Sitting of 20 May 1878

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBERS—John Gilbert Talbot, esquire, for the University of Oxford (sworn); George Palmer, esquire, for Reading (affirmation).
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—Resolutions [May 16] reported.
PRIVATE BILL (by Order)—Clare Slob Land Reclamation, 3° *.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Local Government Provisional Orders (Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellings) * [162]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Darenth Valley) * [175]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Belper Union, &c.) * [164].
Second Rending—Watch Cases (Hall Marking) * [128], and referred to Select Committee on Gold and Silver (Hall Marking).
Withdrawn—Money Laws (Ireland) * [56].

PUBLIC PETITIONS.

  PUBLIC PETITIONS COMMITTEE.
  Special Report brought up, and read—
  "Your Committee, having examined the signatures to three Petitions presented on the 18th of February last and on the 18th and 11th of March last from the city of Dublin and its vicinity in favour of the Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday (Ireland) Bill, have to inform the House that to these Petitions a certain number of signatures have been appended which seem to have been attached, without authority, by persons other than those purporting to have signed. Your Committee feel it their duty to report these informalities to the House, though they do not recommend any further action in respect of them,"
  Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 188.]

QUESTIONS.
  MILITARY AND NAVAL EXPENDITURE.

    QUESTION.
    MR. RYLANDSasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, What is the estimated monthly charge at the present time for Army and Navy Services in excess of the provision in the Army and Navy Estimates, taking into account the cost of calling up the Reserves, of the additional ships in commission, of the war at the Cape, &c., but exclusive of the cost of the troops on their way from India to Malta, for which an Estimate is to be presented; and, when Supplementary Estimates for this excess will be laid before the House?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I understand the hon. Member to ask what is the estimated monthly charge for Army and Navy Services, exclusive of the cost of troops coming from India to Malta? The Supplementary Estimate, with regard to those troops, will, I hope, in the course of a few days, be laid on the Table. With respect to the other Question, it is a little difficult to form, at the present moment, any very clear estimate; but I have endeavoured to obtain from my two right hon. Friends the best information they can give me. I find that from the War Office it is said that the cost of calling out the Reserves may be taken at about £140,000 per month, including the separation allowances. As to the war at the Cape, the Imperial cost is £5,000, and

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    the Colonial cost about £20,000 a-month. These amounts can only be approximate. Many of the charges will be terminable and will not continue at so much per month. It would be difficult to take a Supplementary Estimate other than for the Indian Force until somewhat later in the financial year, when we can see what our position is. With regard to the Naval Services, my right hon. Friend gives me a calculation showing a monthly expenditure on extra ships in commission, the cost of pensioners, wages in the Dockyards, the cost of stores, the coals for the Mediterranean, extra freight, and so forth, running up to a total of somewhat less than £50,000 per month, which, with about £10,000 for contingencies, will make, perhaps, £60,000 per month. That is the information as we have it at present; but it would hardly be desirable to lay on the Table Supplementary Estimates for these expenses until a little later—perhaps at Whitsuntide—when we can see what our position is. The Indian Estimate, as I have stated, will be laid on the Table in the course of a few days.

    CRETE.—QUESTION.
    MR. EVELYN ASHLEYasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government will use their good offices to secure an armistice between the Turkish forces and the insurgents in Crete, in view of the fact that otherwise the forces liberated by the armistice just concluded in Thessaly, owing to the efforts of the British Government, will be employed to crush the Cretans?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHE-QUER: Yes, Sir; Her Majesty's Government have been, and are now, using their good offices for that object.

    CHARGE OF ARSON.—QUESTION.
    MR. ISAACasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is true that eight boys, of thirteen, twelve, and ten years of age, were arrested by the Police between midnight and the morning of Wednesday last at Moulton, Mid-Cheshire, and lodged in the lock-up of Northwich on a charge of arson; whether the case was adjourned, bail refused, and these children locked up for the night; whether, on the case being heard, the Magistrates, without hearing the solicitor for the defence, discharged the boys, saying—
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    "He did not think there was any case. He did not see any evidence to bring the charge home to the boys. It was not even proved that they were in the building;"
    if it is true that five of the boys attended the National School at Davenham, and, consequent on this arrest, were absent from the Government inspection, one of the boys having to receive a prize for good conduct; and, whether he will direct measures to be taken to prevent the Police in this district in future from taking young children from their beds during the night without sufficient evidence to warrant such action?
    MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, he thought the facts were truly stated in the Question. He had no control over the county police; but the matter had already been taken in hand by the local authorities, and the police cautioned to be more careful in future. At the same time, he was bound to say that when those boys were brought before the magistrates, evidence was given that they had been seen playing about the building together with a match-box in their possession.

    ORDNANCE SURVEY.—QUESTION.
    MR. WILLIAMS WYNNasked the First Commissioner of Works, If he is aware that there is no more recent Ordnance Survey of the county of Montgomery than that on the original 1-inch scale, published nearly 50 years ago, and now quite incorrect as to roads, &c.; if he would state why the 6-inch survey of Denbighshire, the triangulations for which actually extended into Montgomeryshire, was not continued over the whole of the latter county; and, if he can hold out any hopes of its being so extended; and, what prospect he can hold out of the publication of the portions of the 6-inch survey of the counties of Denbigh and Flint, which it is understood are already completed?
    MR. GERARD NOEL, in reply, said, there was no more recent Ordnance Survey of the county of Montgomery than that which was made about 45 years ago, and it could hardly now be so accurate as might be desired. It had been decided to survey the counties of Denbigh and Flint because of their rich mineral products, and in order to carry that out a portion of Montgomeryshire was to be surveyed.

    CONTRACTS FOR WATERING THE STREETS.—QUESTION.
    MR. BECKETT-DENISONasked the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, If he will lay upon the Table of the House Copies of the Contracts for Watering and Scavengering the streets for 1878, entered into by the undermentioned Vestries and District Boards—1. Saint James, Westminster; 2. Westminster District; 3. Strand District; 4. Saint Giles District; 5. Holborn District; 6. Saint George, Hanover Square; 7. Saint Marylebone; 8. Paddington; 9. Kensington; 10. Fulham; 11. Chelsea?
    SIR JAMES M'GAREL-HOGG: I should be very glad to comply with the wishes of the hon. Member if it were in my power; but I have no exclusive information, in virtue of the office which I hold, respecting the contracts entered into by the vestries and district boards, and I must refer him to the vestry clerks of the parishes mentioned in his Question. If I can render him any assistance in obtaining the information from those gentlemen, I shall be happy to do so.

  LOCOMOTIVE ACCIDENT NEAR LEEDS.

    QUESTION.
    MR. BARRANasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to a serious injury that was done on the 11th instant to an old woman, seventy-five years of age, by a locomotive engine on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, whilst walking on the footpath alongside a tramway which is laid down across the Moor from the Middleton Collieries; whether he is aware that the tramway in question is traversed by locomotives without Parliamentary sanction, and is so unguarded and uncontrolled as to be dangerous to the numerous persons crossing the Moor; and, whether he would direct an official inquiry to be made with a view to protect the public against similar accidents?
    MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that the accounts he had received represented the case to be absolutely hopeless. As, therefore, there would probably be a coroner's inquest held on the case in a few days, he did not think it necessary to institute any official inquiry into the circumstances.

    SOUTH AFRICA.—QUESTION.
    MR. ALEXANDER M'ARTHURasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether his attention has been directed to the following statement, which appeared in the "Times" of May 3rd:—
    "The chiefs of two tribes situate south of Pongola (Magnami and Job) have expressed their opinion, in presence of an Englishman and some of their inounas, that they would be pleased to see the Zulu country in the hands of the English, as it would relieve them from the present slavery they are in with regard to the Zulus. The Aborigines' Protection Society may not be aware that some few months ago 1,000 Caffirs were drafted from these two chiefs to work in Natal by Cetywayo, the Zulu chief, and that the money they earned was not paid to them but to the Zulu king; and the whole thing has left such a bad impression that it is almost impossible to get a single native from them to go to Natal;"
    and, whether, if this statement is true, he will take steps to free the immigration of native labourers to Natal from the abuses complained of?
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH, in reply, said, that he had no information whatever respecting the statement that had been read; but he would direct the Lieutenant Governor to make inquiries into the subject.

  RETIREMENT FROM THE ARMY.

    QUESTION.
    COLONEL NAGHTENasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, having regard to the Order in Council of the 15th January 1878, which allows officers of the Royal Marines who entered the Service before April 1, 1870, to count their services from eighteen to twenty years of age towards retirement or pension, he will consider the advisability of allowing officers of the Army who joined it before the abolition of purchase to enjoy the same privilege?
    COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, that, as the decision with respect to the Royal Warrant last year had been arrived at after careful consideration between the War Office and the Treasury, he was not prepared to consider the advisability of altering it.

    GRAY'S INN ROAD.—QUESTION.
    MR. J. G. HUBBARDasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been directed to the dangerous insalubrity of

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    some dwellings in Gray's Inn Road; and, whether he can explain why apparently no steps are being taken, for the reconstruction of the adjacent district, although a scheme for that purpose was the very earliest among those which were suggested in pursuance of the provisions of the Artizans' Dwellings Act?
    MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that it was quite true that the part of London referred to had been reported upon by the medical authorities, and he could not conceive any worse place in the whole of London. The scheme that was originally presented by the officers of the Metropolitan Board of Works was a large and comprehensive one; but, unfortunately, the Metropolitan Board of Works cut down that scheme, and presented to him such a mutilated scheme that he thought it utterly unworthy of its being passed into law, and he repudiated it. He had been told that during the last Session the Metropolitan Board, under one of their Improvement Acts, but not under the Artizans' Dwellings Act, obtained power to pull down one side of the Gray's Inn Road, which would remove some of the worst descriptions of the dwellings, and he understood that power was being exercised as speedily as possible. If the right hon. Gentleman wished to obtain any further information as to the action and intention of the Metropolitan Board of Works, he would refer him to the Chairman of that Board (Sir James M'Garel Hogg).

  EVANGELICAL DISSENTERS IN RUSSIA.

    QUESTION.
    CAPTAIN PIMasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If his attention has been called to an article in the "Globe" of the 8th instant, describing the sufferings and persecutions to which the Stundisli or Evangelical Dissenters are now subjected in Russia, and pointing out—
    "That they had commenced operations in 1870, first by holding a prayer meeting in secret and then extending their influence openly, until at last whole parishes had joined the heterodox faith. For doing this and persisting in weaning the peasants from their orthodox belief in the holy images, saints, and caudles, the prosecutor demanded that the three offenders should be exiled to the Mines of Siberia,"
    although they had already suffered three
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    years' imprisonment without trial; and, whether Her Majesty's Government would use their good offices to ameliorate the condition of these Christians so that their condition might in some degree be assimilated to that of their nonconformist brethren in this country?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I regret to say that my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is still prevented by indisposition from being present. He has, however, enabled me to answer this Question, and I have to say that no information has been received at the Foreign Office respecting the persecution in Russia of the sect referred to, and it would not appear to be a matter in which Her Majesty's Government can use their good offices.

  THE CHEFOO CONVENTION.

    QUESTION.
    MR. ALDERMAN W. M'ARTHURasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the Chefoo Convention, made by Sir Thomas Wade with the Chinese Government in September 1876, has been ratified by Her Majesty's Government; and, if so, why the Papers relating thereto have not been laid before Parliament; whether China has fulfilled in good faith her part of the Treaty, and opened the several ports promised therein; and, whether he is aware that great dissatisfaction prevails in China in consequence of the delay in carrying out the stipulations agreed upon by Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I am informed that Her Majesty's Government have not yet formally approved of the whole of the arrangements concluded by Sir Thomas Wade. Some of its stipulations cannot come into operation without the concurrence of the other Treaty Powers. The Report of the Indian Government on the clauses relating to the opium trade are still under consideration by Her Majesty's Government, and they hope shortly to be able to announce the decision they have arrived at. The Chinese Government have opened the new trading ports in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, although the stipulations as to the posting of the Proclamations have not been fulfilled in

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    some parts of the country. Her Majesty's Government are not aware that any great dissatisfaction prevails in China on the ground that the Convention has not been ratified.

  GROCERS' LICENCES IN SCOTLAND.

    QUESTION.
    SIR ROBERT ANSTRUTHERasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the Government are prepared to bring in any measure to carry out the recent recommendation of the Commission which reported upon the question of Grocers' Licences in Scotland?
    MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, he saw no prospect, in the present state of Public Business, of being able to deal with the question of grocers' licences in Scotland by any legislation this Session.

    MADAGASCAR.—QUESTION.
    MR. ALEXANDER M'AETHURasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether, having regard to the injurious effects of the cheap importation of spirits, and especially of Mauritius rum, into Madagascar, Her Majesty's Government has had under consideration the expediency of consenting to a revision of the duties of those commodities by the Home authorities; and, whether any, and, if so, what steps, with the above object in view, have been taken by Her Majesty's consent in Madagascar?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, in the opinion of Lord Salisbury no object would be gained by altering the duties on the commodity, and that it was manufactured in small quantities in Madagascar itself.

    THE RESERVES.—QUESTION.
    MR. PELLasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether, in order to anticipate an inconsiderate addition to the number of paupers on the application of wives of men in the Reserve Forces, he will circulate a statement of the sums of money their husbands may have been entitled to receive per annum in respect of their contract with the State, their estimated equivalent weekly wages, as well as the separation
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    allowances to which the wives and children are entitled at the cost of the State, and such other information on the subject as may be of service to Guardians in considering these applications?
    MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: A Return is in preparation at the War Office, on the Motion, I believe, of my hon. Friend, which will give, as I understand, most of the information to which his Question refers. I have been in communication with the War Office on the subject, and propose to embody the particulars of that information in a letter which will be sent by the Local Government Board to an important Union in the Midland Counties, and I will take care that due publicity is given to the terms of that letter.

  THE SOLWAY COMMISSIONERS.

    QUESTION.
    MR. PERCY WYNDHAMasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he would authorise the Solway Commissioners to make a Report; and, if he would lay such Report upon the Table of the House?
    MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that the Commissioners had not yet finished their sittings; but he would lay on the Table any Papers respecting their inquiry with which he might be furnished.

  DISTURBANCES IN IRELAND.

    QUESTION.
    MR. M'CARTHY DOWNINGasked Mr.Attorney General for Ireland, Whether his attention has been given to the inquest held in the city of Cork on the body of Richard Andrews, who was killed by a shot fired by sub-constable John Roche on the 5th instant; and, if so, whether, having regard to the statement of the jury that they had agreed to a verdict finding the said John Roche and constable Guerin guilty of manslaughter, upon which the said constables were taken into custody, and to the fact that the said jury subsequently handed to the coroner a verdict of justifiable homicide, on which the said constables were released from custody, he will cause to be made a further investigation by the proper authorities?
    THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. GIBSON): I should say

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    that the matter was fully inquired into by the coroner, judging from the lengthened newspaper reports of the inquest referred to by the hon. Gentleman. However, I have given instructions that copies of the depositions taken before the coroner shall be furnished to me.

    MALTA.—QUESTION.
    SIR GEORGE BOWYERasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, What information has been received regarding recent manifestations of public feeling in Malta; and, what steps have been or are about to be taken in consequence thereof?
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: On May 15 the Governor of Malta telegraphed that there was great popular excitement and a demonstration against a Vote of £7,000 which he had proposed to the Council for drainage works which have for some time been in course of construction and against any alteration of the taxation, and added that a deputation had waited on him asking for suspension of action pending a reply to the Petition to the House of Commons. He was reminded, in reply, that with regard to the taxation question all that had been at present desired was public discussion, and that any proposals for a change in the law should stand over until his successor assumed the government next month, but that means must be provided to meet such portion of the cost of the drainage works now in progress as would be required during the present year. These works were undertaken because they were considered essential to the health both of the garrison and the civilian inhabitants. A large portion of their cost will fall on Imperial funds, and it is only right that the locality should bear its share. I may add that I do not gather from the Governor's telegram that any disturbance has occurred; but, of course, he will take all necessary measures for the preservation of the peace.

    ORDERS OF THE DAY.
    Ordered, That the Orders of the Day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Military Forces of the Crown.—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
MOTIONS.
  THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN.

    RESOLUTION.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, in rising to move—
    "That, by the Constitution of this Realm, no Forces may be raised or kept by the Crown in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the Dominions of the Crown, excepting only such Forces as may be actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions,"
    said: Mr. Speaker, it is, of course, impossible for me, even if it were my desire, to attempt to fix any limit to the scope of the debate which may arise on the Motion which I am about to submit to the House. The measure of the Government to which I shall have to advert, and which is the cause of my Motion, is one, no doubt, of the most important character. It is one not only important in itself, but it is one of a series of measures which form part of a policy which has already engaged, to a certain extent, the attention of the House, which has already received discussion from the House, and which will probably, at some future time, receive still further consideration. But the measure, taken by itself, irrespective of its being part of the policy of the Government, is of a most grave nature. It is a measure which raises totally new questions concerning the relations between this country and our Indian Empire—which raises, probably, some of the most difficult questions connected with the problem of government in India. Compared with these considerations, I must admit that the issue to which I am now about to ask the attention of the House is an extremely narrow one; and I confess I have purposely and intentionally thus narrowed its scope, partly because we have reason to believe that negotiations are at present going on of an extremely delicate character, and because we have very recently been informed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, in his opinion, a general discussion of the state of affairs in the East would not be for the interest of the public service; and that, after that intimation, I do not wish to be a party to raising such a discussion. I will also admit that I have endeavoured to narrow the scope of my Motion, because I think

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    that the issue itself which is raised in the Resolution is one of sufficient importance to merit full consideration and discussion upon its own merits, irrespective of any other consideration. Well, Sir, I need not detain the House at any length in vindicating the necessity for the Resolution I have brought before the House. It will not, I think, be denied that the claim put forward by the Government is very novel. I do not think it will be disputed that that claim, and the issue raised by my Resolution, are not simply issues of a technical character. It will, on the contrary, be admitted that they involve considerations of the greatest importance as affecting the relations hitherto existing between the Crown, Parliament, and the Army, and also the principles of financial control which Parliament has always maintained over every branch of the Administration. It will not be denied, I think, that, whatever may be the merits of the case, it is the duty of the Opposition, if the Opposition has any duties whatever—it is the first duty of the Opposition fully to examine and call in question any novel claims of this description which may be put forward, so that if they are to be admitted and to become part of our Parliamentary system, they may become so only after full and sufficient consideration. The claim of the Government is understood to be that, by the Prerogative of the Crown, they are entitled to transfer troops raised in India, and not voted by Parliament, to be made use of in time of peace, in other Dominions of the Crown. Lest there should be any mistake upon this point, I may, perhaps, be allowed to read what was stated on the subject by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In answer to a Question from me, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said—
    "I can only say that the decision of Her Majesty's Government to order a certain number of Indian troops to Malta was one arrived at some time ago, but that it was not thought necessary, nor is it according to practice, that such a decision should be communicated to Parliament."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxix. 1421.]
    That appears to me to bear out the statement I made that they claim to employ these troops without the consent of Parliament as a Prerogative of the Crown. The Chancellor of the Exchequer made this still more clear the same evening, when he said—
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    "But, under any circumstances, I may frankly say that we should not have thought it our duty, even if we had foreseen that the matter would become public within so short a time, to have made a communication to Parliament with respect to it until the arrangements had been completed."—[Ibid. 1436.]
    Further, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said—
    "There is no doubt whatever that this is a very important step; but it is, at the same time, a step which, after all, when you come to regard what it is, is neither more nor less than a direction given by Her Majesty for the moving of a portion of Her Forces from one part of the Empire to the other. And though it is a movement which will undoubtedly come under the notice of Parliament, and over which Parliament holds the control which it holds over all movements of British Forces—that of the right of withholding or challenging the Supplies asked for the purpose—yet, so far as the order given to Her Majesty's troops is concerned, it is an order strictly within the proper Constitutional Prerogative of the Crown, and one which Her Majesty has as much right to give as to order any portion of British troops now in England to proceed to Gibraltar or Malta, or anywhere else."—[Ibid. 1435.]
    That is what I understand to be the claim of the Government, and it is that claim which we deny. We contend, on the other hand, that it is in India, and in India only, that Forces can be raised and maintained without the authority annually given by Parliament; and that when such Forces are transferred to any part of Her Majesty's Dominions, they would come under those conditions which govern and regulate the other Regular Forces of the Crown. I will have to ask the House to consider—and I will do it as briefly as I can—the general principles which govern the relations between the Crown, Parliament, and the Army; and I will ask them to consider, further, the exceptions to those general principles which are made in the case of India, and which conditions ought to govern the transfer of Indian Forces when they are removed to other Possessions of Her Majesty outside that country. There is no Member of this House who is ignorant that, since the Revolution, Parliament has always claimed a special control over the Regular Forces of the Crown, altogether separate from that financial control which it exercises over every branch of the Administration. That control has been asserted by three distinct guarantees. It has been asserted by the annual voting by this House of the number of men to be maintained,

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    by the annual voting of the Supplies for their maintenance, and by the enactment for one year only of the Act for securing their proper discipline. The Bill of Rights did not specially enact these or any other guarantees. It was not an enacting Statute; it did not prescribe or lay down penalties; what it did was to lay down general principles. It was a Statute declaratory of the ancient liberties of the Kingdom which had been infringed, and declaratory of the principles which, in the opinion of Parliament, were then necessary for the maintenance and, continuance of those liberties. The principles thus laid down in the Bill of Rights have been carried into force and into effect, not so much by special enactment as by a constant course of practice, precedent, and usage, which have shown what was the intention of Parliament, and what are the guarantees which Parliament thought necessary for the proper regulation and control of the Army. I wish it, I may add, to be clearly understood that I am not saying that the numbers of the Regular Army are to be limited to the exact number stated in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act. What I say is, that such number cannot be exceeded except with the consent of Parliament, and that the consent of Parliament must be obtained, if not by a Supplementary Statute, at least by a Supplementary Vote; and by a Vote, not only for the cost of the additional number of men, but by a Vote of the precise and actual number of the men themselves. Such was the doctrine laid down by Lord Hardwicke in 1734. Lord Hardwicke said—
    "As to the giving His Majesty a power by an address or a vote to raise land forces, there is certainly nothing illegal in it: for though the King cannot by law raise or keep up a standing Army in this nation in time of peace without consent of Parliament, yet, my Lords, I know of no law that directs how that consent is to be obtained; it may, in my opinion, be had by a vote or an address from each House of Parliament, as well as by an Act regularly passed in Parliament."—[Parl. History, vol. 9, p. 539.]
    Even at the risk of repetition, what I say and maintain is, not that it is necessary that a Supplementary Statute should be passed, but that any increase to the number of the Regular Army to be raised or kept in any of the Dominions of the Crown must be obtained, if not by legislation, yet by the special consent of Parliament, and that that consent
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    must be given not merely to the cost but to the number of the men. To illustrate what I mean, I may say that I hold—and I hardly think the Government will dispute the proposition—that it would not be within the competence of the Crown to increase the numbers of the Regular Army, even if, by some means or other, they could maintain the Regular Forces more cheaply than they had estimated. Again, I maintain that it would not be within the competence of the Crown to increase the numbers of the Regular Army, if, by means of reference to some other resource—private contributions or otherwise—it was found to be not necessary to seek the assistance of Parliament for their maintenance. The principle which I maintain, and which has invariably been asserted by Parliament is, that the consent of Parliament must be obtained to the increase in the number of men. I understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other night to say that by the Bill of Rights it was only from the United Kingdom that Indian or other troops were excluded. I do not know whether the Government is prepared to maintain that construction of the Bill of Rights; but it is one which was entirely repudiated more than 100 years ago. In 1775, an important debate occurred in both Houses of Parliament on the occasion of the garrisoning of Gibraltar and Port Mahon by Hanoverian troops during the American War. One defence of the Government of that day was that the prohibition in the Bill of Rights was confined to the United Kingdom; but that construction was finally repudiated by all sides in the debate. "Lord Camden," according to the records of the debate—
    "Elucidated in the most satisfactory manner the literal and obvious meaning of the clause in the Bill of Rights; adverted to the spirit of that law, as applying to the grievance which was then to be remedied; pointed out the true construction of the letter and spirit united, as interpreted for a series of almost 90 years, and during the reigns of four Princes, besides the present, three of whom were foreigners, no slight matter of consideration, and then drew this obvious conclusion—that no foreign troops could be brought into the Dominions of the Crown of Great Britain, without the previous consent of Parliament."—[Parl. History, vol. 18, p. 811.]
    It was true that the word "foreigners" was not mentioned in the law; but would anyone infer from that, that though it was not permitted to keep a standing Army of Natives, it might be

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    wise, constitutional, and legal, to keep on foot a standing Army of Foreigners? Lord Chancellor Bathurst spoke for the Government—
    "Deserting what he called the quibbles of Westminster Hall, and the subtle distinctions of lawyers, he allowed that the fortresses of Gibraltar and Port Mahon were fairly within the spirit and meaning of the paragraph of the Act of Settlement."—[Ibid. 815.]
    Finally, the Earl of Shelburne said—
    "The Bill of Rights is declaratory: it supposes a law which can be found in no written book or statute whatever. It can only be looked for by recurring to its principle. The only principle that can be suggested is the danger to be apprehended by keeping a standing Force without the consent of Parliament. To do this within the limits of the Kingdom, and in time of peace, is more dangerous, and carries with it less colour of necessity. To do the same in Ireland, Gibraltar, or any of the dependencies of the Kingdom, may be less dangerous; but will any man say, there is no danger?"—[Ibid. 816.]
    The hon. Member for Exeter (Mr. A. Mills), whose constituents appear to take a good deal of interest in this question, the other night put aside this debate as altogether beside the question; because, he said, the subject in dispute at that time was whether foreign troops might be admitted within the Dominions of the Crown without the consent of Parliament?—but that appears to me to be a total misapprehension of the argument. What was then laid down and assented to by all parties was that no troops of any kind, whether Native or Foreign, could be raised or maintained in any of the Dominions of the Crown without the consent of Parliament having been previously procured. It may be said that the Bill of Indemnity which was brought in at that time was not passed. That, no doubt, is true; but the very fact that Lord North thought it necessary, if only out of regard for the scruples of some of his supporters—who appear to have been more ticklish on these Constitutional points than some hon. Gentlemen who sit opposite now—to introduce a Bill of Indemnity, went to show that he thought it at any rate an open question, that ought to be in this case reserved; and the House, perhaps, will remember on what ground the indemnity was thrown out. It was thrown out in the House of Lords because it recited—what? It recited that there were doubts about the matter. The House of Lords declined to assert that there were any doubts at
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    all about the matter, and rather than admit those doubts the Bill was rejected altogether. I do not think that the fact of the Bill not having been passed, and of Lord North having still kept his head upon his shoulders, can be cited as a proof that his conduct at that time was constitutional or correct, or that it received the consent of Parliament. The question is, what was asserted and admitted by Constitutional authorities at that time and the continuous course of practice since. If the House will reflect for a moment, it cannot fail to see that the limited construction of the Bill of Rights to which I have referred is not consistent with, I might say, common sense. What are the words of the Mutiny Act?
    "Whereas the raising or keeping a standing army within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law: and whereas it is adjudged necessary by Her Majesty and this present Parliament that a body of forces should be continued for the safety of the United Kingdom, and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown," &c.
    Then it goes on to say—"The whole number of such force" shall be such and such. What is the meaning of the recital of the whole number of Forces? When Parliament voted this year the number of troops to be maintained, Parliament was perfectly aware that only a certain portion of these troops were to be maintained within the United Kingdom. Parliament knew perfectly well that a large number of them would be maintained in the Colonies and in the Colonial garrisons. If the view of the Government is correct, that a large number of Native troops may be brought over to fill these garrisons and these posts without the consent of Parliament, why, then, it is obvious that a very much larger number of troops may be withdrawn from the Colonies, and concentrated in the United Kingdom, than was ever contemplated by Parliament at the time when it voted the Estimates and when it passed the Mutiny Act. I am quite aware that at a later time—in 1794—Mr. Pitt held very high language as to the power of the Crown to introduce troops into the United Kingdom without the sanction of Parliament; but I hardly think that right hon. Gentlemen opposite will make use of the authority of Mr. Pitt at that time, if they recollect that Mr. Pitt himself, at a later

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    time, was obliged, or thought it necessary to bring in and pass the Bills of 1800 and 1806, giving the express authority of Parliament to such an increase of the Forces as he had hitherto made as being within the Prerogative of the Crown, and limiting the number of the troops which might be so introduced. I assert in general terms—not resting upon any special interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and not taking my stand upon any particular precedent, or any obiter dictum of any statesman, however eminent an authority he may be on the Constitution, but resting on what I believe to have been the constant usage and practice of Parliament—I assert that, in the words of my Resolution—
    "By the Constitution of this Realm, no Forces may be raised or kept by the Crown in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the Dominions of the Crown, excepting only such Forces as may be actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
    When I use the term "Forces of the Crown," I believe I am using a strictly correct and technical description. I wish it to be understood that my Resolution applies solely to Regular Forces of the nature of a standing Army, and that it applies in no way—I do not wish or intend that it should apply—to the Militia Forces raised either in this country or in any of the Colonies. The latter Forces have always been regarded as being under different conditions and as not requiring any guarantees for security similar to those which have been insisted upon in the case of the Regular Forces or the standing Army. I come now to the exception which has been made in the case of India. I need not detain the House by reminding them that in almost every respect India has been, and still is, an exception to our general Constitutional system. There is no parallel in our own history, or, as far as I know, in the history of the world, to the record of our Dominion in India—originally begun by a Trading Company, and eventually becoming a great Eastern Power. When that anomaly was finally terminated, in 1858, India still remained an exception to our Constitutional system. Parliament decided—wisely I think, and of necessity—that a system more nearly approaching a despotic and absolute system of government should be applied to India, where we ruled over such vast
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    numbers of subject-races, and where we were surrounded by a still larger number of semi-barbarous people. Parliament decided that the system of Constitutional checks and guarantees which we maintain at home and in all our Colonies and Dependencies was not suited to the government of India; and accordingly Parliament established, and still retains, a different system of government there. The Indian' Army was transferred to the Crown under substantially the same conditions which it had previously existed under. Parliament did not insist in 1858 on the same Constitutional checks and guarantees in the case of the Army which was maintained for the defence of our Indian Possessions as it had always maintained in the case of the standing Army at home and in our other Dependencies. The Indian Army is not limited in numbers by an annual Vote of Parliament. It is not voted by Parliament at all; its numbers are not enumerated in the Mutiny Act; and the Native portion of the Indian Army is not even subject to the Mutiny Act. In fact, it may be described as a non-Parliamentary Army, as compared with the Army which is maintained at home and in the other Dependencies of the Crown. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has already stated that this is simply a case of moving one part of Her Majesty's Forces from one part of Her Majesty's Dominions to another. That, in my opinion, is a fallacy. It is perfectly true that Her Majesty has power; at all events, there is nothing to restrain the Crown from moving one part of the Parliamentary Army from one part of Her Majesty's Dominions to another; but what we maintain is, that when they are brought into the Dominion of the Crown outside India, those troops I have described as a non-Parliamentary Army must come under the same regulations as a Parliamentary Force. That has been partially provided for by the Act of 1858. The 55th section of that Statute enacts that the Indian Army should not be used for military operations out of India except in certain specified cases of emergency, and that they should not be made use of at the charge of the Revenues of India without the consent previously obtained of both Houses of Parliament. If that provision had been literally and strictly observed, this question could

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    never have arisen at all. These troops have now been moved—temporarily, at any rate—on the charge of the Revenues of India. If the Act of Parliament had been literally and strictly obeyed, they would never have come for a moment on the charge of the Indian Revenues; and the Imperial Revenues could not, legally, at all events, have been charged without the previous assent of Parliament. I am not going to contend that the 55th section of the Government of India Act was mainly intended to prevent such an operation as this. It was mainly intended, no doubt, to protect the Revenues of India. That point is one to which I will come by-and-by; but I contend that one of the effects of this 55th section, if strictly obeyed, would have been to prevent any violation of Parliamentary practice. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated the other day, in reply to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James), that—
    "The Native Indian troops of Her Majesty are not, and never have been, reckoned in the numbers mentioned in the Mutiny Acts. The Native Indian troops recently ordered to Malta are not, and ought not to be, reckoned in the number mentioned in the Mutiny Act of the present year."
    That is perfectly true; but I fail to see what argument the right hon. Gentleman derives from it. I fail to see that that absolves the Government from the necessity of coming to Parliament for authority to remove these troops. It is altogether, in my opinion, beside the question. The relations of the troops employed in India under the Mutiny Act are extremely peculiar. The British troops employed in India are under the Mutiny Act; but, nevertheless, they are not enumerated in the Preamble of the Act. The Native troops of India when employed out of India are not under the Mutiny Act; but I will show the House immediately that when they are employed out of India they have been, and ought to be, voted distinctly and directly by Parliament. My contention, therefore, is, that in time of peace, both in accordance with general principle and by the Act of 1858, Native troops cannot be moved to Dominions outside India without the consent of Parliament. I say in time of peace; because it is very well known that Indian troops have been employed frequently in time of war outside the limits of India. I have
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    nothing to say about the Prerogative of the Crown to use these troops in time of war. I should not be prepared to admit that, even in time of war, the Crown has an unlimited power of ordering troops to be moved from India without the consent of Parliament. But we are not at war, and it is not necessary to discuss that matter now. As far as I know, the only case of employment of Indian troops in a time of peace outside India, is that of the sending of Indian, troops to China after the China War. General Peel, who had been Secretary for War in a Conservative Government, and who took a great interest in all military matters in this House, called the attention of the Committee of Supply to the employment of those Indian troops in China, and remonstrated against their employment without their being voted by Parliament. General Peel said, in March, 1864—
    "Certainly, if the control of the House was necessary in any case, it must be in the case of the Indian Native troops. If any part of the Indian Native Army could be employed without a Vote of that House, those troops were altogether removed from Parliamentary control. In the case of ordinary troops there were two checks—the Mutiny Act, and the money voted by Parliament for the pay of the troops. But neither of these checks applied to Indian troops. Native Indian troops were not liable to the Mutiny Act, being expressly excluded from the operations of that measure, and were ruled by Articles of War expressly framed for India; and the House had no control over Native troops through its privilege as to money Votes, because these troops were paid, in the first instance, by the Indian Government, and the expenditure never came under the notice of the British Parliament till long after it had been incurred.''—[3 Hansard clxxiii. 1436–7.]
    That was what General Peel said in criticizing the action of the Government of the day—the Government of Lord Palmerston—and it appeared so sound to that Government that, in the subsequent year, a Vote was taken for the Indian troops employed at that time at Hong Kong; and, from that time up to 1870, so long as the troops remained there, a Vote, distinguished from Vote "A," was taken for the Native troops who were employed in the Dominions of Her Majesty outside India. That is precisely what we ask the Government to do now. General Peel, being a military authority on the other side of the House, called upon the Government in 1864 to comply with Constitutional practice, and to vote the men, wherever they might be and whoever they might be, employed upon

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    the service of the Crown outside of India. We make precisely the same demand. If the Government intend, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has declared, to take a Vote for the men, the case will no doubt, be greatly altered. So far, I have referred to what is the Constitutional aspect of this question; and, before I conclude, I wish to say one or two words about the financial aspect. The conduct of the Government appears to have violated both the Rules which have been made for the protection of the Indian Exchequer and the English Exchequer. As I have pointed out, I am unable to say how far the 55th section of the Government of India Act has been broken. In the year 1867, in a case somewhat similar, but not entirely so—because it was a case of war and not of peace in—1867, Indian troops were moved from India, and the assent of Parliament had not been previously obtained, Parliament not being then assembled. When Parliament met, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer was then extremely humble. He was not then supported by quite so large a majority as he now finds behind him, though I do not know that that has anything to do with the difference between his action then and his action now. The Chancellor of the Exchequer then said the point had been raised as to whether the conduct of the Government had been strictly within the law, and he was rather inclined to doubt whether, on a strictly technical interpretation of the Act, they had kept within the limits of the law. He said—
    "The point on which we are challenged, so far as I understand, is this—in the application of the Revenues of India to the purposes of the Abyssinian Expedition, as far as it has hitherto gone, we have been proceeding upon the view, not to their ultimate application without the consent of Parliament, but only to their advance for the purposes of an Expedition, which advance will be repaid by subsequent payments from the Imperial Revenue. I am inclined to think that the wording of the clause would, strictly speaking, prohibit that proceeding."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 360.]
    The right hon. Gentleman, then, seems to have thought that he had so far violated the law, or, at all events, he regarded it as extremely doubtful, that he came to Parliament and moved a Resolution which had the effect of obtaining the consent of Parliament. Well, those scruples do not appear to trouble the Government now. We have heard nothing of any violation of the 55th
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    section of the Government of India Act. I admit I am curious to know what explanation will be offered on the point by the Government. Well, now, has the British Exchequer received better treatment at the hands of the Government of the day than the Indian? If the cost of this movement is not to be paid out of Indian Revenue, it must be paid out of British Revenue. But the Government have obtained no authority either by a specific Vote for the purpose, or by a Vote of Credit. So far, in effect, they have pledged the credit of the country to an expenditure which it would be impossible for this House to refuse to sanction, even if it should consider the movement of troops which occasioned it impolitic. I want to know what is the justification for this course on the part of the Government? I am perfectly aware that there are occasions upon which it is necessary for the Government to take responsibility upon themselves and come to Parliament afterwards for an indemnity. But I want to know what is the justification, not of taking responsibility upon themselves, but of keeping Parliament in the dark? Parliament was sitting, according to the admission of the right hon. Gentleman, at the moment when the order was given for the movement of Indian troops. If, as was alleged the other day, it was impossible for the Government to lay upon the Table of the House an Estimate of the cost, it is perfectly well known that, according to Parliamentary practice, there are other means by which that consent might have been obtained. If the precise cost of this movement could not have been communicated, there was nothing easier than for the Government to have asked for a Vote of Credit. That is the ordinary Parliamentary proceeding in a case of unforeseen emergency of this description. A Vote of Credit, we know, was resorted to by the Government for other purposes; but the authority conferred upon them by that Vote of Credit had expired, and nothing was easier, if the Government wished to remain within the ordinary Constitutional practice, than to communicate with Parliament, who were sitting at the time, and ask for their approval at once and for a Vote of Credit. It was said, the other day, it was extremely desirable that the arrangements as to the despatch of Indian troops should not be made known. Why was it extremely desirable?

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    That has not been explained. I can understand perfectly well that, when we are engaged in war, it may be desirable that all the arrangements of an Expedition should remain a profound secret as long as possible. We are not at war. It has been represented by the Government, over and over again, that it was not even a menace of war, but only one of a series of preparations. I should be rather inclined to call this, not in an invidious sense, a series of military demonstrations. But what is the object of that in a time of peace? To preserve peace, we are told. But how is that object to be accomplished, if the military demonstration is to be kept an absolute secret? If a demonstration is to produce any effect at all, the sooner and the more widely it is known the better. If a demonstration of the military power of this country was required, surely the demonstration would not have had a less, but a greater effect, if it had been looked upon, as it might and would have been, with the overwhelming approval of the House? I cannot see that the concealment of this movement by the Government from the House can have been intended for any other object than a deliberate assertion of the right of the Government, by the use of the Prerogative of the Crown, to make a use of our Indian Forces which has never before been attempted. Something was said about the difficulty that would have been placed in the way of making the arrangements by publicity. I should be glad to know whether the Government are still prepared to maintain that it was necessary to keep this secret from the House and from the public up to the very rising of the House of Commons, in order to facilitate the arrangements which would have to be taken? I have no desire to obstruct this operation of the Government, or this movement of Indian troops if, after deliberation, Parliament should consider it to have been a wise and well-considered step. I am not going to discuss the merits of the question now; but I do say that the House has a right, before expressing its approval of this proceeding, to consider well the grounds on which all information regarding it has been withheld from it. Now, I have only one or two words to say as to the Amendment to my Motion, which is to be moved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. That Amendment asserts that the Constitutional control of Parliament
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    is amply secured in two ways. It asserts that it is maintained by the provisions of the law, and by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse the Supplies. As to the provisions of the law, I do not know exactly to what provision the right hon. Gentleman refers. I have endeavoured to show that the Constitutional control of Parliament over the Army is rather the result of practice and of precedent than of any special enactment. I have endeavoured to show, also, that, in my opinion, the claim of the Government in this case is inconsistent with the Declaration contained in the Bill of Rights. Well, if that is so, then either the provisions of the law referred to in the Amendment are insufficient, or, if they are sufficient, they must have been violated. I do not know to what provision precisely the right hon. Gentleman refers. If he refers to the Act of 1858, to which I have alluded before, then I admit, with the right hon. Gentleman, that the provisions of the law would have been sufficient if they were observed. But, unfortunately, they have not been observed; and, I suppose, the Government would say, with good reason. But it is impossible to maintain that those provisions are sufficient, and also, at the same time, to maintain that they are such as, whenever an emergency arises, they must necessarily be broken. Then, as to the undoubted right of the House to grant or to refuse the Supplies, I have already endeavoured to prove—I think not altogether unsuccessfully—that Parliament has always required in the matter of the Army something more than the financial check for securing the control over it. Parliament possesses a financial control, undoubtedly, over every branch of the Administration. In the case of the Army, I have endeavoured to show that Parliament has required something more than that. But what does the financial control, to which the right hon. Gentleman refers, amount to? What is the question which will be put to this House, and which this House will have to answer, when the Estimate of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is submitted to us? That question will be, whether the House will recoup—whether it will provide for an expenditure which has already been incurred temporarily and illegally out if the Indian Revenues, and which, if this House refuses to make it good, must continue to be paid illegally

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    and unjustly out of those Indian Revenues? Sir, that is the sole question which will be put to the House when the Estimate is submitted; and how can it be maintained for a moment, when the discretion of the House is limited to answering "Aye" or "No" to such a question as this, that a control of that sort enables us to exercise any real or substantial control over a proceeding of this kind? There is no doubt that the financial control possessed by Parliament is a very substantial one when it is previously asked for. But when, as in this case, it is asked for only subsequently to the expenditure, and when no power of Parliament can prevent its being incurred, and it has only to pay the bill, then I say, if the Government which has taken on itself a responsibility of that character appeals to Party, and turns the question into a Vote of Confidence, Parliament has no check whatever. Well, the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, not depending altogether on its argumentative part, concludes with something which is extremely like a Vote of Confidence in Her Majesty's Administration. I think it is a very unusual course for a Member of a Government to move a Vote of Confidence in his own Administration. That is a point on which I do not wish to dwell. But it appears to me that the effect of the conclusion of the right hon. Gentleman's Amendment—I do not know whether that is its intention—would be to widen the scope of this discussion. I have stated, at the outset of my remarks, why I thought it was desirable on many grounds—and mainly on consideration of what has been said by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—that a wide scope should not be given on this occasion to the discussion. If the Government now think that a different course should be taken, we shall know how to judge on a future occasion how much value is to be attached to representations such as those made to us a very short time ago by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and we shall also be able to form some sort of an opinion on the relative value which is placed by Her Majesty's Government on the public interests and on Party convenience. No doubt, if Her Majesty's Government choose to put the question that I have raised aside by bringing forward a Vote of Confidence in themselves, it is perfectly within their competence to do so; and I have no doubt,
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    also, that it is within their competence to carry it. But I must say, in the interests of fair and free Parliamentary discussion, I think I have a right to protest against such a course as this, which, it seems to me, might be employed to cover or evade any breach whatever of the Constitution. These are all the remarks which I think it necessary to make with respect to the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman. I have endeavoured as well as I am able—and, I am afraid, most imperfectly—to lay before the House the great Constitutional issues which, I think, are raised by the proceedings of the Government in relation to the Constitution of this country; and I submit, with confidence, the Resolution of which I have given Notice to the judgment of the House.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That, by the Constitution of this Realm, no Forces may be raised or kept by the Crown in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the Dominions of the Crown, excepting only such Forces as may be actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."—(The Marquess of Hartington.)
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH, in rising to move the following Amendment:—
    "That this House, being of opinion that the constitutional control of Parliament over the raising and employment of the Military Forces of the Crown is fully secured by the provisions of the Law, and by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse Supplies, considers it to be unnecessary and inexpedient to affirm any Resolution tending to weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in the present state of Foreign affairs,"
    said: Sir, the last thing that I should wish to do would be to object to the raising and the full discussion of a Constitutional question, however inopportune the time, or however small the leisure at the disposal of this House. To us, at any rate, if to any Party in this House, the Constitution of our country should be dear; and all that I would say with regard to the action of the noble Marquess is, that I think it is a subject of congratulation for the present, and of happy augury for the future, that so strict and careful a jealousy for the English Constitution in matters relating to the control of the Army should be shown by those who are responsible for the Royal Warrant for the Abolition of Purchase. Now, the noble Marquess has raised this as a Constitutional question, and has complained, to

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    some extent, that his Motion should be treated by us as a Vote of Censure. I have, Sir, but to refer to the mode in which that Motion has been received by some of his own Followers, to the Notices which have been withdrawn in its favour, and the support which has been given to it by certain obscure sections of people in the country, to justify us in regarding it as something more than an abstract discussion of Constitutional questions, and as being accepted, if not intended, as a Vote of Censure on Her Majesty's Government. Now, on our behalf, I have to say that we do not admit the accuracy of the statement of Constitutional or legal doctrines contained in this Resolution. We do not accept the argument of the noble Marquess as to our position in connection with the question; but we maintain that we have acted in this matter for the best interest of the Empire, and that in that action we have not in one tittle violated either the Constitution or the law of the Realm. And I must add that, to some extent, the circumstances in which this Motion has been proposed, carry with them its refutation. For what has happened in "another place?" There, if anywhere, both Parties in the State can muster their leading Constitutional authorities. There, if anywhere, a violation of the Constitution—had any occurred—would be discussed and voted upon with perfect freedom, independence, and absence of Party feeling; yet there it is that no one has ventured to propose a Motion that, in this matter, Her Majesty's Government have acted in violation of the law and Constitution of the country; and the action of the noble Marquess himself is, I think, an additional proof of the weakness of his case—for I have that belief in the straightforwardness of his character, that I am confident that if he had really believed that we had violated either the Constitution or the law, he would put that issue plainly to the House, and would not have contented himself with a Resolution of the character of a Constitutional truism. Now, what are we accused of having done? In the first place, there is no question whatever of the movement of foreign troops. The noble Marquess referred to debates on this subject a century old—debates of which the results were scarcely favourable to his view; because, whether
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    in 1775 or 1794, both Houses of Parliament, by large majorities, approved the course of the Ministers of the day; and, when a Bill of Indemnity was proposed, perhaps under circumstances somewhat similar to those of the present Motion, by a noble Lord who was acting rather on account of the demands of his Followers than on his own view of the merits of the question, it was rejected by the House of Lords, not on account of the Preamble, but because it was inconsistent with the Vote they had come to, and no need whatever existed for the passing of such a Bill. I do not propose further to refer to those debates. The question now before the House is not a question of the movement of foreign troops, nor even of troops that can be separated from the other Forces of the Queen. What was the use of passing the India Act of 1858, if it did not assimilate and unite the East India Forces, whether European or Native, to the other Forces of the Crown? After having united these Forces into one Army, are we to be unable to use them? The argument of the noble Marquess, if carried to its full logical extent, would not merely hinder us from using the Native Indian Army, but must lead to its entire abolition; for what is the good of a Force that cannot be used by this country in the time, perhaps, of its greatest need? The Native Indian Army is as much a part of the Forces of the Crown as any other part of Her Majesty's Army; but we are told that the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown, under which the Army can be moved from one portion of the Empire to another, is limited in the case of these Indian Forces. Now, it rests with those who assert the existence of such a limitation to prove it; and I have failed to find, in the speech of the noble Marquess, any proof of the kind. I do not admit that there is anything in the Constitution or in the law which prohibits their movement to any part of Her Majesty's Dominions, unless it be to the United Kingdom. And, in connection with this subject, I must demur to the statement with which the Motion of the noble Marquess concludes, that the Forces actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Dominions are excepted from the consent of Parliament. In the first place, I would remind the noble Marquess that the consent of Parliament implies something more than a Vote by this House in Committee of Supply; it implies something

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    more than the mere recital of the numbers in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act; it implies an Act of Parliament; or, at any rate, a solemn Resolution arrived at by both Houses of Parliament. The noble Marquess admitted that it was not necessary to adhere strictly to the number of the Forces serving in this Kingdom enumerated in the Mutiny Act; but he added, that no increase to those numbers could be made without the consent of Parliament. Now, it is easy to prove that this enumeration in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act is really, so to speak, not an essential part of that Act, but a recitation of the Vote already arrived at by the House in Committee of Supply. Until 1717, the numbers were seldom mentioned in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act. From 1713 to 1812, the men serving in the Colonies, India, and the Peninsular, were not included. In later times, the numbers mentioned have not been invariably adhered to even in the United Kingdom. In 1820, many thousand men were raised beyond those mentioned in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act, Lord Palmerston defending it on the plea of urgency. In 1858, there were 15,000 men raised in excess of the numbers stated in the Preamble. And what happened in 1870? The Mutiny Act of that year was, as usual, passed early in the Session, and towards the close of the Session, in consequence of the state of foreign affairs, the right hon. Gentleman then Prime Minister, came down to the House of Commons and proposed, not a Vote of men, but a Vote of £2,000,000 to pay 20,000 men in addition to those already voted by the House. That Vote was passed by this House; but it cannot really be argued from that circumstance that the consent of Parliament was obtained to that increase of the Army, because a Vote of the House in Committee of Supply, as the hon. and learned Member for Oxford knows full well, is not the consent of Parliament. [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: The Appropriation Act.] Does the hon. and learned Gentleman mean to say that the inclusion of the £2,000,000 to pay these men in the Appropriation Act is the consent of Parliament?
    SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: As the right hon. Gentleman has appealed to me, I must say, that in the Appropriation Act of 1870, the number of men was mentioned as well as the money.
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I am unable to refer to the Act at present; but my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer says, to the best of his recollection, that the numbers were not mentioned at all. But even if they were, are we to be told that the scruples of the noble Marquess are sufficiently met by the mere mention of the numbers in a Schedule of the Appropriation Act, an Act which deals with all the annual expenditure voted by Parliament, and which the House of Lords cannot amend. However, that is a point which the hon. and learned Gentleman can take up when he addresses the House. It is not material to the point I am arguing—namely, that the numbers named in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act have, on several occasions, not been taken as limiting the strength of the Army in the United Kingdom. And, further, if we are to consider the actual wording of the noble Marquess's Resolution, and include within the Forces of the Crown all those that can properly be included in that designation, it is notorious that the Army Reserve, the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Indo-European Forces, never have been included in the numbers mentioned in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act. Therefore, it by no means follows that, because any part of Her Majesty's Forces is not included in the numbers named in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act, that it is not raised with the consent of Parliament. There can be no question whatever that the Indian Army, though not mentioned in the Mutiny Act, is raised with the full consent of Parliament. The Native Indian Army was raised at first by virtue of the Charter of the East India Company. That Charter was confirmed by a series of Acts of Parliament which empowered them to make laws and regulations for the discipline of the Army. I think the first Act giving that power was the 53 Geo. III., c. 153; but the next is one to which I would call the special attention of the House, because it is very material to a branch of the question we are discussing—that is, the 4 Geo. IV., c. 81. That Act confirmed the previous Acts by which power was given to the East India Company to make regulations for the government of their Native Indian Forces—
    "Whenever any portion of such Native troops shall be serving in any country or place out of the possessions or territories which are, or may

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    be, under the government of the East India Company, whether such be the Dominions of His Majesty or elsewhere."
    I think that clearly proves that the possible service of the Native Indian Army outside the possessions of the Company, and within the Dominions of His Majesty, was absolutely recognized by Parliament. The Act 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 85, gave power to the Government of India to make Articles of War, and provided for courts martial wherever the troops might be serving; and, under the Articles of War framed under that Act, the Native troops are to go wheresoever they may be ordered, by land or by sea, and are to obey all the commands of the officers set over them, and courts martial might be held outside the limits of India. And now, Sir, I come to the last Act dealing with the subject—the Government of India Act. By that Act, the Forces of the Company were transferred to Her Majesty the Queen, and the 55th section of that Act, to which the noble Marquess has referred, clearly contemplates the service of those troops without the Indian Possessions of Her Majesty, and without the consent of Parliament. ["No, no!"] The words are—
    "Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontier of such Possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues."
    That clearly implies, that in certain cases, these troops may be used beyond the limits of those Possessions without the special consent of Parliament. ["No, no!"] All that the section does is to provide that, except in such cases, the Revenues of India shall not be charged with the expense of using them, without the consent of Parliament. It does not hinder such use at any time, if the expense is otherwise borne; and anyone who will look at the debates on this section will see that it was carefully altered so as to meet objections which were made that, in its original shape, it interfered with the Prerogative of the Crown in moving these troops. But, if I turn from the law to the facts of the case, what do I find? I find that these Native Indian troops have frequently been so moved and used beyond the limits of Her
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    Majesty's Indian Empire. It is not necessary to refer to cases in which they have been used in time of war. I will simply mention cases in which they have been moved to other places in Her Majesty's Dominions in time of peace. There are two special instances of that having been done—in the first place, a regiment of Madras Native Infantry garrisoned Singapore, after it was transferred to the Colonial Department, from April 1867 to 1871; and Hong Kong was similarly garrisoned from 1868 to 1871. I do not know whether it will be argued that those places are within the old limits of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions. I am glad the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) is not going to raise that, because it is a technicality unworthy of him. These places were recognized at the time as within the Dominions of Her Majesty, but not within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions; for, in the Estimates of the respective years in which they were employed, these Forces are referred to as "maintained beyond the limits of the Indian Empire." Therefore, I say, as a matter of fact, it has been held to be absolutely legal and Constitutional, in time of peace, for the Crown to employ these Native Indian Forces within Her Majesty's Dominions outside the Indian Empire, provided always that they are paid for by Parliament. [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: They were voted.] I will come to the question of financial control later on. But more than this—I will venture to say that this Constitutional and legal objection raised by the Motion of the noble Marquess, has never been really accepted by any Party in this House till to-day; for what happened in 1868? A Committee was appointed by this House on the Motion of Major Anson, to inquire, amongst other matters, how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Native Indian Army in our Colonial and Military Dependencies. I find it stated in the Report that the inquiries of the Committee were chiefly limited to the expediency of such employment. It then discussed questions of health, cost, and efficiency, and referred to a scheme of Sir Richard Temple for a partial substitution of Indian for English troops in certain places, including Malta and Gibraltar; and, finally, it came to a conclusion against making any considerable

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    change in the proposed direction, mainly on the ground of adverse military opinions and doubts as to the financial value of the measure. But, in the Report of that Committee, which appears to have been agreed to by the noble Marquess, who was himself a Member of it, there is not a word which points to any Constitutional or legal objection. Now, perhaps, it may be said that the facts I have endeavoured to lay before the House, if they prove anything, prove too much, and that if there is this complete power in the Crown of employing these Indian troops within Her Majesty's Dominions outside the limits of Her Indian Possessions, they may be brought into the United Kingdom. The question now before us is not the question of their employment within the United Kingdom at all. Whatever Constitutional doctrine may be laid down on that point by no means necessarily applies to the case before us. The noble Marquess appeared to object to any possible difference from the interpretation which he was pleased to put upon the word "Kingdom" in the Bill of Rights. He argued that any commonsense interpretation of that term must be held to extend to all the Dominions of the Queen with the exception of India. I believe that such an interpretation is unwarranted in law, and inaccurate in fact; and I think I have a higher authority to appeal to on the subject than even the great authorities quoted by the noble Marquess. The provisions of the Bill of Rights, as they originally stood, and as they were quoted in many successive Mutiny Acts, use these words, and these only—namely, "this Kingdom;" and when Great Britain and Ireland were united, Parliament itself supplied a definite interpretation of the term; because, from the year 1801, you will find that in substitution for the words "this Kingdom" in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act, these words occur—"the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland;" and, therefore, I say, that the view put forward by the noble Marquess, with regard to all the Dominions of the Crown being comprehended in the words of the Bill of Rights, is entirely unwarranted in point of law. But, further, there has been since the authoritative interpretation to which I have alluded, an actual occurrence which, I think, shows how the country and Parliament viewed the matter. At the time of the Crimean
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    War, a German Legion was raised. In the Act authorizing that Legion to be raised, it was distinctly laid down that it should not serve within the United Kingdom. It did not serve within the United Kingdom; but it did serve in Malta, and it did serve at the Cape. In this instance, therefore, a clear distinction was purposely drawn between service in the United Kingdom and in other parts of Her Majesty's Dominions. But, besides being unwarranted in law, the view adopted by the noble Marquess is also inaccurate in fact; he asks this House to declare that—
    "By the Constitution of this Realm, no Forces may be raised or kept by the Crown in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the Dominions of the Crown, excepting only such Forces as may be actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
    Now, if we are to read these words literally, they must be subject to an interpretation which in his speech the noble Marquess repudiated. I cannot help thinking, that when he gave Notice of this Resolution, he had forgotten the existence of Forces which throughout our Colonies are raised for the service of the Crown—the existence of those Colonial Forces which may at some day play so important a part in the defence of our United Empire. He says that he does not mean to include the Colonial Militia; but there are Colonies in which not only a Militia, but a Force is raised in form the same as our standing Army, under the powers of the Colonial Parliaments and the Prerogative of the Crown. No doubt such Forces are at present small in numbers; but they are likely greatly to extend, with the increasing desire of the Colonies to take measures for their defence against any possible attack by an enemy of the Empire. In New South Wales and Victoria Forces are permanently maintained—mainly artillery—under the Colonial Acts, without the consent of the Imperial Parliament, for the defence of the Colonial harbours and towns liable not only for service in the Colony, but to embark and serve according to regulations to be made by the Governor; and, according to the words of the Resolution, it would be contrary to the Constitution of this Realm that these Forces should be raised and maintained. Now, I listened with great attention to the speech

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    of the noble Marquess to ascertain precisely where it was that this great Constitutional crime which he imagines us to have committed was to be found. I fail to detect exactly what that crime is; but it appears to me, from his speech, that the whole question at issue is one of the financial control of this House. I do not gather that he disputes that the movement of those troops was within the Prerogative of the Crown. I do not think he disputed that we were justified in advising that movement. I do not think he disputed—I believe he agreed—that we should be performing our duty if we proposed a Vote to the House to defray the expense of that movement. The whole point of his speech, it seems to me, turns upon this—that the Vote was not moved before these Forces were actually ordered to be sent to Malta. It is usual, I admit, and in every way proper and convenient, that, before expenditure is incurred, this House should be asked to sanction that expenditure. There have, however, been numerous cases in which that salutary doctrine has been departed from, on account of the special circumstances of the time, and we maintain that the special circumstances of the present case were such as to warrant our taking this action on our own responsibility before proposing a Vote to the House of Commons. We may, in this matter, have been somewhat to blame for having done that which, I am bound to say, we have very rarely felt disposed to do—for having accepted the advice of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. I find that the right hon. Gentleman, not very long ago, used the following words with reference to our action in proposing a Vote of Credit to this House:—
    "If a sudden emergency did arise, the Government must know their duty too well to wait for a Vote of this House. No Government worthy of its place but would, on a sudden emergency, give the orders which the circumstances of the time might demand, and then come down at the earliest moment in their power to ask the concurrence of the House in what they had done. Undoubtedly, that is the principle on which all Governments have acted in this country: a principle which has never been challenged."
    Now, that is precisely the course which we have adopted. The real difference between us and those who sit upon the other side of the House is this—that they disbelieve in the reality of the
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    present crisis. I admit that we are not at this moment—and I hope we may not be—in a state of war. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] I have not asked the House to consider the precedents under which, in a state of war, expenditure has been incurred by Governments before the sanction of this House was obtained. I may, however, be allowed to refer to one instance—that of the Abyssinian Expedition—in which an Expeditionary Force was sent out without a state of war existing, composed of Native Indian troops. That Force arrived in Abyssinia on the 26th of September, 1867, but the Vote of Credit was not moved until the 26th of November in the same year; yet I am not aware that Parliament at the time considered that any Constitutional or legal rule had been broken, or even infringed, by that course of proceeding. But, again, I say we differ from the noble Marquess and many of his Followers in our appreciation of the circumstances of the present crisis. It is not a time of war; but is it a time of peace, in the real meaning of that term? This House has sanctioned the Declaration on the part of Her Majesty that the present is a time of emergency; and it was because we believed that it was a time of emergency that we thought it necessary to show quickly and decisively to the world that we were able, if need be, to wield the Forces of an united Empire. The time that elapsed from the date when the decision was arrived at, to the date at which local circumstances in India rendered it necessary that the Expedition should sail, was but very short for the purpose of settling all the practical difficulties that had to be arranged; and that might, perhaps, have prevented the departure of the Expedition within the time allotted. What would have been said of us if we had come down to this House and announced to the world that this policy was to be adopted, and it had been afterwards found that the practical difficulties to which I have just referred had prevented its execution? We believed, that, in order to insure the successful carrying out of that policy, it was necessary that until the actual movement of the troops occurred, the sanction given by the Government should be kept secret; and, so far as we were concerned, we were anxious that that secrecy should be maintained

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    longer than turned out to be actually possible. We took this course, because we knew that, in spite of the attacks of those who have long been endeavouring to mislead foreign nations as to the real feeling of this country, and who now would seek to minimize her power and depreciate the valour and the loyalty of their fellow-subjects in India—our policy would receive the approbation of a patriotic Parliament. We knew this, because that policy was but the natural if not the necessary complement of what Parliament had already approved as the only one which was really likely to secure an honourable and a permanent peace. If the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition differs from the course which we have felt it our duty to pursue, I would venture to suggest that he might more properly meet it with an alternative policy than with a Constitutional Motion, which, after all, is but a shelter for all kinds of objectors to the policy of the Government. If he approves the course we have taken, surely we have a right to ask for his support. We have, at any rate, a right to ask the House if they mistrust us, to relieve us from those onerous and difficult duties which, for more than two years past, we have been endeavouring to perform. But if, in their opinion, we are to be maintained in the position which we have the honour to hold, then let them, by their votes, support us against the petty cavils, the ceaseless misrepresentations, and the vulgar personalities of those who appear to believe everything that is good of foreign Ministers, and nothing but what is bad of their own countrymen.
    MR. FAWCETT: Mr. Speaker, I rise to Order. I ask you, as a matter of Order, whether it is usual for a Member of this House, without specifying names, to charge a section of this House with vulgar personalities?
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH rose to continue his speech, but——
    MR. FAWCETTagain appealed to the Speaker to say whether the right hon. Baronet was in Order in using the words which he had just mentioned?
    MR. SPEAKER: I understood the right hon. Baronet was about to make an explanation of the words he used. The House will hear his explanation.
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I am bound to say that when I used those words I had in my mind not the
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    statement of any hon. Member made in this House or out of it, but personal attacks on the Government, and mainly on the Prime Minister, such as those which were made by members of a certain deputation who waited on a Member of the late Government—I forget who it was—and whose expressions I think fully deserved the application to them of the words which I employed. I appeal to this House to support the Government against attacks of this nature made out-of-doors, not so much because we who now sit here happen to be the existing Government of the day, as because I believe it to be the true English principle that in a time of national difficulty the Ministers of the Crown, as such, irrespective of differences in domestic politics, are entitled to the support of all patriotic citizens. Sir, I trust that this House, by rejecting the Motion of the noble Marquess, and adopting in lieu of it the Amendment which I have placed upon the Paper, will not only declare that, in its opinion, the hands of Her Majesty's Government ought not to be weakened in the present state of foreign affairs, but will also say, with no uncertain voice, that the policy we have ventured to adopt, while consistent with the Law and Constitution of England, is calculated to prove to the world that when danger threatens us the ties of our Empire will be drawn but closer and closer still; and that in defence of the cause, as we believe it to be, of right and freedom and of civilization, we can, if necessary, marshal, not only the inhabitants of the small Islands within these narrow seas, but the peoples of distant shores and varied climes, united by those ocean waves which are at once the symbol and the bond of the world-wide Dominions of our Queen.
    Amendment proposed,
    To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House, being of opinion that the constitututional control of Parliament over the raising and employment of the Military Forces of the Crown is fully secured by the provisions of the Law, and by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse Supplies, considers it to be unnecessary and inexpedient to affirm any Resolution tending to weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in the present state of Foreign affairs,"—(Sir Michael Hicks-Beach,)
    —instead thereof.
    Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, that the right hon. Baronet who had just sat down (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) had spoken of the strength of England; but there was something which was even more peculiar to her than her strength, and something, therefore, of which Britons were more proud—and that was that freedom which had been expressed in the maxims in which the ancient Constitutional liberties of the Realm were stated. It was to be regretted that the right hon. Baronet should have replied to the noble Marquess in a tone and manner so different from his, and that he should have ventured to have complained of the importation of personality into the question; when it had been imported into the debate, indeed, but only by himself. The right hon. Baronet had begun his speech by a tu quoque argument, and had attacked the occupants of the front Opposition bench for having strained the Prerogative some years ago in the issue of the Purchase Warrant. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had protested against their action at the time, and had spoken against it frequently; and when the present Government denounced, and, as he thought, rightly, Lord Granville's conduct, in not proposing to take a division in the Lords, it should be borne in mind that in the Purchase Warrant case the present Prime Minister had not ventured to divide the Commons. But when the right hon. Baronet was defending the conduct of the present Government in the present case, he should have seen that that conduct had to be defended, not to their Predecessors, but to the House of Commons as a whole. The acts of the late Ministry had nothing to do with the question now before the House; and if it were important that England should make a show of her strength, it was still more important, and far more likely to impress foreign nations, that she should stand forth as the champion of Constitutional freedom. What was the case presented by the right hon. Baronet against the terms of the Resolution of the noble Marquess? Almost in the same breath he said—"I do not admit the accuracy of the Constitutional doctrine contained in the Motion of the noble Marquess," and "the Resolution is a Constitutional truism!" Which did he mean? If it were constitutionally inaccurate, it hardly could be a Constitutional truism; and if it were a Constitutional
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    truism, it could hardly be constitutionally inaccurate. The right hon. Baronet then went on to allude to the so-called precedent of 1775. Now, the events of 1775 had no bearing whatever on the present case, although the debates of 1775 had a most important connection with it, as he would show. What was done in 1775 had no importance, because it was done in time of war, as both Parties in that day allowed; but what was said in 1775 was of the highest moment. The right hon. Baronet, with commendable ingenuity, had taken note of what was done, and had made no reference to what was said. The right hon. Baronet had completely misrepresented the scope of the Motion of the noble Marquess, when he had declared that it might "prevent a Government from using the Indian Army in the time of our greatest need." Not at all. No one wished to prevent a Government from using the Indian Army in a time of need. That our Indian troops might be employed in time of war was perfectly admitted by hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House, and even their employment in time of peace was not objected to, provided only that the previous consent of Parliament was asked. The right hon. Baronet had then gone on to contend that there was nothing in the Bill of Rights to prevent the use of Indian troops in any portion of the Dominions of the Crown, except only in the United Kingdom, and upon this point he must be reminded, not of what had been done in 1775, but of what had in that year been said. The speeches, from which he would quote, were the speeches of two legal Peers of the highest name and fame, one of whom was, indeed, Lord Chancellor at the time. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had some respect for the legal dicta of the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Colonies; but he had even higher respect for the direct opinion of the Lord Chancellor of the day, directly given by way of admission against his own case when arguing in support of the Prerogative; given amid general assent, and in terms the accuracy of the report of which could not be impeached, inasmuch as the words were over and over again quoted and referred to in the course of the debates. Lord Chancellor Bathurst [Parl. History, vol. xviii. p. 815] distinctly admitted that the words "within the Kingdom" applied to Gibraltar and

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    Malta, and that there was in 1775 "a rebellious war" also "within the Kingdom"—that is to say, in the Colonies in America. The right hon. Baronet next came to the so-called precedent of 1870, and displayed his utter inability to grasp the question that was at issue, by failing to see that the case of 1870 told altogether against his view. Why, in 1870, the number of men—20,000—was voted by the House, and, after being voted, was distinctly referred to in an Appropriation Act. He would make a fair offer to the Government—let them now place the number of men distinctly in the Estimates; let them refer to it again in the Appropriation Act, and not another word should be said upon the question of legality, although there would remain much to be said upon the Constitutional aspect of their policy, and upon the discourtesy with which they had treated Parliament. The right hon. Baronet had next taken up a different line of defence, and one inconsistent with that which he had adopted in the previous portion of his speech. He seemed to have tried a number of arguments which answered one another, in the hope that, if all but one should be upset, some single one might yet remain which would hold good. After arguing that the Bill of Rights did not prevent the Crown from raising an Army in time of peace anywhere in the Realm outside of the United Kingdom, he proceeded, a little later, to contend that even the Indian Army itself was raised with the consent of Parliament. That contention was utterly untrue. Parliament neither voted the number of men nor paid them. But, said the right hon. Baronet, their service outside of India was always contemplated. No doubt it was in time of war, but the present was a time of peace. The right hon. Baronet further contended that the words "other sudden and urgent necessity" covered the point. In the first place, he would reply, without going into the question of whether any "sudden and urgent necessity" existed in Europe at the present time, that the word "other," taken in connection with the word "invasion," which preceded it, and which, undoubtedly, applied to India alone, showed that the meaning of the words "other sudden and urgent necessity," was a sudden and urgent necessity applying directly to India. What was the clause? A clause, declaring
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    that the troops when employed outside of India should not be paid by India except in certain cases. Those cases, of course, must be cases which referred to India. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] He was glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman, who, in 1858, had first brought before Parliament the necessity for such a clause, expressed his full assent to that view. Moreover, if it should be again contended that the words "sudden and urgent necessity" applied to the needs of the Empire in general, he would further reply that Parliament was sitting when Government decided to use these troops, and that to Parliament the question should have been referred. The right hon. Baronet then came to certain cases of the use outside of India of Indian troops. He first named the case of a Madras regiment which served at Singapore from 1867 to 1871. Those troops, he would point out, were left in Singapore, which had been part of India. It would be found that they were mentioned in the Estimates voted by that House. The right hon. Baronet then alluded to the case of some troops who served at Hong Kong at the same time. They also were mentioned in the Estimates. The Amendment of the right hon. Baronet said that the control of Parliament over these troops was secured by the provisions of the law, and by the power of the House to refuse Supplies. What law? No law but the Bill of Rights, which the Government had broken. What power to refuse Supplies? On the 3rd of March, 1864, that eminent Conservative Minister, General Peel, had, by anticipation, directly answered the eminent, but less eminent, Conservative Minister who had just spoken—
    "If any part of the Indian Native Army could be employed without a Vote"—
    and by these words they would see directly that General Peel had meant a previous Vote—
    "of this House, those troops are altogether removed from Parliamentary control. In the case of ordinary troops there are two checks—the Mutiny Act, and the money voted by Parliament for the pay of the troops. Neither of these checks apply to Indian troops. Native Indian troops are not liable to the Mutiny Act, being expressly excluded from the operation of that measure; and the House has no control over Native troops through its privilege as to money Votes, because those troops are paid in the first instance by the Indian Government,

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    and the expenditure never comes under the notice of the British Parliament until long after it has been incurred."
    The right hon. Baronet had next referred to the Report of a Committee which had inquired, in 1867, into the employment of Indian troops outside of India. His noble Friend the Leader of the Opposition and his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) had both of them been Members of that Committee, and had been present at the discussion of its Report. They would correct him if he were wrong; but he had read the Report of that Committee, and the evidence submitted to it, and it was obvious that the Committee had all along assumed that Parliament should be consulted in any arrangement which might be made. [Mr. CHILDERS: Hear, hear!] It had never occurred to that Committee that any sane Minister would ever suggest a contrary course. The right hon. Baronet had then referred to the so-called precedent of the German Legion. Now, most of the "precedents" of the right hon. Baronet failed only in a single point. It was true that that point was invariably essential; but, in the dearth of precedents, he could not afford to be too particular. This German Legion precedent failed in every point, and the right hon. Baronet ought to be fairly ashamed of himself for having mentioned it. It was raised in time of war, the number of men were specified and voted, not one single step was taken without previous communication to Parliament, and the whole of the conditions of the service of the Legion were laid down in an Act of Parliament which was passed before it had been raised. At last, however, the right hon. Baronet thought that he had found a precedent which really did apply. There was "a small Artillery Force in Victoria and in New South Wales." He was not in a position to impugn the accuracy of that statement. How many of them were there? Did the right hon. Baronet think that there were 100? Would he swear that there were 50? He was Colonial Secretary, and he ought to know. Was it not the case that this Colonial Artillery Force was a local Force, serving under a Colonial Act, which would prevent their being employed outside the Colony, not only in time of peace but even in time of war itself, without the consent of the Colonial Parliament? After concluding his argument with regard to the Colonial
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    Force, the right hon. Baronet turned to the case of Abyssinia. Abyssinia was not "within the Realm," and the times were times of war. The Abyssinian case was certainly not a case of increasing the standing Army within the Realm in time of peace. It should be observed, that at the very same moment Indian troops were being employed at Hong Kong, and that these, so employed in British Territory, were being voted by the House. Moreover—[Hansard, vol. cxc. p. 359]—the present Leader of the House came down to the House and apologized, over and over again, for the illegality which he had committed in the Abyssinian case, and threw himself upon the hands of the House, supplicating Parliament in the most humble terms. The point upon which the Opposition were now insisting was this legal and Constitutional point—that, never in time of peace, and not even in time of war if Parliament were sitting, and à fortiori never in time of peace when Parliament was sitting, ought the standing Army, authorized with special regard to the state of our foreign relations and to the needs of our Colonies and fortresses, to be increased without the previous consent of Parliament. The right hon. Baronet, who had first denied "the accuracy of the Constitutional doctrine contained in the Motion of the noble Marquess," and had then proceeded to call it "a Constitutional truism," had left the House in the dark as to how far he really contested the Constitutional principle for which the Opposition were contending. The works of those great authorities, Hallam and De Lolme, clearly showed that the Resolution of the noble Marquess exactly expressed the Constitutional doctrine applicable to the present case. These were the words of De Lolme—
    "The King cannot raise Land Forces without consent of Parliament. In these times, however, when it is become a custom with Princes, …. Parliament has thought proper to establish a standing body of troops. … But this Army is only established for one year; and at the end of that term it is (unless re-established) ipso facto disbanded; and as the question which then lies before Parliament is not whether the Army shall be dissolved, but whether it shall be established anew as if it had never existed, any one of the three branches of the Legislature may, by its dissent, hinder its continuance."
    The right hon. Baronet, in his Amendment,

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    spoke first of law, and next of the Votes of Supply. As had been pointed out, it was impossible to discern from his speech what law he could mean, except it were the Bill of Rights, the provisions of which had been infringed. But the contention of his speech appeared to be that the real control of Parliament lay in its power to refuse Supply. Now, it must be remembered, that this power, if unaccompanied by other forms of control, could be evaded—for instance, by private subscription, such as that proposed by Pitt in 1794, by supply granted by a Colony, by subsidy from an Ally, or by requisitions upon an occupied country. Let them suppose, for instance, that the Indian troops were to be detained in Egypt, and paid by the Khedive in return for a guarantee of the Sovereignty of Egypt to himself and heirs—such an employment of Indian troops, according to the right hon. Baronet, would be Constitutional, although no Estimate would be laid, no Supply would be asked, and no control of Parliament would exist. It was clear that, even in a fuller sense than had been argued by General Peel, the voting of Supply was an illusory manner of exercising the control of the House of Commons over the numbers of the Indian troops. In 1816, when a Treaty was signed between the Crown of England and the Crown of France, by which an English garrison in Paris and in Northern France was to be maintained at the expense of France, the English House of Commons insisted that the number of men to be so employed in France and paid by France should be voted by that House. The dangers which lay in the contrary course, dangers not probable but possible, conceivable, against which it was the duty of the House to guard, could only be effectively prevented by compelling Government, in all cases, to ask the previous consent of Parliament to any augmentation of the Forces of the Crown. If such a step were taken suddenly, on a great emergency—a really great one—Government must come for a Bill of Indemnity, which, if their action had been defensible, would be freely granted by the House. If the King were to be allowed to increase the standing Army within the Realm in time of peace, without previous reference to Parliament, he was thus permitted to impose charges
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    upon his people without the assent of Parliament. For Parliament could not refuse to pay the soldiers who, in obedience to military commands, had been brought within the Realm. The Government had no kind of right to pre-assume the approval of that House, to take a novel step which could not be undone without punishing innocent persons and destroying the credit of the Realm. There was behind the present case this fact—that if the House refused to supply money for the payment of these troops, the expense would illegally be charged upon the Revenues of India—a starving country, which had been suffering from famine within the year, and the finances of which were in a condition of decay. If there were put before the House the alternative of either condemning the illegal action which the Ministers had committed, or of illegally burdening the Revenues of India with this charge, there could be no doubt what course generous Englishmen would adopt. He thought it a grave stretching of the principles of the Constitution to bring the Indian troops to Europe on the assumption that the consent of Parliament would be given; but, if angry debates should arise on the occasion, Members opposite would have to thank their Leader, because of the light manner in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had treated the matter at the first meeting of the House after the Recess. It was the right hon. Gentleman who had caused the proposal of the Motion of the noble Marquess. The Opposition had been placed by him under the necessity of either allowing dirt to be thrown on their principles, or else of exposing a Resolution, expressing the high Constitutional view, to the chance of rejection upon the votes of a docile band. The Amendment of the right hon. Baronet was what the lawyers termed a plea in confession and avoidance. As between the Amendment and the Resolution of the noble Marquess, which way would the great authorities on the English Constitution pronounce themselves were they present in the House? Which way would Hallam vote, if he were there? It might be answered that Hallam was a Whig; but, to be frank, most men had of late times come to think that the Whig view of the Constitution, however much it had been ridiculed in the early novels of the present Premier, was

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    nevertheless in these days accepted by both sides. Hallam's History, for instance, Whig book though it was, was the text book of both the older Universities; and the modern Tory voters, who last week had given so triumphant a majority at Oxford to their side, had certainly, many of them, been trained on Hallam in doctrines very different to those which were being taught them by their Leaders now. There was a passage in Hallam, of which he would remind them in case they had forgotten it, in which he declared that that was unconstitutional which was "a novelty of much importance, tending to evade the existing law." Those words appeared exactly to describe the present proceeding of the Government. There ought immediately to be issued, for the use of the next generation of Conservative Undergraduates, an expurgated edition of Hallam, in which this and many other leading passages would be left out, even if Oxford and Cambridge were not compelled to accept as a brand-new text book, the Constitution according to Lord Beaconsfield. To turn for a few moments to the historical view of this question, let him call the attention of the House to some words which fell from Lord Winchilsea in 1734, and which were exactly applicable to the present situation—
    "If Parliament should come into the practice of raising phantoms in the air, as an excuse for their granting extraordinary powers to Ministers of State, the liberties of this nation will then begin to stand upon a very precarious footing."—[Parl. History, vol. ix. p. 556.]
    Those debates of 1734 did not, as a whole, help them much, for that was done which had not been done on the present occasion—namely, the previous consent of Parliament was asked to the augmentation of the Forces; but there was much in the language which was made use of in the debates that was of the highest moment. They should not lightly forget, for instance, these words of Shippen—
    "We all know how difficult it is to refuse to the King upon the Throne those favours or powers which have been granted to his Predecessor; and, therefore, it has always been the established maxim of every honest man, who had a seat in either House of Parliament, not to grant to a good King those powers which a bad King might make ill-use of."—[Ibid. 583.]
    As for the precedent of 1775, he had
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    pointed out already that it did not apply; but the debate of 1775 was worthy of the most careful consideration by the House. The doctrine which he collected, by reading the India Act of 1858 in connection with the debates of 1775, was the following:—The territory of the Crown was, for military purposes, of two kinds; there was what might be called the Parliamentary Kingdom, garrisoned by troops subject to the English Mutiny Act, and there was India. Parliament left it to the Crown to keep up in India such Military Forces as the Advisers of the Crown thought fit. As regarded the Parliamentary Empire, the countries garrisoned by troops subject to the English Mutiny Act—or, in other words, the whole of the Dominions of the Crown, except India—Parliament did not leave it to the Advisers of the Crown to settle what Forces should be kept up; but Parliament itself, after hearing the statement of the Secretary of State for War, annually considered what Force was necessary, taking into account all the circumstances of the case and the state of international relations. Having considered all those facts, Parliament annually voted the number of men, and then passed an Act, the Preamble of which recited that number, and exhaustively specified and explained the whole of the reasons for which the men were needed. It must be obvious that if the Crown could bring the non-Parliamentary Army, the numbers of which were not voted, and which might be indefinitely great, into the Parliamentary territory without the previous consent of Parliament, all their present trouble—annual trouble—over the number of men and the Preamble of the Mutiny Bill was mere idle waste of time. Parliament, in sanctioning the numbers of the Parliamentary Army, had regard to the need for placing garrisons at Halifax, Bermuda, the Channel Islands, the Cape, Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Ceylon, the Straits, Hong Kong, Vancouver Island, and so forth; but, if what Ministers had done was legal, the whole of these garrisons might be brought into Great Britain or into Ireland without the previous consent of Parliament and replaced by Indian troops. The right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Colonies had said that Parliament had approved of what was done in 1775. Now, it was

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    quite true that the Bill of Indemnity, which was assented to by Lord North, and which passed through the Lower House, was thrown out in the Lords; but, in 1775, the Electoral troops of George III., who had been sent without the previous assent of Parliament to garrison Gibraltar and Minorca, had been sent there in time of war, for it was admitted on both sides that the American Rebellion constituted a state of war. Parliament, too, was not sitting in 1775 at the time the troops were sent, and as soon as it met, it was informed of what had been done by means of a Royal Message. Parliament had been treated with vastly greater courtesy in 1775 than had been extended to it now. On the consideration of the Message of the King, a Resolution had been moved by the Duke of Manchester, which declared—
    "That the bringing into any part of the Dominions of the Crown of Great Britain the Electoral Troops of His Majesty, …. without the previous consent of Parliament, is dangerous and unconstitutional."—[Parl. History, vol. 18, p. 801.]
    In the Commons, the Whig Motion had been in the following words:—
    "That the introducing the Hanoverian Troops into any part of the Dominions belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, without the consent of Parliament first had and obtained, is contrary to law."—[Ibid, p. 818.]
    How were these Resolutions met? Lord North moved that the measure was one—
    ''Demanding more despatch than was consistent with waiting for the assembling of Parliament."
    That defence could not be made on this occasion. Parliament was actually sitting when the movement was decided on by the Cabinet, and there was no question of the immediate employment of these troops. The Government of 1775 most certainly had not taken the line of the right hon. Baronet the present Secretary of State as to the scope of the Bill of Rights. It might be added, that, even with regard to a time of war, the Tory doctrine was not admitted by the leading Whigs in 1775. The Duke of Manchester, omitting the words "in time of war," declared—
    "From every instance I have submitted to you, and from constant practice, I must infer that the King has no right to maintain, in any
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    part of the Dominions of the British Crown, any Troops, other than are consented to by Parliament, both as to number and to nation."
    The Protest of the Lords, which was signed by the Dukes of Richmond, Portland, Grafton, Manchester, and Devonshire, by the Marquess of Rockingham, and by many other Peers of great Constitutional authority, declared—
    "That Hanoverian Troops should, at the pleasure of the Minister, be considered a part of the British Military Establishment …. tends wholly to invalidate the wise and salutary declaration of the grand fundamental law, which has bound together the rights of the subject and the succession of the Crown."
    Lord North, in answer to these speeches and declarations, had at first maintained, but, ultimately, by consenting to a Bill of Indemnity, had half given up, a Prerogative which had gone to this extent, that in time of War the Crown might employ troops out of the United Kingdom without the previous consent of Parliament. But they were not now at war, and he ventured to maintain that the Resolution of the noble Marquess, containing, as it did, the words "in time of peace," would have received the assent even of Lord North. Mr. Clode, who was the chief authority upon The Military Forces of the Crown, declared that—
    "It can no longer be questioned that the assent of Parliament is needed to the continuance of any armed Force within the Realm in time of peace."
    He explained that the Vote and the Preamble of the Mutiny Act, taken together, gave to the Crown the right to employ in the Army the number of men specified, and no more. And he then said—
    "If ever the Crown should intentionally retain in arms a larger number of Forces than has been agreed upon, the Minister upon whose advice this course had been adopted would be open to impeachment."
    These were not times in which there was such danger of the invasion of the liberty of the subject that any man would seriously propose the impeachment of a Minister; but, nevertheless, they ought to guard against the setting of a mischievous precedent. He would make but one further allusion to the debates of 1775, and that would be a quotation. Serjeant Adair, a great Constitutional authority, had in that debate made use of words which, in another sense, were applicable to the existing situation, when he had said—

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    "Of all Foreign Troops, the most dangerous are those who are the subjects of the King, and not of … Parliament."
    And he might add that, as regarded the employment of the Native Indian troops, they were calling in men who, whatever might be their military virtue, could neither esteem nor understand the laws and liberties of the English people. Besides the debates of 1775, there were many others of a later date, in which similar doctrines had been accepted by both sides. For instance, those of 1794 and those of 1798, when Parliament recognized that even voluntary offers of aid from British subjects in time of war required Parliamentary sanction. In 1803 it had, indeed, been allowed that the number of ordinary volunteers need not be limited by Statute, because any volunteer not on actual service could resign without the assent of the Crown. In 1816 there occurred the debates to which he had already briefly alluded, and to which he would now recur; only mentioning in passing that in 1800, and again in 1806, Mr. Pitt came down to the House and asked the previous assent of Parliament to the augmentation of the Forces of the Crown, even though it was time of war. In 1816, it would be remembered that it had been arranged between the English and French Governments that the English garrisons of Paris and of Picardy were to be paid by France. The right hon. Baronet maintained that the necessity for voting Supply was sufficient to meet all cases; but, certainly, it did not meet the case of 1816; and Parliament, in 1816, insisted that the number of men intended for these English garrisons to be paid by France, even though they were not to be maintained within the Realm, should previously be voted by that House. There were many other cases which went to show that the financial control referred to in the Amendment was not enough. He would mention one which occurred in the recollection of many hon. Members still in that House. He referred to the Chelsea Pensioners Bill, which was opposed by Mr. Cobden and by the right hon. Gentleman who now sat for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright); and, although the number of pensioners was not at first stated in the Bill, yet it was afterwards specified in deference to the objections that were raised. All the later debates that had been referred to
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    bore upon the state of things in time of war. There was one case which had not been named, which was not a case of war, and which might possibly be referred to as a precedent. He meant the occupation of Quettah—which was outside India—by Indian troops two years ago. Quettah was not "within the Realm." No one could possibly maintain that the Bill of Rights applied to Quettah; but it was certainly his view that the charging on the Revenues of India of the expenses of the Quettah operations was a breach of the 55th clause of the Indian Government Act. He hoped that if the Quettah case were to be quoted as a precedent, the question of its legality would yet be brought forward and carefully debated by the House. To return to the main question, the old Constitutional doctrine took no account of any differences between any one part and any other part of the Dominions of the Crown. In the days of Lord North, it was generally allowed that "the King's Prerogative is no greater in one part of his Dominions than another." In the panic of 1858, they had unfortunately changed all this, and accepted the direct government by the Crown of a despotically-ruled community, the laws of which were not the laws of England. This fact was first brought home to the people of England by the adoption, under the auspices of the present Minister, of a despotic title to apply to that portion of the Dominions of the Crown. Parliament was now asked to condone a fresh act of the same kind, but one taken without even the observance of Constitutional form, and which, if approved, would bring about a permanent confusion between the Parliamentary and the non-Parliamentary portions of the Realm. He had tried to keep closely to the Constitutional argument; but, in replying to that which had been urged upon the other side, there were two special circumstances of the present case to which it was necessary to allude. They were told that there was a need for secrecy. For what purpose? These troops were not to act. It was by the mere bringing of them that Russia was to be impressed. Surely, the impression would have been more profound had a communication been made to Parliament by means of Message, and the consent of Parliament obtained? The ground for secrecy given by the Chancellor of

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    the Exchequer was no military necessity, but the saving of a few thousand pounds in transport. The House had already been told by the highest authorities upon the subject that the money had not been saved, and could not have been saved; and, even if there were this reason for the concealment for about a fortnight, while the arrangements for the transport were being made, there could be no such reason for continuing the concealment up to the Easter Recess, when it was certain that the news would become known. He could not but think, judging from the date at which one of the ships of Lord John Hay's Squadron had sailed with sealed orders, which had ultimately proved to be orders to convoy the Indian troops back to Malta, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer's memory must have failed him when he had given the House the dates a few days before that time. The second circumstance peculiar to the present case, which must also be briefly mentioned, was that it had become clear that the Crown was maintaining in India—a famine-stricken, an almost bankrupt, and a wholly unrepresented country—a Native Army larger than was needed for its defence. They were, in short, burdening India for Imperial purposes with a charge which, from a purely Indian point of view, must be a needless charge. In conclusion, he complained, in the first place, of the illegality which had been committed; in the second, that, even according to the views of the Tories of the last century, a grossly unconstitutional method of proceeding had been followed; and, in the third, that an act of great discourtesy had been done towards Parliament.
    MR. GOLDNEYsaid, he was prepared to argue that the question of the Bill of Rights, on which the whole issue now before the House turned, was much more limited than had been assumed by preceding speakers. The wording of the Preamble of the Bill of Rights showed that it was intended to be limited to this Kingdom alone; while, on the other hand, under the existing and preceding Mutiny Acts, the Indian Forces, having been directly recognized by Parliament as the Forces of the Kingdom, were placed under the Prerogative of the Crown. In the early Mutiny Acts the number was not mentioned. The present
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    Act stated that it was necessary that a body of Forces should be employed for the safety of the Kingdom and the defence of the Possessions of Her Majesty, and that the whole should number 135,452 men "exclusive of those actually serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions;" and the Prerogative of the Crown obviously gave the Queen the power of moving these latter as she might think fit. In 1867, after the Indian Forces had become part of the Forces of the nation, Colonel Anson moved for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire how far they should be employed elsewhere than in India, and no person ever questioned the right of the Crown to deal with these Forces, and when the subject was brought before the Committee, no question was raised as to whether such employment would be unconstitutional. It was proved, in the course of the evidence taken before that Committee, that the Governor General of India had actually made provision that the troops should serve outside of India by issuing a General Order refusing the services of anyone who would not undertake at the time of enlistment to serve anywhere as required. Beyond that, Sir Richard Temple had proposed to send Indian troops to China, Africa, Malta, and Gibraltar. The question had been raised whether, under the Bill of Rights, the Queen could exercise Her Prerogative, without the consent of Parliament, in moving these Indian troops. Now, he contended that the Forces set out in the Mutiny Bill comprised not only those there enumerated, but the troops employed in India; and it had been clearly contemplated by the authorities in India that any troops employed there might be called upon to serve in any portion of the Queen's Dominions; because, under the Indian Act, the Governor General had the power to frame Articles of War binding on the Native troops, in whatever part of the world they might from time to time be called upon to serve. He contended, therefore, that it was in the power of the Crown, seeing that it was contemplated that Indian troops might be employed to garrison our Mediterranean fortresses, to do all that they had done. The idea was not new, but the opposition was entirely novel, and was a condemnation of powers which had hitherto never been challenged. The

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    Resolution was framed on the assumption that the Mutiny Act, by containing the word "excepting," did not confer this power; but he, on the other hand, held that it did not comprise that word, and that the control of Parliament had been asserted and recognized in a practical way in the measures taken, and, believing it inexpedient to affirm any Resolution weakening the hands of Her Majesty's Government, he had no difficulty in cordially supporting the Amendment of the right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). He was unable to see that the Government had in any way exceeded the legal and Constitutional limits within which they were permitted to act in this matter, and he hoped that that would be the view which the House would take of the question submitted to it.
    After a pause,
    MR. SPEAKER MR. SPEAKER rose to put the Question, when
    MR. DILLWYN MR. DILLWYN rose and said, that although he had not intended to address the House, he could not allow the debate to fall through unexpectedly. The Resolution submitted to the House by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition asserted a great Constitutional question, and ought not to be passed by lightly whilst hon. Members were having refreshment. He declined to accept the doctrine of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Goldney), and supported the Resolution, on the ground that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government had violated the Bill of Rights in a particular not second in importance to anything in that Bill. He was surprised at the manner in which the Government met the charge. Without attempting to deny the violation of the Bill of Rights, they simply contended that it was not such as to call for discussion or condemnation. It was true, no doubt, that no penalty was attached to this particular violation in the Bill of Rights, and so far it might be contended that it was not a breach of the law; but the Bill of Rights suggested, instead of penalties, an appeal to the House of Commons, and that appeal was now made. As the violation had been made by a Conservative Government, they had no alternative but to re-assert the principle in the strongest possible manner, without proceeding for pains and penalties
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    against the Government. To his mind, their Empire in India, and their interests in the East, were second by far to the interests of the people of this country, and, therefore, he did lay great stress upon the assertion of this principle. The right hon. Mover of the Amendment did not condescend to argue whether the Government had violated the Bill of Rights; indeed, his Amendment fell little short of an admission that it had been violated, while it assumed that the present securities were sufficient to insure Parliament having ample Constitutional control over the Military Forces of the country. But there must be no assumption of the kind. It was their duty to watch with a jealous eye all encroachments on the rights of the people; and it was with that view only that they now took the course they did. He (Mr. Dillwyn) did not know what greater security Parliament had over the Military Forces by voting money than was secured by the Bill of Rights. If the Amendment were carried, it would be tantamount to an admission that, in certain cases, the Bill of Rights might be violated with impunity, and they did not know in what other particular it might not next be infringed by Her Majesty's Government. If it were allowed to be violated in one instance, it was impossible to say where the evil would stop; they would find themselves at the beginning of a downward course in the direction of sacrificing the rights of the people to the Prerogative of the Crown. There was no doubt that the country was now governed by a Sovereign who would not willingly do wrong; but that was no reason for not preventing any Constitutional right being trenched upon, or any new Prerogative being set up, because some future Sovereign might not be so scrupulous. There was no doubt that what was now claimed as a Prerogative of the Crown was an innovation, though it had been brought in by a Conservative Government. He hoped and believed that many hon. Gentlemen opposite would give a non-Party vote on a question which involved the rights and privileges of the people, and which was a distinct violation of the Constitution.
    MR. MAC IVERsaid, that like the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn), he desired to see a non-Party division on the question, although he thought there was nothing which hon. Gentlemen opposite

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    less contemplated. If there were really a non-Party division, almost the whole House of Commons would go into the same Lobby in support of Her Majesty's Government; but he feared that many Liberal Members who outside the House, in their private capacity, said there was little difference of opinion between moderate men on both sides with reference to this subject, and that the Government had done their best, and the Liberals could not have done better, would vote against the Government on the present occasion. This was one of a long-continued series of attacks on the Government for no other than Party reasons; and it seemed to him that hon. Members opposite took up the Turkish question for the purpose of troubling the Government, and, if possible, to obtain their places—desirous to get back to power, no matter by what means. With gradually diminishing minorities, however, these attacks must, sooner or later, come to an end. He believed that in their hearts nine-tenths of the House of Commons and of the people completely approved of what the Government had done. The Government had carried out a wise measure in a most successful way. They had picked up all the useful vessels they could get at Bombay; they had taken all the available troops, and had sent them off at once; and the operation had been as successful as the best friends of the Government could wish. Hardly any hon. Member representing a large constituency having relations with Eastern trade, was opposed to the Government, and the opinions of the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) had been repudiated in that town. He admitted that the Government might have obtained transports for the Indian troops at a cheaper rate from London, Calcutta, or Madras; but if they had not secured such as were on the spot, the effect of the Expedition would have been prejudiced. The moral effect of what the Government had done was, as had been ably put by the right hon. Gentleman, that it at once showed the world that it knew its own mind, that it was strong, and would use the resources of their united Empire to defend interests which were equally dear to India and Great Britain.
    MR. OSBORNE MORGANsaid, the question, though important, was exceedingly simple, and it was purely legal
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    and Constitutional. The right hon. Baronet the Colonial Secretary (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) had achieved nothing less by his Amendment than the distinction of adding a new chapter to the Constitution. The proposition which the right hon. Baronet laid down came to this—that because the House could undoubtedly refuse to vote Supply, therefore it was competent to the Crown to raise 100,000 men in India, or, as far as he (Mr. Osborne Morgan) could see, anything else, without the consent of Parliament, and bring those troops to Malta, Gibraltar, the Isle of Man, or the Channel Islands, in sight of these shores, provided only they did not land them in Great Britain or Ireland. He must say a more startling proposition, coming as it did from a Leader of the Constitutional Party, he never heard. Those who followed the right hon. Baronet, however, did not go so far, though they contended that the Government might do anything, provided, after they had done it, they obtained the consent of Parliament. Now, that was not his notion of the Constitution; it was not his view, though the Constitution was intended to operate prospectively, and not retrospectively. No doubt, salus populi suprema lex was the first maxim of their law and their Constitution, and he did not deny that circumstances might arise which would justify high-handed, arbitrary, even illegal and unconstitutional, acts, for necessity had no law; but would anyone seriously and honestly assert that any such necessity as that had arisen in the present case? Would anyone assert that, in time of peace, when Parliament was sitting, the safety of the nation—for it was necessary to put it as high as that—required that these Indian troops should be sent to Malta, not only without communicating the fact to Parliament, not only without obtaining the consent of Parliament, but with an affectation of secrecy, and an almost ostentatious disregard of the wishes and opinions of Parliament in the matter. Were the Government afraid of Russia, or of Parliament, or of both? He never saw such a disproportion of means to an end as in this case. It was a most monstrous thing that for the sake of getting transports cheap, for the sake of saving a few hundred pounds, or a few days at most, the Government should value, as

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    they seemed to have done, the British Constitution at the price of a bag of old clothes. Talk of driving a coach and four through an Act of Parliament? Why, the Colonial Secretary had driven a coach and six through the whole Constitution. Had the Crown the right to take 7,000 men from India? If so, it had the right to take 70,000 or 700,000, if it could get so many. If that plea were put aside, the question resolved itself into a purely Constitutional question. He knew the difficulty of arguing a grave Constitutional question before a popular Assembly. Such questions had always been, and always would be, debated and decided on Party lines; and, unfortunately, when a lawyer tried to address an audience as if they were a bench of Judges, he was told he was splitting straws and getting into Nisi Prius. But he would not be deterred by any such considerations from stating his belief that this course on the part of the Government to be equally opposed to the letter of their law and to the spirit of their Constitution. India was excluded from the Mutiny Act because she had a Government of her own, a Budget of her own, and a military system of her own. Under the Preamble of the Mutiny Act, there was a contract between the Crown on the one side and Parliament on the other. Mr. Clode, in his work on Military Law—a great authority—said—
    ''This limitation created a Parliamentary compact that no larger number of soldiers than are here stated should he continued on foot by the Crown during the period of time to which the Act had reference."
    It was very well to say that was a lawyers' crotchet, but it was a crotchet which had cost one King his head and another his Crown. He maintained that the words in the Bill of Rights "within the Kingdom" applied to other parts of Her Majesty's Dominions besides this country, and that was the opinion of Lord Camden and Lord Bathurst. From Magna Charta downwards their Constitution had abhorred military law, which only existed on sufferance in England, and, but for the Mutiny Act, the putting under that law of any subject of the Realm would be an illegal act. The exigencies of the State requiring a certain number of men to be kept in the Army, Parliament every year gave permission for the levy of that number of
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    men, and no more. From the recitals of the Mutiny Act, it appeared that two distinct propositions were there maintained—firstly, the financial right of control possessed by Parliament, which applied to every branch of the Service, civil as well as military; and, secondly, that no man could be placed under martial law in time of peace without the consent of Parliament, which was only given from year to year. Hallam in his Constitutional History, said—
    "These are the two effectual securities against military power; first, that no pay can he issued to the troops without a previous authorization by the Commons in a Committee of Supply, and by both Houses in an Act of Appropriation; and, secondly, that no officer or soldier can he punished for disobedience, nor any court martial held without the annual re-enactment of the Mutiny Bill. By the Bill of Rights it is declared unlawful to keep any Forces in time of peace without consent of Parliament. This consent by an invariable and wholesome usage is given only from year to year, and its necessity may he considered, perhaps, the most powerful of those causes which have transferred so much even of the Executive power into the management of the two Houses of Parliament."
    There were two proposals involved in the Bill of Rights and the Mutiny Act. The Motion of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) took both in; but the Amendment, while it admitted one, gave the go-by to the other. Further, he denied the correctness of the construction which had been put by the Colonial Secretary on the 55th section of the Act of 1858 for the Government of India, contending that that section related merely to finance and not to Prerogative. He did not accuse Her Majesty's Government of mala fides, but no doubt in reading the Mutiny Act they had made a blunder, and there were blunders which were worse than crimes. Had the right hon. Baronet come forward and said—"We have misread the Mutiny Act; we have made a mistake"—had the right hon. Baronet in that way appealed to the generosity of Parliament, he (Mr. Osborne Morgan) was sure that the House of Commons, which was, perhaps, the most generous Body in the world, would have met him half-way and said—"Let bygones be bygones." But that was not the language of the Colonial Secretary, or of the Leader of House. The right hon. Baronet took high ground, and declared—"We have not violated a tittle of the Constitution; we have not broken a particle of the

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    law." That being the tone adopted, it was absolutely necessary that those who were opposed to the action which the Government had taken should occupy equally high ground. He knew that the Government would beat their opponents in a division. He knew that the Government were blessed with a majority so docile and obedient—he would not say so mechanical—that it would endorse anything it was told to endorse. He had no doubt that the Amendment would be carried by a large majority, but to his mind that would only make the matter worse; because, if it were so easy to obtain the consent of Parliament to the policy of the Government, why, then, was the consent not obtained before that policy was entered upon? The result of several recent Elections did not give the Government much encouragement for believing that the country was so entirely on their side as some supposed; and he would warn them that, in appealing to popular passions in support of a high-minded policy, they were trading on dangerous ground—
    "Incedis per ignes Suppositos cineri doloso."
    In conclusion, he asserted that though the arguments and authorities which had been adduced by the noble Marquess in support of the Resolution against the Government might be conveniently ignored—they could not be satisfactorily answered.
    MR. RITCHIEsaid, he agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Osborne Morgan), that there was a certain amount of inconvenience in discussing great Constitutional and legal questions in a popular Assembly where Party feeling was likely to be imported into the discussion; and therefore he regretted, with his right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, that noble Lords who raised that question in "another place," which was eminently fitted for its discussion did not take on themselves the responsibility of inviting a decision upon it there. He did not know the reason, but it appeared to him that the circumstance that no Resolution was before the other House argued a certain want of confidence in the position taken up by the Opposition; and it had even seemed doubtful at one time whether the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) intended to take a
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    decision on the Resolution before the House. It was not in direct terms a Vote of Censure on the conduct of the Government; but, to be logical, the noble Marquess should have gone further, and asked the House to censure the Government for having departed from the lines of the Constitution. If the proposition of the noble Lord were correct, then the Government had violated the Constitution; if, on the other hand, the Government had not violated the Constitution, then the Resolution of the noble Marquess was not correct, and it asked the House to alter the Constitution by means of an abstract Resolution of one of the Houses of Parliament. Many precedents had been quoted, some in favour of the Government, and some against; and an objection had been raised that the employment of the Native Indian troops would infringe the Mutiny Act by taking the place of the British troops authorized by that Act, and so set them free for other service; but he would remind the House that at that very moment a war was going on at the Cape, in which their troops were helped by Native levies and by friendly volunteers, who, of course, liberated a certain number of European troops, and yet who would venture to say this was contrary to the law and the Constitution. The debate of 1775 had been mentioned, and he would only remark that on that occasion many good authorities had construed the word "Kingdom" in a sense totally opposite to that put upon it by the noble Marquess. The point had also been debated at the same time in the House of Commons, where the Resolution extending the meaning of the word "Kingdom" to the other Dominions of the Crown had been rejected by 283 votes to 81. The Bill of Rights was, by general admission, the test. It professed to declare the law, not to enact the law, and for the reasons for which a standing Army had been voted a grievance, it was necessary to look back further. Those reasons all applied to the Kingdom in the limited sense of the word, and were, in fact, chiefly local and domestic. Besides, the Bill of Rights spoke not only of the "Kingdom," but in another clause it spoke of the "Kingdom and the Dominions there unto belonging;" so that one might fairly conclude that when in the same Bill it spoke only of the "Kingdom" it was not intended

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    to include the other Dominions of the Crown. The truth was, that it was never in contemplation to extend the provisions of the Bill of Rights beyond the limits of the Kingdom, and the Mutiny Act, as it recited almost the words of the Bill of Rights, confirmed that view. If the Constitution required alteration, then let it be altered by a deliberate Act of all the Estates of the Realm, and not by a Resolution of the House of Commons. It had been said that our liberties were in danger; but did any sane man really believe that so long as Parliamentary control and Ministerial responsibility existed, our liberties were endangered by such a proceeding as that under discussion. Parliament must vote the Supplies; but objection had been taken that the Government had first spent the money and then come to Parliament, thus leaving it no option but to vote the money; but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had, when the Vote of Credit was under discussion, admitted that Ministers would be justified in a time of great emergency in spending money, and afterwards coming to Parliament to sanction the step. Well, the Government had declared that the emergency had arisen, so that really this matter was a question of Ministerial responsibility, and nothing more. But the noble Marquess who moved the Resolution said that the Government ought to come to Parliament, not only for money, but for the men they wanted, and referred to Native troops having been employed in China, saying that a Vote had then been asked for; but he forgot to say that from 1859 to 1863 Native troops were being employed in China, not only without an application by the Government to the House for a Vote of money, but even for a Vote of men. Yet the Chancellor of the Exchequer during that time was the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone). It was not until 1863 that the money expended for those troops was put into the Votes, and not until 1864 were the men put into the Votes. The whole affair was made a matter of account between England and India, and the right hon. Gentleman was responsible for not putting either the money or the men into the Votes until 1863 and 1864. But why, it was asked, did not the Government state openly to the House that troops were to be brought
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    from India to Malta, when the decision was taken, seeing, as had been observed by the hon. and learned Gentleman who spoke last, that they had behind them a docile majority, who would at once approve any measure they might think fit to adopt. The hon. and learned Gentleman, however, seemed to him (Mr. Ritchie) to have altogether failed to take into consideration the composition of the Opposition, which consisted of a great many separate factions, with a great many Leaders, and, as time was an element of importance in this matter, the Government might well hesitate to bring the matter prematurely before the House. If the hon. and learned Member took this into consideration, he (Mr. Ritchie) was sure he would sympathize with the Government in the course which they felt it to be their duty to pursue in a time of great emergency, and when the difficulties they might have to contend with in bringing the matter before Parliament would not have been found easy to overcome. It had been said that this movement of troops had taken the House by surprise. That was true, so far as the actual movement of the Indian troops was concerned; but the question was openly discussed for some time previously whether the Government would fall back upon Indian troops, and it was, therefore, a surprise that might any day have been expected by this House. ["Oh, oh!"] For his own part, he maintained that the Government had not only acted in a strictly legal and Constitutional manner in what it had done, but that it had also acted wisely. From an Indian point of view, it had acted wisely, because those who were well acquainted with India were of opinion that no step could have a greater effect in drawing the people of that country more closely to us than the asking them to come and fight side by side with our soldiers in a time of common danger. Such a step increased the bond of sympathy between the English and the Indian people, which had been lately strengthened by the gracious visit of the Prince of Wales, and the wise assumption of Imperial rank by the Queen. It had also acted wisely from an English and European point of view. What was the position of England at this moment? She had the approval of the whole of Europe in standing up for the integrity of Treaties. She admitted that they

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    required modification, but contended that they should not be altered by one of the parties, but by the whole of the parties to them. At the present moment, no step which the Government had taken had, he thought, been more calculated to bring about the peace of Europe, or secure the object we had at heart, than the bringing over of Indian troops; because it showed a determination on their part to draw upon all the resources of the Empire to maintain its integrity and the independence of Europe.
    MR. LAING, having had some experience in India as Finance Minister to Lord Canning, wished to say a few words on the question of our Indian policy, as regarded the employment of Native troops outside India, believing, as he did, that the principles that had been laid down by the Government were fraught with great danger and most destructive consequences to the future of our Indian Empire. The great principle now laid down was that we ought to consider the Native Indian Army as an integral portion of the British Army—that it was to be used on all occasions as a portion of that Army to supplement the military power of this country in the case of European wars or foreign expeditions, in order that by drawing on the immense population of India, great Britain might become one of the great military Powers of Europe. That new policy involved the necessity of entirely re-organizing it, and bringing it up to a high standard, both in point of numbers and of military efficiency. The question arose, was such a policy consistent with the safety of our Indian Empire? It was contrary to the principles laid down by Lord Canning, and many others of our most eminent statesmen. The fundamental conditions laid down for the safety of that Empire were—first, that the Force should be brought down to the lowest standard at which it could perform garrison and police duty. The numbers were fixed at 120,000, and the Force was reduced to that number. The next principle laid down was that for every two Native, there should be one European soldier, or a force of 60,000 men. The third principle was that the Native Troops were not to have any artillery, except a few mountain guns. The fourth was that the Native Army was not to be brought together in large bodies, but kept to separate and
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    distinct regimental duties. Now, was not each one of these principles inconsistent with the principle that the Native troops were to be looked upon as a portion of the British Army? If these troops were to be used for European wars, all that system would have to be altered. The Army in India was not and could never be a national Army. In the first place, India was not a nation, but merely a geographical expression, It contained many different races, only agreeing in their entire difference to the English and dominant race. The Army in India must always be a mercenary Army, and, therefore, could never be actuated by national impulses and feelings. There never could be any community of feeling between the Rulers in India and those who were ruled, and it was a serious matter to depart from the principles which had been laid down. As to the statements about the popularity of the Expedition in India, of course, every soldier worth his salt preferred active service to the monotony of garrison duty. But public opinion in India, military and civilian, had always been in favour of any foreign Expedition. The great inducement which the Indian soldiers had to engage in those Expeditions was the hope of preferment, increased pay, and loot. It had been precisely the same thing in the case of the Expedition to Cabul, which had been undertaken under the same influences as had now been operating, mainly because the influence of the English Foreign Office had been brought to bear upon India, to come forward against supposed Russian encroachments in Central Asia, and next because civilian and military pressure had been brought to bear upon a weak Governor General. That had led to an Expedition which had struck a great blow at the security of our Indian Empire. He hoped nothing of the sort might occur now. Supposing that these Indian troops were employed, the real difficulty of the case would only occur when the war was over and the men were sent back to their Native country. Some persons thought that as the expedition was so popular among the troops, their return, instead of being a danger, would cement the bond existing between this country and India. In his opinion there could not be a more complete delusion than this. While conceding that the

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    Expedition was popular, he could not admit, as some ton. Members opposite seemed to imagine, that the "Jingo" feeling extended to India, or that they were all Mussulman troops who would go into a war singing "Rule Britannia" because they fancied they were defending the Mussulman power of Turkey. The preposterous nature of such an idea would be apparent when it was considered that more than three-fourths of the population of India and the Indian Native troops, were not Mussulmans, but the descendants of people who had been for ages the subjects of Mussulman misrule during the Mogul domination. It was only the dread of the establishment of a Central Mahomedan Government at Delhi which kept the great bulk of the other races from joining in the Mutiny. To speak, then, of the feeling of the Mahomedans who rebelled against our rule a year or two after we had spent millions of treasure and oceans of blood in support of tottering Turkey, as sympathizing with the Sultan, was to talk utter nonsense. Indeed, there could be no greater danger to our rule in India than favouring one particular race, as the favoured one immediately jumped up to the conclusion that we were afraid of them; while, at the same time, it excited the jealousy of others. Our true policy, instead of being either the champions or the enemies of the Mahomedans, was to treat all creeds alike, holding the scale firmly and fairly between all the races, and showing no fear of any. If war really took place, and the Indian troops were employed, we must either be victorious or be beaten. In the latter case, the Native troops would go back sullen and discontented, to proclaim in every bazaar in India how much greater a Power Russia was than England. In the alternative—which all hoped might be the case—the Indian, troops would go back to boast that they had crossed bayonets successfully with the best troops in Europe, driving them like chaff before the wind, and to reflect that, in the event of another Mutiny, they would have a good chance of success. They were not the men to put their light under a bushel, and would have to get something more than empty praise. Then, again, there would be a large number of Native officers, who, by courage in the field, would gain promotion; was it to be supposed that such
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    men could be sent back and put under the command of an English boy-subaltern? But if they were not, the whole system of officering the Sepoy Army would be broken up, and Native officers of ability would then attain positions which would ensure the success of another Mutiny; the want of Native leaders and the heroism of our own countrymen being the cause of the failure of the last. These were serious dangers, not to be met by empty phrases, but which had been met by the statesmen who had re-organized the Indian Army after the Mutiny. In addition to those questions of principle, there were other difficulties of detail which had been mentioned to the House a few evenings since, by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) arising from the existence of caste and other causes, which made an Indian Army engaged in European warfare far more costly than the same number of English troops, all of which would have to be seriously considered when employing Indian troops became a reality. What was to be done in regard to the additional batta and pay which Indian troops received as compared with British troops? A colonel in the British Army received about £500 a-year, while a colonel of an Indian regiment received £1,500; was it likely that, with the troops serving side by side in Europe, such an anomaly could be continued? With regard to the financial aspect of this question, he found that the condition of Indian finance was at that moment one of great tension and great distress. The Mutiny, following the wars which had been carried on many years in India, aggravated the condition of India into a severe financial crisis. She was saved by the great efforts of Lord Canning and other Governors General in reducing expenditure, based mainly on military reduction. Indian finances were thus brought into a fairly satisfactory condition, and so continued for a series of years. But India was overtaken in the last few years by famine and a great fall in silver. The consequence was, that after struggling against that depression with temporary loans, the Indian Government had been driven to the most disagreeable necessity of imposing new taxes, and those of an unpopular kind, and of which he did not know which was the worst—namely, the salt

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    tax and the licence duty. The political bearing of increased taxation there was shown by a saying of Lord Canning that danger for danger, he would rather undertake to govern India with 40,000 Europeans without the income tax, than with 80,000 Europeans with it. Economy in India meant military reduction; civil expenditure was not only fixed there, but inevitably tended to grow with the growth of the population and with the increase of civilization, like the Civil Estimates in this country. Therefore, it was the first duty of every Government in India to keep its military establishment down to the lowest figure possible, and the key-note of the position in that respect must be the number of Native troops. If, in this particular case, 7,000 Native troops could be spared from India for an indefinite time—and probably they would be followed by another 7,000, and possibly more after that—surely it would appear that she had been maintaining 7,000 troops who were not wanted for the ordinary garrison duty in India, and who ought to have been disbanded; and by sending home three European regiments to keep up the same relative proportions between the Native Indian and the European troops in India, £600,000 or £700,000 might have been saved. That was about the same amount as we got by imposing the obnoxious salt duty. We might not only have avoided increasing the salt duty, but have reduced it and given millions in India a large and immediate relief. If these men could be spared from India it was clearly the duty of the Government to give the people of that country the benefit of such an economy. Had Lord Canning been Governor General he believed it was what he would have done. Was it fair that India should pay the excessive expense of military establishments, which were kept up for English policy, to enable England to take a more prominent part in European quarrels? We never thought of bringing Indian troops to Sebastopol. To employ Indian troops in exceptional expeditions—to send them to meet Chinese matchlocks or the warriors of King Theodore—was totally different from employing them in regular European warfare, where they would have to stand in the same line as British troops, against adversaries like Russians or French or Germans. What had been done marked
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    a clear revolution of policy in the question which should not have been determined on without consulting Parliament. He wanted to know what the late Governor General, or a still higher authority, Lord Lawrence, and the other high authorities upon India had to say to this question. The objections that had been raised ought to be met by the Government, and if the policy now complained of were to be allowed to continue, Indian finance would become thoroughly disorganized, or England would have to take upon herself a very heavy burden, and rightly so, if she made Indian troops fight her battles.
    MR. CHAPLINsaid, he was unhappily placed in a similar position to that occupied by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel) with regard to this question, because he could not pretend to the knowledge of Indian matters that was possessed by the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. But when he heard the hon. Member ask why they kept 60,000 English troops in India, and also speaking in disparaging terms of the utter want of community of feeling between the Rulers and the ruled in that country, he could not help referring to the striking display of loyalty on the part of the Native troops and people of India which had been evoked by the recent policy of Her Majesty's Government. The immediate question, however, before the House was the Motion of the noble Lord opposite. Now, however much on home grounds they might regret that Motion, no one could dispute the right of the noble Lord and his Friends to challenge the decision arrived at for ordering the Indian troops to Malta without the knowledge or consent of Parliament. If there was any reason for thinking that the Constitution had been infringed in that matter, the House of Commons would not only have a right to demand, but would fail in its duty if it did not demand a full explanation from the Government. He was resolved, if the occasion should arise, to do all in his power to uphold the Constitution which they had inherited from their forefathers, and under which they enjoyed a degree of prosperity and of freedom which fell to the lot of few other nations. At the same time, he was not prepared to accept the doctrine contained in the noble Lord's Resolution, which, he thought,

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    involved a direct infringement of the Prerogative of the Crown. Although, as regarded the English troops of the Crown, the Resolution only affirmed what was generally acknowledged, yet in regard to Indian troops it would preclude the use of those Forces beyond the limits of India, without the consent of Parliament, in every case short of actual war, whether Parliament was sitting at the time or not, and however great might be the necessity or emergency. On that ground alone, therefore, if on no other, he would resist the Motion to the utmost. Supposing that a declaration of war between this country and another Power was a question of weeks, or perhaps of days, and that that war would imperil the fortunes of England in some part of her Empire, the Government might know that by due preparation and the movement of Indian troops in good time, the danger might be altogether averted; but Parliament not being in Session, its consent could not be obtained without a great loss of time. Was he to be told that in such a case a Government which used, without scruple, as it was bound to do, all the resources at its command in defence of the Empire, would be guilty of unconstitutional conduct? That, however, would be the effect of the noble Lord's Motion, whether it was so intended or not. Now, was it the fact that the Constitution was really in danger from recent proceedings? If the ordering of those Native troops to proceed to Malta, in a great emergency, was a breach of law and Constitution, he asked what Act did it violate? It was a fact that before those Indian troops were ordered to Malta, the number of men authorized by the Mutiny Act was more than completed. Therefore, it might be argued that the Mutiny Act was being infringed, because troops were being used in excess of the number specified in that Act. That was a very plausible ground on which to base an attack on the Government. But, on the other hand, the troops serving in that case were Native Indian troops which never had been included in the number specified by the Mutiny Act, and which formed part of a separate establishment altogether, and were serving under separate law. It was perfectly clear that the employment of troops, who did not come under an Act, could not by any ingenuity be distorted or twisted into a breach of
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    that Act, which related to troops of a totally different description. The noble Lord said, if that was so, the law was either insufficient, or it had been violated. He could not agree with that; but if the noble Lord thought the law was insufficient, let him propose its amendment. So long as the law remained as it was, and so long as Her Majesty's Ministers remained within it, they had no right to charge the Government with unconstitutional conduct. In 1858, when the Government of India Bill was under discussion, an additional clause was moved by the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), providing—
    "That, except for repelling actual invasion, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, Her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies shall not be employed in any Military operation beyond the external frontier of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions without the consent of Parliament to the purposes thereof."
    That clause was identical in its effect with the present Motion of the noble Lord; and if that clause had been carried, he admitted that then the Government would have been guilty of a grave breach of Constitutional law. That clause was opposed by Lord Palmerston and others on the ground that it embodied a doctrine inconsistent with the Prerogative of the Crown and with the Constitution. After certain Amendments had been made in it, the clause was carried on a division; but it was not allowed to become law, or it was superseded by another, which had been quoted already. It said that, except in emergency, the Revenues of India should not be applied to defray the expenses of any military operations beyond the frontier of India; and the movement of troops from India to Malta was, he contended, precisely one of the cases contemplated by that clause. It was a military movement "beyond the external frontiers of India," and the House would see that while the acknowledged Prerogative of the Crown in this case was in no way interfered with the counter-check to that Prerogative which Parliament in former days devised, was exercised fully, in that the Government could not defray the expenses of the movement out of the Revenues of India without coming to the Legislature—could not, indeed, obtain those expenses from any source whatever, unless Parliament

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    chose to vote Supplies for the purpose. It was not accurate to distinguish the English Army as a Parliamentary Army; so far as their movement was concerned, both the English and the Indian Army were on the same footing. It was true there was this distinction between them, that the number of troops in England was annually voted by Parliament, and that in India there was no Parliamentary limit whatever upon the number; but when Parliament had voted the particular number for England, and when they came to the question of moving either those troops, or the troops in India, their control in the one case was precisely similar to what it was in the other. They could stop the Supplies, but they could do nothing more. Why, however, were they asked by the Motion of the noble Lord to impose a restriction for the first time in India upon the Prerogative of the Crown which did not exist, and which was altogether unknown in this country? The noble Lord opposite had said—"What is the justification of the policy of secrecy, which has been pursued by the Government?" That was a fair question, and in connection with it he would ask—"Is it the case that the Government have been at all wanting in the deference, the courtesy, and respect which are due to the House?" He had heard the explanations which had been given from the Treasury bench, and one of these explanations appeared to him to have been more than sufficient. Surely hon. Members could not deny that it would have been the height of unwisdon on the part of the Government to have announced their intention of calling out Indian troops, unless they had been perfectly certain of the success of their scheme. As it was, their success had been greater almost than they could have themselves hoped for, and all Parties in the country must now agree that they had been justified fully by the event. He could come to no other conclusion than, that no charge of unconstitutional conduct could be maintained against the Government; and of the wisdom of their policy he never had a doubt, and, indeed, it was not called into question, nor challenged by the Motion. Hon. Members opposite might be assured that those on the Conservative benches were animated by a resolution no less ardent and determined than their own to guard and maintain
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    that Constitution which they had inherited from their fathers, and to hand it down unimpaired to posterity. But with that Constitution they should remember that they had inherited something else besides—that those who sat within those walls were at this moment the trustees of the future fortunes of the Empire, the traditions of the people, and the greatness of the country, and those fortunes and traditions and the greatness they were determined, come what might, to maintain.
    SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, that had the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition required any confirmation of the argument which he addressed to the House, or any testimony to the justness of the Resolution which he had brought forward, it would have been found in the answer, if answer it could be called, which had been given on the part of the Government by the Colonial Secretary. The character of that answer was almost as singular as the Amendment by which it was accompanied. The right hon. Baronet had attacked the Resolution of the noble Lord with some severity, and the condemnation which he passed upon it was that it was a Constitutional truism. If it was a Constitutional truism, the least one might have expected was that a Constitutional Government would have accepted the proposition contained in it. On the contrary, however, no sooner had the Colonial Secretary declared it to be a Constitutional truism, than he added—"You must understand that the Government do not accept it." That was a very singular situation for a Secretary of State, to decline that which he stated was' a Constitutional truism.
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I never said I accepted the Resolution of the noble Lord as a Constitutional truism.
    SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: The right hon. Baronet having so dealt with the proposition of the noble Lord, had gone on to refer to the general policy of the Government, and in a peroration of a most imaginative character had called upon the House to set aside the Constitution, and to declare their confidence in that policy which, if he remembered rightly, linked together, according to the right hon. Baronet, the various races of the Empire by the ocean wave. When the policy of the Government properly

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    came under the consideration of the House, and was stated in a somewhat more prosaic and, perhaps, more intelligible form than in the peroration of the Colonial Secretary, he, and those with whom he acted, would be prepared to consider it; and he hoped it might then be found that the races of this Empire might be linked together by something more stable than the ocean wave. Having stated that the Resolution of the noble Lord was a Constitutional truism which the Government could not accept, the right hon. Baronet had gone on—he could not say to grapple with the argument of the Leader of the Opposition, but to nibble at it. The right hon. Baronet, criticizing the terms of the Resolution, had said—"You speak of the Forces of the Crown; but you exclude the Militia and other Forces in the Colonies." The noble Lord, however, in drawing up his Resolution, had adopted well-known and Constitutional terms, which had received Parliamentary acceptation, and were thoroughly understood. The Forces which were spoken of in the Mutiny Act did not include the Militia or the Reserves. The word "Forces" in that Act meant Forces of the character of a standing Army, and it had always been so understood. His noble Friend, therefore, had employed the word in the sense in which it was perfectly well known in Constitutional language. So in reference to another cavil, if he might so call it, on the part of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The right hon. Baronet said—"What do you mean by the consent of Parliament? The consent of Parliament is given by statute in the Mutiny Act, and you cannot add to the Forces without altering the Act." But that was precisely the point which was dealt with, in 1874, by Lord Card-well, who said the consent of Parliament need not be testified by statute, but might be testified in another way—by a vote of the House of Commons after the Mutiny Act had been passed. "But," said the right hon. Baronet again, "you only vote the money and do not vote the men." He had been astonished at that statement. In 1870, no doubt, there was a Vote of Credit for money; but then there was also a separate and distinct Vote for men. In 1870, when it was necessary to add 20,000 men to the Army, it was done by a Supplementary Vote and a Vote of Credit for £2,000,000. What
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    he charged the Government with was, not with the intention of violating the Constitution with any sinister motive, but with having come down to the House without understanding the Constitution of the country upon the capital points he had named. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had made two errors of the most palpable kind. Then, that right hon. Gentleman had endeavoured to excuse himself and the Government by stating that these Indian troops were employed in the same way at Singapore and Hong Kong. Yes; but on what terms and conditions? These troops were voted on a specific Estimate. They were voted at the instance of General Peel, the Secretary for War of the Conservative Government, who took the Constitutional objection that they ought not to allow the Native troops of the Crown to be employed unless they voted them on a specific Estimate. Then the Secretary of State referred to the Committee moved for by Colonel Anson, who, said the right hon. Baronet, did not say a word about there being no right to employ those troops. No one contested the right to employ these troops, if the proper Parliamentary preliminaries were taken. Then, said the Secretary of State, the Bill of Rights was wholly confined to the United Kingdom. He asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to explain what claim he put forth. Was he prepared to say that outside the United Kingdom the Crown claimed the right to maintain an Army of any amount it chose in all its Dominions without the consent of Parliament? If that was not the claim, he could not deny the position of his noble Friend. If that was the claim of the Crown, then he said there had been no Government since the days of the Stuarts—not in the bad days of Lord Bute and Lord North—who had dared in the presence of the House of Commons and the country to maintain such a proposition. If they were not prepared to maintain that, he asked what intermediate proposition was there between that and the proposition of his noble Friend? It was said to be sufficient that Parliament should have the command over the Supplies. But the Crown might maintain an Army without Supply. The Crown might use its own means, or utilize the other resources which it might

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    obtain. There was such a thing as subsidizing countries to maintain armies. He would give an example. In the year 1816, after the war was over, the English Government maintained an Army of Occupation in Paris. He supposed, according to the doctrine of the Government, that the Crown might do what it liked with that Army without the consent of Parliament. It so happened that the Ministers of the day did not want Supplies for it; because, by the Treaty of Peace, an indemnity had been obtained', and a sum was to be paid by the French nation for maintaining the Army of Occupation. The consequence was, that the Minister said he would not apply to the House of Commons for the maintenance of the troops in Paris. But what was the language of the House of Commons? They said—"No; we will not stand that. We will not stand the Crown having an Army in Paris which is not under the control of Parliament. You must get a Vote of money for that Army, and you must pay into the Treasury the indemnity you receive from France; and so the control of Parliament shall be kept over the Army which is outside the United Kingdom, as well as over the Army within it." Then the right hon. Gentleman came to a precedent which was a little interesting, as it would appear as if for once, and once only, the Government had become disciples of his right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich. The Secretary for the Colonies read a passage from a speech of the right hon. Member for Greenwich, to the effect that there were emergencies in which a Government ought to act even without the consent of Parliament, upon condition that they should come down and ask the concurrence of Parliament at the earliest possible moment. That was most excellent doctrine, a doctrine in which they would all agree; but what was most amazing was that the right hon. Gentleman said—"That is exactly what we have done." Why, it was a month ago since the thing was done, and they had not come down for the concurrence of Parliament yet; and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was asked about the matter, he said—"We did not even think it necessary to allude to it." And that was what the Secretary for the Colonies called following the example of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich! All
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    he could say was that the Secretary for the Colonies was not a very apt disciple of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. The right hon. Gentleman said that the object of the movement was to show to Europe that the British Government had the command of the Forces of a united Empire. But if they had pursued a different method, they might have shown not only that they had the command of the Forces of a united Empire, but the support of a united Parliament. [Laughter.] He did not know what the laughter meant. Did it mean that the Government did not communicate their intention because they did not think Parliament would support them? The Government had not ventured so far as that; but he thought the laughter of hon. Gentlemen opposite meant that. Passing from the right hon. Gentleman's speech, he would ask the House to consider some of the other speeches which had been made—very interesting, no doubt, but without any particular bearing upon the Resolution of the noble Lord. What was the meaning of that Resolution? It did not dispute, and he did not dispute, that this employment of Indian troops was a thing which might be done, and which ought to be done. But the question was whether this was a thing which ought to have been done in the manner in which it had been done. That was really the only question before the House. Some people said it was a very trivial matter, but he maintained it was not a very light thing to depart from Constitutional precedent. Hon. Gentlemen opposite—among them the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie)—had said that, after all, it was a question of the responsibility of the Government; but what did that mean? Did it mean that a Government was entitled to do anything in which it could secure the support of a majority? If so, it was a very dangerous proposition. Hon. Gentlemen opposite might not always be in a majority; and they might depend upon it, it was quite as important for them to consider the matter. The principles of the Constitution were checks upon majorities. They had seen Assemblies where democratic principles had prevailed, and where a majority had ruled without Constitutional checks. If these checks were swept away, they might depend upon it the danger was

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    very great to whichever Party might prevail. When, therefore, they said that the act of the Government was being covered by a majority, surely they did not mean that a Government ought to be allowed to do anything, regardless of Constitutional checks, so long as it was certain that it might come down and get the sanction of a majority.
    MR. RITCHIEsaid, if the hon. and learned Gentleman was referring to his observations, he begged to disclaim his interpretation of his argument. What he said was, that the question of urgency was a question which must be decided by Ministers on their responsibility.
    SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, he was not referring particularly to the hon. Gentleman; but he would deal with the argument upon its own merits. We must regard these Constitutional checks as something totally different from the power which a Government had to cover anything it might do by the vote of a Party majority. The Government relied upon the fact that in 1775, the Motion against the employment of foreign troops in British territory was rejected by a large majority. But those were bad times, and there was no Government who, in bad times, might not command a majority in Parliament. We were now in the presence of a proceeding which, as his noble Friend had said, was certainly a novel proceeding. The Indian Army had only to a slight extent been used outside India, and in each of those cases provision for it had been voted by Parliament in the Estimates of the year. It might be wise to employ the Indian troops for general purposes; he did not say it was not. But it could not be denied that the principle of so employing them was a novel one, and therefore it ought to be examined. As he understood the contention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, these troops were to be used in exactly the same manner as the other Forces of the Crown. That was an important proposition, as affecting not only the members of the Army, but as equally affecting Parliamentary control over the Army, and they could not blame the Opposition for examining it. If it was a right thing to do, Parliament ought deliberately to have pronounced it to be right; but it could not be right
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    that it should be slurred over, and that Parliament should treat with carelessness and negligence a matter on which their ancestors and Predecessors were justly and wisely jealous. What was the position of Her Majesty's Government in this matter? They said—"These Indian troops are in exactly the same position as any other of our troops, and therefore they should be dealt with in the same manner." But he and those who thought with him entirely denied the truth of that proposition. They said that the British and the Indian Armies were under totally different conditions, and that when it was sought to convert Indian into British troops the authority of Parliament should first be obtained. The hon. Member for Mid-Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) had just now challenged the phrase "Parliamentary Army," used by his noble Friend. It was, however, perfectly justifiable when rightly understood. In one sense the English Army was a Parliamentary Army; in another it was the Army of the Crown. The control of the Army was in the hands of Parliament—it determined the number and pay of the Force, and it gave authority for its discipline. The Executive, on the other, had in its hands the discipline of the Army, and by this wise compromise the rights of a free people had been reconciled with the Prerogative of an ancient Monarchy. But not one of those conditions applied to the Indian Army, and that made the whole difference between the Indian and the British Army, all the elements of control being absent in the case of the former. The general principles of the relation of Parliament to the Army had been declared in the Bill of Rights. As he had said, the main element was the voting of the money; but it was a mistake to say it was only the money which was voted. In 1843 there were riots in Lancashire, as there unhappily were at the present time, and Sir Robert Peel's Administration thought it was necessary to embody the Chelsea Pensioners. When the Bill for that purpose was brought into the House of Commons, there was no specification of the numbers, and at the instigation of the Liberal Party a limitation was placed on the number to be embodied, which would be found in the Act. That showed that the principle of enforcing the limitation

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    of numbers had been observed down to the latest times. He could not admit that the case of the Abyssinian War, and the employment of Native troops therein, came within the principle which was urged in support of this particular line of conduct on the part of the Government. Abyssinia was not within the dominions of the Crown, and the time was not a time of peace. So far as he knew, the only cases in which Native Indian troops had been employed out of India in time of peace were when they served in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Labuan; but, on those occasions, they were included in the Votes. He did not contend that these troops should be included in the Mutiny Act; but they ought, at any rate, to be included in the Votes for the numbers of men and for the money which was to be used in paying them. He wished to say one word about the contention that the Bill of Rights only applied to the United Kingdom. The old recital was only done away with 10 years ago, by which it was upheld that troops were maintained for supporting the balance of power, and he did not know why it was struck out by the present Prime Minister. Coming to the Act of 1858, the Indian Army never was and never had been on the same footing as the English Army. It was not voted in numbers; it was maintained by moneys which did not come from Parliament, and it was governed by a Mutiny Act, which was not annual, but perpetual. Now, all those anomalies were tolerated with respect to the Indian Empire, and that was the reason why the Indian Army was, and as long as it remained in India must be, different from the Army of the Crown. If this non-Parliamentary Army was to be treated on exactly the same footing, Canada, Australia, and the Channel Islands, and, according to his view, the whole of the United Kingdom, might be filled with troops who were not voted by Parliament, and who were not subject to the Mutiny Act. That would be betraying the ancient liberties of the country, and was exactly what had happened in ancient Rome. They could not be too cautious in this respect. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said it was only moving troops from one part of the Empire to another. Yes; but the distinction was between non-voted Forces and voted Forces. The Act of 1858 was indirectly
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    clear upon this subject—not directly, he admitted, because it was stated that the troops should not be moved out of India and charged upon the Indian Revenue. But the Government had violated the Act, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer admitted that the very thing he had now done was contrary to the law. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER dissented.] The right hon. Gentleman shook his head; but what he told the House he was doing was that he should move these troops from India, charging the cost in the first place on India, and then recouping the Indian Revenue afterwards. That was exactly what was done in the case of the Abyssinian War—the charge was put first on India, to be afterwards repaid. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Only to repay them partially.] In the case of the Abyssinian War, the Chancellor of the Exchequer confessed that what he had done was outside the letter of the law, and pleaded in extenuation that others had done the same thing before him. That was a very pardonable thing, then, in the face of the bad example set him. [Mr. GLADSTONE: It was not a bad example.] He would not argue the matter with his right hon. Friend. All he could say was that, having discovered that the thing was unlawful and required condonation, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had come again to the House of Commons and done the very thing which he had found was unlawful—that was to say, making an advance from the Indian Revenue, with the intention of recouping it afterwards. Of course, they would hear the explanation the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to give them. He (Sir William Harcourt) said that Parliament must vote these men not only as a Constitutional principle, but as a matter of necessity. They must vote them as new levies, otherwise they would have no control over them. He considered that he had now shown that the Government had violated the rules of English finance. The rule of English finance was that the object should be first stated to Parliament, which should then vote the expenditure necessary to carry it out, unless they obtained a Vote of Credit for the expenditure, for which they might afterwards account to Government. If, however, it was enough for Government first to spend the money, and then come

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    down and ask Parliament to sanction the expenditure, where, he would ask, was the use of a Vote of Credit at all? He had endeavoured to discuss this question far from anything like Party asperity, as he wished rather to maintain a great Constitutional principle than to gain any mere Party advantage. Indeed, he was bound to say that he was not opposed to the general policy of Her Majesty's Government. So far as they were contending for the authority of England, and that she should have her just weight in the councils of Europe, he entirely agreed with them. He had always desired, and did now desire, that the dominion of Turkey should be put an end to. But he had never desired that Russia should have the undisputed control of the East; and, if the policy of the Government was to insist that Europe and England should be consulted in this matter, he was ready to place at their disposal, not only the Forces of the United Kingdom, but of the Empire generally. But it seemed to him quite as necessary for them to have, in a matter of this kind, the cordial co-operation of the House of Commons, which could only be obtained by treating the House on terms of complete confidence. It seemed to him that it was never more necessary than at a time of public danger, to adhere to the principles of the Constitution—he did not mean in a pedantic spirit. If the Government convinced the country that an overwhelming necessity existed, the country would put a liberal construction upon their acts. But what was the case? No such plea was put forward. The Government had not said—"We were obliged to do this thing, and could not consult you." No such thing. They came down and said it was not necessary to consult Parliament at all. With the majority they had at their backs, they might have had the Vote at any time for the last month. They might have had it before Parliament adjourned. They might have had it sooner. They might have had a Vote of Credit. Well, what was the plea of urgent necessity? The secret of the Government had been known for a month, and yet they said they could not communicate it to Parliament. What the Government said was, that this was to be a demonstration of the Forces of a united Empire. It could not be demonstrative
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    and secret too. This essence of a demonstration was, that it should be made public. They could not demonstrate in secret any more than they could conspire in public. He did not impute to the Government any of the sinister motives that had been attributed to them in trying to find out precedents of Prerogative. There was a good deal of the trash of Imperialism talked in places where they would not expect to hear it, and written in quarterly organs, which, it was said in one case, ought to be burnt by the common hangman. Well, they did not do that kind of thing now, but rather reserved them for domestic use. He believed that what they had done was a sheer blunder, and it was a greater mistake that it had not been corrected. Very much the same kind of blunder had been committed by Mr. Pitt in 1794, accompanied by similar criticism, when he advanced the very violent doctrine of Prerogative, that the Crown had a perfect right to bring any number of foreign troops into the United Kingdom without the consent of Parliament. He was offered a Bill of Indemnity, and refused to accept it; and The Annual Register, which was written in those days by men of ability not unfriendly to him, said, that though people approved of the measure itself, still the propriety of a Parliamentary Commission for it appeared manifest; that the Ministers declined to accept an indemnity for conduct which was not reported blameworthy in any other light than in their refusal to acknowledge its illegality; that it was not without difficulty that their friends could find arguments to exculpate them; and that false pride and obstinate prejudice induced them to uphold measures once adopted, rather than candidly and magnanimously to admit an error. But how had the Government met the Motion of his noble Friend? The Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies did not take issue upon the Constitutional principles laid down by the Motion. It did not deny them. It did not accept them. It did not regard the Motion as a Vote of Want of Confidence. It was an appeal of what lawyers called confession and avoidance. It was a mixture of the Previous Question and a sort of resolution of general indemnity. That was not the way in which a grave error, however unintentional, should be atoned for. He

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    believed that the principles which the Government had infringed in this case were principles that required to be re-established by the Resolution which his noble Friend had proposed, because it asserted principles which were consistent with the Prerogative of the Crown, which were agreeable to the authority of Parliament, and which, therefore, were essential to the interests of the Empire.
    MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, that in the course of the debate to which they had listened, and in no slight degree in the speech which they had just heard, there had been a great deal of confusion of thought which, in the first instance, he desired to clear up. What Her Majesty's Government wanted to know was, whether they were really charged with a breach of their Constitutional obligations, or with the crime of secrecy, in having concealed from their political opponents something they thought they had a right to know. From what had occurred he was inclined to think that it was because the Government had not told them what they proposed to do that they brought forward this Resolution. The charge of secrecy, however, had been, he thought, sufficiently answered by his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But he must say that if they desired to seek any further justification, or to prove the necessity of the step which the Government thought it necessary to advise Her Majesty to adopt, it would be found in the proceedings of that night and of the last fortnight. Was it not perfectly obvious that, if the Government had come down to the House and stated that Indian troops were to be brought to Malta, they would have been exposed to a perfect catechism? They would have been cross-examined as to the ultimate destination of the troops, as to whether 7,000 was the limit they intended to propose, and they would have had such patriotic speeches as that of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), who thought it consistent with his duty to express for the advantage of the enemies of this country his opinion of the character and qualities of these troops. Never did he hear a more despairing speech than that of the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing). As to a great part of it, he would be prepared, when the proper time came for
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    discussing this question upon its merits, to meet the arguments of the hon. Member; but he ventured at once to protest against some of the doctrines laid down by the hon. Gentleman. And he had gone just one step too far. He had told them a story to show why they ought not to engage the services of the Indian troops outside of India. It happened that the story attracted the attention of his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had a retentive memory, and he had referred him (Mr. Stanhope) to an occasion when the hon. Member related the same story—of that he did not complain, as a good story would bear repeating—but, unfortunately, it was used to support just the opposite principle. The hon. Member contended in 1867 that the employment of Indian troops was most desirable, and that, being in India when the Indian troops were returning from service in China, and having special opportunities of consulting military men, he could declare that in India we possessed a Reserve in an extremely warlike population which might be drawn on largely for reinforcements. He said, also, that the Sikhs, who had served in China, had been so much impressed with the valour and discipline of the British troops, and their superiority to the French, that they evinced the greatest desire to serve with the British in any part of the world they might be sent to. He hoped the hon. Gentleman who had just related the story would change his mind on the subject once more, and quote the story in support of his original view. As for the speech made by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, it reminded him (Mr. Stanhope) of what used to take place at quarter sessions. He had always found there that when any person was anxious not to have a discussion upon the merits, he always raised a preliminary objection upon the notices. That was what the noble Lord in effect had done. He had said to the Government, "Prove your notices." The noble Lord would not attend to the political bearings of the question, he would not consider the opportuneness of what had been done and the necessities of a great crisis; all he would think of was his technical point. It had been stated by the noble Lord with great fairness and moderation; but when the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William

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    Harcourt), who had some claim to be considered a Constitutional authority, rose, he fully expected to hear some argument adduced in support of the Motion; but he did not hear a single argument from the hon. and learned Gentleman addressed to the Constitutional aspects of the question. Much had been said about the consent of Parliament. Well, what did that mean? The noble Lord seemed to be a little shy of it. He was a little afraid of that plank in his platform. Ho went back to the year 1734, and told them what somebody else had then thought might be the different meanings of the phrase. But he would have liked to have got from the noble Lord what he himself meant by it in his Resolution. Parliament must mean both Houses of Parliament. The noble Lord could not get out of that position. It could not mean the vote of the House of Commons only; and he protested against any interpretation of the Resolution in that sense as an utterly unconstitutional proposition. But what the consent of Parliament undoubtedly involved was excessive delay. If this Resolution were correct, it applied not only to Native troops in India, but it applied to British troops in India; and, suppose there was a revolt in Ceylon, the consent of both Houses would be required before we could move British or Indian troops into Ceylon—that was what the proposition would lead to. Suppose Parliament was not sitting. Of course they might call Parliament together; but that would involve a delay of five or six weeks at least, so that they would not be able to move a single regiment without calling Parliament together in order to receive its sanction. Or, if there was a revolt in the Mauritius, they must send home and get a Vote of Parliament before they could take measures to put it down. But that was not all. What they wanted in a case of that kind was to send troops, if they could, to overawe an insurrection, rather than to put it down after it had occurred. If this Resolution was accepted, they would not be able to move a single regiment until they had obtained the consent of Parliament. Then a question had been raised as to the limits of the employment of the Native Army, and as some exception had been taken to the argument of his right hon.
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    Friend (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), it was only due to him to re-state, as far as he was able, one or two points which he desired the House to consider. What was the position of the Indian Army? It was clear that in the time of George II. it was not intended to go beyond the limits of the trading Company; but it had been the subject of subsequent legislation; and in the Preamble to the Statute of 4 Geo. IV. it was referred to in terms which assured its employment not merely within the limits of the Charter of the Company, but anywhere upon land or sea, within or without the limits of the Company. If Parliament then made that declaration, it could not now be maintained that Indian troops could only be employed outside the limits of India after obtaining the consent of Parliament. If it were unconstitutional, why had Parliament declared, in such wide and comprehensive terms, that the Indian Army might go anywhere? The fact was that the Indian Army had been employed elsewhere. That was a fact which it was impossible to get over. It had been sent to the Cape and to China; and if they were going to contend that what had been done already was a thing which ought not to be done now, they ought to bring forward the most definite and conclusive propositions in support of, and in proof of, such contention. But what had the noble Marquess done? Why, he had told them that he did not so much rely upon any particular words as upon practice and precedent. But precedents, so far as he (Mr. Stanhope) was able to understand them, were in favour of the action of the Government. But the noble Lord thought his proposition so clear, so indisputable, that; it was worthy of being submitted to the consideration of the House of Lords without taking a division. The proposition of the noble Lord was not affirmed by the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights said "within the Kingdom;" therefore, no one could maintain that it forbade the use of the troops which the Government had made. Then it was said they did not rely on the exact words, but on the principle of the Bill of Rights. The noble Lord had relied on the precedent of 1775; he said at that time it was agreed on all sides of the House that the proposition for which he contended was a sound one, and that the Kingdom included the Dominions of the Crown.

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    Well, if that were so, he should have expected to find that proposition afterwards re-affirmed. But had any evidence been produced of that character? On the contrary. He would not rely on The Annual Register, though it might be made up by a very competent person; but on what he believed to be a most authentic register in that respect of the proceedings of the period, and that was the Protests recorded in the House of Lords. They were in the writing of the noble Lords themselves, and had been, on the book of Parliament ever since. On one occasion referred to, in 1795, two Protests were recorded in the House of Lords, and one began thus—
    "Because it is contrary to law for the Crown to keep an Army in this Kingdom, either in time of peace or of war, without the consent of Parliament;"
    while the second ran—
    "Because in this debate it has been unanimously admitted, with, the exception of one noble Lord, that the keeping in this country of troops, native or foreign, in time of war or peace, without the consent of Parliament is unconstitutional.''
    At that time the House of Lords had examined the doctrines laid down in that Protest, and had struck out the words "with the exception of one noble Lord," and had affirmed that the keeping of troops in this Kingdom in time of peace or war was unconstitutional. Then the noble Lord relied on the Mutiny Act. Well, the propositions laid down were not to be found in the Mutiny Act. He had taken two distinct propositions out of the Preamble of the Act, and, jumbling them together in one Resolution, had flung them down for the acceptance of Parliament. If, however, the House went a little further, it would see that that Act did contemplate the raising and keeping troops other than those mentioned; for the 4th clause, which dealt with Colonial and Foreign troops in Her Majesty's pay, said that all officers and soldiers raised and serving in any of Her Majesty's Dominions should be subject to the Articles of War; and if such officers and soldiers, having been made prisoners, should be sent into Great Britain or Ireland, they should not be allowed to serve therein. That evidently meant that they could serve elsewhere; and it expressly denied their right to serve in this Kingdom, according to the Bill of
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    Rights. The House should look still further. What the Preamble of the Mutiny Act said was, that there was a declaration on the part of Parliament that the whole number of troops capable of serving in England should be 135,452, exclusive of the number actually serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, which, of course, meant that the Crown might maintain 135,452 men plus the number actually serving in Her Majesty's Dominions. Not a single word in the Preamble of that Act interfered with the Crown's undoubted right to regulate the removal and exact disposition of the troops. When he looked for a moment to the Bill of Rights, he was led to the conclusion that the noble Lord was wrong in his interpretation of its principle, and he admitted that the actual words did not bear out the proposition which he had placed before the House. But what were the principles on which the Bill of Rights was founded? We had only to read any history of the time to estimate the jealousy with which the standing Army was then regarded, though most historians found it rather difficult to explain the reasons for that extraordinary jealousy. They told us that the reasons mainly were, the desire to prevent the assembling of military Forces for unjustifiable purposes, so as to overawe Parliament, and induce it to enact for the people measures destructive of their freedom. Parliament objected, also, to the billeting of troops on the people without their consent; and those were the chief objections then raised to the maintenance of a standing Army, which, they urged, ought not to be kept in this country. That was the real principle on which the Bill of Rights was founded; but was there any man in that House, he would ask, who would pretend that we were in such danger no w? Why, in any one year, on Salisbury Plain or somewhere else, we had an army assembled far larger than that by which the liberties of our forefathers were endangered. Even within the last few months, Reserved Forces far exceeding it had been called together. If, therefore, that danger ever again arose, Parliament would be perfectly prepared to meet it. At that time of night he would not trouble the House to listen to any elaborate argument; but he might be permitted to advert to the precedent of 1815, when the French indemnity was.

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    handed over. Sir J. Mackintosh then said that one of the controls which Parliament possessed over the Army was the annual Mutiny Bill, and another, which belonged solely to the House of Commons, the annual granting of money for its support. It was this latter control to which he desired especially to direct attention—the financial control. Was the intention and meaning of the Resolution, that certain Forces could not be introduced into any of the Dominions of the Crown, without the previous consent of Parliament? The word "previous" was not in the Resolution of the noble Lord, and the reason was that neither by precedent nor by authority could the proposition be justified that it was only with the previous consent of Parliament, in all cases, that these forces could be brought into any of the Dominions of the Crown. There must be many cases in which the Executive must be allowed to exercise their discretion. There was a time when the right hon. Gentleman opposite proposed a clause in the Government of India Bill. It was at a time at which the Indian Army could be employed anywhere, with no control except the provisions in the Bill of Rights, declaring that it could not be employed within this Kingdom. The House very properly desired to have some check against those constant frontier wars which were often begun and ended without Parliament having any control at all in the matter. The right hon. Gentleman, therefore, brought forward a clause to the effect that Her Majesty's Indian Forces should not be employed beyond the frontier of India without the consent of Parliament. There was upon that occasion a very interesting discussion, in which a noble Lord whose name could not be mentioned, especially at the present moment, without the deepest respect—he meant Lord Russell—took part, and in which he concurred with Lord Palmerston in the inexpediency of fettering the power of the Crown in the movement of these troops—
    "Supposing we had a war with some European Power, and that, this war being supported by the House of Commons, it was considered desirable for the Indian Army to attack the possessions of this enemy of the Crown, it appeared to him the clause would prevent the employment of those Forces without the consent of Parliament."—[3 Hansard, cli. 1015.]
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    Propositions such as those to which he was referring were, he was aware, laid down in time of war; but hon. Gentlemen opposite appeared unable to understand a state of affairs so critical, without amounting to actual war, as would necessitate preparations for the maintenance of the honour of England. General Peel had some right to complain, because the troops, in that case, had been kept for some years in a particular locality, without any explanation being given to Parliament of their number or of the amount of money which would be required to sustain them. When the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) talked of the phantoms which the Government had conjured up, he seemed to him to speak far too lightly of a crisis which, in the Gracious Message which Her Majesty had been advised to send to Parliament, was described as an emergency. If hon. Gentlemen opposite disagreed with the course adopted by the Government, they could express their disapprobation of that policy, and say that the troops should go back to India—though no doubt, in some form or other, the country would have to bear the burden if that were done. The Opposition could satisfy their consciences, if they chose to do so, by turning out the present Ministers of the Crown and taking their places. Therefore, it was idle to say that the House had no effective control over this movement. The Government fully admitted the financial control which Parliament ought to exercise over this matter; in the course of a short time they would be prepared to submit a general Estimate of what they believed the expenditure was likely to be, and it would then be for Parliament to exercise the control which they thought fit under the circumstances. Anything that could have been said before the Easter Adjournment would have been a mere declaration of what the Government intended to do; no Estimate could possibly have been given. A certain amount of discretion had necessarily to be exercised by the Executive; but it was far from their thoughts to interfere with the form of the Constitution, and still less to tamper with its spirit. To institute any comparison between the dangers which threatened their forefathers and those against which they had now to guard was obviously impossible. But

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    while, on the one hand, it was the advantage and the strength of their Constitutional system that it was capable of easy extension and adaptation to the altered circumstances of the Empire, so it ought not to be their weakness that, while amply secured against any real dangers, they were to be fettered and hampered by a too rigid interpretation of technical rules in the development and employment of their power. They all remembered the classical story of the man who carried a newly-born calf, and day by day as it grew he continued to carry it, so that his powers became enlarged just in proportion as the demand upon them increased. So must it be with England. They too, always, indeed, on the whole with advantage, but sometimes with purpose and deep anxiety, had had to bear an ever-increasing burden. And lo! it was suddenly made lighter. India had contributed, and willingly to the strength of their Empire. The Government had asserted the strength of the British Empire in the midst of a crisis which might exercise a material influence on the future of Europe. Was it necessary, wise, or opportune, to choose that exact moment to cast doubt upon the legality of this proceeding on the part of the Government, and in the eyes of Europe—because Europe would not understand these technical distinctions which hon. Gentlemen opposite had been attempting to draw—upon its wisdom also. To that question Her Majesty's Government awaited the answer without anxiety; because, whatever might be the feebleness of the efforts they could make to maintain the honour of the country, they would be satisfied, if it were said of them, as it had been said of another man in days gone by—"They knew how to make a small State great."
    MR. FAWCETT MR. FAWCETT moved the adjournment of the debate.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERhoped the House would assent to the debate being renewed on Tuesday, and that hon. Gentlemen who had Notices on the Paper for that day would give way.
    MR. W. HOLMSsaid, he had no wish to interrupt the progress of so important a debate. He stood first on the Orders of the Day for Tuesday, and had a Resolution of considerable importance to propose on a question which excited
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    great interest in Scotland. He, therefore, asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give him a day for his Motion. He did so the more readily, because during this Session Scotland had not received a large amount of attention from the Government.
    MR. DILLWYNobjected to private evenings being taken for the discussion of public matters.
    Motion agreed to.
    Debate adjourned till To-morrow.

  ORDERS OF THE DAY.

    SUPPLY.—REPORT.
    Resolution [16th May] reported.
    First Resolution read a second time.
    MR. PARNELLobjected to the Resolution, because the amount included £289 for the printing in connection with the Queen's Colleges, Ireland. Whatever might be the merits of the system of education in Ireland, he, and the great majority of the Irish, were opposed to it, and he could not conscientiously allow any Vote on its behalf to pass unchallenged. It was impossible for him to express the extent to which he felt himself responsible in this matter; and if hon. Members looked into the way these Queen's Colleges had been worked, if they saw how they had failed in carrying out the ideas of the Legislature, it would be perfectly apparent why Irish Members should feel deeper interest in the question of education than in any other Irish subject which came before the House. The Queen's Universities were formed for the purpose of supplying University Education to those classes in Ireland who could not conscientiously avail themselves of the education afforded at Trinity College, Dublin. But, well-meaning as the determination on the part of the Legislature was, these Colleges had been to a very great extent——
    MR. SPEAKER: I would remind the hon. Member that, on the question of a Vote for Stationery, it is not competent for him to enter into a general discussion regarding the Queen's Colleges.
    MR. PARNELLsaid, he bowed to the decision of the Speaker; and, as he could not, by the Forms of the House,

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    move to leave out the one item of £289 for Stationery for the Queen's Colleges, he should move to reduce the Vote by £271,000, the whole amount set down for Stationery.
    Amendment proposed, to leave out "£376,545," in order to insert "£105,545,"—(Mr. Parnell,)—instead thereof.
    Question put, "That '£376,545' stand part of the said Resolution."
    The House divided; Ayes 115; Noes 13: Majority 102.—(Div. List, No. 142.)
    Resolution agreed to.
    Subsequent Resolutions agreed to.
    House adjourned at a quarter after One o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading— Local Government Provisional Orders (Abingdon, &c.)*(83); Public Works Loans*(81)
Committee—Report—Adulteration of Seeds Act (1869) Amendment*(79).
Third Reading—Customs and Inland Revenue*, and passed.

THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN—EMPLOYMENT OF INDIAN TROOPS.—OBSERVATIONS.
LORD SELBORNE LORD SELBORNE rose to call attention to the question whether the Indian troops excepted from the Vote recited in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act can, consistently with Constitutional Law,
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be employed during time of peace elsewhere than in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions without the previous consent of Parliament?—and said: My Lords, it is not my intention to attempt to make use of the present opportunity to call in question the policy of the step taken by Her Majesty's Government in ordering troops from India to Malta. That is a very important matter, on which, doubtless, a variety of opinions may exist in your Lordships' House, and a matter on which I should be fully prepared, at what I might deem a fitting opportunity, to express the opinion which I may have formed. But, on the present occasion, I think it better to abstain from entering upon any such question of policy. The occasion in respect of which I shall address your Lordships is, as I view it, a peculiar and remarkable one. It has not arisen in a time of war, and therefore it does not give rise to any considerations peculiar or appropriate to such a state of circumstances. It has not arisen at a time when Parliament was not assembled, and when the Government could not advise the Sovereign to have immediate recourse to the counsels of Parliament. It has arisen when Parliament is in full Session, and when there has been no obstacle whatever to any communication which might be constitutionally right and proper between the Queen and Her Parliament. No doubt there have been occasions in the past history of this country—and such occasions may occur again—when, in consequence of alarm of war when Parliament was not accessible, extraordinary measures might not only be justified, but it might have been the duty of the Government at the time to take them; and in such circumstances, if those measures were wisely and necessarily taken, the Government might rely on the ratification of Parliament on the first opportunity after its re-assembling. But that is not the state of circumstances in this case. Neither can the case be represented as one in which there has been any inadvertence or oversight in any sense whatever on the part of the Government. The facts are these. The usual preliminary Votes having been taken, the annual Mutiny Bill, founded on the Vote of Men for the Army, passed the House of Commons on the 29th of March last. Before

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that time your Lordships will remember a change had occurred in the composition of the Government, which I cannot be far wrong in presuming to have occurred after the measure now under consideration had been decided upon by the Cabinet. On the 1st of April, in compliance with the requisition of the Act of Parliament relating to the Reserves, a Message was brought down from the Crown which communicated, in the proper and Constitutional manner, the measure which the Sovereign, on the advice of Her Ministers, had taken for calling out those Reserves; and I need not state to your Lordships, that, if Her Majesty's Government had not thought that this other measure, which then either had been resolved on or was in immediate contemplation, was one that needed no communication to Parliament, it is hardly possible that a communication respecting it should not have been made simultaneously with that relating to the Reserves. My Lords, no such communication was made. Both Houses of Parliament adjourned on the 16th of April for an unusually long period, and on the same day the Royal Assent was given to the annual Mutiny Act. Immediately afterwards the country became aware that the Government had given orders that, I think, seven regiments of Native troops should be sent from India to Malta. Naturally, as soon as Parliament met, attention was called to that subject; and Parliament was informed, in the most authoritative manner, and by one of the most authoritative organs of the Government, that this was an order
"strictly within the proper Constitutional Prerogative of the Crown, and one which Her Majesty has as much right to give as to order any portion of British troops now in England to proceed to Gibraltar or Malta, or anywhere else;" and was subject to the control of Parliament only like "all movements of British forces"—namely, by means of "the right of withholding or challenging the Supplies asked for the purpose."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxix. 1435]
Again—
"Under any circumstances, we should not have thought it our duty—even if we had foreseen that the matter would become public within so short a time—to have made a communication to Parliament with respect to it until the arrangements had been completed."—[Ibid, 1436.]
My Lords, I ought not to omit to mention
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that the same authority, while admitting that it would be an infringement of the Bill of Rights to bring Native troops from India to England, thought that those troops might legally be called on to serve in the Channel Islands. On the day following, this further announcement was made in the House of Commons—
"The Indian Government has for the moment provided what is necessary for the fitting out of the Expedition, and the payment of the troops."
(Adding, that a Supplementary Estimate would be prepared for re-payment, and to provide for future expenses). In The Gazette of India of April 20 appeared a notification regarding the force to be despatched for service beyond sea, laying down rules for its pay, equipment, &c.—
"Regiments of Native Infantry will draw extra batta and free rations, or ration money at 3 rupees and 8 annas per month will be allowed to rank and file while on foreign service. Forage will also be allowed to horses and ponies of Cavalry, &c. The commanding officers will be authorized to advance three months' pay to the troops for service."
That was, of course, out of the Indian Revenues. My Lords, it appears to me that even if I could not challenge this measure on the strictest grounds of legality—as I propose to do—I should be well entitled to speak of it as "unconstitutional," in the sense attributed to that term by the great Constitutional historian, Hallam; who, calling in question the strict historical accuracy of the statement in the Bill of Rights, that the maintenance of a standing Army in this Kingdom had always been against the law, added that it was at least unconstitutional in this sense—that it was "a novelty of much importance, tending to endanger the established law."
But, my Lords, I challenge this measure both on the ground that it is unconstitutional in that wider and larger sense of that term which may be taken to include things not against the strict letter of the law, and also on the ground that it is against the very letter of the law. The two propositions which I shall endeavour to establish before your Lordships' House are these—First, that the previous consent of Parliament is necessary before any Imperial Forces in addition to the 135,452 men voted for the year commencing April 1, 1878, and

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mentioned in the Mutiny Act of this year, can be employed in time of peace elsewhere than in India, whether they be Indian troops or any other; and, secondly, that under the India Government Act of 1858 the Indian Revenues cannot be legally used, unless in the particular cases excepted by that Act, without the previous consent of Parliament, for the payment of Indian Native troops serving out of India; and that such use of those Revenues is not made legal by any intention on the part of the Government to ask Parliament for repayment. These are the two propositions on which I take my stand. My Lords, to avoid any misapprehension, I may observe that, when I use the words ''Imperial Forces," and say the previous consent of Parliament is necessary for the increase of these Forces serving out of India beyond the number mentioned in the Mutiny Act, I, of course, exclude every local Force in the nature of a Militia, or by whatever other name it may be called, in any of Her Majesty's Colonial or Foreign Possessions, which is not movable at the pleasure of the Crown. And, when I speak of the previous consent of Parliament, I do not mean only a consent signified by an Act of Parliament, or any formal or technical mode of consent; but I mean anything which, having regard to established Parliamentary and Constitutional usage, is habitually accepted as a sufficient Parliamentary consent. With those explanations, I confidently affirm the soundness of the propositions I have advanced. And, my Lords, I attach great importance to the word "previous," in my propositions; because, whenever by law or by the Constitution, the consent of Parliament is required, that consent, if you do not mean to make the obligation illusory and nugatory, must be sought for beforehand whenever it can reasonably be so sought. Of course, the safety of the State must outweigh all other considerations; and if it were not reasonably possible to ask the consent of Parliament before the thing was done, then, the thing being proper in itself, Parliament would doubtless condone the proceeding and ratify the act. But, wherever it is reasonably possible, it is of the first Constitutional importance—it is of the most urgent moment—that when the consent of Parliament can be obtained beforehand, the
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asking for it should not be deferred to whatever time may suit the convenience of the Government. There is another reason why the consent of Parliament should be "previous"—founded, as I understand it, first, on the manner in which Parliament from year to year gives its sanction to the raising and maintaining the Forces it authorizes; and next, on the form and manner in which that authority is now expressed and embodied in the Mutiny Act. The authority is given, in the first instance, by the Vote of that Body which has command over the public purse, and which votes for the year commencing on a particular day and ending on another day, over which the annual Vote runs, and over which the Mutiny Act also extends, a certain defined number of Men, "not exceeding" so many, who shall be maintained as the Army of the Crown. The words "not exceeding" express a plain prohibition, as far as the terms of that Parliamentary consent go, of any excess in addition to the number then sanctioned by Parliament, which Parliament may not afterwards, in the usual and Constitutional manner, authorize. Until a Supplementary Vote is asked for, and granted, any number exceeding that limit is a direct transgression of the terms in which Parliament has given its consent. And, although that exact form of words is not transferred into the Mutiny Act, yet the affirmative form of that Act amounts in substance to the very same thing; and, as I shall be prepared to show when I come to comment on that Act, it excludes by necessary implication any excess of the number therein mentioned which Parliament may not have authorized. Therefore, both by the letter of the law and on the Constitutional principle, the consent of Parliament is necessary before such a thing can be done; and it is the duty of the Government to obtain that consent before doing it.
How, my Lords, am I to establish the propositions I have advanced? I am content to adopt what was said by Mr. Pitt, in 1794, on the landing of Hessian troops at Portsmouth—
"In such a case there were only two principles to be proceeded upon—the written law, or the known practice and established usage of Parliament."
I think I shall be able to show that both the written law and the established

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usage of Parliament are against what has been done in this case.
My Lords, first as to the written law. The Bill of Rights, if technically construed—if construed without the application of the Constitutional principle which underlies it, and without regard to the Constitutional interpretation it has received—might not, perhaps, be in the mere letter of its terms sufficient to prove my case; yet, it is so connected with the foundation of that case, and with the whole history of the Constitutional practice that has resulted from it, that it is impossible not to mention it prominently and in the first instance. I refer to the famous declaration in the Act of Settlement of 1689—
"That the raising or keeping a standing Army within the Kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law."
My Lords, you observe the words "in time of peace." My notice has reference to a "time of peace," and I am not now going into the question how far in time of war the application of that prohibition is co-extensive with its application in time of peace; but you cannot look through the documents containing the public history of this country since 1688, without seeing that Parliament has always been most anxious, even in time of war, to conform, as nearly as it possibly could, to the Constitutional principle laid down in the Bill of Rights as applicable to time of peace. The words are "within the Kingdom," which, at least, means the Realm of England—though I should be sorry to construe the words as applicable to England alone; but it may, no doubt, be contended that they had reference to England alone, because, in 1689, the Union of Scotland, and the Union of Ireland, with England, had not been effected, though there were foreign Dependencies, and the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. I do not want to enter into that technical argument; but I cannot help calling attention to the fact that, the words of the Bill of Rights having been recited in every Mutiny Act down to the year 1800, the words "within the Kingdom," were then and thenceforth, without any new legislation upon the subject, changed to "within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland;" and I am much mistaken if I shall not satisfy your Lordships
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that Guernsey and Jersey had always been considered as included in their proper meaning. I think, also, that I shall be able to show your Lordships, that the Constitutional principle on this point has always been understood to include all the Dependencies of the Crown. What security could possibly be imagined to be derived from a law or a Constitutional principle, which limited the rule as to a standing Army so as to make it apply only to such a standing Army as might for the time being be within the four corners of Great Britain—or, after the Union of Ireland, of Great Britain and Ireland—if there might, at the same time, be a standing Army of unlimited numerical force in other Possessions of the Crown, which the Crown, for its own purposes, might move and dispose of without reference to Parliament? It appears to me quite plain that the public danger, which it was believed would exist if the Crown had the power of keeping a standing Army without the consent of Parliament, never could be provided against on such a limited construction of the Bill of Rights, as would admit of a standing Army being maintained without limit anywhere except in Great Britain and Ireland—even, according to the Government of the present day, in the Channel Islands.
And now, my Lords, let me refer to the Constitutional practice which followed the passing of the Bill of Rights. From 1689 down to the time of the Peace of Utrecht, this country was almost uninterruptedly at war. During those years, there were no numerical Votes and no numbers in the annual Mutiny Acts; but the manner in which Parliament, in the annual Mutiny Acts, then consented to the maintenance of the Forces necessary for the public service, was by declaring that—
"The present Forces should be maintained and others raised for the safety of the Kingdom and the preservation of the liberties of Europe."
But, in 1714, after the Peace of Utrecht and the accession of George the First, an Act was passed for the regulation of the Army; and it was stated that there was to be—
"A number not exceeding," &c., "to be kept up on foot for the guard of Her Majesty's Royal person and the safety of the Kingdom, and also a certain number of troops for the

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defence of Her Majesty's Possessions beyond the seas belonging to the Crown of Great Britain."
This "certain number" was fixed by a numerical Vote of "not exceeding" so many men, for each Plantation and Foreign Garrison or Possession for one complete year; and the Appropriation Act followed the same distinction. This practice became permanent, and continued for nearly a century, during which the Forces maintained for the defence of the Possessions beyond the seas belonging to the Crown of Great Britain were not numerically defined on the face of any Mutiny Act; but they were numerically defined by annual Votes of the House of Commons, for which distinct and separate provision was made in every year by the Appropriation Act. The whole subject was fully debated in the House of Commons in the year 1717; and from that time down to 1808, in every year, there were separate Votes taken for what it may be convenient to call the "Home Service"—though I shall presently show that much more than "Home Service" was comprehended within it—and for the service of our Foreign Possessions, during the current year; which Votes passed into the several Appropriation Acts. The Mutiny Acts, during the same period, did not mention numerically any Forces, except those which were for what I have called the "Home Service," which, in the Votes, were often described as "for guards and garrisons, and other His Majesty's Land Forces, in Great Britain, Jersey, and Guernsey;" and which, in time of war, always included the Regular troops serving abroad. My Lords, that "Home Service," as you will see very plainly, really meant the whole standing Army of the country, which was kept up for the defence of Great Britain, and also for the maintenance of those Imperial interests of which Great Britain was the centre and the guardian. I wish to show the House for what purpose the troops mentioned in all those Mutiny Acts were kept up. From 1717 to 1866, with very rare exceptions, the Forces mentioned in those Acts were stated to be maintained—
"For the safety of the Kingdom, the defence of the Possessions of the Crown, and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe."
That shows clearly how mistaken would be the notion, that those numbers
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were at any time kept up simply for domestic purposes, or as an Army to be employed only in the United Kingdom. It was the whole Imperial Standing Army which was mentioned in those Acts. The Forces for outlying Plantations and Garrisons were kept separate from that Army—they had separate numerical Votes taken, and separate Appropriations made for them, and were not regarded as part of the Imperial Standing Army maintained—
"For the safety of the Kingdom, the defence of the Possessions of the Crown, and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe."
I do not know why, but since 1866 the "balance of power" has been left out of the Mutiny Acts. That, of course, makes no difference, but I mention the fact. In 1808 the form of the Estimates, Votes, and Appropriation Act was changed, so as to comprehend in one general Vote all Her Majesty's Land Forces for service at home and abroad, except the regiments in the East Indies, the foreign corps in British pay, and the embodied Militia. That Vote included all the Foreign Garrisons, the West India, and other Colonial regiments, and Canada and other Fencibles; and, from that time forward, no separate Vote was taken for Plantations and Garrisons abroad. The annual Votes and Appropriations have ever since followed the precedent of 1808, with variations of form only. Till 1812 no corresponding change was made in the Preamble of the Mutiny Acts. Then, for the first time, there was given in the Mutiny Act of that year the whole number voted—245,996—which in that year included the King's Forces serving in the East Indies, for which a separate Vote was taken. From that time, there has been swept away both from the annual Votes and from the Mutiny Acts the distinction which, from 1714 to 1808, had been made between that which I have described as the Home Army—but which, in a far higher sense, was the Imperial Standing Army, kept up for the defence of the Possessions of the Crown and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe—and the Local Garrisons and Plantation Forces. From that time the whole were consolidated and brought together. I find, that from 1813 to the passing of the Act for the Government of India, in 1858, all the Mutiny Acts followed the precedent of 1812, except

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that they excluded from the number mentioned "His Majesty's Forces employed in the territorial possessions of the East India Company," but included "the officers and men of the troops and companies employed in recruiting for those Forces." After that date, there were no men employed in the moveable Armies of the Crown, anywhere save in India, who were not included in the number of men voted, and mentioned in every year's Mutiny Act. Since 1858, the same principle has been adhered to, with some differences of expression, which I shall note hereafter. The Votes, the Appropriation Acts, and the Mutiny Act, all continued to refer to the number of men, voted for the year as "not exceeding" so many, excluding the Forces in the territorial possessions of the East India Company. I apprehend, therefore, that if a portion of the latter had in any year been withdrawn from those territorial possessions and sent to Malta, so as to add to the whole aggregate of the number of troops to be maintained under the Mutiny Act, that would have been a plain and distinct violation of the Mutiny Act, and an undoubted contravention of the law. It would have been necessary to go to Parliament, and get a Supplementary Vote, before any of the Forces employed in the territorial possessions of the East India Company could be moved from India and taken anywhere else, except in exchange for an equivalent number, sent instead of them to India. That brings me down to the end of the time which preceded the change, such as it was, which was effected by the Government of India Act; and when I deal with that Act, I shall have to cover the ground of both at once of the propositions, which I told your Lordships it was my intention to maintain.
Before, however, I leave this part of my subject, I should be doing wrong if I did not refer your Lordships to two historical precedents illustrating what I have said, both of which occurred during the last century. In the first place, I shall refer shortly to what happened in 1734. Europe was then engaged in war. Great Britain was not at the time involved in it, but there was great reason to apprehend that this country might become so involved, and Parliament was about to be immediately dissolved. The new Parliament could not meet for a considerable time,
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and events of the gravest importance might occur in the interval. What did the Government of the day do in that state of things? Did they consider it their duty to dissolve Parliament, and to meet any case of necessity, by making an addition, on their own responsibility, to the Forces, and afterwards applying to Parliament for an Act of Indemnity? No; they took a very different view. They saw that the state of circumstances was such as might make it necessary, in the interval between that time and the meeting of the next Parliament, to raise additional Forces. Accordingly, a Message was sent down from the Crown, asking the consent of Parliament to an indefinite increase of Forces, of which an account was promised to be given to the next Parliament, on the ground of a necessity for taking precautions—
"During such time as it may be impossible for His Majesty to have the immediate advice and assistance of his great Council."
The King, therefore, having asked beforehand, that both Houses would give their consent to the raising of such additional Forces as might be necessary, both Houses voted Addresses of Assent in answer to the Royal Message. It was thought by many statesmen of that day that even that was too large a power to be entrusted to the discretion of the Crown; but Lord Hardwicke and Lord Chancellor Talbot held that consent might be given by an Address from each House of Parliament, as well as by an Act. The imminence of the danger was held to justify His Majesty's Message, and what followed was covered by the consent given beforehand. That was an example of a clear adhesion to the Constitutional principle for which I am now contending.
Again, my Lords, in 1775, on the breaking out of the American War, Parliament was informed in the King's Speech, on the opening of the Session, that his Majesty had
"sent to the garrisons of Gibraltar and Port Mahon a portion of His Electoral troops, in order that a larger number of the established Forces of this Kingdom might be applied to the maintenance of its authority."
That was done while Parliament was not sitting, and the proceeding was defended on the ground of necessity;

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but it was very much contested whether such a proceeding, without the consent of Parliament, could be justified; and I find that some of the most eminent men of that day supported a Motion for a grave Censure. Among them were Lord Lyttelton, the Duke of Grafton, the Duke of Richmond, and Lord Camden, all of whom insisted on the received Constitutional understanding of the principle of the Bill of Rights. Lord Camden,
"from the true construction of the letter and spirit united, as interpreted for a series of almost 90 years. … drew this obvious conclusion—that no foreign troops could be brought into the Dominions of the Crown of Great Britain without the previous consent of Parliament. … It was true," he said, "that the word 'foreigners' was not mentioned in the law; but would anyone infer from that, though it was not permitted to keep a standing Army of natives, it might be wise, constitutional, and legal, to keep on foot a standing Army of foreigners?"—[Parl. Hist., xviii. 811–12.]
He added, that "he was ashamed to dwell on such puerile distinctions." But it does not rest on what Lord Camden said. Other ancestors of noble Lords now in the House expressed similar opinions. The Lord Chancellor of that day, Lord Bathurst,
"deserting what he called the quibbles of Westminster Hall and the subtle distinctions of lawyers, allowed that the fortresses of Gibraltar and Port Mahon were fairly within the spirit and meaning of the paragraph in the Act of Settlement; and that, in the same sense, too, he understood it applied to foreigners, but to neither in the manner now contended for."—[Ibid., 815.]
He justified the measure on the ground that America belonged to "the Kingdom" in the same sense that those fortresses did, and that, there being war in America, it was not a "time of peace." Even when so defended, the Government of the day, though professing to believe in the strict legality of their act, did not depend upon that justification, or meet the Motion of Censure moved in both Houses with a direct negative. They moved the Previous Question, and in that way, of course, succeeded; and Lord North, the Premier, brought in a Bill, reciting that there were doubts of the legality of the measure, and proceeding to grant an Indemnity for it. That Bill passed through the House of Commons and came up to the House of Lords. In the House of Lords it met with opposition, not from any unwillingness to grant the indemnity, but
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because it was not thought right to acquiesce in the proposition that there was any doubt as to the law. The supporters of the Government said—"We do not care about it on our part." They were strong and confident both in their majority, and also in their substantial justification for what they had done, when Parliament was not sitting, for the safety of the Realm. They knew, that in so acting, they had incurred no actual peril; and therefore they were content to leave the matter as it was, and to let the Bill be rejected. But history records that, far from taking their stand upon the ground that this was a thing which could properly be done in time of peace without the consent of Parliament, they justified their conduct only because the country was at war; and they were not content to take a negative Vote against the proposition of Censure, but they moved the Previous Question, and pressed forward a Bill for their own indemnity, until they found that it would not pass with the unanimity which in their eyes would alone give it value. These are the precedents, arising before the year 1808, to which I have thought it right to call your Lordships' attention; and, if your Lordships will allow me, I will read a short passage from the speech of Serjeant Adair, delivered in the House of Commons in 1775, because it bears strongly upon the question now under discussion. Serjeant Adair said—
''It was no answer, to say that, in fact, the number of troops mentioned in the Mutiny Act are only those kept up in Great Britain, exclusive of those employed in the garrisons abroad; because Estimates were every year laid before Parliament, and supplies granted for the express purpose of supporting the troops kept in those garrisons, as well as in Great Britain; and, therefore, the one had the consent of Parliament as well as the other."—[Parl. Hist., xviii. 833.]
Serjeant Adair was a man of considerable reputation in his day; but I am not obliged to rely on his authority, because your Lordships have seen that Lord Chancellor Bathurst, in speaking upon the same question, admitted that Gibraltar and Minorca came within the substance of the principle, and only justified the step taken by the fact that we were then at war.
My Lords, this brings me to what may be called the second division of the subject—namely, that arising out of the legislation for the Government of

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India in 1858. Your Lordships are aware that the Act for the Government of India contains a clause of great importance, which bears upon this subject, and on which the second proposition which I have submitted to your Lordship depends. The terms of that clause are as follows:—
"Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such Possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues."
It is quite clear that the present case does not fall within the exception stated in that clause. There has certainly been no actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, and, however serious the present emergency may have been considered to be on this side of the world, it would not justify any steps being taken under the other branch of exception laid down in the Act, which the context plainly shows to mean a sudden and urgent necessity with respect to the safety of India. That being the effect of the clause, I will, with your Lordships' permission, advert briefly to its history. The Bill, as introduced, did not originally contain that clause. There had been a clause, not identical with it, in the first Bill introduced in the same year, 1858, by the Government of Lord Palmerston, which was to the following effect:—
"Provided no such military Forces as aforesaid, or any other military Force hereafter paid out of the Revenues of India under this Act shall, while so paid, be employed out of Asia."
When the change of Government occurred, the late Lord Derby brought in the Bill which afterwards became law. It was, in the House of Commons, that Mr. Gladstone, on the 6th of July in that year, proposed a clause, differing from that which we now find in the Act in this respect—that it proposed to prevent the employment of our own Indian Forces beyond the frontier of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, except with the consent of Parliament, or in cases of emergency. When Mr. Gladstone proposed that clause, he made use of some expressions which I think it right to read to your Lordships—not so much on account of Mr. Gladstone's authority,
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but because of the assent given to them by the then Secretary of State for India, the present Earl of Derby, who had charge of the Bill. Mr. Gladstone insisted on the danger of leaving it
"in the discretion of the Executive to make use of what might be called extraneous finance and an extraneous Army for the purpose of making war, the expense of which was to be hereafter charged on the British people."—[3 Hansard, cli. 1011.]
Lord Stanley (accepting the clause with only a slight verbal change, suggested by the present Lord Chancellor, then Solicitor General) said that Mr. Gladstone "had said nothing to which he was not prepared to assent." When the Bill came up to this House on the 19th of July, the late Lord Derby proposed that the form of the clause should be changed, so as to make it stand as it is at present. It had been objected to in the House of Commons by Lord Palmerston, and in the House of Lords it was still objected to in its altered form by several Peers then in Opposition, including my noble Friend behind me (Earl Granville), as interfering, more than was safe or desirable, with the Prerogative of the Crown: and that for a very plain reason—namely, because it would operate, not in time of peace only, but also in time of war. In answer to those objections, Lord Derby said—
"The Crown would be at full liberty to employ those Forces in any quarter of the globe for which, by the terms of their enlistment, they were eligible. It being the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown to make war and peace, the constitutional check upon the exercise of that Prerogative was the sanction of Parliament, by the granting of pecuniary resources. … The clause did not prevent the Crown from making use of the Indian troops; subject only to this—that, as a general rule, the expense of those troops must be defrayed by Parliament; and the same constitutional check, therefore, was imposed on the Crown with respect to troops serving in India which was imposed with respect to troops serving in every other part of the globe."—[Ibid. 1697.]
The noble Earl the present Prime Minister had spoken in the House of Commons to the same effect. I do not see a word there to which reasonable exception can be taken, or which is inconsistent with either of my propositions. There is not a word there about moving troops from India in time of peace—the whole argument was, that in case of war the Crown would be able to use these troops out of India, subject to

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the control which Parliament might exercise by refusing Supplies; and that any troops which might be so moved would be subject to all the Constitutional checks and safeguards which would be applicable to any other part of Her Majesty's Forces serving beyond the limits of India.
What has been the practice since the time to which I am referring? I find that the Votes, the Appropriation Acts, and the Mutiny Acts, have all mentioned numerically the whole Army of the Queen, excepting such part of the troops as were serving in the Indian Possessions of the Queen; in addition to which, care has been taken to let Parliament know how many European troops were, from year to year, actually serving in India. It is remarkable that, almost as if anticipating the present discussion, and giving beforehand a crucial answer to the arguments that might be used in support of the course which has been taken, the language of the Mutiny Acts underwent in 1863 a change which has been continued down to the present year, and from that date gave the numerical total of the Forces serving, or to serve, for the following year, "exclusive of the numbers actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions"—as if the expressions formerly used had been too ambiguous. I do not suppose that the present question was foreseen; but the alteration in the terms is useful, as showing distinctly the sense of Parliament, that the number voted was meant to include all Her Majesty's disposable Forces, which could be used for the purposes of a standing Army, except such troops only as, from time to time, might be actually serving in India; and that, when Indian troops might be moved to places other than India, the fact should be made known to Parliament, so that, by means of Supplementary Votes, or otherwise, a Constitutional and Parliamentary sanction might be obtained for their employment and payment.
My Lords, I now come to the action which has been taken—for action has been taken—on this view of the law; and we are not left to mere abstract arguments with reference to this matter. My contention is, that according to the terms of the Mutiny Act, it is altogether contrary to law to exceed, elsewhere
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than in India, the number of men actually voted for the service of the year, and mentioned in the Mutiny Act, and I shall endeavour to prove this from what has been said and done. I also contend that it is against the express words of the 55th clause of the India Government Act to use the Revenues of India without the consent of Parliament for the payment of these troops; and that it is no answer on the part of the Government to say that they intend, at some future time, to ask Parliament to sanction, or to refund that payment. What has been done is opposed to the letter of both the Statutes to which I have referred, and it is also opposed to the great and broad Constitutional principle which underlies them both. It cannot be said that what has been done has resulted from inadvertence or oversight; inasmuch as on three previous occasions the same question has arisen in Parliament, and with one uniform result. The first occasion was in the year 1863—the very year in which the words "Exclusive of the numbers actually serving in India" were first inserted in the Mutiny Act. In that year a Maori outbreak occurred in New Zealand, and Sir George Grey, the then Governor of the Colony, sent a message to the Duke of Newcastle, suggesting that it would be very useful if some Sikh troops could be sent from India to his assistance, the case being one in which help was urgently required. The Government thought that the application was reasonable, and it was agreed that the troops should be sent. On the 23rd of July a debate arose in the House of Commons on the proposal to send 3,000 Indian Sikh troops to New Zealand. In the course of the debate, my right hon. Friend Mr. Forster used words which I quote, not as of authority, but because they produced their effect. He said—
"He did not object to the employment of Sikh troops in New Zealand; but it appeared that, by little and little, the Crown was getting the disposal of a much larger Force than was voted by Parliament; and it was highly important that the relations in which we stood to the Indian Army should, in this respect, he clearly established and understood. The subject was noticed when the Bill for amalgamating the Indian with the Queen's Army was under discussion; and the difficulty was foreseen by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who introduced a clause to meet it. It was a high breach of the privileges of the people to maintain a standing

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Army without the authority of Parliament; and the precise number of men of which the Army was to consist was annually voted by the House. But if they permitted the employment, without remark, of Indian troops out of India, although there might appear reasons for it, the result would be to place at the disposal of the Crown an Army of 100,000 or 200,000 men beyond the Force directly sanctioned by the House."—[3 Hansard, clxxii. 1291.]
Lord Palmerston, who answered Mr. Forster, justified the proceeding as one of urgency; the expense of which, if not met out of the money already voted, or by the Colony, would be asked for from Parliament in the next Session. Lord Palmerston showed a bold front to Mr. Forster on that 23rd of July; and on the 25th the Duke of Newcastle sent the following despatch to Governor Sir George Grey:—
"On learning the apprehensions which are entertained by yourself and your Government, I wrote without delay to the Secretaries for War and for India, requesting that you might receive immediate assistance. I have every reason to hope that a European regiment will be at once sent to you from Ceylon and two Sikh regiments from India, unless, happily, the occasion for their services in New Zealand shall have passed away before they can be embarked."
But what was the result? It is not difficult to see, that, between the 23rd and the 27th, the Cabinet must have had an opportunity of deliberating on what had been said in Parliament; and, on the 27th of July, two days after his first despatch, the Duke of Newcastle wrote again to Sir George Grey in these altered terms—
"With reference to my despatch No. 78, of the 25th inst., I have now to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government have not considered it desirable to send from India the two Sikh regiments for which you have applied. The Governor General for India has, however, been desired to despatch immediately to the Colony two of those regiments which would, under other circumstances, have returned home during the present season."
I am now going to quote the authority of a man whose name must have considerable weight with noble Lords opposite, because of his great reputation with them on military matters, and because of his public services—I mean General Peel. General Peel, on the 9th of March, 1863, speaking in the House of Commons, took exception to the omission from the Vote of men, then proposed by Sir George Lewis, of two regiments of Indian Native Infantry employed in China; and he moved to reduce
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the money Vote so far as it covered their pay and clothing. He said—
"His object was to prevent any Government employing a Native Indian Army in China at the charge of this country, without the House knowing and having control over the expenditure. He wanted the right hon. Gentleman (Sir George Cornewall Lewis) to add these two regiments to the number to be voted, and then the House would know what the actual Force was; for it was quite evident that the number of 148,242 set down in the Estimates was not the total Force."—[3 Hansard, clxix. 1277.]
Nothing was done in consequence of that at the time; and, in the following year, the Vote, as again brought forward, still omitted those two regiments from the number of men to be voted. It was stated, however, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, that there was no objection to including them in the Estimate; and a statement of their actual number was laid before the House. On that occasion General Peel said—
"Last year, when the Indian troops were first noticed in the Army Estimates, and a sum of money was taken for their payment, no number was given, and there were no means of ascertaining their number. … The result of what then took place was that this year not only the amount of cost, but also the number of men, was given. Certainly, if the control of the House was necessary in one case, it must be in the case of the Indian Native troops. [Colonel SYKES: 'Serving out of India.'] If any part of the Native Indian Army could be employed without a Vote of that House, those troops were altogether removed from Parliamentary control. In the case of ordinary troops there were two checks—the Mutiny Act, and the money voted by Parliament for the pay of the troops. But neither of these checks applied to the Indian troops. Native Indian troops were not liable to the Mutiny Act, being expressly excluded. … and were ruled by Articles of War expressly framed for India; and the House had no control over Native troops through its privilege as to money Votes, because those troops were paid, in the first instance, by the Indian Government, and the expenditure never came under the notice of the Imperial Parliament till long after it had been incurred."—[3 Hansard, clxxiii. 1431.]
The consequence of what then occurred was this—that from 1865 to 1872—the last occasion on which there has been any employment of Native Indian troops out of India—the number of those troops to be so employed in each year was regularly voted by Parliament; though they were not included in the numbers mentioned in the Mutiny Acts of those years. It is true that the numbers were small; but the smaller the numbers, the more important, as illustrating the principle. Lord Hartington,

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Sir John Pakington, and Mr. Cardwell, were the successive Secretaries of State who moved those Votes. In 1865 the number of Indian Native troops voted was 178. They were employed in China and the Straits Settlements. The same number was voted in 1866 and in 1867. In 1869 the number was 880, and, in the two following years, 1,760. The Army Votes in 1866 were in this form—and, in such matters, form is of importance—
First:—"That a number of Forces, not exceeding 138,117 men, be maintained for the service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from the 1st of April, 1866, to the 31st of March, 1867, inclusive."
There, my Lords, "the service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" means the service of the standing Army, as voted by Parliament, for all Imperial purposes. The second Vote followed:—
"That a number, not exceeding 178 of Native Indian troops belonging to Her Majesty's Native Indian Army, be maintained beyond Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
In the present year, there is only one Vote, for a
"total number of men, including the staff of the Militia Forces on the Home and Colonial Establishments of the Army, exclusive of those serving in India, 135,452;"
and that number has passed into the Mutiny Act of this year,
"exclusive of the number actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
And now, my Lords, I come to the latest precedent. It is that of 1867, and it arose out of the Abyssinian Expedition. The Native Indian troops employed in that Expedition were so employed during a time of Recess, without the previous, though with the subsequent consent of Parliament. They were, from the first, paid out of Indian Revenues. But what occurred? An Autumn Session was held for the express purpose of getting that consent. In the course of the discussion which arose in November, 1867, on the Message from the Crown, Mr. Gladstone, referring to the 55th clause of the India Government Act, said—
"This was the very thing the Act of 1858 was passed to prevent. If the application of the Indian Revenues, by way of advance, be not prohibited by the clause as it stands, the clause is little better than a dead letter."
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Two days later, on the 28th of November, Sir Stafford Northcote moved Resolutions for the payment of the Indian troops employed on that Expedition out of Indian Revenue. Sir Stafford Northcote, who is always as frank as the interests of the public service will permit, but whose frankness differs in its manifestations under different circumstances, said, in moving these Resolutions—
"I am bound to say, wishing to be as frank as I can with the Committee, that, although the question is by no means free from doubt, I am inclined to think, upon a very strict interpretation of the Act, it may be held that what we have done is outside the letter of the law. The point on which we are challenged, so far as I understand, is this:—In the application of the Revenues of India to the purposes of the Abyssinian Expedition, as far as it has hitherto gone, we have been proceeding upon the view, not to their ultimate application without the consent of Parliament, but only to their advance for the purposes of an Expedition, which advance will be repaid by subsequent payments from the Imperial Revenue. I am inclined to think that the wording of the clause would, strictly speaking, prohibit that proceeding."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 359.]
I certainly regard that as a very frank admission, indeed. Your Lordships will, I think, be of opinion that there has been no occasion on which the same question has arisen in so practical or important a form as on the present occasion; but, on every occasion which the question has arisen, the result has been the same. Lord Palmerston, a man as inflexible of purpose as any man could be, abandoned the intention he had formed, as I have shown, when he gave it further consideration, because he could not reconcile that intention with the existing law. General Peel, for several successive years, caused Votes of the House of Commons to be taken for the numbers of the Native Indian troops employed out of India; and Sir Stafford Northcote admitted that the payment of Indian troops serving beyond the limits of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions out of Indian Revenues, even by way of an advance intended to be afterwards repaid, was, strictly speaking, prohibited by Act of Parliament; although he pleaded, by way of extenuation, that others had done the same thing before, and that it was always the intention of Her Majesty's Government to come as soon as they could to Parliament to obtain assent to what had been done.
This, my Lords, is no mere matter of form—it is a matter of principle. If that

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principle be violated, the effect may be to take away the practical securities intended to be given to the nation by the Bill of Rights. It is no answer to plead the general control which Parliament has in the matters of Supply. It is no answer to say that the Government has a great majority, which is sure to approve their action, and that it little signifies whether that approval is asked sooner or later. It is of the very essence of the Constitution and of the safety of our civil government that the power of the majority should not be so strained; and that, when other checks have been provided, you should not rely merely on the power of a majority. And, my Lords, if I could give no other reason, I would insist upon this—that the observance of these checks and rules enables Parliament to form an unprejudiced judgment upon the measures which it is proposed to take, and that their neglect deprives it of that power. When troops have been actually employed, they must be paid; and when advances have been made out of the Indian Revenue, Parliament has no choice but either to leave the charge on that Revenue, or to provide for its repayment. My Lords, I shall not dilate further upon that subject. I prefer to quote words by no means without application to the present occasion, uttered by one who was able to give much more forcible expression to his views than I can, and by one of much higher authority. The words are these—they were used in the House of Commons in the debate upon that very Abyssinian Vote—
"It is not any present danger I fear, as resulting from the present step; but, having regard to the future, I do not like India to be looked upon as an English barrack in the Oriental seas, from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them. It is bad for England, because it is always bad for us not to have that check upon the temptation to engage in little wars"—
[I suppose it would be equally so as to great wars]—
"Which can only be controlled by the necessity of paying for them. But it is bad, very bad, for India; because if there were a weak, or a timid, or too facile, a Governor General in that country at the time of any similar operation, you might have India seriously denuded of troops in order to suit the Imperial interest, while there would be this precedent to prevent you from censuring any officer who pursued such a course. I think
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that the precedent of the Persian War, which has been mentioned in this discussion, is applicable in more respects than one; because, if I am not mistaken, at the time the Mutiny broke out, part of the troops which should have been guarding India were absent on that war. Now, this is a warning which we ought to lay to heart. If this garrison which we keep in India is—as all Indian authorities assure us—necessary for maintaining that country in security and peace, that garrison ought not to be rashly diminished. If, on the other hand, it is too large, and India can for any length of time conveniently spare those troops, then the Indian population ought not to be so unnecessarily taxed."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 406.]
My Lords, I am not sure what number of troops were employed in the Abyssirian Expedition, but I think they were not more than are now proposed to be removed from India. The Member who uttered these remarkable words in 1867 was a man of no small weight—it was Her Majesty's present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
My Lords, I have now brought my remarks to a close, but I will say a few words in justification of the course I have taken in not concluding with a Motion. It is a difference between the practice of this House and that of the House of Commons, not unattended with some advantages, that we may raise discussions which they cannot, unless they conclude with a Motion. If, in the public interest, it seemed necessary to take the same course here, I should not be in the least afraid to undertake the task of putting my propositions in the form of a Motion. But, my Lords, on this occasion, it has appeared to me, and to the Friends with whom I act, that the public interest which we have in view may be effectually promoted without any Vote of this House; and, by adopting this course, I hope, in the first place, we shall avoid anything like controversies on mere matters of form or of words. This is a question about matters of substance, not of words. In the second place, from the nature of the question, from its very important bearing, not only at the present time, but it may be for all time, upon the interests of the country, I think there is much convenience in a form of proceeding which avoids imputations of personal censure or of Party attack; and I am the more satisfied with the course I have adopted because I infer, from what is passing elsewhere, that if I had put it in the

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form of an affirmative proposition, I should have been met, not by any negative issue, but by a very general reference to existing law and practice, informing me, at the same time, that Her Majesty's Government consider it to be
"unnecessary and unexpedient to affirm any Resolution tending to weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in the present state of Foreign affairs."
Well, I do not ask your Lordships to affirm any Resolution "tending to weaken Her Majesty's Government in the present state of foreign affairs;" but I have thought that the occasion was one which absolutely demanded, from those who had Constitutional law and principle at heart, protest and criticism. That protest I have made; that criticism I have offered; and I hope, and confidently believe, that they will not be unattended with some public advantage and utility, now and hereafter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My noble and learned Friend(Lord Selborne) has called your Lordships' attention to a subject of much interest and importance; and I own I cannot but rejoice that a subject which has been so much misunderstood out-of-doors, and which, I am afraid, has been imperfectly considered, even by my noble and learned Friend, has been brought at once under the light of public discussion. In order that your Lordships may see that I am at one with the noble and learned Lord as to what is the point now to be examined, let me remind your Lordships of those views of the question, which he properly stated he did not mean to approach, and upon which I do not mean to make any observations. He said that he did not on this occasion challenge or propose to argue the policy or the expediency of the moving of any part of the Native Indian Army for employment out of India. My Lords, that is a subject of great interest. It is a question upon which different opinions may be entertained. When it is thought fit to raise that question in this House, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to state the reasons, in point of policy and expediency, upon which they have acted; and they entertain a confident hope that they will have the full assent of your Lordships, as they believe they have the assent of the country, to the step they have taken. My Lords, another subject
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which my noble and learned Friend said he should not refer to, and to which I do not mean to refer, is the question of the provision to be made by the other House of Parliament for the maintenance of the troops which have been moved to Malta. Upon that subject, Her Majesty's Government have stated, and stated in the most emphatic manner, that their intention is to apply to Parliament—to lay before the other House the expenditure which would be incurred by the removal of these troops, and to ask the assent and support of the other House for that expenditure. There is no Government which, in any time of emergency or difficulty, has not over and over again had to face a question of this kind. There is no Government in this country which has not at times incurred an expenditure or made an expenditure of money which, in the first instance, is not authorized, and for which they have had to come to Parliament afterwards for assent to an expenditure already made or already incurred. My Lords, whether that expenditure is only incurred, or whether it is made, for temporary purposes, out of a fund which has afterwards to be recouped, the principle is the same—the Government have done the thing upon their own responsibility and risk—they have to come to Parliament and state what has been done, and they have to ask, retrospectively, the consent of Parliament to their act. Upon that point we have very high authority, beyond which I have no desire to go. In the course of the last financial year, Her Majesty's Government came down to the House of Commons for its sanction to an expenditure, beforehand, of a very considerable sum of money. That step of the Government was challenged by persons "elsewhere," who objected to what was done. It appeared to many to be a safe and judicious course to ask for the assent of Parliament to an expenditure which might become necessary on a sudden occasion with regard to which no delay could be brooked. An objection was, however, taken, and the Government was told that there was a higher and better principle upon which they ought to have acted. It was said in the debate, in the other House, on the 8th of February—
"He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) says a sudden emergency may arise, and he may want transports and other means to meet the emergency.

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If a sudden emergency did arise, the Government must know their duty too well to wait for a Vote of this House. No Government worthy of its place but would, upon a sudden emergency, give the orders which the circumstances of the time might demand, and then come down at the earliest moment in their power to ask the concurrence of the House in what they had done. Undoubtedly, that is the principle on which all Governments have acted in this country, a principle which has never been challenged."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxvii. 1370.]
That was the opinion as to the Constitutional course that ought to be taken given by the late Prime Minister (Mr. Gladstone), and that is the course we have taken.
My Lord, these questions being put out of the ambit of our discussion, I come to what, after all, is a dry and bare legal and Constitutional question, although it has taken two hours by the clock to call your Lordships' attention to it. I think it is a simple question; but, like every other question, it may be overlaid with matter—and, if it be, it is necessary to strip away and to put aside all the irrelevant and perverted matter by which a simple and plain question has been covered, and to ask your Lordships' judgment upon the question as it stands divested of all those irrelevancies. The Notice of my noble and learned Friend is a very simple one; it affirms or suggests one proposition which may be expressed in very few words. The proposition which the Notice expresses is this—that it is unconstitutional in time of peace to remove any part of the Native Army of India out of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions without the assent of Parliament. That is a very short proposition, and one which, once that all which is irrelevant has been explained and discarded, may be determined without any great length of argument on the one side or the other. That is the proposition of which my noble and learned Friend has given Notice.
But before I address myself to it, I must call attention to what I cannot but consider a remarkable occurrence which has come under our notice. It was about a week ago that the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition in this House (Earl Granville) gave a Notice on behalf of my noble and learned Friend, who was then absent. The next evening my noble and learned Friend came down and said he had been
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given to understand there was a similar Motion coming on in the House of Commons, so that there would be a simultaneous discussion in both Houses of Parliament upon this subject, and it was the opinion of himself and of those who acted with him that it would be better to have it upon the same evening; and, accordingly, the debate here was fixed for this evening. I have no right to say what is being done at this moment in another House of Parliament; but I have in my hand a proposition which has attached to it the name of an eminent Leader of the Liberal Party; and this is stated to be the opinion which he is prepared to maintain—
"The Marquess of Hartington:—Military Forces of the Crown.—That by the Constitution of this Realm no Forces may be raised or kept by the Crown in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the Dominions of the Crown, excepting only such Forces as may be actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
Of course, the first observation which must occur to your Lordships is this—that if this is the proposition which is to be submitted to the other House of Parliament, it is entirely a different one from the proposition contained in the Notice before us. It is the first occasion in Parliamentary history on which a simultaneous discussion has been fixed for the two Houses to discuss upon the same evening two different questions. It is difficult to see what virtue there can be in having the discussions on the same night. One proposition may be right, or the other may be right, or they may both be wrong; but they are perfectly different propositions. The proposition of my noble and learned Friend relates to the employment of troops which are raised with the consent of Parliament. The proposition of Lord Hartington relates to the raising of troops without the consent of Parliament. The noble and learned Lord, laving probably had his attention drawn to the great anomaly of Leaders of the Liberal Party advancing different propositions in the two Houses, has endeavoured to lead your Lordships up to two other propositions which he now puts forward as covering the whole ground. So they may do; but these were not the propositions of which he gave Notice. He gave Notice of a simple proposition implying the want of power to move Indian troops out of India without the

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consent of Parliament. A noble Lord is affirming "elsewhere" that, looking broadly over the whole of Her Majesty's Dominions in every part of the world, in no corner in any one of them can any troops be raised or kept which can be called troops of the Crown unless they are included in the number of men mentioned in the Mutiny Bill. I must, therefore, in the first place, say a few words about the proposition of the Marquess of Hartington—because the noble and learned Lord has shown more or less willingness to adopt it. Where is the authority for the proposition that the consent of the English Parliament must precede the raising of troops in any and every portion of the Dominions of the Crown, no matter how those troops are to be maintained? I say nothing about a time of peace or a time of war, for a separate discussion would be required to determine what is a time of peace or a time of war. The noble and learned Lord found great difficulty in explaining the exact meaning of the Bill of Rights, and I think there is very great difficulty from his point of view. It says that maintaining an Army in time of peace within the Kingdom without the consent of Parliament is illegal, and at that time "the Kingdom" was England. After the Union with Scotland, "the Kingdom" became Great Britain. After the Union with Scotland, and before the Union with Ireland, we know that throughout the last century Forces were kept up by the Crown in Ireland without the assent of the English Parliament. Does anyone say that that was a violation of the Bill of Rights? Since the Union with Ireland, the wording of the Mutiny Act has become "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland;" and the understanding between the Parliament and the Crown has been declared to be that there is to be no standing Army kept up within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in time of peace without the consent of Parliament. That is the interpretation which Parliament yearly puts upon the well-known clause of the Bill of Rights, as applied to the present state of affairs. Does the noble and learned Lord mean to say that Malta is part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland? Where, then, is the authority for that proposition of the Marquess of Hartington?
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I do not stop there. I take the Mutiny Act, and in the 4th clause of the Act I find a most clear distinction drawn between troops in a Colony or Dependency of the Crown which cannot serve in the United Kingdom and those which can serve in the United Kingdom. The 4th clause provides that all officers and soldiers of any troops—of any "troops," observe—mustered and in pay, which shall be raised and serving in any of Her Majesty's Dominions abroad, or in places in the possession of, or occupied by, Her Majesty's subjects, and under the command of any officer having any commission immediately from Her Majesty shall be subject to the provisions of the Act and of the Articles of War. The troops may be raised in any Colony or Dependency. The clause does not stop there; but it says that if, having been made prisoners of war, they be sent to Great Britain or Ireland, although they are not to serve therein—because they would be in excess of the number sanctioned by Parliament—the clauses with regard to billeting are to be applicable to them. Therefore, it is assumed that there may be in all other parts of the Dominion of the Crown out of the United Kingdom, a raising of men which shall be Forces of the Crown, which may serve under the Queen's Commission, which shall be subject to the Articles of War, which may not come into this Kingdom to serve, but which, if made prisoners, may be billeted, although they may not serve.
But the Motion of the Marquess of Hartington is an impeachment against the whole system of procedure in our Colonies. There is scarcely one of them in which there have not been such Forces. The noble and learned Lord said he did not speak of local Forces which might be raised in the Colonies, whether as Militia or under any other name, but which could not be moved out of the places where they were raised. But what has the removability of troops to do with the Motion of the Marquess of Hartington?
VISCOUNT POWERSCOURT: This is the fifth time the noble and learned Lord has referred by name to a Member of the House of Commons. I should like to know whether he is in Order?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am perfectly in Order.
EARL GRANVILLE: The Question should probably be, whether the noble and learned Lord is in Order in discussing a Motion which is to be made in the other House?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not in the least know what Motion is to be made in the other House of Parliament; but I said I had had before me what I understood to be Lord Hartington's opinion on the subject. If the noble Earl is prepared to say that this is not Lord Hartington's opinion on this subject, I am prepared to withdraw all my observations. What, then, is the fact as regards the Forces of the Crown serving under the Queen's Commission? I find that there are such Forces in Canada, New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand, British Guiana, Jamaica, Honduras, St. Vincent, Grenada, Antigua, Dominica, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and St. Helena—and all of these are Forces of the Crown not included in the numbers mentioned in the Mutiny Act. They assume various forms. Sometimes they are in the form of a standing Army; sometimes in the form of a Militia. They are called out from time to time, and they are under the command of officers bearing Her Majesty's Commission. The service is compulsory; and with regard to one of the places mentioned—Canada—they number, I believe, in one year something like 45,000, and they are bound to serve either within or without the Dominion. With regard to some of these Colonies—those having Representative Institutions—it is possible that permission may have been given them by the Imperial Legislature to raise Forces of this kind; but I will take the Colonies to which the observation does not apply; and in these Colonies there are Forces of the Crown, without any authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, but also without any violation of the Bill of Rights or the Mutiny Act. I now come to the proposition of my noble and learned Friend. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes, but the noble Duke who cheers me appears to forget what has happened. The proposition of my noble and learned Friend is the proposition of which he has given Notice; but the noble Duke forgets that my noble and learned Friend adopted in his speech the other proposition, and it is for this
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reason that I passed aside to answer that other proposition.
LORD SELBORNEsaid, that the proposition he had laid down was expressed in its own terms, and if they were to be criticized, it would be better that those terms should be quoted than others.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My noble and learned Friend has placed a proposition on the Notice Paper, and we understand what that proposition means; but, in his speech to-night, he has expressed two propositions which are not on the Paper. If I understand one of those propositions rightly it is the same, in effect, as that of Lord Hartington—namely, that there cannot be maintained in the Colonies or Dependencies of the Crown any Forces of the Crown except those included in the Mutiny Act.
LORD SELBORNEsaid, he would repeat the words of his first proposition—
"That it is necessary to have the previous consent of Parliament before any Imperial Forces, in addition to the 135,475 troops voted for the year commencing the 1st of April, 1878, and included in the year's Mutiny Act, can be employed during the time of peace elsewhere than in Her Majesty's Indian possessions."
He had been careful to explain in what sense he used the word "Imperial," as excluding any local Force not moveable at the pleasure of the Crown.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Where is the authority of my noble and learned Friend for importing into his definition the word "Imperial," and for saying that "Imperial" troops cannot be maintained?—there is no such expression in the Mutiny Act as "Imperial." That expression has been introduced by my noble and learned Friend in order to found an argument upon it; and he knows that, without the introduction of that word, his argument could not be maintained. The expression is that no "standing Army" can be maintained, and my noble and learned Friend adroitly imports the word "Imperial," in order to get rid of the Colonial argument, which he feels is fatal to his contention.
My Lords, I now come to the Notice of my noble and learned Friend. I have no wish in this matter to gain a mere triumph of words. I am anxious to consider the Constitutional question fairly. I believe that in this House—however we may differ on other points—both sides

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are anxious to maintain the Constitution of the country. I believe I speak as much for one side as for the other—no one sitting on either side of the House would consent, knowingly, to what would be a violation of the Constitution; and speaking for Her Majesty's Government, I will say that if they believed for one moment that what they have done—even if carelessly done—had been a violation or straining of the Constitution, they would come at once to Parliament and ask for its indemnity for the act they had committed. But I think I shall be able to show your Lordships to demonstration that there has been no departure from the Constitution. In one respect, and in one respect only, has the act which has been done by the Government transcended the powers they possess—that one respect being the expenditure of money, with reference to which they have expressed their intention to apply to the House of Commons for the purpose of obtaining its retrospective assent.
The transaction of 1775 has been referred to, but nothing could be more irrelevant to the question. There were three distinct features in that case, not one of which is now present. The three distinguishing features of the transaction of 1775 were these—The King garrisoned Gibraltar and one of the islands adjacent by a number of Hanoverian troops; and the question was not as to the movement or employment of troops which were the troops of the Crown, but as to the employment of troops which were not the troops of the Crown. They were the troops of the Elector of Hanover. It so happened that the Elector of Hanover was also King of England, but that did not alter the circumstances of the case. The employment of the troops of Hanover was as much the employment of the troops of a foreign Power as if they had been the troops of France; their employment, therefore, was an unconstitutional act. What was the second feature of that transaction? There was in what was done a violation of the Act of Settlement. It was a violation of the Act of Settlement that any office or place of trust should be placed in the hands of foreigners. These troops being foreign troops, and the garrison of Gibraltar being placed in their hands, there was a violation of the Act in placing an office of trust in the hands of those who
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were foreigners. But, in addition to that, the third feature in the transaction, which was very much insisted on in the debate, was that the Hanoverian troops were subject to no Mutiny Law. They had a Mutiny Law of their own, but they had left it behind them in Hanover, and when they went to the British Colonies they were a body of armed men subject to no discipline. They entered the employment of the British Crown, and the Crown trusted them with its fortresses. Yet, if they had risen in mutiny, they could not in any way have been controlled. But not one of these features applies to the present case. Beyond all doubt, the Government of that day had done what could not be justified. My noble and learned Friend says Lord Bathurst expressed an opinion that the provision in the Bill of Rights as to a standing Army extended to every part of the Kingdom. Now, it is well known that the debates of that time were very indifferently reported, and whatever observations Lord Bathurst made appear to have been made for the purpose of introducing a paradox. You say, said Lord Bathurst, that the Realms of England mean every part of the King's Dominions; well, suppose I admit that, the effect of it is, whenever there is war in any part of the King's Dominions, the Bill of Rights does not apply; this Kingdom, therefore, means America, and there is war in America, and that, therefore, these troops could be brought to Gibraltar. Now, is it possible that this is anything but a fanciful paradox of Lord Bathurst's?
My Lords, the question which your Lordships have to consider is not as to foreign troops, but as to the Forces of the Crown, duly raised under the sanction and authority of Parliament. Where and what is the limit placed on the authority of the Crown to use and to move its own troops? In the first place, I would remind your Lordships that the Native Indian Army is, since the Act of 1858, part of the Forces of the Crown; and, with regard to the forces of the Crown, the general rule is that it is the Prerogative of the Crown to move them to whatever place it may think fit, and that it is for those who assert, that in any particular case that Prerogative is restrained, to show how that restriction presses upon the Prerogative. As to the Prerogative of

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the Crown, let me point out to your Lordships what the undoubted law on the subject is. The Prerogative of the Crown was defined so long ago as the reign of Charles II., in the Preamble of an Act, which Preamble has been kept alive, though the rest of the Act has been repealed. The Prerogative of the Crown is stated to be—
"Forasmuch as within all His Majesty's Realms and Dominions, the sole supreme government, command, and disposition of the Militia, and of all Forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength is, and by the laws of England ever was, the undoubted right of His Majesty, and his Royal predecessors, Kings and Queens of England, and that both or either of the Houses of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same…"
That is the general rule with regard to the Prerogative of the Crown. I should like to fortify that position by reference to two eminent authorities to which I should think Members of the Liberal Party will attach weight. Mr. Fox, towards the close of the last century, was speaking on a subject which in the last century was of much interest—the right of the Crown to move the Irish Army. Mr. Fox, after remarking that the English and Irish Armies had different Mutiny Acts, which he thought inconvenient, then proceeded to make a proposal, the precise nature of which does not seem very clear. But he observed—
"Though he was an enemy to the dangerous influence of the Crown, he was a friend to the just Prerogative, and he considered the power vested in His Majesty, of sending troops to whatever place of His Dominions might require their assistance, as the most valuable Prerogative. It was on this ground that the Earl of Chatham said that retrenching the number of troops to be employed in Ireland was 'tearing the master-feather from the eagle's wing.' He considered, therefore, this Bill, as containing different laws, to be dangerous to the Prerogative, because it might prevent the Crown from sending troops from any other place of His Dominions to Ireland, or from Ireland to any other part of His Dominions in cases of emergency."
What was the opinion of Lord Grey's Government as to the power of the Crown? Sir John Hobhouse, representing Lord Grey's Government, said—
"No House of Commons, at the commencement of every Session, could fairly call upon the Government to state the manner in which the Army of the country was disposed of at home or abroad. That was certainly a matter which should be left to the discretion of the Crown, and the existing Government, according to the
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emergencies of the time, for there might be circumstances, with which the Government alone could be acquainted, to render it of the utmost importance that the mode in which the military Force was disposed of should be concealed. With the vast interests of our great Empire, with Colonies spread over the whole surface of the globe, it was apparent, looking to England, Ireland, and the West Indies, and, indeed, to all parts of the world, that no man could have a right to call upon the Government to proclaim how many troops were stationed in this place and how many regiments in that. It would not only be the grossest imprudence, it would be usurping the power delegated to the Government, and it would be exposing to those who might take advantage of such exposition what Force was to be stationed, in disciplined array, in different parts of the Empire."
My Lords, this is the general and well-settled doctrine of the Constitution with regard to the power of the Crown over the disposition of its troops; and I repeat, it lies with those who desire to limit the Prerogative to show upon what principle they would limit it. If limited at all, it must be by some condition or limitation in the terms of the enlistment of the troops, or by some localization in the code of discipline for the troops, or by those precedents which, as my noble and learned Friend said, become, after a certain length of time, the law and custom of the case, or by some written statutory enactment. And now I proceed to the inquiry whether in any of these modes it has been limited? Remember, that this is not a question about raising or increasing an Army; it is a question of moving an Army which already exists—an Army which is undoubtedly the Army of the Crown. The inquiry is the simple one, whether that Army, like any other Army of the Crown, can be moved at the discretion of the Crown, or whether that discretion is limited by any of the modes to which I have referred? What is the case with regard to enlistment? What are the terms of enlistment of the Native Indian Army? The terms are these—
"I will be faithful to Her Majesty the Queen, Her heirs, and successors, and will go wherever I am ordered, by land or sea, and will obey all commands of the officers set over me even at the peril of my life."
There is no doubt that there is no limit whatever imposed by the terms of enlistment. Well, then, is the Prerogative limited by the Code of Discipline? Has it been contemplated or not that the Indian Army may be employed out of India? I take the Act of 1834—an

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Imperial Act of Parliament, which gives power to the Governor General in Council to make Articles of War for the government of the Native Indian Army—and what do I find in it? I find these words—
"It shall be lawful for the said Governor General in Council from time to time to make Articles of War for the government of the Native officers and soldiers in the military service of the Company, and such Articles of War shall prevail and be in force, and shall be of exclusive authority over all the Native officers and soldiers in the said military service to whatever Presidency such officers and soldiers may belong, or wheresoever they may be serving."
Well, is it the case that the Articles of War do apply to the Indian troops serving out of the Indian Dominions? I find that they contemplated this very case, for they say—
"74.—Every General Court-martial shall, if held in British India, consist of not less than nine commissioned officers; but may, if held out of British India, consist of not less than seven commissioned officers.
"142 (e).—In the case of a Detachment General Court-martial held beyond the limits of British India, and not within the Dominions of the Princes and States of India in alliance with Her Majesty, &. …. Provided that, in detached situations beyond sea, or out of British India, or on service in the field, &c."
So much for the discipline. I now come to the precedent or custon. I will take, in the first place, one very instructive document. It was a Report of a Committee of the other House of Parliament upon the subject of the employment of the Native troops, not many years ago. It was appointed on the Motion of Major Anson, and made its Report in 1868. Of course, I have nothing to do with the recommendations of that Committee; but I go to that Report as a convenient historical statement. The Committee, after hearing evidence as to the practice with regard to the Native Indian troops in times past reported upon that point—
"The Madras, Bombay, and Bengal Armies have been employed beyond seas from the earliest period of our connection with India. The Madras Army has garrisoned Amboyna, Ceylon, Ava, Mauritius, the Straits Settlements, Malacca, Java, Burmah, and China. The Bombay Army has been employed in Aden, China, Scinde, and now in Abyssinia; and the Bengal Army in Egypt, Java, China, Ava, and now in Abyssinia. The Bengal Army, previous to 1856, had only six regiments recruited on the agreement of general service; but in that year, the Madras Army being overworked, the Supreme Government altered the conditions of
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recruiting, and, in the General Order, dated July 25, 1856, gave this reason for so doing."
Now, this was the reason—
"It has become very inconvenient to Government, and it is also hurtful to the State, that a small portion only of the Bengal Army should be available for the service of the State beyond seas, and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire Native Armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service."
And, on this ground, the Order goes on to say—
"The Governor General will not henceforward accept the services of any Native recruit who does not at the time of enlistment distinctly undertake to serve beyond seas, whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them."
There is, in this, no reference to a time of peace or a time of war; and no suggestion as to the consent of Parliament being required. Nor is it material that these movements of the troops were in the days of the East India Company. If the East India Company, who were the vicegerents of the Crown, could move the troops, à fortiori, the Crown could move them. The Committee continues—
"It seems difficult to believe that the Indian Government would have issued such an Order as this, if they thought that there were any real difficulties to overcome in the employment of Native troops beyond seas, or if they did not intend it to be a reality."
Now, that is the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons. Was that Report challenged, or was it qualified, or in any way objected to from that day to this? Certainly not.
I will now go on to examine the specific instances in which the Native Indian troops have been used out of India. In deference to the noble and learned Lord, who seems to think it of some importance, I will take, in the first instance, the case in which Native Indian troops were ordered from India to the Cape of Good Hope. Notice was taken of the fact in the House of Commons, not on the ground of the unconstitutional or illegal character of the proceeding, but on the ground that if those troops were so used, the expense of moving them ought not to be charged upon the Indian Revenue. Lord Palmerston said he did not think the Indian Government should bear the expense out of their Revenue, or that it should be defrayed by contributions from

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the Colony, and that the House would be asked next Session to grant a Vote to defray this additional expenditure. It was never even hinted that there was any question as to the legality of the employment of those troops out of India—the only question being one of money, and of who was to pay. The noble and learned Lord has found that the order for the troops was countermanded, which was probably done to save the financial controversy which was threatened in the House of Commons.
Now, I pass to the precedent with which the name of General Peel has been connected. Your Lordships who have the leisure to investigate that case will find it an interesting one. General Peel, as the noble and learned Lord says, was one of the most skilful, accurate, and experienced statesmen that ever presided over the War Department of this country, and he had an eye for Estimates the sharpness of which was never exceeded. The objection that was taken in the House of Commons was, not that the Government had acted illegally or unconstitutionally in employing Native Indian troops out of India, but that, having so employed them, they went down to the House of Commons and asked for a lump sum to defray the cost. As many noble Lords will, perhaps, recollect, General Peel made it what I may call his hobby to ascertain how much each man in the Army cost, and he had worked out the problem with such accuracy as to say that every British soldier costs £100—though I fear the cost is now somewhat more. His complaint, on the occasion referred to, was not as to the illegality of the employment of the troops, but to the way in which the Estimates were framed—which prevented him from being able to ascertain the average cost of each man so employed. I find that in 1863—
"General Peel moved that this sum be reduced by £38,000, 'repayment to the Indian Government for pay and clothing of two regiments of Native infantry employed in China.' …. He had great objection to the Government employing Native troops out of India, and he should therefore move to reduce the Vote by the sum which he had named. …
"Sir George Lewis found himself very much perplexed as to the mode in which he ought to deal with those Indian troops employed in China. He was told, when they were not introduced into the Estimates, that they ought to have been introduced, and that he was following an irregular course in making a transfer from one Vote to another when providing for those
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regiments out of the moneys voted for other services. In order to obviate that objection, he had introduced them into the Estimates this year, and had followed the precise practice which had been adopted with regard to the Force maintained at Labuan. If, therefore, the sum of £38,000 for those two regiments in China ought to be omitted, so ought also £4,500 for the troops at Labuan. ….
"General Peel said the right hon. Gentleman had stated his wish to be the direct contrary of what he (General Peel) desired. His object was to prevent any Government from employing a Native Army in China at the charge of this country without the House knowing and having control over the expenditure. ….
"Mr. W. Williams (an hon. Member who at that time scrutinized every Vote on the ground of economy) said, that the course taken by the Government was unconstitutional, and he should support the Amendment.
"Sir George Lewis (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not admit that there was the smallest force in what the hon. Member called the constitutional objection to passing the item. If he had attempted to procure payment for these two regiments without a Vote of Parliament, something might have been said as to the unconstitutionality of that course, though he believed there were precedents for it."—[3 Hansard, clxix.]
The contest of the noble and learned Lord to-night was reduced to the smallest possible point by the noble and learned Lord himself, when he said that the result of General Peel's Motion was, that from that time forward the men of the Indian Army employed out of India were included in the aggregate number of men voted in the Mutiny Act.
LORD SELBORNE: I did not say so. I said the exact contrary; but a Supplementary Numerical Vote was taken for them in each year; and I said that a Supplementary Vote would do just as well.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Then my noble and learned Friend relieves me from what I was about to do—to show your Lordships that these men were never included in the Mutiny Act, or in the numbers voted by Parliament, my noble and learned Friend says there was a Supplementary Estimate. Of course there was. The money required could not otherwise have been obtained. But the men were never treated as a portion of that standing Army which, in the Mutiny Act, was stated to have been voted by Parliament. So much, therefore, for the great precedent with which the name of General Peel was connected.
I must, however, beg to add to the precedents referred to by the noble and learned Lord, and I shall cite them

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for the noble and learned Lord's consideration. In 1867 the Straits Settlements were removed from the Government of India to the Government of the Crown, through the Colonial Department. From 1867 to 1871 the Madras Native Infantry garrisoned the Straits Settlements in time of peace, and no Constitutional objection was taken to their being so employed; and can the noble and learned Lord show that the consent of Parliament was either asked or given for their employment? The same course was taken with respect to Hong Kong. The case of Abyssinia has been mentioned. In that case, the Chancellor of the Exchequer went down to the House of Commons—as he will do in the present case—and asked the House of Commons to recoup the expenditure incurred on an emergency by the Indian Government on behalf of the Empire. Did any speaker in the House of Commons on that occasion say, or even suggest, that the removal of the Indian troops to Abyssinia was an illegal act? The question was treated simply as one of the money which had or had not to be paid, and no speaker dealt with the question as being one in connection with which the Government could be said to have committed an unconstitutional act.
I will now say a word as to the assent of Parliament. The assent of Parliament is not a matter upon which, as I regard the matter, there can be any argument, as I do not expect anyone will stand up in this House or elsewhere and assert that it does not require the assent of the Crown, of this House, and of the House of Commons. There have been occasions on which the question has arisen how the assent of Parliament should be manifested. One of these occasions—alluded to by the noble and learned Lord—was in 1734, in the time of Lord Hardwicke. Some Members of this House thought that the assent of Parliament required an Act of Parliament to express it; but Lord Hardwicke said that, in his opinion, when the Crown came down and asked for a Vote of men, and both Houses responded to that Address by agreeing to the Vote of men asked for, that was the assent of Parliament within the Bill of Rights. I adopt that view, and it has been adopted on several occasions. Indeed, I should have thought that no Government would either overlook or violate that rule, considering
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that it comes fresh before Parliament every year in the Mutiny Act. The Mutiny Act, in its recital, says that there must be no standing Army raised in time of peace within the United Kingdom without the consent of Parliament, and I should have thought the words so clear that they could not have been misunderstood; but they have been not merely misunderstood, but neglected, and actually violated—though only once. In the year 1870, which was a time of profound peace, as far as this country was concerned, and when Parliament was sitting, the Government of the day raised an addition to the numbers of the Army authorized by the Mutiny Act to the extent of 20,000 men; and I will venture to say that there is not a syllable on the records of your Lordships' House to show that your assent was asked to such increase in any shape or form. The men were raised on a Vote of the House of Commons, without an Address to the Crown—without any communication to this House, and without the assent of this House. The amount of the Vote of Credit of course found its way into the Appropriation Bill, and the Appropriation Bill came to this House. But the Appropriation Bill is the provision for the whole of the services of the year, and your Lordships' House has no power, as far as the Appropriation Bills is concerned, to do anything other than to accept or reject the whole. You cannot alter or modify it; and to say that in this way the assent of this House could be obtained to an increase of the standing Army, would be to reduce this Constitutional safeguard to a mockery.
So much for precedents. And now I would come to the question whether there is anything in the Statute Law to prevent the Government from removing those troops from India to any part of the Queen's Dominions without the consent of Parliament? I will just refer to a Statute which, although not now in force, was the governing Act for 40 years with respect to the Indian troops—I mean the Act of 4 Geo. IV. c. 81. That Act provided for the trial and punishment, if necessary, of officers or men in His Majesty's Indian Army who might be guilty of offences against the law in these words—
"Whenever any portion of such Native troops shall be serving in any country or place out of the possessions or territories which are, or may be, under the Government of the said United

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Company, whether such be the Dominions of His Majesty or elsewhere, on the trial of all offences committed by any Native officer, or soldier, or follower, reference shall be had to the Articles of War framed by the Government of the Presidency to which such Native officer, soldier, or follower, shall belong."
This shows clearly that at the time the Act was passed, it was in the mind of the Legislature that the troops might be serving either in or out of India—not merely on foreign ground, but in other parts of the Dominions of Her Majesty.
But now let me take the Act of 1858, the Act for the Government of India. The 55th clause, as it now stands, provides that the Indian troops should not be paid out of the Revenues of India, except when they are serving in the country; and this shows that the possibility of their so serving out of the country under the orders of the Crown was in the mind of Parliament. Otherwise, if the assent of Parliament to their movement was necessary, it would have been time enough, when that consent was asked for, to have considered how the expense was to be borne. But, what was the history of this clause? When the Indian Government Bill was passing through the House of Commons in 1858, a clause was proposed by Mr. Gladstone on the Bill in these words—
"Except for repelling actual invasion, or other sudden and urgent necessity, Her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies shall not be employed in any military operation beyond the external frontier of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, without the consent of Parliament to the purposes thereof."—[3 Hansard, cli. 1007.]
This proposal raised considerable discussion, and opinions concerning it were expressed by several leading statesmen. Sir George Cornewall Lewis said, in course of the debate, that—
"In his view of the matter, the general Prerogative of the Crown, in declaring war, was practically limited by the necessity of obtaining Votes of Supply from Parliament for the purpose of carrying on war. Beyond that constitutional necessity, the Prerogative of the Crown with regard to a declaration of war or concluding peace was unlimited. Suppose, however, the Governor General desired to make war, not for the purpose of repelling actual invasion or under other sudden and urgent necessity, he would have to communicate with the Home Government; and in what manner would the consent of Parliament be obtained? He presumed it would be necessary to obtain the consent of both Houses, and that it would be the duty of the Executive Government to introduce a Bill formally giving their consent to the Governor General's making war. That might be difficult to procure. Then the question might
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arise whether, Parliament having consented to the commencement of a war, it was competent for the Governor General to terminate such war without the assent of Parliament. If they sanctioned such a principle, it might be extended to other wars, and they might eventually adopt the doctrine that the British Parliament, like the American Senate, should give its consent to all wars in derogation of the existing Prerogative of the Crown. If this clause were to have a practical effect, these points would have to be considered."—[Ibid. 1012.]
Lord Palmerston, in the course of the same debate, said—
"He entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend who last spoke, that the consent of Parliament was not necessary previous to a declaration of war, because it was a fundamental principle of the Constitution that the power of declaring war and concluding peace rested with the Crown, the Ministers of the Crown being responsible for the manner in which they advised the Crown to exercise that Prerogative. To maintain that the previous consent of Parliament was necessary, either to the commencement of a war or to the conclusion of a peace, would be to introduce a principle destructive of the British Constitution; and he was somewhat surprised that Her Majesty's Ministers, who were the guardians of the Prerogatives of the Crown and of the Constitution of the country, did not rise and protest against doctrines which in his opinion were most inconsistent with Prerogative and the Constitution. … He thought the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) would act somewhat hastily, if he adopted the clause in its present form."—[Ibid. 1013.]
The opinion of Lord John Russell, who followed Lord Palmerston on this occasion, was that—
"He was disposed, however, to concur in the objections raised by his noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) to the terms of the clause. 'Her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies,' it was said 'shall not be employed in any military operation' beyond the frontier of India without the consent of Parliament. Now, supposing we had a war with some European Power, and that, this war being supported by the House of Commons, it was considered desirable for the Indian Army to attack the Possessions of this enemy of the Crown, it appeared to him the clause would prevent the employment of those Forces without the consent of Parliament. Thus if, prior to the attack on Java, when we were at war with the Dutch, the Governor General had been obliged to send to the Home Government, and they had been obliged to apply to Parliament to obtain authority for this Expedition, it might have failed altogether, because, by making it known to the enemy, through a debate in Parliament, you would entirely defeat your object. He doubted also whether the language of the clause would not have prevented the Expedition to Egypt."—[Ibid. 1015–16.]
It was quite clear what the view of Lord Russell was. No doubt, he referred to a state of actual war; but his objection to the clause was that it would limit the power of the Crown in

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the case of war being imminent, or with a view to objects of great Imperial importance, and render the accomplishment of those objects difficult, if it was necessary to come to Parliament for its assent. On that ground was founded the objection of those eminent men to the clause proposed by Mr. Gladstone, which would have prevented the movement of the Indian troops from India. Well, my Lords, Mr. Gladstone's clause was inserted in the Bill with some verbal alterations, and the Bill came up to this House. When the Bill reached this House, the late Lord Derby drew attention on the occasion of the second reading to the 55th clause. The noble Earl said—
"There are, I believe, only two other subjects to which I need now direct your Lordships' attention, and I allude to them because I think that, as far as they are concerned, the principle and the object of the Bill have been somewhat misunderstood. One relates to the employment of the Indian Army, and the other relates to the admission to the Civil Service of India. The 55th clause deals with the first of those subjects; and it has been objected to that clause, that it appears to interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown, inasmuch as it provides that none of Her Majesty's Forces maintained out of the Revenues of India shall be taken, except in cases of urgent emergency, beyond the frontiers of that country without the previous consent of Parliament. Now, it has been thought—and I confess that the wording of the clause makes it open to a construction which was not intended by its framers—it has been thought that that would be an interference with the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown to make war or peace. …. Our intention, however, is not to limit the Prerogative of the Crown, but to protect the Revenues of India; and, consequently, when we come to that clause, I mean to propose in it an Amendment which will, I think, remove all ambiguity upon this point. It will be to the effect that, except for the purpose of preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or in order to meet some sudden and urgent emergency, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of Parliament, be applicable to the expense of any military operation carried on beyond India by Her Majesty's Forces chargeable on such Revenues. That provision will impose a pecuniary check on the Prerogative of the Crown in regard to the Army of India such as already exists in the case of all other portions of Her Majesty's Forces."—[Ibid. 1458–9.]
And what said the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition in this House (Earl Granville) on that occasion? He thus addressed your Lordships' House—
"The noble Earl has already alluded to the fifty-fifth clause. I have very often remarked that when anything not very wise is done by any person, it is done at the suggestion of some one else wiser than himself. He who offers the
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suggestion does not very carefully consider it, and the person to whom it is offered thinks he may adopt it, inasmuch as it has proceeded from a very sensible man, without that sifting to which he would subject his own proposition. Something of this sort seems to have taken place in the other House with regard to this clause. A very able man (Mr. Gladstone) in the other House suggested this clause, and the Government, to my great surprise, instantly adopted it. What is the clause? That, except in cases of great urgency, the Army in India shall not be employed beyond the frontier of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions without the consent of Parliament. That appears to me altogether unconstitutional. Then, how is the assent of Parliament to be signified? Is an Act of Parliament to be passed before any military operations can be executed? If so, I presume that it will be equally necessary to have an Act of Parliament declaring peace, and in this way you will entirely take out of the hands of the Crown one of its most important Prerogatives. I must say that if this clause be merely modified in the sense in which I understood the noble Earl to say he was willing to modify it, it will still be open to much objection, and I shall feel it my duty to ask your Lordships to reject it altogether."—[Ibid. 1470–71.]
Well, my Lords, Mr. Gladstone's clause was removed in your Lordships' House from the Bill, and the clause in its altered form became that which is now the 55th clause, and in this form the noble Earl did not ask your Lordships' House to reject the clause; and he must, therefore, have subsequently satisfied himself that when it took its present form it was free from the Constitutional objection which he had pointed out—namely, that in the matter of the movement of Native Indian troops beyond the boundaries of India, it would limit the Prerogative of the Crown. My Lords, I entirely agree with the view expressed by the noble Earl. I believe that the clause, as it now stands, in no way limits, or professes to limit, the Constitutional or legal right of the Crown with regard to the movement of Native Indian troops. It does this, and this only—it protects the Revenues of India from bearing the cost of the movement of those troops. But the argument of my noble and learned Friend is this—that whatever the Act of 1858 does, the annual Mutiny Act by its wording prevents Indian troops being made available out of India without the assent of Parliament. But, in 1858, the Mutiny Act was just the same as it is now, and if any of those eminent statesmen, to whom I have referred, were of opinion that it prohibited such movement of the Native Indian troops, would they on that very ground have opposed the clause proposed by Mr. Gladstone?

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It would be absurd to have had the discussions to which I have alluded if that were so. Well, my Lords, that being the history of this clause and its wording, I confess I am surprised that at this time of day, 20 years after it has passed, it should be gravely maintained that all the care and pains taken to alter and modify the 55th clause in its original form went for nothing, and that the clause in its present form produces just the same effect which would have been produced by the clause which was removed from the Bill.
My noble and learned Friend endeavoured to produce in the minds of your Lordships the impression that there was something in the Mutiny Act which in some way affected the Native Army of India. The fact is, that the words to which my noble and learned Friend alluded do not refer to the Native Indian Army in any way. They refer to Her Majesty's European Army—the White Army—serving in India, and there is nothing in the Act which refers to the Native Indian Army. The argument from the Mutiny Act requires a very short examination, and it will turn out to be as baseless as that founded on the Indian Government Act. But first, let me remind your Lordships of the point in the discussion at which we have arrived. I have shown your Lordships that the Native Indian Army are Forces of the Queen, and being so the Crown, primâ facie, has an absolute right to move them wherever the Sovereign may think fit. Those who say that that right is limited must show that it is so. I have shown to your Lordships that it is not limited by the terms of enlistment or by Code of Discipline; that, so far as precedents are concerned, there are numerous precedents for the employment of those troops out of India without any objection having been taken as to the legality of that step. I have shown that an Act in force for 40 years up to 1848 contemplated the employment of Native Indian troops out of India; and now the only question is, whether the whole of this body of evidence and proof is to be contravened by a few words of recital in the commencement of the Mutiny Act.
My Lords, in order to understand the effect and object of this recital, I would ask your Lordships to remember what was the position of the various Armies in India before and since 1858.
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Before 1858 there were three different classes of Forces in India—the Regular Army of the Queen—next, the European troops kept up by the East India Company—and there were, thirdly, the Native troops of the East Indian Company. There were these three sets of Forces. How were those Forces dealt with by the Mutiny Acts? With regard to the Queen's regiments serving in India, they were subject to the annual British Mutiny Act just as much as if they served in England. With regard to the European White troops of the East Indian Company, they were subject to a Mutiny Act of their own. That was not annual, it was perpetual, and it was passed by the Imperial Parliament. With regard to the Native Indian Forces, they were subject to an Act of the Indian Legislature, made under the Imperial authority, as I have already pointed out. There were, then, three different sets of Forces, and three different Mutiny Acts. Now, the Act of 1858 provided that the two sets of Indian Forces should become the Forces of the Queen; and the consequence was, since the Act of 1858, we had, at first, three separate Forces belonging to the Crown—the British regiments, the White troops formerly belonging to the East India Company, and the Native troops. That state of things continued until 1863, and then an Act was passed bringing the European Forces, formerly belonging to the East India Company, under the annual Mutiny Act. That Act, in the Preamble stated—
"It is expedient that Her Majesty's European Forces in India should from henceforth be subject to the Acts for the punishment of Mutiny and Desertion, from time to time, passed for the government of Her Majesty's General Forces."
But that Act expressly declared that it was not in any way to affect the Native troops of the Crown in India. They were to continue under their own Mutiny Act and Articles of War. The European Forces, therefore, and the European Forces only, in India, are within the Annual Mutiny Act.
Now, my noble and learned Friend takes out of the Preamble of the Mutiny Act these words, "exclusive of the numbers actually serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions," and he first assumes that these words refer to the Native Indian troops, and he then founds on this assumption the argument that the Native Indian troops must serve within

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India and nowhere else; and that if they go beyond that it is a departure from the Mutiny Act. Well, that depends on the great question—what troops are meant by the words "exclusive of the numbers actually serving?" for if those words do not refer to the Native Indian troops, the argument of my noble and learned Friend falls to the ground.
My Lords, the words which my noble and learned Friend relies do not touch, and are not meant to touch, the Native troops. The Native troops are not brought within our Mutiny Act in any way. That is made clear from the clause which enacts—
"Nothing in this Act contained shall in any manner prejudice or affect any Articles of War or other matters made, enacted, or in force, or which may hereafter be made, enacted, or in force, under the authority of the Government of India, respecting officers or soldiers or followers in Her Majesty's Indian Army, being natives of India."
On the other hand, the European Forces in India are within the Act, but the men are not to be reckoned numerically, unless they are at the depôts in the United Kingdom. If your Lordships will read the Preamble with this key to its meaning, all difficulty will at once disappear. The Preamble runs—
"Whereas it is adjudged necessary that a body of Forces should be continued for the safety of the United Kingdom, and the defence of the Possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, and that the whole number of such Forces should consist of 135,452 men, including those to be employed at the depôts in the United Kingdom for the training of recruits for service at home and abroad, but exclusive of the numbers actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
Therefore, the meaning of the words which have caused my noble and learned Friend difficulty is perfectly clear. The Act is not to apply to the Native Indian regiments—the recital is to include those officers and men of the European Army of India who are employed in depôts in England and Ireland, and to exclude the number actually employed within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions.
But that this is the meaning of the meaning of the recital can be shown to demonstration. The noble and learned Lord has, in his Motion, properly spoken of the Vote recited in the Preamble to the Mutiny Act. I turn in the Estimates to the Vote, and you will find on one side it runs thus:—"The number of men, Regular Army, exclusive of India;" and, on the other side,
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"the number of men of the Regular Army serving in India." Of course, therefore, "exclusive of India" means "exclusive of the number of men of the Regular Army serving in India," and the Regular Army throughout the Estimates means the Queen's European Army. The number of the European Army serving in India at the present time is about 62,000, and of the Native Army 125,000. It is a case of one-third and two-thirds. We have a Vote for the number of men, 135,452—that is the exact number provided for in the Mutiny Act; and then you have those serving in India set down as 62,650, which is the number of the White European Army, and not the number of the Native Army. Therefore, those who are excluded, and by the very word of your own Vote are excluded, from the enumeration of the Mutiny Act, are the 62,650, and are not the Native Army. My Lords, the case is thus brought to this simple point. Nothing can be shown which in any way fetters the legal and Constitutional power of the Crown to move the Indian Army anywhere except it may be the United Kingdom. The expense must, of course, be provided by Parliament, and this, which is the Constitutional check, is, at the same time, the only check on the Constitutional right of the Crown. How can that right be affected by the recital in the Mutiny Act, which does not relate to the Indian Army at all? This is the whole of this case.
My Lords, I agree with my noble and learned Friend that there is a very great difference between questions of substance and questions of form. But, my Lords, if the action of a Government cannot be challenged on a matter of substance, I think great care should be taken that misapprehension is not produced by challenging it on a question of form. If the noble and learned Lord had entertained the opinion that Her Majesty's Government had been chargeable with any error of judgment, with pursuing an erroneous and mistaken policy, as a matter of policy, in moving these Indian troops to Malta, under all the circumstances of the case, that question might have been raised before this House by a proper Motion on the subject. Nay, more, if it had been the opinion of the Opposition that the policy of the Government was erroneous, I maintain it was their duty, as I understand

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the duty of public men, to have challenged that policy and to have asked the House to condemn, in substance and not in form, what the Government had done. But, my Lords, I also maintain that where, in the present state of Foreign affairs, arguments in the English Parliament on questions of form may easily be mistaken abroad for arguments on questions of substance, you ought, before you challenge on a question of form, to be quite clear that your form is right. I maintain there is no foundation whatever for the proposition which my noble and learned Friend has placed on the Paper to-night. I believe that, as to the substance of the case, Parliament will justify the policy of the Government; I am quite satisfied it is justified by the country at large. The question of form I leave to your Lordships' decision; without fear or apprehension I maintain that criticism on the form is entirely misplaced.
VISCOUNT CARDWELLsaid, he certainly understood the noble and learned Lord who introduced the Motion to make a substantial charge against the Government, when he said that they violated the express terms of the Act of 1858 when they moved Indian troops out of India without the assent of Parliament, and without having made any provision out of the Imperial Revenue for meeting that expenditure. The Act of 1858 prohibited the application of the Revenues of India to the expenses of any military operation beyond the frontiers of India without the consent of both Houses of Parliament; and the argument of his noble and learned Friend was that the action of the Government in ordering the Indian troops beyond the frontiers of India without having obtained any authority from Parliament for the application either of European or of Indian money for the expenditure, was either a violation of that Act, or an infringement of the Constitutional principles of our own Government. But the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had discovered what he described in grandiloquent terms as a most serious, a most unprecedented breach of all Constitutional propriety on the part of the late Administration—of that Department of it for which he (Viscount Cardwell) was especially responsible. His noble and learned Friend imagined he had discovered that, although he (Viscount Cardwell) had obtained from the House of Commons, in
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the regular manner, a Vote for 20,000 men, and a separate Vote for the money, on the outbreak of the Franco-German War, yet the consent of Parliament had never been given, inasmuch as no communication had been made to their Lordships—not even in the Appropriation Act.
THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that the Appropriation Bill sanctioned the Vote of Credit for £2,000,000, but it did not say that the money was for the purpose of raising 20,000 additional troops. The only reference to the purpose of the Vote was in the Schedule.
VISCOUNT CARDWELLsaid, that the reference in the Schedule of the Appropriation Act was of the utmost importance, and since this charge was so serious and so specific, their Lordships would excuse him if he read to them the words of the Schedule from the volume of the Statutes, which he found in the Library of the House. The words he found were these—
"Towards defraying the expenses beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament which may be incurred in maintaining the Naval and Military Services of this Kingdom, including the cost of a further number of Land Forces of 20,000 men during the war in Europe."
He had asked for the Votes in the House of Commons on the 1st of August, 1870, and the Bill, with their Lordships' consent, had received the Royal Assent upon the 10th. While he was vindicating himself in this matter, he might do so in another—the exercise of the Royal Prerogative in the abolition of Purchase—which he had been privately informed it was probable he might hear of in the course of the debate. Ho had been charged with having transgressed the law and Constitution when he advised the use of the Royal Prerogative in the case of the abolition of Purchase in the Army. But the facts were these. On going to the War Office at the end of 1868, he found that his Predecessor had obtained the sanction of Her-Majesty to the abolition of the rank of cornet and ensign in the Army, without making any provision for the cost of so doing; and, therefore, he (Viscount Cardwell) submitted to the House of Commons an Estimate for the money necessary to furnish the regulation price of the commissions. He could not offer more than the regulation price, traffic in commissions being forbidden by the Act of 1809. There was great alarm at

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the proposal, as involving the whole principle of the over-regulation prices, and a great deal more than the regulation price was demanded. He therefore referred the whole subject to a Commission composed of very eminent men. The Commission reported in substance that the sale of commissions had obtained such general sanction that the prohibition could not rightly be enforced without full compensation; and that while regulation prices were permitted, it was impossible that the statutory prohibition of over-regulation prices should be obeyed. He then asked Parliament for money to indemnify the officers and abolish the whole system of Purchase. The House of Commons adopted his proposal; but their Lordships delayed the Bill. He was therefore obliged to recognize the continuance of the system which a most stringent Statute had prohibited and the other House had provided the means to abolish, or to resort to the exercise of the Royal power, so far as to put an end to the regulations permitting Purchase on the specified terms; but, in adopting the latter course, he had no notion of enlarging the Prerogative of the Crown, or of showing any disrespect to their Lordships' House. He was surprised to hear his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack begin his speech by replying, not to the able speech by which the debate had been opened by his noble and learned Friend near him, but by replying to a speech which he supposed to have been made by a noble Marquess in the other House. The opening speech of his noble and learned Friend (Lord Selborne), to which he had listened with admiration, was described by the noble and learned Lord as "overloaded" and "irrelevant," and as dealing with matters that were either "misapprehended" or "perverted;" but no attempt had been made to justify that description. He thought, indeed, that he would have found it difficult to have replied to the speech of his noble and learned Friend, who did not question the policy of moving troops from India, but treated the mode by which the Government had done it as a question of Constitutional law of the first magnitude. He (Viscount Cardwell) thought it most desirable to keep the question of Constitutional law and right, which was one of the greatest magnitude and importance, entirely
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separate from those of mere personal or Party interest. His noble and learned Friend, in keeping apart the great Constitutional question from all the small and unworthy interests which were capable of being associated with it, had performed one of the greatest services he could have rendered to the country. The question of Constitutional policy had been entirely lost sight of by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack. Reference had been made to what had taken place in 1775, and a large portion of the noble and learned Lord's observations were in answer to arguments that might have been used in 1775, but which had not been used at the present time. He hoped, after what had been said by his noble and learned Friend (Lord Selborne) on that subject, they would hear no more of it. With reference to the Report of the Committee of 1867, he thought the long list of precedents which had been read by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack contained scarcely one that happened while the Indian Army was under the Crown—his criticism, therefore, was entirely irrelevant. He agreed with the doctrine laid down by General Peel. What he understood was this, that the limitation of the number of men was necessary to the efficient control of Parliament; but that it was not sufficient to take merely a subsequent power of repaying the money. Every year both the men and the money must be voted. Vote A accordingly was the general Vote, and Vote B included the numbers of Indian troops; but these did not go into the Mutiny Act. Now, if these Indian troops had been voted under Vote B, and the Vote of Credit placed in the Appropriation Act, the old Constitutional practice would have been restored; but under the course pursued by the Government, the number of men would not have the sanction of Parliament at all. The question now was not a question of policy, but a question of whether the prior consent of Parliament was necessary or not. He understood that was not disputed by the Government. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack quoted the doctrine of emergency, and cited the authority of Mr. Gladstone, that the Government which did not take on itself the responsibility of acting in an emergency independent of Parliament, applying afterwards for indemnity from Parliament, would not be worthy

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of the country. He quite agreed with that sentiment of Mr. Gladstone's. The Government admitted that they could not employ troops without the previous sanction of Parliament, if it were possible to obtain it, and that whenever they were compelled to employ them without the previous sanction of Parliament the solemn obligation lay on them to obtain that sanction at as early a moment as possible. After such an acknowledgment, he must say the object of his noble and learned Friend in initiating this discussion had been obtained.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICKsaid, it was to be regretted that upon a question involving an important and interesting point of Constitutional law, two of the greatest legal authorities in that House should entertain diametrically opposite opinions. The discussion had taken the aspect of a mere intellectual contest, in which the two noble and learned Lords contended for the mastery in technical learning. If this question was to be raised at all, it should have been with some prospect of producing some deep and clear impression upon public opinion, and of exercising some salutary influence upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government. From the beginning, however, it had seemed to him, there was very little prospect of such a result being attained. The noble and learned Lord seemed to have overlooked that it was in the highest degree improbable that Her Majesty's Government would have taken such a step without having obtained from the highest authorities the assurance that it was in accordance with Constitutional law. Had it been otherwise, would not the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack have employed all his legal knowledge and learning to prevent it? And was it not likely that the public would attach the greater weight to an opinion given with all the responsibility of official position? There was another consideration. They were all aware that, on several occasions, the authorities in India had sanctioned the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies of the Crown, and the legality of that course had never, so far as he was aware, been seriously questioned, either in England or India. Within his recollection, and within the period of his official employment in India, the Madras troops were regularly employed out of India, under the sanction of the Government of India,
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with the assent of the Local Government, and, it must be assumed, of the Government at home. A Madras regiment was despatched to Hong Kong in 1867–8, and some Madras regiments had been stationed in the Straits Settlements for many years; and after the Settlement was transferred to the Colonial Office in 1867, one Madras regiment still continued to garrison it. He had not gathered from the discussion a single argument to show that the employment of Indian troops, being legal in the East, would be illegal in Europe. He thought it a most lamentable thing that at a time when the people of India were animated by the most loyal and devoted sentiments to the Crown—when the Indian troops were burning with a desire to consummate their reconciliation and union with their British fellow-subjects—and when the people of Malta were about to give a most kindly and confiding welcome to their strange guests and new defenders—a noble and learned Lord, adorned with every ornament of learning and eloquence, should have suggested to the Indian soldier that he might possibly commit, and to the Colonial subjects of Her Majesty that they might possibly suffer, an illegal act.
THE DUKE OF RUTLANDsaid, that though he could not offer a single observation on the Constitutional and legal aspect of the question, he might be allowed to express his deep and unfeigned regret that their Lordships' House and the House of Commons should have received at the hands of the Government what seemed to be a very great slight. Her Majesty's Government, on the 27th of March, came to the conclusion that Indian troops were to be utilized; on the 28th of March, his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) resigned; on the 12th of April, Her Majesty's Government telegraphed that transports should be sent to India to bring Indian troops to Malta; on the 16th of April, the Governor General announced the number of troops that would be sent; and on the 16th of April, also, Parliament was adjourned. Now, it seemed to him that if ever there was a question which, independent of its Constitutional aspect, ought to have been submitted to Parliament, this was that question. It was a totally new question. Indian troops had never before been sent from India to Malta. Not only was the question a new one, but it was raised in a time of

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peace, and the step taken was a threatening of war. He wanted to know why Parliament was called together three weeks before the usual time—to the great inconvenience of the Members of their Lordships' House, as he knew, and to the great inconvenience of many Members of the other House—if it were to be kept in the dark upon this important matter? What was the reason?—what the object?—what the excuse? Why did not the Government, in the case of a great emergency—at a great crisis—resort to the advice and assistance of Parliament? He could answer that question, and if he was wrong, the Government would contradict him. It was because, if it had been known before the Recess that these troops were to be sent to Malta, the movement of troops might have been arrested, all the doubts pointed out, serious difficulties might have arisen, and the hands of the Government might have been impeded. Yes; but why was Parliament called together, except to discuss a question of this nature? The noble Viscount, who lately addressed the House, alluded to the Abolition of Purchase Bill. That Bill they were invited in the Queen's Speech of 1871 to consider. They did consider it for three nights, and at 2 o'clock of the morning of the third night, they decided to send it before a Royal Commission by a majority of 25. The next day their decision was overridden by Royal Proclamation. He was quite sure the noble Viscount meant no slight to their Lordships' House; but it added to his alarm at the encroachment, in the present case, of the Executive upon the functions of Parliament. He protested against this conduct of the Government, as an encroachment by the Executive upon the functions of Parliament.
LORD DENMANsaid, that he could not be persuaded that the previous consent of Parliament was needed for the step which the Government had taken. He would apply to the present Members of it words used by an eminent diplomatist, in 1775, in a letter—
"There is an old French author, the Duc de Rohan, who writes about the principles of government, and says of that of England—'La constitution d' Angleterre est une grande bête quine saurait mourir si elle ne se tue pas ellemême,' Now, that is precisely what I could have said in six sheets of paper, and not more clearly. England will not be felo de se now. I trust in Providence, and in the manly principles
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of those sound politicians who have a fair and just preponderance in the management of that Constitution."
It had been said by a great authority—as was truly or falsely reported—that England was like a great whale, which could only fight on sea; and it was necessary, in the present emergency, that troops should be ready in case, unfortunately, "force" should be needed instead of "diplomacy."
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, before the debate closes, I must express my surprise that no one Member of the Government should have thought it necessary to say one word on the appeal made to them by the noble Duke behind them, who is one of the most consistent Conservatives in the House. The noble Duke, with great clearness, appealed to the Bench below him to give an explanation as to why it was that the proposed movement of troops had been kept secret from Parliament. So far as my experience goes, I do not remember an occasion on which Parliament has been treated so cavalierly as both Houses have been treated on the present occasion. It is perfectly true that on the day fixed for the Adjournment, I said I was quite sure Her Majesty's Government would inform the House whether it had any further information to communicate to Parliament on the subject of the Eastern Question; and we know that in "another place" a still more important Question was put; yet we know that not the slightest information was imparted on this most important subject. I do trust that the Government will condescend to give us some information on this particular point. We have to thank the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for the very interesting sermon or lecture he has given us this evening. He complained very much of my Friend the noble and learned Lord—who, on this great Constitutional point, has given us one of the most complete and exhaustive speeches I ever heard in this House—for the great length at which he had addressed your Lordships, and then the noble and learned Lord himself proceeded to speak at still greater length than my noble and learned Friend; but he did not touch upon some of the most important precedents and arguments which have been brought forward, and without attempting to answer some of his most cogent arguments. The noble

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and learned Lord admonished my noble and learned Friend to be more accurate in his historical references—an admonition which I should think the noble and learned Lord was the last to require. The noble and learned Lord himself committed an error in the information he has given us respecting the Appropriation Act; but when he came to the debate of 1775, referred to by my noble and learned Friend, and whose reference to it he pooh-poohed, he certainly in what he said bears out my recollection of what was said by Lord Chancellor Bathurst, who, according to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, was only talking paradoxically. He concluded in this manner—that the King had no right to maintain in any part of the Possessions of the British Crown any other than the troops agreed to by Parliament, both as to the number and also as to nations. The previous consent of Parliament is one of the most important points of Constitutional law, and I cannot conceive why Her Majesty's Government did not come to Parliament and state what they had decided upon. The whole character of the demonstrations made by the Government appear to me to have been of an ostentatious character. The bringing of these men to Malta is an act of that kind, and the secrecy with which the movement was shrouded seems to have been confined only to this country, and especially to Parliament, as it appears to have been known in India. If there had been any immediate probability of war, and that the Russian Government might have been able to prevent moving these troops to the spot, there might have been some excuse for this policy of secrecy; but nothing of the kind existed. It has been said that if the intention of the Government to bring these troops to Malta had been known in India, the rates of freight would have been enormously increased; but I have been told that if the wants of the Government had been known, the competition which would have ensued would have made the freights much cheaper. Therefore, I am still at a loss to know why the information was not given. And I must say that I utterly object to the way the noble and learned Lord has laid down as a fundamental Constitutional principle, that it does not signify what is kept from Parliament if the Government afterwards
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explains the course it has taken, and obtains its sanction—a sanction which, in 99 cases out of 100, Parliament could not refuse. I do not deny that there may be cases in which a Government would be perfectly right to take a certain course without consulting Parliament, and in keeping it secret if it were necessary to do so; but no such necessity existed in this case. We are not in a state of war; and it would have been not only Constitutional but a wise and prudent thing for Government to take Parliament into its confidence, and in a Constitutional manner obtain its consent beforehand. The clause moved by the late Lord Derby in the Government of India Act, to prevent the Revenues of India being employed for the movement of troops outside the boundaries of India, was not intended to authorize the Revenues to be so employed, provided the Indian Exchequer was recouped. In fact, you break the law, when you make the Indian Revenue supply the means of moving troops on the chance of getting Parliament to repay the money. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, instead of answering the precedents of my noble and learned Friend, gave us precedents of his own. My noble and learned Friend, at the opening of his speech, stated distinctly that his propositions and illustrations would be entirely separate from cases in which we were in a state of war, or when Parliament was not sitting; but nearly the whole of the precedents quoted by the noble and learned Lord were connected with a state of war, and referred not to the Imperial Army, but to that of the Company—which is a perfectly different thing. The noble and learned Lord, at the beginning of his speech, said the subject was a very fit one to bring before the House; but, at its conclusion, he made it a reproach against my noble and learned Friend, that he should bring forward what he described to be a mere question of form, instead of proposing a direct Vote of Censure. We are continually challenged to bring forward Votes of Censure, and to divide upon them. It is one of the advantages of this House that we can discuss questions without Motions of a character hostile to the Government; but these continual challenges remind me of the old quotation—"Fas est et ab hoste doceri;" and I think that the meaning

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of the poet was not so much that we should follow the advice of our opponents, but copy their example. Noble Lords in this House and right hon. Gentlemen in the other House, when they were in Opposition, made perpetual attacks upon the Government; but they abstained, and very wisely abstained, from Motions or divisions, and I prefer now to follow their example than their advice in this matter. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack spoke somewhat disparagingly of forms, and there is an opinion prevalent in some quarters that these Constitutional checks are obsolete things; but I think it most unwise to allow unconstitutional precedents to be created without some sort of remonstrance against what might prove mischievous, or even disastrous, if evil days should come. Such checks ought not, in this House, to be treated as mere forms. I remember hearing the late Lord Derby say—
"We live not in times when Lords and Commons have to protect themselves against the arbitrary power of the Crown—those days have long passed, and the Prerogative of doing that which is beside and beyond the law is not now vested in the person of the Sovereign, but in the responsible Advisers of the Crown. It was their duty now to see, therefore, that the power should not only be legally exercised, but also that it should not be stretched to an unconstitutional extent."
That I think sound and Constitutional doctrine, and much safer than that put forward by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack. I am glad this discussion has taken place. I hope that its result may be to make Her Majesty's Ministers more thoughtful in matters of this sort, and then the discussion of tonight will not have been without value and importance.
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just spoken (Earl Granville) has rebuked us for not having answered a Question put by the noble Duke who sits behind me. The Question is one which everyone has been asking for a considerable time. If a Question which is frequently put is not answered, it may be taken that there is some good reason for silence on the part of those to whom the Question is addressed. I shall not take refuge in any technical reasons that I might give for the silence which has been complained of; but will say at once, that I do not think it would be for the advantage of the public service that the Question suggested
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by the noble Duke and referred to by the noble Earl, should be answered. As to not making communications to Parliament, this House, I think, was not sitting when the resolution of the Government was arrived at, and the resolution of the Government, I think, was only arrived at four days before the other House adjourned for the Recess.
EARL GRANVILLE: This House adjourned on the same day.
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: However that may be, my answer to the noble Duke and the noble Earl is, that I did not think it was for the public advantage that that communication should be made. Unfortunately, we are obliged on this subject to speak with a seal upon our lips. I shall not enter upon the legal and technical discussion which has been raised this evening. If a debate had been commenced, in which the general policy of the Government was challenged, we should have been ready to enter upon the discussion with perfect fulness—in that case, we should have been quite prepared to vindicate the course we had adopted—though, possibly, we must have spoken under some disadvantage. We found, however, that the question to be raised was of a very different character, and that noble Lords opposite were to studiously avoid expressing any opinion of their own, or asking any from your Lordships' House upon the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government. I must decline, in these circumstances, to explain the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the movement of the Native Forces of Her Majesty from India to Malta. I shall be ready, my Lords, at the right time, and so also will my Colleagues be ready, and that without hesitation, to enter upon any discussion your Lordships' House may require on this matter; and I have sufficient confidence in the patriotism of this House to feel no doubt that the result of any such discussion will not be to the disadvantage of Her Majesty's Government. The noble Earl who has just addressed your Lordships (Earl Granville) has sketched the more important parts of the speeches delivered by the noble and learned Lord who introduced this discussion, and of my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack. I myself listened to both those speeches with instruction, and certainly with pleasure.

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At the same time, I have a right to form an opinion as to those speeches as well as the noble Earl, and I must say that the shield was on one side silver, and on the other golden; but it seems to me that our side was the more precious metal. It appeared to me that the noble and learned Lord who introduced the question (Lord Selborne) most ingeniously treated a variety of subjects which have for a long time now been under public discussion. I must, with all humility, observe, that there was nothing very novel in the noble and learned Lord's materials, nor was there anything eminently felicitous in his treatment of them. My noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack met the charge of the noble and learned Lord in a bold and complete manner, and demonstrated that the batteries which the noble and learned Lord had attempted to raise against the Government were powerless, and that for the attack he made there was really no foundation whatever. It appeared to me that the noble and learned Lord, in a most laboured manner, discovered—if I may use so unclassical a word in this Assembly—only a mare's nest. What were the only arguments used in a speech of two hours, and which was answered in a speech of equal length?—not longer, for I particularly watched the time of each—it showed a great knowledge of each other's powers that the orations should have balanced so exactly. Two arguments were urged by the noble and learned Lord, which I must say have been urged before, but urged to-night, of course, with the greatest ability of which they were susceptible. The first was this—You have no right whatever to move Her Majesty's Native Forces from India to Malta; the second was, you have not only no right to do that, but you have no right to call upon India to bear the expense of such movement. These were the two great points—one point for each hour. Now, my Lords, let us see how the matter stands. We entirely dispute the first proposition. The noble Earl who has just sat down says—"I object to your conduct, and I object to it on this broad ground, that you had no right to move those troops from India without the consent of Parliament." In fact, the noble Earl recommended to our consideration to-night that very unfortunate Amendment
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of Mr. Gladstone's which has been referred to, and which, at the time it was submitted, he opposed with so much energy and dignity in this House. Well, the noble and learned Lord bases this first point upon the Mutiny Act. My Lords, we entirely dispute his interpretation. We maintain that there is no reference whatever to Native Indian troops in the Mutiny Act. The Mutiny Act does not refer to Native Indian troops, and, therefore, the charge against the Government is one which cannot hold. On the other hand, we say that we have a perfect right to advise Her Majesty to exercise Her undoubted Prerogative, and that, under that advice, She may command Her Native Indian Army to occupy Malta or any other place to which Her responsible Ministers advise Her that, owing to public necessity and for the public advantage, they should go. Well, my Lords, what is the next point of the noble and learned Lord. He says—"You have no right to fasten this expenditure upon the Revenues of India." Well, we are not going to fasten this expenditure upon the Revenues of India. The noble and learned Lord admits that, virtually speaking, we do not intend it; but, practically speaking, he says there is an expenditure immediately incurred in transactions of this kind, and it is to the Indian Treasury that you look—it is the Indian Treasury that you have already drawn upon and appealed to in order to carry on the expenditure, and you have no right to get out of the difficulty by saying that it is your intention to introduce a Supplementary Estimate into the other House of Parliament at the first convenient opportunity. I ask, in what way can we really comply with our engagements to this country and to the Indian Treasury, but in the manner which is now proposed to be followed by the Government? The noble and learned Lord, who has been a Minister of the Crown, must know very well that the accounts between England and India are of a very considerable character. They have this peculiarity, I believe—namely that the Debt of the Indian Treasury to the Treasury of England is generally very large, and thus far, if even for two or three months, the Supplementary Estimates were not carried in Parliament, still the Indian Treasury would be perfectly safe, because it would probably

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owe that of England a much larger sum. The noble and learned Lord, in working his two points, dwelt very much upon one precedent—the Abyssinian Expedition—and, although he treated that precedent with dexterity, I do not think he did so with that ingenuousness which distinguishes his character. The noble and learned Lord showed by various documents—by researches which no one disputes—that there were considerable advances made at that time by the Indian Treasury, and says that those advances were illegal; but the noble and learned Lord chose to forget that at the time no one in the other House of Parliament, where, from its financial character, the question must have been brought forward, nor in this House, so far as my knowledge or recollection guides me, disputed the authority of the Crown to employ the Native Indian troops of Her Majesty on that Expedition. The question which was raised was of a financial character; but the noble and learned Lord avoided reminding your Lordships that the question as to the movement of the Indian troops beyond the boundaries of India was not in the course of those discussions for a moment referred to. That, my Lords, is my answer to the two great points of the speech of the noble and learned Lord. I maintain, and those who act with me maintain, that there is no allusion to the Native Indian Army in the Mutiny Act—that that Act refers to the European—the White troops—of Her Majesty, and not to the Native Indian Army. I cannot believe that anyone who has listened to my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack can have a doubt that the opposite conclusion could not be successfully asserted. There, then, is an end of one of the great bases on which the question urged by the noble and learned Lord was founded. And, with regard to the other—namely, the illegality of the Indian Treasury bearing for the moment certain expenditure, I think your Lordships must feel that, under the circumstances, that was really trifling with the question. The noble and learned Lord could not have flattered himself that he was establishing the fact as against Her Majesty's Government that they did not intend that the expenditure should be repaid to the Indian Treasury. We have heard the noble and
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learned Lord opposite, and my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack indulge in a great gladiatorial duel. We have had the pleasure of witnessing that between two of our most eminent Members. I can only say we are perfectly satisfied with the discussion—except that we would have preferred either silence, or a fair outspoken issue. I do not think that discussions like the present at this moment are to the public advantage. If the noble and learned Lord who introduced this question (Lord Selborne) believed that we have acted contrary to the Constitution, he ought to act up to his tall phrases—he should have come forward and declared his belief that our action was unconstitutional, and that it was his duty to ask the opinion of Parliament upon it. The noble Earl who last spoke said they did not do that because they would not like being in a minority. But you will never be in a majority if your nerves are so delicate. You must assert your opinions without fear; and, if they are just, and true, and right, you will ultimately be supported by the country. But at this moment I do not think they are just, or true, or right; or, rather, I would say—although it has been said so often it may be repeated—that what is true is not new, and what is new is not true. That is my general view of the speech of the noble and learned Lord. It has given us an opportunity of hearing my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack make a completely exhaustive discourse on this subject, and I hope to-morrow the moral and beneficial effects of this discussion will be felt not only in this House, but in the country. I must for a moment revert to what I can assure the House I would like to have passed—for I wish to regard matters of this kind with not too serious a feeling. I have expressed my regret that this discussion should have arisen at this particular moment. My lips are shut. I should like, of course—and all my Colleagues would, I am sure, like—if we could come forward and do that which we should be prepared and glad to do—to vindicate our policy and give our reasons, which I hope would be satisfactory to the country, for all the measures that we have recommended and introduced. We have been animated by one feeling throughout this business, which sustains and, I hope, inspires us at present, and that is to secure the

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blessings of peace, and to maintain the freedom of Europe and the just position of this country. We are striving at this moment to attain those results. But it is impossible at this particular moment to meet discussions and attacks of this kind, and vindicate our conduct, without our having to make statements and enter into arguments and details which might be prejudicial to those great objects which not only ourselves, but I am sure equally the noble Lords opposite, must desire to accomplish and achieve. I would willingly take no part in the discussion to-night, but the noble Earl opposite challenged me to rise, and he is a knight to whom one owes every courtesy. Therefore it is that I make these few remarks in this discussion; and, in answer to the noble Duke who spoke behind me (the Duke of Rutland), he may urge the question again and again in this House, but until the time arrives when we can enter into a complete vindication of our policy, all I shall answer is—what we have done we have done with the belief that it was done for the public service; and, though you may condemn us, we will remain silent under the accusation, sooner than vindicate our conduct by injuring the public we are bound to serve.
House adjourned at half past Ten o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.