Sitting of 27 July 1882

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Report—Railways (Bates and Fares) [No. 317].
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—£2,300,000, FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (Vote of Credit); ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, Vote A.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Parcel Post [254].
Select Committee—Agricultural Tenants' Compensation) (Nos. 1 and 2) [26 and 80], Sir Thomas Acland discharged, Mr. Acland added.
Committee—Report—Third Reading—Conveyancing (re-comm.) * [121–246].

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
  DOVER HARBOUR BILL.

    RESOLUTION.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That, in the case of the Dover Harbour Bill, Standing Orders 84, 214, 215, and 239 be suspended, and that the Bill be taken into consideration To-morrow, provided amended prints shall have been previously deposited."—(Sir Charles Forster.)
    GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, this Bill dealt with a really most important public measure, though it was put forward as a limited municipal work. It contained proposals of considerable magnitude affecting our national interests. He thought it was too much to ask the House to take it into consideration suddenly at 2 o'clock to-morrow. That could only be done by suspending Rules of the House which appeared to have been framed for preventing hasty legislation for works of the kind now before the House. He urged this objection with great reason, because he had served upon a Committee some years ago to which the question of Dover Harbour had been referred; and he thereby knew that there were most important public interests bound up in the question. He strongly deprecated the loose and uncertain manner in which this subject was now being dealt with; he submitted that the consideration of the Dover Harbour Bill ought to be deferred until such time as the House had had an opportunity of seeing the Amended Bill, and of studying the proposals of the Municipality of Dover.
    MR. FRESHFIELDsupported the proposal of the hon. Member for Walsall

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    (Sir Charles Forstor). The hon. and gallant Member for Kincardineshire (Sir George Balfour) was a Member of the Committee which sat upon the Bill of 1875; and he (Mr. Freshfield) was unable to discover that the hon. and gallant Gentleman had any other objection to the scheme than that the Harbour was not large enough. The Harbour it was proposed to construct by the present Bill was of the size originally intended, and the nature of the proposal had been well known for the last 30 years. The hon. and gallant Member seemed to be of opinion that the Harbour, instead of covering an area of 500 or 600 acres, should inclose a space of 25,000 acres.
    MR. SPEAKER: The Question before the House is simply the suspension of the Standing Orders in reference to this Bill; and upon a Motion of that kind it would not be regular to discuss the merits of the Bill.
    MR. FRESHFIELDexpressed his regret if he should have unwittingly committed a breach of the Rules of the House. He only intended to say that the Harbour it was now proposed to make was that suggested many years ago, and that the hon. and gallant Gentleman had been upon one Committee which had inquired into it, and reported in its favour. It had been brought forward now under peculiar circumstances, and the suspension of the Standing Orders was necessary in order to enable it to go through its necessary stages at so late a period of the Session. He submitted that the circumstances under which the measure was brought forward justified an exceptional course being taken with regard to it. He had thought he was in Order in making one or two observations in reference to the Bill; but after the direction he had received from the Speaker, he would bring his remarks to a close by simply expressing a hope that the House would not do anything on the present occasion to stop the progress of the Bill. All that was asked was that the Standing Orders of the House should be suspended in order that the Bill might be considered; and seeing that the matter had now been thoroughly threshed out, and that it came forward under such circumstances as to justify the Motion which had been made, he hoped the House would consent to the suspension of the Standing Orders.
    Question put, and agreed to.

QUESTIONS.

  SCOTLAND—THE HIGHLANDS—VIOLENT LANGUAGE TO A LAND LEAGUE AGENT.
  MR. BIGGARasked the Lord Advocate, Has the Government observed the language used by Anderson, Laird of Lochabber, at a meeting of magistrates, officers, and landlords, in Inverness, about two weeks ago, where Lochabber is reported to have said—
  "An Irish fellow called M'Hugh had been going about lecturing, and he would deal very summarily with him. He would take him down and drown him;"
  and, the language of Provost Ross, of Dingwall, at same meeting, who said the people of Forres were prepared to dip the Land League agent in the sea, if he set foot on the island, and if the Government is prepared to give Mr. M'Hugh protection?
  THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. J. B. BALFOUR): I did not observe the language here referred to until my attention was called to it by the hon. Member's Question. As the result of inquiries made, I am informed that some such expressions were made use of in after-dinner speeches. But I think I can assure the hon. Member that the person named in the Question will not be in any risk in the Highlands of Scotland if he does not himself violate the law.

  STATE OF IRELAND—PARTY DISTURBANCES IN TYRONE.
  LORD ARTHUR HILL (for Mr. MACARTNEY)asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is true that, on the 12th of this month, at Omagh, in the county of Tyrone, green arches were erected by the Roman Catholics in the streets through which it was known the Orangemen must pass when proceeding to and returning from the Orange Hall, and the Orangemen, who went quietly into the town in the morning, and returned quietly in the evening, were assaulted with stones, and had one of their party wounded by a pistol shot; whether it is the case that, although a procession of Roman Catholics, bearing green flags with disloyal mottoes, and accompanied by a band playing disloyal tunes, had been allowed to parade on the roads

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  near Donegal and Ballintree, on the 5th of this month, without interference on the part of the Constabulary, the Orangemen of the same district were prohibited from marching on the same roads on the 12th instant, although it was their only route to their place of meeting; and, if it be true, whether any notice has been taken by the Government of such one-sided action on the part of the Donegal Constabulary?
  MR. TREVELYAN: I find that one green arch was hung across the street in the Roman Catholic Quarter of Omagh on the 12th instant. The members of two Orange Lodges going to and coming from the rendezvous at the Orange Hall had to pass through this street. When returning stones were thrown at them. They retaliated with sticks and stones, and fired several shots. One of their party was wounded by a pellet in the leg; but it is thought possible that the wound may have been inflicted by one of his own party in the confusion. The disturbance was quelled by the police, who rushed in between the two parties. The police inform me that there were two arches erected in other parts of the town by the Orange Party, a proceeding quite unknown for many years past. With regard to Donegal, there was no procession of Roman Catholics on the 5th instant; but on the 7th instant the Railway Company gave an excursion from Derry and intermediate stations to Donegal, which was largely availed of. The Derry contingent came with a band and banner. The conduct of the excursionists was most orderly, and there was nothing to call for the interference of the police. On the 12th of July the action of the Constabulary was determined at a meeting of the magistrates of the district, seven being present. Sworn informations were submitted to them that a serious disturbance might be anticipated if the Orange Party were permitted to march in procession through Donegal. Last year, for the first time for a great number of years, there was an Orange procession through Donegal on the 12th of July, and it led to serious rioting.

  THE MAGISTRACY(IRELAND)—LORRHA PETTY SESSIONS.
  MR. REDMOND (for Mr. DILLON)asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the re-
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  sident magistrate at Lorrha Petty Sessions, on the 7th July, in the case of a cross summons, bound all the parties to keep the peace, without postponing the case, in the absence through illness of a principal witness; and, whether Larkin, one of the parties so bound over to keep the peace, has been granted a licence to carry a revolver, and whether this will now be revoked?
  MR. TREVELYAN: There was no Resident Magistrate at Lorrha Petty Sessions on the 7th instant. There were two local magistrates on the Bench, and in the case referred to they bound all the parties to keep the peace. On the 14th of June last, Larkin, one of the parties, was granted a licence to have a revolver. The Resident Magistrate informs me that he is a respectable man, with a large stake in the country; and he is strongly of opinion that his licence should not be revoked.

  PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—RELEASE OF PERSONS DETAINED UNDER THE ACT.
  MR. REDMOND (for Mr. DILLON)asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether, as Mr. William Russell, of Golden, has now been in gaol since 18th April, and his presence on his extensive farm is much required at this season, the Government can see their way to his release; and, whether the cases of P. Hillery and John O'Brien, of Milltownmalbay, have been reconsidered?
  MR. TREVELYAN: His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant ordered William Russell's release on the 22nd instant, and Messrs. Hillery and O'Brien were discharged from custody on the 22nd and 19th instant respectively.

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL SCHEME.
MR.BROMLEY-DAVENPORTasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether, in view of the legal complications which may arise as to the right to tunnel under the foreshore or sea between England and France, Her Majesty's Government will set the question at rest by bringing in a short Bill rendering it illegal to construct, or attempt to construct, any tunnel at all under the Channel, unless sanctioned by Parliament?
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: In answer to this Question, I do not anticipate, at present, that any legal complications will arise in the manner referred to; and it seems to me that it would be undesirable to attempt any fresh legislation until we bad become satisfied that the existing law was insufficient to protect the rights of the Crown and the interests of the public.

THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—PETTY SESSIONS CLERKS.
MR. BIGGARasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Is it a fact that the recently appointed petty sessions clerk for the districts of Dubek and Julianstown, in the county of Meath, H. D. O'Callaghan has been disqualified by His Excellency on account of his being over the age for applicants to fill such appointments; is it true that His Excellency, immediately on making this disqualification, issued a circular extending the limit of ago of the candidates to such positions to fifty years, so that H. D. O'Callaghan may be qualified to again compete for the vacancy; has he any objection to lay this circular upon the Table of the House; also copy of letter sent Mr. O'Callaghan with it; is this H. D. O'Callaghan the late sub-inspector of police in Drogheda who was identified in the recent Rue perjury case as having bribed Rue to become informer, as was proved in case tried at Dunleer Petty (Sessions, but dismissed on account of uncorroborated testimony, and for which Rue, on his ultimately being prosecuted for perjury, was, at the late assizes held at Dundalk, awarded nine months' imprisonment; did H. D. O'Callaghan resign, on pension, his position in the Force in order to compete for the position of petty sessions clerk; will he also state what pension he now enjoys as a retired officer of the Police Force; and was he not also, before he resigned, a candidate for a resident magistracy?
MR.TREVELYAN: Mr. O'Callaghan was elected by the magistrates to the Clerkship of Petty Sessions for the Dubek and Julianstown districts; but His Excellency declined to confirm the appointment, as he was over 40 years of age. At the same time, His Excellency thought it advisable, with a view of securing the services of persons calculated, from their previous occupation, to
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possess a special knowledge of the duties of the office of Petty Sessions Clerk, that, under certain circumstances, the recognized limit of age should be extended to 50 years in the cases of magistrates, barristers, solicitors, and their clerks, and of retired Sub-Inspectors of Constabulary and Head Constables; and, accordingly, he issued a Circular on the subject to the magistrates in Petty Sessions throughout Ireland. I shall be happy to show a copy of the Circular to the hon. Member if he wishes to see it; but no copy of it was sent to Mr. O'Callaghan, nor was he written to on the subject. As Sub-Inspector of Constabulary, Mr. O'Callaghan was concerned in the case of the man Rue, who has recently been convicted of perjury at the prosecution of the Crown. Mr. O'Callaghan did not resign his office as Sub-Inspector; he was discharged; he had been non-effective since the 29th of March, and was pronounced by medical certificate to be no longer able to discharge the active duties of his office. His pension is £150 per annum. So far as I can ascertain, no application was made by Mr. O'Callaghan for a Resident Magistracy; certainly none has readied Lord Spencer.

CHINA—CHEFOO CONVENTION.
SIR JOSEPH PEASEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he has any Papers relative to the Chefoo Convention, or any information thereon, to lay before Parliament; whether he has any information of negotiations with the Chinese Government for the alteration of duties levied on opium under the Treaty of Tientsin, or of the "Li-kin" duties, which he can lay before Parliament; whether, in accordance with his expectation expressed on the 4th of June 1880, he received by the French Mail, which left Shanghae on the 19th of May, a compromised agreement between Sir Thomas Wade and the Chinese Government in which the representatives of other Powers had concurred; whether, on the 15th of July 1880, he did not state that he expected to receive, on the 18th of July, Despatches, and then would consider whether any further Papers could be presented to Parliament; whether, on the 27th of August 1880, he stated that Despatches had not reached the Foreign Office at the end of July, and that Sir

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Thomas Wade had replied, in answer to instructions, that the Report was not completed; whether Sir Thomas Wade, in a Despatch to the Marquess of Salisbury dated the 19th of January 1880, having stated—
"I shall submit to your Lordship some observations on this subject (Chefoo Convention) in a separate Despatch;"
whether such a Despatch has ever arrived; whether in January 1881, he stated that negotiations respecting Opium were now pending, that discussions had been opened, and were still proceeding, between Her Majesty's representatives at Pekin, and the Chinese Government, in relation to Inland taxation and other matters, and whether these discussions are still proceeding; whether, on 12th August 1881, he did not state that Her Majesty's Government have received information of an increase in the Inland Tax on Opium being under the consideration of the Chinese Government, and whether such deliberations have been brought to a close; whether, on the 28th of February 1882, he did not state that, until negotiations are concluded between the Governments of England and China, it would be inconvenient to produce further Papers; whether, on the 24th of April 1882, he did not state that Sir Thomas Wade telegraphed on the 9th of February 1882, that he was reporting fully, and that Her Majesty's Government were then awaiting his Report, and whether that Report has been received; whether, on the 14th of April 1882, Lord Granville did not write a Despatch to Sir Thomas Wade on the subject of Opium duties, to which his Lordship asked a direct reply by telegraph from Sir Thomas Wade, and whether such a telegraphic reply has ever been received; and, whether, in view of this constant delay, he will explain to the House what course Her Majesty's Government intend to take?
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: Papers on the matters referred to in the first two Questions of the hon. Member are being prepared, and will shortly be laid on the Table of the House. The expected Report by the French mail from Shanghai of the 19th of May, 1880, was not received by that mail, and it referred to a proposal which had not been submitted to the Representatives of the other Powers. With regard to Ques-
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tions Nos. 4 and 5, I did make the statements therein mentioned. The despatch alluded to in Question No. 6 was dated the 31st of January, 1880, and a preliminary Report was afterwards received. The negotiations referred to on the 18th of January, 1881, which had been opened between the Chinese Government and the French Representative respecting Inland taxation and other matters have not as yet led to a definite result. Her Majesty's Government do not know whether those negotiations are still proceeding. I did make the statement mentioned on the 12th of August, 1881; but Her Majesty's Government do not know whether the deliberations of the Chinese Government on the point referred to have been brought to a close. With reference to Questions 10 and 11, I did make the statement mentioned, and Sir Thomas Wade's Report has been received. The despatch of Lord Granville to Sir Thomas Wade referred to asked for a telegraphic reply to a particular inquiry, and that reply was received accordingly. Papers are about to be laid before Parliament, and, in the meanwhile, Her Majesty's Government are considering the course they will pursue.

DOMINION OF CANADA—IRISH EMIGRATION.
MR. BLAKEasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the Government contemplates, in the instance of suitable persons availing of the offer of the Canadian Government to provide settlers with 160 acres of land each, on condition of the Imperial Government conveying the immigrants from Ireland, and making an advance for the erection of dwellings and preparing for crops with seed a portion of the land, all cost incurred to be secured on the settlers' land, and repaid by annual instalments, so as to save the Exchequer and Irish Poor Law Unions from loss?
MR. TREVELYAN, in reply, said, that His Excellency was now in communication with the Colonial Office in regard to the question of emigration to Canada and other Colonies; but it would not be possible to reply fully to the inquiry of the hon. Member, inasmuch as the Arrears of Rent (Ireland) Bill, he was sorry to say, had not yet become an Act.
MR. T. P. O'CONNOR: If it should become an Act, will the right hon. Gentleman then consider the advisability of availing himself of the offer?
MR. TREVELYAN: Most certainly.

THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—MR. MORRIS READE, R.M.
MR. T. P. O'CONNORasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to the statement in the "Galway Observer" that Mr. Morris Reade, E.M. who has been a resident magistrate for twenty years, has sent in his resignation; that the ground of this resignation has been Mr. Reade's unwillingness to be under the control of Mr. Clifford Lloyd; and, if there be any foundation for this statement?
MR. TREVELYAN: Mr. Morris Reade, E.M., has sent in his resignation; but there is no foundation for the statement in the next paragraph of the Question. Mr. Reade expressed his desire to take advantage of the favourable terms of retirement offered by His Excellency with the sanction of the Treasury, and His Excellency accepted his resignation.

STATE OF IRELAND—CRIME IN GALWAY.
MR. T. P. O'CONNORasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he is aware that Judge Ormsby, at the recent assizes in. Galway, congratulated the grand jury for the county of the town on its immunity from crime; whether the cases brought before the learned judge were about six in number, and all of a comparatively trivial character; and, whether, under these circumstances, the Lord Lieutenant will re-consider the proclamation of the county of the town of Galway?
MR. TREVELYAN: I am aware that the Judge at the recent Assizes did express satisfaction at the present state of the town of Galway. There were only two Crown cases for trial. His Excellency has no present intention of revoking the proclamation.
MR. T. P. O'CONNOR: Am I to understand that districts are to be proclaimed in which no crime exists?
[No reply was given to the Question.]

PRIVATE BILLS—STANDING ORDER 167.
MR. H.E. BRANDasked the Chairman of Ways and Means, Whether, having consideration to the late period of the Session, and the present state of Public Business, he intends to press the Motion which stands in his name, having reference to the amendment of Standing Order 167?
MR. LYON PLAYFAIR, in reply, said, that Bills involving capital amounting to almost £20,000,000 had been introduced this Session, and were now in suspense, asking for powers to pay interest out of capital during the construction of works in contravention of the Standing Order 167. The Select Committee this Session had recommended that, with certain precautions, the powers should be allowed, and had suggested that an Act should be passed in respect of them; and after consultation with the Board of Trade it was thought advisable that the Standing Order mentioned should be modified in the sense recommended by the Select Committee. Although the pressure of Public Business at present prevented the House from giving attention to this subject, he was unwilling, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, to abandon the hope that the House might find an opportunity of reconsidering the Standing Order, and he accordingly intended to put down his Motion for Tuesday week.

NAVY—PROMOTION—DEATH VACANCIES.
SIR JOHN HAYasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether the Board of Admiralty will so far re-consider the arrangements for promotion in the Navy as to enable a Commander in Chief to fill up at once by promotion vacancies caused by deaths in battle, from deserving officers under his orders at the time?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Sir, the House will, I feel sure, be pleased to learn that on the 18th of July, on hearing of the unfortunate occurrence of two deaths among the officers of the Fleet at Alexandria, Lord Northbrook telegraphed to the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief asking him to recommend two officers to fill the vacancies so caused. This course can always be followed at

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the discretion of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and there appears to be no sufficient reason to alter the general regulations regarding death vacancies which were laid down by the late Board of Admiralty in November, 1874.

EVICTIONS (IRELAND)—THE RETURN.
COLONEL COLTHURSTasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, When the Return, lately ordered, of Evictions under Magistrates' orders will be laid upon the Table?
MR. TREVELYAN: The hon. and gallant Member alludes, I presume, to the Labourers' Dwellings Return, for which he obtained an Order on the 27th of June. I am informed that the Return is now complete, and will be forwarded for presentation immediately.
MR. HEALYasked when the Government expected to receive the recommendations of the Land Commission on this subject, and when they would be laid on the Table?
MR. TREVELYANsaid, he would see to the matter at once.

NAVY—ROMAN CATHOLIC SAILORS AND MARINES—PROVISION AS TO CHAPLAINS IN THE FLEET.
COLONEL COLTHURSTasked the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether any provision has been made for the spiritual need of Her Majesty's Roman Catholic Sailors and Marines now serving in Egypt?
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Sir, the rule laid down and the practice followed by the Admiralty in regard to the subject of my hon. and gallant Friend's Question are expressed in a Minute of June 7, 1878, a copy of which was laid before Parliament. The Minute runs thus—
"My Lords direct that when a large number of ships forming a Squadron are sent on any service that would keep them for a considerable time away from a port where the services of a Roman Catholic priest would he available, arrangements are to be made for one to accompany the Squadron."
In accordance with this Minute, we inquired a day or two ago of Sir Beau-champ Seymour whether there are at present any Roman Catholic clergymen available for the seamen and Marines at Alexandria or Port Said, and we have received a telegram from him saying
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that Roman Catholic priests are available.
MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked whether there would be an English Catholic priest stationed at Aden? He understood that the present chaplain was hardly able to speak English at all.
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: The hon. Member had better give Notice of that Question.

LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881—CLAUSE 31—LOANS TO IRISH TENANTS.
COLONEL COLTHURSTasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether, in view of the comparatively small number of occupiers of land in Ireland who come within the conditions laid down by Treasury Minute of 21st December 1881 for loans under Clause 31 of the Irish Land Act, 1881, namely:—That they must borrow at least £100; that the sum borrowed must not exceed five times the rateable value of the holding; thus excluding all rated under £20 absolutely, he will take into consideration the reduction of the minimum to £50 (while maintaining the second condition), so as to allow the system to be fairly tested?
MR. COURTNEY: The working of the Minute of the 21st of December last has been too short to allow any conclusion to be formed as to the expediency of modifying its conditions; but my attention is directed to the subject, with a view to seeing how the intentions of Section 31 of the Land Act may be best fulfilled. My hon. and gallant Friend must not, however, understand me to admit that any definite alteration will have to be made.
MR. HEALYasked when the monthly Return promised by the Prime Minister two months ago, showing the loans granted under this section, would be laid on the Table?
MR. COURTNEYsaid, he would furnish the Return up to a recent date.

ARMY (AUXILIARY FORCES)—THE MILITIA.
MR. GORST (for Earl PERCY)asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to extend the training of certain Militia regiments to a period of fifty-six days this year; whether he is aware that in some regiments at present

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assembled for training the recruits have been already three months with the colours; and, whether, under the circumstances, he would consider the propriety of granting separation allowance to the wives and families of the volunteer non-commissioned officers and privates in the event of the period of training being extended?
MR. CHILDERS: In reply to the noble Earl, I have to say that separation allowances have never been given to the families of Militia men, and I am not disposed to establish a precedent which would be open to grave objections. I certainly could not recognize the fact of recruits being out for more than three months as any reason for this grant, inasmuch as Militia recruits are rarely, if ever, married. If a Militia battalion is embodied they will be then treated in this respect like the Line.

VACCINATION—ALLEGED DEATH OF CHILDREN AT NORWICH FROM EFFECTS OF OPERATION.
MR. P. A. TAYLORasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether he has received any report in reference to the vaccination fatality at Norwich; and, if so, if he proposes to have it printed; whether he has ascertained the description of lymph used upon the occasion; and, whether he has forbidden the use in future of similar lymph?
MR. DODSON: I have not received the Report of the Inspector who has been appointed to inquire into the alleged vaccination fatality at Norwich; and, therefore, I am unable at present to afford the hon. Member the information for which he asks.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—POLICE SUPERANNUATON BILL.
MR. PELLasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, having regard to the very general opposition expressed to the Police Bill, he can assure the House that the measure will not be proceeded with this Session?
SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: I am not aware that there has been that very general opposition to the Police Bill which the hon. Member seems to assume. Some of the Corporations thought that the Bill unduly interfered with
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their authority over the police; but the Government are prepared entirely to remove that objection. The measure is of such consequence, and of so much justice to the police, that I am not disposed to let the responsibility for its falling through rest on the Government.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES—REGISTRAR'S REPORT, 1881.
MR. W. H. JAMESasked the Secretary to the Treasury, When the Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies for 1881 will be presented; and, if he can state the reason of the great delay in its publication for 1880?
MR. COURTNEY: The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies informs me that the first part of his Report on the year 1881 will be ready for presentation to Parliament by the middle of August, which is the usual date, or even earlier. The first part of his Report for 1880 has long since been presented and circulated; the publication of the second part is delayed by the nature of its contents, and in particular by some additional matter which is being inserted in it to meet the wishes of persons interested in the subject.

PREVENTION OF CRIME (IRELAND) ACT—BANDS AND PARTY TUNES.
MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is the fact that the sub-inspector of the district has informed the committee of the Millstreet brass band that they cannot assemble in their band room to receive instruction between 8 and 10 p.m. (as they have been accustomed to do) on account of a Clause of the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act; and, whether he approves of the conduct of the sub-inspector? In putting the Question the hon. Gentleman remarked that "the editors" had considerably altered it. As originally framed, it asked whether the playing of a musical instrument was a crime under the Act?
MR. TREVELYAN: I find that the local Constabulary look upon this band as a source of much disorder in the Mill-street district. The Sub-Inspector informed the committee of the band that the members were liable to be arrested if found out of their abodes one hour after sunset.
MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: Under suspicious circumstances.
MR. TREVELYAN: Under suspicious circumstances. I have also obtained a Report from the special Resident Magistrate confirming the necessity for the action taken.
MR. HEALY: I beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether playing instrumental music is a suspicious circumstance within the meaning of the Act?
[No answer was given to the Question.]
MR. HEALY: I beg to give Notice that on the first opportunity I shall call attention to the ruffianly manner in which the police are using this Act.

EGYPT—RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA—ARREST OF THE PLUNDERERS.
MR. HEALYasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any of the "convicts," whom it is stated were let loose on Alexandria after Arabi's retreat, were caught by the British and punished for burning and pillage; if so, how many; what number are supposed to have been engaged; and, if anything is known as to what has become of the remainder?
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: The Foreign Office have no information as to the number or fate of the convicts released after the bombardment of Alexandria. Any Question of this nature would more properly be addressed to the Naval authorities.
MR. HEALYsaid, that his Question had not been answered. It was whether any of the convicts had been caught by the British?
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: A number of people were shot for looting on the first day when our sailors entered the town; but really these are questions which can only be properly answered by the Naval authorities. I do not know if any of the people shot were convicts.
MR. HEALYintimated that he would question the Secretary to the Admiralty on the subject.
MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANsaid, he hoped that the hon. Member would postpone it for a few days, because the detailed despatch had not yet been received.
MR. HEALY: I will put my Question this day week.

CRIME (IRELAND)—THE ASSASSINATIONS IN THE PHŒNIX PARK—REPORTED ARREST OF ONE OF THE ASSASSINS.
MR. M'COANasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any official confirmation has been received of the reported arrest in Venezuela of one of the murderers of Lord F. Cavendish and Mr. Burke? The hon. Member also asked whether there was any confirmation of the confession said to have been made?
SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: It falls more properly to me to answer this Question. The only reply I can give to it is, that I do not think it right or prudent to make any statement on the subject. I can only regret the amount of publication which is given to particulars of these matters, and state that the insatiable indiscretion in matters of this description tends to defeat the detection of crime. Any information the Government might have on the matter I should not think it right to publish.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACTS—EDUCATION OF PAUPERS.
MR. R. H. PAGETasked the Vice President of the Council, If he will be good enough to state on what conditions, as to payment of school fees, can a board of guardians claim that the indoor pauper children of their union shall receive education in the elementary school (whether Voluntary or Board School) of the parish in which their union workhouse is situated?
MR. MUNDELLA: The Board of Guardians can claim the admission of indoor pauper children to any public elementary school, whether voluntary or denominational, on tendering the ordinary fee payable at the school, provided such fee does not exceed 3d. per week. The experience of the Education Department proves that it is a distinct advantage to the indoor pauper children to receive their education with other children at the ordinary elementary schools.

RETURN OF PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.
MR. ARTHUR O'OONNORasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, If he would cause to be laid upon the Table a Return showing the Papers, Reports, Returns, &c. to be presented to

1975
Parliament under the various Acts of Parliament, and the dates or periods of the Session on or at which they should severally be so furnished?
MR. COURTNEY: Such a Return is already printed, and a copy is supplied to the Library of the House. I shall be happy to supply the hon. Member with another copy should he wish to possess one.

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL SCHEME.
SIR JOHN LUBBOCKasked the First Lord of the Treasury, When the Government would lay upon the Table the Report of the Scientific Committee on the Channel Tunnel; and, whether they would also give the Memoranda of the military authorities upon the said Report?
MR. CHILDERS: My hon. Friend cannot have been in the House when on two occasions I have answered this Question on behalf of my right hon. Friend the First Minister. The Report of the Scientific Committee and the Memorandum of the military authorities will be shortly laid on the Table, with the decision at which Her Majesty's Government hope to arrive, in a few days. The Papers are very voluminous, and are still with the printers.

JURY LAWS—SUMMONING OF JURYMEN.
MR. BIDDELLasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, before next Session, he will consider the state of the Law (with the view to improve it) under which thirty or forty jurymen are sometimes summoned to attend at quarter sessions, when there is nothing whatever for any of them to do when there?
SRI WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, that he would consult with the Attorney General en the subject. He had not had this inconvenience brought under his notice.

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACTS—INFECTED AREAS.
MR. JAMES HOWARDasked the Vice President of the Council, in respect of foot and mouth disease and to pleuro pneumonia, What results have attended the plan of declaring smaller districts than petty sessional divisions "infected areas;" what has been the offect of the
1976
steps taken by the Veterinary Department in January last to check the spread of disease from Norwich Market; whether the circular letter addressed to local authorities in March last, urging them to a more vigorous exercise of the powers conferred upon them by the Act and Orders in Council, has had the desired effect in diminishing swine fever; and, what is the present condition of the country in respect of the three diseases referred to?
MR. MUNDELLA: Early in the pro-sent year the Privy Council adopted the plan of declaring a small infected area round every infected place. The result of this system has been generally successful, as my answer to the next Question will illustrate. With regard to Norwich Market, I cannot do better than read extracts from a letter which I have received this morning from Mr. Clare Sewell Read, the Chairman of the Committee for the county of Norfolk—
"We have in Norfolk now only one infected place of pleuro and one of swine fever, and no other case of any sort of contagious disease. We have not had such a clean bill of health in Norfolk for 30 years. Since the markets were stopped we have only had one fresh outbreak of foot-and-mouth, and telegraphing up to your office, you promptly declared an infected district and the disease did not escape from it. Norfolk has been entirely free from that disease for some months."
With regard to swine fever, I regret to say that, notwithstanding our circular letter, that disease has continued to increase. We have, therefore, felt it necessary to impose further restrictions on the movement and sale of swine in diseased districts by an Order, which came into force a few days ago. Pleuropneumonia has steadily decreased since 1877, in which year there were over 2,000 outbreaks. Last year these fell to 729, and the first six months of the present year show a steady and continuous decline. The outbreaks reported are only 290, against 410 in the corresponding period last year. There is very little foot-and-mouth disease in the country. Ireland and Scotland are entirely free; and the comparatively few cases remaining in England are principally confined to one district.

INDIA—THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—OPIUM CULTIVATION.
SIR JOSEPH PEASEasked the Secretary of State for India, Whether the

1977
time has now arrived when he can properly lay upon the Table of the House his Despatch to the Government of India relative to the cultivation of Opium in India and the trade with China, and the reply of the Government of India to that Despatch, and any Minutes that may have been made on these Papers by any members of the Council of State for India; and, the Correspondence between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India on the question of Opium cultivation, and especially of the introduction of that cultivation into Sind?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, in reply, said, that the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had promised to lay on the Table several important Papers connected with this subject; and, in these circumstances, he could have no objection to lay on the Table his despatch and the reply of the Government of India. As to the Minutes of Members of Council, he was not aware of the existence of more than one. Personally, he had not the slightest objection to produce it; but he was not sure whether it was in accordance with the usual practice to lay on the Table the Minutes of Members of Council upon a matter as to which no final decision had been arrived at. He would make further inquiries on that point. As to the Correspondence between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India, the India Office was in possession of only one letter of the Government of Bombay. There was nothing in the nature of a Correspondence, and it would be premature to lay such Papers as these were on the Table.

POST OFFICE (IRELAND)—TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT—CLERKS' LEAVE OF ABSENCE—THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH CLERKS.
MR. BIGGARasked the Postmaster General, If it is a fact that telegraph clerks removed from Belfast to Dublin since 1878 and 1879, and discharging night duty in that office, are given three weeks' annual leave, whereas some of their brethren in the Belfast Office, discharging precisely similar duties, are only accorded a fortnight's leave in the year; will he be good enough to explain the cause of this marked distinction in treatment of clerks in these offices in respect of annual leave; will he be
1978
good enough to take such steps as will extend to those in Belfast, who do not now enjoy the privileges accorded to their brethren in Dublin and other large offices in respect of leave; and, does the term "future entrants" mean clerks newly appointed to Belfast since 1879, or those who held appointments, but were only removed to Belfast from provincial offices since that year?
MR. FAWCETT: In reply to the hon. Member, I have to state that in the case of telegraphists the rules with regard to annual leave are uniform throughout Ireland. A telegraphist at Dublin, therefore, should have no longer leave than one at Belfast discharging the same duties and to the same extent, and I am not aware that any difference is made. As stated in reply to a former Question put by the hon. Member on the same subject, the exceptional privileges which some of the Belfast telegraphists now enjoy in the matter of leave will not be extended to new entrants, by which term is meant all persons joining the Belfast Post Office since 1879, whether they have come from other offices or not.

INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT—GRIEVANCES OF EXCISE OFFICERS.
MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, having regard to the great discontent which prevails among the officers of the Inland Revenue Department, as evidenced by the sentiments expressed at meetings held by those officers in the various Excise Collections throughout the Kingdom, he is prepared to appoint a Committee of independent persons, unconnected with the Treasury, to inquire into the constitution of the Board of Inland Revenue and the system under which that Board's business is conducted, and into the grievances put forward as regards office accommodation, salary, &c, in their recent Petition to the Lords of the Treasury; and more especially with respect to the statement that, in the bonded warehouses throughout the Kingdom, officers of Excise and of Customs who are of the same rank, and who are employed side by side on exactly the same work, are paid on widely different scales of salary?
MR. GLADSTONE, in reply, said, that the Board of Inland Revenue, upon the recommendation of the Treasury, had allowed seven days' additional leave

1979
to Excise officers of a certain number of years' service. He could hold out no expectation that the Government would he able to accede to the suggestion made in the Question.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—THE STANDING ORDERS.
SIR JOSEPH PEASEasked the Prime Minister, Whether he thought that at this time of the Session, and in the present state of Public Business, it was expedient to discuss the proposed alterations of the Standing Orders at the time of Private Business on Tuesday, the 1st of August?
MR. GLADSTONE, in reply, said, the authorities of the House were better judges than himself of the time when an important change of this kind might, with advantage, be taken into consideration; but he saw little prospect of their getting into Supply for effective purposes much before Tuesday, the 1st of August. He thought the House would justly be most unwilling, except for some very good public purpose, to interrupt the course of Supply when they had entered into it. He was not sanguine enough to suppose that even on so late a date as the 8th of August they would be in a condition to spare time for considering the proposed alteration of the Standing Order. That was all the answer he could give on that point. It was with very great regret that he had to make a further statement in anticipation of a Question of which Notice had been given from the other side. Reluctant as he was to admit the total failure of the Session for legislative work, he did not think he could any longer cherish an expectation of being able to proceed effectually with the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Bill. It was with extreme regret that he acknowledged that, considering the very active opposition directed against the Bill from certain quarters, they were not able to proceed with it without imposing upon the House sacrifices for which they were scarcely prepared to call.
MR. MARRIOTTasked whether, after the statement of the Prime Minister with regard to the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Bill, it was the intention of the Government to go on with the Police Superannuation Bill?
SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, he did not see any connection between the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Bill and the Police Superannuation Bill.
MR. T. P. O'CONNORasked whether it was the intention of the Government to move that the Order for the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Bill be discharged, or whether they could not continue the Bill to the Autumn Session? He asked the Question particularly for the purpose of eliciting from the Government whether there was any truth in what he hoped was a false rumour, that the Government had abandoned their intention of holding an Autumn Session.
MR. GLADSTONE: I am afraid that it would be contrary to the distinct pledge given to the House if we were to say, however much we may wish it, that we should at the Autumn Sitting propose to go on with the Corrupt Practices Bill. The hon. Member is quite right in supposing that there is no truth whatever in the rumour—if he has hoard the rumour, which I have not—that we have had any intention at any time of abandoning the plan of having an Autumn Sitting.

POST OFFICE (TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT)—TELEGRAPH CLERKS—PAYMENT FOR OVERTIME.
MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHYasked the Postmaster General, If it be true that telegraph clerks in provincial and other offices have, since the promulgation of the scheme purporting to improve their position, been called upon to work for twenty, thirty, and forty minutes daily over their established hours of duty, and without being paid for those periods at the specified rate per hour; if it is a fact that clerks who have such extra duty to perform would not be permitted to claim at the end of the week, and that, in such instances where they did claim for the total number of hours worked at this rate in the week, the claim was disallowed; and, whether it is with his approval that this system is carried out; and, if not, whether he will allow all fractions of an hour overtime to be paid for at the ordinary rate per hour?
MR. FAWCETT: In reply to the hon. Member, I have to point out that any system of payment for overtime

1981
needs to be very carefully watched, in order to prevent its encouraging dilatoriness in work. It has been a long-established practice in the Department not to pay for overtime under one hour, and I think it would be undesirable to alter this practice so as to allow a fraction of an hour to be counted for overtime. I shall be glad if the hon. Member will give me the instances in which overtime is daily required in the manner indicated in his Question.

WAYS AND MEANS—THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT—RELIEF OF HIGHWAY RATES.
MR. ANDERSONasked the President of the Local Government Board, If he has yet decided what proportion of the amount he is allocating to the relief of highway rates will be given to Scotland?
MR. R. H. PAGETasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether he was able to state the amount of the subvention to be paid from Imperial funds in aid of main roads, and the manner in which it is to be allotted among the various highway authorities?
MR. DODSON: In answer to both my hon. Friends, I can only say, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I have said in answer to former Questions of a similar character, that the Government are not prepared to make statements piecemeal as to the proposed distribution of the provisional grant in aid, but must wait till they have the opportunity of submitting their scheme of distribution as a whole. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated, in his Budget speech, that the total amount of the proposed subvention was £247,000, or, in round numbers, £250,000.

COMMISSIONERS OF IRISH LIGHTS—TORY ISLAND LIGHTHOUSE.
MR. LEAasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether the works in connection with the proposed improvements of Tory Island Lighthouse, and the establishment thereat of gas instead of oil as the illuminant, have yet been taken in hand, and why they were not commenced in the spring of this year, in accordance with the expectation stated in reply to a question on the 15th August 1881; and, whether the delay is still attributable to the want of strength in the Engineering Department of the
1982
Board of Irish Lights; and, if so, what steps have been taken to remedy this defect?
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I am informed by the Commissioners of Irish Lights that the pressure of work caused by the gales of November last has hitherto prevented the carrying out of the proposed improvements of Tory Island Lighthouse. During those gales some 43 lighthouse stations sustained damage, which required immediate attention, and the destruction of the Calf Rock Lighthouse rendered necessary the erection of a temporary light on Dursey Head with as little delay as possible. These works have now so far progressed that the Commissioners inform me that they purpose instructing their engineer to enter forthwith upon the question of the improvement of Tory Island Light.

EGYPT (MILITARY OPERATIONS)—CONFLAGRATIONS AT ALEXANDRIA.
MR. O'DONNELLasked the Prime Minister, in view of the interest taken by him in the authorship of the conflagration at Alexandria, Whether he had seen a letter from the Correspondent of The Times, in which a resident in that city stated that, during the bombardment, shells went over the town, and sometimes fell into it, and that he himself saw 10 Natives killed by a shell that fell at one of the city gates; whether he would procure a copy of the report made by the captain of one of the vessels of the Messageries Maritimes, in which it was stated that most of the fires were caused by the lire of the English Fleet, the shells pouring into the town for several hours; and whether he would order an impartial inquiry to be made into the facts of the case?
MR. GLADSTONE: I have not seen the correspondence to which the hon. Member refers; but I may say that when we have stated that the fires were not caused by the shells of the Fleet, we proceeded on the assurance of the Admiral in command. Until that information is superseded by something more definite we accept his assurance.
SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTasked the Prime Minister whether he had any news from Alexandria or Ramleh?
MR. GLADSTONE: No, Sir; no intelligence has reached me to-day, and I do not think that any can have reached

1983
the Foreign Office, or I should have been in possession of it.
MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he had received any official communication to the effect that the abolition of flogging had had a serious effect on the discipline of the British troops in Alexandria; and that the officers now-found themselves perfectly powerless to inflict any punishment short of death?
MR. CHILDERS: No, Sir; I have received no such communication.

WAYS AND MEANS-THE VOTE OF CREDIT—THE INCOME TAX.
MR. RAIKESasked if there was any precedent for obtaining a Vote in Ways and Means for the purpose of which that Vote was intended?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. GLADSTONE), in reply, said, in his opinion, there was a great multitude of precedents. In point of fact, augmentations of the Income Tax were constantly voted by the House at a period when the House had only sanctioned a portion of the expenditure of the year; and, consequently, it remained uncertain whether the expenditure would reach such a total as to make the augmentations of the tax necessary.

EGYPT—TRANSMISSION OF LETTER OF ARABI PASHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
MR. LABOUCHERE: Will the Prime Minister tell the House from what source the letter that was published in the newspapers as coming from Arabi Bey to him was received?
MR. GLADSTONE: I have no objection to state the source from which I received this letter. It was received under a covering letter from Mr. Blunt, and I have no doubt my hon. Friend understands his connection with the Egyptian Question. I may say that I do not understand the language in which the letter purports to be written; but it was sent to me with a translation in the same handwriting as the letter accompanying it.

LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—THE CORK ASSIZES.
MR. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it was true that inconsiderate
1984
delay was being used in bringing on the trial at the Cork Assizes of the 80 or 90 persons charged at the instance of Connell, the original "Captain Moonlight," and now an informer, with various offences near Millstreet, in the county of Cork? He (Mr. Healy) had received a letter from the solicitor for the defence alleging that the police were arresting the principal witnesses for the defence under the Protection of Person and Property (Ireland) Act, because they could disprove the charges against the prisoners sustained by the evidence of the Government assassin, Connell.
MR. TREVELYAN: I am sorry that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General for Ireland is not here, for this is the first I have heard of the matter; but, as the earlier part of the Question appears to be pressing, if the hon. Member will give me a copy of his information I will make inquiries.
MR. HEALYsaid, that he had several times communicated with the Attorney General for Ireland on this point. The lives and liberties of nearly 100 of his countrymen were at stake. ["Order!"] If necessary he would conclude with a Motion. Men had been arrested over six months ago on the evidence of a man named Connell, a deserter from the Army, himself an assassin, as there were witnesses to prove him the murderer of Daniel Leary, the son of the President of the local branch of the Land League. Since then the men had been brought up at the Assizes, entailing an attendance of over 300 or 400 witnesses. The solicitor for the defence had informed him that of these the principal were being arrested day by day, and lodged in gaol one after another. This was the third example of such a proceeding. The first was the police assassination at Bodyke, and the second that at Ballyragget. What was the nature of the evidence? The Crown knew that Connell was himself an assassin, and, no doubt, the reason for the postponement of the trial was lest Connell might be condemned for Leary's murder in the county of Cork before alluded to. By such procedure the Government were allying themselves with traitors and informers, and they could not so retain the respect of mankind. This was the way the new Act-was to be worked. This was the un-fairest playing with loaded dice. This

1985
was how law and order were to be obtained in Ireland. Law and order! The people despised such law; and as for order, it was such order as was procured in Sardinia, or perhaps under the First Napoleon. The Government were only humbugging.
MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is using language which is not Parliamentary.
MR. HEALYsaid, he was using the phrase "humbugging" in reference——
MR. SPEAKER: I have told the hon. Member that he is using language which is not Parliamentary.
MR. HEALYsaid, he withdrew the expression. He did not use it in reference to the Attorney General for Ireland—he should be sorry to accuse the right hon. and learned Gentleman of any such conduct—but to the local Crown prosecutors, who were trained jury-packers. Why were not these men put upon their trial at once? Why were the witnesses in their favour got at and doctored by the police, sent home, or put into gaol, so that the accused might be unable to bring forward witnesses in their defence? What the Government were now doing in Cork was producing a rankling sore. Unless the Attorney General for Ireland sent peremptory orders at once to put these men on their trial the greatest injustice would be done. If the police knew that those they were now arresting were criminals, why did they not take them up months ago? Were not the 30 or 40 men that were in gaol enough to glut the vengeance of the Government? He moved the adjournment of the House.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Mr. Healy.)
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. W. M. JOHNSON)said, he had to apologize to the House and the hon. Member for not having been in his place when this subject was brought forward. Not having expected any Question of the kind, he had left the House for a few minutes on private business. He could not quite understand the excitement of the hon. Member in this matter. As Attorney General for Ireland he was the director of prosecutions in Ireland, and he had directed the prosecution of these men at these Assizes; they would be prosecuted, and, for aught
1986
he knew, they might at that moment be on their trial. But he had no power, and would not undertake to interfere with the arrangement of the business of the Assizes, which must depend upon circumstances over which he had no control. If the circumstances of the case were such as to require specific directions from him, communication would be made to him, and directions given according to the exigencies of the occasion. He would ask the House, however, whether it was reasonable or proper, or even consistent with the administration of justice, that while a case was pending every officer connected with the administration of the law in Cork, and with the prosecution of this case, should be stigmatized and held up, as far as the hon. Member could do it, to public odium as corrupt?
MR. HEALY: They tried to pack my jury, for one instance.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. W. M. JOHNSON)said, that was hardly so, since the hon. Member had himself stated in the House that he was saved by an accident from going before what he called a jury prepared to try him. As to the charge against the Crown Solicitor for Cork that he was a "trained jury packer," that was incredible. He had known him for most of his life, and he had not the least hesitation in vouching for his (the Crown Solicitor's) character to the House. For personal honour, private worth, and public capacity, there were but few men his equal, and no one whom he (the Attorney General for Ireland) knew to be his superior. Nor were the Crown Counsel at all open to impeachment. They were his personal friends; he had been often engaged with and against them in civil cases, and after an experience of nearly 30 years he could vouch for their honour as for his own. The hon. Member had referred to the informer Connell with every kind of abusive term that could be applied to him. He was not going to vindicate Connell; it was no business of his. On the contrary, he had directed his prosecution, and declined to do anything else. The man pleaded guilty to a barbarous outrage, in which he was accompanied by others. He recollected a time when an Irishman's blood would boil at the thought of such an outrage. These persons broke into a farmhouse, where a woman and her

1987
daughters were dragged out of bed, and one of the daughters was barbarously treated: to subject her to humiliation they tried to cut her hair off, while her mother and sister were trying to save her. He put it to the House whether, while this prosecution was pending, it was proper or decent to reflect in any way upon one of the witnesses? The value of his testimony would be estimated by the jury, and he deprecated any further discussion of the subject. It should be remembered that the reports of what was said in that House were not confined to the London Press. They were given at great length in the local papers, and probably all that was said on the subject that evening would be read to-morrow morning in Cork.
MR. HEALYasked whether the men could not have been tried at the Winter Assizes?
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. W. M. JOHNSON)said, he could not direct them to be tried at that time: it was then just possible that a more complete case might be made for the prosecution by further evidence being obtained. It should be recollected that in these cases the Crown had all the odds against it; and he, as Attorney General for Ireland, would have betrayed his duty if he put men upon trial on insufficient evidence, which he believed could be afterwards supplemented. He deprecated further discussion on the subject, and hoped the hon. Member would withdraw his Motion.
MR. NEWDEGATEremarked, that the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) seemed to have watched until the Attorney General for Ireland had left the House before he made this gross attack upon the judicial arrangements in Ireland. The hon. Member said that he had given the Attorney General for Ireland private Notice of his intention; but these private Notices mattered nothing to the House. The House had a right to expect that Notice should be given to itself, and within its walls, otherwise the House had a right to consider that an attempt had been made to take it by surprise, and to render the House an arena for libellous imputations upon which, under the present lamentably deficient order of proceeding, the House had no opportunity whatever of expressing an opinion. The practice of putting a Question, and then moving
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the adjournment of the House, before, as in this case, the Question could be answered, was altogether an abuse. No vote or division could be taken; no expression of the opinion of the House could be given upon topics thus started. There had been no more marked instance of the absurd position in which the House was placed by those practices than the present. He (Mr. Newdegate) begged emphatically to call the attention of the First Lord of the Treasury to this occurrence. Since the right hon. Gentleman had undertaken to reform the Procedure of the House, it was to be hoped that he would not overlook the present illustration of the absolute necessity for effective action.
MR. O'DONNELLurged that the gist of the Question of the hon. Member for Wexford had not been answered—namely, the charge that while the Government wore delaying the trial, the principal witnesses for the defence were being picked up and lodged in gaol.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. W. M. JOHNSON)said, he had forgotten to answer it. So far from the charge being true, he had given express directions that sufficient notice of trial should be given them, and that the attendance of all the witnesses necessary for the defence should be provided for.
MR. HEALYpointed out that many of them had been arrested.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. W. M. JOHNSON): I know nothing about that.
MR. O'DONNELLgathered that the Attorney General for Ireland was only an agent in the matter, which was most serious, as the people believed the arrests were made to defeat the defence of the prisoners; while some of those in gaol at the present moment were prepared to identify Connell, the informer, as the assassin of the young farmer Leary near Millstreet. They had those arrests of witnesses going on, and the trial of the accused men delayed, while the source and the spring of the Government case was as foul as it could possibly be—namely, that of an assassin and an expelled deserter. Yet the Attorney General for Ireland wondered at their complaining of such proceedings while the case was still pending. It was not the fault of the Irish. Members that the case was pending. He must say that

1989
when the Attorney General for Ireland believed he had cleared the character of the Crown Agents who superintended the trial of his hon. Friend (Mr. Healy) by stilting that, as a matter of fact, his hon. Friend was not tried by a packed jury, while, at the same time, he admitted there was no time to provide the packed jury, the right hon. and learned Gentleman failed to meet the point of his hon. Friend's objections. It was only by an accident that his hon. Friend was tried by an ordinary jury instead of a packed jury. He was confident that the Government would look into this matter, for nothing could be more detrimental to the cause of law and order than the toleration of the circumstances that surrounded this case.
MR. DALYsaid, that in the city of Cork a very strong distrust had been created in the minds of the people, owing to the way in which these trials were being conducted. Beyond all doubt, a great injury had been done by the conduct of the Crown prosecutions. He would remind the House that it was of the first importance that the men now standing at the bar of justice and accused of serious crimes should get a fair and impartial trial. The hon. Member proceeded to denounce the action of Crown prosecutors in a recent case, when——
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. W. M. JOHNSON)rose on a point of Order, and reminded the Speaker that the hon. Member was quite irrelevant in his observations.
MR. DALY, continuing, said, he rose to address the House in the interests of law and order, and to show how the Crown prosecutors had conducted those cases. Many men of most reputable character in Cork were told to stand aside from the jury-box, simply because they were known to have Nationalist aspirations. As far as regarded the informer Connell, he would mention a most noticeable case concerning him. Connell was a man who was well known in his district as one of the persons referred to by the late Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, and who was described as belonging to the gang of "midnight marauders and village ruffians" against whom the Protection of Person and Property Act was intended; yet the police knew him to be engaged in disseminating his pernicious doctrines
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in Millstreet, and they did not arrest him. He believed it to be true, and that it could be proved, that men had been arrested in Cork whose statements would be most damaging to the Crown informer. The manner in which those prosecutions were being conducted would, in his opinion, be the means of provoking angry feelings, and preventing the restoration of law and order. He sincerely hoped that the words of the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) had induced the Attorney General for Ireland to warn his subordinates to have a little less zeal and more discretion in the conduct of those trials.
MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORalso referred to the present system of Crown prosecutions in Ireland, of which, as the rule, English Members knew less than they did of the condition of Egypt. The other day, in the Queen's County, there occurred a notable instance of the manner in which those trials were conducted. A terrible murder of an old man was committed, and the Crown proceeded to arrest a number of persons against whom they had not one single tittle of evidence. Nevertheless, they remanded them from Assizes to Assizes, until at last the Judge told the prosecution that he would stand that thing no longer, and that if the Crown could not proceed with the prosecution he would discharge the prisoners. Thereupon the Crown prosecutors produced a most infamous character, who deliberately swore, over and over again, that he was standing within a short distance of the scene of the murder, and saw the five accused men actually commit the crime. He also feigned ignorance of the reward that was offered for information; but it was conclusively proved that the witness had grossly perjured himself. That was not the only incident in the case, for the driver who discovered the body asserted that he was sought by the police to extend his evidence so as to convict the prisoners, and he was even promised by a Sub-Inspector of Police a sum of £1,000 if he would do so; but he refused, and the Crown failed to show that the men were guilty. That was the way in which guilt was sought to be brought home to those five persons. Under these circumstances, it was perfectly impossible that the people of Ireland should do otherwise than regard the law as their enemy.
MR. HEALY, in asking leave to withdraw his Motion, said, that he should not have intruded a pending case upon the attention of the House if the case were legitimately pending. He was determined, however, to watch these proceedings very carefully, if he was not arrested himself.
Question put, and negatived.

EAST INDIA (EXPENSES OF MILITARY EXPEDITION TO EGYPT).
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he proposed formally to move his Resolution that night relating to the charging to the Revenues of India the cost of the transport of Indian troops to Egypt, with the object of the debate being immediately adjourned, the Motion be made an Order of the Day, and be placed first or second on the list of Orders of the Day, or, as his right hon. Friend suggested, immediately after the Customs and Inland Revenue Bill. That would be the most convenient course to adopt.
SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEpresumed that those who had Notices of opposition to the Resolution would not lose their power of bringing them forward. The only thing to be desired was that the Resolution should occupy an early place on the Orders, and should not be brought forward at an inconvenient hour.
MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked whether the Resolution would come within the terms of the Rule exempting Money Bills from the operation of the Half-past 12 Rule?
MR. SPEAKER: It appears to me that the Resolution would not come within the operation of that Rule, and might be brought forward after half-past 12 o'clock.
MR. O'DONNELLgave Notice that to-morrow he would ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether he had seen a telegram in one of the daily papers stating that a body of British troops, on the ground of searching for supposed plunder, blew up with gunpowder a house in a village in which a number of women and children had taken refuge; and whether such proceedings were approved by the Government, or any steps would be taken to prevent the recurrence of such an outrage?

ORDER OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY—FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (VOTE OF CREDIT). [THIRD NIGHT.]
  SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  (1.) Question again proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £2,300,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883, in strengthening Her Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean."—(Mr. Gladstone.)
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, at the conclusion of the remarks I was permitted to make yesterday afternoon I was alluding to the despatch of Lord Granville, dated November 4th, and I was remarking that there was nothing to criticize in connection with that despatch, except there was no mention contained in it of British interests in Egypt. That despatch had, at first, a quieting effect; but the assembling of the Chamber of Notables shortly after that despatch appeared seems to have had a disquieting tendency upon the French Ministry. Attempts were made at this time to draw closer the relations between the two Governments of England and France with a view of action in the matter, and the famous Dual Note was written by M. Gambetta and accepted without hesitation by the British Government. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at that time was in Paris, engaged in a very laudable, but ill-starred, endeavour to conclude a Commercial Treaty between France and England. The making of that Treaty was no doubt a matter of considerable importance both to England and France; and, from a political point of view, it was of very great importance to the British Government. Whether the anxiety of Her Majesty's Government to conclude that Treaty had or had not any effect in their desire to conform in every respect to the wishes of the French Government in regard to Egypt I am, of course, unable to state; but there is no doubt that that is the general impression both in this country and in the diplomatic world. The Dual Note was no doubt the turning point of the

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  whole of these transactions. It fell like a thunderclap upon Egypt and upon the whole of Europe. With regard to Egypt, it was looked upon as ignoring altogether the Sultan's authority, and it treated the Khedive as a puppet in the hands of the European Powers; and the consequence was that it invoked a very strong protest from the Porte. I do not think there could be any doubt whatever upon the mind of any ordinary reader that that Note certainly implied material intervention on the part of both England and France because England and France were united, it was said, to oppose the pretensions of Arabi Bey in Egypt, and they declared that the two Powers would be found united in preventing those pretensions being carried into effect. It was looked upon by the Powers as the first step to action; and as a first step to action on the part of England and France it was unanimously rejected by the Eastern Powers, as we see by the French Yellow Book. Well, Sir, the British Government, through Lord Granville, endeavoured to explain away the impression that was made upon Europe by this Note. I do not think that explanations generally are of much use in a matter of that kind. I think they generally leave the question where it was, or, if possible, lead to further misunderstanding. But when this question of explanation was suggested by Lord Granville to M. Gambetta, he declined altogether to enter into negotiations as to the matter of any sort or kind. Of course, he gave his reasons for that decision. He said that any explanation would encourage the arrogance of the enemies of France. Now, I do not know to whom the eminent French Minister alluded when he mentioned the enemies of France; whether it was some of the Powers, or Turkey, it is impossible to say. But that was a very remarkable answer. In the meantime there was not one single line from our Ambassador at Constantinople in these Papers; there is not a single trace to be found of any despatch of Lord Dufferin upon the question of the Dual Note, although it is the turning point of the whole of the negotiations. The Government have kept back Lord Dufferin's opinions upon this vital question. It is quite clear that from that moment England had lost all her influence with
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  Turkey upon the question. The whole of the Mussulman population were alarmed, and Mr. Malet suggested that, in the serious condition of affairs, the only solution of the difficulty was a Commission from the Porte. That met with the same reception at the hands of the French Government as all other suggestions of the same character. They refused to allow the Porte to interfere in any way. About this time a change took place in the Government of France, and, at the suggestion of the British Government, an appeal was made to all the Powers; and from that moment, it may be said, that the joint action of England and France was at an end. After the new Ministry came into Office, the Powers generally were made acquainted with everything that passed, except one thing, which I will mention hereafter. But there can be no doubt that the impression left upon Egypt with respect to the Joint Note was still more unfortunate as time went on, because, although at first it had a bad effect in Egypt—the people imagining that a holy war against them was going to be proclaimed—they felt that, as nothing was to be done under the Joint Note, and that as England and France were only threatening, they were really to be regarded, to use the words of Sir. William Gregory at that time, as being "nothing more than a pair of blusterers." At this period M. Tissot arrived in England as Ambassador from France. Everybody who knows M. Tissot is aware that he is a most accomplished and able diplomatist; but it will be as well for us to remember that, up to this time, he had been the French Ambassador at Constantinople, so that he came to England permeated with the views of M. Gambetta, although representing the Ministry of M. Freycinet, and pledged, as much as a diplomatist could be, to forward the views of M. Gambetta with respect to the non-intervention of Turkey in Egypt, and intervention on the part of England and France. Before many days elapsed, M. Tissot called Lord Granville's attention to the very serious state of things which had now arisen in Egypt, and he asked Lord Granville if any suggestion could come from the British Government. Lord Granville's answer to this very important communication from France was one of the most remarkable, I think,

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  ever made by any English Minister; and I must say that I think there never was a more foolish proposition made by a Minister. It was made in these words—
  "I then," said Lord Granville, "said that an idea had occurred to me that I should be glad if he would mention to M. de Freycinet, hut simply as a personal suggestion of my own. It was that the French and English Governments should each send to Egypt some person of financial knowledge and experience, who might act as advisers to the Agent and Consul General in drawing up the details of any proposals for settling the future basis of administration."
  Now, anything more futile I cannot imagine could be proposed. There was nothing in the financial administration of Egypt at that time which required such a remedy, and the reception which this suggestion met with by the French Government was the only one it could naturally receive. It is curious to observe the irony with which the suggestion was treated. It was summed up in one or two words by M. de Freycinet in Paris—
  "That the suggestion made by the English Government would take away the only institution left that they look to for keeping anything like law and order."
  The next suggestion was made about a month after, and it was of a still more remarkable kind. It would appear that Lord Granville was applied to, whether he could suggest anything as to the affairs of Egypt, those affairs having been going on from bad to worse. After stating that affairs were considered by Lord Granville to be more gloomy and alarming, he says—
  "It would have a great moral effect in Egypt if the English and French Governments were able to announce to their respective Parliaments that not only were they prepared with the concurrence of Europe to take a step at once towards an arrangement with the Egyptian Government, but that they were also agreed as to the policy to be pursued in case of matters coming to a crisis, which they still hope may be averted."
  Now, Sir, what is the proposition? Recollect that we have heard very often in this debate that the moral effect likely to be produced by the interference of Turkey was much to be deprecated. Yet this was the proposition—
  "The procedure to be resorted to in case of necessity might, in my opinion, consist in asking the Sultan to send a General, with full powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army with a well-defined agreement, that he was not to exercise those powers in any way without the concurrence of an English and a French General
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  who would be associated with him. Care must he taken so to frame the arrangement that the functions of the three Commissioners should in no way detract from the position, or trench upon the duties of the French and English representatives. I thought this plan was not likely to meet with objection on the part of the other Powers, and it seemed to me to be calculated to prevent the necessity of a resort to armed intervention, which might, perhaps, ultimately become inevitable, but which, as both Governments agreed, presented great difficulties, and was open to grave objection in every form."
  I imagine that no person who knows anything at all about the opinions of the Sultan, or the views which he, or any other person connected with the Porte, entertains, would suppose that he would do otherwise than scout such a proposition as that. The idea of these two Generals being sent to Egypt, and that the Porte was to give all its influence to them—that they were to be sent there without any authority, and without a single armed man—and that the Turkish General was to conform in every respect with the opinions of the French and English Generals, was absurd. The French Government saw at once that that was not a proposition that could receive support, and they treated it in the same way as they had treated the previous suggestion. But affairs grew more gloomy at Constantinople, and Consul Cookson and Mr. Colvin wrote at that time very serious despatches calling attention to the grave events which were occurring. Mr. Malet reported that—
  "It was impossible to regain influence until the military supremacy was broken."
  Another suggestion was now made by the English Government. This time they seemed to have plucked up their courage, and they wont so far as to threaten. The threat assumed a peculiar character, because they threatened that they would use a force over which they had no control whatever. "On our part," said Lord Granville to Lord Lyons—
  "We were ready to consider, with every wish to aceede to it, any proposal that might be made by M. de Freycinet; but as regarded any proposal of my own, I have nothing better to suggest than the plan I had already mentioned of sending three Military Commissioners, Turkish, English and French. Under the present urgent circumstances, I should have been ready to accompany it with a threat of Turkish intervention."
  After offering every slight it was possible to offer to the Turkish Government, the British Government supposed that they

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  had the power of offering a threat of Turkish intervention. Lord Granville adds—
  "I believed that such a threat would he the most likely means of preventing the necessity for any intervention, and I repeated my wish to avoid such intervention, if possible."
  That threat, of course, was not put into execution, because it met with exactly the same reception from the French Government as the other two propositions from the British Government. At this time the French Government seemed determined to become more energetic, and they proposed to the British Government to send the English Fleet to Egypt. That proposal was accepted, of course, at once, but no notice whatever was given to the Sultan; and the Fleet was sent to Egyptian waters, and, consequently, to Turkish waters, without the slightest intimation to the Sultan. The consequence was that it met with the most energetic protest from the Porte; and it must be remembered that at that time Lord Dufferin was not even allowed to suggest Turkish intervention, although the British and French Fleets were sent to Alexandria. Things at Cairo grew worse and worse. Preparations for war were made by Arabi Pasha; insults were heaped upon Christians of all kinds, and all these events were attributed to the policy of the two Powers. It was clear then that Arabi was the only power in Egypt who had any influence whatever; he was the only power that had force at his back, and, notwithstanding this, the next proposition that was made was even still more absurd than the others, because it was proposed to the Khedive that he should banish Arabi, who was the only man who had any power in Egypt. How he was to carry out that advice was not stated. Of course, the advice itself, when it became known, irritated all the partisans of Arabi and the whole Military Party, and hastened the crisis. At this period there was a sharp difference of opinion between England and France. Lord Granville suggested, as he had done often before, that it was desirable to send Turkish troops to Egypt. M. Tissot spoke of the uselessness of such a proposal upon that occasion. I think the sharpness of the difference between the two Governments was extremely remarkable, for, certainly, the "uselessness of the proposal" is not language often
  1998
  employed by one diplomatist towards another. I am glad that the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is in the House at this moment, because I wish to call the attention of the House to an answer given by him to a Question asked by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote) on the 15th of May. My right hon. Friend asked whether the hon. Baronet could give any information as to the present position of affairs in Egypt; and after making a statement similar to that which was made by Lord Granville in the House of Lords on the same day, the hon. Baronet ended his statement by saying—
  "In March certain differences manifested themselves in the views of the English and French Governments; but the divergences which then existed are wholly at an end."— [3 Hansard, cclxix. 669.]
  Now, I fail to find in the whole of these Papers that the divergences were at an end. The hon. Baronet, however, immediately added—
  "During the present month the unconstitutional steps taken by the Ministers of the Khedive resulted in a most critical situation. This became the subject of an active interchange of views between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic, with the happy result that the two Powers are now in absolute accord as to the steps to be taken in view of future eventualities which it is now hoped may not arise. The two Governments feel confident that the course agreed upon will meet with the assent of all the other Great Powers and of the Porte."—[Ibid.]
  He went on to say in answer to another question—
  "The Porte had been informed of the steps that had been taken. He had already stated that the English and French Governments were of opinion that the course they had taken would meet with the assent of the Turkish Government."
  Now, at that moment there was a sharp difference between the Porte and ourselves.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: What I then said was that an agreement had been come to in view of future eventualities. I said that I was quite sure that what had been done would be approved by the Porte.
  MR. BOURKE: Steps were not agreed to by the Porte.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: They were not known to the Porte at the time.
  MR. BOURKE: But the hon. Gentleman stated that the steps taken would meet with the assent of the Turkish Government.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: Yes; it was our opinion that they would.
  MR. BOURKE: The hon. Gentleman said that the English and French Governments were of opinion that the course taken would meet with the assent of the Turkish Government; but that course never did meet with the assent of the Turkish Government so far as I know. In regard to the ships going to Egypt, the Sultan was perfectly ready to send a ship alone by himself; but he was told he must not do anything of the kind, and something more which ought also to be considered, and which almost amounted to an insult. He was actually told that if he sent a ship to Alexandria it was likely to be kindly received by the ships already there. Now, that was a decided insult, seeing that the waters were his own. I wonder what course we should have taken if we had been placed in the same position—if we had been told by two Powers that our own waters were in their occupation, but that we were welcome to send a ship of our own which would be kindly received. I think we should have considered the whole matter a great and gratuitous insult. Shortly afterwards a Conference was proposed. Now, in the first instance, I cannot see that there was any necessity for a Conference whatever, because at Constantinople the Ambassadors of the different Powers are in the habit of meeting continually; and if it was a desirable thing that the English and French Governments should bring their views to the notice of other Powers through their Ambassadors at Constantinople, it was a perfectly easy matter to bring them under such notice without any Conference at all. As to the meeting of the Conference, it was against the will of the Sultan, and it added, I think, another gross insult, still worse when it was said, as it has been in one of the papers, that the Sultan ought to be pleased at the compliment. I am not surprised that the proposal was regarded in the light of an insult, not only by Turkey, but in other quarters as well. The proposal to meet in the capital of the Sultan was analogous to half-a-dozen gentlemen meeting in a private drawing-room with-
  2000
  out the consent of the occupier of the house. The first thing the Conference did was to propose a military intervention. After preventing the Sultan from exercising his authority, we called upon him to exercise that authority to put down a military revolt, when it had risen to such a crisis that it was very dangerous and almost impossible to do so without the employment of a very largo force indeed. The terms were not only hard, but insulting; and at that time Germany came forward and said that she considered the terms offered to the Porte in regard to military intervention as being far too hard. And then what did you do? Why, you turned round, and, having failed to obtain Turkish intervention, you endeavoured to obtain a mandate from Europe on behalf of the English and French. It is quite clear that the Powers had very different views upon that question, and they refused to grant a mandate for that purpose. They declined to make themselves enemies of Turkey; and the}' did not take the same view we had taken of the friendship of the Sultan. It was of the utmost importance to them to remain on good terms with the Sultan, and they entertained different views from those of the present Government of this country with regard to the friendship of the Sultan. In that way I am afraid they have shown a very great contrast to the policy of the other Powers, a contrast which other Powers will endeavour to accentuate, and which hereafter may have a very prejudicial effect upon England. I believe the justification for the bombardment of Alexandria is a sound one, and I do not propose to enter further into that matter. I believe that it can be vindicated on the grounds of necessity, self-defence, and International Law. Of course, I deplore the policy which led to that bombardment, and the necessity of that disaster; but I shall offer no hostile criticism on the act itself. I have nothing to say in regard to it upon a diplomatic and international point of view. I would wish, at the same time, to bear my humble tribute to the gallantry of the officers and men engaged in that action, and I think it must have given great satisfaction to the House to find that our Fleet was in such a perfect state of efficiency. They had no mean enemy to contend with,

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  and I think that the Egyptians fought with a courage and with a perseverance that entitled them to the admiration of all candid and generous men. I have stated the points upon which I differ with Her Majesty's Government, and I will now sum up in a very few words. I think they have made a mistake in ignoring the authority of the Sultan, in offending the religious feeling of the Mahomedan population, both of Egypt and of Asia, and in showing, by their changing and shifting policy, that they were ready to suit that policy to the ephemeral circumstances of another Power whenever they were asked to do so. The result has been that we have been left to act alone as far as Europe is concerned. We are told that we have the good wishes of certain Powers; but good wishes are generally accompanied by "Good bye;" and if we are to go to Egypt in conjunction with Turkey, I fear very much, after what has passed, that we shall not now be able to go there with that cordiality which is required, and which is necessary when military operations are to be carried on by two Powers acting in conjunction. But, at the same time, I wish to guard myself against being in the least degree disposed to follow Turkey blindly, or in allowing for an instant that there should be any change in the relations that exist between Turkey and Egypt. I do not think it would be for the interests of the world, or for the interests of Turkey herself, that the relations between Egypt and the Sovereign Power should be modified. At one time I should have been disposed to allow Turkey to go to Egypt alone—that is, to go there with her moral influence—but I should never have allowed her to go alone with an army. Now, of course, the time has passed for allowing her to go without an armed force at her back. It is necessary, if she goes at all, that she should go with an army. Such a proposition will require, I think, very grave consideration, and it is quite a different thing asking Turkey to have gone some months ago and asking her to go with us now. I should like now to say a word or two in respect of those who are in favour of non-intervention altogether. Independently of the reasons stated by the hon. Baronet on the 7th of June—namely, our duty to India, the capital we have invested in Egypt,
  2002
  and our Eastern commerce generally—I should like to ask those who are in favour of non-intervention, if we left Egypt to-morrow, do they think the other Powers would do the same? Can they point out for a moment that free institutions would have the slightest possibility of being instituted in Egypt? Do they think the other Powers, if we leave Egypt, will be kinder to the Natives than we are; and if the other Powers are left in Egypt, and we go away, do they think those other Powers will employ more Natives in the administration of the affairs of the country? The Committee may take it from me that it is the fact, if any persons will go over to the offices where we have an official establishment, either at Cairo or Alexandria, they will find a larger number of Egyptian officials employed than in any analogous establishments belonging to any other Power. That is a fact which is notorious, and which I have seen myself. It is perfectly certain, therefore, that, as far as the rest of Europe was concerned, the Natives would suffer rather than benefit by our withdrawal. It has been mentioned several times in the course of the debate that an agreement has been arrived at with France as to the Suez Canal. I hope, before the debate closes, that we shall have some information about that agreement. It is an agreement of the greatest possible importance, not only for the present, but for the future. I trust the Government will tell us exactly what the terms of the agreement are as to the protection of the Canal. I want to know whether it is a permanent or a temporary arrangement, and what arrangement has been made in detail for the protection of the Canal. With regard to the arrangement for the future, I shall defer the observations I have to make until I hear what it is. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State went at some length into the subject of the future government of Egypt. I think it is too soon to speak of that question. The first thing we have to do is to restore order and reduce the anarchy which now prevails. In the meantime, I hope we shall apply ourselves with energy to the task before us, and that we shall not ask ourselves too critically who are our allies. I think it is a very bad way of obtaining allies to be continually asking ourselves who are going to be our friends. If we follow a

  2003
  straight for ward course, especially when we are dealing with an Oriental nation, we shall always find that allies will come to us with the greatest alacrity, without entering into any agreement or stipulation which may embarrass us in future. There is one other reason why I think we ought not to hamper ourselves with unnecessary alliances. English diplomatists have no special genius for intrigue, and if we embark in courses of intrigue we shall certainly be defeated. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) spoke with some severity of the intrigues which, he said, had been going on between Paris, Constantinople, and Arabi Bey; but the right hon. Gentleman cannot deny that until a short time ago these communications were perfectly legitimate. In fact, it was the very thing we had been asking the Sultan to do. How was the Sultan to exert his moral influence in putting down disturbances without communicating with Arabi Boy? Of course, Dervish Pasha went openly from Constantinople to Egypt and put himself in communication with Arabi Bey. It cannot, then, with any degree of justice, be said that these were intrigues. But when the history of these events comes to be written, it will be found that there were other intrigues going on with Arabi Bey which had no justification whatever. It is not necessary to say more on that subject now, because I am quite sure that Her Majesty's Government are perfectly alive to the fact, and that agents— not Turkish agents—have been very active in their intrigues with Arabi Bey. I hope, also, that Her Majesty's Government, before this debate concludes, will tell us something about the "Self-Denying" Protocol. How do we stand with regard to it? I hope the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) will be able to tell us. It was made upon the understanding that other Powers were to co-operate with us. If we are to act alone I think it is a matter for serious consideration whether that "Self-Denying" Protocol should be allowed to bind us as to its terms any further. I am, as much as any Member of this House, in favour of pursuing an unselfish policy in Egypt; but, at the same time, do not let us be hypocritical about it, or imagine for a moment that the Powers will believe us if we say that
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  we are not going to Egypt mainly for our own interests. Having undertaken this gigantic work, I hope that we shall not stay our hands until it has been thoroughly completed. I hope the British Government will rely upon British power, moral and physical; and that, if necessary, they will not hesitate to call forth all the power of the nation, and all the power of our Indian Possessions as well. If they do so, I believe they will do much to condone, in the minds of those who differ from them, the weakness of the past, and if they do not, I believe they will add very considerably to their difficulties. I hope they will not think lightly of their duty, because the more difficult they think it, I am quite sure the more easy it will be of accomplishment. So long as they are bold and true to British honour and British interests, I think I am not presumptuous in assuring them that they may rely upon the support of the Tory Party both in this House and in the country.
  MR. CHILDERS: I do not propose to trespass upon the attention of the Committee at any length; but it would not be right for me, as the Minister who is charged with a considerable portion of the duties represented by the Vote of Credit, not to address some remarks to the Committee, and perhaps the present would be the most convenient moment. We have heard, during this debate, a considerable number of very interesting and able speeches; but I think I shall be doing no injustice to other speakers if I allude specially to those of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), who sits on the other side, and of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), all of whom contributed largely to the information that will enable us to discuss the question. The speech of the Under Secretary of State, if he will allow me to say so, in his presence, formed a most admirable summing up of the history of the question, not only of the earlier history, but also of the details of what has passed during the last six or nine months, with an accuracy which has never, I believe, been equalled in a statement of so laborious and, at the same time, of so interesting a character. The hon. Member for Portsmouth I am sorry not to see in his place;

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  but he brings to the question extraordinary knowledge from his position as a banker largely interested in the East, who knows the whole systems of the finance of the Eastern world, and of whom it may be said that be pre-eminently, mores hominum multorum vidit et urbes, contributed to the debate a most remarkable amount of knowledge, and who put it before us in such a way that, in spite of our reading for the last two years upon this important English question, he told us in the course of his speech as much as many of us could acquire after many days' or months' study. It was a most interesting speech, and must have contributed much information to the Committee. It was a most fair and impartial speech, and although my hon. Friend is a good partizan in his way, it was without a trace of Party feeling; and I may say of it that, except as regards one point in which be differs from us in his estimate of the value of a French alliance, and the manner of dealing with the French Ministers in foreign affairs, we might rest upon it a great deal of the defence of the conduct of the Government. He introduced into the debate the consideration of the difficulties which have attended the question in consequence of recent occurrences at Tunis. No more fair statement could have been made in many respects, and none that could have more completely justified the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. The speech, too, of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), who sits behind me, was a speech of which the Committee must be proud, as coming from one who, not only officially, but personally, has been connected with this question for some time past, upon whose recommendation the late Government acted to so large an extent, and whose knowledge of the whole question, during the time he bad connection with the financial affairs of Egypt, must be admitted to be not only extensive but accurate. My right hon. Friend may, perhaps, be thought to have spoken out rather plainly and frankly with respect to the right manner of dealing with Oriental Powers, and especially as to the proper mode of transacting financial business. He used strong language, which some may say went too far; but still he exposed the weak side of our transactions with Eastern Powers, and
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  especially with the Porte, and in that respect his warning deserves to be taken into serious consideration by the House. My right hon. Friend struck the very keynote of the controversy in which we are engaged when he asked hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, who dispute the conduct and the line taken by Her Majesty's Government, with which horse they proposed to win—do they propose to win by attacking Her Majesty's Government because their action has isolated them in regard to European affairs, or do they propose to win on the ground that their line of policy has hampered and entangled us in alliances with other Powers? I watched with great interest the answer which would be given to that question by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke). He said—"We want to know what you are going to do, but we will not tell you what your fault has been." But the temptation to argue from the point of view which he had adopted was too much for the right hon. Gentleman. Afterwards, and in a few sentences, he said, after some words about the Concert of Europe, that he was against sacrificing the interests of England to the Concert of Europe, and that we ought to co-operate with France, but ought to have told her fairly and broadly that we could not follow her policy. I take these words of the right hon. Gentleman to mean that be thinks our fault has been rather that we have been hampered by arrangements with other Powers than that we suffered in the direction of isolation. Taking that as the view which he adopts, I should like to address a few words to the Committee to show bow it was that we were in a position to pursue the line of policy we first adopted, and which I think I can show we have consistently followed ever since. I would like the Committee to consider, first, whether we have acted consistently with the conditions which were laid down when we took Office two years ago? On this question of the policy of the English Government in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, the despatches of 1876 and 1878 show that in this respect the late Administration arrived at an understanding with France which is perfectly plain, and appears on the face of the Papers presented to Parliament. The late Government said to France—

  2007
  "We claim to do what we like with Cyprus, and we leave you to do what you like with Tunis. But, with respect to Egypt, we agree jointly to use British and French influence." That was the step taken by the last Government. Well, we inherited that policy in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, and we have often done our best loyally to act up to it. I do not say that we approved of it, or that we disapproved of it. We found it the policy of the Government which we succeeded, and we worked up to it loyally and faithfully and, I think I shall be able to show, with success. But, although that may be the general outline of the policy of his Government, I do not think the right hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) described accurately the situation of public affairs in that part of the world, and especially in Egypt, when we succeeded to the administration of the foreign affairs of the country. He said we inherited a peaceful policy in Egypt, only broken by the first military riot which took place a year ago. He said, with respect to the last arrangement made by Lord Salisbury for the exercise of British influence in Egypt, that when Lord Salisbury was urged to nominate a European Minister he declined, and that it was entirely by the action of the Khedive that the Minister was appointed, and that when the Khedive was dismissed the Control was established. He said the Committee would see that Lord Salisbury adopted no now policy in 1879, and that after the small revolution which took place in Cairo we re-established the Control on its former footing. But nothing can be more inaccurate than that description of what was done in 1878–9. The first military riot was not in 1881, but in 1879; so that the difficulties with the Army began not in 1881, but in 1879; and that riot, to use Lord Salisbury's own words, had the effect, by a military tumult, in which the officers of the Khedive were really the rioters, of overthrowing an independent Ministry with two European officials attached to it. Therefore, the difficulties with the Khedive really began, not in 1881, but a few months before we took Office. They began with the military riot at Cairo.
  MR. BOURKE: The first riots had no connection with this affair.
  MR. CHILDERS: I have only taken up the words of the right hon. Gentle-
  2008
  man, He said the first military riot took place in 1881, whereas the first riot took place while the late Government were in Office. We did not inherit a peaceful state of things. The late Government insisted on the abdication or the resignation of the Khedive, and the revision of the Control, and they revised the Control on a perfectly different system from that which existed before. Under the new arrangement there were two Controllers, one appointed by us and the other by France. They were removable only by us and France, and they were Members of the Khedive's Ministry. So that, the old arrangement having been revised, a new system of Control was established, under which the two Controllers General were nominees of the Governments of England and France, and could not be removed except by the act of those two Governments. The words in the Papers are "removable by thorn." I do not now raise the question whether that was a good arrangement or not; but it was an entire change; and what I want to show is that the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the late Government loft everything in a peaceful condition is not strictly accurate, because a short time before there had been a serious military riot which led to the upsetting of the Government, and a new Control was established which was placed upon an entirely different footing. There is no doubt that the new arrangement, however good it might have been, was full of danger. What happened? Well, as I have said, we worked strictly upon the lines laid down by our Predecessors. A very few months after we took Office another military riot took place in February, 1881, not arising from any act of ours; and there was a third in September. Therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman says the late Government left Egypt peaceful, we might just as well say we left Turkey peaceful in 1874, and then objected to the conduct of the late Government, because in 1875 and 1876, not in consequence of any act of theirs, a large portion of Turkey was found to be in a state of incendiarism. So far as the allegation goes, that there were satisfactory arrangements with the Khedive, which we, by some act of ours, upset, it cannot for one moment be substantiated. The fact is that whatever may have been the intention of the arrange-

  2009
  merit of 1875, it contained elements of great danger; and, without our touching them, those elements within a few months after our accession to Office led to the trouble which has now been brought upon us. Having inherited that state of things, and that policy, what were our efforts in the furtherance of order and good government in Egypt? In the first place, our endeavour was to carry out that jointpolitical influence of France and England which had been established by our Predecessors, and, in my humble judgment, wisely established. We endeavoured to do so with the good feeling and the goodwill of the Powers. We endeavoured, in all that followed, to use to the utmost, I will not say the moral influence, but the material influence of the Sovereign Power; and our great anxiety has been throughout all these troubles, while favouring National objects in Egypt, to get rid of the military usurpation which has been destroying the happiness and progress of the country, and to do so on the lines and principles I have described. We have kept these objects steadily in view, and when hon. or right hon. Gentlemen complain that in this respect we went a little too far in the direction of obtaining the concurrence of France, or in the direction of obtaining the Concert of Europe, or that we pressed too much or too little upon the Porte the duty of exercising its own rights and its own duty—I say, however much you may criticize in detail one act or another act, and say that one was too soon and another too late, I think I may refer, in answer to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) has said—for he has pointed out that what you ought to look to is not this step or that step, this detail or that detail, but to our acts as a whole—that the position was an extremely difficult one, and that the attention of Her Majesty's Government was necessarily directed to the attainment of two or three great objects. I believe in the end, in spite of the difficulty of the transactions in which we have been engaged, and in spite of the weakness of the French Government, which has delayed us so much, it will be seen that we have kept steadily in view our object, and have never flinched from it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) says we have been dawdling.
  2010
  That is the charge he brought against us in his speech. If he means by dawdling not being over hasty in plunging into the first difficulty that presented itself to us, I admit the justice of the charge. If, on the other hand, he means that we have unnecessarily delayed, I say that it is not so—we have not dawdled, but we entered with prudence into negotiations, in order to bring them to a successful result. I venture to say that if we had adopted a different course we should have had serious difficulties with France, and we should not have been proceeding now with the goodwill of Europe. In all probability we should have run the risk of a serious war. As it is, I think it is plain that Europe is now satisfied that we have no selfish object in the course we have taken or in the military operations for which we ask the sanction of the Committee. On this point it is necessary that we should be very clear, and I think it would be much to be regretted if Europe suspected that we, for instance, were seeking the sole Protectorate in Egypt. Our object is entirely of an unselfish character, keeping clearly in view the maintenance and protection of our interests, and the interests of other civilized countries. We desire order and good government in Egypt, and we desire this both for the advantage of England and that of the whole world. We hope to succeed in bringing about this—that Egypt shall cease to be a Military Power, except in respect to such forces as it may be necessary to maintain in order to protect herself from the incursions of her Southern neighbours. But it must be remembered that Egypt is the great highway between this country and the East, and that our interest in that highway is at least four times as great as those of all the other nations together; and if we clearly show the world that we are unselfish with respect to the administration in the future of Egypt, and have no wish to obtain any Protectorate over her, I think it will not be unreasonable when, by force of arms, we shall have made Egypt cease to be a Military Power that we should have the most honourable part in the settlement of Egyptian affairs. Sir, I shall not dwell at greater length upon this part of the subject; but I think it will be expected from me, after these general declarations

  2011
  as to the objects we have had, and those which we still have, if I say a few words with reference to the more strictly military questions which are involved in the Vote of Credit, so far as the operations of the War are concerned. I will not, in the first place, repeat the arguments which have been put with such remarkable force by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to why we should not have sooner engaged in these operations; but there are one or two points connected with that subject which I should like to make quite clear to the Committee after what passed in the previous stages of the debate, and especially on the first day. Now, I was pressed somewhat unreasonably on that occasion with respect to an answer which I had given some days before, in reply to a Question put by the noble Lord opposite about the employment of a certain Major Tulloch, and the advice which he was supposed to have given to Admiral Seymour. The noble Lord, and I think one hon. Member from Ireland, pressed the Question home to me to an extent which I confess made me doubt whether I was wise in refusing to state what I said I ought not to state. My noble Friend asked whether, referring to the statement in The Times, which used Major Tulloch's name, he had advised with the view to avoiding the perpetration of atrocities, that there should be a force to land when the bombardment took place. Well, Sir, the Question having been urged, I thought it would be a simple and natural course to send this telegram to Admiral Seymour—"Did Major Tulloch warn you against bombardment without landing troops?" I did not say anything more than that, except that I asked for a reply at once, and the answer which Sir Beauchamp Seymour sent us was—"No; decidedly not." I think that answer puts an end to the story about Major Tulloch. Another detail has been alluded to, with respect to the movements of the Army, which requires some explanation. Three charges have been made both in and out of the House, with the object of showing stupidity on the part of those who managed military affairs. One of these, relating to the arrival of the Marines at Alexandria without ammunition, has been conclusively disposed of by the Secretary to the Admiralty. With regard
  2012
  to the second charge, that the Orontes arrived at Alexandria empty, it has been shown that she did not go there at all. A third charge is that a battery of Artillery had been landed without horses. This last charge is quite true. A battery of Artillery from Malta was landed without horses. They could not have been landed with horses, because they had none. In other words, they were Garrison Artillery. As a matter of fact we have no Field Artillery either at Gibraltar or Malta; and when it was necessary to send troops to Alexandria, we despatched a battery of Garrison Artillery, armed with four 40-pounder guns, and these guns have done extremely good service. This, I think, disposes of the last question as to the stupidity of the Government in small points of detail. But I think it will be expected that I should give the Committee some information on questions connected with the strength of this Expedition. These are already subjects of inquiry proposed to be addressed to me by hon. Members. Nevertheless, I think it would be more satisfactory for me to make a statement with reference to them on the present occasion. I want the Committee clearly to bear in mind the difficulties that have been found to exist on previous occasions in sending out with despatch forces satisfactory in point of numbers and other conditions. On the present occasion we have been able to send out such a force in a manner which has, I believe, on the whole, proved acceptable to Members on both sides of the House. It will be in the recollection of the Committee that last year I proposed a somewhat different method of organization for our regiments; and the basis of that proposal was that, instead of our regiments being exactly of the same strength, we should raise the regiments at the top of the rota to the strength of about 1,015 men, and that those regiments should be liable to be treated in the same way as other regiments in reference to service abroad. I said I hoped we should be in a position to send out, when necessary, the First Army Corps in such a condition that volunteers from other regiments would not be required to complete its strength. That, to a great extent, we have been able to do. Of course, in raising the strength of regiments from 600 to, say, 1,000 men, this additional strength must be made up by volunteers

  2013
  from other regiments, or recruits. But we had so arranged, if we had not had the present disturbances, that the regiments at the top of the rota would have been in a thoroughly prepared state for war—that is to say, that they might have gone out without receiving assistance by drafts from other regiments, or by drafts from the Reserve. We have not, of course, had time to complete that arrangement; but we have been able to send out the whole of the First Army Corps, consisting partly of home battalions, and partly of battalions from the Mediterranean Stations, brought up to their full strength in almost every case by men of the Reserve belonging to the respective regiments. At the same time, we have called out about 10,000 men of the Reserve, 2,000 or 3,000 of whom will form a reserve in our Mediterranean Colonies, available to go on service immediately, and the remainder will be drafted to regiments at home, so as to strengthen the force left behind in the Mother Country. I wish these arrangements to be clearly understood, because there seems to be still an impression abroad that we have not been able to dispense with the old system of getting volunteers from other regiments. But we have been able to do this; we have carried out the plan in which our Predecessors in Office took so great a share, although, on this account, we do not claim for ourselves any particular merit. With the exception of raising the strength of certain regiments, to which I have referred, to 1,015 men, all that we have done is simply to carry out the plan initiated by our Predecessors. I think the Committee will rest satisfied with this—that whatever faults there may be in connection with the system, before long, so far as the organization of regiments goes, they will be put on a proper footing. We shall be able to send out a force which, with the Indian troops, will amount to 30,000, leaving out the 20,000 Reserve men, who can be called to the Colours. It is evidence of the gradual progress of reform that we have been able to effect this, and I think the Committee and the country ought to be congratulated upon it. I should like now to explain the arrangements we have made to secure the health of our soldiers. We are entering upon a campaign in a country not necessarily unhealthy, but one in which sanitary
  2014
  arrangements ought to be carefully studied, and I think those who are responsible have devoted themselves to this subject with great zeal and great success. My right hon. Friend behind me will, perhaps, excuse me for being as clear on this point as I always wish to be on economical questions of this kind; but we have come to the conclusion that one of the first instructions ought to be that while extravagance should be avoided, there could be no worse form of economy than starving the sanitary arrangements. I am able, then, to inform the Committee that two hospital ships have been provided, and that we are sending out 800 men of the Army Hospital Corps, together with a very large staff of doctors. Amongst other arrangements for securing the health of our men, I may mention that special measures have been taken for preserving them from a peculiar form of ophthalmia, to which Europeans are very liable in Egypt. I have also been asked to state that we are sending out a body of nurses, both to the hospitals and depots; and in other respects—with regard to which I shall always be happy to satisfy any hon. Member—we are taking every possible precaution against the sanitary dangers of Egypt. We have, for instance, set at rest any possible doubt as to the supply of water by adopting what appears to be a most perfect system. With respect to clothing, we have studied with great care the conditions of service in the climate of Egypt, and I believe we have satisfied every requirement under this head. With regard to tenting. It is necessary that the tents employed should be different from those ordinarily in use, and it is now some weeks since the needful arrangements in this department were set on foot.
  LORD EUSTACE CECIL: Will the tents be double?
  MR. CHILDERS: They will be double—marquees and hospital tents. We have also provided means of transport that I believe will be sufficient for all purposes, and respecting which I shall be happy to give any information that is desirable later on. I may mention that this subject very closely occupied myself and Colleagues during a period of four or five weeks before the other arrangements were made. I will now say a few words as to the amount

  2015
  of the Vote. My right hon. Friend opposite asks me whether we have taken a sufficient amount of money; and the suggestion is that we have not provided for the full time the war is likely to last; and that we may have to come to Parliament for further supplies. The length of the campaign is, of course, a matter of great doubt; but after studying the circumstances which are likely to influence its duration, and after consulting the responsible officers, particularly Sir Garnet Wolseley, we are satisfied that prudence, based on probability, only requires that we should ask for the sum of £900,000 for Army purposes connected with this Expedition on the assumption that the operations will be concluded within two months. If, however, the war wore unfortunately to drag on for a longer time, we should then, doubtless, have again to apply to Parliament. I am not one of those who think that the best way of dealing with these matters is to ask for a sum far in excess of the probable requirements, and then to say you will repay the surplus. The fittest way, in my opinion, is to make the best estimate you can of what is likely to be required, and frankly to communicate it to Parliament. Then, if the estimate is exceeded, I believe Parliament will more readily grant the further sum required than if an unnecessarily large demand had been made at first. The noble Lord asked me a question with respect to vacancies at the War Office owing to the absence of certain officers engaged in the campaign. Assuming that the campaign only lasts for three months, that is a period which does not exceed the term of leave often taken by officers at the War Office in the ordinary course of business. Sir Garnet Wolseley's place will be filled during these three months by a distinguished general officer. The work of Sir John Adye has also been similarly arranged for, and the departments being exceptionally strong, owing to the good selection which we found when we came into Office, I think it possible to carry out the business which has to be transacted without importing into them other officers.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT: The Intelligence Department?
  MR. CHILDERS: The hon. and gallant Member refers to Sir Archibald Alison. I told the House that we did
  2016
  not intend to employ two general officers, and it would, therefore, be quite absurd now to appoint a fresh head of the Intelligence Department. At this point I should like, if the Committee will allow me, to say a word on a matter which the War Office and the Admiralty consider to be of great national importance in connection with an expedition of this kind. I would appeal to the Press, through this House, to be cautious as to what it discloses in relation to matters connected with the campaign. During the campaign in the Transvaal I made a similar appeal, and it was, I confess, fairly responded to. But I already notice in the reports which arrive from the correspondents of newspapers—newspapers not alone of small circulation, but those of the first standing also—a want of caution in the indication of operations which, considernig how rapidly the telegraph carries back anything that appears in the Press here, cannot but be attended with bad results. I trust, therefore, that those who are responsible for the management of newspapers will exercise due discretion with regard to the reports I have alluded to; I hope they will be careful to excise from them every statement that even in a small degree indicates the intentions of military commanders, and thereby interferes with what they are contemplating for the public advantage. I will add that I have not the slightest objection to the presence of newspaper correspondents at the seat of war. On the contrary, I think their presence there a good thing, amongst other reasons, because it is likely to have a good effect upon the officers responsible for the conduct of the war; and, therefore, we shall on this occasion make arrangements similar to those which were made on past occasions under which correspondents of newspapers will be allowed to accompany the Army in the field, but with the necessary restrictions as to the conveyance to their journals of the injurious information to which I have alluded. Although no man detests war more than I do, yet when it becomes necessary to resort to it I sincerely believe that its miseries are not lessened by it being sluggishly carried on. On the other hand, the greatest mistake we could commit in connection with the undertaking we have now embarked in would be to send out our troops precipi-

  2017
  tately without proper arrangements being made as regards stores and other matters, which in every war are quite as important as the fighting men. To those who have criticized the Government for not having been quicker, I reply that we shall do the work more thoroughly by doing it more deliberately. I owe my thanks both to the officials of the War Office and the India Office for the skill with which they have carried out the preparations for the Expedition. With very little excitement and very little notice, we have collected in a few days a force of 30,000 in addition to the force in the Mediterranean; and I have the fullest confidence in the General who is to command and the officers who will be associated with him, as well as in the gallantry of the British soldier, which causes me to believe that they will thoroughly rise to the height of the great task they have before them.
  LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, that everyone would agree with the concluding words of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. He did not propose to follow the great speakers who had exhausted the subject financially, morally, immorally, historically, diplomatically, and in every conceivable way; he rather should confine his observations to that portion of the subject which had been dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman. He believed that every impartial man who had looked into the Blue Books must have come to the conclusion that throughout these transactions, to put it in the fewest possible words, procrastination had been mixed with hesitation and supplemented by vacillation. He believed Her Majesty's Government had been more or less the dupes of the Turk as well as the humble followers of France, and that, like Mr. Micawber, "they had been waiting for something to turn up." He assured the right hon. Gentleman that he had not risen for the purpose of carrying on a disagreeable controversy, or casting reflections upon Gentlemen on the opposite Benches; but this was a time when, before all things, Members ought to recollect that they were Englishmen, and that they were bound, as far as they were able, to support the Government, however strongly they might feel—and he confessed he did feel it—that this war, with all the expense and
  2018
  bloodshed attending it, might have been avoided. But he would pass on to the present and future of the military situation. He did not think the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister quite apprehended the point which hon. Members on that side of the House had urged. Their point was that the Admiral ought to have had a sufficient force at his command for any purposes that he might have thought it desirable to carry out in connection with the bombardment which had taken place. Now, he had heard it stated by those who knew Egypt well that a small force of 5,000 men might have landed without difficulty upon the peninsula which ran between the two lakes, and on which the railway was carried. If these 5,000 men had been landed at the time the bombardment was taking place, it was considered that the Egyptian Army, thoroughly demoralized by the great loss of officers and men, would have been caught, as it were, in a trap; and that, had the isthmus been properly defended, they would have been compelled to surrender. He did not intend to put forward that view authoritatively, notwithstanding that it was the view taken in military quarters, and had, as he believed, been advocated by Dervish Pasha himself. Of course, it was necessary to the success of that plan that the Admiral should have had the necessary force at his command. But that was not the case. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in the course of his speech, said it would be a gross insult to the Conference which was sitting had this landing taken place. But he would like to know how it could be a greater insult to the Conference to land troops at the time of the bombardment, than to land them five or six days afterwards, when the Conference was still sitting? If troops could be landed after the bombardment they could surely have been landed at the time it was taking place. He could not, for the life of him, see that the Conference could have resented this, judging from their subsequent action; nor had he heard that any kind of protest had been made against the landing of our troops, or against our holding Alexandria during the time we had been in possession of the city. However, the subject was an unpleasant one, and he had no intention of pursuing it. As the result of all that had happened,

  2019
  we were about to enter upon an Egyptian campaign at the very worst season of the year. It was almost impossible that the force we were about to despatch in the course of a week or 10 days should arrive before the beginning of September. Now, it seemed to him, notwithstanding what had fallen from the Secretary of State for War, that the Government, throughout these transactions, in consequence of their policy of procrastination, hesitation, and vacillation, had been in very considerable doubt as to the course which they should adopt. First of all, notwithstanding the existence of that lately-constituted and most able Department—the Intelligence Department—it did not seem that the Government were in possession of sufficient knowledge as to the climate, diseases, means of communication in Egypt, or oven of the class of troops best fitted to servo there. Considering that these Egyptian difficulties had extended over the last year and a-half, the Intelligence Department must have been aware that there would shortly be a campaign in Egypt, and that the Government would require exact information as to the best time of the year for undertaking it, the proportions of White and Black troops that should compose the forces, and other matters, such as the means of transport, about which there seemed to be a great amount of uncertainty at the present moment. It was understood that the Life Guards were sent out without horses, and that in all probability they would have to be mounted on donkeys. He had asked the Secretary of State for War whether there was any truth in the report that the War Office had bought 5,000 mules in the South of Europe, and the reply was that there was no foundation whatever in the rumour. When he heard that he was exceedingly sorry, because he could see that his right hon. Friend had not really calculated what was likely to take place. The purchase of mules was a most essential matter. It was only horses of a certain kind that could live in Egypt; and, therefore, if the Life Guards, or any considerable body of troops, were despatched to that country, it was most necessary that a sufficient number of mules should be at hand. The right hon. Gentleman now said that 500 mules had been bought for the present, and that the War Office could
  2020
  lay their hands on the rest; but when the question was asked in the House he said there was no foundation for the rumour that a purchase had taken place. It was an extraordinary thing that the Orontes should have arrived without troops, and the Tamar without ammunition. He hoped they were not about to repeat the story of the great disaster which happened in the Crimea. It was perfectly true that a great deal had taken place since then in the way of thoroughly reforming our Departments, inside and outside the War Office; and he hoped and believed that such a calamity as occurred in the Crimea was, at the present time, impossible. But, having regard to what had taken place politically and diplomatically, the want of preparation, and the waiting on Providence for what might happen on the part of the Government, he confessed he was very nervous when he read the story of the Orontes and the Tamar. The statement of his right hon. Friend had, however, re-assured him. His right hon. Friend had the great faculty of painting everything couleur de rose, and far be it from him to throw a darker shade upon the picture he had presented to the Committee. But he thought it right to ask the Government if they had calculated all the difficulties with which they would have to contend? He had cut from a newspaper a paragraph, which described what the state of the country would be, a month hence, in these words—
  "It is well that the people at home should recognize the importance of rapid action in Egypt. The Nile will soon he up, and all the ground will be flooded; then comes the period of falling water, with universal mud and chance of fever. We ought to be already on the march to avoid the consequences of September."
  The expedition to Egypt under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in 1801, consisted of 13,000 or 14,000 European troops. A very good reason existed for sending out White troops on that occasion—namely, that they had to fight European troops; but we did not send them out in September, we sent them in March, and the whole affair was over before the rising of the Nile took place; and, consequently, there was nothing to be looked to like this state of universal mud and the chance of fever. Now, he would like to know from his right hon. Friend, who was surrounded by the best mili-

  2021
  tary advisers, what would be the position of the English troops, supposing there should be a great inundation of the Nile, and that Arabi Pasha proved himself a greater commander than we took him to be. How would it be possible for us to move a man from Alexandria? If the country were flooded, we should have 24,000 men cooped up in the city, sweltering under a hot sun, attacked by fever, and a prey to ennui. The probable result of this would be great discontent and a large amount of crime, and the troops would either have to be re-embarked, or recourse would have to be necessary to the punishment of death, because, as flogging had been abolished, it would, under the circumstances he had described, be otherwise impossible to maintain discipline. This was probably a matter which his right hon. Friend had taken into consideration. They had received an account the other day that some of our soldiers had looted a Palace belonging to the Khedive. The story had no foundation; but, supposing it had been true, the men could not have been imprisoned. They must have been shot, and the consequence would be the stirring up of a great amount of public opinion against the Government. He was glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) that we were, on the whole, on good terms with the European Powers, a fact which he had previously doubted. They were told that the alliance with France, if it was not cordial, was not otherwise, and that it was possible that they would have the French as helpers and co-operators in the field; but it was a matter of regret that since that statement was made there had been a report that the Vote for the French Naval Demonstration would not be acceded to by the Chambers. If that were true, it seemed to him clear that we should have to go single-handed into this great and unfortunate contest. Again, if we were to judge from the organs of public opinion in Italy, the attitude of that country was anything but friendly at this moment. He made this remark, however, without having read the diplomatic despatches upon that point. Then we had Turkey diplomatizing. He need not ask what the support of Turkey, morally or otherwise, was worth, because the Prime Minister had constantly told
  2022
  them that he had no confidence in Turkey.
  MR. GLADSTONE: When did I say that?
  LORD EUSTACE CECIL: In the Mid Lothian speeches.
  MR. GLADSTONE: Quote them.
  LORD EUSTACE CECIL: It was well known that the right hon. Gentleman was anxious to drive the Turks, bag and baggage, out of Europe, a phrase which he afterwards explained as referring to the Turkish officials.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I have asked the noble Lord to quote that passage from my speech. He has entirely misstated what I said.
  LORD EUSTACE CECIL: Turkey was diplomatizing at the moment; but the Prime Minister had so poor an opinion of Turkey, that that did not signify.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I did not say so.
  LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he had understood the right hon. Gentleman to say so. He would, however, pass the matter over. His object was only to show that we were not at all certain at that moment of the actual support of any single European Power. There might be a general feeling that it was a very good thing that England, at this moment, should put her hand out and take the chestnuts out of the fire. He dared say that was so; indeed, he had no doubt of it, and that we should only get that kind of moral support. As far as material support was concerned, there was very little chance of it—not that he cared particularly for material support—and he would tell the Committee why. He had had the honour of serving during the last part of the Crimean War, and he knew very well that the feeling of the English officers and men at that time was not in accord with that of the French and Sardinians. He recollected a certain passage in Mr. King-lake's work, The Invasion of the Crimea, with regard to Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud after the Battle of the Alma. Mr. Kinglake stated, in so many words, that had Marshal St. Arnaud given that support to Lord Raglan which Lord Raglan had a right to expect, the Allied Forces, immediately after the Battle of the Alma, would have marched directly upon Sebastopol, and, in all probability, the conclusion of the war would have been brought about

  2023
  very much earlier than it actually was. Lord Raglan, with that admirable tact and that perfect knowledge of men which he possessed, did not make this in anyway a personal complaint; but he (Lord Eustace Cecil) knew, from information he had received, that Lord Raglan felt the matter very keenly. He knew, also, that after the Battle of Inkermann there was a considerable amount of ill-feeling between the two Armies, because the French, whether rightly or wrongly, did not support their Allies as cordially and as completely as it was thought they ought to have done. He had no wish to go back upon these old stories, or to make any insinuation against the French; but it was necessary, for the sake of his argument, to say that there was a feeling, after the Battle of Inkermann, that the Frenchhad not come up in support of the English troops as they had a right to do. That was the result of having allied nations with Armies working in the field together; and he believed it was the feeling of every officer who served in the Crimea that if ever we were called upon to take the field again he would prefer, if possible, to serve alone. He had, therefore, no regret, in a military point of view, that we were going to undertake this expedition to Egypt single-handed. We should be more likely to take the chestnuts out of the fire satisfactorily to ourselves, and we should not be subjected to the jealous or carping criticisms of our neighbours. Whatever might become of Egypt we should have to bear the brunt of the battle, and we should have the right hereafter of settling the affairs of that nation. He desired to say one word as to the troops whom it was proposed to send out. He had alluded to the Life Guards; he did not know why they should be sent out, except for the attack which had been made upon them by an hon. Member. He had no wish to say anything derogatory of those gallant troops. He knew that they did good service at Waterloo, and he was satisfied that they would do good service in Egypt; but he confessed he did not understand why men 6 feet 2 inches high should be sent out without their horses, for the only purpose, as far as he could understand, of riding Egyptian donkeys.
  SIR ARTHUR HAYTERremarked, that the Life Guards, like any other
  2024
  Cavalry, would go out with their horses.
  LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he was very sorry to hear it. In that ease, it was much to be feared that very few of the animals would ever come back again. What he wanted to know was, why Her Majesty's Government were going to send out to Egypt this enormous force of 24,000 men, seeing that at the Battle of the Alma, when we were fighting the whole of the Russian Empire, we had only 27,000 men. Was it known that we never sent so large a force out before, since the days of the Crimea and the Peninsula? And why we should send out a force of that nature, for the purpose of fighting some 10,000 demoralized Egyptians, he could not for the life of him understand. The only way in which he could understand the matter was this—that the Government wanted to occupy the country afterwards. If that were so, he warned them that their occupation would prove to be a very costly affair; and after the country had been inundated, and they had had the horrible months they had been talking of, he should like to know how many of their Army and of their black horses would ever come back again? It seemed to him that, if ordinary common sense were used in the matter, they might send out a certain number of White troops; that would be all well and good; but the large number of the forces ought to be Native troops from India, who were far better fitted to endure the climate, and who would be far less costly. The only reason he could understand why these Native troops had not been sent to Egypt was that there were very few to send. And why were there few to send? It was because the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of Hartington), whom he did not see in his place at that moment—and there were very few who entertained the opinion of the noble Lord now—it was because the noble Lord had been steadily reducing the Native Army for the last year or a year and a-half. It might have been supposed that as this Egyptian Question had now been going on for about the same period, affecting, as it did directly, the great Empire of India, and leading, perhaps, to a general European war, the reduction of the Indian Army would have been about the last thing the Go-

  2025
  vernrnent of India would have thought of entertaining. Nevertheless, he understood that a reduction had taken place of about 9,000 or 10,000 men. Those 9,000 or 10,000 men were seasoned soldiers, whose services would have been of the greatest advantage to Her Majesty's Government at this moment. Through having taken this course they were now compelled to send out some 24,000 men from among the best troops we had; and there was a chance, when they reached Egypt, of finding themselves cooped up in Alexandria, and, instead of being food for powder, becoming food for worms. He desired now to say a word or two in regard to the question of expense. The question of expense was not a matter that could be passed over. In January, 1854, Lord Aberdeen, being then Prime Minister, moved in the House of Lords for a Vote of Credit for £3,000,000, and it was then supposed that the Guards would go to Malta and come back again with return tickets. But they all know that a serious and costly war followed, and in the month of December of the same year Parliament had to assemble. The war itself lasted for a year or a year and a-half, and, instead of costing £3,000,000, the country had, in the end, to pay something like £100,000,000. The next expedition of a considerable character was that to Abyssinia. The Government asked for that Abyssinian Expedition £2,000,000, and proposed to send out 10,000 men. The whole Estimate of the cost of the war was £3,500,000. The Estimate was moved by right hon. Gentlemen who agreed with him in politics; and they all knew, after it was proposed by Mr. Ward Hunt, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, how severely it was criticized, and how in every way it was pulled to pieces. He believed that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was one of the critics.
  MR. GLADSTONE: No; I was not.
  LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he had no wish to misrepresent the right hon. Gentleman.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I voted with the Government for the Vote.
  LORD EUSTACE CECILremarked that if he was wrong he was glad to be corrected. Certainly, the Estimate was criticized by the Opposition, and by right hon. Gentlemen who ordinarily agreed with the Prime Minister in politics. He
  2026
  was quite certain that many criticisms were made upon what was termed the bad Conservative finance, and Lord Sherbrooke (then Mr. Lowe) complained that they were very bad Estimates.
  MR. GLADSTONE: That was afterwards.
  LORD EUSTACE CECIL: Afterwards! No doubt, the Estimates were very much criticized afterwards. The Government asked for £3,500,000, of which only £2,000,000 were to be spent in the year for which the Vote was passed; but it was well known that, in the end, the Abyssinian War cost £9,000,000, although it was only to be an expedition of 10,000 men, who were to be removed from Bombay to Abyssinia, and were then to march for some 200 or 300 miles into the country. Somehow or other, how the money was spent nobody ever appeared to know. The result was that the country had to pay no less than £9,000,000. Now, what was it that Her Majesty's Government proposed to do at this moment? They were to move a force of 24,000 men to Alexandria, and the Committee were told that it would also be necessary to move a further force of 10,000 men from India. He thought the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India had fixed the Indian contingent at that figure; and now the right hon. Gentleman opposite came down to the Committee and asked the House of Commons for a Vote of Credit for £2,300,000. This, be it remembered, was to cover the expense of an expedition consisting of a force of 24,000 White troops and 10,000 Native Indians. The matter was a very important one, and he asked the Committee to consider it seriously. The whole of the extra taxation would be thrown upon one class of the taxpayers—namely, the income taxpayers, and there was no doubt that there would be a heavy bill to pay in the future. No other class would be called upon to pay a farthing, and he was exceedingly sorry for it.
  MR. GLADSTONE: We had a precedent for that course.
  LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he was glad that a precedent could be cited; but he regretted that the whole of the country was not to be made to feel the burden. The sum which they might be required to spend in the future was a very important matter, and it was per-

  2027
  fectly clear that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was to throw the whole of the burden upon one class of the taxpayers. It was for this reason he was urging now that it would have been far wiser if a larger number of Coloured soldiers were sent out who, if he did not understate the case, would cost not more than one-third of the expense of sending out English soldiers. He did not think the Government or the Committee had sufficiently taken into consideration what a very expensive article the English soldier was. He recollected the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), in one of the first speeches he delivered, informing the House with truth, some years ago, that the English soldier cost £100 a-year. He (Lord Eustace Cecil) had some experience in the provisions, clothing, and other matters connected with the British soldier; and he was satisfied that he did not in the slightest degree overstate the case when he asserted that since the right hon. Member for Bradford made that statement the sum of £100 a-year. which had been put down as the cost per man, had gone up to £130. The Black soldier was not only far better suited to the climate of Egypt, but he lived for a great deal less, and cost considerably less in consequence. The expense of keeping him in Egypt would be very much less than would attend the enormously costly expedition which Her Majesty's Government had decided upon sending out. He did not pretend to say for what reason this large force of men had been fixed upon, unless it were to show that we were able to send out a corps d'armée. He was glad to find that the Government were in a position to send out a corps d'armée. It had been said there were grave doubts whether we could send out half that number of men; and, considering the garrison we had at this moment in Ireland, it was creditable to the military authorities that they were able to collect so large a number of troops and send them out. But le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle; and he could not conceive why we should send out this enormous force for such a campaign, unless it was intended to march all over the country and occupy it. It certainly was not required if there was any likelihood of the troops being cooped up in Alexandria, where they would meet
  2028
  with every kind of misfortune in the shape of disease; and he could not for the life of him understand how it was that the Government had decided upon sending out such a force. He hoped some explanation would be given by the Secretary of State for War, and if such a force was really required, the proper place to find them would be India; and India was quite as much interested— nay, even more interested—than this country in maintaining the Suez Canal. The least we might have expected was that the Indian authorities should have provided the men. He should also like to hear something as to the sanitary arrangements which had been alluded to by the Secretary of State for War, whom he regretted to see absent from his place. It was quite right that the sanitary arrangements should be attended to; but although he thought our brave soldiers should have every possible want supplied he did not think they ought to be furnished with luxuries. He had heard of all sorts of things being sent out, such as veils and spectacles.
  MR. GLADSTONE: To guard against ophthalmia.
  LORD EUSTACE CECIL: They would guard against ophthalmia, no doubt; but it was only under certain circumstances that ophthalmia arose, and, as he had said before, it was not necessary to provide the troops with luxuries. All that was required was to see that their legitimate wants were attended to. He did not say that in a few cases the articles ordered to be sent out might not be necessary; but there was no necessity for a largo or general supply of them. No doubt, when they consulted the Medical Department, one gentleman would say—"Such and such things are required," while another medical officer wouldsay—"We must also have such and such articles, "and so the matter went on. Having had to do with old stores, he knew what it was that happened when all these things went back again into the stores. If any particular articles were absolutely needed they should be supplied without stint; but the experience of former days proved that many of the articles directed to be supplied were really not wanted, and were only to be regarded as luxuries. He was satisfied that the House of Commons and the country would grudge no expense for the preservation of the lives and health

  2029
  of the soldiers; but it was quite absurd to waste money in stores that were not required. At any rate, there should be some limit, and the Government ought not to send out more than was absolutely necessary to supply the wants of the men. Otherwise, all he could say was that their estimate of £2,300,000 would turn out to be much too small. What happened when the Vote of Credit for £6,000,000 was voted when the late Government was in power? It was often said that the Vote of Credit for that sum was most extravagant, and yet the Government did not move a man. Her Majesty's Government came down now and asked Parliament for£2,300,000, and they proposed to move 24,000 men. What portion of that sum they were going to apply to the removal of Indian troops from India to Egypt still required explanation. It was always a disagreeable task to make criticisms of this sort, and all he could say was that upon that side of the House hon. Members felt they were bound, and he hoped they would give the Government every support in the emergency in which they found themselves placed. But in giving them full support they would reserve to themselves the right they undoubtedly possessed of criticizing the way in which the Government had brought the country into this great mess—for he could call it nothing more. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, through his very long political life, had passed through many changes of scene, and had filled many different positions. Indeed, speaking of the right hon. Gentleman with the greatest possible respect, he did not suppose there was a single position in connection with the Government of the country which the right hon. Gentleman had not filled; and it now remained to be seen whether he would be a successful War Minister. He would assure the right hon. Gentleman that while economy was always to be studied efficiency was the first thing to be secured. The truest economy was to obtain everything that could be required, to have all their reserves and all their stores in the best possible order, and, in whatever part of the world their services might be required, to employ those troops who were the most fitted for the purpose and occasion. It was because he believed that Her Majesty's Government had not exercised all the judg-
  2030
  ment they ought to have done that he very much feared and apprehended some disaster might arise—not a disaster over which we could have any control, but a disaster brought about by fever and disease, to which, above all other men, White troops were subject in tropical climates.
  MR. VILLIERS-STUARTsaid, the noble Lord who last addressed the Committee seemed to be apprehensive that they were choosing the very worst time of the whole year for their operations in Egypt; but, as a matter of fact, the summer season was by no means unhealthy. The heat was not oppressive, there was a cool north wind blowing, and it was not until October that the inundations began to retire, and the mud banks appeared. The country then did become unhealthy, as he knew from experience. But they must hope that the military operations would be over long before the unhealthy season set in. The noble Lord also anticipated that they would have to march of 180 miles from Alexandria to Cairo; but it would be a most perverse thing if they preferred a march of 180 miles from Alexandria through the mud to a march of only half the distance across the Desert from Ismailia. There were other matters touched upon by the noble Lord which he had to refer to later on; at present he wished to refer to some remarks which were made from these Benches. An hon. Member on this side of the House (Mr. Rylands) levelled at the Government a charge which he thought was one of the most cruel and most unjust that could have been made—namely, that the guilt of the bloodshed in the massacre of the 11th of June rested upon the Government, be-cause that massacre was the consequence of the sending of the Fleet into Alex-audrian waters. He was in a position to state that the arrival of the Fleet had nothing to do with the massacre. It happened he had received letters from friends of his who were residents of Cairo; these letters were written before the Fleet arrived at Alexandria, and in those letters it was stated that Arabi was sending out emissaries to work up the religious fanaticism of the people and to foment hatred towards the Europeans, and it was also stated that that was so well known in Alexandria that there the presentiment had established

  2031
  itself in the minds of the foreigners, especially the Maltese, that such a rising and such a massacre as had occurred would take place. Only the other clay he was informed by Mr. Cookson, the Vice Consul at Alexandria—and it showed that not only the Europeans, but the Natives, were looking forward to that massacre—that the conduct of the Natives had become so defiant and so insolent that oven the Arab pedlars, when hawking their wares, carried this notice—"Buy, oh! Christians, buy today; for you won't be here to buy tomorrow." That was before the arrival of the Fleet, and the result showed how thoroughly well grounded were the anticipations of the Europeans and Natives. He believed that if it had not been for the presence of the Fleet the disaster would have been far more terrible and complete than it was; had it not been for the asylum offered by our men-of-war, every European might have been massacred. Surely there was no hon. Member in the House who would blame the Government for sending the Fleet to Alexandria, or who would maintain that it was our duty to have left our countrymen there to their fate. If the Fleet had a right to be there, it also had a right to take measures necessary for its self-preservation. The earthworks and the guns on the sea front were directed against our ships, and against nothing else; therefore Sir Beauchamp Seymour had as good a right to destroy them as a man had a right to strike a pistol from the hand of the man who aimed at his life. Complaints had been made that a sufficient military force was not sent out to prevent the burning of Alexandria and the escape of Arahi. But it would have been impossible for us to have foreseen long enough beforehand that the burning of Alexandria would take place, because it would be remembered that at the very last moment it was hoped that Arabi would be as good as his word, and would discontinue the fortifications. It would have taken a long time to have sent out a sufficient force to have cut off Arabi's retreat. The neck of land of which the noble Lord spoke was occupied by the city itself, and it would have required a very large force indeed to have extended itself over the miles of country in the rear of the city, and to have taken up a secure military position. We had not
  2032
  time, under the circumstances, to send out the force required. He had heard a parallel drawn between the burning of Alexandria and the burning of Moscow; but there was nothing in common between the two instances. The burning of Moscow had an object and a pur-pose—the object was a patriotic one— namely, to cause disaster to the invading Army of Napoleon by destroying its shelter. The burning of Alexandria could have no military advantage whatever to the men who perpetrated it— it was simply an act of savage ferocity. Speeches had been made from the Benches near him during the debate which were remarkable for florid oratory; but they showed a great deal of ignorance of the people and of the country which formed their subject-matter. In those speeches there were many professions of attachment to the Government and admiration for the distinguished statesman at the head of the Government; but from no part of the House did such vehement denunciation of the policy of the Government come as from these Benches. They must only hope that the bark of hon. Gentlemen was worse than their bite, and that what was said was intended more for their constituents than for this House. He would not go into the abstract question whether intervention or non-intervention was the proper course. As a matter of fact, Her Majesty's Government had not the choice open to them; they found that the intervention was an established fact, and they had to make the best of it. The Control was established, and he believed it was established with the approbation of the great majority of Englishmen, It had been brought as a charge against the Government that they had. interfered in the development of the National movement in Egypt; hut, having been acquainted with Egypt for many years, and having been there for some months last winter, both in the lower and upper regions, and having had opportunities of acquainting himself with the feelings and views of the people, he could assert most positively that in the interior of the country there was no sympathy with Arabi and his claims. The farmers and peasantry appreciated the benefits of the Control; they appreciated the vast improvements in their position and circumstances that had resulted from it—

  2033
  the diminished taxation, the increased personal liberty, the freedom from exactions by the bastinado, and the better administration of justice. After the Control was established there was a degree of prosperity which had never been witnessed before in Egypt, and the people in the interior would have been only too glad if that happy state of things had been allowed to continue. He was bound to say that although the people in the interior had no sympathy with Arabi, it was otherwise in the cities—in Alexandria and Cairo—and for the reason that there the people had profited very much by the extravagant and reckless expenditure that had gone on previous to the days of the Control. As may be very easily supposed, the Control had very many enemies, because it introduced a system of rigid economy and retrenchment, and it displaced many Europeans and Natives who had previously occupied very profitable positions. Worse still, it found an enemy in the Army, because regiments were disbanded and officers were dismissed, and expenses were cut down in all directions. The governing classes in the Provinces also resented the Control, because it took out of their hands the power of the bastinado which they had hitherto wielded. Last, but not least, the Sultan became an ememy of the Control, because those splendid bribes which had found their way into his Treasury under the late Khedive ceased under the Control. It would be easily understood, therefore, how formidable this array of enemies of the Control was. Arabi was encouraged by another class—the Italians and the Germans—and he (Mr. VilliersStuart) had ample opportunity of seeing their operations in Cairo. He saw the development of their intrigues; and he watched with great interest how the Italians and the Germans, animated by a jealousy of France, encouraged Arabi, who was also encouraged by certain Englishmen who were deceived by his sham patriotism. He made these statements from personal knowledge, and he could assure the Committee that there was nothing in the nature of a true National movement in the present revolt. Arabi and his followers were animated by far more sordid motives. The ingredients he had mentioned formed the intrigue of Arabi, his instrument was the Army, and his
  2034
  purpose was the overthrow of the Control, and the promotion of his own ambitious ends. His earliest step was the increase of the Army, and the whole tendency of his movement was retrograde from the very first; and, as it developed, its selfish character became more and more pronounced, and more and more mischievous. Hon. Gentlemen opposite appeared exceedingly anxious to throw Egypt back again into the hands of the Turks; but he doubted whether they had considered what the consequences would be. Under the system of European Control, enormous improvements had taken place in the condition of the country. Twenty-five years ago its population lived in a state of abject slavery. His blood had often boiled at the ill-treatment and oppression of the people which he had witnessed; but he confessed that during the whole of last winter, while he was there, he did not see the bastinado used in a single instance. It was obvious the Control had developed the liberty of the Egyptians instead of being adverse to it. When he first knew Egypt the practice was to extort the last penny that could be extorted; the tax-gatherers were not guided by the amount that was honestly due in the way of Imperial taxation, but they demanded from the fellaheen every farthing they could wring out of him by torture. It was, therefore, a mistake to suppose that the bondholders were answerable for the present state of affairs. It was quite the contrary. Although much more was now paid annually as interest on the debt, yet, as a matter of fact, it was now levied equitably, and actually a smaller amount was extorted from the people than under the old régime. If Her Majesty's Government had been influenced by a wish not to adopt the retrograde policy of giving the Turk a stronger hold in Egypt they deserved the approbation of all right-minded men. The Government had been pursuing a most enlightened and statesmanlike course, and he should regret extremely if the force of circumstances defeated their intentions. Hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House had insisted upon the right of the Egyptians to govern themselves, and no one sympathized more thoroughly with that sentiment than he did. He sympathized entirely with the Egyptian people. He took a very great interest in them, and if he believed that leaving them to

  2035
  themselves at this crisis would promote the cause of freedom amongst them, he should be very sorry for this country to interfere. But he believed that directly opposite consequences would follow. He believed they would be bound hand-and-foot under a most cruel and crushing military despotism; he believed that nothing could be more thoroughly fatal and destructive of the interests of freedom than to allow the present state of things to continue. Egypt might be considered to be peopled by two races— the governing race and the subject race. The governing race differed even in colour, and were either of Turkish or Arabian origin; whereas the great mass of the population were coloured people, the descendants of the ancient Egyptians. The government of the Turk, wherever it had been tried, had been nothing better than a curse upon the countries over which it had extended. From a European administration they might expect better things. What he was anxious to impress on Gentlemen who were opposed to intervention at present was that it was not a question between Native government and government by foreigners, but between the government of the Turks and the government of the Europeans. Gentlemen who said that men preferred to be governed badby by their own countrymen rather than well by foreigners had no conception of the cruelty, oppression, tyranny, and misgovernment which prevailed in Egypt before the Control. He had seen Egypt at its worst under Turkish despotism, and under the rule of the bastinado, and he had seen it at its best—only a few months ago— under European administration. It was impossible to exaggerate the striking contrast there was between the two states of things. If intervention was wrong in principle in the present case it seemed to be justified by the result. He had often been asked by the people in the interior whether there was any chance of England taking possession of the country, and they had asked the question whilst groaning under the system of oppression which prevailed. They had seemed to hail with joy the prospect of being under English rule, and they looked upon it as a bright future indeed compared with the dark lot under which they now lived. It was the unanimous opinion of those who knew Egypt that the only remedy
  2036
  for its evils was to replace Turkish despotism by European administration. The hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard) had spoken of the drain on the resources of the country which the payment of the interest to the bondholders caused. He would point out that, although there had been very grievous financial mismanagement, it must not be supposed that the whole of the large sums which were contributed by the bondholders in this country were altogether wasted. On the contrary, most important public works were undertaken with the money. Twelve hundred miles of railways were constructed—embankments, bridges, and irrigation works were carried out; and, besides that, the cotton cultivation was developed and the sugar industry created with the money. Those industries were the fruits of the loans, and they contributed to increase the Revenue of Egypt very largely. He had no hesitation in saying that the increased revenue from those causes went a good way towards covering the amount of interest paid to the bondholders. It was too late to talk about non-intervention. It would be simply disgraceful if England did not intervene, if England now turned a deaf ear to the cause of humanity, and left the country, for the good government of which it had made itself responsible, a prey to anarchy and ruin. He was convinced their true policy was to promote, if possible, the total separation of Egypt from the curse and blight of Turkish rule. The only hope for the real independence of Egypt lay in its being trained and prepared under European tutelage for free institutions. He believed there was good stuff in the Native Egyptian race; he knew they had good qualities—industry, docility, patience, and intelligence. Only give them time and good government, and they might yet become a free, self-governing, and an independent people. He believed England was undertaking a noble mission, and that it would be successful. He believed they would lay the foundations of the future independence of Egypt, and that the result of their action would sooner or later be to relieve Egypt of the curse of slavery under which she had for many centuries groaned. Holding these sentiments, he should give his most hearty support to the Government in this matter.
  MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHYagreed with his hon. Friend (Mr. Villiers-Stuart) in his detestation of Turkish rule in Egypt, and in the belief that it would be a misfortune if Egypt were to be again subjected to Turkish rule. He did not, however, understand how his hon. Friend supposed that by the vote he was now about to give he would assist Egypt to obtain her national independence. The hon. Gentleman praised Egypt's virtues, he praised her patience and her industry, he admitted her claim to independence, and for that reason he supported a Vote to enable the Government to carry war into the country, to destroy its towns, and to put down any representative leaders they might have. He agreed with his hon. Friend that the Control, whatever act of policy created it, was productive of decided material advantage to Egypt. Taxes and all other imposts were arranged, under the Control, upon a definite and distinct principle. The poor man knew exactly what he had to pay, and in every way a material impulse was given to the prosperity of Egypt. But his hon. Friend seemed to have forgotten that during all this time the old system of Turkish rule was working actively in the interior; that the Control in no way interfered with the police of Egypt, and a great many of the old evils were as rife as they had been before the days of the Control. In some parts of the country it would be found that the Slave Trade was carried on as openly as ever. The Control had, however, done some practical and substantial good; but that was not exactly the question the Committee had to consider now. What they had to consider was, in fact, whether the Control, no matter what its merits, was worth the tremendous costs and sacrifices it seemed to have brought with it; the question was whether that policy which led to the bombardment of Alexandria, to the murder of Christians, and to a condition of war, was surrounded with advantages which outweighed these evil effects. It was useless to endeavour to deny that this was strictly and distinctly in its origin a bondholders' war. It was as much a bondholders' war as was the Mexican campaign under the Emperor of the French. Did anyone a year and a-half or two years ago suppose there was the slightest danger to
  2038
  the free navigation of the Suez Canal? There was no question, as there could not have been any question of the safety of the Suez Canal. Was the war made for the sake of the prosperity and independence of the Egyptian people? He listened with pleasure to the most interesting, instructive, and able speech of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce); and he was greatly pleased with the remark the hon. Gentleman made as to the ideal profession of generosity and benevolence and general philanthropy made by Lord Granville in his despatches. He did not think anyone would pretend to say we had gone into this struggle merely for the sake of doing good to the Egyptians. The undoubted fact was, we had been drawn into this quarrel step by step because of the entanglements of the bondholders. The recent quarrel with Arabi Pasha and with the Chamber of Notables was about the Control and the safety of the Debt. We demanded the right to withdraw from the Chamber of Notables any consideration whatever of the Budget. They claimed the right to go in for the whole Budget, or so much of it as did not involve the foreign Debt; but we contended that, if we did not watch over the whole expenditure, over the whole government and condition of the country, it might come to pass that some Egyptian policy might imperil the revenue of the country, and thus imperil our Debt. We made our Debt a matter of paramount consideration. The welfare of the country and the progress of the people were matters of inferior moment. The one thing we insisted on, and the one thing they resisted, was our right to have our Debt at any cost. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) thought it necessary to remind the Committee yesterday, in his very able speech, that interference in Egyptian affairs was not of recent date. The right hon. Gentleman referred the Committee to the early days of Mehemet Aliand Ibrahim Pasha, and the Committee were to infer that in those times European and English interference in Egypt was acknowledged. The very minutest instruction in history was required to show that English interference in Egypt did not begin with the establishment of the Control; but the difference between the interference of old days and that of the

  2039
  present day was very marvellous. Formerly our interference, whether right or wrong, was one of policy. We were not then tied to the sleeves of the bondholders; there were no bondholders, and there was no Egyptian Debt then. It was not then in the power of a knot of men, looking after their own concerns, to drag us into a struggle such as the one in which we were about to enter. He held there was a great and marked distinction between the past and the present. Formerly interference in Egypt took place at the instance of great and distinguished statesmen; but in the recent affairs we interfered at the command of stockbrokers and money jobbers. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain), in his recent speech, paid a high tribute to the virtue and patriotic earnestness of the Chamber of Notables- He confessed he was somewhat anxious to hear how the right hon. Gentleman would bear himself in the new character of imitation Jingo. He did not seem to enjoy the part; in fact, he got through his part reluctantly and with as little success as possible. The right hon. Gentleman paid a high tribute to the independence and patriotic feeling of the Chamber of Notables, because they set themselves strongly against the feelings and purposes of Arabi Pasha, and because they, and not us, were responsible for the second Dual Note, the Dual Note demanding the exile of Arabi Pasha. The right hon. Gentleman was rather severe with someone who had dared to throw the blame and responsibility of the Dual Note upon Her Majesty's Government. He said the hon. Gentleman who had done this must have paid little attention to the Papers before the House, or he would have known that the Dual Note was sent at the request and suggestion of the Chamber of Notables themselves. The right hon. Gentleman denied that the Ultimatum was an Ultimatum; let them, therefore, call it a penultimatum. Whatever it was, the President of the Board of Trade contended it was nothing of our doing; but it was done at the instigation and instance of the Chamber of Notables. He (Mr. M'Carthy) had taken the pains to read the Papers, voluminous as they were, with some care; and he could not find a line suggesting that the Chamber of Notables recommended the sending of
  2040
  the Ultimatum. On the contrary, it seemed to him that the whole thing was got up on this side of the water. It was M. de Freycinet who concocted the idea of demanding the removal of Arabi Pasha and his Colleagues, and we went with him so far. We afterwards drew back a little, and instructed our Agent in Cairo to do nothing and to say nothing which would prevent the removal of Arabi Pasha. We had some hesitation in going the whole way; but at last we did, and even further than the French were inclined to go, and we forwarded to the Egyptian Government that Ultimatum, or whatever it was, which so vigorously demanded the exile of Arabi Pasha. Arabi Pasha refused to retire from his position, or from the country. Much of the historical interest of the present events centred round the career and character of Arabi Pasha. He would not venture to say what estimation the man had formed of his own position; but he might say he happened to be in Cairo for a considerable part of last winter, at the time when many of the events mentioned in the Papers took place, and he formed some idea of what was passing. In an Eastern country it was difficult to get any knowledge of what was passing in the Native mind. There were some things one could see with the naked eye; one could easily tell whether a man was popular or not with his own people. The present Khedive was not very popular even with the Native population. The Khedive, when he went out driving in the great public drives, as he did two or three times a week, was always received with the most marked attention and courtesy, with loyalty and deference, by all the Europeans and strangers; but he was treated with marked coolness by the Native population. On the contrary, when Arabi rode in the city or suburbs he was received with adverse comment by almost all the foreign population; but he was received, as anyone could see, with favour and enthusiasm by the Native population, down to the donkey boys in the street. He must confess he was rather surprised to hear the hon. Member for Waterford (Mr. Villiers-Stuart) excuse recent events by saying we could not possibly have been prepared for the events which took place, for the first massacre led to the bombardment. If there was one thing that

  2041
  was plain amongst all foreign Consuls in Cairo during all last winter, and he in-eluded some of our own Consular officers in that number, it was a conviction that the moment interference reached a certain point there would be massacre in the great cities of Egypt. He was told that himself again and again in Cairo, and he asked the Representative of one Power if the matter was made known to the English Government; and he assured him that, so far as his own conjecture went, the fact had again and again been impressed upon their knowledge. The common talk and common feeling in Cairo might have afforded some reason why we at home should have known that in drawing too finely the circle of our interference we should bring about, as a necessary consequence, a massacre of Europeans and Christians in some of the towns of Egypt, and that it was our duty to take some measures to guard against such an occurrence. But to return to the position of Arabi. Whatever he might have been in the beginning it was quite certain we had made him a great man, a great hero with his countrymen. From the moment he appeared in any prominence on the political stage, by a kind of instinct all European public opinion had been directed against him, and had made a set against him, and had singled him out as the representative man and spokesman of that cause, to the head of which he was then only trying to push himself. He should not judge of Arabi's sincerity; but certain it was, if he was the Representative of Islam, in the minds of the people of the country we had done more to place him in that position than any efforts of his own. Arabi did not begin by being in the wrong. On the contrary, Sir Edward Malet admitted that his first grievance—his grievance about the Army—was well founded and just. The men were starving. Arabi, seeing the great incursion of foreigners—indeed, the whole land swarmed with them—and seeing the movement of the French in Tunis, no doubt came to the conclusion that there was an organized attempt on the part of Europe to deny the Egyptians any control over their own country. However that might be, Arabi steadily became powerful, and the public opinion of Europe was unanimously against him. He was set down as an adventurer, a man of blood, a man in
  2042
  every way to be condemned, and European public opinion would hear of no other conjecture. He was opposed to the ideas of the European Powers, to many of their schemes, and they set out with the determination to hold him responsible for everything evil that might occur. The Powers might, perhaps, have been somewhat better instructed if they had consulted the Native Press in the country; but they started their operations by suppressing the Native Press. There was one journal supposed to be the organ of Arabi Pasha, and two or three other Native papers, and we set to work to suppress their publication. The Native Press in Cairo was not very enlightened—it might not even be very high-minded or very safe as an authority; but, at least, it was better than nothing, better than absolute darkness, as a means of getting to know something of what was going on in the Native mind. In one of the despatches of Sir Edward Malet to Lord Granville, on the 31st of October, he said it had been his duty on several occasions to call Cherif Pasha's attention to the increasing virulence of the Native Press, and he had urged Cherif Pasha to use his authority to prevent the dissemination of ideas which preached distrust of Christians and misrepresented the action of France and England towards their Mussulman subjects. The Native journal, El Bourhan, in one of the articles of which Sir Edward Malet complained, said—
  "Up till now we have treated foreigners with all courtesy, and even as if they belonged to a superior creation. Seeing this, they have concluded that our day is past, and resolved to make as much profit as they can out of us. Under pretence of civilization, they have attracted many of our countrymen into their own lands, where every kind of vice is unchecked. Their object in this is to imbue their minds with strange ways and habits, which will cause them to forget their language and their religion. In this way, foreigners hope to get possession of Egypt without fighting for it."
  And then there followed an anecdote on the evils of wine drinking. The El Hedjâs, after much indiscriminate praise of the Arab race, gave an extract from a newspaper published in Yemen, to the effect that Europeans had begun to publish journals in Arabic which aimed at creating divisions among the Arabs. It went on to say that, if they wished to divide them, they would like to see their co-religionists, who were now under

  2043
  the domination of England, France, and Russia, in a condition more satisfactory than the misery they now endured. This country pressed upon Cherif Pasha the necessity for suppressing these organs; but Cherif Pasha replied that French papers published in Cairo were in the habit of using much stronger language against the Egyptians, and if he suppressed the Native papers he would have to suppress the French papers. L' Egypte had insulted Mahomedans by speaking of Osman as the "fanatical descendant of a false prophet." He would ask the Committee if the conduct of the Powers in regard to the Press reflected credit on our honour? He asked if that was the way either to get to understand the Native mind, or to obtain the respect of the Native population of Egypt. In Egypt we were doing paltry work of that kind—work which no one would venture to suggest in Europe, work we had denounced, over and over again, in terms the most indignant and most eloquent. In Cairo we had prevented the publication of papers which contained nothing whatever but a most reasonable and proper defence of Arabian principles and Egyptian politics against the attacks of strangers. He supposed the articles he had referred to were the worst which could be picked out; surely Sir Edward Malet did not pick out the least offensive. Was it to be wondered at that, under a system of this kind, Arabi Pasha, whatever his own merits, came to represent in the Native mind something like the cause which he professed, and which he sought to represent? In an official document, signed by both Controllers, it was said that the Chamber of Notables, which under the Reign of the late Khedive had given innumerable signs of servility, did not hesitate to claim rights incompatible with their position, and had gone so far as to compel the Khedive to change the Ministry which had his confidence. It was held that we were bound to interfere in order to put down such- an intolerable assertion of independence. Was it at all strange that it should occur to the people that they were only meant to be crushed when, in place of a servile Chamber, they had got an independent Chamber? We compelled the course taken by Arabi Pasha. We made him a hero and a leader in the eyes of his countrymen. The other night the right
  2044
  hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) talked in a strain with which they were a little more familiar in the days of Lord Beaconsfield, a statesman whom the right hon. Gentleman did not regard with much commendation and approval. The President of the Board of Trade reminded the Committee that we were a great Mahomedan Power in the East, and, therefore, bound to look carefully after the safety of our Indian Empire. Was the course we were now pursuing likely to strengthen our position as a great Mahomedan Power? Was it not certain that day after day we wore making Arabi Pasha more and more recognized as the champion of Islam? It was the fact that many of the Natives in our own Dominions were being converted to the Mussulman faith; and, therefore, by the course we had adopted in Egypt, a new danger and difficulty was arising. We went on from bad to worse, until we sent our ships to Alexandrian waters. Then came that massacre which was talked of and prophesied as a certain result of our interference. He was not an advocate of interference, unless under the extremest national necessity; he certainly would not go so far as to say there were not occasions when a nation must interfere, for her own sake, in the affairs of a foreign country. We wore now obliged to go on. We were to go on at the most unfavourable time of the year, through a most difficult country, and under circumstances when a single loss on our part, or a single successful skirmish of Arabi Pasha's forces, would fill all the Mahomedan mosques throughout the world with hope and passion. He confessed that even if he were not a devoted admirer of non-intervention, he should doubt very much about giving Her Majesty's Government this Vote of Credit. They had not shown themselves much more fitted for making war than they showed themselves fitted for making peace. Her Majesty's Government had acted as Spenser's knight acted; they had listened to doubt, and they had yielded to delay, and now they found themselves in the presence of the Giant Danger. They would not go much further without seeing across their path the shadow of that yet more terrible monster, the Giant Disaster.
  MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, the calm and quiet aspect of the Committee en-

  2045
  abled him to address some observations to the Chair. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. M'Carthy) who had preceded him was great as an orator, as an historian, and as a novelist; but he thought the hon. Member had drawn on his imagination for the character he had given Arabi Pasha. They knew perfectly well that most eminent men in the world were very frequently great patriots; and they also knew that military adventurers always called themselves patriots in order to advance their own ends. They knew little of the career of this Arabi Pasha; but they did know that he had designedly massacred Europeans in Alexandria, and had deliberately burnt down one of the noblest cities of his native land. There were Gentlemen on the Ministerial side of the House—Gentlemen with whom, upon domestic matters, he (Mr. Labouchere) generally agreed—who had taken an exceedingly strong view of the action of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt. He perfectly understood their position, and he sympathized with them in their general objections to interference; but it seemed to him that in this particular case they had laid down a general rule that interference was wrong, because, in their opinion, this was a bondholders' war. He entirely denied that this was a bondholders' war. If it were a bondholders' war, he was sure that not only would the voices of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) and the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard) have been raised against it, but the Prime Minister and others on the Treasury Bench would have been found refusing to have any connection with it. He did not wish to go into all the details of the Control; they had been gone into very clearly and fully by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). But the Committee must remember that our relation towards this Control was mainly caused by the fact of the French having claims against the Egyptian Government based upon debts owing to Frenchmen. The French had always held that they had a right to force the country to pay its debts. The French were prepared to interfere in Egypt alone if we did not join them. He was not in the habit of lauding right hon. Gentlemen opposite for their conduct towards any other Power; but he thought they were per-
  2046
  fectly justified in their action in Egypt. It must not be supposed that the Control was established exclusively in the interest of the bondholders; in fact, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon went there to reduce the Debt. The right hon. Gentleman's orders were to establish a sound financial administration in Egypt; and, if he might compare what the right hon. Gentleman did in Egypt with what had been done in the House of Commons, he would say the right hon. Gentleman established a Land Law in Egypt by which the land taxes were properly adjusted. Before the Control was established, as much was exacted from the people as could be forced out of the wretched fellahs; but the right hon. Gentleman stepped in. He ascertained what the people could live and thrive on, and then said—"So much you shall pay; the interest to the bondholders shall be reduced, and you shall not be called upon to pay more than the exact amount that you are charged for in the taxes." The scheme, therefore, was not introduced essentially for the benefit of the bondholders, for by it the amount paid to them was reduced. He would ask his hon. Friends who sat near him, what would be the effect of the vote they proposed to give if that vote were successful? The effect would be that the English nation would have to withdraw entirely from the position they now occupied in Egypt. He did not believe that even his hon. Friends desired such an event. Whatever might be said with regard to the initiation of these acts in Egypt, he believed that if we were to withdraw at the present moment we should not only act in a contemptible manner to the Khedive, but in a contemptible manner in the face of Europe. India would not be worth one year's purchase. He was not a great believer in prestige; but if we were to retire after our men had been massacred our Empire in the East would not be worth a year's purchase. Most of the speeches that had been made in the present debate had come from the Leaders of the Conservative Party; but it seemed to him that hon. Gentlemen of that Party had been in a somewhat difficult position. They had criticized the conduct of the Government, but each of them had done so from a very different point of view. What was the charge brought by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bourke)?

  2047
  He said that we had been too friendly with France, and not sufficiently so with the Sultan. Under the circumstances, he (Mr. Labouchere) did not think we could act in too conciliatory a manner towards France, and we now perceived the effect of our action. We saw that France was irate with us because we were going to take a more active part in suppressing this revolt than France herself. The right hon. Gentleman said with regard to the Sultan we were too conciliatory, and then complained that we had not acted with sufficient energy. Who prevented us from acting with energy? Surely not the Sultan; and, as far as he could gather from the right hon. Gentleman's speech, he would have us act without regard to the Sultan; but, knowing the necessity for complaining of something, he complained of the Government for not being sufficiently conciliatory to the Sultan. The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), who was always complaining that he was not a Baronet, took the same line as the late Under Secretary, but went a little further. The hon. Member was fond of discovering mare's nests, and he thought he had one which he would submit to the Committee. It was this. There were, as everybody knew, negotiations with France for the continuance of the Commercial Treaty, and we were acting with them in regard to Egypt. He said it was evident that the Government truckled to France, and made a species of corrupt bargain with France, saying that if France would give in on the Commercial Treaty, then England would allow France to do exactly what she liked in Egypt. Except in the hon. Member's own mind, there was not the slightest connection between the Commercial Treaty with France and the action of England and France in Egypt. The hon. Member for Longford (Mr. M'Carthy) contested the fact that Sultan Pasha had looked at the Memorandum of the 25th of May, to which reference had been made. The President of the Board of Trade stated that that Memorandum emanated from Sultan Pasha. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also said so; but the hon. Member for Longford said he did not find it in the Blue Book. He (Mr. Labouchere) could understand that, for it took place at Cairo, and if Arabi had known of that despatch Sultan Pasha would have been
  2048
  in danger of his life. Did anybody mean to say that the Notables and Arabi were at any time acting together? He entirely denied that; and he found that soon after that Ultimatum the Ulemas and the Notables went to the Consuls of France and England and said they were in fear of their lives from Arabi. Moreover, as the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had pointed out, when it came to an independent vote there were 67 Notables voting against Arabi and nine for him. How could it possibly be said that Arabi and the Notables wore ever acting together, except at some particular moment when Arabi was practically holding a pistol at their heads? Hon. Gentlemen had pointed out that there was some inconsistency in the action of the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party. [Lord EUSTACE CECIL: Hear, hear!] The noble Lord said "Hear, hear!" but, if he remembered aright, that noble Lord, early in the evening, showed how much he knew about the subject by citing a speech of the Prime Minister, and said, if it was not precisely as he cited it, probably he had an incorrect copy of it. A very incorrect copy he had. The noble Lord said the right hon. Gentleman had, in that speech, insisted on the Turks being driven, bag and baggage, out of Bulgaria. If the noble Lord would look at a correct copy, he would find that the Prime Minister gave a long list of Pashas and others, and he remembered at the time exceedingly regretting that the Prime Minister did not go further and urge that all Turks—not only Bimbashis and others, but all Turks—should be driven, not only out of Bulgaria, but out of European Turkey. What was the charge of inconsistency? The Prime Minister protested against the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, not because it did interfere with Turkey, but because it did not; and he urged that it would be desirable for England to join with Russia, and call upon the Turks to govern better in Bulgaria and other parts of her Dominions, and pointed out that the Turks would be gainers by that. The result proved that the right hon. Gentleman was right. The reforms were made in Bulgaria; and not only did those Bimbashis go out of Bulgaria, but all Turkish officials. Therefore, if the advice of the right hon. Gentleman had been fol-

  2049
  lowed, it would have been far better for Turkey. But, as he had said before, he was delighted to see the campaign of the right hon. Gentleman against the aggressive policy of the late Government. But he confessed that he was sorry to see that, far from being a persistent advocate of non-intervention, the right hon. Gentleman was somewhat in favour of occasional intervention—from his point of view, rather too much in favour of it, because he was not a believer in the European Concert, and the habit of considering ourselves part and parcel of the moral police of Europe. He did not believe it was our business to interfere in any case unless our interests were absolutely concerned. The hon, and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) complained that the Government acted with duplicity. Duplicity between an English statesman and a Turkish Pasha ! The right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) had stated that, from the fact of Members having to speak openly in the House, they were putting themselves in the position of a man playing whist with his hand on the table; but when they had to play whist or a game of politics with Turkey, they were in a different position. Turkey was like the Heathen Chinee. We could not trust Turkey. She was so base and vile, and so ready to cheat on the first occasion, that it was not, in all probability, as the hon. and learned Member for Chatham had said, that there was duplicity on the side of England, but duplicity on the side of Turkey. He confessed there was some point in what hon. Members said, that a small amount of energy was shown at first. He did not agree that we had made a hero of Arabi Pasha; but he did believe that we gave Arabi an opportunity of figuring as a hero by not taking active steps at first. He thought hon. Gentlemen had a fair case against the Government when they complained that no troops were at hand to land after the business of the Fleet was done. He knew it was said that that could not be done, because the question of whether we could land troops was being discussed in the Conference; but as we had, without a mandate, bombarded the forts of Alexandria, it followed, as a necessary consequence, that we should have taken steps to prevent what we might have supposed would take place
  2050
  from the reckless character of Arabi. At all events, there ought to have been a sufficient number of troops to land in the great European Square, where most of the Europeans were collected. But what was the real answer on this point? The real answer was that a good and great statesmen was not the man who made no mistakes, but the man who made the fewest mistakes; and he must say, the Leader of his Party having made these mistakes, that the Leader of the opposite Party would probably have made more. The Prime Minister had defended, to a great extent, the course of action he pursued, on the ground that he was obliged to take that course in order to act consistently with the action of the previous Government. That was to say, that a state of things had been produced when he came into Office that rendered it necessary for him to go on, step by step, until the bombardment and intervention in Egypt took place. That was a somewhat dangerous argument to use, considering that we should occasionally have Conservative Ministers in power, as he believed that, when they were in power, they would get us into entangling engagements abroad. It would be a great mistake when, after great trouble, they had been turned out, the Liberals should be bound to keep their engagements. He would take the case of Armenia. Lord Beaconsfield signed a Treaty, agreeing in all cases to defend Armenia against Russia, provided certain reforms took place in Asia Minor. Evidently those reforms had not taken place; and, if they had, did the right hon. Gentleman say he would maintain the Treaty? [Mr. GLADSTONE: Yes.] The right hon. Gentleman said "Yes;" but it was a terrible thing, and only showed that the Liberals ought to strive and struggle to keep the Conservatives out of power. The right hon. Gentleman said "Yes;" but he could scarcely agree with him that a Liberal Government must carry out in every particular case the general engagements of their Predecessors, and that they could not renounce their engagements. Be that as it might, he should not vote for the Government, simply because the Government was forced by the attitude assumed by the Conservative Government to go on, step by step, until they reached intervention in Egypt. He considered it absolutely necessary to maintain a

  2051
  supreme and paramount influence over the Canal, and that it was impossible to maintain that influence unless we also had a paramount influence at Cairo. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire said one day in the House—and he thought the House was wrong to laugh at the statement—that the Canal connected two seas, and ran through a desert. That was the whole truth of the matter; the Canal did run through a desert, and the nearest point to this desert was Cairo and the Valley of the Nile, and England could not maintain herself on the Canal without maintaining her paramount influence in the Valley of the Nile. He had never been able to make out whether hon. Gentlemen opposite regretted that France had not taken part with us. He himself was rather glad France had not. For a long time there was a strong feeling in France that she ought to make a great display in Egypt. So far as he could make out, that was because Napoleon had made a great display in Egypt; and he believed that, as England had far greater interests in Egypt than France, France was no longer willing to go to war for an idea, but was willing to leave it to us to occupy the position which we thought we ought to occupy in Egypt. But he should like the Leader of the Opposition to say definitely whether he was in favour of the Sultan intervening by sending troops into Egypt or not. He thought it would be a most serious danger to us if the Sultan were to send troops into Egypt, and that it would be most undesirable that the Sultan should do so. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon had pointed out, the position of the Sultan was very different now from when we first asked him to send troops. It was pretty clear that the Sultan had been intriguing more or less with Arabi. He (Mr. Labouchere) knew that after Arabi had organized the massacre of Europeans the Sultan sent him one of the principal decorations of his country; and before we entered into a species of military partnership with Turkey we ought clearly to understand from the Sultan whether he was a foe of Arabi or not. And he could not understand how we could recognize Turkey as an ally in Egypt until Turkey not only declared Arabi to be a rebel, but stripped him of his decoration. He would go a step further. He hoped the
  2052
  Government would seize this opportunity to cut away the relations between Egypt and Turkey. Why did that relationship exist? It existed through our folly. We must remember that the Egyptians threw off the supremacy of Turkey under Mehemet Ali, who fought a great battle in Syria, and became master of the situation, and insisted that she should withdraw from Egypt. The Suzerainty of Turkey continued to exist, and was, he believed, at the bottom of all these evils. The position of the Sultan was perfectly anomalous, and he could only compare it to the position occupied by the Pope in regard to Naples in past times. Whenever an intrigue took place in Naples the men who wanted to alter the Government fell back on the political Suzerainty which the Pope held over Naples. By having on the one side the Khedive, and on the other side the Sultan, two antagonistic parties were connected. Whenever anyone wanted to go against the Khedive he immediately commenced to intrigue with the Sultan; and it must be remembered that the solo relation of the Sultan with Egypt was this—the Sultan received no money in tribute; he could not properly recall the troops from Egypt, though he had done so once; and the sole relation was that, under Ismail, it was calculated that at least £1,000,000 sterling was extorted in the shape of black-mail from Egypt, and went, to a certain extent, into the pockets of the Sultan and the Sultanas, Eunuchs, and others in Constantinople. So long as the Sultan exercised this Suzerainty whenever anyone wished to act against the Khedive he would think it worth his while to bribe the Sultan. He had been told, and he believed rightly, that the origin of these troubles was the sending of £100,000 by Ismail to Egypt to buy two or three Black regiments. Ismail was to be declared a kind of Khedive; but his heart failed him, and Arabi, having those regiments in his hands, commenced to intrigue with the Turks, and so, little by little, he had acquired his present position. He should vote in favour of the Government. He did not know that there was anyone more strongly opposed to intervention than he was, speaking of the general term; but he really believed this intervention was absolutely necessary if England was to remain the great Empire she was. If she did not interfere now he believed further and greater

  2053
  troubles would arise, and larger amounts of money would have to be spent henceforward. He was glad to think that this was an intervention not to impose a foreign rule in Egypt or a despotism in Egypt; and he believed the Prime Minister, as he had said he would, would make it his business to see that the National feeling was developed.
  SIR GEORGE ELLIOTsaid, he would give a slight narrative of what had taken place for the last nine or ten years in Egypt. He had been in the habit of visiting Egypt every year for the last 14 or 16 years in the winter months. He had had an opportunity of witnessing what was going on in that country since the establishment of the International Courts of Control, and, in his opinion, a most important change had been effected by the introduction of those Courts. He was in Cairo when the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) was exerting all his energies to organize and carry out a scheme for regulating the payment of the bondholders. The right hon. Gentleman was not sent by any Government; but he was the Representative of the English bondholders in conjunction with M. Joubert as the Representative of French bondholders; and he thought he was correct in saying that these two gentlemen did their utmost on behalf of the bondholders. He was not aware that they relaxed any part of the interest that the country was to be subject to; but he remembered very well how hard he had pleaded to have the interest reduced. It was in 1879 that Major Baring and some other gentlemen, after two years of the Control, discovered that it was impossible for Egypt to pay this high rate of interest. There was a discovery of what was called the floating debt, which had to be dealt with, and Major Baring was, he believed, actually sent by the Government—at any rate, he had the authority of the Government—and he recommended the reduction of the interest from 6 to 4 per cent. That reduction was accepted, and reduced interest had been paid. Major Baring was the authorized agent of the English Government at that time. For his own part, he was proud to be associated with and to support the Party who, when in Office, instituted the Control which had worked so well. The country was now about to intervene in
  2054
  the interest and for the good of the people of Egypt, and, therefore, he was prepared cordially to support the present policy of Her Majesty's Government. There was very little doubt that the present difficulty in Egypt was due, in a large degree, to a want of firmness on our part in not dealing sooner with Arabi Bey. Still, there was a difficulty in the way of that, because his experience had shown him that there was always distrust on the part of the people of anything we did in connection with France. He believed, however, that our action in Egypt would result in the consolidation of a good understanding between the two countries. It appeared to him that the campaign in Egypt, whether it proved to be a short or a long one, would be no easy task, and he could not help thinking that if the Government were to obtain the moral support of the Sultan to the extent of proclaiming Arabi a rebel, and offering so much, he would not say for his head, but for his body, it would have more effect upon the Mussulmans, and bring the war to a speedier conclusion than any other mode of action. From his own observation, he could state to the Committee that while the Egyptians hated the French, they had no great objection to the English. The French abstention, therefore, caused him no regret; on the contrary, he thought it was a subject for congratulation, because nothing was more calculated to disarm the followers of Arabi Bey than the fact that the settlement of affairs in Egypt was undertaken by England single-handed. The opinion of Ali Pasha, a man of education, with whom he was personally acquainted, was that if the Khedive could be induced to grant freedom and amnesty to the officers of Arabi they would leave him, and he did not know any person whose opinion in a matter of this kind was more to be relied upon. With this view he concurred in the full belief that if our action was prompt we could, so to speak, encircle the rebellion and crush it. He would also impress upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of having a sufficient number of locomotives at Suez as well at Alexandria, an arrangement which would enable the troops speedily to take up a safe position. It must be remembered that September and October were the two worst months in the year for mili-

  2055
  tary operations, that the Nile was at its highest in September, and that if Arabi Bey were badly disposed he might do a great deal of mischief by flooding the country and keeping it a long time under water. Had it been possible, he would have preferred that 10,000 or 15,000 men should have been sent from India, for the reason that they would have been much better able to endure the climate of Egypt, and in consequence a much smaller sacrifice of life might have been expected. However that might be, he thought that the sooner our force arrived in Egypt the better to counteract the influences that were at work, and to re-assure the loyal inhabitants of the country and to secure their support. It was not necessary for him to dwell upon the facts that we were parties, with others, to the general administration of Egypt, that we had an enormous business interest in the Canal, and that in consequence it was impossible for us to allow that great international highway to be imperilled by the continuance of a state of anarchy in Egypt. His contention was that as long as Egypt was in a state of peace the Canal would be unendangered, and that its management by external intervention was not necessary. Our object being the re-establishment of peace in Egypt, he again ventured to suggest the advisability of obtaining from the Sultan the declaration concerning Arabi Hey to which he had already alluded, and then, with prompt and judicious action, he believed our object would be speedily achieved without aid from the soldiers or ships of other Powers.
  MR. BRYCEsaid, he did not deny that the position was a grave one; but he thought, if it were closely examined, it would be seen that the support which he and other hon. Members on those Benches now gave the Government was not inconsistent with the principles they held in 1880. He agreed with the general principles laid down by the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr, Richard) and the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). He agreed with them in considering that the moral law ought to be supreme with nations as well as with individuals, and in several other axioms they had laid down. But he also felt that these generalities were not enough to solve practical questions. They must examine the facts of the case, how the
  2056
  situation had been brought about, and what it was likely to result in before those principles could be applied. It was at this point that he was obliged to part company with his hon. Friends to whom he had referred. He said, if the situation were looked into, there was no course open to them but to support Her Majesty's Government, although he agreed that, had the present situation been entirely created by the present Administration, this support could not have been given. At what point, he would like to ask his hon. Friends, would it have been possible for Her Majesty's Government to have changed the policy of their Predecessors? When they came into Office in 1880 they found the status quo established. What was before our eyes at that moment—the present hostilities—had sprung from the seed sown by the late Government in 1879; and he submitted that since the present Government took Office there had been no point at which a departure from the policy of their Predecessors could have taken place. When the Liberal Party came into Office, they found that the new Khedive had just been established by the action of the late Government; that a great deal of capital had been embarked in Egypt on the faith of that condition of things; that the Control was working well and with increased benefit every year to the Fellahs; and notwithstanding the hon. Member for Carlisle had quoted a statement to show that they were suffering from the taxation, he reminded the Committee that this only referred to some years before 1879, since which time the condition of the agricultural population of the country had largely improved. No departure, then, could have been made at that time from the policy of the late Government; nor could it have been made after the first military revolt in September last year, or after the second military revolt which occurred in the present year. He was bound to acknowledge that there was such a thing as continuity in foreign policy. [Opposition cheers.] Hon. Members opposite would say by those cheers that the Government had broken the continuity of the foreign policy of the country in the case of the Transvaal and Afghanistan. But he reminded the Committee that in those instances our position was very different from what it

  2057
  was at that moment. When we considered it advisable to withdraw our troops from Candahar there were no European Powers to say that we were changing our status towards them; and, again, we were in a position to do in the Transvaal what we deemed to be right without incurring the reproach of any other Power. Perhaps he should be told that this continuity might have been departed from by slow degrees—that we might, so to speak, have edged out of our position with regard to Egypt. But it must be remembered that there was the French policy of the time to be considered; and on that point hon. Members seemed to make the mistake of supposing that the attitude of France was the same as it was now, whereas it had entirely changed. And, moreover, if it had been proposed to alter our policy before the face of M. Gambetta, it was perfectly well known that England would never have tolerated a step that would have left Franco sole arbitress of affairs in Egypt. Again, after the Fleet had once gone into Alexandrian waters, and after the massacre of the 11th of June, it would have been impossible for us to retire. We could not separate our position in Egypt from our position in the East; and he ventured to say that after the 11th of June for our Fleet to have moved would have been to put the life of every Christian European in the city at the mercy of Arabi Bey. Much as he deplored the necessity for the subsequent action which had taken place, and terrible as had been the bombardment of the forts, yet he was obliged to acknowledge that it was unavoidable if the authority of the West was to have been vindicated. A Circular had been received that morning by hon. Members, which had been also distributed amongst the commercial classes of the country, tending to prejudice the question by representing it to be a matter of money only. But he pointed out that there was no question in this case as between the National Party and the bondholders. Their position was entirely outside the matter; and he trusted that the interest of the bondholders would not be allowed to influence the arrangements which would ultimately be made. For his own part, he did not believe there were three Members of that House who would vote for a single gun being fired in Egypt to protect the
  2058
  interest of these persons. He did not mean to deny that the policy of the Government might be open to criticism in matters of detail. They had heard a great deal of criticism upon despatches of the conventional kind that they were accustomed to on these occasions. It seemed to be a matter of course, when a subject of this nature was under consideration, for hon. Members to take this or that despatch and say—"You might have done better had you acted in such and such a way;" but this, he contended, ought not to blind one's eyes to the real features of the case. For these reasons they were about to give Her Majesty's Government their moral support, and he thought this should be made clear at once, because they knew that the country at large was still hesitating and doubting as to what the nature of our foreign policy should be; and he believed, in cases of this kind, that instead of Members taking their tone from the constituencies, the constituencies would take their tone from them, and would be guided by the support which the Government received. He supported the policy of the Government because he believed it to be peaceful and honest; he did not say it might not be improved, but he maintained that it was eminently not a policy of aggression. The desire of the Government to preserve this character for their policy had laid them open to the charge, on that side of the House, that they had not struck hard enough or soon enough; while the criticism from all the other Benches was that they had not been sufficiently bold and high-handed. It had also been charged against the Government that we were isolated in this matter; but he pointed out that this position secured for us the great advantage of not being embarrassed by any doubtful ally. With regard to France, they might regret that they were not to have the support of that country; but he considered it would be much easier for us to make the necessary arrangements as to the future of Egypt without the assistance of that country. He believed we should be much less embarrassed in the future if we made no statement as to our policy beyond that which was demanded by the exigency of the moment. Hitherto that policy had been dictated by the highest motives, and he trusted it would not be

  2059
  long before we should see this country coming out of the strife into which she was entering, not only in strength, but purity and consciousness of right.
  MR. CHAPLINsaid, he rose a few minutes ago to follow the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere). He would not, however, enter into the question raised by that hon. Member as to whether the Suzerainty of the Sultan over Egypt was to be maintained or abolished in the future. That was a question of the utmost importance which arose upon the immediate issues before them; but it seemed to him (Mr. Chaplin) that it was wholly unnecessary, if indeed it were not altogether impolitic, to express an opinion upon it just now. He was glad to learn from the hon. Member that there were, at all events, two points, in his opinion, on which the Conservative Party had established their case. It was satisfactory to learn that there was at least one Member sitting upon the Benches below the Gangway on the Ministerial side of the House who had appreciated the fact which he (Mr. Chaplin) had ventured to state to the House a short time ago—namely, that, as far as the interests of England were concerned, for all practical purposes the Suez Canal was Egypt and Egypt was the Suez Canal. The hon. Member raised another point as well. He put this question to the Government—"If it was right for you, without a mandate from the Powers, to protect your Elect, why was it not also right for you, without a mandate, to protect the subjects of the Queen?" He (Mr. Chaplin) ventured to say that that was a question which the Government would find it very difficult to answer. No doubt, the Government had not yet satisfactorily answered it; but he believed the day would come, and that before very long, when the English people would require and demand an answer. The hon. Member who had just sat down reminded them that the main question really before them that night was, whether they were or were not going to give their support to Her Majesty's Government? And he (Mr. Chaplin) did not hesitate to say that, in his opinion, their first duty on this occasion was most undoubtedly to support by their votes the Motion made by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, and to place unreservedly at the disposal of the Government the
  2060
  means which they on their responsibility came forward and told the Committee were necessary for the maintenance of the honour and interests of England. Under circumstances such as these, as Englishmen, as patriots, as men who held the honour and interests of their country as their first consideration, it was obvious that they had no alternative—that they had only one course to pursue. But, while they were prepared on this occasion to give their support to the Government, and to place at their disposal the means for which the Government asked, they must also claim this— namely, the full right to reserve to themselves, if they thought fit, the power of criticizing and, if need be, censuring the policy which had been pursued. He was bound to say that he thought they had already many cases of complaint to urge against the Government. The position of affairs in Egypt was now, and had been for many months, one of great anxiety and concern to all hon. Members who sat on the Opposition side of the House; and it was a fact that not only for weeks, but for months past, appeal after appeal had been made to the Government to give them information, and that nearly all those appeals had, until a recent period, been made in vain, and the consequence of that had been, that this vast question, to all intents and purposes, had been entirely removed from what might be called the jurisdiction of Parliament. Whatever they might think of the general policy which the right hon. Gentleman had pursued, he (Mr. Chaplin) thought he could congratulate him at least upon this—namely, the prudence which he had exhibited, in the interests of the Government, in the time which he had selected for the taking of this great debate. He (Mr. Chaplin) remembered that one of the points made by the right hon. Gentleman, some few years ago, when complaining of the policy of Lord Beacons-field, was this—that for securing the escape of a great question from the vigilance of the public, there was no expedient parallel to that of postponing the discussion of it until the dying hours of the Session. Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) ventured to think that was a charge which was infinitely more applicable under existing circumstances, and which could be made with infinitely greater justice with regard to the course which

  2061
  the right hon. Gentleman himself had thought it right to pursue. He (Mr. Chaplin) would not dwell that night upon the desperate and harrowing condition of affairs in Egypt which had been described to them by the Prime Minister himself. Nothing that he (Mr. Chaplin) could say, nor that any Member of the Committee could say, could add to the horrors of that description, and what he would ask hon. Members to consider for a few minutes was, how and by what manner of means things had ever been allowed to come to such a pass as that; and on that point he was bound to say that the right hon. Gentleman himself, while professing the utmost frankness to the Committee, gave them scarcely any information whatsoever. And the scanty stock of information they obtained from the right hon. Gentleman had not been materially added to, as far as he (Mr. Chaplin) had been able to gather, by any single speech that had been made since by any Member of Her Majesty's Government. The general impression which he had gathered from as close a perusal as he had been able to give to the Papers that had been laid on the Table, was that there appeared to him to be three distinct periods in which the English Minister, Lord Granville, found himself placed in a position of considerable difficulty, and there had been three distinct propositions for dealing with the Egyptian Question. There was, first, the policy of the joint intervention by England and Prance, which was the policy advocated from the first by M. Gambetta. There was, secondly, the policy of Turkish intervention, which was, from first to last, throughout the whole of this question, steadily advocated by Sir Edward Malet; and then there was the third policy, the negative policy of M. de Freycinet, which was, under all circumstances, to resist any Turkish intervention. He (Mr. Chaplin) might be asked whether there was not a fourth policy—what was the policy of the English Minister for Foreign Affairs? Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) declared that, after searching carefully through the Papers, he was utterly unable to discover that, at any moment, from first to last, the English Foreign Minister had ever had any definite or settled policy of his own. The first period of difficulty of which he (Mr. Chaplin) spoke appeared to him to have
  2062
  commenced from the time when Arabi Bey, on the 9th of September, 1881, demanded the dismissal by the Khedive of Riaz Pasha, the convocation of a Representative Chamber, and a considerable addition to the Egyptian Army. Well, when these demands were made, the Khedive found himself powerless to resist them, and appealed, very properly, to his Suzerain for support. But what happened under these circumstances? As far as he (Mr. Chaplin) could gather from the Papers, Lord Granville first appeared to waver in that direction; at all events, he favoured the sending of a Turkish General to Egypt; but to that, and to any Turkish intervention whatever, M. de Freycinet offered a decided opposition, and Lord Granville dropped the intervention by a Turkish General like a hot potato. The Sultan was naturally very mortified at that. In conversation with Lord Dufferin, the Sultan made use of a statement which appeared to him (Mr. Chaplin) so statesmanlike that he would ask the permission of the Committee to read it. He would not read many despatches. The Committee would remember, perhaps, that last night the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade made this remarkable statement, that the Papers showed conclusively that from first to last the English Government had solicited the intervention of the Sultan. Why, he (Mr. Chaplin) had never heard a statement made in the House of Commons which was more diametrically opposed to the facts, as revealed by the Papers laid on the Table. Complaints had been made of too frequent and too copious quotations being made from the Papers; but when statements of this kind were made by Members of the Government—statements that were diametrically opposed to the facts—it was absolutely necessary for Members to offer quotations in reply. On September 19, Lord Dufferin wrote to Lord Granville in these words. He said—
  "Upon this I observe that I am glad to learn that His Majesty does not contemplate taking so precipitate a step as the sending of troops to Egypt without consulting with Her Majesty's Government, and that, although I had received, as yet, no instruction, I had reason to know that your Lordship would consider such a proceeding inopportune. The Sultan replied in words to this effect, though evidently mortified; he said that Great Britain had great interests in Egypt which he was quite prepared to recognise, and so had Turkey, and those interests he

  2063
  would make great sacrifices to maintain; that England was a great Mussulman Power, and that the friendship and co-operation of Turkey must he necessarily most advantageous to us."
  He must ask the Committee to allow him to quote one more despatch in answer to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade. On page 135, Paper 7, he found these words—
  "In order not to add complication to the state of things, the two Governments have thought it right to instruct their Ambassadors at Constantinople to recommend the Porte to abstain from all intervention and all interference in Egypt;"
  and that in spite of the statement of the President of the Board of Trade. There were other statements in the despatches of the same nature. The French policy at that time appeared to be that the French Government appeared to desire a joint military control by Prance and England; but it appeared that Lord Granville objected for reasons that he said had been stated to the French Government, although what these reasons were he (Mr. Chaplin) was totally unable to say, as he had failed to find a single one of them in the Papers. The first period of difficulty he had alluded to came to an end by two despatches, one from the English Minister, and the other from the French Minister, in which they recorded their views of the situation, and the different interests which, according to them, both of them had in the condition of Egypt. He now came to the second period of difficulty in which Lord Granville was placed, and that appeared to have begun shortly before the Chamber of Notables was summoned. M. Gambetta, who was a man of great decision of character, as well as of ability, evidently foresaw the possibility of difficulties arising when the Chamber was convoked; and he accordingly proposed to Lord Granville to take steps, in conjunction with France, to deal with those difficulties. [Interruption.] He (Mr. Chaplin) should be very much obliged to the Committee for silence.
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I rise to call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that the hon. Member for Stockton (Mr. Dodds) is carrying on a loud conversation and interrupting the hon. Member.
  MR. CHAPLINsaid, he was sure the hon. Member was not interrupting him
  2064
  intentionally, and he should be obliged to him for silence for a few minutes. This proposal of M. Gambetta resulted in the Joint Note. He (Mr. Chaplin) did not wish to say anything about that document that night, further than it was accepted by M. Gambetta, and presented on the 8th of January. But, here, unfortunately, a new difficulty arose, because, although the policy of M. Gambetta was decided upon that point, owing to one of those sudden political changes which frequently occurred in some countries, and more often, perhaps, in France than in any other, the Government of the day in France vanished out of view, and M. Gambetta was replaced by M. de Freycinet. Well, what was the view of M. de Freycinet? He was by no means in favour of an active and decided intervention of that character, and he communicated his view to Lord Granville without delay, although he accompanied the communication with the naÏve statement that he was bound to admit that he did not know much about the subject. Well, what was the position that an English Minister should have taken under such circumstances? He should have said to M. de Freycinet—"My position is different to yours. I have pledged myself to the Khedive—I have put my hand to a despatch granting him my support under certain conditions. Are you prepared to fulfil that engagement? If you are, well and good—let us go hand-in-hand; but if you are not, I must take a decided course in accordance with my pledge, and must adopt some line of my own." When M. de Freycinet declined to pursue the policy indicated by Lord Granville, he (Mr. Chaplin) must say there were two courses open to the English Minister. He might then, if he had thought fit, have appealed to Turkey and asked her to intervene; and, failing Turkey, he might, of course, have intervened himself. But here arose a further complication. The Porte protested vigorously against this Joint Note, and not only that, but forwarded its protest to the other Powers of Europe, who made an Identic communication. This appeared to have had a great effect on Lord Granville, for immediately on the receipt of it, though little indeed, if anything, had been heard on the subject before— though the policy up to that time had been a French and English intervention

  2065
  —Lord Granville immediately fell back on the Concert of Europe. Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) was bound to say that even then Lord Granville appeared to have adopted that policy in a very halfhearted and undecided manner. They must remember that time was of the first importance. Well, what happened? Count Munster, the German Minister, made a representation which was tantamount to this—that there had better be a Conference without delay. Lord Granville, however, said—"Nothing of the kind; it would be exceedingly premature." What happened then? A number of more or less feeble attempts were made by Lord Granville to induce France to agree to a Turkish intervention, and things went on in this kind of way until at length the Ultimatum was presented, and it became absolutely necessary that a Conference should be summoned. A Conference was summoned; and, in his (Mr. Chaplin's) opinion, whilst making all allowances for the great difficulty that he quite acknowledged the Government had had to contend with, it was to the determination to refer the Egyptian Question to that Conference, and to the delay in summoning the Conference, that the terrible position in which they were now forced was entirely owing, and that the present period of difficulty was to be met by the English Government. Whatever might be their views as to the wisdom of the policy of referring Egyptian questions, under ordinary circumstances and in ordinary times, to the Concert of the Powers of Europe, he did not hesitate to say that. for his part, he was firmly convinced that under all the circumstances of the case—under the pressing, and urgent, and immediate exigencies of the case—to refer these questions to the European Conference at the time at which they were referred was most dangerous. It appeared to him to have been the greatest mistake the Government had made, judged by its results? What had been these results? What had they gained by referring this question to a Conference, and what was it they had asked? Their gain had been a negative one; they had not gained what they sought—Turkish intervention. They had not gained the concurrence of France, except in so far as the Suez Canal was concerned; they had not even got the mandate of Europe;
  2066
  but what the right hon. Gentleman was able to tell them he had got, or rather what the right hon. Gentleman was able to say was, that he "thought they had secured the moral support of the Powers." The right hon. Gentleman was not even sure of that; and against that, what had they lost? He (Mr. Chaplin) said they had lost that which, under all circumstances, was the most priceless possession in the world, and that was time. What had been the effect of this loss of time? It appeared to him to have been this—that, in the first place, if they had had troops at the proper time they might, undoubtedly, have stopped the massacre at Alexandria. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, again, had made a most extraordinary statement on this point the other night. He (Mr. Chaplin) must again refer to the right hon. Gentleman's words, because they were once more so diametrically opposite to the facts. The right hon. Gentleman had answered an hon. and learned Member by saying that in the sense in which the word was ordinarily used there never had been a massacre since the bombardment, and in consequence of it. Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) should like to meet that statement, if he might be allowed to do so, by a quotation from a letter which he had seen that day from Mr. Cornish— whose name must be pretty well known by this time as that of a gentleman who had rendered the country such splendid services in Alexandria. He (Mr. Chaplin) would set the authority of Mr. Cornish against that of the President of the Board of Trade. What did Mr. Cornish say? Why, he said—
  "I went into the town (Alexandria) on Friday morning, that is, immediately after the bombardment, and a more sickening sight I never beheld. Several corpses, terribly mutilated, were still lying about."
  And yet the President of the Board of Trade, with all the information which he either had, or which, if he had not, certainly ought to be at the disposal of the Government, had the assurance to get up in the House of Commons and say that there never had been any massacre since the bombardment, or in consequence of it. Now, what was the second thing this country lost by loss of time? He answered, without the slightest hesitation, that they lost the chance of averting the second massacre,

  2067
  and the second destruction of Alexandria. He would quote Mr. Cornish again as his authority. That gentleman, in his letter dated July 18, said—
  "All went on very well until the firing ceased on the second day's bombardment, and the troops and the rabble were in full retreat; but when they found that the firing had stopped many of them went back into the town, and then the work of pillage and firing began."
  Was it not evident from that, that if the mere effect of the firing of the Fleet had driven the rabble and soldiery out of the town, that if the firing had continued and a certain number of troops had been landed we might have effectually prevented the second massacre and destruction of Alexandria? The right hon. Gentleman the other night spoke of the impossibility of preventing that; he said, "I know not what force of men would have been sufficient. I know that 10,000 men at least would have been required." He (Mr. Chaplin) had been informed, for it was many years since he himself was in Alexandria, and, therefore, he could not speak from personal recollection; but he was informed on good authority that there was only one means of escape from Alexandria, and that was between the sea on the one hand and the Mahmoudieh Canal on the other, and that the guns of the Fleet would have absolutely covered that piece of ground. If the Government had not tied their own hands by the Conference, they might, by landing a small body of troops, have caught Arabi like a rat in a trap, and the whole thing would have been over by now. And what was the third thing they lost by this loss of time? He had said they would have cut off Arabi Bey—there was no doubt about that. And if they had cut off Arabi, he would not now have been in the position of vantage which was leading us into this war, and which might turn out to be a war of great difficulty, and possibly one of danger. But, more than all, anarchy would not have prevailed in Egypt at the present time, and there would not now be re-enacting the scones that were enacted during the Indian Mutiny. He had listened to the speeches which had been delivered on each side of the House that night, He had heard what had fallen from the hon. Baronet (Sir George Elliot), and what had been said by other hon. Members, and he defied any Member of the Committee to say now whether the war would be a short or a long one.
  2068
  All he knew was this, that unless they were able to bring the matter to a conclusion within a very short time indeed, it would be impossible for the Government to re-establish order in Egypt for months to come. And what did they think was likely to be their position in India if the war should be prolonged, and if Arabi was allowed to pursue his way unchecked, and if those horrible scenes which were said to be taking place in the centre of Egypt continued for any length of time? He confessed it seemed to him to be a matter of the greatest peril. Did they not think there was some danger of the contagion spreading and of the possibility of similar disturbances taking place in India? They had seen such disturbances before, and he knew of no reason why, if circumstances were favourable for them, they should not occur again. The only excuse of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was that his hands were tied by the Conference; and what he (Mr. Chaplain) wished to ask the House of Commons was this—what right had any English Minister to place himself in such a position and to tie his hands in such a way that he was not able to give assistance to the subjects of the Queen, although they were being massacred within sight of Her Majesty's Fleet? That, then, was the general result of the information which he had been able to acquire from the Papers with regard to the present position of affairs which, to his intense astonishment, he had heard the Secretary of State for War, before the dinner hour, speak of as a most successful result. All he could say was that if the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been so successful up to the present time he sincerely hoped it would never be so successful again. He could only come to the conclusion, whilst he desired to make all allowances for the difficulty in which the Government had been placed, that the immediate difficulties they had to encounter in Egypt were really owing to the indecision and procrastination of Her Majesty's Government. They must not tell him that their difficulties were owing to the Control. That argument, he thought, had been pretty well disposed of already. It was true that the Control was established during the Administration of the Predecessors of right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Ministerial Bench; but they must

  2069
  in fairness remember that during the time Lord Beaconsfield's Eastern policy was in the ascendant, the Control—as Her Majesty's Government had themselves admitted—had done much for the regeneration of Egypt. It had proved to be a blessing and a boon not only to Egypt, but to the whole of the civilized world; and if, unhappily, it was true— and he, certainly, was not there that night to deny it—that since the accession to Office of the present Government the influence of England with the Suzerain of Egypt, in that part of His Majesty's Dominions, had considerably waned, in all fairness they ought to attribute it not to the fault of the Control, but to the complete reversal of the policy of Lord Beaconsfield, which, up to now, had been their never-ceasing boast. When he thought of the results of that reversal, when he called to mind some of the proceedings of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in days not very long gone by, when he remembered how political principle, political honour, political consistency had been sacrificed to nothing but the interests of Party— ["Oh, oh !"]—well, he challenged any one of them who dared do so to get up and deny it—when he remembered all these things, and when he compared their crusade against Lord Beaconsfield with their speeches, and their policy of to-day—which had been denounced, and denounced by none more strongly than by those to whom they had turned in appealing against Lord Beaconsfield— when he thought of these things, and when he remembered also that within this short period of that reversal of the policy of Lord Beaconsfield, amongst the first fruits of the reversal had been rebellion in Ireland on the one hand and ruin in Egypt on the other, he confessed he was filled with grave misgivings for the future. He could not help thinking that the Prime Minister felt something of this himself, for he had observed the other night that the right hon. Gentleman began to recant some of his former opinions with regard to Turkey. He (Mr. Chaplin), to his great surprise the other night, heard the Prime Minister describe himself as having always been the friend of Turkey. And when the right hon. Gentleman had said that, a dim recollection—in which he supposed he must have been mistaken— came into his mind, and he thought once
  2070
  more he could hear the Prime Minister describing Turkey and her people as "the one great anti-human specimen of the human race throughout all the world." Was that friendship? If it was the part of a friend to denounce his friends in that kind of language, then all he (Mr. Chaplin) could say was that the right hon. Gentleman and he differed very much as to what friendship meant. But he did not wish to pursue this theme any further that night; and although he had ventured, as he thought hon. Members were in duty bound to do, to criticize the policy of the Government and to point out what he believed to have been their errors in the past in order that those errors might be avoided in the future, he did not desire either to weaken the bands of, or embarrass, the Government at the present time. ["Oh!"] Well, whether hon. Members believed it or not, he could assure them that he had no desire to weaken the hands of the Government at this moment, and for this reason, that they had to consider the future as well as the past. It was in the future that were involved not only the immediate issues of the war in which they were now engaged, but also the ultimate settlement of the Egyptian Question. He was not one of those who could enter with a light heart into the war in which they were now engaged; but, on the other hand, he had an almost boundless faith in the spirit, the resources, and the power of England and her people when for her cause she had a good one, and if only she were led by her rulers with courage, with wisdom, and with unfaltering decision. In this instance, he believed—nay, more, he knew and was assured—that they had a good, a righteous, and a just cause, and he hoped that the other conditions of success would not be lacking. The campaign itself was, necessarily and properly, entirely in the hands of the Administration, and, for all he knew, they were about to enter upon it unaided and alone. For his part, he did not quarrel with that. On the contrary, he thought it was the best thing, probably, that could have happened to them; but, that being so, he did most sincerely trust that they would take care of this— that now they were embarked in this gigantic enterprize, once for all the interests of England should be permanently and effectually secured in that

  2071
  part of the world, and that in doing that they would remember the, to thorn, pregnant words of His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, that while they were among the greatest of European nations they were also "a great Mussulman Power."
  MR. O'CONNOR POWERtrusted the Committee would be disposed to listen to a few temperate observations on this subject, notwithstanding the excitement that must have been created by the powerful speech to which they had just listened. He had no Party purpose to serve; yet, in the observations which he would ask the indulgence of the Committee to put before them, he would, at the outset, call their attention to the peculiar difficulty under which every private Member laboured who attempted to discuss the question of the foreign relations of this country in the House of Commons. He had been sitting, like other hon. Members, for the past two or three months in expectation of what was to come on the subject of our relations with the Sovereign of Egypt; and he had noticed that, from day to day, Questions were addressed to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and to the Prime Minister for the purpose of eliciting such information as would enable the House and the country to ascertain what were their intentions with regard to the Egyptian Question. He made no charge of conscious concealment either against the right hon. Gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's Government or the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but he described simply his own impression when he said that he had been unable to ascertain, from the information which had been from time to time vouchsafed, the tendency of the policy of England in that part of the world. How were they situated now? They were told beforehand that the public interest would not permit of the communication of such information as would enable them to form a judgment on this subject; and, day by day, they found themselves getting more and more involved in serious complications, until the hour had arrived when the Government felt called upon to draw the sword; and then, when the sword was unsheathed for the purpose of maintaining the honour and the interests of the country, hon. Members were accused of something akin to treachery if they
  2072
  ventured to discuss the action of Her Majesty's Ministers. He would ask hon. Members—and, if he thought his humble voice would reach the people of England, he would ask them too—were they satisfied with the limited control which they were able to exercise over the foreign relations of this country? Information was kept from them in the first instance; then their patriotism was appealed to when active operations were commenced, and they were told that anything like free discussion and independent criticism would embarrass the Government. The policy of Her Majesty's Government was to be gathered from the Papers which at length had been laid before them, and the exposition which Her Majesty's Ministers had vouchsafed. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) a while ago had raised his (Mr. O'Connor Power's) hopes by the character of the exordium to his speech, because he had undertaken in the first sentence to prove that there was no inconsistency whatever between the present position of the Liberal Party in supporting the policy of the Government in making war in Egypt and the position occupied by the Party in 1880. His hopes had been raised by the promise of his hon. and learned Friend at the commencement of his speech; but he (Mr. O'Connor Power) appealed to those who hoard that speech whether they were not disappointed at the utter failure of the hon. and learned Member even to approach anything like a proof of the proposition he had laid down at the beginning? Those of them who, up to that moment, had been disposed to look upon the accession of the Liberal Party to power as an indication that the policy of Jingoism could never again prevail in the foreign affairs of this country must have been very much disappointed by what they had heard on the subject during this debate. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, in his speech the other evening, had laid very great stress upon the fact that the Government was guided and controlled in their policy by what they called inter-ternational engagements. The right hon. Gentleman did not stop in that speech to pronounce any opinion of approval or disapproval of the nature of those international engagements; and, in describing the attitude of the Government, he said

  2073
  that they were obliged, by the circumstances of the case, to frame their policy in reference to those international engagements. Well, he (Mr. O'Connor Power) would like to know whether, when engagements of that kind were formed, they were intended to be perpetual? He should like to know what it mattered to the people of this country whether their foreign affairs were administered by a Conservative or a Liberal Administration, if a Liberal Administration that succeeded a Conservative one was bound to pursue the very same policy? If he recollected anything at all of the issue which was put before the constituencies in 1880, it was distinctly the issue of the foreign policy of the Conservative Government; and to say now that they wore bound hand and foot to the results of that policy, and that they could make no departure whatever from the engagements that were entered into, was simply to say that a great deal of eloquent indignation was wasted upon the hustings, and that it had produced no profitable results to the people of this Empire. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) put this view of the present Ministers in the strongest possible light, because, he said, it was necessary to impress foreign Governments with a sense of the continuity of English policy. Now, he (Mr. O'Connor Power) asked for how long had Liberal Ministers considered it to be their duty to adhere to the policy of their Predecessors? He would ask where was the justification for the strong language they employed in denouncing that policy a little more than two short years ago? Well, the Prime Minister dwelt also in his speech on the value of the European Concert; but it was a singular circumstance that while the Conference representing the Powers of Europe was still deliberating upon these grave matters Her Majesty's Government took the determination of the question into their own hands. The Conference was not dismissed when they were bombarding Alexandria; and it seemed to him that their profession of regard for the European Concert jarred somewhat with the determination which they had formed. And it appeared to him, also, that if international right and International Law was to be scrupulously observed in their policy in Egypt, they must consider themselves at the
  2074
  present moment not so much at war with the Egyptian Army, and whatever portion of the Egyptian people that Army represented, as at war with the Sovereign of Egypt—the Sultan of Turkey. He could not see where their right to bombard Alexandria commenced, unless they believed that their relations with the Sovereign of Egypt—the Sultan of Turkey—justified them in adopting that policy. When the Prime Minister came to deal with the criticism, which he anticipated, in consequence of the failure of the Government to protect British subjects from massacre, the right hon. Gentleman declared, in a manner which he (Mr. O'Connor Power) could not at all appreciate, that the Government would have been disloyal to Europe, and would have acted in contravention of their own professions, if they had landed any men——
  MR. GLADSTONE: Not if we had landed men.
  MR. O'CONNOR POWERsaid, he should like, then, the right hon. Gentleman to inform him in what connection these words were used? It seemed to him (Mr. O'Connor Power) that they were employed in rebutting the accusation that the Government had failed in their duty to protect British subjects from massacre.
  MR. GLADSTONE: The hon. and learned Gentleman asks me in what connection the words were used, and I will tell him; but I should have thought, if he had heard the speech, he would have known the connection. They were to be taken in connection with the landing of such a force as it would have been our duty to propose in order to cope with and to overcome the Egyptian force under the Egyptian Commander, which was represented to us to be certainly between 10,000 and 15,000 men.
  MR. O'CONNOR POWERasked whether it was not right to infer from that explanation that, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, the size and effectiveness of the force affected the question of International Law at stake? It was as much a breach of International Law to land 20 men for aggressive purposes as it was to land 10,000. Therefore, he could not understand how Her Majesty's Government were able to defend their policy in Egypt, commencing with the bombardment of Alexandria, and other measures of force they

  2075
  had been since obliged to adopt, on the theory of self-defence. He was sorry, also, to be obliged to complain of the vague and uncertain terms in which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister described the objects which, he said, the Government had in view in their recent proceedings. The right hon. Gentleman said one of those objects was to assert international right; but he (Mr. O'Connor Power) had watched and waited and waited and watched with considerable anxiety for one single sentence on what he believed to be the root of the difficulty—namely, not international right, but national right. The Prime Minister could not have made a speech in the last Parliament on a subject of foreign policy in which the Sovereign power of the Sultan of Turkey was affected without calling their attention to the claims of the rising Nationalities of the East; but, either by design or by accident, there had not been a single reference made that would lead them to believe that the right hon. Gentleman sympathized with whatever there was of a National Party amongst the Egyptian people. They were told, also, that the protection of the Suez Canal was merely an incident, and that the chief object the Government had in view was to put down anarchy in that country. Well, now, did Her Majesty's Government consider themselves bound by engagements or by a sense of duty to preserve order in the East? Would it undertake that responsibility; and, if it was prepared to act for the restoration and the maintenance of order in Egypt whenever the peace of that country was threatened, would it act in the same spirit towards the countries on the frontiers of India? It was in language not very different from that that many of the advocates of the policy of the late Conservative Government defended the invasion of Afghanistan. They said that the independence of that country was threatened by Russia, and that, therefore, it was necessary that English power and English influence should be asserted in that country. It seemed to him that when the Government claimed that they had no selfish object in view in this movement in Egypt, and told the Committee, at the same time, they were fighting in defence of their interests, there was a manifest inconsistency. Wherever they had interests they had selfish objects.
  2076
  But they wore told that though their interests in Egypt were tremendous, they were acting in that country in a spirit of absolute unselfishness. It seemed to him that the step the Government had taken in reference to Egypt was a very serious one; and if it did not mean the ultimate establishment of an English Protectorate over that country, he humbly submitted that their policy was a very false one, and a very unwise one, and one that would entail great sacrifices upon our people without producing any corresponding advantages. But if their policy was to establish that Protectorate, why had not they the manliness to avow it? He could imagine Her Majesty's Government adopting the "bag and baggage" policy in regard to Egypt as far as the rights of the Sultan in that country were concerned. He could imagine Her Majesty's Government repairing to some extent the wrong they had already done by doing something to develop the principles and habits of self-government amongst that population, and ho, for one, would not regret to see the protection of Her Majesty's Government substituted for that of the Sultan of Turkey, if such a change was believed to be absolutely necessary for the prosperity of the people. But he said that, if that was the tendency of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, why did they not manfully avow it? The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had told them, in reviewing the history of the Control in Egypt and English interference, that England did not force herself upon Egypt, but that she had been encouraged to go by the Egyptian Government. Well, then, what was it which had given rise to the discontented party which supported Arabi Pasha? It was their dissatisfaction with the conduct of successive Egyptian Governments in truckling, as they believed, to foreign influences rather than relying upon their own people. It might be true that the Egyptian Governments had encouraged English influence at one time and French influence at another time, and to that extent they had alienated the sympathies of their own people. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in order to conciliate those who had some respect for the doctrine of nationality, had said that Her Majesty's Government did not

  2077
  at all object to the National movement in Egypt until it became a military movement. What did that mean? He did not object to the National movement until it became a powerful one, because it was only when it became a military movement that it was able to exercise any influence on the Councils of either the French or English Governments. In destroying the power of the Army they were destroying the only organized authority in Egypt. Talk about the friendship of the Khedive, the Khedive could not be anything else but friendly to them. He was a puppet in their hands, and to justify their conduct by the approval which His Highness might express of their policy was simply to take courage and consolation from their own self-esteem. The Committee had received so many assurances that this measure had not been undertaken in the interests of the bondholders that he supposed they must be persuaded that that was the real state of the case, and he was of the number of those who had failed to understand why, if the Government could not guarantee the investments of its citizens at home, it should be expected to guarantee them abroad. So far as that part of the question was concerned, he was glad to see that upon no side of the House had anyone the courage to get up and defend the proposition that the Government would be justified in guaranteeing a foreign investment. They had heard a great deal about what Europeans had done for Egypt—they were told that the Control established over the finances had had a very sound effect, and that it had, to a certain extent, promoted the prosperity of that country. That might be so within a limited period; but was it or was it not the fact that, until our influence began to be a power, Egypt was a country free from debt. Was it not the fact that the Debt of Egypt was a very great burden upon the population? He maintained that to say that they were to form their opinion of the conduct of England, to-day at war with Egypt, by a reference to what had happened within the last three, four, five, six, or ten years, was to take a very narrow and a very unfair view of the subject. Even within that limited period, however, it was undeniable that the Control, which was financial in 1876, became political as well as financial in 1879; and he should
  2078
  like to know whether it was not a natural feeling on the part of the Egyptian Army, and of those who were qualified to speak for even a section of the National Party in Egypt, that this discontent should grow proportionately as the Government insisted on imposing their Control on them? They not only established a Control in the first instance that discharged the duties of a National audit, but they went further, and practically seized upon the administration of the finances of the country; and then they thought that the Egyptian Army, the only party representing National feeling, was to be satisfied with this condition of affairs. They had chosen to take a very different view of their duty, and he would tell the Government they would find the consequences would be very serious indeed before this terrible business had been brought to a conclusion. He had ventured to make these observations be-cause the attitude which Irish Representatives were supposed to take with regard to the foreign policy of this country was very much misunderstood. He believed the time had gone by when it was the desire of any section of the Irish people to profit from the foreign difficulties of England. In times gone by, when the Irish people had not only just cause for discontent, but just cause for rebellion, he could imagine the justification of the sentiment which declared that England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity. He did not believe in that sentiment at the present hour; and he was sure no Member who had expressed an opinion on this question had spoken with greater sincerity than he did when he said he had ventured to obtrude himself on the attention of the Committee from no desire whatever to weaken or embarrass in the slightest degree Her Majesty's Government. He hoped he should never, by his voice or vote, support a policy of aggression, no matter with what professions that policy might be inaugurated. At the same time, he trusted he should never be suspected of the crime of advocating a cowardly policy. He did not believe in a policy of universal surrender. He believed in a spirited foreign policy when they were satisfied they were embarking in a just cause; and he believed that the highest interests of this Empire could best be

  2079
  promoted by encouraging National sentiment, not only in every part of the Empire itself, but amongst those populations in whose relations we were from time to time obliged to interfere. He thought that the unfortunate complications which had arisen in Egypt might have been avoided by some timely conciliation of the National spirit. If things went on now; if this war—for war it was at last—should be protracted, it was plain to everyone that we should have, in addition to the hostility of the Military Party in Egypt, the hostility of most of the Egyptian people, because we should have carried desolation and ruin into their homesteads and across the face of their country; we should have done what the British Army did in Afghanistan— left behind us memories of wrong and suffering which would survive all the arguments by which the Government now defended their policy, and these memories would, in a future day, accumulate and constitute a more terrible danger for the strength of the British Empire than the temporary difficulties with which we were now called upon to deal.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: The Committee are about to come to a vote upon one of the most important questions which has been submitted to the British Parliament for many a long year. I do not think there is any doubt as to the general feeling which will be expressed by the vote to which we are presently invited to concur. There can be but one desire on the part of every Member of the House, and that is to support as far as possible the Government in the policy which they have recommended to us, if we can be satisfied it is right and sound. But it is not possible for us altogether to divest ourselves of the responsibility that lies upon us, before we give a vote of this character, of satisfying ourselves of the conditions under which it is to be given. There is no inconsiderable number of Gentlemen, usually supporters of the Government, who do not in their hearts like the policy which is submitted to them, but who yet feel themselves obliged to support it—some from Party fidelity, some from their general confidence in the Government, and others because they feel that it is a choice of difficulties that lays before them, and that their choice must turn to that which will
  2080
  cause the least embarrassment to this nation as a whole. I say there is no small number of those Gentlemen who are prepared now to vote this sum of money to the Government, and thereby approve of their policy. I say that on our own side of the House there is a large body of Gentlemen who are prepared also to support the Government with their votes—to support them in a policy which they are, as we believe, about to initiate—but who are far from feeling that confidence in them, and satisfaction with their proceedings hitherto, which is to be found on the other side of the House. But in this case we must endeavour, so far as possible, to divest ourselves of Party feelings and Party recriminations, and to look upon so great a question as this from a large and national point of view. I entirely agree with what fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschon) yesterday as to the very great importance of our maintaining a national policy in matters of foreign affairs; but I am bound also to make this observation upon that statement, that if we are to maintain a national, or, so to speak, a continuous policy in foreign affairs, the policy which is submitted to us for our countenance and support must be recommended to us upon broad national grounds, and upon principles which we can ourselves see and approve. Now, what I feel with regard to the conduct of this discussion—I refer especially to the speech of the Prime Minister when he introduced the Vote—is this, that the issue is put upon far too narrow grounds, and that we are asked to vote upon special pleas which are applicable, or appear to be applicable, to the circumstances of the moment, but which certainly do not afford anything like a ground for a national policy. The right hon. Gentleman differs very much from the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I shall have to refer subsequently. The Prime Minister took a very different line from the Under Secretary, and advanced in support of the policy which he recommends one or two special pleas, to which I wish to draw attention. In the first place, there is what I may call the Control plea. He pleaded that the Government were not free in this matter; that they were bound by the policy which

  2081
  they inherited from their Predecessors, and that it was in consequence of that, and of the proceedings which had flowed from it, that they found themselves now obliged to recommend these measures to the House. The hon. and learned Member who has just sat down, and other supporters of the Government, gladly caught at that kind of argument, and are ready to throw upon the late Government, and especially upon Lord Salisbury in the last year of the existence of the late Government, a certain responsibility which seems to give especial reason for our action. I say that if that were true, and that if the conduct of Lord Salisbury in this matter were truly represented, it would be far too narrow a ground to base such action as we are now called upon to adopt. If the policy which the present Government found in existence, and which they say was inaugurated by Lord Salisbury, was wrong, why did they not abandon and change it? But if right, why do they now come and throw dirt upon it? In fact, it is entirely misrepresented. The hon. and learned Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) has re-echoed much that has fallen from the Treasury Bench when he said the change made in the system of Control in 1879, as compared with the Control in 1876, was this, that it turned the Control from a financial to a political Control. That is an entire mistake. I call it an entire misrepresentation. I wish to know if the right hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members can tell us where that distinction is to be found, and in what respect it has affected the operations of the Control since that date? The change made in 1879 was merely this—the Control, which was purely of a financial character, established for good reasons in 1876, was suspended during the period that there was a mixed European Ministry. But when that mixed European Ministry was terminated by the arbitrary dismissal of Nubar Pasha by the late Khedive—when that was suddenly terminated—the Control revived, and it revived in precisely the same form in which it had been in 1876. But then came the important question whom to employ. Lord Salisbury found that the French were going to nominate a Controller who was to act for the French Government, who was to act as the Representative of France, and the question
  2082
  was, whether it would be possible for England to abstain from doing the same thing with regard to the Controller who was to act on behalf of England? It was quite obvious that if we were to run pari passu with France; if we were not to leave that predominance to France, which the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) told us we ought not to leave, it was absolutely necessary that we should place ourselves as far as possible on the same lines with France. And then came the question as to the decision that these Controllers should be irremovable, except with the consent of their Governments. The whole matter turned upon that. What was this Control for? It was to enable the finances of Egypt to be properly directed and properly administered; and if there was always a power in the Sovereign arbitrarily, upon the slightest ground, to dismiss those who were managing the Control, obviously the Control might break down at a most critical point, and, therefore, the late Government agreed to the insertion of that provision. But, at the same time that we did so, feeling how important that change might be, and how necessary it was that there should be no mistake as to the position of the terms, we insisted upon the introduction in the new Decree of September, 1879, of a modifying provision, and that provision was the 3rd Article of the Decree, and it was to the effect that the Governments of France and Great Britain consented that, for the present, the Controllers General should take no part in the direction and administration of the financial services, but should confine "themselves" to communicating either to "ourselves"—that was, the Khedive or to "our Ministry"—the observations to which their investigations may have given rise. In that way, we entirely confined these gentlemen to watching the financial progress and fair working of the finances, depriving them of any power of interference with administration. Well, we have hardly heard anything about the Controllers. I dare say not half the Members of the House are aware of even the names of the Controllers. The question has been rather between Sir Edward Malet and the French Consul. Of course, the Controllers had a very important duty to perform in keeping the finances straight; but, at the same

  2083
  time, you have had the difficulty of this Military Party and insurrection to deal with, and in all the proceedings that have taken place it has been with the Agents and Consuls General that these questions have been discussed, and the difficulty has arisen. Just let me call the attention of the Committee for a few moments to the history of our dealings with Egypt. That history goes far beyond either the Decree of 1879, or that of 1876. Remember what the record of Egypt is. Remember she is not a State that has grown, like most of the European States, but she is the creature of European Concert. She was placed, in point of fact, in her present position by the consent of the Powers in 1840, and from that time there has always been a considerable watchfulness observed in Egyptian affairs by the Consuls of European Powers. It was against the irregular interference of the Consuls that the efforts of Nubar Pasha, the most distinguished and most valuable Minister Egypt had had for many years, were directed—he was desirous of getting rid of this irregular interference of the Consuls, and of substituting for it an International Tribunal. When the International Tribunal was once established, you then came to all the difficulties which arise in connection with the debts of the State—embarrassments of the most serious and political character were produced. It was to get rid of these embarrassments that the financial Control was mainly established. It was established, no doubt, at the instance of the Representatives of the bondholders; but it was maintained especially with a view of preventing political complications, such as would have arisen if the International Tribunal had given judgment, and there had been no means of check, and if the finances had been left in the state of confusion in which they were at that time. The condition of confusion in which the finances of Egypt were before the institution of the financial Control system, was bad for all parties. It was bad for the Fellaheen, because they were heavily taxed; it was bad for the Rulers of the country, because it was demoralizing; it was bad for all Europe and the civilized world, because it left open so many opportunities for intrigue and embarrassment. Now, Sir, I wish to ask—Is the Prime Minister, and are the Government,
  2084
  prepared to say that the action of Lord Salisbury, in 1879, was really, in their belief, the cause of the difficulties which have arisen? Can the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister trace those difficulties—can he put his finger upon the course which those difficulties have pursued, and show that any blame attaches to Lord Salisbury? No; it is really impossible to do so. There is another plea which the right hon. Gentleman put forward. He said—"We have had to give advice step by step, and our advice has been followed, and therefore we are bound to take the consequences." Well, but what we complain of is that the Government did not give wise advice, that they did not give good advice. If there was to be any advice, if Egypt was bound to follow it, it was incumbent upon our Government to give good and sound advice. There is another plea put forth, and it is one the Committee will do well to observe, for it is a good illustration of the mode in which this case is put before us. The plea to which I refer is that of self-defence. I think that if the Committee is called upon to take up a question of this sort, and to engage in so large an enterprize as this, on the ground that it was necessary, in self-defence, to fire our guns at the fortifications of Alexandria at a particular time, all I can say is that an insult is offered to the common sense of the Committee. The Government are attempting to make war upon peace principles, and such an attempt always must fail. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister tells us what is his theory with regard to self-defence. His theory is that if our ships come into the Harbour of Alexandria, and if the guns of the fortifications are, placed in position and pointed against them, the ships have a right to fire in self-defence, for fear the guns would fire and damage and sink the ships. I should like to know what Arabi's idea of self-defence is. Suppose Arabi were to apply the argument of the right hon. Gentleman to his own case, might he not say—-"We were in Alexandria, we had a right to be there; we saw the British and French ships coming in with their formidable armaments, and coming in in a significant manner, taking soundings, and otherwise taking up a position that it was in their power to destroy the fortifications and the town itself; were

  2085
  we not entitled to exercise our measures of self-defence; were we not entitled to defend ourselves against the ships which were coming against us?" I do think that arguments of this sort in support of so great a proposal as that which we have before us tends to weaken rather than strengthen the case. They are, in fact, cob-web arguments. Let me point out another thing. If these arguments are sound ones, the right hon. Gentleman must bear in mind that the course of his arguments reflects very severely upon the conduct of his Ally, the French, because they, too, were connected, and more than ourselves, with the Control arrangements; they, too, through their Agents, had given advice, step by step, and very often their advice prevailed over ours; they, too, were in the position of having their ships subject to the possibility of being fired upon from the forts. And this really is the theory which is put forward by the right hon. Gentleman as that which ought to be adopted. Now, the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs used arguments of a very different character and of a very different calibre, and though there are some points in the hon. Gentleman's speech with which I should not be disposed to agree, and against which I should enter my protest, I am bound to say that the arguments which he used do form the foundation of a policy which we can recognize as one with some substance in it, and one capable of being taken up as a national policy, and one which may be used continuously. The hon. Gentleman said there were three grounds upon which we had right to interfere. There is the ground of necessity, because we have to guard our road to India, and we have to guard all those great interests connected with the East, which were so well enumerated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) yesterday; there is the ground of Treaty right; and there is the ground of the duty which we owe to the people of Egypt, which, no doubt, is one that weighs heavily upon us; and of our duty to keep the high road through Egypt to the East as clear as possible from disturbance; and of our duty to promote, as far as possible, the peace and tranquillity of the country over which we have so much influence. I recognize in these principles, principles which are
  2086
  capable of being taken as the basis of a National policy, and they are principles which I am quite prepared to accept and agree with. We talk of intervention; but there are different kinds of intervention. There is intervention for the sake of making war for an idea, which we sometimes hear of; but that is a kind of intervention which we ought to be very careful not to be led into. I should protest against intervention of that character altogether. Then there is intervention to fulfil stipulations we have entered into with foreign nations, where you are bound by engagements and are bound to exercise your rights. Then there is a third kind of intervention— namely, on behalf of our own interests, which, I admit, requires the greatest care, because it is easy to fall into an unjustifiable interference; but, on the other hand, that is a simple and intelligible principle which every nation recognizes and knows what it is about, and will understand, and will know how it is dealing with you, and if you interfere for your own interests they can reckon with you and know what is likely to be your course; whereas, if you interfere on special pleas and shadowy ideas on the general fitness of things, nobody knows what to make of it, and what your next turn may be. Under these circumstances, I think the Government are quite justified in saying that where there exists in Egypt an organization—if I may call it so—an organized Military Party which is disturbing and destroying the country and all good government, and producing such havoc amongst the interests in that country, we are in our right, and not only that, as a matter of duty, we are bound to take such steps as we can in order to put that party down. So far, I agree with the Government; but I am quite unable to agree with a great deal said by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He glides altogether over the miscarriages and shortcomings and mistakes that have been committed in the course of the last six or seven months. That is our point. We are prepared, as matters stand, to go with you and support you on the ground of National interests; and, on the ground of duty, we are prepared to support you in the undertaking which you have engaged in—that of putting down this anarchical and disturbing Military Party; but we

  2087
  are quite unable to clear you of mismanagement and of confusion in the way in which you have brought this about. I hope there is nothing unpatriotic in saying that I think it is not at all unreasonable that those who are looking on independently, and who are prepared, and desire above all things, to support the Government in any patriotic proceedings, should criticize the faults which appear to them to have been committed in the course of events which have led us up to this point. We do not desire to go minutely into those matters. We have had enough of it; and it is getting too late to go into them. But, speaking generally, I would say, looking to the choice the Government had in the beginning of this matter; looking to the many forces there were conceived to be on our side—there was the Khedive, he has displayed throughout these proceedings an honesty and courage which deserve the highest praise at our hands, and render it possible for us to reckon entirely on his support in what has to be done; then there was the Chamber of Notables, the Notables representing, as they did, the true National Party in Egypt, as much as anybody can represent a different National Party from that represented by Arabi— they might have been made good use of to prevent and stop the evils which arose. Then you have the influence of the Porte. I never knew a case in which an influence like that of the Porte was so wantonly sacrificed as in the proceedings which have taken place. Whether it was owing to these uncertainties and hesitations, or to the influence of your Allies, I do not now inquire; but the right hon. Gentleman seems to think that because I do not ask this question I have no opinion as to the course which has led to the present position. But I am looking to the result of all this. With the possibility you had of making use of all these instruments—of the Khedive, of the Notables, of the Alliance with Prance, and the Concert of Europe—if you chose to call upon them, what has been the result at which you have arrived? The right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues attach the highest importance to the Concert of Europe; and yet I observe that whenever an expression is used as to going into this war alone, there is a cheer from all parts of the supporters of the Government
  2088
  who prefer the isolated action of England to the Concert of Europe. We have been asked, two or three times over, a number of questions which I do not think it is at all right that we should attempt to answer; but there was one question which the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Gosehen) asked, and which was asked also by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere). They said—"Wo must call upon you, the Opposition, to tell us what you complain of? With which horse will you win? Do you complain of the Government for isolating England or for hampering England?" I would take both horses, because the Government have accomplished at the same time the feat of hampering and isolating us. You could not have a stronger instance than the non-landing of troops in order to prevent the calamities at Alexandria. You were there isolated; you were there firing at the forts two or three days, with the spectacle of all those horrors that were going on, and yet you could take no steps to prevent them, and for the reason that it would have been grossly disloyal in the face of the European Concert to have taken necessary measures for preventing all that happened. Now, we have got refinement upon refinement, because, as I understand, it would not have been disloyal to the European Concert if you had landed an insufficient number of men; but it would have been disloyal if you had landed a sufficient number of men. The whole thing turns upon that. You might have landed a few hundred men—perhaps 1,000; but when it came to 8,000 or 10,000 men, you were there stopped by this Conference and this Concert, which, after all, does not even give you a mandate. I say we are perfectly at liberty to fight; but the Government have isolated us and driven friends from us at a critical moment, and hampered us in the action we are to take. With regard to our advice to the Khedive, he must sometimes have felt a difficulty as to what he was to do, for while he was receiving all this advice from us, we were weakening his authority with his people, and making him the poor tool of a foreign nation, and the further you went the worse it was for him. That had nothing to do with the Control; that was the action of the Consul General, acting under the

  2089
  orders of the Foreign Office. There was never any talk of dismissing any of the Controllers; but it would have been fair for the Government to have said they found it embarrassing and thought it right to make such changes as they thought necessary. They never thought of that. It was always the action of the Consuls of the two Powers, acting under the direction of the Foreign Office. Now, with regard to the position of Arabi himself. Had you dealt with him, or had it been found possible to deal with him firmly and vigorously at first, he never would have grown into the power he now is; and you must take good care that you do not by mismanagement in the future let him grow into greater power. At present he is at the head of a Party which we can speak of as the Military and Insurgent Party. He is not at the head of the National Party, but take good care that his Party does not become the National Party. That is the danger you have to guard against, and it is one of a very serious character. I do not wish to go into the question of your dealings with the Porte. We have had enough of that for the present, and there is no object to be gained in discussing this matter further. I think that is a point upon which we had better throw the responsibility on the Government of determining what course they should take. I am aware we are touching upon very delicate ground. A question has been put to us from the other side which, I think, we should be wrong and unpatriotic to attempt to answer, especially with our limited information; but I do think there have been several occasions upon which we can at once put our fingers as calculated to destroy and alienate the influence of the Porte if you had desired to use it, and which undoubtedly led to very great confusion. I do not say anything about that matter of the sending of the ships to Alexandria; but in regard to the Dual Note, was there ever anything more calculated to irritate the Porte than the manner in which that Note was presented? What was the effect? It produced all that jealousy in Europe which has been an embarrassing condition with us ever since. What did M. de Freycinet say to us three days ago in the French Senate? He said a Note had been presented which was expected to work great wonders, but it had lamentably failed and excited
  2090
  distrust throughout Europe. Under that influence the four Powers drew closely together. That was all the ad-vantage you got. What possible advantage you got nobody could see; what disadvantage you got is shown by the words I have referred to. The question of calling the Conference at Constantinople without the Sultan's consent, and the question of sendingiron-clads against the protest of the Porte; all these are questions of mismanagement for which we must hold the Government responsible. I am not prepared to say that their decisions in some cases, where they appeared to us to be wrong, might not have been justified by matters with which we are not acquainted. I do not desire to be too critical upon questions of that sort; but I do say we have every reason to be unsatisfied and even dissatisfied with the general result of the policy the Government have been pursuing, and which they have been allowed, so far as any Parliamentary action is concerned, to pursue for six or seven months, and which has culminated in such a state of things as that we now see. If you leave the Government responsible, as you are bound to leave them, if you abstain from interfering at every turn with their policy, you must judge by the result, and you must say that, judging roughly by the result in the present case, the case lies very much against the conduct pursued by the Government. I do not desire to pursue that line of argument longer. I am very sorry that it was necessary for us oven to appear to be carping at the Government at a moment when they seem to have the need of all the strength which the country can give them. For my part, I am quite prepared to re-echo the words of the right hon. Member for Ripon, that England ought to speak with one voice in this matter. I am quite aware of the great importance of the task before them. I am aware of its great difficulty and great delicacy. It is one which, so far as an immediate object is concerned, we may look at without any great anxiety. With regard to the attainment of the first object, I have no doubt that the power of England will be amply sufficient, if properly put forth and directed with energy and wisdom, for the accomplishment of the important object of putting down this insurgent force. I regret extremely that so much time has been lost in undertaking that

  2091
  duty. I earnestly hope that more time will not be lost than is necessary, because there is a tendency in these things for difficulties to accumulate and grow, and I hope we shall be able to act before they have grown stronger. But when I say we shall be able to deal with such a force and task as that without difficulty, I cannot but see that there are many other dangers that lie beyond that. The matter does not rest merely in the putting down of this force. We are moving on very delicate ground, and in the midst of many and serious complications. We have to consider not only the attitude of other Powers, not only the great difficulties of the question and the possibility of arousing Mahommedan feeling throughout the East; we have to consider not only all these things, but we have also to remember that we have also a settlement ultimately to be arrived at still before us; and in whatever blows we have to strike we must remember what the settlement is to be in the end, and how far what we do will complicate the settlement. We are anxious, as far as we can, to maintain and support the National policy; but if we are to support it, it must be a policy founded on intelligible principles, and principles having in them the character of permanency, and which are not merely temporary means, or anything in the nature of hair-splitting reasons, and that we should be convinced that the policy we are pursuing will be consistent and in accordance with our general duties and obligations, as also for the true interests of both countries. If that is the spirit in which we are going forward, I care not myself whether we are to go alone or with friends. If it is found that it is best for us to go alone, why alone we shall be prepared to go, and there will be no flinching on the part of Englishmen in the contest. There will be great indignation if, after all the sacrifice we are called to make, and all the risks we are to run, a good result is not arrived at. I cannot believe there will be any fault in us. The heart of England is sound, and the ready voice of her sons will be given in support of the Government if they are proceeding upon sound principles, and with adequate firmness and courage. But we must not be supposed to be subject to sudden and unaccountable delays, or to some revolu-
  2092
  tion of feeling, and liable to be told that we have always been wrong, and acting contrary to proper principles, and that the Military Party is, after all, the National Party, and that Arabi is not a rebel, but a patriot. I hope a spirit of this kind will be responded to, and done justice to, by the spirit of the Ministry whom we are prepared now to support; and I am sure that the vote which will be given to-night will be found adequately and truly to represent the feeling of the nation.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I have observed that a great distinction is to be drawn between the charges made against Her Majesty's Government in the course of this debate. Some of them have been entirely vague and general, such as those of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, when he speaks of their mismanagement, errors, and confusion, and such as those who complain of their indecision and hesitation and procrastination. All those are the stock phrases of the Opposition. I should waste the time of the Committee if I did more than meet them with a general negative. But it is only fair to admit that on certain points charges of a much more specific and more definite character have been made, which it is our duty more particularly to notice. And do not let it be supposed that we deprecate criticism upon our conduct. The right hon. Gentleman could not but be aware that this has been considered the fairest possible occasion for tracing conduct to causes, and for examining what has been the action of the Governments who have been concerned in bringing about the present state of things in Egypt. I hail that criticism; it is the duty as well as the privilege of the House of Commons; but I object to the course of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who resents extremely our going back upon any share he and his Government had in bringing about this state of things in Egypt, and is determined that, under no conditions, shall we be allowed to examine his action. The right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke), fatigued with his oration, has wisely retired from the House; but I am afraid I must take the opportunity of making some remarks upon what he said. One of his arguments was—"We handed over to you Egypt quite quiet, and now

  2093
  it is disturbed." It certainly was a bold definition of the law of post hoc, propter hoc. We might as well say—"In 1874 we handed over to you Turkey perfectly quiet, and in 1875 it was disturbed." Egypt has not been so quiet as the right hon. Gentleman supposes, for in 1879— that is, in the time of the late Government—the first symptom of the aggression of the MilitaryParty, which was favoured and probably made practicable by its being able to plead that it was a reaction against foreign interference and influence with the Government of that country—the first case of military émeute took place in 1879. The right hon. Gentleman resents extremely my reference to the establishment of the Control by Lord Salisbury in 1879. The hon. and learned Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) stated roughly, but I think with great accuracy, what took place in 1879. The hon. and learned Member stated that before 1879 the Control was financial, but in 1879 it became political. That is entirely denied by the right hon. Gentleman. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: No.] But here is a despatch of Lord Salisbury's, dated November 8, 1879, in which he endeavours to remove the difficulties and jealousies he had excited in the minds of other Powers by the Control he had established, and when he had rejected the proposals of Count Karolyi, that the Austrian Government should have a share in it. He said—
  "I observed to Count Karolyi that the action of England, though her interests were largely commercial, was dictated in the main by exclusively political considerations."
  And Lord Salisbury refused Count Ka-rolyi's proposal, because, he says—
  "Any international government of Egypt I thought quite impossible."
  He speaks of the government of Egypt, and said Austria was not to be admitted, because that would have made it international. While Lord Salisbury speaks of the government of Egypt, and though the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that it was necessary to have command over every institution in Egypt, the right hon. Gentleman now says it was not political Control.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: That is not the question.
  MR. GLADSTONE: The first question is, was it a political Control? I
  2094
  assert it was not so in 1876, because the Government were not concerned in it. The fact that the Egyptians chose to establish foreign Controllers, which was an arrangement attended with great benefit to the people of Egypt, was not of necessity an arrangement entailing foreign intervention, because they retained the right to dismiss those Controllers; but in 1879 you deprived them of that right to dismiss those foreign Controllers, and you brought foreign intervention right into the heart of the government of Egypt, and established, in the strongest sense of the phrase, a political Control. Now, Sir, it is necessary for me, after the denial of the right hon. Gentleman, to show how completely his assertion is contradicted by the language of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose Colleague he was. But do not let it be supposed that I overlook the benefits of the Control or the difficulties which, I believe, the late Government mot with at the time when they established it, and when they had to do exactly what we have had to do ever since—that is to say, to make a choice between the greater and lesser difficulty, and by accepting the lesser to avoid the greater. The right hon. Gentleman says that I ought to have dwelt more on the topics of general necessity and of our national interests, and he finds great fault with me for not having done so. But I adopted what appeared to me the shortest and most conclusive way of establishing my case, and stated that, apart from the consideration of general principles, we found a position established in which we had become the counsellors of the Khedive, involved in all the interests and proceedings of his Government, parties to the carrying of it on, and without the possibility of escape from the consequences to which its carrying on might lead. The right hon. Gentleman says that the Control never led to difficulties in the course of this controversy. But is he aware that the objections of the Controllers to the scheme of the Notables was the main cause of the failure of that scheme? Not that I think it prudent to say it would have been accepted without amendment; but their objections to the Control of the Notables were what made it on the one hand most difficult for England to give any support to the scheme, and on the other hand tended to throw

  2095
  the Notables into the hands of Arabi Pasha, and to give him that pretext of representing national feelings and aspirations which it had been his main object to acquire. Every apology is to be made for that Control; great benefits have resulted from it to the cultivators of the soil in Egypt; but that must not be permitted to keep out of view the fact that that Control did establish distinct intervention in the heart of the Egyptian Government, and thereby laid the foundation of almost certain dangers. Then, says the right hon. Gentleman, "Why did you not give it up?" But he ought to know—and if he does not know I must remind him—that the Control was not established as two engagements independent of each—one by France and one by England. Besides being an arrangement with England, it was an arrangement between France and England, having practically the nature of a political covenant; we were bound to France in respect of that covenant, and we could not recede from it. I believe I have now stated the case of the Control impartially, admitting its benefits, and admitting the difficulties under which the late Administration lay with respect to its establishment. At the same time, there comes out in strong and clear relief the danger of establishing in any country—and especially where there is a rising popular National feeling—a system of intervention in the heart of affairs of the National Government, which is always, in the view of the people, an odious object, and which gives to any adventurer—as it has done in this particular case—and to any revolutionary party, a fulcrum or a standing-ground for the advancement of their designs. It was not, therefore, on the grounds which the right hon. Gentleman supposes that I disclaimed general arguments with regard to interference in the affairs of Egypt, and that I resorted to this method of proof; but because, as I say distinctly, we had absolute engagements upon us as to the government of Egypt, which made it our duty to act as we have done—taking our share of responsibility in advising in the difficult circumstances through which the Khedive had to pass, by which we have arrived at the present state of the case. Now, Sir, I will not dwell for more than a very few moments upon the charge reiterated by the right hon.
  2096
  Gentleman—that we did not land troops in order to prevent the ruin which took place in Alexandria. I am rather astonished at the misrepresentation by the right hon. Gentleman of what was said by me. He says I stated, refining upon refinement, that the distinction turned upon the number of troops. I suppose the right hon. Gentleman thinks in saying this that he is making a true representation of my meaning; but, Sir, it is as far as anything can possibly be from the statement I made. I said it would not have been compatible with our engagements to prepare a force for the invasion of Egypt. Amongst the suggestions on this subject which have been made, is that contributed to-night by the noble Lord the Member for South Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil)—namely, that it might have been possible, by landing a force at Aboukir Bay, to occupy the isthmus or nock of land which separates Alexandria from the mainland, and to intercept the Army in that city. But, Sir, if that were required to be done, it would have been an operation which could not have been undertaken by any Government in its senses, except after the preparation, with all its equipments, of an invading force. [Mr. CHAPLIN: Why not?] Because it would have been totally at variance with the principles of our policy. We recognized the title of Europe to be consulted in that matter—[Colonel STANLEY: Hear, hear!]—a subject which offers the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) the occasion for a cheer, or, at any rate, of a significant intimation of dissent. Is that a strange proposition for me to make now? Has the right hon. Gentleman forgotten the Treaty of Paris, and that the Treaty of Paris, except so far as it is modified by the Treaty of Berlin, is still in force; and that by the Treaty of Paris everything political or territorial affecting the dominions of the Turkish Empire is matter for the common concern of Europe? We should have been guilty of breaking that Treaty had we presumed to take upon ourselves without reference to Europe the preparation of an invading Army. Therefore, I adhere to the remark I made that it would have been, first of all, inexpedient, inasmuch as it would have upset utterly our plea that we were taking action in self-defence; and, secondly, that we were

  2097
  forbidden by International Law and high, international policy from passing by the views of Europe in this matter. Hon. Members seem to have forgotten that the work of conflagration and pillage was carried on under a flag of truce, and that it would not have been possible by the landing of any force to have prevented what took place. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) persistently urged that we were throughout these transactions surrendering everything to France. Now, I wish the Committee to bear in mind that the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down charges upon us that we did not regard the subject from a sufficiently high point of view; but I could wish that he had recollected what was our greatest and most imperative duty in approaching this question of Egypt. Sir, we had to bear in mind that the Crimean War, which involved the greater part of Europe and cost 500,000 lives, arose out of a dispute about the access to holy places; we had to recollect that the Russo-Turkish War arose out of a local disturbance in the mountain districts of Herzegovina; neither of the countries where these events occurred being so sensitive as Egypt may be said to be; and the great duty incumbent on us was to take care and strive with all our might that whatever contention should arise with respect to Egypt should be a contention in and for Egypt alone, and that under no consideration should that local difficulty be allowed to grow into a European struggle and, probably, into a European war. Now, I ask hon. Gentlemen to read the Papers presented to Parliament in the light of these considerations, and then I think they will cease to cavil at the exact phraseology of this or that Note, and as to whether it was right of us to give way on this or that point, or at this or that particular period in deference to the views of the Government of France. It is quite true we did give in on a variety of points and on a variety of occasions to the views of the Government of France, and I contend we were right in giving way, because to break with them would have been a far greater evil and a far greater wrong than anything we have done. Were our concessions barren of any ultimate effect? I admit it would have been advantageous if we could have secured an agreement between the two
  2098
  Governments on every point and at every period in these negotiations; but let us see if the principles on which we acted with reference to the Government of Prance have proved to be barren in their results. Our principles, or rather the points which we highly appreciated, were that the action of Europe should be invoked; that Tewfik Pasha should be firmly and unequivocally supported—that is to say, his title unequivocally recognized; that Turkish intervention should be considered as preferable to every other; and that popular liberty in Egypt should be brought within the terms of international engagements. It is perfectly true that on these points we were not quite in unison with the Government of France; it is true that on some of them we made concessions at certain periods; but it is also true that, by the temperate and conciliatory course of Lord Granville, this effect was produced upon the Government of France—that later if not earlier upon all these great points France ceased to be in any degree at variance with us, and adopted the great cardinal principles which we ourselves had so long urged, and which I have placed before the Committee. Every one of these, as certain stages of the negotiations were reached, became the basis of French action in Egypt. Sir, I think this is a very important result. It is said that France has been exceedingly wrong in the matter of Tunis. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) touched in his speech of last night upon this very delicate subject; but my right hon. Friend touched upon it in a spirit of equity and impartiality which I hope will command for his observations candid consideration wherever they may be read. It is easy to begin to raise little objections here and there to the conduct of France in this case, and it is easy to say that France was in a false position in Egypt on account of what she had done in Tunis. But, unfortunately, when you have carried back the argument as far as Tunis, it does not stop there. It goes back beyond Tunis. It goes back to inquire who opened the door to Tunis? And it goes back to the Anglo-Turkish Convention and the occupation of Cyprus. And those who blame France for what she has done in Tunis must consider what inducement on the one hand, and what provocation on the

  2099
  other, had been administered to the policy which she carried out. We have endeavoured to act in the spirit of our engagements to France, which my right hon. Friend opposite well knows to have been close and binding in their nature. I will not enter now into the question fairly raised by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), who asked whether such engagement should last for ever? It has been said that inconvenience resulted from our adherence to these international engagements; but, even if that be so, I would rather undergo great inconvenience than set a fatal precedent by laying down a lax doctrine on the obligation of observing them. But I am quite sure that it is a sound principle to draw a distinction with regard to the position of a Government in relation to the policy and engagement of its Predecessors. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) brought himself up with this admission, which he had great difficulty in making. Undoubtedly, of all questions I have ever become acquainted with, this has been far the most mo-mentuous, on account of the great number of different authorities we have to deal with, and from the difficulties existing between those authorities. There were jealousies; there were varieties of opposition; there were second intentions; and there were separate interests involved. We had before us the Khedive, the Sultan, our great Ally France, and Europe at largo. Well, Sir, it was our duty to harmonize, to the best of our ability, these various and, in many cases, divergent Powers; and I am glad to say that, whatever else may be said, I believe it to be undeniable that English influence has throughout the course of these transactions been that middle influence which has been seeking to bind all into one harmonious whole, and to prevent the collisions or strong divergencies which might otherwise have occurred. Sir, I think we are not entirely without our reward. We have at the present time a clear and well-defined position; and if the Conference has produced but a negative result, it has, at any rate, effected this— that every Power represented there is satisfied of our loyal and unselfish mode of dealing with the Egyptian Question. Every one of those Powers looks at least with goodwill on the course which we
  2100
  have taken, and every trace of international jealousy has been effaced from the mind of every Government in Europe. I say that this, although a negative, is an all-important, result. It is very easy to say—"You ought to have broken off from France." But that is a serious proposition. It is not the power of France that England fears; it is the long experience of her friendship, continued through half-a-century without a breach, and of the great good that has been wrought for Europe by means of that friendship, which makes it the duty of the English Government well to consider its course before it breaks with France. The effect of breaking with France must have been a sharp conflict in Egypt, where the two countries would have been divided into separate camps, and, as I believe, a general European war. There is no point upon the surface of the globe where you have to deal with more susceptible materials than this country of Egypt, connected, as it is, by geographical position with the jealousies and interests of every country of the civilized world. The consequence has been, then, that as regards Europe every trace of jealousy has been removed, and that which we call moral assent is substituted in its place; and jealousies, be it remembered, are apt to grow into positive and substantial acts of hostility. In respect of France nothing can be more complete than the accord which now exists. The right hon. Gentleman and all the House must feel how the difficulties of these negotiations have been aggravated by the occurrence of more than one political crisis in France during a short period of time, and by the passing, as it were, of a variety of shades over the tone of the French Government in connection with those Ministerial changes, and with popular and Parliamentary action, which is no less lively in that country than it is in this. But, still, whether we look to the Government that is now in power, or the Government that was in power before it, as, I may say, apart from Ministerial changes, we have not the slightest reason to apprehend that, even if the exterior form of action be not the same—if France, in the exercise of her independent judgment, arrives at some conclusions different from ours—the harmonious feeling between the two countries, or their united purpose, will be in the least

  2101
  impaired, or that anything but the temper which has hitherto obtained will govern their international relations. With reference to the Sultan, let me say, in respect of the valuable speech of the hon. Member for North Durham (Sir George Elliot), that I entirely agree with him in the recommendation which he made that we should endeavour to procure from the Sultan some proclamation which would at length effectually define his position with relation to Arabi Pasha and his party. I was much struck with the pertinacity with which the hon. Baronet dwelt on that subject, and we entirely agree with him in the feeling he has expressed; and, further, I am able to say that I believe every Power in Europe is of the same mind, believing that it is required absolutely as a necessity of the situation that the position of the Sultan in regard to Arabi Pasha, which has been compromised by various circumstances, should be defined by a proclamation that would leave no possibility of mistake upon the minds of men, and which will have the effect, we trust, of obviating what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon has justly observed is one serious danger of the present case—namely, the danger of its being made to partake, in the least degree, of the character of a religious war. That is, of course, what the rebellious Chiefs are endeavouring to import into the controversy, and that element, of all others, the most poisonous and most mischievous, we must endeavour to counteract. Lastly, I think we may say, with respect to the Khedive, that for months past it has been a matter of great uncertainty whether even his personal title was recognized by those who took part in the consideration of this question. That controversy, I believe, has now been brought to an end, and I earnestly hope that the Khedive will now reap the reward of his manfulness and integrity in the support of all Europe, and in the best support which England can give him. While I admit that you may exercise small criticisms, if you like, on this or that despatch, or this or that expression, in which we have deliberately compromised, for the moment, some sentiment that we ourselves entertain on account of that which we felt to be our duty to our great Neighbour with whom it was our duty to act in unison—while I make that ad-
  2102
  mission, I say, fix your minds on the dangers that overhung the paramount interests which it was our duty to keep in view. These greater dangers have been obviated, and a clear field and an open stage of action has been obtained; and I think you will find that it has been by no small difficulty that these obstacles have been surmounted, and that you are in the position to look on yourselves, on the one hand, as free to use your own power without restraint or without interference, and, on the other hand, you can do it in full possession of the confidence of the other great States of Europe, because they believe your action is honest, loyal, and directed to beneficial ends. In the course of this debate I have heard various declarations—very well-meant declarations—and appeals as to the value of national unity on the question of foreign policy, and, sometimes, when these declarations have been made, there have been reference to what took place in the time of the late Government, and when, unhappily, that national unity was not always attained. And I wish we could clearly understand one another as to what this national unity is or ought to be. It appears to me that there are some in this House who are disposed to push the doctrine to this point—that when a question of arduous foreign policy arises, it is the duty of all men to silence their own judgment, and their own consciences, and blindly follow whatever may be the action of the Government of the day. Now, is that the meaning, or is it not? Is that a principle which can be sustained, or is it not? I am not prepared to give my adhesion to that doctrine. I claim for myself the liberty, always admitting the responsibility to be very great, of offering opposition to any foreign policy of which I strongly and heartily disapprove; and I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite will do the same thing. We would not ask them to support Votes for purposes of which they disapprove. If they think this Vote is asked for a purpose of which they do not approve, or that it ought to be impeached in point of policy or right, let them oppose it—let them do what Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright did at the time of the Crimean War, and for which we thought more highly of them than we should have done if they had suffered their sentiments to be concealed in

  2103
  silence within their hearts. Let them do what Pox did, as Burke and Lord Chatham did during the time of the American War; but do not let them lay down the sluggish doctrine that Englishmen are blindly, like sheep, to follow the action of the Government, or to give their votes in silence to that which they in their hearts condemn. No; let this question be tried on its rights. I believe it is being tried on its rights. I believe that while you claim with perfect justice and freedom your title to judge us in the past, yet you feel there is something besides the past that we have to deal with—that we must look forward to the future, and that you must give us your support, that at this moment the nation throughout all its borders is giving us its support, because they see we are engaged in an enterprize which we desire and mean to follow with all our energy, and in which we trust it may be granted to us to labour for maintaining the interests of the Empire, for promoting the welfare of the Egyptian people, and for doing honest work towards the establishment of the peace and order of the world.
  MR. O'DONNELL(who was frequently interrupted by cries for a division) said, he would not trouble the Committee with more than a very few words; but he had several observations to make which he considered it his duty to put before the Committee, and which would not be averted by these interruptions. He had been inclined to be sorry he had not caught the Chairman's eye earlier in the evening's proceedings; but now that he had heard what purported to be a full explanation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but which he had some special reasons for believing not to be a complete explanation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, he was not sorry that he was obliged to address the Committee at this late hour, and under these unfavourable circumstances. He did not rise for the purpose of indulging in any lengthened criticism of the speech or speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. He did not rise, though under other circumstances he should have much wished to do so, to criticize the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), who, to use an Irish phrase, sought to represent the international
  2104
  gombeen man in this transaction. Strongly as he felt that the charges made against Arabi Pasha by the Prime Minister were, to use something like the right hon. Gentleman's own moderate language when speaking of the Leader of the Opposition, directly the reverse of the facts, he did not intend to criticize the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He (Mr. O'Donnell) might have been tempted, when the Premier reminded them this evening that Egypt was such a singularly sensitive part of the universe, to have pointed out to the House the delicate manner in which the right hon. Gentleman had treated that sensitiveness. [Cries of " Divide !"]
  An hon. MEMBER: Move the adjournment.
  MR. O'DONNELLsaid, he wished to know whether the Government were going to allow the Committee to come to a vote on this subject in ignorance of the fact that, instead of England enjoying the moral consent of Europe, and being allowed to use its power, as the Prime Minister had just now informed the Committee, without any restraints, owing to the entire confidence which Europe placed in the English Government, the mandate of Europe had sent Turkey as an intermediate to watch the British Government, and that Turkey had accepted that mandate? He wanted to know whether it was to be excused, on the ground of official reticence, that the Foreign Office should be in possession—as he was informed it was—of the formal and solemn consent of Turkey to send an Army into Egypt, and yet should neglect to communicate a single word with regard to that important fact to the Committee? He wanted to know under what conditions, with what scope, with what guarantee, was the Turkish Army to appear in Egypt and remain there? He wanted to know, and he thought the Committeo had a right to know, and, he maintained, it was the duty of the responsible Opposition to insist upon knowing, what was going to be the action of Her Majesty's Government in face of the presence of the Turkish Army in Egypt? Were Her Majesty's Government going to relax their warlike efforts, and to allow Turkey to carry-out the mandate of Europe, and to restore peace and order in Egypt by its forces? Or, on the other hand, would

  2105
  Her Majesty's Forces be employed in Egypt without regard to the presence of the Turkish Army? Whilst Turkey was authorized to use the Turkish Army in Egypt, by the mandate of Europe, to restore order, were Her Majesty's Force's to be employed in more bombardments, in further expeditions and invasions, in warring against the Native Egyptian Forces without allowing any opportunity to Turkey to restore order, according to the mandate of Europe? He wanted to know—the Committee had a right to know—why they had not had an explanation, or even an admission, of this fact up to the present? Why had they not had the slightest intimation of the fact? Why had the Government apparently sought to obtain a Vote of the Committee by keeping back a knowledge of the most grave and serious, and important fundamental fact of the whole situation? He was entitled to ask whether Her Majesty's Government would assist or oppose the entry of Turkish troops into Egypt, and whether or not they were satisfied with that solution of the question? If Her Majesty's Government resolved to oppose the entry of Turkish troops into Egypt, would they, or would they not, incur responsibilities to the European Concert? Were Her Majesty's Government prepared to attack the European Concert as well as to attack Arabi Pasha? He was entitled to ask, and the Committee were entitled to know, all these things, and in order to enable the Prime Minister to answer, he would move that the Chairman report Progress.
  Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"—(Mr. O'Donnell)—put, and negatived.
  Original Question again proposed.
  MR. O'DONNELLsaid, he rose for the purpose of asking Her Majesty's Government whether they had received a Note from Turkey accepting the mandate of Europe to send an Army into Egypt; and whether Her Majesty's Government meant to explain their policy in regard to that Note before asking for the Vote the most important part of the explanation of which would have been left unsaid?
  MR. GLADSTONE: What I wish to say, in answer to the question of the hon. Gentleman is, that the House is
  2106
  aware of the restraint under which we lie with respect to the present position of affairs. But I can say this, in the most positive manner, that nothing has happened which, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, in the slightest degree affects their duty to request this Vote from the House of Commons, or to prosecute the undertaking on which we have entered.
  Original Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 275; Noes 19: Majority 256.

  AYES.

  Acland, C. T. D.

  Cavendish, Lord E.

  Aguew, W.

  Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.

  Ainsworth, D.

  Chamberlain, rt. hn. J.

  Alexander, Colonel C.

  Chaplin, H.

  Allen, H. G.

  Cheetham, J. F.

  Allen, W. S.

  Clarke, J. C.

  Armitage, B.

  Clifford, C. C.

  Armitstead, G.

  Cohen, A.

  Arnold, A.

  Corbett, J.

  Asher, A.

  Corry, J. P.

  Ashley, hon. E. M.

  Cotes, C. C.

  Aylmer, J. E. F.

  Courtauld, G.

  Balfour, Sir G.

  Courtney, L. H.

  Balfour, J. B.

  Cowper, hon. H. F.

  Baring, T. C.

  Cropper, J.

  Baring, Viscount

  Cross, rt. hon. Sir R. A.

  Barnes, A.

  Cross, J. K.

  Barran, J.

  Crum, A.

  Barttelot, Sir W. B.

  Currie, Sir D.

  Bass, Sir A.

  Davenport, H. T.

  Bass, H.

  Davenport, W. B.

  Baxter, rt. hon. W. E.

  Davies, D.

  Bective, Earl of

  Davies, R.

  Bellingham, A. H.

  Dawnay, hon. G. C.

  Birkbeck, E.

  De Worms, Baron H.

  Blackburne, Col. J. I.

  Dickson, Major A. G.

  Blennerhassett, Sir R.

  Dilke, Sir C. W.

  Blennerhassett, R. P.

  Dillwyn, L. L.

  Bolton, J. C.

  Dixon-Hartland, F. D.

  Borlase, W. C.

  Dodds, J.

  Brand, H. R.

  Dodson, rt. hon. J. G.

  Brassey, Sir T.

  Douglas, A. Akers-

  Brett, R. B.

  Duckham, T.

  Briggs, W. E.

  Duff, R. W.

  Bright, J. (Manchester)

  Dundas, hon. J. C.

  Brinton, J.

  Dyke, rt. hn. Sir W. H.

  Brise, Colonel R.

  Earp, T.

  Broadhurst, H.

  Ebrington, Viscount

  Bruce, rt. hon. Lord C.

  Ecroyd, W. F.

  Bruce, Sir H. H.

  Edwards, H.

  Bruce, hon. R. P.

  Egerton, Adm. hon. F.

  Bryce, J.

  Errington, G.

  Buchanan, T. R.

  Evans, T. W.

  Burnaby, General E. S.

  Fairbairn, Sir A.

  Buszard, M. C.

  Farquharson, Dr. R.

  Butt, C. P.

  Fawcett, rt. hon. H.

  Buxton, F. W.

  Feilden, Maj.-Gen. R. J.

  Buxton, Sir R. J.

  Ferguson, R.

  Campbell, Lord C.

  Findlater, W.

  Campbell, J. A.

  Fitzwilliam, hon. W.J.

  Campbell, R. F. F.

  Fletcher, Sir H.

  Campbell-Bannerman, H.

  Flower, C.

  Foljambe, C. G. S.

  Causton, R. K.

  Forster, Sir C.

  2107

  Fort, R.

  Mason, H.

  Fowler, H. H.

  Milbank, Sir F. A.

  Fowler, R. N.

  Monk, C. J.

  Fowler, W.

  Morgan, rt. hon. G. O.

  Fry, L.

  Morley, A.

  Gibson, rt. hon. E.

  Morley, S.

  Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

  Moss, R.

  Gladstone, H. J.

  Mowbray, rt. hon. Sir J.R.

  Gladstone, W. H.

  Glyn, hon. S. C.

  Mundella, rt. hon. A. J.

  Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.

  Murray, C. J.

  Gower, hon. E. F. L.

  Nicholson, W.

  Grafton, F. W.

  Nicholson, W. N.

  Grant, A.

  Noel, E.

  Grantham, W.

  Northcote, rt. hn. Sir S. H.

  Grenfell, W. H.

  Grey, A. H. G.

  Northcote, H. S.

  Hamilton, right hon. Lord G.

  Norwood, C. M.

  O'Brien, Sir P.

  Harcourt, rt. hon. Sir W. G. V. V.

  Onslow, D

  O'Shaughnessy, R.

  Hartington, Marq. of

  O'Shea, W. H.

  Hastings, G. W.

  Otway, Sir A.

  Hay, rt. hon. Admiral Sir J. C. D.

  Paget, R. H.

  Paget, T. T.

  Hayter, Sir A. D.

  Palmer, C. M.

  Heneage, E.

  Palmer, J. H.

  Henry, M.

  Parker, C. S.

  Herschell, Sir F.

  Pell, A.

  Hibbert, J. T.

  Pender, J.

  Hill, T. R.

  Phipps, C. N. P.

  Holden, I.

  Plunket, rt. hon. D.R.

  Holland, Sir H. T.

  Portman, hn. W. H. B.

  Holland, S.

  Potter, T. B.

  Hollond, J. R.

  Pugh, L. P.

  Holms, J.

  Puleston, J. H.

  Howard, G. J.

  Pulley, J.

  Howard, J.

  Raikes, rt. hon. H. C.

  Inderwick, F. A.

  Ralli, P.

  James, Sir H.

  Rankin, J.

  James, W. H.

  Rathbone, W.

  Jenkins, D. J.

  Reed, Sir E. J.

  Jerningham, H. E. H.

  Rendel, S.

  Johnson, rt. hon. W. M.

  Repton, G. W.

  Kennard, Col. E. H.

  Richardson, T.

  Kinnear, J.

  Ritchie, C. T.

  Labouchere, H.

  Robertson, H.

  Lawrence, Sir J. C.

  Rogers, J. E. T.

  Lawrence, W.

  Rolls, J. A.

  Lea, T.

  Round, J.

  Leake, R.

  Russell, G. W. E.

  Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.

  Samuelson, B.

  Lefevre, rt. hn. G. J. S.

  Samuelson, H.

  Leigh, R.

  Sclater-Booth, rt. hn. G.

  Lindsay, Sir R. L.

  Scott, M. D.

  Lopes, Sir M.

  Seely, C. (Lincoln)

  Lubbock, Sir J.

  Severne, J. E.

  Lyons, R. D.

  Sheridan, H. B.

  M'Arthur, A.

  Shield, H.

  M'Arthur, W.

  Simon, Serjeant J.

  M'Clure, Sir T.

  Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.

  M'Coan, J. C.

  Slagg, J.

  M'Intyre, Æneas J.

  Smith, rt. hon. W. H.

  M'Kenna, Sir J. N.

  Smith, E.

  Mackie, R. B.

  Stanley, rt. hon. Col. F. A.

  Macliver, P. S.

  Magniac, C.

  Stanley, E. J.

  Maitland, W. F.

  Stanton, W. J.

  Makins, Colonel W. T.

  Stevenson, J. C.

  Mappin, F. T.

  Stewart, J.

  Marjoribanks, E.

  Stuart, H. V.

  Marriott, W. T.

  Talbot, C. R. M.

  Maskelyne, M. H. Story-

  Talbot, J. G.

  2108

  Taylor, P. A.

  Whitley, E.

  Tennant, C.

  Wiggin, H.

  Thornhill, T.

  Williams, S. C. E.

  Tillett, J. H.

  Williamson, S.

  Torrens, W. T. M'C.

  Willis, W.

  Tottenham, A. L.

  Willyams, E. W. B.

  Trevelyan, rt. hn. G.O.

  Wilmot, Sir H.

  Vivian, A. P.

  Wilson, Sir M.

  Vivian, Sir H. H.

  Winn, R.

  Walrond, Col. W. H.

  Wodehouse, E. R.

  Walter, J.

  Wolff, Sir H. D.

  Warton, C. N.

  Woodall, W.

  Waugh, E.

  Webster, J.

  TELLERS.

  Whalley, G. H.

  Grosvenor, Lord R.

  Whitbread, S.

  Kensington, Lord

  NOES.

  Burt, T.

  Power, J. O'C.

  Callan, P.

  Redmond, J. E.

  Collings, J.

  Richard, H.

  Illingworth, A.

  Sheil, E.

  Lawson, Sir W.

  Storey, S.

  M'Carthy, J.

  Thompson, T. C.

  Nelson, I.

  Wedderburn, Sir D.

  O'Connor, A.

  Wyndham, hon. P.

  O'Connor, T. P.

  O'GormanMahon, Col. The

  TELLERS.

  Biggar, J. G.

  O'Kelly, J.

  O'Donnell, F. H.

  Bill read a second time, and committed for Monday next.

  ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE—VOTE A.
  SIR ARTHUH HAYTER, in rising to move—
  "That a number of Men, not exceeding 10,000, all ranks, in addition to those already voted, he maintained for the service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, at home and abroad, excluding Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883,"
  appealed to hon. Gentlemen opposite to allow this Vote to be taken at once, because it was very necessary to do so, and they would have an opportnnity of saying what they wished on the Army Vote which was not yet passed. The 10,000 men proposed to be taken were the very cream of the Service, not one of them being much over 30 years of age.
  (2.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a number of Men, not exceeding 10,000, all ranks, in addition to those already voted, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, at home and abroad, excluding Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883."—(Sir Arthur Hayter.)
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, he wished to ask a question with regard to the different battalions now in the Ser-

  2109
  vice. The other day the Secretary of State for War admitted that the Brigade of Guards alone were below their establishment by an average of 50 men a battalion. As there were seven battalions of Guards, that average represented a deficiency in the Brigade of Guards alone of 350 men, and, if the same system had been pursued throughout the whole Army, there was a number of men accounted for almost equal to those which the Committee were now asked to vote over and above the present establishment. There were 136 battalions of the Line; those with the seven of Guards made 143 battalions, and, if the average deficiency, which was acknowledged with respect to the Brigade of Guards, was to be found throughout the whole of the Infantry Service, there was a deficiency of over 7,000 men. He knew that the strength of many of the Cavalry regiments had been below their establishment for a considerable time; and if the Artillery was in the same position, there was actually the whole of the 10,000 men now asked for over and above the existing establishment entirely accounted for by the deficiency in the recruiting arrangements. He believed that the phrase applied by the late Lord Derby some years ago to the Army might be repeated now—"attenuated battalions"—and that was why the Government had to ask for a special Vote to call out the Reserves. He should like to hear a statement from the Government as to the strength of the Cavalry and Infantry battalions?
  SIR HENEY FLETCHERsaid, he wished to make one or two remarks in correction of statements made by the Secretary of State for War as to the Brigade of Guards. He did not wish to say a word against the appointment of the Duke of Connaught to command the Brigade of Guards proceeding to Egypt; but the Secretary of State for War had stated that the appointment of an officer who had no connection with the Brigade of Guards did not come under the Queen's Regulations. Such an appointment did, however, come under the Queen's Regulations with respect to the command of regiments on foreign service. At page 374, the Regulations said—
  "The Foot Guards from time immemorial, when detached by Brigade, have always
  2110
  been commanded by officers belonging to the Guards, and the custom will continue for the future."
  He merely wished to call attention to the fact that this was in the Queen's Regulations. On every occasion on which the Guards had proceeded on foreign service they were commanded by their own officers. In 1801 they were commanded by General Ludlow. When they proceeded to Waterloo they were commanded by Major General Maitland and Major General Banks. In the Crimea they were commanded by Major General Bentinck; and when they went to Canada, although that was not exactly the scene of war, they were commanded by Lieutenant General Fitzroy and Lord John Lindsay. He thought, by stating these facts and quoting the Queen's Regulations, he had shown that when-ever Her Majesty's Foot Guards, which he had the honour to serve, proceeded abroad, they had been commanded by their own officers. He did not pass any reflection on the appointment made in this case; but, for the sake of the Service, he thought it important to mention that this matter was dealt with in the Queen's Regulations.
  SIR ARTHUR HAYTER, in reply to the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor), said, the battalions of Guards consisted of 761 rank and file, and with the officers were nearly 800 strong. The Cavalry battalions consisted of 452 men. Men were taken from some battalions to make up for other battalions.
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTwished to know whether the Reserves would join the regiments to which they belonged? Although this had been contemplated from the first, it had never yet been done.
  SIR ARTHUR HAYTERpromised to inquire into that matter.
  MR. O'DONNELLsaid, he thought the statement recently made by the Secretary of State for War was inaccurate, and he hoped some explanation would be made by the Government which would be in the nature of a reparation to the House and to the Service for that statement. He had asked whether it was intended to observe the Regulation requiring that when the Brigade of Guards went on active service it should be commanded by its own officers? And the

  2111
  answer he received from the War Minister was that the Regulation he referred to was only a Guards' Regulation, and not one of the Queen's Regulations for the Army. It was, however, one of the Queen's Regulations for the Army, and from time immemorial it had been observed in the Army. There had been no instance pointed out in which the Brigade of Guards went on active service when it was not commanded by a Guards' General. There had been a serious injustice done in the present case. He did not approach the subject in any spirit of depreciation of the Royal Prince who had been selected; but Regulations were Regulations, and merit was merit. Service ought to count as service, and when the War Minister showed undue influence at the top of the tree, that was an example which was likely to prove destructive in all the lower branches. The Brigade of Guards ought to be commanded by a Guards' General, according to the Regulations, and there were at least three Guards' Generals of distinguished service, one of whom ought to have been appointed. There was General Higginson, General Burnaby, an hon. and gallant Member of that House, and General Gibbs. General Higginson was at present commanding the Home District, and he understood that that officer had waived his right because the Home District was regarded as one of the plums of the Service.
  MR. MAGNIAC: I can assure the hon. Member that it is not the case that General Higginson has waived his right; he never had the opportunity.
  MR. O'DONNELLsaid, he was glad to receive that correction, and the hon. Member's statement only added to the impropriety of what had been done. Then, besides General Higginson, who was a most distinguished officer of 34 years' service, there was General Burnaby, who was also a veteran in the Service, and had been all his life an ardent friend of the Guards, and a most popular officer among the soldiers; and then there was Major General Gibbs, who had seen over 32 years' service, was wounded at the Alma and stabbed at Inkerman, or stabbed at the Alma and wounded at Inkerman—for the purposes of the War Minister it did not matter how that was, for neither wounds, nor service, nor the Queen's Regulations
  2112
  could lead him in the path of duty against powerful solicitations. If he had any opportunity on which he could take a precise vote by which the country could recognize and mark the conduct of the Government he should take such opportunity, for he thought it was just as wrong to break the Regulations, and to overlook the rights of gallant soldiers in the interests of a Royal Prince, as it would be in the interests of an inferior person. The Duke of Connaught was a Line officer, and the Government might very easily have given him the command of the Line forces sent out; but it was His Royal Highness's desire to command the Guards without any regard for the Queen's Regulations. Then the extraordinary inaccuracy which had led the War Minister to deny that this was a matter under the Queen's Regulations had about as fishy a look as anything in the administration of the War Office. As it was the Liberal War Minister who had committed this act of misconduct, there would be no burning and boiling protestation from the Liberal ranks below the Gangway; but it was the fact that three gallant officers had had their claims overlooked, and their rights set aside, and also honourable rights on behalf of which they had risked, and, as it turned out, sacrificed very large sums of money. All this had been done purely out of regard for influences which ought not to interfere with the rights and merits of old officers, and with old privileges in the Army.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, the answer of the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir Arthur Hayter) was really no answer at all, because he had not asked what was the strength of the different regiments which were to go on foreign service. What he wished to know was, whether it was not the fact that the establishment of the whole Army was not very much below its proper strength; and was it not a fact that the Engineers at home, the Artillery, the Foot Guards, and the Infantry were 100,000 below their proper strength; and whether the Cavalry and Infantry and Engineers in India were not also below their proper strength?
  SIR ARTHUR HAYTERassured the hon. Member that he was entirely mistaken, for lately it had been found necessary to diminish the recruiting.
  Motion agreed to.
  Resolutions to be reported To-morrow, at Two of the clock.
  Committee to sit again To-morrow, at Two of the clock.

QUESTIONS.

  PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
  MR. RAIKESasked whether Supply would be taken as the first Order of the Day at 2 o'clock? He wished to know in consequence of an answer he received from the Chancellor of the Exchequer earlier in the Sitting.
  MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, he hoped that an opportunity would be given his right hon. Friend (Mr. Raikes) to raise his question, because, without imputing anything like sharp practice to the Government, he had no doubt the course taken was an unusual one. An addition to the Income Tax was carried by Resolution after 10 minutes to 7 on Tuesday, or, at all events, without Notice to the House that such a Resolution was to be proposed. He was aware that it was said that the Resolution would be dealt with in Ways and Means; but it was the practice when a tax was imposed to give duo Notice of it, and the first step in setting up Supply was such that the House was aware what was to be proposed. In this case the House was not aware that it was intended to take this Resolution, and very few Members were aware that it had been passed. Under these circumstances, some opportunity ought to be afforded to his right hon. Friend to discuss the question he desired to introduce. It was one of considerable importance, and he believed his right hon. Friend was right in stating that no similar case had occurred for the last 40 years, and that under no circumstances whatever had an addition been made to the Income Tax to meet a charge which had been imposed by the House, without any opportunity being afforded for discussion.
  MR. T. P. O'CONNORasked when the Resolution which stood in the name of the Secretary of State for India would come on?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: At 2 o'clock.

ORDERS OF THE BAY.
  CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE (re-committed) BILL.
  (Mr. Playfair, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Frederick Cavendish.)

  [BILL 239.] COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Committee be deferred till To-morrow, at Two of the clock."
  MR. MAGNIACasked for an explanation from the Secretary to the Treasury. He said that a deputation had waited on the President of the Board of Trade on this subject, and an arrangement had been come to which it was impossible to carry out between now and the Morning Sitting. An intimation had also been given that the Bill would not be taken until Monday, and Members had made their arrangements accordingly. Several hon. Members in consequence were not now present; and he hoped the hon. Gentleman would give some assurance that there would be a point at which, if the Bill was taken to-morrow, the discussion should cease.
  MR. COURTNEYsaid, his right hon. Friend had announced that this Bill would be taken at the Morning Sitting, and it was now quite impossible to make any alteration in that respect. He was ready, however, to undertake that the Bill should not be proceeded with beyond the first objection to the Bill which stood in the hon. Member's name.
  Motion agreed, to.
  Committee deferred till To-morrow, at Two of the clock.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (PUTTING THE QUESTION).

  ADJOURNED DEBATE.
  MR. T. P. O'CONNORasked the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India, What possible advantage there was in this Order, seeing that the Prime Minister had pledged himself to consider the whole question in the Autumn Session? The only reason he could imagine for keeping the Order on

  2115
  the Paper was the hope of inducing hon. Members on the other side of the House to agree to the Rule in a certain modified form. He would suggest that the Order, which had been on the Paper since February 20th and reported at intervals, much to the alarm of certain hon. Members, should now be discharged.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONreplied that the Order could not be discharged, because it then could not be considered during the Autumn Session.
  Adjourned Debate on Main Question [20th February] further adjourned till Monday next.

  BALLOT ACT CONTINUANCE AND AMENDMENT BILL.— [BILL 84.]
  (Sir Charles Dilke, Secretary Sir William Harcourt, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Attorney General.)

  COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Committee be deferred till Monday next."
  MR. ONSLOWdeprecated the action of the Government on this Bill. He had understood that the Bill was to be one of the discharged Orders, and he must call upon the Government to keep then-pledges made in the face of the House. If the Government did not agree to discharge the Order, he would move that it be discharged.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)said, as soon as the Continuance Bill came in, this Order would be discharged.
  Motion agreed to.
  Committee deferred till Monday next.

  PARCEL POST BILL.— [BILL 254]
  (Mr. Faweett, Mr. Courtney.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Faweett.)
  MR. CALLANobjected, as this was the first appearance of the Bill.
  MR. SPEAKER: The Question is that this Bill be read a second time.
  MR. CALLANsaid, this was the first day the Bill had appeared, and his objection brought the Bill under the Half-past 12 o'clock Rule.
  SIR JOHN LUBBOCKsaid, he did not rise to oppose the second reading. At the same time, feeling as he did very strongly against the general principle of allowing Governments to undertake business for the sake of profit, he did not wish to allow the Bill to pass altogether without remark. He knew that in the opinion of his right hon. Friend there were special and exceptional circumstances in the present case; and, under these circumstances, and at so late an hour, he should not press his doubts further on the present occasion.
  MR. CALLANasked whether he was to take it as the ruling of the Chair that this Bill, being objected to, did not come under the Half-past 12 o'clock Rule.
  MR. SPEAKER: The Half-past 12 o'clock Rule applies to Notices of Motion; this is an Order of the Day.
  MR. FAWCETTsaid, the Bill had been down since Monday and fixed for the second reading.
  Motion agreed to.

MOTIONS.
  EAST INDIA (EXPENSES OF MILITARY EXPEDITION TO EGYPT).

    RESOLUTION.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That, Her Majesty having directed a Military Expedition of Her Forces charged upon the Revenues of India to be despatched for service in Egypt, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on by such Forces beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possession."—(Sir William Harcourt.)
    MR. CALLANsaid, he had a Notice blocking this Motion. He wished to know whether his opposition precluded the Motion from being made at this hour in the morning?
    MR. SPEAKER: It will be in the recollection of the House that on the 9th of May the Standing Order with regard to Opposed Business was altered so as to exclude Motions of the character in question from the operation of that Order. This Motion comes under this exception, and, therefore, it may be taken.
    MR. ONSLOWasked whether the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India would make his Statement before any other Member spoke, or whether he intended to give his reasons for moving his Resolution after the Members of the House had discussed it?
    MR. R. N. FOWLERsaid, he hoped an opportunity would be given for the discussion of this Motion.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, it had been stated that this Resolution would be put down for the second reading to-morrow. He proposed, when the Order was called on, to make a Statement.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(The Marquess of Hartington.)
    Motion agreed to.
    Debate adjourned till To-morrow, at Two of the clock.

LOUTH COUNTY (OFFENCES).

  MOTION FOR A RETURN.
  MR. CALLAN MR. CALLAN moved for a Return
  "Of the Offences reported in the County of Louth, specifying the dates thereof, from the commencement of 1881 up to the period when it was proclaimed under the provisions of The Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act, 1881,' specifying those for which Convictions were obtained,"
  "And, Copy of the Correspondence as to the said Proclamation, which has passed between His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant and the Magistrates of the said County."
  The hon. Member said, he believed there would be no objection to this Return; and, with regard to the second part, his principal reason for wishing to have the Return was that he thought the Return would be nil, as he believed there had been no correspondence whatever between the Lord Lieutenant and the county magistrates of Louth. It was not from any curiosity to see the correspondence that he moved for it, but simply to have an authoritative statement that there had not been any correspondence. He would not, under other
  2118
  circumstances, move for what might be deemed confidential documents; but he wished to have either the Return or some statement made that the correspondence had been confidential, or that no correspondence whatever had taken place between the Lord Lieutenant and the magistrates of the county. With reference to the correspondence between the magistrates, no district in Europe was so peaceable, quiet, and orderly as the county of Louth; and when a man had applied for leave to carry arms to protect himself, leave was refused, on the ground that there were no outrages in the county. Therefore, he wanted to know why the county had been proclaimed? When the Arms Act was passed through the House in March, 1881, the late Chief Secretary, among other pledges which had been broken since by himself and by his whole Executive, pledged himself that no county should be proclaimed unless there was some absolute necessity for doing so. The Act passed in March, 1881, and the county was not proclaimed until September, 1881. Between the passing of the Act in March, 1881, and the proclamation of the county in September, no outrages occurred, and there was nothing to justify the Proclamation. He wished to know upon what ground the Proclamation was issued, because the first part of the Proclamation showed that there were no such crimes and offences in the county as to justify such an outrage on the county? He wished to see upon whose advice the Proclamation was issued, and hoped the Government would not refuse this Return.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. W. M. JOHNSON)said, he had no answer to give the hon. Member; but there was no objection to give the Return moved for.
  Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at Three o'clock.

MINUTES
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Labourers' Cottages and Allotments (Ireland) * (210).
Second Heading—Arrears of Rent (Ireland) (205).
Third Reading—Friendly Societies (Quinquennial Returns) * (194), and passed.

CRIME (IRELAND)—THE LATE ASSASSINATIONS IN THE PHŒNIX PARK—REPORTED ARREST OF ONE OF THE MURDERERS.—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF MILLTOWN: My Lords, seeing the noble Lord (the Lord Privy Seal) in his place, I beg to ask him, Whether he can give the House any information with regard to the alleged arrest of one of the Phoenix Park murderers at Puerto Cabello?
LORD CARLINGFORD (LORD PRIVY SEAL), in reply, said, that he was unable to give the House any information on the subject.

THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE (RESERVE FORCES).

  CONSIDERATION. MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
  Order of the Day for the consideration of the Queen's Message read.
  Message considered accordingly.
  Moved, "That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her most gracious Message communicating to this House Her Majesty's intention to cause the Reserve Force, or such part thereof as Her Majesty should think necessary, to be forthwith called out for permanent service."—(The Earl Granville.)
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, before the Question was put, he wished to ask for some explanation in regard to it. He did not wish to criticize the proposal of the Government in any adverse sense; but, at the same time, he did not

  1905
  think it was altogether satisfactory that in so comparatively small a military expedition as that about to be undertaken to Egypt, requiring, as it appeared, only an addition of 10,000 men to the Army, we should be obliged to rely upon a Force which was intended, after all, as a last resource. He trusted Her Majesty's Government had in their recollection, and had fully considered, the inconveniences and difficulties which attended the last calling out of the Reserve. The wives and children of many of the men had fallen upon the rates for maintenance, considerable distress was suffered, and difficulties arose in consequence of employers, in certain cases, declining to take back the Reserve men into their service when relieved from their duties with the Colours. He thought their Lordships would feel that there could be nothing so unfortunate, and nothing so calculated to injure the Eeserve system, as any feeling of unwillingness on the part of employers of labour to re-employ the men when discharged from service; or, on the other hand, any feeling on the part of the men that they were likely to suffer from being called out. He wished to know whether these points had been considered by Her Majesty's Government; and he should also like to be informed whether the men who were to be called out were not the men who served in 1878? The men might, it was true, be required only for a very short time; but, on the other hand, complications might ensue which would render it necessary that their service should continue for a considerable period; and as the men would have to leave their wives and children unprovided for, it would be well if some arrangement could be made whereby they would receive some portion of their pay in advance, so that the worst cases of hardship might, in that way, be mitigated?
  LORD ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he wished to consider the matter from a military point of view. The fact that we had to call out the Reserves for an Egyptian expedition—for that which, under happier circumstances, would have been a comparatively small and short war—showed that having regard to our enormous Possessions and extensive commercial interests, our fighting Force was not only on a ridiculously inefficient scale as regarded numbers, but absolutely Liliputian. With regard to the manage-
  1906
  ment of military and naval affairs, we were more civilian in our notions than if we had no Army at all—than even our American cousins. The civilian element everywhere had the upper hand, and the consequence was that there was seldom, if ever, any military or naval undertaking on the part of this country managed on purely professional principles, neither were naval or military men selected to represent the Naval or Military Departments of the State; and naval or military subjects were not listened to in Parliament with the smallest degree of patience when there were other political matters pressing themselves on the attention of the Government of the day. He hoped that the present necessity for calling out the Reserves would be a warning to Her Majesty's Government, and that it was not true, as was rumoured, that there had been as many collapses in respect to the war we were unhappily about to undertake as there had been during the Crimean War, and that everything had been turned topsy-turvy when everything was to have been quite perfect. The taxpayers would prefer that naval and military officers should be held responsible for grave errors of judgment, the same as officers who committed themselves in the field. He would repeat that the Army was not proportionate to the magnitude of the interests of the country; and as to the Navy, our line-of-battle ships did not carry sufficient Marines on board, from the circumstance of insufficiency of space to accommodate them, notwithstanding the costly nature of them making any such defect inexcusable.
  THE EARL OF MORLEYsaid, he was not surprised that his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) should require information as to the calling out of a portion of the Reserves. He (the Earl of Morley) could not subscribe to the theory that the noble Earl had enunciated—namely, that it was only as a last resource that the Reserves were to be used. On the present occasion they served a very important purpose. He (the Earl of Morley) looked upon the question of the Reserves from a very different point of view to that of his noble Friend. He looked upon it from the point of view—as it was looked upon by officers of great distinction and experience—that it was desirable that the

  1907
  young and inexperienced soldiers of the Army should not be sent into the field. The object the Government, therefore, had in calling out the Reserves was that they would be able to leave at home all soldiers who had not been at least one year in the Service, and fill up the gaps by the well-seasoned men taken from the First Class Army Reserve. They had, accordingly, chosen those men of the Reserve who had been the shortest time absent from the Colours—namely, those who had joined the Reserve since the 1st of January, 1881. It happened that just at present there was a larger proportion of younger soldiers in the battalions which compose the First Army Corps than there would be next year, or at any future time. Under former arrangements it was supposed that there were always at the top of the Roster a certain number of battalions of high strength ready for foreign service, and that these should consist of 820 rank and file. Leaving at homo the young and untrained and unfit men in these battalions would reduce them below their war strength; and, therefore, it was determined that in future the 12 battalions at the top of the Roster for foreign service should be maintained at considerably over their war strength—namely, at 950 rank and file, without including the depots, which would be of varying strength, from 50 to 150 men. This system had been adopted last year; and to bring it into operation it had been necessary suddenly to raise the establishments of the battalions of the First Army Corps from a low to a very high strength. That, obviously, could only be done by recruiting rapidly for those battalions; and, consequently, there were now with the Colours a larger proportion of young men than there would be when the system was complete. There were two advantages in calling up the men who had most recently joined, for then the First Class Army Reserve men would have had the least time to lose what military instruction they might have received; and, from their having been a shorter time in domestic and civil life, they would find it a lesser hardship to be disturbed in their civil employment than those who had been for a considerable number of years engaged in civil occupation, and, being younger, they would be less likely to be married than those who had left the
  1908
  Colours at an earlier date. The Government had not overlooked the point alluded to by his noble Friend, as to the resumption of their employment by the men on their discharge. With regard to it, all he could say was that the Government could not bring any pressure to bear on the employers in England in regard to taking the men back into their civil occupations. They could only appeal to their patriotism in the matter; and he thought that the employers of labour, in the country's and even in their own interests, should take back into their service, at the termination of hostilities, the men who had done good service to their country, by serving it abroad, and who were disciplined and reliable. In so doing, they would not only be acting considerately to those who merited it for their past services; but they would be doing much to induce others to join the Reserves. It was, however, as he had said, a matter upon which the Government could not exercise any pressure or authority, and which must be left to the force of public opinion. With regard to the women and children, that was a subject of great importance. He might say that the wives and children of Reserve men would be treated in the same way as those of other soldiers, and would receive their separation allowance; but the Government hoped by taking the men who had last joined—that was to say, the youngest—men in the Reserve, that the proportion of women and children who would be affected would not be so large as the noble Earl expected. It could not be regarded as a hardship that the men should be recalled to the Colours. That recalling to the Colours was the very essence of the Short Service system, because, while the men were serving upon their Re-serve engagements, they received pay at the rate of 6d. per day, which might be regarded in the light of a retaining fee. He thought he had now answered all the questions of the noble Earl. The noble and gallant Lord who had followed him (Lord Ellenborough) was rather severe in his criticisms upon their whole military system. He (the Earl of Morley) did not think he should be meeting the wishes of the House by embarking upon a general discussion of the subject of the efficiency of our Army; but he would content himself

  1909
  with saying that he was unaware in what manner the noble and gallant Lord could show that all the arrangements made by the Government for the Egyptian expedition had broken down. As a matter of fact, he thought the noble and gallant Lord would have great difficulty in proving that any arrangements hitherto made had collapsed in the manner indicated.
  THE EARL OF LONGFORDthought the explanation of the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for War was scarcely satisfactory; and it was certainly most unfortunate that the Eastern Question had broken out again before the new arrangements of the War Office were completed. Yet he had no wish to oppose the Motion. It was, however, to be observed that the military operations proposed by the present Government under the moral law were somewhat differently viewed from those proposed by other Governments. He could not help remarking that what in the late Lord Beaconsfield was denounced as "Jingoism" was in the case of Mr. Gladstone described as righteous justice.
  LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNEsaid, that he understood the noble Earl (the Earl of Morley) had stated that no soldiers would be sent abroad who had served less than one year. He (Lord Oranmore and Browne) believed, however, that a regiment had been ordered on foreign service—namely, to Gibraltar or Malta, containing 300 men, who had only been in the ranks for three months. Was it so?
  THE EARL OF MORLEY, in reply, said, that what he had said referred to the despatch of men on active foreign service. Men below the age of 20, and who had served less than one year, had been sent with the battalions which were to form the garrisons at Gibraltar and Malta, replacing the battalions which had proceeded from these places to the field. He saw no objection to this, for these young soldiers would not be sent into the field; but he did not see why they should not be trained at Gibraltar or Malta just as well as at Portsmouth or Plymouth.
  Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente.
  Ordered, That the said Address be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

  ARREARS OF RENT (IRELAND) BILL.—(No 205.)
  (The Lord Privy Seal.)

  SECOND HEADING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Beading read.
  LORD CARLINGFORD (LORD PRIVY SEAL), in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said: My Lords, this is the second time within a few days that it has been my duty to ask your Lordships' indulgence while I explain to you the provisions of a measure of great importance relating to the condition of affairs in Ireland. That fact is not surprising. No one, I think, who rightly estimates the tremendous problem with which we have to deal in Ireland, and the gravity of the crisis through which that country is passing at the present time, can be surprised that Parliament should have been compelled to devote so large an amount of its time, its labour, and its thought to these matters, or at the variety of measures which the Government and Parliament have been compelled to adopt. There is a great contrast, in some respects, between the measure which your Lordships passed the other day and the present, while it resembles it in others. That was a measure for the severe repression of crime; this is a measure, the object of which is to remove or diminish the causes of crime. Its object is to improve as far as possible, in one important respect, at all events, the miserable, impecunious, discontented, and hopeless situation of a very large number of Irish tenants, and, at the same time, to relieve a large number of Irish landlords, not only from heavy pecuniary losses, but from the hard and painful necessity of resorting to the extreme measures of the law in enforcing their legal rights by means of the eviction of tenants. But, notwithstanding these great differences between the two Bills, there is, at all events, one striking likeness, and that is this—both Bills are measures which, under ordinary circumstances, in a healthy condition of the country to which they are applied, would be indefensible; but both are Bills which, in the present emergency, and in the diseased and dangerous condition of the country, become both a necessity and a duty for Parlia-

  1911
  ment to adopt. Who would think of interfering, under any ordinary circumstances, with the relation of debtor and creditor in this country? Who would think, under any ordinary circumstances, of interposing, by the power and funds of the State, for the purpose of effecting a settlement of debt between two great classes? Yes, my Lords; but who would think of giving to the Executive and to the police the enormous powers which we gave them the other day? and what would justify the House in suspending the practice of trial by jury, except some over-mastering necessity? This Bill may be described as a measure for the compulsory composition of the arrears of rent in Ireland upon the smaller holdings in the country under certain rigid conditions which I will describe. The holdings must be under £30 valuation, and the Bill may be put into operation by either landlord or tenant. The Bill lays down certain preliminary conditions, which will have to be proved to the satisfaction of the Land Commission in Ireland, assisted by a number of properly qualified persons whom they are enabled to employ. The preliminary conditions are these—the tenant must pay the year's rent of 1881; he must pay that rent as a first condition before the 30th of November next. It must then be shown that the tenant owes antecedent arrears and cannot pay them; and upon these conditions being ascertained and fulfilled, the State comes in to the amount of half these antecedent arrears not exceeding one year's rent. So that, as frequently will be the case, when the tenant owes three years, the State will supply him with one of these years' rent; and thus the landlord will obtain, in such a case, two years of his arrears of rent out of three. This House not being peculiarly the guardian of the Public Treasury, I presume that I need not dwell on the financial part of the case; but it is well known that it is provided in the Bill that the necessary funds shall, in the first instance, be supplied out of the Irish Church Fund, to be supplemented, in case of need, by the Consolidated Fund of this country. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, after making use of every possible means of inquiry and investigation, has come to the opinion that it is very unlikely that any heavy demand will be made on
  1912
  the Consolidated Fund, and it is very possible that no demand at all upon it will accrue; but, for the purposes of the Bill, it is absolutely necessary that there should be no doubt whatever of the offer made to the landlords and tenants of Ireland being carried into effect; and, therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the resources of the Church Fund should be supplemented by the Consolidated Fund. It will be evident to your Lordships, from what I have said, that the plan of the Bill rests on the principles of compulsion, of a gift of public money, and of the inability of the tenant to pay the full amount of his arrears. We do not hide from ourselves, and I certainly shall not hide from your Lordships, the objections which naturally attach to a scheme of this kind. That those objections are easily overrated, and that they have been overrated, I feel sure; but that they do exist, the Government has not only always admitted, but has asserted. But we say that the necessity of the case, the stringency of the circumstances under which we act, the prospect of success, which is everything, in attaining the object which this measure has in view, the necessary vigour and efficacy which, as we believe, will certainly be attained by the scheme of this Bill, far outweigh the disadvantages, drawbacks, and risks on the other side. It is said that this compulsory settlement is, in itself, unfair to the Irish landlords; that the method of gift is unfair to those Irish tenants who have paid their arrears; that it is both discouraging and demoralizing; and, also, that the inquiry into the tenant's inability to pay will prove a fictitious and illusory inquiry. ["Hear, hear!"] I am glad to hear those cheers, as I presume that by them noble Lords recognize the fairness of my statement of the objections taken to the measure. I do not deny the existence of those objections, though I think they are exaggerated; but I ask 3'our Lordships to fix your eyes, not merely on these attendant evils, but on the circumstances of the case with which we have to deal. We are, I think, apt to forget, or, at least, to underrate, the agricultural distress which prevailed in Ireland a short time ago. Many things have happened since then, and many persons appear almost to have forgotten its existence. But those bad seasons, coming on a

  1913
  very poor peasant tenantry, under what I must think was a very bad system of Land Law, did produce an amount of distress and misery which is the real and main cause—I do not say the sole and exclusive cause—of the arrears of rent with which we are now trying to deal. I shall not, I think, find the reality of that distress denied in this House, and certainly not on the Benches opposite; because it was recognized to the fullest extent by the late Government, who had recourse to the most exceptional measures—an advance of public money, so-called loans, at no interest or nominal interest, for the relief of that distress, and the provision of employment on a very large scale. And these measures were happily assisted by great efforts of private benevolence. If it had not been for those efforts, public and private, there can be no doubt that great disasters would have followed. You would have had, not only misery, but starvation in that country. But can it be supposed that the effects of such years as those on the poor, small peasant farmers of Ireland, and especially of the South and West, can now be extinguished? On the contrary, the small holders of Ireland have never, till this moment, recovered from the effects of that distress. It stopped to a great degree the payment of rent, and induced, mainly, the accumulation of the arrears with which we have now to deal. One result of that state of things has been that the landlords have been driven to the assertion of their rights, and, naturally, evictions have very greatly increased. They have steadily increased since 1877 or 1878; the increase has been going on in the present year at an alarming rate, and the fact is that the evictions to which the Irish landlords have had recourse during the first six months of the present year are more numerous than all the evictions which took place in the five years between 1873 and 1878. And these evictions are continuing, and undoubtedly will continue to increase in a most alarming ratio, unless some such effort as is attempted by this Bill is made. Unless we make some such effort to diminish, at all events, the causes of these evictions, to put the embarrassed small tenantry of Ireland in something like a solvent condition, there can be no settlement between landlord and tenant in numerous instances
  1914
  either in the Land Court or out of it. It is evident, as things stand at present, that a very large number of embarrassed tenants are now prevented from availing themselves of the advantages of the Land Act of last Session, and of the Laud Court that was then created. It cannot, I am sure, be the wish of any noble Lord, however much he may have opposed the Land Act of last year, that a large class of Irish tenants should find themselves, in a great majority of cases by their misfortune, excluded from the doors of that Court; and I leave your Lordships to imagine what contentment and peace and good relations between landlord and tenant can exist, as long as you have a large class of tenants in that situation. I believe it is necessary to make a strong effort to save both parties from this deadlock which will otherwise ensue, and to give the tenants a fair start again in the cultivation of their holdings and the payment of their rent. This may naturally be represented as a boon to the tenant; but it is absolutely impossible to separate the interest of the tenant from that of the landlord in this matter, or, indeed, from that of all classes in Ireland. We propose this measure in the interest not of the tenants only, but in the interest of the landlords also, and in the interests of the peace and tranquillity of Ireland generally. It may be supposed that certain Gentlemen in the other House who, some months ago, brought in a Bill that contained some of the principles of this measure, were not specially desirous to promote the interests of the landlord; but they could not promote the interests of the tenants in this respect without also benefiting the landlords. We have come to the conclusion that the plan of this Bill is the only one that will enable us to deal effectively and certainly with the great evil that we have to encounter; and that nothing but a compulsory settlement, under the sanction of the State, by the power of the State, and with the assistance of the money of the State, would enable us to feel any certainty that the remedy will really reach the object in view. If it were to depend on the chances of private agreement, it would be most uncertain, and would most probably fail in its effect. If then, the measure is to be one of compulsory settlement, we hold that it must be one of gift on the part

  1915
  of the State, under the limitations and conditions of the Bill. I need hardly remind your Lordships that Parliament, and, above all, the present Government, have been committed to the necessity of dealing with this question of Irish arrears by the Act of last year; he-cause we proposed, and Parliament adopted, a clause in that Act dealing with the subject, a clause most important in its principle, although it has proved inadequate in its machinery. No doubt, the difficulties of the case were underrated, and that section of the Act has proved inadequate; but from the time when the effect of that section lapsed, in the early part of the Session, the mind of the Government has been directed to this matter of Irish arrears; so has that of the Irish Government; and, above all, my right hon. Friend the late Chief Secretary (Mr. W. E. Forster) had his mind very full of the subject. The same may be said of other Members of the Government, among whom I may mention my lamented friend the late Mr. Burke, who, not long before his death, gave me the benefit of his views as to the necessity of dealing with the question of arrears effectually; and Mr. W. E. Forster also came to the conclusion that no other milder or weaker course than that proposed in the Bill—namely, that of compulsion and gift—could be relied upon for anything like a settlement of the matter in hand. Well, my Lords, this proposed settlement is compulsory, and open to all the obvious objections that may be brought against it when that word is mentioned. But that compulsion will impose very little sacrifice upon landlords in Ireland—certainly, in my opinion, no more than is well worth their bearing for their own interests, considering the great objects this measure has in view. I will now state what the compulsory provisions of this Bill are. In the first place, the tenant must pay one year's rent—the rent for the year 1881. It comes to this—that a landlord with an estate weighed down by arrears will be able to obtain, first of all, the rent of the present year from a tenant who had become entitled to the great relief given him by the operation of the Bill; and, in the next place, two years' arrears. From that it does not appear to me that very hard terms are imposed upon landlords in Ireland. I may point out that a landlord may,
  1916
  under the Bill, under certain circumstances, obtain a contribution from the State, even in cases where the tenant cannot pay one year's rent. I cannot tell how far that part of the Bill may operate; but I can conceive that in cases where, from various motives, a tenant cannot pay his rent for 1881, the landlord will be inclined, from the consideration of his own interests, and from good feeling towards the tenant, to give him a clear receipt, in which case he would then be entitled to apply to the Laud Commission and obtain the amount of the one year's rent which the State offers under the Bill. Now, my Lords, I come to the question of the tenant's ability or inability to pay, and the means of ascertaining that inability. I hear it very often said that to ascertain that fact will be impossible. I cannot understand those statements. First of all, I will remind your Lordships that the problem will be smaller and less difficult this year than it would have been last year, because a very large number of rents have been paid during the earlier part of this year; and, under legitimate compulsion by the landlords, rents to a large amount have been recovered, and recovered from that class of tenants who had been lawlessly refusing payment. I cannot understand what enormous difficulty there will be in making inquiry into the inability of the tenant to pay his arrears. On the contrary, my belief is, that a properly qualified person, such as a skilled land agent—and that class of persons will, in all probability, be those most often employed—appointed to make such an inquiry, will very soon detect the parties who may falsely assert their inability, and whoso real position would probably be notorious among their neighbours; and it appears to me that an inquiry conducted by an experienced man will, in the majority of cases, be effectual in defeating any attempt to obtain the benefits of the Bill on the part of tenants who are able to pay; moreover, very stringent powers are given to the Commission for the prosecution of these inquiries, and for the infliction of punishment in cases not only of perjury, but of suppressing evidence bearing on the facts to be ascertained. My Lords, as to the original cause of the tenant's present inability to pay, I confess I cannot speak in so confident a tone. I do

  1917
  not believe it will be possible, as a rule, to ascertain the causes which have led to the present inability of the tenant to pay his rent. There may be causes of various kinds in addition to the ordinary cause of inevitable misfortune; there may be a moral or a political cause, such as sympathy with the doctrines of the Land League; but I confess I think inquiry into the matter would be a hopeless task to undertake. That is one of the drawbacks which we have to encounter; but I do not think it is one of much magnitude. I must again remind your Lordships of one of the conditions under which the tenant is to obtain the benefits of this Bill. Your Lordships will remember that every tenant who wishes to avail himself of it must qualify himself by the payment of the rent of the "no rent" year 1881. That is the first condition that is laid down. The Irish tenant must repudiate the "no rent" principle of the Land League, and pay in full the rent for the year 1881. In the next place, I wish to point out that, whatever may be the success of the inquiry as to the inability of the tenant to pay, at any rate, the Bill bears on its front the condition that the help of the State is only intended for that tenant who is unable to pay the full amount of his arrears. The portion of the Bill dealing with gift and compulsion is intended only for that tenant. I need not trouble your Lordships further with that part of the Bill. I will now refer very shortly to a provision which has been inserted in the Bill since it was first introduced—a provision for payment of arrears by means of a loan. It is provided that in the case of any holding not exceeding £50 valuation, the amount necessary to comply with the conditions of the Bill may be advanced by way of loan on the joint application of the landlord and the tenant. I have no doubt that a considerable number of landlords and tenants will avail themselves of this provision. As to those tenants who have holdings above a valuation of £30 a-year, a loan will be the only mode of relief; but as to a tenant who has a holding under £30, and whose inability is not proved, this provision comes into play as an alternative; and I feel satisfied that it will be the means of setting on his feet many a small, struggling, and embarrassed tenant who has been unable
  1918
  to satisfy the Commissioners that he cannot pay the full amount of his arrears. Then, my Lords, I come to that part of the Bill dealing with the subject of emigration. I think this part of the measure will be accepted by both sides of the House with a large concurrence of feeling; and I am happy, for my part, to be able to propose it to your Lordships. An Act of some years standing in Ireland—that of 1849—enabled Irish Boards of Guardians to provide for the expenses of emigration either out of the rates, or by way of loans. Those Boards have done a good deal by way of assistance out of the rates; but have done nothing by way of loan, in consequence of the terms being so excessively stringent. The terms are that the loan shall be paid off by seven yearly instalments, and that requirement has made the Act inoperative. The Bill before us, on the contrary, offers loans to any Board of Guardians in Ireland upon terms of a very different nature, terms ranging from 15 years at the lowest to 30 years at the highest, according to the discretion of the Treasury, and such terms as we may fairly hope will often be made use of by the Guardians. In addition to that, we also propose to make a free grant to be applied to a certain number of the most over-peopled and miserable Unions in Ireland for the purpose of emigration. The amount of the grant is limited to £100,000, and it is intended not to meet the whole cost, but a large part of the cost, of emigration from those Unions. I will trouble your Lordships with a few figures showing the extraordinary condition of the district to which this grant is intended to apply. In five Unions in the counties of Mayo and Galway it appears that there are 20,000 holdings, of which 14,000 are under £4 Poor Law valuation; while, of the whole number, only 890 exceed £9 Poor Law valuation. These are the Unions scheduled in the Bill; but any portion of the grant may be applied to other distressed Unions in the West of Ireland. Let us take another test of the condition of these Unions. I find that in these five Unions the valuation per head of the population amounts only to 15s.; while, upon the average for the rest of Ireland, the proportion is as much as £2 12 s. 6d. In fact, every test we can apply shows the miserable condition of things which exists in the

  1919
  West of Ireland; and, if the remedy of emigration is to be applied, it ought to be applied in such districts, and at the present time. It may be said that the amount of the grant is a limited one; but we hold that a great deal can be done with such a grant, taking in the worst cases, and that a very good beginning may be made. We think, also, that it would be extremely unwise to force on emigration in any extravagant manner, which would excite the suspicions of a very suspicious people; and we believe that the worst thing that could happen would be the production of a feeling of that kind. There are many supplementary provisions of the present Bill of considerable importance, provisions by way of supplement, and by way of machinery; but I think it hardly necessary to trouble your Lordships with them at this stage, and I shall be happy to explain them when we go into Committee. I have only, in conclusion, to appeal to your Lordships, as I did when I began, not to fix your eyes exclusively upon the difficulties, the objections, and the risks which, in any bold attempt at a settlement of a most important and difficult matter such as is made by this Bill, are likely to engross your attention. I entreat you not to overrate or exaggerate those objections and those risks—a thing which it is so easy to do. I would ask you not to shut your eyes to the grave crisis and the formidable prospects in Ireland with which we have to deal; but, by adopting this measure, to join with the other House of Parliament in making a strenuous attempt to remove at least one of the great obstacles to the return of peace and tranquillity in that country, and the restoration of good relations between landlord and tenant. The noble Lord concluded by moving the second reading of the Bill.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Privy Seal.)
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, it is pleasant to me to be able to welcome with hearty approval, at all events, the provisions which were the subject of the closing part of the noble Lord the Lord Privy Seal's speech. That part of the Bill which relates to loans, I believe, proceeds upon a sound principle, one by which much good has already been done in Ireland, and which,
  1920
  if extended further, will confer still greater benefits on that country. Whether the terms of the loans are in every respect those which I should wish, I will not inquire; but I prefer rather to recognize in these provisions, introduced at a somewhat late period into this Bill, an acknowledgment on the part of the Government that the efficacy of the system of loans to distressed classes, and that at the sorest period of their distress, is one whose value has not been exhausted, and one to which the Imperial Parliament may with propriety and profit resort. Still less should I be inclined to cavil at the provisions, of which the noble Lord has spoken, with regard to emigration. He knows that on this side of the House the value of emigration has always been very highly estimated as one of the best palliatives or remedies for the distressed state of things which exists in Ireland. All the evidence that reaches us—and some of us have been in a condition to receive a good deal of evidence during the past Session—all the evidence that reaches us points out that, in many parts of Ireland, the problem caused by the poverty of the people is not one that can be solved by any legislation adverse to the landlords, however generous it may be in the view of the Liberal Party, and however prejudiced and unjust it may be in the view of the Conservatives. Even if you were to go so far—which I suppose is not yet contemplated—as to take all the property of the landlord, and give it to the tenant, it is evident from the evidence that reaches us on every side that, where the population is so vastly in excess of the resources of the country, you would scarcely produce any appreciable difference, any interval of mitigation in the misery of the people. No doubt, if emigration is to be carried on with anything like success, it must be—to use the language of the Government—on the principle of gift. It is of no use to ask the poor parishes to increase their poverty in the future, by pledging their resources for the purposes of getting rid of their surplus population. Nothing but assistance from without, nothing but assistance from the Exchequer of the community, can be efficient or effectual for the purpose. The evil to be met is two-fold. In the first place, the soil on which these people have gathered is not fertile enough to support the mouths that have grown up upon it. In the

  1921
  second place, owing to disturbances, owing to numberless historical causes, the increase of persons has exceeded in its pace, exceeded very far, the growth of capital by which those persons can be employed; and it is only by removing the congestion of population from those particular parts of the country that the equilibrium can be in some degree restored between capital and population. I, therefore, welcome this as an acknowledgment of a sound principle, however short the step may be on the part of Her Majesty's Government; and for that, if for no other reason, I should hesitate to move the rejection of the Bill on the second reading. Indeed, the principle appears so very valuable that, if the Bill can possibly be amended, I should earnestly wish to see it recorded in the Statute Book. But passing, my Lords, from these beneficent after-thoughts, which were introduced into the Bill at a late period, let us comeback to the original skeleton of the Bill, the true product of the Kilmainham Treaty. Now, my Lords, the proposal of the Bill is to make a very-large advance of money to the tenant. The noble Lord who has just sat down (Lord Carlingford) has told us that, in advancing money to the tenant, we must be equally doing so to the landlords, for it is impossible to separate the interests of the landlord and tenant. My Lords, I think it will be one of the greatest glories of this Administration in the eyes of posterity that they have contrived to make the interests of landlord and tenant absolutely antagonistic to each other. The sources from which it is proposed to make the advances to the tenants are three. In the first place, there is be a large draft upon the Irish Church revenues; in the second place, there is to be a draft of an uncertain amount upon the Consolidated Fund—that is to say, upon the English taxpayer; and, thirdly, there is also a draft of an uncertain amount upon the unhappy Irish landlord, who has been so frequently the subject of similar operations during the last few years. Now, as to the application of the Irish Church Fund. I will not say absolutely that I assent; but I recognize that in any mere dealing with that Fund, there would not be of itself matter to induce your Lordships to interfere very decidedly with the proposals of the Government. It is a purely exceptional Fund; it has arisen in a not
  1922
  very creditable manner. It was originally assigned by Parliament for the relief of undoubted cases of distress; and anything that is done with this Fund, whether it is given to this man or to that man, or whether it is applied to this purpose or to that purpose, it cannot create a precedent or establish a principle, for it is, for obvious reasons, perfectly impossible that any such Fund should ever again arise. In that respect, it differs very widely from the other two Funds—the Consolidated Fund, which furnishes a practically inexhaustible supply; and the other, the property of the landlords, of which, although it is not so entirely inexhaustible, yet there is still a good deal to be consumed. Now, the noble Lord rested very much upon the principle of the Bill, that its aid was only to be extended to tenants who were absolutely unable to pay the arrears of rent which they owed upon their holdings, and which weighed upon them. My Lords, if that boast—if that principle really were the principle of the Bill, if that claim could truly be substantiated, it would be very difficult for anyone on either side of the House to object, at least, to the principle upon which the noble Lord proceeds, for it is a very old principle of our law, and one to which we are giving expression every day—that where it is found that a person is absolutely unable to discharge his debts, those debts shall be discharged, and he shall be allowed to begin the world again free from those debts. If this Bill were nothing but a huge Insolvency or Bankruptcy Bill, there would be little more to be said; but, in the first place, how are you to prove insolvency? In other and ordinary cases you prove insolvency by the debtor giving up all his property. But there is no intention of proving the insolvency in that way now. I listened with very great interest when the noble Lord came to that part of his speech. He treated with scorn and astonishment the objection that there would be any difficulty in proving, on the part of the tenant, his inability to pay his rent. I then listened with some curiosity to the mode by which he established this confident conviction. He relied upon two tests. One was, he said, that the agent of the landlord would always be able to know whether the man would be able to pay his debts, and the other was that the neighbours would always know it
  LORD CARLINGFORD (LORD PRIVY SEAL): I beg your pardon. I did not mean that. I did not mean the agent of the landlord. I meant the person employed by the Land Commission to inquire and report; he would probably be an experienced person—such as a land agent, and not the agent of the landlord.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Exactly; a person selected after the fashion in which the Sub-Commissioners have been selected, and selected, no doubt, for the same qualifications, and with the same absolute impartiality. It is quite certain that whoever may be appointed to do this work, whether by the Government or by the Sub-Commissioners, he will not be a harsh agent; he will not be a person who has any prepossession in favour of the landlord, and he will not be a person inclined to bear hardly in ascertaining the poverty of the Irish tenant. As to neighbours, I should like to know what neighbour would like to risk his life by telling what he knows of the poverty of his fellow neighbour. It is well known that there is nothing in the administration of justice more difficult than to ascertain the absolute poverty of a man who tries to conceal what he has. It is difficult even in our highly complex and artificial society, where money is easily traced. It is difficult where you require a man to prove his insolvency by giving up all he possesses. But when a man has every facility to conceal, when he can put all his money into notes, which he can hide in the ticking of a bed, or in a stocking, or under the thatch of his dwelling, or deposit it in a bank, in the name of some friend, and when he is not required to prove the sincerity of his insolvency by giving up all he possesses—the holding on which he dwells, or the means by which his industry is sustained—it will be absolutely impossible, even for the most impartial and severe tribunal, to ascertain whether he is destitute or not. My Lords, we have always been met, by those who know Ireland, with a statement which I always felt must be unjust. We have always been told that we cannot believe anything we hear in Ireland. I am sure that cannot be the case. Still, it must indicate to us a certain tendency to romance, a certain facility of imagination through which it is difficult to pene-
  1924
  trate, and which certainly will put off the scent the severest Sub-Commissioners Her Majesty's Government are likely to send there. But I will not argue the question of the inability of the tenant. Supposing, as has been said, that he stood in the position of an ordinary debtor in insolvency. You say that he is to show that he is unable to pay his rent, and then, in the same clause, you insert two special provisions. He is to be unable to pay his rent without the sale of his holding, and without the sacrifice of the means necessary for the proper cultivation thereof. Now, what are the means for cultivating land? Well, I believe £10 an acre is required in this country. I do not know whether an Irish tenant requires £ 10 an acre; but it is obviously a matter upon which a very wide difference of estimate may be held as to whether a man has or has not a sufficient amount of money to enable him to pay his rent and properly cultivate his land. He will come before the Sub-Commissioners, and say—"I have 30 acres of land, and the rent is £30, and I am two, three, or four years in arrear, I have got the money to pay"—supposing the tenant to be possessed of unusual candour—"but the cultivation of my land costs £6 per acre, and I must keep the money to cultivate my land." It will depend in this case whether the landlord or the State are or are not to be forced to assist the tenant, and whether the landlord's rent is to be thought of when the tenant is in this condition. I do not say that I should rely upon a provision of this kind for the entire protection of the landlord. I believe he requires much more complete protection. But for the protection of both the landlord and the taxpayer, and more especially the latter, who may possibly, though not certainly, be involved in the operations of this Bill, it appears to me to be an absolute necessity that, in some form or other, the true value of the holding, and of the other property the tenant may be possessed of, should be brought into account in determining whether he is or is not capable of paying his arrears. We well know that the value of a holding in many parts of Ireland rises to an enormous figure. I will not take fabulous cases of tenant right, or where it actually rises above the fee-simple of the land; but I have heard of cases where the value of the holding is 10, 11, 12, or

  1925
  13 years' purchase of the land. In those cases, of course, the landlord has trusted to the value of the tenant right as a security for the payment of the rent; and it is precisely in these cases that the Act will inflict the greatest injustice upon him, as well as on the English taxpayer, by allowing the tenant to take money from the landlord and from the State on the ground that the tenant is in a destitute condition. Of course, the noble Lord will tell me that the Sub-Commissioners will be able, under the Act, to bring the value of the holding into account, if they think it reasonable. I confess that whatever solution of this difficulty your Lordships may come to, I earnestly hope you will not make any more drafts upon the wisdom and impartiality of the Sub-Commissioners. Last year we thought these Sub-Commissioner ships were to be judicial appointments, made in a judicial spirit. We have, on more than one occasion, had an opportunity of considering what was to be said against them, and what was to be said in their favour. We have had a very striking and able speech from the noble Lord on the Cross Benches (Lord Brabourne), which, I think, commended itself very much to the approval of this House, showing the kind of men who have been appointed by the Government, and the qualifications and the antecedents of those men; and we heard what the noble Lord the Lord Privy Seal was compelled to advance by way of answer. It was justly described by the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Abercorn) as "a lame and impotent conclusion." I never heard a defence which more absolutely avoided the main topics which wore urged in the attack. But, at least, we know of the Sub-Commissioners that they have been appointed—not from men who took little part in politics, not from men who have abstained from expressions of contested opinions as to landlord and tenant, but they have been appointed from men who have fought in the front ranks of Party contests, waged upon the principal questions that are litigated between landlord and tenant; and we also know—or, at least, those who sat on the Select Committee of your Lordships do—that no one was able to give the slightest information as to the principles upon which their decisions were based. They entirely abstain from any attempt to do so. If their decisions were so
  1926
  righteous and so just as is pretended, it would be very easy to point out the principles upon which, and the philosophy by which they arrived at them; but no such attempt has been made by the Treasury Bench, no such attempt has been made by any advocate in the witness chair, and everything that has come out with respect to their decisions leads to this conclusion—that they have been rather seeking a political end, which very possibly they may think a laudable and desirable one, than acting in a judicial spirit, and deciding as to what is right between man and man. I do not say that the decisions of the Commissioners are necessarily immoral or unjust, or that this conduct on their part exposes them to censure. It is easy to see that it is possible that in the pre-sent state of Ireland they may have misconceived their duty; but the decisions to which they have come, and the entire want of principle which underlies them, and the peculiar antecedents which preceded their appointments, are very ill-fitted to increase the trust which ought to be reposed in judicial officers, and certainly ill-fitted to induce your Lordships to extend the amount of confidence to be reposed in them under this Bill. Now, my Lords, I have spoken of the insolvency test, and I have spoken of the protection which ought to be afforded to those from whom the subsidy to the tenants is to be drawn; but, in my opinion, a much more stringent and effective protection is required in this case for the interests of the landlords. The noble Lord spoke of this Bill as one of gift and compulsion, and I think in the other House it was said that gift and compulsion were the pillars of the measure. It does not seem to have occurred to the noble Lord that compulsion is not usually necessary in the case of gift—that is, if you give a man something, he does not require to be compelled to accept it; and what is the truth in this case is, that the compulsion is addressed to one set of men, and the gift is addressed to another. Some landlords, no doubt, have a great quantity of bad debts, and they have arrears which it is impossible for them to recover. To them the gift may, no doubt, come in very welcome guise. They may be very glad that Her Majesty's Government is willing to dispose of the funds at its command, for the purpose of wiping off

  1927
  those bad debts, of which they could themselves obtain nothing under any other condition. But, on the other hand, there are other landlords, and, I believe, in considerable numbers, who, by kindness, have allowed their tenants to fall into arrear; but knowing that their tenants were possessed of resources which would, in the end, enable them to pay, did not conceive their arrears to be bad debts at all; and it is to them that the compulsion is addressed, and the Government think they have done absolute justice, because they give a gift to one set of men, and force another set of men to abandon their rights. They meet two men on the roadside, one possessed of a great coat and the other of none. They give a coat to the man without one, but take away that which the other man has. And this is what they call a generous policy. But it is not only the landlords who possess arrears that are good who will suffer by this process of relieving their more desperate brethren at their expense. Remember that the right to much of this property in arrear is often vested in different persons. Let us take an instance which is very common—the instance of land settled on the eldest son, and personal property divided among the other children and legatees. The landlord dies in 1879. There are a good many arrears perfectly recoverable upon the property. These arrears belong to the younger children. The eldest son will receive, in respect of 1880, one year's rent; and, by way of compensation for that gift of the Government to the landlord—that is to say the heir—the younger children will go without the arrears upon which their fortunes depend. That is a specimen of the confusion into which you fall when you interfere with the ordinary law of debtor and creditor. The noble Lord opposite seems to be rather proud of the peculiar conduct of the Government. Ordinary Governments do not interfere with the law of debtor and creditor; but this is a great Government, a Government of especial excellence, and it despises all such petty considerations, and does not mind taking money away from the creditor in order to give it to the debtor. But the unfortunate thing is that such proceedings cannot be taken without inflicting injustice and confusion far beyond the view of those persons who have betaken themselves to such anomalous
  1928
  legislation. I can imagine a crisis of great public difficulty—a much severer crisis than any which we have seen lately—and can suppose that it justifies or extenuates this violent interference with the rights of property. But having imagined even such a crisis as that, such interference ought only to be undertaken after due consideration and after careful inquiry. You should know exactly what you are doing; you should not go and promise to certain prisoners in Kilmainham that you will strip one important class in order to clothe another, without knowing how many are the men whom you will have to strip, and how many those are whom you will have to clothe. I object to this proposal that we should confiscate the property of unknown men in unknown proportions, under conditions which are absolutely strange to us, without any preliminary inquiry; and that we should satisfy our consciences, after doing that, by presenting money belonging, some of it, to the taxpayers of this country, to other people, with whom those who have suffered have necessarily no connection. There is, it seems to me, a simple test whether the Government are sincere in their professions that they do not wish to invade the rights of landlords, or to injure their property by this proposal. Let them make the operation of the Bill optional to the landlord, as it is to the tenant. Men do not refuse gifts. Men do not decline to receive 10 s. in the pound for debts that are certainly bad, for arrears that are absolutely irrecoverable. There are undoubtedly in Ireland such debts, and such landlords who would not make any such refusal; and if you go to them and say, "Cancel your arrears and we will pay you 10 s. in the pound," do not tell me there are any men so absurd and Quixotic as to refuse the proffered gift. It was said in the other House1—the noble Lord the Lord Privy Seal has not repeated it here, however—that there are some Irish landlords of so peculiar a kind, and so eccentric that they do not care for money—that what they care for is power—and that they will keep these debts hanging over their tenants, and refuse the offer of 10 s. in the pound, merely to keep a hold over their tenants, and exercise power over them. I believe that class of landlords has been invented for the purposes of this Bill. They are as unreal and mythi-

  1929
  cal as a dragon or as a griffin. Let us have some kind of proof that they exist. Let us have an inquiry to show that there is such an unreasonable and insane class, before you commit a great public wrong—a great act of public plunder—merely on account of the danger which this class may cause you. I think anybody who has watched the recent course of affairs in Ireland has seen what the relation in actual and practical life of landlord and tenant really is, and has noticed how far the tenant defers to the wishes of his landlord in any position of life, will treat with ridicule this idea that any landlord conceives that by allowing a certain amount of arrears he can exercise powers over his tenantry. That is a theory, an imputation, which belongs to a long past time of Irish history, and which would be no justification whatever for interfering with the plain and ordinary rights of creditors, or disregarding the laws of common honesty when adjusting the pecuniary relations between landlord and tenant in that country. This injustice ought to be remedied before your Lordships consent to the passage of this Bill. I think that you ought to take care that the tenant's interest in his holding is, in some form or other, brought into account in determining whether he is destitute or not, whether he is incapable of paying his just debts or not; and I think that you ought to insist that the landlord shall be as free as the tenant is to enter into this arrangement for cancelling past arrears in exchange for a gift of public money. If you do not do so, you will be inflicting great injury upon the class with whom you are dealing; and it is very possible, if this measure takes a wider range than that contemplated by the Prime Minister, that you may be pledging the taxpayer of England, at a moment of great public pressure, to very much larger obligations than those which your representations now lead him to think he will have to bear. This is not a moment to increase his burdens, or to ask him to bear that increase of burden, for the sake of a class who have distinguished themselves in the history of their country in the manner in which large portions of the Irish tenantry have lately distinguished themselves. There are other evils connected with this legislation. You are warning every
  1930
  owner of property, not only in Ireland, but in England also, not to allow arrears to exist. Are you quite sure that that is a wise, or a just, or a generous policy? The Prime Minister spoke of the system of arrears as an irritating, a wretched, and a vicious system. He seems not to have taken into account the fact that the system is, to the poorer class of farmers, the inevitable concomitant of the circumstances of agriculture. Agriculture is eminently a pursuit which does not yield identical or uniform produce every year. It is an industry interrupted by great intervals of serious depression, and attended by serious losses; and those losses can only be met, in the case of the poorer farmers, by a willingness on the part of the landlord to give time, and to accommodate his demands to the circumstances of the hour. But if you declare that such kindness on his part shall be a penal offence to be used against him; that if he allows arrears to accumulate, he runs the danger of a Liberal Government coming in and declaring those arrears cancolled, you will be proclaiming widely that a landlord must not give this accommodation, or allow this time, and you will be causing serious hardship to deserving men, and placing difficulties in the way of the prosecution of the most important industry in the country. The recent legislation of the Government has too much tended to preach this maxim to owners of property—"Whatever you do, do not be good-natured." Irish landlords allowed tenants to remain upon their land, who were little calculated to improve their estates, and to educe the greatest value from them. They allowed those tenants to remain year after year out of kindness and good feeling, never dreaming that in consequence of that kindness their rights would speedily disappear. But suddenly came down the Liberal Government, and first by maintaining the principle of compensation for disturbance, and afterwards that of fixity of tenure, they have turned that act of good nature to the prejudice and loss of hundreds of landlords, and now they repeat that lesson. Landlords have allowed arrears to accumulate, when seasons were bad and poverty stalked through the land, in order that they might not drive their tenants to desperation, and because the enforcement

  1931
  of their rights might have produced great human misery; but now you come down upon them, and say that those who have been thus merciful shall suffer because of their good qualities, and that Parliament will take away from them for ever the right of receiving the money of which they have for a time allowed the tenantry to delay the payment. This, surely, is the worst lesson that the Government can possibly teach. The object of a Government should be to encourage all classes to show mutual forbearance and mutual regard for each others' rights, and a mutual desire not to push their special rights to extremes. But the lesson taught by the Government is exactly the reverse. According to their teaching, all men who would be safe must not allow a single one of their rights to fall into disuse or abeyance, and must not allow the delay of a single hour, or the temporary withholding of a single shilling. And that is not the only lesson that will be taught the Irish people by the policy adopted by the Government in relation to this question. In what way does the present crisis in Ireland differ from the many crises that have repeatedly occurred in that country? Is it altogether a new thing that there should be for two years in succession bad harvests in Ireland—in this country we have had six successive years of bad harvests—two years of bad harvests which have been followed by two years of singular prosperity? Such an event, in our changeable climate, must happen again and again; and do you think that when it does occur the Irish tenant will not remember what that event did for him in 1882? What is there in this juncture to separate it in any degree or any respect from occasions which will arise from time to time? In the history of the country, no doubt, the time will come when the seasons, now fair, will change again, and there will be bad harvests for two or more years in succession in Ireland, when the Irish tenant will again be unable for the moment to pay his rent; and then what lesson will be drawn from the present action of the Government? Instead of addressing himself by industry and thrift to repair his losses and to meet his just debts, in some future years, he will remember that a short time before the English Government was induced, partly out of his landlord's pocket and partly
  1932
  out of the pocket of the taxpayer of this country, to pay his debts for him—debts which had accumulated during bad seasons. And, moreover, he will remember how that complaisance on the part of the Government was brought about. He will remember that he has not obtained this indulgence by the exercise of all the virtues, but rather by the exorcise of all the vices. It has been by agitation, by disturbance, by cruelty to dumb animals, by acts of incendiarism, and by cruel and causeless murders, that the mind of the Government has been so impressed that they have departed from the policy which, last year, they openly and strenuously avowed their belief in, and have been induced at this moment to bring in this measure for the relief of the tenant at the expense of the landlords and of the taxpayers. These are the lessons which the tenants of Ireland will learn from the course which has been followed by Her Majesty's Government, a lesson which, your Lordships may depend, they will not learn in vain. Again and again we have had to protest against the policy of Her Majesty's Government, because by rewarding disturbance and crime they have made them more probable in the future. If you allow this measure to become law in its present form, I fear that, far from putting an end to dissension and healing the sores of Ireland, you will only be giving occasion for new and more extravagant expectations to be enforced by fresh and more atrocious means, and you will have to come and ask in a future year for new and more dangerous concessions, to be followed in due course by new and more dangerous disturbances. My Lords, I do not feel that this Bill, containing, as it does, some provisions that are useful, and which we may heartily approve of, can properly be made the subject of rejection on its second reading; but in assenting to its second reading I earnestly protest against the view that I assent to those dangerous principles which some parts of it include, or that I could undertake at any future stage to join in passing the Bill into law, unless those dangerous provisions are removed.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEsaid, that he did not, in any way, underrate the considerable primâ facie objections to the Bill which the noble Mar-

  1933
  quess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) had pointed out. As a matter of fact, the noble Lord in charge of the measure (the Lord Privy Seal) had candidly admitted that they existed; but the question was whether those objections were not far outweighed by the considerations which had been put forward by the noble Lord. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) could not shut his eyes to the political nature of the remedial provisions of this Bill, nor to the fact that their operation was not likely to be in all respects complete, and that they would, perhaps, have the effect of demoralizing the minds of a large portion of the tenantry of Ireland; and, regarding the measure from a financial aspect, he did not think it was very much more satisfactory. He had not come across a single individual, who was conversant with the internal affairs of Ireland, who had not been bound to confess that it would be almost impossible to restrict the advantages which this measure offered to persons properly deserving of them. It was also true that the Bill involved the appropriation of a Fund which might have been used for more advantageous, and certainly for more elevated purposes; and it was equally true that it involved in indefinite liabilities the taxpayers of the country, who were called upon to back the Bill. Neither was it possible altogether to disregard the view that had been put forward in the public Press and elsewhere—that the supposed surplus of the Irish Church Temporalities Fund, which was to bear this charge, might, in fact, prove to have no existence, and that, at all events, the accuracy of some of the assumptions upon which the calculations of the Government were founded was open to considerable doubt. But to all that mass of argument there was one answer, and one only, that the supporters of the Bill could put forward, and that was that some settlement of the Irish Arrears Question was indispensable, and that, upon the whole, the settlement suggested by Her Majesty's Government was the most favourable, and the only one likely to be effectual. Moreover, this Bill did not come before them entirely on its own merits, or as a completely fresh proposition. He did not wish to misrepresent or to exaggerate what had taken place last year, when the Land Act was passing through
  1934
  that House; but when they passed that measure, containing clauses dealing with the question of arrears, they did commit themselves to the view that a fair trial should be made of the principle embodied in those clauses. Her Majesty's Ministers now came to them and stated that the Arrears Clauses had proved to be an absolute failure; and they proposed that further steps should be taken in the direction of the principle contained in those clauses. In those circumstances, he did not see how they could refuse the request of the Government, or recede from the position which they had taken up last year. The noble Marquess opposite, however, had pointed out that the present proposal differed from that of 1881 in two important points—that the measure of last year proposed to proceed upon the lines of "option" and loan, while that of this year proposed to proceed upon the lines of "compulsion" and gift. With regard to the question of compulsion, he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) thought that he should not be wrong in imputing to most of their Lordships the desire that, if this question of arrears were to be dealt with at all, it should be dealt with under conditions which should be as likely as possible to insure the success of the attempt; and what prospect of success would there be for it, if the settlement were left to the option of the parties? If it were, the Bill would certainly not succeed. Did any noble Lord believe that, in the present position of agriculture in Ireland, any measure which depended upon the cordial co-operation of the landlord and the tenant would be effectual or successful? If the Optional Clauses of the Bill of last year had proved a failure, he saw no reason why similar clauses in the Bill of 1882 should prove successful. If their Lordships turned the Bill into an optional one, they would be told six months hence that, just as they thwarted and outwitted the operations of the Act of 1870 and the Act of last year, so had they thwarted the Act of 1882; and not the least important or the least advantageous of its proposals was the fact that the Bill deprived the agitators of Ireland of the grounds upon which they based their operations, and an excuse for exaggerating and misrepresenting the conduct of Irish landlords; and, in his opinion, therefore, public policy, as well as the interest of the landlords, required

  1935
  that the clauses of this Bill, if the settlement was to be effectual, should be compulsory. Next, as to the question of gift. Looking at the question whether this advance should partake of the nature of a gift or a loan, he put aside all those suggestions which thinly disguised a gift under the name of a loan, a disguise through which everybody saw, and which was open to the double objection that a loan would be disadvantageous to the tenant; while a gift would involve a loss to the public. The Government proposed to say to the creditor—"You shall, whether you like it or not, accept a composition of 10 s. in the pound." That might be a violent proposal, but it was not so violent to his thinking as to say to the creditor—"You shall accept only 10 s. in the pound, and you may recover it, principal and interest, as best you may." No doubt, it might be possible for the Government to recover from the tenant; but their doing so would involve the admission that the security was so bad that it could not in common decency be foisted upon the landlord. That appeared to him to be an untenable position. The great difficulty of recovering small loans seemed to him to condemn the loan principle; and he should vote for the second reading of the Bill, therefore, on the understanding that it proceeded strictly upon the lines of compulsion and gift. The Government, it appeared to him, had very much weakened the Bill by appending to it the Loans Clauses, especially as the arbitrary limits laid down for loans would probably aggrieve many deserving tenants. Arbitrary elements were always open to objections; and he thought, in that case, it would have been bettor not to have limited the Act to holdings under £30, and that any kind of tenant who proved his inability to pay should have been allowed to share in the advantages of the Bill. Those who were excluded by it would be subjected to hardships, and the limit might be dispensed with, as there were few above the £30 who would be able to prove their inability to pay their arrears; but if there were any, as he had said, they might be allowed to come in. He hoped their Lordships, when they had accepted the Bill, which was nothing if it was not a violation of the principles by which they had hitherto been guided in legislation, would not endeavour to
  1936
  make peace with their conscience by in-sorting Amendments designed, no doubt, to satisfy honest scruples, but likely to sacrifice or impair the efficiency of the Bill, and, in that way, to divide between the Government and the House the responsibility, which must rest on someone, if the measure stopped short of success. In so saying, the Amendment which he had before his mind was that clearly indicated by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), which he intended to bring forward in Committee—namely, an Amendment to compel the Court to deal with the tenant's interests as an available asset in considering his inability to pay. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) hoped the Government would oppose to the utmost such an Amendment, or any other in the same direction, and that they would not allow the test of the tenant's inability to pay to be that of giving up his holding. The main object of the measure was to place these persons in a position which would enable them to take advantage of the privileges of the Act of last year; and he could not see why those privileges should be restricted by making available the saleable interest in the farms. It would be inconsistent to take away with one hand what they gave with the other. It was perfectly true that this attempt to secure immunity to the tenant was a strong justification to those who, last year, were a little incredulous as to the advantages to be derived by the landlord from the general introduction of tenant right. They had been told by advocates of the Land Bill that tenant right would furnish the landlord with unfailing security for rent and arrears of rent; but if, at that time, they had known of this Bill, and that tenant right would be left for other persons, while to the landlords it was said, "Hands off," that argument would have lost some of its weight, and they would probably have reconsidered the matter. The question they had now to consider was, did this Bill bring them any nearer, and, if so, how much nearer, to that ever-receding goal which they had been pursuing with "wandering steps and slow" during the past few years? He frankly admitted that it would give real and much-needed relief to a considerable number of tenants who, from no fault of their own, were in a condition of dire distress; but, nevertheless, he was in-

  1937
  clined to agree with the noble Marquess opposite that the great mass of the Irish tenantry were beyond the reach of these legislative doles. It should be remembered that of the 600,000 people who occupied the soil of Ireland, 300,000 possessed holdings of less than £4 Poor Law valuation. Now, what was the position of those people? He maintained that for every shilling due in rent to the landlord, the tenant owed a great deal more to his other creditors. Their Lordships had probably read a very valuable Paper by Mr. Tuke, in which he gave two instances—in the one case, the tenant owed his landlord £332 and his other creditors £372; and, in the other case, £230 to the landlord and £178 to other creditors. Professor Baldwin, in his discoveries, went considerably further, for he went so far as to state that many small tenants owed their general creditors four, five, six, and even 10 years' purchase of their rent; while they paid exorbitant rates of interest, ranging from 10 to 43½ per cent. It was unfortunately the case, moreover, that those people depended almost entirely upon the potato, a most precarious root, though some improvement had been made in the sorts planted. As to the Act of last year, let them 'assume that, on a rent of £5, it was reduced 25 per cent. That would be a reduction of about 6d. a week during the whole year. He mentioned these things because of the extreme importance of looking these matters in the face, and he did this because of the clauses inserted in the Bill at the last moment dealing with emigration. Those clauses were an important step in the right direction; but they would be administered under enormous difficulties, not the least of which was the, to Irish ears, hateful sound of the very word "emigration." He regretted the way in which those clauses had been pared down in the other House; and he was also much afraid that the Poor Law Guardians, upon whose cooperation the Government relied for the purpose of carrying out the clauses, would, in many cases, be either actively hostile or indifferent to the working of the emigration scheme. He should have preferred to see the duty intrusted to some other body of persons—perhaps the Commissioners mentioned in the Bill. He had said enough of what was in the Bill, and now he would turn to what was
  1938
  not. There was a question which he thought they had a right to ask the Government before the debate closed, and that was, how did they stand with regard to Irish land legislation? Was the present proposal merely an instalment, or was it the conclusion? There were three questions of great interest in connection with that question—the Purchase Clauses, the question of dealing with existing Leases, and the Prairie Pent theory. With regard to the first, he believed it was the intention of the Government to propose further legislation; but they had heard nothing of the attitude of the Government towards the Prairie Pent theory, except the most vague and shadowy announcements. They had been told that the Land Commission had made recommendations. If so, he wished to press upon the Government that nothing could be more unfortunate than to leave these matters in suspense for an indefinite period. Let them make a clean breast of it; and if the Land Commissioners had made recommendations, let them say what they were, and whether the Government meant to adopt them or not. With the prospect of the coming winter, nothing could be more mischievous than to keep these promises hanging over the heads of the tenants. They would never put an end to the chronic restlessness of the country in this matter until they were able, in plain and unmistakable language, to say—"Thus far we mean to go, and no further." They ought to make up their minds to say that and adhere to their resolution; and he urged them, at any rate before the Session closed, to make a definite statement upon the subject.
  THE MARQUESS OF WATERFORDsaid, that he also should be glad to hear from the Government how far they were going. He never remembered to have heard such a lukewarm support given to any Bill in the whole course of his experience as that which the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had just given to the Bill before the House. In his (the Marquess of Waterford's) belief, the Bill was, as the noble Marquess had said, demoralizing; it was the most dangerous and demoralizing measure which had ever been introduced, and it was a fact that that would be its only effect. It was useless talking to Her Majesty's Government

  1939
  about principles of political economy, because they had, ever since they came into Office, thrown all theories of that description to the winds. The only arguments that had been used in support of the measure were, that it had been rendered necessary by the exceptional condition of Ireland; but he would ask the Government who it was that had created this exceptional condition, and whether they did not think that in adding wrong to wrong, and demoralizing measure to demoralizing measure, they were not more likely to increase than to diminish the dreadful difficulties with which they were menaced at the present time? The noble Marquess the Loader of the Opposition (the Marquess of Salisbury) the other night pointed out, in the clearest way, how agitation and murder had been fed by concession and weakness; and he (the Marquess of Waterford) did not think that, as long as wrong-doing and dishonesty were successful, there was much likelihood of law and honesty being restored. Over and over again the Government had deplored the dishonest advice tendered to the Irish tenants by the agitators of the Land League. They suppressed the Land League, in consequence of the "no rent" manifesto; and now they had issued a much more effective "no rent" manifesto themselves. The Land League told the tenants of Ireland to pay no rent, and to show their patriotism by submitting to lose their holdings; and, in many cases, their unfortunate dupes had submitted to ruin and disaster for what they wrongly believed to be the public good. But the Government had brought in a "no rent" manifesto, with no ruin or disaster attached to it. On the contrary, instead of telling the tenants to pay no rent, and submit to being evicted, they told the tenants, under £30 valuation, to pay no rent until this Bill was settled, and until their own particular cases came to be adjudicated upon—which might take a long while—and that the Government would prevent their being evicted and have their arrears paid for them, partly at the expense of the State and largely at the expense of their landlords. The honest tenants who had paid their rent, who had been "Boycotted," mutilated, and shot in the legs for having done so, were to gain nothing under this Bill; but the men who had, in some instances,
  1940
  carried out with impunity these "Boycottings" and mutilations were to have their debts cleared off at the expense of their landlords and of the State. What must be the feelings of a man who, but lately in the pride of health and strength and conscious honesty, now lay a helpless cripple upon the bed of sickness and suffering—and there were many such in Ireland—in consequence of that honesty, when he knew that the very men who had been concerned in his mutilation were to be rewarded by the State for their conduct? Was that not enough to prevent the possibility of rent being paid in the future? Was it not a premium upon dishonesty and assassination? And how could they expect Ireland to return to a state of quietude when they placed a premium on agitation like that? It was said by the Prime Minister that that was a Bill for the purposes of stopping eviction, of relieving distress, and of enabling the poorer class of tenants to enjoy the advantages of the Land Act and have their rents fixed. But in cases where the arrears had been caused by real inability to pay there was no protection for the tenant under this Bill; because he was bound to pay a year's rent now, or to have paid it between November, 1880, and November, 1881. It would have been impossible to have made any other proposition; but, at the same time, he (the Marquess of Waterford) could not help seeing that they were not dealing with the real cases of distress at all, nor preventing eviction in such cases, nor enabling the poorer class of tenants to come into Court; because it would be impossible for the very men who were being evicted, or who were, as they said, prevented from coming into Court to meet that particular obligation. From his own experience, he could say that, at the present time in Ireland, there was hardly such a thing as a landlord who would evict a tenant when that tenant, no matter what his arrears might be, was prepared to pay him a year's rent within a year. And, therefore, at the present moment, there were only two classes of tenants being evicted—either those who could pay and would not pay, or those who could not and did not pay a year's rent, and the latter class could hope to gain no advantage from the Bill whatever. Noble Lords opposite might say that they had no wish

  1941
  to keep such men upon the land; but that did not prevent Her Majesty's Government from holding up to condemnation landlords who evicted in cases of that description. An eviction was the same in their eyes, and, in the words of the Prime Minister, was a sentence of death, whether the tenant was able to pay any rent at all or not. The landlords had been appealed to by the Government not to press their tenants during the bad years; and those who had acted as the Government implored, and as humanity dictated, were to be punished by the compulsory loss of a great amount of the money which was due to them—which money was allowed to remain out, without interest, upon the security of the tenant right of their holding, and which would inevitably be repaid upon the first sale of tenant right which took place. But now that was to be swept away, and the tenant was to be cleared of all his debts due, if he had paid a year's rent since November, or would pay one up to December, 18S2, and could, if he so wished, step into the market the very next day and sell his tenant right for five, seven, or possibly 15 years' purchase, putting the whole of the money into his pocket, without any deduction whatever for the arrears which his landlord had been obliged to forgive him, or any deduction for the money advanced him by the State. More than that, if his landlord should wish to be the purchaser of his holding, he would have to pay him the full market price, notwithstanding that he might have lately had to forgive him two or three years of the rent that was due. Then, if proceedings had been taken, and costs were due by the tenant to the landlord, were those costs to be wiped out?—because he could not make out that there was any clear provision made for the payment of those costs under this Bill. As an Irish landlord, he was in a most difficult position with regard to this measure. He knew it was the most monstrous proposition which had ever been made; he knew that it was most vicious in principle, and that if their Lordships gave it a second reading they would be charged with accepting the principle. He knew that its initiation was utter destruction to the country, and would go far to prevent the payment of all rent in future. And on the very face of it, whatever the
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  Government might say to the contrary, it was no settlement of any question, and would absolutely increase agitation, because there were two classes of tenants, who had both been, in different ways, the life and soul of the agitation from its outset, who were entirely left out in the cold. The first of these were the larger tenants, who were almost as much in arrear as the smaller ones; and the second class were the broken men, unable to pay any rent at all, and thus bring themselves under the operation of the Bill, and who, the Land League leaders had stated, had terrorized the other tenants, and got up most of the "Moonlight" and other outrages. There was an idea abroad that the landlords of Ireland were receiving a great boon under this Bill, and that two years' rent would be paid to them, which, under other circumstances, they could not recover. But he thought that was a great fallacy, because, in many instances, where proceedings had been taken, or even without proceedings, the landlords had received a year's rent between November, 1880, and the present time; and, therefore, instead of receiving two years' rent as was supposed, they would merely receive half of the arrears due, which in no case would exceed a year's rent, and have wiped out what in some instances might be perfectly good money, and which would be recoverable. It was not, therefore, in the interests of the landlords of Ireland that this Bill should pass—at any rate, in its present form. He looked upon the introduction of the Bill as utter destruction to them, because it was a premium on dishonesty, and would prevent the payment of rent in future, giving very little in the present, and that upon such terms that it would make that little dangerous to accept. But, at the same time, it would be unfortunate if the Bill were thrown out upon the second reading, as its initiation had excited such hopes among the tenantry of Ireland, and would throw the whole responsibility of anything which might take place in that country—and he feared much would take place, whether the Bill passed or not—upon their Lordships' House; and, in addition, in the present unfortunate condition of affairs, both at home and abroad, he was sure their Lordships would have no wish to force a Dissolution upon the Government. But he thought they were

  1943
  bound, in justice to all concerned, to amend that measure in Committee in such a manner as to preserve, so far as they could, the interests of the British taxpayer, and to prevent the confiscation of the landlords' recoverable property which would take place under it; and if Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to accept reasonable Amendments, on their heads—and their heads alone—-would remain the responsibility if that Bill should be lost and a Dissolution take place. He said this the more as the Bill was drawn in such a manner as to lead him to believe that its real effects were little understood by the Government. It inflicted great and, he believed, unintentional injustice upon the landlords, and forced the British taxpayer to find in some cases large sums of money which were totally unnecessary, and which would go to tenants who did not require their assistance at all. As he read the Bill, there was one section that would inflict the greatest injustice upon a deserving class of tenants who were intended to come under the operation of the Bill, but who, to do so, must pay a year's rent more than some of those who deserved nothing at all at anybody's hands. There were two ways in which the Bill might be amended—one was by adopting the lines of the Act of 1881, and a clause in this Act itself, dealing with tenants between £30 and £50 valuation, in so far as to render it optional; and, by so doing, to protect the interests of the British taxpayer by obliging the landlord to protect those interests in protecting himself, by not allowing tenants who were perfectly able to pay their arrears to come under the action of the Bill; and, in addition, by clearing up a few of the ambiguities contained in it, so as to make clear the utmost both parties had to expect, and which no one could hope to arrive at at present; also to see that any tenant who had assets sufficient to meet his liabilities should not become a charge upon the British taxpayer, at the option of the Commission; or, on the other hand, to amend several of the clauses in the Bill, for the purpose of rendering a measure which was compulsory, not one of compulsory confiscation—confiscation which he believed, to a great extent, was unintentional; but the Bill, as it was at present worded, would inevitably have the effect of taking away a large part of
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  the landlord's property, and, at the same time, of absolutely robbing the British taxpayer. If it was rendered optional, they must suppose that the landlords, who were likely to know whether their tenants were solvent or not, better than any Court which could possibly have to decide upon this question, would not agree with any tenant who they knew was well able to pay, and, therefore, would save the taxpayer from finding money for those for whom the Bill was never intended, but who would certainly come under its operation if it was not amended in the way suggested; and their Lordships must remember that the Bill was now optional to the tenant, because he had only to refuse to pay a year's rent to prevent coming under its operation. He should like to point out a few of the effects of its clauses, both upon the interest of the landlord, of the taxpayer, and of the tenant, if it was passed in its present form. In the first place, in Clause 1, in the case of a tenant owing a year's rent to November, 1881, but having paid a year's rent since November, 1880, the year's rent paid would be taken as representing the year's rent due November, 1881; and that would throw the year 1880, for which the rent was paid, into antecedent arrear. In many parts of Ireland, a tenant was accustomed to pay a year's rent after harvest; and if there was a hanging gale on the estate, the tenant in October, 1882, by paying a year's rent, as usual, would be clear up to his hanging gale, and, therefore, there would really be no arrear upon his holding. But if the Bill became law, that tenant would be taken as owing a year's rent at the present time, half of which would be wiped out, and half of which would be paid by the State, inflicting a grievous injury upon both the landlords and the State, because the money he referred to was good money, and need be lost by neither; and he doubted whether the Government, in making their estimate, had taken that class of antecedent arrear into account at all. Then, again, there was a point which acted directly against the more honest tenants; but the whole Bill seemed to be drawn in favour of the dishonest tenant, and to the prejudice of the honest tenant. In Clause 1, Subsection 3 said—
  "All payments on account of rent made by the tenant to the landlord in or subsequent to

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  the year expiring as aforesaid, but before the 30th day of November, 1882, shall be deemed to have been made on account of the rent payable in respect of that year, to the extent to which the rent for that year had at the time of such payment accrued due."
  And perhaps their Lordships were not aware that rent did not accrue due until the gale day; and supposing the gale days were May and November in 1881, and a tenant had paid a year's rent before the 1st of May, 1881, that could not be, according to this section, counted in this year's rent at all, as none had then accrued due—therefore, that tenant would have to pay another year's rent to bring him under the operation of the Bill; and what he had paid would go merely to the credit of the antecedent arrears. But if the tenant had paid a year's rent after May, 1881, and before November, 1881, he would only have a half-year counted to his credit, because the other half-year would not have accrued due, and therefore that half-year would go to cover the most antecedent arrear; and a deserving tenant of that description, who had paid his rent, would not be in half as good a position as a man who had held his rent and simply refused to pay it. He did not know whether that was the intention of Her Majesty's Government; but, at the same time, as far as he could understand it, it was the clear reading of the Bill. In the same sub-section, the paragraph intended to save the hanging gale, to his mind, had the contrary effect; and when they remembered the extraordinary decisions given in the case of "Adams v. Dunseath," upon a clause in the Act of 1881—which was clear as daylight compared to that sub-section— in which the different learned Judges in the High Court of Appeal in Ireland almost all arrived at different decisions by different lines of argument, one might have some fear that in so complicated a sub-section as this the Sub-Commissioner, possibly without any knowledge of law, and strongly biassed in favour of the tenant, might arrive at a decision entirely opposed to the intention of the framers of this Bill. He believed the end of this sub-section might be read in three opposite ways, and he thought it absolutely necessary that its real meaning should be clearly defined. The Government stated it was for the purpose of saving the hanging gale. Let, then, words be put in to make it clear that it
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  did save the hanging gale, in the interest of the tenant as well as of the landlord; because, if this Bill was made optional, he believed that the landlords would be prepared to take advantage of it in every case which it was intended to cover, and the only cases that would be left would be either those not intended to come under the action of the measure, or those which, by the effect of a section like this, the landlords would be prevented from compounding with, because of the great loss—unintentional, he believed, on the part of the Government—which compounding with the tenants who came under this sub-section might inflict upon them. The end of this subsection said—
  "If the rent of such holdings has usually been paid on some day after the day on which it became legally due, the usual day of payment shall be deemed, for the purposes of this subsection, to be the time at which it accrued due;"
  there being generally a hanging gale of half-a-year, and in some cases eight or ten months, one reading of this paragraph would be that, instead of the gale being saved, the legal date of payment would be shifted to the date at which the rent was usually paid, and all antecedent arrears compounded for or wiped out, thereby clearing the tenant, not only up to the date the rent was due, but up to the date, after that, at which the rent was usually paid. It might be said that this was not the meaning of the section; but he believed that the tribunals with which the landlords had to deal—strongly biassed as many of them were in favour of the tenants—would place that meaning upon it; and in the future, when a landlord served an ejectment—which he could only do when a full year's rent was due—he would be told that, as the rent due in November, 1881, was usually paid in May, 1882, or possibly July or August, 1882, the tenant was cleared up to that date. Their Lordships would see that if this took place no rent would be collectible in Ireland until either May, or possibly August, 1883. But if Clause 10 was read in conjunction with Subsection 3 the matter was made even worse, because it was there stated that the tenant could make application up to December, 1882, or, in certain cases, up to the end of April, 1883. Therefore, if he paid a year's rent at any time be-

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  tween November, 1880, and November 30, 1882, he might have his arrears compounded and wiped out, as he had shown, up to May or August, 1882, and he was given three harvests—the harvests of 1880, 1881. and 1882—to pay one year's rent. Then there was another point in respect of which the Bill, if it was not made optional, required careful amendment. A man who died generally left his arrears, which were part of his personalty, to pay his debts, and the residue to his legatees, and his successor in title generally made this money good and collected it from the tenants; and he would like to know from noble Lords opposite, if this Bill passed without being made optional, who was to be the loser? Would the executors have to compound for so much in the pound of these arrears, having a very much larger sum of money duo to them as a charge upon the estate; or would the successor have to pay them out of arrears which by this Bill would be wiped out? He saw that in Clause 16 the advances for arrears were to be divided between those who were entitled to them; but that did not clear up the other point. The Prime Minister gave as one of the justifications for this measure that it was very usual in Ireland for arrears to be sold, especially under the Encumbered Estates Court. He (the Marquess of Waterford), unfortunately, had had a good deal of knowledge of what took place under that Court, as his father bought a great deal of property through it; and was he satisfied from his personal knowledge that the Prime Minister was misinformed, and that the sale of arrears was one of the most rare occurrences which ever took place, either in that Court or anywhere else in Ireland. If noble Lords opposite doubted whether he was correct in what he stated, he was satisfied to abide by a Return of the arrears which had been sold under the Encumbered Estates Court since it was established, if the Government would produce such a Return. There were many other questions with which he could deal. For instance, there was the question of appeals. The Sub-Commissioners, with an appeal to the Chief Commission alone, had to decide upon points of law of the utmost importance, the very points which rendered it necessary that there should be an ap-
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  peal to the Court of Appeal in Ireland under the Land Act, such as whether holdings came under the Act of 1881 or not. And, again, there was the fact of the unfortunate tenants who were to be saved from their cruel and rapacious landlords, and who were in consequence to be left entirely at the mercy of other creditors, such as the gombeen men—men who were really cruel and rapacious, and from whom this actual debt to the landlord had often saved them. But he would pass from these questions and merely say, in conclusion, that if the Church Surplus was large—as the Government said it was—or small—as he believed it to be—he was satisfied that the expense that would be incurred would be largely in excess of the estimate of the Government, and would come, with the other increased taxation which they had lately heard of, as an oppressive drain upon the English taxpayer. He had attempted to show some of the faults and effects of this most extraordinary Bill; and he thought their Lordships would agree, if he was right in what he had pointed out—and he had arrived at these conclusions by dint of personal experience in the management of Irish property, and with the advice and assistance of some of the most able and experienced lawyers and land agents in Ireland—that it was an absolute necessity that this Bill should be amended in Committee; and, upon the understanding that it would be so amended, he should vote for the second reading.
  EARL COWPERsaid, that having, in view of the position he lately held in Ireland, carefully considered this Bill, he could assure their Lordships that he was of opinion that it was, upon the whole, a wise and beneficent measure, though it was unnecessary for him to say that he did not like the circumstances which led to its introduction, for it was most unfortunate that it should be regarded at the time as a sort of sop and concession to induce agitators, who might not otherwise have supported the Government, to do so. Having, however, on a former occasion fully expressed his opinion on the matter, he thought that all that ought now to be put on one side. In his opinion, it was impossible to feel that the measure before the House was not closely connected with the Land Act of last year. That Act, of course, was passed when he (Earl

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  Spencer) was in Office, and of its provisions he heartily approved. No doubt it violated general principles, and it was supposed at the time to be a concession to agitation. He would, however, remind their Lordships of the general principle that governed the Land Act, which was that the Irish tenant should not be considered in an independent position and able to take care of himself, but that his rent should be ascertained for him by a tribunal appointed for that purpose. Not only was the Government responsible for the Act of last year, but the House of Commons had approved it by a large majority, and their Lordships, after having proposed a large number of Amendments, gave way, and passed the measure. Having, then, accepted that Act and adopted the principle it advocated, those whom it was intended to benefit should not be prevented from taking advantage of it; and it would not be wise or expedient to turn round now and say they must be governed entirely by political economy, and that they would not in this instance go out of the beaten path. That was an impossible and untenable ground on which to oppose the measure, and he was glad to see that such a course was not to be adopted. If they had abandoned the principles of political economy, they had better not return to them until the objects were all gained for which they had been abandoned. A good deal had been said, and forcibly said, in regard to the objections to the Bill; but, perhaps, they were not altogether as strong when they came to look at them as they at first sight appeared. As had been said, it was a difficult matter, no doubt, to make out whether these tenants were or were not able to pay their rents; but it struck him that when men were two or three years in arrears, the landlords allowing them to be in arrears during that time was bonâ fide evidence they were not able to pay. It should be borne in mind that most of these men were men of small property, men who were only able to live from hand to mouth at the best times; and, therefore, in most cases they might safely assume that they were not able to pay, and that those cases in which they could pay and would not were exceptional. He was not aware whether any Amendments would be proposed in Committee with reference to the decision of the tenant's
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  ability to pay. A great deal had been heard against the Land Commissioners. He was not going to defend them; but, perhaps, even angels from Heaven would not have given entire satisfaction. It should be remembered that the Commissioners were already intrusted with a far more important function than that of deciding a tenant's solvency—namely, that of fixing rents for 15 years. Another point to which he would refer was the alleged injustice to the tenants who had paid their rents, by giving their arrears to their neighbours who had not. A great deal had been made of this objection to the Bill; but he did not think that, practically, it would be found to be a great injustice. When they had numbers of tenants hopelessly in arrear who were utterly unable to pay, what was to be done with them? One of two courses would have to be adopted, whether the Bill passed or not; either they must be allowed to go on with the rope of the arrears hanging round their necks—and this would be a harsh and cruel way to leave them—or the uttermost farthing must be exacted from them and they must be evicted. He was sure that very few landlords in Ireland would adopt the latter course, and that the great majority would rather follow the example of English landlords, and deal generously with their tenants by forgiving them their arrears and allowing them to go on. He did not think that those who had paid their rents would feel it an injustice that those in arrear should receive the benefits of the Bill, because whenever evictions occurred, whether just or unjust, the evicted tenants had the sympathy, not only of those in arrear, but of those who had paid their rents. In reply to the objections of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Waterford), he would point out that the Bill would only affect those tenants who had paid the last year's rent. It had been argued that the introduction of this Bill had led to the stoppage of the payment of rent; but he thought they must look for another reason for that. People had found that deductions in their rent had been offered to them, and they thought that, having got so much by being obstinate, they should get more by refusing to pay altogether. The new departure in the release of the Irish "suspects" must also be considered as having more to do with

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  the stoppage of rent than this Bill. The injustice was also dwelt on of asking the British farmer, and the British public in general, to pay the debts of the Irish tenant. As one of the British public, he was willing to pay his share, and he did not think it was so great an injustice as it was usually made to appear. Was it not advantageous to this country that Ireland should be united to us, and be peaceful and prosperous? These things were so necessary to us that we should be willing to pay anything that would tend to the peace, well-being, and tranquillity of Ireland. Moreover, their Lordships were not the guardians of the public purse; and the interests of the taxpayer, being their especial care, might safely be loft with the other House of Parliament. He was very glad—and he felt sure also that their Lordships generally were equally pleased—that the question of emigration had been introduced into the Bill. Almost everybody who knew anything of the district felt that in the West of Ireland it was absolutely necessary; and people who formerly were most opposed to it—even the priests—were now altering their views and seeing the necessity of emigration. One of their objections had always been the deterioration in the condition of their flocks when no longer under their eyes. He believed that that objection would be met by the care with which emigration was to be conducted. The noble Marquess behind him (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had objected to emigration being carried out by the Boards of Guardians. He (EarlCowper), however, hoped that Boards of Guardians were now becoming alive to the necessity of emigration; their objections should be overcome when they found that for £50, which it cost to keep a family for a year, they could get rid of that family altogether. With respect to the compulsory nature of the Bill, he might say that when the Land Act of last year was passed, a clause was inserted enabling the landlord and tenant to obtain a loan charged on the tenant's holding; but making the landlord's consent necessary before the arrears should be so dealt with. A good deal was expected of that provision; but nothing came of it, in consequence of that consent being necessary, the jealousy existing between landlord and tenant being an insuperable bar to the clause being taken advantage
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  of; and if they now required the consent of the landlord the Bill would remain as dead a letter as the clause of the Act of last year. He was glad that the question of tenant right was to be taken into consideration; but he would not go into those questions now, as they would be better dealt with on the next stage. He was also glad their Lordships were going to give the Bill a second reading, because he thought it would be a most unfortunate circumstance if that Assembly of landowners were not particularly tender to the interests of those to whom their own were supposed to be antagonistie; it would be most unfortunate that they should think it their duty to interfere and put a stop to the further progress of the Bill. He also thought that, in the present condition of Ireland, it would have a very bad effect upon, and have been a tremendous shock to, the large class of men who had their expectations aroused, to suddenly reject the Bill; and he should himself have been prepared to vote for the second reading, oven without those considerations, as he considered it a measure that was absolutely necessary under existing circumstances.
  VISCOUNT BURYsaid, he wished their Lordships would look at the question in an English point of view, for it affected England as well as Ireland. No doubt, Irish landlords were mainly concerned in it; but he thought it should be looked at more than it had been from an English point of view. The noble Earl who spoke last (Earl Cowper) hit the nail on the head when he said this legislation was a mere continuation of the legislation of last year. The noble Earl also made use of a very singular argument, for he said because they had gone astray long ago they were to resist all attempts to go back into the right path—that having abandoned political economy it would be the height of folly to attempt to go back again.
  EARL COWPER: I said we had better not go back to political economy until we had accomplished the object for which we had left it.
  VISCOUNT BURYsaid, his objection to the Bill was this—that it was a continuation in an evil way that we entered upon years ago. No one contended that the Bill was otherwise than grossly unjust. It was not only unjust, it would fail in its immediate objects. He agreed

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  with his noble Friend behind him (the Marquess of Waterford), that the Bill would not touch the very people whom it was primarily intended to relieve. It was unjust to the British taxpayer. Many of their Lordships were land-owners, not only in England, but in Ireland; and what would they be able to say to their tenants in England, who, in consequence of bad seasons and bad times, were in arrears, when these tenants said to them—"Didyou not, in this last Session of Parliament, pass a Bill which was to put one year's rent into your pocket as an Irish landlord at the expense of us, the taxpayers of Great Britain? Why did you do this? Why did you receive it? Why did you take it out of our pockets?" The noble Earl who spoke last said it was important to retain the Union between England and Ireland, and that we ought to be willing to pay the price proposed by this Bill for retaining the Union. But those of their Lordships who were English landlords and who owned land in Ireland could not rely upon that argument. It would be no argument to the English tenant in arrear to say they were so interested in maintaining the Union between England and Ireland that they agreed to vote out of moneys of the taxpayers of Great Britain part of their rents, because that was what it really amounted to. The noble Marquess who spoke second in the debate (the Marquess of Salisbury) said the Bill was saved from absolute badness by the Emigration Clause. He (Viscount Bury) could not altogether agree with that. For some years he lived in Canada, and saw a good deal of emigration, and he found the wind taken out of his sails with regard to emigration when he remembered the magnificent men that used to come over in emigrant ships. They were, no doubt, capital people for emigrating to America or Canada, or for breaking up a new country: but they were the bone and sinew of the manhood of Ireland that the Government were going to get rid of, instead of the old and infirm who, if any, ought to be out of the country. The legislation on which they had now embarked in Ireland would touch England to-morrow; and, so far as he was concerned, he was sorry the Bill was not to be divided upon. He, however, washed his hands of it, and protested against it altogether.
  THE DUKE OF ABERCORNsaid, with reference to a remark of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Cowper), he (the Duke of Abercorn) wished to state his belief that the failure of the Land Act of 1881, as regarded the small number of cases of arrangement between landlords and tenants, was caused not by distrust between landlord and tenant, but in consequence of distrust in the action of the Commissioners and Sub-Commissioners in the valuation of farms that were burdened with loans.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, he entirely disagreed with the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury). The procedure, by compelling a man to accept a gift, was somewhat novel; but he (the Earl of Dunraven) thought the case justified that. Likewise, he considered that if the Bill practically compelled the tenant to pay a year's rent, under penalty to pay up the whole of his arrears, the same principle of compulsion ought to be applied to the landlord, for a voluntary principle would be of no value. As the Bill was framed, it would confer great benefit on Irish landlords generally, both great and small, for the small landlords could not get on without the money due to them. It would also be useful to the small tenants, who could not possibly get rid of their arrears, or wipe them out, without its aid. If the taking of the tenant's interest in his holding into account meant that he should be obliged to realize that interest before he could come within the Act, the measure would, he believed, be useless; and it would be better to reject the Bill at this stage, on the ground that its principles were wrong, than to accept it, and then introduce a provision compelling a tenant to sell his interest in his holding. If such a provision were introduced, the Bill would practically be inoperative. He did not agree in the prediction of the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition (the Marquess of Salisbury) as to the demoralization of the tenants; and he was certain that solvent and honest tenants who had paid their rents were sick of agitation, and wished the country to settle down, and did not for a moment regret their honesty. Those men understand their position sufficiently well to know that unless by some means or other they could get rid of the large number of small and broken

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  men whose interest it was to keep up agitation, the country never could obtain that peace which was so desirable. If the farmers who had paid their rents could be polled, it would be found that they were unanimously in favour of the Bill. It had been said that the measure was nothing more than a further concession to violence and agitation. He could not take that view, holding, as he did, that the Bill was but the necessary complement of the Land Act of 1881. In fact, the measure might be considered part and parcel of that Act, inasmuch as it made that Act operative, and extended to a larger number of men for whose benefit it was originally intended. When passing it in 1881, the Legislature made a sacrifice of principle; but as their Lordships had swallowed the camel before, he did not see why they need now strain at the gnat, seeing that the swallowing of the gnat now might possibly relieve them from the violent fit of indigestion which followed the swallowing of the camel. He did not wish to defend the Land Act or its administrators; but if the Act worked badly, it was the duty of Parliament to try to neutralize its bad effects, and unless it were supplemented by the present measure they would be hampered in their endeavours to amend it. The present state of things in Ireland, he maintained, was altogether exceptional. If it were not, he should not vote for the present Bill, which could only be defended on the ground that it was an exceptional measure, called forth by exceptional circumstances. He would conclude by urging upon their Lordships to consider whether it would not be better to throw the Bill out at once upon the second reading than to agree to it, with the intention of afterwards altering it in Committee in such a way as to make it useless and utterly unacceptable to the people of Ireland, for whose benefit it was intended.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREsaid, the answer to the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Dunraven), who had asked why their Lordships, having swallowed the camel in 1881, should not now swallow the gnat, was very simple. It was this—that when their Lordships swallowed the camel, they did not know what they were swallowing. It had been said that the Bill was one which treated the Irish landlords with libe-
  1956
  rality; but he did not think that any Bill which had been drafted in Kilmainham would be one which was likely to be characterized by liberality to the Irish landlords. He wished to point out that by one part of the Bill it was proposed to root an insolvent tenant to the soil, while by another it was proposed to give him facilities for emigration. The two principles involved were antagonistic. With regard to emigration, he approved of it, for he thought that it was a mistaken policy to fix a pauper in his holding. He did not, however, think the Poor Law Guardians were very likely to be of any assistance in promoting the success of that operation; and it was the more to be regretted that that was the case, for, in his opinion, it was the proper remedy for the evils which existed in Ireland. He did not agree that the small shopkeeper was the best friend of the Irish tenant, because he had a strong interest in keeping him in the country. He considered that the application to the Court ought to be made jointly by landlord and tenant; because the landlord was much more likely to know the real circumstances of his tenants, than a number of Sub-Commissioners sent from various parts of the country, and having no local knowledge. He took exception to the Bill as another step in the direction of confiscation. Under the Act of 1881 there had been great confiscation of the landlords' property, and under this Bill there would be further confiscation, as, in many cases, tenants owed some four or five years' arrears.
  LORD VENTRYsaid, it was easy to see that Her Majesty's Government had not evolved this measure out of their own minds, but had adopted the proposal of the Home Rule Party. He believed that its introduction was due to the action of their Lordships' House, in throwing out the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, the rejection of which had never been forgotten; and he thought the present measure should be passed in some shape or other, if only to cut the ground from under the feet of those who were constantly saying that this and the other would not have happened if that particular Bill had been passed. At the same time, he believed the present Bill would operate in many cases with great injustice, for it treated the landlords harshly as regarded the hanging gale.
  LORD DENMANthought that it would have been better to throw out the Bill on the third reading than to endeavour to amend it in Committee. In 1836 he had been from Cork to Dungarvan and back in 22 hours, and he would not fear to go over again soon. It had been then said that small tenants whose farms were thrown into larger ones at first regretted the loss of the old roof tree, but had afterwards been convinced that it had been for their good. He had given to the Library of their Lordships' House The Irish in America, by Mr. Maguire. He found in that book that, before 1875, an Anti-Rent League had gained their ends in Prince Edward's Island, and that an act of their Legislature had passed an Agrarian Law, of which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had been a Commissioner. His late father, in 1832, in a letter to his friend, Mr. Merivale, stated that—
  "Such is the nature of property that you can lay your hands on no accumulation, however exorbitant, without introducing an agrarian law at the end of every year, month, and day—in a word, without endangering the rights of property altogether. These distinctions may be just and reasonable in the abstract, yet they would be no barrier against the inroads of excited passions, in the form of political unions, public meeting's, unanimous resolves, &c."
  At present, a Land League had obtained too much sway, and it was the duty of the Government to use their power, now so enormous, to break up secret associations by day and by night. He was surprised that the son of one of the most distinguished statesmen who had ever sat in that House should have sold that property in Tipperary which was made so valuable by the forbearance and generosity of his noble Predecessor. He (Lord Denman) reserved to himself the right, when the Bill came before their Lordships with Amendments (which had already been condemned as fatal to the Bill), to move its rejection on the third reading.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.
  House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Four o'clock.