Sitting of 12 February 1884

MINUTES.
NEW WRITS ISSUED—For Meath County, v. Robert Henry Metge, esquire, Chiltern Hundreds; for Cork City, v. John Daly, esquire, Manor of Northstead; for Northampton Borough,;v. Charles Bradlaugh, esquire, Chiltern Hundreds.
SELECT COMMITTEE—East India (Railway Communication), appointed.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Crown Lands * [99]; Real Assets Administration; [98]; Petty Sessions (Justice) (Ireland) * [100].
Committee—Report—Elections (Hours of Poll) * [2–97].

MOTION.

  NORTHAMPTON BOROUGH WRIT.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a New Writ for the electing of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Northampton, in the room of Charles Brad-laugh, esquire, who since his election for the said Borough has accepted the office of Steward or Bailiff of Her Majesty's Three Chiltern Hundreds of Stoke, Desborough, and Bonenham, in the County of Buckingham."—(Mr. Labouchere.)
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: I venture with great respect to suggest to the House that they would do well not to adopt the somewhat precipitate course recommended by the hon. Member for Northampton. The House is well aware that, so far, there has been no authoritative statement from the Leader of the House or the Law Officers of the Crown; but there is a general knowledge that the proceedings of yesterday afternoon will form the subject of inquiry before a Court of Law, and I think there can be also no doubt that Her Majesty's Attorney General will be instructed by the Government, and perhaps by Parliament, to commence a more or less friendly and collusive suit against Mr. Bradlaugh for what he did yesterday afternoon. All these proceedings will require careful consideration; and the House will have to consider at its leisure and in a dignified manner what course it should take to protect its proceedings from disorder and further assaults by Mr. Bradlaugh. It seems to me that if we agree to this Motion Mr. Bradlaugh may be re-elected for Northampton, and the Motion of the Leader of the Opposition, which was agreed to yesterday, will become a dead letter, leading to a repetition of the extremely unpleasant and unbecoming scenes which I am sure everybody in this House regrets. Legal proceedings of the highest importance are going to be taken against Mr. Bradlaugh, and the House must be protected against a repetition of disorderly scones. In order to give time for due consideration, I move the debate be now adjourned.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Lord Randolph Churchill.)
  MR. NEWDEGATEurged that under the decision of the House of Lords the duty was incumbent upon the Law Officers of the Crown to take proceedings to recover the penalties that had been incurred by Mr. Bradlaugh in voting without having taken the Oath or its equivalent Affirmation in a manner satisfactory to the House. There was no option as to whether the Attorney General should proceed or not——
  MR. SPEAKER: I must remind the hon. Member that the noble Lord has moved the adjournment of the debate. It is not competent for the hon. Member, therefore, to discuss the Main Question.
  MR. NEWDEGATE: I beg your pardon. I have known, under other circumstances, that the subject-matter that led to the Motion for Adjournment has been debated; but I bow to your decision. I apologise, Mr. Speaker.
  MR. RAIKES: I think, before we vote on the question which has been raised by my noble Friend, it would be not altogether unreasonable to expect some explanation of the circumstance which has led to this Writ being moved. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is the only person who has the power of granting the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds. I believe that a discretion is exercised in the case of a Member against whom a Petition is pending, or against whom any corrupt practices are alleged. That is not the case in this instance; but I think that in the case of one whose status as a Member has been a matter of discussion in this House, and who has broken the regulations of this House, it would be well that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should state to the House the reasons which led him to give Mr. Bradlaugh the opportunity of evading the Rosolution passed by the House yesterday.
  MR. LABOUCHERE: I really am very much surprised at the course taken by hon. Gentlemen opposite. Mr. Bradlaugh has ceased to be a Member of this House, and Northampton, which has a right to send two Members to Parliament, at the present time has only one. When a constituency is not charged with any species of corruption or wrongdoing, a Writ is always issued without question under such circumstances. Hon. Gentlemen opposite do not even know whether Mr. Bradlaugh will stand again

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  or not. But I may point out this difficulty. If they contend that a new Writ ought not to be issued, they ought not to allow a new Writ for any single constituency to be moved. What is to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh from going to County Heath or the City of Cork as a candidate?
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: I would ask you, Sir, whether the hon. Member is not now speaking to the Main Question?
  MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is certainly arguing the Main Question, and is out of Order. In fact, the Main Question cannot now be discussed.
  MR. HEALY: On the point of Order, Sir, I would ask you whether the hon. Member for Northampton is not perfectly in Order in showing reasons why the debate should not be adjourned? If he keeps to that subject—["Order! Oh, oh!"]——
  MR. SPEAKER: I have already decided that the hon. Member is not in Order.
  MR. LABOUCHERE: Of course, I bow to your decision, Sir. Really, I have nothing more to say.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): I have been appealed to on a subject which clearly appertains to the Main Question. I am not going to put myself out of Order in referring to it now, when the question of adjournment only is before us.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I do not feel at all sure that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is right in saying that the question put to him entirely relates to the Main Question. The Question before the House is, whether the House shall forthwith proceed to issue a new Writ for Northampton; or whether it shall take time to consider what has taken place. Under ordinary circumstances, when new Writs are moved——
  MR. HEALY (loudly and continuously)"Order, order! Question!" [Cries of "Name, name!"]
  MR. SPEAKER: The conduct of the hon. Member for Monaghan is quite disorderly.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I apprehend, Sir, you will stop me if I say anything irregular. As a matter of custom, new Writs are issued immediately the Motion is made; but there are cases in which more time is taken by
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  the House, and we have now to decide not whether the Writ should be issued or not, but whether at this moment we should adjourn the question. Before deciding it, we wish to know what course the Chancellor of the Exchequer has taken, and on what grounds that action has been taken? That is a very material question, and, I think, is material for our consideration at this moment.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, it was perfectly plain that the Government intended to shirk out of that discussion, as they had done out of others. It was perfectly plain that their silence was owing to collusion with Mr. Brad-laugh. His reason for believing that the debate should be adjourned was that he did not think the wording of the Motion was in consonance with the law of the country. He thought, before they proceeded to discuss the Main Question, they should know whether it was a legal one, to be put or not. On that subject he thought they ought to be enlightened by the Attorney General. Mr. Bradlaugh had probably vacated his seat by reason of his sitting and voting in the House without being properly sworn.
  MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is not addressing himself to the Question before the House.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, he bowed to the decision of the Chair. It appeared to him that the form of the Motion was not one that they could accept without an opinion from the Law Officers of the Crown. He, therefore, wished the debate to be adjourned, in order to enable the House to have a distinct opinion from the Law Officers of the Crown as to the real bearing of the Motion made. He thought, therefore, subject to the ruling of the Chair, and without infringing the Rule laid down by the Speaker, the House was entitled to ask the Law Officers of the Crown to give an opinion as to the legality of the form in which the Motion was made.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 145; Noes 203: Majority 58.—(Div. List, No. 12.)
  Original Question again proposed.
  SIR HARDINGE GIFFARD: On the Main Question I should like to call the attention of the House to the position in which the action of Her Majesty's Government

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  have placed the House. Last night Mr. Bradlaugh voted, and in one view of the case—I am not at all assuming it to be the right view, but it is held by a very large number of Members—Mr. Bradlaugh thereby, and ipso facto, vacated his seat. I shall hope to hear whether the Attorney General intends to take proceedings against Mr. Bradlaugh for having voted in the Division Lobby? The inducement for the issue of this Writ is, that Mr. Bradlaugh, having accepted the Chiltern Hundreds, has vacated his seat; and the House will at once perceive that the action of Her Majesty's Government has induced a vote of this House, which, in terms, decides the question against the contention of the majority; because, if the seat were already ipso facto vacated, Mr. Bradlaugh could not have vacated his seat by accepting to-day the Chiltern Hundreds. It is desirable that it should be understood what inducements have led Her Majesty's Government to take this action, which, in terms, sets at naught the decision of the majority of the House.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): With the evident approval of the majority of the House, I declined to violate the Standing Orders in order to answer the question of the right hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Raikes), a few minutes ago; but I will answer the question now. Mr. Bradlaugh applied to me this morning for the Chiltern Hundreds. I am not aware of any instance in which the Chiltern Hundreds have been refused, except in the case of corruption being, under certain circumstances, charged against an hon. Member. As, therefore, it was in my power to grant the Chiltern Hundreds, and as it was not my duty to solve the question to which the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Sir Hardinge Giffard) has just referred, I conceived I was using a wise discretion in granting the application.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he was informed that, under the recent decision of the House of Lords, which abrogated the action of the public in the case of any man who failed to take the Oath, and thereby incurred penalties, the Law Officer of the Crown had no option but to proceed against any such man? He wished to know from the Attorney General whether this was the case?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTasked the House to consider the aspect of this question on the Motion for a new Writ for Northampton, and to observe upon how entirely different a footing they stood from that of the discussion which they had had with respect to the personality of Mr. Bradlaugh. They had now to discuss, not the rights or the duties of Mr. Bradlaugh, but the right of the constituency of Northampton. The hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard) had said that, from the point of view of Gentlemen opposite, the seat had been vacated by the conduct of Mr. Bradlaugh in voting without having taken the Oath. That was contended last night by the Leader of the Opposition, and someone from this side said—"Will you move the Writ, then?" and the right hon. Gentleman said—"No; I will not move the Writ." Well, the people who contended that Mr. Bradlaugh did what was illegal and vacated his seat would not take the course which, from their point of view, would have given Northampton the right to elect a new Member. They could, by another course, give Northampton the right to elect a Member, and that was by giving Mr. Bradlaugh the Chiltern Hundreds. Could any man in the House, no matter on what side he sat, desire to deprive Northampton of one of its Members, putting Mr. Bradlaugh out of the question altogether? That was the course that hon. Gentlemen did take, if they refused to issue a new Writ. They took advantage of a doubtful question to hang up, not Mr. Bradlaugh, but the constituency. It might be that Northampton would choose another Member, not Mr. Bradlaugh, and why should it not have the right to do so? The question being undoubtedly a difficult and complicated one, here was a course which was quite clear of the personality of Mr. Bradlaugh. It did not in the least affect the penalties. If Mr. Bradlaugh had incurred the penalties, his taking the Chiltern Hundreds would not affect them at all. Therefore, that question was not before the House. There was only one single question—whether they would give Northampton the right which, he would venture to say, belonged to it by the Constitution of this country, to say whether it would elect another Member or not? However warmly they had differed on other points, this was a point

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  on which they could all agree, and he hoped, therefore, the House would grant the Writ.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I can agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman that there is no answer to the application of the hon. Gentleman who desires that a Writ shall be issued to enable Northampton to elect a new Member. I think, however, it would have been reasonable under the circumstances that we should have had time to consider the matter, and that we should have been favoured with the view of Her Majesty's Government after the peculiar proceedings of yesterday, which had, I think, more to do with the vacating of the seat than the granting of the Chiltern Hundreds. It would have been more reasonable and decorous that we should have had a special intimation from the Government in regard to the matter before we came to a decision. But the House has decided that the Writ shall issue at once, and I think there is no reason for refusing to accede to the issue of the Writ.
  SIR JOSEPH M'KENNAobserved, that the Motion appeared to imply that Mr. Bradlaugh had only forfeited his seat by accepting office; whereas the majority of the House considered that he had forfeited his seat before he applied for office. Unless, therefore, words were inserted in the Motion, or other notice taken, making it clear that one side of the House maintained that the seat was already forfeited, a Court of Law might be misled as to the true sense of the House on the subject.
  Original Question put.
  Ordered, That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a New Writ for the electing of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Northampton, in the room of Charles Brad-laugh, esquire, who, since his election for the said Borough, hath accepted the office of Steward or Bailiff of Her Majesty's Three Chiltern Hundreds of Stoke, Desborough, and Bonenham, in the County of Buckingham.

QUESTIONS.

  EDUCATION (SCOTLAND)—THE LOCHGOILHEAD SCHOOL CASE.
  DR. CAMERONasked the Lord Advocate, Whether Mr. Duncan Blair, in
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  November last, lodged with the Procurator-Fiscal of Lochgoilhead a complaint of gross ill-treatment of his children by the master of the public school of the district; and, whether the Fiscal has taken any proceedings in the case, or has forwarded his precognitions to the Crown Office; and, if not, whether he would call for the precognitions in question?
  THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. J. B. BALFOUR): In November last Mr. Duncan Blair made a complaint to the Procurator Fiscal that his son had been severely caned on one occasion by the schoolmaster. A full precognition was taken in the case, which was reported to the Crown Office, and considered by Crown Counsel. No complaint was made to the Fiscal as to the administration of castor oil to the children as a punishment; but statements were made in the course of the investigation that such a practice prevailed—a practice, I may say, which appears to me to he deserving of severe condemnation. The decision of the Crown Counsel was that, while the chastisement of the boy may possibly have been excessive, there were not adequate grounds for criminal proceedings against the schoolmaster.

  NAVY—NAVY PAY.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether Her Majesty's Government will agree to the appointment of a Select Committee of this House to consider and report upon the pay and allowances of Officers and Seamen of the Royal Navy?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, in reply, said, it would be an unusual proceeding to refer such a question to a Select Committee, and the Government could not agree to adopt such a course.

  NAVY—NAVAL DISCIPLINE-LEGISLATION.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether the Admiralty have considered the sentences of courts martial for breaches of Naval discipline, and whether they contemplate bringing forward any amendment of the Naval Discipline Act, with the view of preventing the passing of sentences of penal servitude, except in

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  very aggravated cases; and, whether the Admiralty is willing to reconsider the case of the seaman Endenby, of Her Majesty's troopship "Assistance," who was sentenced to penal servitude for an assault on a ship's corporal, and of Quinn, in whose favour a memorial has been presented to the Admiralty?
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: It is our intention to introduce a Bill amending the Naval Discipline Act, and its introduction will supply an opportunity for stating the opinion of the Admiralty on the question referred to by my hon. Friend. As to the two cases stated in the Question, the Admiralty have considered them, and have remitted two years of the sentence in each case.

  VACCINATION-ALLEGED TRANSMISSION OF ERYSIPELAS AT CARDIFF.
  MR. P. A. TAYLORasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board, Whether he has received a Report of the result of the inquiry instituted by the Local Government Board in regard to a series of cases in which erysipelas had followed vaccination at Cardiff?
  MR. GEORGE RUSSELL: The Local Government Board are aware, from a brief report in The British Medical Journal, that at a branch meeting of the British Medical Association in December last, a statement was made by a private medical practitioner as to certain cases in which erysipelas had followed vaccination. No particulars as to the names, &c, of the children vaccinated are given. It is not alleged that the children were vaccinated by a public vaccinator, nor is there any suggestion that the lymph was obtained from the National Vaccine Establishment. The Board have not received any communication on the subject of these cases from the medical practitioner by whom the vaccinations were performed, from any of the parents or relatives of the children who are stated to have suffered from erysipelas, or from any person residing in the locality. The Board, under these circumstances, have not directed any inquiry by one of their Inspectors. The gentleman by whom the statement was made at the meeting is not in any way subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, and the Board have no right to require him to give information as to his private patients.

  RAILWAYS (IRELAND)—THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE WATERFORD AND CENTRAL (IRELAND) RAILWAY COMPANY AND THE KILKENNY JUNCTION RAILWAY COMPANY.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether his attention has been directed to the recent negotiations between the Waterford and Central (Ireland) Railway Company and the Kilkenny Junction Railway Company with regard to the working of the line from Kilkenny to Maryborough, and the inconvenience and loss which the people of the Queen's and Kilkenny counties will suffer in the event of the discontinuance of the traffic from November next, failing the completion of the line to Mountmellick; and, whether he will consider the possibility of protecting the public against the ruinous consequences of the disagreements of the Companies?
  MR. CHAMBERLAIN, in reply, said, his attention had been called to the circumstances set forth in this Question in September last, by the gentlemen residing in the neighbourhood. Although the Board of Trade had no legal power to interfere in the matter, they communicated with the two Railways, for the purpose of bringing about an agreement. Eventually the two Boards of Directors did enter into an agreement, and the Board of Trade hoped that the matter was satisfactorily settled. Since that time they had no official knowledge of what had taken place; but he believed the arrangement had fallen through, in consequence of some difficulty interposed by a Financial Company interested in one of the Railways. The Board of Trade was anxious to do everything that was reasonable to protect the public; but he did not see how circumstances of this kind could be provided against by legislation. Although the Board of Trade had no statutory power to act in the matter, he should, however, be willing to undertake the duty of arbitrator between the two Companies, if they agreed to abide by his decision.

  THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—CAPTAIN M'TERNAN.
  MR. BRODRICKasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is the case, as re-

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  ported in the local newspapers, that at the Petty Sessions at Enniskillen, on Monday, 28th January, Captain M'Ternan, resident magistrate of the district, used the following expressions from the Bench:—
  "I think it worse to curse the Tope than to curse the Queen. It is provocative of a breach of the Peace, and loads to a disorderly condition of the town;"
  whether he was publicly called to order by the other magistrates sitting with him for such an expression of opinion; and, whether this is the same magistrate who reported upon the proceedings at Rosslea, for which Lord Rossmore was dismissed from the Commission of the Peace?
  MR. HEALY: Before the Question is answered, I would like to ask whether it is not a fact that the Resident Magistrate referred to is the only Catholic magistrate in Enniskillen, and that, since the Rossmore incident, he has been publicly insulted and "Boycotted" by the unpaid magistrates of the district?
  MR. TREVELYAN: In reply to the first Question, I have to say that Captain M'Ternan has sent me a Report of what occurred, taken from one of the newspapers, which he says is correct. There had been a riot in Enniskillen, and a man named Rankin had been charged before a Bench of eight magistrates, the Rev. Mr. Frith being in the chair, with being drunk and disorderly, and using Party expressions.
  "Constable Quinn states that the defendant was drunk and disorderly, and witness heard him cursing the Pope."
  I will read a sentence or two further—it is not very pleasant reading—but it is necessary, in order to do justice to Captain M'Ternan—
  "The witness was cross-examined by the counsel for the defendant—Were there other people cursed besides the Pope? I heard a lot cursed besides. Did you hear the Queen cursed? I did not. If you had heard any person cursing the Queen would you have arrested him? I would."
  Now, this is the first expression that came from the Bench—
  "Captain Collum observed that there was a great difference between the Queen and the Pope."
  Then the chairman said, "There is a great difference," and Captain M'Ternan stated that—
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  "Cursing the Pope, the Queen, King William, or anybody else, should be put down with a firm hand;"
  an observation which, having regard to the circumstances under investigation, was perfectly justified.
  MR. BRODRICK: Might I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he can state to the House why the Resident Magistrate did not explain the language attributed to him in my Question; and, whether he is aware that a large body of witnesses, including the other magistrates, have deposed to the words in question? I would also ask the right hon. Gentleman to say whether this is the magistrate upon whose Report Lord Rossmore was suspended?
  MR. TREVELYAN: The observations of the Bench are set forth in the newspaper report which the Resident Magistrate sent me, and which he is willing to abide by. There was a great deal of unseemly conduct on the part of the magistrate; but it was not of a sufficiently serious character to bring it before the Lord Chancellor. I cannot say that I think Captain M'Ternan's language calls for any notice.
  MR. HEALY: I would ask the Chief Secretary whether he has received any Report from Captain M'Ternan as to the conduct of the unpaid magistrates in connection with the riots at Enniskillen; whether Captain M'Ternan reported to the Castle that, in the case of every Orangeman who was proved by the police to have broken the windows of Catholics, the majority of the magistrates dismissed the summons, while in the case of every Catholic a conviction was recorded upon the same evidence; and if he can state whether he proposes to take any steps with regard to these unpaid magistrates?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would give Notice of that Question.
  MR. BRODRICK: Would the right hon. Gentleman answer my Question?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Undoubtedly, Captain M'Ternan is the magistrate who reported upon the proceedings at Rosslea; and I may say that he likewise is the magistrate whose great courage and discretion were the means of bringing to justice the first person who suffered capital punishment during the late agitation in Ireland, and he suffered very severely in the South of

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  Ireland from the treatment of the neighbours of this man.
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: What paper does the right hon. Gentleman quote from?
  MR. TREVELYAN: From The Fermanagh Reporter.

  POST OFFICE-UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked the Postmaster General, If he can state why a telephone exchange licence cannot be granted to the United Telephone Company, on payment of the usual royalty, for Portsmouth, on the same terms as to Bristol and other large towns; and, whether he will consent to receive a deputation on the subject from the Town Council and Chamber of Commerce of the Borough?
  MR. FAWCETT: I fear I could not, without unduly occupying the time of the House, explain the reasons which have led to some conditions being inserted in the telephone licences recently granted which were not in the licences first given. There is the less occasion to enter into such an explanation, as I shall have no objection to receive the deputation from Portsmouth referred to by my hon. Friend; and if be will communicate with me I will arrange a day convenient to those who wish to see me.

  METROPOLIS—CLEARANCES OF INHABITED HOUSES.
  MR. A. J. BALFOURasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether it is in his power to lay upon the Table of the House any extracts of the number of the houses pulled down, and of the population compelled to seek new dwellings, since the year 1815, in consequence of the compulsory purchase in the Metropolis of land for the construction of docks, railways, new streets, public buildings, or other similar purposes?
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: I am unable to lay upon the Table the information referred to in the Question, and I know no means by which the particulars alluded to could now be obtained. As the hon. Member is aware, there are Standing Orders of both Houses of Parliament, which require that when, by a Bill, power is sought to take in any town or parish more than 15 houses
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  occupied wholly or partially by persons belonging to the labouring classes as tenants or lodgers, the promoters shall deposit in the Private Bill Office a statement of the number, description, and situation of such houses, the number of persons to be displaced, and whether any and what provision is made in the Bill for remedying any inconvenience likely to arise from such displacement. But this statement was first required by a Standing Order of the Lords in the year 1853. There was no similar Standing Order of the Commons till 1874. A Return could, no doubt, be made in respect of the period subsequent to those dates by the officers of the two Houses as to the number of dwelling-houses and persons who, according to the statements deposited in pursuance of the Standing Orders, would be affected by schemes embodied in Bills. Such a Return would, however, involve much labour in its preparation, and when completed it could not be regarded as satisfactory, as it would show what was proposed rather than what was actually done, even in cases where the Bills were passed without modification of the provisions bearing on this subject.

  POST OFFICE—DELAY OF INDIAN MAILS.
  MR. MACFARLANEasked the Postmaster General, If he can explain why the Indian Mail of the 11th of January, which was due in London on Tuesday the 29th, was not delivered until Friday the 1st of February; if it is a fact that the steamship "Lombardy," with the Mail on board, was detained at anchor at Suez for twenty-four hours, nine hours at Port Said, taking in cargo, and that the Mails were further delayed for some hours at Brindisi after they reached that port; and, if he will call upon the Company holding the contract for the carrying of the Mails to explain the cause of these delays?
  MR. FAWCETT: I must explain to the hon. Member that although, according to the time table he refers to, the mail was due in London on the 29th of January, that date was based on the anticipated resumption of the transit of the mails through Egypt by railway and by steamer from Alexandria to Brindisi; whereas, in fact, the mails had to be brought through the Suez Canal, and from Port Said to Brindisi.

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  So that, in reality, they could not be expected in London before the 31st, and they would have been delivered on that date but for untoward delays arising from the Italian quarantine regulations and the heavy weather experienced at Brindisi, which prevented the mails being landed there for 24 hours after the packet arrived. It is satisfactory to me to be able to state that the regular mail service is about to be resumed early in March.
  MR. MACFARLANE: I will put a further Question to the right hon. Gentleman on the subject of the Lombardy. I was a passenger on board of her.

  LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—THE PURCHASE CLAUSES.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he would have any objection to state how the Government propose to give effect to the unanimous Resolution of 12th June 1883, that the purchase clauses of the Land Act of 1881 should be revised and expanded?
  MR. T. P. O'CONNOR: Before the right hon. Gentleman answers this Question, I would like to ask him whether a Resolution calling upon the Government, in practically the same terms as the Resolution of the noble Lord last Session, to revise and extend the Purchase Clauses of the Land Act, was one of the Resolutions passed at a meeting held in the North of Ireland, which was denounced by the noble Lord himself as seditious, and dangerous to the peace of the country?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Perhaps the hon. Member would quote my words. I said nothing of the kind.
  MR. TREVELYAN: In reply to the noble Lord, I am not prepared at present to make any statement on this Question. The first Notice referring to it which appears on the Paper of the House is a Bill of my hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. T. Dickson) for the 30th of April.

  STATE OF IRELAND—THE CASE OF PHILIP MAGUIRE.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If any reply has been given to the Memorial of the mother of the murdered man, Philip Maguire, who applied for
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  an inquiry into the outrage under the Crimes Act; and, what has been the average length of time His Excellency has taken, in previous applications of a similar kind, to give a reply?
  MR. TREVELYAN: A reply to this Memorial is sent to-day. It is impossible to fix an average length of time which such applications have been under consideration. Each case is dealt with on its own merits, and the time must depend upon the nature of the case and the preliminary inquiries necessary, and also upon the general pressure of business.
  MR. HEALY: Would the right hon. Gentleman have any objection to state whether an inquiry is to be granted?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I cannot say.
  MR. HEALY: I beg to give Notice that on an early day I will call attention to the fact that, in every case in which landlords' bailiffs and others have lost their lives, the Lord Lieutenant has granted an inquiry; while in every case in which a Catholic has been murdered he refused to grant an inquiry.

  COLONIAL GOVERNORSHIPS (THE BAHAMAS)—APPOINTMENT OF MR. BLAKE.
  MR. HEALYasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Upon whose recommendation was Mr. Blake appointed Governor of the Bahamas?
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEY: The hon. Gentleman asks me upon whose recommendation Mr. Blake was appointed Governor of the Bahamas? My answer is that Mr. Blake was appointed Governor of the Bahamas by the Queen, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
  MR. HEALY: Might I ask the hon. Gentleman who recommended Mr. Blake to the Secretary of State for the Colonies?
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEY: In answer to the hon. Member, I apprehend that the hon. Member can, if he chooses, challenge Mr. Blake's appointment upon a regular Motion to that effect; but I decline, and think it would be inconvenient, to enter into the particulars of his appointment in answer to a Question.

  EGYPT (RE-ORGANIZATION)—MR. CLIFFORD LLOYD.
  MR. HEALYasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Upon

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  whose recommendation was Mr. Clifford Lloyd sent to Egypt?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Sir, Mr. Clifford Lloyd was appointed on the recommendation of Lord Granville, and I have his permission to state that he acted on the recommendation of Lord Spencer and Lord Dufferin.
  MR. O'DONNELL: Did any recommendation come to Lord Granville from the people of Egypt?

  STATE OF IRELAND—WITHDRAWAL OF POLICE FROM THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OFFICE, DUBLIN.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he can explain why the detectives have been withdrawn from the doors of the offices of the Irish National League, Dublin?
  MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, the police have received no instructions such as those suggested in the Question. Detectives may, in the discharge of their duty, have been brought into the vicinity of the office named; but they were not told to be there.
  MR. HEALY: I may state, for the information of the right hon. Gentleman, that they were posted there for the last six months, and when Parliament opened they were withdrawn.

  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—TOKAR.
  MR. VILLIERS STUART, in putting a Question as to the relief of Tokar, hoped that the Government would give such a reply—["Order!"]
  MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is not entitled to enter into debate.
  MR. VILLIERS STUARTthen asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there is any body of insurgents between Tokar and the Coast capable of barring the way to a disciplined European Force; whether the distance is less than fifteen miles; whether, therefore, it is included in the Red Sea littoral which Her Majesty's Government have undertaken to preserve to Egypt; and, whether, in the event of there being a sufficient force of soldiers, marines, and blue jackets available at Aden, or within easy reach of Suez, Her Majesty's Government will endeavour to relieve the gallant but starving garrison of Tokar?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE, in reply, said, the force was about 3,000; the distance was rather over 15 miles. In regard to the third and fourth heads of the Question, he could not anticipate the statement of the Premier.

  EGYPT (MILITARY OPERATIONS)—THE VOTE OF CREDIT.
  MR. ONSLOWasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to ask for a Vote of Credit on account of the expenses incurred for the reinforcements being sent to the Red Sea?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): In reply, I have to say that I am in communication with the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary to the Admiralty on this matter, and if an Estimate is required it will be presented in due course without any delay.
  MR. ONSLOW: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any money will be required?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS): This is altogether a premature Question.

  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—THE TELEGRAMS.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government will inquire of Sir Edward Malet and Sir Evelyn Baring whether any telegrams or other communications were addressed by them, while employed on Her Majesty's service in Egypt, to any Egyptian officials in the Soudan besides those mentioned by him in his reply in this House on the 11th February, and will lay upon the Table any such communications without delay?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: There will be no objection to make this inquiry.
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: In reference to this Question, I would like to ask the noble Lord whether he has read the Blue Book Egypt No. 22; and, if so, whether he has observed on page 22 that General Hicks alludes to a telegram to Sir Edward Malet on June 20, inquiring for information from General Hicks, and whether that telegram has been withheld by the Foreign Office? Secondly, Sir, I would ask the noble

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  Lord whether his attention has been drawn in the Blue Book No. 22 to a despatch from General Hicks to Sir Edward Malet, in which General Hicks referred to a telegram of the 31st of May, and also another telegram asking for much information on many important points, and why that and the other telegrams were not laid before the House?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I can only say I must ask the noble Lord to give Notice of that Question.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Will inquiry be made by telegraph?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I shall make it immediately. Of course, when I say immediately, I shall make it in whatever way I consider best, in order to obtain full information.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: This information will be required, and will be of great importance in the debate. Will the inquiry be made this evening by telegraph?
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Does the noble Lord require Notice of a Question relating to a telegram, copies of which must be in the Foreign Office at the present moment? I wish also to know whether the noble Lord wishes the House to understand that Her Majesty's Government deliberately conceals the information?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Will the noble Lord make inquiry by telegraph or not?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I have no objection whatever to make the inquiry by telegram; but I must be guided by the instructions given by the Secretary of State in the matter.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked whether or not those two telegrams were in the Foreign Office; or whether it was intended to pursue the policy hitherto pursued by Her Majesty's Government of concealing information?
  MR. GLADSTONE: On the part of my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State, I distinctly decline to answer such Questions. The noble Lord has used words which, I am sorry to say, convey what between Member and Member of Parliament is an insult. The statement I am making on behalf of my noble Friend does not refer to matters of fact embraced in the former portion of the Question, with respect to which it is not
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  possible for me to give information, but to the imputation contained in his closing words.
  LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: I wish to ask you, Mr. Speaker, on a point of Order, whether the right hon. Gentleman is in Order in imputing to an hon. Member a deliberate insult to himself and his Colleagues? I wish to ask the First Minister of the Crown whether he did not frequently charge the late Government with deliberately suppressing information?
  MR. SPEAKER: It is desirable to recall to the recollection of the noble Lord and the House the position in which matters stand. I understood the noble Lord to ask a Question of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Under Secretary, acting entirely within his own right and discretion, stated his desire to have Notice of the Question. Upon that, it seems to me, the matter should drop.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I only rose as a matter of courtesy to the noble Lord.
  MR. BOURKEasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the Correspondence which had taken place during the past year between Sir Evelyn Wood and General Hicks would be laid before Parliament; and whether Sir Evelyn Wood had made any communication to Her Majesty's Government with respect to the affairs of the Soudan; and, if so, whether this communication could be laid before Parliament?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE, in reply, said, that Her Majesty's Government were in possession of no Correspondence between General Hicks and Sir Evelyn Wood, neither of whom were in the service of Her Majesty's Government. Sir Evelyn Wood had made no written communication on the subject of the Soudan to Her Majesty's Government; but he had been consulted by Sir Evelyn Baring, and his views were contained in the telegrams and despatches laid before Parliament.

  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY (IRELAND) BILL.
  MR. THOMAS DICKSONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, When he proposes to introduce the Sunday Closing Bill for Ireland referred to in the Speech from the Throne?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I propose tomorrow to ask leave of the House to introduce this Bill.
  MR. HEALYsaid, that, as a matter of fact, the Education Bill preceded the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday (Ireland) Bill in the Queen's Speech, and why should not the same order and priority be maintained?
  MR. TREVELYANsaid, he was not aware that the order in which the Bills were mentioned in the Queen's Speech was any guidance or rule for the introduction of measures to the House. Over and over again he had stated that the order he now proposed to adopt would be the order in which the measures would he introduced to the House.

  INLAND NAVIGATION AND DRAINAGE (IRELAND)—THE RIVER BARROW DRAINAGE.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If he can state whether the preliminary inquiry by the Board of Works in reference to the question of the Barrow Drainage has been completed, and generally how the matter now stands?
  MR. COURTNEY, in reply, said, he would answer this Question as far as he could, no Notice having been given of it. He understood that about 10 days ago the work of the valuator and engineer was well advanced.

  ARMY (AUXILIARY FORCES)—SMALL ARMS FOR THE VOLUNTEERS.
  VISCOUNT LEWISHAMasked the Secretary of State for War, If it is the intention of the Government to supply the Volunteer Forces with the Martini-Henry rifle; and, if so, if he can state how soon it will be done?
  MR. BRAND, in reply, said, although very anxious on the subject, he was afraid he could not promise that the Volunteers could be supplied with the Martini-Henry rifles this year.

  EVICTIONS (IRELAND)—COUNTY KERRY.
  MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he will call the attention of the Irish Executive to the following extract from the "Kerry Weekly Reporter" (a Conservative organ):—
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  "Ejectments in Kerry. The number of ejectments is becoming alarming in Kerry. Every Quarter Sessions Mr. Bland, Mr. Blennerhassett, Mrs. Drummond, Miss Busteed, and a host of other proprietors are proceeding against tenants. One attorney made over £300 last year law costs, by one estate alone. A sickly poor man, who never joined the Land League, never combined against paying his rent, was served with an ejectment. The priest wrote that the poor man was, very likely, on his death bed, offering one gale and costs, and offered to become security for the second gale, but was refused. Many of the other cases are of a class with the above;"
  and, whether he can hold out any hope that the forces of the Crown will not be granted to landowners indiscriminately to carry out evictions under circumstances of hardship?
  MR. BLENNERHASSETT: As this Question may be supposed to refer to me, perhaps the House will permit me to say that, as far as I am concerned, there is absolutely no foundation whatever for the statement it contains.
  MR. HEALY: I never supposed for a moment that this Question referred to the hon. Member. There are a score of Blennerhassetts in Kerry, and my Question refers to one of them who lives at Ballyseedy.
  MR. TREVELYAN: I have no information from Dublin about this Question. It is rather difficult to say in what respect it could properly be put to me; and I am not quite certain that I would be doing any public service in giving the House any information as to the truth or want of accuracy of this newspaper. With regard to the last paragraph, I may say that no change will be made in the administration of the law.

  LAW AND JUSTICE—DORMANT FUNDS IN CHANCERY—THE LIST.
  In reply to Mr. GUY DAWNAY,
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)said, the publication of the list of dormant funds in Chancery would be published in a very few weeks.

  ARMY—WOOLWICH ARSENAL-STOCKTAKING.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, What was the date of the last general stocktaking at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich; whether there has been any stocktaking or "remain" of the stores in the Carriage Department within the

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  last ten years; and, if so, whether the result was compared with the "remain" as shown by the Carriage Department ledgers; whether it is the intention of the Government to direct any "remain" to be taken of the large accumulation of either obsolete or unserviceable stores now at the Royal Arsenal and Dockyard at Woolwich; and, whether there would be any objection to the furnishing of a Return of all the obsolete and unserviceable stores now in the Departments above referred to?
  MR. BRAND: The date of the last general stocktaking at the Royal Arsenal was 1859. If the hon. Member refers to the Carriage Manufacturing Department, a yearly "remain" is taken and compared with the ledger. If, however, his Question has reference to the store of carriages, no "remain" has been taken since 1859. Last year the Secretary of State decided to take a general "remain" at Woolwich Arsenal, and this is now being proceeded with. There is a large quantity of obsolete and unserviceable stores at Woolwich, which are periodically sold by the Director of Contracts, and the produce of the sales is credited to Vote 12. It does not appear to the Secretary of State that any useful purpose would be served by giving a Return of these stores, which form a constantly shifting quantity. A Return, moreover, would involve considerable clerical labour.

  COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH SPAIN.
  MR. MAC IVERasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If the Papers recently issued with regard to the commercial arrangements with Spain that are referred to in the Queen's Speech, and which contain no reference to any endeavours to procure equal treatment for British ships, are a complete statement of the present position of the negotiations?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: Further Correspondence is about to be laid on the Table.
  MR. MAC IVERsaid, he wished also to know whether it was the intention of the Government to take steps for procuring the equal treatment in Spanish ports of British vessels?
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEreplied, that that was not the Question of which the hon. Member had given No-
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  tice. The Correspondence he had referred to would be laid on the Table in the course of two or three weeks.
  MR. MACIVERsaid, that he should put down all the Questions he had asked on next Thursday's Paper, and he trusted he would then obtain a satisfactory reply.

  LAW AND JUSTICE—NATIONALITY OF CRIMINALS.
  MR. DAWSONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been drawn to the charge of Mr. Justice Butt at the Liverpool Assizes on the 5th February, who directed the attention of the Grand Jury to the preponderance of Irish names on the calendar; whether the calendar contained the following names, viz. Gee, for murder; Clifford, for attempt to wreck a train; Vaughan, Price, and Hadfield, for the murder of a boy named Burns; White, for stabbing; M'Lean, Campbell, and Ballantyne, for murder; and M'Comb, for manslaughter; and, whether only four names, Flanagan, Higgins, Duggan, and Dempsey were Irish, or what other names were on the calendar? In putting this Question, I would ask whether it is probable that the female prisoners convicted may not be married women who may have borne previously non-Irish names?
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, he had no means of being able to answer the Question. The Assize Calendars were in due course sent in to the Home Office; but this particular one had not yet been received, and if it had, it was not possible with certainty to fix the nationality of the prisoners merely by reading their names.
  MR. DAWSON: The right hon. and learned Gentleman did not answer the Question. I ask as to the correctness of the preponderance of the names on the Paper.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: I have no means of answering the Question.
  MR. DAWSON: Did not the Judge name the nationality of the prisoners to the predjudice of those who happened to bear Irish names?

  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—FATE OF SINKAT.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether

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  orders have been given to Admiral Sir William Hewett, now commanding Suakim, to attempt the relief of the starving garrison of Sinkat? The hon. Member also asked, whether Her Majesty's Government had received any confirmation of the rumoured massacre of the garrison of Sinkat, which had been so long neglected by them?
  MR. GLADSTONE: I do not think that any public end would be gained by my taking any notice of the statement which the hon. Member has interpolated into his Question, that the garrison has been long neglected by Her Majesty's Government, nor do I think it a fair and equitable method of proceeding that such statements should be insinuated into Questions. There is no doubt it is unhappily the fact that the garrison of Sinkat has been "cut off," or, as another telegram expresses it, "cut to pieces." When I have an opportunity afforded me of addressing the House I shall state fully the instructions which have been given to Sir William Hewett, and shall also state fully all the difficult circumstances having reference to the business.

  ELECTIONS (HOURS OF POLL) BILL.
  In reply to Mr. E. STANHOPE,
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, the House having last night approved the principle of the Bill for the extension of the hours of polling in certain boroughs, he proposed to commit it pro formâ on Monday next, in order that it might then be reprinted with some necessary corrections. He should then be quite willing to postpone for a few weeks the consideration of the clauses in Committee, in order that the Bill might be discussed in the constituencies.

  PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTONinquired what Business the Prime Minister proposed to put down for to-morrow?
  MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that the adjourned debate on the Address would naturally be put down on the Paper for Wednesday; but if the debate on the Vote of Censure should be adjourned—as it probably would be—it would be in the power of the right hon. Gentleman
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  who moved it to take the adjourned debate on Wednesday, and it would then take precedence of the debate on the Address. In the event of his not doing so, the Government proposed to proceed with the debate on the Address, in the event of the only Order of the Day—the Middlesex Land Registry Bill—only taking up a short time.

MOTIONS.
  EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—EGYPTIAN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

    VOTE OF CENSURE. [FIRST NIGHT.]
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I can assure the House that it is with no ordinary feeling of diffidence that I approach the question which I have ventured to place upon the Paper, and I feel that the circumstances which have occurred, and which have only come to our knowledge to-day, in no degree diminish the anxiety with which I take up the question before us. My hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) just now put a Question which elicited from the Prime Minister a confirmation of the melancholy statement which has been circulating in the course of the day, to the effect that the gallant garrison of Sinkat has been entirely destroyed; and it is impossible not to feel that whatever may be the answer which Her Majesty's Government may make to such observations as that which fell from my hon. Friend the Member for Eye—I mean, whatever may be the answer of the Government as to their own responsibility in the matter—it is at least but natural that those who have been watching for a long time past with thrilling interest the proceedings in that unfortunate town should feel anxious, and should be prompted to express themselves warmly on the subject. It had not been my intention to have commenced or prefaced the remarks I have to make by a reference to Sinkat; but I cannot help feeling that, with the words of the Prime Minister last night still ringing in my ears, and with the melancholy foreboding, which, no doubt, was not in his mind at the time, but which the event has justified, that the question of Sinkat was not a question of hours, but was a

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    question that had long been decided, I am justified in doing so. I say, with these words ringing in my ears. I would also refer for a moment to a despatch to be found on page 16 of the Blue Book from Consul Moncrieff—a lamented and gallant public servant, whose loss to the service I am sure all who knew anything of him must feel to be deplorable. In that despatch, dated the 26th of August, there were observations made which impressed us both with the very great importance of the position of Sinkat, and the gallantry of those who were upholding its defence. The Consul, in his despatch, used these words—
    "The Mahdi evidently meant to raise this part of the Soudan, to disturb the Berber road, and to create a diversion;"
    And then he goes on, speaking of the dangers of the situation, to say—
    "There is still some hope, by the gallant conduct of Tewfik Bey, of defending the place if proper provision should be made. Probably one complete battery of artillery, with 500 Infantry, and two or three mitrailleuses, would make Suakim and Tokar secure, if sent at once, to meet the difficulty."
    Now, Sir, whether those reinforcements ought or ought not to have been sent is a question I may leave to the House and everyone to consider. That will, of course, be treated, and properly treated, by the Government as being a bye point altogether, so far as concerns their responsibility in the matter, unless we can, by some process of reasoning, prove that the Government, the British Government, are in some more or less direct sense responsible for the omission to take proper measures for the protection of these garrisons; and I feel that upon this point the House will naturally expect that I shall offer the principal observations I have to make, in order that we may ascertain for ourselves how far the responsibility of our own Government goes. For, Sir, it cannot have escaped the attention of anyone—in fact, we had it continually paraded before us—that the argument of the Government is this—that inasmuch as they repeatedly, over and over again, have disclaimed all responsibility for the events in the Soudan, therefore they are not responsible for its protection. I admit freely that there were disclaimers, and plenty of them; the papers bristle with them, and I have been almost tempted to count them; but I would
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    point out to the House, and I would point out to the Government, that it is not by disclaiming a responsibility that you can get rid of it. I may take a pistol in my hand and say I am going to fire that pistol into the street, but that I disclaim all responsibility for the consequences; but I do not thereby escape my responsibility. If I do any act, or omit to do any act, which, either by the commission or omission, ends in fatal consequences, I cannot get rid of my responsibility by saying I am not responsible. And so, if the right hon. Gentleman considers that by disclaiming responsibility he can get rid of it, I take issue with him on that point. But I must give some reasons for saying that we are responsible, and have been strictly and seriously responsible, for the proceedings in the Soudan country; and the proofs I have to offer are of two kinds. In the first place they rest upon the nature of the ease, and in the second place upon certain of our own sayings and doings in the matter. With regard to the nature of the case, let me remind the right hon. Gentleman of the arguments of which he and his friends were extremely fond some years ago, when they used to attack the late Government and blame them for outrages and lamentable incidents which occurred within the dominions of the Porte. When those outrages were brought under the notice of the late Government we were frequently obliged to say, however deplorable they might be, that it was not within our power to apply a remedy. The right hon. Gentleman then would say—"You are responsible for these outrages; because you are the Power which maintains the power of Turkey, and therefore you must answer for what the Turkish Government does, or suffers to be done." If that was an argument against the late Government, surely it applies at least equally in the present case. Is the support which we give to Egypt less or more than the support that was given by this country to the Porte? I venture to say there never was a case in which a more complete responsibility was forced upon us by the position which we took up—actually taking the whole government or the greater part of the government into our own hands—than in the case of Egypt. Sir, we have assumed a power

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    in that country which makes us deeply responsible for its protection, whatever may be our disclaimers. I will not ask the House to go back further than the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, but I will ask them to consider what was the result of Tel-el-Kebir. I will not ask them now to consider in what circumstances we went to Egypt, and why we fought that battle; but I will only quote the words of the Government as contained in the Gracious Speech from the Throne on the opening of Parliament last Session—namely, that Her Majesty's troops were sent there in order to put down "a formidable rebellion." Well, Sir, that formidable rebellion was put down, and with it there was put down the Army of Egypt; and not only the Army of Egypt, but there was practically put down the Government of Egypt, which had to be reconstituted, and Her Majesty's Government undertook to reconstitute it. Now, Sir, the charge of reconstituting that Government was materially and in the main committed to the hands of Lord Dufferin; and he, with great ability, taking a view of the whole of the circumstances of the country, laid down a plan for the administration of the country—he laid down its Constitution, made a provision for its civil government and its revenue; but among other things, and, indeed, almost before anything else, he made provision for the reconstitution of the Army of that country. I may say of Lord Dufferin's despatch that the text of it was that, in spite of the events of their past history, it ought to be no difficult task to endow the Egyptian people with a good Government; but the burden of his despatch was that, for some time to come, European assistance in the various Departments would be absolutely necessary; and so we not only established, but the Ruler of the country was induced to adopt, a Constitution which we had promulgated, in every Department of the Government of which we took good care to put European Administrators. Now, what was the nature of Lord Dufferin's proposal for the Army? He argued that it was not necessary, and that it was not desirable for Egypt to have a large Army, and he took notice of the observations of some persons that it was not necessary for Egypt to have an Army at all; but from that he dissented, because, he said, Egypt lay
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    open to the incursions of the neighbouring tribes—wild Bedouins and others on the Southern Frontier, and that it was necessary to make provision against the wild fanatics and impostors who might from time to time make a descent upon it. A force of 6,000 men were, he said, required, not for ordinary warlike purposes, but to keep in check these wild fanatics, and it was to be Egyptian. Having thus constituted his Army, he proceeded to constitute his police, and there, again, he desired that, besides a small and highly-disciplined Army, there should be a Reserve Force; an intelligent, active, and ubiquitous establishment, which was to preserve peace among the Bedouins. Besides these, there were to be other police. I say that Lord Dufferin, in providing a Constitution for Egypt and in dealing with the questions of the Army and the constabulary necessary to protect the country and maintain order, did undertake the responsibility of providing adequately for that purpose. If not, he and the Government who supported him were not discharging their duty to the country or to the Government they had to organize. They were responsible to the people of Egypt, and they were responsible to the people of this country. They were responsible, too, to the other Powers of Europe, from the position we had assumed by taking into our own hands the suppression of the military rebellion and the breaking up of the Egyptian Army and the destruction of the old Egyptian Constitution, and it requires strong proof indeed to lead us to believe that that provision could be made without some reference to the question of the external relations of Egypt. Well, Sir. I have heard it said that a matter which lay entirely outside this was the question of the Soudan, and that, the Soudan being treated altogether separately from Egypt Proper, the Constitution of Lord Dufferin had nothing to do with it. And, moreover, I have seen it stated—I am not sure that something of the kind did not fall from the Attorney General himself within the last two or three days—that the insurrection of the Mahdi and the proceedings in the Soudan were events such as the House and the country had no right to calculate upon, and which, as it were, took them by surprise. But, Sir, that was not the case. The

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    provisions which Lord Dufferin made, and which he thought sufficient to be made, were made with a perfect knowledge that the war had been going on in the Soudan for nearly two years, and was being carried on with energy and success on the part of the Mahdi, who was the instigator. The noble Lord, too, in the course of his despatch, made special reference to the Soudan, and he said—
    "In considering the military establishments of Egypt, I have left out of account the requirements of the Soudan, nor will it be possible to form an accurate estimate of what would meet the requirements until all these disturbances have been suppressed."
    He knew what these disturbances were, and he knew at the time he was writing the despatch or shortly afterwards what steps were being taken on the part of the Egyptian Government to send a European officer to command in the Soudan, and he had himself frequent conferences with the unfortunate Colonel Hicks, afterwards Hicks Pasha, and it was in consultation with the latter that he made many of the observations which he from time to time transmitted to this country. Lord Dufferin, in the very despatch we are speaking of, argued in this way. He said—
    "Some persons are inclined to recommend Egypt to withdraw altogether from the Soudan, but she can hardly be expected to acquiesce in such a policy."
    That was not only Lord Dufferin's opinion at that time, but in the last Blue Books laid on the Table you will find a despatch written subsequently in defence ex post facto of the proceedings that were taken under General Hicks to recover the Soudan. He points out also that he had every reason to believe that General Hicks was a man of great judgment and ability, and well fitted for the work he had undertaken. He was told distinctly, it is true, by the Government that he was not to incur any responsibility in this matter, and that, of course, was an instruction which governed him in his conduct, and which induced him repeatedly to tell General Hicks that such was the case. I venture to think that the treatment which General Hicks received, beginning from the time when he was first brought into communication with Lord Dufferin to the time when his life was sacrificed,
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    was one of the most extraordinary character, and amounted to the sacrifice of General Hicks. It is perfectly obvious that there were two courses open to the Egyptian Government in the matter of making war in the Soudan. One course would have been to limit the operations to such portions of the Soudan as they could be sure of succeeding in; the other course was to make proper provision for carrying the expeditions further and giving greater power to them. But neither in the one case nor in the other did General Hicks receive that support from the Government—either the Egyptian Government or Her Majesty's Government—which I consider he had every right to expect. Lord Dufferin, in the despatch to which I referred, wound up his observations upon the state of the Soudan by saying that, in his opinion, it would be desirable to limit their operations to the Eastern portion of the Soudan. That was his opinion, and it was the opinion of General Hicks himself, Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Edward Malet, General Stephenson, and others. Notwithstanding this fact, a different course of action was forced upon General Hicks against his own judgment and against his own will, and forced—I do not say by the British Government, but forced by the Egyptian Government, while at the same time they withheld from him—they were not able, I dare say, to supply them—the supplies and assistance which he required; and all that was done with the knowledge of the Representatives of Her Majesty's Ministers in Downing Street. Every piece of information was forwarded immediately to Her Majesty's Government, but they did not lift up their voice in order to prevent the mischief which they must have foreseen. General Hicks was in the first instance appointed while Lord Dufferin was at Cairo. It is said he at first refused the appointment, but was afterwards persuaded to take it. At all events he was not dissuaded. Lord Dufferin at that time thought it reasonable that Egypt should object to give up the Soudan; but he held the opinion that it would be wise to abandon Darfour and part of Kordofan. It does not appear whether he gave advice to this effect. He mentions that he had frequent conversation with General Hicks, and seems to have given his advice on various points, though—

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    "Being strictly precluded by his instructions from incurring any responsibility in connection with the Soudan Expedition, he could not force the Egyptian Government to adopt Hicks's advice."
    He had a final interview with him on the morning of the day on which he started, and
    "Was careful to ask him whether he was satisfied with his prospects and the conditions of his engagement, and he told me that he was."
    Under these circumstances, General Hicks started on his expedition; and it may be noted that he throughout corresponded with, and reported to, the Egyptian authorities through the British; and that Sir Edward Malet or Sir Evelyn Baring always forwarded his communications to Lord Granville. No doubt we disclaimed responsibility; but, at least, we had ample knowledge. Soon afterwards a special bureau was formed in Cairo for the affairs of the Soudan, and Lord Dufferin impressed his opinion on the chief of it. In May, General Hicks reported that he had gained a decisive victory, and the effect was that he could have established Egyptian authority in the districts originally contemplated by Lord Dufferin, though not in Darfour and Kordofan. But he is pressed by the Egyptian Government to go on and attack Kordofan. He appealed for more men and money, and urged Sir Edward Malet to do him the favour of submitting his requests to the Egyptian Government. He gets no help from Sir Edward Malet, who is strictly enjoined—"Take care to offer no advice." At length he is persuaded to undertake the expedition with insufficient means. Matters get worse, and he earnestly appeals to Sir Evelyn Wood, and expresses his conviction that it would be best not to attack Kordofan. He asks for more troops; but General Wood can spare none, because English forces are about to be withdrawn. He advances, and is destroyed. In Egypt 22, at page 27, I find that Sir Edward Malet sends to Lord Granville a communication which he had received from General Hicks, dated Khartoum, June 3, in which he states that during his absence the Mahdi had lost influence, but he had still a considerable number of men with him; and he goes on to say that the forces with him are not nearly sufficient. He points out that every ounce of food will
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    have to be carried a great distance under convoy, and that will leave his available strength under 6,000 men, and that he has not sufficient force for that which he was about to undertake. "Do me the favour," he adds, "to submit this communication to the Egyptian Government." Sir Edward Malet, struck with this, sends it to the Foreign Office, at the same time pointing out that it was impossible for the Egyptian Government to supply the funds demanded for the Soudan, and that the operation ran considerable risk of failure. Under these circumstances, Sir Edward Malet says—
    "The question arises whether General Hicks should be instructed to maintain his present supremacy in the regions between the Blue and White Niles."
    That was just what Lord Dufferin and Sir Edward Malet and everyone desired. What would anyone expect the Home Government to do under these circumstances? Not, of course, to come forward and take part in expeditions which they considered beyond the strength and interest of Egypt. But it was natural that they should give some opinion or some advice for the purpose of warning the Egyptian Government not to press this excellent officer to undertake what he had not sufficient forces to perform. The following was the answer sent to Sir Edward Malet—
    "Your telegram of 5th instant received on reinforcements in the Soudan. Report decision of Egyptian Government as soon as you can, taking care to offer no advice—but pointing out that the Egyptian Government should clearly make up their mind what their policy is to be; and carefully consider the question in its financial aspects."
    This method might be extremely convenient for the Government, and, no doubt, when they had given it, their consciences were satisfied. They considered that, having thus liberated themselves, they might leave the Egyptian Government to go on in its own course, while this unfortunate man, General Hicks, was carrying on an unequal struggle with insufficient means and without receiving from Her Majesty's Government either assistance of a material character—which I do not say they ought to have given—I am not expressing an opinion that this was their duty, but it was their duty to have offered advice to the Egyptian Government, which was entirely in their hands—ad-

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    vice which they would no doubt have given if it had been proposed to incur some small expense in rebuilding a city or opening a canal, or in the administration of the judicial system. But when it comes to be a matter of life and death, this Egyptian Government, which was actually in their hands, which they knew they had the management and direction of, was left to itself. It was not worthy of the dignity of the British Government to stand still, wrapt up in what they considered their own irresponsibility, and which has led, I venture to say to them, and which they must feel in their own consciences now, to their being placed in a position of far greater responsibility for the consequences of their inaction than would have been incurred by their reasonable and proper action at the time. There is another telegram, almost more touching than the previous one, from General Hicks. It was sent later in the year, and is to be found at page 83 of the Blue Book No. 122. It is too long to attempt to read to the House; but I earnestly request hon. Members, who have the opportunity of doing so, to read and consider the terrible and plaintive story which General Hicks there tells to Sir Evelyn Wood, who was put by us as the General in command to administer this Army, which was established for the purpose of keeping down fanatical impostors and wild tribes. He received from General Hicks an urgent request—
    "Will you do me the favour of impressing upon the War Minister the necessity of seeing that money is sent to me for the payment of the troops on the Blue Nile?"
    and then he goes on to give a terrible account of the condition of the country and of the men, and the impossibility, if such provision is not sent, of effecting his object. He winds up with this observation—
    "Taking into consideration the whole state of affairs in this country, I am convinced it would he best to keep the two rivers and the Province of Sennaar, and leave Kordofan to settle itself."
    He had succeeded in establishing himself at an important point. He knew that, without the assistance which he was asking for, and which he could not have, it was impossible for him to effect his object; and when he makes this request, what is the answer he gets? The answer to his representation was made and forwarded on the 13th of August to
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    the British Government; and, among other things, there is a matter which I should draw attention to later on, as to the appointment of the Governor General in Chief. That took place later, and is not, I believe, included in the despatches in the Blue Book. The communication which was made direct to General Hicks from the Khedive was made through some English channel. I am not quite sure what the channel was; but it was in some shape, I presume, in the knowledge of the Government that a telegram was sent direct from the Khedive to General Hicks, appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and urging him to proceed to Kordofan. What is the answer to that terrible appeal? All that Sir Edward Malet answers is—
    "I enclose a copy of the telegram which I despatched to General Hicks on his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, and in which I informed him that, according to instructions, I am debarred from giving advice to the Egyptian Government with regard to the action to be taken, the policy of the Government being to abstain, as much as possible, from interference with the government of the Soudan."
    What is the telegram he communicates to General Hicks?—
    "I congratulate you on your appointment as Commander-in-Chief."
    And then he goes on to say that—
    "Although I am ready to transmit telegrams from the Egyptian Government, I am now debarred from giving advice."
    Was there ever a more bitter satire? Here was this poor man induced to take the full command of this expedition feeling, in all probability, that there was certain destruction before him, and appealing in a helpless and hopeless manner for troops and money to retreat, at least, from the impossible part of his expedition, and to limit himself to that which was possible. I could quote more passages showing that he appealed for help, that he had asked for troops and supplies and money, and that he could not have any of these things. He gets the cold reply—"We have no advice to give; we have much more care for our responsibility than your safety." The Government would seem to have more regard for their responsibility than their honour. I go back for a moment to what took place here since the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Her Majesty, having accomplished the objects of her expedition, thought it a necessary course to make a

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    communication to the Foreign Powers by means of a Circular through Lord Granville, and to this House through the Queen's Speech. In the Queen's Speech of last year reference was made to the success of Her Majesty's land and sea forces in putting down a serious rebellion. A slight discussion took place, as is usual, upon the Address, and I ventured to take notice of the expression used in the Speech, "to put down a serious rebellion," and to ask the noble Lord the Secretary of State for War, who was then leading the House, whether it was understood that whenever there was a serious rebellion in Egypt British troops ought to be sent to suppress it, for I pointed out to him that there was even then going on a somewhat serious rebellion. The noble Lord made these remarks—
    "Troubles may arise from time to time in the Soudan, but it is not certain that they will cause disturbance in the Provinces of Lower Egypt; still, circumstances may arise to cause anxiety, and, at all events, to call for the attention of the Government and of the House."—(3 Hansard, [283] 124.)
    Well, Sir, these disturbances which have occurred since General Hicks's defeat, and, I venture to say, at a considerably earlier time, were calculated to give anxiety for the defence of Lower Egypt. It was one of the main points that was made in the arguments used against the representations in favour of withdrawing from the Soudan, that the defence of Lower Egypt, to a very great extent, depended upon the proper management of the Soudan, and that the defence of Lower Egypt, if the Soudan were left to become a prey to these wild tribes and their fanatical leader, would be both very difficult and extremely expensive. I need not point out that they were bound to see that Egypt Proper was properly protected, and that the fact of neglecting what took place in the Soudan would be to throw upon the Government a much heavier burden than they would otherwise have. So far, I venture to think, the charge I bring against the Government is not merely one of neglect, but one of culpable neglect, of purposed neglect, and purposed neglect is a very serious offence. I do not mean to say that in all the transactions of the Government in the matter of Egypt there has been fault, and that everything has
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    been wrong. It was said the other day that it could hardly be supposed that 14 Gentlemen enjoying the confidence of the Queen and the country could never do anything right. I do not maintain that; but I say throughout these events there has been one fatal fault vitiating all their proceedings—a love of dawdling, a proclaiming their own irresponsibility, and waiting to see if, somehow or other, the crisis would not pass over. I now wish to call attention to what has taken place since the defeat and destruction of General Hicks and his Army. When General Hicks fell the best half of the Egyptian Army was destroyed, and that was the only force which could really be relied upon. It was a very serious loss, and it was one that ought immediately to have awakened the Government to a sense of the extraordinary danger in which Egypt was placed by it, and they ought at once to have taken into their hands—which too late they ultimately did—so much of the administration of Egypt as should enable them to force the Government of Egypt to withdraw, while there was still time, from that which they could not possibly hold. One of the places to which our interest is naturally attracted at the present moment more particularly is Khartoum. What are we told with regard to Khartoum? Lord Granville received on the 9th of January a communication from Sir Evelyn Baring saying that Colonel Coetlogon strongly urged immediate withdrawal, and that if the withdrawal did not take place immediately difficulties would increase, and it might become impossible. The Government had no right to neglect these warnings. They had no right to stand with their arms folded and to say—"Leave matters alone; trust to the Government of Egypt being ready to act." But Her Majesty's Government were going beyond neglect. They were, at the very time of these sufferings and anxieties being brought to their notice, urging forward a step which could not but increase the difficulties and the dangers of the situation. They were actually, at the moment they were receiving these despairing telegrams from General Hicks, proceeding to withdraw Her Majesty's troops from Egypt. They say it would have been wrong to send British or Indian troops to take part in the military operations. I do not raise that question, but that

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    question might fairly be discussed, and there may be something to be said on both sides of it. I wish to bring home to the Government that in that which they were doing they considered themselves responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Lower Egypt. They have admitted that over and over again. They proved that was their belief, because they did ultimately, under pressure, arrest the departure and the withdrawal of the troops; but at the moment that General Hicks was in his greatest difficulties he communicated with Sir Evelyn Wood. He implored that assistance might be sent to him, and what was the answer? "We cannot send you this assistance; you do not understand our difficulties, and cannot know our position;" and it was explained by Sir Evelyn Wood that it was impossible to send troops of the Egyptian Army to defend the frontier, because the Government contemplated the immediate withdrawal of the troops of Her Majesty from Egypt. The Egyptian Government, whose duty it was to manage these matters, who were responsible for the conduct of the war and for furnishing proper supplies and reinforcements to their Generals, were unable to send forward their Army to the scene of action where it was wanted, because they could not leave Cairo in safety. And why could they not leave Cairo in safety? Because of the imminent withdrawal of Her Majesty's troops. The imminent withdrawal operated in that way; and, in addition to that, I need scarcely say that the knowledge of, and the continual circulation of, the news that the British Government were just about to carry out that withdrawal had a very disastrous moral effect. I might enlarge on other points, but I am unwilling to detain the House. There is one on which, of course, all our minds are fixed—namely, the mission of General Gordon. But on that point I am anxious, on the present occasion, to say little or nothing; and for this reason—General Gordon is now engaged in an attempt of the most gallant and daring character. No one can speak with too much admiration of his courage and self-devotion; no one in this country can fail to sympathize with him and earnestly desire his safety. It would be the greatest possible misfortune if by any words accidentally or carelessly dropped,
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    here or elsewhere, anything were done that could in the slightest degree imperil or destroy the success of his mission. All I will say is, that I trust that the Government are not proceeding in the case of General Gordon as they have done in too many instances; that they are not throwing all the responsibility upon him and leaving none on themselves; that they are not confusing his position and leaving him uncertain as to whose servant he is and to whom he is responsible. I think there has been far too much of that. What is the position of Admiral Hewett? No one knows what is the position of the gallant Admiral, now holding the chief command of our Naval Squadron in the Indian Seas, and who also has received the chief civil and military command at Suakim. What, I ask, are that gallant Admiral's duties, and what is his position both towards Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government? It is clear now that both in the case of General Gordon and Admiral Hewett, Her Majesty's Government have distinctly and unmistakably taken upon themselves responsibilities of the most serious character—responsibilities far greater than those which they would have incurred if they had in time given a word of advice and support to the unfortunate Khedive's Government. I will not dwell on the serious character of the events which are happening in Egypt. What has happened has, it seems to me, both endangered the safety of Lower Egypt itself and devolved considerable risk and responsibility on Her Majesty's Government. But, besides that, look at the result of what you have done within the last few weeks, when Lord Granville came down with his thunder-bolt on the Egyptian Ministry, and insisted on their following his counsels, or rather orders, and withdrawing from the Soudan against their own opinions and protests, by the bold and confident assertion that the true responsibilities in these matters rested not with them but with us. If that was the doctrine of Her Majesty's Government it would have been well if it had been acted upon long ago, when it might have prevented the mischief that has occurred. Now, what has happened? Your breaking up of the Ministry has been the breaking up of the Constitution which you have been so proud of rearing. How will you be able to restore the position of the Egyptian Government

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    after you have so manifestly, so openly, and so rudely shattered it by an interposition of that kind? You have raised questions which it will he long before you have settled—you have greatly enhanced the difficulty of establishing such a state of things as will enable you to withdraw your forces from Egypt. I do not know, indeed, whether you have not brought yourselves under the necessity of immediately adding to them. Already we hear of some additions which have been made to them; but are these all? We await anxiously for the information which the Prime Minister has promised to give us to-night. We wish to know how he reads the responsibilities of England, not only to Egypt, but in the eyes of Europe—responsibilities which Her Majesty's Government not only undertook, but undertook alone, and boasted that they had undertaken alone, and with the assurance that they would be discharged in a manner agreeable to the maintenance of peace and to the prosperity of Egypt. The loss to this country may be serious. Probably we shall see the closing of the great trade route from the equatorial lakes to the Bed Sea; you will see a stimulus given to the Slave Trade; you will see a great check given to the beneficent efforts to open the interior of Africa, in which many feel so deep an interest; and you will have weakened throughout that country, and, perhaps, throughout the civilized world, the prestige of England; and this at the very time when a great impulse is being given to Mahomedanism by the success of a fanatical leader. I will not trespass longer on the attention of the House. I have endeavoured to bring home to the notice of the House, and, as far as I could, to the notice of the Government, that which we feel to be the root of all these difficulties—their own vacillating and inconsistent policy. I trust the House which has so long maintained the Government will remember that it also has its responsibility, which cannot possibly be got rid of by saying we leave these things to the Government in which we have confidence. Your confidence in the Government is now challenged, and you have to consider not whether you desire to support it, but whether you can consistently with your own conscientious views of these grave matters refrain any longer from interfering. The Government have had
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    liberal indulgence from Parliament. The opposition that has been offered to them, although there has been opposition, has always been tempered with a desire, as far as possible, to allow the Government to act on their own responsibility. But this cannot endure for ever. It is our duty to challenge them, and we feel that we should be wanting in our duty to the country and to the Empire if we did not present to the House the issue involved in the Resolution which I now, Sir, with confidence place in your hands. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That this House, having read and considered the Correspondence relating to Egypt, laid upon the Table by Her Majesty's Command, is of opinion that the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due, in a great measure, to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government."—(Sir Stafford Northcote.)
    MR. GLADSTONE: Mr. Speaker, we have lost, but we have also gained, by the unfortunate collapse of the debate last week. The Government lost an opportunity—when a contention had been made of the failure of its efforts in Lower Egypt—of showing that they had not failed; but the House have had this advantage, that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) has been able to make his Motion on the basis of authentic Papers, instead of on newspaper reports. Moreover, they have had this greater advantage, that after the calamities which have recently happened in Egypt, he has felt that those calamities warrant him doing what last week he did not venture to do—namely, to submit a direct issue to the House. Why, what did he submit last week? He submitted that we could not adequately perform our part in Egypt unless we acknowledged our obligations. We have been doing nothing but acknowledging our obligations in the most solemn form. They have been defined and described three times over in the Speeches from the Throne. There was not a word in the debate of last week to tell us what these obligations were. Everything positive, everything binding, was carefully avoided, and the House was invited in the name of a Tote of Censure to discuss a truism and a platitude. But the right hon. Gentleman has now, as I say, plucked up his cour-

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    age and has submitted to us a direct issue of adequate force, for in the terms of his Motion he calls on us to allege that—
    "The recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due, in a great measure, to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government."
    [Cheers from the Opposition.] Yes; you are ready to cheer those words, or any words, it matters not what, provided only that they are sufficiently condemnatory of Her Majesty's Ministry. [Renewed Opposition cheers.] I am delighted with the frank and truly English response which that affirming; cheer gives to the sentiment I have indicated. I was not sanguine enough to hope for it. I admit that it was in the nature of a decoy offered to hon. Gentlemen; and they took it and cheered it to the echo when I said it did not matter whether the proposal was this or that, provided it was condemnatory. Now, Sir, I put it to the House that there is but one mode in which Her Majesty's Government can meet the Motion. I move no Amendment; I meet it with a direct negative. I say, in the first place, there has been no vacillation; there has been no inconsistency in the policy of Her Majesty's Government; and, Sir, I say more, that no part of the ingenious argument of the right hon. Gentleman has for a moment gone to show that there was either vacillation or inconsistency. I admit that he has condemned our conduct; but he has not attempted to show that one part of our conduct was inconsistent with another part. He has not shown that we hesitated in the adoption of resolutions when the circumstances were laid before us; and the propositions in his Motion do not derive the smallest support from any argument in his speech. The right hon. Gentleman has used arguments in his speech, I admit; but his argument is this, not that we vacillated or flinched—I mean from our own view of the case—not that we were different at one time from what we were at another, but that we adopted a wrong policy; that we refused to strengthen the Egyptian Army for the conquest of the Soudan; that we refused to counsel the Egyptian General in the Soudan; and that we refused to override the Egyptian Government with respect to the Soudan. Sir, these are very serious charges, with which I shall
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    deal, but they have nothing to do with vacillation or inconsistency.
    What the right hon. Gentleman calls upon the House to vote is, not that we have had a false policy, but that we have been vacillating and inconsistent in the pursuance of our policy; and, Sir, do you suppose for one moment that these strange inconsistencies between the speech and the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman are due to some accident—that they are due to a want of perception or want of acuteness on the part of the right hon. Gentleman? No, Sir, nothing of the kind; they are due to this—that if the right hon. Gentleman, instead of charging us with vacillation and inconsistency, had plucked up his courage to a higher point, and called upon the House to condemn any particular portion of our policy by a Motion, he would himself have been obliged to declare a policy. But while he, forsooth, charges us with flinching from responsibility, he does not dare to put his objections in a form in which they could receive the judgment of the House, because he knows that if he did he might bind himself to something; whereas the essence of the whole affair is that he shall bind himself to nothing. I must say that the right hon. Gentleman, considering the nature of the case that he had to lay before us, has been very far from extravagant. I have risen somewhat in contravention of my own statement of Parliamentary usage, in a case which is a very broad one, at a time when I am afraid I shall be a loser in a competition which will presently arise in this House between continuing in this House to hear my argument and the fulfilment of a very much more necessary, if not more legitimate purpose. Whether I am justified in the charge I have just made—and I have made a very distinct charge—that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman had nothing whatever to do with his Motion, and that he did not venture to put the upshot of his speech into a Motion, because it would have bound him to a policy, and he was determined not to bind himself to any policy—whether this be so or not, I say that this debate has a wider interest than the mere issue raised between the two Parties. I shall not scruple, as far as my strength permits me, to say to the House all that appears to me of vital importance, in order to re-

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    deem the pledges I have given, to practise no reserve, and to state minutely and particularly those facts that are material to enable the House to judge of our conduct. But I must go beyond that and say that this debate will have the character of a historical debate. Now for the first time is raised a great issue between Parties in this House, but that great issue involves in it something much more important than the victories of Oppositions or the continuance of Ministries; it involves the development of great and useful lessons with regard to rash and unwise interventions. I will, at least, take care that I shall be sufficiently explicit in what I have got to say. It is absolutely necessary to go further back than the right hon. Gentleman has done, and to present, in what I conceive to be its completeness, the case of the Government.
    Sir, the situation in Egypt, with or without the aggravation of the Soudan and the increase of the responsibilities which it has brought, is one of the utmost degree of anomaly and inconvenience, and, in some points of view perhaps, even of political danger. How has this situation come about? Where is the root of the mischief? It is the business of the House to censure the Government if they have gone wrong; but it is the business of the House, as the Guardians of the public weal, to search to the very bottom into the causes and origins of great public disaster or of great and serious public inconvenience. Sir, I affirm, and I will show, that the situation in Egypt was not one which we made, but one that we found. I shall show that we have never had an option. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"] I am not prematurely claiming your assent, I am stating what I will show, not what I have shown. I will show that we do not claim those laudations for vigorous initiatives and the like, which have been sweet, perhaps, to the ears of others.
    We are content to administer the affairs of an Empire of 300,000,000, and as far as we can to keep the enormous interests of that fifth or fourth part of the population of this globe within the limits, already wide enough, which history, Providence, and the genius of the country have assigned to them. But, Sir, it would not have been in keeping with the propriety of things to reverse the attitude which we found occupied
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    by the British Government in Egypt. We inherited from our Predecessors certain engagements—["Oh, oh!" from the Opposition]—see whether I make good my words or not; from those engagements it has never been in our power honourably to escape. Sir, what the country knows is perhaps not much of this case. They know that there was established in Egypt what was termed the Dual Control. But what was the Dual Control? It was the establishment in the heart and centre of Egyptian Government of two great functionaries, the Representatives of two of the greatest nations in the world, who held their office in Egypt, and for Egypt, by a tenure independent of the will of Egypt, and dependent altogether upon the will of the two Governments they represented. For what did these two nations go there? [Cheers.] The right hon. Gentleman can contradict me if I am inaccurate. I say they went there pledged to each other for certain purposes. It was not merely to manage the Revenues in the interests of the bondholders; it was general control, general advice, general support to the Government of Egypt. The late Ruler of Egypt had been displaced, a new Ruler had been put upon the Throne, by the agency, mainly, of the British Government—at any rate, with an essential, and, at least, equal share in the operation. The two Governments had undertaken obligations towards that Ruler, and, in my opinion, those obligations were, when they had once established this extraordinary system, matters strictly and essentially consequential. They could hot possibly have put Tewfik on the Throne and have declined to support him; and they bound themselves to one another to support him, and to support him earnestly. They bound themselves, likewise, to one another, while those were their obligations to him, to maintain the peculiar, and, in a certain sense, exclusive political influence, that these two Powers, and these alone, were to exercise in Egypt. Under these circumstances, it was obvious that we were bound to counsel the Khedive to the best of our ability. I do not speak now of the action of the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). The right hon. Gentleman knows that my remarks have nothing to do with his proceedings in Egypt. They have no-

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    thing to do with any of the proceeding's of the late Government in the earlier part of its existence. They have to do with the Dual Control established under Lord Salisbury; and my contention is that when we placed independent officers, representative of England and France, to hold office in Egypt, by a tenure in no way dependent on Egypt, we were bound—indeed, Lord Salisbury has always admitted this—to counsel the Khedive to the best of our ability.
    The next contention is that if we counselled the Khedive to the best of our ability, we were bound, by every sentiment of honour, to support our counsels by our acts, [Cheers and counter cheers.] It is a singular pleasure to me when I find myself in concurrence, as has happened already once or twice, with hon. Gentlemen opposite. It has been admitted that when difficulties arose in the country—such as the difficulties of the year before last—we were bound to give, by the position we occupied, our advice to the Khedive upon all those difficulties; and, having given that advice, we were bound to support it, by consequent action, to such an extent as circumstances might appear to demand, subject, of course, to the judgment of Parliament. I am not in the habit of going back upon statements of my own; but I must say that all these obligations, and all the difficulties they involved, ought to have been foreseen. I must say that the late Government, when they built up this curious system, did it with their eyes open. They were not unwarned of what would happen. They were not unwarned that the establishment of financial control by a Government must mean political control and must involve political responsibilities. I hope it will not be an unpardonable breach of manners if, happening to recollect what I myself said upon the subject, I read an extract, reported in Hansard on the 6th of March, 1876; not corrected by me, but expressing with substantial accuracy what I said. This was at the very first beginning of this intervention, and no control such as I now speak of was established for some considerable time, I think three years afterwards. This was the warning I ventured to give—
    "I should, therefore, wish to know whether, if the proposition for the appointment of such a Commissioner be entertained, the right hon.
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    Gentleman (that was Lord Beaconsfield) means the appointment of a Commissioner who would really have such an effective control over all arrangements and the mode of accounting for these revenues that he could guarantee to us the receipt of the whole, that it might he applied to the purpose in view? If this is what it does mean, it appears to me that we are only shifting the difficulty one step further; because in that case our Commissioner is to take into his hands the administration of a very important portion of the government of Egypt; so that the measures which we may think necessary as a matter of prudence to cover the proposal which we are to consider may entail upon us still greater difficulties and mix us up still further with a heavier responsibility for a portion of the internal government of Egypt. When we have begun with one portion of the internal government of Egypt we may pass on to another. We may come to occupy the entire ground by a series of degrees not difficult to contemplate, and possibly this may have been in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman the other night, when he said that while the people of this country would view the diminution of the Empire with horror, they would see it increased without dissatisfaction."—(3 Hansard, [227] 1452–6.)
    Thus I ventured to point out what, I do not think, I deserve the smallest credit for pointing out—namely, that these arrangements, then in partial contemplation, afterwards greatly developed and rigidly enforced, did advance from financial to political, and from political to probably territorial responsibilities. I have no charge of ill motives to make against the late Government. In my opinion they committed a great error, of which we are now from day to day bearing the burden. I give them every credit for honourable and upright motives. Though I then disapproved of the means, and now I do not need to say still more deeply lament these means were resorted to; yet I am fully persuaded that the object which the late Government had in view was to secure a better Government for Egypt. Further, I admit that very considerable practical and administrative advantages were secured for the fellaheen by the administration of the Revenue, although I am afraid those were far more than counterbalanced in their political importance by our having imported into the country that fatal and most dangerous idea that it was doomed to be placed under foreign domination, and that Egypt was to be governed and maintained for the benefit of persons beyond its portals. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Hear, hear!] The noble Lord cheers me, and there is very

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    great truth in what I take to be the meaning of that cheer. He probably thinks that Arabi was one who fought against that foreign domination. That is not my view. I think I could give conclusive proof to the contrary; but of this I do not entertain a doubt that Arabi was able to give vigour and extension to his motives by appealing to that hatred of foreign domination; and so long as foreign domination continues in Egypt, the danger will recur from time to time. So far I have said something to show that I do not use idle words when I allege that the situation which we have now in Egypt was, in its root and origin, far beyond the power of such prosaic people as the present Ministers to conceive it was due to higher and more venturesome geniuses, such as those who preceded us. There has been no moment at which it was possible for us, consistently with our honour, to retrace our course; and we must look back as well as forward if we want to place before the English people, the people of the Three Kingdoms all the lessons of this great question which is far greater than the right hon. Gentleman would have us believe.
    I have spoken thus far of the situation in Egypt down to the close of the military operations; and I will adopt divisions of time in what I have to say for the purpose of being more intelligible to the House, and depriving myself of the power of using subterfuge, even if I were, which I trust is not the case, inclined to resort to it. The close of the military operations was, I think, on the 21st of September, 1882, the time of the surrender of Damietta, the battle of Tel-el-Kebir having been eight days or something like that before. The right hon. Gentleman has placed the pith of his charge during the 13 months between the surrender of Damietta and the defeat of Hicks Pasha, in November, 1883. He is extremely angry with us because, in our cowardice, our timidity about responsibility, we did not take enough of responsibility for the Soudan. Well, we had to begin with taking a good deal of responsibility upon us. We had taken the responsibility of military operations. The Army was entirely broken up; the institutions of the country were gone. We had before us the work of reconstitution. Our obligation in honour to
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    support the Khedive bound us, in our opinion, to supply him with means of the defence and with some primary means of good government. In those 13 months what was the course we took? We sent to Egypt the very best men of every class and stamp that we could find, from Lord Dufferin to General Gordon, from the first to the last; though I might go back to Sir Edward Malet, but it would be too long to enumerate the list of able, upright, patriotic men who have been serving the interest of Egypt with our concurrence and authority; but from Lord Dufferin to General Gordon they were men as remarkable for their ability and fitness for their work as any men that have ever been in the political service of the British Crown. I am not going to say because they were able men they were responsible for what was done; but I am going to say that, at least, by choosing men of that vigour and masculine force of character, and that consumate skill in affairs, we did not take the course which might be taken by those who were undoubtedly anxious to shirk their proper responsibility. We endeavoured to go to the root of the matter, and to put into action all those reforms which it was clearly necessary we should endeavour to make. If we were bound to support the Khedive, we were bound to support him earnestly—and I am sorry to say that the right hon. Gentleman has been extremely reticent on that subject—and, if we were bound to support the Khedive earnestly, we were bound to have some regard also for his people; and if we endeavoured to give security to his Throne by the constitution of something like an adequate military force, we were bound also to do what we could in seconding what we not only believe, but what we knew, to be his own good, upright, and patriotic intentions for the Government of Egypt and the good of his people. Was nothing done in that period? New tribunals for Natives were organized, and I believe I may say that they are at work—at any rate, the Codes have been for some time completed, and the Judges have been appointed; the legislative institutions—hardly, I admit, worthy of that name—they would, perhaps, be more accurately called consultative institutions, but intended to give some moderate expression to the national life, have been framed, and the scheme has been

    709
    carried into execution. Elections have taken place, and the Legislative Council met last November at the very epoch of the disaster to General Hicks's force. It will be remembered what grievances there were with regard to the undue employment of foreigners and the non-taxation of foreigners. With respect to the undue employment of foreigners, great efforts have been made, which it may be possible to exhibit more fully in the shape of numerical results at a future stage, largely to cut them down. The non-taxation of foreigners is no easy matter to deal with. It is liable to be met by jealousies in every quarter. However, the actual state of the case is this, that that exceptional and odious practice has been given up, of course, by us, and not by us alone, but by France, Italy, Germany, and Austria—in truth, I believe I may say by nearly every Power in any way concerned. The land survey which the right hon. Gentleman, I think, referred to the other night, has been economized, and what is thought a new and better system for conducting it has been introduced. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that in our 13 months of occupation we ought to have completed our land survey; but when I reflect that, in the half-century during which I have been a Member of this House, I have been accustomed to hear of successive Votes for the completion of our National Cadastral Survey, it does not seem to me that an excessive term has been occupied in this matter in Egypt. A valuable Report has been made upon irrigation by Mr. Moncrieff, and, I trust, great benefit is to be expected from it. With regard to the constabulary and police, the constabulary was organized in what appeared to be an effective form for its purposes under Baker Pasha. The police is certainly under the most efficient handling we could give it, being in the hands of Mr. Clifford Lloyd. I believe, and have been informed, that the prisons have undergone considerable, at all events initial, reforms. I will not refer to Sanitary Departments, and other matters; but there are several very important matters, such as the debts of the fellaheen, which have not escaped attention, and a Commission has been appointed for the consideration of that question. The slave traffic to which the right hon.
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    Gentleman refers has not been forgotten, and the charge of all measures relating to it has been transferred to what I believe to be the best and most efficient Department—namely, the Department of the Inspector General of Constabulary, with an increase of means, and a better system for including the principal routes now under reformation. The only other point I will mention that is vital to the whole is, that the Army has been organized under the able auspices of Sir Evelyn Wood. All the Reports of officers show that its discipline is as high as, indeed higher than, it was possible or reasonable for us to expect. I have only now to say that instead of having failed in carrying forward these institutions, we were justified in advising Her Majesty to declare in the Speech from the Throne that down to the month of November last, in the execution of this exceedingly heavy and responsible work, she had ample reason to be satisfied with the progress which had been made.
    I wish to say two or three words, however, upon the exact position which we hold in Egypt, for it is material that it should be accurately understood. At one moment the right hon. Gentleman cast upon us great responsibility for having shattered the Government of Egypt, which, he said, it may be impossible to replace with dignity and credit before the people. But not many sentences before in his speech he had reproached us with at least equal vigour for not shattering that Government long before. It will be in the recollection of the House when I affirm that again and again he stated how it was our business to have forced upon the Egyptian Government, much earlier than we did, the adoption of principles and methods of action, to which we have been unhappily compelled to resort. In my opinion, this shattering of the Egyptian Government is a very serious matter indeed. It is an essential portion of our policy to uphold the Egyptian Government with all the credit and dignity we can. We bound ourselves to that, and therefore we do not wish to make any demand upon the Egyptian Government except that which necessity requires. But, Sir, as the Power in military occupation of the country, we are after all primarily responsible in those matters which we

    711
    deem vital to the purpose for which we went there. It is a great mistake to suppose that we have taken out of the hands of the Egyptian Government the whole important administration of the country. We have done nothing of the sort. We have only conveyed to the Egyptian Government, at a serious crisis, a clear knowledge of this fact, that our military occupation entails upon us the obligation and duty—where we have no doubt as to the right and propriety of the thing to be done, or as to its importance—of seeing that, if we are to remain in the country, the course which we recommend shall be adopted. It is true, Sir, that upon all these vital points we have have taken, and shall continue to take, all the power necessary for our purpose. We do not seek more. We should think it wrong to take it. We are under engagements earnestly to support the Khedive. We think it would be a most unfortunate policy were we to show indifference in the matter. We cannot concur with those Gentlemen who say we should sweep the Egyptian Government away, and govern the country by English functionaries. I am not willing to undertake a thing which would result in setting up any sentiment adverse to foreign domination. And though we will firmly and resolutely go up to the point when necessity calls us, we will not willingly go beyond that point. I must remind the House that the difficult, onerous, and inconvenient—some may think it the almost hopeless—task which we have undertaken is that, first, of putting down disorder in Egypt, and then of establishing at least some beginnings of tolerable government. That task is also one of considerable delicacy. It is one which we are executing, not alone on our own behalf, but on behalf, I may say, of civilized mankind. We undertook it with the approval of the Powers of Europe, the highest and most authentic organ of modern Christian civilization; but, having undertaking it at their invitation, or with their concurrence, we must fulfil it as we received it from them. I know sometimes the word "Protectorate" is spoken of. If it is not spoken of in its technical sense, and it is only meant by that that we must have full and plenary power to do what our purpose requires in Egypt, I agree with it. But
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    it is a dangerous word, because it has a technical and a legal meaning. I may remind the House that we have ourselves held a Protectorate. We had a Protectorate over the Ionian Islands, but that Protectorate was imposed upon us by the united voice of the Powers of Europe; and even now Austria, in Bosnia, having taken over the administration of that Province and Herzegovina, has done so by the united voice and invitation of the Powers of Europe. The point is as to sufficiency of control, and it is to that, therefore, that we shall look. We conclude it to be absolutely included in the purpose of our mission, and we should go beyond what the purpose required were we to insist on more than that. I may remind the House of an analogy I think worthy of their notice—I mean the analogy of the Indian Protected States. Now, Sir, in the case of these States, our power is, I may say, absolute; we are under no restraint of European law. Those States are enclavis within our own Dominions; our intervention becomes a matter of absolute practical necessity; but what do we do? We send an agent there, and take care that he shall have all the power necessary for efficiency; but we take care, also, that he shall have no more; and we leave, in its native vigour and its dignity before the people of those countries, the Native Adminisstration, which, depend upon it, they love far more than foreign domination. Pew, indeed, are the peoples so degraded and so lost to every noble sentiment, that it shall be a matter of indifference to them whether they are governed by persons who belong to the same political Constitution with themselves, or whether they are governed by those who come from a remote quarter, with foreign instincts, foreign sympathies, and foreign objects. Such was our case in Egypt until we came to the month of November last year.
    Now, I pass to the Soudan, and there I will take three periods—first, the period before the defeat of Hicks; next, the period between the defeat of Hicks and the defeat of Baker; and then the period which, I admit, the House has the right to scrutinize most narrowly—namely, that between the 5th February last week and the 12th February, on which I have the honour of addressing the House. Now, Sir, I directly traverse the assertion of the right hon. Gentleman

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    with regard to the period before the defeat of Hicks Pasha. I have already observed that there was not a word of his accusations that bore upon the question of vacillation or inconsistency at all, and I am not now going to discuss his Motion at all. I hope, Sir, I shall not be called to Order, because if I am discussing a matter not contained in the Motion before the House, I am bound to say that the same objection may be taken to every word of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. Sir, what the right hon. Gentleman charged upon us was false policy. I told you why he does not venture to put it into his Motion? If he did he would be bound to show a true policy. What true policy has he shown to-night? What approach to it, what sketch, what shadow, what outline, what shred or patch to one? It is all very well to say that what we have done is wrong; but, notwithstanding the ingenious efforts of the right hon. Gentleman to shirk pointing out to us anything like a policy, there are certain indications which it is difficult for him to efface from critical remark. He says we are greatly responsible for these disasters, that we cannot—and in this I quite concur—escape responsibility by saying we are not responsible, and then came in his simile of the pistol. He never pointed out to us what the pistol was. He did not explain his own parallel; and I suspect it would rather puzzle him to do so. What the right hon. Gentleman contended was virtually this, that we ought to have taken into our own hands the business of advising Egypt upon the war. He began with saying that we ought to have seen that Egypt was supplied with such an army of her own as would have carried on the war with effect.
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I did not say that we ought to have supplied an army.
    MR. GLADSTONE: I am speaking now, not of a British Army, but that in our reformatory operations in Egypt we ought to have included the provision of such an army—of such Egyptian Army. Now, I affirm most distinctly that we ought not, and that if we had done so, we should have undertaken what was impossible, what was unreasonable, what was beyond our position of competency, and what was probably unjust. It is all very well for the right
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    hon. Gentleman to point to the smallness of Sir Evelyn Wood's army, and to say that a larger army would have been requisite in order to send to General Hicks the supplies which, when, unhappily, he got into difficulties, he came to want. How were these men to be supplied, Sir? Where were the funds to supply them? Is Egypt so rich a country? Egypt is in financial difficulties. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Now.] Egypt was long ago, when the right hon. Gentleman had to do with it himself, in financial difficulties. The financial difficulties were then the excuse for our most unfortunate intervention. But I say that this was impossible, for Egypt had no means to constitute such an Army.
    MR. BOURKE: They were obliged.
    MR. GLADSTONE: They found the means of constituting Hicks' Army; but that is not the charge, and I hope when the right hon. Gentleman interrupts me he will not do so for a purpose of forcing me to circumlocution. The charge is that it ought to have been a better and more considerable Army, able to meet the wants of Hicks when he had undertaken this charge. That is the charge which I traverse by a direct denial, and by saying, in the first place, it was impossible to constitute such an Army. Even had it been possible to constitute such an Army, when we received from the Powers of Europe our commission with regard to Egypt, we received no such commission with regard to the Soudan.
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Where is the commission?
    MR. GLADSTONE: The commission is in the records of the Conference at Constantinople, immediately before the operations in Egypt; and I may also say that it was quite sufficiently recited in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman to-night, when he spoke of the relations which the Powers of Europe bad assumed towards the work we had in Egypt. In that work, in their view, there was no question of conducting the conquest or re-conquest of the Soudan. But has the right hon. Gentleman made up his mind with regard to the relations between Egypt and the Soudan? Has he ever considered what the Egyptian people think of the Soudan? Is he aware that if there is one thing that the Egyptian has in horror of more than another, it is being called upon to

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    carry on the war in the Soudan? Is he aware that the Army of Sir Evelyn Wood was organized expressly without the obligation to serve in the Soudan? And if he is aware of these things, what does he mean by saying that it was our business to constitute a sufficient Egyptian Army to supply the demands of Hicks Pasha, as these might grow under the necessities of the time, and to enable Egypt to reconquer the Soudan? But what is the case of the Soudan? The other night, when I was referring to a paragraph in which something had been said about the Mahdi, I entirely declined to give any opinion about the Mahdi. I know this—and now I am speaking in conformity with the opinions of the man whom I look upon as by far the highest authority on the subject—I mean the opinions of General Gordon. The Soudan is a vast country, equal in size to France, Germany, and Spain—a desert country, as he states, with a deadly climate, inhabited thinly by sparse and warlike tribes; but still it is the country of those tribes. They love it as their country. The right hon. Gentleman seems to me to have made up his mind—his whole speech shows it—that Egypt is in the right in subjecting that country, and in sending Turks, Circassians, and Anatolians to govern it. Sir, I have not made up my mind to any such thing. I decline to enter into that controversy. We have refused—and I believe the House will approve our refusing—to have anything to do with the reconquest of the Soudan. During all my political life, I am thankful to say that I have never opened my lips in favour of a domination such as that which has been exercised by certain countries upon certain other countries, and I am not going now to begin. I look upon the possession of the Soudan—I will not say as a crime, because that would be going a great deal too far; but I look upon it as the calamity of Egypt. It has been a drain on her treasury; it has been a drain on her men. I believe it is estimated that 100,000 Egyptians have laid down their lives in endeavouring to maintain that barren conquest; and at this moment, when your sympathies have been justly excited on behalf of 500 men in Tokar, and on behalf of 500 men who were in Sinkat, there are 29,000 Egyptian soldiers, or soldiers in the service of the Khedive, scattered
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    over that enormous region. In those circumstances, I utterly repudiate and repel the doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman, that it was our duty to construct a military system for Egypt, by which—I am supposing now that she had the means, which she had not—she would have been able to reestablish in its fulness the reconquest of the Soudan. The right hon. Gentleman has challenged me to-night. I challenge him. He asks us to pronounce on vacillation and inconsistency, and we are ready to pronounce upon it. I ask him to put into a Motion that which was the pith and essence of his speech tonight—namely, that the Egyptian military system ought to have been constituted for the full support of Hicks and the reconquest of the Soudan, and to take the judgment of the House upon it.
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I never said anything of the sort.
    MR. GLADSTONE: The right hon. Gentleman does not seem very fond of responsibility as to the meaning of what he says. What were his touching pictures of the inhuman conduct of Sir Edward Malet, who would not give a little advice to General Hicks? Does the right hon. Gentleman think that it was in our power to advise General Hicks as to the conduct of the war without becoming responsible for the war? I say that responsibility for the war directly followed upon our undertaking to advise as to the conduct of it. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Oh, no!] The right hon. Gentleman thinks not. That is the very dignified course he would take. To say, "Hicks, you should march here, and, Hicks, you should march there." Yes; to say here to go and there to advance, and if he advanced and succeeded, we should have the credit; if he advanced and failed—Oh, "No, no!" says the noble Lord (Lord Randolph Churchill) opposite—"we are not at all responsible. We could not advise without becoming responsible." Well, I do not stand alone upon that, because the House will recollect that in the most distinct manner the right hon. Gentleman constructed the first division of his speech upon the insufficiency of the Egyptian Army which we had created, or which it was our duty to create, in order to enable this war to be carried on.
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Or to limit the purpose to which it was to be applied.
    MR. GLADSTONE: I will follow the right hon. Gentleman—"or to limit the purpose to which it was to be applied." I examine his words. What do they mean? They mean the shattering of the Egyptian Government. The Egyptian Government was determined to adhere to the whole of the Soudan, and I cannot much blame them. They had been for 60 years in possession of it. They had struggled to hold it. The success of Hicks was remarkable. On almost every occasion he had defeated the Mahdi, and I believe the Egyptian Government would have laughed in our faces if we had attempted to force upon them the abandonment of the Soudan. We had no business to enforce our counsels upon the Egyptian Government, except in cases which we knew to be essential for our purposes in Egypt. How did the right hon. Gentleman know, or how did we know, when the Mahdi was driven back at every point, that the Egyptian Government would not be able to hold its own? He says we ought to have restricted the limits of the shattered Egyptian Government, because it did not conform to our views in giving up what was no essential part of the Egypt in which we interfered. Well, we should have again become responsible for the retention of that part, as we should have given Egypt her charter to that part, and that part would have been just as liable to the fear of foreign domination as the rest. I decline—and let the right hon. Gentleman get the House to censure us for it if he likes—to become a party to maintain that foreign domination. Well, I think I have shown that it was not our mission to deal with the Soudan at all, and if we had advised upon the conduct of the war, we should have inevitably become responsible for a war when Egypt was perfectly impotent to do more than she did, which was to create the army which Hicks Pasha thought sufficient. [Mr. BOURKE: No.] But the right hon. Gentleman read it out, and now a right hon. Gentleman sitting by his side contradicts him. We have every reason to believe that the people of Egypt—not the ruling classes, but the people—detest this war; while we have very great reason to doubt whether this war
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    is based on those considerations of honour, and interest, and just necessity and regard for the welfare of the governed, which alone can render any war tolerable or endurable for a moment in the sight of a Christian.
    I think I have pretty well gone through what the right hon. Gentleman has said upon the subject. He referred to Lord Dufferin's opinion about the limits to which the Soudan ought to be restricted, and I refer to that opinion because it is a matter of great weight. I am sorry it did not weigh with the Egyptian Government. It was the opinion of an intelligent friend, though not of a responsible Government, for Lord Dufferin did not speak on our behalf; but the rejection of that opinion, combined with the high estimation in which the Egyptian Government held Lord Dufferin, is a clear proof of the importance which they attached to the holding of the Soudan, and that it was not possible for us to interfere with them until it had been irresistibly shown that for them to attempt to hold the Soudan would be an insane sacrifice of the best interests of Egypt.
    Sir, I am very much obliged to the House for the patience with which they have heard me thus far, and I am glad to say that I am making progress. After the defeat of Hicks—this is the second period—our position was entirely changed. We deemed that that defeat—especially when it was followed up by a second defeat—the knowledge of which reached us about three weeks later—was a distinct proof that it was impossible to hold the Soudan in any manner tolerably satisfactory, and that consequently it was our duty to speak frankly and boldly upon the matter, because the Soudan had assumed a question not of £100,000 a-year, as was the old story, but it had assumed a character such as to make it evident that if the struggle were to be continued, it would suck the life-blood from the heart of Egypt.
    I will now give the House very rapidly and succinctly the course of events simply by dates. On the 19th November came the first report of the defeat of Hicks. On the 20th November we thought that, supposing that news to be true, we were at once justified in saying to our Agent—"If consulted, recommend the abandonment of the Soudan within certain limits." On the 21st we came to

    719
    know the defeat of Hicks. There were subsequently rumours casting doubt upon it; but we believed it on the 21st. The Government then had to consider it, and consider the very grave measure of interrupting the course of the withdrawal of our troops, which had, down to that time in all its stages, proceeded with perfect satisfaction. On the 25th we suspended the evacuation of Cairo. On the 26th we found we were, unfortunately, at issue with the Egyptian Government. They were, in the first place, not so certain of the news as we were. In the second place, they were contemplating assistance from the Turkish Government, and that, also, was a very serious question. It was very difficult to deny their right to contemplate assistance from Turkey, and very difficult, under certain circumstances, to deny the right of Turkey to give that assistance. But those were the reasons why we could not proceed peremptorily in the matter. We found they were disposed, if they could, to hold the Soudan, and, at any rate, to wait a while for fuller ascertainment of the facts before they took a positive course. That was on the 26th November. They determined to wait, and take in hand, in some manner, this communication with Turkey, of which I am not sure that we are directly cognizant with the particulars. On the 8th December came the second defeat. That was a heavy blow, succeeding a frightful blow; and on the 12th December the Egyptian Government at length stated that they were ready to be guided by us in respect to the Soudan. Did we vacillate or hesitate? On the 13th December, the very next day, we telegraphed our deliberate decision that the Egyptian Government should withdraw from the Soudan, and should confine its efforts to maintaining the Valley of the Nile as far as Assouan, which is the limit, I think, of Egypt Proper, or, at all events, if there were strong military reasons for their going further, as far as Wadi Hafit, which is farther up the Valley. Well, I am not going to censure Cherif Pasha and his colleagues. Their difficulties were enormous. We know the self-love of a class holding dominions of this kind. But while making every allowance, we found, with deep regret, that on the 22nd December the Egyptian Government were again hesitat-
    720
    ing. That created a very serious state of affairs. This shattering of the Egyptian Government was the only alternative left. Naturally, we desired to turn to every other alternative rather than resort to it; but we found it impossible to avoid something that an unfriendly critic would describe by that term. On the 4th January our demand was made peremptorily; on the 7th Cherif Pasha resigned; and on the 8th Nubar Pasha was appointed. He was in complete accord with us, and on that day it was perfectly competent to the garrison of Khartoum to retire in safety, and, so far as we know, it is the case now.
    Here I have the pleasure of contradicting the statement made by the right bon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn, that the abandonment of the Soudan was contrary to the deliberate judgment of the Khedive. If he has read the Papers on the Table of the House, he would have found that, on the contrary, whatever prior leanings the Khedive might have had—and, of course, the prior leaning of a Sovereign is to keep his territory—the deliberate judgment of the Khedive was in complete accord with the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Now, my contention is, that we interfered to require the abandonment of the Soudan as soon as we were justified in carrying up to that point what must be considered as a high-handed proceeding with regard to the interior administration of Egypt. But it may have occurred to many that a long time had elapsed after we had heard of the defeat of Hicks and the time I am now speaking of; and that all this time was lost. That would be an entire and absolute misconception, as I will point out. It was perfectly true, that in the region of political right principle, we were separated during that interval from the Egyptian Government. We at once adopted the policy of withdrawal; we had pressed it first as friendly advice, we pressed it at last as an imperative injunction; but during the whole interval between the first and last stage, there were practical measures in progress upon which we were perfectly agreed, and which must have gone on precisely in the same manner had Nubar Pasha been in office from the first day, instead of Cherif Pasha.

    721
    We were all agreed that measures should be taken for the extrication of the garrisons. The force of Baker Pasha, which has, unfortunately, been defeated, was organized for that purpose. [Mr. ASHHEAD-BARTLETT: Oh, oh!] The hon. Member, with his supreme authority, scoffs at that statement, and an impression has gone forth that Baker Pasha was sent as a sort of forlorn hope. [Mr. BOURKE: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman is not aware that my hon. Friend the Under Secretary for India happened to be in Egypt during the organization of this force. [Mr. BOURKE: So was I.] Well, I will back my hon. Friend, with some confidence, in the match if it comes off. I am not going to make an extravagant assertion, but what I am going to say is this—that, when Baker Pasha set out, it will be obvious he was under no military obligation to undertake that business. He was not enlisted for that purpose, and was under no obligation or military service at all, unless he thought it a profitable and hopeful expedition. He was the head of the Constabulary, and a Constabulary is not organized—though the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bourke) seems to think it is—for marching into foreign countries. I have no doubt he was entreated to go. I have no doubt the Egyptian Government greatly desired it; but what I say is, that he was under no military obligation to go, and I say, with the authority of my hon. Friend, that Baker Pasha went with the belief that the means at his command were adequate means for the immediate purpose he had in view. I am going to produce something else; but I produce, in the first instance, my hon. Friend (Mr. J. K. Cross), who is not deficient in the faculty of expressing himself when he has occasion to address the House. Baker Pasha had very great doubts, as I understand, citing my hon. Friend, whether it would be in his power to effect the whole operation of relief from Suakim to Berber, and from Berber to Khartoum; but he was very confident that his means were sufficient for the smaller operation of reaching Sinkat. Here is a telegram of Sir Evelyn Baring, dated February, 2nd 1884, three days only before the calamity which overtook Baker Pasha—
    "Baker telegraphs that he will advance to the relief of Tokar to-morrow, the 3rd, with
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    3,200 men, and that there is every chance of success."
    Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bourke) will likewise overthrow the authentic official information received from Sir Evelyn Baring. I have shown, then, that during the whole of this time the expedition of Baker Pasha was in preparation and in progress, and that there was a reasonable expectation that that expedition would suffice, if not to get to Khartoum, at any rate to deal with the case of Sinkat and the case of Tokar. Well, that organization removed a practical difficulty for the moment, and prevented its becoming necesary for us to shatter the Egyptian Government at the earlier period, which the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) seems at once emphatically to desire, and resolutely and positively to condemn. That brings me to the 5th of February, and the failure of Baker's efforts.
    I have gone through now, I think, all that relates to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, but I must say a few words on the remaining period of five days, on which I admit we are justly open to a careful scrutiny; and here I arrive at the case of General Gordon. General Gordon, in our estimation, is a very great feature in the case. What is General Gordon? He is no common man. I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the manner in which he referred to him. I may also say that General Gordon is not alone. Other very able men are with him—one in particular, Colonel Stewart, his seconder and coadjutor—and, in fact, we have acted all along on the principle of obtaining for this difficult Egyptian problem the very best services we could possibly get. It is no exaggeration, in speaking of General Gordon, to say that he is a hero. It is no exaggeration to say that he is a Christian hero. It is no exaggeration to say that in his dealings with Oriental people he is also a genius—that he has a faculty of influence or command, brought about by moral means, for no man in this House hates the unnecessary resort to blood more than General Gordon. He has that faculty which produces effects among those wild Eastern races almost unintelligible to us Western people. Perhaps it maybe said—"If General Gordon has all those gifts, why did you not employ him sooner?" [Opposition cheers.] Again you have fallen into the

    723
    decoy. You have not taken the least pains to ascertain whether it was possible or not. Now, the suggestion to employ General Gordon in the Soudan was made at a time so early, that it really is not within the limits of the direct responsibility of the present Government. As early as in the month of November, 1882, Sir Charles Wilson recommended the employment of General Gordon; but there were difficulties on both sides. It is very difficult to marry two people when one is averse; but it is still more difficult to marry them when, unfortunately, there is an aversion on both sides—and that, I believe, was found to be the case at that period between the Khedive and General Gordon. However, when it came to the grave period and to the increased responsibility upon us for the affairs of the Soudan that followed Hicks's defeat, then it was again our duty to have regard to the possibility of what might be got through General Gordon.
    SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Was there anything between these periods?
    MR. GLADSTONE: No; but the right hon. Gentleman will fee that I have been contending all along, that, down to the time of Hicks's defeat, we should not have been justified in interfering to take into our own hands the management of the Soudan; and it was already known to us that the Egyptian Government objected to General Gordon. On the 1st of December my noble Friend Lord Granville had reason to believe that he was in a position to offer the services of General Gordon to the Egyptian Government. Unfortunately, they were refused; but not entirely without reason. The reason given was one that did not satisfy us, but still it went far to silence us, as is often the case; and I think the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) will find that to be the ease too. The objection made to us was this—"The Soudan is a country of strong Mohammedan fanaticism. For us to send a Christian as our agent, with a view to govern it, might be a dangerous course, which might cause a still more serious outbreak." We were not satisfied with the reason, but it was difficult to thrust that objection rudely aside, and it caused further delay. That was the offer of Lord Granville on the 1st of December; but we became acquainted
    724
    with the sentiments of General Gordon, and as time went on the aversion of the Egyptian Government became mitigated, and at last entirely removed. However, it was not until the 16th of January—that is to say, eight days after Nubar Pasha came into office—that they sent to us a request for a qualified officer to undertake the conduct of the evacuation of the Soudan. That was sent to us on the 16th January, and on the 18th General Gordon was on his way to Egypt. At Cairo General Gordon formed his plan. A Taper will be laid on the Table, I believe. We received General Gordon's plan first in the shape of a valuable memorandum of his own; but we have had some doubts whether it was our duty to produce his plan. If we could have produced it to this House, or even to this country alone, it would have been another matter; but the promulgation of that plan through the telegraph in Egypt might have caused its failure. All I will say of it on this occasion—for I would rather not go into particulars about it—is that it was evidently a well-reasoned and considered plan; that it was entirely pacific in its basis; that it proceeded on the belief—a belief which would have been fanatical or presumptuous in my case, or in the case of most of those in this House, but which in the case of General Gordon, with his experience and gifts, was, I believe, neither the one nor the other—not that he certainly must, but that he fairly might hope to, exercise a strong pacific influence by going to the right persons in the Soudan; and it was his desire, quite as much as ours, that this should be done without any resort whatever to violent means. As I have said, General Gordon went not for the purpose of re-conquering the Soudan, or of persuading the Chiefs of the Soudan again to submit themselves to the Egyptian Government. He went for the double purpose of evacuating the country, by the extrication of the Egyptian garrisons, and of reconstituting it by giving back to those Chief's their ancestral powers, which had been withdrawn or suspended during the period of the Egyptian Government. I have told the House already that General Gordon had in view the withdrawal from the country of no less than 29,000 persons paying the military service to Egypt. The House will see how vast was the

    725
    trust placed in the hands of this remarkable person. We cannot exaggerate the importance we attach to it. We were resolved to do nothing which should interfere with this great pacific scheme, the only scheme which promised a satisfactory solution of the Soudanese difficulty, by at once extricating the garrisons and reconstituting the country upon its old basis and its local privileges. It was our duty, whatever we might feel as to a particular portion of the garrisons, to beware of interfering with Gordon's plans generally, and, before we adopted any scheme that should bear that aspect, to ask whether in his judgment there would or would not be such an interference.
    I will now explain to the House what we have been doing during the last seven days. February 5th, when the disaster happened to Baker Pasha, unfortunately found us cut off for a moment from communication with Gordon. He had considered it his duty to take the shortest and swiftest means to convey himself to Khartoum, and that severed him from the telegraph which runs up the course of the river. We resumed the telegraph on the 11th—on the morning of yesterday. We used our utmost endeavours to communicate with him at the earliest moment. We did not wait till we were coming near the time of his possibly reaching Berber, but we sent our messages from the very first moment when we thought there was a chance, being determined to anticipate the possibility of his arrival. We did that on Thursday or Friday of last week, and inquired from him what were his views after Baker Pasha's defeat. We had already taken certain measures. Our first duty was to recollect that the defeat of Baker Pasha altered the position of Suakim, and therefore we took measures, as rapidly as was in our power, to make Suakim safe. We further issued preliminary orders to the British ships that were going up and down the Red Sea, in order to have them in readiness if any action should be found possible and advisable. When Baker Pasha was defeated, the case of Sinkat was hopeless as to military help. It was known for a long time that the garrison had been in extremity. I have read a telegram which acquaints us that Baker Pasha was on the way to its relief, and that he had every hope of succeeding in that
    726
    relief. No means that we could possibly use could have availed in the slightest degree to bring aid to Sinkat before the time when, unhappily, it fell. That was not a question of difficulty, but of absolute impossibility. There was another mode, as to which, I believe, Admiral Hewett and Sir Evelyn Baring have been in communication. Admiral Hewett has endeavoured to see what could be done by negotiations for the extrication of the garrison. He failed, but this failure only became known to us about 10 o'clock last night. I think it was reasonable and right that he should make the effort in the impossibility of any other effort that could be made. But we were bound to take into view this—would an attempt of relief in that quarter have the effect of endangering, first of all, the precious life of General Gordon, on which the whole hope of the solution of this question was depending? Would it also have the effect of endangering the measures for the extrication of the 29,000 men, who, after all, must be regarded of more weight than the 500 in Sinkat? We have at last heard by telegraph from General Gordon on that subject. Having reached Berber he has received our messages, and we are satisfied, from his replies, that although he does not like the use of military means, yet such an effort as might be made for the relief of Tokar would not, in his view, interfere with the safety or the likelihood of his success. He does not speak with enthusiasm of anything of that kind, but he leaves upon us the entire responsibility of such a proceeding. Under these circumstances we have not hesitated for a moment. Having been put in possession of this, partly by evidence that reached us through Colonel Stewart, and now again since the House met by telegram from General Gordon, we have come to the resolution to gather immediately, with absolutely the utmost promptitude, a force—a British force—at Suakim with the view, if possible, to the relief of Tokar, with the computation of its being sufficient for that purpose if the garrison should be enabled to hold out.
    We have acted, therefore, without the smallest hesitation upon our own undivided responsibility for a purpose which implies no departure whatever from our policy in regard to the re-conquest of the Soudan, but with the view of performing what I hope may be regarded as a simple

    727
    service to humanity, which I am quite sure that this House and the country will not grudge. When I said yesterday that it was not a question of hours, my meaning was this—that our communications with ships would not have been in the slightest degree accelerated by having been made yesterday, and to-day, on the contrary, the position of the ships would enable us to do so. The House will therefore understand that our injunctions and directions have, as I trust, by this time reached the authorities in Egypt, and that their first efforts to give effect to them have probably been by this time taken.
    I think I have now stated distinctly what we have been about during the last week, and why we thought it wrong, without any reference to General Gordon, in his great and comprehensive plan, to pursue a purpose which, although one of humanity, and one strongly appealing to the feeling of this country, yet concerned, after all, but a very limited portion of a very difficult and formidable undertaking. I stated that we took preliminary measures with a view to the increase of the force at Suakim. We have moved up troops from Malta in order to be in a condition to put them forward for any purpose of this kind.
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: How many?
    MR. GLADSTONE: I think it would be very much better that I should not enter upon that. We have had from Admiral Hewett, the best authority on the spot—no doubt he had consulted with others—a very distinct account of what he considered necessary for the relief of Tokar.
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I should not have put the question had it not been told that the number was stated in "another place."
    MR. GLADSTONE: I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman means the final or the initial number. I have been speaking of initial measures. If he means the final number, it will be a number somewhat in excess of the number considered by Admiral Hewett to be sufficient for the purpose. I believe it will be 4,000 men. I do not enter into the constituent parts, but I believe that will not be inexact in round numbers.
    Now, I have endeavoured to give the reasons why we have acted and why we
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    did not act before. I revert to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman. I hope it will be thought that I have not shrunk from grappling with it. If the House will vote for it—which, I own, I do not expect—it would be a singular case of voting for a Motion on behalf of which not a single word has been said by the Mover. The right hon. Gentleman made imputations. These imputations, if they imply anything at all—and the right hon. Gentleman seems to say that they did not imply anything at all—imply that he desires and recommends a policy which we think alike opposed to prudence, to humanity, and to justice. I have thus stated the case of the Government; I make, in few words, my final appeal to the House of Commons, and I ask, from your indulgence it may be, but also from your justice, that acquittal which we feel we are entitled to claim.
    LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Sir, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has been anxiously looked for by the House and by the country; but I think hon. Gentlemen will be of opinion that, from its beginning to its end, it is most deeply disappointing. In assuming that he had grappled with the charges put forward by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote), he made, in my opinion, a most unwarrantable assumption, because he never either dealt with, or even touched upon, those charges from the beginning to the end of his speech. Sir, I will endeavour, with the indulgence of the House, to follow the Prime Minister as far—and I fear it will not be very far, but as far as may lie in my power—through the very discursive speech which he made. He began, Sir, by taunting my right hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) on the Amendment which he moved to the Address, and he ridiculed my right hon. Friend, because he had called upon the Government for a clear and distinct recognition of their obligations. Sir, the obligations of Her Majesty's Government have been very clearly stated; and, if the action of Her Majesty's Government towards those obligations had been as clear as their statements, we should not, perhaps, have had much cause to complain; but when the Prime Minister goes on and declares that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader

    729
    of the Opposition had failed to prove any charge of vacillation or inconsistency against Her Majesty's Government, I think I can show that, as a matter of fact, a very heavy and serious charge of vacillation and inconsistency lies against Her Majesty's Government, from the statements made by Her Majesty's Ministers themselves to the House. On June 14, 1882, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister informed the House as to the nature of the conclusions to which Her Majesty's Government had come as to their obligations towards Egypt. He then said that it was their business to indicate the ends they had in view, though not the means by which those ends were to be attained; that those ends had been repeatedly and distinctly stated to be the maintenance of all established rights in Egypt, whether those of the Sultan, of the Khedive, of the Egyptian people, or of the foreign bondholders. By that statement of obligations made on the 14th of June, Her Majesty's Government most distinctly recognized their obligations and responsibility with regard to the tranquillity of the Soudan, and, in the case of disturbance, for the restoration of that tranquillity. That was the formal statement of obligations by the Prime Minister, in June, 1882. But, after this, there was a change; and, to show how rapidly the Government alter their policy, I come to the second statement of obligations, made last August. The Prime Minister said—
    "It is our duty to give Egypt a fair start, and, I believe, to make provision for peace and order there. If we see supplied a military and civil force suitable for the maintenance of that peace and order; if we have placed in control of the country a man in whose justice and benevolence we have confidence; if we know that the administration of justice is under enlightened supervision, and in competent hands; if we have made a reasonable beginning in legislative institutions, into which there is incorporated at least some seeds of freedom and some elements of rectification; then, I think, a state of things may be said to exist in which, undoubtedly, some assumption may be made that our duty is complete."—(3 Hansard, [282] 2202–3.)
    This speech was made in answer to the junior Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), who, in the absence of any such pledge, was prepared to have resisted the Vote for Sir Evelyn Baring's salary; and the House will observe that
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    there was in that statement not one single word which, by any ingenuity, could be construed into a recognition of any sort of responsibility for the state of the Soudan. The Prime Minister on that occasion, stated, in reply to the hon. Member for Newcastle, the conditions under which he considered it the duty of Her Majesty's Government to evacuate Egypt, which were the formation of an army, the control of the country by the Khedive, and provision for the administration of justice, and for proper legislative institutions. This evening the Prime Minister has told us that all this has been accomplished beyond his expectation; but I ask the right hon. Gentleman, and I ask the Government, why, if the solemn statement of their obligations, under cover of which they obtained the consent of the House of Commons to the salary of Sir Evelyn Baring, have all been fulfilled and carried out, they are in Egypt now? Not a word of the Soudan is there in that second statement. Why are you in the Soudan? Why have you not withdrawn from Egypt? You knew, at the time that you made the second statement, that military operations to a large extent were being carried on in the Soudan by a very large force. You knew the danger of these operations. You knew that these operations might fail and produce disaster, and upset your plans—not even Her Majesty's Government could be so ignorant as not to know that—yet you deliberately excluded any conjunction of circumstances in the Soudan from the circle of circumstances which should control the evacuation of Egypt. Is there no inconsistency in these different statements made in the House itself—the first statement recognizing the responsibility of England in the Soudan, the second excluding all mention of any responsibility, and the third, of to-night, stating that a military force is to be sent to the Soudan? Is there no inconsistency in this? But of all the quotations I like to make in this House, there is one quotation which I like more than any other, and that is to quote from the Speech from the Throne, because the Prime Minister—and I am sorry to say he is followed in this respect by the other Members of the Government—has a practice of saying that any quotation from speeches of his that you make are either incorrect

    731
    or unauthentic. But to the Speech from the Throne no such qualification can he applied. Addressing Parliament in February, 1883, Her Majesty said—
    "It will be my endeavour to secure that a full provision shall be made for the exigencies of order, for the just representation of the wishes and desires of the population, for ensuring the Khedive's Government, the prosperity and happiness of the Egytian people, and the peace of Europe in the East."
    Now that all the Soudan is in a conflagration, and no man but Gordon dare venture to go through, I want to know where is the consistency of Her Majesty's Government? In dismissing Parliament in August, the Address from the Throne stated—
    "The constant direction of my efforts to the maintenance of established rights, and to the tranquillity of the East."
    When we hear of 4,000 men being actually ordered to Suakim, probably followed by 14,000 or 40,000 more, I do not think Her Majesty's Government have been consistent either in their professions or their acts. The right hon. Gentleman proceeded to comment severely on the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, because he had not declared to the House an alternative policy. For my own part, I confess that I should have received with some amount of satisfaction a definite statement of the views of the Leader of the Opposition with respect to the future of Egypt. I believe the time has gone by when concealment of policy advanced electoral prospects. I believe in the magic of putting forward an alternative policy; but what I would ask the Prime Minister is this—What has been the foreign policy of the Liberal Party generally, compared with the pledges it gave to the country? I should be very sorry to see the Leader of the Opposition following the intensely evil example which has been set him by the Prime Minister, of declaring, in the country, the policy which he meant to pursue if in Office, and of pursuing when in Office a policy diametrically opposite. If the Leader of the Opposition thinks proper, at any time, to state a policy to the House, that policy will be abided by and receive the support of the Party when in power. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister endeavoured to fix the responsibility for the present difficulty in the Soudan on the late Advisers of the Crown on account of their having
    732
    established the Dual Control in Egypt. I am utterly unable to perceive the smallest connection of any sort between the Mahdi and the Dual Control, and it requires the extraordinary powers and mind of the Prime Minister even to suggest such a connection. But I utterly repudiate your charging the late Advisers of the Crown, or the Party which supported them, with the slightest responsibility for the present state of affairs in Egypt on account of the Dual Control. You came into Office; you had gained the confidence of the country by pledging yourselves to a complete and utter reversal of everything your Predecessors had done; and, by making the Dual Control the only exception to that policy, you assumed the whole responsibility, and you divested hon. Members on this side of the smallest responsibility for the continuance of that policy. The Prime Minister said it was not within the power of Her Majesty's Government to abandon the Dual Control. Why, your most trusted Ally—the Ally which you follow with the most slavish devotion—France—she abandoned the Dual Control; and will any Member of the Government, who means to take part in this debate, explain to the House why it was not within the power of Her Majesty's Government to do that which it was open to their Ally, France, to do? The essence of the Dual Control was its duality, and the moment it was repudiated by the one party there was your opportunity. I say your not having got out of it, your having gone out of your way to support it—because that was the object of the war—fixes upon you that which I believe to have been, in its ultimate development, an intense evil to Egypt, and from that responsibility I am certain the people of this country will not absolve you. The Prime Minister called the Dual Control an extraordinary system. When he first came into Office, he praised it; he said it was the one thing done by the late Government of which he did not disapprove, and he declined to take a single step towards impairing its efficiency. Now, Sir, I submit that the Prime Minister has stated with extreme boldness, considering all the facts of the case, that Her Majesty's late Advisers had committed a fatal error when they settled the Dual Control. I think it would be an utter waste of time to discuss that to-day, because the late

    733
    Advisers of the Crown—speaking of them collectively—are like the Dual Control itself, dead and buried. But Her Majesty's Government committed a far greater error when they brought about the suppression of Arabi for the sake of the Dual Control. That is the point. If you disapproved of control, why did you suppress the movement of Arabi, which was directed against nothing but the Dual Control. You sent an army to Egypt to break down the movement of Arabi in favour of Liberal and National aspirations, and you did this in order to support the Dual Control. To show the inconsistency and the utter vacillation of your policy, it has only to be said that the Dual Control for which you suppressed nothing more or less than a national cause has now ceased to exist. The suppression of Arabi was indeed a blunder. I have never favoured Arabi, as an individual, so much as because Arabi represented a national cause, the nature of that cause being freedom and independence of foreign domination. Why did you suppress it? In order to set up on his logs again the present Khedive of Egypt, who was the creature of the Dual Control. I will not detain the House by any examination of the state of affairs regarding my accusations against the Khedive. I will only say this. At the invitation of the Prime Minister I made some grave charges against the Khedive. The Prime Minister promised he would give those charges his earliest and best attention. For eight months nothing more was heard of those charges, and then the Government put up the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords to answer charges I had made in the House of Commons. In the House of Lords I had, of course, no one to reply for me, and I cannot in the House of Commons take the slightest notice of what took place there. I appeal to those hon. Members opposite, who, in their mechanical support of the Government, have not, I hope, lost all idea of justice, to say whether that is the way they would treat an opponent—to make him commit himself to what the Prime Minister calls the tremendous responsibility of making certain charges, and yet never giving him an opportunity of hearing the reply which the defendants of that creature have to make? Is that fair or chivalrous conduct? We
    734
    had in the House of Lords, the other day, what was called an official denial. Official denials have never had a very high reputation in this House; but since Her Majesty's Government came into Office they have been hopelessly degraded. There was once a Member of Parliament, who is now a Minister of the Crown, who imputed Lord Beacons-field, at a public meeting, as a man who never hardly told the truth except by accident, and who flung at the British Parliament the first lie that entered his head. I should not think of adopting such language in addressing the Chair in this House, for the reason that you, Sir, might consider it un-Parliamentary; but of all the temptations to which human nature is liable, of all the temptations which have assailed human beings from the beginning of the world, none have been more powerful than that which assails me to-night—the temptation to use that quotation against Her Majesty's Government, and to adopt that language as my own. I have triumphantly resisted the temptation, and have, I hope, thereby earned not only the gratitude, but the admiration of Her Majesty's Government. With that remark, I leave the subject of my accusations against the Khedive Tewfik. I cannot help thinking how mortifying it must have been for the Prime Minister to have to defend to-night more elaborately, and with more pains than he has ever been called on to do before, a policy in Egypt which, I venture to think, every hon. Member opposite feels in his heart to have been utterly out of accordance with the principles of the Liberal Party, and with every sentiment hitherto predominant in the English mind. The question of the Soudan is, after all, that which is occupying the attention of the House and of the country. We are not concerned with the Dual Control; and, I regret to say, we are no longer concerned with the fate of Arabi Pasha. The Prime Minister was at endless pains to make out that, from the beginning of the Soudan difficulties, Her Majesty's Government were free from responsibility with respect to Egyptian interference in those quarters. I have no doubt he relied to a great extent on the despatch of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on May 11, 1883, when the noble Earl used these words—

    735
    "It is unnecessary for me to repeat that Her Majesty's Government are in no way responsible for the operations in the Soudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of the Egyptian Government, or for the appointment or action of General Hicks."
    Well, what are the facts of the case? The news of the great successes of the Mahdi reached Cairo in November, 1882. Lord Wolseley was at that time in occupation of Cairo, and British soldiers occupied the whole of the Delta. What order there was depended entirely on Lord Wolseley and his soldiers. The Khedive had disbanded the Egyptian Army, and there was absolutely no Army in Egypt. Furthermore, there was not a single policeman in Egypt. Baker Pasha had only just received a commission from the Khedive to commence the formation of the gendarmerie. At that moment, when positively the Ministers could not even wink without the authority of Lord Wolseley, came the news of the defeat of the Egyptian Army in the Soudan; and the Egyptian Government decided to send an army under General Hicks for the protection of their territory. I ask Her Majesty's Government, I ask hon. Members opposite, do they really seriously contend that a Sovereign who depended absolutely, as the Khedive did, for police purposes and for military purposes on a Foreign Ally, and who had absolutely nothing in the nature of military and police himself, could be held responsible for a Military Expedition which he undertook in any other quarter of his territory, or that the Foreign Power, whose military and police supported that Sovereign on his Throne, could divest itself of the inherent responsibility for every act, the smallest or the greatest, which that Sovereign might do? The proposition is so enormous that it is impossible to describe it adequately to the House. I leave it with hon. Members opposite to decide whether, when Her Majesty's Government fruitlessly and foolishly endeavoured to mislead English and Egyptian opinion into the idea that they were not responsible for the despatch of General Hicks, the Khedive was in a position to do anything else but despatch him in accordance with the command of a Foreign Power. General Hicks was commissioned to re-conquer the Soudan and to collect an army for the purpose. He collected that army in Cairo and the neighbourhood; and on the
    736
    advice and with the assistance of your Agents in Egypt. The most revolting barbarities were resorted to by the Khedive's officials, who positively could not have walked the streets of Cairo without the permission of Lord Wolseley for the collection of that Army. The bravest battalion of the Egyptian Army—the Black regiment under the command of the Black Colonel Abdallah, which was the last of the troops to surrender—was sent in manacles and irons—your foes whom you, the Liberal Government, had conquered, gallant men as they were, were in this way sent by you, or you connived at their being so sent, to the Soudan in order to form the Army of General Hicks. Yet you profess to tell the House of Commons that these atrocities, barbarities, and indignities could be committed by the Khedive, and that the Khedive is to bear the responsibility of them—the Khedive, who, but for Her Majesty's Government, would not have sat on the Throne! I say that proposition is utterly untenable. It is, of course, a proposition which the Government may force down the throats of hon. Members behind them; but I defy them to do the same on this side of the House. The Prime Minister stated that, short of any responsibility for the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government did everything possible for Egypt, and that they sent out the very best men to Egypt. Undoubtedly, the Government sent some very reliable and excellent Agents to Egypt; but they fettered them in every way, and on no single occasion have they followed their advice until too late. You had an excellent man in Sir Charles Wilson, and he, at the time he was in Cairo with Lord Wolseley, advised you to make use of the troops in Egypt in order to bar the route of the Mahdi into Lower Egypt. Suppose you had taken that action then, as your Agent advised, Hicks Pasha, with his 10,000 men, would have been alive; all the barbarism and indignity inflicted on those unfortunate foes of yours would never have been perpetrated; Baker Pasha's Army would have been alive, as would the garrisons of the Soudan. Sir Charles Wilson also advised you to send General Gordon to the Soudan at the time. Why did you not? You need not have sent him with an Army, for you have not done that now. His

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    influence in the Soudan was possibly-greater then than now, because the remembrance of him was more recent. The Prime Minister said he wished to define the exact position which Her Majesty's Government held in Egypt, and he stated that they wished to hold the Egyptian Government in all credit and dignity. He drew an analogy between the position of a Resident in a Native Indian State and the position of the English Agents in Egypt. He said the position of the former was one which did not interfere with the Government, which he stated the people loved, and that that was the position of the British Agent in Egypt. With that proposition I should like to compare your treatment of Cherif Pasha. I will give the House the opinion of Sir Edward Malet, one of the best men you sent to Egypt, with respect to the Government of Cherif Pasha, and the service it was in the power of that Minister to render to Egypt. In September last Sir Edward Malet wrote—
    "It is due to the intelligence and largeness of views of the Ministers that Egypt is likely to become the one well-governed autonomous Mussulman State. Without their authority no reform would be possible, and a clear injustice is committed when it is asserted that the reforms will be carried out, not by them, but in spite of them.…They have undertaken a noble task, which may be beneficent as an example to all Mussulman States.… It is their rule under an honourable and large-minded Prince that makes the future of Egypt hopeful, and allows me to leave the country, after watching it through its darkest hours, with the confident assurance that it will recover from its misfortunes, and ultimately become a prosperous and well-governed State."—[Egypt, No. 1 (1884), p. 27.]
    Sir Evelyn Baring also wrote—
    "I think the loss of Cherif Pasha will be very detrimental to the country."
    The Government which, by the confession of your responsible Agents, did hold a position of credit and dignity, and was capable of forming the future of Egypt, is kicked out of Office by you with every mark of ignominy. And why? Because the Government of Cherif Pasha proposed a policy to which at that time you did not consent, but which now you adopt. All the Government of Cherif Pasha wanted to do was to try and hold Khartoum, and to re-open the road between Suakim and Berber, and they wished to concentrate all their efforts on those points. What has Gordon
    738
    been sent to the Soudan for but to hold Khartoum and to re-open the road between Suakim and Berber? ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Members could express dissent from what he had said; but General Gordon, who was on his way to Khartoum, had distinctly stated this to be his object, and the language of the Queen's Speech distinctly contemplated the same thing. You at that time, however, insisted on the precipitate abandonment of the Soudan as far as Wady Halfa, and Cherif Pasha's Government resigned rather than carry out that policy. Now, by means of Gordon and Baker Pashas you are carrying out the identical policy which you turned out the Government of Cherif for refusing to adopt. A great point has been made by the Prime Minister of the consent of the Khedive to the policy of the abandonment of the Soudan. He is the one Egyptian whom the Government can produce out of the whole of Egypt as being a consenting party to that policy. This Tewfik, who, as everybody who knows anything on the subject must know, has not a friend in Egypt, and that if England were to withdraw from Egypt he would be unanimously and ignominiously expelled from the country, is the party whose opinion is held up to us as being conclusive and overwhelming. The part which the Khedive played in the matter of General Hicks is as dark and unsatisfactory, and in all probability as criminal, as it was with regard to Arabi Pasha. Before Lord Dufferin left Egypt he expressed the opinion that the expedition of General Hicks would have been successful if he had stopped at a certain point; but the Khedive and the Egyptian Government insisted on his going further, and after he had gained, as we all know he did, a brilliant victory over the Mahdi, and established himself at Sennaar, he was instructed to proceed against Kordofan, with a view to its conquest. That is what General M'Leod says, and I should vastly prefer his statement to that of Her Majesty's Government. What does Sir Samuel Baker say about the expedition of General Hicks? Sir Samuel Baker says—"It was the Egyptian Government that forced Hicks to his doom." It is not I, the Member for Woodstock, who am saying that, but Sir Samuel Baker, brother to General Baker, an authority on the Soudan greater than the noble

    739
    Lord or the Prime Minister. But who does the House think was Minister of War in Egypt at the time? Omar Lufti, a man suspected by nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Cairo as being in collusion with the Khedive in organizing the massacres at Alexandria. Is not that a singular coincidence? Furthermore—and I state it on the authority of the gentleman who is the depositary of General Hicks's papers—that he undertook the expedition against Kordofan in consequence of a telegram in cypher sent to him by the Khedive, who, with his Government—to repeat the words of Sir Samuel Baker—forced him to his doom. Omar Lufti is not now Minister of War, and if Her Majesty's Government desire anything like prosperity from their efforts in Egypt with respect to the garrisons of the Soudan, I would advise them to eject the Khedive Tewfik from office. The Prime Minister alluded to the position of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt, and compared it with the position of Austria and Bosnia, and referred to a commission which England had received with respect to Egypt from the Powers of Europe. Now, Sir, in the broadest manner, I absolutely deny that there was ever anything in the nature of a commission given to England in this matter from the European Powers, inasmuch as the Government broke up the Conference at Constantinople long before any such commission could have issued. I have no objection to the Government taking up their position there by their own force and will; but I deny absolutely, and repudiate entirely, that they received any commission from the European Powers. That assertion cannot be supported by one tittle of evidence. The position of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt is simply one of broken pledges and abandoned principles. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has found great fault with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition for having said that it was the duty of the Government to supply the Egyptian Government with an army capable of defending the country. I, however, did not understand the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) to make that statement. But what is the reason the Prime Minister gave for the Egyptian Government not having been supplied with a proper army? Financial
    740
    difficulty! What does financial difficulty mean? It means bondholders. By the statement of the Prime Minister, bondholders prevented an army being provided for the support of General Hicks. In other words, the bondholders murdered Hicks. I am anxious to point out to the House that the Prime Minister has mistaken—I may almost say purposely mistaken—the whole tone of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, because the right hon. Gentleman has not censured the Government for not reconquering the Soudan. What we do censure, or are trying to censure, the Government for is that they did not prevent the attempt to reconquer the Soudan with a force which was obviously inadequate. That is the case against the Government. But what was the original reason for the conquest of the Soudan? It was the suppression of the Slave Trade. During the time of General Gordon that trade was undoubtedly seriously interfered with, and if those efforts had been continued it would have been abolished. But under a Liberal Government, who are responsible for Egypt, the Soudan will once more become the scene of the barbarities of the most awful Slave Trade that ever existed. The Prime Minister has said that he would not be a party to the Circassians, the Pashas, the Turks, the Anatolians reconquering the Soudan. If that be so, why did he allow every ruffian from the slums of Cairo to be sent from Egypt, if he wished to free the Soudan from Turks and Circassians? Is there not some slight inconsistency and vacillation in that? The Prime Minister had said that if they had advised on the Soudan they would have become responsible for the war. But the Government did advise the Egyptian Government, in November, not to attempt the reconquest of the Soudan; and how do they reconcile that with the Prime Minister's statement? Is there no inconsistency there? In November, 1882, the Government gave advice to the Egyptian Government, and did not insist on its being attended to; and in December, 1883, they gave advice, and did insist on that advice being followed. There is, however, this difference—that if they had insisted on their advice being followed at first, they would have saved all the lives that had been lost in the Soudan. I should like to have a more

    741
    detailed statement of the transactions between Her Majesty's Government and General Gordon than have been given, for it is said there is no inconsistency, no vacillation, in your treatment of him. I am informed, on the highest authority, that General Gordon, in the summer of last year, offered Her Majesty's Government to accept service in the Soudan. The Government telegraphed to him—"The Government decide to accept your offer; wait letter." General Gordon waited for the letter, and in the letter found the words—"The Government decline your services." Is there no vacillation, no inconsistency there? That is a statement which I believe General Gordon is prepared to vouch for. And when you proposed to the Egyptian Government that General Gordon should be sent out on the 1st of December, why did you not insist upon your advice being followed then? General Gordon was a man who had kept all these people under his thumb, and yet you allow the Egyptian Government to make the ridiculous objection that sending out a Christian might alienate the tribes. And yet you now send him out to pacify the tribes. Is there no inconsistency, no vacillation there? I know why—every-one knows why—the Egyptian Government did not like to have General Gordon. It is because he knew too much about the Egyptian Government—he knew that the Khedive was a man utterly unworthy to govern the country. That is shown by the conditions under which General Gordon accepted service—namely, that he should serve under the English Government, and not under the Khedive, whom he would not even see. The Egyptian Government knew the estimation in which they were held by General Gordon, and therefore it is that they did not wish to employ General Gordon. The reason they gave to Her Majesty's Government, and which appears to satisfy the Prime Minister, is one of the most empty and ludicrous that could be put forward. General Gordon had plainly expressed his opinion as to the Egyptian Government; and if you throw doubt upon his statements, you should not have given him the position you have conferred upon him. Either he speaks the truth, or else he is not fit to be entrusted with dictatorial power. Then the Prime Minister made another most extraordi-
    742
    nary statement—that General Gordon had drawn up a most valuable Memorandum in reference to his plans in the Soudan, and he feared to produce it to the House, in case it might interfere with General Gordon's mission. I appeal to hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House as to whether it is likely that the disclosure of a document from General Gordon now would be likely to reach the Mahdi in time to interfere with the operations of General Gordon? No, Sir; I will tell you the reason he did not read the Memorandum of General Gordon—because he does not want the Pashas of Cairo to know the plans, because the men from whom the assassination of General Gordon is likely to proceed are not the Mahdi's followers, but the Pashas of Cairo. The Prime Minister has stated that on the 7th the Government did not act in the matter of the beleaguered garrisons, because they believed Baker Pasha would be successful. But the troops under Baker Pasha were only policemen and blacks who had been coerced into serving. On the 7th that force was annihilated. The Prime Minister now says that it had been known for a longtime that the case of Sinkat was hopeless. Yes; it had been known for a long time; for on December 18 the Government were informed that the town had very little ammunition or provisions, and was besieged by the Mahdi's forces. Tewfik Bey, who was in command of the garrison, was one of the few heroes—I may say, indeed, the only hero—produced in Egypt. Consul General Monorieff, writing to the Egyptian Government, on the 24th of August, spoke in the highest terms with regard to Tewfik Bey. The General knew the position of this brave man at Sinkat, and the British Government knew his position, for, from the 24th of August up to now, accounts have been regularly received on the condition of the place; but though British ships were in the neighbourhood, and a British force was within four or five days' journey of Sinkat, the British Government never moved hand or foot to rescue that unfortunate officer. I ask the House to contrast the treatment of Tewfik Bey by the Government with the treatment of Tewfik the Khedive in Cairo. The Prime Minister said we could not take steps before to rescue Sinkat or Tokar, because it might en-

    743
    danger the life of General Gordon. I venture to say that if there is any man in the world who would hear that statement with horror, absolute horror, it is General Gordon. He would consider himself disgraced by having such a statement made concerning him. General Gordon is like Marshal Ney, the "bravest of the brave," and yet we are told that he would not risk his life for the sake of saving a brave General and a garrison. Never did a Government perpetrate such an insult against anyone. As to the enormous trouble the Government have taken to communicate with General Gordon in reference to these garrisons, I believe every person in this country could have told the Prime Minister that General Gordon had no objection to his making an effort to relieve the besieged garrisons. This garrison of Tokar is probably now in the position of Sinkat, with this difference, that within 15 miles of the place there are a certain number of British ships fully armed and equipped. I would appeal to hon. Members whether it would not be in the power of those in command to equip a naval brigade to take measures to provide the beleaguered garrison of Tokar with provisions? In order to show its unfortunate condition, I would ask the attention of hon. Members to a letter, dated the 13th of December, from the Commandant, complaining that his letters had not been answered or taken into account—that their hopes were in the hand of God, as he saw no help from anyone—asking that a force should be sent at once, and that it was no use writing complimentary letters if, at the end, they were to be in the hands of the enemy. This letter was written on the 13th of December; and on the 12th of February the Prime Minister of England, on whom alone the rescue of these men depended, at last made up his mind to send British troops. And yet the Government dare to stand up at that Table and say that, with facts such as those before the public, there has been no vacillation in the Councils of the Government. A statement of that kind is enough, in my opinion, to justify 50 Votes of Censure. Now, they knew that the orders had come too late; and it almost seems as if God had permitted those garrisons to be filled with such an excess of gallantry in order that the measure of your iniquities might be
    744
    filled up, and that the cup of your crimes might overflow. The policy of the Government has been one of "Too late." Too late is an awful cry. Prom time immemorial it has heralded and proclaimed the slaughter of routed armies, the flight of dethroned Monarchs, the crash of falling Empires. Wherever human blood has been poured out in torrents, wherever human misery has been accumulated in mountains, wherever disasters have occurred which have shaken the world to its very centre, there, stright and swift, up to heaven or down to hell, has always gone the appalling cry "Too late—too late!" The Opposition cannot but move a Vote of Censure on a Government whose motto is "Too late." The Liberals will act wisely in being chary of giving support to a Government whose motto is "Too late," and the people of this country will undoubtedly repudiate a Government whose motto is invariably "Too late."
    Sir GEORGE CAMPBELLand Mr. MARRIOTT rising together, and both declining to give way, Mr. SPEAKER called upon the former.
    SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, who had the following Amendment on the Paper:—
    "That this House is of opinion that material aid to the Khedive of Egypt should not he indefinitely prolonged; that the proper administration and protection of the country should he the first charge on the revenues before the creditors of the late Khedive are paid; and that the demands of Foreign moneylenders should not he enforced by seizure of the lands of the Egyptians by Foreign tribunals, regardless of Native laws and customs, and uncontrolled by any Egyptian Legislature,"
    said, although he had always been against any interference of the Government in the affairs of Egypt, he should not support the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote). He had long ago warned the Government of the danger in which they were involving themselves by their action in Egypt. The late Government began by assuming, as they had, a joint control with Prance; and he believed that the present Government might have withdrawn with honour and safety from their embarrassing position in that country at the moment when the French withdrew. But they had taken a different course, and the result was that they

    745
    had now undoubtedly got into a deplorable hole. However, he could not lend a hand to hon. Gentlemen opposite in pushing the Government still further into the hole, but would rather wish to help them out of their dilemma if he possibly could. In India, sometimes an elephant would get into a quicksand, and then they threw faggots to the elephant, who was sagacious enough to make a pathway with them to enable him to get out of the hole. The Prime Minister was like an elephant in such a predicament. He had been urged too far by his riders; and now he (Sir George Campbell) would be glad to throw him a faggot or two to help him out. He understood that the Government wished to oppose the Vote of Censure with a direct negative, and, therefore, he should not move his Amendment. He certainly hoped that they would not yield to shrieks of panic, and allow themselves to be led into what might be eventually a great and disastrous war, if they were led far in the direction in which hon. Gentlemen opposite would lead them. The danger to the Soudan garrisons had been well known for months; but he was not aware that there had been a suggestion from the Conservative Party in favour of sending a British Army, until Her Majesty's Government was placed in a dilemma. It was then, and then only, that this intense interest in the garrisons was shown by hon. Gentlemen opposite. He was glad that Her Majesty's Government had found it possible to undertake the rescue the lives of the gallant garrison of Tokar; but the case of Sinkat had been very hopeless, it being only a week since the failure of the expedition which Baker Pasha undertook with hopes of success. He hoped that the attempt to save the garrison of Tokar would be successful; but, at the same time, he strongly recommended them to be very careful not to despise the enemy about to be encountered too much, and not to send against him anything like a mere scratch force, but only a thoroughly equipped force on which they could fully rely. He earnestly hoped that the Government would not embark in any large operations, or enter on a great war in the Soudan, but would rest content with rescuing the garrisons. He protested against going to war with the Mahdi. He objected to a war of
    746
    Christianity against Mahomedanism in the Soudan, for he saw no reason for it. They had taken into their bosom Jews, Infidels, and heretics, and they must not take any prejudice against a people because they were Mahomedans. The idea of entering into a war for the sake of religion was to be thoroughly deprecated; no distinction should be made in this case between men according to whether they were Christians or Mahomedans. After all, there was strong reason for supposing that two-thirds of the garrisons were people of the Soudan, who would probably be very glad to join the Mahdi; and he saw no reason why they should not be permitted and encouraged to join the Mahdi, who was, for the time at all events, the Representative of the Native element in the Soudan. He recommended that we should get out of Egypt as soon as we possibly could, and cease to interfere with the country at all. We had had no quarrel with the Mahdi, and the sooner we got out of it the better. It was to be hoped that those who wished to get away might be safely withdrawn from Khartoum, and that then we should be able to leave Egypt. The mission of General Gordon was one of peace, and as such it had his heartiest wishes for its success; but he was still very much inclined to think that in the end the Government would have to bring back Arabi. If it turned out to be necessary to do that, he trusted that Her Majesty's Government would not be deterred by any fears of the interests of the bondholders and the creditors of the last Khedive from doing that justice to the people of Egypt which they always professed it was their wish to do. He hoped that they would carry out the policy of Egypt for the Egyptians. In dealing with Orientals half measures were utterly useless; it was useless to establish a Protectorate; we must either take over Egypt ourselves, or allow the Egyptians to rule it for themselves, and the latter alternative was the one that ought to be chosen, although hon. Gentlemen opposite held the contrary view. The Government thought they were benefiting the Egyptians by introducing judicial reforms. He rather doubted whether the introduction of a number of lawyers would be gratefully received by the people; if, in the result, the people

    747
    were deprived of their land it would certainly not be received in that spirit. He hoped in what arrangements the Government might ultimately make their aim would be to secure Egypt for the Egyptians and not for the bondholders.
    MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, he could not help feeling great sympathy for the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, who lamented the line of policy which the Prime Minister had adopted, but who nevertheless was going to vote for him. Moreover, the hon. Gentleman had prepared a speech on Egypt which had nothing to do with the Motion under discussion, and it was absolutely necessary for the hon. Member to place an Amendment on the Paper in order to justify his speech. He was afraid that it was not the first time the hon. Member had found himself one of a small minority in that House; but he thought that on this occasion the hon. Gentleman formed part of so small a minority that he was well advised in not pushing his Amendment forward, but in contenting himself with the remarks he had just addressed to the House. In common with a number of Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House, he (Mr. Stanhope) had listened that night with a deep sense of humiliation to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. From the beginning to the end of that most remarkable and lengthy speech there was an attempt to evade responsibility, and to endeavour to persuade the country that responsibility did not rest upon him. As he listened to that speech he could not help thinking what would have been said by a former Colleague of the right hon. Gentleman if he had been still in that House and had heard that speech—he meant Lord Palmerston. He should like to know what Lord Palmerston would have said, when he was Prime Minister, if he had known that men's lives were absolutely at stake, and that there was a beleaguered garrison within 15 miles of the reach of British forces, whom those British forces could have immediately relieved. Would Lord Palmerston have consulted anybody? Would he have hesitated one moment? Would he have spent 20 days in telegrams, or would he at once have proceeded to action? He (Mr. Stanhope) confessed, for his own part, that Lord Palmerston would have speedily dis-
    748
    posed of the legal quibbles which the Attorney General expressed some time ago. Would he not have set aside the subtle casuistry of the Prime Minister? He would have acted from a sense of what was necessary in the interests of this country to maintain its honour and dignity. He believed the speech of the Prime Minister would always be regretted as a speech the most unworthy of a great occasion which the right hon. Gentleman had ever delivered. He believed he was right in saying that there were great issues before the country. He believed he was right in saying that at this moment men's lives were trembling in the balance, and yet the right hon. Gentleman thought it a fitting moment to get up and devote a considerable portion of his speech to all manner of side issues and to what he himself called laying decoys for cheers. Surely such a thing was quite out of place on such an occasion. The right hon. Gentleman had devoted three-quarters of an hour in the early portion of his speech to the discussion of subjects which had not the most remote connection with the question before the House, and in endeavouring to divert the House and the country from the plain issue before them. The right hon. Gentleman professed to be glad that a plain issue had been raised, but one-half of his speech was devoted to an endeavour to divert the mind of the House entirely from that plain issue he professed himself so anxious to obtain. The right hon. Gentleman, in the first place, went back a very long way into ancient history, and, in order to prevent full attention being paid to that portion of the speech which he (Mr. Stanhope) believed to be of the greatest possible importance at this moment, the right hon. Gentleman endeavoured to direct the mind of the House rather to the conduct of the late Government, and to pointing out that the events now passing in Egypt were not due to anything he or his Government had done; but that the late Government—the Government of Lord Beaconsfield—were entirely responsible for what had recently taken place. The right hon. Gentleman traced everything that had taken place lately to the establishment of the Dual Control. He (Mr. Stanhope) at once and absolutely refused to follow the right hon. Gentleman into any such devious

    749
    path. That allegation of the right hon. Gentleman had been very often answered in that House, and if necessary it could be answered again. He would, however, put this to the House—suppose they granted and admitted that the late Government were as bad as they had been painted, and as guilty as the right hon. Gentleman liked to describe them—supposing that, for the purposes of the present debate, everything the present Government had to do was in consequence of the misconduct of the late Government, still the House ought not to have their attention diverted from the main question now before them, which was the responsibility of the present Government, and how had that Government discharged that responsibility? In the first place, there was an attempt on the part of the right hon. Gentleman to argue that he and his Government were not responsible for what had taken place in the Soudan, and that, at any rate, at the outset of the events which were the main subjects of the present discussion, Her Majesty's Government were not responsible. He (Mr. Stanhope) utterly denied that the right hon. Gentleman could evade for a single moment that responsibility. They had been and were, as a matter of fact, the Government of Egypt for the time being, and they could not evade that responsibility. His right hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote), in a most temperate part of his most temperate speech, had pointed out clearly the reasons why Her Majesty's Government must be held responsible for what had taken place in the Soudan. He did not observe that any one of the arguments his right hon. Friend had put forward had been fairly grappled by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. His right hon. Friend pointed out that, at the outset of these proceedings, Lord Dufferin, the trusted agent of the Government, did recognize that the English Government were responsible for what took place in the Soudan. His right hon. Friend had quoted what Lord Dufferin had said, and although it was quite true that Her Majesty's Government did not follow Lord Dufferin's advice, there was not the smallest atom of evidence to show that at any time they repudiated his suggestion, that it was their duty, and that they ought at once to be prepared to
    750
    discharge that duty, to make preparations for enunciating a policy which would settle the whole question of the Soudan. Further than that, after the declaration on the part of the Government that they had no responsibility in the Soudan, they, nevertheless, practically accepted the whole of the responsibility. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said that, in what the right hon. Member for North Devon had said, he was urging upon the country and upon the House that Her Majesty's Government ought to have attempted the reconquest of the Soudan. Nothing could have been further from the intention of his right hon. Friend than to suggest such a policy, and there was not the smallest ground for the attempt made by the Prime Minister to attribute such a suggestion to the right hon. Gentleman. He now passed from their general responsibility and came to the time when Colonel Hicks was sent by the English Government into the Soudan. They must all of them admit that Her Majesty's Government took the utmost possible pains to explain on paper, both to the Egyptian Government and the country, that they would not accept any responsibility for Colonel Hicks's expedition. He (Mr. Stanhope) contended, however, that it was utterly impossible for them, at any time, to evade it. Colonel Hicks's expedition was practically settled with the assent not only of Her Majesty's Representatives, but with that of the Government of this country. They had absolute control over the number of men Colonel Hicks was to take with him, and over the amount of money which the Egyptian Government were to spend upon the expedition. The Financial Adviser of the Egyptian Government was entirely in their confidence, acting under their instructions, and was present at the Cabinet Council which determined upon the expedition. What was it that Her Majesty's Government did? They interfered whenever they were wanted to interfere; and they abstained from interfering where their interference was imperatively called for. Colonel Hicks saw through it all. He saw through the thin veil which Her Majesty's Government interposed between themselves and their responsibility, and the result was that Colonel Hicks insisted upon communicating with the Egyptian Government, not directly, but through the agents of

    751
    Her Majesty's Government. He should like to apply one simple test. Could the English Government have stopped the expedition of Colonel Hicks from setting out? Of course they could. Why did they not do it? When Colonel Hicks had had considerable success, could they then have stopped him? Of course they could; and it would have been better if they had at once stopped the expedition of Colonel Hicks instead of plunging into the deserts of Kordofan. But they allowed Colonel Hicks to go. He started, an Englishman leading a large body of troops among a population who recognized that the presence of an Englishman leading those troops among them meant that the English Government intended to assert their power in that region. Then came the time when Colonel Hicks asked to be reinforced. When Hicks Pasha telegraphed that he must have the support of the English Government, and said—
    "Unless you put pressure upon the English Government it is utterly impossible to carry out the expedition with success,"
    Her Majesty's Government did nothing-Having allowed him to start, having had the opportunity of preventing him if they had chosen, they shut him altogether out of their minds, and did not allow the possible fate of that gallant officer to influence their policy in the Soudan. What did they know about Colonel Hicks's probable chances? Lord Dufferin had given them full information. Lord Dufferin told them that Colonel Hicks was leading a body of raw, undisciplined, and disheartened troops, whom he had every reason to believe were utterly untrustworthy. They knew that the Government of Egypt itself was entirely exhausted, both in regard to money and men. They knew that they never intended to support Colonel Hicks, and yet they allowed him to make this expedition into a distant country, when they knew that his defeat must have an important effect upon the Government they were endeavouring to set up in Egypt. On the mere chance of his success they allowed him to start; and they shut their eyes to all the possible consequences, and excluded the whole question of the Soudan from their policy. Lord Dufferin had told them that they ought to prepare a policy for the Soudan in the event of Colonel Hicks's success, and there was nothing
    752
    to prevent their preparing a policy in the very possible event of Colonel Hicks's failure. Their preparation was this—In the first place, when troops were wanted, they began to withdraw their forces from Egypt, and they announced their policy of withdrawal from the country by the curious irony of fate, at the precise moment when Colonel Hicks was annihilated. Their further preparation was to give most careful instructions to the Government of Egypt that the force of constabulary, which, after all, they might want to use for warlike purposes in Egypt, was not to be drilled as soldiers. On the 19th of November they had their first warning, and their first warning was that if Colonel Hicks happened to be defeated, the probability was that they could not hold Khartoum, and that their hold of the Government of Egypt and the whole of the Soudan was so uncertain that it was difficult to say at what part of the Nile Valley the victorious forces of the Mahdi would be stopped. It was after that solemn warning that they took their first decision, and the answer Her Majesty's Government gave was, he (Mr. Stanhope) thought, worthy of a few moments study by the House. Her Majesty's Government said—"If consulted." That was how they began the telegram. It was a very curious remark in itself. Of course they were going to be consulted, for the Government of Egypt consulted them at every point of their policy. He did not say that they had always followed the advice of Her Majesty's Government when they got it, but there could not be the slightest doubt that the Government of Egypt did consult the Government of this country at every point of their policy. Then, "if consulted," what was to happen? Were they to say they were not responsible for the government of the Soudan, that they declined to give any advice, and refused to make any suggestion? No; but the telegram said—"If consulted, recommend the abandonment of the Soudan within certain limits." He asked the House to note those words. It was a thoroughly sensible telegram for the purpose of evading responsibility. The telegram itself was made so vague that whatever happened Her Majesty's Government would probably be able to slip out of the recommendation they made. He

    753
    ventured to say that from that very moment, if it had never occurred before, Her Majesty's Government became absolutely responsible for what was taking place in the Soudan, because they had given the Egyptian Government a recommendation in a most important document leading them to suppose that, if the recognition of England was worth anything, Her Majesty's Government were prepared to support them. On the 22nd of December there came a report of the defeat of Hicks Pasha. What did the Government of this country do? From the 23rd of December, at any rate, until the 19th of January, they did absolutely nothing. What did they know? They knew perfectly well the condition of the garrisons. As his noble Friend the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) had pointed out with great force, warnings as to the condition of the East of the Soudan came continually from time to time last year. Her Majesty's Government knew perfectly well that there were in Sinkat 1,000 women and children besides the garrison. They knew, also, that there was a garrison in Tokar under the gallant Tewfik Bey; and, further, that there was a garrison in Khartoum. As early as the 6th of September they were told that Tokar and Sinkat might have to be abandoned at any time. On the 8th of December they had the painful warning which the noble Lord had quoted. On the 19th of December there was a further telegram from Admiral Hewett, telling the Government that the garrisons of those two places could not hold out long, and must soon be compelled to abandon their posts. On the 26th of December they were solemnly warned that the Egyptian Forces were utterly and entirely inadequate, and that if they wanted to rescue the garrisons they must take steps for themselves. They had reports as to the terrible straits to which the garrisons were reduced—how they had eaten everything they had at hand; how they had been reduced step by step, until at last they had to eat such leaves of trees as they were able to gather for the purpose of sustaining themselves. With all these warnings month after month, Her Majesty's Government did nothing at all. It was quite true that they allowed the Government of Egypt to send General Baker; but they sent General Baker
    754
    without an army, with a body of men who had not been organized for the purpose of an army, but who had been expressly organized not to be an army. In addition, General Baker had a few Black troops. Sir Evelyn Baring told them all about those Black troops at the time he said that the Black troops might fight, but the matter was doubtful. That was not very encouraging. Then, again, there were only four companies of them, numbering about 400 men; so that, practically, General Baker had an army of about 400 men composed of Black troops, about whose fighting qualities there was some doubt. Yet those were all that could be relied upon to support General Baker in the exceedingly difficult and dangerous service he had entered upon. But did Her Majesty's Government support General Baker? Of course, he did not speak of material support. Her Majesty's Government never gave material support to their friends; but he meant moral support—that sort of moral support Sir Evelyn Baring asked for when he expressed a hope that, if the troops were withdrawn, the Government would give a moral support to the Khedive Tewfik in carrying on the Government of Egypt. Did they give even that? The course they adopted was absolutely to paralyze the action of General Baker by announcing publicly the abandonment of the Soudan. He would detain the House for a moment by reading the opinion of General Gordon. What did General Gordon say? He said—"There is one subject on which I cannot imagine anyone can differ." General Gordon did not understand Her Majesty's Government when he said that; he had had no experience of them. General Gordon said—
    "There is one subject on which I cannot imagine anyone can differ, and that is the impolicy of announcing our intention of evacuating Khartoum. Even if we were bound to do so we should have said nothing about it. The moment it is known that we have given up the game every man will go over to the Mahdi. All men worship the rising sun."
    That was the encouragement Her Majesty's Government gave to Baker Pasha. That statement was absolutely sufficient, in his (Mr. Stanhope's) opinion, to ensure the failure of Baker Pasha's mission; and it was absolutely impossible, therefore, for the Government at this time of day to shrink from the responsibility of what Baker Pasha did,

    755
    or to say that they had no substantial ground for believing that Baker Pasha's mission could possibly be attended by failure. What had Her Majesty's Government done since then? They had sent out General Gordon. Every man on that side of the House wished as much as hon. Members on the other side that that noble spirit, that almost solitary man, tracing his way across the Desert in order to endeavour to the utmost of his power to carry out the policy of the Government, should be absolutely and completely successful. He wished to ask a question of the Government in reference to General Gordon, and it was this—when did they first consult General Gordon? General Gordon was an officer about whom the Prime Minister could not say too much that night. They all know that he was thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of the Soudan. When did Her Majesty's Government consult him? Was it really true that the first consultation they had with General Gordon was a few days before they sent him out to carry out their policy in the Soudan? He (Mr. Stanhope) did not intend to dwell any further that night upon the unfortunate garrison of Sinkat. They had all of them heard with feelings of terrible distress of the unfortunate fate of that gallant garrison. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister told them that its relief was absolutely hopeless. He wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman when it became hopeless? Was it for a single moment pretended that from the 19th of November, when they first heard of the defeat of the Mahdi in another part of the Soudan, the relief of that garrison was at all beyond hope? They knew perfectly well that it was not. It was in the belief that it could be effected if General Baker was allowed to go, and yet they allowed General Baker to go with a force that was known to be utterly inadequate for the release of the garrison. They allowed him to go to what was the certain destruction of his force. Now, at the last moment they had authorized an expedition to Tokar. Why did they not send out an expedition before? The Prime Minister said the reason they did not send it before was that they wished to consult General Gordon, and they wanted to know if the sending out of an expedition would endanger the safety of Gene-
    756
    ral Gordon. In the first place, he should like to know why they did not ask General Gordon when he was here in this country whether the despatch of a force under General Baker for the purpose of relieving the garrison was likely to endanger his safety when he was proceeding to Khartoum; and he should like to know how the situation was altered? General Baker was going with their consent to relieve this garrison, yet, when General Baker was defeated, they waited, forsooth, for precious days and weeks before they allowed a force to go out to accomplish the object for which they had permitted General Baker to go. He (Mr. Stanhope) confessed that it seemed to him all the evidence they had before them showed an utter indifference on the part of Her Majesty's Government to the safety of those garrisons which they might have relieved. But the country was not indifferent. The country knew that they still had resources which would enable them to relieve these unfortunate garrisons, if it was only right that they should be relieved. What the country would demand of Her Majesty's Government was this—when they talked of rendering special services to the cause of humanity by sending out on the 12th of February a small military force for the purpose of relieving Tokar, why did they not weeks ago take similar steps, which every man know ought to be taken, in order to save these unfortunate men, women, and children from being massacred as the consequence of their policy? He came now to consider the earlier policy of Her Majesty's Government in the Soudan. He had been much amused by one argument which the Prime Minister put forward. The right hon. Gentleman said—"You cannot blame us for what we have done in the Soudan, as we have got the very best men, and sent them there, beginning with Lord Dufferin, and going down to General Gordon." The right hon. Gentleman said further—"Can you tell us where we could have found better men?" Why, of course not; but the matter for consideration was not only the men they sent, but the instructions that were given to them, and the support Her Majesty's Government were willing to afford to them in carrying out the necessary policy they ought to pursue. In November they were told that the Egyptian Government had arrived

    757
    at a decision as to their policy in the Soudan; that the Egyptian Government had determined that they would endeavour to try and hold Khartoum; and, further than that, that it was necessary to open out the route between Berber and Suakim. The answer of Her Majesty's Government was the same as usual. It was that the responsibility must entirely rest upon the Egyptian Government, who must rely upon their own resources. Her Majesty's Government knew perfectly well that the Egyptian Government had no resources left. It had used up all its men; it had used up all its money; and it could not form an army without the consent of the English Government; nor could it raise money for the purpose of sending out an army without their consent. It was, therefore, perfectly clear that the Egyptian Government could do nothing without the approval of Her Majesty's Government. They did not give that approval, and they did nothing themselves. On the 3rd of December a conference was held between Sir Evelyn Baring, General Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Stephenson to consider the best policy that could be adopted in regard to the Soudan. They recommended the opening out of the Berber and Suakim route just as the Egyptian Government had done, and they told Her Majesty's Government that that was the best means of saving the lives of the garrison. That was to say, that their own officers, the men most competent to advise Her Majesty's Government as to what was the best policy to adopt, did advise them that the opening out of the Berber and Suakim route was the only course they ought to adopt. What was the answer of Her Majesty's Government? On the 13th of December they said they were determined to send no troops whatever, and they told the Egyptian Government that they might not spend a single shilling except for the relief of the garrisons. They added that they would relieve the sea-port garrisons unless Turkey were called upon and undertook that duty by taking charge of the whole government of the Soudan. He was much surprised when he heard that declaration on the part of Her Majesty's Government. He should have thought that if there was one thing this country was pledged to Egypt, to Europe, and the rest of the world to do, it was to
    758
    attempt the suppression of the Slave Trade in the Soudan. They had told Europe that there was nothing they had so much at heart as the suppression of the Slave Trade throughout the Soudan, and the means by which that object was to be attained was pointed out over and over again in the Papers which had been laid upon the Table. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government declared their readiness to hand over this great object which they had at heart to the great anti-human species of humanity. Passing over that, he came to this fact—that for 18 months Her Majesty's Government did nothing except advise the Egyptian Government. They certainly gave them plenty of advice. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister talked about abstaining from giving advice, but he (Mr. Stanhope) should like to read a short passage which appeared in a despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring, dated December 8, describing the policy hitherto adopted towards Egypt. Sir Evelyn Baring said—
    "I wish to explain to your Lordships the attitude hitherto adopted towards the Egyptian Government in dealing with the affairs of the Soudan. I have given them every assistance I can legitimately afford in minor matters, and I have occasionally, in the course of conversation with Cherif Pasha and others, made a few suggestions on points of secondary importance. But I have at the same time clearly explained to them that the whole responsibility for the course of affairs in the Soudan must rest with the Khedive and his Ministers."
    That was the policy Sir Evelyn Baring thought it necessary to adopt in pursuance of his instructions, and he did give advice, when they turned to him and said—
    "You are advising us every day on points which are of considerable importance, but they do not touch the main point of our policy, and we now call on you to advise on the much larger matters which are involved in the questions concerning the Soudan."
    He had read with great approbation and assent the speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. Forster) about the middle of December, when the right hon. Gentleman told the country very plainly that Her Majesty's Government could not govern Egypt by merely giving good advice, but that they must go beyond giving good advice and insist upon that advice being followed. The Government had apparently now reached

    759
    that stage, and accordingly there was a despatch on the 4th of January intimating that the advice they had given to the Egyptian Government must be adopted. First of all, there was an intention and desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government to ignore the Soudan altogether; the second stage was that of giving good advice over and over again to the Egyptian Government; the third stage was that of insisting upon that advice being followed; but the great complaint he made was that they were in this, as in everything else, a great deal too late. Her Majesty's Government were bound, as the Prime Minister admitted, by every sentiment of honour to support their advice by their acts; and yet they delayed until the last possible moment, until they were too late to insist upon the advice they gave to the Egyptian Government being followed by them. On this ground he thought the House was entitled to say that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Soudan had not only been inconsistent, but vacillating to the last degree. There were, it seemed to him, speaking for himself, two things which the country demanded of the Government at the present time. They had at the very last moment, almost at the 12th hour, recognized in a small degree their responsibility, and authorized the sending out of a force for the purpose of relieving one garrison that happily might chance still to be able to maintain itself. But that was not nearly enough. On the contrary, he was satisfied that the country demanded further of them that they should carry out the policy the Egyptian Government originally recommended—the policy which their own officers told them was the only one that could be safely and consistently adopted—namely, that of opening out the route between Berber and Suakim, and further that they should give active support to General Gordon by showing that the English power was paramount and supreme. There was one further step which the country expected from Her Majesty's Government, and that was that they should strengthen the Government at Cairo. Certainly they had recognized, but only too tardily, that, after all, the great evil was at Cairo itself. Long ago General Gordon said that the strength of the insurrection in the Soudan was
    760
    because of the weakness at Cairo. At the very first moment of Arabi's defeat that was obvious to everyone. Everybody saw it except Her Majesty's Government themselves, and they had, unhappily, refused to recognize it. The Natives of Egypt perfectly understood it. Europe was prepared to acquiesce in their decision, and yet their whole policy had been to minimize to every extent in their power the responsibility which justly and rightly devolved upon them from the moment of the defeat of Arabi. They ignored their responsibility, and when they could not do so they threw it upon the Egyptian Government. Let the House take as an example the treatment by Her Majesty's Government of the Khedive himself. They always interfered with the Khedive when they were not wanted to do so, and they never interfered with his Government when he wanted them to interfere. It was a most ingenious policy by which they could throw all the blame on the Government of Egypt, and get any credit, if there was any credit, for themselves. Foreign countries had long ago seen through all that, and they were prepared not only to attach to Her Majesty's Government all responsibility for everything that had taken place in Egypt, but they were prepared also to blame them for any faults of omission and commission by the Government. Their policy in this respect had every possible disadvantage. It broke down, in the first instance, from a circumstance which no doubt was a very unfortunate one to them and to everyone else. It broke down, in the first place, from the unfortunate visitation of the cholera; but that would not have been an unmixed evil if it had only taught the Government the lesson that it would not do hastily to withdraw their troops from Egypt before they had established a Government that would stand after the troops were withdrawn. The Prime Minister told them a good deal in regard to what had been done as to the establishment of institutions in Egypt, but the Judges who had been established there as one of those institutions ran away when the cholera came, and had not gone back since. When the Prime Minister announced at the Mansion House on the 9th of November that Her Majesty's Government had arrived at the conclusion that the time had come for withdrawing British troops

    761
    from Egypt, did he tell his hearers that the objects for which they went to Egypt had been secured? Not a bit of it. He told the country that Her Majesty's Government desired to withdraw the troops in order that the experiment might be made in Egypt whether the Egyptian Government could carry on the government for themselves. Now, he (Mr. Stanhope) would ask if that was the spirit in which this great question should be approached? He ventured to say that there should be no attempt to withdraw the troops from Egypt solely on the ground of trying an experiment, but that the troops should only be withdrawn when there was a well-founded assurance that there would be a good Government in that country, and that the protection of the Suez Canal could be absolutely secured. They must now recognize for themselves that the real Minister of Egypt at the present moment was the Prime Minister of England; but they could not withdraw their troops by constantly proclaiming to the world that they were going to withdraw them. The only way of extricating themselves from the difficulties which surrounded them was by establishing a strong Government in Cairo—a Government that would last when Her Majesty's Government had really withdrawn their troops from the country. He had said that he had no desire to minimize the difficulties which Her Majesty's Government had to encounter when they undertook to interfere with the Government of Egypt. Financial, legal, and international obligations beset them at every turn. Any Government that desired to be leniently judged in regard to their difficulties ought to show that they were able to lead, and not only to drift. Two policies were from the first open to the Government, and two policies only. They might have adopted that policy which was recommended in such graceful terms by one of their own Colleagues—they might have allowed the Egyptians to "stew in their own juice." But they knew the country would never stand that for one moment. They might, on the other hand, take the full responsibility of the policy which devolved upon them in Egypt, and England would have supported them, whatever their Radical supporters might have said. But they did nothing of the kind. The policy of the Government had been half-
    762
    hearted, the result of divided Councils. It was never continuous; it was generally unintelligible; and, even when intelligible, it was thoroughly disheartening to their friends. It deserved to fail, and it had failed. The time had come when failure did not only mean danger and humiliation, but it had now become vital to the interests and honour of England and the future of Egypt. Neglected opportunities, evaded responsibilities, excited the ridicule of Europe, and their callous indifference to human suffering until it was too late to afford effectual relief had excited the contempt of the country. In the words of the Prime Minister, they had "added to abnegated duty a chapter of perpetrated wrong."
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)
    Motion agreed to.
    Debate adjourned till Thursday.

  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (IRELAND).

    MOTION FOR A RETURN.
    MR. O'BRIENmoved for a Return
    "Setting forth the religion and salaries of employés in the following Government Departments in Ireland:—The Lord Lieutenant's Household, the Chief Secretary's Office, the Privy Council, the Military Staff, the Local Government Board, the Board of Public Works, the Courts of Justice, the Officers of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police, the General Prisons Board, Irish Fisheries Department, Lunatic Asylums Board, Board of Inland Revenue and Customs, Board of National Education, Board of Intermediate Education, Registry of Petty Sessions Clerks, Geological Survey of Ireland, General Valuation and Boundary Survey, General Register Office, Ordnance Survey of Ireland, Endowed Schools Commission, and Loan Fund Board."
    MR. SPEAKERpointed out to the hon. Member that the Return was substantially the same as that which had already appeared upon the Paper, and had been negatived.
    MR. O'BRIENsaid, that a very important element in the Return which was upon the Paper on the previous night was not included in the one for which he now asked, so that he might say that substantially the Return was different from that which had previously appeared upon the Paper.
    MR. SPEAKER: It is substantially the same, and it would be out of Order to put it.
    Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

  STANDING COMMITTEES—REVIVAL OF RESOLUTIONS OF 1ST DECEMBER, 1882.—RESOLUTION.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, in the absence of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, I rise to make the Motion which stands in his name for the revival of the Resolutions of the House of the 1st of December, 1882, relating to the constitution and proceedings of Standing Committees. The House will remember that at the close of last Session my right hon. Friend did not, as was intended, propose to make the Standing Order a Sessional Order, because, as I think was stated, it would be more convenient that this course should be taken when the Government were in a position to say what Bills would be referred to the Committees if re-appointed. I am, of course, unable to state positively at the present moment what Bills will be so referred, because the stage of second reading had not been reached. I may, however, state that, in the event of the Standing Committees on Law and Trade being re-appointed in the present Session, it would be proposed by the Government to refer to the Committee on Trade a measure dealing with the preservation of Life and Property at Sea, and another measure dealing with the powers of the Railway Commission; and to the Committee on Law it would be proposed to refer a Bill dealing with Corrupt Practices at Municipal Elections, and another Bill relating to the Law on Stolen Goods. It was, I believe, understood last Session that no measures except Government measures should he referred to these Committees. That was an engagement which the Government would be quite willing to renew, if it were desired by the House; but, in the event of any measures introduced by private Members being passed at the second reading, and if it be the general wish of Members that they should be considered by either of the Standing Committees, the Government would not think it necessary to interpose any objection to their being so considered. There are two measures, introduced by
  764
  private Members, which it might be desirable to refer to the Committee on Law—one of them being a Bill which deals with Copyhold Enfranchisement, and the other, introduced by the hon. and learned Member for Launceston (Sir Hardinge Giffard), and which, I believe, will come on for the second reading tomorrow, dealing with the Registration of Deeds in Middlesex. Those, and any other Bills on similar subjects might, perhaps, in the opinion of the Government, be referred to the Standing Committee on Law; and they would not think it necessary to present any objection to that course being adopted, unless it should be contrary to the desire of the House.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Resolutions of the House of the 1st December, 1882, relating to the constitution and proceedings of Standing Committees, be revived."—(The Marquess of Hartington.)
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHsaid, as he had last Session the honour of serving on the Standing Committee on Law, he would like to address to the House some remarks founded upon his experience of that Committee, and he was quite sure his right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Raikes) had the same intention. He was bound to say that the results of his experience were by no means as favourable to these Standing Committees as the experience of some hon. Members who served on the Committee on Trade and Commerce appeared to have been; and, therefore, he desired to submit to the House some reasons against the renewal of the Standing Order, as moved by the noble Marquess opposite. But, taken as they were by surprise, he could not but feel that it was impossible adequately to discuss the question at the present moment. There had been no apparent intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to make the Motion that night. If he remembered aright, it was distinctly stated by the Prime Minister, on a former occasion, that when the Motion was made full opportunity would be afforded for its discussion. But this evening the Notice of the Motion on the Paper had actually been passed over by Mr. Speaker, and subsequent Notices had been called on, before the Motion was moved by the noble

  765
  Marquess. He protested against the discussion being taken at that Sitting. He did not think it fair to the House to continue the debate in the present circumstances, especially as the noble Marquess had stated that Her Majesty's Government contemplated a distinct addition to the powers of the Standing Committees. The Government, according to the speech of the noble Marquess, contemplated that Bills introduced by private Members, and which it was well known were almost invariably unripe schemes, should be referred to those Committees as well as the Bills of the Government. That appeared to him a question too serious to be settled on that occasion, and he, therefore, begged to move the adjournment of the debate.
  Motion made, and Question proposed; "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.)
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, he was very much surprised at the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman. He would like to ask for what purpose the Notice Paper was printed that was placed in the hands of hon. Members? Night after night the House was told that Motions deliberately put upon the Notice Paper, and reached in the due course of Business, came upon them as a matter of surprise, and that the debates could not go on. He did not understand that assertion at all. It was not a matter of surprise to anybody that any Motion on the Notice Paper should be brought on before half-past 12 o'clock; the half-past 12 o'clock Rule meant nothing else than that every Motion on the Paper should be dealt with, if there were an opportunity for so doing. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross) said he was taken by surprise last night. Was it 11 or 12 o'clock, or what hour was it, that surprise should be felt that a Motion on the Notice Paper should be taken? They all knew the difficulty there was in getting through the Business of the House, which was not likely to be lessened by hon. Gentlemen making an arbitrary rule for themselves, and then postponing discussion on the ground that they had been taken by surprise; indeed, he did not see how the Government were to get through Business at all, unless hon. Members were prepared to take all Motions on the Paper, if there
  766
  should be time to make them before half-past 12 o'clock. That was the practice and the rule of the House, and he could not understand the objection to take the Motion of his noble Friend. The House was aware of the pressure now upon the Government. There was the Vote of Censure; and the debate on the Address was unfinished. How, then, could the Government throw away these opportunities of dealing with other matters in their regular order? The right hon. Gentleman opposite had put down a block to the Motion, and then, because in the proper course of Business it was reached before half-past 12 o'clock, the right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) said that the House was taken by surprise. To avoid such surprises, hon. Gentlemen need do no more than understand that Business on the Notice Paper, which could be taken before half-past 12 o'clock, would be proceeded with.
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTHsaid, he thought he could tell the House why the surprise spoken of by right hon. Gentlemen was felt. The Prime Minister, on the first night of the Session, announced that the Business next after the debate on the Address would be the introduction of the Franchise Bill, and that he proposed, in due course, to introduce a Motion for the revival of the Standing Committees. No one after that had any idea that this Motion would be brought forward in the absence of the right hon. Gentleman; indeed, the Prime Minister was so much identified with the Business of the House dealt with in the present Motion, that he thought it natural, on the part of hon. Members, to expect that it would be brought forward by him. He would not go into the question as to the success or otherwise of the Standing Committees appointed last year, but merely say that, in his judgment, the imperfect action of the Standing Committee on Law, in respect of a certain measure which came before it, was due not to the construction or action of that Committee, but to the character of the measure which it had to consider. It was a Bill, the principle of which was strongly objected to by a large proportion of the Committee. That principle had never been really discussed in the House at all, still less by many of the Gentlemen who served on the Committee; and the Bill was,

  767
  therefore, not in a fit state to go before the Standing Committee. There were, doubtless, many Bills to which that objection would not apply; and he, for one, was not at all clear that they had not arrived at a useful method of dealing with a certain class of measures; but he did not think the Bill which came last year before the Standing Committee on Law was one of that class.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, he thought it scarcely worthy of the House for right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Opposition Benches to put forward the argument as to time in support of the Motion for the adjournment of the debate, because, as the Secretary of State for the Home Department had pointed out, any Business on the Paper might be reasonably expected to be taken which came forward before half-past 12 o'clock, and although this proceeding on the part of Her Majesty's Government did smack a little of what to some might appear sharp practice, they were not to be surprised at anything which the Government did. The proposal which had just been put before the House was one so important in itself that it seemed to him reasonable to ask that the discussion upon it should be postponed, and the decision of the House postponed until all those Members were in their places who felt an interest in the question. He had certainly understood the Prime Minister to say that it was not his intention to bring forward the Motion on the subject of the Standing Committees until a more advanced period of the Session had been reached, and his own opinion was certainly that the Motion would not be taken at that Sitting. He thought, with regard to the Standing Committees, that there was a good deal to be said against them as well as for them. He was a Member of one of those Committees, every Sitting of which he attended, and his experience was that there was an immense waste of time in connection with it. He believed much more work could have been got through in a Select Committee than in the Committee of which he was a Member, and much less expenditure of the force of the House would have been involved. The end of its labours was that the Bill which was passed through the Committee, and which was very imperfectly understood by the House, was brought down, and
  768
  was ultimately read a third time without the House having before them the Amendments on the Paper. He would detain the House but a few moments longer in order to urge the desirability of postponing this discussion, on the ground of the great importance of the proposal made by the noble Marquess, the attenuated condition of the House, and the absence of Members who were greatly interested in the question of the Standing Committees, which made demands upon their time and attention that they could very ill afford.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he trusted the Government would agree to the adjournment of the debate. He had been a Member of one of the Standing Committees, having attended every Sitting, and he would venture to say that no one who had sat during the day on a Standing Committee, and gone through the work which they had to do, was then in a condition to come down to that House, sit there the whole evening, and discharge his duties efficiently. There were many considerations arising out of this question—namely, as to whether the old Committees had not worked as well as the Standing Committees, and as to whether the duties of the Standing Committees might not be discharged by a less number of Members.
  MR. SPEAKER: I would point out that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is going beyond the Question before the House.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, with submission to the ruling of Mr. Speaker, that it was difficult to support the adjournment of the debate without showing the importance of the considerations involved in the Motion for the revival of the Standing Committees. The noble Marquess, however, must see that there were good reasons why the debate should be adjourned. He himself was exceedingly anxious that there should be an opportunity of fully discussing this important question of reappointing these Committees, to which in future very important Bills might be relegated.
  MR. ONSLOWsaid, he wished to remind the noble Marquess that the Prime Minister had stated distinctly that first after the Report of the Address he would ask leave to introduce the Bill dealing with the Franchise, and that he would next make the Motion relating to

  769
  the Standing Committees. He felt sure that if the Home Secretary had known that, he would have agreed at once to the Motion of his right hon. Friend for the adjournment of the debate. It was all very well to say that Members must expect to be taken by surprise. They knew that. They were taken by surprise last night, and he must suppose that the Government intended to move these important Motions at a time when the House would be taken by surprise. If the debate on the present Motion were allowed to continue there would be a distinct breach of pledge, the responsibility of which would rest not on the Government alone, but particularly on the shoulders of the Prime Minister himself, because, as he had shown, the right hon. Gentleman said that the Motion would come on after the introduction of the important Bill of which he had given Notice. He did not think the noble Marquess was cognizant of this fact when he made the Motion, and they all knew that the Prime Minister had had a very onerous duty to perform in the House that evening; no one supposed for a moment that he would be in his place after the speech he had made in the debate which had taken place. He did not say it was un-Constitutional, or a thing that ought not to be done, for another Member of the Government to make a Motion of which the Prime Minister had given Notice, but it added to the number of surprises they had experienced; and for the reasons stated he trusted the noble Marquess would agree to the Motion for the adjournment of the debate.
  MR. BIGGARsaid, he rose to corroborate the statement of the hon. Member who had just spoken with regard to the announcement of the Prime Minister. The right hon. Gentleman certainly did say that this Motion would not be brought on before the Report of the Address had been taken; and that fact, in his opinion, bound the Government to agree to the adjournment of the debate. But another point had been raised by the Home Secretary—namely, that because the Motion appeared on the Notice Paper, it was perfectly legitimate and proper to bring it forward. The right hon. and learned Gentleman must have known that it was a regular thing to put Motions on the Paper which it was not intended to bring forward;
  770
  and that when a matter of great importance was really to be discussed, it was usual to bring it forward early in the evening, not at a quarter past 12 o'clock, as had been the case with the present Motion. The Motion of the noble Marquess stood in a very different position from that of the Bill brought forward last night, because, in the case of the latter, there would be an opportunity for discussing the merits of the measure at a subsequent period; whereas, if the Motion of to-night were carried, there would be no other opportunity for discussing the re-appointment of the Standing Committees. The Prime Minister certainly led the House to believe that he would not bring forward the Motion until after the Report of the Address. For that reason, in view of the importance of the question, and because there was room for much difference of opinion as to whether or not the Standing Committees should be re-appointed, he trusted the noble Marquess would agree to the Motion for the adjournment of the debate.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEpointed out that, although the Prime Minister was not present, yet the Motion was made with his cognizance and consent.
  MR. J. G. TALBOTprotested against the Motion, and earnestly pressed the Government not to persist with it that night. It was in his recollection that it was a matter of dispute last year, in the course of the Session, whether these Grand Committees were to sit during the Sitting of the House. He mentioned that as an illustration of matters of dispute that might arise again with regard to these Committees. He thought the Government would be wise not to press this matter now, because this question necessarily produced a considerable amount of friction, as there was not a unanimous feeling in the House with regard to these Committees. No doubt, the majority of the House had agreed to them; but he thought the Government must feel that on a matter of this kind, which affected the conduct of the House, and naturally became a part of the arrangements of the House, every effort ought to be made to obtain as nearly as possible the general assent of the House. That was not the case at the present time. He had hoped to hear a statement on the subject from the Prime Minister; but the House had

  771
  not had the advantage of hearing a statement of the right hon. Gentleman's views, and he thought that as that expectation was common to the whole House, it would only be dealing fairly and candidly with the House if the noble Marquess agreed to the adjournment, so that the Prime Minister might fulfil the pledge which hon. Members had understood him to give—namely, that this Motion should be made by himself, when the House was full, and proper attention could be given to the matter. He was sure the Government would consent to the adjournment if they consulted their own interests.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 50; Noes 70: Majority 20.—(Div. List, No. 13.)
  Original Question again proposed.
  MR. BERESFORD HOPEmoved the adjournment of the House. No doubt hon. Members on this side would be taunted, because, up to now, they had been credulous enough to suppose that certain well-recognized principles, which would prevent Party warfare degenerating into faction, would still be observed; but if this Resolution was pressed through that night, these Grand Committees, which were passed at the end of that very excited Winter Session in 1882, and which were tried last year wholly experimentally, would again be forced upon the House without a fair discussion, into which all could enter with goodwill, and they would become a Party measure. There was a strong opinion on all sides last Session that this was the one portion of the New Code of 1882 which was to be kept out of the area of Party politics. That night the simple question was, whether the Government majority should, under conditions to which he would not further refer, acting under a strict Party Whip, snatch a purely Party victory over an Opposition totally unprepared. He must endorse everything that had been said as to there having been a general understanding as to when this Motion would be brought on; and he thought there could not be better evidence of that than that his right hon. Friend and Colleague (Mr. Raikes), who was the last man to go to bed when there was anything to fight about in the House, had left the House. Could there be
  772
  better evidence of the utter surprise that had been sprung upon the House? If the Government did snatch a majority that night they might carry the Grand Committees; but that would make them very unpopular, and would be a very bad beginning indeed.
  SIR R. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, he must recall the recollection of the noble Marquess to the fact that when these Grand Committees were first brought into action, towards the end of that long Session, the noble Marquess himself gave a most solemn pledge that when these Committees were to be proposed again the Motion would be made at a time of the Session when a full House could be expected to be present. When the Prime Minister brought forward, or attempted to bring forward, this matter at the end of a Session, and was reminded of this pledge, he then said he would not press it forward at that time, but would bring it forward early this Session, so that it might be considered by a properly constituted House. Considering that and the statement of the Prime Minister that after the Report of the Address he would bring forward the Franchise Bill, and after that the Standing Committees—words which he himself heard—it was a gross breach of faith to bring forward this Motion now. There was one further matter which he was bound to mention. Through the ordinary channels from one side to the other, he and his hon. Friends had been told that this matter was to be put down as the third Order for tomorrow. His objection would apply just the same in that case; but, that communication having been made, he considered the present proposal as a still further breach of faith. This was a question for the serious consideration and deliberation of the House, and it could not be supposed that hon. Members who had sat on these Committees would be able or willing at that time of the night to state their experience; and if hon. Members found in the morning that these Committees had been struck in their absence, and without their having had an opportunity of discussing the matter, their astonishment would have been very great. Therefore, he put it to the noble Marquess that, considering the opposition which would undoubtedly be persevered in, it would be better, if the House was to have

  773
  a discussion at all upon these Committees, to bring them forward when Members were in their places. He ventured to say that these Committees would not have been agreed to but for the understanding to which he had referred. Under all these circumstances, he hoped the noble Marquess would not persist in the attempt to force this matter on an unwilling House, otherwise he might rely upon it that there would be a most determined opposition.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)said, in regard to the argument as to the application of the Standing Committees to private Members Bills, that the Registration of Deeds Bill was not a private Member's Bill, but a Bill to be introduced in the other House by the Lord Chancellor. There was no wish to press the other private Bill further, if there was any objection on the part of the House. He had, however, something to say with respect to the somewhat excited charge made by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Assheton Cross). The right hon. Gentleman said there had been a gross breach of faith on the part of the Government. That was a rather awkward charge to make. [Mr. WARTON: It is quite true.] He was not surprised the hon. and learned Member for Bridport agreed with that charge. The right hon. Gentleman stated that the Prime Minister said he would introduce the Franchise Bill on Friday, and after introducing it on Friday he would take this proposition. He (the Attorney General) heard the Prime Minister use those words. It was in reference to Friday that the right hon. Gentleman used them, and he (the Attorney General) knew it was the right hon. Gentleman's intention and wish to make this proposition on every night of the Session since. He (the Attorney General) was sorry the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Assheton Cross) had seen fit to use such strong language, and that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope) should have expressed the belief that there was a desire to push this proposition down the throats of hon. Members. There was no such wish on the part of the Government; indeed, if there was a strong feeling on the part of a considerable minority that the Motion ought not to be pressed on the present occasion, the Government would
  774
  not further persevere with it. His noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) had asked him to make this explanation, and to protest against the violent charge which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Assheton Cross). He trusted that the Motion would be withdrawn.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question again proposed.
  Debate adjourned till To-morrow.

  CROWN LANDS BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. COURTNEY, Bill to amend the Law relating to the management of the Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues of the Crown, ordered to be brought in by Mr. COURTNEY and Mr. HERBERT GLADSTONE.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 99.]

  REAL ASSETS ADMINISTRATION BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. ARTHUR O'CONNOR, Bill to facilitate the Administration of Deceased Persons Estates, ordered to be brought in by Mr. ARTHUR O'CONNOR and Mr. WARTON.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 98.]

  PETTY SESSIONS (JUSTICE) (IRELAND) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. O'SULLIVAN, Bill for the better administration of Justice at Petty Session Courts in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Mr. O'SULLIVAN, Colonel NOLAN, Mr. RICHARD POWER, and Mr. SEXTON.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 100.]

  EAST INDIA (RAILWAY COMMUNICATION)
  Select Committee appointed, "to inquire into and report upon the necessity for more rapid extension of Railway Communication in India, and the means by which this object may be best accomplished, with special reference to the Report of the Famine Commissioners, and with due regard to the financial condition of India."—(Mr. J. K. Cross.)
  House adjourned at One o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Marquess of Hertford, after the death of his father.
TOOK THE OATH—The Lord Bishop of Lichfield.
PUBLIC BILL—First Reading—Trustee Churches (Ireland)* (11).

EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—FALL OF SINKAT.

  QUESTION.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I hope the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will excuse my asking him a Question of which it has not been possible for me to give him previous Notice. A report has reached us that Sinkat has fallen. Have Her Majesty's Government any confirmation of the news?
  EARL GRANVILLE: I presume the information that has reached the noble Marquess is the same that has reached me. I am sorry to say it is true that Sinkat has fallen, and that the troops have been cut to pieces.

EGYPT (EVENTS IN THE SOUDAN)—EGYPTIAN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

  VOTE OF CENSURE.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, in rising to move—
  "That this House, having read and considered the correspondence relating to Egypt laid on the Table by Her Majesty's command, is of opinion that the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due in a great measure to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government,"
  said: My Lords, I rise in a grave conjuncture of public affairs to ask the judgment of your Lordships upon the conduct of the Government with regard to recent events in Egypt, as displayed in the Papers which have been laid on the Table. My Lords, we stand in the presence of events of great gravity, of lamentable occurrences, which have spread discredit upon the English name, and carried sorrow into many a home. In Kordofan, the force sent out by the Egyptian Government, which is under our absolute control, generalled by an English officer, has been defeated and entirely cut to pieces by the insurgent tribes acting under the Mahdi. Again, on the borders of the Red Sea, another force, also sent out by that Government, which is under our control, commanded by Baker Pasha, one of the most skilful officers that ever served Her Majesty, has been defeated and utterly cut to pieces; and now, as we hear to-day—we have from the lips of the noble Earl official confirmation of the disastrous news—Sinkat, containing perhaps the most gallant officer in the Egyptian Service, containing a garrison which have fought nobly for their lives, containing 1,000 women and children, has been taken by the same tribes which overcame Baker Pasha, and have nearly all perished by the sword. We wish to know what is the course of policy which has led to these disastrous results? And when we come to read the Blue Books, we shall find that it is not a single course of policy which has led us to this end. It was possible to have maintained the
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  Egyptian dominions in all their integrity. I have no doubt that if Her Majesty's Government had applied themselves to the task—though, undoubtedly, it would have been at the cost of some sacrifice—British troops would have defeated the populations which in other days had to give way to Mehemet Ali and Ismail Pasha. On the other hand, if Her Majesty's Government had adopted the policy from the beginning of saying that those vast outlying Provinces acquired and added to Egypt in the course of this century were no longer fit to form a part of that Empire, whatever other considerations might have been brought against that policy, no doubt it must have had this result—that none of these disastrous events would have taken place. My Lords, the defence of Her Majesty's Government lies, with respect to those events in the Western Soudan, in this—that in all their instructions they have perpetually stated that they were not responsible for the expedition of General Hicks, and that their representatives were to give no advice upon the subject. Even if they had taken from first to last a steady and consistent policy, it would have been no defence for the result which their policy has brought about. Those who have the absolute power of preventing lamentable events, and, knowing what is taking place, refuse to exercise that power, are responsible for what happens. You find scattered through these Blue Books again and again the phrase—"Her Majesty's Government are not responsible for the expedition of General Hicks;" it occurs with a sameness of repudiation that reminds you of the refrain of a popular song. But suppose that the manager of a mine, seeing that those who are under his guardianship and in his employment were performing some operation of certain danger, were simply to say again and again—"I never gave advice; I am not responsible," what view do your Lordships think a Court of Law would take of the conduct of such a manager? Precisely that which I take here, that if they had consistently adhered to their principle of repudiating responsibility in reference to the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government would have been in no better condition than such a manager as I have spoken of. But they have not done so. The gravest part of the indictment

  569
  against them is that they have followed no one particular policy, but that they have followed three policies. At first they accepted the Soudan as an integral part of the Egyptian Empire. Abdel Kader conducted many campaigns there; but though all the operations were duly reported to Her Majesty's Government, no disapproval was expressed, no attempt was made to stop the operations that were carried on. In the spring of last year, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, a very gallant officer of Her Majesty, was sent on an expedition through the Soudan. He visited all the towns and villages where troops were kept and all the garrisons, detected a great number of abuses, and made a number of recommendations with respect to the disposition and government of the soldiers in the Provinces, and those recommendations were embodied in a very able Report, the value of which the noble Earl opposite has fully acknowledged. Yet, while the noble Earl (Earl Granville) was disclaiming all responsibility for anything that took place in the Soudan, he was, at the same moment, impressing on the Egyptian Government the necessity of making those changes in the administration which Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart had recommended. How was it possible, under such circumstances, to expect that the Egyptian Government should believe that Her Majesty's Government had divested themselves of all responsibility for the Government of the Soudan? The first of the three policies which the noble Earl had recommended was, I think, a sound one. It was at least a sound one at the time. I express no judgment as to what should be done now. It was explained in a despatch of Lord Dufferin on the 2nd of April last year—and the occasion on which it was explained was one of some peculiarity and of a very special character—in which it might have been expected that Her Majesty's Government would lay down for the benefit of the Egyptian Government what policy they wished to be pursued in respect to the Soudan. The occasion was when a new Department was being created for the purpose of taking care of this Province. The head of that Department visited Lord Dufferin, and Lord Dufferin took the opportunity of explaining the policy of Her Majesty's Government to the head of the Department, and it was not an unauthorized
  570
  act of his own, because he had weeks before explained exactly the same policy to the noble Earl who sits opposite. Now, what Lord Dufferin writes is sufficiently short for me to quote it at length, because it is a statement of the policy which, under his advice, the noble Earl recommended to the Egyptian Government. It was a policy from which they afterwards departed; but which, I think, you will see had very much to recommend it. Lord Dufferin wrote as follows to the noble Earl:—
  "My Lord,—The Egyptian Government has constituted a special bureau for the superintendence of the affairs of the Soudan. The Head of the New Department, Ibrahim Bey, called upon me yesterday. He seemed an intelligent and well-educated person, and I have no doubt that under his direction the present situation of that unfortunate region will improve. I ventured to impress His Excellency with my belief, that the recent disturbances were mainly to he attributed to the misgovernment and cruel exactions of the local Egyptian authorities at Khartoum, and that, whatever might he the pretensions of the Mahdi to a divine mission, his chief strength was derived from the despair and misery of the native population. If the Egyptian Government were wise, I added, it would confine its present efforts to the re-establishment of its authority in Sennaar, and would not seek to extend its dominion beyond that province and the bordering river banks. By this modest policy the annual drain on the Egyptian Treasury would be greatly diminished, if it did not altogether cease, and if he succeeded in endowing Dongola, Khartoum, and Sennaar with a just, humane, and beneficent administration, there could be no doubt the ultimate recovery of so much of the abandoned territories as it might he desirable to re-annex would be easily effected at a later period."—[Egypt, No. 13 (1883), p. 54.]
  Your Lordships must bear in mind the geography of this district. You will recollect that the Nile splits into two forks at Khartoum, and that between these two forks of the White and the Blue Nile lies the Province of Sennaar. On the West lies the Province of Kordofan, where Hicks Pasha met his death, and the Province of Darfour lies still further to the West. What Lord Dufferin recommended was that Sennaar, which lies between the two forks, should be retained, and that Kordofan and Darfour, which had only been recently acquired, should be abandoned. Therefore, if the policy of Lord Dufferin had been adhered to by the Government, if they had insisted on its being carried out as they have insisted later, General Hicks would never have started on that

  571
  ill-omened campaign to Kordofan, where he and 6,000 troops met their death. But when Lord Dufferin went away then came the next phase; and from a sound and sober policy Her Majesty's Government went over to a policy of sheer indifference—a policy which I can only call that of the Epicurean Gods. They did not prescribe anything to Egypt. They did not even advise. All their energies were devoted to the one point of preventing their Representative from expressing any opinion or undertaking any responsibility with respect to the operations which were going on. But those operations we know perfectly well were not without serious danger. General Hicks telegraphed on the 3rd of June that he had only 5,000 men for the Kordofan campaign, which he thought quite inadequate, and that he ought to have 10,000. Others thought that nothing short of 15,000 would do; but, at all events, 10,000 were absolutely necessary. This report of his was telegraphed home, and, at the same time, Sir Edward Malet warned Her Majesty's Government of the dangers which were impending. He warned them that already the Egyptian Government could not supply the funds demanded for the operations in the Soudan, and that the operations would undergo a considerable risk of failure, unless they were conducted on a largo scale, and the Army was well supplied in every respect. And then he suggests that Hicks Pasha should be instructed
  "To confine himself to maintaining the present supremacy of the Khedive in the regions between the Blue and White Niles."—[Egypt, No. 22 (1883), p. 27.]
  that is to say, in the Province of Sennaar, to which Lord Dufferin had recommended that the Egyptian Government should confine itself. If that remonstrance of General Hicks had been listened to, if that warning of Sir Edward Malet had been accepted, the bloody scene which took place in Kordofan would never have been enacted. But this was the advice of the noble Earl. They had gone from their preliminary policy—their sound policy—inspired by Lord Dufferin, and they had lapsed into a policy of Epicureanism. The answer which they sent to Sir Edward Malet was—
  "Report decision of the Egyptian Government as soon as you can, taking care to offer no advice"—
  572
  this is the way the Government fulfilled their responsibilities, which, by the campaign of Tel-el-Kebir, they had accepted—
  "but pointing out that the Egyptian Government should clearly make up their minds what their policy is to be, and carefully consider the question in its financial aspect."—[Ibid. p. 33.]
  That seems to be the only aspect in which Her Majesty's Government have considered the matter. But this financial view of the matter did not satisfy Hicks Pasha. Again, on the 5th of August, he telegraphed his apprehensions with respect to the campaign he was ordered to undertake. He said that he had no money, no food, no camels; that the men were insubordinate; and he closed with these words—
  "It is almost impossible to contend against all these adverse conditions.…. Taking into consideration the whole state of affairs in the country, I am convinced that it would be best to keep the two rivers and Province of Sennaar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself."—[Ibid. p. 83.]
  Again, he presses upon the Government at home to adhere to the wise recommendations of Lord Dufferin; and again his warning is disregarded. On the 18th of August Sir Edward Malet writes to Hicks Pasha—
  "Although I am ready to transmit to the Egyptian Government telegrams that come from you, I am debarred by my instructions from giving advice with regard to action on them, the policy of Her Majesty's Government being to abstain as much as possible from interference with the action of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan."—[Ibid. p. 85.]
  Well, there was nothing for it. Hicks Pasha had to start. Instead of the 5,000 men he had asked for he got 3,000, and 1,800 of that number were men who had been previously rejected from the Army. He started, stating his knowledge and belief that the supply of water was not sufficient, and that the troops which he had to count upon were not to be relied upon. In this way he went into the Desert. The supply of water, as he had feared, failed; his wretched troops and himself were cut to pieces; and, so far as we now certainly know, not one returned to tell the tale. But what was the attitude of Her Majesty's Government? Did the fear of any such disaster disturb their supreme tranquillity? On the 19th of November Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed—

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  "No definite news has been received from Hicks since the 27th September.…. Egyptian Government has no funds to meet an emergency, and they have already despatched almost every available man to the Soudan, with the exception of the forces under Sir Evelyn Wood and General Baker."—[Egypt, No. 1 (1884), p. 92.]
  The noble Earl answers, on the 20th of November—
  "We cannot lend English or Indian troops. If consulted, recommend abandonment of the Soudan within certain limits."—[Ibid. p. 93.]
  But the noble Earl will not commit himself so far as to say what those limits will be. That is all that the Egyptian Government obtains in the way of guidance or assistance from the English Government, that has undertaken the guardianship of their territory. Well, we know the terrible events that happened. But the information that Hicks Pasha and all his force had been cut to pieces only very slowly penetrated the mind of the Cabinet, and induced them to consider whether there was anything in this world of the least importance to them, except the repudiation of responsibility. On the 22nd of November the terrible tale reached this country; on the 25th of November all that the noble Earl can contribute towards the solution of the difficulty is—
  "Her Majesty's Government can do nothing in the matter which would throw upon them the responsibility of operations in the Soudan."
  That was after 3,000 men had been cut to pieces under an English General. And the noble Earl went on to say—
  "This responsibility must rest with the Egyptian Government relying on their own resources. I have to add that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Egyptian Government would be right to restrict their action to defensive operations."—[Ibid. p. 98.]
  Considering that all the troops in the field had been cut to pieces, and that all the other troops were shut up in the garrisons, that was a very modest and safe recommendation. After the 25th of November, the noble Earl lapsed into silence for nearly three weeks. Piteous appeals came from Khartoum, and the Commander there informed the Government that the garrison could not be held in two months' time, that there was no food, that the troops left were the refuse of the Army, and mostly old and blind. At last the noble Earl came down from his height of Olympian
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  serenity on being reminded by the Egyptian Government that if Her Majesty's Government would not send troops it would be fair that the Sultan of Turkey should have an opportunity of securing to his Empire this vast territory, which was being overrun by rebels. This is the suggestion which causes Her Majesty's Government to speak; and they speak in a tone which almost, if you consider the stress of the emergency, sounds like bitter and cruel mockery. Her Majesty's Government instructs the noble Earl to write, on the 13th of December, that—
  "They have no objection to offer to the employment of Turkish troops, provided they are paid by the Turkish Government, and that such employment be restricted exclusively to the Soudan, with their base at Suakim."—[Ibid. p. 131.]
  In other words, while the English Government were keeping their own troops in Egypt at the cost of the Egyptian Government, while they were refusing to use those Forces in the elementary duty of maintaining the defences of the Empire which they had taken over in charge, they say that if the Turkish Government should be more humanely inclined and disposed to lend their troops for the recovery of their lost Provinces, not one farthing of the expenses should come from the English Government. At the same time the noble Earl recommends simply the abandonment of the territory south of the Wady Halfa—something like, I believe, two-thirds of the Empire. No doubt he was very much surprised to receive an intimation that the Egyptian Government could not undertake to perform such a process of self-mutilation, and thus the third policy of the Government was adopted, and they go from recommendations to command. On the 4th of January an order is sent that the Egyptian Forces shall be withdrawn from the Soudan, and that if the Ministry of Cherif Pasha declined to carry out this operation it should be dismissed. Now, my Lords, what I wish to call your attention to is this—that our judgment of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government does not depend upon what was the right policy to pursue. We may think it was a right policy to maintain the Soudan, or we may think it was a right policy to abandon it; but we must, whatever

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  opinion we hold, condemn the policy of the Government. If they had adopted from the first the policy of Lord Dufferin—if they had resolved to maintain Sennaar, Hicks Pasha would never have gone, and his Army would never have been cut to pieces. If they had resolved to abandon the Soudan, to withdraw every garrison, to give up everything, still these terrible disasters would never have occurred, because the expedition would never have taken place. The shame and misery that have been caused, and the dishonour that has been shed upon the Egyptian Army and upon our English General—I say that those things come not from any definite policy, but from vacillation and inconsistency in the application of three policies, commencing with the policy, which will be found sound and sober, going on to a policy of inertness and indifference and fear of responsibility, and ending with a policy of panic. Now, my Lords, what will the result of this policy most likely be? You are well aware how much the hopes of those who desire to extinguish the last remaining home of the Slave Trade depend upon the operations that have taken place in the Soudan. It was this hope that inspired first Sir Samuel Baker, and afterwards General Gordon, in the performance of difficult and arduous and ungrateful tasks; and it must be confessed that if you once withdraw your hold from the Upper Nile you take away from yourself the last chance of crushing the Slave Trade which supplies Egypt, Arabia, and Asia Minor. Along the banks of the Blue Nile you have the establishments of the slave-dealers. If you hold the Nile you can check their operations; but it is idle to hope that any real impediment to the slave traffic can be interposed by the attempt to control the shores of the Red Sea, and to imagine that in so unwholesome a climate your ships can at all times of the year prevent the passage across by which the Slave Trade is maintained. If you give up the control of the Nile, you give up the attempt to suppress the Slave Trade. And beyond that you may draw fine distinctions between expeditions authorized by the Government and expeditions which the Government allows to go on before its eyes and with its sufferance; but such distinctions are not drawn either upon the spot or in any
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  other nation of the world. To all the world the defeats of Baker Pasha and Hicks Pasha are the defeats of English Generals. They have been defeated by savage tribes, ill-armed, strong in nothing but in their fanaticism, and without supplies. You will have running through the whole Mahomedan world; through the whole Turkish Empire; through Arabia; and among the 64,000,000 Mahomedans who submit to your rule in India—you will have running all through their bazaars this terrible intelligence that English Generals, having fought to maintain their hold of the vast territory that lies south of the Second Cataract, have been again and again defeated, in spite of all the efforts that could be made to support them, and that English rule has been hunted out by Mahomedan insurrection. How much this will conduce to your power in the settlement of the Eastern Question when it again arises, how much it will conduce to the stability or ease of our rule in India, I leave to your Lordships to imagine. There is yet a further consideration. We loudly proclaimed our position in Egypt as temporary and provisional, that we looked forward to the day when we could leave the country, British interests having been secured. But how have they been secured? We could only take away our material force by leaving behind us such esteem and affection in the minds of the population and the rulers of the population as shall make British power and influence supreme in the country; but with what eyes are the Egyptian people likely to look back to the period of British rule in their country? What have we done for them? What impress have we left upon their country, their Empire, their institutions, their social life? We have so demeaned ourselves that their principal commercial city, one of the most ancient cities of the world, has been burned and desolated. We have so acted that their Army rebelled, and we were compelled utterly to destroy it. We took over the Government so ostentatiously that the authority of the Khedive over his Mahomedan subjects has been utterly destroyed; and we have finished by dismembering the Empire, by giving up the splendid conquests of Mehemet Ali, who founded the Egyptian Dominion, and reducing Egypt to a small frag-

  577
  ment of the area it originally covered. Is that a process which is likely to leave our name imprinted on their minds in association with affection and respect? Because you do not care for Empire, because nothing is so pleasing to you as evacuation, you imagine that all other nations are the same. You imagine they have none of the instincts, you so ostentatiously repudiate, of love to see their country great, powerful, and extended. My Lords, you may tell how deeply this act has been felt by the difficulty which you had in carrying it out. Egyptian statesmen are not a stubborn and stiff-necked race; they do not adhere with undue and incorrigible tenacity to their own opinions; and yet when you required this policy to be carried out you could find no Native Egyptian who would undertake the task; you were obliged to have recourse to a man, highly distinguished no doubt, but whom the population of Egypt yet bitterly remember as a foreigner and a Christian. My Lords, I feel that this inconsistent and halting policy of Her Majesty's Government has not only been the cause of these lamentable events, by which so much blood has been shed, and so much misery produced, but it has also left behind it a legacy of hatred and contempt in the minds of the Egyptian people, which leaves us in this dilemma—that either our occupation must be indefinitely prolonged, or some other nation will take from us the position we occupy. As to the Eastern Soudan, I have not so much to say, because there is not so much material to be obtained from the Papers that are before us. The news, the wretched news, that has reached us this evening lends a sad emphasis to our deliberations. We know that on the 12th of November the Government—indeed, they received the news earlier, in October—were aware that the tribes were up, that the Mahdi's influence had procured the cutting to pieces of an Egyptian force; that their own Consul was killed; that the two towns of Tokar and Sinkat were besieged; that they were ill-furnished with supplies or ammunition, and that they must speedily fall. On the 8th of December Sir Evelyn Baring sent additional information, that on the 2nd of December 720 Egyptian troops were defeated, and only 50 returned, and the garrison was expected to fall from want of provisions. From
  578
  the 12th of November is throe months, or from the 2nd of December is two months, and to this day what have the Government done to meet this danger? In this case we have not the wretched excuse of the disclaimer of responsibility upon which, in other cases, they relied so much. They have never disclaimed responsibility for the littoral of the Bed Sea; on the contrary, they have openly avowed that it is their policy to maintain the Egyptian Dominion in that locality. Having arrived at this as their policy, we know that from the 12th of November to this date they have not taken a single measure to relieve those who were placed in such terrible straits. They had troops—I think there were 7,000 English troops in Egypt; there were, I believe, three battalions at Aden; there were troops at Cyprus; there were large forces at Malta. Since the 12th of November it would have been easy to have placed on the coast of the Red Sea a sufficient force, at all events, to have opened the way to Sinkat, only 30 miles from the coast, and to Tokar, which I think is less, about 15. It would have been easy to have forced the road, and to have relieved the garrisons; and if you were determined to abandon the locality, at all events not to have had the blood of these garrisons on your head. But from the 12th of November the old Olympic indifference of the Foreign Office continued. The only trace of the Government having received any information on the subject was an instruction to Admiral Hewett to take care of the waters of the ports of the Red Sea, and a telegram from the noble Earl (Earl Granville), in which he sends to Sir Evelyn Baring the following information:—"Tokar and Sinkat besieged, and cannot hold out many days." This the noble Earl sends to Sir Evelyn Baring on the 26th of December, and he sends it as if from a disinterested spectator who had observed an interesting fact, which he thought it desirable Sir Evelyn Baring ought to know. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the interest, the honour, and the pledges of England were in the least concerned in the fall of these garrisons. I have said they did nothing; but there is one thing they did which did much to hasten and assure their doom; they announced with a loud voice that they intended that Egypt should abandon the Soudan. If troops

  579
  were not to be sent, the one hope of these beleaguered garrisons was that friendly tribes could be induced to interfere in their behalf, and to drive back the forces of the Mahdi; but the friendly-tribes depended upon the assurance that they would not in their turn be deserted; if you tell them from the first that it is your intention to abandon the country, and leave them to the wrath of those whoso forces they have resisted, you may be sure you cannot long count on their friendship or support. This is what Her Majesty's Government deliberately did. Being determined to send no forces of their own, no forces from Bombay or Aden, or Cyprus or Malta—all so near at hand, from any one of which a sufficient force to prevent this terrible calamity could have been obtained—they resolved they would not do that, and they went one step further, and did that which made it absolutely impossible that any friendly tribe should interfere on our behalf. If they had wished to sign the death-warrant of this garrison they could not have acted with more signal imprudence. My Lords, these things carry us back to matters within our recollection. We can remember when those who now hold Office were very strong on the question of responsibilities. We can remember when they insisted on every platform that those who were then in power were responsible for the acts of the Turkish Government, over which they had no material hold or control whatever. Now, having absolute material hold and control over the action of the Egyptian Government, they try to persuade us that these terrible calamities, which they allowed the Egyptian Government and the gallant defenders of these fortresses to incur, do not involve their own responsibility at all. We can remember on another occasion, when the honour of England was at stake and her arms had been tarnished, the Government of this country refused to do what every other Government that ever existed here would have done—they refused to avenge the defeat lest it should involve blood-guiltiness. Is there not blood-guiltiness here? In this resolute renunciation of responsibility—in this abandonment of gallant men to an inevitable doom, in this giving up of 1,000 women and children to all the hideous horrors of an Oriental victory—is there no blood-
  580
  guiltiness here? My Lords it is on all these things that I ask your verdict. I am told that it is of little avail. Perhaps we may hope to infuse some vigour and some energy where there was none before—to awake the Government to a sense of their real responsibility; to induce them to cast aside the screen of a sham Egyptian responsibility, behind which they have hitherto skulked. But we may not be able to do so. It may not be possible for us to affect the philosophy to which they have pledged themselves, and the promises by which they are bound. If it is so—if we cannot induce them to reconsider their course, at least a duty remains for us to perform. They may take refuge behind their Constitutional powers. They may shelter themselves behind the Caucus. Weak in argument, but strong in wire-pulling, they may defy the opinion of England and of the civilized world. But at least, my Lords, we will discharge our responsibility. We will place on record the convictions of this House, and of that large and influential section of the community whose opinions are reflected here. We will not allow this miserable apathy, this timid repudiation of responsibility, to pass without a protest of indignation. We will, at all events, not be accomplices in the completion of this dishonour.
  Moved to resolve—
  "That this House, having read and considered the Correspondence relating to Egypt, laid on the Table by Her Majesty's command, is of opinion that the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due in a great measure to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government."—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I rise with a feeling of responsibility which lies on a Minister who is the first to speak on a matter of such grave importance as the defence of Her Majesty's Government on a Vote of Censure, moved, I admit, with great ability by the noble Marquess. There is one thing for which I am grateful to the noble Marquess. I think that in the form of the Motion which he has proposed to you he has made very considerable admissions in favour of the Government. Your Lordships will remember that a week ago the noble Marquess, in this House, explained to your Lordships the necessity of the House of Commons immediately adopt-

  581
  ing an Amendment to the Address, for fear of not being able to obtain a subsequent day. At the very time he was speaking an Amendment was being moved in the other House. The debate on that Amendment collapsed, to the great misfortune of the Government. Owing to purely accidental circumstances, to which I myself can personally bear witness, it came to an end. The noble Marquess did not complain of this, because they had the immense advantage that this Amendment was concocted by noble Lords opposite and the Leaders of the House of Commons; and, in order to give greater solemnity to it, moved by the ex-Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke), the Representative of the noble Marquess in the other House, who was able to make a full statement of the case; and you had that statement made by the Gentleman who was considered by the Leaders of the House the most competent to make that statement, without any answer being made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. Now, what was the nature of the Amendment then proposed? It was long, it was comprehensive, it was argumentative. If I remember right the substance of it—I do not attempt to give the words—it condemned the Government for a failure to reconstruct the Government of Egypt, and for not having reorganized justice. It complained that we put ourselves under greater obligations than we were under before to Egypt and to Foreign Powers. It complained that our course had, among other things, tended to this result—tended to delay the withdrawal of our troops from Egypt. Now, I beg to say that this portion of the Amendment struck me as very remarkable; it was the first authoritative statement of the views of the Conservative Opposition that it was desirable not to delay the withdrawal of the troops. I certainly did not expect that result from the speeches made by the noble Marquess and others in the Provinces. But this was an authoritative statement on the part of the Conservative Opposition to show that they were against annexation, or the permanent armed occupation of Egypt. It also insisted on the necessity of the Government making ample recognition of their obligations with regard to Egypt. Now, I beg to point out that
  582
  there was one other paragraph—I think it related to the Soudan—
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The Soudan was not mentioned.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Now, it is a singular fact that, after all these important points in condemnation of Her Majesty's Government had been taken, the noble Marquess, having read the Blue Book, has entirely discarded every single charge against the Government, except that with regard to the Soudan. He accuses us of leaving Egypt without leaving any trace of our beneficent action. It is impossible, however, to read the Blue Books and come to that conclusion. Now, I will mention one point which has been received with ridicule elsewhere; but which, I hope, will not be received with ridicule here. I mean representative institutions in Egypt. The noble Marquess has just told us that he does not think much of the opinion of the House of Commons against his own opinion and the opinion of the rest of England. I therefore quite understand his supreme contempt for Egyptian institutions of that sort. Now, my Lords, it does happen that Lord Dufferin recommended that the experiment should be made of institutions with limited powers. His recommendation was acted upon and was carried out. Lists were made, electors chosen, Members returned; and towards the end of November Sultan Pasha was appointed President of the Legislative Council and of the General Assembly. But he had hardly been appointed a week before it was announced that the institution was a complete failure. Now, can your Lordships imagine that Lord Dufferin or Her Majesty's Government, or any of the numerous persons who were anxious for some mode of self-government in Egypt to be initiated, should have expected that such institutions would, like Minerva, come forth at their birth, fully armed, and that they would have a full-blown House of Lords and House of Commons in a few weeks? We have been anxious to give the Egyptians an opportunity of self-government. A hundred years ago representative government was hardly known in Europe. Now they exist from the Atlantic to the Vistula, and it is everywhere admitted that it is desirable that the people should have a share in the government. I am quite sure that

  583
  it is not a bad thing that we have already given them a chance of obtaining self-government. One great charge against us in the Amendment was that we have done nothing for the reorganization of justice in Egypt. Everybody who has read the Blue Books must have perceived this—that justice is one of the great requirements of Egypt, and that what we have done is very great indeed with regard to that. We have established Native Courts; we have obtained for them the aid of European Judges, and they are at this moment beginning to sit. Now, with respect to Codes of Law. It has not even in this country been easy to frame Codes of Law. In Egypt they have been completed, and have already been sanctioned by the Khedive. There are a Civil Code, a Commercial Code, a Penal Code, and Codes of Procedure. With regard to the International Courts, it has been settled, with the complete consent of the Powers, that these shall be prolonged, and that a considerable extension of power shall be given to them. So that, with regard to justice in Egypt, it is impossible to say that it has not been entirely reorganized. The prisons of Egypt have been in the most horrible state. Mr. Clifford Lloyd, in October, made a Report strongly condemning them; but at this moment he might justly boast that if we went away to-morrow, the improvement in the prisons would be a monument to the English name. Now I come to another point. The Army has been put under the command of one of our most distinguished Generals—Sir Evelyn Wood. In appearance and in drill these men have been perfectly remarkable. General Stephenson said he could hardly believe what Sir Evelyn Wood and his officers bad achieved in so short a time. It has been stated that this Army will not tight. Well, I admit that that is a considerable drawback to an Army. I deny that it is perfectly fair to say that of an Army which has never been tried. In a very large portion of that Army General Wood, who, after all, is a better judge than your Lordships here in England, has complete confidence. There has been a still more gratifying circumstance the other day, that although all these men under General Wood enlisted on the condition that they should not be sent to what they considered a "hell upon earth"—namely, the Soudan—yet,
  584
  when a few officers were invited to go there, a number of volunteers came forward utterly disproportionate to the number it was intended to send. I do not think it is just either to the officers or to the men to say that this Army is absolutely worth nothing, because it is a very differently composed Army from an Army which has behaved disgracefully in another part of the world. No doubt the efforts of General Wood and his officers have been of a very successful character. A few words now about the police. The Constabulary was organized by a very distinguished officer—General Baker. Members of that Constabulary were sent to the Soudan, and I believe they behaved very badly as soldiers; but as a Constabulary during two months and in most trying circumstances—namely, when cholera was rampant in Egypt—the men did admirable work. With regard to the police, Mr. Clifford Lloyd has done wonders. He has entirely reorganized the force, and put it into a state of amalgamation and efficiency; and, what is not an undesirable thing to add, with an economy of something like £100,000 a-year. My Lords, with regard to another important question—that of public works—most valuable Reports have been published by an English officer, who is aided by an Indian officer of great experience; and the Egyptian Government, in compliance with a request made by the India Office, have sent out two more officers to assist in that work. As to the state of the land at the present moment, the new system is going on not only with much greater efficiency, not only with much diminished expenditure, but it is going on in a manner which has already obtained the confidence both of the Fellaheen and of the Native officials in the district. One of the great grievances of the Fellaheen is the inequality of taxation; but that was being adjusted, and the house tax would be immediately extended to all Europeans, of all nationalities. Take, again, the case of licences. The Egyptian Government is preparing an appeal on the same principles, and I feel hopeful that the proposal will be agreed to by the Powers of Europe. Then there is another question with regard to slavery in the Soudan. I believe that the conquest of the Soudan by Mehemet Ali increased it, and opened

  585
  out an avenue of slavery which has continued up to this day, in a manner which nothing else could have done. But as far as Egypt Proper is concerned, the whole question of slavery is now put in different hands—in the hands of the Inspector of Constabulary—and measures are being decided. It is by preventing the supply reaching those who pay for it, more than by any extraneous work, that you can really deal with that great evil. I do not say anything about the obligations which we recognize, as I have already spoken at some length on that point; but I must say one thing with regard to our relations with foreigners. The noble Marquess has stated that we have increased our responsibilities. The other day he told us that we had received indications from the organs of public opinion in different countries to show how wrong we are. I am not quite sure; but I suppose he alluded to the public Press abroad. Now, this I will observe—that English policy will not be directed according to the criticisms of foreign journalists writing from a perfectly different standpoint from that which we ourselves have. I should be very sorry if the time ever came when we should judge of the policy of Germany or France from the writings that may appear in the newspapers of these countries, or that the proceedings of our own Government should be judged by French or German Governments merely by a few extracts from articles written under what circumstances we do not know. If the noble Marquess meant that we had received remonstrances from Foreign Governments, I say that he is absolutely mistaken, and that we have not had one communication from any Foreign Government on the subject. It is true the Sultan did at first object to our sending orders to suspend the withdrawal of the troops after Hicks Pasha's defeat; but I need not say that objection was not insisted upon. We have since had a most friendly assurance from the Sultan, expressing his extreme desire to act in every way with England in regard to the matter. I must say the noble Marquess rakes up all sorts of extraneous subjects, in which he chooses to say we have been failing to the national honour. I venture to go back and ask him what is his particular locus standi for always advocating Turkey in this matter? Does he derive it from the
  586
  secret arrangement about Cyprus? The Sultan understood that arrangement to be an undertaking on the part of this country to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire at the Berlin Conference; yet the noble Marquess was the first person to propose that two important Provinces of Turkey should be handed over to Austria. Was it in the suggestion which he made to the French about Tunis? Was it from the establishment of the Dual Control, which placed England and France in a position which was very galling to the Sultan, and which was objected to by other European States? Are these the warrants which entitled him to lecture Her Majesty's Government for not paying sufficient respect to Turkey? We do not wish to interfere with any of the legitimate rights of Turkey. We have endeavoured, under difficult circumstances, to follow that course, and I refuse to agree that we are open to any censure upon that point. My Lords, the noble Marquess has given us a long analysis of the incidents in the Soudan. He gave us what I must say was a rather coloured narrative. I have got a much fuller and longer, and, as I think, a more perfect analysis; but I should not like to follow the example of the noble Marquess, and omit everything which tells against my case. Why should the noble Marquess quote the cry of alarm on the 2nd of June, and entirely omit to refer to the letter written by General Hicks to General Baker 14 or 15 days afterwards, stating that he was prepared to conduct the campaign with the force available, and that he did not think any mishap probable?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: What is the date of that letter?
  EARL GRANVILLE: The 18th of June. My analysis dates a long way further back than that of the noble Marquess, who entirely leaves out of sight the fact that the Mahdi did not first appear after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, but proclaimed himself the Messiah in 1881. I think that gives an entirely different complexion to the whole statement of the noble Marquess. I will jump over the narrative of the noble Marquess, for it comes to this—that we are accused in the Motion before your Lordships of vacillation and weakness and inconsistency. I, on the contrary, say that we may have been wrong, we

  587
  may have been too obstinate; but, even on the noble Marquess's showing, we adopted a certain policy at a certain date, and until the terrible disaster to General Hicks we entirely adhered to that policy. Now it is a question whether that policy was right. We found, after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, which undoubtedly put us in an exceptional position, a state of things which had lasted for two years previously, in which, with varying success, but generally with success, the Egyptian Government resolved to maintain their whole dominion over the Soudan. The noble Marquess, however, is of opinion that we should have interfered. Can anybody conceive anything more calculated to have destroyed all good feeling between this country and Egypt than for the former to have told the Government of the latter, at a time when they believed that they were perfectly able to hold their own in the Soudan, that they must give up that great district? I do not want to present to the House a ridiculous hypothesis; but suppose that by any marvellous concatenation of circumstances a Foreign Government were to say to the Government at London that they must give up India, or to the Government at St. Petersburg that they must give up the Central Asian Provinces, because, in the belief of that Foreign Power, neither of them were able to hold those countries, what would be the reply? Had we insisted upon Egypt giving up the Soudan, it is not so much what Egypt would have said, but what the noble Marquess would have said in such a case, that we should have had to dread. In the circumstances, we should not have been justified in insisting upon Egypt giving up this large Colonial Empire, although the case is very different now, when events have proved mathematically that it was impossible for her to hold it. Had we, however, insisted at an earlier period upon her giving up that large territory, the noble Marquess would have declared that we had covered ourselves with disgrace. The reasoning of the noble Marquess upon this part of the question was, in my opinion, most inconsistent. When we determined not to give Egypt that advice, there were only two courses open to us—one was, to permit Egypt to act alone upon her own responsibility, and the other was to mix
  588
  ourselves up in the administration of the Soudan. The administration of Egypt was perfectly distinct from that of the Soudan in every way; and when we had once settled that we would not interfere to prevent Egypt from carrying out a policy in the Soudan which we thought reasonable and right, was it right that we should have proceeded to interfere in a piecemeal manner and to have said to the Egyptian Government—"We do not disapprove of your general policy; but we have this or that objection to make in reference to its details?" By adopting that course, we should have made ourselves responsible for the results of that policy without our having been parties to carrying it out. The case, however, became perfectly different after General Hicks's defeat. On this point, however, one assertion has been made against which I must at once enter my protest. It has been assumed that we, as a nation, are covered with dishonour because General Hicks has been defeated. I must, however, strongly protest against the idea that because a Foreign Government selects for the command of its Forces an officer who is on the Retired List of the British Army, or who has altogether ceased to belong to it, that at once constitutes a state of things that renders England responsible for the success or the defeat of that officer. Now, what happened after the Egyptian Government arrived at the determination to send General Hicks into the Soudan? Hicks Pasha's defeat, which took place, so far as is known, on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of November, was practically known, as a matter of certainty, on the 21st of November, and, in consequence, orders to postpone the evacuation of Cairo were given immediately on the 25th, while the Egyptian Government, having settled to hold the Soudan, decided to strengthen its Army by trying to recruit in Turkey. On the 25th Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed—
  "In view of the recent intelligence from the Soudan, I have thought it advisable to obtain the opinion of competent military authorities on the military situation in that province, for the information of Her Majesty's Government. Accordingly, General Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Baker met unofficially at my house to-day, and fully discussed the subject. They were unanimously of opinion that the Egyptian Government will find it impossible, with the forces at present at its disposal, to hold the Soudan, and that it will eventually be necessary, after withdrawing the garrisons, to

  589
  fall back from Khartoum on to Egypt proper. They think that Khartoum should, if possible, be held sufficiently long to allow the more advanced posts and detached garrisons in the Soudan to rejoin. They are also of opinion that it is desirable, under the present circumstances, that the Egyptian Government should act from Suakim, and should try to render as much support as circumstances will allow from that quarter."—[Ibid. p. 98.]
  This is a very important telegram, as it was reasonable for us to suppose, not merely that this view was being urged on Cherif Pasha by Sir Evelyn Baring, but also that Cherif would not venture to resist the opinion of his own Generals—Wood and Baker. On the 26th of November Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed that Colonel Coetlogon had sent a telegram to General Wood from Khartoum, stating that a retreat on Berber should be made at once. But on the 26th of November Sir Evelyn Baring informed me that Cherif Pasha was clinging to the hope that Hicks Pasha's defeat was not true, and was hesitating as to asking for assistance by recruiting in Turkey, and that he proposed to wait for a few days before taking action. On the 8th of December the news arrived of the defeat of the Egyptians at Termanhib, three hours from Suakim, and that Tokar and Sinkat, the latter of which commands the road from Berber to Suakim, were surrounded. On the 12th of December Cherif Pasha informed Sir Evelyn Baring that the Khedive and his Ministers had met, and wished to place themselves absolutely in the hands of Her Majesty's Government. In reply to him, the telegram of the 13th of December was sent, recommending an early decision to abandon all south of Assouan, or, at least, of Wady Halfa. It will thus be seen that only five days intervened from the news of the battle of Termanhib to the decision to urge the withdrawal from Khartoum, and that this decision was sent the day after the Egyptian Government had announced its willingness to be guided by Her Majesty's Government. On the 22nd of December Sir Evelyn Baring had informed me that the immediate position was not so alarming as it appeared to be supposed in England; but, nevertheless, the withdrawal was necessary; but he had to add that the Egyptian Government absolutely refused to carry it out, and that the only way to get the policy of withdrawal obeyed was to
  590
  insist upon it in the most determined way. On the 2nd of January Sir Evelyn Baring informed me that the Egyptian Government intended to hold the Nile up to Khartoum inclusive, which, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, it had not the means of doing. On the 4th of January I replied that Her Majesty's Government desired the withdrawal of the forces from the interior of the Soudan, including Khartoum; and that the Ministers must carry out the advice offered them or forfeit their Offices. On the 7th of January the Egyptian Ministers resigned; and on the 8th of January Nubar came in, entirely agreeing with the withdrawal policy. On the 9th of January Colonel Coetlogon telegraphed that if a retreat was ordered at once it could be safely effected. On the 14th the policy of immediate withdrawal was again pressed on the Egyptian Government, and an inquiry made as to what measures were being taken. On the 16th of January the Egyptian Government asked for a qualified British officer to go to Khartoum, with full powers, civil and military, to conduct the retreat. On the 18th of January General Gordon was sent. It will thus be seen that, so late as the 9th of January, in the opinion of Colonel Coetlogon, the retreat could be safely commenced; and that between the 8th of December, the date of the battle of Termanhib, and the 9th of January, Her Majesty's Government had never ceased urging withdrawal on the Government of Egypt, who, for the first time during the last 15 months, formally declined to receive our advice, which was met by the imperative despatch of the 2nd of January, which I have already mentioned. The noble Marquess argued in the strongest way against the abandonment of that part of the Soudan which includes Khartoum, which he described as the key of Egypt. All that I can say is, that if Khartoum be the key of Egypt it is a key that has never been brought into use. Is the noble Marquess aware that Khartoum is 1,450 miles from Cairo by a river that is only navigable in parts, and that to reach it by land stretches of desert of 200 and 300 miles in extent, without any water, have to be traversed? As to Khartoum being the military key of Egypt, a greater mistake never beclouded the mind of anyone. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon)

  591
  talked of "civilization" there. Why, the place is nothing but desolation. There are only a few houses, properly called, in the place. The house of the Governor and two others can only bear the name of houses; the rest of the tenements were in such a state that they would crumble to pieces in the hot weather, unless the occupants, either from natural instinct or the teaching of civilization, smeared the walls with dung, which, of course, did not tend to their improved sanitary condition. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon), again, was in perfect misery as to the safety of the French and Germans and Italians in Khartoum. The noble Earl might have saved all his sympathy, for, as a matter of fact, excepting a few Europeans in the garrison, there is not one Frenchman, or German, or Italian in the place. There are some Greeks, who will probably stay there whether the garrison is given up or not. I now come to a very sad and melancholy episode which has affected Members of Her Majesty's Government at least as much as any of your Lordships—I mean the disaster to General Baker's Army. The noble Marquess says we might have prevented all that has happened; but he does not say how. What does he think we ought to have done? I do not know whether he thinks that we should have sent a purely British Army into the Soudan, which we were most anxious not to retain, or whether we should have sent a small portion of our troops to be mixed up with General Baker's force, and to be swamped in the miserable defeat which overtook that force. Now, I will venture to read to you, and I will lay upon the Table, the Correspondence that has passed with reference to Suakim, Tokar, and Sinkat—
  "Sir Evelyn Baring to Earl Granville.
  "Cairo, January 11, 1884.
  "My Lord,—I have the honour to enclose a copy of fresh instructions which have been sent to Baker Pasha since the accession of Nubar Pasha's Ministry to Office.
  "I have, &c, "E. BARING."
  "'General Sir Evelyn Wood to Baker Pasha.
  "'January 9, 1884.
  "'Excellency,—His Highness the Khedive, having determined to abandon the Soudan Provinces, the Ministry, of which His Excellency Cherif Pasha was President, resigned. His Highness has appointed Nubar Pasha, who
  592
  has nominated Abd-el-Kader Pasha as War Minister.
  "'His Excellency has not yet taken over the duties, and I write, therefore, by direction of His Excellency Nubar Pasha, who has received His Highness the Khedive's commands to order me to inform you of what has occurred, and also—
  "'1. All that portion of your instructions which gave you discretion to open the Suakim-Berber route westward of Sinkat by force, if necessary, is cancelled.
  "'2. If it is absolutely necessary to use force in order to extricate the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar you can do so, provided you consider your force is sufficient and that you may reasonably count on success.
  "'The enforced submission of the men who have been holding out at these two places would be very painful to His Highness the Khedive; but even such a sacrifice is better, in his opinion, than that you and your troops should attempt a task which you cannot reckon fairly to be within your power.
  "'3. You are directed to continue to use every effort possible to open the route up to Berber by diplomatic means.
  "'His Highness has not yet decided how the troops and civil populations shall be withdrawn from Khartoum; but he is convinced that non-combatants will pass over the road with more facility if no further fighting occurs than they could after any victory which is now in the power of your force to obtain.
  "'4. The Mansourah, with 180 Bashi-Bazouks and stores, carries these instructions. Be good enough to report what force you consider sufficient to hold Suakim alone, and also to withdraw in safety the people at Sinkat and Tokar.
  "'5. There is but the Mansourah available now at Suez, but when other steamers are sent back by you, or can be obtained from Alexandria, His Highness the Khedive proposes to send to you about 120 more Bashi-Bazouks and about 1,600 Black troops who have been collected by Zebehr.
  "'His Highness has not yet decided if Zebehr will accompany them, but you are to understand clearly that neither they nor any portion of your force are sent westward of Sinkat, and that the negroes now sent will probably be recalled to Cairo when you have extricated the people at Sinkat and Tokar.
  "'EVELYN WOOD, for War Minister.'"
  Now, my Lords, we had some right to think the instructions sufficient. General Baker is a very distinguished and brave officer, but he also possesses that quality of military prudence which is absolutely necessary to a great commander. He considered the situation, and we received a telegram from him saying that he was sanguine of success. I do not blame General Baker for having miscalculated the chances of success. How was it possible for the Government at home, or for General Baker in Egypt, to imagine that 4,000 men would throw themselves down to be annihilated by a

  593
  force not one-fourth of their number? That has, unfortunately, happened. The noble Marquess thinks that nothing has been done by the Government. Before Baker's defeat in his attempt to relieve Tokar we had fair reason to suppose his force would relieve Tokar and Sinkat. I will read the instructions to him. The news of his defeat arrived at 2.30 on the 5th of February. Sir William Hewett reported that the troops left in Suakim were utterly unreliable, and that he intended landing men to defend the place. We immediately telegraphed approving of Hewett's action, and asked him if he wanted reinforcements. The Orontes, with 1,000 seamen and Marines on their way home from China, was somewhere near Suez. We telegraphed at once to stop her at Suez. She had passed in the morning on the 5th, but she was stopped at Port Said, where she arrived on the 6th. We warned Lord John Hay at Malta to be ready to reinforce Hewett. On the morning of the 6th Sir William Hewett telegraphed that Baker's force had returned to Suakim quite disorganized, and that some trustworthy troops should be sent to protect the place. We ordered the Carysfort at Alexandria to be ready to take arms and ammunition to Port Said, and to embark reinforcements from the Orontes, and asked Sir William Hewett what numbers he required. On the 7th Sir William Hewett answered that he wanted to make up the Marines to 500, that he would keep 500 Black troops and 100 Turkish Cavalry, the rest of the Egyptian troops to be sent away. The Carysfort was then ordered to proceed to Alexandria and take 120 Marines (all available) from the Orontes, and proceed to Suakim. Lord John Hay was instructed to send 280 Marines to Port Said to be sent in the Orontet to Hewett, the seamen in the Orontes remaining at Port Said in case they should be wanted. On the 8th the Monarch and the Hecla left Malta, with 300 Marines, for Port Said. Sir William Hewett's proposal to withdraw Baker's force was approved. Sir William Hewett reported that he expected Suakim to be attacked
  "As soon as Sinkat and Tokar fall; two-thirds of people and troops are disaffected, and believe in the Mahdi."
  On the 9th Sir William Hewett was invested with full powers, civil and military, at Suakim. He was told to warn
  594
  the Arabs that any attack would be repulsed by British troops. On the 10th, in reply to a question what news he had from Tokar and Sinkat, Sir William Hewett telegraphed that the rebels near Suakim were reported to be about 3,000, round Tokar 3,000 to 4,000, and round Sinkat 3,000, and that there was no news of the Tokar garrison. On the morning of the 11th Sir William Hewett was asked, by private telegram, whether there was any chance of relieving the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat by negotiation or arms; and, if by arms, what force was requisite? On the evening of the 11th he replied, stating the force which he considered necessary. In the meantime, steps were taken that the Jumna, a troopship on her way to Aden from Bombay, should call at Aden, so that she might take on troops from that place if necessary. Other preliminary measures were taken in communication with Lord Wolseley, so that no time should be lost in the event of its being decided to attempt to relieve the garrisons. No earlier action would have been of any avail, because the Jumna was not due at Aden till the 12th, and the Monarch and Hecla, with the Marines, were not due at Port Said till the 12th. The preliminary arrangements made enable us to send to Suakim a force as large as that stated by Sir William Hewett by the 18th instant. The noble Marquess would have us send a British force to reconquer the Soudan, and calls us vacillating and inconsistent because we do not do so. A distinguished statesman, who is chiefly characterized by an absence of all vacillation—I mean Prince Bismarck—once said of the whole Eastern Question that to Germany it was not worth the bones of one Pomeranian Fusilier, and that it was the duty of a Government to be most economical of the blood of their countrymen and soldiers unless great interests were at stake. Now, would it be an economy of the blood of our fellow-countrymen and soldiers to send a British Army to reconquer the Soudan, or any portion of it, the Soudan being a country in which they have not the slightest interest? I say it would not. The Soudan has no interest for England or India. Then there is another question to be considered, the question of humanity. I quite admit that humanity has great claims; but I know that on former occa-

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  sions humane acts have been determined on by this country—and I hope that in future that will be so—without exactly counting the cost of such acts. But in the case of humanity, like private charity, you must a little consider whether the humane object you have in view does not clash with some larger humane views which you may have in the same direction. Your Lordships know that General Gordon was sent out on a mission, of which, I am happy to say, he is as sanguine now as when he left England, that he will be able to accomplish satisfactorily if time is given him. This opinion is expressed in the following telegram, which we have received to-day from Sir Evelyn Baring:—
  "Gordon telegraphs as follows:—' I have formed a Committee of Defence with Hassan Kalifa Pasha; they meet to-day. They have announced my assumption of the supreme power in the Soudan. I hope to conciliate the whole Province of Berber under my Presidency. Question of getting out garrison and families is so interlaced with preservation of well-to-do people of this country as to he for the present inseparable. Any precipitate action separating these interests would throw all well-disposed people into the ranks of the enemy, and would fail utterly in its effects. Therefore, I trust patience will be shown, and that you will not be at all anxious as to issue."
  Although our feelings have been greatly moved by the position of Sinkat, and particularly the dreadful news of to-day, and by the anxious position of Tokar, we must remember that those garrisons only represent a fractional part of the Egyptian troops who are scattered over the country; and, therefore, when we are sending out an expedition charged with the relief of some of the besieged garrisons, it is most important that our intentions should not clash with the larger views of General Gordon for the relief of the 23,000 men who are scattered throughout the Soudan. My Lords, we could not have the views of General Gordon until after the news of General Baker's defeat reached him at Berber. We sent telegrams to him last week telling him of the bad news, and inviting his opinion as to whether the sending out of a considerable force would be hurtful or useful to his general purpose. I am glad to say that the information we have received to-day shows that it will not be inimical to the purposes he has in view. [Ironical laughter.] Noble Lords seem to regard that as an inconsequent explanation; but it is not
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  at all absurd to have imagined that General Gordon's scheme for the relief of the Egyptian garrisons might have been defeated by an early and premature interference on the part of the Home Government. The doubt we displayed was perfectly reasonable, though I am happy to find it has been dissipated by the information we have just received. The result was that the following telegram had been sent:—
  "From the Adjutant General, Horse Guards, to the General Officer Commanding the Force Fin Egypt, Cairo, dated February 12,1884.
  "Force is to be collected at Suakim, with the object, if possible, of relieving Tokar garrison if it can hold out; if not, of taking any measures necessary for defence of ports. General Graham to command Force. Redvers-Buller to command Infantry Brigade, and be second in command. Herbert Stewart to command all mounted troops. Two last, and Wauchope, as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, start tonight. Select other Staff Officers as required in Egypt. Make following arrangements at once, settling all details yourself. Select three best battalions in your command. Those, with 2nd Irish Fusiliers, now in Jumna, and battalion of Marines, to form Infantry Brigade, under Buller. If you deem it advisable, bring garrison of Alexandria to Cairo while expedition lasts. Report if you wish to do so, as orders would be sent to Fleet to hold Alexandria temporarily. While so held a Naval officer will command there. 19th Hussars, Mounted Infantry, and any reliable Native horsemen now at Suakim to constitute mounted force under Stewart. Take horses from Wood's Cavalry to complete 19th, with country horses, leaving behind for the time English horses with the Egyptian Cavalry. One Garrison Battery Royal Artillery to take over guns, equipment, camels, and camel drivers from Wood's Camel Battery. If it has started from Cairo, it must be brought back at once for this purpose It can take ordinary field guns with it up the Nile. Send one of its officers with camel drivers. Baring will give necessary authority. Admiral Hewett will furnish machine-guns, manned with sailors, if required. Do not send field guns on any account with expedition. Regimental transports to be taken with troops. Employ camels as much as possible. Hire them if possible; if not, purchase. Baggage to he on lowest possible scale, as troops ought to be back in Cairo in three weeks. Obtain from Egyptian Government means for carrying water on camels. Turn your best attention to carriage of water. Stretchers at rate of three or four per company. Make best arrangements you can for conveyance of wounded. Tents to accompany force to Suakim or Trinkitat, as case may be. Troops to bivouac on line of march. Provisions for men and horses for a fortnight to be embarked. Arrange for sending on enough afterwards for one or two more weeks. Naval authorities may be depended on for first needs to be landed from ships. All sea transport require to be arranged with Naval authorities. Three months' supply of groceries for 6,000 men, and a reserve of 180,000 lbs. preserved

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  meat and 400 tons forage will be shipped from England immediately. You will telegraph any further requirements. Send your best doctor as principal medical officer. Two hundred and fifty rounds per man, besides 70 in pouch. Furnish each man with ample puggaree. 10th Hussars, from Jumna, will be landed to garrison Suakim. A few of them might be mounted on horses now there, as it is desirable to be strong in Cavalry. Order all good horses now there to remain for this purpose. Tell Parr to do his best to obtain land transport there. Naval officer at Alexandria will arrange for conveyance from Suez to Suakim. Communicate with him at once. Two medical and two commissariat officers start at once for service in your command. All confidence felt in your judgment and experience to settle necessary details. Communicate this to Baring and Hewett at once, and arrange details with latter. The greatest publicity to be given to the determination to relieve Tokar by British soldiers."
  My Lords, I trust this may be successful. The Government desire, if possible, to communicate with the Tokar garrison, and they think they can relieve them if only they can hold out till the end of the present month. The noble Marquess spoke of the feeling of the country. But it was perfectly impossible that we could have done anything to relieve Sinkat since General Baker was defeated. We can only hope that our efforts will be successful. I have told the noble Marquess that I am quite prepared to repeat the obligations we consider this country to be under. We have no obligation whatever to annex or to countenance anything in the nature of annexation. We say, as we have said from the beginning, that it is our intention to withdraw our troops after we have established a stable and permanent Government in Egypt. We have also a responsibility. During that time we have a right to see that our advice on all important questions is followed in Egypt. I really wish to say one word further, and it is this—that it is utterly impossible to administer the details of the Egyptian Government from Downing Street. What we have done is this—to choose the very best men we can find for that purpose. I venture to say that the men that have been appointed in succession to represent Her Majesty in Egypt are all first-rate men, and that the men we have been able to recommend to the Khedive for his civil and military administration are as good as can be found. Having done this, I am sure that the right principle to pursue is to lay down sound principles by which
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  they are to act, and as long as we have confidence in them, to give them our most ample support. I am sure this is the right doctrine; and although the force of circumstances has obliged us to go farther than that in Egypt, I am quite sure that as much as possible we ought to confine ourselves within those limits. I do not say this because I happen to be connected with the Office whose normal heavy duties are not of an administrative character. I should say exactly the same if I was at the head of a great administrative Office like that of India. In India for more than 30 years the principle of annexation has been abandoned, but Native States have constantly been administered by British Residents, and then transferred back to Native Rulers. The Resident has generally done this through Native Ministers. His duties are easy compared with those of an English Representative exercising influence over the administration in Egypt. The country he administers is at the other end of the world. He has no European foreigners, no Consuls to represent them; no staff of reporters, whose first business it is to report upon every trivial incident, almost always judging of everything by a standard as high, and sometimes higher, than obtains in the most civilized country. The difficulties are enormous in Egypt, and can only be met by a firm support from Her Majesty's Government and from both Houses of Parliament.
  EARL CAIRNS: My Lords, I have some difficulty in following the noble Earl in this discussion. It is not on account of the arguments which the noble Earl has used; they were very few in number, and, such as they were, I think they are very easily answered. But I do not approach, and I think none of your Lordships can approach, this subject to-night without being sobered and saddened. There are, I am sure, very few of your Lordships, on whichever side of the House they sit, who do not also feel somewhat humiliated at the events which have taken place. But this feeling of sadness and humiliation makes it your Lordships' duty to pronounce on the events which have occurred a judgment which in the eyes of this country and of foreign countries shall be clear, distinct, and unmistakable. A good deal of what fell from the noble Earl it

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  will not be necessary for me to follow. He occupied half-an-hour by the clock in dealing with a Motion not made in this House, but made by a right hon. Gentleman in the House of Commons. That Motion was made before the Papers we now have were produced, and I do not know how it occurred that when the Mover and Seconder of the Motion had concluded no Member of Her Majesty's Government was found to rise and reply; but now at the end of a week the noble Earl has attempted an answer in your Lordships' House. Then there is the subject of the Dual Control. The word Egypt is never mentioned in this House without the noble Earl all at once adjourning the discussion to that question. If the noble Earl wishes at any time to have an academic discussion upon the question of the Dual Control, the noble Marquess behind me will offer every facility for the purpose, and we shall have a night of it. But for the purposes of these Papers now before your Lordships, you might as well, it seems to me, refer to the policy of Rameses II. The subject of the Dual Control has nothing on earth to do with the matter now before us. It is a misfortune that whenever the subject is introduced language is used which appears to me to be highly calculated to mislead. At present we have the blessing of the Prime Minister, who, perhaps, more than any of his Predecessors, has the power of using words which do not exactly represent the real subject-matter on which he speaks, and he has decidedly used that power with regard to Egypt with a freedom which commands our admiration. A short time ago we bombarded Alexandria, which was burnt and destroyed, and sent to Egypt an expedition and had a battle and carried the Egyptian entrenchments and defeated the Egyptian Army; but nobody was even allowed to call that war. It was "military operations." No doubt they were military operations, and the battle of Waterloo was a military operation; but it is better to call a review by its proper name and give the name of battle to such an event as that to which I have just referred. Our Army at present is in Egypt. I should say that at present we occupy the country by our Army. But we are not allowed to use the proper term. What occurred was this. There is "the presence of our
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  troops in Egypt," and there is "the desire to maintain order" there. In this way people are deluded, and they forget for the moment that the position of this country is that we are in military occupation of Egypt. Then there is the mission of General Gordon. He went out to Egypt as an officer in the service of Her Majesty's Government. Some suggested that he was in the service of the Khedive, but that was positively denied. Then we heard that he had a Firman from the Khedive, and was appointed Commander in the Soudan with full civil and military powers. The Government were asked how these things were to be reconciled, and they gave no answer at all. Again, the other night, it was said that the great house of Rothschild had been induced to lend £1,000,000 to the Egyptian Government, and Her Majesty's Government were asked whether they had given their approval to the loan. The noble Earl scouted the idea; the thing was absurd; noble Lords went home and said—"That, at any rate, is a mare's nest." But what did we find? That letters had passed between Her Majesty's Government and the house of Rothschild. It is no doubt true that the Government did not approve the lending of £1,000,000; but they expressed their satisfaction that Sir Evelyn Baring had expressed his pleasure that the Egyptian Government had expressed their gratification that the house of Rothschild should lend the money. Whatever the language held may be, the fact is that the English Government are pledged up to the hilt to approve the loan. Then we were told in the Queen's Speech that Her Majesty's Government had given counsel to the Khedive, and that he had taken a resolution. That was thought to mean that the Khedive had weighed that counsel and was going to follow it. When, however, the Papers were examined we found that Her Majesty's Government had given no counsel or advice, but as positive and absolute a command as ever proceeded from the most autocratic Sovereign to the most humble slave. The Khedive was told that if the advice was not followed his Ministry and all the Governors would be dismissed; and it must be remembered that the Khedive himself is a Governor. What followed? The Khedive

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  assured Sir Evelyn Baring that he was perfectly convinced, and that the arguments of Her Majesty's Government were unanswerable. Well, that is all very pleasant; and one advantage resulting from the publication of the Blue Book is that we have now got at the truth instead of the verbiage we have been accustomed to hear. The position of Egypt and of the Egyptian Government in regard to this country, arising from our military operations and the presence of our troops, is that we are absolute sovereigns of Egypt. The noble Earl (Earl Granville), recounting all the good that had been done for Egypt, passed a panegyric on the representative institutions of Egypt. Could anything be more charming? I believe representative institutions to be a very good thing; but representative institutions where a Foreign Power dismisses the Ministry does not appear to me to be very promising. Well, such is our position in Egypt, and it is no use blinking the fact. There is no Crown Colony where our orders are more imperative and absolute than they are in Egypt. Our position in Egypt has not been altered by the defeats; it is as absolute now as it was in the beginning. We may, or we may not, exercise our rights; but those rights we have had all along. The noble Earl sometimes dwells on Egypt Proper as if for his purpose it could be treated as on a different footing from the Soudan; but there is no ground for the distinction. The Government that governs the whole of the Egyptian territory is the Government of Egypt. We govern the Government of Egypt, and therefore we govern the whole of the Egyptian territory. The Government of Egypt send troops to the Southern Province, and support those troops with the Revenues of Egypt. If we are satisfied with what they do, well and good; but if we are not satisfied, it is within our power, and it is our absolute duty, to interpose. The Mahdi came into existence in 1881, and in 1883 the Government interfered, and Lord Dufferin gave very positive advice. Was not that advice an interference clear and unmistakable? Was the subsequent conduct of the Government consistent? Two or three months afterwards we find them taking a different line, and saying—"We will not give any advice about the Soudan, or undertake any responsibility
  602
  for it." There is vacillation No. 1. It was said they had no idea but that Hicks Pasha was going on well and would be successful, and that the Egyptian Government would have resented interference. I maintain that that was just the time when it was the bounden duty of the Government to have decided one way or the other what the policy of Egypt should be with regard to her Southern Possessions. If it was right that any part of them should be retained, then was the time to say so, and to give moral and, if necessary, material assistance; if it was not right, then was the time that Egypt could with safety and honour have retreated from the contest. It is too late now, as we find to our shame, after mischief is done and defeat sustained. The time to retreat is before defeat has come. Is it the fact that the Government were under the impression that Hicks Pasha had the ball at his feet and was going to prosper?
  EARL GRANVILLE: I have not said so.
  EARL CAIRNS: The noble Earl says he did not say anything of the kind. On the 18th of June Hicks Pasha said he would undertake the expedition with good hope of success; but in August he gave a graphic and picturesque description of adverse conditions which it was almost impossible to contend against. General Hicks telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Wood from Khartoum on the 5th of August—
  "The men at Kerkoj are 25 months in arrear of pay, and at Fazoglu 9 months, and have neither clothes nor food; they cannot get very much from the country, as they are surrounded by rebel villages. The men have shown a spirit of insubordination, which is not to be wondered at. It is very difficult to provide food for them at Fazoglu, and I do not know how to remedy this. They are so far off, and steamer cannot get there. I shall try to withdraw them as far as Kerkoj, but the Moudir of Fazoglu, who has left the place in a small boat and come here, says the men were reduced to the last extremities, and it is quite probable that now they have either starved or joined the rebels. The withdrawal will be difficult, as they are 300 men, with 600 women and children, and having to pass through an enemy's country: £80,000 for arrears was promised, but none received yet. If the Government will forego the 1½ per cent charged for bills on Cairo, I could get money from merchants here. I sent a Staff officer to Sennaar to report on matters, and he has returned. Soldiers of the irregular troops have positively refused to go where ordered in consequence of not having been paid. There is

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  neither money nor transport with the army on the Blue Nile. They have no grain from Wad-el-Medina to Fazoglu. They require mo to send steamer from here to take up grain for them. I want all myself—in fact I want more to bring up reinforcements and supplies for Kordofan column. If money is sent to Sennaar camels can be bought, but it will take time. Camels ought to be kept for the force of 6,000 men there; they have none whatever. If I must now deprive myself of a steamer urgently required here, if I am to keep the Blue Nile army from starving, I despair of ever getting my column ready. As at present, it has been arranged it would take 45 days from now to get the reinforcements from Berber. I must try if I can expedite this. It is quite probable that after the season opens the Arabs in Sennaar will break out again; the flies will have gone, and they will have gathered their crops, and they will be free to move where they like. Our column will have gone to Kordofan; and to keep Sennaar in order there will be this army on the Blue Nile, without money and without transport. It is almost impossible to contend against all these adverse conditions; to-day, the first time I have heard of the condition of the Fazoglu garrison, although the Moudir says he has reported frequently. The garrison was left by Abdul Kader. Taking into consideration the whole state of affairs in this country, I am convinced that it would be best to keep the two rivers and Province of Sennaar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself."—[Egypt, No. 22 (1883), p. 83.]
  It was the most hopeless expedition ever undertaken. On the 8th of August the noble Earl writes to Sir Edward Malet that the Government have no responsibility whatever with regard to the condition of affairs in the Soudan, and that it is desirable Hicks Pasha should understand this. It is their policy to abstain as much as possible from interference in that question. The same phrases are repeated in November. On the 1st of December the noble Earl falters, and says that, "if consulted, you may advise them to retire within certain limits," not specifying what they are. Was there that action that ought to have been taken? The Government had everything before them. They could have recalled Hicks Pasha, and so confined the expedition to the limits they approved. We have the opinion of Lord Dufferin, that if the operations of Hicks Pasha had been confined to Sennaar, and if he had not gone to Kordofan, there was every reason to suppose he would have been successful. How was Her Majesty made to describe the state of affairs in the Queen's Speech? It was on the 31st of October last year that the Government came to the decision to reduce our troops in Egypt
  604
  in order to concentrate those that remained. On the 2nd of November the two days' engagement with Hicks Pasha began. Is this what the historian would deduce from the Queen's Speech. It says that—
  "Having had every reason to be satisfied with the tranquillity of Egypt, and with the progress made in the establishment of orderly institutions, I gave, during the autumn, instructions for the evacuation of Cairo, for the further reduction of my military forces, and for their concentration mainly in Alexandria;
  "But in the month of November the Egyptian Army, appointed to maintain the rule of the Khedive in the Soudan, was defeated and broken up with heavy loss."
  The historian would infer that there was a wide interval between the two events, whereas there was only two days. Is there in the first passage a play upon words? Does it refer to Egypt Proper? I dare say Egypt Proper was very tranquil, just as 140 years ago, at the time of the battle of Culloden, England may have been tranquil, although the fall of a dynasty hung in the balance. Yet I do not think at that time anyone would have proposed a reduction of the Army. The ruin of Hicks Pasha's Army was impending, and yet the Government had every reason to be satisfied with the tranquillity of Egypt. How is the defeat of Hicks Pasha described? It is an "unforeseen and calamitous necessity." Could not anyone have foreseen it who read the Papers? Surely there were men of intelligence in Downing Street, who, going through these Papers, must have foreseen the extreme probability of that which happened. In my judgment, a heavy moral responsibility rests upon Her Majesty's Government for the destruction of Hicks Pasha's Army. The noble Earl said that the noble Marquess had contended for the reconquest of the Soudan. I heard no such statement, nor do I think the noble Earl heard a single word which would justify that statement. My noble Friend did not advocate any policy of the kind. I am not going to advocate any policy of that kind; indeed, I am not going to express any opinion on the subject. But I want to say something about the Soudan. Now, months ago, the Egyptian Government—I do not mean the present Government, but that of Cherif Pasha—stated distinctly that their policy was not to retain the whole of the Egyptian Possessions to the South, but to limit the territory they retained by

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  Khartoum. In fact, Cherif Pasha did not propose to go so far as Lord Dufferin. I dare say this policy of the Government, not to go so far as Khartoum, is a very good policy; but the difficulty is that I find no argument on the subject, although we have some despatches stating the opinion of Sir Evelyn Wood, General Stephenson, and Sir Evelyn Baring. But although Sir Evelyn Baring says he agrees with the policy of Her Majesty's Government, all his arguments are the other way; all his arguments are dead against giving up Khartoum. Hear what he says. At the end of November the noble Earl opposite had telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring, on November 22, asking his opinion with reference to the reported destruction of General Hicks's Army by the forces of the Mahdi, and instructing him, after consultation with General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood—
  "To report his opinion as to whether the present state of affairs in the Soudan must be considered as a cause of danger to Egypt proper."
  Sir Evelyn Baring replied—
  "That the unanimous opinion of Lieutenant General Stephenson, Major General Sir Evelyn Wood, and myself is that the recent success of the Mahdi is a source of danger to Egypt proper, and that the danger would he greatly increased if Khartoum falls, which seems not improbable,"—[Egypt. No. 1 (1884), pp. 96–7.]
  So far, therefore, as Sir Evelyn Baring goes, I should say that his opinion was against giving up Khartoum. What did he say next? On December 3 he says—
  "General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood are therefore of opinion that, if the Egyptian Government be left to rely exclusively on its own resources, and the Mahdi advances, Khartoum must fall. They think that an endeavour should be made to open out the Berber-Suakim route, not because the mere establishment of communications between those two points will enable the Egyptian Government, with the forces at its disposal, to hold Khartoum permanently, but because the success of General Baker's undertaking will afford the best hope of retreat to the garrison of Khartoum and the immediate neighbourhood."
  Then he says—
  "If Khartoum is abandoned, they think that the whole of the valley of the Nile, down to Wady Halfa or thereabouts, will probably be lost to the Egyptian Government. As regards the Eastern Soudan, they do not at present wish to pronounce any decided opinion, but they are inclined to think that it may be possible to hold Kassala and one or two other points from Suakim, and Massowah, provided the Abyssinian Government abstains from active hostilities. I
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  have dwelt especially on the opinions of General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, because, under the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd ultimo, I consulted those officers, and because, as they have seen this despatch, I am confident that I am rightly interpreting their views. I may, however, add that I have gathered, in communication with Baker Pasha, that his views on the military situation do not differ materially from those of General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood.… Although, however, the abandonment of the valley of the Nile south of Wady Halfa might ultimately be productive of good to Egypt, and although it would certainly be a great relief to the oppressed tenantry of this country no longer to be dragged from their homes in order to be sent to the Soudan, I would not on that account underrate the grave consequences which would probably ensue from the abandonment of Khartoum and the provinces lying between it and Wady Halfa. The adoption of this measure would inflict a heavy blow on the authority of the Khedive and of his Government, which has already been rudely shaken by recent events. A fanatical population, flushed with religious enthusiasm and military success, would be brought to the frontiers of civilized Egypt. A considerable military force would be required to guard those frontiers. The fanatical portion of the population of Egypt, and especially Upper Egypt, would scarcely look with indifference at the success of the Mahdi. In a word, the difficulties attending the government of Egypt proper, which are already sufficiently great, would be materially enhanced."—[Ibid. pp. 129–30.]
  That was Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion. But it did not stop there. On the 22nd of December he says—
  "My own opinion is that the policy recommended by Her Majesty's Government is the best of which the very difficult circumstances of the case admit. The immediate position is not, I think, so alarming as appears to be thought in England. Dissensions seem to be rife among the tribes of the Soudan, some of the most important being opposed to the Mahdi. It is quite possible that by a judicious expenditure of money and by good management the Government of the Khedive may succeed in retaining its authority northwards from Khartoum. They will not, however, be able to hold that country except on sufferance, and I believe them to be perfectly incapable of governing it properly. On the other hand, the abandonment of the country as far as Wady Halfa would inflict a very serious blow upon the authority of the Khedive in Egypt proper. Without doubt, too, the argument of Cherif Pasha, that the friendly tribes and the hordes of Bedouins all round Egypt would turn against the Government, is very forcible. Moreover, although I think that the retention of the Soudan would entail greater financial difficulties than its abandonment, it must not be supposed that the latter course will be free from serious financial embarrassments. A considerable increase in the Egyptian army will be unavoidable. I feel sure that under no amount of persuasion or argument will the present Ministers consent to the adoption of the policy

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  of abandonment. The only way in which it can be carried out will be for me to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty's Government insist on the adoption of this course, and that if his present Ministers will not carry out the policy, others must be named who will consent to do so. I am not, however, at present prepared to say that any native Ministry can be found both willing to carry out this policy and capable of doing so. I should very much regret a change of Ministry, and I think that the loss of Cherif Pasha would be very detrimental to the country, but it will be almost inevitable if the policy of abandonment is carried out. It would also be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum, with full power to withdraw all the garrisons in the Soudan, and to make the best arrangements possible for the future government of that country."—[Ibid. p. 144.]
  Well, my Lords, I submit that with respect to the policy of the abandonment of Khartoum I am at a loss to find in these despatches a single argument in its favour. The arguments supposed to be for it are directly against it. Now, my Lords, suppose that the policy of the Government was right—suppose the policy which they adopted on the 4th of January was right, it is directly at variance with everything they did up to that time; and, therefore, I say that it was vacillating and inconsistent. Now, my Lords, what was done and what ought to have been done if we were to assist the Egyptian Government? The first thing was to have consulted Turkey and obtained her consent. You know perfectly well the terms on which the Khedive ruled Egypt. Yet you were forcing him to do what he had not properly the right to do. [The noble and learned Earl then read an extract from the Firman under which the Khedive held his authority, and by which he was not to abandon any of the privileges given to Egypt or alienate any part of his territory.] What communications did you make to Turkey on the subject? On the 4th of January two despatches were sent to Sir Evelyn Baring, in the first of which the noble Earl opposite says—
  "The general views of Her Majesty's Government on the question of the Soudan were stated to you in my telegram of the 13th ultimo, and have already been made known to Cherif Pasha. They have carefully considered the arguments and views of the Egyptian Government, and your observations upon them, and they see no reason to modify their conclusions as set forth in my telegram of the 13th ultimo. With reference, however, to the proposal contained in Cherif Pasha's note of the 2nd instant, I have to instruct you to inform his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government
  608
  have no objection to the Khedive's applying to the Porte to send troops to Suakim, provided that it will not increase the expenditure falling on the Egyptian Treasury, or cause the Egyptian Government to delay coming to a decision as to the movements of their troops from the interior of the Soudan. You will further state to Cherif Pasha that Her Majesty's Government concur in his second proposal. As to Cherif Pasha's suggestion (3) that with the frontiers thus reduced Egypt would be able to hold the Nile up to Khartoum, and secure the safety of Egypt, Her Majesty's Government do not believe it to be possible for Egypt to defend Khartoum; and, whilst recommending the concentration of the Egyptian troops, they desire that those forces should be withdrawn from Khartoum itself, as well as from the interior of the Soudan, and you will so inform Cherif Pasha."—[Ibid. p. 175.]
  And in the second—
  "It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices."—[Ibid. p. 176.]
  Then, on the same day, a despatch was written to Lord Dufferin in the following terms:—
  "The Turkish Ambassador called upon me to-day, and asked me whether I had any information to give him about Egypt. He said that he saw much argument in the press which, while it omitted all mention of Turkey, seemed to indicate that England was about to take upon herself the administration of Egypt, and to treat that country as France had treated Tunis. I told Musurus Pasha, in reply, that I had already informed him of the reasons which had compelled Her Majesty's Government to suspend the withdrawal of the troops which had been ordered. The responsibility of this country had, under actual circumstances, obliged Her Majesty's Government to assist in maintaining order in and defending Egypt proper. But they had no intention of sending troops to undertake the reconquest of the Soudan."—[Ibid. p. 177.]
  We live in a world of visions and dreams. There was nothing in the faintest degree approaching the real state of things in what the noble Earl said to the Ambassador. The unfortunate Ambassador goes home and transmits this as news to his own Government. But that territory belonging to the Sultan of Turkey had been abandoned—not a word was said to the Ambassador on that subject. Then, my Lords, I maintain that the Government ought to have taken some precautions upon the subject of slavery. General Gordon tells you that for two

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  years there have passed out by a particular route not less than 600 slaves every week on their way to the Red Sea. General Gordon glories in the fact that his government in the Soudan practically put an end to that state of things; and I observe that at the time when Sir Evelyn Baring was paralyzed with the orders from home not to interfere, and not to give any advice with regard to the Soudan, he did not feel himself able to remonstrate against the appointment to a high office of Zobehr Pasha, the king of the slave-dealers. What is the state of things with regard to this Mahdi? The only conspicuous leaders in his army are well-known slave-dealers in the Soudan. In fact, the rebellion is based, first, on the propagation of the religious fanaticism of those who composed the army; and, secondly, on the hatred of the slave-dealers at the interruption of their operations. These are the two great objects which the rebels under the Mahdi have in view. With such a state of things before you, you abandon the district where all the slave-trading takes place. The only way in which the Slave Trade could be stopped was by nipping it in the bud at its head-quarters. But it has been our fate, in the present generation, to see two of the most retrograde steps taken with regard to slavery. In the Transvaal you handed back to slavery hundreds of thousands of Natives; and now you are doing the same thing in the Southern districts of Egypt. It is perfectly essential for the safety of the garrisons which the noble Earl has properly described as being sown broadcast over the Soudan that the policy should be kept perfectly secret until those garrisons were either concentrated or withdrawn. I have said that Her Majesty's Government are, in my opinion, morally responsible for the disaster to Hicks Pasha's army. Even if there may be controversy as regards Hicks Pasha, there can be none at all with regard to Baker Pasha, for at that time Her Majesty's Government had intervened and taken possession of the government of Egypt. They were at the head of affairs, and everything which took place then took place under their eye, and was in their absolute power. Now, what was Baker Pasha doing? He was going to relieve Suakim, Sinkat, and Tokar. You had then engaged yourselves to defend the littoral of the Red
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  Sea, and do you mean to say that you engaged only to defend Suakim, and not Sinkat and Tokar, which are only some 20 or 25 miles distant from Suakim? Such a proposition is absurd. There was no difficulty of communication between these places. The roads were perfectly open at that time, and we read in the papers that the roads were perfectly good. You had engaged as long ago as December last to defend the littoral of the Red Sea. Did you not know the position of Baker Pasha? I have here a despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring written on the 3rd and received on the 13th of December. He goes into the question of Sinkat and Tokar, and he tells exactly the number of men Baker Pasha would have with him. He states that the greater portion of them will not fight, and that there were 400 Black troops who might fight, and he adds that if Baker Pasha could do anything, it must be with money and not with troops. If anybody could imagine that Baker Pasha could succeed, I should say he was a simple-minded man. In addition to that, Her Majesty's Government had Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion that they ought to be prepared with forces. Her Majesty's Government had clear and distinct notice that Baker Pasha was at Suakim. He endeavoured to do everything which Her Majesty's Government neglected to do; but his force was unable to do the work. The noble Earl has read telegrams about what has happened since this day week, when we heard of the defeat of Baker Pasha. We have had wonderful activity during the past week. We hear this morning the saddening news of the fall of Sinkat, and then there comes a fresh crop of orders. If, as I hope will not be the case, Tokar should fall, no doubt we shall have further orders and further activity. And now I should like to say a word about General Gordon. I rejoice that he has arrived safe at Berber. General Gordon is one of our national treasures, and I do not think Her Majesty's Government had any right rashly to expose our national treasures. I do not think that since the days of knight-errantry in the dark ages such an expedition was ever undertaken. And I think it was about equally wise as the expeditions of the knights'-errant. I heartily wish that General Gordon may arrive safely at Khartoum; but what is he to do when he gets there? I do not know

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  whether Her Majesty's Government have any idea. If so, they certainly do not favour us with it. General Gordon had formerly the government of this district, and he obtained the most marvellous ascendency over the White population. They would have murdered him if they could. It must be recollected that General Gordon is going to negotiate, not with the Native population of that part of the Soudan, but with the slave-dealers, who will certainly not be favourably inclined towards him. I can only wonder how General Gordon, acting from Khartoum, can save the garrison at Tokar. But, however that may be, I wish General Gordon every success, and I am sure that every one of your Lordships joins in that wish. But if the success comes, I do not think that it will be from Khartoum that the other garrisons will be saved. The noble Earl said that he objected to reference being made to the opinions of Foreign Powers on this subject.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I deprecated the opinion of foreign journalists being accepted as the true expression of the opinions of their various countries.
  EARL CAIRNS: But the foreign journalists of all countries appear to look at the conduct of Her Majesty's Government from the same point of view. I fully admit that there are many matters of domestic policy on which we might well disregard the opinions of foreign journalists; but this subject stands on a very different footing. We have taken a very unusual step with regard to Egypt. We have requested foreign nations to stand aside, and to let us do what had to be done there alone. They have taken us at our word, and some of those who used the grandiloquent language of the Prime Minister, said that we had received a mandate from the European Powers with regard to Egypt. These Powers are now asking us how we have carried out that mandate.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Where does the noble Earl find that statement?
  EARL CAIRNS: Through the usual channels of information, which are as open to the noble Earl as to myself. The noble Earl confined himself closely to the despatches which he has received from Foreign Powers; but if he were to take a wider survey of what is going on in the world, if he will pass from the conventional rules of the Foreign Office
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  to the unconventional rules of common sense, he will find that Foreign Powers are now asking us "How have you executed our mandate?" I hope that your Lordships will show the Foreign Powers and the people of this country that, as far as we are concerned, we are of opinion that it is the vacillating and inconsistent policy of Her Majesty's Government which has led to those lamentable events which we all join in deploring.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, there are many of the observations of the noble and learned Earl who has just sat down which I shall not attempt to answer, partly because he spoke so that I could not hear them, and partly because they relate to topics which are not directly relevant on the present occasion. For my own part, I will endeavour to confine myself to the issue which has been raised by the Motion of the noble Marquess. I cannot but think that the speeches that have been delivered have touched very lightly upon the issue which has been raised by the Motion, which is that the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due, in a great measure, to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government. The speech of the noble Marquess did not indicate directly any policy other than that pursued by Her Majesty's Government; but it contained a very cautious suggestion that some other policy might have been better. Indeed, the noble Lords opposite are not agreed among themselves as to the exact nature of the policy which ought to have been pursued; because while some of them contend that we should have defended Egypt in the Soudan by force of arms, others are of opinion that Egypt should have withdrawn from that Province long ago. With regard to the terms of the Motion of the noble Marquess, I deny that there has been any vacillation or inconsistency whatever in the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The real charge that has been brought against Her Majesty's Government is not that their policy has been vacillating and inconsistent, but that they have too obstinately and persistently adhered to their policy. I also deny that there is the slightest ground for connecting the recent lamentable events which have taken place in Egypt with the policy which Her Majesty's Government have

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  pursued in that country. It is clear from the published documents that there never was the least departure from the tone assumed by Lord Dufferin on the part of the other Representatives of the Government in Egypt. I totally deny the assumption of the noble and learned Earl that we were to act as absolute masters of Egypt, as persons possessing Egypt by an Army of Occupation, and that we were to exercise all the powers which would belong to us in a case of annexation. We had direct interests in Egypt, some common to us with other European Powers, and others more especially our own, which justified our interference for their protection; we had also undertaken obligations, from which we could not recede, towards the Khedive; and we intefered, from the beginning to the end, solely with the view of protecting those interests, of redeeming the pledges by which we were bound, and of making use of the position which we had assumed for the good of Egypt. At the same time, we always intended to relinquish that position as soon as we possibly could, and in the meantime to respect and support—and certainly not to treat with contempt—the Government of Egypt and the authority of the Khedive. To have dictated to the Khedive that which the noble Marquess has called a dismemberment of his territory, at a time when General Hicks had had an unbroken, or almost unbroken, series of successes, would have been to take a course which I feel sure the noble Marquess and the noble and learned Earl would have been the first to censure; because the justifying cause of pressure on our part for a relinquishment of the territory in question could only be found in the failure of the experiment which the Egyptian Government was allowed to make upon its own responsibility. The whole history of the Egyptian position in the Soudan, before the time when the noble Marquess would have had us so dictate to the Egyptian Government, had consisted of a series of alternate reverses and successes; the reverses having preceded, and the successes having followed, the employment of General Hicks in the Egyptian Service. From the despatches of General Hicks in the first six or seven months of 1883, it is impossible not to see that he believed that
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  the power of the Mahdi was very precarious, and that the Mahdi's people were deserting him. He wanted money and troops, and the supreme command, without interference; and in August these requests were, to a considerable extent, complied with; the Egyptian Government agreeing that, if these efforts should fail, the whole situation must be reconsidered; and our Representative in Egypt thinking it reasonable that those efforts should be made. It was surely impossible for us, after declining to accept the responsibility of those operations, then to dictate to Egypt that she should relinquish the territory. There has been no inconsistency in our policy. We have thought all along that our interests and our duty were concerned with Egypt Proper, and not with that enormous extent of territory, reaching to the Equator, which extends 1,600 miles in one direction, and 1,200 or 1,400 in another. We had entered into no engagements in connection with the Soudan. European interests were not involved in the government of the Soudan in the same way in which they were involved in the government of Egypt. There was an allowance of £100,000 a-year for the expenses of the government of the Soudan, but with it we had nothing whatever to do; and there were good reasons why we should be careful not to commit ourselves to responsibility in that direction. The noble and learned Lord has stated that the causes of the present difficulties in the Soudan are religious fanaticism and the greed of the slave-traders. But that view does not seem to commend itself to Colonel Stewart, who says that the main causes of those difficulties are misgovernment, oppression, and the extortion of the tax-gatherers. Nothing can be more clear than this, that to have interfered in the Soudan at all would have involved our interference on a large scale in order to insure its good government. We may be asked, why did we depart from the policy of non-interference after the defeat of General Hicks? The answer is that it became necessary then to try to put a stop to proceedings which were ruinous and hopeless. As I have said, £100,000 had previously been allowed for the expenses of the administration of the Soudan. But this year £600,000 were devoted to that purpose, at a time when the Egyptian Revenue was suffering

  615
  under many difficulties. Then 24,000 troops and more were scattered over the land which, without money and large reinforcements, must all have been lost. How could a contest under such conditions have been continued without destroying all hope of that which we have in view in our Egyptian policy—namely, the establishment of improved domestic institutions, of a system of justice and police, of the rudiments of self-government, of a system of equal taxation, and of better financial institutions? All the plans referred to must have been sacrificed if the contest in the Soudan had been prolonged; and it became our duty to impress on the Khedive with all the authority in our power that this was the only policy which could be adopted. I was surprised to hear the noble and learned Earl say that Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion was not in favour of this policy. Sir Evelyn Baring wrote on the 26th of November—
  "In view of the recent intelligence from the Soudan, I have thought it advisable to obtain the opinion of competent military authorities on the military situation in that province for the information of Her Majesty's Government. Accordingly, General Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Baker met unofficially at my house to-day and discussed the subject. They were unanimously of opinion that the Egyptian Government will find it impossible, with the forces at present at its disposal, to hold the Soudan.… They think that Khartoum should, if possible, be held sufficiently long to allow the more advanced posts and detached garrisons in the Soudan to rejoin."—[Ibid. p. 98.]
  Colonel de Coetlogon wrote to the same effect, and added—
  "Again, I say, the only way of saving what remains is to attempt a general retreat on Berber."—[Ibid. p. 99.]
  England might, no doubt, send a sufficient force to reconquer the Soudan and to hold it; but I should like to know whether the noble Marquess and the noble and learned Earl would commit themselves to say that England ought to have done so, and, if not, would they say that England ought to have nibbled at the matter? We hear sometimes of prestige. I am glad we have not heard the word in this debate. Prestige is a thing which I do not worship, and to sacrifice to the idol of prestige many British lives and much British treasure is a thing for which I should not be prepared. And most assuredly no policy could be worse than a half policy in this
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  matter. If we were to interfere for the recovery of the Soudan, to hold it or any part of it, such as Sennaar, we must have interfered in force. Well, our policy was not to do so, and we have adhered to that policy in spite of anything that any person may say; and I must remark I have not heard anything in condemnation of that policy in the speeches which the noble Lords have made. No doubt it may be said that we might have done more for relieving the garrisons. But there have been a great many of those garrisons, and one reason for our peremptory tone in pressing on the Khedive the withdrawal of those garrisons was our desire for their safety. One reason why we have availed ourselves of the services of that heroic man, General Gordon, is because he, with his vast knowledge of the country and great influence over the Tribes and Chiefs, was better able than any other man to say by what means a policy of conciliation and pacification might succeed in extricating the different scattered garrisons from the dangerous positions in which they were, and withdrawing them without loss to them and with advantage to the country. That was one main object of General Gordon's mission, and it would not be consistent with that mission that we should accompany it by warlike demonstrations, which could, by no possibility, seem consistent with its objects. I do not say that action from Suakim, or in the immediate neighbourhood, would interfere with such a mission. But so long as there was ground for believing—and I maintain there was—that the force sent with General Baker might be sufficient to meet the danger in that quarter, as the Egyptian Government itself certainly believed, we thought we should adhere as long as we could to our policy of non-interference. The positions of Sinkat and Tokar are not identical with those of the maritime ports which we are committed to defend. Since the disaster to General Baker's force we have lost no time whatever in making those preparations which would enable us to act, if act we must. We could not have acted in time to save Sinkat, but I hope we may be able to save Tokar. But you should not be carried away by the natural and just excitement connected with what happened at Sinkat, so as to lose all sense of proportion in these matters,

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  and disregard the importance of maintaining the general policy of which the mission of General Gordon is the practical result. General Gordon is most sanguine of its success, and no man is better able to judge. If, as we trust, in a short time success shall attend his efforts, I believe the general opinion both of your Lordships' House and of the country at large will not be adverse to the policy of the course we have pursued. At all events, we have pursued it consistently, and with a sincere belief that it was the policy most for the good of Egypt and the good of the Soudan. And with respect to the important question of slavery, to which the noble and learned Earl has referred, I do not think that the experience of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan has been such as to make us believe that the substitution of Native Powers will make things worse. I do not believe General Gordon is of that opinion. It must be remembered, too, that if we maintain our power at the maritime ports, through which alone slaves can be transported, unless they pass down the Valley of the Nile—which the Egyptian Government is bound, and will be able, to prevent—we shall have it in our power to stop the traffic at the maritime ports. I do not think that this is a question of small detail; it is a question of large policy. Our policy, as I said at the beginning, may have been wrong; but of one thing I am quite sure, it has been honest and it has been consistent.
  LORD LAMINGTONsaid, that we had no right to have interfered in Egypt at all, and that we were now sinking deeper and deeper into Egyptian mud. He had been very much pained by the speech delivered by the Prime Minister the other night in the House of Commons. At the present time they had the Mahdi in open rebellion, and he was surprised that Mr. Gladstone should have used the expressions he did in reply to a Question with reference to an article in United Ireland. The right hon. Gentleman said—
  "With regard to the article itself, it evidently raises two distinct classes of topics. It contains a clear expression of opinion that the Mahdi is contending for the liberty of his country. That is a subject on which I do not find it my duty at the present moment to give an opinion."
  He could not conceive anything more
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  astounding than that and other statements which the Prime Minister made with reference to the article to which he had referred.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN: My Lords, the only objection I have to the Motion of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) is in one small respect. It appears to me that the noble Marquess has perused the Blue Books to such effect, that the disinclination evinced by the Government in all their despatches to take up a decided line at any time, has somewhat induced him to follow them a little in that direction. He says that the recent events are due in a great measure to the vacillation and inconsistency of the Government. The only alteration I would make in that sentence is this—I would leave out the words "in a great measure," for I very firmly believe that the disasters in the Soudan, and in Egypt before, are entirely due to the vacillating conduct of the Government. They have desired to pursue several policies, and have attempted to reconcile irreconcilable principles. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) alluded to the Dual Control, and something that happened some time ago; and I would allude very briefly to what occurred in Egypt at the commencement of the difficulties. The Government were actuated by a desire to pursue two principles—one, that, if any intervention became necessary, Turkey was probably the best Power to intervene; and the other, that they were very careful to preserve intact their alliance with France. It was perfectly impossible to succeed in both, or either of those policies. Prance distinctly stated that Turkish intervention was impossible, and would not agree to it under any consideration whatever; and in the desire to please France, and allow Turkish intervention, the Government succeeded in falling to the ground. Then the Government endeavoured to shift their responsibilities on to the shoulders of the European Concert, but they got no satisfaction whatever out of that. The only distinct opinion expressed was that of Germany, which was diametrically opposed to that of Prance. That failed Her Majesty's Government also, and, as we all know, eventually England was obliged to act entirely alone. The rebellion, or the national movement—whichever you like to call it—was getting great head in

  619
  Egypt. There was one point at which. Her Majesty's Government seemed determined to interfere actively. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs mentioned one thing which would justify interference. The noble Earl declared that anarchy would be a sufficient reason for intervention, and for departing from our former and general policy. The noble Earl was informed, by our own Advisers in Egypt, that anarchy was gaining ground at different times. On the 20th of January, Sir Edward Malet said that the refusal to comply with the demand, on the part of the National Party, to exercise some control over the finances would necessitate some interference from the outside—that is, "armed intervention." On the 16th of March, Sir Auckland Colville said that the country was without efficient government and in imminent danger of disorder. Previously to that, the noble Earl had declared that anarchy would cause intervention. Sir Auckland Colville had asserted that it was imminent, and that the country was without efficient government; and yet nothing was done then! On the 5th of May, 1882, the noble Earl declared that matters did not press for an immediate decision. As a matter of fact they did very much. A short time afterwards our Squadron before Alexandria bombarded the forts, and the burning of the town speedily followed. I fully believe that the bombarding, and the burning, and the subsequent disasters which befell Egypt, are entirely due to the fact that the Government had not been able to make up their minds as to what they intended to do. They did not state then that they were interfering. Why? Because they had not made sufficient preparations beforehand for interfering. Even after that event, they endeavoured to declare that we were not at war. If we were not engaged in war, we were engaged in active murder We were engaged in killing people, and if we had not the excuse of warfare, we were committing murder. It is a most extraordinary thing to see Her Majesty's Government, who got into Office imbued with peace principles as a peaceable Government, going to war, or what I call war, though they did not say so at the time; to see the war ending successfully, and on that account being popular, and then to see Her Majesty's Government slip-
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  ping out of peaceful Quaker garments, and coming upon the scene full of war paint, beating the big drum, flourishing trumpets, and claiming for themselves all the honour and glory they could have gained by a successful campaign. I admit that they had great difficulties to contend with previous to the war; but the difficulties were immensely intensified, if they were not created, by their not having a definite policy. They suffered themselves to drift up and down with the tide; first in one direction and then in another, never pursuing a settled course or moving in a straight direction. I believe that in cases of difficulty and danger, the surest way to preserve peace is for a country to speak out and say distinctly what it intends to do. I believe that a straightforward policy is much more likely to insure peace than the most able practice of diplomacy. Wars, complications, and troubles arise from nations being misunderstood, and not having said that they will not allow such and such things to be done, and that in certain circumstances they will act in a certain way. The best policy is a straightforward, outspoken, manly policy. Instead of having such a policy, Her Majesty's Government drifted about idly. Future historians will look upon this epoch of Her Majesty's Government as corresponding with the drift period in geology. The last despatch of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in its references to the domestic institutions and stability of Egypt and so on, will be looked upon by future historians with the same kind of interest that archaeologists take in the rudimentary evidence of the development of civilization in the earlier races of mankind. After the war, I submit that Her Majesty's Government really found themselves in a position of great simplicity; there was nothing difficult or complicated in the matter. They had become masters of the country; we were in Egypt alone; the rest of Europe had allowed us to go there, and had accepted the situation. We were there, and could do anything we liked in the country; and we made no use of the simplicity of our situation. Instead of taking hold of the country; instead of announcing to Egypt, and the rest of the world, that they would remain there until they had settled the affairs of the

  621
  country; instead of saying that they intended to stop until they had straightened the finances of the city; placed all its internal institutions on a sound basis, seen its departments administered by capable men, and put the country in such a position that it was free from external aggression—instead of doing all this, they said—"Oh, we shall go out in a few months; we are only waiting the first opportunity to leave the country." If they had put their feet down, and said—"We are going to stop here, however long it takes, until Egypt is in a position to walk alone," no subsequent troubles would have come to that country. But Her Majesty's Government displayed, either an ignorance of what was going on, or a total disregard of it, which was almost supernatural; it is almost impossible to understand it. They appear to have taken no note or notice of what was going on in the Soudan; yet, during 1882, the best authorities frequently gave it as their opinion that the whole Soudan was in a blaze. Her Majesty's Government had any amount of information also from their own officials; they could see what was going on, and that massacre after massacre was taking place. In the month of June we were informed that the Mahdi had taken several prisoners; in July there was a massacre of several merchants; then 6,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed; in October, two battalions of 850 Regulars were destroyed; on the 4th of November there was another engagement, in which 1,000 men were killed; in January, 1883, we were informed that garrisons were cut off; in February, we were told that Suakim and the neighbourhood were swarming with the followers of the Mahdi, and so on. During 1882 and 1883, massacre after massacre and outrage after outrage were going on in the Soudan. Not only were Her Majesty's Government informed by their Advisers that Upper Egypt was in danger, but they were told that Egypt Proper was involved. On the 26th of October, Sir Evelyn Baring wrote—
  "So long as affairs in the Soudan remain in their present unsettled condition, a considerable danger must always threaten."—[Egypt, No. 1 (1884), p. 74.]
  They were told also that Lower Egypt was involved. All this was perfectly well known to Her Majesty's Government
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  before last November. Yet, in his speech at the Guildhall, the Prime Minister never said one word about the difficulties existing in the Soudan, or the necessity of doing anything there; but he simply stated that we were going to evacuate Egypt, and he stated the reason for it. He said—
  "We should show the world we were going to carry out the declarations we had so frequently made."
  There is where the difficulty arises. The Government have made declarations that they were going out of Egypt in six months, and they thought themselves bound to endeavour to carry them out, notwithstanding that, by doing so, they caused misery to Egypt, and degradation to their own country. They endeavoured to make their performances fit in with the promises which they had given before they came into Office. They endeavoured to make the conduct of the Prime Minister appear consistent; and they sacrificed the honour of their country and thousands of lives in order to save the Prime Minister one more inconsistency. I think that apparent consistency was dearly bought. What was occurring at the time of that speech? Just before the Prime Minister made it, the very catastrophe occurred which we all so much deplore—General Hicks and 1,100 men were exterminated. I am quite aware the news had not reached us; but news had come home which ought to have warned Her Majesty's Government, and would have led almost any other body of men in London to dread greatly, that such a disaster might occur. Certainly they had ample information to have led the Prime Minister to have made a different statement from that which he made at the Guildhall, when he merely stated that we were leaving Egypt that the world might see how consistently the Government were carrying out the declarations they had made. After that we know how disaster followed upon disaster. A British Consul was killed; 500 men were killed; and many other disasters happened. A great calamity was also suffered in the destruction of Baker's army. Now, my Lords, the situation then was surely sufficiently explained to induce the Goverment, or any Government which had the common interests of humanity at heart, to take sufficient measures to guard against the recurrence of such

  623
  calamities. A telegram was sent to them that the situation was a serious one, and was causing great anxiety, and that, if Hick's army was destroyed, it was nearly certain that the Egyptian Government would lose the Soudan; and that once they began to withdraw, it was hard to say at what point they could stamp out the insurrection. There was distinct intimation also that Lower Egypt was in danger. But all that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said was that no troops from England or India should be sent. We have a consensus of opinion before us—Sir Evelyn Wood, Colonel Stewart, and Sir Evelyn Baring, all of whom declared, over and over again, that the success of the Mahdi was a serious and great danger to Egypt Proper, and that that danger would be increased if Khartoum fell, which appeared to be probable. At this point, the Government almost did something. But they did not really do anything. They did not take any active line; they only acted negatively, and countermanded the withdrawal of the troops. But the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs takes great credit for all that had been done to improve the internal arrangements of Egypt during all this long period. I have read the Blue Book, and it is full of schemes, electoral and other schemes; and I believe voting papers were sent out with directions, showing how the Egyptians were to use them—and all this time the country above them was in active rebellion; the movement was going on in which lay, as your responsible Advisers had said, "a danger to Lower Egypt;" the movement of which these three Agents of the Government had said that it would be hard to say on what point it might fall, unless it was checked. All this time, while the Mahdi was carrying on his rebellion, the Government thought that they were doing their duty, to this country and humanity, by sending out voting papers and promoting internal reform. You might as well think it a wise action on the part of a man to amuse himself by putting up some trifling alterations in his drawing-room, while his house was burning over his head. My Lords, I am quite aware that the Government have denied their responsibility over and over again. I say that the Government cannot decline responsibility in this matter. They ac-
  624
  cepted the situation; they went into Egypt single-handed; and with them the responsibility for that country and for the lives of the inhabitants of that country has rested ever since. They could only divest themselves of responsibility by refusing to accept the situation which they found. But they had not the moral courage to do that. If they had done that, they might have divested themselves of responsibility. But no man can divest himself of responsibility, if he takes upon himself a position which involves responsibility. It was perfectly useless to say in every despatch that "the Government are not responsible." That does not take away their responsibility—they remain responsible because they have placed themselves in a situation which entails these responsibilities, which might have been dealt with satisfactorily by moral courage, but which neglected, has entailed disasters upon Egypt. I hold that the Government is responsible directly and indirectly. Directly, because many disasters—military disasters—are due to the defective management of the Departments in Egypt, Departments which I assert, even strictly speaking, are entirely in the hands of the Government. Your Lordships have read the telegrams—I might almost say the despairing telegrams—of Hicks, saying that he had nothing, was in want of everything, and begging Sir Evelyn Wood to interfere and endeavour to impress upon the Minister of War the necessity of sending these things. You have letters and letters speaking of the defenceless condition of Khartoum; you have the letters and telegrams of Power, acting as Consul in Khartoum, which said that for 40 days they seemed to have been forgotten. All this arises from the defective management in Egypt, which, although nominally in the hands of Egyptians, was really in those of England. Of course, the Government took care that Egyptians should be in charge, for fear that any responsibility should attach to them. But they will find it hard to persuade this country that they are not absolutely responsible for the management of Egypt; and anyone who reads the Blue Books must see that the military disasters have been caused, to a great extent, by the fact that Hicks and Baker were not properly supplied, and that the whole machinery broke down in Egypt. My Lords, I think

  625
  that the Government are directly responsible also, especially in the Eastern Soudan. Long ago they were told that assistance was wanted at Suakim. In December, Sir Evelyn Baring suggested that our forces should be increased there. In January, Tewfik said that he wanted 2,000 men to enable him to hold Tokar, and supplies in the vicinity of Suakim. Most undoubtedly we must be held responsible for Suakim, Tokar, and Sinkat, ever since the 4th of January; for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had at last taken up a distinct position—had at last engaged that the Government would assume full control in Egypt. He had at last asserted that the commands of the Government must be carried out, and threatened them with all kinds of pains and penalties if they were not carried out. Can any Member of the Government pretend that, from that day, they did not assume full responsibility? And as nothing was done to assist Suakim, those unfortunate men shut up in Tokar and Sinkat were left to the tender mercies of their enemies to make the best terms they could. If the prayer of Tewfik Bey had been attended to; if the counsels of the Advisers of the Government had been heeded, and the Government had increased our forces there, no doubt these garrisons would have been secured and enabled to withdraw. I believe that the Government are also indirectly responsible for the disasters not only in the Eastern Soudan, but throughout the whole of the Soudan. I am wrong; what I meant is, that ever since January they have assumed the responsibility, and are responsible, for the Eastern Soudan and the Littoral. They have attempted to deny their responsibility for the rest of the Soudan. I am not here to point out what the Government should have done. I do not know what the value of the Soudan is. I know there are different opinions about it. Baker Pasha has said that the Equatorial Provinces are among the richest portions of the Egyptian Dominions. Lord Dufferin takes much the same view. He said that with their great production of corn, indigo, and cotton the Equatorial Provinces ought to be a source of wealth; and he added that the Egyptian Government could not be expected to give up such a treasure. General Stewart also spoke in high
  626
  terms of the excellence of the cotton and indigo crops; whereas the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs described it as a portion of the Egyptian Dominions which never had been, and never could be, anything but a most unprofitable possession. Well, I do not know which is the true view to take of the matter. But it is really immaterial whether the Soudan is valuable or not. But there can be no question whether the lives of the people there were valuable or not. I do not say what line the Government should have adopted. The accusation is that they did not adopt any line whatever. They knew what was going on in the Soudan perfectly well. They ought to have made up their minds what was the proper course to pursue as regards the Soudan, whether it was advisable to hold it all, to abandon it all, or to hold some portion of it. I do not care which line the Government adopted, so long as they adopted some line. If they had made up their minds to abandon the whole country, they could have saved all those lives which were lost there. They could have drawn off all the garrisons there shut up. The same might have been done if they had retained a portion of it. I believe if they had retained the whole, and distinctly said so, that the rebellion of the Mahdi would never have assumed the complexion which it did assume, and they could have retained the whole country at comparatively small cost. The Government may think that they have succeeded in shifting responsibility from themselves. I feel sure that their countrymen do not hold that opinion. Of one thing I am certain, that if this Government do shelter themselves in this way they do but incur additional responsibility. They do not shelter their fellow-countrymen. The English feel responsible for what has happened in Egypt. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that a man puts up an umbrella when it rains, and closes it when it ceases to rain. The Government feel confident that they can thus shelter themselves. But there is an expression in the west of America which is applied to a kind of person who is not characterized by great decision and energy of character. They say that such and such a man "does not know enough to go in when it rains." I believe that is the position of Her

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  Majesty's Government. In England they do shelter themselves under their umbrellas when it rains; but they do not shelter their fellow-countrymen. We are being rained upon, not with drops of water, but with drops of blood. My Lords, Her Majesty's Government have succeeded, in a comparatively short time, in creating a more deplorable state of things in Egypt, and in doing more to cast a slur upon the honour of their country than, as far as I can recollect, has ever been done in a similar time by any Government. Governments may make mistakes, of course, and those mistakes may be condoned, because all human beings are liable to make mistakes; but Her Majesty's Government have blundered in a way which it is impossible to condone and difficult to excuse. There is no excuse for men who are in a responsible position shirking responsibility. The whole of the disasters which have occurred are duo to the fact that Her Majesty's Government do not accept the responsibility, and that they have endeavoured to please all kinds of factions within the Liberal Party. It is due to the fact that they Lave endeavoured to make their actions conform with the extraordinary unpractical, unstatesmanlike theories promulgated in the Mid Lothian campaign. As a Member of your Lordships' House, professing Liberal principles, I object to the honour of the Liberal Party being defamed in this way. I do not see what Liberals have done that they should be treated in this manner. I am not talking of those wild enthusiasts who believe that the Millennium has come, and that the world will be ruled by honeyed phrases and neatly-turned diplomatic sentences; but I speak of those common-sense Liberals who adhere to Liberal principles, but who believe that peace is best secured by an honest, a straightforward, and an outspoken policy, and that in a period of great danger some decision of character is advisable and necessary. My Lords, it is very hard that a Liberal should be obliged to weigh on one side the honour of his country, and on the other his adherence to his Party. It is very hard that he cannot profess himself a Member of the Liberal Party without seeing a policy pursued that drops the honour of his country into the dirt; that has cost the sacrifice of thousands and thousands
  628
  of lives; and that has brought this great Empire into a position so difficult that it is almost impossible to see how it is to find its way out. My Lords, there was a time when the Liberal Party was led on very different principles indeed. There was a time when they brought in truly Liberal measures at home, and when they pursued a consistent policy abroad. There was a time when the Liberal Party was loved and respected at home, and when it was respected and feared abroad. I should like to know the estimation in which that Party is now held in Europe. In those times, Liberal statesmen thought it their duty to lead the country. Now, however, it appears that Liberal statesmen think they have nothing to do but to wait till they have received a certain amount of propulsion from their supporters in the country. They dare not move or initiate anything. They are afraid of offending, at one time, the Manchester "Peace-at-any-Price" Radicals; and, at another time, they are afraid of offending the more modern belligerent Birmingham school. They seek to please all parties, and the result is that they please none. The Leaders never move until there is a consensus of public opinion behind them, forcing them to move. But while public opinion is gathering, and they are waiting till they are quite sure that the movement will be popular on their part, we see those awful disasters and frightful calamities occurring in another country. My Lords, I do not know what reason we have to expect better things in the future from Her Majesty's Government. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) said he thought the expressed opinion of this House might be of some use in giving them a little more courage, and forcing them to take some steps now. Without any disrespect to this House, I do not think this House is strong enough to move Her Majesty's Government. It requires something more than that to galvanize them into life. There is only one thing which has any effect on Her Majesty's Government, and that is the knowledge that public opinion is strong against them, and that if they do not move they will lose the support of all sections of the Party. I think Her Majesty's Government must see that that state of things has come about. If they have any estimation of public opinion in this

  629
  country, they must know very well that the Liberal Party will not put up with this state of things any longer. They are tired to see the mismanagement going on in Egypt; they are wearied to see the bloodshed going on unchecked; and they are disgusted at seeing the honour of their country dragged down in such a way. That may move Her Majesty's Government—the knowledge that they are losing popularity, the one thing Her Majesty's Government strive to retain. That knowledge may compel them at last to take tardy measures. I hope that they will do so. They cannot undo the past; they cannot bring the dead to life; they cannot restore husbands to their wives, nor parents to their children; but they may, at least, take all the measures they can to prevent further effusion of blood. My Lords, I believe that all these disasters might have been avoided if a consistent, manly, courageous policy had been pursued from the commencement. I believe that if Her Majesty's Government had long ago made up their minds as to what they intended to do in Egypt, and had said so, Alexandria would not have been reduced to ruins; the forts would not have been bombarded; the Egyptian Army would not have been destroyed; and that pestilence following would not have swept away some 30,000 people in Egypt. I believe if they had made up their minds in time as to what they intended to do with regard to the Soudan; if they had made up their minds what policy to pursue—whether it was to retain the whole or a part of it, or to abandon it all—I believe that they could have carried their policy out with perfect safety; that the garrisons could have been withdrawn; and that such of the population who wished to go could have left. I do not believe that any one of those military disasters which have occurred there would have occurred, if Her Majesty's Government had taken up any line of policy as regards the Soudan, and if they had spoken their minds like men, and taken prompt and efficient measures to carry out the policy they had indicated. In the same way, I believe that if Her Majesty's Government after the war, when they found themselves in uncontrolled possession of Egypt, had declared their intention of remaining there till the affairs of Egypt were properly settled; if they had said
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  they intended to stop there until they had disentangled the skein, until Eypttian finances and Egyptian taxation were arranged in such a way that the unfortunate peasants could earn some decent living for themselves out of the sweat of their brow; if they had said that they would stop there till Courts of Justice were instituted; and if Englishmen of sense and of experience had been placed at the head of Departments to train up Natives; if they had said they would stop there till all the internal institutions of the country were smoothly working, till taxation was properly adjusted, and till Egypt was secured from all foreign danger and internal trouble—if they had said this, I do not believe that the rebellion of the Mahdi would ever have assumed these gigantic and lamentable proportions; I do not believe that General Hicks and his army would have been destroyed; or that General Baker's army would have been lost for want of proper sustenance and want of materiel through the breakdown of the administration of Egypt. I believe that the greater part, if not the whole, of these disasters would have been avoided. In my conscience and heart I believe that the responsibility for the lives of these men—I do not know how many, perhaps 50,000—who perished by war or pestilence rests upon the shoulders of Her Majesty's Government. I do assert that they cannot shift that responsibility by ending every despatch with a disclaimer of responsibility. I know it is impossible for them to restore these dead to life; but it may be possible for them yet to take measures to prevent further disasters; and I do most earnestly and sincerely hope that, if not the opinion which your Lordships will give, at any rate the clearly expressed opinion of Liberals throughout England will at last compel Her Majesty's Government to have a little moral courage, and to fulfil the obligations which they cannot escape from.
  THE EARL OF ABERDEENsaid, the noble Earl who had just addressed the House (the Earl of Dunraven) spoke of the position at the close of the Egyptian Campaign as being a very simple one; but surely his noble Friend must have forgotten the various difficulties which had to be taken into account. He (the Earl of Aberdeen) wished to remark that the point of the Motion, as

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  it was the point of many of the speeches which had been delivered, was that the Government had been vacillating and inconsistent; not that their policy was wrong from the outset, but that they had changed and varied it. But circumstances altered cases; and he did not think anyone would consider it reasonable, in observing a vessel which appeared to be steered in a devious manner, to assume that the man at the helm was incapable or intoxicated, but rather to conclude that he was steering clear of the shoals. Account had to be taken of the susceptibilities of other Powers, as well as those of Egypt itself. The Government, it was true, might have followed another course than they had, which might have been not so difficult; but it would not have been so magnanimous. In undertaking to confine their action to Egypt Proper they acted wisely. Had they sent our troops into the Soudan they would have forfeited all the pledges they had given to this country. Now, however, that a state of things had arisen which necessitated a change of policy, they had at once adapted their policy to the circumstances. No one could respect and admire more than he the officers who commanded the Egyptian Army; but he could not help thinking that the complications in that country had been increased by the fact that these officers commanding Native soldiers threw an implied responsibility upon the English Government. As to the charge of endeavouring to disclaim responsibility, he maintained that, from the first, the Government had recognized the responsibility of staying in Egypt until the Military and Civil administration was thoroughly organized. When circumstances had compelled the Government, unfortunately, to interfere in the Soudan, they had not shrunk from doing so.
  VISCOUNT BURYsaid, he did not think that the accusation which had been brought against Her Majesty's Government by the noble Marquess behind him (the Marquess of Salisbury) had as yet been answered by any of the speeches which had been delivered by noble Lords sitting opposite. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack talked as if the indictment was for not reconquering the Soudan. He had based his argument on the supposition that those who had brought the Motion for-
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  ward were blaming the Government because they had not thought it their duty to send out an Expedition to recover the Soudan for Egypt; but the noble Marquess had been careful, at the outset of his remarks, to say that the indictment he had to bring against Her Majesty's Government was, not that they had not taken any steps to preserve or to recover the Soudan for Egypt, but that from the beginning until now they had not known their own minds, and that their policy had been a vacillating and an inconsistent one, which had led to a lamentable state of things, not only in Egypt, but in the Soudan, which would not have arisen had they known their own minds in the first instance. The noble Earl who had just sat down (the Earl of Aberdeen) had said that Her Majesty's Government might have pursued some other kind of policy, but that it would not have been so magnanimous as that which they did adopt. For his own part, he (Viscount Bury) failed to see the magnanimity of the policy which Her Majesty's Government had pursued, seeing that it had resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. They had just heard that Sinkat had fallen; they knew that Tokar was in imminent danger of falling, and that Khartoum might be attacked any day; that a great number of the Soudan garrisons had already been massacred, and that others might be massacred very shortly, unless something unexpected happened. They knew that the Government had had ample warning of the state of things that had existed throughout last year, and yet they had persistently refused to interfere with the Soudan, and had left its garrisons to their fate without even sending a corporal's guard to their relief. They had been told that Sir Evelyn Wood and General Stephenson regarded the progress of affairs with horror; but they were forbidden to move. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) said that when General Hicks was sent on his unfortunate expedition, there were great hopes that he would succeed, and he said that to show that the Government were right in not interfering then. Granting that the Government were right at that time in abstaining from interference, they certainly ought subsequently to have insisted on the withdrawal of all the garrisons from the Soudan. One reason that had been given

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  for not insisting on their withdrawal was that the Government restricted themselves to the defence of Egypt Proper. He doubted, however, whether the Government could justly put forward that argument, for it was not the case that the Government had refused all responsibility as to the Soudan. One of the earliest papers in the Blue Books was an official Report by Colonel Stewart of the woeful state of the Soudan, and the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had sent a despatch demanding of the Government of the Khedive that the reforms suggested by Colonel Stewart should be carried out in that country. What was that but direct interference? Why could not the Government go a step further and interfere to save women and children from massacre? With reference to military matters, also, the Government had interfered in the affairs of the Soudan, as was shown by the correspondence between Hicks Pasha and Sir Edward Malet, to whom General Hicks addressed demands for additional troops, and complaints when they were not supplied, and to whom he eventually tendered his resignation. It was, therefore, idle for the Government to contend that they had not interfered either in the civil or the military concerns of the Soudan. He did not believe that Hicks Pasha and Baker Pasha had been deliberately betrayed by the Government; but he did believe that the Government had been made the unconscious instruments of the betrayal of those two gallant Commanders. The conduct of Her Majesty's Government was such as to make it the direct interest of the Egyptian Pashas to sacrifice them. Early in the day it was made known to the Government that the funds at the disposal of Egypt would not suffice for the military operations in the Soudan. A subsidy was asked for by Cherif Pasha and General Hicks, and the answer was that no subsidy would be granted. Sir Edward Malet was instructed to impress upon Cherif Pasha that all expenditure in the Soudan must be borne by the Egyptians themselves; but from the answer of Cherif Pasha, it was obvious that he argued that if once the Soudan was given into the charge of an English officer, the English Government would certainly have to intervene if he should be defeated. And that very thing happened.
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  Hicks Pasha's troops were starved, and he was paralyzed by the neglect to supply his troops, and his army was destroyed; and Cherif Pasha's anticipation came true—that the English Government must interfere. As the Government did not insist that both Hicks Pasha and Baker Pasha should have been properly supplied when they entered upon those expeditions, they were responsible for their betrayal. Thereby the intervention so much desired by the Egyptians was forced upon England. Baker Pasha had been defeated, and he had been recalled; but had he been recalled in disgrace? He had been sent out with inadequate means, and did not deserve such treatment. He wished to know whether he had been recalled by the Egyptian or Her Majesty's Government? One word he would like to say of respect and admiration for General Hicks. We knew the difficulties under which he laboured—how he went on an expedition which at first might have been hopeful, but which turned out hopeless through the apathy of Her Majesty's Government. Therefore, we who remained behind ought to express our admiration of that gallant man and the gallant Europeans who died with him. Neither ought we to forget our Consul, Captain Moncrieff, who risked his life, and lost it, in the attempt to avert one of those massacres which were now perfectly certain. Her Majesty's Government, he asserted, had not yet declared, and he hoped before the debate closed they would declare, what their policy in Egypt at this moment was. The noble Earl opposite had read out to them part of a despatch which described certain succours he had sent out to Suakim; bat beyond that they knew nothing. They did not know whether the policy of Ministers was to evacuate the Soudan, nor did they know what geographical limits they attached to the term. They were also equally ignorant as to whether it was intended to withdraw the garrisons and to defend only the actual Nile Valley. An explicit answer should be given on these points, for, as Mr. Bright, in one of his eloquent speeches at the time of the Crimean War, said, the angel of death was abroad, and you might almost hear the sweep of his wings. And so now we might say that the angel of massacre was abroad, and we might almost hear the agonized

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  voices of women and children who were about to be sacrificed crying to us for succour, and if not for succour, at least for vengeance. He contended that unless Her Majesty's Government declared their policy in regard to the Soudan, which they had not yet done, they would soon find the Mahdi across the Nile Valley and besieging the English garrisons in their own cantonments. Let Her Majesty's Government say now, even at the eleventh hour, that this policy of vacillation was to be abandoned, and that something was to be done which would be worthy of the name of England.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, there is nothing in the tone or temper of the speech of the noble Viscount who has just spoken (Viscount Bury) of which Her Majesty's Government has reason to complain. He followed and enlarged upon, but I think he did not strengthen, the arguments of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) and the noble and learned Earl (Earl Cairns). I shall endeavour, in the course of what I have to say in reply to them, to answer the questions which have been put to us by the noble Viscount. Nor need I dwell on the remarkable speech of the noble Earl who spoke last but one on the same side (the Earl of Dunraven). He assumes the position of a Liberal, but of a dissatisfied and disgusted Liberal. Well, I am no great authority on the subject. There are many varieties of Liberals; but Liberalism which speaks from the Front Opposition Bench, which includes the championship of the Orange Party in Ireland, and which makes it a reproach to the Government that they are amenable to public opinion, is to me a new variety. The noble Earl made us responsible for many things—I think I am justified in including the outbreak of cholera in Egypt. But it is not worth while wasting energy in dealing with the noble Earl's speech, because, though he was exceedingly liberal in his charges, he was very sparing in his arguments in support of them. But, my Lords, what is the charge made by the noble Marquess and the noble and learned Earl who followed him? First of all, the charge is two-fold—one, that the conduct of the Government, in its conduct of Egyptian affairs, has been marked by inconsistency and vacillation; and the other is, that that vacilla-
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  tion and inconsistency have been the cause of the lamentable occurrences which have taken place in the Soudan, the principal, I suppose, being the loss of the Soudan to Egypt. Now, I listened to the speeches which were not wanting in the acerbity which generally marks criticisms on occasions like these. But they seemed to me not merely to fail to establish the charges contained in the Motion, but not even to aim at establishing them. What I suppose we mean when we talk about vacillation, is, that the persons or the Government so accused have altered their conduct, the circumstances remaining unchanged, in such a manner as to show that they have no definite course of action in their minds. And when we speak of inconsistency, we mean that what the person accused has said or done at one time is at variance with what he has said or done at another, under the same, or nearly the same, circumstances. Now, has that been shown, or attempted to be shown here? What utterance on the part of any leading Minister has been at variance with the language which we have habitually held on this question? What act of ours, at any time during the last 18 months, has shown a divergence from the course of policy which we had originally laid down? What, in fact, the noble Marquess has aimed at proving, and what I I am fully prepared to admit he has proved, is that his view of our position and duty in Egypt differs very widely from ours. But it is one thing to show that we have differed from him, and quite another to show that we have differed from ourselves. My Lords, what was the main object, what was the justification, of the English occupation of Egypt? I am not personally responsible for that step, and I do not therefore speak with authority; but I conceive that the best defence of it is this—if we had not interfered when we did, other nations would have done so, and the practical choice lay between an English occupation, and one by France or some other European State. The question was not whether Egypt should be left alone, but whether some other European nation should interfere. It was not choice, but accident, that caused us to interfere singly. We found revolution and anarchy; we had to restore order, and we have done so. But did we, even from the first moment to the present day,

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  say or do anything to create an expectation that we intended our stay to be permanent? I am in the memory of anyone here when I say that, from the first, our hope and our intention has been to withdraw our Military Force as soon as circumstances allowed. My noble Friend in the other House of Parliament (the Marquess of Hartington), indeed, spoke a year ago of hoping that we might do it in six months. He was sanguine; events have turned out otherwise; but do you doubt that he was sincere? We know why the intended evacuation was delayed. The war in the Soudan is the sole and the sufficient cause. But when we announce, from the first, that we shall retire as soon as we can do so, with a hope of leaving behind us a Government strong enough to hold its own; when we reluctantly postpone the execution of that design, in consequence of circumstances which nobody could foresee; when our purpose ultimately to retire remained unchanged, and does so still, I should like to know, my Lords, where is the vaccillation and where is the inconsistency? I quite understand that many others may take an entirely different view of our obligations; that they may think we ought to prepare for a permanent occupation of the country, and that Egypt, under whatever form, ought to be annexed to the British Empire; and if that policy had ever been announced by us, there might be some grounds for the charges that have been made. It is a conceivable and a possible policy, one that has many supporters, both in and out of Parliament. If that policy were announced in the Resolution which noble Lords are invited to pass—if the Resolution censured us for talking or thinking of leaving Egypt, and laid it down that we ought, on the contrary, to have announced our intention of staying permanently, and acted on the announcement, then I should have dissented from the proposal, but I should have understood it. It would have been a fair challenge to us to defend our policy against a rival policy. But what I find fault with in this Resolution is, that it affirms as a fact that which is not a fact—that it imputes to us uncertainty of purpose, whereas we have known our minds throughout—and inconsistency, when we have held the same language,
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  the same ideas of policy, from first to last, until a total change in the situation compelled a change of conduct. I think that the very ground on which we are blamed is inconsistent in itself. The principle which has guided us from first to last has been the same, and that is to leave the Egyptian authorities free to work out their own policy; and the only reason why we have interfered in the matter of the Soudan is that we had no option, in consequence of the danger which threatened Egypt itself. The real objection which noble Lords opposite feel in their hearts is, not that we have pursued a vacillating policy, but that we have pursued what is essentially our own policy from the first. It is because we have been, and are, consistent that we are blamed; because, having, in the first instance, declared to all Europe that our occupation was for a temporary purpose only, and holding that view and that intention still, we have resisted all pressure to make it permanent, or to lay the ground for its being so. That is our real offence—that is the course of action which our opponents cannot forgive. I admit, of course, that our action now is entirely different from what it was a year ago; but that is because we have to deal with a totally altered state of things. As to the loss of the Soudan being caused by what we have done, or have left undone—for that, I suppose, is the chief of the lamentable occurrences referred to—I meet the charge in two ways. In the first place, I do not admit the fact. In the next place, if it were a fact, I do not admit that the loss of the Soudan in itself—apart from the unhappy accidents which have attended it—is a matter for blame, or for regret. My Lords, if we want to judge what was the cause of the loss of the Soudan, we must go back a couple of years. Let us suppose that the events of 1882 had never taken place; either that Arabi had never seized upon power, or that he had been allowed to exercise it without disturbance; that there had been no foreign intervention and no bombardment of Alexandria. Will you contend that the Soudan would, under these circumstances, have been saved to Egypt? Look, on the one hand, at the passionate religious enthusiasm with which the followers of the Mahdi have fought; and look, on the other hand, at the composition of the Egyptian Army. It will not

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  be contended, I suppose, that the armies under General Hicks or General Baker are worse than those under the Egyptian Pashas. Certainly, they were better drilled and better commanded. What reason is there, again, for the suggestion that, if the Egyptian Government had not been interfered with by us, it would have been better able to deal with the insurrection in the Soudan? And if you believe, as I do, that the Mahdi would have equally beaten the Egyptian troops in the Soudan, whether we had been there or not, where is the sense, where is the justice, of holding us responsible for events which would have happened in our absence as well as in our presence? The noble Marquess spoke of our three successive policies in the Soudan—(1) to advise; (2) to ignore; (3) to compel. Our policy from the first was to leave Egypt free so far as the Soudan was concerned. We did give advice; but it was not taken, and we then left the matter in the hands of the Egyptian Government. We finally interfered when practically we had no option, not to save the Soudan, but to save the rest of Egypt. No doubt, it may be said we could even now reconquer the Soudan if we wished it. I dare say we might. But the failure to do that is not what you charge us with. You do not say the Soudan ought to be regained; you say the Soudan ought not to have been lost. But I am quite willing to accept the challenge on this point also. I say that it is not the duty of England, it is not in the interest of Egypt, that we should reconquer the Soudan. It is not old Egyptian territory. It has been acquired, almost the whole of it, in the memory of living men. It has never been any benefit as a source of revenue to Egypt; but, on the contrary, a perpetual burden to the Egyptian Exchequer. The climate is not healthy, even for Natives, and it is pestilential to all who are not Natives. The distance from all markets and from all civilized parts of the earth is so great that its trade, as regards the greater part of it, can never be of any value. If the Egyptian people were consulted, there is no doubt what answer they would give, for they regard service there as exile, with an almost certainty of death. That the Natives themselves do not wish to continue their connection with Egypt is abundantly
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  certain; and though, no doubt, a European Administration might civilize them to some extent, we are not bound to benefit the savages of Central Africa at other people's expense, and against their wish. If we were, not for a time only, but permanently, the Egyptian Government—which we are not, and which we do not intend to be—and if no trouble or disturbance had occurred in the Soudan, the first thing we ought to have done, even under these circumstances, in the exercise of a wise discretion, would be to arrange for our withdrawal from it. Egypt is nearly insolvent—mortgaged up to the eyes—obliged to compound with her creditors, and she cannot need, even if she could afford, which she cannot, the luxury of holding distant Provinces that pay nothing. As to the question of danger to the frontier, what danger can there be? No State exists in the world which is better protected by nature than Egypt Proper; and I can hardly conceive anything more improbable than a serious attack from the South by tribes which have never yet combined for any length of time, across a frontier defended by the Nubian Desert, and when having gained their independence they have nothing left to fight for. The noble Marquess expressed an opinion that the retention of the Soudan would tend to the suppression of the Slave Trade; but that is not the opinion I have formed. I have read most of what has been written on the subject, including the narratives of Sir Samuel Baker and General Gordon, who know the Soudan best; and, from all I have read, I infer it is not by holding the Soudan we should ever put down the Slave Trade. The noble Marquess said that, in the abandonment of the Soudan, Turkey had been unfairly treated, because the Firman forbade the cession of territory without consent of the Porte. To that there are two answers. Necessity has no law. You cannot tie down a country by Treaty to hold territory which it is not able to conquer or to control. But I do not imagine the Firman was meant to apply to such a case as has occurred. It was meant to prevent alienation to any Foreign Power—not merely allowing the indigenous tribes to live in their own way on their own soil. Well, if I have succeeded in establishing these two propositions—(1) that the loss

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  of the Soudan was not due to our action, but that it was lost by Egypt; and (2) that it is not our duty to re-annexit—what does the charge against us turn upon? What is it for which we are held responsible? I suppose the principal accusation is this—I can see nothing else—that we might have interfered, by an absolute and peremptory veto, to stop the expedition of General Hicks; and that we did not do so. My Lords, it is easy to be wise after the event. It is easy to say you ought to have known that the Array of General Hicks would be defeated and destroyed. But, to know that, we must have calculated on two things—the extraordinary energy and fanaticism of the Arab insurgents, totally unlike anything with which former Governments in Egypt have had to contend, and the exceeding badness of the Egyptian Forces. We may or may not think highly of the judgment of the Egyptian authorities; but, surely, they may be credited with some knowledge of their own Army and their own country. We left the matter in their own hands, because it was their business; and we might reasonably suppose that they were the best judges of it, and of the Forces they would have to contend with. If we had not done so, if General Hicks had, by our order, confined himself to the preservation of Khartoum, in which we may fairly suppose he would have succeeded, should not we have been responsible for preventing the Egyptian Government from defending a Province which, no doubt, they would then have said and believed they were in a position to defend successfully? Would such a course have been compatible with our declared policy of evacuating the country as soon as possible? And would it have been consistent with our position to have undertaken the responsibility of compelling the Khedive to surrender a large part of his hereditary Empire, the conquest of his Predecessors, however small its real value? In how absurd a position should we then have been placed? We should have been using force against Egypt in order to compel the Egyptian Government to surrender territory to Mahomedan fanatics; and we should have been told, not without some reason, that we were holding down the country in order to partition it. With regard to the defeat of General Hicks,
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  no doubt there was a chance that some disaster might happen; accidents in war are always possible: but surely a disaster like that which did occur was not within the bounds of reasonable expectation. I admit that, in one respect, we were unprepared for the event. We did not estimate—we had no means of estimating—the full force of that Arab fanaticism of which we have experienced the effects. There has been nothing like it, I will not say since the days of the Prophet and his immediate successors, but certainly since the Wahabi movement in Arabia. Is it anything new that great popular movements should take the world by surprise? Who foresaw the European Revolution of 1848? Who predicted the Indian Mutiny? Who expected that in 1871 Paris would be all but destroyed by its own inhabitants? I am quite sure of this—that if we had, in contravention of the system deliberately adopted by us, forcibly hindered the attempt to defend the Soudan, unwise as we might think it, we should have been just as indignantly denounced for causing its loss as we now are for allowing the attempt to be made. There is another consideration. Where you have superior force you can, no doubt, compel persons who are dependent upon you, as the Egyptian Government is on us, to abstain from doing what you object to. You can, in a certain measure, compel them to do what you wish; but there is one result you cannot accomplish—you cannot expect efficiency or zeal in carrying out a line of policy when you have to act through unwilling agents. No doubt, the British Government had power, from the first days of the occupation, to dismiss any Egyptian official and replace him by an Englishman. But you cannot re-organize a country in a day; and, above all, if you do organize it—if you administer it through foreigners—what becomes of the State so administered when your occupation ceases, and when you hand it back to the rightful owners? It is easy to say we should have done better if we had swept away all Native authority whatever. For the present, possibly, though as to that there may be two opinions; but how as to the future? We wish to help Egypt out of her troubles; but we do not wish to turn Egypt into a British dependency; and we had

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  to consider, and we have considered throughout, not merely what will happen while we stay, but what is to follow when we are gone. There is the fundamental difference between our view and that of noble Lords opposite. They are asking us to use our power, blaming us for not using it, as if we were permanently settled there. We have always looked forward to the time when our power should be at an end, and we abstained from any action which would compromise the future. We exercise a Dictatorship, no doubt, but it is for a time only. Then I am asked why, at the beginning of last month, did we change our tone towards Egypt, and insist on being masters of the policy to be pursued? Surely, the answer is a very simple one. Up to that time the Soudan only was in danger; and we were willing to leave the decision as to that in the hands of the Egyptian authorities. But after their military failures, after the defeats sustained, the whole situation was altered. It was not then the Soudan, it was Egypt itself that was in question; it was feared that the Government of the country was unable to protect it; it was obvious that we occupying the country could not allow it to be invaded or threatened; and if we were to charge ourselves with its defence, we clearly could not permit a divided authority. When the house is on fire, you must let the firemen do what they please with it. But you wait till that happens; and until it happens, and when the fire is put out, the owner is the master. Then we are accused of neglect and delay in not withdrawing or relieving the Soudan garrisons at an earlier date? As regards the garrisons on the coast, those of Sinkat and Tokar, I think the answer is easy. Those places are distant only a few miles from Suakim. At Suakim, Baker, an experienced and competent General, had nearly 4,000 troops under his command, and the total force to which these troops were opposed in the field did not exceed, probably, 1,500, not all of whom had firearms. Now, we may have known—we did know—that the composition of General Baker's force was not very good; but I venture to affirm that nobody supposed that a body of men calling itself a regular army would run away, almost without a shot fired, from half its own number, or less than half,
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  of savages under no discipline whatever. It is a thing, I should imagine, new in war. It is a misfortune; but it is a misfortune for which we, sitting in London, can hardly hold ourselves responsible. Supposing the same thing to have happened in an Indian campaign; that we had Native allies, and that their contingent ran away and caused the failure of a military operation. Should we admit that the Indian Minister, or the Cabinet at home, were answerable for that failure? And surely this is a case of the same kind. We attach no blame to General Baker, and fully recognize his great exertions to make the best of the unfavourable circumstances in which he was placed. We have done, and are doing, what is possible for the relief of Tokar. We may be too late. We may find no means of effecting our purpose; but surely it is premature to assume the certainty of a failure which has not taken place. Up to the defeat of General Baker we had no reason for interference. We had fair ground for thinking that his force was adequate for the purpose. Since that date—it is only a week—we have been continually occupied in providing the means of retrieving so much as is reparable of the loss. We are accumulating force for the defence of Suakim, and we began to do so from the day on which we learnt the destruction of the Egyptian Force. We have been in constant communication with the naval commander at Suakim, and he has been negotiating with the tribes. As to Sinkat, everybody must lament what has passed there; but it will be obvious that no possible rapidity of action could have prevented its fall, when the relieving Egyptian Force was destroyed. That is a mere matter of dates, and will hardly be disputed. My Lords, as to the case of Khartoum, the position is somewhat different. On November 23rd, the defeat of General Hicks was known. On the 25th, Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed that, in the opinion of the Generals, the Soudan garrisons must be withdrawn, but holding Khartoum as a post to allow them to regain it, and it is unlucky that the Egyptian Ministry did not at once act on that advice. But they seem to have thought that there was still hope; they disregarded the recommendations sent them from here; and they were still of opinion that the Nile, up to Khartoum, could be held on

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  the 2nd of January. Then came the peremptory orders from us, the resignation of Cherif, and the appointment of Nubar. And if it is said that this change was made too late, that we ought to have assumed the direction of affairs at an earlier date, remember that on the 9th of January, after the change of Ministry had taken place, after Nubar had taken the place of Cherif, there came a telegram from Colonel Coetlogon to the effect that a retreat could still be safely effected. My Lords, that fact alone, to my mind, disposes of the charge of undue delay. On the 4th of January we ordered the evacuation of Khartoum; on the 9th the Governor reported that it was still a possible operation. Prom that date there has certainly been no loss of time. I presume that the Governor was informed at once, and that he began his preparations. I do not pretend to foretell the future; but I can see no reason to take a despondent view of the prospects of that garrison. The news that the Soudan is restored to independence must very soon spread. When that is known, the great majority of the nation will have no interest in continuing the war. The Mahdi, and his fanatical following, may dream of the conquest of Egypt; but men do not fight to invade a neighbour with whom they have no quarrel in the same way that they fight to set free their own country. Even the Mahdi is said to have European advisers, and they will hardly advise him to rush into a quarrel with England. There is, of course, a certain amount of risk. If the troops at Khartoum are like those under Baker there may be a great deal of risk; but there is no justification for the idea that the Khartoum garrison is left in a hopeless or desperate condition. For the purpose of the present argument, it is enough to put the matter in this way:—What possible ground have you for censuring us for allowing the Khartoum garrison to be destroyed, when, so far as we know, it is still safe, when we have every reason to hope it may be brought away safely, and when we are doing all in our power for that object? General Gordon, we hear, is hopeful—the garrison is powerful, the country can furnish supplies, and it will be strange if some of the Chiefs cannot be conciliated when there is no longer any cause of war. So, my Lords, with
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  the employment of General Gordon. It has often been said, and I dare say it is generally believed, that that was a sudden thought, taken up and acted upon at the last moment by way of repairing previous neglect. The facts prove the contrary. The Egyptian Government, as early as November, were sounded about the employment of Gordon. He was recommended to them on the 1st of December. They strongly opposed the choice, on the ground that it would tend further to excite religious fanaticism. Nubar, an able and unprejudiced man, shared that opinion. It was represented that, as the war with the Mahdi was a religious war, the employment of a Christian as Commander-in-Chief might be attended with danger. We thought they were likely to know something of their own country, and we deferred to their objections, until the urgency of the occasion became so great that we felt bound to overrule them. It is quite true that the final despatch of Gordon was at short notice. But the question of his appointment had been, as I say, under consideration for two months. My Lords, to sum up the whole case in one sentence, see what it is that you are asked to blame us for. You do not assert that we ought, on the day after Tel-el-Kebir, to have taken the direction of affairs as we have taken it now. That course would have seemed violent and uncalled for, at the time, to everybody. You do not deny that we are right to take the control of Egyptian affairs now. Your proposed censure turns solely on this—that if we had done six weeks earlier what we did in the beginning of January some misfortunes might have been prevented. That may or may not be so; it is very easy to judge by results, but it is often very unfair. The points of our defence are two—first, that the misfortunes which have occurred could not, at least in their full extent, have been reasonably foreseen; and, next, that when they did occur no time has been lost, and no effort has been spared, in endeavouring to repair them as far as they can be repaired. If on these two points you think our case is proved, we are entitled to acquittal. I say frankly that I do not expect a verdict of approval from this House, because I know that the decision on a question of this kind is not given, and cannot be given, upon purely judicial grounds. From the very

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  nature of a political Assembly, that is impossible. We shall accept your verdict with respect, but we shall not treat it as decisive; because we are conscious that in the course we followed in the beginning, which we are following now, and which we shall follow to the end, we shall be supported by Parliament and by the voice of the country.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: My Lords, you have had a cold, calm discussion of that which is stirring the hearts of the English people; and if the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) thinks he will got a verdict of acquittal from the country, I should wish nothing better than that his speech should be circulated in extenso in every part of England. Such, my Lords, is the defence of the Government; such is the man they put forward as representing the views of England. I ask you whether the faltering accents in which he spoke to us are those you would like to be represented by among other nations, or in the Colonies, or in any part of the world? The noble Earl has told us that, whatever their policy might have been, we should have rejected it. No, my Lords; if their present policy had been taken earlier it might have been effective, and even now we do not find fault with their present policy, but only say it is inconsistent with their former policy. If we take the despatches alone, we must conclude that the Government deserted Egypt, so far as related to the Soudan, from the time that Lord Dufferin left it. When that noble Lord went to Egypt, he thought that what was about to be done in the Soudan was, to a great extent, such as Egypt could fairly do; but he represented to Ibrahim that they should withdraw from Kordofan and Darfour, and confine themselves to a more limited space. That advice having been given, the policy of the Government at that time was clear. It was a policy that Egypt should restrict herself to the Soudan Proper, if I may use the expression, down to Sennaar, but should not extend her power beyond that point. After Tel-el-Kebir it is admitted that Egypt was reduced to a state of chaos, and a military occupation became absolutely necessary. So far we are all agreed. The Government of England undertook to consolidate the State into a firm and solid construction. Could Her Majesty's
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  Government support the Egyptian Government, without advising them as to the whole condition of the country, including the Soudan? The Government were being constantly warned that what was occurring in the Soudan would lead to danger to Egypt Proper. Whence comes the danger to Egypt Proper, except from what has happened in the Soudan? The Government cannot possibly say they were relieved from the responsibility from the first, and statements that they did not undertake it, though plentiful as blackberries, could not release them from it. Again and again the opportunity was offered to them to advise the Egyptian Government against running the risk of allowing Hicks Pasha to make the fatal expedition which destroyed him. I know how the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office objected to undertake responsibility in Egypt; but, then, why does he seek to take credit for the paper reforms that have been put forward in that country, unless he was controlling the whole Egyptian Government? We had sent our troops there to maintain our ascendancy over the Egyptian Government, and yet we had allowed that Government to work its will in the Soudan unchecked. In my opinion, the circumstances which called for our interference in the Soudan were just as strong before Hicks Pasha's defeat as they are now; and we might then have interfered with enormous advantage on behalf of those garrisons about which our hearts are so anxious now, and which we might then have easily withdrawn to Khartoum, which would thus have been strengthened to a point that would have rendered it safe from attack, instead of its being garrisoned, as Colonel Coetlogon says, by the refuse of the Army, by a force of lame and blind. Neither must the Government attempt to ride off upon the plea that the whole responsibility rests upon the Egyptian Government, and on the supposition that they had entrusted affairs in Egypt to men who were qualified to conduct them. The Blue Books will show that the noble Earl the Secretary of State has governed Egypt from Downing Street. It is true that Cherif Pasha had said that the Egyptian Government would take all the responsibility for the expedition into the Soudan, and that, therefore, the Foreign Office disclaimed all responsibility. That

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  may be a sufficient answer as between the Government and Cherif Pasha; but it is no satisfactory answer to this House, to the people of England, the Mahomedan subjects of the Grown, or to foreign nations. Her Majesty's Ministers must remember that when they speak they do not speak merely with the voice of the Government, but with the voice of England, and that is why we have a right to interpose and to tell them that they are not giving utterance to the true feeling of the country in this matter. The whole tone of the Government shows that, when they get into a difficulty through their own fault, they regard it as an unforeseen and unavoidable calamity that has overtaken them, and are ready to exclaim—
  "The time is out of joint:—O cursed spite,
  That ever we were born to set it right."
  The great point on which England has failed in Egypt is that connected with finance. Here are we eating up the country with our soldiers, which we maintain there under the pretence of lending them, and yet at the expense of Egypt. When it became difficult to maintain any longer the Egyptian power in the Soudan, it was proposed by the Egyptian Government to re-concede the Soudan to Turkey and to send Turkish troops to conquer it. By the irony of fate there sits on the opposite Bench of your Lordships' House a former Foreign Minister, who held that Office when the Bulgarian atrocities and he himself were denounced by the Chief under whom he serves, who is now set up on high as a Colossus, under whose huge legs he peeps about to find—well, he best knows what. And now that Chief is ready, in order to be relieved of responsibility, to consent that the Turkish troops, Bashi-Bazouks and all, should be sent to reconquer the Soudan, and establish all the abominations which he connects with Turkish slavery. Such is consistency. One cannot help being struck with the way in which the Government shift from one position to another in order to get rid of responsibility. What is the position of affairs now? You have heard that the garrison of Sinkat, with 1,000 women and children, have been massacred within a few miles of the coast. Do not say that it is only since General Baker's defeat that you have known the condition of the garrison. Do not say that you have taken no steps to use the military forces
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  of England on that coast, for you have your ships there; and, for my part, I see no distinction between the landing of seamen and marines and the landing of troops. All are alike forces of the Crown. You have known for a long time that the capture of Sinkat would bring the triumphant forces of the Mahdi up to the gates of Suakim, and you knew that you would have to fight them. Is it not the first principle of strategy that you should prevent yourselves from being driven into a corner and surrounded? Then there is the question of humanity, of which the noble Earl spoke. At present you are in the position of a vessel that will not go out of her direct course in order to assist a wrecked ship. You alienated the friendly tribes who would have assisted Baker's troops. They were told that you were going to withdraw from the Soudan, and they feared that, by assisting you, they would draw upon themselves, after your departure, the vengeance of the Arabs under Osman Digna. These are the things which cause that shame which finds expression in the papers. You knew the materials of which Baker's Army was composed. You interposed to prevent the enlistment of Turks and Arnaouts, who would have fought well. I make the statement on the authority of a letter from Sir Samuel Baker, who also says that your interposition was the reason why Sir Evelyn Wood's Army was not ready to take the field. Is it not anomalous that the gendarmerie should be sent into the field, and that the Army should be left at home? Why was that the case? I have never heard an explanation from the Government. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) read a great many passages which I was unable to hear, I am sorry to say. The noble Earl has placed us in a position of great difficulty; for he only laid his Papers on the Table this evening, and we have not had copies. No doubt he was within his right in using them, but it puts us, who have not seen them, at a disadvantage. We are told that the Government did not send troops to the relief of Tokar, because they had not heard from General Gordon that such a step would not jeopardize the safety of garrisons elsewhere. But the Government were parties to General Baker's attempt to relieve Tokar, and if he could go there without interfering

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  with General Gordon's mission, why could not our Marines go also? Surely the garrisons in the neighbourhood of Suakim ought not to be sacrificed, in order that General Gordon may relieve other garrisons elsewhere? The noble Earl who spoke last (the Earl of Derby) said that our real objection is that the Government have not declared a permanent occupation of Egypt. No such objection is in my mind, nor have I ever desired that a permanent occupation of Egypt should be contemplated by the Government. What I understood was that they had pledged themselves to set up a firm and stable Government; and this should have been the chief thing in their mouths, and not perpetual promises of withdrawal, which defeated their object. I am very much amused, and sometimes amazed, at the total disregard, in the speeches of noble Lords opposite, of the real considerations on account of which England went to Egypt. The noble Earl, to my great astonishment, has stated that we went to Egypt to prevent other nations from going there. And yet we carried on negotiations with other nations, begging them to send troops with ours, and instead of the Dual Control we proposed to the French a Dual Occupation. Do not your Lordships think that one of the greatest escapes England ever had was when France refused to join us, and England was never placed in a bettor position than when she was told she might do the thing for herself, and by herself? You need not pretend to be disinterested; it is all a sham. The first object you had when you went to Egypt was to establish English interests and set up a Government which would protect the Suez Canal and insure at all times and at all seasons a free passage for your troops and for your commerce. It was for the gospel of selfishness that you went; it was for British interests; and, thank God, there are some people still who will stand up for British interests. I am never ashamed to say it, because I do not think there would be the slightest pretence or justification for interference in Egypt, unless English interests were at stake. There was nothing else at stake which would justify sending an army to suppress a rebellion; and you took such steps as made it impossible for Egypt to stand alone, and you selected men to control the Egyptian Government who are re-
  652
  sponsible to you, and who will carry out your orders. It was because you thought that if the rebellion got to too great a head, your interest and power in Egypt would be gone, the occupation of the Suez Canal might be in hands which would be disastrous; therefore you took the sword in hand, put down the Egyptian Army, and brought Egypt from a state bordering on anarchy to a state bordering on chaos. In that state it has remained, because you hesitated to act. It is true you should not have exercised your power in trivial matters or obtrusively; but on all the great principles of policy you ought to have taken up your position boldly and firmly, and insisted that where your advice was given it should be followed. That you have not done. And you have been inconsistent; because the occupation by an English Army showed that you were masters in Egypt, and that you had a right, and that in all cases which concerned British interests that you would dictate. This you should have done, and it was not enough to set up a favourable Ministry and leave it to itself. At last you demand obedience of the Ministry, and dismiss it for disobedience. By doing so, you have proclaimed to all the world that where anything was done you were responsible. From the time that you occupied Egypt after Tel-el-Kebir, everything done by the Government of Egypt was by your permission, and, therefore, wholly upon your responsibility, whether it was in Egypt Proper, in the Soudan, on the coast of the Red Sea, or anywhere else. You have by your conduct, according to Sir Evelyn Baring, given a great impulse to slavery. I take your own authority, who tells you, in one of your despatches, that the abandonment of the Soudan must lead to the great increase of slavery. The extinction of slavery there was one of the objects which you set before you; but it is the increase of slavery which you have achieved. You have now, according to your own admission, taken upon yourselves the whole responsibility for the government of Egypt, for that which is in your hands and for that which is at present out of your hands, and it is for you to decide how you are to deal with it. A man of singularly heroic character has been selected by Government to make a journey across the Deserts to

  653
  Khartoum. General Gordon has been sent upon a mission; we have no particulars of the means he is about to use. All we know is that he is gone with one or two companions—Colonel Stewart is with him—and everything is to depend on the character of the man whom you have sent. The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack denounced in his speech the use of the word "prestige." Why have you sent General Gordon into the Soudan? Because of his prestige. Why was it necessary to send him? Because your prestige was damaged. Prestige is only another word for character, and a nation has just as much need of prestige as a man; and it is because we feel that you have forfeited the character which belongs to English Ministers that this Motion has been made. We say your conduct has been vacillating; that the advice you gave in the beginning you had not the firmness to insist upon; that you left everything to drift, and then brought everything into jeopardy. The garrisons imperilled by your conduct were in your charge, and it became you, above all things, to see that they came to no harm. And in order to escape from your difficulties you have sent an innocent, high-minded, disinterested, unselfish man into that great and terrible wilderness of which the noble Earl spoke with such horror the other night. You have sent him as a scapegoat, with all your sins of omission and commission upon his head, and perhaps, like the scapegoat, he will never return. If he is maltreated, if his mission fails, if he is murdered, what will you do then? Will you allow the sacrifice to be made with no attempt to redress the wrongs you have committed? If so, you will find that you live in a country that will hold you responsible for the risks with winch you have loaded the gallant officer who has done so much for this country and for Egypt. You are responsible for the life of Gordon, as well as for those agonizing garrisons, and upon you will the country call to redress the wrongs that you have done. It will inevitably hold you responsible for that which is so precious.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) has spoken of what he called the faltering accents of my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of
  654
  Derby). Whatever may be said of the noble Viscount, he certainly never does speak with faltering accents, for his speeches are always characterized by violence and invective. I think that, when these things are considered calmly, the argument of my noble Friend will not contrast unfavourably with the outbreak of the noble Viscount. I am not going over again the arguments which have been advanced with reference to the Soudan. I doubt very much whether noble Lords opposite are agreed as to which policy ought to be followed in Egypt. The noble Viscount, I believe, stated that we ought to have insisted on the retirement and return of Hicks Pasha and his troops; but if we had done that we should have endangered all the other garrisons. It must be remembered that there were other garrisons, and that the Egyptians are believed to have a considerable force at Darfour, which they must have been left at liberty to attempt to relieve. In a position of serious difficulty it was considered that Hicks Pasha had been successful, and the steps taken were thought to be wise, although they afterwards proved to be unwise; but it was not a moment when we ought to have interfered peremptorily. The noble Viscount also said that the abandonment of the Soudan was the right policy, but that the Government was wrong in not having attempted it before; but how does that square with the remarks of the noble and learned Earl (Earl Cairns) as to the Slave Trade? When the Government went to Egypt, they had incurred no responsibility with regard to the Soudan; but if we had not counselled the retirement of the Egyptian troops from the Soudan, we must have been prepared to make ourselves responsible for the administration of it. No consideration should have induced us to impose Egyptian rule on the Soudan—a rule which it would have been, in the highest degree, disgraceful in this country to fasten on the necks of the Soudanese; and, therefore, if we had interfered at all, our policy could have been only in the direction of retiring entirely from the Soudan. Many of the remarks which have been made on the subject of the beleaguered garrisons seem to have been on the assumption that the English Government had placed them there, whereas the fact is that they had been put there by the Egyptian Government;

  655
  and the danger to them was caused by the abominable character of the Egyptian Government. It was on that account that they were surrounded by an infuriated population. The Army of Sir Evelyn Wood was engaged for Egypt Proper, and nowhere else. Even if the men had been willing to go to the Soudan, it would have been impolitic to send them. The Egyptians have a horror of the Soudanese service, and it was the knowledge that they would not be called upon to enter it which induced them to serve Sir Evelyn Wood cheerfully. The Sultan declined altogether to allow recruiting in his dominions. It would have been most unjust to General Gordon to have sent British troops to Tokar without knowing what he thought of the situation. His view was, that he could conciliate certain tribes, and bring about the relief of the garrisons; but if British troops had been known to be operating against the Mahdi, the apparent inconsistency might have been prejudicial to General Gordon's mission. To have sent troops without his concurrence would have been extraordinary and unheard-of conduct. I have long known and admired General Gordon; danger never stopped him; and we should not have been justified in hesitating to accept his services on account of the danger involved. In this case, it is not to General Gordon's prestige that the Government trust, but to his general knowledge—the faith which the tribes have in his honesty and honourable character, and to the knowledge that he agrees with the Government in what we deemed the sound policy to pursue with regard to the Soudan. But, my Lords, I heard the noble Viscount say that, in announcing to the world that we intended to abandon the Soudan, we had partly destroyed the means of General Gordon's success. But General Gordon desires that it should be as widely known as possible, and he trusts to that as one of the chief instruments of his success. The Government have, therefore, incurred no grave responsibility in sending General Gordon upon a mission which is essentially pacific. He will announce to the people that the Egyptian rule is to end, and that the whole tribes are to be made independent men as before; and I believe that when he makes that announcement, many of the tribes, knowing that his word is as good as his bond,
  656
  will co-operate with him in restoring order. As the case stands, there is no responsibility which Her Majesty's Government need shrink from; and I do not myself believe that in the Soudan, at the present moment, the honour and interests of this country have been sacrificed by Her Majesty's Government.
  On Question? Their Lordships divided:—Contents 181; Not-Contents 81: Majority 100.

  CONTENTS.

  Buckingham and Chandos, D.

  Leven and Melville, E.

  Lindsey, E.

  Leeds, D.

  Lucan, E.

  Manchester, D.

  Lytton, E.

  Norfolk, D.

  Manvers, E.

  Northumberland, D.

  Mar and Kellie, E.

  Portland, D.

  Morton, E.

  Richmond, D.

  Mount Edgcumbe, E.

  Nelson, E.

  Abergavenny, M.

  Onslow, E.

  Bristol, M.

  Poulett, E.

  Exeter, M.

  Powis, E.

  Hertford, M.

  Ravensworth, E.

  Salisbury, M.

  Redesdale, E.

  Winchester, M.

  Romney, E.

  Rosse, E.

  Amherst, E.

  Rosslyn, E.

  Ashburnham, E.

  Sondes, E.

  Bandon, E.

  Stanhope, E.

  Bathurst, E.

  Tankerville, E. Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

  Beauchamp, E.

  Belmore, E.

  Bradford, E.

  Verulam, E.

  Brownlow, E.

  Westmorland, E.

  Cadogan, E.

  Wharncliffe, E

  Cairns, E.

  Wilton, E.

  Cawdor, E.

  Zetland, E.

  Clarendon, E.

  Clonmell, E.

  Clancarty, V. (E. Clancarty.)

  Coventry, E.

  Dartmouth, E.

  Combermere, V.

  De La Warr, E.

  Cranbrook, V.

  Denbigh, E.

  Doneraile, V.

  Devon, E.

  Gough, V.

  Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.)

  Hardinge, V.

  Hawarden, V. [Teller.]

  Hood, V.

  Eldon, E.

  Melville, V.

  Ellesmere, E.

  Essex, E.

  Hereford, L. Bp.

  Feversham, E.

  St. Albans, L. Bp.

  Fitzwilliam, E.

  Fortescue, E.

  Abinger, L.

  Gainsborough, E.

  Alington, L.

  Graham, E. (D. Montrose.)

  Ardilaun, L.

  Arundell of Wardour, L.

  Haddington, E.

  Hardwicke, E.

  Ashford, L. (V. Bury)

  Harewood, E.

  Aveland, L.

  Howe, E.

  Bagot, L.

  Ilchester, E.

  Balfour of Burley, L.

  Jersey, E.

  Bateman, L.

  Kilmorey, E.

  Beaumont, L.

  Lanesborough, E.

  Blantyre, L.

  Lathom, E. [Teller.]

  Borthwick, L.

  657

  Boston, L.

  Ker, L. (M. Lothian.)

  Botreaux, L. (E. Loudoun.)

  Lamington, L.

  Leconfield, L.

  Brabourne, L.

  Lovel and Holland, L. (E. Egmont.)

  Brancepeth, L. (V. Beyne.)

  Lyveden, L.

  Braybrooke, L.

  Manners, L.

  Brodrick, L. (V. Midleton.)

  Massey, L.

  Mowbray, L.

  Byron, L.

  Norton, L.

  Chelmsford, L.

  Ormathwaite, L.

  Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

  Ormonde, L. (M. Ormonde.)

  Clifton, L. (E. Darnley.)

  Penrhyn, L.

  Clinton, L.

  Poltimore, L.

  Cloncurry, L.

  Raglan, L.

  Colchester, L.

  Ranfurly, L. (E. Ranfurly.)

  Colville of Culross, L.

  Conyers, L.

  Rayleigh, L.

  Crofton, L.

  Rodney, L.

  De Freyne, L.

  Romilly, L.

  Delamere, L.

  Ross, L. (E. Glasgow.)

  De L'Isle and Dudley, L.

  Rossmore, L.

  Rowton, L.

  de Ros, L.

  Sackville, L.

  De Saumarez, L.

  Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

  Digby, L.

  Dinevor, L.

  Saltoun, L.

  Douglas, L. (E. Home.)

  Scarsdale, L.

  Egerton, L.

  Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)

  Ellenborough, L.

  Forbes, L.

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

  Forester, L.

  Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

  Stewart of Garlies, L. (E. Galloway.)

  Gage, L. (V. Gage.)

  St. John of Bletso, L.

  Gerard, L.

  Strathnairn, L.

  Grantley, L.

  Templemore, L.

  Harlech, L.

  Tollemache, L.

  Harris, L.

  Tredegar, L.

  Hartismere, L. (L. Henniker.)

  Tyrone, L. (M. Waterford.)

  Hastings, L.

  Watson, L.

  Headley, L.

  Wemyss, L. (E. Wemyss.)

  Hopetoun, L. (E. Hopetoun.)

  Wentworth, L.

  Howard de Waiden, L.

  Wimborne, L.

  Hylton, L.

  Windsor, L.

  Kenlis, L. (M. Headfort.)

  Worlingham, L.

  Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

  Kenry, L. (E. Dunraven and Mount-Earl.)

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Selborne, E. (L. Chancellor.)

  Kimberley, E.

  Morley, E.

  Northbrook, E.

  Bedford, D.

  Saint Germans, E.

  Grafton, D.

  Sydney, E.

  Westminster, D.

  Canterbury, V.

  Ailesbury, M.

  Gordon, Y. (E. Aberdeen.)

  Northampton, M.

  Sherbrooke, V.

  Camperdown, E.

  Cowper, E.

  Exeter, L. Bp.

  Derby, E.

  St. Asaph, L. Bp.

  Ducie, E.

  Durham, E.

  Aberdare, L.

  Granville, E.

  Acton, L.

  Innes, E. (D. Roxburghe.)

  Alcester, L.

  Ashburton, L.

  658

  Auckland, L.

  Kenmare, L. (E. Kenmare.)

  Belper, L.

  Blachford, L.

  Kinnaird, L.

  Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.) [Teller.]

  Lawrence, L.

  Lovat, L.

  Braye, L.

  Lyttelton, L.

  Breadalbane, L. (E. Breadalane.)

  Methuen, L.

  Moncreiff, L.

  Brougham and Vaux, L.

  Monson, L. [Teller.]

  Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)

  Calthorpe, L.

  Carlingford, L.

  Ramsay, L. (E. Dalhousie.)

  Carrington, L.

  Carysfort, L. (E. Carysfort.)

  Reay, L.

  Ribblesdale, L.

  Chesham, L.

  Robartes, L.

  Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

  Sandhurst, L.

  Saye and Sele, L.

  Coleridge, L.

  Sefton, L. (E. Sefton.)

  Crewe, L.

  Somerton, L. (E. Normanton.)

  Dacre, L.

  Dorchester, L.

  Stafford, L.

  Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)

  Strafford, L. (V. Enfield.)

  Emly, L.

  Sudeley, L.

  Fingall, L. (E. Fingall.)

  Thurlow, L.

  Tweeddale, L. (M. Tweeddale.)

  FitzGerald, L.

  Granard, L. (E. Granard.)

  Tweedmouth, L.

  Vaux of Harrowden, L.

  Greville, L.

  Vernon, L.

  Hammond, L.

  Wenlock, L.

  Hatherton, L.

  Wolverton, L.

  Hothfield, L.

  Wrottesley, L.

  Resolved in the affirmative.

  TRUSTEE CHURCHES (IRELAND) BILL. [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the Irish Church Act, 1869; and for other purposes—Was presented by The Earl of COURTOWN; read 1a. (No. 11.)
  House adjourned at a quarter past Twelve o'clock, to Thursday next, a quarter past Ten o'clock.