Sitting of 10 December 1878

MINUTES.
Public Bills—Ordered—First Reading—Select Vestries* [54]; Patents for Inventions* [55]; Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875) Amendment* [56]; Gun Licence Act (1870) Amendment* [57].
QUESTIONS.

  BORNEO—THE BRITISH BORNEO COMPANY.—QUESTION.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the Statements made on behalf of Government on the 8th of April and 20th of June last, that all action in the matter of a cession of territory in Northern Borneo to a British Trading Company had been suspended till the arrival in this country of the promoters of the Company, Whether he is now in a position to supply any further information on the subject; and, whether Her Majesty's Government have now decided whether the proceedings of the Company and the British Representative in Northern Borneo are such as can properly be sanctioned?
  MR. BOURKE, in reply, said, that within the last few days a statement of the views of the Company had been submitted to the Foreign Office; but sufficient time had not elapsed to allow Her Majesty's Government to come to a decision on the subject.

  TURKEY—PROPOSED GUARANTEED LOAN.—QUESTION.
  MR. W. CARTWRIGHTasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government has cognizance of any project involving a loan to Turkey under British guarantee; and, whether he can give any assurance that there is no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to entertain a proposal involving such guarantee by this Country to a Turkish loan?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Her Majesty's Government have
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  had their attention repeatedly called to the financial difficulties in which the Porte is placed, and many suggestions have been made to them as to the assistance which England might render. But these suggestions have, for the most part, been of a wholly impracticable character, and the Government have nothing at present before them in a tangible shape. They have deputed a gentleman well versed in accounts to make inquiries into the real condition of the Turkish finances. Every facility has been promised him for making these inquiries, and the Porte has placed him on the Financial Commission which is now charged with the revision of the whole financial system. It is obvious that financial considerations must enter largely into the reforms which Her Majesty's Government are urging upon the Porte, and it is, therefore, essential that they should be well informed. It must not be forgotten that Her Majesty's Government are already guarantors of a portion of the Turkish Debt; but no financial engagements will be entered into without the previous consent of Parliament.

TREATY OF BERLIN—SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER AT GUILDHALL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ANDERSONasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, on the 9th November, when the Prime Minister spoke at the Guildhall, the Government had received information of the Czar's assurance of his wish to give all due respect to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, as communicated to the British Embassy by the Russian Minister on the 9th November, but published by Her Majesty's Government here only on the 13th?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I have made inquiries as to the exact time of the receipt of the communication to which the hon. Member's Question refers, and I find that the communication was telegraphed from St. Petersburg by Her Majesty's Ambassador on the 9th of November at half-past 6 in the afternoon, was delivered at the Foreign Office a few minutes before 10 on that evening, and afterwards had to be deciphered—because it came in cypher—at the Office.

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  Therefore, the Prime Minister was not informed of it when he spoke at Guildhall.

AFGHANISTAN—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMEER,—QUESTION.
MR. EVELYN ASHLEYasked the Under Secretary of State for India, with reference to the Statement made on the 20th April 1877 by the then Under Secretary of State for India, in reply to the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs, who asked, "Have the negotiations with the Ameer entirely ceased," namely—
"I believe that the Ameer has expressed a wish to carry on negotiations, and the matter is under the consideration of the Government of India."
Whether any such expression of a wish to carry on negotiation was received from the Ameer; and, if so, why no record of it appears in the Papers now laid before Parliament?
MR. E. STANHOPE: I can give the hon. and learned Member no information beyond what is contained in the Papers already laid before Parliament. My noble Friend's answer was given before the despatch from the Government of India was received, and when no official report of it had yet reached us, and it expressed only his own belief in the matter.

AFGHANISTAN—THE AFGHAN CORRESPONDENCE.—QUESTION.
MR. MOEGAN LLOYDasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether any Correspondence relating to the affairs of Afghanistan passed between the Secretary of State for India and the Indian Government between February 28th 1876 and May 10th 1877; and, if such Correspondence did pass, whether he is prepared to lay the same upon the Table?
MR. E. STANHOPE: No official Correspondence passed between these dates, except the Reports of the Government of India already published and a few other unimportant Cabul diaries.

TURKEY—REFORMS—THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.—QUESTION.
MR. E. JENKINSasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
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fairs, Whether any arrangements have been come to with the Ottoman Porte under the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and, if so, whether he can state the nature of such arrangements; and, when Papers on the subject will be laid upon the Table?
MR. BOURKE: Negotiations are going on with the Ottoman Government with regard to the reforms to be carried out under the Anglo-Turkish Convention; but the state they have reached is not such as to permit of their being published.

AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA—UNDERSTANDING WITH RUSSIA.

  QUESTION.
  LORD ROBERT MONTAGUasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether "the information" which Lord Lytton
  "placed before the Indian Council after personal conference, not only with Her Majesty's Government, but also with the Russian Ambassador in England,"
  was in writing, or was given only verbally and from memory to the Council in India; in what way it "influenced the consideration," by the Indian Council, of Lord Salisbury's published instructions of 26th February 1876; and, the date of the last understanding between the Russian and English Governments with reference to Afghanistan or Central Asia generally?
  MR. E. STANHOPE: The noble Lord can hardly, I think, really expect that I can give him any answer to his first two Questions. We have no information on the subject; and I am quite unable to say in what way the Indian Council were influenced by Lord Lytton's statements, beyond what they themselves explain in their despatch. In answer to the last Question of the noble Lord, I suppose that the last understanding to which he refers is the one of May 11, 1875; but the noble Lord is aware that there has been a great deal of subsequent correspondence on the subject.
  LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: I asked is that the last?
  MR. E. STANHOPE: So far as I know, I believe it is the last understanding.

INDIA—AUGMENTATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES.—QUESTION.
MR. FAWCETTasked the Under Secretary of State for India, If he 'will inform the House what is the addition to the strength of the Native Army in India which was agreed to by the Secretary of State in Council on Tuesday last; what is the estimated annual cost of such increase; and, whether it is proposed to make any proportionate increase in the strength of the European Army in India?
MR. E. STANHOPE: The addition to the strength of the Native Army in India sanctioned on Tuesday last was about 15,000 men. The rough estimate of the monthly cost is from £22,000 to £23,000. No proposal has come from India for a proportionate increase in the strength of the European Army; but two battalions of Infantry which would have come home in ordinary course have been detained in India, and three garrison batteries have been temporarily added to the Indian establishment.

AFGHANISTAN—THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.—QUESTIONS.
SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTasked the Under Secretary of State for India, If he could state the day on which Lord Salisbury's Despatch of the 28th February 1876 was laid before the Viceroy's Council; the dates at which Sir H. Norman, Sir W. Muir, and Sir A. Hobhouse respectively ceased to be Members of the Viceroy's Council; and, the date of the withdrawal of the native agent from Cabul after the Peshawur Conference? Also, whether the letters of the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan of September, 1878, have been sent home; and, if not, whether there is any reason why letters now nearly three months old should not be sent home?
MR. E. STANHOPE: As to the first Question of the hon. and learned Member, I can only say that we have no official information beyond that contained in the 21st paragraph of the despatch of May 10, 1877. Sir William Muir ceased to be a Member of the Viceroy's Council on or about November 6, 1876; Sir Henry Norman on March 18, 1877; and Sir Arthur Hob-house on the 10th of April, 1877. After the Conferences at Peshawur Atta Ma-
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homed went to Simla and remained there; but the Agency was not abolished until November 10, 1877. Her Majesty's Government have only in this country telegraphic reports of the letters of the Nawab; but it does not appear likely that there is anything important in the letters beyond what is contained in the telegraphic despatches.

THE RHODOPE COMMISSION.

  QUESTION.
  MR. SERJEANT SIMONasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government place reliance upon the Report of Mr. Consul General Fawcett, their own Commissioner in the Rhodope Inquiry, which is identical with the Reports of the Commissioners of Prance, Austria, and Italy, to their respective Governments; and, if so, whether they intend to take any and what measures in consequence?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, Her Majesty's Government do place reliance on the Report of Mr. Consul General Fawcett, and in consequence they are considering proposals for the relief of the sufferers; and if they make these proposals to Parliament they will, of course, state the grounds on which they make them: but what I have already stated is this—that the absence of such agreement as would have been shown by a joint Report renders the question of political action one requiring great consideration. I never intended to say, in answer to a Question yesterday—as has been thought by some hon. Gentlemen—that we did not place reliance upon the Report of Mr. Fawcett.

BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND.)

  QUESTION.
  MAJOR NOLANasked the Secretary to the Treasury, If the Government intend to take steps to re-organise the Irish Board of Works, and if the Government purpose to make an announcement on this subject before the Christmas Recess?
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: Sir, the Treasury have not yet decided as to what steps are to be taken, because they are considering the information from the Committee which inquired into the Board of Works in Ire-

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  land. The Report deals with a great variety of subjects, and some of the changes which it proposes would require legislation. The subject is under the consideration of the Council, and the House will perceive it will necessarily occupy a certain amount of time; but I hope that when the House meets again I shall be in a position to announce the course the Government intends to take with regard to it.

AFGHANISTAN—THE WAR—NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS.

  QUESTION.
  MAJOR NOLANasked the Under Secretary of State for India, If newspaper correspondents with the Army in Afghanistan are allowed to proceed to the front, and to send letters and telegrams home without restriction; and, if not, what rules have been framed to govern their correspondence?
  MR. E. STANHOPE: We have no information whatever on the subject beyond what is contained in the newspapers.
  MAJOR NOLAN: I beg to give Notice that on Monday I shall again ask the Under Secretary of State for India a Question with respect to the war correspondents.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE CAPE COLONIES —TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL MUREasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he can give the House any information as to the prospect of telegraphic communication between this Country and the Cape of Good Hope?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Last Session, in reply to a Question from the hon. and gallant Member, I informed the House that in view of the great necessity of establishing telegraphic communication between this country and South Africa, and the improbability that it would be established by private enterprise within any reasonable time, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to co-operate with the several Colonies interested in carrying it into effect, and that I had been authorized to inform the Colonial Governments of that decision, and obtain their
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  views. This was accordingly done; and from replies since received, I understand that the Cape Parliament and the Councils of Natal and Mauritius are prepared to guarantee annual subsidies, on certain conditions, for this purpose. These replies are now being carefully considered; but I fear I cannot yet state that it has been found possible to base any definite arrangements upon them. The undertaking is a great and costly one, and some time may yet elapse before all financial and other details can be settled; but I can assure the House that we are fully sensible of the desirability of the early completion of a work which recent circumstances have shown to be so much required.

AFGHANISTAN—THE MISSION TO CABUL—MR. MARSHALL'S DESPATCH.

  QUESTION.
  MR. GLADSTONEasked Her Majesty's Government, with reference to the Despatch of Mr. Marshall, No. 164, dated 13th September, and received by post on the 18th September, Whether they were in possession of the substance of that Despatch with respect to the Mission to Cabul on any earlier day; and, if so, what day?
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, we received a telegraphic despatch from Mr. Plunkett on the 13th of September stating that he had received the Ameer's Note, and he was sending it home, and giving a brief statement with regard to its purport; but that was, of course, superseded by the full despatch.

ORDER OF THE DAY.
  THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.
    ADDEESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD).

      ADJOURNED DEBATE. [SECOND NIGHT.]
      Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [9th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."
      And which Amendment was,
      To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words

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      "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan,"—(Mr. Whitbread,)
      —instead thereof.
      Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.
      Debate resumed.
      LORD JOHN MANNERSobserved, that the hon. Gentleman who introduced the Amendment on this subject wished them to confine themselves to the past, and told them he would refer neither to the present, nor to the future. But the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. E. Foster), who concluded the debate last night, took a somewhat different line. He explained to the House the alternative policy of which, if there were a change of Administration, his Friends would seriously recommend the adoption. The right hon. Gentleman fairly faced a difficulty which the hon. Gentleman who introduced the Amendment shrank from. That policy would be the old, exploded, barren, and useless policy of "masterly inactivity." He (Lord John Manners), proposed to make a few observations, first, with reference to the criticisms which had been made on the policy of the Government; and, secondly, on the alternative policy of "masterly inactivity." He gathered from the observations of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition on the first night of the Session, that there was no material difference of opinion between the two sides of the House as to what ought now to be done. The noble Lord told the House that he was prepared to vote all the Supplies which were necessary to bring the existing war to a satisfactory and honourable conclusion. Before he proceeded to make his observations, he would reply to two questions with which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford concluded his observations. The right hon. Gentleman, fixing upon an isolated paragraph in the record of a conversation between Lord Lytton and his own confidential Agent, asked with great triumph: "Are we upon the eve of a second secret Treaty with Russia?" He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman expected a solemn and serious answer to that question; but if he did, he might rest assured that there had been no
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      secret Agreement or Treaty between this country and Russia on the subject of Afghanistan, and as long as the present Government remained in power he ventured to say there would be none. Should, however, the Amendment before the House be carried, and should right hon. Gentlemen opposite, as a consequence, return to power, what the result would be he did not claim to decide. From their past conduct and language it might not be uncharitable to suppose that overtures of that kind from Russia might receive a somewhat more favourable hearing than they were likely to do so long as the present Government remained in office. The right hon. Gentleman asked another question, also on the subject of Russia. He asked, if we were content with the answers received from the Russian Government as to the Russian Mission to Cabul; and, if so, why did we make the reception of that Mission one of the principal causes of the war? The answer to that question was, that as soon as the Government heard of the reception of a Russian Agent at Cabul, they lost no time in making proper remonstrances on the subject at St. Petersburg; that those remonstrances had been successful; and that the Envoy had been withdrawn. That being so, did the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that we should pick a quarrel with Russia? But, then it was asked why, if Her Majesty's Government and the Indian Government were satisfied with the withdrawal of the Russian Envoy, they had made the reception of that Mission one of the principal causes of their quarrel with the unfortunate Ameer? Now, if the right hon. Gentleman who put that question would read the Proclamation of "War he would find that no less than seven causes of war were carefully enumerated, and that the reception of the Russian Mission came sixth in order, and merely led up to the seventh, which was, no doubt, the principal motive which caused the war which was now unhappily being waged. We had not quarrelled with the Ameer because he had received the Russian Mission, but because, having received it with great pomp and unwonted solemnity, when the Indian Government asked him to receive a peaceful English Mission, he not only refused to do so, but refused with insult and violence. He now came to the main charge which

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      was brought against the Government with respect to their past policy, and he really trembled when he thought of the number of quotations which had been made on the previous evening from the Yellow Book. [Ironical cheers.] There were various modes of trembling. He had brought down to the House a number of extracts from it also; but for the sake of hon. Members he hoped he should be able to continue his observations without untying the elastic that was round the volume. Well, the whole of the great charge brought against the Government and which had been supported by such voluminous quotations, was that they had changed what was called the traditional policy of this country with regard to Afghanistan. Now, to that statement he demurred. He contended that, in the true sense of the word, the policy of the Government had not been changed at all. What, he would ask, had been the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook? It had been to establish, if possible, on our North-Western Frontier in India, a State which should be strong, friendly, tolerably well-governed, and, in a certain sense, independent. That policy we endeavoured to carry out during many years by the method of what was known as "masterly inactivity." He was not about to say that 10 or 20 years ago that might not have been a very proper method to pursue. All he was contending for was that the change of circumstances, the immense advances which had been made by Russia, and the feeling which from year to year more and more animated the Ameer himself, all necessitated a change in the method of establishing a policy in which statesmen generally concurred. So long as Lord Mayo lived, his personal ascendency over the Ameer enabled that method to be successfully maintained; but no one could study the records before the House without seeing that after Lord Mayo's death the Ameer began to feel year after year more discontented with his position, seeing the pressure of the Russian advance towards his dominions, more discontented with the position which he occupied with regard to the Indian Government, and more and more pressing for a change of relations between him and that Government. It was true that up to the very last Lord Northbrook was not prepared
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      to admit that the time had come for a change; but he contemplated that at some period the necessity of a change for the purpose of securing an independent ally in the Ameer might arise, his contention being that up to the moment of his departure from India that time had not arrived. Lord Northbrook went further, it having been his opinion that it would not arrive until Russia was in occupation of Merv. Now, that was a position which it was, of course, perfectly competent for any hon. Gentleman in that House to maintain; but it was not the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. They felt that they could not view with indifference the advance of Russia to Merv or to the neighbourhood of the northern boundary of Afghanistan. Their views in that respect were, he might add, shared by the Ameer. Year after year he had been impressing on the Indian Government the necessity of taking more vigorous steps to secure his dominions against the onward pressure of Russia. Time after time, however, those representations had been disregarded by Lord Northbrook and his Government; and at last the Ameer, as it seemed to him, in despair, recognizing the fact that the Indian Government did not share in his apprehensions, and were preaching their unlimited belief in Russian goodwill, apparently prepared to throw himself into the arms of Russia. That being the state of the case, when Lord Salisbury came into office the feelings of the Ameer had been still further injured by Lord Northbrook's interference on behalf of his son, Yakoob Khan. Lord Salisbury accordingly instructed Lord Northbrook to attempt, by a more vigorous policy, to recover the lost confidence of the Ameer, and to improve the relations which existed between the two Governments. Now, all through the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford it had been assumed that Lord Salisbury's instructions and those-given to Lord Lytton were hostile to the Ameer. He would, however, venture to say that that was a complete misapprehension and misstatement of the facts of the case. It was to cement and strengthen the relations between England and Afghanistan that Lord Salisbury desired. The Ameer had for years been pressing a particular point on the attention of the Indian Govern-

      535
      ment, and Lord Salisbury's instructions were that those points on which the Ameer had laid so much stress should be conceded with the natural and proper condition that the Indian Government should have the power of verifying the real facts of the case. Lord Northbrook was, therefore, instructed to make the proposal to the Ameer, that if he would consent to the establishment of a British Agent at Herat, the objects which he had at heart should be substantially complied with. Lord Northbrook gave the reasons why, in his opinion and that of his advisers, that course should not be taken, and it was not carried out during the remainder of his Vice-royalty. Then Lord Lytton went out with full and complete instructions and information on the subject; and what, he would ask, could have been more friendly than Lord Lytton's mode of acting upon those instructions? Lord Lytton, in the first instance, proposed that the Ameer should receive an Agent at Cabul to discuss the matters to which he had referred. On the Ameer's declining that proposal, Lord Lytton was not betrayed into any act of animosity, but accepted the counter-proposal of the Ameer, which was that his own confidential Prime Minister should go to Peshawur and there discuss and consider the important subjects of deliberation. Surely that argued no animosity on the part of Lord Lytton to the Ameer. The Prime Minister was in the confidence of the Ameer, and nothing could have been more considerate than the arrangement made. What had happened? Lord Lytton had made it perfectly and distinctly understood by the Ameer that unless the primary condition of his acceptance at Herat of an English Agent was conceded, it would be impossible that the large boons he requested should be granted. That was the basis of the negotiations. Three weeks were consumed by the Prime Minister of the Ameer in a very long statement of his master's wishes; but not a single step was gained towards the primary condition on which the whole Conference was based. At the end of that period the Prime Minister died, and Lord Lytton naturally thought it best to close the Conference. Enough had passed to show that there was no sincere intention on the part of the Ameer to come to any conclusion whatever, seeing that three
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      weeks had elapsed and the preliminary condition had not even been assented to; so that the Indian Government could not but fall back on the status quo and terminate the Conference. Upon that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford had seemed to think that the Ameer had some considerable grounds for his discontent, and had been deprived, by the action of the Home Government, of certain securities for which he thought he had a right to look. He could not quite understand how the right hon. Gentleman established that proposition. He had read a paragraph in a very remarkable way, so as to omit the statement and to quote the consequence. He was able to supplement the omission, and to give the extract as it really occurred. It was in a despatch of Lord Salisbury's, summing up the whole subject; but the following preceded and governed the passage quoted by the right hon. Gentleman:—
      "His Highness has now been informed in unmistakable language that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855—which alone of the two Treaties contracted between the British and Afghan Governments has a character of perpetuity—the British Government has incurred no liabilities whatever on his behalf; and it has been distinctly intimated to him that neither by Lord Mayo in 1869 nor by Lord Northbrook in 1873 was any assurance given of unconditional protection, nor any obligation contracted towards him which was not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, pp. 223–4.]
      That showed that what Lord Salisbury had said was that the Ameer had then learnt distinctly what was in the minds of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook; and that throughout the whole of the Correspondence the Ameer had previously had an impression of obligations on the part of the British Government much larger than they were willing to admit. So, instead of the Conference at Peshawur being unfavourable to Shere Ali in its results, it was genuine kindness to him to show him the true facts of the case and his real position. And apart from that, anyone would fancy, from the speeches that had been made, that Lord Lytton was hostile to the Ameer, while, in fact, from the moment the Conference was terminated, no part of his conduct was so in the least degree, either in word or deed. The Ameer was left perfectly free to conduct the affairs of his territory in any way he chose,

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      and neither by Lord Lytton nor by any one else was the slightest pressure put upon him.
      GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR: Will you tell us when Quetta was taken and occupied? ["Order!"]
      LORD JOHN MANNERS: But what had that to do with the question? Did the hon. and gallant Gentleman not know that in occupying Quetta we were acting under our Treaty rights and wanted no permission? He had really been surprised at such a suggestion from so learned an Indian pundit as the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He contended that for 14 months the Ameer suffered no pressure either from Lord Lytton or the Government, and he might have gone on in the ordinary way for a considerable period, had not a Russian Mission made its appearance at Cabul, and had not he, for reasons of his own, accorded to it an ostentatious welcome, and received it with unwonted solemnity. What was the Indian Government to do? He now came to the alternative policy, which, he supposed, hon. Gentlemen who had supported the Motion would be prepared to undertake. But what was the Indian Government to do when the Mission had been received in the manner he had described? Were they to do nothing? He heard no response from the front Opposition benches to that question. A sudden silence seemed to pervade those benches. Or were they to rest content and wait? Was the policy of "masterly inactivity" to be followed on such an occasion? If the Indian Government were not justified in waiting, and if some action was required on their part, what action, he asked, was it right to take? He ventured to argue that the course adopted with the sanction of the Home Government was a friendly and not a hostile course. A distinguished soldier, who was well known to and highly appreciated by Shere Ali, was selected as the head of the Mission, and no effort was spared to give the Mission an amicable character. The escort, moreover, was cut down to the very lowest point compatible with the dignity of the Envoy and the safety of the Mission itself; and letters were written to the different officials on the road in order to avoid even the possibility of a collision. That being the character and purpose of the Mission, how was it received? As all
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      know, with violence and insult. He asked, again, what would the critics of the Indian Government and the censors of the Government at home have done had they been in the same position? The Mission, he repeated, was rightly sent; and though it came with a friendly object, its rejection was accompanied with insult and violence. Was the Envoy of Her Majesty the Queen of England and Empress of India, and the Representative of the Viceroy, to wait outside the gates of Ali Musjid until it pleased the Ruler of Afghanistan to admit him to his gracious presence? Was he to be, like Charles XII. at Bender—
      "Condemned, a needy supplicant, to wait
      While ladies interpose, and slaves debate?"
      Was that the answer the Opposition were prepared to give? Well, after this insult and violence had been perpetrated, was the next manifestation on the part of the Indian Government one of hostility? He might answer, quite the reverse; for a considerable period was given to the Ameer to reflect upon his conduct and upon the impropriety of the steps he had taken. Did Gentlemen opposite condemn that; and were they going to pass a Vote of Censure on the Government because they afforded the Ameer time to reply to the remonstrance against his insulting conduct? To resume; the time of grace having expired, the Government felt that the necessary consequence was an expedition to enforce submission to their modest and reasonable demands. Was the Government going to be condemned for having, after so much pains and forbearance, vindicated by the only legitimate means left to them the honour and dignity of the Crown of England? That being so with respect to the past, he felt confident that the House would reject the Vote of Censure moved by the hon. Member for Bedford; but he appealed to the House with ten times more confidence when that Vote of Censure was coupled with the future policy of those who would succeed to power. What was it the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford told the House? He did not know whether the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) gave the right hon. Gentleman authority to speak in his name, or if it was a voluntary effort on his own part; but

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      one who filled so important a position in the councils of Gentlemen opposite must be taken to speak on behalf of the whole of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman told them that after all these steps had been taken—after the war had progressed and been brought to a satisfactory and glorious issue—he was prepared to recommend that the Indian Government should fall back into the old beaten groove of "masterly inactivity," and trust to the chapter of accidents to recover or not recover our influence at Cabul.
      MR. W. E. FORSTER: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but he has not given a fair account of what I said. It was this:—That I thought, speaking for myself, the Government ought to return to the old policy, and I defined that as, first, to try to convince the Ameer that it was neither our interest nor our wish to take from him his territory or deprive him of his independence; and, secondly, to convince him that it was our interest and intention to guard him against any unprovoked aggression of Russia or any other Power. I said that that was my definition of the old policy; and that what I considered the new policy brought in by the present Government was that they assured the Ameer of protection against Russia solely upon conditions, which he considered—and considered rightly—would destroy his independence.
      LORD JOHN MANNERSreplied that this was precisely what he meant to summarize under the title of "masterly inactivity." He wanted the House to understand this clearly, and also that when he spoke of the old method as being exploded, he did so on the authority of men of great weight. In the course of that debate the opinion of Sir Henry Norman, of Sir William Muir, and of Sir Arthur Hobhouse and others had been quoted against this view. But every person of authority on these matters did not agree with them. The old policy had been condemned not only by the facts of the case, but also by men of high authority. In Lord Lytton's despatch of May 10, 1877, occurred these words—
      "Whilst still alive to the difficulties and risks inseparable from any attempt to enter into closer and more responsible intercourse with a barbarous neighbour so suspicious, discontented, and untrustworthy as Shere Ali, we certainly
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      could not regard with unconcern the increasing inconvenience, and possible peril, of the extremely ambiguous and uncertain character of our existing relations with him. It was impossible to deny that the practical results of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory."—[Ibid. p. 165.]
      This despatch was signed by Sir E. C. Bayley, Sir A. J. Arbuthnot, and Sir A. Clarke, who had in the previous year signed the Minute approving Lord Northbrook's despatch. He remembered that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), in the course of a speech some time ago, had made a point of the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala, as being unfavourable to the policy of the present Government. Well, on page 226 of the Blue Book he held in his hand, Lord Napier of Magdala's opinion was given in these words—
      "Our policy of masterly inactivity, or rather of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster."
      He thought that on such authorities as these he was justified in saying of the policy to which the right hon. Gentleman would have the country return, that it was a policy condemned both by the facts of the case and also by the authority of some of the greatest living statesmen and Generals of India.
      MR. FAWCETTrose to disclaim having misquoted the words of Lord Napier of Magdala.
      LORD JOHN MANNERSsaid, he did not accuse the hon. Member of misquoting Lord Napier's words, for the Book containing them had not at that time been published. Many years ago the policy of masterly inactivity might have been good and proper; but wise men did not adhere in a bigoted manner to opinions formed in one condition of things when the circumstances had altogether changed. What did the right hon. Gentleman do? He asked the House not only to censure the past policy of the Government, but to place on record their approbation of a recurrence to this condemned policy, and that at a moment when the lives of our gallant British, Irish, and Native Indian soldiers were being risked, when feats of the greatest heroism and endurance were being performed. At such a moment

      541
      the right hon. Gentleman said to them and the world at large—"Never mind what sacrifices are made, what victories gained, they shall all end in nothing; we will turn back to the old exploded views of 30 years ago; and we will in that manner humbly hope that the Ameer will at some time or other—we can't presume to indicate when—think better of his conduct and graciously permit us to look upon Afghanistan as a real protection in future to the advances of Russia." Surely neither the House nor this country would never sanction such a policy. If they were asked what end the Government placed before them, they would reply—"We must prosecute this war until the Ruler of Afghanistan makes due submission; and then we shall be prepared to grant terms as moderate and as generous as would be consistent with the inviolability, the security, and the peace of our Indian Frontier."
      MR. GLADSTONE: I wish to advert for a moment to the closing sentence of the speech of the noble Lord. He says he will prosecute the war until the Ruler of Afghanistan makes due submission. He has bound himself by that pledge in the face of the country. But suppose, Sir, the Ruler of Afghanistan does not make due submission? The Rulers of Afghanistan do not always make due submission. They have a habit of disappearing. Suppose Shere Ali, without making due submission, disappears from the scene of your military operations: what is the noble Lord to do then? He is, I presume, to keep an army of occupation in Afghanistan. How long is he to keep that army there? Quarrels with Afghanistan are not apt to reach a very speedy conclusion; and I think that if the noble Lord saw fit thus liberally and generously to give us his future intentions, he ought to have contemplated an alternative which is perfectly possible, and which, if we are to judge from the case of Dost Mahomed, might even be more probable than the due submission he contemplates with so much complacency. Now, Sir, the noble Lord assumes to himself two privileges, which undoubtedly very greatly facilitate his task. In the first place, he thinks himself entitled to ask of hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House not only in
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      what respect they differ from and condemn the general features of the policy of the Government, but when the Government have entangled themselves by their own errors and misdeeds—in consequence of which we have had to travel over the ground of a multitude of embarrassing situations at every stage, produced by those errors—he thinks it fair to turn upon hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House and say—"What would you have done then?" No doubt the ingenuity of the noble Lord suggested to him that he should fall back upon that. But the noble Lord puts forward another claim, the justice of which I must contest. He claims not to be compelled to refer to the Papers laid upon the Table of the House. ["No!"] I beg pardon—what the noble Lord said was that he would not remove the india-rubber band with which those papers were bound; and he delivered to us a lengthened narrative of the proceedings of the Government, which was not supported, as it should have been, from point to point, by proofs drawn from these Papers. That, therefore, is a claim which I cannot assent to. No doubt it suited the purposes of the noble Lord that he should make that claim, and insist upon it; and that upon only one or two occasions should he furnish us with even so much as a thread of proof of any assertion he made. Our course is a very difficult one. The noble Lord taunts us with going back—that is, with going back to the evidence. It is true that we do not put forward unsupported assertions but with as much care and caution as our unfavourable circumstances and conditions will admit. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes; I thank the hon. Member for that cheer. I thank him for admitting that we do occupy an unfavourable position, when five days before a debate of this character commences, when five days before the speech from the Throne, we are saluted with 500 closely-printed pages of documents and are invited to pass judgment upon them. But, short as the time has been for mastering the Papers, I shall not follow the easy mode of dealing with them of the noble Lord the Postmaster General. In fact, I cannot follow his example and allow the Papers to remain tied up in their tape. On the contrary,

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      Sir, I shall have to refer to these documents; and, more than that, I shall have with great reluctance, but with great deliberation, to impeach those documents. I shall have to point to them as containing the most gross misstatements of fact—I will not say such as raise the suspicion of wilful untruth, because it is far from my mind to impute that to anyone—but misstatements of fact involving a reckless negligence, of which, so far as I know, there has been no example in connection with a subject of Imperial policy ever before in my experience presented to Parliament. That is a startling assertion, and I am not going to ask you to accept it until proved. I will, in the first place, refer briefly to the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain). My hon. Friend said that he could not have voted for any Motion which would have confined the debate to the merits of the war and which would not have included the manner in which Her Majesty's Government had acted on this occasion with reference to the privileges and the rights of Parliament. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I certainly could not have voted for any Motion as one adequate to the occasion which did not leave it open to us to comment upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in denying to Parliament its proper position. As far as I know, the concealment practised by Her Majesty's Government upon this occasion is alike without precedent and without excuse. For two years and a-half a policy has been deliberately carried on by Her Majesty's Government, and the nature of that policy has been kept back with the utmost care from the knowledge of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says—and I really was surprised to hear him say it—that he apologized for the late appearance of these Papers, on the ground that there was such a number of them, and that it was very difficult to prepare and arrange them. The right hon. Gentleman speaks of them as though they had resulted from the transactions of the last few weeks; whereas, in fact, they are the result of transactions which have been spread over a series of years, and the major portion of them have been in the pos-
      544
      session of Her Majesty's Government for a long period. I ask, is it right that Parliament should have been kept in the dark so long on this subject? Is there any reason why these Papers should not have been laid before us long ago? I can understand that there are many occasions, when diplomatic or executive steps are being taken, when it is fitting that Papers of this character should be kept back; but there are many stages in the course of such negotiations when a fresh start is made, and when all reason for keeping back such Papers ceases to exist. I take it that such an opportunity for producing these Papers occurred at the time of the total change of the Government policy which followed upon the solemn Conference at Peshawur between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Prime Minister of the Ameer. I ask whether, when Her Majesty's Government resolved upon that total change of policy, they should not have communicated that fact to Parliament? All that Her Majesty's Government did at that time, however, was to say that there was no change in their policy. How happened it, I ask, that Parliament being prorogued on the 16th of August last, the Mission to Afghanistan was despatched on the 19th? That was the crown and consummation of that policy of concealment from Parliament which has marked the conduct of the present Government; and which in the case of the Anglo-Turkish Convention did so much to endanger the continuance of the Treaty-making power of the Crown and to jeopardize the Prerogative of the Crown to make peace and war. I will not enter into that point, however, upon the present occasion. My belief is, that they have broken the Statute; and, at the proper time, I shall be prepared to give my reasons for that belief. I am now going to call the attention of the House to what I believe to be a very grave matter, and that is the total untrustworthiness of the allegations of fact contained in the most important documents in the Book which has been presented to the House. I do not refer now to the famous paragraph 9 in Lord Cranbrook's despatch, in which the art of saying one thing and of suggesting another has been carried to such a pitch of perfection that I doubt whether the future, with all its development, will ever be able to improve it, I hope that the noble Lord

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      will begin to remove his elastic band I now. In order that there may be no mistake, I say that I impeach the trustworthiness of the allegations of fact contained in the despatch from the Government of India, dated the 10th of May, 1877, and in that equally important Paper read by Sir Lewis Pelly to the Envoy of the Ameer at Peshawur in November, 1877. I take first the despatch of the Government of India. Of course, it is an essential part of the case of Her Majesty's Government that the Ameer had a great and growing stock of grievances against the Government of India at the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook; and in this despatch, which will be found at page 167 of the Papers, it is stated that the Indian Government had discovered that the Ameer had four special classes of grievances. First of all there was the grievance relating to Yakoob Khan; the second was that which related to the Seistan boundary; the third was with reference to the Chief of Wakhan; and the fourth was that which was involved in our refusing to conclude a defensive alliance with him. Let us turn to the source of the account of the grievances of the Ameer. Now that we have got the Papers we know what were the materials upon which they founded that statement. They had before them two accounts of the grievances of the Ameer, and the account that they have given does not correspond with the other. Those two accounts are very different in authority and value. One of them was a report by our Native Agent. It purported to be a statement of the Ameer. He did not say that he knew the grievances of the Ameer. It was only upon being hard pressed by the Viceroy or by the Agents of the Viceroy—I do not recollect which—that he would consent to give an account of what he thought were the grievances of the Ameer, so that in truth the opinion he gave was only his own opinion of the grievances of the Ameer. Perhaps this may be doubted, and I would therefore read from the Book the authentic record—
      "Being pressed to explain more in detail the views or wishes which the Ameer expressed at his interview, the Agent repeated that the Ameer had no further wishes than those already on record, and deemed that a renewal of the request for their fulfilment would lead to no solid result, as nothing had come of his previous efforts. The Agent was then requested to state
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      in particular his own estimate of the feelings and causes which had estranged the Ameer from the British Government, and had induced His Highness to object to the reception of a complimentary Mission. The Agent replied that he could not pretend to be acquainted with all that passed in the mind of the Ameer on the above subjects; but as far as he could ascertain them the grievances were as follows."—(Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 180.]
      Then he goes on to repeat, not four special causes of grievance, according to the doctrine of the despatch of the English Government, but eight causes of grievance, with no speciality at all marked out among the eight, and to say that these eight were among the causes of complaint which the Ameer may have resting upon his mind. That was the inferior source of information to which the Government resorted, and even that they could not state with decent accuracy, for they mis-stated the number of the grievances and they mis-stated the specialities. The truth is—and I challenge contradiction—that they set forth four grievances when there were eight, and they stated that there were four special grievances, while the Agent stated that there was no speciality whatsoever. The Government had before them at this time another statement of the Ameer's grievance, which was of a very different character—a statement made by the Prime Minister of the Ameer himself in writing directly and authoritatively from the Ameer when he met Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. And what was the case then? He gives them only four grievances—only the list does not include that which the Indian Government hoped as the special and great grievance—namely, the refusal of an offensive and defensive alliance. They resort to an inferior authority, because that inferior authority does give them, among the grievances, that one specially marked. They pass by without any note the authentic statement of the Ameer's grievances. [An hon. MEMBER: Give the page.] Page 206. Why do they resort to the inferior authority and pass by the superior? Listen to the list of grievances made by the inferior authority. He had received no reply to a Paper about some Kalut Chiefs; then the affair of Yakoob Khan, and the arbitration of Seistan. So that, according to the statement of the Ameer's Minister, this great and special grievance of the refusal of the defensive and offensive alliance does not

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      appear in the list at all. According to the intention of the British Government, resorting to inferior authority they obtain that which they wish to bring out. ["Oh, oh!"] What I say is this—I do not suppose that these gentlemen were conscious of what they were about, but that is the observation—that they did give the statement of an inferior authority inaccurately, and pass by the statement of the superior authority; and the statement of the superior authority does not contain that one point that it is material for Her Majesty's Government to make—namely, that the Ameer has a grievance, that being, the refusal of former Viceroys to grant him an offensive and defensive alliance. Well, that is the case. I will mention another point, which is certainly a small one, but goes to prove the reckless carelessness with which the Papers were compiled. On page 170 you will find that owing to the Envoy's increasing ill-health several weeks were occupied in the delivery of his long statement. What a statement, that it occupied several weeks in the delivery! The fact is the statement was begun on the 8th of February, and was closed on the 12th of February, and the official statement says it occupied several weeks. I will pass from this point of minor importance to one which I regard as by no means possessing that character. In that famed despatch of the 10th May, 1877, paragraph 32, there is a long series of charges brought forward against the conduct of the Ameer. You will find in paragraph 33 that Sir Lewis Pelly
      "Demanded from the Envoy an explanation of the reported hostility of the Ameer's language and conduct, at a time when the representative of His Highness was still engaged in friendly and pacific negotiation with the British Government."—[Ibid. p. 170.]
      You would suppose from that Sir Lewis Pelly had demanded an explanation of the charges which had been laid before the Viceroy, but which we now know were not in the statement of the Ameer at all, and he never had had an opportunity of being heard upon them as they stand in that despatch. Sir Lewis Pelly made a quite different appeal to the Prime Minister of the Ameer and, in fact, only touched upon one of the eight raised in the preceding paragraph of the despatch. Is it tolerable, I ask, that these gross inaccu-
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      racies upon vital parts of the proceedings are to be made the basis of the official case which we are called upon to criticize and answer? That may be the view of the noble Lord; but it is not the view of those who think a judgment in a case of this kind ought to be based upon evidence. In the beginning of paragraph 34 the Envoy replied that—
      "The reports which had reached us of the Ameer's utterances and proceedings were, he trusted, much exaggerated; he feared, nevertheless, that since his own absence from the Cabul Durbar His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences which he himself deplored and condemned; he would lose no time in addressing to the Ameer strong remonstrances on the subject."—[Ibid.]
      I ask Her Majesty's Government to refer me to an authority for one word of that statement. Where is it? "There is great silence on the opposite Benches," to use a phrase of the noble Lord; but as the noble Lord has doubtless studied these Papers, perhaps he or any other Member of the Government will give me a single passage in support of the statement. Some new Papers were produced yesterday, and in these new Papers there is an appeal made by Sir Lewis Pelly, which does not in the slightest degree correspond with the description of the misconduct alleged by the Viceroy, and there is also the answer of the Ameer's Envoy to the appeal. The Envoy's answer is on pages 12 and 13 of these Papers. I ask you to give me one word out of that answer which supports a single assertion of the Viceroy as to the answer given.
      MR. E. STANHOPE: I distinctly challenge the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and state that in the letter will be found distinct authority for that statement.
      MR. GLADSTONE: Read it. ["Order!"]
      MR. E. STANHOPE: I will not read it.
      MR. GLADSTONE: You will not read it! Oh, yes; but I have seen you ready enough to read—["Order, order!"] Well, I am desirous to know, and hoped references would have been given me to a portion of that letter. Will anyone give me those references? [An hon. MEMBER: No.] No; no one will do that. I have, as the House knows, read to you frankly the statement of the Viceroy which I challenge;

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      and I ask that it may be proved or withdrawn—as, if it can be proved, it establishes a great portion of his case against the Ameer. You produce what you call your authority; and, so far as our best energies go to read and study, there is not one word to support the statement of the Viceroy, and you are not able to refer us to one passage that supports it. The substance of that Paper is that evil rumours are in circulation; that news letters are not to be believed; that he knows nothing of any of those statements; and it is a general protest to the effect that to entertain such statements upon such slight and worthless evidence is contrary to the friendship between States. There is a great regard for Order, and no one will read anything in my speech; but I hope the Gentleman who next rises to speak on behalf of the Government will read again that most important passage from the despatch of the Government of India which I have read, and those most important assertions which it contains, and will show us how those assertions are supported from any Papers now on the Table. I think I have laid something before the House with regard to the reckless negligence with which this Paper has been compiled. I am now going to refer to another Paper, in which the proceedings are in no degree less extraordinary, and that is a very important one, which is attributed to Sir Lewis Pelly, but which appears to be the production of the Indian Government. It is the answer to the statement of the Ameer. I must use the name of Sir Lewis Pelly; but I wish to add I have not a word to say against the accuracy of Sir Lewis Pelly. This was a Paper supplied to him, so far as I can see; and I place no mark of carelessness or of inaccuracy against him. It appears to me this is a genuine production of the Government of India, and it bears the same character of reckless assertion which I have already proved upon the despatch of the 10th of May; and here I may say that if I have not dwelt upon other cases it is not that there are none to dwell upon, but I think I have quoted enough to the House. Now, in this Paper of Sir Lewis Pelly there is a sort of indictment brought against the unfortunate Minister of the Ameer; and I must say, that while the language of Sir Lewis
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      Pelly appears to be usually courteous and kindly, the language of this indictment of which he was the vehicle and the mouthpiece does not deserve such a description. On the contrary, it is discourteous almost to the point of vulgarity. But I will deal with two of the assertions. Two things are said—
      "The British Government has never desired or attempted to re-open the question of appointing a British officer to reside at Cabul."—[Ibid. p. 215.]
      And yet, though they never attempted to re-open that question, they complain that the Envoy talked about that and nothing else. With regard to the desire not to re-open the question, that is not a very accurate statement. Sir Lewis Pelly's instructions are full of injunctions to re-open the question. It was proposed to bind the Ameer by Treaty to receive an Envoy at Cabul as often as an Envoy was required; but the statement that the Envoy had incessantly discussed this question—which is made a ground of complaint against him—is totally without foundation. The Envoy never discussed it at all. I have read through these long statements with all the care I can; but again I ask Her Majesty's Government to point me to any one sentence of the statement of the Envoy in which he discusses the proposition that a Resident should be sent to remain permanently at Cabul. I believe there is no such passage from beginning to end. But what am I to say of the second accusation made against him? It is this—that while he discussed the question not before him, he carefully and studiously avoided discussing the question that was before him—namely, receiving British officers on the Frontier. I must here quote Sir Lewis Pelly's words—
      "You have carefully avoided all reference to the reception of British officers in other parts of Afghanistan."—[Ibid.]
      And again—
      "You have left altogether unnoticed the proposals which are the only ones your Excellency is authorized to discuss."
      That is a very remarkable allegation—that the Envoy had entirely declined to discuss the proposal of the Viceroy, which was that British officers should be placed on the Afghan Frontier. It is totally untrue. [A laugh.] The gallant Admiral (Admiral Edmonstone)

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      laughs. He frequently does laugh. He is an experienced Member of this House, and he is one who opens his mouth oftenest. But perhaps the gallant Admiral has not read these Papers. Perhaps not; but I will give him information which, with his intelligence, he will value. While Sir Lewis Pelly is instructed to say that the Envoy nowhere touched the subject of placing British officers on the Frontier of Afghanistan, there are 11 passages in which he distinctly and expressly discusses this matter. If you are disposed to question my statement—and I think you should question it—I will give you all the passages. You will find them at pages 200, 202, 207, 208—four times over—211, 212, 213—twice over—making 11 in all. Really this is a most extraordinary method of the transaction of public business. The Envoy of the Ameer is arraigned for a kind of insolence—and he is arraigned with something approaching it—in discussing that which he never discussed at all, and in avoiding the discussion of a matter which he frequently discussed. After saying that, I ask the House whether I am justified in challenging the trustworthiness of these official Papers? That despatch of the 10th of May, from which I have quoted such gross misstatements, is the very despatch which receives from Lord Salisbury the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government, and especially for the "patience and discrimination" with which it handled the subjects to which it referred. I do not know what to suppose about the Members of the Government. I ought to suppose that they have studied this Conference at Peshawur fully. If so, have they discovered these things? If they have not discovered them, why not? And why is Parliament, which has nothing to go upon but this information, produced after two years and a-half, entertained with documents that are absolutely contradicted in most material points by others to which references are made and on which they profess to be founded? So much for the question of the untrustworthiness of the two Papers to which I have referred. It is an extremely irksome and painful process to track all these gross and unpardonable errors. As a rule, we receive with absolute confidence all the statements of fact contained in official Papers laid on the
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      Table of this House. We have had these Papers ten days in our hands, and the labour, therefore, of reading them is great; but it is increased fourfold when we have to watch them at every turn, and track the extraordinary deviations from fact in the statements they contain, and in which I am afraid they too much abound. There has been a great deal said—and no doubt there remains still a great deal to be said—ranging over the whole of these transactions; but I shall not attempt to go over the entire history of the case. It appears to me the case is brought to a head in one portion of it, on which the Government, not unnaturally, perhaps, have hardly touched at all. The Under Secretary of State touched with a very light hand indeed on the Conferences at Peshawur. They are not the most agreeable reading, and they are voluminous and very closely printed; but here we have the whole case brought into a focus. We can there see what is the course of action that has placed us in our present position. It is the abandonment of the old policy and it is the adoption of the new; and the first price we have to pay for this new policy is a war that has now begun. It is a war attended with this remarkable feature—that, as the Duke of Wellington said, a victory was the most woeful thing next to a defeat; so in this war military success will be the most painful and embarrassing next to military disasters, which might shake the whole fabric of the Indian Empire. Now, I want to know by the light—the ample and redundant light—which these Conferences afford, what was the situation of things when Lord Northbrook quitted India? There had been no change in the Indian policy between the accession of the present Government and the departure of Lord Northbrook from India. That was not owing to the present Government. Lord Salisbury, at the earliest period, began to feel the pulse of Lord Northbrook on the subject of a change. The reception of the first overture was not favourable. He devised a more formidable attack. He instructed the Government of India to alter its policy. The Government of India, in the first place, ascertained that some short time would be given; and, having ascertained that, they wrote a despatch, manful and dutiful, but, I think, in bold resistance to the injunctions of the Secretary of

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      State. The Secretary of State returned to the charge, and repeated his injunctions. The Indian Government and Lord Northbrook returned to the charge, and repeated their objections, and what I do not mean to call refused in any unbecoming or improper sense, but returned an answer declining, and giving reasons against the injunctions of Lord Salisbury. That is the great epoch. Lord Northbrook then quitted India, a new Viceroy was sent out with new views and new ideas, and what we want is to make an effective comparison of the old and the new. Well, we have the best opportunity of doing that in the Conferences at Peshawur, because the persons are each of them potential, fully authorised and instructed; and because the Papers which were exchanged, and the records which were drawn, give us a most copious account of all that had taken place, but, at the same time, enabling a judgment to be formed. The noble Lord opposite described this old policy with the following epithets. He calls it old. I should have thought that might have been an epithet of praise from the noble Lord. He calls it battered. He calls it beaten. He calls it exploded. He calls it barren, and he calls it useless. Those are the epithets which he applies to the policy of Lord Canning, of Lord Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, of Lord Northbrook, of the other Viceroys of India since the time of the first Afghan War, and of every Government, including his own Government, that have held office in England during these 25 years. That is the description he gives of this policy, I cannot for a moment think of checking the luxuriant imagination of the noble Lord in his choice of epithets; but when the noble Lord, leaving the ground of imagination, passes from adjectives to substantives, and when he deals with matter of fact, I beg leave to contest outright his fundamental propositions, although I fully admit that I have no means of confuting them, except by reference to the Papers which have been produced. The noble Lord says that the Ameer from year to year became more and more anxious for a change in his relations with the British Government, That is the statement of the noble Lord. It is on the ground of a statement like that that he absolves himself from reference to the Book, "He became more and more anxious for a change in his
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      relations with the British Government, and he desired that more vigorous steps should be taken, and that desire he expressed time after time." A change in his relations with the British Government is the cardinal phrase of the statement of the noble Lord. What I say is this—that the change in policy was that undoubtedly the present Government renewed the promise of protection which had been given by Lord Northbrook in a manner substantially the same, but somewhat less cautiously worded. Lord Northbrook, in the words which my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India said he did not understand, described the kind of assistance that he was disposed to give. I have such an opinion of the intellect of my hon. Friend opposite that I know not how to comprehend his words, and I do not understand his not understanding. There never was a plainer passage than that in which Lord Northbrook conveyed his assurance of support to the Ameer.
      MR. E. STANHOPEexplained that what he said he could not understand was the telegram of the right hon. Gentleman's Government.
      MR. GLADSTONE: I am sorry if I misunderstood my hon. Friend; but I thought I heard him say the explanation was obscure. As to whether he understands the telegram which was not sent to him, it is a matter of very little consequence, because Lord Northbrook understood that telegram. As the Ameer knew nothing about the telegram, but only knew what Lord Northbrook said to him, I do not think we need trouble ourselves with that matter; but I beg pardon of my hon. Friend if I misconstrued him. The difference between the assurance given by Lord Northbrook and the assurance given by Lord Salisbury, as I understand it, is this. Lord Northbrook said—"I affix two conditions. One is that you must not bring the war upon yourself by your aggressive policy; and the other is you must be guided by us in the questions of policy that arise with regard to that war." These were the two conditions he laid down. Lord Salisbury, I think, cut off—certainly did not repeat explicitly—the second condition. I cannot say that was an improvement. It might be that the Ameer might be engaged in a war not brought on by his own aggression, and

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      yet he might have brought it on by such folly and mismanagement that it would be very hard that we should be liable to assist him in it; and, therefore, I cannot say that I think that was an improvement on Lord Northbrook's definition of the conditions. They are the only two he affixed, and they appear to me to have been perfectly just and wise. But, at any rate, in the main I take it the same or nearly the same assurance of protection was given as Lord Salisbury contemplated in the despatch in which he first instructed Lord Lytton. Lord Lytton undoubtedly, and the Government of India, went beyond what Lord Northbrook had promised, and I should have said seemingly beyond what Lord Salisbury had enjoined, but I do not dwell upon that. They promised the Ameer apparently a total identification with his foreign policy. That was not what the Ameer wanted at all. He did not want them to be identified with his foreign policy; and it is quite evident that the reason why he took alarm was that he was afraid of interference with his foreign policy, and through his foreign policy of interference with his independence. But the present Government of India, while granting to the Ameer more than Lord Northbrook had been disposed to grant, annexed to it conditions which were absolutely intolerable, and which, in the view of the Ameer and of his people, in their ultimate operations were fatal to the independence of his country. Why, I will not quote the 11 passages to which I have referred; but I will read a few words from one of them. The Ameer says—
      "In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands. In no way can they be re-assured on this point, and it is impossible to remove these opinions from their minds, for they adduce many proofs in support of them, the mention of which now would greatly prolong this discussion."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 208.]
      He speaks of it there with regard to the reception of these officers generally; in almost all the 11 passages he refers especially, and in terms, to their residence upon the Frontier, and urges against them, in a great variety of forms of expression, the very same objection that I
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      have read. Well, now, the case of Her Majesty's Government is this—that the old policy was worn out; that it was necessary to have a new one; that the results were unsatisfactory to both parties—unsatisfactory to the Indian Government, and unsatisfactory to the Ameer; and, as I have quoted from the noble Lord, the Ameer from time to time, and from year to year, more and more pressed for a change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I have promised to confine myself to the Conferences at Peshawur in a great degree, and consequently I will not quote the declaration of Sir Richard Pollock, which referred to a date early in 1874, and which was founded upon information confidentially obtained about the sentiments of the Ameer. It will be remembered that the effect of that declaration was, that there was no unfavourable change whatever in the sentiments of the Ameer. But I will take the evidence which I suppose is the strongest in the case. It is said that the Indian Government of that day on the one side, and the Ameer and his Government on the other side, were fundamentally dissatisfied with the relations which subsisted, and that, consequently, there arose the necessity for a change. I will contradict that statement by the most distinct evidence that can be conceived on the part of the Government of that day, and likewise on the part of the Ameer. I will take first the Indian Government of that day. In January, 1875, these are the words of Lord Northbrook—
      "This being so, and if we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning in the time of Dost Mahomed—which was renewed by Lord Lawrence on the first favourable opportunity that occurred after the death of Dost Mahomed—which was ratified by Lord Mayo at the Umballa Conferences—and which we have since steadily pursued—are secured. We have established friendly relations with Afghanistan: that country is stronger than it has ever been since the days of Dost Mahomed, and our influence is sufficient to prevent the Ameer from aggression upon his neighbours. It is to be regretted that old animosities and other causes have hitherto prevented the establishment of true intercourse between European British subjects and Afghanistan, and the location of British Agents in that country. But we believe that these things will naturally follow in course of time when our motives are better understood."—[Ibid. p. 134.]
      There is the difference clearly brought

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      to issue. The Government assert that the object of our policy had not been attained; but the Government of India of that day, who were the paramount authority at the time, give it as their opinion that it had been obtained—at least in substance. And the Paper from which I have quoted was signed by Lord Napier of Magdala, in whose case the charge relied upon by hon. Gentlemen opposite has reference not, I apprehend, to the question of policy generally, but to the occupation of Quetta. The two Governments are, in fact, directly at issue with one another. The present Government, on the 10th of May, 1877, say—
      "It is impossible to deny that the practical result of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory."—[Ibid. 165.]
      Now, that is a statement which is perfectly at variance with the passage which I have just quoted from the despatch of the Indian Government of Lord Northbrook. I have shown that the two Governments were entirely at issue; while Lord Northbrook, at least, completely contradicts the view of the noble Lord opposite with respect to the temper of the Ameer. And what was the temper of the Ameer? I will state it in the shortest possible form, in order to save the time of the House. It is a matter so important, however, as it comes out of the Conferences at Peshawur—since it entirely destroys the case of the Government with regard to his discontent and dissatisfaction—that I must trouble the House for a few moments with the evidence. The Cabul Envoy, in his interview with Dr. Bellew, says—
      "The Ameer and his people thoroughly appreciated the friendship of the British Government."—[Ibid. p. 202.]
      On the 10th February the Envoy says to Sir Lewis Pelly—
      "That very arrangement and agreement at Umballa is sufficient, so long as from the side of Her Most Gracious Majesty, the great Queen of England, the foundation of friendship shall remain intact and stable."—[Ibid. p. 205.]
      How does he go on? You will find him saying at page 206—
      "Therefore, till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook, the previous course continued to be observed."
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      Again—
      "Lord Northbrook left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct of his predecessors, and in conformity with the preceding usage."—[Ibid. p. 208.]
      What does the noble Lord now think about his representation of the Ameer being from year to year in a state of greater excitement, becoming more and more dissatisfied with his relations with the British Government, and demanding a change? What says the noble Lord to this? The declaration of the noble Lord is, that it was the desire of the Ameer that a great change should take place in his relations with the British Government. The exact reverse was the case. His wish was—"That the usual friendship should remain firm upon the former footing." Then, says the noble Lord, the Ameer was in a state of great alarm about Russia. No such thing. For the Envoy, speaking of Russia, declares, after referring to the communications made to him in consequence of the understanding between the late Government and Russia, that Lord Northbrook had thoroughly reassured him. Well, how did the Envoy sum up all this; because recollect that these alleged disturbances in the Ameer's mind are the only foundation for that change of policy of which we have heard so much. The Envoy says—
      "Therefore the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan have the most perfect confidence that there can be no deviation from the tenor of these writings "—the writing's he had received from Lord Canning, Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook—"which have been briefly mentioned, in respect to the peace and tranquillity and lasting friendship of the States, in accordance with the reply of His Highness the Ameer to the letter of Lord Northbrook of the 6th September 1873. If there should be a want of confidence in the substance of these successive writings approved by Governments, or the probability of a causeless want of confidence in them becoming a reason for displeasure to the Governments, what propriety is there in this?"—[Ibid. p. 202.]
      Then, further on in the same page the Ameer says—
      "The Ameer is, with sincerity of purpose, in accord with his Excellency the Viceroy, in accordance with those communications and the former course. And, as to according his Excellency the Viceroy a 'means,' I beg to say that no better means exist than those of the past, which formerly, in the time of perplexity, and subsequently up to the present time, have produced sincerity and good deeds from time to time."

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      Here we have a flat contradiction of the description which has been given us by the noble Lord. The Envoy winds up with a final appeal to the Viceroy and the Government of India, and with the expression of an earnest hope for the welfare of the two Governments, and
      "That his Excellency, through your good offices, will, with great frankness and sincerity of purpose, act in conformity with the course of past Viceroys, and that by means of his own good acts the relations of friendship and unity may be increased."—[Ibid. p. 213.]
      Note the words—"By his acting in conformity with the course of past Viceroys." What, then, becomes of the main allegation of the noble Lord? We have two parties in relation to one another—the Government of India and the Ameer's Government. The present Government of India say, in substance, that they felt that their relations with Afghanistan had become unsatisfactory. The past Government of India declare that to them those relations did not appear unsatisfactory; and, on the other side, the Government of the Ameer, on whose supposed dissatisfaction Her Majesty's Ministers build their case, in every one of these citations which I have made simply appeals to Lord Lytton to let them alone and to act upon the relations which already existed, merely improving them; but, whatever was done, not to insist, above all, in making that most perilous and fatal proposition for the admission of British Residents into their country. That evidence as to the state of the case up to 1876 is complete. It does not leave a gap, a rift of any kind, for the suggestion of a defect. I know there were certain subjects of dissatisfaction in the Ameer's mind; but the Envoy is careful to make it understood that, whatever be these subjects of dissatisfaction, they are collateral to the main issue, and you have heard his own word in which he again and again beseeches and entreats the Representatives of the Government to let present relations subsist. The Prime Minister of the Ameer within four days of death said he wished to put a meeting off, and it was said it was evident he was trying to gain time. The poor man was trying to gain time. Death had laid his hands upon him in four days after that kind suggestion was made. The Ameer wished to send another Envoy. The former Envoy had
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      found that you were immovable and inflexible. You knew that you had superior power. You knew that you were secure from the scrutiny and criticism of Parliament. You knew that no criticism could be directed against you; and I do not hesitate to say that if these Papers as to the Conference at Peshawur tad been laid on the Table within a short time of that Conference you would have had no Afghan War. The iron hand of necessity was on the Ameer; and after all he had said about the prospect of danger to his country and its independence, still he knew that he could lean only on England, and he clung to that hope with a kind of desperate fidelity and tenacity. He was prepared to send a new Envoy, and, when driven to the last extremity, to concede all you demanded and to run the risks and danger of internal disturbances, which he had described to you in such just and pathetic and such moving terms. But he was not permitted to send a new Envoy to a new Conference. The Viceroy believed that concessions would be made; but he would not allow them to be made, because the Ameer was not eager enough to make them. A strong Power—the strongest in the world—dealing with almost the weakest in the world, forced that weak Power to concessions, which it shows in 11 pleas for another Conference meant its future ruin; and when they express their readiness to make those concessions you refuse them the opportunity, because they have not shown eagerness enough to give in to those terms which they believe in the long run would ultimately destroy their country. These things are hardly credible, and if they had not been known they could not have been believed. You find the Ameer satisfied in the main, though dissatisfied on minor points with his relations with you, and he begs you for God's sake not to disturb and tamper him. How did you leave him? Did you leave him as you had found him? No; you entered upon a discussion of Treaties with him. I have sometimes heard the "faith of Treaties" and the "sacredness of national engagements" talked about from the Bench opposite. But what was the mode of action that was adopted? We had certain engagements with the Ameer, and we proposed to give him our opinions about those engagements. What was the first communication made

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      to him by Sir Lewis Pelly? He actually went to the length of using these words—
      "The only obligations ever contracted between the British Government and the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857. The second of these two Treaties was contracted for a special and limited purpose, and with exclusive reference to an occasion which has long since passed away. This second Treaty, therefore, belongs to the class of Treaties known as transitory Treaties; and on both sides the obligations contracted by it have lapsed, as a matter of course, with the lapse of time."—[Ibid. p. 216.]
      In the first place, I conceive that that statement is an untrue statement. The Article in question—the second Treaty—has not lapsed, for there is no time fixed at which the obligation under that Article is to lapse. But that is not the point to which I wish to call the attention of the House. It is this—The declaration of Sir Lewis Pelly on the part of the Government as it affects the only two Treaties ever contracted by the British Government and the Rulers of Afghanistan. Lord Mayo had said that he would view with the utmost displeasure the acts of those who might try to disturb Afghanistan. Lord Northbrook had embodied his declaration in writing, and sent it to the Ameer, to the effect that he would assist the Ameer against unjust aggression. The present Government of India, representing the gentlemen who are eloquent on the subject of the faith of Treaties, informed the Envoy of the Ameer that the engagements of 1855 and 1857 constituted the only obligations of the British Government towards him, and that the promises of Lord Mayo and Lord North-brook were cast away to the winds. I think that the minds of the Gentlemen opposite, if I may say so without offence, ought to be sensitive on that subject—a little more sensitive than they are. Those obligations of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook were extinguished by implication, and I am now showing that they are expressly extinguished by the declaration of Sir Lewis Pelly. He referred to the writing on which he depended, and to which he said nothing beyond could with advantage be added. There is a statement that protection would be given to the Ameer if his inclinations wore in accordance with those of the
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      British Government. On page 219 you will read as follows:—
      "But His Highness has evinced no such desire; and it is absurd to assume that, because the British Government would have viewed with severe displeasure in 1869 any attempt to disturb the throne of a loyal and trusted ally, it is, therefore, bound in 1877 to protect, from dangers incurred regardless of its advice, the damaged power of a mistrustful and estranged neighbour."
      The declaration of Lord Mayo is, therefore, distinctly annihilated. He then proceeds lower down the page to deal with Lord Northbrook's promise as he has already dealt with Lord Mayo's promise.
      "Lord Northbrook declined to give the Ameer the Treaty which His Highness asked for. And therefore, as in the previous case at Umballa in 1869, it is clear that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord Northbrook to the Envoy were not intended to commit, and could not possibly commit, the British Government to any of those liabilities which it would have contracted on behalf of the Ameer had the Viceroy felt able to comply with the request of His Highness by signing with him a Treaty of Alliance."
      What is the meaning of that sentence? It is this—"Beware of certain obligations contracted towards you by Lord Northbrook as there have been by Lord Mayo in 1869. You have declined to go into a Treaty of Alliance which the Viceroy has offered to you; and as you have declined to go into it, it is absurd to suppose that the British Government now stands by any promise which it then made." That annihilated the protection which the British Government had held out over the Ameer, and leaves him entirely exposed to every blast of adversity. That is the condition of the Ameer at the close of this Conference, but that was not all. You closed the Conference; you shut the door in his face; you stripped him of the protection which had formerly been granted to him; you denied that the promise of Lords Mayo and Northbrook remained in force. But that was not all—you adopted other measures of hostility towards him—you occupied Quetta. The answer of the noble Lord to that is, that you occupied it in accordance with Treaty right. True; but suppose France occupied Belgium in conformity with Treaty rights, how would that satisfy us? In former days the great confidence of the Afghans always lay in the fact that the

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      great Power lay outside the Khyber and the Bolan Passes. Was it nothing, then, to occupy Quetta, and was it not likely to prove a grievance with the Ameer? At page 242 of the Afghan Papers there is a reference which uses these words:—"He reiterated his Quetta grievances," showing that they had been a usual subject of discussion. But it was not Quetta alone. You had built a bridge across the Indus and amassed your troops in a way that must have conveyed to the mind of the Ameer very great alarm. Whether the object of that military occupation was to attack Afghanistan or somebody else beyond it is not necessary for me to inquire. It was not very pleasant for the Roumanians when the Emperor of Russia had to attack Turkey on the other side of their territory; and the Ameer must have viewed with dread your military preparations on the Indus. You had encouraged the Maharajah of Cashmere to move troops towards his Frontier, and were, by a variety of measures, doing everything in your power to increase his sense of destitution and weakness. When you had reduced him to that feeling, in what condition did he stand? Was he still to maintain the same attitude towards Russia as he was glad to do when he had your promises of support? And now occurred the great offence of the Ameer. He received a Mission from Russia; but he did so only when you had annihilated your promises of support; when you had withdrawn from him your Native Agents, and left him without the slightest token of amity remaining; and now, last of all, and, perhaps, least credible of all, you have treated this reception of the Russian Mission as an offence, and have visited it with the penalty of war. For if this Proclamation is intelligible at all, it has this meaning—that at a time when you have accepted the pretexts of the Russian Government, you have made war upon the Ameer for accepting the Russian Mission. They are thin, transparent allegations. Well, Sir, there may be those whose knowledge is wider than mine; but I will say this—that the Ameer did not voluntarily accept this Russian Mission. It was an unwilling reception on his part. You turn round upon him now and say he accepted it with much pomp and display. But I have not been able to find this in the
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      Papers. That is one of the conveniences of not referring to the Papers. The Central Asia Papers last presented to us show this—that the Russians forced their Mission upon the Ameer; but the Russians knew how to go about it, and, in consequence of this, although they sent an urgent and imperative demand, they sent that demand beforehand. We also sent an urgent and imperative demand; but then, instead of waiting to let the Ameer have time to settle that matter with his own subordinate agents, we sent an Envoy on the heels of our demand, and, in consequence, he was met by the subordinate agents saying to him—"We have had no instructions, and have, therefore, no authority to let you pass." And that you call an insult. It is no insult; it is merely a consequence of the grossest blundering. What does the Ameer say? Major Cavagnari says, on the 16th of June, 1878—
      "The Ameer desires that Afghanistan may remain independent, and that there should be no Envoys of a different religion to Mahom-medanism in his kingdom."—[Central Asia (No. 1), p. 139.]
      We are supplied with a document of the 5th of June, 1878, that tells us the Ameer's first impulse was to send a Mission to Tashkend to deprecate the Russian Mission; but before he did this, we are told,
      "A letter was received by him from Kauffman, corroborating the Agent's statement, and adding that the Envoy must be received by the Ameer at Cabul, as he had been sent by the express commands of the Emperor."—[Ibid. 140.]
      Now, Sir, the Russians sent an absolute command to the Ameer; but, being men of business, they sent that command to him without sending the Mission on its heels, and thus they enabled the Ameer to take his decision without shaming himself in the face of his own servants. But you send your demand with your Mission close behind it, before he has time for consideration; and the consequence is it is stopped, not by the act of the Ameer, as you most unjustly accuse him, but by the act of his subordinates, who could not let it pass without authority. Such are the circumstances in which, the Ameer received the Russian Mission. But what have been our transactions in Russia? The India Office appears to avow a good deal more courage than the Foreign Office. It suggests, on the 8th of August,

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      "The adoption of such language at St. Petersburgh as may be best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect."—[Ibid. 143.]
      So Lord Salisbury writes to Mr. Plunkett—
      "Should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be -at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from his Highness."—[Ibid. 150.]
      And then M. de Giers writes to Mr. Plunkett that the Mission is
      "of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy; it cannot, therefore, interfere in any way with the pacific assurances which you mention."—[Ibid. 164.]
      But Lord Salisbury did not ask whether it was a Mission of a merely courteous and provisional character; he asked whether there was a Mission at all, and, if there was, he asked that it might be withdrawn. And the answer is—"We have got a Mission, but we think fit to call it a Mission of courtesy and of a provisional character." But I should like to know who is to draw the distinction? If there was such a distinction at all, it should have been embodied in Lord Salisbury's letter, and directions should have been given to ascertain of what character it really was. The Russians refuse to withdraw the Mission, and say it is within the understanding with our Government. Her Majesty's Government have committed themselves to that. But I venture to say that it is not within the understanding, and I think I have some right to speak upon this matter. The understanding was, that Russia should exercise no influence in Afghanistan, and the sending of a Russian Mission to Cabul was an exercise of Russian influence. Russia justified her military measures by the disturbed state of relations with her which you had created. Why did not she justify on the same ground, her Mission to Cabul? Why, if she had done so, the Mission to Cabul must have passed away at once, and it could never have been renewed. But she put it upon a new ground, as to which she may have obtained information beforehand, that you were prepared to admit it. And, therefore, Russia has got now, by the allowance of the Government opposite, and for the first time and in complete
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      derogation of the communications with Lord Clarendon and Lord Granville, a title to send what she may think fit to call a Mission of courtesy and of a provisional character to Cabul as often as she pleases. That is the humiliation to which you have subjected yourselves by first making a demand and then tamely submitting to the rejection of it. And, now, how are the facts? Has the Mission come back? It is of no avail whether the Envoy has come back. You have established and allowed a title which may be renewed at the pleasure of the Russian Government. But we do not even know that the Mission has come back. It may be there at this moment, while you are making war against the Ameer. I do not like to appeal to national pride; but I think it requires a very small share of national pride to feel sentiments of very strong aversion to a tame submissal to Russia, while at the same time you are making glorification of marching your legions to Cabul. My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) referred last night to vicarious punishment, and he did so with considerable justice. You have a ground of complaint against Russia, and you make war on the Ameer; and, having made war on the Ameer, you are going to exact compensation from the Border Tribes. The policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to make war upon the innocent for the faults of the guilty. First, the Ameer must be punished for the offence of Russia, and then the Frontier tribes must suffer for the vicarious faults of the Ameer. I do not know whether the House is aware of it, but I have here a curious document. It is a Treaty with the King and the Chiefs of Old Calabar and Duke Town, made by the Representative of Her Majesty, Mr. David Hopkin. The names of the Chiefs I need not attempt to read. The substance of the Treaty is this—"That the undersigned King and Chiefs of Duke Town, Old Calabar, undertake to forbid the old practice of inflicting punishment upon the innocent in room of the guilty in the whole regions of Old Calabar." The Government will not object to this reference. The noble Lord has declared, in language which must recommend itself to all the Liberals in the House, that we should always be ready to change our ideas and our measures, and to re-

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      ceive instruction from all sources. Do not let Her Majesty's Government, then, be ashamed to take a lesson from Old Calabar. Let them put an end to this system of making the innocent suffer for the guilty. If the Ameer has offended you—justly offended you—do not visit his sins upon the Frontier tribes; and if Russia has broken her engagements with you, do not visit the punishment of the breach of engagement upon the Ameer. I have now touched upon nearly all the points to which I need refer. The House has done me great kindness in listening to me for so long; but this question has an enormous range, and it requires time to deal with it. You have proceeded, as I have already stated, to make the reception by the Ameer of the Russian Mission a cardinal ground of offence and of aggression upon him at a time when you left him no other option whatever, and at a time when he was ready to endanger his own independence as a Sovereign for the sake of pleasing you. When you sent your Mission you received Reports from your own Vakeel on the 17th and 18th of September which should have led you to pause before you pressed its reception upon the Ameer. The Vakeel was a man you trusted; you had no other Agent; there was no other person to whom you could refer; and your own Agent, as reported by Sir Neville Chamberlain, advises you to postpone the project. He says the Mission should be held in abeyance, otherwise some harm will ensue. On the 18th you sent that to which no Member or Representative of Her Majesty's Government, so far at least as I know, has supplied the slightest answer. On the 18th September Sir Neville Chamberlain telegraphs another message—
      "Another letter received from Nawab Gholam Hasan Khan after an interview with Wazir Shah Muhammad, who assured Nawab, on his oath, that the Ameer intimated that he would send for the Mission in order to clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt to force this Mission upon him without his consent being first granted according to usual custom; otherwise he would resist it, as coming in such a manner would he a slight to him."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 242.]
      What had the poor man done? He had lost the advantage of all your promises, and he had seen your hostile preparations at Quetta and elsewhere, and he had even been ready to endanger the internal tranquillity of his country for
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      the sake of meeting your views, and was now ready to receive your Mission, if you would only send it in such a way as to preserve his honour, his self-respect, and his dignity in the face of his Asiatic subjects. But then we are to be told that this poor quarrel did not turn upon the rights or wrongs of the Ameer, but upon the supposed necessity for the creation of a scientific Frontier. Before Lord Mayor's Day the whole world was filled with idle rumours and with newspaper tales; but on that day, when Ministers were to unbosom themselves, all these foul vapours were to be dispersed by the rising sun. But what the rising sun did was to show us the necessity there was for our having a scientific Frontier in India. I am really loath to dwell upon the historical aspect of these extraordinary transactions. We are now at war; our gallant Forces are engaged in mortal strife. You have made this war in concealment from Parliament; in reversal of the policy of every Indian and Home Government that has existed for the last 25 years; in contempt of the supplication of the Ameer, through his Minister, that you would let things alone; in determined refusal to hear a new Commissioner, when the Commissioner he sent to Peshawur was dead; in opposition to the views of your own Vakeel at the moment when he told you that the Ameer, if his sense of honour and self-respect were spared, and the men were withdrawn, would grant you a Mission; at the time when you had accepted the Russian Treaty; at this time you declared that you wanted a scientific Frontier. Such are the extraordinary circumstances in which you are placed. And it is impossible to refrain from the recollection that an Afghan War is no new war. We made war in error upon Afghanistan in 1838. To err is human and pardonable. But we have erred a second time on the same ground, and with no better justification. That may also be human; and if, as such, it be pardonable, it is certainly, to say the least, lamentable, and repeated error is a grief. This error has been repeated in the face of every warning conceivable and imaginable, and in the face of an unequalled mass of authorities, and in the face of your own Agent on the spot. It is proverbially said that history repeats itself; and certainly the repetition

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      is in some cases singular and touching. There has rarely been an occasion in which there has been a nearer approach to identity than in the case of the present and the former wars. We have plunged into war upon the same ground, to act against the same people, and to fight against the son of the same man whom we previously fought against. There is still many a living being in Afghanistan whose memory bleeds at the recollection of the horrors we carried into their country and which we ourselves endured not yet 40 years ago, and yet all this is to be done over again. May Heaven avert the omen which may next suggest itself! May Heaven avert that catastrophe which befel our Army in 1841, and that sanguinary massacre which followed upon that catastrophe! But Her Majesty's Government must surely feel that the terrible calamities of those four years could not pass away without leaving upon the minds of the people of Afghanistan most painful traces. How is it possible they could look with favour, except as the result of the long-continuance of kindly relations, upon the people who had invaded them without cause, and had suffered and made them suffer so profoundly as the consequence of that invasion? However, it so happened that after 1842, and after the successful march of Pollock and the operations of Nott, 25 years of wise and cautious and far-seeing government prevailed, both in England and in India, and every effort was made to efface these painful memories, and to lay the foundation of a lasting concord. I remember a beautiful description of one of our modern Poets of a great battle-field during the Punic Wars, in which he observed—
      "Wherefore a moment Nature was laid waste, and nothing but the tokens of carnage were left upon the ground; but day by day and hour by hour she, returning to her kindly task, removed one by one, and put out of sight these hideous tokens, and restored the scene to order, beauty, and peace."
      It was a crisis like this that the Viceroys of this country were running through, and the Governments of this country, irrespective of Party, supported these Viceroys. I now ask, is all this to be undone? The sword is drawn; the bloody hand is to be manifested again, and is already manifested, in that unhappy country. The struggle may, per-
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      haps, be short. God grant that it may be short! God grant that it may not be sharp! But you, having once entered upon it, cannot tell whether it will be short or long. You cannot tell what will be its limits. You have again brought in devastation and again created a necessity which, I hope, will be met by other men, with other minds, in happier days; that other Viceroys and other Governments, but other Viceroys especially—such men as Canning, Lawrence, Mayo, and Northbrook—will undo this evil work in which you are now engaged. It cannot be undone in a moment, although the torch of a madman may burn down an edifice which it has taken the genius, the skill, the labour, and the lavish prodigality of ages to erect. As I have said, it cannot be undone in a moment. The best way we can act is to look for the re-instatement of that pacifying and mitigating process which will ultimately, though remotely, result in success. In the meantime, I should have some hope of this Division, if I really believed that many hon. Members of this House had made themselves individually masters of the case which is disclosed in the deep recesses of those two volumes of Parliamentary Papers. They have not done and cannot do this, and, therefore, this vote will go as other votes have gone. You will obtain the warrant of Parliament and the triumph of military success for the moment. That military success has not been quite so unchecked up to the present; but it has in substance corresponded to that which led us on in 1838, and blinded us to the perilous nature of the step which we were taking. Be that as it may, however, you will probably obtain sanction and the warrant which you seek. The responsibility which is now yours alone will be shared with you by the majority of this House. Many will decline to share it. Many will hope in the ultimate disapproval and reversal of your course by the nation; but even if the nation should refuse, and should indeed bow in submission to the tribunal of ultimate appeal, they will still feel they have discharged their duty in this critical moment—a duty absolutely incumbent on them, as they believe, if they are right in thinking that truth and justice are the only sure foundation of international relations, and that there

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      is no possession either for peoples or for men so precious as a just and honourable name.
      SIR ROBERT PEEL: I feel, Sir, that I rise at an immense disadvantage in following the right hon. Gentleman; and I must, therefore, ask the indulgence of the House while I refer to some subjects which he has mentioned, and some, perhaps, to which he has not alluded. I cannot but give my admiration and entire concurrence to the concluding sentences of his speech; for I should be one of the last men in this House who would wish to see this country engaged in an unjust and unnecessary war. But while I admire that passage in the speech of my right hon. Friend, I cannot help saying that I thought the first part of his speech was marked by a very narrow and bitter spirit. I fail to see why a man of his eminence should have thought it necessary to enter into a close and narrow verbal criticism which, surely, does not constitute the point at issue. I was also surprised to hear the right hon. Gentleman object to the observation of the noble Lord who commenced the debate this evening, that "we shall continue our hostility until we have received the due submission of our enemy." The views of the noble Lord are those of a majority of this House, and are shared, I believe, by a very large section of the public, both at home and in India; and I cannot, therefore, understand anyone, in face of the fact of such a policy being approved, expressing a hope that our Forces should turn back until the object with which they were put into the field had been attained. Again, the right hon. Gentleman was rather hard upon the noble Lord when he charged him with having made statements that could not be verified by the Books and which had no shred of truth. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Proof.] Well, proof. Then, again, he charged the Government with having saluted the country with 500 pages of information, and then asked the House, at a short notice, to give an opinion upon that information so afforded. But the right hon. Gentleman has spoken often enough on this subject in the country, and has, in language sufficiently strong to satisfy anybody, attacked the policy and the conduct of the Government without having in his possession a single one of those 500 pages.
      572
      We know perfectly well that he has been making his case without sufficient facts to support his statements and arguments; and it is, therefore, rather hard for the right hon. Gentleman to come down here now to charge the Government with reckless negligence and gross mis-statements in the course of these Papers.
      MR. GLADSTONE: I do not wish to be misunderstood. I have only made the charges this evening against two documents.
      SIR ROBERT PEEL: It is quite true that the charges have this evening only been made against two documents; but in the country he has charged the whole Government with reckless and gross misconduct and mis-management. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No.] But I say yes; and I intend to prove it. The right hon. Gentleman says there has been a broken statute; but he defers his proof of his statement to another day. I, however, do not propose to let that statement alone. I am going to call attention, not only to what the right hon. Gentleman has said in this House, but to speeches which he has made beyond its walls—speeches which ought, in my opinion, to be brought to the bar of public opinion by means of the debates which proceed in this House. Before proceeding with this branch of my subject, let me say, in reference to the speech of the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), who raised this debate, that I never heard a mass of Parliamentary Papers handled with more precision and accuracy by a Member occupying a seat on a back Bench than was shown by the hon. Gentleman. He based upon his quotations and references some rather sweeping charges against the Government; and the House will agree with me that there never was a time when more sweeping invective was applied to an Executive Government than has been used within the last three months. As I have said, the hon. Member for Bedford used some rather strong expressions; but they were the very milk of human kindness compared with what we have been lately accustomed to; it is like sucking painted lollypops, after the expressions we have so recently heard out-of-doors—expressions the consideration of which ought not to be postponed, but at once proceeded with. Once so brought forward, it is easy to show the

      573
      country how little foundation there is for the charges, except in the fever by which they were engendered. On another point, also, I must give credit to the hon. Member for Bedford for the way he advocated the case of Lord Lawrence. He has tried to make out as good a case, perhaps, as could be made out for the Blundering and impotent policy of Lord Lawrence. ["Oh!"] That it was blundering and impotent I can prove from documents laid on the Table of the House. Lord Lawrence has taken a very active part in this matter; therefore, I am desirous to refer to him for a few minutes. He is an ex-Viceroy of India, and the confidence and the favours of the Sovereign have been heaped upon him. He is at this moment the head of the Ameer's Afghan Committee in London. It is the same Lord Lawrence whose epistolary indiscretions have astonished the town; and it is he to whom, not through any Party feeling, the public opinion of the country, through the papers and correspondents, points as one of the principal authors of the mischief and troubles in which we are now placed. ["Oh!"] That may be contested; but I shall prove it. I take the opinion of one of the best of the men who have written on this subject—Sir Henry Rawlinson. I look upon Sir Henry Rawlinson as a most impartial witness. [A laugh.] The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) laughs at that; but no one can doubt that Sir Henry Rawlinson, from his long experience in matters affecting Eastern interests, is fully capable of giving an opinion on such a question. Well, he says our troubles commenced with the hesitation of Lord Lawrence in recognizing the Ameer Shere Ali as the rightful Ruler of Cabul after the death of Dost Mahomed; and if the noble Marquess questions the accuracy of Sir Henry Rawlinson, I must refer him to the Duke of Argyll, who, in a letter published in the newspapers, also admits the troubles with Afghanistan have been owing to the period while he was in the Gladstone Administration. After finding that repeated over and over again in the papers, I was surprised to hear the hon. Member make this audacious statement. The hon. Member said—"The front of the offence was Lord Salisbury's letters in 1875, and to him must be attributed the cause of the present war."
      574
      I have been in Parliament a good many years, and heard a great many statements and hostile remarks against the policy of Members of different Governments; but I do not think that I ever heard a more unfair or ungenerous statement in attacking a Government than to assert publicly that the cause of this war is due to Lord Salisbury. I was anxious to bring the point before the House, in order to show that the Papers cannot sustain that view of the hon. Member for Bedford. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich says he has listened to everything in the course of this debate, and has read all the Papers. I have also listened to the debate, and have read the Papers with as much ability as I can bring to bear upon them; but I must say that after all the explanations and declamations against the Government, I fail to recognize or to accept the full weight and burden of the indictment which has been so freely levelled not only against the Executive of this country, but against Parliament itself which has supported the Executive; and, indeed, one of the accusations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich is that Parliament having supported the Government, that Parliament ought to be got rid of. I am anxious, however, to express my feeling—which, I believe, is shared by a great many hon. Gentlemen in this House as well as in the country—and that is a feeling of anxiety and concern as regards these affairs that are going on in the North-Western Frontier of India. It is an anxiety which arises, not from any mistrust as to the result of the military operations in the difficult Passes and mountain fastnesses which separate Afghanistan from our Indian Empire. I hope—and I am sure I am expressing sentiments which everyone will share—that the arms of England, under God's Providence, will be completely successful in the work in which they are engaged. We trust that the gallant little army—not "our legions;" the right hon. Gentleman says we are pouring our legions into Afghanistan; there is an army of 30,000, not one-half of them within the Ameer's territory at present—will rival and emulate the heroic valour and discipline of the British arms, which have on every field shone conspicuous. Even at this moment we

      575
      have proof of that in the successful strategic achievement of General Roberts and his comrades. No one can doubt or mistrust the success of this expedition; but I share the opinion expressed to-night by the right hon. Gentleman. I see dangers that may arise from the very success and the victories which we may achieve. I think nothing has been more truly said than that our difficulties will arise with the anxieties and troubles of the diplomatic negotiations which must ensue not only in dealing with the Ameer of Afghanistan, but probably, and most certainly, with an enemy concealed behind the Ameer's back, who has had, no doubt, a great hand in these troubles. It is because I share the anxieties of both sides of the House in this respect that I am glad the suggestion of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), on the first night of the Session, did not find acceptance. I am glad that the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford has given this House an opportunity of stating its opinion frankly and fully before Christmas. We shall now know fully the views entertained upon this most serious and grave question. No doubt the object, in a Party sense, is to pass a Vote of Censure upon the Cabinet; and if the hon. Member succeeded there would, probably, not only be a change of Government, but, what is far worse, a change of policy also. The right hon. Gentleman has said a good deal to-night, in answer to the noble Lord (Lord John Manners), about the old way and the new way, and I think he has put a very unfair construction on the object which the noble Lord had in view when he made that remark; but certainly I should be very much surprised if, after the vehemence of the right hon. Gentleman, the suggestion of the noble Marquess had been allowed, that we should say nothing. It is important to bear in mind the sudden change of front made by the Opposition. Let us recollect the first night of the Session. Earl Granville said—["Order!"]—perhaps you will repudiate it—["No!"]—Lord Granville said—
      Mr. SPEAKER: Order, order!
      SIR ROBERT PEEL: It was observed by Lord Granville the other night—["Order!"]—I think, Sir, I am in Order in referring to this? Well, Lord Granville was understood to say that it was almost impossible to move any Amend-
      576
      ment expressing any definite opinion upon the action of the Ministers. In this House, the same night, the noble Marquess went a great deal further. He was most emphatic. On the first night he said—"The Papers are so voluminous, and the matter is so new and requires such careful consideration, that no hon. Member would be justified in calling attention to this grave question and pronouncing a final opinion on the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government." A great change, then, has come over hon. Members. I have referred to strong language. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) used some strong language. He was very angry with the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) for making the suggestions he submitted on the first night of the Session, when so many hon. Members were ready to rush into the fray. The right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen) made use of an expression also bearing upon the policy of the Government, and said that the Government had intentionally kept back the Papers. I must say that, in my opinion, if ever there was a Government which has been lavish not only in the information it gave, but in the anxiety and desire it has shown to communicate it, it is the present Government. Why, the House has had a Book of 500 pages got ready for its use in the course of a few days. Then there is the junior Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), who is not satisfied with the statements of anyone. The hon. Gentleman will excuse me for saying so; but he has not had much experience in this House, and he is always ready to bring forward his patent medicines for remedies. "Chamberlain's plans" are so constantly brought forward in the Midland Counties that I am quite sick of them. Then there is the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), who, of course, cannot sit still, though I must say that the hon. Member's knowledge of Indian affairs always commands the respect of the House, and although many lion. Members do not share his opinions they are sure to catch the attention of the House. This change of front on the part of the Opposition is very curious. Here we have seven or eight malcontents—what a hideous chorus of malcontents from every Liberal point of the political compass—all finding fault with

      577
      the noble Marquess for what he has done, with the policy and wishes of Lord Granville expressed in "another place," and with the policy of the Government. From whence comes this change of front? It is quite clear that the fever heat, the virulent spirit, and the active mind of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, is the cause of it. The Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford is a Vote of Censure and Want of Confidence. That is the broad issue; but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich calls it a "narrow issue." There must be a difference even in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman between broad and narrow. It is quite clear from what we have heard to-night that if he did not want to turn out the Government, he wanted a change of policy in the affairs of India, and to bring back those who in his Administration had been the cause of the war. I think that the difficulties which have arisen have been occasioned by the policy of the Gladstone Administration; and that the stain to which the right hon. Gentleman eloquently alluded in his concluding remarks, notwithstanding all the apologies for ex-Cabinet Ministers, all the profuse recriminations and epistolary correspondence of ex-Viceroys of India, must be on the Members who acted in that Administration. The right hon. Gentleman said he should like to see those who had broken the statutes brought to the bar of public opinion. The right hon. Gentleman is one of those who has for a very long time, from very incomplete information, been indulging in severe charges against the Government; and he and Lord Lawrence are, perhaps, the two men who have most embarrassed the Government. Lord Lawrence has published a correspondence of 17 columns of The Times. I do not know whether hon. Members have read it, but I have, and I must say it was most weary, weary reading. Lord Lawrence is a man of very great authority; but, under the circumstances, I should pay very little respect to his opinion on this subject. Lord Lawrence has made many statements in the country as to the Ameer and to the Committee in London, and he is one of those who have given the most information to our enemies. Lord Lawrence, however, when invited to attend a public meeting
      578
      at Bradford to discuss the war, and the causes which brought it about, wrote to the Committee declining to attend—the Papers having then been presented—and said—"I am so busy with the Papers on the Afghan affair that time alone would not permit me to be present at your demonstration." Now, we must recollect that for weeks before Lord Lawrence was so thoroughly well-informed on the case, in his own opinion, that he had been attacking the policy of the Executive, and making accusations in the newspapers, which everyone thought were wholly uncalled for. Well, then, there is a Member (Mr. Childers) whom I see the solitary occupant of the front Opposition Bench. I hope he may have a vested right in that Bench. I do not wish to disturb him from it; and I think he is most likely to have a vested interest in that Bench, if the Members of the Opposition to which he belongs continue to be so profuse in their differences of opinion. I was shocked at the remarks which he made the other day at Pontefract on the conduct of the Government; for it would be wiser for a man who has been a Cabinet Minister to abstain from criticism until he is able to inform himself of the facts of the case. But what we most complain of on both sides of the House is the vulgarity with which Lord Salisbury has been treated, and the bad taste that has been displayed with reference to Sir Bartle Frere. I must say I believe Sir Bartle Frere is one of the most distinguished servants of the Crown. He has administered a Colony, and is serving his country in very difficult circumstances. An immense responsibility has been cast upon him; and I do think it was a bold thing, not to use a stronger term, for the right hon. Gentleman to have made use of the sort of expression which he did with regard to Sir Bartle Frere.
      MR. CHILDERS: The right hon. Baronet will forgive me for interposing. The expression I made use of, to which I presume he alludes, did not in any way refer to Sir Bartle Frere. It was altered in a newspaper in such a way as to make it refer to Sir Bartle Frere. The moment I read that misconstruction of what I said I wrote to the newspaper in question, stating that the expression was not rendered as I had rendered it; that I, being one of

      579
      Sir Bartle Frere's oldest friends, and valuing most highly his public services, could not by any possibility have used such an expression about him. That letter has been printed; but I presume the right hon. Baronet cannot have read it.
      SIR ROBERT PEEL: I am extremely sorry if I have misrepresented the right hon. Gentleman. But the right hon. Gentleman will, no doubt, feel indebted to me for having given him an opportunity of making the remarks he has just made. I now come to the opinions expressed not only here, but elsewhere, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. He is one of those who indulge in violent invective, and the violence of his invective against the present Government almost exceeds the bounds of probability. His speech at North Wales and his speech at Greenwich contain language that is almost surprising. The contents of his speech at Greenwich, I am sorry to say, I have at my fingers' end. He spoke two hours by Greenwich time. The right hon. Gentleman began his indictment against the Government in this way. He said—"During the last three months we hoped we might have a period of repose." Now, nobody can for a moment suppose that the right hon. Gentleman stands in need of any repose. All I can say is, that during that period he found himself at leisure to interfere in a great many things, and, amongst others, in election matters in the borough which I have the honour to represent (Tamworth), although I am not at all afraid that his interference will produce the effect which he may have anticipated from his kind good office. But the right hon. Gentleman, on the occasion to which I am referring, went on to say—
      "We cherished a hope that by refraining from criticism—a hope even against reasonable expectation—the aim of the Government might at length be directed towards appeasing the prolonged troubles and perils which they had so considerable a share in creating. How were we rewarded? By the disclosure of a now danger, a now peril, in the controversy which has been opened with the Ruler of Afghanistan."
      Now, let me observe, in passing, that this question, instead of being only now opened by the Ameer of Afghanistan, is a question which, I think, ever since the time of Lord Dalhousie, has been con-
      580
      stantly under the notice of the Government of this country. One of the last acts of Lord Dalhousie's official life was to invite the attention of the Government of the day to the necessity of having—what the right hon. Gentleman was pleased to sneer at to-night, though I was glad to observe his sneer fell flat on the House—a scientific Frontier on the north-western portion of our Indian Empire. The right hon. Gentleman also complained of the Government having studiously withheld information from the country and Parliament in regard to their dealings with Afghanistan; but the charge, like many others, met with little encouragement. Well, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman from which I was quoting runs on very much in the same groove. He seems to be of opinion that the occupation of Quetta, which was not in the territories of the Ameer, was a great cause of complaint and a just offence to that Ruler. [General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR: Hear, hear!] The hon. and learned Pundit, I am not surprised to find, concurs in that opinion. But the right hon. Gentleman further pointed out that if any offence had been given it had been given by Russia. "Russia," he said, "solemnly undertook to abstain from all interference in Afghanistan. The agreement was made with us." Well, no doubt an agreement was made in 1869 that Russia should not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan or have a Mission there; but I was sorry to find the right hon. Gentleman follow up his statement by the question—"Why do you fight with Afghanistan? why do you not go to war with Russia? Why attack the poor Ameer, a poor weak savage; why not fight Russia?" The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that that is not the real way to look at this question. You may, by means of your rhetoric, put it with some apparent force in that light; but, in my humble judgment, that is not the way in which it ought to be regarded. A great insult has been offered to this country by the Ameer of Afghanistan, and for that insult he ought, in my opinion, to be made directly responsible. But the right hon. Gentleman goes on to say—"I hope the people of England will make some comparison between the England of 1873 and the England of 1878." Well, I think they have already made such a

      581
      comparison, and that public opinion has in the clearest manner run entirely counter to the policy of the right hon. Gentleman's Administration in 1873. More than that, we now occupy a position in the eyes of the world which we could not then command. I have taken pains to find out not the opinion of the people of England, because that we know, but that of foreign nations; and there are few things to my mind more remarkable than the way in which the Government of 1873 is spoken of by eminent foreign statesmen in Germany, France, and elsewhere. How, for instance, does Prince Bismarck speak of the Gladstone Administration in the Memoirs which have been recently published? He treats it with contempt. We are told that when Prince Bismarck read Lord Granville's despatch about Russia and the Black Sea, he smiled and said—
      "They speak of future complications. Future, indeed! that is not the way in which resolute people speak. They are Parliamentary talkers, and dare not do anything. No; nothing is to be feared from them, just as nothing was to be hoped for from them four months ago."
      I will now give the House the opinion of M. Gambetta, who is decidedly the first man in France, and who will occupy a great space in the future history of that country, if he will only keep himself from fighting duels at less than 35 paces. In a remarkable article in The République Française he expresses his astonishment that the revelations made by Lord Cranbrook, saddling the Gladstone Administration with the responsibility of having alienated the Ameer, should not have silenced the Liberals. The République Française says—
      "This does not prevent the Afghan Committee, which has the support of Mr. Gladstone, from pursuing its task of harassing the Government, even at this critical hour. Lord Lawrence is no more deterred now by the reflection of the ill he can do to his country than was Mr. Gladstone during the crisis in Eastern Europe."
      That is a very remarkable statement to appear in such a journal. But to return to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He goes on to say—
      "It is the duty of the people of England to think of the condition in which we are as citizens and politicians. Government by reserve, government by mystery, government by breach of law, government by bringing the Crown out of the position in which the Constitution has placed it to expose the Sovereign to personal responsibility! It is idle to tell you that the
      582
      attempts of the present Government have been to magnify the Sovereign. Make her Empress, forsooth! Yes, ladies and 'gentlemen ("I should think the ladies must have been pleased at the compliments to their Sovereign") the Liberal Party will be the special champion, at the next election, of the ancient Monarchy against those who, that they may cover it with flattery and adulation, are adopting measures but too likely to sap its foundations."
      Now, it appears to me that for an ex-Prime Minister to allude to his Queen and Sovereign in that way is open to the gravest objection, and I should have thought that he would have abstained from that sort of language. The right hon. Gentleman comes next to the despatch of Lord Cranbrook. We have heard a great deal about the famous paragraph 9, and I have listened to the right hon. Gentleman when, almost in solitary grandeur, he said seven times over that it was not only with the 9th clause he found fault, but that there were many other counts of indictment against the Government which he intended to bring under the notice of the House. How does the right hon. Gentleman talk of Lord Cranbrook? He says—"I will endeavour to avoid severe epithets," and then he goes on to characterize this able despatch and says—"The entire effect of paragraph 9 produces an impression absolutely false." He says—"The despatch asserts what is totally untrue." "It is also untrue," he adds, "that the Viceroy was instructed to postpone the subject," which subject, however, according to the Papers, he did postpone. Then he goes on to say—"This paragraph conveys a totally wrong impression, as if it had been expressed in the severest language of calumny." But these, of course, are not severe epithets! Then, again, "these Papers are garbled." What can go further than this? And the right hon. Gentleman is not using severe epithets when no language can be made more severe. I am really ashamed to trespass on the time of the House with these extravagancies of language of the right hon. Gentleman, and I will not now go through these Papers. I do not even wish to give an outline of that despatch of Lord Cranbrook; but I should like to warn the House that they must not believe a great deal they hear about the responsibility resting on Lord Salisbury. This question of the Ameer was always

      583
      to the front since the time of Lord Dalhousie, who, with the approval of Lord Aberdeen, made the Treaty to which reference has been made. Then came the transfer of the Government of India, and then the internal troubles of Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence was in India in 1869, and pursued that policy of masterly inactivity, which, to my mind, was the most blundering shortsightedness any Viceroy could employ. The way in which he regarded the various claimants to the Throne of Afghanistan is instructive. Within a few months we find him recognizing three sons of Dost Mahomed as each comes up. No doubt it is a want of decision in his character that led to the difficulties in which we are placed, and where a man like Lord Mayo would certainly have created a very favourable impression on Shere Ali. Matters went on, as we have heard, till this Mission, which the right hon. Gentleman has described in strong terms. May I state the conclusions to which I think we must arrive and pray the attention of the House for a short time longer? We must recollect that affairs in Central Asia in 1878 are not as they were in 1876, and why? Surely owing to Russia. Now, the question is—and it is brought home to the country—can Afghanistan be safely surrendered to Russia? Does the altered position of Russia in Central Asia entail a corresponding change of policy on our part? The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) endeavoured to show that we had left the old path; but new events obliged us to leave it. The Duke of Argyll himself said that we ought not to allow Afghanistan to become in any degree subservient to Russia; and yet look at the position of Merv and Herat, and see how Russia is gradually drawing its meshes round Afghanistan. You cannot deny it. The Duke of Argyll, however, qualified his remark by saying that "the ordinary consideration of an enlightened policy are enough to guide us." That is a beautiful and philosophical expression; so philosophical, in fact, that the Ameer did not understand it. Hence Russia is pressing on every side but the North-West Frontier of our Indian Empire on the territory of Afghanistan. And, lastly, one point that has not been referred to in the debate rises in my mind; you may blame the conduct either of this Go-
      584
      vernment or of the last; but the real fact of the case is that there is a fundamental difference between the policy of the two. I will tell you in what it consists. It is a difference in the manner of regarding Russia. The former Administration made common cause with Russia; the present Government is not blind or indifferent to the interests of this country. Over and over again I have heard the right hon. Gentleman use the expression—"Let us imitate the good deeds of Russia." That was the policy of the late Government, and they were sent about their business. This present Government adopts the wiser policy of Lord Palmerston, which was expressed in these words, and which said of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg—
      "When there is moderation at St. Petersburg you may be quite sure it will be followed by duplicity of action."
      Take the advice of Palmerston—the most truly British statesman that ever ruled the country; recollect how all through his life he foresaw our difficulties and always set his face against this Power. Over and over again have I expressed my dissatisfaction with the action of Russia; and I am a disciple of Palmerston, and advocate facing the intrigues with which Russia works her way. When I condemn the action of Russia I condemn it as a most hideous despotism, which accepts no law but the will of an Autocrat, and recognizes no liberty but its own licence. For these reasons I differ from the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and concur in the policy of the present Government. During these troubles in India many people have expressed an opinion that the burden of Government is too great for this country. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich concluded his remarks to-night with a most eloquent peroration about the services of Lord Canning, Lord Mayo, and many others, in which he told us how their great object was to sow peace and prosperity on the borders of our Empire. And this is very true. But we must recollect that the right hon. Gentleman is one of those who think that our Indian Empire is too much for us to bear, and that, therefore, we might part with it. ["No!"] The hon. Gentleman says "No;" but there is a periodical called The Nineteenth Century, in which, the

      585
      right hon. Gentleman had an article on the duties of England, in which he says, with regard to our Possessions in India—
      "Here is a tutelage unexampled in history, one-sixth of the human race. The truth is, we are mot on every side with proofs that the cares and calls of the British Empire are already beyond the strength of those who govern and have governed it."
      What does that mean? Does that quotation not bear out my statement with regard to the right hon. Gentleman? Perhaps, under another Government than the present we might possibly find its cares and calls too much for those who attempt to govern it. I have to thank the House for the kindness with which it has listened to my remarks; and, in conclusion, I will venture to supplement them with only another sentence. I recollect on the first night of the present Session an hon. Member said—"After all, Afghanistan is but a buffer, as it were, between England and Russia." I, in common with many others, repudiate altogether such a sentence as that. England requires no buffer between herself and any other Power. She meets her Allies with frankness, and her enemies face to face. We require no buffer in our dealings with any other Power. It is, therefore, with feelings of confidence that the Government will follow a wise policy in these matters, difficult though they may be, that I am prepared, on this grave occasion for the country and the House of Commons, to support the Government as against the Vote of Censure that has been proposed. And, in spite of all the bickerings of Party malice, in spite of the grave indiscretions of those who ought to have known better, and—I say it with feelings of shame and sorrow—in spite of the attempts that have been too often made of late to run down our country to the profit of our enemies, I believe from my heart that the Executive in these grave and serious circumstances have followed the straight and honest path of duty, of honour, and of national self-respect, without which qualities the character and the influence of the proudest nation in the world—like Carthage of old and Rome in her decline—must soon wither and decay.
      MR. LEATHAM: Mr. Speaker, the right hon. Baronet who has just sat down (Sir Robert Peel) has made, as
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      he always does, an amusing and energetic speech; but I do not think that he has given us very much to reply to. He has taunted us with making a change of front. There has been no change of front. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), on the first night of the Session, distinctly referred to the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread); and if he stated that he would not pronounce an opinion until he had read the Blue Books carefully, his hesitation was probably due to the fact that he did not possess the remarkable memory of the right hon. Baronet. I will not follow the right hon. Baronet in his attack upon the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, for he is here to defend himself, and is quite able to do so; but I think the right hon. Baronet might have spared him the comparison with a pettifogging attorney, which was rather a strong expression to fall from so great a purist as the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Baronet has found fault with the right hon. Gentleman for the terms in which he has referred to Russia, which he said were unbecoming in an ex-Minister; but before he sat down he himself spoke of Russia as "a hateful and insidious Power." In attacking Lord Lawrence, who is not hero to defend himself, the right hon. Baronet attacked his own Friends, who were in Office at the time and fully approved of the policy of Lord Lawrence. In his despatch of 26th December, 1867, the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer writes to the Indian Government, that there was nothing in the Treaty of 1855 requiring Great Britain to support the pretensions of Shere Ali Khan, or of any other Chief, unless his policy appeared likely to promote the internal tranquillity and independence of Afghanistan. With regard to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, Her Majesty's Government "see no reason for any uneasiness, or for any jealousy." The conquests which Russia has made, and, apparently, is still making, in that region are, in their opinion, the natural result of the position in which Russia was placed, and
      "afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country."
      The right hon. Baronet attributed

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      the whole of the present difficulties to; the policy of the late Government. I regret very much that the Government had not the benefit of the right hon. I Baronet's counsel. It might have saved them from the "stains" of which he spoke. But I do not attach much importance to the controversy—as to whether or not the late Government can be made to appear, remotely, indirectly, and wholly unintentionally on their part, responsible for the present war. I cannot help thinking that the plea which we so constantly hear, whenever the acts of the present Government are impugned, that the late Government said something, or did something, which countenanced or caused what the present Government are doing now, is a little unworthy of Her Majesty's Ministers. Surely, it is neither very dignified, nor very courageous, the moment your policy is assailed, to seek to throw the blame upon an Administration which ceased to exist nearly five years ago; but I have observed that this is the course which is almost invariably resorted to by the apologists of the Government, whenever they find themselves in an awkward corner. For example, if we call public attention to what we regard as the extravagance of the Government, we are told that the vast expenditure of the country is not due to extravagance, but to measures which were passed by the late Government eight or ten years ago. Now, no doubt measures were passed which gave an opening for expenditure; but the opening has been most diligently improved. Again, I remember that when the Government found itself in what I must call its first scrape—with reference to the Slave Circular—the Diplomatic Correspondence of the last 50 years was ransacked in order to find something which Lord Palmerston or Lord Clarendon had written, which was supposed to justify the course then being pursued, by the Government, but which they afterwards happily abandoned. And, now, when we complain of this Afghan War as unnecessary and unjust, we are triumphantly told that but for something which Lord Northbrook said to the Ameer five years ago it would never have occurred. Surely, Sir, we have had a great deal too much of this "Please, Sir, it wasn't me" line of defence; a great deal too much for the credit of a Government which ought to
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      have a policy of its own, and one which is susceptible of defence on its own I merits. Every one admits that it would I have been preposterous if the late Government had done what the Ameer demanded, and engaged to defend him, through thick and thin, against all comers, without taking adequate guarantees that their support should not be abused. How were they to know what whim might enter his head with regard to his own succession? Were they to make themselves parties to all the intrigues of an Oriental harem? and as regards his foreign relations, how was it possible that they should guarantee him against the consequences of acts over which they could exercise no control? The late Government was not quite so ready with its guarantees and protectorates; it was not quite so eager to back everybody's bill, and to mortgage the resources of the country. But I will engage to say that even the present Government, lavish though it has been beyond all precedent with the national guarantees, and prodigal beyond all example of the national future, would have paused before they committed themselves to that kind of guarantee, the denial of which is now assigned as the reason for the estrangement of the Ameer. Indeed, we have the despatch before us which contains the instructions of the Government to the new Viceroy upon this very point; and if we take into consideration the new condition as to Residents in the Afghan cities, the assurances to be given to the Ameer were certainly not more liberal than those which Lord North-brook gave him. Well, then, if placed in the same circumstances you would have acted in everything which is essential in the same way, is it generous, is it quite manly, to seek to lay this disaster—for disaster it is—at their door? I must confess, Sir, that if I had not formed an opinion already as to the justice of this war, I should conceive the gravest prejudice against it merely from the line of defence which has been adopted by Her Majesty's Ministers. First we have this attempt to shuffle off the responsibility on to other shoulders. Then we have the secret despatch, prepared with a strict regard to publicity. Or is it because the Government wholly despair of keeping anything whatever secret that they send a document, which is not intended to see the light, to the

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      Press before the ink is dry? Why is there this extraordinary discrepancy among the authorities as to the object of the war? Why have we so much circumlocution at the India Office, and so much candour at the Mansion House? Why is it that we hear nothing about a scientific Frontier at the India Office, and nothing about anything else at the Guildhall? To read the despatch one would suppose that we were driven into war by the intolerable insults of the Ameer. To listen to the Prime Minister one would suppose that we were making war with the most brutal indifference to right and wrong. Whom are we to believe—the Secretary for India, writing secrets for everybody to read, or the Prime Minister proclaiming before Gog and Magog reasons which everybody would desire to keep secret? The Prime Minister's reasons I must decline to discuss. It is enough that there is no living casuist, except perhaps The Times, who would dare to defend them on moral grounds. This is a Christian country; and if the Premier wishes to know what is to be said against his reasons, we must leave him alone with the Archbishops. Well, Sir, if that be so, an observation which is attributed to one of the greatest of our living poets exactly describes the situation. He said—
      "Now that the robbery had commenced, he hoped it would be conducted with as little murder as possible."
      But are the reasons of the Indian Secretary much better? If we refer to the Ultimatum, we find the casus belli described in effect as follows—namely, the reception of a Russian Envoy
      "at a time when a war was believed to be imminent, in which England and Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides,"
      and the repulse of the English Mission. The Secretary of State says—
      "Such Missions are customary between friendly neighbouring States, and are never refused except when hostility is intended."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 254.]
      Now, surely, there is an exquisite naïveté in these words. Just as though the controversy as to whether such Missions should be received at all—or any Missions—or whether any Englishman, official or non-official, should be admitted to the territory of the Ameer had not been going on all through this
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      voluminous Correspondence. It is simply absurd to treat the Ameer as though he were an European Power, who understood, and had made himself a party to, all the courtesies and requirements of European international life. The Ameer stands altogether outside such requirements. If he did not, all your diplomatic representations would have been unnecessary, and your Mission would have gone to Cabul as a matter of course. But he stands so far outside them that he will not permit even your traders to penetrate into his territory. It is laughable, after indulging in negotiations extending over many years with the view of bringing about a state of things which may approximate in some degree to that which exists as a matter of course among European nations, to turn round upon this half-savage Prince and to apply the rules of Europe. In Europe you receive Embassies, as a matter of course, from every nation with which you are not in a state of war. Why? And this leads me to the kernel of the whole matter. It is because in Europe Embassies are not sent with a view of dictating your foreign policy and crippling your independence. But will the hon. Gentleman, who represents the India Office in this House (Mr. E. Stanhope) deny that those were the objects of the Mission which we proposed to send to Afghanistan? Who ever heard of an European Mission 1,000 strong, and armed to the teeth? But if such a Mission presented itself at any European Court, where is the Court so craven as to receive it? And let the House bear in mind that we had received no encouragement to send this Mission. No attempt had been made to ascertain whether it would be distasteful to the Ameer. Everything which had occurred would lead to the inference that it would be distasteful in the extreme. You had no right to expect that your Mission would be received in a friendly manner; yet, because it was not received in a friendly manner you pronounce the act to be one of "enmity and indignity against the Empress of India," and the right hon. Baronet talks about the "direct insult" which the country has sustained. But the Ameer, basing his notions upon the state of things which you had not only permitted, but sanctioned—the practical isolation of Afghanistan—and upon the understanding which you had with him,

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      and with Dost Mahomed before him—that these Missions should not be sent without his permission—could not fail to regard the approach of an armed and uninvited British Mission as an act of enmity and indignity done to himself, and an insult which he could not put up with, if he were to retain the respect of his subjects. As it seems to me, no pains were spared to insure the failure of this Mission. Not only did you demand its admission in a peremptory tone—not only did you back it up by the assembling of a great armed force, but you proclaimed throughout all India what you were about to do; and you went the length of summoning neighbouring Native Princes to witness the success of your exploit. Your exploit did not succeed; and I must say that I respect the Ameer for the line which he took. It was not a prudent line; perhaps many persons will consider it almost a foolhardy line; but the act was the act of a man who did not lose his self-respect in the presence of great dangers, and who resolved to fall an independent Prince rather than to live on in shameful vassalage. But no doubt I shall be told that the Ameer had departed from his position of isolation by admitting the Mission from Russia, and that he did so at a time when his marked preference for Russia was very galling to this country. I admit it; and if the war with Russia had taken place, you would probably have been justified in regarding him as the ally of Russia, and in making war upon him. But the war with Russia did not take place; and this episode in your quarrel with Russia ought to have gone the way of the quarrel itself. There have been diplomatic representations with regard to the Russian Embassy; and we are told that they have been successful. But the point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House, after the remarks of the right hon. Baronet, is this—that the offence for which you are chastising the Ameer was not the offence of one man. There were two parties to it. There was the man who received the Embassy, and the man who sent it. Who is the greater offender—the petty Prince who yields his trembling friendship, or the great Emperor who demands and extorts it? His designs, at all events, were distinctly hostile. His Mission was intended at
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      the moment as a deliberate menace. If there is anything about the Mission which constitutes a casus belli, you are fighting the wrong man. Nothing appears to be too bad for the weak one; the strong one you leave altogether alone. Is it because you very much prefer punishing the weak one? If so, I commend your prudence; but I have no words of commendation for your magnanimity. And what a moment you have chosen for this war? Granting, for the sake of argument, almost everything which you ask; granting that you had a right to make this war; where was the supreme necessity of making it at a time when every enterprize in the country absolutely demands repose? Right hon. Gentlemen seem to live in a paradise of their own, and in utter ignorance of what is passing around them. The oldest Member of this House cannot recall the time when all the great interests of the country have suffered as they are suffering now. There have been periods of depression in trade, periods of depression in manufacture, and periods of depression in agriculture; but when have all three been smitten by the same simultaneous overthrow? Do right hon. Gentlemen reflect that if the cloud which is hanging over the country be not speedily removed, we shall have to face times of the most frightful penury—if not of the most dangerous discontent? Is this a time to go about brandishing your sword in everybody's face? You have reduced the industry of the country almost to despair already by your incessant menaces and your perpetual appeals to arms. Hardly have we escaped one danger before we find ourselves in the presence of another. But, whether escaped or not, they are all equally costly. Did anyone ever hear of such preparations as those for this Afghan Expedition? I hear that we have purchased 60,000 camels—that is, a chain of camels tied head to tail and extending for 120 miles! The first camel would be marching into the market place at Bristol when the last camel was still stalking through the streets of London. It is monstrous that such expenses should be thrown upon the half-bankrupt Treasury of India. It is almost equally monstrous that they should be thrown upon us, with our declining resources, saddled, as we are, with another war, and thrown upon us,

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      too, for the maintenance of a policy which we have never sanctioned? What is that policy? Is it the policy of the Mansion House? That is a policy from which the conscience of the country openly revolts. Is it the policy of the India Office? Are we making war because the Ameer will not receive our Residents into his cities? That is the concession which only the other day Lord Mayo pledged the good faith of the country should never be asked of him. Some persons say that we have gone to war because the Government have roused a war spirit in the country which they cannot control, and which they are anxious to gratify at the least risk. That reminds me of the story of the learned attorney, who was being run away with in his carriage, and cried out to his coachman—"John, can you stop the horses?" "No, sir," said John. "Then drive into something cheap." But whatever may be the object of the Government in making war, there is an uncomfortable suspicion abroad that the quarrel has not been forced upon us, but that we have picked it. How otherwise can we explain the breaking down of the Conference at Peshawur? No one can read this Correspondence without arriving at the conclusion that the Government resolved to force our Residents upon the Ameer by fair means or foul. To crown all, comes the declaration at the Mansion House. I must confess, Sir, that I find it quite impossible to reconcile all this with a policy of prudence and justice; and therefore that I am unable to sustain the Government by any vote of mine in a course which, I am convinced, all honourable men, when they cease to be blinded by Party and prejudice, must eventually condemn.
      MR. FORSYTHsaid, it was highly improbable the Government would, in the present state of trade and commerce of the country, drive the country into war if it could be avoided. He did not think the people of England would take much interest in recriminations in Parliament. What they were concerned about was the question—Was the war a just and necessary war? If it were proved to be just, they would approve of it; if not, they would condemn it, and the Government who were responsible for it. He believed the war was just; and an attentive perusal of the Papers had
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      convinced him that the man who was to blame was the Ameer himself. It was his perversity, obstinacy, and folly that brought the calamity on his country. Those who blamed Lord Salisbury for a change of policy should bear in mind that the policy of a country changed with circumstances. To show how capricious and untrustworthy this Ameer was he would like the House to see what appeared in page 126 of the Papers on this subject. They would there find the following telegram from the Viceroy to the Deputy Commissioner at Peshawur:—
      "The Viceroy has been informed that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan came to Cabul under a safe conduct from the Ameer, and that notwithstanding the safe conduct he has been placed in custody by His Highness. The Viceroy, as a friend and well-wisher to the Ameer, hopes this report is untrue, and desires strongly to urge His Highness to observe the conditions under which the Sirdar has come to Cabul. By so doing the Ameer will maintain his good name and the friendship of the British Government."
      From first to last the Ameer had insisted upon an offensive and defensive alliance with England—first, to guarantee him against civil war, to uphold him on the Throne against all rivals, and to guarantee to him the nomination of his son as heir apparent; and next, to guarantee him against external aggression, and hold him harmless against all foreign foes. Our policy had been not to entangle ourselves with intestine quarrels with Afghanistan, irrespective of the good conduct and rule of the Ameer. At a time when Europe was in a most critical state, when Russia was on the confines of Turkey, and a war was about to begin, the issue of which no man could foresee, and in which we might ourselves very possibly be engaged, we made a request of the Ameer that an Envoy should be sent from Simla to Cabul to discuss with the Ameer the relations between the two countries. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich said that the Government took the statement of that Envoy, and treated his representations as containing a true account of the grievances of the Ameer, when we should have relied entirely on what was said by the Cabul Envoy who came subsequently to Simla. That contention on the part of the right hon. Gentleman was, in his opinion, altogether wrong, for the Agent whose

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      version of the Ameer's grievances was accepted gave it to us after having been in the most confidential communication with the Ameer. Upon the statement of the Ameer himself the Viceroy was justified in saying that the grievances put forward by that mouthpiece were those upon which the Ameer insisted. At the Peshawur Conference between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Envoy, the latter was informed that the Ameer's accepting a British officer to reside on the Frontier would be the condition of our agreeing to an offensive or defensive alliance. The Treaty was actually proposed, and it rested on that condition. The Envoy said he had no power to accept the condition, and the negotiations were broken off. Then it was said we had, in that case, acted precipitately, because another Envoy was on his way, who had full powers to treat. Why should they believe that, when we had for months before been negotiating with Envoys from Afghanistan, and all this time four or five Russian Agents were intriguing at Cabul? The Russian Mission to Cabul was, he might point out, received with great pomp and parade, and was by no means to be regarded as a matter of mere courtesy, as was shown by the evidence contained in the Papers. What, then, were we in those circumstances to do? It had been said that we ought, instead of dealing with Afghanistan, to have gone to Russia; but we had taken that course, and had asked for explanations. As a matter of mere self-defence we were bound to do something to prevent Russia from intriguing in Afghanistan and converting it into a Russian Province. But it was a mistake to suppose that we intended the Envoy whom we proposed to send to the Ameer to be a permanent official; we had merely asked the Ameer to allow us to send an Envoy on a temporary Mission for the purpose of placing the relations between the two countries on a more satisfactory and a sounder footing. It was contended that we had violated International Law by trying to force an Envoy on the Ameer; but that was not so, and it had been distinctly laid down by that eminent jurist, Sir Robert Phillimore, that to refuse to receive an Envoy at all amounted to a breach of International Law. Our Mission having been rejected by the Ameer, we had given him ample time to repent of the insult
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      which he had inflicted upon us; and he wished to know from hon. Gentlemen opposite what other course they would, in similar circumstancs, have pursued than that which had been taken by the Government? Were we to retire from Afghanistan baffled and defeated? Such a course would, he maintained, be unworthy of England, and would have disgraced us in the eyes both of Asia and Europe. The war, therefore, in his opinion, had been forced upon us not by any fault of our own, but by the misconduct of the Ameer himself, and we were bound to uphold the honour, safety, and dignity of the country.
      SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, that his hon. and learned Friend who had just sat down had set out by declaring that although there might be those who would not agree with him, he believed that the sole cause of this war was the conduct of the Ameer himself, and he ended his speech by a statement which implied that he evidently believed that he had proved what he asserted; but the whole tendency of his remarks went to prove that the cause of offence came from Russia. His hon. and learned Friend had remarked that it had been asserted that there was another Envoy on the road at the time the Conference was ended at Peshawur; and he used words, which he afterwards qualified, that he would not believe a word of it, and that the Envoy had no power. [Mr. FORSYTH: I said no power to accept a Mission.] The hon. and learned Member could not know that. The Viceroy evidently believed it. At page 222 would be found these instructions to Sir Lewis Pelly—
      "If, in the meanwhile, new Envoys or messengers arrive to continue negotiation you will tell them that your powers are terminated."
      So that it was quite clear that Lord Lytton had considerable reason to believe that there was another Envoy on his way with permission to treat, and even to agree to our proposal. His hon. and learned Friend had said it was a just and necessary war, and he defined a just and necessary war as a war in which there was a just cause for offence. In order to ascertain whether a war was just and necessary, the first document to which it was usual to refer was the Proclamation. Any hon. Member, however, who looked into the Pro-

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      clamation of Lord Lytton, which had been circulated only that morning, would find that it consisted of unsupported assertions, hardly any one of which was capable of direct proof; and it was somewhat singular that no speaker who had followed the right hon. Member for Greenwich had taken up his challenge to justify the terms of that document. He now came to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel), which to those who sat waiting for the customary fireworks gave the impression that for once the powder must have been damp. The right hon. Baronet had referred to Sir Henry Rawlinson as being an impartial witness on the Afghan Question; but the fact was that, eminent though Sir Henry Rawlinson might be in many respects, he was upon that question a very one-sided authority. The right hon. Baronet then went on to speak of the foreign policy of the late Government; but it was somewhat singular that he, who had at the time supported it, should now lose no opportunity of making an attack upon it. Again, the right hon. Baronet probably knew that the language used by M. Gambetta referred to a transaction of which he had most warmly approved; and when he spoke of the policy of the Opposition as supporting Russia over much, he might remember that no speech was ever more strongly Russian than that of the Prime Minister in 1876. The case against the Government was that the Ameer was not, on the whole, unfriendly until he had been forced into the arms of Russia by Lord Lytton's policy, as revealed to him in July, 1876. To this the Government speakers had replied that a few communications had passed between General Kaufmann and the Ameer before that date. Now, those communications had been made known by Shere Ali to the British Agent; they were not important, and they were made by means not of Russian, but of Russian-Afghan Agents. They were, in short, communications of which just complaint should have been made to Russia rather than to the Ameer. The Under Secretary of State for India had declared that Lord Salisbury had had the gift of prophecy, and had foretold the attempt of Russia to establish influence in Afghanistan. But he was reminded by that statement of that astrologer who prophecied long
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      life to an English King. The King having died immediately, the astrologer, in disgust, prophecied his own death upon a given day, and killed himself in order to make his prophecy come true. Lord Salisbury, by his instructions to Lord Lytton, had made his own prophecies come true—that the Ameer would be thrown into the arms of Russia. It was not his intention to examine once more the question that was at issue between the occupants of the two front Benches. He thought the verdict of the country would be that on this secondary point victory rested rather with Lord Northbrook than with the Government, in spite of the casuistry of Lord Salisbury. The Government speakers had tried to show that the late Government had refused to guarantee Shere Ali against foreign conquest; and that for that reason he had thrown himself into the arms of Russia. That was not the case. The late Government had offered to guarantee Shere Ali against foreign conquest; but he wanted a guarantee against domestic insurrection. It might just as well be said that the present Government had refused to guarantee him, for they had made conditions—conditions which they knew he would not accept. Lord Northbrook would not consent to force Residents on the Ameer at the certain cost of war; and Lord Lytton, a more convenient person, had been found—not so much a Viceroy as a diplomatist; a Secretary of Legation rather than a ruler of men, and consequently a puppet in the hands of the Government at home. War had been determined upon. Everybody knew, but Lord Lytton said he did not know, that war was the certain outcome of the policy devised in Downing Street, and carried out by him. War for prestige; war for the rectification of a Frontier. His hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), in the addition to the Amendment which he had placed upon the Paper, but which he had not moved, had singled out for special attack the concealment by Government from Parliament of their policy. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had already said his say with regard to that concealment. The Government would seem to have been too busy preparing the candidature to the Bulgarian Throne of his hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir H. Drummond Wolff)

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      to lay Papers at the proper time before the House. For example, Lord Lytton's Proclamation of War, published on November 22 at Lahore, and which ought to have been published in London on the 23rd, had not been circulated till the morning of December 10. Had it been published at the earlier date they would have been able to have verified its astounding and apparently unsupported statement that—
      "The Ameer had openly and assiduously endeavoured by words and deeds to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incited war against the Empire of India."—[Afghanistan, No. 2, p. 20.]
      Lord Lytton did not come into court with clean hands, for he had made, also without proof, a year and a-half before, a similar assertion in his memorable despatch about Khelat and Quetta. That Quetta case was, indeed, worthy of more notice than it had received; for it was both the strongest of all the instances of concealment of information from the House, and the main cause of the present Afghan War. There had been frequent allusions in that House, in the other House of Parliament, and in the Press, to many debates in which various Members of the Government had, on different occasions during the last three years, declared that they had initiated no change in our Indian Frontier policy. Little allusion to the Quetta debate had yet been made; for his hon. Friends the Members for the Border Burghs and for Birmingham had quoted it only for another purpose. Now, the only open sign of the change of policy which had occurred had been the advance to Quetta. That advance—the vast moment of which was clear now, but obvious at the time to all who were acquainted with the history of our Frontier policy—had been, according to the practice of the present Government, made without the knowledge of Parliament. Several Questions which had been put in that House had elicited a portion of the facts; but again, according to the practice of the present Government, re-assuring words had been spoken, the effect of which had not afterwards been confirmed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had, as usual, talked to the House in the manner in which a dentist would talk to a child. The force sent forward had been called an "escort." The House had,
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      over and over again, been informed that the occupation of Quetta was not intended to be permanent. Now, even at that time, it was intended that the occupation should be permanent, and contracts for permanent barracks had been made. He himself (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was not opposed to the occupation of Quetta from what might be called the military point of view; indeed, he had written in its favour as long ago as 1867, distinguishing carefully between political and military considerations; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the debate of August, 1877, had taken exactly the opposite view, and had declared that he was opposed to the occupation from the military point of view, and that political considerations alone might be adduced in its favour. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech, said that he belonged to the school which was
      "rather for keeping back, and not committing us to advancing beyond our Frontiers … I have always demurred to the idea which has been put forward by some, that the best way to meet danger is to advance beyond our Frontier, and have always held that the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselves are these—to strengthen ourselves within our Frontiers, and to do so by a combination of measures, moral and material. … It is most important that we should in every possible way endeavour to husband the wealth and resources of India. … rather than that we should expend our force by distance, and weaken ourselves by an unwise advance."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxvi. 718–19.]
      The Chancellor of the Exchequer went on to explain that these were the views which he had always held as to the best means of protecting India from attack, and "there was no change whatever in the policy of Her Majesty's Government." Looking to the vast importance in its bearing upon our relations to the Ameer—that was to say, from the political point of view, which our occupation of Quetta had had—it was interesting to note that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had used the words, "as to the occupation of Quetta, or rather what has been called the occupation of Quetta"—for he denied that there had been an occupation—
      "If we are to regard that advance from a military point of view—a step in the nature of taking up a certain position to defend ourselves against an apprehended attack—then I should maintain the opinion that it would be a false move."

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      But, he went on to explain, all that had been done had been
      "to send an Envoy there … accompanied by a sufficient escort to secure him an honourable reception."—[Ibid. p. 720.]
      Now, it was very singular to notice that those were exactly the same words which were afterwards made use of by the Government with regard to the despatch of Sir Neville Chamberlain and his lancers as Envoy and escort to Cabul. He did not know whether Shere Ali read the Parliamentary debates: they had his own statement for the fact that he read Sir Henry Rawlinson's books and memoranda, so perhaps he did. If he did, or if he was advised by those who did, he must have drawn his own conclusions. With regard to Quetta, at all events, the mask was off; and it must be borne in mind that the House had been kept in ignorance of the advance until the occupation of Quetta had become an accomplished fact. The House had then been assured that it was no occupation at all, and had been told that all that we had done was to send an Envoy accompanied by a sufficient "escort" to secure him an honourable reception. Yet, at that very time, the erection of permanent barracks had already been begun; the telegraph had partly been laid down; and a survey had been made with a view to the extension to Quetta of the Indian railway system. There was another singular resemblance between the action of the Government in the Quetta matter and their action in the present case. The Papers with regard to Khelat and Quetta had been asked for in March, 1877, and they had been pressed for anxiously in April. They had been promised "immediately" in April, and they had been distributed on the 21st July, when it was altogether too late for the House of Commons to interfere. Three and a-half months appeared to be the usual time during which the present Government was accustomed to keep back Papers of vital moment which they had promised to give "immediately." Now, even Sir Henry Rawlinson had admitted that the occupation of Quetta was a most serious matter, and had said—
      "It is doubtful how such a proceeding would be regarded at Candahar and Cabul. … If, as is more probable, the tribes in general regarded this erection of a fortress—above the passes, although not on Afghan soil—as a
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      menace, or as a preliminary to a further hostile advance, then we should not be justified, for so small an object, in risking the rupture of our friendly intercourse."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 41.]
      That was exactly the view which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had always taken. It was the view which the present Government had taken at one time, and their sudden departure from it had had the effect which everybody, which even Sir Henry Rawlinson himself, had anticipated. Yet, as he had shown, the Government had kept all knowledge of the momentous step from Parliament until it was too late, and even after it was accomplished had assured the House that there was no occupation, and no change of policy. He would now, for a few minutes, dwell upon the facts revealed by the Papers "Central Asia, No. 1." It was a humiliating story. On August 8 last the India Office had written to the Foreign Office to the effect that Shere Ali had received a Russian Mission backed by "four columns" with "15,000 men," and suggesting that he had received the Mission "under pressure." The India Office insisted that the Russian Government should be brought to book, the "Russian Cabinet" as they said—a phrase which was rather wild, as there was not, and never had been, a Cabinet in Russia. These were their words—
      "It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent, and it is the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India."—[Central Asia, No. 1 (1878) p. 143.]
      He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) thought so too; but what had their valiant Government done? They had begun by the use of brave words. They had informed Russia of what they, very properly, had called her "breach of her engagement." They told Russia that she was "menacing" the "integrity of Afghan territory." It was Russia, not England, who, according to England, was menacing the integrity of Afghan territory in September last. On the 19th August, and again early in September, we had been defending the integrity of Afghan territory. On the 9th November we were "rectifying our Frontier" by helping ourselves to Afghan soil. Looking to

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      the present condition of Afghanistan, it would seem as though our defence of the integrity of the Afghan territory had been as fatal to that integrity as our defence of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire had been fatal to the integrity of Turkey. Our Government had told Russia that it was "impossible for us to ignore or overlook" what had occurred. They insisted that the Russian Mission should "be at once withdrawn." Russia had laughed at us. The Russian Foreign Minister was away; the Czar was away; the Acting Minister was away, having left the capital without sending a note to the British Embassy, although he had been courteously informed by the Embassy that we wished for an immediate answer. On the 10th September we had again insisted. Our Government then said that there was "no excuse" for what had occurred, and "pressed for a reply." At last, after more than three weeks' delay, we got a sort of reply. The words used with regard to the Russian Mission to Cabul were those which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had used a year-and-a-half before with regard to our "Mission" to Quetta. The Russian Mission to Cabul was "of a provisional nature." Naturally dissatisfied with this reply; afraid to hit Russia, yet determined to hit somebody, our brave Government hit Shere Ali; in fact, they tied him down to hit him, not giving him time to get away. He had received a Russian Mission, received it, as we ourselves admitted, "under pressure" from "four columns" of "15,000 men," and because he had done so we, shrinking from the possible consequences of our big words to Russia, fell on Shere Ali. The conduct of the Government had been the conduct of a bully; of a big boy afraid of another big boy, and hitting that big boy's acquaintance, who was small. England had suddenly turned from its defence of the integrity of the Afghan territory in September, and in November was "rectifying her Frontier" by the annexation of the Koorum. What could we expect to be the consequence of this cowardly policy? Had it made us any the safer against Russia? The result would probably be the occupation by Russia of Merv, which had been, over and over again, declared to be the key to Herat, itself the key to India. The rectifi-
      604
      cation of our Frontier would do nothing towards preventing that occupation. Had or had not our Government, by their action, made our possession of India more secure? The attack on Afghanistan, like the bringing to Malta of 7,000 under-officered black troops, like the Anglo-Turkish Convention, like the occupation of Cyprus by a fevered battalion as a "strong place of arms," were all measures which had had for their object the security of India. Was India more secure at the present moment than it had been in the days of Lord North-brook's rule? What was to be the outcome of the quarrel in which, by the action of the Government, they had become involved? They had been assured that there was to be no large annexation. But it was necessary to provide securities that the well-meaning section of the Cabinet should not be dragged by Indian fire-eaters into an annexation, or veiled annexation, of Afghanistan. Annexation had been disowned, but Sir Henry Rawlinson was still awake and active, and possessed great influence with the present Indian Government, and with some members of the Cabinet. The first Napoleon had said—"There is but one disease of which great Powers die; they die of indigestion." The Government had swallowed Fiji, Cyprus, and the Transvaal, and these had not agreed with us too well. They had the power, if they so pleased it, to swallow Afghanistan; and in the spring their friends were certain to insist that they should do so. Should we be able to digest it? It was a tough morsel, as we should find to our cost. He denied that our Indian prestige could possibly be raised. On the contrary, he asserted that it must be lowered by conduct of the kind he had described. The rectification of our Frontier was, of course, intended to make us safer against the advance of Russia; but he doubted whether it would have that effect; and a rectification of our Frontier obtained at such a sacrifice of honour and dignity as had been incurred could certainly have no consequence of the kind. And as regarded its material and physical effects, the probability was that Russia would think that her prestige in Asia would receive a blow if she did not make a move, which we would not be able to prevent, and our material and physical prestige would have suffered

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      vastly more than it would have gained by this unjust war.
      LORD GEORGE HAMILTONsaid, it was with great regret that he found himself, for the first time, taking part in a Party debate on Indian affairs; but he should not complain if the debate had been carried on calmly, deliberately, and in argumentative language, such as the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea had throughout used. But his charge against the Government for withholding information about the occupation of Quetta was most unjust. His (Lord George Hamilton's) own statements on a former occasion were perfectly consistent with the Papers now laid upon the Table of the House. In 1875, owing to the policy—or rather to the want of policy—which had been adopted, the affairs of Beloochistan were in frightful confusion. Lord Northbrook had before him three alternatives—first, the annexation of that country; second, the total abstinence from interference with it—in which case, in all probability, some other Power would have interfered—and, thirdly, the course which Lord Northbrook himself had adopted. At the time that Lord Lytton was on his way to India he telegraphed to Lord Northbrook not to send an Envoy to Beloochistan until he arrived, because he wished to state the reasons for his interference in Beloochistan to the Ameer of Cabul, in order to allay any suspicions he might have as to our objects. Lord Northbrook, however, did not comply with that request, but sent his Envoy a week before his successor arrived with his own instructions. Major Sandeman succeeded in temporarily pacifying that country. Lord Lytton was far from wishing to occupy Quetta; even up to the end of 1876 he was adverse to it. The only reason of his doing so at last was because Major Sandeman and the military officers who went with him reported that Quetta was the only place the occupation of which would protect our trade, and fulfil the objects of our interference. He believed that if Lord Northbrook had been Viceroy he would have pursued the same policy. They might, however, dismiss altogether this question of Quetta in discussing the affairs of Afghanistan. In the early part of the evening a very remarkable speech was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for
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      Greenwich. The right hon. Gentleman had carefully selected extracts from the context for quotation, the words of which were capable of bearing the exact construction which he wished to have placed upon them, and he made the choice for that sole and special purpose. Upon those quotations the right hon. Gentleman based one of the most formidable indictments, or rather series of indictments, ever thrown at any Government. He stated positively that when Lord Northbrook left India the relations between the Indian Government and Afghanistan were perfectly satisfactory.
      MR. GLADSTONE: No. In the main.
      LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Oh! In the main.
      MR. GLADSTONE: Yes, certainly. I said, "in the main;" and I repeated the phrase over and over again.
      LORD GEORGE HAMILTONsaid, he would accept the correction of the right hon. Gentleman that he used the phrase "in the main"—whatever that might mean. The right hon. Gentleman next said that at the time at which we came into Office there was no reason whatever for attempting in any way to alter those relations. The right hon. Gentleman next said that the Indian Government deliberately and wantonly, contrary to the opinion of everybody who had any experience of Afghanistan, insisted upon forcing upon the Ameer officers whose location in Afghanistan would have been absolutely fatal to the independence of that country; that the negotiations were so conducted that they were intended to fail; that at the very moment the Viceroy knew the Envoy was coming to accept his terms, he deliberately broke off negotiations lest they should be accepted; and that the Indian Government had forced and hunted the Ameer into a corner, and had then on some frivolous pretext made war on him. The right hon. Gentleman then expressed his own opinion that the policy of the Government had not been what they pretended; but that their sole object throughout had been to annex a certain portion of Afghanistan. And the right hon. Gentleman, before he undertook to prove these allegations, took a course which it was to be hoped, for the credit of the House, would not be taken again—he deliberately stated that documents, signed by the Viceroy of

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      India, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and six of the ablest men in the most incorruptible service in the world, were, he would not say false, but contained gross and unpardonable errors and extraordinary deviations from fact, which, as they all knew, was merely an oratorical device for stating that the despatches of the Indian Government were not true. The right hon. Gentleman then found that there was one person in whom he could place implicit confidence; one whose every syllable was true, and against whose word any utterance of the Viceroy or his Council was not for a moment to be placed—this was the Envoy of the Ameer, who came down to Peshawur to negotiate on behalf of his master with the Indian Government. Now, the right hon. Gentleman had had 50 years of experience in political life, and he must know that when negotiations of that kind were entered upon it was the invariable custom for the negotiators to assume things which were not altogether correct for the purpose of obtaining the successful issue of such negotiations; and that all through these Conferences the Afghan Envoy always acted upon the assumption that the Ameer had got everything he wanted, though this assertion was the exact reverse of the language used by the same Envoy in 1873. The right hon. Gentleman then proceeded to charge Lord Lytton with having thrown to the winds all the assurances of Lords Northbrook and Mayo; but it was capable of proof that the interpretation put upon those assurances by Lord Lytton was identical with those of the right hon. Gentleman's own Government. In support of the charges which the right hon. Gentleman made against the accuracy of the Papers, he commented upon a statement in them that certain negotiations occupied several weeks which only took up a few days; but if he had examined the Papers a little more closely he would have found that these negotiations occupied exactly three weeks. Then with regard to the number of the grievances of which it was said the Ameer complained, the right hon. Gentleman endeavoured again here to make a strong point; but here again he would find that the statements made by different Envoys were described accordingly; and, further, that all the statements as well as the reports upon them were fully
      608
      set out in the Papers which had been presented to Parliament, without any attempt at concealment. All the Indian Government did was, finding there were eight grievances stated by the first man, of which four were very trivial, to select four out of the eight, calling them special grievances; and, as regarded the statement of the Afghan Envoy, they call especial attention to it in the following words:—
      "The statement of the Afghan Envoy, which is herein enclosed, in an interesting, instructive, and important document."
      He could not understand how an ex-Prime Minister, possessing more official experience than anybody in the House, could come down and deliberately state that he would put implicit confidence in the statement of an Envoy from Afghanistan—when it was in accordance with his own views—and would not credit what was set forth on their authority by the Viceroy and his Council. He regretted the right hon. Gentleman should have adopted such a course. Speaking from his own knowledge and experience as Under Secretary of State for India at the time when these transactions took place, he could assure the right hon. Gentleman that the officers whose statements he had impugned were men of honour as high as was his own. The right hon. Gentleman had eulogised every other Viceroy, but had held up Lord Lytton to the opprobrium of the House. He could not understand why Lord Lytton, whose responsibilities and difficulties since his assumption of office had been so grave and continuous, was to be thus treated by a political opponent. Lord North-brook had recently made some amazing statements; but the noble Lord was a man of honour, and he (Lord George Hamilton) implicitly believed in his good faith. He saw no reason, therefore, why Lord Lytton and his advisers should not be treated with a moiety, at any rate, of the confidence and consideration which we reposed in his predecessor. The charges launched against them by the right hon. Gentleman were very formidable; and he hoped the House would excuse him if he went at some little length into what the actual state of affairs in India was when the present Government assumed office. If everything was at that time perfectly satisfactory, then he would admit they were

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      unwise and deserving of blame in altering the situation. If, on the other hand, it could be shown that their relations were unsatisfactory; that every year they were getting worse and worse; that they might at any moment have been involved in a war with Russia, on account of entangling and undefined obligations, then he thought the position was altered, and that that which was in the one case unwise would be in the other absolutely necessary. It seemed to him that it was not thoroughly understood why successive Viceroys had attached such enormous importance to having a friendly and independent Power in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had a Frontier from which at any moment the Natives could invade or make a raid on India. The people who inhabited those mountains were, to use the language of Lord Lawrence, "a faithless, lawless, plundering people," who would join en masse an invasion of India from the West. It was an utter delusion to suppose that mountains were insuperable obstacles to invasion. India and Italy resembled each other in their geographical peculiarities; but no two countries had been so frequently and so successfully invaded as Italy and India, and in every single instance, save in our own case, the invaders of India came through the mountains. The reason there was so little danger there was that England was stronger in military power than Afghanistan. It was because they placed a large number of soldiers along the Frontier that they overawed the Afghans; and in proportion as the Afghans became disciplined and organized, so must we increase our Frontier forces and our military expenditure. It was said that it would be much better if they devoted their attention to internal reforms rather than to strengthening their Frontiers externally. This was true to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only. In any country, the people of which were homogeneous and self-governing, the more contented the majority were, the stronger was the Government of that country. But the people of India were not homogeneous, nor in any sense self-governing. The history of India for centuries before our advent was the rule of successive warlike minorities over peaceful agricultural majorities. The intrigues, cruelty, and rapine of these warlike tribes and castes made India for many years one battle-field; we were, in con-
      610
      sequence, forced to interfere, and little by little to absorb the whole country. We, by the strong arm of the law, gave to the majority of the Natives of India a protection, such as they had never had before, from those who for centuries had fattened on them. To keep these elements of turbulence and disorder under control, we sent large numbers of troops from this country, and their presence maintained peace and order. The larger the number we had to station on the Frontier, the less there were for this purpose. To put our position in a graphic way before the House, let us assume that England was in such danger of invasion that it became necessary to garrison Portsmouth and Plymouth with Metropolitan police. The absence of the guardians of the peace might incite the criminal classes of London to do that which their presence would effectually prevent. It was for grave practical reasons such as these, and not for any chimerical dread of a Russian invasion, that we declined to allow the influence of any European Power to become predominant in Afghanistan, for the presence even of a few European officers with money and artillery would give us an infinity of trouble and expense. The next thing they had to consider was the means by which to attain that object. They made a mistake in 1838. They attempted internal interference and they failed, and for many years afterwards they did nothing to re-establish friendly relations. The history of Afghanistan for that period was well known to the House; but he must express his opinion that the policy which was sometimes called the "masterly inactivity" of Lord Lawrence, in 1864, had one great merit. It was a safe policy; but in every other sense it was absolutely unworthy of a great civilized Power. What he said to the Afghan Princes was this—"You may fight and kill each other; we shall keep the ring. Nobody shall interfere with you; and the successful combatant, who shall temporarily establish his Sovereignty, shall be entitled to the recognition of the English Government." To such an extent was this carried that there was a record of a letter being sent to the then Sovereign of Cabul, and the messenger was instructed to be careful who got it, as someone else might be in power when he arrived there. When Shere Ali over-

      611
      came his opponents Lord Lawrence departed from his policy, and assisted him with arms and money. That was done at a time, certainly, when Shere Ali least required them; but he was grateful. Lord Mayo succeeded in ingratiating Shere Ali at Umballa, not because he followed the policy of Lord Lawrence, but because he departed from it; for there was no identity whatever between the original policy of Lord Lawrence and that of Lord Mayo and Lord North-brook. Lord Mayo said that the policy which his Government had adopted was an intermediate policy. An intermediate policy meant that it was the natural consequence of something already done; and, in this instance, consisted of laying down certain lines of action capable of expansion as time went on. The right hon. Gentleman opposite had said that Lord Lytton had extinguished the promises of Lord Mayo; but what authority was there for that assertion? If the right hon. Gentleman would look at the official letter addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to Shere Ali, he would find these words—"The British Government repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer. It does not withdraw from any obligation previously contracted by it; but it emphatically denies that it ever incurred such obligations as those alleged by Shore Ali, and will never undertake such obligations without the amplest guarantees." The interpretation which Shere Ali's Envoy put on Lord Mayo's assurances was that which already had been repudiated both by the Duke of Argyll, in 1869, and Lord Northbrook in 1873. Lord Mayo, during his Viceroyalty, succeeded in satisfying' Shere Ali. He succeeded, not because he acceded to all or to most of his requests, but because Shore Ali felt that he was dealing with a man he could thoroughly trust. Between 1869 and 1873 our relations with Shere Ali were most satisfactory—more so, indeed, than they bad been at any period before or since. Then Lord Northbrook succeeded Lord Mayo, and was Viceroy from 1872 to 1876. He had a very high personal opinion of Lord Northbrook; but it could not be denied that during the time Lord Northbrook was Viceroy Lord Lawrence's policy absolutely collapsed under the management of the late Government. The basis of that policy was this. "Be quiet in your Frontiers; do not in any way frighten the Afghans:
      612
      and the nearer Russia approaches towards Afghanistan, the more she will gravitate towards you—not from love to you, but from fear of the Russians." What Lord Lawrence predicted took place. The Ameer became thoroughly alarmed at the advance of Russia, and applied for definite assurances of protection. The Papers showed that his one object was to obtain definite assurances against Russian aggression. There had been some recrimination with regard to what took place in connection with the meeting at Simla. He thoroughly accepted Lord Northbrook's assurance. But the question was not what interpretation we now, in 1878, placed upon Lord Northbrook's assurance; but what interpretation Shere Ali placed upon it in 1873. This was a point of some little importance. Shere Ali believed, as was clearly shown by his letter, that his request with regard to an alliance had been unconditionally refused; and what steps did the late Government take to remove that impression? With the single exception of two telegrams from the Duke of Argyll, there is not a single line in the Office of despatches from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Northbrook on the subject during the whole time he was in India. When, however, the Duke of Argyll found his Party interests or his personal reputation attacked, he was not content to defend himself with meagre telegrams, but wrote three columns in The Times of vigorous invective. If but a moiety of the same industry had been displayed in 1873, in correcting Shere Ali's misapprehension, how different would our relations with him have been. While, on the one hand, Shore Ali found that his advances for an external alliance were rejected, on the other hand, unfortunately, Lord Northbrook was compelled to interfere, by protesting against the imprisonment of his son, Yakoob Khan. Thus the two principles of our previous policy were reversed; we refused an external alliance; we interfered internally in what Shere Ali believed to be the most sacred of the internal affairs of Afghanistan. When he contrasted the state of the relations which existed between Shere Ali and the Indian Government when Lord Lytton arrived in India and those which existed on the arrival there of Lord Northbrook, he was, he must confess, surprised at the observations on the subject

      613
      which, had been made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook the advance of Russia in Central Asia had been greater than during any former period. Khokand had been annexed; Khiva had been annexed, contrary to the assurances which had been given by the Russian Government; and a Treaty had been made with Bokhara which made Russia practically supreme in all those regions. If, therefore, there was any efficacy in the policy of Lord Lawrence Shere Ali ought to have been more friendly to us when Lord Northbrook left India than when he arrived there, because Russia was much nearer to our Frontier. Now, everybody who knew Lord Northbrook must be aware that he would leave no stone unturned to bring a policy in which he so thoroughly believed to a successful issue. Neither was he in any way overruled by the Home Government. Let the House contrast our relations with the Ameer in 1873, when he was ready to receive an English officer on a friendly Mission to Cabul, and those which subsequently existed in April, 1876. The first act of Lord Lytton was to make exactly the same request, which was curtly refused. Up to 1873 Shere Ali gratefully received a subsidy from the Indian Government; for years previous to 1876 that subsidy was sullenly refused. Up to 1873, almost to the end of 1874, not only were the letters of General Kaufmann sent to the Indian Government, but they were asked to answer them. In the year preceding 1876 the Ameer made no such request, and there was reason to believe that he was receiving a far greater number of letters then than before. Up to 1873 every request of the Indian Government and all their advances were graciously granted and accepted by Shere Ali. Between 1873 and 1876 they were invariably ignored. The Ameer positively refused, in the most discourteous terms, to allow Mr. Forsyth and other Englishmen to pass through his territory. He absolutely ignored altogether Lord Northbrook's intervention on behalf of his son; and he could not, in short, conceive a more unsatisfactory state of affairs than that which then prevailed. That was not all. During the time Shere Ali received 12 cannons, 21,000 rifles, 1,200 carbines, and £250,000. How, under those circumstances, he would ask, could the right hon. Gentleman the Mem-
      614
      ber for Greenwich contend that our relations with the Ameer were so satisfactory, as he had described them to be? The right hon. Gentleman had used very strong language with regard to certain statements which had been made by Lord Lytton; but he should like to call the attention of the House to a statement which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman himself. The right hon. Gentleman, speaking a short time ago, said—
      "We found the Indian policy of the country justly and wisely guided by a man who, though he did not belong to our political Party—I mean Lord Mayo—yet was as honest and as good a Governor General as ever hold the high Office of Viceroy of India. Within three or four months after we acceded to Office a meeting of the most friendly character was held at Umballa, where Shore Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan, and his favourite son, stood upon the platform as friendly, by the side of Lord Mayo. Lord Mayo, at a fixed point in the proceedings, produced a jewelled sword, and handed it to Shere Ali, and said—'I trust Your Highness will use this sword with effect against your enemies;' and Shere Ali replied—'I will use it against every enemy of the Queen of England.' That was the state of feeling; that was the state of affairs which prevailed at the commencement of our government on the North-Western Frontier of India; and that was the state of affairs when we handed them over to the charge of our successors in Office."
      MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that he was not responsible for the accuracy of the newspaper reports from which the noble Lord quoted; but he, in truth, spoke of the state of affairs as being substantially the same.
      LORD GEORGE HAMILTONsaid, that the word "substantially" did not appear in any report of this speech. But that our relations were, at the time of which he was speaking, eminently unsatisfactory, he thought he had demonstrated. He now had to deal with by far the most embarrassing part of the circumstances which they found to exist on their assumption of Office. Lord Northbrook had undertaken that, under certain circumstances, the Indian Government would assist Shere Ali by force in resisting Russian aggression; but he had made no arrangement whatever for carrying out that assurance. At any moment General Kaufmann might advance, and we should have found ourselves in this position—either we must acquiesce in his annexation, and imperil our influence as well as the sanctity of our assurances, or else go to war with Russia. Her Majesty's Go-

      615
      vernment believed the maintenance of peace to be one of the greatest of British interests; they declined, therefore, to allow the greatest of British interests to rest on no safer foundation than the validity of General Kaufmann's assurances, or the whims of a sulky and semi-civilized barbarian. He had, he thought, revealed a state of affairs that called for some remedy. Lord Salisbury, he wished to add, had not acted in a haphazard or hasty manner in the matter. He had deliberately looked through the records, and he had ascertained, upon evidence which to his mind was perfectly indisputable, that Shere Ali was willing, in 1869, to receive British Agents in certain places. Captain Grey, whoso opinion was of the greatest weight—for he was not a mere interpreter between the Ameer and Lord Mayo, but had been specially told off to attend to that Potentate—had said that the Ameer did freely consent to the appointment of British officers in Balkh, Herat, and other places. That statement was confirmed by the terms of the despatch from Lord Mayo, as well as by the letter of Shere Ali in 1869. Yet they were now told by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich that the introduction of an Agent into Afghanistan was impossible and inconsistent with the independence of that country. In the year 1869 the language of Shere Ali was exactly the reverse. He said—
      "I strongly hope that the British Government will always do good and be kind to me, and keep me under its protection."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 91.]
      Lord Salisbury, therefore, communicated with the Indian Government, and asked them to take measures to ascertain whether Shere Ali would agree to the appointment of an Agent at Herat. That Agent was to be placed there simply in order to report the proceedings and advances of the Russians, and thus to give the British Government in India time to avert a collision which everybody wished to avoid. If there was any doubt upon the matter, the reply of the Indian Government was conclusive. They said that if Russian authority were established over Turkestan
      "It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be de-
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      sirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, pp. 134–5.]
      To that despatch Lord Salisbury had replied that he could not accept the opinion that we ought to wait until Merv was occupied, as then our opportunity would, in all probability, be past. Then he said that, although a refusal to receive an Agent would illustrate the feebleness of our interest with the Ameer, yet no useful purpose would be served by keeping up an appearance of influence with him without the reality. He went on to say that he considered it of paramount importance that our whole relations with the Ameer should be put upon a satisfactory footing. The first stop would be to induce him to receive an Envoy, for which a pro-text must be found, or, if necessary, "created." To this expression "create" a great deal of strong language had been very needlessly devoted. He would undertake to say that there was not a sensible man in that House who, finding that, through misapprehension, his relations with some neighbour were becoming unfriendly, would not take an opportunity—or, failing that, create an opportunity—by which he could correct that misapprehension. That was what Lord Salisbury did; for the Envoy was to be sent for the purpose of discussing matters with Shere Ali and ascertaining what his real views were. In reply to that despatch the Indian Government once more invited the Home Government, if they wished to establish fresh relations with Shere Ali, to give instructions to the Viceroy to do so, and that was exactly what Lord Salisbury did. He gave instructions, in the most definite terms, to Lord Lytton to act in as friendly a manner as possible towards the Ameer. The hon. Gentleman opposite had assumed that our relations with the Ameer were thoroughly satisfactory. He thought he had proved that nothing could be more unsatisfactory and dangerous than the state of those relations when they came into Office. Such being the real state of affairs, it might be a matter of opinion how best they could be remedied. Some were inclined to do nothing; shut their eyes to the danger of the position, and trust to the chapter of accidents. Such

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      a policy of inactivity was justifiable and "masterly" on one condition alone—that time was on your side. But if every year your difficulties grew, and your position became worse, a policy of inactivity was both culpable and cowardly. We wished to avert war; and, with the unhappy precedent of the Crimean War before us, we believed war could be best averted by plainly stating what we could allow and what we could not. The first essential of such a policy was to obtain accurate information as to Russian movements in Central Asia. Those who placed implicit confidence in the assurance of an Autocrat, because he had, or was supposed to have, complete control over his servants, committed a great blunder. The more autocratic a State was, the more dependent the Sovereign was upon the good-will of his Civil and Military Services. When once any policy of aggression became so ingrained in the minds of a Service as to become a tradition, there was nothing to prevent the realization of that tradition except the personal will of the Head of the State. He was liable, however, to removal by death, and other agencies. The prosecution of the policy of aggression was continuous, whilst the opposition was intermittent and uncertain. Everybody know that there was a tradition among a certain section of Russian society that it was their mission, one day or other, to conquer India. It was also known that there were certain adventurous generals in Central Asia who utterly disregarded the assurances given at St. Petersburg; and until the British Government had the power to put an Agent at Herat they were in continual danger of the outbreak of war with Russia. Every possible precaution was taken to insure the success of the Mission to the Ameer. But the tone which Shere Ali had adopted towards the Indian Government was one in which it had never been addressed before; his Envoy throughout had endeavoured to cause delay. At the very time—at the very moment—when we were proposing to concur with his master in an unconditional alliance, by which we should undertake to support him under all circumstances, there came rumours from all quarters that he was engaged in stirring up a Jehad, or religious war, on the Border. These rumours were the source of the greatest possible
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      anxiety to Lord Lytton's Government, though they did not like to break off negotiations on that account, for it would then have been necessary to make it a casus belli. But, on the other hand, Lord Lytton did not think, in the exercise of the discretion with which he had been intrusted, that he would be justified in concluding a dynastic Treaty with a man who was endeavouring to promote a war of extermination against us. He must again protest against the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman had quoted from the despatch of Lord Lytton—that the negotiations were broken off simply because the Ameer did not show sufficient eagerness to reciprocate our friendship. If he had only read one line lower down in the despatch he would have seen what Lord Lytton's real reason was, and how, by promptty seizing the opportunity afforded by the death of the Envoy, he extricated himself from the difficulty. A great deal had been said about a change of policy, and much hard language had been used against the Government in consequence of that change having led us into war. What was this change of policy? There was no proposal to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, nor had it ever boon proposed to force upon the Ameer a Resident at Cabul whose presence would have overshadowed the authority of the Ameer. No such proposal was ever made; and it was a totally different thing to sending an Agent to the Frontier to enable the Indian Government to carry out the guarantee that had been entered into with the Ameer. In the Instructions given by Lord Lytton to our Native Agent at Cabul, which would be found on page 186 of the Papers, it was stated that
      "It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the external affairs of the Frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled."
      The present Government were in agreement with the late Government as to the internal policy in Afghanistan; but as regarded the external policy there was this difference—that Lord North-brook had offered the Ameer a binding, but not unconditional assurance; whereas the present Government had given an

      619
      assurance which was unconditional, except for this one stipulation—that if we undertook responsibility in the matter we must have an Agent on the Frontier to prevent Shere Ali from embroiling us in war, as without it he could have done at any moment he liked. The main reason for making our assurance unconditional and definite was the evidence, of which the Indian Government were possessed, that Lord Northbrook's proposal in 1872 being conditional had caused great displeasure to the Envoy from the Ameer. In 1873, when the Ameer's Envoy came to Simla and asked Lord Northbrook to give him an English guarantee, that noble Lord, in reply, gave him a Russian assurance to the effect that General Kaufmann's intentions were perfectly friendly. He scarcely liked to refer to the sarcastic observations of the Envoy on the subject of the introduction of the name of Russia into the negotiations. He said—
      "As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th of July, who said, 'It is necessary that the Ameer should be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is a 'buffer' between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous for Hindustan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against Russia, does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that 'even a friendly Government can become an aggressor. But the English Government, considering the repeated certain assurances which they have received from the Russian Government, cannot entertain any likelihood of it.' After hearing this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance."—[Ibid. p. 205.]
      He did not know how the English Government, with the knowledge it possessed that Russia did not care for its own assurances, could expect Afghanistan, which was most liable to attacks from Russia, to place implicit confidence in its assurances. He thought that he had shown that the situation which existed when he came into office was one with which it was absolutely necessary for them to deal. His firm belief was that if right hon. Gentlemen opposite had been in Office, and had known the facts, they would have taken the same course. Unfortunately, the Ameer did not trust the sincerity of the British Government; from first to last he had played with them. Then came this
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      unhappy business of receiving the Russian Mission. When hon. Gentlemen opposite said that we had gone to war with the Ameer because he received the Russian Mission, they totally and entirely mistook the cause of the war, which was not because he received the Russian Mission, but because he by force refused to receive ours. For years past the Ameer had said that he would not receive any English Mission, as he could not be responsible for their lives; and that if he received English officers he must also receive Russian officers. At a moment when our relations were most strained with Russia he ostentatiously received a Russian Mission at Cabul, thus plainly showing that his previous reason against receiving English officers was a mere pretext. It must be remembered that the Ameer of Cabul was not the only Asiatic Prince with whom we had to deal. There were a great number of Princes under our protection who possessed far greater wealth and power than he did, and who were besides far superior to him in culture and intelligence. They would never be allowed, and they had never attempted, to treat the English Government in the way that the Ameer had. But because a man was a barbarian he could not be allowed to set us at defiance. They were watching our conduct in this matter; and, in all probability, if we were to act without firmness in his case some of the Indian Princes would be adopting the tactics of the Ameer. He trusted that he had shown that the action the Government had taken did not in any way deserve the language which had been applied to it; and he hoped that he had also shown that a very considerable number of the charges which had been brought against the Government were mere fictions. There was another question which had been raised. It was said that if we went to war with anyone we ought to have gone to war with Russia. But the main object and policy of the British Government as regarded the North-Western Frontier of India was to have upon it not only a friendly, but also an independent Power. If they had had a war with Russia because it had sent a Mission to Cabul, they would at once have made Russia responsible for the conduct of the Ameer, and, by making her responsible, have placed Afghanistan under Russian tutelage. We should then have

      621
      had to fight Afghanistan, plus Russia; and the object of the war being to maintain the independence of Afghanistan, we should, at the outset, have destroyed it. If we were successful in the war having destroyed the independence of Afghanistan, we should have been compelled to annex it, a consummation all wished to avert. He could not conceive any single object which would have been gained by going to war with Russia. Had a little more care and attention been exercised some years ago, it was his firm opinion that the necessity for war at the present time would have been avoided. If, on the other hand, finding matters as they were, the British Government had allowed the Ameer to set it at defiance, and had not insisted upon the reception of its Mission, war would only have been postponed for a time, and would have inevitably broken out at a later period; perhaps under more disadvantageous circumstances. Before he sat down, he wished to say a word concerning the Viceroy of India, who, he thought, had not been very fairly treated in the course of that debate. It had never been the fashion before to distinguish between the Viceroy and the Government under which he served, and to hold him up to opprobrium and ridicule on questions of veracity. And if any man might have expected exceptionally considerate treatment, surely that was Lord Lytton. He was not, it should be borne in mind, a Member of one of the great political Parties, like Lord Northbrook or Lord Mayo, with many great and powerful friends in the Legislature. He had served for many years with distinction in the Diplomatic Service, and it was known that he, with great reluctance, accepted the office of Viceroy of India. From the moment he arrived until the present day, he had had to deal with a succession of the greatest difficulties. He had had to contend with famine, financial and currency difficulties, great administrative changes, and the anxiety any Viceroy must always feel when there was a great upheaval in the social and political affairs of the Eastern world. Throughout all this Lord Lytton had shown the greatest courage and ability. It must be admitted that he had not been I always understood; but there never was an abler, more courageous, and, he might say, more industrious Viceroy. And Then Lord Lytton's tenure of office came
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      to its natural end, and it was possible impartially to consider his conduct, and, to study the numerous State Papers which, on almost every conceivable subject, he had written, he was sure that the almost universal verdict would be that under the genius of the poet there lay the true instincts of the statesman. He was very much obliged to the House for the attention with which it had listened to him while he had thought it his duty, at very great length, to endeavour to lay before the House what the course of events had been. He would not attempt to anticipate what the decision of the House would be. If adverse to Her Majesty's Government, they would once more resume their place as an united Opposition; but if, on the other hand, the verdict was in their favour, by a majority much in excess of that which they generally obtained from their supporters, he thought they might fairly take that majority as a censure upon the peculiar tactics of the past two years—tactics which, while they had elevated and popularized the Government they were intended to degrade and destroy had, on the other hand, systematically endangered those great national interests, to promote and protect which should be the common object of all.
      Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. Grant Duff.)
      Motion agreed to.
      Debate further adjourned till Thursday.

      SELECT VESTRIES BILL.
      On Motion of Mr. JAMES, Bill to amend the Law relating to the nomination of Overseers by Select Vestries by custom or usage, ordered to be brought in by Mr. JAMES, Mr. HERSCHELL, and Mr. JOSEPN COWEN.
      Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 54.]

      PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS BILL.
      On Motion of Mr. ANDERSON, Bill to amend the. Patents for Inventions Laws, ordered to be brought in by Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. MUNDELLA, Mr. DALRYMPLE, and Mr. ALEXANDER BROWN.
      Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 55.]

      SALE OF POOD AND DRUGS ACT (1875) AMENDMENT BILL.
      On Motion of Mr. ANDERSON, Bill to amend "The Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1876"," ordered to be brought in by Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. P. A. TAYLOR, and Mr. WHITWELL.
      Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 56.]

      GUN LICENCE ACT (1870) AMENDMENT BILL.
      On Motion of Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, Bill to amend "The Gun Licence Act, 1870," ordered to be brought in by Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, Mr. CLARE READ, Mr. M'LAGAN, and Mr. MARK STEWART.
      Bill presented, and road the first time. [Bill 57.]
      House adjourned at a quarter after Twelve o'clock.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO THEIR SERVANTS—LEGISLATION.

  QUESTION.
  EARL DE LA WARRasked, Whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce a Bill this Session on the subject of the liability of employers for injuries received by their servants; and, if so, whether it was likely to be brought in at an early day?
  EARL BEAUCHAMP, in reply, said, he was not surprised at the Question of the noble Lord; because he stated, in answer to a similar Question last Session, that the Attorney General had promised to bring in a measure on the subject this year. He was unable to state the provisions of the Bill, or the time at which it would be introduced.

TURKEY—CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURYwished to put a Question to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of which he had given him private Notice. Could the noble Marquess inform him whether there was any hope of the establishment of a Convention with the Ottoman Porte for the suppression of the Slave Trade in the Red Sea and elsewhere?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, in reply, said, that for some time negotiations had been going on, and he had no reason to despair of coming to an agreement on the subject with the Porte. In fact, the only objection he had heard on the part of the Porte was rather one as to the means than as to the end. The Turkish Government appeared to prefer an exchange of notes to a Convention; but he believed there was no difference between them as to the substantive nature of what was proposed.

CENTRAL ASIA—MERV AND BOKHARA.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If he can confirm the statements made in Nos. 129. and 132. of the "Central Asia Correspondence (No. 1)," with reference to the submission or annexation of Merv to Persia; whether Merv is now generally recognized as Persian territory; and whether he can give any further information on the subject; also to ask whether the whole of the territory known as Bokhara has been formally incorporated in the Russian Empire?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Earl asks me if I can confirm certain statements made in certain Papers of the Central Asia Correspondence. All I can answer is that the noble Earl himself possesses in the Papers all the information we have on the subject; and therefore I am not in a position either to confirm or contradict any of the statements. Merv, I may say, however, is not generally recognized as Persian territory; and I do not believe that submission or annexation to Persia is recognized by the inhabitants of Merv itself. No doubt the noble Earl will be able to gather further information on the point in the course of the debates. In reference to Bokhara, I am happy to say that it has not been "formally incorporated in the Russian Empire."

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).—RESOLUTION.
Order of the Day for resuming the debate on the Amendment to the Viscount Cranbrook's Motion, read.
Debate resumed.
EARL GREY: My Lords, after the long debate that has already taken

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place, I will not abuse your Lordships' patience by attempting to enter into a full discussion of the subject before us; I will only ask for your attention to some rather desultory observations on two or three of the most important points which have not, I think, received all the consideration they require. In the first place, I would remark that I was surprised to find so little said last night by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) as to the justice of the war. The noble Viscount cannot be ignorant that its justice has been denied by no small number of persons of some authority; we had, therefore, I think, a right to expect that in stating the case of Her Majesty's Government he would have brought forward some arguments to show that the war is a just one, according to those rules as to what is right or wrong between nations which are generally recognized. According to these rules, as laid down by all the greatest writers, it is held that no nation ought to declare war against another unless it be either to obtain redress for some great wrong, for which it has asked and been refused reparation, or else for self-defence. It is true that a war may be one of self-defence, though no actual hostilities have been committed against the nation which begins it; if there is good evidence that hostilities are meditated, in such cases nations may, in self-defence, anticipate an intended attack. But to justify war on this ground, the danger which it is meant to avert must be a certain and a serious one. Last night the noble Viscount did not tell us that any such danger existed; all he said was that for some time the Ameer has exhibited a feeling of enmity and ill-will against us. This may be true; but it is no ground for war. It often happens that accidental circumstances create for a time a very bitter feeling in one nation against another; such a feeling has more than once existed between this and other countries. Great ill-will has occasionally been shown against England by France, and by the United States; but it has never been supposed that we ought to make this a ground for going to war with the people that entertain such a feeling, if no actual wrong is done to us; and between nations, as between individuals, temporary irritation generally passes away, if
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nothing is done to carry it into action. Now, the noble Viscount did not allege that anything had been done by the Ameer of which we had any right to complain, except that he had declined to receive British officers in his dominions. The noble Viscount argued at some length to show how reasonable it was that we should ask to have British officers on the Afghan Frontier to give us accurate information of what was done there if we were to protect the Ameer against attack. I quite agree with the noble Viscount—we should have been very imprudent to promise to the Afghans protection against attacks unless we were allowed the proper means of assuring ourselves that they had not provoked these attacks. The refusal to admit British officers gave us a perfect right to say to the Ameer—"If you will not receive them you must not reckon on our protection;" but I cannot understand what right we had to say—"You shall accept our protection and assent to the conditions on which alone we can give it, and because you refuse we will make war upon you." I cannot understand how we are entitled to act thus towards an independent Prince. As the noble Viscount has not informed us upon what grounds he holds a war thus entered into to be just, according to the rules I have quoted as laid down by the best writers, I am unable to answer arguments of which I cannot guess the nature, and I can only say that, in my judgment, the war is an unjust one, and therefore a national crime. I pass from this topic, and I have next to call your attention to the fact that neither in the noble Viscount's speech, nor in any that has yet been made, has the slightest explanation been given as to the advantages Her Majesty's Ministers hope to gain by the war. We have heard a great deal as to its being necessary for the safety of India to prevent the extension of Russian influence in Asia, and especially in Afghanistan; but not a word has been said to prove that the extension of Russia would be a source of danger to our Indian Empire, or to show how that danger is to be averted by the war. I suppose that the danger which is apprehended is an attack on our Indian Dominions either by a Russian Army or by an Asiatic Army assisted and directed by Russians. But if this is the danger against which we are seeking to take

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precautions, I would remind you that the noble Earl at the head of the Government has told us that the base of operations from which Russia would have to move to the attack of India is so distant, and the line of communication so exceedingly difficult, that he has no apprehension that any Russian Army which would cause us any danger could be brought to the valley of the Indus. To fear invasion from the Afghans is equally absurd—the whole Afghan population is not supposed to exceed 3,000,000 or 4,000,000; and though the men are brave, and capable of making excellent soldiers under proper direction, they are altogether destitute of military science and discipline; and the ease with which they have just been defeated by a comparatively small British force when defending very strong positions in their own hills shows how idle it is to suppose that any force they could raise could attempt an offensive war against the British Army defending our Frontier. Nor could the union of two such weak enemies when combined together have any chance of success in attacking us. I think, therefore, the idea of an invasion of India by a Russian or a united Russian and Asiatic Army may be dismissed from the minds of rational men. In the fears which have been expressed on this subject I can see nothing but a revival of an old panic terror, which many years ago led this country into one of the greatest mistakes it ever committed, and brought upon it a great disaster. Forty years ago much alarm was excited by accounts which reached this country of the doings of Russian Agents in Persia and Afghanistan; and the Government of that day, in order to counteract the projects imputed to Russia, adopted measures which led to the first Afghan War. I had then the honour of being a Member of Lord Melbourne's Cabinet, and I earnestly endeavoured to convince my Colleagues that the policy they were entering upon was wrong. I then thought that the fear of Russia, on which it was founded, was a great delusion, and that in striving to guard against an imaginary danger we were incurring a real and a serious one. I now think the same of the similar policy of the present Government. Since this question has attracted so much consideration, I have referred to a corre-
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spondence I had in October, 1838, with Lord John Russell, who was then the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and I find that I argued then, as I argue now, that we had really nothing to fear from Russia, and that if we had, the best course we could take for the security of India was carefully to avoid, as much as possible, any meddling in the shifting politics and intrigues of the semi-barbarous States of Asia, to enter into no Treaties with them, not to disturb ourselves about what might go on among them, or to excite fears among our Indian subjects by showing that we were ourselves afraid, but to pursue the even tenor of our way, striving by good, and especially by economical, government, by measures for improving the means of communication, for extending education among the people, and raising them in the scale of civilization, to increase the welfare and the resources of the inhabitants of India, trusting that we should thus most surely increase our power there, and be enabled to bid defiance to every attack. These, my Lords, were my views in 1838; and if I am asked how it happened that I continued in the Government when the Afghan War was undertaken, I answer, that I was young in those days; that I was associated in the Cabinet with men older than myself, and of far greater experience and ability; that the Chief of that Cabinet (Lord Melbourne) was a man on whose judgment I had very great reliance, and whose continuance in the post he then held I considered of much importance with reference to our domestic interests; and it seemed, therefore, to me that I should have been guilty of presumption if I had left the Government because I could not bring round my Colleagues to an opinion in which I found that I stood alone. Accordingly, though my opinion was not shaken, but confirmed, by discussion, I continued in the Government; and, of course, as I did so, I accepted my full share of the responsibility for what was done, and it was my duty not to show, by word or sign, that I disapproved of it. But now, my Lords, that these things have become matters of history, as my noble Friend on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) said last night, there can be no objection to my mentioning what took place 40 years ago; and I am anxious to do so, in order to show to your Lordships that I

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am not now supporting an opinion lightly or hastily adopted, but, on the contrary, one formed after much reflection 40 years ago, and from which I have never since seen occasion to depart. I have also thought it advisable to refer to the discussions which preceded the first Afghan War, because the result of what was then decided affords a significant warning as to what may happen now. But let me proceed with the argument I was pursuing. Supposing it to be proved that I am wrong in believing that it would be wise to trust for the safety of India to the effects of good and of economical government, and of measures calculated to increase the welfare of the people, and, therefore, their contentment and attachment to their Rulers, and that prudence really requires that we should endeavour to check the extension of the influence of Russia in Asia—suppose this to be admitted, I should still maintain that the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been wrong, and that the course they have been pursuing is calculated not to check, but to increase the influence in Asia of Russia, and to diminish our own. This, my Lords, is the proposition which I shall endeavour to establish. We have been told that it is the interest of England that Afghanistan should be strong, should be independent, and should be friendly. I accept the statement as correct; and then I ask you, whether we have made Afghanistan stronger by having already destroyed a great part of her military force? When I say we have destroyed a great part of her force, I am not referring only to the number of the Afghan troops who have been killed or wounded, but to the far larger number who have been dispersed and disorganized, to our having captured many of her guns and dismantled her forts. We have already done much to break the military power of the Afghan State; and if the war goes on we shall, no doubt, do much more. Instead, therefore, of making Afghanistan strong—as we want her to be—we are making her weak. Will that make her independent? When she has been weakened, and her own military force has been broken, she must necessarily become dependent on some other Power, and, owing to the course we have taken, that Power can only be Russia. Lastly, you say you want to make Afghanistan
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friendly to us, and what have you done for that purpose? You found that the one thing which was, perhaps, of all others the most distasteful to the Afghans was the notion of having a British Mission established in their country. Successive Rulers of the country, its Chiefs, and its people, were all united in their strong objection to allowing an English Envoy to reside among them. And, with their passionate love of independence, they were quite right in this objection. I do not believe that it would be possible for an Envoy of the Indian Government to reside in Afghanistan without his being led to interfere in its internal affairs in a manner which would gradually bring that country under the control of the Indian Government. You must remember that civil war is almost a chronic disorder in Afghanistan, and especially when the death of its Ruler leaves the succession to be fought for by the many competitors who always come forward to contend for it; when civil war is not actually raging intrigues and feuds go on among the different Chiefs and parties, and in their disputes a British Envoy must find it hardly possible to avoid interfering, while his doing so would lead little by little to the power he represents being brought into play and assuming the control of the Government. It may be true that this would be greatly for the advantage of the Afghans; that they would gain greatly by being placed under such a system of administration as our Government would be capable of introducing; and that it would be much better for them than living under such a barbarous Government as they now do; but surely we have already enough upon our hands without undertaking the task of accomplishing by force the internal reformation of Afghanistan. And, certainly, it is not what the Afghans want. It was said by one of themselves that they could endure anarchy, civil war, rapine, and bloodshed, but they could not endure a master; and seeing that the residence of a British Envoy among them is the first step to their being brought under the yoke of a foreign master, they are passionately opposed to it. I submit that when this is their feeling, and when they have more than once been promised that they should not be asked to receive a British Envoy against their will, it was not wise to turn round

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on our former declarations, to insist on sending them an Envoy, and to make war upon them when they refused to receive him. Surely this is not the way to make Afghanistan friendly to us. We know the effects of the former war; we know for how many years the enmity and hatred it engendered against England survived in the minds of the Afghans. The present war is likely to excite those feelings in a still higher degree, for we have not now even as much pretence for it as we had before, when we professed to invade the country as the Allies of the rightful heir to the Crown, and for the purpose of restoring to him the power of which he had been, as we contended, wrongfully deprived. I think I have shown to your Lordships that it is difficult to understand how this war can tend to make Afghanistan strong, independent, and friendly as Her Majesty's Ministers tell us they desire it to be; but I should like to go a little further, and ask them distinctly to explain what are the advantages they hope to obtain, and what is the state of things they seek to establish by the success of our arms? Do they mean to annex Afghanistan to the British Dominions, or, what comes to the same thing, to set up a puppet King to reign over it, under the advice of an English Resident, and maintained on the Throne by the military power of England? If so, the experience of France in Algeria may give some notion of the enormous difficulties of the task you will have to undertake, though the difficulties the French had to contend with in Algeria were less arduous than those you will have to face in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is described to us as one of the most rugged and impracticable countries in the world. It consists mainly of ranges of high and rocky mountains divided by narrow defiles, with some good land in the valleys, but scarcely able, on the whole, to produce enough food to maintain its inhabitants, who are brave, fierce, barbarians, utterly averse to the restraints of a settled Government. It is a country from which it is simply impossible to draw a revenue of any consequence towards paying the expense of governing it; while it is so unfavourable for the operations of regular troops, that the cost and difficulty of governing it against the will of the people would be enormous. Whatever little revenue it might be pos-
414
sible to levy would have to be collected with the aid of military force, which would also be required every time that an act of violence or disobedience to the law had to be punished; so that considering the warlike habits of the people I am informed that, in the opinion of men well qualified to form a judgment on the subject, 30,000 men, of whom one-half must be British soldiers, is considered to be the smallest number that would be required for the maintenance of order. Have you considered what the cost and inconvenience of this would be? If not, you ought to do so before you undertake so ungrateful and so unprofitable a task, which, in the end, you will probably be compelled to abandon. I do not mean to say that the Afghans will be able to drive you out of their country by force; no, but the troops you could maintain there would be so harassed and worn down by the continual hard work imposed upon them, the difficulties of governing the country would be so great, that in the end you would find it practically impossible to persevere in the attempt. Well, then, if, foreseeing the probability of this result, you determine not to take possession of Afghanistan, what other course will you take when you have brought the war to a successful close?, Will you depose the Ameer? If so, who is to be put into his place? Is there any Prince you can raise to power who has sufficient weight and authority to hold it without your continual support? If not, to appoint a new Ameer, only able to govern by British bayonets, would be but a different and more inconvenient mode of taking possession of the country. Perhaps you contemplate—indeed, I see no other course that would be open to you—leaving the Ameer in possession of the greater part of his territory, only requiring him to give up to you so much, of it as you may want for what is called the "rectification of your Frontier," and to agree to such a Treaty as you may dictate to him. If this should be your plan, I suppose the Treaty the Ameer would be called upon to sign would bind him to be your friend; to receive a British Envoy and as many officers as you may consider to be necessary to watch what is going on in his country; to send away the Russian Mission, and to enter into no further communication with the Russian authorities; and, lastly, to surrender the territory you

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wish to get for the purpose of making a scientific Frontier. These would be the probable provisions of a Treaty imposed on the Ameer at the end of a successful war; and I want to know what you would gain by them? You can hardly suppose that by compelling the Ameer to sign a Treaty declaring himself your friend, you will make him become a friend? Is this in human nature? and, above all, in Eastern human nature? It is certain that you will have made him, on the contrary, a bitter enemy, looking out for the first occasion of using to your detriment whatever power you may leave to him. But then you will have expelled the Russian Agents from Afghanistan! Do you really suppose that by causing the recognized and official Agents of the Russian Government to be sent away from Cabul, you will have thrown the slightest difficulty in the way of its communicating with the Ameer? There will be no want of channels through which more frequent communications than ever will be carried on between the Russian Government of Turkestan and the Ameer, who will greedily listen to every suggestion offered to him as to the means of annoying and injuring England. Nor do I think that you will gain much by acquiring the right of sending a British Envoy, with officers to assist him, to Afghanistan. Tour Lordships have been told that this is necessary, because without it you cannot get the information your interests require as to what is going on in that country. But will you get that information? My noble Friend near me (Lord Lawrence) gave us last night a striking description of the position in which British officers found themselves when sent some years ago to Herat and Candahar with the unwilling consent of Dost Mahomed. They were treated as spies and enemies; they could hardly move a step without a guard to protect them; and they were cut off from all means of observation or of gaining information, because anyone who ventured to communicate with them became a marked man, and was in danger of his life; and this not from the Government, but from the population, for the population and the Chiefs were even more averse to the residence of British Agents among them than the late or the present Ameer. My noble Friend says
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that he was told by Major Todd that he could, from passing merchants and others, get better information at Pesha-wur, where no one was afraid to speak to him freely, as to what was going on at Herat than he could obtain at Herat itself when he was staying there as an Agent of the Indian Government. There remains the advantage of the scientific Frontier you are to obtain by taking territory from the Ameer. Now, my Lords, we know that military authorities are divided on the question whether our Frontier would or would not be made stronger by being advanced; and I find that those who recommend its being advanced have been very careful not to define the exact line of the Frontier they would substitute for that which we have. Perhaps this may be because they have not found it possible to find any new line of Frontier which would not be open to all the same objections as our present one. After reading what has been urged on both sides, it certainly appears to me that the arguments of those who consider our present Frontier better than any we could obtain by pushing it forward are much the strongest on the principles of common sense. But assume—and I am willing for the purposes of argument to assume—that, as a mere question of military science, our Frontier might be made stronger by being advanced, still you must remember that this is not all that you have to consider; you must also take into account the effect on your moral power of your ending the war by taking territory from the Ameer. Your Lordships are aware that when the assumption of the Government of India by Her Majesty in place of the East India Company was proclaimed, it was solemnly declared that Her Majesty desired no extension of the territory which thus came under her direct authority, and would strictly respect the rights of the Princes of India and of the States adjoining her Dominions to the territory they then held. Her Majesty's declaration was received with the greatest satisfaction, and with confidence by those whom it affected. Will that satisfaction and confidence continue to be felt? The Indian Princes know that both Dost Mahomed and his successor had been more than once assured by Viceroys of India that they should not be pressed to receive British

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Envoys contrary to their own wishes. They have now seen that the Ameer has been pressed in the harshest manner to receive a British Envoy, and that his refusal to do so has been made the pretext of the war waged against him. If they now see that the war is ended by depriving him of apart of his territory, may they not think that to gain this territory was our object from the beginning, and that for this purpose we picked a quarrel with the Ameer? Is not this the more likely to be the light in which they will view the subject, when even before the war began it was publicly stated, by no less an authority than the Prime Minister of England, that one of its objects—I am not sure he did not say its main object—was to obtain a scientific Frontier. Will not the confidence hitherto felt in the promises and declarations of the British Government be thus shaken; and will not this cause a loss of moral power, for which the improvement of our Frontier will be, indeed, a sorry compensation? I must now return for a few moments to another point on which I have already slightly touched. I said, my Lords, that I do not apprehend any evil to the British Empire in India from the extension of Russian dominion in Central Asia. I am quite aware how largely that dominion has been extended in the last few years. I listen with the same incredulity as most of your Lordships to those disclaimers of having any ambitious schemes of conquest and aggrandizement which we are in the habit of hearing from Russian statesmen on behalf of their master, and to their assertions that his only motive in all his enterprizes is pure and unselfish philanthropy. I attach no value to these fine speeches; and certainly I am no admirer of the rule of Russia in the countries subject to her. The cruel oppression of Poland by her has been notorious; but not only in Poland, and other conquered Provinces, but in her own original dominions the Government of Russia seems to me to be one of the worst that exists in any civilized country, and the least favourable to the welfare and advancement of those who live under it. Still, when I consider what is the condition of Central Asia, the scenes of rapine and bloodshed continually going on there, while civil wars, and wars with each other, habitually lay
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waste the petty States into which this vast region is divided, and that this state of things has prevailed for centuries, without the smallest symptom appearing that any improvement is likely to take place while these wild tribes are left to themselves, I cannot but think that it would be well for the world if they could be brought even under so harsh a rule as that of Russia, and could be made to submit to order and discipline by her stern compulsion. Nor do I entertain the slightest objection to her undertaking this task. I know that not years, but generations, must go by before she can create in these countries a Power formidable to us; and looking to the bad use—as I think it—which she makes of her resources and of her military power in Europe and in Western Asia, I am far from regretting that she should find employment for a part of these resources and of this power in a region where she may possibly do some good, and can certainly do no harm. On Russian authority we learn that the dominions Russia has already acquired in Asia cost her not less than—1,000,000 sterling annually beyond all the revenue they can be made to yield, and that the demand upon her Army for troops, barely sufficient to keep this territory in subjection, is inconveniently heavy. As she increases her possessions in this quarter, these burdens will also increase; and I do not see how we could wish for anything more likely to keep her out of mischief elsewhere than that she should continue her career of conquest in Central Asia. I deeply regret that Her Majesty's Ministers, instead of wasting so much needless jealousy on the conduct of Russia in Central Asia, had not more carefully watched and resisted her proceedings in other quarters where they were really dangerous, and should have become her accomplices in perpetrating one of the worst acts of spoliation of modern times, by taking a strip of territory, to which she had not the shadow of a claim, from Roumania. This iniquitous proceeding was injurious not only to Roumania, but to Europe, by bringing Russia again to the banks of the Danube, from which it had been one of the most useful results of the Crimean War to drive her back. Instead of showing their jealousy of Russia by adopting a new and hazardous policy on our Indian Frontier, Her Majesty's

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Ministers would have done better if they had acted on this feeling when there was real occasion for it, and refused to be her accomplices in the nefarious act I have referred to. I believe that by the policy they adopted towards Afghanistan they have seriously diminished their means of hereafter counteracting the designs of Russia in Europe. The step taken by the Government in bringing Indian troops to Malta was disapproved by many friends of mine, but I did not agree in their opinion. Though the advantages it ought to have secured for us were afterwards recklessly thrown away, I believe that at the time it was taken it was a wise and politic step on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers thus to show that when the interests of the great British Empire were menaced India, as an important part of that Empire, would help to defend them. But I fear that for a long time to come we have deprived ourselves of this most valuable resource by plunging into war with Afghanistan to guard against an imaginary danger. By rendering that country hostile, and thus creating a new demand upon the services of the Indian Army, you have made it difficult for that Army to spare any force to assist you elsewhere. Instead of this, I believe that your policy has made it necessary to send more English troops to India. Now that you have sent a considerable force beyond the Passes, I think that, in order to maintain your communications and provide for the security of India, you ought to lose no time in increasing your European force there. Though I feel that I have already trespassed too long on your time, there is one more point on which I must say a few words before I sit down. The Amendment moved by my noble Friend expresses the willingness of the House to concur in granting the money necessary for bringing the war to a safe and honourable conclusion. I am ready to vote for this Resolution; but I think it right to explain that in doing so I do not mean to assent to any grant for further offensive operations against the Afghans. Believing the war to be an unjust war, I cannot join in any Vote for affording the means of carrying it further. My noble Friend (Earl Granville), whose absence from indisposition I much regret, said the other night that it might be illogical to profess to consider the
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war unjust, and at the same time to be ready to grant money to carry on the war; but in spite of its being illogical this was what he intended to do, and that for the sake of our gallant soldiers he was ready to grant whatever Supplies were necessary for their welfare and for carrying on the war with vigour. No man will more gladly than myself assent to whatever may be proposed in order to secure the safety and welfare of our gallant soldiers who have so greatly distinguished themselves in the operations that have already taken place; but it would be quite a different thing to give our sanction to Votes intended to afford the means of carrying on the war with vigour—that is to say, of engaging in further offensive operations against the Afghans. This, my Lords, if we consider the war to be unjust, would, in my opinion, be something much worse than illogical; and, for my part, I will not vote for giving a single shilling for such a purpose. I regard the war- as unjust; and I therefore consider that in waging it a national crime is committed, and that we shall everyone of us be responsible before God if we consent, as Members of this House, to abet and encourage it. I must add that my vote for the Amendment of my noble Friend is meant to be one of decided opposition to the Resolution moved by the noble Viscount, declaring the assent of this House to the use of the Indian Revenue for the payment of the expenses of the war. This, I think, would be most unjust to the people of India. My noble Friend on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) has explained his reasons for regarding the present state of the Indian finances as unsatisfactory. I entirely concur in this opinion. I believe the people of India to be already over-taxed and to require relief. We know what heavy burdens have been thrown on the Indian Treasury by successive famines; we know, too, that various public works which are urgently wanted, and some of which would greatly assist in averting future famines, have been postponed, owing to the difficulty of finding money to carry them on. In such a state of things it seems to me that to employ the Revenues of India in carrying on an unrighteous war not to the advantage, but probably to the detriment, of India, would be most unjust. The people of India have not been, and could not be,

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consulted on the subject; they are not responsible for what has been done. It is the people of England who are responsible; for they, through their Representatives, have given Her Majesty's Ministers the power to take the measures which have had the result which we see. The cost of the war ought, therefore, to fall on this country and not on India; and on that ground I must vote against the Resolution of the noble Viscount.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, before making some observations upon the very interesting speech to which your Lordships have just listened, I owe it to the respect which I feel for my noble Friend the late Secretary of State who spoke last night on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) to refer to one subject on which he touched, and on which I think some misunderstanding prevails out of doors. My noble Friend referred to what is called the Constitutional question of the right of the Executive to recommend to the Sovereign a commencement of war without a previous appeal to Parliament. I heard from my noble Friend what I expected to hear—a free and full admission that in any step which the Government have taken they have only acted within the limits of their Constitutional power. But my noble Friend proceeded to say that a time might come when there would be a disposition in the country to consider whether, as a people governing themselves, some alteration in the present rule might not be desirable, and some principle established by which a previous appeal to Parliament should be insisted upon. Upon that question itself, which is only a question of theory and of future consideration, I should not think it right to delay your Lordships with more than a few sentences; but I think it as well, since the subject has been mentioned, to point out to your Lordships that there are connected with it considerations very much wider and larger than those to which my noble Friend referred. My Lords, if it is to be a rule of the Constitution that an appeal should be made to Parliament before war is declared, it must be distinctly understood that that is a rule to be applied to all wars and in all circumstances; because you cannot leave it to the Government to decide that the rule shall be applied in some cases and not in others. Now,
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my Lords, let it be remembered that so far as the Executive Government are concerned there could not possibly be a rule more conducive to their ease and comfort. Nothing could be more agreeable to them than to shift the responsibility of war from their own shoulders to the shoulders of Parliament. I speak, I am sure, for many of those who have held office of State under the Crown. If it has been their fate to recommend to the Sovereign a commencement of war, I think they will agree with me that nothing more serious, no duty more irksome, could well be imagined. My next observation is this. If you appeal to Parliament, you must lay before Parliament all the secret information which the Government possesses. We have not in this country any Secret Committees, such as are possessed by other countries, to which information can be communicated which cannot be made public to everybody. And I would ask your Lordships to consider how it would be possible in Parliament, as it exists in this country, to have a discussion upon the subject of a war with all the secret information which the Government possesses. You must adopt one of two courses. You must either give Parliament an imperfect knowledge of the case, or you must reveal to Parliament information which might utterly frustrate the object you might have in view in making the war. And the matter does not end there. The existing rule of the Constitution of this country in this matter is not, as some people imagine, an ancient remnant of Prerogative right adhered to and preserved for the purpose of increasing the power of the Sovereign and of the Executive Government. It is a rule which was maintained at the very best period of the Constitution, and maintained advisedly and deliberately, and I believe there is no rule which is better for Parliament itself. Parliament at present has this very great advantage—as soon as war is commenced and Parliament is appealed to to support it, Parliament is able to take a wide and general view of the object and purpose of the war, and also of its probable results. If Parliament is dissatisfied, it has nothing to do but to come to those votes which would lead to the appointment of another Executive, and that other Executive would have the advantage, not indeed of being able to

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stop the war, but of preventing its being carried on in the spirit of the policy in which it was originally undertaken. Supposing, however, Parliament to be the authority which had commenced the war, it could not recede from what it had undertaken, and the war would have to be carried on, whatever changes might occur, to the bitter end. There is another consideration to be borne in mind. If it is to be proposed that the power of commencing war should emanate from Parliament, I would remind your Lordships that a very small part of the object which my noble Friend appears to have in view would be accomplished. You cannot stop at the commencement of a war; you must go further back. In the conduct of foreign affairs there is scarcely an interview with an Ambassador—there is no part of the policy of the Government pursued from day to day—which may not in some circumstances and in some contingencies lead to war; and if you say that war must not be undertaken without the consent of Parliament, you must not only have a Secret Committee to judge of the war, but you must have a foreign department of Parliament conducting the foreign affairs of the Government. It is quite impossible that you should take the commencement of the war as a matter separate from the whole conduct of foreign affairs. I pass now from that subject to the more immediate object of the present Motion of the noble Viscount. My Lords, I know that this Motion has been freely called out-of-doors a Party Motion. I am not going to give it any such name. I have no right to speculate upon the motives of those who originated it or of those who support it; and I desire in any observations I have to make not to refer in any shape or form to any question of Party. My Lords, I have in my time paid some attention to the conduct of Indian affairs; and I must say there is nothing which has ever filled me with a deeper feeling of respect than the position in the Government of India of those who are the Ministers of India in this country and of those who are the Viceroy's of India abroad. I believe there is not one of those distinguished persons I have known who has not endeavoured to conduct the Government of India for the benefit of India, and for no purpose
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or object of Party. The Ministers of India at home and abroad have a most difficult part to fill. They are in a position of almost perfect isolation; they have to undertake a work of great difficulty, of great responsibility, and of great importance, requiring great detail of information upon subjects as to which information is difficult to acquire. If all goes smoothly, they get no thanks; if anything goes wrong, they are held accountable. My Lords, I believe nothing could be more disastrous than to make questions relating to the government of India the subject of Party warfare in this country. Looking at the Government of India as I do, I feel that those engaged in it are entitled to every consideration and respect in this House; and I think if it had been my fate to be Viceroy of that great Empire I should have looked with some degree of indulgence and sympathy upon my successors. I will simply look at the policy that has been pursued in India for the purpose of ascertaining the history of that policy We are accustomed to speak of Afghanistan; but I am not sure that we at home can realize exactly the position of that country with reference to our Indian Possessions. Let me give your Lordships an illustration of what appears to me to be the position of Afghanistan. I will ask your Lordships to suppose that the northern part of Scotland was not incorporated with England, and that it was held by an independent race very much less civilized than we are—a race independent and warlike, and as numerous as the population of Afghanistan; and I would ask your Lordships further to suppose that to the north of Scotland there was an extension of land representing somewhat the features of Central Asia, in which there was a Power of great influence, of great strength, and of great energy, and one which had shown a tendency to move southwards. Let me ask your Lordships further to suppose that between this country and Scotland there was a belt of mountains something like that to the south of Afghanistan—a belt of mountains with three or four Passes, impassable except at those Passes, and the Passes were in the hands of the people of Scotland. If that were so, and if, further than that, we began by having with the Sovereign ruling in Scotland a Treaty of friendship, and if we found

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afterwards that that Treaty of friendship was acted upon in this way—the subjects of this country were not allowed to pass into Scotland, and we were utterly unacquainted with what was going on inside Scotland, and we had reason to believe that was going on which might result in injury to this country—then I ask you this question: Would we here in this House—and I speak to those on one side as much as to those on the other—gravely and calmly discuss a point of diplomatic etiquette? Would not, rather, both sides of the House be urging the Government of the country to take those steps which were absolutely necessary to make secure the position of this country in regard to this northern neighbour? Let me ask what has been the policy with reference to Afghanistan in India during the last 10 years? I heard with great interest the noble Earl who spoke just now state what his opinion had been for the last 40 years of the advances which had been made in Central Asia by a great Northern Power. We all know the consistency of the noble Earl; and I have not a doubt that he has maintained, without hesitation and without alteration, the views which he says he maintained in the Cabinet of 1839—that the steps which the Cabinet took at that time to improve, as they thought it necessary, our position in India were taken against his wishes. My noble Friend says how he would deal with the advances of Russia: he would take no notice of them. That is the policy which he says ought to have been pursued in 1839; and that is the policy which he thinks ought to have been pursued ever since. I turn from that policy—the policy of the ostrich—and I look to the policy which has been laid down by the highest authorities in India. You have it stated in moderate compass, and yet one which makes the statement too large for me to refer to in words. Let me remind you of what occurred in 1868. A very interesting Paper was drawn up by Sir Henry Rawlinson, admitted to be one of the best judges of the subject who could be found. That Paper considered the question which my noble Friend has referred to; it considered at great length the position of India with regard to Afghanistan, audit pointed out four dangers, differing in degree. The first was that to which the
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noble Earl has referred—the possibility of an invasion of India by a Northern Power through Afghanistan. You may say that is not very likely and it would be a very difficult task—an invasion of the country against the will of the Ruler of Afghanistan. The second danger was an invasion of India in which the Northern Power and Afghanistan would assist each other. The third danger was action by Afghanistan itself upon our Frontier and upon the northern part of our Indian Possessions. The fourth danger was a progress of a Northern Power into Afghanistan, gaining influence and settling itself there, making Afghanistan a centre, of intrigue and a harbour for discontented persons, to the injury of our Indian Possessions. These are the dangers which are described and explained at great length by Sir Henry Rawlinson. You will find they were submitted to the Government of India of that day, when the noble Lord at the Table (Lord Lawrence) was Governor General. Did he or the other eminent persons to whom the Paper was submitted take the view of the noble Earl, that all this was more chimera—that Sir Henry Rawlinson was the victim of a scare, and that the best policy was to take no notice of what Russia was doing? Nothing of the kind. I find the Memoranda which were written upon the essay of Sir Henry Rawlinson, beginning with the despatch of the Governor General in Council, and including the Minutes which are enclosed in that despatch from some of the best authorities—the Lumsdens, Sir D. F. M'Leod, and Colonel Taylor—all of them differing as to the degree of danger and as to what should be done to meet the danger; but all these eminent and experienced persons admitted that the danger pointed out by Sir Henry Rawlinson to a greater or less degree did exist. But it is in these Papers we find a definition of the policy which has been advocated as the policy of the noble Lord at the Table. I am not entering into this with the least desire to cast the slightest reflection upon any person concerned; no doubt they all stated what they conscientiously believed to be the course we ought to pursue. I will refer to one sentence in which Sir Henry Rawlinson stated what his opinion was of the course that ought to be adopted in the Government of India. Having described what he con-

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ceived to be the danger of the situation, he thus continues—
"Another opportunity now presents itself. The fortunes of Shere Ali Khan are again in the ascendant. He is already in possession of Herat, Candahar, and Ghizni, and is expected, either in person, or as represented by his son, Mahomed Yakoob Khan, to be soon installed at Cabul. He should be secured in our interests without further delay. Provided that he is unentangled with Russia, the restoration of his father's subsidy and the moral support of the British Indian Government would probably be sufficient to place him above all opposition and to secure his fidelity. If he has been already tampered with, his expectations, of course, will be higher. It may, indeed, be necessary to furnish him with arms and officers, or even to place an auxiliary contingent at his disposal; but whatever the price it must be paid, of such paramount importance it is to obtain at the present time a dominant position at Cabul, and to close that avenue of approach against Russia."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 38.]
That was the opinion of Sir Henry Rawlinson; what was the opinion of the noble Lord, then Sir John Lawrence? I will take along with the policy of Sir John Lawrence that of one of his great supporters, Sir Richard Temple; they both stated their opinions, and this was that of Sir John Lawrence, writing as Governor General in Council—
"The following are the only fresh measures which we could bring ourselves to recommend:—We think that endeavours might be made to come to some clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand, in firm but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our Frontier."—[Ibid. p. 45.]
Now, my Lords, divesting this language of what is mere courtesy, it means simply this—that those who are conducting at home diplomatic relations with St. Petersburg should tell Russia distinctly that any interference with the affairs of Afghanistan or any State contiguous to our Frontier would not be permitted—would be a casus belli. That is the meaning of words of this kind. This view was repeated in a separate Memorandum, in which the words used were—
"We might also endeavour to come to some mutual arrangements, and to an understanding with Russia; and, failing that, we might give that Power to understand that an advance towards India, beyond a certain point, would entail on her war, in all parts of the world, with England."—[Ibid. p. 61.]
That was the policy advocated at that
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time. Is that the policy of the noble Lord now? If I caught correctly what fell from the noble Lord last night, he said—
"I think, now, if Russia will not enter into satisfactory arrangements with us about Afghanistan, or, having made them, allows her officers in Central Asia to violate them, that ulterior measures should be taken in England to protect India."
That is the policy—to take ulterior measures in England to protect India. What Sir Richard Temple says is—
"Without, therefore, at all objecting to what Russia is doing in Bokhara, we have a right to ask, for our own interest and safety, that she abstain from all interference in Afghanistan (including Herat) and Yarkand. As our relations with Russia are at present friendly, we might, I submit, make diplomatic representations to her on the subject.…If after that she persisted in interfering within the prohibited limits, it could only he with a view of injuring us, and our Government would know how to take the steps which alone could properly he taken under such circumstances. In that case Russia would have to look to her own safety in various parts of the world."—[Ibid. p. 67.]
That is the policy of the noble Earl who spoke last. That is a clear and decided policy; it is the world at war, and India supine and quiescent: make diplomatic representations at home in England; tell Russia, in firm and courteous language, you will not allow her to interfere with Afghanistan; do nothing in India towards Afghanistan; make no Treaty with Afghanistan in India; make no offer of alliance to Afghanistan in India; leave all that to take care of itself; but let the Government at home, in its diplomatic intercourse with Russia, tell Russia we shall go to war with her in every part of the world. Call this a policy of inactivity! I call it a policy of desperate and dangerous activity. But it is at the wrong time and place. It is an activity after the evil is done. It is an activity of reprisals, not of prevention. You have a great country, in the fate of which you have the highest interest; you have the greatest interest that it should be friendly to you; that it should not be alienated from you—that it should not be corrupted by those beyond it; but in place of doing anything to secure firmly its friendship, instead of taking steps to prevent its being corrupted and alienated, you leave it open to corruption and aliena-

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tion, and make your whole policy to rest upon threats to those outside that they are not to interfere with it. Was there ever a policy which was so little consistent with what our knowledge of human nature is? And I ask your Lordships how is it to be supposed that a policy of that kind is to be called a policy of inactivity? But let us see how this policy works when tried, for it has been tried, and the moment it was tried it broke down. In 1873 the attention of the then Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) was called to the advances of Russia. He wrote a despatch to the Secretary of State at home, and this is what he said. Your Lordships will remember that before the despatch arrived a particular paragraph of it was sent home by telegraph to be communicated by the India Office to the Foreign Office that it might be laid before Russia. This is the paragraph—
"We think it for interests of peace that Russia should know our relations with Afghanistan, and we say in paragraph 18:—'Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference.'"
The Viceroy was not going so far as Sir Richard Temple—he only said very mildly, but intelligibly, that the British Government would not look on any attack on the independence of Afghanistan with indifference.
"So long as the Ameer continues as he has hitherto done in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance. I propose to inform Cabul Envoy of sense of this paragraph."—[Ibid. 102–3.]
What happened? It was sent home to the Duke of Argyll. He thought it a very proper thing to send it to the Foreign Office to be communicated to Russia; but what did the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs say? I am sorry the noble Earl who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is not in his place; but I mention the fact not to cast any blame upon him, but in order to show how this policy worked when it was tried. What did the noble
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Earl do? The noble Earl replies to the Under Secretary—
"I am to request that you will state to the Duke of Argyll that Lord Granville would not think it desirable to communicate to the Russian Government, as suggested by the Indian Government, a copy of the former despatch, and so convey to it indirectly an intimation that any aggression by it on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain with force of arms."—[Central Asia, No. 1 (1878), p. 206.]
So that when the moment came for that to be done which Sir John Lawrence said ought to be done—the moment it was proposed by the Indian Government to inform the Foreign Office, that the Foreign Office might inform Russia, that any aggression on Afghanistan would not be viewed with indifference—the Foreign Office declined to do it. Why? Because it would be conveying to Russia indirectly an intimation that any aggression on the Ameer of Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain by force of arms. The communication was not made, and thus the great policy upon which the Indian Government had rested up to that time utterly broke down. The noble Earl the other night, who was formerly Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville), said—"You ask me what my policy would be with regard to Afghanistan. I will tell you: I would follow the course pursued and advised by those three Viceroys—Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook;" but when in the Foreign Office he did not follow that policy. I want your Lordships to consider what effect this policy produced upon the person principally concerned—upon the Ameer of Afghanistan. The noble Earl who spoke last night from the cross-Benches said it would be quite useless and impracticable to inquire what it was that had affected the temper and disposition of the Ameer of Afghanistan. In the view of my noble Friend it would be quite useless, because he approved the policy of the Government up to the end of the year 1876, and had nothing to complain of in it; therefore it was immaterial to consider what was the effect produced on Shere Ali up to that time. But when he said it was impracticable, I cannot quite agree with him. Generally speaking, it is most unprofitable work to take the opinion of bystanders as to what is passing in men's minds; but as regards

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the Ameer, we have a singular official history on that subject. If you look at these Papers, you will find what I can only call a series of pictures given by Shere Ali himself in his letters, as to how he became affected in regard to his foreign relations from year to year. I doubt whether the records of diplomacy contain anything more graphic. I think they may be termed "The Progress of Diplomacy," because they give the very beginning of the end—the first communication of Russia sent to Shere Ali, and the subsequent communications from us, which produced such an impression on his mind. Your Lordships will recollect what took place in 1869 with Lord Mayo. At that time the Ameer was thinking very little about foreign affairs. I do not observe that the name of any external Power was mentioned, or that anything as to his external relations was referred to; but what he was very anxious about were the internal concerns of his country. He had hardly taken his seat upon the Throne; he was exposed to very great dangers and intrigues on every side; and what he did want was that Lord Mayo would give him an assurance to maintain his family on the Throne, and to assist him if he should be disturbed by internecine causes. Your Lordships know what took place. Lord Mayo did not give him all he wished—he did not enter into the engagement which the Ameer would have liked; but he satisfied him as to the friendship of the British Government, and used this expression—that they would view with displeasure any attempt made inside Afghanistan to disturb him on his Throne. The Ameer went away so far pleased, having had an assurance given him which he had never had up to that time. That was his position at the beginning of this history. What is the next step? A somewhat singular and a very important one in the Ameer's career. He had received the first letter from Russia, and he was in a flutter of excitement on the subject. Your Lordships will find it in the Central Asia Papers at page 108. It is a communication from the Ameer. He expressed his anxiety to know why Russia should write to a State with which she was already in friendly relation. He thought she must have some sinister design. He says there was reason of apprehen-
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sion, for already Bokhara had submitted to Russia. He forwarded the letter to the Indian Government; and in a most humble and respectful way he besought the Indian Government to tell him what answer he should return. Major Pollock, at Peshawur, on the 26th of May, 1870, says—
"With the above came a forwarding letter from His Highness the Ameer to my address, and one from the Cabul Agent, to the effect that the Ameer was much troubled at the receipt of the letters from the Russian authorities at Tashkend, for the following reasons:—1st. What reasons can the Russians have for writing letters in a friendly strain to a State which has already friendly relations with the British Government?…There is room for apprehension, for the King of Bokhara has already submitted himself to, or become a dependent of, Russia, and it would not be surprising to find Russian officials establishing themselves on the actual border of Afghanistan. If (which God forbid) they should so establish themselves on the actual border and harbour our enemies, what hope is there of the borders of Turkestan, Balkh, and Herat remaining on a satisfactory footing without full ('kamil') arrangements being made, and it is impossible that such complete measure can be carried out for the protection of these borders without the help and assistance of the British Government, with which the Afghan Kingdom is allied."
Nothing could show more precisely the state of mind in which the Ameer was in 1869. What is the next picture in this series of transformations? Your Lordships will find it at page 197, in a letter to our Envoy at Cabul. He said—
"His Highness in private said that he gathered from this murrasila that it was the wish of the Russian authorities to establish a regular and frequent correspondence with the Cabul Government. What demands careful thought in their inconsiderate language is, that notwithstanding that the Russian Government must have thoroughly apprehended and been convinced that the weal or woe of the Afghan State is entirely bound up in and associated with that of the British Government, still when writing about boundaries they make use of this unguarded expression, which may indicate God knows what intentions in their minds, viz., ' for as much as the slightest alteration in intention leads to displeasure between parties, it destroys entirely the harmony which may exist between them.' Further, when the Governor of Turkestan writes in his letter that the instructions of his Sovereign are to avoid all interference with or annoyance to his neighbours, it is a cause of astonishment that the Russian interpretation of harmony with neighbours is a strange one, for in but a few years they have extended their possessions from the foot of the Throne of Russia to the borders of Bokhara, and now style the Afghan State 'their neigh-

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hours,' oblivious of the fact that Bokhara and Khiva intervene. If (which may God forfend) the country of Bokhara and Khiva becomes theirs, and their Frontier is extended without the intervention of any buffer ('pardah') to the limits of Afghanistan, which may indeed be truly styled the Frontier of Hindustan, God only knows what line of policy or demeanour they will adopt towards Afghanistan, and what troubles may be in store for the Afghan and English Governments."
That was the letter in 1872. Nothing could be more friendly, nothing could show more complete reliance on the British Government than this letter of His Highness then, as in former cases, requesting the Viceroy to tell him what answer to make. There were one or two more letters in the same strain. Well, my Lords, what was the answer? What did the Indian Government tell the Ameer? I find the Indian Government replying as follows:—
"Should His Highness the Ameer allude to these letters, and manifest the apprehensions which his courtiers entertain, the Agent should be instructed to state that the Viceroy and Governor General in Council sees in them no ground whatever for apprehension, but rather additional reason for believing that the Russian authorities desire to maintain none of the relations but those of amity with the Government of Afghanistan."—[Ibid. p. 202.]
That was the only consolation the Indian Government gave him in his distress. He was very much alarmed at the Russians coming across the Frontier; but the Indian Government cheered him up by telling him that those communications which alarmed him were only a proof of the friendship of the Russian Government. That brings us to the next scene, in 1873. Your Lordships have, I believe, heard a good deal about this already, and I shall refer to it very briefly. We have the impression on the Ameer's mind as to the danger he was in, owing to the movements of Russia, in what his Agent communicated to us. His Agent said—
"Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urganj and Merve Shajehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merve Shajehan, the Turkomans will necessarily take refuge in Badghees in Herat, and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour, viz., from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government that either the Turkomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission
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should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances, such difficulty will present itself to me that even the British Government with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English Governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal."
And he adds—
"The British Government should take my views and reflections into most careful consideration, and be kind enough to sympathize with Afghanistan, otherwise I have not at all received any peace of mind whereon I can place perfect reliance and remain quiet or free from anxiety. Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporizing for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 111.]
Nothing could be more clear than the meaning of the Ameer when he gave us this intimation. He said, in effect—"It is your affair as well as mine. If you adopt a time-serving policy I cannot help it. I have warned you; I have delivered my own soul." I own, my Lords, I was very much surprised the other day at a statement which I saw from the noble Duke, whose absence we must all regret, (the Duke of Argyll). The noble Duke said that in 1873 the Ameer either was or pretended to be very much afraid of the Russian advance, and that he held out the bait which was thought to be most tempting to catch the Indian Government. I do not know how that is. I have read the whole of these Papers—there is a deal more in the same strain—and I must say I have never seen expressions which conveyed to my mind more clearly the convictions of a man really and thoroughly alarmed. But if it was the view of the Secretary of State at that time that the Ameer was only pretending to be alarmed and was holding out a bait to catch the Indian Government, I can very well understand the course which was taken with regard to the alarm of the Ameer. I will say a little more of the documents which passed in 1873. I am going to refer to them not for the purpose of casting a shadow of blame on any person connected with the events of that year, but because it is absolutely necessary that your Lordships should see what was done in 1873 in order to judge of the policy of 1876, because the policy pursued in 1876 was a policy to remedy that which had been overlooked or, at all events, not done in 1873. I will take the telegram which

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was sent home by the Viceroy in 1873 to the Secretary of State. I was very much surprised, I own, as to the controversy which has arisen upon the construction of that telegram. I shall adopt myself implicitly the construction which the noble Lord (Lord Northbrook) tells us the Government of the day put upon it, and that he put upon it. But, while adopting that construction, I must tell your Lordships the construction which I put upon it. The Viceroy had informed the Government at home of those apprehensions of the Ameer, and had proposed to give the Ameer some assurances of assistance. This is what the telegram of the 26th of July says in reply—
"Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it: but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."—[Ibid. 108.]
Now, my Lords, I have been accustomed all my life to study the meaning of documents, and I will tell you frankly what I think this document means. The Ameer told the Viceroy that he was very much alarmed at the advance of the Russians, and he asked for some new assurances in the circumstances of his new position. He never suggested to the Viceroy that the Indian Government was going to fall short of anything that had been promised by previous Viceroys—by Lord Lawrence or Lord Mayo; he never suggested it for a moment. He never suggested that the Indian Government was going to recede from any engagement made with him; but what he did suggest was that the changed state of affairs required that something new should be done—that some engagement must be entered into, some promise made to him, which had never been made before; that the policy pursued by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo was all very well in its way and well suited for the time when it was adopted, but that the time had arrived when he must have something more definite, something more tangible, than the engagements previously given by the Indian Government. That was what the Ameer meant; but the meaning of the telegram from home was that we did not share the alarm of the Ameer, and that we meant to pursue the policy we had pursued all this time. What
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happened? Communications were made to the Ameer, and how were they taken? The first complete communication to the Ameer was in the shape of a despatch from the Governor General, which your Lordships will find at page 116. It said—
"The result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments has been, in my opinion, materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan, and to remove apprehension of dangers from without… I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is in my opinion one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity. I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Highness' territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency. My hope is that having received the foregoing assurances, your Highness will now be enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of your internal government. The British Government desires to see your Highness' country powerful and independent. It is my determination to maintain the policy which has been adopted towards your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and I repeat to your Highness the assurance given you at the Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor."
How did the Ameer understand this, because that is the next evidence we have on the subject? If I had been the Ameer I should have said to myself the substance of all this is that nothing is to be done. I asked for a new engagement, and I am told to wait till a more convenient time. The Ameer wrote back after a short interval to the Governor General. I will not read the letter, since your Lordships have seen it. What the Ameer says is, in substance, this, and I may remark that the tone of the letter is such as was never adopted in a communication to a Viceroy of India before. To say that the tone of the letter is not courteous is saying much too little. Apart, however, from the discourteous tone, the Ameer, in substance, says—"I come to you for relief and for engagements suited, to the posi-

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tion in which I find myself. You are going to retire from what Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo proposed; but I come to suggest that you must do something more than was promised by either of them, and you tell me that you are going to resume their policy. If so, what is the use of your going through the ceremony of having these long interviews? "Your Lordships have heard the Ameer's opinion about the letter he had previously received from General Kaufmann. Well, his answer to the next letter he received from General Kaufmann was this—and your Lordships will be amused at the change of tone. I do not think the reply of the Ameer, dated the 16th of November, 1873, was submitted to the Indian Government. It was written on his own inspiration, and here it is. He says to the Russian Governor General at Tashkend—
"I received your kind and friendly letter dated the 1st August, 1873, on 22nd idem, and was extremely gratified with its contents. The cause of the delay of a few months in the dispatch of a reply to it is evident, viz., first you went to St. Petersburg, and afterwards you were occupied in the Kharism expedition. I hope you have now returned in health and comfort to Tashkend, and I have, therefore, considered it advisable to take the opportunity of sending a reply to your murrasilla. I am much gratified with the contents of your letter explaining that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia is anxious for the peace and welfare of neighbouring States, and that you have considered it one of your most pleasing duties to report to His Majesty that you have had every reason to be satisfied with me, and that I have upheld the friendship existing between us. It is as evident as daylight that at present His Majesty is a great and powerful Monarch, and it is, therefore, becoming that neighbouring States should enjoy tranquillity and convenience. This policy will tend to confirm the friendship existing between His Majesty and these States."—[Central Asia, No. 1 (1878), p. 8.]
Did ever such a change in the same number of months come over a Correspondence between two Potentates? Compare this with the letter sent to our Viceroy only a few months before and see what a difference there is. Yet I am told that the mind of the Ameer continued the same, and that up to the time of the late Viceroy's arrival in India there was no change on his part. My Lords, it was done at the end of the year 1873. It was finished then, and there was no change afterwards. So much for the letters; but I must call in two witnesses to speak on this subject.
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First, there is the late Governor General. What does Lord Northbrook say as to the feeling of the Ameer in the year 1873. His Lordship says—
"His language after the return of his Envoy, Noor Mahomed Shah, from Simla in 1873 was certainly far from satisfactory; but we are disposed to attribute it either to his impression that we were so anxious for his support that by assuming an attitude of dissatisfaction he might obtain further assistance from us; or to his disappointment that we did not give him the distinct pledge he asked that the British Government would protect him under all circumstances against external attack, coupled perhaps with his discontent at the result of the Seistan arbitration."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 134.]
I am not here dwelling on the question as to whether it was right or wrong to refuse to give the pledge which the Ameer asked for. I am now dealing merely with the question of fact. Is it a fact that the mind of the Ameer was changed at this time? Lord North-brook, at all events, makes no doubt about it. Next, I will take the evidence of our Native Resident at Cabul. Writing in January, 1875, but speaking of the previous year, he says—
"Considering then the external and internal state of Afghanistan, I am firmly convinced that now is the time for the interference of the British Government with a view to the peace of that country and the tranquillity of Hindoostan. The following are a few of the reasons why the Government of India should interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan:—For a long time the British Government has been anxious to establish amicable relations with the Ruler of Cabul, but without success."
And then he goes on—
"The possible inclination of the Ameer towards another party (Russia?) owing to the silence and apparent apathy of the British Government."—[Ibid. p. 146.]
That is what our Resident at Cabul at the time of the late Viceroy reports to him as his opinion of the feeling of the Ameer. Now, what evidence have we on the other side? The noble Viscount who moved the Amendment told us last night that Sir Henry Norman, who was on the Council of Lord Northbrook and that of Lord Lytton, had addressed to the newspapers a letter, in which he said that up to the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook the Ameer had no feeling of hostility to us, and that all his hostility was due to the measures taken in 1876, and since that time. The noble Viscount dwelt very much on that

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letter as a proof that it was the conduct of the present Government which has caused the hostility of the Ameer. My Lords, I wish to speak with great respect of Sir Henry Norman. I have heard some persons say that that letter was one which ought not to have been written to the newspapers; but I do not express an opinion on that point. I do not know what the habits of Indian Councillors are; but they appear to me not to be very reticent, and they seem to use considerable freedom in their communications to the newspapers. However, I do not say anything about this letter, except to express my opinion that if it had been kept back for 24 hours it would never have been published at all. Strange to say, when it was published in the newspapers, it appeared side by side with another letter from the Ameer himself. Side by side with Sir Henry Norman's letter, saying that the whole of the hostility of the Ameer had been occasioned by the events since 1876, there appeared a letter from the Ameer stating just the reverse. Unfortunately, therefore, the noble Viscount's witness is discredited by the person principally concerned. The Ameer says the hostility occurred at the time when the late Viceroy interfered with him on the subject of the treatment of his son. I must say that the late Viceroy was in a very unfortunate position in regard to that subject, for I observe that General Kaufmann wrote on the same subject to the Ameer. General Kaufmann told the Ameer that he had acted quite right towards his son, and that the first thing necessary was that parental rights should be enforced. The late Viceroy, writing in a different strain, told the Ameer that he was quite wrong. In these circumstances, I am not surprised at the Ameer preferring the advice of General Kaufmann to that of the late Viceroy. At all events, I think we may remove from this discussion the testimony of Sir Henry Norman. Let me now say a word or two about these occurrences in 1873. I repeat that I blame no person whatever, for it is very easy to be wise after the event—to go back and say what ought to have been done five or six years ago. I do not propose to adopt that course. But I appeal with confidence to your Lordships on both sides of the House, whether if you had to do over again what was done in 1873, you would not then have pro-
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mised to give the Ameer the assistance he asked for? I cannot entertain a doubt that, by an overwhelming majority, you would have said it would have been a happy thing if we had taken that opportunity, as Sir Henry Rawlinson advised, of obtaining the friendship of the Ameer by conceding all that he asked for. Well now, my Lords, the transactions of 1873 were the justification for the conduct of the Government in 1876. I refer to the Mission of Sir Lewis Pelly. I am not going into the details of the history of that Mission; but I have heard it said that that Mission was an attempt to force upon the Ameer British Residents in Afghanistan. I entirely deny that statement. There is no foundation for it. The whole of that Mission—the whole of the proposals made by Sir Lewis Pelly, and the proposals made before Sir Lewis Pelly met the Ameer's Envoy—proceeded on the avowed and the distinct condition that there was to be no force whatever applied to the Ameer, and that he was to understand it was not a question of forcing anything upon him. I was surprised to hear the noble Earl speak of this as an attempt to force. What were the facts? They were that the Envoy who was sent to Cabul was supplied with an aide mémoire to show to the Ameer and to the Durbar at Cabul what the advantages were which we were prepared to give in return for the concession of having British Agents resident in Afghanistan. He was told that the Government were ready to make with him, in the form I have described, engagements of a character such as before he had asked for; but that if he wished for those engagements, there must be a consideration on the other side; that that consideration must be the presence of British Residents, not in Cabul, but on the Frontiers of his territories; and that this was absolutely necessary in order that we should carry out the engagements which we were about to make. Well, what happened at Cabul? Your Lordships have the narrative of the meeting which took place, and of the Durbar held before the Envoy was sent to meet Sir Lewis Pelly. The Durbar distinctly understood that the condition which was to be the sine quâ non of the negotiations was the admission of British Residents. They met again, and at last they agreed to accept that condition;

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and it was on that footing that the Envoy came to meet Sir Lewis Pelly. What happened afterwards? Let me remind your Lordships, in the first place, as to the question of these British Agents, that the policy of having British Agents in Afghanistan has never been disputed. It has been admitted by the late Governor General, as well as insisted on by the present Viceroy. Let me remind you of what was said on this in the time of the late Governor General. Writing in Council he said—
"We agree with Her Majesty's Government that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkestan, it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat. The appointment, it is true, would be attended with some risks, and the usefulness of the measure would depend on the discretion of the Agent who might be selected. But if an officer of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of the Ameer and the Afghan officials, we should anticipate great advantage from the arrangement.—[Ibid. p. 133.]
And your Lordships will remember that in 1873 the late Viceroy himself proposed that a British officer should go into Afghanistan and survey the whole of the boundaries of that country. Was there any reason to suppose that the Ameer would not be prepared to receive British Residents as a concession in return for advantages which were to be given to him? Here, again, I have got the concurrence of the late Viceroy and his Council. Their testimony on the subject is quite explicit. I do not agree with what fell from the noble Earl who spoke last, that any engagement on this subject had been given to the Ameer either by Lord Mayo or by anyone else on behalf of the Indian Government. I believe the correct statement on this point is the one given in the despatch of the Governor General in June, 1875; and I am quite satisfied with the conclusion which the Governor General and his Council then came to as to the intentions of the Ameer. He says—
"On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. But our impression, is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is, upon obtaining the
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recognition, in a Treaty with the British Government, of his son Abdoolla Jan as his successor."—[Ibid. p. 131–2.]
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: Read the next paragraph.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am anxious not to omit anything which in fairness ought to be read.
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: The next paragraph is not in my hands; but it simply states that the impression was that this was not information which could be so relied upon as to found on it any representation to the Ameer.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not see the alteration which that makes in these matters. I am anxious to state the thing as favourably to the noble Earl as I can. As I understand the view of the noble Earl, it is this—They state that the Ameer required some terms to be offered to him as a condition to his receiving British Agents. That is exactly the conclusion which I have given. If you had proposed to the Ameer to put Agents in Afghanistan without giving him something in return, he would never have consented; but he was quite prepared, when the subject was last mooted to him, for the consideration of the advantages which were to be given to him, to consent to the admission of British Agents. And I wish to remind your Lordships that it is a complete misapprehension to say that the Ameer had manifested an absolute objection to receive British Agents in his territories. Nothing of the kind. I take the evidence which the Governor General and his Council have given as to that. They say it is a question of bargain, and that was exactly how Sir Lewis Pelly was ordered to deal with it. He was ordered to make a bargain; he was armed with the power of offering the Ameer very great advantages and benefits, and was directed to ask in return, as a matter on which the Ameer was to be a free and a consenting party, the admission of British officers into Afghanistan. That bargain was not accepted. What occurred at the Conference? It has been said that the object of Sir Lewis Pelly was to pick a quarrel at the Conference with the Ameer and his Envoy. I have read with some care the narrative of what took place at the Conference; and I am bound to say that anything more unlike an attempt to pick a quarrel than Sir Lewis

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Pelly's conduct I never read. Anything more careful, more elaborate than his explanations, more patient than his attention to all the complaints of the Envoy I never read. The Conference went on from day to day and from week to week. The whims and the caprice of the Envoy were indulged; he was allowed to speak day after day without interruption. Sir Lewis Pelly presented the advantages which he had to offer in the most attractive form; everything which patience, temper, and long experience could enable a man to do to make a Conference successful was done by Sir Lewis Pelly. But what was the conduct of the Envoy? In the first place, when he arrived, although our resident Agent told us that the Durbar at Cabul had agreed to the terms that were to be offered with regard to British Agents, the Envoy professed himself to be entirely without power to assent to such an arrangement. What was his argument? It was this—"You offer to me certain advantages, certain assistance, certain promises, and a certain Treaty with the Ameer, but you are bound to do this already. My interpretation of the Treaties which already exist between Afghanistan and Great Britain already binds you to do all that you now propose to do." Nothing could be more absurd than that statement. That was really the climax of Oriental ingenuity. What did the Envoy do? He said—"You point out to me in great detail the position of Afghanistan and the advantages which it will derive by being protected by Great Britain from any aggression of Russia: but I must remind you of what you told me three years ago. Then you read to me extracts from your despatches with Russia, and read to me assurances by which Russia promised not to meddle with Afghanistan, and that it was not within the sphere of her influence. Then now," says the Envoy—"I cannot think that all these assurances could be given between two such religious Governments like those of Russia and Great Britain, and by excellent and religious Envoys, and Secretaries of State, and after all there is the slightest reason to fear Russia's interfering with Afghanistan. He turned against us the despatches of 1873, which assured him that there was no danger to his dominions, and in that way the Conference continued until the
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Envoy died. But what was happening at Cabul all this time? Your Lordships will find it in the Central Asia Papers. Russian messengers were going to and from Cabul, and seldom was there a day when one was not present there, holding conferences and consultations with the Ameer. The Ameer was collecting troops on his Frontier; he was communicating with the Akhoond of Swat, the Patriarch of the Mahomedans, for the purpose of raising a religious war; while all the time the Envoy was wasting time, getting adjournments of the Conference for a week or a month, and insisting that he had no authority to give that which was a sine quâ non of a settlement. I should like to know, in these circumstances, what other course the Governor General ought to have pursued than the one he took when the Envoy died? It is said the Viceroy states that another Envoy was coming to agree to all our proposals. If the Viceroy had shut the door against any fresh overtures which the Ameer wished to make, I could have understood the suggestion that there was a precipitation and a want of indulgence towards the Ameer, although I do not think there would be any justification for saying that he wanted to pick a quarrel with him. The Mir Akhor, the only person on the spot, said he had no authority. The proceedings at Cabul being such as I have described, the Viceroy directed, as he was bound to do, the Conference to be closed; but it was intimated that the door would be kept open for the Ameer—as was actually done for more than a year—in order that he might come forward and accept those terms which he had in writing, and which he perfectly well knew would be agreed to by the Indian Government. Well, my Lords, that is the case with respect to the Conference with Sir Lewis Pelly; and up to this point my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) said he agreed with the policy of the Government, that he was quite satisfied with the way in which the Conference was closed, and the despatches had stated the position of affairs at the end of the Conference. What my noble Friend objected to, he said, was what occurred afterwards. Now, my Lords, what occurred afterwards? More than a year elapsed. The Ameer kept himself back; he made no overture; he showed no disposition to accede to what

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we proposed; and then he received an Embassy which was sent to him on the part of the Russian Government. My noble Friend said he received that Embassy under compulsion. So far as the evidence in these Books is concerned, there is not the slightest evidence, that we can find, that there was any compulsion before the reception of that Embassy; and, so far as we have information which is not in these Books, all the public information goes the other way, and leads us to suppose that there was no compulsion whatsoever, but that the Embassy was received without anything like duress or pressure on the part of Russia. Well, my Lords, the noble Earl who spoke to-night asked what right or authority had we to require that our Envoy should be received? My Lords, I have seen that asserted elsewhere; and the case of Afghanistan has been likened to the case of some European Power with which we might have no relation by way of Treaty, but which we might require to receive an Embassy, and it is said that such a State might refuse to receive it. I shall not, my Lords, stop to inquire whether that would be so, because our relations with Afghanistan were of an entirely different nature. We had a Treaty—a Treaty of friendship—with Afghanistan; and it was absolutely necessary, in order to discharge our obligations under it, that we should have a right, in the ordinary way, to information as to what occurred in that country. But, in addition to that, Afghanistan is a country which had professed for years to lean upon us, and the Treaty was entirely connected with ourselves. Well, my Lords, when it was proposed that Afghanistan should be made a neutral zone, the Indian Government and the Russian Government declined it, on the ground that our relations with Afghanistan were not such as to enable us to look as neutrals upon that country, or to enable us to be bound by a Treaty forming Afghanistan into a neutral zone. And if your Lordships look at the Central Asia Papers you will see that the opinion of Russia and the opinion of Afghanistan also was this—that we had the power by Treaty to force upon Afghanistan a certain line of conduct with respect to the tribes and people of the country. Therefore, my Lords, in that state of things, it is idle to talk of the
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question of our right to send an Envoy to Afghanistan as if it was a question of sending an Envoy to the King of Dahomey, or to any country with which we have no Treaty relations whatever. We had, therefore, a perfect right to send an Envoy, and the only thing which led us to forbear from doing so was this—that the Ameer told us that if the Envoy of one Christian Power was received, the Envoy of another Christian Power would be received also. But the moment the Envoy of Russia was received and our Envoy was rejected, that excuse fell to the ground. My noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) said—"You ought to have taken this course with the Ameer—you ought to have allowed him very much more time. You ought not to have called upon him for an answer to your request at the time you did; and if you had given a greater lapse of time what would have happened would have been this," and, speaking with an appearance of almost absolute authority, my noble Friend told us what would then have occurred. Well, in the first place, I must remind your Lordships that the concession of a longer period would have meant the concession of the whole winter. It would have been the giving up of all the time necessary for purposes which might have to be accomplished. But what my noble Friend said was this—"If you had given a longer time, I can tell you what would have happened. The Ameer would have gone to Russia; he would have said to Russia, 'I have received your Embassy, and now I am called upon to receive a British Envoy, and I want to know whether if I resist you will see me through it, and fight for me?'" Then, says my noble Friend, it is perfectly certain that Russia would have said she would do nothing of the kind; that she would not fight; that he might make the best terms he could; and I think I heard my noble Friend say—but I am not quite sure of that—that Russia would have mediated. But, my Lords, what would be the state of things then? We should have given up the whole winter to Afghanistan on the chance of Afghanistan going to Russia and Russia saying she would not stir, and advising the Ameer to make terms with us, and, perhaps, offering to mediate. Well, I should like to know what would have been the result of that policy, which

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would have left the Ameer the master of the situation during the whole winter upon the chance that Russia might have come forward to mediate between England and Afghanistan—between England, the protector, and Afghanistan, the protected country. Yet my noble Friend would have had us leave the Ameer master of the situation, trusting to the chapter of accidents which might happen in the course of the winter. But might not the Ameer also have said that he now saw exactly what this great Power was going to do? That if he allowed the time given him to pass, possibly it would do him no harm; that he would trust to the lapse of the winter months, set us at defiance, and treat us as he had treated us hitherto. What, my Lords, would have been the result? My noble Friend says—"Well, but you have made war upon Afghanistan; but was there no one else? Is Afghanistan the only country which has done you wrong?" And my noble Friend admits that we have good reason to complain of what has been done and intended by Afghanistan; but he asks, Have you not cause of complaint against Russia also? I do not know whether my noble Friend meant to represent as his policy that he would have had us engage in a war with Russia. I rather think that what my noble Friend intended to convey was this—that inasmuch as he could show logically that if we went to war with Afghanistan we should go to war with Russia, therefore we should go to war with neither. That seemed to be the drift of my noble Friend's argument. Well, I can give my noble Friend two short answers, each of which is, I think, conclusive. If it had been the case that we should have gone to war with Afghanistan because the Ameer received a Russian Envoy, then I quite understand the argument that in that case we should have gone to war with Russia also for having sent an Envoy. But, my Lords, the mistake made by my noble Friend is, that we have gone to war with Afghanistan for having received a Russian Envoy. We have never said it; we have never thought it. What we have gone to war with Afghanistan for was for not receiving our own Envoy. That is the first answer. Here, my Lords, is the other. We requested Russia to withdraw her Envoy, and the Envoy has returned. We asked Afghanistan to
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receive our Envoy, and she refused. And yet the argument is, that because we have gone to war with the second, we ought to have gone to war with the first. Why, my Lords, it seems to me the most absurd thing in the world to say that we should go to war with Russia because the Ameer had refused to do that which we naturally and necessarily required him to do. Now, my Lords, I own I cannot help regretting the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Viscount. I said at the beginning that I was anxious not to treat this as a Party question; and I hope I have not said a word which would make anyone think that I desired to represent the conduct of any Party in these transactions in a Party spirit. But, my Lords, I know how this Motion will be looked at out-of-doors. It is very seldom the House of Lords has a Motion brought before it on a question of Supplies. The jurisdiction of this House as regards Supplies, as your Lordships all know, is very peculiar and very limited. I never heard of any case in which this House could interfere by an Amendment on a Motion of Supply until the Act of 1858 for the government of India was passed. Parliament, in passing that Act, provided that the House of Lords should have a power in regard to Supplies that it never before possessed; it provided that the Revenues of India for particular purposes—purposes of external war—should not be applied without the consent of both Houses of Parliament. The consequence is, that the House of Lords, as it appears to me, has upon this question a jurisdiction co-ordinate with that of the House of Commons. Well, it is a very singular thing that upon what I think is the second occasion at most on which that power has come before your Lordships to be exercised, a Motion should be made which would have the effect, if carried, of stopping the Supplies. The noble Earl is much too candid—much too straightforward—to put any disguise upon a matter of this kind. There is no doubt that, as the noble Earl says, it would have the effect, if carried, of annihilating the means of providing for the troops in India out of the Indian Revenues; and as this House has no jurisdiction over any other Revenues the very liberal offer made in the Preamble of the noble Viscount's Amendment must be taken for what it is worth.

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This, then, is a Motion calling upon your Lordships who have power over the Revenues of India to stop the payment out of those Revenues of the troops now engaged in Afghanistan. My Lords, what object is to be gained by this Amendment? The noble Viscount (Viscount Halifax) says, in his Motion, that his object is to bring the war to an honourable conclusion. For my part, I cannot, for the life of me, see how the war, which, in the opinion of the noble Earl who spoke last (Earl Grey), is unjust, impolitic, and even criminal, can be brought to an "honourable conclusion." It can be brought to a conclusion, of course, like everything else; but how it can, under the circumstances, be brought to an "honourable conclusion," I confess, is more than I can understand. The noble Viscount, for his part, gave us a great deal of information with regard to Afghanistan of a not very encouraging kind. He said he knew Afghanistan very well, and that it was a terrible country. If our troops went into the valleys they would be surrounded by tribes from the hills; and if they went upon the hills they would not be able to get water from the valleys. If we sent small bodies of troops into the country they would be cut to pieces; and if we sent large bodies of troops the expense would be intolerable. If they went to Candahar they would be in great danger; and if they did not go to Candahar they would be in greater danger still. The noble Viscount fills the air with these sinister prophecies, and proposes to bring the war to an honourable conclusion by stopping the Supplies. Well, my Lords, I regret the course that has been taken by the noble Viscount. I believe it will be misunderstood in this country and still more in India. Our troops are engaged in a war which I am satisfied the great majority of the people of this country—and I believe the majority would be much greater were the question thoroughly understood—consider to be a war which could not have been avoided for the honour, for the dignity, and for the safety of our Indian Empire. That I take to be the feeling of this country; in India, I believe, there is no difference of opinion whatever; and in the face of that a Motion is proposed of the character I have described, a Motion which will be regarded here—and which I am certain will be re-
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garded in Indian—as made for Party purposes. In considering a Motion of this kind, whatever may be the result of it, we are bound, in theory at least, to assume that, if carried, it may lead to the embarrassment or removal of the present Government. That, my Lords, is a very small matter. I am satisfied that if one Government in this country is removed, another will be found, without difficulty, to take its place. But if you endanger, or imperil, our Indian Empire, we can only lose it once. We have heard of the saying, "Perish India!" I do not stop to inquire by whom it was used or when; but, my Lords, I would say this—I care not what becomes of this or any other Government; I say, "Perish Governments;" but I implore your Lordships, in the vote which you are about to give on this question, to do nothing which will impair, or shake, or endanger the stability of our Indian Empire.
LORD SELBORNEsaid, he could not help being struck by the remarkable contrast presented by the speech of his noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor) and that made by the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) at the opening of the debate. The Secretary of State for India treated the question before the House as being in no respect a financial one, and passed at once to a general defence of the Government policy. His noble and learned Friend, on the contrary, seemed to regard the financial aspect of the question as of vital importance, and assumed the effect of the Amendment before the House, if carried, to be a stoppage of the Supplies for the troops now engaged in Afghanistan. He (Lord Selborne) ventured to say that no such consequence was involved in the Amendment. The supporters of the Amendment thought it their duty to express their opinion on the policy of the Government which led to the war; but that duty being discharged, they would not only be ready, but, on the face of the Amendment, they professed to be ready to vote all the necessary Supplies for the conduct of the war. If any particular Member of their Lordships' House was of opinion that no portion of the Revenues of India ought to be applied to the war, he could have no objection to vote for the Amendment, because after its adoption he would be perfectly free to abide by his opinion. If, on the other hand, the

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majority of those who adopted the Amendment should be of opinion it was right to provide Supplies for the war out of Indian Revenues, there would be nothing to prevent their agreeing to such a step. He did not see that there was any inconsistency whatever in the views of those who thought the war unjust and impolitic, and who, nevertheless, professed a desire to bring it to an honourable conclusion. What they wished to avoid was anything which could disgrace or discredit the British arms, or endanger the safety of our gallant troops, who were now acting under orders as to the justice of which they could have no responsibility and no concern. At the same time, it would be necessary to put an end to the war as quickly as possible, due regard being had to the conditions he had specified. It was, therefore, mere rhetoric to speak of there being any inconsistency at all in the matter. His noble and learned Friend had said that in some quarter the cry had been raised of "Perish India!" He was not aware that such language had ever been employed. What he believed really did happen was that a distinguished historian, speaking at a public meeting in a manner, perhaps, not sufficiently guarded to obviate perverse misconstruction, said, in effect, that it would be better that their dominion in India should perish than that they should be disgraced by doing what was unjust and wrong. He did not, of course, mean that India should perish; but merely to express, in as strong language as he could, his abhorrence of what was unjust and wrong. When a man used the proverb "Fiat justitia ruat cœlum," he did not mean that he wished the heavens to fall, but only that he wished justice to be done. No doubt his noble and learned Friend was thoroughly persuaded of the soundness of his own arguments and the justice of his own conclusions; but what could be the advantage of winding up with a suggestion that those who were in favour of this Amendment, or anybody in the House or out of it, wished India to perish, or was not fully convinced that the safety of India would be best promoted by that course which was most just, most honourable, and most wise, in dealing either with the Ameer or anyone else? His noble and learned Friend had said, that this was not a
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case for Party warfare: and had added that some sympathy should be shown to successors in office. He wished heartily that these questions had not been treated by anybody, or at any time, in a sense which would admit of the suggestion of Party warfare, or of there being any question between successors and predecessors in office; but was it not the despatch of the Secretary of State for India that raised questions between successors and predecessors in office, and showed, perhaps, less sympathy and indulgence than even the noble Lord would recommend not towards successors, but towards predecessors? Was not the able speech of the Secretary of State, of which he had no other complaint to make, almost from the beginning to the end an impeachment of the policy of his predecessors in office and of former Governors General more than anything else? The moment that despatch was written, no other course was open to the Government. It was not possible for them to vindicate their own policy except by accusing their predecessors of want of foresight and error of judgment, and by saying that the war was the result of the policy pursued by their predecessors. If a comparison of policy with policy had been imported into this discussion, it had been so imported because the present Government had presented its policy in contrast with that which preceded it, with the object of showing that the former policy was wrong. Another preliminary point touched upon by his noble and learned Friend was what was called the Constitutional question. There was no doubt whatever that the conduct of the Government in calling Parliament together was strictly within the Constitution; but what had been said, truly and wisely, by the noble Earl on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) was this—that it was of essential importance in these great matters not to strain the Constitution. The strength of the Constitution lay in keeping habitually within it when dealing with vital interests of the State. They could not revoke important public engagements by which the whole future of the country might be affected and all its resources might be pledged by afterwards turning out Ministers; they could not undo a war and restore a state of peace by passing a Vote of Censure upon those whose

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policy led to the war; and therefore it was essential that those who would act wisely, and really in the spirit of the Constitution, in those affairs which were necessarily intrusted to the Sovereign, should carry Parliament with them, as far as possible, in the preliminary policy as well as in the final one, and take Parliament into their counsel, so that it should have a substantial voice and judgment in these great matters, not only when it was too late, but before it was too late. Surely no stronger illustrations of the advantages of that doctrine could be adduced than those that were mentioned by the noble Earl (Earl Grey). An arrangement was sprung upon the country by surprise—which it might have disapproved if it had known of it before it was actually made—by which we were pledged, under all circumstances, to defend Turkey against foreign enemies, if Turkey would shape its domestic policy according to our views. What could be a stronger illustration of the danger of straining those powers of the Crown, than that such enormous engagements should be irrevocably contracted without Parliament being consulted before it was too late? So with regard to a war of this sort. It was not, as the noble and learned Earl had put it, that Parliament must always be consulted before going to war at all, and that secret information must be disclosed, but that Parliament must be consulted whenever and as soon as it is practicable. There might be occasions when it would be impossible, and when Parliament would not expect it to be done. No doubt great powers were given to the head of the State in order to provide for emergencies; but when a course of policy was definitely foreseen, and Parliament could be consulted without detriment to the interests of the country, then surely it ought to be taken into council as soon as possible. And the complaint was that this had not been done. For three years—during 1876–7–8—the Government had pursued a course which had led to war, and they paraded their policy as different from that of their predecessors, and on that account claimed credit for it. Yet so far from letting Parliament know the change which was going on, when they were pressed to take Parliament into their council, they unfortunately gave answers which everybody but them-
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selves understood to represent the exact contrary of the facts. This was not acting in the spirit of the Constitution, and this was the only sense in which that question was raised. When the noble and learned Earl was instituting a comparison between Afghanistan and Scotland, he should have been glad to know whether the large map theory or the small map theory would have illustrated that argument best; but at the end of that course of instruction he failed to get any light from the comparison, and thought, on the whole, that it was a somewhat round-about process to go to the geography of Scotland for the purpose of understanding that of Afghanistan. The noble and learned Earl was loud in his praise of the foresight of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 10 years ago: but the predictions in the paper of Sir Henry Rawlinson had not been entirely verified. No railways had been constructed between the Caspian and the Sea of Aral, nor had steam navigation been established on the Oxus, so that the anticipated changes on which most of Sir Henry Rawlinson's alarm was founded had not been carried out. The opinions and actions of Lord Lawrence and his advisers were not correctly represented by saying that they did nothing but recommend England to make arrangements with Russia. Both Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook had done all that was wise and necessary for safety, not with reference only to communications with Russia, but also with reference to our relations towards Afghanistan: thinking, for the best possible reasons, that it would be inexpedient to do other things, the effect of which might have been to involve us in danger instead of improving our position; there was no ground whatever for the representation, that either of them recommended activity of reprisals and not of precaution. Was it fair to represent the Indian Government of that day as saying that nothing should be done in Afghanistan but merely to threaten Russia? He read the Papers very differently. His noble and learned Friend, adverting to what fell from the noble Earl (Earl Granville), the other evening, had, said that noble Earl was now ready to follow a policy which he had declined to follow in 1873. What was the ground for that assertion? Simply this—that the Indian Govern-

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ment had suggested the communication to Russia of a particular despatch, urging that she should not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan; which despatch his noble Friend (Earl Granville) then thought it inexpedient to send—and why? Because other communications had then recently passed between Russia and this country resulting in an arrangement upon that very subject; and if that Indian despatch had been sent, it might reasonably have given offence to Russia, as implying that we doubted her sincerity. But what had that to do with the Afghan policy,—to which his noble Friend and the Government of which he was a Member then as much as now adhered? It was true, Lord Northbrook did not give the Ameer the unconditional assurance of support at home and abroad which he wanted. His noble and learned Friend asked if we had to do over again now what was done in 1873, was there a man in their Lordships' House who would not give the Ameer the assurance he then asked for? He (Lord Selborne) did not believe there was a man in that House, not even excepting the noble and learned Earl himself, who would do it. He could not conceive any circumstances under which this country could possibly be justified in giving an unconditional guarantee against all enemies at home and abroad to the Ameer, and this was all that Lord Northbrook had refused to do. The present Government never offered to do anything of the kind, and would not have been justified in doing so if they had. If the late Government was to blame for not being alarmed about Russia in 1873, what were they to say of the Government of 1876, who, in the month of May, by the mouth of the Prime Minister, on two successive occasions, thus stated the condition of mind in which they then were, and wished all the world in and out of India to know it? In March, 1876, Mr. Disraeli, in the House of Commons, on one day said—
"I am not of that school who view the advances of Russia in Asia with those deep misgivings that some do. I think that Asia is large enough for the destinies of both Russia and England."—[3 Hansard, ccxxviii. 500.]
And on the 5th of May he repeated those views, and added these words—
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"So far from looking forward with alarm to the development of the power of Russia in Central Asia, I see no reason why she should not conquer Tartary any more than why England should not have conquered India. I only wish that the people of Tartary may gain as much advantage by being conquered by Russia as the people of India from being conquered by this country."—[3 Hansard, ccxxix. 139.]
No doubt the Cabul Envoy, on the 12th of February, 1877, referred to certain things which happened in Lord Northbrook's time, as instances of what the Ameer considered objectionable interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan; the intercession for Yakoob Khan, and the presents sent to a dependent Chief; and he objected also to the Seistan arbitration; but the attempt of Lord Lytton to impose on the Ameer the necessity of receiving British officers as Residents in his Kingdom was at the same time stated by the same Envoy to be in his view a much more serious interference, and greatly more objectionable than anything else. It was the same Envoy who stated, that while Lord Northbrook remained in India nothing had occurred to disturb the friendship which subsisted between the Indian Government and the Ameer. It was said that something had passed at the time of the Umballa Conference which justified the Indian Government in its new demands, and that the Ameer had been at that time willing to receive British Residents. There was, however, a difference in the testimony of the best informed persons as to what had occurred at that time. Mr. Seton-Karr, who was then the Indian Foreign Secretary, had stated, in an official letter written at that very time, that the Ameer was told we did not want British officers as residents at Cabul or anywhere else in his dominions, as he said they would do him harm in the eyes of his people. And at page 94 of the Papers would be found this passage from a despatch of Lord Mayo—
"The policy that we had endeavoured to establish may be termed an intermediate one, that is to say.…we distinctly intimated to the Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities."
He did not know what might be Lord Mayo's reasons for giving that assurance; but Lord Mayo said it was a

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distinct intimation to the Ameer. The only conclusion which could safely be acted upon, under these circumstances, was that drawn in a passage of Lord Northbrook's despatch, which unfortunately the noble and learned Earl had not quoted, but which would be found at page 132, paragraph 20. It was as follows:—
"Looking to all the circumstances of the case, the absence of any formal record of the alleged admission, its entirely private and confidential nature, and the uncertainty as to its scope and intention, we consider that we should not be justified in founding any representation to the Ameer regarding the Mission of a British Agent to Herat upon the assumption that he had, when at Umballa, expressed his willingness to agree to such an arrangement."
Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government had thought fit to act upon the contrary view. Supposing it was advisable to attempt to get these Agents at Herat and Candahar, he did not think that would dispense with the necessity of obtaining information from Cabul, for which we should still have to depend upon Native Agents: and the importance of the object could hardly be sufficient to justify a new departure in policy for the sake of it. If, however, it was as important as the Government considered it to be, what was the course which a wise politician would have taken to accomplish the object he had in view? He would have put the bait before the fish first that he might swallow the hook. Instead of that the Ameer was ordered to swallow the hook first, as a condition which must precede his getting the bait afterwards. Instead of saying—"We want to have British Residents in your territory," a wise politician would say—"We wish to make a Treaty upon the most beneficial terms to you. Of course, we must have reasonable safeguards, but they can be discussed afterwards." Then, if the advantages offered proved attractive to the Ameer, when we came afterwards to settle the conditions, we might insert one about Residents, and unless the objections to Residents were, from the nature of the case, really insuperable and likely to throw his dominions into confusion, the Ameer would most likely have agreed to that condition. But to say at the commencement of the discussion—"We will not negotiate with you at all, unless you assent to this condition"—why, if we intended to invite failure we could not
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possibly have taken a better course. It had precisely the effect predicted by Lord Northbrook and his advisers—it ended in the loss of all the influence we had previously gained. His noble and learned Friend protested against the use of language which imputed to the Government an attempt to force British Residents on the Ameer. But force could be applied, morally as well as physically; and, if moral force could be employed by saying, in the most direct and unceremonious way, that the stronger intended to impose his own terms upon the weaker, that was the course which had been taken in the present case. To be sure that language was not held to the Ameer; it was to the Native British Envoy; but it was Lord Lytton's object, and his direction to the Envoy, that at least its general tenour should be communicated to the Ameer. Even deducting all the strongest phrases, about iron pots and pipkins, as meant to be translated into something more civil, the effect would still be menacing and would come to this—"If you don't do all we want, you will lose our protection, and your dominions will be effaced either by us, or by Russia with our consent, from the map of Asia." And after all, when Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission had taken place, when the Ameer's Envoy was dead, and his successor was expected with instructions to concede all that was asked, the Government of India suddenly changed their front, and broke up the Conference; saying, that in the actual situation of affairs they thought it would be no longer useful to prolong the controversy. If Russia could have dictated a policy, surely that was the very policy she would have dictated. It was telling the Ameer, in point of fact—"You must make your own arrangements with Russia, if you wish to be safe." Because the Ameer would not grant that which Lord Mayo said they would never ask, he was treated as a criminal. A more utterly suicidal and destructive policy, if the object were to strengthen our influence in Afghanistan, he could not possibly conceive. Well, when we had said and done all this, we nevertheless ended by giving to the Ameer a distinct pledge, approved by Her Majesty's Government at home. On the 15th March, 1877, Sir Lewis Pelly assured Syud Noor that the British Government had no sort or kind of

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quarrel with the people of Afghanistan, and closed the Conference by this declaration—
"Meanwhile, the Afghan people may rest fully assured that so long as they are not excited by their Ruler, or others, to acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the British Government no British soldier will ever he permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited." [Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 220.]
He wanted to know how had that promise been kept; what acts of aggression on the territory of friends of the British Government had been committed by the Ameer when the present war was declared and when British soldiers entered Afghanistan? Sir Lewis Pelly went on to say—
"The Ameer, therefore, so long as he remains faithful to those Treaty stipulations which your Excellency has involved on behalf of His Highness, and which the British Government fully recognizes as still valid, and therefore binding upon the two contracting parties, need he under no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the part of the British Government."—[Ibid.]
Had the Ameer broken those Treaty stipulations? He found no stipulations in the Treaty that the Ameer should receive our Envoys at anytime we might please to choose, with or without escort, or that he should hold no communication with Russia. On the contrary, he had for several years with our knowledge been communicating with Russia. What were our engagements? We engaged to respect the territory of Afghanistan, "now in His Highness' possession," and therefore not to send British soldiers uninvited into Afghanistan to rectify our Frontier, nor to force by menace British Residents into the Ameer's cities. His noble and learned Friend had said there was nothing in the Papers to show that the Ameer was unwilling to receive a Russian Envoy. That statement was, however, not correct, as appeared from the following telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated July 30, 1878—
"British Native Medical Officer lent some time ago to Ameer returned on leave to Peshawur, the 21st instant, reporting that Kaufmann, with troops, had reached Karki, and was personally proceeding to see Ameer. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending Ameer's orders; but he declined to obey them. Ameer thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers. Native Doctor heard Ameer tell his Minister in durbar, 7th July,
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that Kaufmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Cabul, refusing to be stopped."—[Ibid. p. 227.]
This expression "refusing to be stopped" was repeated in a telegram from Major Cavagnari, and in a subsequent letter from the Ameer himself. All the evidence in the Papers, whether more or less, was to the effect that the Russians would not be stopped when the local officers objected to their proceeding. He could not but express his profound dissatisfaction both at the conduct of the Indian Government in September, 1878, and at the justification which had been offered for that conduct. It had been said that the Ameer repeatedly, steadfastly, and obstinately refused to receive our Mission. He ventured to say there was no ground for that statement. On the contrary, the Ameer offered to receive our Mission, provided that he were allowed a short and reasonable time, and that it was not pressed upon him in a manner derogatory to his independence. Sir Neville Chamberlain sent a letter on the 18th of September, asking—
"Am I authorised to endeavour to detach the tribes permanently from the Ameer's control?…It should be clearly understood that our doing this will be viewed by the Ameer as an act of hostility."—[Ibid. 242.]
The authority so asked for was given, and the course so suggested was taken, before the Ameer had given any answer to our requests. The Ameer was willing to consent to receive the Mission, provided a short and reasonable delay was allowed, and that it was not forced on him in a menacing and offensive manner. That delay was refused, and what was the excuse for the refusal? That if it had been granted, it might have been necessary to postpone military operations until the end of the year, although we had not declared war against the Ameer, or intimated our intention of doing so. He would very much rather, as an Englishman, have given the Ameer the time he asked for, and then have acted as might have been just if he did not keep his word and receive the Mission, even although we might have been put to some military disadvantages in consequence. Some previous Governments of this country had been charged with "meddling and muddling." If he were at all disposed to use such epithets, he

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thought, looking at every single step which had been taken in that matter, that the policy which had been pursued in it might be called one of bullying and blundering. If our object was to strengthen the influence of this country and obtain ascendency in Afghanistan, he was wholly unable to conceive what possible course of policy more calculated to defeat that object could have been followed than that which had been adopted. At every step errors had been committed that were entirely unnecessary, and this war, in consequence, was completely unjustifiable. He could only repeat the question of the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, and ask—Was there ever a policy so little consistent with our knowledge of human nature? He would not enter into the remoter political considerations as to what might be the consequences of this war. He was no great admirer of the peculiarities of Russian government, nor would he by any moans be prepared to justify all the acts of Russian policy in Asia, or in Europe. Nevertheless, he had always held it to be the wise and true policy of this country, for the sake of the peace and benefit of all European nations, and for the safety and welfare of our Indian Possessions, to endeavour to be upon as good and friendly terms with Russia as Russia would permit us to be. It seemed, however, as if the whole policy of the Government had, unfortunately, tended in the opposite direction. Even while they assisted in the negotiation of peace they continued to brandish the sword at a great Power with whom it was our interest, as far as possible, to live in amity; and when they were, by their own confession, not in a position to make what had happened in Afghanistan a cause of quarrel with that great Power, they yet took measures against Afghanistan without adequate justification, which, though they might not provoke any immediate manifestation of the hostility of Russia, still must be felt by that country to be hostile in principle and spirit to her as well as to Afghanistan. He did not pretend to say what the consequences might be; but he said we were engaged in a war which, in his humble opinion, both might and ought to have been avoided, and of which he could neither see the necessity nor the justice. He must, therefore, support the Amendment of his noble Friend.
LORD HOUGHTONsaid, that the noble Earl who began that debate (Earl Grey), with the great candour which was, perhaps, the most remarkable part of his character, had told them that, notwithstanding that he had many years ago held a different opinion from that of his Colleagues as to the manner in which Afghanistan ought to be regarded by the Indian Government, he had not thought it his duty to leave the Government which prosecuted the war with that country to an end. He drew from that confession of the noble Earl the deduction that the present question was one on which both sides of the House ought to show much indulgence towards each other. He did not believe that any personal discussion of that matter could be advantageous or useful. If Indian Governors General and Secretaries of State were to go on criticizing each other, or imputing to their predecessors errors not only of judgment but of morality, it would be impossible to secure the services of independent or honourable men, or to govern our great Dependency with anything like the unity of purpose and the security with which it had been governed for more than 100 years. He was old enough to remember the time of Lord Auckland, and the war to which the opener of the debate had alluded. The former war in Afghanistan was prosecuted for the same purpose as the present one; but there was this difference between the two—that the former war was a case of suspicion, and the present war was a case of certainty, as against Russia. The different temper in which the former war was dealt with by Parliament, as compared with the present occasion, was illustrated by the fact that Lord Auckland was not made the object of serious political animadversion in either House, but was considered to have acted to the best of his judgment, even although the issue was so disastrous. He could not vote for the Amendment now before their Lordships. The words of the Amendment were that the war was unnecessary; and, therefore, everyone who voted for it would, in effect, say that Her Majesty's Government were spending the blood and the money of the country in a war which might well be avoided, and for which they themselves could offer no complete vindication. The noble Earl

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who spoke first that night (Earl Grey) laid down very distinctly the lines within which the advancing morality of the world now confined the right to go to war. He (Lord Houghton) would go further, and say that the first and the growing impression of the civilized world, notwithstanding the enormous standing armies which, now existed—notwithstanding the great wars which had of late years occurred—was this—that no war was justifiable that was not a war of self-defence. It was solely because he believed this war to be one of self-defence that he could not support the Amendment. If the Ameer was to be made the centre of the picture—if Afghanistan was a separate country, the relations of which with India were such as those of Scinde—both sides of the House would be very apathetic with respect to such a State. Hours had been spent in speeches as to the character of the Ameer, and as to whether this or that message ought to have been sent to him at a particular time; but what had such matters to do with the real question before their Lordships' House? He was very much of the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala, who had said in a Memorandum of May 30, 1878—
"We have unfortunately managed Shere Ali badly. Perhaps it might not have been possible, with our scruples, and his want of them, to have managed him advantageously; but it must be admitted that we have not given him the reasons to unite himself with us that he naturally expected."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 225.]
He would not go into the question of our relations with Afghanistan; but he would ask, why had they been entered into? Would they have been, had there been nothing behind the Ameer? If the Ameer was an independent Sovereign the case would have been different; but there was no pretence for regarding him as an independent Sovereign. All the arguments, therefore, as to International Law and the personal treatment of the Ameer were of very small relative importance. Afghanistan lay between the great, consolidated Empire of India, and the great, growing, progressive, and aggressive Empire of Russia; and although the comparison of Lord Lytton, that it was like an earthen pipkin between two iron pots, had much better have
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never been made, it described exactly the Ameer's position. So long ago as 1870—as appeared by the Papers on the Table of their Lordships' House—a Russian official, writing in that capacity to the Ameer, said that, though they were distant neighbours, they should live in harmony, and assured him that Russia would not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and gave as one reason that that country was under the protection of England, with which Power Russia was on the most friendly relations. Russia, therefore, knew long ago the relations which existed between England and Afghanistan; and when hostile feelings grew up between Russia and England, necessarily and naturally those feelings extended to Afghanistan. He would only say of the conduct of Russia in those matters that she acted towards us under the influence of the uncertain faith with which she had been in the habit of dealing with Oriental nations; and nothing had more alienated from her the confidence of the English people than her action in Afghanistan. He (Lord Houghton) viewed our present military expedition as directed to prevent Afghanistan from getting beyond the range of English authority, and possibly getting into the range of Russian authority. The story of Khiva must have produced the impression on the mind of the Ameer that Russia was not only a great, but an unscrupulous Power, and he felt that he must have the present certainty of protection from England, or that his only alternative was to place himself under the protection of Russia; and this consideration, doubtless, led him to adopt the course which he had taken. The present was, as he had said, a war on the part of England of self-defence. Much adverse criticism had been bestowed on the Prime Minister's desire for a "scientific Frontier;" but if by this was meant a Frontier that could be easily defended, he saw no great harm in it. Indeed, a scientific Frontier in that sense would be practically useful and right. As to the two opinions held by military authorities, he would not feel justified in giving a vote which implied that he thought one side was right and the other side entirely wrong. He was informed, however, that a new idea held among the strategists of India was

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that of a delimited Frontier which should not include any large portion of Afghanistan, nor make us responsible for the administration of any large portion of it. It seemed that a Frontier might be devised which should secure us absolutely against any future conduct of the kind now resented, even though the Ameer admitted Russian influence and intrigue into his country. He could only say that if by a very limited annexation of Afghan territory a Frontier could be obtained which would render India practically safe from invasion on the North-West, it would be very desirable to have it. The Government might, in fact, incur serious blame if they failed to rectify an indefensible Frontier when a legitimate occasion for doing so arose. Another reason why he could not vote for the Amendment was that the effect of a difference of opinion among us with regard to the war could not fail to be unfortunate at the present moment; because, declaring as it did the war to be unnecessary, it would cause great pain to our gallant soldiers, who were now shedding their blood for us in Afghanistan.
THE MARQUESS OF BATHsaid, that it was perfectly consistent to be prepared to give every support to our troops in the field, and to conclude the war without injury to our dominions in India, yet, at the same time, to condemn the policy that had led to the war, and the means by which that policy had been carried out. He would not trouble their Lordships with the question of Prerogative. It seemed to him that whatever might have been the use of the Prerogative, and whether or not the Government was justified in declaring war without the consent of Parliament, what Parliament had to complain of was this—not that they had declared war without its previous consent, but that they had for some years studiously concealed from Parliament the change of policy that had led to the war. If the case of the Ameer was as good as it had been made out by the Secretary of State and by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, it was rather unfortunate that the Government should have gone to war with him. The Ameer knew that England was bound to defend him against aggression from the North; and therefore he did not care about obtaining a formal guarantee of our protection,
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except with regard to possible disturbance within his own dominions, which was properly refused him both by the late and the present Administrations. As to the increasing power of Russia in Central Asia, it was a pity the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) had not sat in that House long enough to have heard his Predecessor (the Marquess of Salisbury) ridicule the idea of Russia's advance involving any danger to us, though it might occupy some future generation of statesmen. Certain subjects of a personal nature could not be disposed of by calling them personal matters, for they affected the credit of Ministers and of the country. The Question asked in the House last June by the Duke of Argyll was clear and distinct, and so was the reply of the noble Marquess. That reply was received by the House and the country as an assurance that there was no change in the policy of the Government and no danger of any disturbance in our Indian Empire, and as such an assurance it was acknowledged by the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook); but when they looked at the Papers on the Table they saw that when the noble Marquess made that statement the Government were trying to press an Envoy upon the Ameer at Herat, and that our relations were getting worse every day, and that the feeling of the Ameer against England was becoming more embittered. But suppose it were possible, as the noble Marquess contended, to accept the construction he had placed upon his words, what did it come to? A Minister of the Crown in that House conveyed to the minds of those who heard him erroneous impressions with regard to the policy he was pursuing; and, knowing that those erroneous impressions were received as true, considered he was justified, because it was possible to put another construction upon his language—at variance with those impressions, and not at variance with the truth. Nothing would be so fatal to a man's character in private life as the suspicion that there might be a second and undiscerned sense in the meaning of his words; and any statesman would lose consideration with the public when it was known that an occult meaning must be looked for in his words—different from the meaning they conveyed, from the meaning those who

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heard them believed them intended to convey. The country had been kept in the dark on this question, and had been misled. The Indian Press had been encouraged to write in favour of warlike measures, and to give to steps ordered from home the appearance of an Indian origin. The incidents connected with the repulse of the Mission had been misrepresented before the true account was received; the whining reply of the Ameer had been characterized as insulting to an extent not borne out by the text; Minutes had been published by the Government to support their policy, and others opposed to it kept back; and all to involve us in a war in which certain victory would bring little credit, and could only add embarrassments to an overburdened Indian Exchequer. He attributed the sufferings which had been caused to the people to the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government to secure "Peace with honour"—honour for themselves; for the country—peace, without repose or prosperity; the costs, the troubles of war, without its glories.
THE EARL OF JERSEYfelt he owed no apology to noble Lords for the course he was about to pursue. Some noble Lords who usually sat on that (the Ministerial) side of the House had declared their intention to vote against Her Majesty's Government; while on the other side some who, he might say, were unconnected with official Opposition had declared their intention of voting for the Government. He thought the course which he intended to take was consistent alike with the interests of Party and the honour of his country. The noble Marquess had just sung a terrible dirge on lesser England; but he could not believe that the Ministers would in any way be affected by that expression of opinion. They had heard what the real opinion and intention of the Government was, and he, for one, was prepared to support that opinion. As for the remarks of the noble Marquess he would leave the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to explain himself, and he had no doubt he would do so in a manner satisfactory to the House and the country. The noble Earl who commenced the debate that evening (Earl Grey) told them that the war was illegitimate, unnatural, and criminal. These were certainly strong expressions; but
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the noble Earl had failed to make out that Her Majesty's Ministers had pursued an illegitimate course in calling Parliament together, or an unnatural course in looking after our interests in India, or a criminal course in supporting by the Army of England the honour and interests of the Empire. The noble Earl had stated that it would be impossible for an English Envoy to live in Afghanistan; but he did not seem to think that a Russian Envoy would be in danger at Cabul. The speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India would find many an echo out-of-doors. He laid down the basis of a clear and intelligible policy—a policy to which, on more than one occasion, Russian Ministers had given their adherence—that Afghanistan should be beyond the sphere of Russian action. But the acts of Russia did not always tally with her words. Her policy was, no doubt, a very subtle one—she sent friendly letters to the Ameer containing accounts of the success of the Russian arms, and even a Russian Governor General was able to tell the Ameer that he could not refuse to receive a Mission, because it was sent by the Emperor of Russia. The late Viceroy of India said we had no right to take umbrage because the Ameer had chosen Russia as an Ally; but it was the unanimous opinion of statesmen and generals that England could not allow Russian influence to be predominant in Afghanistan. It was said the Ameer was independent; he was not so in the ordinary meaning of the term. He was obliged to us for money and arms, and he came to us to answer his letters. This was more like pupilage than independence. It was said we should have allowed the Ameer more time for deliberation; but when a great danger was to be averted it was right that timely precautions should be taken. Russian promises had been accepted by them as men of honour long enough, but they now knew what those promises were worth; and when the Ameer took for his Ally the enemy of this country it was time to take action. If there was a time when it became necessary to avert an open danger by war, there was surely a time when it was necessary to avert an insidious and lurking danger by taking proper precautions. He could not help thinking that Russian policy towards India had been based on deception and

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aggression. Were the Government to allow Russian intrigue to increase at Cabul? While we were negotiating with the Ameer, Russian influence would be growing. Russia knew how to wage an unofficial war; and the time might come when the Afghan troops might be thrown into Her Majesty's territory, officered by others than Afghans. While we were negotiating Russia would have been preparing for war, and Her Majesty's Government would have been held responsible for their own inaction. Fortunately, they decided to take action in time. Her Majesty's Government decided that if responsibility was to be incurred they would incur it; that they would not hesitate to act; and that before the serpent was hatched they would break the egg. If Her Majesty's Government had not hesitated to incur responsibility, he trusted their Lordships' House would to-night share that responsibility. But Her Majesty's Government had incurred something else. They had been made the butt of the speeches of every rampant orator and every disappointed statesman. Upon their heads had been showered abuse of every kind, because they preferred their duty to their country to following the vain crotchets of irresponsible men. It was only a short time ago that he read the speech of a Member of Parliament who likened Her Majesty's Government to pick-pockets. Fortunately, they were indifferent to charges of that kind, and, instead of answering them, preferred to be consistent in their duty. He trusted they would continue to do so; that they would remain firm in the policy they were now pursuing; and that when the heat of Party passion had passed away—when the clouds which now hung over the plains of Roumelia, as well as the mountains of Afghanistan, had been dispelled by the resolute attitude of Her Majesty's Government—the people of this country would not forget the debt which they owed to them; and that of them it might be said, as had been said of other statesmen—
"Not once or twice, in our fair island story,
The path of duty was the way to glory."
THE MARQUESS OF RIPONsaid, that when those who did not approve the policy of the Government contended that Parliament should have been consulted before war was declared they
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were told that such a doctrine was altogether un-Constitutional, and tended to interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown. On the other hand, when war had been declared, they were told by his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Jersey) that if they challenged the policy of the Government they were forgetting what was due to the gallant services of our Army. These two objections destroyed each other. There was one thing, however, which was satisfactory in this debate, and that was that it was now admittted on all hands that the policy pursued by Her Majesty's present Government differed widely from that which had been pursued up to the time they entered office. They had been told by the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) that changed circumstances required a changed policy, and by the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) that it was foolish to think that the policy pursued towards Afghanistan in 1878 should be the same as that of 1868. But then we were reminded, in justification of this altered policy, of the course of events in Central Asia, and of the progress and designs of Russia. He was not insensible to that progress, or trustful of those designs; though he was not one of those who were accustomed to attribute to the Government of Russia and its agents supernatural abilities and supernatural wickedness. But one of the main reasons why he should vote for the Amendment of the noble Viscount was that he was convinced that in this case, as in that of South-Eastern Europe during the last year or two, Her Majesty's Government had, unintentionally, no doubt, but steadily and very successfully, played the game of Russia. He would undertake to establish that assertion in a few moments out of the Papers which had been laid on the Table of the House. There was an old saying—"Forewarned is forearmed;" but Her Majesty's Government had continued to pursue the policy against which they had been warned. His noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) had told Her Majesty's Government that if they were to insist upon the policy of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) the effect would be "to throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia at the first opportunity." That policy had been insisted on, and it had thrown Afghan-

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istan into the arms of Russia at the first opportunity. Not only did the noble Marquess, in 1875, require that the Ameer should be called upon to receive British officers at Herat and Candahar, but he also urged the Viceroy to find some occasion for sending a Mission to Cabul and to press that Mission very earnestly upon the Ameer. That the noble Marquess did, notwithstanding the opinions of the most competent officers in India and of his noble Friend who was then Viceroy. Therefore, he had a right to say that Her Majesty's Government had adopted a course which was effectually playing into Russian hands. It had been amply shown, too, in the course of the debate, that the means by which it had been sought to obtain the object in view were even more ill-advised than the object itself. The first letter to the Ameer asking him to receive a Mission was dated on the 5th of May, which was, by a remarkable coincidence, the very day upon which the noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield) told the House of Commons that he had no fear of Russian advance in Central Asia. Perhaps sufficient attention had not been paid to that first demand for the reception of a Mission. He had the pleasure of knowing Sir Lewis Pelly personally, and was aware that he was a gentleman of great intelligence, and a zealous public servant, who might be employed to great advantage in many situations. Still, he thought the choice of Sir Lewis Pelly was in this case singularly unfortunate, because he was the principal disciple of General John Jacob, who was, if not the inventor, at all events the chief supporter of what was called the "forward school" of Indian policy, whilst the fact of his being the author of a work entitled The Views and Opinions of General Jacob, in which the taking of Quettah was advocated, with a view to an advance on Candahar, would render him most unacceptable to the Ameer. It was a remarkable circumstance that until the demand for Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission was made there was no Russian Agent permanently residing at Cabul. After the Conference at Peshawur the Ameer was left to his own devices, and yet some noble Lords were astonished at his turning to Russia. For his own part, he thought it extremely unfortunate that the Ameer should have turned to
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Russia; but, really, Her Majesty's Government gave him the best possible reason for doing so. Again, with respect to the steps taken after the reception of the Russian Mission at Cabul, it seemed to him (the Marquess of Ripon) that they were in many respects specially calculated to defeat the object which the Viceroy had in view. The moment Lord Lytton heard of the death of the Ameer's favourite son, Abdoollah Jan, he ought to have paused. He must have known, surely, that the grief of Shere Ali was such, when he lost his former son, that, although a civil war was raging in his dominions and he had all but lost his Throne, he shut himself up for many weeks in Candahar and refused to be seen. The noble Lord, then, might have imagined what would be his grief on the death of his favourite son; but, notwithstanding, the demand was sent, and the acceptance of the Mission forced upon him even before the 40 days, the formal time of mourning, had expired. No wonder that the Ameer felt great irritation. The noble Viscount opposite told them last night that the letter of condolence sent to the Ameer on the death of his favourite son was not answered in a reasonable time, and that this was considered a grave insult by Orientals; but what would be thought here in the West if a man professing to be the friend of another who had sustained such a bereavement should, at the same time that he sent a letter of condolence to his friend, also write to him about a most disagreeable matter of business? Such a proceeding would naturally be resented by the receiver of the communication. There was, indeed, one explanation of these proceedings which was sometimes put forward by supporters of the Government, and which had been hinted at that night, by which it was said that they had all along desired to take advantage—to use a phrase of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury)—of any circumstances which might enable them to obtain that rectification of Frontier, which was their real object in Afghanistan. He did not say that the Government had pursued that course. The language used by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) at the Guildhall gave only too much colour to the theory; but he did not find it in the despatch of the noble Viscount, and he would not charge any

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English Minister with conduct so utterly unjustifiable. He would now ask their Lordships to consider what was the character of the contest in which they were engaged. Sir Henry Rawlinson, a supporter of the policy of the Government—if, indeed, he were not its author—in his recent article in The Nineteenth Century,said—
"War with Afghanistan is to be deprecated beyond all other wars, because, however it may end, it will leave behind it a heavy legacy of debt and the hatred of people who ought to be our friends."
Such, then, was the war in which Her Majesty's Government had involved the country. For what ends was it being pursued? In the course of this discussion they had had two speeches from Members of the Government, and two alone. What had been the cause of this unusual silence he could not say; but before the debate came to a close the Government ought to give the House some inkling at least of the objects and purposes with which they were prosecuting that contest. At the present moment they knew nothing about them. The noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) had told them the previous day that we must be paramount and supreme in Afghanistan. Upon these words a very wide construction could be placed; and he thought the Government were bound to tell Parliament, from whom they were asking Supplies, whether the war was merely to be waged to punish the Ameer for the insult he was said to have offered us, to obtain satisfaction for that insult, and to carry out the objects stated in the last paragraph of the last despatch of the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook), or whether it was intended to procure a rectification of Frontier—of which there was no mention in that despatch, although it had been mentioned in the Prime Minister's speech. If the last was their real object, what was the extent of the spoliation which was concealed behind the dark word "rectification?" Was it to be the rectification recommended by Sir Henry Rawlinson, which was the military occupation of Western Afghanistan; or what we were told in the newspapers was the policy of the Government of India—to occupy the triangle of Jellalabad, Cabul, and Candahar; or was it to be a more limited rectification, starting from Jel-
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lalabad and passing down the mountains to the South-West, which would have the effect of transferring to our rule some of the wildest and most savage tribes on the face of the earth? To these questions the House had a right to demand an answer. Their Lordships were told that if they were not prepared to refuse the Supplies they ought not to pass censure on the Government; but in the case of the war with China—which he had believed to be unnecessary and unjust, just as he believed the present war to be so, and against which he, in common with Members of the existing Government, had voted—no such doctrine as that had been recognized. It would be unjust, he fully admitted, that the Government should be severely condemned if, in the course of a series of long and complicated transactions, they had made some mistakes of detail. But, in the present case, the root of the evil lay in the policy itself, which the Government had adopted. They had deliberately rejected the principles that for nearly 40 years—from the time of Lord Ellenborough, the Duke of Wellington, and Sir Robert Peel, down to that of the present Administration—had governed our conduct towards Afghanistan, and which had been acted upon without exception by every Ministry at home and every Governor General in India; they had embarked on their novel policy in spite of the warnings of the men best qualified to speak; and the result had been to fulfil to the letter the predictions of those whose counsels they had rejected. Their Representative in India—the Viceroy—for whose conduct they were fully responsible, had pursued the policy thus entered upon in a manner which would have wrecked a better cause; he deliberately closed the Conference at Peshawur when he knew that if he waited for a few hours all his demands would be conceded; and he had thrown the Ameer into the arms of Russia, as his noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) had foretold; and then, when at length he was brought face to face with the inevitable consequences of the course which he had pursued, he so conceived and executed his attempts to extricate himself as to render their failure certain. It was against such a policy, begun so rashly, carried on so unwisely, concealed so studiously from Parliament, marked on more than one

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occasion by a dark stain of injustice, and ending in the establishment of a Russian Mission at Cabul, and in war with a people with whom it was our interest to be friendly, that he protested that night; and he should vote for the Amendment in order to clear himself from all complicity with proceedings which he believed in his conscience to be so deeply injurious to the reputation and to the interests of the country.
VISCOUNT MIDLETONconsidered that the conclusions at which the noble Marquess who had just spoken (the Marquess of Ripon) had arrived were strangely at variance with the facts of the case. What were those facts? The basis of our relations with Afghanistan was admitted to be the Convention entered into by the Government of India and the late Ameer Dost Mahomed. Upon his death, eight years afterwards, there occurred one of those struggles which seemed to be the normal condition of Afghanistan after the demise of one of its Rulers. It was not until the year 1868 that any formal acknowledgment of the present Ameer on the part of our Government was made, and since that time he had many grievances to bring forward against us, the head and front of which—and this occurred during the holding of his office by the noble Earl the late Viceroy (the Earl of Northbrook)—had reference to our preference for his eldest son, whom he desired to put aside in favour of his son by a favourite wife, and this grievance he mentioned with some bitterness in his recent reply to the Ultimatum sent to him by the present Viceroy. It had been asserted that there was no change in the bearing of the Ameer towards us. Such an assertion could not be maintained. His bearing had greatly changed since the days of Lord Mayo; and he had no doubt that had that noble Lord lived the personal influence he exercised over the present Ameer would have saved us from the trouble in which we now found ourselves. About the time of the War of Succession Lord Russell took note of the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and he received from the Government of that country assurances that their objects were purely commercial and pacific. In 1867 similar assurances were received from Russia, and they were repeated to Mr. (now Sir)
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Douglas Forsyth in St. Petersburg by the Russian Chancellor, who, in 1873, wrote to the same effect, stating distinctly that "we consider Afghanistan altogether beyond the sphere of Russian operations." Their Lordships were aware how those promises were kept. In 1873 the noble Earl the late Viceroy pointed out in one of his despatches that the advance of Russia in Central Asia could not but be regarded with anxiety in Afghanistan. The change in the Ameer's conduct towards us in 1873 was, he believed, entirely owing to his distrust of the confiding simplicity of the Government of that day. The conduct of Russia in seeking to ingratiate herself with the Ameer, in breach of her solemn assurances, was a matter into which he would not enter further than to say that it seemed to him fully to justify the desire of the present Government to obtain the admission of English officers to Cabul and other places in the Ameer's dominions. He did not see why Afghanistan should be treated differently from the Native States in India in which we had established Residents. When Tippoo Sahib declined to receive our Envoy we marched troops into his dominions, with what result they all knew. The course taken by the Government in the present instance was very similar to that pursued towards Tippoo Sahib, and he anticipated for it an equally auspicious termination. If the case for the reception of our officers in Afghanistan was strong before, it was doubly strong when it transpired that a Russian Embassy had been received with every mark of favour at Cabul, while our Native Agent was only allowed to transmit to us such information as the Ameer or his officers thought convenient. With regard to the question of the Frontier, he would only remind their Lordships that the defenders of India, when they encountered their invaders in the plains, had invariably been worsted; and that the same lesson was taught by the collapse of the Turkish resistance in the late war as soon as the Russians managed to cross the Balkans. A scientific or strategical Frontier was therefore a matter of vital importance to India; and whatever the opinions entertained in reference to it 10 or 12 years ago, no one could maintain that we ought to be guided by them in the altered circumstances of the present day. Her Majesty's Government

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could not have done more than they had done, and they ought to have done no less; their measures had been dictated by prudence and common sense; and an adverse vote at this crisis would cripple the energies, if it would not paralyze the arm, of England.
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My Lords, in addressing some remarks to your Lordships this evening, I wish to commence by expressing the gratification which I have felt at the gallantry which has been shown by Her Majesty's Forces in the field in Afghanistan. I wish also to express my confidence in the officers in command of those Forces—Sir Samuel Browne and General Roberts—who have conducted successful operations in the field, and General Stewart and General Biddulph, who have had no such opportunity yet, but who, I am sure, will justify their reputation when they have that opportunity. Having been personally acquainted with those officers, I believe that better selections could not have been made. The spirit which Her Majesty's British and Native Forces have evinced on this occasion cannot be surpassed; and I may be permitted to say that the general efficiency of the Army is, in my opinion, mainly due to the administration of my noble and gallant Friend Lord Napier of Magdala, who was for many years Commander-in-Chief in India, and of my gallant Friend Major-General Sir Henry Norman, who for a long period was Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, and afterwards the military Member of the Council of the Viceroy. The general arrangements for the campaign, so far as we know them, reflect great credit upon the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Haines, who will, I am sure, satisfactorily discharge his responsible duties; and particularly upon the Quartermaster General's Department of the Indian Army. I must further express my satisfaction—not surprise—at the expressions of loyalty received by the Viceroy from the Native Princes of India, some of them my personal friends. The Maharajah of Gwalior and others have offered their personal services and those of their troops. Having so recently filled the office of Viceroy in India I cannot pass these offers by without expressing my gratification.
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I will now say a few words on the main question of the Address. Your Lordships are asked to assent to the application of the Revenues of India to defray the expenses of the war in Afghanistan. My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble Friend who recently filled the office of Governor of the Presidency of Madras (Lord Napier and Ettrick) in regretting the course Her Majesty's Government have taken. It would have been right, just, and generous to have decided at once that no portion of the expense should fall upon the Revenues of India. I consider the war to be the direct consequence of the state of affairs in Europe, and not to have arisen from anything immediately connected with our Indian Empire. For that reason, if for no other, India should not be called upon to bear the cost. Moreover, India has suffered recently from two severe famines; the people are impoverished; and the state of the finances is far from satisfactory. True, the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) told us that the Indian Government expect a surplus of £1,250,000 above the Estimates this year; but this is exactly what I anticipated in the discussion of last year. The reason of this surplus is the extra taxation unnecessarily imposed upon the people of India for the purpose of raising what is called a Famine Fund. The new taxes, which press upon the poorer classes, and which I believe to be unpopular and impolitic, ought to be taken off as soon as the condition of the finances will allow of it.
I entirely agree with what has fallen from the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, that it would be a subject for regret if Indian questions came to be regarded as Party questions. I have never considered them to be so; and it was a gratification to me to hear the complaint of the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), that there had been no great meeting of the Liberal Party called together upon this question. As regards the speech, of the noble Viscount who introduced this subject (Viscount Cranbrook), I have nothing personal to complain of. He is right in saying that there has been no reticence on the part of the Government in producing Papers, and he has a perfect right to criticize my public conduct. I

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am the last person to complain of any such criticisms. What I am now about to say is the result of my actual experience in India. The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack has given an account of the objects of the British Government, during the last 10 years, in dealing with Central Asia and Afghanistan. During that period there have been two Administrations—five years under Mr. Gladstone, and five years under the noble Earl opposite. I was Viceroy in India during two years under Mr. Gladstone's Administration, and two years under that of the noble Earl; and, as far as I know—and so far as my dealing with these affairs enables me to form an opinion—I have not been able to find out any difference whatever in the objects which the British Government desired to secure with regard to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, or to our dealings with Afghanistan; bearing in mind, of course, that the general line of policy must be modified by the progress of events. Having filled the high office of Viceroy in India, I think it is absolutely necessary, to avoid any misconception in discussing the policy of the British Government towards Russia in regard to Central Asia, for me to say that the Government of India, while I had any connection with it, has not been actuated by the fear of any attack upon India by Russia. We never believed that such an attack was possible; and we were of opinion that if anything of the kind were possible the strength of the British Empire in India and in this country was amply sufficient to render such an attack futile, and disastrous only to those who might make the attempt. The Governments of England and of India have never looked upon the progress of Russia in Central Asia with the eyes of that school of which Sir Henry Rawlinson, who has been quoted by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, is the most able exponent. In 1869 the Government of India said—
"We by no means share in the exaggerated apprehensions expressed in many quarters as to the danger to British rule in India which may arise from an extension of Russian influence in those countries lying to the South and East of her enormous possessions in Asia.
"We believe that the influence of a civilised European power over wild and savage tribes cannot be otherwise than beneficial.
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"We would therefore heartily assist in establishing a frank and clear understanding with Russia as to the relative position of British and Russian interests in Asia."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 103.]
In accordance with these principles, they suggested that, as it was for the interests of both countries that a wide border of independent States should exist between the British and Russian Frontiers, it would be desirable that Russia should be invited to adopt the same policy with regard to the independent States which come under her legitimate influence, as the Government of India had pursued with regard to Afghanistan and the independent States within their influence. Her Majesty's Government entered into negotiations with Russia for this purpose. Russia accepted, in 1873, the boundary of Afghanistan suggested by the Government of India in the time of Lord Mayo; and it was arranged that Russia should, to the best of her ability, prevent the Native States on her side from creating any disturbance in Afghanistan; while, on the other hand, we engaged to exercise our influence to prevent the Ameer of Cabul from transgressing the boundaries of his dominions. These negotiations took place under the Administration of Mr. Gladstone; and again, under the Administration of the noble Earl opposite, similar negotiations took place in 1875. The Government of India entirely concurred with the views expressed by the Home Government in those negotiations; and one of the last despatches I sent home when I was Viceroy expressed the concurrence of the Government of India in the arrangements made by the noble Earl now sitting on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby). It is but fair to the Russian Government to add that, during the time that I was in India, they loyally carried out the engagements into which they had entered.
The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, and the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook), have accused the late Government of having pursued a timid policy, and alluded to a paragraph in a despatch of the 30th of June, 1873, in which the Government of India, when I was Viceroy, suggested that Her Majesty's Government should make a plain declaration to the Russian

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Government that the British Government would defend Afghanistan in the event of unprovoked attack; and they have said that this was not done. The Government of India always urged upon Her Majesty's Government—perhaps in terms a little stronger than the Foreign Secretary of the day may have liked—the expediency of speaking in the plainest language to the Russian Government both of the independence of Afghanistan and of the inconvenience which might arise from the further progress of Russia in the direction of India. I do not want to pit the policy of one Government of Her Majesty against another; but as that policy has been indiscriminately attacked by one Member of the present Cabinet, I am afraid I cannot depend upon other Members of the Cabinet to defend it. However, in the Central Asia Papers lately laid before Parliament, there is a despatch written by the noble Earl on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) to Lord Augustus Loftus in June, 1877, in which the noble Earl quotes a despatch from Earl Granville, dated January, 1874, and says—
"His Lordship thought it right to state candidly and at once to the Russian Government that the independence of Afghanistan was regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a matter of great importance to the welfare and security of British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia."—[Central Asia, No. 1 (1878) p. 111.]
The Government of India, in 1874, were much concerned about some probable movements of the Russians in the direction of Merv, not on account of any apprehension of danger to British India, but because such an advance might lead to difficulties between Russia and Afghanistan; and at the time when the late Government resigned that question was particularly prominent. The Government of India wrote pressingly to the Home Government to speak frankly to Russia—to tell her of the inconvenience that might arise from that advance, and to do what was possible to prevent it. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) wrote in the strongest terms to the Russian Government, and said that the advance of the Russian arms in the direction of Merv would impose on Her Majesty's Government the necessity of making a corresponding advance, in order to allay apprehensions and to remove misconception from
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the minds of the people of those countries. On reading those words, and the words used by Earl Granville in 1874, I felt that the intention of the Government of India had been fully carried out by Her Majesty's Government. It seems to me, therefore, that the inference drawn by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack and the noble Viscount opposite as to the conduct of Mr. Gladstone's Government, and of their own Government, is entirely unfounded. Both Governments, notwithstanding the objections of the noble and learned Earl, actually used much the same language to Russia as the Government of India—rightly, as I believe—had suggested. With respect to the opinions of Her Majesty's present Government on the position of Russia in Central Asia, it is hardly necessary to do more than to refer to the speech of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons in May, 1876, when he said he was
"Not of that school who view the advances of Russia in Asia with those deep misgivings that some do."—[3 Hansard, ccxxviii. 500.]
He said that Asia was large enough for the destinies of both Russia and England
"At no time," he added, "has there been a better understanding between the Courts of St. James and St. Petersburg than at the present moment; and there is this good understanding because our policy is a clear and a frank policy."—[3 Hansard, ccxxix. 139.]
I think that those were wise words. They seem, from the Papers laid before Parliament, to have given great satisfaction in Russia, and they show that the policy of both Governments towards Russia was up to that time one and the same.
So much for our policy with regard to Russia. With regard to Afghanistan and other neighbouring States, the policy of the Indian Government was thus expressed by Lord Mayo before he died—
"The cardinal points of the foreign policy which the Government of India should steadily pursue may be briefly described as follows.…We should establish with our Frontier States of Khelat, Afghanistan, Nipal, and Burmah, intimate relations of friendship; we should make them feel that though we are all-powerful, we have no wish to encroach on their authority; but, on the contrary, that our earnest desire is to support their power and maintain their nationality; and that if severe necessity arise we might assist them with money, arms, and, per-

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haps, in certain eventualities, with men. We could thus create in those States outworks of our Empire, and assuring them that the days of annexation are passed, make them practically feel that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by endeavouring to deserve our favour and support."
The noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) seemed the other night to have some difficulty in describing what our "settled policy" towards Afghanistan was. If the noble Viscount had been longer in the India Office he would have found out that the policy was clear and decided. I do not want to add anything myself to the explanation I have read, and I have read it because the policy ought to stand clearly before your Lordships. When Lord Mayo was in India the first application he made of that policy was in dealing with Afghanistan, in consequence of the arrangements made by his predecessor, Lord Lawrence, for the support of Shere Ali, and that a meeting should take place between him and the Viceroy. I am not going over again the history of the Umballa Conference. Although Lord Mayo, when he met Shere Ali, could not comply with all his wishes, the result of the Conferences which then took place was by no means unsatisfactory. I wish to add my testimony to the testimony of those noble Lords who have said in this House that the personal influence and the generous confidence inspired by Lord Mayo were of substantial public advantage in dealing with the Native Princes of India, and almost, if not quite, disarmed the suspicions of one who was the most suspicious of a suspicious race. My Lords, Shere Ali was not less suspicious when, in 1873, I had to enter into some negotiations with him. I will not trouble your Lordships with any long account of them, they have been so much before the House; all that I shall say is that upon that occasion, having received authority from Her Majesty's Government, I gave Shere Ali assurances in respect to assistance from the British Government, under certain circumstances, very much in the terms I read just now when describing the general policy to be pursued towards States which adjoin British India. There were in the speeches of the noble Viscount and of the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack certain statements with regard to those negotiations which I cannot accept. Of course, I know that the assur-
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ances which I gave to Shere Ali did not come up to the expectations he entertained. At the same time, when the noble Viscount brings forward the Prime Minister of Shere Ali, who conducted the negotiations in 1873, as evidence to show that the assurances which I then gave were vague, I cannot accept the extract read by the noble Viscount as conveying a correct account of the views of the Prime Minister. The noble Viscount read an extract from the Conference between the Prime Minister and Sir Lewis Pelly on the 8th of February, 1877, and which will be found at page 204 of the Afghanistan Papers. It is true that the Prime Minister then said that the nature of the assistance to be given to Shere Ali was left obscure, both in my writings and sayings; but this remark applied only to my first interview with the Prime Minister; and if the noble Viscount had taken the trouble to read the Report of the next Conference, on the 10th of February, given in the very next page of the Papers, he would have found that the Prime Minister proceeded to relate how he had afterwards discussed the subject completely with the Foreign Secretary, and how at a subsequent interview with me "all the subjects were thoroughly discussed, and so nothing was left unconsidered." The Prime Minister, who, I must say, gave a very accurate account of the transactions of 1873, throughout the Conferences with Sir Lewis Pelly, in 1877, so far from complaining that the assurances given by me in 1873 were vague and undefined, was actually trying to meet the complaint put into his mouth by Sir Lewis Pelly that they were vague and inconclusive, and that, therefore, it would be necessary to make a new Treaty with the Ameer.
There were, no doubt, some causes which led the Ameer to be dissatisfied with the Government of India. In the first place, both he and the Persian Government were dissatisfied with the arbitration which the British Government had undertaken, and which was ably and impartially carried out by Sir Frederick Goldsmid, to settle the boundary of the two countries in Seistan. Then Shere Ali was offended at the advice I gave him to keep faith with his son, Yakoob Khan. I need not defend my conduct in having done this, for no noble Lord has taken exception to it.

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The noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook), having been so short a time in office, cannot be expected to know much about these details; but he entirely misapprehended the facts of the case when he charged me with having sent the message to the Ameer by a "common messenger." My Lords, I sent it by the ordinary channel of communication with the Ameer—the Native Agent of the British Government who was resident at his Court. That was, in fact, the only channel of communication I could have employed; and it was precisely the same channel that was used by Lord Lytton to conduct the recent negotiations with the Ameer. The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack—and I cannot say that I am surprised at any error into which he may have fallen, for the subject is very complicated and difficult—has said that there was a great contrast between my letter to Shere Ali with regard to his son Yakoob, and that written to him by General Kaufmann, the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, in the year 1875.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It was in the year before.
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I certainly understood the noble and learned Earl to say 1875; but the letter was written by General Kaufmann before I went to India. In fact, it was written in 1871, when Lord Mayo was Viceroy, and related to different events. I feel that I need not dwell long upon the other ground of complaint which the Ameer had against the Government of India—namely, the sending a Native gentleman to carry a present to the Euler of Wakhan, who had been civil to some British officers who had visited his neighbourhood. There was some misapprehension about this affair which I explained to the Ameer; but I insisted upon his permitting the messenger to proceed, as I thought his objections were unreasonable. The noble Viscount has commented upon this transaction as if I had been disposed to go to war with Afghanistan upon the matter; but your Lordships will readily understand that there were other ways of dealing with the Ameer if he had refused; and, in fact, he did what I wished. As regards all these sources of complaint on the part of the Ameer, I apprehend that no noble Lord would wish the Government
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of India to do everything which the Ruler of Afghanistan wanted him to do—that would have been a course entirely undignified and quite improper. I hold that the Ameer had no reasonable ground of complaint; and I think I did what was quite right and reasonable towards him. Let us look, however, at the general result of this policy, which I have said was the policy of two Governments in India and at home during the time that I was Viceroy, and also in the time of Lord Mayo. There was no difference whatever in the policy of the two Governments. Both wanted to give reasonable assurances of protection to the Ameer, and both desired to keep on good terms with him. The result was fairly satisfactory. We wished that the Ameer should keep peace with his neighbours, and that he should follow our advice in his foreign affairs. He wanted to make an attack on Bokhara, but he abstained from doing so upon our advice. He next quarrelled with the Persians about Seistan; nevertheless, in consequence of our advice, he accepted our arbitration on that subject, and, as far as I know, he loyally kept his word. I advised him to give no assistance to the Turkomans; he acted upon my advice; and, moreover, at my request he tried to induce them to give up to the Russian Government some Russian subjects who had been captured and made slaves, in order to prevent a quarrel between Russia and the Turkomans, which might have brought the Russians to Merv. Then, as to his domestic affairs, I am not aware that the Ameer had any serious quarrel with me about them, with the exception, perhaps, of my advice to him about Yakoob Khan. He asked me, in 1874, to do what I could with the Persian Government to induce them to give a civil answer to his letter, announcing the nomination of Abdoolla Jan as his heir. That did not look like the act of a man who was hostile to the British Government and wished to quarrel with it. The most important thing he did just before I left India was to bring entirely within his control the country bordering on the Turkoman Frontier, not very far from the boundary which was laid down between England and Russia as that which was not to be transgressed. He communicated with us. We wrote home to the Government asking them

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to inform the Russian Government; and I believe the noble Earl on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) communicated with Russia. All this shows that what was contemplated by the Governments of Mr. Gladstone and of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield)—namely, to remain on good terms with the Ruler of Afghanistan and to keep him a reasonable and sensible being who should not quarrel with his neighbours—was maintained up to the time when I left India. I do not like to quote my own despatches; but the account I gave in them of the state of mind of the Ameer was very much like that which I have now given to your Lordships. I believe now—not on my own authority, but on that of everybody who knew anything about it—that the Ameer was then loyal, in the sense that he had not the slightest inclination to turn to Russia for support. On the other hand, he was a little "touchy" on certain things. On two occasions the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State when I was Viceroy that if he would treat him with patience, and not press upon him certain things unnecessarily which were distasteful to him, there was no doubt that he would remain our good friend. We felt that he was an Asiatic, and must be treated with patience as such by his European neighbours.
I know the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) entertains a different opinion from that which I hold, in common with everyone with whom I have conversed who has filled a responsible position in India, upon the disposition of Shere Ali. The noble Marquess, of course, has a perfect right to his own opinion; but he ought not to cast a slur on a distinguished servant of the Government of India, which is entirely undeserved. In a despatch of October 4, 1877, the noble Marquess, referring to the state of mind of the Ameer, when I left India in 1876, said—
"This (the course of events) demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as the year 1875 by Sir Richard Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that 'no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the Ameer.' Shere Ali's confidential Envoy stated explicitly that his master had 'now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government.'"—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 223.]
Sir Richard Pollock tells me that he was unable to correct this statement himself,
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because he has very properly felt it to be his duty, in consequence of the confidential position he so recently occupied at Peshawur, to consider his lips sealed, and to take no part, directly or indirectly, in the discussions that have taken place about the Afghan War. My Lords, the opinion given by Sir Richard Pollock was quoted by the noble Marquess from the despatch of the Government of India of the 7th of June, 1875, and it was given, not in 1875, but in the beginning of 1874, and therefore before the incidents about Yakoob Khan and the despatch of a messenger to Wakhan had occurred. But, besides, your Lordships will see in a moment how unfair the statement of the noble Marquess is with respect to Sir Richard Pollock. It is perfectly true that Shere Ali's Prime Minister said to Dr. Bellew in a private conversation on the 28th of January, 1877, which will be found at page 195 of the Afghanistan Papers, that
"the Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust;"
but it appears from that conversation that the main reason for that mistrust was the endeavour to force British officers upon him. No doubt the Prime Minister alluded to other matters: but this was, all through the Conferences, the principal ground of his complaints. And, therefore—I am sure, perfectly unintentionally—the noble Marquess was in error in attributing a mistake to Sir Richard Pollock. I regret that the noble Marquess should have thrown any doubts upon Syud Noor Mahomed's character by saying that his statements were obviously insincere. It is true that his history is like a chapter from the Arabian Nights. He travelled once with a string of horses from one end of India to the other, and eventually rose to be the trusted Minister of the Ameer, and served his master ably and loyally. A further statement was made by the Prime Minister, as will be seen by the Papers, when he was lying ill. Dr. Bellew went to see him, and the statement he then made was very pathetic. He said to the doctor—"This is a very serious business. It is the last time the Ameer will treat with the British Government. You must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear; and if you overload us the responsibility

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rests with you." The doctor asked him what burden he referred to, and he replied—"The residence of British officers on the Frontiers of Afghanistan." This, my Lords, is enough to show that the state of the Ameer's mind, as represented by his Prime Minister, arose mainly from, the endeavour to force Resident British officers upon him, directed by the noble Marquess himself in 1876, contrary to the opinion of Sir Richard Pollock, and to that of every officer who had a knowledge of Afghanistan.
I said that when I left India the Ameer was loyal to the British Government. Whether he was inclined to turn towards Russia, however, is the main point. After the negotiations of 1873, it was said by the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) that the Ameer at once turned to Russia. What proof is there for that statement? I was surprised to hoar the opinion of our Native Agent at Cabul quoted in support of it, and at the manner in which the noble Viscount spoke of the reports of the Native Agent. The noble Viscount said it was easy to see that his reports were all rubbish. Our Native Agent was a Mohammedan gentleman of high character and standing, who did good service in the Mutiny, and received a handsome reward from Lord Lytton for his services at Cabul. Englishmen are not the only people who can do anything. Many Natives can and do render good service to the British Government. In October, 1876, our Native Agent went to Simla, and said that Shere Ali did not suspect us of conspiring with Russia to his prejudice; nor that the British coveted any portion of his territory: the Ameer was well aware, he said, that Russia, sooner or later, would attack Afghanistan. The Agents of Russia, he added, were regarded by the Ameer as a source of embarrassment. That statement was made at a formal interview; and in a private interview with Captain Grey he said—"That the Ameer was desirous of securing a pied à terre in British territory whither to send his family and property when he cleared for action with Russia." Is it possible, in the face of such testimony, to say that at that time he was unfriendly to England and friendly to Russia? The noble and learned Earl on the "Woolsack—who, by the way, in commenting upon the letters of Shere Ali,
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although he is doubtless accustomed, as he said, to interpret English documents, strangely misinterpreted the ordinary terms of compliment employed in the East—after giving an account of the negotiations of 1873, turned round and asked whether any of your Lordships would have refused to grant what was then asked by Shere Ali and refused by me? I have again to come between one Member of the present Administration and another, and to say that in his remarks addressed to me the noble and learned Earl was, at the same time, condemning his own Government. I had the honour of serving as Viceroy for two years under the Administration of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield). What happened in 1874? There was a debate in your Lordships' House in which the subject of the negotiations of 1873 was thoroughly discussed; and what was then the opinion of the present Government? The opinion of the Government, as expressed in that debate, was that it was quite impossible to give Shere Ali what he wanted—namely, an unconditional guarantee of protection. But is that all? I served as Viceroy for two years after that; and did I receive any instructions to give Shere Ali the unconditional guarantee he wanted? Not one single despatch; not one single expression; not one single hint to that effect. "Here," said the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) "is what ought to have been done—the guarantee ought to have been given;" and the noble Earl says that this was the thing that drove the Ameer into the arms of Russia. But look at the two despatches in which the noble Marquess opposite instructed me, in 1875, to obtain the admission of British Residents into Afghanistan. Is there a single word about giving any additional assurances to the Ameer? Not a word; no suggestion whatever was made that any greater assurances of support should be given to him than I had given in 1873. So much so, that I was obliged to remind the noble Marquess that if Shere Ali entertained the proposal he would be certain to ask for some return. Therefore, I say that the charges brought against me by noble Lords opposite are really charges against the Government of which they themselves are Members. There can, in fact, be no distinction drawn

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in this matter between the present and the late Government. I do not accuse the Government of doing anything wrong in the matter; for I do not believe any Government would do such a thing as to give Shere Ali an unconditional guarantee of protection—arms, ammunition, troops, whatever he liked—without asking for anything in return. This is what he asked; and this is what is now said by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack that I ought to have given him.
I have shown that during these eight years there had been no change of policy. The objects of the Governments in India and at home were the same; we all wanted the friendship of Afghanistan; our difference was as to the means of securing it. In 1875 I received a despatch from the noble Marquess, pointing out the desirability of our having a British Resident at Herat. I should have liked to have had on that Frontier a British officer. I was not against the measure. Do not suppose I had the least desire to oppose it; but I thought it well to consult the officers of the Government who knew most about the matter. I was on the point of proceeding to Delhi. When I arrived there I consulted the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, and all the most experienced officers of the Frontier. I also summoned two Native gentlemen of high character, who had been the Agents of the Government of India at Cabul, and who knew the Ameer well. One of them was the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan. I did not hold a formal Conference; but I saw all these officers privately—one at a time—and asked them how that request would be likely to be entertained by Shere Ali, and what would be the best way of making it? They said that the admission of British Residents into Afghanistan was the one thing which the Ameer disliked more than another, and which was most likely to get us into trouble with him; and I made them write down their opinions, that I might send them home. After that I had all the Papers on the subject looked out and examined, to see if there was any information which would warrant us in assuming that Shere Ali would receive a British Agent at Herat. The noble Marquess was under that impression. He wrote to the Government of India that—
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"The Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is therefore not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now."—[Ibid. p. 129.]
I was under the impression myself that, at some time, he might have said something to that effect. We found that Lord Mayo, at Umballa, had distinctly told the Ameer that he would not be asked to receive British officers in Afghanistan; but we thought that he might have said something, in private conversations, to the effect that he might accept them elsewhere than at Cabul. We wrote this to the Secretary of State, adding that what might have passed then could not fairly be used in any negotiations with the Ameer. But since we examined into this matter in 1875, it has been set at rest by the evidence of Mr. Seton-Karr, who was Foreign Secretary to Lord Mayo at Umballa, and was, therefore, completely acquainted with all that took place. Mr. Seton-Karr came to me, of his own accord, the other day, and said—"I want to tell you that it is quite a mistake to suppose that anything of the kind was ever said by the Ameer." Not only is Mr. Seton-Karr's recollection clear on the point that Shere Ali never expressed his willingness to receive British officers in Afghanistan, but he gave an account of what occurred in a letter to Lord Lawrence, written on the 5th of April, 1869, immediately after the Conferences at Umballa, which he has authorized me to use, and which contains the following passage:—
"He (Shere Ali) is told that we do not want British officers as Residents at Cabul or anywhere else, and he says they would do him harm in the eyes of his people."
Lord Mayo's official account of what took place has been strangely misinterpreted. It has even been said that the Mission of British officers to Afghanistan was a boon which he denied to Shere Ali. This, however, is an error, which is refuted by a private letter written on the 3rd of June, 1869, by Lord Mayo to the Duke of Argyll, in which Lord Mayo, summing up the Umballa Conferences, wrote—
"The only pledges given were that we would not interfere in his affairs; that we would support his independence; that we would not force European officers as Residents upon him against his wish."

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In June, 1875, the Government of India gave their opinion that it was not wise to force British Residents on the Ameer. We thought it might lead to trouble; and, as servants of the Government, we thought it our duty to point that out. There was no hurry about the matter; and having been told, by everyone whose opinion was of any value, that the course proposed was likely to alienate the Ameer, we stated our opinion to the Government; but the Government, notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the Viceroy and his Council, replied that the course they had suggested must be followed. Again, the Government of India, in January, 1876, pointed out the evil effects which, in their opinion, would follow from carrying out the Instructions of the noble Marquess, in the hope that the matter might still be re-considered by Her Majesty's Government.
In February, 1876, however, Lord Lytton, before leaving England, received distinct and positive Instructions, both written and verbal, to insist that Shere Ali should receive British Residents in Afghanistan. My Lords, I do not wish to say a word against the proceedings of Lord Lytton; I know the difficulties and responsibilities of a Viceroy, and Lord Lytton seems to me to have carried out the Instructions which he received. The responsibility rests not upon him, but upon Her Majesty's Government. And here it is necessary to remember that there was no change of circumstances which made it necessary then to alter our relations with Afghanistan; for, as I have already shown to your Lordships, the Prime Minister declared, in May, 1876, in the House of Commons, that the relations between Great Britain and Russia had never been more satisfactory.
The first step that was taken in India was to request Shere Ali to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Cabul. On his declining to do so he was warned in July, 1876, that if he persisted he would isolate himself from the alliance and support of the British Government. My Lords, I consider that that was the turning-point of the negotiations with the Ameer; and we know that three Members of the Viceroy's Council—Sir Henry Norman, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, and Sir William Muir—dissented from the course which was then followed. As some exception has been taken to their conduct in
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making their dissent known, I must explain to your Lordships that the Government of India is not a government by a Viceroy, but by a Viceroy in Council; that ordinary matters are determined by the majority; and it is only in regard to matters essentially concerning the interests of India that the Viceroy has the power by law to overrule the majority. By statutory rules, framed by the Viceroy in Council under the Government of India Act, Members of Council have a right to express their dissent from any act done by the Government of India. These three Members of Council expressed their dissent at the time. The Viceroy requested them to postpone the formal record of their dissent until a despatch was sent home reporting the proceedings; but, for some reason or other, no despatch was sent home for a great length of time—indeed, until May, 1877, when all three had left India. I do not blame Lord Lytton for detaining the despatch, for I do not know his reasons; and I must add that I do not think it was done for the purpose of preventing the dissents from being recorded: Lord Lytton is an exceedingly able writer, and need not be afraid of answering any objection that might be raised by Members of his Council. But whatever the reason may have been, it is totally contrary to the practice that the course of important affairs should not be frequently reported to the Home Government. As those Members of Council were debarred from the usual opportunity of recording their dissent from the course taken in July, 1876, I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that when the despatch of the Government of India of the 10th of May, 1877, was made public, they were fully justified in also making public their dissent. If they had not done so, it must have been supposed that they were consenting parties to the policy described in the despatch as having been pursued by the Government of India when they were Members of that Government, and responsible for its action.
To return to the negotiations with Shere Ali. The next important step followed in October, 1876, when the Ameer was plainly told that if he did not receive British officers in his territories he would lose all the protection he had hitherto obtained from England.

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At one time it was thought he would not give way; but "owing to helplessness" he said he must agree to the demands of the British Government. He said, in substance, let my Envoy meet Sir Lewis Pelly, explain my difficulties, and if, after this, the Viceroy will not give way I must.
My Lords, I should like to dwell somewhat upon the Conferences at Peshawur, but time forbids it. I have no fault to find with the manner in which Sir Lewis Pelly carried out the instructions which he had received; he certainly carried them out with great determination. He began by telling the Prime Minister that the Viceroy desired to remove some misapprehensions in the mind of the Ameer. The Prime Minister replied that the Ameer had none; and when he was told that these misapprehensions had arisen out of the Conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa, and the communications with Lord Northbrook in 1873, the Envoy said that the Ameer went away from Umballa perfectly satisfied, and that the communications with Lord Northbrook in 1873 were satisfactory also. What weighed most in the Ameer's mind, he said, was the policy of the present Viceroy, which was different from that of previous Viceroys, in forcing the Ameer to receive British officers as Residents in Afghanistan, contrary to the Treaty of 1857 with Dost Mahomed, and to all the "agreements," "writings," and "assurances" he had received from Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and myself. The Conference concluded by Sir Lewis Pelly, at the Prime Minister's request, submitting his objections for the consideration of the Viceroy. Sir Lewis Pelly was then instructed to demand a distinct and prompt answer, whether or no the Ameer refused to receive British officers in any part of Afghanistan? On this point, however, no answer was ever given, in consequence of the death of the Prime Minister. It is a very extraordinary thing that no explanation has been given, why this demand was not pressed further; for it was clear that the object of the British Government was to have British Residents in Afghanistan, and there is reason to believe that, under great pressure, and under great apprehensions, the Ameer would have given way. Indeed, it appears, from the despatch of the Government of
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India of the 18th of May, 1877, that Lord Lytton knew that another Envoy was on his way from Cabul, who was reported to have "authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government." Sir Lewis Pelly was nevertheless instructed, on the 30th of March, to close the Conference at once.
Something has been said of the conduct of the Ameer at that time as justifying the close of the negotiations. It seems that he had been raising the cry of "jehad," or of a religious war, and using hostile language towards the British Government. My Lords, I am not going to defend this suspicious Ameer, for I think he behaved very foolishly throughout these transactions. But it is only fair to look at the circumstances under which he was then placed. The occupation of Quetta occurred in October, 1876, just at the time when the Ameer was most frightened at the menacing language of the British Government. Preparations were made about the same time at Rawul Pindee to assemble a force; a bridge was thrown across the Indus; and I believe that arrangements were actually made to send a column up to the Kurram Valley, which is on the direct route to Cabul. Besides this, the Viceroy had recently seen the Maharajah of Cashmere, and encouraged him to advance against some territory on the north-east of Afghanistan, over which Shere Ali claimed sovereignty. Nothing is said about all this in the Papers laid before Parliament; but there is no doubt about the facts. They have been stated in Parliament without contradiction. The truth seems to me to be that the poor Ameer could not form any other conclusion than that the British Government were on the point of attacking him, and he turned to every side to see what defence he could make. He found, however, that the people around him did not wish to quarrel with the British Government; and we are told by the Government of India that the whole movement had "completely collapsed" before the close of the Peshawur Conference.
The Conference was closed in March, 1877. When the Viceroy closed the Conference he took away from the Ameer every assurance that he had received of protection and support from Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and myself, either for himself or for Ms dynasty.

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He withdrew our Native Agent from Cabul, and therefore deprived the Ameer of the means of communicating with the British Government; and perhaps the noble Marquess opposite will explain what door was then left open to the Ameer. Neither the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) nor the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack have alluded to the real result of the Peshawur Conferences; and the noble Viscount described the position of affairs most inadequately in his despatch of the 28th of November, by saying that we had assumed towards the Ameer a position of "vigilant reserve." My Lords, these were the circumstances of the case. I think the course pursued was not wise. When the Government found that the Ameer was not willing to receive British Residents in Afghanistan, they need not have altogether broken off from him, or have led him to feel that he had nothing to expect from the British Government. If a different course had been taken, and time had been given him, his feelings were such that he would, I believe, in the end, have accepted their terms, however hard he might have thought them to be.
Then came a time of real difficulty, when it was necessary that closer relations should be maintained with Afghanistan. That necessity arose on account of the political condition of Europe, England and Russia having been gradually brought to the verge of war. It would then have been right to have strengthened our relations with the Ameer; but in what position had Her Majesty's Government then placed this country with reference to Afghanistan? By pushing forward demands which were not necessary, contrary to all Indian advice, when there existed no crisis whatever, they had so alienated the Ameer that it would have been almost humiliating then to have made any advances towards him. The Secretary of State (Viscount Cranbrook) used an expression in regard to the state of things in 1873 which is far more applicable to the policy of 1876—namely, that "it was too late." The policy of Her Majesty's Government made it "too late" to make a friend of the Ameer when it was really wanted. It may be said that I ought not to content myself with offering criticisms on the conduct of the Government, but should indicate
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what I think ought to have been done. I say that if the Ameer had not been frightened about the reception of British Residents in Afghanistan, the moment there was the probability of a war between Russia and England the Viceroy ought to have communicated with him, arranged for a meeting, and offered to enter into an agreement with him similar to that entered into with his father in 1857. I am satisfied that he would have readily accepted such an offer. The policy of the Government, however, prevented that being done; and this, I believe, was one of the main causes of the war.
Then came the last stage of these transactions. The Ameer was alienated from us; he had no hope of support from us: he had no Native Agent of ours at his Court. It was arranged at Simla, in 1873, that if he were asked to receive a Russian Mission he should at once consult the Government of India; but this was impossible, as our Native Agent had been withdrawn. The Ameer had been told that we did not care either about him or his dynasty. When, therefore, the Russian Mission was pressed upon him, as he could look for no protection from us, he had no alternative but to accept it, and it seems that he did so unwillingly. When this was first known, it appears to me that the Government of India rightly intimated to Her Majesty's Government, in their telegram of the 30th of July, that the matter was one which ought to be settled between the British and Russian Governments, and not between the British Government and Afghanistan. When England and Russia were on the verge of war, it is true that neither country could fairly be held to be bound by the arrangements of 1873 or 1875 in regard to Central Asia. But before the Russian Mission reached Cabul the Treaty of Berlin had been signed; and I agree with the noble Earl on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby), that the Government should have dealt with Russia and not with Afghanistan. I believe, moreover, that they might have come to a peaceful and satisfactory understanding with Russia, and have avoided the present war. Russia was asked, no doubt, to withdraw the Mission from Cabul; but I am surprised at the satisfaction expressed by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack at the answer received to

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that demand. In fact, having received no satisfactory answer from Russia, Her Majesty's Government went to war with Afghanistan. I will not dwell on the circumstances connected with the dispatch of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, because from the beginning I can only regard it as a declaration of war.
My Lords, I have trespassed so long upon your indulgence that I shall say no more excepting that I believe this war was unnecessary, and that with the exercise of a little common prudence on the part of Her Majesty's Government it might have been avoided. No advantage, I am convinced, can result from it, either to England or to India: and, holding these views, I feel myself reluctantly obliged to vote for the Amendment proposed by my noble Friend behind me.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, at this hour of the evening I certainly shall not delay your Lordships long by following in detail the able but very minute speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down. But before I touch on one or two of the more important points raised in this debate, I must refer to some observations which he addressed to me in reference to Sir Richard Pollock. If the noble Earl misconstrued the meaning of that despatch I am sorry for it, for Sir Richard Pollock is a very distinguished officer; but, if anyone will read my despatch at a more reasonable hour of the day, I think he will say that the construction which the noble Earl has put upon it is entirely unwarranted, and that the proofs I sought for the assertions I made were derived from the general report of the facts addressed to me by Lord Lytton. The noble Marquess below the Gangway (the Marquess of Bath) has addressed some reproaches to me. He was in some difficulty naturally to find a reason for the vote he is about to give; and he gave as his reason that I had used some language last year which he was pleased to say was not accurate. My Lords, I prefer resignedly abandoning my character in the eyes of the noble Marquess to keeping your Lordships out of bed: therefore, I shall not go into the matter, which I dealt with sufficiently on a previous occasion. I will merely say that the Duke of Argyll asked me certain Questions, which I thought it proper and expedient should be answered. He asked me whether
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certain troops were assembled to force a Resident upon the Ameer; he spoke of a bridge of boats erected on the Indus to facilitate operations; he wished to know whether there was any departure from a policy which had been adopted by many Indian statesmen, and whether any attempt was being made to force on the Ameer a Resident at the Court of Cabul—"Resident at the Court of a Native Prince" being an expression whose significance is well understood in India. To that Question I gave a negative answer. He asked me for positive information. I told him I could not give positive information; and because, under these circumstances, noble Lords opposite appear to have misunderstood what I intended to say, the noble Marquess and others are pleased to accuse me of disingenuousness. I imagined everyone in this House knew there were many subjects on which the mouth of a Minister of the Crown is sealed, and they cannot always explain fully what their policy is. If I had explained fully what our policy then was I must have explained the reasons on which it was founded; I must have depicted the Ameer as he had been depicted to me—as a faithless, treacherous, intriguing man, whose loyalty we had vainly attempted to secure. The noble Marquess has forgotten that anything said here by a Minister of the Crown is said not merely to this House of Lords and the English people, but to the whole world—to the Czar of Russia, to the Shah of Persia, and to the Ameer of Afghanistan; and if you insist that no answer shall be given except such as contains a complete revelation of the policy of the Government, the only inference I draw is, that in the future no answer at all can be given to Questions of that kind. Now, my Lords, turning to the main matter we have in hand. I thought at one period of the debate that we were getting rid of the study of that interesting question how the Ameer came to be angry. Seeing that he has refused, when asked in perfectly friendly language, to receive a friendly Embassy, places a force outside his own territory, and drives back that Embassy by a threat of rifle shots, it does not, in these circumstances, seem to me to be a matter of much practical importance what the particular cause of the ill-temper or disloyalty was that in-

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duced this man to commit an act which was undoubtedly an act of war. If we are to investigate the question, let us compare for a moment the theories that are offered on the other side to account for the change of the Ameer's policy. The theory advanced the other evening was this—that the Ameer was imbued with great loyalty to the British Government, and firmly determined to resist Russia; that he had been deeply impressed by all the civil speeches which successive Viceroys had addressed to him; and that up to the date of the 8th of July, 1876, that feeling of loyalty was unbroken, and the determination in favour of England and against Russia was unchanged. Of a sudden a change came over the spirit of his dream; he altered his whole policy at once, and a Russian Envoy—as we read, for the first time—was received at Cabul. And what was the cause of this wonderful change? Why, that we had proposed to send him, at any time he pleased, and in any part of his dominions he chose to select, a friendly Ambassador. If our ally was really so constituted as that such a cause as that could produce a change in his deepest feelings of affection and long-tried loyalty, I cannot think he could be an ally about whose temper we need trouble ourselves much. We have heard there is something peculiarly terrible and unknown in the idea of a Resident being sent to Afghanistan. But, my Lords, the State with which the Ameer is best acquainted is that of Persia, which adjoins his own territory, and he knows that Envoys are sent to Persia, and continue to reside there, and that no diminution is thereby occasioned to the Shah's independence or sovereignty. I believe that the idea that the Ameer has any real aversion to the location of Residents on his Frontier is an imaginary one. That he pretended to have it, I quite admit; but as the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) said the other evening, when you want to know why a man is angry, you had better ask himself; and the Ameer told us on two occasions what was the cause of his anger. One cause was the very impartial conduct of Sir John Lawrence when he was struggling for his life. Sir John Lawrence had a profound conviction that it was not the duty of the British Government to interfere with the claimants for the Afghan
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Throne; but he desired to obtain influence over the combatants for the Afghan Throne: and so, instead of leaving them alone according to each changing vicissitude of war, he recognized each candidate as he turned uppermost—always telling him, at the same time, that he had recognized the last who gained a victory, and that he would recognize the next with equal zeal. He went so far on one occasion, not being certain which was likely to be uppermost, as to send an Envoy armed with instructions to offer his facile congratulations to either. We have been told that the Ameer sees English books and newspapers—perhaps he is versed in English literature; if so, I can readily suppose that he must have looked upon Sir John Lawrence as an Oriental Vicar of Bray. What evidence is there as to what his feelings on that occasion were? Here is a record of what passed at the Conference at Umballa. His Excellency urged the Ameer to state the precise mode in which he could help him; but he replied in general terms;—but at last he broke out with great violence that the primary recognition of his rival had been the main cause of his estrangement. But then at the Conference of Umballa Lord Mayo was able to exercise an influence over him by his noble presence and genial mind. What was the next cause of his change of mind? I will accept no other testimony than that of the Ameer himself. If you look in this Blue Book at the speeches to which the noble Marquess has alluded, you will see that the circumstance upon which he dwelt more than any other was the interference of the Government of India between himself and his eldest son. That was the result of Lord Northbrook's intercession. That Lord Northbrook was perfectly justified in the course he took I do not dispute. It was perfectly impossible for any Indian Viceroy to stand by and see such gross cruelty and perfidy perpetrated without interfering. But you must remember that the great danger of the Ameer's race and of his own reign had been civil dissension, and that the one thing he had most to fear was that some member of his family should be set up by his people against him. He saw clearly the Power which loudly expressed its determination not to interfere in his civil affairs coming forward

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in a crisis of civil dissension to interfere against himself. It seems, therefore, on the Ameer's own showing, we may clearly conclude that what offended him on the part of the British Government was not the offer to send Sir Lewis Pelly at any place or at any time on a friendly Mission into Afghanistan—it was, in the first instance, the conduct observed to him when struggling for his Throne; and, in the second place, our apparent design to renew the civil war by encouraging his eldest son in rebellion against him. Therefore, what your Lordships have to decide is, whether we were justified in the course we took in calling upon the Ameer to allow British officers to be placed at Herat and Candahar? I was very much struck by the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) reiterating again and again that there was no change of policy. If there was no change of policy, why propose to censure us? Of course, there was a change of policy. When we came into Office we found there was practically no information from Afghanistan. The noble Earl asked us to ascertain what was going on on the North-Western Frontier,—which ought to have been ascertained in Asia—and to interfere in Europe in matters which ought to have been settled on the spot. The Ameer had expressed his willingness to receive Residents at any place except Cabul. It is true that the noble Earl entirely denied that fact; but I can hardly take it that he looked at the evidence on which my statement is founded. The circumstance was stated by persons who were more likely than any others to have heard what was the fact. The noble Lord (Lord Lawrence), who spoke the other night, dismissed one of the Residents, Captain Grey, on the ground that he was "an interpreter." But surely an interpreter who necessarily hears all that is said and translated is precisely the man who knows what is going on. Then there was the friend of the Ameer, Dr. Bellew, and Colonel Burne, the Private Secretary of Lord Mayo, and these men distinctly aver that the Ameer was ready to receive Residents on his Frontier. After that, what is the use of quoting a letter written by Mr. Seton-Karr on the subject? On such a point negative testimony is of no value. There can be no doubt, if evidence is worth anything, that the Ameer was ready at that
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time to allow Residents to come upon his Frontier. Now, it seems to me that much of the misunderstanding upon this point, and much of the difference of opinion, arise from the fact that the real danger and difficulties we have to encounter in Afghanistan have never been rightly appreciated by Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook. The noble Lords have spoken in this debate about military invasion, and they have shown the difficulties that would stand in its way. In what they say I entirely concur. I accept the language used by my noble Friend behind me some weeks back when he said that a military invasion of India was almost impracticable. But it is not so much a military invasion of India that we have to fear; it is a diplomatic invasion of Afghanistan that we have to fear. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) who opened the debate to-night was apparently willing that Afghanistan should become, if necessary, a happy Russian hunting-ground. He was perfectly willing that it should be entirely occupied by Russians, and he had no fear of any results which might follow. My Lords, we are not in secret executive Session—as the Senate of the United States would be in under similar circumstances—and I cannot enter fully and freely into the dangers which Russians established in Afghanistan, and with Afghanistan as their base, working in India as they worked in Bulgaria and in Bosnia, would bring about. In dealing with the Russian Government, you have undoubtedly to make considerable allowances. That Government is not organized as other Governments are. You constantly meet with this phenomenon—that what is done by the Generals or the Ambassadors at one place is not known to the Government at St. Petersburg or by the Generals or Ambassadors at other places. At the very time when General Kaufmann was negotiating with the Ameer, Prince Gortchakoff was denying that anything of the kind was going on. At the very time that the last Mission of which we complained was crossing the Oxus, M. de Giers was saying to Lord Augustus Loftus at St. Petersburg that no Mission was being sent. I know it is the fashion to attribute all these discrepancies simply to dishonesty. I say—and I do so with absolute sincerity—that I do not believe that this is the

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true explanation; and, if for no other reason—besides the regard I should naturally pay to the honourable character of those concerned—I should say that, if they were inclined to deceit, they would not venture on such clumsy deceit. The truth is that Russia—a vast Empire in which the whole of the cares of the State are thrown on the central Government—is administered practically at the will of one man alone, who, like other men, is subject to interruptions of health, to distractions of business, and who probably finds it difficult to struggle against the work which he has to do; so that that unity of policy which in other countries, where there is a Cabinet of Ministers who meet together and govern in unison, is easily attained, in Russia is difficult to arrive at. The Departments appear to act separately. The Foreign Office does not know what the War Department is doing, and one section of the Foreign Office is not always in communication with another section. I make these observations in order to clear myself from using any language which from all of us would be unfitting—and which would, perhaps, from me be particularly unfitting—in derogation of the sincerity of the Russian Government. But still you have the fact that, whether by orders or without orders, Russian Commanders and Diplomatists go forth into any country which borders on any Russian territory and devote themselves to the task of organizing it in Russian interest; they command its armies, they erect its forts, they guide its diplomacy, they shape its councils; and this unauthorized diplomatic invasion is the danger that we had to fear in Afghanistan. Now, it was of no use talking about plunging the whole world in war, as Lord Lawrence said, to cure such an evil as that; it was no use sending home suggestions about remonstrances, as the Government of Lord Northbrook did. Remonstrances at St. Petersburg are of no avail to stop a danger such as that. The only thing would be to have British Agents on the spot to watch and counteract those influences. That was the only remedy that could be applied; and that was the reason why, immediately we saw the state of things which led to the gradual rapprochement of Russia and Afghanistan in consequence of the proceedings of
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1873, we selected this particular measure of placing British Residents on the Frontier of Afghanistan, because they could have watched, reported, and counteracted the intrigues which really threatened our supremacy in that country. What was going on all this time? The neighbourhood of Russia—the moral as well as the physical neighbourhood—was increasing. The negotiations were getting more frequent and more warm. The subordinate tone of the Ameer was getting more subordinate; the tone of General Kaufmann was getting more patronizing and more imperious. And all this time we had only a glimmer of the events taking place. There was, as it were, a thick curtain stretched across the Frontiers of Afghanistan, behind which all these intrigues were going on. I have heard something of the Native Agent, and the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) was very indignant because we expressed dissatisfaction at the intelligence furnished by the Native Agent. Why Major Cavagnari and Mr. Thornton, men of the highest experience, admit that the reports sent by the Native Agent were meagre and incomplete; and nothing was put into those reports that had not been previously seen by the Ameer. This was what happened, in Cabul to the reports of the Agent we were exclusively trusting. The noble Earl perpetually reminds my noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook) that he has been only a year in office, and seems to defend himself simply by appealing to the opinions which he himself expressed. He says we have adopted something which is disapproved by everybody who knows anything about India, and that it was strange presumption of us to go against it. Well, if that is the case, every measure to which he and his Government were opposed is approved by Lord Lytton and his Government—and one Government of India is generally as good as another; and I will not allow that the present Government is in anyway inferior in experience or talent to that over which the noble Earl presided. Therefore, if the authority is good in the one case it is good in the other. I have shown you that in the evidence of Captain Grey and with respect to the Native Agent, the noble Earl has misunderstood the evidence of the Blue Book. I will only touch on two more points, as the hour is

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late. The noble Earl says we broke off negotiations suddenly, and left the Ameer no door by which to approach the British Government. The negotiations were broken off, not in anger, but through the death of the Envoy sent. Lord Lytton thought it a good occasion for putting an end to them, because he understood that the Ameer was negotiating with the Frontier Tribes to attack us at the very time negotiations were going on. Those negotiations, let it be borne in mind, were founded on large terms of support offered by us. Was it possible to go on making these offers to the man you knew was arming his subjects against you? But that the door was closed to him is absolutely incorrect. During the whole time, whatever means the Ameer had of communicating with the British Government he still retained to its full extent. It was still open to him to have sent an Envoy of his own. There was nothing to make it either humiliating or difficult for him to do so. Well, then I am told we ought to have gone to war with Russia. Why on earth ought we to have gone to war with Russia? The burden of Mr. Gladstone's speech at Greenwich was that we had not for this and for that gone to war with Russia. Why on earth should we go to war with Russia? Our complaint of the Ameer was that he had not received our Embassy. His excuse for not receiving our Embassy was, first, that the Russians would make it a ground for coming themselves; and, secondly, that Christians could not live safely at Cabul. The Mission of Russia tore into fragments both those excuses. It was obvious that he did not fear the Russians coming, and that Christians could live safely at Cabul. From that moment his excuses disappear. And now by his own showing, without any reason—out of pure hostility and disloyalty, because he was conspiring with others, because he did not wish light to be cast on his proceedings—he refused to receive our Envoy into his territory. It is natural for every man who has done mischief to object to light being thrown on what he has been doing. The excuses raised by the Ameer remind me of the conditions which spiritualist Professors lay down with regard to their claims—namely, that darkness is absolutely essential to the success of their operations. If I were speaking at an earlier period of the
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night I should have much liked to dissipate some more of the stranger misconceptions of the noble Earl. Now I will not detain your Lordships. I will merely urge your Lordships before you give your vote to consider the gravity of the vote you are about to give. You are endowed by Parliament with the power of refusing or giving Supplies. You have therefore, on this question at all events, the power of deciding whether a Ministry should stand or fall. A Ministry itself is a small thing—it matters little what men sit on this bench—but in this case we represent a cause, and we carry a standard. If this matter is taken out of our hands it must be placed in the hands of others, and you know what policy they will pursue. It must be placed in the hands of those who have found India a burden; of those who comtemplate the superiority of America over this country with acquiescence and complacency; in the hands of those who even now advise us to take back our army and allow the Ameer to gain in diplomacy the victory which he has been unable to gain in arms; who would permit the Ameer again to draw down the deep veil that has hitherto concealed his proceedings, and prevented us from penetrating his designs—and who would allow him to pursue beyond the border his intrigues and disloyal designs.
VISCOUNT CARDWELL, who was very imperfectly heard, was understood to express his surprise that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) should have contented himself with so slight a reference to the speech of his noble Friend behind him, the late Viceroy of India (the Earl of Northbrook), which had so entirely disposed of the whole history of the question at issue; and that he should have thought it worthy of him to pass by the speech of the noble Marquess behind him (the Marquess of Bath) without any attempt at an answer upon the merits. Late as the hour was, he should have thought that such a speech would have been considered to demand an answer—and could not be attempted to be got rid of merely by a sneer. As regarded the letter of the late Secretary of State (the Duke of Argyll), in which he so clearly negatived the assertion that the Ameer had expressed to Lord Mayo his readiness to receive British Residents in his cities,

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he presumed the noble Marquess could not have correctly heard it. He would, therefore, read it to him again, and commend it to his more careful consideration hereafter. The noble Marquess asked if there had been no change in the policy since the present Government came into Office, why had this Motion been made? The answer was a very simple one. The noble Marquess must have perceived, from the interest with which the House had followed every word that had fallen from his noble Friend the late Viceroy, as compared with the reception they had given to the reply, how complete the statement of his noble Friend had been. The policy, perhaps, had not been changed—for this Government, like all its Predecessors, professed to desire a strong and a friendly Afghanistan, but the mode of carrying the policy into effect had been entirely changed. Every preceding Viceroy, and every experienced Indian officer, had avoided the demand for British Residents in the territory of the Ameer as being the red rag to the bull; but the present Administration had made it the sine quâ non, and had brought about the present war. At that late hour, he would not weaken by repeating the speech of his noble Friend; who had stated with clearness and force the policy which, as Viceroy, he had carried into effect with skill and power. The speech of the noble Marquess was no answer to the statement of his noble Friend; and he was quite satisfied to leave the matter as he had stated it for the judgment of the House.
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, the hour is late, but I hope your Lordships will think me justified in detaining you for a few moments. My noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack sketched to us, as it were in allegory, a picture that may give to your Lordships an idea of that North-Western boundary that has been the subject of discussion these two nights. My Lords, I think it is advisable that at this moment some general conception of this scheme should be again put before you. I would picture it, not in allegory, but such as it really exists. That boundary, that North-Western boundary of our Indian Empire, is a branch of a chain of mountains the highest in the world—higher even than the Andes—yet no portion of
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this Frontier is in possession of the inhabitants of the Indian Empire or the Indian Government, and through its Passes invading armies may make their raids, or wild and turbulent tribes ravage the fertile plains which are entrusted to your Government in that part of the world. Well, then, my Lords, I ventured to say that the inconvenience of such a boundary—the injury which frequently follows such a boundary—were felt by the Government of India, and had been more than once the subject of their consideration. The noble Viscount who moves this Amendment (Viscount Halifax) expressed upon that subject some incredulity with respect to my observations. He told us that he had much acquaintance with the Governors of India, and that he could not recall any Viceroy who had experienced a feeling or conviction of that kind. Well, now, my Lords, let us look for a moment to the facts of the ease. We have been in possession of this boundary for, I believe, 28 years. During that period we have been obliged to fit out 19 considerable expeditions to control its inhabitants, have undertaken between 50 and 60 guerilla enterprizes, and have employed upon these expeditions between 50,000 and 60,000 of Her Majesty's troops. All I can say is, that if none of the Viceroys of India who are the acquaintances of the noble Lord have felt the inconvenience, or if they have been insensible to the injury of such a boundary, they were not fit to be Viceroys. But I cannot believe that that is the case. My information would lead me to a very different result. The Government of India is not merely the business of Viceroys, but of statesmen—of sometimes eminent statesmen—and sometimes military leaders of world-wide renown. And it was the information which I derived from one of the most eminent individuals of that character and class that authorized me to make that observation which I made. That eminent personage was for a considerable time a Member of the Indian Administration. He was not prejudiced in favour of the views adopted by Her Majesty's Government. For a considerable period, notwithstanding his sense of the inconvenience and the injury of this boundary, he was one of those who opposed any change, because

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he believed it was better to incur that inconvenience and injury than to embark on the difficult and responsible office of making a fresh boundary and disturbing arrangements in which political considerations were involved. Remembering the possibility of some Power equal to our own attacking us in that part of the world, but remembering also that some 10 years ago that Power was 2,000 miles distant from our boundaries, a man might consistently uphold the arrangement that then existed, and might, by force of circumstances and the lapse of time, be now a sincere supporter of the policy which Her Majesty's Government now recommends. That, for instance, is the case of Lord Napier of Magdala. It was only recently—on the 8th of November—that I received a telegram from him in which he says—"A careful study of our Frontier convinces me that a rectification of our Frontier is necessary." Those are the words of one of great experience and of consummate ability and judgment, who for a long time was opposed to that which he now finds is absolutely necessary. He does not shrink from the use of the word "rectification," although definitions of that word have been given by many noble Lords opposite which are not to be found in any dictionary. The noble Earl who resumed the debate to-night (Earl Grey) spoke of "rectification" of the Frontier as though it were another phrase for spoliation and annexation. ["Hear!"] I expected those cheers, and wished to receive them. Another noble Earl who spoke in the debate yesterday (the Earl of Carnarvon)—I wrote down his words, because, unfortunately, on a previous occasion he seemed to accuse me of misquoting him—said, "I hate the word 'rectification.' It seems to me to savour of the worst traditions of the French Empire—a word to conceal wrong and robbery." A noble Marquess (the Marquess of Ripon), who recently addressed us, described it as a dark word, and he seemed to tremble as he uttered it. For my own part, I cannot agree in any of these definitions. "Rectification" of Frontier, is a correct diplomatic term which is accepted by the highest authorities and which has a precise and a definite meaning. The "rectification" of Frontiers, instead of being a word of the French Empire, has been long adopted, and your Lordships
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will be surprised to find that the peace of the world very much depends upon Treaties for the rectification of Frontiers. If all the Treaties for the rectification of Frontiers were destroyed as instruments of the terrible kind described by noble Lords opposite and by the noble Earl on the cross Benches (the Earl of Carnarvon), the peace of the world would be endangered, and might be destroyed. Well, my Lords, after that observation the other night, I took a note of some Treaties for the rectification of Frontiers, and I took them on conditions which I am sure your Lordships will all agree are fair. First of all, they are modern—I would not produce old instances. Secondly, they are not only modern Treaties, but Treaties none of which were entered into or negotiated after a war. Therefore, they are not the consequences of force or fraud. Now, I find that from 1856 to 1868—quite in our own time—there were five Treaties between France and Spain for the rectification of Frontiers; and I have no hesitation myself in saying that if those Treaties had not taken place, there would have been war between France and Spain, and that the existence of those Treaties prevented war. Between France and Switzerland there was a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers in December, 1862—a Treaty of some celebrity—one which was certainly not a dark instrument. It was a Treaty which certainly has contributed to the maintenance of peace. There is a Treaty between Great Britain and France for the rectification of Frontiers—your Lordships may be surprised to find a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers between an island and a continent; but it had reference to their possessions in the East Indies. That is a modern Treaty. There is a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers between Italy and Switzerland, and one between Portugal and the Transvaal. The Transvaal is a place of which I believe the noble Earl on the cross Benches has some knowledge. To make it complete, there is a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers between Great Britain and an Oriental Kingdom—like Afghanistan—the Kingdom of Siam. Now, I believe the number of those Treaties I have mentioned—some dozen—might be doubled or even trebled if it were necessary.
EARL GREY: Did these Treaties involve any of the States parties to them in a diminution of territory?
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: The observation of the noble Earl deserves remark. A rectification of Frontiers does not necessarily involve a diminution of territory. Many such Treaties are carried out by means of equivalents. I make no application of those Treaties to the case of Afghanistan. I have not touched upon that point yet. The noble Earl is impetuous. It has been said that I stated on a recent occasion the object of the war to be a rectification of Frontier—the substitution of a scientific for a hap-hazard Frontier. Now, in the first place, I never said that was the object of the war. I treated it as a possible consequence of the war, which is a very different thing. Our first application to the Ameer was, in fact, virtually founded upon the principle of rectifying our Frontier without any disturbance of territory whatever. What was our difficulty with regard to Afghanistan? We could gain no information as to what was going on beyond the mountain range—which was, in fact, rather a prison than a Frontier—or what might be preparing in the numerous valleys of Afghanistan. What we wanted, therefore, was eyes to see and ears to hear; and we should have attained our object had the Ameer made to us those concessions which are commonly granted by all civilized States, and which even some Oriental States do not deny us—namely, to have a Minister at his capital—a demand which we did not press—and men like our Consuls General at some of his chief towns. With that we should have been satisfied. It would virtually have been a rectification of our Frontier; because we should have got rid of those obstacles that rendered it utterly impossible for us to conduct public affairs with any knowledge of the circumstances with which we had to deal as regarded Afghanistan. Therefore, the noble Earl is precipitate in concluding that because I am in favour of a rectification of Frontier, and wished to see a scientific instead of an hap-hazard one, that necessarily any change would occur. I only wish to observe that abstractedly there is no absolute necessity for change, because you may rectify a Frontier. And you may rectify it in different ways—by equivalents and
514
so forth. But, my Lords, my observations on that subject in another place were made rather with reference in my mind to certain wild ideas that were then prevalent, to the effect that it was the intention of the Government to invade and conquer Afghanistan and annex it to our Empire. I explained that that was not our object, and that a scientific rectification of our Frontier would effect for us all the results we desired. And, my Lords, what is a scientific Frontier compared with a haphazard one? Why, it is, as a military authority has said, this—a scientific Frontier may be defended with a garrison of 5,000 men; while, with a hap-hazard one, you may require for its defence an army of 100,000 men, and even then not be safe from sudden attack. It is not for us now to consider what arrangements may be made with this object further than to say that Her Majesty's Ministers, after all that has occurred, will feel it their duty to take care of the security of our Indian Empire. My Lords, whatever may be the objections to the present Northwestern Frontier of our Indian Empire, I have little doubt things would have gone on much in the same way—Members of the Indian Administration would have been equally conscious of the deficiencies of that Frontier—and yet so difficult is the task of amending a Frontier, and so great are the obstacles which certainly present themselves, things would have gone on, I dare say, as they had gone on for 28 years, had it not been for the sudden appearance of Russia in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan. I would, my Lords, speak on that subject with frankness. It is, no doubt, much easier to speak of it now than it would have been a year ago, or eight months ago. Eight months ago war was more than probable between this country and Russia; and an imprudent word might have precipitated that war. At present we know, from the language of the gracious Speech from the Throne, that Her Majesty's relations with all Powers are friendly, and they are not less friendly with Russia than with any other Power. I will say of the expedition which Russia was preparing in Central Asia at the time when she believed that war was inevitable between our country and herself—I will say at once that I hold that all those preparations on the part of Russia

515
were justifiable; and if war had occurred, of course they would have contributed to bring about the ultimate result, whatever that might have been. Had we been in the position of Russia, I doubt not we might have undertaken some enterprize of a similar kind. No doubt there were a great many wild expressions uttered by persons of some authority. No doubt there have been dreams indulged in by individuals which were never realized. I dare say there are Russian officers who would not have disliked to have cooled the hoofs of their chargers in the waters of the Indus; on the other hand, I dare say there were some English soldiers who would have liked to have caught a glance of the Caspian, and to have exclaimed , like the soldiers of Xenophon. We may dismiss from our considerations all these dreams and wild expressions, and admit that if war had occurred between the two countries, all the preparations in Central Asia against Great Britain and India were justifiable; but when it was found that war was not to be made, Her Majesty's Government made becomingly courteous representations to St. Petersburg, and it was impossible that anything could be more frank and satisfactory than the manner in which they were met. The Emperor of Russia said—"It is very true we did intend to injure you as much as we could on your Indian border; but war has not occurred—war, I trust, will not occur between Russia and England. We have already given orders for our troops to retire to their old stations beyond the Oxus; our Ambassador shall be merely considered as a provisional Ambassador on a Mission of courtesy, and as soon as possible he shall disappear." I think that was sufficient and satisfactory conduct on the part of Russia in regard to this matter. But, my Lords, it was totally impossible for us, after all that has occurred, to leave things as they were. After we had found the Russian armies almost in sight of Afghanistan, and their Embassy within the walls of Cabul, we could not go on with the old system and indulge in the fancy that our Frontier was a becoming and secure Frontier in the circumstances. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to consider what course we should take. My noble Friend who spoke last night from the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) made a most ingenious speech,
516
marked by all his characteristics. I never was more pleased. I listened for a long time to what seemed a complete vindication of the Government; and remembering it came from an old comrade in arms with whom I had worked for a quarter of a century, who had ever possessed my entire confidence, but who had left me, unfortunately, from circumstances over which, I assume, he had no control, I thought he was making the amende by taking an early opportunity of vindicating the policy of the Government. But before he sat down, all that romantic flutter of the heart which I had experienced entirely ceased when I found that, notwithstanding his approbation of the Government policy, he was going to vote for the Amendment. What surprised me more than anything else was the reason he gave for it—that was, because we did not go to war with Russia. My noble Friend said—"If you acted logically and properly you ought to have gone to war with Russia, and therefore I must vote for the Amendment. You ought not only to have gone to war with Russia, but in regard to Afghanistan you ought to have treated the Ameer with more courtesy and kindness. You ought to have made appeals to him, and taken every step which might gain his confidence and guide his policy." My Lords, that is the very course which we have pursued. Really, the Ameer of Afghanistan has been treated like a spoiled child. He has had messages sent to him; he has had messengers offered to him—he has sent messengers to us, who have been courteously received. We have written him letters, some of which he has not answered, and others he has answered with unkindness. What more could we have done? Yet my noble Friend is going to vote against the Government, because—with, we think, an imperfect conception of our conduct—he says we have behaved harshly to the Ameer, and not taken the proper course of behaving hostilely to Russia. But Russia has taken every step to make honourable amends to England, and her conduct presents the most striking contrast to that furnished by the Ameer. Then there was another point, which at this late hour of the night I cannot dwell upon, but which I will notice, because it has been treated with great misconception. It refers to the financial

517
part of the question—to the expenses. My noble Friend on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) has no confidence in our finance. He recalls the instance of the Abyssinian War, and he says that there was an estimate of £3,000,000, and it turned out to be £9,000,000. My noble Friend ought to be well informed on that subject, because it was at his instance and by his advice that we decided upon that war. I believe better advice was never given; a more necessary war was never undertaken. But when that war took place it unfortunately occurred very late in the season, and the Cabinet were of opinion, and were informed by those who were competent to advise them in such matters, that the affair could not be finished in one campaign. But information subsequently reached the Government which convinced them that by great exertions and expense it might be concluded in one campaign, and we did not hesitate to incur that expense, which amounted to a very large sum, and which was chiefly spent in obtaining means of transport. But it was through that expenditure that Lord Napier, in addition to his great qualities and skill, was enabled to conclude the Abyssinian War in one campaign. If you had had two campaigns you would have spent not only £9,000,000, but more. In the second campaign you might have had a very bad season, instead of the very fine season that we had; and you might, instead of savages, have found European officers who would have assisted them in resisting their enemy. But instead of that, Lord Napier conducted the one campaign to a successful issue without, I believe, the loss of a single life. Well, my Lords, the question is—What is the course we ought to take at the present moment? I was in hopes, after the debate the other night, in which no one interfered with those Members of your Lordships' House whose conduct was implicated in the various Blue Books on the Table, that we might have discussed the political character of the question much more fully than we have done, and that we should not be again lost in a series of what I must call wrangles about the conduct of Ministers who are in office and those who are out. If the noble Viscount who has just sat down (Viscount Cardwell) is satisfied with the triumphant speech of the late Viceroy
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of India, as he describes it, I can only say that it is not a speech which will give to the people of England that knowledge which is desirable, and which they wish to have of the great question at issue. If I am to sum up the three nights' debate which we virtually have had upon this matter, I should say it might be summed up in a sentence, so far as the discussions have gone—we have done something which in theory you approve, and which, if England had acted in time, you would have done yourselves. In a despatch of the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook), who addressed us at such length this evening, your Lordships will find this statement—His Government is alarmed by an account that the Russians are going to occupy Merv, and what he proposes is this: He proposes that we should make—I do not know that it was not to be an offensive and defensive alliance—but certainly a defensive alliance, with Afghanistan, and that English officers should be immediately admitted to Herat. What is the difference——
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I never made any such proposal.
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: I am sorry that the noble Earl has the habit of contradicting without appealing to documents. I can give the date to the noble Earl. He will find it in June, 1875. His despatch says—
"Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turkoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place."
Here it is—
"It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him," (not merely an assurance but) "a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian Frontier."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, pp. 134–5.]
I appeal to your Lordships whether this quotation does not entirely substantiate my statement as to the policy of the noble Earl, and whether my summary

519
between the policy of the late Viceroy and our own is not correct and complete? I have no objection at any time to be interrupted, and the only reason why I regret it now is that it will add to the few moments during which I shall have to trouble you. I received yesterday a communication from Lord Napier of Magdala, who expresses his regret that he cannot arrive in time to take part in this debate. He says—
"Afghanistan, if in the hands of a hostile Power, may at any time deal a fatal blow to our Empire. We cannot remain on the defensive without a ruinous drain on our resources. Our Frontier is weak; an advanced position is necessary for our safety.
When I am told that no military authority justifies the policy of Her Majesty' s Government, I can appeal with confidence to one who, I believe, must rank among the highest military authorities. I will not detain your Lordships, because it is impossible in your exhausted state, having met at an extraordinarily early hour to-day, to enter into any great discussion. What I want to impress on your Lordships before you divide—which you will do in a few minutes—is that you should not misapprehend the issue on which you have to decide. It is a very grave one. It is not a mere question of the Khyber Pass, or of some small cantonment at Dakka or at Jellalabad. It is a question which concerns the character and the influence of England in Europe—and your conduct to-day will animate this country and encourage Europe if it be such as I would fain believe you are determined to adopt. My Lords, I object entirely to this Amendment of the noble Lord. It is an absurd position almost in which to put the House of Lords to come down and appeal to them to stop the Supplies to Her Majesty. If the Amendment is substituted for our original Motion, that would be the inevitable result. I cannot believe that many noble Lords opposite, when they accurately comprehend the issue which is before them, can sanction such a course. They can scarcely have been conscious of the dangerous precipice to which the noble Viscount the Mover of the Amendment is leading them. We have seen in this debate an indignant spirit hostile to these tactics evinced by some of the most eminent members of the Party opposite. The speech of the
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noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), which was hailed from both sides of the House, was one which expressed the sentiments which I am sure the great majority must feel. My Lords, what I see in the Amendment is not an assertion of those great Whig principles, which no man respects more than myself. What is at the bottom of it is rather that principle of peace-at-any-price, which a certain party in this country upholds. It is that dangerous dogma which I believe animates the ranks before me at this moment, although many of them may be unconscious of it. That deleterious doctrine haunts and harasses the people of this country in every form. Sometimes it is a committee; sometimes it is a letter; sometimes it is an Amendment to the Address; sometimes it is a proposition to stop the Supplies. My Lords, that doctrine has done more mischief than any I can well recall that have been afloat in this century. It has occasioned more wars than the most ruthless conquerors. It has disturbed, and nearly destroyed, that political equilibrium so necessary to the liberties of nations and the welfare of the world. It has dimmed occasionally even the majesty of England. And, my Lords, to-night you have an opportunity which I trust you will not lose, to brand these opinions—these deleterious dogmas—with the reprobation of the Peers of England.
On Question, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Motion? their Lordships divided:—Contents 201; Not-Contents 65: Majority 136.

CONTENTS.

Cairns, E. (L. Chancellor.)

Bute, M.

Exeter, M.

Hertford, M.

Beaufort, D.

Salisbury, M.

Leeds, D.

Manchester, D.

Amherst, E.

Marlborough, D.

Bathurst, E.

Newcastle, D.

Beaconsfield, E.

Northumberland, D.

Beauchamp, E.

Richmond, D.

Belmore, E.

Sutherland, D.

Bradford, E.

Wellington, D.

Brownlow, E.

Cadogan, E.

Cawdor, E.

Abercorn, M. (D. Abercorn.)

Clonmell, E.

Coventry, E.

Abergavenny, M.

Dartmouth, E.

Ailesbury, M.

De La Warr, E.

Ailsa, M.

Denbigh, E.

Bristol, M.

Devon, E.

521

Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.)

Ashford, L. (V. Bury.)

Aveland, L.

Bagot, L.

Eldon, E.

Balfour of Burley, L.

Ellesmere, E.

Bateman, L.

Erne, E.

Blackburn, L.

Ferrers, E.

Blantyre, L.

Fitzwilliam, E.

Bloomfield, L.

Fortescue, E.

Brancepeth, L. (V. Boyne.)

Gainsborough, E.

Haddington, E.

Braybrooke, L.

Hardwicke, E.

Brodrick, L. (V. Midleton.)

Harewood, E.

Howe, E.

Byron, L.

Jersey, E.

Charlemont, L. (E. Charlemont.)

Lanesborough, E.

Lonsdale, E.

Churston, L.

Lovelace, E.

Clements, L. (E. Leitrim.)

Lucan, E.

Macclesfield, E.

Clinton, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Colchester, L.

Mansfield, E.

Colville of Culross, L.

Manvers, E.

Conyers, L.

Mar and Kellie, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Crofton, L.

Nelson, E.

De L'Isle and Dudley, L.

Onslow, E.

Orford, E.

De Mauley, L.

Pembroke and Montgomery, E.

Denman, L.

de Ros, L. [Teller.]

Powis, E.

De Saumarez, L.

Radnor, E.

Digby, L.

Ravensworth, E.

Dormer, L.

Redesdale, E.

Dunmore, L. (E. Dunmore.)

Romney, E.

Rosse, E.

Dunsany, L.

Rosslyn, E.

Ellenborough, L.

Sandwich, E.

Elphinstone, L.

Stanhope, E.

Ettrick, L. (L. Napier.)

Strange, E. (D. Athol.)

Forester, L.

Tankerville, E.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Verulam, E.

Waldegrave, E.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.)

Westmorland, E.

Gerard, L.

Wharncliffe, E.

Grey de Radcliffe, L. (V. Grey de Wilton.)

Wicklow, E.

Wilton, E.

Grinstead, L. (E. Enniskillen.)

Bangor, V.

Gwydir, L.

Bridport, V.

Hampton, L.

Clancarty, V. (E. Clancarty.)

Harlech, L.

Hartismere, L. (L. Henniker.)

Cranbrook, V.

Doneraile, V.

Hastings, L. (E. Loudoun.)

Falmouth, V.

Hardinge, V.

Hastings, L.

Hood, V.

Hawke, L.

Melville, V.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoul.)

Sidmouth, V.

Heytesbury, L.

Strathallan, V.

Houghton, L.

Templetown, V.

Howard de Walden, L.

Torrington, V.

Inchiquin, L.

Bangor, L. Bp.

Keane, L.

Chichester, L. Bp.

Kenlis, L. (M. Headfort.)

Gloucester and Bristol, L. Bp.

Ker, L. (M. Lothian.)

Hereford, L. Bp.

Kesteven, L.

St. Albans, L. Bp.

Leconfield, L.

St. David's, L. Bp.

Londesborough, L.

Abinger, L.

Manners, L.

Airey, L.

Massy, L.

Alington, L.

Monteagle of Brandon, L.

522

Mowbray, L.

Skelmersdale, L. [Teller.]

Northwick, L.

Norton, L.

Somerhill, L. (M. Clanricarde.)

Oranmore and Browne, L.

Sondes, L.

Ormonde, E. (M. Ormonde.)

Stratheden and Campbell, L.

Penrhyn, E.

Strathnairn, L.

Penzance, L.

Tollemache, L.

Poltimore, L.

Tredegar, E.

Raglan, L.

Truro, L.

Ramsay, L. (E. Dalhousie.)

Tyrone, L. (M. Waterford.)

Rayleigh, L.

Ventry, L.

Rivers, L.

Vernon L.

Rodney, L.

Vivian, L.

Romilly, L.

Walsingham, L.

Ross, L. (E. Glasgow.)

Wentworth, L.

Rossmore, L.

Westbury, L.

Sackville, L.

Willoughby de Broke, L.

Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

Windsor, L.

Saltoun, L.

Winmarleigh, L.

Scarsdale, L.

Wynford, L.

Sheffield, L. (E. Sheffield.)

Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Bedford, D.

Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.) [Teller.]

Devonshire, D.

Saint Albans, D.

Carew, L.

Westminster, D.

Carlingford, L.

Chesham, L.

Bath, M.

Coleridge, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Crewe, L.

Northampton, M.

De Tabley, L.

Ripon, M.

Dunning, L. (L. Rollo.)

Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)

Airlie, E.

Camperdown, E.

Emly, L.

Carnarvon, E.

Hammond, L.

Cowper, E.

Hatherton, L.

Derby, E.

Lanerton, L.

Ducie, E.

Lawrence, L.

Dudley, E.

Leigh, L.

Grey, E.

Lyttelton, L.

Kimberley, E.

Meldrum, L. (M. Huntly.)

Morley, E.

Northbrook, E.

Monck, L. (V. Monck.)

Portsmouth, E.

Moncreiff, L.

Shaftesbury, E.

Monson, L. [Teller.]

Spencer, E.

O'Hagan, L.

Sydney, E.

Oxenfoord, L. (E. Stair.)

Zetland, E.

Ribblesdale, L.

Cardwell, V.

Rosebery, L. (E. Roseberg.)

Gordon, V. (E. Aberdeen.)

Sandhurst, L.

Halifax, V.

Sefton, L. (E. Sefton.)

Selborne, L.

Oxford, L. Bp.

Strafford, L. (V. Enfield.)

Aberdare, L.

Sudeley, L.

Acton, L.

Waveney, L.

Beaumont, L.

Wolverton, L.

Belper, L.

Wrottesley, L.

Blachford, L.

Resolved in the Affirmative.
Then the original Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at a quarter before Three o'clock, to Tuesday next, a quarter before Five o'clock.