Sitting of 29 July 1878

MINUTES.
— SELECT COMMITTEE — Report— Indian Native Troops (Transport and Employment Abroad) [No. 321].
WAYS AND MEANS—considered in Committee— Consolidated Fund (£14,500,000).
PUBLIC BILLS—Resolution in Committee—Elders Widows' Fund [Deficiencies] .
Ordered—First Reading—Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices [281]; Disqualification of Medical Relief Removal [282].
Second Reading—Duke of Connaught and of Strathearne (Establishment) [277]; Arranmore Polling District (Ireland) [270].
Committee—Elders Widows' Fund [226]—R. P.
Committee—Report—Endowed Schools and Hospitals (Scotland) [157]; Prison Authorities Act (1874) Amendment✶ [246]; Commons Regulation (Expenses) [273].
Third Reading—Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) [268], and passed.
Withdrawn—Ancient Monuments (re-comm.) [209].

QUESTIONS.

  THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN—THESSALY.—QUESTION.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any complaints have been made to Her Majesty's Government to the effect that during the sitting of the Congress Consul Blunt suggested to the Turks to get up a Petition in Thessaly in favour of the establishment of an autonomous province under the protectorate of England; and, if so, whether Mr. Blunt has been asked to explain his conduct?
  MR. BOURKE: No, Sir; no such complaints have been made at the Foreign Office, and no such proceedings on the part of Mr. Blunt have been reported to the Foreign Office.

THE JUDICATURE ACT—RULE I., ORDER 36—SURREY ASSIZES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CHARLES LEWISasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he is aware that at the commencement of the present Guildford Assizes the senior judge made the announcement that, notwithstanding the terms of Rule I., Order 36, under the Judicature Act, he should only try causes which had arisen in Surrey; that in consequence of such announcement several cases were struck out, including a case where a judge of the Supreme Court at chambers had changed the venue from another county to Surrey; and, whether the Government is prepared to take steps to prevent the serious consequences to suitors arising from the course taken by the judge?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, he sent the Question of the hon. Member to the Lord Chief Baron, who was senior Judge at the Surrey Assizes. The learned Chief Baron, in reply, said the learned Judges who had held Assizes in Surrey since the new distribution of circuits throughout England had found it necessary to try no causes in Surrey other than those in which the cause of action arose in the county, or in which the parties and their witnesses were resident in the county. The Lord Chief

  519
  Justice and Lord Coleridge had adopted this principle, and the main reason was that a great number of causes—sometime 150 or 200—were brought to the Assizes, the parties to which were strangers to the county, and often came from distant parts of the country, and even from Scotland; consequently, the real business of the county was greatly delayed. He (Mr. Assheton Cross) presumed that his proper course would be to send the letter to the Lord Chancellor, in order that the letter might be brought under his notice.
  MR. CHARLES LEWISsaid, he should on that day week renew his Question, and ask, Whether Her Majesty's Government intended to take any steps in order to prevent Her Majesty's Judges placing themselves above the law?

ENDOWED SCHOOLS ACT, 1869—TIMBERSCOMBE SCHOOL SCHEME.

  QUESTION.
  MR. COURTNEYasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether it was not provided by the forty-eighth section of the Timberscombe School Scheme, approved by the Queen in Council on the 12th August 1876, that
  "no boy or girl shall, by reason of any exemption from attending prayer or religious worship, or from any lesson or series of lessons on a religious subject, be deprived of any advantage or emolument under the Foundation to which he or she would otherwise have been entitled;"
  whether he is aware that, under the seventh clause of a Scheme of competitive examinations for Exhibitions drawn up by the Governors of the said School, it is provided that the examination shall include "Group IV. of the diocesan system in religious subjects," i. e. the creeds and catechisms of the Church of England; and, if he proposes to take any steps to protect children not attending religious instruction from the loss of advantage they suffer in the examinations for Exhibitions?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, my attention has been directed to this case, and after looking at the Endowed Schools Act, 1869, and the Timberscombe School Scheme, I find that the only persons having jurisdiction in the case are the Charity Commissioners, whose decision is final; and they are not of opinion that the regulations for the
  520
  examination violate the School Scheme. I should add that this school is a Church of England foundation, and by Section 19 of the Endowed Schools Act is specially excepted from preceding clauses relating to religious instruction.

  MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACTS—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.
  MR. STEVENSONasked Mr. Attorney General, Whether he can hold out any prospect on the part of the Government of introducing next Session a Bill for the amendment of the Acts relating to municipal corporations, as he has been unable this Session to carry out his intention of doing so, which he announced on the 10th of August last year, in which Bill he hoped to include provisions for the readjustment of wards and councillors in boroughs, with a view of correcting anomalies in the representation arising from changes in the population and rateable value of existing wards?
  THE ATTOENEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER): Sir, when on the 10th of August last year I made some observations to which the hon. Member refers, but which he does not in his Question quite accurately describe, I had been informed that a Bill to amend the Municipal Corporations Acts would be introduced by the Government this Session, and I expressed an opinion that the provisions relating to the adjustment of wards, which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick (Mr. Arthur Pell) was then pressing, would find a more appropriate place in such Bill than in the one which was then under my charge. The Government measure I alluded to has been introduced by my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury, and, I believe, is now in Committee. I had no other Bill in contemplation when I spoke.

CRIMINAL LAW—VACCINATION PROSECUTIONS—PRISON DISCIPLINE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. GOURLEYasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he has had his attention called to the treatment of Thomas Bertram, who was sentenced at Sunderland, on the 14th June, to fourteen days' imprisonment for the non-vaccination of his child,

  521
  "who was sent to Durham Gaol handcuffed with ordinary criminals, and whilst there his daily diet consisted of two pints of gruel and one pound of bread; that he was denied the use of a mattress on which to sleep, and that his cell door was kept continually locked with the exception of three quarters of an hour twice a-day while out for exercise;"
  and, if he intends making any alterations in the existing prison regulations?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that this question did not rest with the Secretary of State. The whole thing turned upon the warrant of commitment. He was in hopes that by the passing of the Summary Jurisdiction Bill a great part of the evil referred to might have been prevented; but, unfortunately, it had not been possible to get that measure passed this Session. He hoped to re-introduce that measure at the very earliest period of next Session, in order that a great part of the inconvenience alluded to might be obviated. He thought that the unregulated use of handcuffs was a matter deeply to be regretted, and he called the attention of the mayor to this matter, and he (the mayor) stated that he would bring the matter before the bench. He (Mr. Assheton Cross) had expressed his opinion as strongly as he could against the indiscreet use of handcuffs.

  THE EASTERN QUESTION — TREATY OF BERLIN—THE TURKISH INDEMNITY.—QUESTION.
  MR. LAINGasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether there is anything in the Treaty of Berlin, or in the engagements taken by Russia at the Congress, by which the indemnity to be paid by Turkey to Russia is postponed to other debts of the Turkish Government which had no special hypothecations, contrary to the general rule that the debts of a State have no priority, inter se, apart from special hypothecations?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, there is nothing in the Treaty of Berlin that bears upon this matter; but in the 11th Protocol it will be found that there were some communications that passed between the Plenipotentiaries. I will especially call the hon. Gentleman's attention to what passed between Count Corti and Count Schouvaloff. Count Corti quotes the
  522
  words of Count Schouvaloff declaring that if the indemnity of 300,000,000 of roubles be affirmed by a vote of the Congress, this sum would enjoy no preferential claims over the loans guaranteed by France and England. His Excellency remarks that he thinks there are other loans not guaranteed, and he thinks he may believe that the Russian declaration extends to all the other loans of Turkey. Count Schouvaloff says that he has not examined this difficulty; but he states generally that Russia proposes to respect the legality of every anterior loan. Prince Gortschakoff remarks that the war indemnity would not affect the interests of the creditors of the Porte. I do not pretend to put an interpretation upon nice questions of international law; but these are points which are material to the Question of my hon. Friend.

  ARMY — THE AUXILIARY FORCES — YEOMANRY ADJUTANTS.—QUESTION.
  MR. STARKIEasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether Adjutants of Yeomanry, appointed under the old regulations, are to be granted the same steps in promotion of a Majority as the Adjutants of Militia appointed under the old regulations, and holding their appointments permanently, the same as Adjutants of Yeomanry?
  COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, that the question was at present under the consideration of the Committee appointed to consider the matter, and he should prefer waiting until the Report of that Committee was received before he made any statement on the subject.

  POOR LAW (IRELAND)—UNION WORKHOUSES.—QUESTION.
  MR. MACARTNEYasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether the Report of the Commission appointed last year to inquire as to the advisability of the amalgamation of union workhouses in Ireland will be presented to the House before the Prorogation of Parliament?
  MR. J. LOWTHER, in reply, said, that the Report would not be presented to Parliament this Session, because it was not expected that the Commission would have concluded its labours before September.

  PUBLIC BUSINESS—THE MEDICAL ACT AMENDMENT BILL.—QUESTIONS.
  MR. LYON PLAYFAIRasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, at this advanced period of the Session, it is the intention of the Government to proceed with a measure involving so many important interests as the Medical Act Amendment Bill?
  MR. A. MILLSasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether it is the intention of the Government to proceed this Session with the Medical Act Amendment Bill, now standing for Second Reading on the 5th day of August, against which stage six Notices have been placed on the Order Book, together with three pages of Amendments in the event of the House going into Committee on the Bill?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, in consequence of the opposition by certain Members to this Bill, its chances of becoming law this year daily diminish. My Amendments were put upon the Notice Paper to make clear to the opponents of the Bill the course we intended to take, in the hope that their opposition would be then removed; and until I know the effect of my Amendments, I am unable to give a definite answer as to the fate of the Bill this Session.

NAVY—H.M.S. " VANGUARD."

  QUESTION.
  MR. M. BROOKSasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If his attention has been called to the losses of drift nets and other tackle suffered by owners of fishing craft in the Bay of Dublin owing to the standing rigging and wreck of H.M.S. "Vanguard;" and, if he will inform the House of the measures taken for the removal of the said wreck?
  MR. W. H. SMITH, in reply, said, that he was not aware that fishermen had lost their nets owing to the wreck of the Vanguard, and if they had done so he was afraid it must be due to some want of care on their own part. He was sorry to say that it was not in the power of the Admiralty to take any steps in the matter until the 31st of October. The contractor had undertaken to raise the ship by that date, and until he fulfilled or abandoned his
  524
  undertaking, it would not be possible for the Admiralty to interfere with the ship.

  SUPERANNUATION ACT, 1859—THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT. — QUESTION.
  MR. RITCHIEasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the answer given by him to a question on June 27th, that in the scheme for the reorganisation of the Customs Department the ordinary terms of retirement under the Superannuation Act of 1859 will be offered, applies to the outdoor as well as the indoor department of the Customs?
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, that his answer of the 27th of June applied both to the out-door and the in-door Departments of the Customs.

ARMY—DISMISSAL OF THE RESERVES.

  QUESTION.
  SIR BALDWYN LEIGHTONasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, in the probable event of the Reserve men being shortly sent to their homes, the Government, having in view such effect on the labour market, would consider the propriety of not dismissing them all suddenly or simultaneously?
  COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, the difficulty referred to by the hon. Baronet had been very carefully considered by the War Department, and they had decided to discharge the men some time before the expiration of their engagements, so that their discharge would be spread over a period of something like a fortnight. Perhaps he might be allowed to add that, in consequence of communications which he had caused to be made to the Inspector General of Fortifications, instructions were given to ascertain if the Government contractors would find, as far as possible, work for the men on the operations in which they were engaged. In some cases this had been done, and notification had been given to the men that they might find employment.

  COAL MINES—THE HAYDOCK EXPLOSION.—QUESTION.
  MR. MACDONALDasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, When the Report of the Inquiry

  525
  into the cause of the Haydock Explosion is likely to be laid upon the Table of the House; and, whether it will be circulated among Members?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that the Report referred to had not yet been received; but that as soon as it was it would be laid upon the Table in due course.
  MR. MACDONALDgave Notice, that on going into Committee of Supply on an early day he should call attention to the subject, and should move a Resolution.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSShoped that the hon. Member would not move a Resolution on the subject until he had seen the Report of the gentleman who was specially sent to investigate the question.

  ARMY—THE AUXILIARY FORCES-MILITIA COLONELS—QUESTION.
  MR. HAYTERasked the Secretary of State for War, with reference to his reply on the 25th of July, that in the Militia the regulations as to the retirement of officers at 60 years of age, unless specially recommended for five years' extension, were strictly enforced, what course he proposes to pursue with regard to the officers commanding the Bedford and 2nd Stafford Militia who have attained the ages of 77 and 70 respectively; and, whether he is of opinion that sufficient information as to the ages of Militia officers and their consequent retirement to ensure a proper flow of promotion, is at present at the disposal of the War Office?
  COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, perhaps the hon. Member would allow him to answer his Question generally and not particularly in reference to the cases of certain officers who were Members of that House. The rule which he had adopted in all cases was the one which he understood, from consultation with the Commander-in-Chief and the Inspector General of the Auxiliary Forces, was to be generally acted upon —namely, that when an officer attained the age of 60 he should, as a rule, retire from the active command of a regiment, his commission then being an honorary one; but that, in certain exceptional circumstances, he should be permitted to retain his command for another five years.

TREATY OF BERLIN—BULGARIA.

  QUESTION.
  MR. OTWAY: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a Question of which I have given him private Notice, with reference to a discrepancy in the French and English versions of the Treaty of Berlin. I wish to know, Whether the elaboration of the organic law of Bulgaria is to precede the election of a Prince, according to the French version, or whether the Prince is to be elected before the organic law is elaborated, as is stated in the English version?
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, the French version of the Treaty is correct—that is, the organic law precedes the election of a Prince. I would take this opportunity of expressing my regret to the House that I find that there are a good number of inaccuracies in the translation of the Treaty, and I can only say that these inaccuracies are to be excused by the fact that we were most anxious that not one moment should be lost in presenting the Paper to the House. Beyond causing inconvenience to hon. Members, those inaccuracies are of no importance, and they will be rectified before the ratification of the Treaty.

  PUBLIC BUSINESS—THE SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES.—QUESTION.
  MR. CHILDERSsaid, he had asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer two or three times when the Supplementary Estimates would be laid upon the Table, and when he would make his statement in relation to thorn? He should be obliged if the right hon. Gentleman would give the House that information now.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The Supplementary Estimates will be laid upon the Table this evening, and I hope to be able to take them on Monday next, provided the course of Public Business will enable me to do so.
  Ordered, That the Orders of the Day subsequent to the Order of the Day for the Second Reading of the Duke of Connaught and of Strathearne (Establishment) Bill be postponed until after the Notice of Motion of the Marquess of Hartington relating to Eastern Affairs.— (Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  DUKE OF CONNAUGHT AND OF STRATHEARNE (ESTABLISHMENT) BILL— [BILL 277.]
  (Mr. Raikes, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Secretary Cross, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.)
  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Beading read.
  MR. MACDONALDsaid, it had been his intention to divide the House on the question; but he had no wish to stand between the House and the debate on Eastern affairs, which was then about to come on. He would not, therefore, carry out his original intention; but he must say he entered his strongest protest against the measure.
  MR. BURTfully approved of the course taken by the hon. Member for Stafford. He also would like to make a few remarks upon the subject; but he thought he should best consult the convenience of the House by reserving them until the third reading of the Bill.
  Bill read a second time, and committed for To-morrow.

MOTIONS.

  EASTERN AFFAIRS.—RESOLUTION.
  THE MARQUESS OF HAETINGTON, in rising to move the following Resolutions:—
  "That, whilst this House has learned with satisfaction that the troubles which have arisen in the East of Europe have been terminated by the Treaty of Berlin without a further recourse to arms, and rejoices in the extension of the liberty and self-government of some of the populations of European Turkey, this House regrets:—
  "That it has not been found practicable to deal in a satisfactory manner with the claims of the Kingdom of Greece, and of the Greek subjects of the Porte:
  "That by the assumption under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of a sole guarantee of the integrity of the remaining territories of Turkey in Asia, the Military liabilities of this Country have been unnecessarily extended:
  "That the undefined engagements entered into by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the better administration of those provinces have imposed heavy responsibilities on the State, whilst no sufficient means have been indicated for securing their fulfilment:
  528
  "And that such engagements have been entered into, and responsibilities incurred, without the previous knowledge of Parliament;"
  said: Mr. Speaker, I rise to call the attention of the House to the Papers which have been recently laid before us on the subject of Eastern affairs, to the Convention concluded between the Governments of England and Turkey, to the Treaty which has been concluded at Berlin and the despatches which accompanied it, and to the Protocols of the Congress which has lately closed. I am afraid that in doing so, I may have to occupy somewhat longer time than I am in the habit of doing, and I fear that even then it will be in my power but very imperfectly to lay before the House a sketch of those considerations which I think ought to be taken into view by the House, before we vote on the Resolution that I am about to propose. But, in these circumstances, I think I shall best consult my duty and the convenience of the House, by refraining altogether from any unnecessary preliminary observations, and by directing attention as briefly as I can to the main points which I ask the House to consider. The Re-solutions which I am about to move, it will be observed, do not, in any way, attack the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin; but, at the same time, I think the House ought to take this opportunity of considering what are the provisions of the settlement of Berlin, in what respect it alters previous engagements, and in what position it leaves the Turkish Empire and affairs in the East. The Government appear to be desirous of inviting us to consider the Treaty of Berlin in comparison with the Treaty of San Stefano, and to limit our consideration of it to that view. I think that a very inadequate idea of what is accomplished by the Treaty of Berlin would be arrived at in any such manner. The Treaty of San Stefano was avowedly a preliminary Treaty; it was always admitted by Russia that its main provisions—at all events, those provisions which affected other European Powers, should be subject to revision by Europe; and it did not profess to be, on the part of the Russian Government, a final settlement of affairs in the East. I think that a more just idea of what has been effected by the Congress of Berlin would be obtained if we compared, for a moment, the state of things which

  529
  existed at the close of the Crimean War with that which now exists in Turkey. The principles of the Treaty of Paris, by which the Crimean War was terminated, were, in the main, these — That the integrity of the Dominions of Turkey, as then established, was guaranteed, and the independence of the Sultan, on the principle that he should be complete master within his own Dominions, was there asserted. Well, before the late War broke out, before active operations commenced, a communication was made by the Russian Government to Her Majesty's Government, in June, 1877, informing them what were the demands of Russia in case peace could be concluded without having recourse to actual hostilities. No doubt, those demands made very considerable inroads on the two principles which I have referred to as being the basis of the Settlement of 1856. Still, I think it would be desirable to recall to the House what those demands of Russia, in June of last year, were, and to see how very far short they fall of what has been accomplished by the Congress of Berlin. At that time, Russia demanded that Bulgaria, up to the Balkans, should be an autonomous Vassal Province. As to Bulgaria South of the Balkans, it was proposed to secure to it, as well as to other Christian Provinces of Turkey, the best possible guarantees for a regular Administration; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be provided with institutions compatible with their internal state and good administration; and Austria was to have a preponderating voice in their future organization. As to the independence of Roumania, that was to be settled by European agreement; as to Montenegro and Servia, nothing was said about their independence, but an increase of their territory was to be determined on by a common agreement; and as to the annexation of territory on the part of Russia itself, nothing was asked for except that part of Bessarabia which was ceded in 1856, and some portion of the territory at Batoum. These were the terms asked for by Russia in June, 1877, and the House will remember in what manner they were described by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to whom they were referred. Sir Austen Layard declared that they were terms virtually amounting to the destruction of the Turkish Empire, and
  530
  he proceeded to argue in what way they would have that effect. I do not know— we have never known—what was precisely the view taken by Her Majesty's Government themselves of those terms; but they never expressed their approval of them, nor took steps to urge them upon Turkey to save her from the horrors and disasters of the war which has lately been concluded. Let the House compare those terms of June, 1877, with those of the Settlement agreed to by the Congress of Berlin. Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro have all acquired complete independence; Bulgaria, North of the Balkans, has acquired a larger and more complete degree of independence than that which was stipulated for in June, 1877. The Bulgarians, North of the Balkans, are, in fact, on the high road to complete independence, and following in the footsteps which have been trodden by Roumania and Servia. In South Bulgaria, or, as the Congress preferred to describe it, in Eastern Roumelia, an administrative autonomy has been established. It is true that it is described in the Treaty as remaining under the direct political and military authority of the Sultan. But under what condition is the Sultan to exercise that direct political and military authority? There is to be a Christian Governor, who is to be appointed with the assent and after consultation with the Powers of Europe, and he is to be irremovable for a period of five years. That is to say, the Mahomedan Sultan is bound to appoint, to rule over this Province, which remains under his direct authority, a Governor of a different religion, and he is bound to do that only after consultation with, and with the assent of the Powers of Europe. A Constitution is to be prepared for Eastern Roumelia, not by the Sultan and his Advisers, but by a European Commission, and it is to receive the assent of the Powers. The Sultan is, it is true, to be permitted to defend the frontier of that Province; but even that Prerogative is only to be exercised under certain restrictions. Irregular troops may not be used, even in the defence of the frontier; and as to the internal administration of the Province, he is not permitted to introduce any regular troops for the preservation of order; he is not to be the judge when order in the Province is or is not disturbed—internal order is to be preserved

  531
  by a native gendarmerie or militia; and it is the Governor General appointed by the Powers of Europe who is to be the judge when the necessity arises for summoning troops for the preservation of internal or external security. Such is the nature, political and military, of the authority which has been reserved to the Sultan by the Treaty of Berlin. What is his position as regards independence with respect to the other Provinces of Turkey? By the 23rd Article of the Treaty, the Porte undertakes to apply scrupulously in the Island of Crete the organic law of 1868. Similar laws are to be introduced into the other parts of the Empire; special Commissions, in which the native element is to be largely represented, are to draw out the details of the new laws, and the Sublime Porte, before promulgating those laws, is to submit them to, and take the advice of, a European Commission instituted for the organization of Eastern Roumelia. Such is the amount of independence preserved to the Sultan by the Treaty of Berlin for the remainder of his Empire. I have now to refer for a moment to the case of Greece and the Greek Provinces of Turkey; and I wish to state, at the outset, that though I have thought it necessary to refer to them in the resolutions, I do not propose to formulate any serious charge against Her Majesty's Government in this respect. Any responsibility that has been incurred—and I think it is a very great one—has been incurred by all the other Powers that met in Congress; but, nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government did, in my opinion, incur with regard to Greece a special responsibility not shared by the other Powers. Throughout these troubles, Her Majesty's Government have been in constant communication with the Greek Government, and assurances and promises in considerable numbers have teen made to the Greek Government with a view of inducing them to abstain from adding to the difficulties of the Porte. I freely admit that the promises of the Government were not of a very distinct or definite character; but I think that their general effect, if I am not misrepresenting them, was that the Greek Government was informed that they would lose nothing by waiting, and that Her Majesty's Government would use its best endeavours, when the time for the final settlement arrived, to gain
  532
  for the Greeks in Turkey all the advantages and reforms that would fall to the other Christian subjects of the Porte. That being the nature of the promises made by Her Majesty's Government, and the nature of the inducement held out to the Greeks to abstain from taking part in the war, let us now proceed to consider what the results are. Lord Salisbury, in the Congress, asked for and obtained the admission of a Greek Delegate; but what were, respectively, the attitudes of the Governments of the European Powers to the Greeks in the Congress? Who proved to be the friend of friends at the Congress? Prince Gortschak off declared beforehand that he was anxious for the Greek cause, and that the Representatives of Russia were not exclusively concerned with the Slavs, but regarded also all the Christian subjects of the Porte; and when the question came on, he said that he would identify himself with any measures adopted in favour of the Greeks, and would even demand for the Greek Provinces of Turkey an autonomy similar to that claimed for the Slavs, the object of his Government being to draw those races closer together. That being the view taken of the Greek claims by the Russian Plenipotentiaries in the Congress, what do we find is the attitude of the British Representatives? At a later period of the deliberations of the Congress, France brought forward proposals in favour of the Kingdom of Greece which were, no doubt, the result of a preliminary arrangement between the Powers. I cannot say that those proposals, moderate in the extreme though they were, received any warm support from Lord Beaconsfield. The Greeks were informed that they had totally misapprehended the objects of the Congress; they were told—and, after the assurances they had received, with cold comfort—that no one could doubt the future of Greece, and that nations that had a future could, like individuals similarly placed, afford to wait. But as to the proposals themselves, Lord Beaconsfield declared that he looked upon them as open to objections, which, however, his Excellency would withdraw in the interests of unanimity. That is the amount of support which the Greeks received in the Congress from the British Plenipotentiaries, who had before put themselves forward as the champions

  533
  of their admission and of their claims. Well, Sir, we are told that in point of territory Greece will obtain a great deal. But the Congress does not insist, as it does in other cases, upon any extension of Greek territory, but merely recommends it; and it rests to a very considerable extent upon the goodwill and disposition of the Government of Turkey whether or not Greece will ever obtain that extension of territory. But, Sir, Greece in that matter acted not merely in her own interests as a nation; but she was, to some extent, and was recognized to be, the champion of the Greek subjects of Turkey; and the course she desired to take, but which she was persuaded not to take, was calculated not only to advance her own interests, but also those of her compatriots in Turkey. The Government of Her Majesty promised to use their best endeavours to give them the same advantages as those gained for other races; but what is the result? The Slavs are protected by Russia, and acted just as we advised Greece not to act, and they are now either absolutely free or else in a very advanced position towards acquiring absolute independence; the Greek Provinces, on the other hand, obtain nothing but the extension to them of the Cretan Constitution, which has not preserved their freedom nor prevented the occurrence of continued struggles against the authority of Turkey. Lord Beacons-field, in his speech on Saturday last, said there was a Party not in this country alone—which I take to mean that there is one also in this country—which, for factious purposes, egged on the Greeks to take a violent course. I think Lord Beaconsfield is somewhat difficult to satisfy. When his policy is not directly challenged in the House in which he sits, he complains that it is met only by question and innuendo; when, on the other hand, it is challenged in this House, and when I, acting on behalf of a good many hon. Members on this side of the House, put forward some one of our objections to it, then we are told that we are acting for factious purposes. But I deny the charge altogether that in this country there is any Party that for factious purposes is endeavouring to egg on Greece. Everyone must be aware that after the end of the war—after the termination of the labours of the Congress, it would be
  534
  perfect madness for Greece to attempt to pursue a violent course. What I regret is that past proceedings will have taught the Greeks a lesson which they will not soon forget, and that on the next occasion of difficulty in Turkey, they will rather be disposed to follow the example, which has been proved to be successful, of the Slav subjects of the Ottoman Empire, than to follow the advice which has been given them by Her Majesty's Government. In future they will be disposed to follow Servia, Roumania, and Bulgaria, who, with the assistance of Russia, have obtained some tangible advantages, instead of listening to the Government that soothes them during the time of possible action with smooth words and promises—words and promises which, when the time of performance arrived, seem to have been so greatly and so unfortunately misapprehended. There is one point of view from which I am perfectly ready to concede that the Congress has done good service to Europe, and also to the cause of Greece. I cannot look upon the Treaty of San Stefano or of Berlin as a final solution of the Eastern Question, though the Treaty of San Stefano was, perhaps, more complete than that of Berlin. I give no opinion whether it is a better solution or not; but the Treaty of San Stefano pointed to a complete solution, which would been entirely and solely in the interests of one race, and that the Slav race. I think that the Great Bulgaria, which was planned in the Treaty of San Stefano, would have left open to Greece an extension in the direction of Epirus and Thessaly; but would, no doubt, have closed to Greece all prospect of extension in the direction of Salonica, Roumelia, and Constantinople. Well, Sir, I believe, as I have said, that the Treaty of Berlin will not prove a final settlement. I believe that the future of the inhabitants of what remains of the Dominions of Turkey will ultimately be determined by internal and natural causes, rather than by causes which are external and artificial; and I rejoice that a temporary solution, temporary though it be, has been arrived at, which will leave scope for those natural causes to work, and which will not replace the military domination of Turkey by the military domination of Russia or the Slav over unwilling races. In the main, Sir, the provisions of the

  535
  Treaty of Berlin are not repugnant to the views which have frequently been expressed by hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House. We have always looked at the Treaty of Paris as an experiment. It was based on the idea that the institutions of Turkey might be reformed, and that with the chances there given her, she might ultimately take her place among the nations of Europe. We have come to the conclusion, sooner than hon. Gentlemen opposite, that the experiment has failed, and that some policy must be substituted for that which was the dominant policy in 1856. We believed that the only substitute for that policy lay in the gradual development of the Christian races of the Porte. You may disguise it if you choose, you may use what phrases you please about the independence and power and direct authority which are left to Turkey; but, disguise it as you will, that is the principle which is at the bottom of the Treaty of Berlin. So far as the Treaty of Berlin is a complete settlement, it is in the direction of extending self-government to the races which were lately subject; so far as it is incomplete it points to a complete settlement in the same direction; and it is because we believe that it is a step, and a very long step, in the direction of the policy which we have from the very beginning of these troubles advocated upon this side of the House, that we do not repudiate, but rather welcome, the Treaty which has been concluded. I observe that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Plunket) has given Notice of an Amendment, which is about to receive the support of the great majority of hon. Gentlemen opposite, expressing great satisfaction with all that has been done or attempted to be done by Her Majesty's Government. I suppose we may take that to mean an approval of what has been done by the Congress of Berlin. If that be so, and if the Amendment is to be assented to by hon. Members opposite—what greater justification could we desire for the course which we have taken from the very beginning? If you approve what has been done at Berlin, you approve what has been done by the war. If you approve the independence of Bosnia, Servia, and Roumania, and the self-government of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, then you must
  536
  approve those results which have been brought about by the war. You yourselves tried at the Conference at Constantinople what could be effected by peaceable means. Those means failed, and all that has been accomplished has been brought about by the war; and the course we have taken throughout has been, by every means in our power, to induce the Government and the country to refrain from going to war for the purpose of resisting the enterprize which had been taken in hand by Russia. If, then, you are about to vote approval of all the results of the war, how can we desire any better justification of the course we have taken? But, Sir, it is impossible to look only at results, and to shut our eyes altogether to the course which has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government, and the mode in which those results have been arrived at. The character of English statesmanship and of English diplomacy must always be a subject of no common interest to this House. I am not going now into a subject which has been discussed at considerable length in "another place," as to the good faith and accuracy of statements which were made in both Houses of Parliament. I have no doubt it was extremely inconvenient to Her Majesty's Government, when the secret Agreement, which they entered into with Russia, was inadvertently disclosed. I think that after the Agreement had been disclosed, it would have been as well had a full and complete account of it, and all that led to it, been laid before Parliament. All I can say is that if it was the intention of the Government to give that frank, clear, and complete account of the Agreement, and of the circumstances which led to it, they have been somewhat unfortunate in the replies they have given and in the impression they produced. But, Sir, I do not want to go into that controversy, and I venture to express a hope that we may proceed to this debate without reopening it. But it is important to consider whether the course pursued by the Government, not towards us, not towards Parliament, but towards Europe, has been a consistent one—whether it has been a course consistent with the declarations that they made to Europe, or consistent with the obligations they owed to Europe? We have, since the conclusion of the war, been incessant in

  537
  our expression of disapproval as to the secrecy with which the Treaty of San Stefano was entered into. We have declared, over and over again, that we should recognize no agreement as binding which affected European or British interests which had not been submitted to Europe, and had not received the approval of Europe. We concluded that the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted at the Congress as a whole; and I observe that in the despatch of July 13, Lord Salisbury says that the demand had been fully recognized. But Lord Salisbury did not think it necessary to state that before that contention was fully recognized and admitted by Russia, we had entered into a secret Agreement with Russia, by which the main provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano—not certain unimportant stipulations which did not affect European or British interests, but its most important stipulations—were agreed upon between England and Russia, who had all through been considered as the chief opponents in the matter; and that, therefore, practically, they were removed from the consideration of the Congress of Berlin. Sir, that was not the only secret Agreement which Her Majesty's Government entered into before the Congress was held. There was also a Convention with Turkey, which up to that time was also a secret Convention. And now I wish to ask Her Majesty's Government how, in their view, that Convention, which was never submitted to the Congress, and had never received the approval of Europe, was consistent with the declarations they made to Europe? That Convention binds Turkey to do two things. First, it gives to us certain rights of intervention which were, in our opinion, necessary to secure better government in Asiatic Turkey, and next it allows our occupation of the Island of Cyprus. Well, in what respect did the first concession differ from the contention put forward by Russia before the Crimean War as to a Protectorate between the Porte and its subjects, and which we resisted by force of arms, and which it was one of the main objects of the Treaty of Paris to induce Russia to abandon? How is it admissible for us to assume the special right of interference between the Porte and its subjects apart from the rest of Europe, when we prevented the carrying into
  538
  effect of a similar assumption on the part of Russia? As to the occupation of Cyprus, it may be said that it is no breach of our obligations under the Treaty of 1856, because it has been done with the consent of Turkey, and the question of the extent of territory to be occupied has nothing to do with the matter. But let me put this case. Supposing that before the outbreak of war, either by means of threats or promises, Russia had induced Turkey to permit her to occupy Bulgaria, or any part of Bulgaria which she might designate. If such an agreement had been entered into, would Her Majesty's Government have admitted that the contracting Powers were justified in such a course under the provisions of the Treaty of 1856? If the Government are not prepared to admit such a right as I have suggested, I fail to see how they can reconcile with their international obligations an Agreement entered into behind the back of Europe for the occupation of Cyprus. As to the policy of the occupation itself, I do not intend to trouble the House at any length. If Her Majesty's Government can show that the occupation has been accomplished in an internationally legal manner; that it is an advantage to this country in any respect; that it is necessary for the protection of the Suez Canal; or that England requires another naval station in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, I shall not be disposed to make any objection to the step which Her Majesty's Government have taken. But I cannot forget that we are in possession of no such information, either in the form of Papers or of statements made in "another place;" and that nothing has been said to show that the occupation of Cyprus will increase our military or naval power, or assist us in any degree in meeting the engagements into which we have entered. I will assume, for a moment, that the occupation of Cyprus is necessary to enable us to fulfil the Guarantees into which we have entered for the protection of the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan; but surely it can never be intended to embark troops at Cyprus, and then to land them on the coast of Asia Minor, across which country they would have to be transported, although, at present, no roads or provision for the passage of an Army exist. If we are to undertake

  539
  the defence of Asiatic Turkey, it would be much more easy to make Constantinople, or one of the ports of the Black Sea, a base of operations than the Island of Cyprus. It is, therefore, impossible to see how the military occupation of Cyprus will add to our naval power. I come now to the Convention which has been concluded between the Government of Her Majesty and the Porte. The first question I have to put is as to the necessity for that Convention. If a necessity exists, it is in some degree, at all events, one which the Government has created for itself—or, at any rate, one which the Government had made no effort whatever to avert. The necessity which is alleged is that of preventing the advance of Russia in Asia Minor, and the acquisition of certain territory there; and I have pointed out that up to June of last year the Russian demand did not include the annexation of any part of Asia Minor. [Mr. BOURKE: Except Batoum.] Exactly so, but we have heard from a very high authority in "another place" that Batoum is a port of very little importance; and, if my memory does not deceive me, the despatch of Lord Salisbury placed the alleged necessity for the action taken by the Government, not upon the cession of Batoum, but on the cession of Kars, Ardahan, and the adjoining frontier of Asia Minor. The original terms demanded by Russia did not include any of these points of Asiatic Turkey; and if the Government had been aware that a Russian advance in that direction would be so fatal to the interests of this country, it does seem to me extraordinary that they should not have made some effort to press upon the Government of Turkey the acceptance of terms which did not involve these conditions, when they must have known that a Russian advance in Asia would have been the inevitable result of a war. I am not in a position to deny the accuracy of the statements which have been made by Lord Salisbury as to the possible consequences of a Russian advance in Asia Minor. It is probably true that a weak Government there would grow gradually weaker, and that such weakness would probably end in disorganization, and Russian annexation of the Provinces? I cannot say that I have any such positive knowledge on the subject as Lord Salisbury appears to possess.
  540
  He seems to know as a fact that the increasing weakness of Turkey can only lead to the Asiatic Dominions falling into the hands of Russia. That may be so; but, at the same time, I must say that it does not appear to me so self-evident as it does to the mind of Lord Salisbury. The Provinces are inhabited chiefly by Mahomedan races who would strongly resist the destruction of the Mahomedan power or annexation to Russia, and even if Russia succeeded in annexing them they would, in my opinion, not only prove a source of very little strength to her, but would, on the contrary, turn out to be a very troublesome acquisition of territory. Assuming, however, that Lord Salisbury is right, I think the House ought to be asked to consider— and they have not yet been asked so to do—what is the nature of the British interests involved in Asia Minor. As far as I can see, our interests in India are not in any way affected by the question of Asia Minor. It is possible that at some future day there may be a railway through the Euphrates Valley; but as to that we have an authority in this House. Not long ago a Committee, presided over by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, sat to consider how far the construction of this railway would be inimical to our interests. That Committee reported in the mildest terms imaginable, and they said that, although the railway might be of considerable importance to the Indian Government, it was by no means an object of paramount necessity. And even if this railway were made, and it was made use of by Russia what would Russia find when she reached the other end of it? She would find the British Navy. I should like to know how, even supposing Russia had hostile intentions, she could, when brought face to face with the British iron-clad Navy at the Persian Gulf, carry out those intentions through Asia Minor. But we are told on high authority that in the event of a Russian attack upon India, the line is not through Asia Minor, but lies through Persia. I believe that is an assertion no one will deny. Persia is as much within the grasp of Russia as Asia Minor. Persia is as misgoverned a country as Asia Minor, and it seems to me if you are bound to assume the Protectorate of Turkey, you are bound to guarantee the protection of Persia. A large use has

  541
  been made of the word prestige, and I fully admit its importance, particularly as far as Eastern countries are concerned; but when we speak of impressing the Natives of India with our power, a reservation should be made as a condition precedent that the power should be used for objects which all the world approves. I do not think that, in order to maintain our prestige among the Natives of India, we should make an exhibition of our power in connection with objects which we ourselves should not deem it necessary to go to war about. Depend upon it that the Native Princes are too clever to be misled by such a course of proceeding on our part. They understand us well enough when we make a display of force to secure objects of Imperial necessity; but their minds would not be influenced in the smallest degree if we were to lower our standard of statesmanship to the level of their ideas, and if we were to use our power for objects we ourselves did not consider worth contending for, but which an Asiatic Potentate might go to war to obtain. But I want to know when it was first discovered that vital British interests were connected with Armenia and Asia Minor? Certainly, the discovery was a very recent one. It had not been made in May of last year, when the celebrated charter of policy was promulgated by Lord Salisbury. Neither had it been made a little later, when that noble Lord addressed the Merchant Taylors, when he absolutely ridiculed the idea of any vital British interests being involved in Armenia and Asia Minor. Certainly, it had not been made in June, when the Russian terms were made known to the Government. It had also not been made when, on a later occasion, Colonel Wellesley had his interview with the Emperor of Russia, and when the Czar stated that he should require to annex some parts of Armenia, and when Her Majesty's Government expressed their satisfaction that the demands of Russia were so modest. Neither had the discovery been made in November last, when Her Majesty's Government told Russia that a further advance of her Armies in the direction of Constantinople would be resisted by us by force of arms; while, at the same moment, they were looking on unconcernedly at the capture of Kars by the Russian Forces. Well, we are told by the Prime Minister that
  542
  our responsibilities have not been increased by this Convention with Turkey; but that they have, on the contrary, been diminished by it. The noble Lord said—
  "Suppose now, for example, the settlement of Europe had not included the Convention of Constantinople and the occupation of the Isle of Cyprus; suppose it had been limited to the mere Treaty of Berlin; what, under all probable circumstances, might then have occurred? In 10, 15, it might be in 20 years, the power and resources of Russia having revived, some quarrel would again have occurred, Bulgarian or otherwise, and in all probability the Armies of Russia would have been assailing the Ottoman Dominions both in Europe and Asia, and enveloping and enclosing the city of Constantinople and its all-powerful position. Well, what would he the probable conduct, under these circumstances, of the Government of this country, whoever the Ministers might be — whatever Party might be in power? I fear there might he hesitation for a time— a want of decision—a want of firmness; but no one doubts that ultimately England would have said—'This will never do; we must prevent the conquest of Asia Minor; we must interfere in this matter and arrest the course of Russia.' No one, I am sure, in this country who impartially considers this question can for a moment doubt what under any circumstances would have been the course of this country."
  Why, I wish to ask, are we to assume that, when the next occasion arises, the Government then in Office will do exactly the reverse of that which has been done by Her Majesty's Government? No doubt Lord Beaconsfield is a very good judge of what is likely to take place in the future Cabinet; because he was, probably, relying on his memory when he said that there might be hesitation for a time, a want of decision, and a want of firmness. No doubt, the noble Lord was speaking from experience; but I cannot see why the future Government should do precisely what the present Government have not done. Lord Beaconsfield goes on to say that this Convention will remove all doubt in the matter. That does not appear to me to be so certain. This is not the first Guarantee that we have entered into with respect to Turkey. The terms of the Guarantee of 1856 and of the Tripartite Treaty were distinct enough, and could not have been more binding upon the high contracting parties than they were; nevertheless, they did not remove all doubt from the mind of Russia, who, notwithstanding them, had proceeded to make war upon Turkey, in which she was so far justified that none of the

  543
  parties who were bound by the Guarantee had stepped forward in defence of the latter. The fact is that guarantees of this sort cannot possibly bind future generations. The foreign policy of future generations must be decided by themselves according to the circumstances of their own time and according to what is expedient at the time. In his opinion, it was idle for any Government to say that by entering into any guarantees now they would prevent Russian aggression some 20 years hence. It is true that on some occasions the Prime Minister does assume to himself extraordinary power. He says that it is time to say to Russia—"Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther." I wonder when the Prime Minister used these words, he considered where the quotation originated. These words are taken from a passage in the Bible, in which were described the attributes of the Almighty. There is a legend in English history of the courtiers of a certain British Monarch who desired to flatter him with the possession of Omnipotence. The British Canute was not to be deceived by the counsels of those courtiers; but proved to them, by practical experiment, that they were assigning to him powers beyond those he possessed or could possess. But I am not surprised at the Prime Minister using language which would attribute to himself not only Omnipotence, but Omniscience, seeing that he professes to be able to tell us what will be done by the Government of this country some 20 years hence in the event of the Eastern Question arising again at that time. I contend that it rests upon Her Majesty's Government to show to Parliament and to the country wherein lies the imperative necessity and compulsion for us to enter into these engagements. I think that no adequate necessity has been shown by Her Majesty's Government for our entering into them, and that no corresponding advantage has been secured to us in return for our having surrendered our freedom of action. There can, however, be no doubt that we have largely extended our liabilities. It is to defend Turkey in Asia Minor, not when we please, but when Russia pleases. Not to take our own time, not to be our own judges of the interests which are involved; but to defend the territorial integrity of Turkey in Asia whenever and for whatever cause
  544
  Russia may attack it. Are you perfectly certain that Russia, which has hitherto not been generally considered wanting in astuteness, will always select the time for attack which precisely suits our own convenience, or do you think it possible that Great Britain may be involved in difficulties or wars with other nations and that she may not always be ready at the call of Russia to undertake this military liability you have imposed upon her? I know it is now extremely unpopular to talk about our insular position, although there was, I believe, a time when we were extremely proud of that position. To the strength which we derived from it we owe, in my opinion, the greater part of our power. But, although we have not been content—and I do not complain of it—to confine our Dominions within the Seas which surround these Islands, though we have extended them to every part of the globe, we have hitherto been very fortunate in the way in which those extensions have been made. We have been fortunate in not possessing an extended military frontier. The frontier between the United States and Canada is, I believe, the only extensive military frontier which we have had to defend, and hon. Gentlemen may remember the anxiety which was felt a few years ago when our relations with America were not so good as they are now. In India we have an Empire of vast extent, surrounded on two sides by the sea; while, on the third side, we have been singularly favoured by the nature of our frontier. There we have a chain of the highest mountains in the world, and on both sides of those mountains you find warlike and independent Tribes, who, if they resent encroachment from our side, equally resent it from any other quarter. Indeed, the position which we occupy in India is one which is as secure as it is possible to have. But what is it that we have done by this undertaking of the Government? We have advanced the time for the conflict, if conflict there is to be, between us and Russia, perhaps by 100 years, and we have advanced the frontier open to her attack, to our disadvantage, at least 1,000 miles. We have left behind us a frontier such as I have described in India, with which every military authority has hitherto been satisfied, and we have planted ourselves close to the frontier of our sole enemy, close to his resources, and 1,000

  545
  miles away from our own. We have left behind us, in India, our Navy and the Navy of India, the resources, the wealth, the railroads of India, the Native troops we have trained, and the population from whom they are recruited—we have given up, I say, all these military advantages, and placed ourselves close to the resources of our enemy, trusting only to the resources of the misgoverned and semi-civilized Turkish Provinces in Asia Minor. If that be not a policy rightly described—as it was described the other day—as an insane policy, I want to know what epithet is to be applied to it? This reminds me of—and this is the last reference I need make to— the speech of the Prime Minister on Saturday. I do not complain of his retort to that description of his policy which was given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich; it was, I think, a fair Parliamentary retort. But when the noble Lord thought it worthy of himself to go on to describe my right hon. Friend as
  "a sophistical rhetorician, inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity, and gifted with an egotistical imagination which can at all times command an interminable and inconsistent series of arguments to malign an opponent and glorify himself;"
  when the noble Lord went on to describe my right hon. Friend in that way, I think he was offering somewhat of an insult to the Sovereign of whom my right hon. Friend was for no inconsiderable time the chief Adviser; to the Privy Council, of which my right hon. Friend is still a Member; to this House, which he has led; to the people of this country, whose confidence at one time my right hon. Friend possessed, and the confidence of a large portion of whom he still commands. Sir, I regret that personalities of that description should enter into our discussions, whether inside or outside this House. But, passing by that, I go on to consider the political responsibilities which the Government have undertaken by the policy which they have adopted. Some persons entertain a doubt whether the military engagements into which we have entered with Turkey depend or not on her performance of her promises. But, whether they be or be not unconditional engagements, there can be no doubt about the responsibilities which we have incurred under the engagements which Turkey has made to
  546
  us. Those responsibilities extend very far, indeed, beyond Asia and the Asian frontier, to the whole external and internal policy of that country. I think it quite clear that when the contingency arises, and when the Asiatic Dominions of Turkey are attacked by Russia, it will not be an isolated attack, but part of a general attack on the Turkish Empire; and the defence of the Asiatic frontier will be, to all intents and purposes, a general defence of Turkey in a war with Russia. Is it possible that Her Majesty's Government can bind themselves to be the Ally of Turkey in any such war, altogether irrespective of the cause for which such a war is being waged? It is inconceivable that Turkey is to be made the judge of her action in bring about a war under such conditions; but, unless we intend to regulate the foreign policy of Turkey when it has relation to Russia, how is it possible we can tell whether the cause of such a war is one we can fight for? It is necessary, therefore, that we should assume some control over the foreign policy of Turkey with regard to Russia. Let the House look at the responsibilities which we have now incurred in Asia, and the consequences to which they may tend. We are assured by Lord Salisbury that our aid is conditional on reforms being introduced in the government of the Turkish Provinces, and that we have the promise of the introduction of those reforms. But are we to rely on the promises which have been made to us by the Porte? Previous experience serves to show us what those promises are worth. Have we taken power to introduce ourselves, or to insist upon Turkey introducing, the necessary reforms into her Asiatic Dominions? If so, then, as negotiations are not now going on, the House ought to be informed what those powers are. All that we have heard is that the Sovereign rights of the Sultan are to be respected; but, then, the problem to be solved is this—how to respect the Sovereign rights of the Sultan, and at the same time not to rely simply on the promises of the Sultan. What machinery are you going to employ to ensure reforms being introduced into Asiatic Turkey? I suppose we shall be told that the problem has been solved by Great Britain in India; but I am surprised that India should be referred to as an analogous case, for the very name

  547
  of India negatives the idea of the independent Prerogative of the Sultan. We may be told of protected Indian Princes whose governments we have undertaken to and succeeded in reforming, and who retain a shadow of independence. That case has been repeated over and over again. In the first place, we protect a Native Prince; in the second place, we find fault with him; and, in the next place, we correct him for his bad government; and, finally, we disestablish him altogether. Perhaps the Sovereign rights of the Sultan are a mere phrase? Perhaps it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to assume a real authority, and to administer, in the name of the Sultan, the Provinces of Asiatic Turkey by our own officers? Has the House considered, even for one moment, the enormous difficulty that will attend such an enterprise? India, no doubt, will again be referred to, and it will be said we have succeeded there in that task. But how different are the circumstances in the two cases! In India we are the paramount Power; there is no military force that can compete or compare with ours. When we resolve that something shall be done in India, we have the unquestioned military power to enforce our will; and there we are exposed to no interference from any other European Power. No other Power either desires or has a right to interfere with or to question our position in India. With the Protectorate you are about to undertake in Asia Minor the case is far different. There not only every European Power has a right to be present, but under the 61st Article of the Treaty which you have concluded you have given to every European Power that has signed it a right to inquire into, to investigate and supervise the reforms that are to be introduced by the Porte for the better government of the country. Then, again, what are you going to do in the event of insurrection? You are to guarantee Turkey against Russian aggression. But is it merely aggression from without that threatens the Turkish Dominions? And does not such aggression generally begin with insurrection from within? Have you undertaken, or do you intend to guarantee the Porte in Asia against the consequences of its own misgovernment if that misgovernment, is continued, and to use the armed force of England in putting down internal re-
  548
  volt? Surely .engagements so embarrassing were never entered into with so little consideration? If there had really been any serious consideration of their policy, Her Majesty's Government might have pointed out to the Sultan that there was but one chance left for the continuance of his power either in Europe or in Asia, and that was by the better government of his subjects. They might have offered their assistance for that purpose. They might have said— "We want no more words, but some evidence, however little, that we are to have deeds." They might have given him what assistance he needed to initiate those reforms; and when they had something tangible to bring before us, when they had some reforms made, some improvements effected, in the condition of those Asiatic Provinces, then I could have understood Her Majesty's Government coming to Parliament and saying—"The work of reformation has begun; the Sultan is availing himself of our assistance; the well-being of these Provinces has been secured and will be further secured; and now we ask you to aid in protecting this work against foreign aggression." In such a policy as that there would have been something solid and clear; but there would have been nothing showy, and nothing to justify congratulatory regrets. Her Majesty's Government have given us great professions— immense professions—and I ask them what shadow or tittle of action, or performance, there is to correspond with these professions? We are told that we shrink from the responsibility; that we, and such politicians as we are, would not have been the men to adopt that policy. But to that, my reply is that the Indian Empire has been managed by men on very different principles. They advanced their Dominions gradually and steadily, and they said very little about it. You make very large professions; and I want you to tell Parliament what ounce or tittle of performance there has been for all these professions? Sir, I may be asked what is the object I have in bringing forward this Resolution? and in asking the opinion of the House upon them. From a Party point of view, I have no doubt it would have been easier to have remained quiet, to have bowed our heads to the breeze of popularity which is now carrying forward the vessel of the Government, and

  549
  to have waited for the time—in my opinion, the inevitable time— of re-action, and to have reaped our own advantage from the disappointment and discontent which follow the exaggerated hopes of an untrue confidence. It would have been easier, perhaps, in a Party point of view, and more politic, if we had adopted that course. But that is not the view which we take of the duty we owe to the country. We have thought that it was more patriotic to endeavour to point out to this House and the country the nature and the magnitude of the liabilities and responsibilities which you are undertaking, and the dangers which we believe are involved. We have thought it better, if those dangers and liabilities are to be incurred, that they should be incurred with a full knowledge of their character. And we wished, further, to prepare the way, if possible, when the time for reflection should come—as come, I believe, it inevitably will—so as to enable the country, while there is time, to retreat from this false, and, as we think, ill-advised, course with honour, and to retire from a position which we believe that neither its interest nor its duty demands that it should assume.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That, whilst this House has learned with satisfaction that the troubles which have arisen in the East of Europe have been terminated by the Treaty of Berlin without a further recourse to arms, and rejoices in the extension of the liberty and self-government of some of the populations of European Turkey, this House regrets:—
  "That it has not been found practicable to deal in a satisfactory manner with the claims of the Kingdom of Greece, and of the Greek subjects of the Porte:
  "That by the assumption under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of a sole guarantee of the integrity of the remaining territories of Turkey in Asia, the Military liabilities of this Country have been unnecessarily extended:
  "That the undefined engagements entered into by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the better administration of those Provinces have imposed heavy responsibilities on the State, whilst no sufficient means have been indicated for securing their fulfilment:
  "And that such engagements have been entered into, and responsibilities incurred, without the previous knowledge of Parliament."— (The Marquess of Hartington.)
  MR. PLUNKET, in rising to move to leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to insert the words—
  "An humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for communi-
  550
  cating to this House the Treaty of Berlin, the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, and the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey; assuring Her Majesty that this House has learnt with deep satisfaction the termination of the late unhappy War, and the conclusion of a Treaty between the Great Powers of Europe; and expressing an earnest hope that the arrangements made and sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government may, under the blessing of Providence, avail to preserve Peace, to ameliorate the condition of large populations in the East, and to maintain the interest of this Empire,"
  said: Mr. Speaker, in rising to move the Amendment of which I have given Notice, I have first of all to say. a word in expression of my sense of the courtesy with which the hon. Member for Stoke (Dr. Kenealy) has given way to me on this occasion, and not imposed on me the necessity of moving an Amendment to the same effect. I think that the House will agree that, however much any of us on this side of the House, at all events, are in accord with the views expressed in the Amendment of the hon. Member for Stoke, we must all agree that as his Amendment seemed only to touch one part of the Motion brought before us, and did not appear, as I understand it, to deal with the Anglo-Turkish Convention, it was more convenient that the sense of the House should be taken on the Amendment which I have framed. Because, Sir, I regard the proceedings of this evening, at all events the Amendment of which I have given Notice, should it be adopted by the House, as doing something towards recording the approval of the country of the conduct of their Representatives here in the House of Commons, and of the acts of the Government, which are really now completed, and as also indicating—as the result of this debate will indicate—the determination of the country to support the Ministers in proceeding with and carraying out that other old, and I think wise, policy which they have now entered upon. Of course, Sir, I am well aware that this Amendment, if carried, will be in the nature of a Vote of Confidence in Her Majesty's Government, and as a loyal supporter of that Government I shall rejoice on that account; but I think it of much higher importance in a national sense, because I believe that the great majority—as I am sure there will be—as the result of this debate, will show to Europe and to the world that after all the controversies, and after all the contentions that

  551
  have raged in this House upon this subject, we are again I hope thoroughly, as regards our foreign affairs, a united people. The noble Lord who has just sat down, towards the close of his speech, referred to the breeze of popularity which he said was now passing over the land, and he regarded that as only of a passing and temporary character. I cannot agree at all in that view of the extraordinary enthusiasm and unanimity with which the conduct of the Premier and the announcement of the future policy of the country, as regards Turkey, has been received in this country. Nor, indeed, need we surprised when we consider what a wonderful change has passed over the mind of these people within the last few weeks. It is not so long ago since we were all in a state of extreme anxiety and great attention; this peaceable, commercial people had been required to prepare itself for the possibility of a war—a war which, if it began at all, was sure to prove a great and probably a long-continued struggle. We had seen the wonderful resources of this country, which, during times of peace, she had carefully hoarded up, rapidly and easily developed; but while the country, I am sure, would view with admiration and with pride the rapid development of those great resources, should it have become necessary to employ them, when Fleets could have been sent forth by England such as no other country could pretend to equip—whilst we saw not only our own Army rapidly mobilized and in a short time made ready for active service—while we saw with pride the Native troops of India rallying to the Standard of the Queen, while we received from all quarters of the country promises of assistance should we require it, at the same time the feeling of the country was one of extreme and painful apprehension. There was a feeling that when we were preparing with all our energies for war, the horrors which at that time seemed to be impending over the country predominated in the national mind. But, Sir, all that now has passed away. The soldiers who were called out—the Reserve Forces— are no longer necessary on sea or land, and the ordinary course of peaceful life at home has been happily resumed. I do not think that anyone could wonder at the breeze of popularity which is now, as it is said, passing over this land, and
  552
  over those statesmen who have maintained the dignity of this country in the counsels of Europe, and who have brought back to her from that great Assembly of the statesmen of Europe, "peace, and peace with honour." But, Sir, the noble Lord who has just sat down has taken the Prime Minister somewhat severely to task for a sentence uttered by him at a banquet on last Saturday evening. Now, I really think myself the noble Lord treated that in a somewhat too serious manner. I was under the impression that it was not delivered in a vindictive or in a serious mood. It was received much more with laughter than with any serious feeling. But I must say one word more. The noble Lord has spoken gallantly and loyally for his Chief, and I may say one word on behalf of the Prime Minister in speaking those words. Does the noble Lord think that the Prime Minister had received no provocation? Does he not remember how, not in jest at all, but in sober and solemn earnestness, that Statesman has been denounced now for these three years; how in patience he has endured all those taunts and all those insults, and, I must say, in the most pleasant and good-humoured way? He referred to his great rival at a banquet on Saturday, and I do not think that great blame can be attached to him. Why, I recollect the time when we were told that the Ministry, of which Lord Beaconsfield was the Chief, could hardly be excused; the right hon. Gentleman guarded himself from accusing them of "purposed complicity with guilt." The expression occurs in a famous pamphlet; and not only that, but we were told that the Government of that day had more disgraced the name of England than any Government for years; and we were assured that nothing good would come of their Administration, until they had been taught as "lisping babes." Why, Sir, is all that nothing? I am referring to expressions by the right hon. Gentleman himself in serious earnestness. If you add to those the calumnies of orators and writers on Lord Beaconsfield, my astonishment is not so much that at last he must have said something, or that he should have said something rather more playful than serious, but that he should so long have succeeded in maintaining his patience. I cannot, of course, ask the indulgence

  553
  of the House for any length of time; and, therefore, I shall at once address myself to the question raised by the Resolution of the noble Lord, and the Amendment that I move. Now, Sir, as to the Treaty of Berlin. The noble Lord contrasted the terms of the Treaty of Berlin with the terms of the Despatch of last June, and also with the principles that were founded on the Treaty of 1856. Now, Sir, I think that is not the fairest or the best way, perhaps, of treating this question. I did not understand the noble Lord that he was led to imply that we should have coerced Turkey to adopt it— I thought the noble Lord himself was opposed to the policy of coercion—or that we should have sooner checked the Russians when they made their advance with the encouragement of the opponents of the Government. I do not see with what object these comparisons have been made; but when the noble Lord went on to say that he has always been against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the Conservatives of the opposite opinion, he must, I think, have forgotten what occurred before the Conference of Constantinople. In the Session of 1876 the noble Lord himself warned the Government not to depart from the traditional policy of Palmerston, and similar advice was given by Lord Granville. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire has also been the whole foundation of the Conference of Constantinople. So much, however, has occurred since, that I do not see that one can gain much by contrasting the terms of the Berlin Treaty with those earlier documents, and therefore it is much better that we should contrast them with those of the ,Treaty of San Stefano. I will not follow the noble Lord in his analysis of the Treaty of Berlin; but as one of the questions raised by the Resolution concerns that Treaty—the question, namely, of the Greeks—I am compelled to make one or two remarks upon it. The noble Lord said he did not attach much blame to the Government for what had been done with respect to Greece, for that after the representations which had been made on the subject he found that the other Plenipotentiaries took the same view of the case; but he went onto say that some hopes had been held out to Greece by Her Majesty's Government which had misled her. I have selected passage after passage from
  554
  the Blue Books, which prove incontestably that that has not been the case. On the contrary, Greece has been specially warned that Her Majesty's Government could not pledge itself to procure for her any territorial additions; but it did pledge itself to obtain for the Greek cause, as far as possible, a hearing in the Congress, and to obtain for the Greek Provinces of Turkey whatever was granted to the other Christian Provinces of the Porte. There is not one word in any of those despatches to show that the Government did not in every respect adhere to their promises; on the contrary, when we compare the action of the Government with that of the French, we will see that the speech of the Prime Minister contained very friendly advice to the Greeks, and that, as a matter of fact, the proposals of the Plenipotentiaries were just those agreed upon between the Greek Minister and Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield, who never did anything to diminish the force of the representations made on behalf of the Greeks. If anything, they wore more in favour of the Greeks than the other Plenipotentiaries; because when the question arose of the demands of Greece, and whether her Representatives were to be present at all discussions touching the various Greek Provinces, they proposed that they should be present, while the French Plenipotentiaries would have excluded them. The results obtained for Greece were very considerable indeed; and though she may not acquire any vast increase of territory, she is a gainer by the Congress, and has a great future before her. One great boon obtained for the Greek Provinces is this—that the duties as regards the supervision of the new arrangements instituted in the Greek Provinces are relegated to a European Commission, and not to a Russian Commission. The real wishes of Greece are stated in a Blue Book of December, 1876, which contains a Minute of a conversation between Lord Derby and M. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, who told him that the Greek nation could not but regard with apprehension the attempt to extend the Slav Provinces at the expense of the Greeks, for the Greeks formed the most important element in that part of European Turkey, and were a particularly thriving community. It went on to say that, as a body, the

  555
  Greeks would prefer Turkish rule to the domination of the Slav races. I need not say that the hopes of the Greeks will not be likely to be realized under the supreme control of Russia. In my opinion, next to the strengthening of the power of the Sultan—to whom has been intrusted again the great city of Constantinople and the guardianship of the Straits—the next most important result of the labours of the Congress was the substitution in the disturbed Provinces of European for Russian authority and influence. It is an entirely unfair and an unjust accusation to say that any promise made by Her Majesty's Government to the Greek Kingdom or the Greek Provinces has been in any way violated; or to say that France or any other country exhibited towards the Greeks any greater favour than was shown them by England. Indeed, I had forgotten Prince Gortchakoff for the moment. He did not care if the Greek Provinces were made altogether independent; but that never occurred to him when making the Treaty of San Stefano. Under that Treaty the Greek Provinces would have been subject to Russian predominance altogether. I now come to the only part of the Treaty of Berlin with which the noble Lord appears to find serious fault—I mean the Anglo-Turkish Convention. I was rather struck by the curious series of arguments used on that subject by the noble Lord. They reminded me of a phrase sometimes seen in our charts— "dangerous winds from opposite quarters." Russia, said the noble Lord, would not assail Asia Minor, because she had no desire to come into conflict with Mahomedans. Well, that is a startling statement, considering what Russia has already done in Asia; and then the noble Lord said — "You incur a fearful responsibility." But where is the responsibility as regards the Turkish Provinces in Asia if Russia is not going to attack them? But, said the noble Lord—"You forget the Tripartite Treaty; is it not stronger than any you can make?" Well, I have heard that argument used before. I put it to the House, is it true that a Treaty —which it is the business of three different Powers to carry out, where responsibility is divided, and where there must be great difficulty and delay in bringing it to pass—is at all as binding or as valuable as the Convention which
  556
  has been entered into by England and Turkey; a Convention by which England, for the purpose of carrying out her guarantee, accepts an important naval station, and undertakes to assist, from day to day, as far as she may be required, or invited to do so, the reforms which the Sultan agrees to adopt? It is obvious that no Russian statesman or soldier could for a moment believe that, under such circumstances, the English Government would recede from the important obligation which they have now incurred. It is a wise policy to defend Asia Minor against future aggression on the part of Russia, and one from which England will not recede. Then the noble Lord, having stated that the Russian Government would not think of attacking a Mahomedan country, proceeded to argue that she might do so with safety so far as this country is concerned. Is it likely that, if the Convention had not been entered into, Asia Minor would have been attacked? If you realize the condition of Turkey in Asia—a country inhabited by divided races, and races belonging to different creeds—if you realize the disintegration of Turkish Government in Asia Minor from the events of the late war, and if you realize all the fortresses which defended the territory of Turkey, and which have passed into the hands of Russia, do you not think that that is a prize which would present an irresistible attraction to the ambition of Russian statesmen and Russian soldiers? With regard to danger being apprehended in the event of the Russians getting down to the Isthmus of Suez, that might come to pass if they became the conquerors of Asia Minor; but would not their first advance on the Southern shore of the Black Sea bring them directly and speedily to the very confines of Constantinople? If it is intended to give a fair trial to the policy which has been undertaken of still intrusting to the Sultan the guardianship of Constantinople and the Straits, it is absolutely necessary that he should be safeguarded in his Asiatic Possessions as well as in his European Provinces. Then, said the noble Lord, we have undertaken grave responsibility as regards reforms in Turkey. No doubt we have undertaken considerable responsibility; but it is a responsibility we were bound to undertake. If we are to protect the Sultan

  557
  in his Asiatic Dominions, is it not the first and necessary condition for successfully protecting him that reforms should be carried out in earnest? But it will be said there is no use in depending on the promises of Turkey. Well, I do not suppose there is any Member of the Liberal Party who will regret to see reforms effected in the Government of Turkey. What they say, then, is that there is no use in leaving the carrying of them out in the hands of the Sultan of Turkey. He requires aid, and that aid England has undertaken to give him. If the guarantee is to be carried out at all, what have we to do? We have to make an attempt to reform the Turkish Government in Asia Minor, and to redeem from their present miserable condition the subjects of the Sultan. That is not only a duty which we may fairly say we owe almost to humanity, but it is obviously a policy which, if successfully carried out, must be of immense advantage to this country and to the world. Is it not well known that there are enormous resources lying waste in Asiatic Turkey—immense fields of enterprise which have long been lying fallow, and that there is great wealth there to be developed? The people of that country are an industrious people— an honest people; and if their Government could be reformed, there is no reason why the country should not become as prosperous as it has been in times past. Therefore, I contend that this undertaking on the part of Her Majesty's Government to assist in the reform of Turkey is not only a wise, but a generous policy; and one which I am very confident the people of this country will fully approve. But it is said—"Why do you not declare the way you are going to carry it out?" Surely that is not a thing that can be done in a day. The British Government have undertaken to do their best to assist the Sultan in carrying out these reforms, and the Sultan has undertaken to carry them out under the advice of the British Government; but it necessarily will be a matter of time. Hon. Members opposite think it can be done off-hand—done by a stroke of the pen—but no reasonable expectation of any such thing can be formed. It will be necessary to make investigations, and to concert measures in order to secure real practical reforms; but I venture to think that if in other respects
  558
  the policy of Her Majesty's Government as regards Asia Minor is accepted by the English people, they will not be turned away from carrying it out by those phantasies of responsibility. That, at all events, has not been the history of England. The noble Lord has pointed out that in India we have accepted responsibilities under different circumstances. That is true; but that is no reason why we should not incur these particular responsibilities for the purpose of regenerating the country, developing its commerce, and securing the good government of its people. To shrink from it would not be in accordance with the history of the great achievements of the English people, and which has made us what we are. In former times the English people in these Islands had for centuries treasured up the spirit of freedom, until it became a part of their character, and gave strength and vigour to it. Because they have thus formed a character the most daring and the most capable of sustaining effort, when opportunities have been given to the whole world to visit untried fields, the English have always been the first to colonize and the greatest to conquer. If we conquered, we did not take the vanquished people into slavery; we conquered in order to push forward the cause of freedom. We do not purpose to go as colonists or conquerors to Turkey, but as ancient and faithful allies and friends; and by our advice, example, and experience to endeavour to lead them out of the unhappy condition into which they have fallen; and, as far as possible, to confer upon them the blessings which were intended by nature to rest upon the favoured countries now under Turkish rule. I beg to move the Amendment of which I have given Notice.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to insert the words "an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for communicating to this House the Treaty of Berlin, the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, and the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey; assuring Her Majesty that this House has learnt with deep satisfaction the termination of the late unhappy War, and the conclusion of a Treaty between the Great Powers of Europe; and expressing an earnest hope that the arrangements made and sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government may, under the blessing of Providence, avail to preserve Peace, to ameliorate

  559
  the condition of large populations in the East, and to maintain the interest of this Empire,"— (Mr. Plunket,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: Sir, before I refer to the speech which has just fallen from my hon. and learned Friend, I wish to notice one omission in the admirable speech of the noble Lord. The noble Lord, unintentionally, forgot to support, by speech, the last paragraph of his Resolutions, which is certainly not the weakest point in our attack on the proposals which the Government have placed before the country. I mean, of course, the paragraph in which we express the deep regret we feel that the Government policy has been adopted without the knowledge or the sanction of this House. At a moment when a new departure has been taken in the foreign policy of England, and a Convention signed, which friends and enemies unite in admitting to be of the utmost gravity, no attention has been called to those proposals by the Government in the House of Commons, and it has been left to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition to raise the matter by his Resolutions. When we are asked to support what I suppose will be termed a grand policy, I cannot refrain from saying that I think that it would have been far more deserving of the epithet if it had been a policy approved by Parliament after it had been laid before Parliament as a whole. It is not in these days that Governments can make Conventions, that will bind free peoples to engage in bloody wars, without the previous consent of Parliament. It is one thing to make Treaties on lines which have been foreseen, and on principles which Parliament has been permitted to discuss; but it is a very different thing to take a new departure and to deal in a clandestine manner with matters which have never been before either Parliament or the country. The clandestine character of the conditional Convention will be the chief of the reasons which are likely to give it a short life. The people will not forget the manner, if they forget the matter, of this Convention. I turn now to the consideration of the speech of my hon. and
  560
  learned Friend (Mr. Plunket). My hon. and learned Friend is one of the favourite orators of this House; but, if he will allow me to say so, I do not think that his speech to-night was equal to the occasion: and I cannot but believe that it must be the badness of his case which must account for the defective character of his speech. It was not really a defence of the policy of the Government. My hon. and learned Friend did, indeed, ask the House to approve their policy; but instead of explaining it to the House, or defending it as best he could, he indulged in tu quoque observations, and, if I may be allowed the phrase, in "chaff." It is quite true, as my hon. and learned Friend said, that the noble Lord began his speech by expressing satisfaction, not only at the conclusion of peace, but, on the whole, at the nature of the peace which has been arrived at. The majority of the arrangements which have been made in the Treaty of Berlin are satisfactory to both sides. The noble Lord did not refer to the retrocession of Bessarabia, and there is not a man in the House who is favourable to that retrocession, or who would not desire to have seen it avoided. But, with the exception of the case of Greece, it may be taken for certain that the general character of the arrangements was inevitable. It is interesting to observe how extremely like the Treaty is to the suggestions made by the Russian Government in June of last year. It goes a good bit further, but it goes upon the same lines; and it is clear that Russia has gained considerably more by the temporary settlement which has been arrived at than, at this time last year, she expected to obtain. On the whole, the arrangements of the Treaty of Berlin are arrangements which, from the time of the Conference of Constantinople, might have been foreseen. What has been done could not have been avoided when once it had been decided not to prevent the war; but those who, like our Ambassador at Constantinople, foresaw such terrible calamities as he described in changes much milder than those which they themselves have now carried into effect, must surely ask themselves whether the Liberals who supported the policy of the Berlin Memorandum were really, as they were described to be, the enemies, not only of Turkey, but of England

  561
  herself? The second head of the three main heads of the Motion of the noble Lord is that which refers to Greece. Before I come to the consideration of what has been done, or of what has been left undone in regard to Greece, let me first apply myself to remove a false impression which undoubtedly exists among many in the country, if not among many in this House. It is, that Greece is merely an ambitious Power, like Piedmont before 1859, desirous of obtaining, at the expense of her neighbour, territory, chiefly on the sentimental ground that it is inhabited by her race. Those who have not carefully followed this question for themselves are not aware of the frightful cruelties which have been perpetrated by the Turks close to the Greek frontier, in the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. Read the account which history gives of the massacres and destruction wrought by the Turks in Greece in our fathers' time, and you will find the true picture of the state of things prevailing in Thessaly and Epirus now. I should almost think that the Turkish Pashas, knowing that they will be compelled to hand over the frontier Provinces to Greece, have determined to hand them over in the condition of a desert, with every homestead burnt, and the green fig-trees, that will not burn, cut down. I pointed out in the House, some months ago, that the Porte had emptied its gaols, and let the convicts loose upon the Greek Provinces, to rob and murder all the people. Up to that moment, in spite of immense temptations, the Greek Government had preserved neutrality; and when at last they resolved upon action—which was forced upon them by the sufferings of their race, and by the outcry of their population—we checked their action by the promises that we made. One of those promises, which was made over and over again, was, that we would "use our utmost endeavours," and again, "do all in our power," to-prevent the deeds of lawless violence which were being committed by the Turkish troops in Thessaly and Epirus, and in Crete. I have yet to learn that we did much in this sense except talk, through the pleasant mouth of Mr. Layard, to the Turkish Vizier; and I now assert that those deeds of lawless violence are continuing unchecked at the very moment at which I speak. As far as words went, however, nothing could
  562
  be more satisfactory than the treatment about two months ago by the Government of the case of Greece. The instructions, addressed to the English Plenipotentiaries by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department, are strong and clear upon this point; and as it so happened that the two principal Representatives of England were themselves present at the sitting of the Cabinet, at which the instructions to themselves were drawn up, it must be presumed that the language used had their sanction, although that made use of in Lord Salisbury's despatch of the same day to Lord Odo Russell was far from being equally emphatic. At the first meeting of the Congress Lord Salisbury gave notice of a resolution for the admission of Greece. At the second meeting he brought it forward. At the third meeting he moved it—the debate at the second meeting having been adjourned; and on this occasion England took, or appeared to take, the wider and more liberal view. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Plunket) affirmed that England did more for Greece than did France herself—a statement which will provoke the laughter of the Plenipotentiaries. It may be distinctly affirmed, indeed, that at the third sitting of the Congress England showed herself far more liberal to Greece than did France; and yet it is France, and not England, who has left the Congress with the thanks of Greece, for reasons which I presently will show. At the ninth sitting of the Congress Greece stated her case, and asked for Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus. There is only this to be said in regard to her demand for Crete—that the very reasons which were given by the English Plenipotentiaries in support of the demand, introduced by, and actually proposed by, them, to the Congress—that Austria should occupy and administer without limit of time the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina—apply in the case of Crete. Crete has over and over again been the scene of revolutions, and the government of Crete by Turkey is a permanent menace to European peace. At the 13th sitting of the Congress the Greek case was considered. When the case of Greece was brought before the Congress, it was not upon a proposal of England, but on a proposal of France;

  563
  and not even on a proposal of France, on behalf of France and England, as was the case with some other proposals submitted to the Congress. The proposal was of a very moderate nature—in fact, far too moderate to give any lasting chance of peace, which could only be secured by giving to Greece her mountain frontier of the Olympus line. To the obvious arguments on behalf of Greece, put forward by France and Italy, the Turkish Plenipotentiary replied—"The sea which surrounds Greece on all sides affords her the means of unlimited development." As the Turkish Plenipotentiary, however, refused to give up the possession of any Island in the seas which surround her, it is rather difficult to know what his suggestion meant, unless that Greece should drown herself. Lord Beaconsfield then spoke, and blamed Greece for not having listened to the advice of England—a statement which was contrary to all history; for I think I can prove that, on the contrary, she listened to it too much for her own good. The resolution of France was then agreed to. So much for the position of affairs as it appears to stand upon a consideration of the Protocols. So much, in short, for the public history; but what has been the private history of these transactions? At the beginning of the Congress Greece found, on the part of England, encouragement and fair words, and had the hope of at least some small prospect of reaping the reward for her abstention from action, or rather, as I would call it, the reward for the action she took, for putting down insurrection on the frontier, at the request of England. Then she had to face the postponement of her case; next, after a long delay, her Delegates were heard; and when they left, Prince Bismarck, in a marked manner, addressed the English Delegates, and asked them what they had to say in regard to the Greek demand? A dead silence followed, and then Lord Salisbury whispered that before any decision was taken, the Roumanians ought also to be heard. Towards Roumania, be it remembered, England had taken no engagement; and she seemed to consider that her formal engagements towards Greece had been redeemed when Mr. Delyanni had been allowed to talk for half-an-hour — an act of kindness extended to Roumania, to whom no English promise had been given. This
  564
  was the redemption of the English pledge! Greece had had every right to understand from all the declarations which Lord Salisbury had made, that her Representative would have been admitted to be present at the sitting of the Congress at which the Cretan Question was discussed. The Protocols distinctly show that the Article of the Treaty of San Stefano which relates to Crete was considered, and the corresponding Article of the Treaty of Berlin was passed, without any intimation to the Greek Delegate as to when the question would be raised; and it is plain, indeed, that his presence at the discussion, had he known of it, would not have been allowed. The fact that the Cretans are in successful revolt against the very organic law of 1868, which is mentioned by the Article, and that they hold, at this moment, the whole Island as much as the Russians possess Bulgaria, had no weight with the English Plenipotentiaries. In what I have said down to this point, I am speaking of facts which can be proved. I will now speak upon matters which can neither be proved or disproved, but which I have upon the highest authority. I am informed that M. Waddington was privately charged by his Colleagues with the duty of studying the Greek proposals, and formulating a resolution to be submitted to the Congress; that he declared himself favourable to the annexation of the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece; that this proposal was supported by Italy and by Austria, but fell to the ground, in the face of the absolute opposition of the English Plenipotentiaries.
  MR. BOUBKE: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Baronet; but will he be good enough to point out in what part of the Protocols he finds the proposal to cede the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece?
  SIR CHAELES W. DILKE: I said nothing about the Protocols. That which I have stated has appeared in those German newspapers which are best informed on foreign affairs; but I did not get my information from the newspapers. I am sure that what I have said will not be contradicted by those who know the facts. M. Waddington then fell back on the territorial limits, which are those mentioned in the Protocol, but proposed a definite and settled annexation. This met with decided op-

  565
  position from the English Plenipotentiaries, who held that public opinion in England did not allow them to sanction a further dismemberment of Turkey, beyond the lopping off of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which they had themselves proposed. On the very morning of the sitting which was to decide the case of Greece, M. Waddington had an anxious but fruitless interview with Lord Beacons-field at 11, and pointed out in how hard a position he was placed, by those who had asked him to formulate a resolution on the subject of the Greek demands, and who then opposed his minimized proposal, which was, in fact, their own. M. Waddington's proposal was supported, at another interview, by Count Andrassy. The outcome of the opposition of the English Delegates was the proposal of the resolution in such a form that it finds no place in the Treaty; and to a resolution which Lord Beaconsfield, on Saturday night last, declared to be his own, Lord Beaconsfield, in his place in Congress, actually objected. The result of the transactions which I have described is that England has lost the sympathy of the only rising Power in the East which can be set against the Sclavonic friends of Russia. The right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) made a speech at Cheltenham the other day, in which he said that the Government had secured a permanent and lasting settlement of the Eastern Question. Now, I venture to assert that no settlement can be permanent or lasting that fails to give satisfaction to the legitimate claims of Greece. The settlement come to is but a truce; and into the future complications and the future wars which must arise, you will venture in this melancholy fashion—that by guaranteeing Turkey and betraying Greece, we have set ourselves on the side of what is dead, or, at least, decayed and dying, and against that race which is young and full of life. I am, speaking myself in the character of one of those who have been deceived; because I rejoiced at Lord Derby's downfall, and at the accession to Office of Lord Salisbury; and I spoke, shortly afterwards, in this House, in support of Lord Salisbury's Circular, and of its policy of running the Greeks against the Slavs. I have spoken strongly of the breaking of the
  566
  pledges that have been undertaken towards Greece. Now, what were those pledges? On the 23rd of February M. Delyanni addressed our Government at great length on the subject of the representation of Greece at the Congress; and he put his claim for that representation on the ground that the Greek Government were the natural representatives of the Greek population of the Turkish Empire. What was the answer of our Government? Did they contest the justice of this view? Not a bit of it. They only replied, on the 9th of March, that they had considered the appeal—that they thought Greece ought to be represented; and they expressed their opinion on the same day to the whole of the Great Powers, for which they received . the warm thanks of Greece. Surely this justifies me in the statement that, at that time, the Government had in view no limited, but an absolute, representation of Greece at the Congress? Not only is a so-called settlement of the Eastern Question—which leaves in the possession of the Turks that most Greek part of Greece, the Island of Crete—no settlement at all; but it must be remembered that there is at least grave doubt whether, by the arrangements of the Treaty of Berlin, we have made dispositions with regard to Constantinople itself which will last our time. Fresh importance is given to the Hellenic Question by the division of Bulgaria. Bulgaria, south of the Balkans, is, by race, largely Greek. If this new Province of East Roumelia is to form a barrier, in the future, against the advance of Prussia, it can only be by one of two means—either by a pure military Austrian Protectorate, or by the fostering of the Greek element among the people. The former plan offers no prospect of permanence, and it is to the latter, if we are to succeed, that it would be necessary for us to resort. I am aware that there is in this country, and in this House, a certain prejudice against the Greeks. I cannot but think that those who know their ancient history will see in the modern Greeks the virtues as well as the vices of their ancestors. So close is the resemblance, that if it be true, as ethnologists believe, that there is a large Albanian and a large Sclavonic element among the Greek people of our day, we have to fall back upon the supposition, even more flattering to the

  567
  modern Greeks than the theory that their race is pure—namely, that they are of so conquering and predominating a blood as that they impose upon inferior races, not only their religion and their tongue, but also their love of freedom and their national character. It should be remembered that the Greek people has never been given a fair chance. The Hellenic Kingdom, formed under the protection of the Powers, contains within its present boundaries a quarter only of the countries and of the people who took part in the war of independence against the Turks; and by restraining Greece within those narrow limits, we believe that you not only make it impossible that she should become a Power able to hold her own, but also that you are not, in so doing, supporting the Turkish Power so much as you are labouring for the ultimate triumph of the Pan-Sclavonic idea. I now come to the third part of the Resolution of the noble Lord, which is that in which he emphatically condemns the vagueness of the obligations that we have entered into as regards Asia. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Plunket) over and over again referred to the great popularity of the Convention. He said that the country from one end to the other had testified its unanimous delight at this arrangement. I do not know what opportunities my hon. and learned Friend may have for learning the opinion of the country. I, perhaps, have equal chances with him, and I venture to assert the very opposite. I think the country has been filled with wonder and amaze, and has shown its wonder and amaze by silence. Some years ago I wrote in favour of the scheme for the construction, in the interest of our rule in India, of a railroad from Constantinople to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, with a branch from it to the Gulf of Scandaroon. This line I recommended as an alternative route, and that at a time when the position occupied by France in Egypt made it clear that England could not, at that moment, play in Egypt the dominant part; and I ventured then to prophecy that the glories of Cyprus could be revived, and that it had a second history before it. Since that time the position of affairs, with regard to Egypt, has greatly changed, and our position in that quarter is far more strong. But, even now, I am
  568
  favourable to the construction of the Bagdad line, and to that amount of intervention in Asiatic Turkey which is necessary to secure it; and I should contemplate a military occupation of Cyprus and Scandaroon in time of war, in order to provide for the security of our line. Now, the question that I ask myself is, whether we have bought the right to have troops at Cyprus in time of peace at too high a price? I have no hesitation in adhering to the view that almost any direct engagement, however grave, would have been better than the enormous, because utterly vague, responsibility that we have undertaken. I am not opposed, in short, to a grand policy; but I am completely opposed to a policy which is not only grand but also reckless. And with regard to the grand policy itself, I cannot but think that it would be all the grander for being—not the policy of two Ministers, or the policy of a Cabinet of 12, but the policy freely resolved upon by a free Parliament and a consulted people. To my mind, the whole effect of the new policy has been destroyed by the clandestine character of the conditional Convention. I had expected to have heard from my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Plunket), who asked us to vote our confidence in the Government, what was to be the future of Asia Minor. I hoped in vain. Not a word fell from him as to the nature of the arrangements to be made. We are placed in a certain difficulty when we try to argue this question in much detail; because, if we speak of our now responsibilities as great, we are instantly assured that they mean nothing. Now, if they mean nothing, I should be still more ashamed of my country's conduct in the matter than is the case at present. Surely, England cannot put her name to such a deed, with the intention of not carrying out her share. But whatever may be the intention of the Government, I cannot but believe that it will be found in practice that our responsibilities are very great. The inventors of this policy with regard to Asia Minor are the men who, in the fullest degree, believe in the habitual resort of Russia to intrigue. Now, by the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, the Porte engages to carry out certain reforms in Armenia, and to guarantee the security of the Armenians against the Kurds; and the Powers are to superintend the execution of those

  569
  promises by the Porte. When we say the Powers are to superintend, we mean that Russia, as well as the other Powers, is to superintend. Russia, more than other Powers; for what interest can Germany, and Austria, and France, have in the Armenian Question? That is to say, that in Armenia Russia will have her Consuls reporting to her Ambassador at Constantinople every murder and every robbery that takes place. Russia will be urging the British Government to prevent atrocious acts, which undoubtedly will continue to disfigure the government of Provinces, as to which we have assumed, by our clandestine conditional Convention, peculiar responsibility. No Minister will be able to get up here and say that the conduct of the Turks in Armenia is no business of ours. It will be impossible to do so in the face of that Convention. It seems, then, to me, that with England interfering under her Convention, and driven, as she soon will be, by Parliamentary pressure, to appoint Residents in Armenia, and with Russian Consuls, under the clause of the Treaty of Berlin, watching the English Residents, you will have a state of things which inevitably, sooner or later, must lead to war. What kind of war? An inland war, in a country which we cannot reach. If we wanted war, and thought that war with Russia for the possession of Armenia inevitably must come, it would have been better to have faced it frankly, and called upon England to retain Batoum for the Turks. My belief upon the matter is, that we shall be held by Europe to have agreed to secure good government in Armenia; that we have no power to prevent the raids upon the Armenians by the Kurds; and that we shall be held in future morally responsible by Europe for those crimes. I do not, therefore, think, whatever may be the intention of the Ministers, that our responsibilities under the Convention can be looked upon as light; but, on the contrary, I believe that we have displaced the centre of gravity of the British Empire towards the East, and entered upon a course which, if persevered in, must lead to England becoming a sort of rich Dependency upon the Indian Imperial Crown.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEobserved, that during the last two years the important questions which had arisen, and upon which the destinies of the nation,
  570
  the interests of the people, and the question of peace or war had depended, had been made throughout Party questions by the Liberal Opposition. He should have thought that on great occasions— and especially on the present occasion, when peace had been restored and war avoided—Party animosities would have disappeared; there would have been a unanimous feeling of congratulation upon that which had been accomplished, or, at least, of recognition of the efforts of the Government, and of the manner in which they had been carried out. He could not imagine, looking to the terms of the Resolution proposed by the noble Lord opposite, that their author had read the Protocols before framing those Resolutions. In the very first Protocol it was shown that Lord Salisbury brought the question of Greece before the Congress; it was repeatedly brought forward; and it almost seemed at first as if the existence of the Congress depended upon the solution of the Greek Question. Many years ago he (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had charge of the interests of Greece in that House, and he had never lost his sympathy with that classic country; but when he considered what the condition of Greece was, and what were her demands in the present instance, he could not conceive for one moment that those demands could have been granted. During the Greek War of Independence, in 1827, the question arose of annexing Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete to Greece, and if that annexation had been made, King Leopold would have accepted the Throne of that country. It was, he thought, very much to be regretted that that was not the solution of the Greek Question, for it would have been a solution of the great Eastern Question also. Russian intrigues, however, caused the opportunity to be lost; and it would have been impossible for the Congress of Berlin further to partition Turkey by adding to the Kingdom of Greece Thessaly and Epirus. It might, however, be supposed, from the speeches of some hon. Members, and the articles in some portions of the Press, that the Congress had done nothing for Greece. He maintained that a great deal had been done for Greece. The Congress had unanimously recommended to Turkey to grant another frontier to Greece, and there was no doubt that the Turkish Government would carry out that recom-

  571
  mendation. If that proposal were carried into effect she would gain no less than 5,500 square miles, while the addition to Servia was only 3,800, to Montenegro 1,300, and to Russia in Europe 2,500 square miles, by the retrocession of Bessarabia, although, of course, 10,000 square miles had been added to the last-mentioned country in Asia Minor. It was impossible in these circumstances fairly to contend that Greece had been ill-treated; and he might further point out that the territory which she would acquire would include those mountain passes which were the resort of the brigands who had hitherto infested the Greek frontier, and thus brigandage could be put down. In the whole of the arrangements which had been made, the Government had taken a wise and judicious course; they had obtained for the Christian Provinces great assurances of better government; the disaffected Provinces, which had hitherto been a source of danger to Turkey, had been placed in a more satisfactory position; and, Turkey thus strengthened, and concentrated, would now be enabled to make a very material advance. The Government had been charged with not carrying out their principles. Now, at the time when the war broke out, Constantinople, Gallipoli, and the Dardanelles had been described as English interests; it was certain, however, that, if so, they had been maintained. He did not know what would have happened if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had been in Office; or, rather, it was tolerably clear that in that case the Russians would have been at Gallipoli and Constantinople, and we should have had to declare war in vindication of our honour. The Government had avoided that misfortune, and had gained for the country not only the certainty of peace for many years, but a knowledge of its own strength and of the unity of feeling between England and her Dependencies. There was another point on which he wished to touch. It had often been said that we had incurred a great responsibility; but with respect to Asia Minor, there was no better way of protecting the Christians than by showing to the inhabitants of the mainland the advantages of English rule and the merits of Western civilization. Of course, there were great responsibilities and difficulties; but when objection was taken to
  572
  the occupation of the Island of Cyprus, he was bound to point out that Turkey had always been under a kind of tutelage, and that we had always in a manner had a control over her. Consequently, all we had to do was to carry out our plan, and to get the best possible men for the Consulships in Asia Minor. As for Russia, he neither trusted nor mistrusted her; but he had never believed the debates of last year, in which all good qualities had been claimed for her, and an absolute absence of ambition and cruelty. He had always taken a more just view of her national character; and now, judging from the whole tone of the remarks of Count Schouvaloff and Prince Gortehakoff, he felt confident of the maintenance for a long time of the peace of Europe. He believed, then, that we ran no risk from our policy in Asia Minor. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, who last year had felt so strongly on the question, had on a previous occasion thought very differently, and had said, in the year 1856—
  "But there was another danger—the danger of the encroachment upon, and the absorption of, Turkey by Russia, which would bring upon Europe evils not less formidable than those which already existed. Such a danger to the peace, liberties, and privileges of all Europe we were called upon absolutely to resist by all the means in our power."—[3 Hansard, cxlii. 96.]
  Turning to another point, he would remark that Lord Salisbury had been much blamed for the secrecy which had been kept with respect to Cyprus; but he could show that the Congress had had a very fair hint of what was about to be done—
  "Without laying stress on a proposition which seems to him evident, Lord Salisbury asks the Russian Plenipotentiaries whether the considerations which the Representatives of England had brought forward in their private interviews with their Excellencies have affected their determination to retain the fortresses of Kars and Ardahan; in the event of Russia thinking herself bound to persevere in this belief, Lord Salisbury declares that he would reserve for England the right to secure her interest and her influence on the populations by whatever means she might consider fitting."
  He believed that that extract was only one of many that might be cited in explanation of the policy of the Government; and if the Protocols were circulated throughout the Kingdom, that policy would be generally approved by

  573
  all parties. The future, he was confident, was peaceful; and it was satisfactory to think that Prince Bismarck had been able thus to speak at the close of the Congress—
  "Gentlemen,—At the moment of separating I do not hesitate to affirm that the Congress has deserved well of Europe. If it has been found impossible to realize all the aspirations of public opinion, history will nevertheless do justice to our intentions and to our work, and the Plenipotentiaries will have the consciousness of having, as far as was possible, given and secured to Europe the great benefit of peace, which was so gravely menaced. This result cannot be diminished by any criticism which the spirit of Party may be able to publish. I have the firm hope that the European understanding will, with the help of God, be lasting."
  He trusted that a division would be taken on the question before the House; and that hon. Members would show that, although they were unwilling to wound, they would not be afraid to strike—that they would have the courage to stand by their opinions—and that the House would, by a large majority, prove that England had achieved a measure which was not only honourable to the country, but satisfactory to Europe.
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEYsaid, though the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had never appeared in the character of a recognized novelist, he ought henceforth to be looked upon as a great master of romance. The hon. Member had certainly attributed the Liberal Party views about Russia that they never entertained. When the hon. Member accused the Opposition side of the House of being actuated by Party motives, he would only point out that the hon. Member was such a Party man himself that he made not only his speeches and votes, but also his confidence or mistrust, his likes and dislikes, depend upon Party exigencies of the moment. For instance, he was astonished to find that the hon. Member had now entire confidence in Russia. He would not refer to the many speeches the hon. Member had addressed to the House against Russia; but he might refer to one on May 26th, 1877, in which he went to considerable length in describing the aggressive character of Russia, and said that whenever Russia and England were contiguous, great armaments must spring up from that contiguity, and the British forces doubled. Another point which
  574
  proved that the hon. Member was a great master of fiction was his account of 1830 and the affairs of Greece. He had stated that the narrowing of the boundaries of Greece in 1830 were entirely owing to Russian intrigues. Why, it was beyond all controversy that it was solely owing to the Turkish fears and Turkish proclivities of a Conservative Government under the Duke of Wellington. Both the French and the Russian Governments, parties to the Treaty of London, were perfectly willing to give Greece wider boundaries; Crete and Samos were thrust back under Turkish rule, when they both desired and expected union with Greece, by the action of a Tory Government. There was, therefore, special reason why England should have come forward at this Congress and strongly advocated the claims of Greece and Crete. But look at these Protocols! It might be said that it would have been absurd for England to have advanced propositions that had no chance of being accepted. It seemed, however, to him that even if England found she would be in a minority, which he much doubted, it was due to the Greek feeling in this country, due to her own dealings with Greece, that England should have got endorsed in a Protocol her desire to offer a larger extension of the Greek boundaries than the Congress had thought fit to give. Undoubtedly, the English Government had held out hopes to Greece; and they must remember that the question of peace in the South-East of Europe would never be settled until the Greek Question was settled. This led him to the question of the Treaty of Berlin. The hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had explained very fairly the Liberal view of that Treaty. The Treaty, as it stood, leaving its omissions out of consideration, was not a Treaty which the Liberal Party could in any way attack, either justifiably or with pleasure; because, although there were points that must be deplored —such as the cession of territory to Russia in Asia and Roumania—these were points that they foresaw and warned the country of as inevitable when once the war had begun; but as to the other points of the Treaty, these were, in the main, points which they must all rejoice at. Undoubtedly, the Treaty of Berlin had effected an

  575
  enormous change in the Turkish Question. Undoubtedly, it had given a blow to the old fetish that we had held for years—namely, the "independence and integrity" of the Turkish power in Europe. Undoubtedly, it gave distinct recognition to what they had contended for—that the Christian populations of Turkey were the sources to which to look for the future governing classes. Undoubtedly, it had given such a start to the progress of events in that direction, as soon to leave us no more cause for anxiety as to how that Question, so far as Europe was concerned, might be solved. For do not let hon. Members imagine that by the Treaty of Berlin they had set up a state of things in the East that was going to last 15 or 20 years, or even 10 years. The Plenipotentiaries at Berlin thought they had made a great achievement by calling one of the new Provinces Eastern Roumelia instead of Southern Bulgaria; yet neither that dividing name nor the mountain ridge would prevent Bulgaria South of the Balkans from being united, sooner or later, with Bulgaria, North of the Balkans. Then the proviso that the Greeks should have no extension of boundary beyond certain limits, at a time when the Greek was attempting to free his fellow-religionists, and men of the same race from murder, rapine, and tyranny, would not, he was convinced, cheek the Greek aspirations for freedom. The lesson that it must be by their own swords and their own hands that they must obtain their deliverance, would not be lost upon them. Let him here remark that he repudiated entirely the statement made by the Prime Minister the other day that there were persons in this country who, for factious purposes, were inciting the Greeks to revolt. That was on a par with the conduct of our Ambassador at Constantinople in respect of his statements relating to the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone.) All that those who were thus condemned were doing was to recognize existing facts, and to discuss them as such—dealing with things as they are, and not as it might be desired that they should be. It seemed to him that, during the last few years, we had had new exemplifications of how history repeated itself. The same course of events that took place in 1829, under the policy
  576
  started by Canning, but more than half dropped by his successors, had been repeated now. After a war extremely bloody, the Russian Government, on both occasions, virtually obtained all that she desired. Mr. Canning's policy was identical with what had been lately advocated as the "policy of coercion," and, if pursued, might have prevented the fatal Treaty of Adrianople. In that House two or three years ago, when he ventured to advocate a policy of coercion as the only way in which war could be prevented, he was held up to ridicule as a man who advocated a bloody war. He ventured to say if that policy of coercion had been adopted there would have been no war; Russia would not now be in the position she is; and the Turkish Power in Europe would have been maintained for another quarter of a century. With reference to that, he must contradict the statement of the hon. and learned Member for Dublin University (Mr. Plunket), when he said that the Leader of the Opposition had condemned a policy of coercion. He had not had time to consult the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) since the speech made by the hon. and learned Member; but his memory served him as to no such condemnation having been pronounced; and he well remembered that the noble Marquess had said that if the Berlin Memorandum had been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, very different results would have been obtained. What was the Berlin Memorandum but coercion before war—coercion to enforce a reasonable demand? It was, of course, galling to men who, for the last two years, had been called Russophiles, and similar names, to feel that Russian views had been advanced not by them, but by the so-called friends of Turkey. They had now, however, to look at what the Government were going to do in the future. If Her Majesty's Government would accept the friendly advice that was given to them, they would adopt a more solid and more temperate line of statesmanship. While, however, the country was considering these questions, a Convention burst upon them, which he was, at all events, justified in saying was unparalleled in British history, which had been undertaken without the slightest notice to the people of what was called a free country, or the rest of Europe. The only pre-

  577
  cedent was one relating to Portugal in the middle of last century. But in that case the only liability we entered into with Portugal—a country with a large seaboard—was, that should war break out, we would send 12,000 men to serve under the Portuguese Government, and would keep the Force recruited up to that number. There our liability began, and there our liability ceased. But the liability under this Treaty, if it was real —that was the question—he wanted to know, was it real?—was enormous, and our responsibilities were dangerously increased. Either this Anglo-Turkish. Convention was a reality, or it was not a reality. If it were a reality, had the Government taken the trouble to examine its full meaning, and to convey any idea of it to others? If it was not a reality, what on earth was the vise of making such a Convention? The first result would be that the Turk would say—"The British Government has undertaken my defence, and I shall trouble myself no further about the matter." If, six years hence, Turkey should call upon the British Government to defend her frontiers, how many Turkish soldiers did they expect to find there? Did they suppose the Turkish Pashas were not going to spend their money in kiosks and seraglios, when they could get a British Army to fall back upon to defend them? If they had to go to war in five years' time, and expected to find a powerful Army ready to take the field, they would find them utterly inefficient. The only lever that could be used effectually on the Turks up to this time was the fear of Russia. If this Convention took away that lever, what had they got to set up? How were they to act directly upon them? They were told that they must send their best men under their own officers, that they must put pressure upon them, and that they must annex Turkey. Now, really, was the word " insane " too strong a word to use when a British Minister undertook, by one stroke of the pen, to manage Asia Minor? That case had been put so well by the noble Lord who moved the Resolution that it would be presumptuous if he detained the House by enlarging upon the point. Since the conquest of the Caucasus and the acquisition of Kars, Russia had got positions of unparalleled strength. We were moving our Indian frontier to the very
  578
  strongest point of the Russian military system. That was a point he hoped the House would not forget. By this Treaty they had given Turkey the right to call upon them to come forward and execute their bond, and resist any attack that might be made by Russia. Turkey was not a Party to the Tripartite Treaty of 1856 between England, France, and Austria, and was, therefore, luckily held incompetent to call upon us for its fulfilment; but in this case she was not only a signatory, but the only signatory besides ourselves. By this Anglo-Turkish Convention they had completely parted with freedom of action, and had handed over the national honour of England to Turkey. ["No, no!"] Turkey had now the power to ask Great Britain at any moment, however inconvenient, to do that which she could not refuse to do without the loss of national honour. Who knew what might happen under those conditions? There might be an irruption of Kurds. Then would come an advance on the part of Russia to pursue these marauders. The Russians might perhaps take some part of their territory to keep them in order. Then Turkey would call upon Great Britain at once to help her in resisting this incursion, and there would be war between England and Russia. If he were the Russian Government he should withdraw his Ambassador from Constantinople, and should treat directly with the British Foreign Office, because all diplomacy rested on force in the background. If a third party came in to take charge and to guarantee, it was to that party you must address yourselves. If they were going with a light heart to take this unknown and terrible responsibility, they had better make the whole transaction complete by undertaking the regulation of Persia, because Persia was infinitely more valuable to Russia than Asia Minor as a route to India. Persia was completely in the hands of Russia, and she need not require to disturb Asia Minor so long as Persia was so completely in her power. So long as the British Government shut the back door in Armenia, but paid no regard to the front door in Persia, they were not acting in a rational manner. But he regarded the whole thing as an unreality, and to be got out of as soon as convenient. The policy of the Government for the last three years had

  579
  been a policy of unreality. He did not deny that they had had enormous difficulties to contend with; but he would tell Her Majesty's Government that the greatest difficulties they had to contend with were difficulties of their own creation. [An hon. MEMBER: NO.] The hon. Member who said "no," should wait to hear what he meant. Their chief difficulty arose from their having tried to "halloa" with the music halls, while all the time compelled, and perhaps inclined, to hunt with rational men. Well, the Government, by their self-imposed difficulty of "jingoism," were driven into a secret agreement with Russia. It need not have been a secret Convention if they had not had a Party behind them whom they were fearful to offend by any conciliatory arrangement with Russia. He did not blame the Agreement, but he blamed the secrecy of it, and he said that that Anglo-Turkish Convention was part of the same necessity—a necessity imposed upon the Government by a certain portion of their supporters—that they should not come back from Berlin without something in their pockets to satisfy them. He did not think that sort of thing was beneficial to the country. It was far too like the conduct of a gambler who had lost all his ready money and then staked his inheritance. They were, in fact, pledging those who came after them by that Anglo-Turkish Convention, without running much risk themselves, because it stood to reason that after a convulsion of this sort all the parties were weary, and they were sure of a certain period of exhaustion. They were, for their own Party purposes, loading the Turk into a feeling of false security, and making him believe that he was going to have that assistance from England which would avail him at the last moment. He believed that Turkey in Asia had a good future before it if it only took the good advice of the English nation; but that it might have had without the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The possession of the Island of Cyprus was in one view a matter of congratulation; for he did not hesitate to say that, as an Englishman and a patriot, he was always glad to see, if it could be done with justice, honour, and legality, the maritime bounds of the Empire extended. What he did not want to see
  580
  was the extension of our territory over Continents where our maritime supremacy would be of no avail, and by the holding of which they would undoubtedly change the complexion of their military and civil burdens. He wished to say one word as to the last part of the Resolution of the noble Lord. He knew that there had been times in the history of this country when it had been most respected, when the Foreign Office sought in Parliamentary discussions their surest aid in the conduct of their transactions with Foreign Powers. But since the last two or three years Her Majesty's Government seemed to take an exactly opposite course. They seemed to keep Parliament in the background; they disliked debates, while they courted divisions and they abominated questions. What they seemed to like to do was this—Having settled their policy, they came down to the House of Commons and said—" The thing is done;" and even then some of their Party would use very harsh language, talking about a "factious opposition" when the Party opposite did what it undoubtedly was the duty of an Opposition to do— namely, asked that a certain amount of information should be given to them. He did hope that such a line of conduct had only been adopted to meet the temporary exigencies of an anomalous occasion, and that it would not be carried out to the extent of depriving Parliament of a voice in matters to which such great liabilities were attached. The Parliament of this country was, after all, the representation of the nation, and he did not think that the history of the past would show that when treated with confidence it did not rally round Her Majesty's Ministers, especially in relation to foreign affairs. He did not hesitate to say that the feeling that had been growing up in the country of late had been one of the results of the action in foreign affairs of the last two or three years. It was felt that an enormous expense had been incurred by the country; but without the country that Parliamentary control over foreign affairs had been gradually diminishing; and that the time was approaching when, if that state of things was to continue, the Liberal Party would have to make it one of their cries that the Prerogative of the Crown, as exercised by Her Ma-

  581
  jesty's Ministers, had increased, was increasing, and must be diminished.
  MR. R. E. PLUNKETTsaid; he did not attach much importance to the noble Lord's Resolutions, because he did not believe that in any popularly-elected Assembly in this country, at the present moment, it would be possible to pass a Vote of Censure upon the Government. Indeed, he believed that if the Opposition had acted upon their first impulse, they would have brought forward a Resolution to express "regret that it had not been found possible to dispute, in a satisfactory manner, the claims which the Government had established upon the gratitude of the nation." But although, from one point of view, one was tempted to treat the Resolutions somewhat lightly, there was another point of view from which they had a serious bearing. The question at issue was not merely as to the conduct of the Government, or as to our immediate action in Asia Minor. It seemed to him that the Congress of Berlin had inaugurated a new state of things in Europe, and that what the present debate would decide was the part which this country was henceforth to play in the European system. There were two views which might be taken of our position. One was that we should shake off all Imperial responsibilities and confine ourselves to trade, protracting a miserable existence as long as our coal and iron lasted, and ending finally in smoke and nothingness. The other ideal for this country was that she was a great nation with a high destiny to fulfil, and that her interests were not confined to the narrow limits of these Islands. England was a little nation in Elizabeth's time, and she then defied the greatest Power of Europe. They had humbled the pride of the greatest Monarch France had ever possessed, and were they to shrink before the force of a single Power? Why should they be afraid of holding one side of the frontier, when Russia was not afraid of holding the other? With regard to the Persian Gulf, if an ironclad Navy were to be kept there, he did not see that the scheme of the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) was less hazardous, and certainly not more practicable, than that of keeping Cyprus. With regard to the treatment of Greece, he was reminded of certain benevolent people described by Dickens, who, when
  582
  they see a fight going on, invariably, in the goodness of their heart, tell the smaller boy to go in and win. If the smaller boy went in and fought, they knew what would happen to him, and no benevolent gentleman would step in to help him. We had said to Greece that she could not establish her cause by fighting, and that she must not fight. There was now open to her, without resorting to arms, a better prospect than she could possibly have secured if she had expended all her little force. The noble Lord's logic was complete. He said—"You approve of the Treaty of Berlin, therefore you approve of the war." It would be a pity to spoil such an argument by handling it, therefore he left it as it was. Then it was said that the Convention with Turkey was an infraction of the Treaty of 1856; but if that was so, why was not the Treaty of 1856 quoted to show where the variance came in? For the simple reason that there was not an article in it which could, by any possibility, be held to exclude that Convention. The object of the Convention was clear. It was accepted on all sides that the misrule of Turkey would never cease until there was some Power standing by her side and ready to exercise pressure upon her. They had tried remonstrances and appeals from a distance, and Heaven know what; but they had seen no result for all their efforts. They had brought pressure to bear on Turkey in Europe, but in Asia they had a population which could not look to Europe. It was with this population which England had concerned herself. In giving a military guarantee to Turkey against Russian aggression in Armenia, England acted for her own interests; but it was to her honour that she had undertaken to protect the people against Turkish misrule, and they must be on the spot to do it; and were they now to shrink back, afraid to undertake the responsibility of the situation? They had been told a great deal about the liabilities we wore undertaking. He held them very lightly, for if Russia was going to attack us, we would now be able to meet her on ground with which we were acquainted, instead of having to send out a hasty Expedition to unknown territory. Two hon. Members had told them they were giving up their insular frontier, which had been our safety hitherto. Where had those Gentlemen been the last 200 years?

  583
  Since the end of the 17th. century they had not had an insular frontier. The frontier of Canada stretched for 4,000 miles along the border of a country ten times as powerful as Russia, and they had a considerable land frontier in India. During the Eastern debates they had heard a great deal of what was to happen when Turkey split up; but they had not heard anything of what was to happen when Russia split up. Yet in a country like Russia, where the populations differed so much in character, and were only held together by the loose bonds of a common savagery, there was sure to be a re-distribution of power as civilization increased. Long before their power was threatened, they might see an entire re-distribution of the power of Russia. As to the "undefined engagements" into which they bad entered, he thought misconceptions had arisen from a misreading of the first Article of the Convention. Our engagement was not to effect reforms, but to defend Armenia by force of arms; and there was nothing undefined about that. He could not see what was loft of these extraordinary Resolutions, but supposed the Leader of the Opposition felt bound to make a formal protest against a policy which had been pursued until it was a notable success. Perhaps, what was intended to be the sting of those extraordinary Resolutions was the Constitutional objection that these engagements had been entered into without the previous knowledge of Parliament. It was impossible, however, that our Plenipotentiaries could consult the Legislature with respect to the various questions which were raised at the Congress. Either their mission was to be a mere sham, or it was absolutely necessary that they should be allowed to act upon their judgment; and he could not but think that this charge of not consulting Parliament was introduced to furnish a decent tag-end to what the noble Lord must have himself considered a most inconclusive set of Resolutions.
  MR. GRANT DUFF: Sir, the subject which is brought before us by the Resolution of my noble Friend divides itself into four parts—The effect of the recent negotiations on the Turkish Empire in Europe, their effect on the Turkish Empire in Asia, their effect on the British Empire, and their effect on the world at large. On each of these
  584
  parts I should like, with the permission of the House, to say a very few words. First, then, as to the results they have produced on the Turkish Empire in Europe. No one, I should hope, will grudge to Montenegro the gift of independence and the small accession that has been made to her scanty territory. Some writers and speakers, to whom the existence and history of that gallant little clan seems to have come suddenly as a sort of special revelation during the struggles which have so lately closed, have doubtless made too much of its merits; but after much has been subtracted, much that is creditable and deserving of sympathy still remains. Then as to Servia. Servia has made no great figure in the whole business, and before the foolish war into which she entered, her politicians indulged in preposterous dreams; but we cannot regret that she, too, has obtained some sentimental and some material advantages, though far less than she would have obtained if good sense had prevailed two years ago in the Councils of Belgrade. Nor is there anything in the aggrandizement of Roumania which is otherwise than satisfactory. The pity of it is that she was not made independent 10 years ago. The wiser friends of the Porte urged that. Its less wise and far-seeing friends resisted it, and we now see the result. If Roumania had been in that position in 1877, how much would the difficulties of Russia in the way of attacking Turkey have been increased? Neither can I much regret the retrocession of the too famous piece of Bessarabia. Of course, I know that that district, being inhabited by a Roumanian population, is much more similar in character to Moldavia and Wallachia than is the Dobrudscha, or the other territory which she obtains South of the Danube; but those who go a-hunting with the lion must submit to the lion's terms; and who shall say that, looking to the future, it may not be well for the peace of the Provinces, which are not essentially warlike, that they should not be encouraged to cherish ambitious hopes of being the nucleus of a great Roumanian Kingdom, which might extend from the Bug in the East, a long way towards the Theiss in the West. With, however, the names of Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania, the list of the districts which have received very

  585
  substantial benefit from the Treaty of Berlin comes to an end. We have now to look at its failures. When we broke the concert of Europe in 1876, by declining to adhere to the Berlin Memorandum, it was our bounden duty to be prepared shortly afterwards with some scheme which we might submit to Europe. Such a scheme must have been based upon one of two policies— either on the old policy of 1856, the traditional English policy, as modified by the Andrassy Note to which we acceded —or on a bold attempt to reach the root of the evil and cure the heart disease under which the Turkish Empire was suffering. That heart disease was the incapable, and more than incapable, character of the Central Power at Constantinople. No half-measures were any longer reasonable. By its acceptance of the Andrassy reforms, the Porte had gone as far in concession as an independent Power could go. If that concession did not meet the exigencies of the case, then there was nothing for it but to acknowledge that the Porte was no longer sustainable as an independent Power, to knit once more the concert of Europe, and with Europe to put something better in its place. We did not do this. We entered with the unhappy Constantinople Conference on the region of half-measures, and we see to what they have brought us. What is the result? We have become parties to the creation of an autonomous tributary Bulgaria, from which those very districts, which our people first learned to call Bulgaria, are studiously excluded. That autonomous Bulgaria will have two great objects in life—first, to get rid of paying tribute, and secondly, to add to itself all the Bulgarian-speaking districts South of the Balkans. Whereas, for 10 years previous to the ineffectual rising which was stamped out so savagely by the Bulgarian massacres, you had Bucharest as the centre of Russo-Bulgarian intrigue in Turkey, you will now have Tirnova or Sofia for the centre of that intrigue. Her Majesty's Advisers make much of having restored to Turkey a defensible frontier in the Balkans; but how idle it is to talk of Turkey having any longer a defensible frontier in Europe. Her garrisons in the Balkans will be a mere source of expense, and a ready means of fixing a quarrel upon her, whenever it may suit
  586
  her Slav neighbours to re-commence a contest. Then, again, as to the organization of Eastern Roumelia. If its organization is made predominantly Christian, that may be a very good thing; but it is vain to talk of its being any longer a real portion of Turkey, which is Mahomedan or nothing. It is a Province being got ready to be taken from Turkey, as Roumania was three years ago, and got ready by a very clumsy process. Then as to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am quite willing that they should go to Austria, if it is to the advantage of Austria that she should have them; but it is well known that their annexation is looked upon with the greatest distrust by many of the wisest and most patriotic men in the Empire. They fear that the introduction of those Provinces into the Empire may be the beginning of the end, may break up the arrangements of 1866 between the Domains of the Hungarian Crown and the States West of the Leitha. That is a turn of affairs that could not be looked upon with perfect calmness, even by those who remember the terrible days of 1848–9, when it was said of one aged General—"In his camp was Austria." Of course, it is conceivable that the experiment may succeed; but if it does not, which is but too likely, Her Majesty's Government, by contributing to it, will have had the poor satisfaction of, while they left the Eastern Question unsettled, opening a far more serious Central European Question. Then, again, as to the Greeks. What has been done, or proposed to be done, has stimulated their appetite, and further excited their ambition without giving their wise aspirations any reasonable satisfaction. Nay, so far as anything has been done, they have been led upon a wrong road. They have been incited to think rather of advancing in the direction of Macedonia and Thrace, than of making themselves strong on the coasts and on the Islands. Greece is not like Antae us. Her forces are re-vivified, not by touching the earth, but by touching the water. If, from some fantastic notion of using her as a barrier against the advance of Panslavism, we encourage her to think that she has a great future on the mainland, we do her a cruel wrong. We engage her in the same struggle in which Denmark, in an evil hour, engaged with her great Neigh-

  587
  bour. I, for one, heartily hated the Treaty of San Stefano; but what Her Majesty's Government has brought us from Berlin is the Treaty of San Stefano disguised, not the Treaty of San Stefano altered. The essential feature of the Treaty of San Stefano was the breaking up of Turkey in Europe, without putting anything that could live with its own life in the place of that effete organization, and without settling the question of Constantinople, which remains a standing menace to the peace of Europe. That, however, would be a perfectly accurate description of the Berlin Treaty. There are differences between the two; but the differences are made merely to gull simples. They are razors good to sell—bad to cut. Of two things, one—either we should have held to the policy of 1856, and tried to keep the sick man on his logs till his natural heirs could have got their full rights in the Balkan Peninsula, or we should have taken our part in putting in his place a Western Prince, as the Duke of Wellington long ago advised. We took neither course, and our sons, who will seethe question of Constantinople opened again, will hardly thank us. And. now I pass to the effect of the recent negotiation upon Turkey in Asia. Well, as to Cyprus, of course what has happened is an excellent thing for Cyprus. There is no doubt about that, and the Anglo-Turkish Convention will be a beginning of great good to Asia Minor, and many other broad lands, if the British people really moan to take a serious view of its responsibilities, not merely to-day or to-morrow, but for the next half-century. But, when we come to ask what is the effect of the recent negotiations upon the British Empire, a very different answer must be given. The Anglo-Turkish Convention either means nothing, or it means something. If it means nothing, it is altogether an imposture. If it moans something, it is well nigh an impossibility. I will not say anything as to the first supposition, the supposition that the Convention was meant to be like one of those quarterly articles by a theologian famous in his day, as to which Mr. Lockhart once said when someone remonstrated with him about them—"Yes, I know it. They tell nothing, they mean nothing, they are nothing—but they go down like bottled velvet!" I will take it for
  588
  granted that it means something. In that case, I say it is well nigh an impossibility. Never has this nation, in all its long history, taken such a burden upon its shoulders with its eyes open. India, says someone. But did we take India on our shoulders with our eyes open? Assuredly not. We slipped into our Indian responsibilities by a series of accidents—happy accidents—perhaps yes—perhaps no. That is the secret of the future; but accidents undoubtedly. This, however, is no accident—it is a stroke of high policy. How? What do we gain by it? It is replied that we secure our route to India. Our route to India, I rejoin, is not threatened; and if it were, is in no way secured by our engagement with Turkey. Our hold of India is no more endangered by Russia having Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan, than it is endangered by her having Modlin or Cronstadt. All the five possessions are to India supremely immaterial. If Russia were ever to invade India, her route would be from the South-eastern corner of the Caspian, viâ Astrabad and Meshed, to Herat. There are other possible routes, though really none worth considering at present; but an invasion of India by Russia is, as I have often had occasion to show, so entirely out of the question, under any circumstances that can occur in our times, that we may cease to think of it. But if, instead of being a far-off danger, it were a near and present one, it would not be even remotely affected by Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan having changed hands. If Russia, neglecting the only possible line, along which even a man who united the genius of Napoleon with resources such as Russia could only obtain by mortgaging her future for 100 years, might conceivably lead her hosts to attack us in India, were to advance from Armenia to the Persian Gulf, she would only be preparing for herself a defeat even more disastrous than that with which she would meet if she, having taken Herat, advanced down the Bolan. But, it is said, we secure the Suez Canal. Look at the map—what have Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan to do with the Suez Canal? No, Sir, by the unlucky Convention we do not secure the Suez Canal; we take away our thoughts from the country of the Suez Canal, from Egypt, which is of great importance to us, to

  589
  fix it on a dream and a delusion—to chase some phantom of a railway down the Euphrates, which it would be a most pleasant and desirable thing to have, but which should never be allowed to take off our thoughts from the infinitely more important Egyptian transit. Why do I say infinitely more important? Because Egypt is the only country over which the English flag does not wave where we can, at any moment, be immensely strong both by land and by sea. Far better, if it is intended to spend money in improving our communication with India, to spend it in quickening and improving the service, viâ Egypt, than in getting, at infinitely greater cost, a line which can never be of the same importance to an essentially Naval Power. By all means encourage railways being made in Asia Minor or Syria, running towards the Persian Gulf—the more strings to our bow the better; but do not let us throw away national money upon objects which, however good, are only in a very secondary sense national. But I shall be told—away with these merely selfish considerations; think of the blessings we shall confer on one of the most interesting and unhappy regions of the earth. I do not wish to forget them; but it is a question of relative duties. Is everything in so satisfactory a state at home that we can afford to go world-bettering at the expense of our own people? We can do nothing worth doing in Asiatic Turkey without incurring great expense. That means that we shall impose new, and not take off old, taxes in Great Britain. We shall stint our development at home to restore prosperity to the banks of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Are our own gigantic Colonies and India, trifling in size and in future compared to these, but still so enormous, not a sufficiently wide field for our energies? Must we wander so far out of our way in search of sure excitement and uncertain markets? Then, again, just see what we are doing. We are afraid of Russia in India, and so we, in the first place, give Russia a good reason for wishing to trouble us in India by thwarting her in the Balkans, and then we take up position in Armenia, which enables her to bring her strongest against our weakest part. When I learnt fencing, I used to be told that I should bring the forte of my blade against the foible of my ad-
  590
  versary's. I rather think my Lord Salisbury took lessons from the same master; but, if so, he has forgotten his cunning, for he does just the opposite. What demon can have tempted any not wholly-mad Briton to give his country a long land frontier? But that is exactly what this Treaty does, since it makes us defend Asiatic Turkey—a country 20 times as large as Scotland—just as if it were Scotland. All I have said is on the supposition that the Turkish authorities in Asiatic Turkey will meet us in good faith, and allow us virtually to govern Turkey; but is not that an extravagant supposition? Why should they? Is it not more likely that they will intrigue against us, and thwart us, and even, if the worst comes to the worst, throw themselves into the arms of Russia? I have long thought that it would be a perfect God-send to all these countries to be governed by Anglo-Indians; but, in order to give the Anglo-Indian fair play, you must change your central authority at Constantinople. English gentlemen acting under the sort of people who have long ruled there would be in a most painful position. And observe, one false step involves another. If it is right to take charge of Turkey in Asia because Russia has got Batoum, Ears, and Ardahan, it is much more right to take charge of Persia. Her Majesty's Ministers have already, in spite of our protests, practically annexed Khelat. A very little encouragement would send them to Cabul, and then we should have everything on our shoulders, from the Mishmee Hills, which look down on the eastern corner of Assam, to the cypresses of Scutari. I confess that, to my mind, such a prospect is more dazzling than re-assuring; and will anyone say that it is a whit more improbable than what we see before our eyes in this Anglo-Turkish Convention? I come now to the influence of these negotiations upon the world at large; and this is certainly not their most agreeable aspect. Before they began, Her Majesty's Government had gained a great deal of credit on the Continent amongst those who, hating Russia and desiring to thwart her, were unwilling themselves to "bell the cat." But when it was found that, far from "belling the cat," Her Majesty's Ministers had made a private arrangement behind the back of Europe to go shares

  591
  with the dreaded animal, that cheap and noisy popularity, acquired by the readiness to waste British blood and money upon non-British objects rapidly declined. How does Europe stand affected to us at this moment? Russia, of course, hates us cordially, and bides her time. Austria is pleased or acquiescent. Germany thinks we are what we always were—clever traders on high principles, with a weather-eye open to commercial results. France thinks that perfide Albion is, as ever, perfide Albion; and Italy, the country where, for a long time back, there has been more popular sympathy for England than in any other European land, is thoroughly disgusted, and says that the pens with which the Berlin Treaty was signed were taken from the wings of four vultures, one Turkey, and two geese. The wise policy for this country being in every possible way to minimize its military obligations and territorial interests wherever the British flag does not now wave, while we keep up the very best possible Diplomatic and Consular Service, so as to be at once able and willing to assist other nations, as a well-informed, powerful, and disinterested friend to all of them, we have, thanks to Her Majesty's Ministers, taken a precisely opposite line, forfeited the good opinion of our honesty, which some held, confirmed the bad opinion which others held, while we involved ourselves in new and perplexing duties. We have descended from the grand and unique position which history has been more and more giving us, of being in Europe, yet not wholly of Europe; but rather a great Asiatic and Oceanic Power, to make ourselves largely dependent upon the intrigues of Constantinople, one of the most corrupt of European cities. The negotiations of this summer will be what those of 1864 would have been if Lord Salisbury had then prevailed—the very parting of the ways, the beginning of Imperial decline —if we cannot within the next few years overturn them, burying, let us trust, in their ruins, those who had most hand, in building them up. Before I sit down, I should like to say just one word on the Constitutional question to which the Motion of the noble Lord refers at its close. No one doubts, I suppose, that the Crown has full power to conclude Treaties without consulting Parliament; but that is a doctrine which wise Minis-
  592
  ters will not push to its logical extremity. Our Constitution is good for nothing, if it is permitted to Ministers, without the consent of Parliament, not merely to conclude an ordinary or even extraordinary Treaty without Parliament being consulted, but to utterly revolutionize the whole policy of the Empire. That is what this Convention does, if it does anything at all, and is not a mere deliberate deceit practised on Turkey, on England, and on Europe. The Constitution says, no doubt, that the nation is, in this respect, at the absolute disposition of the Crown, which is another phrase for the Ministers of the day; but the Ministers of the day should remember that complimentary and courteous expressions must not be interpreted all too literally. When a Spaniard or an Italian tells you that his house and all it contains are at your disposition, you may safely understand that he means to be very civil and hospitable; but you must not understand him to mean that he actually transfers his property to you. If you do, it may fare with you as it did with the late Prince Metternich. That statesman being in Rome and in the house of Torlonia, expressed great admiration for an extremely valuable picture which belonged to his host. Torlonia, with the courteous instincts of his country, immediately begged him to consider it as his. Metternich, acting with as little discretion as the present Cabinet, took him at his word, and Torlonia revenged himself by telling the story to the day of his death, with the epilogue, Et le coquin l'a pris. I am afraid the word which he used was rather stronger than coquin, and very like it. Well, Sir, the Constitution being an impersonal creature, will not be able to tell the story to the disadvantage of those who have treated it so badly; but the Constitutional historian will do that for it, and we may be very sure that when he tells the story of the too literal interpretation which has been put upon its provisions, he will end it with an epilogue at least as severe, if not quite so bitterly expressed, as the Et le coquin l'a pris of the plundered Italian. Ministers who try to strain the Prerogative should remember that the violence of the 16th of May was followed by the humiliation of the 14th of December, even if their studies in French history do not go further back, and

  593
  bring with them more formidable recollections.
  MR. BOURKEsaid, he was not surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman who tad just spoken say that he expected to see the Government buried under this Treaty, of which he was disposed to take so unfavourable a view. That, no doubt, was the wish of the hon. Gentleman. But he (Mr. Bourke) could not agree in one or two of the remarks which the hon. Member made, especially when he complained of the position this country held in relation to, and in the estimation of foreign Powers. For his own part, he believed there never was a time when we had more friendly relations with all the Powers of Europe than the present; while with regard to the effect which the hon. Gentleman said the Anglo-Turkish Treaty would have upon them, he was convinced that there never was an episode in the history of Europe where England had shown so much influence as she had done in that which closed in the Congress of Berlin. The noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) at the close of his speech made some statements which called for observation on his part. The noble Lord and his Friends who acted with him, thought the most patriotic course for them to take was to bring this question boldly before the House, and state their objections to the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The Government entirely concurred in that sentiment. They had no objection whatever to the course taken by the noble Lord on this occasion; and the only complaint they had to make was that his criticisms had been small and captious, and had not battled with the grave questions involved in the policy before the House. The noble Lord's remarks, in fact, were not calculated to place before the country the grave issues which it would have to decide. There were one or two remarks of the noble Lord which, although of a general character and applying only to the details of the question, he should like to brush away before he came to the great subject under consideration. He hoped the hon. Member for Elgin (Mr. Grant Duff) would not suppose that he was treating him with disrespect when he passed by, also, some of the observations he had made, recurring to others as they arose. The noble Lord said—"If you approve of the Berlin Treaty, you
  594
  must approve of what was done by the war;" and the hon. Member who had just sat down had stated that he could not understand the object of it. But why did we join in the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Plunket), in approving of the course which Her Majesty's Government had taken? We did so because we undid, by the Berlin Treaty, a great deal of what was done by the war. Therefore, the House must look at the matter in a light exactly the reverse of that placed upon it by the noble Lord. He also said, in his opening remarks, that he thought it more desirable to compare the Treaty of Berlin with the terms of June than the Treaty of San Stefano. These terms of June might be disposed of in a very few words. It had often been said that the Government ought to have insisted on the Porte accepting the terms of June. Well, we were most anxious that the terms of June should be accepted by Turkey, and they still had no doubt that Turkey would have acted very wisely in accepting them. What did Her Majesty's Government do? The course adopted was well known to the House, because it was recorded in a Parliamentary Paper. Her Majesty's Government wrote a despatch to Mr. Layard, and asked him whether there would be any use in bringing the terms of June to the notice of the Porte? It would be in the recollection of the House that at that time the Turkish Army was making a gallant defence on the Danube against the whole power of Russia. It would also be remembered that, according to all the reports we received, we had every reason to think that Turkey was firmly determined to carry on the struggle to the last, and had not unreasonable grounds for hoping that even she, with her small forces, would be able to make terms of peace which would be more likely to be to her advantage than anything we could shadow out in the terms of June. Then the Government heard from Mr. Layard that it would be perfectly hopeless to mention the terms of June to the Porte. Mr. Layard did sound the authorities, and came to the conclusion that we should be losing our influence for good hereafter if we asked the Porte to consent to anything like the terms of June. With regard to the noble Lord's comparison between the

  595
  terms of June and the Treaty of Berlin, he had this remark to make. The terms of June were not before the Congress of Berlin; and, therefore, the question the House had to decide was the difference between the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin, which were the two great documents on which the Congress had to decide. It would be disrespectful to the House if he were not to give hon. Members credit for knowing the main features of those great events which had occurred in Europe during the last three years, and the general causes which led to the Congress. Therefore, he would not delay the House a minute by dwelling on those great events. It was admitted that the terms of the Treaties of Paris and the Treaty of London could not be modified without the general consent of Europe It was also seen by every person who gave the subject his calm, attention that, as Russia had waged a victorious war against Turkey, she had obtained advantages and rights which nobody could deny. When the Treaty of San Stefano appeared, that document astonished and alarmed the world. But it was not until after it had been studied for some time that its true significance was perceived either in this country or in Europe. When, however, the real meaning of that Treaty was discovered, a diplomatic struggle ensued between Russia and Europe, the question being how far Europe would modify that Treaty, which had been made between Russia and Turkey. Lord Salisbury's Circular of the 1st of April appealed to the public law of Europe and to the Declaration of 1871. In that Circular it was pointed out that, under the Treaty of San Stefano, a great State would be constituted from the Ægean to the Danube, in the formation of which Russia would have a preponderating influence, and over the future of which she must exercise complete dominion. Moreover, in the future, all the races would be subject to one nationality which hitherto had shown no power of self-government. It was also felt that the power of the Sultan would be reduced to absolute subjection. Europe generally concurred with that Circular of Lord Salisbury's. For a considerable time it was doubtful whether the Congress would meet or not. Some
  596
  Governments, particularly that of Germany, concurred with the British Government that the Congress would be worse than useless unless the divergent ideas and opinions which existed, not only between England and Russia, but between other Powers and Russia, were smoothed away by preliminary negotiations before the Congress met. It was well known that irreconcilable opinions existed between the Governments of England and Russia, and it was this circumstance that led to that interchange of ideas between the two Governments out of which arose the much-abused secret understanding come to by Count Schouvaloff and Lord Salisbury. He might take that opportunity of reminding the House of the great efforts that Count Schouvaloff made to bring about an understanding—of his journey to St. Petersburg, and of the great influence which he not only possessed with his own Court, but of the influence which he was able to be bring upon every other Court in Europe. He, for one, was glad to take this opportunity, if it would not be considered a liberty, of saying that he believed this country and Europe were very much indebted to Count Schouvaloff for his wise counsels at the beginning of these troubles, and, above all, in the negotiations which preceded the Congress. But the great and cardinal point was that the Treaty was submitted to Europe. What was the object England had in view in going to the Congress? The object they had in view was to build up and not to destroy. They recognized the fact that, bad as the government of Turkey had been, there were elements of good in the country, and that there was much industry, integrity, and valour among the Mussulman population—who, he might be allowed to say in passing, had never been permitted to take a share in the government—that there were elements still in Turkey by which territorial and administrative arrangements could be made in accordance with the interests of the majority of the population, the wishes of the Sultan, and with future tranquillity. The arrangements with respect to Bulgaria were only arrived at after protracted discussion, much of which turned upon the question of the frontier. It was important that a defensive frontier should be given to the Porte, and it would be observed in the Treaty what the frontier

  597
  was now to be. It was to be laid out by Commissioners, and it was to be not only a geographical, but a really defensible frontier. With regard to Montenegro, the changes effected in the Treaty of San Stefano would, he believed, be hailed with general satisfaction. Herzegovina and Bosnia naturally fell under Austrian administration. It was desirable for Austria that her frontiers should no longer be disturbed, and that consideration more than anything else induced the Congress to confide to her the administration of the two Provinces mentioned. In connection with Roumania, the retrocession of Bessarabia had been made the subject of complaint against Her Majesty's Government; but although Roumania had at the commencement of the war allied herself with Russia, and therefore had not primâ facie any great claim upon our consideration, both Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury urged her claim to be heard, and it was through their instrumentality that the question of Bessarabia was brought before the Congress. The position of Roumania in the matter might be thought one of hardship; but no Power was prepared to make the question of Bessarabia a vital one to the success of the Congress. He did not suppose anyone would contend that it was the duty of England to go to war for every act of injustice committed by one State upon another. Looking generally to the work of the Congress, it could not be denied that great dangers which would have been produced by the Treaty of San Stefano had been averted by the modifications brought about by the Treaty of Berlin. The preponderating influence of Russia was not now to be apprehended, and other influences had been introduced into the countries on her borders. The policy adopted by Great Britain in the Congress with regard to Greece had been attacked that night by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, and the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke); but he thought that the objections which they urged were without foundation. From the first, they endeavoured to impress upon Greece that if she wished to succeed in her aims, she would not do so by insurrection; that by insurrection, indeed, she would perpetuate rather than remove the evils of which she complained. Not only did they do that, but they
  598
  urged Turkey to behave in a generous spirit towards Greece, so as not to tempt her to any acts of violence, in proof of which it was only necessary to refer to the despatches which had already been published in the Blue Books. In October last, Lord Derby requested Mr. Wyndham to inform the Greek Government that the wisest policy for them to pursue would be to maintain an attitude of strict and impartial neutrality. At the same time, they urged upon the Porte the necessity of preserving a good understanding with Greece. Not only had Her Majesty's Government given that advice to Greece, but they had also urged Turkey to act in a generous manner towards that Kingdom. The Greek troops crossed the frontier into Thessaly; but, owing to the representations of the British Government, the Porte refrained from attacking them. Then, with regard to what took place at the Congress, Her Majesty's Government undertook to represent to the Congress the claims which Greece had to be heard; but, at the same time, they told the Greeks most distinctly that all questions of territorial acquisition must be settled by the Congress, and that they could give no opinion themselves, nor prejudge what the opinion of the Congress might be. Both the noble Lord and the hon. Baronet had spoken as if Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury were indifferent to the claims of Greece; but he thought the Protocols showed that it was very doubtful whether Greece would have been heard at all had it not been for Lord Salisbury. With regard to the indemnity, it was agreed by all the Powers that it was not to be converted into a pretence for further territorial annexations, neither would it affect the interests of the creditors of the Porte. The Treaty of San Stefano, which provided for a cession of territory in lieu of the indemnity, had been considerably modified by the Treaty of Berlin. Bayazid, which, as they all knew, was an important place on the road to Persia, had been restored to Turkey. Batoum had been represented as a place of very great importance, a statement which had been challenged; but, whether it was of great importance or not, the disposition of it made by the Treaty of San Stefano had been changed, and it was made a free port. He could not help thinking that by this change the great danger of

  599
  the place becoming a naval arsenal for Russia, and so being turned into a serious menace of the freedom of the Black Sea, was avoided. In view of the fact that England was not prepared to go to war for the sake of Batoum and the territory around it, he thought the conclusion which had been arrived at on the subject was perfectly satisfactory. Then, with regard to the Asiatic Protectorate, if Europe was not prepared to assist England in the prevention of the undue aggression of Russia in Asia, Europe could not be jealous of England for taking the course which she thought most desirable to arrest these encroachments in Asia Minor. Lord Salisbury had distinctly told the Russian Plenipotentiaries that, if Kars and Ardahan were taken by Russia, then England must take the measures which, she thought best for preserving her interests in the East. When Russia declared war against Turkey, it must have been perfectly clear to any intelligent observer that the responsibility of England would vastly increase. It was quite clear that under Russian influence, a new state of affairs would arise in the East. Notwithstanding this, England agreed to remain neutral, and it was not until the Turkish capital itself was threatened that England took those measures of precaution which she thought absolutely necessary. The Treaty of San Stefano showed the dangerous condition of Asia Minor, and the menace which was offered to the Turkish Provinces there. Her Majesty's Government were convinced that if some great effort were not made to restore good government in Asia Minor, those Provinces of Turkey must inevitably become Dependencies of Russia. If Russia were to acquire a populous territory in Armenia, she would obtain a large recruiting field and a district from which she might get large supplies, and thus she might apply unlimited pressure upon Persia. He did not say whether a railway would or would not be made in the Euphrates Valley; but there were plenty of districts in Asia Minor where railways, if made, would be of great value and importance in opening up the country. The question was asked, what were their interests in Asia Minor? and it was said that Asia Minor did not touch India. But the same argument might be applied to Egypt and other places. Again, it was
  600
  said that Asia Minor was not the way to India. But Persia was the way to India, and he had shown that Persia must inevitably fall to Russia if Russia once got possession of Asia Minor; so that it came to this—that whether the Anglo - Turkish Convention existed or not, if Russia attacked and conquered Asia Minor, the consequences to English interests would be serious; and he believed that no British Government could long exist which did not use the resources of the country to avert such a result. From that point of view, therefore, their responsibility was not increased by the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The noble Lord himself said they should tell Turkey once more that she had a chance of reform, that she must reform her Asiatic Provinces, and that if she showed an anxiety to reform—if she carried out their advice in that respect, they might then proceed to offer her protection. Well, that was substantially what that Convention did, with the important amendment that they would help Turkey to reform. But, if the noble Lord's plan were adopted—if, when Turkey had reformed, they were then to say they would protect her, what became of the argument of those who asserted that Asia Minor was of no importance to England? If that country was left alone, it was vain to hope for any amelioration of its condition. The old intrigues and collisions would continue, and the unhappy population would only remain in the miserable state in which they had been for many years; and, in all probability, they would before long see the same scenes enacted in Asia Minor as were lately witnessed in the Balkan Provinces. One of the first conditions for averting such a state of things was that the country should be at peace, that intrigues should cease, and that Russia should be convinced that further conquests in Asia Minor were incompatible with the local reforms which it was the admitted duty of England to encourage in an especial manner. A great deal had been said about the military liabilities they were incurring; but that phrase, however adroitly used, would not frighten the English nation. High authorities assured him that the best military measures they could adopt were the opening up of the country, making roads, providing security for life, and giving the people an interest in their

  601
  own prosperity. If that were done, the people would be ready and willing to devote themselves to their own protection. In that way he believed the best foundation they could have would be laid for giving strength in a military point to Asia Minor, and also for attaining other valuable ends in connection with its good government. He could not believe that those objects were beyond the resources of Turkey, if she was well advised and assisted morally. It was said that they had pledged themselves to advance 1,000 miles closer to the military resources of Russia. Of course, in one point of view, they had gone 1,000 miles closer to her; but it was entirely an error to suppose that Russia had her great sources of strength in Asia Minor. Russia's object was to obtain possession of the populous country of Asia Minor, in order to avoid the necessity of transporting her troops South of the Caucasus—of a country, in short, which would admirably serve as a recruiting ground. If Russia were not really an aggressive Power, she would not be hurt by their acquisitions, and would desire no advantages in Asia Minor. If that was the case, well and good; but if not, and she had designs on the country, it could be only for one object, and that the ulterior object of further conquest. She had already plenty of territory North of Asia Minor, but no means of recruiting her Army South of the Caucasus— which he considered necessary in view of further conquests. Surely, on such a question, they were a united people? Russia, under the Treaty of Berlin, had taken upon herself great responsibilities as to the improvement of the populations under her care. Austria, too, had undertaken enormous responsibilities; and it was not for them, the only country greatly interested in Asia Minor, to be alone afraid of the duties attaching to their position. It would be observed that they had not guaranteed Turkish territory as had been done in 1856; their guarantee of Asia Minor was conditional on the reform of that country, and if the condition was not complied with the guarantee ceased. The inducements to the Sultan to introduce reforms were very great, because their promise depended on that point, and he would not otherwise be protected from Russian attack; if, on the other hand, he intro-
  602
  duced no reforms, he would be left to his fate, and England would be obliged to re-consider her position with regard to the territories of Asia Minor. No doubt, in the first case, it would become the duty of England to assist the Sultan in the work of reform, to help him in levying taxes, in police, and in the administration of justice; and, above all, in caking care that men of tried integrity were put at the head of affairs, and should not be subject to arbitrary removal, but should hold office for a certain term of years, without being liable to dismissal by a decree from Constantinople. Now, it might be asked what was the nature of the reforms that would be recommended to the Sultan? but he could imagine nothing more impolitic than that he should stand there and state what the reforms suggested would be, nor would any course be more certain to prevent their accomplishment. Probably, too, the changes they should propose would be canvassed and criticized both in the House and out of it, and so the Sultan would be led to doubt the soundness of the advice tendered by Her Majesty's Government. With regard to Asia Minor, they would all feel that any improvement must be very gradual, and that if they did their duty there could be no doubt whatever of success. The dangers were not very considerable, and he had already indicated those against which it was necessary to provide. He did not know that he need say much about Cyprus; but he wished to say a word or two on what had been called by hon. Members opposite the Constitutional question. It had been called a secret Treaty, while, in fact, it had never been intended to be secret, but to be laid on the Table of the House as soon as it was ratified. In that respect they had exactly followed the precedent of 1856, for the Treaty of 1856 had not been laid on the Table till some days after its ratification. Nothing would have been less judicious than a discussion in the House on a Treaty that required secrecy for its success. Why, the first thing that would have happened, if it had been known that such a Treaty was about to be signed at Constantinople, would have been to try to prevent the Sultan from agreeing to it. The whole question of signing or not signing had depended upon a few men at Constantinople, who might easily have been

  603
  pursuaded to induce the Sultan to withhold the ratification of the Treaty, and thus the object in view would have been frustrated. As to the Anglo-Russian Agreement, it was one of those agreements which were very common. Hon. Members must know that, when a great international arrangement was about to take place, negotiations often went on for months before, and agreements were come to preliminary to that arrangement, which were sometimes put in writing and sometimes not. But it was absolutely necessary to come to some agreement before the Congress met, because the divergences between the two Powers were so great that, otherwise, in all probability, war would have been the result. With the arrangement which the Government had made the country was, he believed, satisfied. If peace really reigned in Asia, large fields of future industry would be open which would otherwise have been closed to British commerce. By the arrangements made in Asia Minor, they had not added to the responsibilities of this country in the least; but by taking time by the forelock, by telling Russia what they really did intend, they would avoid those difficulties which would certainly have come on the country if they had simply allowed things to take their course. It would require determination on the part of any English Government to carry out the policy which had been inaugurated; but if they exhibited the same character which had distinguished Englishmen in all generations, they need not fear the verdict which history would pass either on the Berlin Treaty or the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
  MR. HUSSEY VIVIANhad no desire to call in question the statement, made on the Ministerial side, that England had always exercised an important influence in the affairs of the world; but he denied the truth of the customary assertion on the other side of the House that the influence of this country had been diminished during Liberal Administrations. He did not believe that the influence of a great country like this was increased by constant boastful references to its power. The question at present before the House was not to be limited to a comparison of the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin. In order properly to appreciate the policy of Her Majesty's Government, the House must take into
  604
  consideration the declarations of the Head of the Cabinet when these difficulties began; and it was a most remarkable thing that the policy he at first enunciated had been entirely reversed. It was the policy of the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) that had triumphed; the policy of the Prime Minister had certainly not been secured by the Treaty of Berlin. At one of those meetings at which it is customary for Ministers to state their policy to the country, the noble Lord at the head of the Government had said that he had been labouring for 12 months to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. As far as he (Mr. Hussey Vivian) was aware, this statement had. never been retracted. But was that a statement of the policy which had been affirmed at Berlin? Why, neither the integrity nor the independence of Turkey had. been maintained. Under the Treaty of Berlin Turkey lost large possessions, and the famous Convention of the 4th June tore away the last rag of the independence of the Turkish Empire. The evidence of this was contained in the speech just delivered on behalf of the Government. From that speech it appeared that we were about to interfere with the most intimate relations between the Sultan of Turkey and his subjects in Asia Minor. It was extraordinary to note how Her Majesty's Government had contrived to persuade the country that their diplomatic defeat was a victory. That they should have been able to do so passed his comprehension. No doubt, there was great cause for rejoicing that peace had been secured; and there was no man in the country who must not, to a certain extent, be thankful that Her Majesty's Government had conducted these negotiations in such a manner as to bring them to a peaceful issue. The Opposition would certainly have taken a different course. First of all, they would never have allowed the peace to be broken. If, at the time of the Berlin Memorandum, the Government had joined the other Powers of Europe in plainly telling the Sultan of Turkey that we would not allow his misgovernment to continue, no European war would have broken out. He believed that the Berlin Memorandum was placed before the country in such a way that our Go-

  605
  vernment could not with honour have concurred in it. But there was nothing to prevent the Government making such a counter-proposal as the other three Powers would have assented to. If our Government had plainly said to Turkey —''We cannot allow your misgovernment to continue," Turkey must have given way. There would then have been no war. He could not, therefore, give the Government the credit of having secured the peace of Europe. The same might be said of the Congress. He (Mr. Hussey Vivian) had compared and collated the terms of Russia as expressed by the Treaty of San Stefano with the terms of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Berlin, and the differences between them were extremely slight; there was, in fact, an extraordinary similarity between the two documents. In his opinion, Her Majesty's Government were deeply responsible for not instructing Mr. Layard to lay before the Porte the distinct terms which Russia was prepared to accept on the 8th of June, 1877; and which, if they had been submitted to by the Porte, would have been far better than those she had since been forced to accept. If they came to consider the arrangements made by the Treaty of Berlin, it would appear that many points remained unsettled. The internal peace of East Roumelia was to be preserved by a native gendarmerie, or local militia; but he desired to know of what materials it was to be composed? Were the officers to be appointed by the Sultan to be Christians, or were they to be sent by the Sultan from portions of his Dominions other than Roumelia? The wording on these points was not at all clear, while upon these questions the most material issues arose. Again, what would be the position of Turkey 10 years hence, possibly with another war with Russia on her hands, and having this militia, which would certainly be hostile in feeling, in her rear? What would become of the Balkan passes in such a state of things as that? As to the Commission, he looked with the greatest hope to the Russian portion of it; for the Russians throughout had struggled to secure the liberties of Christians, while the Plenipotentiaries who represented England had striven to maintain, as far as possible, the status quo. With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, those States had been handed
  606
  over to the military control of Austria. The English people ought at no time to allow such a tyranny to be imposed upon any nation. This he felt from his own experience, having travelled in Italy, when that country was in a similar condition. Knowing what Austrian military rule meant, he could not believe that the freedom of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be thus secured. The fact was that the question of the freedom of those oppressed nationalities had never been present in the minds of our Plenipotentiaries, who, possibly, had to contend with the jealousy of Austria; but who were, nevertheless, bound to "use their best endeavours to secure for them as many as possible of the blessings of that freedom which we enjoyed. The Bosnians and Servians were people of the same race, of the same language, and, largely, of the same religion, although he was aware that many of the former were Mahomedans. Under such conditions, there would have been no difficulty whatever in handing over to Servia a large portion of the Principalities; but, as he had said before, there was Austrian jealousy to conciliate, and our Plenipotentiaries had yielded to it at the cost of Bosnian freedom. Now, with regard to the retrocession of Bessarabia, he thought that no one could feel that the conduct of Russia had been in any respect satisfactory; at the same time, he was bound to admit that he thought the Government had acted wisely in not going the length of declaring war against Russia on that ground. What was the outcome of all this, but that Russia had triumphed on every point, and had obtained the original terms laid down by her? Surely, that was no cause for congratulation on the part of Her Majesty's Government, who had opposed her? Again, the question of the indemnity had been treated at the Congress in the most superficial manner. So long as that immense claim continued to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Turkey, so long would she continue under one of the most severe conditions imposed by the Treaty of San Stefano. It really seemed that no serious effort had been made at the Congress to deal with that question, which would continually menace her independence. It appeared to him that it ought to have been disposed of in some way; but it was, practically, passed over, after a very short

  607
  discussion. It was true that the Russian Plenipotentiaries had given assurances that the claim would not rank before the prior claims of other creditors of Turkey; but the indemnity would still hang over her. On the whole, he thought he had shown that it was not the Government policy, but that of their opponents, which had triumphed at Berlin. Then as to the famous Convention. They now knew that it was made at the same moment as the Agreement with Russia. Could that Convention have been entered into for the purpose of covering the retreat of Her Majesty's Government after their diplomatic defeat? He very much suspected that such was the object which they had in making that Convention. He was reminded that Her Majesty's Government were somewhat in the habit of referring to The Encyclopœdia Britannica, and would venture to draw their attention to a little matter of natural history, which appeared to him to have a considerable similitude to their action in the matter of the Convention. The Encyclopœdia said that—
  "The cuttle-fish contained in a certain distinct vessel a fluid as black as ink, which it shed for the purpose of concealing itself when pursued by its enemies."
  He had a strong suspicion that the Government had used the art of the cuttlefish in covering their retreat. It was also possible that the Convention might have been a portion of the grand idea for the regeneration of the glorious East, which had occupied so much of the mind of the most prominent Member of Her Majesty's Government. He believed the result of it would be to involve the country in great difficulties, because it would bring us face to face with Russia —a result that when we complained of her advance in Asia we had always been anxious to avoid. If Russia ever invaded Asia Minor, it would be at a time when this country was involved in some great difficulty. It had been admitted by the hon. Member who had just spoken (Mr. Bourke) that we must exercise a large influence upon the internal government of Asia Minor. He said that we must advise and assist the Porte in the levying of taxes, police functions, and the appointment of officers who were to be permanently occupied in the administration of justice. By undertaking to
  608
  mix ourselves up in the local details of a country like Asia Minor, we had incurred enormous responsibilities. How were these engagements to be carried out? Was it to be supposed that the Turks, who had struggled against annexation by Russia, would allow us to take possession of their country in such a manner? And yet it must come to this if we thrust ourselves into the internal management of their affairs. He presumed it would be admitted that there must be a Resident in every important town of Asia Minor; but those Residents would be backed up by no force as in India, where they had the support of the Army. It appeared to him, moreover, that an interminable struggle would go on between the Residents and the Consuls of the various other Powers, which would produce difficulties that before long would involve the country in actual war either with Turkey or Russia. It had not been made clear to his mind why we had undertaken these serious responsibilities. Lord Salisbury, in his despatch of the 30th May, 1878, to our Ambassador at Constantinople, had described the Turkish Dynasty as one that rested more upon active power than upon the sympathies of nationality; and he went on to say that the defeat which its Army had sustained would produce a belief in its decadence and speedy change; that the only way to prevent this was an engagement on the part of a Power strong enough to fulfil it—that in future it would be defended by force of arms. The decadence of Turkey formed no reason why we should undertake such enormous responsibilities as were involved in the undertaking to put matters right in Asia Minor. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke) had said we must undertake some responsibilities, because other countries had taken responsibilities upon themselves. But he denied that Austria, who had simply to march her Army, which was quite ready, and to take possession of two Provinces, had incurred any responsibility whatever. He had also used words which had certainly somewhat alarmed him, when he said that "there were imminent dangers in Asia Minor." When an hon. Gentleman holding the position of his hon. Friend made a statement of that kind, they had a right to expect that he should tell

  609
  them what those imminent dangers were. The necessity of guarding the Euphrates Valley, which had been dwelt upon to a very slight extent, was not now urged as a necessity for undertaking the grave responsibility which we had assumed. It was not mentioned in Lord Salisbury's despatch, and the Government did not seem to treat that matter as one of very great weight. Great weight had, however, been attached in "another place" to the influence which our action in Asia Minor might have upon the Mahomedan mind; and a noble Lord, well acquainted with India, lost no time in pointing out that though we had poured out our blood and treasure in maintaining the Dominions of the Porte during the Crimean War, we had no sooner done so than the Indian Mutiny broke out. He repeated that we had. incurred a great responsibility, and that, too, without the sanction or knowledge of Parliament. Parliament, by a tendency of the Government to make these great strokes of policy without its consent, had become little else than a Registry Office. He would only add, that as long as he had strength to raise his voice, it should be raised in that House against such engagements as this being contracted without Parliament being in any way consulted.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."— (Viscount Sandon.)
  MR. GREENEwished to make an appeal to both sides of the House. The debate had been the dullest he ever remembered. The House had always been indulgent to him, and he wanted to get away to attend to his business. He thought that the debate should terminate the next night, as there had been the greatest possible difficulty in carrying it on. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had made a very able speech; but all who had followed him had spoken in the same terms. He thought the noble Marquess would be doing an act of kindness in causing the debate to finish next evening.
  MR. GOSCHENsaid, the Government had not assisted to bring about the end desired by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Greene). At 12 o'clock, a Cabinet Minister had proposed to adjourn the debate, and
  610
  then there was the remarkable fact that during the whole course of the debate no Cabinet Minister had condescended to address the House. They had had in the course of the proceedings many departures from ordinary precedents; but they had now come to this—that on the first night of one of the most important debates that could occupy the attention of the House, no Cabinet Minister had risen to defend the policy of the Government. He could not express surprise at this, for it was in accordance with the course pursued by Ministers through the whole of the negotiations.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHE-QUER: The remarks of the right hon. Gentleman are very amiable, no doubt; but, considering that we were challenged by the Leader of the Opposition to a most solemn debate upon the most important action of the year, or, indeed, of many years, it is rather remarkable that there should be so small an attendance, and that so very slight an interest should have been manifested during a great part of the evening. I cannot, of course, account for that; but, although my noble Friend was perfectly ready, and had intended to address the House, yet it seemed that there was a certain slackness, and that it would be a better economy of time—for, at this period of year, we must economize our time— not to proceed with the debate, but to take it up to-morrow with perhaps a little more spirit, and, in the meantime, to get some through some of the Orders. When it is said that no Cabinet Minister has spoken, it must be remembered that the Under Secretary, who represents the Foreign Department in this House, has spoken with great ability, and his speech was a complete answer to the observations addressed to the House on the part of the Opposition early in the evening. I thought that his speech deserved an answer from the front Opposition Bench. It is, of course, impossible for us to control the course of debate so as to render it agreeable to everyone, and I know how difficult it is to arrange a debate of this character in a way that will give a due and fair place to everyone who is naturally desirous of speaking. I should be glad if we could continue it a little longer; but I am afraid the House has fallen into luxurious habits in this respect,

  611
  and we do not often carry on a debate after 12 o'clock. Although I am not sanguine enough to imagine that the debate will be concluded to-morrow, I hope it may terminate on Thursday next.
  MR. LYON PLAYFAIRsaid, it was explained at the beginning of the evening that the Endowed Schools (Scotland) Bill would be brought on at a reasonable hour. The object of adjourning at present was, he believed, to enable that measure to be proceeded with. It was understood, however, that the Bill would not be brought forward except at a time when the Scotch Members could fully discuss it. He thought the debate should be continued.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSwould reserve his answer, until he made a statement further on.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONcould hardly hope that the debate would be closed until the end of the week; indeed, he was not sure that it would terminate then, unless there was a disposition on the part of hon. Members to facilitate that result by somewhat curtailing their remarks and confining them to one or two points. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had referred to the fact that the speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was not answered by any Member on the front Opposition Bench. Two of his right hon. Friends were extremely anxious to have an opportunity of replying to that speech; but it did not tend to bring a debate to a conclusion if too much time, especially in the earlier part of the debate, were occupied by Members on the front Benches. There was a reasonable feeling that fair opportunities ought to be given to speakers in other parts of the House.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) rose to reply to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  MR. M'LARENsaid, he was unable to agree with the right hon. Member for the University of Edinburgh (Mr. Lyon Playfair) as to the desirability of postponing the Scotch Endowed Schools Bill.
  MR. RAMSAYsaid, the Endowed Schools Bill for Scotland had been read a second time in April last, and he put it to the House whether it was reasonable, when they were promised a full discus-
  612
  sion of the question to proceed with it at that hour of the night? The right hon. Gentleman must recognize that there had been undue delay in bringing forward the Bill. He was of opinion that the business should be taken on another occasion.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLwished to know with what object it was proposed to adjourn the debate, whether for the purpose of proceeding with the Scotch Bill, or the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSreplied, that he intended to proceed with the Scotch Bill.
  SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKEwas also of opinion that the House should be made aware of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Assheton Cross) as soon as possible.
  Motion agreed to.
  Debate adjourned till To-morrow,

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  ENDOWED SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS (SCOTLAND) BILL— [Lords.]
  (The Lord Advocate.)
  [BILL 157.] COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(The Lord Advocate.)
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, he trusted hon. Members would allow them to go into Committee on this Bill. It was intended to give all the trustees of these institutions a chance of reforming themselves; and, if the Bill were postponed to another year, the opinions of the Government would remain the same. The Government proposed that the trustees should have power conferred upon them for a limited time to promote schemes of reform. These schemes would be referred to a Commission, and the names of the Commissioners would be given to the House before the Bill passed. It was quite evident that those who took the extreme view that there should be some summary measure, would gain their object earlier by supporting the Bill. The schemes proposed by the trustees would be referred to the Government for approval. This would be the

  613
  last chance which the trustees would have of reforming themselves. The Government undertook, by the Bill, not to vary the schemes in any vital point. Under those circumstances, the trustees would have a free course of action. They must, however, bear in mind that their schemes must be bonâ fide, and such as would meet with the approval of the Commission and the Government. After the schemes had been proposed and approved, there would follow an Executive Bill to carry them out; and, if this were not sent in and approved of, then the Government would do for the trustees what they would or could not do for themselves. He trusted the House would agree to the Bill, which, if it did not go so far as some hon. Members wished, was still a long step in the direction recommended by the Commission which had already reported upon the question; and, if the Bill was not passed this Session, it would be brought in again next year.
  SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKEwished to understand clearly that the Bill should not pass without the names of the Commissioners being given, and when they should have an opportunity of discussing the Bill. [Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: On the third reading.] He hoped they would not be asked to pass the Bill through an important stage at a period of the evening when it was impossible to discuss it fully. After the inquiries instituted by the Commission of which he had been Chairman, it was very disheartening that they should have to begin with this legislation. The trustees of many of the institutions to be dealt with were guided by very narrow instincts—narrower, in fact than the trusts. For instance, Heriot's Hospital had always been spoken of as if it belonged to Edinburgh; but the fact was, it was a double endowment, first for the benefit of Edinburgh, secondly for the benefit of the whole world, through the University—as would be seen from an examination of the codicils to George Heriot's will. Hitherto the endowments had been administered wholly in the interest of Edinburgh. He did not think that that was the way in which this matter should be carried out. But if it were to go on, it must be upon condition that there should be a strong assurance to the people of Scotland that the Government was in earnest,
  614
  and that the time for the duration of this measure was only a year, and that after that year the Government would be prepared to act in the spirit of which the right hon. Gentleman had spoken. He could see no reason why they should not act in that manner at once, and why the Bill should not be upon the same principle as that upon which legislation for England had proceeded. There was no reason that he could see for any difference between the two countries in that matter. He did not, however, wish to oppose the Motion for going into in to Committee on the Bill; but it must be on the clear understanding that, before another stage was reached, the Government would give the names of the Commissioners proposed to be appointed.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLwas very much disposed to support the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, provided they could be carried out fully and fairly, and that nothing was done which should have the effect of leading the trustees of the Endowed Schools and Hospitals into a trap. He did not take so gloomy a view of the position of trustees as was taken by the hon. Baronet. In the burgh he represented there was an important educational trust; and while there was in it, like others of the kind, great room for reform, those who represented that trust were themselves sincerely anxious to reform it, and only sought facilities to enable them to do this. As the Bill originally stood, where the trustees agreed to a scheme of reform, the Commissioners, whose names had not yet been given, and afterwards, the Government, might alter it. It was said by the Government that such schemes were not to be altered in any material degree. But he was apprehensive that there was not sufficient safeguard to satisfy trustees that something would not be imposed upon them for which they had not bargained. If it were clearly understood that nothing should be done against the will of the trustees, and that the Government should only retain the power of rejecting a proposal, he could see no objection to the measure. Not only did he think that it was necessary that the Amendment of the Lord Advocate should be adopted; but he was of opinion that it should be made perfectly clear, so that the trustees should not find their schemes altered in any material degree. It was,

  615
  further, of the utmost importance that the names of the Commissioners should be made known to Parliament as soon as possible, for the whole working of the Bill would rest with the Commissioners to be appointed. His chief apprehension was that those gentlemen who might be appointed might be inclined to carry out the principle which had already been carried too far in England—namely, the diversion of endowments intended for the poor to the benefit of those who were not poor. He was very anxious that a change of that kind should not take place. In his own burgh a foundation had been established at a not very recent period, which was made as exclusively and absolutety for poor people as possible. He should be sorry to see that and similar foundations diverted by Commissioners from their original objects.
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYdid not think that much of real reform was to be expected from the Bill. It was all very well to propose that reforms should be carried out in the abstract on liberal principles; but that might mean anything or nothing. In his opinion, the reforms should all proceed upon this principle— that the benefits be conferred, not as a matter of favour, but as a reward of merit; that was the principle which should run through all these foundations. Times had very much changed, and it was now found, from experience, that whore foundations were applied as a matter of favour the privileges conferred did more harm than good. This Bill was most important, and ought to be discussed at a time when it could be reported in Scotland. He did not think that a proper discussion of it could take place at that hour in the morning. Speaking from experience of the last Act of a similar character, he should not be disappointed if this Bill was dropped. Under the last Act only two schemes were proposed, and one only was passed. That was some indication as to what might be expected to be done under the present Bill. In his opinion, trustees would not be likely to agree to schemes of real reform. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would find some other evening for the discussion, when the Scotch Members would have an opportunity of taking part in it. He begged to move that the debate be now adjourned.
  MR. LEITHseconded the Motion. He said that there was a promise that Scotch Business should receive more attention, and yet this Bill was now brought forward at a time when it was impossible for it to have full discussion; and while, at the same time, it was admitted that the Bill was one of very great consequence and would affect a very large amount of property in Scotland. In the constituency which he had the honour to represent, there was a large amount of property depending upon this Bill; and he did protest, in the cause of his constituency, against so important a measure being brought on at past 12 o'clock at night. He would also call attention to the way in which Ministers had dealt with Irish Business in contradistinction to Scotch Business. The reason for that difference of treatment was that Scotch Members were not banded together for the purpose of obstructing the measures which the Government might bring forward; but were always ready to assist the Government in the progress of beneficial legislation for England, Scotland, or Ireland. Therefore, he thought it was not right that the Government should treat Scotch Business in the way they did, and give the preference to Irish measures over those relating to Scotland. With reference to what had been stated by the Secretary of State for the Home Department with regard to the Commissioners, he thought that the names of the Gentlemen proposed to be appointed should be given to the House before it went into Committee. It was of great importance that those names should be known, and he thought that a distinct pledge should be given by the Government that the names should be made known at an early stage of the Bill. He was in favour of the Bill, and on behalf of his constituents would offer every facility in his power for its passing. But there were certain conditions which in fairness they had a right to ask, and one was that they should be given the names of the Commissioners, at least, before they arrived at the stage when the Bill was reported. It was most important to recollect that everything must depend upon the character and conduct of the Commissioners.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned," —(Mr. J. W. Barclay.)
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSobserved, that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had censured the conduct of the Government in showing undue partiality to Irish measures, and in bringing forward an important Scotch measure at that hour. He must remind the hon. Gentleman that, at that period of the Session, unless the Bill was got through that night, it was impossible for it to pass. That fact was clearly understood in Scotland. As to the general charge of neglect of Scotch Business, he begged the hon. Gentleman to remember how much time had recently been spent upon matters relating exclusively to Scotland. If he took the trouble to count up the nights spent on the Scotch Roads and Bridges Bill, and other measures, he would find that as much time had been spent in Scottish matters as on those relating to Ireland. In regard to the measure now before the House, did hon. Members wish it to pass or not? If they did, he hoped that at that hour they would not refuse any longer to go into Committee.
  MR. LYON PLAYFAIRsaid, it was, no doubt, very convenient for the right hon. Gentleman to say that the Scotch Members ought to go into this matter without further discussion; but it was not at all agreeable to those for whom he spoke to follow that advice. The Home Secretary did not explain how he differed from the Report of the Royal Commission. The right hon. Gentleman simply said, dogmatically, that the Government did not agree with it, and had consequently brought in the present Bill; and he threatened that if it were not accepted, a precisely similar measure would be brought in again next year. Why were Scotch Members to be treated in this manner? Why was Scotland to be so served? Was the wisdom of the Home Secretary so great and so concentrated as to overcome that of the whole of the Royal Commissioners who had reported on the subject? But he hoped that the Lord Advocate might be able to supply the omission. In what state would they be if the Bill were passed? If, with the large experience of the working of endowments in England, it was found desirable for the Royal Commissioners to have full power to promulgate schemes, why should not the Scotch Commissioners also have the power? There was no reason to
  618
  suppose the Scotch Commissioners would not do their duty as well as the English ones. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Lord Advocate had said that if the Bill were changed to that extent its chance of passing would be over; but he could not regard that as an excuse. The only point upon which he was satisfied was the promise of the right hon. Gentleman that the Government would, in the future, bring in a more firm and sweeping Bill than the present. For his part, he could not see any reason why two measures of reform were necessary. There was no reason why everything should not be done by the present Bill; and he was entirely dissatisfied with the feebleness and weakness of the present measure, which he thought would do no good to Scotland. He should certainly vote for the adjournment of the debate.
  MR. M'LARENwished to protest against the assumption that the people of Scotland were of the same opinion as the Royal Commission, and that they desired their recommendations should be adopted. From that view he entirely dissented. He believed that if this were to be made a test question, an enormous majority of the people of Scotland would be in favour of giving the trustees three years to decide as to the schemes they would propose, and have the matter settled by a local body rather than handed over to a Government Commission with no local knowledge. In Scotland, the opinions generally were that the Government plan was the best. All those who took the other side in this controversy could require was that the Government should be pledged to bring in an additional Bill at a subsequent period.
  COLONEL MUREhoped the Amendment would be withdrawn. It was the desire of the people of Scotland that the trustees should have an opportunity of proposing reforms. Many of the trustees who now desired reform were trammelled by local influences and prejudices. If the Bill passed in its present form, it would have the effect, in every locality, of giving the trustees an opportunity of reforming themselves; and, at the same time, hold over them the probability of being dealt with if they neglected to reform. He would himself be exceedingly sorry if the period allowed for reform were shortened. He quite

  619
  agreed with what had been said that the names of the Commissioners should be announced before Report.
  MR. RAMSAYsaid, that the general object of the Bill was to secure the better administration of the Endowed Schools and Hospitals in Scotland. The hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. M'Laren) was not very accurate in the figures he had given, for there was no institution in Glasgow that possessed £48,000 a-year. He did not remember that there was any other institution in Scotland, which enjoyed so large an income as Heriot's Hospital. [Mr. M'LAREN reminded the hon. Member of Hutchinson's Hospital.] He thought it was a mistake to say that that institution had £48,000 a-year, it was not yet one-half of that amount. He thought the Bill was of very little consequence in an educational point of view, as the Commissioners who were to be appointed had not the slightest power to do anything. They might report to the Secretary of State, but that was all. And yet it was proposed to pay several of those Commissioners. What were they to be paid for? They could do nothing but report to the Secretary of State. He objected altogether to such a proposal, and should move in Committee that it be rejected. He should do that not simply on the ground of economy, although that in itself was a very important element, but also on the ground of efficiency. The work could be done without any payment, and it certainly would be a great blunder if the provision for payment of the Commissioners were retained in the Bill. He hoped, when they came to discuss the details of the measure, the right hon. Gentleman would give careful consideration to the arguments he should adduce against his proposal.
  MR. GRANT DUFFsaid, he knew in his part of the country the opinion about the Bill was that it was one which might do some little good; but that the clauses giving the Secretary of State power to interfere were not nearly strong enough. Therefore, he should give effect to what he believed to be the opinion of his constituents by voting for the Motion for adjournment, unless the right hon. Gentleman would distinctly tell them that upon Report the Government would name the Commissioners they proposed to appoint.
  MR. YEAMANhoped his hon. Friend the Member for Forfarshire (Mr. J. W. Barclay) would withdraw his Motion for adjournment. No doubt, improvements could be made in the Bill; but they must remember that the end of the Session was fast approaching, and if the measure did not come on that night, they would not have an opportunity of discussing it again this year. He had not such little confidence in the Commission it was proposed to appoint; and he considered that the Bill might be passed in a very short time, if those Gentlemen who were not pleased with it would at once proceed with their Amendments.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLasked the hon. Member for Forfarshire to withdraw his Amendment. The Scotch Members had had very frequently to complain of the neglect of Scotch Business in past Sessions, and especially of Scotch Business being held over until the early hours of a morning. But this Session the Government had certainly behaved better towards Scotland, and it was, undoubtedly, the case that a longer time had been spent on the Scotch Roads and Bridges Bill than on any other measure save the Cattle Bill. It was better to have the measure now before them at such an hour than not to have it at all, and he hoped it would pass this Session.
  SIR GRAHAM MONTGOMERYsaid, he had seen many Bills, quite as important as the one before the House, taken at such an hour in the morning. He was quite satisfied, and he thought the House ought to be, with the discussion they had had on the Bill, and he hoped they would at once go into Committee. Of course, the measure was not all they could desire. A strong Government could not always produce as strong a Bill as might be wished for; but he thought the one before them, as far as it went, was a good Bill, and he objected to its being postponed until another Session. They should take it now for what it was worth, remembering that half a loaf was better than no bread. He had every confidence that the trustees of endowments in Scotland, when they knew the feeling and temper of the House and of the Scotch Members upon the subject, would voluntarily produce such schemes of reform in the management of their institutions as would meet with the approval of all parties.
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYsaid, he should be happy to withdraw his Motion for adjournment, especially as the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) was satisfied to proceed with the Bill at such an hour.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clause 1 (Short title) agreed to.
  Clause 2 (Application of Act) agreed to.
  Clause 3 (Interpretation of terms).
  On the Motion of Mr. ANDERSON, Amendment made, in page 2, line 3, after "charitable," by inserting "or for the establishment and maintenance of a public library;" also, in page 2, line 6, after "charitable," by inserting " or for the establishment and maintenance of a public library."
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 4 (Governing body may resolve to apply for a Provisional Order).
  MR. YEAMANmoved, in line 20, after "thereof," to insert "or for the transference of such institution and the endowments thereof."
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALROURsaid, in his county there was a number of small endowments, and he should be glad to know if the effect of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Dundee would be to combine these several endowments in one?
  THE LORD ADVOCATEsaid, it would be competent to do so under the Bill as it stood.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 5 (Governing body may present petition to Secretary of State) agreed to.
  Clause 6 (Commissioners may inquire and report to Secretary of State) agreed to.
  Clause 7 (Power of Secretary of State to issue Provisional Order).
  SIR WILLIAM CUNINGHAME, in moving, in page 3, line 8, to leave out from "or" to "requisite," inline 10, said, his Amendment was placed upon
  622
  the Paper immediately after the second reading of the Bill, and the object of it was to make it a purely permissive measure; and yet, at the same time, effective as a permissive Bill. He would leave it to the trustees to say if any alteration should be made; and he was glad to see that, since his Amendment had been down, the Lord Advocate had proposed to make an alteration very nearly to the same effect. He thought the trustees should have power to make alterations which were not inconsistent with the general principles of the Bill, and the simplest and most straightforward thing was to allow them to bring forward schemes for the reform of these institutions.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, he should, if necessary, second the proposition of the hon. Member opposite. The Amendment was not inconsistent with that of the Lord Advocate's, but entirely consistent with it. He therefore hoped the Amendment would be accepted.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEsaid, that by the Amendment it was proposed to strike out certain words, the want of which would compel the Secretary of State to accept the prayer of the Petition presented to him.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLunderstood that that had been already conceded by the Secretary of State, when he provided that the proposals of the Government should be substantially the same as the recommendations of the trustees.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, he expressed no opinion upon the wording of the clause. He left that entirely to his right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate.
  SIR WILLIAM CUNINGHAMEdid not understand what the word "substantially" might mean. It certainly was rather a doubtful phrase.
  MR. RAMSAYconsidered that the hon. Member for Ayr (Sir William Cuninghame) had got conceded to him all he could expect. To go any further in the direction desired by the hon. Member would be to still further weaken a measure which, as it was presented, was weak enough. He therefore hoped the Lord Advocate would not give way any further.
  MR. LYON PLAYFAIRwould like the word "substantially" to be interpreted.
  DR. CAMERONthought the Amendment of the Lord Advocate would exactly carry out what was necessary.
  Amendment negatived.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEmoved, in page 3, line 9, to insert, after the word "modifications," the words "not being inconsistent with the general principles thereof."
  MR. LYON PLAYFAIRthought the Amendment a very unwise one. He thought the Commissioners should have full power to make alterations for the benefit of the public, and they ought to be able to decide what changes were required in the interest of the country.
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYthought the fact of the Secretary of State having to determine what changes were consistent would be likely to lead to a great deal of dissatisfaction. Was the Home Secretary to be absolute in his decisions, or subject to the revision of the Courts of Law?
  MR. M'LARENregretted the reference to Courts of Law. If the Home Secretary thought the proposals of trustees reasonable, he would allow them to go before Parliament, and if he did not, he would stop them. There was no reason for Courts of Law coming within the four corners of the Bill at all.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 8 (Provisional Order to be laid before Parliament) agreed to.
  Clause 9 (Several governing bodies may concur in applying for Provisional Order) agreed to.
  Clause 10 (Governing body may apply for transference of endowments to other governing bodies or school boards).
  MR. YEAMANmoved, in page 4, line 1, after the first "of," to insert "the institution and."
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 11 (Commissioners to be appointed).
  MR. M'LARENmoved, in page 4, at end, to add the words—
  "And no Commissioner shall receive any payment except for such travelling expenses as he may incur in the service of the Commission."
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, he would accept the Amendment.
  MR. RAMSAYthought the object in view would be better met by the Amendment of which he had given Notice.
  MR. M'LARENexpressed his willingness to withdraw his Amendment in favour of that of the hon. Member, which was to the same effect, but differently expressed.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. RAMSAYthen moved, in page 4, line 20, to add, at the end of the Clause—
  "Provided, That such Commissioners shall receive no remuneration except for such reason-able travelling or other expenses as may be incurred in the discharge of their duties under this Act."
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 12 (Commissioners to report).
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURremarked that it would be well for the Commissioners to make a Report every three months.
  MR. RAMSAYthought it would be a little too much to expect the Commissioners to make a Report so frequently.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 13 (Saving powers of governing bodies under special Acts, &c).
  MR. M'LARENmoved, in page 5, line 9, after "Parliament," to insert "or Provisional Order."
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause .14 (Commencement and duration of Act).
  MR. RAMSAYmoved, in page 5, line 16, the substitution of the words "seventy-nine " for the word " eighty," as the time allowed for trustees to send in schemes for the reform of their endowed schools and hospitals. He believed the Government had accepted one year for the period in question.
  Amendment proposed, in page 5, line 16, to leave out the word "eighty," in order to insert the words '' seventy-nine."—(Mr. Ramsay.)
  Question proposed, "That the word 'eighty' stand part of the Clause."
  THE LORD ADVOCATEcould not accept the Amendment, as it was perfectly obvious the Commissioners would not be able to report in time.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLthought the time fixed by the Bill was perfectly reasonable, and hoped the Amendment would not be accepted.
  MR. C. S. PARKERsaid, that the Re-port of the Royal Commission was issued in February, 1875, and trustees had had long notice to prepare for reform. From year to year they had been in expectation that the Bill would pass, and they ought, therefore, to have their plans ready. In his opinion, it would be desirable to shorten the time. If the schemes were required to be prepared in reasonable time, those trustees who stood aloof, declining all reform, could be the sooner dealt with, if necessary, by a further measure.
  MR. M'LARENthought it unlikely that large bodies of trustees would agree in any general plan for their several endowments, and therefore considered it desirable that a longer rather than shorter time should be given within which to send in schemes.
  MR. RAMSAYhoped the Government would accede to the Amendment; for although he agreed that there should be a period of grace, he thought it was unduly extended by the Bill.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEremarked that he had already said that he could not alter the period fixed by the Bill.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:— Ayes 42; Noes 24: Majority 18.— (Div. List, No. 244.)
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURthought the Government should give way, seeing that the majority of the Scotch Members had been in favour of the Amendment.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, the Government could not do this, seeing that the majority was nearly two to one.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR: But not of Scotch Members.
  Clause agreed to.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEmoved a new clause, empowering the Commissioners to be appointed under the Bill to report to the Education Department,
  626
  from time to time, their views with regard to the promotion of higher education in Scotland.
  New Clause (Commissioners to submit conditions, &c.,)—(The Lord Advocate,) —brought up, and read the first and. second time.
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYobserved that there had been a good deal of difficulty with regard to the power of the Commissioners. It would not be satisfactory to them to be asked to give advice without having some control; and he, therefore, objected to this clause being introduced into the Bill. The Commissioners ought, if they were to have any control over education in Scotland, to be a representative body, reflecting the wishes and views of the people of Scotland; and, if so constituted, would have more title to represent the Scottish people than the Education Department in London, which was to overrule them. He hoped the Government would not press the clause.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEthought it impossible to conceive that the views of such a body of gentlemen as the Commissioners would not be of use to the Education Department.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURcharacterized the clause as a petty one, which was not likely to be of much value. The power of expressing opinion without the responsibilities of giving practical effect to their expressions was totally antagonistic to sound administration.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLregarded the future action of the Commissioners with considerable suspicion. Their views would most likely be of a Conservative character, and they would seek to keep education in the old grooves. He was strongly of opinion that the Education Department in London would be more likely to exercise a sound discretion than the Commissioners.
  MR. M'LARENconsidered that the influence of the Education Department in London upon the Commissioners would most probably be deleterious. It would be better for the Government to omit the clause, and leave the control to the Scotch Department to be formed, the announcement of the creation of which had been hailed with pleasure by the Scotch Members.
  MR. RAMSAYwished to state that the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy did not, in his opinion, represent the views of the majority of the people of Scotland.
  MR. LYON PLAYFAIRagreed that the clause would be very useful; but if the Commission was constituted according to the opinion of his hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh (Mr. M'Laren), which would mean that they would not know much about carrying on educational work, it would be a dangerous trust to give them.
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYprotested against the control of education being taken away from Members of the House and vested in a body sitting at Edinburgh. If the Commissioners consisted of Professors in the Universities, their opinions would, at least, be known; but if they were nominated by the Government this even might not be the case, and they would know no more about the views of the people of Scotland than Members of that House. That being so, he should take a division against the clause.
  Question put, "That the Clause be added to the Bill."
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 51; Noes 12: Majority 39. — (Div. List, No. 245.)
  Bill reported; as amended, to be considered upon Thursday.

  WAYS AND MEANS.
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March 1879, the sum of £14,500,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.
  Resolution to he reported To-morrow;
  Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.

  ELDERS WIDOWS' FUND [DEFICIENCIES].
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the payment, out of the Revenues of India, of such sums as may be required to make good the deficiency in the Elders Widows' Fund, and to enable the Trustees from time to time to meet the current liabilities of the said Fund, under the provisions of any Act of the present Session to enable the Trustees of the Elders Widows' Fund to apply the Capital of the said Fund in aid of Income, and for other purposes relating thereto.
  Resolution to be reported To-morrow.

  PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND CORRUPT PRACTICES BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Bill to amend and continue the Acts relating to Election Petitions and to the prevention of Corrupt Practices at Parliamentary Elections, ordered to be brought in by Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL and Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 281.]

  DISQUALIFICATION OF MEDICAL BELIEF REMOVAL BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. RATHBONE, Bill to remove disqualification by medical relief for Infectious or Contagious Disease, ordered to be brought in by Mr. RATHBONE, Sir JOHN KENNAWAY, and Sir CHARLES W. DILKE.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 282.]
  House adjourned at half after Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading— Admiralty and War Office (Retirement of Officers) ✶ (176); Highways ✶ (177).
Committee — Report — Marriage Preliminaries (Scotland)✶ (172); Corrib (Galway) River✶ (166); Metropolitan Board of Works (Money)✶ (169).
Third Reading—Commutation of Tithes✶ (151); Weights and Measures✶ (161), and passed.

THE CONGRESS AT BERLIN — THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD CAMPBELLrose, pursuant to Notice, to call attention to the Protocols of the Congress at Berlin, and to the Convention of June 4th between Great Britain and the Porte, and said: My Lords, when the Protocols were laid upon the Table, many speeches were delivered. Even on Friday last, from a Question of a noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery) upon an isolated point, there arose a rather general discussion to which my present Notice refers. If, on either of these occasions, the topic which appears to me the most important had been noticed, I should, for many reasons, have been indisposed to encroach at all just now upon the patience of the House. That topic is the Russian occupation, and the degree to which it has been sanctioned.
  My Lords, I have not put a Resolution on the Paper, because it did not seem to be a moment when any Resolution, even if adopted by your Lordships, would lead to practical results. Even if Parliament advised the Crown to withhold ratification from some parts of the Treaty, and, if it was with held, as far as I can learn among diplomatists, the Treaty would not fail to operate in Europe. As to arraignment of the Government on the Eastern Question, it requires the transactions of many years to be exhibited, and involves materials beyond human force at this time of the Session, even to advert to. It could only be appropriate in order to bring about a change which nobody yet aims at. But I will move for some documents which it would, perhaps, be easy
  480
  to produce, and which would throw a certain light upon the occupation I have mentioned.
  It is not requisite to dwell upon the Protocols, because they were alluded to on Friday, and the subject thus in some degree anticipated. The first, in which the Prime Minister, in spite of all the eloquence he is said to have brought to bear upon the Congress, was unable to effect the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the positions which they occupied, may be regarded as a sample. It illustrates the spirit by which the Congress was directed, and which the three Plenipotentiaries habitually encountered. What I propose is during a few minutes to examine, as a whole, the Convention and the Treaty under some divisions which make it easier to judge of them, although it is to one point alone I wish to draw the more particular attention of your Lordships.
  The first division which occurs is that of stipulation to which a qualified degree of praise may be accorded. It contains, however, nothing as I view it; but the arrangement by which, as the noble Marquess who went to Berlin (the Marquess of Salisbury) has explained, the Porte is sheltered from the weight of the indemnity demanded. It may not be agreeable to the bondholders of the Sultan, since one class—at least, one individual—must be perpetually unpaid, to keep his Empire from destruction. The interpretation of the noble Marquess is disputed as to the contract which exists; but, if accurate, it cannot be denied that a mischievous effect of a destructive war has been ingeniously parried.
  The next division would refer to several arrangements which admit of plausible defence, although they may be seriously criticized. As I regard the subject, it includes the whole mass of stipulations upon Cyprus and upon Asia Minor. It is here important to remark that no new obligation to defend has been contracted. Ever since 1856 the obligation has existed. From that period we were bound to defend the Ottoman Dominions, either in Asia or in Europe, either with others or alone. Of course, the more recent the engagement, the less decorous to connive at it. But that is all the difference. So, too, the right to interfere as a defending Power previously existed. In the same

  481
  division, one might reckon what has been done in Bessarabia. It is to be regretted as a Russian triumph over Europe. But it was necessary that Roumania, after making war upon her Suzerain, should incur a penalty of some kind. Nothing better might have been acceptable at Berlin, where the Vassal has, of course, considerable influence.
  The third division would consist of several arrangements objectionable on the face of them, and highly mischievous when separately viewed; but which may have a latent plea as conducive to some great and distant object, if Ottoman authority should fail to be perpetuated on this side of the Bosphorus. To this category I should venture to refer the independence of Servia and Roumania— in itself at once an element of conflict, and a premium on rebellion; at the same time, the creation of another Vassal Principality, which is sure to follow the example of the former ones; again, the mode in which Eastern Roumlia is to be virtually subjected to the Embassies at Constantinople, and the strife it will produce. To that class I should assign, too, the Austrian possession of Herzegovina and Bosnia. They all would seem to merit censure; but all may have a hidden vindication in some beneficent design to which they may be gradually subordinated.
  The last division to be noticed is that of measures which no policy excuses, which no kind of argument can possibly defend. The Russian occupation is the only one I shall advert to in this category. The essential point to keep in view is that there is no security whatever for its ceasing. There will be innumerable pretexts for extending it. The new Austrian possession of Herzegovina and Bosnia is among them. Austria has never been a check to Russian progress during the whole of these transactions, although it might have frequently been urged it was her interest to be so. Those who feel convinced that in a year the occupation will determine should be referred to Polish history. It is the specific medicine for credulity of that kind. But there is something else to be considered. At this moment the Russian occupation is causing the iniquities and horrors which the two Mr. Bartlett's, authoritative witnesses just returned from European Turkey, have, in their own names, so vividly delineated. These
  482
  gentlemen are brothers. One is a contributor to literature on the Eastern Question. The other was engaged by Lady Burdett-Coutts to assist in organizing and distributing her well-known fund for refugees and victims of the conflict. They have both addressed themselves to that journal whose circulation is allowed to be the largest. According to these gentlemen, 100 villages can be named which subsequently to the Armistice have been razed by Cossacks and Bulgarians. There is now, in consequence, to the extent of many thousands, a starving and a houseless population. Eight hundred people, who were lately sent back to their homes under promise of Russian protection, were robbed of everything and brutally ill-treated by Bulgarians in sight of Russian troops. Near Constantinople, mosques and graveyards have been knocked to pieces. There is a statement with regard to the Bulgarian police and Russian officers, which I refrain from communicating to your Lordships. The occupation of the Russians during the last five months is responsible for 500,000 deaths. Even if the occupation was doomed to cease, when, in an inverse sense, it had repeated the atrocities of which we heard so much two years ago, it could not be defended.
  Instead of dwelling upon these gloomy scenes, let me remind the House that the existence of Russian Armies, where the Treaty will permit them to remain, is certain to preclude the action of the now suspended Ottoman Assemblies, the best and. latest check to the despotic power so long regarded as incapable of adequately governing. It is, at the same time, a bar to every improvement the British Embassy might call for. It utterly annihilates their influence. The proposition will come home to everyone who knows Constantinople, and the noble Marquess the Secretary of State is now himself among the number. But there is a larger and. a graver sense in which the occupation ought to be regarded.
  Whatever prepossessions or convictions he may have in favour of that system, everyone must see that late events have weakened the arrangements the Crimean War was undertaken to establish. No one, although he may decline to initiate or countenance, can help canvassing and listening to schemes by which it is proposed to guard Con-

  483
  stantinople against Russia without the slightest reference to Ottoman dominion. On the character of these schemes I do not hazard an opinion at this moment. The point to be insisted on is that the Russian occupation as effectually defeats them, as it is a positive impediment to every improved and salutary form of government under the direction of the Sultan. We have heard of Byzantine Empires, although the term has not been properly defined. How can you possibly establish a Byzantine Empire, in the face of a Russian Army which, for years to come, may hold Adrianople? A Danubian federation was long ago suggested by a very eminent Hungarian, but certainly will not be framed while Russian soldiers still command the passes of the Balkans— which they may do without a limit. But projects of that magnitude would be difficult to realize in any case, even without an intercepting Army to prohibit them. Considerable reasoners have urged with a more practical, more statesmanlike acumen, that if Austria only had the Suzerainty of Moldavia and wallachia which have been withdrawn from the Sultan, and which cannot stand alone, the Russian march to Constantinople would be barred, since war with Austria—possibly with Germany behind her—would be a necessary incident of trying it. But even such a combination would be useless, when Russian Armies are so placed that they no longer have the pruth and Danube to get over. It is not my aim or hope to-night to do much justice to the topic. Let me only add that the occupation whether of Bulgaria or Eastern Roumelia, for the time allowed, has not a shadow of a ground, in the advantage of the inhabitants, or in the interest of Europe, since, if it had, the Protocols would have revealed it.
  Even if the occupation is irrevocable, so far as it is sanctioned by the Congress, it is not useless to refer to it. The question leads to several conclusions as regards the British Meet maintaining its position; as regards the hazard of a struggle at no distant time; as regards alliances to be created or revived in order to prepare for it. Above all, a due attention to this subject may correct a doubtful spirit which has recently been manifested—the spirit which is ready to give up political
  484
  engagements for material possessions, to exult in Cyprus, to forget the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, as if all the Islands of the Archipelago could be a set-off for abandoning the European interests of which, 20 years ago we were—of which so much more recently we meant to be—the guardians. But that disposition would also be restrained by anything which brings in an authentic shape before the House the effects the Russian occupation is producing, and enables it to see how far the witnesses I have invoked have faithfully described them. I move for Copies of any Diplomatic Correspondence with Her Majesty's Government on the state of European Turkey since the termination of hostilities.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I thought some Member of the Government would have risen to reply to the speech of the noble Lord. I wish, however, to refer to another matter. The noble Earl at the head of the Government is reported to have made a speech on Saturday at a banquet at Knights-bridge, in which he complained that he had in this House opponents who never "unsheathed the sword," and that the Government were met only by "innuendo and question," although the two chief Plenipotentiaries of the Queen sit in this House. I am anxious to know whether the noble Earl can quote many instances—or even one instance—when, during the five years of an eventful foreign policy pursued by the late Government, the noble Earl over unsheathed his sword at all. I am not aware that he ever did so, although he has made many disparaging remarks of that foreign policy. I own that I do not quite understand all these complaints about what takes place in this House. I do not understand this complaint that we have not done more than ask Questions. I think, for instance, that last Friday's debate gave no proof of what the noble Earl referred to. The noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), on a recent occasion, criticized the disappearance, for a very few minutes, of the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) from his place in this House. On Friday last, following the example of the First Plenipotentiary, the noble Marquess escaped from the House before half the discussion, which was of a very interesting character, was over;

  485
  and it was perfectly impossible to extract any remarks from the two Members of the Government who remained. It appears to me that Her Majesty's Government do not wish to enter into discussions, while they clamour for Motions and for votes which they themselves, when in Opposition, never made or insisted upon. It is said that we confine ourselves exclusively to innuendo and question. As regards Questions, we did not act in a very embarrassing way—I even observed perfect silence—during the time the Plenipotentiaries were away from the House. Since their return, we have certainly put Questions—Questions which we thought were of some importance— in order to elucidate the action of the Plenipotentiaries. I am bound to say that to those Questions we have either received no answer at all, or an answer to which the maxim of a great moralist might have been applied—"If the first rule is truth, discretion is the second." As regards innuendo—I will not refer to the speeches — the very weighty speeches — made by the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, nor will I refer to the speeches made by the noble Duke and the noble Marquess who sit opposite; but I do think I have heard in this House something of argument and something of reasoning, not only from the late Lord Chancellor, from the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley), and the noble Viscount behind me, but from several Members of your Lordships' House sitting on the back Benches of the Opposition— some of which speeches have up to this time been met with no reply. Then it is said that we confine ourselves to innuendo. What is an innuendo? Your Lordships may have heard of the word, though it is so insufficiently acclimatized as not to be found in five different English dictionaries which I consulted on the point. I have an idea as to what an innuendo means, and it may be possible to give your Lordships some idea of an innuendo. Your Lordships will remember what appeared to me a rather painful scene when, in the course of a debate, the noble Marquess thought it right to compare the vilest character in English history to a great personage in this House. I think something of innuendo lurked in that remark. The noble Earl at the
  486
  head of the Government is also at the head of a large majority in this House, and a majority normally of 100 in "another place." He boasts that he has the confidence of his Sovereign—which I do not doubt. The Queen has graciously and constitutionally shown Her confidence to every successive Ministry which has existed. The noble Earl also spoke of the confidence of the country. At the beginning of this Session he defied us to prove that there had been any real difference between himself and any of his Colleagues; and he further assured us that since the very beginning there had never been the slightest hesitation as to the course which Her Majesty's Government should pursue with regard to the great events in the East. On Saturday, he is reported to have stated that he came back from Berlin with the firm conviction—I presume, imparted to him by Prince Gortchakoff— that the Crimean War and the late War might have been prevented if England had been more firm in her language; and he deprecated the renewal of Councils where there might be hesitation, a want of decision, and a want of firmness—he described Ministers doubting, considering contingencies, and then acting, but, perhaps, too late. It does appear to me that if this is not an admission of great weakness on the part of the noble Earl— that is, not to have used language when it was in his power to prevent war—it is something like an innuendo against his own Colleagues in the way in which they have supported him during the last two years. A great political contemporary of his, in a speech made a week before, used a very strong epithet—"insane"— and applied it to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The speech was devoid of any personal allusion. That Convention seems to have been defended by the noble Earl on Saturday, on the ground that it forces all future Governments, whatever may be their opinions or the opinion of the country, or the circumstances of the time, to do that which Her Majesty's Government a year ago firmly declined to do—admit a policy was right, whether the circumstances were favourable or unfavourable. The noble Earl thought it became himself and his own great position to give an offensive personalty to a tu quogue which he had very carefully and with almost painful elaboration prepared, and which

  487
  reminded one in its violence, though not in power, of the attacks made some 30 years ago against a very great statesman of this country. I do not know whether this is innuendo, or whether it is more than innuendo; but I utterly deny that we on this side of the House have indulged in such practices as these, and I certainly do hope that we shall not be led by such example to do anything of the sort in the future.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: I am rather at a loss to ascertain what is the exact object of the observations which we have heard from the noble Earl. Possibly they form one class of innuendo themselves. The noble Earl wishes to insinuate some remarks, for which probably I shall show there is no foundation, which may disturb the digestion of the dinner of last Saturday. The noble Earl, in the first place, has remarked upon some observations which I made upon a charge that was urged against the Convention of June 4, by a right hon. Gentleman who described it as an "insane Convention." The noble Earl admits that was rather a strong epithet—one of a character that could scarcely be passed unnoticed. He says that the person who made it indulged in no personal remark. No personal allusion, it seems, escaped his lips, and he spoke with all the abstraction of a political philosopher. It is very possible that on that occasion, although so strong a charge was made against the Convention for which I and my Colleagues are responsible—a charge that I think required notice—it is possible, I think, that the charge may not have been coupled by the speaker with any personal allusion at the moment. But, although I could not have thought of introducing the question myself, as the noble Earl has introduced it, I must say that that speaker on several occasions has taken the opportunity of making personal allusions to myself—allusions which were intended to be extremely offensive— though I am glad to say that they were allusions that did not much disturb me. I may refer, amongst other instances, to a speech at Oxford, which I believe was not even an after-dinner speech, but which was made in cold blood. He singled me out of the Cabinet—he charged me with all the offences of the Cabinet, he described me as a dangerous, and, I believe, even a devilish character. If I had
  488
  taken a very early opportunity of noticing the expressions of the right hon. Gentleman, and noticing them with some acerbity, I do not think the world would have been surprised. For a long time I did not take any notice at all of the criticism which came from that quarter; but when his criticism was levelled at a political act which, I believe, is of the highest importance to the welfare of the country—coming, as it did, from one occupying a great position with great Parliamentary experience —it appeared to me that it was one that should be noticed. Previously, during a more or less exciting rhetorical campaigning of a period of two years, the right hon. Gentleman levelled the most offensive epithets and criticism upon my conduct and in a description of my character; and I thought it was not remarkable that I should take an opportunity of expressing what I thought a very just view of the position of the individual, of his conduct, and of his language. The next charge against us in this lengthy innuendo of the noble Earl seems to be one which he has made before. It is perfectly erroneous; but it is impossible to notice, at the time, every erroneous statement. They are always sure to re-appear again when the noble Earl is concerned. He has taken this opportunity of declaring that my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) and myself have asserted that there never was any difference of opinion in the Cabinet. No such statement ever was made by me or by my noble Friend. We said there had been no change in the policy of the Cabinet. We adhered to the policy which we understood those two distinguished Noblemen who resigned had accepted, and which I understood they were prepared to carry into effect. We thought they had given their adherence to a policy which, when the time came to carry into effect, they shrank from the responsibility of so doing. That I deeply regret. It was a policy that declared, until British interests were in danger, we should not feel it our duty to counsel war with Russia. It was said that was a contracted policy, but it was a distinct and definite policy. When the time came, and we thought British interests were in danger, and we appealed to our Colleagues to act according to such circumstances, they did not think it consistent with their duty to

  489
  do so. But the policy of the Cabinet was not changed. The statement that I or my noble Friend ever declared to this House that there had been no difference of opinion in the Cabinet between its various Members is one utterly unfounded. No such statement was ever made. I think I have noticed pretty well the different points of the noble Earl's remarks. This criticism upon a dinner is difficult to meet. What we complain of the noble Earl and his Friends is not that they ask Questions, but that they ask Questions on the most limited subjects, and of the most limited interest. For instance, what was the Question which the noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery) introduced the other night? Really I forget what the subject was, but it was one of a limited character. I think he asked for some explanation about that Memorandum which was surreptitiously obtained and published to the detriment of the Public Service. Now, that Question was of a limited character. It was answered completely by my noble Friend the Secretary of State, who took the opportunity of explaining the matter in a way that must have been gratifying to those who were not acquainted with the details of the case. But the occasion was taken to produce what my noble Friend calls a debate of considerable interest— that is to say, a well-prepared debate— a debate conducted by noble Lords who had prepared their speeches, and who were ready to assail, as they did assail, the Government—but a debate ending with no Motion and beginning with no Notice. That, I say, is a very unsatisfactory way of conducting business, and I repeat my objection to such tactics. The noble Earl says that during the last five years of the late Administration, when there were Questions of great interest in regard to their foreign policy, I never unsheathed my sword. Well, I was not aware that, during the five years in which the late Government administered our affairs, Questions of foreign policy did considerably attract their attention. Indeed, I think it was very much regretted by the country that those Questions were generally neglected by the late Government. The most important Question of that kind that probably occurred during their Administration was that relating to the policy which referred the American
  490
  claims—the Alabama claims—to arbitration. Certainly, I did not unsheath my sword at that time to attack Her Majesty's Government. But when Her Majesty's Government were attacked at a time of considerable peril, and when many of their Friends were not ready to support them, I did then unsheath my sword to defend and uphold a policy which, though I could not approve all its details, I believed to be, on the whole, a wise policy. We heard, as I say, very little of foreign policy during the Administration of the late Government. Those Questions were generally neglected, and we have suffered in consequence; but, on the most important occasion, I was, at least, their humble defender. I think I have now touched upon most of the points comprised in the noble Earl's definition of innuendo. I do not myself wish to speak in the way of innuendo on this matter; and I would say, that if the noble Earl and his Friends do not approve of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, if they think the Convention of June 4th is an "insane Convention"—and I understand they have adopted the policy which that epithet describes—I think it is their duty to ask the opinion of this House and of Parliament on the subject. That is the constitutional mode of proceeding. It is not by little petty criticism—it is not by asking little questions and making long speeches—it is not by calling your Lordships' attention to questions of the greatest importance without giving due notice of an intention of making speeches, and shrinking after making those speeches from the Motions which would test your Lordships' real opinion —it is not, I say, by such methods that I think an Opposition can recommend itself to the confidence of the people of this country.
  LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICKsaid, it was impossible not to deeply regret that the ability and energy displayed in bringing about a settlement of the question that had occupied so much of the attention of Europe had not been applied from the beginning in defending the Treaties which had been attacked. Though he held sentiments on this subject which were not shared by many noble Lords on his side of the House, it certainly was not his intention to defend the whole course of action pursued by Her Majesty's Government. It

  491
  was not his intention to enter into any analysis of the past; he should content himself with dealing with the two Treaties as they stood at that moment. He was of opinion that the general settlement which had been effected for Turkey in Europe was not one which could be perfectly defended from any point of view. From a Turkish point of view, the concessions made by Her Majesty's Government were too extensive; from a Russian point of view, they were not large enough. The arrangements were too delicate and complex to have much chance of permanency. In his opinion, the European portions of the Treaties were not destined to be practically useful, or of long endurance; but his chief purpose was to call their Lordships' attention to the Convention of the 4th June—that Convention for which Her Majesty's Government stood singly responsible, and respecting which many erroneous impressions had been disseminated. Now, what was the character of that Convention? It bound the Government of the Porte to make reforms in the administration of Asiatic Turkey, and to make them to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government. On the other hand, it bound England to defend the Asiatic territory of the Porte in case of necessity. Now, it was contended, in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, that the Porte could not effect those reforms alone, and that England could not assist it to do so without taking the government of Asia Minor into her own hands, which was much to be deprecated. It became important, therefore, to ascertain what was the nature of the reforms which the Porte would be expected to effect in her Asiatic Kingdom. If those reforms were to be of a very extensive, complex, or elaborate character, he should despair of the Porte being able to carry them out, either assisted or unassisted. They had heard a noble Earl on that side of the House, not long since Governor General of India (the Earl of Northbrook) descant on the immense responsibilities which the Porte had undertaken in promising those reforms. The late Governor General of India had spoken of the necessity of establishing a good revenue system, a good judicial system, a good system of popular education, a good system of public works, the creation of an order of intelligent and useful proprietors to
  492
  stand between the Turkish Government and the people, the reform and reorganization of the Army, which was to be placed under the command of English and other European officers, and the erection of a line of fortresses to secure the country from future Russian attacks. If all these reforms were necessary for the prosperity and happiness of Asia Minor, the task would be indeed difficult, if not impossible; but, as a fact, they could not be reasonably expected from the Government under present circumstances. First, in regard to the Turkish revenue system. That system, he believed, was the only system possible in the state of society now existing in the country. It was almost identical with the revenue system in India, the main feature of which was the exaction of a certain proportion of the produce of the country by the Government from the country. If the matter were fully examined into, and the totality of taxation in Turkey was compared with the weight of taxation which existed in some European States—in Russia and Italy, for instance—it would be found that the Turkish system was not more oppressive than the systems which obtained in the countries he had named. The Turkish system was not in itself oppressive; it was the manner in which was imposed that made it crushing. Again, it was very desirable to establish good laws and a good judicial system; but that was the most difficult task of all. Why, in some parts of British India, which had now been under English influence for so many years, the judicial system was still so corrupt that the humblest subject of Her Majesty was not allowed to be tried before a criminal court in a Native State. God forbid that he should say that it was not necessary that Turkey should have better tribunals; all he asserted was that the reform presented one of those problems which in any country, but especially in a semi-barbarous country, it was very difficult to solve. Then, again, the Turkish Government was to be called upon to immediately establish a good system of popular education. Talk of popular education in Asia Minor!—why, at this moment, there were large provinces of British India which had been subjected to our humane and intelligent rule for half-a-century, in which not 6 or 10 per cent of the population could

  493
  either read or write. He himself went to India with an ardent and a sincere desire to see a good system of elementary education established in those parts with which he was connected. He was assisted in that desire by a gentleman of the highest ability, who had devoted his whole life to the cause of education; yet he was compelled to leave the country without having accomplished his object. In fact, he was driven to this conclusion— that it was better, on the whole, that the people should remained untaxed and ignorant. Next, Turkey was called upon to promote a good system of public works. Nothing was more desirable and politic; but where was the money to come from? They would not find it in Turkey; it would, indeed, be an insult to the indigence and misery of the country to ask the Government to raise the money. Were Her Majesty's Government, then, to be asked to give guarantees? Were the people of this country to be asked to find the money for making public works on the territory upon which they had already poured millions without any return, or the slightest prospect of return? The noble Earl the late Governor General of India insisted with much earnestness upon the absolute necessity of establishing a class of landed proprietors to stand between the Government and the labouring classes. Far be it from him to undervalue the importance and utility of a class of intelligent, humane, and philanthropic landed proprietors, to any country; it certainly was of the highest importance that such a class should exist in the Dominions of the Sultan; but, unfortunately, those landed proprietors, unless their power was very much limited and controlled, would not be the sort of men that his noble Friend would like to see instituted. The existence of large classes of landed proprietors had not been found beneficial in Oriental countries. In fact, people flourished best in those parts where equality prevailed, and where there were either few or no proprietors at all. He might cite the case of Bulgaria in contrast to that of Bosnia, where the people were oppressed and discontented, and, consequently, given to assassination. Bulgaria enjoyed a very fair share of material prosperity, yet there were no gentlemen in Bulgaria. Once more,
  494
  it was insisted that Turkey ought to reform and re-organize her Army, placing it under the command of British officers. Now, of all the bad advice which it was possible to offer to the Government of the Sultan, that was the worst. It meant an increase of expenditure where there ought to be a deduction. It was this preposterous expenditure on military and naval purposes that had been the curse and the ruin of Turkey. He could not too strongly deprecate, too, any proposition for committing the Turkish Army to the command of British officers. He trusted that in this matter Her Majesty's Government would exercise great caution and judgment, and that they would abstain from pressing upon the Turkish Government the desirability of inviting foreigners to fill places either of civil or military authority. If the foreigners were not Englishmen, they might expect that they would not respect either the policy or the interests of this country; and, therefore, their introduction into the Government of Turkey would be a serious and dangerous innovation. Her Majesty's Government had no notion of anything of the kind. If we were prematurely and imprudently to urge on a policy of this nature, we should inspire the Porte with the profoundest, most incurable, suspicion of the intentions of our Government, and drive it from our side to seek protection and support from Russia or some other European Power. With reference to the proposal to immediately set to work to fortify Asiatic Turkey and create new ramparts, it seemed to him to be most unreasonable and unnecessary; for, not to speak of the expense such a course would involve, we have given a guarantee, which was the chief defence of Turkey, and would enable her for a time to do without other defences. The necessary remedy for the misfortunes and sufferings of Asia Minor was to his mind very simple. It was one which was enjoyed by the Children of Israel after they had taken possession of Canaan, and after they had become wearied by many struggles and vicissitudes. It was described in the Book of Judges in these words—"And the land had rest 40 years." Asia Minor required rest from the tax-gatherer, from the recruiting officers, from enforced labour; and there was no insuperable difficulty

  495
  in obtaining this repose for some years. It might be said that rest was a very good thing, but the Turkish Government was incapable of giving it. He did not believe there would be any difficulty in that way, although the condition of the populations of Asia Minor had been an unhappy one, and their history had been darkened by atrocities; still, relatively, that condition had not been so bad as might be supposed. It would be unjust and unreasonable to suppose that the inhabitants of Asia Minor had ever enjoyed the same security for life and property, and the same certainty of justice, as Her Majesty's Indian subjects did; but, in many places, they had enjoyed as large a share of material prosperity as in some parts of India and Russia, and even in some parts of this country. When he visited Asia Minor, he always asked the Consuls what was the condition of the people, and one Consul told him that their condition was middling. The Mussulmans were better off in some particulars, because they did not drink, and the Christians were better off in another sense, because they were not compelled to serve in the Army. If that was the condition of the country, the great thing they wanted was repose, and he did not see why the Turkish Government could not obtain and secure that rest. He saw no reason to fear for the future. In Asia Minor there was no organized political conspiracy, no wild spirits of revolt. The Kurds might come down upon the Nestorians, the Druses upon the Maronites, and the Bedouins upon all who possessed houses; but these were partial, accidental, and controllable evils, and, with a moderate military establishment, the Porte could stop these acts of brigandage and sectarian animosity if they had a mind to do it, and secure for the community a tolerable amount of material peace. The question arose, then, what could the Turkish Government do, and what could Her Majesty's Government do to assist the Porte? He thought it was very undesirable that Her Majesty's Government should force in any new controlling power between the Porte and her subjects; but there was a permissable organization already to hand through which we could act more freely, and that was the Consular body, which, in many cases, had rendered most substantial and valuable services,
  496
  and which gave great energy and efficiency to its actions, without infringing upon the Sovereignty of the Porte. It might be that we were to engage in more active interventions than hitherto, and that some improvements should be effected in the character of our Consular arrangements; and, if so, he would advise that the Consular body should be strengthened by a large importation of the military element, and that we should look to the officers who had been engaged in political and administrative functions in India. There were many instances in which, in India, Consuls had exercised salutary and beneficial influences, and an example could be found in the House in one who filled an important political office for more than 10 years, as Consul General of Beyrout, during which period it was said that not a mouse could stir in the Lebanon without the knowledge of Colonel Rose. For many years he might be said to have pacified and ruled the greater part of Syria. He created no jealousy whatever, and was equally confided in by the Mussulman authorities and the Christian populations. By improving and extending their Consular establishments, they would do much to procure for Asia Minor that repose, and eventually those reforms of which she stood so much in need. He did not undervalue the responsibility that would attach to our Ambassador at Constantinople. It would be necessary that he should incessantly enforce upon the Turkish Government the duty of fulfilling their promises and effecting legitimate reforms. The other evening he had heard an expression fall from a noble Earl on his side of the House, but who was not now present, which caused him sincere regret. He said that Sir Austen Layard was more of a Turk or a philo-Turk, than the Turks themselves. He was sorry to hear such an expression fall from one of so much authority with reference to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who had been exposed, in the performance of his arduous and responsible duties, to so much misrepresentation. He had had the advantage of knowing Sir Austen Layard for a very long period. He had recently, by the course of events, been identified with the Turkish Government. It had been his duty to give that Government energetic and invaluable support;

  497
  but it must not be supposed that because he had performed his duty in that respect he was insensible to the highest claims of the Christian population. Sir Austen Layard belonged to the school of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and he would venture to say that when the proper time came it would be found that there was no more ardent defender, no more enlightened and liberal advocate, of the claims and rights of the Christian subjects of Turkey than the British Ambassador at the Porte. If the task was to be an arduous one for the Ambassador, so also the Foreign Office must bestir itself. It must not be satisfied to hold its hands. It must, for years to come, keep its attention fixed on the question of Asiatic Turkey. He would even go so far as to say that the Government might be obliged to have recourse to some military demonstration, and they did not suppose the reform of Asia Minor could be carried out without some risk of that sort. They remembered the terrible explosion of Turkish fanaticism in the Lebanon, and the French Government did not shrink from the responsibility of sending a large Force to Syria to show that they were not to be trifled with. They amply fulfilled the duty they undertook, and the result was that peace had prevailed ever since. Then it was said that we had guaranteed the Turkish frontier in Asia, and this was objected to on these grounds. This Guarantee, it was said, placed us in a position of permanent antagonism to Russia; in the second place, it imposed on us obligations dangerous, and exactly in case of difficulties arising from other Powers; and, thirdly, it was urged that the Guarantee was not necessary for our own interests. He could not agree with any of those arguments. So far from embroiling us with Russia, he thought it would have quite the opposite effect. From the moment this Guarantee was signed, our relations with Russia would probably be better than they were before. It was only necessary to tell Russia what we wanted, and there would be no disposition to interfere with us. The responsibility we should incur by this Guarantee was only greater because it was single; but we knew what the contingency was, and we could be prepared for it; and his experience of Russia was that she would not come into collision with England, if she knew definitely what England insisted upon. Lord Palmer-
  498
  ston's despatches proved that, and he was certain the attitude now adopted by Her Majesty's Government would result in their being on better terms with Russia than before. It was said that by the Convention we had enormously increased our responsibility. But the responsibility was only greater because it was single and more direct; and whereas, formerly, we scarcely knew what it might involve us in, we were now aware what was the contingency which would render it necessary for us to act, and must be prepared for it accordingly. It might be observed that the responsibility extended over so large a range of territory that no wise Government would have incurred it. But there never was a more prudent Administrator in the world than the Earl of Aberdeen, and yet he signed a Treaty by which he engaged the honour of England in defence of the 49th parallel as the boundary of our North American possessions; and if that vast territory, extending across an entire Continent, was defended by anything, it was defended simply by the Guarantee and prestige of England. Nor was the multiplication of such Guarantees necessarily dangerous. His belief was that the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs might go into his cabinet, pull down the map fixed to the wall, and, with his pencil, trace a line across the wilds of Afghanistan or the woods of America; and if that line in any measure expressed the true interests and real resolutions of the British people, it would not be lightly transgressed by any Power. That line might run where no human foot, had ever before trod; but still it would remain inviolate, because it would be protected by the unseen yet irresistible genius of our country's destiny. He trusted that Her Majesty's Government would not be prevented from undertaking responsibility of this nature by the apprehension that it might tend to excite the enmity of foreign Powers. The Guarantee might not be immediately necessary in view of British interests; but it would eventually be so, and it was just as easy to establish it now as at any other time. It might have been better to have given the Guarantee to Afghanistan instead of to Turkey in Asia Minor, yet the road to India in that direction would probably be established at some period or

  499
  another, and when it was established, the further Russian power was kept from it the better. The Russians were not at present in a condition to endanger our interests in Asia Minor; but still, the whole of that territory had been over and over again traversed by hostile armies; and if Russia were allowed to encroach on the provinces of Asia Minor, the time might come when her attitude would create a feeling of insecurity as to our communications with India. It might be said that it was not possible to defend the Convention of the 4th of June, inasmuch as by it we had not only undertaken a separate responsibility, but left the European concert. Was that objection a well-founded one? Was it true that, having contracted a separate Treaty, we had isolated ourselves from European action? He thought the objection was not well-founded, it being perfectly consistent with previous policy to frame and sign a separate Treaty. What occurred in 1856? In that year there was a general Treaty of adjustment and peace; but Her Majesty's then Government, not being satisfied with its stipulations, negotiated and signed a separate Treaty of Guarantee, with Austria and France, for the protection of the Turkish Empire. On this occasion, Her Majesty's Government had followed, though in a different form, exactly the same course. Having signed a general Treaty of adjustment and peace, they had negotiated a separate Treaty, not with two Powers— because two Powers were not available for their policy—but with Turkey, because that Power was necessary for their policy; and, therefore, he said that this separate Treaty was strictly conformable to precedent. The last objection upon which many persons had founded their opposition to the Convention was that it had been negotiated in secret, and not in communion with other Powers. It had even been stated that it was a departure from the character of British diplomacy. He did not deny that the diplomacy of England was more open than that of other Powers; but it certainly would be very erroneous for one moment to infer from that, that Her Majesty's Government were not entitled to negotiate in secret a Treaty when, as in this transaction, secrecy was expedient. It was not necessary to go far back for an example of an important Treaty negotiated in secret. The first great diplo-
  500
  matic transaction of which he had any knowledge in early life was the Treaty of 1840. How was that Treaty negotiated? In this way. The Liberal Government of that time had exhausted every means of coming to an understanding with France for the pacification of affairs in the East. What did Lord Palmerston do? Did he negotiate a Treaty in public? No. With the greatest energy, he undertook the negotiation of a secret Treaty with the Northern Powers, and the French Ambassador knew nothing about it until Lord Palmerston handed it to him himself across the Table. The negotiation of that Treaty placed Lord Palmerston at the head of European diplomacy, and England, for years, in the van of Europe, just as at the present moment the diplomacy of the noble Earl opposite had done. It was always a painful thing for a person to advocate opinions which were antagonistic with the opinions of the Leaders of the Party to which he was attached by birth and education. He was unable to state exactly how far his opinions were antagonistic with those of the noble Lords who sat on the front Opposition Benches, because he had not heard those opinions expressed with sufficient accuracy. It was even possible that the opinions of the noble Lords did not entirely agree the one with another. But he must admit that he was at variance with that great Leader of his Party in ''another place"—a statesman to whom he must always look with the greatest reverence and gratitude, on account of the immense service which, in past times, he had rendered to his Party and to his country. No one regretted more than he did that he was unable to agree with the opinions of the right hon. Gentleman; but the interests which had been brought under discussion in those debates were interests with which his official life in former times had identified him so much, that he did not feel at liberty to subordinate his impressions to those of any other person.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONsaid, that when he rose to address their Lordships, a short time ago, he had certainly no intention of travelling over the wide field which the noble Lord who had last spoken (Lord Napier and Ettrick) had traversed. He would endeavour to correct some misapprehensions into which the noble Earl the Prime Minister seemed to have

  501
  fallen, and to point out some forgetfulness to which he had been subject with respect to the course taken in that House on the Eastern Question. The noble Earl complained that although Questions had been addressed to the Government, no Motion had been made nor issue joined. The noble Earl could scarcely have recollected the nature of the Questions which had been put to Her Majesty's Government on the subject when he passed them over so lightly. Those Questions had related to the character and circumstances of the Island of Cyprus, which had recently been taken possession of on the part of Her Majesty. Noble Lords on his side of the House had been anxious to learn from Her Majesty's Government the capabilities of the Island; what was the law under which Her Majesty's subjects and the other inhabitants of the Island —who, he supposed, would remain subject to the Sultan, though under a special form of Administration by Her Majesty —would henceforth live; and on what principle justice was to be administered in the country. There had been, also, Questions which constituted an attempt to obtain from Her Majesty's Government some sort of explanation of the nature and meaning of what was called the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and the circumstances under which it had been negotiated. The noble Lord who had just sat down had given the House his interpretation of that Treaty; but Her Majesty's Government had not, so far as he was aware, condescended to give Parliament any information at all on the subject. The noble Earl observed that a Question was raised the other night by his noble Friend (the Earl of Rosebery). He said—"I forget what the Question was, but it was something about the Memorandum between the noble Marquess the Foreign Secretary and Count Schouvaloff." He was not surprised that the noble Earl should not desire to recollect that discussion, and the able speech of the noble Earl by whom it was introduced. No doubt, the noble Earl and the noble Marquess ran away from the discussion at the earliest possible period, and did not wait to receive the heavy shots fired at them from their own side in the latter part of the evening. The nature of the discussion was surely not unimportant, because it involved the inquiry, whether the manner in which Her
  502
  Majesty's Government had intended to treat Parliament was frank and open, and whether, if it had not been for the surreptitious disclosure of the Memorandum between the noble Marquess and Count Schouvaloff, the Papers laid upon the Table would have given a complete and honest statement of the course pursued by the Government? The noble Earl seemed to intimate that the Question was brought forward without Notice. He (the Marquess of Ripon) believed, however, that the Notice stood upon the Paper for a considerable number of days. Certainly, the course pursued by those who sat on that side of the House was not one which was not contemplated by the Rules and Practices of the House, because the fact that those Rules and Practices differed from those which prevailed in the House of Commons, showed that it had been found convenient to initiate discussions in their Lordships' House without terminating with a Motion. His experience of their Lordships' House was more extended than that of the noble Earl opposite, and he could only say that he had heard most interesting discussions raised and carried on in that manner. Then the noble Earl, when he was challenged with not having himself followed, when in Opposition, the course which he so kindly recommended to the present Opposition, said—"I could not do that, because no important questions of foreign policy occurred under the late Administration." Well, he was not quite sure whether it was the best test of a foreign policy that it should be very noisy, and bring the country very near the verge of war. He was by no means sure that a foreign policy of which little was heard, but which kept the country at peace, and on good terms with its Allies, was not really the best and soundest foreign policy after all. In point of fact, however, there were a considerable number of important questions, relating to foreign affairs, going on during the period the noble Earl referred to. The noble Earl himself mentioned the question of the Treaty with America. Then there was the Franco-German War; and one of the most important Treaties ever entered into by any Ministry in this country was made by his noble Friend behind him (Earl Granville), for the purpose of maintaining the independence of Belgium. Again, there was the Treaty of 1871, for the revision

  503
  of the Treaty of 1856. He was not going to find fault with the noble Earl because he did not violently attack the foreign policy of the late Government; but he might remark that the noble Earl, as Leader of the Opposition, did take advantage of many of those occasions to make serious criticisms and complaints, though he did not bring his criticisms and complaints to the test of a division. Of course, every Opposition must be the best judges of the course they ought to pursue; and he was sure that the noble Earl himself would have been the last man in the world, when in Opposition, to have shaped his course in accordance with recommendations emanating from the Treasury Bench. He would now ask their Lordships to allow him, for a few moments, to make some observations on the larger and more important questions which had been touched upon in the speech of the noble Lord behind him. He, for one, very much agreed with the noble Lord in the estimate which he appeared to place on the future results of the Treaty of Berlin. The noble Lord said, that if that Treaty stood alone, it would not be likely to be a very permanent arrangement, and that it was the kind of thing upon which future difficulties might, from time to time, arise. That appeared to him to be also the opinion of the noble Earl opposite; because, in his speech last Saturday, as reported in the morning papers, he said the very same thing. The noble Earl said—
  "If we had made the Treaty of Berlin, and had not made the Anglo-Turkish Convention, we should have been told that there was no permanent security, and that after the lapse of 10 or 11 years these questions might turn up again."
  The noble Earl also stated, that if the Government had spoken out, and adopted the course which, he believed, they ought to have taken, the war last year would not have occurred. The truth seemed to be this, that the noble Earl had shrank—he considered most wisely —from involving this country in war for the objects for which we must have fought if we had taken up arms on behalf of Turkey; and, in his opinion, that was the strongest condemnation that could be pronounced on the policy of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Our vital interests might be attacked in other quarters; "but," said the noble Earl, "on no such ground as that must
  504
  we withdraw from our obligations in Asia Minor." Whatever the circumstances of the time, the future Governments of England were to be debarred, so far as the noble Earl could debar them, from exercising, on behalf of the country, the discretion which statesmen ought to possess. Furthermore, if the policy of the Anglo-Turkish Convention was a sound policy, it was in itself the strongest possible condemnation of some portions of the Treaty of Berlin. If the noble Earl could bind the future Ministers of this country as he desired to bind them, surely, when he proposed to convert the Asiatic frontier of Turkey into the frontier of this country for military purposes, so far as attack from Russia was concerned, he ought not to have yielded up, in the Treaty of Berlin, the strongholds of that frontier to the enemy he professed to dread? With regard to the complaint which had been made by the noble Lord behind him (Lord Napier and Ettrick) as to the absence of his noble Friend the late Governor General of India (the Earl of Northbrook) and other Peers on the present occasion, he would remark that it was not usual in their Lordships' House to refer at great length to speeches delivered in a previous debate, and that noble Lords could not be expected to be present when reference was being made to their conduct of which they had received no warning. On the general question his noble Friend's (the Earl of Northbrook's) argument appeared to be this — Her Majesty's Government had undertaken, by this Anglo-Turkish Convention, special obligations for the good government of Asiatic Turkey, and it would be impossible to carry out those obligations without providing a sound system of finance, and education, of public works, and a satisfactory administration of justice. But it was said Turkey could not provide anything of the kind. No doubt, that was so; but it was just because Turkey could not do anything of the kind, and just because England had undertaken to accomplish such a task, through the Turkish Government—a task which was almost beyond human power—that he, for one, objected to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. There was one feature of that Convention which had not been much alluded to, but which he thought well worthy of consideration. It was

  505
  this—the principle upon which it was founded was, in reality, a reversal of one of the main principles of the Treaty of 1856, which was the substitution of the collective Protectorate of Europe for the individual Protectorate of any particular country. In the Treaty of Berlin there were certain collective engagements on the part of the Powers, of which he would only say that they were very good indeed on paper, but that their value depended entirely upon the mode in which they were carried out, and that they did not seem to him to go very much beyond the engagements made in 1856. But in Asiatic Turkey, by virtue of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, England had undertaken a special and individual responsibility of a nature so serious, that to fail in it would be a disgrace and a shame to us. That responsibility was one which it did not seem wise or sound policy for this country to undertake. He would not venture to pronounce the Anglo-Turkish Convention an "insane Convention," because that was a phrase which did not seem to have secured the approbation of the noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield); but he would say it was one of the most dangerous and unwise engagements into which any Minister of this country had ever entered. The noble Earl said he did not know what were the views taken by the Opposition as to the course to be pursued in regard to Asiatic Turkey. Well, it was not the business of the Opposition to provide measures of detail in regard to a question upon which they had such a very limited amount of information as the present one. At the same time, the information they possessed seemed to him sufficient to show that the engagements entered into by Her Majesty's Government were of the character which he had ventured to state. If, however, the intentions of Her Majesty's Government had been misapprehended in this matter, the explanation was to be found in the persistency with which Her Majesty's Government had kept Parliament in the dark with regard to the whole scope of their policy, as it affected the relations of this country with other Powers. It was this want of frankness on the part of the Government which had all along constituted the difficulty in the discussion of this subject, and which increased the conviction, looking to the whole scope of
  506
  the engagements into which this country had entered, apart from the other countries of Europe, that Her Majesty's Government had once more departed from that European concert, which, if they had maintained it, would have prevented all these troubles.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the noble Marquess who has just sat down has, I think, rather misapprehended the nature of the complaint we have ventured to make with respect to the conduct of Business by Her Majesty's Opposition in this House. We complain that they have departed, in two respects, from what we have always considered to be the legitimate mode of conducting Business, and from the traditions of other Oppositions. Formerly, it used to be regarded as the duty of the Opposition, whenever they entertained a strong objection to the policy of the Government upon any great and capital question, to lay their objections before Parliament, and put them to the test of a division. This has always been done on all great questions where the Opposition of the day has challenged the policy of the Government of the day. I will speak only of what is within my own recollection. I remember two capital questions upon which the Opposition differed from, and condemned strongly, the policy of the Government. There was, first, the Chinese Question. That was condemned by us very strongly; but did we satisfy ourselves, in either House, by putting small Questions night after night, and getting up desultory discussions? On the contrary, a formal Motion of Condemnation was moved—and a formal division was taken in both Houses— and, if I remember rightly, we were defeated in one, but were successful in the other. The next great question upon which we differed deeply from the Government of the day was the Danish Question—a question of prime European importance. No doubt, there were during the whole of the Session preceding the ultimate negotiations occasional discussions. When, however, we were in a position to challenge the policy of the Government, a formal Motion was made, and a division taken, and in that case, again, we were successful in one House and unsuccessful in the other. If you will go further back, you will find that the run of precedents is unmistakable; and there can be no doubt

  507
  that the precedents agree with that which is the rational and intelligible course to take—namely, that this House should, like the other, be allowed to express its views in a formal manner, and have the result recorded on the Journals of the House. But that is not our only complaint. We complain that these desultory discussions invert the usual order of proceeding. The strange fate seems to pursue them, that the discussions never have any logical connection with the Notice by which they are introduced. The first Notice given was that by the noble Earl (the Earl of Camper-down), whom I do not see in the House. The noble Earl brought under our notice a very limited question—whether the Government would lay on the Table details of the financial arrangements with the Turkish Government about Cyprus?—a question about as small as it is possible to conceive; and upon that question was raised the whole matter of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the question whether slavery existed in Cyprus, and what we intended to do with it, and the whole question of the future government of Cyprus, and the powers now vested in the Government of the Queen. Then the noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery) called attention to a certain document which had been surreptitiously obtained from the Foreign Office; and I am bound to say, in his own remarks, he did not wander much beyond the narrow record he had prescribed to himself. But what did we have? We had the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Ripon), and the noble Earl who recently left the Cabinet (the Earl of Carnarvon), making speeches which had come too late for the debate on the first night after the return of the Plenipotentiaries, when the whole question of the Congress of Berlin was discussed. The same fate has pursued them now. The noble Lord (Lord Campbell) has put down a large Notice on the Paper which would cover a debate of great extent, and we are treated to a lengthened criticism on what took place at a dinner at Knights-bridge. We prefer that the time-honoured practice should be pursued. If noble Lords opposite entertain deep objections to the policy that has been pursued—if they pronounce it unsound —if they think it worthy of the great efforts made in the other House—we think that this House ought also to be
  508
  allowed the opportunity of recording on the Journals its own judgment on the policy pursued. But if the Opposition will not take this course—if they persist in bringing forward this succession of petty debates—at least, we have a right to ask that the Notices on the Paper shall give some indication of the speeches which are to be made. But, my Lords, the speeches we have heard to-night have been devoted to a criticism of something beyond what took place in the House; and since it pleases the noble Marquess who has just sat down (the Marquess of Ripon) to answer speeches not made here, but at the dinner at Knights-bridge—where I am afraid there was no chance of finding him—I regret he did not study more carefully the documents he proposed to answer. As I understand my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Beaconsfield), the ground on which he asserted that we have not increased our responsibility by the Anglo-Turkish Convention was this— that the policy of preventing Russia from acquiring an influence would diminish instead of increase our responsibilities.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONinterposed a remark which was not heard.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I regret if I misrepresent the noble Marquess; but I repeat my impression is that the charge he brought against my noble Friend behind me was that he had defended the Convention on the ground that it did not increase our responsibilities but would diminish them.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: What I did say was this. I understood the noble Earl opposite to say that he admitted the Berlin Treaty alone would not be of a permanent character, and that, therefore, it was necessary to make up for its defects. That was the part of the speech to which I referred; and I stated that the policy of the Government had increased our responsibility; but I did not say this with reference to the speech of the noble Earl on Saturday.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Then it comes to this—that we have increased our responsibility. Our ground is simply this—whatever happens, whatever Party be in power, we feel convinced, knowing what the spirit of the people of the country is, that they will never tolerate that Russian influence

  509
  shall be supreme in the valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris. We take that as a firm point of departure, and we challenge you to contradict it if you think we are wrong by an appeal to Parliament. But, if that is true, so far from increasing the responsibilities of England, we have diminished them by announcing beforehand to Russia the policy which, in all cases, the nation is determined to pursue, and we illustrate the value of that precaution by referring to all that was lost in the Crimean War by want of similar frankness. It has been established again and again, and on the best authority—on the authority of the Emperor Nicholas himself—that if he had known what the policy of the English Government was—what the English people would definitely oppose—he never would have taken those steps from which he could not retreat, and he never would have pledged his honour to the pursuit of a disastrous war. We desire to save the Russian Government in the future from that danger, and therefore we have placed upon public record, in the most solemn and unmistakable manner, the policy which we believe the English people are determined to pursue; and in so doing I think we have given character and plainness and frankness to English diplomacy which, perhaps, in recent years, it was in danger of losing. Those misty and shadowy guarantees which bound you to everything in theory, and which turned out, in practice, to bind you to nothing, were anything but honourable to the character of European diplomacy. There was, for instance, the Tripartite Treaty, which engaged in the strongest language possible the Governments of Austria, France, and England, to make it a casus belli if any of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris were broken. But when the hour of trial came, and the provisions of the Treaty of Paris were broken, it was found that the Guarantee was collective; and that, therefore, it was not binding on those who made it. I think it is time that the practice of making pledges of this kind was abandoned in the diplomacy of Europe. We claim, at all events, that we have made a pledge which will be easily understood by those whom it concerns; and therefore it is that I am not alarmed even by the condemnation passed on it by the noble Lord, when he declares that we have de-
  510
  parted from the "European concert." What will the future historian think of the "European concert " when he comes to record what that concert has promised and what it performed? The "European concert" in 1856 was to preserve the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire; and certainly a more imposing machinery could not be devised. But 20 years have passed, and not one member of the "European concert" has lifted its hand in defence of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. I am not complaining of this result, but of pledges being made, which must have misled Turkey, on the one hand, and taught Russia, on the other, to despise them. I think it is better that we should come to a simpler form of engagement, in which, only two Powers being mixed up, there can be no doubt as to the pledges being fulfilled. It is, perhaps, characteristic of these debates and Motions that we should, in our speeches, have wholly forgotten the Motion of the noble Lord who introduced it. There was much in the noble Lord's speech which was complimentary to the Government; therefore; I need not notice it; but there is one observation which I should not pass over without remark. The noble Lord seemed to be under the impression that the Russian occupation would last over nine months, and he said we were guilty of great credulity in thinking that it would terminate in that time. It is impossible to compete with prophecy, and I will not put my prophecy against that of the noble Lord. But if he will examine the Protocols he will find that the subject of the evacuation of Turkey in Europe was one to which the Government of Austria attached intense importance; and if England and Austria agree that the Russian Army shall not remain there, the Russian Army must retreat. Therefore, I think the noble Lord need be under no apprehension in that respect. I have not the faintest suspicion that Russia desires in any way to depart from the engagement so solemnly made. On the contrary, the Russian Plenipotentiaries came forward at the end of the Congress, and offered to bind themselves by engagements more than ordinarily solemn that, on their part, the Treaty would be observed; but we did not think it desirable to depart from the ordinary diplomatic practice of Treaties in this respect, and most of the Powers de-

  511
  clined to entertain the proposal Russia made. There was nothing in all that passed at the Congress Table, there is nothing in the present aspect of the diplomatic world, which justifies the slightest suspicion that Russia desires in any way to depart from the engagements into which she has solemnly and frankly entered.
  VISCOUNT CARDWELL: My Lords, we have arrived at an hour at which your Lordships do not desire to continue the debate, and I have not risen to do more than notice one or two remarks that have fallen from the noble Marquess who has just addressed you. He complains that we depart from the usual practice in not putting down a Motion on the subject, and he tells us what his side did when they differed from the late Government on questions of foreign policy. He did not tell us that his Friends knew perfectly well that they had a very considerable majority in the House at the time they so confidently appealed to it.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: We were beaten on the Chinese Question.
  VISCOUNT CARDWELL: But you did not expect to be; so that my noble Friend's answer is not quite so successful as he expected it to be. We were told by the Prime Minister earlier in the evening that our objections were very small; but, in spite of the view which the Government profess to take of them, we fail to obtain any information. The first Question raised by my noble Friend (the Earl of Rosebery) the other night related to the financial position of the Island of Cyprus; but though the Question was so small, we failed to obtain an answer. A similar result attended an effort to obtain information about the harbours and resources of Cyprus, as affecting our own liabilities. Next, a Question was asked as to the future laws under which Cyprus would be placed; objection was taken that no Notice had been given of the Question. But it was one which had been asked on a former occasion, when no answer whatever was given to it. Is it inconsistent with our practice to ask Questions about that which we want to know? I have been glad to hear from the noble Earl opposite one definite statement — that this Anglo-Turkish Convention is a certainty and reality; and that, being a Guarantee given by
  512
  ourselves, and not mixed up with foreign countries, it is one that will be carried into effect. To enable us to form a judgment, we wanted an answer to the Question whether it was to be a reality or not? We were anxious to know whether it was to realize the picture we have read of what is to happen, when the Turkish Government is reformed and purified, in that most fertile, most classical, and most interesting portion of the world? But these Questions were deemed not worth answering at all. Were the answers consistent with the Notices given and with the expectations we might justly entertain? The other House, presumably, will have to ask some Questions as to the bearing of these arrangements on the responsibility of the taxpayers of the country, and whether it will find the money or accept the new duties devolved by the Convention on the country? Surely, we are within our right in endeavouring to obtain clear views upon the subject? Are we to sit still and say nothing? Are we to propose Motions of Censure, condemning things of which we are as yet only imperfectly informed? Our duty is exactly that which we have discharged. It is very kind of the noble Earl the Prime Minister to take so much pains to impress upon us, line upon line, precept by precept, what it is our duty to do, and. how we are to conduct our own affairs. I am not surprised at it; he has educated his own Party with infinite skill and success; but if he finds us less amenable to his instructions, he cannot be astonished or disappointed.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: It is somewhat singular that that which my noble Friend does not accept as the duty of this House he affirms to be the duty of the other, and that the deficiency of information which he pleads as an excuse for inaction in this House does not deter the Leader of the Opposition in the other from moving a Resolution to condemn the Government; and that he is at this very moment, despite his want of information, engaged in thoroughly condemning every portion of our policy. It seems to be an unsatisfactory way of dealing with questions that affect the Government of the country, that those who may in their turn be called upon to administer affairs should be so doubtful as to the course that they would take on a great question that they confine them-

  513
  selves to criticism, and carefully refuse to commit themselves to anything they would do under any circumstances in which they might be placed. There is every readiness to take advantage of all the condemnation they can bring forward in the way they have done it in this House without showing the country in any respect what it is they think ought to be done at this time, and how far the country ought to be advised to go in order to get rid. of the engagements which have been entered into. They will not say whether they will support them hereafter or they will not; but they throw out insinuations of every kind which favour the supposition that this is not a sincere movement on the part of this country, and that no reliance can be placed on this country fulfilling its engagements. We take a different view; we enter into these engagements meaning to fulfil them. We have no idea of making Asia Minor a Garden of Eden or a Paradise; no such expressions have been used by Members of the Government. We are too well aware of the condition of things that has existed there—at the same time, we are not unwilling to do what we can to bring about a better. A gradual and a slow process it may be, but it is one which will promote the interests not only of England, but of the world; for it is well known that if that country were occupied by the great Power to which allusion has been so often made, that would materially affect the interests of this country and the destinies of the world. It was under these circumstances that my noble Friends undertook to enter into that Convention. They did it with the full assent of the Cabinet, and, having done so, they think it a poor kind of criticism which they are called upon to meet night after night —a carping criticism, which, instead of making definite charges against them or the document they have signed on behalf of the Government, indulges in vague insinuations. Nothing is done like to what was done in the cases of China and of Denmark, when we affirmed our views of the policy of the Government of the day. We have nothing now but criticism. Considering, also, the ingenious personal insinuations thrown out against some of us on more than one occasion, I am obliged to conclude that the only reason why the Opposition do not venture to propose a dis-
  514
  tinct Resolution is the consciousness that they will have, in so doing, the support, not of a majority, but of a very small minority, either of this House or of the country.
  LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, we have heard many charges in this and the other House as to the policy that was pursued by the late Government; but I am delighted to hear from noble Lords opposite that, although questions of the greatest importance in foreign policy were dealt with during the five years, no occasion arose upon which it was possible to found any clear and definite charge against the foreign policy of the Government.
  LORD HAMMONDpressed for an explanation of how the occupation of Cyprus would enable the Government to defend the Turkish frontier in Asia Minor and to watch over the internal administration of that country?
  LORD CAMPBELL, in reply, said, he understood that the Government acquiesced in his Motion for the Correspondence.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that no Notice having been given of the noble Lord's Motion, it was contrary to the Rules of the House to entertain it.
  LORD CAMPBELLcontinued, that on points of Order he was always ready to enhance the authority of the noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack, so much wanted in the House; but might still be permitted to make one observation on what had fallen from the noble Marquess the Secretary of State. He concurred with the noble Marquess that Austria and Great Britain, if united, would suffice to close the Russian occupation; but he could not forget that the whole history of the transactions which had so long engaged them prohibited reliance upon Austria as a controlling Power over Russia, in any policy the latter might be inclined to adopt.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, that Papers of the kind indicated in the noble Lord's Motion were on the point of being given to the House.
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, that in that case the object of the Motion was attained.

  POOR LAW—THE BOARDING-OUT SYSTEM.—QUESTION.
  VISCOUNT ENPIELDasked Her Majesty's Government, Whether the Local

  515
  Government Board have issued any fresh instructions or regulations with reference to the boarding-out of pauper children since the statement of the Lord President of the Council on that subject on the 5th of July, 1877?
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOKreplied, that two classes of pauper children were boarded out—those boarded out within the Union, and those outside the Union. The cases which had given rise to the noble Lord's Question were of two children who had been boarded within the Union, and they had undoubtedly been subjected to gross neglect. Since then—in September last—rules had been made with regard to pauper children boarded within the Union, which will, it is hoped, work very satisfactorily. In these rules it was laid down that the medical officer should report on the sanitary state of the house where it was proposed children should be boarded, and that not more than two children should be boarded together unless they belonged to the same family. The children were to be brought up as members of the family where they were boarded. The boarding-house was to be within two miles of a school; and the children were to be placed in families of the same religious opinions as their parents. The relieving officer was to pay the money weekly, and at the house, so that he would have the children continually under his eye; the medical officer was to visit them once a fortnight. Each case was to be reported to the Board of Guardians at the end of every quarter, and a general return was to be made annually. Two thousand five hundred children were now boarded out within Unions; outside the Unions the number of children boarded out were 423.

SCIENCE AND ART—HISTORICAL GALLERY OF CASTS.— QUESTION.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  EARL COWPERasked, Whether, considering the admitted importance of establishing a Historical Gallery of Casts from the Antique, according to the plan proposed by Mr. Walter Perry, the First Lord of the Treasury will take immediate steps to have a Report prepared which could be laid before Parliament, on the scope and limits of the collection, how it could be obtained, and the probable cost? The matter was one as to
  516
  the desirability of which there could be no question; and he was encouraged to put forward the subject, because two additional Memorials had been presented since he had last brought forward this subject. One was from the heads of the British Museum and the National Gallery; the other was signed by the Head Masters of Public Schools, and had attached to it the names of 26 gentlemen eminent in their profession. What he wanted was in the nature of a preliminary inquiry, which he believed there would be no difficulty in making. With regard to a site, there were rooms available at South Kensington quite large enough for a beginning. A grant of £10,000 for the purpose of establishing the collection would be all that would be required. The Commissioners of the Exhibition of 1851 were favourable to the design. The authorities of South Kensington were ready to perform their part, and the chief authorities of the Museums in this country and abroad were ready to give assistance. He hoped he should receive a favourable answer from the noble Earl at the head of the Government, who, it was well known, took much interest in the promotion of the arts.
  EARL GRANVILLEsupported the application of the noble Earl, and hoped the noble Earl at the head of the Government would give his consent to the preliminary inquiry—which was all that was asked at the present moment.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELDsaid, it was unnecessary to impress on Her Majesty's Government the interest and importance of the object which the noble Earl had in view. There had never been any hesitation on the part of the Government upon that head. Nor did he think there had been any difficulty on the score of expense, although he did not pledge himself on that point. He quite agreed that this was a matter in which many took a great deal of interest. The difficulty first felt by the Government arose in this way. There were at this moment many Collections and Museums urging their claims on the Government either for pecuniary assistance or for having sites conferred on them. Both these claims were difficult to deal with. The expenditure for an object such as that brought forward by the noble Earl might not be excessive; but a precedent once set would influence

  517
  other bodies to put forward their claims; and, therefore, they must be considered together by the Treasury in estimating the probable increase of expenditure. The matter was not so easily settled. There was another cause of delay. He had, perhaps imprudently, personally undertaken the attention of this business, and shortly afterwards he was very unexpectedly obliged to go abroad, and so it was neglected. He could say little more, therefore, than he said at the end of March; for, although several gentleman had been applied to to form a Treasury Committee, still nothing had been brought to a head, and the question was in the same state as at the end of March. Having candidly confessed his backsliding so far, he assured his noble Friends opposite it was a question which he fully appreciated, and he hoped during the Recess they should bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.
  House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.