Sitting of 14 August 1879

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL—Committee—Report—Considered as amended—Third Reading—Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) [235], and passed.
NOTICE OF MOTION.

  NAVAL AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.
  SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN, in rising to give Notice of a Motion on this subject, complained that the report of his speech of the previous evening upon Naval Administration appeared in only one of the London papers. He was proceeding to comment upon this matter, when——
  MR. SPEAKERsaid, he understood the hon. Baronet was about to give Notice of a Motion. The House having given him some indulgence upon a personal matter, it would be for the hon. Baronet now to state the terms of his Motion.
  SIR PATRICK O'BRIENsaid, that the observations he had made on the previous evening had reference to both Naval and Horse Guard administration, owing to some accident, he presumed, his observations had been suppressed. The terms of his Notice were as follows:—
  "To call attention to the maladministration of the Admiralty as regards the Corps of Royal Marines, and also to the violation by the Horse Guards Department of the five years' rule regarding the Staff."

QUESTIONS.
  ARMY (INDIA)—THE 10TH HUSSARS.

    QUESTION.
    SIR ARTHUR HAYTERasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he can inform the House if the 10th Hussars received the order to make forced marches on their return to India while suffering from cholera; and, if so, from whom the order proceeded, and what was the countervailing reason for increasing the pace at the risk of the health of the men?
    MR. E. STANHOPE: I cannot yet say whether the 10th Hussars received

    969
    the order to make forced marches on their return to India. If such an order was issued, it was, probably, not in spite of, but because of, cholera, it being of the first importance, and at almost any other risk, to remove cholera-stricken troops from the infected district.

  NAVY—COMPOSITIONS FOR COATING IRON SHIPS—QUESTION.
  CAPTAIN PIMasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether the Chief Constructor at a dockyard is the officer whose duty it is to report upon the merits of various compositions used for coating the bottoms of iron ships at the several dockyards; and whether he submits recommendations as to the use of these compositions, and regulates the time during which ships are allowed to remain in dock for the application of such materials, as also the number of coats to be applied in each case; whether he be aware that at Portsmouth the son of the Chief Constructor is now, and has for some years been, the agent for the gentleman whose compositions have been among those offered for competitive trial; and, whether it is not the case that the compositions to which reference is now made have been more largely brought into use and more favourably reported upon at Portsmouth than at the other dockyards.
  MR. W. H. SMITH: It is the duty of the Chief Constructor, in conjunction with the Senior Constructor, as it is also that of the Admiral Superintendent, to report upon the merits of the different compositions. They submit a Report of the state of vessels' bottoms, when docked, to the Admiralty, and recommend what composition, and how many coats, should be applied. In all cases the Admiralty decide and give directions as to the course to be taken. The Admiralty have been for some time aware that a son of the Chief Constructor of Portsmouth Dockyard was connected with one of the gentlemen whose compositions for the protection of ships' bottoms are used in the Navy; but the Admiralty have not had reason to believe that this fact has influenced the officers of the Dockyard in their Reports on the merits of any of the compositions under trial. The question as to the merits of compositions is decided by the Controller's Department at the
  970
  Admiralty from their own personal inspection, as well as from the Reports received from the Dockyards on foreign stations, and that Department is responsible for the adoption of any composition, and not the officers of the Dockyards. It is not the case that the composition to which reference is now made has been more favourably reported on at Portsmouth than at other Yards; it has been most favourably reported on by the Dockyards at Malta and Bermuda; and if its use has been more extended at Portsmouth than at other Yards, it is due to the Admiralty officers acting in accordance with their own observations, and the Reports they have received from the foreign Yards.

  FIJI—SMALL POX.—QUESTION.
  MR. ALDERMAN W.M'ARTHURasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he can give any information as to the prevalence of smallpox in Fiji, and will lay upon the Table of the House any Despatches on the subject from the Governor of Fiji?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: The Leonidas arrived at Fiji, from Calcutta, with Coolie immigrants, on May 14. There were then cases of small-pox on board. The ship was at once placed in quarantine; great energy and resource were shown by the Administrator, MR. De Vœux, Dr. Macgregor, and other authorities, in making the necessary arrangements for preventing communications with her; and, by the last accounts, it seemed that their exertions had proved entirely successful in preventing the spread of the disease. On first receiving this intelligence I telegraphed to the Governor of New South Wales to send temporary medical assistance to Fiji if the small-pox extended beyond the quarantine station, and on June 19 I sent out an extra medical officer from this country to the Colony.

  ARMY—FIRST APPOINTMENTS IN THE 60TH RIFLES.—QUESTION.
  SIR PATRICK O'BRIENasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether first appointments in the 60th Rifles are made by H.R.H. the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, as in other Infantry Regiments (excepting the Brigade of Guards and Rifle Brigade, in

  971
  which the Colonel commanding the Regiment personally selects the recipients of first commissions), in the ordinary course, or are made by the personal selection of His Royal Highness in his capacity of Colonel commanding the 60th Regiment?
  COLONEL STANLEY: The practice is not different with regard to the 60th Rifles from that which exists in every other regiment. As I had occasion to point out the other day, the Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief exercises the double function of Commander-in-Chief and of colonel of the regiment. I do not know that I could explain how he could keep the two characters apart.

  POOR LAW—CARDIFF BOARD OF GUARDIANS.—QUESTION.
  MR. O'CONNOR POWERasked the President of the Local Government Board, If his attention has been called to the proceedings of the Board of Poor Law Guardians of Cardiff, as reported in the "South Wales Daily News" and "Western Mail," of the 11th instant, in reference to the appointment of Catherine Gwyn, a Roman Catholic, as a nurse, and the efforts of the Guardians to change the appointment and dismiss Catherine Gwyn because she was a Roman Catholic; whether the Guardians have not heretofore acted illegally in requiring a particular religious qualification in the officers appointed by them; and, whether he will take steps to insure that no person shall be disqualified from holding office in the administration of the Poor Law (except in the case of chaplains appointed for particular denominations) on account of his or her religious belief?
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, all I know officially about this case is that the Cardiff Guardians have recommended the sanctioning of the appointment of Catherine Gwyn as a nurse in their Union, and I have sanctioned the appointment. I have had no other communication from the Guardians on the subject. The hon. Gentleman has drawn my attention to a newspaper report of a discussion which occurred among the Guardians subsequent to the appointment, in which there was an objection made to it on the ground that the person appointed was a Roman Catholic. It is impossible for me to check the observa-
  972
  tions made in debates of Boards of Guardians. I do not know what steps I can take to insure—in fact, it is impossible so to insure—that Guardians should not give preference, if they choose, to members of their own religion, however objectionable and unauthorized that may be. The tendency is rather to relinquish control in such matters over Boards of Guardians by the Central Authority.

MALTA—REPORTS OF SIR PENROSE JULYAN AND MR. KEENAN.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ANDERSONasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he is yet in a position to say when Sir Penrose Julyan's report on Maltese matters will be laid before Parliament; and, whether he will lay MR. Keenan's report on educational matters at Malta upon the Table?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I understand that MR. Keenan has just completed his Report, but I have not yet received it; and I cannot say whether either this or Sir Penrose Julyan's Report will be laid before Parliament. Certainly the letter, if published at all, should first be published in Malta.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR— CETEWAYO.—QUESTION.
MR. ANDERSONasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, If he has seen in the "Daily News" of the 12th, that the statement is repeated by Cape Town correspondents that Sir Garnet Wolseley has put a price on Cetewayo's head; and, if he can yet say whether there is any foundation for the statement?
SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I can only say that this statement does not appear in any communication that I have received from South Africa. Sir Garnet Wolseley has stated that he thinks Cetewayo's continued presence in Zululand undesirable, a view which appears to be shared by the Zulus themselves, and I do not doubt that he will do his best to take Cetewayo prisoner if he can.
MR. ANDERSON: I feel very reluctantly obliged to make some remarks to the House, and in order to put myself in Order I shall conclude with a Motion. ["Oh!" and "No!"] I am compelled

973
to do so in consequence of the extraordinary answer which has been given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and I can assure the House that I shall be exceedingly brief in what I have to say. We are now about to separate, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies will soon be out of reach of being asked any Question, and out of reach of being called on to give an explanation; I, therefore, feel bound to ask the Government what their views are as to offering a reward for Cetewayo's head? [Interruption.] I will not detain the House above three or four minutes. Sir, I think the country generally will agree with me in the opinion that this country has already reaped a sufficient crop of infamy out of the Zulu War, and we do not want to be dragged down to the lower depth of infamy still by the employment of brigands and assassins to take away the life of the man opposed to us. Cetewayo is no criminal—he is no criminal to have a reward set upon his head. I do not think such a course of warfare has been adopted by this country since the time when £30,000 was put upon the head of Charles Edward Stuart, the Pretender, and that was a very evil example, which I should not like to see followed now. The verdict which history will pass upon Cetewayo will be that he was a gallant Monarch, defending his country and his people against one of the most wanton and wicked invasions that ever could be made upon an independent people. That will be the verdict of history; and if we go down to the depth of infamy of offering a reward for his head, the country will condemn any Government that does it. I think we are entitled to hear from the Government before we separate some explanation of what their views are on the matter. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, in answering my Question, has given a reply which seems to show not only that he does not know, but that he does not care, whether the statement that was made, and has now been repeated by the Colonial papers, is true or not, and that, probably, Sir Garnet Wolseley would adopt that course; because, he said, Sir Garnet Wolseley had sent word home that there would be no peace in the country so long as Cetewayo was there. We see what he is doing, and that, although the country is not yet conquered, he is send-
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ing home troops, as if he were now going to trust to some other means than honest warfare for the attainment of his ends. These things will excite suspicion in this country; and I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will give us the assurance that such a course as has been stated to have been taken will meet with the strongest disapproval from Her Majesty's Government. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to let us know the opinion of the Government on this important point, and I beg now to move the adjournment of the House.
MR. COURTNEYseconded the Motion.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Mr. Anderson.)
SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I think the House will be of opinion that I need not trouble it at any length on the subject. What I said in answer to the hon. Gentleman's Question was, that I had no doubt that Sir Garnet Wolseley, having expressed his opinion that it was undesirable that Cetewayo should continue in Zululand—an opinion which is shared, it appears, by a very large number of Cetewayo's late subjects—would do his best to take him prisoner. I should like to know how what I have said, or what has appeared anywhere else, justifies the hon. Gentleman in charging Sir Garnet Wolseley with hiring assassins and murderers to put an end to Cetewayo's life? If we cannot trust the people we send out to a distant country to manage the affairs of this great Empire better than the hon. Member for Glasgow appears to trust them, we shall do the gravest injustice to those who are serving us.
MR. COURTNEYsaid, the right hon. Baronet seemed to have misunderstood the Question. He (Mr. Courtney) did not know what was the intention of the hon. Member for Glasgow; but he assumed it was this. He utterly disbelieved that any English commander, in the position of Sir Garnet Wolseley, would ever put a price on the head of his enemy; and as the statement had been made and repeated in the Colonial papers, he desired to receive from the Secretary of State for the Colonies an indignant denial. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not deny it. He did not even say it

975
was impossible to suppose it to be true. He treated it as a thing that might possibly happen to be within the policy of Sir Garnet Wolseley. What he certainly expected to hear from the Secretary of State for the Colonies was an indignant statement that such an imputation as this could not be cast on the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces engaged in a warfare which we must conduct with some regard to the maxims of war among civilized nations.
SIR PATRICK O'BRIENhad understood the hon. Member for Glasgow to ask a simple Question—namely, whether the statement in a morning journal was correct or incorrect; and, if it was correct, whether Her Majesty's Government would send out a telegram to the Cape expressing their disapproval of such a course? He (Sir Patrick O'Brien) was not aware that the hon. Member for Glasgow had exceeded his right as a Member of that House.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The Government have no information of anything of the kind, nor of any such statement that Sir Garnet Wolseley has put a price upon the head of Cetewayo. They do not believe it. But how are we to answer Questions of this sort put to us upon information in Colonial newspapers which we have not seen? The hon. Baronet says—"Why don't you telegraph out?" and to that I must answer, because the telegraph has not yet been completed.
SIR PATRICK O'BRIENexplained that what he meant was that they should telegraph to Madeira.
MAJOR NOLANthought the hon. Member for Glasgow was quite right, and added that there was a precedent much later than that of Charles Stuart, for the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico put a price upon the head of Juarez, and issued an order that all men found fighting under him should be shot as rebels. Under that order, when Juarez became the stronger, the Emperor Maximilian was himself shot. This country certainly ought not to follow such a precedent as that.
SIR JOSEPH M'KENNAsaid, that he would not have risen except to remove an aspersion which his hon. and gallant Friend had incautiously cast on the memory of the Emperor Maximilian. The Emperor never set a price on the capture of those who were in arms
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against his Government. What he really did was this. He issued a Proclamation that the war was at an end, and that he would treat those thenceforward found in arms against the Empire, not as prisoners of war, but as rebels. Shortly after this Proclamation certain Mexican leaders were taken in arms, and were shot. It was done on the assumption that they were criminal disturbers of the peace. The war, however, was not over. Juarez was simply at bay. He, subsequently, resumed active operations, and eventually took the Emperor prisoner, and brought him to trial by court martial for having issued the Proclamation under which the Mexican leaders had been condemned and shot. They all knew that the Emperor Maximilian was found guilty and shot, not, however, for having set a price on anyone's head, but for what his captors held to be a capital breach of the laws of war.
MR. ANDERSON: If the Secretary of State for the Colonies had answered as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had done—that he did not believe the statement—I should not have troubled the House; but his reply led to the impression that he did believe it, and would not condemn it. After the answer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I beg to be allowed to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

INDIA—THE NIZAM—LOANS.

  QUESTION.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLasked the Under Secretary of State for India, If Her Majesty's Government have any information of the truth, or otherwise, of a statement in the Indian newspapers, that the regency of the Nizam's country being in pecuniary difficulties are trying to raise a large loan in Bombay?
  MR. E. STANHOPE, in reply, said, he had made careful inquiry into this matter, and he was not able to give any information whatever on the subject.

NAVY—KRUPP GUNS.—QUESTION.
MR. E. J. REEDasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If he will inform the House what officers of the Admiralty were recently sent to Westphalia to inspect the Krupp breech-loading guns

977
and the various mechanical appliances connected therewith, and to report upon their performances; and, whether any skilled mechanical officer was among the number of those sent?
MR. W. H. SMITH: The British naval officers witnessing the trials are Rear Admiral Hamilton, First Director of Naval Ordnance; Captain Herbert, Her Majesty's gunnery ship Excellent; Captain Cyprian Bridge, a member of the Heavy Gun Committee and also the Committee on Explosives; and Commander Grenfell, Naval Attaché. The Admiralty are not charged with the duty of manufacturing their own guns, and they have, therefore, no mechanical officer employed in the manufacture of guns.

ARMY—THE AUXILIARY FORCES— MILITIA SERGEANTS—QUESTION.
MR. CALLAN (for MR. GRAY)asked the Financial Secretary for War, What changes, if any, have recently been made in the fuel and light allowance of first-class staff sergeants of Militia; and, whether the change is in accordance with the provision that these non-commissioned officers should be placed in this respect on an equality with corresponding non-commissioned officers in Line Regiments?
COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, from the information given to me since Notice of this Question was put on the Paper, I am led to suppose that I was correct in the statement I made the other day—that no difference exists between the allowances to staff sergeants of Militia in England and the allowances to staff sergeants of Militia in Ireland. The Question, probably, has arisen from the circumstances that an erroneous issue at a higher rate than that which ought to have been issued was made in the case of certain staff sergeants. Of course, that issue will not be continued.

CATTLE DISEASE (IRELAND).

  QUESTION.
  MR. CALLAN (for MR. GRAY)asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether cattle disease has recently again broken out in the Phœnix Park, Dublin; whether the Park has in consequence been "closed" under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act by the Board of Guardians of the North Dublin Union;
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  whether, when this was done before, the Government did not seek to have the closing order set aside; and, whether, in view of the constant recurrence of disease in the Phœnix Park, Government, instead of endeavouring to have the provisions against the spread of infection more relaxed, will consider the propriety of excluding cattle and sheep altogether therefrom for a reasonable period?
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: Sir, there have been three cases of pleuropneumonia in the Phœnix Park since the 27th of June last. The Guardians have not declared the entire Park to be closed under the Contagious Diseases Act in consequence of the infection, but only a field at Whitefields has been so declared. The Irish Government declared the Park to be free from pleuro-pneumonia by Order dated the 27th of May last, no case of the disease having occurred therein since the 30th of October, 1873. The Irish Government does not consider that there is any necessity at present for excluding cattle and sheep altogether from the Park.

IRELAND—THE POLICE, DUBLIN.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CALLAN (for Mr. GRAY)asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether he is aware that under present arrangements the citizens of Dublin pay twice over a large proportion of the salary of every policeman employed by the local authority in sanitary duty, first, through the police tax, and second by having to pay the full salary and cost of clothing of every policeman so employed, no allowance being made for the proportion already received by the Treasury in the former shape; and, whether he will give directions to have this injustice remedied?
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: The Question referred to has been fully investigated by the Irish Government and the Treasury, and the conclusion come to has been that there is no injustice in charging to the Corporation of Dublin the full salary and cost of clothing of the police employed on sanitary duty. The addition of these men to the police force makes no addition to the amount of the police tax, which has remained unchanged since 1837. The increased expenditure for these men falls

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  wholly on the Vote, not on the ratepayers; and as they are maintained solely for the use of the Corporation, it is only right the Corporation should pay the total cost.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS— REGISTRARS' FEES.—QUESTION.
MR. CALLAN (for Mr. GRAY)asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether superintendent registrars of births, deaths, and marriages in England are allowed a fee of 5s. for each index to a register book prepared by them; and, whether any similar fee is allowed for the discharge of a similar duty in Ireland?
SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: Sir, the fees paid to the superintendent registrars in England are 7s., not 5s., for each index. No similar fee is paid to superintendent registrars in Ireland.

THE SLAVE TRADE—PAPERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ANDERSONasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, When the Slave Trade Papers for 1878 will be laid upon the Table; and, what progress has been made in getting the Red Sea Slave Trade Convention signed at Constantinople?
  MR. BOURKE, in reply, said, the Slave Trade Papers would be in the possession of hon. Members in a few days. The Red Sea Slave Trade Convention with Turkey had not yet been signed; but the Government had every reason to believe that the negotiations on the subject would very shortly be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

AFGHANISTAN—THE WAR—LOSS OF CAMELS.—QUESTION.
SIR ARTHUR HAYTERasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he can give to the House any information contradictory of the following telegram from Simla, contained in "The Times" of the 9th of June, respecting the alleged loss of camels during the campaign in Afghanistan, viz.:—
"The statement that 16,000 camels have been lost may be correct with regard to a portion of our forces, but at least twice this number have perished altogether, without counting other baggage animals. An estimate, which ought to be trustworthy, makes the total number nearly
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40,000. It is earnestly to be hoped that the successful termination of the campaign may not prevent fullest inquiries into the cause of mismanagement so discreditable and dangerous. The Khyber force was for some time so helpless, owing to the want of transport, that it could not have advanced to Cabul if Yakoob Khan had defied us;"
and, whether the camel owners will receive compensation from the Government only for camels captured or destroyed by the enemy, and not for those which have perished from other causes?
MR. E. STANHOPE: We have telegraphed for detailed information on this subject; but it has not yet reached me. I am afraid that there is no doubt that the loss of camels was heavy; but there is nothing in any of the Correspondence from India to lead to the idea that the force could not have moved forward if required to do so. It is understood that the terms offered to camel owners covered all risks of death or loss from any cause.

TREATY OF BERLIN—ARTICLE 23— THE TURKISH PROVINCES.

  QUESTION.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If he can yet say whether the very first step required by the provisions of the 23rd Article of the Treaty of Berlin for granting autonomous constitutions to the several provinces of European Turkey, viz., the appointment of special commissions for each province, has yet been taken in regard to any; and, if any, to what province, or if any real step whatever has been taken or is likely soon to be taken towards establishing these autonomies?
  MR. BOURKE: At the end of June last, Sir Henry Layard made an urgent appeal to the Porte to appoint the Commissions which were necessary under the 23rd Article of the Treaty of Berlin as soon as possible. A month after that, since the new Prime Minister was appointed, Sir Henry Layard renewed that appeal, and received from Aarifi Pasha an assurance that the Commissions would shortly be appointed. I must say that it is earnestly to be hoped that the Porte will see it is to the interest of the Sultan, just as much as to the interest of the populations in the Provinces of European Turkey, that these Commissions should be appointed without any delay.

INDIAN NATIVE TROOPS—RETURN OF COST OF CONVEYANCE TO EUROPE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE (for Mr. MUNDELLA)asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, The cause of the delay in furnishing the Return, ordered by this House early in the Session, as to the cost of bringing the Indian Troops to Europe?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The information had to be got from India, and that led to some delay. When it arrived it was sent to the War Office, and it has now been prepared, and was laid upon the Table of the House yesterday.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE.—QUESTION.
MR. KIRKasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is a fact that not only portions of the evidence of some of the witnesses, but the entire of the evidence of at least one other witness, and that given at more than one sitting of the Royal Commissioners, has been omitted in the Minutes of Evidence contained in the Blue Book presented to Parliament relating to the Inquiry by the Royal Commissioners into the constitution, custom, and usages of the London Stock Exchange; and, further, by what authority, and under what circumstances, certain portions of the evidence of Mr. Cooper, and the entire of the evidence of the Right honourable G. J. Goschen, in relation to the promotion and the subsequent winding-up of the Imperial Land Company of Marseilles, has been suppressed from the Blue Book on the customs and usages of the London Stock Exchange, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I have no knowledge whatever on this subject, and I only saw the Question to-day. I have sent over to the Home Office, where the Report has been presented; and I am informed that all the evidence that was sent in by the Royal Commission was presented by the Home Office, and that nothing was cut out there. Therefore, if there has been any omission, it rests with the Royal Commission; but I have no knowledge of the matter myself.
MR. CALLAN: As to the second part of the Question, the right hon. Gentleman has not informed us whether a Royal Commission has authority to cut out any portion of the evidence.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I really do not know. I apprehend that they took such evidence as they thought right, and presented it to Her Majesty. Whatever was presented to Her Majesty would have been sent to the Home Secretary. He is not now in London, as he is in attendance upon Her Majesty at Osborne; but, as I understand, the Report, as it was sent in to Her Majesty through the Home Secretary, was presented without any alteration to this House.
MR. CALLAN: I beg to give Notice, as it is a matter of deep interest to us, especially now that another important Royal Commission has just been issued, that none of the evidence should be suppressed—I beg to give Notice that I will to-morrow ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether a Royal Commission, in presenting the evidence it has taken, has any power to suppress any of that evidence? If evidence is suppressed in one case it may be in another; and we have just had an important Commission appointed to consider the agricultural distress of the country.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR— THE MARINES AND NAVAL BRIGADE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. B. WHITWORTHasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If Despatches have been received from the Commodore at Natal, mentioning the services of the Marines and Naval Brigade, particularly the men of the "Shah," at Ekowe and Ghirgelova; and, if so, why they have not been laid before the House?
  MR. W. H. SMITH: All despatches mentioning the services of the Naval Brigade and Marines are already in print, and will shortly be issued by the Colonial Office.

THE INDIAN MUTINY—CASE OF MR. W. TAYLER.—QUESTIONS.
SIR HENRY HAVELOCKasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether his attention has been drawn to the statement made in several public

983
journals that the memorial presented to the Secretary of State for India in Council by Mr. William Tayler (late Commissioner of Patna during the Indian Mutiny) between the months of October and December, 1868, together with six original letters which accompanied that memorial, are not forthcoming amongst the records of the India Office; whether he can give the House any information as to the truth, or otherwise, of that statement; and, whether he will cause to be laid upon the Table of the House and printed, before the House rises for the Recess, the counter-statement lately sent in by Mr. Tayler to the allegations made, in his case, by Sir Frederick Halliday?
MR. E. STANHOPE: The Memorial of 1868 was recently moved for by the hon. Member for South Warwickshire, and is now being printed. It will, I hope, be in the hands of hon. Members before very long. As for the counter-statement recently sent in, it appears to me, after a careful perusal, to be in such a form, and to contain statements affecting individuals of such a character, that we should not be justified in recommending the House to have it printed.
SIR HENRY HAVELOCKasked, Whether there would be any objection to referring the Memorial back to Mr. Tayler, and pointing out to him the objectionable passages, in order that he might excise them, and present the Memorial in an amended form?
MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, there could be no objection to Mr. Tayler revising his Memorial, and presenting it in an amended form.

MERCANTILE MARINE—EXPLOSIONS ON COAL-LADEN SHIPS.—QUESTION.
MR. CHILDERSasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether his attention has been called to an incorrect statement recently published as to the dangers connected with explosions on coal-laden ships; and, whether he will put forward, by authority, some statement to remedy the very great danger arising from the acceptance of misleading statements on the subject?
VISCOUNT SANDON, in reply, said, the important subject to which the right hon. Gentleman called attention had been under the consideration of the Board of Trade, and it was not impro-
984
bable that it would deal with the matter in some such way as the right hon. Gentleman had indicated; but he could not give any definite assurance.

COUNTY COURTS—PRIVILEGES OF PEERS.—QUESTION.
MR. MONK: I wish to ask Mr. Attorney General a Question, of which I have given him private Notice, with reference to a report that is prejudicial to the character of Lord De L'Isle and Dudley. That report, having appeared in the public Press, appeared to receive confirmation from an answer given by the hon. and learned Member in this House yesterday to a Question put by the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Blake). I now ask the Attorney General, What grounds he had for stating that he believed the facts mentioned by the hon. Member for Leominster to be correctly represented; and, whether it is within his knowledge that any Peer of the Realm has acted in the manner described by the hon. Member? Owing to illness, Lord De L'Isle and Dudley, who is confined to his room, is unable to attend in "another place" to deny that there is one word of truth in the report.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (SIR JOHN HOLKER): Before I answered the Question put to me by the hon. Member for Leominster, I had seen a report in a newspaper of proceedings in the Brompton County Court, and of a judgment, or decision, pronounced by the learned Judge of that Court. I assumed the report to be correct. What I meant by saying that the facts appeared to be correctly represented was that the statement contained in the Question corresponded with that given in the newspaper. I have no knowledge whatever of the matter, except from information derived from the newspaper report, and from the Question of the hon. Member for Leominster, and I should be glad if it turns out that the report was incorrect. I may say that I studiously avoided mentioning any name whatever.
MR. MONK: The Question was in reference to a Peer of the Realm, and Lord De L'Isle and Dudley is the only Peer of the Realm of that name. On his behalf I beg to give the statement in question a most unqualified contradiction.
MR. BLAKE: Perhaps the House will allow me to state that in the Question I asked of the Attorney General there was no mention of Lord De L'Isle and Dudley's name. It is rather inconvenient that the noble Lord should take this mode of clearing up an inaccuracy which appears in a newspaper report. I handed a copy of the Question to the hon. and learned Gentleman (the Attorney General) that he might be prepared to answer it.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE BATTLE OF ULUNDI.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ALDERMAN W. M'ARTHURasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he has received from the Aborigines Protection Society a letter calling his attention to a statement published in the special correspondence of the "Daily Telegraph," on August 4th, to the effect that, at the Battle of Ulundi, our Native Contingent despatched all the Zulu wounded who were found after the action; and, whether he intends to accede to the Society's request that he will make a searching inquiry into the truth of this statement?
  COLONEL STANLEY: I have received the letter in question, of which, I believe, an acknowledgment has been sent to the Society. But I have made a similar inquiry, at the instance partly of the Society, about similar reports which were made earlier in the Zulu campaign, and I called the general officer's attention to them, and directed that inquiries should be made. Therefore, I have not conceived it to be necessary, in respect of this particular occurrence, to give any fresh instructions, taking for granted that it was covered by the instructions previously given.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (OFFICERS) BILL.—QUESTIONS.
MR. CHILDERSwished to make an appeal to the House and the Chancellor of the Exchequer about this measure. Its passing this Session was of great importance, as it would result in the saving of several thousands a-year. But several clauses were most objectionable. What he asked was, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should
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withdraw the most objectionable clauses, and then that the Bill should be passed this afternoon, so as to receive the concurrence of the House of Lords.
MR. GREGORYasked, Whether the Government intended to proceed with the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts Amendment Bill?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, it would be hopeless to proceed with that Bill. There was no doubt that the Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Bill was a measure of great importance, being the outcome of two Select Committees and a Royal Commission, and that it involved a considerable economy. In order, therefore, to insure its passing, he was prepared to accept the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman, and omit from the Bill the clauses which made officers of the Supreme Court permanent Civil servants, and gave the Lord Chancellor the power to award pensions. He should move that all the Orders after the Bill should be postponed, thus taking the Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Bill before the Afghan debate, so that the Bill might be sent up in time to the Lords.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR— RUMOURED ADVANCE.

  NOTICE OF QUESTION.
  MR. WHITWELLgave Notice that to-morrow he would ask, Whether it was true that Sir Garnet Wolseley had ordered an advance beyond Zululand into the neighbouring territory, contrary to what was intimated to be the desire of the Government?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I can answer that Question now. I know nothing about it.

PARLIAMENT—PRIVILEGE—PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE—NOTE TAKING IN THE MEMBERS' SIDE GALLERY.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. CALLANrose to call attention to a matter with regard to which he wished to set himself right. He referred to a recent incident in the House, when attention was called to a gentleman who was sitting in one of the side Galleries making notes. A few days after the discussion his attention was called to a summary in The Times, in

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  which he was represented as having referred to a supposed indictment being drawn up against the Irish Members, with the assistance of the Chief Clerk. He did not make any such charge against the Chief Clerk; but he had said that there was a rumour that such an indictment was being prepared. He had received an assurance from the Chief Clerk—whom they all esteemed so highly for acting with perfect impartiality towards all Members of the House—that there was no truth in that rumour. Having made that statement, he begged to make the amende; and, on the part of those with whom he acted, to say that they, in common with the other Members of the House, entertained the highest respect for the Chief Clerk.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I believe I may say, on the part of the whole of the House, that we are glad to receive the observations which the hon. Member has just made; because we are all conscious of the great services which are performed by the officers at the Table, and especially by the Chief Clerk. I am quite sure that all who know him, and who see how he has conducted himself in his important position, feel that he would be incapable of acting as was alleged.

BLIND AND DEAF-MUTE CHILDREN (EDUCATION) BILL.—OBSERVATIONS.
MR. MONKrose to a point of Order. When the third reading of the Blind and Deaf-Mute Children (Education) Bill was called last night, attention was drawn to the fact that 40 Members were not present, and the House was counted out. That morning, however, he found that by some extraordinary means the Bill had found its way to the House of Lords, had been read a first time, and had that morning been circulated among the Peers. He had obtained two copies of the Bill, one of which he had handed to the Speaker, and the other he held in his hand. He wished to know whether, by this proceeding, the Privileges of the House had not been viclated?
MR. SPEAKER: In answer to the Question of the hon. Member, I can only say that the Bill in question was put for third reading yesterday, and that the House having been counted
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out, the Bill became a dropped Order. It is, therefore, quite impossible that this Bill can have been read a first time in the other House, because it had not yet been sent to the House of Lords. It has become a dropped Order.
MR. WHEELHOUSE, who had charge of the Bill, said, that he had not the slightest knowledge that the Bill had been circulated among the Peers, or had been taken to the House of Lords. What had happened was this. Yesterday afternoon, believing that the Bill would be read a third time, and following the example which had often been adopted before, and which, indeed, he believed to be necessary, he had asked a noble Earl to take charge of the Bill in the Upper House. This the noble Earl had consented to do; and in consequence of its being so late in the Session, and so that there might be no unnecessary delay in the progress of the Bill, was most probably the reason why it had been printed. Beyond that he personally knew nothing, though it was abundantly clear that the Bill could not yet have been read a first time in the other House. If any copies had been circulated he felt sure it must have been by some mistake; and, so far as he was concerned, he could only express his regret if he had accidentally done anything to contribute to it. No one who knew him would suppose that he would dream of doing anything which was not perfectly honourable and in accordance with the Rules and Privileges of the House.

AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS—THE ROYAL COMMISSION.—QUESTION.
MR. MORGAN LLOYDasked, with reference to the intended despatch of sub-Commissioners in connection with the Royal Commission on Agricultural Distress into Wales, Whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer will take care that the sub-Commissioners shall be acquainted with Welsh, the only language which the Welsh farmers can speak freely?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, the matter did not rest with him; but he would take care that the hon. and learned Gentleman's observations should be represented in the proper quarter.

ORDER OF THE DAY.
  PRIVILEGE (TOWER HIGH LEVEL BRIDGE (METROPOLIS) COMMITTEE) —MR. GRISSELL.

    REPORT OF THE SERJEANT AT ARMS.
    Report of the Serjeant at Arms considered.
    MR. SPEAKER: As there appears to be some misapprehension as to the powers of commitment exercised by this House, it is right that I should state that, although the prisoner in custody would be released immediately upon the Prorogation of Parliament, his offence would not be purged by his imprisonment. If in another Session this House shall determine that the prisoner has not undergone adequate punishment for his offence, he would be liable to further imprisonment at the pleasure of the House.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, after the information which you have communicated to the House, I think our course is tolerably clear. As but a few hours of the Session remain, it will be impossible this Session to deal with the principal offence with which Charles Grissell is charged. That, I think, must remain for a future decision, if in a future Session any proposal shall be made with regard to it. But the House has also to remember that he has been guilty of a second offence against the House, inasmuch as he has evaded, by his conduct, the execution of Mr. Speaker's Warrant for bringing him to the Bar of the House; and I think that the proper course for the House to take, under present circumstances, will be to agree to that which I am about to propose—namely—
    "That Charles Edmund Grissell, having evaded, until the close of the Session, the execution of Mr. Speaker's Warrant for taking him into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, be committed to Her Majesty's Gaol of Newgate; and that Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrants accordingly."
    That will only be an imprisonment for a few hours; but, still, it marks the sense of the House as to the conduct of this gentleman. I move that Resolution.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: It appears that, in the circumstances, there is scarcely any alternative but for us to take the course suggested by the
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    Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is certainly to be regretted that we should be driven to take this course, which is scarcely one conducive to the dignity of the proceedings of this House. It is, however, to a certain extent, satisfactory to learn that Mr. Grissell will not be purged of the offence he has committed by the short imprisonment he is about to undergo; but I cannot think that it is altogether a satisfactory or convenient course that we should be obliged to re-consider his case again at the beginning of a subsequent Session. There appears, however, to be no alternative course; and, therefore, I will give my cordial assent to the Motion.
    Motion agreed to.
    Ordered, That Charles Edmund Grissell, having evaded, until the close of the Session, the execution of Mr. Speaker's Warrant for taking him into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, be committed to Her Majesty's Gaol of Newgate; and that Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrants accordingly.—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)

MOTION.
  ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  Resolved, That the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Orders of the Days be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Afghan Treaty.—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
ORDER OF THE DAY
  SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (OFFICERS) BILL [Lords.]—BILL 235.]
  (Mr. Attorney General)
  SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (OFFICERS) BILL [Lords.]—BILL 235.]

    COMMITTEE. [Progress 13th August.]
    Bill considered in Committee.
    (In the Committee.)
    Clause 14 (Abolition of certain officers and continuance of others).
    MR. CHILDERS MR. CHILDERS moved the addition of the words, after the word salaries, "as the Lord Chancellor with the concurrence of the Treasury may determine."
    MR. MONKsaid, the Committee had had considerable discussion upon this point yesterday, and he believed the feeling was in favour of not giving an additional salary to the Senior Master who was to undertake the duty, and he could see no reason for the additional

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    salary; there would not be heavier duties to perform. It really was not the case that there would be only four Masters to perform the duties now performed by five. The truth was that the Courts of Queen's Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas, being amalgamated, the Masters of all would become Masters of the High Court of Justice; therefore, there would be 12 or 15 Masters, and under the section it would be within the power of the Lord Chancellor to recommend the appointment of an additional Master, should the duties become too heavy. He could not understand why the Senior Master, who, instead of performing his usual duties, was to perform the duties of Queen's Remembrancer, was to receive more than £1,500 a-year. To that he had a strong objection, and yesterday he quite understood it was not to be pressed. He felt compelled to take the sense of the Committee on this point.
    MR. CHILDERSappealed to the hon. Member not to do that, for the effect must be to stop the whole proceeding in Committee this Session.
    SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSONsaid, if the hon. Member insisted upon contesting the point it must have the effect of stopping the Bill, which time only admitted of being taken with general assent. The clause which they had passed had reference to the salaries; and the proposal now was, whether or not additional salaries should be regulated by the Treasury? These were the words before the Committee; it was the regulating words, not additional salaries, they were now deciding.
    MR. HOPWOODsaid, it was a mistake to say the clause, as regarded these salaries, had been passed by the Committee.
    MR. MORGAN LLOYDsaid, if this Amendment was accepted a few words might be added which would remove all difficulty. If the words were passed as they were printed in red then the Committee might add a Proviso, that the amount fixed by the Lord Chancellor and the Treasury should not exceed the salary now payable to the Queen's Remembrancer. If the Amendment was passed he should move the addition of the Proviso, and hoped it might meet with general concurrence.
    MR. ANDERSONsaid, the payment of salaries to the Queen's Remembrancer was the very point upon which the Com-
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    mittee broke down yesterday. He was opposed to this system of raising salaries. It would appear that lawyers, at a time when trade was bad and everyone, more orless, impoverished, thought they should continue to live in increasing prosperity and become richer as the rest of the community became poorer. It was agreed yesterday that it could not be shown that these duties were more responsible than those the same official discharged before, or that they took longer time, and as his whole time was already paid for there was no excuse for raising the salary. He certainly understood, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested the Amendment should be accepted, that it was not intended to press this increase of salary.
    MR. MONKdid not wish to delay the progress of the Bill, and if it would be more convenient to take a Division on Report as to the omission of the words after the word "office" he would do so; but, certainly, he must take a Division upon the point. The Bill, as his hon. Friend had said, was one to reduce expenses; but the clause granted an increase of salary to the oldest Master.
    MR. CHARLEYsaid, the person who held the office of Queen's Remembrancer received no salary at all under the Bill.
    MR. MONKsaid, under the Bill he would receive £1,500 a-year.
    MR. B. WILLIAMSwas glad there was a probability of the Bill passing into law, and he intended to give the Attorney General all the support in his power. As to the clause in reference to the salary of Queen's Remembrancer, it was a well-established rule that when additional duties were imposed on any man in any official appointment then an increase of pay should be given. It was on this principle, for instance, that increased payment was given to County Court Judges, when their judicial duties were increased. He thought it was important that members of the Profession, who were invited to accept the position of Senior Master, should be well paid, as they ought to be men whose position and experience demanded it.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he was afraid he must move to report Progress. He understood that, by general consent, the Bill was to pass through Committee; and he reminded hon. Members that Government were under an obligation to afford opportunity

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    for another discussion, and could not now consume the time. He must throw upon hon. Gentlemen opposite the responsibility of preventing the passage of a measure intended to produce a considerable saving in public expenditure.
    MR. CHILDERSmade a last appeal to the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) not to persist in his objection. The Bill would, undoubtedly, effect a great saving, and it was the outcome of careful inquiry by Committee. In giving this power to the Treasury not one shilling would be added to salaries unless they were deserved.
    MR. CHARLEYhoped that Progress would not be reported. It was absolutely necessary to pass the Bill. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act had amalgamated the Courts, and this Bill amalgamated the offices.
    MR. MONKsaid, of course, he did not wish to stand out against the appeals made. He had made his protest, and the responsibility of the increase of salary must rest with others.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Clause, as amended, agreed to.
    Clauses 15 to 23, inclusive, agreed to.
    Clauses 24 to 26, agreed to, with verbal Amendments.
    Clause 27 (Saving as to fees).
    MR. CHILDERSsaid, it was understood that next Session the Treasury would take up the question of fees, so that salaries might be substituted for them; but, for the present, it was thought advisable to leave the clause as it stood.
    SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSONundertook to deal with the matter, with the view of doing away with the system, to which he saw much objection—payment by fees as well as salary.
    MR. MONKsaid, he did not care whether the clause was struck out or amended in the sense of the Notice he had put upon the Paper; but he thought it was most undesirable, when a fixed salary was paid, and in some cases an increasing salary—increasing in such manner as the Lord Chancellor might recommend, with the subsequent sanction of the Treasury—it was most undesirable that the payment of fees to these officers should be continued. By
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    all means, if the salaries ought to be increased, let it be done; but these fees ought to be paid into Her Majesty's Exchequer. He felt sure the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not have given his sanction to this clause, and that he would consent to the spirit of the Amendment, if not to the omission of the clause. He Moved, in page 8, line 16, to leave out "affect any liability to," and insert "be construed to permit."
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERthought it impossible to accept the Amendment in the present position of affairs; but the Government would promise to look into the matter between this and next Session, and make some arrangement by which the system of payment by fees should be done away with.
    MR. HOPWOODsaid, unless the liability to pay foes was kept up, the persons who owed fees to the Exchequer would be released from their liability.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Clause agreed to.
    Clauses 28 and 29 agreed to.
    New Clause after Clause 17 (Salaried Officers of the Supreme Court).
    THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER)THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER) moved the addition to the clause of the words "shall be deemed to be permanent civil servants."
    MR. MORGAN LLOYDthought it was understood that the clause was to be left out. His objection to the clause was that it gave power to the Lord Chancellor to fix the amount of the salaries—a power which the House ought to retain in its own hands. He thought he must move the omission of the clause.
    MR. CHILDERSexplained, that every salary in the Public Service was first settled by the Treasury, and then the amount came before the House to be voted.
    MR. MORGAN LLOYDdid not wish to hinder the progress of the Bill; but he did think that the fixing of a maximum was necessary against the extraordinary power assumed by the Treasury.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Clause added to the Bill.
    THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER)THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER) moved the addition of a new clause, giving to the buildings erected under the Courts of Justice Building Act the name of "The Royal Courts of Justice."
    Clause agreed to, and added to the Bill.

    SCHEDULES.
    SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON moved the following Amendments:—
    Page 12, column 3, against Act 7 Will 4, and 1 Vic. c. 30, after "nine," insert "thirteen, fifteen, nineteen;" page 13, column 3, against Act 6 and 7 Vic. c. 20, after "Act," insert "except sections six and eleven;" page 14, column 3, against 15 and 16 Vic. c. 73, after "eleven," insert "twenty-six;" page 14, column 3, against 15 and 16 Vic. c. 87, after "sections one," leave out "to five and sections;" page 16, column 3, against 32 and 33 Vic. c. 91, leave out "section fourteen, and."
    Amendment agreed to.
    House resumed.
    Bill reported, as amended; Bill read the third time, and passed.

MOTION.
  AFGHANISTAN—THE TREATY.

    MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
    MR. GRANT DUFF: I rise, Sir, to call attention to the Treaty lately concluded with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and to endeavour to elicit from the Government some explanations with reference to that document. The Treaty contains 10 Articles, of which the 1st presents no features of special interest, and the 2nd only so far calls for remark as to oblige me to say in fairness that Lord Lytton has had the grace to do what another Governor General did not do—that is, to stipulate for the safety of those Natives who had assisted the British. Lord Ellenborough left his friends at Candahar to be destroyed—which was done in due course. The 3rd Article requires, however, more attention. It runs as follows:—
    "His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Ameer will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will
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    not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions, the British Government will support the Ameer against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished."
    Now, I want to know if I rightly understand that Article? Afghanistan marches not only with Khelat and Cashmere and Beluchistan, which are all within the Indian system, but with Kashgar, and Persia, and Bokhara, and the wandering Turkomans, and certain wild Tribes. Am I right in supposing that the Indian Government takes charge of the whole of the relations between Afghanistan and those States? If so, this Article opens a prospect of somewhat doubtful blessings. Within a very few years, if all Eastern experience is not to be falsified, we shall have a whole crop of new questions, and names will become familiar which are now known only to a few. Already those who interpret through the Press the views which are in favour at Simla tell us that we must turn Eastern Turkistan into an outwork of Cashmere, and assure us that we shall soon make better acquaintance with the "interesting inhabitants of Kaffiristan." I make no doubt of it, Sir, and, as a student of geography, I rejoice; but in the interests of the Indian taxpayer I had rather have deferred any close acquaintance with that attractive community. The House has a distinct right to a plain answer to a plain opiestion—Does this 3rd Article add to the already multifarious duties of the Indian Foreign Secretary the duty of keeping his eye on the relations between the Ameer of Afghanistan on the one hand, and Kashgar and Bokhara, and the Turkomans, and Persia, and Khelat, and Cashmere, and all and sundry the wild Tribes who do not acknowledge his Sovereignty—with the exception of those which, under a later Article, we take direct charge of—or, if this is not so, what does the 3rd Article mean? The 4th Article provides for the residence of a British Representative at Cabul, and for the deputing of British Agents to the Frontier, when external events

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    seem to call for it; while the 5th provides that these Agents shall not interfere with the internal administration of the Ameer's Dominions. The Treaty is silent as to the interference of the British Representative at Cabul. He may interfere as much as his Government thinks fit. And, indeed, we are obviously intended by the draftsman of the Treaty to interfere a good deal, for the 4th Article must be read along with the 10th, in which we agree to pay £60,000 a-year for the support of the Ameer "in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority." Now, that must refer to his support against internal enemies; for, so far as I know, no foreign aggression on the Ameer has taken place. That this is the view which is taken by some of the warmest friends of the Government will be apparent to anyone who reads the interesting article on the Afghan Treaty in Blackwood for July. There I find the following remarks:—
    "We have promised to support the Ameer against foreign aggression; but the Treaty makes no mention of aiding him against internal insurrection. That, however, goes without saying. A strong Administration and a peaceable country is the only basis on which the Government of India could safely manage the Ameer's foreign relations. And here the advantage of a British Resident in Cabul will be specially felt. His advice will assist the Ameer in introducing regular systems of justice and revenue into his Dominions. He will mediate between the pretensions of the semi-independent Chiefs and the rights of the Ameer's Sovereignty. He will use the influence of the Indian Government to counsel the Ameer to moderate measures when there is discontent among his subjects, and will strengthen his hands when it is necessary to use force to bring malcontents to a sense of their duty. The Treaty tacitly assumes that the Ameer will be guided in his administration by the counsel of the Resident; and as we are accordingly responsible for any evil consequences which may flow to him from following such advice, we are, of course, bound to assist him in making good his authority against all unlawful opposition on the part of his subjects. We may accordingly conclude that, though no support is specified in the Treaty, an obligation rests with the Government of India to protect Yakoob Khan against internal rebellion as well as foreign aggression, so long as he continues faithful to the spirit of the new alliance."
    Now, is that the view of Her Majesty's Government, or if not, what is its view? If the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says—"Yes, that is our view," good and well; we know for once what he means. If,
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    however, he says it is not, perhaps he will allow me to ask him, as we say in Scotland, to "condescend on particulars." In paragraph 43 of the despatch of the Viceroy in Council, it is said that the British Envoy at Cabul will be strictly required to abstain from interference in internal affairs, and, doubtless, there are many everyday affairs in which he will not interfere. On the other hand, however, there are affairs in which he will unquestionably interfere. It is certainly not meant to put him in the position of the British Resident in Nepaul. That would be quite out of the question. He will inevitably become either the guide of the Ameer, or the rallying point of the Ameer's enemies. Then remember the state of Afghanistan as described in this very despatch. I want to know what attitude Her Majesty's Government would take if Yakoob Khan were driven from Cabul, as so many of his family have been, by a successful pretender raising the standard of revolt? I want to know what it would do if the Northern and North-Western Provinces, or some of them did the same—a highly probable contingency? The right hon. Gentleman may say Alors comme alors. But that is not a fair answer to one who is asking what interpretation he is to put upon a Treaty to which the Government has committed the honour of England. No one can say that it is; but it would be fair ereven to give that answer than to point to the despatches and say—"We have declared against interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan." My case is that with a British Representative at Cabul right hon. Gentlemen, or their successors, will be led on to interfering by forces which cannot be resisted. Another claim made for the Treaty by the writer in Blackwood is that it is the nearest approach that has been made to Lord Wellesley's system of subsidiary alliances in the present generation of Eastern statesmen. This, he says, he conceives
    "To be a high compliment; for it was Lord Wellesley's policy which first laid the firm foundation of British empire in India and extended the aims of the Government in that country beyond the narrow groove to which the Court of Directors would fain have confined it."
    Now, I confess I quite agree with the writer. The Treaty, as I read it, means that, or means nothing. The Ameer of Afghanistan appears to me to be put by it precisely in the position of Holkar or

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    Scindia. He becomes a great vassal, nothing more. Perhaps, if this is not so, the right hon. Gentleman will explain what his position is. Is he an independent Prince? Surely not. There is nothing Lord Wellesley would have liked loss, by the way, than what has happened, for he wrote to Lord Ellen-borough—
    "Your Lordship, I am satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Cabul, with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Shoojah had bequeathed them as a peace-offering to England."
    In the despatch from the Secretary of State the stipulations about non-interference are called unambiguous. I have shown how some of the warmest friends of the Secretary of State interpret them. However anxious, I repeat, the present or any other Viceroy may be not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, he will not be able to help being dragged into doing so, if once we have a British Representative established at Cabul. It is vain to fight against the nature of things. Under the provision of the 9th Article of the Treaty we agree to restore all the territory which we now hold except Kurrum, Pisheen, and Sibi. I leave my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) to deal with the objections to holding Kurrum, as he has already put them forth very admirably in a pamphlet. But Sibi, what is the case for Sibi? Holding Sibi will not make it unnecessary to hold Dadur, which Dost Mahommed told Lord Auckland would be a good substitute for Gehenna. Against Pisheen all the same objections hold which held against Quetta. It is merely going one step further in a thoroughly mischievous policy—another illustration of the facilis decensus Averni. Speaking just two years ago, I said—
    "If there was any intention to permanently occupy Quetta, he must protest against that course in the strongest possible way. It was undesirable for several reasons. In the first place, it was a triumph given to the most aggressive school of Indian politicians. In the second place, it would be very expensive. In the third place, it would add seriously to the duties, already very considerable, of our not too large Army. In the fourth place, what would be the advantage of 1,000 men in Quetta? Why, none whatever; for in the case of troubles arising we should only lay ourselves open to insult. If the occupation was to be permanent, they would have to increase that Force, and might have to send reinforcements across some of the very worst country in the East at the season of
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    the year least adapted to European constitutions, as it was not likely that our enemies would choose the most favourable time for us to raise a disturbance. In the fifth place, as implying virtual annexation, it could not be agreeable to Khelat. In the sixth place, it excited the jealousies of the Afghans, and would increase the difficulties we already experienced with Afghanistan; and, lastly, it exposed the Viceroy to have his hands forced by the extreme party who, the first time that Russia made any forward move in Central Asia in the direction of Merv, would assuredly clamour for advance to Kandahar and ultimately to Herat, and we should not be allowed to stop at Quetta. They would urge the Government of India to go in for the whole Rawlinsonian policy, before which it faltered."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxvi. 691–2.]
    I wish to call the attention of hon. Members to those words, "the whole Rawlinsonian policy;" they will see the importance of them before I have done. I wish, too, to point out that I would have nothing to say against occupying either Quetta, or Pisheen, or Candahar, if all North-Western Asia were filled up by a State which stood to our Indian Empire in the relation that the Macedon of Alexander the Great stood to the Empire of Darius. But that is not the case nor likely to be. What did the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer reply to me? He replied as follows:—
    "As to the occupation of Quettah, if we are to regard that advance from a military point of view—a step in the nature of taking up a certain position to defend ourselves against an apprehended attack—then I should maintain the opinion that it would be a false move; but if our relations with the Government of Khelat are of such a character as to demand that we should take certain steps to improve and regulate those relations—if it is thought right and desirable that we should send an Envoy there, and that the Envoy should be accompanied by a sufficient escort to secure him an honourable reception, I do not see that such a course can be open to objection, or can be liable to the construction that in taking such a step Her Majesty's Government are doing anything that is inconsistent with the policy that has hitherto been pursued—the policy originated by Lord Northbrook, approved by my noble Friend Lord Salisbury, and continued by the present Viceroy, Lord Lytton. I gather from the language of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) and the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) that they are not dissatisfied with the explanations of my noble Friend, if they could only feel sure that there was not something behind. They refer to some expressions used by my noble Friend, Lord Lytton, in which he speaks of the desirability of considering our Frontier policy as a whole, and treating it from an Imperial point of view, and they seem to assume that that policy is going to change its character, and pass from a policy

    1001
    of inactivity into one of activity. I do not admit that that is a fair construction of the language of my noble Friend's despatch."—[Ibid. 720.]
    Then we shall be told that Kurrum, Sibi, and Pisheen are not annexed, they are only assigned—"Convey, the wise it call;" but Her Majesty's Government likes the word "assigned," and we will not quarrel about a word. I want to be informed, however, what "assigned" territory we have given back? It looks to me as if the word "assigned" had been used merely to evade the declarations against annexation in the Queen's Proclamation. Are not these assigned districts going to be another Cyprus, and shall we not have the same sort of questions about them if anyone cares to raise them? Under the provision of the same 9th Article we also retain the control of the Khyber and the Michnee Passes. Well, I can understand that the Government may reasonably expect some advantage from doing that; but one may buy gold too dear. Would it not have been better, if there was any question of our being attacked through the Khyber or Michnee Passes—a most violently improbable contingency—to have obtained possession of them as we did the other day? And, with regard to both Passes, I should like to know what advantage the Government expects to gain from holding them, at all commensurate with the expense and the increased invaliding which will result? Why, if we are really afraid of having to meet an invader coming through these Passes, would it not have sufficed to have strengthened the small forts at the mouth of them, and sealed them in that way? We could have seized Ali Musjid at any time. If it was necessary to do more, surely it was necessary to get up to a country over which our troops could communicate, without going back within our old Frontier. We have pushed beyond our old Frontier, but we have not reached a new Frontier. The three assigned districts and the Passes we hold are all isolated. They are assuredly not scientific. They are not even a Frontier. The military objections urged by General Hamley to what we have done in the Northern part of the Suleiman range are overwhelming. Another claim which the advocates of the Treaty make is, that it "relieves
    1002
    the Ameer of the entire responsibility of the troublesome Pathan country between India and Afghanistan proper." Doubtless, it relieves the Ameer not of the "entire responsibility," but of a considerable portion of it. But at whose expense does it do this? Why, at our expense! The idea probably was, that the Ameer, relieved of the obligation of looking after some of his troublesome neighbours in the East, would have more leisure to consolidate his power in the North—in the Provinces of Afghan-Turkistan. To act on that idea, however, was to engage in very telescopic politics. Who can say that the new Ameer, relieved of anxieties on the East, may not devote his leisure rather to the West than to the North—may pick quarrels with Persia rather than conciliate Afghan-Turkistan? We undertake a real and increasing burden upon a mere hypothesis—not to say on a mere fancy. Even Sir Henry Rawlinson admits that our new Frontier must bring us into contact with a large mountaineer population, comprising some of the wildest and most unruly Clans in the country. Well may he add, after giving a list of the barbarians whom we must now either fight or bribe, and warmly approving the policy which has brought us into relation with them—"Altogether, I do not pretend to look on the new Frontier arrangements as economical." I should think not. These are the principal questions which it occurs to me to ask about the Treaty; but there are other important questions which are not directly raised by anything within the four corners of that Paper. As, for example: I think we have a right to know what the war has cost in men killed, or dead of disease, or invalided, in money, and in beasts of burden; whether it is intended to reduce the Native Army to the proportion which it had before the war was thought of, or if not, what increased expense its larger numbers will throw on the Revenues of India? Then, we ought to be told what force it is intended to employ in holding our new acquisition, and in keeping open the Passes; whether it is intended to construct works for their protection, and, if so, at what approximate cost; and, generally, as the lawyers say, what has it all been about? The right hon. Gentleman took very good care not to tell us in December

    1003
    what were the objects of the war. It was a wise precaution; but now that the war is over, I ask him to tell the House of Commons what he wishes it to be supposed the objects were. The first object of the war, as defined in the 8th paragraph of the despatch of the 7th of July from the Viceroy in Council, was the exclusion of all foreign influence from Afghanistan. Have we succeeded? Sir Henry Rawlinson says that we must not relax our vigilance for a moment. The second was—
    "Such a rectification of the Frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that State."
    This war has proved that British influence could not be excluded—has proved, in fact, that the war itself was at the best a costly superfluity. Two aids to the understanding of anything the right hon. Gentleman may tell us, in addition to the Blackwood article, are at hand, and I may point them out. The one is the book by Dr. Bellew, who was one of the most important persons behind the scenes in all this Frontier policy; and the other is the article of Sir Henry Rawlinson in The Nineteenth Century for August. From the following passage will be seen what Dr. Bellew, writing in the middle of the war, thought his masters in India would like him to say:—
    "How and where the war now begun is destined to terminate time will show. But it will be our own fault if, with the opportunity now before us, we do not settle the question of our Indian Frontier in this direction once and for all. It behoves us to remember, and the fact requires to be impressed on our minds, that in our invasion of Afghanistan now it is not the Ameer of Cabul we have to deal with alone, but with the fate and disposal of the entire territory over which we have recognized his rule, and which we have made for him what it is. We have now, on entering Afghanistan, to provide not only for its internal security and order, but we have also to provide for the safety of its frontiers against external aggression and intrigue. And the only way in which these objects of vital importance to the success of our enterprise, and of lasting benefit to the Empire, can be attained with any prospect of a satisfactory and stable result, is by our taking their arrangement, execution, and control directly into our own hands. With British garrisons at Cabul, Candahar, Herat, and Balkh, for which the existing Army of India, with but slight increment, is amply sufficient in ordinary times, Afghanistan will be pacified, and Russia, in the direction of Persia and Bokhara, be deprived of an object of ambition and field of intrigue."
    1004
    Dr. Bellew thinks that all this could be done at a very moderate cost. Another, and a far higher military authority, Sir Henry Norman, has said that it would cost £3,000,000 a-year and require 30,000 men to hold a far less expanse of Afghan country, the article of Sir Henry Rawlinson in The Nineteenth Century is, I need not say, of the very first importance, for not only is Sir Henry Rawlinson an extremely able man, but he is in all these matters not merely the inspirer, but virtually the lord and master of the Government, the Party opposed to his views in the Indian Council having been utterly rejected and put outside. Anybody who knows the A B C of what has occurred since Lord Northbrook left India, knows that Sir Henry Rawlinson has most skilfully used, for his own far-reaching views, the desire of the Government to make a little political capital by what they foolishly thought would be a perfectly easy and cheap triumph over the non-showy and pacific policy of the Liberal Party, though, indeed, it was the policy of all Governments since the old Afghan War. What, then, does he say? He says this, amongst other things—
    "An argument has been brought forward in influential quarters that the Afghan settlement must be held to have dissipated all danger; that alarms at the advance of Russia are now vain alarms; that even if Merv were taken, and Russia and Persia combined threatened the Afghan Border, the British-Indian Government, secure in Yakoob Khan's fidelity, and in his maintenance of the Frontier fortresses of Herat and Mymeneh especially, might laugh at the machinations of its enemies and defy their efforts to annoy us. There is much of fallacy, I believe, in this argument. The Afghan settlement is a very good settlement, as far as it goes; but it is not immaculate, it is not complete. To yield to us its full measure of defence, the Treaty must be supplemented by all legitimate precautions and supports. Persia must be detached from Russia, coûte que coûte. Russia herself must not be left in any uncertainty as to our intentions. She must be made to understand, while there is yet time for her to modify her aggressive preparations, that she will not be permitted unopposed to establish herself in strength upon the Afghan Frontier, either at Merv, or at Serakhs, or even at Abiverd, nor to re-commence intrigues against the British power in India. She might, indeed, be warned that, if necessary, we were prepared in self-defence to support the Turkomans—with whom she has no legitimate quarrel—with arms and money, or even to turn the tables on her by encouraging the efforts of the Uzbegs to recover their liberty."

    1005
    Now, the first remark that occurs to me is this—The Russians, forsooth, are not to be permitted to establish themselves at Merv, or Serakhs, or even at Abiverd. Examine all the books of all the writers on International Law. In which will you find authority for so astounding a demand? And, observe, this is not the opinion merely of a private person. It is the opinion, signed with his name, of a man who, for all matters connected with Central Asian politics, is virtually a Member of the Cabinet, for he is the most influential Adviser of the Cabinet behind the scenes. And the Russian Government is sufficiently well-informed to know that he is speaking what, it is to be feared, will soon be the views of Her Majesty's Government. What have we to do with any one of these places? If this war had never occurred, a skilful and judicious Ambassador at St. Petersburg would, I doubt not, have succeeded in preventing the Russians coming to Merv for many a long day, not because we had any rights in Merv, but because he would have been able to show various good reasons against it, besides the fact that, to use the happy phrase of the Duke of Argyll, there were many Mervous persons both in England and India, and because it would probably lead to difficulties with the Afghans. But now, after this Afghan War, what shadow of a moral, to say nothing of a legal, right have we to object to the Russians going to Merv, when it suits them to do so? Is, then, the net result of the expenditure of a sum which it is admitted will amount to nearer £3,000,000 than £2,000,000, but which will assuredly, before all bills, directly and indirectly chargeable to the war, are paid, amount to more—of a considerable expenditure of human life, chiefly in the saddest and most inglorious way, through disease, and a quite hideous amount of animal suffering—this, and merely this, that the able man whose skilful piping has been the only interesting feature in the foolish dance that has been performed on the North-West Frontier can write in such a way, can tell us, in effect, that we are just as little able now to turn our attention away from the Frontier as we were before Lord Lytton went to India; that we must be ready at any moment to undertake obligations which will make this country responsible for the defence of
    1006
    all Asia, from the last outposts on the Assam Frontier to the Bosphorus, for that, and nothing less than that, is what it comes to? I say that Imperial dreams of that kind are well enough as a matter of pleasurable excitement; but that to attempt to carry them into effect is to strain the resources both of England and India to an intolerable extent; and the worst of it is that it is very doubtful whether we can draw back immediately—it will be too late to do so—and the most pacific statesmen now alive may be compelled at least to annex the whole of Afghanistan as a consequence of the fatal policy on which the present Government entered when they first began to make and meddle on the North-West Frontier. It is the cue of the right hon. Gentleman to discredit any predictions we may make about the future, by saying that we expected the conquest of Afghanistan to involve very extensive warlike operations. We did nothing of the kind. I myself, so far from doing so, asserted long before there was any question of war that "if we thought a warlike policy a right or wise one, we could occupy all Afghanistan, and hold it with the greatest ease. But what good would or could come to us from so doing—from annexing new expenses and responsibilities without any new advantage?" That is what we have said all along, and what we say now. We shall see whether our predictions are not as exactly and literally fulfilled in the future as they have been in the past. Hon. Gentlemen opposite thought the Ameer would yield without a war; we thought he would not do so. Hon. Gentlemen thought that there would be no annexation; there has been annexation. Hon. Gentlemen thought that they would, when once a satisfactory Treaty was made with Afghanistan, be able to forget that they ever had feared Russia; Sir Henry Rawlinson, their guide, philosopher, and friend, has now told them what they are to think upon that subject. I had hoped that the Viceroy's despatch might put the policy in a new light; but this is not so. The despatch is written with great ability, as how should it not be? Never since India was India has a Ruler who wrote so well himself had a Foreign Secretary who was at once a great poet and a great essayist. Still, the united genius of Lord Lytton and Mr. Lyall has not suc-

    1007
    ceeded in furnishing one now argument or illustration. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be more fortunate; I fear not, however. I think I can guess what will happen. He will rise before the debate closes, and with that Nathaniel manner of his, will deny Dr. Bellew, the oracle of the Viceroy; will deny Sir Henry Rawlinson, the oracle of Lord Cranbrook; will deny the Blackwood writer, who addresses the forward section of the Party. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite would deny everything in earth or heaven, except, perhaps, since the Mansion House speech of the Prime Minister, the divine inspiration of the English land system. It will not do, however, this plan of winking hard at agents while they write one thing for one section, and another for another section of the public, while yet another and different account is given in Parliament. We may say to right hon. Gentlemen what was said elsewhere to some of their Colleagues—"You are beginning to be found out." The Afghan War, for which they have taken so much credit, will have to find its place with its brother impostures—the imposture of Cyprus, the imposture of Asia Minor, the imposture of the Balkan fortresses. The right hon. Gentleman may do his best, but he will not persuade the country, as assuredly he will not persuade himself, that it has not, at considerable expense, made us a little weaker in our hold in India, by enlarging our responsibilities; and a little weaker against Russia, by bringing us nearer the region where she, in the nature of things, must grow stronger; and further from our true strength—the sea. That is what has come of timorous fussiness assuming the garb of courage, and of neglecting the maxim which I long ago repeated in this House as perfectly applicable to our situation on the North-West Frontier of India—"Let him attack who will; the strong man waits." The hon. Gentleman concluded with his Motion for Papers.
    SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, in seconding the Motion, reminded the House that he had a Motion on the Paper connected with this subject. The real and the serious difficulties of our situation had now arisen after the war. It would not be necessary for him to address the House at any length, because he had taken the trouble to put his views into
    1008
    the shape of a pamphlet, which he had had the honour of sending to most Members of the House who, he thought, were interested in the matter. He expressed his disappointment at the despatch from the Viceroy of India which had been laid on the Table. That despatch was a mere glorification of the past addressed to the British public, and an attempt to put the best face on what had been done. It did not deal with the real difficulties of the question of the Frontier in a military or scientific point of view. He had heard with regret that, in order to cut down the expenses of the war, the Government proposed to take a narrow, technical, and very inequitable view of the claims of those who had supplied them with the means of carriage on account of the enormous number of camels which had been lost in the campaign. As had been expected, they had had a triumph at the beginning of the second Afghan War, as they had at the beginning of the first Afghan War; but he submitted that the Government were not entitled to speak as those who put their armour off, when, in fact, their real difficulties were only commencing, and had yet to come. It was right and proper that the Government, the House, and the country should prepare to look those difficulties in the face. He would not criticize the Treaty made with Yakoob Khan in detail; but, broadly speaking, his objection to that Treaty was not so much as to its terms as to the difficulty of executing it, and the danger that attended its execution. It was extremely uncertain whether the Treaty would ever be executed at all. Yakoob Khan's interest was, perhaps, now much bound up with ours; but even supposing he was anxious to fulfil the Treaty, the real difficulty was as to his ability to do it. Yakoob Khan might be the Ruler of Cabul; but he was now in no sense the Ruler of Afghanistan, although he might hope to become so some day by our support and influence. It was just possible he might show himself to be superior to any Ruler that ever existed in Afghanistan, and might carry out the Treaty; but, according to all experience and all history, the chances were violently against such a happy consummation. As regarded the people of Afghanistan, they were most independent, and little likely to surrender their inde-

    1009
    pendence; and yet those were the people whom we hoped to bring under our rule. The Afghans were the same people as in Elphinstone's time; and it was almost impossible that they could be reconciled to us, and he looked forward to fresh complications and to further bloodshed in maintaining our rule. He pointed out that there were territories over which Afghanistan had a very weak control, and that it might be many years before the Ameer had established his power over those territories. He also reminded the House that one man who they had described as a Pretender was not to be looked upon in that light, because he was the son of a preceding Ruler, and might be considered as the legitimate successor. With regard to the neutral zone that existed between Afghanistan and the Russian Dominions, it would be to the general advantage if the latter Power could bring the unruly Turkoman Tribes that inhabited it into subjection. It was an error to suppose that Merv was to be regarded as the gate of India or of Afghanistan, from which it was separated by a great and difficult mountain range. As to the "scientific Frontier," about which so much had been said, he would like to know who were the competent men who were ready to support it? He believed there were none such; but that, on the contrary, there was high military authority for the belief that the new Frontier had landed us in very difficult country and among Tribes we should find it very hard indeed to deal with. His conviction was that it was the most unscientific Frontier it was possible to conceive, and entirely opposed to every military principle. He had prepared a little sketch, which he ventured to show the House as exhibiting the character of the Frontier. As he had not been brought up in the clays of science classes, he feared it was rather a rough piece of work; but from it hon. Members would see the position of the old Indus Frontier and the position of the new Frontier, which had involved us in these multiplied dangers. He contended that we had possessed ourselves of a long and unmanageable Frontier, intersected by three difficult Passes, between which no communication was possible. It was this absence of all lateral communication between the Passes which, in the opinion of the most eminent authorities, occa-
    1010
    sioned its chief difficulty. He had been told that communication was possible from peak to peak by means of the heliograph. But that was a small advantage. The opportunity of physical communication for troops was what they required. Another difficulty was the character of the people who inhabited this region. He could not speak of them from personal experience, because he had never seen the country, and he hoped he never should. But he might refer to the authority of Dr. Bellew, whose knowledge of the locality was greater than that of any other man. According to Dr. Bellew, we had taken possession of a cul-de-sac in the hills, whore we ran the risk of being hemmed in by our foes and cut off from our communications. In return for all these disadvantages we had gained absolutely nothing. A rectification of the Frontier meant, according to Dr. Bellew, the complete conquest of the tribes of Afghanistan. Our present position was one of the most difficult that could be conceived. It would not be possible to stop where we were, and the reduction of the Afghan Tribes would be a very stiff job indeed. They would fight in their fastnesses as they had never fought before. We were drawn into more immediate contact with the celebrated sect of the Afridis, whose prowess had been famous for centuries. Lord Cranbrook, in one of his despatches, had spoken of the success which had attended the management of what had been our Frontier hitherto; but such language was little better than a farce. The humiliations experienced in connection with that Frontier were the very reasons which were urged as a justification for its extension. We were now under the necessity of increasing our Frontier forces. It was a hornets' nest with which we had to deal, and we had invaded it and stirred up the hornets. The disturbances on the Frontier were such that, so far from withdrawing our garrisons, we had had to increase them. He could point to several expressions of opinion in the Indian Press which showed the unsettled state of the Frontier, and the fact that peace with Afghanistan did not necessarily mean peace with the Border Tribes. The Governor General of India, in a despatch that was among the Papers recently presented to Parliament, said that we should soon

    1011
    resume our payment and control of the Tribes; but, probably, it would be necessary to pay them long before we acquired any real control over them. With regard to the occupation of Quetta, he had never been wholly hostile to it, but had only hoped that the forward movement might be delayed as long as possible. There was, no doubt, great military authority in favour of the occupation of Quetta from a military point of view; but if we held that advanced post, it was conceded that we should inevitably incur a great expense in making a railway from the Indus to the mouth of the Bolan Pass. It would, however, be better to do so at once than, by deferring it, to make our Frontier inefficient. If the advanced post at Peshin was to be maintained, the Government ought to come forward and state the necessity of spending money on it. But supposing that done, then, being able to dominate Ghuzni and Cabul on one side, and Candahar and Herat on the other, it would be quite unnecessary for us to occupy the most regretable political position that would bring us into contact with all the Tribes in the neighbourhood. Had we been content to occupy Peshin, and to hold the Khyber Pass, our position would have been much better; but we had committed ourselves to a most expensive Frontier, and would probably be compelled to advance still further. As things were, we could not stop, and would have to incur yet greater military expense. In fact, an expression used by the Governor General himself had made it clear that he knew that the Frontier now occupied was not a scientific Frontier, and that we had taken up our position with a view to a further advance. His words were that the advantage of our position was that we could advance upon Cabul and Ghuzni whenever we chose to do so. But now that the Viceroy had occupied a position from which he could punish his enemies and protect his friends, it seemed to him that Afghanistan was only a protected and subsidized Kingdom, and that Yakoob Khan was no more than a Shah Soojah over again. In his opinion, no greater mistake could be made, and the Ruler of Afghanistan ought to have a certain independence of his own. As for the desirability of dominating Cabul and Ghuzni, they had to consider that
    1012
    the Passes leading from the Kurrum Valley were from 11,000 to 12,000 feet high, and that the idea of constant access through such Passes was a mistake and a delusion. The great misfortune of our present position was that we should not only dominate Cabul, but that we should be involved in all the petty wars of Afghanistan, and, in all probability, we could not stop without a great extension of our liabilities and expenses.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, Copies of any Despatches that may have reached the Secretary of State for India, with reference to the concentration of Troops in the Punjaub in 1876 and 1877."—(Mr. Grant Duff.)
    MR. E. STANHOPEconfessed that when he had heard the hon. Member express a desire to bring on a discussion on the subject he had had some little hope that in the dying days of the Session they were going to hear from him something like a death-bed repentance, and after the prophecies of the hon. Member had been so completely falsified he had expected to hear some admission of the fact. He feared, however, that the political opinions of the hon. Member were such that they could not change, no matter how much circumstances might alter. The hon. Member did not seem to think there was much in the fact of a Russian Embassy occupying Cabul, or of Russia dominating Afghanistan, or that those circumstances ought to make any difference whatever in our relations with the Ameer. Her Majesty's Government had acted on a totally different principle. He would ask the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs what was the object of the speech he had made? He supposed, in the first place, that the hon. Gentleman supposed he would damage Her Majesty's Government; but he could not think the hon. Gentleman had succeeded. But had the hon. Gentleman ever thought what the effect of his speech might be upon our relations with Afghanistan? We were now engaged in endeavouring to establish friendly relations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, and, at a time when the Ameer was endeavouring to meet them in every possible way, was it to be suggested to him by a Member of

    1013
    the House, who spoke with some authority, that we really were endeavouring to slip through the clauses of the Treaty, and that, whatever was said to the contrary, our real intention was to interfere with the internal administration of the country, and permanently to annex parts of his territory. All these things were very mischievous. It was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to carry out the spirit of the Treaty as well as its letter; and, so far as the Ameer was concerned, if his personal influence prevailed, he (Mr. E. Stanhope) believed the Treaty would be faithfully carried out. He had been asked what was the cost of the war, and he could only refer hon. Members to the speeches he had made in the House on several occasions. He had no reason whatever for supposing that the Estimate he had given would be exceeded, nor had he any other statement to make on the subject. Then, as regarded the future expenditure that would result from our obligations, he could not deny that the altered state of things would cost some money. We must make roads, and improve our communications on the North-West Frontier. We must, undoubtedly, maintain part of our Army at stations more advanced than they had hitherto been; but whether that would involve greater expenditure was a question which he did not desire to enter into now. Hon. Members were aware that a Commission was sitting at the present time in India to inquire into the whole subject of the distribution of our Army in British India. He thought the House would be satisfied to wait until their recommendations were received before he gave any opinion as to what the cost of the new arrangements would be. He was asked what was the object of the policy that had been pursued? That was summed up in a despatch from the Government of India as follows:—Firstly, the exclusion of all foreign influence from Afghanistan; and, secondly, such a rectification of our Afghan Frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that State. He would venture to say that both those objects had been, to a very material extent, attained at a comparatively small cost and a very moderate loss of life. Sir Henry Rawlinson had been quoted in the debate as a very great authority, and as having
    1014
    suggested the policy of the Government. That gentleman had not yet become a Member of the Cabinet; but no one could doubt that his opinion on any question with which he was acquainted was entitled to very great weight. And what did he say? He had said of the Treaty that—"On the satisfactory nature of the general principles involved in the Treaty there cannot be two opinions." But he added that the Treaty required to be supplemented, and by what? By keeping a strong position on the Frontier, ready for any emergency that might arise. He came next to the Treaty itself. The hon. Member for Elgin had called attention to the 3rd clause, by which they had obtained absolute control over the foreign policy of Afghanistan. The hon. Member had asked what that meant. That was fully explained in the despatch from India, in which the Governor General had said that—
    "The Ameer undertook to conduct his relations with foreign Powers in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government."
    Then the hon. Member had called attention to the clause by which they were entitled to place a British Resident at Cabul. He supposed that no one would revert to the dangers and the difficulty of placing an Envoy there that had been mentioned in December, for all those prognostications had been contradicted by subsequent facts. The Ameer had accepted a Resident, and had fixed his place of residence at Cabul, contrary to the expectations expressed at the time. Major Cavagnari, whose ready tact and growing friendship with the Ameer marked him as specially qualified, had been appointed to the post. He was received with every demonstration of cordiality, and was able to go about the city with perfect freedom, and found that he was well received not only by the Ameer but by the people. He could not agree with the hon. Member that the effect of the clause was to make a mere puppet of Yakoob Khan; nor could it be maintained that they had ever attempted or desired to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The utmost care had been taken to make Major Cavagnari not a Resident, such as we sent to feudatory Princes, but an Envoy; and particular care had been taken on that

    1015
    point, both in the Treaty itself and in the instructions which had been given to him. And if Article V. of the Treaty was not sufficiently clear, he would ask the House to consider for a moment what the Government of India said upon this matter at paragraph 43 of their despatch—namely, that they in no wise contemplated any system of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that the British Envoy at Cabul would be strictly required to abstain from such interference, and they added that they hoped that the small subsidy would strengthen the hands of the Ameer in maintaining his authority. The territorial arrangements were very simple. In the first place, they restored Jellalabad and Candahar to the Ameer, a provision which had given great satisfaction to the Ameer, and had proved to him and to his people, as well as to our own subjects in India, that our desire was not to annex any portion of Afghanistan. He next came to the alterations in our Frontier. He would not enter into the questions connected with the old Frontier, for they had been discussed over and over again. It had often been said that the old Frontier had one very great advantage—namely, that it enabled us to avoid entanglement with the Hill Tribes. But did it do so? During 20 years we had had to undertake 19 expeditions against those Tribes, and we had employed in those expeditions 68,000 men; and we had also been engaged in many conflicts of a less serious character with the Hill Tribes; and while we had to encounter the very greatest difficulties when attacking them, they were able to attack us with corresponding ease. Well, we had now obtained a new Frontier. In arranging it the Government had to bear in mind not only the military considerations, to which so much prominence had been given, but the grave political requirements, the sanitary necessities, and the financial requirements of the case. With these considerations in their thoughts, and after taking the best advice at their disposal, the Government had determined upon the occupation of carefully-selected positions, which they believed would give them a strong Frontier, secure them the command of the routes into Afghanistan, and close those routes completely against anyone who should desire to enter them in a hostile
    1016
    spirit. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs objected to our occupying Quetta. Well, they knew quite well what the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala, and of many other eminent men was with regard to the occupation of Quetta. Instead of our occupation of Quetta being distasteful to the Ameer, it was quite approved by him, because he found after the commencement of our occupation that the impediments to the progress of commerce through the Bolan Pass were removed. What did General Hamley say in reference to our occupation of Quetta—
    "By occupying Quetta we practically close all passes to the Indus Valley which issue south of Dera Ismail Khan. Strategically, then, I hope, there remains no doubt of the immense advantage of holding Quetta, whether as a means of controlling Afghanistan, or of meeting such a formidable combination of enemies as I have contemplated."
    He was sure that any Frontier they could have selected might have been equally criticized; but he believed the House would accept, and that the country would approve, of that which had been chosen as one determined upon after very careful consideration, and in accordance with the advice of the best military authorities. Then the hon. Member said—"There is no use in what you have done, because you have no lateral communication." Well, as a matter of fact, we had at present excellent lateral communication along our base, from which our reinforcements and supplies would certainly have to be drawn. It was also urged as an objection that we could not pacify the Hill Tribes. But had we ever tried to pacify them? Up to the present, our relations with the Tribes had consisted in raids upon the one side, and in burning villages upon the other. Our officers were never allowed to enter the Passes except for warlike purposes. He could not help thinking that in the altered condition of circumstances now we might hope for far better relations than those which he had just described, and he could not help deriving the greatest encouragement in this matter from observing the alteration which had taken place of recent years in the demeanour of the Tribes in the Bolan Pass. If he might do so, he should like to refer to some words of General Hamley, who said, in a lecture delivered last year—

    1017
    "When, in the former war, our Forces moved on Candahar, the Tribes of the South were no loss hostile and mischievous to us than those of the North, and every march from the Bolan to the Kojak was marked by their depredations on our trains, by the slaughter of their conductors, by the murder of stray soldiers and numbers of defenceless camp followers. But a few years afterwards they were rendered thoroughly peaceable and friendly by vigorous handling and judicious management. At least one distinguished officer who took a leading part in the process still lives to tell us what the process was. It might be worth trying on other parts of the Frontier. However that may be, the result for us—and one well worth taking into account—is that, to all appearance, our trains march as safely now from the Indus to the Kojak as from London to Aldershot."
    This testimony, he thought, was most encouraging to us in our dealings with the Hill Tribes. The Government believed that they had taken the most important step that had been taken for a very long time towards humanizing and civilizing these Tribes. They were about to establish a Commercial Treaty with Afghanistan, and he believed very strongly in the civilizing influence of commercial relations. If we succeeded in making other Passes anything like as secure as the Bolan Pass, we should encourage an enormous trade from Central Asia, a change that would have a greater civilizing influence than anything else that might be done. He did not, in fact, despair of a time when many of the Tribes to whom he had referred would be attached to us, instead of being our enemies, and when they would become as a quickset hedge to keep out not us, but our enemies. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs said that one result of the Treaty with the Ameer was to provoke Russia to make a fresh advance upon Merv. But this advance had been going on ever since 1872 or 1873. Even this year, long before the Treaty, four columns of Russians were advancing against the Turkomans, and in the direction of Merv. And the Government of this country would be able to contemplate the process with very different eyes now that our Frontier was so very much more secure. It should also be remembered that we had recently received the most solemn promises from Russia that it was not her intention to advance so far as Merv. But, after all, what was the general effect of the Treaty? Had it alienated the Ameer from us? Far from it, for the Ameer was now on the
    1018
    most friendly terms with us, and accepted the Treaty in the most cordial spirit. Had it alienated the people of Afghanistan? The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) had said—
    "You have inspired the people of that country with such a hatred towards you, that all the ground you fail to occupy will be the fortress of your foes."
    The result had, however, gone to show—and the occupation of Candahar, undertaken for temporary purposes, afforded strong proof of it—that the people of Afghanistan, as a whole, had no unfriendly feelings towards us. The policy lately pursued had gained for this country a friendly, an independent, and a strong Afghanistan. British influence was paramount in that country; our Frontier was secure to a degree which had never before existed—at any rate, for many years past—and the Government were proud—as the country, in his opinion, would be proud—of the great results which had been accomplished mainly owing to the patient foresight and perseverance of Lord Lytton—results which it would not be possible for any politician, either in or out of the House, to minimize. Yet that policy had been attacked with a violence and a personality which, he was happy to say, was rare in the annals of political warfare. The Government believed that the result of that policy would be to maintain and strengthen our Indian Empire, and they would await without fear the verdict of the country.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Although it is impossible at this period of the Session to have anything like a complete or exhaustive debate on this question, I think the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs was perfectly justified in submitting the Treaty into which we have just entered to some examination. The policy of the Cabinet must be necessarily so influenced by the opinion of Parliament and the country, that it is extremely desirable that every possible means should be adopted to enable Parliament and the country to form a just opinion upon an important question of Indian policy such as this. I cannot think that the recent despatches sent by the Indian to the Home Government have afforded sufficient materials on which to form a correct opinion as to the nature of this

    1019
    policy. The House will recollect that in a famous despatch of Lord Cranbrook in November last the Secretary of State professed to give an account of the transactions which led to the breaking out of the war which has just been concluded; but in the course of the debates which occurred in the winter Session, I think it was shown that the despatch was more in the nature of an advocate's address than a historic summary of events which had taken place; and it was shown, also, that a good many of the inferences contained in the document were without foundation. As to the despatches which have been recently presented, I must say that those despatches—principally those of the Indian Government on the 7th July, and the Secretary of State on the 7th August—read less like State Papers of historical value than like a sort of antistrophic ode in which the British and Indian Governments, in alternate verses, sing the greatness, the magnanimity, the success, and the moderation of the deeds which have been achieved by the Indian Government. I therefore think, considering how important it is that the country should be able to form a moderate, calm, and accurate estimate of what has recently taken place in India, that the policy which has dictated the Treaty should be submitted to the kind of examination which it has received at the hands of the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs. I do not want to depreciate the complete success of the military operations undertaken by the Government of India to the extent to which they were directed. The scope of our operations was considerably less than was desired by many advocates of an Imperial policy; and, perhaps, our thanks are duo to the Indian Government for the moderation they exercised in thus limiting the scope of those operations. But what we have to consider is, whether the moderation which has marked the policy of the Indian Government up to the present time is likely to be maintained, or whether a policy has not been embarked upon which will necessarily lead us a great deal further than either the Government at home or the Indian Government at present desire to go. As I have already said, I do not dispute the success of our military operations. That, however, does not in the least preclude the various questions of the justice
    1020
    of this war, and the expediency of this war, and the value of the objects for which it was undertaken, and the value of the objects which have been gained, or the effect which it will have on the future policy of the Indian Government. I do not feel myself competent to speak at length upon the question of the Frontier which has been obtained; but I would remark that while a great many military authorities were dissatisfied with the North West Frontier as it existed before the war, they are also far from being satisfied with what has been attempted and accomplished by the Indian Government in the course and by the means of the war which has just been concluded. There is one very great authority whose name has already been mentioned in the course of this debate—General Hamley. General Hamley certainly does not approve of the military positions which have been taken up by the Indian Government, while he recommends the occution of Candahar, which has not been thought desirable by the Government. I should like to ask the Government upon what military authority they rely for the positions which they have actually taken up? As has been pointed out by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), they have not secured a line at all. The positions they have taken up are rather a series of detached positions, a series of cul-de-sacs which are totally incapable of communicating with each other, and which are exposed to the greatest possible extent to the operations of wild and warlike, and, as far as we know at present, hostile Tribes. The political position is one which seems to me even more grave and important than the military question, especially when regarded in the light of the present condition of Indian finance. The statement of the Government is that we have by this war and by this Treaty excluded foreign Powers from Afghanistan, established a paramount influence there, and, in fact, have obtained such control over the foreign relations of the Ruler of Afghanistan as justifies us in giving that unconditional guarantee which we have given him by this Treaty, What the Government rely upon for the accomplishment of their objects is the acquisition of certain positions by means of which, in case of the failure of the Ameer to execute his engagements, it will be able to put such pressure upon

    1021
    him as will make him conform to his engagements—that is to say, in the case I am contemplating, in the case of a failure of the Ameer to carry out his engagements, either through want of will or power to observe the conditions undertaken, the Government of India will be obliged to proceed to do that which in the late campaign it deliberately abstained, from political reasons, from doing; it will have to shatter completely the frail fabric of the power of Afghanistan. I believe it is altogether an illusion to suppose that, by any process short of complete annexation, it is possible to secure complete control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan. Such a policy as we are now pursuing might be possible if Afghanistan was a regularly-organized State under the control of a despotic Sovereign, or under a regular form of government. As far as we have been able to learn, no such state of things exists in Afghanistan. The Ameer is simply a most powerful Chief in Afghanistan among others whose power is not much inferior to his own. We need not name Wakhan, Balkh, Badakshan, Herat, and Candahar. In some of these districts rebellion exists. You cannot hold the Ameer responsible for the proceedings of the Rulers in these districts, unless you give him what you have not given him, and do not profess to give him by this Treaty—adequate control and power over these unruly Princes.
    Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, resuming, said: What you have really done, I was saying, is to make yourselves responsible for the raids, feuds, and lawless proceedings of a variety of Chiefs on the Frontier of Afghanistan whose names you are scarcely acquainted with; and in appointing a British Resident at Cabul you have taken care that this responsibility shall not be nominal, but real. You will be expected to know what is going on within the Dominions of Afghanistan; and you will make yourselves more or less responsible to the Russian Government for everything that takes place within those Dominions. My hon. Friend (Mr. E. Stanhope) dwelt upon the functions which would naturally devolve
    1022
    upon the Residents. It was said they must not interfere in the internal affairs; but it was shown that the Residents could not help interfering. An hon. Member opposite thought it sufficient to reply that it was stipulated in the Treaty that the Residents were not to interfere in the internal affairs. Experience, however, is a much surer guide than any intentions of the Indian Government; and our experience of Residents, in all cases, has been that if the Resident is not to be reduced to the position of a mere nonentity, he must necessarily interfere, to a great extent, in the internal affairs of the country in which he is placed. At all events, you have secured that you shall have complete knowledge of the external proceedings and condition of Afghanistan, and you have thereby made yourselves responsible; and I cannot imagine any arrangement more fraught with danger, and possibly with complications, in that quarter where you most wish to avoid them—namely, the Russian quarter. It is altogether useless to disguise the magnitude of the step taken by this Treaty. We have advanced beyond the mountains which hitherto have been boundaries to us. These mountains were a good strategic frontier; they were a natural boundary. We have now advanced—our responsibilities have been advanced, the sphere of our operations has been advanced—beyond that natural boundary into a district where we find no natural boundary at all, and no possible limit to the extension of our responsibilities and relations, until that takes place which is so often spoken of—the meeting of the Sepoy and the Cossack. The concession made to the alarmists is not likely to satisfy them. It has only stimulated them. It has given them better grounds to press on for a further advance than they ever had before. My hon. Friend spoke of Sir Henry Rawlinson. What is his opinion of this Treaty? He says it is a very good settlement, as far as it goes; but it does not, in the least, absolve us from being on the same constant watch, and maintaining the same jealous attitude, with regard to Russia in Central Asia as before. The hon. Gentleman opposite just now said that the Russian advance in the direction of Merv had been preparing since 1872; but in this he is contradicted by Sir Henry Rawlinson,

    1023
    who says that the Russian advance on Merv is the necessary, the inevitable consequence of the great success we have obtained in Afghanistan. In the opinion of Sir Henry Rawlinson, we ought to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Persia, and support the Turkomans in their resistance to the Russian advance. Those are measures which show what, in the opinion of the ablest of the advocates of the policy which has dictated this Treaty, the Treaty is worth. What is his opinion as to the execution of the Treaty itself? Although he gives a sort of academic consent to the principles which have dictated the withdrawal from Candahar, he considers that that withdrawal ought never to be put in practice. Now, it is said that Sir Henry Rawlinson has never been authorized to express the views of the Indian Government; but we know that in time his views are those which are adopted by the Indian Government, and we are safer in the forecast which is to be learned from Sir Henry Rawlinson's views than that which is to be derived from the authorized statements of the Government. The hon. Gentleman has said that he will not discuss Quetta, because we have often had fights on that subject. But I beg to remind him that we have not fought over it at all. We received an assurance, two years ago, that the occupation of Quetta had been undertaken on purely local grounds, and was not a part of any fixed policy of advance. Now we find that it is to be maintained as a part of the strategical plan which the Government have had all through these operations. It is the same policy as that which induced them to occupy the Khyber Pass and the Kurrum Valley. Sir, all these have been advocated by Sir Henry Rawlinson for some time; and when we find that the Government have advanced so far, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they will go with Sir Henry Rawlinson and his disciples a good deal further. I do not know whether this policy is one which can now be reversed, or even can be restrained. I do not believe for a moment that Parliament, when contemplating the magnitude of the new departure, will approve of the Afghan War; and when the country is invited to believe that a chapter in Indian history has not only been opened
    1024
    but closed, I think it is their duty to say that that is a false and misleading view, and, so far from any chapter of history having been closed, a new volume has been opened. In the North West Frontier, a policy has been undertaken which is full of danger, is certain to be costly, and is fraught with every element of insecurity to the safety of our Asiatic relations on the North West Frontier of India.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I shall not enter at any great length into the question which has teen raised. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India has, I think, in one of the clearest and one of the best speeches it has ever been my pleasure to listen to in this House, explained the real position of affairs and the policy of the Government, and has given a complete answer to the observations of the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs and the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy. The noble Lord said he did not hear all the remarks of my hon. Friend. I am not surprised at that, for if he had heard the opening observations of my hon. Friend, he would, I think, have endeavoured to reply to them. My hon. Friend asked the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs a question which it might have been well if the noble Lord had answered. He asked what object or advantage they anticipated from the sort of speeches they had made on the present occasion? What is to be the advantage which is to be derived by the country from this kind of criticism and from this sort of discussion, which, as we know, will not be limited to the walls of this House? The main points in the mind of the noble Lord appeared to be to express a feeling of disappointment—first, at the success of the Government in spite of the prophecies so freely uttered against the possibility of such success; and, secondly, against the moderation of the Government. The noble Lord is disappointed not only that we succeeded in occupying important positions in Afghanistan, but that we had arrived at a settlement far short of that which he says other people had pressed upon us, and that we had endeavoured to put into shape and give effect to views which we always have professed, but which he says some people, believed more powerful than ourselves, are not satisfied with. I am very sorry

    1025
    that anybody should be disappointed, and I can sympathize with the noble Lord; but I really do think that unless he is prepared to suggest some correction of the line of policy which we have adopted, unless he is prepared to come forward and say—"If we were in power we would reverse that policy," I think he is not doing any service, but, on the contrary, is doing a disservice to the country, by merely suggesting all the points he can imagine, and all the difficulties that might be raised from the arrangements that have been made. The noble Lord entirely misrepresents several points in the Treaty. He misrepresents especially the position which we are about to assume—which we have, in fact, assumed—under the settlement with regard to the foreign affairs of Afghanistan. He speaks of our having made an unconditional engagement. The engagement we have entered into is not an unconditional one at all. It is an engagement which is dependent upon a most important condition. The condition is that the Ameer of Afghanistan agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; that he will enter into no engagement with foreign States; that he will not take up arms with foreign States, except with the concurrence of the British Government. Upon these conditions, which place the whole of his foreign policy at our direction, we undertake to support him against any foreign enemy with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may think best for the purpose. That seems to me to be a bargain of a character which entirely recommends itself to good sense. What, after all, is the main thing that we have to consider? We have to consider the great importance of maintaining the peace and tranquillity not only of our Indian Empire, but the importance of maintaining proper State relations on our North-Western Frontier. We have not only to consider the question of an imaginary invasion from some great European Powers, but, what is more important, we have to consider what is the best way of maintaining that amount of peace and confidence on our North-Western Frontier which will give security not only to our own Borders, but may prevent a recurrence of those
    1026
    panics which from time to time have been started, and which have their effect all over India, not only in our own possessions, but among our feudatories in India. In dealing with those matters, we have to deal with the people of Afghanistan as an element which cannot be left out of consideration. We have always desired to treat them on the footing of an independent people, maintained, as far as possible, in a position of independence, and with whom we should cultivate friendly relations. But it is impossible not to see that the policy, which of late years has been pursued, has failed to secure that state of relations. It has been forced upon our attention that if matters were allowed to go on as they had been going on, we should find that Afghanistan would not remain an independent and friendly State, but that there was the greatest possible danger of her falling under the influence of a Power which might or might not be friendly to us, but which, at all events, we did not desire to see in the command of supreme influence in that country. It was because matters were taking that course that we found it necessary to adopt measures of a purely defensive character, in order to re-assert the influence which we thought the Indian Empire ought legitimately to have in Afghanistan. It was because the friendly Mission we proposed to send was refused, and because we had plain proof that a state of things existed which could no longer be allowed, that we found it necessary to take strong measures. It is all very well to say that this is a dangerous policy; but that policy was forced upon us. It was impossible to remain in the position in which we stood before our Mission was repulsed, and repulsed in a manner calculated to bring our power into contempt in India. Hon. Gentlemen and the noble Lord opposite apparently desire to put out of sight all the events which led to this war, and they mislead the House and the country with regard to the real state of affairs. What we say is this—We do not want to go into minute questions about military details, as to whether this or that is the best line of communication, or whether this or that post has particular advantages. The noble Lord asks us—"What military authorities did you consult in regard to this line of Frontier?" Well,

    1027
    it was arranged upon considerations that were not merely military, but that were political also. You had to consider what were the conditions, political as well as military, with which you had to deal. I say that the settlement arrived at, in a military sense, but still more in a political sense, is the one which, in the most careful judgment of those who are responsible for the government and the peace of India, is the best attainable under the circumstances. It is true that what has been said of the written stipulations in the Treaty may also be said of particular posts on the Frontier; but what we have to consider is not so much whether this particular Article or that strategical post has a talismanic effect, but it is the general effect produced by the policy that you pursue, and the way in which you are going to carry it into effect. I say that the general policy which we have laid down, and are prepared to support, is this—We desire to maintain the same relations with Afghanistan. We have always desired to maintain relations with her as a friendly country, as strong and independent as circumstances will permit. We will maintain those relations, and, at the same time, maintain an attitude which is one of strength, and which shows that we are determined to use that strength, if necessary. We believe, by maintaining that attitude, we shall give confidence to the people of Afghanistan, and that they will see that they are dealing with a Power which is not disposed to trifle with them, which has announced its objects simply and clearly, and which is prepared to maintain and support them; which, when it says that it does not interfere with their domestic affairs, is in earnest and sincere in so saying; which, when it says it desires to promote improved commercial relations, is prepared to take all the steps that may conduce to that policy; and which will be believed to be sincere when it guarantees the aid of British power in support of Afghanistan, if it should be attacked from without, on condition that Afghanistan submits to our guidance in its relations with foreign Powers. My belief is that one cause of the difficulty we have had of late years has been the impression in the minds of the Afghans that we were not sincere; and that, from the uncertainty of the language we held on some
    1028
    occasions, they believed that the undertakings which were given were not meant to have the full effect the Afghans desired to attribute to them; and when they found we were not prepared to support them, but explained away the engagements we had entered into, they said—"This is a Power we cannot rely upon. We must turn to another to support us." Now, whatever you may say of what is past, or however you may disagree with the policy adopted, you yourselves admit that the policy which has been adopted is one that cannot be reversed; if you do not, tell us how it ought to be reversed, and what your policy would be. But if you say it cannot be reversed, the success of it depends upon the conviction which ought to be impressed upon the minds of the Afghans and the people of India, that it is a policy which is adopted not by one Party alone, but by the Government of this country as a whole, and which will be maintained by the Government of this country, in whatever hands the reins of power may, from time to time, be placed; and if you succeed in impressing upon the Afghan Power that our policy is one which has been adopted deliberately and which will be pursued steadily, then I think you may expect to derive advantages which you will certainly not derive in any other way. Therefore, I would reply to the Question of the noble Lord by asking another Question, which is—Are we to understand, or are we not, that the Liberals, if they come into power, will reverse the policy which we have adopted? If they do not intend to do that, what earthly object do they expect to gain by endeavouring to suggest difficulties and put into our minds—and, what is of much more importance, into the minds of others at a distance—suggestions that our policy means something different from that which we say it means, which we know it means, and that which I believe the country is determined it shall mean?
    MR. FINIGAN: As this is a subject of great importance which ought not, I think, to be considered in such a small House, I beg to call attention to the fact that there are not 40 Members present.
    House counted, and 40 Members not being present,
    House adjourned at half after Nine o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Committee negatived—Considered—Third Reading—National School Teachers (Ireland) (199); Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices* (200); Consolidated Fund (Appropriation*; Banking and Joint Stock Companies (201); Public Works Loans (No. 2)* (202), and passed.
Third Reading—East India Loan (£5,000,000)*; East India Loan (Annuities)*; Exchequer Bills and Bonds (No. 2)*; Artizans Dwellings Act (1868) Extension* (181); Endowed Schools Acts Continuance* (182); Expiring Laws Continuance* (183); Metropolitan Board of Works (Water Expenses)* (184); Vaccination Acts (Ireland) Amendment* (186); Metropolitan Board of Works (Money)* (188); St. Giles Ancient Church (Edinburgh)* (189); Lough Erne and River (Continuance)* (190), and passed.

COUNTY COURTS—PRIVILEGES OF PEERS.—STATEMENT.
LORD SKELMERSDALE: My Lords, in the absence of my noble Friend Lord De L'Isle, I have been asked to make a statement on his behalf. On the 20th of July last, Lord De L'Isle underwent a serious surgical operation, and he has since been confined to his room. Yesterday, for the first time, his attention was called to a paragraph in a weekly newspaper stating that a judgment had been applied for against him in the Brompton County Court for a sum of £2 8s., in respect of coals supplied to him by a certain firm, but that he did not appear, and, as on a previous occasion, pleaded the privileges of a Peer. This morning a well-known daily paper published an article on the subject. I have the authority of Lord De L'Isle for stating that there is not a word of truth from beginning to end in the whole statement—that it is a gross libel; that Lord De L'Isle has never been a defendant in such an action; that he never had any dealings with the firm in question; that he has never been sued in the Brompton County Court; and that he has authorized his solicitors to take proceedings against the author of the libel.
NATIONAL SCHOOL TEACHERS (IRELAND) BILL—(No. 199.)
(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
NATIONAL SCHOOL TEACHERS (IRELAND) BILL—(No. 199.)

  SECOND READING. THIRD READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: This Bill, my Lords, affects the salaries and position of National School teachers in Ireland. The subject has in various forms frequently been before the other House of Parliament, and also before your Lordships' House as well. The present measure affords a means by which National School teachers in Ireland can, by contributions on their own part, and by assistance from the Irish Church Fund, receive pensions in certain cases and under certain conditions. There are powers in the Bill, by which National School teachers can retire at certain ages, and by which they can augment those pensions. The Bill has been very carefully considered in the other House of Parliament, and I believe the result arrived at in it will be very acceptable to the

  965
  National School teachers of Ireland, who have hitherto been not overpaid. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
  On Question, agreed to.
  Committee negatived; Then Standing Orders Nos. XXXVII. and XXXVIII. considered (according to order), and dispensed with; Bill read 3a, and passed.

BANKING AND JOINT STOCK COMPANIES BILL—(No. 201.)
(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
BANKING AND JOINT STOCK COMPANIES BILL—(No. 201.)

  SECOND READING. THIRD READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that it was only part of a larger measure which was introduced into the other House by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but which, from the state of Business and the opposition it was likely to meet with, it had not been thought desirable to press it in its entirety; and therefore Her Majesty's Government, abandoning those provisions of the original Bill which had given rise to controversy, and might have imperilled the passing of those sections which were universally accepted, had retained only those clauses which enabled unlimited Companies to register themselves anew as limited Companies, and those which provided for the limitation of liability and the powers of audit.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
  LORD DENMAN: My Lords, the discussion yesterday was quite irregular, and if the Bill which I heard read a third time at 5 o'clock in "another place" had been sent up in time, the observations I made, and which were objected to, might have been attended to. In my remarks with reference to the Trustees Relief Bill, I wished to allude to the enormous powers which creditors and depositors possessed in being able to make trustees liable; because the change is so great from a power to make several innocent persons contributories, to limiting the liability to
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  any fixed sum. My Lords, as I ventured to say in the presence of the noble and learned Earl (the Lord Chancellor), I consider the case of Buchanan v. Ridsdale to be erroneous, and many Scotch advocates, and every English barrister who knows much of the matter, will agree with me in what I say. In your Lordships' answer to the Speech from the Throne, you say—
  "We humbly assure your Majesty that, after full deliberation upon the matters which have led your Majesty to anticipate our usual time of meeting, we shall he prepared to give our careful consideration to such measures for the public benefit as your Majesty may hereafter direct to he submitted to us."
  But I ask your Lordships, how can we "carefully consider" that which has only been in our hands a quarter of an hour? The proposal of the noble Earl now on the Woolsack (the Earl of Redesdale) in 1855 to refer the first Limited Liability Bill to a Select Committee is applicable now. A Minister has proposed that a new clause for a Bill should be brought forward next Session. Following the example of the Irish Education Bill, which, instead of plodding through "another place," was begun in this House, a Bill on the whole subject might be introduced, and the opinion of such noble Lords as Lord Overstone and Lord Wolverton might be taken. At present, the House does not contain the usual number of Government supporters. The liquidation of the City of Glasgow Bank is not yet finished, and the trustees are at the mercy of the liquidators. My Lords, to show how hardly shareholders are dealt with, I may mention the case of a shareholder in the Western Bank, in which a Baronet supposed to have £20,000 for his wife's fortune lost it all, and had to pay the same amount by way of calls; but in the City of Glasgow Bank a shareholder of five shares, purchased by an agent, had to pay £5,000, being all, with the assistance of relatives, that could be paid, and if the full amount of calls now made had been within the power of the shareholder, £16,000 would have been the amount beyond the loss of the shares. My Lords, I earnestly beseech your Lordships to postpone the consideration of the Bill to the beginning of next Session. The subject is one which is worthy the consideration of every depositor, every shareholder, and every

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  trustee; but it is impossible at this time of the Session that it can be adequately discussed. Many of your Lordships will remember that in 1855 the question of an independent audit was considered; and, in my opinion, if there had been an independent audit of the City of Glasgow Bank accounts, the disaster which is deplored by so many thousands, and which has ruined so many families, would not have occurred. I earnestly hope, my Lords, that the measure will be postponed at present, and will be reintroduced the first day of next Session. I move that the Bill be read a second time this day three months.
  Amendment moved, to leave out ("now") and add at the end of the Motion ("this day three months.")—(The Lord Denman.)
  On Question, That ("now") stand part of the Motion? Resolved in the Affirmative.
  Bill read 2a accordingly; Committee negatived; Then Standing Orders Nos. XXXVII. and XXXVIII. considered (according to order), and dispensed with; Bill read 3a and passed.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (OFFICERS) BILL.

  CONSIDERATION OF COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Bill returned from the Commons agreed to, with Amendments.
  Amendments considered.
  THE EARL OF REDESDALE (CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES)said, the Amendments which had been inserted by the Commons were such as their Lordships would agree to; and he, therefore, moved that their Lordships do concur with the Commons in their Amendments.
  Moved, "That this House do agree to the Amendments made by the Commons in the said Bill."—(The Earl of Redesdale.)
  On Question, agreed to.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, Two o'clock.