Sitting of 17 December 1878

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Beading—Ancient Monuments [52].
Considered as amended—Disqualification by Medical Relief* [22].

QUESTIONS.

  POOR LAW—METROPOLITAN UNIONS —OAKUM PICKING BY FEMALE PAUPERS.—QUESTION.
  MR. COLEasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether he is aware that in the Poplar and other Metropolitan Unions a rule has been adopted and acted upon that every female adult pauper, not suffering under temporary or permanent infirmity of body, who shall be relieved in the workhouse, in return for such relief shall, as a task, pick four pounds of unbeaten oakum per day; and, if so, whether he approves of such rule, or whether some other and less severe work could not be substituted?
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, the rule in question was sanctioned by the Local Government Board, and

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  the Guardians had exercised their own discretion in putting it in force. He saw no reason for disputing the exercise of that discretion in the present instance. In the neighbourhood of Poplar, oakum picking was pursued by women and children as a regular industry.

  CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY—THE PREVALENT DISTRESS.—QUESTIONS.
  MR. J. G. HUBBARDasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he can correct or corroborate the report that we are almost face to face with such a crisis of distress as this generation has never known; a distress affecting even the Metropolis, but operating with greater intensity in the cotton, coal, and iron districts?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I presume my right hon. Friend's Question refers to distress among the poor inhabitants of the localities he has mentioned, and not to any commercial distress? [Mr. J. G. HUBBARD: Yes.] Everyone—and no one more than myself and the Government, and, in fact, this House—sympathizes with the poor inhabitants of all the great centres of industry in their present distress; but from all the inquiries I have been able to make I think the statement contained in the Question of my right hon. Friend, is a considerable exaggeration and does not agree with the true facts of the case. Therefore, I hope that, at all events, no unnecessary alarm will be excited as to the state of distress that undoubtedly exists. I have here a letter which I have received from a highly respected gentleman, the Chairman of the Board of Supervision at Edinburgh. He says—
  "So far as I am able at present to judge, I am not apprehensive that the distress will be beyond the ordinary means of relief."
  The Mayor of Liverpool telegraphs—
  "There is considerable distress here, and in this respect we anticipate a severe winter; but it is not likely to be greater than we have experienced before with a depressed state of trade in the cotton districts."
  Another telegram, from the Mayor of Manchester, says—
  "There is scarcity of work and consequent distress, beyond doubt increased by severity of weather; but local sympathy is actively aroused
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  and charitable efforts abound. There is no wish for Government aid. Manchester is quite able to bear the strain."
  I am quite sure that everyone who has it in his power to relieve distress will very willingly do so.
  MR. MUNDELLAasked, if there was any statement from the authorities in the coal and iron districts—Sheffield, for instance?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I have not had time to inquire into the state of the coal and iron districts since Notice was given of the Question. The right hon. Gentleman's Question was only put on the Paper last night.
  MR. ANDERSONasked, if any communication had been received from Glasgow?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSanswered in the negative.
  Afterwards,—
  MR. HANBURY TRACYasked the President of the Local Government Board, If, in the present state of severe distress in some parts of the country, he will consider whether it may be necessary in any cases to modify the rules ordinarily governing the administration of poor relief, in order to tide over the emergency?
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, that no evidence had as yet been brought to his notice of such severe distress as to require exceptional measures. On the contrary, he found that in 20 of the largest Lancashire Unions, the increase of paupers in the first week of December was 13,482. In 15 of the West Riding Unions it was 3,063; in the whole of Durham, 196; in seven Unions in Staffordshire, 1,141; in South Wales, 727; in the Metropolis, 52. Without wishing to depreciate the distress which undoubtedly prevailed, he might illustrate these figures by a comparison with a period of severe pressure on the rates. In Manchester there were at the end of November, 1862 (the period of the cotton famine), 39,023 paupers; there were now 6,243. He would add that the General Regulations of the Local Government Board, contained numerous exceptional provisions to enable Boards of Guardians to deal with extraordinary emergencies. These provisions had quite recently stood the test of severe distress in the South Wales iron and coal districts.

THE SLAVE TRADE—ZANZIBAR.

  QUESTION.
  MR. WHITWELLasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any information has reached the Foreign Office regarding a renewal of the Slave Trade from Central Africa through Zanzibar; and, whether any measures can be taken or are in contemplation to check this traffic at its source in the interior of Africa?
  MR. BOURKE, in reply, said, a despatch had been received from Dr. Kirk in November last, stating that a caravan of 300 slaves was said to have reached the coast of Zanzibar. These slaves were conducted, not as usual by Arabs, but by Natives of the interior. One of the Governors of the Sultan behaved very well, and refused to allow the slaves or any part of the caravan to enter the villages on the coast. They were taken into the interior, and placed under the protection of the Abdallah. When the Sultan heard of the circumstances he sent for the Governor, and they have been detained by the Sultan ever since. The Government had no means of stopping the traffic at its source, which was a long way in the interior of Africa. All they could do was to do their best to make it unremunerative by stopping it at the coast.

TURKEY—RUMOURED GUARANTEED LOAN.—QUESTION.
MR. H. SAMUELSON, asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether any communications have passed from Sir H. Layard to Her Majesty's Government containing references to a proposed guarantee of a Loan of a considerable amount to be raised by the Turkish Government; and, if so whether he will lay them, or any part of them, upon the Table of the House?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, a letter relating to a proposed guarantee of a loan of a considerable amount, to be raised by the Turkish Government, had been received from Sir Henry Austen Layard by the Foreign Office and the Treasury. He had not had time fully to examine it, but he might observe, that as far as Sir Henry Austen Layard was concerned, he stated that he had not held out any hopes to the Sultan
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that the proposed loan would be guaranteed by Her Majesty's Government. No such engagement or guarantee would be entertained by Her Majesty's Government without the previous approval of Parliament.

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN—INDIAN FINANCE—BOMBAY.—QUESTION.
MR. MUNDELLAasked the Under Secretary of State for India, If it is true, as stated in the "Times" telegram of yesterday, dated Calcutta, December 15th, that, having regard to the cost of the war in Afghanistan, the Bombay Government have issued an order directing
"that, in view of the immediate importance of avoiding or deferring expenditure where it is possible till next year, no new works are to be commenced, and all allotments provided for them are cancelled; all works in progress are to be suspended, except in cases of urgent necessity; nor are any repairs to be effected beyond such as are absolutely essential, repairs of that description having, moreover, to be reduced to a minimum. No further purchases of tools or plant are to be made, and all applications for grants for public works are to be retained until such time as the state of the finances will permit;"
and, if it is true, will he lay such Order upon the Table of the House?
MR. E. STANHOPE: We have no information on the subject beyond that contained in the telegram in The Times. I think it most probable that the Government of Bombay is taking steps to restrict expenditure as much as can reasonably be done. The hon. Member assumes that it is done with regard to the war in Afghanistan; but I find no such statement in the telegram.

TURKEY—COMMERCIAL TREATIES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. WHITWELLasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any and what Commercial Treaties are in progress by which British productions and manufactures will be admitted on satisfactory terms into the states made independent, or newly constituted, in what was recently European Turkey; and, whether the eight per cent Import Duty said to be charged on goods imported into Cyprus will be charged on British goods?
  MR. BOURKE, in reply, said, that no Commercial Treaties were being nego-

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  tiated with the States to which the Question of the hon. Gentleman related—unless Roumania were referred to. A Treaty with that country was, as he had previously stated, in process of negotiation. The commercial relations with the other States were regulated by the Berlin Treaty, and those with Servia were prescribed by a clause in that Treaty. As regarded Cyprus, things remained as they were.

AFGHANISTAN—NORTH-WEST FRONTIER—LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

  QUESTION.
  MR. LEITHasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, with reference to the use which has been made by the Government of the opinion, by telegram, of Lord Napier of Magdala in favour of the alteration and rectification of the north-west frontier of India, the Government have obtained any other opinions of military men on the subject, either in favour or against the alteration; and, if so, whether the Government will lay those opinions upon the Table of the House; and, whether they will also lay upon the Table the telegram sent by the Government to Lord Napier, and to which his telegram was a reply?
  COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, the hon. Gentleman would, perhaps, allow him to answer the Question, although, as he had become aware that it was to be put only within the last hour, he was afraid he had not been able to acquaint himself so fully with the matter to which it related as he otherwise would have been. The last part of the Question, he might add, showed that some misapprehension existed in the mind of the hon. Gentleman on the subject. He (Colonel Stanley) had been informed by General Dillon, who was now Assistant Military Secretary at the War Office, and who formerly served on the Staff of Lord Napier, that the latter had telegraphed to him to say that he was most anxious to be present at the discussion on the Afghan Question in the House of Lords; but, not being able at the last moment to make arrangements for the purpose so as to be in time, Lord Napier sent to General Dillon by telegraph a Memorandum, which he desired him to
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  place before the Commander in Chief, with a request that His Royal Highness might make of it any use he might think fit. The message was communicated to His Royal Highness; but as he did not take part in the debate in the House of Lords, he handed the Memorandum to the Prime Minister. He understood that Lord Napier was anxious, as a Peer of Parliament, that his views should not be misrepresented; but he wished to add that no telegram asking him to express them had been sent to him on the part of the Government, and that his telegram was not to be considered in any way as a reply to one from them. As regarded the opinions of military men on the question of the rectification of Frontier, he had to state that the Government, as a Government, were not in possession of any such opinions at the present moment; but, of course, in the exercise of his office, he was in communication with various military authorities on all questions of military interest. He did not, however, deem it to be consistent with his duty to lay such communications, which were necessarily of a private and confidential character, on the Table of the House; but, at the same time, he should not use in debate any memorandum which was not of a public nature.

PARLIAMENT—QUESTIONS—STANDING ORDERS.—QUESTION.
COLONEL BERESFORD, who had given Notice to ask the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, Whether his attention has been directed to the reports in the newspapers of the 13th July and the 3rd of August, of a case wherein a complaint was made against the London Street Tramways Company by a private resident to enforce penalties for having failed to keep in good condition and repair, and so as not to be a danger or annoyance to the ordinary traffic, the rails of their tramways and the substructure on which the same rested, in the Hampstead and Kentish Town Roads, and in High Street, Camden Town, and in which the fact of the non-repair was admitted, but the magistrate decided that the Act of Parliament referred to gave no remedy to a private inhabitant but to the Metropolitan Board of Works, who

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only had power to enforce penalties of five pounds per day; whether in consequence any and what steps had been taken to enforce the law against the Tramway Company, or to recover such penalties; and, what had been done by the Metropolitan Board in consequence of the receipt of a Letter from a Correspondent to the Chairman of the Board, of May 1st, 1878, and the subsequent Correspondence thereon, was proceeding to put his Question accordingly, when——
MR. CHILDERSrose to Order. Primâ facie the hon. Gentleman was acting in violation of the Standing Orders of the House in putting a Question which was addressed neither to a Minister of the Crown with reference to public matters, nor to a private Member with regard to any Bill or Motion before the House. On the other hand, he believed it had on a previous occasion been ruled by the Speaker, that it had for some time been the practice to permit Questions relating to matters of public interest to be addressed to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, who, although not a Minister, might, perhaps, become one, and who meanwhile discharged very important public functions. These Questions had always been confined to matters of public importance. The point involved in the Question of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark, however, referred merely to an action which had been brought by some person against a Tramway Company and to a letter from an anonymous correspondent, and he did not think the Chairman of the Board ought to be called upon in his place to answer a Question of that kind. If the Rules of the House were to be violated in that way, Questions might be put to every Mayor or Chairman of a Local Board who happened to have a seat in it with respect to the affairs of that municipality or local authority.
MR. WHITWELLsaid, it was not customary to put Questions such as that of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark to private Members.
MR. SPEAKERsaid, the right hon. Member for Pontefract had stated quite accurately what the Rules of the House were with regard to putting Questions. He was also correct in saying that it had for some years past been the practice to make an exception in enforcing
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those Rules in the case of Questions addressed to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, in consideration of the magnitude of the interests which he represented. That practice, which had been the practice of his Predecessors in the Chair, he had followed by permitting Questions to be put to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board on matters of public importance. He must, however, say that the Question now addressed to the hon. and gallant Member seemed to him to be against the spirit of the Rules of the House; and if his attention had been previously called to it he should have pointed out to the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark that it would be scarcely proper to put it.
SIR JAMES M'GAREL HOGGasked the permission of the House to state his readiness to answer that or any other Question which might be put to him by any hon. Member.

INDIA—FINANCIAL CONDITION.

  QUESTION.
  LORD FRANCIS HERVEYasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he can give the House any information with respect to the telegram to which he had referred on the previous evening relating to the condition of Indian Finance?
  MR. E. STANHOPE: In consequence of what occurred last night, I have looked over the recent financial telegrams, and found that they would have conveyed very vague information to hon. Members who are not conversant with the Finance Accounts of India. But as I understood that what right hon. Gentlemen opposite really wanted was the best information we have at our command, I have had a short statement printed giving all the details as clearly as we can; and copies of it are in the Vote Office.

ARMY—THE AUXILIARY FORCES.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL KENNARDasked the Secretary of State for War, If the Committee that sat last summer on matters relating to the Volunteer Force had concluded their inquiries; and, if so, when the Report was likely to be issued?
  COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, that the Committee had reported, or

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  were just about to sign their Report. He would be happy to lay all the Papers connected with the subject on the Table of the House.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).—QUESTION.
MR. J. G. HUBBARDasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he could give any definite information as to the intentions of the Government in relation to the distribution of the expense of the Afghan War between Great Britain and India?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: It is difficult within the limits of an Answer to reply satisfactorily to the Question of my right hon. Friend, because the matter involves very serious considerations, affecting, as it does, both England and India, and requires more discussion than I can now venture upon. I hope to be able to refer to the Question at more length in the course of the evening. We should certainly not assent to any principle upon which the military operations of the war would be conducted by one Government—the Government of India—on the understanding that the expenses would be defrayed by another—the Government of England—and the same objections would equally apply to any fixed proportion being arranged, as my right hon. Friend suggests. I believe that that would lead to extravagance, and would throw more, rather than less, of the burden on India in the long run. Nevertheless, I fully admit that the subject is one which requires special consideration, and by-and-by I shall be prepared to enter on it, and to state my views. This, however, is not the proper time for doing so; for without knowing the extent or the expense of the war, I am not able to say what fixed sum, or what proportion, ought to be borne by the Indian Revenue.

MOTION.

  ADJOURNMENT.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That this House will, at the rising of the House this day, adjourn till Thursday the 13th day of February next."—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)

  THE RHODOPE COMMISSION.

    OBSERVATIONS.
    MR. RYLANDSsaid, he thought the statement just made by the right hon. Gentleman fully justified the remarks he was about to make. He thought that before they agreed to the Motion for the Adjournment of the House, they were entitled to more information than had been afforded respecting the charges of the Afghan War. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them that the question of apportioning the expenses raised very grave issues. ["Order!"]
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, that there was an Order on the Paper for a Motion dealing with the subject, which was to be discussed at a later period of the evening. The observations of the hon. Member were, therefore, irregular at that time.
    MR. RYLANDSsaid, the object of his rising was simply to ask the right hon. Gentleman to tell them, before they passed this Motion for Adjournment, whether the Government had come to a determination to charge any portion of the expenditure in connection with the war upon the Imperial Exchequer?—because, if so, it had always been the practice of previous Governments, when making a charge upon the Exchequer for such a purpose, to take the earliest opportunity possible to come forward and lay upon the Table a Vote of Credit for the purpose they proposed. He hoped he should not be considered out of Order if he impressed upon the Ministry the necessity of giving the House some information on this point before they adjourned——
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, the hon. Gentleman was altogether out of Order in the remarks he was making.
    LORD ELCHOwished to make a few remarks on a subject which had been debated on the previous day, but on which he had not been able to give his opinion at the time. On a former occasion he had asked, but had some difficulty in getting an answer to his Question, whether the Government believed or did not believe in the trustworthiness of the Report of the Rhodope Commissioners?
    MR. DILLWYNrose to Order.
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, that the ruling he had just given in the case of the hon. Member for Burnley did not apply to that of the noble Lord, who was not

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    debating a subject ordered to be taken into consideration on that day. At the same time, he doubted whether the subject could be introduced conveniently on a Motion for the Adjournment of the House.
    LORD ELCHOsaid, he thought he should be in Order in referring to a subject which had been debated on a previous day—he meant the Rhodope Commission. He was in the House when the Question came up; but he took no part in the debate, partly because he had not the necessary documents with him, and partly because he was not very well satisfied with the course that had been taken by Her Majesty's Government. It would be in the recollection of the House that on a former occasion he asked a Question on the subject, and had considerable difficulty m getting an answer. He wanted to know, whether the Government believed or not in the trustworthiness of the Report of the Rhodope Commissioners?
    MR. DILLWYNsaid, that as his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley had been called to Order for alluding to the Afghan War, he wished to ask, if the noble Lord was in Order in alluding to the Rhodope Commission?
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, he had ruled the hon. Member for Burnley to be out of Order, because he was anticipating the discussion of a subject that would come on later in the evening. That objection did not apply to the remarks of the noble Lord; but, at the same time, he reminded him of the inconvenience of the course he was pursuing.
    LORD ELCHOsaid, that it would be the last thing he should wish to do to intrude himself upon the House; but he was very anxious to say a few words now, because he might not have the chance of introducing the subject in the subsequent debate. The authenticity of the Rhodope Report was questioned by several hon. Gentlemen opposite, although it was the result of a Commission appointed by the Berlin Congress, and it had been signed by four out of the six Commissioners appointed. When the "Bulgarian horrors," as they were called, took place, no sooner was there a notice of anything in the newspapers than Questions were asked in Parliament concerning them. Thus, he found that when a voice—an almost solitary voice—sounded over sea and land, the voice
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    of a newspaper Correspondent—when that voice sounded in The Daily News of the 23rd of June, on the 26th and three days afterwards, the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords, and Mr. W. E. Forster in the House of Commons, asked Questions regarding it. On the 8th of July another notice appeared in The Daily News, and on the 10th, Mr. Forster renewed his inquiries. On the 17th Mr. Baxter, revived the interrogatories. On the 16th of August, the question of the cruelties to the Bulgarians was again raised, and further attempts were made to penetrate the mystery in the official mind on the 6th, 7th, and 9th, and the 11th of August. The writer of the pamphlet from which he was reading said on the 5th of September that he was still depending upon a foreign source for any official information, and that foreign source was Mr. Schuyler. That pamphlet was dated Hawarden, the 6th of September, and it was entitled "Bulgarian Horrors," by the Eight Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. Now, he had quoted that pamphlet to show that no sooner was the question of those "Bulgarian Horrors," raised in an anonymous way in the columns of the Press than five, six, seven, eight, eleven times was the subject immediately brought before the House by the hon. Gentlemen opposite, having no evidence whatever of the trustworthiness of the Report, except what the pamphlet contained and a foreign writer supplied. On the other hand, what happened with regard to the Rhodope Commission? As he had said—it was appointed by the Berlin Congress. It went into the inquiry—it took evidence in the way that the Commissioners had agreed upon among themselves, and the inquiry went on until the evidence became unfavourable to the Russian soldiery. No sooner did that take place than the Russian Commissioner objected; and his objection was backed by the Austrian Government, who said in a telegram—"The evidence of most of the refugees concerning the atrocities committed by the Russian soldiers is unanswerable." The Russian Commissioner wished to stop these accusations, and threatened if they went on he would retire, and so put an end to the Commission. But in spite of the remonstrance of the Russian Commissioner it did go on, and the Report had

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    become a Parliamentary document. Now, hon. Gentlemen opposite declined to admit that evidence. They looked upon as trustworthy the anonymous evidence which appeared in The Daily News and other papers. Now, Consul General Fawcett, in his Report, had said that Mr. Baring's evidence was taken in precisely the same way as the evidence taken by the Commission. He also stated that he knew that, for atrocities committed at Batak, Mussulmans had been hanged upon no other evidence than that of these Reports. He (Lord Elcho) had addressed a letter to Lord Shaftesbury—who had been Chairman at one of the meetings at St. James' Hall, and who was not the least intelligent man or the least accustomed to deal with public affairs—with reference to the Rhodope horrors. In his letter in answer, Lord Shaftesbury said—
    "I share the belief that the atrocities reported by the Rhodope Commissioners are strictly accurate. No one, I think, can read that document without coming to the conclusion that though it has not the usual cold and stilted tone of official papers it has a character of authenticity, and that the Russian Commissioner, aided by the German Commissioner, endeavoured in every way to suppress or evade the evidence. Probably, since the days when the Goths and Huns and Vandals overran Christendom, there is nothing to equal what is now recorded against the armies of the Czar."
    This was the ground upon which he ventured to bring this subject before the House. He would make no comments upon the inconsistencies of hon. Gentlemen or right hon. Gentlemen opposite. They no doubt shared the horror of Lord Shaftesbury and himself with regard to these atrocities; but it was to be regretted they showed so much anxiety to bring justice home to Mussulmans who had perpetrated horrors upon Christians, and so little desire to bring it home to Russian soldiers, who were guilty of horrors upon Mussulmans before which those other horrors paled.
    MR. E. JENKINSrose to move the adjournment of the debate until after the debate upon the expenses of the Afghan War had been concluded. He supposed he should not be out of Order if, without referring at all to the substance of the debate, he pointed out that in the position in which the House was now placed, after the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was impossible that they could separate without having re-
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    ceived from the right hon. Gentleman some more specific statement as to what was the intention of the Government with regard to the apportionment of the expenditure.
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, that it was not competent to the hon. Member to make this Motion, there being at this time another Motion before the House.
    MR. HERSCHELLsaid, he could not allow the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire to pass in silence. No doubt, it was extremely inexpedient to enter upon a discussion of the subject, because it was impossible to exhaust it on that occasion. He had himself gone into the matter very carefully, and was prepared to discuss it at the proper time with the noble Lord or with anyone else. Nothing could be less chivalrous than to vent any ill-feeling they might have against Russia by too great an eagerness to believe reports against her troops. The evidence was not of such a nature as they themselves would be willing to be condemned on. For the present, however, he would merely enter his protest against the views of the noble Lord, believing that when the time came he should be able to show that the Report, though it might have some foundation, was not to be accepted as absolutely to be relied on. He deprecated the raising of a question by the noble Lord as to the humanity of those who sat on that side of the House. It was not their custom to regard such matters from a religious standpoint. They were all at one in denouncing any cruelties that had been clearly established; and he did not think it a pleasing mode of commencing a discussion to cast aspersions upon one another or claim a monopoly of humanity.
    LORD ELCHOexplained that he had not accused hon. Members opposite of inhumanity. He had no doubt they had as much humanity as hon. Gentlemen on his side of the House; but the inconsistency of their conduct required to be pointed out.
    MR. ANDERSONsaid, he had been about to make similar remarks upon the subject; but what he intended to say on the subject of the Rhodope Report had been much better expressed by the hon. and learned Member for Durham (Mr. Herschell). He thought it would be extremely inconvenient to

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    discuss the matter then; but he had examined the whole question, and should at some other time be prepared to enter into a discussion upon it. What he had risen to say was upon a totally different question. He could not avoid feeling very strongly, from the reply given by the Home Secretary earlier in the evening, that the Government did not appreciate the real gravity of the industrial prospects of the country. The right hon. Gentleman quoted telegrams to prove that the country was not in a very bad state; but those telegrams were in no case from industrial centres. If he had gone to Glasgow, or to the coal districts, or to Sheffield, he would have found a very different state of things indeed. He (Mr. Anderson) had learned from Glasgow that there were 25,000 people there who were on the brink of starving, and who were only saved by the action of temporary relief. That state of affairs would become worse and worse; and the Government, before they knew where they were, might have to consider the wants, not of a small number of Rhodope refugees, but of the starving millions of this country. He desired that the Government would consider what the state of the country was at the present moment. He did not mean to charge the present Government with having brought it about—he did not believe that they had done so—but he did believe that their policy had immensely aggravated it. He believed that by the state of irritation in which they had kept the world, keeping them always on the brink of war, and then plunging into an unjust war by way of variety, they had entirely prostrated the commerce of the country, and had ruined its industrial prosperity. He did not believe that they would see any remedy or any improved state of things as long as the present Government were in Office.
    MR. H. SAMUELSONsaid, that those who had taken action with reference to the horrors in Bulgaria would be equally ready to take action in the case of the alleged Rhodope horrors, if those horrors should be proved. But he did not exactly see what Government could do in the matter. They had already proved their incapacity to make the Turks, their sworn allies, punish convicted offenders, as in the case of Chefket Pasha, who, after Lord Derby had categorically demanded his punish-
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    ment, had received promotion and reward, and was at that time occupying a high official position in Thessaly. Under these circumstances, it was not likely that the Russians, even if guilty, would submit to their dictation.
    MR. CHAMBERLAIN MR. CHAMBERLAIN moved the adjournment of the debate on the question of the adjournment of the House, because he understood that that was the only way in which, in strict Order, he would be able to ask the House whether it would not be better to adjourn the discussion on the main Question until Her Majesty's Government had furnished them with the information which they had promised to lay upon the Table. Her Majesty's Government had themselves to blame if the House was unwilling to put so much confidence in them as to separate before the promised information was given. They had deliberately left the country in the dark; and he did not feel inclined to assent to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman until full information on this large question had been laid before the House. He begged to move the adjournment of the debate.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. Chamberlain.)
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I am afraid, from what has fallen from the hon. Member for Birmingham, that he and others are under a misapprehension in assuming that I have promised to give the House some further information on this question. I made no such promise. I merely said that I wish to state my views, and the views of Her Majesty's Government, with regard to the main principles which should be observed in the arrangement and the distribution between England and India of the burdens connected with the military operations. The propriety of those views will, of course, be open to argument. What Her Majesty's Government have all along proposed, and what Lord Cranbrook proposed in "another place," is that the House should now pass the Vote which is necessary to give legality to the application of the Indian Revenues towards the expenses of the military operations now going on in Afghanistan, and without which the application of a single rupee of such funds to that purpose would be illegal. I have

    965
    already stated that this Vote is not intended in any way to prejudge the question with regard to the ultimate apportionment of the cost and burden of the war between the two countries; and I stated last night, and I do so again now, that we regard this as a case with exceptional features, such as may render it desirable, when we know to what extent the matter has grown, to come forward and make some proposal that this country should give assistance to the Indian Exchequer in the matter. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the theory that in a case of this sort the Revenues of this country are to be placed—so to speak—at the disposal of the Administration of India, because we believe that such a course would lead to extravagance. With regard to the present position of the discussion, I understood that a common understanding had been arrived at last night that the debate on the main Question should be finished to-night, and that the House should then adjourn until the 13th of February, and I should regret if the House were to desire to go back from that understanding. To prolong the present discussion, however, would merely have the effect of shortening and, perhaps, crippling the debate upon the main Question. With regard to the question raised by the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) relating to the Rhodope Report, I earnestly press upon the House the fact that it is one which is connected with an important and delicate subject, which can be more conveniently discussed, if at all, at another opportunity.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that if he shared the belief that appeared to be entertained below the Gangway, that Her Majesty's Government was about to give the House any additional information on this subject, he should be much disposed to agree to the course proposed by the hon. Member for Birmingham. He confessed, however, that he was rather sceptical as to the amount of information they were likely to receive from Government. He entirely agreed with the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), that if what had been said were correct—that Her Majesty's Government intended that any portion of the expenses of this war were to be borne by the British taxpayer—they should present an estimate
    966
    to Parliament, and ask the sanction of the House to the expenditure. But that could not now be done before the adjournment. The House was now sufficiently aware that it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to lay such an Estimate upon the Table before the adjournment, neither did they intend to ask for a Vote of Credit on account of the war. In adopting the course they had done, Her Majesty's Government had assumed a great responsibility; and, in his opinion, they should not have deferred to a future occasion the question whether the whole cost of the war was to be borne eventually by India, or whether the burden was to be shared in this country. The expediency of the course which Her Majesty's Government had taken was one which the House would have to consider hereafter. At present they could not hope to receive from the Government any further information which might alter their views on the subject. In these circumstances, he thought that the hon. Member for Birmingham would gain nothing by persisting in his Motion for the adjournment of the debate. He must confess that he could not appreciate the object of the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) in raising the question of the Rhodope Commission. No doubt it was quite open to the noble Lord to take any action in the matter he thought fit. He thought the noble Lord's intention was to put some questions to the Government in reference to the course they took on Friday and yesterday; but that did not seem to be his object, which was rather to shake the Report in the face of hon. Members on this side, and to demand why they did not take the same course as they had taken in the case of the Bulgarian atrocities. The warm interest which had been felt by hon. Members on that side of the House in the Bulgarian atrocities was due to the fact that they felt that those atrocities, committed by the Turkish authorities, ought to have exercised a strong influence upon the policy of this country; but he did not see how that policy was to be affected by the Report in question. If the noble Lord believed that, in consequence of the Report to which he had referred, war ought to be declared against Russia, or any other course adopted, he should bring the matter before the House by a distinct

    967
    Motion. As it was, he must protest against the noble Lord introducing this subject without notice and without warning, and probably in the absence of many hon. Members who might have something to say in reference to it, and against his taunting them with having refrained from taking any action in the matter, when it was evident that Her Majesty's Government themselves did not intend to take any action in reference to it.
    MR. CHAMBERLAINsaid, that after the observations of the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, and especially after the remark of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he intended to state his views without giving the House any information on the question, he begged to withdraw his Amendment for the adjournment of the debate.
    Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
    Original Question put.
    Resolved, That this House will, at the rising of the House this day, adjourn till Thursday the 13th day of February next.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.
  (Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sir Richard Wallace.)
  ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.

    [BILL 52.] SECOND READING.
    Order for Second Reading read.
    SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that as the House had on several previous occasions affirmed the principle of the Bill, he thought hon. Members would not wish him to enter into the subject at length on the present occasion. He would only observe that the principle of the Bill was that, after proper notice had been given, an owner of one of the monuments comprised in the Bill who wished to destroy it should, at least, give the country the option of purchasing it at a fair price. As regarded the constitution of the Commission and other details, he did not ask the House to commit itself, though, for his part, he believed the Bill in its present form would work well; but he should be most ready to consider any suggestion with reference to it in Committee.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Sir John Lubbock.)
    LORD FRANCIS HERVEYasked, whether that was the same Bill as the hon. Baronet had introduced in previous Sessions? He had understood that the hon. Baronet was prepared to make considerable modifications in its provisions.
    SIR JOHN LUBBOCKsaid, he had adopted all the recommendations of the Select Committee which sat on the measure, and also other suggestions, in order, as far as possible, to remove objections.
    Motion agreed to.
    Bill read a second time, and committed for Thursday 13th February.

  AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).

    ADJOURNED DEBATE RESUMED.
    Order read, for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment proposed to Question [16th December],
    "That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external Frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."—(Mr. Edward Stanhope.)
    And which Amendment was
    To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House is of opinion that it would be unjust that the Revenues of India should be chargeable with the extraordinary expenses of the Military operations now being carried on against the Ameer of Afghanistan,"—(Mr. Fawcett,)
    instead thereof.
    Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    Debate resumed.
    MR. LYON PLAYFAIR: The Under Secretary of State for India asks power to defray the cost of the war in Afghanistan from the Revenues of India. But he has frankly and fairly explained that the £1,200,000 now foreseen form no estimate of the real cost of the war. This sum only represents that portion of

    969
    the cost which is likely to occur before the 1st of April, and for which about £1,000,000 must be found by that date. The House must recollect that the Government has never given us the slightest estimate of the cost of the war. Indeed, the permanent increase of annual expenditure by the augmentation of the Army and of the rectification of our Frontier, is likely enough to be as much as is at present put down as the cost of the war. But the Government has given us no information, probably because they possess none, as to the actual and total cost of the war. All that the Secretary of State has said in "another place," and the Under Secretary of State in this House, is that £1,200,000 will be spent by the 1st of April. The war, if it extend into operations next spring, will cost an unknown quantity of money; so the Government, remembering how widely the Abyssinian Estimate differed from the actual expenditure, are prudently reticent on the subject of the costs of the war in Afghanistan. Hence the questions before us are two in number—First, is it just or politic to defray the extraordinary costs of the war from Indian Revenues? Second, can the Revenues of India, without increased taxation, pay the £1,000,000 or £1,200,000 in the present financial year, and the future unknown costs, and necessary permanent charges? At present I defer considering the question of justice, and deal with the financial considerations. The Secretary of State "elsewhere" told us that he had recently given the subject of Indian finances careful consideration, and that in consequence of the new taxation, and especially of the unexpected large increase of the tax on opium, amounting to £1,245,000, he found the clear surplus of Indian Revenue was no less than £2,156,000, so that the realized Revenue had exceeded the Estimate. Under these circumstances, Indian Revenue could readily be charged with £1,200,000, and still there would be a surplus of £500,000, which Sir John Strachey told us was the smallest balance he could do with for unexpected expenditure in ordinary years. Several of my hon. Friends, who with myself take an interest in Indian finance, heard this statement with amazement, but with gratification. It seems to have excited equal amazement in India, for the telegraphs have been
    970
    busy, and already the Under Secretary of State corrects the sanguine surplus of his Chief, and cuts it down to the more modest dimensions of £1,500,000.
    MR. E. STANHOPE: My noble Friend, when he stated the original surplus at £2,156,000, expressly intimated that recent information had caused considerable reductions to be made from that surplus.
    MR. LYON PLAYFAIRadmitted that he had not heard the speech of the noble Lord; but in the report of The Times, which he held in his hand, there is no such statement. Nor, indeed, was it compatible with the argument of the Secretary of State, who wished to show that not only could the war costs be met, but that there would be a surplus after that of £500,000. In any case, the total alleged surplus now is about £1,500,000. Well, that happens to be exactly the sum stated to be requisite for a Famine Insurance Fund, and is derived from the increased taxation levied this year for that specific object. It ought to be kept sacred for such a purpose. I could not understand clearly the Under Secretary of State when he spoke on this subject. But so far as I did understand him, I presume he admitted the sacredness of this Fund, for he said that £700,000 was still to be paid in respect to it. In that case his available surplus has dwindled down from £2,136,000 of the Secretary of State to £1,500,000, loss £700,000, or really to an available surplus of £800,000. Well, at this rate of decrease, this surplus is likely to vanish by new and unexpected charges not yet brought into the account. Unless, then, you encroach upon the Famine Insurance Fund, and break faith with the Indian taxpayer, I deny that you have in the surplus of Indian Revenue, even for the present financial year, resources from which you can pay the expenses of the war. Now, let us remember the words of the Secretary of State uttered in "another place."
    "I am bound to say, after looking carefully into the financial condition of India, that I believe it will not be necessary, at least in the initial steps, to call on the Revenues of England."
    If this means anything, it means that India is to defray the expenses of the war without the aid of England, unless the war assumes proportions beyond

    971
    those then in the contemplation of the Government. It does not mean participation between England and India in the present financial year, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Hubbard) would fain hope that it does mean, in order that he may cast his vote with the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, frightened no doubt by the rapid contraction of the alleged surplus, stated yesterday that the Resolution of the Government did not "necessarily" mean that England should not aid in defraying the costs; but the Secretary of State for India distinctly declared his opinion that, in the present condition of Indian finance, he did not think that it would be necessary "to call on the Revenues of England." We must, therefore, take the Resolution as we find it, and presume that we are placing by our vote the cost of the war on the Revenues of India. Under ordinary circumstances, I think the principle of the Government is just. As a general principle of policy, it is obvious that Imperial Revenues should not be charged wholly at least with the expenses of local wars in any Empire, Dominion, or Colony of the Crown. If local revenues are not to be charged with the costs of local wars, there will be continual aggression and annexation of weak neighbours on frivolous pretexts. We all recollect the cry of anger when the Imperial Government left New Zealand to its own defence; but now the quarrels of Colonists and Natives are few in number and far less costly than they once were. If local revenues were generally made chargeable with local wars, even our dominions in South Africa would find means of living peaceably with their savage neighbours. I would make no exception in the case of India if I felt that its taxation had a fair incidence on those classes of the population who can influence public opinion, and who are responsible in some degree for peace or war. But this is not the case in India. Our highly-paid officials in the Civil Service engaged in Indian administration and the officers of the Army pay no income tax, and feel no result of the oppressiveness of war. The rich Native merchants and bankers of India contribute nothing of their earnings by direct taxation, except in the insignificant tax recently estab-
    972
    lished of a licence on trades, a miserable sort of income tax which falls mainly on the poor, and affects only infinitesimally the rich. The main sources of the taxation, excluding opium, are derived from the 200,000,000 of Natives who have no representative voice to express how heavily taxation falls on the poorest classes of the Indian people. One-third of the Revenue is derived from land, and this ultimately becomes a tax on the food of the people. One-tenth of the Revenue is got by a poll tax of the worst description—by means of salt, an impost which lowers the health and diminishes the scanty comforts of the people, and prevents the development of the manufactures and industries which might better their position. The chief tax beyond these—for the salt tax produces more than the Customs and Excise combined—is the Revenue got from opium. This, of all sources of taxation, is the most precarious; because if China takes to growing opium itself—a likely enough incident—where would be the £6,000,000 or £7,000,000 of Revenue derived from it? We have lately seen countries—such as Holland and Turkey—suddenly cut off from a staple product of their land—the crop of madder—by a sudden withdrawal of the demand for it. The Revenue from opium can scarcely be deemed a permanent source of Revenue. I confess, therefore, that I am one of those who look at the state of Indian finance with serious apprehensions. You cannot increase the tax on land or on salt without hazarding the only protest which an unrepresented people can make—namely, insurrection. You cannot impose an income tax on the richer Natives without raising a clamour and discontent which may extend itself to the masses of the population, who already feel taxation keenly. It may ultimately be right to expose ourselves to this danger, because such a tax is just and right in political economy; but we are dealing with a country which knows nothing of political economy—one which simply views taxes as property derived by Government through conquest, and which is, to a certain extent, tolerant of unjust taxes, and yet fiercely intolerant of new taxes, though they are just. No wholesome check on local wars can at present be obtained by burdening Indian Revenues with the costs of a war beyond the Indian Frontier.

    973
    Nevertheless, if this war were necessary for India, the costs should be borne by India. But it is a war avowedly undertaken for purposes of Imperial policy. One might say, in the words of Lord Lytton, that it is a war of the British Cabinet, were it not that Parliament, by a large majority, had sanctioned the war and made it one of Imperial policy. It is a war which proximately rose as the Russian answer to thrusting the Sepoy into the politics of Europe. Parliament approves of the war, and the country ought to be prepared to pay for that approval. At all events, I think it would be far better for this country to pay a large part—if not all—the extraordinary expenses of the war than to create dangers in our Indian Empire by increasing taxation in India. The costs are not known, but it is certain that the extraordinary costs must far exceed £1,200,000, while the fixed annual expenditure can scarcely be under £1,000,000, if the increase of the Army be maintained, and the scientific Frontier be secured. I have shown that unless you encroach on the Famine Insurance Fund there is no surplus available to meet this temporary or permanent expenditure, either this year or in subsequent years, with a Revenue so inelastic and unsound as that of India. India can only obtain the money either by loans, or by the increased taxation of the people. But the most able Viceroys and Finance Ministers see the dangers of increased taxation, and know not how to impose it. The taxation from which we derive our Revenue in this country is, no doubt, largely derived from the people; but it is levied on their luxuries, and not on their necessities. But the Indian people are struggling for existence in the sense that they live on a minimum of what is necessary to support existence, and have no surplus of wealth as fit subject for taxation, and yet we raise our taxes on the very necessaries of life. You cannot proceed further in this direction without creating dangers far more serious to our Indian Empire than those which are threatened by an unsubstantial Muscovite spectre looming over the Frontier mountain ranges, like the spectre in the Hartz mountains. Why is it that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not more distinct in his assurances that English Revenue will be
    974
    brought in aid of Indian Revenue for a war which has been brought on by Imperial policy? He knows well that if he gave such an assurance in positive terms, he is encroaching on the authority of Parliament by borrowing money from India to meet an expenditure for which no Supplies have been voted by Parliament. I am sure that he knows India too well to throw ultimately all the burdens of this Imperial war on its impoverished people. He knows, also, that this country is ill-fitted at present to bear increased taxation. He felt yesterday how sensitive it is on this subject, when he proposed to ask for a small sum in aid of distress in Turkey. There is distress at home nearly as keen, and growing in alarming proportions. Our industry is paralyzed, and our commerce is stagnant. We on this side of the House believe that the wars and rumours of war in which the Government indulge, as part of a spirited policy, prevent the revival of industry, and depress the condition of the people. It is sad, therefore, to join in a Vote which, if carried, will add to the burdens of the people of this country. But it is they who will it. The majority of their Representatives approve the policy of the Government, and the increasing Expenditure which this policy entails. Our people are still better able to pay the costs of war than the half-starved ryots of India; because, with us, all classes share in taxation, while the rich in India refuse to lighten the heavy burdens with the tips of their fingers. It is, then, because I believe it to be just that we should pay the costs of Imperial policy, and because it is dangerous to our Indian Empire to increase its taxation, that, with a sad heart, I record my vote for throwing the costs of the war on the Revenues of England.
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTONwished to say a few words to the House, for the reason that the right hon. Gentleman who had last addressed it entered somewhat into detail in reference to Indian finance, upon which his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State could not speak again. The right hon. Gentleman admitted that the principle contained in the Resolution was a sound one; but because a Conservative Government was in Office, he seemed to think that that principle must be reversed. Was it to be assumed that if a Liberal Govern-

    975
    ment had been in power, and had the misfortune to become engaged in a war with Afghanistan, it would not contemplate placing any portion of the expenses of the war on the Revenues of India? The right hon. Gentleman had asked several questions—he wanted to know whether it was just and politic that India should pay the costs of the war; and, secondly, whether India could pay for it? With all deference to the right hon. Gentleman, the first question to be considered was, whether this was an Indian war? If it was an Indian war, India, as a matter of justice, ought to pay for it. He thought he could show that it was an Indian war. If he could prove that, then came a question which was quite distinct and separate—namely, was it expedient and politic that the whole cost of the war should be placed upon the Revenue of India? Upon that question many considerations would naturally arise. But was it an Indian war? Every Member of the House would, he thought, say that the Afghan War of 1837 was an Indian war. There was a Liberal Government in Office at that time; but he believed that they did not throw any portion of the cost of that war on the Revenues of England. On that occasion our Government deliberately and intentionally interfered with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the policy they pursued was so Indian that the whole cost of the war was defrayed by that country. Since that time we had advanced until our Frontiers touched those of Afghanistan; we had consolidated our power, and the Indian Revenues had passed more directly under the administration of the Crown; but that did not mean that India had lost all concern in the questions which had led to the present war. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) said that Lord Lytton stated that the Frontier question was an indivisible part of the great Imperial question to be decided by the foreign policy of the Government; and the hon. Member, therefore, assumed that the whole cost of the war should be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. But who made it an Imperial question? It was Lord Lawrence, whose policy, which had failed, was this—that if we kept perfectly still the Afghan Ruler would incline to us, not from love of us,
    976
    but from greater fear of Russia. But, unfortunately, in 1869 Lord Lawrence suggested to the English Government that they should remonstrate with Russia, and receive assurances from Russia as to what she intended doing in Central Asia; and it was then that the question of the Frontiers of India came into prominence. But no one would contend that the interest of India was less in having a secure Frontier, because the Imperial Government had exercised its moral influence in order to obtain a certain assurance from Russia. The present war was, he considered, nothing less than a purely Indian question. Did anyone suppose that we should be now at war with Afghanistan if we did not possess India? He would go further, and say that we should not have taken the interest we had done for the last 20 years in the Eastern Question if we had not possessed India. He believed that if they were to strike a balance between the expenditure England had borne for India, and that which India had borne for England, the result would be very much to the advantage of India. The Crimean War arose, to some extent, from our being a great Eastern Power; and from that time until the present we had constantly, both by expeditions and otherwise, incurred expenses which we should not have incurred if we had not possessed our Indian Empire. Well, it had been assumed that the Indian Revenue would be unfairly dealt with if it were made to bear the cost of the war, as the cost of this war ought, in some degree, to be shared by the Home Government. Those who held to this assumption ought not to forget the heavy price England paid every year for the maintenance of India. England maintained India mainly for the benefit of India. The right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), some time ago, described the position of India accurately, when he said it was a mistake to suppose that India was a rich country; the great majority of the people were poor; and he said that the impression to which he had referred was derived from the fact that India had always fallen an easy prey to the rapacious. Well, the task of England was to protect the weak; and for that purpose it was necessary for her to have a large force of British troops in India. In fact, if it were not thought necessary to make a play on the word

    977
    "Imperial," there was no sort of ground for saying that the present was any other than an Indian war. He was much interested as to what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) would say on this subject. The right hon. Gentleman had told the House that England had a great interest in India—that it was the interest which the gambler had in the gaming-table. Well, but nobody would say that because a gambler ruined himself at the gaming-table, therefore someone else should pay his debts. He had, he thought, shown that the present was an Indian question; and that, as a matter of justice, India should bear the whole expenditure of the war. But, no doubt, there were other 'matters to be considered. They all knew that, according to the Act of Parliament, no part of the Revenue of India could be expended for military operations beyond the Frontiers of India without the consent of Parliament; and his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State had adopted the exact words of the Act in framing his Resolution. His hon. Friend had stated more than once in his speech—and his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated more than once in answering Questions—that the passing of the Resolution would not in any way prejudge or prejudice the ultimate apportionment of the cost of the war; but before any money could be advanced out of the Indian Treasury, it was necessary that it should be sanctioned by Parliament. What they really had to consider, therefore, was not so much what was the actual condition of Indian finance, but what was the condition of the cash balances. He believed that they were unusually high; and that if it was necessary to advance the whole sum required this year for the carrying on of the war no inconvenience would be caused by such a measure. Then as to the question of expediency. Was it expedient or politic that India should bear the whole cost of the war? That depended upon three conditions—first, the condition of Indian finance at the end of the financial year; next, the cost of the war at the end of the financial year; and, thirdly, what proportions the war was likely to assume after the end of the financial year. On these points it was absolutely necessary that the Government and the House, before
    978
    arriving at a conclusion, should have full, complete, and reliable information. At the present moment, less than a month after our troops had crossed the Frontier, their information, derived chiefly from telegrams, was necessarily meagre. With respect to the condition of Indian finance, for the last few years the estimates have been extremely accurate, the surplus being usually in excess of the estimate. On this subject of Indian finance he must express his surprise at observations made in reference to the salt tax. It had been asserted, over and over again, in the course of the debate, that the Indian Government had raised the salt tax 40 per cent on a starving population. [Mr. LYON PLAYFAIR: In Madras and Bombay.] Well, that limitation was not made so clear as it might have been. Last year he explained fully what was the cause of the increase. For years past the Indian Government had been anxious to deal with the salt tax with a view to equalize it; for whereas in Bengal the salt tax was 52 annas per maund, in Madras and Bombay it was only 29 annas, and, in order to prevent the lighter taxed salt passing into the more heavily taxed districts, there existed a Customs line some thousands of miles in length, which was a great source of inconvenience and annoyance to the neighbouring population. There were two ways of dealing with the subject—to level up, or to level down. Now to level up would have been most unwise and impolitic, because it would have increased over a great part of India a very heavy tax on one of the necessaries of life. On the other hand, to level down to the Madras and Bombay rate last year was not possible; because, owing to the tremendous famine expenditure of the previous four years, it was absolutely necessary that the Indian Government should get fresh Revenue, and it would have been impossible for them to say—"We want fresh Revenue, but we will reduce the amount we derive from salt;" for, after all, notwithstanding the objections made to the salt tax in this country, there was no portion of the Indian Revenue so easily collected or so willingly paid. Sir John Strachey, therefore, said—
    "I am obliged to raise a larger income, because so much has been spent in Madras and Bombay in relieving famine; but, at the same time, I cannot exempt Madras and Bombay

    979
    from the increased taxation; it would be absolutely contrary to every principle of local financial responsibility to exempt a district which is specially benefited by the additional money raised."
    So Sir John Strachey, while exempting Madras and Bombay from certain taxes imposed on other parts of India, said—
    "I will level up the salt duties in Madras and Bombay in order that I may level down elsewhere."
    The result of that step, which when communicated to Parliament last year met with great support, was, that although an increase had been made in the salt duty in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, which numbered a population of 48,000,000, a heavy reduction had been made in other parts of India which numbered 137,000,000. Never, in his opinion, was there a more beneficial reform than that effected by Sir John Strachey; and he did not think it fair of hon. Gentlemen to be constantly carping at the Indian Government, and stating in vague terms that the salt tax had been raised 40 per cent, without mentioning that there had been a corresponding reduction in the amount of duty paid by a very large proportion of the population. Into the question of the licence tax and others it was hardly necessary to go. He admitted—and the Indian Government admitted—that there were many objections to them; but seeing that the hon. Member for Hackney had been, of all men in the world, the most instrumental in inducing the Indian Government to abolish the income tax, it was rather hard of him to complain of the tax which they had been compelled to substitute, though it might, in some respects, be more objectionable still. He now came to the question of the surplus. According to the latest information, the Indian Government estimated its surplus at £1,541,000. But, it was stated, the whole of that was pledged to the Famine Insurance Fund. Well, he could quite understand hon. Members objecting to the appropriation to one purpose of money which had been raised for another; but as regarded the Famine Insurance Fund, there were one or two peculiar circumstances to be stated. It was originally estimated that the taxes imposed would raise about £1,500,000. It so happened, however, that the taxes were not imposed so soon as the Indian Government wished; and the conse-
    980
    quence was, that during the present financial year they would only yield £1,200,000. Moreover, £500,000 was already disbursed in relieving distress in Madras, Bombay, and elsewhere, and that deducted from the £1,200,000, reduced the total amount of the Famine Insurance Fund this year to £700,000. Against this, as he had stated, there was a surplus of £1,541,000; and assuming, as his hon. Friend (Mr. E. Stanhope) calculated, that a sum of £940,000 was advanced out of the Indian cash balances towards defraying the cost of the expedition into Afghanistan, £600,000 of surplus would still remain. In other words, the present Motion, if acted upon, would only make the amount at the disposal of the Indian Government £100,000 short of that required to carry out their intentions, as announced in their Budget. Now, the small difference between £600,000 and £700,000 was hardly sufficient, he thought, to justify the strong language used by hon. Members, who seemed to assume that the Indian Government were departing altogether from the pledges they had given; for even if every penny of the war costs were to be paid by the Indian Government, there would be almost enough left to enable them to carry out their intentions of last year.
    MR. CHILDERS: Are we to understand that the £500,000 alluded to as spent upon Famine was included in the estimated expenditure of the Budget irrespective of the £ 1,500,000?
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: The £500,000, he believed, was included in the ordinary expenditure; but his right hon. Friend would obtain details of that kind from the Under Secretary of State. In placing these statements before the House he had endeavoured to show that no financial inconvenience to India would result from the adoption of the Motion before them; while the Government would be enabled at a subsequent period to arrange equitably the amount of war expenditure to be borne by India and England respectively. If the Amendment were adopted, the whole of the expenditure, except that for the increase of the Native Army, would fall upon the English Revenue exclusively. Now, what would be the result? Loans or subsidies to India for public works were clearly impolitic—and the hon. Member

    981
    for Hackney admitted them to be so—because there would be no checking the fancies of Engineers in India if their schemes were to be paid for out of the English Exchequer. Could anyone doubt that the same argument applied with even more force to military operations? Were it understood that the cost of no matter what expedition undertaken by the military authorities in India would be defrayed by England, the authority of the Viceroy and his Council over the many gallant and able Generals who were burning to distinguish themselves would be greatly weakened. He hoped, therefore, that the House would assent to the proposal of his hon. Friend. At the same time, he did not mean to contend that the Indian Revenues should necessarily bear the whole cost of military expeditions. He was quite ready to admit that there had been times when it was attempted to diminish the English Estimates at the expense of the Indian Revenues; but while he was at the India Office he always set his face against anything of the kind; and since the present Government had been in Office there had been no attempt to saddle the Indian Revenue with improper charges. The adoption of the Motion of his hon. Friend would not lead to any departure from the rule. It would leave the Government completely free, and would enable them, on a future occasion, to divide, as they and as the House might think proper, the expense of the war between India and England. In view of this, and considering that the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hackney would pledge them to meet out of English Revenues any expense which might be incurred by the Indian troops in Afghan territory, he could not doubt but that the House would support, by a large majority, the Motion of his hon. Friend.
    SIR HENRY JAMESsaid, the Attorney General had claimed, on the part of the Government, the right to expend Indian finances upon military operations beyond the Frontier of India before the consent of Parliament was obtained. If that right did not exist, the claim ought to be met with a clear denial; if it did exist, it was time for Parliament to consider whether there ought not to be further legislation on the subject; but he believed, with the right hon. Gentleman
    982
    the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), that the present Administration had broken the statute affecting the Government of India. Notwithstanding what had fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it could not be assumed that this was another occasion, to be added to an already long list, on which the views of the hon. and learned Attorney General were to be disclaimed by the Government, and it must be inferred that the claim put forward was one which the Government meant to enforce. If the Government insisted upon this right to bring into the Dominions of the Crown other than India the forces of India without the consent of Parliament, and if it also claimed the right to expend the finances of India in relation to wars beyond the Frontier of India, and if both claims were conceded, it was clear that power would be conferred upon the Crown to carry on war without the consent of Parliament, and without any check whatever. He was not endeavouring to attack the Prerogative of the Crown to declare war if it thought proper; but, if the claim were made to employ the troops and the money of India in a war beyond the Frontier, there ought to be some check in the hands of Parliament, and such check was provided by the Act of 1858. The 54th section imposed upon the Government the duty of communicating to Parliament within three months the fact that hostilities had been carried on, and this clause referred to all hostilities, both within the Frontier and beyond the Frontier, and whether arising from sudden emergency or not. That was one check clear and distinct from any other; but the next clause imposed an entirely different check; it did not deal with wars carried on within Indian territory, but with those carried on beyond the Frontier, and not arising under circumstances of urgent necessity. The language was so plain that it did not need interpretation, though if it did it would be found in the debates of 1858. The clause said that—
    "Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any Military operations carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions."

    983
    The hon. and learned Attorney General said that if the consent of Parliament were obtained at any time, that would be a sufficient compliance with the statute, because the earlier section contemplated the carrying on of war before it was announced to Parliament, and the consequent expenditure of money; but it was overlooked that that section applied to wars within the Frontier as well as beyond it, however they might arise. The hon. and learned Attorney General admitted that the subject was surrounded with great difficulty, and he said it was true that if money were spent on a war beyond the Frontier, and Parliament refused to sanction its repayment, there would be no means of replacing it; but still the hon. and learned Gentleman contended that it was enough to obtain what he called the subsequent "ratification" of Parliament. But ratification was the wrong term to use; it was admissible in a case in which, for example, an agent acted for the benefit of, and on behalf of, another; but if there was an independent body whose consent had not been asked, but whose consent ought to have been obtained to a certain act, then that body could not subsequently ratify, but only condone, what had been done. Money had been spent on this war without the consent of Parliament being first obtained; and if Parliament should refuse its sanction the money could not now be replaced, and the Government would be reduced to the necessity of coming to Parliament for an Act of Indemnity, which, in fact, the present Resolution amounted to. When a certain thing was to be done with a certain consent only, what right had the Government to do it without consent, and to stand the chance of what they called its being ratified, when the case was not one of either urgency or necessity? It did not follow that India should be invaded or placed in jeopardy, and no measures taken to defend it, without the consent of Parliament, because it was distinctly provided that money might be spent in case of invasion or other sudden and urgent necessity. In the absence of such emergency there was no more right to anticipate the consent of Parliament than there was on the part of a sportsman to shoot over another man's land on the chance of obtaining his consent afterwards. Without troubling the
    984
    House further with the legal question, he must say he had heard with astonishment and regret the doctrine propounded by the hon. and learned Attorney General, and he trusted it would not receive the sanction of anyone who valued the privileges of Parliament. He now wished to state briefly the reasons why he should vote for the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). The first question with him was, whether this war was in every sense an Indian war, and whether it was necessary for the protection of our North-Western Frontier? They were told last night very fairly, by the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), that this war had arisen out of European complications. It was a war which found its origin in Europe, and, like every Afghanistan War, it sprang from the fear and action of a European Power. In 1843 there was a most interesting debate in that House in relation to a war which had arisen from circumstances very much in common with the present war. Out of 75 Members who voted against that Afghan War three only remained, and two of them stated their views so clearly and distinctly that he would take the liberty of reading some extracts from their speeches. Mr. Roebuck said they feared Russia, and therefore attacked Dost Mahomed. They were afraid of the powerful, and therefore they jealously attacked the weak. They had a great enemy, and therefore they turned on their weak ally. The noble Lord the Postmaster General (Lord John Manners) spoke of that war as disgraceful, and inflicting a stain on his conscience which he was anxious to wipe out. No doubt the noble Lord entertained similar views with reference to the present war with Afghanistan. There was another conspicuous Member of the House who spoke on that occasion, who strongly repudiated the idea that our Frontier required protection, and who gave it as his opinion that no boundary could be more perfect before the invasion of Afghanistan. That speaker was Mr. Disraeli. The question of finance also arose in 1842. The expedition was undertaken, it was said, to check Russia; and on what ground, it was asked, could the people of England refuse to pay the

    985
    bill? The operations were undertaken to check a European Power, and how could the Government refuse to defray its expenses? That was the language attributed to Mr. Disraeli. There were reasons why it would be most inexpedient to give authority and power to the Government to place all this expenditure on the finances of India. It would tempt them to go to war with an almost unlimited supply of Native troops, who were, in a sense, mercenary; and though in this case the war was conducted by a mixed army, still the evil existed to a great extent. He could not conceive any time more perilous than the present for imposing additional taxation upon the people of India. Since the present Viceroy of India occupied his high office he had adopted measures which were calculated to cause extreme irritation among the Natives of India. Lord Lytton had obtained for the Executive the right of interfering with the discretion of the Judicial Bench in that country; he had also obtained sanction to a measure which was calculated to destroy the independence of the Indian vernacular Press, and to prevent, on the part of that Press, a free expression of public opinion; and there could be no doubt that taxation in India had grown to such an extent that, if ever the ordinary average production of the country failed, and famine again swept over the land, the Natives would immediately fall prostrate before it. It was upon such a people, in such a condition, that the Government asked by this Resolution that the whole burden of the war should be thrown. He knew it would be answered that the Resolution did not throw the whole of the burden upon the Natives of India. But to its uncertainty he objected. He would rather that the Natives of India should know what their real position was. It seemed to him worse for us to say, not that we were to bear the burden, or that India was to bear it, but that it was to be left to the Government to decide who should bear it. When this substantive proposition of the Under Secretary of State was put that the Government should have that discretion, he would say "No" to it. He would not now enter upon the question whether the burden should be cast upon the two countries. It might be said that by the sympathy of the two countries in this war benefit might
    986
    accrue to India. That might be the case; but when he saw that the Resolution gave the Government, apart from the sanction of Parliament, the power to throw the whole burden of this contest upon India, he could not bring himself to vote for it.
    THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD)said, before referring to the question of law, he was desirous of saying one word, upon general topics. He did not purpose, however, to go 35 years back in order to do so. This only he would say—that it did not strike him as quite logical to assume that because a war 35 years ago was unjust, a war waged under entirely different circumstances now must be unjust also. His hon. and learned Friend suggested that some supposed conduct of the Viceroy of India rendered it inappropriate to charge the expenses of the war on the Indian Revenues, as it was calculated to irritate the Natives, and render them impatient of additional taxation. He had the honour to discuss with his hon. and learned Friend at the time the circumstances arose the point referred to. Lord Lytton, for the protection of the life of the Natives, had told one of the judicial authorities that he had not done his duty; but he never claimed any right over the Judicial Bench. The Judicial Bench possessed some executive functions; and the Viceroy, with regard to these, did exercise the same kind of authority over the Judicial Bench which his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary exercised over the magistracy.
    SIR HENRY JAMESsaid, he referred to a letter which Lord Lytton despatched to the Secretary of State for India, in which he claimed authority over the Judicial Bench, and the Secretary of State for India sanctioned the claim.
    THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD)said, the fact was that there were certain executive powers possessed by the judicial body, but not in their judicial capacity, and it was with respect to these powers that the Viceroy exercised his authority. That was the explanation which he gave his hon. and learned Friend at the time the matter was under discussion. Very naturally his hon. and learned Friend disregarded his opinion; but the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir

    987
    William Harcourt) was of the same opinion, and his hon. and learned Friend disregarded that also. As to the legality of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government and the construction to be placed upon the Statute, he did not intend to give any dogmatic opinion, as was done last night. One or two Gentlemen said they had no doubt the Government had broken the law, and the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had said the same. But in Courts of Law you did not advance a question much by simply asserting it. He was going to show that it was neither "extraordinary nor surprising," as his hon. and learned Friend had said, that the Attorney General should have put on the Statute the construction which he had. Hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to apply themselves to the language of two consecutive sections as if the Act of Parliament was contained in them. But you must take the whole purview and aim of the Statute, otherwise you could not see the bearing of any particular sections on the Act of which they formed a part. Marginal notes formed no part of the Statute; but the headings of chapters formed a part of it as much as the provisions themselves. Now, from the 41st to the 55th sections inclusive all applied to the Revenues of India. By the 54th and 55th sections, taken together, the framers of the Statute contemplated this case—that war might be made without the consent of the Council and without immediate communication to Parliament; it might be going on even during the Session of Parliament for a period of three months. But within 14 days this war was announced to Parliament; whereas, by the express language of the Statute, the communication might be kept back for three months if Parliament was sitting. No doubt the framers of the Act were not insensible to the fact that from September to February Parliament might not be sitting, so that you might have a war going on from September to March without the sanction of Parliament, and in contemplating that contingency they were, no doubt, thinking what might become of the Revenues of India under such circumstances. The 54th section would have no application whatever, unless that construction of the Act were admitted. His hon. and learned Friend had to do the most extraordinary
    988
    violence to the language of the Act. He said that hostilities must be confined within Her Majesty's Possessions. But, in the first place, hostilities in India necessarily involved hostilities outside the Dominions of Her Majesty. You do not speak of rebellion as the commencement of hostilities; and the hypothesis was that hostilities were to be carried on outside the Dominions of Her Majesty. The pressure of his hon. and learned Friend's argument required him to consider these words "hostilities in India" to mean hostilities confined within the Possessions of Her Majesty in India. But that appeared to be absolutely inconsistent with the reasonable construction to be placed on the words. His hon. and learned Friend sought to introduce into the 55th section the words "without the previous consent of Parliament." But it was a bad mode of construing an Act of Parliament to put in words which were not there already. He did not see why his hon. and learned Friend should put words into the Act which Parliament had not put into it. Let them bear in mind that the House was not dealing with a case of invasion. The country had to consider a case where they had to attack a foe—where an expedition was to be sent forth. Did his hon. and learned Friend suppose that the Legislature intended these sections as a trammel on the action of the military authorities when action was, as in this case, absolutely necessary? The contention of his hon. and learned Friend, that the moment the troops crossed the Frontier their charge on the Indian Revenue became illegal without the consent of Parliament, which it was impossible to obtain, hardly required serious refutation. He was, of course, speaking of ordinary cases of warfare, conducted on the ordinary principles, according to which an enemy must not be warned of the point at which he is to be attacked. To say that, under the circumstances that had arisen, not a single soldier could be legally sent across the Frontier without the consent of Parliament, at the charge of the Indian Revenue, was to reduce the two clauses in question to such an absurdity that it would require very strong reasoning to induce him to believe that that was the intention of Parliament. He was contented to read the Act of Parliament according to the plain common-sense meaning of the

    989
    words. The Act of Parliament did not say the Executive must not proceed without the consent of Parliament. It said that the House should not bind the Indian Revenue without that consent. That seemed to him to be a reasonable and just construction of both sections of the Act.
    GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURexpressed an opinion that this war ought never to have taken place. Now that it was commenced, however, one great object should be to take care that the means were sufficiently provided for bringing it to an end as speedily as possible. To this end they ought to know whether they had sufficient European forces in the country where the war was being carried on to bring it to a successful issue. They had begun this war, as in several previous wars—particularly the first Afghan War—with a peace establishment. Indeed, it was only a few months ago that the attention of the Secretary of State for "War was called to the fact that the total European Infantry force for the garrison of India was below its fixed strength to the extent of numbers nearly sufficient for three battalions. Even now, though the total fixed strength was kept up, yet there were about 36 battalions considerably below their proper establishment, and about 16 so far above as to equal the deficiency in the 36 battalions. An instance of the danger from allowing the European troops to fall down in India would be apparent if they looked back to the 1st of January, 1857, only three months before the Mutiny. They would then find, by the printed Returns, that the European strength was between 5,000 and 7,000 below the number that ought to have been in India. Many of the great losses sustained might have been prevented if the proper strength had been kept up. That was a lesson which the country ought to have taken to heart before now; but it had not been attended to, for he feared it was too true that the gallant 72nd had crossed the Frontier into Afghanistan with only 640 men. To allow a regiment to fall 200 below its complement was a dangerous thing to do. That was only one regiment, and no doubt the Returns would show other regiments to be far under their strength. Another great deficiency was in the estimated expenditure for
    990
    this war—about £1,000,000 sterling for the year 1878–9 had been mentioned. But the very small cost of this war for the remainder of this year was further contrasted with the flourishing state of the finances. That, as indicated by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State for India, had, indeed, taken the country by surprise. He was certainly not prepared to find that there should be no less a sum than £2,000,000 of surplus on the Revenues of India in the year 1878–9; because, in the last few years, there had been deficiencies of that amount in the ordinary income as against the ordinary expenditure; and it was difficult for him to comprehend how the surplus had sprung up, and how it would be available to carry on this war without resorting to other financial sources. The statement submitted to the House as to how this surplus arose was so arranged as to be incapable of verification; because the Budget for 1878–9, to which the figures referred, was withheld. The figures in the Memorandum merely stated the excesses and deficiencies on several items of income, without showing the total sums in the Budget on which those charges arose. The remarkable contrast between this flourishing finance and the figures of the Budget for 1877–8, the last laid before Parliament, was found in the fact that that Budget showed an excess of ordinary expenditure over income to the extent of £3,383,381, and, including the extraordinary expenditure, to the extent of £8,286,666. The change, then, from this great excess of outlay to one of excess of income over expenditure, was one of the most incomprehensible of all financial results. He had had some experience in War Estimates. The cost of the last Afghan War amounted to about £4,000,000 per annum; and while there were 18,000 men employed in it, we had now something like 34,000 men—so that the expense of the present war might be expected to be greater, instead of much less, than that of the former war. The sum estimated as the charge for this year was so small that it could only be shown in the accounts at that amount by not bringing forward the charges actually incurred, on the plea of being mere advances, or by not having the bills paid sent in within the year. Both practices were open to the gravest ob-

    991
    jection. He urged upon the House the necessity of carefully looking into the finances of India, for he believed they were in a most dangerous state. In 1842 Sir Robert Peel, when Prime Minister, with the first Afghan War still going on, said the time might come when the state of the Indian finances would require aid from this country. He thought the time was fast coming when the apprehensions of Sir Robert Peel on that subject would be realized. Those who were best acquainted with India well knew how serious was the danger from putting on additional taxes. It only remained to protest against the increased and increasing taxation in India. It was not only unfair to the people, but dangerous to our power. In the East, oppressive taxation was the main cause of dissatisfaction and the cause of risings of populations. Instead of avoiding the evil ways of Eastern Princes they were imitating and enforcing their bad courses, and with the more danger, because they backed up that practice with a powerful military force, so that the openings for risings, as under Native Rulers, was prevented. The result would be deadly hatred against their taxation and, consequently, of their rule. Those remarks were made with regard to the speech of the noble Lord the Vice President (Lord George Hamilton), who had, he regretted to hear, again made allusion to the question of the equalization of taxation in India—as if that taxation had been lessened. It had, on the contrary, been largely added to, on the pretext of providing for famines. And the first use made of the Fund raised for that object was to spend it in war. Again, when the noble Lord spoke about equalization in reference to the salt tax, he should have referred to the great inequalities in the land tax. It was a fact—partly in consideration of the salt tax at the time of the permanent settlement—that in Bengal that land tax was set at a low rate, in comparison with the area and population; while in Madras the land tax was high, at the time we took the territories from the Nabob of the Carnatic, because the salt tax was very moderate. The population of Bengal was nearly double that of Madras, and the cultivated area was believed to be nearly double; and yet Madras paid £4,500,000 for land tax, and Bengal but £3,000,000.
    992
    That was not equal taxation, in his opinion. The land tax of Madras was settled in the first year of this century at a high rate, because there was no salt monopoly, such as then existed in Bengal. But in 1805 a small salt tax was converted into a close and costly monopoly. This was initiated by orders from Bengal, and since then many additions had been made to the Madras burdens under the same dictation; and so high had that salt impost been raised, that Madras alone contributed about one-fourth of the total amount collected in all India from the salt tax. He declared it was unjust to impose on the poorest classes in India the excessive salt tax, as it was imposed at the present time. Out of a net income, for all India, of £37,000,000 sterling, £6,000,000 were raised from the salt tax, and the bulk of that amount from the classes who were, above all others, most unable to spare the money. Although they were engaged in a war with Afghanistan, no person could tell in what way they intended to rectify their Frontier. They had had, with respect to Afghanistan, different proposals, which included very large operations, that might involve us in serious difficulties. So far back as 1868 Sir Henry Rawlinson—then a Member of that Hoiise—submitted to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer a proposal to occupy Herat, Candahar, and Quetta. Since then he had become a Member of the Council of the Secretary of State, and had published his former proposal, with a statement of the garrison needed for that occupation. The force named, of 10,000 men, appeared very far below the number needed. The Papers recently laid before Parliament were totally devoid of proofs in support of our proposed or our present policy. No doubt Lord Napier of Magdala had supplied a Memorandum, dated in May last, condemning the past policy; but it must be borne in mind that Lord Napier was not now in any office which involved official responsibility for Indian affairs. Nay, more; although Lord Napier had been a Member of the Governments of the last six Viceroys—from Lord Canning to Lord Lytton—and had been the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay and of all India, yet he had never before recorded disapproval of the past policy, so far as the Papers showed; but, on the contrary, had opposed, as

    993
    he stated, the advance on Quetta. In 1867 the Government of India had under their consideration a proposal to advance their Forces as far as Quetta, when General Jacob urged this advance. But there must be some mistake in this; because General Jacob was dead before Lord Napier became a member of Lord Canning's Council. That proposal emanated from the Government of Bombay; and as Lord Napier of Magdala was then Commander-in-Chief of the Army of that Presidency, it might be supposed that his opinion on this military movement must have been expressed. It was to be regretted that these Papers had been kept back from Parliament; because they saw from chance passages that the proposal was fully considered by Lord Lawrence's Government. At that time Sir William Mansfield was Commander-in-Chief, and his Minute, dated October 5, 1867, was entirely against the advance to Quetta. Sir Henry Norman also stated that his Memorandum of October 5, 1867, contained strong opinions against that advance. They also learnt that other Minutes were recorded by Lord Lawrence and members of the Council entirely at variance with the proposals then made; but those Minutes had never been laid before Parliament, though repeated applications had been made for them. That was more objectionable, because the present Chancellor of the Exchequer was then Secretary of State; and it would be useful to contrast his then views with those of the present Government as to our movements in advance. It might also be inferred from the Papers that the cost of that proposal was calculated out; so that when Sir William Mansfield opposed the advance on Quetta, he probably thought that the money to be spent on that movement might be better employed, without going so far away from the base of our operations. Those Papers should be produced, not only to supply information, but to enable the House to ascertain the then views of the Bombay Commander-in-Chief. The hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James) having quoted the strong speeches of the noble Lord the Postmaster General in 1842 against the former Afghan War, he (Sir George Balfour) would quote from a pamphlet published by the noble Lord in 1843,
    994
    in which he described the Chinese and Afghan Wars of that time as a piece of insolent dictation on our part, and he must express his regret that the noble Lord, when in Office, had now changed his opinions in favour of the justice of this war. The pamphlet of the noble Lord was worthy the perusal of hon. Members. In it would be found lamentations over the ruin and desolation which was coming on England by reason of our wars and our wasteful expenditure, public and private. This decay of England was then the fashion of a set of young men to put forward; and the noble Lord urged, as an indication of that decadence, the decrease of Maypoles. But a far more sensible statement was therein made by the noble Lord, who pointed out that the nation had recently spent
    "Untold millions in slaughtering the Afghans and the Chinese, because the former would not submit to our insolent dictation, and the latter to our invasion of their fiscal Code."
    These last quoted youthful views were far more consistent with right and justice than those now held by the noble Lord as to the necessity for this war, and as to our right to occupy Quetta under Treaty rights. No doubt a Treaty made in 1854 with the Khan of Khelat did give that right; but there were two Treaties made in 1839 by Sir Alexander Burnes, and another by Sir James Outram in 1841, which distinctly recognized Khelat as owning allegiance and fealty to the Afghan Government. The Treaty of 1841 was cancelled by the Treaty of 1854, but not with the consent of the Ruler of Afghanistan; and the 1839 Treaty had never been abrogated, though they had styled it a "dead letter." On those grounds, the occupation of Quetta had always appeared to him a very doubtful matter; and he had always thought that the Ameer of Afghanistan had a fair claim to be consulted, and his objections removed, before we marched our troops to Quetta. We had entered into a Treaty, by force and violence, with the Khan of Khelat; whereas we should at that very time have arranged with Dost Mahomed, when that Ameer was our friend, for leave to occupy Quetta. The scheme had been further developed; and now the intention was, to all appearance, to occupy Candahar, and probably eventu.

    995
    ally to force us on to Herat. He warned the Government against the danger of their policy. It involved very serious complications and difficulties. Their present costly Army in India was quite insufficient for the additional strain for those new garrisons. The finances of India could not be increased, and their political responsibilities must be vastly swelled up. And he regretted that those complications had been brought about by the Government refusing to continue the negotiations with the Ameer. With regard to the Ameer's main objection to the more close alliance between the Governments—namely, the admission of British officers into his country—he might remind the House that when they were taking up the cause of Shah Soojah he had particularly requested that British officers should not be allowed to interfere with his Government—a circumstance that proved the desire of the Afghans for absolute independence. Even when Sir John Lawrence and Sir Herbert Edwardes negotiated the 1857 Treaty with Dost Mahomed, and though they then agreed to pay large subsidies, yet that Ruler insisted on conditions which so thoroughly restricted the interference of British officers as to enable the Ruler at Candahar to keep the Lumsden Mission—sent there to see to the proper application of our funds—in a virtual state of imprisonment. It was much to be regretted that the war had been begun, or had been found necessary, from the forced closing of the negotiations. He could not help thinking that if Sir Lewis Pelly, Major Cavagnari, and Dr. Bellew had been allowed to carry on their negotiations by themselves, under general instructions from the Viceroy, they would have been more successful in securing an agreement on all essentials, without entailing conditions hateful to the people and Rulers of Afghanistan. The freedom formerly given to Indian politicians to work out negotiations on broad instructions, without too close an adherence to details, was the secret of success in past years. When negotiators met with less interference, they were individually interested in securing agreement. With those remarks he would close by adding that, in all probability, the result of the war would be to reduce, rather than increase, their influence within India; and he could
    996
    only regret that the position which the Government had taken up to strengthen their Frontiers would produce such evil results as to endanger the peace and security of the heart of the Empire.
    MR. BALFOURsaid, that not long since the Government had been taunted by the Opposition with making arrangements which would confuse the discussion before the House; but now the Opposition had themselves inflicted this inconvenience on the House by introducing into that debate speeches with a special bearing upon the question they had been considering last week. This example he did not propose to follow. He would confine himself to two questions—namely, the legality of the Government's action with regard to the Act of 1858, which had been disputed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, and the question raised by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) as to whether this was or was not an Indian War. With regard to the first of these questions, he would not enter into any minute verbal criticisms. He relied upon the intention of the Legislature in passing the 54th clause of the Act. There could be no doubt that its object had been rightly described by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. It had in view, as he had stated, a limitation of the power of the Crown in declaring war. But the accuracy of the right hon. Gentleman had ended there. There could be no doubt that the whole object of that clause was to put the making of war with Indian troops on exactly the same footing as the making of war with English troops. Its purpose was not to put extra restraints upon the Royal Prerogative in India, but to reduce the power of the Crown in India to the same footing on which it stood with respect to English troops in Europe—for previously to 1858 the Royal Prerogative in India had been much greater than at home. This view had the support of many high authorities. The late Lord Derby, for example, at the time of the Abyssinian War, had declared that the object of the Act of 1858 was to place the Crown in exactly the same position in India as it already occupied in Europe. During the 20 years that had elapsed since the passing of the Act the English Government had twice pursued precisely the same course as on the pre-

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    sent occasion—in the Abyssinian War and the China War of 1859–60. The latter war was carried on by a Ministry of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich was Chancellor of Exchequer; and on that occasion the right hon. Gentleman dealt with regard to Indian Revenues precisely as the present Government were now doing. In the debates upon the Abyssinian War the right hon. Gentleman raised the same objection as now, and he had been met by the reply that he and his Colleagues had acted similarly with regard to the China War. His answer was that that was a case of sudden and urgent necessity, and that therefore their action had been covered by the Act. But surely in the present case, as in every other, it lay with the Government to decide what was and what was not a case of urgent necessity. If that were not so the clause of the Act of 1858 was no more than waste paper. He would now pass on to the point of equity which had been raised by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). The hon. Member had more than once announced beforehand to the House that he could prove this war to be, on the showing of the Government themselves, a European war; and he (Mr. Balfour) had, therefore, looked forward to the speech of the hon. Member with much curiosity. But when it came to the point they found that his only argument was founded upon the use of the word "Imperialism"—a word which had been used much more often on the other side of the House than by the supporters of the Government. The hon. Member had touched upon the subject very lightly, and had soon gone off to his favourite topic—the poverty of India and the riches of England, the selfish conduct of Anglo Indians, and the general shortcomings of Secretaries of State. The argument from Imperialism amounted to very little, because the word was used to signify a good many different things. His definition of it was this—that they recognized themselves as parts of a great Empire spread over the world which had great responsibilities and duties; and, further, that this was not a burden to be grumbled at and thrown off at the first opportunity, but one that had great privileges which no English Government would have the courage to throw
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    off, whatever its Members might say when they were not in power. There could be no doubt but that the immediate occasion of the war was an insult offered to England; but the more profound cause of the war was the necessity which every Indian Government felt, and must feel, of keeping Afghanistan in such a position that it should be not a menace, but a cause of safety to India. That feeling lay at the root of all our Indian policy, and it was on that ground that he asserted that if ever a war could be correctly described as an Indian war, this one deserved that title. Were we to leave India to-morrow, our successors would at once find that Afghanistan was not a place which could be left to become the centre of intrigue and of military operations against that country. That was the case before we went to India; it was the case now, and it would be the case after we left there. Even if England had not been the possessor of India, the Russian movement in that direction would have been made sooner or later. In these circumstances, the House could not do better than reject the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hackney.
    SIR WILFRID LAWSON: Sir, although there has been a long debate on the Amendment to the Address, the House will remember that this is the debate which we are specially summoned to carry on, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer has explained to us that Parliament was summoned for the purpose of fulfilling the statutory obligation which made it necessary to consult the House of Commons, by which the money is to be provided for carrying on the war in which we are unfortunately engaged. That is the subject which we have now to discuss; but we cannot discuss this matter simply as a matter of revenue and finance. I think when you discuss finance it necessarily involves the discussion of the policy which has rendered it necessary for you to raise the money. We met on Thursday week; and the next morning I was very much surprised, to read in "the leading journal" that Parliament was opened under very "happy auspices." Why, on that very day, an hour after we had met, one of the right hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Ministerial Benches got up and told us of a battle which had taken place in Afghanistan, and read a telegram

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    stating that a very large number of the enemy had been killed, and 50 of our own men and two well-known officers had lost their lives. That was a day of slaughter and disaster in that country, and it seems to me extraordinary that in a Christian country that should be called a Parliament meeting "under happy auspices." In Her Majesty's gracious Speech she said that we should give full deliberation to this Afghan War—and by fully deliberating I mean gravely considering whether the war in which we are engaged is a war of policy and justice, or whether it might have been avoided and put a stop to. I do not think that is a question which we can discuss at too great length. The lives of our soldiers are at stake, and that is a matter to which too much importance cannot be attached. I have heard debates in this House as to saving the life of some criminal under sentence of death, and the House did not think it unnecessary to debate at length whether the man's life should be taken or spared. Is it not equally important to consider the lives of our brave soldiers now engaged in warfare in a distant land?—
    "For when the life of man is in debate,
    No time can he too long, no pains too great."
    But that is not the only thing that makes our meeting a disastrous one. There were other things to be considered. There is an African War looming behind; we have banks breaking, mills stopping, masters failing, and men starving; and, so far from meeting under "happy auspices," I think the House has never met under more gloomy, humiliating, depressing, and disastrous circumstances. Let us, then, discuss whether this Afghan War is calculated to brighten the state of things which I have described. I am glad this question has been brought under discussion in the House of Commons, because it seems to me we have been living for the last two years in what might be called a Reign of Terror. We have not been allowed to enjoy free discussion in this country. ["Hear, hear!"] I hear the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) cheer. I do not know whether he cheers the remark, or is delighted at the fact that free discussion has been put down. He knows, as well as I do, that if anybody dared, in London at any rate, to speak in
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    favour of peace, he would be assailed, not only with sneers and abuse, but with sticks and threats of violence. ["Hear, hear!"] Does the noble Lord who cheered remember the meetings in Hyde Park? I do not know whether he led the brigade on that occasion, but he was very likely among them. It is not out of place to allude to this, for I see by the papers that a new patriotic association has been formed with the object of informing and enlightening public opinion. That is, they intend to inform the public of what their opinions are, and to take good care to put down everybody else who expresses different opinions. That is what is called patriotism. I think, like the noble Lord, they are very mistaken patriots. Patriotism does not consist in singing "Rule Britannia" from morning till night, in flinging dead cats, or in sitting in a snug Editor's room and writing leading articles hounding on your countrymen to the slaughter and the death you yourself dare not face. Those are the true patriots who stand up for the truth even when it is unpopular; and there was far more patriotism in my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) bringing forward his Resolution—which he did in a masterly manner—even though he advocated an unpopular cause, than in singing "Jingo" songs and "Rule Britannia." I think that even in Her Majesty's gracious Speech from the Throne the Government did not deal frankly with the House. The Ministers make Her Majesty say—"I receive from all foreign Powers assurances of their friendly feelings." That may be the truth, but it does not express the whole truth; because I am quite sure there can be no friendly feelings entertained by them towards Russia. You call this a war with Afghanistan, but you are really fighting Russia. There can be no doubt about it. Why, the greatest panic-monger in the country would not be afraid of anything that Afghanistan could do. Even the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire would not be afraid of the Afghans, and the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel)—the King of the Jingoes—would not be so absurd as to say that we were afraid of anything the Afghans could do. No:—and because you were afraid to attack Russia, afraid to attack

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    the big one, you set to work to fight the little one. That appears to me to be as plain as any fact in ancient or modern history. Do you remember what you did at the Island of Tanna? It appeared that a murder had been committed, and one of Her Majesty's ships was sent to catch the murderer. They could not catch him, but they caught his brother, and found out to their satisfaction that, although the man had not committed the murder, he no doubt would have done so if his brother had not done it for him—and so they hanged him. A Correspondent of one of the newspapers, writing of this transaction, said—
    "It is too soon now to know what will be the effect of this act on the inhabitants of the Island, but all seem to acquiesce in its justice."
    That came before the House of Commons last year, and the Government had a bad quarter of an hour. They did not attempt to defend the act, and the House condemned it. I believe, in like manner, the time will come when this country will say there is nothing to be proud of in these Afghan victories, and that this war is what I do not hesitate to call it—a cowardly, a cruel, and a contemptible war. I sometimes wonder what has become of our former boasted English generosity. Are we the same nation that used to sympathize with the wrongs of Poland and the oppression of Hungary, when we are now backing up this Government of ours in fighting to put down the independence and freedom of a nation that has never done us any harm? Just suppose the case reversed. Suppose Russia had been forcing herself on Afghanistan and doing what we are doing now. What articles we should have had in The Daily Telegraph and Times; how we should be called on to succour those patriots who are defending their mountain homes! But now, the case being reversed, we being the invaders and tyrants and oppressors, nothing is too bad for these wretched people, and nothing too good for us, who are carrying on this wickedness and oppression. And this just after we had teen told with such a flourish of trumpets that we had gained "peace with honour." The official Papers show that the Government have been inventing pretexts, creating opportunities, and taking advantage. This is not a very nice story for Englishmen to read. I
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    say this is war with dishonour, and dishonour that will long adhere to the name of this country. We all remember Talleyrand saying that words were made to conceal our thoughts. This Blue Book which the Government have presented us with was given us to conceal their policy. In one of the most memorable debates of last Session the Home Secretary said there was "a lying spirit" abroad. That lying spirit was probably abroad on this side of the House, and it pervaded the other side of the House to an equal extent. But suppose the state of things into which we have unfortunately been drawn had been brought about in the most honourable manner, surely we need not have rushed into the war with such haste. An hon. Member who sits on the other side of the House, and whose observations may therefore be received with some respect by my hon. Friends opposite, discussing with me the career of the present Administration up to the close of the last Session, said—"The present Government were put into power for the purpose of doing nothing, and they had great trouble in doing it until the Obstructives came to their assistance." Now, the Obstructives are, for the time, quiet. I believe they are busy digesting the million that was given to them to keep them quiet last year; and as the Government were deprived of their assistance in doing nothing they entered into war—if it should not rather be termed massacre—with this miserable Ameer to turn attention away from their other policies and to give them another lease of power. I say that, because it is so difficult to arrive at what the war was really made for. First we had Lord Cranbrook's despatch, full of all sorts of reasons for the war. Then we had another statement from the noble Lord which amounted to this—that he had got a surplus from the Indian Revenue, and might as well spend it in fighting the Afghans. And how was this surplus obtained? By the opium monopoly; and so it has come to this—that we get money by poisoning the Chinese and spend it in killing the Afghans. I have got a new reason for the war this afternoon. If anybody turns to The Echo he will find a letter from the Bishop of Gloucester, and that excellent Prelate defends and supports this attack on the Afghans and the

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    slaughter of the Ameer's subjects. He says he does so because he is interested in the blessed work of the propagation of the Gospel—and he goes on to explain that he thinks England will carry on the work much better than the Russians. So that all the Border Chiefs who have made friends with us, and all the wild hill tribes we have heard so much of, are simply one branch of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. So much for the reasons of these statesmen and ecclesiastics. But that is not the real reason of the war. I go to the fountain head. I go to an after dinner speech delivered at the Guildhall by the Prime Minister. I do so because the Prime Minister emphasized his statement by saying that erroneous reports had gone abroad, but that there, at the Guildhall, words of sense and truth were spoken; and in the awful presence of the Lord Mayor he declared what was the real reason of this war. He said that it was to get "a scientific Frontier"—to rectify our Frontier. I know what that means; it means robbery—neither more nor less. The Prime Minister is a master of phrases. He once said he had "concentrated" the Sultan; which meant that he had cut him in pieces—and this "rectification" which he talked about was nothing more than robbing and shooting the Afghans on purpose to get bold of their property, to which they have a right, and to which England has none. That is the policy of England, and I am ashamed, at it. Lord Beaconsfield is a modern Ahab, and the wretched Ameer is Naboth the Jezreelite. But that is not the worst of it. There are in this House 328 accomplices of Ahab who support him in this policy of robbing his neighbour's vineyard. I am thankful that I was able to record my vote—and I shall ever be thankful, although in a minority—against a policy so atrocious. I should like to clear myself from being supposed to agree entirely with all that has been said by many eminent speakers on this question on my own side of the House. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition (the Marquess of Hartington) has spoken with a pluck and vigour which no one admires more than myself; but I did not agree with him when he said that, although he had a strong conviction that the policy of the Government which has led to this war
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    against the Ameer was not capable of justification, yet that he had no intention of opposing any measure having for its object the refusal of means whereby to carry on the war. It has also been said that although the war may be condemned, yet those who condemn it are ready to grant the means of bringing it to an honourable conclusion. In my opinion, if you are engaged in a dishonourable enterprize there is no honour except in getting out of it as early as possible. I would not fight in any case in which I could not use the good old words, "God defend the right!" and God is never on the side of injustice and robbery. I shall therefore give no assistance in the way of providing means to carry on this wicked war. Why should the noble Lord not have gone further, and have said that he would stop the war altogether? I was delighted to hear him speak out so manfully as he did when he advised the recall of Lord Lytton, who, in my opinion, is one of the worst of the promoters of this sad business. But why not recall the troops also? There will be no more loss of prestige in the one case than in the other. You say you would lose prestige and glory; but surely the House ought to remember that honour is worth more than glory. I believe that your prestige would be increased, even among these savage tribes, by acting in a strictly honourable and honest way. The policy of the Government is one that we cannot defend; and the more we protest against it the more will be the satisfaction with which we shall go back to keep Christmas in the country, for our hands and consciences will be free of the blood of those unfortunate Indians who are being slaughtered in distant lands. But who is to pay for this war? I am inclined to adopt the hon. Member for Hackney's view of this matter. Supposing some foreign Power were to attack us, and the scene of operations was to be in Ireland, and that all the military operations were carried on there—you would not go and say—"Ireland is in danger, therefore make Ireland pay." No—you know the reason why is because Ireland has Representatives in this House to defend her interests. The hon. Members for Cavan and Meath are Members of this House, and you dare not do it. I do not believe the Government would dare

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    propose to put this money on India, if there were an Indian Biggar and Parnell. But India is not represented, and therefore the present proposal is before us. Her Majesty's Government are responsible for this war—the people made the present Government, the people elected the Conservative Party, and the electors of this Kingdom ought to be called upon to pay for the mischief they have done. What have the Indians to do with it? They are not Christians, and therefore do not want all this bloodshed. You have had your great majority, and you have outvoted us, and you may think all things are going swimmingly. I am not so sure of that. It is 25 years since we had the Crimean War. That was a popular war—the right hon. Member for Birmingham and Mr. Cobden were almost alone in condemning it. But this is not a popular war; and I agree with the hon. Member for Morpeth (Mr. Burt) in his belief that the great mass of the working classes are against it, and at any rate that hon. Member, who comes much in contact with the masses, stated that he had not met a single working man who was in favour of it. The Nonconformists are against it, and it has been condemned in manly, outspoken language by Dr. Plumptre, who spoke as a minister of the National Church; and for his outspokenness and honesty I do not suppose that he will be appointed to the See of Durham. The policy of this war is a policy of revenge, and that appointment will probably be given to a sanguinary Christian. I have said that the war is yours and the working classes are not with you; but there was a voice heard in this House last night from Bristol—and that proclaims the change that is going on in the country. Is there any Member of this House during last Session who does not perceive the change that has come over the spirit of the Opposition? You see that we are full of energy and spirit. We are full of hope and energy, because we know the country is with us, and will soon endorse our condemnation of the flagitious policy of the Government. The more this policy is looked into the more it will be condemned. The voice which we have just heard from the West of England is only the prelude of the full volume of public opinion which, before many months are over, will condemn the Government who have thought that might is right,
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    and who maintain the doctrine, that moral wrong can be politically justifiable and who have acted upon the mischievous pretence that British interests can be permanently maintained at the sacrifice of British honour.
    MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, that the eloquence of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) could not persuade him, that the war in Afghanistan was unnecessary and therefore unjust, although his belief was that, through the vacillation, not so much of the present, but of the last Administration in their negotiations with, and the treatment of, the Ameer, Shere Ali, the Ameer was induced to look elsewhere than to England for that protection which, immediately after the lamented death of Lord Mayo, he openly asked for from his successor, Lord Northbrook. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had quoted the Ameer's application in the course of his speech on a former night. It was made in the month of May, 1872, and his (Mr. Newdegate's) belief was that, if at that time Her Majesty's Ministers had offered to the Ameer of Afghanistan the Treaty (which had since been offered by Her Majesty's Government), before the influence of Russia had become predominant at Cabul, and before the Ameer was committed—as no doubt he was now committed—to the Russian Government, the Ameer would have seen that in the successor of Lord Mayo he had found the same friendly, the same bold spirit as he had recognized in him. But this was, properly, the subject of the recent debate, and he would now come to the matter of business before the House. The proposal on the part of the Government was that this House should grant them an unlimited credit upon the Revenues of India. Before the House entered upon the subject, the House had nothing in the shape of an Estimate submitted to them; but the pressure of the House had at length induced the Government to present them with an Estimate, and having furnished that Estimate, why had Her Majesty's Ministers not also proposed and asked for a Vote of Credit, which would correspond with their Estimate? They told the House that the proposal they were then making applied to the present financial year, and they had given an Estimate of

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    the expenses of the war for that period. Then he said—"Why do not Her Majesty's Ministers ask the House to give them a corresponding Vote of Credit?" He, for one, most sincerely deprecated the idea of this House undertaking the Government of India in the same direct form in which the House exercised its Constitutional functions in reference to the Executive Government of this country; but he found that the House was being brought to the necessity of dealing with these matters touching the Army of India, the Services of India, and the Revenue of India, in the same manner that it had legitimately and for many years dealt with the Army, the Public Services, and the Revenue of the United Kingdom. And why was this? Because, unfortunately, the organization for the representation of India, which had been sanctioned by successive Acts of Parliament, and finally by the India Act of 1858, had, in the case of the Council for India, been practically invalidated by the Acts of 1869, chapters 97 and 98. The Council for India in this country had by these Acts of 1869 been deprived of its independent character, of its distinct existence as an independent body, and being reduced to this condition, that all its Members were mere nominees of the Secretary of State for India, it was, in many important matters, pushed aside by the Secretary of State. Lord Lytton appeared to have taken his cue from what Parliament had done in destroying the independence of the Council for India in England, and to have deliberately set aside the Council in India. The first instance in which this was done, that he (Mr. Newdegate) knew, was, when the Governor General undertook to change the terms of enlistment for the Indian Army. By the 56th clause of the Act of 1858—a clause which remained unrepealed by the Acts of 1869—the Government were bound to lay before Parliament the Order in Council, by which they had sanctioned the change in the terms of enlistment. He (Mr. Newdegate) knew, that this Order in Council was not laid before Parliament at the time, when it was due; and his belief was that it had never been laid before Parliament at all. If he were right, then, this was a distinct violation of the Act of 1858—he looked upon that, indeed, as the first step which was taken
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    by the Indian Government in violation of the law. Next, he came to a subject which had been so well illustrated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), and on which the learning and ability of the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James) had been so ably exhibited that night. The point to which he referred was this—that by the employment of the troops of India beyond the limits of the Indian Empire, without giving simultaneous information to Parliament on the subject, the Act of 1858 had been violated. The House would forgive him for calling to its recollection, that last Session he stated that he had personal knowledge of the intentions of the late Lord Derby, when he carried the 55th clause of the Act of 1858. He could speak of Lord Derby's intentions from personal knowledge, and he would read to the House what the noble Lord had said, when he moved that clause in the House of Lords in 1858. Hon. Members would find the speech of Lord Derby in the 151st volume of Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, July 19th, 1858, page 1697. Lord Derby said—
    "The Crown could not send out forces unless Parliament provided the funds to pay them, but it was necessary to introduce this clause for the protection of the revenues of India."
    The first part of the sentence referred to the Queen's, the Regular, Army as well as to the Army of India. The noble Lord continued—
    "The effect of the clause would be that Indian troops, except for the purpose of repelling anticipated invasion, or of repelling actual invasion, should not quit their own territory; or if they did, the expense should be defrayed out of the revenues of this country, and not out of the revenues of India. If the troops were employed out of India, it would be for Parliament to decide whether they were employed upon Indian or Imperial objects."
    Thus, Lord Derby had distinctly laid it down in public, and had stated to him (Mr. Newdegate) in private, that his intention was, if those troops were employed out of India, unless for repelling invasion or upon some sudden emergency, that they ought not to be paid out of the Revenues of India, but out of the Revenues of this country. Well, this was the case of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett); and he did not see anything in the circumstances of the present case which could justify

    1009
    the inference that these troops ought not to be paid out of the Revenues of this country, but that they ought to be paid entirely out of the Revenues of India. Reference had been made that evening, by the hon. Member who spoke from the Bench below him (Mr. Hardcastle), to the war in China. Well, the war in China originated upon a sudden emergency. The Chinese had fired upon our Envoys. It was a war of long continuance, and sudden emergencies arose during it—emergencies affecting the safety of the European residents at Canton and elsewhere in China. The Government were justified in using the resources of India to meet emergencies. Then, take the case of the Persian War, in which the Indian troops were used. He himself had heard Lord Palmerston apologise in the House for having used Indian troops and applied Indian Revenue in the manner that Her Majesty's Government were now doing. That war, like the China Wars, began before or in the year 1857, at least a year before this Clause 55, in the Act of 1858, was passed; and that clause was passed, to his knowledge, in order to restrain any future Minister from using the military power of India in the manner in which Lord Palmerston had done in the case of the Persian War. He came next to the Abyssinian Expedition; and what did the late Lord Derby do in that case? He knew that he was about to use Indian troops beyond the Frontiers of India, and, if not simultaneously with the Proclamation of War, at all events simultaneously with the issue of orders for the movement of troops out of Indian territory, he convened Parliament, and in so doing he acted in compliance with the clause which had been passed by Parliament at his instance in 1858. The Abyssinian War was in 1867; and now he would come to the year 1869. In 1868 the late Lord Derby resigned the Premiership, in consequence of ill-health, and died in the autumn of 1869; and it was not till rather late in the Session of 1869 that the Indian Bills were considered in the House of Lords, which proposed to set aside the principle upon which seven out of the 15 Members of the Council for India were elected, and to render every one of that Council a nominee of the Secretary of State for India. It had been said that the late
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    Lord Derby consented to that proposal. He (Mr. Newdegate) did not believe it, and would tell the House why. The late Lord Ellen borough was an old friend of his, and nobody believed that the late Lord Ellen borough was a friend of the East India Company. But he (Mr. Newdegate) knew that Lord Ellen borough respected the independence of the Council for India in England. In 1869 Lord Ellen borough rose in his place in the House of Lords and remonstrated against the then proposed change, by which the independence of the Indian Council would be abolished. He was, however, overpowered by his own Party, and had to give in, though he (Mr. Newdegate) believed that he had spoken the opinions of the late Lord Derby, the author of the Act of 1858, as well as his own. It might be said—"What is the importance of having any independence in the authority which governs India? Parliament is excessively jealous of any independent authority, which is not immediately subject to the Ministers of the day, over whom this House supposes that it can exercise some control." The importance of this independence was felt in 1858. He held in his hand the Resolutions on which Lord Derby's Administration proposed that Parliament then should legislate—the Resolutions upon which the Act for the better government of India was, in 1858, founded. With the permission of the House he would read two of them. The 8th Resolution, as proposed, described how seven Members of the Council were to be elected—
    "That the Members of the elected portion of the Council shall be chosen by a constituency composed of persons who have previously held military commissions or civil appointments in India, in Her Majesty's service, or in that of the Government of India, or who may possess a direct interest, to an amount to be specified, in some property charged or secured on the Revenues or territories of India."
    But upon the 6th Resolution it was objected that the proposed security for the independence of the Council was unnecessary and inexpedient; so a Division was taken on the 6th Resolution—
    "That, with a view to the efficiency and independence of the Council, it is expedient that it should be partly nominated and partly elected."
    This Division was taken in this House on the 14th of June, 1858, and the Question put was—

    1011
    "That the words 'with a view to the efficiency and independence of the Council' stand part of the proposed Resolution."
    The Committee divided—Ayes 250, Noes 185—giving a majority of 65 for retaining those words in the Resolutions which wore to form the foundation of the Act of 1858. He mentioned this Division in order to show that the Parliament of that day, as well as the Parliament of 1853, which had supported the qualified but still distinct independence of the East India Company, deemed it to be essential that there should be a valid independence in the Council in this country that was to regulate the affairs of India, and the same feeling existed with respect to maintaining the qualified independence of the Council of the Governor General in India. They had now an illustration of the mischief and danger which were likely to arise from the abandonment of that system. There had lately been published a Return showing "the Opinions" recently recorded by Members of the Council of the Secretary of State for India "in reference to the expenditure for, and other matters connected with, the military expedition against Afghanistan," and, with the permission of the House, he would read an extract from a Minute of Sir Erskine Perry, whom he had formerly the pleasure of knowing as a Member of this House, and had heard speak, with great knowledge and effect, on Indian affairs in the House. This Minute was dated the 3rd of December, 1878, and contained the following passage:—
    "It is the first opportunity that has been given to the Council of India to express an opinion as to the justice or expediency of the war, and I regret that it has arisen now. I should have preferred that when the Secretary of State was asked in Parliament, 'What are the views of your Council on the subject?' he should have been able to reply, 'I don't know; the law does not compel me to consult them, and I have not consulted them.' This places us, no doubt, in a rather humiliating position, and it is strange that we are the only body of men in the United Kingdom who have been precluded from expressing our opinions either to the Government or to the public on this momentous question. Still, it is the position assigned to us by law, and, at all events, it relieves us of all responsibility."
    Here, then, they had positive testimony to the effect of the alteration of the position of the Council made in 1869. For it was manifest the Secretary of
    1012
    State for India had not until very recently consulted the Council for India at all upon such an important subject as the commencement of a war, in which India was concerned and took part, and of which Her Majesty's Ministers even now formally proposed that India should bear the entire cost. He had now stated some of his reasons for the belief he entertained; but he was not at liberty to communicate to the House all the circumstances that had come to his knowledge. It appeared that Lord Lytton had set aside his Council in India, just as the Secretary of State bad set aside the Council for India in this country. It had always been held essential to the safe government of India that there should be some authority responsible for the highest functions of administration, which was independent of the Government of the day in this country. And why? Because, as a rule, the Administration of the day was only in Office for a limited period. Her Majesty's Ministers must necessarily be the Representatives of a Party; whereas it was essential to the preservation of our Indian Empire that there should be a continuity of policy and a stability of system, which it would be impossible to maintain if the uncontrolled power of Indian Administration rested in a Minister who was appointed by one Party, perhaps for a short, certainly for an indefinite, period, and might at any time be displaced by the Representative of another Party, which happened to outnumber that of Her Majesty's Ministers, in some Division in that House, and represented a different policy. This was apparent to the common sense of everyone. There was also the fact be had mentioned in the debate on the Address, that if no such independent authority existed, that House was utterly dependent for its information upon the Secretary of State. He (Mr. Newdegate) deprecated the form in which this unlimited credit, this unlimited power of drawing upon the Revenues of India had been asked from the House; he also deprecated the idea that, in addition to all its other labours, the House of Commons should be obliged to undertake the functions formerly discharged by the East India Company, then by the Council modified by the Act of 1853, slightly modified by the infusion of a small number of nominees of the Secretary

    1013
    of State for India—the same principle upon which the Council of 1858 was founded—he deprecated the idea of this House being compelled to assume those functions. He did not believe that the Government of India could be safely or advantageously regulated from month to month, and year to year, by continual reference to the House. He was sure the House was too fully occupied satisfactorily to discharge these additional functions; and, unless a careful review of the whole of the statutes relating to the Government of India was undertaken—unless there was a careful review of the requirements of India, and some statute correcting the Act of 1869 was introduced, and passed—what was the alternative? The alternative, really, was the continuance of a state of things in which the Secretary of State for India, the Minister for the day, would be a despot, armed with the control of a Revenue of £50,000,000, and an Army of 200,000, men, with the power, if the precedent of this expedition to Afghanistan, and the precedents of the Chinese Wars, and the Persian War, were accepted, of plunging this country into war by interfering uncontrolled in external relations affecting not only India, but England. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes; that was the alternative. He asked the House, whether it was safe to leave to the uncontrolled power of a Minister of State the disposal of a Revenue of £50,000,000 and an Army of 200,000 men—subject only to the subsequent verdict of Parliament? If that were to be so, what a farce were all their forms! The Revenue of this country was larger than that of India, but our Army was smaller; yet the House was required to go through the process of Estimates submitted to them for Supply, and of Ways and Means with respect to the English Army; and surely, if all these forms were necessary to control the Prerogative, in the case of England it would not be reasonable to leave, without the control of some authority, independent of the Administration of the day, the enormous power vested in the Secretary of State for India, for which the Act of 1869, and the abuse of it, now form a precedent? Summoned, as the House had been, for a particular purpose, the House could not then review this great subject; but, as a disciple of the late Lord Derby, as
    1014
    a disciple also of the late Mr. Melville, the last Secretary of the East India Company, and as an Englishman, who held the Constitution of his country in respect, he prayed the House never to rest satisfied until this much-abused power vested in the hands of the Secretary of State for India had been, to some extent, limited, and placed upon a safe and Constitutional footing.
    MR. MUNDELLAsaid, he thought the House must have felt the value of the arguments of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate). He was quite sure that if the hon. Member's remarks were not appreciated by hon. Members around him, they would be fully appreciated by the country. He would not follow the hon. Member in the able Constitutional statement he had made to the House; but he did feel with him that they were placed in a position of grave doubt and ambiguity. Once again, it was the old story. What was the state of things before them? He would not attempt to enter into the causes of the war expenditure which they were now discussing; but he complained that the Government did not tell the House whether the whole of this payment was to be borne by the English Exchequer, or be thrown upon the Indian Exchequer. They simply said—"Go on with the expenditure; give us unlimited control over the whole of the funds of India, and at some future time we will come down to the House and tell you what proportion India and England ought to pay." He asked, upon what principle they were asked to divide expenses? If it, was an Imperial war, as the other side contended all last week, why should they not pay for the cost of it out of the Imperial Exchequer? If it was not an Imperial war, but was purely an Indian war, why did they hold out the hope and the promise that they would place some indefinite part of the cost upon the Indian Exchequer? On what principle did they do this? Surely, if it was an Indian war, whatever the consequences might be, let them do justice and charge it on the Indian Revenues. If it was an English and Imperial war, let it be paid out of English funds. On that side of the House they were more unanimous than he had ever seen them on any other question, that this was an unjust and unnecessary war. They recorded their votes

    1015
    against it last Friday night, and, for his own part, he was content that that should be his protest on that part of the question. He had endeavoured, in the course of the debate, to catch the Speaker's eye; but like many others he failed, or he should have had something to say upon the question of payment. The Under Secretary of State for India had endeavoured to minimize the cost. He said it would only come to £1,200,000 up to April next, and he added that we had a surplus for once in India, and should be able to pay the probable cost up to April out of the surplus? Now, what did the surplus arise from? From the most precarious source of income conceivable. It was calculated by the Estimate of March last that there would be a surplus of £2,136,000. There was a deficiency on railways, interest, compensation, and other items amounting to nearly 200 lacs, or £2,000,000 of money; but, altogether, the Revenue would be the better by 124 lacs, or £1,250,000, from the opium Revenue alone. All he could say was he wished it might be so; but he could not believe it would, and. there were very few people who knew anything at all about the Indian Revenue who believed that the Revenue from opium would realize £10,600,000, seeing that the highest figure it had ever reached was £9,300,000. If, however, they should have the good fortune in one year to have this large increase in this precarious and doubtful source of income, it must not be forgotten that they had levied a tax upon salt—the most shocking duty that could occur to the conscience of an English Minister—and had put an income tax upon traders who earned 4s. a-week, which was probably the meanest tax ever imposed' upon the people of any country. Was it right, then, considering that these taxes were raised exceptionally with a view of providing against the Famine, that they should appropriate this surplus of £1,200,000 for the purposes of this war? When the war was first mentioned, the whole of the Conservative Press ridiculed the idea of charging it on the Revenue of India. It was asked—"What is £2,000,000. It is only a very small sum." It was, however, a large sum to India, small as it was to England. In reply to a Question which he (Mr. Mundella) had put to-night, the Under Secretary of State admitted that the Order
    1016
    published in The Times of yesterday was true—to suspend all public works, and, as far as possible, all the repairs, going on in India. [Mr. E. STANHOPE: In Bombay.] Well, in Bombay; but if it was done by one Government it would soon be done by the rest. The House would probably know what the meaning was of suspending the public works in India. They had there the whole of their engineers, the European supervisors and staff, so that the whole of the real expenditure connected with the public works would still be going on; while the only thing they would save would be the wages of the miserable labourers, who received 3d. a-day. He had heard an engineer say that what generally happened when works of this sort were suspended when about half finished was that a monsoon came and swept them all away. If they suspended these public works they would impose an enormous outlay upon India, and that was really what was meant by taking £1,200,000 from the Revenues of India. Let the House know how those Revenues were raised before they ventured to dream of throwing the cost upon them. For the sake of what had been described as a grand Imperial policy, but which, in reality, was the policy of one man—the Prime Minister—what they were really going to do was to diminish the handful of rice and the purchase of salt, which formed the daily meal of the Indian ryot. All this policy had been agreeable to hon. Members opposite until it came to be paid for. He held in his hand a letter written on Thursday night—the night Parliament opened—by an hon. Member to the editor of The Berks and Hants Advertiser. The writer said that—
    "As some of your readers may not see the papers, let me call attention to the fact that the British troops have within the last few days almost succeeded in obtaining the new Frontier considered necessary in Afghanistan. The brilliant victory of General Roberts will do much towards getting rid of all further resistance. No money will be asked for at present, as the military expenses are not very great."
    So they were going to sing pæans over the victory in that House, and they were not to put their hands in their pockets, to the extent of 6d., to pay for it. Surely to throw the whole cost of the Jingoism of the Government and their admirers upon the poor ryots of India was dis-

    1017
    creditable to the first Assembly of gentlemen in the world. On the other hand, there was something else that deserved consideration. Thirty-six years ago the first Afghan War occurred, and what did the present Prime Minister say about the expenditure at that time? He (Mr. Mundella) never read a speech of the right hon. Gentleman with more pleasure; he never read one which showed more power, ability, and argument; and he strongly advised hon. Gentlemen opposite to read carefully the speech delivered by Mr. Disraeli on the war in Afghanistan, when he had the courage to divide the House, although only eight or ten Members followed him into the Lobby. Mr. Disraeli, on that occasion, said—
    "He did not believe that we should he deprived of the Indian Empire either by internal insurrection or by the foreign invader. If ever we lost India, it would be from financial convulsions. It would be lost by the pressure of circumstances, which events like the war in Afghanistan were calculated to bring about by exhausting the resources of the country in military expeditions, and by our consequent inability to maintain those great establishments which were necessary to the political system that we had formed and settled in Hindostan."—[3 Hansard, lxiv. 460.]
    The appalling distress now prevailing in our industrial centres was another subject to which he begged to direct the attention of the House. Never, he believed, since 1847 had such a state of depression in all our industries been seen, and much responsibility for its continuance and aggravation lay at the door of Her Majesty's Government. ["Oh!"] No doubt the original causes were economical; but latterly the distress had been aggravated, and the return of prosperity impeded, by diplomatic causes, which had disturbed trade, convulsed markets, and driven industry away. For instance, a Sheffield establishment was on the point of signing a large contract with the Russian Government for railway materials when the despatch of the Indian troops to Malta was announced, and on that account Russia obtained elsewhere the materials which would otherwise have furnished employment to a great number of men in Sheffield. Similar incidents had occurred in other cases, and all great financial and industrial establishments had been paralyzed by the apprehension of war. If the Chancellor of the Ex-
    1018
    chequer had had control of our affairs, we should have escaped much of the trouble and misery of the last two years. He trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would do one of two things—that he would courageously say he would place the whole cost of this war on the Indian Revenue, or that he would tell them what proportion he proposed should fall upon the Imperial Exchequer, and ask for a Vote of Credit in the regular Constitutional manner. It seemed as if England and France had changed policies during the last two years, and as if English common-sense had gone across the Channel, and the Imperialism had come to this side; and the French had certainly got the best of it. A special reason why England should bear the cost of the war was that the consequences of the war would be a great addition to the burdens of India in defending it against the Afghans, whose hostility would be embittered by the remembrance of blazing villages and of outrages said to have been committed on the field of battle by the tribes whose support we had secured.

  QUEEN'S SPEECH—HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.
  THE VICE CHAMBERLAIN OF THE HOUSEHOLD (Viscount BARRINGTON)reported Her Majesty's Answer to the Address, as followeth:—
  Your loyal and dutiful Address affords me much satisfaction.
  I feel assured that I shall receive your cordial co-operation and support in all Measures which I may deem necessary for upholding the honor of My Crown, and for maintaining the great interests of My Empire.

  AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).
  Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  MR. HARDCASTLEsaid, he was astonished at the statements made by the Opposition as to the oppressive nature of this charge upon the enormous population of India. It seemed to him absurd to say that the cost of a war with a petty kingdom of 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 of people in a poor lime-

  1019
  stone district could not be borne by the Empire of India, with its 200,000,000, whose share of the burden would average about 1½d.each. He was disposed to think that there would be very considerable danger, seeing this war was waged in the interest and for the defence of India, in saddling the people of this country with that expenditure. It might be a question of policy, but it certainly was not a question of principle, that this country should bear a portion of the expenditure of a war for the defence of India. Happily, there had been recent indications given that the people of India were eager to co-operate with us in our Imperial policy, and it might possibly be politic that we should be called to bear a portion of this expense; but India was both able and willing to defend herself. Frequent allusion had been made to the war with Afghanistan 40 years ago, which was stated to have thrown a burden of £20,000,000 on the people of India. That war was waged under a Liberal Administration; but nothing was said of saddling England with the cost, although, at that time, the resources of India had not been developed as they had since been; the millions of British capital thrown into the country for the construction of railways had not been introduced; the internal communications had not been opened up to the extent they now were—in short, India was not at that time in the same condition to bear the burden of a war that she now was; and it seemed unreasonable to say that that country, with her increased resources, was unable to bear the small expenditure requisite for a war to defend her own Frontier. During this debate, and that which preceded it, there appeared to be, on the other side of the House, an almost general forgetfulness of the enormous benefits which British rule had conferred on India. India, they had been told by the hon. Member for Morpeth (Mr. Burt), was "groaning under the military despotism of England;" but let them remember what the state of that country was before British rule was established. Lord Macaulay thus eloquently described it—
  "A succession of nominal Sovereigns sunk in indolence and debauchery sauntered away life in secluded palaces. A succession of ferocious invaders descended through the Western Passes to prey on the defenceless wealth of Hindostan.
  1020
  A Persian conqueror crossed the Indus and marched through the gates of Delhi …The Afghans soon followed to complete the devastation which the Persian had begun, and every corner of the Empire learnt to tremble at the might of the Mahrattas, whose dominion stretched across the Peninsula, and though they had become great Sovereigns, did not cease to be freebooters. Wherever their kettledrums were heard, the peasant threw his bag of rice on his shoulder, hid his small savings in his girdle, and fled with his wife and children to the mountains or the jungles, to the milder neighbourhood of the hyena and the tiger."
  He could not allow all that had been said against British rule in India to pass without some reference to the advantages which our rule had conferred on that once down-trodden and distracted country. We had established peace and prosperity in India, and he could not admit that the people of that country were not able to bear the cost of a war of this kind for their own protection.
  MR. CHILDERSsaid, he would not provoke any recurrence to the debate of last week, or touch on any topic which did not relate to the Resolution before the House; still, in passing, he must observe that no one could fail to be struck with the great change of tone which had come over the front bench opposite in the course of these discussions. Last week they were told they had to deal with an Imperial question, in which the fortunes of the country were bound up; now they were discussing "a mere Frontier war," and they were told that the Resolution moved by the Under Secretary of State for India prejudged nothing, and that if the House should hereafter decide that the whole charge for this war should be paid out of the English Exchequer, the Resolution would not be inconsistent with that decision. If that were the case—if they had been called together to discuss "a mere Frontier war" and to pass a Resolution which prejudged nothing—he could not but wonder that Parliament should have been summoned at such an unusual season to discuss such trifling matters. It had been contended that this Resolution amounted to nothing more than a permission, under the Act for the Government of India, to the Indian Exchequer to make certain advances in connection with this war, and that it concluded nothing as to the ultimate incidence of the burden—whether it should be converted into a permanent

  1021
  charge either upon the British or Indian Exchequer. Now, he believed that doctrine was altogether unsound. On the contrary, the Resolution was an absolute and unlimited Vote of Credit on the Indian Exchequer for the whole expense of the war, whether incurred in the present or in any future year. A Resolution of this kind was a precedent for all time, and it was necessary to be extremely cautious in framing it. The Resolution said—
  "that this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external Frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
  What he wished to ask the Government was simply this—whether there was the smallest authority or precedent in any financial Resolution adopted by Parliament, either in present or past times, for the word "defray" being applicable to anything else but an absolute charge on the Revenue? It so happened that at the end of the 56th section the word "defray" occurred again. It said that the pay and expenses incident to Her Majesty's Military and Naval Forces in India should be "defrayed" out of the Revenues of India. There could be no question whatever that when authority was given to "defray" a charge the authority to defray it was absolute, and that the word was never used for a temporary charge. Therefore, as it was intended to carry out the object of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, this Resolution should be modified in its terms. A very simple explanation of this extraordinary proceeding had been suggested to him; it was that the English Exchequer was in deficit and that the Indian Exchequer, as he would show, was overdrawn, and it would be possible under this Resolution to leave it open for a year to say upon which Revenue the expenditure should be charged. He hoped that to-night the House would arrive at a definite vote as to what should be done. On this question he could not help thinking that the House was being dealt with hardly fairly. Assuredly they were competent in that House to receive a definite proposal from the Government, and the Government had had ample time to consider what proposal it would make. Though this Resolution covered, in its
  1022
  terms as it stood, the whole expenditure of the Afghan War, we were expressly told that it was only to apply to the present year. It was, therefore, a very simple question for the Government to say what their views were as to the division of the charge. He did not think it was reasonable, in dealing with such a body as the House of Commons, for the Government, because it had a large majority at its back, to place only a limited amount of information before the Members. Nor was Parliament alone kept in the dark. How, he would ask, had the Government dealt with the Council in London, constituted to advise with the Indian Secretary upon financial questions? ["Hear, hear!"] He submitted it was the duty of the Secretary of State to submit to his Council all proposals involving financial questions. ["No, no!"] In 1869 the present Lord Chancellor took this view of the Act, and ultimately the then Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll, agreed with him. He complained that the Council had been passed by and over-ridden in this question, and the control of the Council of India over Indian finance, which it was the object of the statute to confer, had been rendered practically nugatory. It was shown by the Papers that in this important question, which might involve millions, and which would certainly cost more than £1,000,000 in the present financial year, the Members of the Council, who were supposed more particularly to advise with the Secretary of State on financial matters, had not even a day given them to consider the merits of the case, or even to review the calculations of the officials. They had been treated most cavalierly, and no real financial check had been exercised by them. In this way the control intended by the framers of the Statute had been evaded and set at nought. Let him now pass to the purely financial question. He was by no means satisfied with the statement made on behalf of the Indian Government of the existing state of their finance. The Secretary of State, in "another place," explained that, including the new taxes, the surplus of Indian Revenue had been calculated at £2,131,000, or, after deducting the credit to the Famine Fund, £1,500,000, at above £500,000. But, he said, the Revenue had exceeded the Estimate; in

  1023
  opium the increase was £1,246,000; that during the present financial year the cost of the operations would not exceed £1,100,000, so that there would still remain a substantial surplus of above £500,000, after the payment of the charges for the expedition. That was the information the Secretary of State had on Monday week given to the country. But what was the explanation given now in this House. Instead of the financial position being improved since the Indian Budget it was admitted to be worse by £600,000. Thus the whole surplus was swallowed up, and the £1,100,000 could only be obtained by trenching on the credit of the Famine Fund. Now, there was an express contract between the Government and the people of India, when the increased taxes were imposed upon them last year, that the proceeds of those new taxes should be devoted to providing what Sir John Strachey called "an insurance against famine," and to no other purpose whatsoever. If, therefore, the Government having got the additional £1,500,000 so raised, instead of placing it to the credit of the insurance fund, paid out of it the expenses of the Afghan War, they would be committing, he contended, a distinct breach of contract. That was a very serious consideration, and the House ought, in his opinion, to hesitate before it gave its sanction to such a course. The House would remember the very important Petition presented to the House of Lords last year by Lord Northbrook, who stated that faith ought to be kept with the people of India to the utmost in this matter, and this had been admitted on all hands. He would now proceed to the question whether the present war could be fairly charged in its entirety to India? It seemed to him that very strong reasons had been already given for not treating this as a purely Indian war, or entered into upon purely Indian considerations. But there was a point in connection with the war which he would like to submit to the House, and with regard to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer might possibly be able to give some information. If the war had been entered into on purely Indian considerations, it would have presented a totally different aspect on the question
  1024
  of time. The India Office Papers which had been laid on the Table of the House did not show when, in the view of the Government, there was a probability of the Russian forces being moved in the direction of India, or when it was known that a Russian Mission was about to be sent to Cabul. But, on looking very carefully at the Central Asia Correspondence, prepared by the Foreign Office, hon. Members would find a somewhat astonishing fact, and it was that as to which he thought some explanation was due. They would see that the movement of Russian troops commenced on the 13th of June (new style), that another column set out on the 20th of June, and that the intention to move those columns towards India was notified in The Tashkend Gazette of the 26th of May, in which the strength of the columns was described. Further, that the Mission left Samarcand on the 14th of June. Taking those dates into account it was somewhat extraordinary that the Government of India appeared to have done nothing until the month of August. Now it might be, perhaps, said that the news took long to travel, and, no doubt, the unwise withdrawal of the Native Agent from Cabul put us at a disadvantage. But on looking closely at the Central Asian Papers, details would be found as to the time when these proceedings became absolutely known to the Indian Government. It would be seen that on May 13 intelligence reached them as to proposals of Abdul Rahman to the Russian Government to aid in subduing Afghanistan which had very much alarmed the Ameer. It would be seen, too, that on the 7th of June Major Cavagnari reported that the Russians were road-making to the Oxus, and that the Khan of Khiva, with 800 horse, was protecting the working parties; that on the 16th of June he reported that the road-making was being pushed on with great activity, and that a large force was mobilized, part of which was to move by Khiva, and that the Russians had ascertained what supplies and means of carriage could be procured; that the Ameer was alarmed, and anxious to know how these proceedings would be met by the British Government; that he said he would make friendly advances to what-

  1025
  ever Government was friendly to him. Further, that the Mustaufi urged him to come to terms with the British Government, as they were moderate, whereas the Russians were shameless; and that Wali Mahommed, when appealed to, concurred. It would also be see that on the 18th of June news, stated to be authentic, was reported from Peshawur to the effect that Russian Agents had laid proposals before the Ameer for permission for Russian troops to be quartered in his territories. Reports of the coming of the Mission were received on the 5th, the 11th, and the 13th of June—so that early in that month the Government had information, if not in detail, at any rate from several different sources. However, the first complaint we made at St. Petersburg as to the movement of troops was on August 14, and the first communication to the Ameer was of the same date. There was, then, the strange circumstance of the Government having information from a variety of sources—information which, though, not official, was strictly correct, and some described in the Papers themselves as authentic—of the movement of Russian troops and the approach of a Russian Envoy, and yet the Government for two months did nothing. If that was so, what were they entitled to say of the Government? Had it been a question solely of India, and the Indian Government had been acting free from dictation at home, could there be any question that the Government of India would have sent at once to the Ameer and have told him that his fears seemed likely to be justified, and that we were, therefore, prepared to step forward, as he wished, and we had promised, in defence of his Frontier? But, unfortunately, it was an English and not an Indian question, and they waited two months. And why? At the end of May the Salisbury Schouvaloff agreement was signed, which the Government believed would settle all things satisfactorily; so that, feeling that the danger reported to them from so many quarters was over, they made no representation to Russia or to the Ameer for two months. And then, on the same day, they ordered Lord Augustus Loftus to protest to the Russian Government against a movement of troops which was long over, and the Viceroy to summon the Ameer to receive
  1026
  the Chamberlain Mission. That was the question which, in his opinion, called for an answer from the Government; for who could doubt that, but for this delay, there would have been no war?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I hope to detain the House but for a very short time, and do not intend to follow the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) into his examination of the statements of my noble Friend, Lord Cranbrook, nor into his financial examination of the statements of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State as to the Indian Budget, because I am sure that were it necessary to tell anything further on that subject my hon. Friend would be better able to tell it than I; but with regard to one or two questions raised, it is my duty to make some remarks. With reference to one of the charges, he mentioned the delay which he notices as having taken place in the communications made with Russia and to the Ameer with respect to the Russian Mission. I admit that undoubtedly it was the case that for a considerable period—even extending much further back than the month of June last year—we were continually receiving communications of more or less authority, pointing to the movement of Russian forces in Central Asia. It was, however, exceedingly difficult to get at the exact truth of these reports. Reports often reached us which at first sight appeared very formidable, but which were afterwards explained away, or reduced in their importance; and frequently we were led to the conclusion that they were spread for the purpose of causing anxiety, or accidentally magnified by the imaginations of those who had made them. Without going too minutely into details, I may say that it was not until the middle of August that we were distinctly informed by the Indian Government that a Russian Mission had actually come to Cabul; and until that Mission had actually arrived there, we had no right to say that Russia was moving in parts of Asia in which she had no right to interfere; while we might always have been met with the denial on her part, as to the intention of overstepping the limits assigned to her influence. We were in no hurry to raise a question which might have produced a quarrel; but, as far as

  1027
  we could, wished matters to cool down, as we hoped they would after the negotiations at Berlin; and it was not until we were absolutely certain that the Russian Mission had arrived at Cabul that we sent conditional instructions to the Viceroy to take certain steps as soon as he was able to ascertain this beyond doubt. With regard to another point raised by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers)—who I see has left his place—in passing, upon which he quoted the authority of the present Lord Chancellor and of Lord Salisbury from opinions expressed some years ago in the House of Lords, he seems to have forgotten that on that very occasion the Lord Chancellor of his own Government then in power—Lord Hatherley—answered the observations of Lord Cairns, and that he laid down with authority that—
  "an order to the Governor General to declare war against a border State would not require the assent of the Council, though, of course, it would, in its consequences, involve expenditure."—[3 Hansard, cxcv. 1830.]
  This latter view is against the contention with which we are met; but it is not my intention to pursue that subject, which is unnecessary for the purposes of this discussion. The right hon. Gentleman has made a very great part of his speech turn upon the terrible word "defray"—indeed, we have had that word so dinned into our ears by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, as well as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract that we have come to feel uncomfortable about it. I quite agree with the right hon. Member for Pontefract, that in our proceedings, when we are setting precedents, it is desirable and incumbent on us to be cautious about the language which we use; and I must say upon that point, with reference to that particular statute, that I think the Government, drawn from the front Bench opposite, were exceedingly cautious when they had to take proceedings under that Act. For very shortly after it was passed, upon one occasion when they did use Indian troops, and allowed Indian monies to be applied for the maintenance of those troops upon an expedition beyond the borders of India—in China—they were so afraid of using this terrible word "defray," that they did not use any
  1028
  word at all, and never came to Parliament either, to tell them anything about the affair. That was a very curious and interesting circumstance. When I have had occasion before to refer to it, I have always been met with this observation—"Oh! that was a case which did not fall within the meaning of the statute at all; that was a case which was provided for by the exception clause, in which it is said that—"Except for the purpose of repelling or preventing invasion, or in case of some sudden or urgent necessity, the Forces of India should not be used without the consent of Parliament." The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) told us that the Peiho affair was a case of "urgent necessity;" that what happened in that case was this—a friendly Mission was being sent by the British and French Governments to the capital of China—to Pekin—and on its way it was suddenly assaulted and stopped in its progress, and therefore the emergency was so sudden that it was absolutely necessary to take steps to redress the insult. There are, certainly, some parallels which might be suggested in the present case, and, let me add, some points of difference. Notwithstanding the suddenness of the emergency, one year and two months were allowed to elapse before the Force was dispatched; and during that time a Session of Parliament took place, but nothing was said about it; and we are driven to the conclusion that in the view of Gentlemen opposite, when an insult is offered to the British Power beyond its own Frontiers, it is such an emergency that it will justify the employment of Indian troops without Parliament being consulted. You cannot say that the case in question was in any sense one of preventing or repelling invasion. In the case of Afghanistan, it might, perhaps, have been contended, with some little plausibility, that it was a measure of precaution, used to prevent invasion; and, certainly, with regard to its suddenness, that it was one of the very greatest emergency; because we could not wait 14 months, nor even 14 days, for it was a question of the season of the year, which, if the troops had not been ordered to move, would have been lost, and this would probably have led to much greater bloodshed and suffering, as well as added to the cost of the war.

  1029
  If we are to be so careful about precedents in the use of this ambiguous word "defray," our conduct is, I think, more excusable than that of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. It is said you cannot apply the word "defray" to the payment of temporary charges; and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) observed that there was a great difference between the language used in this case and that used in the Vote for the Abyssinian Expedition. Of course, there was; because in the latter it was distinctly intended that the British Government should pay for the whole, or the greater part, of the expenditure—the object being avowedly an Imperial and British object. All that was then proposed was, that we should use the Indian Army and relieve the Indian Revenue of all charges; and, therefore, anything that was put upon it was distinctly of a temporary character. But what is proposed now is something wholly different. It is proposed to apply the Indian Revenue to this expenditure; not thereby meaning to say that it is not a matter that will require serious attention as to how far the British or Imperial Exchequer is to come in aid of that expenditure. But the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that it will fall in the first instance, upon the Indian Revenue; and I wish to go into this matter and face it, without attempting to disguise what is my view of it. I have said that I wish to put our view of the case before the House; and I hope hon. Members on both sides will endeavour to free their minds from any feeling of prejudice, and not be guided by mere impulse, without consideration of all the consequences at which they may arrive. What I ask the House is this—are we or are we not to understand that India is to be a self-supported part of the British Empire? The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) says it is. Then, if India is self-supporting, is it to pay for her own self-defence? That is a question which must be answered with some little reserve. I think there is to be the greatest distinction drawn between defence against immediate neighbours and defence against distant enemies. Take, for instance, the strongest case on the one side. Suppose a quarrel to arise between the British Government in India and the Nizam or Maharajah Scindia, and a contest or war takes
  1030
  place between them—is it or is it not the part of the Indian Exchequer to bear the expense of that war? I apprehend that, supposing it to have arisen in ordinary circumstances, there would be no question whatever that the charge should be rightly laid on the Indian Revenues. If you were to adopt a different principle, and say that the Indian Government should be at liberty, whenever they thought right, to undertake wars against their neighbours, and that they should be held harmless, I ask, what would be the temptation of the Government of India to go into quarrels which would be of a dangerous kind, and which would bring anything but satisfaction or economy to the people of India? But knowing that if they get into complications with their neighbours they will have to bear the expense is a check which, in their interest, as well as in the interests of the people of England, ought not to be disregarded. Again, where you have to deal with immediate border neighbours—such as Nepaul, Burmah, or any other States—I apprehend the case is clear that India ought to bear the expense. And similarly, I believe, within the Indian system, in which I include Afghanistan, upon the rule I have laid down, if a quarrel arose between that country and India, the Indian Revenues should bear the expense. I now want to qualify that doctrine by another consideration. I have said it is right that India should bear the expense of hostilities against immediate neighbours; but I have drawn a distinction between them and distant enemies: and when I speak of distant enemies, I especially refer to enemies who may be moving against her, not on account of any direct quarrel with her, but on account of some quarrel with the British Empire of which she is a part. In such a case, we ought to recognize the justice and equity of the Imperial Exchequer coming in aid of that part of our dominions which is attacked, not from any special local cause but from Imperial causes. We must bear in mind, therefore, what the Imperial Power does towards the general defence of India. There is no doubt we do a great deal to keep back the tide of invasion. If anybody will look at the history of India, they will see that wave after wave of different na-

  1031
  tions came over that country and overran it, generally from the North West and through these very Passes of which we have been speaking. Anyone will see that this would again be the natural course of events, if there were not some strong Power in India like the British Power; and that if a great Power were advancing over those regions of Asia, that advancing Power would sooner or later sweep over India also. I believe that if it were not for the presence of British Power there, the shadow which such invasion would throw before it would even now be producing alarm and disturbance in that country of a serious character. But the great Power of England, and the warning hand of England, keeps India quiet, and thereby confers great benefits upon her. But what is the real cause, extent, and meaning of the present war? This is one point upon which we require further information than we have at the present moment. As to the actual and immediate cause of the present war, it was the refusal, with insult, offered in the eyes of all India, of a Mission sent by the Indian Government. There can be no doubt that if that were submitted to the Government of India would have been fatally, or at least seriously, weakened; and the country would have been put to considerable expense and exertion in order to redress the evil suffered. If there were nothing more in this quarrel than that insult offered—perhaps from the peculiar character, the moodiness, or ill-will and obstinacy of a particular Ruler, which might be speedily avenged, and that Ruler brought to his senses—and if the expenditure is to be of a moderate character—as we are told by the authorities of India it may be expected to be—and if, as I earnestly hope and pray may be the case, we have nearly arrived at the conclusion of this business, it will be a matter of considerable doubt whether the Imperial Exchequer ought to be called upon to pay anything at all. But if, on the other hand, there should be more in the war than at first sight appears—if it should seem that this is a war—of course, not openly or avowedly, but secretly, and against the will of another Government, but, nevertheless, by unofficial means—stirred up and maintained against us by a European Power; and if it becomes
  1032
  necessary to put forward anything like our Imperial strength, I am sure that the people of England will be ready to bear their full share—and even more than their full share—of the burden of this war. I wish to remind the House of the position of affairs under which we are called together. Up to the time of the period allowed for the Ameer's reply to our Ultimatum we fully hoped that war might be avoided, and a peaceful settlement arrived at. Prom the moment when the advance began—namely, on the 21st November—until now, the interval is less than four weeks, and it is really exceedingly difficult at present to tell what is the real nature of the resistance to be offered, or the upshot or outcome of the war. In the course of another month or two we shall have learned a great deal, and be in a very much better position to make to Parliament a serious proposition appropriate to the real state of the case. At the present moment in our uncertainty as to the extent of the operations necessary to obtain the submission of the Ameer, it would be impossible for us to come forward and do what we have done in other cases—propose a definite Vote of Credit. If we are to give aid it must not be by undertaking that we should bear the expense of a war administered by others, set free from all considerations of economy, who might press it beyond the length which might be desirable, because they are exempt from all risk of having to pay for it; but what we may think it right to give should be in the shape of a Vote in aid of the expenditure of the Indian Government. The principle upon which we proceed is one which we have adopted with reference not only, and not even principally, to the interests of taxpayers in England; but with the sincere belief that it would be better for the interests of India herself that she should be made to feel the responsibility under which she carries on war, and that it would be a very bad principle to allow her Administration to believe that they might go to war and cast the expense upon the Imperial Exchequer. I admit that there is much which raises the presumption that this should be treated as an exceptional case; but all I can say at present is that the Government will be fully prepared when we meet after the Recess to give full explanations to the House

  1033
  as to what proposals we shall have to make.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: There is one point in the observations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which I think ought not to be left altogether without remark. I think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had some injustice done to him at an earlier period of the evening, inasmuch as the right hon. Gentleman has now given us some information as to what are the actual intentions of the Government. It appears that Her Majesty's Government intend the first charge of the war to be defrayed by the Indian Government; and their further intention is that according to the amount of resistance, or, in any case, according to the nature or object which they desire to gain by the war, they will come forward and ask this House to grant a subsidy in aid of the Indian Revenues. This appears to me to be a new and altogether unprecedented view of the subject. We have in former times frequently conducted wars by means of subsidies to foreign Powers; but I am not aware that we have ever subsidized one of our own Dependencies to conduct a war for us. There is this difference, I believe—that when a foreign Power has been subsidized to carry on a war in our behalf, there has been a distinct understanding and distinct stipulations as to the amount to be paid and the amount of assistance to be rendered. In this case, however, everything remains vague. It is in the power of the Government at home to issue such orders as they may think fit to the Indian Government as regards the prosecution of the war; and when the work has been performed, they can come down to the House and ask us to vote money in order to reimburse the taxpayers of India for the services rendered. In this case, what becomes of the power of this House to control questions of peace and war; and what becomes of the power of this House to protect the purse of the British nation? If Her Majesty's Government, through the agency of the Indian Government, conducts the war, the control of Parliament over the expenditure entirely vanishes. And as to the guardianship of the resources of the taxpayers, what becomes of that when, after the Indian Government has done the work, the Government comes for-
  1034
  ward to say that by our instructions and by our directions all this expenditure has been incurred? How is it possible that the House should turn round and say we decline to pay? We have been fulfilling one of our most important functions. To this House is confided, no doubt, the guardianship of our Indian subjects to a very great extent; but I think its primary duty is to guard the interests of the British taxpayer. Under the circumstances in which we have been debating this question, it has been impossible to enter into it at length; but I am anxious that the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer should not pass without a protest; and I am of opinion that when we meet again, this question will be more seriously considered than the Government think it should be at the present moment.
  MR. JACOB BRIGHTsaid, he would not detain the House more than two minutes while he alluded to a matter which he had hoped would be mentioned by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Hardcastle), who had been more fortunate than himself in getting a place in the debate. A great deal had been said in the course of the debate about taking a surplus which ought to be devoted to the unfortunate people of India. He wished to remind the Government that there were many poor people in this country who had some interest in that surplus. Large deputations had come up from the North of England, from time to time, to ask for the removal of the cotton duties of India; and a Minister of the Crown had more than once promised those deputations that as soon as there should be a surplus it should be devoted to the removal of those duties. The Minister who made those promises was Lord Salisbury; and it would be rather a curious coincidence if, on looking up the dates, it should be discovered that at the moment when he was making those promises to the Lancashire people he was reversing the policy of peace in India, and making it impossible to apply the surplus to any such purpose. Representing a part of Lancashire, and knowing the condition in which Lancashire was at the present moment, he felt it his duty to say a word on this subject. The mills were being closed or working short time, and a great number of poor people would look with

  1035
  surprise and indignation on this unfortunate mode of disposing of the Indian surplus.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 235; Noes 125: Majority 110.

  AYES.

  Allcroft, J. D.

  Dalkeith, Earl of

  Allsopp, C.

  Dalrymple, C.

  Arbuthnot, Lt. Col. G.

  Denison, C. B.

  Arkwright, A. P.

  Denison, W. B.

  Arkwright, F.

  Denison, W. E.

  Assheton, R.

  Dickson, Major A. G.

  Astley, Sir J. D.

  Digby, Col. hon. E.

  Bagge, Sir W.

  Douglas, Sir G.

  Balfour, A. J.

  Dyott, Colonel R.

  Barne, F. St. J. N.

  Eaton, H. W.

  Barrington, Viscount

  Edmonstone, Admiral Sir W.

  Barttelot, Sir W. B.

  Beach, rt. hn. Sir M. H.

  Egerton, hon. A. F.

  Beach, W. W. B.

  Egerton, hon. W.

  Beaumont, W. B.

  Elcho, Lord

  Bective, Earl of

  Elliot, G. W.

  Benett-Stanford, V. F.

  Elphinstone, Sir J. D. H.

  Bentinck, rt. hn. G. C.

  Emlyn, Viscount

  Bentinck, G. W. P.

  Estcourt, G. S.

  Beresford, Lord C.

  Ewart, W.

  Beresford, G. de la Poer

  Finch, G. H.

  Floyer, J.

  Beresford, Colonel M.

  Folkestone, Viscount

  Birley, H.

  Forsyth, W.

  Blackburne, Col. J. I.

  Fremantle, hon. T. F.

  Boord, T. W.

  Galway, Viscount

  Bourke, hon. R.

  Gardner, J. T. Agg-

  Bourne, Colonel J.

  Gardner, E. Richardson

  Bousfield, Col. N. G. P.

  Bowen, J. B.

  Garfit, T.

  Bowyer, Sir G.

  Garnier, J. C.

  Brooks, W. C.

  Gathorne-Hardy, hn. A.

  Bruce, hn. T.

  Gibson, rt. hon. E.

  Brymer, W. E.

  Giffard, Sir H. S.

  Bulwer, J. R.

  Giles, A.

  Burghley, Lord

  Goddard, A. L.

  Burrell, Sir W. W.

  Goldney, G.

  Buxton, Sir R. J.

  Gordon, W.

  Cameron, D.

  Gore-Langton, W. S.

  Campbell, C.

  Gorst, J. E.

  Cartwright, F.

  Grantham, W,

  Castlereagh, Viscount

  Gregory, G. B.

  Cave, rt. hon. S.

  Hall, A. W.

  Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.

  Halsey, T. F.

  Charley, W. T.

  Hamilton, rt. hn. Lord G.

  Christie, W. L.

  Clive, Col. hon. G. W.

  Hamilton, Marquess of

  Close, M. C.

  Hamilton, hon. R. B.

  Clowes, S. W.

  Hamond, C. F.

  Cobbold, T. C.

  Harcourt, E. W.

  Cole, Col. hon. H. A.

  Hardcastle, E.

  Coope, O. E.

  Harvey, Sir R. B.

  Cordes, T.

  Hay, rt. hn. Sir J. C. D.

  Corry, hon. H. W. L.

  Heath, R.

  Cotton, W. J. R.

  Helmsley, Viscount

  Crichton, Viscount

  Herbert, H. A.

  Cross, rt. hon. R. A.

  Herbert, hon. S.

  Cuninghame, Sir W.

  Hervey, Lord F.

  Cust, H. C.

  Hick, J.

  1036

  Hill, A. S.

  Pim, Captain B.

  Holford, J. P. G.

  Plunket, hon. D. R.

  Holker, Sir J.

  Polhill-Turner, Capt. F. C.

  Holland, Sir H. T.

  Home, Captain

  Powell, W.

  Hood, Capt. hn. A. W. A. N.

  Praed, H. B.

  Puleston, J. H.

  Hope, A. J. B. B.

  Raikes, H. C.

  Hubbard, E.

  Read, C. S.

  Hubbard, rt. hon. J.

  Rendlesham, Lord

  Isaac, S.

  Ridley, E.

  Jervis, Col. H. J. W.

  Ridley, Sir M. W.

  Johnson, J. G.

  Ritchie, C. T.

  Johnstone, Sir F.

  Rodwell, B. B. H.

  Jolliffe, hon. S.

  Round, J.

  Kennard, Col. E. H.

  Russell, Sir C.

  King-Harman, E. R.

  Ryder, G. R.

  Knight, F. W.

  Salt, T.

  Knightley, Sir R.

  Sandon, Viscount

  Lawrence, Sir T.

  Scott, Lord H.

  Learmonth, A.

  Scott, M. D.

  Legard, Sir C.

  Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.

  Legh, W. J.

  Leighton, Sir B.

  Shute, General C. C.

  Leighton, S.

  Simonds, W. B.

  Lennox, Lord H. G.

  Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.

  Lewisham, Viscount

  Smith, A.

  Lindsay, Colonel R. L.

  Smith, S. G.

  Lindsay, Lord

  Smith, rt. hon. W. H.

  Lloyd, S.

  Smollett, P. B.

  Lloyd, T. E.

  Spinks, Serjeant F. L.

  Lopes, Sir M.

  Stanhope, hon. E.

  Lowther, hon. W.

  Stanhope, W. T. W. S.

  Lowther rt. hn. J.

  Stanley, rt. hn. Col. F.

  Macartney, J. W. E.

  Steere, L.

  Mac Iver, D.

  Storer, G.

  M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.

  Swanston, A.

  M'Kenna, Sir J. N.

  Sykes, C.

  Makins, Colonel

  Talbot, J. G.

  Mandeville, Viscount

  Taylor, rt. hn. Col. T. E.

  Manners, rt. hn. Lord J.

  Thornhill, T.

  March, Earl of

  Tollemache, hon. W. F.

  Marten, A. G.

  Tremayne, A.

  Master, T. W. C.

  Tremayne, J.

  Merewether, C. G.

  Turnor, E.

  Mills, A.

  Wait, W. K.

  Mills, Sir C. H.

  Walker, O. O.

  Montgomerie, R.

  Wallace, Sir R.

  Montgomery, Sir G. G.

  Watney, J.

  Moray, Col. H. D.

  Watson, rt. hon. W.

  Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R.

  Welby-Gregory, Sir W.

  Muncaster, Lord

  Wellesley, Colonel H.

  Naghten, Lt.-Col. A. R.

  Wethered, T. O.

  Noel, rt. hon. G. J.

  Wilmot, Sir H.

  North, Colonel J. S.

  Wilmot, Sir J. E.

  Northcote, rt. hn. Sir S. H.

  Wilson, W.

  Woodd, B. T.

  Onslow, D.

  Wynn, Sir W. W.

  Parker, Lt.-Col. W.

  Wynn, C. W. W.

  Peek, Sir H.

  Yarmouth, Earl of

  Pell, A.

  Yeaman, J.

  Pemberton, E. L.

  TELLERS.

  Percy, Earl

  Dyke, Sir W. H.

  Phipps, P.

  Winn, R.

  NOES.

  Acland, Sir T. D.

  Balfour, Sir G.

  Allen, W. S.

  Barclay, A. C.

  Amory, Sir J. H.

  Bass, A.

  Anderson, G.

  Bass, H.

  Ashley, hon. E. M.

  Beaumont, Colonel F.

  1037

  Bell, I. L.

  Jenkins, D. J.

  Blake, T.

  Jenkins, E.

  Blennerhassett, R. P.

  Johnstone, Sir H.

  Brady, J.

  Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir U.

  Briggs, W. E.

  Bright, Jacob

  Kensington, Lord

  Bristowe, S. B.

  Kingscote, Col. R. N. F.

  Brogden, A.

  Lawson, Sir W.

  Brown, J. C.

  Leatham, E. A.

  Burt, T.

  Leeman, G.

  Cameron, C.

  Leith, J. F.

  Campbell, Lord C.

  Macduff, Viscount

  Campbell, Sir G.

  M'Arthur, A.

  Campbell-Bannerman, H.

  Maitland, J.

  Middleton, Sir A. E.

  Carington, hn. Col. W.

  Milbank, F. A.

  Cave, T.

  Monk, C. J.

  Cavendish, Lord F. C.

  Morley, S.

  Chadwick, D.

  Mundella, A. J.

  Chamberlain, J.

  Mure, Colonel W.

  Childers, rt. hn. H. C. E.

  Newdegate, C. N.

  Cole, H. T.

  Noel, E.

  Colman, J. J.

  O'Beirne, Major F.

  Courtauld, G.

  O'Brien, Sir P.

  Courtney, L. H.

  O'Gorman, P.

  Cowan, J.

  O'Reilly, M.

  Davies, R.

  Palmer, G.

  Delahunty, J.

  Parker, C. S.

  Dilke, Sir C. W.

  Philips, R. N.

  Dillwyn, L. L.

  Playfair, rt. hon. L.

  Earp, T.

  Power, J. O'C.

  Edge, S. R.

  Ramsay, J.

  Edwards, H.

  Rathbone, W.

  Errington, G.

  Richard, H.

  Evans, T. W.

  Roberts, J.

  Fawcett, H.

  Rylands, P.

  Ferguson, R.

  Samuda, J. D' A.

  Forster, Sir C.

  Samuelson, B.

  Forster, rt. hon. W. E.

  Samuelson, H.

  Fry, L.

  Sheil, E.

  Gladstone, rt. hon. W. E.

  Sheridan, H. B.

  Gladstone, W. H.

  Simon, Serjeant J.

  Gordon, Sir A.

  Smyth, P. J.

  Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.

  Stacpoole, W.

  Gourley, E. T.

  Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.

  Grant, A.

  Stewart, J.

  Gray, E. D.

  Sullivan, A. M.

  Grey, Earl de

  Tavistock, Marq. of

  Harcourt, Sir W. V.

  Taylor, P. A.

  Hartington, Marq. of

  Tracy, hon. F. S. A. Hanbury-

  Havelock, Sir H.

  Hayter, A. D.

  Trevelyan, G. O.

  Herschell, F.

  Waddy, S. D.

  Hill, T. R.

  Waterlow, Sir S. H.

  Holms, J.

  Whitbread, S.

  Hopwood, C. H.

  Whitwell, J.

  Howard, hon. C.

  Williams, W.

  Hutchinson, J. D.

  Ingram, W. J.

  TELLERS.

  Jackson, Sir H. M.

  Laing, S.

  James, Sir H.

  Morgan, G. Osborne

  Main Question put.
  Resolved, That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external Frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions.

  ARMY (MEDICAL DEPARTMENT).
  Copy presented,—of Statement by Members of the Board of Examiners of Candidates with reference to the Report of the Committee on that Department, with a Rejoinder on the part of the Committee [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  MILITIA (TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT).
  Return presented,—for each Regiment showing the number present, absent, and wanting to complete the training for 1878 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACT, 1878.
  Copy presented,—of Orders made by the Secretary of State granting special exceptions [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

  ARMY (STAFF COLLEGE).
  Address for "Returns showing the number of Officers of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers who have competed at each examination for admission to the Staff College, Sandhurst, since its formation; the number on each occasion who would have gained admission but for the limitation rules, and their places on the list; the number of and places obtained by those who did gain admission; the number of and places obtained at the final examination by those who passed out; the number who passed the final examination without going through the College; and the rules as to limitation of numbers in force at different periods: "
  "And, numerical and nominal list of those who passed through the College, or passed the final examination, who have been employed on the Staff of the Army, and the appointments they have held, specifying in the numerical list the totals of those who have been employed on the General Staff, and of those who have held Regimental Staff appointments; appointments on the Staff in India not to be included in this Return."—(Colonel Arbuthnot.)

  EGYPT (DAIRA LANDS).
  Address for "any Papers showing the agreement between this Country

  1039
  and the Khedive of Egypt which enabled the Marquis of Salisbury, in his Letter to Lord Lyons of 24th October 1878 (Papers, Egypt, No. 2, 1878), to state that the person nominated by Her Majesty's Government as one of the Commissioners of the Daira Lands shall not be divested of his functions without their previous consent."—(Mr. Samuelson.)

  RAILWAYS (IRELAND).
  Return ordered, "of all Railway Companies in Ireland which have now or have ever had guarantees on the county rates; giving in each case the date of the Act authorising the guarantee; the date of the opening of the Line; the amount of authorised capital; amount of guaranteed capital; rate of interest guaranteed; character of guaranteed capital, whether a first charge on the net receipts or not; amount paid out of rates to the Company on account of the guarantee; and the number of years, if any, in which the net receipts from the Line were sufficient to dispense with a call on the rates."—(The O'Conor Don.)
  EAST INDIAN ARMY.
  Address for "Return showing rank and names of the British Officers serving with each regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878 on the 1st day of September 1878, either in the advanced columns or in their support, with names of the Officers subsequently attached to each, and the casualties amongst them, made up to the 31st day of December 1878."—(Sir Henry Havelock.)
  EAST INDIAN ARMY (NATIVE TROOPS).
  Address for "Return showing Annual Cost of the Pay and Allowances of all Officers in the East Indian Army (Native Troops) showing each Presidency separately."—(Sir Henry Havelock.)
  JOHN NOLAN.
  Address, for "Copy of Depositions taken before the Coroner at the Inquest on the body of John Nolan."—(Mr. Mitchell Henry.)

  PRISON RULES.
  Address for "Copy of Correspondence between Sir W. H. Wyatt, or any other
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  of the Magistrates of Middlesex and Westminster, or of the City of London, or of the county of Surrey, and the Home Office, relative to the working of the new Prison Rules and the control of the Magistrates."—(Mr. Mitchell Henry.)

  CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.
  Address for "Returns with regard to the Established Church of Scotland, giving in separate columns the number of Male and the number of Female Communicants in each parish in Scotland for the year 1878 included in the Roll prepared by the Kirk Session, in conformity with the Regulations of the General Assembly; and stating the date of the Minute of the Kirk Session sanctioning the Roll as last purged of persons disqualified by removal or otherwise, and finally adjusted:"
  "Of the number of Adherents, not being Communicants, and not under 21 years of age, admitted on application to the Roll of the Congregation, under the General Assembly's Regulations of the 3rd day of June 1878, in those parishes in which Ministers have been elected and appointed under the provisions of Church Patronage Act of 1874:"
  "And, of the Population of each parish according to the Census of 1871, and a summary of the results (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 239, of Session 1874)."—(Mr. M'Laren.)

  AFGHANISTAN (No. 3).
  Copy presented,—of Correspondence respecting the relations between the British Government and that of Afghanistan [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  TURKEY (No. 51, 1878) (REFORMS IN ASIATIC TURKEY).
  Copy presented,—of Correspondence respecting Reforms in Asiatic Turkey [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

  TURKEY (No. 52, 1878) (RHODOPE COMMISSION).
  Copy presented,—of Further Correspondence respecting the proceedings of the International Commission sent to the Mount Rhodope District [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock till Thursday 13th February

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE).

  ADDRESS OF CONDOLENCE.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, when last I had the honour of addressing your Lordships it was in the warm controversy of public life. I little thought then that before we dispersed I should have again to appeal to your Lordships. The subject to which I have to refer on this occasion is one on which there will be unanimity—but, alas, it is the unanimity of sorrow. My Lords, you are too well aware that a great calamity has fallen on the Royal Family of this realm. A Princess, who loved us though she left us, and who always revisited her Fatherland with delight—one of those women the brightness of whose being adorns society and inspires the circle in which she lives—has been removed from this world, to the anguish of her family, her friends, and her subjects. The Princess Alice—for I will venture to call her by that name, though she wore a Crown—afforded one of the most striking instances that I can remember of richness of culture and rare intelligence combined with the most pure and refined domestic sentiments. You, my Lords, who knew her life well, can recall those agonizing hours when she attended the dying bed of her illustrious Father, who had directed her studies and formed her tastes. You can recall, too, the moment at which she attended her Royal Brother at a time when the hopes of England seemed to depend on his life, and now you can remember too well how, when the whole of her own family were stricken by a malignant disease, she had been to them the angel in the house till at last her own vital power perhaps exhausted, she has herself fallen. My Lords, there is something wonderfully piteous in the immediate cause of her death. The physicians who permitted her to watch over her suffering family enjoined her under no circumstances whatever to be tempted
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  into an embrace. Her admirable self-restraint guarded her through the crises of this terrible complaint in safety. She remembered and observed the injunctions of her physicians. But it became her lot to break to her son, quite a youth, the death of his youngest sister, to whom he was devotedly attached. The boy was so overcome with misery that the agitated mother to console him clasped him in her arms—and thus received the kiss of death. My Lords, I hardly know an incident more pathetic. It is one by which poets might be inspired, and in which the artist in every class, whether in picture, in statue, or in gem, might find a fitting subject of commemoration. My Lords, we will not dwell at this moment on the sufferings of the husband whom she has left behind and of the children who were so devoted to her; but our immediate duty is to offer our condolence to one whose happiness and whose sorrows always excite and command the loyalty and affectionate respect of this House. Upon Her Majesty a great grief has fallen which none but the Queen can so completely and acutely feel. Seventeen years ago Her Majesty experienced the crushing sorrow of her life, and then she was particularly sustained by the Daughter whom she has now lost, who assisted her by her labours, and aided her by her presence and counsel. Her Majesty now feels that the cup of sorrow was not then exhausted. No language can express the consolation we wish to extend to our Sovereign in her sorrow—such suffering is too fresh to allow of solace; but, however exalted, there are none but must be sustained by the consciousness that they possess the sympathy of a nation. My Lords, with these feelings I beg to propose for your Lordships' acceptance the following Motion:—
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion.
  "To assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of her family."
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I feel your Lordships will expect, and indeed wish, me to join in the declaration which the noble Earl has made with so much feeling of the heartfelt loyalty and deep sorrow with which we all desire to approach our gracious Sovereign on the occasion of this Address. My Lords, the accidents of a political career gave me some opportunity of observing the domestic life of the Royal Family during the course of eleven years. At the beginning of that period Princess Alice was a singularly attractive child of seven years old. I doubt whether any childhood or youth was ever more joyous and bright, or ever gave a livelier promise of that which was afterwards so amply fulfilled. At the end of that time I had the honour of proposing an Address in this House on Her Royal Highness's marriage—a marriage which seemed founded upon all the best securities for wedded happiness. The child had grown into womanhood with all those personal, moral, and mental qualities which the noble Earl has so well described. The principal characteristics of the married life of the Grand Duchess appear to have been—first, absolute devotion to her husband and children; next, a course not merely of benevolence, but of unceasing thoughtful beneficence to all depending upon her; and, lastly, a remarkable talent for acquiring the sympathy and attracting the regard of some of the most gifted of the intellectual country which she had adopted, and to whose interests she was devoted without ever breaking a link in the chain of memories and associations which bound her to the country of her birth. The noble Earl has already alluded to the singular coincidence of three dates which will never pass from the pages of English history. My Lords, I trust that neither the writer nor your Lordships will think it indiscreet if, instead of trusting to my own language to impress your feelings as to the loss which has on this last 14th of December befallen the Royal Families of England and Darmstadt, I read to you a few words extracted from a letter written on the day of the sad tragedy by a brother passionately devoted to his sister, and who left England last night to pay the last sad tribute of affection and respect to her beloved memory—
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  "So good, so kind, so clever. We had gone through so much together—my father's illness, then my own; and she has succumbed to the pernicious malady which laid low her husband and children, whom she nursed and watched with unceasing care and attention. … The Queen bears up bravely, but her grief is deep beyond words."
  My Lords, I will add nothing. I only ask to be allowed to second the Motion which has been made.
  On Question, agreed to, nemine dissentiente.
  Ordered, That the said Address be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.
  House adjourned at half past Five o'clock, to Thursday the 13th of February next, a quarter before Five o'clock.