Sitting of 18 February 1884

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN—Stewart Clark, esquire, for Paisley; Charles Isaac Elton, esquire, for Somerset County (Western Division).
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Heading—Canal Boats Act (1877) Amendment ٭ [111]; Public Health Acts Amendment ٭ [113]; Municipal Corporations (Borough Funds)٭ [112]; Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday (No. 3) ٭ [114].
Withdrawn—Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday (No. 2) ٭ [107].

QUESTIONS.

  ARMY (INDIA)—INFANTRY QUARTER-MASTERS.
  MR. SOTHERON ESTCOURTasked the Under Secretary of State for India,

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  Whether it is the fact that quartermasters of Infantry Regiments are, by Article 198 of the Royal Warrant of June 25th 1881, allowed pay at the rate of nine shillings per diem on first appointment; and, whether it is also the fact that such quartermasters of Infantry Regiments serving in India are at present receiving pay at the rate of six shillings and sixpence per diem only; and, if so, why this deduction of two shillings and sixpence per diem from their proper pay is made?
  MR. J. K. CROSS: The hon. Member for North Wilts correctly states the rate of pay of an Infantry Quartermaster at 9s. a-day on first appointment. It is not, however, the case that in India they receive 6s. 6d. per diem only. While on Indian pay and allowances they receive salaries far in excess of those granted under the Royal Warrant; and if while in India they come by any chance on English rates of pay, they receive precisely the same as they do at home—namely, 9s. per diem.

  LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—MURDER OF CONSTABLE BROWNE.
  MR. HEALYasked the Solicitor General for Ireland, How long the men accused of the murder of Constable Browne, in King's County, were detained in gaol; how many men were so detained; whether they were ever brought to trial; and, whether they were subsequently released without trial; and, if so, if he would state why?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. WALKER): The men accused of the murder of Constable Browne in King's County were detained in gaol from the 15th and 19th of May, 1883, to the 11th and 12th of September, except one, who was discharged on the 8th of June, 1883. Nine men in all I were so detained. True bills for murder were found at the last Assizes for the King's County on the 3rd of July; but the trial was postponed on the application of the Crown to the next Assizes. The accused were, on the 11th and 12th of September last, released on their own recognizances with two sureties, to come up for trial at the following March Assizes if so required. They were released on bail because the Law Officers were of opinion that, though the case was one of strong suspicion, it was not one in which the Crown should proceed
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  with the trial, and the case will not be proceeded with.

  EVICTIONS (IRELAND)—EVICTION AT DRUMGAW.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is in accordance with the rules of the prison service that Chief Warder M'Kenna, of Armagh Gaol, should, on 7th November, have taken part along with the police and sheriff's officers in evicting a tenant at Drumgaw, several miles from the scene of his duties; whether it is the fact that possession was given to the chief warder by Lord Gosford's bailiffs, and that the relieving officer was not present, nor any notice given to the guardians, as the Law requires; and, what steps he proposes to take in the matter?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Chief Warder M'Kenna did not take any part in the eviction. He attended at the place two hours later than the police and Sheriff's officers for the purpose of taking over possession of the farm, which he had taken from Lord Gosford. The relieving officer was not present at the eviction; but he had been given the notice required by law. I do not propose to take any steps in the matter, as I see nothing requiring my interference.

  PRISONS (IRELAND)—DEATHS IN CORK GAOL.
  MR. HARRINGTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, At what hour on January 20th Horgan, the prisoner, touching whose death an inquest was recently held in Cork Gaol, was removed to the hospital; and at what hour on the following day did he die; whether there is in the book of the warder in charge of the prisoner at the time any record of his having applied to see the doctor between the 9th, when he first complained, and the 18th, when he was removed off the treadmill; whether, if the prisoner suffered at his entrance to prison, on December 29th, from any rough treatment received immediately before, the doctor of the prison did not treat him as an invalid; whether it is true that the doctor swore at the inquest that Horgan was a "strong, active, and muscular man at the time;" and, whether it is true that, at an inquest held in the prison a week previous

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  to that on Horgan, the governor and doctor explained that their reason for not removing Mahoney to the hospital was, that the hospital accommodation was insufficient?
  MR. TREVELYAN: The prisoner Horgan was removed to hospital between 10 and 11 on the morning of the 20th of January, and died between 3 and 4 o'clock on the following afternoon. The warder's book contains no such record as is mentioned. The doctor, however, saw the prisoner on the 10th of the month. Horgan was not at first treated as an invalid, because he made no complaint of illness on entering the prison. It was, as I stated before, at home, before his committal, that he had complained of having been severely beaten and received internal injuries. After his death this was stated by his mother, widow, and brother, and it was mentioned to the Coroner, who, however, made no inquiry on the subject. With regard to the words attributed to the doctor, both he and the Governor state he did not use quite those words. According to their account, the doctor described the deceased as "a pretty muscular little man," and the Governor added the word "wiry." At the inquest upon Mahoney, referred to in the last paragraph of the Question, no one stated that the hospital accommodation was insufficient. It was temporarily somewhat limited, owing to repairs being carried on; but this did not effect Mahoney at all. The doctor stated that he was isolated for suspicious disease, and kept in his cell on that account only. As soon as the nature of the disease was recognized he was removed to hospital. From the inquiries I have made I have found that it was an acting medical officer, and not the permanent officer, who examined the prisoner Horgan on his committal; and as the Government are not satisfied that he proved himself qualified for such employment, they have directed that he shall not be employed in that capacity again. It also appears that the chief warder was not sufficiently careful to note the directions given to him by the acting medical officer, and he has been severely reprimanded. But there is no reason to think that the prisoner was prejudicially affected by the warder's action, which resulted only in substituting a class of punishment which experienced authorities
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  consider a lighter one for that sanctioned in the case by the acting medical officer.
  MR. HARRINGTON: I beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman, whether, in the reply he has made, he has referred to the published reports of the inquest; and, whether he was not informed by the officials originally that Horgan was two days in hospital?
  [No reply was given.]

  PREVENTION OF CRIME (IRELAND) ACT, 1882—RIOTS AT DERRY—. JAMES KELLY.
  MR. DAWSONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether, in view of the admission of the leaders of the Orange Party in Derry, on the 1st November, that their action was a protest against certain land policy, and that the man, James Kelly, was shot and deprived of his sight in the pursuance of that action, the outrage comes within the term agrarian (19th sec. Crimes Act, Ireland); and, whether he will, therefore, ask the Lord Lieutenant to have the case investigated; whether Kelly is an artizan, who, by the loss of his eye, will be seriously impeded in the earning of his bread; and, whether, for cases very similar, large compensation have been awarded to individuals and charged upon the districts in the other provinces of Ireland?
  LORD CLAUD HAMILTON: Mr. Speaker, I should like to intervene for one moment between the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member who has put this Question. I would point out that this Question contains a statement of fact which has, in reality, no foundation whatever. ["Order!"] It states that the leaders of the Orange Party in Derry on the 1st of November admitted that their action was a protest against certain land policy. They have made no such admission. ["Order!"] I stated in the House of Commons in my place that the action of the loyal party in Derry was——
  MR. O'BRIEN: I beg to rise to Order.
  MR. SPEAKER: The noble Lord has stated that the statement of fact in the Question is inaccurate. He cannot go beyond that.
  MR. TREVELYAN: The Government have been advised that, having regard

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  to the special definition of agrarian crime laid down in the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, this is not a case which might lawfully be dealt with as agrarian crime under the Act. I/ am not aware of any case not properly coming under the Act, in which compensation had been awarded.
  MR. HEALYinquired whether, in order to put down Orange outrages, the Government proposed to amend the Prevention of Crime Act?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I think, from several things that have occurred lately in the North of Ireland, I should be inclined to refer to the Law Officers for their opinion as to the bearing of the clause defining unlawful Societies with regard to this sort of crime. In saying this I am not in any way opening the question as to Orange Societies being illegal Societies.
  MR. GIBSON: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what question he is opening up?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I am perfectly ready, Sir. I will take another Society than the Orange Society. Suppose a branch of the National League were to plot an outrage. I think it is doubtful whether we should exempt that outrage from the question of compensation, because the branch belonged to a Society that was not illegal. In the same way, if a branch of the Orange Society plotted an outrage, I think it would be a question to be carefully considered by the Law Officers whether the fact of being affiliated for the Orange Society would exempt the district from charge. If it were otherwise, every secret Society might keep itself out of the Act by affiliating itself to the National League or the Orange Society.

  EVICTIONS (IRELAND)—EVICTIONS IN KERRY.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, "Whether he will call the attention of the Irish Executive to the following extract from The Kerry Weekly Reporter (a Conservative organ):—
  "Ejectments in. Kerry.—The number of ejectments is becoming alarming in Kerry. Every Quarter Sessions Mr. Bland, Mr. Blennerhassett, Mrs. Drummond, Miss Busteed, and a host of other proprietors are proceeding against tenants. One attorney made over £300
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  last year law costs by one estate alone. A sickly poor man, who never joined the Land: League, never combined against paying his rent, was served with an ejectment. The priest wrote that the poor man was, very likely, on his death-bed, offering one gale and costs, and offered to become security for the second gale, but was refused. Many of the other cases are of a class with the above;"
  and, whether he can hold out any hope that the forces of the Crown will not be granted to landlords indiscriminately to carry out evictions under circumstances of hardship?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, that he intimated a few days ago that all evictions taking place were reported to the Government, and the Government were informed of the circumstances in certain cases. From the paragraph quoted it would appear that the hon. Member referred to ejectments, not evictions, and they all knew that ejectments were issued which were not always followed up by eviction. In the absence of names and places it would be impossible to ascertain the cases of hardship referred to. The Sheriff had a legal right to protection in carrying out evictions; and he would remind the hon. Member that the Land Act and the Arrears Act were passed to protect tenants from harsh evictions.

  LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881,—THE IRISH LAND COMMISSION—SUB-COMMISSIONERS' DECISIONS.
  MR. W. J. CORBETTasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he is aware that the Sub-Commissioners under the Land Act put off for along time giving their decisions, frequently giving judgment in places distant from where the cases were tried; whether he is aware that the applicants for reduced rents think that, if their cases were adjudicated on within a reasonable time, while the facts are fresh in the minds of the Sub-Commissioners who have heard the evidence and inspected the lands, they would get larger reductions; and, whether he cantake any measures to grant their wishes?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, the Land Commissioners were of opinion that decisions of Sub-Commissioners as to time were given in the interests of justice, and according to the best of their ability.

  EGYPT—ARMY OF OCCUPATION.
  MR. W. H. SMITHasked the Secretary of State for War, If any steps were taken by the Government to comply with the recommendations of Sir Evelyn Baring, General Stephenson, and General Wood, stated in No. 153, page 131, of Egypt, No. 1, 1884—
  "That immediate steps should he taken to bring the present British Force up to its war strength,"
  and
  "That the Egyptian Army should he strengthened by a brigade of black troops, with English officers," &c.;
  if nothing was done, whether the advice asked for by Lord Granville, in No. 97, page 94, was disregarded; what the numbers of the British Forces in Egypt would have been if raised to war strength; and, what they were on the 1st of January, or when the last Returns were made?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: The steps recommended by Sir Evelyn Baring and General Stephenson were that a couple of battalions at war strength in the Mediterranean garrisons and a mountain battery, without horses, in this country should be held in readiness for despatch to Egypt at short notice; that the British Force in Egypt should be raised to its war strength; and that the Egyptian Army should be strengthened by a brigade of black troops, with English officers and a proportion of non-commissioned officers. Two battalions in the Mediterranean were at once selected by His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief to be sent on whenever demanded; and a battery of artillery has been held in readiness here to proceed at short notice if required. Steps were at the same time taken to make up the battalions in Egypt to their full Colonial establishment, and arrangements were made with the Admiralty to provide for the garrisoning of Alexandria, so that the two and a-half battalions there might be available for active service if General Stephenson should need their aid. This was thought preferable to raising the establishment of the regiments in Egypt to what is technically called war strength, as it obviated the necessity for a large influx of young recruits, and placed at General Stephenson's disposal a larger reinforcement than he had himself indicated.
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  Sir Evelyn Baring was also informed that Her Majesty's Government were ready to provide the officers and non-commissioned officers for the proposed new brigade of the Egyptian Army. The regiments in Egypt were, on the 1st of February, 384 below their authorized establishment.

  IRELAND—THE TOWN COMMISSIONERS OF ENNIS—RE-CONSTITUTION.
  MR. KENNYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he will state the legal difficulties in the way of the reconstitution of the Ennis Town Commissioners; if he his aware that the attention of the Irish Local Government Board has been called to the unsanitary state of the town and the consequences likely to follow from disease if immediate steps are not taken to remedy the evil; and, if, in view of this state of facts, he will, as President of the Irish Local Government Board, endeavour to accelerate the action of that body in arriving at a satisfactory readjustment of the difficulty?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, he was not aware of any legal difficulties in the way of reconstituting the Town Commissioners, and the Local Government Board were about to apprise the ratepayers that they were prepared to receive an application on the subject. In the meantime, the Board of Guardians would become the sanitary authority of the town, to the unsanitary state of which the Local Government Board had directed attention.

  ENDOWED SCHOOLS—MILTON ABBAS SCHOOL.
  COLONEL DIGBYasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether it is true that it is the intention of the Charity Commissioners to open the Milton Abbas grammar school at Blandford, which they have kept closed for the last seven years, as a girls' instead of a boys' school, which it has been for the last 300 years; and, if so, whether such a course is not entirely opposed to the views and wishes of the trustees of that charity, and to those of the inhabitants of the town and neighbourhood of Bland-ford; and, whether he will exert his influence as a Commissioner to dissuade the Charity Commission from such a

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  course, and urge upon them the desirability of reopening the school for hoys as soon as possible, as by their delay the inhabitants of that district are suffering great inconvenience?
  MR. MUNDELLA: The scheme for the Milton Abbas Grammar School has not yet been submitted to the Education Department by the Charity Commissioners, and, therefore, I have no knowledge of the provisions it contains. When it is submitted it will be my duty to consider any objections that may be made by the hon. Member and by other persons interested. But until then it would not be proper for me in any way to interfere.

  SPAIN—THE COMMERCIAL TREATY.
  BARON HENRY DE WORMSasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether negotiations are now in progress in respect to the conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce between this Country and Spain; whether the report is correct that Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid promised the Spanish Government that, in consideration of such Treaty being concluded, the British Government would take steps for the suppression of smuggling from the Rock of Gibraltar into Spain; what steps, if any, will be taken; and, whether this House will be apprised thereof before the ratification of the Treaty?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: No commercial negotiations are at present in progress between Great Britain and Spain. From the Paper already laid before Parliament it will be seen that in the course of the negotiations for the conclusion of a definite Treaty, which are to follow the adoption by the Spanish Cortes of the Protocol of the 1st of December, 1883, Her Majesty's Government have engaged to give attention to the question of smuggling at Gibraltar. In the present state of the case it is not possible to say more, or to give a pledge as to the course which will be taken in making known to Parliament any agreement which may be come to on the subject.

  LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—FIRING IN A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE—CASE OF JOHN GALLAGHER, OF CARNDO-NAGH.
  MR. O'DONNELLasked the Chief-Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of
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  Ireland, If it is a fact, as reported in The Derry Journal of the 8th instant, that one John Gallagher of Cardonagh who had been charged with "discharging firearms on the public street of Carndonagh" on the 27th January, was at petty sessions held on 6th instant in Carndonagh, fined only ten shillings, though three witnesses on oath testified that they believed the revolver contained a bullet, and though at the time said shot was discharged (7 o'clock p.m.) the streets were thronged with boys and children; does Gallagher possess a revolver licence; and, if so, on what grounds was it granted, and have any steps been taken to have it revoked; and, has an investigation been held to show why the police took no steps in the matter, beyond summoning the defendant seven days after the occurrence; and why they did not arrest the defendant and examine his revolver to know whether it contained bullets or blank cartridges, though it was admitted in court they heard the report of the shot?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, Gallagher was fined 10s., because it was considered that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the fact that the revolver contained a bullet. The street was not crowded at the time, and the four persons could not say whether the revolver contained a bullet. The prisoner was allowed a licence for fire-arms because it was considered necessary for his protection, and because he was subjected to persecution and intimidation during the recent times of agitation.
  LORD CLAUD HAMILTON: At whose hands was he persecuted?
  MR. O'DONNELLasked whether the Chief Secretary was aware that every member of the Bench of Magistrates, with one exception, who allowed Gallagher off so extremely easy, signed a Memorial expressing approval of Lord Rossmore's conduct; and, whether he would take steps to secure the impartial administration of justice in that part of the country?
  [No reply was given.]

  REGISTRATION APPEALS (IRELAND)
  MR. HEALYasked Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to the refusal of the Recorder of Dublin to grant appeals

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  in a number of registration eases, in which it was alleged that his decisions were in conflict with the decisions in England under analogous statutes; whether Mr. Justice O'Brien, in giving a conditional order for a mandamus to compel the Recorder to grant such appeals, declared that the reasons for refusal alleged to have been given by the Recorder were improper; whether the order for a mandamus was afterwards discharged, on the ground that the Recorder's affidavit that he considered the appeal should not be allowed deprived the Queen's Bench of jurisdiction; whether, in England, under the Act of 1878, the Superior Courts can compel the revising barrister to grant an appeal, if, in their opinion, it is reasonable and proper that such appeal should be entertained; and, whether the Government intend to assimilate the Irish Law on the subject to that in force in England?
  THE SOLTCITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. WALKER): My attention has been called to the matter. I cannot find any report of a statement being made by Mr. Justice O'Brien, in giving a conditional order for a mandamus, that the reasons for refusal were improper. The conditional order was granted on an ex parte statement, and on the allegation that the Recorder had declined all jurisdiction. The order was discharged on the ground that it appeared the Recorder had exercised a discretion in refusing the appeals which by the Act was vested in him, and which the Court could not interfere with. In England the Superior Courts can, under the Act of 1878, compel the Revising Barrister, in a proper case, to state a case for appeal. If the question of Irish Registration Law is dealt with, I see no reason why the Irish and English law should not be assimilated.

  STATE OF IRELAND-THE NATIONAL LEAGUE MEETING AT ROSSLEA—ASSAULT ON MR. M'ALEESE.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, What steps were taken by the police to prosecute the assailants of the representative of The Monaghan Advocate at Ross-lea on 16th October; whether it is the fact that Constable Wallace and two other policemen were standing near when
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  the outrage was committed; why no arrests were made; whether Lord Ross-more and Mr. Lloyd, J.P., Clerk of the Peace, were close by and witnessed the assault; whether the police endeavoured to get from either of them the names of the criminals (supposing them to have been unknown to themselves); whether the police waited on Mr. M'Aleese, senior, and asked him would he prosecute, and that he replied this was their duty and not his, and that he could not identify his son's assailants; whether it is the usual practice of the police to endeavour to get private prosecutors under such circumstances, or to proceed themselves; and, whether, if the police allege that they cannot identify the guilty parties, an inquiry under the Crimes Act will be held; and, if not, what is the reason?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, that the moment Mr. M'Aleese was assaulted two constables rushed to his rescue, and saved him from the crowd, which consisted of a procession of 3,000 or 4,000 Orangemen. The constables could not identify any of the persons who struck Mr. M'Aleese, and nothing was known to them of the fact that Lord Rossmore or Mr. Lloyd were witnesses of the assault. He could not ascertain that any policeman waited on Mr. M'Aleese and asked him to prosecute. He might say that he was extremely anxious that there should be a prosecution, and he over and over again wrote to that effect, but the evidence was not forthcoming. He did not think the case was one calling for inquiry under the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act.
  MR. HEALY: I may say that I have Mr. M'Aleese's word that the police came to him and asked him to prosecute, and that he told the police that it was their duty to do so.
  MR. TREVELYAN: There may be a difference of recollection in that respect; but I may tell the hon. Member that I used my best endeavour to get up a prosecution, but the means were not forthcoming.

  PRIVATE BUSINESS—MUNICIPAL BILLS.
  MR. HOPWOODasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the Improvements Bill at present

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  being promoted by various Municipalities, in which it is proposed to enact laws for those places inconsistent with the general laws of the land; and, whether he would, under the circumstances, refer the Bills in question to a Select Committee specially chosen, as was done in the Session of 1882?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, that the Local Government Board were engaged in reporting on these Bills. He agreed with his hon. and learned Friend that the Committee of 1882 served a very necessary and useful purpose in placing these Bills on one uniform principle; and if it should turn out that the Bills this year were sufficiently numerous to justify the appointment of a Committee, he should be prepared to support a proposal. He was already in communication with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Sclater-Booth), who so ably presided over the Committee of 1882.

  LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—THE LAND COMMISSION—SITTINGS IN DONEGAL.
  MR. O'BRIENasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he is aware that small farmers in the neighbourhood of Moville, county Done-gal, have been obliged to travel distances of from fifteen to twenty miles to attend sittings of the Land Court; whether he is aware that the expenses of applicants and their witnesses in such cases frequently absorb the value of the reductions of rent obtained on small holdings; whether numbers of tenants have in consequence been deterred from prosecuting their claims under the Land Act; and, whether arrangements can be made in future by which sittings shall be held at Moville?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, that the Land Commission, in arranging the Sub-Commissions, fixed some central place in a county, and application might then, on the first day of the sitting, be made to the Sub-Commissioners to adjourn to another place for the hearing of certain applications. The sittings for the County Donegal were fixed for Carndonagh and another town, and it rested with the Sub-Commissioners to say whether they would adjourn to Moville. He was not aware
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  that any tenants were deterred from prosecuting their cases because sittings were not held at Moville.
  MR. O'BRIEN: Is not Moville double the size of any other town in that barony?
  MR. TREVELYAN: From the information given by the Solicitor General for Ireland I am bound to admit that it is so.

  CHILI AND PERU—RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.
  SIR HENRY TYLERasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, To give the House the latest information as to the condition of affairs between Chili and Peru, and the prospects of peace being finally concluded, and on what terms, between those countries; and to state what steps Her Majesty's Government are taking in regard to the letter addressed to Lord Granville by the Committee of Peruvian Bondholders on the 10th of January, and the memorial forwarded by that Committee signed by Peruvian bondholders; and, when definite replies may be expected to the representations which have been made?
  LORD EDMOND FLTZMAURICE: A Treaty of Peace between Chili and Peru, signed on the 20th of October last, is awaiting the ratification of the Peruvian Congress. Her Majesty's Government have agreed to unite with the French and other Governments in a representation to the Governments of Peru and Chili for the protection of the rights of the public creditors of Peru, which, in their opinion, present peculiar features, warranting their making a communication on the subject to the Governments of Chili and Peru.

  THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—CAPTAIN FERRALL.
  MR. T. D. SULLIVANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If his attention has been directed to the following letter, which appeared in The Dublin Daily Express of January 16th, in reference to the death of the Orangeman, Samuel Giffen, who was wounded by the police at Dromore, county Tyrone:—
  "Sir,—I beg to enclose an order for £1 towards the fund being raised for the family of

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  the first man in 1884 who fell in the execution of his duty to his Sovereign and his Country. "
  Your obedient servant,
  "J. J. O'F. GARMICHAEL FERRALL,
  "Captain, R.N.
  "Augher Castle, Augher, county Tyrone,
  "January 14th 1884;"
  whether the author of this letter is a Justice of the Peace for the counties of Longford and Tyrone; and, whether the Government intend to take any action in reference to this matter?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTONsaid, that before the Chief Secretary answered this Question, he would like to ask, as showing that the assumption that Giffen was a "rioter" was contrary to the facts, whether it was not proved at the inquest that when Giffen was stabbed that he was going in a direction contrary to that in which the Nationalists were; whether the surgeon did not swear that it would require the full strength of a man to effect the wound by which the body of the unfortunate man was nearly perforated; whether any person except the Loyalists received a wound that day; whether the Crown Solicitor did not refuse to examine the official witnesses who were present in Court; whether the jury at the inquest was not constituted of 11 Roman Catholics and 11 Protestants; whether a strong minority was not in favour of the returning of a verdict of murder; and, whether, under those peculiar circumstances, it was intended to punish a man for expressing sympathy with Giffen, and contributing to the maintenance of his family? He dared say the right hon. Gentleman would require time to answer those Questions categorically, and he would postpone the matter if the hon. Member for Westmeath did the same. ["No, no!"]
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, I am perfectly prepared to answer the Question of the hon. Member for Westmeath without reference to the Question put by the noble Lord. As regards the Question of the noble Lord, I would say that the best course to adopt would be to lay the evidence taken before the Coroner on the Table of the House, and and let every hon. Member read it for himself. The views of the Government on the whole transaction I stated at very great length in my speech the other
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  night. As the hon. Member does not postpone the Question, I am prepared to answer it, believing that I can do so without any discourtesy to the noble Lord. I think the expressions contained in the letter quoted are very improper, coming from a magistrate who, by virtue of his office, should refrain from saying or doing anything to shake public confidence in his impartiality; but I do not think the matter of such grave importance as to call for any action on the part of the Government. ["Oh, oh!"] I am bound to say that if in the case of the Wexford riot, with regard to which inquiries were made in this House last Session, or if in the case of the Ballyraggett riot, which was analogous, such a letter was written, I should not consider it worthy of notice.
  MR. T. D. SULLIVANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If his attention has been directed to the following letter which appeared in The Dublin Daily Express on or about the 17th of January, in reference to the death of the Orangeman, Samuel Giffen, who was wounded by the police at Dromore:—
  "Sir,—I beg to enclose a cheque for £1 for the Dromore Fund (Giffen's), who died in the cause of loyalty to his Queen and Country, and shall he much obliged if you kindly insert this letter in your paper.
  "I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
  "L. F. S. MABERLEY.
  "Waverley Terrace,
  "173, Strand Road, Merrion,
  "16th January 1884;"
  whether the author of this letter is one of the "Clerks in Charge" in the Surveyor's Department of the General Post Office, Dublin; and, whether the Government intend to take any action in this matter?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, the Irish Government has no jurisdiction whatever over Post Office officials, and I must refer the hon. Gentleman to the Postmaster General in this case.
  MR. T. D. SULLIVAN: Well, I beg to give Notice that on Thursday I will question the Postmaster General on the subject; and arising out of the Question just put by the noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton), I will ask whether it is not a misuse of terms to call the Orangemen Loyalists?

  POST OFFICE (IRELAND)—POSTAL ARRANGEMENTS, WESTMEATH.
  MR. HARRINGTONasked the Postmaster General, Whether representations have been made to him in behalf of the inhabitants of Fairymount, Miltown, and Oldtown, county Westmeath, complaining of the unsatisfactory postal arrangements of the district; and, whether he will take steps to arrange for the delivery of letters at these places?
  MR. FAWCETT: I cannot ascertain that any representations have been made complaining of the postal arrangements referred to; but if the hon. Member will send mo particulars, I will obtain a Report upon the subject, and communicate to him the result.

  PRISONS (IRELAND)-DEATHS IN BELFAST GAOL.
  MR. HARRINGTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is true that within the past month three prisoners have died in Belfast Gaol; whether he will say how long these prisoners had been ill; and, why it was that the medical officer of the prison did not recommend the release of any of them?
  MR. TREVELYAN: One prisoner died in Belfast Prison within the last month; prior to that no death had occured in the prison since May in the year before last. The prisoner who recently died was under treatment from the 18th of January to the 31st, when he died. The medical officer did not recommend his release, because his illness had been neither caused nor aggravated by confinement, and he was not of opinion that the prisoner would derive any benefit from being discharged—every care being bestowed upon him in the prison infirmary.

  PRISONS (IRELAND) COMMISSION—DR. SIGERSON.
  COLONEL KING-HARMANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he is aware that Doctor George Sigerson, of Dublin, is the writer of many articles of a seditious nature in The Irishman newspaper, and is believed to have acted as sub-editor of that paper during the imprisonment of Mr. Pigott; and, whether that gentleman has been appointed to a position
  1180
  of trust and influence by Her Majesty's Government?
  DR. LYONSasked whether Dr. G. Sigerson was not the same gentleman whose researches into the physical condition of the atmosphere had been described as a work of great authority in Parkes's History of Hygiene; and, whether for the hon. and gallant Member not to know Dr. Sigerson was not an argument that he himself was unknown?
  MR. HEALYasked if the same Dr. Sigerson was not a member of the Mansion House Relief Committee, of which the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel King-Harman) was also a member; whether he had been engaged at the request of the Committee in inquiring into the fever districts of the West of Ireland; and, whether a unanimous vote of thanks had been passed to him by the hon. and gallant Gentleman's colleagues?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Dr. Sigerson has informed me that he neither is nor has he been for a considerable time a contributor to any newspaper. He denies that he has been the writer of articles of a seditious nature, and states that he was not sub-editor of The Irishman newspaper during the imprisonment of Mr. Pigott, an event which happened 17 years ago. Dr. Sigerson is a member of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the administration of prisons in Ireland, of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross) is Chairman. That is the only position he holds in connection with the Government; and I may say that both his position in the Medical Profession, and the special attention he has given to hospitals and matters connected with the public health, amply justify his appointment to that post.
  MR. T. D. SULLIVANasked the right hon. Gentleman if it was not a fact that up to a more recent time than the imprisonment of Mr. Pigott, the hon. and gallant Member who had put this Question (Colonel King-Harman') was not a Member of the Home Rule League?
  [No reply was given.]

  LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—THE IRISH LAND COURT.
  COLONEL KING-HARMANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant

  1181
  of Ireland, Whether it is true that the estate of Mr. Arthur Costello, of Ed-mundstown, county Mayo, was offered for sale to the tenants under the terms of the Land Act; whether the Land Court, or any official acting for it, either advised the tenants that 16 years' purchase was too much to offer for their holdings, or informed them that the Court would not advance the two-thirds of the purchase-money authorised by the Act for more than 12½ years' purchase; whether he is aware that 14 years' purchase has been given, not far from that locality, for the interest in holdings, and that even larger prices have lately been given in other parts of Ireland for the simple tenant's interest; and, whether Her Majesty's Government will take steps to prevent the Purchase Clauses of the Land Act being rendered nugatory by the action of officials of the Land Act?
  MR. TREVELYAN: The Land Commissioners inform me that when the estate referred to was offered for sale, their agent, acting according to his duty, informed the tenants of the amount which, in his opinion, the Commissioners would advance to assist them in purchasing, having regard to the nature of the security. I have nothing before me to show that any official of the Court exceeded his duty. The Land Commissioners know nothing of the sums paid for the interests in tenants' holdings on neighbouring estates.

  SCOTLAND—THE SASINE OFFICE, EDINBURGH.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, "Whether, considering that there are at present several vacant clerkships in second class of the Sasine Office, Edinburgh, it is intended now to reward those officers who were instrumental in detecting the recent frauds in that office by promotion to those vacant clerkships, without regard to seniority, as promised in Treasury Minute of December 1882?
  MR. COURTNEY: The hon. Member appears to have been misinformed as to the existence of vacancies in this Office; but I can assure him that we quite sympathize in the spirit of his Question, and intend at the proper time to carry out the views expressed in 1882.

  LAND LAW (IRELAND)—CASE OF MICHAEL KILLIAN.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to the following statement in The Freeman's Journal of 12th February:—
  "Colonel King-Harman's Estate,
  "From our Correspondent,
  "Longford, Monday.
  "During the hearing here of the 90 fair rent cases listed for hearing before Mr. J. Adye Curran, Q.C. County Court Judge, a case in which Colonel E. R. King-Harman was landlord, Michael Killian tenant, was heard. The tenant, it appeared, enjoyed the right of free turbary until recently, when he voted for the election of a Poor Law guardian whose opinions were different from those of his landlord. It was alleged that for this he was deprived of turbary. The old rent was £14 0s. 2d., the judicial rent fixed was £12, and 5s. for turbary, if the landlord gave it; if he did not, the judicial rent to be £9. His Honor strongly condemned the action of the landlord in depriving the tenant of turbary;"
  whether the eighth section of the Crimes Act provides for the punishment of any one who uses intimidation to any person in consequence of his having done any act which he had a legal right to do; and, whether the Government propose to prosecute the landlord; and, if not, what steps they intend to take to secure freedom of election in such cases?
  MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHYasked whether the Chief Secretary was aware that since the last case a similar case on the same estate had come under the notice of the Court, and that the Judge commented strongly on the matter?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: I beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman, Whether he is aware that the bog from which Killian had been for some time past allowed to supply himself with turf at a nominal payment is the exclusive property of the landlord, and that the landlord has full power and rights to sell, give, or refuse permission to anyone to cut turf thereon; whether the 8th section of the Prevention of Crime Act provides for the punishment of anyone who uses intimidation to any person in consequence of his having done an act which he had a legal right to do; and, whether the Government intended to prosecute Mr. John Adye Curran and the hon. Member for Monaghan; and, if not, what steps they intend to take to prevent further attempts to intimidate

  1183
  landlords when dealing with their own property according to law?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I am informed that it did appear, by the evidence adduced during the hearing of one of the cases referred to, that a tenant had been deprived of the privilege of free turbary in consequence of having voted at a Poor Law election against a nominee of his landlord. This appeared by the evidence of a sub-agent on the estate. [Mr. HEALY: Liberty of conscience.] Assuming this statement to be accurate, and that the landlord was directly answerable for it, I am advised that no prosecution could be sustained in respect of it. There is no mode of preventing an act such as that mentioned, which appears to have been the withdrawal of a voluntary allowance. The Government are asked what steps they intend to take to secure freedom of election. In Poor Law cases, in which there is considerable interference on both sides, the only remedy is vote by ballot.

  FISHERIES (IRELAND)—MR. W. JOHNSTON, AN INSPECTOR.
  MR. SEXTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether Mr. William Johnston, one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Fisheries in Ireland, attended and spoke, on the 19th October last, at a political meeting convened by the Dublin Constitutional (Conservative) Club; on the 3rd and 4th of October, at political party meetings and a political banquet at Belfast; on the 4th December, at an Orange Soiree of "The Royal Hobals Black Preceptory," in Dublin, (at which, on the motion of the grand chaplain of the Orange Society, a motion was adopted—
  "That this meeting records its solemn protest against the action of the Government in depriving Lord Rossmore of the Commission of the Peace, and regard the step so taken as a slur on the loyalists of Ireland);"
  on the 8th of January ult. at a political meeting in Lower Gloucester Street, Dublin; and, towards the end of January, at a banquet in honour of Lord Rossmore, a superseded magistrate, in the Rotunda, Dublin; and, whether the speeches made by him on several of those occasions were calculated to excite ill-will and hostility between Her Majesty's subjects; whether The Down Recorder of the 9th instant contained a letter from Mr. Johnston,
  1184
  appealing for funds to build a new hall for an Orange lodge, of which he describes himself as the master; whether this Mr. William Johnston is the same person respecting whom the Eight hon. Gentleman stated, on the 23rd July last year, that he should not have attended a political demonstration at which he had attended and spoken on the 12th of that month, and that he had been informed such was the view of the Government; whether Mr. Johnston is the same official in regard to whom he made the following statement on the 31st July last year:—
  "So far as I have been able to ascertain, he was twice cautioned in 1879 by the Government then in office, and reminded of his obligations as a permanent salaried officer of the Crown. I did not ask him to give any pledge, but cautioned him against the repetition of such conduct. I hope he will accept the warning, but if he does not he must take the consequences;"
  and, as Mr. Johnston has repeatedly disregarded those warnings, what the consequences now will be?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, I shall not enter into the details of this Question any further than to say that it is quite correct that Mr. Johnston was warned twice by the late Government and twice by the present Government. I now propose to lay before the House the following documents. His Excellency has caused the following letter to be addressed to Mr. Johnston:—
  "18th February, 1884.
  "Sir,—I am directed by the Lord Lieutenant to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 13th instant, and to state that he regrets that you have neglected the warning given you by the Chief Secretary in his letters of the 23rd and 31st July last, and have again participated in a public Party demonstration, although he conveyed to you the opinion of the Irish Government that it was imperatively necessary, having regard to the quasi-judicial functions of your office, that you should abstain from doing so. Under these circumstances, I am to inform you that His Excellency will find it necessary to remove you from the office you hold, unless you are prepared to undertake to refrain while holding office under Government from taking active part in public Party meetings, and from discussing in public any Party questions.
  "(Signed) R. G. C. HAMILTON."
  Mr. Johnston has sent the following reply:—
  "I, William Johnston, Inspector of Irish Fisheries, hereby undertake to refrain, while holding office under the Government, from taking any active part in any public Party

  1185
  meetings, or discussing in public any Party questions.
  "(Signed) WILLIAM JOHNSTON."

  LABOURERS' (IRELAND) ACT, 1883—DEEDS OF CONVEYANCE OF SITES FOR COTTAGES.
  MR. O'SULLIVANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he would direct the Local Government Board in Ireland to prepare and to perfect all deeds of conveyance for the purchase of land for sites for labourers' cottages under "The Labourers' (Ireland) Act, 1883," so as to avoid the enormous expense which will be thrown on the occupiers of the labourers' cottages if isolated action has to be taken in each case throughout the Country?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, that he could not comply with the request of the hon. Member in this matter?
  MR. O'SULLIVANasked whether he would assist in amending the Bill in this respect when it came before the House?
  [No reply.]

  ARMY—POLITICAL MEETINGS—THE QUEEN'S REGULATIONS.
  MR. SEXTONasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether an officer on full pay in the Military Service of the Queen is allowed by the rules of the Service to join in proceedings provoking or tending to violation of the peace; and, whether it is permissible for him to publicly associate himself with other persons in condemning an act of the Government, and taking a side in a political conflict in respect of which he might be called upon to act in the execution of his Military duty?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I do not think it would be desirable to give a definite reply to a hypothetical Question. I may, however, say generally that officers of Her Majesty's Army are forbidden by the Queen's Regulations to take part in political meetings or Party demonstrations.

  SCOTLAND—EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS COMMISSIONERS—THE REPORT.
  MR. DICK-PEDDIEasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether any Report has as yet been made by the Scotch Educational Endowment Commissioners;
  1186
  and, if so, whether it will be in the hands of Members at an early date; and, whether he expects to be soon able to lay upon the Table of the House Schemes for any of the Endowments with which the Commissioners have already dealt?
  MR. MUNDELLA: No Report has yet been made by the Scotch Educational Endowments Commissioners, although I understand that the Report is nearly ready; and so soon as it is received, I shall take care that it is placed in the hands of Members with the least possible delay. In reply to the second branch of the Question, we have received a number of schemes from the Commissioners, which are now under consideration; but unless they are opposed it will not be needful to lay them on the Table of this House.

  LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—THE IRISH LAND COMMISSION (SUB-COMMISSIONERS).
  MR. SEXTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it has come to his knowledge that the Sub-Commissioners of the Land Court, in the county of Sligo, have been in the habit of staying, at the time of their session, in the houses of landlords directly concerned in cases pending before the Court; whether he is aware that this has excited distrust among the tenant farmers; and, whether he will cause instructions to be issued on this subject to Sub-Commissioners and other functionaries of the Land Court?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, that he had received a communication from the Land Commissioners stating that they had been informed by the Chairman of the Sligo Sub-Commissioners that never, so far as he was aware, had any member of the Commission stayed at the house of any person, landlord or tenant, in the county who had a case pending before the Court; and that in November, 1881, the Land Commissioners issued a Circular to the Assistant Commissioners, recommending them all to decline every proffer of hospitality within their district.

  PRISONS (IRELAND)-REMOVAL OF CONVICTS.
  MR. SMALLasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland

  1187
  For what reasons a number of prisoners undergoing sentences of penal servitude, including several of the Crossmaglen prisoners, have recently been removed from Irish to English prisons?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, in consequence of the abolition of Spike Island as a prison, and the concentration of a large number of prisoners in Dublin, arrangements were made for the temporary removal of some of those prisoners to English prisons, and amongst others transferred were the convicts referred to by the hon. Member.

  CRIME AND OUTRAGE (IRELAND)—ATTACK ON MURRAY (BALLY MOTE).
  COLONEL KING-HARMANasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he is aware that on Sunday, the 3rd instant, an old man named Murray, and his two sons, when returning from Divine Service, were wantonly attacked by a body of about 300 men who were on their way to a meeting of the National Land League; whether the old man, Murray, was struck on the head with a stone, and whether he is still in a precarious condition from the injuries he received; whether there were only twenty-five police in the town of Ballymote on the occasion, although incendiary placards calling the Land League meeting had been posted for some days; and, whether this is one of the meetings which the Government decline to prohibit on the ground that there is "no fear of crime or outrage arising from them?"
  MR. SEXTON: As this matter concerns my constituents, I wish to ask whether the National Land League, of which this is said to have been a meeting, was not suppressed in October, 1881; whether the meeting was not one even of the National League; whether it was a meeting of a purely local character, convened by the principal Catholic inhabitants of the district, to protest against a Circular issued by five Protestant clergymen, chaplains of the local Orange Lodges, calling upon the landlords of Sligo to give farms to none but Protestant tenants; and, whether all the other statements by the hon. and gallant Gentleman are not equally ill founded?
  MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, it was an exceedingly inconvenient thing to have these supplementary Questions
  1188
  put without Notice. Two or three hours' Notice might, at any rate, be given. He would not answer Questions from impressions; and, therefore, he would not categorically answer the hon. Member for Sligo (Mr. Sexton). He was aware that on the occasion referred to an old man named Murray was injured, and that he was in a precarious state; but he could not express any opinion on the circumstances of the affray, as cases arising out of it were now sub judice. Meanwhile, he must not be taken as admitting the accuracy of the statement of the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel King-Harman). After careful inquiry, a force of 25 police had been considered sufficient for the occasion; and, as a matter of fact, it was sufficient. Although it happened that some persons fired shots with serious results, the disturbance in connection with this firing was over in a few minutes, and all persons concerned in it on both sides were made amenable. The placard calling the meeting, which he had read, could not be called incendiary. No recommendation was made to the Government to prohibit the meeting, nor had they reason to apprehend that crime or outrage would follow.

  EDUCATION (IRELAND)—PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS.
  MR. MELDONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If the Government propose to bring forward a measure to improve the condition of the teachers of primary schools in Ireland; and, if so, when such a Bill will be introduced?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I can give no further answer to this Question at present than I have already done more than once during the present Session. At the same time I admit that if anyone has a right to ask a supplementary Question on the subject it is the hon. and learned Member. The Government will bring forward the Bill as soon as they see a chance of passing it.

  CRIME AND OUTRAGE (IRELAND)—RIOTS AT ENNISKILLEN.
  VISCOUNT CRICHTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he has received any report as to the recent riots at Enniskillen; whether the stone throwing on the occasion

  1189
  was commenced by the Nationalist mob breaking the windows of the Protestant Hall and of the office of the local Conservative newspaper; and, whether, owing to the inaction of the authorities, the town was left at the mercy of the same mob for a considerable period?
  MR. TREVELYAN: From the information supplied to me it appears that both the windows of the Protestant Hall and of the local Conservative paper were broken on the occasion referred to. On the 16th of January, two nights afterwards, the mob following the brass band broke the windows of the Nationalist bandroom, and also the windows of prominent members of the National League. This commenced the rioting. I do not think the authorities can be charged with inaction in protecting the town. Their efforts were mainly directed towards preventing a collision between the contending parties.

  CRIME AND OUTRAGE (IRELAND)—THE CONSPIRACY AT MILTOWN MALBAY, CO. CLARE.
  MR. KENNYasked Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland, Why the prisoners charged in the Clare conspiracy case were not tried at the recent Cork assizes; how many assizes have elapsed since they were first arrested; and, whether the informer, Tubridy, has been, or is to be, pardoned or released, or if he is at present kept to penal servitude?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. WALKER), in reply, said, the prisoners were not tried, because the Attorney General was of opinion that, though there were strong grounds for suspicion, there was not sufficient evidence to proceed with the trial. Tubridy had not been pardoned or released. He was not at present kept to penal servitude.

  POST OFFICE (IRELAND)—IRISH MAIL SERVICE.
  MR. SMALLasked the Postmaster General, Whether he will consider the requirements of the towns on the Dublin and Wexford Line when the mails are accelerated, so that replies may be sent to cross-Channel letters from Gorey, Wexford, &c, without losing a post?
  MR. FAWCETT: The particular acceleration of the Postal Service which will be practicable in the case of any towns in Ireland cannot be settled until
  1190
  the new time table for an accelerated service between London and Holyhead has been determined. Every effort is being made to hasten on the settlement; but the arrangement is a somewhat complicated one, as the mail train between London and Holyhead has to be made to fit in with all the cross trains bringing letters for the Irish Mail from the Provincial districts. I can assure the hon. Member that the postal requirements of the towns to which he refers on the Dublin and Wexford Railway shall be carefully considered.

  SCOTLAND—PURIFICATION OF THE CLYDE.
  SIR R. ASSHETON CROSSasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the Report of Sir John Hawkshaw upon the purification of the Clyde, made some years ago; and, whether it is now proposed to take any steps under that Report, or otherwise, with that object?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, it would be within the right hon. Gentleman's recollection that in 1876 Sir John Hawkshaw made his Report on this subject, and the Corporation of Glasgow had gone to great expense in the matter of promoting a Bill. They met with very formidable opposition. They applied then for a promise of Government support to the Bill, which the Government was not able to afford; but the late Government at the same time intimated their intention of introducing a measure for constituting Boards of Conservancy in such cases as that of the Clyde. That, however, was never done. In 1883 he (Sir William Harcourt) made a further attempt by applying to the Corporations of Glasgow and other towns. The Corporation of Glasgow declined to go to any further expense, seeing that they had gone to so much expense already without any result; and the other towns consulted said it was Glasgow alone that was concerned in the question.

  THE SUEZ CANAL COMPANY—ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN M. DE LESSEPS AND EASTERN TRADE SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION.
  MR. NORWOODasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

  1191
  To inform the House by whom, and under what regulations, will the "seven new Directors chosen from amongst English shipowners and merchants," provided for in the arrangement between M. de Lesseps and the Eastern Trade Shipowners' Association, be selected?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: The matter referred to by my hon. Friend is still under the consideration of the parties to the Agreement, and it would be premature at present to give any reply.
  MR. NORWOOD: I wish to ask whether the Government do not think they ought to exercise some control between the shipowners and M. de Lesseps?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I am afraid I cannot answer that Question.

  IRELAND—THE TOWN COMMISSIONERS OF WICKLOW—POWERS AND DUTIES.
  MR. M'COAN: As the Solicitor General for Ireland objects to answering abstract questions of law, I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the Irish Local Government Board has any authority over Boards of Town Commissioners abusing the powers conferred by their constituting Acts, or whether the only remedy of aggrieved ratepayers lies in recourse to the legal proceedings recently indicated by Mr. Solicitor General; and, whether, if the Local Government Board has such authority, it will, on complaint duly made, direct an inquiry into the charges recently preferred in a memorial to Her Majesty's Treasury against the Commissioners of Wicklow by the ratepayers of that township?
  MR. TREVELYAN: The Local Government Board has no authority over members of Town Commissioners abusing their powers beyond those recently indicated. If any illegal payment has been made out of the rates such payment may be questioned before the public auditor at his annual audit. Such auditor is appointed by the Local Government Board in pursuance of Act of Parliament. If the Town Commissioners, being also the sanitary authority under the Public Health Act, make default in the exercise of their powers, the Local Government Board has the power
  1192
  to direct the holding of an inquiry, and to enforce the provisions of the Act of Parliament. This power is conferred by the 211th section of the Public Health Act of 1872.

  LAW AND POLICE (IRELAND)—ORANGEMEN IN CO. SLIGO.
  MR. SEXTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether three men, members of the Orange Society, charged at Ballymote, county Sligo, with having fired revolver shots at a crowd proceeding along the highway to a public meeting, on Sun-day, the 3rd instant, were admitted to bail by Mr. Moloney, P.M., although the application for bail was opposed by Mr. Valentine B. Dillon (Sessional Crown Solicitor), appearing on the part of the Attorney General; and although there was medical evidence given at the time of the admission of the prisoners to bail that the life of one of the men wounded by the revolver shots was not out of danger; whether Mr. Dale, D.I.R.I.C. set one person at liberty without any magisterial authority, after his arrest; whether a man named Joseph Murray, respecting whom it was sworn that he had a revolver in his hand at the time of the shooting, has not yet been indicted or arrested; whether two of the men wounded by the shots have been since arrested on a charge of striking a member of the Orange Society on the same occasion; whether they were placed for identification among a number of young men, every one of whom was well known to the person alleged to have been assaulted, and to the members of his family; whether Mr. Moloney, P.M., although he had heard the grave charge against the Orangemen in public, and had admitted them to bail, heard the charge against these men in private, excluding even the press, refused to hear evidence tendered on their behalf, and sent both men to prison on remand, refusing bail for either, though one of them had not been identified by the men assaulted; and, what explanation can be given of the proceedings in relation to this affair?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: Might I ask why Mr. Dillon was instructed in this case instead of Mr. Peyton, the ordinary Crown Solicitor?
  MR. TREVELYAN: It would be impossible in all cases to give the reason

  1193
  why a case was put into the hands of a particular Crown Solicitor. I do not know whether these reasons existed in the present case. In answer to the hon. Member for Sligo, I have to say that the Orangemen were bailed only at the earliest stage of the inquiry. On the last day of the inquiry a certificate was produced that the life of one of the men whom they were charged with injuring was in danger. Bail was then refused, and they were committed for trial, and have since remained in prison. Bail was not accepted, as stated, in opposition to the Sessional Crown Solicitor. The man set at liberty by Mr. Dale was one against whom there was no charge at the time. He was arrested with a revolver; but it was found, on examination, not to have been fired, and he subsequently produced a licence to carry it. Joseph Murray, mentioned in the Question, has not been arrested, because on the occasion of the firing he was found, when searched, to have no arms about him. Two of the wounded Nationalists have been arrested on a charge of assaulting one of the opposite party—an old man, named Murray, whose life is in danger. They were arrested on the sworn information of the son of the injured man (one of the Orange prisoners), and one of them was fully identified by the injured man himself. There was, I am informed, nothing irregular as stated in the manner of the identification. The old man's life being in danger, the prisoners have not been allowed out on bail. They have not yet been brought before the magistrates. It is therefore not correct to say that the charge against them was heard in private. The Resident Magistrate distinctly states that he did not on any occasion refuse admission to the Press, and that he did not refuse evidence for the defence—none having been tendered.

  CRIME AND OUTRAGE (IRELAND)—RIOTS AT ENNISKILLEN.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he has received any Report from the Resident Magistrates at Enniskillen as to the recent trials of rioters there; whether he will read it to the House; whether the Government are satisfied with the administration of justice by the Enniskillen Bench; and whether it is the fact that every Catholic
  1194
  rioter was convicted, and every Orange rioter acquitted?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, it is not usual to produce or lay before Parliament the Reports of Resident Magistrates. It is only done for very special reasons, and I am not prepared to say that they exist in this case. Besides, it is a sort of Report which, out of feeling for Captain M'Ternan, a gentleman for whom I have a great respect, although I know him only officially, I would be very unwilling to produce; because, whatever its nature may be, it is not a very desirable thing to make public the Report of one magistrate criticizing others. With regard to the Enniskillen Bench, there is nothing in the face of the decisions given by the magistrates in the cases referred to, which, in the opinion of the Government, would justify a reference to the Lord Chancellor, without which no expression of opinion can be given. It is not the fact that in the cases before that Bench arising out of the recent riots every Catholic was convicted and every Orangeman acquitted. Of the Roman Catholics charged, three were sent to prison for assaults. A similar charge against a Protestant was dismissed. Two Protestants were fined for being drunk and disorderly and cursing the Pope. Two cases against Protestants for window-breaking were marked "no rule," several cases against parties on both sides for aiding and abetting in assaults were withdrawn or not pressed by the Constabulary. Two cases against Catholics for window-breaking were not pressed. A Protestant was discharged with a caution for igniting explosives in the street.
  MR. HEALY: The right hon. Gentleman has not stated whether the Government are satisfied with the administration of justice by the Enniskillen Bench?
  VISCOUNT CRICHTON: Would the right hon. Gentleman state the number of Protestants and Roman Catholics who were summoned?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I will state that on another occasion.

  EXCISEABLE LIQUORS (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  MR. WARTONasked the honourable Member for Glasgow, Whether, seeing that on Saturday last, the 16th instant,

  1195
  the Exciseable Liquors (Scotland) Bill was not printed, it is his intention to take the Second Beading next Wednesday; or, whether he will, by reasonable delay, give the people of Scotland time to consider the nature and effect of the said Bill?
  DR. CAMERON: The hon. and learned Member will see that the Bill to which he refers was published on Saturday. I am paying anything but an unmerited compliment to the vigilance of the hon. and learned Member in saying that no Member in charge of a Bill opposed by him can afford to miss any chance of advancing it a stage. If, therefore, I can get the opportunity of moving the second reading of the Bill referred to on Wednesday I shall do so, with the full conviction that the people of Scotland may rely upon the sleepless watchfulness of the hon. and learned Member to secure them an ample opportunity of studying its provisions before it leaves this House.

  BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883—THE SCALE OF FEES.
  MR. DIXON-HARTLANDasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether it is a fact that the effect of the second and third items in Table B of Scale of Fees under Bankruptcy Act 1883, is to impose a tax upon all accounts opened at banks other than the Bank of England; whether this is not a clear departure from the compromise of the subject made by him and the Standing Committee; and, whether he is willing to alter the Rules so as to carry out such compromise?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: In my opinion the Scale of Fees referred to in the Question does not impose any special tax upon accounts opened at local banks. The object of this Scale of Fees, which has been sanctioned by the Lord Chancellor and approved by the Treasury, is to spread the charges of administration in bankruptcy equally and fairly over all classes of accounts, and the fixed fee of £3 which has been settled upon for the opening of an account does not nearly represent the loss of interest which is sustained in the large cases, which are the cases ordinarily subject to these local accounts. Under these circumstances, the only doubt I have is whether I ought not to alter the scale and make it an ad valorem charge on the amount of assets.
  1196
  Unless something of the sort is done the smaller accounts will be paying a share of the expenses which are incurred in the larger accounts.
  MR. DIXON - HARTLAND: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered my Question, which is whether the scale is not a departure from the compromise which the right hon. Gentleman made in the Grand Committee; but for which compromise an Amendment which I moved would have been carried against the Government?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I think I have already answered the spirit of the hon. Gentleman's Question. I did not answer that particular part of the Question about the compromise, as it would have been necessary to trouble the House with some explanation. I do not admit the compromise the hon. Member speaks of. I made certain proposals and concessions with reference to this matter to the hon. Member and those who supported his views. The hon. Member refused those concessions, and took a division, on which he was beaten. I cannot consider that that was a compromise. I would add that, in my opinion, the Scale of Fees is no departure whatever from the proposals I then made.
  MR. DIXON-HARTLAND: I beg to give Notice that I shall bring forward this matter on the Motion for the salary of the Receiver General. Although the compromise was not made with me, it was made by the right hon. Gentleman with the Committee.

  POST OFFICE (MONEY ORDERS) ACT, 1883.
  MR. MONKasked the Postmaster General, Whether the provisions of "The Post Office (Money Orders) Act, 1883," which came into force on the 1st of January, are now in operation; if not, when they will be brought into use; and, whether any arrangement has been entered into for the interchange of postal orders between this Country and the Dominion of Canada?
  MR. FAWCETT: Regulations for giving effect to the Post Office (Money Orders) Act of 1883 have been approved by the Treasury, and will be published in the course of a few days in The London Gazette. The date fixed for these Regulations to come into effect is Monday, the 2nd of June next, being the

  1197
  earliest date on which it is possible that the new Orders could be manufactured and issued. In replying to the second Question of my hon. Friend, I may state that as soon as the Regulations have been published a copy will be sent to the Canadian Post Office, and steps will be taken to ascertain whether the Dominion Government is disposed to enter into an arrangement for the exchange of Postal Orders with this country.

  THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—MAJOR HAMILTON, OF DROMORE.
  MR. HARRINGTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to a paragraph in The Freeman's Journal of January 3rd, in which it is stated that at the Dromore Petty Sessions on January 2nd, Major Hamilton, the presiding magistrate, who was one of the signatories to the Orange placards, and one of the organisers of the Orange meeting at Dromore, commented in strong language upon the conduct of the policeman who inflicted the wound on the boy Giffen; whether, according to the evidence, this wound was inflicted while the police were repelling an attack which the Orangemen made on the Nationalist meeting; whether this district of Dromore is chiefly a Catholic district, and those who composed the Nationalist meeting were mainly inhabitants of the district; whether, under these circumstances, Major Hamilton will be entrusted with the Commission of the Peace in this locality; and, whether he will make any representation to the Lord Chancellor as to his conduct?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I do not know on what authority the statement that Major Hamilton used these expressions rests. A special inquiry has been made of the police who were present at the Petty Sessions, and they state that they did not hear it. That would, of course, govern the action or inaction of the Government. According to the evidence the wounds were inflicted by some person carrying out a legal order to prevent a collision between the Orangemen and Nationalists. The Dromore district is chiefly Catholic, and the people who attended the National meeting were believed to have come from a radius of 10 miles around.
  MR. HARRINGTON: If I supply the right hon. Gentleman with the
  1198
  names of persons who were present and heard Major Hamilton use the expressions, will he report the ease to the Lord Chancellor?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I must act, as we always do act, on the positive statements of the police.

  LICENSING LAWS (IRELAND)—INTERFERENCE OF THE POLICE.
  MR. O'BRIENasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is the fact that, on the occasion of the National League meeting in Charleville, a policeman forced his way into a private room of the hotel where three Members of Parliament were being entertained at dinner at the expense of the proprietor of the hotel; whether the constable stated that he would not give any information as to his business until threatened with expulsion from the room; whether the proprietor of the hotel and some townspeople, who, at his invitation, joined his visitors at dinner, were subsequently fined for their presence on the occasion; and, whether this action on the part of the police was authorized or approved by the Irish Executive; and, if not, upon whose instructions it was undertaken?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I am informed that the police went into the licensed premises on the occasion in question because they had reason to believe that a breach of the Licensing Laws was going on. They found a number of persons seated round a table with liquor before them, and they took the names of those who they knew to be residents in the place, and therefore not bonâ fide travellers. The constable distinctly denies that he refused to state his business until threatened with expulsion. The persons identified as not being bonâ fide travellers, as well as the proprietor of the hotel, were proceeded against for an offence against the Sunday Closing Act. When the case came before the magistrates the defendants failed to prove that they were there as invited guests, and they were accordingly convicted and fined. While I think that the proceedings were in some respects to be regretted, they do not appear to have been illegal, and I cannot therefore blame the police for their action in the matter.
  MR. O'BRIEN: Might I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether there is any

  1199
  instance in England of a number of respectable inhabitants of a town being punished in a Police Court for paying a mark of respect to strange Members of Parliament on a visit to their county?
  MR. HARRINGTON: Might I also ask whether there was not a similar prosecution in Bandon arising out of the same cause?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I can only blame the police if they have acted illegally. I cannot blame them for carrying out the law.
  MR. HEALY: Will the right hon. Gentleman, in introducing the Sunday Closing Bill, take care to insert a provision preventing the recurrence of prosecutions of this kind?
  [No reply was given.]

  THE NATIONAL LEAGUE (IRELAND)—INTERFERENCE OF THE POLICE.
  MR. KENNYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he will state the reason why Police have been instructed to intrude themselves on meetings of the Kilrush (county Clare) Branch of the Irish National League; if he will state the special circumstances which have called for similar instructions to be addressed to the Police at Miltown Malbay in the same county; and, if he will state what general directions (if any) have been given to the Constabulary throughout Ireland with regard to attending such local indoor meetings of the National League?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I have already stated to this House the general nature of the instructions given to the police with regard to their attendance at National League meetings. In some parts of the country it was feared that some of these meetings might be for illegal objects; and it was on grounds of that kind that the instruction was given to the police at Miltown Malbay and Kilrush. They were directed not to force their way into the meetings, and they have not done so.

  ITALY—THE CONGREGATION OF PROPAGANDA—ENGLISH ROMAN CATHOLICS.
  MR. MOOREasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether the action of the Italian Government in regard to the property of the Congregation of the Propaganda is not a distinct violation of the
  1200
  assurances tendered to the British Government, through their Ambassador, Sir Augustus Paget, in September 1870; and, whether Her Majesty's Government will ascertain if any action is contemplated by any other of the Great Powers, and use their good offices in conjunction with them, to safeguard the interests of Her Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects?
  MR. GLADSTONE: The Government are not aware of any assurance given to them by the Italian Government which would apply to the present action of that Government. Neither do they think that that action, as reported to them, would warrant our undertaking any official steps. But Sir John Lumley will be instructed to use his good offices in the matter, in case he should see any opening for that purpose.

  MADAGASCAR—LOSSES OF BRITISH SUBJECTS.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If his attention has been called to the great losses inflicted upon British subjects in Madagascar by the bombardments and arbitrary proceedings of the French Naval Authorities in that island, whereby trade to the amount of £750,000 per annum has been wholly stopped, and especially to a letter from the Correspondent of The Standard, which appeared on January 3rd, in which he states:—
  "At Mojanga and along the western coast of the island are over five hundred Chorah merchants from Bombay, regarding whose fate during the past six months their friends in India have learned little. Although British subjects, they have apparently been altogether abandoned by their Government. During my stay in Bombay, Her Majesty's Ship Euryalus arrived from Mauritius, and Her Majesty's Ship Dragon from Zanzibar and Tamatave. From the officers of these we had confirmation and more of all that has appeared in the home Press regarding the insulting attitude of the French;"
  whether he will lay upon the Table the Despatches of Commander Johnstone, describing the insults offered to the British Consul and the British flag in July last and since that date, and the apology stated by the First Lord of the Treasury, on November 9th, to have been given by the French Government; and, what steps are now being taken to put an end to the sufferings of British subjects in Madagascar, and to secure

  1201
  them compensation for their heavy
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: The attention of Her Majesty's Government has been called to the losses incurred by British subjects by the existence of war in Madagascar, and they are being considered with reference to the accepted Rules of International Law bearing on the subject. A communication has been addressed to the French Government in regard to losses reported to have been suffered by British subjects at the bombardment of Vodhemar. A British man-of-war is on the Station, and the Consular staff in the Island has been strengthened. It is not intended, by producing further Papers, to revive the discussion which has been happily terminated by the expression of regret contained in the Note by M. Challemel-Lacour, printed at page 56 of the Papers which have been laid before Parliament.

  CENTRAL ASIA—ANNEXATION OF MERV.
  MR. ONSLOWasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether Her Majesty's Government have received any confirmation of the report of the annexation of Merv and the neighbouring country by the Russian Government; and, if so, what steps, if any, Her Majesty's Government intend to take in consequence?
  MR. GLADSTONE: All the information of which we are in possession with regard to the subject-matter of the hon. Gentleman's Question is contained in two telegrams from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which I will read to the House. The first is dated the 14th of February, and says—
  "Representatives of four tribes of the Merv Turcomans presented themselves at Askabad on the 1st instant, and swore allegiance to the Czar, and invited Russia to accept the government of the country."
  The next, dated the 15th instant, is as follows:—
  "The Emperor has determined to accept the allegiance of the tribes, and will send an officer to administer the government of the country. He will, perhaps, be accompanied by a Turcoman escort."
  These telegrams appear to imply a virtually complete submission of the Merv Turcomans to Russia. Should this prove to be the case, and should any diplomatic
  1202
  action arise out of that fact, Parliament will be duly advised of it at the proper time.
  MR. ONSLOWsaid, that in consequence of the answer of the right hon. Gentleman he wished to ask him whether he would not telegraph to our Ambassador at Teheran, asking whether he could confirm the statement as to the annexation of Merv by Russia?
  MR. GLADSTONE: We have had some information from the Minister at Teheran, but it is of a less definite and precise character than the telegrams I have read; and it is for that reason that I made the reservation in my answer, when I said—" Should this prove to be the case." Probably, in a day or two, we shall have further information on the subject.
  MR. ONSLOW: My Question is, why could you not telegraph at once to the Minister at Teheran? I do not ask for the information just now; but I ask why the right hon. Gentleman could not telegraph to ascertain if the information is confirmed?
  MR. GLADSTONE: The Minister at Teheran sends to us whatever he learns in relation to the subject. What he has sent amounts to less, and is less definite and distinct, than what is contained in the telegrams I have read to the House.
  MR. E. STANHOPE: May I give a Notice in reference to this subject? There are a good many points that want to be cleared up in relation to it, yet I feel that it is hardly fair to expect from the Government at the present moment, in answer to a Question, a definite statement of policy; and therefore I beg to give Notice that on the Report of the Address I shall call attention to the recent proceedings of Russia in Central Asia, and ask some Questions upon them.

  EGYPT (AFFAIRS OF THE SOUDAN) PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL GORDON.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I wish to put a Question to the Prime Minister with reference to a statement that has appeared in the newspapers as regards a Proclamation purporting to be signed by Gordon Pasha, and said to have been posted on the walls of Khartoum. This document proclaims the Mahdi as Sultan of Kordofan, remits one-half of the taxes, and permits the

  1203
  trading in slaves to be carried on. I wish to ask, Whether the Government have received any further information on the subject; and, whether they can give any explanation as to whether General Gordon's powers extend to the issuing of such a Proclamation?
  DR. LYONS: I beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman a Question of which I gave Notice this morning. It is, Whether Her Majesty's Government have taken the very earliest opportunity, and in the most distinct manner possible, to disengage itself and the country from any responsibility in the arrangements which General Gordon appears unfortunately to have felt himself compelled to permit in regard to even the temporary continuance of the slave traffic, and whether he has instructions to put a stop to it at the earliest possible moment?
  MR. GLADSTONE: Sir, we are not in possession of the text, nor do the newspaper correspondents appear to be in possession of the text, of General Gordon's Proclamation. They have received—and we have received—what appears to be a summary of that Proclamation; but upon the point particularly relating to slavery and to the Slave Trade, we do not think it is possible—viewing especially the arrangements which now exist in the Soudan—safely to extract its true moaning and purport from that summary. [Opposition laughter.] I do not think that this is a laughing matter. The opinions of General Gordon with reference to the Slave Trade are perfectly well known. We rely entirely upon him, and are confident—although we are not in possession of this Proclamation—that when we receive it—which no doubt we shall do shortly—it will not be found in any way to derogate from his well-known general sentiments upon the subject. I link the right hon. Gentleman also asked me—at any rate he gave Notice of it—whether such a Proclamation is within the powers of General Gordon? I cannot answer that, and could not answer that definitively, until I have received the Proclamation itself. But I should think, without any derogation from what I have just said about slavery and the Slave Trade, that the Proclamation relating to the Mahdi and to the remission of taxation would be within General Gordon's powers, and we have
  1204
  no reason to believe that he will go beyond them.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to lay the Proclamation upon the Table as soon as it is received?
  MR. GLADSTONE: We shall have to communicate with the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs before doing so; but I should not think that there will be any objection to the Proclamation being laid upon the Table: when it is received.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I think that there may be some misunderstanding as to a part of the answer of the right hon. Gentleman. We understood him to say that the Government had received a communication with regard to the Proclamation of General Gordon. I wish to ask whether the summary which the Government have received is identical with that which appears in the newspapers; and, if not, will he lay it on the Table?
  MR. GLADSTONE: No; it is not identical; and in what I said I intended to signify that there was a difference between them. Neither of them explains the matter fully on a point with regard to which the interest of the House is naturally excited; and there would be no advantage in our producing an imperfect document when we shall have an opportunity shortly of producing the perfect document.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: I wish to ask whether, in the instructions given to General Gordon, there might have been anything said by Her Majesty's Government which could in any way have authorized General Gordon to issue the Proclamation as to the continuance of the Slave Trade?
  MR. GLADSTONE: The only reason I do not like to answer that Question is because I am not willing to admit—and I do not admit to my own mind in the slightest degree—the supposition that General Gordon has issued any Proclamation of that kind. With that preliminary remark, I answer the hon. Gentleman's Question in the negative.

  EGYPT—REPORTED DISBANDING OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT: I beg to ask the Prime Minister, or if he cannot answer it now I will put the

  1205
  Question to-morrow, Whether there is any truth in the rumour that the Egyptian Army is to be disbanded?
  MR. GLADSTONE: There is no truth in that report, as far as we are aware.

  EGYPT—THE SOUDAN—SUZERAINTY OF THE SULTAN.
  MR. ASHMEAD - BARTLETT: I wish to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a Question of which he has had private Notice—namely, Whether the Sultan of Turkey, as the Sovereign of Egyptian territory, has given his assent to the abandonment of the Soudan; and, whether there is any precedent for thus compelling a vassal to give away the territories of his Sovereign?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I only received Notice of this Question a short time ago; and as it refers to a search for precedents, I think the hon. Member will feel that I am not making an unreasonable request if I ask him to place the Question on the Paper tomorrow.

  LAW AND JUSTICE—STEALING A DEAD RABBIT.
  VISCOUNT LYMINGTONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to a statement quoted in The Echo of February 12th, from The Newbury Weekly News, that Joseph Tilbury, of Eddington, appeared to a summons charged with having stolen a dead wild rabbit from off land at Eddington, the property of William Palmer, and committed for one month's imprisonment with hard labour; and if the proposes to take any action in the matter?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, that it might be a question whether a rabbit, when dead, was wild or not. When killed and reduced into possession the rabbit became the property of the person who had a right to it, and anyone who stole it from him was guilty of theft.

  PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—ARRANGEMENT OF PUBLIC BUSINESS.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I wish to put a Question to the Prime
  1206
  Minister with reference to the proceedings of the House. There are so many hon. Gentlemen who wish to take part in the debate on the Motion which I brought forward that it is not probable, and, in fact, it is generally understood, that the debate cannot close to-night. To-morrow is a private Members' night, and if the debate on that Motion is to be continued to-morrow, of course Notices of Motion given by private Members will stand before it. What I wish to ask Her Majesty's Government in reference to the subject is, whether they will do their best to induce hon. Members, whose Notices stand upon the Paper for to-morrow, to allow the adjourned debate to take precedence of them?
  MR. GLADSTONE: I do not wish to be considered a voluntary party to the prolongation of the debate, for I confess that I shall be an involuntary and protesting party to its prolongation. The matter, however, is not in my hands to determine; and, assuming that the debate is to go on beyond to-night, I should certainly in that case support the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman, and should press, as far as I am able, upon hon. Members, who have Notices of Motion upon the Paper, and who may be inclined to give way, the propriety and convenience of allowing the debate to proceed to-morrow night. I am obliged to my hon. Friend the Member for Forfarshire (Mr. Barclay), and to the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Edward Clarke), for the intention kindly expressed by them to refrain from bringing forward their Motions; and I may, perhaps, remind the House that it is not exactly the case of last year. Last year, for three or four nights, the Motion was made for postponing Notices of Motion in order to continue the debate out he Address. Now, this is not, of course, a debate on the Address, and so far is a variation from previous practice. But it is a case where the argument is still stronger, because the debate has with perfect propriety been allowed to take precedence of the Address; and, consequently, it is quite right that we should pursue the same course and allow the debate to go forward.
  MR. EDWARD CLARKE, while very sorry to lose the opportunity he had gained for bringing forward his Motion, would postpone it in deference to the wish of the right hon. Gentleman.

  THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—INFLAMMATORY LANGUAGE.
  MR. T. P. O'CONNOR: I sent to the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland last night a Notice, which I hope he received this morning. The Question which I proposed to ask him is this—Whether the Irish Government have resolved to iustitute a prosecution against Captain Barton, Mr. Murray Kerr, Colonel Stuart Knox, Lord Claud Hamilton, M.P., Colonel King-Harman, M.P., or any of the other gentlemen who recently used language inciting to murderous outrage? and, by way of accounting for my desire that the right hon. Gentleman should give an early answer, I may state that all these speeches were made between the periods beginning on October 6, 1883, when Colonel Knox spoke, to January 10, when Colonel King-Harman used the expression, "Keep the cartridge in the rifle."
  MR. TREVELYAN: I only received Notice of the Question this morning. It is an important one, and I cannot answer it without communicating first with the Executive in Ireland. I should feel obliged if the hon. Member would inform me in writing what are the exact passages he referred to, for it is a very difficult thing to decide upon in a case of this kind. I think, however, perhaps, it is one of those cases in which the courtesy every Member owes to another obliges me to state with regard to those Gentlemen mentioned in the Question, who are Members of this House, that I have read a great many of the speeches made, and, generally speaking, I cannot remember any speech which I think would come within the meaning of the phrase "inciting to murderous outrage." "With regard to the question in general, there is no doubt that speeches and observations have been made in Ireland that deserve the sort of attention from the Government which the hon. Member desires to draw to them, and I shall communicate very minutely with the Executive in Ireland upon the subject.
  MR. T. P. O'CONNOR: Arising out of the answer of the right hon. Gentleman, I beg to give him Notice that I will put on the Paper to-night the extracts on which I rely, and some of these extracts I shall take the liberty of quoting from his own speeches.

ORDER OF THE DAY.
  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—EGYPTIAN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

    VOTE OF CENSURE.
    [ADJOURNED DEBATE.] [FOURTH NIGHT.]
    Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [12th February],
    "That this House, having read and considered the Correspondence relating to Egypt, laid upon the Table by Her Majesty's Command, is of opinion that the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due, in a great measure, to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government."—(Sir Stafford Northcote.)
    And which Amendment was,
    To leave out from the word "House" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "whilst declining at present to express an opinion on the Egyptian policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued during the last two years, with the support of the House, trusts that in future British Forces may not be employed for the purpose of interfering with the Egyptian people in the selection of their own Government,"—[Sir Wilfrid Lawson,)
    —instead thereof.
    Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    Debate resumed.
    SIR JOHN LUBBOCKsaid, that, after listening carefully to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition, he could not but conclude that his Resolution must have been prepared before he had read the Egyptian Papers, and that it indicated what he expected, and not what he really found there. The hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour) asked why we should have aided Tewfik in Egypt and not in the Soudan? But the cases were altogether dissimilar. Of course, those who considered that the revolt of Arabi was really a national, and not a merely military movement, would disapprove of our having interfered at all. But, rightly or wrongly, Her Majesty's Government believed that in supporting the Khedive's Government against Arabi's demands for an increase in the Army, larger pay, and more promotion, they were acting in the interests of the people of Egypt. The hon. Baronet the Member

    1209
    for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) read out what he termed the programme of Arabi. No doubt, on paper, it was one with which many hon. Members would heartily sympathize; but Rulers must be judged by their acts rather than by their words, and, looked at from this point of view, Arabi's was a military revolt, and not a national movement. It seemed to him that we were quite justified in supporting the legitimate Government in Egypt. The case of the Soudan was very different. He gave all credit to the Egyptian Government for the best intentions; but, unfortunately, they could not exercise a sufficient control over their officials. Colonel Stewart's Report clearly proved the misgovernment of the Soudan. For instance, he said—
    "I am firmly convinced that the Egyptians are quite unfit in every way to undertake such a task as the government of so vast a country with a view to its welfare, and that, both for their own sake and that of the people they tried to rule, it would he advisable to abandon large portions of it. The fact of their general incompetence to rule is so generally acknowledged that it is unnecessary to discuss the question."
    One Governor to whom he expressed his dissatisfaction naively excused himself by saying that he only robbed the poor and never interfered with the rich. Colonel Stewart did not appear to accept the limitation, and observed generally that—
    "He thought there could be no doubt that the whole local government was in league to rob and plunder. Nor were the Egyptian officials even loyal to their own employers. General Hicks stated that in his opinion, more than half of the Government employés were partizans of the Mahdi, and that in the event of any reverse, the dangers would begin with the Government officials."
    If the soldiery were undisciplined and unruly, it was only fair to remember that many—he might say most of them—were in the Soudan entirely against their own will, and that their pay was greatly, in some cases as much as two years, in arrear. The military service in the Soudan was both hateful and deadly to the Egyptian soldiery; and, lastly, the Soudan was a constant drain on the Egyptian Treasury, costing habitually £200,000 a-year, while last year it would amount at least to £600,000. General Gordon's view on the subject was stated in the Memorandum—
    "I must say it would be an iniquity to reconquer these people and then hand them back to the Egyptians without guarantees of future
    1210
    good government. It is evident that this we cannot secure them without an inordinate expenditure of men and money."
    And, he added—
    "Indeed, one may say it would be impracticable at any cost."
    It was, then, quite clear that neither in the interests of the Soudanese nor of the Egyptians should we have been justified in assisting to reconquer the Soudan. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. Forster) went further, and maintained that Her Majesty's Government ought to have interfered to prevent the Egyptian Government from attempting to put down the revolt of the Mahdi. He said that after Tel-el-Kebir we had the power—we had also the responsibility. But had we the right? No doubt we had the force which would have enabled us to insist on the abandonment of the Soudan, but we had not the moral right to do so. The Government of the Khedive at that time was strongly in favour of retaining the Soudan, and we should have been acting in opposition to Cherif Pasha, whose opinion was entitled to great weight, the Khedive, and, in fact, to the opinion of every man of any authority at that time, in insisting on its evacuation. Such, then, being the views of the Egyptian Government, supported as they were by other high authorities, he could not think that Her Majesty's Government would have been justified in using their power to compel Egypt to abandon her great dependency. They would have been severely and justly blamed if they had taken such a course. The right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) had expressly told them that he did not advocate the mission of English troops to the Soudan; nor did he maintain that we ought to have insisted, on its being abandoned; but if we were not prepared to adopt either of these courses, it would have been useless and undignified to tender advice. But then it was said, why should we interfere now? Well, the whole circumstances had so greatly altered that the Egyptian Government themselves were now in favour of retiring from the Soudan. They were informed, in Sir Evelyn Baring's despatch of the 8th of January—
    "The Khedive now accepts cordially the policy of the abandonment of the whole of the

    1211
    Soudan, which he believes, on mature reflection, to he the beat in the interests of the country."
    Nubar Pasha, the present Prime Minister, entirely concurred in the wisdom of that course. Nay, Cherif himself had greatly modified his views; in his communication of the 2nd of January last, he said that his Government found itself compelled to apply, either to us or to the Porte, for a contingent of 10,000 men to be sent to Suakim. And if that was not done at once he and his Colleagues had determined to retire from the shores of the Bed Sea and the Eastern Soudan. The right hon Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) had told them that recent events had lowered the prestige of England. What evidence was there of that? He himself believed the prestige of England in the Soudan never stood higher. The right hon. Baronet told them that General Gordon's mission was—
    "To tame this fanatical Mahdi and all his savage followers, who have just conquered two Egyptian Armies; … to withdraw 27,000 men from the Mahdi and his followers—their greatest enemies in the world—in peace and safety.… He is to do all this by his own personal influence."
    Well, that certainly sounded almost a hopeless mission; yet General Gordon had been received by the tribes with enthusiasm, and he himself had telegraphed—"Have no further anxiety about this part of the Soudan." It would be difficult to have stronger evidence of British prestige. Perhaps it would be said that, as regarded the latter case, that was not the prestige of England, but of a great Englishman. But the prestige of England abroad was due to the individual character of our countrymen. It was impossible not still to feel much anxiety for General Gordon himself, but he believed that danger was greater from treachery behind than from any open foe in front. His hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Morley), in his interesting speech, said he only consented to go into Egypt because he expected we should have to come out again. That seemed a very extraordinary argument. One could understand those who, like the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, said we ought never to have gone at all; but if we were right to go, if we were wise in spending several millions of money and
    1212
    sacrificing many valuable lives, it would be folly to leave the country once more a prey to the same dangers. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle spoke of leaving the Egyptians to work out their own political salvation. But Egypt, was no new country. For 6,000 years it had been mainly ruled by foreigners, Arabs and Ethiopians, Persians and Assyrians, Greeks and Romans, Turks and Circassians. Then they had heard something of leaving the Egyptians to "stew in their own juice." But if we were to leave Egypt now, that was not what would happen. Egypt for the Egyptians even now would mean Egypt for the Turk, the Arab, and the Greek. The country would be only too likely to relapse once more into anarchy until some European Power—Franco, or perhaps we ourselves—once more intervened. He was sorry to hear the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle endorse the saying of the last Khedive, that Tewfik had neither head, nor heart, nor courage; the hon. Baronet did not hesitate to characterize him as "the most contemptible Potentate living," and yet he asked them to leave the destinies of Egypt in his hands. It seemed to him that Tewfik had shown great courage and prudence; but if he was so feeble and contemptible, to leave Egypt now would be to hand it over to some new military adventurer or some Foreign Power. Again, they had heard a good deal during that debate with reference to the finances of Egypt, which several speakers had painted in very gloomy figures. The right hon. Member for Bradford spoke of Egypt as bankrupt. He did not, however, refer to figures; and the figures did not seem to bear out that contention. The total Revenue for 1883, according to the figures contained in the Blue Book just issued, was put at £8,800,000, and the Expenditure at £8,600,000, showing a surplus of £200,000. Of course, under the circumstances, those figures would not be realized, though they might take them as representing the normal condition. But it was quite true that under the Law of Liquidation, out of that amount, £4,400,000 was set aside for the interest and redemption of Debt, leaving only £4,400,000 for the civil and military government of the country, which, however, was just about the usual cost. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary

    1213
    for India (Mr. J. K. Cross) told them that the deficiency for civil and military expenditure this year would be £500,000, while the surplus on the Revenue assigned for the Debt was £250,000, so that the net deficit was only £250,000. But the hon. Gentleman told them, on the one hand, that great economies were being effected; the noble Lord the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) pointed to one item where in Cairo alone there would be a saving of £30,000 a-year; and, on the other hand, by better administration, and especially by a juster and more equable irrigation, the produce of the country would, in his own words, be "immensely increased." The drain to the Soudan would now cease, and various exemptions would be abolished. Another large increase of Revenue would be derived by the sale of the Daira domains, which comprised over 400,000 acres of the best land in Egypt, which at present contributed scarcely anything to the National Revenue. No doubt it was unfortunately true that the fellaheen were far from being in a satisfactory condition, but that was due not so much to the national taxation as to the misgovernment and injustice which had hitherto prevailed, and to the enormous rates of interest charged by local moneylenders. And that raised one of the most important questions which they had to face. The question of finance was of great importance, because nothing would more benefit the Egyptian peasantry than some system by which they might obtain the necessary advances on more reasonable terms. But of course that was impossible if the financial condition of Egypt was really as bad as the right hon. Member for Bradford supposed. Under the old Egyptian law, when a peasant borrowed he pledged his crops, no doubt, but the creditor could not take his land. His family could not, therefore, be driven from their homes. He had fixity of tenure, but not free sale; his holding was a sort of life tenancy. But that had been now altered. The creditor could seize the land, and evict the peasant. That was a change in the law which the fellaheen had not comprehended, and for which they were not prepared; and it was, as it seemed to him, the greatest difficulty, and one that
    1214
    required the immediate and careful attention of Her Majesty's Government. His hon. Friend the Member for Waterford (Mr. Villiers Stuart), in his admirable speech, had pointed out other reforms which were most necessary. There was one point, however, in which, though with great diffidence, he was not sure that he quite concurred with his hon. Friend, who said that we must "give Egypt good government first, and representative institutions afterwards." He ventured to think the wise course would be to give them some power at once and extend it by degrees, because he thought that a period of good government entirely from without would leave them even more unable to govern themselves. He could not, therefore, support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Carlisle. If we were right to go to Egypt at all we should be unwise to leave our work unfinished. "We had now the power to secure the blessings of a good Government to Egypt, and he believed it was our duty to do so. In conclusion, he should cordially support the Government, believing that when the impartial historian came to deal with the events connected with our intervention in Egypt, he would record that not only in the victory of Tel-el-Kebir, but even more, perhaps, in our subsequent endeavours to promote the prosperity and welfare of Egypt, we had been writing a page in English history of which our children would have no cause to be ashamed.
    MR. MARRIOTT: Mr. Speaker—Sir, the question before the House is not, as has been imagined from a good many of the speeches delivered on this side of the House, and especially from the speech made by the Prime Minister himself on the first night of the debate, whether the late Government were right or wrong in establishing the Dual Control; and it is not whether the present Government were right or wrong in not reversing the policy of the late Government in Egypt as they did in Afghanistan, and as they did in South Africa after Majuba Hill; but the question is, whether the calamities and the disasters which have undoubtedly occurred in Egypt are due to the vacillation and inconsistency of Her Majesty's present Government. Sir, great credit is due to Her Majesty's Government for the

    1215
    able men they have employed in Egypt, and that credit has been claimed with no little ostentation. Why, Sir, when the names of Lord Dufferin and Sir Evelyn Baring are mentioned as being among those who have been thus employed, I am reminded of some cunning and clever old solicitors, who, when they have any difficult cases to conduct, employ the best counsel they can get, probably the Attorney or Solicitor General, not, perhaps, expecting them to be in Court; not, perhaps, even taking their advice, although it may assist them to have the pleasure of a triumph, but only to be able to say—" We, ourselves, are shielded from all responsibility." But the advice of Lord Dufferin has not been acted upon; and because it was not acted upon Her Majesty's Government have been guilty of both vacillation and inconsistency. At the present time, fortunately, the House is well acquainted with all the facts of the case, and consequently I shall not have occasion to refer to Blue Books, but to dates well within the memory of the House. On the 10th of April, 1883, the Government knew what was the right policy to adopt in the Soudan. On that date they had Lord Dufferin's despatch in their hands, saying the right thing was to limit the Government of Egypt to Sennaar, and to give up Kordofan and Khartoum. They knew on the 3rd May that Hicks Pasha concurred in that policy. They knew that in August in that despatch of the 5th, where Hicks Pasha pointed out all his difficulties, and almost implored that he should not be sent on, how short of money he was; how discontented were his soldiers, and how slight was the Army under his command. In that touching despatch, which cannot be read without making one's blood thrill, he closes by saying that Lord Dufferin's advice on the 10th of April previous was the right advice, and that they ought to limit their operations to Sennaar. Knowing, then, the opinion of their most trusted agent, Lord Dufferin, and knowing also the opinion of Hicks Pasha, what did the English Government do? It does not recommend any line of policy to the Egyptian Government, and it asks its agents to take no steps in the way of assistance—not even to give advice to the Egyptians. Then we come to what the hon. Member for
    1216
    Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) calls "the fatal 4th of January," and what do the Government do? They turn their coat quite entirely, and change their policy from beginning to end, and say—" Hitherto we have recommended, but now we insist." There is a vast difference between the policy of the 4th of January and that of the 10th of April. And why on earth should there be that difference? The Egyptian people were the same, their nation also; the Government was the same, resting, as usual, upon, and governed by, British bayonets; and yet, why this change of front? Simply because these calamities had happened, which everyone who knew Egypt had foretold; and had the Government listened to the advice of him they themselves sent, and acted on the opinion of Lord Dufferin and Hicks Pasha, millions of money would have been saved, and at least 11,000 human lives. Well, Sir, this action with regard to the Soudan has not been exceptional on the part of Her Majesty's Government. If there has been any consistency in their policy it has been consistency in vacillation and consistency in inconsistency. Why, Sir, if we go back to the commencement of this case, I see in this case, as in some others, Her Majesty's Government has a singular faculty of creating difficulties in order to have the credit, and to enjoy the advantages to be derived therefrom, of removing them. It was Her Majesty's Government who created Arabi, who was at first a simple soldier, with not one follower in the country. If it had not been for the line of action pursued by Her Majesty's Government Arabi would never have exercised any power in Egypt. When he first attempted a rebellion—at least, not a rebellion, but a mutiny—in order to get extra pay, what did Her Majesty's Government do? Why, if you examine the Blue Books, you will find that they cautioned and threatened 10 times, and never struck once. They sent an Ultimatum which was afterwards explained away. They sent out big men-of-war which remained idle and unemployed, for they refused to give the Admiral commanding them orders to act; and as the result of their weak and hesitating policy, they gave Arabi a hold on Egypt that made the Egyptians think he was the strong man, and England the coward. Arabi was

    1217
    like a shying horse, and, just as a shying horse will got accustomed to the steam roller on the Thames Embankment, so did Arabi get so accustomed to ultimatums and notes and big vessels and big guns, that he came at last to regard them without fear at all. A consideration of the dates will show vacillation throughout the policy that has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government in Egypt. Thus, on the 11th of June, 1882, after the riots at Alexandria, when the English Consul (Mr. Cookson) was insulted and dragged from his carriage, at that time English vessels with English guns, and manned by English seamen, were in the harbour of Alexandria. In the course of the debate in this House on this subject, we have heard the name of one great Liberal statesman mentioned not with that honour he deserves—I allude to Lord Palmerston—and I venture to say that if that noble Lord had been at the head of the Liberal Government on the 11th of June, 1882, and any English Minister or Consul, or even any Englishman, had been insulted as Mr. Cookson was, retribution would have been demanded, if not exacted, on the next day, and the Egyptians would have been promptly called to account for the insult offered to the English nation. But what did we do? There were our men-of-war in the harbour, and yet nothing was done until the 11th of July; and even then Her Majesty's Government, not wishing to have the responsibility thrown on them, left it to the Admiral in command of the Fleet to take what steps he liked, when the necessity of the occasion arose. We know what he did. He bombarded the place, but there were no troops sent to support him. It is perfectly clear to all people—in Egypt, at all events—that, if the Admiral had been properly supported on that occasion, there never would have been war in Egypt. The war itself, therefore, was the result of the vacillation and inconsistency of Her Majesty's Government. There is one bright spot in our Egyptian policy, and that is the way in which the war was conducted by the naval and military authorities. Our sailors and soldiers did their duty well, despite the sneers of some carpet critics, whom we hear now and then in the House. But after Tel-el-Kebir, England was master of the
    1218
    situation. This country then had an opportunity of rendering the greatest service to Egypt, to England, to Europe, to the whole civilized world—she had everything practically in her own hands for the purposes of the Government. She found in Egypt three classes of people: First, there was the Khedive, Tewfik; secondly, there were the official classes, who had always carried on the Government of the country in former times, consisting of Armenians, Copts, and aliens, and not including one single Egyptian; and, thirdly, there were the fellaheen, a people easy to lead, easy to guide, and easy to govern; but the greatest cowards that almost ever existed, and having no more notion of self-government than the monkeys in the Zoological Gardens. Her Majesty's Government might have done one of two things: they might have said to the Khedive—" Now that we have driven Arabi out of Egypt, you can govern the country according to your own plan, and we know what will be the result. Probably Riaz Pasha will be called to the head of affairs, and corruption and bribery may have to be resorted to, and many lives lost, but a stable Government must be formed." Or Her Majesty's Government might have said they would take over the rule for a certain period, and in that time establish a stable and a just Government. What did we do? We followed neither of these courses. We said—"You shall govern, but you shall do it in our way. You shall govern, but it shall be in accordance with English ideas." To anyone who knows the Eastern mind, that is asking an absolute impossibility at the present time. Nothing proved that more conclusively than the trial of Arabi. I know what occurred in Cairo when the discussion took place with regard to Arabi. The Khedive and his Ministers said—"You try him if you like, and take all responsibility, or, if we do it, let us do it according to our laws." What did Her Majesty's Government do? They said—" No; you shall try him; but you shall try him according to the rules that guide an English Court of Law." It was absurd. You might just as well ask a Mussulman to carry out a religious service according to the forms observed in the English Church. Our forms of legal procedure are unknown in Egypt

    1219
    and the East; and to have a counsel in Court addressing them in favour of the prisoner was, to the Egyptian mind, repugnant. The result was that, in reality, Arabi never was tried at all. The whole thing was a farce. Lord Dufferin was called in, and arranged the matter. Arabi, I say, was never tried, and he is now enjoying himself in Ceylon. That is what annoyed the Egyptians—not to be permitted to govern their own way, and, while we had the power, telling them they were responsible. This policy has, undoubtedly, led to very bad results in the country. I know that, on the first night of the debate, the Prime Minister went through a variety of heads, and showed the country was improving. I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman got his facts from the Blue Books. I can only say I have before me some few facts which differ in toto from the Prime Minister's facts, and I will give some of them with the permission of the House. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), speaking in the course of this debate, has alluded to a gentleman who is well acquainted with Egypt. He has been a merchant there for 17 or 18 years, is there now, and is likewise the representative of our leading journal, The Times—I mean Mr. Moberley Bell. I received a letter from him, dated the 2nd of this month, from Cairo, in which he gives an answer to certain questions. I cannot say whether those answers are correct or not; but they are given on the authority of a man who knows the country well, and I will mention a few of them to the House. Take the Army first, and what has taken place will prove its accuracy. He says, speaking of it—
    "More progress has been made there than any where, mainly because it has been placed absolutely in the hands of Englishmen. Yet it has not yet proved itself sufficiently fit; when forces were required for the Soudan, it was not fit for employment, and was made to do police duty."
    Whether the report I have heard to-day is correct or not I know not; but here is what this gentleman says—
    "As to the Constabulary, the attempt to make a force has been an entire failure; and as to the urban police, they have been even a worse failure than the Constabulary,' into which they have now been merged."
    Then, as to Representative Government,
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    ho says the whole idea is a mistake; and the greatest satire on it is the fact that the man who received the greatest number of votes was the consistent opponent of Representative Government—Riaz Pasha. It is the lazy, ne'er-do-well of the village, or only those who can bribe most freely, that are elected. The result of what has taken place is that each Minister seeks to dodge the Chamber by spending the money first, and getting the Vote afterwards. That is the opinion of an acknowledged authority, writing on the spot, of the Representative Government with which we have blessed the fellaheen. Again, no progress has been made with regard to education, and Mr. Bell finishes up with saying—
    "That from the 1st of October, 1882, to the 1st of October, 1883, the time has been absolutely wasted."
    That is also the opinion of people on the spot, and I believe it is the general opinion in Egypt; for, notwithstanding the glowing account given by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, as well as by others who agree with him, both here and in "another place," of the reforms that have been effected, the universal opinion of competent judges in Egypt itself is that Her Majesty's Government have reduced the country to such an inextricable mess and such a state of chaos that no one knows or sees their way out of it. Men who wish to see the country thrive, who take a lively interest in the fellaheen, who desire to see capital invested in a land possessing so rich a soil and beautiful a climate, tell us they have no confidence, and hold up their hands in despair, saying they know not what will become of this poor and afflicted country. The noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) used the right motto when he uttered the words "Too late." That is absolutely the motto upon which Her Majesty's Government have acted in Egypt, and it is through their acting on that motto that all these various calamities have occurred. It was so with the cholera. Take, again, the abandonment of Darfour, Kordofan, and Dongola. We recommended their abandonment at one time; we insisted when they were lost. Take, again, the retirement from Berber. We recommended that step, but insisted upon it when it was too late. And thug throughout the whole of this miserable

    1221
    Egyptian policy we have been too late to be of any good to the country, or to redeem the character of this Empire. I do not agree with every particular in all that has been said about the Khedive by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock. One characteristic he has which, to my mind, ought to recommend him. He has always been faithful and loyal to this country. There is, too, a mistake which the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock has not made, and, I believe, never will make; but it is a mistake which the Khedive has made, in common with the majority of the people of this country. He has placed implicit reliance in Her Majesty's Government; and the result of that reliance and confidence has been the pitiable condition to which he is now reduced. Now, Sir, I have gone at some length—I hope not at too great a length—into the facts of the case; and the question then comes—How ought Members of this House of Commons to vote? I must say the exhibition that has been given in the course of this debate is somewhat singular. Some reasons for a want of confidence in Her Majesty's Government have been given from that side of the House; but, Sir, out-and-out the strongest reasons for want of confidence in the Government have proceeded from this side. Why, Sir, not only do all the Members on this side differ, but it seems to be the height of their ambition, while they support the Government, to give them as many and as hard kicks as they can. The only consensus amongst them is the consensus of abuse; and yet they say they will still support Her Majesty's Government. But why? Is it because the country is reduced to such a state that, bad as the present Government is, a better one is impossible? It is bad, they say, but a better is impossible. Well, they must try. But assuming, Sir, that the past conduct of Her Majesty's Government is as bad as hon. Members on this side of the House say it is, what security have they that it is to be better in the future? Do they not know what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government? I listened with very great attention to that eloquent, energetic, and most vigorous speech made by the Prime Minister on the first night of the debate, and it is in no words of disrespect I say it; but, having listened to the speech, it
    1222
    produced on my mind the same effect as from reading the Blue Books; and that is, that up to this moment Her Majesty's Government do not recognize the seriousness of the position in Egypt. No person in England can speak in more solemn and moving tones, or thrill the whole heart of the country more than the Prime Minister, when he talks of Bulgarian atrocities and bloodguiltiness with regard to South Africa; and yet here, though some 11,000 lives have been sacrificed, awakening the indignation of the whole Empire; though blood has been poured out like water upon the and wastes of Egypt; though, at the present time, Egypt and this country—indeed, the whole Empire—is surrounded with difficulties, the Prime Minister in that speech, so far from rising to the occasion—so far from, speaking in solemn tones of bloodguiltiness—like Ollivier, under the Empire in France, when he drifted into the Franco-German War, seems to treat the matter with a light heart, and throughout it offers what he himself has called "decoys" for the cheers of the House. He speaks of this as a historic debate. What, I ask, is this? Is it true that so many lives have been lost; that, perhaps, at this moment at Tokar there are men, women, and children, a miserably panic-stricken band, who go in fear and trembling of their lives, besieged by a ruthless barbarian horde, when they know that there are British ships and British bayonets at Suakim? And yet, when it is so, are they to be slaughtered and butchered, helpless as they are, by the savage foe? Is this true or not? Is that the reason why so little sympathy has been shown on that Bench for those who are suffering?—and of those sufferings, I believe, Her Majesty's Government are the cause. Is distance to remove and limit our sympathy? I say, "No." I must say it does strike me—I cannot explain it, and I cannot understand it—how people can give the reasons they have with regard to this vote, and yet, in spite of their own convictions, support Her Majesty's Government. I, for one, cannot; and I do not intend to; and I say that, in the policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued in Egypt, they have forsaken all the traditions of the Liberal Party, as they were understood under Lord Melbourne, Lord Russell, and

    1223
    Lord Palmerston. In not giving my vote to, and in not remaining a supporter of, Her Majesty's Government on this occasion, I in no way forsake the Liberal principles which were acted upon by Lord Melbourne. [Laughter.] The right hon. Gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's Government laughs; but I ask him, was Lord Palmerston a Liberal Minister or not, and did we, did England, occupy a higher position under his Leadership than now or not? The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government professes, and has often professed, a great regard for the opinion of the Press of the country, and when he was under the Leadership of Lord Palmerston he rendered great services to the Press of this country. At the present time, does he despise the Press of the country? The Press of every country, be it Germany, France, or Italy—indeed, there is no Press in Europe that is not holding this country up to ridicule as having disgraced itself. [Laughter.] I observe the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department is laughing. Were this House but for one moment to become a Palace of Truth, and we could see the working of the right hon. Gentleman's mind, I think it would be found that he disagreed more with those sitting on the same Benches with him than he does with those sitting on the opposite Benches. What I say is, that the Government have not only lost the confidence of the country, but of the Liberal Party. ["Oh!"] I say this with all seriousness, and I will tell them of the step I intend to take—and they will approve of it—and I should not stand here to say what I say if I did not feel that the majority of my constituents agreed with me. The step I intend to take is this. As soon as I have voted in this Division I shall ask one favour, and it will be the last, of the Government, and that will be, that they shall grant me the Chiltern Hundreds, so that I may go down to test whether a majority of my constituents at Brighton have or have not lost their confidence in me, or whether they have clone so as regards the present Administration.
    LORD JOHN MANNERS: Sir, I think it will be admitted that the House exercised a wise discretion in allowing the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down to address it after the hon. Baronet,
    1224
    for he has made one of the most scathing, one of the most eloquent, and one of the most patriotic speeches delivered in this debate; and I rejoice, therefore, that I was relieved from interfering to prevent the House enjoying that speech. I listened with great attention to the speech of the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock), who I think achieved a great Parliamentary success in one respect. There is nothing more stimulates interest or keeps it alive than a startling paradox. The hon. Member for the University of London succeeded in achieving that success. He announced that the events of the last few days had greatly raised the prestige of England. That, if I may venture to say so, was about his sole contribution to the debate, because in a single sentence he disposed of the main question, by saying that the House had quite decided that the defence of the Government was invincible, that the case of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon had nothing in it, and that we should pass on to consider the state of the finances of Egypt. Now, the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just left the House (Mr. Marriott) said the disaster to General Hicks was foreseen by everyone who knew anything of Egypt. But in that he made a slight mistake. There were some who saw and foresaw nothing, for we find in the Speech from the Throne that Her Majesty is made to describe that dreadful catastrophe as an utterly unforeseen one. Unforeseen by whom? Unforeseen by Her Majesty's Ministers; and why? Because they deliberately chose and refused to see and hear what everybody else saw and heard. The Prime Minister said they were accused of vacillation and inconsistency when they were consistent throughout. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Devon fancied he saw in the Blue Books gleams of sanity and intervals of common sense, and he gave the Government credit for them, but the right hon. Gentleman would have nothing of it. They would not see, they would not hear, from the beginning to the end of the Egyptian business, anything connected with the Soudan, and so they commenced reorganizing the Army, re-organizing the finances, and a whole new system of government in Egypt totally irrespective of what was going on in the Soudan.

    1225
    Let us take two points—the Army and finance. What has been the result here of excluding all reference to the affairs of the Soudan? The hon. Member for the University of London told us we were going on remarkably well with regard to finance, but that a great change had lately been made. No doubt a great change has been made. There was a new loan of £1,000,000 by the Messrs. Rothschild, guaranteed morally, if not technically, by Her Majesty's Government. In what condition is the Army? Does it exist in any practical sense? Has it now got any officers? If it has, are they satisfied with their men? We know that days ago—weeks ago—the Army of Egypt was so demoralized that for all practical purposes it had ceased to exist. The right hon. Gentleman and his Cabinet thought they could re-organize Egypt without thinking of the Soudan. We have been told recently that we must not say a word about General Gordon, that the whole responsibility rests with him, and that anyone who says anything about his Egyptian doings is committing something like a crime. What does General Gordon say about separating the affairs of Egypt from the Soudan? I shall read it to the House. It was given four years ago. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman cheers that; but does he not know that it is equally applicable this year and last year? The affairs of the Soudan are far more dangerous now than they were in 1880. This is what he said—
    "If you care for the prosperity and quiet of Lower Egypt, do not be oblivious of what goes on in the Soudan. Lower Egypt may be the head and chest; the Soudan is the belly."
    But the Government appears to have been oblivious of all that was going on in the Soudan, and so the solemn farce went on without the slightest attention being paid to the Soudan. The hon. Gentleman who has just spoken told us, with perfect truth, that so long as we were served in Egypt by Lord Dufferin that distinguished man and consummate statesman did not fall into that error. But when Lord Dufferin gave advice to the Government, what I want to know is, whether he gave it as their agent or as an isolated individual? Here was Lord Dufferin's advice in April, 1883—
    "The Egyptian Government has constituted a special bureau for the superintendence of the
    1226
    affairs of the Soudan. The Head of the New Department, Ibrahim Bey, called upon me yesterday.… I ventured to impress his Excellency with my belief that the recent disturbances were mainly to be attributed to the misgovernment and cruel exactions of the local Egyptian authorities at Khartoum, and that, whatever might be the pretensions of the Mahdi to a divine mission, his chief strength was derived from the misery and despair of the native population. If the Egyptian Government were wise, I added, it would confine its present efforts to the re-establishment of its authority in Sennaar, and would not seek to extend its dominion beyond that province and the bordering river banks."—[Egypt, No. 13 (1883), p. 54.]
    Well, we have been told that the opinion of Lord Dufferin was not official, and that the Egyptian Government might disregard it, as they did disregard it. Lord Dufferin's suggestion was sanctioned and approved by Her Majesty's Government in an official despatch by which responsibility for his suggestion was accepted. It was clear that Lord Dufferin had many interviews with, and was in agreement with, General Hicks; and it is clear, further, from the manner in which Lord Dufferin spoke of General Hicks, after his unfortunate and miserable death, that the gallant General left Cairo with the full consent and approval of the noble Lord to enter on a campaign which had been arranged between them, and which Hicks was prepared to carry out. This is shown further, I think, by the letter which Lord Dufferin wrote to Colonel Stewart on his return from the Soudan, and in which he thanked the gallant colonel for having, in spite of innumerable difficulties, placed at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government, as well as at that of the Egyptian Government, a mass of carefully-analyzed and useful information on all the various points to which his attention had been directed, and which could not fail to prove of the greatest assistance to those who were interested in ameliorating the condition of that region. It is clear, I think, from what I have said, that Colonel Stewart set out for the purpose of furnishing information first and foremost for Her Majesty's Government, and it is equally clear that, as long as Lord Dufferin remained at Cairo good advice was given to the Egyptian Government by him; but that advice was not backed up by Her Majesty's Ministers in Downing Street, and when Lord Dufferin left Cairo there was despatched that

    1227
    abrupt and almost brutal telegram with which our Representative was told to press upon the Egyptian Government that they alone were responsible for everything connected with the Soudan. I have no doubt that had Lord Dufferin remained two or three months longer in Cairo the miserable disaster which befell General Hicks would have been avoided. For whether the noble Lord was or was not backed up by Her Majesty's Ministers at home, he would, I believe, have succeeded in preventing that most disastrous expedition. The next period to which I would refer is that when Her Majesty's Government, relieved by the departure of Lord Dufferin from Cairo, proceeded upon the course of total abstinence from responsibility and advice. It was in vain that Hicks Pasha wrote those plaintive and melancholy letters to which reference has been made. Her Majesty's Government did not look at them. It was nothing to them whether General Hicks and his Army went to death or not. At the time the Government were announcing that the evacuation of Egypt by British troops was about to take place, it was necessary for Party considerations that the Prime Minister should be able to announce to the startled and disgusted citizens at the Guildhall that the evacuation was about to become an accomplished fact; and so they foresaw nothing, as they now have told us in the Queen's Speech. Before the change of policy, communicated by the despatch of the 4th of January, there was a month of vacillation and doubt, and that was at the time when Baker Pasha's Force was being organized to perform duties for which it was not competent, and for which it was not originally intended. We have been told in the course of this debate that Her Majesty's Government had no reason at the time to suppose that Baker Pasha's Army was unequal to the task which he was commissioned to undertake, although we have also been told that we could not send a real Egyptian Army, in that the men composing it were enlisted upon terms which precluded their being sent into the Soudan. But the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has said that though Suakim, Sinkat, and Tokar were in the Soudan when General Baker was despatched they are not in the Soudan now. I
    1228
    certainly understood the noble Lord to say that politically and geographically the littoral of the Bed Sea might be regarded as being no longer in the Soudan.
    LORD EDMOND FITZMAURTCE: I said nothing of the sort. What I said was that it was necessary to distinguish between the geographical and the political Soudan, which hon. Members had frequently in the course of this debate confused.
    LORD JOHN MANNERS: Then what I wish the noble Lord now to do is to tell the House whether at the present moment he regards Suakim, Sinkat, and Tokar as belonging to the political or the geographical Soudan; because if they are not now regarded in both aspects, why were they so regarded at the time when Baker Pasha's Force was despatched? The only reason, as far as I can understand, for sending the heterogeneous, miscellaneous, and totally incapable force to the Soudan was that the real Army of Egypt could not go because of the terms of their enlistment. Then we were told that the Army which Baker Pasha took with him was one on which reliance could be placed to give a good account of any force which might be opposed to them; but Baker Pasha's own opinion was that he was marching with them on to certain death; and when he arrived at Suakim he did not put himself at the head of the demoralized array of blacks and fellaheen, but took steamer at once to Massowah, in order, if possible, to find men upon whom he could better rely than upon the miserable policemen who had been put under his charge for the execution of a difficult and perilous enterprize. The Government say that they could not have presumed to give the Khedive any advice with regard to the Soudan for fear of hurting his dignity. But what was their action? Have they not interfered at all points with the Khedive? What was the knowledge of the Government with regard to the composition of Baker Pasha's Force? Writing on the 3rd of December Sir Evelyn Baring says—
    "As regards the Egyptian portion of the gendarmerie, reports are freely current here to the effect that the men have openly declared that they will not fight, that they will join the Mahdi, or, if attacked, throw down their arms and run away, &c. Possibly these reports are somewhat exaggerated. It is, however, quite certain that the service on which they are about to be

    1229
    engaged is exceedingly unpopular with the men, and that some 200 of them deserted between Cairo and Suez."—[Egypt, No. 1 (1884), p. 128.]
    It is clear, therefore, that the whole power of that force depended upon the Black troops, and did not they interfere with the composition of that force? With regard to the appointment of Zebehr Pasha, Sir Evelyn Baring, writing on the 9th of December, says—
    "Whatever may be Zebehr Pasha's faults, he is said to he a man of great energy and resolution. The Egyptian Government considers that his services may he very useful in commanding the friendly Bedouins who are to be sent to Suakim, and in conducting negotiations with the tribes on the Berber-Suakim route and elsewhere. I may mention that Baker Pasha is anxious to avail himself of Zebehr Pasha's services. Your Lordship will, without doubt, bear in mind that up to the present time the whole responsibility for the conduct of the affairs in the Soudan has been left to the Egyptian Government. It appeared to me that, under present circumstances, it would not have been just, whilst leaving all the responsibility to the Egyptian Government, to have objected to that Government using its own discretion on such a point as the employment of Zebehr Pasha."—[Ibid. 137.]
    How cruel it is to remind the Khedive of his responsibility for everything that, occurred up to that point. Lord Granville, however, who had received verbosa et grandis epistola from the Anti-Slavery Society, yielding to their influence al-together, put aside all these pretences as to the sole responsibility of the Khedive, and interfered vitally with the force by refusing to sanction the appointment of Zebehr Pasha. How can it be said, in these circumstances, that there has been no vacillation or inconsistency on the part of the Government? The fact is that, to use the words of the poet, the consistency of the Government has been "constant to a constant change." Thus it was that General Baker, with his heterogeneous and pusillanimous force, was sent to encounter certain defeat. The vast loss of life that has resulted from the expedition is entirely due to the vacillating and inconsistent policy of Her Majesty's Government. Then I come to consider those most painful and lamentable days which followed the defeat of Baker Pasha. The right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) told us that the moment the Government heard of that defeat on February 5, they lost not a single instant in ordering two ships to go to
    1230
    Suakim for the purpose of saving the lives of the remnant of the force, and that, in giving that order, he thought that they had done everything that it was in their power to do. But did they do all in their power? Could they have done nothing else but send those ships? The right hon. Baronet went on to say that Sinkat must have fallen before English troops could have relieved it. But the Government did not know at that time that it was on the eve of capture. It is not improbable that, as General Gordon said in one of his recent telegrams—
    "The rumour that the British troops were coming would have had more effect than even their actual arrival."
    But were there no British troops within speedy reach? Why, there were British battalions at Aden, which is only two days' sail from Suakim, who might have reached the port in time to save the starving garrison of Sinkat from slaughter. But what steps did the Government actually take in the matter? They sent telegrams to General Gordon, which, if he had read them in the sense in which they were read to this House by the Prime Minister, he would have regarded it as a personal insult, had they been addressed to himself. To ask a man of General Gordon's humane, gallant, and chivalrous nature whether an attempt to relieve a starving and helpless garrison should be put aside lest it should inconvenience his movements or should subject him to personal danger is an insult. Such, then, being the main facts of the case, I ask what reasons have been assigned by hon. Members opposite for the House of Commons shrinking from discharging its plain duty to express its own opinions and those of the country? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), who condemns the past conduct of the Government quite as severely as we do, says that they are repentant, and that he believes in their promises of amendment, and that, therefore, he will give them the benefit of his vote. I was reminded by the right hon. Gentleman's speech of Denman's peroration in defence of Queen Caroline, when he suggested that the House of Lords should, in acquitting the Queen, say to her—"Go and sin no more." That was very much the result of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. He has always been sanguine and hopeful in his

    1231
    judgments of his political Friends. He hoped that the Government would maintain the Pretoria Convention. He hoped to govern Ireland without any exceptional legislation, and he then hoped that that exceptional legislation would be sufficient. His hopes and his wishes, I am sorry to say, have been disappointed. Another main objection that has been brought against this Vote of Censure is that it contains no direct explanation of future policy. But I will ask the Prime Minister two questions. He has had a long experience. Does he remember a Vote of Censure which on its face bore an explanation of future policy? And does he remember a Vote of Censure the terms of which were agreeable to the Minister against whom it was directed? The Vote of Censure declares this—that those who support it would not adopt the policy which it censures. What, in the present case, is that policy? It is a policy of vacillation and inconsistency, and those who support this Vote of Censure are bound to avoid vacillation and inconsistency. [Laughter.] I notice that the Prime Minister laughs at this assertion, and I understand him to ask what those words mean. I will proceed to explain them. They mean that England, having now openly assumed the full and undivided responsibility for the re-organization and protection of Egypt, shall no longer palter with any dangers that may menace her externally or internally; that Her Majesty's Ministers, be they who they may, shall maintain a severe and statesmanlike silence as to the time of possible retirement; and that they shall not permit any fancy sentimentalism nor Party expediency to shorten by one single hour the term of England's occupation and of England's control of Egypt and Egyptian affairs. And, in conclusion, I would remind this House that it is exactly 100 years ago since the House of Lords, by a courageous vote, enabled the Sovereign and people of this country to shake themselves free from the yoke of an Administration which retained, indeed, the confidence of the majority of the House of Commons, but which had, as the result showed, forfeited the support and alienated the affections of the constituencies of the country. Will this House, when the Division is called, associate itself with the other House of Parliament in expressing the deliberate opinion and judgment
    1232
    of the country on these lamentable transactions? Will this House, by adopting that course, become, as it ought to become, the organ and mouthpiece of a brave, humane, high-spirited, and, therefore, justly indignant people?
    MR. WADDYsaid, he could not give his adhesion to the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), because the reason upon which it was based appeared to him (Mr. Waddy) to be utterly unsupportable. It was impossible for the House and for the Government to allow the matter to pass over without having an opinion distinctly expressed. It would have been difficult before—it was perhaps still more difficult now—because there had been a vote in the other House which rendered it absolutely necessary that this House should accept the challenge, and should distinctly state that they did not agree with the conclusion at which the House of Lords had arrived. The hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott) had successfully appealed for Conservative cheers, and had told the House that he was now going down to Brighton, when he might appeal to Conservative votes. It was quite possible the hon. Member might imagine that, under these circumstances, his possibility of success was greater than it would have been if he had appealed to his constituents before giving his vote in that House. He was rather struck with the notion that the hon. Member should have reserved that appeal to his constituency until after he had given his vote in the Division to-morrow. He thought it was a little too late for the hon. Member to go down to Brighton after he had done the mischief; and if he wanted to know whether he was or was not representing the views of his constituents, it would have been well for him to go down to Brighton before he gave his vote as a Member of that House. They were told that their policy was humiliating and wretched; that they ought to be ashamed of themselves; that they did not believe in what they said; and that they were tied and bound to the chariot wheels of the Premier. They did not believe that. They certainly were unaware of their changed condition; and they did think that there were persons on that side of the House of sufficiently independent views to be able to judge for themselves. The reasons which the

    1233
    right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition gave for the Motion he had made had been already satisfactorily dealt with. They were told that they were guilty already of interfering with the Egyptian people in the selection of their own Rulers. He did not believe in it for a moment. He did not believe that Arabi was the representative of the people. On the contrary, he believed that Arabi traded on the misgovernment and tyranny to which the people had been subject. He did not believe that the Mahdi was the representative of the people; but that just as one was an adventurer in a military plot, so the other was an adventurer in a fanatical and religious plot. If we did interfere with the Mahdi, he did not think we should be committing ourselves to one side or the other. The right hon. Baronet had stated his opinion that it was a vacillating and inconsistent policy which the Government had been pursuing; but he (Mr. Waddy) did not propose to examine the grounds for that opinion. They were told that the Government had been wading in blood; and a great many similarly extravagant statements had been made that were quite unworthy of responsible statesmen. But the real fault that had been found with the Government was one with which they must grapple. The real point raised was, that the conduct of the Government was reprehensible, because they had been responsible for producing the events, which everybody deplored, in the Soudan. How had that been argued? It had been argued very frequently by confounding the two Governments—the English and the Egyptian. With respect to the Soudan, the Mahdi was very likely making use, for his own purposes, of the feeling of the people, and he might, if they liked, be regarded not only as an ambitious, but as a wicked plotter; but what had given him his present power? "What been done by the Egyptian Government had been spoken of as if it had been done by Her Majesty's Government, thus making the latter responsible for the misdeeds or errors of the former. The noble Lord opposite, for example, charged Her Majesty's Ministers with sending bad or worthless troops to Suakim under Baker Pasha; but they had really no more to do with the sending of those troops than had the Czar of Russia. It was said Her Majesty's Government
    1234
    ought to have advised the Egyptian Government, and had not done so; and he had been waiting to hear someone on the Opposition side manfully follow out the results of that advice. Nobody could say that if this country, with its power and influence in Egypt, and with its right, if it gave advice, to have that advice followed—no one could help seeing that if we gave that advice we should be bound to insist upon its being followed. That amounted to the dethronement of the Egyptian Government, and practically to annexation by this country. The question was, whether we were or were not prepared to begin in Egypt in this century exactly the same history as we had begun many years ago in India, and by degrees to annex Egypt. The conclusion was inevitable that if we once began, under such circumstances, to give advice, we must go on, and insist upon that advice being taken; and when the Egyptian authorities were unable to carry it out, we must help them to do it. He considered that, if there had been any inconsistency at all on the part of the Government in this matter, it had been in that into which they had at last felt themselves forced in regard to Tokar. He thought the verdict of the British public would be that, even in regard to that, we were going to the extremest limits of our rights and duties. The noble Lord blamed Her Majesty's Government for not giving Hicks Pasha material support; but it was not a fact that they were ever requested by that officer to send such support, or that he had addressed imploring or despairing telegrams to the Government when our troops were being withdrawn. What was this Soudan rebellion? Was it a matter in regard to which we, as a United Kingdom, had anything whatever to do? The Soudan, according to Colonel Stewart's Report, was—
    "A place which is likely to remain—much of it, at all events—in the future, as in the past, a comparative desert."
    But it was said that humanity had summoned us there. Was the rebellion in the Soudan, then, an attack upon innocent and unoffending people, whom we were called upon in a spirit of chivalry to go and save? He did not understand that this country, even when there was iniquity being wrought in different parts of the world, was called upon to

    1235
    go and put everything right. We could not undertake to go to war here, there, and everywhere, because we believed that iniquity and wrong were being perpetrated. Why, then, should we have gone to the Soudan? That the Mahdi was making use for his own purposes of the excited feelings of the people was very likely; and he might, if they thought fit, be regarded not only as an ambitious, but as a wicked plotter; but what had given him his present power? The real causes of the uprising were shown in a Report of May 14th, in which Colonel Stewart said that up to the time of the rising in the Soudan the grossest robbery and tyranny were practised by the officials, that the local government was in league to rob and plunder, and that murders were committed by the Bashi-Bazouks and other troops, who considered that they were in a conquered country, where they might do whatever they pleased. The real cause of the rebellion was misgovernment and oppression; and all that the Mahdi did was to apply a lighted match to the fully-prepared tinder. What he wanted to know was, what would have been said on the opposite side of the House if the Government had sent British troops to put down such a rising? They would have been told that they had done in the South what they had done in the North—that they had sent British troops to quell the uprising of a down-trodden but a generous people. That was the sort of language with which the Government would have been taunted if they had been foolish enough to send troops to put down the insurrection. Another reason was given why we should have gone to the Soudan. It had been said that we should have gone to the Soudan because there were Englishmen there, in command of foreign troops, on an expedition which Her Majesty's Government had never ordered, and in regard to which they had accepted no responsibility whatever; that because Englishmen were there, therefore British soldiers should be sent. That was a proposition which he entirely denied; the fact of an Englishman—however gallant, able, and brave—accepting an Office under a Foreign Government did not throw any responsibility upon the English Government. To take the instance of Hobart Pasha, who had accepted a high position
    1236
    in the Turkish Navy, it could not be contended that his appointment threw responsibility upon England. If it was to be said, because General Hicks—whose memory they must all deplore—was an Englishman, and that because he was deceived as to the character of the troops he had under him, and to a certain extent, perhaps, as to the nature of the military operations before him, that, therefore, this country had anything to do with the matter, that was a proposition to be entirely repudiated. They had heard from time to time astonishing statements from the other side of the House as to the deplorable condition in which General Hicks was represented to have been, but it must be remembered that it was with his own Government, the Government of Egypt, that General Hicks had communicated; and, further, was it really a fact that General Hicks had taken up his command in a desponding state of mind? General Hicks first spoke of a heavy disaster having happened to the rebels; on the 23rd of May there was Lieutenant Colonel Stewart's Report; on the 26th of May General Hicks reported that the rebels at Duem had dispersed, and in another despatch of the 30th of May that the rebels were demoralized; and that there was no limit to the devotion and fidelity of his own soldiers to the Khedive. Then in June reinforcements had been sent to him; and on the 2nd of July he said that he was prepared to make the campaign with the forces given to him. The man, in fact, who, as they were told, knew that he was going to his doom, had said that his doom was not probable. On the 21st of August, again, he gave as his opinion that all would soon be quiet. On August 28 there was a communication from Consul Moncrieff in a very cheerful tone; and on September 1 he reported that the movement in the Eastern Soudan seemed entirely to have collapsed; and that it merely rested with the Egyptian Government to secure the total failure of the Mahdi. He invited the attention of the House to the terms of the Resolution before it, which were—"That this House, having read and considered the Correspondence relating to Egypt," &c. Hon. Members opposite might laugh at Blue Books, but they ought to remember that the words of the Amendment implied the fact of

    1237
    having read them. They bad been reading and considering that Correspondence, and it formed the information given to Her Majesty's Government and to this country, and upon which alone the Government could act; and these Papers showed that the Government had had no reason to believe that there was any call for intervention on their part. They heard no more of General flicks for some time, and the last heard directly from him was a communication to Sir Edward Malet on September 6, in which he said that it was reported that the disturbances in that part of the Soudan had been suppressed; and that the Mahdi was no longer believed in. The first intimation of any reverses had come on October 29, and that was of a comparatively small reverse; and on October 31 there was a telegram actually stating that it was rumoured that the Mahdi had been routed and 12,000 of his troops slain. In fact, down to the 12th of November, there had been cheering hopes expressed. Cherif Pasha said that the Army of Occupation consisted of 6,000 or 7,000 men, and he proposed the reduction of that Army by 2,000 men, on financial among other grounds. On October 31 orders were given for the withdrawal of the troops, but that order was given before any intelligence arrived about Hicks Pasha. At last the bad news came from Sir Evelyn Baring. On the 22nd of November the news came that Hicks Pasha's Army had been destros'ed, and the same day Lord Granville telegraphed to know whether the present state of the Soudan was a cause of danger to Egypt Proper, with which alone they had relations. On the same day a gunboat was sent to the Red Sea to maintain authority there. They had been told by hon. Gentlemen opposite that the Government had withdrawn their troops in the face of great dangers. What was the fact? On the 24th of November information came from Sir Evelyn Baring that it was not desirable to withdraw the British garrison from Egypt, and on the 25th this bloodthirsty Government, anxious to withdraw their troops, telegraphed that they had decided that the preliminary steps for the withdrawal of the British Forces should be postponed. Lastly, it was said they had stood by and seen garrisons slain. At the very first moment it was possible to interfere,
    1238
    he ventured to say, it would be the judgment of the House Her Majesty's Government did interfere. As long as the Egyptian Government was keeping control of this matter itself we could not interfere. We had no right to do so. But directly it became clear that the mischief in the Soudan would interfere with the work we had taken in hand, the Government did not hesitate a single day. We had no right to involve the country in the expense and bloodshed that might have ensued if we had gone further. They were told by Gentlemen on the other side that they did not mean annexation; but until the Egyptian Government were decidedly beaten, until they were prepared to accept our help, and even to ask for it, which they had never done, we had no right to force that help upon them, and to say we would advise them with the almighty power we held over them. That would have been annexation; it would have been practically to make Egypt a British Colony, and we should have been involved in an expenditure of money which Her Majesty's Government could not justify to the House or the world. The charge against the Government, which had been made by the use of strong language, and by the careful forgetting of the real issues between ourselves and the Egyptian Government, had, he thought, fallen to the ground. Caring very anxiously indeed for those responsibilities and those liabilities which had been east upon it, the Government had steered the course of this country in the midst of that which had been, no doubt, disaster. But the disaster was not ours. It was the disaster of the Egyptian Government. That Government had been told from the first that if they went on enslaving those people we would not support them with English men or with English money. But as long as it was only a question of keeping Egypt Proper in order, and repairing mischiefs which had arisen, English men and English money would have been at their command. He entirely sympathized with the expression of opinion which had fallen from the opposite side—and it was the only thing he sympathized with—that after what had taken place the Government would not be too ready to state how soon they would be prepared to evacuate the country; but he did hope that nothing that had taken place

    1239
    would tempt them to involve us in responsibilities which we were altogether unwilling, nay more, unfit and unable, to take. The Soudan did not belong to them, and to it our money should not go, and in it English blood should not be spilt.
    MR. STANLEY LEIGHTONsaid, that the hon. and learned Gentleman who had last addressed the House was the first Englishman in the House, and he hoped he would be the last, to approve the desertion of Sinkat. In so doing the hon. and learned Member made himself accessory, to use a legal phrase with which he would be familiar, to the massacres in the Soudan. Members of the Opposition had asked the Government to explain certain facts, and had only obtained smug apologies in reply. For a long time he believed in Her Majesty's Government, because the country was always assured that things were proceeding satisfactorily in Egypt; but he found that he had been living in a fool's paradise, and that the Government knew it, because all the time their Representatives in Egypt were informing them that things were as black as they could be; that the state of things in the country was altogether dispiriting, and that the position on the Red Sea littoral was critical. If we had nothing to do with the Soudan, why was General Gordon in the Soudan issuing Proclamations, deposing one Sultan, placing another in his stead, and declaring, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, that slavery had their approval? This was the fourth night of the debate, and it was the first occasion on which any hon. Gentleman had been found on the other side beyond the Treasury Bench to support Her Majesty's Government. The House had had from the Prime Minister a fanciful and fantastical account of the occupation of Egypt, based, not upon actualities, but upon falsities. The facts which history would record were the preventible massacres at and burning of Alexandria, the carnage at Tel-el-Kebir, and the defeats and massacres in the Soudan. They had been told of the wonderful social reforms which had been effected in Egypt; but what were they? Sanitary reforms, accompanied by the cholera; the new Legal Code, which had made the creditors more cruel than before to the fellaheen; slavery, recognized by General
    1240
    Gordon on behalf of Her Majesty's Government; a re-organized Army of men who were mutinous and could not fight; a Suez Canal, sold by a treacherous Government to a Company of Frenchmen. It was an open secret that there were two Parties in the Cabinet, one in favour of establishing an English Protectorate in Egypt, and one in favour of immediate retirement from that country—two policies which were absolutely irreconcilable. The Prime Minister was the exponent of the policy of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), with which he was in much more sympathy than with that which the Government were now pursuing. How could a Cabinet which were so divided in their Councils hope to carry on a consistent government of Egypt? They divided their corporate conscience into three parts, and entrusted a third portion severally to the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, the hon. Member for Northampton, and to the Caucus. They were so generous that they retained no conscience for themselves. If Her Majesty's Government were to dissolve Parliament at once, the country would send them to a place for the detention of incapables, there to be confined during Her Majesty's pleasure. He advised the Prime Minister to avail himself of this opportunity of going into retreat. He had often expressed, apparently with sincerity, his wish to do so. Now was his opportunity. There were the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) ready to jump into his place. Still the question was asked, and remained unanswered—" Why was not Sinkat saved? "The Prime Minister answered—"Because there was a Dual Control four years ago." Was that a sufficient answer? Or, again, was it enough to say that Baker Pasha, under no military necessity to undertake the expedition unless he were hopeful of its success, did undertake it, and failed? He failed because the Government failed him. No doubt, if General Gordon died the death he had courted, the Prime Minister would tell them that he need not have gone unless he thought the chance hopeful. The action of the Government was cowardly, for they endeavoured to protect themselves by throwing the blame of their vacillation upon other people.

    1241
    The question still remained unanswered—"Why was not Sinkat saved?"
    MR. SLAGGsaid, he had been impressed by the very great diversity of opinion that had shown itself in this debate, both as to what Her Majesty's Government ought to do in the future and what it was their duty to have done in the past. He was also impressed by the fact that that diversity was not con-fined to Members on that side of the House. Members on the Liberal side had put some limit to their differences, and had expressed agreement on some fundamental points. They were pretty generally agreed, for example, that Her Majesty's Government could not possibly have escaped intervening at one time or another in the affairs of Egypt, and they were also agreed that the duration of that intervention should be limited to the shortest possible time. As to the Soudan, he believed they were generally agreed that in the past their responsibility should have been very small, and that in future they should have absolutely no responsibility at all. But when they turned to the conflict of opinion on the Benches opposite they found it ranged over an illimitable area, extending even to the annexation, not only of Egypt Proper, but the whole of the Soudan. Within the limit of difference manifested on the Liberal side, however, there had been room for the expression of great variety of opinion in the matter of time and degree. It was much to be deplored that the prophets who had appeared on the scene at this later period had not manifested their foresight earlier. They had been very tardy. They would have been very useful to the world at large if they could have declared authentically all they knew about the inevitable success of the Mahdi, had made it certain that the Egyptian Army in the Soudan would be hopelessly beaten, and had given a clear premonition of the cholera and all its attendant complications. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle seemed to have known pretty well everything that was going to happen. He could not, however, agree with the picture drawn by the hon. Member for Carlisle, which pourtrayed Arabi as a patriot at the head of a brave and noble-spirited army, surrounded by reforming Pashas, who, having wiped off the national obligations, were about to govern Egypt
    1242
    by and for the Egyptians. He had failed to discern the sacred attributes of patriotism in a man whose rallying cry to an overtaxed people was, "More pay for the Army." The hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) sneered at commercial interests. He (Mr. Slagg) ventured to say those commercial interests were of the profoundest importance. The hon. Member had spoken of the Manchester Radicals and Cotton Jingoes as being very much to blame, and being mean-spirited, because they attached so much importance to these things. He maintained that there was a marked distinction between the bondholders and the legitimate merchants trading in Egypt. In his opinion, the bondholder exercised an influence wholly inimical to the Egyptian people. He had no sympathy with his exactions, or with any aspect of his operations, for he uniformly exercised an evil influence on the people of Egypt. On the other hand, the legitimate merchant exercised an important beneficial influence. He did not mean to say he went there out of motives of pure benevolence; but while his commercial operations were of advantage to the merchant they were of inestimable benefit to the people of Egypt, and he hoped nothing would be done to destroy that state of things; and the Government had done some good in their day, if they had only pre-served to the Egyptians their commercial system at a very critical period. The commercial prosperity of Egypt had been entirely created and sustained by British capital. To give the House some idea of the importance of the commercial aspect of the matter, he might mention that since 1860 the crops in the country had been trebled solely through the influence of British agency and the employment of British capital. Cotton seed, which formerly was thrown away or burnt up in the baths, had been made by English merchants an article of enormous value. It alone produced an immense quantity of oil, and half our supply of oil-cake for cattle feeding came from Egypt. This industry kept an immense number of hands employed at high wages. In addition to that, there had been established, through the English commercial agencies, credit associations throughout the country, which had been successful in reducing the usurious rate of interest.

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    These, he submitted, were considerations of no light character, and it behoved the Government to look after them. The English merchant in Egypt took no bonds, drew no salary, and did nothing whatever to oppress; and when the hon. Member for Carlisle spoke slightingly of Cotton Jingoes he was speaking on a subject on which he was not well informed. He ventured to say the Government had made a great mistake when they allowed themselves to be induced by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Morley), at the close of last Session, to promise a certain and complete withdrawal from Egypt within a specified time. He knew no one practically acquainted with the affairs of Egypt who did not consider that that was a promise which it would be absolutely impossible to fulfil. It ought to be remembered that they had not intervened in the affairs of Egypt at the suggestion of the House or at the instance of any particular Party, but at the desire of the whole of Europe; and he thought it would be a great mistake to leave until we had entirely fulfilled the business of our mission. With regard to the Soudan, hon. Gentlemen opposite, who were so tender-hearted on account of the Egyptians, seemed to forget the possible horrors and dangers which would attend an expedition of British soldiers sent to occupy that vast territory, and he hoped the Government would carry out the policy of evacuation which they had announced. As to the Egyptians in the garrisons, they ought not to have been there at all. He hoped the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Soudan would be a "bag and baggage" policy of the greatest completeness. The only possible excuse that could be urged for their presence in that country for any purpose but that of rescue would be on account of the Slave Trade. But Egypt was responsible for that Slave Trade, which had been created and supported by the Egyptians, and the first and greatest step they could take towards the suppression of the Slave Trade was the withdrawal of Egyptian influence from the Soudan. That trade had been fostered by the Khedive and his Pashas; it could not be conducted by the tribes of the Soudan unaided; and when the Egyptian middlemen were withdrawn there was every reason to hope that the
    1244
    traffic would languish and expire. The handing over of the government of the Soudan to the Soudanese themselves would not only strike the most serious blow to the Slave Trade, but would be the most conclusive step towards the establishment of commercial relations with it; and a frank acknowledgment of the justice of the cause of these wild tribes against their Egyptian oppressors would more effectually promote a settlement of the country than all the Pashas, Bashi-Bazouks, and British Governments together could effect.
    MR. RITCHIEsaid, the last speech was essentially a Manchester speech, and the impression it was calculated to produce was that the House and the country were thinking more of the capabilities of Egypt to produce cotton and oil-cake than of the present condition of the people of that country. Whatever might be the opinion of Manchester, the hon. Member was vastly mistaken if he thought his speech was at all in harmony with public opinion generally. It was surprising to hear him speak of garrisons being in the wrong place, when the country was resounding with the records of their gallant deeds. It was the duty of soldiers to go where they were ordered by their Sovereign. The hon. Member spoke of certain fundamental points on which the Ministerialists were agreed; but he omitted one, and that was, whatever their opinions might be, to vote with the Government. Hardly one unofficial Member on the Ministerial side had ventured to defend the course the Government had taken, and yet they were going to vote for it like sheep. He sympathized with the remark of the Prime Minister, that the Leader of the Opposition had not declared a policy; but the omission had been supplied that evening by the noble Lord (Lord John Manners). But did anyone suppose that if his right hon. Friend (Sir Stafford Northcote) had enunciated a policy as clearly and distinctly as one could wish it would have made the difference of a single vote on the Ministerial side of the House? The Birmingham Caucus had destroyed the independence of the Liberal Party, and they could not give effect to their opinions by their votes, because they had become delegates instead of Representatives. It was admitted that although the Division would be in favour of the

    1245
    Government, it would not express the opinion of the country, for the reason repeatedly given for supporting the Government was that a Vote of Censure would destroy it and place the Conservative Party in power; that meant that if the country were appealed to it would not support the Government. If an adverse vote was given by the House, it would be necessary that the country should be appealed to, either by the present Ministry or by their Successors; and if the opinion of the country was in favour of the Government it need have no fear of the result. It was because the Liberal supporters of the Government knew that the country would sweep them from power if appealed to that they were determined not to afford it the opportunity it desired. The Ministerial speeches had entirely evaded the charges made by the Opposition. As an oration the speech of the Prime Minister was magnificent; but as an answer to the indictment presented so clearly and incisively by the Leader of the Opposition, it was worthless. It consisted mainly of petty criticisms and gross misrepresentations. He said that the speech of the Leader of the Opposition was not in accord with his Motion: but no one had repeated that assertion since the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock had refuted it. The Prime Minister denied that the Government had been inconsistent. He was prepared to acknowledge that most of the difficulties that had arisen were created by an attempt to adhere to a slavish consistency which, however, had led them into the most inconsistent conduct it was possible to conceive. Their policy was to avoid all responsibility. The Prime Minister mildly condemned the Dual Control, and endeavoured to prove that the present condition of things was mainly owing to it; but he utterly failed to show any connection between them. It was impossible he could do so. We had a partner in the Dual Control, and we had not in the intervention. This clearly showed that the one thing was entirely independent of the other. The hon. Member for Newcastle had pointed out truly that our responsibilities were owing much more to the Joint Note, for which the present Government were responsible, than to the Dual Control; but the fact was that, altogether irrespective of Dual Control and Joint Note, our
    1246
    interests were so vast that it was impossible for us to see anarchy arise in Egypt without stepping in; if we had not done so someone else would, and would have settled matters with but little regard for our interests. If the Government had from the outset taken a strong course there would have been no massacre of Alexandria, no battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and no massacre at Sinkat. He had said that the Prime Minister had grossly misrepresented the charges we made against the Government. The right hon. Gentleman said—"We, who have the charge of the interests of 300,000,000 people, think we have sufficient to do without taking upon our shoulders the additional burden of re-conquering the Soudan." This was a complete misrepresentation of the charge against the Government, which was not that they did not recognize the Soudan, but that they did not prevent General Hicks from attempting to do so. The only answer was that made by the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) when he said—"Would you have had us stop General Hicks in his victorious career?'" Her Majesty's Government, while desirous to shake off all responsibility for the event which actually occurred, would, if General Hicks had been victorious, have been quite prepared to take credit for the success. But, feeling considerable doubt as to the success of the enterprize, they took care to safeguard themselves by repudiating all responsibility. After Tel-el-Kebir, Her Majesty's Government had the sole responsibility on their shoulders. The first necessity was to restore confidence. Lord Dufferin wrote home—
    "As long as men's minds are shaken by the expectation of change, every public, private, commercial, and political interest in the country is compromised and endangered."
    How did the Government proceed to give to Egypt the prime element of stability? By immediately beginning to speak of withdrawal. Even as late as the 11th of the present month they still adhered to that insane policy of withdrawal; for Lord Granville, on that day, telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring—
    "It has been suggested by a military authority that, to assist the policy of withdrawal, a British force should be sent to Suakim sufficient to operate, if necessary, in its vicinity."—[Egypt, No. 5 (1884), p. 2.]
    MR. GLADSTONE: That means the withdrawal of Egypt from the Soudan.
    MR. RITCHIEsaid, he accepted the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman; but he would observe that the most essential feature in the case at that time was the relief of the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar. To ask whether a British Force should be sent to Suakim to assist the policy of withdrawal was to trifle with the situation, and showed completely that the Government had failed to rise to the occasion. "But," says the Prime Minister, "we gave Egypt an Army, small, it is true, but efficient." After what we had heard, however, of the condition of that Army during the last few days he thought nothing more would be said about its efficiency. They were afraid to employ it. The right hon. Gentleman also said—" We have given them legislative institutions and a new Constitution, and we have preserved for them that which they loved so much, a Native Ministry." The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) had shown that the Constitution was totally unfitted for the Egyptian people. Moreover, the people did not want a new Constitution and new laws so much as they wanted the just administration of the existing laws. They wanted a stop put to the peculation, dishonesty, and oppression under which they had so long suffered at the hands of their Native Rulers. The Dual Control, at any rate, did one good thing—it entirely put an end to central corruption. [Mr. GLADSTONE dissented.] His authority for that was one which the right hon. Gentleman would recognize. It was the present Prime Minister of Egypt, Nubar Pasha, who said to him in Egypt twelve months ago—" The Dual Control put an end to central corruption, but it did not touch the corruption in the Provinces, and it is that from which the fellaheen are suffering so much." And so, with reference to a Native Ministry, which the right hon. Gentleman tells us is so dear to the Egyptians, Nubar Pasha had told him that the people had no confidence in Native Rulers, but, on the contrary, looked to England as the only hope of relief from their intolerable oppression. Turning next to the subject of the garrisons, and our failure to relieve them, he said it would be difficult in all future time for any Englishman to hear
    1248
    the names of Sinkat and Tokar uttered in their presence without blushing with indignation and shame. The right hon. Gentleman said it was no fault of Her Majesty's Government that the garrisons were not relieved; that they believed Baker Pasha would have been successful. But Baker Pasha did not arrive at Suakim with a view of relieving Sinkat till December 27; whereas from the 3rd of November, when an attempt to relieve it had failed, it was known that the place was in danger, and since that time repeated messages had been received representing the danger of the garrison. On the 4th of December Tewfik Bey sent word that his troops were starving. But Baker Pasha did not get definite instructions to relieve the garrisons till the 9th of January, and only then with qualification. General Wood, writing to Baker Pasha on that day, by direction of Sir Evelyn Baring, said—
    "If it is absolutely necessary to use force in order to relieve the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar, you can do so provided that you consider your force sufficient and that you may reasonably count on success."
    Two months after it was known that Sinkat was in deadly peril, a month after the Government had been informed by Tewfik Bey that he was starving and could not hold out, Baker was instructed to resort to force in order to relieve Sinkat; but only if—
    "It was absolutely necessary, and he had a reasonable ground for expecting success."
    Absolutely necessary! How else was it possible to relieve Sinkat? Reasonable ground for expecting success! What Englishman, knowing the condition of Sinkat, could have declined to go to its relief, whatever were his hopes of success? But what had Baker Pasha to give him success? A parcel of riffraff and police. The noble Lord the Member for North Leicestershire (Lord John Manners) had sufficiently shown the condition of Baker Pasha's Army. A large part of the force consisted of policemen—men whom the Government had ordered should not be trained as soldiers. Lord Dufferin, some time before this, had written to Baker Pasha, saying—
    "I am instructed to inform you, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, that in their opinion the constabulary under your command should not be allowed to acquire the characteristics of a military force."

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    This was the force which, according to the Prime Minister, they had every reason to believe would be successful. This was the force behind which the Government with their craven cowardice had taken refuge. In addition to the policemen, there was also a number of black troops with Baker Pasha; but what was to be expected from them? Did they go away in such a manner as to give reason for hoping that they would really assist Baker Pasha? They refused to get into the train, and were driven in by cavalry. They were told that their Chief would accompany them, and because he did not they said they would not go, and when they were made to go they declared they would not fight, and they kept their word. What had been the conduct of similar expeditions? On October the 25th, a force of 150 gendarmes, proceeding to reinforce Tewfik at Sinkat, were cut to pieces by 150 or 200 Arabs. "They made no effort at all," Consul Moncrieff writes to Sir Evelyn Baring, "but were killed in flight." Only 15 men escaped. On November the 3rd, 550 soldiers, with one gun, on the way to relieve Tokar were surprised by a small party of Arabs, amounting to 150 or 200 men, when the Egyptian soldiers immediately ran away. "It was a regular stampede," writes Commander Darwall. It was with such troops as these that Baker was sent off to almost certain defeat. It was from such troops as these that the Government anticipated success. This force of Baker Pasha's was intended to relieve Tokar first and then Sinkat, but they knew that Sinkat was in much greater peril than Tokar. Baker Pasha might have got to Tokar, but how was he to have got to Sinkat? His force,' however, never reached Tokar, and the unfortunate garrison of Sinkat, with hundreds of women and children, have perished to our everlasting disgrace. He hoped sincerely that the news that had been circulating in the Lobby to the effect that Tokar had now shared the fate of Sinkat was not true. He did not know whether the Government had received any information on this point. [Lord EDMOND FITZMAURICE: No.] They might then hope it was not true, but if it was no one would be surprised. Well, at last, the Government were moving. It always seemed to require some disaster to awaken them to their duty.
    1250
    Troops were to be sent to relieve Tokar The hon. Baronet the Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock) said that England's prestige in the Soudan had never stood so high as at the present moment. A more extraordinary statement he had never heard. Prestige! The less said about that the better, he thought. He said the mere rumours of our sending troops had dispersed the rebels. If this was true it would be the strongest condemnation of the Government, and showed how grossly they had neglected their duty in not making, at least, a show of force before. But such was not, unfortunately, the case, and the danger of Tokar was becoming more and more imminent. All this, the Government acknowledged, might have been prevented if they had taken action a month ago—if they had done what they were doing now a fortnight sooner. The present attempted relief of Tokar was the greatest condemnation that the Government could have passed on their own previous inaction. What had occurred to lead them to change their policy? The inhabitants of Sinkat had been massacred, but it was known long since that they were in imminent danger of massacre. The Government had remorselessly and ruthlessly denied the request that the whole country was making to them to relieve these garrisons; but not until one garrison had been massacred would they move a hand. It was in their power to relieve these garrisons and they pitilessly refused. They had been told of the ovation which General Gordon had received on his arrival at Khartoum; but much of the enthusiasm on the occasion appeared to be due to a Proclamation which had been posted on the walls of Khartoum promising a revival of the Slave Trade. If this were true, it was a new thing that an English officer should have been instructed to invite and permit the renewal of that trade, which the English nation and General Gordon himself had been doing their utmost for many years past to suppress. No more shameful story was to be found in the annals of the country than the sacrifice of the garrison of Sinkat. The inmost convictions of the Liberal Party went one way, but their votes would go another. He had no doubt, however, that the verdict of the House on the Motion before it would be in favour of

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    the Government. They were determined to prevent an appeal to the country. But although the Conservative Party was prevented by the subservient majority opposite from obtaining the verdict of the country upon this issue, the time would come, and could not be long delayed, when they would be able to appeal to the people. [Ministerial cheers.] Let hon. Gentlemen opposite, then, vote according to their consciences, and the constituencies would be given the opportunity they desired. They might depend upon it that when that opportunity arose the country would remember with shame and indignation the disgraceful position in which it had been placed by the Liberal Ministry. Under that Liberal Ministry they had suffered many humiliations, but this last one was the greatest of all; and he predicted that when the country was appealed to it would sweep from power the Minister who was prepared to shed tears at the Bulgarian atrocities, but who could look on with calmness and indifference at the slaughter of brave men and helpless women and children within the sound of British guns—a tragical and shameful episode which he devoutly trusted might never again sully the page of English history.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): Mr. Speaker, I have listened with very great attention to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. Ritchie). The hon. Gentleman said a great deal with much force; but, with one exception, he said nothing that was not said before, and that exception was a sentence which I took down at the time—namely, that the Government went wrong in consequence of their persistent consistency. Well, considering that we are asked to divide on a Motion condemning the Government for their inconsistency and vacillation, it strikes he that that one original remark did rut give much support to the Motion.
    MR. RITCHIE: What I said was, that a slavish regard to what they considered consistency led them into the most inconsistent conduct possible.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I took down his words. He has put a gloss on them now, which I have no doubt was his meaning.
    MR. RITCHIE: I rise to Order.
    MR. SPEAKER: The right hon. Gentleman is in possession of the House.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): There was another speech delivered this evening to which, as to several others, I also paid great attention. I mean that of the hon. and learned Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott), who spoke on this side of the House. That hon. and learned Member did me the kindness to give me a Notice which would be of some interest to me. He told the House that he proposed, after the Division, to-morrow, to apply for the Chiltern Hundreds; that he was a good Liberal all the same; but that, disapproving of the policy of the Government on the subject involved in this debate, he would ask for the Chiltern Hundreds, and go down to Brighton to test the sense of the constituency on the matter. I had the pleasure of seeing a good deal of my hon. and learned Friend during the time I held the Office of Secretary of State for War; and although, since the debate on the Clôture Resolution, it has not been my fortune to see so much of him, yet, from the opportunity I had then of gauging them, I fully appreciated the nature of his principles; but I nevertheless promise him that I am be little reluctant to show sport that I shall be happy to give him the Chiltern Hundreds when he applies for them, so that he may have the interview with his constituents he desires; and I only hope, for his sake, that he will not have the bad success which most hon. Gentlemen have had who asked for the Chiltern Hundreds under similar circumstances, for there are two or three cases where that has occurred in which the experiment was not attended with any great success to those who made it. Sir Robert Peel asked for the Chiltern Hundreds when he changed his policy as to Catholic Emancipation, and was defeated. Again, Mr. Milner Gibson, when Member for Ipswich, changed his politics, and was defeated. I can only suppose that the hon. and learned Member thinks that personal attachment at Brighton will be stronger than the ties of Party feeling. But the hon. and learned Member was not satisfied with justifying his own conduct in this matter. He thought it necessary to make one of the most violent personal attacks upon my right

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    hon. Friend at the head of the Government that I ever heard in this House, certainly from anyone sitting on the same side and calling himself a Liberal. He compared my right hon. Friend and his career for some time with several of his Predecessors in high Office, and especially with Lord Palmerston; and he said, with the cheers of the House, that, at any rate, my right hon. Friend must notice that the course he was taking was condemned strongly by public opinion abroad, by public opinion as expressed in the Press of almost all foreign nations; and in that respect he wished my right hon. Friend to be compared with the estimation in which Lord Palmerston was held by Governments and the Press abroad. Sir, my right hon. Friend is not the first Minister who has been violently attacked in this House on account of the manner in which his public course has been received by the public opinion of foreign countries. A most powerful attack was made on a great Minister between 80 and 40 years ago exactly on the same grounds as those taken by the hon. and learned Member for Brighton; and what was the answer of the best of Liberal statesmen of this country at that time to that attack? He said, in the great Pacifico debate of June, 1850—
    "So long as we continue the Government of this country, I can answer for my noble Friend that he will act not as the Minister of Austria, or as the Minister of Russia, or of France, or of any other country, but as the Minister of England."
    And the Minister who was so described was the Minister with whom my right hon. Friend is now put in comparison. Lord John Russell gave that reply to the attacks made upon Lord Palmerston, I repeat those well-known words, and say that my right hon. Friend is not the Minister of Austria, or the Minister of Russia, or of Germany, or of France, or of any other country, but the Minister of England, strong in the support of the heart and soul of the nation. I hope that the House will now allow me to say a few words on a question personal to myself, which was introduced, to my great surprise, by the right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), who wound up the debate on Friday night. The right hon. Baronet says that I am in conflict with my right hon. Friend about the Dual Control. He says—
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    "The Prime Minister and the President of the Local Government Board uttered opinions against the Dual Control; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, in July, 1882, that the endeavour of the Government had been to carry out in Egypt that joint political influence between England and France which was established by their Predecessors, and, in his humble opinion, wisely established. I set that opinion of the right hon. Gentleman against those of his Colleagues, and I leave them to settle the matter between them."
    But, of course, quite unintentionally, he entirely misrepresented what I said about the Dual Control. If he had looked in Hansard a few lines above, he would have seen that I first described the two systems of Dual Control, and I used these words as to the second—
    "I do not now raise the question of whether that was a good arrangement or not; … however good it might have been … it contained elements of great danger, and without our touching them those elements … led to the trouble which has now been brought upon us. Having inherited that state of things, and that policy, what were our efforts in the furtherance of order? … In the first place, our endeavour was to carry out," &c.—(3 Hansard, [272] 2008–9.]
    These words were exactly in consonance with what my right hon. Friend had expressed. I then stated that we hoped, by a joint action with France, to get through these dangers. It was not fair-to quote these concluding words and not the preceding sentence in which I had discussed the dangers which we saw in the Control. Now, Sir, having passed from that personal matter, I may say as to this long debate, as of all long debates and analogous proceedings in Courts of Law, that it has cleared the issue of much extraneous matter, and has eliminated many doubtful points of controversy which have been raised, so that, at the end, we have so reduced the matters in dispute that there are only two or three to decide. I think that these questions are—In the first place, were we consistent in disclaiming responsibility for the Soudan, and were we right in so doing? Secondly, were we responsible for not relieving Sinkat? Thirdly, were we wrong in postponing the Expedition to Suakim, until we had consulted General Gordon? And fourthly, have we a future policy, and what is it? It is to these points I propose to address myself. First of all, as to the responsibility which it is assumed we had in connection with the Soudan, and whether

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    we were consistent and right in disclaiming that responsibility? Now, what I am going to say is, I think, conclusive on one branch of this question. I hope to show to the House that it does not he with the right hon. Gentleman and those who act with him, and who have supported him in this debate, to censure us in this matter. They were fully aware in Parliament for six months what our policy was, and if they gave any indication whatever, it was rather in favour of that disclaimer of responsibility than against it. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote), in his speech last Session on the Address, very gingerly touched the ground of responsibility. He said—
    "We should like to know whether, whenever there is a formidable rebellion there, Her Majesty's Forces are to be used to suppress it? According to the newspapers at the present moment there seems to be something like one now in Egypt, and it may easily assume proportions which would endanger and shake the governing body of that country and the Throne of the Khedive."
    And he went on to say—
    "If we have assumed such relations as involve us in dealing with her rebellious subjects whenever they become formidable, I am bound to say that the prospect is one not likely to be of a very satisfactory character to the people of this country."—(3 Hansard, [276] 111,)
    This meant, I submit, that he did not look with favour upon our undertaking any responsibility as to the Soudan operations at that time. A few days afterwards the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) was asked whether Government had any reason to believe the alarming reports of the progress of the revolution in the Soudan, and, if so, what steps they had advised the Egyptian Government to take? The noble Lord, in reply, said that the suppression of the rebellion in the Soudan was a matter left entirely to the Egyptian Government, and that neither Lord Dufferin or Sir Edward Malet had been concerned in the arrangements made. A week afterwards, on the 1st of March, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) referred, in his discursive speech on Egypt, to the events in the Soudan, and my noble Friend, in reply, used these words—
    "Officers serving there were in no way serving the British Government. There was no desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government
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    to widen the sufficiently extended sphere of the responsibility of this country in Egypt."
    A few days afterwards the first Blue Book on Egypt, No. 1 (1883), was published. In that Blue Book, on page 36, Sir Edward Malet, on the 28th of October, 1882, wrote thus—
    "I have now been asked by the Egyptian Government to submit to Her Majesty's Government a request that English officers be allowed to accompany the force, which they will endeavour to equip as quickly as possible; and I gather that they would be glad to avail themselves of the services of an English Chief of the Staff."
    On the 7th of November, Lord Granville writes to Sir Edward Malet that the Government are unwilling to take any responsibility for any military expedition to the Soudan, that Colonel Stewart and two other officers may be sent to make inquiries, but that it must be distinctly understood that those gentlemen must not act in any military capacity. Well, Sir, I have thus shown you that in the Blue Books, distributed early in last Session, nothing can be clearer than the resolution of the Government that they would have no responsibility for the affairs of the Soudan, and that they would not allow any British officer to go in any way under their direction or control. But there was no objection taken at the time by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to the course we pursued. The Blue Books distributed last year up to the latter part of July are six in number, and range from October, 1882, to May, 1883. They were all presented before the debate of the 9th of August. They contain no less than 38 military Reports on the Soudan, including the long Report of Colonel Stewart. They are sometimes hopeful, sometimes despairing—
    "Condition of the Soudan one of great disorder." "If the Mahdi advances, there is no Egyptian force to meet him." "Alarming news received." "Danger hardly as imminent as at first supposed." "Garrisons in good spirit." "Second Mahdi hung by the first." "General oppressed by late news, and wants two more regiments." "Egyptian troops very demoralized."
    Lord Dufferin's general Report says—
    "I have left altogether out of account the requirements of the Soudan." "Reinforcements to the extent of another 10,000 men have been despatched to Khartoum, but they seem to be raw, undisciplined, and disheartened levies." "Both Colonel Hicks and his companions have

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    entered the Egyptian service on their own responsibility; nor have either Sir E. Malet or myself been concerned in the arrangement."
    Then Lord Granville, in No. 13, page 65, on May 7, says—
    "Her Majesty's Government are in no way responsible for the operations in the Soudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of the Egyptian Government, or for the appointment or actions of General Hicks."
    All this was before the House, and in the possession of hon. Members on the 9th of August. A great deal of stress has been laid by hon. Members opposite upon the despatch from Lord Dufferin, in which it is said that Lord Dufferin acted in a manner very different from the instructions which he received from Lord Granville. On the 1st of April, Lord Dufferin says, in No. 13, page 54, that the head of a new bureau for Soudan affairs called on him. He seemed an intelligent and well educated person. Lord Dufferin impressed upon him that disturbances were due to misgovernment and the cruel exactions, and the despair and misery of the population. He considered that they should confine their efforts to Sennaar, and establish a just, humane, and intelligent administration. In Lord Granville's answer to that despatch, on the 20th of April, on page 62, Lord Granville approves of his having
    "Impressed on the head of the new Department the advisability of pursuing a modest and more humane policy."
    It is this despatch which is said to be, as it were, a reversal of the policy explained during six months in the despatches laid on the Table, because, when the head clerk of a new office called upon him, Lord Dufferin gave him a few words of kindly advice. But Lord Granville ends as he began, with the instructions that the Government are determined not to take part in the affairs of the Soudan. Well, Sir, I think I have shown pretty clearly, at any rate, this—that during the whole of that six months the policy of Her Majesty's Government was quite plainly expressed to the House. And now I will show how the House in the August debate took it, and to what extent there was any objection to that policy on the part of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. On the 9th of August there took place the debate on the Motion of my hon. Friend
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    the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley). The object of the Motion I take to have been to get a clear statement of the views of the Government, and to strengthen their hands in carrying out their intentions in regard to the prospective evacuation of Egypt Proper, and the hon. Gentleman was met with a frank statement by my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke). The hon. Member for Newcastle used these words—
    "There was the Soudan. … Were they going to take even an indirect responsibility for an enormous territory like that? … The Egyptian Government was hopelessly unable to maintain even a semblance of order there. … Were they going to acquiesce in the military occupation of the Soudan? … If they did, the task of governing half India would be child's play compared with the difficulties and embarrassments that would accompany the attempt to introduce even the semblance of order into the Soudan. The fact was they could not afford to be responsible."—(3 Mansard, [282] 2126–7.)
    Now, there was a long debate on the Motion of my hon. Friend. Three or four of the hon. Gentlemen spoke on the Front Bench opposite, and I have read their speeches. If the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote) disapproved of the policy which had been announced from this side of the House on four or five different occasions, and which is set forth in the Blue Books as the distinct policy of the Government—namely, that they would take no responsibility for the administration of the Soudan, why did he not say so at any rate then? From the beginning to the end of the debate, no one attempted to cast the slightest blame upon the policy of the Government, which was as clear as crystal, and which had been repeated over and over again in our speeches, and in the Blue Books. It is clear that in the opinion of hon. Members opposite we were right in our policy on this question up to the month of August. So it follows that, in the opinion of the Opposition, between August and December we ought to have changed our minds, and to have adopted altogether the opposite policy. And yet we are now charged with vacillation, and with inconsistency, merely because we persevered in our policy. I am, however, bound to say that in certain quarters there is a considerable, and, indeed, a dangerous amount of vacillation. For

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    instance, we have had, not many miles away, a considerable amount of vacillation on the part of hon. Members opposite upon this very question. What has happened within the last few days? I read an announcement of a meeting which was called at the Mansion House for last Friday, and the notice was that the meeting was to be held for the purpose of condemning the abandonment of the Soudan by Her Majesty's Government. However, when we came to read the speeches at the meeting, there is nothing about condemning the abandonment of the Soudan, but simply a condemnation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government—a subject on which it is always very easy to get up a meeting. The fact is, that when the notice of the meeting was first drawn up there was in the minds of the gentlemen who convened it the idea that the proper policy was the retention of the Soudan. In a day or two this was not found to be popular, and was given up. The vacillation and the inconsistent policy, therefore, seems to have left us, and to have crossed the floor of the House to take up its abode with hon. Gentlemen opposite.
    MR. RITCHIE: Where did the right hon. Gentleman see the circular stating that the object of the meeting was to condemn the abandonment of the Soudan?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): I saw it in the notice of the meeting which appeared in the newspapers.
    MR. RITCHIE: Through a breach of confidence.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): It is really too bad to be interrupted in this manner. I will show the hon. Member the words of the actual notice in the newspaper from which I cut them.
    MR. RITCHIE: The Liberal Party were responsible for the terms of that notice.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): I think I have now shown pretty clearly that if our policy with regard to the Soudan was wrong for six months, hon. Gentlemen opposite approved of it. First of all, they approved of it in almost express words, and lately they approved of it by complete silence when the Papers laid upon the Table explained it in the fullest and clearest way. Therefore, if we
    1260
    have been sinners in any respect it is not for hon. Gentlemen opposite to pass a Vote of Censure upon us. The next charge which has been brought against us—if it can still be said to be the subject of debate—is the non-relief of Sinkat. I had certainly hoped to have heard no more of that charge, after my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board, who spoke in the debate a few days ago, had so completely dealt with every portion of it. [Sir R. ASSHETON CROSS: Oh!"] I do not, of course, mean to say that he persuaded the right hon. Member for South-West Lancashire. That, no man could do; but my right hon. Friend so completely answered the charge, that I should be guilty of unnnecessary repetition if I went over all the facts again. We hold our opinion upon that point, and you are welcome to hold yours. I can only assert that the Blue Books show that the defeat of Baker Pasha was entirely unexpected both by us and by his own friends. [Laughter and cries of "Oh!"] I merely assert that as being our contention. So much for the second of the charges against us. Now, let me deal with the third charge, which is that we postponed sending an expedition to relieve Sinkat for the purpose of obtaining General Gordon's advice. What are the facts? General Gordon left Cairo believing that Baker Pasha was about to advance upon Tokar, and when Baker Pasha was defeated General Gordon was altogether out of telegraphic reach. General Gordon left—nobody denies it now who reads these Papers—essentially to carry out a pacific policy; and whatever might have been thought as to the employment of a Mussulman Army, there was grave doubt, indeed, as to the propriety of despatching an English Army. I want here to draw attention to the extraordinary misrepresentations of the right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) on Friday night with regard to the terms of the message to General Gordon. I have no doubt they were unintentional misrepresentations. The right hon. Baronet took up the print which had only been distributed that night, and asked—
    "What, in fact, was the nature and the terms of the message which was addressed to General Gordon?"
    And he then read the telegram—

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    "Earl Granville to Sir Evelyn Baring, Foreign Office, February 11th, 1884, 1.45 P.M. Send on following to Gordon:—'It has been suggested by a military authority that to assist the policy of withdrawal a British force should be sent to Suakim sufficient to operate, if necessary, in its vicinity. Would such a step injure or assist your mission?' "—[Egypt, No. 8 (1884).]
    The right hon. Gentleman went on with great indignation to say—
    "Not one word about the beleaguered garrisons."
    But is that the fact? Why, Sir, printed immediately above it is the telegram which had already been sent—
    "Ask Gordon whether he can suggest anything respecting Sinkat and Tokar."
    And General Gordon's reply to that telegram, which did not arrive till after his reply to the telegram the right hon. Gentleman quoted, and which is No. 7 on the Paper, was—
    "About Tokar and Sinkat you can do nothing except by proclaiming that the Chiefs of Tribes should come to Khartoum to Assembly of Notables, when the independence of the Soudan will be decided. As for money, it would be well to try, but difficult to arrange."—[Ibid.]
    And the answer to the telegram about Suakim, No. 6 on the Paper, was as follows:—
    "As to sending forces to Suakim to assist withdrawal I would care more for rumour of such intentions than for forces. What would have greatest effect would be rumour of English intervention."
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Those were two telegrams.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): Yes, but forming part of a continuous message. One portion was sent at half-past 2; another at 4; and a third at 7. They were each parts of the same message. General Gordon follows with a telegram, at 7, saying—
    "Not least probability of any massacre of women, children. Efforts of rebels confined to raising revolt among their neighbours."—[Ibid.]
    MR. STUART-WORTLEY: That, I think, applies to the women and children at Sinkat.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): The first message applies to the sending of forces to Suakim, where he says—
    "About Tokar and Sinkat you can do nothing except by proclaiming that the Chiefs of
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    Tribes should come to Khartoum to Assembly of Notables, when the independence of the Soudan will be decided."
    MR. STUART-WORTLEY: That is an answer to another telegram.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): That answer is dated an hour later than the previous telegram. When we got that answer, we had both of the telegrams before us. We have to telegraph a distance of many thousands of miles. These telegrams leave almost together, and General Gordon, having two in his possession, sends an answer to each, and when he sent the answer about Sinkat and Tokar, he had before him not the second telegram only, but the whole of our telegrams, including the proposal to send a force to Suakim. In the speech which he made on Friday night, the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) ought to have quoted the first and second of these telegrams together. General Gordon received them together, and he answered the second first; so that, in answering the first, General Gordon must have had the second before him. The right hon. Gentleman, however, tossed the Paper down and said—" Not a word about Tokar and Sinkat;" and he produced in the House and in the country an effect which the recital of the telegrams as they were received can alone put right. Having dealt with the question of the third charge brought against us, let me say a few words about the future policy which we have been challenged to declare and the question whether we propose to deviate from the line which we laid down last year and which we have pursued ever since. I understand our policy to be this. In the first place, we shall continue to promote the evacuation of the Soudan; and to do so, if possible, by peaceable means after the relief of Tokar. We have sent an Expedition to relieve Tokar, and when that Expedition has done its work, our policy will be to carry out the evacuation of the Soudan by peaceable means. In the second place, our policy is firmly and unhesitatingly to continue the occupation of Egypt until the objects for which we first went there are accomplished. Our third intention is to keep in view our prospective retirement from Egypt at a time when the Khedive's Government shall be in a fit state to administer the affairs of the country

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    without our assistance; and our fourth object is, in the meantime, to restore as far as we can the finances of Egypt, which Lave been greviously burdened in the expenses resulting from the disturbances at Alexandria and the operations in the Soudan. To that policy I believe there is an alternative policy. I can imagine a statesman—shall I say a bold, shall I say a rash, shall I say a reckless statesman—who might propose that Egypt should be permanently annexed. There would be great charms, I admit, for some people in the adoption of such a policy. In the first place, it would save £2,000,000 a-year to the finances of Egypt. The credit of Egypt stands at about 5 ½ per cent; while our credit stands at 3 per cent. Therefore, as I have said, if we were to give the benefit of our credit to Egypt, she would gain something like £2,000,000 sterling a-year. With that, of course, would go the clearing out of the Turkish Government from Egypt. I use the words advisedly when I say the Turkish Government in Egypt, because the governing class in Egypt are not and never have been Egyptian. It would, therefore, only be the substitution of one stranger for another. This would be for Egypt, no doubt, an advantageous policy. I do not, for one moment, dispute that. But what would be the effect to us? To us such a policy would be perilous in the last degree. It is one thing to protect the road to India; but it is another thing to bring India into the range of European politics, which would be the result of Egypt being made a part of England. The consequence would be that Egypt would be practically, as Asiatic Russia is striving to be, a part of Europe. I wish to impress upon the House that there is no middle course between the two which I have described. No middle course will result in the restoration of the finances of Egypt in the sense in which hon. Gentlemen wish them to be restored. To my mind, the recent proposals which have been made, even within the last few days, really amount—if they do not nominally amount—to the annexation of Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), on Friday last, said—
    "It is time that when English officers fight in defence of Egypt they should fight as officers of the Queen, and not as officers of a shadow."
    But if the Army of Egypt—I am not
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    speaking of our Occupying Army—is to be the Queen's Army, of course the Civil Service of Egypt must be the Queen's Civil Service, and Egypt must be as much a part of our Empire as India is at this time; as India has been since the abolition of the Company, and as Bosnia and the Herzegovina are a part of Austro-Hungary. It is no use, therefore, talking about a Protectorate. A Protectorate with an Army, which is the Queen's Army, and with a Civil Service, which is the Queen's Civil Service, means nothing but annexation. But the scheme is even more formidable than the right hon. Gentleman formulated it on Friday last. I refer to the speech made by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) on Saturday last. I am sorry he is not now in his place. I do not know whether the noble Lord is the proximate Leader of the Tory Party; but, at all events, he says he does not know who its Leaders are. I am not now going into the long list of abusive epithets which the noble Lord showers in that speech upon my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and those who act with him. I can only say that when he makes use of those epithets—
    "We only call it pretty Fanny's way,"
    May I add with Pope?—
    "Lord Fanny spins a thousand such a-day."
    Without discussing his epithets, let me tell the House what is the conclusion at which the noble Lord arrives. The noble Lord said—
    "The occupation of Egypt by the British Forces will be called a Protectorate of Egypt by the British Empire, having for its object the establishment in process of time of a Government at Cairo."
    He further said—
    "We are now in Egypt by the sufferance of Europe; but we must endeavour to be in Egypt by the mandate of Europe."
    He goes on to say that there must be a
    "Congress in which Turkey shall he adequately represented, and the rights and powers of the Sultan loyally protected."
    He also says that, in dealing with Mahommedan races, we should not shrink from prosecuting our aim even by force of arms, meaning, I suppose, some other Great Powers to assist us—
    "We should not shrink from dealing comprehensively and boldly with the financial indebtedness of Egypt, even though such dealing

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    should involve some pecuniary liability on ourselves."
    These words are very serious words; but I do not exactly know what the noble Lord means by the pecuniary resources of this country being drawn upon in any connection with the debts of Egypt. I can, however, name one way in which the finances of this country would be very seriously affected by any such proposal as that which he makes; such, in fact, as that which is made by the right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire. I put it at a very low figure indeed; but if 10,000 English troops are permanently stationed in Egypt, that means an addition of 20,000 men to our Army. I assume for a moment, that the 10,000 men in Egypt are to be paid for out of the finances of Egypt; but I do not know whether it is possible for us to charge the consequential increase of our Home Army upon the same revenues. This addition of 10,000 men means a charge on our finances of £1,000,000 a-year. If the Army in Egypt is to consist of 15,000 or 20,000 men, the charge to us would be £1,500,000 or £2,000,000 a-year. That charge would be incurred for our Army alone quite irrespective of the large annual charge which must also fall upon us in connection with our Fleet. This is certainly not the time to follow up in detail all the remarks of the noble Lord; but is the House prepared, quite irrespective of what the noble Lord intimates that we should have to do in connection with the Debt of Egypt, to burden the finances of this country for the sake of Egypt to the extent of something like £2,000,000 a-year? Sir, I repeat again that there is no middle course—no practical middle course—between the policy which the Government have adopted, with the approval of the House of Commons, and the policy advocated gingerly and tentatively by the right hon. Baronet opposite, and boldly by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock. For my part, I hope the House will not be led away, by the charm of a scheme of this kind, from the reasonable, sensible, and practical course which Her Majesty's Government have recommended, and which they intend to carry out.
    MR. STUART-WORTLEYsaid, that at the outset he must ask the House to excuse him for having interrupted in an
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    undoubtedly disorderly way the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had just sat down. He must, however, say that he had interrupted the right hon. Gentleman in order to point out the difference between the deduction he sought to extract from the production of the two telegrams in the Blue Book, and the conclusion any other man would logically and seriously draw from them. Those two telegrams showed what was the opinion of General Gordon upon matters on which he might have been consulted, and should have been consulted, before he started. As the Government of Her Majesty chose not to consult him on these questions, they had now no excuse to offer for not earlier moving to the rescue of the beleaguered garrisons in the Soudan, except that they did not know General Gordon's opinion on these undoubtedly vital points. Such an excuse might satisfy hon. Gentlemen such as the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Jesse Col-lings), whose only consideration was what might or what might not play into the hands of the Tory Party; but it could be no excuse for permitting horrible massacres of men, women, and children, such as those which had recently occurred in the Soudan, when British aid was easily within reach. The right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Childers) made much of the fact that for months hon. Members appeared to have acquiesced in the oppression, or rather in the subjugation, of an oppressed people by force of arms, because they had said nothing during all that time when steps could have been taken to have prevented all that had occurred in the Soudan; and because they said nothing, the right hon. Gentleman therefore drew the conclusion that they must have approved of all that was being done. No such conclusion as that, however, was possible, because the Opposition chose to say nothing; it might indicate rather a disapproval than an approval of the policy that was followed. As the Government themselves confessed, Her Majesty's Ministers staked their policy and risked the sincerity of their doctrines on the military success of Hicks Pasha, and nothing greater or more probable than that. Into the military aspect of the question, however, former speakers had already entered to a sufficient degree, and he should

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    not have risen to trouble the House if it had not been that the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) and others always offered to speak for what they called the whole North of England. Why, the other night, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) offered to speak for the whole of England North of the Trent. Well, he (Mr. Stuart-Wortley) happened to represent a small oasis in the middle of that Northern waste. He represented a district whose air was not darkened by the cloud of words which, at the last General Election, swept over the political horizon of the country, and where ignorance on such matters certainly had not increased since that date. He believed it was owing to the healthy open-air tendencies of the vigorous and robust political views of the workmen who lived there that he owed his return in 1880; and, that being, so he felt bound to enforce here the views his constituents held. It was not necessary that he should harrow the feelings of the House with recriminations on the subject of the massacres which had taken place in the Soudan, or with inquiries whether such high military authorities as the hon. Member for Ipswich believed or did not believe in the success of the Expedition of Hicks Pasha, and of that of Baker Pasha. He desired to go a little further back, and to inquire into the validity of the defence of that part of the Government position which had not been seriously defended at all—namely, the admission that these horrors arose out of the fact that they did not do something which hon. Members on that side of the House said they ought to have done, but which Her Majesty's Government said they ought not to have done. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer very naturally considered they ought to carry their minds even further back—indeed, as far as they possibly could. It was neither profitable, nor necessary, to follow the Prime Minister into the Joint Control. It was only necessary to note that, with his accustomed ingenuity, the Prime Minister had been very sparing in his mention of the earlier Joint Control instituted by Lord Derby, or, if he had mentioned it at all, he had done so solely in connection with the name of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen),
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    and had studiously kept out of sight the name of that Minister who, if anyone, shared the initial responsibility of the whole measure. It was all very well for the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) to draw distinctions between the financial Control of 1876 and the political Control of 1879; the two were in either case so much alike that Lord Granville's own despatches spoke of the second Control as a "revival" of the first. The Prime Minister's own Cassandra prophecy of 1876 was uttered before what he called Lord Salisbury's Control was thought of; it therefore applied to and condemned Lord Derby's, and not Lord Salisbury's Control. And yet Lord Salisbury was the Minister whose name was now kept in the front. All that was very ingenious, but also very characteristic of the Prime Minister; but, perhaps, after all, he had bettor reserve his tu quoques for the seclusion of the Cabinet Council-room, where he might amuse himself as he liked by bandying recriminations across the Table with the man who was Foreign Secretary to the late Government, but who was the Prime Minister's trusted Secretary of State for the Colonies. No inconsistency! What were they to say to the initial and fundamental inconsistency of undertaking practically the government of one-half of a country, and yet disclaiming all responsibility for the other half? What would they say if a stronger Power than England were to become, in the same sort of way, charged with a practical Protectorate over England, and yet were to profess to have no responsibility for the integrity of England's Indian or Canadian possessions? But this was what the Government did or sought to do in the case of Egypt and the Soudan. They pretended to suppose that they could undertake the practical government of Egypt Proper, where the cultivable soil was comparatively fertile, where the population was unwarlike and submissive, where a sufficient revenue could be raised, where the climate was endurable, where Englishmen would gladly accept service, and where many comfortable posts could be found for them. They pretended to suppose that they could undertake that part of the duty in which the conditions were thus easy, and could escape responsibility for the

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    other and greater half of the Egyptian Dominions, where all those conditions were reversed, and where the duty was in a proportionately excessive degree unattractive and difficult. But that sort of inconsistency was no new thing in the councils of Her Majesty's Government. It was all of a piece with the way in which, in another part of the world, they reserved a Suzerainty and yet sought to escape the inevitable responsibility for the misconduct of those whom they required to acknowledge that Suzerainty. But the worst of the Egyptian business was, that the Government were not prepared even to face the necessary consequences of their own untenable position. They chose to think that they were under no responsibility for the maintenance of Egyptian supremacy, and they therefore gave no sort of countenance or aid to the efforts for its vindication. That was, as the House knew by their own confession, because of their belief that that Egyptian supremacy in the Soudan ought not to be maintained. They thought the Soudan was a danger and a weakness to Egypt. And so very likely it was; but, unfortunately, they could not summon to their vacillating minds courage enough to insist that Egypt should be relieved of that danger and that weakness. The reasons advanced for this were curious indeed. One of the pretended reasons why they did not say so, in tones which they know must be listened to, was that they thought that the supremacy practically could be maintained—maintained, that was, by the sword—the sword of the still successful General Hicks, and that, therefore, the abandonment of it would be very unpalatable to the Egyptian Government. Had it come to this, then, that Liberal Ministers, even when they desired and considered to be just, the emancipation of an oppressed people, whom they had it in their power to emancipate, were, nevertheless, content to sit still and say nothing about it as long as—what? As long as the continued subjugation of that people by pure force remained a matter practically feasible, and as long as to advise emancipation might, therefore, be unpalatable. It struck him, that after all they had done to the Egyptian Government, it was rather late for them to begin thinking of what was palatable or not to the Egyptian
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    Government. Nor did it seem very creditable for a Liberal Government to say that it was upon such a ground that they refused to give advice which they knew they could insist upon seeing followed, and which they said they believed on the highest grounds of Liberal principle to be the only true and good advice. In future, at all events, we should know that when Liberal statesmen said that they were in favour of the autonomy of a people, they did not intend to concede that autonomy until it had become no longer practicable to keep down the people with the sword. This was a policy which had a characteristic resemblance to the policy of Majuba Hill; but it was strangely unlike the pretended beliefs of the irresponsible advocates of Bulgarian and other autonomies. Here, then, they had inconsistency in taking up an originally untenable position, and vacillation as soon as the consequences of the original inconsistency became difficult to face. Seeing all this, they need not wonder that the Prime Minister should eagerly resort to such trite artifices of debate as pretending—what nobody believed—that he could not see in the facts detailed to the House by the right hon. Baronet (Sir Stafford Northcote) any grounds for the terms of his Motion. Such another artifice was the way the Prime Minister claimed to have his policy defined for him by those on that (the Opposition) side of the House. But let him (Mr. Stuart-Wortley) say one word as to this demand for a definition of the Opposition's policy. He did not suppose anyone believed the demand to be seriously made; for if there could be anything more foolish than that any Opposition should so declare itself, it must be that anyone else should expect it to do so. But if the demand was not seriously made by the Ministerialists generally, least of all could it be so made by the Prime Minister. No one, probably, had more often than he made such a demand when in Office, or more often repudiated it when in Opposition. No one could know better than he its value as an artifice of debate. Naturally, he desired to divert the attention of that House and of the public from the terms of the right hon. Baronet's Motion; because it dealt with the past and the past alone, and included in its purview

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    nothing but those admitted acts of the Government which had preceded, and which it charged to have caused, the disastrous perplexities of the present. Naturally, the Prime Minister wished to draw attention away from this dark and sinister record of what had been done and what had been omitted by himself and his Government. Listening to what had fallen from the Prime Minister and hon. Gentlemen opposite, one would imagine that it was not the Government, but the Opposition, who were on their trial—one would imagine that the only use of the present debate was not to review the proved acts of responsible Ministers, but to judge of the possible actions of certain other persons who might become responsible Ministers in the event of a contingency which had not yet arrived. This debate had no such useless or dangerous purpose—he said dangerous, because he believed that the condition of Egypt had come to be such that any sudden new departure in policy must be either injurious or impossible. It was to be feared that they had irretrievably injured and undermined the power of self-help in Egypt—the Government of that country had come to depend, like a hot-house plant, upon artificial nursing and support from a Power external to itself. For a state of affairs so unhealthy it was difficult enough to say what should be the remedy. Prolonged occupation might mean a further enervation of the national character; while withdrawal of support might bring the greatest injury to the enfeebled organism. But it would, above all, be unjustifiable for any statesman to advise either of these courses without first being placed in a position to form a responsible judgment upon materials accessible to Ministers alone. Whether a prolonged or permanent occupation of Egypt was or was not destined to become necessary, whether it was a Liberal or Conservative Government by whom it would have to be carried out, it would always be to Her Majesty's present Advisers and to their treatment of Egypt that the prolonged occupation would be chargeable. The Government had, surely, enough to answer for as it was. Let them not seek to provoke a premature declaration from the Opposition, lest, in the necessary nature of those declarations, there should be recognized a stronger than all previous
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    condemnations of their own policy. Let them not provoke speculation into the future; let them answer for the past. They would, surely, have enough to do to discharge themselves from the blame arising out of the massacres and bloodshed which this Motion affirmed, and which hon. Members opposite, whichever way they might vote, scarcely denied to be the direct and disastrous result of what they were pleased to call their consistent and determined policy.
    MR. BRYCEsaid, he must congratulate his hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Stuart-Wortley), who had just sat down, on having observed a certain amount of decorum in the speech which he had delivered, and upon having abstained from those violent and reckless assertions which the House had been too much in the habit of hearing from hon. Members opposite. His hon. Friend had proceeded altogether on a wrong assumption, because he believed that Her Majesty's Government had been erroneous throughout. Now, he (Mr. Bryce) did not propose, at that stage of the debate, to weary the House with any quotations from the Blue Books. He would rather endeavour to express the feeling which he believed to exist among a considerable section of Members who called themselves independent Supporters of the Government. They were Members who were not prepared to maintain that the Government were infallible, but who disapproved of the Amendment moved by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), and were still more opposed to the Resolution moved by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote). Why must they oppose that Resolution? It was because they considered not merely that the policy of the Government had not been vacillating and inconsistent, but for a stronger reason—that the Government, although under great temptations to abandon a firm line of principle, had taken and adhered to a true policy throughout. He might put their policy in these words. They had looked upon the Soudan as being altogether outside the sphere of English action—that we had nothing to do with it, and that we had no title or interest or reason to interfere in the affairs of the Soudan. It was upon that view that hon. Members on that side of the House felt disposed to

    1273
    give their support to Her Majesty's Government. They had been told that they were slaves, and that they were going to vote against their consciences in order to please some mysterious body outside. Gentlemen on the other side of the House seemed to know much better what went on here than they did themselves. He might say that if they were slaves, at any rate they were unconscious and contented slaves; and he could not say that he knew of any hon. Member on that side of the House who had expressed a desire to vote against the Government, except the hon. and learned Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott), who had, that evening, openly avowed that desire. Why did they think the Government entitled to credit for having adhered to a policy of abstention in the Soudan? It was because they considered that the danger of English intervention in the Soudan was one of the greatest dangers which could possibly menace the Egyptian policy of this country. Did hon. Members know what an attempt to rule the Soudan meant? It had been openly avowed by many hon. Members—avowed a few minutes ago by the hon. Member for Sheffield, that he and his Party disapproved of the withdrawal from the Soudan. Now, the Soudan was not only an enormous country, thinly-peopled, unhealthy, poor, and full of deserts, but it was a country where boundaries were not defined. If the Government had gone into that country, there was no reason why they should have stopped anywhere. Their action would have meant the creation of an immense Empire in Equatorial Africa. The danger to the strength of a country like England lay in its strength. She was so powerful that she was obliged to be careful, because experience taught us that we were likely to destroy any weak country we came into collision with, just as a powerful iron-clad was to destroy any weak vessel she came into contact with. Suppose we were successful, we could not abandon our conquest; if we met with a reverse, it would be said that we must avenge that reverse; and we should be led on until we established an Empire in Equatorial Africa like that of India. It must also be borne in mind that England could not govern a country under her control in the way in which Egypt dealt with her Dependencies, or as Russia managed
    1274
    her Asiatic Provinces. England could not attempt to govern the Soudan without introducing her own civilization; without sending there an army of English soldiers and civilians to keep the country in order, and apply to it the same ideas of administrative progress and government as existed in England itself. He quite admitted that Her Majesty's Government might have rendered a service to civilization by creating an Empire in the Soudan; but there must be some limits to British intervention. Even England, with all her power, must feel that there should be some sort of limit placed on that power. We were not called upon to carry our intervention into every part of the world. We could not afford, so to speak, to lock up our available capital in investments at the same moment in all parts of the world, because, if a pinch came, where should we find ourselves in the case of a difficulty? Hon. Members had spoken upon the assumption that the Soudan was a part of Egypt. The hon. Member for Sheffield said, in so many words—"You cannot expect the Government of half a country to escape the responsibilities of the other half." But the Soudan was not part of Egypt, nor did we go to Egypt to assume the government of the country. That was a matter which had always been disclaimed. It might be thought, from some of the speeches which had been delivered in the course of the debate, that we were in the position of universal successors or heirs, who came into a property and took it with all its liabilities and all its debts, and were bound to fulfil all the engagements connected with it which had been entered into. Our occupation of Egypt was for the limited purpose of re-establishing order, and, as far as possible, bringing into working order local institutions, and thus enabling the country to stand alone. We had nothing to do with the Imperial policy of Egypt, and we could not assume any responsibility for that Imperial policy. He would go as far as to say that it appeared to him Her Majesty's Government were no more responsible for what happened at Sinkat and Tokar, or in the Soudan, than they were responsible for what went on in one of the islands of the Western Pacific, where, also, there were many things happening which humane men must deplore. The House had been treated with expressions of

    1275
    horror about the slaughter of the garrison of Sinkat. Did hon. Members remember that we had by the Treaty of Berlin made ourselves responsible for the good government of Armenia and Macedonia? Far greater horrors had gone on there, and not one voice had been raised from hon. Members on the Conservative side of that House about the non-fulfilment of our responsibilities. "We ought to discharge the duties already incumbent upon us before undertaking, like knights-errant, the task of redressing wrongs all over the world. He had listened to the speech of the hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay) the other night, not without sympathy for the genuineness of that hon. Member's feeling, but with astonishment at his assumptions, and he could not help wondering how it was the hon. Member came to persuade himself we were responsible, in this country, for what had occurred in the Soudan, except on the hypothesis that, wherever there was an opportunity for an English soldier to go, an English soldier ought to go. It was remarkable to notice the way in which hon. Members opposite—perhaps not so much in the House as out of it, where they were under much less restraint—had dilated upon the horrors of Sinkat, because they thought it was a means of drawing the country away from the real point at issue. They tried to put it on the score of humanity, but ignored the plain facts of the case. These were operations of war; and he did not see why, in operations of war, they should sympathize more with one side than with another. If the arms of the Khedive had been successful there would have been much slaughter of the Native troops. They must regret the slaughter, no matter on whom it fell; but they must not be led away by mere appeals to their feelings of sympathy. If Her Majesty's Government had now interfered at the last moment, it was not because they recognized any responsibility on their part to do so, because they had expressly declared that the question of the Soudan was out of the scope of their interference, but it was simply from a feeling of humanity and their desire to rescue the garrisons. It was considered desirable to rescue the garrisons in order that a useless trouble might not further be prolonged. He was not prepared to say that the Government
    1276
    had been right in all their acts. He thought it possible that they had been too tenacious in following out and continuing the policy they had declared, and which the House had approved. Let it be remembered that the House had approved of their policy, and had agreed to the view of the Government that we had nothing to do with the affairs of the Soudan, and that, if the Government were to err in any direction, it were far better to err in a direction of keeping this country out of a responsibility which Parliament had encouraged them to disclaim. He might be asked what were our duties with regard to our future relations with Egypt? He believed that the country desired that English troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible; but, in wishing that, he felt sure that they did not desire our retirement a day sooner than was necessary for the proper accomplishment of our plan of organization. With regard to a Protectorate, he did not for one moment think that the country wished for anything of the kind, because it involved, not only the danger which had been pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but also other dangers relating to the general attitude and policy of England in the East and her relations with the other Powers. With reference to the reforms which it was the wish of the country to see established, the desire was that there should be an alteration of the Law of Liquidation, and that some means should be taken to relieve the peasantry in their present difficulties. If there was one thing desired among the working classes of this country, it was that the Government should be relieved of the groundless imputation of having been moved to their action in Egypt by mercenary motives. He believed it would give great satisfaction to those Members who had approved the policy of Her Majesty's Government hitherto, if an emphatic disproof of this were given. But he repeated that in desiring to withdraw from Egypt they did not wish that our work there should be left undone. Her Majesty's Government had over and over again said that the withdrawal from Egypt should be their proper aim. They desired the Government to adhere to that pledge; but they did not wish any time to be specified, because it might lead to a recurrence of the same difficulty

    1277
    and miscalculation which had already occurred. We were bound to carry out our reforms in a satisfactory way; but when this had been attained, the sooner we left Egypt the better.
    MR. GRANTHAMsaid, although he had thought, on listening to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that he had made the most extraordinary speech delivered in the course of the debate, yet he must confess that he was more surprised by the speech of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce), who began by stating that the Government ought not to be censured, because they had not gone to Egypt to take the government of that country on their shoulders. The hon. Member then went on to inform the House that, although at the present time English troops were moving for the relief of Tokar, or to do what they could to defend that town, yet by so doing we had not increased our responsibilities. He thought it only necessary to mention these statements to show how fallacious they were, and time would prove whether the country would acquit the Government of responsibility in case their preparations for the relief of Tokar were insufficient. Again, he would like to know who had been responsible for the government of Egypt since the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had deposed one Egyptian Administration that was not sufficiently subservient, and installed in its place another Administration which was the mere puppet of English rule? But he would turn to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on which he desired to make one or two observations. The right hon. Gentleman had taunted his (Mr. Grantham's) hon. Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie) with having, in his speech, mentioned but one new fact; but, if that were so, his hon. Friend stood in a much superior position to that of the right hon. Gentleman with regard to his speech, for, even if the latter had said anything true, he had suggested nothing new whatever. What truth was there in the attack made by the right hon. Gentleman on the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott), whose speech he had described as the most violent and unscrupulous attack that had ever been made on a Liberal Prime Minister from
    1278
    those Benches? But surely the recollection of the right hon. Gentleman was very treacherous indeed; because, unless he (Mr. Grantham) was mistaken, the right hon. Gentleman was in the House on a former occasion, when the Prime Minister was attacked by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby—then Mr. Harcourt, now Sir William—who came into the House as a Liberal, and who made one of the most violent attacks on the Government of the day that could be conceived, on the ground of their having obtained their position by false pretences. He (Mr. Grantham) well remembered reading the violent language which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department made use of on that occasion, but for which he was soon after promoted to the Office of Solicitor General. Again, it was not many years ago that another right hon. Gentleman, also a Colleague of the Head of Her Majesty's Government, the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), made a far more violent attack upon his Chief than the hon. Member for Brighton had made that evening, and he, again, was rewarded by promotion to the position in the Cabinet which he now occupied. There was, however, this great difference between the two right hon. Gentlemen and his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Brighton, for they had attacked the Prime Minister in order to force him to buy off their opposition by giving them seats in his Administration; and, as he had pointed out, they had been rewarded—the one with the Solicitor Generalship, and the other with the Presidency of the Board of Trade. Since that time they had been among the most servile of the right hon. Gentleman's followers; whereas the hon. and learned Member for Brighton attacked the Prime Minister at his own cost, and was ready to vouch his condemnation of their conduct by an appeal to his constituents. His hon. and learned Friend said—" I admit that my language is strong, but I am expressing the opinions of my constituents. I shall go down to them and place my seat in their hands." Again, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said that the Conservative Party did not oppose the policy of the Government with regard to Egypt 12

    1279
    months ago, and that it did not he with the Opposition now to criticize their policy with regard to the Soudan. But they must not forget that the circumstances originally known to the Opposition had entirely changed during the Autumn of last year, so far as concerned the position of affairs in the Soudan. They must remember that Her Majesty's Government stood in the position of trustee with regard to Egypt, and that Egypt was in no other position than that of ward, and the moment it was found that Egypt would be ruined materially, financially, and politically, it was the duty of the Government, as trustees, to alter its policy with respect to Egyptian affairs. But what happened? They found, in November of last year, the British Representative, Sir Evelyn Baring, writing, on the 19th of that month, to Lord Granville, and telling him plainly that the position of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan was bad. He said that the Egyptian Government had no funds to meet the emergency, that they had already sent every available man to the Soudan, with the exception of the forces of Hicks and Baker, and that if those forces were destroyed Egyptian authority would cease over the whole of the Soudan, unless some assistance were given. What he charged upon the Government was this—that, knowing that Hicks Pasha could meet with nothing but disaster, they would not stir a hand or utter a word, either to assist or encourage him, lest they should become responsible; and, although despatch after despatch were sent, warning them of all—of his impending fate, and then of his utter destruction—they were still craven-hearted, and would not move a finger to help the Egyptian Government in their dire necessity, lest again "they should be considered responsible." They guarded themselves in the way which had so often been referred to in the course of this debate. They said, in the despatch of the 20th of November—
    "We cannot lend English or Indian troops. If consulted, recommend abandonment of Soudan within certain limits."—[Egypt, No. 1 (1884), p. 93.]
    He would like to know what the Government meant by saying there was no responsibility incurred by that recommendation. It was clear the question
    1280
    as to what should be done had boon a matter of consultation for some time between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government. But the position became worse, because what was only rumoured before was afterwards confirmed by the despatch in which Sir Evelyn Baring gave Lord Granville an account of the way in which the army of Hicks Pasha was destroyed, an event which could only be compared to the overwhelming of the army of Pharoah in the Red Sea. Well, what did the Government do then? Lord Granville, writing to Sir Evelyn Baring, said, in reference to his telegram—
    "I have to instruct you, after consultation with General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn "Wood, to report your opinion as to whether the present state of affairs in the Soudan must he considered as a cause of danger to Egypt Proper. If such should he the case. Her Majesty's Government will he glad to learn your views as to what measures are desirable."—[Ibid. p. 94.]
    And yet Her Majesty's Government said there was no responsibility on them at all. The first observation he wished to make was that it was a lasting disgrace on the name of Lord Granville, that when he heard of the destruction of that brave man, General Hicks, and his army, his despatch did not contain a single word of sympathy for the General himself or those who died with him. The telegram of the 25th of November showed clearly and unmistakably the disgraceful way in which Her Majesty's Government prepared first of all to do something—to inquire into the matter—and that when they perceived that they might be held responsible, they threw the whole of the responsibility on the unfortunate Government of Egypt. Of the despatch of the 25th of November, only an extract was given in the Blue Book, and hon. Members could not possibly tell whether something of far more importance had not been kept back; but it said that Her Majesty's Government could do nothing in the matter which would draw upon them responsibility for the operations in the Soudan, and it went on to state that the responsibility would rest with the Egyptian Government, who must rely upon their own resources. That was the reply of Her Majesty's Government, in spite of the fact that telegram after telegram and letter after letter had been sent by

    1281
    Sir Evelyn Baring informing them that the Egyptian Government had no resources; that they had despatched every available man to the Soudan, and that they relied on the British Government to protect them from the consequences which must follow the defeat of General Hicks and his army. He would not go through the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because there was little in it that had the slightest bearing on the question before the House, but would pass from it in order to make some observations on the real issue before the country; for, unless it could be shown that the Motion of Censure on Her Majesty's Government, and the reasons on which it was based, were in accordance with the views of the country, they were not justified in occupying the time of the House with its discussion. He admitted at once the correctness of the observation of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), that, unless there were some special reasons, it was the duty of the House to support the Executive Government in cases of national difficulty. He quite agreed with that; but he said there were occasions when the Government of the day had shown itself so miserably weak and incompetent, that no amount of strength and support given to it could prevent that Government falling again into similar difficulties and errors. He repeated that the principle laid down by the right hon. Gentleman had his assent; but he was unable to forget that when Lord Beaconsfield was in Office, neither the Prime Minister, nor the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford, or any other Liberal Leader in Opposition, rendered the Government of the day assistance during those trying and eventful difficulties which culminated so triumphantly for the Conservative Party in the Treaty of Berlin. What was the charge which they made against Her Majesty's Government? It was not only that recent mishaps, but that all the misfortunes of Egypt since the year 1881 had been brought about by that vacillating and half-hearted policy which was the certain outcome of divided Cabinets and divided counsels. The same want of courage, and the same vacillation which first allowed the forts of Alexandria to be repaired and manned, and guns to be mounted on them, to
    1282
    hurl defiance, if not destruction, on the British Fleet, and then witnessed the burning of Alexandria and the murder of English subjects, without allowing a shot to be fired, or a sailor to be landed—that same vacillation and want of courage that brought about the destruction of Alexandria, brought about also the massacre of the brave garrison of Sinkat, together with its noble Captain, Tewfik Pasha, and 1,000 innocent women and children. What was it that saved Egypt from anarchy and ruin after the criminal blunders of the Government at Alexandria? It was the voice of indignant England which would have hurled the Government from power, if they had not adopted a more patriotic course; it was the expression of that indignation which led to the victory of Tel-el-Kebir, and it was the same spirit and the same indignation which had led to those measures that were now being taken for the relief of Tokar. From the year 1882 down to the present time, what was it that all Europeans and all well-wishers to Egypt had enforced upon Her Majesty's Government? Time after time, to quote their own Blue Books, they had assured the Government, in the most positive and uncompromising terms, that nothing but the presence of a British force for some time longer could assure the tranquillity of Egypt, or prevent the recurrence of disturbance. The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) said Her Majesty's Government had accepted no responsibility. It was for what they had not done that they were blamed; they never would have accepted any responsibility had they not been compelled to accept it by the English people. It was said contemptuously that this Jingoism was simply an agitation of the bondholders in this country and in France. He repudiated entirely that assertion, which he thought came with a very bad grace from Her Majesty's Government, because they knew full well the nature of the Reports which came from Lord Dufferin, and which were to be found in the Blue Books. There were several of these Reports; but he would only refer to one, which he thought of too much importance not to be mentioned to the House. It was on page 57 of Blue Book No. 13—the despatch in which Lord Dufferin, writing to Lord Granville, enclosed

    1283
    a Petition from the inhabitants of Alexandria, and which, after enlarging on the continued presence of British troops in Egypt, went on to refer to the American missionaries in Alexandria, all of whom, he said, were in favour of the retention for a considerable period of the British Army in that country. Lord Dufferin added—
    "That the document must he regarded as the genuine and spontaneous expression of the convictions and wishes of the European colony in Lower Egypt."
    Having stated so much, he went on to say that another document had been placed in his hands—namely, a memorandum from the American Missionary Society, respecting which Lord Dufferin continued—
    "The Society to which these gentlemen belonged has, as your Lordship is aware, been for many years established in the East, and has won for itself a very high and honourable position. … It will probably surprise your Lordship as disagreeably as it did me, to find that the unanimous and deliberate opinion of the gentlemen in question was very much in accord with that of the European community at Alexandria. They assure me, in the most positive and uncompromising terms, that they consider that nothing but the continued presence of a British force for some time longer can assure the tranquillity of Egypt, or prevent the recurrence of disturbances."—[Egypt, No. 13 (1883), p. 58.]
    It was manifest, from the Reports which Her Majesty's Government were fully aware of, that it was the uncertain sound of Her Majesty's Government, and the want of courage on their part, that led not only to the difficulties which culminated in the destruction of Alexandria, but to those difficulties which had resulted in the destruction of Egyptian influence in the Soudan, because, just in the same ratio as the friends of Egypt lost confidence in Her Majesty's Government, the enemies of Egypt gained confidence in the course they were pursuing. While Her Majesty's Government occupied their proper position in Egypt there was not much likelihood of the Egyptian Government being really defeated so far as the Soudan was concerned. They charged the Government of Her Majesty with inconsistency and vacillation, and want of courage throughout the whole of their Egyptian management; but the recent fall of Sinkat enabled them to make the charge with increased force, because it was to the inaction of the Government that the
    1284
    disaster which befel that brave garrison was to be attributed. Let him ask, when they proposed a Vote of Censure on account of the weakness of the Government, which led to the garrison of Sinkat being massacred and the women and children being outraged, and afterwards murdered, what was the good of the Prime Minister getting up in the House and deliberately saying, and occupying an hour and a-half in saying it, that the Dual Control established by Lord Salisbury was a mistake? That was no answer to the poor people who were begging for assistance lest they should be murdered. When those people were sending despatch after despatch, to the effect that they were starving, it was no consolation to them or their friends to say that Her Majesty's Government had improved the cadastral survey of Egypt, and had also increased the irrigation of the country, whereby the crops might be made more valuable. England was now in the position of trustee of Egypt, and if the trustee allowed its ward to act in a foolish way, or in a way disastrous to its own interest, it was necessary that the trustee should be discarded, and another chosen in its stead. He rejoiced that his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote) had brought forward this Vote of Censure, No doubt they would fail to arrive at the real opinion of the country by the Division which would be taken upon the Motion; but, fortunately, they could do so by an appeal to the constituencies, and when that appeal was made there was little doubt what the result would be. What had been the consequence of the policy of the Government? They came into power with the old boasted cry of "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform!" They boasted of being an economical Government; but what had been the result of this policy of Her Majesty's Government—this policy of always doing everything too late? Why, the result was that it was a most extravagant policy; they had to pay for what they required millions, whereas if they had done their duty earlier they might have satisfied their needs by the expenditure of a few thousands. Not only had they spent millions of money needlessly, but they had involved the country in a war which would not have been necessary had they acted wisely and prudently. Their extravagance

    1285
    had shown itself in the expenditure of money, although it was a shame that the country should have been required to spend its treasure unnecessarily. What was that, however, compared with the extravagant expressions which had now to be used by General Gordon, in the hope of rescuing the troops of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan? If it was true that General Gordon had found it necessary to abandon the time-honoured practice of England, in the pursuit of which she had spent millions of money—namely, the practice of suppressing the Slave Trade—if it had been necessary that an English General Officer should openly proclaim he would allow slavery to be carried on, if only for a time, our protection of the Egyptian Government had, indeed, been purchased at a price which was too high for even this country to bear. He well remembered the extraordinary conduct in 1878 and 1879 of the right hon. Gentleman the present Prime Minister. The then Government of Her Majesty were in great difficulty owing to the Russo-Turkish War; but hon. Members well remembered the unpatriotic way in which the right hon. Gentleman endeavoured to frustrate the policy of the then Leader of the Government. The conduct of the right hon. Gentleman was excused by his Friends, and it was afterwards excused by the country, because they believed he was acting in the cause of outraged humanity. If he did, where were his feelings now? He had had many opportunities of protecting outraged humanity; but he had always, somehow or other, contrived to neglect them. He had an opportunity at Sinkat of protecting that brave garrison which was subsequently massacred to a man. But the right hon. Gentleman preferred that humanity should be outraged rather than his Government should accept any responsibility. The right hon. Gentleman had an opportunity of preventing the outrages which, no doubt, were committed upon those unfortunate women and children of Sinkat previous to their massacre; but he preferred that their humanity should be outraged rather than weaken the support he got from the Radicals, or disturb the position which he held in the Radical Party. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford told the House, there were times when it was the duty of the House
    1286
    to lead the Government. He (Mr. Grantham) agreed with the right hon. Gentleman, because the whole history of the present Government had been a history of divided counsels, followed by disaster. In 1880, owing, no doubt, to their divided counsels, they stood by in Ireland while a rebellious and murderous organization got hold of the country, and almost broke the bond which united that country to England. In 1881, they witnessed the same thing in reference to that unhappy country the Transvaal. That, no doubt, was owing to divided counsels; because the Ministers of Her Majesty, when out of Office, held language very different to that they held when in Office. Then, again, hon. Members knew what happened in Ireland in 1882, owing, again, to divided counsels. What had happened, however, in Egypt was far worse than that which occurred in Ireland and the Transvaal, for the weakness and vacillation of Her Majesty's Government had been written in letters of blood on the sands of that unhappy country. Many Governments had made mistakes in their foreign and domestic policy; but those mistakes had always been in upholding the honour and credit of this country. It had been reserved for the present Government to make mistakes dishonourable and discreditable to England. It had been reserved for the present Government that, during every year of their existence, there should be times when loyal subjects of the Crown had publicly to proclaim their shame and humiliation at the thought of being Englishmen. In Ireland loyal men had been obliged out of fear to join the ranks of the rebellious in that country. In the Transvaal pretty much the same thing happened. Englishmen hung down their heads with shame and humiliation at the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government; and they were obliged to declare they were not Englishmen, or that they had ceased to belong to the Mother Country. It was only last week that it was reported in the newspapers that English people in Egypt were ashamed of their nationality. In that shame he believed a large majority of the people of this country shared. The different speakers on the Ministerial side of the House had one and all condemned the policy of the Government, though they had one and all declared their intention of supporting the Government.

    1287
    It might be in consequence of such inconsistency that Her Majesty's Ministers would obtain a majority. If, however, the Government had as much courage as the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Brighton (Mr. Marriott), they would dissolve. If they did that they would assuredly be hurled from power; indeed, their destruction would be as complete as was that of Pharoah and his hosts in the Red Sea.
    MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTmoved the adjournment of the debate.
    Motion made, and Question proposed "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett.)
    MR. W. H. SMITHasked the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) if there was any truth in the statement that Tokar had fallen; and whether he was able to give the House any information as to the state of affairs in the Soudan?
    SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked whether the Government had received any information in confirmation of the Proclamation of General Gordon establishing the Slave Trade at Khartoum? It was stated in that evening's papers that the issuing of such a Proclamation had been confirmed.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, in reply, said, that no information had reached the Government as to the alleged fall of the garrison of Tokar. In reply to the Question of the hon. Gentleman below the Gangway (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), he also had to state that no information beyond that given at an earlier hour that evening had been received at the Foreign Office. Of course, he did not propose to oppose the Motion for the adjournment of the debate; but he hoped it might be convenient to hon. Members that the debate should conclude to-morrow.
    Question put, and agreed to.
    Debate further adjourned till To-morrow.

MOTIONS.

  CANAL BOATS ACT (1877) AMENDMENT BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. BURT, Bill to amend "The Canal Boats Act, 1877," ordered to be brought in by Mr. BURT, Colonel MAKINS, Mr. SAMUEL MORLEY, Mr. JOHN CORBETT, Mr. PELL, and Mr. BROADHURST.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 111.]

  PUBLIC HEALTH ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. DODDS, Bill to amend the Public Health Acts in relation to private improvement expenses, ordered to be brought in by Mr. DODDS, Sir EDWARD REED, and Mr. ARNOLD MORLEY.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 113.]

  MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (BOROUGH FUNDS) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. Dodds, Bill to amend an Act of the Session of the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth years of the reign of Her present Majesty, chapter ninety-one, intituled "An Act to authorise the application of Funds of Municipal Corporations and other governing bodies, in certain cases," ordered to be brought in by Mr. Dodds, Mr. EDWARD CLARKE, Mr. JACKSON, and Sir JOHN ST. AUBYN.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 112.]

  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY (NO. 2) BILL.
  Order for Second Reading upon Wednesday 2nd April read, and discharged; and, instead thereof,—

  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUN-DAT) (NO. 3) BILL.
  On Motion of Sir JOSEPH PEASE, Bill for closing Public Houses on Sunday, making exception for the sale of beer during certain hours, and for the Metropolitan district, ordered to be brought in by Sir JOSEPH PEASE, Viscount CASTLEREAGH, Earl PERCY, and Mr. CHARLES PALMER.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 114.]
  House adjourned at One o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL—Second Reading—Trustee Churches (Ireland)٭ (11).

EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—TOKAR.—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF WEMYSSsaid, he wished to ask a Question of the noble Lord the Under Secretary for War, of which he had given him private Notice. It was, Whether Her Majesty's Government had seen the statement in that morning's papers that Osman Digna, who was besieging Tokar, was using two Krupp guns captured from Baker Pasha's force with great precision and very deadly effect to the garrison? He wished also to ask whether the relieving force of English sent to the relief of Tokar

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had any artillery except mountain guns? His impression was that they had not; and, if that was the case, perhaps, the noble Lord would give the reason why.
THE EARL OF MORLEY: The noble Lord says he gave me Notice of this Question. No doubt he did, but it was only three minutes ago. It is impossible for me to answer a Question of this kind with such a short Notice. As a matter of fact, a battery of camel guns have been despatched from Cairo; but what other arrangements have been made I can hardly at this moment say.
THE EARL OF WEMYSSsaid, the news only arrived this morning, and he had not been able to give earlier Notice of his Question. With respect to the camel guns mentioned, he wished to know whether they were equivalent to field guns? He did not think they were.
EARL GRANVILLE: I think there is some little doubt whether it is desirable to state in this House, even after due Notice, the details of the military preparations made with regard to this Expedition. It is most certainly not desirable to put a series of Questions without Notice. The noble Earl saw the announcement in the morning papers, at least eight or nine hours ago, and he might have given my noble Friend Notice then.

EGYPT (AFFAIRS OF THE SOUDAN)—GENERAL GORDON.—QUESTION.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am afraid I am going to commit the same offence; but if it is inconvenient for the noble Earl to answer the Question now, I will give Notice for to-morrow. I wish to ask, Whether it is true that General Gordon has placarded Khartoum with proclamations permitting the re-establishment of the Slave Trade, and whether it is in consequence of any authority given him by Her Majesty's Government?
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, if I give any answer whatever to the noble Marquess I hope he will not think it presumptuous in me if I point out the importance of what has been very often stated in this House, that it would be for the convenience of the Government, and the House, and the country, that due Notice should be given of such Questions. I never put Questions without Notice myself, and
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I have never seen it done in this House. I think the old-fashioned rule of giving Notice should be adhered to, especially when the difference of a word might have an important effect. With regard to the Question of the noble Marquess, we have received intimation of the issue of a proclamation bearing on the question of buying and selling slaves by General Gordon, but it is not exactly to the same effect as that published in the newspapers. I think your Lordships will agree that if there is one man in the United Kingdom who understands slavery, and has the unhappy condition of slaves completely at heart, it is General Gordon. Any arrangement he has made will, no doubt, be found to be one calculated in the long run to be in favour of the views which he has entertained all his life.

THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—SUPERSESSION OF LORD ROSSMORE.

  RESOLUTION.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion which stands in my name; and, in doing so, I desire to say that I have no personal feeling whatever to induce me to mention the case involved in this question. I have not had the honour and pleasure of Lord Rossmore's acquaintance until the other day; and I am bound to say that I was very pleased and proud to make his acquaintance, because I think, especially in these times, it is a privilege to know a man who does not shrink from responsibility, and has the courage to take responsibility upon himself for the public good. On the other hand, I should be glad if personal feeling would have allowed me to pass this matter over in silence, because I have great respect for the present Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, both in his official capacity, and as a private individual. My reluctance has been somewhat increased by the fact that the papers dealing with the subject have been only this moment placed in my hands, and I have not had time to examine them with any care whatever. But, as far as I can see, they make no change whatever in our knowledge of the facts as already published; and, therefore, I do not feel justified in postponing the Motion or interfering with the convenience of the House by my doing so. The case appears to me to be an exceedingly simple one; but, at the

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  same time—if it be not a paradox to say so—rather complicated. It is simple in itself, but has been made complicated by the fact that Lord Rossmore, rather foolishly, I think, entered into totally unnecessary explanations of his conduct; and the remarks made by the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal, which appear to me to have nothing whatever to do with the case, have also complicated it very much. The offence which Lord Rossmore is said to have committed is that of having led a body of men into such close proximity with another body of men, congregated for another purpose, as to render imminent a breach of the peace; and it is said that he did this after being warned by the constituted authorities, who are responsible for keeping the peace. That is, practically, the whole charge made against the noble Lord, and that is the offence for which he was removed from the Commission of the Peace. That is abundantly shown in the first letter to Lord Rossmore, written by the Lords Commissioners; in the second letter, by which Lord Rossmore was superseded; and in a letter to Sir John Leslie, from the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal. In the first letter, the Lords Commissioners say—
  "Whilst considerable excitement prevailed, your Lordship, heading a procession of large numbers of men moving towards the second or counter-meeting, led that procession into such close proximity to the place of the first-mentioned meeting as to seriously endanger the public peace; that your Lordship was remonstrated with in the first instance by Sub-Inspector Trescott, one of the Constabulary officers then charged with the preservation of the public peace, and was requested by that officer to adopt another route," &c.
  They go on to say—
  "That soon afterwards your Lordship, pursuing the route you insisted on following, and by which you were leading your procession, was again remonstrated with and warned by Captain M'Ternan, the Resident Magistrate, then also charged with the preservation of the public peace, to alter that route, so as to avoid the risk of collision between the men forming your Lordship's procession and those assembled at the first-mentioned meeting; and that your Lordship refused so to do, persevering in the route you had selected."
  That shows, plainly, that the complaint against Lord Rossmore was that he followed the route he was requested not to take. The same charge appears to have been made in the second letter of the
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  Lords Commissioners, in which they say—
  "Your Lordship admits the facts mentioned in their letter as substantially correct, and those facts plainly show that your Lordship, on the day in question, took a leading and active part in a proceeding which was fraught with peril to the public peace. This in your Lordship's letter stands conceded—nay, further, it appears from that letter, with the fullest knowledge of an almost certain danger and risk to the public peace, you deliberately headed and led a determined and excited procession into the immediate vicinity of the meeting to which you and your procession were opposed."
  In another letter, a letter to Sir John Leslie, the Lords Commissioners say—
  "Lord Rossmore was the leader on the occasion in question; and, after it had come to his Lordship's knowledge that the men he headed would insist on proceeding by the route which other portions of the procession afterwards followed, he continued to lead his men to the point most truly described by you as the most critical point, where the circuitous route diverged," &c.
  Therefore, it is perfectly plain that the charge against Lord Rossmore was that he insisted upon taking his men to Rosslea by a road which he was requested by the Sub-Inspector and the Resident Magistrate not to take. But in the quotation from the second letter I want to call your Lordships' attention to a most extraordinary complication introduced by the Lords Commissioners. The Lords Commissioners say that Lord Rossmore admits certain facts mentioned in their letter as substantially correct, and that—
  "Those facts plainly show that your Lordship, on the day in question, took a leading and active part in a proceeding which was fraught with peril to the public peace."
  I want to know, if the offence charged is the taking a road which Lord Rossmore was requested not to go, what are the facts to which the Lords Commissioners allude as to something which occurred previously, because it is very difficult to understand whether the real offence is the offence he is accused of committing, or whether, behind that, there is some other charge which the Lords Commissioners have taken into consideration without having mentioned it to Lord Rossmore? My Lords, the issue is only a very narrow and simple one. It consists in the fact whether Lord Rossmore maintained this particular route contrary to the advice of the proper authorities. I would ask your Lordships'

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  attention to the words which are used, and which I have already read. They say that Sub-Inspector Trescott "requested" Lord Rossmore to adopt a certain course; that the Resident Magistrate "remonstrated with" and "warned" Lord Rossmore about certain things. But, my Lords, as your Lordships know very well, the Resident Magistrate was in a position of complete authority; he had the power to order Lord Rossmore to do anything he thought right. He would have had that power had Lord Rossmore been acting in his official capacity as a magistrate. He was not acting in that capacity; he was not in his own county; he was acting in a mere private capacity; and, therefore, the Resident Magistrate and the Sub-Inspector had a right to compel Lord Rossmore not to adopt the course which he wished to follow. They say in the Papers that they had not force enough to do so; but it does not appear, even in those Papers, that they distinctly forbade Lord Rossmore to take that course. I must repeat it, because it is most important, that the words used by the Lords Commissioners are that he was "requested" not to do so by the Sub-Inspector, and that he was "remonstrated with" and "warned" by the Resident Magistrate. That is not the kind of language the Sub-Inspector or the Resident Magistrate ought to have used. They were in a position of complete authority, and they ought to have said that they forbade Lord Rossmore to adopt that course, and they ought to have stopped him and prevented him from doing so, if possible. Lord Rossmore's answer is a very simple one. He declares that, practically speaking, he had permission to take the road which he took. He says that he asked Sub-Inspector Trescott if he had authority to stop him, and that the Sub-Inspector said "No," he had not authority to stop him; but that he advised him to follow the course that Viscount Crichton had taken. Lord Rossmore also says that the Resident Magistrate gave him permission to go on, provided he undertook to keep the peace. I see, by the Papers, that that statement is not borne out by the testimony of the Resident Magistrate; but it is borne out by the testimony of other persons present—by Mr. Saunderson, who most distinctly supports Lord Rossmore's view of the case; and
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  by Sir John Leslie, a magistrate for Monaghan and Donegal and High Sheriff of Monaghan. Lord Rossmore's contention is, that he had practically permission to go the way he took under certain conditions. That view, as I have said, is borne out by Mr. Saunderson and Sir John Leslie, and also by Mr. Porter, J.P. of Longford and High Sheriff of Fermanagh. It is therefore a question of conflict of testimony, and there are the strongest reasons, therefore, why no action should have been taken in the matter until strict inquiry had been made. You must bear in mind also the words that were made use of by the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal. They say—
  "That words might have been used which Lord Rossmore might have uaderstood to mean that he had permission."
  Well, there is very little difference, in common sense, between the contention of Lord Rossmore that he was given permission, and the allegation of the Commissioners that words may have been used which were liable to misconstruction, and which he may have considered gave him permission to go on. Perhaps I had better quote the exact words which the Lords Commissioners used on that occasion. Although I do not want to weary the House with many extracts and quotations, it is necessary to be as exact as possible. The Lords Commissioners said—
  "They are witling to believe that some expressions used at the moment may have led your Lordship to think that no opposition would be offered to your persevering in the route you had been following; but your Lordship must have been then aware that you had brought your procession of excited followers into such close proximity to the meeting you were opposed to that it might have been a more prudent course to allow you to go on than to attempt to repel your advance by force, even if Captain M'Ternan had the means of doing so, which, as a matter of fact, he had not. A permission of that kind, even if actually accorded, could by no means excuse the deliberate action theretofore taken by your Lordship."
  The last sentence of those which I have quoted appears to me a most extraordinary one. According to the Lords Commissioners, the permission of a man in authority, whose power of control was complete, could not excuse the action taken by Lord Rossmore. Your Lordships must bear in mind that Lord Rossmore did not act as a magistrate at that meeting, and was beyond the range

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  of the jurisdiction which he could exercise as a magistrate. Therefore, what the Lords Commissioners say is that a permission given to a private individual by a Resident Magistrate, responsible for keeping the peace and in command in a certain place, was no excuse for action such as Lord Rossmore's, and did not relieve him from responsibility—that is to say, that a responsible person is not responsible for the action of a private individual to whom he has given permission to follow a certain course. Now, that is a monstrous and extraordinary doctrine to put forward. The Lords Commissioners allow that Lord Rossmore might have understood Captain M'Ternan's words as giving him permission to persevere in the route which he had been following. Therefore, the issue is narrowed down to a still smaller compass. The question is, whether Lord Rossmore took a certain road on the understanding that he had permission to take that road, the Lords Commissioners allowing that the words used to him were capable of being taken in that sense. The charge against Lord Rossmore is thus whittled down until its proportions are almost absurdly small. It comes to be a mere question of whether Lord Rossmore committed a slight error of judgment; whether he may have misunderstood certain words addressed to him; and whether on that misunderstanding he was guilty of an error of judgment. Now, my Lords, I want you to consider the position in which Lord Rossmore was placed, and to compare it with the position of other Gentlemen on the same occasion—Viscount Crichton, for example, who took the chair at the meeting, or would have taken the chair if there had been one to take. Viscount Crichton led a body of Orangemen some distance in front of the body led by Lord Rossmore; but he was communicated with by the Resident Magistrate, I believe, on the day before the meeting, and was told that the places of the two meetings had been changed, and he was recommended to take the circuitous route which he adopted. He was again spoken to on the day of the meeting; and he was, therefore, perfectly well aware that the places of meeting had been changed; he understood that it was advisable to take this road, and he had an opportunity of explaining the matter to the
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  men under his charge. Now none of these precautions were taken in the case of Lord Rossmore. He did not know that the place of meeting had been changed, and he had not the slightest idea that, by following the straight road, he would come into close proximity with the Nationalist meeting, and he had no opportunity of explaining the position of affairs to his men. The result was that when he was first stopped by Sub-Inspector Trescott, he was obliged to take one of two courses—either to follow the advice that was given him, and so go by a circuitous road to the place of meeting, and thus relieve himself of all responsibility; or to go on with his men, to take the responsibility of events upon himself, and, if possible, to prevent a breach of the peace. If he had gone himself by a circuitous route, without his men, who expressed their determination to go on by the straight road, they would have been freed from all control, and the consequences might have been most lamentable. I have not the smallest doubt that, in taking the course which he did take, in pursuing his way with his men, and sticking by them, and influencing them by his presence, Lord Rossmore took the only wise course open to him, and that by that action he did prevent a breach of the peace. At the most, therefore, Lord Rossmore was guilty of an error of judgment, and that error of judgment has been punished by a most severe sentence; because, as your Lordships are well aware, that to remove a magistrate from the Commission of the Peace is a step that has never been taken except in the gravest cases. It has scarcely ever been done, as far as I can ascertain, except in cases where there has been a dereliction of duty by a magistrate, sitting on the Bench as a magistrate. The cases are very rare where a magistrate has been removed for conduct not connected with his judicial functions. There are, however, a few cases, of which I will mention one or two. There is, first, the very famous case in which Lord Ffrench, and 60 other magistrates, were removed from the Commission of the Peace in 1843. That was the time when the Repeal agitation was at its height. The Government determined to stop the attendance of Justices of the Peace at the monster meetings. In consequence of that determination,

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  a statement was made by a Minister in the House, intimating that it was the determination of the Government to uphold the Union, and that it was impossible to allow Justices of the Peace who should attend monster meetings to remain magistrates. Lord Ffrench, and other Justices of the Peace, thereupon sent to the Irish Government an intimation that, notwithstanding the dictum of the Minister, they would continue to attend the Repeal meetings, and the result was, that Lord Ffrench and 60 other magistrates were dismissed from the Bench, and the reason stated in the House of Lords was that, in case of a breach of the peace, there could be no confidence in magistrates who attended and promoted what were unconstitutional and illegal meetings, which would be likely to lead to outrage. Now, this case is very different from that of Lord Rossmore; for these magistrates attended meetings which were unconstitutional and illegal, and insisted upon attending them in spite of declarations by Ministers of the Crown that they were not to do so. Then, I will return to the case of Mr. Parnell, who remained a Justice of the Peace after he had given utterance to sentiments of a very peculiar nature. Your Lordships will remember Mr. Parnell's famous speech, in which he explained the reasons why he divested himself of his coat. In that speech, which was delivered in 1880, he said—
  "He would not have taken off his coat and gone to that work, if he had not known that he was laying the foundation in that movement for the regeneration of legislative independence in Ireland."
  Then he said, at Cincinnatti, on February 23, 1880—
  "When we have undermined English misgovernment, we have paved the way for Ireland to take her place amongst the nations of the earth. Let us not forget that that is the ultimate goal at which all we Irishmen aim. None of us, whether we be in America or in Ireland, will be satisfied until we have destroyed the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England."
  Now, that is the question of absolute separation, and not simply of Home Rule, and yet after such an utterance as that Mr. Parnell was not removed from the Bench, but remained a Justice of the Peace. We have, with reference to Mr. Parnell, very strong expressions of opinion on the part of the Prime Minister.
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  Speaking at Leeds on October 7, 1881, he said—
  "I take as the representative of the opinions I denounce a Gentleman of considerable ability, Mr. Parnell; but, while I admit that he is a man of considerable ability, I say his doctrines are not such as require any very considerable ability to recommend them. If you go on a mission to demoralize a people by teaching them to make the property of their neighbours the object of their covetous desires, it does not require a superhuman gift to find a certain number of followers and adherents for a doctrine like that."
  I take it, my Lords, that—
  "To go on a mission to demoralize a people by teaching them to make the property of their neighbours the object of their covetous desires,"
  amounts to teaching the people that robbery is a legitimate occupation; and yet, though the Prime Minister thus explained Mr. Parnell's mission, that Gentleman was not at that time removed from the Commission of the Peace. The Prime Minister goes on to say in the same speech—
  "Now that there is danger lest the people of England should win the hearts of the Irish nation, Mr. Parnell has a new and enlarged gospel of plunder to proclaim."
  Yet, though this magistrate was, according to the Prime Minister, proclaiming a doctrine of plunder, he was not on that account removed from the Bench. It was not until Mr. Parnell was lodged in Kilmainham Gaol for being reasonably suspected of committing certain crimes that he was removed from the Commission of the Peace. My Lords, it appears to me a monstrous thing to visit what was at most an indiscretion on the part of Lord Rossmore—to visit that without inquiry, immediately, with a punishment of the gravest character, which was not inflicted on Mr. Parnell until he had for months and years proclaimed a doctrine of plunder, according to the Prime Minister, and until, according to other Ministers, he was marching through rapine and blood towards the dismemberment of the Empire. There is one more case to which I will allude—the case of Lord Roden. That also occurred some time ago. On July 12, 1848, the grounds of Lord Roden's park, in County Down, had been appointed the rendezvous of a great Orange meeting. Lord Roden took part in the meeting, and used his influence to prevent the Orangemen from disturbing the peace. Notwithstanding

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  this, on the way back through Dolly's Brae there was a serious breach of the peace and loss of life. Lord Roden sat at Petty Sessions to hear applications for informations against certain Orangemen, and with five of the Justices of the Peace present, refused them, after inquiry. After the inquiry a letter was sent by the Under Secretary. Mr. Redington, to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, recommending the dismissal of Lord Roden, and showing—
  "That Lord Roden had attended the Petty Sessions in his magisterial capacity, had taken part in the proceedings, made a speech on the subject, and voted with the majority of the magistrates in refusing to take informations."
  Then more is said of the matter; but the important point is, that Lord Roden was removed, with five other magistrates, because he had refused to take informations against men who were at the meeting at which he was present, while sitting in his official capacity on the Bench. I would call your Lordships' attention to the fact that that is an entirely different case to the one in question. Although I can understand that certain action in private is necessary to make a man fitted to assume the functions of a magistrate, and that certain action on his part is necessary in order to enable him to continue the exercise of those functions, yet I do say there ought to be a most distinct line drawn between the action of a magistrate in his private capacity, and his action when sitting on the Bench and exercising his official functions. In this case of Lord Rossmore there appears to be no difference made whatever; and even if Lord Rossmore had been exercising the functions of a magistrate, the punishment imposed upon him was not only incommensurate, but infinitely larger than that applied in any of the other cases I have mentioned. Now, my Lords, in all these cases your Lordships should not forget that deprivation followed after strict inquiry, and not before. That is really the whole case. The great danger in this matter appears to be this—that the case of Lord Ross-more in itself is so utterly small, so entirely flimsy, that it is impossible for the public not to believe that there must be some hidden motive. I do not for one moment suppose that such is the case, for I am quite certain that there is the utmost confidence placed in the impartiality
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  of the Irish Executive. I am convinced that this great injustice and this great error is entirely the result of the most, injudicious action of the Irish Law Officers. But I doubt whether the public hold that opinion. The case is so infinitely small that I am assured that the public out-of-doors, and certainly the public in Ireland, are of opinion that there was some hidden motive, something which has not appeared in this matter, which really has been the cause of Lord Rossmore's dismissal from the Bench. Some of the remarks of the Lords Commissioners are of a most extraordinary character. Lord Rossmore, in his first letter, takes the trouble to enter upon some explanation of his conduct in organizing the meeting. I think he was very foolish to do so, because it was entirely unnecessary. The Lords Commissioners also thought it was unnecessary. They say—
  "It must he obvious to your Lordship that you were not called upon to give any explanation of the holding of a counter-demonstration on the day in question. Loyal subjects of the Crown can, if they so think fit, hold their meetings to protest against what they may deem to he sedition and disloyalty, or to assert their views in a legitimate manner upon any public question; but in so doing they must not either assail a meeting of those whose views they think objectionable, or hold their counter-meeting in such close proximity thereto as to provoke or render imminent the risk of a hostile collision."
  I can state that Lord Rossmore was perfectly justified in holding this meeting, and in organizing a counter-demonstration. But the Lords Commissioners say—
  "They must not either assail a meeting of those whose views they think objectionable, or hold their counter meeting in close proximity thereto."
  Lord Rossmore had nothing to do with that. He did not assail any counter-meeting, nor did anyone connected with him assail such a meeting. He had nothing to do with the meeting, more than any other individual there, after taking his men to Rosslea. Lord Crichton assumed the control of the meeting. Lord Rossmore had nothing to do with stating the place of the meeting any more than I had. I do not know who fixed the original site of the meeting; but the original site was changed, and changed by the local authorities, and they are responsible for the meetings being held close to one another. Then

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  I say that neither Lord Rossmore nor the men who were with him undertook to assail any meeting on that day. Then the Lords Commissioners used a very extraordinary expression in replying to Lord Rossmore's statement that he had Captain M'Ternan's permission to go on. The Lords Commissioners say—
  "Your Lordship, however, mentions as an incident of your interview with Captain M'Ternan that you had his permission to go along the same route you were pursuing. The Lords Commissioners have thought it right to obtain Captain M'Ternan's additional Report as to your Lordship's statement upon this point. That Report, unfortunately, cannot be easily reconciled with your Lordship's statement; but their Lordships do not think it necessary to pursue this conflict of recollection any further."
  Now, it will be seen that the Lords Commissioners have treated this matter as an unimportant incident; whereas it is a most important incident, because the whole responsibility of Lord Rossmore depends upon whether he got permission or whether he did not, or whether he understood that he got permission when it was not given him. And yet the Lords Commissioners go on to say that they do not think it necessary "to pursue this conflict of recollection any further." It was most important to Lord Rossmore that it should be pursued further, and that the whole matter should be settled by holding a strict and impartial inquiry. Then there is another matter. Lord Rossmore was absolutely exonerated by the Lords Commissioners for everything except taking the wrong road. But they say, referring to the permission given to him—
  "A permission of that kind, even if actually accorded, could by no means excuse the deliberate action taken by your Lordship, which, as is fully manifested by your Lordship's letter of the 19th instant, as well as your published letter therein referred to, had at the very moment brought about a very dangerous and almost fatal crisis."
  Then comes a remark which is most important—
  "And which in your Lordship's letter you seem quite ready to repeat upon any similar occasion."
  Now, I have read Lord Rossmore's letter; and taking it sentence by sentence, word by word, and letter by letter, I defy any human being to see anything in it to justify anyone in contending that Lord Rossmore expressed a determination to commit on another
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  occasion the fault with which he was charged—that is, taking the wrong road—taking the road he was recommended not to take. What he said he would do again was to organize a counter-meeting of loyal men in opposition to what he termed a rebel meeting. That they distinctly say he has a right to do; but the Commissioners have gone on a totally different issue, and say that he has declared his intention to commit upon another occasion that which they have charged him with committing. It is, I say, utterly impossible to see any intention of that kind expressed in Lord Rossmore's letter. Now, my Lords, the crime or accusation against Lord Rossmore is confined within the strict charge of taking the wrong road. In a letter of Sir John Leslie's there is a most extraordinary sentence—
  "The grounds of Lord Rossmore being superseded in the Commission of the Peace are plainly disclosed in the hitter of the Lords Commissioners to him on the 24th of October. They are not based upon his taking part in the organization, or holding a counter-meeting; but rest upon the fact that he, as leader of a determined and excited procession, being a magistrate, committed an act highly calculated to endanger the public peace by leading that procession into the immediate vicinity of the meeting to which it was opposed."
  That clearly states the case against Lord Rossmore. But the letter goes on to say—
  "It by no means follows that your acquiescence in Lord Rossmore's decision to go forward, even at the critical point you mention, involves you in the same degree of responsibility, which must always be estimated as it affects individuals by the entire circumstances of their conduct before, during, and after any given transaction."
  That, my Lords, appears to be a most extraordinary statement, because it amounts to this—you make a certain specific charge against Lord Rossmore, or any other individual, and he replies; and then you say—"We are going to judge, convict, and punish him, not on that account, but in reference to things which he has done before, and things which he has done after the event." That, it seems to me, is utterly subversive of the first principles of justice; and I think it is the duty of every Englishman to protest against such a course of action. A man brought up before a Bench may have previous convictions proved against him, and his previous

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  character may be mentioned; but be always has an opportunity of clearing himself. Lord Rossmore had no such opportunity. He was rebuked for justifying his conduct at the meeting, and then his action in taking the wrong road was judged by what he had done before and what he had done after. There is another disingenuous and most extraordinary charge made in this letter. The Lords Commissioners say that Lord Rossmore, having been remonstrated with by Sub-Inspector Trescott, and requested to take another route, which the Inspector pointed out, still continued to lead his followers by the route they were pursuing, and took them into such close proximity to the other meeting that a breach of the peace was well nigh brought about. But Lord Rossmore states, in his letter to the newspapers, that the facts were the other way. In speaking of the stone-throwing he says—
  "This made it more difficult to prevent the storming of the hill on which the Parnellites were. But for strenuous efforts it would have been carried at a run, in spite of the military and police, and the consequences would have been frightful."
  I agree that in making their statement the Lords Commissioners thought they were stating what was perfectly accurate; but inquiry would have shown that danger was averted rather than caused by Lord Rossmore. The stone-throwing and the danger would have occurred just the same if he had gone by the road he was asked to take; it did not occur on the road, but it occurred after he had got to Rosslea. It would not have made a particle of difference if he had taken the road suggested to him. I do not believe the Commissioners knew what an unjust charge they were making in this statement; but to have made such a statement when it would have been cleared up by inquiry is a most monstrous thing. As it appears to me, Lord Rossmore is completely exonerated from the charge of having wilfully offended in taking the road he did. As regards any action taken by Lord Rossmore at the meeting, that really has nothing to do with the matter. If it has, the other magistrates who were at the meeting were equally guilty. An active part was taken by both Sir John Leslie and Mr. Porter, who are Justices of
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  the Peace for two counties and High Sheriffs, and who identified themselves in every respect with what Lord Rossmore did. If Lord Rossmore was guilty in not having taken the road pointed out to him, I maintain that all the magistrates who were present, and all the magistrates of Ireland who have signed the protests, are equally implicated in the matter. As to this meeting I have little to say. I am not a member of the Orange Society; I have not the least sympathy with its Lodges. The noble Earl the Colonial Secretary commented upon my Liberalism, and mentioned the fact that I spoke from the Table. I quite recognize the authority of the noble Earl to criticize a change of political views; his criticism is valuable, because of his own experience of such change; but I maintain that my Liberalism in this matter is a far superior article to that of the noble Earl. I maintain the Liberal doctrine that every man is entitled to justice, in spite of any religious or political opinions. The noble Earl seems to think that a man's being an Orangeman puts him outside the pale of justice. The noble Earl said that I spoke from the Front Opposition Bench. I spoke from where I am now speaking—not from the Front Opposition Bench, but at the Table—on account of the peculiar acoustic properties of the House. In some parts of it it is difficult to be heard; in others it is almost impossible to hear. The noble Earl the Leader of the House ridicules sitting on the Cross Benches; I should like to see him there, or bringing the Cross Bench mind to bear firmly on foreign policy. Whether Orange meetings have been productive of danger to the peace is a matter which does not concern me; it concerns the Executive of Ireland. Whether there has been improper conduct, or improper language has been used by Orangemen, does not affect the question at all. If such has been the case, it has not been mentioned in the accusations against Lord Rossmore. But if such had been the case, I must point out that there has been very great provocation offered to the loyal men of the North of Ireland. I have no sympathy with Orangemen; I have the very greatest possible sympathy with loyal men; and I maintain that loyal men in the North of Ireland have had the greatest provocation. What

  1133
  occurred in Ulster in 1881, on the former invasion of Ulster by the Party who call themselves the Nationalist Party of Ireland? They have no right to that title. In speaking of that invasion, Mr. Trevelyan said, the other day, in the other House, in his speech on Mr. Parnell's Amendment—
  "In 1881 the Gentlemen who were then the leading figures of the Land League and the present League went into Ulster to some purpose; and in 1881 the danger of crime following an invasion of Ulster was much greater than now, for the outrages committed then were five times more in number than those committed last year."
  That is pretty strong evidence, and should justify every loyal man in taking every means to prevent the second invasion of Ulster. They had had a lesson of what the consequences were, and they had before them the experience of the South of Ireland. The country had not forgotten the awful state of things that existed for months and years in Ireland; the horrible outrages and murders committed; the mutilation of cattle; and the men shot at and maimed, if not murdered outright. All this had been going on for months. Why? The Government did not see that law and order was maintained. I am quite willing to admit that after the Government gave up the idea that force was no remedy for such a state of things the country settled down; but I think that Ulster men may be excused for not wishing to see a repetition of this horrible state of things, the anarchy and the misery that were witnessed month after month in the South of Ireland. The object of the invasion by the so-called National Party was plain enough. Mr. Parnell attempted in the House of Commons to show that it was a Constitutional movement. If you will look at the resolutions passed at the Nationalist meetings you will see what its real objects were. I will read one or two of those that were passed. At Tipperary, on the 30th of September, 1883, it was resolved—
  "That we proclaim the National independence of Ireland as our goal, and pledge ourselves to ceaseless and determined action till attained."
  "We, then, call upon the people who have not as yet organized these districts under the banner of the Irish National League to do so at once, and fall into line with the grand onward march of Democracy, which is now wielding its powerful influence all the world over."
  1134
  Mr. Arthur O'Connor, M.P., speaking at Maryborough on the 7th of October, 1883, said—
  "The National cause was advancing, but they had not engaged in the land agitation in order that the farmers of Ireland might make money and grow rich, and like fat cattle be asleep and satisfied. These were only means to an end, and that end was the re-establishment of the people of Ireland as an independent nation."
  In all these utterances there is no question of Home Rule; it is the tearing away of Ireland from England that is contemplated. It is not in the least surprising that sensible men in the North of Ireland, who know well that the Union between Ireland and England is absolutely essential for Ireland, and that it is considered so necessary to England that the English people are determined it shall be maintained, are determined by any means in their power to prevent the preaching of what is called the Nationalist doctrine, seeing what is the end and object of that preaching, and seeing the horrible things to which it has given rise. Besides this, the Prime Minister has made strong speeches about the sluggishness of the loyal classes in Ireland. Speaking at Leeds on the 7th of October, 1881, he said—
  "There is another misfortune in Ireland besides the fact that for the first time in our history these degrading and immoral doctrines are taught by men of education and men of respectable station to their social inferiors; and the other unhappy fact is the traditional sluggishness and incapability of the wealthier portion of society in Ireland to do anything whatever for themselves. In this country, if sentiments of this kind were to go forth and become in any degree dangerous to the public peace, the vast multitude of loyal citizens would exert themselves in support and aid of the office of the law. But no such thing as that is heard of in Ireland. I hope there will be a change in that respect. I am sure it is necessary. What is amazing and discouraging is that during the past 18 months no Irishman in Ireland has lifted up his voice to warn his countrymen, or to condemn the statement made by Mr. Parnell. There has been no meeting of any importance, no movement of any importance, and no expression of opinion in support of public law and public order. The upper class—the landowners—are silent, or are refugees, and their power is gone. There is no middle class there, as there is in England, to step forward to sustain the Government and to denounce the evil. A general cowardice seems to prevail among all the classes who possess property, and the Government is expected to preserve the peace with no moral force behind it. This is the secondary evil of Ireland, and until that evil is removed the condition of Ireland will not be thoroughly sound."

  1135
  Well, my Lords, it goes on to say that I a general cowardice seems to prevail amongst all classes who possess property; and that the Government have no moral force behind them. Well, Ulster is the only part of Ireland where the landlord can dare to speak. If that is not the strongest invitation to them to express their views; if that is not the strongest invitation to the gentry who take a prominent position in these meetings; then I do not know how anybody can give a stronger invitation, or express it in stronger words. Now, my Lords, as far as I know—and I have looked into the matter—the Orangemen have, as a rule, behaved extremely well under great provocation. A great many things have been said to provoke them. Mr. Chamberlain, on the 15th of January last, at Newcastle, spoke in very hard terms of the Orangemen. He had been discussing what he calls the "Irish Leaders." He then goes on to say—
  "What shall I say of those self-styled Loyalists, who, with fulsome professions of their devotion to the Crown, insult and defy the Representatives of the Crown in Ireland, and who break the law themselves, while they pretend to defend it? (Hear, hear.) I believe at this moment, if there is any danger to the peace in Ireland, it lies in the proceedings of a certain section of the population in Ulster, led by men of rank and by men of education, who know enough to know better (cheers), and who seem to have been stimulated into a burst of unreasoning ferocity by the mild eloquence of the Leader of the Opposition. (Laughter and cheers.) Well, between these opposing forces the Government will steer with an even keel."
  Well, my Lords, comparing that statement with Mr. Gladstone's, it is very hard to reconcile them. The Orange meetings, as far as I know, have been conducted with a great deal of order. I have met with no cases in which the Orangemen have endeavoured to hold meetings which were proclaimed, or endeavoured to evade the law in any way. They have conducted themselves, as a rule, in a way so orderly, in circumstances of great provocation, that they deserve the greatest credit. My Lords, one of my chief reasons for making this Motion is the reason which I have mentioned—the absurdly small character of the accusation. I am convinced that loyal men in Ireland think that there is something behind, and that some blow is being aimed against them. Of course, I do not for a moment believe that such an intention on the part of the Executive
  1136
  in Ireland exists. But it certainly is most lamentable that such an idea should get about in Ireland. Your Lordships must remember that the extension of loyal feeling in Ireland is the only alternative to ruling the country by Coercion Acts. You must coerce Ireland, or you must have a sufficient body of loyal men to enable the country to do with out Coercion Acts. It is a most lamentable thing that under the authority of the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal any discouragement should be offered to the loyal classes in Ireland. My Lords, I have digressed a little, because in this matter, as I said, it is impossible not to see more than lies in the accusation. But I want your Lordships to recall the real facts of the case before I sit down. The real accusation is that Lord Rossmore took a road which he was requested not to take, about which he was remonstrated with and warned. These are the words used by the Lord Chancellor. Your Lordships will further remember that Lord Boss-more said that he had permission to go by that road, and you will recollect that the Lord Chancellor acknowledged that words may have been used which Lord Rossmore was justified in thinking gave him permission. The whole question, therefore, is whether Lord Rossmore committed this slight error of judgment in taking this particular road. Recollect the position of Lord Rossmore. He had but one moment to decide. He knew perfectly well that if he left his men they would not be under any control. He decided in an instant, and, in my opinion, most timely, to remain with his men and control them, and take the position which a country gentleman ought to take by controlling the men who are with him. He succeeded in doing so; and remember that they came back by the other road—the road which had been indicated to him. These are the facts of the case, as far as I am able to trace them to your Lordships. As I said, I put down this Motion with considerable reluctance. I was reluctant to do so, because of the high opinion which I entertain for Lord Spencer. I have always tried, and always shall try, to do everything in my power to induce the public to uphold the authority of the Crown and the Executive in Ireland. But I do not see that on that account I am precluded from commenting, in the

  1137
  strongest terms, upon the ill-advised, and, as it appears to me, most unjust and iniquitous conduct of the Law Advisers of the Crown and the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal. The case may sometimes happen where one's private feelings must be put on one side. I will go further, and say that even if I thought the Executive were to blame in this matter, I should not think that a sufficient reason for holding my tongue; for I do not believe that any Executive, in any capacity, can be strengthened in the long run by allowing a great injustice to be done.
  Moved to resolve—
  "That in the opinion of this House the removal of Lord Rossmore from the Commission of the Peace in Ireland was not justified by the facts of the case, and is calculated to discourage the loyal population of that portion of the United Kingdom."—(The Earl of Dunraven.)
  LORD CARLINGFORD (LORD PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL)said, that his noble Friend's Motion was really a Vote of Censure upon the Lord Lieutenant and the Lord Chancellor of Ireland. ["No!"] If it was not that it was nothing at all. That being so, he was astonished at the weakness of the case put forward by his noble Friend. He did not seem in the least to recognize what he was doing in asking their Lordships to pass this Vote of Censure. The noble Earl had made a very wide digression from the subject of his Motion, and had discussed some expressions of Mr. Gladstone and other matters which had nothing to do with the question. When, however, he came to the question upon which he asked the House to pronounce, he carefully, with a caution which he thoroughly understood, limited himself to the hours, and almost moments, of that day at Rosslea. He (Lord Carling-ford) would not go into any large questions of Irish policy; but he could not confine himself to that moment when Lord Rossmore, at the head of his men, arrived at a certain point on a certain road. In order to judge with any fairness of the position and conduct of an Irish magistrate under the circumstances, and to understand the view which the Irish Executive and the Irish Lord Chancellor took of it, they must know a little more than that. What were the whole facts of the case? What brought Lord Rossmore into that position?
  1138
  Ulster had been, as they expressed it in that part of the world, invaded by the Nationalist Party. It was by no means the first time that such an invasion had occurred. There were several occasions in 1881, when contested elections were held in the North of Ireland, and when Ireland was in a very critical state and crime was rampant. That crime, he was glad to say, had now been reduced to a very small amount under the government of Lord Spencer and his Colleagues. But at that time not a single word was uttered by the Orange Party against the invasion of Mr. Parnell and his followers. On those occasions, however, the invasion was for the purpose of defeating the Liberal candidates for Derry and Tyrone. But in this case the word was given by men in high position that this invasion of the Nationalist Party was to be resisted. For this purpose what were called counter-demonstrations were to be organized. Now, what did such demonstrations in the North of Ireland mean? They meant a large body of excited men, brought from a distance—many of them armed—marching in military array, their leaders leading them, as it were, to battle, and denouncing their opponents in the strongest language. They shouted defiance and fired pistols. This was not moral force—it was physical force. It was the next thing to civil war; and but for the presence of the military and the police it would be civil war. This was the proceeding which Lord Rossmore not only took part in, but which he organized and led, and where such very thin partitions divided the use of moral force from that of physical force, the least one could say was that an Irish Orange magistrate putting himself in such a position was bound to use the utmost possible discretion. Lord Rossmore, by his own act, put himself in a position in which he ran the greatest risk of forgetting that he was a Justice of the Peace, and remembering only that he was the Orange Grand Master. This great counter-demonstration, which was intended to drive the Nationalists out of Ulster, was organized, to a great extent, by Lord Rossmore himself. It was brought about by the following proclamation signed by his Lordship:—
  "Orangemen of Monaghan, the late Invincibles and Land Leaguers are afraid to enter

  1139
  Monaghan, but they have flooded our county with proclamations asking your attendance at Rosslea on the 16th to hear their treasonable speeches. Attend, then (with others named), to assist our Fermanagh brethren …. and oppose the rebels to the utmost, thereby showing that Orangemen are loyal to England. …. We will show them that they are liars and slanderers. Boycott and Emergency men to the front, and down with Parnell and rebellion. God save the Queen—Rossmore, Grand Master."
  But "Rossmore, Grand Master," was also a Justice of the Peace, and it was under these circumstances that he led his men to the neighbourhood of Rosslea on the day in question. The Government took precautions by sending down police and military, some 500 or 600 men, to the neighbourhood. This force was put under the charge of the Resident Magistrate, Captain M'Ternan, a gentleman of great experience, who had rendered remarkable services to the cause of law and order in Ireland, and in whom Lord Spencer had great confidence. One judicious method of preserving the peace that was adopted by him was the following. On the evening before the meeting was held he begged of Lord Crichton to take care not to lead his men to the immediate neighbourhood of the other meeting. And when he said "immediate neighbourhood" he meant within a stone's throw. Lord Crichton at once promised to make a slight detour, and to lead his men to the place of meeting by another road. On the day of the meeting Lord Crichton, and his party, arrived at a spot where two roads divided, and was met there by a Constabulary officer, Mr. Trescott, who presented to his Lordship a letter from the Resident Magistrate, reminding him at the same time of his promise. Lord Crichton, without the slightest demur, either on his own part or on the part of the Orangemen whom he led, at once made a detour and avoided going near the hostile meeting, thus preventing any risk of collision. Very shortly afterwards, Lord Rossmore and his men arrived at the same spot, and the same Constabulary officer, armed with the same authority from the Resident Magistrate, asked him to do the same thing. Could anyone imagine a more reasonable request, even if it were made, not to a Justice of the Peace, but to any one of Her Majesty's subjects? But Lord Rossmore, unhappily losing his head, no doubt, amid the shouts of his followers to "go on," said—"He is not
  1140
  here to stop us, and so we will go on." Therefore, at a point where a representative of the public authority told him that there was danger to the public peace in pursuing the direct road, which would bring him within a stone's throw of the other meeting, Lord Rossmore, no doubt, in the excitement of the moment, and under the influence of his excited followers, refused to act on that recommendation, and said—"No; we will go on;" and he marched his men into the immediate neighbourhood of, and almost into contact with, the other meeting. That proceeding of his was the breach of the duty of a magistrate for which Lord Spencer thought it necessary to bring his case before the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and for which the latter thought it necessary to remove Lord Rossmore from the Commission of the Peace. Lord Rossmore marched on, and after advancing a mile or so he met Captain M'Ternan. What passed between them was a matter on which the memories of the two gentlemen differed. Lord Rossmore did not deny that Captain M'Ternan protested against his going on, but he said that in the end Captain M'Ternan gave him permission. Captain M'Ternan, on the other hand, said—
  "Lord Rossmore and a number of gentlemen round him appeared to be determined to ignore my wishes and advice. I had no compact whatever with Lord Rossmore; and his procession passed because I was not prepared to stop it."
  The so-called permission of Captain M'Ternan was supposed to have justified the conduct of Lord Rossmore. He pledged himself to the Resident Magistrate that he would do his best to keep the peace in the position in which he found himself. There was an unconscious irony in a Justice of the Peace pledging himself to keep the peace in circumstances of danger that he had himself created. Lord Rossmore, in a letter which was published in the newspapers, said that when they got to that point—the cross road—stones began to be thrown from the field over the hedge, and that made it most difficult to prevent the storming of the hill on which the Parnellites were, and that but for the strenuous exertions of himself and other officers of the Society it would have been carried at a run, and the consequences would have been frightful. Again, addressing the Lords Commissioners

  1141
  of the Great Seal, Lord Rossmore said—
  "As already stated in my letter of the 20th of October, published in most newspapers throughout the Kingdom, I, with other officers of the Society, had the greatest possible difficulty in controlling the men, and preventing them from retaliating on the stone-throwing and insulting mob assembled at the disloyal meeting, and had we not been present I firmly believe that a collision would have taken place, entailing, in all probability, a fearful loss of life."
  He evidently thought it necessary to dwell upon the tremendous dangers which were averted by his exertions to keep the peace. But he (Lord Carling-ford) said that those dangers were brought about by the course which Lord Rossmore himself adopted, in spite of the warning and remonstrance which he had received. ["No, no!" from the Opposition.] He was talking of the critical point where the roads divided, which had been described by Sir John Leslie as the critical point—the point where Lord Rossmore had to choose whether he would make a detour, or whether he would march into the midst of the enemy. That was the point. What passed between Lord Rossmore and Captain M'Ternan did not matter. Evidently, if Lord Rossmore had done what Lord Crichton had done nothing of this sort would have happened. In both his letters Lord Rossmore devoted his attention to his momentary conversation with Captain M'Ternan, and in his second letter he went so far as to say that the mention by the Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of his interview with Mr. Trescott, a mile and a-half off, was raising quite a new issue. That second letter showed an extraordinary transformation of style compared with the first, and he (Lord Carlingford) observed that the line of argument which it adopted had been the line since taken generally by those in Ireland who fancied that Lord Rossmore was right, and was also the line which had been taken to-night. But a greater misconception could not be imagined. The first letter from the Lords Commissioners had three paragraphs. The first paragraph was that their Lordships understood that—
  "During the time the first-mentioned meeting was assembled, and while considerable excitement prevailed, your Lordship, heading a procession of large numbers moving towards the counter-meeting, led that procession into such
  1142
  close proximity to the place of the first-mentioned meeting as to seriously endanger the public peace."
  The second paragraph referred to the remonstrance addressed to Lord Rossmore by Sub-Inspector Trescott, and the request by that officer that he should adopt another route; and then only followed any mention of the remonstrances of Captain M'Ternan. The third paragraph might be struck out of that letter, and still the whole gravamen of the charge against Lord Rossmore would remain precisely the same. It was difficult to think of this rencontre between Captain M'Ternan and Lord Rossmore, an Ulster magistrate, without the thought being suggested that the Commission of the Peace held by an Irish Resident Magistrate was precisely the same as that held by Lord Rossmore, the only difference being that one was paid and the other unpaid. That those two gentlemen, holding the very same Commission of the Peace, should meet under such circumstances, and that the paid magistrate should find himself in the position of resisting and protesting against the action of the unpaid Justice of the Peace, was a fact that told its own story. But, more than that, would any noble Lord who knew Ireland say that the position of the unpaid magistracy in that country was a very easy one? Drawn as its members were necessarily almost entirely from one class, from one religion, and from one Party, was it not known that their position was beset with difficulties and dangers? Could it be good for the security and strength of that magistracy that such unfortunate forgetfulness of duty as he had described should be passed over by the head of the law? He was sure that Sir Edward Sullivan, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, when this matter was laid before him, acted not only in the interests of law and order and peace in Ireland, but in the interest of the Irish magistracy itself. He had, he thought, given accurately the facts under which Lord Spencer thought it his duty to lay this case before the Lords Commissioners, and under which the latter thought it their duty to remove Lord Rossmore from the Commission of the Peace. Lord Spencer and Sir Edward Sullivan had a right to expect that their Lordships would credit them with absolute impartiality in dealing with the

  1143
  case, and in arriving at the conclusion that the conduct of Lord Rossmore was such as could not be sanctioned in an Irish magistrate. As to Lord Spencer himself, if the House adopted this Vote of Censure he did not know what his view might be as to his own course under the circumstances; but of this he (Lord Carlingford) was sure—that Lord Spencer would look upon such a Vote adopted by his own House and his own order as a very heavy blow against him in the tremendous difficulties of the Office which he now filled. The responsibility of censuring the Lord Chancellor and Earl Spencer, which their Lordships were asked to undertake, was so grave, so heavy, so odious, that if such a Motion were to be supported from the opposite side, which he hardly thought possible, it ought at least to have come from the Front Opposition Bench instead of from a volunteer on the Cross Benches. Let him remind their Lordships that Lord Spencer and the Irish Government were the subject of a similar Motion in "another place" proceeding from a very different quarter. At this moment a Vote of Censure awaited the decision of the House of Commons, moved by Mr. Parnell against Lord Spencer and the Irish Government for having suppressed a number of Nationalist meetings, and for having treated so leniently the Irish magistrates who, unfortunately, had risen up in a kind of insurrection against the Irish Government and against the head of the law. That Motion, he had no doubt, would be rejected in the House of Commons by a great majority; and he asked their Lordships to do the same with the present Resolution.
  THE MARQUESS OF WATERFORDsaid, that ever since the question had been before the public they had been led to believe that there was something in the background which would be brought out when the subject was brought before Parliament. They had just heard the speech of the Lord President, and they had had the advantage that day of looking over the Correspondence which had been laid on the Table of the House; but, so far as they could see, there was nothing whatsoever in the matter. The Lord President had told them what was the real reason why Lord Rossmore had been deprived of his Commission. If the real reason why
  1144
  Lord Rossmore had been removed from the Commission was because he did not act on the advice of the Resident Magistrate, why did the Lords Commissioners refrain from putting it forward as the reason why they dismissed him? But, instead of doing that, they beat about the bush in every direction. That, however, was the solo reason now put forward. The Lord President said that Sub - Inspector Trescott showed Lord Rossmore a letter; but he had it from Lord Rossmore that no letter was shown to him. The Lord President held that Lord Rossmore had plenty of time to consider what course he should follow. That was a mistake. Lord Crichton had had notice—Lord Rossmore had not. The men who were with Lord Rossmore knew that the road which they desired to take was the shortest way to the meeting, and they declared that they would go by it whether Lord Rossmore himself went by it or not. He had, therefore, only a moment to decide whether he would go on with his men or leave them to go on without him, and by going on with his men he distinctly prevented bloodshed. One would imagine, from the tone of the Lord President, that Lord Rossmore had encouraged his followers to come into collision with the opposite party, when, as a matter of fact, his Lordship was the main instrument in preventing a collision. The Lord President gave them to understand just now that it was a meeting which Lord Rossmore should not have attended. Other magistrates attended the meeting besides Lord Rossmore; and if it were wrong for Lord Rossmore to attend the meeting, it was equally wrong for the other magistrates to attend. Why should he alone have been selected from amongst other magistrates, and when there were a great many other magistrates, who acted in a precisely similar manner? They must look further to find the real reason. The real reason was the letter which Lord Rossmore wrote to the leading journals.
  LORD CARLINGFORD (LORD PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL): I did not object to the letter.
  THE MARQUESS OF WATERFORDsaid, whether the noble Lord objected to the letter or not, he believed that if that letter had not been written very little more would have been heard about the matter. The letter produced a storm of

  1145
  indignation in the rebel Press against his Lordship personally; and it was somewhat strange that although some time had then elapsed the Lords Commissioners should suddenly come to the conclusion that it was necessary to call upon the noble Lord for an explanation. He should be sorry to say that the Irish Executive were influenced by the articles which appeared in the rebel Press; but it was a most important coincidence that these things happened together, like a great many other unfortunate coincidences which had happened during the rule of Her Majesty's present Advisers in Ireland. From the numerous Memorials which had been signed, and letters which had been written, by Liberal and Conservative, Catholic and Protestant, throughout Ireland, it had been shown distinctly how deeply this unjust indignity had been felt. It was not a question of class or order. It was simply one of loyalty and disloyalty. It was very difficult for Englishmen to understand the true state of affairs in Ireland at the present moment. How old names, old watchwords, and Party cries were disappearing; how religious differences among the loyal were still, all men who were loyal to their Queen and country sinking their differences in the face of the startling danger which threatened their unfortunate country. The conduct of the Government in dismissing Lord Rossmore was condemned by many Liberals, among whom might be mentioned Lord Fitzwilliam, the Lord Lieutenant of Monaghan, and the Lord Lieutenant of Wicklow. He admitted readily that anyone who followed the Prime Minister's advice was very likely to act wrongly; but, however that might be, there was no doubt whatever that the right hon. Gentleman had distinctly asked for the assistance and co-operation of loyal men in Ireland. The Loyalists of Ireland had experienced the most ungenerous treatment at the hands of the Government. Mr. Chamberlain had said that the country would be perfectly tranquil but for the noisy conduct of a small minority of Ulster Orangemen, who broke up the political meetings of their opponents. Was that, he asked, a fair description of the action of men who acted on the advice of Mr. Gladstone, and of a part of Ireland which had remained perfectly peaceful in very troublesome times? No one knew better
  1146
  than Mr. Chamberlain that if the Crimes Act was suspended for a fortnight they would see as great anarchy in all parts of Ireland, except Ulster, as prevailed when the Land League was allowed by the Government to supersede the law of the land. Did Mr. Chamberlain, did the Lord President, wish that no protest should be made by the Loyalists of Ireland against the Land League? Did the Lord President wish no protest to be made against treason and dismemberment? "Would the noble Lord wish the whole of the people of Ireland to appear united in hatred of England? If Ulster men had not protested against these Socialistic meetings, and raised their voice against what had taken place in the North, the people of England might fairly infer that there was no voice strong enough in Ireland to make itself felt in favour of the minority in the country. One-third of the people—men of all sects scattered all over the country—were loyal to the Queen and the Empire; and were they to sit still and allow judgment to go by default? They had suffered terribly during recent times. They had seen the rebels continually rewarded, and concession made to outrage and agitation. They had seen unheard-of demands conceded to Obstruction in Parliament, backed up by murder and bloodshed at home; but if a protest was made and a meeting called by the Loyalists the Government at once supposed they were jeopardizing the public peace, and a most unmerited indignity was inflicted upon them. If anyone was to be punished, he would ask on whose shoulders it should fall, as far as regarded the present state of affairs in Ireland? The present Government had inflicted indignity on the Loyalists of Ireland through one of their number. He had heard nothing from the Lord President that explained why that indignity had been inflicted, and Her Majesty's Government had played distinctly into the hands of those who were animated with an intense hatred of England, and who openly declared that they would use every means in their power to injure the Empire of which they were so justly proud. He should certainly support the Motion of the noble Earl.
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, he could not think that the matter rested upon the narrow issue raised by the noble

  1147
  Earl who made this Motion. On the contrary, its consequences and results might prove far more extensive than the noble Earl contemplated. The Motion consisted of two parts. The first was—
  "That the removal of Lord Rossmore from the Commission of the Peace was not justified by the facts of the case."
  That meant justified not by one fact, but by all the facts. The second point was that it—
  "Is calculated to discourage the loyal population of that portion of the United Kingdom.'"
  He (Lord FitzGerald) did not know exactly the meaning of this word "calculated," but he understood it to mean that either it was so intended, or was likely to have that result. If he thought there was any such intention on the part of the Government, be, for one, would support the Motion. But he did not believe that the removal of Lord Ross-more from the Commission of the Peace would in the slightest degree interfere with real and true loyalty. He sympathized with loyalty, but he did not sympathize with Orangeism. He had stated in Ireland—as he now stated openly and above board in that House—that as long as Ulster was loyal—and he hoped it might long so continue—he had no fears for the dismemberment of the Empire. But he distinguished between loyalty and the spirit of Orangeism. He did not mean for a moment to say that Orangemen were not loyal, but he believed, as a rule, they were loyal in their own way. He had long studied that institution; he had been brought into close connection with it; and he had arrived at the conclusion that, as at one time Orangeism had been dangerous to the State, so it might become dangerous again. He was surprised to hear from the noble Earl that their Lordships should not look beyond one circumstance of the case, instead of looking at all the circumstances. He asked them to consider who Lord Rossmore was, and the position in which he was placed. He did not himself know Lord Rossmore, nor did he mean to say an unkind word of him, except that he had shown remarkable indiscretion. Did Lord Rossmore know what the preservation of the peace meant in Ireland? Did he ever realize in his own mind why he had been created a Justice of the Peace. Nearly 600 years ago, when the old Conservator
  1148
  of the Peace gave place to the present Justice of the Peace, the statute law declared the object to be that—
  "The King's peace should he well and surely kept and maintained at all points, so that the King's subjects may go and come and abide in peace according to the law of the land."
  A commentator shrewdly observed that the Justice of the Peace was not called on to effect a uniting of minds, but a restraining of hands. The Commission of Justice of the Peace from the Queen, after stating that Her Majesty—
  "Reposing special trust and confidence in your fidelity, prudence, and care, has appointed you to keep our peace,"
  and then defining his powers and duties, contained, inter alia—
  "And also to inquire of all those who presume by unlawful assemblies to he disturbers of our peace and of our people within our said country, and also of all those who shall presume to go and ride in companies with armed force against our peace."
  This being so, let them consider the course taken by Lord Rossmore. They had heard from the Lord President that Lord Rossmore was one of the organizers, if not the chief organizer, of the counter-meeting at Rosslea. He admitted at once that the Loyalists of the North had received great provocation. But what was the language of the proclamations calling the counter-meeting?
  EARL CAIRNSasked whether it was given in the papers?
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, he believed it was not, but here was an extract from a document which was widely circulated—
  "Think of those who he in their bloody shrouds at Smithfield, Oxford, Derry, the Boyne, Aughrim, Enniskillen, and Newtownbutler. Let no man be absent from the loyal meeting at Rosslea on October 16."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Was that signed by Lord Rossmore?
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, he did not charge the noble Lord with having signed it, but such a passage showed that the meeting which it called upon the Orangemen to attend was most perilous to the public peace. The Daily Express of the 22nd of January last contained the following statement:—
  "Ulster is in a state not easily distinguishable from civil war. The Quean's forces are defending the Queen's enemies from the certain destruction which would overtake them at the hands of some thousands of loyal men if those hands were not held by reverence for the Queen's own Royal authority."

  1149
  Then they had heard from the Lord President a description of the march of the men who were headed by Lord Crichton and Lord Rossmore, and he had to call their Lordships' attention to the fact that the greater portion of the party consisted of armed men.
  EARL CAIRNSasked what authority the noble and learned Lord had for making such a statement?
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, he certainly had authority, or he should not have made the statement. He should like to know if the noble and learned Earl denied that the greater part of the procession consisted of men armed with revolvers and pistols?
  EARL CAIRNSsaid, he had read the statement made by the Chief Secretary for Ireland, who drew a distinction between the meeting at Rosslea and the meeting at Dromore. The latter was composed largely of armed men.
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, he had read the statement which he had made in some document, and he believed it to be true. The noble and learned Earl could deny at the present time, if he thought fit, that the greater portion of the party possessed arms.
  EARL CAIRNSsaid, he did not wish to deny the statement, but desired to have some authority for it.
  LORD FITZGERALD, continuing, said, he would like to refer to the language used at the meeting at Rosslea. Lord Rossmore, who was received with enthusiastic cheers, said that—
  "That was undoubtedly the most glorious meeting of Orangemen he had ever attended, or that had ever been held in the North of Ireland, to stop rebellion. As far as they could see, the rebels on the hill yonder only numbered a few hundreds. He thought it was a great pity that the so-called Government of England stopped loyal men from assembling to uphold their institutions there, and had sent down a handful of soldiers whom they could eat up in a second or two if they thought fit; but it was not their business to do so. He was sure they would be very much pleased if everything passed over without any fracas with the military or police. They must leave them to the scum of the hills beyond. The soldiers and the police were the friends of the Orangemen, because they belonged to the Queen and fought for the Queen. (A Voice: There are 400 Orangemen in the regiment.")
  He would wish their Lordships to notice particularly what followed—
  "At this part a number of shots were fired into the air by persons on the outskirts of the
  1150
  meeting, and immediately hundreds of revolvers were produced throughout the gathering, and it is no exaggeration to say that firing became general. For fully ten minutes it was steadily maintained, notwithstanding the efforts of the leaders to stop it."
  This, he would observe, was a meeting which was organized and promoted by one of Her Majesty's Commissioners of the Peace. Thirty-five years ago, on the 31st of July, 1849, the House of Lords was engaged, upon the Motion of Earl Stanhope, in considering the case of Lord Roden. On that occasion the Marquess of Lansdowne, in reply to a statement by his Lordship, said—
  "It was quite clear, by the common law of the land, and according to the most eminent authorities in the law who had been consulted on the subject, that the bringing into movement multitudes, armed, as it appeared in this instance—but, even when unarmed, in a mode calculated to excite public disturbance—was in itself illegal, and might be, and ought to be, prosecuted by the Government, by the magistrates, and by all well-wishers to the peace of the community, so that the offenders, for offenders they were, might be brought to justice for endangering that peace."—(3 Hansard, [107] 1136.)
  In addition to that, he might quote the opinion of the Attorney General who was in Office at the time of the Dolly's Brae riot upon the following question, put by some of the magistrates concerned—
  "Is an assemblage of Orangemen, 1,500 in number, partly armed, proceeding along the road, and partly decorated with ribbons, an illegal assembly?"
  The Attorney General said—"I have no doubt such a meeting is illegal." Referring to the case now before their Lordships, he had no hesitation in saying that an assembly, partly armed, such as that which Lord Rossmore headed, was an illegal assembly. According to the law of the land they had the spectacle of a Justice of the Peace assuming to himself the functions of Government, and a magistrate, whose duty it was to put down a meeting of this kind, so acting that, according to his own statement, it was only by a miracle that loss of life and the commencement of actual civil war were avoided. No doubt Lord Rossmore was distinguished by his loyalty, courage, and devotion to the Queen and his country; but his conduct was unwise, and even criminal, from the fact that he was a magistrate. He did not know what course the Lords Commissioners could have adopted other than that of

  1151
  recommending the removal of Lord Ross-more from the Commission of the Peace. Lord Rossmore held his Commission from the Great Seal, and when a magistrate was removed from the Commission of the Peace it was never done without the most grave and anxious inquiry. He believed that that inquiry did take place on the present occasion. There was, however, a larger question involved in this Motion. He believed that Lord Spencer accepted the responsibility for what was done; and their Lordships were asked to censure his administration of Ireland. He was induced to accept the Viceroyalty 20 months ago when murder prevailed, and the law of the land was superseded by that of the Land League. All this bad been changed. During the last four months, but for the disturbed state of Ulster, Ireland would compare favourably with any part of Her Majesty's Dominions for peace, order, and the absence of crime. ["Oh, oh!"] He defied contradiction of that statement, for since the summer there bad been a singular absence of crime, and their Lordships were aware that rents were now well paid. In these circumstances, he appealed to the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, who held the issue of the matter in the hollow of his hand; he could prevent an adverse vote on a Motion which ought not to have been made, and which ought to be withdrawn. Were their Lordships ready to wipe out all that had been done by the Lord Lieutenant, and to weaken his hands in carrying on the administration of the country? He appealed to the noble Earl to withdraw the Motion which he bad so unwisely brought forward. If that course was not adopted, he asked their Lordships to meet it with a direct negative.
  EARL CAIRNSsaid, he always approached Motions of this kind with very great caution. As he had had the honour of holding the Great Seal he knew the anxiety and delicacy attending such cases. He knew that magistrates were often placed in situations of great difficulty as to what they should do as magistrates and as individuals; and that great forbearance was due to them on this account, while the authority controlling them was also entitled to consideration. But the last speech had rather disturbed his balance of mind, for nothing could be more wild
  1152
  than the view the noble and learned Lord bad presented. Two years ago Parliament had thought fit to give the Government the power to declare these meetings illegal, and to prevent them. The attention of the Government was distinctly drawn to the matter; they did not interfere; and yet the noble and learned Lord said the meetings were illegal. If the noble and learned Lord was right in that statement, the Government stood exposed to absolute condemnation for having abdicated their functions and refused to exercise the power vested in them by Parliament. Not only did they abstain from doing that, but they had refused to censure the scores of magistrates who attended them. Was it possible to imagine for one moment that the Irish Government deliberately and wantonly allowed these meetings to be held, and deliberately refused to censure the magistrates who attended them? The Lords Commissioners were entirely at variance with the views of the noble and learned Lord, and said that Lord Rossmore was not called upon to give any explanation of the holding of the counter-demonstration. The Prime Minister had encouraged the holding of those meetings, and the Chief Secretary himself had stated elsewhere that those were the kind of meetings which the Prime Minister meant. But it was stated that the meetings ought to have been held on different days. The Government, however, knew that they were to be held on the same day and at the same place, and yet made no effort to stop them. Then it was said that Lord Rossmore's speech was objectionable. But that speech was before the Government. They had a reporter present, as was most proper, and as they had at all political meetings; and in the letter containing the charge against Lord Rossmore no reference was made to what he had stated at the meeting. What right, then, had the noble and learned Lord (Lord FitzGerald) to make such a charge, and to say that Lord Rossmore's dismissal was warranted, not by what the Government and the Lord Chancellor alleged as the ground, but by words spoken which bad never been complained of before? The fact was that the accusation against Lord Ross-more was, as his noble Friend (the Earl of Dunraven) had said, very small—he

  1153
  might say, ridiculously small. It was said, and said truly, that communications took place between the stipendiary magistrate and Lord Crichton, who was going with the Fermanagh men; but no such communication was made to Lord Rossmore, who was coming with the Monaghan men. If Lord Rossmore had received an intimation such as was conveyed to Lord Crichton, no doubt he would have acted as Lord Crichton acted. When Lord Rossmore came up with his men very weary, he met a sub-inspector who was unknown to him, and who asked him to go by the other route. He was bound to say that he also should have asked—" Have you any authority to stop us?" The sub-inspector said to Lord Rossmore—"I am not here to stop you," but said that Lord Crichton had gone by the other road. The men were extremely unwilling to go round, after a long journey, a mile and a-half further than was necessary. It might be said that Lord Rossmore had committed an error of judgment; but he doubted whether, if he himself or any of their Lordships had been stopped at the head of a procession by a sub-inspector of police who admitted that he had no authority, they would have taken any other course than Lord Rossmore did. The Lord President had said that was the turning point of the whole case, and that the decision had been come to after the most careful inquiry. How could there have been careful inquiry, as some important documents and the report of the stipendiary magistrate had only been received that very evening? In the position in which Lord Rossmore was placed it was clearly his duty to stay with his men, for the consequences might have been very serious if Lord Rossmore had gone one way and his men another, and the latter had been withdrawn from their leader's influence and authority. Then it appeared that Lord Rossmore stated that he had distinct authority for taking the road which he had taken, and that statement had been confirmed. An attempt had been made to justify the action of the authorities by reference to an Act of Parliament of 500 years ago with respect to tumultuous assemblies. But why did the Government permit such assemblages, and why did they allow two rival meetings to be held on the same day? And how could they then turn
  1154
  round and visit on Lord Rossmore the consequences of their own want of prudence? He was glad this matter had been fully put before the public. He thought it was right that the public should know the facts of the case, for he felt satisfied that the public would be of opinion that if there was—and he (Earl Cairns) did not say there was—an error of judgment on the part of Lord Rossmore, there was nothing more than that; and, therefore, he thought it was a hard measure of justice and a wrong measure to remove him from the Commission of the Peace
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, we live to learn. My noble and learned Friend has reminded your Lordships that he himself not long ago held the Office which I now less worthily hold. He held it with great honour and credit; and I never could have believed, if my noble and learned Friend had not himself so informed your Lordships, that after having read the facts of the case he could support the Motion before the House. I wish this case could be referred to my noble and learned Friend as Lord Chancellor either of Ireland or of England. I feel absolutely sure that if this case, or anything like it, had happened in England when my noble and learned Friend was Lord Chancellor, he would have taken a course exactly the same as that adopted by the Lords Commissioners in Ireland. According to my own notions of the duties of a magistrate, a clearer or more absolute necessity for such a line of action could not possibly be shown. As to the facts of the case, they he in a nutshell; but they were not brought out as they really are by my noble Friend. He treated the whole matter as if it depended on what took place when Lord Rossmore met Captain M'Ternan; the truth being, that he met Captain M'Ternan in the very place of danger, where he ought never to have been, and where he never would have been, but for his previous wilful departure from the proper line of his duty at New Bridge, where the road of safety diverged from the road of danger. I will assume that up to that point Lord Rossmore had done nothing which need have led to his removal from the Magisterial Bench; but the critical moment was when his Lordship and his attendant Orangemen arrived at the

  1155
  cross roads, and when he was informed by the Constabulary officer of the necessity of his following the example of Lord Crichton, and making a detour to the place of meeting, and was requested by that officer to do so. If the noble and learned Earl had studied the Papers on the subject he would not have spoken of Lord Rossmore as arriving at this spot, with his men wearied after a long journey, and as if they had been then suddenly surprised by an unexpected and unforeseen request. Lord Rossmore himself stated, with reference to what occurred at the spot where the two roads divided, that the men under him were thoroughly conversant with the locality, and had learnt that it was intended to march them by a circuitous route; and his Lordship added that he had received reliable information that they would not be dictated to in this matter, and were determined to march by no other than the direct road to the Loyalist place of meeting. And what was the direct route? It was a route which brought them into immediate contact with the opposing party, and thereby rendered probable, indeed all but inevitable, a very serious breach of the peace. That being so, I hold that the Lords Commissioners were perfectly right in deciding that the course adopted by Lord Rossmore was inconsistent with his duty as a magistrate, whether founded on an error in judgment or on a disposition to set himself above the authorities. In my opinion, if a man who justified that course of conduct and did not excuse himself as having acted under some misapprehension were to be allowed to remain in the Commission of the Peace in the present circumstances and condition of Ireland, there would be an end to all confidence in the impartiality of the administration of the law. The Lords Commissioners were right in holding that the answer received from Lord Rossmore was a virtual declaration that he, being a magistrate, would consider himself justified under like circumstances in taking the same course again. In a later letter there is a passage from which I infer that Lord Rossmore would have gone on whatever Captain M'Ternan had said. He said—
  "Had Captain M'Ternan persisted in his remonstrances, I should have been placed in the embarrassing position of deciding whether it would he my duty to lead the procession or take the course which my own knowledge and
  1156
  convictions as a magistrate indicated as best calculated to preserve the peace; but I was relieved from this difficulty."
  I will assume, in Lord Rossmore's favour, that at that critical moment, when the Orangemen and the Nationalists were almost in contact, and within a stone's throw of each other, and when the signs of conflict began to appear, the desire to preserve the peace may have been as present to the mind of Lord Rossmore as to that of Captain M'Ternan. But, remembering what Lord Rossmore had said and done when he was asked to take the road which would have avoided that risk and opportunity of collision, I cannot feel the smallest doubt that on this occasion also he would have taken his own course, whatever Captain M'Ternan might have said. It has been suggested that he might not have been able to do much to preserve the peace if he had complied with the requests of the authorities. But if the peace had been broken after he had done all in his power to induce his followers to comply with those requests, the responsibility would not have been on him. That he had great influence with his followers was perfectly plain, and it should also be noted that Lord Crichton was able to persuade his men to do what was his and their duty. At all events, I am sure that a magistrate, having placed himself in that position, is not fit to maintain his place as Justice of the Peace, having led a vast body of people—and there was no doubt many of those assembled were armed—of whose temper he is himself the witness, into a position where conflict was imminent. As to the powers of Her Majesty's Government to prohibit the meeting, I wish to say a word or two. They have, under the Act passed two years ago, power to prohibit such meetings, when they think them dangerous to the peace or the public safety. They have exercised that power in the South of Ireland, as to meetings where no counter-demonstrations were threatened, because of the prevalence of crime and the effects of inflammatory speeches in those neighbourhoods. Such considerations, however, do not apply to Ulster, where crime is not so prevalent. The Government have been unwilling to interfere with the expression of public opinion at public meetings, either by

  1157
  Loyalists or by other parties in the country, when there has been no reason to anticipate any breach of the peace, or any stimulus to crime, and when there has been nothing plainly illegal in the declared object of the meeting; and they have even gone the length, which beyond question did involve considerable responsibility, of not interfering with meetings appointed to be held in opposition to the objects of other meetings, even at the same place or on the same day, when they thought they were able to keep the peace, maintain order, and prevent other evil consequences. But a meeting, which was very pithily described by the noble Marquess on my left as held for the purpose of breaking up their opponents' meeting—a meeting such as that was not an expression of opinion which was calculated to strengthen the law or to promote loyalty. I hold with the Irish Government that in times like the present, when a meeting is held which is not proclaimed by the Executive, or which the magistrates do not resolve to suppress as illegal, such meeting cannot be à priori assumed to be illegal. But parties who, after organizing a counter - meeting, bring their forces into close proximity with the meeting which is objectionable to them, incur a responsibility of the most serious character, that of endangering the public peace; and a magistrate assigned to preserve the peace ought not to take any part in such a proceeding. Those are the principles with regard to public meetings which have been laid down by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, as to the general case; and I cordially endorse every word which his Lordship has used; and but for the forbearance which has been shown to both sides, I very much doubt whether a magistrate taking any part in such proceedings ought not to be deemed to have forgotten his duty. But, at any rate, any magistrate taking part in such a proceeding must be absolutely bound to obey every direction, remonstrance, or request which the persons appointed to preserve the public peace may make; and if magistrates refuse to obey those directions, and to comply with those requests, it is right that they should be removed. That is what Lord Rossmore has done. The Lords Commissioners would have accepted from him any reasonable submission or explanation; but a justification
  1158
  of such a course of action—and Lord Rossmore's reply was nothing more or less than a justification of it—they could not accept. A Grand Master of an Orange Lodge, whether a magistrate or not, is not entitled to take the law into his own hands, and he cannot claim to be the judge as to how order is to be preserved. Had the Lords Commissioners acted otherwise than they did act, they would have forgotten their duty to Ireland, and would have set an example fraught with very dangerous consequences to that country.
  THE EARL OF LONGFORDsaid, if this case had stood alone, the House of Lords would have condemned the action of the Irish Government in terms stronger than those of the proposed Resolution. If anything had been wanting to confirm the House in this view, it was supplied by the very unsatisfactory speech of the noble Lord the President of the Council. As a resident in Ireland, he was aware that this unfortunate mistake of the Lord Lieutenant had aroused a strong feeling of irritation and discontent, that it would be difficult to compose, amongst a class who might rather have expected favour than discouragement. "Rossmore" would be a watchword with more than one signification. But the House did recognize that Lord Spencer had conducted the government of Ireland with firmness and courage, and that he might yet have occasion to exercise all his vigour in the management of the affairs of that country. The House was, therefore, unwilling to weaken his authority by passing that which would amount to a Vote of Censure.
  THE EARL OF BELMOREsaid, that, being a magistrate for two counties, and residing in the district in which the Rosslea and other meetings had been held, although he had not attended them, and was not an Orangeman, he wished to make a few observations. As regarded the case itself he had not much to add. He regretted the very unsatisfactory tone of the speeches made by noble Lords opposite. The matter really turned on what had passed between Lord Rossmore and Captain M'Ternan, although the noble Lord the Lord President had thrown over Captain M'Ternan, and made what had passed at a previous point between Lord Boss-more and Sub-Inspector Trescott, the

  1159
  main justification for the former's dismissal from the Commission of the Peace. The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack had taken the same line, although he afterwards read the passage in which the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal had based Lord Rossmore's dismissal on what had taken place with Captain M'Ternan. He (the Earl of Belmore) would read it again. The Lords Commissioners said—
  "If your Lordship had indeed been able to say that up to the time of the interview with Captain M'Ternan, you had not realized the dangerous consequences likely to ensue from the situation in which you had placed yourself, and that your then going forward was entirely based upon a permission at that moment given, the Lords Commissioners would have been too ready to accept an excuse on your part resting upon that state of facts."
  Well, Lord Rossmore asserted that he had had Captain M'Ternan's permission to go on, and his going on undoubtedly prevented a riot. We had to deal with facts, not with tendencies. Lord Rossmore said that if he had not gone on his men would have gone on without him. It was argued that Lord Crichton had take the other route, as requested by Captain M'Ternan; but he (the Earl of Belmore) had it from Lord Crichton himself, that a large number—he might say two-thirds—of his party had refused to follow him, and had joined Lord Rossmore's party. He (the Earl of Belmore) knew exactly what had taken place when the party reached the Fair-green, where the Nationalists were assembled, although he was not there. It so happened that very soon after the meeting, and before any of these discussions arose, a friend of his—a magistrate and a clergyman—had given him an account of what happened. He bad written to his friend to repeat what he had told him, which he had done; and it agreed with what had been already stated in this debate. When they arrived at Rosslea, his correspondent and another gentleman were about two-thirds of the distance from the head of the column. Some Nationalist boys began to throw stones, but were at once stopped by the men—not Orangemen, but Nationalists. The slight movement, however, caused by this extended rapidly to the head of the column, where some of the men got over the fence. His friend could see the leaders—he was too
  1160
  far off to distinguish who they were—head their men and drive them back into their ranks, and all passed on quietly to their own meeting. Such being the case, the Lords Commissioners ought to have let the matter drop. He appealed to the noble Earl not to press his Motion, for, as the noble and learned Earl (Earl Cairns) had pointed out, Lord Spencer was not the person really responsible for Lord Rossmore's dismissal, and the Body responsible—the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal—had ceased to exist. He wished to refer to the subsequent meeting at Dromore, where the Chief Secretary had stated that the Orangemen had gone armed, but that owing to the action of a shrewd and energetic public officer, sackloads of revolvers had been loft behind, near the place of meeting; and that these young men had gone there with murderous intentions. Now, what had appeared in the papers was this. The police had began to search the Nationalists—not the Orangemen—and had taken three revolvers. He (the Earl of Belmore) had made some inquiry into this matter, and had had a letter from Mr. E. Archdale. It appeared that when the search was made, a telegram to that effect was sent to Enniskillen; whereupon Lord Crichton and Mr. Edward Saunderson had searched their own men at the railway station there—miles off from the place of meeting—and had taken away all the revolvers they could find; and Mr. E. Archdale had done the same with his party at Bundoran Junction. Mr. Archdale had not himself heard a shot all the day, and there could not have been above one or two fired whilst the opposing parties were in any risk of collision. This was the return the Chief Secretary made to these gentlemen for doing their best to preserve order. He (the Earl of Belmore) deprecated the statement made by Mr. Trevelyan, that but for the Government, Ulster was in a state of civil war. He (the Earl of Belmore) lived in the country, and he asserted that anything further from a state of civil war it was impossible to conceive. He granted that since these meetings had been permitted there was a great deal of bitterness, and a great tendency amongst young men of 18 and upwards to throw stones. Throwing stones in Ireland was as much a disease as cutting

  1161
  their names everywhere was with a certain class in England. But this was not civil war. If the Chief Secretary wanted to know what civil war in Ulster really meant, let him, on his return to Ireland, go to Trinity College Library and examine the depositions taken after the Rebellion of 1641. The cruelties and the awful atrocities therein recorded, were as far removed from anything now existing in Ulster as could possibly be. He strongly urged on the Government the duty and necessity of not permitting, under any pretence whatever, any more out-door meetings in Ulster for the present. Freedom of speech was all very well, but the irritating personalities indulged in at these meetings were only an abuse of the term. He could sympathize with Lord Spencer in his present difficult position. He had at Cambridge been intimate with him, although he did not often see him now, and he had a great respect for him; and he had himself had to fill an analogous position in another, though no doubt loss important, part of the British Dominions. He thought that the Commissioners had gone too far in dismissing Lord Rossmore from the Commission of the Peace, and that a reprimand would have sufficed had they thought it necessary. He again advised the noble Earl (the Earl of Dunraven) to withdraw his Motion.
  LORD WAVENEYsaid, he hoped that the noble Earl would withdraw his Motion. It ought to be remembered that there was a large number of men in Ireland who did not belong to the Orange Organization, and who were supporters of law and order. He was not aware whether the noble Earl who had made the Motion was within the Ulster borders when the events to which allusion had been made were going forward, and when people did not know what each day might bring forth, as they saw men meeting in large armed masses.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, that he had listened to the speeches which had been made with great attention. There had been a strong desire expressed that he should not press his Motion to a Division, and the appeal which had been made by his noble Friend the Lord President was one which he ought to seriously consider, as he did not wish to censure the conduct or add to the difficulties of the Lord Lieutenant
  1162
  of Ireland. Under all the circumstances, he was desirous of withdrawing his Motion. But he should not have felt himself at liberty to do so if he had not had the opportunity of consulting the noble Lord who was so much interested in this matter (Lord Rossmore). He found that Lord Rossmore was most anxious to do nothing that would interfere with the maintenance of law and order in Ireland, and expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with the tone of the debate. He (the Earl of Dunraven), therefore, thought himself at liberty to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

ENDOWED SCHOOLS (IRELAND).

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF BELMOREasked the Lord President of the Council, Whether Her Majesty's Government would bring in a Bill this year to deal with the Endowed Schools in Ireland?
  LORD CARLINGFORD (LORD PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL)said, that the Government hoped that a Bill on the subject would be brought in either in the other House of Parliament or in their Lordships' House.
  House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.