Sitting of 28 January 1878

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBER SWORN—James Stewart, esquire, for Greenock.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee —R.P.
PUBLIC BILLS — Ordered — First Reading — County Administration [93]; Valuation of Property*[94]; Highways*[95].
Second Reading —Referred to Select Committee — Merchant Seamen [79].
Committee — Report — Linen and Yarn Halls (Dublin)*[2].

QUESTIONS.

  THE ISLE OF MAN — OUTBREAK OF SMALL POX.—QUESTIONS.
  SIR JAMES LAWRENCEasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether information has reached him of an outbreak of small pox in the Isle of Man; if it is true that the Vaccination Laws are not in force in the Isle of Man; and, if any steps have been or are about to be taken to remedy this defect?
  MR. RITCHIEcalled attention to the fact that the Question put by the hon. Member opposite (Sir James Lawrence) was not in the same terms as the Question of which he had given Notice, which included a reflection upon the Lieutenant Governor of the Isle of Man. The Question as it originally stood included the following:—
  "Whether it is true that the Governor and his family have left the Island on account of the virulent character of the disease?"
  He should like to ask, Whether there was any foundation for the rumour?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, he was quite sure that anybody who knew the character of the Governor would not think for a moment that he was capable of deserting his post at a time of danger. It was utterly untrue that he had left the Island. With regard to the outbreak of small-pox, it was quite true there had been a violent outbreak of that disease; but stringent measures had been adopted to localize it, if possible, and it was now limited to only a few cases. It had undoubtedly spread owing to the vaccination law not Being in force in the Island. But a Bill had now passed through the local Legislature, and it would have received the Royal Assent at the present, but for a small technicality which he hoped to correct. Papers connected with the question of vaccination in the Isle of Man would soon be laid before Parliament.

  INDIA—THE NIZAM—MR. OLIPHANT.

    QUESTION.
    MR. CHAPLINasked the Under Secretary of State for India, If it is true that Mr. Oliphant, Private Secretary to Sir Salar Jung, was summarily dismissed by order of the Indian Government, in opposition to the wishes of Sir Salar Jung; and, if so, whether he will state to the House the reasons for that course of proceeding, and will lay upon the Table the Papers and Correspondence relating to his dismissal?
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, by a well-known Treaty, negotiated in 1798, between the British Government and the Government of the Nizam, no European is permitted to enter into the service of the Nizam, or to remain in Hyderabad territory, except with the consent of the British Government. Subject to these provisions, Mr. Oliphant became some time back Sir Salar Jung's secretary. The Government of India having recently reason to believe that Mr. Oliphant's presence at Hyderabad was not conducive to a good understanding between the two Governments considered it necessary to withdraw the sanction previously given to his employment. The Secretary of State does not consider this a matter upon which, with advantage to public interests, Papers could be laid upon the Table of the House.

  H.M. DOCKYARDS—WRITERS.

    QUESTION.
    MR. GORSTasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether any arrangement has yet been made for treating the Mechanic Writers of Her Majesty's Dockyards as salaried clerks, or whether they are still to be treated as ordinary workmen at day pay?
    MR. W. H. SMITH: Sir, the Question to which my hon. and learned Friend has referred is part of the larger one of the clerical establishments of the Dockyards, which are now being considered by a Committee. I admit there is a great deal to be said in favour of the proposition; but I am unable to deal with it until I have the Report of the Committee; and I may also add that Treasury approval will be required for any change in the status of the persons employed.

  THE EASTERN QUESTION—THE WAR— THE SUEZ CANAL.—QUESTION.
  MR. GOURLEYasked Mr.'Chancellor of the Exchequer, If any and what communications have been received from M. de Lesseps relative to the neutralisation of the navigation of the Suez Canal since those of the 16th May 1877, contained in Correspondence "Egypt, No. 1;"if so, whether he will be good enough to place the same upon the Table of the House; and, further, to inquire if any communications have been received from the French or other Foreign Governments relative to the future navigation and government of the Canal in times of war?
  THE CHANCELLOE OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, there has been no communication on the subject beyond what appears in the Papers before the House.

  THE METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS AND THE WATER COMPANIES.

    QUESTION.
    COLONEL BERESFORDasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he will use his influence to postpone the consideration of the Bill promoted by the Metropolitan Board of Works for the purchase of the Water Companies at a cost of many millions sterling, until that Board have, in accordance with the spirit of his recent reply to the Board, taken the necessary steps to prevent the recurrence of Floods on the Surrey side of the water?
    MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, he had not done so, neither did he see what right he had to take the course suggested by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He might take that opportunity of stating that he had received from the Metropolitan Board of Works, in answer to a letter which he had sent to them some time ago, a communication which induced him to hope that the arrangements they intended to make on the subject would be satisfactory.

  THE MEDICAL PROFESSION—LEGISLATION —QUESTION.
  MR. MILLSasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce into Parliament during the present Session any measure for providing ah uniform

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  test of admission to the Medical Profession in England, Scotland, and Ireland?
  VISCOUNT SANDON,in reply, said, the subject was one of great importance, and it had been under the consideration of the Government; but he was not at present able to state whether they would be prepared to bring in a measure dealing with it this Session.

  METROPOLIS—PAROCHIAL (METROPOLITAN) CHARITIES.—QUESTION.
  MR. JAMESasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, What steps the Government intend to take with respect to the Parochial Charities of the City of London; and whether it is their intention to introduce any legislative measure for the purpose of extending existing jurisdictions for the re-appropriation of these funds, in accordance with the recommendations of the last Report of the Charity Commissioners?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, that he had several times during the Recess called the attention of the authorities who had the guardianship of these charities to the Report of the Commissioners. During the past week he had received a memorial from many persons interested in these charities, pointing out in some way how, in their opinion, they could be dealt with. At present he was not prepared to advise the Government to take any steps in the matter.

  IRELAND—LORD JUSTICE CHRISTIAN.

    QUESTION.
    MR. GRAYasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether the New Irish Court of Appeal, constituted by the Irish Judicature Act, held its first sitting last week in Dublin to hear an Appeal of great importance; and, whether Lord Justice Christian, one of the permanent members of the Court, declined to attend the sittings; and, if so, on what grounds did he so decline?
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, I have been informed that it is an error to suggest that Lord Justice Christian declined to attend the sittings of the Court of Appeal; he was merely absent from one particular case, which was heard by four Appellate Judges. I do not consider it to be my duty to inquire what
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    were the grounds of his absence. The Government do not expect from the Judges any account of their attendance in particular cases, and I should be sorry to take any action which might be construed as a precedent for interference on the part of the Government with the independence of the Judicial Bench in Ireland.

  POST OFFICE—SUB-POSTMASTERS.

    QUESTION.
    MR. MONKasked the Postmaster General, Whether the rules for sub-postmasters in charge of money order offices, 1877, have been published by his authority containing, among others, the following rules:—
    (76.) "Officers of the Post Office may now vote at elections for Members of Parliament, the former disabilities having been removed; but they are still prohibited, under severe penalties, from exerting their influence cither for or against any particular candidate, or otherwise intermeddling in elections."(77.) "This prohibition is contained in the forty-fourth section of the Act ninth Anne, chapter ten."
    And, whether he is not aware that the forty-fourth section of the ninth Anne, chapter 10, was repealed in 1874 by 37 and 38 Vic. c. 22?
    LORD JOHN MANNERS,in reply, said, sub-postmasters were now in possession of knowledge as to their right of voting at elections of Members of Parliament.

  H.M.S. "BEAGLE "—JUDICIAL POWERS OF NAYAL COMMANDERS.

    QUESTION.
    MR. GORSTasked Mr. Attorney General, Whether his attention has been called to the fact (as stated by the First Lord of the Admiralty) that the Officer commanding H.M.S. "Beagle" has, by order of his Commodore, held a Court at which a person, not a subject of Her Majesty, was tried by an unauthorized process for an offence not committed within Her Majesty's jurisdiction, and was, by sentence of such Court, put to death on board H.M.S. "Beagle;" whether such proceedings were warranted by the Laws of the Realm; and, if not, whether the person by whose orders the trial took place, the members of the Court, and the persons by whom the sentence of the Court was executed, are not all guilty at law of the crime of murder?
    THE ATTOENEY GENERAL: Sir, when one of Her Majesty's ships of war is lying- off the coast of land inhabited by savages, where no law prevails and no redress for outrages can be obtained from any Government or in any tribunal, and British subjects residing in this region are attacked and one of them is murdered by the Natives, it seems to me that the captain of such vessel is placed in the same position as is occupied by the Commander of Her Majesty's Forces in the field in time of war, and has the same duties cast upon him and possesses the same rights and powers. If this view be correct, I shall be justified in stating, in answer to the Question which is asked of me, that the person by whose orders the trial alluded to was held and the members of the Court and the persons by whom the sentence of the Court was executed were not guilty of murder or of any crime whatsoever. I should give this opinion with great confidence, were it not that the fact of the Question which appears on the Paper having been put to me induces me to believe that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham, who has earned for himself a great reputation as a lawyer, appears to take a contrary view and to consider that some of Her Majesty's servants have committed a dreadful crime, for the perpetration of which Her Majesty's Government are bound to subject them to condign punishment.

  ARMY —THE PERAK EXPEDITION—ALLOWANCES TO OFFICERS, & c.

    QUESTION.
    MR. SERJEANT SIMONasked the Secretary of State for War, Why the special allowances to the officers and men of the Perak expedition promised last Session have not been paid, and when they will be?
    MR. GATHORNE HARDY,in reply, said, he was sorry that those allowances had not yet been paid. The reason of the delay on the subject was that Correspondence was obliged to be held upon it between four Departments—the War Office, the India Office, the Colonial Office, and the Admiralty. [Mr. Serjeant SIMON: Where is it now?] The matter was in the hands of the Treasury, and he had reason to believe that it would be speedily settled.

  THE EASTERN QUESTION—MOVEMENT OF THE FLEET.—QUESTION.
  COLONEL MUREsaid, he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer a Question of which he had given him private Notice —Whether, without inconvenience to the public service, he would communicate to the House the substance of the Telegram which induced Her Majesty's Government to announce their intention of sending the Fleet to the Dardanelles and Constantinople?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I think it will be more convenient that I should answer this Question in the statement which I shall have to make presently, as I propose to do. Indeed, I believe that the reasons which induced Her Majesty's Government to take that step will be also included in the Papers laid on the Table.

  SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE—THE MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

    QUESTION.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether after the statement to which he has referred, and which I presume he is about to make in Committee of Supply, seeing that it will probably be one of very great importance, he will be willing to agree to report Progress, after, of course, such explanations as may have been asked for have been given, more fully to explain the proposals of the Government. I wish to ask whether he will be willing to report Progress in order that the House may have some time to consider the character of that statement and the proposals of the Government?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the statement which I shall have to make to the House as soon as the House is in Committee of Supply will be one no doubt of great importance, and one that will be seen to contain some new matter. I think it will be advantageous and convenient to the House that the course suggested by the noble Lord should be followed, on this understanding—thatweshouldbeallowed at once to go into Committee of Supply, and that I should make my statement before any discussion is raised, such, for

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    instance, as that suggested by the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) on the Speaker leaving the Chair. On that understanding we should be willing, after my statement and any explanations that may be necessary to elucidate our proposals to the House, to report Progress till to-morrow, in order to enable the House to consider what course it should take on those proposals. Under those circumstances, I think we should lose no time, because we cannot expect such a debate to close in one night; and I hope that hon. Gentlemen who have Notices on the Paper for to-morrow will consent to waive them to allow us to proceed with the debate.
    MR. RYLANDSsaid, he had no hesitation at all in acceding to the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman.
    MR. E. S. HOWARDalso promised to postpone his Motion standing in his name for to-morrow.

  ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  Ordered, That the Orders of the Day subsequent to Supply and Ways and Means he postponed until after the Notice of Motion for leave to bring in a Bill respecting County Government.—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY—ARMY AND NAVY SERVICES.
  SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Mr. Raikes, although the statement which I have to make to the Committee is one of greater importance, or, all events, one touching upon a question of greater importance, than any which has been brought forward I think I may say in my time in the House of Commons, yet I feel sure I shall be consulting the wishes of the Committee, as well as my own inclinations, if I abstain from attempting to offer any prefatory remarks, and go straight to the point to which I wish to draw the attention of the Committee. I am quite sure that it is not desirable for us at such a time as this to indulge in general or exciting oratory, even if I were capable of so doing, and that it is far better that at a moment which requires careful, calm, and deliberate consideration, we should endeavour to look the facts in the face,
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  and to consider quietly and in a businesslike way the proposals which have to be submitted to us. Now, Sir, I think it will be for the convenience of the Committee that I should very shortly endeavour to sum up the present situation which appears to exist between the belligerents, and I will then make some remarks upon the situation as a European one. As regards the belligerents, I think a very short description of the situation may be given. Turkey has been defeated by Russia, and the Plenipotentiaries of Turkey have been sent to the Russian head-quarters in order to ask for terms of peace and for an armistice. They have boon received there, and a communication has been made to them to the effect that an armistice will be granted; but only upon conditions, amongst which will be this —that the Plenipotentiaries must agree to certain bases which shall form the foundation of a future Treaty of Peace. We need not question the propriety of such a demand on the part of Russia. It was one which she had it perfectly in her power to make, and one which it was not unnatural that she should make; because she might fairly argue with herself that an armistice granted without some undertaking as to the ultimate bases of peace might lead merely to a suspension of hostilities, which might, perhaps, give an advantage to her enemies without giving a prospect of an ultimate settlement. At all events, the demand has been made on the part of Russia that the Plenipotentiaries shall agree, before an armistice is granted, to certain terms which shall be the bases of an ultimate Treaty of Peace between the two countries. Well, we are aware that certain bases have been proposed, and that those bases have been taken into consideration by the Plenipotentiaries, and that they have been communicated by them to their Government. It has also been stated to us, with more or less authority, though it has not yet been officially communicated to us by either of the Powers—but it has been stated to us with some authority that the Government of the Porte are prepared to accept, or have accepted—for we hardly know which it is—the bases which have been so submitted to it. But although we received that statement some little time ago— several days ago—still, day after day

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  passes, and we do not hear that any armistice has been signed, and we therefore naturally ask ourselves—"What is the cause of the delay that has taken place?" On the part of the Government, I am not in a position to supply the reasons for that delay. We require to have recourse to conjecture, and conjecture supplies several circumstances which may have occasioned it. Among these there are some which I may mention; but, in doing so, I do not want the Committee to suppose that they are anything more than possible reasons, and in no case must any one be taken from me as the true solution. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that there is a great difference between the terms of an armistice and the terms of a peace; that it is quite possible the terms of an ultimate peace may be agreed upon, and yet that there may still be questions as to the terms of the armistice which may be the cause of difficulties. If it be true, as it seems to be, that in several particulars the bases of peace are somewhat large and elastic, and admit of more than one interpretation, it may well be that the Power to whom they are proposed may think that it is an object of importance that those bases should be discussed under conditions which will be fairly favourable for her when they come to be discussed; and there may be terms in the armistice as to the surrender of some important fortress or some important military position which seem to her to be of a character which would put her under a disadvantage and render it difficult for her to enter into that discussion— that is to say, there might be difficulties connected with the terms of an armistice distinct from those connected with the bases of peace. Or, again, there may be difficulties in regard to the bases themselves. It may not be true, as we have been told, that the bases which have been communicated to us have been accepted; or, again, it may be that the terms which have been made known to us have been accepted—either readily or reluctantly—and yet that there may be other terms of which we know nothing, other terms which may still be in the background, other terms which may be of the greatest importance, and which may still have to be considered, before the armistice is arrived at; or lastly, it is possible that
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  there may be some motive on the one side or on the other which may lead them to desire the protraction of these negotiations. I have now given several solutions, any of which might be suggested as a probable cause of delay. We do not pretend to be able to say which is correct; but this we certainly do see—that day after day passes in which we are always expecting to hear of the signature of the armistice, and yet we do not hear of it; and this we are now bound to consider, that so long as it is unsigned so long it is in the right of the forces of Russia to advance; and, as it is their right, so it also appears, in point of fact, to be that which they are doing. From day to day we hear of further advances by the Russian troops, now in this direction and now in that, and this both in Europe and in Asia; and I must say we await with some curiosity the time when that advance will be put a stop to by the signature of the armistice. Now, Sir, I shall have presently to make a few general observations upon the terms of peace which have been communicated to us, and of which' we know something; but before I do so I wish to guard myself, lest in any observations which I may offer on them I should unwittingly seem to be giving advice to the Porte, or giving an opinion which may guide the Porte as to the course of conduct it ought to pursue in this emergency. Nothing has been further from the desire of Her Majesty's Government, and nothing would be more contrary to their feelings now, than to give, or be understood as giving, any advice to the Porte at so critical a moment as the present; because they feel that if they did so, they would incur a responsibility which it would be altogether wrong they should incur. The Porte has not consulted us with regard to these terms of peace. The Porte has exercised its own unfettered judgment so far as the influence of other Powers are concerned. It has exercised its own individual judgment upon the course that it should pursue; and if it were to consult us, it would be impossible for us to give it advice. If we said to the Porte that it should accede to the proposed terms, it would imply an approval of them which, perhaps, we might not be able to give. If, on the other hand, we said "Reject those terms," we

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  should take upon ourselves a great responsibility—a responsibility involving a prolongation of the war and a prolongation of the sufferings of Turkey— the responsibility, in short, of seeing her safely through all her difficulties without having to bear our part in the decision. Therefore, as things are, absolute silence, so far as the Porte is concerned, is our duty in this matter. But, at the same time, it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to avoid expressing in their own Houses of Parliament their opinion upon the terms, such as they are, which have come to our knowledge. To avoid this would be impossible under any circumstances, but it is rendered more impossible than ever by some of the misrepresentations which have prevailed with regard to those terms; because it is said that the terms of peace are of a thoroughly satisfactory character—that they are of a moderate character; that, in fact, terms, the moderation of which are a marvel arid surprise us, have been communicated to us, and that it is utterly unintelligible—accepted as we are told they have been by the Porte—how it could be for a moment in the view of the Government to suggest to Parliament that any measures of precaution, or any measures of the character which I am about to propose, should be taken. It is therefore necessary for me to make a few observations upon the details of the terms which are before us. But here I am met with a difficulty, because we have more than one statement of terms which are said to have been made. Some of them are in detail, but are not authentic, and some that are authentic do not go into much detail, and it is rather difficult for us to know upon which of all these statements we should rely. Of course, if we had an official communication, either from Russia or from the Porte, that official statement would have been sufficient to give us a text for our remarks. But we have got no such official communication, and therefore the most we can do is to take the next best communication which we have got—that, namely, made to Lord Derby by the Russian Ambassador. It was indeed, made in a form which was not official, but which was marked private; but yet it was placed in Lord Derby's hands with perfect authority to make use of it, and to give it as an authoritative, though not official,
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  communication from the Russian Government with regard to the terms of peace which are proposed. Among the Papers which are now laid upon the Table, and which will be in the hands of hon. Members to-morrow morning, there will be found at page 14 [Turkey No. 3,1878] a statement of the bases of peace communicated by Count Schouvaloff to Lord Derby on the 25th January, that is on Friday last, and these are the terms—
  "Bulgaria, within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality, not less than that of the Conference, to be an autonomous tributary Principality, with a national Christian Government, a native militia, and no Turkish troops, except at some points to be determined.
  "Independence of Montenegro, with an increase (of territory) equivalent to the military status quo; the frontier to be decided hereafter.
  "Independence of Roumania, with a sufficient territorial indemnity.
  "Independence of Servia, with rectification of frontiers.
  "Autonomous administration, to be sufficiently guaranteed, to Bosnia and. Herzegovina; or similar reforms for the other Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe.
  "Indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war; in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form to be decided hereafter.
  "An ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits.
  "These being accepted, a Convention, an Armistice, and the despatch of Plenipotentiaries to develop them into preliminaries of peace."
  Now, the remark which I have to make on these terms is this, that be they good, or be they bad, they are, at all events, conditions of a very sweeping character. With regard to the first— that relating to Bulgaria—it is right that hon. Members should bear in mind the explanation given of the term Bulgaria—"Bulgaria, within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality, not less than that of the Conference." On referring to the Conference, it will be found that this probably refers to some such definition as is given of them by Mr. Layard. That gentleman says—
  "I understand the limits proposed for the now Bulgarian Principality are those mentioned in page 123 of the Correspondence on Turkey No. 2 (1877). They do not include Salonica or Kavala, but it can scarcely be doubted that they extend to the AEgean seaboard."
  That is to say, a glance at the map will show that Bulgaria, as referred to in that portion of the Conference, takes in the whole, or nearly the whole, of the centre of European Turkey. It extends, not only down to the Bal-

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  kans, but to the south of them, down almost to the Adriatic Sea and to the port of Salonica. The case may be illustrated roughly in this way—by supposing that you were to take England and set apart a portion beginning, say, with Northumberland and Durham, going right down to Devon, cutting off Wales, and perhaps Middlesex and East Anglia, and erecting this portion so set apart into an autonomous tributary Principality. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, now, I am not finding fault with these conditions of Russia; but I am desirous for a moment of putting it to the Committee whether they are not very serious conditions, raising very serious considerations. I would call its attention, in the first place, to the magnitude of the district thus spoken of, and to its position, as completely separating Constantinople and the small portion of territory immediately adjacent to it, from all the rest of the European dominions of Turkey. Now, what is to be the position of this State? It is to be erected into an autonomous tributary Principality. Now, hon. Gentlemen who have paid attention to the details of the discussions of last year—and I suppose this includes all the Members of the Committee—will remember that there were many and very warm discussions as to the meaning of the word "autonomy," and that there were great differences of opinion between some of the great European Powers as to the kind of autonomy which ought to be established. Everybody agreed, with regard to certain portions of Turkey, that it was desirable that an autonomy should be founded; but when it came to be considered what autonomy was to mean, there was found to be a considerable divergence of opinion. A phrase was then invented which was accepted, I believe, by all parties. The phrase was "administrative autonomy," by which was meant something in the nature of a system of local self-government under the direct authority of the Sultan. But in the phrase used here, it is not an "administrative autonomy" that is referred to, but the erection of an autonomous tributary Principality. That is to say, the Principality which is to be established is to be very much in the same position as Servia or Roumania occupied before the war. That is a matter, of course, of considerable gravity,
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  and the question would naturally arise —"Who is to be the governing Prince, and how is he to be elected? Who, in short, is to be at the head of the State?" Upon this point we have no positive information; but among other reports which have reached us, there is one which bears some appearance of authority, to the effect that the Prince is to selected by the Emperor of Russia. Under these circumstances, you will be establishing in the heart of European Turkey a Principality of considerable extent and of considerable power, ruled by a Prince who will be devoted to the interests of the Russian Government. I am unable to say whether this is true; but it is one of the reports which have reached us. [Mr. GLADSTONE: There is no official authority for it.] My right hon. Friend seems to think I ought not to mention anything except on official authority; but as we have no official authority in regard to anything relating to the subject whatever, we are as much bound to take it into consideration as any of the other terms of peace. The bases which I have been reading, and which, of course, are to be taken as being thoroughly to be relied on so far as they go, are not given to us by the Russian Government as their official statement of the terms which they propose, but they have been communicated to us through the Russian Ambassador; and while we have no reason for doubting their correctness, we have no means of knowing whether they contain the whole of the proposals of the Russian Government. Therefore, the whole question is in a way left open to us, and there are other points besides those I have mentioned which may require consideration. I now pass from that. I say nothing as to the other portions of the Turkish Empire—the parts which hitherto have been tributary, but are now to be independent—further than to point out, and I do it with reference to what I shall have to say in a moment, that the position of Servia, the position of Montenegro, the position of Roumania, the position of Bulgaria itself—though they may be of secondary interest to us—all will be found to involve questions which will affect very great interests elsewhere, which will no doubt undergo considerable examination, and may possibly give rise to difficulties which we can hardly at present calculate. There is

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  one other point which I would just notice, but very briefly. Among the terms of peace which I have read there is one for an indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form to be decided hereafter. Upon that point I wish to say that it is hardly to be expected— everybody must have foreseen that it could scarcely be otherwise—that Russia, after undergoing the hardships of such a war, should not ask for an indemnity; but the condition is put in such a manner as to be very large, and vague, and open. Nothing is said as to its amount, and nothing is said—or rather, I should say, something which is more significant than silence is said—as to its form. Now, with regard to an indemnity which is to be paid by a pecuniary subsidy, that is a matter which rests between the two belligerents alone; no one else could have anything to say to that; but we all know very well that the financial position of Turkey is not such as to enable her to raise a large pecuniary indemnity. Then, even if it were in her power to comply with this condition, it might be the case, from the way in which the condition is framed, that Russia in deciding how she should receive the indemnity might, in short, elect to receive it in territory; or she might insist on having partly a pecuniary and partly a territorial compensation, which would be of the greatest possible interest not only to Turkey, but to all the other European Powers. I have nothing whatever to guide me in the matter, but as I have put other hypothetical cases, if the Committee will allow me, I will also put this one—not, I admit, in the least likely to occur, but showing what may happen. Russia might say that she would take the port of Salonica, or the port of Smyrna. ["Oh, oh! "] I am not saying that she will do this, I am only putting it as an extreme case. She may undoubtedly demand some territorial indemnity; and it may be of serious importance to Europe if she does. Therefore, in examining those conditions I am examining them, not with reference to any question between Russia and Turkey, to any intrinsic reasonableness or unreasonableness in the conditions themselves; but solely for the purpose of pointing out to the Committee that they do involve and must raise questions which may be of wider interest than
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  any which simply affect the two belligerents. That is the object with which I am making these observations, for I am desirous of calling the attention of the Committee to the necessity that there may be of having European concert and counsel with regard to those proposals. There is one other, and only one other, condition in the terms of peace which I think important, and to which I shall call attention. It is the last-—the ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits—that is, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. That is a condition which may mean nothing, or may mean anything. It must, however, be borne in mind by the Committee that throughout these proceedings England has always declared that the arrangements for the navigation of the Straits are a matter of European concern, and a matter in which this country takes a deep interest—so deep an interest that even at the time we were declaring our intention to observe neutrality in the war—and we only reserved those points on which we thought it possible British interests might be affected—the question was not left out of sight, and we included the arrangements for the navigation of the Straits. But the navigation of the Straits is not a British interest only; it is a European interest. And I merely now mention and call attention to this condition for the same object with which I have called attention to the others—that is, to point out that those and other matters are all matters in which no separate understanding, and no sort of engagement or treaty between Russia or Turkey can be acknowledged or admitted by England, unless the other Powers are consulted, and they are made the subject of European agreement. We have expressed this opinion openly. We have expressed it to all the Powers of Europe. We hold to the view which we have taken up, which is based on the rights we have under Treaties which exist, and especially the last, the Treaty of London of 1871. I have no doubt we shall get the support of the other Powers in upholding that position; and in regard to Austria, I may say that the repeated declarations of that Power show that she entirely shares the views of Her Majesty's Government. I have gone through these conditions with the view of pointing out

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  how largely they will affect the interests, and will, or may, rouse the susceptibilities of the European Powers; and we cannot disguise from ourselves the immense importance of questions of this kind being raised at the present moment with regard to so great a change as is going on in the direction of Southeastern Europe. The key-stone of the political system of that district is at the present moment being removed from its place. We have for a century been engaged in maintaining a certain state of things in a country which is now evidently being made the theatre of the greatest and the strongest modifications. Turkey, which has been for a considerable time a great Power in the South-east of Europe, is in danger of being dismembered. Under the arrangement which existed until recently, Turkey might have been regarded as in one of two positions. She might either be regarded as a State which was strong enough to maintain herself against any single enemy which might attack her—a State, therefore, which might stand alone upon her own basis, and which might regulate her own internal affairs without reference to the advice or opinions of any other Power; or she might be regarded as a State which, though not strong enough to maintain herself without assistance from without, yet was a Sovereign State within her own borders, and was supported by the guarantee of other and stronger Powers, with the condition implied, and to some extent expressed, that they should have a right to advise her in her relations with other Powers. Well, taking a general view of the circumstances of the last few years, Turkey may be said to have acted on the assumption that she was able to do without, and to some extent disregard the advice of, the other Powers. Gallantly, and with a spirit which—however erroneous the view she took of her own prowess and capacity—we cannot but admire, however unfortunate we may think it—the spirit of a truly gallant nation—she has contended against tremendous odds and against a most formidable Power, and though vanquished yet she cannot be said to have been in a military sense humiliated. The result, however, of her defeat, the result; of her prostration, is that a very great change must necessarily take place in the ar-
  546
  rangement of that part of Europe, and as all Europe is interested in the condition of that part of the Continent and will be obliged to have a voice in the arrangement of it, it is necessary to consider upon what footing the European Powers are to moot and discuss the subject. One thing, I think, we may very distinctly say. We must not now push forward and sacrifice the Turks by urging them to fight on for the sake of purely European objects. They have suffered enough, and it would be indeed cruel to endeavour to make them suffer still more, for the sake of objects which are European rather than Turkish. Well, then, if that is the case, what is the position of the European Powers at this moment? Russia and Turkey are engaged in the settlement of an armistice which is to include the basis of a Treaty of Peace between them. The armistice, no doubt, will sooner or later be granted, and the Treaty of Peace will be discussed and concluded, and then— but, so far as we can at present see, not till then—the Powers of Europe will be called in to consider what position they will take with regard to the terms that may be agreed upon. Well, when that time arrives we may find ourselves in a position of some disadvantage, because if Russia and Turkey came to an agreement, say, with regard to the question of the Straits or any other matter of considerable importance, the agreement between those Powers and the territorial and strategic arrangements which will be made upon that agreement may give Russia such a voice in the Council of Europe as that her voice alone will prevail, and none of the other Powers will have any chance of making their voice heard. Now, those are considerations of a very serious character, and they make it necessary for us to consider what is the position and what is the policy, and what ought to be the policy of England. I do not wish to weary the Committee by going over what is now a thrice-told tale, the policy which England has adopted throughout the contest. I need only repeat in a single sentence that our policy has been that enunciated by Lord Derby in his despatch of the 6th May— a policy of neutrality, subject to the conditions which were enumerated in that despatch with regard to points affecting British interests. Since that declaration

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  was put forth, we have strictly followed the lines therein laid down. We have observed neutrality, and have endeavoured, as far as possible, to keep a careful watch over the interests we have undertaken to guard, and have done what we could to prevent the extension of the war, and to prevent complications which it is undesirable should take place. I cannot help, at this point, saying one word on a particular point, which is of some interest, and which I think has been somewhat misunderstood—I mean the conduct which we have pursued with regard to Greece. There is an impression which prevails amongst hon. Gentlemen opposite that the influence of England has been used in some unfair and undue manner to prevent Greece from taking the course which she was disposed to take, and to keep her from going to war with Turkey. Well, when-over we are authorized to produce the Papers relating to Turkey and;. Greece— and, as I said the other day, we shall be ready to do it the moment we obtain the consent of Turkey and Groece—it will be found that all we have done has been to endeavour as far as possible to roconcile the comparatively slight difficulties which have arisen between these Powers; that, in short, there have been only differences upon points of detail, as to which we have used our good offices, as we should have done in the time of peace, and when we were actuated by a desire to prevent small sparks from kindling into a great blaze. But we have never put any pressure upon Greece to induce her to change her policy, nor have we offered any inducement in the form of bribes or encouragement with that object. The policy of Greece has been the policy she has adopted for herself, and all we have done has been to play the friend's part in endeavouring to smooth down differences of detail which have from time to time arisen. Now, I have a few words to say upon a matter to which the Question of the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Colonel Mure) lately referred, with regard to the course the Government has followed within the last week or 10 days, and amongst other things with regard to the despatch of the Fleet to the Dardanelles and its recall. I could not without considerable difficulty, and without, perhaps, confusing the House, attempt to go through the whole of the changes
  548
  that have occurred in the political and military affairs of Turkey from day to day since the beginning of the year; but I may say generally that, since the time when the first proposals were made for peace negotiations, a complete revolution has occurred in the military situation. At the time those proposals wore made, and when Russia, on December 29, expressed her willingness to entertain them, the forces of Russia were practically on the north side of the Balkans. Plevna, it is true, had fallen, but Sofia had not yet been taken. There were many troops in the field; there were serious operations still to be performed; the season was advanced and inclement; the Quadrilateral was untouched; a defence of Adrianople was in prospect—in a word, the position of the Russians was very different from what it is to-day. All the time the negotiations have been going on, and whether the delays that have occurred have been accidental, or whether they have been intentional— whether the necessity for sending the terms of peace by special messenger, instead of by telegraph, was duo to something very extraordinary and exceptional in the nature of those terms— something far beyond what the précis now given us would seem to indicate; whet her the so are the reasons, or whether the reason was to gain time for the advance of the armies, is a question into which I do not wish to enter. I only wish to point out as a matter of fact that the delay which has occurred has given the Russians an advantage, and has very materially altered the military situation in Turkey. And not only are the relations of the Russian to the Turkish Armies different, but it is a question into which it is necessary for me to enter as far as regards the relative conditions of the belligerents and the effect which may be produced upon the terms of peace which the Russians may demand on the one hand, and the Turks must agree to on the other. I draw attention to it for different reasons, and I wish to point out what was the relative position of the Russian Force at those points which we had expressly reserved as points to which attention had been directed, and in which British interests wore involved. We have constantly been told— throughout all these proceedings, when we have spoken of the reservations we had made in the despatch of the 6th of

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  May—we have been constantly told— "These reservations are all very fine, but they relate to those interests which are least likely to be affected." "Nobody," we are told, "thinks or dreams that the Suez Canal will be interfered with, or Egypt, or the Persian Gulf," and it was a common remark—"Nobody supposes that Constantinople or the Dardanelles is threatened." Now, with regard to Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and the Isthmus of Suez, I need not say anything at present; but in regard to Constantinople and the Dardanelles our anxiety could not be altogether set at rest when we saw the Russian Forces advancing as rapidly as they did towards those points which were vital to those places. From day to day we received information —first, that Sofia was taken; then, that the Servians had effected a junction. Then came the important news that the Shipka Force had surrendered, with a large portion of the flower of the Turkish Army; and lastly, on the 10th of January, came the news that it was not intended to defend Adrianople. Events, in fact, were marching with a rapidity enough to take one's breath away, and at the same time came the news from one quarter and another as to the inadequacy of the defences of the lines of Boulair, the defences of Constantinople in the event of an advance upon Gallipoli, and the probability of a rapid advance being made upon the key of the Dardanelles. When those matters came to be considered, and we know what was going on, we thought it right to place our-selves in communication with Russia on the subject; and with regard to Gallipoli in particular we made a certain declaration which I will road to the Committee. But before I do so, in order to make it clear, it is necessary that I should refer to something which took place a short time previously, as far back as the 13th of December. The Committee will bear in mind that the despatch of Lord Derby in May last was a despatch communicated to the Russian Government, in which several points were laid down, the infringement of which by Russia would affect British interests, and, amongst others, the possession of Constantinople was referred to as being a matter vital to British interests. The reply of the Russian Government to that despatch was to the effect that the acquisition of that capital was excluded
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  from the views of the Emperor, and that its future must be considered a matter of common interest. But there was nothing in the reply of the Emperor which indicated that he would not, if necessary for his purposes, occupy Constantinople temporarily, and the question was left open from that time until December—it being understood that we had the distinct assurance, on which we could implicitly rely, of the Emperor that it was not his intention to acquire Constantinople; but we had no pledge that he would not temporarily occupy it for military purposes. It appeared, however, to Her Majesty's Government in December last that inconveniences and dangers might arise even from the temporary occupation of that capital; and accordingly, on the 13th of December last, Lord Derby sent to Count Schouvaloff a despatch in which, after recounting the provious Correspondence, the noble Lord went on to say—
  "While appreciating the courtesy and friendly character of this answer, Her Majesty's Government feel that it does not sufficiently meet the dangers against which they desire to guard. They are strongly of opinion—an opinion which the course of events tends still more to confirm—that the occupation of Constantinople by the Russian Forces, even though it should he of a temporary character and for military purposes only, would be an event which it would, on all accounts, be most desirable to avoid.
  "They cannot conceal from themselves that if such an occupation appeared imminent, public feeling in this country, founded on a just appreciation of the consequences to be apprehended, might call for measures of precaution on the part of Great Britain from which they have hitherto felt justified in abstaining.
  "It is with the view of avoiding what might endanger seriously the good relations happily-maintained between the two countries that Lord Derby has been charged by the Cabinet to express to the Russian Government their earnest hope that, should the Russian armies advance to the south of the Balkans, no attempt will be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles.
  "In the contrary event, Her Majesty's Government must hold themselves free to take whatever course may appear to them necessary for the protection of British interests; but they sincerely trust and confidently believe that any such necessity will be averted by mutual understanding between the two Governments.
  "In making this communication they think it right to add that they will be willing, as they have been from the first, to avail themselves of any suitable occasion that may present itself for assisting in the work of mediation and in the restoration of peace."—[Turkey, No. 3 (1878), p. 1.]
  An answer to that communication was received on the 16th of December. It

  551
  was a communication from Russia sent to the Russian Ambassador in this country respecting the assurance of the Emperor. [Cries of "Bead!"] The despatch is in French, and it does not contain any expression of opinion at once; but it communicates a Memorandum, which Memorandum is to this effect—
  "An acquisition of Constantinople is not now comprised any more than before the war in the intentions of His Majesty the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty continues to consider the destiny of that capital as a matter of common interest which can only he determined by a general understanding. His Imperial Majesty also holds equally to the opinion that if the possession of Constantinople should arise, it should not belong to any of the Great Powers of Europe.
  "His Majesty the Emperor, at the same time, considers that it is his right and his duty to oblige Turkey to conclude a solid and real peace which shall offer effective guarantees against the return of the crises which disturb the peace of Russia and that of Europe."— [p. 3.]
  It goes on to say that for that purpose it is necessary that the Russian Forces should continue to advance, and it adds that—
  "if the obstinacy or the illusions of the Porto should oblige His Majesty to continue military operations,"
  His Majesty will reserve to himself that full liberty of action which is the right of every belligerent. It further states that after the formal assurances which Russia has several times given, and which she now repeats, His Majesty cannot understand how the interests of England, as defined in the communications of the British Government, can be affected by the course which His Majesty is pursuing; and, finally, it asks Her Majesty's Government to state what are the interests of England which they deem likely to be so affected, in order that His Majesty may endeavour to reconcile them with those of Russia. Nothing could be fairer—nothing could be more friendly than that communication; but it left the point where it was. It left it still open to Russia, and apparently indicated that it might not improbably become the duty and the policy of Russia to advance to Constantinople. I make no complaint against Russia on the subject; she was under no engagement to us contrary with respect to it. We had asked and she had given us an undertaking that she would not acquire
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  Constantinople; but she had expressly reserved her right to occupy it temporarily if it should be necessary for her to do so for military purposes. I make no complaint, therefore, against Russia with regard to the terms of this Memorandum; but I say that it may become the duty of England to watch over the action of Russia with respect to Constantinople, and, having so distinct a warning, we were necessarily obliged to consider what might possibly be coming. We have always felt, and it has been one of the great difficulties we have had to contend with throughout the whole of the war, that we must take no step that would have the effect of encouraging Turkey to expect assistance from us which would not be rendered; and, therefore, it was that we found it necessary to abstain from making public any of these communications, because had we done so, we might have given Turkey the idea that she had but to withdraw her Forces and to tempt Russia to attack Constantinople to secure for herself British assistance. We were not prepared and we did not intend to offer her that assistance, and therefore we did not make the nature of these communications public. But in answering the communication from Russia, we were bound to point out to that Power what it was that made us so jealous of even a temporary occupation of Constantinople by her forces. Observing that, in the meantime, the Russian forces were advancing, and that they had not only obtained possession of Adrianople, but had advanced far beyond it, and were marching in the direction of Gallipoli, and that there were rumours that they might shortly reach that important point, we thought it right in a despatch, dated the 12th of January, to state—
  "In answer to the inquiry contained in the last paragraph of Prince Gortchakoff's Memorandum of the 16th of December, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to proper consideration of terms of the final settlement between Russia and Turkey."
  That is to say, that Russia, seated at Constantinople, and holding the key of the Dardanelles, might gain such an important advantage in the discussion of terms, that we might be unable to meet her on a fair and equal footing.
  "Ask Prince Gortchakoff whether he is willing to give assurance to Her Majesty's Government

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  that no Russian force shall be sent to the Peninsula of Gallipoli."—[p. 4.]
  That communication was made to Prince Gortchakoff, and in reply we received a telegram from Lord Augustus Loftus to this effect—
  "On receiving my note, Prince Gortchakoff deputed Baron Jomini to call on me as the hearer of a verbal reply, which was to the following effect:—' The Russian Government have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli, unless' "—[p. 6.]
  [Laughter.] But this is important. I do not desire to imply that there was anything wrong in that statement, but to call attention to it for a reason which you shall hear in a minute. The statement proceeds thus—
  "unless the Turkish regular troops should concentrate there."
  Nothing could be more reasonable than that—at all events, it is perfectly intelligible—Russia might well say—"We give you the promise you desire, that we will not direct our attacks against Gallipoli unless our enemies are concentrated there, and that it is necessary for military purposes that we should attack them."
  "They further hope that, in putting the question, Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate an occupation of Gallipoli, which would he a departure from their neutrality and would encourage the Porte to resistance."
  In answer to that communication we replied, by a despatch dated the 21st of January, to this effect—
  "Her Majesty's Government are glad to receive the pledge thus given by the Russian Government that they have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there. You are authorized to inform Prince Gortchakoff that Her Majesty's Government do not, under present circumstances, contemplate any occupation of the position in question."—[p. 11.]
  So matters rested at that time; but, as I was remarking, the Russian advance continued, and not only did that advance continue, but the movements of the Turkish troops began to take a direction which caused us still more anxiety, and it appeared that Suleiman Pasha was retreating in a direction which might very possibly bring him to Gallipoli; and that, therefore, circumstances might lead to a state of things in which the Russians might, within the terms of their engagement, be free to direct their attack upon that place.
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  That was a moment, no doubt, of considerable anxiety to the Government of this country. We had, at the time we gave that warning, thought it right to inquire whether the Sultan was disposed to permit our Fleet to enter the Straits if such a movement should be necessary; but the Sultan did not encourage that idea, and accordingly, it was laid aside. On the 19th of January, however, the Sultan asked us to take the step, and orders were sent to the Fleet to move to the entrance of the Dardanelles, to be ready when necessary; and then we found things were in this state—on the one hand, the Russians were advancing with great rapidity on Gallipoli, and it seemed possible that they might direct their course towards this quarter. On the other hand, there was great alarm at Constantinople at the advance, and it was not impossible that tumults might have arisen in the town which would have endangered life and property. Under these circumstances, for the sake of keeping the waterway open, and for the sake of protecting life and property at Constantinople if tumults should arise, we thought it right to direct the Fleet to proceed to the Dardanelles. We accordingly did so, communicating the fact to the Porto, and requesting the Sultan, whose invitation we considered to be still in force, would send the necessary permission to the Fleet. Accordingly, he sent a firman to admit the Fleet into the Dardanelles. The Fleet was ordered to sail for this purpose on Wednesday evening, the 23rd instant. On the following day, I came down here for the purpose of giving Notice of the Vote which I am now about to move. At that time we knew no more than we had known for a long time past, of what was proceeding with regard to the negotiations, and we still supposed that those negotiations were entirely hanging fire, and that it was impossible to say how long the delay, which had now lasted something between three and four weeks, might be prolonged, and what might occur in the meanwhile. It was, therefore, with a view to protect those interests in the meanwhile that we felt ourselves in a position which required us to take that step with regard to the Fleet; and it was under that view, among other considerations, that I came down and gave Notice of this Vote. But the same even-

  555
  ing, and late that evening, we received a telegram which was not altogether of an authentic character, and which has proved in some particulars not to be entirely accurate, from our Ambassador at Constantinople. It contained the terms of peace as far as he had boon able to ascertain them. They were to this effect —A pecuniary indemnity; a guarantee from Turkey for payment of the indemnity in the shape of territory in the east of Armenia, including Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan; the fortifications of Erzeroum to be destroyed; Roumania to be declared independent; and so forth. Finally, the question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to be settled, as the telegram to us said, between the Congress and the Emperor of Russia. "Such," said our Ambassador, "are the conditions which are proposed," and such was the message as it came to us; and it was entirely in accordance with the expectations which we had been led to form— that this question of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be reserved by Russia for discussion between the Europoan Powers generally, and would not be made a matter of separate discussion between Russia and Turkey. It appeared afterwards, however, that there was an incorrect transmission in the telegram, and it was corrected the following day; when it appeared that the question was to be settled not between the Congress and the Emperor, but between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia. That was entirely in accordance with what we now understand to be the aim of the Russian proposals. We have received from other quarters more or loss information which throws some light upon it, and I believe I may state now without the slightest doubt—indeed, I state it on my own personal authority —that I know that the intention of the Russian proposal was that the question of the Straits—that the ulterior settlement for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits should be an understanding to be arrived at separately between Russia and the Porto; not, of course, excluding—because Russia could not exclude—the Powers from consequently discussing the settlement of those terms; but as between those two Powers, providing a separate arrangement could be made. So that the result would be that whenever we come to the discussion—whether in a Conference or
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  Congress—the Porte, if her Representatives were admitted, would be precluded from taking an independent part in the discussion, and would be bound to give her voice in the way she had already agreed to do with Russia. That is a danger which we have always thought ought to be guarded against. But, as I say, the only communication which had been made to us having been received here in the form in which it came to us—namely, that the arrangement was to be made between the Congress and the Emperor, and not between the Sultan and the Emperor—we took a different view of the matter; and understanding from the form of the telegram, that the Porte had accepted, or was ready to accept, these terms of peace, we considered that our sending up the Fleet was no longer necessary; because if the Porte had accepted the terms of peace on the basis of the armistice, it was, of course, to be presumed that there would be no further advance of Russia against Constantinople, and that there would be no danger of the tumults we had apprehended. And if the question of the navigation of the Straits was to be reserved for the consideration of a Congress, there was not the occasion which we had before imagined for the Fleet to go in and keep the waterway; and it was for that reason that we sent a counter-telegram, by which the Fleet, which had. been ordered to call for orders at the entrance of the Dardanelles, was stopped, and returned from the point it had reached. That is the history which the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Renfrew, I believe, wishes mo to explain to the House; and it explains the ground on which that rather unintelligible movement was made. I hope I have made the meaning as well as the order of it clear to the House. Although we knew it was a strong step, and one capable of being misunderstood and misrepresented, still it was a stop which, under the circumstances, as we then understood them, we felt bound to take in order to preserve those interests which are not our own merely, but which are European also, and in order to prevent the effusion of blood and loss of property which might have been consequent on a further Russian advance. But when we believed that the necessity for such a step had passed away, when we found that

  557
  the terms of peace had been practically accepted, and when we found ourselves coming after everything had been settled, we gladly and most readily recalled the Fleet which had been despatched. The Sultan had given an order, the firman was there, and the Fleet had entered the Dardanelles; but on receiving the order of recall, the Fleet returned to the outside of the Straits. It has been said—and it is one of the errors which have been much dwelt upon of late among the public—that we recalled the Fleet because we understood that satisfactory terms of peace had been offered by Russia and accepted by Turkey, and the question was asked— "If we had ourselves felt that the terms of peace were satisfactory, and that the necessity of sending the Fleet had so passed away, how could it be consistent with that view to persevere in moving the Vote which we are about to ask for to-night? "Sir, the two cases rest upon different grounds. The question of sending up the Fleet for the purpose of keeping the waterway, and of protecting life and property at a particular place was a question of the moment; the question of the attitude which England has to take in the Council of Nations which must shortly be expected is not a question of the moment. It is a question whether we are or are not to go into that Conference armed with the strength of a united nation, and whether we are or not to be able to speak with the voice of England as that voice ought to be heard. We hear a great deal that is very painful to hear with regard to the position—and, as some will have you believe, the humiliated and degraded position—of England. I believe myself that all this language is false—that it is as mischievous as it is false. England is not a weak country. I would challenge a comparison between the strength of England, and the strength of any other country you like to name; try it by what tests you please, and I say this, that England will come out second to none. There are points of weakness, no doubt in England; but we have great wealth, we have a great and well-appointed Navy, and we have a small but very well-appointed Army—an Army capable of great and rapid movements, and of quick and easy increase; we have positions which are of the utmost im-
  558
  portance; but, above all, we have the support of a people who are by constitution and temperament the lovers of freedom, the supporters of all that is noble, and who are ready at any time to shed their blood and expend their treasure in any cause they believe to be right. It is not because England frequently desires peace rather than war; it is not because England is slow to draw the sword, and is quick to discover any other means of advancing the interests of which she has the charge, that anyone is to be allowed to suppose either that England has no strength, or that she is afraid to use the strength she has. My belief is that, if put to the test, and roused as we might be, our strength would be found as great or greater in proportion now than it has been in former times. But, Sir, I feel there are certain sources of weakness which we must not conceal. It is a great source of weakness that we should have among us those who perpetually go about decrying and making light of the power and the spirit of the country. I am not one of those who attach great importance to what is called prestige, or who would go and engage in the expenditure of blood and of treasure for the mere purpose of keeping up the glory of the country; but what I think is even worse than the attempt by such means to increase and maintain a false prestige is the deliberate attempt to damage and destroy the proper prestige of the country. I venture to say that if by courses such as those we see on the part of some who ought, I think, to know better—if, by the course taken by such persons, England should be by degrees forced into a position which she would at once feel in her inmost heart to be a position of real humiliation—if England should once believe that she is affronted and her interests really and seriously attacked, depend upon it there would be a re-action from that feeling which would require that the humiliation should be wiped out, and wiped out in a manner we should all regret. It is not the cause of peace that is promoted by language of such description. ["Hear, hear! "] It is not the cause, of peace that is promoted, if you are perpetually telling everyone that your country is afraid to go to war—["No, no! "]—that she is too weak to go to war, that she is too divided to go to

  559
  war. ["Hoar, hear! "] [An hon. MEMBER: Name!] I most respectfully decline to give names; but I would say this—that I rejoice to hear from the expression that I gather from all quarters of the House, including that from which the rather indignant cry of "Name!" proceeds, that I am expressing the sentiments, not of a Party, but of the House of Commons. It is that that we wish to ascertain. We wish it to go forth clearly to foreign countries that on one point, at all events, there are no differences of opinion. There may be differences of opinion as to whether this course or that course is the right one to take—there may be differences of opinion as to whether this interest or that interest is worth the expenditure of blood and treasure; but as to this I venture to say there is no difference—there is no difference among Englishmen that when they are satisfied as to the cause, and when they are satisfied of the importance, of entering into war—the hand of England is not shortened, and the heart of England has not grown timid. I do not desire, Sir, to pursue language of this kind; but I am glad I have strayed for a few moments into the few sentences which seem to have evoked so general an expression of opinion—an expression which, I venture to say, will be heard and do good far beyond the walls of this House. I will resume my argument only to say that if this is the position of England—if this be the real feeling, if this is the mind and wish of the English people—let us, then, when we go into the Council of Nations, be in a position to show that it is so. We are asked—"Why are you asking for this Vote; what is the object you are going to apply it to?" Sir, we ask for this money, not necessarily that that money or the greater part of it should be expended at all, provided you give us free leave and authority to expend it if we think it necessary. We have shown, I think, by our conduct that we have not been disposed, though the accusation has from time to time been made against us, to lead the country into a war from which the country would have shrunk— shrunk not from the fear of danger it might have led to; but because it would have been a war into which they could not enter with a clear conscience. But we desire that if you believe the sin-
  560
  cerity with which we ask your assistance, you should show your confidence in us by enabling us to use the force of England if the force of England it should become necessary to use. As I have said, the strength and power of England is as great as it ever was, and will stand comparison with the strength of any other Power. But you must bear in mind that the strength of England can only be measured by the power you have to make use of it. Where is the weakness of England? The weakness of England is, no doubt, in the great extent of her Dominions. If the great British Empire were concentrated, as the Empires of Russia, Germany, and France are concentrated, no doubt everyone would at once see the immense strength and power which that Empire would, possess; but, in the long communications we have to guard, in the necessity we have to look after the security of our line of communication with our distant Colonies, it is, of course, rather upon our Fleet than our Army we must rely; it is upon our naval superiority, our maritime ascendancy, we must place our trust; and it is because of our great anxiety lest the changes that are taking place, or that may take place, in the East of Europe may endanger our maritime communications, and may make, it necessary to spend larger sums in the maintenance and protection of our line of communications, that we are desirous of taking precautions for their proper security. We have, as I have already all ready said, a well-appointed, though a small Land Force. That Force could never be of use, unless there should be the means of moving it as required. Everybody knows that as well as we do. Everybody knows also that, although we have brave men at home, who could, in concert with our Navy, protect those interests to which I have referred, unless you are able to place that Force wherever it may be required it would be of no avail. Everybody also knows this—that unless you have the support of the Parliament and the country of England you have no means of supporting with energy and vigour anything you undertake. Now, we are shortly, no doubt, to be parties to the great settlement that must before long be attempted. It is desirable—we consider and. believe it essential—that in entering into this Council we should be able to speak with the

  561
  firm voice that will belong to those who not only represent a free and great and wealthy nation, but represent a nation that has confidence in them, and which will support them in whatever steps it might be necessary for them to take—we desire that we shall be armed by you with the means of so going into those negotiations. We go, we should propose to go, with no desire whatever of using force; it is not for that we ask it at all, but we desire to go armed with this, which would be, not only a Vote of Credit, but a Vote of Confidence, entitling us to speak as we should wish to speak in the Councils of Europe. If you decline to place that confidence in us, well and good; it is for you to say. We must accept your decision, but under the circumstances it would be impossible we could administer matters of so much importance any longer. We ask you to give us this Vote which we now demand with full confidence that we will not make a bad use of the trust you repose in us, and We ask you to give it to us in the full assurance that such a step on your part will not lead to the danger of war; but, on the contrary, will be the wisest and most efficient step you can take for the maintenance of peace. I am tempted before I sit down to repeat in this House a few words which I hoard this morning from a foreigner of distinction—one who is not likely to take an unfriendly view towards Russia in this matter. He said—"I think what you are about to do this evening is a wise action and one that will be advantageous for the interests of Europe. We all want to be taught the lesson of prudence, and no one will be listened to unless he is strong." The right hon. Gentleman concluded by formally moving the Resolution.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £6,000,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the Ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may he incurred, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1878, in increasing- the efficiency of the Naval and Military Services at the present crisis of the War between Russia and Turkey."
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I need not say, Sir, I do not rise to make any observations on the statement which has just been made by the right hon. Gentleman. I think the arrangement which was made at an earlier period of
  562
  the evening is a convenient one, and that any discussion which takes place had better be confined to matters of explanation; which, however, from the very clear statement of the right hon. Gentleman, I think will be hardly necessary. I rise for the purpose of making an appeal to the right hon. Gentleman. I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say he was anxious that the debate should be resumed to-morrow. Now, I was not willing to make any protest against that proposal at the time; and, in fact, the other day, when I had some conversation with the right hon. Gentleman, I said that if money were urgently wanted for the necessities of the Services, it would no doubt be hotter perhaps that the question should be decided without delay, and that we should proceed at once to a discussion of the proposals of the Government. But the statement which has just been made by the right hon. Gentleman, based as it is upon Papers which he has read and which are upon the Table, but not in the hands of Members, has put the matter, I think, in a totally different position. The right hon. Gentleman has very frankly stated to the House, what was apparent to everyone in the course of his speech, that the Vote which has just been proposed is the form in which the Government have decided to ask this House to pass a Vote of Confidence in them. That Vote of Confidence is based not only upon the declaration now made by the Government, but also upon their past conduct in various particulars, which have only now for the first time been unfolded to the knowledge of the House. The Papers which the right hon. Gentleman read do not appear to be voluminous; but still, if we are asked to pass a Vote of Confidence—a Vote of Confidence in this form, and based upon these Papers—in Her Majesty's Government, I think it is only respectful to Parliament that Parliament should have an opportunity of deliberating for more than one or two hours upon the real nature of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. I cannot conceive that the public service would suffer if even we should all agree that this discussion should not be proceeded with before Thursday. I cannot but think that, upon reflection, Her Majesty's Government will see that this, even to themselves, will be the most

  563
  satisfactory course. Surely it would not be satisfactory to the Government to obtain a Vote of Confidence from this House based on an ex parte statement and imperfectly considered Papers? If they require a Vote of Confidence, they require a Vote of Confidence which is given deliberately and after full consideration. I cannot, therefore, but think that the course I suggest is so reasonable that he will recognize the necessity of agreeing to it.
  MR. JOHN BRIGHT: Following the example of the noble Lord, I will not now enter into a discussion of the very serious question before us; but I want to put a Question to the right hon. Gentleman. I did not wish to interfere with the course of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, although I was much tempted to ask for a particular explanation, and I hope he will be able to give it. He stated that the Government sent the Fleet into the Dardanelles with two views. One was to keep open the waterway—I do not very well understand that —and the other was to prevent tumults, disorders, and perhaps great loss of life which might possibly occur at Constantinople during the excitement in that city under the impression that the Russian Armies were near. But I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, at the time when a communication was made to the Sultan that the Fleet was going into the Dardanelles, and that, the English Government wished it to go there, any communication of a like character was made to the Russian Government? I ask the Question because it appears to me, if the object of sending the Fleet there was only that which the right hon. Gentleman explained to the Committee, that the Russian Government, in all probability, would have been quite willing to concur in that arrangement. No doubt the Russian Government is just as anxious as our Government is—and I believe both Governments are equally anxious on that point—that there should be no tumult, or disorder, or sacrifice of life in Constantinople. The right hon. Gentleman will see that there is no reason why the Russian Government should not concur in that step; and, if that had been done, it would not have been in any degree a menace, nor would it have produced the excitement which has unfortunately been caused by it in this country. Another
  564
  point is this—I gather from the right hon. Gentleman's observations that it is intended that this Vote, if it be consented to by this House, is not to be expended for the purpose of interfering by any military force in the contest between Russia and Turkey. That, I think, is to be understood. If that be the case, then I should like to have a fair explanation whether it is necessary that England should go with shetted cannon and revolvers into a consideration of this great question with the Plenipotentiaries of the various Powers in the Conference which is intended to be held. I think we have a right to know that. I am not now objecting to the Vote, or advising the Committee as to its duty with regard to it; but I think we have a right—and the people of this country have a right—to know clearly and distinctly what are the real and ultimate objects of the Government in the proposition they have submitted.
  MR. GLADSTONE: Sir, I only wish —or at least I principally wish-—to add one very easy, and as I think simple Question to the Questions put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham. It relates to point of interest on which I hoard with surprise what fell from my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his enumeration of and his comments upon the presumed, or I may say the proposed, bases of peace. He said he had heard a rumour that there was to be a Prince of Bulgaria, to be chosen by the Emperor of Russia. I certainly listened with great surprise to that statement. Would my right hon. Friend kindly toll us what source that rumour came from? Was it transmitted home from Constantinople? I am very desirous of having in my hands the best possible means of putting a fair value on the rumour; and if I learn that it was sent home from Constantinople, I shall know pretty well what it is worth. With regard to the question raised by my noble Friend, I would venture to say one word in support of what has fallen from him. I came down to the House under the impression that we were to be asked simply for a military Vote, based on considerations connected with military subjects, and I own that I was entirely prepared to have gone forward with the debate to-night on that issue. But my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Ex-

  565
  chequer has himself greatly widened the area of the debate. He asks for this Vote as a Vote of Confidence in the Government, and as a Vote of Confidence in the Government on the ground of the conduct of the Government in relation to this Turkish question all along. Well, Sir, it is a serious matter, even with respect to the length of the debate—and it is an extremely serious matter in other points of view—for us to determine how far it is necessary for us to enter upon that wider ground; and I put it strongly to my right hon. Friend that, if we are to be challenged to a debate the ground of which is to rest ultimately on our opinion respecting the conduct of the Government during the long and complicated transactions of the last two years and a half, we ought not to be so challenged at 24 hours' Notice. I do not speak of it as a question of convenience or inconvenience, but upon much higher considerations. I think he will feel that my noble Friend's appeal is a just and reasonable one.
  LOUD ROBERT MONTAGU*: Mr. Raikes—The Chancellor of the Exchequer has not, I think, treated the House quite fairly in making this Vote of Credit a "Vote of Confidence in Her Majesty's Government." I am ready to vote as much money as the responsible Advisers of Her Majesty think it right to ask, and to vote it without delay, for defending the honour and the rights of Great Britain. But I am not prepared to endorse all the past acts of the Government, nor to express my entire confidence in them for the future. I will go farther than this, and say that I consider the whole House is pledged, by the Address on the Queen's Speech, to vote these Supplies at once. The words in the Address, which the House unanimously passed, were these—
  "We thank your Majesty for informing' us … that your Majesty cannot be blind to the fact that, should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent upon your Majesty to adopt measures of precaution; that such measures could not be effectually taken without adequate preparation; and that your Majesty trusts to the liberality of Parliament to supply the moans which may be required for that purpose."
  By voting that paragraph, Parliament committed itself to three things—First, to the possible necessity of armed inter-
  566
  vention, by Great Britain, in the East secondly, to the Ministerial announcement that the Vote of Credit would be asked for before the unexpected necessity should arise, because the object of the Vote was stated as being to make "preparation" and to "take measures of precaution" against an unexpected danger; and, thirdly, to the expressed intention of the Government to act motu proprio, and without consulting Parliament, whenever they should deem it necessary to take precautions against such a danger. I am, therefore, ready to grant the necessary Supplies to Her Majesty for that object. But I am not ready to pass a Vote of Confidence in the present Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer concluded his speech by asking for a Vote of Confidence; but he began it with very numerous assertions of ignorance; such as that "he had no positive informanion"; that he was "ignorant of the bases of peace"; that "he did not know whether the bases had been agreed to by the Porto"; that "he was not aware whether an armistice had been signed"; that "he had no official communications from either Russia or Turkey upon the subject"; and so forth. Yet he calls upon the House to place confidence in such a Government! To me, the concealment of all these negotiations from the British Government reveals the contempt in which we are held by Russia, and by all Europe; and the irritation and hatred which our conduct has engendered in every Mahommedan breast. The Chancellor of the Exchequer mentioned the "protracted negotiations" and the "unaccountable delays" in commencing and carrying on the negotiations for peace; and he attempted to assign causes for those delays. It seems to me that he has omitted all explicit mention of the one true cause—although, indeed, it appeared to crop up continually throughout his speech—I mean the intention of Russia to force Turkey to make a separate peace, and an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Russia. If anyone were to put himself in the place of Russia, and to ask himself how he would set about obtaining this end, he would at once see that he must manage to delay and prolong negotiations, which he must inaugurate between the Commanders-in-Chief; that all the while his Armies should be ad-

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  vancing towards strategic points; and that he must convince Turkey that she is abandoned by all Europe, and will never receive assistance from any Power. That would be the only method for forcing Turkey into a close alliance. Lot us now consider what did really occur. On January 4, Lord Derby wrote a despatch (No. 16), in which, while allowing the distinction between an armistice and a peace, he said—
  "It is clearly indispensable that the conditions on which it is to be granted should be discussed between the two belligerent Governments, and not between the generals in command."
  On January 8, he wrote (No. 22), that as the generals had received their instructions to negotiate—which they had not—the essential conditions had "been practically fulfilled." It was not until the 11th, he learned that Prince Gort-chakoff had not telegraphed the instructions, but had sent them by a courier— who would be a fortnight on the road— doubtless in order to create delay. But on the 10th, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, announced (No. 32) that "the negotiations can only take place directly" between himself and the Turkish Commander, and that bases for a Treaty of Peace must first be signed before the negotiations could begin concerning an armistice. In the case of Servia, last year, and in every other case that I know of, an armistice was brought about as a step towards negotiations for a peace. In this case it was not so, for an armistice was not desired; seeing that Russia intended that her troops should advance behind the screen of protracted negotiations. Lest, however, England should regard that advance on Constantinople as a casus belli —for the Home Secretary, in May last in this House, said that" an attack or approach on "Constantinople should be considered as an infraction of a British interest, which we were bound to defend—lest we should move, Russia actually gave us notice on January 9th, saying that there were two conditions antecedent to negotiations—(1) That "the Russian armies should advance"—she gave us notice, so that we should not afterwards make it a casus belli; and (2) That "the Turks should be convinced" that England will, on no condition, give them any assistance. On the 12th, Lord Derby wrote (No. 37) to the Porte to
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  "convince her "most positively that no help was to be expected from England, and that England would not even act as a mediator, because Russia did not wish it. With regard to the advance of the Russian Armies, no despatch demanding explanation was ever written by Lord Derby— so said the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs the other night. How did the negotiations commence? The first thing the Russian Commander exacted was a free entrance for his troops into Adrianeple; after which he said he would commence the negotiations. This was granted; and the Russians entered Adrianople, and at once advanced farther towards Constantinople, as well as towards Callipoli—the Gibraltar of the Levant. Lest there should be any mistake as to the intention of the Russians, we were informed by telegram on January 22nd, that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, M. de Novikoff, had endeavoured to calm the fears of the Austrian Government, by informing them that, although it was intended that the Russian Armies should occupy Constantinople, yet that the occupation should be but temporary. Delays, the "unaccountable delays," in negotiation, then took place, during which the rapid and unceasing advance of the Russian Armies was maintained; and the conviction was, in the meanwhile, forced upon the minds of the Turks, that they must cease to look for any help from England. Those steps which were taken were the very means which would be used in order to force the Porto to make a separate peace, and an offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Islam, against England. Russia says to Turkey, as it wore —"See! all your friends have abandoned you; you can hope for nothing from them; all your strong places are now in my hands, and you are completely in my power; resist me further, and I will crush you entirely; but if, on the other hand, you will join with me in alliance, I will give you the protection which Europe has denied; I will befriend you, and you shall aggrandize yourself in Persia, and extend yourself even to Hindostan; and I will always help you; and, between us, we shall rule the world, crushing the nations of the West, who have so meanly abandoned you." This evening we have, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, been told the heads of this separate peace;

  569
  and every single one of them is fatal to the power of England. These heads were first made known on January 25th. The first head which he mentioned was "the autonomy of Bulgaria, after the model of Servia "—of Servia, for whose good behaviour we became surety in 1867, when we persuaded Turkey to give up to her the Turkish forts. What did Servia do? Servia made a rebellion and levied war against her Suzerain in 1876; and then we saved her from destruction, and obtained for her a peace on the principle of the status quo, again becoming surety for her good behaviour. Within the year she again played false, and levied war on her generous Suzerain. Now, after this model, we are asked to create a Bulgarian State, which shall include the southern slopes of the Balkans—the last defence of Constantinople— as well as a port on the sea! This State is, moreover, to be ruled by a Prince selected by the Czar. This head of peace undoubtedly means that Russia shall have the power to swoop down and seize Constantinople at any moment which may suit her. The second head was "the Independence of Roumania;" and the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to think that such a provision could not be objected to by anyone. Let us look into it. There are only two Powers on the Black Sea—Russia and Turkey; Turkey with a powerful Fleet, and Russia without a Fleet. As soon as a war breaks out, the whole commerce of Southern Russia is destroyed by the ships of Turkey, and she loses the sinews of war without having the power to prevent it; for your Declaration of Paris cannot be made to apply to such a case. But constitute an independent State on the Black Sea, and Turkey can no longer stop the trade of Southern Russia as long as the Declaration of Paris is recognized; for all the Russian trade will flow through Roumania—which will remain at peace for the purpose—and be covered by the neutral flag of Roumania. The third head was "the freedom of the Dardanelles." For this, the Chancellor of the Exchequer invented a euphemistic expression, and he called it "a safeguard for the rights of Russia in the Dardanelles."[The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: It was Schouvaloff's expression.] Schouvaloff's? I do not wonder; every Russian Ambassador is a great master of phrases, a weaver of
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  euphemistic expressions, an inventor of fallacies and amphibologies, to delude the million. But what right has Russia in the Dardanelles? Under the Treaty of 1856 Russia bound herself not to keep any ships of war in the Black Sea, except a few light ships for police purposes in the Black Sea. She chose to declare herself free from that Treaty in 1870, and Austria and Italy advised our Government to resist it by war, promising us their active alliance; even France, who was at war with Prussia, promised us her Fleet if we would resist. But England feared, because Bismarck threatened, although Prussia had her hands full with the French War. In 1871, however, Russia again bound herself by the Treaty of London. If, then, Russia has no right to ships in the Black Sea, what right has she to an egress for ships from the Black Sea? Why does she even want it? She has nothing to defend in the Mediterranean; it must be for purposes of attack. Or, rather, the purpose is, probably, to anchor in front of Constantinople, without warning, and compel submission. This head, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, is to be settled between the Sultan prostrate and the Czar triumphant—as an article of the separate peace and offensive and defensive alliance of which I have spoken. The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hardy) said at Edinburgh that we shall never recognize a separate peace between the Czar and the Sultan. Who will care whether we do or not? We shall not fight about it, as we shall, henceforth, have to fight both the Turkish Fleet and Russian Armies. What, then, shall we do? "We shall hold a Conference," said the Chancellor of the Exchequer. What? Have you forgotten the Conference of last winter? Was that so successful that you can wish for another? Did that so cover you with glory that you have appetite for another? Was not every basis on which the holding of a Conference was agreed to shamelessly violated as soon as it met? Wore not law, and right, and Treaties set aside by it? Was not your policy of non-interference set at nought by it? Were you not cajoled, bamboozled, outwitted, and befooled enough at that Conference without wishing for another? But Russia is not thinking of a Conference; she is aiming at a separate peace, and an offensive and

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  defensive alliance between herself and Turkey. On January 22nd we learned a confirmation of the assertion that Russia had ordered, in Germany, 41 torpedo boats for service in the Baltic. Are these for a Conference and for peace? On January 26th we were informed that the Cabinets of Copenhagen and Stockholm had appealed to our Government, saying that Russia and Germany were preparing to seize the Sound and close the Baltic. Germany will, of course, take Holland, as well as Denmark, and Russia may easily seize Sweden and Norway; and the two Powers will then threaten the shores of England. Then what will you do? Appeal to Treaties? Treaties in those days are waste paper, and you, yourselves, have ignored the obligation of Treaties. Perhaps the just retribution of Heaven is even now being prepared.
  SIR ROBERT PEEL: Sir, there is a good deal in the suggestion of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) that the debate on the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be adjourned until Thursday next; because, whilst many of us, or, indeed, most of us, would be prepared to vote money in advance, yet the reading of those despatches, and the momentous issues which are raised by the point submitted to the House, render it desirable that the Government should cheerfully acquiesce in postponing the discussion until Thursday next. De-pond upon it, if their policy is good, the Government will lose nothing by the adjournment, and the House and the country will be quite as ready and willing to support thorn in the issues which have been raised as if those issues were brought on suddenly. However, my object in rising was rather to refer to a Question put to the Chancellor of the Exchequer by the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright). He said—
  "I think that a very false impression would got about if we supposed that the money asked for would he for the purpose of going with shotted guns and revolvers into a Congress of Peace."
  I feel sure that the House of Commons and the country will believe that the money which is now asked for will not be employed unless it is absolutely necessary. They have stated as much. It is meant to be employed solely and only
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  for the honour and interests of England, if these interests are imperilled. But it certainly should not go forth to the country to-morrow morning, without an emphatic contradiction of such an insinuation, that the Government tonight have asked for money for the purpose-—to use the expression of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham—of going with shotted guns and revolvers into a Congress of Peace. There is another point—one raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) —who, I think, misinterpreted the use of an expression of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He said that it was a Vote of Confidence as well as of Credit. Now, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did use those words; but I recollect exactly the same phrase being employed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite when he asked for a grant of money during the war between Franco and Germany. He then expressed himself in terms, although, perhaps, not in words, very much as follows:—"Place in our hands that credit, and place confidence in us that we will only use it in the event of the interests of the Empire being imperilled; place confidence in us in such a manner as to believe that we will employ it in the interests of the country." I suppose I may be wrong; but my impression is that the Chancellor of the Exchequer meant to say—"Grant us this money and place confidence in the Government that they will employ it only on a fitting and necessary occasion." If, of course, a Vote of Confidence is to be passed in the policy of the Government that is a totally different question. But I think the Chanceller of the Exchequer did not say that. He did not say it shall be a Vote of Confidence in the policy of the Government, but it shall be a Vote of Confidence in the Government as regards this particular grant of money; though I believe that if a Vote of Confidence in the policy of the Government wore wanted, it would be responded to by a very remarkable majority. He asks for the £6,000,000, in my judgment, to enable the Government to snow a bold front if it be necessary, and as a proof of the confidence of Parliament that the money will be expended rightly and properly.
  MR. W. E. FORSTER: I hardly need say that I do not intend to follow

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  either my noble Friend behind me or the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Robert Peel) by any remarks upon the general question of the Supplementary Vote; but I understand that an arrangement or understanding was come to at the beginning of the evening that after the statement of the right hon. Gentleman had been made we should report Progress and consider it on a future day; and I think hon. Members must now see that such a course is absolutely necessary, as we have not got the materials before us upon which we can form an opinion. I merely rise to support the appeal of my noble Friend, seconded by the right hon. Baronet opposite, that we should not be asked to continue the discussion to-morrow. The Government might have pleaded the immediate necessity for action; but I understand that the right hon. Gentleman did not make any such appeal. He used the words that the despatch of the Fleet was a question of the moment. Undoubtedly it was, and the countermanding of the order was also a question of the moment. But he added that the question which he now brought before the Committee was the attitude which the Government should take in the Conference; but as the appointment of a Conference is not a matter of a day or two, we ought not to be asked for a decision before the materials are laid before us. I am not going into the question as to the exact interpretation to be placed upon the right hon. Gentleman's closing words. I understood him to end with an appeal to the House—especially to Members on his own side—for a Vote of Confidence. But taking the interpretation placed upon these words by the right hon. Baronet opposite, there is, at all events, an appeal for a Vote of Confidence in the last acts of the Government. We do not know what they are. We have heard the right hon. Gentleman's explanation of a part of thorn; but he referred to certain despatches, and until those are before us we can really form no opinion what over either on the recent conduct of the Government, or upon the actual condition of the country as represented by the Government. Therefore, it does seem to me that the Government can hardly refuse to give us, at any rate, an opportunity of looking at the Papers, in order that we may consider what steps we should take. I think it is hardly
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  necessary to enforce that appeal by reminding the right hon. Gentleman that my noble Friend asked for the Papers on Thursday, and it was understood that, if possible, they should be given on Friday.
  MR. BROMLEY-DAVENPORThoped the Government would be firm and not give way. If they did, everybody knew what would happen. The country would be agitated from one end to the other.
  MR. TREVELYANsaid, he hoped the hon. Member would remember that what was asked for was a Vote of Confidence, in whatever sense the words might be used. The hon. Gentleman had his confidence ready made; but he and others had to pick their confidence with great difficulty out of the Papers which would be laid before them by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
  MR. LAINGwished to know from the Government, seeing that the decision of Wednesday last to send the Fleet through the Dardanelles must have been of the greatest importance, since it had led to the resignation or contemplated resignation of two Ministers, one of them no less a person than the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether our Admiral was instructed, should a Turkish force have retreated to Gallipoli and there been attacked by an advancing Russian force, to take part in the operations in support of the Turks?
  MR. C. BECKETT-DENISONsaid, under ordinary circumstances it was difficult to resist a demand for time to enable hon. Members on both sides of the House to read the Papers in order that they might make up their minds on an important question. It would, no doubt, be in the recollection of the House that a certain number of hon. Members had declared in and out of the House that, under no circumstances, would they vote a shilling of money in connection with the contest between Turkey and Russia. His objection to delay was that by assenting to it the Ministry would appear to the country to falter in their policy and to have some misgiving as to the purposes for which the present Vote was proposed. A habit had sprung up lately which, in his opinion, did not conduce to the dignity of the House or its proceedings—he alluded to the system of telegraph wire pulling on questions on which its Members did not happen to be of

  575
  one mind. There was no one in that House who had a greater respect than he had for the deliberate, cool expression of the opinion of the nation; but he now protested, and always should protest, against degrading the Members of the House into the position of delegates, and against a system of what he might call wired-up agitation on a subject of the most extreme gravity, for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon them. He hoped the Government would hold on to their course and take all the responsibility upon themselves. That the meetings got up in the country upon this question expressed the deliberate opinions of the people he denied, and he objected to be ruled by the mobocracy.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: I am surprised to hear the hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire denouncing public meetings. I saw a report of the speech of the hon. Member the other day—he had a St. James's Hall of his own—which he had made at a great aristocratic society, presided over by a noble Duke, in which he spoke in favour of war. [Mr. C. BECKETT-DENISON: The hon. and learned Gentleman is quite incorrect.] I read the speech, and am therefore fully able to judge. I say that the speech and the meeting was to press upon the Government to enter upon the war, and the hon. Gentleman who has been denouncing public meetings in the country in favour of peace, was the man who went to St. James's Hall to join in the agitation in favour of war. It was not an open meeting, but a select, social meeting, because neither he nor any other member of the War Party dare hold any such meeting. And now he has appealed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as a Member of the Conservative Party, to be in a hurry to get a Vote of Confidence in the Government of the country. They are going, then, by the advice of the hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire, to snatch a verdict, because they cannot afford to postpone the discussion for a day in order to see whether public opinion would pronounce against it. I do not do injustice to the Government and his Party to suppose they will adopt so unworthy a suggestion. I will now address myself to something which deserves your consideration. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has put his case upon one very material matter. The great part of his
  576
  speech was occupied in the order of the British Fleet to enter the Dardanelles. I do not know whether it was an order or a revocation of the order—it might be both—but it was a serious matter, because the entry of the Fleet into the Dardanelles was an act of war. It was an act of war. I venture to say, there is no statesman or jurist in Europe who will deny that to enter into the territory or the territorial waters of the belligerents for the purpose of interfering with the acts of those belligerents is an act of war. I will not say whether it was a justifiable act on the part of the Government. We shall see, when we have the Papers before us, what justification there was for doing an act of war—an act of war which was ordered by the Government on Wednesday last. On Thursday they give Notice of the Vote in the House of Commons, which has been summoned three weeks before the usual time. They never told the House of Commons then that they had ordered the Fleet to the Dardanelles. That was on Thursday. The resolution was taken on Wednesday. The order was standing at the time—the Fleet was actually sailing for the Dardanelles—at the time the Chancellor of the Exchequer stood at that box and announced this Vote, and he never told the House of Commons they had done it. Now he asks us to place confidence in the Government for the future. There may be grounds in these Papers for asking that confidence. Hon. Gentlemen opposite cheered very loudly when he said—"It is a monstrous thing that you don't place confidence in the Government; you ought all to do so on both sides." Well, then, what a curious thing it is that two years' old Colleagues don't place that confidence in you. You ask us to place this confidence in you without Papers. You are quite right, because your Colleagues, who did see the Papers, did not place confidence in you. It is a most extraordinary demand for a hurried Vote of Confidence. Let us see the Papers and discuss them, and then lot us see whether this Vote of Confidence is so well founded, and whether we shall be as much convinced as your Colleagues were that such confidence ought to be placed.
  MR. C. BECKETT-DENISONsaid, the hon. and learned Member (Sir William Harcourt) seemed to have for-

  577
  gotten, when making an attack upon him, that the House was in Committee, and that an hon. Member so attacked had a right to reply. He was not disconcerted by anything which the hon. and learned Member had said of a personal nature. The hon. and learned Gentleman had said that the meeting to which he had alluded was a packed meeting. [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I did not say it was a "packed "meeting.] The meeting in question was held for the purpose of hearing a lecture, which was given by a gentleman (Mr. Borthwick) well known and much respected in that House, in order to disseminate information on this subject. It fell unexpectedly to his lot to propose a vote of thanks to the Chairman, and that was all. The hon. and learned Member had therefore gone out of his way to found a personal attack upon what he had said in proposing that vote of thanks. But a few days before, the hon. and learned Gentleman himself, addressing his constituents at Oxford, quoted one of the proverbs of Solomon. He was afraid that the hon. and learned Member was going to throw at their heads another proverb from the same authority, but the hon. and learned Gentleman had spared them that infliction. In his speech to his constituents, the hon. and learned Member said, if it came to be a question of interfering with the interests of England in regard to the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal, he, in his great goodness and superior wisdom, would permit one citizen of Oxford to shed his blood, but under no smaller circumstances would he permit him to do anything of the kind. The hon. and learned Member would have an opportunity a few days hence to put his promise to the test. He would like to know where the hon. and learned Gentleman would draw the line. Perhaps if the Suez Canal were attacked, he might go farther back and say—"When one of the sources of the Nile is attacked I will permit it." The hon. and learned Member's patriotism was to go down to the vanishing point; and all that he did now—as he had done on every public occasion—was to embarrass and throw difficulties in the way of Her Majesty's Government.
  MR. CHILDERSwished to put a Question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer with regard to his answer to him (Mr. Childers) on Friday last.
  578
  He had asked the right hon. Gentleman what the nature of the Vote would be; and the reply he received was that it would be simply a Supplementary Estimate for a large amount required for the service of the year 1877–8. The right hon. Gentleman also read certain words from what appeared to be the Estimate itself, as it would be laid upon the Table of the House. Those words contained no mention of a Vote of Credit; but they did contain a passage to the effect that the sum to be asked for would include the cost of the "further increase of the Land Forces." The Estimate in question had now been converted into a Vote of Credit, which would be apparently applicable to no particular year. It was now drawn something like the Votes of Credit for the Abyssinian and the Ashantee Expeditions, except that the word "Estimate" did not appear in it anywhere. He therefore wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman—Was this to be a Supplementary Estimate for the current financial year, so that any balance unpaid on the 31st of March would be surrendered to the Exchequer; or was it to be a Vote of Credit available in the coming year?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: With regard to the Question just put to me, it certainly is a point whether this ought to be a Supplementary Estimate, or a Vote of Credit, but this is the form of it—
  "Vote of Credit for the sum required beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1878, in increasing the efficiency of the Naval and Military Services at the present crisis of the War between Russia and Turkey."
  That is the form of the Motion now in the Chairman's hands.
  MR. CHILDERSbegged to repeat that, on Friday last, the Chancellor of the Exchequer read distinctly from a Paper which he gave the House to understand was to be a Supplementary Estimate; and the right hon. Gentleman said not one word about a Vote of Credit. The Paper since distributed among hon. Members stated nothing about Supplementary Estimates, but spoke only of a Vote of Credit; but the form was that of a statement explanatory of the Vote, no Estimate for which had been printed.

  579
  The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the Vote provided for an increase of the Land Forces; and as there appeared no mention of them in the Paper that had been circulated, he asked the right hon. Gentleman whether the Land Forces were to be increased?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: With regard to the last point, the omission of the number of men, I am not at this moment able to explain what exactly was done by the War Office, as to the striking out of these words. What is still included in the Vote is pay and staff allowances. There would, of course, be a separate Vote required if men should be wanted; but I understand that the men will not be required at present, because there are men enough for a service for which they might be needed. With reference to the expression "Vote of Credit," I have no doubt that this is properly so called. It states that it is a Vote of Credit to the 31st March, 1878, and any balance is to go back into the Exchequer. I consulted the highest authority in the Treasury on such subjects, and he said—"You were wrong technically in describing it as a 'Supplementary Estimate;' you ought to have said 'Vote of Credit.' But, after all, it is only a technical difficulty." The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) may rest assured that any portion of this sum of money not expended before the 31st of March next is to be surrendered to the Exchequer. It is not to be, as some old Votes used to be, a Vote to go over the year and expire with the year. Several Questions have been put to me, to which I will give the best answer that I can. My right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) asked where the rumour as to the possibility of a Russian Prince being put at the head of the Bulgarian Principality came from? Well, I only gave it as a rumour, and I was stating it to show the uncertainty which attaches to the terms of peace, as we have them, and to show that they are not definite enough to exclude such a possibility. I stated that I had heard many rumours. I should not have mentioned a rumour if it had not been one that had sufficiently attracted my attention; but I do not think it right or proper to say from whom it came, and I was arguing upon it, not as if it were a real argument against these terms of peace, but as a reason for our being
  580
  careful how we expressed our opinion with regard to them until we knew more definitely what the bases meant and covered. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Did the rumour come from Constantinople?] I must decline to answer. I do not say it came from Constantinople. My right hon. Friend puts Questions in away that many people do. He says—"Now I am going to ask you about this. Is it or is it not so? If you won't answer me I shall know of course that it is so." From the very beginning to the end of my right hon. Friend's catechism I beg to oppose an obstinate silence. There was a Question put by the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) as to whether, when we ordered the Fleet to go to the Dardanelles, any communication was made to the Russian Government? Well, no communication was made to any Government, because it was so very shortly afterwards countermanded —[Laughter] —yes, because it was so soon countermanded—and I may answer both the right hon. Member for Birmingham and the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) upon that point by the same statement. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford complains that we came down to the House on Thursday and gave Notice of a Vote to-day without stating that we had already given this order to the Fleet. The right hon. Member for Birmingham asks whether, at the same time that we gave the order, did we communicate to the Russian Government why we gave it? We did neither the one nor the other, and for this reason—that a movement of that sort could not be made unless precautions were taken to prevent any possibility of its being intercepted by information being prematurely disclosed; but, as has already been stated—I think by the Prime Minister in the House of Lords—we had prepared a communication to be made, not only to the Russian Government, but to all the Governments of Europe, as to the grounds upon which the Fleet was so sent; and I may also state upon this point that there is no doubt whatever as to the manner in which the Fleet was to be employed. In answer to the other Questions of the right hon. Gentleman, I will read the orders that were sent to Admiral Hornby on the 23rd. These were the orders—

  581
  "Telegram sent to Admiral Hornby,
  "January 23, 1878.
  "Most Secret.
  "Sail at once for the Dardanelles, and proceed with the Fleet now with you to Constantinople.
  "You are to abstain from taking any part in the contest between Russia and Turkey; but the water-way of the' Straits is to be kept open, and in the event of tumult at Constantinople you are to protect life and property of British subjects.
  "Use your judgment in detaching such vessels as you may think necessary to preserve the waterway of the Dardanelles, but do not go above Constantinople.
  "Report your departure and communicate with Besika Bay for possible further orders, but do not wait if none are there.
  "Keep your destination absolutely secret."
  Well, certainly it would not have been necessary to tell the Admiral to keep his destination absolutely secret if we had published it in this House. My noble Friend the Member for Westmeath (Lord Robert Montagu) asked me as to a separate peace between Russia and Turkey, and also with regard to certain proceedings of the Russian Government of which he has heard, but about which I am not in a position to give him any information. My noble Friend can form his own judgment upon them. I can only say that the whole gist of my argument was that I presumed that a separate peace would be made between Russia and Turkey, and that that would render it necessary for us to be on our guard as to what effect it might have upon the interests of Europe. I have now answered most of the Questions which have been put to me; but there is one remark which I made, and which I must beg pardon of the Committee for having made in a manner which has led apparently to its being misunderstood. I had no intention whatever to describe this Vote of Credit as a general Vote of Confidence in the whole policy of the Government in connection with the war and the Turkish question. It would have been most unfair for me to do so; but what I wanted to do was this. It was possible, of course, that I might have come forward and said—"We ask you for £6,000,000, which will be spent in such or such a way. We tell you precisely what purpose we want it for, and what is to be done with it; "but I came forward and said—"We do not ask for it on these terms; we ask for it in order that we may be able to go into
  582
  Conference and into negotiations with the force of England at our back." "Oh," the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham says, "we are to vote loaded cannons and revolvers." That is not the way in which such a proceeding ought to be described. We ask for the strength of England; and I say if we are to be of any use in these Conferences, if the voice of England is to be heard, there must be some evidence, some outward and visible sign of our being possessed of the confidence of England in the course we must take. If we are to be told upon all occasions—"Yes, it is all very well to say you insist upon such and such terms, and you object to such and such terms; but who are you? We must refer back to the other—the real—voice of England, which does not speak through you." I say our position would be one which would be not only humiliating to ourselves but detrimental to the country, and that if you will not give us this with the amount of confidence which we ask you to show in asking you to give that money to dispense in the manner that we may think necessary, you had better not give it us at all. That is the point, and of course the House will bear in mind that it is impossible for us to take any steps of a warlike or of an important character without its becoming speedily known in this country and in Parliament. You always have a check over us; but if you think we are not to be trusted, then I say the sooner we leave power in the hands of those who can be trusted the better. There is only one thing more, and that is when this debate is to be resumed. I had certainly hoped that when this proposal was made the Committee would have been willing to go on with it at once, but the noble Lord suggested that a reasonable time should be given; and I cannot deny that if there is a strong impression upon the part of those who wish to take part in the debate that they ought to have rather more time to examine the Papers that are laid upon the Table, it would be wrong in us to refuse to give it. As this is a point upon which we challenge the general confidence of the country, we shall consent to report Progress, and consider the matter further on Thursday.
  Committee report Progress; to sit again upon Wednesday.

  COUNTY ADMINISTRATION BILL.

    LEAVE. FIRST READING.
    MR. SCLATER-BOOTHsaid, lie need make no apology if he prefaced the introduction of the Bill, of which he had given Notice, by a few preliminary observations. As was well known, the idea of county financial administration was very different from what it was 20 or 25 years ago. At that time the general feeling was simply that the ratepayers of the country had no adequate representation in the body that administered the financial affairs of the country—that was to say, the court of quarter sessions. It was not disputed that the magistrates who constituted that court discharged their duties honourably and well; and that, being themselves ratepayers, as well as owners of property, they had a large interest in the proper administration of the county finance. But it was at the same time felt—and it was true—that the great mass of the ratepayers had no sufficient representation on the court, and had no direct control over the increase or diminution of the expenditure for which they had to provide. It was true that a very large part of the expenditure of the county did not depend upon the discretion of the magistrates, or of the ratepayers, but was imposed and levied under express Acts of Parliament. For this expenditure the magistrates were in no way responsible; they did not originate it, and were no more than the agents of the legislation which imposed it, and consequently the collection and expenditure of the county rate was to a great extent a matter of administrative necessity. Nevertheless, within the 20 years preceding the period to which he had alluded, there had arisen, not only a great increase of expenditure, but also a great increase of indebtedness, in consequence of the establishment of the county police, the building of new prisons, and the requirements of the Pauper Lunatic Acts; and the dissatisfaction which had arisen from these circumstances found expression in various Bills which were introduced into Parliament attempting to provide a more effectual system of regulating and administering the county finance. In 1852 a right hon. Gentleman, then President of the Board of Trade, but no longer a Member of this House (Mr. Milner
    584
    Gibson), introduced a Bill for the regulation of county rates and expenditure, the principle of which was the establishment of a county financial board, to be composed half of ratepayers elected by Board of Guardians, and half of magistrates elected by the court of quarter sessions. This Bill was referred to a Select Committee, but was not afterwards proceeded with. Mr. Hodgkinson, the Member for Newark, in 1860, and Sir William Gallwey and Mr. Wyld, then Member for Bodmin, in 1868 introduced Bills dealing with the subject. In 1869 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) introduced a Bill which went no further than the first reading, and was then withdrawn. In the year 1871 the measure of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen) was introduced, but not proceeded with, and since then no legislation on the subject had been attempted. He (Mr. Sclater-Booth) thought there were good reasons why the proposals which were renewed from time to time in these Bills failed to command the assent of the public; because, from the time when this series of measures began —namely, 1852, down to the present time, no new functions had been given to the magistrates, nor had any new burdens been thrown on the county rate. The policy of Parliament, on the contrary, had been to avoid any measure of that kind, and the uniform practice of successive Governments, and the recommendations of Committees of both Houses and of Royal Commissions had been, when new functions were required to be discharged in country districts, that these functions should be relegated to the Boards of Guardians. That had been now the practice for a good many years. The Guardian was, in the first instance, a parish officer; but afterwards became, by the Union Chargeability Act, the representative of a union. He was then required to construct the valuation lists of rateable property. He was afterwards required to exercise the functions of sanitary authority in the rural districts; and only the other day was suggested and matured the idea of making him an educational authority throughout the Kingdom. This being the case, we had nevertheless lately had a revival of the old feeling for a county board, and various views had been put forward with regard to it.

    585
    He would first of all notice a well-known expression of the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), who said we wanted municipalities for counties. He quite agreed with this expression to a certain limited extent; it was a half truth of some importance, and, so far as it was true, he hoped the Bill now to be introduced would carry it into effect. As far as regarded the representation of the general interests and policy of counties; in that sense, no doubt the expression of the right hon. Gentleman was strictly accurate. But what was the more material object of municipalities? It was to provide for the population certain comforts and conveniences which they could not provide for themselves, but which, as population grew, became necessities of existence— such as the scavenging, paving, and lighting of streets, the sewage of towns, the providing a gas and water supply for houses. But, as far as these duties required a municipal authority for their discharge, he must contend that they were already provided for by the rural sanitary authority. In the Public Health Act of 1875, which summed up and consolidated the preexisting law, would be found a complete code of municipal management for the rural districts laid down in successive stages under the head of "urban powers," "parochial committees," and "local board districts," and he must assure the House, in spite of the prejudice which had been thrown on it, that the institution of local boards was growing in favour in populous communities. The hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Bath-bone) sometimes alluded to the establishment of county boards as a sort of panacea for the existing wide-spread, disorder and confusion of area, as if by a stroke of the wand a county board would be able to turn chaos into order, or extravagance into thrift, and complications into facilities; but he could assure the House that if the local government of this country had become more or less confused to the eye of the outward spectator, it was known perfectly well what rights and liberties were given by these local institutions, and he doubted very much whether it was in the power of this or any government, or of any county board, to diminish or detract from the independence or the privileges now enjoyed by those commu-
    586
    nities, although, perhaps, their increase might be in future, to some extent, restricted. Now, he was as desirous as his hon. Friend that attention should be paid by the county authority to the condition of separate local areas within the counties, and he hoped to give sufficient place in the Bill for that function. He also hoped to improve the financial powers of the local authorities, and that economy might be the result. He thought the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) had been misled in supposing that the heavy indebtedness of local authorities, to which he had so often drawn attention, would be held in check by any county authority. The greater part of that indebtedness had been contracted by independent urban communities, which no county board could check. There was one point, however, upon which all would agree—that there was room at this moment for a local authority to be set up which would satisfy the principle contended for in former days of giving representation to the counties, and also satisfy some urgent needs which were now beginning to be felt, and which the law as it stood at present had no means of providing for. There was, for instance, the grievance arising from the state of the main roads of the country as the turnpikes fell in; there was the grievance felt in counties from the enormous expenditure on lunatic asylums; there was the grievance so prominently brought forward last year connected with the flooding of various districts. All these and other things seemed now to have been brought to that point that the attention of Parliament had been sufficiently called to them, and would enable the Government, with effect, perhaps, to deal with them; and he hoped to do so by this Bill. At all events, the Government were of opinion that the time had come for constituting a new county authority which would rectify grievances, discharge certain new duties, and guide and direct county policy. The Government were most anxious that the body which they would set up should possess certain qualifications; that it should be of such a character as to represent both owners and occupiers; that it should have a sufficiently extensive standpoint from which to survey and direct the general interests of the county; that it should engage the services of the

    587
    most competent and experienced men of the county, and thus be such a body as to attract the general confidence, not only of the ratepayers, but of the public; and lastly, that it should, if possible, be free from political bias. Now, in approaching the subject, the natural and obvious method was to collect from the various local institutions of the county a body which would be sufficiently independent, and which should take charge not only of the matters to which he had alluded, but also of a great many other things besides; but the objections to this course were found on examination to be insuperable. The Government had accordingly determined upon a plan of identifying the county board with the court of quarter sessions in its executive capacity. One felt that it would be extremely undesirable to have two authorities dealing with a county rate; if the two authorities were kept separate it was obvious that there were a great many executery functions appertaining to the idea of justice, which could not conveniently be removed from the authority of the magistrates. It was felt that the existing county officers, whose time from year to year was less and less called upon, might have the new services consolidated with their former duties, and most of the functions at present discharged by the magistrates could be transferred to the new county authority. He had every reason to think that the transfer of business might be effected without friction, and without inconvenience or injury to those who were interested out-of-doors, or to the officers themselves. He thought there had been eight or 10 Bills on the subject, and they had all proceeded on the assumption that a certain number of magistrates should form the nucleus of the county board, and all but one of them vested the election in the Boards of Guardians. The great question was as to the elective element. It was quite evident that the ratepayers could not be brought together to vote in one single centre on a matter of this kind. What divisions were there that they could have recourse to? There were the unions and the petty sessional districts. There were grave objections to the use of unions for the purposes of the Bill, for nearly one-third of them overlapped the county boundaries. The cases of overlapping were 400, although the
    588
    number of unions concerned only numbered 180. Another objection to the use of unions was that they included, as a rule, the quarter sessions boroughs, with which this Bill did not propose to deal. The decision of the Government had been to adopt the petty sessional district as the elective area. Each parish had its Guardian, and he would vote as the representative man of his parish. Let it be observed that there was a very great advantage in this plan. In addition to avoiding complication they took the guardian away from the workhouse, where he had not really in this capacity so much to do, to the central town of his district, where he would vote in public, not as a member of the Board of Guardians, but as the representative of his parish, and that in a place at which every Guardian in the county could readily attend. Of course, there were objections to the petty sessional areas; but, on the whole, they presented not at all an inconvenient basis for the formation of county boards. It had been said by some of the newspapers, in criticizing what they supposed he was about to say, that the constitution of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and of the Metropolitan Asylums Board was not satisfactory; because the members were appointed by vestries, and there was no direct representation of the ratepayers. He would not stop to defend those bodies, though he did not concur in the criticisms to which he referred; but he might point out that the plan he laid before the House was a very different one from that under which they were constituted, for the Guardians would not be called upon to vote in a hole-and-corner fashion as it were, but would come out publicly for the purpose. In order to show the advantage of selecting the petty sessional districts he would quote a few figures. In Berkshire, out of 15 unions, 11 transgressed the county boundaries; in Devonshire there were 20 unions, and 15 of these overlapped; whilst in Radnorshire, where there were five unions, all of them overlapped. In fact, out of a list he had of 10 counties, he found there were 137 unions, 105 of which overlapped the county boundaries. One of the arguments in favour of the plan he proposed was that they had the division ready to hand. Of course a Royal Commission might, in half-a-

    589
    dozen years, lay out a better plan, but they wanted one for immediate application. The constitution of the county board was contained in eight clauses of the Bill. County magistrates were to elect at Michaelmas two of their body to serve on the county board in respect of each petty sessional division of their county. In the month of November in each year the Guardians would be summoned from the parishes within the county to assemble at the petty sessional head-quarters, where they also would proceed to elect two members to serve on the county board in respect of their petty sessional divisions. Then there came the question of the boroughs. It was not proposed to include in the Bill the quarter sessions boroughs, which were, for the most part, independent of the county rate. There was, however, a class of boroughs of great importance, which had a separate commission of the peace, though not a separate quarter sessions. The whole of these boroughs contributed to the county rate. They varied much in size, and were about 92 in number. It was proposed to deal with them by a somewhat rough method, which, however, seemed on the whole to be most convenient. It was proposed that all of these boroughs which had less than 20,000 inhabitants should be dealt with as parts of the county. They would by their Guardians contribute to elect the elective members for the petty sessional district to which they would be attached for this purpose. With regard to the boroughs having above 20,000 inhabitants, it was proposed that they should be treated as separate local areas, and should be represented on the county boards by four members, to be nominated by their town councils. Taking all these points into consideration—and great care had been taken to arrive at a proper quota of members for the county—he believed the numbers fixed would be found sufficient and satisfactory. He would mention a few as examples of all. Berkshire would have 48 members; Derbyshire, 52; Durham, 78; Essex, 68; Hereford, 44; Kent, 68; Lancashire, 150—not at all too large a number—as there were 800 county magistrates who now had the opportunity of attending the county sessions; Norfolk, 96, not too large a number for so extensive a county; Northamptonshire, 36; Northumber-
    590
    land, 56; Shropshire, 76; Somersetshire, 86; and Wilts, 72. Without going through the whole list, he thought that he had quoted sufficient to show that the number of the members of these county boards would be by no means in excess of the duties that would have to be discharged by them. Very important new functions were to be assigned to these boards. It was proposed that the management of the main roads should be transferred to them, half of the expense of keeping these roads in repair being defrayed from the county road fund, and half by the parish through which they ran. One clause he had inserted in the Bill with considerable hesitation, inasmuch as it empowered the county boards, in certain cases, with the consent of Parliament, which would always be required, to establish turnpike gates. He should be prepared to show that there were some cases of extraordinary hardships, of which the House could scarcely be aware, in which it would be most unfair to throw the cost of the repairs upon the county board or upon the parish. Thus where there was a large mineral traffic to and from a railway station, or where the communication between two large towns ran through a small parish, it would be manifestly fair to raise the funds for the repair of the road by some such means as tolls. It was also proposed to give county boards power to enforce the repair of the roads. They would also be empowered to take upon themselves the duties of river conservators, and likewise to put in force the provisions of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act. He admitted that owing to the different interests which were affected by rivers this power would involve difficult and delicate duties; but any improvement in the management of our rivers seemed hopeless unless a beginning were made, and he thought, therefore, the present opportunity a golden one for transferring the conservancy of rivers to a county authority. Acting in this capacity they would have power to remove obstructions, to improve outfalls, the navigation of the river, and the flow of water therein. On this point he should be most happy to receive suggestions. He did not propose to deal peremptorily with the provisions of the existing Acts; but there was reason to think that there were a large number of rivers the con-

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    servators and. trustees of which would gladly avail themselves of the opportunity of getting rid of their duties and responsibilities. The county boards would also be entrusted with the provision and care of asylums and schools for the imbecile paupers, and for idiotic and other pauper children. And they would be empowered to prepare schemes for forming the whole or parts of their county into one district for the purpose. The word "school," he should add, for the information of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gravesend (Captain Pim), was defined to include "training ship," so it would be competent to a county board by themselves, or in union with other counties, to establish a training ship on the coast. It was also proposed, with a view to prevent the inconvenience which arose from the overlapping of unions, parishes, and other districts, to give power to the county board to propose schemes for the dissolution of existing areas, and for the rectification of existing boundaries, where it was thought desirable to do so. This power already existed in the hands of the central authority—the Local Government Board; but it was found extremely difficult to put it in force, as regarded unions, although a good deal had been done in the way of re-constructing the divided parts of parishes. The next was, he feared, one of the most radical of all the provisions of the Bill; but he believed it was one which would meet with but little opposition on either side of the House. It was proposed that the time-honoured institution, according to which coroners were now elected by the freeholders, should no longer exist, and that the election of coroners should be committed to the county board. There was also proposed to be given power to the county boards to borrow money on the security of general rates, not only for the purposes of the Act, but also with a view to lend money to smaller bodies, thus forming financial centres, which it was hoped and believed would work beneficially. They would enable Guardians and other bodies to borrow on easy terms, and be an inducement to the people of the locality to lend money on good security, and they would also bring under the notice of the county authorities a general view of the financial condition of the respective districts. He
    592
    had now gone through the greater number of the 48 clauses of the Bill. The remainder gave directions as to how the various functions of the county board were to be discharged, and defined the administrative business which was to ro-main in the hands of the magistrates and that which was to be transferred to the county board. They also contained directions as to the mode in which the elections were to be conducted, the term of office being limited to a year, and provided the necessary machinery for the elections. His statement would not be complete if he did not refer very briefly Of course it would be said that the elections should be direct by the ratepayers, and not through the agency of the Guardians. He believed direct election would be very unpopular, and it would certainly be very expensive. They had some evidence as to expense in what had occurred in connection with school boards. He found that, in 1876, 150 school board contests had cost the ratepayers not less than £23,000. Assuming that there would be contests in every parish, the cost of an election direct by the ratepayers would be not less than £100,000. That might be thought an extravagant sum, but it was founded on a careful estimate, and its correctness was singularly illustrated by a recent experience of his own on a small scale in connection with an election relating to the New Forest. There was a natural feeling against expenditure of that kind, but he went further, and said there was no occasion for it. The great interest of the ratepapers was in the election of the Guardians, who spent 2s. 6d. in the pound, not in the administration of the county rate, which, when the Prison Act was in full operation, would amount to no more than 1 ½d. in the pound; but what did they find as regards the interest manifested in the election of Guardians? "Why, that in 1875, out of 14,000 parishes in England, there were 456 contests only, and those, for the most part, in populous towns where Party and political feeling ran high and was brought freely into play. Was it too much to ask that the House of Commons would set an example to the country at large and treat this serious question apart from Party considerations? That was a bold thing to ask with regard to the first matter mentioned in Her Majesty's

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    Speech; nevertheless, he was encouraged in making the request, partly because of what was said in the debate last year, and partly because of his own experience in these subjects. The question was too important to be dealt with in a narrow spirit. He was glad to say, and he acknowledged it gratefully, that since he had been in office he had received the utmost consideration from both sides of the House, and he had found there was a disposition to keep questions arising in his Department apart from politics. He highly appreciated the indulgence which had been extended to him in former to two measures which, at a later period of the evening, he would ask leave to introduce—one was their old friend the Valuation Bill, and the other the Highway Amendment Bill. With respect to the former, the House was already familiar with its leading provisions, and he might add that some new clauses wore introduced, one of which would specially charge the county board with the duty of enforcing the uniform rating of unions inter se, and some of the Amendments placed on the Paper last year had been adopted. The second was what was generally denominated an omnibus Bill, and proposed sundry amendments of the existing law, which he hoped would be considered satisfactory by the House. Among them was a proposal that when a highway district was to be repaired the rate for the repairs should run over the whole district, although geological or geographical considerations might lead to a division of a particular district. "With respect to the Bill he was about to ask leave to bring in, he hoped nobody would say that it was not a bond fide and thorough-going measure. It did not go so far as some hon. Members might desire; on the other hand, it went further than other hon. Members might approve; but Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that if new and ample powers were not to be placed in the hands of the county boards they were not justified in proposing so large a change as the Bill, if it passed, would effect. It would provide the means of meeting real grievances and might be put into immediate operation. It might be objected that it bore too quarter sessional an aspect; but he hoped at the proper time to show that that was not the case, and it should be borne in mind that it would be attended with this ad-
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    vantage—that it would secure the experience and knowledge of the county officers and of the most active and competent of the magistrates in the carrying out of its provisions. It might be said that petty sessional districts varied in size; but there was no separate interest in one petty sessional area as compared with another. It was not like one town against another town, or a town against a county. It was more like the relation of one ward compared with another ward of a borough. He believed the arrangement he proposed would provide adequate representation. Sessions. Unless this conciliatory spirit were acted upon such a difficult subject as that of local government would never be satisfactorily settled, nor could such questions as the consolidation of the Sanitary Acts and the purification of rivers have been dealt with as they deserved. All he asked for the present measure was fair play. Although, therefore, he did not presume that this measure would do other than stand or fall by its merits, he believed he would find a disposition on the part of the House to see this great experiment carried into operation and a workable and satisfactory Bill passed. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to the Administration of County business, and to make further provision for County Government.
    MR. GOSCHENsaid, the right hon. Gentleman had made a clear statement of the principles and scope of the proposed measure, and might with certainty anticipate that it would be discussed with impartiality on both sides of the House. There was a general desire to keep local government reforms free from Party action, although it was not always possible to do so, as he had good reason to recollect. Passing over the functions and powers to be assigned to the boards when they were established, he would make a few remarks upon the constitution of the boards and the mode of electing the members. In this respect he doubted whether the Bill would give satisfaction or be adequate to the occasion, and he would give the reason why. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to think that it was not desirable to move the rural mind more than was necessary. The country districts, he appeared to think, did not wish to

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    be disturbed by elections. They had hitherto been apathetic, and they should not have another election to stir them up. Now, he and many along with him on that side of the House differed fundamentally from that view of the question. He desired that the rural districts should be more interested in local government than they had hitherto shown themselves; and the reason why he feared the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman might prove to be inadequate, was because it would not interest the great mass of the rural electors. The right hon. Gentleman said it would be unpopular to give them an additional election because of the expense; and he therefore suggested that the Guardians should elect half the members of the county boards. The effect of this would be simply to add one more duty to those of the Guardians, and there the matter would rest. Now, in the first place, he thought the whole system of election to the various local offices should be revised; these elections should, if possible, be combined into one to be held on one day, and if that were done, instead of apathy, real interest would be excited among the ratepayers in the various localities. Tried by this test, he thought the plan of the right hon. Gentleman would not be satisfactory. Contests, even in local elections, were not entirely without their advantage. The right hon. Gentleman was anxious to avoid expense, which might frighten the electors; but was it necessary that large expense should be incurred? It was part of the plan of the late Government to combine all the local elections, so that they might be held on one day; and this amalgamation of elections, far from involving an increased expenditure, would save expense. It would increase the local interest in elections, and put them on a more satisfactory footing. He hoped when they came to consider the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman in Committee, it might be possible to amend it in this respect. They had moved very rapidly during the past eight years. The position which the county franchise had reached was not without its bearing upon this question. Though he might not take the same view as his right hon. Friend upon that question, yet it was believed on the Opposition side of the House that the county franchise was sure to be granted within a limited period of time, and, if so, he would like to see
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    the county elector better trained for his work in the county. In the boroughs the constituencies had been trained by municipal and other duties for their political duties; and on his side of the House there was a desire to see the electors in the rural districts put into training, so that they might feel a greater interest and take part in the government of the public institutions in their own localities. It would be a subject of great regret if this opportunity should be lost by establishing county boards simply through the means of giving the Guardians one additional function.
    MR. GOLDNEYsaid, he did not take precisely the same view as the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen); but he certainly had hoped that a measure with a much larger scope would have been proposed. In his opinion, the board should have been constituted in such a way that it could gather from all the different localities the amounts it would be necessary to raise in the year for each parish, whether for poor rates, sanitary, or other rateable purposes; so that the ratepayers might know at the beginning of the year what amount they would be called upon to pay. At present enormous discrepancies existed in the assessments; but a county board would be able to make one general assessment which would be fair to all. The spending powers of magistrates in quarter sessions were at present exceedingly limited. To the extent of about five-sixths they were entirely governed by Statute, and merely carried out the duties imposed by special Acts of Parliament. They had no control or discretion; but, notwithstanding all this, it seemed to him that the county board, which it was proposed to establish under the present Bill, would in those respects be very much in the same position as was the case at present. Unless wider ideas were imported into the measure, it would run the risk of dying a natural death towards the end of the Session; but if a strongly constituted Board were entrusted with the powers which he thought it ought to possess, considerable economy might be effected in expenditure, the assessments would be fair and reasonable, and many complaints which were now made would cease to be heard. Whether the elections of members were to be by Boards of Guardians or by

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    direct representation—which, like the right hon. Gentleman opposite, he would prefer himself—the machinery was as nothing compared as to the objects for which the county boards were constituted.
    SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he could not agree with the observations of his hon. Friend (Mr. Goldney), for it appeared to him that the Bill set out a good deal of important work which ought to be done, and which, if well done, could not fail to be of great service to the counties. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Sclater-Booth) had stated that the members of the county boards would be elected for one year only. But men elected for one year only could scarcely take the same interest in the various duties imposed upon them as if they were elected for a long period. In his opinion, men who entered upon the numerous and important duties which the right hon. Gentleman had indicated ought to be left in power for three, or, as he would prefer, for five years. In that way, if engaged in any work, they might be able to bring it to a conclusion. His right hon. Friend had not said anything about the chairman of the board, who, in a body of this nature, would be a most important personage. His right hon. Friend probably intended that he should be elected by the persons over whom he was to preside, and they, no doubt, would make a very proper choice. His right hon. Friend had said that the roads would be under their direction, and the rivers also to a certain point; and he had stated distinctly that he was going to introduce the principle of re-erecting turnpike gates in his Highway Bill. That might or might not be very right; but he ventured to think, however much they might believe that tolls ought to be imposed on certain districts, it would be a very invidious thing to do, and would not recommend itself to the ratepayers of the country. We knew that most of the traffic came from the great towns, and if turnpike gates were to be erected at all, they ought to be erected just outside the great towns. If the county rate were extended over the whole county area and the towns paid their fair proportion, which he thought they would do sooner than have turnpike gates set up outside their boundaries, that would be a fair solution of the difficulty. With
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    regard to rivers, he hoped his right hon. Friend would consider whether the area, which at present only extended to the flood level, ought not to be enlarged. The enormous quantity of water which came down from the higher grounds flooded the lower, and yet it was the lower grounds only that were required to pay. Only one word more. He could not sit down, after listening to speeches on a subject of this kind, without being reminded of a Gentleman who had long sat in the seat below him—his right hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley). In all matters of this description—in the Highway Bill and in the Rating Bill, which were to be introduced, and in the measure which had now been brought forward—there was no man whose practical experience would have enabled him more easily to point out defects and difficulties. Nor was there any man who had been more useful than their esteemed Friend, who had been a Member of the House for so many years, in criticizing every measure of importance brought before Parliament, be it what it might. There was no man whose common sense was of so much use to that House, and especially to those Friends who sat around him, in guiding them aright to the views they ought to take; and there was no man whose loss they would more regret and whose memory would be more lasting in the House than that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire.
    MR. STANSFELDsaid, the subject was one of too serious and practical a nature to be discussed then, and therefore he should only give expression to some general views with regard to the subject. The question of local government and county boards had greatly grown of late years, and the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board had very accurately shown how much our notions with regard to the functions of county boards had enlarged since 1852, when Mr. Milner Gibson introduced a Bill for establishing county financial boards to be elected directly by the ratepayers. Since then the question had entirely changed, and they had ceased to look upon it as the establishment of mere financial boards; but as general administrative boards with new administrative functions, extending over a larger area than a parish, or a union, or a borough. The President

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    of the Local Government Board had shown his appreciation of this change by the new functions he proposed to assign to county boards under this Bill, although in his historical sketch he hardly succeeded in presenting a correct picture of the growth of the county boards question and its effect on the general question of local government. The most important point of view was the effect of the constitution of these boards upon the whole system in strengthening the principle and re-vivifying the life of local government. He was prepared and willing to admit that the proposed change was no inconsiderable one for the better with regard to the functions—that of the proposal to assign to them the charge of turnpike roads, and so on—and he cordially approved the proposal to confer on county boards the conservancy and prevention of the pollution of rivers. He assented to the proposal that the modification of unions should require the assent of the Local Government Board, and that the county boards should have the election of coroners. So far, therefore, as the proposed functions of these bodies were concerned, he cordially approved of them; but he was unable to do so with regard to the constitution of the boards. He was sorry to find that the election of the members was to be taken from the unions and given half to the magistrates and half to the Guardians in petty sessional divisions. He must say that he preferred the unions to the petty sessional divisions as an electoral area. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Sclater-Booth) had said that the members of the county boards should command the confidence of the public, and they and their elections should be free from political bias. But according to the scheme of his right hon. Friend, half of the members were to be county justices, and would hon. Members opposite be prepared to say that they would carry on elections without political bias? ["Yes, yes!"] Those hon. Gentlemen who said that certainly made a very bold assertion, for the appointments of county justices were to a large extent political appointments. Instead of the proposal of his right hon. Friend, it would be better at once to accept the idea of the direct election of members of county boards by household suffrage. ["No, no!"] Well, that was his opinion. If that course were adopted, it would
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    add to the self-confidence of the members, and to the amount of public confidence to be reposed in county boards. There was scarcely a petty local body that was not elected by popular suffrage, and the question of the extension of the household suffrage in boroughs to counties was one which, he believed, would soon be settled. The Government was a strong Government; it had a powerful majority; and it could pass a strong Bill. His right hon. Friend had appealed to that side of the House not to treat this as a Party measure. He replied to that appeal by another to his right hon. Friend—namely, that the Government would not persist in saying what they would and what they would not accept; but that they would make this, like other measures before it, a House of Commons Bill.
    SIR BALDWYN LEIGHTON,who said he had had considerable experience in local administration, congratulated the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board upon having skilfully grappled with this difficult question. He hoped that the quarter sessions, in electing the members from the petty sessional divisions, would not be restricted to magistrates belonging to those divisions; and as regarded the appointment of coroner by the new board—of which he entirely approved—he would suggest giving them also power of dismissal, or at least suspension. In opposition to the views of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen), he strongly approved of vesting the election in members of the Board of Guardians, and believed that in this way better men would be chosen than by direct election; for, if such a system were adopted, many who were the most qualified for the position would decline to come forward. In regard to what fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax as to political bias, that was a thing from which, in the administration of county business, the magistrates were entirely free. He was in favour of extending the term of office to three years, as had been suggested, instead of one year; and he believed, if these boards worked satisfactorily, as he had no doubt they would, their functions would become shortly very much extended to other matters. He trusted that in dealing with this Bill political

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    considerations would not be obtruded, and felt sure that if the best men on both sides put their heads together they would be able to make a satisfactory Bill.
    MR. RATHBONEsaid, he thought it would be a mistake to enter much into the discussion of a Bill before they had it in their hands. He had, however, always felt that the great reform which was wanted in that matter was not so much in county management itself as in regard to our primary local authorities, many of which were expending large and rapidly increasing sums of money in an unprofitable manner. He could not join in the optimist views taken, whether by past or by present Local Government Boards, as to the existing state of things; and he conceived that the great test by which they would ultimately have to judge that Bill was whether it would facilitate or impede the reform of our primary local authorities. One of the great improvements to be aimed at in that matter should be the establishment of one area for all purposes of local government.
    SIR GEORGE BOWYERdid not wish to discuss that Bill, but to make a few observations on the general question to which it related. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) had spoken about the apathy of the ratepayers with respect to that subject. Now, he acknowledged that that apathy existed on the part of the ratepayers; but what was the reason for its existence? It was that the ratepayers knew very well that, upon the whole, the business of the counties was very well managed at present. The taxation by county magistrates was, no doubt, more or less anomalous, the principle being that taxation and representation should be co-ordinate. That had been brought about by Acts of Parliament and Statutes, and no doubt constitutionally the Parliament of this country, as having the right to taxation over the whole country, had the right to delegate the power to any other body. If the magistrates exercised the right, they did it by virtue of Acts of Parliament, and it was a great mistake to suppose that the magistrates were an aristocratic body, representing aristocrats and great landowners. Most of the right hon. and hon. Gentlemen present were
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    magistrates, and they would bear him out in saying that some magistrates were very small landowners, and that there was not a more mixed body than the magistrates; complaints had even been heard that some magistrates had an insufficient qualification or status. In levying rates they had managed very well and economically, and they did so because they had themselves to pay the rates they levied. The apathy of the ratepayers was a very good proof that there was no substantial ground of complaint in the present state of things. As a large ratepayer himself, he could bear testimony to matters being well managed. He thought Her Majesty's Government had done wisely in giving attention to the cry for something more representative in the magisterial body in counties by adopting the principle of double election. Hon Members opposite did not approve of it, and they had clearly shown why. If there was a system of direct election by taxpayers of the body which was to make rates and administer the funds, he thought there would be a great deal of jobbery, which would be extremely dangerous, and the funds of the county would no longer be economically administered. It would be a Party fight with a view to a county election, and men would become candidates for the county board with a view to becoming Parliamentary Representatives. He preferred to see the present apathy, for by Party fights the rural mind, naturally apathetic, would be sharpened, and there would be no end of jobbing. With regard to the management of rivers, he hoped the Government would in Committee consider this matter, as he believed it was absolutely essential, with a view to the conservancy and management of rivers, that there should be one authority over them from their source to mouth. If there was a distinct authority over them in every county through which they ran it would be most unsatisfactory. It had been found to be so in the case of the Thames, but the evil had been partly remedied by Acts of Parliament. He should support this Bill, not because he thought it was necessary, but because he really thought upon his conscience that the magistrates of counties used the best discretion with regard to the management of the county funds.
    MR. ARTHUR PEELsaid, as the right hon. Gentleman proposed to give county boards the management of the rivers, he hoped he would in his Bill take into consideration the question of floods, which introduced the question of the rating. The great Act which governed the management of the rivers was the Act of 1862; but that Act dealt with agricultural land merely, and under it there was no power whatever of rating a town so that immense improvements might be effected up to the very borders of a town, and many—in some cases—of its streets freed from the liability of being under water; and yet there was no process by which the town so benefited could be brought to contribute its share in the expenses which had been incurred. He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman proposed to give power to rate towns for the purpose of securing them from the recurrence of these floods; but he thought it a matter which was worthy of consideration. With reference to what fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld), who thought there would be political bias in the elections, he would say that though magistrates as town councillors might also be elected through political bias, when they dealt with county matters he was confident there was nothing further from their minds than allowing any political feelings to influence their conduct.
    MR. CLARE READsaid, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated that Her Majesty's Government meant business, and certainly, on the first available night, they had introduced their measure, and it was the first measure, too, mentioned in the Speech from the Throne. He thanked his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board for having so fully redeemed the pledge given by the Government last year that this subject should receive their serious consideration. He was glad his right hon. Friend had not accepted the principle of direct representation, not that he was opposed to direct representation, but there were many evils connected with it which entirely counter-balanced the good. The expense would be enormous, and they could not by any possibility divorce politics from the election,
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    whilst he wished to exclude politics altogether from the board. They would not under the system of direct representation get the best men; because they want edquiet, practical, business men, who would devote their time and attention to the business of the board, instead of the oratorical gentlemen who would, in all probability, be elected by direct representation. He could not quite agree with his right hon. Friend on the constitution of the board. It ought to be a representative board, but he thought the representative element which his right hon. Friend would introduce would be much too small. One-half of the board would be magistrates. Why half, when upon the assessment, school, and other committees, they were only a third? One hon. Gentleman had said that the magistrates paid all, or nearly all the rates. He was prepared to say that directly they paid scarcely any. He wished to impress on his right hon. Friend that one-third of the number on the board would be quite sufficient for the magistrates. It appeared, too, that the magistrates in quarter sessions were to elect magistrates. Why, then, should not the Guardians at their meetings elect Guardians? It was quite possible under the Bill to have three-fourths of the board magistrates. A statement had been made that the magistrates were going to be deprived of a great deal of their power. Why was that power given to them? Not because they were magistrates, but because they were the only authority in the county to whom the power could have been given. There was a deviation from the fines he had marked out in taking petty sessional districts instead of unions. He must say that had rather disappointed him. He thought the Board as proposed would be too numerous—90 or 100 members being too many for practical purposes. It was to be hoped that care would be taken that the Board had power to appoint committees, not only for rivers but for many other purposes. He hoped that when they had the Valuation Bill before them, some such suggestion as that made by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Rod-well) would be adopted, and that the Board should not only have power to equalize the assessments, but it should be the ultimate Court of Appeal.
    MR. WHITBREADsaid, he also begged to thank the Government for having so soon redeemed their promise on this subject. He hoped, however, that the right hon. Gentleman who had introduced the measure would get rid of the notion of re-erecting turnpike gates. There were many ways of getting out of the difficulties which existed without doing anything so unpopular. The real point in the Bill was the area, and he did regret that the petty sessional area had been chosen. It invited one, first of all, into an inquiry as to the history of the mapping-out of the petty sessional divisions. He thought it would be an instructive inquiry to go into before adopting the area chosen. The magistrates under the Bill had far too much the best of it. He would have preferred direct election; but he would ask his right hon. Friend to consider how he had abandoned one of the advantages of indirect election. It was desirable that the election should fall on one who was well known and respected by a body of men amongst whom he was accustomed to act; but under the Bill the Guardians were taken away altogether from the places where they were known, and from those with whom they had acted. This was done, it was said, in order that they might vote in the light; but if that was the case, he would rather they should vote in the dark. If they held out to the ratepayers the concession of one-half the representation, care should be taken that they did not get the notion into their heads that after all the magistrates were going to have the best of it. Let the ratepayers have their half with the utmost impartiality. From their knowledge and experience the magistrates would always have enough power if they only had one-third of the representation. There was one other objection to these petty sessional areas. Were they to be merely for elections or for administrative purposes? If not for administrative purposes, how long would they remain so? The union area was for sanitary purposes. The most frequent cause of conflict in the country was between the highway authority and the sanitary authority, and the adoption of the petty sessional area would increase and perpetuate many of the evils of the present very complicated system. He was glad the Government had taken up this question before
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    the small rural authorities to whom they had recently given large borrowing powers had had time to saddle themselves with debt. It must not be understood that he was hostile in his criticisms, but he wished the points he had mentioned to be taken into consideration.
    MR. KNIGHTsaid, the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) was a centralizer of the centralizers, and had attacked the Bill on the very grounds on which he (Mr. Knight) thought it was most excellent. The great tendency of modern legislation was to absorb all local power, and to place it under the control of London Boards. Those who originated the new Poor Law had the idea of breaking up by their unions the unit of the county, and thus pave the way for putting everything under the central authority, until the local authorities could not give a pair of trousers to a poor lad without referring the matter to the Poor Law Board in London. He was glad, therefore, his right hon. Friend had taken the county as the unit, and divided it by the petty sessional divisions as now existing. Young men who wanted to know the effect of this centralization, and how the attempt to stop out-door relief led to riots and outrages in 1837, could not do better than read the novel of Sybil, which gave an exact description of the state of England at that time. The effect of the Bill would be that the counties would entirely govern themselves and be as independent of London as the court of quarter sessions. He was glad the right hon. Gentleman had made a division between much-frequented roads and those in purely country parishes; but the former, he thought, ought to have the benefit of public grants.
    MR. HIBBERTthanked the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board for the Bill; but was of opinion that in various particulars his proposals might be improved. He thought it would be found that the new Boards would be more under the Local Government Board than was supposed by the last speaker. Whatever plan of election was adopted, we might get good working boards. He should prefer direct election, which, unfortunately, involved expense, though he did not think it would be so great as some imagined, and too great to deter us from

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    resorting to it. There were great objections to election by Guardians in petty sessional districts. It would be a departure from recent legislation to adopt these districts, which varied much in size and population, including unions with separate interests, the larger and more important of which would be inadequately represented. The overlapping of county boundaries by unions was a difficulty, but in time it might have been got over; and he should have preferred that the union, which was the unit for many purposes, should have been chosen for this also. It was not necessary that magistrates should have equal representation with the ratepayers; and he would give two-thirds of the representation to the ratepayers. The magistrate of his own district would not be dissatisfied with the smaller amount of representation. It was gratifying that so much work was to be given to the Boards, and in time, no doubt, their functions would increase in importance. There was an objection to annual elections, which even now were objected to in the case of Guardians; and certainly triennial elections would involve less expense than yearly elections.
    MR. SCLATER - BOOTH,in reply, said, he had adopted the petty sessional area because he thought it preferable to the unions as they existed at present; but if the unions could be rectified, he should not object to their adoption. With respect to the proposal that the tenure of office should be for three years instead of one, he was quite willing to try the experiment; and, in point of fact, he had given directions that the experiment should be tried. He hoped that in Committee it would be found possible to amend any faults which might exist in the Bill.
    SIR THOMAS ACLANDcontended that the way wardens, as well as the Guardians, should have a voice in the election of county boards. At the same time, he saw great objection to the principle of indirect representation.
    MR. RAMSAYargued that there was nothing in the circumstances of England justifying the imposition of tolls at a time when tolls were being abolished in Scotland.
    MAJOR NOLANsuggested that it would be well to leave the discussion of matters of principle until the Irish Bill on the same subject was introduced.
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    These points in the two measures could then be taken together.
    MR. WHEELHOUSEsaid, that he did not rise for the purpose of stopping the introduction, or even taking part in the observations on the proposed measure, beyond asking one single question, and pointing out a difficulty which was not very uncommon in the North of England. First, he should like to know what was to be done in a case like that of Leeds, in which borough there were no less at this moment than four different Boards of Guardians? One administered the Poor Law affairs of what might be called Leeds proper, while each of the other three bodies were severally located within the ambit of the Parliamentary Municipal Borough, and severally administered those of the suburban districts. The area, however, over which these suburban Boards went "overlapped "—to use the language of the hon. Member for Oldham—considerable tracts of the country outside, and it might therefore be difficult to adjust each area correctly; and, moreover, it might be desirable to treat such special cases somewhat exceptively. At all events, it would be absolutely necessary, when legislating on this matter, not to lose sight of the fact that such cases, being exceptional in their circumstances, would require careful investigation, and, perhaps, even specific arrangements. Then there was another class of cases, of which the union for the district in which he himself spent his younger years — that of Goole — formed an excellent type. That union was upwards of 20 miles long, with, comparatively speaking, but few resident magistrates; and in such cases, too, great care would be requisite to provide a fair, and at the same time adequate representation on the proposed Board. He merely mentioned these matters, in order that sight might not be lost of them in dealing with the measure ultimately.
    Motion agreed to.
    Bill to amend the Law relating to the administration of County business, and to make further provision for County Government, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Mr. Secretary CROSS, and Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 93.]

  MERCHANT SEAMEN BILL — [BILL 79.]
  (Sir Charles Adderley, Mr. Edward Stanhope.)
  MERCHANT SEAMEN BILL — [BILL 79.]

    SECOND READING.
    Order for Second Beading read.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Sir Charles Adderley.)
    MR. GORSTsaid, he would not oppose the Bill, as he understood it was to be sent to a Select Committee. Unless certain of its provisions were modified by the Select Committee to which it was to be referred, it could scarcely be considered as a redemption of the pledge given last Session by the President of the Board of Trade. The grievance of seamen was that at the present time they were exposed to an extremely hard and rigorous law, and were not allowed that emancipation conceded to every other class of industry in reference to breach of contract with employers. The Bill really contained nothing but two clauses, except what was discussed at great length in the Bill of 1875, and approved of by the House.
    Motion agreed to.
    Bill read a second time, and committed to a Select Committee.

    VALUATION OF PROPERTY BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Bill to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to the Valuation of Property for the purposes of Bates and Taxes, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SOLATER-BOOTH, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, and Mr. SALT.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 94.]

    HIGHWAYS BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Bill to amend the Law relating- to Highways in England and the Acts relating to Locomotives on Boads; and for other purposes, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH and Mr. SALT.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 95.]
    House adjourned at Twelve o'clock.

THE EASTERN QUESTION—RUSSIA AND THE PORTE.

  RESOLUTION.
  LORD CAMPBELL,in rising to call attention to the further Papers respecting the affairs of Turkey, said: My Lords, it may be thought, in reference to the Notice I have given, that a Motion ought to have been added to it. I will certainly conclude with one, so as at least to give the debate a greater regularity. There was obvious difficulty in putting it beforehand on the Paper, in the midst of the varying events by which each day has been characterized. A Motion suitable on Friday might not be appropriate on Monday, with such rapid scenes, and none could be put down during the interval. One could hardly tell for what a Motion should provide, or engage other men— without much reservation on their part —to support it. But no one feels more strongly than myself that your Lordships ought not at a time like this to meet only with a view to listening and speaking. If an important Vote is taken in the other House of Parliament, the opinion of your Lordships might do something to enhance; if none arises, something to replace its influence in Europe.
  My Lords, in so harassing a juncture the House would not be much inclined to dwell upon Blue Books, although they cannot be entirely lost sight of. The first, and most voluminous, may be passed over very quickly, as it is chiefly a mirror of reciprocal atrocities during the war, and of the weakness to which the British Embassy at Constantinople is unavoidably reduced, when it continues to advise, after Great Britain has ceased to act as a defending Power towards the object of its counsels. There is only one despatch in the second I am anxious to refer to, as it throws a vivid light on much which is engaging us. It is the admission of Prince Gortchakoff, in page 13, that Russia aims at such a peace as can only be obtained by the further progress of her arms and the prolonged inaction of this country. It is the clearest intimation of what nearly

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  everyone feels—that the aggression 'will be only cheeked by the obstruction which it meets with. Hope could not be more wild, credulity more fatuous, than the belief that Russia will arrest herself before Great Britain has assumed a different attitude towards her. To-night, however, she may do so. On the prospect of that event—in common, I believe, with a large majority on both sides of the House—I venture to congratulate the Government.
  My Lords, the most important topic to consider at this moment would appear to be the terms of peace, which have been shadowed as an argument against preparatory measures on our part. It is true that we have no official knowledge on the subject. It is true that geographical and military details may be wanting. I refer merely to the accounts which are the most recent, the most generally credited, and that because the manner in which these propositions—exact or not—are viewed, may deeply influence opinion in the country. As far as we yet know, the Vassal Principalities which have iniquitously waged a war against their Suzerain will be rewarded for their treason at the dictation of the Empire which used to plume itself on being the scourge of revolution, and, as it were, the constable of Europe. They would thus be brought to absolute dependence upon Russia, as the only prop of their factitious nationality. Their newly-gotten right to go to war with one another—a necessary incident of freedom—they would owe to a State which in the world has always been the patron of tranquillity and order. According to the sketch, the influence which Russia is to claim on both sides of the Balkans really places Constantinople at her mercy. There is no occasion to demand—although apparently she does— the power to bombard it by control over the Dardanelles. In one point of view, too much forgotten at this moment, the encroachments traced in Asia are even more momentous. If European Turkey is held by the Sublime Porte on the most precarious of tenures, in spite of Treaties and in spite of prepossessions, the interest of Europe must suggest the birth of some new Power to guard the Bosphorus against disastrous usurpation. That such a Power should exist, if only in conception, it is essential that his Asiatic Provinces should not be wrested
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  from the Sultan. But the privation of Batoum and Kars, of which we hear, effaces their security. Some minds—I offer no opinion on their project—are fond of speculating on the hope of a Byzantine Empire. The Patriarch of the Greek Church might very possibly agree with them. The late Duke of Wellington, in 1828 or 1829, gave a kind of sanction to this view in a contingency which struck him, although perhaps he did not mean it to be handed to posterity. The cession of Batoum and Kars, with other sacrifices mentioned in Armenia, would be fatal to the hope of what at all events is rather difficult to execute. If men wish the Sublime Porte to be no longer European, they cannot authorize encroachments which render it impossible in Asia. Last of all, the indemnity to be exacted annihilates the hope of the ill-used, the exasperated bondholder, who is thought in no small degree to rule our Eastern policy at present.
  My Lords, at this stage one cannot help reflecting on the habitual language of the Government last Session, when urged to act as far as possible, without hostilities, upon the Treaties which engage us. They said that when the war closed would be the moment to step in with [overmastering authority and limit the demands of the belligerents. They seemed to think that, without sacrifice, or risk, or toil, they might achieve the ends for which those means are generally lavished. In vain it was insisted that diplomacy would hardly give an instance of advantages so cheaply bought, so pleasingly appropriated. In vain it was insisted that for political success political exertion was desirable. They admitted that historical examples might go the other way; but they contended on general and abstract grounds—as it occurred to me, far too general and abstract—that the Power which has not wasted its strength in a campaign may dictate to the two belligerents, whose treasure is reduced, whose armies are exhausted. It did not appear to them that a victorious belligerent is not entirely exhausted—that he is likely to be far beyond the operation of their counsel—that he may treat with scorn the views which they present to him. It is not, however, for the purpose of attack that I recall their calculations, but rather with a view to show that their

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  decision in the other House was no unnecessary proof of their consistency and rectitude.
  My Lords, a Russian occupation of Constantinople has been so frequently discussed that it is worth while to say a word or two upon it. I pass over the indignity to which it would expose our country and our Sovereign, who used to be, who ought to be, the guardians of that capital. It might lead to carnage the most fearful, from the diversity of races which is found there and the hatred to which the foreign elements would be exposed. In all time it would degrade the British Embassy, while to the Russian it must secure — however brief—still more unlimited control than that which did exist before, and brought such terrible calamities upon the Empire it demoralized. But it is far more serious to recollect that we have not the slightest guarantee for such an occupation being of temporary character. Should it be permanent, as neither the Crown nor Parliament have any ground for acquiescing in it, it must involve Great Britain in hostilities with Russia, which all reflecting men are anxious to prevent, until our duty to the world compels us to resort to them. The measures necessary to avert an occupation are very different from the measures necessary to dislodge it. The measures to avert it would not involve departure from neutrality—the only point demanded even by the kind of partial agitation which is thought to cheek the action of the Government.
  My Lords, that proposition bears so much upon the moment, that I am bound, perhaps, to shew it has not lightly been advanced. It was, indeed, insisted on by a deputation which approached the noble Earl the Secretary of State during the autumn, and it has never been replied to. It is a question of public law, on which the best authority lays down, that when a State is bound by Treaty to give support to an Ally who is in danger, it is consistent with neutrality to grant it.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Can you mention the authority?
  LORD CAMPBELL: Vattel, book 3, chapter 7, section 105. The House has heard of Vattel so repeatedly of late, that with a view to save them from fatigue, I was inclined to hurry over that part of the subject. Should it, however,
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  be the pleasure of the noble Earl the former Secretary of State and of your Lordships, I should not at all refuse to dwell upon it. But it is not only the authority of public law—the dictum of Vattel, which may direct us on the subject. In 1853, in a long series of communications to the Government of which he was a Member, and which are published now, Lord Palmerston exhibited this principle. War going on between Russia and the Porte, Great Britain still adhering to the position of a neutral, Lord Palmerston was urgent for two measures—the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and the movement of the British Fleet up to the Bosphorus. But the argument is not obliged to rest entirely upon Vattel and Lord Palmerston. The same principle has been applied on several occasions in our history. In the time of Henry VII., according to his best historian, Lord Bacon, the King resolved to give support to the Duke of Brittany, then an independent Prince, upon the ground of an alliance, while his neutrality towards France, the invading Power, continued as it had done. But to step at once to modern times, when in 1827, the Government of that day sent out, in virtue of engagements their well-known expedition for the defence of Portugal, whom Spain was undermining, no casus belli was afforded to that country, and no hostilities were threatened. The essence of the new Treaty to uphold Belgium in 1870, superadded to the former guarantee of 1839, if I have understood it, was that Great Britain should restrict herself to that task without becoming involved in further operations of the war, without entirely departing from her function as a neutral. These instances, however, are not at all required in order to maintain that Great Britain may do quite as much as Lord Palmerston advised in 1853, without giving any Power a title to hostilities.
  Of course it is well known to all of us, that the Russian Party, which within a year has been established in this country, when they insist upon neutrality, really wish to bar the measures of precaution by which the Czar may be arrested in his progress to the destruction of the Treaties which are binding on us. My Lords, the answer is, that the Russian Party cannot be permitted to dictate to a State, of which they are alike indifferent

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  to the faith, the honour, and the interest. The Russian Party are, unfortunately, open to a long variety of charges, but very few of them are quite sufficient, to dispose of their authority at present. They have not attempted to fulfil the first condition of being listened to. It is obvious that the first condition upon which they could demand adherents, was ability to show that the foreign policy of Russia, as it was known in the time of Catherine II., as it betrayed itself in 1853, as it burst out in 1870, had lost the qualities by which it formerly excited vigilance among us. But they have not attempted to establish any variation in its character. They have connived at all the startling proofs of its identity which followed one another from the Crimean War to 1871, and from that time down to this moment. They begin, therefore, by proclaiming their incredible fatuity. In the next place, they have never listened to, or recognized, or tried to controvert the argument, although in many forms it has been urged upon them—that the welfare of the races subject to the Porte—the races they have patronized—depends on British influence they have done their utmost to destroy, and not on British nullity, they have now succeeded in creating on the Bosphorus. Beyond that, they have done their worst to check Ottoman reform, by blackening the Constitution which was founded to produce it, and thus have leagued themselves with all the darkest elements by which the Sultan is habitually prompted to overthrow the freedom he has sanctioned. Last of all, the Russian Party have endeavoured to deceive the public by asserting upon every occasion that those who do not follow them are advocates of war, when it has been repeatedly demonstrated they advocate the measures by which eventual war alone can be averted. My Lords, on this point, although it may arise from ignorance and passion, to which they are particularly liable, the Russian Party nave been led to absolute mendacity. One thing, however, should be admitted in their favour—-they are not unworthy of the feet at which they sit, or of the school in which they have been disciplined.
  My Lords, I have observed, although not in this country, that when political events have gone beyond a certain line of gravity and tension, speeches of any length are felt as inappropriate, although
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  before that line is reached they may be welcome. It was the case in France in 1870. During the eventful weeks of August the Assemblies, still at Paris, listened with increased susceptibility. After the catastrophe of Sedan no voice was heard, although, apparently, there never was a greater scope for exposition and remonstrance. There is a strong impression—out-of-doors, at least—that on the Eastern Question our Sedan is consummated. Although I do not share it, one is bound to consult the taste of those who may be under its ascendancy. As regards the Motion which I promised, it would, I think, enable this House to double the advantage of the precautionary measure which the other House of Parliament is being invited to consider. Should that appear to be its tendency, no technical objection, at such a time, can well prevent your Lordships from adopting it. The noble Lord concluded by moving his Eesolution—
  Moved to resolve, That in the opinion of this House neutrality, whether conditional or absolute, in no way prohibits Her Majesty's Government from adopting such measures as are necessary to conform to the Treaties of 1856, and to guard Constantinople against an hostile occupation.—(The Lord Stratheden and Campbell.)
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I think the few remarks I have to make may be addressed to the House more conveniently before the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, whom I am glad to see present, replies to the speech of the noble Lord who has just moved his Resolution. The noble Lord gave Notice merely that he would call attention to the further Papers Nos. 1 and 2 which were laid on the Table at the opening of the Session. Your Lordships have attentively listened to the speech of the noble Lord, and you will agree with me that he hardly alluded to those Papers in the course of his observations. The noble Lord entered into the larger question. I am not surprised that he has done so, and I do not complain of the course he has taken; but having made those observations, he concluded with a Resolution of which, as far as I am aware, he had given no Notice whatever. With regard to the general question, perhaps it is not necessary for me to say much. I think it would be better for me to leave the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary to declare his acquiescence in, or his dissent

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  from, a doctrine, which rather startled me at first, quoted upon the great authority of Vattel, although the noble Lord did not give the words of that authority —namely, that if we assisted Turkey at this moment against Russia we should not be breaking our neutrality. I say I leave the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary to dispose of that assertion if he pleases to do so. But there was one remark which the noble Lord made in regard to a matter of fact to which, as a Member of the late Government, I think I ought more particularly to allude. He said that our circumstances at the present time are the same as those which existed when Her Majesty's late Government made the Treaty with regard to Belgium during the Franco-German War. My Lords, there was not the slightest profession of neutrality in that Treaty. It certainly involved great risk, and it certainly had great success; but that Treaty was not one of neutrality. It stipulated that if Germany invaded Belgium, this country would go to war against Germany with France, and if France invaded Belgium, we would join Germany in going to war against France. With regard to those recent Papers on the Eastern Question, I am not surprised that the noble Lord who preceded me left them almost entirely alone, because they afford singularly little material for making a speech or forming observations upon. The thing which struck me most in reading them was the persistent determination of Turkey to assume that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary had said things which he had not said, and not only things which he had not said, but things which he had contradicted over and over again. As for No. 1, it is the most horrible reading I have ever attempted to go through; and as for No. 2, the sins in it are not sins of commission, but of omission. I do not remember great transactions, interesting to the whole of Europe, in respect of which Parliament has been left so completely in the dark as we have been in respect of those negotiations and of the policy of other nations, in reference to what has been going on between Russia and Turkey. When I said something on this point the other night, the noble Earl the First Lord of the Treasury made an observation in which there was some force. He said that there was an increasing objec-
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  tion on the part of other Governments to the publication of their diplomatic documents. But this is no new objection. Those nations have always entertained the same objection to our readiness to publish despatches. It may be remembered that the form of Government in other parts of Europe is different from ours in respect to diplomatic affairs. But the objection is not one to the publication of Blue Books generally. I absolutely and positively deny that it is so. The objection is to the publication of Papers of a confidential nature, or Papers containing observations which might prove insulting or injurious either to Sovereigns or individual statesmen. I cannot see how there can be any objection to putting Parliament in possession of full and complete knowledge of the policy being pursued by our own Government on a question of this kind, and of the opinion of foreign Governments on that policy. I merely draw the attention of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary to that matter, and I have nothing more to say on it. But I should be very sorry to sit down without expressing the satisfaction with which I, and I am sure all your Lordships, observe the convalescence which enables the noble Earl to be present. I must say there are other reasons which make me rejoice to see him on that bench. The other day it was confidently stated and believed that Lord Carnarvon's was not the only resignation, but that the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had resigned the office which he holds. I put a Question on the subject to the noble Earl at the head of the Government. He did not contradict the rumour; but, in his usual genial way, he answered that it was a high, useful, and ancient privilege that when a Minister of the Crown resigned office, that Minister should himself be the first to announce his resignation to Parliament. That may be; but I think it will be found that this privilege has sometimes been "more honoured in the breach than in the observance." If I remember rightly, when some few years ago the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon), and General Peel resigned office in a Government, the late Earl of Derby was the first to announce it in the House of Lords, and Mr. Disraeli was the first to announce it in the House of Commons.

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  But with that I do not quarrel, nor do I quarrel with the valuable privilege itself. I have not the slighest right to ask the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) for any explanation of what has passed; but, considering the great uneasiness which has been felt in the public mind on this subject, and the announcements which have been made almost, I may say, in a peculiar way with regard to it, I leave it to him whether, having in view the immense importance which at a moment like this, the country attaches to the position of Foreign Secretary, he will not think it consistent with his duty to give the House some explanation of the circumstances in which the rumour of his resignation got abroad?
  LORD DORCHESTERsaid, that on two occasions last year he characterized the policy of the Government as wise and moderate; but he could not now say he thought that they had acted consistently throughout. Last May they agreed to a principle of conditional neutrality. The time had now arrived when they should ask what the strict terms of such neutrality meant. First, it was considered that our conditional neutrality would come to an end when the Russians were advancing on Adrianople; but we now heard of their marching to Gallipoli, and before long they might be throwing up earthworks at the mouth of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It would not surprise a large portion of the people of this country if some day we found the British flag blocked out from the Dardanelles, and in the event of such a contingency their Lordships and the country had a right to hear more specifically what our conditional neutrality actually meant. The country had heard of more blood being shed in this war than in all the Bulgarian atrocities. The Russian Government had for the last 300 years pursued a policy of aggression, tyranny, and treachery'—treachery and aggression, so far as other nations were concerned, and tyranny within her own Empire. In the reign of Queen Elizabeth she annexed Livonia, Lithuania, and Mycenæ and had she not more recently annexed, in the most traitorous manner, the Kingdom of Poland? The action of this "Christian Power" had been far from that which we had in youth been taught to practice—"peace on earth, goodwill towards men." In their aggressive marches
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  Russian Armies carried the Cross before them; but were the aggression, tyranny, and treachery of Russia in keeping with the teaching of Christianity? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) had said that contractors, the aristocracy, and the Army were interested in a war. He rejected with scorn the imputation that the Army was interested in a war. He only knew of two or three families which had gained pecuniarily by wars in which their relatives were engaged as British officers. But we must never forget what the true character of Russia and Russian policy was. "We had heard a good deal about the Christianity of Russia, but what was the Christianity of Russia in the annexation of Poland and in her conduct with reference to the Caucasus? What was it in the Crimea when they fired on the funeral parties? It was a sad truth, but he believed it was a truth—at any rate it was a truth sustained by past history from the days of Queen Elizabeth—-that the duplicity of the Russian character was too well known to require dwelling upon. With regard to Turkey, he did not believe that it was the intention or wish of this country to stand up for that country; but he believed it to be the wish of the great mass even of the Liberal party in this country that fair play should be shown, and that an independent country should exist on the borders of the Dardanelles. That independence, however, would soon cease unless we came to an understanding as to the meaning of those two words "conditional neutrality," and he did not think the country would be satisfied unless that explanation was given.
  THE EARL OF FEVERSHAMsaid, he did not think that there had been sufficient acknowledgment of the strenuous and arduous efforts of the British Government at the outset to preserve the peace of Europe — efforts which unhappily had failed in their object. As tending to that result, he regretted that the unfortunate action of the late Government in surrendering one of the most important clauses of the Treaty of 1856 had proved a direct encouragement to Russia to make further encroachments. She received a check in the Crimean War, and he wished that we had maintained a similar attitude towards her now. What was the object of the Crimean War? It was a most

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  sagacious and wise undertaking, and resulted in the destruction of a great naval arsenal, which was only erected for the purpose of aggression and for the supply of a powerful aggressive Meet. He quite admitted that he should regret to see a new Crimean War, and it had been termed an insane policy which led to that war; but he was convinced that it was a still more insane policy which led to the surrender of all that we had acquired by that war at the expense of so much blood and treasure. Lord Odo Russell had contended that even without an Ally we should resist the abrogation of the Black Sea Treaty; but, unfortunately, Lord Odo Russell was not supported. The agitation respecting the Bulgarian Atrocities which was led by the late Prime Minister was to a great extent the cause of the mischief which had arisen, was the very thing Russia was waiting for, and as soon as it arose there was at once a marked change in her policy. It was a wise course, in his opinion, for the Government to join in the Conference at Constantinople; but no sooner did that Conference fail than the mobilization of the Armies of Russia took place. Then within a few days, because Turkey did not at once agree to the terms sought to be imposed upon her, war was declared without any further time being given for negotiations. No doubt, it was said, if Turkey had agreed to the terms and disarmed, war would have been avoided; but was it likely when Russia had her Armies on the frontiers that Turkey would disarm? Turkey having failed to comply with the wishes of the European Powers, it was not possible at that time to join in the defence of Turkish independence. With regard to the present situation, he believed that there would be great danger in the permanent acquisition by Russia of a large amount of territory in Armenia. The proposed payment of a large indemnity by Turkey implied in itself, in the present condition of Turkey, acquisition of territory, Turkey not being in a position to pay any large sum. Any large acquisition of territory by Russia in Armenia was not only undesirable, but might prove dangerous to the interests of England; because it would give Russia dominating influence in Asia Minor and the Euphrates Valley, which was the shortest route to India. With regard to Constantinople, he trusted that
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  if Bulgaria was to obtain autonomy it would not extend south of the Balkans, as that, he believed, would prove a source of danger to Constantinople. It was necessary for the security of Constantinople that Turkey should have a certain area of territory there, and should also have power over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. That was the most serious question for this country. By the opening of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the Russian Fleet Constantinople would be as much under the domination of Russia as if it were actually a part of that Empire. The object of Russia in regard to the Straits —seeing that she had no territory on the shores of the Mediterranean to protect—was one of aggression and not of mere commerce, and the opening of them to Russia would oblige us to keep an enormous Fleet in the Mediterranean if we wished to maintain the integrity and independence of this country and the liberties of Europe. He believed that the people of England would be prepared to make any sacrifice which might be demanded of them to maintain the integrity and the interests of England and the independence and liberties of Europe.
  THE EARL OF DERBY,after a short pause, rose and said: My Lords, I have waited to see whether any other Member of your Lordships' House wished to address you; but, as that does not appear to be the case, I shall make some very brief comments upon the speech and Resolution of my noble Friend (Lord Campbell), and some of the speeches of the noble Lords which have followed his. I do not think it would be either necessary or desirable that I should follow one by one the remarks which have been made on the various subjects which have been mentioned in the course of the interesting, but somewhat discursive, conversation which we have heard. The noble and gallant Lord (Lord Dorchester) who has addressed you, spoke in the character of a representative of the British Army—a character, to which I have no doubt, he is perfectly entitled—and he asked what were the conditions of our neutrality, at the same time intimating that that neutrality has turned out to be not conditional but unconditional. Now, my answer to that is very simple. At the outbreak of the present unfortunate war

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  we addressed a despatch to the Powers which we laid on the Table of your Lordships' House, in which we stated the conditions of British neutrality-conditions which I will venture to say were laid down with greater precision and fullness of detail than has been usual on any former occasion of the kind. From the principles laid down in that despatch in May last we have not varied, and we do not intend to depart from them now. I come now to the few remarks made by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), to whom I must offer my best thanks for the personal courtesy of the expressions with which he commenced his speech. The observations of the noble Earl bore upon three points. He spoke of the apparent determination of the Turkish Government to ascribe to us intentions which we have repeatedly disclaimed, and though he did not proceed to draw what seemed to me to be the natural inference from his words, I gather from what he said that he thought there was something strange and unexplained in the manner in which the Porte persisted in hoping for military assistance from us. If the noble Earl entertains the suspicion that our formal assurances to the Porte of neutrality were in any manner counteracted by unofficial encouragement, or by hopes held out in a private manner, I can offer, in respect of such a suspicion, the most absolute assurance that it is unfounded. We have never held but one language from the beginning of the war up to the present time; and I am certain that no one connected with the British Embassy or the British Government has been or could be guilty of what, in the circumstances, would be the crime of encouraging brave men to persevere in a hopeless struggle by holding out to them fallacious expectations. The second point on which my noble Friend touched was the comparative paucity of the Papers laid upon the Table of the House. Now, my Lords, it is an invariable subject of criticism either that the Papers laid before us are so voluminous that it is difficult to get at their more material points, or that they are so few that they do not afford the information which is looked for. But, my Lords, when my noble Friend complains of the absence of information as to the conduct of Foreign Powers, I would point out this, not merely that under any circumstances we are precluded
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  from laying on the Table Papers which are communicated to us confidentially by foreign Powers, but also that, although the last few months have been fraught with great and important events, they have been months comparatively barren, so far as actual negotiations are concerned. It is obvious that in the earlier stages of the war no reasonable prospect existed of interposing which would have had any beneficial effect. It was not till within the last few weeks that any course could have been proposed or suggested by any of the neutral Powers which would have had the slightest chance of being acceptable at once to Russia and the Porto. So universally was that felt in Europe that, although I believe most of the Powers were earnestly desirous of seeing the war brought to a close, they abstained, as we have abstained, from making attempts which they believed would be hopeless and which would only lead to increased complication. Before I leave the subject, I may, however, add that some additional Papers are in preparation, and will be laid on the Table without delay. Now, my Lords, I come to another matter on which my noble Friend has thought fit to comment in a very pointed manner, and I am not surprised that, under the circumstances, he should have called attention to it. My noble Friend asks me whether I am willing to give any explanation of the transactions of the last few days, as respects my own personal relations with the Cabinet, of which I am a Member. My Lords, the only explanation which I have to give is so short and of so simple a character, that if I had not been invited by my noble Friend to give it, I should not have thought it necessary to have troubled your Lordships with it. An important step, my Lords, was decided upon — decided upon, no doubt, after anxious and earnest consideration—by the Cabinet, in the policy of which I did not concur as Minister for Foreign Affairs. I should have been responsible for it in a peculiar degree, and had that step been taken and the course adopted by the Cabinet been criticized in your Lordships' House, as it was certain to be, it would have been my duty, from the position I held, to undertake its defence, and I do not think that in a matter of grave national importance any man is j ustified in coming forward to defend a

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  measure which he does not in his conscience approve. My Lords, under these circumstances I had only one alternative, and I adopted it reluctantly, but from a conviction of its necessity. But, my Lords, it is a matter of daily experience in public affairs that the most perplexing emergencies often result in the most unexpected solutions, and it so happened that —before many hours had passed from the time that the step I have referred to, was agreed upon-—the circumstances of the case had entirely altered; and, under the altered conditions, my Colleagues thought—and they did so quite consistently with their formerly expressed opinions—that, the circumstances having so altered, they were no longer bound to take the step to which I have alluded. The cause of difference between us, therefore, disappeared of itself, and, that being the case, I had no hesitation and no difficulty in withdrawing the tender of my resignation. My Lords, I am not afraid of being accused at the present time of being actuated by an undue desire to retain the office I have the honour to hold; but I do not think that a time of difficulty and anxiety is one at which any man holding such a position is justified in running away from it, unless under a conviction that it is his imperative duty to do so. My Lords, I now turn to a far larger and more important question—namely, that involved in the Resolution which the noble Lord who opened the discussion put before your Lordships. I think your Lordships will not be disposed to adopt that Resolution. In the first place, it is one of a purely abstract character, and, oven if it were adopted, would not in any way tend to attain the object which I presume my noble Friend has at heart, as it would in no manner pledge the country or the Government to the course he thinks it desirable to take. The noble Lord asks you to say that
  "neutrality, whether conditional or absolute, in no way prohibits Her Majesty's Government from adopting such measures as are necessary to conform to the Treaties of 1856, and to guard Constantinople against an hostile occupation."
  Now whether that view be true or not, the noble Lord says nothing in his Resolution as to the policy or expediency of taking the course he recommends. The view may be a perfectly true one—I do not think it is —and yet
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  the Resolution, oven if passed, be inoperative. Neutrality may not prevent us from doing something which upon other grounds it may be exceedingly undesirable for us to do; and what measure we could have taken within the last 12 months to enforce and give effect to the Treaties of 1856 short of going to war, I confess I cannot understand. If the noble Lord thinks that we ought to have gone to war to enforce those Treaties, that is a definite and intelligible view, and it is a view which the noble Lord has consistently maintained.
  LORD CAMPBELL: My Lords, at no time and in no discussion have I ever maintained that we should go to war for that purpose.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: Well, if my noble Friend does not mean that we should have gone to war, I cannot quite see what he does moan. The noble Lord is, of course, the best judge of his own opinions, and I will only say that if any man thinks we ought to have gone to war to maintain the Treaties of 1856 that is an intelligible and defensible view of the case; but it is not the view of Her Majesty's Government or of the great majority of the public. I will not, therefore, waste your Lordships' time in defending a course which, as far as I am aware, has met with all but universal acceptance. But when the noble Lord says we might occupy Constantinople—for to guard it against hostile occupation is, in fact, to occupy it—and do that without any violation of neutrality, it is possible the noble Lord may be technically right according to rules he has found in books on International Law; but you must look at the matter as the mass of men would regard it. When war is going on and a hostile army is approaching the capital of one of the belligerents, if a third party steps in and says—"No, you must not go to the capital; we will interfere if you do," that is a course which, whether right or wrong, would, in the general acceptance of language, be regarded as incompatible with an attitude of neutrality. If seven years ago the Government of this country had done what some persons advised—namely, declared that if the German Armies advanced upon Paris we should interfere, it is quite clear that we should, by taking that attitude, have made ourselves parties to the war. Is there any difference in the present case? I need not

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  do more than say that the precedent of Belgium mentioned by the noble Lord is not at all a case in point. The question then raised was not that of occupying the territory of a belligerent. It was neutral territory that was concerned, and the Government of this country said that if that territory was violated by cither party we should take part against the Power which was guilty of that violation. That precedent, therefore, does not bear on present events. I pass over much that my noble Friend has said as to the encroachments of Russia and the necessity of stopping her, the plans which are alleged to have existed, and the language which he says we ought to have used at a certain point of the struggle. I remember perfectly well the discussion to which my noble Friend refers. It was one raised by himself, and my noble Friend used the argument that if a Power does not interfere in the early stages of a war it is deprived of the power of interfering effectually at a later stage. I re-member commenting on that observation, and I prefaced what I said with the remark that I referred to it in a merely speculative manner. I said if the matter was to be argued, it might be held that interference was never more effectual than when one or other of the belligerents was exhausted by the contest; but I never stated that it was our intention to interfere in that or in any other manner. I could not do so without contradicting in the most flagrant manner the language which my Colleagues had held in their despatches defining the conditions of our neutrality. I shall not trouble your Lordships with further observations. I do not think that it would be desirable I should follow my noble Friend in discussing the conditions, or, rather, the bases of peace; because we are very imperfectly informed of what those conditions are. I have seen a summary, a brief summary, but I have not had officially communicated to me the full text of the terms in question, and the abstract which I have seen, and which will shortly be in your Lordships' hands, is so brief, and, from its brevity, necessarily so obscure in many respects, that it would be impossible to discuss it, even if at the present stage of matters it were desirable to do so. There will, no doubt, be many opportunities for your Lordships to express your views on the conditions of
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  peace, and all I need say for the present is that, although we have not in any manner interfered, nor do we think it our duty to interfere, to prevent the Turkish Government from accepting those bases, while we can give them no help or hope of help which would justify us in interposing in any manner, we have, at the same time, stated—and a similar statement has been made by other Powers— that with regard to those matters of European concern which will be involved in the conditions of peace we claim for this country—as other countries will undoubtedly claim for themselves—the right to have a voice in the final settlement.
  LORD DENMANsaid, he trusted nothing that passed in that House would interfere with the establishment of a sound and solid peace. It ought not to do so, as no reports of the proceedings were authentic till reported in Hansard's Debates. He hoped the Turks would remain at Constantinople, and continue to be a vital Power in Europe. He could not vote for the Motion of the noble Lord, because this country should, in his opinion, take its stand on the Treaty of 1856, and we did not know how far the other two parties to the Tripartite Treaty wore prepared to support it.
  LORD CAMPBELL,in reply, said, that, although the House was no longer full the course of the debate imposed on him the necessity of making a few remarks in answer. As regarded the Treaty of 1870 for the maintenance of Belgium, he at once accepted the noble Earl who had framed it (Earl Granville) as its legitimate interpreter, although he (Lord Campbell) had been disposed to interpret it in a different manner. But the loss of that example—which in fact was wholly unrequired—would not all affect the proposition as to the title of a neutral to give support to an Ally. He was bound to return to his noble and gallant Friend below (Lord Dorchester) his cordial thanks for the speech he had delivered. "Whether or not his noble and gallant Friend was an exponent of the Army, he had faithfully reflected a large mass of Liberal opinion on the present war, which in that House had seldom found an adequate expression. As to the noble Earl the Secretary of State, the public would learn with little satisfaction the grounds on which he had withdrawn

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  his resignation. They would be led to think that the greatest variance existed between the First Lord of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, and that the latter was the only obstacle to the advance of the Fleet where it had been previously directed. That the noble Earl the Secretary of State should charge him (Lord Campbell) with promoting war between Russia and Great Britain was indeed astonishing, unless his memory had been impaired. On every occasion he (Lord Campbell) had disclaimed such a tendency. He had contended always that war could only be averted by preparatory measures, as the decisive reason for adopting them. The same view had been presented—he hoped with some degree of accuracy—to the noble Earl in a prepared paper by a deputation to the Foreign Office in November. The noble Earl had not attempted an argument against the Resolution beyond the fact that it was not sufficiently explicit, and did not recommend in terms the line of action it declared to be consistent with neutrality. Would any man on earth, at least would any man in Europe doubt as to the encouragement it gave to the line of action which it sanctioned. Except in Parliament an objection of this kind would never be resorted to. If the Government declined to accede to the Motion it was impossible to carry it. He should not withdraw, but he left it to others to consider in what manner it might be least injuriously dealt with, as regarded effect beyond the limits of the House.
  LORD DORCHESTERmoved the Previous Question.
  Previous Question put, "Whether the said Question shall be now put?"Resolved in the Negative.
  House adjourned at a quarter-past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.