who will otherwise be deprived of their living?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN, in reply, said, he feared the hon. Gentleman had not seen an answer which he gave, a few days ago, to a duputation of pilots who had waited upon him (Mr. Chamberlain) in regard to the matter. He invited the pilots to prepare a scheme of compensation, to which he promised full consideration.
  BARON HENRY DE WORMSsaid, he had received a deputation of pilots the day after the right hon. Gentleman, and he had then put the Question on the Paper.

  EGYPT—THE PRESS LAWS—THE "BOSPHORE EGYPTIEN."
  MR. M'COANasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the Egyptian Press Law is still in existence; whether, according to it, three "warnings" must precede the
  1036
  suppression of any newspaper subject to its provisions; whether such "warnings" were given to the Bosphore Egyptien before its recent suppression; whether the decree ordering such suppression emanated from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as provided by the Press Law, or from the Ministry of the Interior, of which Mr. Clifford Lloyd is the Under Secretary; whether such decree has been sanctioned by Sir Evelyn Baring; whether the specific offence for which the suspension has been ordered was the publication of an article in the issue of the condemned newspaper for the 18th of February last, in which the influence of Sir Evelyn Baring on Egyptian Administration was unfavourably, but still moderately and respectfully, commented on; and, whether he will lay Copies of such article, of the decree suppressing the newspaper, and of any Despatches received from Cario on the subject, upon the Table of the House?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Sir, I have already stated that no despatches have been received from Sir Evelyn Baring on the subject; and, in the meanwhile, it must be assumed that the proceedings in question have been conducted according to law. When they arrive, they will be examined with a view to their publication in the ordinary course.
  MR. O'BRIENasked whether any complaint had been received from France in reference to the treatment of these miserable papers?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: No communication has been received.
  MR. M'COANsaid, as the paper had been suppressed for 10 or 12 days, he would put the same Question on Thursday.

  LUNACY ACTS—ALEXANDER KAY, AN ALLEGED LUNATIC.
  SIR HERBERT MAXWELLasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the narrative of Alexander Kay, as published in The Westminster and Lambeth Gazette of 16th November and 16th December 1883, in which his detention for upwards of five years in various lunatic asylums is described, and his subsequent escape from Brook-wood Asylum; and, whether the allegations contained in the said narrative are in accordance with fact?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, he had not seen the particular narrative referred to in the Question of the hon. Baronet, though many such narratives, written by Alexander Kay, had been received at the Home Office. He thought he could safely answer that there was no truth in the allegations contained in the narrative. The case had been frequently examined, and there was no reason to believe that the man was improperly detained.

  INDIA (FINANCE, &c.)—THE SALT TAX.
  MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHYasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the Salt Tax in India is now exactly double what it was in the time of the East India Company in 1858; whether the Salt Tax is now two rupees per maund against one rupee in 1858; and, whether nine-tenths of the price Natives pay for salt go to Government as a tax?
  MR. J. K. CROSS: Sir, to the first two clauses of the Question I must reply in the negative. The Salt Tax was in 1858 in Bengal two rupees eight annas per maund; in Upper India two rupees; in Madras and Bombay 12 annas to one rupee. It has now been equalized throughout India at two rupees. To the last clause I must also reply in the negative. The mean average selling price of salt, including the tax, was in December, 1883, in Madras, two rupees 13 annas; in Bombay, three rupees 12 annas; in the North-West Provinces, three rupees 12 annas; in the Punjab, three rupees two annas; and in Bengal, three rupees 15 annas.

  BURIAL BOARDS—NEW CEMETERIES—LEGISLATION.
  MR. BRODRICKasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, What conclusion the Government have arrived at as to meeting, the difficulties of local authorities in obtaining land for new cemeteries; and, whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce legislation on the subject during the present Session?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, he was not aware that any practical difficulties had arisen in the way of burial boards getting ground for new cemeteries. Difficulties had
  1038
  arisen on other points; but he was not aware that there had been any difficulty as to the physical acquisition of land.

  STATE OF IRELAND—PARTY DEMONSTRATIONS—ST. PATRICK'S DAY.
  MR. O'BRIENasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to a placard extensively circulated in Derry, and signed "Robert M'Clintock, C.G.M." summoning "the Orangemen of the North of Ireland" to assemble at Derry, on the 17th March, to oppose a Catholic celebration of St. Patrick's Day, and promising the Orange sympathisers an escort of Derry Orangemen to and from their trains; whether he is aware that the Catholic celebration referred to is one of a non-political character, such as has for many years taken place on this anniversary, and that St. Patrick's Day is celebrated by a public ceremonial at Dublin Castle; whether the Robert M'Clintock, C.G.M. whose name is appended to the Orange proclamation, is a justice of the peace and deputy lieutenant, and whether his conduct in summoning strangers to Derry to assemble in dangerous proximity to a lawfully convened meeting, and in avowed hostility thereto, is in contravention of the rule recently laid down by the Lord Chancellor for the guidance of magistrates in such cases; and, whether the Government will take steps to prevent the peace of Derry from being disturbed, and the proposed celebration interfered with, by the means suggested in the placard?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, a counter demonstration of Orangemen has been summoned for the 17th of March, St. Patrick's Day, at Derry. Although it is the custom to allow the celebration of the anniversary of St. Patrick's Day at Derry, a reference to the terms of the placard announcing this year's celebration would not justify the statement in the Question, that the present celebration, which, in the placard announcing it, is called a "monster demonstration," is one of a non-political character. One of the Orangemen who signed the proclamation calling the counter-demonstration is Mr. R. M'Clintock, who is a Justice of the Peace and Deputy Lieutenant, and His Excellency has determined to

  1039
  bring his conduct in this matter before the Lord Chancellor. As regards the proposed demonstration on the 17th of March, the Irish Government is of opinion that it could not be held without involving serious danger to the public peace, and they are determined to prohibit both demonstrations, as was done in the case of analogous demonstrations in December, and will further have the City of Derry proclaimed under the 8th section of the Prevention of Crime Act.
  MR. O'BRIEN: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, If the Nationalists get up a counter-demonstration, will the Irish Government prohibit the celebration in the Upper Castle Yard, which is far more offensive to the Irish people?
  MR. HEALY: Would not the right hon. Gentleman, in view of preserving the peace, consider the prohibiting of the Orange demonstration only; and, whether, if in any part of Ireland, when a counter-demonstration is held, the Government will suppress both demonstrations?
  [No reply.]

  THE IRISH LAND COMMISSION—FAIR RENTS IN THE CO. LIMERICK.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether, in 1881, four tenants of the Rev. Richard Fitzgerald, Tarbert, county Limerick, namely, Gerard Leahy, Patrick Heartney, and Bridget M'Cay, of Bally donahoo, Glin, county Limerick, made application to the Land Court to have a fair rent fixed; whether the originating notices were served in December 1881; whether the hearing of these cases has taken place; whether, since these tenants pay a rent much higher than the Government valuation of their holdings, he can state when these cases are likely to be proceeded with by the Limerick Commissioners?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, that he was informed by the Land Commissioners that certain applications for the fixing of fair rents by tenants in the County Limerick referred to in the hon. Member's Question were made on the 23rd of January in the present year, and not in December, 1881, as stated. The cases would, in the ordinary way, be sent for hearing in the next list issued for the County Limerick.

  STATE OF IRELAND—THE RIOTS AT LONDONDERRY—CASE OF DOHERTY.
  SIR HERVEY BRUCEasked Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland, On what grounds Doherty was sent to Sligo for trial, involving large expenditure and great inconvenience to witnesses, instead of sending him for trial at Londonderry, where the alleged offence was committed; and, have the jurors of Londonderry shown themselves unworthy of confidence on any occasion.
  MR. HEALY: Before the hon. and learned Gentleman answers the Question, perhaps he will state also why similar cases were brought from Galway to Cork, and from Westmeath and Sligo to Dublin, as also all the other cases in which the venue was changed?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. WALKER): In reply to the hon. Member, I have to say that my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General for Ireland was of opinion the interests of justice would be better served by trying the prisoner Doherty in some place other than, Londonderry, where considerable excitement on the subject of the riots prevailed, and for that reason he changed the venue to Sligo. I am not aware of any occasion on which the jurors of Londonderry have shown themselves unworthy of confidence.

  IRELAND—THE REGISTRAR GENERAL (DUBLIN).
  MR. HEALY (for Mr. DAWSON)asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether sec. 10 of the Act 26 and 27 Vic. permits appointment of assistant in case of illness or absence of the Registrar General, Dublin; and, whether the Registrar General has been ill or absent during assumption by secretary of the title of Assistant Registrar General?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, the section mentioned in the Question empowers the Registrar General to appoint a fit person to act as his assistant in case of his illness or absence. It does not require him to wait until he is ill or absent to make the appointment, or to renew it on each occasion when the services of the deputy are required. Such a construction of the section would be not only contrary to the view of its

  1041
  meaning hitherto adopted, but would be highly inconvenient to the Public Service. The present Registrar General has been occasionally absent for brief periods. On such occasions his duly appointed assistant has acted for him. The Registrar General informs me that no unauthorized use has been made of the title.

  CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACTS—CATTLE DISEASE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
  MR. R. H. PAGETasked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, If he will be good enough to lay upon the Table of the House a statement of the several memorials or resolutions, respecting the danger of the introduction of contagious diseases by the importation of foreign animals, received at the Privy Council Office in the twelve months ending the 29th February last, distinguishing for each county the number of such memorials or resolutions that have been received?
  MR. JAMES HOWARD: Before the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster answers the Question, perhaps I may be allowed to put another, bearing on the same subject—namely, Whether information has reached his Department of a serious outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Texas?
  MR. DODSON: Sir, I should be quite ready to give my hon. Friend opposite (Mr. R. H. Paget) the statement he asks for; but it will take considerable time to prepare, because very often the resolutions on this subject are contained in Memorials relating to a great number of miscellaneous points, and these Memorials will have to be gone over. In answer to the hon. Member for Bedfordshire (Mr. James Howard), I have to state that we have heard that some cases of foot-and-mouth disease have occurred at Texas, but we have received no particulars with regard to the matter.

  LABOURERS (IRELAND) ACT.
  MR. O'SULLIVANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the Government will take any steps this Session to amend the Labourers (Ireland) Act so as to make it workable?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, I am not aware on what grounds the hon. Member
  1042
  (Mr. O'Sullivan) designates the Act as unworkable, and I should be glad if he informed me of it by letter. I may say that the Local Government Board hold a different opinion.
  MR. O'SULLIVAN: Many Boards of Guardians find that they cannot use it.
  MR. TREVELYAN: It has been very largely availed of also; but I should be glad if the hon. Member informed me by letter where the contrary has occurred.

  THE IRISH CHURCH COMMISSIONERS—MR. EYRE W. PRESTON.
  MR. SEXTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lieutenant of Ireland, with reference to the statement that Mr. Eyre W. Preston has spent thirty-eight years in the public service, When he first entered it; what departments he has served in; by whom he was recommended on each occasion; when he entered each department; when, and under what circumstances, he quitted each; and, how often during the entire period, he has been discontinued from employment in the public service?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, it would have been more strictly accurate if I had added that of Mr. Preston's professional career of 38 years, the greater part had been spent in the service of the State. Mr. Preston is a civil engineer, and his earlier engagements appear to have been professional. His public employment was as follows:—From 1846 to 1851, Drainage Department of the Board of Works; from 1852 to 1855, Valuation Department; from 1867 to 1874 he was in India, where he was engaged in the Public Works Department and upon railways, guaranteed and the appointments sanctioned by the Government of India; in 1874 he was given temporary employment by the Church Commissioners; in 1876 he was placed on their permanent Staff, and has remained on the Staff through the changes which constituted the Land Commission. Upon each occasion of his services being dispensed with, it was on account of reduction of Staff, or because the work for which he was employed was finished. I cannot state the names of all the persons who may have recommended him for public employment during his long and multifarious services; but I can say that he was recommended by the Heads of the Public

  1043
  Works and Valuation. Departments in which he had been engaged.

  CRIME AND OUTRAGE (IRELAND)—ALLEGED FIRING AT MR. CHARLES JONES HENRY.
  MR. SEXTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether Mr. Charles Jones Henry, of Artarmon, Linadell, county Sligo, deputy collector of county cess, some time since informed the police at Breaffry Station that, while driving home from a fair, he was fired at, wounded, and robbed of a sum of £81, being county cess which he had collected; and, whether his statement was investigated by Colonel Forbes, S.R.M. and Mr. G. F. Molony, R.M., and what conclusion they arrived at, particularly with regard to the attack alleged to have been made, and the wounds alleged to have been inflicted?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, it is true that about a year ago Mr. Henry alleged that he was attacked and robbed, and that his complaint was investigated by Colonel Forbes, who was not satisfied that any such occurrence had taken place. Mr. Molony, Resident Magistrate, states, however, that he could come to no conclusion but that the alleged outrage had been committed.
  MR. HEALY: May I ask whether this outrage is included in the Returns?
  [No reply.]

  PUBLIC HEALTH—DRAINAGE WORKS AT TWICKENHAM.
  MR. LABOUCHEREasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether any steps have been taken to ensure that the effluent water discharged from the drainage works at Twickenham into the Thames is pure; and, if so, with what effect?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: Sir, since Questions were asked on this subject last Session the district has been visited by myself, as well as by one of the Engineering Inspectors of the Board. It appeared that although works and machinery for treating the sewage by a chemical process had been provided, and were, in fact, all ready for use, no chemicals had ever been employed for the clarification of the sewage. The Board communicated with the local board, and reminded them that it was only on the understanding that the sewage would be
  1044
  treated either by application to land, or by chemical processes, that they had sanctioned the loans for the works, and urged them without delay to adopt measures for effectively purifying the sewage before its discharge into the river. The Board received on the 28th of February a communication from the Thames Conservators, in which it is stated that a sample of the effluent taken on the 25th of January was submitted to the analyst of the Conservators, and found by him to be—
  "Much better purified than the previous sample received by him in September last, but that it would be still further improved if it were more efficiently aerated in the settling tanks."
  The analyst, however, considered that no objection could be taken to the discharge into the river at the point where sewage is now discharged of an effluent similar in character to the sample.

  PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
  MR. CHAPLINasked the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, in the absence of the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he will arrange to take the Second Reading of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill as first Order of the Day on Thursday next, if the Debate on the Supplementary Estimates is concluded on Monday?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, if the whole of the Supplementary Estimates are passed to-night, the second reading of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill will be taken on Thursday. I am afraid, however, that as the number of the Supplementary Estimates is very large, it will be necessary to make Supply the first Order of the Day for Thursday.
  MR. CHAPLINasked whether the Government would agree to take the second reading of the Bill on the first Government night after the Supplementary Estimates had been disposed of?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I am afraid that it will be necessary next week to proceed with the Army and Navy Estimates.
  MR. GORSTasked whether the Bill would take precedence of the Merchant Shipping Bill?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman had better give Notice of his Question,

  1045
  Her Majesty's Government are anxious to proceed with the second reading of this Bill as soon as possible; but I cannot give any promise on the subject.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Will the noble Marquess state upon what day the Army Estimates will be taken?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: In my reply to the Question of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley), I explained that there has been greater delay than usual in laying these Estimates upon the Table. They are, however, in print, and a number of them will be at the Vote Office to-night for the use of hon. Members who desire to have a copy of them at once. The whole distribution will be made on Wednesday. We propose to move the Army Estimates on Monday.
  MR. W. H. SMITH: When will the Army Estimates be taken?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: On Thursday week.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Thursday is the day fixed for the second reading of the Reform Bill. I presume from the answer of the noble Marquess that the Estimates will take precedence of that measure.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Yes; it will be necessary to take the Navy Estimates next week.

  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN AT SINKAT.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTasked the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, in the absence of the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he will direct Admiral Sir William Hewett, now commanding at Suakin, to make every effort, including power of ransom, for the release of the wives and families of the Commandant and the garrison of Sinkat, who have been sold into slavery by Osman Digna?
  MR. O'DONNELLsaid, that he desired, at the same time, to ask, whether the Government would make every effort, including power of ransom, for the release of the wives and families of those who were being sold into slavery under General Gordon?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Sir, the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) may be sure that Admi-
  1046
  ral Hewett will be instructed to do everything within his power for the release of the unfortunate persons referred to; but it is impossible, under present circumstances, to state what exact steps will be taken for that purpose.
  MR. GIBSON: Has he yet been instructed?
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, that he had asked whether the Government had refused to make an offer of ransom. Only a few hundred pounds would be required for the release of these unfortunate persons.
  MR. O'DONNELLasked, whether the Government refused to take into consideration the case of the wives and families of those who were being sold into slavery under General Gordon?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: There has been no refusal on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I distinctly stated that the attention of Admiral Hewett had been directed to the subject, and that instructions had been given to him with reference to it.
  SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS: May we have those instructions?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I cannot make any promise with reference to them at this moment.
  SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS: I beg to give Notice that on Thursday next I shall move for a copy of the instructions to which the noble Lord has just referred.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: In regard to the Notice just given, I do not think it would be possible at present to lay those instructions on the Table of the House. They form part of the confidential communications that have passed on the subject of the military operations, and those instructions could not be separated from the remainder of the telegram in which they are contained.

  EGYPT (MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE SOUDAN)—THE LIST OF CASUALTIES.
  MR. GRANTHAMasked, Whether an official list of those wounded during the recent operations in Egypt would be published?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, all information that we have received has been published, including a list of the killed. When the full list of the wounded has been received, it will be published.

  INDIA—ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTAGIOUS DISEASES ACT (INDIA), No. XIV., 1868, IN BOMBAY.
  MR. HOPWOODasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether, in respect of the retention by the Bombay Government, out of the annual subsidy due to the municipality, of a large sum to administer the Contagious Diseases Acts against the will of the justices of the city, the noble Lord the then Secretary for India conveyed to the Bombay Government his opinion, concurring with that of the Government of India, "that the Government of Bombay should withdraw their orders, and refund the corporation the sums retained;" whether the same Secretary, by despatch, dated Oct. 26, 1882, gave permission to the Viceroy and Government of India at their request to pass an Act to suspend the Contagious Diseases Act (India), No. XIV., 1868; whether the Act has been accordingly suspended by any and what law; whether the position taken up in either of the above cases has been reversed by the present Secretary of State for India, and, whether, since the Vote of this House in the last Session on the subject of the English Acts, any further correspondence had taken place on the subject with the Indian Government?
  MR. J. K. CROSS: Sir, I must refer my hon. Friend to the Return on this subject presented to Parliament last Session. No further Correspondence regarding it has passed between the Secretary of State and the Government of either India or Bombay, since Lord Kimberley's despatches of the 3rd of May, 1883, printed at page 81 of the Return, nor has any law been passed to suspend the Contagious Diseases Act.

  BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883 (PATRONAGE)—MR. MESSENT, OFFICIAL RECEIVER AT IPSWICH.
  MR. WESTsaid, that he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade a Question of which he had given him private Notice—namely, Whether he has made any inquiries, or whether he proposes to take any steps in reference to Mr. Messent, the Official Receiver of the Ipswich district, with regard to whom the hon. Member for Evesham (Mr.
  1048
  Dixon-Hartland), in a speech in that House on Friday last, had used the following words:—
  "He was at one time so successful in business at Birmingham that he was obliged to ask for the indulgence of his creditors?"
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Sir, I have received a letter from Mr. Messent, the Receiving Officer of the Ipswich district, to the following effect:—
  "I enclose a copy of a letter I have addressed to Mr. Dixon-Hartland. I am not clear whether that gentleman meant that I have compounded with my creditors, or that I have asked for time to meet my engagements. In either case my denial is equally emphatic, and extends both to my creditors as a body, or to every individual among them. Upon the suggestion of Lord George Hamilton that I was a stranger imported here by Mr. Collings, I may observe that the greater part of my life has been spent in this town, in which I was born, and from which I believe I have never been away for three months in succession. I am not aware that Mr. Collings knew I was connected with the neighbourhood until several months after I had left Birmingham, and returned here to reside, which I did in April, 1881."
  I think the House will share with me the regret that so serious an attack should have been made on a public official without sufficient investigation. With the permission of the House, I wish to make two other corrections arising out of this debate. It was stated that Mr. George Mallam, who was appointed Receiver for Oxford, was the political agent for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department. I have to-day received a letter from Mr. Hughes, who is, I believe, the Mayor of Oxford, and who said that Mr. Dixon-Hartland appeared to have remarked that the person appointed to the office of Receiver had acted as agent for the Secretary of State for the Home Department. He added that Mr. George Mallam, who was appointed Receiver, never acted for Sir William Harcourt. It was Mr. Thomas Mallam who was his agent. Mr. Hughes goes on to say that when he received a letter from the Board of Trade asking for information as to the fitness of Mr. Mallam for the appointment, he called a meeting of the Estates Committee, consisting of all the members of the Town Council, and a very prominent Conservative proposed that Mr. Mallam's appointment should be approved. This was carried, and the only member who voted against the Motion was a Liberal. The letter concluded by saying that, all

  1049
  things being taken into consideration, there could be no doubt that Mr. George Mallam was the most eligible candidate, he having done more bankruptcy work than any other man in the town. I have also received a letter from Mr. Herbert Bramley, who complains that I was reported to have said of him that he had acted as agent for both political Parties. He informs me that he has been recently an active worker for the Conservative side, but that he never received from them any remuneration for his services. He was, however, my political agent, and I have remunerated him, though not at all beyond the services which he rendered to me. I am very sorry to have troubled the House on this matter; but I think the House will see that it is necessary, in consequence of the failure of the hon. Member for Evesham (Mr. Dixon-Hartland) to give me any Notice beforehand of the cases he intended to bring forward.
  MR. RAIKESgave Notice that, tomorrow, he would ask Mr. Attorney General, Whether he had brought under the consideration of the hon. Member for Evesham the following words said to have been used by the hon. Member in the debate on Friday last:—
  "Take the last election for Hereford. After the last election, a petition was presented asking that the two Members returned for that place might he unseated; but it was withdrawn at the last moment, in consequence of an arrangement signed on behalf of the Liberal Party by Mr. Scobie."
  He would ask, whether the Attorney General was prepared to assent to the appointment of a Committee to test the accuracy of this statement; and what steps he proposed to take to secure purity of election, and to vindicate the character of Members of that House?
  MR. PULLEY: I rise to say that I was not in my place on Friday night when the hon. Member for Evesham (Mr. Dixon-Hartland) referred to the circumstances connected with the Election Petition at the city of Hereford. Had I been in my place, I should have risen to say that I was not connected at all with the withdrawal to which he alluded, and that any agreement which might have been entered into was entered into without my knowledge, authority, or consent. I beg to say also, at the same time, that I think the hon.
  1050
  Member for Evesham, if he is in his place, can bear witness that my Colleague and myself resisted every pressure that was brought upon us to be connected in any way with any compromise.

  MERCHANT SHIPPING BILL—LOSS OF LIFE AT SEA—MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S STATEMENT AT BIRMINGHAM.
  LORD CLAUD HAMILTONasked the President of the Board of Trade, What were the data on which he based his statement in a recent letter to the Birmingham Trades Council, that there were grave reasons for apprehension that the waste of life at sea would be greater during the last two or three years than it had ever been before?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Sir, I will endeavour to answer the Question of the noble Lord, although I think he will see it is a subject which it would be more convenient to deal with in argument than in answer to a Question. Stated briefly, my reasons for the opinion which I have formed are these. For some years shipowning has been the most prosperous and profitable industry in the country. This has led to an overproduction of ships, the supply has now exceeded the demand, and over-production has been followed by over-competition, and a great reduction of freights, which are now, in many cases, unremunerative. If the practice of over-insurance continues, the result must be that the loss of a ship will, to a greater extent than ever, be an advantage to the owner. The tendency of this, coupled with the necessity for strict economy in all items of ordinary expenditure, will be to bring about a relaxation of the precautions necessary to secure safety, and, other things being equal, will lead to increased loss of life and property. This is my firm conviction, and it justifies my anxiety for immediate legislation.
  LORD CLAUD HAMILTON: I wish to ask another Question arising out of the previous one, and the answer just given to it. Is it not a fact that the Returns issued by the right hon. Gentleman's own Department, the Board of Trade, do show that, in the year 1882, there was a much smaller loss of life than in the previous year; and, whether the average loss during the last five years has greatly decreased in com-

  1051
  parison with the average of the five preceding years?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Sir, to answer those Questions fully, I must engage in more particulars than respect for the time of the House would justify me in doing. But I may say that the first statement of the noble Lord is correct. The loss of life in 1882 was somewhat less than the loss of life in 1881; but taking three-yearly periods, the loss of life in the last three years was greater than the loss of life in any three years to which the statistics apply. There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that, on the whole, there has been an increase rather than a diminution in the loss of life during recent years.
  Subsequently—
  MR. NORWOODrose and said: I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, with reference to the answer he gave just now to the noble Lord opposite (Lord Claud Hamilton), Whether I correctly understood him to say something to this effect—that, in his opinion, the unremunerative state of the shipping trade at the present moment will have the effect of inducing shipowners during the next two or three years to over-insure their ships, with the view of causing them to be lost for their own benefit, and by that means risking the lives of seamen? I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he still adheres to that statement?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: No, Sir; I did not say anything of the kind. ["Oh, oh!"] I will repeat the exact words I used in answer to the noble Lord's Question. [The right hon. Gentleman read the latter part of his reply, as already given.]

  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—KHARTOUM.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether any telegrams have been received from General Gordon respecting the present position of Khartoum; and, if so, whether the noble Marquess would communicate them to the House?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Many and voluminous telegrams have been recently received from General Gordon; but I cannot say that I have received any bearing on the present state of Khartoum. If there were, I cer-
  1052
  tainly could not answer a Question of this sort without Notice.

  PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
  COLONEL KINGSCOTEasked, Whether he had rightly understood the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) just now to say that there was no prospect of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill being taken on Thursday?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, in reply, said, that he had not said it was certain that the Bill would not be brought forward on Thursday. Unless, however, the Supplementary Estimates were disposed of to-night, it could not be the first Order on Thursday.
  LORD JOHN MANNERSasked, Whether negotiations had been in progress between Her Majesty's Government and the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arthur Arnold) as to withdrawing the opposition to the second reading?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he was unable to give the noble Lord any particulars, but believed that the block was still on the Paper.
  MR. CHAPLINasked, Whether the noble Marquess was aware that, on the 29th of February, the Prime Minister stated that, after leave had been given to introduce the Representation of the People Bill, he would take a stage of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill. He trusted that the latter measure would be taken as the first Order on the first Government day after the Supplementary Estimates had been voted?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he was afraid the state of Supply would make it absolutely necessary to take Supply as the first Order on Thursday and Monday next, and on Thursday week. He hoped, however, there would be nothing to prevent the possibility of taking the second reading of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill at a later hour next Thursday.
  MR. R. H. PAGETasked, Whether the noble Marquess would give an undertaking, in harmony with the promise made by the Prime Minister, that the second reading of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill should be taken previously to a further stage of the Reform Bill?
  MR. ARTHUR ARNOLDasked the noble Marquess, Whether he was aware that the second reading would have been

  1053
  taken on Thursday night if a Conservative Member had not talked till 12.30?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that he could not make any general statement, and hoped that the hon. Member would kindly repeat his Question to-morrow.

  EGYPT (MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE SOUDAN).
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONsaid, he had seen it stated that an attack was expected to be made on the Arabs tomorrow, and he thought it was desirable that the Government should state what was the object of the attack?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I am afraid I can give no further answer to the Question than the statement I made last Thursday in Committee. I stated on that occasion the nature of the information we have received from Admiral Hewett and the nature of the instructions given to him.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSON: I presume it is a defensive operation?
  [No reply.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY—ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES (VOTE FOR THE EXPEDITION TO THE SOUDAN).
  SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  (1.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £370,900, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1884, to meet additional Expenditure for Army Services."
  Whereupon Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £164,750, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1884, to meet additional Expenditure for Army Services."—(Mr. Labouchere.)
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: The question which my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) placed before the Committee on Thursday last, in
  1054
  so temperate and comprehensive a manner, was intended to elicit from Her Majesty's Government some further information in reference to the affairs of Egypt; and I do not think that anyone who listened to the debate which followed will be prepared to admit that my right hon. and gallant Friend was altogether so successful as to render unnecessary any further attempt in the same direction. We do not ask the Government for information concerning the details of the campaign now being carried on in Africa; but what we do ask for is, that the Government should be prepared to make an intelligible statement of the policy they intend to pursue in Egypt. The only answer which, as yet, we have been able to extract from the Prime Minister is that, until the campaign is over, we cannot measure our position. Put into homelier phrase, I understand that statement to mean that, when the fighting is over, we may be told what we have been fighting for. I have consulted the various Blue Books which have been laid upon the Table of the House, to find out what the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt is, and the only definition of that policy which I can find is one given last month by Earl Granville to the Italian Ambassador—that our policy is an elastic policy, to be guided by circumstances. Now, I think there is a ray of hope ill the definition of "an elastic policy to be guided by circumstances," because one of the most important of these guiding circumstances is the opinion of the House of Commons. I, therefore, venture to lay before the Committee the position we now occupy. I believe we are in this position, as regards this Vote of Credit—for I shall continue to term it a Vote of Credit—that, whenever military operations have previously been carried on, the Government have always been able to show, to the satisfaction of their own Supporters, that the object of the campaign was to promote national interests, or to protect or extend the Imperial rule of the country. But no one will pretend that the campaign in which we are now embarked is for the promotion of national interests. It is altogether disassociated from national interests; for we are utilizing our resources, and spending the blood of our soldiers, for the purpose of keeping together the debris of the repudiated policy of an impotent

  1055
  foreign Government, and a policy which was enforced against the wishes of every English employé of that Government. English money and English soldiers are being used for the purpose of pulling the chestnuts out of a fire into which the Egyptian Government ought never to have been allowed to put them. That is not only the opinion of the majority of the House, but of the men who are on the spot. There are two important telegrams in the papers to-day—one from General Gordon, and one from General Graham—and I would ask the attention of the Committee to two extracts from these telegrams. General Gordon says—
  "Be sure of one thing; if Her Majesty's Government do not act promptly, General Graham's victory will go for naught, and with the useless expenditure of blood the effect of it will evaporate."
  He goes on to say—
  "We cannot blame them (the Natives) for rising, when no definite sign is shown of establishing a permanent Government there."
  The telegram in The Standard newspaper is of a different nature, but it is to this effect—
  "Neither officers nor men have the slightest desire to kill any more of these gallant Arabs, who are an infinitely superior race to the men of the miserable and treacherous Tokar garrison whom they were supposed to have relieved."
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Is the noble Lord opposite quoting from a telegram sent by General Graham?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: No; it is a telegram from a Correspondent of The Standard, who is with General Graham; but I expect that the Correspondent is pretty well acquainted with the views of the officers of General Graham's Force. Therefore, as I said before, we are not fighting to promote any national object. The Egyptian Government having exhausted its resources, both in men and money, the English taxpayer and the English soldier are to make up the deficiency and to keep together the remains of a policy which, at any time during the last year, Her Majesty's Government, by holding up a finger, could have put a stop to. The difficulty arises from the ridiculous system of Government which we have established in Egypt, by which the functions of Native officials are to resist the reforms which their European colleagues desire to introduce, and to continue the abuses which it is the object of the Eng-
  1056
  lish officials to check. The heads of the Egyptian Departments initiate troubles and difficulties, which the English officials find it impossible to solve. This House has a right to insist, before voting this money, upon a declaration from Her Majesty's Government, either that they will discontinue or reverse the policy which has brought disaster in the past, and must, in the future, produce the like effect. Not only anyone who has taken part in the previous debates upon Egyptian matters, but anyone who has followed those debates, must be struck with the fact that, from first to last, the House has been induced to interfere in Egypt on false pretences. First, the country was told that the bombardment of Alexandria was an act of defence. That ridiculous plea was put forward to keep the right hon. Gentleman the senior Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) in the Cabinet. What was the consequence? The Government were prevented from taking steps for the preservation of Alexandria; and, in the end, Alexandria, which they wished to preserve, was destroyed, and their late Colleague, whom they wished to keep, was lost. In the next place, the Prime Minister asserted that we were not at war; and, yet, the right hon. Gentleman has conferred more honours and rewards upon the men who were engaged in operations which were not war than are ordinarily conferred after an arduous campaign. We were told, in the first instance, that our only object was to put down the despotic rule of a pretender and military adventurer—Arabi. We did put down that adventurer; but, in doing so, we found that he was so connected with the military and civil institutions of the country, that, in suppressing him, we annihilated them, and we put up nothing in their place. We were led from one blunder to another, because, from the first to the last, Her Majesty's Government refused to look the facts in the face. I confess I felt some little shame when the Prime Minister got up on Thursday to say that the Government had inherited all their difficulties from the late Government. Now, railway accidents frequently occur in this country, involving serious loss of life; and the effort to connect the Soudan massacres with the establishment of the Dual Control is very much the same as if, when a disastrous railway accident

  1057
  occurs, and is occasioned by the incapacity of the officials, the directors were to contend that the fault did not rest with them, or their subordinates, but with George Stephenson, who invented the locomotive. That is precisely the same as the defence of the Prime Minister, when he says that all the difficulty has been brought about by the Government inheriting the policy of their Predecessors. I think it can be shown that the difficulty has arisen because Her Majestys Government did not continue the policy they inherited from their Predecessors, and because they chose to give a different character to the Control that had been established, in order to extricate themselves from political difficulties at home. Up to the commencement of November, 1881, the present Government continued the policy of their Predecessors, and at that time there were two despatches—one by the English Government and the other by the French Government—which placed the Egyptian Government in full possession of their views. The French despatch said that the national aspirations of Egypt were much too real, and, in some sense, too well justified, to warrant their being neglected, or to admit of the idea of suppressing them. From November until the end of December, 1881, no further difficulty occurred in Egypt. On the 31st of December, Sir Edward Malet telegraphed home that the Khedive was in a cheerful mood, and he took a hopeful view of the situation. But there was a difficulty at home, a hitch in the negotiation of the Commercial Treaty with France. M. Gambetta was anxious to negotiate that Treaty, and it occurred to him that if he could give to France a tangible proof of the value of the political alliance with England, it might help to overcome the objections which the French Protectionists took to the Commercial Treaty. Therefore, without disclosing a reason, he went to Lord Lyons, and suggested that a Joint Note should be sent, in the name of the French and the English Governments, to the Government of Egypt; and to this Lord Granville was persuaded to assent. The Note was presented on the 8th January, 1882, and within a fortnight it produced a complete revulsion. The first object of the Note was to emphasize the unity of the action of the two Powers; the second, to strengthen the
  1058
  personal influence of the Khedive, by giving him a guarantee against internal and external danger; and the third, to prevent the interposition of the Porte as the Suzerain. This was a total inversion of the principles which the French and English Governments had laid down two months before. The Joint Note was presented to the Egyptian Government on the 8th January. Three days afterwards there was a collision between the Council of the Khedive and the two Controllers, because the Assembly of Notables wished to have some control over that part of the Budget which did not relate to the service for the Debt; but M. Gambetta would not hear of it. Without consulting us, he telegraphed to the French Representative to resist at all risks; and Sir Edward Malet then said that, unless a compromise were effected, armed intervention would become a necessity. Then M. Gambetta was turned out of Office; and the first act of his Successor was to repudiate his action, and to say that he had misconceived the duties of the Control in Egypt. We were left to face the storm raised by M. Gambetta; and that was the primary cause of our difficulty. The result of this underhand and tortuous policy was that Her Majesty's Government altogether failed to get what they wanted. What they wanted was a Commercial Treaty, and to avoid a war with Egypt. We got a war with Egypt, and lost the Commercial Treaty with France. Therefore, the statement that these difficulties were an inheritance from the late Government is a pure fiction, which may serve the purposes of debate, but will not stand the test of examination for a moment. And now as to the elastic policy. It certainly has been most elastic during the last eight months. On the 11th June instructions were sent to our Representative in Egypt to take and give no advice to the Government of Egypt; but at the beginning of January we sent a telegram to the Khedive, thanking him for his patriotic conduct in adopting the policy of Her Majesty's Government as to the Soudan. Then Her Majesty's Representative was warned to give no advice; and two months later we had to send troops to and spend money in the Soudan. It is clear that if Her Majesty's Government had not evaded their responsibilities 8 or 10 months ago the disasters in the Soudan would never

  1059
  have occurred; and now we are asked to assent to a campaign which may lead us anywhere and end in anything. The House has a right to insist that the Government should inform them what is the ultimate object of their policy in Egypt. The present position there is an inversion of every moral and political principle that has ever before regulated the action of the Government of this country. We sent a number of Englishmen to represent us in Egypt, to supply the brains, to make reforms, and the machinery for carrying out those reforms, which alone could keep the Egyptian Government in its place, and yet we left the control of affairs more or less in the hands of incapable Orientals. Now, who are the governing classes in Cairo? The majority of them are Turks and Circassians, those very men whom, six years ago, the Prime Minister spoke of as the "anti-human specimen of humanity." We allowed these persons to check and frustrate our benevolent intentions in regard to Egypt and the administration of the country. I cannot exactly understand what object the Government have in continuing to act on their present lines. We may have different views; but, as far as I can see, the action or re-action which characterizes the Government policy in Egypt is not likely to promote the objects of a single section of the House. There are a certain number of hon. Gentlemen like the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), who wish to see the troops removed from Egypt as soon as possible; there is another section of hon. Members who are anxious that we should do the work we have undertaken, and that before we evacuate Egypt we shall lay the foundation of a good Administration and Government; and then, again, there are hon. Gentlemen whom I may call the thick-and-thin supporters of Her Majesty's Government, who are very anxious that they should adopt such a line of action as will not render it an impossible task to defend them at the approaching General Election. I would ask any of these Gentlemen, are their views in the smallest degree consulted or promoted by the action which the Government is taking? It is perfectly clear that the longer we have been in Egypt, the further off we are from getting out of it. We have not carried out a single reform as far as
  1060
  I know, although it is said that some progress has been made with an alphabetical list of voters. Then, why are Her Majesty's Government to continue this—if I may so call it—vacuous and fatuous policy? The reason appears to be that the Egyptian Government is an excellent buffer between the Prime Minister and responsibility. If we temporarily took over the Government, we should be forced to do many things that are not now done, and undo much that is now going on. The other day the Prime Minister exclaimed, with exultation, that there was not a tittle of evidence in any Blue Book to show that Hicks Pasha had the right to claim the moral support of Her Majesty's Government. Now, I say that if there is no evidence in the Blue Books to show that Hicks Pasha had a right to the moral support of Her Majesty's Government, their policy stands condemned by that one fact alone; because, if he had had their moral support, all these disasters would have been avoided. The cost of this dual system of administration is such that every day makes it more and more difficult for us to reform the Administration of Egypt. I do not know whether the House is aware of it; but actually, at the present moment, the Egyptian Government are paying a sum which goes in diminution of the cost of troops on the English Establishment. I believe that fact was pointed out last year upon the Army Estimates. Not only are the Egyptian Government obliged to support English troops, but they are also paying the cost of what General Gordon with some irony calls "Wood's Invincibles," the only invincibility of which is their invincible objection to go into action. Making full allowance for the exaggeration of newspaper reports, I may point out that there were two telegrams received on two succeeding days, which give us a tolerable idea of that force. It was stated one day that all the English officers were prepared to send in their resignation, because they were not allowed to go on service, and the next day we were told that all the Natives, rank and file, were about to mutiny because they were going on service. I find in the Papers that there was a distinct warning sent to Her Majesty's Government by one of our most distinguished Consuls, who informed them that if they

  1061
  sent Egyptian and Turkish troops against the Arabs, they would be to a certainty defeated. Her Majesty's Government paid no attention to this warning, but thought they would be able to shield themselves behind this sham and imaginary Government. If, however, they were responsible for the Administration of Egypt, they should not have so shielded themselves. Let us put the matter in a common-sense point of view, and ask ourselves, is it possible to reform the Administration of a country whose finances are in permanent disorder? It will be absolutely impossible, so long as you have two sets of Administration and two Armies, to improve the financial condition of Egypt. Until the finances are placed in a satisfactory condition, it is idle to talk of effecting any satisfactory improvement. But there is something more grave still. I do not know whether hon. Members have read a remarkable telegram, which comes from Khartoum, and which appears in The Times of this morning. It has been sent by a gentleman who is our Consular Agent at Khartoum—a man who has gone at the risk of his life to assume his duties there, and therefore there is more importance to be attached to his statements than to those of an ordinary newspaper correspondent. He reports an interview which he has had with General Gordon; and, unless the whole of the telegram is an absolute forgery, he shows the existence of a state of things which it is absolutely essential that the Committee should seriously consider. General Gordon announces that it is essential that he should be succeeded as Governor by a man of the name of Zebehr Pasha. Now, we all know something about Zebehr Pasha. We know that he is the chief slave-driver. If Lord Beaconsfield had been in Office and had thought of employing such a person, the present Prime Minister would probably have designated him the "Legree" of the Soudan. General Gordon says—
  "As for Zebehr Pasha's blood-feud with me it is absurd; if a subsidy be granted him for three years dependent on my safety. As for Zebehr's slave-dealing offences, they are bad, but not worse than those of Ismail and other Turks, for the thief is no worse than the receiver."
  Now, General Gordon has absolute power, and yet his suggestion for the pacification of the Province is that he is
  1062
  to be succeeded by the man well known as the greatest slave-driver in the country; a man of so murderous a tendency that he could only be kept from murdering General Gordon by the receipt of a sum of money dependent upon that distinguished officer's safety. Is it right that this House should vote money which is to be expended in this way, when they are clearly told that one of the objects of Her Majesty's Government is to employ this man as an agent in extricating them from the political difficulties of the situation in which they are now placed? What does slave-driving or slave-hunting mean? It means wholesale destruction and murder, the sacking of villages, the killing of those who are unfit for slavery, and the sale and captivity of those who are. It means a perpetual repetition of atrocities similar to those which took place in Bulgaria, and promoted in this case for the sake of gain. The Prime Minister was good enough, when the late Government were in Office, to attempt to associate them with the atrocities in Bulgaria, and there was one sentence at the end of his remarkable pamphlet which I always recollect. He said—
  "There is not a cannibal in the South Sea Islands, not a criminal in Europe, whose blood does not boil at the recital of what has been done, and which remains unavenged;"
  but nothing is now said about the atrocities of the Slave Trade. Are we to understand that when Lord Beaconsfield was in Office the blood of every criminal in Europe and of every cannibal in the South Sea Islands was to boil over at the recital of cruelties and atrocities which, when the present Prime Minister is in Office, are to receive approval from a majority of the Members of the House of Commons? There seems to me only one straightforward course for Her Majesty's Government, and that is clearly to accept their responsibility for the present position of affairs in Egypt. That would be far more manly, straightforward, and English than to attempt to delude the House by what I cannot help calling humbug and imposture. It is humbug and imposture to pretend that there is any Government in Egypt except that which is promoted by Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) the other

  1063
  day gave an answer which it seems to me was exactly the sort of answer which, in accordance with the policy of the Government, ought not to have been given; because, in reply to a Question as to the position occupied by Sir Evelyn Baring, he made this remarkable statement—
  "In matters of importance in which Sir Evelyn Baring thinks it necessary to give advice, it is expected that during our present armed occupation his advice will be followed."
  I do not know what my noble Friend meant by that; but it is capable of this inference that—as soon as our armed occupation is over, his advice might not be followed. What follows if that be so? We intend, I suppose, to keep a Representative in Egypt after our occupation is over; but, if it is not intended that our advice should be received then, one of two things must happen—either we must perpetually occupy the country, or withdraw our Representative when we cease to occupy it. Answers such as these, I believe, do much harm in the state of uncertainty which now prevails, and accelerate the very evils you wish to avert. In urging Her Majesty's Government to pursue a manly and straightforward course by taking over temporarily the Government of Egypt, I do not for one moment advocate annexation. I think no one could have been, even for a short time, connected with the Administration of India without being aware of the heavy strain upon English resources and English funds caused by the acquisition of a great territory in which Europeans cannot permanently reside. We are alone able to govern that country by annually sending out a large number of civilians and soldiers for the purpose of supplying the place of those who die or who are sick owing to the unhealthy character of the climate. Therefore, I confess I should be very reluctant, unless it was absolutely essential, for this country to annex any great extent of territory which might have to be governed in the same way. But I recollect, when I was at the India Office, that I frequently had the advantage of talking to one of the most distinguished Indian civilians who ever lived, Sir George Clerk, who had been many years in the Service, and who was able to talk of those who were living some 50 years back. Sir George Clerk was, perhaps, one of the best friends the Natives ever
  1064
  had in the Indian Civil Service; and although his aversion to annexation or even to the temporary assumption of the annexation of a country was very strong, he told me that there was only one thing to be remembered in taking over the administration of the country—namely, that it was the only means of breaking up the incapable and corrupt ring of officials who would intrigue and check all efforts at reform. You may appoint excellent officials, but their efforts will be frustrated by intrigue; but the moment you take over the Government of a country, you can deport or otherwise punish this gang of obstructives as you choose. In the case of Egypt our efforts have been checked by a small ring of Turkish or Circassian officials, and we shall never be able to do anything with them until we become directly responsible for the administration of the country. To this the Prime Minister puts forward two objections. The first is, that it would make the Khedive a puppet. Well, Sir, will anyone dispute that he is not one already? Would the Government dare to leave him and his Ministers for a month to face the consequences of their own acts? If they did, the Khedive and his Ministers would speedily be thrown, bag and baggage, out of the country. The next objection of the Prime Minister is that it would be contrary to the public law of Europe. The late Lord Beaconsfield once remarked that all persons were subject, however eminent, to moments of riotous hallucination, and one of these hallucinations on the part of the Prime Minister is that he is the sole repository and exponent of the public law of Europe. Although the right hon. Gentleman made an indictment against the late Government in the interests of foreign countries, he never received one particle of endorsement from the accredited Representative of any Foreign Power in Europe. If a regard for the public law of Europe prevented the Prime Minister from taking the course suggested, what does he think of the remarkable Proclamation issued a few days ago by General Graham and Admiral Hewett, from which I will read one or two sentences? The Proclamation says—
  "The great God who rules the Universe does not send such scoundrels as Osman Digna as his messengers. Your people are brave, and England always respects such men. Awake,

  1065
  then; chase Osman Digna from your country. We promise you that protection and pardon shall be granted to all who come in at once; otherwise the fate of those who fell at El Teb shall surely overtake you."
  Will the Prime Minister say that that Proclamation was issued in accordance with the public law of Europe? Will any Member of the Government say that it was issued in accordance with the public law of Europe? [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: Yes.] The right hon. Gentleman opposite is a very able man, but I am curious to hear the arguments by which he can support that contention. It does seem to me to be trifling with the House for the Prime Minister to get up and drag in the public law of Europe—that public law for which he has so extreme a reverence—when a few days before he had given his sanction to a Proclamation which he perfectly well knew was in the very teeth of that public law. Then the Prime Minister has said that it is a serious source of danger to put Christians in places of trust over Mahomedan races. My hon. Friend the Member for South Lincolnshire (Mr. Finch-Hatton), in his very remarkable speech, on which I hope I may be allowed to congratulate him, because it was characterized by the spontaneous debating power and facility of expression which I think are always eagerly welcomed by all sections of this House—pointed out that we are the Rulers of more Mahomedans than the Sovereign of any other country. I greatly question the propriety of a Minister of the Empress of India asserting that it is a serious source of danger to put Christians in places of trust over Mahomedans. Does the Prime Minister believe in that assertion, or is it a mere debating assertion? Who now is the Prime Minister of Egypt? It is Nubar Pasha, who is at the head of three great Departments of the State. The Prime Minister may say that the races who inhabit Lower Egypt are not fanatical; but he must admit that the most fanatical Mahomedans who are to be found reside in the neighbourhood of the Soudan. Yet what is the measure of the Prime Minister for the pacification of the Soudan? He has selected General Gordon, a genuine hero, but who is probably one of the most fanatical Christians to be found in Europe, and he has put up General Gordon in a post of absolute authority over
  1066
  the most fanatical Mahomedans that can be found, and he is so satisfied with the result that he declines to inform the House of the proceedings of General Gordon. Then, I say that the Government must find some better reason and advance some better objections. It is a serious thing to be asked to vote money, or to sanction an expedition, when those who make the request cannot tell us for what objects they want it. We are now incurring loss of life and a large expenditure of money; trade and commerce have been dislocated; social relations are unsettled, and all for what? Merely in order that a certain number of Turks and Circassians may, for the edification of Her Majesty's Government, attempt to play the part of responsible Ministers at Cairo. Every English official, from Lord Dufferin downwards, has warned the Government that these men are incapable of performing the duties assigned to them; but Her Majesty's Government proceed to invest these men with virtuous qualities and attributes which everybody but themselves know they do not possess. That is the pantomime which has been going on for the last eight months; but what is the cost of your pantomime? You have destroyed three Egyptian Armies; you have deplenished the Egyptian Treasury; and now the English taxpayer is asked to step in and make up the deficiency. I say that it is time this cruel, costly, and murderous farce should be brought to an end. The Prime Minister, in a voice of thunder, on Thursday last, told us it never could be. The right hon. Gentleman occupies a unique position; but if he keeps to the word "never," somebody else must be put into his place who will substitute the two words "at once." Sooner or later Her Majesty's Government must make themselves directly responsible for the administration of Egypt. The longer they delay it, the more difficult it will become, and they will not gain a single friend and not conciliate a single enemy by their delay. What are Her Majesty's Government afraid of? Not of the public law of Europe, which they have already broken, or of setting Christians over Mahomedans, which they have already done. If that be their ground, they may re-assure themselves. This Parliament is in its fifth year, and I have noticed that the first instinct of all moribund majorities is

  1067
  self-preservation. It is tolerably certain, therefore, that nothing will induce hon. Gentlemen opposite, if they can help it, to put Her Majesty's Government in such a minority as to force on a Dissolution, which might put an end to the political career of so many of them. I thank the Committee for the attention with which they have listened to me. Sooner or later I am certain the Government will have to harden their hearts and do that which we advocate. There are, however, two excuses which Her Majesty's Government cannot make for their past misconduct; they cannot pretend that they have inherited their difficulties from the late Government, or that they have failed owing to the want of Parliamentary support. The Prime Minister's majority is greater, his expenditure higher, and the lost of life he has caused is heavier, than I believe has occurred in almost any other period in the history of the country; and the more money we spend, and the more life we take, the further off we are in getting even an intelligible excuse from Her Majesty's Government for the havoc they are occasioning. Thirty years ago the Prime Minister was a Member of a distinguished Government which landed us in the Crimean War, and which was denounced by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) as "a guilty and incapable Administration." Are not those words applicable to Her Majesty's Government now? If they cannot shake off their responsibility, at least they can retrace their steps. They have been compelled to do so in Central Asia, and they may be made to do so in this case. Can any of them suppose that they would lose anything in the public estimation by frankly admitting that they have been wrong in the past? I ask Her Majesty's Government, for another reason, to state plainly their intentions. They regret very much what they are pleased to call the waste of time. Yet more time will be wasted, until we get a clear and definite expression of opinion from Her Majesty's Government as to what their ultimate policy in Egypt is to be. Therefore, I would implore Her Majesty's Government to take this opportunity of allaying that apprehension, suspicion, and anxiety which in the latter phases of this Egyptian muddle has made our position in that
  1068
  country at once as ridiculous as it is deplorable.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: I do not intend to occupy the attention of the Committee for any length of time. I have already expressed my views on the question of our policy in Egypt generally, and I can only say that I remain of the same opinion. I think our best chance—in fact, our only chance—of being able to fulfil our promises in Egypt is to be found in realizing the facts of our occupation and responsibility. In one respect I differ from the noble Lord opposite (Lord George Hamilton). I think that in his powerful, and what I may call controversial speech, he has lost sight of the circumstance that, although not, perhaps, in accordance with the intention and wish of the Government, we are, nevertheless, in reality realizing the facts of our position in Egypt more and more every day. We are obliged to realize them. The noble Lord states that the Prime Minister very much deprecates the idea of the military, political, and financial affairs of Egypt being conducted by English officials. But what are the facts? There is a remarkable instance in to-day's papers. The Secretary of the Interior, Sabet Pasha, has differed from his English subordinate, and, of course, he is at once dismissed. Now, I do not blame the Government for this action. I thoroughly approve of it; but I think this ought, to some extent, to be a comfort to the noble Lord. The logic of circumstances has been too strong even for the strong will of the Prime Minister himself, or the wonderful resources of his argument. It is to my mind so clear, that I shall make no further remark about it, as I do not wish to weary the House. The only remark I want to make is upon another and a very important question which has come into prominence within the last day or two; and that is in regard to what is happening in a portion of Egypt or the Soudan. I am not now talking of the Western Soudan, of Kordofan or Darfour, or of Suakin, but of Khartoum, a most important point geographically, and, indeed, one of the most important positions in the world. It does appear to me that, as regards this part of the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government have not yet lost their initiative. I do not think they will be able to keep it long

  1069
  unless they make use of it; but for the time they have the option of taking several courses. If they adopt the drifting policy the current will quickly carry them with it; but at present it is possible for them to adopt one of two or three alternatives. There is especially one alternative, and I trust the Committee will allow me to say that to that alternative, at least, there are very strong objections. It is impossible to ignore the rumour which is current that General Gordon is to be replaced by Zebehr Pasha. It is in everybody's mouth. I do not go so far as the noble Lord. I do not imagine that the Government have made up their minds to use Zebehr Pasha as their agent. I have no reason to believe that; but I do own that the course suggested by General Gordon is one of the alternatives in these great difficulties. The Prime Minister, in reply to a Question last Friday, did not deny the truth of the rumour. He merely said that the Government had come to no decision. Allow me to say why I trust this may still be true, and that, if the Government have this course yet under consideration, and do come to the opinion that it ought to be followed, they will not commit the House and the country to it without telling us the reasons why they have formed such opinion, and giving us an opportunity of forming and expressing our opinion. I confess that I do not think this is an unreasonable request, for really it is impossible to imagine a course which, at first sight, at the first blush, would be more contrary to all the traditions and all the antecedents of our policy with regard to the African races, and especially in regard to the Slave Trade. It would be a new departure, more complete than anything else. Who is this Zebehr Pasha? He is undoubtedly a strong man; but he is also chief of the slave traders. He is a man who has obtained great power and enormous wealth by means of the Slave Trade. He is not only a very large slave-owner; he is very different from that. He has been the principal instigator of the horrible slave hunts. He was the chief organizer of that caravan traffic which was marked across the desert by the skulls of dead men, women, and children—a traffic accompanied by even greater horrors and atrocities than the old Western "Middle
  1070
  Passage" to America. General Gordon knew him very well. He had a long contest with him, and in no part of his life did he show his wonderful power to greater advantage. He finally succeeded in defeating him, and his lieutenant found it necessary to put Zebehr's son to death. What did General Gordon say in 1879 of Zebehr? I am not going to weary the House with long extracts; but there is one short one I should like to quote. What does General Gordon say at page 337 of that most interesting book entitled General Gordon in Central Asia, published in 1879, of Zebehr Pasha? He says—
  "That it was he (Zebehr) who devastated the whole country, and that he alone is responsible for the Slave Trade of the last ten years."
  What was that Slave Trade? I find this passage at page 343, under the date March 31, 1879—
  "This evening a party of seven men, slave dealers, with 23 slaves, were captured, and were brought to me, together with two camels. Nothing could exceed the misery of these poor wretches—some were children of not more than three years old; they had come across that torrid zone from Shaka, a journey from which I and my camel shrink."
  Let me give another extract from the instructions sent to General Gordon by Lord Granville. They are the main instructions on which he is now acting—
  "You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea coast can best be secured. In connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary movement, and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior."—[Egypt, No. 2(1884), p. 3.]
  We must not forget that these are the instructions to General Gordon, and very proper instructions they are. Therefore, if General Gordon has given us this advice, I must confess that I am not prepared blindly to follow even him without knowing the grounds on which he is acting. Pray do not suppose I disparage the qualities of this wonderful man. I know no man like him. I go further than that; I believe him to be a hero. As a personal administrator, he has the intuitions of genius. He is utterly regardless of all selfish, con-

  1071
  iderations. He despises money. He ares nothing for fame, he cares nothing or pleasure, for life, or for death. He seems to have no temptations. Perhaps he may have one temptation. If you will read his striking journals and letters you will feel—I do not know why—that, perhaps, he is weary of life. ["No, no!"] Well, he says so; and I confess it sometimes occurs to me that it would he the greatest possible delight to him to be a martyr. Undoubtedly, he is a deeply religious man. In this world, God's guidance and government are to him the strongest and greatest realities of life; and so we find this—that while personally one of the humblest of men, thinking nothing of his own faculties, he has the power of unlimited self-confidence in himself, because he believes himself to be God's instrument. He has wonderful resources in action. He gets out of difficulties in a way no other man could. No wonder that, with all these qualities, these savages look on him not as a man, but as a demi-god. If he really advises this action, I think we are bound to consider it; but we cannot, as I say, blindly follow his advice. There is one simple reason why I am not inclined to do this, and it is this. I have more confidence in what General Gordon does himself than in what he recommends others to do. I have so much confidence in his personal action that, although I confess I was staggered by the notorious Slave Proclamation, which must, I fear, be taken to deal with slave dealing as well as with slave holding, and although I cannot but regret that it was issued, I am not going to blame General Gordon for that Proclamation until I know the grounds on which it was issued. And for these two reasons. First, I know the wonderful administrative ability of the man; and, secondly, because I know how he hates the Slave Trade, and I only state the simple truth when I say that he would gladly lay down his life to stop it. But this confidence, I confess, is in Gordon's personality—in what he would do himself—hut not in what he instructs others to do, when he is not by their side to influence or control them. Remember what must be the necessary consequences if such a man as Zebehr is to assume the place of General Gordon. First of all, Gordon would be gone. All his wonder-
  1072
  ful influence would be gone with him—the influence of his personality, of his courage, of his unselfishness, of his enthusiasm—all that would be gone with him. His daring and his ability would no longer be feared, and his devotedness and power to help would no longer be there to be almost worshipped. If Gordon could remain, I confess that I should look on the future of the Soudan with great confidence. I believe he would do great work in a short time at little cost to Egypt, with less loss of life than by any other means; that he would establish a beneficent Government; and that he would strike a blow against slavery such as has never been struck before. But that is not what we have before us. I do not know whether the Government have ever asked him if he would remain. I should like the Government to say whether he has ever been asked to remain. What we have to deal with is different; it is not with Gordon as Governor of Khartoum, but with Zebehr Pasha in his place. Do not let the Government suppose that they will get rid of responsibility simply by placing Zebehr in Gordon's place. We cannot let him alone; we cannot let that man, with his cruelties and his slave trading, alone if we put him there. If General Gordon puts him there, the Government have rightly stated that they are responsible for what General Gordon does, as long as they do not disavow him. But if they allow this man to be put there, they will be responsible for the impetus he will, in all probability, give to the Slave Trade, and for the cruelties which will be revived under his rule. Remember where you would put him. You would put him in a place where he would be more likely to do harm than in any other place in the world. Khartoum is a remarkable place, in a wonderful position. Besides being the emporium of commerce, it is the great mart of the Slave Trade. It is the high road to the Red Sea, where an outlet is found for the slaves, and it is at the junction of the two branches of the Nile, to which the slaves are easily brought down and floated in vast cargoes of men, women, and children, and thence sent to Lower Egypt. I do not know whether the Government contemplate this course; but I think it is time we should know if they do contemplate it or not. It is most necessary to see that

  1073
  they do not commit the House and the country without giving us an opportunity of forming and expressing our opinion upon it. To put this man Zebehr, the chief of the slave traders, at the head of the Government, would, indeed, be a remarkable result of our occupation of Egypt, and a remarkable fulfilment of the excellent instructions of Lord Granville to General Gordon, that he was to do all that he could to prevent any impulse being given to the Slave Trade. There may be an explanation, but we ought to be in a position to judge before any action is taken. There are only two more remarks with which I will trouble the House. We cannot be perfectly sure that, in recommending Zebehr Pasha's appointment, General Gordon may not change his mind, for he has already changed his mind in another instance, as a Memorandum received from him when he got to Egypt shows, with regard to the restoration of the small Sultans in the Soudan. He says—
  "My idea is that the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet All's conquest, and whose families still exist; that the Mahdi should be left altogether out of the calculation as regards the handing over of the country."—[Egypt, No. 7 (1884), p. 2.]
  He has found it necessary, for a good reason, I dare say, to change that opinion. He has authorized the Mahdi to become the Ruler of Kordofan. I do not blame him. His difficulties are far beyond anything we can imagine or comprehend here. But he may be recommending not what he would do himself, but what others would do, and not such a course as might be the final conclusion of his own judgment. I do not think that the House of Commons, or the vast majority of the people of this country, would regard the appointment by Her Majesty's Government of this slave trader consistent with the traditional policy of this country with respect to the African races, and with respect to the Slave Trade. For generations we have been the champions of the slave in every part of the world, and one of our boasted historical traditions has been that we have never ceased for many years to do what we could to stop this terrible evil. We have pressed upon and persuaded other countries to follow our example in this respect, and
  1074
  sometimes they have suspected our motives. I am sure, however, we shall in this matter lose much of our moral power with other nations if we pursue this policy with regard to the Slave Trade. I need only give one example—that of the Congo. What we desire there is, that there should be no possibility of a re-opening of the Slave Trade; but we shall certainly lose our power of argument with the Portuguese with regard to slaves on the Congo if we take the course I have mentioned, unless we can give them reasons based on arguments far more overpowering than any that can be drawn from our own recent policy in Egypt, and the arguments that have been adduced in its support in this House.
  SIR GEORGE ELLIOTsaid, it was with great reluctance that he rose to trouble the Committee; but he could not refrain from making a few observations upon the subject of Egypt. He had, on one or two occasions, risen in the House rather to sympathize with the Government in the difficulties in in which they were placed in Egypt than to condemn their policy. Recent transactions, however, clearly showed that the difficulties connected with the administration of the affairs of Egypt were getting worse and worse. Having had the opportunity of witnessing the course of affairs in Egypt, he could not help thinking that the evils surrounding the situation had grown from bad to worse as a result of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government. The Egyptian story was a very sad one. In the first place, there was the difficulty with regard to the concert of Europe, and then there was the bombardment of Alexandria. That was followed up by the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, which was the principal feature of a very serious and terrible expedition. The cost of the expedition, both in loss of life and money to Egypt, as well as to our own country, was very great; it was very embarrassing to Egypt, and very discouraging and disheartening to us at home. And now the country was experiencing the evil of the undefined responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. He certainly believed that the Government were desirous, according to the light which they were possessed of, and which, perhaps, was greater than his, or greater than that of anybody else in the

  1075
  House, because they were in possession of all the facts, of doing what was right and proper; but it was very strange to him that they did not realize more thoroughly and more fully the great reponsibility which attached to the position they occupied. In his opinion, if the Prime Minister and his Cabinet were to make it known that for a certain period—he did not suggest a very long period—they would stay in Egypt, and put the administration of the country upon a thoroughly sound footing, they would do a great deal to lessen their own responsibility, and to add to the material well-being of Egypt itself. Seeing that the affairs of Egypt had now got into such an embarrassed, confused, and chaotic state, and having regard to the welfare of the county, he did not believe that Europe, or the world, would find fault with Her Majesty's Government if they took up the bold position he recommended, because they had already incurred great responsibility in the eyes of Europe in the part they had taken up to the present time. If we were justified in going to war to maintain our rights over the Suez Canal, and to protect the interests of our commerce passing through that great highway to India, he could not understand, as he had previously said in his place in Parliament—and he had some knowledge of the situation of Egypt—how we could maintain the independence of our communications with India, unless we had the control of Lower Egypt. Why did we fight for the Canal? Because the safety of that great waterway was indispensable to the interests of this country; and, to his mind, it was impossible for anyone to have that control over the Suez Canal which was necessary to provide for its safety, unless they were in possession of the littoral of the Red Sea. He did not wish to embarrass Her Majesty's Government, or to pass Votes of Censure upon them; but he desired to urge upon them the importance of taking decisive steps in order to assume a responsibility which had been practically avowed, and which, if taken promptly and boldly, would immediately lessen the difficulties of the situation.
  MR. LAINGsaid, he trusted the Committee would allow him to say a few words upon this Egyptian Question, in which his connection in India led him
  1076
  to take considerable interest. He felt that the policy which had been put forward by one or two hon. Members below the Gangway on the Ministerial side of the House was one which would be fatal to the interests of their Indian Empire. He felt, also, as an independent Liberal, that it would be no less fatal to the interests of his Party, if it sympathized in any degree with the policy which had found expression from one or two mouths below the Gangway. What was the theory of that policy? Why, that our presence in Egypt was a crime and calamity; a crime, because we were putting pressure on a nation struggling for its independence; and a calamity, because it was involving us in still larger responsibilities, when those of our extensive Empire were heavier than we could bear. The practical conclusion they drew from those premises was a very logical one; it was, that we ought to be ashamed to find ourselves in Egypt; that we ought to apologize for our presence; and that we ought to get out of the country as quickly as we could. That policy was now known as the policy of "Rescue and retire." He maintained that that policy was not approved by the majority of the country, or by the majority of the House, or indeed, by the majority of the Liberal Party. "Rescue and remain" would more happily describe the policy which met with most favour in the House and in the country. "Rescue and retire" might be applied to the outlying parts of the Soudan, the parts which it was impossible for us to maintain under our control; but as regarded Egypt Proper, and possibly as regarded the ports of the Red Sea and Khartoum, that was not a policy which the country would approve of. It was perfectly evident that the Government had lost—nobody could deny it—a great part of their popularity and prestige through the events in Egypt during the last six or eight months. It was not because they had come to act resolutely, but because they were not resolute sooner, and because they did not go much farther many months ago. The majority obtained on the Vote of Censure was a very respectable one; but no one for a moment supposed that it expressed the opinion of a majority of the House of Commons. It was a majority obtained, not in favour of that irresolute policy and

  1077
  shirking of responsibility which had led to the disasters in the Soudan; it was obtained partly by what no man need be ashamed to confess—namely, loyalty to his Party, and general confidence in the present Government, apart from Egyptian questions; and partly owing to the feeling that the Government had, at last, begun to recognize the gravity of the situation. The despatch of the 5th of January, shattering of the Egyptian Government, was, in fact, the turning over of a new leaf; the sending of General Gordon to the Soudan, and the despatch of a force to Suakin, with instructions to fight the battle of Teb, were indications of a more resolute course of action. And, again, what weighed very greatly with a number of Liberal Members in the House was the fact that hon. Members opposite did not announce a policy of their own. They felt, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) had very happily said—that they ought not to give a blank cheque to Gentlemen who would not announce a policy. The only hon. Member opposite who did venture to formulate a policy was the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill); and even his policy was so overlaid with explosive epigrams and abusive epithets that the House did not know whether to treat it seriously or not. He (Mr. Laing) was not at all certain that, if the noble Lord could succeed in putting the Government in a minority by catching the votes of a few Liberal Members, he would not have turned round and advocated the immediate evacuation of Egypt, and the recall of Arabi. These were the reasons, undoubtedly, which led to the majority upon the Vote of Censure a few nights ago. A much better test of the real opinion of the House was obtained the other evening when the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) moved the adjournment of the House in order to censure the Government for having allowed a military force to go to Suakin, and to fight the battle of El Teb. On that occasion, if hon. Members opposite had not, for some reason best known to themselves, got up to support the Motion for Adjournment, and afterwards voted with him, the hon. Baronet and the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) would have found them-
  1078
  selves in the remarkable position of being two Tellers without anyone to tell. That showed to his (Mr. Laing's) mind the weakness of the Peace-at-any-price Party. He was sorry, however, to say that the language repeatedly used by the Prime Minister seemed, in some degree, calculated to support the views of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle. The Prime Minister, as well as the hon. Member for Carlisle, was constantly saying that our presence in Egypt was a great misfortune—a misfortune which he (Mr. Gladstone) apologized for as being due to diplomatic entanglements in which he had been involved by the fault of the late Conservative Government. The right hon. Gentleman never missed an opportunity of proclaiming to the House his anxiety to retire from Egypt, and used language which he (Mr. Laing) was afraid came perilously near that of some of the hon. Members below the Gangway—groaning under the responsibilities of an Empire of 300,000,000 of people, wishing we could contract and turn our great Empire into a second-rate State, and anxious that we should retire behind the "silver streak," which he would make the boundary of the Kingdom. ["Oh!"] He did not mean for a moment to impute such deliberate opinions to the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister; but he did say the right hon. Gentleman had used language quite recently, in debates in the House of Commons, which produced such an impression out-of-doors, and which did a vast deal of mischief. It was the holding of such language that was the main cause of that loss of prestige and popularity which had been sustained by what was, a few months ago, the strongest Ministry this country had ever known. Why were we in Egypt? Was it true we were in Egypt only by the misfortune of diplomatic entanglements produced by the Predecessors of the present Government? No; decidedly not. It was not true. It was true that the late Government made engagements, with regard to the Law of Liquidation and the Dual Control, which were very unwise and embarrassing; but they made them with very good motives towards France. France was a party to the Dual Control in the interest of her own bondholders, and we followed suit. The establishment of the Dual Control, however, was

  1079
  not the real reason why we now found ourselves in Egypt. We were driven there by the inevitable force of circumstances. As long as we had an Indian Empire we could not afford to have Egypt—the half-way house between India and England—either dominated by the influence of any Foreign Power adverse to our own, nor could we afford to see Egypt fall into a state of anarchy and confusion, and dominated by military adventurers. That was the urgent motive which took us to Egypt. The immediate cause of our presence there was not so much diplomatic entanglement, but the massacre which occurred at Alexandria. And here he might observe that hon. Gentlemen who talked about our expedition to Egypt, and the bombardment of Alexandria, as if they were national crimes, always conveniently put out of sight the occurrences which immediately preceded them—namely, the massacres at Alexandria. If foreigners murdered and massacred English subjects, the Peace-at-any-price Party regarded it as an incident worthy of no special notice; but if the English proceeded to revenge the massacres, and to teach barbarous races that they could not kill Englishmen with impunity, the Peace-at-any-price Party ransacked the dictionary to find language to express their indignation at such blood-guiltiness. He (Mr. Laing) distinctly affirmed that we could not, if we wished to retain our Indian Empire, afford to have it proclaimed to the whole world that any military adventurer who could get a few thousand Native troops to mutiny could set up his own authority, and either encourage directly, or connive at, massacres of English subjects by a fanatical mob like that at Alexandria. If we were going to tolerate that state of things, we had better give up India at once. There was not the least doubt that the safety of our Indian Empire was the main cause of our present responsibilities and anxieties. If we had no Indian Empire, what need we care whether the French were at Cairo, or the Russians at Constantinople? Why need we trouble our heads about the movements of Russia in Central Asia? If we were content to retire behind the "silver streak," we should, no doubt, save ourselves a great deal of expense and anxiety and trouble, and we should be able to attend to domestic
  1080
  affairs; we might, as a second-rate State, be secure for a generation or two, if we trusted to the jealousy and rivalry between Continental Powers continuing. But did we not feel that our great Indian Empire was one of which we had the greatest reason to be proud? India was now enjoying peace and tranquillity such as she had never enjoyed for centuries. England was gradually educating the Natives up to the point that in future generations they might be able to share in their own government. Were we now going to throw all our efforts away, either through the selfish fear of taking the responsibility which belonged to us, or because of over-scrupulousness in not being able, in case of necessity, to maintain by the sword an Empire which was made by the sword? The history of India showed very clearly the contrast between a decided line of policy which he advocated, and the line of policy which had been adopted with regard to Egypt. The case of the Punjaub was as near a parallel to that of Egypt as could be found. There was a rising of the soldiery which endangered our Indian Empire; but it was suppressed. After the victory of Goojerat, did we say—"Our responsibilities are too great; we will not cross the Indus?" Suppose such language had been held, what would have been the state of India in the Mutiny? It was our resolute action in annexing the Punjaub which had proved our sheet anchor. The instance of the Punjaub was another proof of the fallacy of the contention, in which he was sorry to hear the Prime Minister indulge, that annexation was unpopular in India; that the Indians preferred a Native Government. Why, anyone who had the least practical acquaintance with the state of things in India must know that exactly the opposite was true. Those Provinces which were the most loyal, and most contented, and most prosperous, were those which had been annexed to the British Empire within recent time. Everyone knew that the Punjaub and Scinde were the most loyal Provinces in India, and they were Provinces in which the National Government had been suppressed, and in which direct and immediate British rule had been established. Let us compare the case of the Punjaub with the case of Cashmere, which was left under Native Government. It was not

  1081
  true that the Natives were better off under Native government. On the contrary, they were infinitely better under British rule. The Native population only began to grumble and to become discontented when they had been under British rule for generations, and had forgotten the state of things which existed under the old Native Government. He could not pretend to say what difficulties might arise in the case of the actual annexation of Egypt; but he ventured to say that, if they could look only at the interests of humanity, and at the benefit to the Native population, annexation would be the best thing that could happen. Again, what did history teach them as to Egyptian nationality? Why, there had been no National Government in Egypt since the days of the Pharoahs—since the conquest of Cambyses! They had had since then the rule of the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Circassians, the Mamelukes, and, finally, the Albanians. But as to the mass of the population, they had been under the kourbash of taskmasters from the time of the Pyramids down to the present day. The only thing approaching to an aristocracy in Egypt were the descendants of the Turks, the Mamelukes, and the Circassians, and in saying that he spoke of the military aristocracy. The commercial class was composed of foreigners—English, French, and Italians. And when they came to the smaller class of traders, they found it composed of Maltese, Greeks, and those miscellaneous races included in the term Levantine. Those were the elements out of which they thought they could make a Constitutional Government, and then wash their hands of all responsibility. Well, there never was a wilder theory. The Egyptians would never be a nation, unless for generations we, or some other Power, took them in hand; gave them just and equal laws; educated the fellahs, who were by no means deficient in natural intelligence, and did everything for them as we had done for the ryots of Bengal—educate them up to a point at which they could be employed in the administration of their country, and could be allowed some degree of self-government. If that were not done, what would become of Egypt, if we followed up the present aspirations for an early withdrawal? Why, Egypt must
  1082
  fall back into a worse position than she was in before. She was not in a condition for self-government. If we were to withdraw, Egypt would become an arena for the contentions of the diplomatic Representatives of all the nations of Europe, and such a withdrawal would probably lead to an European war. Practically, it might be said—"If we step out, France steps in." If we had an Indian Empire, France had a North African Empire, and she could not tolerate any rule in Egypt which would make it a centre of Mahomedan propaganda. He maintained that we had gone to Egypt in accordance with the most righteous of all laws—the law of necessity. It was a most fortunate combination of circumstances that when it became necessary for some Power to step in there and assert the cause of civilization and Christianity, and to restore order, England was the only Power to do it. This was a task of difficulty and danger, no doubt; but he believed that we should be able, single-handed, to carry it to the end. It was one of the first international rules that Treaties expired with a state of war. Why should Treaties, entered into long before the commencement of hostilities, be maintained by us, when the whole burden and the heat of war was thrown upon ourselves? Our Treaty with France expired the moment that the French Admiral steamed out of the harbour at Alexandria. When that event took place, we had, so to speak, a clear sheet of paper in our hands. We should take our own course in this matter, and, having undertaken our task in Egypt, we should go on with it. One word on the finances of Egypt; and here he would just advert to what might be thrown out against him for making these remarks—namely, that he was speaking in the interest of the bondholders. He was doing no such thing. He would say at once that, in his opinion, the one point of all others on which resolute action by the English Government was required was that of finance. He thought the Law of Liquidation was an iniquitous law; he looked upon it as a law made in the interest of the bondholders against the taxpayers of Egypt. He thought that that law should be modified, and that a heavy income tax should be imposed on those who derived benefit from the public funds of

  1083
  Egypt. Certainly, he could not be accused of speaking in the interest of the bondholders when he said that the finances of Egypt required to be taken in hand in order to place them on a sound foundation. If it were true, as he believed it to be, that good government meant good finance in all countries, it was especially true in the case of Eastern countries. Let the agricultural class in Egypt pay only that moderate rent which was in this country paid to the landowners, and then there would be a fair surplus of income for carrying out the work of the Government; and, upon those conditions, they might secure in Egypt a prosperous state of things, and make the people fairly happy and contented. But as long as the present uncertainty lasted it was impossible to have good finance. Everything was paralyzed. Who was going to rebuild the houses at Alexandria, which had been burned down, when no one knew whether in six months or six years we were going to retire from Egypt? There would not be the least difficulty in our way if what he had pointed out were taken in hand resolutely. Those dangers with which the Prime Minister tried to terrify them when he spoke of the extent of our responsibilities, and the difficulty of a Christian Power governing a Mahomedan population, were partly true, but to a very great extent untrue. They were true, no doubt, as applied to the Southern Soudan, but untrue as a general proposition, or as applicable to Egypt Proper. It was difficult to govern any Eastern population, especially Mahomedan populations, where the race was turbulent and warlike; and it would be most difficult in a country naturally strong and intersected by mountain ranges. The attempt to occupy Afghanistan, or the Southern Soudan, if it were not absolutely impossible, would be well-nigh impossible, even if we were to strain our resources to the utmost. On the other hand, the physical geography of Egypt made it singularly easy to occupy that country, and two or three garrisons along the Valley of the Nile would be sufficient to keep it in perfect order. He held that it would be infinitely easier to keep Egypt in order than it was to keep the Punjaub in order, because, in the former, they had a quiet and pacific race, singularly unwarlike, as recent experience had shown.
  1084
  The inhabitants were the remains of a population which, as he had said, had crouched under the lash of the taskmaster; and, if there were any truth in Darwinian theories, the characteristics he had mentioned must be expected to continue in a race which had been in that state for 4,000 years. Turning again to the question of national finance, Egypt was not like a poor country which could never pay its expenses; it was a country singularly fertile in resources, and nothing was wanted there but to put things right at the beginning, and then agriculture and trade would extend and the Revenue increase. He ventured to say that if Sir Evelyn Baring, who understood the finances of India, received the full confidence and support of the Government for three years or less, he would leave those finances in a most satisfactory condition—a condition which would support a proper Army of Occupation, and, at the same time, decrease the amount of taxation on the mass of the population. There could be no doubt as to what we ought to do in the case of Egypt, and he was glad to be able to look upon the present policy of Her Majesty's Government as much more satisfactory than it had formerly been. With regard to the Estimate before the Committee, they were called upon to reject the Vote at the next Division. But he supposed hon. Gentlemen opposite, in their hearts, really approved of the Expedition to Suakin and of the battle at El Teb quite as much as did hon. Members on that side of the House. Well, those operations had been carried into effect, and they had to be paid for; and it would be simply childish to object now to the cost, merely because hon. Members were dissatisfied with the tone of the Prime Minister's speeches. He had nothing more to add, except to say that, in speaking as he had done of the Prime Minister and the tendency of some of his speeches, he did not wish it to be supposed that he was saying one word in derogation of the high character of the right hon. Gentleman. His (Mr. Laing's) present opinion did not prevent him thinking that the right hon. Gentleman and Sir Robert Peel would go down to posterity as men who were in their time the two greatest Home Ministers that the country had ever seen; but it was of vital necessity for the country at the present time to have a good Foreign Mi-

  1085
  nisters. And when he said that he meant that the present crisis ought to be met in the spirit of a Chatham or of a Dalhousie; and, if that were so, the result could not be otherwise than satisfactory. That he believed to be the universal sentiment of the country, and he entirely disputed the right of one or two hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway to speak for the Liberal Party, or even for the Radical section of that Party, in this matter. His own belief was that the nearer they approached the genuine working classes of the country, the more it would be found that they were thoroughly determined, happen what might, that they would never hand down this great Empire to their sons loss great and less glorious than they received it from their fathers.
  SIR EARDLEY WILMOTsaid, he rose to say a few words upon this very important question. It was not his intention to oppose in any way the Supplementary Vote then before the Committee; indeed, he would have supported a much larger Estimate for military operations, the only complaint on his part being that they had been undertaken too late to prevent that great sacrifice of life which had occurred in consequence of delay. During his absence abroad, he had had the advantage of hearing the opinion of foreigners, and of ascertaining the views of the Continental Press upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government. In the first place, foreigners were astonished at the vacillating and incomprehensible policy that had been announced by Her Majesty's Government. They could not comprehend their policy, and it was impossible to take up a newspaper abroad, or to enter into conversation with any foreigner of intelligence, without being met by expressions of astonishment at the course Her Majesty's Government were pursuing with regard to Egypt. He found that foreigners likened the Prime Minister to the Egyptian Sphinx, with this difference—that whereas the Sphinx, when her riddle was interpreted, destroyed herself, the right hon. Gentleman, even if he were disposed to follow her example, might be assured of a long life, because it would be a very long time before his secret was discovered. With regard to the Proclamation of General Gordon to the people of the Soudan, it was all very well for The Times and other autho-
  1086
  rities to say that the last clause of that Proclamation clearly related to domestic slavery, and guided all the others; but any man in his senses who read the document must have come to the conclusion that it was the general traffic in slaves, and not merely domestic slavery, that was signified by the Proclamation. Hon. Members knew that when General Gordon took office and started upon his Egyptian expedition, it was upon the condition that he should take no orders from the Khedive; that he was positively and solely the servant of the English Government, and that they alone were responsible. Hon. Members on those Benches were, therefore, justified in their opinion that the Proclamation of General Gordon was directly sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, and that it was in direct contravention to all former historical precedents on which we prided ourselves so much. And there, again, foreigners expressed their astonishment that we, who had been the champions of freedom, and who had spent millions and sacrificed so much in putting down the Slave Trade, should now go back upon ourselves and sanction what we had constantly and universally condemned. In his opinion, the criticism of foreigners was perfectly justified by the Proclamation of General Gordon, which now ran through the whole length and breadth of Africa. But there was another point upon which foreigners had, on several occasions, expressed their astonishment—namely, the course which proceedings were taking in our Parliament with regard to this question. Having watched with interest, as they always did, the debates in that House as reported regularly in Galignani's Messenger and other newspapers which circulated throughout the whole of France, they were astonished to find that two of the most eminent right hon. Members of the Liberal Party who, as it were, kept the outposts on the other side of the House, and certainly very often turned the flank of the enemy, should vote for the very policy which they had condemned. Had the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) been in his place, he (Sir Eardley Wilmot) would have taken the opportunity of expressing his regret that so distinguished a Member of the Liberal Party, who was inferior to no man in the country in talent and

  1087
  ability, should have voted contrary to his opinions. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) also had concluded a great speech with these words—"I decline to give a blank cheque to Lord Salisbury;" but the right hon. Gentleman must have been aware that he was himself drawing a bill of exchange upon a Government which he knew to be discredited. He (Sir Eardley Wilmot) said that the action of those two right hon. Gentlemen had not raised the character of the British Parliament in the eyes of foreigners. Then he came to the view of foreigners as to what ought to be the policy of the English Government in the present crisis. Their opinion was that we should go boldly into Egypt, and assume the Protectorate of the country. They spoke to this effect—"We admire the British character; we know your honour; we will give you the Protectorate for a certain term of years. Administer Egypt as best you can, and at the end of whatever period it may be, come to us, and then, if we find that the affairs of Egypt under your auspices have been wisely administered, let us put our heads together and institute an independent Egyptian Government." In that way the road to India, the great highway of commerce, would be protected under the eyes of the Great Continental Powers. That appeared to him to be the general opinion in France. The suggestion was a wise one, and embodied a policy which he thought the Government would do well to adopt. But the present policy of the Government was neither one thing nor another; it was vacillating and unintelligible, and did not commend itself either to this country or to any of the European States. Then as regarded the future. They were considering what was to be done, and how they could extricate themselves from the difficulties which surrounded them. Were they to evacuate the Soudan? He said, with all respect for the opinions of those who differed him, that the evacuation of the Soudan was an impossibility. They had the duties and responsibilities of a great nation to discharge; it was not more than half-a-century ago that we emancipated our own slaves; and it was our bounden duty to hold the country until the horrors and iniquities of that accursed traffic, the Slave Trade,
  1088
  had been rooted out. No doubt, one of three courses might be adopted—the total abandonment, the total retention, or the partial retention of the Soudan; but he was most strongly of opinion that the partial retention of that country was the best policy under the circumstances. By drawing a line from Dongola along the Nile down to Khartoum, and then straight across the Soudan, and from Kassala to Massowah, a parallelogram would be formed embracing a vast region over which we might extend the blessings of a wise administration, and in that way prevent the abominable iniquities of the Slave Trade. He said that General Gordon, who, during his five years' rule in the Soudan, had done wonders, was the proper man to be made Governor of that country; and under his administration he had no doubt that the Eastern portion of it, at any rate, might be brought into a state of order and peace. There then was the proposal to hold only the littoral of the Red Sea; but foreigners were generally of opinion that to hold to a line 20 miles from the coast would not prevent the incursions of the wild tribes of the interior, and that the country, under such an arrangement, would be in a constant state of disturbance. He asked Her Majesty's Government to make up their minds quickly as to what should be done; and it was not only he, but General Gordon himself, who asked them to be prompt, in order to prevent the continuance of the present disturbances. He respectfully asked Her Majesty's Government to put an end to this position of uncertainty, hesitation, vacillation, and bad management. If the Prime Minister were present, he would remind him that Lord Bacon had said—"The first quality of statesmanship is boldness; the second, boldness; and the third, boldness." The want of that great quality in the Councils of the Government had been the cause of great evils in our management of the Egyptian embroglio. He could not help saying that the truth of that proposition had been manifested in the case of his noble Friend the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill), whose possession of the quality of boldness, in an eminent degree, had enabled him to take and to retain a strong hold upon the public opinion of the country. Finally, he urged upon Her Majesty's

  1089
  Government the adoption of a bold and energetic policy, as the only means by which they could put an end to the Slave Trade and settle the Egyptian Question in a manner satisfactory to the people of this country and to Foreign Powers.
  SIR HARRY VERNEYsaid, he hoped that the House and the country generally would suspend their judgment in regard to the Proclamation of General Gordon until that gallant officer had an opportunity of explaining it himself. Having long known General Gordon, he felt quite convinced that there was no greater or more determined enemy of slavery than General Gordon himself, and he had no doubt in the world that General Gordon believed the course he was adopting was the one best calculated ultimately to destroy the Slave Trade. Of course, he (Sir Harry Verney) did not know what explanation General Gordon might offer; but he thought it was quite possible that he would be able to offer one which would amply justify his course of action. General Gordon might have deemed it expedient to select the most cruel slave-hunter and slave-driver in the country, because he might be convinced that Zebehr Pasha in command of Khartoum was the only man who would be able to put down the Slave Trade. General Gordon might know that the previous connection of Zebehr Pasha with slave-trading, slave-hunting, and slave-driving rendered him the fittest man to put down the Slave Trade in the end. He (Sir Harry Verney) was quite certain that General Gordon's first object was to pacify the Soudan; and in order to accomplish that object, he might have found it necessary to put a man in power who was able to control others. He would not be surprised to find that that was the case. He knew that one of General Gordon's objects was to find out who were the men best fitted to govern the Soudan in connection with Egyptian rule; but when General Gordon got to Khartoum, he might have found that that was impracticable. His great object must be to put down the Slave Trade; but he might feel that, in order to secure the pacification of the country in the first instance, it was necessary to put in power those who were really able to rule it. Zebehr Pasha, although he had made his fortune by dealing in slaves, would probably, if
  1090
  placed in power, do his utmost to put down the trade. He was afraid that he was the only Member of that House who had been in the plantations and seen all the horrors of slavery. He was almost the only one who had voted against the continuance of slavery in the British Possessions in the year 1834, and who knew all about the horrors of the "Middle Passage." No one could be more opposed to slavery than he was, and he felt confident that General Gordon, in his proceedings, must have had in view the limitation and final suppression of the Slave Trade. He thought nothing that had been stated by the Prime Minister warranted the construction put upon his language as to India by the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing). He did not believe that any man had a higher opinion of the value of our Indian Possessions to this country than the Prime Minister. He had heard the right hon. Gentleman speak warmly and authoritatively on that subject, and he could not believe that the expression of the hon. Member for Orkney was at all warranted by any words that had fallen from the Prime Minister. His (Sir Harry Verney's) own opinion was that our Possession of India was one of the brightest jewels in the Crown. No greater responsibility was ever committed by the Almighty to any nation in the world than had been committed to us in the government of India, and no greater benefits had ever accrued to another country ruled over by foreigners than had accrued to India. He thought no greater attention had ever been paid to the welfare of the Indian people than by the noble Marquess the present Secretary of State for War when he was Indian Minister, and conducted the Administration of that great Empire. He (Sir Harry Verney) entertained strong feelings in regard to India, and he believed it had been governed by the best Civil servants, to be found in the world—the most able, the most upright, and the most honourable who had ever administered the affairs of any country; and he repeated that India was one of the brightest jewels in the British Crown. He had, however, only been induced to rise in order to express his anxiety that hon. Members should not too hastily form a judgment in regard to the course taken by General Gordon, in the absence of full information. He

  1091
  was quite sure that when they received full information the country would approve the steps which General Gordon was taking in order to put a stop to the foul and horrible system of slavery.
  MR. WHITLEYsaid, he wished to say a few words as one who was closely connected with the shipping interests of the country. He was of opinion that the action of Her Majesty's Government throughout all these transactions had been such as to destroy our commerce, and very materially to interfere with the progress of that commercial prosperity in Egypt with which this country was closely identified. He was quite satisfied that he was expressing the opinions, not only of those who usually acted with him, but of hon. Members on both sides of the House, when he ventured to say that it had been proved, in the course of the debate, that the Government had constantly vacillated in their policy, and had frequently changed their views. He had no desire to repeat what had already been stated by previous speakers, who had dealt with the subject very exhaustively; but he thought they were in a position to form some opinion as to the state of the facts presented by Her Majesty's Government, together with what had been advocated on that side of the House. So far, the only excuse which Her Majesty's Government had offered for their vacillating policy was that the origin of all of it was the former existence of the Dual Control; and, secondly, that they were now doing everything in their power to remedy the mistakes they had originally made. With regard to the Dual Control, he would only say that Lord Granville himself admitted that the Dual Control had been of great benefit to Egypt. The noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton), who addressed the House early in the debate, clearly pointed out that it was not the Dual Control, but really the Dual Note, which had led to the original complications. France did not continue her alliance with this country, as Her Majesty's Government had anticipated; and when France retired it became at once apparent that the state of things was entirely altered, that a new responsibility was cast upon Her Majesty's Government, and that that responsibility was to protect Egypt, which they professed to take under their charge.
  1092
  Unfortunately, they had not done that; and they had not only broken their faith with Egypt, but with Europe as well. In the course of the debate some of Her Majesty's Ministers had stated that we owed a great deal to Egypt. He was afraid that one of the cardinal mistakes which had guided the policy of Her Majesty's Government was that they had regard to the interests of every other country in the world, while they were neglectful of our own. In Alexandria a large English commercial interest had been gathered together for many years past, and he was surprised to learn that such was the state of uncertainty occasioned by the policy of the Government, that not a single warehouse destroyed at the time of the bombardment of Alexandria had been rebuilt. No commercial house would go to any expense, because it was not known how soon Egypt would be abandoned altogether. The Government told the House that we had rights in Egypt; but those rights had been crippled. They told the House that it was impossible for us to exercise a Protectorate over the whole of Egypt, but that we might remain to protect Egypt Proper. What the country wanted to know, and especially those connected with the commercial interests, was what Her Majesty's Government meant by protecting Egypt Proper? Hitherto they had shown such vacillation and such uncertainty in their policy that the country had a right to expect them to state distinctly now what they meant by protecting Egypt. In the course of the debate there had been a statement from the Government that they considered the Protectorate of Egypt to extend not only to Egypt Proper, but to the littoral of the Red Sea. That was not the original policy of Her Majesty's Government; but it was one of the changes of front which had occurred during these debates. What he wanted to know was, whether they were prepared, and how far they were prepared, to protect the littoral of the Bed Sea? Were they prepared to remain there in sufficient force to be able to protect the shipping and the trade of the district; or were they going to occupy it with such a miserable force that at any time the Mahdi and the inland tribes might come down to Suakin and destroy their power? That was a very likely thing to result, unless Her Majesty's

  1093
  Government were prepared to state boldly and firmly that they would never leave Egypt until she was settled, until she was completely tranquillized, and until her enemies were totally defeated. The House had received no such statement yet from Her Majesty's Government; but the Government complained of the Dual Control, and tried to make the country believe, in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that they were victims of the conduct of the former Government. It was all very well to talk of the obligations of the late Government; but if that Government had been in Office, he believed they would never have allowed Egypt to be brought into such a state as that in which it was in at present. They would have had sufficient firmness to protect British interests. When the Government talked of the Dual Control, he could not help thinking that they had entered into a Dual Control themselves. A Dual Control for the protection of a weak country by two great ones might be of advantage; but they had altered the whole aspect of affairs, and, instead of having a Control which consisted of two great Powers over a weak one, they had joined with Egypt in a Dual Control—a great country with a weak one; and such a state of things was absolutely disastrous to the interests of the weak one. Instead of assuming the responsibilities which devolved upon them after the bombardment of Alexandria, they had formed a Dual Control which was certain to be fraught with dangerous results. What might have been predicted had happened in Egypt. They had weakened the country they professed to protect; they had turned out the Administration of the country they professed to govern; they had refused her every means which she could use for strengthening her power; and they had allowed British soldiers to join the Egyptian Army, and had then permitted that Army to be destroyed. What was their policy now? To his mind, it was a policy of extreme danger and of extreme weakness. They had now a Dual Control of a different kind. They had tried a Dual Control with different nations; but they had now a Dual Control with a single man at the head of it, and their difficulties were caused, to a great extent, by the extraordinary position in
  1094
  which they had placed General Gordon at Khartoum. Everyone admitted that General Gordon was one of the bravest of British soldiers, and one in whom every confidence might be placed; but surely no man was ever placed in such a position as that which General Gordon occupied at the present moment. They had placed him in a position of almost irresponsible power. They had promised to uphold everything he did. What was the consequence? They had General Gordon asking General Graham to go up with his troops to assist him at Khartoum; while, on the other hand, they had Her Majesty's Government forbidding General Graham to leave the neighbourhood of Suakin. On the one hand, General Gordon was making peace with the False Prophet; and, on the other hand. Her Majesty's Government were fighting a battle with the high priest of that False Prophet. Such a state of things was unparalleled in the history of the country; and he could not help thinking that Her Majesty's Government had placed Egypt in a position not only most embarrassing, but most disgraceful. He believed that the only result of the present policy of the Government must be a heavy loss. There must be a further expenditure of money, and he feared a further loss of valuable lives. He thought the Government ought to speak with no uncertain sound, and that they should satisfy the earnest wish of the country as to their policy. Was General Graham to be ordered to advance?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: He has never been asked to advance. I did not like to interrupt the hon. Member just now, but the statement he made had not the slightest foundation.
  MR. WHITLEYsaid, the House were in this difficulty—that they were obliged to rely upon the statements which appeared in the newspapers. Her Majesty's Government told them that there were telegrams. Then why did they not produce those telegrams, and show the actual position of General Gordon? The House were not in a proper position to discuss the matter in the absence of the telegrams. As, however, the information in the possession of the Government was not put before the House, hon. Members were obliged to have recourse to the statements which appeared in the papers. Would Her

  1095
  Majesty's Government, at this eleventh hour, tell the House if they were going to remain in Egypt to protect, not merely European interests, but the general interests of Egypt herself? What the country wanted to know was, whether they intended to remain in Egypt, so as to be able to protect, not only Egypt Proper, but the littoral of the Red Sea; or would they leave Egypt, as had been stated, he believed, by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Courtney), to "stew in its own juice?" That was the language of one of the Ministers of the Crown. Did they propose to continue that policy? The country demanded more; they demanded that we should remain in Egypt with a firm government and a firm hand until the prosperity of the conntry could be assured, because we could not leave her bankrupt and exposed to her enemies. If not, Egypt would have been in a far better position if she had never been allied to this country at all. Her Majesty's Government had taken upon themselves a deep responsibility, and they were bound to fulfil that responsibility in the interests of England, of Egypt, and of the European Nations. He did not ask the Government to drag in any Treaties the country had entered into. He was a believer in the faithful observance of Treaties; and upon the fidelity which Treaties were maintained would depend the peace of Europe. But what he did say was, that having taken upon ourselves new responsibilities, we were bound to fulfil those responsibilities in the face of Europe and in the face of the world. Therefore it was that hon. Members on that side of the House would again and again appeal to the Government, in the interests of this country and of Egypt, to fulfil those obligations they had unhappily brought upon themselves. It would not do to act upon the policy hitherto pursued. There had been a new policy from day to day, and England had never been able to know what the real policy of the Government was from day to day. The House had been told that the policy of the Government was "Rescue and retire" but a policy of "rescue and retire" was a fatal policy, and was the unfortunate policy which had led to the present complications. If they had not sent away the troops from Egypt, the late massacre would have been
  1096
  avoided. They paid no attention to the remonstrances addressed to them; but they believed in their own vacillating policy, and imagined that things would be brought right by the chapter of accidents. They had been deceived once, and they were now deliberately deceiving the country. Now, if they had their eyes open to the real state of things, they ought to act as English statesmen in the interests of England and in the interests of Egypt, and for the peace of the world. He knew that he was addressing the House under a great disadvantage in not being able to speak to the Amendment of his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley). Hon. Members on that side of the House would have been glad to take a Division upon that Amendment, but the Government declined to give them the opportunity. It had always been the hereditary view of Members on that side of the House that the Government of the Queen must be maintained, and they were, therefore, unable to support the Motion for the reduction of the Vote. They were placed in the position of being bound to support the Government; but they warned the Government that they were not, by continuing that mistaken policy, to expect the Opposition to come forward in their support again on a similar occasion. He believed that if the Government did not at once take a bold and decisive policy, there would be more lives of English soldiers sacrificed, and that blood would be shed and lives lost owing to negligence, want of energy, and want of courage on the part of the Government of the day. He hoped the House might yet be able to receive such a declaration from the Government as would give confidence to the country. To talk of leaving the Egyptians to "stew in their own juice" could not give confidence either to this country or to Egypt. He believed that there were many hon. Members opposite who did not approve of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but who would do everything in their power to maintain the interests of commerce and the interests of Egypt. He asked the Government to speak out, and tell the House what their future policy would be; and, although late in the day, England would only be too gratified to learn that Her Majesty's

  1097
  Ministers were not afraid of the responsibilities they had brought upon themselves
  SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he desired, as a military man, to make one or two observations upon the Vote now before the Committee; and he thought it would be well that one of the officials connected with the War Office should give the House some information regarding that Vote. They were asked to vote £307,900, and out of that sum £209,050 was expenditure due to military operations in Egypt. He believed that the whole of that expenditure was not confined to the expedition lately sent to Suakin and that neighbourhood, because he saw among the items several which could not possibly be connected with that expedition, but which must have relation to military movements in other parts of Egypt. He referred, for instance, to the item for Metals, and also to an item of £2,900 for Camp Equipage. He had thought that the large number of troops we had had in Cairo were in barracks, although we had not a large number there for the last few months, except Cavalry. There was another item of £13,300 for Miscellaneous Expenditure, which he also thought would require some explanation. Without alluding further to these items, he wished to make a few observations in connection with the expedition to Suakin, and the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt. The first expedition of Baker Pasha was to relieve Tokar; but Sinkat had already fallen, and though some Members of the Government said that we had relieved Tokar, he believed that garrison had surrendered many days before the expedition even landed at Trinkitat. There was no doubt that Baker Pasha's expedition was a most unfortunate move both for the Egyptian Government and for the Government of this country. He had had placed under his command the gendarmerie, which he had used the greatest care to make efficient as gendarmerie; but they were never intended to act as regular soldiers, either in Egypt Proper or in any expedition into the Soudan. He (Sir Henry Fletcher) well recollected reading in the papers that when this expedition was first started from Cairo, a large portion of Baker Pasha's so-called Army were very loth indeed to go on this expedition, and, in
  1098
  fact, on one occasion they were so resolute in their determination not to enter the trains for conveyance to Suez, that the officer commanding the Cavalry of that expedition had to charge and drive the men before him into the trains. This expedition had been very unfortunate. A very large loss of life occurred; many English and other foreign officers sacrificed their lives in the endeavour to keep these men to the front; but they were determined that they would not face the foe, and they fled by hundreds and thousands, and were cut and mown down, notwithstanding the exertions of the English and other European officers. That expedition failed completely; and what happened? They had to retire to Suakin, and when they arrived at Suakin the remainder of Baker Pasha's force turned mutinous; and, no doubt, it was wise to disband them, and apply for further help from the English Government. He would like to know why the gendarmerie were used in this expedition? The Egyptian Government, he believed, had a large force of Egyptian soldiers who had been under training for many months by that brave and gallant soldier, General Wood, a man who had devoted his time and his energies to this cause, and he feared had also, in some degree, ruined his health by the exertions he had gone through; and at the moment when it might have been supposed that that Egyptian Army would have been made use of, they were not utilized, although Her Majesty's Government had stated that that Army was in such an efficient state that they would be able to order the withdrawal of all, or, at least, very nearly all the English troops from Cairo, and place the safety of Egypt in the hands of that Egyptian Army. Something must surely have happened to show that that Army was not of such value as the Committee had been led to believe; and he thought it was a most fortunate day when the Government resolved to reverse their decision to withdraw the English troops from Cairo, and that, at any rate, a small portion were available for the expedition which had been sent to Suakin and the neighbourhood. He would also like to make one or two allusions to a telegram which was sent from the Adjutant General of the Forces in England to Cairo. He quite admitted that that despatch was very concise, and was

  1099
  very well framed; but he thought there were one or two points in it which would help to show that England was now practically, if not really, reigning in Egypt. That despatch directed a battery of Artillery to be taken from General Wood's forces up to Suakin, and in that despatch he found the words "Baring will give authority." He would like to ask the Government whether any intimation was given to, or any leave asked of, the Khedive or General Wood in respect to this authorization? The only name mentioned in the despatch was in this way—"Baring will give necessary authority." Those few words alone, he thought, proved that the Government were in command of the Egyptian Army; otherwise they would have no right or authority to use those words. At all events, no field battery was used in the expedition to Tokar or Suakin, although it had once been stated that a field-battery and guns would have been of the greatest assistance to General Graham; and he believed that they would have saved the lives of many officers and men of the Cavalry when they charged and endeavoured to disperse the rebels. There was one thing, at any rate, which he thought Her Majesty's Government ought to do. During these debates he had not heard one word from the Treasury Bench, thanking the officers and the men for the devotion which they had shown in the expedition. These men laid down their lives, willingly and gladly, in answer to the call of duty; and he thought it was only due to them that some recognition of that should be made from the Treasury Bench in honour of those brave and gallant soldiers. One lesson to be learned from this expedition was that these Arab rebels were a foe not to be despised. They were armed simply with spears and knives; but with those old-fashioned weapons they were able to inflict great injury on our Cavalry. They lay down as our Cavalry charged upon them, and as the horses went over them they sprang up and hamstrung the horses, or, if they failed in that, they speared the riders. It was the old story; and there was no doubt that the proper weapon for the Cavalry in these irregular engagements with wild tribes was the lance instead of the sword. When these men crouched down, it was impossible for the troopers
  1100
  to reach them; but the lance would be much more effective. There was another circumstance in connection with this expedition to which he wished to call attention. He thought it was a most fortunate thing that, through the wise policy of the late Government, the Suez Canal was available, and was made use of for the transit of our troops from England and from India, because there was a troopship on the way home from India with a regiment—the York and Lancashire—of old soldiers who had served for many years in India, together with a small body of the 10th Hussars, who were also old Indian soldiers. These old soldiers were, no doubt, of the greatest service in mixing with the younger soldier, and in helping to maintain that discipline and courage which he was proud to say all had shown in this expedition. But he saw, from a telegram from Lord Northbrook, that the Jumna, which was on its way home, had on board the 10th Hussars, and he suggested that, if necessary, the Aden Cavalry, about 300, might be brought, who were used to irregular warfare and had been abroad; and he was sorry they had not been made use of, as he believed they would have saved the lives of some of the British Cavalry who fell in the recent engagement. One question now to be considered was, what was to become of Suakin when this expedition against Osman Digna was ended? The papers stated that a fresh expedition was to start from Suakin, most probably tomorrow morning—in fact, that it had already advanced seven or eight miles into the desert. The force, he believed, had orders to find Osman Digna, if possible, and his rebel army; but they were not to follow him up into the mountains. He agreed that it would be bad policy to follow these Arabs through defiles and passes in a mountainous country, where they would probably find no water, and where they would be exposed to great risk of defeat; but the question was, if they could not find Osman Digna, what was the intention of the Government with regard to Suakin? It had been stated that the policy of the Government was to give up a certain portion of the Soudan; but it was also said that the littoral of the Red Sea was to be maintained. If we were to hold our route to India, there was no doubt that Suakin and the littoral of the Red Sea

  1101
  must be held; but the matter came to this—if the English troops were withdrawn from Suakin, how were the Government going to garrison that town? In a few weeks, the climate of Suakin would be such that the English troops would not be able to exist there. Were they going to garrison it with those Egyptian troops who, it had been said on many occasions, were not to be relied upon; or would they employ foreign mercenaries? If he might make a suggestion, he did not see why the West India regiments, who had been taken from the West Coast of Africa, should not be employed to garrison Suakin, and the other places. They were men with whom he had served many years ago in the West Indies, and he knew that they were a most quiet, frugal, well-behaved body of men—men who were most obedient to their officers, and who could stand any climate such as that at Suakin. He would suggest to the Government to consider whether they would not employ those men to garrison Suakin, instead of putting a number of English soldiers there, at the risk of their lives. Now, he would pass to another part of the Soudan. General Gordon was at Khartoum. He had sent many telegrams, saying that all was going well, and that there was no fear for Khartoum, or that part of the Soudan. He had made the Mahdi Sultan of Kordofan, and in a great measure given the Mahdi encouragement in regard to slavery; but during the last few days telegrams had come from Khartoum putting quite a different face on the picture. General Gordon was was now reported to be to a certain extent in danger, and he had suggested various things being done for his safety. One was, that a certain number of English troops should be sent up the Nile to help to secure his safety, in case he wished to withdraw. But it must be borne in mind, in considering this suggestion, that in a few weeks the climate would be unbearable for English troops, and if the Egyptian troops were sent without being backed up by English troops, he feared the result would be very serious. General Gordon was also reported to have asked for two squadrons of Cavalry to be sent from Suakin to Berber to open up that route. He (Sir Henry Fletcher) had no idea what the distance was between Suakin and Berber; but he believed it was a
  1102
  very considerable distance—perhaps several hundred miles—and if these squadrons of Cavalry were sent there, wells were not very numerous, and unless a line of communication was kept between the advancing squadrons and Suakin, they would be in danger of being cut off by the various tribes. This was only a report from Khartoum; and he should like to ask the Government whether they had received any information in connection with the matter, because it would be, he thought, a most extraordinary thing if General Gordon had made this suggestion? It was also reported from Khartoum that the retirement of the garrisons was imperilled, and that General Gordon had demanded the immediate decision of the Government. He believed General Gordon had said that it was a question, not of days, but of hours, whether the telegraph wire might not be cut, and he would be prevented from communicating with Cairo. This was a most important matter, and the Committee ought to have some explanation from the Government as to what they intended to do, if this statement was true, He also wished to urge the Government not to be content with sending a small force up the Nile. A considerable force ought to be sent if the safety of General Gordon and the garrisons he was trying to withdraw was to be secured. There was no doubt that General Gordon had been checkmated by the indecision of the Government. The Mahdi was now all powerful. He had been made Sultan of Kordofan, and he could now do almost what he liked in that portion of the Soudan. It also had been recommended that Zebehr Pasha should be appointed to succeed General Gordon. Zebehr had always been known in this country as the greatest slave dealer in the Soudan; and it was a question for the Government whether a man who had that character, and who bore in Egypt the name of the "Scourge of Central Africa," should be appointed Governor of that portion of the Soudan. We were now practically reigning in Egypt, and the sooner Her Majesty's Government said so openly and distinctly the better. A few months ago, to show that we were reigning in Egypt, we dismissed the Ministry of Cherif Pasha and appointed the Ministry of Nubar Pasha. Whether Nubar Pasha was any better than Cherif Pasha was, he thought, very

  1103
  doubtful; but when that change of Ministry took place, a Fellah who was asked by an Englishman whether he considered that the substitution of Nubar Pasha for Cherif Pasha was better for Egypt, replied—"One Pasha very like another Pasha." He (Sir Henry Fletcher) thought that was true; but, for the sake of this country, he must urge the Government to give some explanation of their policy, if they had one. The country was looking for an explanation of their policy. The Prime Minister told the House, a few nights ago, that his determination was to quit Egypt immediately matters were put in order and things became tranquil. There was no doubt that English troops would have to be kept in Egypt for many years to come, in order that Egypt might be put in order; and what would keeping a large number of English troops in Egypt mean? The Egyptian Government was in such a miserable state with regard to its finances that it would be impossible for it to find sufficient money to pay for the maintenance of these troops; and then, if Egypt could not pay for their maintenance, it would be hard on the British taxpayer that he should have to pay to provide for these troops, when it was said that we were not reigning in Egypt, or taking possession of Egypt. He hoped that to-night the Committee might get some true and explicit explanation from the Government, and also that they might be informed whether these rumours that were flying about, as coming from Khartoum, were true or not; because, if it was true that General Gordon had been checkmated by the policy or by the vacillation of the Government, the whole country would feel more strongly than ever that the Government was not worthy of support, and would resolve that a better Government should be brought into power. There was no doubt that the feeling in the country was very strong, as had been proved last week at one of the elections. He knew Brighton well, and, being down there, he had asked the people what was the cause of this change in their political views, and why something like 500 Liberals had supported the junior Member for Brighton? The answer he got from every man who was well informed, and who watched the action of the Government, was that they voted for the junior Member for Brighton
  1104
  because they were tired of, and had no faith in, the vacillating policy of the present Government. At the recent election in Somersetshire there was also a considerable majority for the Conservative candidate over the majority in 1880, and there was no doubt that that majority was augmented by the policy of the Government in regard to Egypt. He had simply spoken an an old soldier, anxious to keep up the honour of England and English troops, and he trusted the Government would now give some explicit explanation.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he also deeply regretted that more had not been said from the Front Ministerial Bench in praise of the zeal and gallantry of the forces on the Red Sea Coast. The attitude which had been taken by the Party of which he was a humble Member was one of admiration for the exploits of our soldiers and sailors whenever they did their duty, as they had undoubtedly done their duty of late. But they had never considered that the Forces of Her Majesty should be politicians. It was their duty simply to obey and carry out their orders, wherever they might be; and whether the cause in which they were engaged was just or unjust—whether the war in which they were called upon to take part was a necessary or unnecessary war—they equally regarded the gallant deeds of our soldiers and sailors to the country with satisfaction and praise. For that reason, they felt that the exploits of the Queen's Forces were deserving of the admiration and thanks of the country. But the persons who were responsible for the present war, and for the many blunders which had marked the policy of this country in its dealings with Egypt during the last two years, were not the Queen's Forces, but the Ministers of the Crown; and the Conservative Party held themselves free to criticize those Ministers, without any detraction from their admiration of the gallantry of the troops. There could be no doubt about the responsibility of Her Majesty's Ministers. They were clearly responsible for everything which had taken place in Egypt; because, undoubtedly, after the successful battle of Tel-el-Kebir, in September, 1882, they had been in comple control of the country. That control had necessarily been increasing, as everyone foresaw it must

  1105
  increase, week by week, and even day by day. At the present moment no single step could be taken, and, as a matter of fact, no single step was taken, either in regard to the policy or the administration of Egypt without the previous assent of Her Majesty's Representative at Cairo. An interesting and remarkable letter appeared in The Times some days ago, purporting to give the views of a distinguished foreigner resident in Egypt as to our policy. He gave a list with winch he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) would not trouble the House, but which ran somewhat as follows:—That no alterations in regard to prisons, legal procedure, cattle disease, police, sanitary arrangements, sites for custom house or schools—much less in regard to the more important questions of State finances, debts of the fellaheen, and the higher branches of administration, &c.—could be dealt with by the Egyptian Ministers without previously consulting Sir Evelyn Baring; and the writer concluded with the remarkable but natural expression—
  "Why not do away with this sham altogether, and acknowledge to the world that you are really administering the affairs of Egypt?"
  The advantages of such a course were apparent, except, as the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton) had stated, the Government would thereby be deprived of the useful buffer which now existed between themselves and English public opinion. If they were to assume in name the Government of Egypt, Her Majesty's Ministers would be amenable to public opinion for every act that was done in Egypt. They were in truth morally responsible now; but it was convenient for Ministers, who were not able to make up their mind a week beforehand, to be able to throw the blame of their own vacillation upon the unfortunate dummies whose own power of organization and activity was paralyzed by the employment of British officials, while the administrative power of the English officials was destroyed by the necessity of working through these Egyptian dummies. He had ventured, in the last debate upon this question, to put before the House, with considerable diffidence, what seemed to him to be the only policy for freeing ourselves from our difficulties. He had suggested that we should undertake the definite administration of Egypt. He
  1106
  did not advocate the annexation of Egypt, nor even what was commonly called a Protectorate over it, unless, indeed, such Protectorate could be obtained by negotiation or purchase from the present Sovereign. But what he advocated was a definite Administration publicly acknowledged before the world by English officials in Egypt, for a given period, such arrangement to be brought about by negotiation with the Suzerain of Egypt, the Sultan of Turkey. We could do nothing without the assent of the Sultan; but with his support we could do what we pleased. Nothing, he thought, would be more easy than to obtain that assent, if the Government were willing to cast aside their old prejudices and wild theories with regard to Turkey, and approach the Porte in a fair and conciliatory spirit. Turkey was fully sensible of all the difficulties of the matter, and was not blind to the position in which she found herself placed; because Turkey, no less than this country and France, was menaced by an Arab Revolt. Turkey must realize the awkwardness of the position, and, in view of recent occurrences in the East, must know that her power was seriously menaced by the possibility of another crusade such as that which took place in 1876 and 1877. She would, therefore, be willing to obtain the support of this country in the event of certain contingencies, and in return would give us the right to administer the affairs of Egypt. But we must go to her in the spirit in which Lord Palmerston or Lord Beaconsfield would have approached her, and admit her rights without usurping them. If that course were followed, we should, no doubt, obtain her cordial assent to a British Administration in Egypt for a period of years. What would be the advantage of that step? Our present difficulties in Egypt arose from the uncertainty which prevailed as to our policy in Africa. We were unable to deal with French intrigues, because France was extremely active in making partizans, and French agents would go to influential persons in Egypt for the purpose of spreading their own ideas, saying—"You cannot depend upon the English. They are always talking about going out of Egypt; and when they go you will have to be left in the lurch." He did not know whether Her Majesty's Go-

  1107
  vernment had any idea of the strength of French intrigues in Egypt at this moment. There was one active just be fore the movement of Arabi, which was found to be a most serious obstacle to our operations. He had no doubt that similar intrigues were going on now. Only that morning there was an interesting letter in The Times from Alexandria, in which the Correspondent—one of the most intelligent in Europe—stated—
  "Matters, however, have now arrived at such a point that, unless we wish to wreck the entire Administration, our policy must be altered. Some of the best of the English officials openly declare that, unless measures be taken to prevent French intrigue, they will resign their positions. The treble Administration is wholly indefensible; and seeing that our efforts to conciliate our quondam allies receive no return and only result in the ruin of Egypt, it is clearly advisable that they should cease."
  The writer went on to give instances of successful administration in Egypt, solely managed by Englishmen, or from which Frenchmen were excluded, and thus concluded—
  "Against this take the railways, which are under an Englishman, a Frenchman, and a Native, and concerning which the complaints of a useless bureaucracy are perpetual. The position of the Domains' administration, in which a Frenchman, who is worse than useless, has just been re-appointed at a large salary, is, unfortunately, notorious. In the Daira corruption is rampant, and the English member is outvoted in every attempt to effect the smallest reform. My own remarks on the futility of half measures must have become nauseous. Will the Government listen to General Gordon's opinions? His words are as applicable to Egypt as to the Soudan. He says, 'We cannot blame this people for rising, when no definite sign is shown of our establishing a permanent Government.'"
  Were we alone made responsible, the French officials would cease to exist, or would understand that their opportunity for paralyzing our efforts was at an end. In consequence, we should have some chance of bringing that administrative power, which undoubtedly did belong to British officials, especially British officials trained in the East, to bear upon the affairs of the country. We should at once have the administration working smoothly; and it was upon regular and beneficent administration that the welfare of Oriental people mainly depended. It was upon sound administration, far more than in theoretical forms of Constitutional Government, nicely-planned Legislative Assemblies, and paper fabrics of that kind, which
  1108
  were comparatively valueless to these people—it was upon the administration of a country that the prosperity of the people, their finance, and all which went to make them happy and secure depended. If that administration were in the hands of Englishmen, he had not the smallest doubt that the troubles, difficulties, and disasters in Egypt, the bad finance, the corruption, and the suffering amongst the fellaheen would practically cease in a very short time, and with them would cease many of our political troubles. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, he limited his advocacy of an English administration of Egypt strictly by the condition that we were able to do it by a friendly arrangement with the Sovereign Power. He had already stated, and he would reiterate it tonight, that we could not play fast-and-loose with the rights of the Turkish Government any more than we could with the rights of a Christian Power. Whatever might be thought of the Turkish Government, whatever might be thought of the Turkish system, or of the Turkish people, there was no doubt that the Sultan was the rightful Sovereign of Egypt. If they once seriously broke International Law in this case, as they had broken it over and over again of late, they would furnish to other Powers a fatal precedent, and the privilege of doing the same when it suited their purpose. They would give Russia, for instance, an excuse when it suited her to make her final attack on Asia Minor. They would, in short, set up an example which might be fatal to themselves. Whatever might be our confidence as to the respect other countries entertained for us, for our reputation and for our power, there could not be the smallest doubt that England, before long, would have to defend what was the widest and wealthiest Empire in the world against very serious aggression. When that day came, we should require the support, not only of all the material strength we had, and of the vast Possessions which Her Majesty's present Government lost no opportunity of weakening, but we should require to be supported with the consciousness of moral and international right in our dealings with the people of the world. He would not weary the House by saying anything upon the other branch of his policy, which he had ventured to put

  1109
  forward on a previous occasion. Since he had had the honour of a seat in the House, he had always maintained that the only way in which this country could successfully conduct her foreign policy was by an understanding with, and the co-operation of, the German Powers. That view had been received with ridicule; but he took it that our foreign alliances were the key-stone of successful operations abroad. It was a reversal of the policy of Lord Beacons-field in this respect which had led us into our difficulties with Egypt; it was the reversal of that policy which gave the Ministry such confidence in France, that they were led along blindfold by a noble and ambitious French statesman. He believed that the German Powers represented the greatest force, both moral and material, in Europe, and that we could not look for support or for a successful alliance elsewhere; that our interests were largely, if not entirely, identical with theirs; whereas our interests clashed with those of Russia, and more or less rivalled those of France. Believing that, he only hoped it was not too late—though there were indications abroad, in the recent rapprochement between Berlin and St. Petersburg, that it might be rather late, he hoped it was not too late—for Her Majesty's Ministers to recur to the understanding that Lord Beacons-field had with Berlin, which undoubtedly enabled him to carry on his policy in Egypt and elsewhere with safety and success. These were the three branches of the policy he would recommend to Her Majesty's Government—a definite administration of Egypt by England; a friendly understanding with the Porte; and a close alliance with the German Powers. In criticizing the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt with regard to this Vote of Credit, he had said just now that the Opposition laid no blame on the Army or upon their operations, which had been conducted with great skill and gallantry, but that they did lay blame on Her Majesty's Ministers. He had come across, the other day, a very interesting paragraph in a French paper, which so tersely and epigramatically gave the cause of the failures of Her Majesty's Government, that he would venture to trouble the Committee with it. This French paper said of the British Government—
  1110
  "It goes on from contradiction to contradiction, and systematically decides to do on the morrow, what it abstains from doing to-day, when too late to be of avail. England has seen nothing, has foreseen nothing, and has let herself be surprised by events."
  It would not be possible to sum up the failure of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in more appropriate language than that. The grievous slaughter of the Arabs at El Teb was almost a counterpart of the destruction of, or the injury to, Alexandria. Both were brought about by the same causes—namely, a failure to realize the coming danger, and the failure to take action in time. It would not be appropriate to go back into the circumstances attending the disaster to General Hicks. They had been gone into with so much detail, and with so much effect, that he should only be wearying the House if he were again to discuss them. He might point out that energetic action, at the time of General Hicks's expedition in June or August last, would have prevented almost all the troubles which had occurred in the Soudan. He might point out that the Government were bound, either to support General Hicks in his entreaty not to be sent on that useless expedition—that fatal expedition into the wilds of Kordofan—or, if they suffered him, in spite of his protests, the Ministry were bound to see that he was supported by a sufficient and effective force. He might point out that later the Government should have been more speedy and energetic in taking action for the relief of the garrisons on the Red Sea Coast. They were really responsible for allowing Baker Pasha to march his undisciplined cravens to what was almost certain butchery—to what intelligent opinion, throughout England and Europe, knew to be certain massacre, and of which the Government had been warned over and over again. They were responsible, for they must have known that the expedition of General Baker could have but one result. He might point out, above all, how the Government had neglected their duty with regard to the brave and unfortunate garrison of Sinkat. So long as the history of this country remained he believed the betrayed and cruel fate of that brave garrison and its gallant leader would be a lasting stain, not only on the annals of this country, but

  1111
  on the character of Her Majesty's Ministers. Her Majesty's Government had been repeatedly warned of the perilous condition of affairs—they had had solemn despatches from their Representatives on the spot telling them of the painful and desperate condition of Tewfik Bey and his men; they had been warned over and over again by the active and intelligent newspaper correspondents of this country, who had given so much valuable and accurate information as to the course of events in that part of the world. 80 long ago as September, 1883, Tewfik Bey had sent, through Consul Moncrieff, a clear statement as to the state of affairs in the Soudan. He had shown that notwithstanding, by a most gallant defence, he had beaton off, with a mere handful of blacks, an attack of Osman Digna and 3,000 Arabs, the whole country was in a state of dangerous ferment, and he would require reinforcements at once if an end was to be put to the revolt. No notice was taken of Tewfik's appeal. No help was offered him; and the Committee might judge—they might gauge exactly—the danger of neglecting a movement of this kind, by comparing the fact that in September last, Tewfik Bey, with a force of 70 blacks, was able to beat off successfully Osman Digna and his 3,000 Arabs, with the fact of the desperate resistance that the same Arabs had recently offered to the disciplined troops of Her Majesty. Such was the cost and such was the danger of allowing these fanatical movements to develop. It might be worth the while of the Committee to consider how sluggish the Government had been in making up their mind to send any expedition at all into the Soudan. This was one of the most extraordinary instances in history of the way in which a Government was forced against its will to take action even at the twelfth hour. He had made a note from the official despatches, showing exactly how the mind of the Government had been made up on this question. In the first place, the news of General Baker's defeat reached this country on the 5th February last. The Committee would remember the right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke), whose ingenuity was far in excess of his accuracy of statement—["Oh, oh!"] Well, that was his (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett's) opinion, and he
  1112
  was only sorry some hon. Members did not agree with it. He could give a great many proofs in support of his view if necessary. The right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board, who was the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, seemed still to be, in this House, the principal Minister for Foreign Affairs, because he was frequently put forward to answer any serious and important question on foreign affairs, and was generally put up to make statements when the Prime Minister did not feel himself sufficiently safe in making one. On the 6th February, the day after the receipt of the news of General Baker's defeat, he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had put a question to the Government. The question was, whether they would now take steps to go to the relief of the garrisons; and this was the extraordinary answer he got from the Prime Minister, who appeared to be somewhat agitated at the time and, therefore, perhaps, did not realize what he was saying. ["Oh, oh!"] He would read the answer, and then hon. Members who interrupted him could form their own opinion. The Prime Minister, when the news of the dreadful disaster to Baker Pasha's force, which had caused the expedition of General Graham, reached this country, on being asked what steps the Government intended to take, used these words—"The Government are not called on or justified to adopt any measures of any kind." Well, he did not hear the objections which were raised a minute ago when he said the Prime Minister was agitated. It seemed to him the kindest view to take of it to say that the right hon. Gentleman was somewhat agitated when he made that statement. Later in the same day, the Government went so far as to order arms and ammunition to be sent to Admiral Hewett, but no men, though a few hours after that they ordered 150 Marines to be sent. The Marines were a useful force. They were now being mounted on horses in order to supply the deficiency in Cavalry. The Committee would notice what a useful force the Marines had been to the Government. After putting down the Fenian movement in Dublin, they were now sent, on horseback, to reconnoitre against the forces of Osman Digna. That same night Sir William Hewett asked for 500 Marines. Next day, February 7th, the

  1113
  Government got so far as to order 280 Marines to go to Suakin, and the number was soon afterwards increased to 350. On the 9th, Admiral Hewett was ordered to take the command at Suakin. On February 10th, they sent out to General Gordon, who was out of reach of the telegraph, asking "if he could suggest anything for the relief of Sinkat and Tokar?" And on February 11th, they had Lord Northbrook's despatch, asking "if there was any chance of relieving Sinkat and Tokar by arms or negotiation." The right hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) took credit to the Government for having taken immediate steps to relieve the garrisons in the Soudan; but the relief, up to the 11th February, consisted merely in the despatch of 350 Marines. On February 12th, Admiral Hewett telegraphed that Sinkat had fallen, and that the garrison had been cut to pieces; and the Prime Minister, with a somewhat remarable levity, which in anyone else would have been styled "anti-human," made a play of words as to whether the despatch referring to the unfortunate garrison said "cut up" or "cut to pieces." On February 12th, the Cabinet at last made up their minds to do something practical, for they telegraphed—
  "Steps have been taken to relieve Tokar—sufficient force will reach Suakin on the 19th or 20th."
  But, so far from that promise being fulfilled, sufficient force was not at Suakin until the 26th. If the force had reached Suakin on the 19th or 20th, the garrison of Tokar would not have surrendered. The plea that the measures they had taken had been delayed till receipt of information from General Gordon would not hold water, and he had noticed that the Government had not of late laid much stress on it. If they had wished for General Gordon's opinions, they could have telegraphed in clear and unmistakable terms—"Baker has been badly beaten; what shall we do to relieve the garrisons?" But they did not do that—they asked General Gordon if he could make any suggestion for the relief of Sinkat and Tokar. There was no evidence that General Gordon knew of the desperate straits of these places, or even of the defeat of Baker Pasha. These, he thought, were sufficient reasons why they should criticize and examine the right of Her
  1114
  Majesty's Government to large Supplies for an expedition which a little foresight would have rendered altogether unnecessary. There had at last been a gleam of light in the policy of the Governmeht—their conduct seemed to have been marked by a ray of intelligence. ["No, no!"] He was not so hard-hearted in his judgment of Her Majesty's Ministers as some of his hon. Friends seemed to be. It was, he thought, about a week ago, when, for the first time since this question was opened, Her Majesty's Government showed some signs of an appreciation of its gravity. The indignation of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was excited by a statement from the Prime Minister to the effect that it must be remembered that there were other questions involved than merely the defence of Suakin; that the Arab movement threatened to spread to Arabia, and to involve the peace of the Ottoman Empire, and of French Provinces in North Africa; and various considerations of that kind. This, though it excited the horror and indignation of the hon. Member for Carlisle, was yet the first gleam the House had of the Government's perception of the real seriousness of the occurrences in Egypt and the Soudan. If Her Majesty's Government went on developing in the same way, in the end they might realize some of the elements of statesmanship, though it would in all probability be too late to undo the evils they had brought about. The Committee would, perhaps, here allow him to say a word or two with regard to General Gordon's position at Khartoum. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had never, either in or outside the House, criticized General Gordon's action. The Government had sent a remarkable man to fulfil an impossible mission; and the remarkable man they had sent out was doing remarkable things, although the objects of the mission appeared to remain impossible. They did not blame General Gordon for issuing what was now the notorious Slave Proclamation, however much the Government might play upon the difference between domestic slavery and what they called "slave-hunting." There could be no doubt that General Gordon's Proclamation did authorize not only domestic slavery, but slave-dealing. There was something probably less offensive and

  1115
  less cruel than slave-hunting, and something more than domestic slavery, and that was slave-dealing—namely, buying and selling slaves like any other merchandize in open market. As the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton) had pointed out, that involved great and grievous cruelty. It involved the breaking up of families, the separating of children from their parents, brothers from their sisters, wives from their husbands, and the greatest possible disruption of social ties which could be inflicted on the human race. Nevertheless, that it was which General Gordon's Proclamation had authorized in the Soudan. There was plenty of proof that such was the case. General Gordon had said, in effect, to the people—"Knowing your regret at the severe measures taken by the Government for the suppression of the slave traffic, and seizure and punishment of all concerned, according to Convention and Decrees, I confer upon you these rights—that henceforth none shall interfere with your property. Whoever has slaves shall have full right to their services, and full control over them." But domestic slavery was not forbidden by the Convention, though slave-dealing was. Therefore, it was clear from this and from the phrase "full control over them," that it was the slave traffic which the Proclamation made legal. It was obvious, therefore, that slave-dealing was allowed; and General Gordon had been obliged to allow it under the conditions under which the British Government had sent him out. General Gordon was sent out to accomplish an impossible task, and one most obnoxious to him. Though the Government had, in scattered forms, certain opinions of General Gordon's, which might be quoted to show that he believed the Soudan was a costly and difficult possession, yet there could be no doubt his original view was that they should not abandon the Soudan—that was to say, the Soudan between the White Nile and the Red Sea Coast, That he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) believed to be General Gordon's view at this moment. He believed General Gordon did not wish to abandon the Soudan, and that he felt they could not with honour abandon and leave it to anarchy. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had ventured to protest against the abandonment of the Soudan. He was sorry that the
  1116
  Party of which he was but an humble Member had not seen their way to taking up that view strongly—he regretted that the abandonment of the Soudan had not been protested against from the whole of the Opposition Benches. He did not say the more remote parts, such as Darfour and the Equatorial Provinces, should be held—although it was an extraordinary fact that at this moment Darfour and the Equatorial Provinces were well governed, better governed, in fact, by European officials, than any other part of the Dominions of the Khedive. With regard to what was called the Eastern Soudan—that was to say, the vast region between Dongola and the bend Westwards of the White Nile—between the White Nile and the Red Sea Coast—it was not only contrary to the interests of civilization, but he believed it to be contrary to right, for us at this time to abandon it to what was really slavery and barbarism. The noble Lord the Member for Middlesex had quoted from a telegram from The Times Correspondent at Khartoum—a most extraordinary telegram; but the noble Lord had not given the most important portion of it. General Gordon had stated, according to the Correspondent of The Times, who was also our Consular Agent—
  "The emissaries of the Mahdi will succeed in raising the tribes between this and Berber. This is not owing to disaffection, but to fear caused by the pronounced policy of the abandonment of the Soudan."
  And General Gordon went on to say—
  "We cannot blame them for rising, when no definite sign is shown of establishing a permanent Government here."
  Then he said—
  "Be sure of one thing. If Her Majesty's Government do not act promptly, General Graham's victory will go for naught, and with the useless expenditure of blood the effect of it will evaporate."
  And he added—
  "I do not believe we shall send any more telegrams, for it is no longer a question of days, but of hours."
  In this state of things, were Her Majesty's Government going to put Zebehr Pasha in power at Khartoum? That would be a disgraceful thing for them to do. Let them ask General Gordon to undertake himself the administration of the Eastern Soudan; or, if he were unwilling to accept the office, let them

  1117
  send some other distinguished Englishman thither, such as Sir Samuel Baker. In no other way could a satisfactory result be achieved. The Government had declared, some time ago, that their main hope was bound up in the restoration of the ancestral Sultans of these Provinces; but little had been heard of this idea of late. What had become of the Sultans—where were they? The Government had tried the experiment of sending one out; he took with him 23 wives, and only got, so far as was known, to the first post on the Nile. Since his arrival at that place he had been in a state of hopeless inebriation. The idea, in the face of a fanatical crusader like the Mahdi's, of expecting to restore the ancestral Sultans and small tribal Chiefs, whose power had been broken for two generations, was most absurd, and only showed to what extremes Her Majesty's Ministers had been driven in their hopeless indecision and vacillation in regard to this question. The only plan, as he had said, was to place the administration of the country under a British Governor General, with the consent of the Sovereign Power, and to back him up with all the moral support possible. As to the argument of the cost of the administration of the Soudan, it was only used by the Government to cover their retreat. He had it on the very best authority that the Soudan could pay its own expenses. He did not believe General Gordon was in favour of the abandonment of the Soudan, for that gallant officer had declared that under a good Administration the country would pay its own expenses. It was on record, according to the figures of the Government, that in the last year of its independent administration, the Soudan only cost £96,000 above its Revenue. What was our Expedition, which had as yet only touched the coast of the Red Sea, costing us? Had it not cost us £500,000 already, and had we seen the end of the expenditure yet? Was not General Gordon asking us for troops, and were the Government going to abondon this country to anarchy? He knew that was a favourite panacea of the Treasury Bench, and that it had been deified by the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney). That hon. Member had told them that anarchy was "a new birth." If it was a new birth, all he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) could say was that a great
  1118
  many peoples had had a new birth under the present Government. To his mind, anarchy was the greatest curse of a people; and he believed that the rule even of Zebehr Pasha was better than hopeless anarchy, which would be the result of abandoning the Soudan to its ancestral Sultans. They had been told that Her Majesty's Government were going to evacuate the Soudan altogether. Now, he had asked the other day what they were going to do in such a case as that of Kassala? Here was a great town, a great commercial centre, second only to Khartoum in importance, and which in the last 20 years had increased largely in respect of population. Twenty years ago it contained 8,000 inhabitants; now it had at least 25,000. Besides the rest of the population, there were now in Kassala 6,000 or 7,000 Egyptians—men, women, and children. How were they going to remove these people from Kassala and get them down to the Red Sea, a distance of 300 miles, and provide for them afterwards? Again, were these people to be denied compensation, unlike the people at Alexandria, for the destruction of their property? All these questions would have to be faced by Her Majesty's Government. He protested against the abandonment of the Soudan on the ground of trade also; he protested against it on the ground brought to the notice of Sir Evelyn Baring, their Agent in Egypt, by the committee of merchants, who stated that the exports of the Soudan were £11,000,000, and the imports £2,000,000, and that there were 3,000 Egyptian and 1,000 European commercial houses in the Soudan. Were the Government going to give up the great route for trade with the interior of Africa? He protested against such a policy, on the ground that it was the most ruinous and costly policy that could possibly be adopted by this country. The Government would be driven, step by step, to further action. They could not recede; they could not abandon the Soudan; they would not be allowed to abandon it. Already the Government had been met with remonstrances from Prance, from Turkey, and, as he believed, from other European Powers. Why, then, should they neglect this opportunity? He was convinced that, if the secret diplomatic history of these campaigns I could be read, it would be found that

  1119
  the action of the Government, in despatching General Graham's force to Suakin, had been influenced by the pressure put upon them by Foreign Powers, and that pressure was not likely to cease. Her Majesty's Government were losing all the trade of the Soudan, and casting away the means of doing good to the people, by their half-and-half policy. [Mr. JESSE COLLINGS: Oh, oh!] He appealed to the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Jesse Collings) to get up in his place, and give the House his idea as to what the Government were going to do. Hon. Gentlemen on those Benches wanted to know, and the country wanted to know, how far Her Majesty's Government were going to retain their hold upon Egypt, and how far they were going to hold the Soudan? The policy of Her Majesty's Government had long been one of hesitation in re spect of Egypt; but it was now becoming a policy of costly and sanguinary vacillation. He believed he should be correct in saying that, since August last, when Her Majesty's Government foolishly refused to acknowledge responsibility in the case of Hicks, 45,000 Egyptians and others had been slain, owing to the weakness and indecision of the Cabinet. How much more bloodshed and destruction of property would be required before Her Majesty's Government made up their minds to take the only course consistent with interest and duty, and their own honour—namely, that of declaring distinctly and clearly that they would secure the appointment of a British Governor General, and superintend the administration of the Soudan for a certain period? In thanking the Committee for the indulgence shown to him, he took the opportunity of expressing a hope that the present debate, and others which had recently taken place in that House, would result in forcing the hand of Her Majesty's Government a little further, and in making them adopt a more firm and consistent and honourable policy with respect to Egypt.
  MR. JOHN MORLEYsaid, he did not wish to follow the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) into the rather ambitious scheme of policy which he had sketched. He did not suppose that that was the right occasion for taking stock of the whole Egyptian situation. As for the Soudan, the hon. Member for Eye had reproached hon. Gen-
  1120
  tlemen on that side of the House, who repudiated interference in that question, with a partiality for anarchy. But he had forgotten, as it was very often forgotten in discussions on the Soudan, that there had always been anarchy there, and that ever since the Egyptian Government had been responsible for the Soudan, the anarchy which they created had been more savage and ferocious than any other. His (Mr. John Morley's) authority for that statement was the Report of Colonel Stewart. The hon. Member admitted, at least, that the Leaders of the Opposition were as little inclined as Members on those Benches to accept his policy of annexation of the Soudan. He might not have risen to speak on this question but for the speech of the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), who reproached some of them who sat below the Gangway with misleading, or doing their best to mislead, the country. It was certain that there was a vital difference of opinion as to the policy to be pursued in Egypt between some of them who sat there, and the hon. Gentleman; and whether they, or the hon. Gentleman, represented the feeling of the constituencies, remained to be seen. For his own part, he had no fear either of meeting the present constituencies, or the constituences enlarged as he hoped they would be, and placing before them the issue between the hon. Member and themselves. It was from that point of view that he rather deprecated what seemed to him a new departure on the part of Her Majesty's Government. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) said, on Thursday last, that it would be necessary to provide for the security of Suakin during the short interval which would elapse before the final decision was come to as to the permanent garrison. That clearly indicated that Her Majesty's Government had made up their minds that Suakin was to be held. Well, that, in his view, was certainly an advance from the position taken up by Lord Granville no further back than January last. On the 9th of that month, Lord Granville wrote to Sir Evelyn Baring that, although he was favourably disposed to the retention of Suakin by Egypt, yet Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that further information and discussion would be necessary before the

  1121
  question of that and other ports could be definitely decided. About the game date, the Khedive himself said, in a long conversation which he had with the Correspondent of The Times, that, as regarded the Eastern Soudan or the littoral of the Red Sea, the Egyptian Government had no direct interest there; that it cost them money; and that, as they received it from Turkey, they must formally offer to restore it; but that its destiny did not affect Egypt. In view of these declarations by the Khedive and Earl Granville, which showed that the former had no interest in the Red Sea, and that Her Majesty's Government had not made up their minds as to the retention of Suakin, he should be interested if the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would disclose to the Committee what had been the course of information and discussion that had led Lord Granville and the Government from the position of the 9th of January to the position taken up by the noble Marquess on Thursday night, and by Lord Granville himself, in a slightly different form, on Monday last. The question of the retention of the ports was a matter of vital importance, because he might remind the Committee, without egotism, that he had ventured last year to make what had been called the most gratuitous form of mistake—a prophecy. He said, on the occasion referred to, that if we did not leave Egypt then, the Soudan would retain us in Egypt; and he would now venture upon another prophecy, and say that if we remained in Suakin we should remain in the Soudan. And we should remain in the Soudan, because it was perfectly clear that after the defeat of General Baker's force the Egyptian Government could not hold Suakin and the Red Sea ports. If, as General Gordon said, it would be an iniquity to hand back the Soudan generally to the Egyptians, he failed to see why it would be a less iniquity to hand back any particular portion of the Soudan. Then it remained to be decided whether the ports should be held by Turkey or by ourselves. It was true that Lord Granville had said that Her Majesty's Government concurred in the proposition to retocede those ports to Turkey; but nothing more had been heard of that; and it remained, there, fore, for us to garrison Suakin and the
  1122
  Red Sea Ports. And if that were all, we might undertake the work; but it was obvious, from all the arguments used by the supporters of annexation in the Press, that the acquisition of Suakin and the Red Sea ports really meant the making of a railway to Berber, and through that to Khartoum and Sennaar. In that case the advocates of extension would speedily spring up, and quote passages from the Report of Colonel Stewart, in which he said—"If you wish to put down the Slave Trade, you will find no better way of doing it than that of opening a way through Khartoum to legitimate trade." Therefore, if Her Majesty's Government wanted to find themselves settled in the Soudan, and ultimately on their way to Central Africa, they could take no better course to that end than by establishing themselves, on however insignificant a plea, and with however small a number of troops, at Suakin. He confessed he was alarmed, not only by a sentence of the noble Marquess, but by the express statement of the grounds on which the Prime Minister justified our remaining in that place when he said—
  "We are there on good grounds; first, because Suakin is a vent for the Slave Trade, which we ought to stop; and, secondly, because it is important that we should arrest communications between the movement of which the Mahdi is the head, and a movement for which the tribes in Arabia are only too likely to be ready."
  So far as the last reason was concerned, he submitted that the very way to spread the movement from Africa to Arabia was for us, who were Christians, to remain in Suakin. Indeed, the announcement of our intention to remain there had not been made many days before a telegram informed us from Jeddah that the Mahommedans in Arabia were so excited at the prospect of a Christian people establishing themselves in Suakin, that already the insurgent and discontented movement had received a further impulse. He contended that it was exactly because we were Sovereign of a great Mahommedan community that it should be our special care to abstain as much as possible from meddling in Mahommedan troubles. As for putting down the Slave Trade, the retention of Suakin was not at all necessary to that end. What we wanted for the purpose was, as Colonel Stewart said, a number of small boats

  1123
  for cruising off the coast—not men-of-war's boats, for they were too conspicuous—and with these far more could he done towards putting an end to the Slave Trade than by the possession of any portion of territory inland. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) spoke, with great force and pathos, of the duty which England had imposed upon herself of repressing slavery and the Slave Trade. That, no doubt, was one of the most glorious pages of our history; but when we found the best authorities telling us that we should do much more to repress the Slave Trade by stopping the market in Egypt, and putting down domestic slavery, he thought we ought to pause before committing ourselves to new engagements of which we should never see the end. Sir Evelyn Baring, in November last, warned Her Majesty's Government to abstain from all interference in the Soudan, which he said would not only make the policy of withdrawal a matter of extreme difficulty, or, so far as the present generation was concerned, of impossibility, but would involve a great risk that we should be led to establish British authority on a permanent or quasi-permanent basis over the greater part of the Valley of the Nile. It was because he saw that this was the beginning of a new departure that he ventured as early as possible to utter his protest against it. So far as the Vote before the Committee was concerned, he was not able to follow his hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) into the Lobby. But if the question was raised as to the retention of the Red Sea ports, he should not acquiesce, by vote or otherwise, in a step which he looked upon as the beginning of a most dangerous policy.
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTHsaid, the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. John Morley) had exercised, both in and out of the House, a most unfortunate influence on the Egyptian policy of Her Majesty's Government. He hoped the Committee might infer, from some of the remarks which had fallen from him, that the hon. Gentleman felt that influence to be on the wane. There was one passage in the eloquent speech of his noble Friend (Lord George Hamilton), who introduced this subject to the Committee that evening, with which he
  1124
  was unable to agree; and that was the passage in which he called on the Prime Minister to come forward and state what was his policy with reference to the Soudan and Egypt generally. He thought the Prime Minister had been called upon often enough to state his policy. Hon. Members had had many specimens of the kind of answer which the right hon. Gentleman thought it incumbent upon him to return to those appeals; and, for his own part, he was unwilling to call upon the right hon. Gentleman to state once more in this debate the views with which the House was unhappily too familiar. They had been stated by the right hon. Gentleman on Monday last, and he (Mr. Sclater-Booth) feared that if he were present he would only re-state them with redoubled vigour and energy. He hoped that the views which had been expressed in the course of the debate, especially those of hon. Members sitting behind the Treasury Bench, might have some effect upon the conduct and policy of Her Majesty's Government, and that the opinion of the country, already expressed with sufficient clearness in the public Press of all classes of politics, might be brought home to them by the language of their own supporters. He looked forward, therefore, with some hopefulness to seeing the Government go forward in the direction in which hon. Gentlemen on those Benches desired thorn to go, and he did not wish for any more explanations which might have the same unfortunate result as that of which they had reason to complain. He did not, for himself, regret that his right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) was on Thursday last precluded from bringing forward his Motion on going into Committee of Supply. If he had done so, it would have been the more incumbent on Her Majesty's Government to stand by their previous utterances. But, as the matter stood, the mouths of hon. Members opposite had been opened in a manner that was not unsatisfactory to hon. Gentlemen on those Benches. The conduct of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt, which had always been more or less in accordance with the feelings of the country, contrasted very strongly with the statements drawn from them by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), and others who had advocated a totally

  1125
  different line of policy; and he believed that that duplicity of conduct and language lay at the bottom of all the misfortunes and difficulties that were now before them. He believed, moreover, that the same contradiction which prevailed between the statements of Her Majesty's Government and their conduct, and of which he and his hon. Friends so much complained, was prejudicially affecting both the military and the civil government of Egypt. The Government had throughout, from the beginning of the last Session of Parliament to the present time, said one thing while they were doing another. Under the pressure of circumstances, stronger than the Government itself, they had occasionally done the right thing; but they had always vitiated their action by the premature statement of their intention to withdraw, which stopped further progress in the right direction. Her Majesty's Government should have adopted a perfectly different line of conduct, and, instead of making premature declarations, they should have remained silent when asked to state when they intended to retire from Egypt, and then the result would have been far more in furtherance of their actual policy than the language which they had unfortunately held. But what could they expect from the Prime Minister when they found him catching at the language of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), and describing the policy of Her Majesty's Government as a policy of "Rescue and retire." The word "re tire" had such a magical effect upon his conscience and sympathy that he could not refrain from turning round, and, as it were, expressing his sympathy with the sentiments of the hon. Member. This anxiety to announce a policy which was inconsistent with the views of the country, and inconsistent with much of the line of action which had been adopted by the Government, equally affected the military as well as the civil situation. In that day's Times there was a telegram from Khartoum—he was not sure whether it was one of the telegrams which had been alluded to by other speakers—to the effect that General Gordon was greatly embarrassed in carrying on his work by the premature statement of the Government that the whole of the Soudan was to be immediately aban-
  1126
  doned. It was quite evident General Gordon would have profited very much by a little more ambiguity and reticence on the part of the Government, because it must be recollected that the uncompromising and unqualified statements of the Prime Minister were telegraphed not merely to Cairo and Alexandria, but to the remotest parts of the Soudan, where the Arabs were in arms against us. As he was upon the subject of Khartoum, he ought to say he agreed very much with the views which were expressed just now by his hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett). He could not help thinking that events would prove that it was premature, dangerous, and impolitic to announce that the Egyptian Government would be required to withdraw from the whole of the Soudan. It was not merely that the question of slavery might cause that policy to be reconstructed as time went on; but in the interest of the civilized world, in the interest of all the enlightened and scientific men who took so much trouble now-a-days in penetrating the most barbarous regions of Central Africa, a reversal of the Government's present policy might be necessary. Scientific men were disgusted beyond measure at the surrender on the part of the Government of the great advances towards civilization which recent enterprize had brought about. It was a disgrace to this country that it should take the lead in abandoning the Valley of the Nile, which had been laid open to civilization by the heroic efforts of our great travellers. He believed that what he might call the Mesopotamia of the Nile and the town of Khartoum were points of the greatest consequence, which might by-and-bye require to be reconquered and handed over to Egypt, or some other civilized country. The scientific men were very strong and powerful in the Metropolis. Many of the scientific gentlemen with whom he was acquainted were supporters of the general policy of Her Majesty's Government; but the whole of the Government's Egyptian policy was by them unanimously condemned. He should not be afraid if the Government were to announce that they would undertake what was called a Protectorate of Egypt, although the term was a little ambiguous. He was not frightened by the examples of Pro-

  1127
  tectorates which the Prime Minister put before them the other day. A' Protectorate of Egypt founded upon the analogy of that of the Ionian Islands would not be a very serious or objectionable thing. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, speaking ex cathedra the other day, laid it down as an uncontrovertible principle that there was no alternative between the policy which the Government had pursued and the policy of absolute annexation. That was a most exaggerated and unwarranted view of the question. The Government themselves had given them an example of something between those two policies in the authority exercised in Egypt during the presence there of Lord Dufferin. There was no actual annexation then; but the policy now pursued by Her Majesty's Government was certainly very decidedly different from that which prevailed during Lord Dufferin's presence in Cairo. Lord Dufferin was responsible, in an indirect way, for all that occurred; indeed, no step was taken in civil and military government in Egypt without his authority and cognizance. The only drawback to Lord Dufferin's position was that everybody knew that his period of retention of office, or of power, could not last very long, and that it was extremely doubtful what successor might be appointed. No successor was appointed, and his (Mr. Sclater-Booth's) impression was that a great change for the worse took place on his departure in the policy of the Government. He had the opportunity of witnessing the departure of General Hicks from Egypt to the Soudan. General Hicks went as it now turned out, on a forlorn hope; but he went under the eye of Lord Dufferin, who was in power at the time, and whose complete control over the Government of Egypt was undoubted and unquestioned. It might be well for the Government to say that they renounced responsibility when they washed their hands of the whole business; but the multitude who witnessed General Hicks's departure believed that Lord Dufferin was probably on the ground, and that, if not responsible, he was a silent party to the proceedings. The people who witnessed the procession through Cairo thought more of Lord Dufferin's presence at that moment than of the protests and repudiations which
  1128
  were to be found in the Blue Books. The Prime Minister said the other day that some progress had been made in improving the civil government of Egypt. No doubt, something had been done; but how much more might have been done in the 21 months which had elapsed since the battle of Tel-el-Kebir? The irrigation of Egypt had been surveyed and reported upon. Nothing, however, had been actually begun, yet the expenditure of a small sum of money upon irrigation in Egypt would produce immediate results, and would have been productive ere now of considerable profit. The plan for the sale of the Domain lands was settled last year; but it was not carried out, owing to the departure of Lord Dufferin. The same might be said with regard to the indemnities. His right hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) had clearly shown that the Government were deeply responsible in the matter of the indemnities. It was not only that their action at Alexandria was the indirect cause of the destruction of the city, but when the Khedive was restored to power he was hand and glove with the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces, and he voluntarily promised to make good the damage. The indemnities might have been settled; but nothing had been done, because of the financial difficulty which was always weighing on the Government of Egypt. Again, as to the military establishments. They had seen how little reliance could be placed upon the forces organized, whether by Baker Pasha or by Sir Evelyn Wood. But the time was rapidly approaching when Sir Evelyn Wood, and all the officers who took service under him, would relinquish their appointments. They only engaged to serve the Egyptian Government for two years, and that period would come to an end at the close of the present year. In this respect there was a difficulty in store for the Government. How were they going to replace Sir Evelyn Wood and his officers? Certainly, some officers had been enlisted and sent out within the last few weeks; but the confusion in the Egyptian Army would be very great in the course of a few months, unless some real steps were taken to avoid it. He felt that until that was done the withdrawal of our forces would not only be impossible, but absurd. With regard to the finances

  1129
  generally, they had heard that something like an interchange of civilities had taken place between the house of Rothschild and the Government. If that was done the other day, why could it not be done six months ago? If Mr. Vincent was coming to London within the next week to arrange for some further operations, why could not Sir Auckland Colvin have entered into the same negotiations when he was in London last June? He (Mr. Sclater-Booth) thought the house of Rothschild would have been quite as ready to assist the Egyptian Government then as now. The hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Slagg) contended that financiers were the enemies of Egypt, and that cotton merchants were its friends. He (Mr. Sclater-Booth) believed that cotton-growing and finance were of equal importance to the permanent welfare of Egypt; merchandise, commerce, and finance were essential to Egypt's success. Even now, at the eleventh hour, he would appeal to the Government to make up their mind, and act without reserve in the direction that not only hon. Members who sat on the Opposition side of the House, but, judging from certain speeches which they had made, hon. Gentlemen opposite desired. He wished them to act in accordance with their duties and engagements towards Egypt and the Egyptian people—duties and engagements which were very serious, and could not be evaded. He wished them to act in accordance with the wishes of the vast majority of the people of this country. In doing so they would fulfil the expectation of all rational politicians in Europe without any exception; they would consult the interests of Englishmen both here and in India; and even in reckoning with their own supporters they would see they would gain more credit by following the sagacious advice of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), than by siding with the narrow-mindedness of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), or the cynicism of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere).
  MR. M'COANsaid, that what, to his mind, was the strongest argument against this Vote—namely, that Egypt could very well afford to meet the expenditure herself—had hardly as yet been touched on. Whatever might be the case in Egypt Proper, it could
  1130
  not be pretended that we had any national interests in the Soudan, and these operations of General Graham must consequently be regarded as undertaken on behalf of Egyptian interests with which we were in no way immediately concerned. Primâ facie the cost ought, therefore, to fall on the Cairo Treasury, which, if some very obvious and practicable financial reforms were carried out, would be well able to bear it. Before justifying this statement, however, he begged to avail himself of this opportunity to refer very briefly to some other alleged reforms which the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) and the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had both claimed to have been already achieved by our Agents in Egypt. Thus credit had been taken for great progress in the establishment of the new Native Courts; while the fact was that this reform, the initiative in which was due to the late Khedive, had advanced very little beyond the point at which he left it. Some few Belgian and Dutch Judges were, indeed, now idling about Cairo at large salaries; but not a single one of the proposed new tribunals was yet open. As regards the so-called "Legislative Assembly," projected by Lord Dufferin, and for which great credit had also been taken, he need merely say that that was about the most worthless delusion of the whole. So, too, as to irrigation; Colonel Moncrieff had, indeed, made a survey and report; but not a single mile of new canal had yet been made, nor a mile of even the existing ones cleaned out. The whole irrigating system had been neglected since the deposition of Ismail, and was now in very much worse condition than when he left it. Similarly as to the police; that, to be sure, had been "re-modelled;" but with the result that it was, at that moment, everywhere more inefficient than it had been any time within the past 20 years. And so too, lastly, as regards the prisons. Mr. Clifford Lloyd had, it was true, cleaned out and otherwise improved the state of the gaol in Cairo; but in the interior—at Tantah, Damietta, Rosetta, Mansourah, Assiout, Kenneh, and elsewhere, absolutely nothing had been done in this direction. He could affirm this on the authority of wholly trustworthy information, and it

  1131
  was but right that the truth should be known. But whatever might be the difficulty and failure as yet as regards these various reforms, those to which he desired to call the attention of the Committee were still more important, and, if carried out, would effectually and permanently set right what was the main difficulty and danger in the Egyptian situation—its finances. These were—(1) the Tribute to the Porte; (2) the abolition of the Capitulations; (3) the equalization of the Land Tax; (4) the revision of the Law of Liquidation. As regarded the Tribute, the Committee would, perhaps, remember that this heavy tax on Egypt, for which the Porte had never rendered the least equivalent, originally stood at £376,000 a-year; but, in 1866, was raised to £675,000, in consideration of the Firman which in that year conferred on Ismail Pasha the title of Khedive, and made the succession hereditary to his eldest son. To this was subsequently added another £85,000, for the cession of Massowah and Berbera, raising the black mail now paid to Turkey to a round sum of £760,000 a-year. It was obvious that that was a monstrous payment, extracted from the blood and sweat of a population on whom the Porte had never conferred a benefit, and which there was absolutely nothing but a corrupt personal bargain to justify. This heavy drain should, therefore, be reduced to at least its original figure, and a saving of £384,000 a-year be thus effected. The fact that the Porte had mortgaged the present sum for its Tribute Loan supplied no argument against such an economy, as those who bought the stock of that Loan did so at their own risk, and speculatively took their security with all its "equities." As regarded the Capitulations, if we are to exercise any power over Egyptian Administration, the raison d'être for those would be wholly gone. As it was, the immunities which they unjustly conferred on some 100,000 foreigners most seriously affected the Customs, Excise, Land Tax, and many other branches of the Revenue, to which justice could not be done so long as these old checks on Turkish misrule remained in force. I With the precedent of the French in Tunis, there should be little difficulty in their abrogation; and if anything like broad and equitable reform was to be
  1132
  effected, that must be done. If it were done, the Revenue might expect to gain at least £250,000 a-year. But, financially, the equalization of the Land Tax was even more important. At present, nearly three-fourths of the whole 4,900,000 acres of tilled land in Egypt, held under the miri tenure, paid an average tax of 22 s. an acre; while more than a fourth, chiefly owned by the Pashas, Beys, and other favourites of the Viceroys—held under what was called the oushurieh tenure—paid only an average of In an acre. It was under this latter tenure that Nubar Pasha, for instance, held his large estates, which were nearly all the gift of the late Khedive. Well, if that gross injustice to the fellaheen, who paid the higher rate for generally worse land, were redressed by the lower being raised to a level with the higher rate, the demonstrable gain to the Treasury would be above £850,000 a-year. But quite as urgent, and more immediately fructuous, would be a reduction of the interest paid on the bonded Debt under the Law of Liquidation. At present this involved a yearly charge of £3,382,406, exclusive of the interest paid on the Domain and Daira Loans, which were separately dealt with. Well, it was obvious that this was a monstrous charge on a total Revenue of less than £9,000,000 a-year; and the only remedy for it was a reduction of, at least, 1 of the 4 per cent—plus a Sinking Fund—now paid on the Unified Stock. This alone, even without touching the Preference Stock, would represent a saving of some £550,000 per annum. For that the increased security, given to the Stock by our presence in Egypt, would be far more than an equivalent; and in view of this there would not, he believed, be any difficulty in effecting the necessary modification of the law under which the existing interest charges were fixed. If, then, these several reforms were effected, it would be seen that, what with economies and new revenue, the resultant gain to the Treasury would roundly exceed £2,000,000 a-year,—a sum more than enough to place Egyptian finance on the very soundest footing, without calling on the British taxpayer for a penny. But these great and fructuous reforms could not be expected so long as the present shilly-shally no-policy of Her Majesty's Government was adhered to.

  1133
  They were possible only under an avowed British Protectorate, and for that and all the blessings it would confer on the Egyptian people they supplied an unanswerable argument.
  SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS: I only rise for the purpose of making two observations which will not be long—neither one nor the other. The first observation I wish to make is, that I do not understand the new policy of silence taken up by Her Majesty's Government. I am quite sure that the speech of my noble Friend (Lord George Hamilton;, at the opening of the debate to-night, was well worthy of an answer; also the speech which followed by an old Colleague of the Government (Mr. W. E. Forster), every word of which must have gone to the heart of the Government, and must have been a warning to them that they must take great care what they are doing, if they mean still to guide the Councils of this great nation. That right hon. Gentleman touched upon the subject of Khartoum, and upon the suggested advent to power of Zebehr Pasha, and the consequent increase in the Slave Trade, which is a matter much more likely to touch the feelings of every Englishman than any of those stories of Bulgarian atrocities of which we heard so much a few years ago. This policy of silence is to my mind most wonderful. I do not know whether any Members of the Government were present when the hon. Gentleman the Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) made his speech; but, whether or not, that speech is also one which requires to be answered, and which must be answered before the debate closes. This policy of silence, this policy of retiring from the debate before they have extricated themselves from the position in which they find themselves, is a new policy. When this debate began last Thursday, both the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) and the Prime Minister said they would make short speeches, as they would, in all probability, have to speak again in the course of the debate. The noble Marquess most faithfully kept his promise, and his speech was short; but the Prime Minister as faithfully forgot his promise, and his speech was long; but, at all events, I think we are entitled to ask that before this debate closes we may have that further statement from the
  1134
  Government which we were promised when the debate was opened, especially considering the speeches which have been made on this side of the House and the important speeches which have come from, at least, two Members on the other side in the course of this evening's discussion. It is difficult to account for the silence of the Government. I wonder whether it is because they are not agreed. We have often charged them with being disagreed in the Cabinet; but that charge has always been denied, although, in the long run, events have always proved the charge to be well founded. After a charge of this kind has been made, we always find that some Member of the Cabinet drops out of it. On this very Egyptian Question, one of its most important Members left the Cabinet. That right hon. Gentleman left them the very moment the bombardment of Alexandria took place, because, as he said, he considered their policy had been wrong from the very beginning, and that he could no longer go with them. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), to whom I refer, left the Cabinet, and when he took that course of action, you may depend upon it there were other Members of the Cabinet very much of his way of thinking. There are, very probably, Members of the Cabinet who still agree with the right hon. Gentleman, although they have not left their Colleagues. The Government say they represent the action of the Liberal Party as a whole; but we know that, on this matter, the Liberal Party is disagreed, and that there are Members of the extreme Radical Party in the Cabinet—we have every reason to believe, indeed, that the Cabinet are by no means agreed as to the policy that is to be pursued. Is that the reason of their silence, then, or is it because, as they say, they have so often explained their policy that it is no use repeating it over and over again? Only the other day, the Prime Minister said he had repeated the policy of the Government, and explained it so often, that he thought he required the indulgence of the House in venturing to repeat it again; and the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville), in "another place," has said that as the Government had repeated their policy 16 or 17 times, he

  1135
  must decline to repeat it again. But, if they have so often repeated their policy, they have never yet explained it to the satisfaction and to the intelligence of the country. It so happens that the Members of the Government have spoken not only inside, but outside this House; and their voices have been weakened, in attempting to explain their policy, by the fact that there has been such a wide difference between their statements—even the explanations we have had, with all the eloquence and ingenuity of the Prime Minister himself, have been nullified by the widely different explanations which have been given in "another place." Let us inquire what really is the policy of the Government—let us examine it for one moment; and I now here come to my second point, on which I will detain the House for a very few minutes. From the speeches we heard on Thursday night, we may be able to gather what is the policy of the Government, and where it is that we differ so essentially from them; and that is the point I want to accentuate to-night. The Prime Minister, in the speech in which he introduced the Reform Bill, said he would have to consider the question affirmatively and negatively. I should like to take these very words of his in considering this question of the policy of the Government. Let us consider what has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman negatively, and what has fallen from the Government, affirmatively, and I think we shall see what is the feeling of the Government and how the feeling of the Opposition—which I believe to be the feeling of the country—differs from that of the Government. Let us take the negative side first. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman who brought forward this Motion (Colonel Stanley), in a speech which it was not difficult to understand, for the reason that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman spoke as plainly as a man could speak, has given his view of what the policy of the Opposition would be; and the Prime Minister could not help acknowledging that such was the case, because he said—"We have heard in it something like a clear and comprehensive plan arrived at by the speeches of the Opposition, and we hare this advantage—that we are and desire to be at distinct issue with regard to their policy so far as we can discern it."
  1136
  I am glad that those words were spoken. I am glad that now, after all the taunts that have been thrown out, to the effect that we had no opinions, and never suggested a policy, and had nothing to put before the country, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, than whom there can be no better judge, says he is at distinct issue with us as to our policy. The sooner the country knows that the better; for it is no use our saying "We find fault with your policy" unless we have one of our own to suggest. I am quite ready to meet the point as to our policy; but it has been already met by my right hon. and gallant Friend. We have it now, on the authority of the Prime Minister, that he discerns what it is, and that the Government are at distinct issue with it. Let there be no mistake about that. Now we come to another sentence of the Prime Minister's. He goes on discussing the speech of my right hon. and gallant Friend, and says—
  "We cannot enter with advantage on the consideration of a policy for Egypt Proper, until we are enabled in some degree to close this chapter in the Soudan, and especially the military chapter."
  I do not quite know whether that means that the policy of the Government is to change, because of the events which have happened in the Soudan, or not. The Prime Minister does not express himself on that point; but he goes on to say—
  "The right hon. and gallant Gentleman is under no such difficulty—he has got his plan cut and dry, and he has told us what it is. It is that the Egyptian Government should be swept clean away; it is that the Khedive may be maintained, or shall he maintained, as a puppet in the hands of the British authorities."
  Well, I should like to ask what the Khedive is at the present moment; I should like to know what power the Khedive has? If he expresses a single wish, you say it shall not be carried out; if one of his Ministers disagrees with the Minister you have placed under him as Under Secretary, you say that Under Secretary is to have the power, and the Minister is to be dismissed, and you dismiss him accordingly. You say—"The political, military, judicial, and financial government of Egypt is to be conducted not only in word, but in fact, on an English plan." What is the position of the Egyptians in Egypt—have they any part or parcel in this

  1137
  policy? They have an Army; but can they stir without our advice or direction? When you come to judicial matters, have you not destroyed all the elements of justice that were to be found in the country, and have you not set up your own Courts and Judges to administer the judicial system in submission to dictates from England? And as to finance, do you believe that the Egyptian Government, as a Government, can spend one single shilling without your leave and approval? We might suppose that England had assumed the Government of Egypt; but that is what the Prime Minister said Her Majesty's Ministers would not do. But that is exactly what you have done in actual fact, only that you will not acknowledge it. You have destroyed the Government of Egypt; you have absolutely annihilated the Army; you have, to use your own words, "dismissed and shattered" the Cabinet of the Khedive; you will not allow any of his Ministers to have the slightest authority in the Cabinet or elsewhere without your permission; and yet you say that all this is what you will not do—you will not assume the Government of the country. That is the negative side of what we find; now let us come to the affirmative side, and see how far you can go along with us, and where it is that we differ from you. Before, however, I enter upon that, I must refer once more to the reasons the Prime Minister gave for not assuming openly this power which he exercises actually. He said it
  "Would be a gross breach of the public law of Europe. I hope this country will well consider …. before it undertakes the government in Egypt of a Mahommedan people."
  As to the breach of the public law of Europe, what have you done with the Khedive? You have, in the first place, shattered his Government; you have, in the next place, absolutely changed the relations on which he stands towards his Suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey; you have forced him to give up the greater part of his Empire, and to withdraw from it—and when I say the greater part, I mean in size, not in importance. What more can you do to degrade that Sovereign in the eyes of his people, and how can you say that, if assuming the actual Government is a gross breach of the public law of Europe, you have not committed that breach? Now let us
  1138
  come to the affirmative side of the right hon. Gentleman's policy. The Prime Minister said—
  "The right hon. and gallant Gentleman"—meaning my right hon. and gallant Friend—"…. made an appeal to us …. entreating us to remain in Egypt until our work is done. If there is one declaration more than another that we have reiterated until the House must be sick of hearing of it, it is that very declaration, and it now comes out as the climax of a great Opposition speech, addressed to us in total for got fulness of the language which we have used so often and so freely that it requires a special petition for the indulgence of the House if one were to attempt to use it again."
  ["Hear, hear!"] Oh, yes. Hon. Gentlemen cry "Hear, hear!"—they cheer "until our work is done." But let us have the issue raised a little more clearly. The question is, what is your work? The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington), 13 months ago, took it upon himself to say your work would be over in six months; but your work has not begun. The Prime Minister, at the end of last Session, said he hoped that within six months there would not be a British soldier left in Egypt. ["No, no!"] Well, some Member of the Government said it—either the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for War. Your work had not begun when you made these declarations. When we come to the great feast on the Lord Mayor's Day, we find an announcement made to an astonished and silent gathering of citizens, to the effect that your work was done, and that the order had been given for the troops to retire. Why, I say, at that time, your work had not begun. In spite of your want of foresight, you must have known, from the statements of your Agents, what the danger before you was, and yet you did not dare to face it. You knew that Parliament was to meet in February, and that you had given a pledge, as far as you could, to your supporters below the Gangway, which pledge you could not redeem, but which you did not care at that moment to disavow. Circumstances compelled you to refrain from any attempt at withdrawing the British troops before the meeting of Parliament. This is where our difference lies. I have ventured to speak over and over again on this point, and I venture to repeat before the face of the Committee what I have said over and over again, that you have never openly recognized

  1139
  and acknowledged your responsibilities. You have done what events have forced you to do; but you have been ashamed of telling the world what your responsibilities are, and of acting up to them. You have been content to call things by wrong names; and, if I may so say, to play false with yourselves. I will quote a few sentences which fell from a Member of the Government in "another place." I have the more right to do so because they refer to something which was said by myself. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in "another place," said an obligation had fallen on us by the course of events, and referred to something I had said to the effect that we were occupying Egypt, and that we did not mean to annex Egypt, or to remain in permanent occupation of it; but that it would be an act of treachery to Europe, to Egypt, and to ourselves, if we withdrew our troops before there was a reasonable prospect of a suitable Government being set up. I dare say I used words very like those; but I added a sentence that should also have been quoted by the noble Earl, showing my notion of what the responsibility of the Government was. I added that they should state openly and in the face of day—"Here we are and here we intend to remain—we are the only people who are the Government of Egypt—it is perfectly useless setting up the Khedive as a Government, and Secretaries of State, with Under Secretaries under them, so that you are not responsible for the acts of those Secretaries, unless you choose to be." I said it was useless to set up Egyptian Ministers whom you could turn away at a moment's notice if they did not do what you wanted them to do, and I asked if it was your intention to support your own Ministers against those of the Khedive, why did you not acknowledge it at once? The real evil is that you have been always putting before the people of Egypt the provisional character of your power and responsibility in their country, and that you have unnecessarily accentuated that fact. You have led the people of Egypt to believe, you have led the people of Europe and the Mahdi to believe, that your policy is to scuttle out of Egypt the moment you can get out of it with credit to yourselves. This is where we entirely differ from you; we do not want to call it ugly
  1140
  names; but where our policy is really distinct from yours is in the fact that we hold England to be responsible for the Government of Egypt, while you do not. We say you have made her responsible—that it is in consequence of your acts that this responsibility rests with us. If the people of Egypt are left to believe that six months from. January, 1883, six months from August, 1883, or six months from now—March, 1884—we are going to retire from Egypt, how can you possibly imagine that any of the tribes or the people in that country will rally round your standard? How can you expect them to be with you, when they know that within six months they may be deserted by you, and that the people, in opposition to whom they have taken up arms under the British flag, may fall upon them and punish them for what they have done?. If they have read the history of the past few unfortunate years, they may know well enough what penalty they may have to pay for rallying round our standard; they may know that the tribes who helped us in Afghanistan suffered severely in consequence, and that a similar fate attended those South African tribes who rendered us assistance. The present Government in South Africa did not remember the old precept so intensely valuable and necessary for Governments to remember—namely, that if you require the help of your neighbour you must not disappoint him. Then there is another question before us. You have ruined Egypt; you have brought her at the present moment almost down upon her knees; and the question is, how is she to be got up again and revived? She should be revived just as Ireland ought to be revived, by restoring confidence and inducing capital to flow into the country—by making people believe that if they invest their money in the country they will be quite sure it will be safe. The Natives know perfectly well that the Government of Egypt is in your hands, and they should know that you are going to keep it until you see that it is safe and firm. Prosperity will then be restored; but if you go dangling before the eyes of Egypt the prospect that in this six months the country will be evacuated, or in that six months you will have retired, you will not get anyone to invest a single shilling in the country. In this we see the fundamental

  1141
  difference between our policy and yours. You are afraid of the Gentlemen who sit below the Gangway. You are afraid of their threats. My right hon. and gallant Friend used a simile which I thought a very good one; you are like a man who always has his beard over his shoulder, looking to see who is following him. We are not, and that is the difference between our policy and yours; and in that policy we believe the country is on our side, and I am certain that if you want to get out of Egypt with honour and credit to this country you will have, sooner or later, to adopt this policy which we have put before you. Do not say it is your policy—it is not. The Prime Minister understood this well enough, for he said—"That is exactly what we will not do;" and that is the difference between us. One word before I sit down as to the Soudan. No doubt this question of the Soudan is a difficult and delicate one; but there is no doubt about it that the difficulty is of your own creating. No one can possibly doubt that after reading the Blue Books. If you had given advice on your own responsibility; if you had followed out Lord Dufferin's policy—if Lord Dufferin had remained in Egypt, you would never have had one of the calamities which have occurred. It is because you withdrew Lord Dufferin from Egypt and turned away from his policy that all these difficulties have come upon you—difficulties from which you do not know how to extricate yourselves. How are we situated at this moment? You have this distinct warning from your own trusted officer—that it would be a heavy blow on the authority of the Khedive if you withdraw from the Soudan; that there is a fanatical population there which would be a great terror to Egypt; and that you would have to keep a powerful force outside Egypt Proper in order to restrain that fanatical population in Upper Egypt. There was another matter which always impressed itself strongly on my mind—namely, that the population of Upper Egypt is also fanatical, and that their rising was added to enormously by the disaster which occurred to Hicks Pasha. I read in a letter from either your own officer, or from a newspaper correspondent, a description which impressed itself upon me very forcibly. The writer said—
  1142
  "You talk of erecting fortifications either in Assouan or somewhere else, and you talk about placing guns and armies there; but you might as well use fortifications and armies and guns to exclude the cholera from Egypt, as to keep out the influence of the Mahdi."
  The influence of the Mahdi will be felt inside your fortifications, and that is what you will have to deal with; you will have to face the enmity of the population inside Egypt Proper, as well as of Upper Egypt, as the result of withdrawing from the Soudan. General Gordon has given you a note of warning which you must not neglect. He has told you distinctly that the emissaries of the Mahdi are, at the present moment, engaged in raising the tribes between Berber and Khartoum. He has told you distinctly that it is not owing to the disaffection of the tribes that they are doing this, but because of the forecast you have unwisely published of your policy of abandoning the Soudan before you have taken proper precautions for its good government. General Gordon is a man whom you have trusted entirely in this matter; that is his opinion. It is the opinion of the officer in whose hands you have placed yourselves; and it should, therefore, receive the greatest consideration from you. An hon. Friend of mine the other day pointed out that General Gordon, in his first despatch, expressed amazement at the fact that you had determined upon abandoning the Soudan. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, who answered, accused my hon. Friend of not having read through the despatch, or through another despatch, in which that sentence was qualified; but the right hon. Gentleman forgot that the qualifying words were words not warning you against the abandoning of the Soudan, but saying—
  "It is my strong opinion you cannot but help Egypt to retain that part of the Soudan which has not been already taken from her."
  That is a very different thing. In this matter of the Soudan, unless the Government act promptly, the victory of General Graham will go for nothing, and affairs will be in a worse condition practically than that which they were in before. The Government must at once announce their intention of remaining in Egypt until they obtain their object. I do hope they will take these things to heart, and that, at all events, they will break this policy of silence to which I

  1143
  have referred. I hope they will explain, as far as they can, the conversation that took place between General Gordon and our Consular Agent at Khartoum. I cannot expect right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who sit opposite me to go down on their knees and recant all they have said, and reverse all they have done; but I can assure them the country expects that in the future they will act with firmness, and that they will give up this policy of waiting on events, of drifting, of having no policy at all. The country expects that they will rally, and put before themselves the facts as they stand, and will recognize at once, and proclaim to the world, that we are practically and really the Governors of Egypt, and intend to remain so as long as we believe it to be to the interests not only of England, but of the civilized world, and of Egypt herself. I see the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) is about to rise. I am glad of it, as I was afraid this policy of silence was going to continue through the whole night. If any observations of mine may draw from the noble Marquess anything he would not otherwise have said I shall not have spoken in vain.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir R. Assheton Cross) has concluded his observations by referring to the policy of silence which he says Her Majesty's Government have adopted during this debate. I think I can very easily explain what has actuated Her Majesty's Government in not obtruding themselves in great numbers on the attention of the Committee. The debate was practically opened by the speech—of which the right hon. Gentleman has spoken in not too high terms—of the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley). That speech was answered, as the right hon. Gentleman has admitted, very fully by my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government. The remainder of the debate during last Thursday night did not appear to us to be such as to call for any further reply from any Member of the Government; and it was our strong belief, as I stated at the time on the Motion for Adjournment, that, so far as the public interest was concerned, and without any detriment to the public interest, the debate might have been very well suffered to conclude on that
  1144
  evening. Those among us whose fate it was to attend the greater part of that evening saw the manifest and evident difficulty with which the debate was kept alive at all. ["Oh, oh!"] We saw that, at one time, the Benches opposite were occupied by only two or three Gentlemen, and we saw the active efforts made by the hon. Member for North Lincolnshire (Mr. Winn) to induce hon. Members to rise. On the urgent representation of hon. Gentlemen opposite that there were numerous hon. Gentlemen who desired to continue the debate we assented to the adjournment. It had been intimated, I believe, to hon. Members who sit opposite that if they deemed it to be incumbent upon them to take any great part in the prolongation of the debate, it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to occupy any considerable time of the Committee in repeating declarations and explanations that had already been given. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir R. Assheton Cross) has said that the Prime Minister has admitted that the policy of the Opposition had been distinctly laid down in the speech of the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire, and that we are now diametrically opposed. I cannot recollect, during the progress of the debate, that the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, or any of his Colleagues, or any hon. Gentleman on this side, has supported the policy which was enunciated in that speech with which this debate was opened; and the right hon. Gentleman (Sir R. Assheton Cross) himself, in the observations he has just made, has not so much attempted to support the particular line of policy laid down by his right hon. Colleague, as to endeavour to prove that the policy enunciated by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was practically the same policy as that pursued by Her Majesty's Government. Before I sit down I will say a few words, although it is not necessary that I should do so, upon what I conceive to be the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt, and the difference between that and the policy proposed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite; but, before I proceed to that part of the subject, there are one or two points upon which I should like to make a few observations, and I can promise the Committee that I will do so as

  1145
  shortly as I can. I am indebted to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) for having pointed out to me that I had, perhaps, made an omission in my opening remarks in not having made any reference to the gallant conduct of Sir Gerald Graham and the troops under him in the operations which have just taken place. I did not do that, because I had already spoken of that in the few observations I made in reply to Questions on the first day after the engagement at El Teb. I took the very earliest opportunity of expressing the sense which the Government and I myself had of the exertions made by all who were concerned—both by the military authorities in Egypt and by General Graham—of the excellence of the dispositions made by the officers and troops engaged, and of the gallant conduct they had displayed, and the admirable manner in which they had carried out the operations. It did not, therefore, occur to me that it was necessary, on a merely formal occasion, to repeat the acknowledgments I had already made, as I thought sufficiently, on that occasion. On Thursday evening the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) also criticized some of the arrangements which had been made with regard to the operations between Suakin and Tokar, and I was surprised to hear him blame the military authorities for not having despatched, as a portion of the force, a regiment of the' Army commanded by Sir Evelyn Wood. That was a matter which, in our opinion, was of the very highest importance in relation to the success of these operations. It must be remembered that Sir Evelyn Wood's Army is not only an untried army, but is also an extremely young army. It has only been organized for a period almost under one year, and that the operations about to be conducted by General Graham were of a very trying and a very difficult character. We were ignorant of the exact numbers of the force we should have to deal with; but we knew it was one of a warlike and fanatical spirit. The peculiar dispositions which would have to be employed made it necessary that all portions of the force should be competent, and that we should be risking a reverse to the British arms, which might have been fatal not only in its immediate consequences, but in ulte-
  1146
  rior results, if we had trusted any part of the success of the operations to troops which had not been thoroughly tried. The noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton), and also, I think, the hon. and gallant Member for Horsham (Sir Henry Fletcher), referred to-night to some details of the Supplementary Estimate I am now asking the Committee to vote. I think it will, perhaps, be convenient that we should postpone any minute discussion of those details until we have an opportunity of discussing them on the general Army Estimates and the general Votes; but I may, perhaps, mention that the manner in which the Supplementary Estimate, Vote 12, which has called forth most criticism, is composed, in addition to the Egyptian War Expenditure, briefly stated, is as follows. We ask for £40,000 out of £122,000, in order to defray charges which are outstanding on the Vote of Credit 1882–3. Of that amount, £25,000 is for tents supplied for the expedition by the Indian Government. Further, we ask for £30,000 to replace stores issued to the Egyptian Government; and we also ask for £50,000, which is the rough estimate of the value of the stores sent to Suakin. These stores have been issued from the Reserve in Egypt, and they have been replaced by the purchase and manufacture of stores, representing as nearly as possible the stores sent out. These stores have been distributed as fairly as possible, and a rough estimate of them has been included in Vote 12; for instance, rifles and ammunition sent out have been replaced by the purchase and manufacture of a large quantity at home.
  SIR HENRY FLETCHER: I asked about the charge of £13,000 for forage.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: A large portion of all these items is due to the necessity of providing for the expenses of the Army of Occupation in Egypt during the whole 12 months, instead of for six months, for which the original Estimate was taken. The Vote has been exceeded; but no real practical charge came on the country, because the Capitation Grant allowed by the Egyptian Government paid those excesses. But, going from the details of this Supplementary Estimate, I should like to say one or two words in reference to the Amendment before the Commit-

  1147
  tee. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) moves to reduce the sum by a considerable amount, which practically includes all the expenditure in respect to the occupation of Egypt and the recent military expedition. I understand him to move this reduction principally on the ground that this expedition, if for the advantage of anyone, is for the benefit of the Egyptian Government, and therefore ought to he paid for by the Egyptian Government. My hon. Friend admits that it is impossible, or not easy to make the Egyptian taxpayer pay more than he does at present, and that this expense ought to be met either by a reduction of the Turkish Tribute or by the bondholders. I am not prepared to say that, in principle, I am very much disposed to go contrary to the contention of my hon. Friend; but the Committee must look not at what is desirable now, but at what it is possible to do. My hon. Friend is as well aware as I am that the Egyptian Government, and also the arrangements under the Law of Liquidation, are international obligations which cannot be abrogated by a stroke of the pen, by the action of the British Government, or by a vote of this House. I am very far from saying that it may not be necessary ultimately for the Government to propose to the parties who are interested some modification of the Law of Liquidation. Through recent events Egypt has incurred many losses and many expenses. It is possible that the necessity for a prolonged occupation by our military forces, or the re-organization of her military forces, may involve her in still further expenses; and it is also possible that the reforms that are being introduced may, in the first instance, cause some increase in the Public Expenditure. All these things may increase the annual Expenditure of Egypt to an extent which will be incompatible with the maintenance, in its present form, of the Law of Liquidation; and I am far from denying that this question will be a proper subject to be raised by the English Government; but it is one which must be raised in a regular manner, and on a consideration of the whole position, in concert with the European Powers. It will be a question which will occupy considerable time, and involve considerable negotiation; and if it is undertaken at all, it would be de-
  1148
  sirable to deal with it as a whole, and not in an incidental way upon a small sum such as that we are asking the Committee to vote on the present occasion. If my hon. Friend is somewhat premature in asking that this great question of the financial condition of Egypt should be incidentally decided upon a Vote in Committee, I think the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley), and other hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House, are also somewhat premature in asking the Government, at this time, for a precise and definite explanation as to the exact arrangements which are to be made in the future for the garrisoning of Suakin and other Red Sea ports. That is also a small part of a very much larger question. I fully admit that the whole of the military arrangements in Egypt may require—and, indeed, will require—further consideration. The conditions of the problem are, to a certain degree—and perhaps to a considerable degree—qualified by the decision which has been forced by circumstances upon Egypt to evacuate the military occupation by her garrisons of the Soudan. It is possible and probable that the Government of Egypt will have to make arrangements for the defence of the Southern Provinces of Egypt against invasion by warlike tribes, of a different character from those arrangements which were necessary when it was supposed to be in the power of Egypt to occupy and to hold the Soudan. And it is also possible that the fanatical spirit aroused by the success of the religious movement may cause some disturbance and trouble in Egypt Proper, and that garrisons of a somewhat different character from those which were originally contemplated will be required. I am perfectly willing to admit that there appear to be some recent events which throw some doubt on the value of the fighting capacity of Sir Evelyn Wood's Army as it is at present composed. We have asked Sir Evelyn Wood and Sir Evelyn Baring to send us the fullest information on that subject at the earliest possible date, and it in a question which must occupy the earliest consideration; but I submit to the Committee that this question of the military arrangements for the defence of the frontier and the interior of Egypt itself is one which must also be looked at as a whole, and that it would be pre-

  1149
  mature on the part of Her Majesty's Government at this period to declare in what way the military garrisons which are to hold the Red Sea ports are to be ultimately constituted. Some question has been raised by the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton), and by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), as to the expediency of the policy of holding the Red Sea ports at all. The noble Lord appeared to express some doubt as to whether the recent military operations in the neighbourhood of Suakin had been intended for the protection of the Red Sea ports; and he seemed to suggest that they were really intended to intrench Egypt in the position in which we had announced we did not think she should or could be—that is, of holding the Soudan. The hon. Member for Newcastle expressed some doubt as to whether the British Government should make itself responsible for the protection of the Red Sea ports. Perhaps it may be sufficient to say that no part of the policy of Her Majesty's Government than that of assisting the Egyptian Government in the protection of these ports was more fully explained and stated in the debates which had previously taken place, or more fully acquiesced in by all parts of the House. It appears to me that there are several reasons why it is essentially necessary that the British Government should take care that those ports are held either by a civilized Power, or by a Power which is under the influence of civilization. In the first place, I consider it a matter of importance to British interests that the ports of the Red Sea should not be in a position which would tempt any other European Power to occupy them. We know very well that there are other European Powers which would not be averse to the occupation of the ports on the Red Sea. It appears to me that the importance of the Red Sea, as being on our line of communication with our Indian Possessions, makes it of great importance that no other European Power should be established in any of these ports. Further, it is of great importance, in reference to the prevention of the Slave Trade, that these ports should be in the possession of either a civilized Power, or of a Power under the influence of civilization. If, as we hope and trust, satisfac-
  1150
  tory arrangements are made on the Nile, and in Egypt itself, which will preclude the Nile routes being used for that traffic, the only route for the export of slaves from the interior of Africa will be by the Red Sea ports, and it is by the exercise of control over those ports that that traffic may be most effectually checked and put an end to. Finally, in the interests of the Soudan, and in the interests of civilization, it appears to me very necessary that these ports should not be in the hands of a barbarous Power, such as the Arab Tribes, which have lately been menacing it. Whatever may be the Power which is to hold the interior of the Soudan—whether it be the Egyptian Government or the Native Sultans, or whether, as some hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to desire, this country, or someone supported by this country—it is certain that, sooner or later, after more or less prolonged disturbance, trade will revive, and the trade of the Soudan must always go to Suakin, and probably Suakin will always be the principal route of that trade. The only way by which we can hope that the real and the best influences of civilization will ever penetrate to the interior of the Soudan is through the medium of trade; and it is in the interests of the Soudan itself and of civilization that the principal ports of exit for the trade should be in the hands of a Power which is under the influence of civilization. Under these circumstances, I think there is ample reason, without any reference to the interior of the Soudan at all, why the Government of England should have given assistance to the Egyptian Government in defending the Red Sea ports, and especially Suakin, against the threatened attacks by the Arab Tribes. As to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the Soudan itself, the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), as I understood him, regretted the decision which Her Majesty's Government had come to, of recommending the Egyptian Government to evacuate the whole of the Soudan. I do not know that it is necessary that I should follow the hon. Member at any length into that part of his observations, because he admitted that the views he held were not fully shared by the responsible Members of the Party to which he belongs. In my opinion,

  1151
  there is overwhelming evidence that the Egyptian Government has done nothing for the civilization of the Soudan, and has done nothing for the protection of the country. General Gordon had arrived at a conclusion long before recent events took place. His firm opinion before he left this country was that the insurrection which had broken out in that country was an insurrection justified by the misgovernment of the Soudan by the Egyptian Government. The hon. Member said that good and efficient Government had been established in some Provinces in the Soudan by a European Power. I believe that is the case; but I do not think the hon. Member showed, and I do not think it is possible to show, that the Government to which he referred had received any real assistance or support in the successful Administration it had established in those Provinces of the Soudan from the Egyptian Government. The Egyptian Government did nothing to support that Power; on the contrary, it was the Egyptian Government which made the task more difficult than it otherwise would have been; and I know nothing that will prevent the exertions of such men being continued effectually, and perhaps more effectually, under some system of autonomy, than the nominal rule of the Egyptian Government.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I did not mention the Egyptian Government at all. I advocated the restoration of order under a British Governor General, with the consent of, and co-operation with, the Sovereign Power.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: The hon. Member advocates the appointment of a British Governor General of the Soudan; but I think, in advocating that policy, the hon. Member stands almost alone, and I do not know that there is anyone in this House who would support the proposition that the British Government should make itself responsible for the good government of the whole of the Soudan. Sir, the hon. Member has referred to Kassala, and the other garrisons, with their trading populations; and he asks, how are you to withdraw those large populations which have grown up under the Egyptian Government? General Gordon tells us that these garrisons are perfectly secure from any attack which might be made against them, and that there is not the slightest
  1152
  reason to fear that the garrisons and the Egyptian officials may not be withdrawn. I do not see, after the withdrawal of the garrisons, that the trading populations will have anything to fear. The problem which General Gordon has to solve is the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops and the Egyptian officials, who have made themselves detested, and justly detested, by the people whom they have oppressed. The peaceful trading population have, I believe, nothing to fear from the people of the country; and, indeed, it has long been known that there are a considerable number of that class who intended remaining at Khartoum, whether the Egyptian garrison were withdrawn from that point or not. Then, Sir, I am not at all surprised that the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), should have referred to the statement which appeared recently in the newspapers, as to Zebehr Pasha being appointed Governor of Khartoum, in succession to General Gordon. Sir, the objections to such an appointment must be obvious to the Committee; and I can assure the Committee that no one could have been more surprised than Her Majesty's Government when the first suggestion of such a course was made, and when it first appeared that General Gordon was contemplating its adoption. I need not take up the time of the Committee in repeating the obvious objections that there would be to such an appointment; but I desire to point out that the more obvious those objections are, and the more they are such objections as would be likely to occur to a person in General Gordon's position, the more necessary it is that Her Majesty's Government should satisfy themselves fully as to the reasons which have induced him to make such a suggestion; as to the reasons which have induced him to think that Zebehr Pasha, under the circumstances, would pursue an altered course of conduct, and what are the certain guarantees which, in General Gordon's opinion, render it safe in the interests of humanity that such an appointment should be made. We have, of course, asked from General Gordon full explanations upon that point; and, as soon as they have been received and considered, the Government

  1153
  will lose no time in coming to a decision. But what I want to point out to the Committee is, that we owe so much to General Gordon, who has gone on an expedition of an extremely dangerous, difficult, and delicate character, and who is known not only to be opposed to slavery—not only a man of ordinary humanity, but one who has devoted the greater part of his life, and is well known to be willing to sacrifice it, in the cause of humanity, and in protecting the welfare of the people in whom he takes so much interest—that it would not be just to General Gordon, and the character of the mission he has undertaken on behalf of the Government, to set aside summarily any suggestions he should make until Her Majesty's Government have before them all the reasons which have induced him to make them. But I can assure the Committee that the suggestion has not received the assent of Her Majesty's Government; on the contrary, we have expressed our surprise, and the strong objection we feel to make any such appointment. We are most anxious that General Gordon should, as rapidly as possible, complete his task and return from Khartoum, and from the dangerous and critical position which, of course, we are aware that he occupies so long as he remains there. It would be far better, in our opinion, that General Gordon should remain a longer time to complete the work himself, than that he should receive the assistance of, or leave the succession to, an objectionable agent. All that I can state further is, that, on a matter of such cardinal importance, Her Majesty's Government will lose no time, when full information is before them, in coming to a decision, and also in announcing that decision to the House in a form in which the House will be enabled to pronounce judgment upon it. Sir, we have been called upon over and over again, in the course of this discussion, to make some further declaration as to our policy in Egypt itself. The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken (Sir R. Assheton Cross) is, I am sorry to say, not satisfied with the declaration of the policy laid down; he is not satisfied that we shall stay in Egypt until our work is done. He says we do not understand the completion of our work in the same sense as he and his hon. Friends understand it, and he refers to the speeches which have
  1154
  been made by myself and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, as to the possible limit and character of our occupation, as showing that we have no idea of what the work to be accomplished is. Sir, I have already made some observations in my speeches in this House and in the country upon this subject, and I will not weary the Committee by repeating them. But I would point out to the right hon. Gentleman that he was inaccurate in saying that my right hon. Friend had announced his intention of immediately withdrawing the British garrisons from Egypt. All that my right hon. Friend said was, that the Government thought the time had come when they might possibly effect a further reduction of the garrisons; and I firmly believe that, in the condition in which Egypt was, if these events in the Soudan had not occurred, the presence of 2,000 or 3,000 troops in Egypt, for the purpose of supporting our Agent and the British officers by whom he is assisted, would have been amply sufficient for the maintenance of that security which we as well as the right hon. Gentleman opposite desire. The right hon. Gentleman says we do not understand what our work really is. We admit, as far as it is possible to admit, that our duty is to remain in Egypt until a stable Government is established there, which can rest upon its own foundation, and which will inspire confidence not only in the people of that country, but also in those whose presence is so necessary there as furnishing the capital and the energy requisite for the development of the resources of Egypt. These declarations can only be supplemented either by further words, or further acts. Some have suggested that we should announce our intention of maintaining the occupation—the military occupation—of Egypt for a definite term of years. Sir, that is not a solution of this question which appears to my mind to have in it any elements which would commend it to the judgment of the Committee. It appears to me that any confidence which was based upon such a declaration on the part of Her Majesty's Government would be a confidence which, from the very nature of the declaration upon which it was based, would be one which would materially diminish during the term, and which would in the end totally vanish. It seems to me that there would be far

  1155
  greater confidence and security if the British Government should declare its intention of remaining in Egypt so long, and no longer, than was necessary for the establishment of a firm and stable Government. Then, Sir, it is suggested that there are acts by which Her Majesty's Government may supplement what has been done already. I understand what is first pointed at to be the substitution of Englishmen for Egyptians in the high Offices of State. I doubt very much the wisdom of such a step. I have a strong opinion that, for the immediate and actual purposes of Egyptian administration, such substitution would not be of advantage to the people of Egypt. It is of no use making comparisons between our Government in India and the Government in Egypt. I believe we secure, in the main, a good Government for India; but our officials charged with the Indian Government have the assistance of a trained Civil Service which has been in existence for years, and which, I understand, is conversant with the ordinary Business of the country, and with the wants and necessities of the people. But, in Egypt, if the great Offices of State are placed in the hands of British officials, they have no such Civil Service to their hand as they have in India; and, therefore, I believe that the substitution of Englishmen for Egyptians in every Department of the State would not tend to the immediate advantage or to the improvement of the Administration. And, further, the substitution suggested would have, in our opinion, that great objection which I pointed out when I addressed the House on a former occasion. The government of Egypt by English officials would be the entire exclusion of Egyptians from all positions of trust and responsibility; and it would bring into use a system which would absolutely, and for ever, exclude the possibility of a Native Adminstration. Whenever a system of that kind, resting upon the foundation of British administration in all important Offices of the State, is withdrawn, the whole system must fall away; and, although it may be said that this is only advocated as a temporary arrangement, it is one which from its very nature must, unless it leaves anarchy behind it, be essentially of a permanent character we are, therefore, not disposed to adopt that policy, if it be the
  1156
  policy which is recommended by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. We fully admit that, so long as our military occupation continues, we are responsible for the main lines of the policy of the Egyptian Government. We admit that we have increased that responsibility by the action which we have thought it necessary to take on a very recent occasion, and that our responsibility is increased by the advice we have given with respect to the Soudan. We fully acknowledge that responsibility; but we believe that we can best discharge it, and best secure to Egypt good adminstration in the present and the future, by availing ourselves of such elements as exist in Egypt, with the hope that those elements may widen, strengthen, and increase until Egypt is capable of being governed by a Native and self-supporting Administration.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Sir, there are two observations of the noble Marquess opposite the Secretary of State for War to which I wish to draw attention. In the first place, the noble Marquess spoke of the prolongation of this debate, and he likewise referred to the character of the discussion on Thursday last. I will not ask now what was the character of that discussion; but I think everyone who has attended to the course of the debate of this evening must feel that there was very good ground indeed for those who asked for another evening on which to continue that discussion. And I think it will be generally felt that the discussion which has taken place this evening, in respect not only of the speeches of hon. Gentlemen on this side, but in respect of those which came from the opposite Benches, including the speech of the noble Marquess himself, has very well justified the lengthened debate which has taken place. I must say that the speech of the noble Marquess does, on more points than one, appear to us to indicate something like a new departure, and to place matters on a different footing from that on which they stood the other night. Sir, there is another point to which I wish to call attention. The noble Marquess said, with reference to more than one matter brought forward, that these were grave questions, which it would not be easy or discreet to discuss upon so limited a point as the amount which we are now asked to vote in the form of a Supplementary Estimate for Army Services. I

  1157
  agree that it is not the most convenient way of discussing our present and future policy in Egypt, to take the discussion on the question of how much money should be given under a Supplementary Vote for Army Services; but, at the same time, I am bound to point out that it was no fault of ours that the discussion should be so taken. We were anxious to challenge the policy of Her Majesty's Government as a whole in what appeared to us to be a legitimate way. My right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) had given Notice of a Motion that would have raised this question in the most legitimate and convenient form, and which would have given us an opportunity for discussing that which we were anxious to discuss. But the Government, availing themselves of the Forms of the House, and declining to give us any other opportunity, forced upon us the discussion in the form in which we were obliged to take it. I should not have made these remarks, had it not been for the observations of the noble Marquess, who complained of our having raised the larger question on so small a basis.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I believe the right hon. Gentleman has misunderstood me. I did not complain of the issue being raised on this Vote. I said that several points had been raised which involved very large questions, and that explanations were asked from the Government on what was a very small part of a much larger question.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I agree with the noble Marquess, and I say that the reason for this was that we were prevented debating the question in a more convenient form. The position in which we stand is clearly understood by the whole of the Committee. We shall have to pronounce an opinion on the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), and that Amendment is one which I expect the great body of the Committee will decline to accept. We, at all events, find ourselves unable to accept it; although, at the same time, we do not approve the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in several matters connected with their Egyptian policy. Sir, some advantage has been gained by the form which the Motion of my right hon. and gallant Friend has taken. It is un-
  1158
  doubtedly a fact that we have not before us a Division on a matter which involves a Vote of Confidence in the Government; but the mode in which this discussion has been taken has had the effect of setting free the tongues and minds of hon. Gentlemen opposite, who have spoken very freely, and in a way that would not otherwise have been open to them. I do not say that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) or the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) would have withheld their opinions had such a Division been before us; but, undoubtedly, their task has been made more easy by the mode in which the discussion has been taken. Sir, what we feel with regard to the position of affairs and the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt is this—that there is very great danger of prolonging a crisis which is of a very serious character, and which may at any moment assume a dangerous development. I cannot help feeling that the present state of affairs in Egypt is extremely critical, and that the manner in which the Government have dealt, and are now dealing, with that state of affairs, has been such as to encourage and increase the difficulties of the situation rather than remove them. We are anxious, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government and the country should realize, as far as possible, the great issues which are involved in this question; we are anxious that they should see how great are the national interests at stake, and to how great a degree the very character of this country is concerned. It is not only a question of interest, however; it is a question of the duties of the country. It appears to me that we sometimes neglect to consider how very great are the duties which the Government, by the course of their policy in Egypt, have taken upon themselves not only in foro conscientiœ, but in the eyes of the civilized world, and how serious it will be, as far as our character alone is concerned, if we fail to discharge those duties. Now, it does seem to us that the Government are hardly sufficiently alive to this fact. They do not seem to think that if we fail to accomplish what we have taken in hand, through any unwillingness or misconduct on our part, we shall bring upon ourselves a large amount of well-deserved punishment which no number of elo-

  1159
  quent speeches, no tactics in the House of Commons, will enable us to do away with. We stand to be judged by the manner in which we conduct ourselves in this business. Although it is undoubtedly the duty of us all to avoid doing anything that may weaken or embarrass Her Majesty's Government in this matter, yet we ought not to shrink from telling them the truth, or telling them why we think they are going wrong. Now, Sir, we complain that the Government do not tell us all they ought to tell us in regard to their plans. It maybe they will say—"The truth is, we do not altogether know what our plans are; we must leave a great deal to the course of events; we cannot tell at present what may be the outcome of these matters." That may, or may not, be true; but, if it be true, it is a very great defect in their position. What is really of importance is that they ought beforehand to know their policy. If they appear to be uncertain of that, they actually increase the difficulty in Egypt itself, and they render nugatory the exertions which they are making to get out of the position in which they stand. How long they are to remain in Egypt is one question. I have no doubt there is great force in what the noble Marquess said about fixing the term, and I am glad to see that in this matter he has advanced from the position which he originally occupied. I have no doubt, in my own mind, that that little sentence of the noble Marquess which he spoke at the beginning of last Session, and to which, perhaps, at the time he attached very little importance, has weighed upon the proceedings in Egypt, and that it has not been forgotten, but has been spread and magnified, and, by producing the impression that the Government are not in earnest, has brought about the very feeling which they are anxious to avoid. Again, the Prime Minister came forward, and, putting words into the mouth of my right hon. and gallant Friend as to what my right hon. and gallant Friend thinks should be done in Egypt, said—"That is exactly what we are determined not to do." Now, Sir, the words which the Prime Minister used—the words which he quoted from my right hon. and gallant Friend—do not very materially differ from what has been told us by the noble Marquess. It may be considered by the
  1160
  Government wise to use such language; but we cannot help thinking that, in using it, they are opening a door by which they themselves can retreat. They are endeavouring to build a bridge by which they may advance or retreat; but they are so careful in the building of the structure, that we can see more of the retreat than the advance. The confidence of the people in the Government, therefore, is shakened, and the spirits of those who are mischievously inclined are raised, and so the evil goes on increasing and increasing. You may say that, having regard to the conduct of the Government—sometimes so particularly scrupulous, sometimes so strangely violent and, as it would seem, unscrupulous—they are at one time straining at a gnat, and at another time swallowing a camel. They have oftentimes to swallow camels because they strain at gnats. They have to meet these difficulties in the largest and most grievous form, just because they have been afraid, or unwilling, or too fastidious to deal and grapple with them properly. You might have stopped all this business in the Soudan, by a little strong language judiciously addressed to the Egyptian Government at the time Hicks Pasha's expedition set out; you might have stopped this miserable business, but you would not do it. What is the reason the Prime Minister gave us for not doing it? He said it would not have been very cordially received by the Egyptian Government, if we had proposed at the moment that they thought they were advancing to victory that they should not advance. I dare say not; but the difficulty then would only have amounted to a little want of cordiality; whereas, now, you have humiliated the Egyptian Government in a way that no Government was ever humiliated before. You see how your reticence or scruples at one moment, brought upon you great difficulty in the end. I ask, what are the obligations that I say we have incurred? What are the obligations you have incurred to Egyyt itself, because that is probably what you have to look at? "You have two obligations," says the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. "You have the obligation to maintain tranquillity in Egypt, and you have also the obligation to maintain the Government of the Khedive; I want to know how far those obligations are con-

  1161
  sistent one with the other, and, if there is anything inconsistent between them, which is the one which must be considered as the dominant obligation?" No doubt, we are bound to do all that we can to maintain tranquillity in Egypt; but it must be tranquillity not resting upon a force of bayonets or upon overwhelmning military armaments; it must be, as far as possible, tranquillity resting on good government or good administration, and upon a just adherence to all those rules of economy which bring about national prosperity. That is what we desire to see, and no doubt we desire to see that arrived at through the agency of the Khedive and a Native Ministry, if it can be done; but how is that to be done? You can see now, for yourselves, everybody sees for themselves, that it is impossible. If you were to leave the Khedive and his Native Ministry alone, it would be absolutely impossible to secure tranquillity in Egypt. If you withdraw your supporting or your controlling hand, you will run the risk of most serious evils in Egypt, and you will hereafter be called upon to interfere in some violent and unsatisfactory manner. How are we to avoid a misfortune of that kind? It must be by one of two processes; it must be either by strengthening the the Native administration, or it must be by controlling it. Are we going to strengthen it, or to control it? Let us know how that is to be; and, whether we take the one line or the other, whether we try to combine both strength and control, let it be clearly understood that it is upon us that the responsibility rest; that we do not shrink from acknowledging that responsibility; that we declare ourselves prepared to act upon it; and that we shall proceed with all due regard for the feelings and position of those with whom we deal; and that we shall proceed on our own lines, our own responsibility, our own convictions whenever it is necessary so to proceed. Now, Sir, that is where I think we have hitherto somewhat failed. We have failed to make that sufficiently clear; and it is because of that that we have found our difficulties have increased, instead of diminished. Your system, which promised extremely well at one time, the system which, I venture to say, during the time of the late Government and the earlier part of your own
  1162
  experience, promised very well and very fairly—your system now has crumbled in your hands. You see, by the information which we receive each day—such information, for instance, as we received yesterday, to the effect that an Egyptian Minister has had to resign because he could not work with the subordinate whom you have placed practically over him, though nominally under him—you see how much your system has failed. We wish to impress upon your attention the necessity of recognizing and dealing with that state of things; otherwise you will have a state of chronic anarchy; you will absolutely destroy what you have already very much weakened—namely, the principle of authority; you will destroy all confidence in the Government; you will destroy all respect, either for the nominal Rulers whom you are supposed to be supporting, or for yourselves. You will have chronic anarchy, which will spread, not only over the Soudan, not only over the littoral of the Red Sea, where you will have enough on your hands, with that large undertaking which you now seem ready to prepare for, but you will have that anarchy spreading over Lower Egypt itself. The dangers with which we are now beset are very considerable; because, after all, what is our position in Egypt—what is it that we are doing there? How is it that foreign nations generally assented, as they have assented, to our taking this remarkable position upon ourselves? It is upon the assumption, upon the theory, that we are conscious of what we are about, that we have the great object of maintaining the country tranquil, peaceful, and prosperous, and that we have the power, and the will, and the determination to do it. But if you once shake the confidence of foreign nations in your power or your determination, you will raise all those serious questions which the Prime Minister is so very much afraid of raising. It is very likely you will come across all the difficulties about the public law of Europe. You will raise them in the most serious form, if you fail to accomplish that which is the main object you have before you, and for which you have been permitted to remain where you are. Sir, I do not wish to enlarge upon the evil effects which may flow from want of confidence. Everybody admits there is a great work

  1163
  to be done; everybody admits that there are great capacities in Egypt, which may still be developed; and, no doubt, as was said by the hon. Member for Wicklow (Mr. M'Coan), a little while ago, Egypt, if she has her resources developed, and if confidence is maintained, may still show that she has great recuperative power, and that she will be able to rid herself of her difficulties, financial and otherwise. But the foundation of all that is that there should be confidence and credit; that there should be confidence that Egypt herself is to be allowed to be quiet, and that she is to be encouraged by another Power to proceed in the path of self-reformation. I do not doubt that the language which the noble Marquess has used to-night is greatly in advance of that which we have heard on former occasions. He has undertaken to do some things from which the Government has hitherto shrunk. I think what he says about our duties on the littoral of the Red Sea goes far beyond what was said by the Prime Minister the other night. If we have brought nothing else out of the Government, we have, at all events, obtained from them a very large advance in regard to the littoral of the Bed Sea. Perhaps it is even a larger advance than the noble Marquess himself was quite conscious of when he spoke of the duties that we had in regard to the protection of the Red Sea ports. The Red Sea, I believe, is something like 2,000 miles in length; and if we are to maintain ourselves there for such purposes as those which the noble Marquess spoke of—and I do not say he is wrong—it is a great and serious responsibility which we are taking upon ourselves. And as we take large responsibilities one after another upon ourselves, it is all the more important that we should show that we are serious and in earnest in the matter, and that we are not taking up these responsibilities for a few years or so, but that we are taking them up with the firm intention of carrying out the work before us. If that is so, if that is the spirit in which the Government are acting, all may be well; but I cannot help feeling that we are in a position of considerable anxiety. I fear the time, to which the hon. Member for Orkney pointed, may come when England may be placed in a position which looks a little like retiring from
  1164
  her great place in the front rank of nations. Depend upon it, if that time ever should come, if England should ever wish, or be tempted, to step back from that position into which she is by the force of ages and by her own energies, it will be a time not only of great loss and sorrow and great humiliation for England herself, but it will be a time which will bring great sorrow and misfortune and difficulty to the rest of the world. Her position is not one that concerns herself alone; it is a position which is of importance to the whole civilized world; and I anxiously trust that the spirit which has brought us so far and maintained our great Empire up to this point will not fail us now.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 13; Noes 178: Majority 165.—(Div. List, No. 29.)
  Original Question again proposed.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, he had one or two questions to put, but did not wish to put the House to the trouble of a Division. The account stood thus—Grand total for Egypt, £371,000; repaid by the Egyptian Government, £162,000; net payment by this House in respect to the expedition, £209,000. They were told that £100,000 was on account of the expedition to Tokar, and which, he thought, the English Government were obliged to pay. Perhaps the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) would explain the item of £109,000? He believed the noble Marquess had said that £40,000 was part of the expenses of last year, and that the remainder had yet to be received by the Egyptian Government. If so, his (Sir George Campbell's) objection fell to the ground.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, the explanation was substantially what his hon. Friend (Sir George Campbell) had just said. The great portion of the money represented arrears from the Egyptian Expedition in 1882. He could not, however, give the exact figures.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, that, on the understanding that the Committee was not called upon to pay any additional sum, he would not propose the Amendment which stood in his name.
  Original Question put, and agreed to,

  SUPPLY—NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES (VOTE FOR THE EXPEDITION TO THE SOUDAN).
  (2.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £147,200, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1884, for additional Expenditure arising out of Military Operations in Egypt."
  MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, he hoped the Government would now consent to report Progress. ["Oh!"] He spoke, he thought, with reason. He had been sitting in the House more attentively than many Members of the Government since 4 o'clock. He hoped they would not now, at 1 o'clock in the morning, be required to enter into a debate upon questions which were of the very gravest importance. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) had informed the Committee that the littoral of the Red Sea, which was 2,200 miles in extent, would be held by Her Majesty's Forces. Was that the case or not? ["No!"] The noble Marquess said Her Majesty's Forces were to occupy the littoral of the Red Sea, and it was intimated the other evening that the Navy was to be employed for that purpose. If it was the intention of the Government to employ the Navy in order to hold the littoral of the Bed Sea, much more explanation ought to be given to the Committee than could be given at this hour of the morning. Individually, he would be prepared to protest against the landing of blue-jackets and Marines to garrison any of the ports on the coast of the Red Sea. The duties of the Navy were confined to duties afloat, except under circumstances of great emergency and difficulty. The Navy deserved the highest possible credit for the services they had rendered in the course of the operations at Suakin during the last few weeks; they had done their work nobly and well; if the Army had done well, certainly the Navy, under Admiral Hewett, had done equally well. But it was a totally different thing to call upon the Navy to furnish blue-jackets and Marines for garrison duties on the Bed Sea Coast. Whether the Naval Forces were to be so employed or not, there had undoubtedly been a declaration of policy this evening to the country and
  1166
  to Parliament which involved very serious and very grave responsibilities. They were told that the whole coast of the Bed Sea was to be held by Her Majesty's Forces or by some civilized Power. As he understood that to be a declaration that, directly or indirectly, England was to hold the waters of the Bed Sea, time ought to be allowed to the Committee to ascertain by what means and in what way this very large addition to our responsibilities was to be carried out. He begged to move that the Chairman do report Progress.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. W. M. Smith.)
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I do not know whether, on this Motion, I may be allowed to make an explanation. I was extremely unwilling to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote), who, I think, made use of a similar expression to that which has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. W. H. Smith). I do not think I made any such declaration as has been referred to—namely, that the Bed Sea ports are to be held by British Forces, either naval or military. What has been announced is, that Her Majesty's Government would assist in defending the ports of the Bed Sea. I stated the reason which, in my opinion, rendered it imperative that that policy should be pursued by Her Majesty's Government. There is no intention, and I trust there will be no intention, of holding any ports on the Bed Sea except Suakin, or of remaining there any longer than is necessary. I never used the expression that the Bed Sea ports were to be held by this country; therefore I trust the right hon. Gentleman will not think it necessary to press his Motion. He cannot desire that, on the proposal before the Committee, there should be a further discussion of the policy that has been so much debated.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I think the Motion of my right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) is perfectly justified by the speech of the noble Marquess. What did the noble Marquess say? I quite admit that he did not dwell upon our holding, or any other civilized Power

  1167
  holding, the whole of the Red Sea Coast; but he did declare that certain places on that coast should be held by this country—he said some "civilized Power," which, practically, means this country.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I said not by any other European Power. I said that it is necessary that we should take care that these ports are held by a civilized Power, or a Power under the influence of a civilized Power.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Yes, by a civilized Power, or a Power under the influence of a civilized Power; in other words, either by England, or a Power under the influence of England. Very well, let us see what additional light the speech of the noble Marquess this evening has thrown upon this matter. Only on Thursday last, the Prime Minister used the strongest words he could to express the urgency of an immediate withdrawal of Her Majesty'3 Forces from these very ports in the Red Sea, including, of course, Suakin, that being the chief of them. This evening the noble Marquess has told us, for the first time, of the doubts Her Majesty's Government entertain as to the efficiency of the Egyptian Army to hold Suakin. I should like to know, and I think the Committee are entitled to know before they vote this sum, how Her Majesty's Government propose that Suakin should be held, if Her Majesty's Forces are to be withdrawn from it as a matter of urgency, and if the Forces of the Egyptian Government, to which the noble Marquess has alluded, are not to be relied upon? It must be, if English soldiers are to go, and Egyptian soldiers cannot be sent, because they cannot be trusted, that the blue jackets, to whom reference has been made, are to take their place. If that is so, I do think we are entitled to some further discussion of this new phase of the policy of the Government, which has been suggested by the speech of the noble Marquess to-night. I trust, therefore, that my right hon. Friend will persevere with his Motion.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 56; Noes 114: Majority 58.—(Div. List, No. 30.)
  Original Question again proposed.
  SIR JOHN HAY: I rise to move that you, Sir, do now leave the Chair.
  1168
  On the statement we have heard from the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, questions will arise affecting this Naval Vote which, at this hour of the night, it would be impossible to deal with satisfactorily. With this observation I beg to submit my Motion.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That the Chairman do now leave the Chair."—(Sir John Hay.)
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 53; Noes 113: Majority 60.—(Div. List, No. 31.)
  Original Question again proposed.
  CAPTAIN PRICEsaid, that earlier in the evening he had given Notice that he should call attention to a matter of great importance as to the embarkation of the Marines in a certain ship for Egypt. It was quite impossible that he could go into the matter at that hour of the night. He could not attempt to do justice to it; therefore he would move that the Chairman report Progress.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Captain Price.)
  MR. ACLANDsaid, he hoped the Government would not yield to this appeal. He had observed that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Dodson) had been in his place up to half-past 12 o'clock on Government nights lately, on purpose to bring in the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill. They had been told, and he believed the statement had been accepted, that it was impossible for the Bill to be brought in until the Supplementary Estimates were disposed of. He failed to see how it was that hon. Members could not give their attention to Business now, as they had constantly to do so on other occasions, instead of spending night after night in fighting over Business that they all knew would have to be done, especially when they had been told, two or three night ago, that cattle were dying by hundreds and thousands in the country of foot-and-mouth disease.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, he wished to point out to the Government that there really was a great reason why they should adjourn. At

  1169
  the end of the debate, the noble Marquess made a new departure in the policy, in the absence of the Prime Minister, who was, unfortunately, detained elsewhere—probably in consequence of the declaration the noble Marquess was going to make. Such being the case, he really did not think they ought to continue the discussion on Egyptian matters without the presence of the Prime Minister. His hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Price) was perfectly justified in the proposal he had made, and it was to be hoped he would persevere in it.
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANsaid, he had heard two reasons given for the postponement of the Vote. One, which he would notice first, was given by his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Captain Price), who had alluded to a very small point—namely, whether certain Marines ought or ought not to have been sent in a certain ship from Malta to Alexandria. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) ventured to say that five minutes would exhaust all that it was possible to say on that subject on one side or the other. Then the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith) said the Vote ought to be postponed, because it was announced that they had undertaken certain responsibilities with regard to what was called the littoral of the Red Sea, to which the right hon. Gentleman ascribed a number of miles. [Cries of "Order!"] He was quite in Order, as he was stating the reasons which had been given for the adjournment. The right hon. Gentleman ascribed an exaggerated number of miles to the littoral of the Red Sea, which he had said the Government had undertaken to defend. As a matter of fact, the Vote before the Committee was of this nature—it was an Estimate of additional expenditure during the present year arising out of military operations in Egypt; it was an Estimate for money which was to be expended within the current financial year; and, therefore, the task, whatever might be its importance, of protecting any ports in the littoral of the Red Sea, was one which could only be undertaken and accomplished, so far as this Estimate affected it, during the remaining three weeks of the financial year. The question raised by the right hon. Gentleman was really one more affecting the Naval Estimates for next year, than this Supplementary Estimate.
  1170
  If the question was raised at all, the arguments which the right hon. Gentleman had used were arguments against proceeding with the last Vote for Army Expenditure quite as much as against proceeding with the present Vote. This was merely a Vote to cover the expenditure which had been incurred, and would be incurred during the rest of the financial year in connection with the present military operations in Egypt, and he saw no reason why it should be treated in such a way that questions raised upon it would not be identical with those raised upon the Vote which had been already discussed.
  MR. GIBSON: Only one word to clear up a point. The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Acland) stated that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Dodson) has been down here on several Government nights waiting until half-past 12 for the purpose of introducing the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill. There is no foundation whatever for that statement. Although this may not be the first day the Bill has appeared on the Paper, the Government must have put it down knowing perfectly well there was no real chance or intention to introduce it.
  MR. DODSON: I must take leave to correct the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gibson) as to a matter of fact. The Bill has been the second Order of the Day for several Government nights now in succession, and we have been waiting here to-night, as on former nights, in the hope of being able to bring it on before balf-past 12. I do not wish to raise a discussion, therefore I will not say how it has happened that it has never been reached; but this I will say, that we are most sincerely anxious to take the Bill on Thursday next. If we dispose of the Vote before the House, we shall only have some short Civil Service Estimates to dispose of as the first Order on Thursday, and we may, therefore, hope to be able to reach the Bill in good time on that day.
  MR. BIGGARsaid, that they had been told that this Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill was an extremely important measure, and that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Dodson) would bring it on after other Business had been disposed of—probably somewhere about

  1171
  12 o'clock at night. Well, it appeared to him (Mr. Biggar) that the Bill was far too important to be brought in at such an hour as that. He was inclined to think it a Bill which ought to be taken as the first Order of the Day. If he was rightly informed, he believed that a great many borough Members were likely to speak on one side, and a great many county Members on the other. Two nights, therefore, would very likely be occupied with the discussion on the introduction. As to the statement that there were only some small Civil Service Supplementary Estimates down for Thursday as the first Order, and that this important Bill could come after, he was informed that it was extremely doubtful whether those Civil Service Estimates would be got through in one evening. He was inclined to think they would occupy at least two Sittings—Thursday and Friday, he thought, would be much nearer the mark than the present calculation, and it was preposterous that a question of this kind should be pushed on by a tyrannical majority. It was an unreasonable majority, because the arguments were entirely in favour of an adjournment, and there was no argument worthy of any consideration in favour of voting this money at so early an hour.
  MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, there was much more reason and sense in the action of the Opposition that night than usual, and he should support them in the course they were taking, because there was undoubtedly a wide distinction between the statements made at the commencement of the Sitting by the Prime Minister, and those made by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War that night. When a sum of £140,000 was asked for, even if there was only a small minority opposed to it, it was reasonable that it should be taken at an earlier hour. He did not intend to take a Division; but after the speech of the noble Marquess, and after the desire shown by hon. Gentlemen opposite to discuss this question, the Motion ought to be agreed to. But he hoped the Opposition would not act as they had on the last Vote—that was, after talking for two nights, run away without voting. He hoped they would, in this instance, give their votes if necessary, and that the Government would accept the protest not only from Gentle-
  1172
  men on the other side, but from Gentlemen on this side of the House, and allow this Vote to be discussed at an earlier hour.
  MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, he certainly was surprised that the Government had not thought it right to allow another opportunity of discussing this Vote. What was the explanation given by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty? What they desired was to discuss the question of the way in which the Navy was to contribute its assistance to these operations on the Navy Estimates—that was to say, instead of settling that matter now they should have another debate next week, or the week after. This present proposal on the part of the Government was distinctly a waste of public time, a distinct invitation for a further debate. The Committee were at this moment fresh to the consideration of this question. A great deal of what had been said in the last two or three nights would probably be repeated; events and circumstances would occur which would compel the repetition of warnings and protests which had occupied the attention of the House during the last two nights of the debate. The Government now refused to allow a reasonable opportunity for the consideration of their naval policy, and they asked that that naval policy should be considered a fortnight hence, when the discussion of the Naval Estimates came on. He ventured to say that that was a mode of procedure which would not conduce to the rapid transaction of Business, nor to the settlement of the gravest and most important questions. The Committee had a right to know how it was proposed to furnish ships for this additional service which the Government contemplated. There was a Vote for the Naval Services in the war in Egypt on the Red Sea; and, of course, there was the Report stage when this question might be discussed. The Government might put the Vote down so that a debate of reasonable length might be taken on the Report. Upon that understanding he would recommend his hon. Friend to withdraw his opposition, and permit the Vote to be taken that night.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I am not without a hope of our arriving at some practical settlement of this question. I should like, however, to re-

  1173
  peat that I am perfectly unaware of having made any such declaration as the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) has referred to. What I think I did was, in reply to speeches that had been made in this debate, to state, perhaps more fully than we had previously done, the grounds which justified Her Majesty's Government in their policy with regard to the defence of the Red Sea ports. I do not question the undertaking of Her Majesty's Government in any manner, and I should like also to point out that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. H. Smith) and his Friends are a little too much in haste for any statement on the subject on which they desire information. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to events which have necessitated the protection of these ports by the Naval and Military Forces; but it is a little too premature to ask Her Majesty's Government to make a declaration as to the future arrangements for a state of things which has not yet come into existence. And if such a statement could be made, it would hardly be advantageous, at this moment, to the protection of these ports. I hope some arrangement can be come to. Her Majesty's Government desire to give every opportunity of bringing on a discussion of this matter, if necessary, on Report; but this must be the first Order on Thursday, and I should think it would be the general wish of the House that, if there should be any time available before half-past 12, an attempt should be made to take the second reading of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill. However, all I can say is, that the Government will put this question down on Report in as good a position as is in their power, with the general desire, as I believe, that the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill should be proceeded with.
  MR. PERCY WYNDHAMsaid, he understood the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Hartington) to say that the occupation was to be of short duration; but he (Mr. Wyndham) thought that before Parliament was called upon to spend any more money, or endanger any more lives, they ought to hear from the Government what reasons they had for hoping that the Egyptians would be able to hold the Red Sea ports after we evacuated them. The Egyptians possessed no Army; it
  1174
  was destroyed a year and a-half ago by operations which we were not allowed to call a war.
  THE CHAIRMAN: The Question is that I report Progress, and ask leave to sit again, and on that Motion it is not in order to discuss these points.
  MR. PERCY WYNDHAMsaid, he was endeavouring humbly to give arguments in favour of reporting Progress. If the Government intended we should retain the possession of these ports, let them say so, and there would be some reason in voting the money. Egyptian troops could not hold them against the vast hordes of brave Soudanese who had beaten them before and would defeat them again.
  THE CHAIRMAN: The hon. Member is now exceeding the proper limits.
  MR. HEALYasked whether it was not the fact that the noble Marquess the Secretary for War (the Marquess of Hartington) had discussed these questions on the Motion for Adjournment?
  THE CHAIRMAN: If the hon. Member had considered that the noble Marquess was out of Order, he should have risen at once. There must be some latitude given in respect to explanations of statements previously made.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONsaid, he hoped to be able to do something to arrange this matter. He certainly had voted on two former occasions in favour of reporting Progress; but he felt now that the noble Marquess had offered a fair compromise—namely, that there should be an opportunity of discussing this question on the Report.
  An hon. MEMBERsaid, he did not think there had been anything like a definite intimation from the noble Marquess in response to hon. Gentlemen as to when Report was likely to come on, or anything approaching that; while, on the other hand, several hon. Members opposite agreed with hon. Members on this side about the new departure taken by the Government on this question. With regard to the Navy, there were several hon. Gentlemen who wished to say something on questions which were not such small matters as the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Campbell-Banner-man) suggested. At all events, the speech of the noble Marquess, ready as he always was to meet hon. Members in a fair spirit, had given no guarantee that

  1175
  there would be an opportunity for discussion at a reasonable hour.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHsaid, he wished to make an observation in the same spirit as that of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). The noble Marquess opposite had stated that it was the intention of the Government to place the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill as the first Order of the Day, after the Supplementary Estimates, on Thursday. If the noble Marquess would only use the great influence he possessed with the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arthur Arnold) to induce that hon. Gentleman to withdraw his block against that Bill, that measure might be taken at any hour and read a second time without opposition. Then the noble Marquess would be able to redeem his promise to fix the Report of these Estimates at such an hour as would ensure a fair discussion. If the noble Marquess would do that, the House would be well-advised in accepting the arrangement.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Does the right hon. Baronet suggest that the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill should not be the second Order?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: No; I suggest that the noble Marquess should induce the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arthur Arnold) to withdraw his block.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I shall be glad to use any influence I have to induce the hon. Member to withdraw his block; but do I understand the right hon. Baronet to suggest that the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill should not be the second Order?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: It might then be taken after half-past 12.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I will see what can be done. If the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arthur Arnold) withdraws his block, so that the discussion might take place, I believe it would be convenient to make that Bill the second Order; but that must be provided that the block be removed.
  MR. BIGGARsaid, he should be disposed to prophesy that it would be half-past 12 before Supply was finished on the Supplementary Estimates on Thursday next, so that unless this question was discussed now, it never would be discussed, and, in point of fact, there would be no real oppor-
  1176
  tunity; and even if the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arthur Arnold) with drew his block, it was not certain that some other hon. Member would not block the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill, so that it would be in the same position and could not come on before half-past 12. The Government would occupy all the time till then, and no substantial progress would be made. This simple arrangement for saving time would end in an absolute waste of time. The Navy Estimates would come on next week, and all this discussion about Egypt would be repeated. If the Government wished to save time, they had better allow all the speeches that had been prepared to be delivered now.
  CAPTAIN PRICEsaid, he should like to ask the Government whether the Report of the Army and Navy Estimates could be taken on Thursday, before the Civil Service Estimates were taken?
  THE CHAIRMAN: The hon. and gallant Member cannot require the Government to fix a time for taking the Report.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: That would not be possible. Hon. Gentlemen on the other side are aware that if Supply is not the first Order on Thursday, the Rule which precludes our going into Supply will come into force, and it will be absolutely necessary to make Supply the first Order.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 46; Noes 111: Majority 65.—(Div. List, No. 32.)
  Original Question again proposed.
  CAPTAIN PRICEsaid, he could not think of entering upon the question he had to raise with reference to the Royal Marines at that hour. If the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty thought that five minutes would be sufficient for his purpose, he (Captain Price) was of a different opinion; and, under the circumstances, he should reserve the observations he had to make until another time.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he did not in the least doubt the good intentions, or the bona fides, of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War. He should have no objection to the discussion taking place on Report, provided it was brought on at a reason-

  1177
  able hour, and he would, therefore, suggest that the Government should fix a time after which they would not take the Report. It was quite evident that there were a number of important subjects to be considered in connection with this Vote; but the convenience of hon. Gentlemen on these Benches would be met by an assurance that the Report would not be taken after 10 o'clock. That would afford a more suitable opportunity for the discussion of the important points to be raised, which would otherwise have to be taken at that unreasonable hour (2 A.M.). He was sorry to see several hon. Members leave their places when this Vote was put from the Chair, and it was much to be regretted that some hon. Members knew so little of the important questions which were involved in the Navy Estimates.
  SIR JOHN HAYasked the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the cost of the transport ships lost in the Red 'Sea fell upon the country or was covered by insurance? He would also be glad to know whether there had been any loss of life?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, in reply, said, that only one transport had been wrecked in the Bed Sea, the loss of which did not fall on the Estimates.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFEsaid, he wished to draw attention to a paragraph which appeared in The Standard newspaper, to the effect that the ships of war belonging to Russia and other Foreign Powers were furnished with the electric light; whereas, of the English ships in the East of a certain size, not one had any electric light apparatus, and that all were deficient in the scientific appliances with which the foreign ships were supplied. He asked, if this statement were true, whether the Admiralty intended to take any steps in the matter?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, in reply, said, this question had been asked and replied to on a former occasion. The only ship belonging to the East India Station of the size to which the electric light was usually applied was the Euryalus, and that ship loft England in the year 1878, before the system of electric lighting was adopted in the Navy. It was not usual, and he did not think it would ever be the custom, to fit the smaller class of gunboats with the electric-light
  1178
  apparatus. There was, at all events, a strong opinion against this; and in order to remove the idea that the absence of electric lighting was any loss to the Force on the Red Sea, he might say that it was the opinion of many competent authorities that the use of the electric light for the purposes of war was not of the importance which some persons imagined.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty had not answered the question of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff). The hon. Member asked why it was that vessels smaller than the Euryalus were not furnished with the electric light? The statement was that all the foreign vessels much smaller than the Euryalus were furnished with the electric light; but what was more serious, in his opinion, was that those foreign gunboats were also supplied with machine shell guns, while our ships were not. It was the universal testimony of all who had seen the Russian, Italian, and French gunboats now in the Red Sea, that, in every single respect, with the exception of their crews, they were superior to the English vessels of the same class. That was a serious state of things, because England depended for its security on her Fleet, and it was evident that this must not be allowed to fall behind the Fleets of other Powers. It was a question with many authorities whether it had not already done so. He did not propose to go into the question of the size and construction of our ships, on which point, however, a great deal might be said; but he would like to have a distinct reply from the Secretary to the Admiralty, as to why the machine shell guns promised some time ago for ships on foreign stations had not been furnished, and why our gunboats were not furnished with the electric light?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, in reply, said, he thought he had dealt with the question of electric lighting as applied to gunboats. He would suggest to the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) that he should not believe everything he might read in the newspapers. However, it was quite possible that some of the foreign vessels at Suakin were furnished with more modern appliances than our own. There were gunboats and gunboats; and a

  1179
  vessel recently fitted out would probably have all the newest appliances of maritime warfare, and he thought the hon. Member would find that any new vessels which the Admiralty might fit out would be furnished with those appliances. But it was impossible that either the electric light or quick-firing shell guns could be fitted into ships which were already in commission on the East India Station.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he should not have risen again but for the unnecessary impeachment by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty of the report referred to by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff). The authority in this case was the Correspondent of The Standard, Captain Cameron, a gentleman remarkable for his experience and ability. He passed from the newspaper report which the hon. Gentleman had so summarily disposed of to the statement of no less an authority than Lord Charles Beresford, who had pointed out some time ago, in an interesting article, that all our ships of war were inferior to those of foreign nations in the matter of machine shell guns.
  An hon. MEMBERasked whether the practice in the British Navy was different from that in Foreign Navies with regard to scientific appliances; and whether the Committee were to understand that the gunboats in question were of a different size to that of the Euryalus?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, in reply, said, he was not aware what was the practice of Foreign Navies with regard to electric lighting; but he had stated the practice in the British Navy adopted on the advice of the highest authorities—that was to say, the system of lighting by electricity was not considered suitable for the smaller class of vessels.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  Resolutions to be reported upon Thursday.
  Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.

  BANKRUPTCY APPEALS (COUNTY COURTS) BILL.— [Lords.]
  (Mr. Attorney General.)
  BANKRUPTCY APPEALS (COUNTY COURTS) BILL.— [Lords.]

    [BILL 118.] COMMITTEE.
    Order for Committee read.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(Mr. Solicitor General.)
    MR. HORACE DAVEYsaid, he did not propose to offer any opposition to the Motion for going into Committee on the Bill; but he desired to take that opportunity of expressing his regret that the Government had thought it necessary to introduce the measure. He believed that the supposed necessity for it had not been experienced, and that the Bill was prematurely brought in; he thought also that the Preamble of the Bill was open to the most serious objection. Now, so far from thinking, as he had heard it said, that this Bill was no reflection upon the Bankruptcy Act of last Session, he thought, on the contrary, that this Bill undid one of the most valuable parts of the work done by the Standing Committee in the course of the discussion on the provisions on the Bankruptcy Bill. One of those provisions was to provide one General Court of Appeal for bankruptcy cases. Instead of allowing the country bankruptcy cases from County Courts to go first before the Judge, and afterwards to a Court of Appeal, thereby making a double Court of Appeal for country cases for every district, except London, they had established, as they thought, a General Court of Appeal. Well, then, before that system was brought into operation, this Bill was introduced, and the reason alleged was a supposed block in the Court of Appeal. He thought it would have been worth while to show whether the bringing of appeals from County Courts made such an addition to the work of the Court of Appeal as to render this Bill necessary. At present, they had experienced nothing of this kind; it was purely a matter of surmise. He did not believe that the Act would cast any additional work on the Court of Appeal; because, tinder the old system, the County Court Bankruptcy appeals were heard in London, and the Court by sitting one day a-week was able to get through all the County Court appeals, and, at the same time, to do a large portion of the business of the London Court. Therefore, he thought that the supposed necessity for the Bill, on the ground of additional labour being cast upon the Court of Appeal, had not been made out. But the provisions of

    1181
    the Bill seemed to be open to more or less serious objection; it was proposed that all appeals from County Courts in bankruptcy matters should go to a Court composed of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy and another Judge in the same Division. Well, he believed that to be a perfectly illusory proposal; it was nothing more than an appeal to the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. The Chief Judge was, of course, a Judge who had the greatest experience in bankruptcy, and to whom any one of his colleagues would naturally defer; and, therefore, he said that the appeal under the Bill would be merely an appeal to the Chief Judge, who would, in fact, be sitting alone. Under the old system, there was at least an appeal to the Court of Appeal; but, under this Bill, it was proposed that there should be no appeal to the Court of Appeal, unless the Chief Judge gave leave. Therefore, unless the Chief Judge felt sufficient hesitation about his decision, leave would not be granted. His (Mr. Davey's) impression was, that this system would be found intolerable by the people who had to go to County Courts for jurisdiction in bankruptcy, and that Parliament would be asked before long to recur to what he had thought a Standing Committee had established last year—namely, one uniform Court of Appeal for the country. He did not propose to ask the House to divide against the Motion for going into Committee, particularly at that late hour (2.15 A.M.); but he could not allow that stage to be taken without at least expressing his humble opinion that there was no necessity for the Bill before them.
    MR. WHITLEYsaid, he supposed the House was bound to take the assurance of Her Majesty's Government that there was a necessity for this Bill, on the ground of there being a block of business in the Court of Appeal. It seemed to him to be rather a hand-to-mouth proceeding to transfer, in this way, business from one Court to another, the effect of which could only be to create another block. Under the present system, the Judge who presided over the Court of Bankruptcy was sent out on Circuit, and the result was a block in that Court, which was entirely due to the Judge's absence. He hoped before the debate closed that they should have some assurance from the hon. and
    1182
    learned Solicitor General that the Government intended to make an arrangement which would render it unnecessary to allow that Judge to go on Circuit, and, at the same time, make it unnecessary to institute another Court of Appeal.
    MR. WARTONsaid, there was considerable force in the argument of the hon. and learned Member for Christ-church (Mr. Horace Davey). He (Mr. Warton) himself strongly objected to the idea of the Court of Appeal proposed to be established; one reason being that the one Judge associated with the Chief Judge would probably agree with him, and, if he did not, he would hardly like to express dissent from him. They knew well what had taken place when the appeal was to a Chief Judge and two other Judges. Lord Penzance said that it was well known that two ordinary Judges would not venture to put their opinion against his; and he (Mr. Warton) was equally sure that one ordinary Judge would not venture to put his opinion against the Chief Judge. It appeared to have been forgotten that the second Judge on the Court of Appeal was to be taken from some other Court, the result of which would be that one of the Law Courts would, some day, be closed to suitors, on the ground that the Judge was sitting as a Court of Appeal in Bankruptcy. The Bill would have the effect of removing one block and creating another. It was a very strange thing, after all they had heard about Standing Committees, to find that their sole success—the Bankruptcy Bill—no sooner came into operation than it created a block of business, particularly as, on account of that Bill, the Standing Committee had received so much praise for the work it had gone through. He did not like the principle of the Judge giving leave to appeal from his own decisions, which, he believed, by degrees would give rise to a vicious system. Appeal, in his opinion, ought to be a matter of right, and not a matter of law.
    THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir FARRER HERSCHELL)said, he would point out that the Bill assimilated the appeal from the Bankruptcy County Court Judge to the appeal in other cases. No objection had been taken to the Bill when it was read a second time, and he had heard of no objection being taken to it since.
    Question put, and agreed, to.
    Bill considered in Committee.
    Committee report Progress; to sit again upon Thursday.

  VALUATION (METROPOLIS) AMENDMENT BILL.— [BILL 108.]
  (Mr. Tomlinson, Mr. R. N. Fowler, Mr. Alderman W. Lawrence, Mr. Dixon-Hartland.)
  VALUATION (METROPOLIS) AMENDMENT BILL.— [BILL 108.]

    COMMITTEE.
    Bill considered in Committee.
    (In the Committee.)
    Clause 1 agreed to.
    Clause 2 (Enabling owners and lessees to appeal).
    MR TOMLINSONmoved, as an Amendment, to add at end of Clause—
    "Provided, that any form of return, order, notice, or document required to be given to or served on the occupier under the principal Act shall, except where the owner or lessee is liable to he assessed or to pay any rate or tax in the place of the occupier, he doomed to he sufficiently given or served, notwithstanding this Act, if addressed to such occupier and left on the premises to which the return, order, notice, or document relates."
    Amendment agreed to.
    Words added.
    Clause, as amended, agreed to.
    Remaining Clause agreed to.
    House resumed.
    Bill reported; as amended, to be considered To-morrow.

MOTIONS.
  POST OFFICE MAIL CONTRACT (MESSRS. G. AND J. BURNS).
  "Resolved, That the Contract with Messrs. (L and J. Burns, for the Greenock, Ardrossan, and Belfast Mail Service, be approved.—(Mr. Courtney.)

  WORKING MEN'S CLUBS REGISTRATION BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. JOHN HOLLOND, Bill to amend "The Friendly Societies Act, 1875," as to the Registration of Working Men's Clubs, ordered to be brought in by Mr. JOHN HOLLOND, Mr. FRANCIS BUXTON, Sir JOHN KENNAWAY, Mr. LYULPH STANLEY, and Mr. STUART-WORTLEY.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 132.]

  REDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS BILL.
  On Motion of Admiral Sir JOHN HAY, Bill to adjust the numbers of the electors in some constituencies of the United Kingdom, and to provide for a more equal distribution of the duties of the Representatives, having consideration to Population and Taxation, ordered to be brought in by Admiral Sir JOHN HAY and Mr. JAMES A. CAMPBELL.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 131.]

  UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE (BORROWING POWERS) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. BERESFORD HOPE, Bill to extend the Borrowing Powers of the University of Cambridge; and for other purposes, ordered to be brought in by Mr. BERESFORD HOPE AND Mr. RAIKES.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 133.]
  House adjourned at half after Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Lord Congleton, after the death of his brother.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Habitual Criminals Act Amendment * (28).
Second Pending—Mr. Speaker's Retirement.*

TUNIS—CONSULAR JURISDICTION—THE DEBATE OF FRIDAY LAST.

  PERSONAL EXPLANATION.
  LORD LAMINGTONsaid, he wished to explain an observation which he made on Friday night. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) appeared to have been under the impression that he (Lord Lamington) said Mr. Gladstone's Government had ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece. He was perfectly aware that Lord Palmerston was in Office at the time, and what he said was that Mr. Gladstone, having been sent out as High Commissioner, suggested the concession of the Islands.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that what he had stated the other night was perfectly accurate. Mr. Gladstone had been sent out by a Conservative Government, and the cession of the Islands was made under Lord Palmerston's Government. Mr. Gladstone had recommended great reforms in a Liberal direction; and, although Mr. Gladstone approved of the cession, it was not upon his recommendation that it took place. It happened that they were suddenly summoned in the autumn for a Cabinet. Mr. Gladstone met Sir George Lewis outside the door and asked him what was the object of the summons, and was told that Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell wished to obtain the sanction of the Cabinet to the cession of the Ionian Islands.

PROTECTION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.
THE BISHOP OF ROCHESTERasked, Whether it was the intention of the Government to introduce this Session a Bill for the better protection of women and children?
THE EARL OF DALHOUSIE, in reply, said, that a Bill with that object was in course of preparation, and would be introduced as soon as possible.

MERV AND AFGHANISTAN.

  MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
  THE EARL OF LYTTON, in rising to move for Papers showing what communications had passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, about Merv and Afghanistan since the year 1881, said My Lords, I rise to ask your Lordships to agree to the Motion of which I have given Notice. But I do not bring forward this Motion with any sanguine expectation of expediting the distribution of the Papers promised us by Her Majesty's Government. I am told that for those Papers we shall still have to wait an indefinite time; and my main object is to call attention to the position in which, meanwhile, we are placed by the announcement, made to us more than a fortnight ago by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville), that the Emperor of Russia has accepted the unconditional surrender and allegiance of the Merv Turcoman tribes. I understand that the noble Earl has not yet had time to consider fully the important despatches from St. Petersburg to which he then referred; and I can well believe that he is not prepared, nor do I think we can fairly expect him to be prepared, to state to us definitely, and in precise detail, the course which Her Majesty's Government propose to adopt in consequence of the event he has announced to us; and in consequence also of the importance attached by them, in the Papers last laid before us, to the prevention of that event which they have nevertheless failed to prevent. But, to some extent, the matter has already been discussed in the other House of Parliament, and I presume that the view taken of it by the noble Earl will not greatly or materially differ from that which was then indicated the right by

  959
  hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) in regard to the course of action now contemplated by Her Majesty's Government. Now, I am not going to weary your Lordships with many details or quotations from the numerous official documents and speeches which have been written and spoken upon this subject. I shall endeavour to describe, as briefly as I can, the manner in which I conceive that Russia's possession of Merv must inevitably affect our position in India, and to state the reasons why it appears to me impossible to accept, with any degree of satisfaction, the sketch of future policy which has been put forward in "another place" by the President of the Local Government Board, and will, I suppose, be again put forward by the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-night. I shall also have something to say as to the course which, in my judgment, ought to have been taken, and which I think ought now to be taken, so far as the policy of the present Government has left open to us any means of taking it; but, in the first place, your Lordships will, I trust, allow me to make one or two observations upon the situation of the territory and the character of the population which have thus been added to the Asiatic Dominions of Russia in the vicinity of our own, and in the closest possible proximity with that State which we have hitherto been accustomed to regard as the natural barrier between the two. My Lords, Merv is a district of ill-defined dimensions, lying between two rivers—the Murghab and the Heri-Rud, or Tejend. These two rivers, after running parallel to each other for about 70 miles, ultimately lose themselves in the great Turcoman desert. The so-called cities of this district are mud huts, and are in ruins; and the importance of the district lies entirely in the fact that, although it is surrounded on all sides by sandy deserts, it is itself a region of extraordinary fertility, placed precisely at that point where the two main roads from Russia to Afghanistan intersect each other. One of them is the road through Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian, to Herat; and the other is the road from Tashkend, through Bokhara, across the Oxus, in the same direction. So much for the district. As for the popu-
  960
  lation, it consists, as your Lordships are well aware, of some of the rudest, but, at the same time, the most warlike tribes of Central Asia—born fighting men and born horsemen, who, if disciplined and equipped by a European military Power, cannot fail to furnish that Power with a numerous and splendid irregular Cavalry. The ruins which represent the City of Merv itself are about 230 or 240 miles distant from Herat. How far the Merv district extends in the same direction it is difficult to say; because, in countries of this character, all boundaries are necessarily vague and undefined, or, rather, it would be more correct to say that they are defined, from time to time, by the comparative military force of those who live upon opposite sides of them. Prom Herat, which is at present in Afghanistan, Afghan territory stretches towards Merv, and the Merv oasis stretches towards Afghanistan. The boundary between them, if anything that can be called a boundary exists at all, is wholly uncertain; but it is a significant fact that the latest official Russian maps put the South-Eastern extremity of the Merv district at about 25 miles from Herat, and the distance from Maimena would, I believe, be much the same. The effect, therefore, of the unconditional submission of the Merv Turcomans to Russia is that, according to Russian computation, the Russian Frontier now becomes practically contiguous with the Frontiers of Afghanistan, and this contact takes place at the weakest point of the Afghan Frontier; for neither the present Ameer of Cabul, nor his Predecessor, has ever been able to establish his authority firmly at Herat. Now, I request your Lordships to consider for a moment what this fact really means; how it is related to the views repeatedly expressed by the most distinguished English and Indian statesmen of all parties and all schools, respecting the conditions necessary to the security of our Indian Frontier; and what light is thrown by it upon the policy which has been, and is being, pursued, as also upon that which ought to be pursued in that matter. Up to the present moment, in all controversies about Indian Frontier policy, one fundamental principle has been invariably admitted and maintained on all sides, and I do not suppose it will be disavowed to-night by any Member of Her Ma-

  961
  jesty's Government. It is that the free access of Russia to Afghanistan, and her close intercourse with the Afghan Government, must necessarily be highly dangerous to our power in India. And the reason why it would be dangerous is, that it would enable Russia to stir up the Afghans against us, whenever she had any strong motive for so doing, and through the Afghans to exert a very disturbing influence even over some of the Native States of India itself. I might cite a long list of eminent Liberal statesmen, some of them dead, some of them now before me, and of distinguished Indian administrators, including Lord Lawrence, who have all emphatically affirmed this principle. But I will only now observe that this remarkable consensus of experienced opinion is not merely theoretical. It has been powerfully confirmed by recent experience; for, on a late occasion, when Russia had cause to fear war with England in the West, her first thought, her first instinctive act, was, naturally enough, to intrigue against us in Asia, and to do this through Afghanistan. I am aware that there are some principles cherished by former Liberal Cabinets which, in the name of a more advanced Liberalism, have been discarded by Her Majesty's present Ministers. But if they have discarded this principle also, at least they have never avowed their rejection of it. On the contrary, they have repeatedly informed us that the very corner-stone of the Central Asian policy still is, as it has been for the last 15 years, an understanding with Russia based on the acknowledgment elicited from her Government by Lord Clarendon, "that Afghanistan is entirely outside the sphere of her influence." So far, then, there is no difference of opinion—at least, I presume there is none. We are all agreed that Afghanistan should stand between us and Russia, and that Russian influence ought, if possible, to be excluded from Afghanistan. But when we come to consider how this desirable end is to be attained, we are at once confronted with two different and conflicting views on the subject. What has now taken place at Merv throws considerable light upon the relative efficacy of these views in the past, and I therefore think it may be some guide to us in the consideration of what ought to be done for the future. My Lords, the
  962
  Ministerial view, so far as it can be gathered from the exposition of it lately given in "another place," appears to be now much the same as it has always been. According to this view, the only barrier against the advance of Russian influence is to be found in Afghanistan itself. Let Afghanistan, it is said, be strong, united, independent, and friendly to England, and then the Afghans will naturally resist the approaches of Russia, maintain our interests, and remain impenetrable to her influence. If we confine our own action to subsidizing the Ameers of Cabul, and refrain from seeking any intercourse between their subjects and ours, this happy result, it is believed, will come about of its own accord. As for anything further, all we can properly do in the matter is to make diplomatic representations to Russia, to obtain from her acknowledgments—such, for instance, as the one elicited by Lord Clarendon, that Afghanistan is outside the sphere of her influence—and then, from time to time, to claim from her a renewed observance of those acknowledgments. That appears to be the view still cherished by Her Majesty's Government. The other view, a very different one, which was acted on during my tenure of Office in India, is that Russia's steady advance towards Afghanistan and our own frontier, and the ultimate extension of her influence into Afghanistan, are the natural and inevitable result of her position in Central Asia, and that, that being so, it is therefore puerile, pitiful, and even vexatious to be continually endeavouring to try and coax, or wheedle, or extort from her reluctant pledges on this subject, which, from the very nature of her position, she is powerless to keep. And here let me interpose one word as to the character of Russia's position in Central Asia. Her mission there has been described as a civilizing mission; and, as far as it goes, I think this description of it is quite correct. Whenever and wherever a barbarous population is brought under the control of a strong civilized Power, the interests of civilization are advanced. But all civilized interests are not identical. If they were, there could never be such a thing as war between civilized Powers; and, therefore, this, of itself, does not necessarily prevent the territorial aggrandizement of such a Power being also advanced at the expense of

  963
  its civilized neighbours. What we have to take care of is, that the interests of Russian civilization in Central Asia are not advanced in a manner detrimental to the interests of our own civilization in India. And unless we have some guarantees about this much stronger than verbal understandings which we cannot conveniently enforce, the result will undoubtedly constitute a real and serious danger to us. That being the case, and all diplomatic assurances to the contrary being absolutely worthless, the only manly and sensible thing for us to do is to take up, as opportunity may serve, such a position, both political and military, as will enable us to regard with due equanimity the increasing speed of her inevitable advance towards our frontiers. It follows from this view of our position and duties that to suppose either that there is at the present moment, or that there is the smallest prospect of there being within any assignable time, such a thing as a strong, united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan, which can be safely trusted to serve in our hour of need as a self-acting barrier against Russia, is a supposition which has absolutely no foundation in fact, and which, for that reason, ought not to be made the basis of our policy. Now, my Lords, the first of these two policies has been carried out, without opposition and without deviation, for by far the greater portion of the last 14 or 15 years. And it has been applied with absolutely no qualification during the last four or five years. For a very short time during my own connection with the Government of India, the second and different policy was adopted. But this alternative policy was not only condemned, it was also reversed, and nearly all the results of it undone by the present Government and by my Successor in the government of India. I shall not, however, trouble the House with many remarks upon this part of the matter; but I must ask leave to compare shortly the practical results of these two ways of dealing with it. It would be easy for me to multiply quotations from despatches and speeches of all sorts, showing the importance attached by many distinguished persons to the condition that Merv should not become a Russian Possession; and it would probably be a task requiring even less research to quote a series of declarations by the Russian Government, all of them
  964
  calculated to lead anyone who reads them to the belief that Russia had no intention of taking possession of Merv; but I think it would be a sheer waste of time to travel with this object over all the published Papers, which bring down the story of our Central Asian diplomacy to the year 1881. I will only remind the House that an explicit declaration to that effect was made to Lord Dufferin by the Emperor of Russia; for I suppose it will not be denied—I presume, indeed, that it will be insisted upon by the noble Earl and his Colleagues—that this declaration, together with the assurances which preceded and followed it, produced upon their minds the effect which it was calculated to produce, and which it was no doubt intended to produce; and that it left them perfectly satisfied that they had nothing to apprehend from any Russian designs upon Merv. It is, in fact, essential to any possible justification of their policy that they should be able to tell us, as no doubt they will tell us, that they attached the greatest possible importance to such assurances, and that they placed implicit reliance upon them; for, however unwise of them it may have been to do this, yet, if they did not do it, they have absolutely no excuse for having done nothing else. It would be impossible to characterize their total neglect of the important national interests committed to their charge, in making no provision for what has now occurred, if they were not sincere in their erroneous belief that there was no chance of its occurrence. If they were not dupes they were deceivers. But I do not refer to these incidents for the purpose of denouncing Russian bad faith, or finding fault with Russian ambition. I have nothing whatever to do with Russian morality, and I think it is not the business of any English politician to concern himself about it. I believe I am one of those who have been denounced by the present Cabinet and its Party organs as a Russophobe—which appears to be, in their opinion, one of the most opprobrious epithets that can be applied to a public man; but I am no more a Russophobe than I am a Russophil, and I can assure the House that from me it will not hear this evening a single harsh word upon the conduct of the Russian Government, or upon that of its military authorities. If I notice these Russian pledges, it is only

  965
  to point out how worthless all such pledges must necessarily be when they are given by a Power situated as Russia is situated in Central Asia. It may be that, when you come to look closely into these pledges, you will find that in all of them Russian statesmen have managed to devise loopholes which will just save the Government that slips through them from the charge of direct falsehood or deliberate bad faith. But that is a question I do not care to discuss. I regard it as a problem in casuistry which has no practical interest. It is very possible that, in every one of these instances, an ingenious casuist may be able to find some such subterfuge or saving clause; but whether he could or could not do so is really of no importance. What is important—and we are inexcusable if we disregard it—is the fact that the whole history of our diplomacy about Merv has added one more to the many illustrations supplied by the general history of the world that diplomatic assurances are of no practical value when they run counter to permanent and well-ascertained national interests, or to deeply-seated national tendencies and passions. To anyone who has watched the course of events in Central Asia—to anyone who knows how, in that country, civilized and uncivilized Powers fray each other, so to speak, at the edges—to anyone who remembers how enter prizing Russian Generals, acting at a distance from St. Petersburg, have invariably been able to commit a possibly reluctant Sovereign to their own projects and proceedings—the conclusion that England and Russia are destined sooner or later to be practically conterminous in Asia must, I think, appear as certain as that water will run downhill when the way is free to it. And to suppose that the most solemn promises will arrest this process is as idle as it was to imagine that the Treaty which closed the Crimean War would exclude the Russian Fleet from the Black Sea one single day later than Russia's first favourable opportunity for breaking through or setting aside the provisions of that Treaty. All that, in such cases, diplomatic assurances can do, is to make those who give them look roguish, and those who require and accept them look foolish. Diplomatic duties will not allow an Ambassador to cross-examine a foreign Minister as if he were a witness
  966
  come to prove a fraudulent alibi at the Old Bailey. The promises or pledges thus obtained can afterwards be easily explained away; and, whether they are or are not explained away, it really matters very little, for in any case they can always be broken at last. My Lords, the game of diplomacy—and I have had something to do with it—has always seemed to me like trying to tie the hands of a juggler with rotten cords. The man who is tied can generally slip out of the knots, and if he cannot slip out of the knots, he has no difficulty in breaking the cords. I dare say some of your Lordships may happen to have witnessed a very popular performance by Messrs. Maskelyne and Cooke. It has been repeated over and over again for many years; and yet, on each occasion of its repetition, the public are as much surprised as if such a thing had never happened before, and could never happen again. This performance is called—"A Dark Séance; or the Cabinet Trick." It consists of a limited number of gentlemen—who have never before been so closely connected with each other—getting into a cabinet, where they are apparently bound fast to a certain position, under securities of great seeming stringency. Then, for a while, the light is excluded from the cabinet. The public is not allowed to pry into its secrets. And, shortly afterwards, it is discovered that the occupants of the cabinet have contrived, somehow or other, to shift their position by getting rid of all the securities that bound them. In the same way it appears to me that the political performances of the present Cabinet, which have led up to the present situation, might not be unfairly described as a series of dark séances, each of which, as soon as the light is turned on it, reveals a bewildering change of attitude, accompanied by the mysterious and wholly unexplained disappearance of some trusted national security; and the chief wonder of which is that, after they have been repeated, they still create the same feeling of amazement. Now, in the present case, the securities we have been told to rely upon are two. First come the assurances of a friendly Russia, and then the arms of a free, independent, and united Afghanistan. The Russians are to promise not to have anything to do with the Afghans; and the Afghans are to be in such a position

  967
  that, if the Russians break this promise, they, the Afghans, can and will—with, perhaps, a little cheap assistance from us—punish the Russians for breaking their promise, and immediately drive them away. Now, I quite agree that a free, independent, united, and friendly Afghanistan would be for us the best of all possible protections against the advance of Russia. My objection to our exclusive reliance on this security is simply that the security does not exist, and that there is not the slightest reason to suppose it will come into existence within any ascertainable time. Let me ask the House to consider the different terms which are used in describing this security. Afghanistan, we are told, will be a firm barrier against Russia, if it is free, if it is independent, if it is united, if it is friendly to England. Well, as for the freedom of Afghanistan, that country certainly is, and it seems likely long to continue, as free as any country can possibly be made by the total absence of all law and of every sort of settled institution. It is free in the sense that each Afghan is practically free to do or own what he pleases at the expense of his neighbours. His neighbours are similarly free to do the same at his expense. And this condition renders such freedom a burden instead of a privilege to the individual, a curse instead of a blessing to the country. Well, then, let us next examine what constitutes the independence and the union of that country. Practically speaking, Afghanistan is, as it ever has been, nothing more than a loose agglomeration of independent tribes, over whom the Ameer, for the time being, exercises by sheer military force just so much authority as the strength of that force, or the fear of the cruelty he may be able to exercise by its means, may enable him to exert. But there is no permanent settled union, no national homogeneity, not oven any tribal sympathy between Cabul, Herat, and Candahar, to say nothing of less conspicuous sub-divisions of the country. In a word, there is absolutely nothing which can be regarded as a national incorporation of the various Afghan Provinces into a single body capable of united action, and there is no probability that such a body will ever exist. My Lords, you may talk as you please of a united and independent Afghanistan; but the very phrase is contradictory.
  968
  The near approach to independence of each other which obtains between the different Afghan tribes and cities is practically inconsistent with their efficient union; and any such union would destroy the only independence they value. As to the friendliness of Afghanistan, I will only say that I fear this is also, for all practical purposes, equally chimerical; and, if we trust only to that, I am afraid the time will soon arrive when we shall regret having done so. To all Asiatics, Russia's attitude and policy are much more intelligible than our own. They inspire fear, but they also inspire confidence. Russia is an aggressive Power. She can at any moment offer to the Afghans more than we can, for she can offer to them the plunder of India. England has long since reached the limits of her Empire, and cannot offer to the Afghans anything they care to have; unless, indeed, we were to offer to their Ruler for the time being an offensive and defensive alliance, which would practically put it in his power to embroil us with Russia whenever he pleased. For these reasons, my Lords, I look upon the security of a united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan as equivalent to the security of Russian pledges. The two securities, each of them by itself, and both of them taken together, are absolutely worthless. But on this point I wish to guard myself against being misunderstood. I certainly do not believe that Afghanistan, if left to itself, can ever be united, as well as independent, or that it can ever be a purely self-acting barrier between us and Russia. But I am far from saying that the relations between England and Afghanistan might not have been such as to make the Afghan Kingdom a real barrier, resting on foundations laid in time by our own prescience and energy. I believe that that might have been effected in 1873, when the late Ameer of Cabul was seriously alarmed by the advance of Russia. He then urged on our attention the dangers to which, in his opinion, both Afghanistan and India would be exposed by her advance to the very point at which her power is now permanently established, and he implored us to make at once practical provision, based on definite written engagements with him, for his protection against those dangers. Unfortunately, however, the Viceroy of

  969
  India was then instructed to put him off with assurances that no such dangers existed, and that there was no occasion for us to afford him the only sort of protection which appeared to him of any use. I do not wish to revive extinct controversies. But I shall never cease to believe that when the Government then ridiculed the fears, and rejected the overtures of Shere Ali, it necessarily threw him into the arms of Russia, and forfeited our last chance of really erecting in Afghanistan that barrier on which it would now be insanity for us to place any reliance, because, in fact, no such barrier exists. But then it may be said—"After all, what probability is there that Russia will now interfere in Afghanistan; and what can it matter to us if she does interfere? "My Lords, I think that, in part, I have already answered this question. But I cannot too emphatically insist upon the fact, which plainly stares us in the face, that if the Russian Frontier is now conterminous, or all but conterminous, with the Afghan Frontier at its weakest point, Russia must interfere in Afghanistan. She will be compelled to interfere in Afghanistan. She will have both the right and the obligation to do so; and, therefore, whatever new policy Her Majesty's Government may now adopt in reference to this altered state of things, the old assumption that Afghanistan is outside the sphere of Russian influence can no longer be entertained as the basis of that policy. As matters now stand, you might as well try to keep the influence of Russia from penetrating into Afghanistan as to prevent the wind from blowing through an empty keyhole. This is the one supremely important fact on which I wish to fix the attention of the House. We are bound to bear in mind that in that part of the world every man is a soldier and a nomad. The most paltry incident, the most petty ambition, may produce disturbances, capable at any moment of growing into civil war and revolution. You may as well expect Northern and Western Afghanistan to remain out of the sphere of the influence legitimately belonging to any civilized Power who is mistress of the Merv oasis, as you might expect Candahar and Cabul to be beyond the influence of such a Power if it were established at Herat. The strength of this natural and in-
  970
  evitable influence it is difficult, of course, to measure. It must vary from time to time; it must depend on the nature of events. But it is already great enough to render credible the rumours lately current that the Ameer feels so strong an objection to being placed between the upper and the nether millstone, that he is not at all unlikely to abdicate and retire into private life, unless he can obtain from us enormous subsidies and far-reaching promises, which it would, in my opinion, be most unwise to give him. The new state of things created by Russia's acquisition of the Merv oasis amounts practically to this—Russia has thereby acquired the means and incurred the necessity of intermeddling how and when she pleases in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and in a manner which we have practically no power either to prevent or control. For whatever she may please to regard as our good behaviour towards her she has obtained efficient material guarantees, while for her good behaviour to us we have no such guarantees; for neither diplomatic assurances on her part, nor any independent efforts which can reasonably be expected from the Afghans, will afford us the smallest security against the danger to which we shall stand exposed if Russia, whenever it suits her policy to do so, should bring to bear against British India the cupidity of the Afghans, enforced and supported, by all the nomad Cavalry of the deserts of Central Asia. The very least of the immediate consequences of this serious change in our situation is, that you will henceforth be compelled, if you abide by your duties, to make a considerable permanent increase in the number of English troops you keep in India, and that will put a new and serious heavy drain upon the financial as well as the military resources of both India and the Empire. Such is the state of things to which the policy, or rather the impolicy, and the improvidence of the present Government have reduced us. Let me now turn to that other policy which was commenced a short time ago, continued under great difficulties for but a very few years, renounced in 1880, and reversed in 1881. That policy was based upon the principle I have already described. It accepted, as an inevitable fact, the worthlessness of Russian assurances, and the chimerical character of

  971
  a united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan, capable of serving as a self-acting barrier between us and Russia. An Afghanistan, united in its dependence on the organized protection of England, would no doubt have placed us in a position involving great responsibilities; but the responsibilities would, I conceive, have been more than compensated by the practical advantages. That position, however, was no longer open to us, owing to the policy of our Predecessors, which had rejected the chance and destroyed the conditions of it. We therefore considered that our only solid security against the natural consequences of a Russian advance must be found in a position both military and political, which, whenever the inevitable meeting should take place between the two great nations in Central Asia, would enable us to accept it without undignified trepidation. The House need not be afraid that I am going to inflict upon it any discussion about the Afghan War. But, be the merits and causes of that war what they may, one thing is certain—its result not only left us in possession of Candahar; it also left us pledged to the inhabitants of that town and district not to allow them to pass again under the rule of Cabul. And this was not all. The policy pursued in Beloochistan by the late Government of India—a policy which at the time was condemned by noble Lords opposite almost as severely as they condemned the Afghan War itself—secured to us three several advantages. That policy gave us, first of all, the command of the Bolan Pass; it gave us, secondly, the possession of the fort of Quetta; and it gave us, thirdly, in the Khan of Khelat, an ally who showed himself faithful to us in very trying circumstances, and who could therefore be trusted. These minor points of our much-abused policy—these three incomplete results of it—are the only ones not irretrievably surrendered by our Successors. And I believe it was with great difficulty that the noble Marquess the Governor General of India (the Marquess of Ripon) was induced to retain them, in reluctant compliance with the strong remonstrances of the officers of his own Government, and the people of Beloochistan themselves. But what has been the practical result of sparing even thus much of the policy
  972
  so severely censured some years ago by Her Majesty's present Ministers? I accept the account given of it by the President of the Local Government Board. This is what Sir Charles W. Dilke said of it the other day—
  "I think I can only inform the House further that we stand in a stronger position towards Afghanistan and Beloochistan, and in a more satisfactory position on the North-Western Frontier of Afghanistan, than we have probably ever stood in time past. We have now, by the wish of the people of the country, formally taken over the Government of Quetta, and a formal arrangement has been made."
  My Lords, it was not in a hostile manner to the people of Beloochistan, nor was it without their absolute approval and support—indeed, their earnest entreaty—that the late Government of India decided on that occupation of Quetta for which it was censured by the present Government. The statement of the President "of the Local Government Board continues thus—
  "The friendliness of the people of Beloochistan now gives us entire control of the Bolan Pass, and that road is now perfectly assured, and is likely to remain tranquil."—(3 Hansard, [284] 1770.)
  I believe this statement to be as true as it is important. But it is equally true that, had it not been for the policy which the late Government was at the time so severely censured for adopting, we should at this moment have had no garrison at Quetta, no friendly relations with the people of Beloochistan, and no command over the Bolan Pass. On that point I have yet another word to say. Since the time when noble Lords opposite were in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility, they have learnt a little from experience. I have no doubt they are learning more every day; but their education is not yet complete. They may not believe it, but I must tell them what is undoubtedly believed by their own authorities in Beloochistan, that had they kept faith with the people of Candahar, as they have been persuaded to keep faith with the people of Quetta—had they continued our protective occupation of that town and district, instead of handing them over to Cabul—we should now be established at Candahar just as securely as we are established at Quetta, and with just as absolute an approval and support on the part of the population concerned. The railway which we began to Candahar

  973
  might by this time have been completed, and what would then have been our position at this moment? With a strong British force at Candahar, and its communications with the Indus fully secured, we might have laughed at any talk of danger, or even inconvenience, from Russia's occupation of Merv; and we could have viewed with undisturbed equanimity an event which is now again, we are told, to be the subject of abortive and humiliating communication with the Russian Government. For it would be impossible for an enemy, whether European or Afghan, to lay regular siege to Quetta, and equally impossible for him to march through the passes into India, leaving Quetta held by a British force in his rear. My Lords, it is certainly remarkable that the very persons who blamed us for going to Quetta and blamed us for going to Candahar—the very persons who gave up Candahar, and who, as one of their arguments for giving it up, put forward the remark that if we kept Candahar we might thereby give Russia a pretext for advancing upon Merv, should now be consoling themselves, and trying to console us, for Russia having taken permanent possession of Merv, by the reflection that we have still got possession of Quetta and control over the Bolan Pass. I cannot help saying that to them and their policy we owe just as little thanks for the possession of Quetta as we do for the abandonment of Candahar. And here I come at last to the most serious and important question of all. The policy of the present Government having drifted us into the position I have described, what ought now to be done in order to diminish the acknowledged weakness and to mitigate the prospective danger of that position? Upon this question Her Majesty's Government have hitherto been singularly reticent and mysterious—so reticent that, in order to obtain any indication of their present intentions, we can only turn to their previous utterances; and these, I suppose, we may assume to be trustworthy sources of enlightenment, as in other matters they are never tired of assuring us that their policy is neither inconsistent nor vacillating; that it has never changed; and that, having on former occasions explained it so clearly, they are under no obligations to explain it again. I shall, therefore, make no apology for reading,
  974
  on a matter of such supreme importance, a remarkable statement of the steps recommended eight years ago, as those which ought to be taken in the present emergency, by the noble Earl who is now First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook). That noble Earl was then Viceroy of India, and in a Government of India despatch, addressed by him in 1875 to my noble Friend the noble Marquess behind me (the Marquess of Salisbury), he made these remarkable recommendations, which, I am bound to say, are very explicit as to what should be done if Russia were to take possession of Merv—
  "We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turcoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan; and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him, and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian Frontier. We think that these would be the measures best calculated to avert any dangers that may ensue from a Russian advance to Merv, and that they should be adopted when the necessity for them arises."—[Afghanistan, 1878, p.p. 134–5.]
  I do not know whether these words represent the present opinion of the noble Earl, or the present intentions of that consistent and unvacillating Cabinet of which he is so influential a Member. I have no hesitation, however, in expressing my own regretful conviction that the steps recommended by the noble Earl are now impracticable. If taken now, they would be taken too late, and if taken too late they would be of no advantage; they would give no security, and they would add to our danger. If the noble Earl was of opinion that those steps ought to be taken in an emergency foreseen by all but himself and his Colleagues—the annexation of Merv by Russia—he ought to have prepared the way for taking them when he had the opportunity of doing so. I should like to learn from the noble Earl, in the course of this evening, how he would propose to protect a British Resident at Herat, more than 600 miles away from the nearest railway communication with

  975
  India, more than 500 miles away from the nearest British garrison, and in the midst of a lawless and turbulent population? I should like to know how he would practically fulfil the engagements of his proposed Treaty for the protection of Herat, when he and his Colleagues have not even ventured to keep a force at Candahar? An expedition to Herat would now virtually be an expedition from the Indus. It would be exceedingly costly and difficult. It would require an enormous force. That force would be completely isolated from its base; and its communication in the rear would be not only imperfect, but very dangerous. My Lords, I know not what steps, either in this direction or in any other, may have been under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government during the last three weeks; but, looking at the invariable results of their policy during the last three months in almost every part of the world, I must confess that it has often occurred to me that there is one step which might be taken—I will not say effectively, but at least very appropriately and characteristically—by the present Government. That step would be to create at once a new Department of the Foreign Office and a new Department of the War Office devoted to the careful preparation of measures to be taken only when too late. I have no doubt that these two Departments would be the busiest in Downing Street, and that they would absorb a large proportion of the funds annually voted by Parliament for the maintenance of interests depending on the management of our foreign and military affairs. I fully recognize, however, and have no wish to minimize, the extreme difficulty of the position in which Her Majesty's Ministers are placed, and in which, through their policy, all of us are placed in regard to the present state of affairs in Central Asia. Perhaps we should be too sanguine if we expected that the Ministers who have got us into that position will tell us to-night how they intend to get us out of it; but it will at least be some satisfaction if their language is such as to show that the real difficulties and the real facts of the situation are no longer deliberately ignored, and that they are at last seriously recognized in a practical spirit by those who must bear, in a very special degree, the responsibility of
  976
  practically dealing with them. The extent to which this situation fundamentally differs from the state of things which preceded it may be plainly stated in a very few words. In the first place, whereas, up to the present moment, it has been agreed all round that Afghanistan must remain outside the sphere of Russia's legitimate influence, events have now brought that country unavoidably within the sphere of such influence. In the next place, whereas a united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan would, be the best barrier between England and Russia in Central Asia, the plain fact is that the constituent parts of that country cannot be united unless they cease to be independent; and that, in the present state of things, it is equally impossible to unite them in any serious dependence upon England; while, as for their future friendship, Russia can now hold out to it inducements infinitely greater than any which it is in our own power to offer. Lastly, my Lords, whereas a military position might have been taken up, and actually was taken up, which, if retained, would have rendered us justified in viewing the advance of Russia with comparative indifference, by far the most important part of that position has been abandoned, and it is difficult to see how it can now be regained. On the other hand, the less important part of that position still remains to us; and that, so far as I see, is the single consolatory reflection upon which our minds can rest in reviewing the state of things which has been brought about and the anxious position in which we have been placed by the policy of the present Government. The noble Earl concluded by moving for the Papers of which he had given Notice.
  Moved, "That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty for Papers showing what communications have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, about Merv and Afghanistan, since the year 1881."—(The Earl of Lytton.)
  THE DUCK OF ARGYLL: My Lords, I hope it will not be inconvenient to the House, nor altogether unfavourable to the important discussion which has been raised, if I venture to intervene between the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Lytton) and the answer which will be made by Her Majesty's Government to the noble Earl, who has made, as he

  977
  always does, a very eloquent and able speech. In many parts of that speech I, for one, fully concur; but I must express my regret that the noble Earl should have thought it well to treat the subject so much with reference to the details of a past controversy which most of us may have forgotten. The House will hear nothing from me to-night which may lead noble Lords to enter into this debate in a Party spirit. It is my desire to raise it to a somewhat higher level than that of mere Party, and I would ask the House, in this new point of departure in the history of Russian advances in Central Asia, to consider what are the consequences of this advance, and what is the policy we ought to pursue. And I think, my Lords, we may enter upon this discussion under peculiarly favourable circumstances. A few years ago it would have seemed incredible that such an event as Russia taking possession of Merv should have occurred, and that so little public excitement should have been raised upon the subject. If it had happened a few years ago every paper would, have been ringing with it; and I doubt very much whether any Government could have withstood the pressure which public feeling would have raised against them in reference to this act of the Russian Government. And yet the news is now received, I do not say without some feeling of misgiving, but certainly with no feeling of alarm, and very little feeling of irritation. How does this come about? Partly, I think, it is due to the fact that the public mind in England cannot be excited to a high point on foreign politics, except as to particular transactions in one portion of the world. The public mind is engrossed, and justly engrossed, with our difficult and dangerous position elsewhere, in Egypt; but I trust that the calmness with which the annexation of Merv has been received is due also to the calmer temper and the more just appreciation of the real importance of such an event as this. Let me recall the attention of the House for a few minutes to the history of this great subject of the advance of Russia in the East. During the last half-century eminent men have been directing attention to the gigantic strides of Russia; but, in former years, almost all those strides were made at the expense of the two Empires of Turkey and Persia.
  978
  It was not until 1864 that Russia began those great advances in Central Asia which have so often alarmed Anglo-Indian statesmen. In that year Prince Gortchakoff issued a celebrated Circular despatch to all the Courts of Europe, explaining the conduct and designs of Russia in regard to Central Asia. Somehow, I hardly know how, that despatch was accepted as a reassuring one. It was so spoken of by Sir Henry Rawlinson; but, looking into its terms, instead of being in reality reassuring, it contained announcements of principles and intentions which were nothing short of a declaration of war against all the Khanates of Central Asia, for they amounted to this—that Russia would not tolerate robber States in her neighbourhood. As a matter of fact, the Khanates of Central Asia were "robber States," for they lived by robbery, man stealing, and slave stealing. The second announcement made in this reassuring despatch was that when a robber State was to be punished, it was not sufficient to occupy their territory by a temporary possession, but they must be finally subdued. And, lastly, there was a distinct intimation on the part of Russia that, in the whole of the matter, she would be governed, not by reclamations of other States, but by her own interests and her own honour. The principles embodied in that despatch were those on which Russia has consistently acted ever since; and I say that if statesmen in Europe and England had looked closely at it and read between the lines they would have seen the inevitable effect of the operation of the principles laid down. As Sir Henry Rawlinson had stated, the ink was scarcely dry with which it was written before the advance began, and in the five years between the beginning of 1864 and the end of 1868, Russia had actually conquered and annexed the whole of the vast territory which stretches from the Ural to the head waters of the Jaxartes. Russia finally conquered Samarcand, and that position commands Bokhara, which is a very important point. With regard to it, the noble Earl, in his speech, implied that, for the first time, Russia would touch Afghanistan in becoming possessed of Merv. That is a complete mistake. In having possession of Bokhara she was already a coterminous Power with Afghanistan. When I first

  979
  went to the India Office I found that Lord Lawrence had directed the attention of Mr. Disraeli's Government to the advances made by Russia, and intimated that the time had probably come for some understanding with that Power on the subject. This proposition was dealt with in a despatch, dated December 26, 1867, by Sir Stafford Northcote, who said—
  "Upon this point Her Majesty's Government see no reason for any uneasiness or for any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has made, and apparently is still making in Central Asia, appear to them to he the natural result of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly communications have at various times passed between the two Governments on the subject, and should an opportunity offer, Her Majesty's Government will avail themselves of it for the purpose of obviating any possible danger of misunderstanding either with respect to the proceedings of Russia or to those of England. This is all that it appears necessary or desirable to do."—[Afghanistan (1878), pp. 25–6.]
  That was the opinion of my Predecessor in Office at the time with regard to the advance of Russia in Central Asia, which brought that Power up to the borders of Afghanistan. When, under the threats of noble Lords opposite, Russia began to prepare for war in the East, it is well known that one of the principal columns which Russia prepared was prepared on the basis of Bokhara. It is, therefore, clear that, on that basis and at that time, she had become a Power capable of doing a serious danger to us in India. Do let us remember who were the public men in England who held power during the five years I have mentioned. It so happened that there was a very rapid succession of Cabinets. First there was Lord Palmerston's, then Lord Russell's and the Earl of Derby's, and, lastly, Mr. Disraeli's Government. Now, I think I may assume that up to that point opinion was clearly united. I never doubted for a moment that it would be very wise and expedient to have political Agents in the principal towns of Afghanistan, if those Agents could be received with goodwill by the people; and I think there was nothing unreasonable in the desire to get reliable information in that way if it could be done. But I decline to follow the noble Earl in the attack on my noble Friend the late Governor General of India (the Earl of
  980
  Northbrook) and myself who was then Secretary of State. That question has been argued in Parliament and has been decided in Parliament, and I wish to go on to another question and try to establish some unity of feeling in regard to it. What is the position which we have got to now? The advances of Russia in those five years were upon what may be called the upper line of attack—I mean of possible attack on India—the line of advance along the Oxus and Jaxartes; and the whole of these two valleys were practically subject to Russia. It has always been considered by those who have looked carefully into this matter that if ever there be an invasion of India by Russia it will not be mainly from Bokhara, but from the Caspian base and through Persia. I believe that no great expeditionary force capable of troubling us in India can advance to our Frontier without the material aid and assistance of Persia. The real alarm that has always been felt in regard to Merv is that there would be an advance of Russia towards the Persian boundary. The pressure of Russia would be exercised on Persia, and not on Afghanistan. I listened carefully to the speech of the noble Earl opposite to-night. He began by saying that he would give the House an idea of what importance Merv was. I wanted to know more about the matter than most people do know. What are the resources of Merv, and what is its geographical position? I have heard one description given of it by the noble Earl that I believe is accurate. The noble Earl says it is an oasis surrounded on all sides by desert; it is a mere green spot in the midst of one of the most hideous deserts in all Asia. But, in order to give us a truer description and a clearer idea of the great importance of Merv, the noble Earl said it was on the way between two great routes to the North. He did not, however, give us any idea of the population of Merv. We know that, at a very ancient period of history, it was the capital of a powerful and flourishing State; and it is just possible that, if it comes under a civilized Power, and immense works of irrigation are executed, it might again be the seat of a teeming population. But now, even while admitting my own ignorance as regards the subject, I doubt if Merv could turn out anything like 10,000 men. If the noble Earl can contradict that, he knows

  981
  more of its present population than I do. But, whatever it may be, we have lately had the letters of newspaper correspondents and other travellers, and we know that it is a place capable of great fertility, producing melons of very great size. That does not tell us much as to the military power it is capable of giving to Russia; but Merv is a mere spot, an oasis surrounded by deserts; and as to the roads of which the noble Earl speaks to the North, I have read the account given by a military writer who took the route to the North near Charjui, to the nearest ford on the Oxus; and his description of a march of 230 or 240 miles gives you the idea that it is one of the most wretched and dangerous deserts in Central Asia, the water, where water is to be found, and that only at great distances, being of the very bitterest kind. It is, I think, perfectly certain that if Russia ever invaded India, she would never send an army, or even a detachment from the Oxus through Merv. I believe that Russian advance of a serious kind must come through the fertile districts of Persia; it must come by Meshed and Sarakhs, and have the resources of that country at its command. I am not prepared to say that, at some future time, such an expedition may not be taken. All I say is, that it must be done with the complicity and with the resources of the Persian Government, and that our best agency should be established in Persia. I believe that all the objects aimed at by the late Government in seeking to establish Agents in Afghanistan will be better accomplished by having a good Minister established at the Court of Teheran, and Agents at Meshed and other places in Persia. Another point in regard to Merv the noble Earl took care not to mention. I do not know, however, that he had any object in concealing it, because his theory—a very reasonable one—is that the advance of Russia is inevitable, and that all her promises are so much waste paper—so much wasted breath. I believe them to be so. All that I want the House to understand clearly is, that no charge of breach of faith or of any absolute promise can be brought against Russia in this matter. I speak for myself—I do not speak for the Government—but some years ago, when I looked very carefully into the matter, I found not one single Russian
  982
  promise, so-called, that was not so fortified—and especially that celebrated despatch of Prince Gortchakoff's to which I have referred—by contingencies, that they would have a perfect right, if those contingencies arose, to go forward whenever they pleased. As to Merv, the noble Earl forgot to mention that of all the robber hordes in Central Asia the Merv Turcomans are about the most bloodthirsty and the very worst. I am told that when Sir John M'Neill was Minister in Persia, for many years he had constant appeals addressed to him as to the rescue of captive Persian and Russian subjects who had been kidnapped by these Turcoman hordes. Russia, therefore, has had a positive grievance in this—that the commerce of Central Asia could not be conducted so long as these people were not subdued. I must say, with all my determination—as strong as that of any other person can be—to maintain our Indian Empire, it is against my conscience, against my belief of the truth, to say that the safety of our Indian Empire depends upon maintaining this robber horde at Merv. I have, myself, for many years read language of constant remonstrance which has been addressed to the Russian Government on the subject of Central Asia. Some of that language was addressed to them by the noble Earl the present Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby), in despatches giving distinct warning to Russia, not so much on the noble Earl's own behalf, as on account of the susceptibilities of the people of this country, to the effect that any advance of Russia in that region would be considered as alarming, and as calculated to create difficulties in the relations between the two Powers. I frankly confess that I have gone the length of feeling that that language was language which it was not worthy of this country to address to Russia. In the first place, I did not believe in the danger; and, in the second place, I did not believe in the justice of those remonstrances. I have thought that, in the natural course of events, Russia must compel the Turcomans to give up their kidnapping and marauding pursuits, which are their only means of living, and that that would mean nothing less than the subjection of the country to Russia. I watched very closely the speech of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of

  983
  Lytton) to learn what he himself would have done in the present circumstances; whether he would have threatened Russia with the wrath of England, or made serious menaces which he might not have been able to carry out; but the noble Earl most carefully avoided committing himself to any resolution on the point. Let me read to the House the opinion on this point of a very distinguished man, no less than Sir Bartle Frere, and I cannot mention his name without expressing the deep sorrow with which we all have heard of his serious illness. I do not know if there is any man in public life with whose opinions I have more widely differed than Sir Bartle Frere; but I have sat with him in council, I have read his despatches, I have observed his public career, and this I will say—that I know no abler man, no abler public servant, no man with a more extended knowledge, and, above all—for this is what we value our Indian officers for—I never met a man who had more of the courage of his opinions, and who was more able or willing to assume the responsibility that his opinions might involve, and I trust that he will soon be restored to health. Well, here is the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere, who, as your Lordships know, was an advocate of what is called a forward policy in India. He says—
  "As for making an advance upon Merv by Russia a casus belli, I do not think the proposal will stand examination. The place is nothing to us except as a step towards Herat and Cabul, and it is not a necessary step to either; but to prohibit the Russians from taking it might, in the event of their regarding our prohibition, force them to turn it, and thus delay for some time the extermination of hordes of robbers and man-stealers, whose intervention between us and Russia must ever be a fruitful source of misunderstanding. But the Russians will not, or, more correctly speaking, they cannot, stop; they cannot regard any mere threats or prohibitions of ours of that kind."
  What, in those circumstances, ought to be the policy of this country? The noble Earl spoke as if the traditional policy that had existed for a long time—that of maintaining an independent Afghanistan—was now out of the question. I have not seen the despatches that have lately come with respect to the state of Afghanistan; but I do not think it is impossible to restore Afghanistan to a sufficient degree of strength to be a very good bulwark against Russia. It is a
  984
  difficult country to enter, and, as we found the other day in the war, it is a country peopled with most gallant tribes, who, on several occasions, gave our troops—the most disciplined troops in Europe—almost enough to do to combat with them. I do not despair of our traditional policy; but if the Afghans are alarmed at the progress of Russia, if they should change their minds in respect of receiving officers at Cabul and Herat, I see nothing to prevent the Government adopting such a policy. If the Government are clear that Russia is making for Persia along the Merv oasis, or in any other direction, with a view to making that country either wholly or in part the basis of military operations, we shall then be entirely in a new position, and able to take our own measures in Afghanistan. But, my Lords, this I will say—that although, in my estimation, the war waged by noble Lords opposite was not, in the circumstances, a just war, yet I am not prepared to say that it has been wholly without some good effect. My Lords, there is no use disguising the fact that the power of England in the East is a great power. It is well that the half-civilized tribes of that part of the world should know that we are their masters, and that when we like to take a country like Afghanistan with the resources of our civilization, we can do it without any serious sacrifice to our resources. And, my Lords, this is the reason—to touch for a moment upon another subject—this is the reason why I cannot sympathize with some of the language which has been held by some noble Lords on this side of the House in regard to what has been called the massacres which have lately taken place in Northern Africa on the Nile. My Lords, it is a matter of great moment to the civilized world—whatever may be the policy of the present Government—that these Mahomedans in Africa should know that we can and will beat them. Depend upon it, we may admire their gallantry as much as we please—and no man can admire their gallantry more than I do—but, nevertheless, it is perfectly consistent with that admiration that we should wish to defeat them. We have defeated them, and they have learned a lesson they will not forget. Whatever may be the future policy of this Government or any other future Government in Afghanistan, it

  985
  is not by any means an unimportant circumstance that we have had a successful campaign against them. Now, I am not going to dictate to the Government, or even to suggest to them the course they should take in relation to this matter. Whatever that course may be, there is one thing which I earnestly urge upon the Government, and it is this—that they shall not go to Russia and ask for new assurances. I quite agree with the noble Earl opposite that it is not a dignified attitude, and, however sincere the Cabinet of St. Petersburg may be in giving its promises, which is quite possible, that Cabinet has not the power always to control events, so as to be able to fulfil them. Therefore, the promises given are not worth the breath with which they are spoken. Whatever may be the policy, let it be independent of them. There may, however, be negotiations between us and Russia in regard to limitations of territory. That is the legitimate thing, and the proposition now made by the noble Earl may or may not be true as a general doctrine; but we have promised her independence to Afghanistan, and I trust that we shall never break that promise, unless Afghanistan commits an act of treachery against us. That is the only ground—and it is a sufficient one—on which I would respect the independence of Afghanistan. Now, my Lords, I hope the House will not think that I have spoken in a spirit either of what the noble Earl would call a Russophobe or a Russophil. I do not know why anyone should suspect me of being a Russophil. I have the honour—and a great honour I deem it—of being one of the very few survivors of the Cabinet which fought the Crimean War. Unlike many other Members of the Liberal Party, who are never tired of denouncing that war as either a great folly or a great crime, I have never been ashamed of the part which the English Government took on that occasion. We did not fight for the resurrection of Turkey. I, for one, never would. We fought for the great principle that, whatever the fate of Turkey might be, it was not to rest in the hands of Russia, but it was a question to be decided by Europe—not by Russia, not by secret Treaties and Conventions, giving her the power to do what she pleases when she pleases. That was the principle for which we
  986
  fought, and it is the principle which I, for one, should be ready to fight for again. But, my Lords, as regards Central Asia, I have had this feeling—that Russia is there, at least, as a civilizing Power. The noble Earl opposite, in his speech, admitted that there is no other Power which can reduce these robber tribes. There is no other Power that can rescue and raise that great region of the world, the source and origin of our own race, from the misery and the degradation which has long afflicted it; and, although, as compared with us, and as regards Europe, Russia is not a civilized Power, in that country she is. But, my Lords, when I come to contemplate such an event as the possible invasion of British India by Russia, then again I turn round and say that such an event would be almost as wretched an event to anticipate as any that had ever happened in history; in fact, a Russian invasion of England would be almost as bad. Such an event would destroy the civilization which we have established in that part of the world, and also the Empire of which we are justly proud. I have to say, in conclusion, that whatever be the measures the Government may take for securing our Indian Frontier, they will receive the hearty support of the united people of this country.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: My Lords, I shall not detain the House any length of time by commenting upon the speech of the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll), with a great part of which I concur. I understand the noble Duke to advance the argument that England should show herself prepared to defend India, and not to be deterred from making whatever preparations may be necessary to secure it from Russian ambition. I am not going to contemplate that as a very near process, nor as one that Russia has in contemplation. I look upon the question of the advances of Russia in Central Asia mainly from the point of view of the effect it will produce on the people of India in weakening the Government there, and giving the impression that England is a receding Power, and Russia an advancing Power. Nor am I disposed to forget that some such feeling has been created in the Indian mind. I do not lay great stress upon the Indian Press; but this I do say—that already, in taking up this sub-

  987
  ject, the newspaper Press has made numberless attacks on British power, and it is said that the British power is waning before the advancing power of Russia. Sir Bartle Frere used stronger language than any used by the noble Duke. He stated that it was inevitable that Russia should advance until she met with some impassable barrier, or until she came in contact with some Power whom she had reason to fear, and who might become conterminous with that Power, taking under its Government the tribes then on the Russian Frontier. One thing is obviously necessary—if Afghanistan is to be protected from Russia, and if Afghanistan is indispensable for the purposes of our defence as regards India, we cannot leave that country in such a position as will enable her to send her Border Tribes into Russian territory. If we consider that the Borders of Afghanistan are to be made practically the Borderland of Russia, and that the internal affairs of Afghanistan are not to be interfered with, it becomes an absolute necessity that, either by force, or in other ways, England should take upon herself the restriction of the Frontier Tribes over which she exercises control from becoming an invading Power against Russia, and so bring Russia nearer to ourselves. I am not going on this occasion to follow the consideration of what took place formerly. It is no use at this time to refer to the past, because at this moment we really want some sort of knowledge as to what is going on. Merv may be the unimportant place which the noble Duke opposite has described it to be at present; but no one knows how strong it may not be made from a strategical point of view in the hands of Russia. The fact that it has once been a great city shows that, at least, under a civilizing Power, it may suffice to maintain a very considerable force. Now that Russia has come to the weak point of the Afghan Frontier, she has, by their recent submission, relieved herself from the pressure of the Turcoman Tribes which could have been brought against her. Irrespective of the line of march that Russia may adopt in the face of an invasion of India, she has, by subduing these tribes, made herself safe on the North from any danger which could have arisen. I quite agree with my noble Friend (the Earl of Lytton) that an
  988
  independent Afghanistan has become almost an impossibility. Although it was so to some extent and for a short period under Dost Mahomed, it never existed in the the time of Shere Ali; and Abdurrahman at the present moment is not strong. I speak, of course, with great diffidence as to his position, because since 1881 we are almost without Papers; and I shall, therefore, press the noble Earl opposite that we should be, as early as possible, furnished with full information as to what has taken place since we withdrew from Afghanistan and left Abdurrahman with a sort of Sovereignty over the country. I also agree with the noble Duke opposite that all we do must be done with reliance on the right hand of England alone. If Russian promises are made, they must be thrust aside as of no consequence, bearing in mind that Russia is pushed forward by inevitable circumstances over which she has no control up to a certain point, where, I am afraid, she must come into collision with England. That point once attained, there will be no other means of restraining her advance but such force as we may possess.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I quite agree with a great deal that has been said by the noble Duke and the noble Viscount. I agree that it is essential, in dealing with the very grave and difficult question regarding our position in Afghanistan, that we should take an independent line, relying on ourselves, and not merely on any assurances which we may obtain from any Foreign Powers. Without wishing to say anything derogatory of a Power with whom we are on friendly terms, I cannot say that I have ever thought we ought to rest much on the assurances we have received. It has been truly pointed out that Russia is pushed forward by a variety of reasons; and, whether we receive assurances or not, we should, in directing our policy, look at facts and accommodate ourselves to them, and not to what Foreign Powers may say. I do not, however, go quite so far as the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton), who said diplomatic communications were perfectly useless. I cannot go so far as that, because, especially between civilized Powers, there must be, from time to time, understandings and communications with regard to matters of common interest, and we have reasonable

  989
  ground for expecting that those communications will be of a certain weight at the time in disclosing to us the policy which a friendly Government intends to pursue. That is a very different matter from placing reliance on those communications in the sense of neglecting measures of precaution which our own interests require, which would he certainly most imprudent. But now in regard to what has taken place at Merv. I have certainly never been what is called a Russophobe; but, on the other hand, I have never been one of those who can regard with indifference the advance of Russia in Asia, and for this reason—not because it indicates an intention on her part to undertake a great invasion of India, but because I believe that the approach of a great Power near our Empire in India must have a disturbing effect on our position in Asia. It is impossible that it should be otherwise. It may not be a hostile approach, and it may ultimately have no injurious effect, but reflection upon the position which we hold and which Russia holds in Asia will show that an advance which brings these two great Empires into contact is an event of considerable interest and importance. The noble Earl who opened this discussion naturally recurred to the past, and I must refer to some of the observations which he made. He spoke of the policy of relying on the assurances of Russia; and, secondly, of the policy which consisted in the maintenance of a friendly and an independent Afghanistan which might be a barrier to Russia. Those were the two alternatives he brought before us. Now, as to the first, I think I have said enough. There is no great difference of opinion between us. As regards the second point we differ entirely. I am quite sure that the policy which he pursued would have rendered it still more difficult than it was to set up the strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan of which we used to hear a great deal. But I admit that the proceedings of the noble Earl have not had all the injurious effects that might have been expected from them. It has been said that Abdurrahman is a Ruler so weak that he exercises no real authority in Afghanistan. Now, from the communications that reach me, I am able to state that that is a very exaggerated view. To say that Abdurrahman is as strong a Ruler
  990
  as Dost Mahomed would be absurd; but he exercises strong authority over a considerable part of Afghanistan, and a certain authority over the whole of it. Our communications with Abdurrahman are such as to show that he is animated by very friendly feelings towards us. The noble Earl's (the Earl of Lytton's) policy was one very intelligible and very ingenious. It was that of destroying entirely this strong; and united Afghanistan; it was to occupy Candahar with British troops, and then Herat was to be given over to Persia. Now, of all the devices I ever heard of for facilitating the advance of Russia towards India I never heard of one more calculated to do so than the handing of Herat over to Persia. If that had been adopted you would practically have brought Russia into very dangerous contact with the Afghan territories nearer India, and certainly would never have attained the object you have in view—the strengthening of India against Russia. When we came into Office we gave up Candahar, and I think that was a wise policy. Why so? Because if we had retained possession of Candahar we should have had an unfriendly Afghanistan, and an unfriendly Afghanistan would greatly increase our difficulties in that quarter; and the cardinal point in the policy to be pursued is, in my opinion, to secure Afghanistan being on friendly terms. To occupy Candahar was to take the course most likely to prevent the possibility of our having a real friendly alliance with Afghanistan. The present Government, therefore, on coming into Office retired from Candahar. Lord Hartington, my Predecessor at the India Office, at the same time, recognized that Afghanistan was a country over which we must exercise a certain amount of influence and control, and we gave an engagement to Abdurrahman that if he were attacked England would assist him in his defence. That is a very important engagement. It was, in substance, the same as the promise given to Shere Ali by my noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook). Now, of course, we are perfectly aware that under the present circumstances it is necessary that we should draw into closer relations with Afghanistan; in fact, that is the essential result of Russia coming near to her; and what is most important in the assump-

  991
  tion by the Russians of Merv is that they will now be in immediate contact with the frontier of Afghanistan on the North-West. That undoubtedly renders it necessary that we should have closer relations with Afghanistan, and that we should continue to exercise that control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan we now exercise; so that, as the noble Viscount pointed out, we should be in a position to prevent quarrels arising between Afghanistan and its neighbours which might give rise to any serious results to ourselves. The noble Earl who brought the subject forward spoke rather slightingly of diplomatic relations. Now, although I do not say you should lay too much stress on diplomatic assurances, I think that some diplomatic understanding was necessary. The noble Earl said that Afghanistan could not he out of the sphere of Russian influence. Of course, Russia must exercise a certain influence in Afghanistan; but what we mean by Afghanistan being out of the sphere of Russian influence is that they are not to exercise any direct diplomatic pressure upon Afghanistan. The main basis of our whole policy in that country, and the basis of the policy of successive Governments, is that Afghanistan is regarded as being outside the sphere of Russian influence, and it is not merely the danger of Russian encroachment, but the obligations we are under as to Afghanistan, which render it necessary that there should be a friendly Afghanistan acting under our influence, and, to a certain extent, in these matters by our directions. Another point to which the noble Earl alluded was what he called the total destruction of his policy with the exception of one part of it—namely, the occupation of Quetta, which, although it was loudly condemned at the time, was afterwards adopted. I remember that there was a very loud condemnation of the occupation of Candahar, and that doubts were expressed as to the occupation of Quetta—doubts expressed by persons of great experience in Indian affairs. But the Government came to the conclusion that, on the whole, weighing the matter on all sides, it was desirable to occupy Quetta, and having so decided they took further steps. They thought it was desirable that one portion at Quetta should be placed on a more stable footing, and negotiations have taken place
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  between the Indian Government and the Khan of Khelat which have resulted in the administration of Quetta and the Bolan Pass being entirely handed over to us. Then the noble Earl referred to the discontinuance of the construction of a railway from Sibi to Quetta. Well, that is a matter which depends upon a variety of considerations; and although the railway to Sibi was completed four years ago, it was not thought expedient at that time that it should be continued to Quetta. The time has, however, now come when the matter must be reconsidered; for, having fixed ourselves at Quetta, it naturally follows that we should give the necessary protection to our garrison there by means of railway communication. Now, my Lords, the noble Viscount who spoke last asked what we intended to do, and that probably is a point the House may feel the most anxiety upon. It is very obvious that, as we are at present in communication with the Russian Government, I am not in a position to say much; but this I think I may say—that we are perfectly sensible that, looking to our communications in Afghanistan and to the approach of Russia to our actual frontier, it will be necessary to have some definite and clear demarcation of what is Afghanistan and what is the Russian line of frontier. That is a point which we are well aware must be settled, and before this occupation of Merv took place Her Majesty's Government had been in communication with the Ameer, with the view of collecting information and preparing for the ultimate dealing with the question. At the same time, as the noble Earl must be aware, it is a subject of very great difficulty. He himself has alluded to the country on the North-West Frontier, and knows how difficult it is to draw a line with perfect satisfaction. I hold that it would be a complete mistake for the Government of this country or the Government of India not to look at the whole of this question together, or to forget that, although the line of approach of Russia from the side of Persia may be an event which more immediately requires our attention, yet that there are other lines of approach, and that, without in the least implying apprehension of an invasion, the approach of the two Powers to one another must necessitate further communication in regard to their position

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  with regard to those regions. My Lords, these are matters which are fully present to our attention; but I gather with satisfaction, from what has been said on both sides of the House, that however we may dislike the advance of Russia towards India, we do not think there is any cause for alarm. It is perfectly competent for us to deal with the matter after our own fashion without consulting the views of any other Power, and in such a way as to make it understood in India that while we do not apprehend any such event as an attack by Russia on India, we are perfectly prepared to take those measures which may be necessary to make our frontier in India one which, I believe, will be as strong and unassailable as any other land frontier in the world.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My Lords, I must express the disappointment which I feel at much that has fallen from the noble Earl who has just sat down. The noble Earl's speech has left your Lordships just as much in ignorance of the policy of the Government as you were at the beginning. He bestowed most of his attention upon what I may call the ancient history of this matter, and steadily avoided the point upon which the attention of the House is mainly concentrated. The noble Duke opposite, from whom we have heard a very interesting and able speech, disbelieves in any danger, and, to a great extent, justifies Russia in her subjugation of the Turcoman Tribes around Merv. Now, whatever nations do in fulfilment of what they hold to be their inevitable destiny, we are entitled to look to their assurances formally, clearly, and unequivocally given. A great Power like Russia should not give deliberate assurances of that kind, and then, almost before the ink in which they are written is dry, endeavour to find some excuse for casting them to the winds. It would be easy to weary the House by reading the numerous assurances given by Russian Ministers, Statesmen, and Ambassadors, explaining her specific intentions with regard to Merv. There are even Imperial declarations on the subject. In 1875 the noble Earl the present Colonial Secretary warned Count Schouvaloff about the approach of Russia near Merv, and received from him in reply satisfactory assurances. In 1876 Prince Gortchakoff assured Lord
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  Augustus Loftus that the Russians had no intention of moving upon Merv. In 1879 a similar disclaimer was given by the Russian Ambassador in London to my noble Friend near me (the Marquess of Salisbury). In that same year the Emperor of Russia, in a personal interview with Lord Dufferin at St. Peters burg, gave him an assurance that the English were unreasonably alarmed, and that no movement upon Merv was intended. These were as distinct and emphatic assurances as one honourable man can give to another. But they were not all. In 1879 Lord Dufferin, receiving from the Russian Minister at St. Petersburg what amounted to a qualification of the assurances that had been given, protested, and satisfying assurances were thereupon again given. In 1881 a letter was shown by the Russian Ambassador to the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs containing an intimation that possibly some temporary occupation of Merv might be desirable. The noble Earl protested against the suggestion as an English Minister was bound to do, and in March of that year further assurances were given that nothing whatever was intended. Thus, year after year you have had successive remonstrances and protests on the part of the English Government as to the intentions of the Russian Government, and year after year you have had the most distinct assurances that your wishes would be respected. But what has happened since 1881? From time to time various Members of both Houses of Parliament have questioned the Government on the subject of the Russian advance towards Merv. I could read a whole string of Questions which prove this at all events—that great anxiety has been felt, and that there has been a prevalent desire to know the true state of things. In March, 1881, Sir Charles W. Dilke, on being asked whether he would telegraph to Herat to ascertain the truth of the rumour that Russian troops were at Merv, replied that the investigation of the rumour was not worth the expense of a telegram. That answer, I think, shows that the Government were extremely apathetic and indifferent. Later on the same Question was again put to Sir Charles W. Dilke. He replied—"The Government have no reason to suppose that the Russian troops are now at Merv;" and on being asked

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  whether he would telegraph for information, he said—"No." Thus we obtained no information from the Government, although we now know that all this time movements in the direction of Merv were going on. Now, what really is the value or importance of Merv? The Russian Government have somewhere been good enough to say that they have changed their opinion about the importance of that place, and that it is of less value than they supposed it to be. But in this House there is a general acknowledgment of its importance. My noble Friend who began this discussion referred to the ancient importance of Merv. It was once a town great in Oriental learning, in wealth, civilization, and population. We read in some old historians that the population was stated to be as high as 1,000,000. This, at least, is certain—that Merv was a rich, cultivated, and populous city. And the old conditions which made Merv rich and populous exist at present. These conditions are two—a fertile soil and an abundance of water. My noble Friend the noble Duke spoke of it as a mere oasis surrounded with deserts, and consequently valuable only in itself, and furnishing no base of operations in a military point of view. I would not set my judgment against that of my noble Friend; but my impression, derived from recent travels and inquiries, is that there is an oasis on three sides, and that on the Southwestern side is a very fertile grass tract, where military operations can be carried on. Though the noble Duke put down the population at the modest estimate of 10,000, I believe that everyone who really knows the country would put the numbers at much more. We know that the population are capable of rendering effective service as irregular horse, and when brought under discipline may render all the services which a military Power may require of them. These tribes have been driven back upon Afghanistan, and the occupation of Merv by Russia distinctly threatens Herat as well as the independence of Persia. If that be a truer estimate of the value of Merv, what are the consequences which may be expected from its annexation? For we must bear in mind that while, on one occasion, the Russian Government threatened a temporary occupation, not one word has been spoken now which
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  implies that the occupation is other than permanent. The Rulers of India in former times held that Merv was the key of Herat, and that Herat was the key of India. The most serious point of all is that, by the annexation of Merv, Russia and England are distinctly brought into political contact. They are the only two great Powers in that part of the world. Once you cut away the neutral zone, be the course what it may, whether the two Governments be friendly or unfriendly, rivalry in various particulars must grow up. Rivalry there must be between the two nations. In every Eastern town, bazaar, and village, wherever England and Russia are known, there will be all that reckless political competition, so to speak, which grows up from the very necessity of the case. There were parts of the speech of the noble Duke which seemed to favour the theory that it was well that we should become conterminous with a civilized Power. I was glad that the noble Earl who spoke for the Government did not lend his voice to that view. The noble Duke said that Russia was a civilized Power, that she would spread civilization, and that wherever civilization spread it must be for the advantage of the world. I do not believe in the doctrine of the noble Duke. The experience of Europe and of the whole world is adverse to it. Conterminous borders are no guarantee for the friendship of States. Are France and Germany the better friends because their borders are conterminous? Are Franco and Italy? Are Germany and Russia? And what reason is there to expect that when our borders are conterminous with those of Russia our relations with Russia will be better? The only result, as far as we are concerned, is that the military burdens of India must be increased. One other point. We hoped to have heard some statement of what the policy of Her Majesty's Government must be in circumstances which the noble Earl admitted to be very grave. The noble Duke said that we should not ask any further assurances from Russia. My Lords, what is the use of assurances when they are not worth the paper on which they are written? The noble Earl said that Her Majesty's Government, at all events, are prepared to deal calmly with the question in their usual fashion. What does their usual fashion mean?
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: I did not say "in our usual fashion." I do not think I spoke of fashion. I may have said that we should deal with it without passion.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I did not so understand the noble Earl. But what is the policy which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to pursue? The noble Earl said that they would draw closer our relations with Afghanistan. Does that mean very much what was the policy of my noble Friends behind me, or does it mean something very different? He said we ought to take up a strong position.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: I never said that we meant to take up a strong position.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: At all events, that we were so to arrange our relations with Afghanistan that Russia should not consider that Afghanistan came within the range of her influence. The Government, I think, should either take up a strong material position, or so speak to Russia that there might be no mistake whatever as to their meaning. Lord Lawrence, who was satisfied of the dangers of the gradual approaches and perpetual annexations on the part of Russia, held that it was incumbent upon the Government of England to draw a particular line, and that if such line were overpassed a casus belli would be established. Whatever policy we now adopt, let it for once be firm and consistent, instead of a policy oscillating to and fro, and which is hot at one time and cold at another. The result of the vacillation that has hitherto been shown by the Government is that they cannot speak out with the plainness and vigour with which they ought to speak. On the other hand, the Russian Government are encouraged by this seeming indifference to make further annexations and to mistake the indifference of a small section of politicians for the indifference of the whole country; and at the last moment we shall awake to find that the dream resolves itself into some most terrible and bloody reality.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just spoken has assumed that there has been vacillation in the policy of the Government in respect to Central Asia. Now, I can recollect a striking instance of vacillation with respect to the policy of
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  this country in regard to Central Asia, and that was when the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) talked one day of "large maps," and then suddenly changed his opinion and policy and pursued a directly opposite line. The policy of Her Majesty's Government, far from being vacillating, has been consistent, clear, and intelligible. Sir Lepel Griffin, who was charged by the Government of India with the conduct of negotiations with Abdurrahman, addressed that Prince in August, 1880, when he was placed on the Throne of Afghanistan, to the following effect:—
  "The British Government admits no right of interference by Foreign Powers within Afghanistan."
  Later on, in the other House, on a very important occasion, when the policy of the Government in withdrawing Her Majesty's Forces from Candahar was discussed, the Marquess of Hartington said that—
  "The present Government have admitted as plainly as any other that the integrity and independence of Afghanistan is a matter to them of vital importance, and that they do not intend to permit interference by any Foreign Powers with the internal and external affairs of Afghanistan."
  Nothing, I think, could be more clear or more precise than the declarations which Her Majesty's Government have made of their determination to prevent foreign interference with Afghanistan; and on every occasion the Russian Government have admitted that Afghanistan was beyond the sphere of the influence which they consider they have a right to exercise in Central Asia. While I quite agree with the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that in some respects the subjugation of the Turcomans of Merv to Russia will be of advantage to the civilization, peace, and comfort of that part of the world—because I know they have been the greatest stealers of men in the whole of the vast area of Central Asia, and have supplied the slave markets for the whole country—while I cannot regret that they have come under the Sovereignty of a Power sufficiently strong to prevent the terrible devastation of Persian Khorassan by these Turcomans, I must, at the same time, express my regret, looking at the matter from a political point of view, that the Russian dominion has

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  extended so far as Merv. But my reasons are not quite the same as those of noble Lords opposite. I do not believe in the great strategical value of Merv, and I consider that no geographical limit will prevent Russia from exercising influence in Afghanistan if she should wish to do so. Besides, Bokhara, a country under the control of Russia already, adjoins Afghanistan. I do not, therefore, believe that the extension of the Russian dominion to Merv is to be regretted on the ground that it will give Russia greater power of exercising influence than she had before. But I regret the acceptance of the Sovereignty of Merv by Russia, because it may probably lead to disturbances and dissensions between the Turcomans of Merv, who are now Russian subjects, and the people of Afghanistan, which may cause unpleasant transactions between Russia and Afghanistan. Mainly on that account the possession of Merv by Russia has always been deprecated by the Government of India, and has always been looked upon by the Rulers of Afghanistan with apprehension. I am one of those who think that the negotiations which were carried on for many years between Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff, and other eminent statesmen, and which had for their object the maintenance of a wide margin between the Possessions of England and Russia in the East, were wise. In Europe no evils arise from great Empires being conterminous; but the case is very different in the East, where the subjects of both Powers are not of their own nationality, and where there must be greater difficulty from the nature of things in settling any small differences than there can be in Europe. Moreover, the local agents on the spot are not always under the same control and subject to the same influences as in Europe. I, therefore, regret that the time has now come when, practically, the English and Russian Empires in Asia must be considered as conterminous. I can state shortly how I consider that this has occurred. In 1878 the condition of affairs between this country and Russia was exceedingly critical. The Reserves were called out, our Fleet was sent to the Dardanelles, and troops from India were sent to Cyprus. In the spring of that year we were on the verge of a war with Russia. At that time General
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  Kauffman unwisely despatched a Mission to Cabul. That led to the war between England and Afghanistan; and the result was, undoubtedly, a great diplomatic defeat to the Russian Government. The Russian Mission was obliged to leave Cabul; Shere Ali Khan, to whom it had been sent, was driven ignominiously from his country; and when he appealed to Russia for assistance, the Russians were unable to assist him. It was about that time that the first really serious movement took place along the Northern Frontier of Persia, and General Lomakin advanced in the direction of Merv. We had in Afghanistan our misfortunes, among them being the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the repulse at Maiwand. The Russians, too, had their misfortunes. General Lomakin was defeated; but afterwards, in 1881, General Skobeleff defeated the Turcomans in a great battle, and, in fact, established Russian authority over the Tekke Turcomans, which carried with it almost inevitably the assumption of Sovereignty at Merv. Russia, in my opinion, has during all these years been impelled forward to acquire an expensive, and, to my mind, very useless territory; we, on the other hand, have spent some £20,000,000 in Afghanistan; and, as far as I am able to judge, the condition of affairs in Afghanistan is certainly no better than it was before. That is my way of accounting for the present condition of affairs; and these mistakes made by England and by Russia are the reasons why the wise provisions contemplated by Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff could not be maintained, and we have at present to accept the inevitable. My noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon) does not seem altogether to have understood the explanation given by the Secretary of State for India respecting the policy of the Government. The general lines of that policy are surely clear enough—namely, that we maintain the resolution which we have expressed in no ambiguous terms, that it is our business to see that there is no foreign interference with Afghanistan; and, moreover, that, under the present circumstances, it is necessary that there should be some more clear demarcation of the frontier between Russian territory at Merv and Afghanistan than now exists, with the view of preventing the

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  difficulties which are not unlikely to arise from the Russian Turcomans and the Turcomans under the rule of the Ameer of Afghanistan being conterminous. It would not be reasonable to ask the Government, so short a time after the news arrived, and before they have been able to communicate with the Viceroy of India, to enter into further explanations regarding the manner in which the relations between England and Afghanistan may be strengthened and made more intimate. But the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton), who succeeded me in the Office of Governor General of India, has asked me whether a recommendation, which the Government of India made in 1875, expresses the policy which Her Majesty's Government now maintain in this respect, and he read a paragraph from the despatch in which that recommendation was expressed. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to read, it again. It is as follows:—
  "Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would he produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turcoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan; and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian Frontier."—[Afghanistan, 1878, pp. 134–5.]
  That opinion was given nine years ago, and it was given before the events took place which are well known to your Lordships, when the noble Earl opposite succeeded me as Viceroy; and if I am asked whether the recommendations we then made can be carried out now, I must know somewhat more than I now do about the present position of Afghanistan. It is a question that can only be answered by the Viceroy, after obtaining the best information that he can obtain of the disposition of the Ameer of Cabul. The warning which the Government of India gave to the noble Marquess opposite, when he was Secretary of State for India, contained in the very despatch from which the noble Earl has quoted, against a course which was calculated to alienate the Ameer Shere Ali, and in all
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  probability to bring on a war between England and Afghanistan, was not taken. No attention was paid to it by the noble Marquess, or the noble Earl, and the warning came true. By their policy they brought on the war. They nearly dissolved Afghanistan into its first elements again; and the noble Earl asks me whether I would now carry out a recommendation which was given in circumstances entirely different from those existing at present, and when he and the noble Marquess who sits by his side have, by their action, prevented the circumstances from remaining the same. I agree with the opinion expressed by the noble Duke behind me as to the establishment of British Agents in Afghanistan. I have no objection to the location of British Agents at Herat, or in other parts of Afghanistan, upon one condition—that is, that they shall go with the full concurrence of the Ruler of the country, and go as friends, and not be looked upon as enemies and spies. That was the advice which we gave to the noble Marquess, but which he did not act upon. I do not agree with the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton) that a British Agent would run any serious risk at Herat. There have been British Agents in Herat before; they have remained there for some time, and they came to no harm. I consider that if a British Agent even now were placed at Herat with the full consent and at the wish of the Ruler of Afghanistan, he would not be in a position of greater risk than Englishmen often occupy in different parts of the world. It would be a great advantage to have an English Resident at Herat, because he would be on the spot when any differences arose between the Turcoman tribes of Afghanistan and of Merv, and, therefore, would be able to settle them. My Lords, I regretted to hear the noble Earl disagree with the general opinion entertained of the value of a strong Afghanistan between Russia and India. I understood the noble Earl to take the view that it was no use our making any representations to Russia in respect of her progress towards Merv; that the idea of having a strong and independent Afghanistan was altogether a fallacy; and that we ought to take up a military and political position which would enable us to look with perfect equanimity at the advance of Russia.
  THE EARL OF LYTTON: Afghanistan never can be, and never has been, independent.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: It comes to very nearly the same thing—namely, that Afghanistan cannot be united and independent. I do not think the opinion of the noble Earl is borne out by the history of Afghanistan. At the present time the Ruler of Afghanistan appears to me, as far as I can judge, to have governed his country with energy and ability, and to have made quite as much progress as could have been expected in the time in establishing his authority over the whole country. The noble Earl doubts whether he can establish his authority over the country. I think Abdurrahman is in no worse position than his Predecessor, Shere Ali, who established his authority over the whole of Afghanistan, including Herat and the outlying parts. For many years his father, Dost Mahomed, did the same thing; and, therefore, I say that history is opposed to the contention of the noble Earl. The noble Earl said that the position he wished to take up had been taken up before he left India—I mean the position which would enable us to look with perfect equanimity at the advance of Russia, and he complained that his policy had been reversed by the present Government and my noble Friend (Lord Ripon) who succeeded him as Viceroy. I was perfectly astonished to hear that statement, and I waited to see what proof the noble Earl had to bring forward. I waited, moreover, to see in what point my noble Friend and the present Government had altered the policy which he carried out while he was Governor General. What was the position in which the noble Earl left Afghanistan? The position of Afghanistan was this. The policy of the Conservative Government was—
  "To hand over Herat to Persia, to separate Western and Southern Afghanistan—that is to say, Herat and Candahar—from Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, composed of Turkistan and Cabul-cum-Jellalabad."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: What is the noble Earl reading from?
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I will satisfy the noble Marquess in a moment if he will only have a little patience.
  "They proposed to make Northern and Eastern Afghanistan over to any strong Ruler
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  who might be found. Candahar had been already erected into a separate State, granted as a hereditary possession of Wali Shere Ali Khan, while Herat was destined for Persia. The Persian negotiations fell through, and the idea was naturally not revived when the Liberals took Office."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: What is the quotation from?
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I will satisfy the noble Marquess in a moment. The noble Earl in his speech threw out, as I understood it, some accusation against Lord Ripon or the Government that some breach of faith had been committed by the evacuation of Candahar. What were the real circumstances of the case? While the Conservative Government were in power a declaration was made at Cabul—
  "That the British Government had no intention of occupying permanently or annexing Candahar, and our withdrawal was in direct accordance with the reiterated and solemn professions and assurances of the Government of India to the Chiefs and people of Cabul. We could not have remained without a breach of public faith."
  My Lords, the words which I have read to the House were written by a gentleman of the highest reputation in the Indian Civil Service, and who was actually the officer employed by the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton) to carry out these negotiations with Abdurrahman—Sir Lepel Griffin. There is no man in existence who is so entirely competent to express a clear opinion as to what the position of affairs was in Afghanistan as left by the noble Earl opposite. The words which I have read to the House were written, as I have said, by Sir Lepel Griffin, in a letter addressed to The Times on March 15, 1883. Now, I think I have, at any rate, protected my noble Friend (Lord Ripon) from the attack made upon him by the noble Earl. I ask the noble Earl what was this very beautiful condition of affairs which he left in Afghanistan, and which would enable us to look with perfect equanimity at the advance of Russia? I cannot understand what hallucination came over the noble Earl which led him to suppose that he left such a condition of affairs, and that the Government of Lord Ripon had amused themselves by destroying this beautiful fabric and substituting something else in its place. The noble Earl took great credit to himself for the Beloochistan proceedings. I think he

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  might have said something of a most distinguished public servant, Sir Robert Sandeman, to whom I feel the main credit for the success of the Beloochistan policy is due. The noble Earl, so far as I understood him, seemed to think that something entirely new and extraordinary had been done in Beloochistan. It is not at all the case. The noble Earl knows that, as regards Beloochistan, we had a Treaty made years ago, which gave us power to occupy any position there which we considered necessary. The occupation of Quetta, therefore, was authorized by Treaty; and, in point of fact, the Beloochistan policy was, to a considerable extent, initiated before the noble Earl went to India. Until after the recent war, I myself was against the occupation of Quetta as a military station, because it is so far from the Indus. But circumstances after the last Afghan War greatly changed. It would have been difficult for us to have withdrawn from Quetta, in consequence of the arrangements we had made with the Afghan tribes in its neighbourhood. I, therefore, have come to the conclusion, with many others, that, whatever objections there may have previously been, it is desirable to maintain a force at Quetta, rather than to alter the arrangements made with the neighbouring tribes. I wish to say that, for my part, I consider the idea of a Russian invasion of India to be a mere bugbear. I agree with the view expressed by one of the most distinguished of our Governor Generals of India—Lord Dalhousie—who, after discussing all the possibilities of such an invasion and the great physical difficulties in its way, said—
  "All I can say is that, if the Russians should try to invade India, I wish that I might he Governor General of India at the time."
  I think that in discussing this question we are apt to run away with the idea that there is some real danger to be apprehended by Russia's advance to Merv. But that the possession of a few mud hovels in the desert should menace the power of England in India is to me an idea which cannot for a single moment be entertained by anyone with a knowledge of the relative power of the two countries, the distances to be passed, the resources of the Indian Empire, and the loyalty of the Queen's Indian subjects. I think the discussions in this
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  House and in the other House have been satisfactory, because they have shown that, however much we may differ as to the past, we are all agreed that the absence of foreign interference in Afghanistan is a matter of great importance, and that in any policy which Her Majesty's Government may pursue to obviate the inconveniences—I will not call them dangers—of Russia's extension of Sovereignty to Merv, we shall have the support of both sides of the House.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the noble Earl, in the course of his remarks, expressed his assent to the suggestion of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that we should not thrash over the controversies that have taken place in this House with respect to past Indian policy; but that good precept which he laid down he certainly did not follow. He gave us very little information as to the future policy of the Government; and very little information as to the immediate past; but it seems to me as if his whole contribution to this debate consisted of all the dirt which he could pick out of past controversies to fling at his opponents. My Lords, in this task his memory has, I fear, somewhat failed him. He revived a number of charges, one of which was that I had expressed my belief in the improbability of a Russian advance to Merv a few days before orders were given for the advance of the British troops to Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, the observations I made in this House, in answer to a noble Lord opposite (Lord De Mauley), expressing my disbelief in Russia's march to Merv, were made in 1877; while the military advance into Afghanistan took place at the end of 1879, in consequence of the presence of the Russian Ambassador at Cabul. And I will observe, in passing, that my scepticism as to the probability of a military advance at that time by Russia to Merv was entirely justified by the subsequent course of events, for it has not been by a military advance that Merv has come under the domination of Russia, but by other means. The noble Earl has also revived the old charge that the war of 1879 was due to the impression produced on Shere Ali's mind by a request made by my noble Friend that he would admit an English Minister to his capital.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I did not say that.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Does the noble Earl say he did not declare that that war in Afghanistan was due to the policy of my noble Friend, which he opposed? There was not a shred of proof for this. The noble Earl must know very well that Shere Ali was alienated before that time from the Government—that he refused to receive a British officer from Yarkund on account of the attitude that had been adopted towards him. He knows that Shere Ali refused the subsidy which the noble Earl offered him. It is a matter of notoriety that the commencement of Shere Ali's alienation was due to the feeble and nerveless policy of the noble Earl in 1873. When, in that year, Shere Ali besought from the noble Earl a distinct declaration on the attitude of the British Government in respect to the advance of the Russian Government he could not obtain any satisfactory assurance. From that day it is well known that the alienation of Shere Ali commenced, and I believe that statement is confirmed by General Roberts, who reported that he himself, when in Cabul, found the general impression among the Afghans was that the alienation which ultimately caused the war in 1879 was produced by the refusal of the noble Earl to give him the required assurances of support in 1873. The noble Earl says that the orders he gave Sir Robert Sandeman to settle some disputes in Beloochistan were the commencement of the occupation of Quetta, to which now, as a sheet-anchor of safety, Her Majesty's Government are clinging. But the noble Earl must be perfectly aware that if it had been proposed to him at the time to occupy Quetta, he would have rejected the idea with the utmost abhorrence. Quetta was occupied two years later by my noble Friend (the Earl of Lytton), and it was then made the matter of vehement protest in this House by Lord Lawrence, supported by the noble Earl. The Government of the noble Earl, when he was in India, never gave the slightest indication of any desire to occupy Quetta; and when it was occupied by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, noble Lords opposite vigorously opposed and condemned it. My Lords, had it not been that I found it necessary to dissipate these charges of the noble Earl,
  1008
  I should not have desired to take any part in this debate, because the subject has been thoroughly and completely dealt with by noble Lords on this side of the House who have preceded me. I will only observe that the information that we have obtained from the Government to-night is of an enigmatical and insufficient character. We are told that the relations must be drawn closer between England and Afghanistan, and that the foreign relations of the Ameer must be placed under the control of the English Government.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: They are now under its control.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Then there is all the less novelty in the information we have received. But we are not told how these relations are to be controlled—whether the influence is to be moral or physical. And I should like to ask the noble Earl to consider this—that it is not the foreign policy of the Ameer that really furnishes the danger of the future. My noble Friend has pointed out that Russia has been urged on by a force which she cannot resist in this course of annexation which has ended in Merv. I do not imagine that that force which has pushed her thus far forward will necessarily stop there now. It is as true now as when the despatch of 1864 was written that Russia cannot bear dens of robbers on her frontiers. She will still have dens of robbers upon her frontiers at Merv. She will have a tumultuous and disturbing population, subject to no authority, bound by no law, who, if not restrained, will be perpetually committing outrages which will give to Russia a motive, or an appearance of motive, every bit as fair as that on which she has hither to gone for advancing a step further in order to punish and control them. And I want to know how you are to so arrange your relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan that that danger will cease to exist? There was another point which I thought unsatisfactory in the speech of the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley). He appeared to me, as did the noble Earl who has just sat down, to think exclusively of strategic considerations. I believe that the great fault of our policy with the Afghans and the Turcomans—a fault which, I am bound to say, I do not think is exclusively confined to one side of the House—is that we have been too much led by

  1009
  European modes of thought and methods of warfare, and have paid too little regard to the peculiar circumstances of the East. In Europe, if the strategic position is sound, everything is safe; but it is not so in the East. There is an impalpable power which we know very little of, and which we are obliged to describe by the unmeaning French word prestige—an impalpable influence which stretches like a shadow before the frontier of every Power, and in proportion as that prestige is great or small—in proportion as the range of shadow is long or short—it will spread forward its true dominion far beyond the exact space that its arms embrace. Your frontier may be as strong as you please; your fortresses may be as impregnable as you please; but if the prestige of the Power coming against you is greater than your own, it will penetrate through that barrier; it will undermine your sway; it will dissolve the loyalty and patriotism of those you rule, where loyalty and patriotism do not mean what they do here, and you will find that your fortresses will dissolve and crumble under you, and that you are overthrown by the desertion of those who readily fly to the Power they believe to be stronger than yourself It is true that Eastern nations fight with arms; but they also fight with the reputation of strength. Russia has gained Merv, not because she has taken it, but because the Turcomans, looking at Russia advancing and England retreating, said—"England is nothing, and we will pay our submission to Russia." Have you not noticed as a strange circumstance that the capture of Merv has taken place when our fortunes in Egypt are at the lowest, when our credit is being sullied, and our resources are being strained? Do you imagine that there are no other populations similar to those of Merv, and that the same reasoning will not arise in other Asiatic places? If you look merely to strategy, and neglect what is popularly described as prestige, the tale which was told of Merv will in due time be related of Herat. I dare say there will be no military expedition—it, perhaps, will not be necessary for Russia to beleaguer the walls of Herat or to open her entrenchments; but if the impression spreads in Western Afghanistan that we are the retreating and Russia the advancing Power, and if they gather from our recent action the melan-
  1010
  choly inference that England, under her present mode of Government cannot be counted upon for any vigorous or tenacious resistance, they will not wait to be besieged or attacked—they will simply carry their submission as the Turcomans have done to the White Czar, in whose prowess they believe. That is the great danger I see in our policy to India. We are simply looking at the strategic considerations, and imagine that if they are cared for all will be safe. But if it should so happen that any Viceroy should occupy the position which Lord Dalhousie was said to desire—of being the Viceroy of India when the Russian invasion takes place—what he would have to contend with would not be a direct attack of the Russian Army coming through the Khyber and Bolan Passes. It would be the undermining of his strength in India by the production of intrigues and rebellions among the Natives of India, the gradual weakening of the respect for the English arms, disaffection towards the English Raj, and the gradual crumbling away of our resources before Russia has struck a blow against our frontier. That is the real danger we have to fear; that is why it is a matter of life and death to us that Afghanistan should be kept clear not only of Russian soldiers, but of Russian influence and intrigue. That is why this acquisition of Merv must not be put aside by platitudes about the advantage of having a humane instead of an inhuman Power upon the borders of Afghanistan, or with the consolation that Merv is not on the route to anywhere particular. The event must be looked on in a graver light than that. It is the gravest that has happened with respect to our Empire in the East, and I feel sure that the English people will exact a heavy responsibility from Her Majesty's Government unless they approach the question with a due sense of the terrible magnitude of the interests surrounding it.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I can quite understand that the noble Marquess has been, much nettled, as he seems to have been at the remarks of the noble Earl on the subject of the past war in Afghanistan. He must feel regret, when he calmly reflects upon what passed at that time, upon the millions that have been spent and the anarchy which has been produced in Afghanistan, and

  1011
  above all on the lesson taught to Russia, which I do not believe dreamed of such a Quixotic enterprize as trying to take India from us, but was convinced by the impulsive action of the noble Marquess that whenever Russia has a quarrel with us she can stir up that sort of irritation, and create that sort of panic, to which the noble Marquess yielded when he went into that most unjust and unnecessary war. I quite admit that the noble Earl the ex-Viceroy, in introducing this question, laid down a very charming scheme in the debate to-night. He said we had better avoid the past and confine ourselves to the present and future. Nothing, I think, could be more sensible or admirable; but hardly a minute had elapsed before the noble Earl proceeded to make a very natural attempt to define his own policy, and began to attack the policy of his Predecessor and Successor. The noble Viscount spoke shortly, without one word in support of the views of the noble Earl. The noble Marquess has made strong invectives against us; but he has entirely declined to reply to that pointed question which the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley) had put to him, and which was to describe what was the strong military and political position which the noble Earl left behind him in Afghanistan at the end of his Vice-royalty. On the other hand, the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) differed entirely from the late Viceroy, and said he knew what those assurances of Russia were; that they were worth nothing; and that he did not blame Russia for making them. He was indignant with me because I did not listen to the very long list of extracts from the Blue Book which he read, with which I happen to be already acquainted. I entirely agree with my noble Friend the Secretary of State for India that it is perfectly impossible to adopt a particular course with regard to another country if you are not to have diplomatic relations; but I quite admit the general tenour of the extracts which the noble Earl read—or rather repeated—to the House. They certainly give the notion that there was no intention on the part of Russia of taking Merv. I admit, however, that there are always in them reservations, and that the Russian Government and the Russian Emperor did not give up their liberty of action for all times and under all cir-
  1012
  cumstances. I am bound to say that I do not think that I was the dupe of any representation about Merv; but I never assured the House and the public that it was perfectly impossible that Russia would advance. My Lords, I certainly think it is a reason of complaint that when two countries are in friendly communication with each other on one subject, and the assurance of one is always more or less in one direction, although unexpected circumstances may arise—though I cannot imagine that any such unexpected circumstances have arisen with regard to the Merv Chiefs—that we should suddenly find that the annexation of Merv is a fait accompli, without any previous communication to ourselves. The noble Earl the ex-Viceroy promised, in the beginning of his speech, that he would tell us what we ought to do. While the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) dreaded proximity, the late Viceroy took the contrary line, and argued that as Russia advances we should advance as rapidly as we can. The noble Earl's argument was, in fact, that the two countries should be in close proximity. The noble Marquess takes a higher line. His views are Oriental, in contradistinction, as he says, to our Western ideas; he says the business of a country like this is not to be concerned about strategy, but about the fanciful impressions you may produce. My Lords, I believe for the defence of India that strategy wisely considered and calmly acted upon is more valuable than attempts to influence in any false way the imagination of an Oriental people. My Lords, my noble Friend so fully stated the general principles upon which we proposed to act that I cannot add anything to what he has said. He wisely abstained from stating the exact mode in which we should try to strengthen our relations with Afghanistan; but, on the other hand, he pointed out that some clear and distinct definition of the frontier between Russia and Persia on the side of Afghanistan was of the greatest importance to the carrying out of the general principles on which we propose to act. The noble Earl opposite twitted us, saying that for three weeks we had been unable to determine what we should say to Russia. The noble Earl is, however, wrong, because it so happens that I have been in communication with the Russian Ambassa-

  1013
  dor here, and I have sent despatches to St. Petersburg. But I cannot help feeling very strongly that if the noble Marquess and the noble Earl had sometimes taken three weeks to consider a new policy before adopting it, if they had sometimes resisted the first impulse of the moment, this country would have been saved great and unnecessary evils. Papers on the subject to which the noble Earl has drawn attention will be presented as soon as possible. They will not include the Correspondence now going on with Russia; but they will include all the documents up to a very recent date.
  LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA: My Lords, I should consider it criminal on my part if I were to remain a silent witness on this occasion, because I was thoroughly acquainted with the circumstances connected with the negotiations with the Ameer Shere Ali previous to Lord Lytton's arrival in India, and I consider that he was fully justified in making war on Shere Ali. The Ameer was alienated by our refusal to accord to him the Treaty which he desired. I do not say that we ought to have made the Treaty, or that anything we could have given him would have satisfied him finally; but I maintain that his refusal to admit our officers into his country, and his reception of a Russian Agent at Cabul, his secret correspondence with the Russians at Turkistan, and his concealed military preparations on so extensive a scale as was discovered, showed that Shere Ali had become an enemy, and that the noble Earl the late Viceroy of India was thoroughly justified in making war on him. The occupation of Quetta was looked upon by many Members of this House with great alarm at the time; but the subsequent information fully justifies it. During the Siege of Lucknow, a part of our troops occupied a garden surrounded with a high wall; it was, however, so commanded by musketry from the houses around, that no one could ascertain what the enemy were doing outside until they blew in a part of the wall, which we had immediately to barricade. We then mined under the foundations of the wall, and emerged during the night on the outside, where we made an outwork as a post of observation, which was our Quetta, and enabled us to see what the enemy were doing.
  1014
  Had Her Majesty's Government retained Candahar and given the Ameer Abdurrahman the same subsidy that they give him now, we should have satisfied him, and have been in a better position to support him than we are at present, and should have secured a valuable and loyal Province. Now that we are told that Russia is conterminous with Afghanistan, and as we are bound to support the Ameer of Afghanistan against external aggression, we ought to define clearly the limits of that country, and to determine at what exact point it would be our duty to assist the Ameer against an external enemy. I sincerely trust that the Government will complete our railway system along the Indus, which is necessary for the defence of India.
  THE EARL OF LYTTONsaid, that as the Government had promised to distribute the Papers, he was willing to withdraw his Motion.
  EARL GRANVILLE: The Motion, as far as concerns some part of the Papers, is agreed to.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

  MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.

    HABITUAL CRIMINALS ACT AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]
    A Bill to amend the Habitual Criminals Act, 1869—Was presented by The Earl of MILL-TOWN; read 1a. (No. 28.)
    House adjourned at Nine o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.