Sitting of 31 January 1878

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN—Lord Charles Bruce, for Marlborough; Andrew Grant, esquire, for Leith District of Burghs.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Commons, appointed; Turnpike Acts Continuance, appointed and nominated.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered —First Heading —Parliamentary Elections (Boroughs)*[98],
Second Reading —Licensing Laws Amendment*[82].
Second Reading —Referred to Select Committee — Public Health Act (1875) Amendment*[66].
Committee —Report —House Occupiers Disqualification Removal [45]; Public Parks (Scotland)*[34].
Third Reading —Linen and Yarn Halls (Dublin)*[2], and passed.

ARMY—THE ROYAL WARRANT OF 1877—ARTICLE 88.—QUESTION.
MR. PRICEasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, in reference to Article 88 of the Royal Warrant of 1877, on the appointment, promotion, and retirement of officers, it is true that service rendered before the age of twenty will not be allowed to count in the case of officers applying for permission to retire on permanent half-pay under the provisions of Article 95; and, whether the words "other than on retired full-pay or half-pay" in Article 88 apply equally to the case of officers retiring on half-pay with liability to service under the provisions of Article 95, and to the case of officers who have an unqualified right to retire after twenty-five years' service, in accordance with the provisions of Article 119; and, if not, whether he would be willing to consider the expediency of allowing service before the age of twenty to count towards retirement in both cases?
MR. GATHORNE HARDY: Sir, service before 20 does not count for the permanent half-pay granted by Article 95. The words in Article 88 apply only to retired half-pay after 25 years' service granted by Article 119, and this will be made clearer in a revise of the clause. It has been decided to adhere to the age of 20 as the limit, except as regards the year's service allowed for Lucknow. The intention of the Warrant was that, for any new retirement created by the Warrant, service before the age of 20 should not count; but that as regards retirements already existing—and which will gradually die out—namely, retired full-pay and retired half-pay after 25 years' service—no change should be made. In the corrigenda Warrant about to be issued, it is proposed to insert a few words in Article 88 which shall make this quite clear.

HIGHWAYS BILL.—QUESTION.
SIR BALDWYN LEIGKHTONasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether, in the Highways Bill, he would be disposed to introduce a Clause for the regulation of wheels, seeing that since the removal of turn-

723
pike gates the width of wheels of ordinary vehicles has been in many cases altered, to the detriment of the roads?
MR. SCLATER - BOOTH,in reply, said, that in the Bill referred to by the hon. Baronet, which he hoped would be in the hands of hon. Members on, if not before, Saturday, he had introduced a clause which would enable County Boards, among other things, to mate regulations as to the width of the wheels of vehicles.

CROWN TEINDS (SCOTLAND)—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.
MR. J. W. BARCLAYasked the Lord Advocate, Whether he intends to introduce a Bill this Session dealing with the subject of Crown Teinds in Scotland?
THE LORD ADVOCATE,in reply, said, the subject of Crown Teinds in Scotland was under the consideration of the Government, but he could not give the hon. Gentleman any assurance that a Bill would be introduced this Session.

THE EASTERN QUESTION — BRITISH SUBJECTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOHN HAYasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If he will state to the House approximately the number of persons at Constantinople who are entitled to the protection of Great Britain?
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, in answer to my right hon. and gallant Friend, I have to state that we are now in communication with Constantinople on this subject, and I hope to be able to give the information in a day or two.

  INDIA—KHELAT—OCCUPATION OF QUETTA.—QUESTION.
  MR. GRANT DUFFasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he has any objection to lay upon the Table a Copy of a Despatch, from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy in Council, in reply to the Despatch of the Viceroy in Council (No. 50, of 1877) dated Fort William, March 23, 1877?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, the despatch asked for by my hon. Friend is a reply to the Viceroy's proposals for
  724
  the pacification of Beloochistan and the occupation of Quetta, and was sent through the Secret Department of the India Office. The Secretary of State might, therefore, refuse to produce it; but as some misapprehensions seem to be prevalent as to our reasons for occupying Quetta, my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) will not object to the publication of this despatch, in which a full explanation of the policy pursued by the Indian Government on their Northwest Frontier is given. Therefore, if the hon. Gentleman will move for it, it shall be laid on the Table.

EPPING FOREST—LEGISLATION.

  QUESTION.
  MR. COOPEasked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether he is prepared to bring in a Bill this Session in respect of the arrangement and future management of Epping Forest?
  MR. GERARD NOEL,in reply, said, the Government were preparing the Bill referred to; but he could not state at what time it would be introduced, as it depended upon the progress of other Business.

  THE EGYPTIAN OBELISK (CLEOPATRA'S NEEDLE).—QUESTION.
  MR. HEYGATEasked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether he proposes to take the opinion of the House before finally deciding on the site of the Egyptian obelisk, or in what manner it is proposed to elicit public opinion as to the position most suitable for its erection?
  MR. GERARD NOEL: Sir, when the announcement was first made that the Obelisk had left Alexandria and was coming to this country, it was intimated to me by the gentlemen who were bringing it over that they were anxious it should be placed in Parliament Square. I therefore requested that a model might be put up, in order to elicit public opinion; and, on the whole, I think public opinion was favourable to that site. We now find it cannot be erected there on account of the Metropolitan District Underground Railway, which runs exactly under that site, and I am informed that they demand a perpetual guarantee against accident, which, of course, could not be granted. Another site has now

  725
  been selected on the Embankment, at the Adelphi Steps, between the Charing Cross Railway Bridge and Waterloo Bridge. Over this site the Office of Works have no jurisdiction. It is under the control of my hon. and gallant Friend the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and he, no doubt, will facilitate the erection of the Obelisk there. Should, however, this site be found unsuitable, and another in the neighbourhood of the Parks or elsewhere has to be selected on the ground under the jurisdiction of the Office of Works, I assure my hon. Friend that I will give it careful consideration, and every opportunity shall be afforded for public criticism before any decision is arrived at.

  RAILWAYS—LEVEL CROSSING AT RADSTOCK.—QUESTION.
  MAJOR ALLENasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether it is the fact that the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Mellor, in their judgment of the 19th November last, "Be Bristol and Somerset and the Somerset and Dorset Railway Companies," ruled that the law is powerless to protect the public from the danger and nuisance at Radstock, where these competing lines obstruct the turnpike road in the middle of the town with two level crossings within sixty feet of one another; and, whether he can see his way to remedying the grievance complained of?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: Sir, as I appeared for the Board of Trade in the case to which allusion is made in the Question of the hon. and gallant Member, I have been requested by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade to reply on his behalf. The application which was made to the Queen's Bench Division of the Supreme Court, and with reference to which the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Mellor gave judgment on the 19th of November last, was an application under the Railway Clauses Act, 1863, Section 7, for a mandamus to oblige the Bristol and Somerset and the Somerset and Dorset Railway Companies—whose lines cross the turnpike road in the town of Rad-stock at a very short distance from each other on the level—to make a bridge for the purpose of carrying the turnpike road over their lines. It was clear from the nature of the case that a bridge over
  726
  one of the lines of railway would be of no service—indeed, could not be made; and in order that a sufficient viaduct should be constructed, it was essential that both Companies should join in the work. It appeared, however, that the Bristol and North Somerset Company was absolutely without funds and practically defunct, having made over its undertaking to the Great Western Company in perpetuity, and that if a mandamus were issued against the Bristol and Somerset Company it could not be enforced. The Court, therefore, decided, in the exercise of its discretion, to refuse the application altogether. With respect to the Great Western Company, the advisability of applying for a mandamus against them was considered by the legal advisers of the Board of Trade; but these gentlemen came to the conclusion that there was no obligation upon that Company to make or join in making the necessary works. I fear there is no remedy for the grievance complained of unless the Legislature be resorted to. It is to be regretted that the Railway Companies originally induced Parliament to sanction the crossing of a highway on the level by two lines of railway placed so near to each other as to create danger.

SERGEANT M'CARTHY—THE INQUIRY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. O'CONNOR POWERasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, having regard to the fact that the inquiry which he has ordered into the death of the late Sergeant M'Carthy must partake of a medical character, he will consider the propriety of associating with Sir James Ingham in that inquiry, an independent and unofficial medical man?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, that he informed Sir James Ingham when he appointed him to make an inquiry into the death of Sergeant M'Carthy that, if he required professional medical assistance, it would be afforded him.

  THE EASTERN QUESTION—TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION IN TURKEY.—QUESTION.
  MR. CHAPLINasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

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  Whether he can state to the House if it is true that all telegraphic communication between Adrianople and Constantinople is interrupted, and that all correspondents have been sent away from the Russian armies south of the Balkans?
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, in reply to the hon. Gentleman, I have to say that, with respect to the telegraphic communication between Adrianople and Constantinople, we have heard from Mr. Layard, and the despatch was laid on the Table yesterday (Turkey, No. 4), that telegraphic communication between Constantinople and Adrianople was still open on the 29th. With regard to the telegraphic communication between Constantinople and Gallipoli, we heard this morning that the telegraph wires had been cut. As to the inquiry whether all correspondents with the Russian Army south of the Balkans have been sent away, I have to state that we have not heard that such is the case.

  THE GREEKS—CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. GLADSTONE.—QUESTION.
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEYasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If his attention has been called to a paragraph in the "Daily News" of the 30th instant, with reference to an official Correspondence which is alleged to exist on the subject of certain Letters addressed by the Right honourable Member for Greenwich to Mr. Negropontis, a Greek Merchant at Constantinople; whether such a Correspondence is in existence; and, if so, whether Her Majesty's Government have any objection to lay a Copy upon the Table of the House; and, whether he can contradict a current report that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has admitted that he was the author of statements as to the contents of the aforesaid Letters of the Right honourable gentleman which the latter has publicly contradicted?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I have not myself seen the Correspondence, but I understand from my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs that there will be no objection to lay it on the Table, and it shall be laid on the Table forthwith. I understand that the Correspondence will
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  answer the last part of the Question of the hon. and learned Member; but I am unable to do so myself.

HYDROPHOBIA—LEGISLATION.

  QUESTION.
  LORD CLAUD HAMILTONasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If his attention has been directed to the alarm prevalent in the Country from the increase of hydrophobia, and to the existence of a number of wandering and ownerless dogs; and, whether he is prepared to deal with the matter by legislation or otherwise this Session?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,in reply, said, that in common with the public generally the Government had had their attention directed to the subject, and they were considering it, in hopes to be able to propose some measure relating to it.

  THE EASTERN QUESTION—THE ARMISTICE — ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES.—QUESTION.
  MR. CHAPLINasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government are yet in a position to state to the House that an Armistice has been concluded; whether it is the case as reported that the Russian forces are still rapidly advancing in the direction of Constantinople and of Gallipoli; and, whether, in the event of the continued advance of those forces, Her Majesty's Government are still prepared to adhere to the conditions laid down in Lord Derby's Despatch of the 6th May; and, if necessary, to resist the infringement of those conditions?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, up to the latest date that we have received there is no information that an armistice has been concluded. It is true, I believe, that the Russian Forces are advancing southwards; but upon what particular points they are directing their advances I am unable to say. Some Papers will be laid on the Table to-night which will give the latest information we have of the movements of the Russian Forces. In reply to the last part of the Question, I can only say that Her Majesty's Government do entirely adhere to the conditions laid down in Lord Derby's despatch.

SUPPLY—COMMITTEE.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

THE SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE.

  ADJOURNED DEBATE. SECOND NIGHT.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER,in rising to move the following Amendment:—
  "That this House, having been informed in Her Majesty's Gracious Speech that the conditions on which Her Majesty's neutrality is founded had not been infringed by either belligerent engaged in the war in the East of Europe, and having since received no information sufficient to justify a departure from the policy of neutrality and peace, sees no reason for adding to the burthens of the people by voting unnecessary Supplies."
  said: Sir, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in bringing forward his Motion for a Vote of Credit, or a Supplementary-Estimate, stated at the commencement of his speech that, although it was almost the most important proposition which ever had been made in his time, yet just for the reason that it was so important, he would not detain the House with any prefatory remarks. I would wish to follow his example in that respect, and will not detain the House with any other prefatory remark than that neither I nor those who think with me would refuse any appeal from the Government for aid or pecuniary support in any matters affecting our relations with foreign Powers, unless we felt it our duty to do so, not merely as guardians of the interests of our constituents, but as men who have at heart, as much as the Government themselves and any of their supporters, the protection of the interests of the country and the fulfilment of its duties to foreign Powers. I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer can hardly have intended to say that this Vote was necessary, and I think it will not be difficult to show that the demand, and the manner in which it is made, is unprecedented, and that it establishes a precedent as unconstitutional as it is dangerous. But I admit my chief motive in moving this Amendment is my belief that the purpose of this Vote and the grounds on which this purpose is
  730
  based are those against which I feel it my duty to protest, and to ask those who concur with me to join in that protest. But before discussing those grounds let me say a very few words upon the Vote itself. My Amendment shows that we think the Government gives no "reason for adding to the burthens of the people by voting unnecessary Supplies." Undoubtedly it is our duty to have good reason for adding to those burdens; but do not let it be supposed that we should abstain from such addition, or that our constituents would wish us to abstain from it, or would pardon us from abstaining from it, if we saw the necessity for such a step. It is true that trade is depressed and that the industrial taxpayer is less able than usual to bear fresh and pressing burdens; but if the Government could make out its case for these £6,000,000, then, notwithstanding I the depression of trade, I am sure our constituents—and I speak as fully for an industrial constituency as any other —would earnestly desire not only to vote that, but any other sum of money that may be required. But the Government has also its duty. It is our duty to give the money when it is wanted; but it is their duty to tell us, in the first | place, how much they want, and in the second what they intend to do with it. Now, the Government has neither told us how much money they want, nor in what manner they intend to spend it. On the contrary, though they ask £6,000,000, they tell us they have no Estimate, and, indeed, they acknowledge that the sum hardly can—that it cannot be expended "within the time for which alone they ask it—that is, before the 3lst of next month. And if they were pressed to say what they intend to do with this Vote of Credit the only answer they will give us is that they will flourish it as a piece of paper in the face of the Representatives of the great Powers at some Conference which they expect speedily to be called. I challenge the Chancellor of the Exchequer to produce a precedent for the course he has taken. Other hon. Members more versed in financial affairs will follow me to attack this unprecedented Vote; but let me say that if money is thus to be granted, the House of Commons will lose one of its dearest and most valuable and most cherished privileges—the privilege—and it is very difficult to maintain it—of

  731
  voting no money without such control as can be given by Estimates at once complete and precise. We oppose the Vote now in order to oblige the Government to tell us how and why it is to be spent. Here we have an Estimate—but I never read an Estimate like it before. It is this—The Estimate speaks of a
  "sum required beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may he incurred, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1878, in increasing the efficiency of the Naval and Military Services at the present crisis of the War between Russia and Turkey."
  Now, I challenge the Chancellor of the Exchequer to produce another Estimate similar to this. Much has been said about the action of the late Government with regard to the Vote of Credit in 1870. I was a Member of that Cabinet, and was jointly responsible for that Vote, and I fully believe that we were right to ask for it. The Vote of 1870, however, was no precedent for this Vote, for it was then clearly stated how much money would be required, in what way it would be spent, and for what purpose. There was also this difference between the position of the Government and of Parliament then from what it is now. We took that Vote at the close of a lengthened Session. The Government now asks for this Vote for an uncertain sum, which they know not whether they will spend, just when they have summoned Parliament together to keep it informed of their action and in order that it may be ready to assist them. But," with regard to the Vote of 1870, it was moved as a Vote of £2,000,000, and was taken chiefly
  "to further increase the Land Forces by a number not exceeding 20,000 Men (All Ranks), to be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, during the year ending the 31st day of March 1871."
  That was not a Vote to flourish about in the face of anybody. It was a Vote for which we asked Parliament, because we felt that there was a necessity for it. It was for 20,000 men; we stated exactly what we wanted, and my argument would not apply at all if we had got from the Government an exact statement of what they want this money for. My right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich, then Prime Minister, stated precisely the object of that Vote. On the 8th of August he said—
  732
  "On Saturday, the 30th of July, the Government made a proposal to France and Prussia severally in identical terms, and that proposal was that an engagement should be contracted by this country with each of them, whether under the name of a Treaty or whatever other designation might be given to the agreement, to this effect—that if the armies of either one of the belligerents should, in the course of the operations of the war, violate the neutrality of Belgium, as secured by the terms of the Treaty of 1839, this country should co-operate with the other belligerent in defence of that neutrality by arms."—[3 Hansard, cciii. 1700.]
  Nothing, then, could have been clearer than the object of that Vote; and it is in vain to quote it as a precedent for this one, because you do not say that you intend to add to your number of men—I think you say you do not intend to add to your men—or to your ships, or to your stores; and we do not know for what precise purpose or action you want it. We may know what speeches you mean to make to other Powers if you have this money, but we do not know what action you mean to take. The House ought to be jealous of the way in which the Estimate has been introduced.; because, although it is on the face of it a sham Estimate, yet I am by no means sure that it will entirely remain a sham. I think that an Estimate for more money for the Services of the country than is acknowledged by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be wanted or likely to be used, is a great temptation to extravagance, and it is exceedingly probable that the result of passing this Vote will be that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will lose that control over the purse strings which I am sure he wishes to exercise, and will find it extremely difficult to prevent more money being used by the Services than he desires. We are told that some of this money is already spent. If that be so, let the Chancellor of the Exchequer come forward and tell us, and he will not find the House ungenerous or wanting in sympathy with the Government in their present circumstances. Leaving these financial, but to my mind most important considerations, I come to the political meaning of this Vote. And here I would take the House back to the first day of the Session. What did the Government advise Her Majesty to tell us in Her Gracious Speech? Her Majesty informed us of three things— first, that neither of the belligerents in this war had infringed the conditions on

  733
  Which her neutrality is founded; secondly, that she believed that both of the belligerents were desirous to respect those conditions; and, thirdly, that, as long as those conditions were not infringed, her attitude would continue the same. Now, we know that, although we have not been informed that those conditions have been infringed, yet Her Majesty's attitude would not have remained the same unless, in consequence of a most fortunate mistake, the order which was sent out to the Meet last Wednesday had been speedily countermanded. Her Majesty's Speech goes on to say—
  "I cannot conceal from Myself that, should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on Me to adopt measures of precaution. Such measures could not he effectually taken without adequate preparation, and I trust to the liberality of My Parliament to supply the means which may be required for that purpose."
  Now it will be recollected that in the debate on the Address, there was considerable doubt among hon. Members, I think on both sides of the House, as to the meaning of this important paragraph. Some supposed that the appeal to the liberality of Parliament was to be made immediately, in order that measures of precaution might at once be taken to guard against an occurrence which might come, though it was not expected. Others thought that this was merely a warning to Parliament that something might happen that would necessitate the taking of those measures. It was very difficult thoroughly to understand that paragraph, and there was general wonder that in that most important passage of the Queen's Speech there should be this ambiguity. That, however, has, I think, been explained; for, looking at what has transpired within the last 10 days, I think it is not an unfair inference that that ambiguity arose from the difficulty felt by the Cabinet in deciding precisely what they should do, and that there was a compromise between the two sections of the Cabinet, of whose differences we have lately heard so much. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer was appealed to to explain that ambiguity and he gave a re-assuring explanation. He declared that no immediate appeal would be made, that no additional supplies would then be asked for; and he referred to the terms of peace which were about to
  734
  be proposed by Russia as the unexpected occurrence which might require an appeal to be made to the House. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER dissented.] The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. His words were—
  "It is necessary, therefore, that we should maintain an attitude of watchfulness and reserve until we Bee and know what it is that they (the Russians) are prepared to demand. The answer cannot be very much longer unknown to us, and when we know it we snail see more clearly where we are."
  He pointed to the terms of Russia as being the occurrence in consequence of which it was possible the demand might be made. Well, since then the occurrence, whether expected or unexpected, has come to pass which the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the Government would wait for before they took measures of precaution. But what is the information that has been received or the occurrence that has taken place? I say, taking the Speech and the explanation given by the Government together, the natural interpretation of this Vote of Credit, and the one that will be put upon it in this country and abroad is, that the Government ask for this money because they consider these terms unsatisfactory. And that interpretation is confirmed rather than contradicted by the manner in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer dwelt on those terms, and described them; and that explanation has been clung to with the desperate tenacity of drowning men by the war party in Constantinople. The first six proposals do not, in my mind, in any way directly affect British interests. The first of them is this—
  "Within the limits of nationality, not less than those of the Conference, Bulgaria to be an autonomous Principality with a national Christian Government, a native Militia, and no Turkish troops except at certain places to be fixed."
  There are some hon. Members, no doubt, who are sorry that that has been asked for by Russia; but, for my part, I am not sorry. Any attempt on the part of the Government or their supporters to pass a War Vote, or to get us into any warlike action to protest against this first, and perhaps most important, of these conditions would, believe, be disavowed by the enormo majority of the country. ["No, no!"]

  735
  I only wish that those who say "No" could put this matter in issue before the country. The next term is the
  "independence of Montenegro, with an increase of territory corresponding to the military status quo, the frontier to be de6ided hereafter."
  Now, is there in that, I would ask, anything likely to affect English interests, or anything endangered that Englishmen would protect? We have then the "independence of Roumania, with a sufficient territorial indemnity;" and although there may be some difference as to the conduct of Roumania, I do not suppose any hon. Member thinks this is a condition on account of which we should go to war with Russia. I am glad to learn that Roumanian nationality has distinguished itself, and that by their promise in the late war the Roumanians may be depended upon as patriots fighting for their country. The next term is the "independence of Servia."["Oh, oh!"] I am aware that Servia is not popular, but I think those who thus express their views might with advantage have studied the history of that country, in order to see what were the influences of past generations which have produced the feeling in Servia that may have led to some infraction of Treaties, an infraction which I am not defending, but in which hon. Members who complain of it might have joined had their ancestors had the same experience as the ancestors of these Servians had. However, even though Servia may be unpopular with hon. Gentlemen opposite, in any case I do not imagine this condition would be deemed sufficient to justify a War Vote. The next term, I am glad to find, is "autonomous administration, sufficiently guaranteed, to Bosnia and Herzegovina;" and the next, "similar reforms for the other Christian Provinces of Turkey in Europe." I rejoice to find that the terms asked for by Russia will give some hope to the inhabitants of Thessaly and Epirus, and that there will be some chance for the Greeks and Christians in the Turkish Empire to be freed from the terrible hardships to which they have lately been subject. Now, taking these terms, which are undoubtedly the most important—so far, at least, as Turkey is concerned—they do not, as it seems to me, so affect English interests that we should agree to a War Vote of £6,000,000. Next in order is the indemnity claimed by Russia for the expenses of the war,
  736
  "in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form, to be decided hereafter." I do not think myself there is anything in that item which calls for a special attitude on our part for a War Vote. It is very probable, I suppose, that the condition points to an indemnity in Armenia, and to such an indemnity I have never understood the Government to say that they were opposed, although that they should do so may be the wish of many of their supporters. Indeed, I have observed with great satisfaction that from the time the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department made his celebrated speech up to the present time—and I have carefully looked through all Lord Derby's despatches—there has been no attempt whatever on the part of the Government to pledge this country against Russia obtaining an indemnity in Armenia. Not that I wish the territory of Russia to be increased, and I will say, once for all, that I am as much opposed to the Russian form and manner of government as any hon. Member whom I see before me; but, however bad may be their government, it is my firm belief that if an appeal were made to the inhabitants of Armenia, they would themselves, by an overwhelming majority, declare that, with all its faults, they would prefer it to the Government of Turkey. Upon this question of indemnity I would add that if there be anything in that shape demanded by Russia which would be injurious to English interests, Parliament is not going to separate directly—let the Government come forward when such a demand is made, and prove it to be so, and Parliament will respond to the appeal. But I now come to that which is, I have no doubt, in the minds of many hon. Gentlemen the most important of these items, and I myself am prepared to admit that it is the most important as far as England is concerned —I allude to the last, the "ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits." Now that is a very natural demand for Russia to make upon Turkey. [Laughter.] Does any hon. Gentleman think it is not a natural demand? It is not an absolute demand, and I am not telling hon. Gentlemen that it is a demand which we should allow to be enforced without any remark on our side; but no one, I think, could expect that

  737
  war would close, and that Russia should have obtained a great triumph, without, her saying to Turkey—"We expect to have our power in the Black Sea, and our power to take our ships out of that sea, placed in a different position so far as you are concerned." I forget by what Minister it has been said, but it has been said, that this demand by Russia was a matter which ought to have been avoided; that it would be greatly to the interest of England to avoid the result that Russia should ask Turkey for another arrangement with regard to the Straits of the Dardanelles. That would not be a reasonable position for the Government to take up now, for I am of opinion that from the moment Russia was allowed to carry on the war by herself, you were bound by the logical result that, if she conquered Turkey, she would ask, so far as her relations with the latter country were involved, to make her own terms, and to appeal to us and the other Powers for their sanction only so far as related to our and their interests. If you did not look forward to that result, another line of conduct should have been taken—indeed, I believe some of your supporters wished it to betaken—namely, that Russia should not have been allowed to go to war with Turkey. But having adopted the line you did, in which you have the overwhelming support of the enormous majority of the country, you must put up with the consequences; and there is, it appears to me, nothing to surprise us in Russia making this demand. If there had been any wish to induce Turkey to continue fighting—I do not charge the Government with such a wish, but many individuals have entertained it—because we should not like to see such an arrangement made directly between her and Russia, that, I contend, would have been most unreasonable and cruel to Turkey; and I must at once admit that I was glad to hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer state that "we could not ask the Turks now to continue the war." I was sorry, however, to hear that word "now" used. We ought never to have asked the Turks at any moment to continue the war for one moment. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: We never did.] There remains, however, the fact that our interests as a naval Power are concerned in this question of the Straits; and let me suppose that Russia, having made
  738
  this demand on Turkey, intended to defy the other Powers of Europe, or to defy us, in that case the Government might have made out a case for an appeal to us for aid. But there is no such attempt whatever, for the very next despatch, which follows these terms of peace, reads as follows (it is from the Earl of Derby to Lord Augustus Loftus, and is dated from the Foreign Office, January 25):—
  "My Lord,—Count Schouvaloff read to me to-day the following extract of a telegram from Prince Gortchakow: '"We repeat the assurance that we do not intend to settle by ourselves (isolement) European questions having reference to the peace which is to be made (se rattachant a lapaix).'"
  We were informed, and no doubt the other Powers, that the Russian Government admitted that the arrangement made by Treaty in 1856, and confirmed by Treaty in 1871, was an arrangement which could not be altered without the sanction of the other Powers. It is possible, however, that Russia may propose, instead of the present arrangements with regard to the Straits, that they should be open to the ships of war of all the Powers. I am not saying anything in favour of such a proposition; but it is not one which, I contend, ought to be received with hostility, or one which we should refuse to admit to be a matter of European consideration, to be decided on by the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of 1871. I will go further and say that if the Government have good grounds for believing that Russia means to make the unfair and unreasonable proposal of procuring for herself a passage through the Straits without allowing us or other Powers to have also the same right of passage, then I think the Government would be joined in protesting against such a proposal by an immense majority of hon. Members on both sides of the House. We have, however, no reason whatever to suppose that Russia has made any such proposal; and here I must ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be so kind as to answer me this Question. I was very much surprised when we got the Papers on Tuesday morning to read the last despatch—the despatch from Lord Derby to Lord Augustuas Loftus, dated the 28th of January, in which occur these words—
  "The Russian Ambassador called on me late this afternoon, and read me an extract from a

  739
  telegram which he had received from Prince Gortchakoff, authorizing him to affirm categorically that the Russian Government consider the passage of ships of war through the Dardanelles as an European question, which they do not intend to settle by themselves (resoudre isolement)."
  I was surprised to read this despatch.— not because of its tenour, but because the Chancellor of the Exchequer made no allusion to it. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I had not seen it when I spoke.] I am very glad to hear that explanation, because I am sure that it was impossible that the Chancellor of the Exchequer could have received that despatch and not have read it to us. I think it contains very important information, and ought to re-assure the minds of some hon. Gentlemen opposite. I will not detain the House any longer on the Russian terms. To me there is nothing in these terms that requires us to arm, or justifies an appeal for a War Vote, and I think that our arming or our passing a War Vote would be misinterpreted, not merely in this country, but in every capital of Europe; and especially at Constantinople, in Bulgaria, and in the other Christian Provinces of Turkey it would be supposed that we were arming against the fact of the terms of peace. It would be taken to mean resistance to Russia, and that, to my mind, is a very strong reason why we should not pass the Vote on any ground yet adduced by the Government. Now, has anything else happened since the opening of Parliament or has there been any other information which the Government has been able to give us which would justify this appeal for a special Vote? I know there is a great feeling of surprise at the delay in the armistice. Nothing can be more extraordinary than the despatch produced by the Government this morning, from which it appears that, although the telegraph is open between Constantinople and Adrianople, the Porte cannot give any information whatever with regard to the proceedings of its own Ambassadors. That is a most extraordinary and most unintelligible circumstance. But the unintelligible part of it is the conduct, not of Russia, but of Turkey. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, I think hon. Gentlemen must admit that if any other Power were in that situation—if it had sent its Ambassadors so long ago as the 23rd instant on the most important business that could concern a
  740
  country, and yet had got no answer from them up to the present time, they would admit that the circumstance was extraordinary and unintelligible. There are two interpretations which might be put upon this delay, and hon. Members may take which they like. They may say that the Russians, who proposed the terms of peace, are delaying the acceptance of them for purposes of their own. How they could do so, I do not precisely see. They proposed the terms of peace and they are waiting for their acceptance. It may be that the Turks are hesitating about accepting them. I do not for a moment deny that they are very hard terms for Turkey, but they are such terms as Lord Derby warned Musurus Pasha Turkey might have to accept, and which she ought to have contemplated when she went to war. It is quite possible, I repeat, that Turkey is hesitating; and I do not admit that there is no danger that that hesitation may be increased by the proceedings of the Government. I am not going to quote the opinion of newspapers. We have got into a region in which we have to consider the opinions of Members of the House of Commons under the guidance of their constituents; but one newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, which is constantly receiving information from Turkey, stated the day before yesterday, upon the authority of its correspondent in Constantinople, that the Turkish Government had sent counter proposals. That may, or may not be true; anyhow, I need not further refer to it. All I wish to say is this—if the Government have any information, or can produce any further information before the close of this debate, as to the delay either in the signing of peace or in the signing of the armistice, or, if any fact has passed since the opening of the Session which, in their opinion, injures English interests and justifies their calling upon us to give them Supplies, let them state it. As yet it has not been stated, and to do the Chancellor of the Exchequer justice, he does not base this appeal upon anything that has passed since the opening of the Session. He said—
  "We are asked why are you asking for this money, and what are you going to do with it? We asked for this money, not necessarily that it, or the greater part of it, may be expended at all; but we desire to be armed by you as we go into these negotiations; we desire to go

  741
  armed with this Vote, which is not only a Vote of Credit, but a Vote of Confidence."
  In his explanatory speech he said—
  "We do not ask for this Vote of £6,000,000 to be expended upon this or upon that; we ask it in order that we may be able to go into Conference and negotiation with the force of England at our back."
  The grounds upon which the Chancellor of the Exchequer puts the matter are these—first, that the Vote will give weight to the Government in the coming negotiations; and, second, that the Government think they have a right to ask for a Vote of Confidence. Now, take the first argument, as regards the weight of England in the approaching Conference. I can understand the Parliamentary ground on which the Chancellor of the Exchequer rests his appeal. It does enable him to obtain the support of all the Supporters of the Government, whether they may be more or less inclined to what may be called a war policy. By a Vote, which appears to be a War Vote, the Chancellor of the Exchequer may hope to conciliate his War Friends, and at the same time by telling his Peace Friends that the money will not be spent, he may conciliate them. I observe, however, that he has not entirely conciliated his War Friends. The hon. and gallant Member for Gravesend (Captain Pirn) has put an Amendment on the Paper, which I must confess goes, with sailor-like simplicity, to the real matter in hand; and which, if the Government thought it necessary to propose a Vote at all, was the sort of Vote they ought to have proposed. He asks the House to declare that—
  "The assurances of the Czar are being deliberately evaded by the proposed Terms of Peace and the advance of the Russian Army, and that the time has now arrived when immediate action on the part of Great Britain is an absolute necessity;"
  and asks the House to—
  "Request Her Majesty's Government to lay upon the Table forthwith the Estimates for placing the Navy and Army upon a war footing."
  That is intelligible, and it would have been understood throughout Europe, and would have given rise to no misunderstanding. But whether the Government have conciliated their War Supporters or not by the manner in which they have made this proposal, I appeal to them and to the House generally whether it is a
  742
  proposal which is fair to the House or calculated to uphold the dignity of the country. The next question is, we are told that this sham Estimate—for there is no intention of making it a real Estimate—is to give weight to this country in the approaching Conference. We have heard some talk of the humiliation of England by the papers which have urged the Government to a war policy which they could not undertake; but there would, indeed, be humiliation if this House felt that a paper Vote of this kind was necessary. I think it is only the present Prime Minister to whom the idea that a piece of paper would give weight to the Government' could have occurred. I would not have thought it possible for him if he had not told us that he would check the encroachments of Russia by an empty title. Why, every Power that meets there well knows that England would give £6,000,000 or £60,000,000 if necessary. But let the Government, let their Delegates, let their Ambassadors, if there be no Conference, and especially let their Ambassador at Constantinople, know that there are vast numbers of Englishmen who, while they are willing to give £6,000,000 or £60,000,000 to support the Government in a just cause, will not give £6,000 for an unjust and unnecessary war; or to induce the Government, by unnecessary suspicion, to make the restoration of European peace more difficult. I now come to the Vote of Confidence. The right hon. Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel), who saw that it was not a very wise ground upon which the Government put it, came forward the other night and said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not mean a Vote of Confidence as generally understood. I think, however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will admit that what they do mean is this—that, in asking for this Vote of Credit, which is also a Vote of Confidence, they ask us for confidence in the immediate future, founded upon the recent past. I put it to the Supporters of the Government—I put it to the House—is there anything in the recent past, is there anything in the recent conduct of the Ministers which tends to increase our confidence in the Government? If there be, what is the particular action of Her Majesty's Government that has inspired that confidence? Have we confidence in Her Majesty's Govern-

  743
  ment because of the order they sent out last Wednesday—an order which might very possibly have plunged the country into war? Or have we confidence in them because they countermanded that order the next day in consequence of their Ambassador at Constantinople having made a mistake, but a most fortunate mistake, his having made which, for the first time for many weeks, made me glad that my old friend Mr. Layard was our Representative at that capital? I congratulate the Government, and I am sure they must congratulate themselves, on that order having been countermanded, because after having read the despatches they must be convinced that it was given recklessly and hastily, under a mistaken impression as to the conduct of the Russian Government. ["No, no!"] Hon. Gentlemen may say "No, no;" but, at any rate, at that time the Government had not the despatches before them. They must also congratulate themselves on the mistake, because it was fortunate in another respect—namely, that it enabled the Government to retain the services of their Minister who has conducted our foreign affairs, and in whom I say, without fear of contradiction, the country has more confidence than it places in the other Members of Her Majesty's Government. ["No, no!"] Some hon. Members opposite say "No, no," and that induces me again to ask this question—is there anything in the recent conduct of Her Majesty's Government that induces us to place confidence in them for the immediate future? In whom are we to have confidence—in which Member of the Government? Are we to have confidence in the Prime Minister? ["Hear, hear!"] Are we to have confidence in the Prime Minister who persuaded his Colleagues—and I have no doubt that he is very proud of having persuaded them—to commit this act, which is now acknowledged to have been hasty, of sending the Fleet to the Dardanelles? Are we to have confidence in the Foreign Secretary who tendered his resignation on the order being given, but came back to the Government when it was countermanded? I have no doubt that it is hoped by some hon. Members on that side of the House, as well as by many on this side, that the threatened resignation of the noble Lord so far frightened the Prime Minister that his presence in the Cabinet may
  744
  be taken as affording us some security for the conduct of the Government in the future. All I can say is, that looking back at the occurrences of the last 10 days, I am surprised that the Government are asking even their own Supporters for a Vote of Confidence. As regards ourselves, most certainly I can see no reason in anything that has happened since Parliament met to give us increased confidence in the Government. The Foreign Secretary, it is true, came back to the Government when he found that he had got his way; but the Colonial Secretary did not come back, and I daresay the Supporters of the Government would now no longer have confidence in that Minister of whom they were so proud. For my own part, I am willing at once to admit that the resignation of Lord Carnarvon has greatly diminished our confidence in Her Majesty's Government. His presence in the Cabinet was, to our minds, the greatest security we had that peace would be maintained, and was a guarantee against the repetition of the reckless acts which the Government have committed within the last 10 days. After reading or hearing his explanation, I think it is impossible for the country to overrate the debt which they owe to Lord Carnarvon. It was by his speech three or four weeks ago that he reassured the country, and, I have no doubt, checked and prevented actions which would have alarmed the country; and I think I am not wrong in stating that it is clear that not once only, but two or three times, the noble Lord has stood between Her Majesty's Government and what we consider would have been a most dangerous policy. Therefore, you must not be surprised that the resignation of Lord Carnarvon—which will, at all events, be a great loss to his special Department in consequence of the excellent manner in which he has conducted the affairs of the Colonies— has not rendered us more likely to assent to this Vote of Credit in answer to the Government appeal. Now, in his speech on Monday last, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was very hypothetical. He then stated that he would not give us the source of the rumours to which he alluded, but he told us the substance of many rumours that had come to his knowledge, which might or might not be true; and he gave us many explana-

  745
  tions of them, and set before us many possibilities. Will the House, therefore, allow me to give one hypothetical explanation with regard to this Vote?— but, although hypothetical, I think it as likely to be true as the hypotheses of the right hon. Gentleman—as that, for example, of a Russian Prince in Bulgaria. Why do Her Majesty's Government ask us for this Vote? It is not a very natural Vote for them to move in existing circumstances; but it was very natural for them to give Notice of it last Thursday, when they had given orders to the Fleet to enter the Dardanelles. It was very possible that the Russians might look upon that step as a breach of our neutrality, which it really was; and, therefore, it was quite natural, and a very logical conclusion for Her Majesty's Government to give Notice of this Motion. But when that order to the Fleet to proceed to the Dardanelles was countermanded, the Motion for this Vote of Credit became unnecessary, and it should have been dropped. The real fact was, however, the Government had so often and constantly changed its policy that the uncertainty of its policy had made it the puzzle, not to say the laughing-stock, of Europe. Seeing this, they wore determined that there was one resolution at least to which they would stick; that they thought, in the first instance, the money would be wanted, yet when they found by the change of policy and countermanding the order under the pressure of Lord Derby's resignation, they no longer wanted the money, they would not at the same time countermand the order to their own Supporters, and they said—"Though it is true that when we asked for this money we wanted it, and that we no longer do so, yet we still ask for it, because we will now call it a Vote of Confidence." There is another reason why we, on our own part, are unable to respond to this appeal of the Government. It is not merely that we are uncertain as to the policy of the Government in the past, but it is also this—that we are uncertain whether the conduct of the Government may not, oven in the next week, be reckless and dangerous as it was reckless and dangerous last week. And we have every reason to believe that, if any other similar reckless act be done, it will be done suddenly, without the slightest warning, although the Members of the House of
  746
  Commons have been called together three weeks earlier than usual, in order, as it was said, that the Government might take them into its confidence and keep them constantly informed as to the state of affairs. And yet we have not received that confidence. Talk of an unexpected occurrence, who could have expected that when the Chancellor of the Exchequer came down on that Thursday and gave his Notice—who could have imagined that at that time the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary had determined to leave the Cabinet on account of the order given to the Fleet to enter the Dardanelles? But let us look for a moment into the grounds on which it is said the order given to the Fleet was based. They were two, nay, three in number. The first was that there was a misunderstanding of the terms of peace. It was supposed that the Czar was going to settle alone with the Sultan questions affecting our interests. Then the order was given for two purposes— one was to protect life and property in Constantinople, and the other to keep open the waterway of the Dardanelles. Now, if the object had been merely the first, and the Government had real reason to suppose that there was real danger to life and property in Constantinople, or that there was going to be a massacre of the Christians, we should not have been surprised at their action. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) stated, it would have been natural in that case that the Powers should have been informed that it was for that purpose, and that purpose alone, that the Fleet had received its orders, and no objection would have been raised by other Powers. But the Fleet was going there for another purpose. What was the meaning of keeping the waterway of the Dardanelles open? I shall be followed, no doubt by international lawyers, and therefore I will not say much on this point; but I think it will be proved that this attempt to keep the waterway open, whatever grounds there were for it, was a breach of neutrality. Some hon. Gentlemen, I suppose, think we are parties to a Treaty now in force in regard to the Straits. I believe that to be a mistake. The Articles of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, with respect to the Dardanelles, do not at this moment in any way apply to the navigation of the

  747
  Straits. They applied merely to Turkey when she was at peace, and Turkey being now no longer at peace the words have at this moment no meaning or effect. We return, then, to the condition of a neutral in any war that may break out, and it is an acknowledged principle of international law by expounders of that science, that for a neutral to go into the territory of one belligerent, and to take possession of such territory, in order to keep out the other belligerent, and then to say it will keep open the waterway—a vague phrase, but which must mean that it will prevent the other belligerent from going into it—is in itself a breach of neutrality. But before I leave this subject, let me ask the Government one question. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in his speech gave as a reason for the order that was sent out, that the Russians were advancing with great rapidity on Gallipoli. Now, I want to know whether the Government have received any explanation from Mr. Layard bearing on the despatch mentioned in No. 30, and dated January 23. Mr. Layard says—"I have communicated the substance of your telegram of the 4th instant to the Porte." That telegram was the assurance which we had sent to the Porte and which we had received from the Russian Government. It stated—
  "That Her Majesty's Government are glad to receive the pledge thus given by the Russian Government that they have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there."
  Her Majesty's Government state that one great cause of their alarm was that they thought the Russian Government was going to take possession of Gallipoli. They asked the Russian Government not to do so, and the Russian Government gave them a satisfactory assurance, saying that they would only go there if they were obliged as belligerents to go there because the Turkish regular troops were there. Mr. Layard goes on—
  "In reply, I am informed that there are now only three battalions at Gallipoli to maintain order and to prevent the Mussulman population from taking flight, and that more troops will not he sent there if I am authorized by Her Majesty's Government to communicate officially to the Porte in their name the pledge given by Prince Gortchakoff."
  What I ask is this—Did the Govern-
  748
  ment allow Mr. Layard to communicate this pledge? If they did, what has been the consequence of it? If Russia said she would not send her troops to Gallipoli unless the Turks concentrated their regular forces there, and if the Turks assured us they would not thus concentrate their forces, what was the ground of the fear of the Government? If, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government did not allow Mr. Layard to communicate this officially to the Porte, we should be glad to have some information. There is one other ground, and it is the last ground, on which the Chancellor of the Exchequer based his proposal. It is the question whether we are or are not to go to this Conference armed with the strength of a united nation, and whether we are or are not to speak with the voice of England as that voice ought to be heard. By all means let the Government go into the Conference with the voice of England as a united nation. I think they can do so with the voice of a united Parliament speaking as the representatives of a united nation. There are English interests involved in this question— English interests which, though they may be special, are not selfish interests. There is the interest of preserving our communications with our Indian Empire. There is the interest of preserving our road through the Suez Canal, and our right to send not only merchant ships, but also ships of war through the Canal at any time, and with that right the power and the right to send our troops across the Isthmus of Suez by railway if any misfortune should happen to the Canal. There is this interest with regard to Egypt; and with respect to it, I believe the country is unanimous to one man in supporting the Government. I am only speaking on behalf of myself, for I have no right to speak for others; but I think that is the belief of the majority of the Members of this House and of a large majority in the country. Another English interest, on which I believe the country would be almost unanimous, is that we are to be treated in the Black Sea on equal terms with Russia and the other Great Powers; but that is not a selfish interest, it involves also the interests of civilization. Our special English interests are not selfish ones, but there are other interests which, though they are not special, are

  749
  yet English. First, there is the question of the permanent possession of Constantinople. Here, again, do not let it be supposed that I am speaking for anyone but myself, though I believe I am speaking what is the opinion of most of the Members of the Liberal Party as well as of the country generally. I am not one of those who would endeavour to prevent the Russians from permanently possessing Constantinople, as a purely English interest. It has not been so stated by Her Majesty's Government, and I believe, on the contrary, that it is much more an Austrian interest, and as much a German, or French, or Italian interest. Again, I do not think the Government ought to be supported in any attempt by force to prevent the temporary occupation by Russia of Constantinople. I think that if we had intended to take that ground we should have done so originally, and have told Russia she must not go to war. If two countries do engage in war, it is not reasonable to expect that one belligerent will stay short of such successes as will force the other to give way, when the conquering belligerent is about to reap all the advantages it had sought to gain by the war. But I do most fully admit that the Government ought to be supported in taking their part in the European concert to carry out the European object of preventing the permanent possession of Constantinople by the Russians, if that is threatened, which I do not believe it is. But, in that case, and if the Government feel it is their duty to take part in such concert, surely they ought to give us all the information they possibly can with regard to our relations with the other Great Powers of Europe upon this question; and as yet they have given us hardly a scrap of such information. Then there is also another interest which is also not the less an English interest because it is not our special interest. That is the good government or better government of the people of Turkey —the interest of the freedom of the Christian subjects of the Porte from the cruel bondage and the senseless tyranny which, until it ceases, makes that European peace impossible which, as the Earl of Derby rightly stated, is the chief interest of England. Let the Prime Minister and his Colleagues go into the Conference declaring that we are in favour of these interests, and I
  750
  know of no other interests connected with this question which they need very strongly advocate. Let them declare in favour of these interests, and they will need no sham Vote of Confidence, but they will have the enthusiastic support of a united people, and there will be an end of Party differences. Not having received any information from the Government which proves that this Vote of Confidence is necessary, fearing, on the other hand, that it will and must be interpreted as an attempt to lessen the advantages which the Christian populations may gain by this war, and fearing that it must be interpreted as a check to the aspirations of the rising Christian nationalities, and that it will be a means through which some, at least, of their chains will remain unbroken, I feel that I have no course to adopt but to move the Amendment of which I have given Notice, and to call upon all those who agree with me to vote for it.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, "this House, having been informed in Her Majesty's Gracious Speech that the conditions on which Her Majesty's neutrality is founded had not been infringed by either belligerent engaged in the war in the East of Europe, and having since received no information sufficient to justify a departure from the policy of neutrality and peace, sees no reason for adding to the burthens of the people by voting unnecessary Supplies,"—(Mr. William Edward Forster,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Mr. Speaker—The vagueness and the ambiguity of the speech we have just heard lead me to see in it the most patriotic statement as to what the right hon. Gentleman would do if British interests were attacked; and, at the same time, he almost imputed to the Government that they were betraying those interests by asking for this Vote. That is one of the most extraordinary statements I ever heard. There are sentiments he has uttered and words he has used which I have heard over and over again in the country, which if I were answering them in the country I should certainly say were not borne out by the facts, and which, as far as Parliamentary language

  751
  allows me to do, I must beg emphatically and distinctly to deny. But the whole gist of the right hon. Gentleman's speech is to create an impression in this House and out of it that there is a war party—"war-mongers,"I think, as we are called by an hon. Gentleman; to lead the House and the country in general to believe that because we felt it to be our duty to come down to the House and ask it to give us this Vote in Supply, we are doing it for the purpose, when we have got it, of going to war without the sanction of this House. I say, as far as Parliamentary language will allow me to say so, that is utterly untrue. But not content with holding out the Government in that light, in which he wants to make us appear extremely warlike—determined to go to war at all hazards—he has gone out of his way to make accusations against my noble Friend at the head of the Government, which are such as during the considerable time I have sat in this House I never before heard from any hon. Member, and such as I, for one, hope never to hear again. What the right hon. Gentleman meant, by what no doubt he thought would be picked up as a catchword through the country was, that this is a "sham estimate," and what he meant by that, I presume, is to attribute to the Prime Minister that he asked the Government to consent to come down to the House and formally to make a proposition such as we have made; but that nothing at all should be meant by it—that it was held up as a piece of show— a mere thing to dazzle the eyes; and he compares it with a measure, which at the time was also attacked, brought in by the Prime Minister, relating to the settlement of the Imperial Crown in India. I hope when the House comes to consider this question more seriously they will be better able to judge how far those observations of the right hon. Gentleman are born out, or how far, in their opinion, he is justified in having ever made them at all. The right hon. Gentleman, fixing upon a word that fell from my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other evening—although it was entirely explained five minutes after it was spoken—still tried to persuade the House that by this Vote we are asking for a general Vote of Confidence in the Government.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: Sir, I did not say that.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I am in the hands of the House whether that is really so or not?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: I think it will be admitted that I said I understood the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to state that it was not a Vote of general Confidence in the policy of the Ministry; but that I thought it was a Vote asking for confidence in the immediate action of the Government, based on their recent conduct.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: My answer to that is, that after the explanation that was given, that it was not a Vote of general Confidence, the remark of the right hon. Gentleman ought never to have been made. The time will come, but not when great national subjects are before us, when that question may be put before the House by the right hon. Gentleman, and the answer will then be given. That is not the question now. The question placed before the House the other night by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is as clear as can be. We ask for this Vote. In our opinion, it is necessary for the purposes of the country. We should not have come down to ask it at your hands if we had not come deliberately to that conclusion. As responsible Ministers of the Crown, what we ask is that you will place it in our hands, relying upon us that we should not use it unnecessarily—should not use it for purposes for which it was not absolutely required. That being so, I must ask for a few moments the attention of the House while I explain what I mean by saying that there has been a general wish on the part of right hon. Gentlemen sitting opposite to hold us up as a war Party. I must for one moment go back, if the House will allow me, as far as the 6th of May last year. On the 6th of May Lord Derby wrote that despatch which has practically been the charter of the policy of the Government from that day to this. I will just relate, for the information of the House, the terms of the despatch, merely premising that the outbreak of the war having been communicated to us on the 24th April, on the 30th April we issued the declaration of neutrality, and on the 6th May we wrote this despatch—

  753
  "Her Majesty's Government do not propose again to enter on the justice or necessity of the present war. They have already expressed their views, and further discussion would be unavailing."
  Then, here comes the first landmark, as I ventured to call it in my speech of last Session—
  "They have respected the obligations which a state of war imposes upon them, and they have lost no time in issuing a proclamation of neutrality. They have from the first warned the Porte that they must not look to England for assistance, as they are determined to carry impartially into effect the pledge of neutrality so long as Turkish interests alone are involved."
  Well, now for the second landmark—
  "At the same time they think it right that there should be no misunderstanding as to their position and intentions. If the war in progress should unfortunately spread, interests may be in peril which they are equally bound and determined to defend, and it is most desirable that they should make it clear what those interests are."
  Guided by those landmarks, from the 6th May up to the present day Her Majesty's Government have always acted. They have never swerved either from one or the other, and they are of the same opinion now as they were on the 6th May, that that is the policy which, so long as the war lasts, they are hound to observe. Now, I admit, and I believe the whole country admits, that this position which the Government has taken up—the position of neutrals, when there is a great war raging between States with which we are friendly—is one of great difficulty. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), at the time when the war was raging between France and Germany, made use of this observation—
  "We have considered the duty of neutrals, and we have done our best thus far to fulfil them. The duties of a neutral are not easy— they are duties which the most sanguine of statesmen and the most sanguine of Governments can hardly hope to fulfil in such a manner as not to give offence to one side or the other, and probably to both."
  I quite agree with those remarks. I say again, we have never swerved from the policy we laid down in our despatch of the 6th of May. Is there any man in this House who will say that we have given encouragement to Turkey? Is there any man in this House who will say that we have in any form or shape
  754
  deceived Turkey? I will not go back to the warning which we gave her at the time. When Parliament was summoned earlier than usual, Lord Derby, writing to Mr. Layard, said—
  "In view of the reports which are likely to be current in this country, Her Majesty's Government think it desirable that you should be aware that this unusually early meeting of Parliament does not imply any intention on their part to depart from the policy of conditional neutrality which they have announced."
  Well, on a later date, on the 21st December, there is a report of a conversation that took place between Lord Derby and the Turkish Ambassador—
  "His Excellency referred more than once to the possibility of an intervention, and I thought it right to repeat the warning—namely, that no intervention was to be expected, but that Her Majesty's Government would adhere to the conditions of neutrality which they had laid down."
  Then, on the 7th January of the present year, in the course of further conversation, Lord Derby took occasion to remind the Turkish Ambassador that our language had never varied from the beginning of the war to the present time—
  "I thought it right once more to repeat this warning, in order that no false hopes might be raised."
  And not later ago than the 12th January Lord Derby writes to Mr. Layard—
  "The Sultan asks whether he can expect any assistance; I fear not, for I told him from the beginning we were not prepared to give any material assistance, and as the Russians have now offered mediation, it would not avail."
  Now, I ask this House, I ask the country, whether there can be a clearer course adopted by any Government than that which we followed? And yet right hon. Gentlemen, not in the Assembly of this House, but elsewhere, have not hesitated to accuse us of having been false to our promises contained in the despatch of the 6th May. [Mr. GOSCHEN: No, no!] The right hon. Gentleman says "No, no." Has he read the speech supposed to have been delivered yesterday afternoon not very far from the City of London?
  MR. GOSCHEN: I said that in reference to the speech I have just heard from my right hon. Friend.
  MR. ASSHETON GROSS: But I refer to speeches that have been delivered outside this House; and even

  755
  in the speech we have just heard, although broken promises were not perhaps said in so many words, there was contained the substance of such an accusation. If the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen) be right, it amounts to this—that right hon. Gentlemen use language outside which they dare not use in this House. Although, as I have said, such language was not used in the speech just delivered, still the substance of that accusation ran through it from beginning to end. To leave that, I shall now refer to what fell from the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) at Oxford. He accused us of not knowing our own minds; but I ask whether the despatches from which I have quoted prove that? He further said that we have spoken with two voices, and that we poured forth from the same fountain sweet waters and bitter waters. I grant at once that in our despatches there is bitter enough water for the Turkish Government. But I defy you to find one drop of sweet. Well, then, to proceed further, I ask, have we ever on the other hand deceived Russia? On the contrary, we have from first to last warned her where our interests lay, and that they would be defended. In the despatch which we wrote later, on 13th December, 1877, when the war seemed to have taken a different turn, we wrote in the strongest way to Russia, telling her that Her Majesty's Government would hold herself free to take whatever course was necessary for the protection of British interests; but that we sincerely trusted and confidently believed that any such necessity would be averted by a mutual understanding between the two Governments. So that whether you turn to Turkey or whether you turn to Russia you will find no act or despatch of the Government in which we have swerved from the despatch of 6th May. I ask, also, whether we ever deceived the country? We told the country in the Queen's Most Gracious Speech that so long as the conditions of our neutrality were not violated, so long would that neutrality be adhered to. But, on the other hand, I say in the speeches which have been made throughout the country there has been a "lying spirit" abroad, and in the Resolution before the House there is an evil spirit lurking, although at first sight somewhat difficult to discover.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: I think the right hon. Gentleman should state what speeches he refers to.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I should be very sorry; but I say this without fear of contradiction, that the policy of these speeches has been to hold out to Turkey that we were going in the long run to assist her. Well, what they have tried to persuade the country is that we have been dishonest in the despatches we have written and in the words we have spoken. I deny that the despatches contain any ground for such statements; but I will not rest it on that—I will show the absurdity of the charge. If we had any lurking wish to depart from the policy of the 6th of May, when we might have acted and with effect at the time that the Turkish Armies seemed likely, at all events for some time, to hold their own against Russia, we should have been not merely dishonest but simply fools had we waited until the Turks were thoroughly and absolutely beaten, and then come forward to help them. Surely, if there is anything in the stern logic of facts, it must prove that the determination of the Government was a very honest determination and one they meant to go upon? The right hon. Gentleman has never in his speech, as far as I am aware, pointed out a single complaint made by the Government of either Russia or Turkey that we have violated our neutrality. I am not aware of any despatch making any such complaint, and I think that if the two Governments in this case—which, I venture to say, is a peculiar case— acquiesce in our attitude; when, after a long and bloody struggle, the position of a country like England is not complained of, we need not trouble ourselves very much as to the complaints coming from the right hon. Gentleman. Now, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman alluded to the orders given to the Fleet, which orders he characterized as a reckless act —["Hear, hear!"]—as recklessly issued. ["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members may say "Hear, hear," but they do not understand the circumstances—and as recklessly recalled. The right hon. Gentleman should clearly understand one of the vital reasons for which the Fleet was recalled, but he did not allude to it in his Speech. It was quite evident, as the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated, that at that time

  757
  there were very serious apprehensions as to the state of affairs with regard to the terms of peace. No one knew in the least what were the terms of peace. The Russians were still advancing in every direction. There was a panic amongst all the populations of the south-east of Europe, and we had a very large number of British subjects—much larger than the right hon. Gentleman and the House know—resident in Constantinople. He quarrels with the orders given to the Fleet to sail at once up the Dardanelles. Lot me read what they were—"Sail at once for the Dardanelles, and proceed with the Fleet now with you to Constantinople." The first order given said—
  "Abstain from taking any part in the contest between Russia and Turkey, but the waterway of the Straits is to be kept open, and in the event of tumult at Constantinople you are to protect life and property of British subjects."
  I do not see that by these orders there was any wish for a breach of neutrality. Under these orders, if the Russian Government had their ships coming up the Dardanelles, and the British Fleet under Admiral Hornby had attacked them, he would, in my opinion, have broken the orders given him. [An hon. MEMBER: now about the waterway?] Keep the waterway open! Do you think that we mean that we were going to send up our Fleet to Constantinople to protect our subjects and have the entrance to the Dardanelles shut against us; and if we have subjects in Constantinople and there is panic and probable fear of massacre that we are to have the gate shut in our face? I say we had a perfect right to see that the waterway was kept open in order that our ships might go up and down. I will not argue the question further; but will the right hon. Gentleman remember, when he speaks of breaches of neutrality, what occurred in the year 1853, when it was doubtful whether war had been declared or not? I am glad, by the way, that he has at last come to see some value in Treaties, because the year before last we were told that we might tear them up. The right hon. Gentleman says that we have broken that Treaty. I say we have not. Let me remind him of what took place in 1853. In September it is recorded that in consequence of the alarming state of affairs at Constantinople, the British and French Am-
  758
  bassadors determined to send two war steamers up the Dardanelles, at a time when no official intelligence of this fact had reached the Government, and Lord Clarendon addressed a despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the effect that, in ordinary circumstances, as long as the Sultan did not declare war against Russia, we must scrupulously adhere to the Treaty of 1841; but after it appeared that the lives and property of British subjects were in danger, it was clear that the Treaty regulating the entering into the Straits had no longer any binding force. I do not know why, if the waterway is to be closed, and if British subjects are exposed to danger, we should not go to rescue them in 1878 as much as in 1853, or that when the ships go there we should not take care that they get back safe. The right hon. Gentleman referred also to the second order to the Admiral to withdraw the Fleet, which he calls a "lucky chance." I must demur to that expression. That second order which we were very glad to issue was sent in consequence of a telegram received from Mr. Layard, the last part of which had the greatest weight with us. It was not simply that he had got, or thought he had got the bases of peace; but that he was told that the Turkish Plenipotentiaries had gone to the Russian headquarters and had been instructed to accept the terms—an entirely different thing. If the Turkish Plenipotentiaries were instructed to accept the bases of peace, then all panic would go, and there was no possibility of danger. The situation was changed, the necessity of sending the Fleet was gone, and the Government at once withdrew the order for the entry into the Dardanelles. I do not know that we are to be blamed for that action. I do not know that we are to be told that our policy in that respect was uncertain. I say it was not uncertain. The Fleet was sent up for an express purpose, and the moment the cause of that purpose ceased the Fleet came back. The right hon. Gentleman twitted the Government with having been actuated by a double motive—not only to recall the Fleet, but also to recall their Foreign Secretary. That statement is wholly without foundation and ought not to go uncontradicted.
  The House will pardon me if I now consider what was the change that oc-

  759
  curred so suddenly in the position of the belligerents. Everyone knows that on December 10 Plevna fell, and that on the 12th the Sultan made an appeal to all the Powers of Europe. That appeal was not responded to, and on Christmas Day the Sultan stated that we might ask Russia if she would entertain the question of an armistice, and asked us to make on his behalf overtures of peace to Russia. It was said at Oxford, without the slightest foundation, that the cause of the delay was the action of the British Government. After some misunderstanding as to whether there should be an armistice, the Russians, saying there should be bases of peace before the. armistice, and that the arrangements should be made between the military commanders, on the 5th of January I find that Lord Augustus Loftus writes to Lord Derby from St. Petersburg, that the Russian military commanders "had been instructed to state the conditions on which an armistice would be agreed to." These words are important; and I venture to say that anyone who read that despatch would have come to the conclusion that we did —namely, that the Russian commanders then had in their pockets the terms which Russia was prepared to agree to. No other meaning could possibly be attached to that despatch. Well, on the 9th of January Mr. Layard telegraphed that an order had at once been sent to the Turkish commanders to address themselves to the Russian Head-Quarters. What could be more speedy than that? On the same day we have another telegram from Turkey saying that the Turkish commanders have also addressed themselves to the Russian commanders in Roumelia as well as to the Grand Duke Nicholas, and they reply that they know nothing of an armistice and have no instructions. Having received the intimation we did on the 5th, we heard afterwards, with some astonishment, that the Russian commanders had no instructions and the Russians were still advancing. Well, the explanation of the delay of those terms reaching Constantinople was that they were of such vital importance, and so very secret, that they could not possibly be sent by telegraph, or in cipher, but must go by special messenger, and would probably arrive in eight or 10 days from the 3rd of January at this place, and in Armenia
  760
  in 15 days; all that time the Russian commanders were advancing. But one must presume from the great care they had taken about these bases, which were so precious that they could not be sent by telegraph, that they must, at all events, have been conditions which had been thoroughly well weighed and settled by the Russian Government. There could be no doubt that they must have been drawn up and settled with great forethought. Here was our first difficulty, and I defy anyone to say that the delay in regard to these terms was caused in any manner or in any form either by the Turks or by Her Majesty's Government. But we come to the next scene. We find that the Emperor of Russia is told on the 15th of January that the two Turkish Plenipotentiaries have gone with full instructions to the Imperial Head-Quarters to negotiate an armistice and a peace. We hear on the 21st that a telegram has been received by the Porte from its Plenipotentiaries stating that they are at the Russian Head-Quarters. They had got there then, at all events. Then we find that on the 24th nothing had been heard about those gentlemen or of what had happened to them. Persons connected with the delegates who had gone there had privately telegraphed to their families saying they were quite well; but no one knew what had become of the bases of peace, or why they were not signed. The delegates had the fullest instructions to accept them, and the Sultan says that he cannot make out why it is they have not signed them. But the Russians are still advancing. I want to call the attention of the House for one moment to the position of the Russian Forces at particular dates. We will take the 3rd of January, when the Russian Government was told that these delegates were going on their mission. At that time the Russians had got possession of Sofia and were marching southwards. On the 24th we learn that the Turkish Plenipotentiaries had been instructed to accept these terms of peace positively; and I think the telegram was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the previous day. Well, on the 25th, we learn that Suleiman Pasha had been defeated, and the Russians were at Adrianople, and had marched as far as one-third of the distance from that place to Constantinople. [Mr. BRIGHT: The Russian Army?]

  761
  There was quite enough of the Russian Army there to frighten the Turks. On the 30th of January (yesterday) they had got to Demotika, and were advancing in the direction of the Narrow Straits. They were within 60 miles of Constantinople. So we find that the slower the progress of these negotiations, the more rapid is the advance of the Russians. Where the Russians may be at this moment we do not know; but I presume that if they are going on at the same rate of speed as they were doing when we last heard of them, they are considerably nearer Constantinople than they were. ["Hear, hear!"] That may be very agreeable news to some hon. Gentlemen opposite, but it is not quite fair to the Turks, and, as I said before, there has been no delay on the part of the Turks, and no interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government. On the 29th of January, Lord Derby, writing to Lord Augustus Loftus, says—
  "The Russian Ambassador informs me that, according to the telegraphic reports he has received, no news of the conclusion of the armis-tice has yet reached St. Petersburg. Prince Gortchakoff, his Excellency states, is surprised at this, and attributes it either to the distance or to an interruption of the field telegraph. Prince Gortchakoff also denies the rumour that the preliminaries of peace are to be signed at Sebas-topol, and affirms that they will be concluded at Adrianople."
  Lord Augustus Loftus answers this by telegraph on the 30th of January—
  "I was this morning informed by Prince Gortchakoff that neither the Emperor nor the Russian Government had received any intelligence from Head-Quarters since the 26th inst. Prince Gortchakoff could not explain the cause, except that portions of the telegraph were defective. The movements of the Grand Duke Nicholas, who was to arrive at Adrianople at the earliest, may have had the effect of delaying the negotiations."
  Why, the Grand Duke Nicholas was the man whom the Turks were told to go to three weeks ago. The cause of the delay, therefore, was neither with the Turks nor with Her Majesty's Government. But the right hon. Gentleman hinted that the Turks may have gone back on the terms, and he asked for information on that subject. We have this telegram from Mr. Layard, dated the 27th of January—
  "With reference to your telegram of yesterday, stating that you had been informed by Count Schouvaloff that the Turkish delegates
  762
  objected to the first article of the bases of peace relating to Bulgaria, and to the second part of the fourth article, respecting reforms in the Christian Provinces—they had taken the whole ad referendum — I learn that, although the plenipotentiaries did make resistance to the first article of the bases of peace relating to Bulgaria, and to the second part of the fourth article respecting the Christian Provinces, none of the articles whatever were taken ad referendum, but the whole were accepted under the last instructions sent by the Porte."
  So that if there has been delay, it has been through the movements of the Grand Duke Nicholas. But all this time Russia is still advancing. The Emperor, I know, pledges his word of honour that he will not go to Constantinople, except for strategical reasons. Now, I want to put a question to the right hon. Gentleman. When the bases are sent by Russia, when Russia knows that the bases are accepted by Turkey, where is the strategical reason for advancing on Constantinople? Another difficulty has arisen. I will now consider the change that has occurred not in the position of the belligerents, but in that of the neutral Great Powers. I suppose we shall all agree that no change in the last Treaty is to be made without the assent of those Powers which signed the Treaty. I will now read the Protocol of the Treaty of London of 1871, in order to refresh the memory of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. It is as follows:—
  "The Plenipotentiaries of North Germany, Austria and Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, assembled to-day in conference, recognize it as an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of the Treaty or modify the stipulations thereof unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement."
  Let us take that as one of the bases on which we are to go, and when we are dealing with these matters let it be understood that Treaties to which we are parties are not to be altered without our consent. That, as was stated by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other evening, is the view of one other Power at least besides England, if not of more than one. The first thing, I may add, which we had to do was to try and find out what were the bases of peace. They were, however, kept secret, and so matters went on until my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Derby)

  763
  pressed the Russian Ambassador here on the subject. Lord Derby wrote as follows to Lord Augustus Loftus on the 21st of January:—
  "In a private communication made to me by the Russian Ambassador to-day, his Excellency told me that as he saw false reports propagated by certain journals as to supposed Russian demands for Russian vessels of war in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, he thought it right to inform me that in the bases of peace sent to the Grand Duke Nicholas no mention was made of either of those Straits."
  That is the only information we have, and it is remarkable that up to the present day we have no official communication giving the terms of peace. But a certain Wednesday has been alluded to, when certain important events were supposed to have happened. On the Thursday the Notice was given by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and within 12 hours—certainly within 24 hours—of the time the Notice was given, we first got knowledge of these bases, and this information was given to us as a private memorandum, though we were allowed to make use of it, and lay it on the Table of the House. In some important particulars this memorandum does not agree with the statement which we have heard from Mr. Layard. First, we hear from the conversation of Count Schouvaloff with Lord Derby, that the bases contain nothing about the Straits. Next, we find, from Count Schouvaloffs written but private communication, that there is to be an ulterior understanding about the Straits; but nothing is said by Count Schouvaloff as to whom the understanding is to be between. It is reserved for us to hear from Constantinople that the understanding is to be between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia. We then hear from Prince Gortchakoff that he agrees that there is rather a vagueness in the matter of the Straits, and that he does not see much use in having it at all. The second remarkable circumstance is that there is an ulterior understanding; and the third, that the ulterior understanding is between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan; and then, after all, this matter is so vague that he will not be sorry if it is altogether suppressed, but it is not suppressed. It seems to me to be altogether a very marvellous affair —this question of the Straits. Had not the Russian Government, I would ask,
  764
  better make up their minds about it? Then, as to a military occupation; we have heard of that, but it has not been defined; next we hear it is likely some fortress will have to be given up, but there is no definite information on that point either; and the House will also remember that, as we hear nothing at all about the bases until the Notice is given by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, so we hear nothing about the vagueness of the article as to the Straits and the willingness of the Russian Ambassador to suppress it until the very night when the Vote was presented by my right hon. Friend. [An hon. MEMBER: Quote the despatch.] The despatch is as follows:—
  "In reply to my inquiries, Prince Gortchakoff stated this morning that the last article communicated by Count Schouvaloff, referring to an ulterior understanding, was vague and unnecessary, and saw no objection to suppress it altogether. I am allowed to state categorically to your Lordship that Russia considers the question of the Straits an European question."
  [Cries of" Hear, hear!"from the Opposition.] It is all well to say "Hear, hear!" for how could it be otherwise after your Protocol of 1871? Is that all you have got to say for your friends the Russians? ["Oh, oh!"] I will withdraw that observation if it is objected to. ["No, No!"] I merely want to avoid saying anything that will offend anyone. I say that if that is all that can be said for the Russians in this matter I must say that little contents you, and that you are thankful for small mercies. I want to know, are you quite certain that you are acquainted with all the bases yet? I want to know why it is, if these bases have been offered and accepted, they have not been produced to the Governments of Europe? The question is—what are we to do under these circumstances? We have no explanation as to how it came to pass that the preliminaries of peace were not settled long ago? We find that the Russians are advancing, and there is not the slightest reason for their advancing towards Constantinople one inch after these bases of peace have been set forth. I am not going, after what fell from my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other night, to argue upon the question of the bases; but I will say this—that these bases of peace do present matters of the gravest possible character, affecting a

  765
  part of Europe in which the Powers of Europe have so long had a deep interest. We are asked in these circumstances which British interest we have particularly to guard? There is this, I would answer, among others, which is certainly worthy of consideration. It arises out of the question which was present to the mind of the Emperor of Russia when he first entered into this war. He declared it to be his object to effect a settlement of the troubles in the East of Europe which should be "complete, effeotual, and surely guaranteed," in order that he might not be under the necessity of going to war again. Now that is a British interest of a most vital kind; and is it not for us to see that in the settlement of this question the peace which may be made is "complete, effectual, and surely guaranteed?" And if, in the opinion of this country, a peace should be concluded which was not likely to lead to these results, but which would still leave smouldering embers behind, which might at any moment be fanned into a flame, that is a matter, I apprehend, upon which we should be heard, and our views forcibly expressed. What may be the mode, whether by Conference or consultation, in which the questions at issue are to be brought before the Powers of Europe, I know not. The Emperor of Russia has never stated, so far as we know, whether it is to be by Conference or consultation, or how. All we need care about is that we shall have a bond fide voice in the settlement which may be effected, and that we shall see not merely that those interests mentioned in Lord Derby's despatch are preserved; but that a long, a lasting, and a certain peace shall be concluded. I sincerely hope that by any such settlement the position of the unfortunate Christian population may be ameliorated. It will take years and years to efface the effects of this horrible war—a war that has inflicted untold misery upon the unhappy country in which it has been waged during the last 18 months. There is another matter which is of vital importance. In all the Treaties which you have had on this matter for a long series of years, you have treated Turkey as a powerful State that ought to be maintained. Now, in consequence of this war, in what state is the Porte left? [Cries of" Hear, hear!"from the Opposition.'] It is a very easy question to
  766
  Say "Hear, hear!" but it is a very difficult question to settle; because you have now, in all human probability, a different state of things. It is very easy to pull down, but it is not so easy to build up; but we say that when you come to deal with this part of Europe, the voice of England must be heard, if the voice of England is to be heard, we must speak as a united nation, and you must get rid of the notion that is in your minds that there is a determined Party in the Government that want to go to war. What the Government want to do is to secure a lasting peace, and the sole object of the Vote which they ask you to pass tonight is that we may appear in such a condition that the voice of England may be heard for the purpose of securing that end. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the action of one of our Colleagues, who is no longer a Member of the Government; but, I would like to remind the House of certain words which that noble Lord used in the solemn letter which he addressed to the Prime Minister, and which was read in "another place." In that letter the noble Earl said—
  "Further, a Vote of Credit, or an increase in the military or naval estimates, is a measure which I consider useful as a means of strengthening our diplomacy at this moment."
  I should not have quoted these words if the right hon. Gentleman had not insisted that there was some difference on this question between Lord Carnarvon and the Government, and I think it right that the House should be reminded that in the opinion of the noble Earl the effect of this Vote would be to give strength to the hands of the Ministers. As I said before, England has no selfish objects to gain, and no cause to fear. She has no ambition in this matter. Her sole object is to secure the peace of Europe on a permanent and satisfactory basis. But, when you find the interests of this country so nearly endangered, and so nearly threatened, then we feel bound to say it is time that Europe should acknowledge that England must have a voice in the final settlement of the question. I cannot believe—I will not believe it till I see it—that the right hon. Gentleman will ever put this Resolution to the House. I do not believe that this Resolution will meet with any better fate than the celebrated Ir-resolutions of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for

  767
  Greewich of last Session; but, if he does go to a division, I feel convinced that this House will, by an enormous majority, give the Vote which the Government asks. They know that the Government does not want to go to war. It shall be known throughout the country that that is not their object. In spite of everything that has been said, the sole object of this Vote is to secure, and that as speedily as possible, a complete, satisfactory, and lasting peace.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONobserved that the right hon. Gentleman had several times declared in solemn tones that the Russians were advancing, and he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) felt almost as much alarm as if the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) had told them that the Jesuits were in the cellars beneath. He did not think it was right of the Home Secretary to speak of "your Russian friends," and he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) wished to discuss the question as an Englishman. The right hon. Gentleman was also unjust in charging the Mover of the Amendment with vagueness and ambiguity, for he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) had never heard the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford less vague or less ambiguous. He did not want to judge the Government harshly, and when the Blue Book appeared last year he did not think that there was any justification for bringing a railing accusation against them. They were not finding any great fault with any despatch of the Government. What they found fault with was the despatch of the Fleet the other day. They thought that the Government was going on in a manner entirely satisfactory, and the calm produced by the despatches and speeches of the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) and others was only broken by a warlike cry from the Prime Minister in the midst of the Aldermen of the City. For the mock heroics of the Postmaster General nobody cared; but Parliament had been summoned in a manner which excited the greatest alarm. This was, no doubt, another of the humourous proceedings of the Prime Minister; but what was sport to him was death to the Turks. He charged the Government with betraying the Turks by luring them on with false hopes and expectations. Then came the speech of Lord Carnarvon, which acted like oil upon the troubled
  768
  waters; and he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was so pleased with it, that he found himself stumping the country, moving resolutions in favour of the Government, and shouting for "Salisbury and common sense," and "Northcote and neutrality." The Chancellor of the Exchequer had inspired them with confidence when he told them so solemnly on the first day of the Session that no money should be spent till they had the terms of peace before them. That confidence was not justified, and it was a most extraordinary time to ask for a Vote of Confidence just when Lord Carnarvon, in whom they had confidence, had resigned his position in the Cabinet. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) would say distinctly he had no confidence in the Government. A right hon. Gentleman on the Ministerial benches opposite, when interrupted in his speech, said—"I cannot say two things at once," but that is just what they had to complain the Government had been doing. He supposed that the reasons for this Vote would be fully discussed before it was agreed to; but it seemed to him that hitherto no satisfactory reason had been offered in its favour. It was said that one of the grounds for asking for it was to enable British interests to be protected. He also desired to see British interests protected; but he could not understand how it could be contended that the establishment of freedom and of good government where they did not formerly exist could be in any way opposed to British interests. There was a curious kind of political controversy which had been raised of late, and which consisted in calling those who did not take the War Party side unpatriotic, and one morning paper—The Morning Post —had committed almost a breach of privilege in saying they believed "the agents of Russia" intended to prolong the debate as long as they could, in order that Russia might have time to effect her purposes before this country could interfere. What right had any man to accuse those who were opposed to this Vote of being Russian agents? That man who did so was hitting below the belt and fighting foul, whether he be a costermonger or a noble Duke. He thought such a style of controversy had better be dropped in that House. He had at first distrusted Russia, and did not believe she had really any noble ob-

  769
  ject in view; but he never felt so warm towards Russia as he did when he listened to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech, which showed how straightforwardly Russia had conducted the negotiations. He remembered the words—
  "Our country claims our fealty,
  We grant it so; but then
  Before man made us citizens
  Great Nature made us men."
  —and he should be ashamed of England if she did not rejoice to see freedom spread. Who could object to the autonomy of Bulgaria? Lord Derby himself, in a speech he made some time ago, stated that the very thing which Russia now proposed was necessary in the interests of liberty and peace. He believed that hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House would be just as pleased as those of the Liberal side to see good and just government extended to all parts of the world. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his speech on Monday said—"It is a question whether we are or are not to go into that Conference armed with the strength of a united nation." The right hon. Gentleman who followed him (Mr. Bright) said—"That means you are to go into the Conference with shotted guns and revolvers." There, however, the right hon. Gentleman was mistaken; and it was clear he had not looked into the Estimate, or he would have seen that the money was to be expended upon surgical instruments. Fancy going into the Conference armed with surgical instruments. They might disguise it as best they could; but there was no disguising the fact that the Motion, if it meant anything, was a War Vote. The speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was of such a tone that he wondered he did not conclude it by saying—
  "We don't want to fight, but by jingo if we do, We've got the ships, we've got the men, and we've got the money too."
  They could, indeed, raise in the City any quantity of money they wanted for any object, however foolish. The right hon. Gentleman thought he could go into the Conference with greater weight if he went with the money in his pocket. Such an idea was vulgar. If a man shook a naked sword in his (Sir Wilfrid Lawson's) face, he would call him a
  770
  barbarian; if he shook his fist in his face, he would call him a bully; but if he shook his purse in his face, he would call him a snob; and they would be called the snobs of Europe if they did as the Government asked them. If they put £6,000,000 on the Estimates because there was a crisis in the war between Russia and Turkey, it meant war and nothing else, and it was insulting their common sense to say that it meant anything else. Those who wished for the money were in a majority, and he believed they had some valuable allies on this occasion—a contingent had been sent from the sister country. That was very disinterested on their part, for they had heard hon. Gentlemen say how unjustly Ireland was taxed, and yet they were going to vote their share of the £6,000,000. The hon. Member for Cavan (Mr. Biggar), whom he saw sitting on the Government benches, made a speech in which he said England would soon have to fight someone in order to show that she could fight; and that was certainly a better argument in favour of the Vote than any they had heard from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Home Secretary. He hoped the money would not be voted without a Dissolution and an appeal to the country. He did not like a Dissolution any more than others, and with reference to a special subject in which he was interested, the longer a Dissolution was put off the better, for every year he grew stronger. Neither was he anxious that the right hon. Gentlemen opposite should go out of Office yet; he wanted them to go through the fiery furnace a little longer, and come out better and purer than they were; but he did say that in this matter they ought to go by the opinion of the country, and he denied that it was in favour of such a step. If he looked at the Perth election he found that the man against this Vote got 2,200 votes, whilst the one in favour of it got but 855 votes. The Standard said the result was certainly not anticipated. He presumed it was one of the "unexpected occurrences" of which they had heard so much. Then at Leith, the candidate who was against the money being voted was returned by three to one, whilst the poor man in favour of it only got 888 votes; and he would not have got so many if he had not stated in the

  771
  middle of the day that he would not vote for it. He next turned to Greenock, and there he found a most excellent and respectable Tory beaten by three to one, and saying afterwards that the conduct of the Government, and the news which had come out during the election, had greatly damaged his chances. Then the public meetings had pronounced against this Vote all over the country except Sheffield. But who represented that town? An hon. and learned Member who had passed his life in fighting everybody and everything; and it was not surprising, therefore, that the fighting spirit existed at Sheffield. There was a meeting yesterday in London, at which the hon. Member for Bristol (Mr. Morley) was present. Ruffians invaded the place, broke the windows, and smashed the furniture, and what had become of the hon. Member for Bristol he did not know. [An hon. MEMBER: He is here!] He congratulated the House on the escape of the hon. Member for Bristol; but that meeting had given the strongest evidence that the country was against this Vote, for it dared not trust to the force of reason, and statements of facts were met by broken chairs. Whether it was done by Conservative working men or members of Constitutional associations he did not know; but rumour said that both were concerned. No doubt the House had ability enough to discuss this question; but still it existed as representing the opinions of the country; and what opinion was there in 1874 on the Eastern Question. There was more talk then of opening the public-houses than of opening the Black Sea; and nobody then spoke of the Straits of the Dardanelles, though there was some talk of the Straits of Malacca. Before this money was taken an appeal, therefore, ought to be made to the country, and he challenged the Government to take that Constitutional course. If they would not accept that challenge, there were men enough below the Gangway to avail themselves of the Forms of the House to resist to the utmost a policy which he believed was the most senseless and the most mischievous he had ever known.
  MR. HARDCASTLEsaid, the hon. Baronet who had just sat down had managed to extract amusement even from this subject; but the position of
  772
  the country was, in his (Mr. Hardcastle's) opinion, too grave for levity. It was recorded that when the shadow went back on the sundial of Ahaz, the King of Babylon sent to inquire of the wonder done in the land, and there was not less curiosity now for an explanation of the startling retrogression exhibited by a section of the Liberal Party. If there was one word which expressed the complete negation of every principle professed by that Party, that word was "Russia." What were the Liberal watchwords? Personal liberty, religious equality, representative government; but in Russia, for personal liberty, were Siberian deportations; for religious equality, Dissent was penal; for representative government, military despotism. Whence, then, their sympathy with Russia—was it because hon. Gentlemen had sacrificed another cherished principle—the right of private judgment —-and were blindly following a Leader, who had played so conspicuous a part in favour of Russia for the last 18 months? They had all read the right hon. Gentleman's speech at Oxford yesterday, which showed that he had brought this great question to a mere personal issue. This is what he said—
  "It is all very well for the Prime Minister, who has got a Cabinet and Departments, and Secretaries and Ambassadors, and a majority in the House of Lords, and a majority in the House of Commons. These are the means through which his will can take effect, hut I have none of these things."
  Just as if the whole matter was a personal contest between these two eminent men. The right hon. Gentleman then went on—
  "My purpose, I will tell you fairly, has been, with extremely inadequate means, and in a very mean and poor degree, but still to the best of my power for the last 18 months, day and night, week by week, month by month, to counterwork as well as I could what I believe to be the purpose of Lord Beaconsfield."
  He trusted that in this contest of giants the weal of the country would not be lost sight of; and he was sorry that so many hon. Members on the other side of the House still backed the right hon. Gentleman. He had observed during the last 15 years a singular concurrence between the personal affronts and the public policy of the right hon Gentleman, once the darling of the clergy, "Oxford's noblest son." In 1863 he lost the

  773
  confidence of Churchmen and his seat for the University. What followed? Leaving Oxford, as he said, unmuzzled, soon his teeth were at the throat of the Irish Church. Transferring his favour from the Anglican to the Roman Church, he next suffered affront at the hands of his new friends. In 1873, Cardinal Manning tripped him up on the Irish University Bill; and, in the pamphlets on "Vatican Decrees," followed the bitterest attack ever made on the Papacy. But, again, his Party had become insubordinate, and they, too, must feel the weight of his arm. An elaborate manifesto, secretly prepared without the knowledge of a single Member of his Cabinet, fell like a bombshell upon his rebellious followers, and the Dissolution of 1874 shattered the Liberal ranks. "Nemo me impune lacessit" was the right hon. Gentleman's motto; but once more the country, appealed to, rejected him with scorn, and British interests are denounced as selfish, and the right hon. Gentleman cast all his influence into the scale of that great Power which was the most formidable rival of his country, and a standing menace to the liberties of Europe. The Government had been denounced for asking for the Vote; but he (Mr. Hard-castle) thought the circumstances of the times were such as to call for a patriotic response to the request of the Government for a sum of money sufficient to put the moderate armaments of the country in a state of preparation for any emergency that might arise. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) had condemned the Government for going to a peaceful Conference with shotted cannons and loaded revolvers. But that right hon. Gentleman forgot that all the other great Powers who would be at the Conference were armed far more than ourselves, and that if our word there was to be of any weight we must have the power to back it up. Would the right hon. Gentleman have them go into the Conference merely with broad-brimmed hats and umbrellas? He considered that the Government, in entering the Conference so prepared that they could speak with power and effect, were pursuing a wise and patriotic course. The contest lay between freedom on the one hand, and enormous military power on the other; he believed that the heart of the country was with the Government
  774
  in the course they had taken, and he, for one, would support them.
  MR. LAINGsaid, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary reminded him of the saying—"No case, abuse the plaintiff's attorney." He had listened with extreme pain to the greater part of that speech, and to the almost passionate appeals which the right hon. Gentleman had made to excite heated feeling on the grave subject before the House. Still more was he pained by the tone taken by the right hon. Gentleman with regard to a friendly Power with whom we were still on relations of neutrality. Russia was a great historic Empire like our own—a country which had stood shoulder to shoulder with us in the greatest war of modern times, and with whom our greatest statesmen, from Chatham downwards, had cultivated amicable relations. If they were to have a difference with Russia, it would be unworthy a great country like England not to conduct the controversy in a noble and chivalrous, he would not say a gentleman-like spirit, instead of in a nagging and suspicious spirit which would disgrace a metropolitan vestry. It was quite evident there had been a change of front in the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards Russia. The policy of the Government was defined in Lord Derby's despatch of the 6th of May. It was a policy of strict neutrality subject only to two or three specified conditions. Had any one of those conditions, with which they were all familiar, been violated? It was unnecessary for him, after the withering sarcasm of the noble Lords (Lords Salisbury and Derby), to refer to the scare as to a possible Russian invasion of India. Then as to Egypt, could anyone seriously say that our position in reference to the Suez Canal was in any way endangered? How far Her Majesty's Government had observed a policy of impartial neutrality as regarded Egypt he would not inquire. Russia had undertaken not to carry on warlike operations in Europe, but had our Government given the Khedive any advice not to squander the money he had borrowed in England in taking part in a war in which he had no concern? With respect to Constantinople, they had that distinct assurance of the Czar that the permanent occupation of that city was not contemplated by him.

  775
  Then with respect to the question of the Dardanelles, they had distinct pledges that that would not be settled by any exclusive arrangement between Russia and Turkey. He therefore maintained that all the points covered by the despatch of the 6th of May were out of danger. They were not touched. He now came to the Vote, and he wanted to know what were the points which had arisen since to alter the situation. He found the reason was that new and totally different terms had been imported into what was called "the charter" of the 6th of May. In the first place, they had this new term—that even the approach of the Russians in the course of military operations to Gallipoli and Constantinople was a thing so wrong in itself, or so injurious to English interests, that it should be prevented. They had not listened to appeals in the case of Paris, and why should they listen to appeals in the case of the Turkish capital? Was Constantinople so sacred that they were going to quarrel with one of the greatest Powers of Europe, and sacrifice many thousands of British lives, in order to save it from the Russians—not from their permanent occupation of it, but from their coming in sight of it, or occupying it as a mere military operation? Yet upon this point they had taken what had been well called the reckless step which had driven their own Foreign Minister from the Cabinet—the order given to the Fleet on Wednesday last. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary talked of that as if it was the most commonplace, ordinary thing in the world. He told them that they went there without any offence to Russia, or any one else. Could they make the House believe that Lord Derby resigned his seat in the Cabinet if the measure was one of that small and commonplace character? They knew that it was a breach of neutrality, as Prince Gortchakoff put it in his despatch. Looking at the Papers he found strong grounds for hesitating to grant this Vote. They heard a great deal about British interests, but to talk vaguely of "British interests," as Lord Beaconsfield did, was to treat men as children. What were British interests? Show him an undoubted interest that was assailed and he would not hesitate a moment. Tell him that an enemy was marching on Herat, for instance, and he should be as ready to vote their last shilling as any
  776
  bellicose Gentleman on the other side. But he was not going to vote any money unless he knew the reason why. He had disposed of India and Egypt. He did not suppose anyone would say they were in danger. The only reasonable thing remaining was that Russia might get possession of Constantinople and the command of the Dardanelles. This was a considerable interest for us; it was a vital one for Austria, and for Germany it was important. But if Austria or Germany were not alarmed, and if they were satisfied with the assurances which the Emperor had given against the permanent occupation of Constantinople and with regard to the Dardanelles, it was strange England was not satisfied. No doubt Turkey had answered the object they had in view in leaving Constantinople in the hands of a considerable, independent Power; but the continuance of that state of things had become impossible. The decay of Turkey rendered her powerless to suppress chronic revolt; her institutions and religion rendered reform impossible; and the English conscience was awakened to the sin and disgrace of supporting her. Stronger than any consideration of policy or interest was the deep conviction of what was right. That mainly compelled us to abolish the slave trade, and in this case deterred us from upholding the degrading barbarism of a Power which had devastated Provinces that flourished under Roman and Byzantine rule as much as if they Lad experienced a great geological change. They had been withered by the burning blast or the icy breath of Turkish misrule until their condition justified the boast that the grass ceased to grow where the Turkish horse trod. Yet for the Power and the rule which had produced these results it was proposed to obtain "the most favourable terms," which meant the least favourable for the oppressed subjects. As a strong and independent Government it had collapsed beyond revival by the blind rejection of our advice; and could it be our interest to bolster up the remains of this wretched and decrepit Empire instead of basing our British interests on something more permanent and enduring? Why, when the Treaty of Adrianople was signed in 1828, the Duke of Wellington said it was a pity the Russians had not gone a little further, upset the Turkish Government

  777
  altogether, and established a Byzantine Kingdom under the guarantee of the Great Powers, so as to close the Eastern Question—a solution which he believed to be desirable now. Russia could be kept from Constantinople only by either a strong, independent Power, or by a State placed, like Belgium, under the guarantee of the Powers. If this Vote were granted, and if the Question were now settled in the spirit of the Home Secretary's speech, we should leave it in the best position for the supposed design of Russia. We should disappoint the reasonable hopes of the Christians, and make them regard England as their enemy and look to Russia as their patron and possible deliverer in a future war. The better course would be to render the States independent and strong, giving them separate nationalities, complete frontiers, and Christian rulers, for then they would have the greatest possible security against Russia. Greece, being independent, had not been vehemently Russian, while Servia and Roumania had looked to Russia for complete emancipation. Russian Armies could march through vassal States, but not through those that were independent. Prom any point of view, it was our interest to create States as antonomous and extensive as possible. If the Kingdom of Greece were extended and made a sort of Southern Belgium, and obliged, under a guarantee of the Great Powers, to keep open the passage of the Dardanelles to ships of commerce or of war, that would be a solution of the difficulty of all others the most beneficial for English interests. It was for a totally different object that this Vote was required. At the best, it was wanted to obtain favourable terms for Turkey; at the worst, to drift us into war with Russia. It was impossible to believe in the unanimity of a Cabinet two Members of which had tendered their resignations; and it was impossible to forget that there remained in the Cabinet the Minister who, immediately after receiving the pacific assurances of the Emperor of Russia, made the Guildhall speech, which, in plain English, threatened Russia if she meddled with Turkey. When Lord Beaconsfield uttered his famous speech at Guildhall, it was impossible to suppose that he was unfavourable to a repetition of the Crimean War. The Prime Minister had once
  778
  educated his Party into household suffrage, and he might again educate them into a repetition of the Crimean War. Lord Carnarvon had told the country that he had been severely taken to task by Lord Beaconsfield in the Cabinet for the expressions he had used, and why? Because he was too pacific. How could the noble Lord expect us to feel confidence in the Cabinet when such things as this were going on, or when they were told there was unanimity in the Cabinet at the time when two of its Members had tendered their resignations? He acquitted the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer of any intentional deceit in the statement he had made—the right hon Gentleman was a man of transparent honesty; but he believed he had been mesmerised by some influence in the Cabinet, and when he reflected on the past he would seriously regret it. The House were asked to give this Vote to show their patriotic feeling, and in order that Ministers might go on with their negotiations with the whole country united at their back. But, looking to the fact of their sending the Fleet to Constantinople and their driving Lord Carnarvon from the Cabinet, he distinctly declared that the Government had not the confidence of the House or the country. If they doubted the fact, let them appeal to the country, and they would suffer a most disastrous defeat. The many meetings which had recently been held proved this to demonstration. There would be an immense and overwhelming majority against their policy, which, he thought, would prove as discreditable to British honour as it was disastrous for British interests.
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he was surprised that the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), in spite of the distinct and clear statement of the Home Secretary, had insinuated that the policy of the Government was a war policy. This Vote was asked, not for the purpose of war, but to place our armaments in a proper condition in case others should declare war against us, or make war on our interests. Looking to what had occurred recently, he thought if there was anything to blame in the policy of the Government, it was the recall of the Fleet. The Fleet had been sent to Constantinople, not to take part in the war, but to ensure the safety and honour of the numerous British subjects in Con-

  779
  stantinople and its neighbourhood who trusted to the protection of England. He had been informed that there were over 30,000 British subjects in Constantinople and its neighbourhood, whose lives and honour would be at the mercy of the Russian Army and the Turkish insurrectionists if the Russians took possession of that capital. He did not blame the Grand Duke Nicholas for trying to crown a great campaign by entering the enemy's capital; but that was no reason why the Government should not take steps for the safety of British subjects. He could not believe, if the Russian Army did take possession of Constantinople, that they would fail to make such changes as would be extremely unsatisfactory to every other European Power. He suspected that in the Mosque of St. Sofia a Te Deum would be sung for the Russian victories, and once the Russian flag was hoisted there it would cost this country more than these £6,000,000, and a vast quantity of blood, as well as treasure, to guard the entrance to the Black Sea and to protect the rights of England in the East. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was challenged to say what he would do with the £6,000,000. No doubt the House was dissatisfied at voting this money blindly. But would it be wise to declare to the enemy, if we had an enemy, what our weakness was? The object of warlike preparations was to defeat an enemy, and when Europe was armed to the teeth it was necessary for us to protect ourselves against all comers. At present there was scarcely a gun on our fortifications, though, thanks to the exertions of last year, both guns and carriages were ready. That was one thing to which the money might be applied. But there was another, although it might not be popular with the House. They did not yet know all the terms of peace. The Turkish Fleet was a large one, and let them suppose that one of the terms was that that Fleet should be handed over to Russia in part payment of the war indemnity. There would then be 17 of the finest ships afloat handed over in the Black Sea to a Power sufficiently great already. Would that be satisfactory? Would it not be a proper application of the money to pay it over to Turkey on condition that the Turkish Fleet should be transferred to Her Majesty's Government? He hoped the
  780
  Government would consider that suggestion. He was surprised at the course taken by Her Majesty's Opposition; for what occurred in 1870? In that year it was the duty of the Government then in office to come to this House and ask for £2,000,000 for the purpose of defence. There was no idea of going to war, and no one challenged them with that intention. Everyone supported them except the "wise men" alluded to by the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). What was the course taken by the present Prime Minister? Did he, through jealousy of his great antagonist, when the interests of the country were at stake, think it proper to offer a vexatious opposition? He would give the words used by Mr. Disraeli on that occasion, and he could wish that the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition were present to hear them, and that by-and-by he would use language as patriotic and distinct. On the 1st of August, 1870, Mr. Disraeli said—
  "I think the House will agree with me that, excellent as is the policy of neutrality, the policy of neutrality which cannot on the right occasion speak with authority to the belligerents is really a policy not entitled to respect. The first object of a policy of neutrality is, no doubt, to protect our fellow-subjects from the calamity of war. The second object of a policy of neutrality is to be able on the right occasion—on an occasion such as may be produced by the equal fortunes in the field of the belligerents, or by the over whelming success of one of them, or by any one of a thousand accidents—to be able to counsel the belligerents and bring about the restoration of peace; because while you impress on the parties the importance of such a result, you show them at the same time that you have the power to enforce, if necessary, the adoption of the course you recommend…Let the Government of this country feel that the House of Commons, without respect to person or Party, is prepared to give them a hearty support."— [3 Mansard, cciii. 1292–1293.]
  Those were the words of a statesman and a patriot, and an example which the Opposition would do well to follow.
  MR. ERNEST NOELsaid, the right hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) had told them the Government asked for this Vote because it might be necessary to buy the Turkish Fleet. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer, before the close of the debate, would inform the House whether the Government had any such intention, for he did not think it likely they would entertain such a proposal without consulting the House upon

  781
  the subject. The Home Secretary had told them there was no such thing as a war Party in the Cabinet, and that it was a "lying spirit" in the country which told them that there was; and yet the greater part of his speech was devoted to telling them how they ought to meet the insidious advances of Russia. A speech more in favour of war than that of the right hon. Gentleman could not be imagined. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech he made the other night, said he wished the Government to enter the Council Chamber of Europe backed by a united people. He believed there was not one hon. Gentleman in that House who did not agree with that sentiment. For his own part, he wished to disclaim any desire to embarrass the Government, or in any way to prevent it entering on the Conference as the representative of a united and a free people. In the presence of foreign complications, when the nation had to meet the other nations of Europe, there could be no graver fault than for a Member animated by any Party feeling to oppose the Government. The honour of England was as dear to hon. Gentlemen sitting on those (the Opposition) benches as to anyone sitting on those opposite; and he trusted there was no one in that House so unworthy of the traditions of Great Britain as to be unwilling forspend any money and any blood in defending her interests; but he did regret the apparent determination of Her Majesty's Government to refrain from announcing any definite policy, and therefore to enter the Conference unsupported by a united people. He gathered from the Home Secretary that they had no intention and no desire to unite this House; but that they intended to rely on their majority in the House, a majority he would at once grant to be a large one. While the Government felt secure in the possession of a majority, which, however, had been obtained under far different circumstances, they were indifferent to all the imputations of want of patriotism which were heaped on the Opposition for its appeals to Government to save the country from a disgraceful as it would be a disastrous war. The right hon. Gentleman would not tell them a word of what his policy was, and when they applied for information concerning it and the bases of peace, they were answered with hints so ambiguous
  782
  that they might mean anything or nothing. But he heard the right hon. Gentleman say it would be a mistake if we allowed Turkey to be dismembered. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I never said so.] He was delighted to hear the right hon. Gentleman repudiate such an idea; but what the House and the country wanted to know was, whether Her Majesty's Government did or did not consider the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, such as the first article of the proposed terms would effect, as a measure this nation was entitled to resist by force of arms? The Home Secretary had omitted to state in the slightest degree what the Government considered it was entitled to demand when it should go into the anticipated Conference. All they had heard from him was simply this, that Russia was steadily advancing on Constantinople. The Porte had. had 20 years breathing time, but had done absolutely nothing in the way of reform; for liberty of any kind was unknown to its subject Christian populations. The House was asked for money to be used for the purpose, for anything they knew, of rivet-ting again the cruel fetters with which for centuries the Turk had bound the Christian peoples of Eastern Europe; so that once more the Turkish flag would float over the city of cities on the Bos-phorus and over the towns and cities they had so long made desolate. He would never give a vote to embarrass the Government; but he trusted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would place before the House some more clear and satisfactory reasons for this Motion.
  MR. BERESFORD HOPE: Long as I have been a Member, this is the first time in which I have taken part in a foreign debate. The question which I now ask myself is the one which has been so fairly stated by the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster)—"Has the conduct of the Government in the immediate past been such as to justify me in giving my confidence to it in the immediate future?" My position, abstractedly speaking, as to this question is that of one who considers that the interests of humanity, of religion, of Christianity, ought to stand before all Party considerations whatsoever; who regards honour as paramount, and who believes that the secret of England continuing great and prosperous

  783
  among the nations lies in her holding to the principle of sound diplomacy— namely, courteous and pacific distrust all round—of France, of Austria, of Russia, or, it may be, of America; coupled with prudent readiness to co-operate with whatever other State owns a similar distrust — the motive power being all along zeal for the national welfare. I claim now to address you as one who never felt any love for Turkey, and never was moved by special dread or special admiration of Russia; but one who has above all things felt that a Christian nation ought not to compass the pursuit of its own interests under the cloak of simulated zeal for the welfare of Christendom. With these convictions, I now ask myself, before I dare to vote, whether the Government has approved itself a traitor to the cause of peace and a recreant to Christianity? That is the question that has been very recklessly tossed upon the floor of England, and which has this very day been debated—as those who look at the evening papers may see—at an influential meeting of ministers of the Gospel held in some room in the more eastern part of London. I denounce the Ultramontane arrogance which dares to bind those who feel for the cause of Christianity only to show their feeling in one prescribed way. Those who would not, in face of the intricate complications of this most wretched war, absolutely shut their eyes to all but the one patented class of considerations, have been taunted as enemies of philanthropy, obstructives to civilization, and recreants from the faith. Really, some men are so unimaginative, that because they lament, as all right-minded persons must do, that blackest epoch in the chronicle of the world, when some four, or rather five hundred years back, the dissensions, the selfishness, the crimes, and sins of Christian Europe opened the door of its fairest Provinces in the South-east to the barbaric hordes of Turkish invaders, they can therefore only compass one narrow solution of the far-reaching question, and one skin-deep remedy for the malignant disease. They may have minds to apprehend Constantinople as the headquarters of a Russian Pro-Consul, but they cannot forecast in some coming time Constantinople as the regenerated seat of a free and independent Christian State. This is my hope, and this my dream—a day-dream perhaps—but a dream surely
  784
  of good omen, and not to be lightly put on one side. If it points to a policy which is in any degree worthy to be pursued, it will not be reached by way of gushing and impulsive philanthropy. I do not, above all things, believe that this or any good result can be attained by that monotonous and senseless vituperation of the Government on every occasion which has characterized so many recent speeches in many places, and of which the upshot is to land its authors on the dilemma of either accusing the Government of want of common sense or else of common honesty. We have had an instance of that form of argument to-night. The Home Secretary may rise and say, as he has done—"It shall not be war, it shall be peace;" yet this does not prevent other hon. Members from getting up, and arguing that when the Minister names peace he means war. When I see a pertinacious policy of never taking things for the best, of always hunting up small discrepancies, and dwelling upon any rhetorical phrase, or epigrammatic, or obscure, or mystical sentence that may be uttered by some accomplished orator, treasuring such sayings up and repeating them, regardless of changed circumstances; while manly speeches like that of the Home Secretary to-night, and that with which he re-assured the country last Session, are put on one side as if they were not intended to bear a meaning, I confess that I am indignant at the invincible prejudice and unfairness of the proceeding. I will borrow an illustration from another question, which, perhaps, next to the Eastern Question most exercises our minds. People of my way of thinking have often expressed surprise, if not disgust, at the sentiments which have fallen from holy mouths, and have contended that being a Dissenter should notinvolve being a charterted libertine in speech, and the answer has regularly been —"You make a great mistake when you charge the Dissenters with this or that offensive remark; it is not the Dissenters, but the 'political Dissenters' who have said it, and you must not believe that these are the same as the Dissenters. The Dissenters pure and simple are humble - minded, simple, unworldly men." Well, I follow that cue, and I say that there are two Parties now— there is the "peace Party," and there is the "political peace Party." I am,

  785
  myself, a Member of the peace Party. I believe the policy of that Party to be to seek peace, and to ensure it by all the legitimate methods of a wide statesmanship, and I believe the Chiefs of that Party to be the present Cabinet. I believe, on the contrary, that the aim of the political peace party is to put the sacred name of peace forward as a stalking-horse in order to turn the Tory Government out. As a peace man' I oppose the political peace Policy. Have we not seen within the last few days the climax of that policy, when a statesman, whose eloquence and long-proved services to the nation have endeared him to this House and the country, and whose name will live in history, forestalling, in a fierce attack upon the Government, the speech that should have been made here, revelling in words which proved his intention of shaking off the salutary restraints which govern the form of our debates, and boastfully claiming to be an agitator? Prom the agitator, into which he then dropped, I appeal to the statesman whom we have so long known, and I protest against the trick of interposing such smoky lenses between the clear question and the genuine judgment of the nation. In making this protest, above all, I appeal to the place where that speech was delivered. The charge against us, as I may premise, is that we are too scrupulous of musty Treaties; and now that the Turk has shown himself—as I believe, and as I dare to say in any assembly, he is—utterly unworthy of the position into which the lamentable mischances of nearly 500 years have foisted him in Europe; now that the continuous misgovernment of his subjects, and the prevalence of those ineffable abominations which stamp his social and political life—hitherto familiar to students, but neglected by the generality—have flashed upon the popular imagination, never to be effaced, the charge against us, as far as I can make out, is that having been fully awakened to the real state of things, we yet feel as men of honour that there are Treaties, there are engagements, there are promises made— not to the Turk merely, but to collective Europe—which must be kept between man and man, even if one man may be a Christian and the other may be a Turk! That is the sum total of the charge against us—that is the bill of
  786
  indictment which Liberal rhetoric brings against the Tory Party. But what are the time and place of this arraignment? The place and the time is the canonization, last night, of the new patron Saint of the Liberal Party. From the temple in which Saint Palmerston was canonized does that voice come. The high priest of the new worship it is who warns us that the slightest imputation of upholding the Ottoman Empire for selfish English purposes, the slightest imputation of thwarting or resisting Russian aggression for selfish English interests, is the unpardonable sin. And that in the name of Palmerston! That was the sermon preached on the occasion when all the great Chiefs of the Liberal Party were assembled together to do honour to the great memory of Palmerston! Whatever other merits they may have, that of a long memory, at least, cannot be attributed to the guides and mentors of Liberalism. Is it their charge against us that we uphold the Turkish Empire as Palmerston did? They cannot urge that. Is the charge against us that we are defiant towards Russia, even as Palmerston was? They have not the face to say that. All they can say is that we have been rather slow in having our eyes opened to learn the lesson of Turkish vice and imbecility. We may be rather slow; but you should not be hard upon us, for has not your own philosopher told us that we are the "stupid Party?" So, if we are the "stupid Party," is it not very much to our credit that we have learned so much as we have, and in so short a time? These things may be very well to laugh at; but they show a state of feeling which is really much too critical for trifling. It is a time when Englishmen ought to be united together as one man in the great necessity of guiding Europe, as a whole, in the arduous struggle of keeping peace; and, while not forgetting justice, of promoting salutary reforms and spreading Christian civilization in Turkey, yet not doing it rudely, brutally, or in contradiction of national faith. At such a time every little slip, every little vacillation, it may be, of the Ministry—and Ministers are but men, and they would be more than men if they did not vacillate occasionally in such troublous times—is garnered and treasured up with a bitter delight in finding fault, a fussy and malicious ingenuity, which must greatly weaken

  787
  the influence of England. What will be the result of your policy? I trust the division after this debate will give the Government such a majority that it may proceed—armiger — strong, and girded with those weapons of defence which mark a State occasion, into the Conference. If the division leaves them barely victorious, or even in a small minority, where do we stand? Either they go to the Conference weak and they are not listened to, or the Government will go out and you come in. Do you think that you will have secured the confidence and support of the Conservative Party in England for that policy which you may then propose; and if you have not secured it, will you go as a united people to claim any hearing or enforce any respect? Do you believe that you can so completely change the feeling of the people, or so completely reverse the verdict of the General Election in 1874, that you will have the strength to represent England as a united nation in the great Congress of European nations? Your policy is simply that, in your hurry to prove the Government incompetent, and place yourselves in the empty saddle, you dare play fast and loose with the credit and the power of the nation, not only in this House, but in the much more important Senatus of Europe. We may there be found to be impotent, and purposely; but if so, I say that it is this agitation, this unprincipled agitation—["No, no!"]—I repeat my words, for I am not accustomed to deal in ambiguous phrases—this unprincipled and unpatriotic agitation which will be to blame for this miscarriage. Why is it that you have brought your political peace Party into this state of bellicose irritation? It comes of your ambiguous and deceptive use of language. You are always producing a lot of truisms, all excessively true in themselves, all untrue as shuffled about and substituted for each other. At one time you say—"Men of peace, war is hateful;" so it is. Another time you say—"Men of peace, an unjust war is hateful;" so it is. And another time you say—"Men of peace, war in favour of anti-Christianity, and against Christianity, is hateful;" so it is. Thus, you have these three distinct formulas—all true in different relations—and you are always ready to darken debate by substituting one for the other; and the glamour of your
  788
  confusion has dazed the popular sight. Then you throw into the scale your theories about British interests. There was a time when the imputation of caring for British interests would not have been cast in the teeth of public men in any public assembly as if it were a very great crime. At present it is dangerous to talk of British interests— the constant care of every former British Minister—of Pitt, of Fox, of Peel, of Palmerston, of Clarendon — without this odious charge of selfishness being ready on the tongue of the glib orator. "Oh," it is said, "if you say this, and don't say that, you will encourage the Turk in his mad resistance; and, thanks to you, so much bloodshed and suffering will take place." Well, if that is the case, it would be truly deplorable, and no one would deplore it more than I. No 12 men would deplore it more than the 12 men in whose hands the destinies of this country are at present placed. But, as we have heard the Leader of this House and the Home Secretary assert, that never by word uttered in despatch, or by word of mouth, has any reasonable encouragement been given to the Turk to hold out. That has been said, but you will not believe it. You say the Ministry have not the honesty or capacity to frame a statement in plain English which carries its own meaning with it. You cannot get out of that. As to these men, you argue, whose utterances to a fairly average Christian people might possibly carry a plain meaning, they have not conveyed it to the Turk. The Turk, as you all know, for you are never tired of hammering on that strain, is very stupid. He is very prejudiced, very ignorant, and very fanatical; and, at the same time, he has a considerable amount of hard, brutal courage. Well, with this most unmanageable savage, with his superficial varnish of external civilization, how are you so to adjust your utterances, what new language are you to discover, so that his stupidity shall just take in your meaning — nothing more and nothing less. How are you to phrase your despatches so as to be intelligible and convincing to the Turk, and yet neither enigmatic nor offensive to Christendom? Mind, I am taking the Turk at your own appraisement, and it is no answer to say because he is a Turk and is very stupid, you must deal

  789
  with him as you. deal with no other people. I have shown the impossibility of complying with such an instruction. Can the Government have its separate voice for every nation, inaudible elsewhere? Can you set up any series of telephones, with one end in London, and the others at each of the European capitals? Every despatch which you publish, sent to any other capital, is read at Constantinople; and every despatch to Constantinople is, under the same circumstances, the property of all the capitals. So to assert that, in condescension to the savage prejudice and the unmanageable stupidity of the Turk, the language you use to him must not be the common phraseology of all European Foreign Offices, is to bring diplomacy and government to a dead-lock. I must apologize to the House for having kept it so long with the views of an independent Member; but, convinced as I am, that many excellent thinking people throughout the country have been led very much astray by the reckless assertions or the astute misrepresentations made by self-appointed teachers, I feel that it is a duty to explain to them the reason of my vote.
  MR. JOHN BRIGHT: Mr. Speaker, the question before the House is not by any means a new one. It is one which, as we have found and shall find, will allow room for great latitude of speech; and I think that, before this debate closes, it is quite likely that much more may be said than has been said, and that it will fill more than one large volume. But, notwithstanding this, I think the question, as it is placed before us in the Amendment which has been moved, is brought really into a small compass, and it probably will be more convenient to the House, and much more pleasant to myself, that I should confine myself within this small compass, and not ramble over the whole of the Eastern Question, as we have been considering it for months past. Unless rumours— which are unhappy and much to be regretted—are true, I suppose we may consider that this calamitous war is now near its conclusion, and that, as has happened at the end of every war, conditions of peace will have to be discussed. Now, I have no intention at all to-night of making any Party attack upon the Government. I know not that any successful
  790
  attack could be made if we were minded, according to the view of the last speaker, merely to turn out the Government and to put ourselves in. I doubt very much whether any such event is at present possible, or is likely soon to be possible. Still, without attacking the Government, I think one may be at liberty to say—and I suspect they will admit there is truth in it—that during the course of these transactions they have shown on several occasions a good deal of indecision of conduct, and that they have made not a few considerable blunders. I know they say—for we have heard it to-night from the Home Secretary—that we have charged them—I suppose he will say falsely, because he says there has been a "lying spirit" among us—with speaking with or in two voices to the country. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that he has been one of the voices, and that he has very often been quoted in favour of a policy not hostile to the general views of this side of the House. And if there have not been two voices, how comes it that in every portion of the Kingdom there has been a fixed belief—not because any of us told them that it was so, but because men read your speeches as well as ourselves, and they came to the inevitable conclusion—that there were two voices speaking in the Cabinet? Do you mean to say, in the face of this Assembly, that the speeches at Aylesbury and the Guildhall were the same as the speeches of Lord Salisbury and Lord Carnarvon—the same as the speeches of Lord Derby? You know that if you said that, you would say what was not true; and that which we know to be the fact in respect of these speeches is known to all the readers— counted by millions now, happily—in the United Kingdom who have read these speeches in the newspapers. But still I do not expect—and right hon. Gentlemen opposite may give me credit for this, because I have had very little experience myself—I do not expect that Ministers are to pursue a career for four or five years without being guilty of indecision and without making blunders. The Government that preceded the Gentlemen opposite made a good many blunders; but they were small in comparison with yours. I dare say those blunders account in some degree for the fact that they have now to sit upon this

  791
  bench instead of upon that. But, admitting—as we must all admit—that Governments are guilty of indecision and make blunders, still I think it is a matter on which we may congratulate ourselves that in the difficult position in which we have found ourselves during the last two years—and especially during the last 12 months—the Government has actually abstained from plunging the country into war. I gather from this that the experience of 1854–1856 has not been lost. It has not been lost upon the people of the three Kingdoms; it has not been lost upon Parliament; it has not been lost upon those who now occupy the position of Ministers of the Crown. Notwithstanding, therefore, indiscreet speeches, and some acts that may be called in question, war has been avoided. There has not been a single ship that I know of that has been added to the Navy in consequence of these events, and no troops have been added to the number of the land forces. And I will admit further on behalf of the Government, that, notwithstanding the indiscretions of which I have spoken, I will accept the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and say that I believe the Cabinet, as a whole, has not been only willing to preserve peace, but that it has been anxious above all things that this country should escape war. There is some credit to be allowed to Gentlemen opposite—I mean those that are in office, for that. They have had much provocation from some of their supporters in this House, and still more from those who profess to speak for them and to them in the Press. It is something that they have not been involved in what I may call the raving lunacy of The Pall Mall Gazette, and, if I may be excused the alliteration, the delirium tremens of The Daily Telegraph. Coming to the question directly before the House, I say it is strange that when the war is over, or nearly over; that when peace is in view, and, as we think, almost within our grasp; when men in this country are breathing more freely, and when England and Europe are glad—I say it does appear to me strange beyond all example, that at this precise moment the very first positive menace of warlike preparation should be offered by the Government to the adoption of this House. What is our position with
  792
  regard to this question of forces? Millions are voted in this House from Session to Session, and few men know how much is voted; but in the last Session of Parliament, within the last 12 months, a sum of not less than £26,000,000 sterling was voted for military and naval expenses. £26,000,000 sterling! When the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel were in office in the year 1835—a little more than 40 years ago— the whole expenditure of the Army and Navy, I believe, was only about £11,000,000. This year it amounts— and it has amounted for several years past—to £25,000,000 or £26,000,000. I should say it was not unreasonable for me to assert to the House that that seems enough. If we are not intending war, if war is not probable, if no nation is attempting to invade or molest us, war being now impossible, surely a Vote of £26,000,000 in a year is enough for this civilized and Christian country in this Christian age. And we are told—with a repetition of phrase that I am sorry to say looks as if the Secretary of State for the Home Department was not quite sure that we could credit it—that there is not the smallest intention of war on the part of the Government. The war is near its end; it would be madness to endeavour to prolong it; but why should it be now promulgated to all Europe that England is at last preparing to draw her sword, it may be—though I hope it is not—to throw it into the scale at the precise moment when the warring nations are returning their swords to their scabbards? No, it is not to go into war; that would be sheer madness. If the Government had intended war on behalf of Turkey, of course they would have joined in the struggle when the Turk had 300,000 or 400,000 men in the field; but now, when all or nearly all his armies are destroyed, or captured, or scattered, it would be an act, not of wickedness only, but of lunacy unmistakeable, to think of entering upon a struggle with Russia, with an Ally vanquished, humbled, prostrate, as our only Ally would be—that is, the Sultan of Turkey. But the proposition is—and I should have thought it an incredible one before I read it—that, seeing that certain negotiations are expected, we ought to make ourselves, by sea and land, more powerful than we are at present, in order that the terms of peace may not be injurious

  793
  to us; but may, I presume, also be made as beneficial as possible to the Sultan of Turkey and to his Government. It is generally understood, I believe, that the parties to a war are, and ought to be, the parties to fix the terms of peace. When France and Sardinia were at war with Austria the terms of peace were fixed by them. Europe did not interfere. Lom-bardy was annexed to Sardinia, and by arrangement between the Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia— the Monarch who the other day descended from his throne to the tomb— Savoy and Nice were annexed to France. But at that time Lord John Russell, then Foreign Secretary, was represented as going to all the Courts of Europe— excepting, of course, those of France and Sardinia—entreating the Powers to join him to prevent any transfer of Savoy and Nice from one Power to another. The Powers paid no attention to him. Lord John Russell was obliged to go back to the Foreign Office. The arrangement was made, and Europe, so far as I know, had no reason to regret. What happened, again, when France and Germany went to war seven years ago? Then we had—I believe all Europe had —a considerable ground of complaint, and that was that at the conclusion of the war certain Provinces were taken from France and annexed to Germany. I do not say that France had any just ground of complaint; because if she had conquered Germany and captured Berlin, she would have taken Provinces from Germany and carried the boundaries of her territories to, or perhaps beyond, the Rhine. But all Europe had a right to complain because Germany insisted upon terms of peace which left a burning resentment in the mind of the French nation which may—I hope it will not—probably lead to desolating wars in the future. At that time Europe might have complained, might have had a Congress, and might have insisted upon other terms; but she did not do it. She allowed the belligerents to make their own terms of peace. On this point I wish to call the attention of the House to a curious paragraph in a work of great interest which I have lately read—I mean a volume of the work which Her Majesty the Queen has permitted Mr. Theodore Martin to publish for the instruction and the advantage of the people—and than which I have not for a long time read any book with
  794
  greater interest. In that book there is a paragraph which refers to the then approaching Conference at Paris, held for the purpose of settling the terms of peace at the end of the Crimean War. The King of Prussia wished very much that he should have a delegate at that Conference; and the Prince Consort, I think in writing to the King of Belgium, his uncle, said, in effect, that it would be a mischievous principle, and at the same time setting a bad precedent, to allow any Power or any person to be represented at the Conference, or to take part in the game, who had not laid down his stake. He therefore objected strongly—though his objection was not persisted in—that Prussia should come to the Conference at Paris. I merely mention these things for the purpose of showing that, in the main, it is historically true that in late years in our own experience the parties to a war have been permitted to arrange their own differences in their own manner, and to fix such terms of peace as suit them both—of course always allowing that any other Power, if anything is done which is adverse to its interests, or which is in molestation of its territory, has a right to complain, and if it thinks its case grievous enough, I presume it has a right to declare war. I am not about to argue that there is any impropriety in the sitting of a European Council or Conference, or in this country taking any share in that Conference. It seems to me quite probable—and I have no objection to it—that there are points in the settlement of the now-terminating war on which it is necessary for the good of Europe in future, for the good of Russia, and for the good of Turkey, that the Powers of Europe should consult, and settle that which seems most likely to produce a just and durable peace. But then comes the question, which will be much canvassed both in this House and out of it—I mean the question of what are, or are to be, the terms of peace which are exciting so much agitation. [An hon. MEMBER: That is what we want to know.] Yes; you want to know. If you do not know, it was not necessary to go into such an elaborate description of them, and to say so much against them? If you do know them, then they are subjects for our consideration. We know this, at any rate, I think

  795
  sufficiently well to take it into our view, that one of the main points connected with the Treaty must be to some extent to liberate the Christian, and I think also to liberate the Moslem, population of what are called the Christian Provinces of Turkey in Europe. Does any man in this House—does the hon. Gentleman who has spoken about preparing for war—I should like to ask him and any hon. Gentlemen who agree with him, if there can be any; I should like to ask them whether they would be willing that this war should close and a Treaty of peace should be made, and that the condition of the population of the Christian Provinces of Turkey should remain exactly what it was before the war? No, surely not. Why did you send one of your ablest Ministers to Constantinople to meet in Conference Representatives from other Powers but for the very purpose that something might be done to liberate from Turkish tyranny and oppression the Christian population of those Provinces? What was it that excited the whole of Great Britain—and I hope it excited, to some extent also, the mind of Ireland—about 18 months ago? Why, surely it was the condition of this population; and if there ever was one thing in this world on which the people of this country had made up its mind, it was that as far as their influence went the Christian population of those Provinces should be as speedily as possible delivered from the tyranny under which they groaned. It is that very wish which has sustained the interest of the people of England in this great question from that hour to this; and what the people believe further is this—that the more persons are free, and the more entirely they are free, the better will it be, of course, for the population of those Provinces; the better will it be for all the regions in that part of Europe, and the better for all of us; because the more remote will be the chance of any future war connected with that portion of the globe. You had a war in 1856. If, at the conclusion of that war, the terms of peace had been wider and better—if the Christian populations of those Provinces had then been saved—the war which has been waged for the last nine months would, in all human probability, have been unnecessary, and would have been avoided. I could not help the other night, in
  796
  listening to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, lamenting the tone in which he referred to this question. He spoke of it as if it were one in which the interests of England were adverse to the feelings of those populations. ["No, no!"] The right hon. Gentleman denies that his language was open to that construction. But what he lamented was, not that a few of the Bulgarians were to be free, but that so many were to be free. If he did not say that, the English language is something that I have yet to learn. He told us that if" the new Bulgaria were to be formed, it would be like a line drawn down this side of England and that side of England." Well, so much the worse for his case, or for the case of the Turks, if it be necessary to take so large a slice out of Turkey. But I say that for England by its influence to bring about a peace which would liberate a portion of the population, and condemn another portion to perpetual wrong, that would be a policy which the Government dare not openly defend in this House, and which the people of England would never, in my opinion, consent to. While I am on this point I will make another observation. I say that the tone and manner and language of the right hon. Gentleman the other night on this subject was not, in my opinion, such as was quite worthy of an English Minister. ["Oh, oh!"] Yes, I have observed that English Ministers, for a very long time past, have generally in their speeches in this House expressed sympathy with the suffering, and an expectation and a hope that freedom might be extended to those who were oppressed and enslaved. [An hon. MEMBER: Poland.] That is perfectly true with regard to Poland. When I was a boy, everybody in England, as far as I can remember hearing or reading, lamented the calamities which had befallen Poland. Lines come to my mind which have rested there from that time to the present moment. They refer to a battle-field—
  "Where Poland sees her gallant sons
  Her first, her best, her bravest ones,
  On the cold earth all gory lie,
  For Poland breathe a prayer and die."
  Sir, surely I am saying nothing offensive to the character of anyone when I say that we expect from every English statesman—I hope we may expect it if he

  797
  belongs to the Party opposite, and I am sure we shall never miss it if he belongs to this Party—that in his speeches in this House and in his statesmanship he shall have regard to the sufferings of the oppressed, be they black or be they white, in every region of the globe. I say that to-night the speech of the Secretary of State for the Home Department partook of the same fault. Most of the Members now present heard his speech—a speech which will not give the satisfaction of the one delivered last Session. Throughout the whole of the description which the right hon. Gentleman gave of the difficulties and delays attending the negotiations he was continually, with dramatic action, conveying the impression to the House that somebody was amusing the Turkish Delegates and Commissioners, while the armies of the Czar were marching on to the accomplishment of something which we had reason to believe might possibly not be within the intentions of the Russian Government. We are even told that these unfortunate Turkish Commissioners are scarcely to be found. They can telegraph to their wives in Constantinople—that seems to be a government that they comprehend; but we have the information—I am not sure that it does not come from the English Ambassador at Constantinople—that although the Government there has telegraphed to them several times during the last few days, they not only can get no answer from them with regard to the progress of the negotiations, but not even an answer as to whether they are still in existence. And to say, without knowing more than that, that the Russians are delaying the negotiations for purposes that they will not avow, is, I think, that which a Minister of this country is not wise in saying of a Sovereign and a Government which the Queen in her Speech from the Throne described as a friendly Ally. Now, Sir, no man in this country laments more than I do, or has grieved more than I have, over the lamentable calamities and bloodshed of this war. I know not that they are greater than those that have happened in other wars; but now we have from day to day, through the wonderful omnipresence of the Press, almost every transaction performed, as it were, before our eyes. But whatever be those calamities, however great this suffering, however much this
  798
  bloodshed, however much the cry of agony has gone up to Heaven during these last months from those ensanguined fields, let us not reject, if it is offered to us, whatever compensation can possibly be given to the people who have endured or survived these sufferings. I should say that the more terrible has been the cost of the war, the more our hearts have been stirred by listening to those details, the more we should rejoice if by the power and statesmanship of Russia, by the consent of the Powers of Europe, a larger and larger area of European territory be included in that great salvation from Turkish rule. Well, I venture to hope—and in expressing the hope to the House and to Her Majesty's Ministers, I speak the mind of the people of England, of Scotland, and I might appeal to hon. Gentlemen from Ireland whether I do not speak the mind of the people of Ireland also—that if the £6,000,000 be granted by the House they may not be used to strengthen the hands of the Government to hinder or lessen the freedom which is intended to be bestowed upon certain Provinces of the Turkish Empire. For if it were so used, what would be the political result? It would teach them all for ever, so long as that page of history was read by the children of those Provinces, to nourish, not a hatred only, but a contempt for free England, and throw them more and more into the arms of Russia, whom you so much suspect. Then as to another branch of this question of the terms. It is one which refers to territory and indemnity. I say nothing about territory. I believe it is generally understood that there is no proposal, nor likely to be one, to take any territory in Europe and put it under the dominion of the Russian Czar. With regard to Asia, I will say nothing except this—that we have no special interest in that quarter. ["Oh!"] Well, if we have, all I know is that it has been forgotten by the Ministers who have made speeches and written despatches. There is one point as to the indemnity which is a matter, I think, of importance—of course, of great importance to Turkey, and of some importance to Russia. If the indemnity insisted on by Russia be very large—and it need not be very large in figures to be very large in burden to a country prostrate as Turkey is—it would be a great hardship to the people of Turkey, and

  799
  would prevent, or might prevent, any restoration of even the poor prosperity that has heretofore existed in that country. If I were the Delegate or Commissioner from this country to the Council—if there be a Council—I should strongly urge upon the Russian Government that the penalty, or indemnity, should be one of extreme moderation. I think that is a point that might be urged; because all Europe is interested in the restoration of the prosperity of the people who have suffered so much during the war. I will only refer to one other question, and it is one which has been constantly discussed—namely, that relating to the Straits. Now really, when so much has been said—and as I think ungenerously said—with regard to what Russia has done in this matter, the House will permit me to read a Paper which was laid before us this evening, but which has not yet been circulated. It is a telegraphic despatch from Lord Augustus Loffcus to Lord Derby, dated St. Petersburg, January 30. [Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: I read the entire of it.] Perhaps hon. Gentlemen opposite would like to hear it again. He says—
  "In reply to my inquiry, Prince Gortchakoff stated this morning that the last article of the peace conditions communicated by Count Schouvaloff, referring to the ulterior understanding with regard to the Straits, was vague and unnecessary. He said he had no objection to suppress it altogether. He denied that it referred to an understanding between Russia and Turkey alone, and he authorised me to state most categorically to your Lordship that Russia considered the question of the Straits as a European question that could only be settled in concert with the European Powers."
  There is here, also, another confirmation of the same thing; and therefore I think it would be desirable in any hon. Gentleman opposite who speaks in the debate not to allude to that particular point. It is one which may well be taken into consideration at the Conference to be held. Europe has some interest in this matter. Russia and Turkey have much the same interest in it. All are interested in the freedom of the Straits to ships of commerce; and we owe it to Russia that the Straits, having been closed to Russian ships for 300 years, were opened to commercial ships of all the world only about a century ago. Russia is now in a very different position from what she was in then. She is in possession of, I suppose, nearly half the shores of the
  800
  Black Sea. She has ports there, and I think at least one naval arsenal. How is she circumstanced at the other extremity of her Empire? Her capital is on the Baltic, and the Baltic is closed half the year by frost, while the Straits are always closed to her ships of war. I put it to any hon. Gentleman opposite, I put it to the very patriotic sailor Member who has given Notice of an Amendment (Captain Pirn)—["Oh!"]—well, hon. Gentlemen cannot say that that is an offensive term to use of one who is so fond of the Service as the hon. Member is—but I ask him or anyone elseholding his opinions whether he thinks it just, or endurable, or possible, that a nation of 80,000,000 of people can be subjected continually to this enclosed or isolated state, shut out from the North Sea by frost half of the year, and shut out from the Mediterranean, and, therefore, from all other seas—not because they wish it; not, I believe, because Turkey wishes it; not because the other Powers of Europe, I suspect, wish it; but mainly because this country wishes it? What a condition it is, that if a Russian vessel homeward bound arrives in Europe at a time of frost, she cannot enter the Baltic; and if she comes to the Mediterranean, she is not allowed to pass the Straits and go to any Russian port in the Black Sea. That is not the state of things that England, and Englishmen, and English sailors, and English patriots would be willing to consent to. I say there is great injustice and great offence to the Russian nation in this exclusion; but it is a fair and reasonable and proper question for the consideration of the Powers assembled in Conference. I have no doubt the Conference will do justice in the case, and I believe the English Government, when the question is fairly discussed, and a proper arrangement made, will find it their duty, and not contrary to their interests, to consent to such a change as may be required. You know that Prance has Cherbourg in the Channel, and Toulon in the Mediterranean. Italy, too, has a Fleet. Turkey may hesitate, but what if Turkey should consent? We have asserted the right of Turkey to close the Straits, because she owns the territory on either side. I doubt very much whether that be a right she could fairly assert. She could much more fairly assert a right to shut you out of the Suez Canal. That Canal has

  801
  been built by the labour of her subjects and paid for to a considerable extent by the money of her vassal Governor of Egypt, and she has far more right— though a right she never would attempt to exercise—to prohibit us or anybody else from passing through the Canal on the way to India—-I am speaking of ships of war—than she has to say that ships of war shall not pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It might be so arranged that not more than one, or two, or three ships should ever be between the two seas at the same time. Notice might be given that a ship has passed out into the Mediterranean before another ship enters the Straits. You have the block system on your railways—why not have the block system in the Straits? The difficulty would then be at an end; and I believe hereafter that the whole difficulty of the Eastern Question as regards this country politically would be at an end also. Well, then, my view is that there is nothing in those terms to excite or to alarm us. Hon. Gentlemen opposite, I am sure, taking them individually, would say that they are just as much for peace as I am. They know that peace is the great interest of every country. They do not wish out of a mean, and it may be in some cases an ignorant, jealousy of Russia to do injustice to Russia. They do not wish to support perpetually the grinding and odious tyranny which they know has been exercised by Turkey upon the largest portion of her population. Well, if you examine these terms you will find there is nothing in them that ought to excite or alarm you. There is nothing to urge you to show yourselves ignorant and selfish, or animated by a discreditable jealousy of Russia—nothing to justify any menace to Russia or to other Powers who may enter the Conference, by the passing of the Vote which the Government has submitted to the House. Let us consider for a moment what we are doing. We often boast—we sometimes boast too much—of the greatness of our great Empire. We say—it is often in rhetorical leading articles said, and some times in speeches—that the sceptre of our Queen rules over 300,000,000 of the population of the globe. To this vast and countless multitude, we, assembled in this House—we, from this Chamber, speak to all of them. They hear our voice. Every decree, every Resolution,
  802
  every act of this House, maybe felt over nearly half the world. Knowing, then, that we affect the nearest and dearest interests of such vast multitudes and so many millions, am I wrong in saying that no language can describe, no measure gauge the magnitude and burden of the responsibilities of this country, and of this Government, and of this House? At the present moment, what do we know of what is going on in various parts of this Empire? In South Africa there is a war, a war it may be with savage tribes, but still not of small consequence; which, I see from the Papers to-night, is said to be presenting darker features by every succeeding mail—a war which, according to the statement of the hon. Gentleman who represents the Colonial Office here, requires troops and artillery to be sent out by succeeding ships. If we turn to another and a more distant portion of the Empire—to the Northern parts of India—we find there troops crossing the Northern frontier seeking a fresh post, fortifying a fresh position, and suspicion and alarm are spreading throughout large tracts of that portion of Asia which lies conterminous with our Northern Indian frontier. I ask this House, then, is not this warring enough for us? Is it not worth our while to consider this question calmly, without passion, and without unworthy jealousy or suspicion? I ask hon. Gentlemen to consider what is the condition—the growing and saddening condition—of not a little of our home population; and I would point out to the Government that in this matter I think they have done—unintentionally, I am quite sure-—a great injustice to our home population. They have not been with the public clear enough, firm enough, decisive enough, consistent enough. They have not had these virtues—their speeches of to-day being in one direction and those of to-morrow in another direction. ["No, no!"] lam grieved to have to say it, but I know it to be true. I know, also, that there is scarcely a single market in the United Kingdom connected with any of the great interests of the country that has not been disturbed and agitated — and when, as I know well enough, there is a deep anxiety amongst employers of labour in almost all the industries of the country, and an increasing suffering amongst the labourers, I say that the Government should be extremely

  803
  careful that not one single word is said by it, not one single act done that can shake confidence in business and can bring an increase of the troubles, the inevitable troubles, with which for a time we are likely to be surrounded. Well, I say that all this tells me that this matter of the Eastern Question, and the matter of this particular Vote, are things we ought to look at calmly, deliberately, and conscientiously, without jealousy and without prejudice; and if we take that course, if the Government will take that course, I believe they will find themselves supported honestly and fairly by both sides of the House. I want us to shake off this miserable nightmare which has so long oppressed us, and for ever to cease pursuing a phantom which I am quite satisfied we never shall overtake. I would declare this—the Government of this country ought to declare it—the time is not far distant, I believe, when they will declare it; I think it is now pretty much the mind of the people of England-—that we have no interest in any longer taking any step whatever to maintain the Ottoman rule in Europe— that we have no interest in cherishing a perpetual animosity with Russia. There are two policies before us—the old policy which, if we leave it to our children, will be a legacy of future wars; the new policy, which I contend for, and which I preach, and which if we adopt, we shall leave to our country, not a legacy of war, but a legacy of peace, and a growing and lasting friendship with one of the greatest Empires of the globe.
  VISCOUNT SANDON: Sir, I think the House will agree that, a short time ago, the position of a Member of the Government in rising to speak upon this great Eastern Question was one of no slight difficulty owing to the meaning and importance which some hon. Gentlemen opposite attached to every word we uttered. If at one time a Minister in a clear, distinct, categorical, unimpassioned, dry and cold manner calls attention to the daily progress of negotiations, he is told, because the catalogue of events seems to tell against one of the combatants, that he is taking a side. On the other hand, if we come forward and say, with the assurance of our own convictions, that we are men of peace, we are then told that, though no one can suppose it possible, we are guilty of deceit; that we are under some
  804
  strange mesmeric influence, and are fated to deceive the country. That was the position of a Member of the Government until the right hon. Member for Birmingham rose and said he had no doubt that Her Majesty's Government had for two years, in times of great difficulty, preserved the peace of Europe. [Mr. BRIGHT: No, the peace of this country.] Of course, that is much better; and he believes that now Her Majesty's Government are anxious, above all things, to escape war. Therefore, we are now no longer to be taunted with being a war Party. You would not believe our own assertion, but you will believe that of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, who is, surely, a witness far above suspicion. In speaking of what he called the blunders of the Government, the right hon. Gentleman did not quote a single despatch to prove the very grave offences imputed; but he referred to the streets, to rumours, to certain newspapers, and to the feeling of the country as showing that the Government, after all, had been in favour of war. The right hon. Gentleman left the matter in some confusion. I prefer, however, to adopt his first assertion— that we have done our best to preserve peace for the country, and for two years have succeeded. The right hon. Gentleman thought it too horrible to contemplate the Government plunging the country into difficulty if not into war, at a time when, as he said, all Europe was glad at the prospect of peace. The use of the word "glad" was rather surprising; for anyone who contemplates the diplomatic condition of Europe just now must see that it is in a state of apprehension as bad almost as the calamity of war. Then the right hon. Gentleman wandered back, as he had often wandered back, to the days of Wellington and Peel, and compared the Estimates of those halcyon days with those of late years; but the right hon. Member must have forgotten that since then nations have increased their armies from tens to hundreds of thousands, that every weapon of war costs a hundredfold more, that instead of one man-of-war costing, as in those days, £100,000, high class vessels cost more than £500,000, and that the missile now fired at every discharge is about the size of the former guns themselves. Is it fair to compare the Estimates of the time of Wellington and

  805
  Peel with the Estimates of the present day? He says—"The war is closing; why prolong it? Why throw our sword into the scale when other nations are sheathing theirs?" It is the one thing we are trying to avoid. We are asking you to sanction such military preparation as shall enable us to throw our sword into the scale of peace. The right hon. Gentleman tells us it is usual for the parties to a war to settle the terms of peace among themselves; but he seems to have forgotten that certain Treaties exist. He forgets the Treaty of 1856, the parties to which engage to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire, guarantee in common the observance of the engagement, and say that they will consider any act tending to its violation a question of general interest. He forgets the Treaty of 1871, by which the Powers recognize the principle that no Power can liberate itself from a Treaty without the consent of the contracting parties; and he has the hardihood to tell us that the parties to this war ought to settle for themselves the terms of peace, although in the conditions of the proposed peace there is hardly one which does not affect the Articles of the Treaty of 1856 which relate to the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Mind, I am not for one moment speaking of the importance or otherwise of maintaining the Articles of the Treaty; but it is one of the most monstrous propositions a public man could advance to say that Russia and Turkey should settle the terms of peace between themselves without consulting any of the other Powers by which the Treaty of Paris was contracted. Then the right hon. Gentleman warned us against the danger of disseminating the principles of war. Had any other country a greater interest in maintaining the principles of peace? The whole conduct of England in her diplomacy in the East has been to avoid a desolating war. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that this £6,000,000 should not be used to lessen the freedom of the Provinces of Turkey. But what right, I want to know, had the right hon. Gentleman to throw out that imputation? He proceeded to discuss the various terms of the conditions of peace, but surely at the present moment it is of great importance that we should not
  806
  discuss the different isolated points when a Congress will have to sit upon them. One point will hang upon others, and though harmless in itself it may be hurtful in combination; and, to say the least, it is a grave imprudence to forestall the action of the Congress, or to say that such and such a point is not approved by the majority of the English people. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) made a speech which convinced me that he felt very uncertain as to the position which he adopted. He began intending to make a strong attack upon the Government. He denounced this Vote as unconstitutional, and therefore to be opposed. Yet he seemed to contradict himself in the most outrageous manner. He said this great subsidy of £6,000,000 was surely a temptation to extravagance; but as he went on he said it was quite clear they could not spend it, and, therefore, the proposal was a sham. Surely these are contradictory proposals—which of the two statements will the right hon. Gentleman abide by? The right hon. Gentleman then took the terms of peace one by one and examined them bit by bit; whereas they should be considered as a whole, and, viewed in that aspect, the demands of Russia would entirely change the condition of the south-east of Europe. I must protest against what I thought a great indiscretion on the right hon. Gentleman's part when he committed himself to the statement that he could see no objection to a temporary occupation of Constantinople. Surely it was most unwise for one in the right hon. Gentleman's position to make such an admission. It should be remembered that it is often impossible to state all the reasons of your action; it is often matter of the highest prudence both in the interests of peace and of the civilized world that you should hold your tongue. I feel myself this is not one of those moments when we should indulge in mutual recrimination, or talk of missed opportunities in times gone by; this is a moment when every Englishman who cares for his country should be prepared to drop all this sort of thing. The present position is far too grave for that—as grave as any country can well be placed in, and our speeches should be set in a tone becoming the situation. The great point before us is whether the House will consent to give this subsidy to Her

  807
  Majesty's Government. The position should be looked at closely as a whole. The great Eastern Question has been the apprehension and, I might say, the torment of Europe for many a long year. The more you look at this question the more you will be struck by what is going on. Europe is at this moment one vast camp. Every Power has for the last few years been arming to the teeth, and the soldiers are counted by tens of thousands, where before they were only numbered by thousands. England herself is quite content with her old position; she does not desire any conquests, and has no selfish interests to serve; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there are movements going on in Europe which are cause for serious apprehension. Surely, then, the whole strength of the country ought to be placed at the back of the Government, in order that they may be prepared for any emergency, and enabled to meet any difficulty that may occur by sea or by land. We are told that this will be interpreted as a War Vote. We are told that if these £6,000,000 be granted it will be misinterpreted by the Christians of Turkey as intended to check their rising aspirations. Now, I venture to say, of all the Powers in the world, we are the least likely to be misapprehended in that way; for though we have not by violent excitement or appeals to arms sought to assist the Christians in times past, we have done what is ten times more valuable—through our agents in every part of the Turkish Empire we have consistently supported and defended the Christians of all creeds and kinds. There is no fear that this will be misinterpreted as a war Vote by them. Then it is said it will be misinterpreted by Turkey; but, surely, no one in Turkey can imagine because this Vote is passed that we are going at the eleventh hour to rescue her from the fate which she has brought upon herself. Then we are told that it will be misrepresented by Europe. Remember what happened upon the breaking out of the Crimean War. England was then misrepresented because she did not show by any overt act or say by the language of her responsible Ministers that her interests should not be trifled with or her honour impugned. Remember the misrepresentation at the time of the Crimean War, and, if you fear any now, fear
  808
  much more the serious misrepresentation you may incur if by any fatal combination of those on the opposite side of the House—which I do not for a moment believe—the interests of England be put in peril. I know that many opposite are actuated by the same feelings as ourselves, and I assure them that should this Vote be refused, there will then arise a most serious misrepresentation of English feeling and English intention which would mislead the whole of Europe and might precipitate it into war. For my own part, ardently devoted as I am to peace, and earnestly as I desire it, I say if you want to preserve peace, not only at this moment, but to lay down such terms as will be settled by the general consent of Europe, and make that peace lasting and endurable, the real course is to pass this Vote, and in passing it you will be passing what may be truly called the most peaceful Vote this country has ever passed.
  MR. HERSCHELLsaid, that because hon. Gentlemen on that (the Opposition) side of the House insisted that this country should not be dragged into this conflict, but should continue in a course of neutrality and peace, they were taunted with being unpatriotic and Russian— that they were lovers of Russia, and cared more for that country than for their own land. Such language had been heard over and over again, and it was language of gross misrepresentation, which it was difficult to submit to in silence and with patience. Because they were not always crying out about protecting British interests they did not feel less for those interests, or were less determined to protect them. When a man was always protesting his honesty, those who heard him were more likely to button up their pockets. He believed they were as patriotic and cared as much for British interests as Gentlemen on the other side, and would be as willing to make every sacrifice to maintain those interests. The great cause of difference between them was how those interests could be best protected, and how best they could carry out the principle of neutrality. But there were two ways of carrying out neutrality—one was always bringing us to the verge of war, and one was constant in its desire for maintaining peace. He did not charge the Government with saying one thing and meaning another, but he did charge them with trying to

  809
  carry out one policy in a double-headed sort of manner, and with trying to satisfy those who were in favour of war without displeasing those who were in favour of peace. The result was, that they were meeting with the difficulties usually encountered by those who were trying to serve two masters. They knew what had happened recently when two Members of the Cabinet resigned. The policy which the Government had desired to carry out had been pursued in a manner which had been likely to lead to disaster. That was the difficulty which many of them felt when the Government said—"leave everything to us," because they did not know that the trust would be well used. In the despatch of the Fleet to the Dardanelles, there was that double-headed policy of which he complained. To those who desired peace it was represented that it was only intended to secure the lives and the property of British subjects in Constantinople, whereas to those who desired war it was represented as being a grand step towards the protection of British interests. The former had been stated to be the case by the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary. But wore Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon so forgetful of common humanity, that they were willing to separate themselves from the Cabinet rather than to consent to the lives and property of British subjects at Constantinople being rendered secure? He thought that could not for a moment be contended. And what was the meaning of the last line in the instructions to the Fleet—"Keep your destination absolutely secret." Surely it would have been better to have let all the world know that our Fleet was being sent upon an errand of mercy, and we could scarcely attribute to Russia the utter barbarism of endeavouring to prevent us protecting our fellow-subjects from massacre. The suggestion that the Fleet was to keep the waterway open meant that any re-sistence that it met with was to be overcome, and that meant that we might find ourselves at war at any moment. Moreover, the Prime Minister had admitted that the departure of the Fleet had for its object the protection of British interests, and the House also knew what that meant. In these circumstances, he did not wonder that two Members of the Cabinet had tendered their resignation. The noble Lord who had just spoken
  810
  said that the subject of the bases of peace was not ripe for discussion. But there was nothing unfair in the criticism of the Opposition on that subject, having regard to the speech of the Home Secretary, the foundation of whose argument was that we should prepare for war. There were two ways of dealing with those bases of peace He did not say that you should place implicit reliance in Russia any more than any other Power; but he (Mr. Herschell) strongly deprecated the insinuation conveyed—not by word, but by tone and manner—by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in reading the bases of peace, that the assurances of Russian statesmen were not to be believed in this country. By laying down conditions, the Government had pledged themselves not to interfere unless those conditions were broken; but he would ask which of those conditions had been broken or threatened? He deprecated an unseemly jealousy of Russia. If this Empire were in peril, we should all be united in the determination to expend our treasure and life blood in maintaining our position in the world; but there was nothing inconsistent with that determination in relying on our strength and refusing to be constantly on the watch here and there against Russia. He did not make light of the differences between Russia and England, but he saw no reason why there should not be peace between them. Russia, it was true, was a great military despotism, but this very war would probably result in great reforms being made, and in her becoming a mighty and free nation. If they had been asked to vote that money because they were on the brink of war, or because they wished to make preparations for war, he could have understood it; and if the country was satisfied that it would be a just war there would be great readiness in granting the supplies. But we were told that the money was not wanted for war, but to give us strength in a coming Conference. Now, he did not believe that we should be a bit stronger in the Conference by the voting of those £6,000,000. We should be strong there if we were a united people; but it was not the way to make us a united people to force such a proposal on the House as that, or to use such language as had been held on that subject. We should be strong in the

  811
  Conference if we went there not to urge our own selfish views only, but to consider the general interests of Europe. Then we should not stand alone, but would have the support of other Powers. But if we were only to look to English interests and to care nothing for those of other countries, then we should be weak, whether the House voted £6,000,000 or £60,000,000. In conclusion, he should record his vote against the proposal, because its only effect would be to encourage those who wanted to urge on the Government to more warlike steps; and because, if the House granted that Supply, it might be taken as the approval, he would not say of a war policy, but of a policy dangerously tending in the direction of war.
  MR. GREENEsaid, that what he wished all along was that this country should preserve a strict neutrality, and that justice should be done to both sides. The logical conclusion to draw from the bag-and-baggage policy was that England should go to war. He challenged the Liberal party to produce even a single precedent in which the Conservative Party had ever opposed the Government of the day in difficult circumstances like the present. He appealed to the conduct of the Conservatives in 1854, during the Alabama dispute, and at the time of the Franco-German War. He contrasted the speeches made by the Liberals during the Recess with those they had delivered in the House, and said the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) reminded him of the Egyptian chariots when their wheels were taken off—he dragged heavily. He could fancy the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition Party crying to be delivered from his Friends. It had been charged against the Conservatives that they wished for war in order to provide employment for their sons. For himself, he was thankful he had only one son, and he was glad to say he was able to provide for him—but if he could not he would prefer putting him to a carpenter's, or some such trade, rather than send him out to be shot at for 6s. a day. Talk about the feeling of the country, and about public meetings, he should like to have the opinion of the hon. Member for Sheffield about these meetings. He would be able to tell the House whether some of these meetings were
  812
  not packed meetings. By the admission of the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) the Government had kept England out of the war up to the present time, and he (Mr. Greene) ventured to assert that in the despatches of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary not a line could be found indicative of a desire to depart from peace. It was true the Cabinet had resolved to ask for a Vote of Credit, but no man in his senses could think that £6,000,000 would be of any earthly use if they had made up their minds to go to war. It had been said that disunion existed in the Cabinet. Great credit was due to the head of the Government, who was the main spirit of the Cabinet; but he would ask how was it possible for any number of men to meet together amongst whom there was not some division, although they had decided upon a certain course of action? The Government desired to obtain the confidence of the House, and he would ask whether it was not desirable that the Government should place themselves in a position to be ready for any emergency that might arise? Some Members of the Liberal Party had been recently making speeches which were unworthy of them, and he was surprised that they could now come to the House of Commons, and look like injured innocents while they asked how they could be to blame for opposing the Vote? If the Conservatives wanted to do the Liberals an unkind act it could not be more effectually done than by letting them into office in the present crisis, inasmuch as they were absolutely without a policy. Their great Agitator had been making a speech at Oxford. He (Mr. Greene) thanked the right hon. Gentleman when he read that speech, because he knew it would give at least 20 additional votes to the Government. Unfortunately, a namesake of his was present at the meeting, and he felt bound to say that he was ashamed that any man of the name of Greene should have been found in such company. As for the Opposition generally, they had no policy; and he believed they heartily wished themselves out of their present difficulty. If their object was to get the Government out of office and get themselves in, all he could say was that they must show a little more honesty than they had

  813
  hitherto done. He felt almost certain that the Opposition would not force a division at the termination of this debate; but, even if they did, not more than about seven wise men would be found going with them into the Lobby. In conclusion, he must say he did not think he had ever passed a duller evening.
  MR. TREVELYANmoved the adjournment of the debate.
  Motion agreed to.
  Debate adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OCCUPIERS DISQUALIFICATION REMOVAL BILL— [BILL 45.]
(Sir Henry Wolff, Sir Charles Russell, Sir Charles Legard, Mr. Onslow, Mr. Byder.)
HOUSE OCCUPIERS DISQUALIFICATION REMOVAL BILL— [BILL 45.]

  COMMITTEE.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, that the Bill before the House, which was represented by its authors as a Bill to remove an anomaly, was, in fact, a measure to create one. He was not con-corned to prove that it violated the principle of inhabitant occupancy, upon which the franchise had been based by the Conservative Government in 1867. This was an objection to be raised by Conservatives, by the Attorney General, or by the Leader of the House. That which he alone wished to show was that the Bill was one exceedingly difficult to understand, and the operation of which it was hard evenfor the greatest election lawyers to foresee. He had consulted most experienced and highly qualified and competent lawyers upon the Bill, and they took opposite views as to what it meant. He held in his hand a letter from a Parliamentary draftsman second to none in his knowledge of this subject, in which he wrote that the Bill was
  "ambiguous, and if I read it rightly, creates instead of removing an anomaly. Why create an anomalous exception to the rule which requires 12 months' inhabitancy as a condition for the franchise under the Act of 1867? If a person who lots his house for part of the year ought not thereby to lose his vote (and I do not say that he ought), let him have it under the Act of 1832. But where a franchise depends upon 12 months' inhabitancy, it seems absurd to give it, in exceptional cases, to persons who have not inhabited for more than six months. If the condition of inhabitancy is to he relaxed, it ought to he relaxed generally."
  814
  His hon. Friend the Member for Christ-church (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) agreed with himself in wishing to remove certain hardships, and in a desire to somewhat relax the conditions required for the franchise; but while he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) desired to remove hardships and relax conditions generally, and as regarded all classes of the population, his hon. Friend wished to remove the hardships in the case of one class alone, and to relax conditions only in the one ease of the letters of furnished houses. The Bill was motived upon questions that had arisen under the Act of 1867; and, in consequence, he feared that the Judges would read it very strictly if it became law, and would hold that it had no bearing upon the Act of 1832. Passing on from these preliminary and general objections, he would attempt to point out some of the difficulties which would arise under the working of the Bill, of which he said the proper title would be "A Bill to shorten the period of residence in the ease of lodging-house keepers." Should his instruction be carried, and the new clauses which he proposed be added to the Bill, it would then, in fact, become that which it was not at present—a Bill to remove disqualifications in the case of all classes of the community. He had not himself directly opposed the second reading of the Bill, much as he objected to its provisions; because he admitted that there was a case for some measure to remove disqualifications. There were several hardships which existed under the present law, and which were not mere questions of registration, but questions of qualification or of franchise; but these ought to be dealt with as a whole, and upon principle. This Bill shortened the period of residence required in the case of a particular class—the persons who let lodgings. He had sooner shorten it for all. The present period, which was called 12 months, became, through the working of our registration system, in reality two years. He would gladly see the period shortened to six months, which would in reality mean 18 months; but he knew that a majority of the House would not be prepared to support such a proposal, and he would not, therefore, place it before the House. Let them consider, in the first place, the case, as it would stand under this Bill, of a man who let his house and removed

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  into another house in the same borough. He would have the franchise, as the law stood at the present time, by successive occupation of houses. Now, let them take the case of a man who let his house and removed into lodgings in the same borough. He would lose the franchise at the present time, and ought not to lose it; but the proper manner to remove this hardship would be to carry the instruction to the Committee which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had proposed last year, and to insert one of his new clauses to give equal rights to a duly-qualified person occupying in succession a house and lodgings of a sufficient value with those possessed by a person occupying in succession a house and a house. No reason could be given against this change in the law, and it was by a mere blunder that the right to claim for successive occupation was not given to lodgers in 1867. The third case was that of a man who let his house and removed to Timbuctoo. Were the Government, who objected to Reform Bills in disguise, and to tampering with the franchise, prepared to stand up and say that a man ought to have the franchise as an inhabitant occupier who, having taken a house in the borough of Christchurch, started the same day for a journey in Central Africa, and returning 12 months afterwards—six months being in the qualifying period of one year and six months in the qualifying period of the next year— found himself on the register under the provision of his hon. Friend's Bill. Moreover, after being once on in this way, he might go away for 12 months at a time under the provisions of this Bill, six months being in one qualifying year and six months being in another, and yet continually retain the franchise as an inhabitant occupier. Not only would this inhabitant occupier in Timbuctoo remain upon the register, but if the person actually occupying the house claimed to be rated under the occupation clause of the Act of 1832, he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) believed that the under-tenant could get on too—though it was not clear—a direct violation of the principle that the same premises should not confer the franchise upon two people, which was laid down by the Proviso at the end of Clause 3 of the Representation of the People Act, 1867. There were so many difficulties
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  that occurred to him with regard to this Bill that it seemed almost idle to raise the whole of them before the House; but he was of opinion that perhaps the greatest of them all was that of how to attain a knowledge of the length of time during which houses were let. Take the case, which was not uncommon, of a man who let his house for short periods several times in the course of a year. Who was to keep watch and to add these periods up and discover to how many months they amounted on the whole? Were the overseers or the Party agents to establish and to pay for the necessary spy system? He repeated that there did exist hardships in connection with the law of qualification, and he proposed to remove them upon an intelligent principle, hoping that the Government would some day see the necessity of dealing with them as a whole by a Bill carefully considered by the Law Officers of the Crown.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFoffered to make the term "four" months instead of "six."
  Amendment agreed to; word substituted.
  Bill reported; as amended, to be considered To-morrow.

  COMMONS.
  Select Committee appointed, Six Members to be nominated by the House and Five by the Committee of Selection, "to consider every Report made by the Inclosure Commissioners certifying the expediency of any Provisional Order for the inclosure or regulation of a Common, and presented to the House during the present Session, before a Bill be brought in for the confirmation of such Order:"—Five to be the quorum.
  Instruction to the Committee, That they have power, with respect to each such Provisional Order, to inquire and report to the House whether the same should be confirmed by Parliament; and, if so, whether with or without modification; and, in the event of their being of opinion that the same should not be confirmed, except subject to modifications, to report such modifications accordingly with a view to such Provisional Order being remitted to the Inclosure Commissioners.—(Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.)

  TURNPIKE ACTS CONTINUANCE.
  Select Committee appointed, "to inquire into the Sixth and Seventh Schedules of 'The Annual Turnpike Acts Continuance Act, 1877:'"— Lord GEORGE CAVENDISH, Lord HENRY THYNNE, Sir ROBERT ANSTRUTHER, Mr. BEACH, Mr. WENTWORTH BEAUMONT, Mr. GEORGE CLIVE, Mr. WILBRAHAM EGERTON, Sir HARCOURT JOHNSTONE, Mr. CLARE READ, Mr. SPENCER STANHOPE, and Mr. SALT;—Three to be the quorum.
  Instruction to the Committee, That they have power to inquire and report to the House under what conditions, with reference to the rate of interest, expenses of management, maintenance of road, payment of debt, and term of years, or other special arrangements, the Acts of the Trusts mentioned should he continued.
  Ordered, That all Petitions referring to the continuance or discontinuance of Turnpike Trusts be referred to the Committee. — (Mr. Salt.)

  PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (BOROUGHS) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. TEAMAN, Bill to extend the Hours of Polling at Parliamentary Elections within Boroughs, ordered to he brought in by Mr. YEAMAN, Dr. CAMERON, Mr. JOSEPH CoWEN, Mr. MUNTZ, Dr. WARD, and Mr. GOULDING.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 98.]
  House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament— The Marquess of Ailesbury, after the death of his brother.
THE EASTERN QUESTION—MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH FLEET.

  QUESTIONS. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD CAMPBELLrose to put a Question, having given Notice to the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. What passed on Monday had led to a general impression that the noble Earl was, under any circumstances, opposed to the advance of the Fleet towards Constantinople. Its advance might be necessary—he (Lord Campbell) thought it was necessary—to guard honour, to protect interests, and avert a state of things which hostilities would follow. If the Government was unable to advance it, the country was deprived of its executive. He wished to know whether the noble Earl had been correctly understood upon the subject?
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I think the Question put by my noble Friend is of rather a peculiar character, but I will answer it to the best of ray ability. I certainly never asserted that under no conceivable circumstances would it be right or proper for the British Fleet to be sent up to Constantinople. Obviously, it is conceivable by me or by anybody else that circumstances might arise in which the sending our Fleet to Constantinople would be quite right; and in which, without in any manner endangering the general peace, it might be for the interests of humanity that such a step should be taken. When
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  my noble Friend asks me to define what the circumstances are which would afford such justification—
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he had asked no such Question.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I am glad I was mistaken, because, had my noble Friend asked me such a Question, I must have declined to answer it.
  EARL STANHOPEwished to ask one or two Questions of his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, relating to the rumoured armistice and terms of peace. The situation changed so much from day to day that it was desirable they should have from Government the fullest information of what was going on. They had had presented to them a great mass of Papers relating to the Eastern Question; and he thought that anyone who had read that portion of the diplomatic Correspondence which had hitherto been published would be of opinion that while the despatches of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary were clear, direct, and intelligible, those which had proceeded from the Russian Government, and also certain of the verbal statements of the Russian Government, were eminently unsatisfactory and evasive. In proof of the latter proposition he need only refer to the reply made by Baron Jomini, on the part of Prince Gortchakoff, to Lord Augustus Loftus, in reference to the intentions of the Russian Government with respect to Gallipoli, which was—"The Russian Government have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there." Again, a short time ago, when the Porte asked for peace, the Russian Government, instead of sending a telegraphic message in reply, sent messengers who were 10 days on the journey, and all this time the Russian Army was advancing towards Constantinople. Their Lordships would have also read in a despatch published to-day, and dated 29th January, from Mr. Layard, that he had received an assurance from the Grand Vizier to the effect that no delay on the part of the Turkish authorities could have been possible. Really, therefore, what in the name of British truth and straightforwardness, he asked, did all this mean? Did it mean that the offer of a crushed Power for an armistice and negotiations for peace had not been acceded to, or, if agreed to, why not acted

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  upon? The facts stated in that telegram were very strange. He begged to ask his noble Friend, whether Her Majesty's Government had received any information respecting the conclusion of an armistice between the belligerents in the East? Also, whether the question of an occupation of Constantinople, either by the Russians alone or conjointly with one of the other great Powers, had recently arisen in the negotiations for peace?
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, in answer to the first part of the Inquiry of my noble Friend—whether Her Majesty's Government have any information as to the conclusion of an armistice? —I can only answer in the negative. I have no information of the kind; and having seen the Russian Ambassador about two hours ago, I found that he was equally uninformed. I read a communication addressed to him direct from his Government, and in it the delay was unexplained. On the other hand, as your Lordships know from Mr. Layard's telegram, to which my noble Friend has referred, the Turkish Government say that more than a week has elapsed without official information, that the delay does not rest with them, and that they are unable to explain the cause of it. Under these circumstances, I am not in a position to give any information or offer any opinion; but I do not suppose we shall have to wait long for an explanation of what certainly is a most perplexing matter. With regard to the second Question of my noble Friend, I must answer it also in the negative. No proposition has been made by the Russian Government for diplomatic sanction to a Russian occupation of Constantinople, and no proposal has been made for a joint occupation of that city.
  THE EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY,in rising to ask, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in the coming negotiations, to insist on adequate measures being taken for the security of the lives and property of the Mussulman population of European Turkey? said: My Lords, Before putting the Question which stands in my name, I hope I may be allowed, by the indulgence of the House, to say a few words on the matter to which it relates. I do not think I need make much apology for bringing this question
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  forward at this particular moment. It is one which must be raised now if it is to be raised to any purpose; and I think I may plead, besides, that it is not, in one sense, a political question. It has nothing directly to do with "British interests," "Russian ambition," "the support of Turkey," or any such dangerous and inflammable matters. It is in itself a simple question of humanity, upon which it would be perfectly reasonable to appeal to Russia herself, as a civilized nation, for co-operation and support. A few days ago, I hoped and believed that the necessity for putting this Question had ceased to exist. The terms of peace, as first rumoured through the newspapers, seemed right and reasonable enough. Christian Governors were to be appointed in the European Provinces of Turkey; due measures were to be taken to afford complete protection to the Christian population, but, apart from this, these Provinces were to remain a part of the Turkish Empire. Some such arrangement would have been, I think, a just one. It would have fulfilled the avowed object of the war; it would have given security to both Christian and Mussulman. But it seems now that a very different arrangement is in contemplation—an arrangement which will certainly free the Christian from Turkish misrule, but which will afford to the Mussulman population no security whatever. I apprehend that no one in this House is inclined to make light of the sufferings that the Mussulman population of Turkey have undergone during the last year, or the intense suffering and peril of thousands of them at this moment; so it will be unnecessary for me to inflict upon your Lordships the loathsome details of the massacres that have taken place, or the still more terrible particulars of the agonies of those who have preferred the horrors of flight to the tender mercies of the Bulgarians and their allies. It will be enough to say that at this moment nearly the entire Mussulman population of European Turkey is undergoing every conceivable form of human misery. I would rather ask your Lordships to look forward, and consider what can be done to enable these unfortunate creatures to return in security to their homes and property when the war is at an end. This is not a matter that can be left to take care of itself. The Bulgarian may

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  have all the virtues with which he has lately been credited; but he does not exercise them towards the Turk. Those who expect to see the Christian Slav as tolerant towards an alien race and an alien creed as the unspeakable Turk will, I fear, be disappointed. And Turkey, under the arrangements that are now foreshadowed, will be very weak; not very able—probably very unwilling—-to assert the rights of Mussulmen in the autonomous Provinces, for fear of giving an excuse to her ambitious and implacable neighbours for a fresh series of aggressions. Nothing but pressure from without—nothing but proper safeguards devised and firmly insisted on by the Powers of Europe, will make it possible for these refugees to return to their homes and obtain their civil rights under Christian rule. I do not wish to sneer at Humanitarianism— indeed, this question has a purely humanitarian object; but I must say that, from the very beginning of these troubles, I have felt it to be a most grave reproach against those who raised the anti-Turkish cry in 1876—not merely that they were reckless, that they were hounding on Russia to a war that would cause more sin and suffering than half-a-century of Turkish misrule—but that they were reckless that by so doing they wore inevitably exposing the whole Mussulman population to the risk of expulsion or extermination. They were reckless then, and they are apathetic now. The very men who insisted that every crime committed in Bulgaria should be registered and reported home by Her Majesty's Consuls are now silent and apparently indifferent to the sufferings that the Turks have already endured, and careless of horrors that may be still to come. We have most of us read this morning a highly ingenious speech on the Eastern Question, delivered by Mr. Gladstone. In that elaborate speech I could not find one word of horror at, or commiseration for, the misery they are now enduring. The only mention of it by any of that Party, that I can call to mind, was when one spoke lately of a "baptism of blood." "A drowning" would have been a more appropriate expression. Putting aside, as unworthy of a serious answer, the small band of fanatics who regard this question solely from the crusader's point of view, and care nothing for any sufferings of the
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  infidel so long as the Christian triumphs, I think there are two great mistakes at the bottom of this apathy. The first is a vague idea that these unfortunate people are in some way or another so connected with the perpetrators of the famous atrocities as to be unworthy of protection or assistance. There are no grounds for believing this is true of one in a hundred of them. The other consists in the Darwinian view of the question, mentioned the other day in the debate on the Address by the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll). The view that this unfortunate race is being destroyed in consequence of their inferiority—not merely by the forcible and most terrible means that we see at work, but by some subtle and mysterious law of Nature at the back of them which it is impossible for us, or anyone else, to resist or avert. Now I want to say one or two things about this Darwinian view. In the first place, it seems to be morally a dangerous view—a view that would justify a treatment of lower races to which we are always too prone, and which I am sure the noble Duke would be the very first to denounce. And I do not think it can be a very safe method of studying such matters. When we look back on past history, and see how great nations have sprung apparently out of nothing; how other nations have, when apparently in the fullness of their vigour, suddenly withered and faded away, I think he will be a bold man who will undertake to prophesy the ultimate destiny of any European or Asiatic race. But, apart from all this, supposing that the Darwinian theory is a safe and proper guide to the study of contemporary history, does it apply in the present case? Is it true that this degree of superiority of the Bulgarian over the Turk exists? Is it the fact that the Bulgarian, by virtue of this superiority, intellectual, moral, or physical, has exemplified the Darwinian theory by becoming the governing race and improving the Turk off the face of the earth? Why, my Lords, a few years ago, before the angelic nature of the Bulgarian was discovered, it was almost invariably held by those who visited the country that the Osmanli was the equal or superior of any of the subject races in everything except monogamy and the commercial instinct. And, as to the other question, we all know

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  perfectly well that the Turk has been conquered—after a desperate struggle, in which he has given the strongest proofs of national vitality—not by the superiority of the Bulgarian, not by any subtle and mysterious law of Nature, but by a military force which might have overrun Italy, or even England, if it could have been landed on our shores. I should like to know whether, in the event of such a misfortune taking place, the noble Duke, or anyone else, would attribute it to the action of the Darwinian theory? When I hear the subject treated in this pseudo - scientific manner—when I hear people indulging in this sort of slip-shod fatalism—I feel reminded of nothing so much as the somewhat ribald lines of Lowell, the American poet—
  "Parson Wilbur, he calls all these arguments lies,
  Says they're nothing in the world but just fee-faw-fum,
  And that all this grand talk of the Destinies Is half of it ignorance, t'other half fum."
  I need not say that these lines are not intended to have any personal significance. I think these poor wretches have the strongest claim upon the sympathy and assistance of this nation; for what is the cry that we have heard throughout England for the last two years?—"We must not support Turkey, because by so doing we make ourselves responsible for the misgovernment of the Christians." If there was truth in that cry, and our Government partially endorsed it by their policy, must there not also be some truth in its converse—"If we assent to the destruction of Turkey, we make ourselves responsible for the fate of its Mussulman population, whose solo security for life or property lies in the supremacy of the Porte." I think that this is a very strong claim, and I earnestly hope that in the coming Congress our Government will see that proper measures are taken to enable the Mussulman population to return to, and remain in, their homes. I cannot conceive it to be a matter of insuperable difficulty. It is not a question on which the interests and jealousies of the European Powers are likely to clash; and it will not, I fear, be a very large question. Many of them will be dead; many more, too, heartbroken, too terrified of the very name of Christian rule, to make any attempt to return and claim
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  their own. But those who wish to return ought to be enabled to do so; and in obtaining for them the necessary security I am sure Government will find the country at its back. I will now put the Question that stands in my name.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: My Lords, if it were possible under the forms of Parliament to second a Question as one would second a Motion, I should say—"I rise to second the Question of the noble Earl who has just sat down." That Question involves matter of much more interest and importance than one might gather even from the speech of the noble Earl himself. My Lords, that Question implies, in the first place, and in the strongest possible language, that we have the right of protectorate over the subject-populations of Turkey. In that I entirely concur, and I rejoice to hear it from the other side of the House. The next proposition involved in the Question is that this right of protectorate and its corresponding duty is not a duty or a right founded upon Treaty, but upon the general principles of humanity. We have the right of protectorate over the Christian population by Treaty, but we have none by Treaty over the Mussulmans; therefore the Question implies, quite apart from Treaty, that England has a general right of protectorate over the whole of these people. I only wish that admission had come from the front Bench and not from the second. I do not expect to hear anything of the kind from the Government—especially from the cautious lips of my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I will say for myself and those who generally act with me, that we desire good government and protection of the lives, property, and honour of the Mussulman population as well as the Christian. My noble Friend —if he will allow me to call him so, for I had the privilege of friendship with those from whom he derives his name— taunted us with not having expressed any sympathy until now with the Mussulman population of Turkey. Did it never occur to him that it was a taunt which might be turned upon himself? Has he till this moment expressed any great concern for the Christian population, when it was the Christians who were underneath and the Mussulmans who were above? I admit the right of every man, whatever be his religious be-

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  lief, to claim the privileges which belong to every man of every nation under every Government under the sun. But, my Lords, if my noble Friend means to tell me or to tell the House that under the Empire of Turkey the Christians and Mussulmans have been equally oppressed—
  THE EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY: I never said anything of the sort.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: I am very glad to hear it. But my noble Friend did say that more misery had been inflicted in this war than would have been inflicted by half a century of peace. What I complain of is that noble Lords and right hon. Gentlemen will not read the evidence which is placed before them on this subject, which their own Government places at their disposal. They road books such as Burnaby's Ride to Khiva, and stuff of that sort. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, I read this book with interest myself, as the account of a spirited ride by a spirited officer; but certainly I should not go to it for my information respecting the condition of the Christian population of Turkey; and what I complain of is that people will not read the official evidence which the Government places on the Table of this House. With regard to the question of the comparative incidence of the Government of Turkey upon the Mussulman and non-Mussulman population, it so happens that there was laid on the Table of this House towards the middle of last Session a thin Blue Book—very small indeed—so small that any of your Lordships could read it in an hour; but which gives complete and conclusive evidence as to the character of the Turkish rule in these Provinces. It is a collection of the Consular Reports on the condition of the various Provinces of Turkey during the 20 years which have elapsed from the Crimean War down to the commencement of the present war. This evidence is wholly unconnected with the Bulgarian massacres — wholly unconnected with everything which can bear in a Party character on this question. I will from this Book show to the House what is the condition of that Government, what has been its conduct upon the subject-population, and what its effect upon the Mussulman population. The first witness I will call into Court is Sir William Fenwick Williams. I will read
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  from a despatch which Sir Fenwick Williams wrote to Lord Clarendon just before he undertook that defence of Ears which will ever remain a noble specimen of British bravery, skill, and endurance. This despatch is dated from Erzeroum, the capital of Armenia—that Province of Turkey which some of the friends of the Turks in England regard with so much jealousy. Let us see what is the condition of Armenia, according to Sir Fenwick Williams. He says—
  "The whole body of cavasses, whether employed as police in the capital or other cities and towns of the Empire, or in the Provinces as the agents through whom the revenue is collected, constitutes an engine of tyranny perhaps unequalled in the world. It is needless for me to assure your Lordships that no language can pourtray the infamy which characterizes the life and character of this body of men; the scenes of their exploits lie in the villages, and more especially Christian, though it must be stated the Mussulman cultivator does not escape their insolence, extortion, and rapine. Throughout the vast extent of this Empire over which I have travelled I have invariably found the last stroke of ruin inflicted on a crumbling village to have been perpetrated by a cavass. The Mussulman villagers might, and possibly did, remonstrate, but woe to the Christian serf who opened his mouth before the tax-gathering and tyrannical cavass. I feel convinced that the Allies who have fought and bled to keep the Russians out of these fertile countries will not allow their triumph to be a barren one to the unhappy and oppressed Christian, nor to his fellow-subject, the Mussulman cultivator."
  That was the account of them by Sir Fenwick Williams in 1856. [A noble LORD: Twenty-two years ago!] Yes, twenty-two years ago—and I suppose the noble Baron who makes that observation has some reason to suppose that things have mended since. I have evidence to the contrary. Here is a despatch, dated 13 years later, dated from the same place, from Consul Taylor to Lord Clarendon. This is what he says—
  "It was dispiriting on my onward route to Kaghizman, through Shuragel, the ancient Shirai, formerly the richest and most populous district in Armenia, to pass so many spots marking the sites of towns and villages, some of them only recently deserted, but now encumbered with their ruins or the mean huts of the indigent population that remained. On many of these deserted sites the massive fabrics of early Armenian churches had successfully resisted the ravages of time and the efforts of man, urged by an implacable hostility to everything Christian, to destroy them."
  A few pages further the same Consul says—

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  "The Kurds belong to the Hassananlee and Millikanlee tribes living in the vicinity of Akhlat, Boolanik, and Malazgerd, under the chieftainship of Soofie Agha, Khaznadar, and Eeseh Oghli. The depredations of their dependants, encouraged by, and proceeds shared in by them, are manifest all around. Deserted villages, ruined churches, crumbling mosques, abandoned fields meet the eye everywhere. The ruthless conduct of these ruffians, rendered bolder by the feebleness of the Executive, has rendered what ought to be a paradise a desert. People who formerly possessed 30 to 40 buffaloes, besides sheep and cows, at the same time working ten ploughs, are now begging their bread; and within the last two years the Christian villages of Medzk Kosthiyan, Tapa Vank, Jizroke, Khulleek, Pogkey, and Sivratore have been utterly abandoned by the Armenians, owing to the depredations of the people mentioned above."
  That is the account of one of our Consuls in 1869; but there is one later still in this little and instructive Blue Book. We have a Report from Consul Zohrab, and his evidence goes down to 1875. He says, in a despatch to the noble Earl who is now at the head of the Foreign Office, dated July 19, 1875—
  "The real condition of this part of the Sultan's Dominions is, I fear, so little known, that the cases I expose may seem exaggerated. I have, however, reported authenticated facts. Were I to report all the cases of cruelty and oppression which have come to my knowledge, but which I have not been able to investigate, but one conclusion could be deduced from them—that fanaticism, cruelty, and dishonesty are the only incentives to action which move the men who are sent to administer this unhappy country. Unfortunately, such a conclusion would be the correct one. Bribery alone can now obtain an appointment; honesty and administrative capacity are not required; the ability to pay is the barometer of a man's ability to do duty. The country is consequently overrun with a crowd of hungry, unprincipled, ignorant men, whose only object is to enrich themselves as far as they can. They are surrounded by satellites, who work for them and for themselves. Extortion is the every-day work of these men. I believe but few of the officials coming from Constantinople are imbued with fanatical ideas; generally they are very indifferent, but as they cannot enrich themselves without the aid of the influential Mussulman classes they are obliged, in return, to permit cruelty and oppression towards the Christians."
  This same Consul, Mr. Zohrab, a few days later, in a despatch addressed to the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby), speaks of an atrocious case of the robbery of a daughter from a Christian family. He draws the noble Earl's attention to two cases. He says—
  "I have brought two cases to your Excellency's notice. In the first case a girl was forcibly taken from her home by the authorities,
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  and for her courageous adherence to her faith she has been punished by a sentence of perpetual exile and separation from her parents, her safety being the untenable plea of the authorities. The second case this despatch reports."
  The Consul goes on to say—
  "It is clear that any Mussulman can now legally rob Christian children from their parents, and, with the aid of the authorities, forcibly convert them to Islamism. Christians, therefore, are no longer safe, and Europeans are eqully in peril. A Turk has merely to go and swear before an authority that he heard some member of an European family declare a desire to embrace Islamism to plunge that family in grief and trouble."
  And that takes place in the Province which you are anxious to keep under the dominion of the Turk; and you speak as if it were the most terrible misfortune in the world that this Government should be brought to trial. Before I pass from Armenia I should like to relate a case which I learned from reading this Blue Book. A man who was, I think, originally a sausage maker, raised himself to the position of a contractor to the Turkish Government, where he amassed an enormous fortune. This man undertook to rebuild at his own cost a large part of the town of Erzeroum, and also to rebuild at his own cost one of their own mosques. That man became the victim of a Mahometan conspiracy. A body offanatics, with the Chief Justice of Erzeroum at their head, made up their minds to burn all the new buildings which that man had erected. They set fire more than once to the quarter of the town which he had erected; but after each successive burning he proceeded to rebuild with extraordinary energy and perseverance; but very soon after, when this poor man was sitting in the streets of Erzeroum, he was approached by a man, who shot him dead in the open day with a pistol, and the crime has to this day never been punished. It was instituted by a fanatical society of Mahometans, who were jealous of his success. My Lords, these things are disgraceful; and yet we are told that the Turkish Government is a Government which should be upheld. What is the natural effect of conduct such as I have described? Why, that the Armenians are becoming Russians—that the Russian feeling among them is rapidly increasing. No doubt they would be very glad to have a Government of their own, and I

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  do not say that they wish to remain under Russia as the best thing in the world; but they do desire to come under Russia rather than to remain under the Turks. I submit that the evidence of these two men, Consuls Taylor and Zohrab, proves to demonstration that when the Russians advance in Armenia they will be welcomed by the great mass of the population. I now pass to another part of Turkey—to the European Provinces. In doing so, let us suppose that such an occurrence as the massacre of Batak, for example, was a mere accident attendant upon the putting down of an insurrection. I am not talking of this war— of the causes of it, or of the probable consequences of it. I am speaking of the permanent Government of Turkey. Well, then, with regard to Bosnia, we have heard a good deal as to the evidence of Consul Holmes —and in referring to that gentleman I may make this general observation, that the position of men accredited from this country to a Government which is thoroughly barbarous and entirely rotten, like that of Turkey, is somewhat peculiar. It is so peculiar that you may almost get from any of our Consuls two contradictory views—the one in violent abuse of the Turk, and the other in defence of him. They look upon themselves as accredited to a Government which is entirely barbarous and rotten, and they think themselves free to comment upon the proceedings of that Government until it is attacked by others—then they turn to defend it. Consuls in Turkey may be compared to vultures who are feeding on a carcase, but who every now and then stop to fight with each other, and when they are fighting with each other, they appear as though they were defending the carcase. That is exactly the position of our Consuls; and when you want to get at the truth you must take their evidence, not when they are fighting with the Consuls of other European States, but when they come voluntarily forward and give their unbiassed and spontaneous testimony. Considering what has been said of Consul Holmes since the war broke out—considering the strong manner in which he has taken what may be called a Turkish side—I confess I was amazed in reading this little Blue Book. Referring to a period when there was no particular fighting going on between the
  702
  Consuls, I find from it that immediately before the war Consul Holmes gives the most emphatic evidence as to the horrible condition of Bosnia, and shows that the Mussulmans were in a perpetual state of conspiracy against the Christians of Bosnia. Writing on the 24th of February, 1871, he says—
  "The unnecessary delay and neglect, to the prejudice often of innocent persons, the open bribery and corruption, the invariable and unjust favour shown to Mussulmans in all cases between Turks and Christians which distinguish the Turkish administration of what is called 'justice' throughout the Empire cannot fail to suggest the question, What would be the lot of foreigners in Turkey were the European Powers to give up the Capitulations? I am convinced that their position in the Provinces, at all events, would be intolerable, and that they would quit the country to a man, while the outcry and feeling in Europe against Turkey would ultimately cause her ruin. The universal ignorance, corruption, and fanaticism of all classes preclude all hope of an efficient administration of justice for at least another generation."
  That is not the only passage to the same effect in Consul Holmes's Report. There is this curious circumstance as to Consul Holmes. Sir Henry Elliot was at that time our Ambassador in Constantinople, and he does not seem to have approved of the Report of Consul Holmes to which I refer. In regard to that point, I may say that I do not generally agree with the principle of choosing men to represent England abroad who are favourable, upon the whole, to the Government to which they are accredited; but I am bound to say that some of our recent Ministers at Constantinople—and eminently our Representative there now —have taken a more zealous part in defending what is indefensible than was necessary to their position. However that may be, the Report of Consul Holmes goes to Sir Henry Elliot; and Sir Henry, referring to a remark in it as to corrupt Turkish officials, says to him in effect—"You ought not to use this sort of language unless you are prepared to give names." But Consul Holmes stands to his guns, and he writes back—"You ask me to give you the names of the men who are corrupt. You had better ask me to give you the names of the men who are honest. There is hardly such a thing as an honest official in Turkey." The same Consul also says that in any law case in which Mussulmans are concerned against Christians, there is no possibility of getting justice for the

  703
  Christians. I pass on to Syria. And here again you have distinct evidence from our Consuls that the fanaticism of the Mussulman population has been rapidly on the increase in recent years, and especially since the political submergence of France. I do not know exactly why, but we all know that France has always assumed a particular right of protectorate over the Christians in Syria. It may be a mere matter of feeling, but we are all aware that the French are very much governed by sentiment, and your Lordships must have seen, from evidence laid before you, that our intervention in Syria, in 1860–61, was very much due to the insistance of the French Government. At the present moment, however, Syria is not under the watchful eye of France as it was before, and the result is the state of matters which the Reports of our Consuls disclose. Our Consuls at Damascus and Aleppo describe the state of things in Syria as daily growing worse. As regards Bulgaria, when Her Majesty's Government sent Mr. Baring to inquire what was going on there, such were his discoveries that he wrote in his despatch—"The result of my inquiries is that the condition of the Christians in Bulgaria is intolerable." I now pass from Bosnia and Bulgaria to Greece. With regard to the Provinces of Turkey closely bordering upon Greece, I agree with what was said the other night by my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Derby), in answer to a Question asked by Lord Emly, that no Government could possibly wish to bring about an extension of the area of this dreadful war. At the same time, there is as great a responsibility in advising people not to rebel against Turkey as there is in giving contrary counsel. It is all very well to say that peace is the interest of all the world; but I agree with the Prime Minister when he recently said, in alluding to a remark of my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby), that "the greatest of all British interests is peace," that that is a passage of rhetoric and not a maxim of politics. I deny that war is the greatest of all human evils, and I say you must compare it with the permanent condition of the country in respect of which an insurrection is spoken of. What, then, as to the Turkish Provinces contiguous to Greece? Most ample proof of the condition of things in Epirus is contained in the Report of
  704
  Consul Stuart addressed to the Foreign Office in 1873, but published not very long ago. Until I read that Report I had no conception that matters were so bad in the Greek Provinces of European Turkey. The Report shows that there is great inequality before the law in the case of Mussulmans and Christians, the inequality being much in favour of the former, and based, in the view of Consul Stuart, on "a fixed intention to keep back the Christian." We have it from Consul Stuart's reply that in Epirus the so-called "equality" of Mussulman and Christian evidence in courts of justice is a mere catchword, and has never been anything else. We have it that the country is governed by Mussulmans, who are armed, that the Christians are unarmed, that their evidence is not received in courts of justice, and that acts of violence and spoliation are not un-frequently heard of, and are almost always connived at by the Government authorities. We also have it from Mr. Stuart that in the matter of taxes the last farthing is wrung from the Christian, while the Mussulman is easily dealt with and mildly let off. What is the result? That the population of Epirus is rapidly diminishing—diminishing at the rate of upwards of 20 per cent in 12 years. That is the condition to which Epirus has been brought; and it may be taken as an illustration of the other and contiguous Provinces. But a great movement of deliverance has been commenced, and, by the help of Russia, I trust may be successful. Well, my Lords, I would ask whether it is fair for any man belonging to either Party—and in this matter I care nothing for Party—to write or to speak on this question without carefully reading such evidence as I have adduced—evidence which clearly shows that the Government of Turkey has been getting worse and worse. I ask the Government whether, in the negotiations which are about to take place, they will consider it their duty to "insist," in the language of the noble Earl who has introduced the subject, upon securities for the better government of the whole population, Mussulman and Christian alike, of those great Provinces. I have said that our Treaty right is confined to the Christians. We are in a position to protect them, and we have a right to do so. I confess that on that point I have never thought the language of the Foreign Secretary

  705
  entirely satisfactory. Along with the other European Powers, we extracted from Turkey a promise that she would protect the rights of her Christian subjects; and I lay this down as a proposition which cannot be disputed—that when one man extracts from another a promise in favour of a third, it is his duty, as far as he can, to see that that promise is fulfilled. Lord Russell, speaking in 1864, recognized this, saying that the Cabinet of the Earl of Aberdeen, while actively defending the independence of Turkey, felt that in objecting to the separate interference of Russia, they were bound to obtain some guarantee for the security of the subjects of the Porte professing the Christian faith, whether of the Greek or Roman Catholic Church, or Protestants, whether Christians by descent, or Turkish converts. The same noble Lord on another occasion used these words—
  "The Treaty of 1856 contemplated the substitution of a collective protectorate of the five Powers on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte, in place of an exclusive protectorate by one Power alone, which is in the Treaty expressly renounced and abolished."
  It might be asked why the Liberal Party did not express its views fully on this question when it was in Office? And on this question I must say that in my opinion it is not politic for any Foreign Office voluntarily to raise the Eastern Question, which has for years been the nightmare of every Foreign Minister in Europe. But, at the same time, I must say that the late Lord Clarendon, who was neither a sentimentalist nor a humanitarian, but, in the best sense of the term, a man of the world, has spoken frankly on the question. On the 30th of June, 1857, Lord Clarendon, writing to Lord Stratford de Redeliffe, used these words—
  "I transmit for your Excellency's information copies of a despatch from Consul Churchill and of my reply respecting the bad treatment of the Christians in Bosnia.
  "Her Majesty's Government know by experience the utter inutility of appealing on such matters to the Porte; but the Turkish Government should be made aware that if this systematic misgovernment and persecution of Christians and violations of engagements continue, it will be impossible to arrest the progress of opinion which is now manifesting itself—that Mahomedan rule is incompatible with civilization and humanity, and can no longer be endured."
  I wish a similar tone had been adopted in all the despatches written by
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  my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Derby). Before sitting down I should like to refer to a Paper which was not before us on the first night of the Session, but which has since been produced. I refer to a despatch dated December 14. That despatch I have read with no small concern—I would even say I have read it with alarm—for it refers to an expression of thanks on the part of the Porte for an assurance which had been given that when
  "negotiations for peace were set on foot Her Majesty's Government would do what lay in their power to obtain favourable conditions for Turkey."
  I ask what does that mean? In diplomatic language it is known that when we speak of Turkey we mean the Government of Turkey. Is it really true that the Government of England is to go into a Conference or into the Councils of Europe in some less formal shape, and give the influence and authority of England in favour of Turkey without check and without security against misgovernment? I am glad to see from a gesture of my noble Friend that he repudiates such an interpretation. In that case you ought to guard yourselves, for you may depend upon it that the Turks will understand that that attitude is in favour of them as a Government, and they will say—"We are effecting reforms—we have a Parliament as well as you, and we have a Constitution as good as yours;" and they will give no weight to the indignant denunciations of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), that these institutions are mere delusions. The language which I have quoted was quite sufficient to encourage the Turks; and the guarantees which have been mentioned were illusory, if it were not for the fact, at which I rejoice, that the military power of Turkey has been crushed. I wish the noble Earl and his Government had taken a different course at first. I should have been glad that the very moderate conditions proposed to Turkey in the Conference had been adopted and carried out; but from the moment the Porte is told that no coercion will be resorted to it is clear what the result will be. It is remarkable that there is not a hint or an indication in all the Papers before your Lordships of the Government of Turkey repenting. Take the case of

  707
  Shefket Pasha, a monster who has been the cause of the massacre of thousands of men, women, and children. His punishment was demanded; but not only has he not been punished—he has been honoured and rewarded—by the Turkish Government, who are wholly unable to comprehend why the people of this country should care about the massacres and atrocities that have occurred. When my noble Friend answers the Question of the noble Earl, I trust we shall have an announcement to the effect that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to use the power and influence of England in order to obtain the best possible conditions for the Government of Turkey; but that they will use that power and influence to the last degree to obtain good government for the subject-populations of Turkey. I fully and readily admit the personal humanity of noble Lords opposite, and that they desire good government for Turkey; but it seems that throughout the negotiations their effort has been to obtain as much good government for Turkey as they could consistently with the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Turkey. I hope that such language will be given up. The independence and integrity of Turkey, as the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) has said, are gone. The conditions of peace, to use the language of Mr. Layard in one of his recent despatches, are inconsistent with the existence of the Turkish Power in Europe. I do not know whether it is in the contemplation of Her Majesty's Government that the Sultan shall be kept at Constantinople in the same way as the Mogul was kept at Delhi; but this I know—that Turkey, as an independent European Power is—thank God!— gone. It is a Government which has abused every power it possessed, and has been a curse to the population over which it ruled; and it will be a. shame to England if her power and influence are used to get the most favourable terms possible with a view to the maintenance of such a Government. I will only add that, much as I differ from the policy pursued by my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby), there is no man in the House who more sincerely rejoices than I do at his convalescence and at his re-appearance in this House and at the Foreign Office. The opportunity has not passed away,
  708
  and my noble Friend may yet take an active part in the deliverance of the subject-populations of Turkey. I am fully satisfied with the policy of neutrality which my noble Friend has persistently and consistently advocated. During the last two years my noble Friend has been the object of incessant personal attacks—personal in one sense only, of attack directed with great keenness, sometimes with some excess of keenness of language—with respect to his conduct of the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government; but I am bound to say—and the fact has the homage of my sincere respect—that during the whole of this controversy not one single hasty word or intemperate expression has passed the lips of my noble Friend. Under the circumstances, that could be said of very few indeed; and anything I have said of my noble Friend has been actuated solely by a regard for the merits of the question, and in no respect by any personal and political hostility towards himself.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, it was quite clear that the Question of the noble Earl referred to the Mussulman population that might be torn from Turkey, and included in an autonomous Bulgaria, or in Servia, or Montenegro, and not to the Mussulmans under the rule of the Sublime Porte. The previous speeches of the noble Duke who had just sat down had not accustomed their Lordships to the special pleading with which he had followed the Question of the noble Earl; but the object of that special pleading was to renew his assertion of a Treaty-right to protect the Christians in Turkey, which had been formerly denied by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The noble Duke said there was as much responsibility in advising people not to rebel, as in advising them to rebel, and he had advised Her Majesty's Ministers to be more guarded in their language; but he had not been so, and their Lordships would remember how, at the beginning of last Session, the noble Duke had incited the subjects of an Ally of Her Majesty to rebel. He did not refer to that passionate harangue, at which most of their Lordships murmured, but to the subsequent speech, in which the noble Duke toned down his first speech, and said that insurrection was justified where the tribunals were closed. These were

  709
  two-edged words, and the noble Duke had less right than any other to use them, for when he had been Secretary of State for India, he had been most inaccessible both to the Natives of India and to members of the Civil Service; and he had closed the doors of the Privy Council on the first disputed case which arose under Lord Canning's Sunnud, which was the Charter of India and the foundation of the new Indian Empire. If the noble Duke thought that no one should have an opinion without having read the Consular Reports in the Blue Book, why had he discredited these Consuls by comparing them to vultures fighting over a carcase? As to the Question before the House, it was one which in ordinary times would meet with the support of everyone in the House; but was it not too late, and whatever the Answer might be, only adding to our humiliation? For England was humiliated and made ridiculous before Europe by the orders and counter-orders to stop troop-ships at Port Said and at Malta, and by the Fleet being sent to the Dardanelles and then back again. That was not the fault of the Government, but the fault of the country, and of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) and the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), who had misled and divided England. It was now two or three weeks since the Government made proposals to the Russian Government in reference to an armistice for peace, and yet we had been told this evening that no armistice had yet been signed. The Russians were advancing on Constantinople and Gallipoli, and those British interests which the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said were so precisely defined in his despatch of May 6, 1877, would disappear. When England was thus played with and hoodwinked, there was only one course for the Government if it wished to be respected at home and abroad, and that was to send his passports to the Russian Ambassador. This was not necessarily a rupture, for in recent years the Representatives of England had received their passports from two countries—first from Spain, and later from the United States.
  THE DUKE OF BUCCLEUCHsaid, he should ask their Lordships to come back to the Question which had been submitted to them by the noble Earl. The noble Duke opposite (the Duke of
  710
  Argyll) had been discussing another subject, and he had not read the Question as it was on the Paper.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: I read the words.
  THE DUKE OF BUCCLEUCHsaid, they were words he could not find. It struck him that the noble Duke had raised a new question—the bad government of Turkey; and certainly if Turkey had been upon its trial, they could not have had a more fervent, vehement, and active advocate for the prosecution than the noble Duke had been that evening. He had no doubt the noble Duke had read the last Blue Book laid before them. If he read it, he would find there plenty of those horrors which they had heard talked of in former days. He was not surprised at a noble Earl opposite asking, why load the Table with additional horrors?—because those horrors were perpetrated by his own friends—by those mild Russians and civilized Bulgarians. They could read there how the Jews were treated, and of the Mussulman population flying before the Russians, suffering immense hardships and dying by hundreds by the roadside. They had been told that the Turks were to be turned out of Europe bag-and-baggage. They had been told by the noble Duke—though he had modified it a little afterwards—that they should be thrust out of Europe, the just and the unjust alike. It was to be hoped the House would come back to the Question, and not let the world imagine that every one was impressed with.-this furore against the Turks—many in this country looked upon such a policy with no favour. They had already thrown over their old Ally, and he thought that was enough without heaping insult and abuse upon him.
  EARL FORTESCUEsaid, he had listened to the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) with some surprise when he heard him utter the fervent aspiration that the Turks might be driven out of Europe, because he could not forget —not to speak of the Treaty of Paris in 1856—that the noble Duke was party to the Treaty of 1871, and now when he spoke against maintaining the integrity of Turkey, he must ask—what had happened since to effect this striking change in his views? He could not learn from any official accounts that there had been any sudden and very marked deteriora-

  711
  tion in the Turkish Government since the noble Duke left Office and the present Government came in. The noble Duke had quoted a Consular Report of a startling character in 1869. In 1871 a Question was put to the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs by Sir John Gray to this effect—If any information could be given to the House "whether the Sultan's Government had recently taken steps in favour of civil and religious liberty?" Viscount Enfield replied that—
  "All the accounts from Turkey agreed in confirming the progress made in that country by the Sultan's Government towards toleration; and much had been done of late years towards raising the position of the Christian population in Turkey."—[3 Hansard, ccyiii. 313.]
  In 1872 Sir John Gray asked whether effect had been given to the provisions in the various edicts? and the reply was that—
  "The latest reports stated that, as a general rule, the edicts were fairly carried into effect, and that the Christians as a class had no reason for complaint."—[ccxiii. 454.]
  He could not understand how deterioration and improvement could be going on simultaneously in the same country. He confessed that what he saw in his short tour in the East did not impress him favourably of the Turkish Government, and nothing that he had read of since had led him to take a very favourable view of that Government either in its conduct or in its results upon the population. But he thought it was rather extraordinary that such a sudden access of horror should have seized the late Prime Minister and the noble Duke, both parties, if not to the Treaty of 1856, to the Treaty of 1871. If the Turk was so very anti-human last year, he could not have been very human in 1871 and 1872. The Bulgarian atrocities, committed under the influence of panic at a real though abortive insurrection, suppressed by the local authorities in the absence of regular troops, were no doubt abominable; but they had been certainly very much exaggerated as to their number and extent. They had conclusive evidence that the Bulgarians, though shamefully insulted, had not been materially altogether unpros-perous under Turkish rule. He did. not say at all that such a Government as that of Turkey was satisfactory. Par from it. But he did not think that the struggling efforts of the new Represen-
  712
  tative Assembly in that country merited the utter contempt with which the Liberal Party had spoken of them. The Spanish Junta, sitting in Cadiz as a refuge left from Napoleon's domination, committed follies and absurdities in abundance; but they had the sympathies of England, because they represented the struggle for independence of a nation, whose country had been seized by a hypocritical invader under the plea of giving it a better government than its previous notoriously bad one. With sympathies inclined to the side of a nation that had been unjustly invaded, he did not feel more reconciled to the proceedings of Russia when he contrasted her profession of disinterested zeal for humanity at the commencement of the war with her present vague but unquestionably large demands. In former times Russia used to be regarded as the chief enemy of Liberal principles. She was identified abroad with the most determined hostility to Constitutional government and representative institutions, and was identified at home with the sternest and most despotic administration; with religious intolerance, if not persecution, and with the most stringent protectionism. These features in her character caused her to be viewed with even more disfavour by the Liberal than the Conservative Party; but both were agreed as to her habitual duplicity in diplomacy and disregard of Treaties. The language of Lord Palmerston and other Liberals in 1854 was mild in comparison with that of the late Lord Derby and the Tory ex-Chancellor Lord Lyndhurst, who said, citing examples to prove his case, that the history of the Russian Empire from its first establishment down to the time when he spoke was a history of fraud, duplicity, trickery, artifice, and violence. Since 1854 her religious intolerance had been illustrated by the persecution of the Uniate Catholics, her contempt for Treaties by her conduct in 1871, and the untrustworthiness of her most solemn diplomatic assurances by her annexation of Khiva. He did not wish to compare the milder reign of the present Czar with those of his Predecessors; for his reign would go down to posterity as made illustrious by the noble act of the emancipation of the serfs; but, as a matter of fact, there were no germs of Constitutional freedom in Russia, no security for personal liberty, and her

  713
  tariff was as protectionist as ever. In considering how it was that the views of the Liberal Party in regard to Russia had undergone such a complete change, it was necessary to remember that some theological questions might have had something to do with it. The extraordinary zeal and activity of the Ritualist Party—with which the right hon. Gentleman had in many ways shown his sympathy—had latterly been withdrawn from that course which had conducted so many of the most eminent among them, lay as well as clerical, to Rome. They looked of late to the Greek Church, for which the Party now professed a warm sympathy, in spite of the denunciations of that creed whose continued use in the services of our Church he could not help deploring as an undesirable heritage received from sterner times. The Greek Church recognized Anglican Orders, while the Church of Rome scornfully repudiated them—that might have had something to do with it. Moreover, the right hon. Gentleman had been personally engaged in angry controversy with the Roman Catholics. His chief supporters in his anti-Irish agitation had been the Ritualists and the Nonconformists. The latter, partly no doubt, from the zeal for humanity which had so honourably distinguished them since the earliest days of anti-slavery agitation; partly, also, from gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman for his past services on questions especially interesting to them; and partly, also, probably, from the hope of similar services from him hereafter. He could not but feel that just indignation at the misgovernment of Turkey and the suffering of the Christian people under Turkish rule had blinded many to the evils resulting from the domination of Russia, and had led them to take a too sanguine view of the probable prosperity and well-being of the Christian Provinces if they became autonomous under Russian auspices. He believed, too, that those feelings had blinded many to the greatness of the British interests involved in the maintenance of the Black Sea as an open sea to the commerce of all nations. He could not conceive a more formidable state of things than Russia with a powerful Navy in the Black Sea and Constantinople as a base of operations from which to attack our highway to India. He had been pained to hear the
  714
  denunciations of the Crimean War as having been a mistake. He was one of those who believed then, and believed now, that that was a wise and just war, and that its consequences to the liberties of Europe could hardly be overrated. He believed that the Constitutional liberty enjoyed at this moment by Germany and Austria would have been much less if the influence of Russia had not been seriously diminished by the defeats she sustained in that war. He was a supporter of that war, and he believed the whole nation supported it. At any rate, there was evidence that the large constituencies supported it in his own case. He contested at the time one of the most important constituencies in the Empire, and was returned by a largo majority against another Liberal, between whom and himself there was only this ground of difference—that his opponent was a follower of Mr. Bright in regard to that war. He hoped and trusted peace would be maintained, but he quite agreed with the noble Duke, that war was not the greatest of evils that might befall a nation. He had always understood that the efforts of the Peace Party had much to do in inciting the ambition of the late Czar to take steps which at last rendered it imperative on England and France to resist him; and so he now believed the interests of peaco would be best served by putting our Forces by sea and land in such a position as to enable England to speak with confidence and authority, as he was sure she always desired to speak with justice and moderation.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONrose to enter his protest against the criticisms of the noble Earl (Earl Fortescue) on the speech of the noble Duke behind him. The noble Earl had twitted the noble Duke with having expressed an ardent desire that the Turks should be driven out of Europe. Now, he did not understand that the noble Duke made use of language of that kind. What he did say was that the Turkish Government in Europe was on its last legs— almost destroyed—a matter of fact about which, he thought, there was very little difference of opinion. The noble Earl had used against the noble Duke the argumentum ad hominem of why it was, when his noble Friend was in Office, during the time these evils of which he produced proofs were going on, no pro-

  715
  tests were made against the conduct of the Turkish Government by the British Government or the Liberal Party, such as they had made during the last two or three years. His (the Marquess of Ripon's) answer to that was that the Eastern question had been the bugbear of all the Foreign Offices of Europe, and one which not any of the Powers would single-handed have ventured to raise. His noble Friend had read the vigorous and energetic protest of Lord Clarendon and others against the proceedings of the Turkish Government; and the great complaint against that Government at the present moment was, that they had from time to time made promises which they had broken, and promulgated ordinances which were so many dead letters. The noble Earl said how strange it was that Liberals should be found to speak with disrespect of the Turkish Government, since it had granted the country a free Constitution. The worthlessness of that Constitution had been demonstrated in the incisive language of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The real friends of free government could surely place no confidence in that Constitution, produced as it was at a particular moment for obvious purposes. It was a Constitution on which it was impossible for anyone to place the slightest reliance, and in which no friend of free institutions could be called upon to believe. He did not stand there as an advocate or a defender of Russia. He had no sympathy with Russian Governments— he knew the truth of many of the charges brought against her; but he regretted that, owing to the course which events had taken during the last few years, it should have been left to the Russian Government—a Government not famous for its love of freedom—to be alone the defender of the freedom of the Christian populations of Turkey, and that England should have been deprived of a share in that great and noble work.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, when I came down to the House to answer the very simple and inoffensive Question of my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Pembroke), I certainly did not expect to have to encounter these formidable masked batteries which have been opened upon me by the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll). I am al-
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  ways ready to listen with interest and attention to anything he says, whether I agree with it or not; but I must point out that there is some inconvenience in a debate which arises in this manner when there is really no definite question before the House. A great variety of topics are mentioned; it is scarcely possible to know what are the points to which the several speakers desire that the attention of the Government should be directed; and as a discussion of this kind begins with no especial reason, so it ends with no particular conclusion. Having made that preliminary observation, I begin by saying I am not inclined to follow the noble Duke through that very long and very elaborate series of accusations which he has brought against the Government of the Porte. General attacks of that kind cannot, I think, prove a great deal. Those who are most conversant with Turkey have never given her credit for having a well-administered Government; but, on the other hand, if you take the history of countries—especially of semi-civilized countries—for some 20 or 25 years, and put together every instance of crime, outrage, and miscarriage of justice which you can collect out of a long series of reports, there are a good many countries which you might paint in very black colours. The noble Duke, in quoting from the Reports made by our Consuls, points out that one particular Consul reported occasionally in more favourable terms of the administration than he did at another. The conclusion I should draw from that fact would be that the despatches show him to be an impartial man, who merely reports the facts which come before him without reference to the inferences which may be drawn from them. But my noble Friend gives a different explanation— He says that when our Consuls are criticizing the Turkish Government on their own account their criticisms are in disparaging terms; but when criticizing statements made by the agents of other countries, then the feeling of jealousy is so strong between them that they are sure to take up the Turkish defence. Well, my Lords, that is my noble Friend's view of Consular Reports, not mine. I do not think I should have undertaken to frame an indictment against the Turkish Government based on Consular Reports if I held that

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  view in regard to them. Nor, my Lords, do I think it advisable in the present state of things to dwell, as my noble Friend has done, on the disinclination of the Armenians to remain under the Turkish Government and their decided preference for that of Russia. I doubt the wisdom of using language of that kind in this House; and though I do not attach that extreme importance to Armenia which some people are inclined to do, still I do not think any of us would like to see an indefinite extension of the Russian Empire along the southern coast of the Black Sea. My Lords, the noble Duke has referred to a statement which he said he had seen somewhere as to the increasing fanaticism of the Mussulman population in Syria in recent times. He ascribed that increase, with a good deal of ingenuity, to the comparative political insignificance of France during the years immediately succeeding the Franco-German War of 1870; and he went on to draw the inference that it was French influence which had kept down that fanaticism, and that when that pressure was withdrawn the fanaticism showed itself with increased strength. I think, however, that there may be a different explanation of the circumstances than that which is given by the noble Duke. I think that any of the Turkish officials or population who have paid attention to European politics must perfectly well understand that the comparative weakness of France would diminish the chance of that protectorate of the Empire against Russian encroachments, which arose out of the Crimean War, being appealed to with the same effect on a future occasion; and that the anticipation of danger in the future would lead on the part of the Turks to exasperation against those who sympathized with the country to which Turkey was opposed. That, I think, is a simpler explanation of the matter than the one suggested by the noble Duke. Then the noble Duke speaks of the complaints caused by the oppressive manner in which the tax-gatherers collect the finances; and I have no doubt that there is much foundation for those complaints. It must be remembered, however, that the last few years have been years of great calamity and financial depression in the Turkish Empire. No doubt the pressure of taxation has been very severely felt, and there has been great
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  discontent among all classes of the community. But the temporary eclipse of Franco has had nothing to do with that. I need not follow the noble Duke through all the details to which he adverted; nor shall I enter into the question, which has been discussed over and over again, of what is the real state of the people of Bulgaria; but I believe there is some truth in the statement which has often been made of late that when the Russian troops entered that country they were much disgusted to find that they had come for the liberation of a people who were, upon the whole, much better off than they were themselves in their own homes. The noble Duke, in alluding to a phrase of mine that peace is the greatest of British interests, said that war was not the greatest of all evils. I quite agree with the noble Duke that phrases of that kind have very little value, except in relation to the particular circumstances under which they are expressed. When the noble Duke says that war is not the greatest of all evils, I answer that I do not know that anybody ever said it was. What I do say is, that when you attempt to remedy misgovernment in any country by the rough method of arms—by internal revolution or invasion from without—you run a great risk of creating a larger aggregate of human suffering than that which you seek to remedy; and that opinion I would not be unwilling to express as applied to the present case. The noble Duke has said that nobody is entitled to express an opinion on this question who has not made himself master of all the Blue Books. I sympathize with him to this extent—that it is certainly an inconvenience to hear opinions so continually expressed upon public affairs by persons who have not taken the trouble even to make themselves acquainted with the most elementary parts of the subject. But the argument is one which cuts both ways. There are a great many people out-of-doors to whose opinions we are invited to listen, and who from time to time send up Petitions and Memorials on the subject, expressed in extreme terms, who have not, I believe, any clear or definite idea of the subject, and who, probably, if they were questioned, would be found to be ignorant what the war is really about. But if nobody is to express an opinion on

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  the subject except those that read all the Blue Books, then popular opinion— in the generally accepted sense of the phrase—is entirely swept away as a factor in the discussion. The noble Duke expressed an opinion in the course of his speech which I can scarcely think was seriously put forward. He said that had we written despatches in the tone of those who preceded us as to the Christian subjects of Turkey, this war would never have taken place. I can only say that if that is the view of the noble Duke —if he believes that the war really arose out of local disturbances in the Herzegovina—if he does not see that there were other and earlier causes at work which led up to the conflict, and which led up to it through the action of those Powers who took the principal part in bringing it about, then his position and mine differ so entirely upon the whole question that we have no common ground on which to argue. But I do not admit that there is that distinction which the noble Duke assumes between former Governments and the Government now in power in anxiety to do what in them lay, and what in us lies, to secure protection and good government for the Christian populations of Turkey. I have never been inclined to lay much stress upon the mere theory of the question, or to argue how far, according to the mere wording of the Treaty, we were entitled to interfere in the affairs of Turkey. Whatever right of interference we claim, or have been in the habit of claiming, does not, I think, rest upon the wording of a Treaty so much as upon that general duty of protection which, subsequent to the Crimean War, we did assume. Obviously, when you undertake the protection of a State, you acquire a moral right to see that its power and independence are not abused. But that is a view of the question which it would be well not to press too far; for it may be argued that if our right of interference depends entirely on assuming the position of protectors of the Turkish Empire, those now in power in Turkey would be entitled to say—"Last year you did not protect us, and we must decline any interference whatever." I state that merely as a theoretical consideration. But I have always thought, in considering the question of the proper limit of our interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, that the
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  great obstacle to its efficacy as a remedy for misgovernment consists in this — that there must manifestly be extreme difficulty in carrying out any such interference persistently and in detail. I repeat, what I have already stated in this House on a previous occasion, that it is impossible to govern a country through a Committee of foreign Ambassadors, all of whom would generally be pulling in different directions. The noble Duke has said that in our most recent official documents there is no mention of "the integrity and independence of Turkey." Well, my Lords, it is not for me to anticipate. Whatever one may have said at the beginning of the war it was pretty clear that something in the nature of territorial concession was likely to follow from it, and territorial concession must obviously affect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That is a sufficient reason for the omission of the phrase from the more recent despatches. The noble Duke hopes that in dealing with this subject Her Majesty's Government will insist upon obtaining good government for the Christian populations of Turkey. My Lords, I believe we shall; and I think that the exhortation which has been addressed to us on that point was, if I may say so, a little superfluous. The question with which we have to deal is very important. It is not sufficient to secure good administration within a certain area, and to take no care for another. We must look to the various parts of the Turkish Empire and endeavour to secure a settlement which will possess the elements of stability, which will have a fair chance of lasting, and which will not involve the almost certainty of future wars at no distant date. It is not enough to consider what arrangement may be most satisfactory to those who inhabit particular districts—what we have to consider is the chance of maintaining permanent peace amongst the various districts and races which compose the Turkish Empire. That is the real difficulty of the situation. The noble Duke has said that the Turkish Empire is gone, and that he thanked God for it. Perhaps that is anticipating a little; but in any case, before I broke out into such an expression of pious gratitude, I should like to see my way a little more clearly than I do at present as to what is to replace the Empire which is "gone." My Lords,

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  there can be no question that there is a formidable difficulty before us — a difficulty which will require for its solution all the care and skill, and, I should add, all the justice and right feeling of the European Powers. I think our first care should be to secure that the settlement shall be one made with the assent and concurrence of all the European Powers. For ourselves, we do not claim any special, peculiar, or exclusive privilege. On the other hand, we are entitled to deny the existence of any exclusive right or privilege on the part of any other Power. At present we know but imperfectly the proposed bases of peace, which must eventually form the subject of our most careful consideration. As far as that is concerned the noble Lord opposite and my noble Friend behind me will assent when I say that it will be our duty to see—one of our most obvious duties—that, as far as possible in a semi-civilized country, where a good deal of fanatical feeling exists on both sides, strict and equal justice shall be dealt out to Mussulman and Christian alike.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.