Sitting of 9 December 1878

MINUTES.
NEW WRITS ISSUED—For Londonderry County, v. Richard Smyth, esquire, deceased; for Borough of New Ross, v. John Dunbar, esquire, deceased.
PUBLIC BILLS—Resolution in Committee—Ordered—First Reading—Copyright * [53].
Ordered—First Heading—Borough Franchise (Ireland) * [49]; Tenants' Improvements in Towns (Ireland)* [50]; Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) (No. 2)* [51]; Ancient Monuments* [52].

QUESTIONS.
  THE COINAGE—WITHDRAWAL OF WORN SILVER COIN.

    QUESTION.
    MR. MONKasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he is aware of the serious extent to which the silver coin of the Realm is defaced by wear and tear, and of the inconvenience arising therefrom to large employers and their workmen; and, whether the Government will take stops to withdraw such worn coin from circulation?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the Bank of England undertakes to receive in London and at its branches worn and defaced silver coin which may be brought to it, and, if required, exchange it for new coin. No banker, therefore, need re-issue worn coin, and large amounts are withdrawn from circulation every year at the expense of the State. The average annual amount withdrawn in the United Kingdom during the five years ending 1877–8 was nearly £200,000; but during the present financial year, owing to the contraction of trade, the amount presented for withdrawal will be little short of £500,000. To meet the excessive charge which will thus be imposed on the Mint a Supplementary Vote of £30,000 was taken last Session. The particulars will be found in the Report of the Master of the Mint.

  TURKEY—REPORT OF THE RHODOPE COMMISSION.—QUESTION.
  LORD ELCHOasked, Whether Her Majesty's Government entertain any doubt as to the trustworthiness of the Rhodope Report; and, whether they have taken, or are about to take, any steps to carry into effect the objects for which the Rhodope European Commission was appointed?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, perhaps, as the Question of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Serjeant Simon) on this subject was addressed to me, and it was at my request he postponed it, I may be allowed to answer my noble Friend. It is not quite correct to speak of "the Rhodope Report." No single united Report has been made by the members of that Commission. Four members have addressed separate and identic Reports to their own Ambassadors; and in these circumstances it would not be possible to take any political action upon it without serious consideration. With regard, however, to the recommendations contained in the Report as to the sufferings which undoubtedly have been brought to light, it is difficult to see how any adequate relief can be provided, either by private charity or by the funds of the Turkish Government. Her Majesty's Government are considering whether they can make any proposal on this subject.
  LORD ELCHO: May I point out that my Question referred also to the trustworthiness of the Report, and that I should like to know whether any doubt is entertained on the subject?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, my noble Friend will see that is a Question very difficult to answer one way or the other. The Report which has been addressed to Her Majesty's Government by Her Majesty's Ambassador is one of considerable importance, and it undoubtedly discloses a serious state of suffering, for which it would be really desirable that some remedy could be found; but I can hardly answer the noble Lord's Question.
  LORD ELCHOgave Notice that he should repeat the Question.
  MR. SERJEANT SIMONsaid, in consequence of the Answer which had just been given, he begged to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, in the circumstance that the Report was

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  not a united Report of the Commission, it was in contemplation to take steps to verify the Report of our Commissioners, or whether the Report would be allowed to drop?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I think it would be better that that Question should be put after due Notice has been given.
  MR. SERJEANT SIMONgave Notice that he should put the Question tomorrow.

  SOUTH AFRICA—THE CAPE COLONY— THE MOUNTED POLICE.

    QUESTION.
    MR. GORST (for Lord Randolph Churchill)asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true that persons who had contracted to serve the Cape Government in a civil capacity in the "Mounted Police" have been by a Colonial Law compelled, without the option of discharge, to serve in a military capacity in a force called "The Mounted Rifles;" whether those who respectfully refused to submit to this arrangement were not tried by court martial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and hard labour, which involves their working on the roads of the Colony with common convicts; and, whether Her Majesty's Government propose to take any action in the matter?
    SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH,in reply, said, he was unable to state whether the reports referred to were or were not correct. Complaints had been made to the Colonial Office in November, and they had been referred to Sir Bartle Frere to report, and that Report, of course, had not yet been received. He feared it would be some time before all the facts of the case were in his possession.
    MR. GORSTgave Notice, on behalf of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock, that he would repeat the Question at a future period.

  THE EASTERN QUESTION—THE TREATY OF BERLIN—DESPATCHES— CYPRUS—JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF LAW.—QUESTION.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there can be laid be-
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  fore Parliament the following Despatches as to the execution of the Treaty of Berlin, namely, the German Despatches of August last and the Answers of the British Government, and the French Despatches of 22nd August and 27th September; and, whether there is any objection to produce any Correspondence as to the power of the Courts in Cyprus to try the subjects of Foreign Powers for offences against Turkish Law, or as to the Cesnola case?
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, the French despatches of the 22nd of August and 27th of September are to be found at pages 300 and 302 of the French Yellow Book published in November last. The first is a Circular addressed by M. Waddington to the French Representatives abroad. The second is a despatch addressed by M. Waddington to the French Ambassador at Constantinople. Neither of these Papers has been communicated to Lord Salisbury. There was no Correspondence with the German Government in August. A communication was made to Her Majesty's Government in September, but it was strictly confidential. No Correspondence has taken place with any foreign Power on the subject of jurisdiction in Cyprus.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked, whether the proceedings of the Cesnola case had been brought to the knowledge of the Government by the Governor of Cyprus?
  MR. BOURKE: I am not in a position to answer that Question without Notice. I do not recollect that they have.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: I will put a further Question to-morrow on the subject.

  AFGHANISTAN—THE RUSSIAN MISSION AT CABUL.—QUESTION.
  SIR HENRY HAVELOCKasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government have any information as to the Russian Mission sent by General Kauffmann having yet left Cabul, or whether it is still there; and, in the latter case, whether any communication has taken place between the Governments of England and Russia later than the Despatch from Lord Salisbury of the 19th August 1878, No. 158, given at page 149 of the Papers, Central Asia, No. 1, as to the

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  probable date of the withdrawal of this Mission after its purpose, stated to be one of "simple courtesy," shall have been accomplished; and, if any such Correspondence has taken place, whether he will object to add it to the Papers already published, and to lay it upon the Table of the House?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, we have no means of obtaining complete information of what takes place at Cabul. But since the Russian Ambassador came back to this country my noble Friend the Secretary of State has seen him, and he has been informed by him that the Russian Envoy has left Afghanistan, and we know from other sources that he has returned to Europe.

  INLAND REVENUE—THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT—RE-ORGANIZATION.

    QUESTION.
    MR. J. HOLMSasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the Commissioners of Customs have submitted to the Treasury a scheme for the re-organisation of their Department, in accordance with the recommendations made in 1874 by the Playfair Inquiry Commission; and, if so, whether he can promise an early settlement of the question?
    SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON,in reply, said, that a scheme for the reorganization of the Customs Department had been submitted to the Treasury. That scheme was now under consideration; and, as far as he was informed, there would be no unnecessary delay in settling the question, but the details were numerous.

  PARLIAMENT—COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC BUSINESS.—QUESTION.
  MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSENasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is his intention to make any propositions to the House, founded upon the recommendations of the Select Committee which sat last Session, to consider the best means of facilitating the despatch of Public Business?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,in reply, said, the Government were not prepared to make any proposal during the present short Session with reference to the subject alluded to in the
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  right hon. Gentleman's Question; but when the House re-assembled it would be one of the measures they would have to bring under its consideration. At present he could not make any positive announcement on the subject.

  THE WINDWARD ISLANDS—COOLIES IN GRENADA.—QUESTION.
  MR. ERRINGTONasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true, that during the month of September last Mr. Kerr, the Lieutenant Governor of Grenada, was obliged to remove from various estates in that island more than 100 indentured Coolies in consequence of their being in a dying state from want of food and general ill usage; whether some of those removed have since died; whether Mr. Denham, the protector of immigrants, has been by direction of the Governor prosecuted for manslaughter; if so, with what result; whether the 400 Coolies now in Grenada on the estates of the persons who ill treated the others are to be left there; and, whether, as Coolie immigration can hardly be done away with entirely, he will take steps in order that such abuses shall not recur?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, it is true that Mr. Kerr felt called upon to remove to hospital more than 100 Coolies from the estates in Grenada on which they had been located. On some estates complaints were made of insufficient food and medical attendance. Proceedings have been taken against the managers. The manager of one estate has been convicted of neglecting to supply the Coolies allotted to him with sufficient food and has been fined £50, and the Coolies from that estate have been allotted to an estate belonging to another person in a healthy locality. On other estates on which no complaints were made the Coolies were found to be in an unsatisfactory state of health, owing partly perhaps to the exceptionally unhealthy season, and partly to the unsatisfactory accommodation provided for them. Since the removal one or two of the Coolies have died; but the rest are doing well. They will not, however, be allowed to go back to the estates unless satisfactory accommodation has been first provided for them. Measures have been taken for more thorough inspection of estates and for more regular medical

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  attendance, and I have reason to believe that the proprietors of estates are exerting themselves to remedy the state of things complained of. On the occasion of the removal one man who was left behind by the captain of the ship which was sent to remove them died. Proceedings were taken against Mr. Denham in the matter, but he was exonerated from blame. There appears, however, to have been a failure of justice as regards the really culpable parties, which is being inquired into.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERasked, whether the 400 Coolies now in Grenada, on the estates of the persons who ill-treated the others, were to be left there; and whether Papers in connection with the subject would be produced?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHsaid, he thought he had already answered the Question. The Coolies had been removed, though not to the number of 400. The owners and managers of those estates on which they resided had been prosecuted and one had been fined; and the Coolies would not be allowed to return until proper accommodation for them had been provided.

  THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA— THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON—THE FISHERY AWARD.—QUESTION.
  MR. GOURLEYasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he has received from the United States Government the amount awarded by a majority of the Halifax Commissioners, under Clause 18 of the Treaty of Washington; if so, how he intends disposing of the amount; whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to re-consider the circumstances under which the Award was obtained with a view to the reduction of the amount; and, if he is prepared to state how far the fishermen of Newfoundland exceeded their rights in interfering with United States fishermen when fishing and drying their nets on a Sunday?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,in reply, said, that the amount of the Halifax Award—namely, $5,500,000 —was paid by the Government of the United States to Her Majesty's Government on the 21st of November last, and was now being disposed of between Newfoundland and the Dominion of Canada. It would be seen, by the Papers published
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  in The London Gazette, and since presented to Parliament, that Her Majesty' s Government had no intention of re-opening the question as to the amount of the Award. The question how far the fishermen of Newfoundland exceeded their rights in interfering with United States fishermen was at present under the consideration of the Government.

  MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1870—LEGISLATION.

    QUESTION.
    MR. P. A. TAYLORasked Mr. Attorney General, Whether his attention has been called to a decision lately given at the Manchester Police Court to the effect that a married woman judicially separated from her husband, and to whom a protection order had been granted, had nevertheless no legal redress against her husband who had taken away her property; and, whether, if such be the state of the Law, he will propose the necessary amendment of "The Married Women's Property Act, 1870?"
    THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER),in reply, said, before the Question of the hon. Member appeared on the Paper his attention was not called to the subject. Since Notice of the Question was given he had endeavoured, but without success, to ascertain the nature of the decision. If the hon. Member would furnish him with further particulars, he would be happy to state whether, in his opinion, any amendment of the law was necessary.

  ARTIZANS AND LABOURERS DWELLINGS ACT, 1875—INQUIRY AS TO OPERATION.—QUESTION.
  SIR UGHTRED KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, respecting his statement on July 12th last that the time had come when inquiry should be specially made in reference to the towns in England where an official Report under "The Artizans and Labourers Dwellings Act, 1875," has been made and no action taken upon it, Whether he has taken any steps in such inquiry, and, if so, with what result; and, whether he will lay the Correspondence before Parliament?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, he had corresponded with the Local Government Board on the subject referred to; and if the hon. Baronet would move for that Correspondence, there would be no objection to its being laid on the Table.

  THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1858.—AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.)

    QUESTION.
    MR. FAWCETTasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether, in view of the provision contained in the 41st section of the Government of India Act of 1858, which runs as follows:—
    "That the expenditure of the Revenues of India, both in India and elsewhere, shall be subject to the control of the Secretary of State in Council, and no grant or appropriation of any part of such Revenues, or of any other property coming into the possession of the Secretary of State in Council by virtue of this Act, shall be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting of the Council;"
    if he will inform the House by what authority the expenditure hitherto incurred in connection with the military expedition against the Ameer of Afghanistan has been sanctioned?
    MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, the expenditure was incurred on the authority of the Secretary of State for India. The matter was fully considered in 1869, and the Duke of Argyll, speaking in the House of Lords on behalf of his Government, said—
    "It is the opinion of all whom I have consulted, including the Law Officers of the Crown, that under the present Statute it is unquestionably in the power of the Secretary of State for India to order in India any service which may be required. Payment for this service is made in India, and the disallowance of that payment is not competent to the Council, without the sanction of the Secretary of State."—[3 Hansard, cxcv. 1074.]
    MR. FAWCETT: As I feel that the question is one of very great importance, and as I believe the money has been spent not only in India, but beyond the Frontier of India—["Order!"]—I am only desirous of having an opportunity of calling attention to the subject; and I will on an early occasion move a Resolution to the effect that, in the opinion of this House, the Secretary of State, by sanctioning the expenditure which he
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    had done, has infringed the spirit and the letter of the Government of India Act.

  AFGHANISTAN—REPLY OF AMEER TO ULTIMATUM.—QUESTION.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether a letter from the Ameer Shere Ali has been received by Major Cavagnari; and, if so, whether its contents are known to Her Majesty's Government?
  MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, the following telegram will, I think, explain all the circumstances as to the receipt of the Ameer's answer:—
  "From Viceroy, Dec. 5, 1878.
  "Cavagnari reports arrival at Dakka on 30th November of a subordinate officer of Ameer's, with letter in reply to ultimatum. Messenger had| reached Basawal 22nd, and there heard of Ali Musjid defeat and returned to Cabul. Letter is dated 19th, but is believed to have been re-written at Cabul after news of Ali Musjid. Summary of contents follow in cipher."
  We do not know when its contents became known to the Indian Government; but the summary was received in England on the night of December 5, and was not seen by any Member of the Cabinet until Friday, December 6. The statement in The Daily News, to the contrary effect, is a simple fabrication. The summary of contents was not published, because the full text was expected. That arrived yesterday, and was at once published in every quarter.

  CRIMINAL LAW—CASE OF JOHN NOLAN.—QUESTION.
  MR. MITCHELL HENRYwished to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department the Question of which he had given him private Notice, What course he proposes to pursue in reference to the case of John Nolan, a lad of 18 years of age, who died in the House of Correction, and whose death the Coroner's Jury found to be accelerated by the repeated, and excessive punishment of bread and water diet, which was ordered by the Governor and sanctioned by the Surgeon; and, whether he will be good enough to procure a Copy of the Depositions and lay them on the Table of the House, together with any Correspondence that has taken place between Sir

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  W. H. Wyatt, the Chairman of the Visiting Justices of Middlesex, and himself, on the working of the new Prisons Act, or any other of the metropolitan or city magistrates on the same subject?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, the hon. Gentleman's Question was a painful matter, and one which affected the character of two officers of the very highest standing, one of them being a medical gentleman who had been in two prisons during a large number of years. He found the circumstances were very bad indeed; and he had therefore written to the President of the College of Physicians to ask him to name some gentleman who would assist him by going with another officer to make the strictest inquiry on the subject. The President had most handsomely stated he would be glad to undertake the inquiries himself. He (Mr. Assheton Cross) had accordingly ordered Dr. Guy, who was on the Commission for Public Prisons, and the President of the Royal College of Physicians, and any other gentleman they should agree on, to make the very strictest inquiry. Until, therefore, he received their Report, he did not think it would be right to press the subject any further. He had, however, already taken action in the matter, by ordering that the recommendation of the Jury should be carried out as to having one physician attached to each prison, instead of one for the two, as had been the case for a great number of years. He was ready to produce the Papers if the hon. Member for Galway would confer with him as to the form in which they should be laid on the Table.

  AFGHANISTAN—THE FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.—QUESTION.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERasked the Under Secretary of State for India, When the further Afghan Papers would be in the possession of Members, especially the Proclamation of War, which he had hoped would be issued by itself, and must have been in the hands of the Government for some days?
  MR. E. STANHOPE,in reply, said, that some Papers had already been issued in a few cases, and were in possession of several Members of the House.

ORDER OF THE DAY.
  THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

    ADDRESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD).
    Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [6th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."
    Question again proposed.
    Debate resumed.
    MR. WHITBREAD,in rising to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice, said: Sir, it was not my desire to have moved the Motion of which I gave Notice upon this occasion. I should much have preferred if it had stood as a Resolution by itself. I had no desire to break in upon the practice —I think a very good one—which has prevailed in recent years of allowing the Address to pass without any Amendment being proposed. I was anxious, for another reason, to have moved my Resolution independently; because I did not desire that hon. Members opposite should suppose that my Motion was moved as an Amendment to any Vote for Supplies for our Army now engaged in Afghanistan. What I wish to obtain is the decision of the House upon the subject, as disclosed in the Papers which have been laid upon the Table. My Motion refers to the past conduct of Her Majesty's Government; and I do not wish that it should be mixed up with questions of the present or of the future. I am well aware of the vast interests which are touched by those who speak of the affairs of our Indian Empire; but I do not believe that any harm can arise from arguments directed solely to considerations of strict and impartial justice. I do not wish to be led away into saying anything upon the various questions that surround the one which I wish to bring under the notice of the House. I do not intend to say more than a single word upon the war which is now going on, and that is, as I have already said in another place, that it seems to me to be unnecessary and unjust. But, although I should not advise the stoppage of Supplies, I think that

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    in the moment of success we might do that which we could not do if we were to suffer a reverse; and I maintain that directly we have obtained a substantial success, we should be justified in doing our best to terminate the war. I would further express a hope that any demands which may be made by the Indian Government upon Shere Ali should be as little humiliating as possible; and I cannot help thinking that the course of the debates will show that, at all events, such grave errors have been committed that it is our strict and bounden duty to come down somewhat in the conditions which some might deem it necessary to impose, and from the arrogant position we nave assumed. Now, in the first place, I must ask the House to consider what has been the policy of previous Governments in relation to this question. The first extract in the Papers which have been laid before us to which I would ask the attention of the House will be found in page 44 of the Afghanistan Papers. It is an extract from a despatch of the 4th of January, 1869, from the Government of Lord Lawrence to the India Office at home. They set forth in paragraph 5 the policy which they recommend. They say—
    "We venture to sum up the policy which is recommended or supported, in various languages and by various arguments in our Minutes, somewhat as follows:—We object to any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a high British officer with or without a contingent, or by the forcible or amicable occupation of any post or tract in that country beyond our own Frontier, inasmuch as we think such a measure would, under present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance, and hatred in the minds of the Afghans, without in the least strengthening our power either for attack or defence. We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia, if that Power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own Frontier, and met her half way in a difficult country, and, possibly, in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our Frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control."
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    That was the policy which was pronounced by Lord Lawrence's Government, and it was the policy which was followed in the time of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook—what they desired to see was a strong, just, and merciful Government established in Afghanistan, which should be an independent State, and friendly to the English Government. I should like, in the next place, to read an extract from a private letter of Lord Mayo, which was written not long after the Umballa Durbar, which showed that Lord Mayo's views were the same as those enunciated in the despatch of Lord Lawrence's Government. The extract is taken from Hunter's Life of Lord Mayo, and it appears in page 271 of that work. It is as follows:—
    "Surround India with strong, friendly, and independent States, who will have more interest in keeping well with us than with any other Power, and we are safe. The Central Asia question is only a bugbear if prudence be observed, and will have no reality for many years to come."
    In another letter he said—
    "Our influence has been considerably strengthened both in our own territories and also in the States of Central Asia by the Umballa meeting, and if we can only persuade people that our policy is non-intervention and peace, that England is at this moment the only non-aggressive Power in Asia, we should stand on a pinnacle of power that we have never enjoyed before."
    That was Lord Mayo's opinion, as expressed in a private letter. At page 93 of the Afghanistan Papers will be found paragraph 4 of the despatch of the Government of India to the Duke of Argyll, dated the 1st of July, 1869, which is as follows:—
    "We entirely agree with the principles laid down in Tour Grace's despatch, i. e., that it is for the interest of our Indian Empire that there should be a strong and settled government in Afghanistan, such as may promote commerce with us and protect the people of the country from the evils of civil war; that the discretion of the Indian Government should be kept absolutely free as to the occasions on which such assistance should be given or withheld;' that further, we should abstain from exercising 'any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,' and give no pledge which would lead the Ameer to believe that we should ever countenance or support a notoriously cruel and oppressive Government."
    It will be remembered that, shortly after Lord Mayo became Viceroy, at the wish of Shere Ali a Conference was held at Umballa, the result of which was stated

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    in the despatch from which I have just read. No doubt when Shere Ali met Lord Mayo he asked for more than the British Government could give him; for years before the Conference Shere Ali had been engaged in a tedious civil war, and had great difficulty in seating himself firmly on the Throne. He desired, therefore, not only pecuniary assistance from the British Government, but also dynastic pledges, which would secure for the heir of his choice the succession to the Throne, and guarantee his country against the evils of civil war. Lord Mayo received him nobly; and all who remembered and deplored the noble Lord, will recollect that he was well calculated to make an impression on such a Ruler as Shere Ali. Lord Mayo thus summed up the practical results of the Conference in the despatch dated the 1st of July, 1869, which will be found in page 94 of the Papers—
    "While we distinctly intimated to the Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his Frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or money allowance would be given for any named period; that no promise of assistance in other ways would be made; that no Treaty would be entered into, obliging us under every circumstance to recognize him and his descendants Rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were prepared by the most open and absolute present recognition, …. to give all the moral support in our power, and that in addition we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, Native artificers, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or desirable to do so."
    Having read that paragraph once or twice, I was a little astonished the other evening at hearing my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) assert that no promise whatever had ever been given to the Ameer that he should not be required to receive British officers in his country, and that the point was never mentioned between him and the Ameer. According to The Times, my hon. Friend ventured to say that no such promise had ever been given; and that he could only reply that Lord Mayo made no mention of such a communication in his despatch home, and had never mentioned it to the Ameer. It is difficult to reconcile that statement with the paragraph which I have just read.
    MR. E. STANHOPE: I did not say exactly what I am reported to have said. What I did say was, that in the conversation which took place between the Ameer and Lord Mayo the latter never mentioned the subject of a Resident Agent.
    MR. WHITBREAD: The hon. Member has mistaken my point, which was, not whether the subject was ever mentioned between the individual Viceroy and the individual Ameer, but whether such a promise had ever been given. The gist of the hon. Member's argument was that no attempt was made to impose a Resident Agent upon the Ruler of Afghanistan contrary to a promise that had been given, and he said that no such promise was ever given. But the subject was thus summed up in the very next page of Lord Mayo's despatch—
    "The position of affairs at the close of the Conferences may, in the Viceroy's words, confidentially addressed to Your Grace, be summed up as follows:—Firstly, what the Ameer is not to have—no Treaty, no fixed subsidy, no European troops, officers, or Residents, no dynastic pledges. Secondly, what he is to have—warm countenance and support, discouragement of his rivals, such material assistance as we may consider absolutely necessary for his immediate wants, constant and friendly communication through our Commissioner at Peshawur, and our Native Agents in Afghanistan; he, on his part, undertaking to do all he can to maintain peace on our Frontier, and to comply with all our wishes on matters connected with trade."
    After reading that extract, the hon. Member cannot contend that no promise was ever made to the Ameer that he should not be required to receive European officers as Residents. Very possibly the subject was never mentioned between the Ameer and the Viceroy; but that was only because it was an unmentionable topic. Dost Mahomed, the father of the present Ruler of Afghanistan had said if we desired to remain friends with the Afghans we ought not to force them to receive European officers as Residents. However, the fact is that at the time of the Umballa Conference the subject was broached to the Ameer; and if Lord Mayo did not do so himself it was on account of Shere Ali's known hostility to the project. I will not weary the House by recounting the various occasions on which the policy of non-intervention has been approved in this and in the other House of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman

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    the Chancellor of the Exchequer has twice expressed his approval of the policy of non-intervention—on the 9th of July, 1869, and on the 22nd of April, 1873. I also recollect a very strong statement of Lord Derby in the same direction—to the effect that the Protectorate of Afghanistan must necessarily follow, if we forced the Ameer against his will to receive our officer as a Resident. It is desirable, at this point, to call the attention of the House to what was our understanding with Russia; and if hon. Members will turn to the Papers they will find the understanding set forth at page 104 of the Papers. In the 6th paragraph of the despatch from Lord Northbrook to the Duke of Argyll, dated the 30th of June, 1873, it is said—
    "In the latter part of the year 1869 the presence of Mr. Douglas Forsyth at St. Petersburg afforded an opportunity for a more full discussion of the proposals which were under the consideration of the two Governments. The subject of the influence which should be exercised by Russia and Great Britain respectively, over the States on their Frontiers was frankly entered into, and it was agreed that beyond the limit of the Provinces which the Ameer of Afghanistan then held he should not attempt to exercise any interference or influence, that the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression, and that, similarly, Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory."
    And then, at the end of paragraph 7, Prince Gortchakoff is reported to have
    "stated that he saw no objection to English officers visiting Cabul, though he agreed [with the Earl of Mayo that Russian Agents should not do so."
    I think that that is an important admission on the part of the Russian Representative. At the bottom of the page we shall see the further declaration of Prince Gortchakoff. It is said that
    "Prince Gortchakoff, on the conclusion of these communications, requested Sir Andrew Buchanan to tell Lord Clarendon that' as both Governments are free from all arrières-penseés, ambitious views, or unfriendly feelings towards each other, the more fully and frankly all questions connected with Central Asia are discussed between them the more effectually will the 'mists' be blown away which, through the misrepresentations of over-zealous subordinate Agents, may, at any time, hang over them."
    Moreover, the result of the communication that had passed was thus summarized by Prince Gortchakoff in a de-
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    spatch to Count Brunnow on the 1st of November, 1871—

    (a.) "That the territory in the actual possession at the present moment of Shere Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.

    (b.) "That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.

    (c.) "That for their part the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.

    "These principles had been unreservedly accepted both by the Cabinet of London and the Governor General of India."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 105.]
    That was the position of affairs between Russia and England as relating to Afghanistan at the time of which I am speaking; and, as will be seen on referring to page 116, Shere Ali was made fully acquainted with it. I would here note that, as will be found upon the following page (page 106), it was about this time that General Kaufmann
    "assured the Ameer of Afghanistan that he had given no encouragement to Abdool Rahman Khan, the nephew of the Ameer, who was residing as a refugee in Russian territory and was supposed to entertained designs upon the tranquillity of Afghanistan."
    This Abdool Rahman Khan is the man who, of all others, could be most formidable to the Ameer—much more so even than Yakoob, his son. He was the son of Shere Ali's elder brother, who carried on a civil war against him for so many years, and very nearly prevented him from gaining the Throne. Abdool was still anxious to stir up trouble on the border, and would have done so if General Kaufmann had not dissuaded him. General Kaufmann told him that living within the Turkoman country as a refugee he was not to abuse the hospitality he was receiving by making any attack upon Afghanistan, saying that Russia tad no quarrel either with the Ameer of Afghanistan or with the British Government. At that time it does not appear that Russia was doing anything in her relations with Afghanistan of which this country could complain. I assert that somewhat boldly; because I wish it to be clearly understood that it was the case that up to that time there was nothing of which we had cause to

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    or did complain. This is a fact which I wish to be distinctly understood. In the year 1873 Lord Northbrook had occasion to make the Ameer acquainted with the decision arrived at, both with regard to the boundary of Afghanistan and that of Seistan. The latter, which was the boundary between Afghanistan and Persia, gave considerable offence to Shere Ali, and Lord Northbrook, wishing to explain the matter to him, proposed to send a British officer to Cabul for the purpose. Here I beg the House to observe the course of action taken by Shere Ali. He declined to receive a British officer, and proposed instead that his own Minister should wait upon the Viceroy. Lord Northbrook accepted that proposal; and I mention this point, because it is one constantly recurring in reference to proposals on our part to send European officers to Cabul, which proposals have been just as constantly refused. It is well to bear this in mind, in order that we may the better understand the question when we come to deal with that part of it which relates to the refusal of the Ameer to receive the last Mission. When the Afghan Envoy, Noor Mahomed Shah, came to Simla he opened up, besides the two questions of the boundaries, a great many other questions. He again asked for an unconditional Treaty, his master having complained always that the only Treaty between Afghanistan and England—that of 1855—was a one-sided Treaty, in that it bound the Ruler of Afghanistan to a great many things and bound England to very little. He therefore wanted an unconditional guarantee against external attack; but when asked whether the Ameer would receive European Residents, the Envoy replied that, in the interest of both countries, he could not recommend that the point should be pushed, and that branch of the question was dropped. Lord Northbrook, after referring home, felt justified in giving to the Ameer assurances which went rather beyond those of Lord Mayo; but he got no unconditional guarantee. The result was, that the Envoy went away not quite so well pleased as did Shere Ali from the Durbar at Umballa. He had got assurances that went even further; but I believe the explanation of it is this—that Shere Ali put rather too hopeful a construction upon the promises made to
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    him by Lord Mayo. Though I admit that those promises were very carefully worded, I cannot help thinking that part of the subsequent disappointment of the Ameer results from this. There is a rather curious little reference to this in the Papers, where it is stated, at page 201, that Sir Lewis Pelly thought, in reading over the agreement come to after the Umballa Conference, he detected in the Persian version words which seemed to convey that the English Government would visit with "severe punishment," instead of with "severe displeasure," any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position as Ruler of Cabul, or to stir up civil war in the Kingdom. The reason why no more definite agreement was come to between Lord Northbrook and Noor Mahomed Shah was that, though the Viceroy was prepared there and then to give him something more definite, the Envoy declared that he had no power to treat further. Now, we come to the first part of the story, as it relates to the present Government. On the 22nd of January, 1875, Lord Salisbury instructed the Government of India to address the Ameer, with a view to getting his sanction to a Resident Agent in Afghanistan. This Instruction is conveyed in a despatch, which commences by stating that Her Majesty's Government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in Central Asia and on the Frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, and then proceeds as follows:—
    "I have therefore to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. When this is accomplished it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Candahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people."
    The next paragraph is a very interesting one. It says—
    "The Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is therefore not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now."—[Ibid. p. 129.]
    This, I think, was the beginning of the mistaken policy. I have no doubt Lord Salisbury believed that the Ameer had really consented to receive these Agents;

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    and upon that point I should like to call the attention of the House to one or two other extracts from the Papers which are before us, because it really seems to me to have been the beginning of the mischief—this belief that the Ameer would consent to receive the Envoys. The evidences upon which Lord Salisbury founded that belief are two notes of private conversations which Captain Grey, who acted as Persian interpreter, had with Noor Mahomed Shah at Umballa, and which will be found in page 173 of the Papers. In the despatch which Lord Northbrook wrote home in reference to this one of Lord Salisbury, he expressed an opinion that it was very doubtful, though perhaps possible, that the Ameer had made this concession, or agreed to accept the Residents, in a private conversation with Captain Grey; and he added, that if such an assent was given, it was given in a private conversation, of which there was no official record; and that, therefore, it would be impossible upon such a foundation to press upon the Ameer the reception of these Agents. Captain Grey's note of the conversation which, as I have said, is to be found on page 173 of the Papers, is very curious. It is contained in an "Extract from Memorandum of Conversations between Captain Grey and Noor Mahomed Shah, dated 31st March, and 1st April, 1869;" and in the first conversation it is recorded that the Ameer
    "is open to any proposition for securing his northern border, while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or Engineer superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet."
    But on the very next day Captain Grey had another conversation with this same Noor Mahomed Shah, and it is recorded that—
    "The Secretary asked him if the Ameer would sanction Native Agents in Afghanistan either as visitors or as permanent residents, supposing the British Government wished it; the Minister replied that he did not wish to commit himself, and asked, rather anxiously, whether European Agents were intended, observing at the same time that it was of no use to send any but Mahomedans, Hindoos were of no good at all."
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    That is the evidence, as far as Captain Grey is concerned; and the question is of some importance, because it is referred to again in the Instructions given to Sir Lewis Pelly in reference to the Conference at Peshawur. I have yet to learn that the assent to the Resident Agents was given, or given in such a form that it could possibly be used against the Ameer at all; and I want to draw the attention of the House to a short statement which has been made by Mr. Seton-Karr, who was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 1869, at the time of the Umballa Durbar. Mr. Seton-Karr has not authorized me, personally, to make use of his statement; but he entrusted it to a friend, with full power to use it as he thought most fitting. Mr. Seton-Karr states that
    "he was the bearer of every confidential communication between Lord Mayo and the Ameer, and was present at every interview between them. He gave Lord Lawrence an account of what occurred in a letter dated the 5th of April, 1869, which he has authorized Lord Lawrence to use. In that letter there is the following paragraph:—'He, Shere Ali, is told that we don't want British officers as Residents at Cabul or anywhere else, and he says they would do him harm in the eyes of his people.'"
    I can hardly believe, therefore, that there was a real assent to the reception of these officers as Residents. If there was, it was given in very private conversations with Captain Grey, and on condition of dynastic pledges and an almost unconditional Treaty, without which nothing would have been done. After a delay of some months, Lord North-brook's Government in India replied to the despatch of Lord Salisbury. In that reply it was set forth that, in the opinion of Lord Northbrook, Lord Salisbury very much underrated the value of the Native Agents the Government already had in Afghanistan; he denied that any real information which it was necessary for them to possess had ever been kept back by these Agents; he asked what piece of information which they ought to have known could be pointed to which had not been received from these Agents; and he went on to express the opinion entertained by everyone around him that the value of British Residents in Afghanistan would be positively nil, unless the Ameer and his people cordially welcomed them. There is not

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    wanting some evidence of this. There are the cases, both recent, of Major Todd at Herat, and Major Lumsden at Candahar, both of whom were as much imprisoned as they would have been if shut up in a gaol, with regard to the information they could get or transmit to their Government. They were watched on all sides; and no one was allowed to have access to them, except those who could tell the story which it was desired should be known. There is, in short, no more difficult position than that of a British officer residing in the midst of a hostile population, determined that he should neither obtain, nor transmit any information which could be of value. The fact of the matter is that, as things at present stand, more could be learnt of Afghanistan affairs by an official residing at Peshawur, than by similar functionaries living in Herat or Candahar. With regard to the larger question—whether the Ameer would willingly receive these Residents—Lord Northbrook took considerable pains to ascertain the views of all those who were entitled to speak on the subject, and for that purpose he addressed a communication to the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, in order to obtain his views, and those of such officials as might be considered competent to advise on the following points:—
    "First, whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place; second, whether the presence of such Residents at either place would he advantageous to the British Government; third, whether the Lieutenant Governor was satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence received from the British Agent at Cabul, and if not, whether his Honour could suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 130.]
    The answers received to these questions were practically unanimous. The opinion of the Punjab Government, set forth at page 132 of the Papers, is in these words—
    "If the concurrence of all those who may be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer is of any value, we must be prepared to find him most unwilling to receive a British Agent at Herat. On this the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir Richard Pollock, Major-General Reynell Taylor, Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari are all agreed, and their views are confirmed—1. By those of Nawab Foujdar
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    Khan and Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan, who have successively served as British Agent at Cabul, and who have means of knowing the present sentiments of the Ameer. 2. By the opinion of Noor Mahomed Shah, the Cabul Envoy, who, when at Simla in 1873, advised the Foreign Secretary that a specific request should not be preferred to the Ameer for British officers to be stationed within the Afghan dominions. 3. By the recent acts of the Ameer in objecting to permit Sir D. T. Forsyth to traverse Balkh on his return journey from Yarkund and in discouraging Colonel Baker from returning to India from Teheran viâ Cabul."
    There was a remarkable agreement among all these officers on the subject; and it seems to me to have been a very strong step for the Government at home to re-open this question, and to insist upon sending these Resident Agents into the territories of the Ameer against his will. Lord Salisbury, believing that the Ameer had previously consented, remarked that if he was still loyal it was not possible that he should refuse now to receive them. On this the Indian Government very properly remarked that it did not necessarily follow that because the Ameer declined to receive these Residents he had become disloyal. There were strong grounds for his refusal; because there cannot be a doubt that there was a very strong party—if not an unanimous people—in Afghanistan opposed to the reception of these Residents. I, for one, doubt very much whether the Ameer could have maintained his rule if he had permitted these Agents to reside in his dominions. What did his people believe on the subject? You will find, from every page of this Book, their belief to have been that if once they allowed these British Residents to come in their independence was gone. You may cast all sorts of hard words against these people of Afghanistan. They have been called barbarous, and I daresay they are; they have been described as treacherous, and I daresay the description is accurate; they may be called an uncivilized race, who will not admit strangers within their country if they can help it; but, at all events, they are independent, and love their independence. Neither Lord Salisbury nor Lord Lytton seem to have realized the feeling entertained by the whole people of Afghanistan upon this subject of the British Resident. They said—If we once admit him, he will be writing all sorts of reports about

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    us to his Government, and then they will come and interfere with us and take our country from us; at any rate, it is not possible that we should maintain our independence in the management of our own internal affairs if we once admit him. Before I leave this despatch, there is one more paragraph which I wish to mention, and that is the one in which Sir Richard Pollock expresses his
    "conviction that no unfavourable change whatever had occurred in the disposition of His Highness, and that he leaned as much as ever on the British Government."—[Ibid. p. 134.]
    Lord Northbrook, in the same despatch, reminded Lord Salisbury of the promise given at the Umballa Conference on the question of the Resident British Agents, and begged to be allowed to continue the conciliatory policy followed by so many Viceroys. It was not long, however, before the Home Government returned to the charge; and on the 19th of November, 1875, Lord Salisbury wrote a despatch to the Indian Government, in which he urged them to find—or, as he said, "if need be, to create"—an opportunity for sending a Mission to secure the assent of the Ameer to the British Residents in his dominions. Lord Northbrook's Government did not take so long to reply this time; and I am glad to say that they adhered firmly to the policy which they had already announced as their wish to follow. They asked for a re-consideration of the whole question; expressed a doubt whether Lord Salisbury had weighed all the reasons advanced in their former communications; and repeated some of them. With respect to the proposal for finding or creating an occasion for sending a Mission to the Ameer with the object indicated, they very properly pointed out that if it were thought necessary to send such a Mission at all, the most advisable course would be—
    "To state frankly and fully to the Ameer the real purpose of the Mission, and to invite him to enter cordially into those closer relations with the British Government which the Mission is to endeavour to establish. The Ameer and his advisers are shrewd enough to understand that only matters of grave political importance could induce us to send a special Mission to His Highness' Court. If the Mission were ostensibly directed to objects of minor political importance, the Ameer and his officials would be incredulous. He might then decline to discuss
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    the weightier questions brought forward by our Envoy, and in all probability his confidence in us would he shaken, especially as the proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences of 1869."—[Ibid. p. 151.]
    Then they asked over again that they might not be driven to depart from the policy which was pursued by Lord Lawrence and by Lord Canning and Lord Mayo; and they pointed out that if these British Agents were sent into Afghanistan without the cordial consent of the Ameer, they would run a risk of having insults offered to them for which it would be difficult to hold the Ameer responsible. The despatch also pointed out over again, with considerable detail, the reasons which guided them in asking a further consideration for this matter in their former despatch. It was hardly possible, therefore, that the Viceroy and his Government could have more manfully or sturdily maintained their policy; and I am glad that they did so. Only conceive the way in which this attempt to force British Residents upon Afghanistan was to be carried out! Of what nature were the men with whom they had to deal? Fancy an Englishman, or even a man endowed with all the shrewdness of a Scotchman, endeavouring to create an opportunity, and putting forward some flimsy pretext to suspicious Asiatics, thoroughly awake to what was going on, and then imagining that they would not see through it! Lord Lytton succeeded Lord Northbrook as Viceroy; and we are told in one of his despatches that he went out to India well prepared to deal with this question, after previous communication with the Government at home and with the Russian Ambassador. I do not at all complain of his communicating with the Russian Ambassador before leaving London. It was natural that the Viceroy who was going out should take every opportunity of learning the views of the Russian Ambassador; but there is a very ugly interpretation to be put on some things that occurred afterwards in connection with this proceeding. Lord Lytton went out with powers to give more definite declarations of support to the Ameer, and to obtain more definite arrangements on the subject of Resident Agents in

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    Afghanistan. These powers appeared partly to be contained in the Instructions drawn out for him by the Secretary of State. These Instructions state that—
    "Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, prepared to sanction and support any more definite declaration which may, in your judgment, secure to their unaltered policy the advantages of which it has been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its sincerity. But they must reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the character of circumstances involving the obligation of material support to the Ameer, and it must be distinctly understood that only in some clear case of unprovoked aggression would such an obligation arise."
    And further—
    "The Ameer must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country, and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorized to enter them."—[Ibid. p. 159.]
    That communication when made to the Ameer would naturally strengthen him in his notion, that when once he had admitted British Agents there would be an end of his independence. Lord Lytton wrote, on the 5th May, 1876, his first letter to the Ameer. It will be found at page 174 of the Blue Book. It was nominally from the Commissioner at Peshawur to the Ameer; but, of course, it was written under the instigation and the directions of the Viceroy. He says to Shere Ali, that as soon as he heard of the arrival of the Viceroy in India
    "I lost no time in waiting on him; and in the course of a lengthened interview with which I was honoured by his Excellency, the present Viceroy inquired very cordially after your Highness's health and welfare, and those of his Highness Abdoollah Jan; intimating his intention of deputing to your Highness, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, his friend, Sir Lewis Pelly, who has accompanied his Excellency from England, and who will return so soon as his interviews with your Highness are completed. Sir Lewis Pelly will be accompanied by Dr. Bellow and Major St. John for the purpose of delivering to your Highness in person a khureeta, informing your Highness of his Excellency's accession to office, and formally announcing to your Highness the addition which Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to make to Her Sovereign titles in respect to Her Empire of India."
    That was the opportunity, or the pretext, which the Viceroy found or created, or
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    rather, which I suppose was created for him at home. The Ameer looked at the last few lines of that letter—for that is the pith of it—and soon saw through it. The letter, after assuring the Ameer of the friendly feelings by which the Viceroy's intention was prompted, went on to say that
    "Sir Lewis Pelly, who is honoured by the new Viceroy with his Excellency's fullest confidence, will be able to discuss with your Highness matters of common interest to the two Governments."
    I do not complain of the tone of that letter; but there you have the pretext of announcing his own accession to office and the assumption of the title of Empress; and then comes the pith of the letter, which, as in many other cases, is contained in the last line, and of course Shere Ali, being pretty wide awake to what was on foot, was not deceived by it. The Ameer replied on the 22nd of May. His reply will be found at page 175 of the Blue Book. He says—
    "In the particular of the coming of the Sahibs for the purpose of certain (some) matters of the two Governments is this—that the Agent of this friend formerly personally held political parleys at the Station of Simla on these subjects. These having been considered sufficient, and efficient, were entered in two letters … and need not be repeated now."
    And he goes on to say—
    "At this time, if there be any new parleys for the purpose of refreshing and benefiting the God-given State of Afghanistan entertained in the thoughts, then let it be hinted, so that a confidential Agent of this friend, arriving in that place and being presented with the things concealed in the generous heart of the English Government, should reveal them to the suppliant at the Divine Throne, in order that the matters weighed by a minute and exact investigation may be committed to the pen of affectionate writing."
    I think it is clear from that, that Shere Ali saw through the pretexts of announcing the arrival of the Viceroy and the addition of Empress to the Queen's titles. He saw that we wanted him to do something in reference to British Agents, or something else, and he first wished to know what it was. This answer appears to have angered the Viceroy; and, as will be found at page 175, the Native Agent at the Court of Cabul wrote a letter, which was, to a certain extent, explanatory of the Ameer's reply. The Native Agent says the

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    Ameer was afraid that the real meaning of the thing was, that he was to be ordered to receive British Residents; and he observes that, as to the coming of the Sahibs, in his view of the state of affairs it is not advisable, remarking, that the point chiefly to be regarded is, that even if for the purpose of securing the good-will of the British Government the Ameer should consent to receive a British Agent, and to make the necessary arrangements for his safety, then this grave difficulty would arise—that what was done could not be concealed from the Russian authorities, who were on his northern borders, who were extremely fearless, and who would want to have Agents in his country too. Now that may, perhaps, have been an excuse; but, at all events, it shows that there was no more desire to receive Russian Agents than British on the part of the Ameer. I quote this, because it is held that the great desire of Shere Ali was to receive Russian Agents, and not English; but I do not think that proposition can be maintained. The second letter of the Viceroy, dated 8th July, 1876, and which will be found at page 176 of the Papers, gives the first indication of the new—that is, the threatening—policy which has landed us in our present situation. In the last paragraph it says—
    "I am to repeat that, in proposing to send a friendly Mission to your Highness, the Viceroy has been actuated by a cordial desire, which it rests with your Highness to reciprocate, for the continuance, on closer terms than heretofore, of amicable relations between the two Governments in view of common interests, more particularly affecting Afghanistan and the personal welfare of your Highness and your dynasty. It will, for this reason, cause the Viceroy sincere regret, if your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand of friendship now frankly held out to you, should render nugatory the friendly intentions of his Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British Government."
    Here was the first distinct threat of the withdrawal of all support from the Ameer if he did not accede to the Viceroy's proposals. That threat was conveyed in language which was certainly direct. It is here important to bear in mind one fact connected with the Russian Agent at Cabul, and that is this—that we never find that anything was done by a Russian Agent at Cabul which could be complained of by our Government prior
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    to the receipt by the Ameer of this threatening letter. Let the House turn to the Central Asian Papers, and at page 79 they will find proof of what I have just said. At the foot of that page, in a telegram dated September 16, 1876, sent from Simla by the Viceroy to Lord Salisbury, it is stated that the Indian Government would send home by the next mail a despatch expressing a decided opinion on the necessity of Her Majesty's Government remonstrating with Russia on the subject of the Correspondence that had passed with the Ameer, through the hands of Russian Agents, two of whom were then in Cabul. On page 83 of the "Correspondence respecting Central Asia" you will find the written despatch, and also certain enclosures. The point with regard to the enclosures is this—that the earliest intelligence received by us of anything done by the Russian Agent or Agents, of which we could complain, is to be found in the Cabul Diary from the 4th to the 14th of August, 1876. This is the first mention of anything in connection with a Russian Agent at Cabul of which we had cause to complain. Now, if you turn to page 76 of the same Papers you will find that, by the Cabul Diary of the 1st of June, 1876, the Ameer had been in receipt on the previous day of Russian communications. It is recorded that on the receipt of the letters the Ameer summoned the British Agent, and showed him the letter of the Governor of Samarcand to the Naib. Its purport is that the Russian Government, with regard to Afghanistan, aims at nothing but friendship; that Mirza Abdul Karim has left with a Murrasila from the Russian Governor General to the Ameer; and that the Naib should appoint an Agent to escort him to Cabul. I quote this in order to show that up to this time, June, 1876, we had never complained, or had reason to complain, of anything done by the Russian Agent at Cabul, and that the Ameer always acted with openness in sending the communications to us. In order to show that that and previous communications were not regarded with anything like distrust, I would point out to the House that at page 79—Paper No. 70—it is recorded that on the 6th of September, 1876, Lord Derby transmitted to Lord Augustus Loftus, for his information, and without re-

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    mark or complaint of any kind, a copy of a despatch, inclosing these Cabul Diaries of 30th May to 1st June. That, to my mind, shows conclusively that up to the time at which we began to threaten the Ameer he acted with perfect openness. Afterwards, there may, perhaps, have been something to say on the other side. The Viceroy, after sending his second letter to Shere Ali by the Commissioner at Peshawur, also sent certain Instructions, by the same hand and on the same day, to the Native Agent at Cabul, with the last paragraph only of which will I trouble the House, in the following words:—
    "If the Ameer … still declines to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, the responsibility of the result will rest entirely on the Government of Afghanistan, which will thereby have isolated itself from the alliance of that Power which is most disposed, and best able, to befriend it."—[Ibid. p. 177.]
    This threat having been sent to the Ameer, he sent, on the 3rd of September, 1876, a reply, not altogether unfriendly in character. After suggesting that he disliked the idea of a Mission, the Ameer proceeded—
    "I have come to this conclusion, that if an Envoy of the British Government, and a selected trusted Representative of this Government, should meet on the Frontier to explain mutually the views and wishes of their respective Governments, it would be a very advantageous arrangement; or, should that course not approve itself to the British authorities, then, that the British Agent at Cabul, who has long been intimately acquainted with all my wishes, should be summoned to his own Government, and expound the whole state of affairs, and, having fully understood the desires and projects of the British Government, should return back to me, and explain them all to me in private, after which I should be the better able to decide what course it is incumbent on me to adopt in the interests of my country."—[Ibid. p. 179.]
    Lord Lytton assented to the proposal; and on the 7th of October, 1876, Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Cabul, had a conversation with Sir Lewis Pelly at Simla. He stated the Ameer's grievances about the Seistan boundary, about Mahomed Yakoob Khan, and our desire for the appointment of political Agents, and he used the following remarkable phrase:—"that the Ameer regards the Agents from Russia as sources of embarrassment," but hardly knew how to get rid of them. This
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    certainly did not look as if the Ameer had made up his mind to side with the Russians. Upon the question of Yakoob Khan, there can be no doubt that the Ameer was very sore on account of Lord Northbrook's interference; but the facts were really these:—This son was the man to whom the Ameer mainly owed his position. He had fought for his father, and helped him materially to ascend the Throne. They quarrelled, and it was owing to the good offices of Lord Mayo that they were reconciled. After this, Yakoob Khan, being anxious to see the Ameer, came under a safe conduct from Herat to Cabul, when he was immediately cast into prison. Lord Northbrook very properly represented to the Ameer that the assistance rendered to him by England, from the time of Lord Lawrence downwards, had been given to him upon the one ground that England desired to see a strong, just, and merciful Government established in Afghanistan. Now, was it possible that we, who had spent so much money, taken so much pains, and bound ourselves to such obligations to the Ameer, would allow him, without a word of remonstrance, to commit this atrocious act upon his son, who had come to him under a safe conduct? Lord Salisbury frankly said that this was a just and proper course to take. But the Ameer looked upon it as a violation of our pledge not to interfere with his internal government. After having seen Sir Lewis Pelly, the Native Agent had an interview with the Viceroy, which is recorded on page 183 of the Afghan Papers; and I think there is more in this one little conversation derogatory to British honour, and calculated to work permanent harm, than in any other Paper that has ever come under my notice. The Viceroy said he was going to open his mind frankly to the Native Agent, who came to him under the somewhat peculiar circumstances and with the Mission which I have described in the words I quoted just now from the letter addressed by Shere Ali on the 3rd September, 1876, to the Commissioner of Peshawur. Lord Lytton, in the course of the conversation, made use of the following words:—
    "The Ameer had apparently come to the conclusion that, having nothing to hope from us, and, at the same time, nothing to fear, he may safely stand aloof from the British Go-

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    vernment; confident that, in the event of external attack, we shall he obliged to help him, for the protection of our own interests, even if we are under no contract obligation to do so. This was a very natural conclusion; but, unfortunately for the Ameer, there was a fatal flaw in its premises. It is true that, if the Ameer proves himself our friend and loyal ally, not our interests only, but our honour, will oblige us to defend his territories and support his Throne. But the moment we have cause to doubt his sincerity, or question the practical benefit of his alliance, our interests will be all the other way, and may greatly augment the dangers with which he is already threatened, both at home and abroad. As regards the former, the British Government can only assist those who value its assistance; and the assistance which the Ameer seems at present disinclined to seek or deserve may, at any moment, be very welcome to one or other of those rivals, from whom he will never be free till he has our assured support. As regards the latter, our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own Frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."
    Here was the Viceroy speaking in the name of the Sovereign of England, in the course of a conversation described as private—but which was no more private, in fact, than is this debate—and suggesting to the Ruler of Afghanistan that as there were rival pretenders to his Throne, he (in other words, England) would offer his help to one of those rivals, unless the Ameer accepted his terms. Is it possible to draw any-other conclusion from these documents, and will anyone say that such a conclusion is worthy of the policy of England? Is it the kind of diplomacy that you in this House approve for our Representative to turn round upon the Ameer, whose friendship we had always professed to desire, and to say to him—"If you do not admit our political Residents into your country we will turn to one of your rivals, from whom you are never safe once our support is withdrawn from you?" I cannot conceive any statement more derogatory to the dignity of England, solemnly made by the man who was professing to speak in the name of his Sovereign. Of this I am sure—that if he was speaking in the name of his Sovereign, he was not speaking either the sense or the
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    judgment of the English people. I think it will be fitting that before these debates close the Government should give the country some unqualified assurance on this subject. Well, with regard to the second paragraph of this statement which he made, what about this understanding with Russia? How far has it gone? Is there another secret Treaty? Is it possible that the farce could go further? Here we have Viceroy after Viceroy protesting to this man,—the Ameer—that we desired to have an independent State between us and the Russians whom we saw coming on in Central Asia; that that was the great object of our wishes; and that for that purpose we were prepared to give him money and troops, and, in fact, anything he wanted; and yet, at the same time, we were intriguing over his head, and had even gone so far as actually to ascertain that Russia was ready and willing to enter into an agreement for the division of his country? This half-educated and half-civilized Prince was accused of intriguing with Russia; but whatever might be his intention, he must have found that the British Government had been in advance of him. It appears to me to be hardly probable that this matter can stop exactly where it stands. This House is entitled to know how far the Government have gone with Russia in this matter. We are entitled to know whether there is anything more with respect to it than is recorded in this Blue Book. It is due to us that we should be informed how far the plan—if I may so call it—of the division of Afghanistan has gone. Has it as yet taken the stage of a written proposal, and are the lines drawn on the map? I think we ought to know clearly from the Government exactly what the position is in which we stand with regard to Russia upon this point. But that is not all. The Viceroy goes on to threaten the Ameer through his Agent. He tells him that our relations with the Ameer "cannot remain as they are; but that they must become either worse or better." He then re-affirms the necessity that exists for the British Government to watch the Afghan Frontier, and speaks of an arrangement to which he says it is expedient the Ameer should accede for the reception of British Residents and a special Mission. I am not

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    going to trouble the House with the poetical allusion to the "earthen pipkin and the iron pots;" but I should like to have some information with regard to a statement which it seems to me is more deserving of condemnation than any other I have read. In the last few lines of page 183 it will be seen that the Viceroy went on to observe that
    "British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite Treaty engagements. The Ameer has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us. The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a Treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms."
    Now, I may, I think, say, with the concurrence of the House, that this is language which is calculated to shake the confidence not only of the Ameer, but of every Prince in India. Here we have this diplomatist drawing a sharp line between written Treaty engagements and the word of Her Majesty's Representative. ["Oh, oh!"] Is that an unfair interpretation? [Cries of "Yes!"] I will read the paragraph over again—The Viceroy went on to observe that "British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite Treaty engagements"—that is to say, of the Treaty of 1855, which has always been looked upon as a one-sided Treaty, and the only clause in which, in reality, is that which binds us to respect the territory of the Ameer. The Viceroy goes on to say that the Ameer has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us; and what conclusions, I would ask, could the Ameer draw from all this, except that British policy did permit the alteration of verbal understandings? [The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Read to the end.] I will; because there are, in my opinion, three things mentioned in this paragraph to which it is desirable that the attention of the House should be distinctly drawn. We have, first of all, the reference to Treaties; then to letters written by our Representatives; and then to verbal negotiations. The end of the paragraph is—
    "The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a Treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms."
    [The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Hear, hear!] Well, the letter was no doubt, "vague and general in its terms."
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    I do not know what construction my right hon. Friend is going to put upon it; but to my mind it appears that we have here a plain distinction drawn by the Viceroy between the obligations which are imposed by written Treaties, and the obligations entailed upon us by the verbal promises of our Viceroy. Can there be any other rational construction, I would ask, placed upon the words which I have quoted to the House? And what more dangerous question, I should like to know, could be raised throughout India than that which those words suggest? What have the Native Princes of India to depend upon in most cases? Not on written engagements, but upon verbal assurances given to them by the Viceroy; and if you cast the slightest doubt upon the fact that the promise of one Viceroy is binding upon his successors, you are aiming one of the heaviest blows which you could possibly deal at the confidence which is reposed in our Government in India. My right hon. Friend, at all events, is awake to the gravity of the point; and I shall be glad if, in the course of this debate, he would give us some explanation on the subject. The Viceroy seems to have been very much enamoured of this singular sentence with regard to the obligations of Treaties; because you will find, if you turn to page 216, that there is a reference to the point, and that there was a distinct idea in his mind that the obligation imposed upon us by a Treaty was one thing, and that by verbal assurances another. I am now about to quote from a letter of Sir Lewis Pelly addressed, during the Peshawur Conferences, to the Minister of the Ameer, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. Sir Lewis Pelly says—
    "Your Excellency's contention is that the British Government is already bound, by its existing engagements with the Ameer, to support and defend His Highness against any foreign or domestic enemy; and that consequently the Ameer has nothing to gain by a Treaty of Alliance which, so far as the British Government is concerned, would be a mere re-statement of the obligations it has already contracted on his behalf, whilst, so far as His Highness is concerned, it would impose upon him obligations altogether new. This is, I think, a fair summary of your Excellency's argument: and the argument would be perfectly sound if its promises were true. But, unfortunately for the Ameer, they are fundamentally erroneous. The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of each other by the British Government and the

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    Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1856 and the second in 1857."
    Now, are there, I would ask, no other obligations except those contracted by these Treaties? Have hon. Members not seen how Shere Ali clung to what he called the writings which were given to him by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo? They were his charters. He repeated, over and over again, that there was no need of any Treaty. He was, he said, satisfied with the assurances which he had received, and wanted nothing more. He had the writings of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and they were, as he himself expressed it, "efficient and sufficient." I can hardly conceive that the Ameer could have put any other construction upon the language which was used by the Viceroy than that which I have put upon it. It seems to me to be the reasonable construction. Well, the Envoy was told to convey an account of what had taken place faithfully to the Ameer, certain conditions being attached to the opening of negotiations—namely, the location of British officers on the Afghan Frontier, and the maintenance of an attitude of friendship and confidence on the part of the Ameer. The second condition there was no difficulty in acceding to; but the residence of British Officers in his territory evidently was a great stumbling block throughout these communications. On this point of the introduction of British Agents on the Frontier there is a very remarkable statement, and it is the first time we hear anything definite with regard to the re-arrangement of Frontier. The Viceroy in the account of his second interview, on the 13th of October, 1876, with the Native Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, says—
    "Should the Ameer not consider the advantages worth the concession required by him, viz., British Agency on the Frontier, and a really friendly attitude on the part of the Ameer himself, it would then he needless for him to depute his Minister to meet the Viceroy's Envoy, and the Viceroy would he free to adopt his own course in his re-arrangement of Frontier relations, without regard to Afghan interests." [Ibid. p. 185.]
    This is the first occasion on which we have the question of the re-arrangement of Frontier introduced. We have next a letter from the Viceroy to the Ameer, dated Simla, October 11th, 1876,
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    which conveyed to His Highness an invitation to attend the Proclamation of Her Majesty as "Empress of India" at Delhi. Now, I am not sure that the Viceroy did a wise thing in inviting the Ameer to grace his triumph at this grand Delhi Proclamation; because he would be sure to meet on that occasion a great many Native Princes whose internal affairs had been very considerably interfered with by different British Residents in India. I do not like, I may add, to dwell in detail on this point of the reception of British Agents on the Frontier. Hon. Members will find in the Papers letters dated November 23, December 5, 7, 11, 18, and 21, which depict the attitude of the Ameer at the time. They are to be found at pages 192, 193, and 194. In the first of these letters, which is written by Atta Mahomed Khan, and which is dated Cabul, November 23, it is stated that—
    "The general result of their observations was that the Government of Afghanistan was not in a position to receive British officers within its Frontier."—[Ibid. p. 192.]
    The letters then went on to show that there were signs of yielding in the Ameer; and in the last of the series, which was dated December 21, the writer says, after a lengthened interview with the Ameer, His Highness observed—
    "God willing, for ever, the friendship existing between our Government and the British Government will remain more firm than before, and this true friendship will never be disturbed. Whatever objections or pleas have been hitherto made as to the residence of British officers on the border are owing to the savage conduct of the people of Afghanistan, and even now we agree to their residence on the border owing to helplessness."—[Ibid. p. 194.]
    The meaning of that is, that he had been driven to this concession; that pressure had been put upon him; in other words, that he had been bullied; and that he could not resist any longer giving his consent to the residence of British officers within his territory. Then he sends an Envoy to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur, and the first interview of this Envoy is with Dr. Bellew. You will find an account of it at page 195. Dr. Bellew, in a Memorandum, dated January 28, 1877, of his visit to the Envoy, records the following observations made by the latter:—
    "The Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British,

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    Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust."
    Dr. Bellew's reply to that observation was to the effect that he had always thought
    "The disposition of the British Government towards that of the Ameer was of a most friendly character, and that he felt sure, from all that he could see as a private individual, that its most earnest desire was to see the Ameer's Government strong and prosperous, and consolidated on a firm basis."
    The answer of the Envoy was—
    "That is what you say. But the promises of your Government are of one sort and their acts of another. Now listen to me. I tell you what I know. It is twenty-two years since the Government of the Ameer made a Treaty with John Lawrence Sahib, and it has not from that time to this diverged from it. At that time the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan refused to consent to the residence of British officers in his country, because he knew the lawless character of his people, and how they had killed Englishmen in the streets of Cabul at the time of Shah Shuja's overthrow. Well, his explanation was accepted and friendship continued, and then after a time the Ameer (Shere Ali Khan) came down and met Lord Mayo. Again the question of British officers was advanced, and on the same grounds objected to. After this you came with Pollock Sahib to Seistan. You will recollect that on one occasion he spoke in praise of Yakoob Khan, and I immediately warned him that if he desired to secure the Ameer's confidence he would never mention the name of Yakoob Khan again. Well, when I returned from Teheran I met Lord North-brook, and discussed various matters at Simla, where the question of British officers coming to Afghanistan was again mooted. Now, why all this pressing to send British officers to Afghanistan when you declare that you have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan? It has roused the suspicion of the Ameer." —[Ibid. p. 195.]
    Now, the more I read these Papers, the more it seems to me that there had not been so much intrigue with other Powers as a deeply-rooted feeling in the hearts of the people of Afghanistan against the introduction of British Residents into their country. They evidently felt that their independence would be gone the moment they gave way on that point. Dr. Bellew paid the Cabul Envoy a second visit, which is referred to at page 202, and there, again, the Envoy uses words which I cannot help thinking are spoken from the man's own heart. In his interviews with Dr. Bellew he appears to have spoken perfectly freely; and that, I believe, is the impression which has been conveyed to the minds of many of those who knew
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    him in India. He says here, at page 202—
    "God grant that the issue be favourable (well). But you must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear, and if you overload us the responsibility rests with you."
    Dr. Bellew adds—
    "I interposed here, and asked the Cabul Envoy what the burden was which he alluded to. He at once replied — The residence of British officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan."
    He told Dr. Bellew at the first interview that the allusion to his assent to the admission of British Agents to reside in Afghanistan "was as much as an order for his death." There is a ring of truth about this story that the people of Afghanistan were violently—fanatically, if you will—opposed to this step. That the opposition was a true one I think we can, after reading these Papers, hardly entertain a doubt; and, moreover, it was an opposition which, it seems to me, the Ameer hardly dare face. In the Report of the Conference at Peshawur between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Agent on February 15, 1877, Sir Lewis Pelly says—
    "But, in the most friendly manner, I beg the Envoy to understand that, if the Ameer reject all we offer and all we ask, and no basis of negotiation is left, the Viceroy, while observing the terms of the Treaty of 1855, will decline to support the Ameer and his dynasty in any troubles, internal or external, and their unknown consequences, and will continue to strengthen the Frontier of British India without further reference to the Ameer."—[I bid. p. 210.]
    Now here I would ask, how was the Viceroy going at once to strengthen the Frontier and maintain intact the Treaty of 1855? That is a matter which appears to me to require explanation. Then the Cabul Envoy says that he does not understand what "strengthening the Frontier" meant; and Sir Lewis Pelly replied—
    "The Viceroy will take such measures as he may deem wise and lawful for strengthening the Frontier of British India and providing for the safety and repose of that Empire; and this without communication with the Ameer."
    Then the Cabul Envoy asks—
    "Does this mean, within the territories of the Ameer of Afghanistan, or otherwise p"
    Sir Lewis Pelly replied—
    "That the object of the present Conference is not to interfere with Afghanistan."—[I bid.]

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    Now was that, I would ask, a satisfactory answer? Now this Pelly Conference, as it is called at Peshawur, was brought to a close at the time of the death of Noor Mahomed Shah, the Ameer's Envoy. The death of the Envoy occurred on the 26th of March, and on the 30th of March the Conference was, by order of the Viceroy, brought to a close, although another Envoy was present at Peshawur at the time. If you want to see the reason for the closing of the Conference you must turn to pages 170 and 171—to the despatch of the Viceroy, dated the 10th of May, 1877. The Viceroy there tells us that—
    "The Afghan Envoy, who had long teen suffering from a mortal disease, expired shortly after his receipt of this communication. His surviving colleague, the Mir Akhor, declared that he had no authority to answer any question from the British Government; and Sir Lewis Pelly was consequently instructed to close the Conference on the ground that there was no basis for negotiation. Apparently the Ameer, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the Conference, His Highness was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong it by every means in his power; a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government. The Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy to close the Conference."
    Now, it is a little difficult to understand why the Conference was closed when that which the Viceroy had taken so much trouble to gain appeared to be at last within his grasp. Was not it the obvious solution of the difficulty, that by that time it was deemed expedient that there should be an extension of our North-Western Frontier? The Viceroy tells us that it was evident it was not desirable to go further with the Conference when he found that Shere Ali was not friendly in his disposition towards us, and was obviously not cordial about the receipt of these British Residents. But had he at any time, I would ask, found the Ameer cordial with respect to the reception of those Residents? Had he not been warned, over and over again, by every officer whom he came across in India, that the Ameer was strongly opposed to such a step? He, nevertheless, presses on the subject; and when at last he knew that the Envoy of the Ameer was about to accept all his terms, he closes the Con-
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    ference. He found by that time that the mere location of British officers in the Ameer's territory would not be sufficient, and that he wanted an extension of Frontier. It is impossible to account otherwise for his closing the Conference after so long a delay when he was on the point of having the very terms acceded to for which he had been asking throughout. Well, a great break occurs at this stage of the proceedings. The matter was reported to the Government at home in a despatch dated 10th of May, 1877, from Simla, and you will find towards the close of that despatch, at page 172, the following remarkable passage:—
    "The further course of Cabul politics we cannot foresee, and do not attempt to predict. But we await its natural development with increased confidence in the complete freedom and paramount strength of our own position. In the meanwhile we see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Ameer, or on our own part any cause for interference with His Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries. But whilst, on the one hand, they are now relieved from all liabilities, real or imputed, on behalf of his personal fortunes or those of his dynasty, on the other hand, they have been placed by our recent arrangements with Khelat (and others which will be separately reported to your Lordship) in a position much less dependent than heretofore upon the personal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so uncertain a neighbour."
    Now, this step was taken of closing the Conference, and it was reported home in the despatch from which I have been quoting, and which is dated the 10th of May, 1877; but it appears, I confess, to my mind, somewhat curious that this despatch is the first official record of these transactions we have following the despatch of the 28th of January, 1876; or, in other words, for a period of a year and a-quarter. That was a very long time for the Viceroy to be left without counsel and support from the Government at home. It seems to me that a Viceroy inaugurating a thoroughly new policy, which had been opposed by his Predecessors, should have sought advice from home during that period. But Lord Lytton does not appear to have done that. Is it possible that a despatch on the subject was delayed? because had such a despatch been written there were members of the Viceroy's own Government who would

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    have been found to protest against it. I hold in my hand a letter which has been addressed to the Editor of The Daily News by Sir Henry Norman. It is too long to read; but I may inform the House that Sir Henry Norman states that if he and his Colleagues had been consulted they would certainly have protested against this policy. I will read only one sentence from the letter. Speaking of how odd it would appear if he cordially concurred in adopting a policy which he had a few weeks previously deprecated, Sir Henry Norman says—
    "I did no such thing, nor did Sir William Muir or Sir Arthur Hobhouse, who, with myself, were members of the Viceroy's Council during all the discussions preceding Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission; on, the contrary, we objected to the policy, and to measures in connection with it."
    We can understand that it would have been inconvenient to write home under the circumstances. I wish also to point out that as it was possible to carry out this policy only by deliberately concealing it from Parliament, it was so concealed. During the spring of 1877 a good many persons began to hear from India reports of these Conferences which alarmed them; but the matter was allowed to rest for a time. There were, however, later on, debates on the subject, both in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. One of the most important was that which took place in the House of Lords on the 15th of June, 1877, and it was a debate, I may observe, which threw the whole of us off our guard in reference to this question. That debate was opened by the Duke of Argyll, who, in the course of his speech, remarked that—
    "Rumour said that the Government of India had determined upon a complete change of policy, and had resolved to insist on the Ameer receiving a Resident British Envoy at his Court. It had been said, too, that a particular officer had been appointed."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxiv. 1832.]
    Well, what was the reply of the Marquess of Salisbury?
    "We have not tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul—we have not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy at Cabul. … Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year. I do not believe that he is worse disposed towards us than hitherto, or that his feelings are in any way more embittered towards the British Government."—[I bid. 1835.]
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    Well, Lord Lawrence spoke after the noble Marquess in the debate, and he was followed by Lord Northbrook, who said—
    "I heard what fell from the noble Marquess to-night … with the greatest possible satisfaction, because I feel it would be no light matter to change a policy which has been pursued deliberately by successive Governments in this country, and which has received the cordial support and approval of men like Lord Canning, my noble Friend who has just addressed your Lordships, and Lord Mayo."—[Ibid. 1842.]
    I have seen that some explanation has since been given of the answer of Lord Salisbury on that occasion, and it is to the effect that we had not meant to send a British Resident to Cabul. Now, for my own part, I am disposed to doubt whether even the literal correctness of that explanation can be maintained; for it will, I think, be found from one of the Viceroy's letters to the Ameer, that he proposed to send Sir Lewis Pelly to him at Cabul or elsewhere. But be that as it may, I contend that the speech of Lord Salisbury was one which was calculated to throw us off the scent, particularly in that sentence which says that our relations with the Ameer have undergone no material change since last year. And now I wish, in dealing with that point, to make this remark. There is, to my mind, nothing more important than that our Questions and Answers to each other should be not only literally true—as I assume the Answer to which I have just referred to be—but that they should be frank. Eight hon. and hon. Gentlemen who sit on the front Benches opposite have far more interest in this than independent Members. If we cannot rely absolutely on the information which we receive in Question and Answer in Parliament, it would be impossible to conduct the business of the country without resorting to practices which would be distasteful to every Englishman. If, where it may be done, an Answer were to be given which, while it may be literally true, might serve to throw us off the scent, then it would become necessary for us to frame our Questions in the form of the clauses of a criminal indictment, and that would be to degrade the business of Parliament. I, for one, trust that we shall always be able to maintain the practice which has hitherto prevailed; and that when we receive an Answer to any Question which we may

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    put, it shall be one which, as heretofore, we may accept with implicit reliance on its honesty and straightforwardness. If that practice should be departed from, and a new mode of putting and answering Questions should be adopted in its stead, nothing, to my mind, could tend more to bring our proceedings into disrepute. But to return to Shere Ali and his fortunes, we find that the Government thought that the Ameer might well be left to reflect upon the situation in which he was placed. On the 30th of March the Viceroy closed the Conference at Peshawur, and thus shut the door between his Government and the Ruler of Cabul. And when was this course taken? That Government, which is always talking about prestige, closed the door of communication between them and the capital of Afghanistan, and withdrew from it their Native Envoy, at a time when grave events were happening in Europe, and when England seemed to be madly bidding the rest of Europe to stand aside in order that she might step in as the champion of Mussulman rule, and alone settle the question with Russia. This was the time chosen to take away our Native Agent from Shere Ali's Court, leaving no one to point out to him that neither in Europe, nor in Asia, were you afraid of the great "White Czar. And this we are told is diplomacy. The Ameer was left alone to his reflections: did they ever consider for a moment what those reflections were likely to be? Might he not have reasoned with himself thus—"This new Viceroy is angry with me. He has broken up the Conference. No Viceroy has ever before treated me with insult and the bard language this one has done. I used to get fair words from Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook; but this last Viceroy casts some doubts on the promises which I received from them. He has gone so far as to tell me that he has been in communication with the Russians for dividing my Kingdom and blotting me out altogether; had I not better talk to the Russians? That General Kaufmann always appears very civil to me. He says nothing about Resident Agents. He makes friendly inquiries after me, and he has got under his control that nephew of mine, who is a most dangerous conspirator against my Throne." Was there any improbability in sup-
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    posing that Shere Ali would have reasoned with himself in that way? The Viceroy had shut the door against himself, but had left it open to Russia, and that at a moment when we were threatening Russia by bringing over troops from India to the Mediterranean. The Government, I may add, never found anything to complain of between Shere Ali and the Russians until after they had written threatening and insulting letters to the Ameer. After that there were, I admit, some intrigues. But be that as it may, the Government approved the course which had been taken by the Viceroy; and I would now quote a passage which will be found at page 223, and which is almost the last extract with which I shall trouble the House. The passage occurs in a despatch dated 4th October, 1877, from Lord Salisbury to the Governor General of India. He says—
    "Upon this point the history of the events reported in the letter under reply is unhappily conclusive, and demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as the year 1875 by Sir Richard Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that 'no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the Ameer.' Shere Ali's confidential Envoy stated explicitly that his master had 'now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government.'"
    Here we have a specimen of putting two paragraphs together in such a way as to create a very misleading impression. You will find, at page 195, that in the interview which he had with Dr. Bellew, the Afghan Envoy stated that—
    "The Ameer has now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government."
    But why? Because of the Indian Government pressing upon him the question of the residence of British officers on his Frontier; and this sentence, taken from the report of a conversation on the 28th January, 1877, is quoted as a proof that the opinion expressed by Sir Richard Pollock in 1855 as to the disposition of the Ameer was plainly erroneous. [Cries of "Read on!"] If I have omitted anything material, there are other hon. Gentlemen who are capable of supplying the omission. Now, on the 14th of August, 1878, the Viceroy writes to the Ameer that a British Envoy will visit him "immediately at Cabul." He gives him no time to consider his position. Then, on the

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    21st August, the Mission was postponed; and when at last it proceeded, in the course of the next month, our Envoy was, as we all know, refused admission. But why was it sent on that particular day, when it seemed probable that, if time were allowed, it would not be rejected? Because it had been prepared with a certain amount of pomp and circumstance, and was designed to invite the attention of the Native nobles who had been asked to accompany it to a sort of triumphal entry into Afghanistan against the wishes of its Ruler and its people. The policy of parade had been carried so far that we could not afford that the Mission should be postponed or recalled. What was the account given in the telegram of the circumstances attending the meeting of Major Cavagnari with the commandant of Ali Musjid? I think the Government are under a heavy responsibility in that matter. The account was, that the Commandant of the fort threatened Major Cavagnari, saying that, save for his personal friendship, he would shoot him on the spot. Remember how every newspaper was led into the belief that our Envoy had been insulted. The Government are quick enough to contradict everything that tells against them and their policy; but in this case this false telegram—false, that is, in the sense of giving an absolutely untrue impression of the facts—was allowed to do its work. I repeat, the Government are under a very grave responsibility for letting the war fever be lashed up in such a manner. They had pressed the Mission on, and I do not say that it could not possibly have been right to do so, even against the wishes of the Ruler of Afghanistan; but that could only have been so if the circumstances of the case were urgent, and if there was no other course open. But were the circumstances of the case urgent? Certainly not. The Papers which were delivered to us relating to Central Asia throw much light on that point; and it must be patent to all who have read them that our real cause of complaint was against Russia. It was Russia who had violated her agreement with us, in sending an Envoy to Afghanistan; and you must remember that it was the Russian Mission that was the immediate cause of the British one. Lord Cranbrook seems to have seen it in this light, for
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    on the 8th August, 1878, he writes, to Lord Salisbury—
    "It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India. In view of the gravity of the situation the Secretary of State for India may safely leave to Lord Salisbury, who has a full knowledge of the question, the adoption of such language at St. Petersburg as he may think best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect."— [Central Asia, No. 1 (1878), p. 143.]
    These sentences have the right ring about them. We shall see how they were acted upon. In the meantime, it appears that on the 14th August M. do Giers, in conversation with Mr. Plunkett, used these words—
    "Everything has been stopped. The political as well as the military precautions which, we thought ourselves justified in taking against you—everything has been stopped."—[I bid. p. 148.]
    This conversation was known at the Foreign Office on the 19th August, and it was not until that day that Lord Salisbury takes any action upon Lord Cranbrook's letter of the 8th. The demand he makes of the Russian Government is conveyed in the following words, addressed to Mr. Plunkett:—
    "I must therefore request you to mention these reports to Prince Gortchak off, and to enquire whether there is any foundation for them. You will not conceal from His Highness that proceedings of the kind referred to would cause uneasiness in India and dissatisfaction in this country, and should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from His Highness."—[I bid. p. 160.]
    Mr. Plunkett, receiving this on the 26th of August, and being unable to find M. de Giers at the Russian Foreign Office, writes to him according to his instructions. But it is not until the 6th September that he calls to inquire
    "why he had not yet received any answer to the request of Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Mission should be withdrawn from Cabul."—[I bid. p. 162.]
    On the 13th September Mr. Plunkett writes to Lord Salisbury, enclosing M.

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    de Giers's reply, which had just reached him from Livadia. M. de Giers says—
    "The dispositions of the Imperial Government in regard to the Central Asian Question … have necessarily "been affected by the political condition in which we were placed by the attitude of England during the recent crisis in the East. But, under the present circumstances, those dispositions are the same as formerly, and are not of a nature to give rise to any distrust on the part of the English Government."
    He adds, that
    "the Mission … is of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy."—I bid. p. 164.]
    By a letter addressed to the India Office, on September 20th, we learn that
    "Lord Salisbury infers from M. de Giers's note that his Excellency acknowledges that all the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity."—[I bid. p. 165.]
    I will here observe this—that M. de Giers does not promise to withdraw the Mission to Cabul, nor does he say the previous Russian assurances have recovered their validity, which is the construction of Lord Salisbury. It is altogether a very vague statement; and its right answer would have been to acknowledge with courtesy his letter, say that we were glad to learn that the dispositions of Russia were the same as formerly, but that we should be glad also to know by what date the Russian Mission would be withdrawn, and whether we might count upon the former Russian assurances having recovered their validity. The truth is, that whilst ready enough to go to war with the Ameer, the Government was not pressing Russia with the persistency with which she ought to have been pressed on this subject. Some time ago it used to be the fashion for hon. Gentlemen opposite to complain of Lord Derby because his utterances to the Russian Government were too gentle and tender. Well, if Lord Derby's utterances were gentle, Lord Salisbury's are lamb-like. But, after all, let the House bear in mind the date. It is a fact that on the 13th September Mr. Plunkett was in possession of M. de Giers's reply, which Lord Salisbury professes to look upon as satisfactory, and it was not till the 21st of September that we pressed on our Mission into the Khyber Pass. If the Russian assurances were to be relied upon, why was the Government in such
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    a hurry to press the Ameer? It seems to me that we have actually gone to war with the Ameer—that we took the step that we knew would lead to war a week after our officer was in receipt of Russian assurances that the very cause of the war was going to be removed by the Russian Government. I admit that Mr. Plunkett's despatch containing M. de Giers's assurances were not received in England till the 18th of September; but why did they not send a telegram? What is the use of the telegraph? It is not given you merely to send showy telegrams, in order to raise a war fever; it was given you that you might take steps to stop a war. The case is this—we have had cause for complaint against Russia, and we have fastened it upon the Ameer; we have gone to war with the Ameer on account of that Russian Mission; and the upshot of the war will probably be this, as far as I understand it—that we shall annex the territory of the independent tribes lying between us and Afghanistan. This is an odd example of vicarious punishment. There is, too, an ascending scale of punishment —to the Russians, remonstrances of the most gentle order; to the Ameer, war; to the independent tribes, annexation. And it is curious, also, that the punishment falls exactly in the inverse ratio of the ability of the different parties to resist. I have detained the House very far beyond what I had anticipated; but these Papers are interesting, and the story, I think, cannot be told without copious reference to them. We have seen the Government land us in this war; a war, as I think, unjust and unnecessary at the outset. I cannot come to the conclusion that anything else has been in their minds since the Pelly Conference was closed but this advance and rectification of the Frontier; and I am driven reluctantly to the belief that they took the opportunity of the Ameer's unwise and improper conduct—for unwise and improper, I think, his conduct was—to make that advance. And now, when you have made that advance, I should like to know what particular end you expect to gain from it? That is a question I am not going to enter into at large. It may very likely form the subject of another debate. But the charges that I bring against them are that they have adopted a new policy in India; that they have

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    adopted that policy against the advice of all previous Viceroys, and against the advice of every officer of experience who has served in the Punjab, and who is entitled to form an opinion upon it; that they have acted upon that policy, and attempted to carry it out by threats, and by language unworthy of the British Government, calculated to defeat the very end they have had in view, and to shake confidence in us throughout India; that they concealed this policy from Parliament and the country; and that it was only by concealing this policy that it could be carried out, for if we had had the story before us, there is such a consensus of opinion among those who have served long in India that I would have defied them to do so; further, that having a cause of complaint against the strong, they fixed the quarrel on the weak; and that, by their conduct, they have brought us to a war in which already gallant men's lives have been lost, and homes made desolate, to atone for the blunders and errors of their Administration. Now, these are grave charges. I have brought them on the foundation of the Papers that have been laid before us; and unless the Government can clear themselves completely of these charges, I am justified in asking the House to assent to the Motion which I now make.
    Amendment proposed,
    To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government -which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan,"—(Mr. Whitbread,)
    —instead thereof.
    Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, that the speech to which they had just been listening had, as they would naturally have expected, been couched in moderate terms—more moderate, indeed, than those in which the hon. Member had recently addressed his constituents at Bedford. He would endeavour to follow his example, and to avoid, so far as possible, what he might call the "personalities" of the question. He must ask the indulgence of the House if he had to follow the hon. Gentleman's speech at some length. As he understood the charges brought by the hon. Mem-
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    ber against the present Government, they were these—that the irritation of the Ameer's mind had been caused entirely by the Government, and mainly, as the hon. Member evidently thought, because they had tried to induce him to accept British Residents. And then he went further, and maintained that the Government, having been desirous of late to annex additional territory in India, had taken advantage of a certain misconduct on the part of the unfortunate Ameer, in order to achieve that annexation. These were the grave charges that had been brought, to which he desired to offer a complete and entire opposition. But as they ranged over a long course of years, it would be necessary for him to present the House, in his reply, with a consecutive narrative of the relations of this country with Afghanistan, in the course of which he would endeavour to meet the various points of the hon. Member. When the Ameer, after various vicissitudes of fortune, succeeded at length in getting under his authority the greater part of Afghanistan, he was desirous of entering upon friendly relations with the Indian Government. Lord Lawrence aided him with money and arms, and if he had remained in India he would probably have arranged a meeting with the Ameer. That intention had been carried out by Lord Mayo, who met him and discussed certain subjects with him very fully and frankly; and though he (Mr. E. Stanhope) was ready to admit that the representations made by Lord Mayo in the letter written at the close of the Conference had been misunderstood and misrepresented by the Ameer, yet, at the same time, there could be no question that, whether from the nature of the assurances or from Lord Mayo's own personal influence and judicious conduct, the Ameer left that Conference a satisfied and a happy man. It had been said that Lord Mayo gave the Ameer a promise that we would never press a British Resident upon him. He (Mr. E. Stanhope) had, on a former occasion, said in that House—and he was ready to say it again—that as between Lord Mayo and the Ameer the subject was never mentioned. But it was mentioned by Lord Mayo's authority in the conversations between his Agents and the Agents of the Ameer. And what happened was this—It was abundantly clear from

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    the despatch which the hon. Member opposite did not desire to read the end of, that the Ameer did wish us to establish Resident Engineer Agents within his dominions for the purpose of affording him advice. It was a boon which he asked us to grant him. It was included among the boons which he had asked from Lord Mayo at the time that he had begged for assistance in money and arms, and it was one of the boons which Lord Mayo thought that we ought not to grant at the then stage of our relations with him. The then state of things was summed up by the Duke of Argyll in 1869, when he said—
    "I have every reason to believe that Lord Mayo has consistently pursued the same policy of non-intervention and of the avoidance of entangling engagements, which was pursued by my noble Friend the late Governor General of India (Lord Lawrence). So far as my own instructions to Lord Mayo are concerned, they certainly have been to avoid all entangling engagements for the future with Afghanistan, and to maintain the British Government and the Government of India perfectly free in regard to that and other conterminous States."—[3 Hansard, cxcv. 1087.]
    After this interview the first difficulty that arose was with reference to the Seistan boundary in 1872. The Ameer did not understand the nature of an arbitration, and the decision undoubtedly rankled in his mind for some time. But the terms of it, although, perhaps, very different from what the Ameer had expected, had been faithfully kept by him. But in 1873 a new element was introduced into the matter. Lord Northbrook, as it would appear, suggested that an Envoy should be sent to the Ameer to explain the Seistan decision to him. And what was the reply of the Ameer? He said that he should like to send an Envoy to us; but that if we preferred to send to him, he was willing to receive him. That was the spirit in which he received the overtures of Lord Northbrook. It was eventually agreed that he should send an Envoy to us, and then it appeared that the advances of Russia in Central Asia had greatly alarmed the Ameer. It was true that the Duke of Argyll seemed to think that the Ameer only pretended to be afraid of the results of those advances; but he (Mr. E. Stanhope) thought that from the Papers themselves there undoubtedly was substantial ground for the fears which the Ameer had then ex-
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    pressed. It seems perfectly clear that the Ameer was alarmed by the Russian advance in Central Asia, and that he sought our protection against its consequences. Upon that point he accepted the statement of Lord Northbrook's despatch to the Home Government on the advance of Russia, although, as Lord Northbrook stated, it was drawn more in accordance with Mr. Gladstone's speech on Mr. Eastwick's Motion than as expressing the views of the custodians of India. Lord Northbrook was of opinion that it was necessary and desirable that some more definite assurances should be given to the Ameer on this point, and he stated that the Cabinet at home gave their consent to his giving them. Upon that point he fully accepted the assurance of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. Lord Northbrook, however, gave those further assurances wrapped up in such a perfect mist of conditions that it was not surprising that the Envoy described those assurances as obscure, and asked for something a little more definite. The Envoy asked that the assurances should be put into writing, to be sent by Lord Northbrook to the Ameer, and that in that writing it should be stated distinctly that we intended to protect him against Russia. And what was the reply of Lord Northbrook? He would ask the House to remember what was the one assurance which had been given to the Ameer in 1869 by Lord Mayo—an assurance in writing which was peculiarly prized by him, and which it was evident from the beginning to the end of these Papers he had stuck to with the greatest tenacity. Well, Lord Northbrook sent a letter to the Ameer, and annexed to it certain conversations—he only called them conversations, not assurances—which had been held with the Envoy, and a Memorandum which the Envoy was instructed to show him, adding, with reference to affording him protection—
    "But the question in my opinion is one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed until a more convenient opportunity."
    And the Memorandum also contained those words and no more. Lord Northbrook stated in his despatch that he had added those words because the Envoy had not authority to enter into the subject; but there was nothing in the

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    Papers to show that the Envoy had not the necessary authority. Then in 1874 occurred the arrest of Yakoob Khan. He had no particular reason for disputing the proposition of the hon. Member, that the conduct of the Ameer in imprisoning Yakoob Khan was such that the Government could not justify it. There was one point of view of the matter, however, from which, doubtless, the Ameer might look at it. The Ameer stated that he had put his son in prison for two reasons—first, for rebelling against his authority; and, secondly, for engaging in intrigues with Persia to undermine his authority. Therefore, the Ameer himself might well conceive that he had ample justification for the course which he had pursued with regard to his son; and he quoted against us the language of Lord Mayo's letter, in which he said he (the Viceroy) should regard with the severest displeasure any rivals who might attempt to dispute the Throne with him. Our interferences on behalf of Yakoob Khan had rankled in the Ameer's breast for years, and it was the only grievance to which he had referred in his last letter. There was a good deal of evidence as to his state of mind in reference to us at this period of our relations. Lord Northbrook's Government told us that his language after the return of the Envoy from Simla in 1873 was "anything but satisfactory;" he had refused to let peaceful expeditions, sent under Colonel Baker and Mr. Forsyth, pass through his territory; he hesitated about accepting our gift of arms; and he had refused to accept the present in money we had offered him. In the meantime, it was abundantly clear that his relations with Russia had altered, and that he now no longer addressed them in merely courteous language, but as soliciting their favour. And what did he do towards England? In the earlier stages he said he was quite prepared to confer with Her Majesty's Government on the subject of his relations with Russia; and he sent on the letters which he had received from the Russian Governor General, in order that the Indian Government of the Queen might suggest replies. But if the House carefully studied the Papers in consecutive order, it would find that after a time his friendly communication was altogether dropped; and the only account which Her Majesty's Government received of any
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    letters having passed between the Ameer and the Russian Governor General was the simple statement of the fact by our Agent.
    MR. GOSCHENasked the hon. Member to state the date at which this form of communication was dropped?
    MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, that if the right hon. Gentleman would carefully examine the documents, he would find it very difficult to fix any very definite date for this event; but he would find the whole of it taking place within the years 1873–4–5; and when they came to 1876, the House would find the Agent representing—before Lord Lytton had said one word directly or indirectly either to the Ameer or to anyone connected with him—the estrangement and the annoyance of the Ameer. This was stated in various ways and by different persons; but there could be no doubt of the fact that the estrangement and alienation came about before Lord Lytton had had any communication with the Ameer, and was the result of action taken by former Rulers of India. The Viceroy, in a despatch dated May 10, 1877, wrote—
    "In short, the information gradually extracted from our Cabul Agent convinced us that the system on which we had hitherto conducted our relations with Shere Ali had practically resulted, not only in the alienation of His Highness from the Power which had unconditionally subsidized and openly protected him; but also in the increased closeness and confidental character of Ms relations with the only other Power that can ever cause serious danger to our Empire in India."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 168.]
    This was the state of things with which his noble Friend (Lord Salisbury) had to deal; and in referring to the action of his noble Friend, he wished it to be clearly understood that up to the present time he had dealt entirely with events which happened before Lord Lytton went to India, [and before the Ameer had any knowledge whatever of what Lord Salisbury had done in his capacity of Secretary of State. Up to the time of which he had been speaking, all Lord Salisbury's actions had been included in confidential communications between himself and the Government of India; and he now came to speak of the time at which the Government of India communicated what they had to say to the Ameer. It was clearly admitted by Lord Northbrook that the circumstances of

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    the time, and the steady advance of Russia, might at length force the Government of India to give to the Ameer assurances utterly different from, and far more definite than, those they had hitherto given; and though he explained in a despatch in 1875 that he regarded the interference of Russia with Afghanistan as neither probable nor near, yet, at the same time, he intimated that if that advance took place it might be desirable not only to give more definite assurances, but actually to enter into a Treaty with the Ameer for protecting him against foreign aggression, adding that the appointment of a Resident at Herat would be a necessary consequence of any such engagement as that to which he referred, and of the advance of the Russian Frontier. Lord Salisbury's reply to this was, that if the Government were to wait for an indefinite period, as hinted by Lord Northbrook, the time for useful action might have passed, and that our influence with the Ameer, which was already on the wane, might have altogether disappeared. So that the only difference between Lord Salisbury and the Viceroy was as to the opportuneness of the time for the course which was suggested; and the consequences of the delay which resulted rested, to a very large extent, on Lord Northbrook, who for more than a year disregarded the instructions which he received from home. Which of the two was right? Events had shown that the contingency which Lord Northbrook described as neither near nor probable had happened within three years; that the time had passed for the representations which might have been made to the Ameer to be made with any chance of success; and that Lord Salisbury showed himself to be gifted with foresight which was entirely wanting in Lord Northbrook. Acting upon the conclusions at which he had arrived, Lord Salisbury instructed Lord Lytton, on his arrival in India, to propose a friendly Mission to the Ruler of Cabul. A great deal had been said upon the pretext on which the proposal of that Mission was based; but it seemed to be forgotten that the Ameer's own Minister had suggested to Lord Northbrook that it being necessary first to familiarize the Afghan people with the very idea of a Mission and of communication with the people of India, it would be unwise at the out-
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    set to set fully forth all the objects which it was hoped to attain by means of the Mission. The Envoy was to be instructed to offer to the Ameer certain definite assurances in the event of his asking for them; but the Ameer positively refused to receive the Mission on the 22nd of May, 1876—a date which was important, because at that time neither the occupation of Quetta nor the proposal of a Resident Envoy at Cabul had been made, and these were the events which in some quarters were said to have led to all or a great part of the difficulty that had arisen. After the refusal further negotiations were commenced; and the Ameer agreed that Her Majesty's Government should withdraw their Native Envoy from Cabul in order to confer with him at Simla as to the views of the Ameer. This was done, and the grievances, supposed or real, of the Ameer were set out at great length in the conversations which were recorded in the Afghan Papers. It transpired that his special grievances were—our decision as to the Seistan boundary, our interference in the case of Yakoob Khan, and certain steps we had taken with regard to Wakhan. It was then shown to the Ameer that Lord Lytton was most anxious to discuss these or any other grievances, and, if possible, to remove any misunderstanding that might have arisen. After this, further conversations took place between Lord Lytton and our Agent at Cabul, and he wished to protest against the language in which these conversations were described. It was certainly true that if there had been any desire on the part of the Government to withhold facts, they would have been amply justified in keeping back the records of these conversations, for the reason that they were just as strictly confidential communications as were those which passed between a client and his legal adviser, whom he wished to put in possession of certain facts, but not in the precise language which he would use when addressing the Court. Thus Lord Lytton impressed upon the Envoy the importance of the Ameer being induced to do something in order to strengthen himself in his external relations. It might be that some incidental expression might have been used which was not quite so judicious as could be wished; but the House would make every allow-

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    ance for the circumstances in which that Conference was held; and they must remember that such confidential communications were never before given in any such form as that in which they now had them. In one of these it was curious to observe what a number of fallacies the hon. Member had discovered. He had tried, indeed, to make out of it that between this country and Russia there was a secret Treaty for the partition of Afghanistan. He thought he should waste time if he offered any observations on that subject. The evidence brought forward was so utterly meagre and unsupported by any facts, that he did not think it was worthy of any further consideration. But what was a much more serious matter was this—that the hon. Gentleman endeavoured also to draw the conclusion that the Government of this country was prepared to fulfil its written engagements, but that it would not keep its verbal engagements. Now, that was an utterly and entirely unfair and misleading interpretation to put on Lord Lytton's words. The distinction Lord Lytton drew as between verbal and written assurances was the distinction which was always drawn by the Ameer; and it was pointed out—as it always had been pointed out—that what the Ameer wanted was written and not verbal assurances. He said so in 1869, and he got them; and he said so in 1873, and he did not get them; and the Ameer had always relied on that little scrap of writing from Lord Mayo as something to be prized, because it was to the Oriental mind a thing he could understand. It was not a mere verbal undertaking, surrounded by conditions and all sorts of suggestions which were to the Oriental mind utterly and entirely a puzzle. Then followed the series of communications between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Agent of the Ameer. There was only one condition, and that was the condition of Lord Lytton that there should be Resident Agents on the Frontier of Afghanistan. The hon. Member quoted a great deal against this proposal, and he must therefore ask the permission of the House to allow him to interpose at this point of his narrative what were the real facts on that subject. In 1857, the question of Resident Envoys was not only raised, but it was accepted for a definite purpose by the Ameer, and was incorpo-
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    rated in the Treaty. Under that Treaty they were entitled to appoint Resident? Agents for a certain purpose, not, indeed, at Cabul, but in other places. Again, in 1859 the question was mooted, and there could be no question whatever that the Ameer assented in principle to that condition. They had heard quoted the authority of Mr. Seton-Karr. This was the gentleman who, having been confidentially employed, thought fit, before any of these documents were given to the world, to give to the public his version of the transactions. Now, he was told Mr. Seton-Karr was a gentleman who did not speak the languages principally used on the occasion, and his evidence was not so powerful as that of other gentlemen concerned in the matter. He was not going to give his own evidence against that of Mr. Seton-Karr; he was going to ask the House to allow him to quote a much greater authority than his own. He was going to rest satisfied with the statement of Lord Northbrook's Government. When the hon. Gentleman approached that period he ceased to read anything from the Papers. He gave them a general idea of what he thought; but if he had read one passage they would have had Lord Northbrook's Government's definite views. He referred the House to the following paragraph in the despatch of Lord Northbrook's Government in 1875:—
    "On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. But our impression is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is, upon obtaining the recognition, in a Treaty with the British Government, of his son Abdoolla Jan as his successor. Such a formal recognition His Highness was anxious to secure, but Lord Mayo, for obvious reasons, declined to entertain the proposal."—[Afghanistan, No. 1,pp. 131–2.]
    Now that was clear and distinct. [Mr. Childers: Read the next paragraph.] He did not want to do anything unfair, he had not the next paragraph, and he did not know what it was, but he thought it had nothing to do with it. Passing on from 1869, it was clear the subject of Envoys was again discussed

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    in 1873. Under Lord Northbrook's express instructions the Foreign Minister discussed the matter with the Agent of the Ameer, and then he suggested the appointment of Resident Agents in Afghanistan. Entire concurrence was expressed by the Agent in principle; but in order to familiarize the people it was thought desirable, in the first instance, only to depute an Agent to examine the Frontiers of the country, and not to reside there until the people of the country understood the matter. The position of affairs, then, was this—that the principle had been assented to more than once by the Government of Afghanistan; that Lord Northbrook had himself suggested it as an indispensable condition for making a complete and definite Treaty with the Ameer; and that the Agent of the Ameer came to Peshawurin 1877 on the express condition, which had been fully explained to him, that it was understood he assented to the condition of the acceptance of Resident Agents. From the first the great object the Ameer had in view was apparent. The Agent went over all the old grievances, and he showed no disposition whatever to come to a definite point. There was great delay; and all this time it was well known that the Ameer was hostile—so hostile that he had endeavoured to incite the neighbouring tribes to enter into a religious war. The conversations were drawn out to such a length that they seemed to be almost interminable. [An hon. MEMBER: There is no evidence of that.] Was the hon. Member who said there was no evidence prepared to disbelieve the distinct statement, not of Lord Lytton, but of the Government of India? Well, that being so, from the spirit in which the Ameer had acted, and in which he had instructed his Agents to continue the negotiations, it did not appear to the Government that there was any great hope of the negotiations ending satisfactorily. However, the Government were prepared to continue the negotiations. Now, the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken had made a great deal of what took place at the time, and he had endeavoured to show that the Government were desirous of snatching an opportunity of ending those negotiations. Well, he (Mr. E. Stanhope) durst say they were, for it seemed to him they would
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    lead to no satisfactory results. But the inference which the hon. Gentleman drew from the despatch of Lord Lytton's Government was not, he believed, such as the House would be disposed to draw. That Government had stated that the Ameer still desired to gain time; that he was sending another Envoy; and that it was reported that he was prepared to accept our conditions. Probably, it was a report spread about by the Ameer himself to gain time, because he did not desire to commit himself finally either to Russia or to England. Then it was said—"Why did not Lord Lytton send home an account of those negotiations?" In the first place, the Government of India waited till those negotiations were concluded, and then sent home a despatch of great length and importance with the least possible delay. He thought it was unjust to the Viceroy of India to say that he delayed, for an unworthy motive, to send home a despatch because he desired to prevent a division of opinion in his Council from becoming known. If such imputations were to be made, he wished to know why did not the Duke of Argyll send a despatch to India and tell the Indian Government distinctly in 1873 what his policy was with reference to Afghanistan? He sent a telegram which it was impossible for any ordinary human being to understand. The hon. Member alluded to a letter written by Sir Henry Norman, in which he said that he had no opportunity of representing his dissent from the opinions of Lord Lytton, because of the delay in this despatch. That was a misleading statement. He (Mr. E. Stanhope) had an opportunity that very day of conversing with a gentleman who held a very responsible position not long ago in the Council of India, and he told him it was a well-established rule that dissent could not be entered before anything was discussed; but that when the thing was thoroughly discussed it was open to any Member of the Council to make an entry of his dissent in the Minutes, and to call upon the Governor General to send the Minutes home. Sir Henry Norman neglected that opportunity. The next point to which he thought the hon. Member attached considerable importance was a statement of his noble Friend (Lord Salisbury) soon after the conclusion of the Conferences. Well,

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    Lord Salisbury had given a full explanation of that in the other House of Parliament. To that explanation it was almost impossible for him (Mr. E. Stanhope) to add. If the House was not prepared to accept the assurances which his noble Friend gave as perfectly sincere there was really nothing more to say. But he did know that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) and the hon. Member for Bedford, in the speeches which they had made in the country, had misquoted the language of Lord Salisbury. It might have been accidental; but it was rather curious that the language should have been misquoted in the same way in both speeches.
    MR. WHITBREADsaid, he held Hansard in his hand, and handed it to the reporter.
    MR. CHILDERSsaid, he wrote down the statement precisely, and read it word for word.
    MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, they must be very much obliged to him for affording them an opportunity of making these explanations. They were unfortunate in being reported by The Daily News.
    MR. CHILDERSbelieved the report in The Times was verbatim. The report in The Daily News was a very short one.
    MR. E. STANHOPEsaid, nobody who read the speech of Lord Salisbury could doubt for a moment that the circumstances were exactly those which he stated. He explained that then he spoke under circumstances which prevented any full statement—and he answered a definite question put by the Duke of Argyll, and the proof that he was understood in what he stated was to be found in the subsequent speech of Lord Northbrook, who said that he understood Lord Salisbury's speech to apply only to an Envoy at Cabul. To resume; the Conference being broken up, the Government considered it desirable to review the position in which we stood towards the Ameer. It was explained to him most fully that we desired and sought no quarrel with the people of Afghanistan. Our object was that they should enjoy their independence, their peace, and their prosperity. We had no wish to interfere with their domestic concerns; and while we carefully guarded ourselves from being supposed to accept the interpretation which the Ameer had put upon certain assurances of Lord
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    Mayo's, we told him that we would not withdraw from the obligations we had previously entered into. We did not disguise from him that we should have preferred a policy of hearty co-operation for the protection of our common interests; but if he would not have it, then we were prepared to revert to our former relations, only hoping that the day would come when he would see matters in the same light as we did, and be prepared to welcome proposals made to him in absolute good faith. So matters continued till an event happened which changed the whole aspect of affairs. We learned in July last that a Russian Mission had arrived at Cabul, and had been welcomed by the Ameer, after having rejected our Mission. Considering the events which were happening in Europe, and the attitude of the Ameer, this appeared to the Government of India to constitute a grave political declaration, and to necessitate a re-consideration of our whole position. He (Mr. E. Stanhope) supposed that our only motive for caring about the affairs of Afghanistan had been the interest of India. We are placed in that country in a position unexampled in the history of the world, as trustees for its many millions of inhabitants, and responsible for their contentment and prosperity. The Government of India had always held that the maintenance of Afghanistan as an independent, strong, and friendly Power was desirable, not only as a barrier against the encroachments of any foreign Power, but as a security to our Frontier. Not that we had, or have, any expectation of invasion, still less any fear of it. But it had long ago been pointed out that the influence of a Russian Mission at Cabul would be perceptible throughout the length and breadth of India. As long ago as 1847 Lord Palmerston thus expressed to Lord John Russell his views with reference to Afghanistan—
    "A Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan might not be able to march to Calcutta, but it might convert Afghanistan into the advanced post of Russia, instead of that advanced post being in Persia; and whatever Hardinge may say of the security of the rest of our Frontier, you would find in such a case a very restless spirit displayed by the Burmese, by the Nepaulese, and by all the incorporated States scattered about the surface of our Indian Possessions. These things would lead to great expense, require great efforts, and might create considerable damage. The best method of preventing

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    these embarrassments seems to be to take up such a position, not in posse, but in esse, as would make it plain to everybody that we could not be taken by surprise."
    Well, the Government of India, entertaining the same opinion, felt that while Afghanistan was under British influence, our Frontier—in itself a purely accidental one—was comparatively secure; but that if she were to become a mere tool of a foreign Power, a formidable element of disturbance and intrigue would be introduced upon our Frontier, while within that Frontier the disturbing effect (to say the least of it) would be enormous. It would, he was sure, very much surprise the House if he were to tell it how numerous were the disturbances which had constantly been occurring upon our Frontier. There had been during the last 28 years no less than 19 expeditions, in which 68,000 men had been engaged, and no less than 60 or 70 affairs of minor importance. And what, he should like to know, would have been the condition of our Frontier, if those who dwelt upon the other side of the mountains had always been hostile to us instead of friendly? We should have been driven from a permanent state of peace establishment into one of constant preparation for war. And what was the course which was, under the circumstances, taken by the Government of India? It might have been, under some circumstances, judicious to have treated the conduct of Shere Ali as a merely unfriendly act, and we might have remained inactive, or the suggestion of Lord Lawrence might have been adopted, and we might have retired from our present position to the line of the Indus. That was a matter which, however, he did not think he need argue for a moment, for everybody must be aware what would be the effect which would be produced in India by any such abandonment of our position as Lord Lawrence proposed. The point was one, he might add, which he was quite content to leave as it had been placed by the Duke of Argyll, in saying we could not allow Afghanistan to pass entirely under the influence of a foreign Power. Or we might have insisted that the course taken by the Ameer amounted to an act of open hostility to us; but a much more moderate view was taken by the Government of India. They said—
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    "It appeared quite possible, however, that the significance of this event might have been over-rated or misconstrued in India, or that the Ameer himself might be induced, by timely diplomatic representations, to realize the gravity of his action, and to appreciate its inevitable effect upon his relations with our Government. But the only hope of clearing up any such misunderstandings, or of bringing our legitimate influence to bear upon the Ameer, lay in the renewal of direct personal intercourse with him through a British Envoy."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 239.]
    That being so, the Government of India proposed to send a friendly Mission to the Ameer; and they pointed out that they did not at the time anticipate that there would have been any serious difficulty on the part of the Ameer in accepting that Mission. They hoped that he would, on the contrary, really have welcomed it; and that to make the attempt was, at all events, not only desirable, but absolutely necessary. And what were the steps which were actually taken? Were they unfriendly? Sir Neville Chamberlain was appointed to conduct the Mission, and he was given an escort of no unreasonable strength, and one by far smaller than that which the Ameer himself had brought with him into India upon a former occasion. If a smaller one, indeed, had been sent, it would have been regarded by the people of India as derogatory to our prestige. We had, besides, sent, in deference to the Ameer, Gholam Hussein Khan, who had already acted as Agent in Cabul, to announce the Mission. But it would appear that, from first to last, the sole object of the Ameer was delay. Our Agent was allowed to make only short marches. Four letters had been sent to the officers of the Ameer, of which a great deal had been said—they had been sent to clear the way, as it were, for our Agent, and in order that there might be no mistake as to his responsibility. That being so, Gholam Hussein Khan arrived in Cabul on the 10th of October. He had an interview with the Ameer, and from that time several letters had been received giving an account of the state of feeling of the Ameer. Among those letters, which had been, as far as they were in the possession of the Government, set forth in the Blue Book, there was one to which he thought it desirable attention should be drawn, because it explained the great point in all these communications—that

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    most of them had been written under the influence of the Ameer. That letter explained previous letters, and was from Gholam Hussein Khan to Munshi Muhammad Bakhtyar Khan, and it was as follows:—
    "The facts are these: Whatever I write is what I hear from the Wazir or from the Ameer, and some sentences are from myself. Considering that the post is in the hands of the Ameer, and that nobody is allowed to communicate with me, you may imagine what sort of an account I can give. The temper of the Ameer is hasty (or touchy), and he gives little or no attention to the letters from the British Government. The reason of his not inviting the English Mission is the intention to delay. Three Russian officers have gone hack and two are still in Cabul. I suspect that the coming of the English Mission is impossible so long as the Russians are here (or until the Russians have gone back). If the British Government is content to delay for its own purposes, then conciliatory letters may prove useful, but in the event of delay being considered injurious, then my stay here is of no profit, and I should be recalled in some suitable manner."— [I bid. p. 247.]
    That being, as we were informed by Gholam Khan, the state of things, what did Lord Lytton do? Did he show himself as anxious to precipitate matters as some seemed to suppose? No; he telegraphed to Major Cavagnari that he was to take great care not to proceed in his arrangements with the Frontier Tribes in such a manner as to offend the Ameer, before the opportunity had been afforded of seeing whether he would accept our Mission. The delay, however, continued to go on, and time passed to such an extent that the Government of India felt they could wait no longer. Major Cavagnari accordingly proceeded and had an interview with the Agents of Shere Ali at Ali Musjid; and, with regard to that interview, he was glad to find the hon. Member opposite had not that evening spoken as he had done at Bedford, because at Bedford he spoke of the telegram which was sent by the Viceroy, giving an account of it, as a lying telegram.
    MR. WHITBREAD: The word "lying" is one which never ought to be used in public speaking, and I am sorry it should have been. What I intended to convey was that the telegram, whoever it came from, gave a false impression of what had occurred.
    MR. E. STANHOPE: The telegram was from the Viceroy, and such a word as "lying" applied to it was, in his opinion,
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    deserving of serious reprobation, and the hon. Member had certainly used it.
    MR. WHITBREADdenied that he had applied such language to the Governor General. He had copied the telegram from a newspaper, not knowing who was the author of it, and what he wished to state—and what he was prepared to state in that House or anywhere else—was that the telegram, in giving an abbreviated account of what had taken place, had conveyed a false impression of the scene at Ali Musjid.
    MR. E. STANHOPEwas sorry the hon. Gentleman had not corrected the report of his speech which appeared in the papers, and would only add upon that point, that any imputation on the character of the Governor General of India, who had such important negotiations to conduct, appeared to him to be extremely undesirable as well as unfair. They had great difficulty in presenting the telegrams in such a way as to do justice to the Viceroy, and afford an impartial statement of the facts. To say, then, that what he asserted was utterly untrue, was very hard on the Viceroy. That being the case, he was prepared to justify the telegram. Having read the Reports of Colonel Jenkins and Major Cavagnari, he was convinced that what the Viceroy had said was the whole truth. He would not quote the Report, which had been often quoted; but he really had thought that the House would believe the truth of the Viceroy's statement as to what passed at that interview. That interview was also remarkable for another thing—the tact shown by Major Cavagnari. At any moment an incautious word from him might have precipitated a conflict; and obviously, if Lord Lytton had intended that result, he would never have instructed him to preserve a cautious demeanour towards the subjects of Shere Ali. After the refusal of the Commandant of Ali Musjid to admit our Mission, the Viceroy, so far from precipitating a collision, telegraphs home that he would endeavour to avoid it, and, if possible, to obtain a pacific solution. And after that, he instructed his Envoy to address a final Ultimatum to Shere Ali, and to offer time for consideration. This forbearance was carried so far as to cause a delay of two months before the insult was resented, and of postponing military operations to the very last day possible

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    before the commencement of the winter. He wished to ask hon. Members opposite, at what point of the negotiations was it that, in their opinion, the Government had gone wrong? He would like to know precisely what they would have done in like circumstances? How would they have treated the Prince who had tried to stir up the Border Tribes against us, and who, in order to embarrass us at a time when, to say the least of it, our relations with another foreign country were strained, had received an Envoy from that country whose intentions were avowedly hostile to us, while our counter-Mission was rejected in the face of all India, and at a point outside his own territory to which he had advanced his forces? In view of all those facts, the Government of India had felt that a crisis had arrived in our relations with Afghanistan; that if such conduct were tolerated, a feeling might get abroad that we were losing our strength; and that that paramount influence in Afghanistan which ought to be ours was not only going, but absolutely gone. The Indian Government had felt that Afghanistan under a foreign Power might prove a constant menace to our safety in the East, and they had accordingly represented to the Government at home the absolute and urgent necessity of taking some steps to secure our position. There could be no pretence for saying that Lord Lytton desired war—of all people in the world he was one of the least likely to desire it; and if there was one thing for which he would be remembered gratefully, it would be for the re-establishment of our Indian finances on a sound basis. Was it likely, then, that he should desire to overthrow that satisfactory basis, and to risk his whole reputation and undertake the anxieties of war? The Government at home had entered upon the war with no light heart—though sometimes they had been accused of desiring war—but that had been at a time when they had achieved peace. In truth, they desired no war, and no annexation of Afghanistan; yet, when dangers and trials were pressing, and when they felt that to take some notice of them was necessary and unavoidable, if they had failed to do so they would have been untrue to their trust. In that spirit, they were quite ready to submit their conduct to the
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    judgment of Parliament, and were not afraid of the verdict.
    MR. TREVELYAN: Sir, in my opinion, the two speeches we have listened to this evening are not likely to diminish the wonder that has been expressed in several quarters at the contrast between the eager warmth with which this matter has been discussed out-of-doors, six weeks ago, and the calm and dispassionate manner in which it has been debated within this House. But the circumstances have greatly altered; for six weeks ago the question of war and peace was still open, and those who regarded war as a great calamity would have been something less than Englishmen if they had not discussed the subject with animation. The Government, however, have now taken upon themselves the responsibility of declaring war. Overt acts of war have been committed; and it has become the duty of Parliament to say conscientiously whether they think what has been done should have been done or left alone. We are bound to do that, unless we are ready to sink to the rank of an Assembly which only meets to register the foregone conclusions of the Government. A theory has been propounded by several leading papers, that when war has once been declared the House of Commons has nothing to do but to hold its tongue and vote the money. But I cannot endorse it; for the simple reason that it goes to maintain that the most important of all resolutions which the Executive can take—if only it be taken without first consulting Parliament—is ipso facto removed from the cognizance of Parliament. I do not propose to touch on any of the matters which have been treated so exhaustively by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), except in so far as that is rendered necessary by some of the observations of the last speaker. It is especially necessary to refer to certain remarks of his with regard to Lord Northbrook; because Lord Cranbrook's despatch identifies Lord Northbrook's reputation with that of the Government which I had the honour to support. Lord Cranbrook, in the ninth paragraph of his despatch, has attempted to throw upon Lord Northbrook the consequences of the fatal step that was taken in 1876, and which has involved us in the war with the Ameer; and the Under Secretary of State for India evidently regards

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    —and justly so—Lord Northbrook as the recalcitrant agent of the present Government. The hon. Gentleman said—"Events showed that representations which were addressed to the Ameer in 1876 ought to have been addressed to him in 1875, and would have been addressed to him but for Lord North brook." Sir, I should rather say that events have proved the truth of Lord North-brook's prediction, and that the consequences which Lord Northbrook said were certain to arise, if a certain fatal step was taken in 1875, have actually resulted now that that step was taken in 1876. Lord Northbrook prophesied that if British Residents were pressed on the Ameer he would refuse to receive them. He has refused. He prophesied that the refusal would impair the influence of the British Government in India. It has done so to such a degree that we are going into a great war to restore that influence. He prophesied that the Ameer would be thrown into the arms of Russia; and he has been thrown so completely into the arms of Russia that no one knows if he will be got out of them. The hon. Gentleman, towards the close of his speech, asked the cardinal question on which the issue of this debate must turn, and that is—at what specific point of those negotiations the conduct of the late Government would have diverged from that of Her Majesty's Ministers? Although I am not in the secrets of the late Government, I will not hesitate to name the exact point of separation, and that is just halfway through the Blue Book, at page 128, at the time when Lord Salisbury wrote a letter raising again the question of the British Agents in the territories of the Ameer, and insisting that his policy with regard to that matter should be carried through. Lord Northbrook, however, clearly shows that his policy with regard to Afghanistan had been to show the Ameer that we desired to assist him with our advice whenever he required it, and not to press upon him the presence of a British officer within his territories. While I thank the Government for the fulness of the Blue Book—and feel bound to compliment the editor upon the skill with which he has arranged the several documents—I have yet to complain that there is one hiatus in the Papers which will have to be explained in a manner which will bring more conviction to the House than has been
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    produced hitherto—the absence of the I Minute of General Norman, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, and Sir William Muir. Had that been given, it would have let some light in upon what is the difference between the old and new policy of the Indian Government. Taking the Papers as a whole, however, such well-digested information, tracing the whole course of events, has never been laid before Parliament to my knowledge, and they give those who study them an opportunity of so tracing them. We have often heard of the high pitch to which the art of writing well is carried among our Anglo-Indian officials; but this collection of Papers proves that at the India Office there exists not only the art of writing well, but a still higher and rarer literary quality—the art of arrangement. This Book contains not merely the materials of history. It is history itself. Almost without a word of comment, the story is left to tell itself; and the only exception brings into strong relief the merit of the performance; for I cannot but think that the author himself would be glad if he had ended the Book at page 260. Lord Cranbrook ought to have been sufficiently confident in the excellence of his own production to have sent it into the world without the tail which he has put to it; and the unfortunate—and to those whose political and administrative reputations are concerned the very unfortunate—brevity and condensation of paragraph 9 contrasts most unfavourably with the full and detailed exposition of the rival policies of Lord Lawrence and Lord Lytton, of the late Cabinet and the present one. As to the merits of those policies we differ, and differ widely; but as to their intention, it is difficult to see how there can be any difference of opinion whatsoever. The old policy consisted in full reliance upon a well-disciplined and well-appointed army, stationed within our own borders; in keeping our troops in hand in a country where there was, or soon would be, complete means of lateral communication all along our Frontier, and where that Frontier would not be cut transversely by great ranges of mountains—as high as the mountains of the Bernese Oberland—which would hinder, instead of furthering, that facility of concentration which is the soul of modern, and indeed of all, warfare. Another supposed—and, as I think, very material—advantage of the old policy

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    was that our Frontier lay in a plain; and the inhabitants of a plain when once conquered are conquered for ever; while there are few instances in history in which the inhabitants of mountains have been finally and thoroughly subdued and assimilated. Situated, to a great extent, in a fertile country, in the midst of their supplies, and in the very heart of the best recruiting ground in India, our Army had nothing to do, except to look after the people who were in front of them, and no reason to trouble themselves about the people among whom they lived, or, still worse, the people who were behind them. And while this policy was, according to the very distinguished military men who held it, the most effective policy from a military point of view, it had, in the eyes of the soldier-statesmen who governed India, and who, while they were soldiers, were not ashamed of being statesmen, this immense recommendation—that it was an economical policy. That was the opinion not of holiday soldiers, or penny-wise and pound-foolish economists. The Minute of 1869 embodying that opinion was signed by the statesman who saved the Punjab, and the General who had been Chief of the Staff of the Army which recovered India. Men who had been in such a position at such a crisis knew very well that a military danger, far more serious than any external military danger, would be the internal discontent that would infallibly result from increased and increasing taxation. Such men as these—such a man as Colonel Reynell-Taylor, the Commissioner of Umballah, who in three desperate campaigns has fought throughout the length and breadth of the country which he now wisely governs—hold the same view; as General Norman, who, in the course of 10 years, was 25 times thanked in general orders and despatches for services in the field—held the view that the old system of Frontier defence was the most effective for military purposes; and that the system which was most effective for military reasons was—as in the long run must always be the case—the most truly economical. To put against opinions like these you have, indeed, great names; but I must beg to remind the House that this is a matter on which we want something more than great names—we want exact calculations. General Norman, and Colonel Taylor, and Sir John
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    Lawrence, are arguing in favour of a system which they know by experience; which they have worked, and, to a great extent, have founded; a system which was in force for many years; a system which was in force from the moment when the Government of Lord Ellen-borough evacuated Afghanistan to the moment when the Government of Lord Lytton occupied Quetta. But the new policy is a thing of the future. The military and still more financial arrangements connected with it are matters of hypothesis and conjecture; and I am bound to say that the imaginations and ideas of some of its warmest supporters are—like the garrisons which they propose to plant a couple of hundred miles from our present Frontier—not in the plain, but in the clouds. What are the data on which we are relying, as against the minute, the well-founded, the familiar, and household knowledge of the old school of Punjaubee administrators? Here is a specimen of what—in default of any estimates proceeding from official and authentic sources—is put forward as a guide to the public opinion of the country. General Shakspear, of the Artillery—a very hard-fighting officer, though his distinguished services were done elsewhere than in India, and who appears to be at least as courageous with his pen as with his sword—writes to The Times from the scientific club to say that, whereas our present Frontier would take 100,000 men to defend it, a scientific Frontier would require only 5,000 men. Now, here we have a scientific soldier writing about a scientific Frontier from a scientific club, who tells us that, if the Russians attempted to invade us—for that, of course, is the contingency under which we should require 100,000 men to hold our present Frontier—wecouldkeepthem back with 5,000 men. Sir, I cannot imagine how anyone—soldier or civilian—can believe that, by placing behind our backs a range of mountains 100 miles broad, 13,000 to 17,000 feet high, and swarming with turbulent and faithless mountaineers, we could at once repel Russia, and keep up our numerous, lengthy, and perilous lines of communication with smaller forces than we have at present. It is at least an open question among scientific military men that a line on the summit of a range of mountains—or, still more, on the re-

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    verse of a range of mountains—is the very worst and most dangerous line to defend. You have not only to protect your main Passes—and for every one of those main Passes, if Russia came, 5,000 men would be barely sufficient garrison—you have to watch and block every mule track, and even foot track, by which Infantry could pass in order to take your garrisons in the rear. Look at the experience of Turkey. By far the greatest and most unmitigated misfortune of Turkey in the late war was the defeat which befel her at a time when events, political and military, were hurrying so fast that very little was heard of it in London—the battle which, I think, is called the battle of Kesnova. The Turks held the Shipka Pass and the neighbourhood in immense force, and with a most powerful artillery. They were attacked in front by the main Russian Army. They beat the Russians handsomely. They were on the very point of ruining their army, when Skobeleff pushed his Infantry across paths by which he could not drag a single field-piece. He took the victorious army in the rear. He had it at a hopeless disadvantage. Without a gun to help him, two-and-forty pieces of Artillery fell into his hands in a couple of hours. And when once they were beaten, the whole Turkish Army, being on the mountains—instead of being on their own side of the mountains—were captured, if I recollect right, to the number of 28,000 men. Now, brave as the Turks are—heaven knows that I do not wish to argue too closely from them to our own valiant battalions; but everybody who has studied military history knows that, in order to fight his best, the British soldier must, like other soldiers, be placed in a position which accords with, the well-established principles of the art of war. I am stating the case insufficiently. I am conceding half of what is urged on the other side, when I say that if we push our line across the mountains, for every soldier who, owing to our improved positions, we could spare from the front, we should be forced to tell off two to guard our communications. Austria requires 60,000 men permanently to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina—countries in which, taking them together, two-thirds of the population are favourable to her—and if we chose to place behind our Frontier a dis-
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    trict much like Bosnia and Herzegovina, with mountains thrice as high, and with a population not a man of which we can trust, to believe that we should in the end get off more cheaply than Austria, is, in my opinion, to labour under nothing short of infatuation. And, what is more, that is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. If the object of this war—the wisdom of which we condemn and you justify—is to provide India with a Frontier which can be defended more economically, what is the meaning of the announcement made in this House last Friday by the Under Secretary of State for India? What is the meaning of his declaration that the Indian Government, with the unanimous consent of the Indian Council, had determined to increase the Native Army? And The Times newspaper—which throughout the whole of this business has shown a minute acquaintance with the military intentions of the Government that is more than prophetic—The Times newspaper, which two full months before war was declared, before ever the Chamberlain Mission had started from Peshawur, before nine out of ten Englishmen knew that such a Mission was to be sent, told us the exact number of troops which would be required in case Afghanistan was invaded, and entered into details so minute that it pointed out the destination of every half-squadron and half-battery— The Times newspaper now informs us that the Indian Government intends to increase every Native Infantry battalion by 200 men, and to add a proportionate complement of European officers. Under the old policy we contrived to guard India with 500 bayonets in a battalion; and since we have been informed by the Prime Minister—on the most solemn and important occasion on which, except from his place in Parliament, a Prime Minister can speak—that we have gone to war to extend our Frontier; and since, by the confession of the Ministry, the first result of our extension of Frontier, as I can well believe, will be to add 40 per cent to the strength of our Infantry—apart from justice, apart from international morality, on grounds of British, or, as it is now called, Imperial expediency—I emphatically put in my protest against such a war. I should very much like to know whether

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    Lord Beaconsfield, before he made his declaration at the Guildhall—which committed the country to a permanent military occupation of the North-Western Highlands—had considered in detail the practical objections which the Indian authorities made to such an occupation in the year 1869, and had satisfied himself of the practical arguments by which those objections should be refuted? Let hon. Gentlemen turn to pages 56 and 57 of the Afghan Papers—I have not risen to take up their time by reading lengthy extracts, and still less shall I presume to translate into my own feeble and insufficient language the phrases in which the ablest and most distinguished of our Punjab officials have put their opinions and their experience on record; but I beg hon. Gentlemen to read that part of Colonel Reynell-Taylor's despatch which refers to the inconvenience—a word which, in the Indian language, means the peril—of permanently stationing Native troops on the other side of the mountains, and still more among the mountains themselves. It has been my great good fortune — a good fortune which I wish had been shared by some very prominent statesmen—to have had just enough connection with India to make me more than distrustful—to make mo absolutely sceptical as to my own power of forming any sound opinion of Indian subjects as the result of my own observation. But I do know just enough of India—or, rather, of Anglo-India—to have some means of judging the relative value of the opinions of others; and I am certain that when Colonel Reynell-Taylor states, and gives the grounds for his statement, that the permanent occupation of the new Frontier will put a strain—and a very serious strain—on the discipline and the morale of our Native Army, he has said something which will require a more weighty answer than a few clever sentences in a debating speech in the House of Commons. I look in vain in these Papers for a confutation of these, as I think, convincing—and, if convincing, most alarming—arguments. At this moment, on both sides of the House, we are under the deep impression produced upon our judgments and imaginations by successes, which prove that the quality of British soldier ship has not deteriorated, and the average quality of British military leadership has largely and unmistakably
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    improved. At this moment our Native troops, who have taken part in those successes, are under the influence of the just pride and exultation which spreads itself like a second patriotism through a successful army; but when two or three—or, if you like, 20 or 30—years have gone by; when the novelty has worn off, and the cold, the discomfort, the exile, the entire breaking up of that family and domestic life which, to the Native soldier, constitutes a necessity of military service, have done their work, then the discontent of the 25,000 Sikhs and Poorbeah Sepoys, who will be quartered in the Passes, will add a very serious feature to our Indian difficulties. But it will be said you may quarter the European troops in the Passes, and keep the Natives in the plains. That may be said in the House of Commons; but it will not be regarded as a practical solution of the question in India. With 200,000 men in arms under the command of the independent Princes of India; with Scindiah adopting the Prussian system to arm his entire male population; with our own Native Army 120,000 strong; our 40,000 or 50,000 British linesmen, and our 10,000 British Artillerymen are not a man too many to enable the Englishmen resident in Hindostan to sleep quiet in their beds. When the first flush of victory and confidence is over, I will venture to say that the least acceptable proposition which could be made to the Anglo-Indian community would be to denude Cawnpore, Meerut, and Allahabad, in order to send 12,000 or 15,000 British bayonets to the other side of the Suleiman mountains. These were the considerations, I cannot doubt, which weighed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when, in August, 1877, he made his declaration against advancing our present Frontier. So strong was the right hon. Gentleman's opinion in favour of the view which I have been advocating, that he declared himself opposed to the military occupation of Quetta. Considerations—political and diplomatic—have since, I suppose, modified the right hon. Gentleman's judgment; but on the military question—and I have not attempted to deal with any other—I boldly quote him as an authority in favour of my view. It is a thousand pities that we did not leave it for Russia, if she wants to invade us, to entangle herself in a

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    preliminary conflict with the Ameer, and hamper and handicap herself with the bitter animosity of that most resentful nation—the effect of whose patient but watchful hostility we ourselves, a generation ago, learned by memorable experience. I could wish no worse fortune for our worst enemy than to have turned himself—as we have contrived to turn ourselves—into the enemy of the Afghan race. An hon. Friend of mine opposite—who, I think, has not been in India—the other day, when speaking to his constituents, described the Ameer as the puppet of Russia. With much greater justice, the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding (Mr. C. Beckett-Denison)—who has been in India for a long time and to some purpose—spoke of the Ameer as a Potentate who was anxious to rub the noses of England and Russia together. But, unfortunately, we needs must step in and remind Shere Ali that there was a Power far more formidable than Russia, and far nearer to his doors, who demanded of him much greater sacrifices, and was determined to inflict on him a more intolerable humiliation. I candidly admit that the negotiations with Lord Northbrook in 1873 left the Ameer sullen. I am very much inclined to think that they found him sullen; but Shere Ali, whatever else he may be, is no fool; and some much stronger motive than sullen-ness is required to induce a Ruler to defy a Power which could at any time occupy his capital on six weeks' notice, and that motive was terror—terror, mixed with indignation, at the persistent determination to force upon him British Residents; the invitation—for so he would read it—to accept the fate of so many other Native Rulers who had admitted British political officers within their Frontiers—to run the usual round of semi-independence, total dependence, and then final subjugation and extinction. He knew his people better than we know them. He knew that when Afghans saw the white faces lording it in their streets they could not be trusted to keep their fingers off the foreigner. He knew—if we have forgotten it—how often, among a people less hot-blooded and vindictive than his, the downfall of a Native dynasty has begun with an attack upon the British Residency. And in this frame of mind he heard that Quetta—which stands at the back
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    gate of his country, as Peshawur stands at the front gate—was occupied by a military force; and he heard it, as we well know, with much the same feelings as George III. heard that Napoleon was encamped with 100,000 men on the cliffs off Dover. And, finally, his Envoy was invited to a Conference at Peshawur, to which our Envoy came with the draft of a Treaty in his pocket, which as hon. Gentlemen will see, if they turn to pages 190, 191, was expressly, carefully, and most effectually drawn for the purpose of turning him into a subsidised dependent. If we wished to hurt his feelings; if we wished to pick a quarrel with him; if we wished to thrust him—whether he willed it or not—into the capacious arms of Russia, I cannot even conceive what other course we should have taken. But the details of the process by which this unhappy Ruler was forcibly alienated from British influence, which by the end of this week will be familiar to the country, I leave in more capable hands. My endeavour to-night was not to enlarge upon the justice or injustice of our conduct—though my vote in the division will be affected by that consideration—but to show, apart from right or wrong, that we are doing not well, but ill for our own interests by going to war in quest of a scientific Frontier.
    MR. MARTENsaid, it must be assumed that the Government was following the advice of military men of experience, and he pointed out that the testimony of an experienced commander like Lord Napier of Magdala was in favour of the Frontier which was now sought for North-Western India. In that noble Lord's opinion the assertion that we were secure in India if we remained within our mountain boundary was at variance with all history. A mountain chain that could be pierced in many places was no security if you hid behind it. How much Austria lost in not defending the Bohemian mountains; and what might have been the position of the Turks had they properly secured the passage of the Balkans? The principal charge the Mover of the Amendment had made against the Government was that they had inaugurated a new policy with regard to our Indian Possessions, and that that policy was a policy of preserving ourselves against the aggressions of Russia. But he (Mr. Marten) dis-

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    tinctly repudiated that charge; for he contended that they had, on the contrary, endeavoured to pursue the same policy, making allowance for the changes which were found necessary under the altered circumstances. As he understood the policy of the Indian Government and of England with regard to Afghanistan, it was that we desired Afghanistan should be independent, strong, and, above all, that it should be friendly to us; and if these three conditions were fulfilled, our position on the North-Western Frontier would be safely protected. The real ground of complaint put forward by the Ameer, according to his Envoy, was the interference of the Viceroy with regard to his son. How could it then, in fairness, be said that we had given him umbrage by asking that he should enter with us into an offensive and defensive Treaty, which was, he contended, a proposal for a complete alliance justified by the advances of Russia, and for the due effect of which it was necessary that we should have the means of having Resident Agents? Reviewing the Papers at considerable length, the conclusion he arrived at was, that had we, at an earlier period, adopted a wise and friendly policy we might still have been on friendly terms with the Ameer, who had at one time avowed his willingness to be the enemy of our enemies. That friendly disposition had, for some reasons not clearly explained, been disturbed. He (Mr. Marten) was very strongly impressed with the belief that both the Indian Government and the Government of this country, before the accession to power of the present Ministry, had not been sufficiently alive to the active progress made by Russia in Central Asia. The House was asked to express its disapproval of the general policy of the present Government; but from what had been already said in the debate, and the references that had been made to the Papers in the hands of hon. Members, the present war, he maintained, had been forced upon the Government by circumstances arising out of the policy of their Predecessors; and if they had pursued a timid or procrastinating policy they would have lost a great opportunity, in his opinion, of strengthening our Indian Frontier. The purchase of the Suez Canal shares; the assumption of the title of Empress of India by Her Majesty; the visit of
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    the Prince of Wales to that country; were, he believed, all portions of a policy which had been pursued by the Government with great skill and perseverance, and which was calculated to uphold our great and glorious Empire.
    MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I understood the hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. Marten) to say that the policy which the Government have recently pursued in India is not a new one, but is only the policy of their Predecessors, with some slight rectification. I think, in the face of the Papers, he will find it difficult to establish such a statement as that; and I think it entirely inconsistent with all that fell from the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India. I listened with great attention to the very able statement he made tonight. It was a clear and consistent statement; but I thought it a little incomplete. It made clear the position which the Government occupied as to Afghanistan; but it left me a little in doubt as to the position which the Government think they occupy in regard to Russia. I understand, from the account given in the speech of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Stanhope), that the hostility—and the evidently increasing hostility—of the Ameer towards this country was an all-sufficient justification for the policy pursued. He told us that this hostility was in a measure due to the action we had taken with regard to his son, Yakoob Khan; to our refusal to complete with him a defensive and offensive alliance; that it was owing to the unfortunate action of previous Viceroys; that it was due to a variety of circumstances; but there was one thing which had not the slightest effect on the good will of the Ameer towards us, and that was the attempt to force upon him the residence of British officers in his territory. This statement was made on the authority of Captain Grey, who reported that Mahomed Shah had declared the Ameer would not object to receive European Agents in other places than Cabul. But the hon. Gentleman omitted to quote the statement which followed the one he read, and which is from the Governor General in Council, in which he says, in reference to this statement, that, looking at all the circumstances of the case, and the absence of all official record of a conversation of a private and confidential nature, he was not

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    justified in founding an opinion that the Ameer was willing to receive a European Agent at Herat. Proofs are not wanting that both the Ameer and his father, Dost Mahomed, persistently, and on all occasions, objected to such a Mission. And what stronger proof could be afforded of this than the fact that he refused an alliance with his powerful neighbour and £100,000, rather than accept such a condition? What are the proofs the hon. Gentleman has given us of the unfriendliness of the Ameer? First, he tells us of the attempt to get up a "Jehad" against the British Government. But I believe that if there is any truth in what appears to be only a rumour—for though he tells us this upon the authority of the Governor General, it must be recollected that the Viceroy does not report from his own knowledge, but from Native and other sources—but suppose there is anything in this report that a religious war was attempted to be got up, it was directed against both Russians and English. The second proof of hostility is the refusal of the Ameer to accept the Mission. That refusal is a proof of his dislike at having the Mission thrust upon him, and not of his unfriendliness towards us. From the general argument, it appears the Government have thought these reasons sufficient to change the policy of their Predecessors; but what I wish to point out is that no intimation of this change was given to the House. When the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) gave Notice of his Resolution I gave Notice of an addition thereto, in the shape of a censure upon the Government for not having, previous to declaring war, taken Parliament into its confidence, and for having withheld Papers so long and on inadequate pretexts. This was not in any sense hostile to the Motion of the hon. Member. Indeed, I hoped to have his support. I find, however, that, owing to a change in the order of the debate, which has transformed the Resolution into an Amendment, I am not able to propose my Resolution. Therefore, I withdraw it. But I do this the more willingly because I clearly understood from the speech of the hon. Member for Bedford that he proposed to include in his reasons for condemning the conduct of the Government, the grounds I purposed to set out in my ad-
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    dition. As it is, even if the failure to consult Parliament was not in itself the cause of war, and even if it cannot be shown that war might have been prevented if the House had had the previous opportunity of discussion, yet there is a great difference between consulting Parliament now, when the country is irretrievably committed to war, and of consulting Parliament before the war commenced. There may have been times of national peril and emergency, when it was impossible to take the opinion of Parliament before it became necessary to declare war; and there have been many and more frequent cases in which Parliament has been kept so fully informed of all the circumstances leading up to war that they were fully prepared for its declaration, and might even be said to have consented by implication. But in this instance we have been kept in absolute ignorance of what was going on, and not merely so, but we have been misled by statements and assurances that, if true to the letter, had the effect of throwing us off the scent. I do not attempt to deny that what has been done may be in strict accordance with Constitutional precedent. But I want the House to see that the use of this precedent, in the present instance, practically reduces the House of Commons to impotence, so far as influence over our foreign relations is concerned. Whatever might be the intention of the Government, practically, the effect of it is to deprive the nation of all control over foreign affairs. Some hon. Members have invented a convenient theory by which opposition is silenced in the presence of foreign complications. If we attempt discussion before war breaks out, we are hampering the Government in negotiations and endangering peace. If we wait until war is upon us, then it is said that, in an unpatriotic way, we are dividing the country in the presence of the enemy; while if we postpone discussion until the war is over, until arrangements are made, then we are told we are guilty of futile fault-finding and unnecessary retrospection. The thing, in fact, comes to this—that it is not the business of the House of Commons or the people to express an opinion on foreign affairs—this should be left to the responsible Advisers of the Crown—the House of Commons confining its functions only to paying the bill. I

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    want to ask them to consider to what their practice will eventually lead. They mistake the temper of the people of this country—they reckon without their host—who think the people will consent to a system so fatal to the future destinies of the country. You may bring Parliamentary government into contempt; but the only result will be that public opinion will find expression in less satisfactory ways. You may diminish the influence of Parliament; but you increase that of public agitation. You may choke up the channel between the people and the Ministers of the Crown; but the stream will still flow on, and find a less safe and less convenient course. If, on general grounds, it behoves Parliament jealously to guard its just authority, in the present case we have special reasons for deprecating the treatment we have received. There has been a great change in the policy which has governed India for the past 40 years, and which has been advocated by leading Members of the present Government; and during the time that this change has been in progress, we have had frequent assurances from the Ministry that there was not the slightest intention of changing it. I do not taunt the Government with the fact that their utterances now are inconsistent with their previously expressed opinions. Circumstances may have changed, or, what is more probable, their view of the circumstances have changed. But I do complain that they have allowed us to believe no change was in contemplation. The Papers produced, and the speech we have heard to-night, show the extent and nature of this change, and the degree to which the old policy of masterly inactivity with regard to India has been abandoned, for what I call a policy of "masterful activity." Lord Cranbrook has drawn up the case for the Government in paragraph 10, and tells us how when he came into office circumstances demanded a policy of timely precaution—an admirable phrase; one of those phrases for which we are indebted to the present Government, meaning more than it appears to mean. I confess I do not understand how it is possible to reconcile speeches made in former debates by Members of the Government with the evidence we find in these Papers. The speech which my hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) has already quoted from the
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    Chancellor of the Exchequer I hope the latter will explain with satisfaction to us, who require no assurances of his good faith, but who are compelled to say that we have been misled by it. On August 9, 1877, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said—
    "I have always demurred to the idea which has been put forward by some, that the beat way to meet danger is to advance beyond our Frontier, and have always held that the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselves are these—to strengthen ourselves within our Frontier, and to do so by a combination of measures, moral and material."
    And, again—
    "The main lines of our policy are unchanged, and I believe the country will be satisfied with and will wish them to continue."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxvi. 718–22.]
    Yes, Sir; but would the country have been satisfied if they had known that at the very moment when these words were uttered our policy had been changed—that a policy of "timely precaution" was in full progress—and that an English Viceroy had actually been instructed by his Government to find a pretext—or, if he could not find one, to create one—to cover demands which they dared not openly avow? The other night the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke with some indignation of a statement made by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, to the effect that the war was being waged on false pretexts; but he did not appear to me to appreciate the exact nature of the accusation which I understood the noble Lord to bring, and which, in any case, I now venture to repeat. We do not accuse the Government of going to war on a pretext which to them appears insufficient; we do not accuse them of such grotesque wickedness; but we do say that the pretext held out to us is not the real one. We do not make this charge on our own authority; we make it on the authority of the friends and supporters of the Government. I find the semi-official newspaper, The Pioneer of India, of the 21st August, speaks of the Mission to Cabul as follows:—
    "It is a measure for which the way has been carefully prepared by the policy of the Indian Government during the last two or three years, and it should begin the establishment of our relations with the most important State on our Northern Frontier on a satisfactory basis. Everything that Lord Lytton has done in connection with the North-Western Frontier has been directed towards undoing the blunders of

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    the past. The work has been one of time, be-cause the way had to be picked carefully. There has been a powerful, though wrong-headed, opposition at home to circumvent."
    Now, how can this be reconciled with the assurance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that at this time there was no change in the main lines of our policy with Afghanistan? I do not know whether it is a strictly Parliamentary practice "to circumvent" an Opposition, which I understand to mean "to take in." But it is not alone the wrong-headed opposition which suffer, but so also do the Parliament and people, from being kept in the dark. We have been told that the Russian Mission at Cabul, which took place after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is sufficient to account for a change in the policy of the Government; but I can point out that pressure upon the Ameer began years before this Russian Mission was thought of; and, in any case, the Russian Mission was certainly not a just cause of war against the Ameer of Afghanistan. The reception of the Russian Mission by the Ameer was, I believe, very unwilling on his part. I believe it to have been unwilling for one reason—that he delayed it for more than a month before he allowed it to enter his territory. But I say the reception of that Mission would be a very natural act, a mere act of self-preservation, after the warnings and threats which he had received from the Viceroy. He had been told by the Viceroy that very probably Russia and England would combine to wipe him out of the map; and I think it very natural that he should take the first friendly offer he received from one of the two Powers. Then we have the fact of the withdrawal of Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission, just at the moment when news came that the Ameer was prepared to assent, although unwillingly, to the demands which were made upon him. When you couple that with the peremptory manner in which the Mission of Sir Neville Chamberlain was carried through, and the violent language of the Viceroy about the earthen pipkin and the two iron pots, it certainly seems to me as though, on the part of the Indian Government at all events, there was a foregone determination to go to war, and to find in the Cabul Mission, or in something else, an excuse for a policy which was to end in a rectification of
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    territory and a scientific Frontier. If the reception of an English Mission was the sole object of the Government, that might have been obtained on two or three occasions; but if a rectification of territory was what was wanted, then we can easily understand that such a policy as was pursued was a very sure and certain way of effecting the desired object. I desire to ask hon. Members whether, assuming that British interests would be served by such an alteration of Frontier as is now contemplated, whether we are to hold that British interests are altogether independent of considerations of right and justice? Does anybody suppose that we should have dared to avow or carry out such a policy in a European country? And is it sufficient to call a man a barbarian in order to discharge oneself of all obligations to treat him with common fairness and consideration? Are we to go on piling up one pretext after another; to act as judges in our own cause; and in this way to justify our policy of injustice and aggrandisement? Only carry this a little further, and it would be a justification of any invasion of national freedom and national independence. Only admit that a country has to follow the law of self-preservation without reference to others, and it is evidently a justification for an attack—say of France upon Belgium, or Germany upon Holland, or the absorption of Canada by the United States—and this deliberate attempt to substitute might for right in dealing with Indian Princes, and the law of force for the law of nations, is certain, in my opinion, to have a most disastrous effect upon the true foundations of our Indian Empire. The Duke of Wellington, writing a letter to Major Malcolm, said—
    "I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every Frontier of India, ten times over in order to save our credit for scrupulous good faith."
    Recently a celebrated historian, who gave utterance to a similar sentiment, was very severely taken to task; but I do not suppose anyone would venture to doubt the patriotism of the Duke of Wellington. But what are we doing? What of this scrupulous good faith? What of our prestige in India? These we are willing to throw away in pursuit of the hazy phantom of a "scientific Frontier." What is a scientific Frontier? The Government have not vouchsafed

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    to us at present any definition of what they understand by it. I do not suppose they would find it easy to get any two great military authorities to agree upon the exact boundary which should give us security; and if they did agree, who is there that does not know that agreement would have no finality about it? If you begin a policy of this kind it has no end. Bach successive stage brings us one step nearer to the inevitable time when we shall find ourselves face to face with Russia, and any further rectification of Frontier will be only possible at the expense of a European war. It is a curious thing that whenever we have had the misfortune to be governed by Ministers who affect a spirited foreign policy, the country at once becomes a prey to apprehension and panic. At one time it is Spain which is the object of this unworthy fear; then France; and now it is Russia. We hear a great deal of a "great" England and of our Imperial destiny; and this great, England, with enormous resources in men and money, is betrayed into an unworthy and undignified apprehension, which, I say, should never enter into its mind as long as it does not meddle with what does not concern it. Those take the truest estimate of Imperial greatness and power who believe that "when a strong man armed keepeth his house his goods are in peace," and none can make him afraid. Those, on the contrary, take a mean, unworthy view who are always going fussily about, going to war with some one, for fear that some one should anticipate them by going to war with them. I have only one point more to which I wish to call attention. I object strongly not only to the policy of the Government, and to the way in which it has been carried out, but also to the time at which it has been adopted. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary lately rebuked an hon. Gentleman for speaking of Russia as an enemy of this country, and said the Queen was on friendly relations with all the European Powers. At the time of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission there was no emergency—we were in full enjoyment of peace with honour—at that time there was a slight revival in trade, which had been depressed so long. Now that revival is absolutely checked, and the nation's industries are prostrate—trade is worse than
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    I ever knew it before. I can speak with authority of my own district. Birmingham is fortunately situated in having so many industries carried on there that it does not suffer so much as other towns in times of bad trade, for if one trade is slack, the chances are that another trade will be busy. But, at the present time, I know no trade which is making any satisfactory return for the capital engaged in it; and I know of a great many which are being worked at a loss. In the district of Staffordshire things are still worse. The coal and iron industries are almost destroyed. Of 150 blast furnaces in South Staffordshire, less than 40 are at work; and there is not a month in which one or more are not added to the unemployed. I happen to be President of the Board of Arbitration which settles the wages of the ironworkers for the whole of the central district of England; and I have had, unfortunately, to my great regret, to award three successive reductions of wages, until they have touched the lowest point which has been known for 25 years, and there is not the slightest sign of seeing improvement. And yet this was the time—when there was no emergency, when there was no reason for haste—when the Indian Government chose, and which the Home Government approved, for taking steps which so greatly add to the prevailing distress and stagnation. I suppose it may be said that in criticizing and condemning the policy of Her Majesty's Government we are acting the part of a factious Opposition. Her Majesty's Government seem to think that the functions of a Constitutional Opposition is to shut its eyes and open its mouth, and take all the Government pleases to send them. But it was not always so. It was not in this sense that the Leaders of the Conservative Party used to understand the duties of an Opposition. In 1857, at the time of the China War—which, in my opinion, was as unjust and as immoral as the present war—Mr. Disraeli opposed the Government of the day, and supported a Vote of Censure upon them, which was carried; and afterwards, when Parliament was dissolved and Lord Palmerston appealed to the country, Mr. Disraeli, in an address to the electors of Buckinghamshire, wrote some words which are very apposite to the present occasion. He said of Lord Palmerston—

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    "With no domestic policy, he is obliged to divert the attention of the people from the consideration of their own affairs to the distraction of foreign polities. His external system is turbulent and aggressive that his rule at home may be tranquil and unassailed. Hence arise excessive expenditure, heavy taxation, and the stoppage of all social improvement. The general policy which I should enforce at this juncture may be contained in these words—'Honourable peace, reduced taxation, and social improvement.'"
    Sir, we appeal from Lord Beaconsfield in 1878 to Mr. Disraeli in 1857. For my own part, I would not wish wiser words or better words in which to appeal to my constituents when the time comes—as I sincerely hope it may come very soon—when the nation will be called upon to decide between the two sides of the House. If its decision should be against us, we shall bow to it with what resignation we may; but until we know it to be given at the polling-booth I, for one, will not believe the nation will sanction a policy the military necessity for which is doubted and denied, and which, regarded from any ordinary standpoint of morality, is unjust in its objects, and dishonourable in the means by which it is sought to be obtained.
    MR. RIDLEYconsidered the most satisfactory chapter in the Blue Book was that which recorded the success of Lord Mayo in gaining over Shere Ali as the real friend of this country. There were two policies to be pursued with respect to Afghanistan as a Frontier State; one was to have treated him as an independent Sovereign—in which case neither we nor Russia had any business to have a Resident at his Court—and the other was to say we would defend him against the assaults of foreign foes, provided his foreign policy met our views—and in that case we must have a British Resident upon whom we could depend to give us authentic information of what was going on in his Kingdom. As long as Russia did not interfere with Afghanistan we were content to stand aloof; but as soon as she sent a Mission to Cabul, and the new factor of Russian aggression came into consideration, it was necessary to provide in some more determined manner for the safety of the Empire under our control. Lord Mayo was satisfied that the Russians meant to be friendly, and that the fears of Shere Ali might be set aside; and Lord
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    Northbrook assured him he was safe under the assurances of Russia, but Shere Ali himself knew better. Before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Umballa we found that General Kaufmann was opening communications with the Ameer; and as Lord Northbrook chose to rely upon Russian assurances we had thrown the Ameer into the arms of that Government. These assurances reminded him of the Acts of Parliament which were passed at the time that the English were conquering India. England acted in a similar manner last century, when, in spite of the written law at home, we conquered India. But for that disobedience of the law, we should have been without half the Deccan and half of Hindostan at this moment. Therefore, without considering the question of right, they could not close their eyes to the fact that the Russians had never ceased advancing in Central Asia since 1847, and the Ameer had a better chance of observing that advance than we had. Shere Ali, from his own Kingdom, could serve the Russians if he chose. He was on the spot, while we had to depend upon despatches at at least 1,000 miles from what would be the scene of action. It was, to his mind, clear from the first that the Russians meant more than they said when they wrote letters to the Ameer expressing hopes that he would be friendly to the Russian nation, and telling him that by good behaviour he might in time merit the favour of their good master the Czar. After these letters had been treated by Lord Northbrook in the way he had described, the relations between India and the Ameer entered upon a new phase; because in consequence of a disturbance which had arisen in reference to the boundaries of Afghanistan, it was considered necessary that there should be an interview between Lord Northbrook and the Ameer. This was after Shere Ali had received letters from Russia which had caused him apprehensions as to which he had received assurances. At that negotiation Shere Ali asked more than any Government of England could grant; and he was also told that, as there was no possibility of his being invaded by Russia, the question of guaranteeing him against the consequences of such an invasion could not be considered. From that point commenced the ultimate

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    enmity of the Ameer, who began to think that he had better turn his eyes to what he thought might prove the strongest nation; and it also became clear that Russia meant more than courtesy in sending her first messengers, for she increased their number and the frequency of their visits, and showed a disposition to take steps which might favour her advance, either in Central Asia or in Hindostan. He thought the despatch quoted by the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) would not serve his purpose; because it was based upon the supposition that Russia was not to interfere with Afghanistan. This was at the basis of their negotiations; and he therefore failed to see the force of the arguments used by those who had the direction of the Government of India at the period in question. If the Russians were not in Afghanistan, England need not be there; but the contrary state of facts applied with equal force; and he warned the country that it behoved it to take care of itself in this matter, if Russia was to be allowed to occupy a position from which she could pour her troops down through the Passes into India. He did not think the country could look with equanimity on such a state of things. Such a course reminded one of no parallel in history except it be that of that King who, while the battle was going on which decided the fate of his Sovereignty, retired to a little place apart, and meditated upon the fortune of the shepherd who had nothing to do with Kingdoms. He did not think they would be content to say—"Here on this mole-hill I will sit me down; to whom God will, be victory." That was not the course which would recommend itself to the country. Their fathers won the Empire of India with the sword and the bayonet, and India had, at all events, received some benefits. The ryot might be poor; but he knew now that what he sowed would be his to reap. He knew also that in India everyone was equal before the law; and he (Mr. Ridley) could not believe there were not some ties beyond those of military occupation which bound together the Indian Government and its subject-population. Such was the Empire they had received from their fathers, and it was their duty to see that it passed from their hands untarnished and the extent of its territory undiminished; and not only that,
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    but that it passed to their descendants protected, in the first place, from the hands of a foreign invader; and, in the second place, by developing mutual interests and strengthening ties, increase the happiness, contentment, and freedom of the country.
    MR. W. E. FORSTERcongratulated the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Ridley) upon the ability he had exhibited in his first speech to the House. He must be allowed to say, however, that he thought it would have been a speech which would have been more appropriate in support of the Government had they acted in a determined manner towards Russia instead of against the Ameer of Afghanistan. The real question of importance that they had before them was this—whether the war with Afghanistan was necessary or not, whether it was provoked, and whether the Government could have avoided that war? There could be no more important question than that, and it seemed to him that it transcended all other questions before the House. As to the charges made against the late Government, he would be content to let them rest; and especially with reference to that 9th paragraph in the despatch to which so much reference had been made, he was quite content to leave that charge and its reply to the judgment of the country. He had not intended to say much upon one other question; but it was of so much importance that he must make some allusion to it. He referred to the question whether the statements made by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India were consistent with the facts in his possession? The Under Secretary of State for India passed very lightly over the speech made by Lord Salisbury in 1877; but it was of some importance that they should briefly consider it. In that speech Lord Salisbury said—"Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year." With what had since transpired that statement seemed to him wonderful. That speech was made in June, 1877, and on March 30 the Conference at Peshawur had been closed, and negotiations with the Ameer had been broken off, the Native Agent must have been withdrawn, and, in fact, that policy of not insisting upon the reception of Resident Agents—a policy supported by Lord Lawrence

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    and Lord Mayo, and a change from which was resisted by Lord Northbrook and disapproved by half of Lord Lytton's own Council—a disapproval they heard nothing of until quite recently—that policy had been changed, and changed for months, and the result of that change was to break off negotiations with the Ameer; and yet Lord Salisbury stated there was no material change in our relations with the Ameer. Lord Salisbury also stated there was no reason for "any apprehension of any change of policy in our Indian Empire." This was one of those statements which were literally true, but which were, he might say, naturally misinterpreted. There was no apprehension of change of policy, because the change had been already made for months. They had, however, a complaint to make far more important than any charge against the late Government, or any charge of inconsistency in the statements of Members of the present Government, and that complaint was, that a change in policy was made which resulted in war, and which most men experienced in Indian affairs thought must, and all knew might, result in war, and yet Parliament was allowed to separate without any consultation being held with regard to this change. He quite admitted that there would be a danger in depriving the Executive of the power of declaring war; it was an ancient and a proper Prerogative; but, like many another Prerogative, it depended on its being exercised in the spirit of the Constitution. He did not for a moment say that under no emergency could a fresh line of policy be adopted without Parliament being consulted; but what he did say was that when there was not an emergency a fresh line of policy ought not to be adopted without some intimation to Parliament, as had been the case in the present instance. But now let him go to the main question, which was one of the most important that could come before the House or the country, and that was—were we engaged in a war in which we ought to be engaged? He would not go over the story told by his hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread). He would not go back to the condition of affairs before Lord Lytton went out to India; though, at a fit time, he would be quite prepared to defend the acts of Lord Northbrook, Lord
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    Lawrence, and Lord Mayo. They all three carried out the same policy. The House at that hour—a quarter to 12 o'clock—would not wish to hear extracts; but would it allow him to refer to a letter that had appeared from Sir Henry Norman? Sir Henry Norman, who distinguished himself at Delhi, had been Indian Military Secretary. He was on Lord Mayo's Council, and was on Lord Northbrook's Council, and remained for some time on Lord Lytton's Council. On his return home, the present Government showed their confidence in him by placing him on the Indian Council. Sir Henry Norman, in that letter, said—
    "My opinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Northbrook's departure the Ameer had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was somewhat out of temper, and was disquieted by writings which more or less pointed at measures distasteful to him. Any real resentment he may have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to measures taken from April, 1876, to the present time."
    The writings to which he alluded were, he supposed, those of Sir Henry Rawlinson, whose book, published in 1875, recommending the annexation of a great part of Afghanistan, was doubtless in the Ameer's possession, and had much to do with his suspicion of the intentions and real desires of England. But the Ameer had not declared war against us. The question was, why we had declared war against him; what grievance we had against him; not what grievance he had against us. He was suspicious and angry about the course we adopted with reference to his son; but there was no reason to suppose he would commit any acts of hostility. Lord Lytton went out—he was not blaming Lord Lytton—under positive orders from Lord Salisbury to insist on the reception of permanent Agents, and then came the first overt act in our change of policy towards the Ameer—the letter dated July, 1876, insisting on the reception of such Agents. What was the next step? By arrangement with the Ameer our Native Agent at Cabul came to Simla in order to know what were the desire and objects of the Viceroy, so that he might convey information with regard to them back to the Ameer. Then came that remarkable conversation which the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State had passed over lightly—in his opinion, somewhat

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    too lightly. The Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) had stated that this conversation was confidential; but did hon. Gentlemen opposite suppose that the two statements—first of all, that if the Ameer did not do what was required of him rivals might be encouraged; or, secondly, that the Russians might wipe him out of the map—were not intended to be communicated by the Vakeel to the Ameer; and, if so, was it not to be expected that from the moment he received them he would be frightened, angry, and suspicious? Well, as a matter of fact, he did become very much frightened, and at last sent word that he was helpless; that he greatly objected to have English Agents sent to reside on his territory, but that if it was insisted on, he would send one of his Ministers to meet our Envoy; and after considering all the difficulties of his position, the Ameer said they might arrange that British officers might be brought to live on the Border. Here, therefore, was a great concession made by the Ameer; but the Ameer's Minister died, and the Conference was broken up. The hon. Gentleman's explanation of the reason why Lord Lytton closed that Conference he must confess he could not understand; nor could he make the account of it given by Lord Lytton himself consistent with the statement of Viscount Cranbrook. Lord Lytton had certainly said in his despatch that the Ameer had been inciting the Border Tribes against him, and preaching a, jehad; but, so far as he (Mr. W. E. Forster) had been able to see from the Papers, no proof whatever of that statement was furnished. But, be that as it might, the Conference was broken up, the Native Agent was withdrawn, and nothing more was heard of any proceedings for a period of 14 months. And what, he would ask, was the position of the Ameer during that time? We had withdrawn our promise to protect him, and there was a positive statement in the despatch of Lord Salisbury to the effect that we had done so, for he said—
    "Any illusions, therefore, which Shere Ali may have entertained upon this point have "been effectually dissipated. He has further learned that the British Government will not undertake the formal responsibility of assisting him to defend his country from the attacks of external foes, or of supporting his dynasty against sedi-
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    tion, unless British officers are allowed to reside on the Frontier for the purpose of acquiring information for communication to their Government.—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 224.]
    There was a curious letter at page 247, in which it is stated—
    "I suspect that the coming of the English Mission is impossible so long as the Russians are here (or until the Russians have gone back)."
    That brought out a remarkable coincidence of dates. That letter was written on the 19th of September—the very same day on which Lord Salisbury received a reply from St. Petersburg that the Russian Mission was a mere Mission of courtesy. He really saw no ground for proceeding to hostile measures with the Ameer. The threatening messages which had been sent to him were still rankling in his memory; and how could they, at a time when he was suspecting that he was the pipkin, as he was told, between the "two iron pots," expect him to refuse permission to the Russian Envoy to enter his territory? He hoped the House would consider—he was sure the country would, when they read the whole of these statements—that the Government were not justified in this war upon the Ameer. No doubt he was a barbarian, but he had his own feelings about independence; and the Government ought to have considered much more deliberately whether they should force their Envoys upon him. He might be told this was not a mere question of justice or injustice; that it lay much deeper; that this was a necessary war—necessary to the safety of India—and that they must not be led away by sentimental considerations of justice. Well, but what would be said if, instead of being a necessary and a wise war, it was an unnecessary and an unwise war? Suppose that, instead of securing the safety of India, it positively endangered it? Many people certainly entertained this opinion, and among them were some who knew much more about the matter than he did, or, for that part of it, than the majority of hon. Members knew. They were going to war with Afghanistan in order to guard India against Russia. But how? Was that object to be effected by conquering and annexing Afghanistan, and by extending our Frontier over that mountainous country until we met Russia at a disadvantage?

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    ["No!"] Some people had advocated that; he did not know whether the Government had done so. Well, then, should we leave Afghanistan independent? But in what a position would she be, and with what disposition towards us? This was not our first Afghan War; we had had another; and there was not one now that he could find to justify it. In this case, too, we should leave memories behind in a hostile Afghanistan, though we said our great object was to guard against Russia by having a friendly Afghanistan. There was a report that the Ameer had fled out of the country. If that were true, whom were we to put in his place? Was it another Shah Soojah? Then it was said we wanted to rectify our Frontier. Well, he would not enter into that question; but this he would say—that for every one competent military expert who said that the new Frontier was scientific there were two who said it was unscientific. One word about the only statement which the Government had vouchsafed as to their grounds for going to war before war was declared. The Government said in the most authoritative manner, through the lips of the Prime Minister, that they were bound to go to war, not because they had been provoked and were obliged in honour to do so, but because they wanted a rectification of Frontier. That confession of Lord Beaconsfield was, perhaps, the most cynical statement which ever fell from a Prime Minister. It was made on the 9th of November, when the Government had not yet got an answer to the Ultimatum sent to the Ameer. It was possible that the Ameer would have accepted the Ultimatum. There was not a single word in the Ultimatum about a rectification of Frontier; and yet the Prime Minister said we were making an arrangement for rectifying our Frontier. He blushed to hear it; and the only excuse he could find for the statement was that we were taking the Frontier, not from the Ameer, but from independent tribes. If so, why go to war with the Ameer? He was one of those who, whenever an important question arose, asked himself, when he opposed the Government—"What should I do if I were not in Opposition?" He, and those who acted with him, could not tell Gentlemen opposite the exact course they would take; but it might
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    fairly be asked what would be the direction of their policy? He thought the enormous majority of those, both in and out of the House, who supported this Amendment would, first of all, say they would have "peace with honour." That, however, was not very easy since the Government had chosen to plunge us into war. He believed the Opposition might go further and say—"We would take—and you ought to take—the very first opportunity of coming to honourable terms with the Ameer." Haying shown the enormous superiority of our strength, we ought to try to convince him that we returned to our old and disregarded our new policy. What was this old policy—the policy of Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord North-brook? It was to try to convince the Ameer first, that it was neither our wish nor our interest to annex his territory, or to conquer him, or to take from him his independence; and, secondly, that it was our interest, and would be our intention, to secure him from any unprovoked attack by Russia. That was the assurance which Lord Northbrook gave to the Ameer; an assurance qualified by the necessary condition that the aggression was not to be provoked by the Ameer himself. That was our old policy, and it formed a strong contrast to the new one, which was to protect the Ameer against Russia, but only on the condition that he submitted to terms which he believed would destroy his independence. We might return to that old policy, though it would not be easy to do so, because the Government had made the Ameer suspicious and caused his people to share his suspicion. Having endeavoured to answer a question which might be asked of the Opposition, he desired in turn to put a question to Her Majesty's Government. He thought the country ought to know more about our relations with Russia in this matter. It ought to know something more about the understanding referred to by Lord Lytton, when he sent word to the Ameer—
    "If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us; Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."—[I bid. p. 183.]
    He thought they had a right to ask whether there was an attempt at such an understanding with Russia now; and he would therefore repeat the question

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    put by his hon. Friend the Member for Bedford—"Is there any probability of our having another secret Treaty with Russia?" If there were no secret understanding with Russia, he should like to know what was the meaning of Lord Lytton's statement, which certainly was not made without authority? They ought to know why, and upon what ground, Lord Lytton ventured to send such a message to the Ameer. Still more important was it to know how the matter stood now. It seemed to him almost impossible to believe that our relations with Russia in this business rested as stated in the documents which had been presented to Parliament. On the 8th of August, 1878, the Indian Secretary told the Foreign Secretary—
    "It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India."—[Central Asia, No. 1 (1878), p. 143.]
    What did the Government do upon that? Lord Salisbury sent on the 19th to our Embassy at St. Petersburg a request that the Mission to Cabul might be at once withdrawn. On the 18th of September he received an answer that the Mission was of a conditional nature and one of simple courtesy. Yet war was declared against the Ameer afterwards; and in the Papers presented to Parliament one of the chief grounds for the declaration of war was alleged to be the formal reception of this Mission. Therefore, he repeated his question—"Have the Government accepted this explanation of Russia as satisfactory; and, if so, why did they make this reception of an Envoy one of their chief grounds of complaint against the Ameer?"
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Lord John Manners.)
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he presumed there would be no difference of opinion as to the necessity for the adjournment of the debate, or as to the desirability of continuing it on the next day (Tuesday). He presumed that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer would appeal to those hon. Gentlemen who had
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    Notices on the Paper to give way. There was, however, one point which it was desirable to decide, and as to which some understanding ought to be come to that night. A very general opinion had been expressed by very many hon. Members that as there was very little Business on the Paper for Wednesday the debate should be continued on that day. If that were the wish of the majority of the House, there were two ways in which the object in view might be accomplished. They might either meet at the usual hour, or the Standing Orders might be suspended, and the debate continued at the ordinary hour in the evening. It was very desirable that some understanding should be arrived at; and he was sure that in this matter it would be the wish of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as it was of himself and his Friends, to consult the convenience of the House.
    SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, as his name was on the back of the Bill which was down for Wednesday, and as his hon. Friend who had charge of it was not present, perhaps, before the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose, he might be allowed to say a few words. This measure affected a large number of voters, especially in the large towns, like London, and it dealt with an entirely novel question, which had never before been discussed in that House. The matter had, however, been under the consideration of several Revising Courts, and it had engaged the attention of a great many local bodies in London and elsewhere. Therefore, it could not be assumed that the Business on the Paper for Wednesday was purely formal. There were also obvious objections to continuing the debate on the Wednesday. If it were commenced at the usual hour, 12 o'clock, he feared there would be a very small attendance. On ordinary Wednesdays hon. Members came down at some time in the day, because there was the certainty, at some time or other, of a division. But there would not be this attraction to bring them down next Wednesday; and there might be, therefore, the greatest difficulty in making a House. If, on the other hand, they were to meet in the evening, that would be very unusual. There was no absolute pressure of time which rendered this step necessary; while it was also open

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    to the objection that many hon. Members had already made arrangements which would keep them away during the greater portion of the evening.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, this was really one of those questions which must be decided entirely by reference to the convenience of the House. No doubt it was desirable, as much as possible, to shorten the time for which hon. Members were to be detained in London at this season; and as there were a great many speeches to be made it would be an advantage if they could go on with the debate on the Wednesday. At the same time, he felt very strongly the force of the two objections which had been urged by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). He and the Government, and he was sure he might say the noble Lord opposite, were only anxious to fall in with what was the general feeling of the House. It appeared to him that the most convenient course, if anything were to be done in the way of altering their course of procedure, would be to take the debate in the morning, and not to attempt to meet in the evening. In the first place, five nights of consecutive debate was very hard work; and, secondly, a good many arrangements had probably already been made for the evening. On the other hand, Wednesday morning might be very well spent in the discussion. If a Sitting were proposed in the evening, it would be necessary for him to give Notice that evening that he would move the suspension of the Standing Orders. It would not, however, he believed be necessary to give Notice that evening of any formal Motion that the debate be taken on Wednesday morning. Unless he heard any decided expression of opinion that they should sit in the evening, he thought it would probably be better that he should not give that formal Notice, but that the debate should be continued on the Wednesday morning, if it were thought on the next (Tuesday) evening, after consideration, that it was desirable to do so.
    MR. RYLANDSsaid, he entirely concurred in the views expressed by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) against the Morning Sitting on Wednesday. It was quite certain that they would have a very small attendance; and, in his opinion, the
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    debate would be very inferior indeed. If they were to continue the debate at all on the Wednesday, his own feeling would be in favour of an Evening Sitting. It would, however, be very hard work to have five nights' debate in succession; and, therefore, he was decidely in favour of not interfering at all with the Wednesday arrangements. They certainly could not interfere with them without creating very great difficulty and inconvenience; and the course proposed was certainly most unusual and unprecedented. He did not suppose there ever was such a proposal made before; and he certainly did not remember a previous instance where the Wednesday was taken for a purpose of this kind. He, therefore, hoped that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he did not feel very strongly on this matter, would not fall in with the suggestion.
    MR. DILLWYNwould remind the House that it would be very difficult to ascertain the feeling of hon. Members generally on the subject at that moment, for the great majority of them had gone home immediately after the Motion for the Adjournment. For his part, he was very strongly opposed to still further trenching on the privileges of private Members, who were continually being cut down bit by bit. If they consented to this alteration on the present occasion, it would be erected into a precedent to be followed at other times, and thus private Members would be deprived of the one day which still remained to them on which to bring on their Bills.
    THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONentirely agreed in the course suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Since he conferred with his right hon. Friend earlier in the evening, he had ascertained, so far as he had been able to discover what were the feelings of Members, that it would not be in accordance with the wishes of the majority in the House that the debate should be continued on Wednesday evening. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to give formal Notice that night of a Motion to suspend the Standing Orders. This discussion would call the attention of hon. Members to the subject; and no doubt by the next day the Chancellor of the Exchequer would, have been able to ascertain what was

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    the general feeling of the House as the continuance of the debate.
    Motion agreed to.
    Debate adjourned till To-morrow.

MOTIONS.
  TENANTS' IMPROVEMENTS IN TOWNS (IRELAND) BILL.

    LEAVE. FIRST READING.
    MAJOR NOLAN,in moving for leave to bring in a Bill for the security of Tenants' Improvements in towns in Ireland, said, there was another Bill of very nearly the same nature introduced by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cork (Mr. M'Carthy Downing), and he would wish to explain that the two Bills were not quite the same. Though his own Bill might be very useful, it would also be very necessary that the Bill of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cork should be introduced. His Bill was one which would remedy a very crying defect in the legislation of Ireland at the present moment. In 1870 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich brought in a Bill to protect the improvements of tenants in Ireland, and it not only protected their improvements, but also gave to a large number of tenants in Ireland the right to a certain compensation for disturbance. The Bill which he (Major Nolan) wished leave to introduce would not in any way interfere with or extend the disturbance clauses of the Land Bill of 1870 to tenants in towns; but the object of the Bill would only be to allow those tenants the right to compensation for such bonâ fide improvements as they had actually made. That was to say, that if under the Bill which he proposed the tenant was disturbed, he should not be in any way worse off with regard to his improvements than if he resided in the country. As, however, he saw the House was somewhat impatient, he would merely ask leave to introduce his Bill.
    Motion agreed to.
    Bill for the security of Tenants' Improvements in towns in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Major NOLAN, Mr. PATRICK MARTIN, and Mr. O'SULLIVAN.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 50.]

  ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.

    LEAVE. FIRST READING.
    SIR JOHN LUBBOCK,in moving for leave to bring in a Bill to provide for the better protection of Ancient Monuments, said, that the Bill was now introduced as passed by the Select Committee which sat last Session; but that he had accepted some verbal Amendments which the Chairman of Committees had been so good as to suggest. The object of these Amendments was to give even greater security to the owners of property, and they had been most willingly accepted by those interested in the Bill, whose great object was to preserve these interesting monuments, but who had every wish to respect existing rights. He hoped the Amendments might satisfy some, at any rate, of those who had hitherto felt it their duty to oppose the Bill.
    Motion agreed to.
    Bill to provide for the better protection of Ancient Monuments, ordered to be Brought in by SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, Mr. BERESFORD HOPE, Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN, and Sir RICHARD WALLACE.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 50.]

    BOROUGH FRANCHISE (IRELAND) BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. BLENNERHASSETT, Bill to assimilate the Borough Franchise of Ireland to that of England, ordered to be brought in by Mr. BLENNERHASSETT, Major O'GORMAN, Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, and Mr. RICHARD POWER.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 49.]

    LANDLORD AND TENANT (IRELAND) (NO. 2) BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. DOWNING, Bill to amend the Law of Landlord and Tenant in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Mr. DOWNING, Mr. BUTT, and Mr. SHAW.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 51.]

    COPYRIGHT BILL.
    Considered in Committee.
    (In the Committee.)
    Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to codify and amend the Law of Copyright.
    Resolution reported:—Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. EDWARD JENKINS, Mr. HERSCHELL, Mr. DILLWYN, and Mr. FORSYTH.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 53.]

    PRINTING.
    Select Committee appointed, "to assist Mr. Speaker in all matters which relate to the Printing executed by Order of this House, and for the purpose of selecting and arranging for Printing, Returns and Papers presented in pursuance of Motions made by Members of this House:"—Mr. SPENCER WALPOLE, The O'CONOR DON, Mr. STANSFELD, Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Mr. DODSON, Mr. MASSEY, Mr. WHITBREAD, Mr. MITCHELL HENRY, Mr. M'LAREN, Mr. WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, Mr. ROWLAND WINN, and Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON:—Three to be the quorum.
    House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock.

Preamble
THE LORD WINDSOR—Sat first in Parliament.
ROLL OF THE LORDS.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House that the Clerk of the Parliaments had prepared and laid it on the Table: The same was ordered to be printed. (No. 1.)

QUEEN'S SPEECH—HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.
THE LORD STEWAED (The Earl BEAUCHAMP)reported Her Majesty's Answer to the Address as follows:—
MY LORDS,
I THANK you sincerely for your loyal and dutiful Address.
You may rely on my hearty desire to co-operate with you in all measures calculated to increase the security of all parts of My Empire.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).—RESOLUTION.
VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: My Lords, I very much regret that it should have fallen to my lot, as Minister for India, to be the person whose duty it is to bring before the House of Lords the question of war in that part of Her Majesty's Dominions. I occupied for some years the office of Minister for War; but I am happy to say that while filling that office it was my good fortune to be a Minister of Peace, though during the whole of that time the Department with which I was connected was occupied in making preparations for war, in case war should be necessary; and I believe that the best way of preventing war is to put a bold face on the matter—to say what you mean and do what you have said. My Lords, the Motion I have to make is in these terms—
"That Her Majesty having directed a military expedition of Her forces charged upon Indian revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."
My Lords, in 1858 a short Act (the Government of India Act) was passed, with the view of putting a check, to a certain extent, on the powers of the Indian Government, but in a different way from the way suggested by the noble Earl (Earl Grey), who moved the Amendment to the Address. The noble Earl assumed that it was essential when the subject of war was under discussion that the Cabinet should be entirely precluded from going to war until a preliminary notification of its intention to do so had been given to Parliament. I am not now going to argue whether or not in other kinds of war there is or should be such a principle; but I do say that by the Act of 1858 Parliament sanctioned the principle that Her Majesty's Government may make war in India without any previous notification to Parliament. Nay—that Act provides that the Government may do so if within three months after they have done so should Parliament be sitting, or within one month after the next assembling of Parliament, should Parliament not be
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sitting at the time, the Government announces the fact to both Houses. That is provided by one clause. Another clause provides for the obtaining of that consent of Parliament to the application of the Revenues of India which my Motion asks this House to accede to. Now, my Lords, in reading a statute the proper rule to be observed is to read it as a whole; and I think that, taking the former clause, under which if Parliament should not be sitting the Government is not bound to acquaint it with the declaration of war for three months after it meets—and the Government might wait a number of months without advising the Queen to call it together—I think, taking that clause in conjunction with Clause 55, it is clearly contemplated that power is given to the Home Government to declare war without previous communication of its intention to Parliament, and it follows, of necessity, that the application to Parliament in respect of funds must be made subsequently. The declaration of war cannot precede the communication, for, otherwise, such notice would be given of our intention as might preclude the war from being efficaciously undertaken. The fact is, then, as stated the other night by my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury), we are taking Parliament into our confidence with greater rapidity than is required by the Act of Parliament. We called Parliament together as soon as there was a certainty of the war. Up to the 20th of November there was not that certainty; we were up to that date unaware of what would be the reply of the Ameer to our Ultimatum; but when the circumstances occurred with which your Lordships are familiar, and there was no longer any uncertainty that our Frontier must be passed, we resolved to call Parliament together. You cannot, however, in such a case wait and stay your hand until you have had the opportunity of consulting with Parliament. And I think I may now say that the acting with such promptitude as the Government did, tended materially to the success of the operations which have already been executed.
Now, my Lords, as to the question of the use of the Indian Revenue, I do not know that much need be said. If the House consents to the Revenues of India being applied to defray the expense of these operations, it will not follow from

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such consent that Parliament would be prevented from contributing to the cost of those operations; but I am bound to say, after looking very carefully into the financial condition of India and the circumstances of this war, I believe it will not be necessary—at least in the initial steps—to call on the Revenues of England. I am in possession of facts which, I think, will convince your Lordships that, without unduly pressing on the Revenues of India, there will be no necessity to call on the English Revenue—at least, during the present financial year. It was announced by my hon. Friend (Mr. Stanhope), in "another place," that, including the £1,500,000 of new taxation for famine insurance, the surplus of Indian Revenue was estimated to amount to £2,156,000. The Revenue has actually exceeded the Estimate. In opium alone the increase is £1,245,000. But some of the charges have been increased, reducing the estimated surplus to £1,800,000. Looking into the different calculations made on the subject, the supposition of the Indian Government is that during the present financial year the cost of the military operations will not exceed £1,100,000 or £1,200,000. Take it at £1,250,000, and there would remain then a substantial surplus of about £550,000 after the payment of the charges for the Expedition. If it should be necessary, in answer to any remarks on the subject, I will go into this question again; but for the present I shall pass from it, as the Amendment of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Halifax) is not addressed to this particular branch, but to the general question. I shall pass, then, at once to political matters.
My Lords, for at least half-a-century great interest has been felt in Afghanistan by those who have devoted any attention to Indian affairs. It has been considered as one of the entrances to India from the North-West; its relations towards Great Britain have always throughout that period been regarded as very important to the Imperial interests of England—it has been considered that without proper relations between British India and Afghanistan our Frontier could not be regarded as secure. This has never been a question of Party politics. The opinion to which I have just referred has not been that of any
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one Government or another; but an opinion expressed by all statesmen of every Party. Everyone will admit that statesmen of all Parties have agreed in the necessity of a strong Afghanistan on friendly terms with this country. And so long as we could trust the Rulers of Afghanistan, and so long as they were true to us, we were content. We desired nothing else and nothing more. I do not think I should wisely occupy the time of your Lordships by going back to the time of Dost Mahomed; but, in fact, Afghan policy was very much affected by what took place in the war with that Ruler. I may make one remark in reference to occurrences in Afghanistan which at the time of those occurrences painfully affected the mind of this country, and of which unpleasant memories still remain. I may say that the sufferings sustained by our troops in the war to which I am referring did not happen because this country was too weak to maintain her rights and unable to vindicate her position in Afghanistan by the sword; but we were unfortunate. We were unfortunate in our political negotiators; we were unfortunate in our generals. The commonest precautions were neglected; and from those miserable complications and neglect, and not from any want of valour in the field, resulted those disasters which we all regret. But, my Lords, those occurrences did not permanently affect our relations with Dost Mahomed. Being our pensioner, and being well affected towards us, when he returned to Afghanistan he was not influenced by any hostile feelings towards England; but circumstances obliged him to maintain an appearance of "sullen reserve." He had to consider not only himself, but his country; and he felt obliged to maintain that attitude until he saw that his people had forgotten what they had suffered in the war. He then became a firm Ally of the British Government. He felt our power, our position, and resources, and he had learnt that what we promised we would assuredly undertake, and in 1855 he entered into that Treaty which is so well known to your Lordships. As showing how implicit was his trust in the British Government, it is remarkable that while he by that Treaty bound himself to regard "our friends as his friends and our enemies as his enemies," there is no reciprocal declaration from us that we

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will regard his enemies as our enemies and his friends as our friends.
And here, with respect to the Papers in which this Treaty has been printed, I wish, in answer to charges which have been made as to these Papers, to say that no such Papers were promised or asked for last Session. In reply to a Question put in the other House, the Papers relating to Central Asia were promised by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but these Indian Papers never were promised; but as soon as we saw that the complications between this country and Afghanistan were likely to become serious, and it was clear that official information would be required, we saw that those Papers would be important, and I gave directions that they should be prepared with all possible speed. I am satisfied that effect was given to those directions. I will add that though there remain unprinted some Papers which some persons may wish to see, nothing whatever has been kept back; and I believe there are in the Papers on your Lordships' Table everything necessary not only for explaining the question, but for enabling anybody who has been concerned fully to explain his own conduct, should he think it necessary to do so.
My Lords, the next Treaty to which it is necessary to allude is that of 1857. It was essentially a temporary measure, and I need not treat it further than to observe that in connection with it there again arises proof that when we are at war with any of our Western neighbours the importance of Afghanistan comes into peculiar prominence. We were at war with Persia when that Treaty was made, and it became necessary to secure Dost Mahomed as our Ally—and that was done. When Dost Mahomed died in 1863, and Shere Ali as his successor ascended the Throne, he notified his accession to the Viceroy of that day. But during six months Shere Ali waited in vain for an acknowledgment of that announcement. I am not blaming anyone for that. In consequence of the illness of Lord Elgin there may have been delay—in consequence of the death of Lord Elgin there may have been still further delay; but, as a matter of fact, six months elapsed after Shere Ali announced his accession before he received any communication from the
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Indian Government. I think we must admit that that circumstance was, at least, unfortunate. It must have rankled in the mind of a man of the Ameer's peculiar temperament, and the feeling to which it gave rise was perhaps intensified by events which followed. Struggles and complications followed. There were wars between Shere Ali and members of his family at the time, and one succeeded another in different parts of the country. At that time the noble Lord opposite (Lord Lawrence) was at the head of British affairs in India; he pursued a policy of recognizing de facto Governments of Afghanistan, and not only of Afghanistan as a whole, but of parts of Afghanistan. The noble Lord, though one of those who maintained the necessity, in the Imperial interests, of a strong and friendly Afghanistan, signalized his Viceroyalty by recognizing de facto Governments in the several parts of that country. So matters went on until 1868. When Shere Ali, though partially unsuccessful, retained a preeminence at Herat, the noble Lord recognized him as the de facto Ruler of Herat; while he, at the same time, recognized as de facto Ruler of Cabul and Candahar Ameer Mahomed Ufzul Khan, his brother, to whom he wrote a letter congratulating him on his successes over Shere Ali. It was not until the latter was again on the Throne of Cabul, and seemed to be permanently seated there, that the noble Lord wrote to him offering him that assistance which would have been so useful to him when he was struggling for that Throne. As I have said, a strong and friendly Afghanistan had been the object of all British Governments; but I ask your Lordships whether it is a likely plan of conciliating the Ruler of a strong and friendly Government to acknowledge the persons who succeed in establishing themselves in different parts of his dominions immediately upon receipt of their letters, but not to acknowledge the Ruler himself until he had been six months firmly seated upon his Throne, and no longer needed our assistance? So thought Shere Ali; but he was prudent in his generation. He accepted the acknowledgment of the Viceroy. Why? Because the first thing which he, or any person who aspired to the rule of Afghanistan, wished to obtain was the acknowledgment and recognition of the British Government,

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That recognition gave the title of the Ruler of Afghanistan a validity which he could not otherwise obtain for it. That was the position of the Ameer just before the noble Lord left India; and Shere Ali, though he felt sore, and was much vexed at what had been done in respect of his brother, proposed to meet the noble Lord and to enter into a Treaty with him. But the noble Lord refused to enter into any Treaty engagement with him. He would give him what he had so much recommended for many years—"present assistance," for the purpose of consolidating and strengthening his Throne. Shere Ali was engaged in trying to establish his dynasty, and wished that our Government should recognize the successor of his choice. The noble Lord conveyed to him that so long as he was content to maintain friendly relations with Her Majesty's Government so long might he rely on our assistance and friendship. No doubt that was valuable; but it was not what the Ameer wanted; he desired to secure the succession of his family, but not to enter upon the general question of foreign relations. But the noble Lord was succeeded by my noble Friend Lord Mayo; and let me for a moment turn to something which occurred, and which has reference to that policy which has been before alluded to. There was at this time no question of Party feeling or Party politics; but there was a very general impression among all at the time to which I have now come that it would be very undesirable to enter into any Treaty binding ourselves in any way to the Ameer in the future, and that policy was supported by many who held very different views on other public questions. But in 1867 there was a paper written by Sir Henry Bawlinson treating of Russian advances in Central Asia, and which everyone will admit to be a paper of great ability, and almost prophetic in its character. In that paper the writer called attention to the4 measures which, in his judgment, were necessary for maintaining for England a dominant position in Afghanistan. The proposition that England should have such a position has, I think, remained unchallenged, although it has been made the subject of much writing, and the paper to which I allude has been reviewed in a great many other papers. One says—"We must use diplomatic measures;"
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another says—"We must use conciliatory measures;" but all look forward to a state of things when we must forbid any further advance, if it should be attempted; and not a few were prepared, to use the words of the noble Lord near me (Lord Lawrence), if a certain line is passed, we must be prepared for war with Russia in all parts of the world. But when Lord Mayo arrived in India questions with regard to the Ameer's foreign relations did not arise. The question uppermost in the mind of the Ameer was that of his dynasty. This appears from despatches sent home by Lord Mayo, and by the despatch of the Duke of Argyll, in which fault was at first found with what Lord Mayo had done. But that was not the ease outside the Conference which took place between the Ameer and Lord Mayo. You find by the Papers that outside the Conference conversations passed on various subjects, and at that time the Ameer would have raised no difficulty to the residence of British officers in certain parts of Afghanistan, excepting Cabul. These things are, I repeat, to be gathered from what took place outside the Conference. In the latter the Ameer was concerned about his dynasty. The noble Lord who preceded Lord Mayo had urged the Home Government of that day, in strong language, to lay down a course of action, and to get rid of these questions which were constantly arising. My Lords, I look in vain among the Papers for any instructions to Lord Mayo on those points. The noble Lord (Lord Lawrence), who had taken his seat in this House, spoke on the 19th of April, 1869. He and the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India, addressed the House on that occasion, and the noble Duke said—
"I think it would be an extremely dangerous thing to govern by telegraph, or even to reply in Parliament upon telegraphs; but I have every reason to believe that Lord Mayo has consistently pursued the same policy of nonintervention and of the avoidance of entangling engagements, which was pursued by my noble Friend the late Governor General of India (Lord Lawrence). So far as my own instructions to Lord Mayo are concerned, they certainly have been to avoid all entangling engagements for the future with Afghanistan, and to maintain the British Government and the Government of India perfectly free in regard to that and other conterminous States."—[3 Hansard, cxcv. 1087.]
Then Lord Lawrence, in reference to the Ameer's proposal to enter into a

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Treaty as his father had done, and to maintain friendly relations, said—
"I thereupon, wrote to the Ameer and told him what were my views—that I was willing to help him still further in a moderate way; that I could not hind myself by any Treaty which would involve obligations on the part of Her Majesty's Government to assist him."—[Ibid. 1094.]
Those distinct statements show that the policy of the noble Duke and the noble Lord was one of distrust and isolation, of independence of Afghanistan in respect of any entangling engagements. Lord Mayo had instructions not to enter into any entangling engagements for the future; but Lord Mayo obtained, by his frank and genial intercourse and character, an extraordinary influence with the Ameer. He wrote in the most friendly manner to the Ameer:—and it is a remarkable thing that though through the whole period of his administration Lord Mayo gave but one rather vague promise in writing, Shere Ali appeared to regard the simple promise of Lord Mayo as stronger than the more solemn engagements of the Government offered to him at a subsequent time—indeed, he evidently considers that what has been subsequently done tended to vitiate and weaken Lord Mayo's promises. Evidently the Ameer believed in Lord Mayo's sincerity; and, no doubt, a man like my noble Friend was such a one as would have impressed one with the erratic, but still, to some extent, chivalric mind of Shere Ali. Lord Mayo wrote him a letter asking him to be reconciled to his son; and that letter was received without displeasure—a circumstance which, I think, was owing to its tone and the manner in which it was worded. With the lamented death of Lord Mayo a great change occurred. My Lords, I cannot but think that in the not taking advantage of what might then have been done a great opportunity was lost. During the period that had elapsed great progress had been effected by the colossal power which is overshadowing Asia. Advances were made by that Power to the Ruler of Afghanistan, and he was impressed with those occurrences more than were those who ruled British India. He saw his neighbours disappearing one after the other, and he concluded that the time had arrived when he must put his own house in order, and
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prepare for any emergencies that might arise. The letter written by the Ameer in 1873 opened the way to a complete understanding. Now, it appears that in 1873 the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) requested Shere Ali to receive a British Enjoy at Cabul. That was a very important step. The Ameer did not refuse to receive the Envoy; but he desired that they should first come to an understanding as to the objects of the Mission and the questions to be discussed, and he proposed to send an Envoy to Simla to hold a Conference with the Viceroy. This was accepted; and on the 12th of July, 1873, the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) held his first Conference with the Cabul Envoy, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. The Ameer then wanted much; but in his view he got nothing, and, in my opinion, a great opportunity was then lost. In alluding to what then occurred I will do so without personal references. I am quite content to take those occurrences as they stand on the Papers, or even to take them as the noble Earl himself wishes them to be accepted. When, the other night, I entered into a consideration of them, as recorded, I did so in vindication of myself from attacks which, I venture to think, went somewhat further than they ought to have done; but I submit that we have had enough of personal squabbles—the events with which we are engaged are too great to allow any place for personalities. Well, then, as it appears on the Papers, I say that in 1873, when Shere Ali pointed out the danger which had arisen from Russian advances, the time had come for a change in our policy towards Afghanistan; the time had come when we were bound to say that we would protect the Ameer, and protect him for the safety and security of the Empire. What had occurred? From his rocky heights he watched the irresistible tide advancing, submerging Kingdom after Kingdom and filling every valley, and approaching his own dominion. He asked you to aid him to set up a sea-wall to keep out the enemy, and you gave him—what? You first of all gave him incredulity, and then promises of assistance so vague, so ambiguous, so obscure, that Syud Noor Mahomed said, in 1877, that neither in writing nor in speech did Lord Northbrook inform him what help he might

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hope to obtain. But the time had come when Mrs. Partington, with her diplomatic mop, could no longer keep out the tide, and when verbal promises here and there were ineffectual. There was the inevitable pressure. The waters were getting higher every year. Shere Ali saw what India did not see—that the danger which was approaching was inevitable, and that the time had come when we ought to have stretched out our hands and helped him. He wanted you to say you would not only help him under certain contingencies, but that an unprovoked aggressor on his dominions should be your enemy. But you would not say it. He asked you practically that you should engage yourselves to resist unprovoked aggression by Russia. You declined. Syud Noor Mahomed Shah said that whatever specific assurances Russia might give, the people of Afghanistan could place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British Government. The Ameer said—
"My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never he removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government."
Again, he said—
"Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporizing for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation."—[Afghanistan, No 1, pp. 110–111.]
My Lords, the Ameer represented his views through an influential Minister at great length to the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) at their interviews; but he only got the same indefinite promise, and he took it for what it was worth. It did not conciliate Shere Ali, who considered it weaker than the promises of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. He considered that they did not in any degree tend to secure to him the assistance he wanted. Whoever may be to blame for it—and I do not now say that anyone was to blame for it—from that time the Ameer distrusted England, and began to look somewhere else. We
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have several proofs of the change in his mind. Take that letter, in which he ironically speaks of his delight at the arrival of that time when there is no danger of the peace being broken, and therefore no necessity for precautions against such an occurrence. We have it on the authority of the noble Earl himself that the Ameer took no notice of the request made of him in respect to British officers, though he was quite ready to accede to that proposal in 1873. He did not let Mr. Forsyth pass through the country, and he did not communicate to the Viceroy his choice of a successor till that choice had been made. As the noble Earl admitted, his language was unsatisfactory, his letters not civil. In 1874, when he had imprisoned his son, against whom even in his latest letter he has expressed such inveterate hostility, he complained of the conduct of this country in interfering between him and his son. His complaint is not so much, however, of the interference, but of the manner in which it was effected. I admit that for the Ameer to have promised his son a safe conduct, and then to have seized him and cast him into prison, was a dastardly and a wicked thing; but what the noble Earl did was not that which Lord Mayo did in reference to the Ameer's son—address him in a private letter. The noble Earl directed our Native Vakeel to go to Shere Ali and read the message to him in his presence. Pride and haughtiness are characteristics of Shere Ali; and one can imagine that to such an Eastern Ruler there could not have been a more disagreeable thing than to have a lecture read to him on that subject, and that, too, without any previous inquiry as to whether anything had occurred to change the circumstances under which a guarantee of safe conduct had been given to his son. That the affair has rankled in his breast is clear from the last communication of his which has just reached this country. We do not know with accuracy, since the time that written message was sent to the Ameer, how many friendly letters have passed between Russian generals and Shere Ali. Some of what passed since then we may know; but I believe we do not know all. After these events, negotiations began to be conducted on a different footing; and whereas we knew everything before that time, we begun to

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know very little after. There is another thing on which the Ameer has laid great stress—the fact that a present and complimentary message was sent direct to the Chief of Wakhan by the noble Earl without having been sent through him as Suzerain over that Khan. Well, in 1874 the present Government came into office; and, my Lords, about the policy of the present Government there is no concealment in these Papers. They fully and freely state the truth, and there is no question about what that policy is. In 1875, after a year's experience, my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) complains of the scantiness of information on what was passing in Afghanistan in the hands of the Indian Government; and no one can read the Native Envoy's news letters without arriving at the same conclusion as my noble Friend. In January, 1875, after a year's reading of these precious Papers, which did give us all that we could get about Afghanistan, my noble Friend, dissatisfied with the imperfect ideas which could be formed on such materials, wrote to the Viceroy that it was desirable we should have a resident British officer, not, my Lords, at Cabul, but at Herat, who should furnish us with fuller information, especially of what was passing near the Frontier. I should have thought that nothing could be more advantageous to the Ameer as well as to ourselves. The time had come when Europeans were acquiring power and influence in those parts, and it was essential that the movements of Europeans should be watched by Europeans. The duty of watching them is one which Asiatics are incapable of performing. It is essential that the duty should be performed by civilized Europeans. I shall read on this subject the opinion of one who is capable of forming a judgment on the point. Sir Bartle Frere says—
"I judge them only from the abstracts of their correspondence, which are, I conclude, weeded of much extraneous and trifling matter before they are printed and sent home; but even in the shape in which these abstracts reach us, I find a vast portion of durbar gossip in proportion to the important items of intelligence, &c. I find no scale of proportion by which to estimate the relative value and probability of the important and unimportant, the undoubted, the doubtful, and the mere hearsay; … still less do I find any discriminating description of persons such as may assist the Viceroy and his advisers in judging of men and events. A man in the
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Ameer's position knows well that he can trust almost any English officer who comes to him as a representative of the English Government."
Well, the noble Earl as Viceroy, in the exercise of his discretion, did not think the time had arrived when the demand for the admission into Afghanistan of such officers should be made. The question was one of time, of degree, of how long we ought to wait, for he said that if the Russians were at Merv the time would have come. The noble Earl thought that the Russians had not approached near enough to cause any danger. If they had been at Merv—that is, within 12 marches of Herat—I have no doubt that the noble Earl would have thought it a good thing to have a British officer there—in time, perhaps, to receive them. Herat is called the key of India. Without going so far as to adopt that phrase, it is a place which must exercise a considerable influence in Central Asian affairs. But the noble Earl apparently wished to follow his own way, and the time passed. My Lords, there is such a thing in politics as "Too late." British officers might have been received into Afghanistan before the Conference in 1873—after the Conference it was "too late." My Lords, I am astonished at the way this matter is argued out-of-doors. I hope that here, at least, it will not be argued as it has been argued elsewhere. I hope it will not be argued as if we were dealing with the state of things which existed 10 years ago—as if within the last 10 years nothing had taken place—as if the world had stood still. Events are crowding upon each other in Europe and Asia; and to speak of the policy of 1868 as the policy of 1878 would be what, if it were not for those who do argue so, I should describe as childish. Again, the noble Earl was appealed to by my noble Friend, but he did not think the time had come; which shows me, begging the noble Earl's pardon, that he had not realized the state of Afghanistan, and the condition which surrounded it.
Well, the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) left in 1876, and the present Viceroy (Lord Lytton) succeeded him. The Instructions with which he set out are contained in these Papers. I venture to say this for him, since so many accusations on the point have been

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made—that the steps taken by Lord Lytton have been taken in strict accordance with the Instructions given to him. The Government accept the responsibility of those Instructions. They do not desire to throw on Lord Lytton the burden of sins that do not belong to him. The Government are here to answer for themselves; and they say that the policy which he was instructed to carry out was a just, right, and true policy for the interests of Afghanistan, the interests of India, and the interests of the Empire; and when Lord Lytton was thwarted in carrying it out, it was not from any fault on his part. It was, I regret to believe, because the opportunity had passed. It was "too late." My Lords, it was a most unfortunate thing that it was too late; because I must say for myself—and I know I can say it for my Colleagues and for the noble Viceroy—that anything more repugnant to our feelings than to be obliged to coerce Afghanistan, instead of being able to enter into intimate and friendly relations with her, cannot be imagined. I cannot help saying that he would be a madman who, if he were able to keep a united and friendly Afghanistan in union with him, would do anything to break up the strength and force which that state of things would place at his disposal. That was not our intention, nor is there a sign of it to be found in the Papers—and when our policy was rejected by the Ameer, hew as told that we regretted that rejection. Well, in May, 1876, Lord Lytton applied to the Ameer to receive a Mission for the purpose of consultation—a friendly Mission to announce Lord Lytton's accession to the Viceroyalty, and to announce that Her Majesty had assumed the title of Empress of India; and, further, to invite the Ameer to attend the great celebration on the 1st of January on that subject. A fitter subject for such a friendly Mission cannot possibly be conceived. It was opportune, too, as it would have given Lord Lytton the means of ascertaining what was going on in Afghanistan; what the feelings of he Ameer really were towards us; and of communicating to him what our feelings were towards him, and of assuring him in friendly Conference that some better understanding could be arrived at. The Mission was rejected. Why was it rejected? There had been no-
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thing in the conduct of Lord Lytton to cause the Ameer apprehension. He had taken no step to weaken the friendly feeling which had before existed between the Ameer and the Indian Government. No preliminaries to the reception of that Mission were demanded. Some have said that our occupation of Quetta displeased the Ameer, but it had not taken place; and as to Khelat generally there was only what had been done—and rightly done—by the noble Earl (the Earl of North-brook), with a view to get Beloochistan into something like good order. The Ameer now tells us, in his letter of the 19th November, that it is customary to receive friendly Missions as a matter of course. Yet he rejected this one, and why? Because there was rankling in his mind all that had taken place in 1873, and to which I have referred, and he said so. He was written to again by the Commissioner at Peshawur as to the folly of such a course, and he then suggested that he should send to the Viceroy our own Native Envoy in order that he should state what was the real condition of things in Cabul. My Lords, I cannot conceive anything more conciliatory than Lord Lytton's reception of that message—of which it might be said that it was not very complimentary that the Ameer, who had refused to receive our Mission, should suggest that he should send our own Envoy to confer with the Viceroy. But Lord Lytton did not object; he concurred in the suggestion in the most conciliatory manner. My Lords, the noble Earl the other night complained of the language of Lord Lytton; but that language was used to his own confidential officer—it was spoken in confidence, and was only an expression of his own feelings. Well, our Native Envoy came down. He was one of those capable gentlemen who were relied on for information; but it was found very difficult to squeeze information out of him. It could only be obtained by degrees. It was manifest, however, from more than one piece of evidence, that nothing had been sent by him from Cabul but what the Ameer wished; that the Native Envoys were obliged to show what they were about to send; that they were under duress—in point of fact, one of these Agents says, in effect, that he spoke with the voice of the Ameer, and

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not with his own. But, at any rate, the grievances alleged by the Vakeel sent from Cabul were all prior to the arrival of Lord Lytton in India. Finally, it was agreed that the Prime Minister of the Ameer should come and confer with the Indian Government, and he came; but nothing could be more unfortunate than the state of mind in which that unfortunate man approached the carrying out of his mission. He trembled at the probable result to himself. This, however, he said not to the Viceroy, but to an intimate friend of his, Dr. Bellew —"The Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust. The Ameer himself has written of his aversion and apprehension." He, therefore, anticipated that there was very little chance of any satisfactory conclusion being arrived at. Accordingly the Conference brought about no satisfactory conclusion, and it came to an end through the death of the Envoy. An attack has been made upon Lord Lytton for closing it, when he knew that another Envoy was coming. His action was approved of by my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) on the grounds on which it took place. In the first place, the Ameer's Minister had never expressed his assent to that which Lord Lytton laid down as the essential condition to the very beginning of the Conference; and Sir Lewis Pelly said to the Envoy—
"The acceptance of the principle that British Officers may reside in Afghanistan is absolutely necessary as a preliminary to the commencement of negotiations."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 196.]
It was, indeed, supposed to have been accepted when the Envoy was deputed to meet Sir Lewis Pelly. But throughout those long debates and discussions he continually evaded giving any promise on the subject. Although he did not actually say it, he used language that what was required was not possible; that everything was against it; and that he would be in danger of his life if he agreed to it. Therefore, my Lords, the very basis of the negotiation was at an end; for after the death of the Minister his colleague, the Mir Akhor, admitted that he had no instructions and no power to go on with it. I say, without hesita-
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tion, that it would have involved the dignity of this country; it would have involved the dignity of the Government of India, if the Viceroy had not at once put an end to that Mission.
But you will remember, my Lords, that it was still open to the Ameer to make any proposal he thought fit, and my noble Friend near me referred to that fact. Writing to the Viceroy, in reference to the Peshawur Conference, he said—
"In the event, therefore, of the Ameer, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your Excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by, him, his advances should not be rejected."—[Ibid. p. 224.]
And added words to the effect that if he will not approach us, if he rejects our approaches, then he must be responsible for that which he will bring down upon his own head. My Lords, I say that the transaction on the part of Lord Lytton is defensible from beginning to end. It was straightforward. There was no concealment about it—no device to conceal his intention. He told the Ameer what he would do and what he would not do. He said—"I must be supported by Political Officers of my own on the Afghan Frontier, who will tell me what is going on. 'That there might be no mistake Lord Lytton told the Ameer the terms on which he was prepared to assist him—to acknowledge his dynasty, to be the friend of his friends and the enemy of his enemies. The noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) has said that his terms were as large as those in which Lord Lytton made a part of his promises as to assistance in case of attack. But a Treaty does not consist of one clause, but of many which went far beyond the noble Earl's suggestion; but anyone who would indicate to an Afghan Ruler that he would be responsible for his foreign policy without having a voice in that policy would undertake a grave responsibility; and therefore Lord Lytton took means to provide that that policy should be in harmony with his own. The consequence would otherwise have been that you would have pledged your honour to a Potentate who did not understand the limits and conditions imposed upon him, and the time would come when he would be in distress, and you could not, without in his eyes forfeiture of your

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honour, fail to assist him; for by dallying about promises which he considered you had made, he might well have cause to conclude that you did not mean to comply with them. So things remained at the close of the Conference, and for a certain period there was no intercourse between Lord Lytton and the Ameer. There was no hostility on our part. Lord Lytton merely said to the Ameer—"What is offered you is as much to your advantage as ours; we press nothing on you; you are left to yourself." Now, my Lords, what happened? The Ameer did not remain by himself. He began more frequently to hold communication with Russia. He began to send, himself, I think, emissaries. Moreover, during the period of the negotiations he was actually attempting to incite the tribes against us—that is to say, he was actually engaged in hostile operations against us. Well, we pardoned him. "We will leave him," we said, "till he is in a better frame of mind." But, instead of getting into a better frame of mind, what did he do? He waited till a time when hostilities appeared probable between this country and Russia, and then he, who had made it an excuse for not receiving a Mission from us, that he should be compelled, in such case, to receive a Russian Mission, received a Russian Envoy with ostentatious pomp and ceremony. The Duke of Argyll, in his published letter, says he had reason to believe the Ameer had received the Russian Mission with reluctance. I am bound to say we have received no official information to that effect. Private letters which I have seen, and Russian newspapers, tend to show, on the contrary, that the Russian General was treated with actually embarrassing ceremony—more like a King than an Envoy. He was received with Royal salutes and attended by what was really an army, and everything was done by Shere Ali to show the general that he was most welcome. It has been set forth in the Russian papers, as from correspondents who were present, that his reception was of a magnificent character. So far, therefore, from this Russian Mission being forced on the Ameer, the Russian Envoy was accepted and entertained to the best of the Ameer's ability. Well, my Lords, I do not hesitate to say that if the Indian Government had said that that con-
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duct on the part of the Ameer was a distinct declaration of hostility against us, she would have been perfectly justified. The Ameer had all along been aware of Russia's pledge not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan was without the scope and sphere of Russian influence. Yet, knowing this, he refused our Mission without any reason, except, perhaps, this—in order that a Russian Mission might come. The noble Duke in his letter says he is one of those who would never allow Afghanistan to be subordinate to Russia. No; there may be room for Russia and England in Central Asia; but I say distinctly there is not room for England and Russia in Afghanistan. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) who, when a Russian Mission is actually at Cabul, can anticipate the lapse of 50 or 100 years before the question of danger to India can arise is, indeed, a consistent disciple of masterly inactivity. Were we to blind ourselves to facts, as he does, we might hear when it was "too late" the warning cry—"The Philistines be upon you; "and although we might, in our giant struggles, then bring ruin upon others, we should also bring it certainly upon ourselves. The Russian Mission having been received at Cabul, the Viceroy sent a message to the Ameer demanding the admission of a friendly Mission, coupling with it a letter of condolence couched in the most proper terms on the death of his Highness's son and heir, Abdoollah Jan. My Lords, there is in the East no greater insult than to delay an answer to a letter of condolence. But it was long before that letter was answered; and to the Native mind in India the delay was an insult of a character which would in itself have justified hostilities. ["Oh, oh!"] I say in the Native mind of India. I do not mean to say it would have justified hostilities from the European point of view, nor was it so regarded by us. Anybody who has been connected with India, even so short a time as I have been, knows how differently from ourselves the Eastern mind views transactions of this kind. Well, my Lords, we demanded the admission of a friendly Mission; we insisted upon it; and we have been told that this was an outrage to the Ameer. It so happens, however, that this is not the first time Viceroys have

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listed upon demands on the Ameer. The noble Earl himself on one occasion—the Mission to the Chief of Wakhan—thought proper to insist upon the admission of his Envoy through Afghanistan. A great deal has been said in this country about the "independence" of Afghanistan; but the word on English lips as applied to Afghanistan is absurd and misleading. Afghanistan has constantly been asking our protection. The noble Earl himself has admitted that it is impossible to interpret neutrality in a strict sense in relation to Afghanistan. And how did he view the question of "insistence" when it arose? He writes—
"When we had reason to suppose that Shere Ali intended to demur to our reasonable request, that our Envoy should pass through Afghanistan with a communication from us to the Meer of Wakhan, we insisted upon compliance with our wishes. We should adopt the same course again under similar circumstances."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 135.]
To "insist" means, if necessary, to resort to force of arms, and this is what the noble Earl who has been held up as the advocate of masterly inactivity was on the occasion referred to prepared, I presume, to do in the event of a passage being denied to the British Envoy through the Ameer's dominions. The step we have taken is, therefore, not so very different from that which the noble Earl opposite—that great advocate of masterly inactivity—was himself prepared to take in similar circumstances. We asked for the admission of a friendly Mission. It was refused, and refused by force of arms and with threats. Sir Neville Chamberlain, of all men, was the least disposed to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. "No man"—to use his own words—"was more desirous than I to preserve peace and secure friendly relations." Yet what does he add? That it was plainly the Ameer's intention to drive them into a corner, and that they had either to obey all his behests or to stand upon their own rights. Nothing could have been more distinctly humiliating to the dignity of the British Crown and nation. "But for the tact displayed by Major Cavagnari at one period of the interview," writes Sir Neville Chamberlain, "even the lives of the British officers and of their small escort would have been endangered," and "the Mission failed because of the
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Ameer's indifference to any indignity imposed by him on the British Government, while he himself would not tolerate anything which could be strained to bear even the appearance of a slight to his kingly privileges."
My Lords, we now come to the time when everyone in India thought an actual declaration of war necessary. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government at home, though they thought it would be justifiable, felt so keenly the importance of the occasion that they resolved to make one last attempt to bring the Ameer to a proper frame of mind and show him where his true interests lay. The Ultimatum was accordingly sent. Having arrived at this point it was no longer for us to talk of unknown and unascertained friendly relations. It was absolutely essential that we should inform the Ameer of the minimum we should insist upon. That minimum was, first an apology for the repulse of the Mission. The noble Lord opposite (LordLawrence), in one of his letters to the newspapers, said that no doubt Shere Ali would, have made us an apology if we had consented to withdraw the Mission. But, my Lords, that would not have been an apology by him, but by us. We required an apology from the Ameer for having stopped by force of arms a friendly Mission. The Mission was not accompanied by an armed force. So careful, indeed, was Lord Lytton to avoid the appearance of a movement pf troops when proposing the Mission, that he even held back the change of reliefs. The Mission was escorted by a force of little over 200 men, which was not so many as the Ameer had himself brought to the Conference at Umballa. Such a body of men could not have threatened the integrity or independence of Afghanistan; it was no more than sufficient as a protection for our Envoy. Accompanying the Mission were Native gentlemen, to show the Ameer that India practically was represented by us, and that it was not merely a British Mission, but that we came with the assent of those in whom we take so deep an interest in India. And, my Lords, let me here say, by the way, if any one imputes unfriendliness to the Native Princes of India, let him look at what these Princes have offered us. They have offered to be at our side in the campaign; and shame ought to

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cause a blush to rise to the cheek of any man who imputes disloyalty to them at such a time and on such an occasion. Why should the Afghan Representative, who was a soldier, and bound to have obeyed orders, have said that but for his friendship for Major Cavagnari, he would have fired on the Mission? Why should he have had such orders? Your Lordships may suppose that the Mission was at the time in Afghanistan, but that is an absolute delusion—Ali Musjid does not belong to the Ameer—it belongs to the Kyberee tribes, the Afredees and others; and therefore the Mission had not entered the Ameer's territory when this hostile action was threatened against us. The Mission, as it was directed, immediately withdrew, and the Viceroy was informed of its withdrawal. When we are spoken of as making an unnecessary war, it must be remembered that there was something more involved than our own honour as affected by the affront we had received; we had pledged our word to the Kyberee tribes that if they gave us a safe conduct to Ali Musjid we would hold ourselves responsible for their safety; and it appears that the house of a Chief had already been burnt. The Kyberees called upon us to fulfil our pledges, and even if they had not, it was our duty to take such steps that they should not be placed in danger. Therefore, when you talk of the non necessity for war, we say that it became necessary on account of our obligations to them, as I think it was also necessary on account of the affront which had been offered to ourselves. The Ultimatum is sent, and the 20th of November is fixed upon as the date before which the Ameer's reply must be received. The term allowed left eight or nine clear days to the Ameer to prepare his reply before despatching his messenger. No reply came by the 21st, and, of course, the troops had by that time advanced to the Frontier to fulfil the duties imposed upon them. How they have fulfilled them has been admirably described by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) on a former occasion; but I should ill discharge my duty as Secretary of State for India if I did not add my tribute to that which has been already paid by saying that praise is well merited by those who have achieved such great results with such small loss of life and with such moderate means. We might
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have sent large armies and have been involved in extravagant expenditure; but the officers made only such demands as they thought necessary for the purpose. India has had all our resources placed at her disposal; but she has been content with what she had; and Indian soldiers have added another laurel to the Crown which Indian soldiers have so well supported.
My Lords, since these events a long letter has come from the Ameer; something has been said by anonymous slanderers that the Government were in possession of this letter before Parliament met on Thursday last. My Lords, that is an absolute fabrication. It is stated, and reasoned upon, as if it were an ascertained and known fact; and I think it is only my duty to give that absolute denial. The Government had received notice that a letter had been addressed to Major Cavagnari, and was waiting for him—that the messenger was waiting for him to give it to him; and, as it will be remembered, we had announced in the Papers that we had heard of it, and therefore there was not the least concealment on our part. The telegraphic summary was received on the Thursday night; it was deciphered by about 1 o'clock on Friday morning; and it was delivered to me early that morning with an intimation that the full text would follow rapidly afterwards. Therefore, we determined—and I think justifiably—that we would wait for the full text before publishing anything, and the full text arrived yesterday. It was a very long business to decipher it; I did not receive it until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon; and I lost no time in making arrangements for its being in your Lordships' hands and in the newspapers this morning. I think this is a complete answer to the fictions circulated in order to discredit the Government.
My Lords, that letter is no answer to the Ultimatum. If it had come on the 20th of November, according to the instructions which my Colleagues and I had given to the Viceroy the troops must have advanced. It is an evasive reply; it makes no apology; it does not give any undertaking with respect to the Kyberees; it says nothing with regard to admitting a permanent Mission; it is in character such a letter

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as would not be sent by one friendly authority to another. We read these things too much with European eyes; but this must be read by Eastern eyes, because it is only in that way we can discern the real meaning which underlies these apparently friendly expressions. We have arrived at this point; and I say the time has gone by for "masterly inactivity." The time has gone by for verbal engagements; the time has come for distinct, definite, perfect understandings, whether it be with those West of Afghanistan, or with Afghanistan itself. I wish—as everyone would—to speak with respect of one of the great countries which forms part of the concert of the nations of Europe; I would not say anything that would be offensive or disrespectful to that country or its Government. It has been driven on by events I dare say, and by necessity, to effect larger seizures of Asiatic territory than it originally contemplated; and with its advances it has continued to give us assurances, solemn pledges reiterated again and again, and not even denied now; and it has admitted that this particular Russian Mission was sent to Cabul because of the apprehension of war between us. Be it so; it proves this—that the weak point in our armour was considered to be Afghanistan; it proves that they thought if they could turn our watch-dog, the Ameer, into a bloodhound against us, it would be a great advantage to them—and, therefore, my Lords, I say that if you have a faithless porter at your door you must dispose of him, and take the charge of your door from him. We are driven to this step.
My Lords, it is no light matter that will make any man carry the country into a war; but, my Lords, our honour, our safety, and our interests alike impelled us to this course. We have been driven to it step by step; and the day has come when there can be no paltering with our duty. I admit that within these Eastern nations you may be compelled from time to time to make further advances than those that were originally contemplated. Be it so, but let us now enter into some conditions about which there can be no mistake; let us say distinctly that in Afghanistan we must be paramount and supreme; that in Afghanistan, holding the doors of India, we must either have a friendly
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porter or we must take the keys ourselves. The objects of this war, then, are those of justice and security. It is a just war, because we are not bound to wait attacks until an enemy shall come upon us in force at his own time; when we see what is coming upon us we have the right to make preparations and act so as to avert it. Such is our course, my Lords; and I am sorry that an Amendment should be moved on this occasion by my noble Friend. He has on all occasions said that he has endeavoured to avoid giving a Party aspect to Indian questions, and when India becomes a Parliamentary question in that sense the day of our Empire will be drawing rapidly to a close. You must have a despotic Government in India; you must make the Executive Government responsible for India. I am far from saying that Parliament shall not exercise its right to speak of what we have done; I am not complaining of it. I only say I deeply regret that in the midst of a war it should be thought that any occasion had arisen for it. I ask you—our opponents—what you would have done if you had known that a Russian Mission had been received with honour at Cabul? Would you have asked the Ameer to let you send a friendly Mission to explain what the relations between him and you ought to be; or would you have submitted, with the retiring modesty which a noble Lord exhibited on a former occasion, when he wished the banner of England to retire behind the Indus? That is not the way in which India was won, or the way in which India is to be held. My Lords, India was looking on. The people saw us at the gates of Afghanistan demanding admittance; they saw us repulsed; what would be, what was, the effect on the Indian mind and Indian feelings? That is a matter of some importance to us who have to govern the country. They thought that we were hesitating too long, and that we were afraid; that there was something behind Afghanistan we durst not meet. This was in their minds, and if we had retired they would have been justified in supposing that such fears were entertained. We call upon you, as we call upon the country, to support us in the policy we have adopted for the honour, safety, and welfare of Her Majesty and Her Dominions. The noble Viscount concluded by moving his Resolution.
Moved to resolve, That Her Majesty having directed a military expedition of Her forces charged upon Indian revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions.—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
VISCOUNT HALIFAX*: I am anxious, at the outset of the observations which I shall address to your Lordships, to express my satisfaction that the debate of Thursday last will have cleared off all questions of a personal or Party character, and I am glad to hear from my noble Friend who has just sat down his wish to avoid anything of the kind. He has only done me justice in saying that I have always disclaimed the introduction of any Party views into Indian questions; and although he is inclined to attribute a Party view to the proceeding of this evening, I can assure him that I have been influenced by no such feeling. The question of the Frontier policy of India is one of such importance, and the recent change in that policy may lead to such serious consequences, that it is above all Party considerations. I agree with my noble Friend that it is of the greatest importance to us that a strong friendly Government should be established in Afghanistan, and that we should have a paramount influence at Cabul; but there is a serious difference between us as to the course of conduct on our part by which that result can best be attained. My noble Friend commenced his review of past transactions from the Afghan War of 1839, which I well remember, as well as himself. It originated in an apprehension of the danger to our Indian Empire which might result from the possible consequences of the presence of two Russian officers at Cabul. We undertook to set up a Ruler there on whose friendship we could depend. It was a great mistake, for which we paid dearly in the greatest disaster which ever befell our arms in India. The only permanent result of the war was an intense hatred of the British name, and jealousy and fear of the British power in the mind of every inhabitant of Afghanistan. From that time forward the object of every Viceroy of India, up to the time of the present Viceroy, and supported by every Indian Minister, has been to en-
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deavour to remove all such feeling from the minds of the Afghans, to conciliate their Rulers, and to make them our firm and steadfast friends; and the result has been that for 35 years peace and a fairly good understanding have been preserved. Soon after the time, however, when the noble Lord now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs assumed charge of the India Office, directions were given to my noble Friend (Lord Northbrook), then Viceroy of India, to raise what has always been a burning question in Afghanistan, and to press on the Ameer of Cabul the residence of British officers in that country. My noble Friend remonstrated, and during his Viceroyalty nothing was done. In 1876, however, Lord Lytton proceeded to India to carry out a new Frontier policy. It would be easy to show that this was so, if it were needful; but we have a statement to that effect in words of his own in a despatch of March, 1877, which will be found in the Khelat Papers. Lord Lytton says in that despatch—
"The present Viceroy, having had the advantage before leaving England of personal communication with your Lordship on the general subject of our Frontier relations, was strongly impressed by the importance of endeavouring to deal with them simultaneously, as indivisible parts of a single Imperial question, mainly dependent for its solution on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government."
The Frontier policy of the Indian Government was no longer, it seems, to be a policy for the interests of India, but was to depend on the general foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. This new line of policy was initiated by Lord Lytton, and it has resulted in war. The old line of policy gave us 35 years of peace; 30 months of the new has plunged us into war. Surely, my Lords, such a change of policy and such results are well worthy of the consideration of Parliament; and I may be justified in bringing them to your Lordships' attention without being supposed to be actuated by Party motives. We are now at war. Why are we at war? I will take £in succession our alleged causes of complaint against the Ameer, none of which—indeed, not all of which together—seem to me to afford any sufficient justification of our invasion of his territory. I have said, my Lords, that the question of the residence of British officers in Afghanistan has been a

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burning question with the Afghans, not with the Ruler only, but with the Chiefs and the people, for years. My noble Friend has alluded to the Treaty of 1857, concluded between Dost Mahomed and my noble Friend, then Sir John Lawrence. At that time Dost Mahomed had agreed to receive a British officer even at Cabul; but on going back to his camp and meeting his Chiefs, they were so violently opposed to it that he was compelled to retract his consent, and my noble Friend was satisfied with his reasons. But, with the consent of the Ameer and his Chiefs, British officers were allowed to reside temporarily at other places. Amongst others, the present Sir Herbert Lumsden resided for a time at Candahar. Now, he went there with the full consent of the Afghan Rulers; he went there to dispense money provided by us for the pay of the Afghan troops—and how were the British officers treated? In a Minute of Sir John Lawrence's, some time afterwards, he says—
"Our officers were all this time in a most precarious position—scarcely for a day were their lives safe. Under plea of taking care of them, from their first arrival they were surrounded by spies, and could not move a stone's throw from their house without an escort, who watched and denounced any man who might speak to them. At last matters got so had that they were glad to leave Candahar. General Lumsden, who was at the head of this Mission, more than once assured me, after his return, that he had better means of gaining information on Afghan and Central Asian affairs at Peshawur."
If such was the position of British officers when residing with the full consent of the Afghans, what would it be if they were forced, on an unwilling people? We learn, too, that the objection is not that of the Ameer alone, but is as fully entertained by his Chiefs and people; and that it is unjust now to hold Shere Ali as solely responsible for refusing assent to the residence of British officers in Afghanistan. At the time of the Umballa Conference with Lord Mayo the question was again discussed, and Lord Mayo again acquiesced in the objections stated by Shere Ali. So the matter remained till the receipt by Lord Northbrook of Lord Salisbury's despatches in 1875, to press the question on the Ameer. On the receipt of those directions Lord North-brook assembled the Frontier officers, who from their knowledge of the dispo-
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sitions and feelings of the Afghans had the best means of forming an opinion. They unanimously agreed that it would be most unwise to press the question on the Ameer. Lord Northbrook brought the question before his Council, and with their unanimous concurrence remonstrated against Lord Salisbury's directions. There are two paragraphs of this despatch which state so clearly the objections to the course enjoined by Lord Salisbury, that I will take the liberty of reading them to your Lordships. Lord Northbrook says—
"It is in the highest degree improbable that the Ameer will yield a hearty consent to the location of British Officers in Afghanistan which the Mission is intended to accomplish; and to place our Officers on the Ameer's Frontier without his hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most impolitic and dangerous movement. Setting aside the consideration of the personal risk to which under such circumstances the Agents would be exposed and the serious political consequences that would ensue from their being insulted or attacked, their position would be entirely useless. They would be dependent for their information on untrustworthy sources. They would be surrounded by spies under the pretext of guarding them or administering to their wants. Persons approaching or visiting them would be watched and removed; and though nothing might be done ostensibly which could be complained of as an actual breach of friendship, the Agents would be checked on every hand, and would soon find their position both humiliating and useless. Such was the experience of Major Todd at Herat in 1839 when his supplies of money failed. Such was the experience of Colonel Lumsden when he went to Candahar in 1857 as the dispenser of a magnificent subsidy. A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 166.]
This was the last act of Lord North-brook's Government; and so the matter rested. Up to that time an uniform course had been pursued of not pressing the residence of British officers in Afghanistan. Not that it was not a measure desirable in itself, but that it would be useless without the consent of the Ameer, and ought not to be pressed upon an unwilling Afghan Government. My noble Friend opposite has taken great pains to prove that the alienation of the Ameer is owing to various steps taken by Lord Northbrook. I venture to think that there is no sufficient reason for such an opinion; and in confirmation of this view I will read an extract from

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a letter of Sir Henry Norman's, which has just appeared in the public papers. Sir Henry Norman is an Indian officer with a great knowledge of Indian affairs, both military and political. He served in the Mutiny and on the Frontier, and he closed his career in India as Member of the Governor General's Council, and is now a Member of the Council of India. He says—
"My opinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Northbrook's departure the Ameer had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was somewhat out of temper, and was disquieted by writings which more or less pointed at measures distasteful to him. Any real resentment he may have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to measures taken from April, 1876, to the present time."
Such, my Lords, was the state of matters at the close of what I venture to call the conciliatory policy. Lord Lytton took a different tone, and we are now witnessing the results. On his arrival he despatched a Native officer to Cabul to propose to Shere Ali to receive a Mission at Cabul, which the Ameer declined; and after some correspondence and communications which the noble Lord opposite has partly stated, and to which it is unnecessary to refer further, the Native Agent of the Indian Government who resides at Cabul, met the Viceroy at Simla, to communicate to him the views of the Ameer and to receive those of the Viceroy, in order that they might be communicated to the Ameer. This meeting took place in October, 1876. I must say, my Lords, that the tone adopted towards the Ameer was such as must have been intolerable to a Ruler who considered himself entitled to be treated as an independent Prince. The assent of the Ameer to the residence of British officers in Afghanistan was declared to be a preliminary sine quâ non to any further negotiations; and I now quote the Viceroy's own words to the Agent, as reported in the official account. The Viceroy regretted the view which the Ameer took of his own position, and went on to say—
"The moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 183.]
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And a little further that—
"If the Ameer became our enemy we could break him as a reed."—[Ibid.]
There are other expressions still more insulting which were quoted by my noble Friend (Earl Granville) on Thursday night, but which I will not repeat. This was on the 10th of October. My noble Friend opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) talks of this as a sort of confidential conversation between the Viceroy and the Agent. It was nothing of the sort. At a subsequent interview three days later, on the 13th of October, the Viceroy said to the Agent that—
"He had treated the Vakeel confidentially, and had stated, without reserve, all that he had in his mind. He had no doubt that the Vakeel would convey this faithfully to the Ameer."—[Ibid. p. 185.]
We do not, of course, know how much of this conversation the Agent did really communicate to the Ameer; but, at all events, he sent his Minister, Syud Noor Mahomed, to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. At this Conference it was again declared that the Ameer's consent to the residence of British officers in Afghanistan was a preliminary sine quâ non to all further proceeding. It seems as if at one time the Ameer was not indisposed to give a reluctant assent, yielding to necessity and pleading his helplessness, but the old hereditary Afghan feeling was too strong, and it is touching to read the appeals of the Envoy. One of our officers at Peshawur was a Dr. Bellew, who had been associated with Syud Noor Mahomed in the Seistan arbitration, and was his personal friend. He was a medical man also, and it would appear that the Syud was almost on his death-bed. He appealed to Dr. Bellew as his friend on the 28th of January, 1877, in the following terms:—
"He (the Ameer) is now convinced that to allow British officers to reside in his country will be to relinquish his own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on the Afghan people will be attached to his name, and he would sooner perish than submit to this."—[Ibid. p. 195.]
Again, on the 7th of February, he said to Dr. Bellew—
"'You must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear, and if you overload us the responsibility rests with you."—[Ibid. p. 202.]
Dr. Bellew interposed here, and asked

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the Cabul Envoy what the burden was which he alluded to?
"He at once replied, 'The residence of British officers on the Frontier of Afghanistan.'"—[Ibid.]
And on the 12th of February, at an interview with Sir Lewis Pelly, he said—
"In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands."—[Ibid. p. 208.]
It was all in vain; there was no relaxation on the part of the Indian Government, and it was ultimately declared that all promises and assurances of support and assistance were withdrawn; that the Treaty of 1855, of the adequacy of which the Ameer had frequently complained, was the only engagement between India and Afghanistan; and, further, that the Viceroy would take steps for the rectification of the North-West Frontier without reference to the Ameer. The Cabul Envoy died at Peshawur; and though Lord Lytton knew that his successor was on his way, and that it was reported that the Ameer was prepared to concede everything, he directed Sir Lewis Pelly to close the Conference and to leave Peshawur. An insulting letter was written by Sir Lewis Pelly—which I believe may be taken as being, in fact, from the Viceroy to the Ameer, in which occurs a most extraordinary passage, which I can only understand as a piece of bitter irony. Your Lordships will remember how the residence of British officers had been pressed; and I think your Lordships will be as much surprised as I was at reading the following sentence in that letter:—
"The proposal of this arrangement was regarded by the British Government as a great concession; and that the British Government will most assuredly not allow its officers to undertake duties on behalf of Afghanistan involving a residence in any part of that country, unless their presence there is specially invited and cordially welcomed by the Ruler of it, whoever he may he, and their personal safety and comfort solemnly guaranteed by the same authority."—[Ibid. p. 216.]
So ended the Conference at Peshawur. The Native Agent who represented the Government of India was subsequently recalled from Cabul, and all the accustomed and ordinary means of diplomatic intercourse with the Ameer were closed.
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I come now to the rectification of the North-West Frontier referred to in the later communications to the Ameer. It is not explained in the Papers; but it received an explanation in the speech at the Mansion House of the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government. He stated that it was requisite to obtain a scientific Frontier, and that the unsatisfactory character of the existing Frontier had been a source of anxiety to former Viceroys. I am sure that the noble Lord would not make such a statement unless he believed that he had good authority for it; but I confess that I am at a loss to imagine what such authority can be. Our present Frontier is what was the Frontier of the Sikh Kingdom under Runjeet Sing; and when in the time of Lord Dalhousie we annexed the Sikh dominions, the Sikh Frontier against Afghanistan became ours. This, of course, was the ease under Lord Dalhousie. Now, I was in constant and confidential communication with Lord Dalhousie, with his successor, Lord Canning, with Lord Elgin, and with my noble Friend near me (Lord Lawrence), four successive Viceroys, and from none of them did I ever hear a word upon the subject. I have never heard that any anxiety was expressed by Lord Mayo, and my noble Friend (Lord Northbrook) has never expressed any. Unless, therefore, the noble Lord opposite has some authority for his statement of which I, at least, have never heard, I must be permitted to believe that no such anxiety has been felt or expressed by any Viceroy since our Frontier has been what it is. I come now to the military authority in favour of advancing our North-West Frontier. The only one given in these Afghanistan Papers is the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala. It was not his original opinion. He had recorded an opinion in the opposite sense. But, my Lords, on looking carefully at this opinion now given, it seems to refer almost entirely to the Frontier of Scinde and the occupation of Quetta; and I am inclined to think that his previous recorded opinion referred to the same question, when a proposal from Bombay on this matter was submitted to the Government of India, but not concurred in by them. But in 1867 this whole question was formally brought before the Government of India, in the time of

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Lord Lawrence, and Minutes against any extension of the Frontier were recorded by himself, Sir Henry Norman, Sir Henry Durand, Sir George 'Yule, and Sir William Mansfield, then Commander-in-Chief in India, three of them being experienced military men. In addition to these authorities we have recently seen the opinions against any extension of the Frontier entertained by Sir Herbert Edwardes, whose military talent and intimate knowledge of the Frontier no one can doubt; of General Sir John Adye, a Queen's officer of high character, and who himself served on the Frontier in the Umbeylah campaign; and I find, somewhat to my surprise, that Sir Henry Green, one of the foremost advocates of the extension of the Frontier of Scinde, is opposed to the extension of that portion of the Frontier which borders on Afghanistan. With this preponderance of military opinion, so far as we have the means of knowing, against any extension of the Northwestern Frontier, it seems now, however, that, regardless of the rights of the Ameer, we are prepared to take possession of part of his territory. It appears to me that any annexation of territory in Europe which has been condemned by universal public opinion—that of the Frontier of the Rhine, the taking possession of Sleswick, or any other such proceeding—may be equally justified. But, indeed, the case is worse against us in this proceeding in India; for by the Treaty of 1855, which we acknowledge still to be in force, we are bound to respect the territories of the Ameer. We have repeatedly given the assurance that we wanted nothing from Afghanistan; even in the last proceedings we declared that we should take nothing over which the Ameer had jurisdiction; and if, in spite of all these engagements and assurances, we commit such an act of unjustifiable and unprincipled spoliation, what becomes of our character for good faith, on which our position in India so essentially depends? My noble Friend opposite, indeed, asserts that Ali Musjid is not in Afghan territory. Whose officer commanded, whose troops garrisoned Ali Musjid? Shere Ali's. And when occupied, as my noble Friend said, by the Khyberees, it has been only at times, and then under the authority of the Ameer of Cabul. Who occupy the northern side of the Pass? The
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Momunds; and when a British officer was murdered by some of them a few years ago, to whom did we apply for redress?—to Shere Ali. Surely that is recognizing his jurisdiction. Whose troops are we fighting in the Koorum Valley? Those of Shere Ali. The inhabitants of that valley are undoubtedly subjects of the Ameer. The intermediate tribes—Afreedees and others—do not pay much obedience even to their own Chiefs; but their allegiance is due, such as it is, to the Chiefs of Cabul, whose dominions, till the conquest of the Sikhs, extended to the Indus and beyond it. I cannot suppose for a moment that the Afghans, or indeed any persons in India, will consider our annexation of territory beyond our North-West Frontier as anything but an encroachment on Afghanistan. I will now advert to the complaint made of the presence of Russian Agents, and of the reception of a Russian Mission at Cabul. In former years it has been the custom for letters to be exchanged between the Russian officers in Turkestan and the Ameer. It was constantly done in Lord Mayo's time, and Lord North-brook's. Sometimes the Indian Government was consulted as to what answers should be sent from Cabul, sometimes they were not; but no objection was ever entertained to this Correspondence, and on one occasion, if I remember rightly, Lord Mayo expressed his approbation of it. It would seem, however, as if, latterly, the arrival of persons claiming to be Russian Agents had been more frequent, and their presence at Cabul more constant than heretofore. We must, however, be cautious in placing too much confidence in these reports. Not only the Russian Government, but the officers in Turkestan have denied having sent such Agents; and in such an atmosphere of intrigue and deceit as surrounds an Eastern Court it is impossible to be sure of the truth, which, indeed, we shall probably never know. The Ameer's Envoy stated at Peshawur that at that time their presence had been a source of embarrassment to the Ameer. In 1878, however, a formal Mission was undoubtedly sent from Turkestan to Cabul; and perhaps we might have had reason to complain that this was a breach of the engagements of Russia, and of her assurance that she considered Afghan-

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istan as beyond the sphere of her influence. But had we not given Russia some justification for her course? I will only allude to what appeared in an Indian newspaper, supposed often to represent the views of the Government there, in which it was said that
"It was now no longer a secret that if war had broken out between England and Russia we should not have remained on the defensive in India."
At any rate, it is undeniable that we brought Indian troops to the Mediterranean, with the view of taking part in the struggle with Russia if war, as at one time seemed not improbable, had broken out. Was it unnatural that the Russians should take measures with a view to finding employment for the Indian troops at home? The Mission did not leave Turkestan till there had been ample time for orders to be transmitted by telegram from St. Petersburg for its departure after the arrival of the Indian troops in Egypt. The Indian troops arrived, I think, before the middle of April, and the Mission did not leave Samarcand till the 10th of June. Explanations have been asked for from the Russian Government, which has stated that the Mission was despatched under circumstances which happily no longer exist, and it appears by the Central Asian Papers that Lord Salisbury is satisfied with their explanations. But this cause of complaint, whatever it may be as to the Russians, does not apply to the Ameer. He had not entered, into any such engagements. And how did we stand with him at the time when their Mission was received? I have already stated that long before this we had withdrawn our promises of support, broken off all intercourse with the Ameer, and withdrawn our Agent from Cabul. There was, besides, another circumstance which we know weighed heavily on his mind—the occupation of Quetta. In 1875, Sir Henry Rawlinson, a Member of the Indian Council, had written a Memorandum on Afghan and Russian affairs, in which he advocated the occupation of Herat and Candahar—leaving him in undivided authority only over Cabul and the Northern and Eastern portions of Afghanistan, and the first step to this occupation was to be the taking possession of Quetta. Lord Salisbury thought it necessary to
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state, in one of his despatches to Lord Lytton, that English newspapers and books on Indian affairs were rapidly translated and forwarded for the information of the Ameer, and it is well known that the Ameer had seen the translation of Sir Henry Rawlinson's book. Now, was it not most natural that the Ameer should consider this occupation of Quetta as the practical commencement of the scheme which would deprive him of about one-third of the best part of his dominions? Lord Northbrook had refused to occupy Quetta. One of the earliest steps, however, of Lord Lytton, coming out fresh from England, and who might, therefore, fairly be supposed to be imbued with the notions of the India Office in England, was to direct the occupation of Quetta; and in November, 1876, an Engineer officer was employed in laying out sites for barracks and public buildings, and it was actually occupied by troops before the meeting with Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. Is it very surprising that after the language held, and the conduct of the Indian Government to him at the close of Sir Lewis Pelly's Conference, and with the threatening of this apparent danger to his territories, which was paraded and magnified by the Indian Press, that the Ameer should not have turned a deaf ear to the Russian Envoy? Is there no excuse for a man whom we had so treated? I do not propose to say a word further as to the justice or fairness of our conduct, or of the war. I am anxious only to deal with considerations affecting India; and I ask, would it not have been more politic and wiser on our part to have endeavoured, even then, to re-establish friendly relations with the Ameer than to throw him into the arms of Russia? If Russia is so hostile and so formidable to us in Asia; if it is necessary to take such precautions to guard against the danger of her action against us; can there be greater insanity on our part than to alienate the Power which would be our best Ally against her? What could Russia, for her own interest, wish more than that we should engage ourselves in hostilities with the Afghans, and waste our strength and resources in a struggle from which military honour would be the only gain? How truly applicable to such conduct on our part is the line of the Latin poet—

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"Hoc Ithacus velit et magno mercentur Atridæ."
Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, as to the reception of which at Cabul no answer had been received, was, as might have been expected, stopped at the mouth of the Pass, but without any insult, as was stated by the noble Lord who moved the Address. An Ultimatum in no very courteous terms was sent to the Ameer, and before any answer was received, with what I should term precipitate haste our troops entered Afghanistan. Conciliation has ceased. Coercion has begun. Where will it end? We have had military success, as was sure to be the case. I have never entertained the least doubt of our being able to go where we chose—to drive Shere Ali from Cabul, to occupy Candahar and Herat; but, my Lords, when we have obtained the military success, wherever and whenever we may stop, our real difficulty begins. I approach with some hesitation what may be called a military question, and so in part it is; but it is also a political and a financial question. Our present Frontier in the plain being deemed insufficient, we are to go into the hills, and amongst them to occupy some line as a "scientific" Frontier. Now, my Lords, I can understand if we were dealing with a single line of mountains—such as the Pyrenees or the Balkans—that by occupying the Passes in such a chain we might obtain what military men would call a scientific Frontier. But there is no such single range beyond our present Frontier. The country is described by a most competent military authority as a vast tract of mountains of the most rugged and desolate character, sometimes attaining the height of 10,000 feet, running down in successive ridges from the great mass of the Hindoo Koosh, intersected by narrow valleys and defiles, with difficult Passes between them, and across which it is impossible to lay down a clear and definite line of Frontier. To whatever line we choose to advance, we must occupy and govern the country behind it. If our posts and the escorts which bring up their supplies—all of which must come from the rear—are weak, they will be liable to be cut off. If they are strong, the expense will be very considerable. If our posts are in the valleys in order to command the water and such roads as are there, they will be overlooked from the surrounding
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heights, and if on the hill sides, the supply of water may be deficient and the communications will be difficult. All this was experienced in the operations at the Umbeylah Pass in 1863; and, indeed, the experience of that operation is a warning against engaging in this mountain warfare. It was at that time desirable to punish a band of plunderers known as the Sitana fanatics, who had established themselves at no great distance from our border. A force was despatched for this purpose, and in order to reach them it had to pass through some territory belonging to the Bonairs. We had no hostility to them, and they were told so; but, nevertheless, they, and the neighbouring tribes, rose in force as soon as we had entered their district, and held us in check for a considerable time in the Pass. At last, fortunately for us, they assembled in force in the valley, and we attacked and defeated them. So little real hostility was there, that they actually aided us in the object of our expedition; but so inveterate was their feeling against the foot of the foreigner on their soil that, as we retired, they destroyed the traces of the route by which we had advanced. If such was the feeling against us for our temporary presence, what will it be if we advance for the purpose of permanent occupation? The country surrounding the Khyber Pass is inhabited by the Afreedees and other tribes, numbering about 100,000 men, of the fiercest, most intractable, and semi-barbarous of the Afghans. They live in a constant state of feud. Robbery and murder are of daily occurrence. How will you punish such crimes, which you cannot permit in the districts which you govern? The guilty persons will escape into the next valley, will be aided by its inhabitants, and there will be frequent incursions of these people, who are admirably fitted for mountain warfare, and being bigoted Mahomedans will be animated by an intense fanatical hatred of the infidel foreigner who seeks to reduce them to obedience, to law and order. You will be compelled to advance from valley to valley, much in the same way as I understand is now going on in the hills on your North-East Frontier against tribes much less formidable than the Afghans. Now, my Lords, assuming that, even in spite of our annexation of part of his territory, friendly relations

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have been established at first with the Ameer, such proceedings as these will render it impossible for him to maintain relations of friendship, or to avoid supporting the tribes whom you attack. The national feeling of his people and their religious fanaticism will force him to do so. You will be brought into collision at Cabul. What may be the result cannot be predicted; but whatever it may be, anarchy, a puppet Ruler supported by us, or actual annexation, will equally involve us in further difficulty, and we shall be again compelled to go forward. I do not see that amongst all the advocates of advancing our Frontier anyone has even suggested where we can stop; and depend upon it that if we once commence advancing into Afghanistan, instead of taking the first ridge, we shall never stop till we have taken the last, which looks down upon the plains of Balkh and the Oxus. But this is an occupation of Afghanistan, the folly of which Sir Charles Napier said only equalled that of attempting to conquer it. Against whom do we require a scientific Frontier? Not against the Afghans; against them our present Frontier has sufficed for the last 28 years. Bands of plunderers are the only persons who have crossed in hostile form. It is not against Afghans, but against Russians that a scientific Frontier can be needed. But nobody expects the Russians to advance for the purpose of assailing India by Cabul and the Khyber. Look to Sir Henry Rawlinson's book, who certainly understands the subject. He tells you that it is upon Herat that they must advance, and I believe that all military men agree in this opinion. In order to meet their possible advance, he proposes to erect a great fortress at Herat, a second at Candahar, with a line of forts and fortified posts at Quetta and elsewhere, in order to maintain the communications along a line of 800 miles, from the Indus to Herat. In this view he is corroborated by a great military authority, General Hamley. If on military grounds this be necessary, then here arises the important question of finance. Herat will have to be defended, not against Persian or Afghan attacks, but against the forces and military skill of the Russians. It must, so near the Frontier, be made a second Metz. I do not presume to say what the first cost of
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constructing such a fortress, of that at Candahar and of those at the other posts, will be, but it cannot be less than £3,000,000 or £4,000,000. As regards the permanent defence of the country, an estimate was made in the time of Sir John Lawrence's Government. The minimum number of men required was put at 30,000, of whom one-third were to be Europeans, and the annual cost was taken at between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000. But it was supposed that the necessary force would in all probability be, not 30,000 but 50,000 men, and no allowance was made for keeping down a hostile population, or for the Civil Government of the country. Whatever the whole force required for all these purposes may be it must be in addition to what there is now in India, where there is not a man too much. It would be a low estimate to put the annual sum required for all this at less than from £4,000,000 to £5,000,000. Now, my Lords, little or nothing is to be obtained in Afghanistan. It is a country which, as Dost Mahomed expressed it, produces only men and stones. The whole expense must be defrayed from other sources. It is impossible to impose such a charge upon the Revenues of India. In spite of the favourable account which my noble Friend opposite gave of the amount of the opium duty this year, the Revenue of India, one year with another, barely covers the expenditure. Some of the Revenue is precarious. The expense of the Civil Administration is steadily and inevitably increasing, and nobody has suggested how much additional taxation can be imposed on India. If such expense is to be incurred it must fall upon the taxpayers of this country; and that is a prospect which may well make the boldest statesman pause. Her Majesty's Government may ask me what I would do. Fortunately, as I think, the winter months render a pause in our military operations inevitable. I would endeavour during this interval to revert to the policy of conciliation. We have done much of which the Ameer has, I think, good reason to complain; but Dost Mahomed had more, when we had deposed and driven him into exile. Nevertheless, Sir Herbert Edwardes and Sir John Lawrence so far conciliated him that he became our fast friend; and during our worst necessity during the

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Mutiny, in spite of the urgency of his Chiefs, he allowed no Afghan to cross the Frontier to our detriment. Call such policy by what name you please—backward policy, or masterly inactivity—it has succeeded in preserving peace and a good understanding with the Afghans. We ought to abandon all notion of permanent occupation beyond our present Frontier; we ought to satisfy the Afghans that we covet no portion of their territory. We ought, if communications are opened—as I hope they may be—endeavour to conciliate them. We should be patient, forgiving, and generous, and require nothing but what is absolutely necessary for the honour of the country. We have, in truth, no cause of quarrel with the Afghans but what we have made ourselves. There is no difficulty as to our Frontier. It is not so on their Northern Frontier, where they are almost coterminous with the Russians, or with States under Russian influence. Bokhara and Balkh are in near proximity; and looking to what has been the progress of Russian advance, it is more than probable that ere long some cause of difficulty or cause of quarrel will occur on this Frontier, and on the occurrence of which the Afghans will naturally look to us for assistance. That is the relative position in which we ought to stand with Afghanistan, not offending their national feelings; respecting their independence; always ready to afford them friendly aid. Such a state of things I hope and trust may be established; and with the Afghans our friends, though we may not have a scientific Frontier, nevertheless, with a friendly and warlike population holding an almost inaccessible country, and the British power behind them, we shall have an unassailable bulwark to our Indian Empire. The noble Viscount concluded by moving the Amendment of which he had given Notice.
Amendment moved,
To leave out from the word ("House") to the end of the motion for the purpose of inserting ("whilst ready to consent to providing the means necessary for bringing the war in which we are unhappily engaged to a safe and honourable conclusion, regrets the conduct pursued by the Government which has unnecessarily engaged this country in the contest.")—(The Viscount Halifax.)
LORD LAWRENCE*: My Lords, the noble Earl who moved the Address to
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Her Majesty on the evening of the 5th (the Earl of Ravensworth) took occasion to quote a sentence from one of my letters, written some years ago when I was Governor General, to the effect that if the Russians got possession of Afghanistan it would be the cause of much trouble to us in India. I quite admit that this quotation may be correct, for in a despatch of the 3rd of September, 1867, I expressed the same view. I considered then that we should do all in our power to avert such a condition of things, and I urged on Her Majesty's Government that some understanding should be at once come to with Russia on this matter. I think, now, if Russia will not enter into satisfactory arrangements with us about Afghanistan, or, having made them, allow her officers in Central Asia to violate them, that ulterior measures should be taken in England to protect India. But, though I entertain these views, I hold—and firmly hold—that it would be an unwise policy for us to go beyond our present boundary on the North-West Frontier of India, and thus to anticipate the attacks of Russia. The policy which England for the last few years has adopted towards Russia is of a very doubtful character. We distrust her—we are continually questioning her as to her intentions and movements—and then profess ourselves satisfied with her explanations. For instance, in the Correspondence recently published regarding affairs in Central Asia, we accept all she says as to the circumstances which have led her to make the recent diversion in Afghanistan; and while we do this, and resume friendly relations with her, we wage war with the Afghans because they received a Russian Mission; and further are about to rectify our Frontiers in the hope of strengthening ourselves against Russian advances. This is not a very magnanimous policy, and I doubt it adding to either our strength or prestige in India. I will not say very much about the policy which we have pursued towards Afghanistan since the war of 1842, except that, after punishing its people for their treachery, our endeavour has uniformly been to make amends to them for our first invasion of their country. The noble Earl taxed me in severe terms—which, however, I view with indifference—on account of my successive recognitions in 1864 of Shere

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Ali and his brothers. I confess that I did this; and cannot help thinking that if the noble Earl had been in my place, and had possessed a knowledge of Afghanistan, in all probability he would have acted as I did. For many years the state of things in Cabul had been one of constant change and struggles for the Throne, one Chief ousting another, as their respective parties gained supremacy. Ameer Dost Mahomed was himself a usurper of the Throne he sat on; and we at one time drove him from it in favour of a de jure King, and afterwards re-instated him, to the general satisfaction of the Chiefs and people. On his death, Ameer Shere Ali, his son, who had previously been appointed heir-apparent, succeeded his father, and would probably have retained possession of the Kingdom if he had only acted prudently; he, however, was not the rightful heir, either by Mahomedan law or by custom of the country, and his brothers were among his bitterest enemies. Sirdar Afzul Khan raised the standard of revolt in Balkh; Sirdar Azim Khan intrigued in Cabul; and a third brother attacked him from Candahar; it was, in fact, an internecine struggle between the members of one family. Why, then, should we interfere to uphold Shere Ali against his elder brothers? On what principle were we to pronounce that Shere Ali was the de jure Ruler of Cabul? Had we maintained his cause, and upheld him on the Throne, we might have found that we were helping a man whom neither the Chiefs nor people of the country desired to rule over them. I affirm, then, that the policy then pursued of dealing only with the de facto Ruler of the day was the right one. When, however, Shere Ali had subdued his enemies and recovered his power, and was willing to renew friendly relations with ns, I judged that the time had come when we could with safety afford him aid; and my opinion was fully concurred in by the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Northcote. I promised the Ameer, therefore, a considerable sum of money—part of which was given him at once, and the remainder in Lord Mayo's time; I also presented him with a number of arms, to which Lord Mayo added, including in his gift 12 guns. The interview with the Ameer which I had arranged previous to my departure
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from India was carried out by Lord Mayo in right Royal fashion. But it is an entire mistake to suppose that the Ameer consented at the Umballa interview to receive British officers either in Cabul or in other parts of his country, or that we desired that he should do so. The evidence of Mr. Seton-Karr, who was Foreign Secretary of the Government of India in 1869, is conclusive on this point. I was very glad to find among my papers a letter of his, written on the 5th of April, 1869, in which, with the approval of Lord Mayo, he gave me information on this point, which confirms fully his recent statement. What the Ameer really wanted was a Treaty of Reciprocity, whereby the friends and enemies of the one country should be deemed the friends and enemies of the other, and that this Treaty should be made with him and his own family. Lord Mayo refused both of these requests; but gave him strong assurances that in case of foreign invasion, if we were satisfied that the Ameer had not acted aggressively beyond his Frontier, he might rest assured of help in time of need. Lord Mayo likewise pledged himself that we would never send British officers to reside in his country—a point which we shall see was of the utmost significance to the Afghans. Shere Ali returned to Afghanistan expressing himself on every occasion as highly pleased with his reception at Umballa. In 1872 Lord Northbrook became Viceroy of India, and shortly afterwards Ameer Shere Ali sent his Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Khan, to pay his respects and make certain representations to him. These consisted in the Ameer's desire for a reciprocal Treaty (as in Lord Mayo's time), and for the formal recognition of his son, Abdoolla Jan, as heir-apparent. Lord Northbrook, of course, did not accede to these requests, but gave him similar promises to those of Lord Mayo; the only addition to them being that troops were more specifically mentioned than before. This subject has excited especial interest, because it has been supposed that the Secretary of State for India, the Duke of Argyll, had not responded to the Viceroy on this point; but it is clear that this was not the case, for the Viceroy acted on his construction of the Secretary of State's telegram, which he understood as giving him the sanction for which he

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had asked. It may be said that from the time of Lord Ellen borough, in 1843, down to April, 1876, a period of 33 years (when Lord Northbrook returned to England), an uniform policy of peace and conciliation had been acted on with regard to Afghanistan. When any unreasonable demands were made they were firmly and quietly refused; on the other hand, if we wished to introduce changes which the Afghans objected to, our wishes were never pressed on them: and this policy was approved of by the Home Government. It is worthy of note that the two points, one of a personal Treaty with the Ameer of the day and his heirs, and the other of a reciprocal Treaty, have been, from 1855 to the time Lord Northbrook left India, subjects of the greatest interest to the different Ameers of Cabul. Sirdar Hyder Ali, in 1855, desired that the Treaty should be made with his father, Dost Mahomed, and himself as heir-apparent individually, and not as Rulers of Afghanistan; we did not comply with this, or the other request; explaining that our Treaties were simply to be made with the Rulers of Cabul, as such; and that in the matter of reciprocity, we could only give full assurance of help in time of need, did we approve of the Ameer's conduct. In one instance, to which I will now allude, the Home Government did not agree with Lord Northbrook. In 1875 the British Government desired to make a material change in the policy hitherto adopted towards the Rulers of Cabul. They desired the Viceroy to press upon Ameer. Shere Ali the reception of a Mission at Cabul as a temporary measure, with the view of urging him to agree to British officers being placed at different parts of his dominion, such as Balkh, Herat, and Candahar, and eventually, if possible, at Cabul. This change of policy was more than once pressed on the Viceroy—who, however, firmly resisted. He stated in one of his despatches that all the officers of standing and experience in the Punjab, and elsewhere, were of his opinion, and that no dissentient voice had been raised in his Council. When, however, Lord Northbrook gave up the Viceroyalty, instructions still more definite to the same purport were again issued; and several letters appear to have been sent to the Ameer which produced great irritation on his mind. It is known that
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three of the Governor General's Council—Sir William Muir, Sir Henry Norman, and Sir Arthur Hobhouse—strongly deprecated both the now Instructions and the way in which they were carried out; but, on the retirement from the Council of these gentlemen, no obstacle then remained to the pressure of this measure on the Ameer. Shere Ali was next asked to attend the Durbar on the 1st of January, 1877; but the invitation was declined—which is not surprising if it be borne in mind that he was an independent Ruler, and that his presence at the Durbar might have been construed as an admission of dependence; moreover, he could be ill-spared from his duties in his own country. Later on, the Ameer was requested by the Viceroy to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Cabul for a short time, to explain the views and wishes of his Excellency; he declined this also, but, after some hesitation, agreed to send down his confidential Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed, to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. The Syud was labouring under a severe form of disease, and came by slow stages from Cabul. On his arrival at Peshawur he was courteously received by Sir Lewis Pelly and Dr. Bellew. His first interview with the latter officer was of a very pathetic character. The Syud deplored the nature of the Viceroy's wishes, and concluded by saying—"Matters have now come to a crisis, and the situation is a grave one. This is a last opportunity for a settlement, and God only knows the future." Sir Lewis Pelly had received instructions to insist on the principle that British officers might be placed in Afghanistan, except, in the first instance, at Cabul; indeed, this condition was to be the basis of the Conference, and without its acceptance no other point was even to be discussed. The Syud entreated, again and again, that the matter might be postponed until later in the proceedings; but Sir Lewis Polly was inexorable, and the Conference consisted of a consideration of this single subject. The Syud, among other questions, was asked why the Ameer had refused a temporary Mission, and what were the misapprehensions which had led him to such a step? He evaded an answer as long as he could; but at last alluded to the settlement of the Seistan boundary, Lord Northbrook's intervention, on. be-

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half of Yakoob Khan, and other minor points. But it is evident from a perusal of the proceedings that the Envoy was on the defensive, and had no real desire to prefer any other complaint than the one under discussion—namely, the reception of British officers in Afghanistan, in which, the Syud said, the Ameer, the Chiefs, and the people were all of one mind, and were all in the highest degree alarmed at the idea of its being forced on them. Every other consideration appears to have been merged in this one anxiety, and to the last moment of the last day of the Conference the Syud refused to admit that the Ameer would ever accept such a measure. The Conference was obliged to end on account of Syud Nur Mahomed's illness; but a letter was sent him by Sir Lewis Pelly (under the Viceroy's directions) still demanding an answer on this point. But no answer was ever sent, for the Syud died without giving any consent to this cardinal condition. On the news of the Envoy's death the Viceroy directed that the Conference should be terminated, though it appeared that the Ameer was about to send down a second Envoy, who was authorized to submit to all the conditions demanded by the Viceroy, including the reception of the officers. The Native Agent who had represented the British Government at Cabul, and had accompanied the Envoy to Peshawur, was not allowed to return to Afghanistan, and the Viceroy sent no one to take his place; and so it came to pass that all diplomatic communications with the Ameer ceased, and the Government of India received no reliable information, but had to depend on the news picked up in the bazaars of Peshawur and elsewhere. But to return briefly to the Conference, the proceedings of which ought to be read, in order to realize fully the genuine feeling of alarm and apprehension that was expressed by the Syud in deprecating the sending of officers into his country. And another circumstance worthy of note is, that in these discussions the Envoy expressed himself as thoroughly satisfied with the manner in which Afghanistan had been treated in the days of Lord Northbrook, Lord Mayo, and myself. He seems to have looked back to the time when we governed India as one of assurance and security to the Ameer of Cabul. I would observe here, that the unsuccessful re-
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suit of the Mission to Candahar in 1857 was one of the reasons which led me to conclude that the time had not arrived for the Afghan Government to be required to accept our policy in this matter. Ameer Dost Mahomed had absolutely objected to receive British officers at Cabul; and though when relieved from this anxiety he had with seeming willingness agreed to their residence for a time at Candahar, yet they were not received with the consideration that ought to have been shown them. The officers chosen were Colonel H. Lumsden (Sir H. Lumsden), Lieutenant P. Lumsden (now Adjutant-General), and Dr. H. W. Bellow; none better, in every way, were to be found on the Frontier. I cannot trace in the Correspondence communications of any kind between the Ameer and Viceroy from March, 1877, to July, 1878. We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that it was during this period that the Ameer turned to Russia for help, and that those communications took place with her which led to negotiations with the Turkestan authorities, and finally to the Mission to Cabul. In July, 1878, the Ameer was called upon by the Viceroy to receive Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, and before an answer could arrive its advance guard was sent on to Ali Musjid, where it met with the rebuff which is one of the reasons of the present war. Telegrams of an exciting nature, describing the conduct of the Ameer's officer at Ali Musjid as violent and insulting, were sent to England, and are still officially uncontradicted. They contributed much to the anger of the people of England against the Ameer. On referring to the Afghan Correspondence two different versions of the mode in which the Mir Akhor received our Mission on the 21st of September will be found. Major Cavagnari, the head of the party, says distinctly, that though told he would be resisted by force if he proceeded, he was treated courteously from first to last. Colonel Jenkins states, however, that the Mir Akhor said that but for former friendship he would have fired on the party. As Major Cavagnari was the principal officer, we are justified in taking his account in preference to that of Colonel Jenkins. But be this as it may, the difference is not of much importance; for if the Mir Akhor believed that our

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Mission was about to force its way through the Pass, it was only natural that he should intimate that he was prepared to resist. Bearing in mind the rough character of the Afghans, the action of this officer at its worst was no more than a rebuff, which, for want of common prudence, our people had brought on themselves. We now come to the Ameer's answer to the Viceroy's letters, which constitutes the gravamen of the charge against him. It is very difficult in the absence of a copy of the exact expressions used by the Ameer in the original Persian to estimate fairly the importance to be placed on its contents; and this difficulty is increased, as we have neither of the four letters of the harshness of which the Ameer complains. However, taking the translation as it stands in the Correspondence, I declare as my deliberate opinion that the words therein used do not amount to an insult. The Ameer was clearly angry, and under great apprehensions when he wrote. His answer is evasive, and to a certain extent, perhaps, defiant; but as little so as could be expected consistently with a resolution to resist receiving the Mission. He also complains of discourteous and inconsiderate treatment on the part of the British Government; and it would be well for us not to forget the provocations which in many instances he had received from us, if we wish to judge justly in this matter. The so-called affront from the Ameer was certainly not one that deserved to be wiped out in blood. I see in the Correspondence in August of this year that the Governor General telegraphed that "the safety of India depended" on our establishing a preponderating influence in Afghanistan, and to that end would insist on the reception of British officers into that country; and, this condition being accepted by the Secretary of State for India, we have been plunged into the present war. It is my firm and unbiassed opinion that the war now raging in Afghanistan is a most unjust one, and that its political consequences will be exceedingly damaging to us. We have already been victorious in the fight; but in the minds of most educated Natives in India the war will be considered—and considered rightly—as an oppressive and high-handed proceeding. It is vain for us to say that the war is with the Ameer and not with his people;
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they will be one in their desire to resist our aggression. All the good results of the policy of more than 30 years have been cast to the winds, and the suspicions and enmity of the Afghan nation have been revived with four-fold intensity. Thus have we played the game of Russia; for rest assured that, if the day should ever come when Afghan influence would be of any value, it will to a certainty be thrown in the balance against us, and we shall have nothing to blame for such results except our own folly and injustice. Now as to our present action. In my opinion, the war ought to be brought to as speedy a conclusion as can with honour be done—the victorious party in a conquest has never any real difficulty in treating with the vanquished. I would exact nothing from the Afghans. I would take no territory from them on any pretext whatever. I would arrange that bygones should be bygones. I would place no British officer in their territory. If they were willing to make a friendly and reasonable Treaty with us I would meet their wishes (still, of course, adhering to the old principles of refusing to bind ourselves absolutely to defend and protect them). I would give them the strongest assurances, provided we were satisfied with their conduct, of help in case of foreign invasion. I would agree, on the same conditions, to give them periodical grants of money—not as a regular subsidy; for by keeping the power of giving or withholding in our own hands our hold over them becomes stronger. The Ameer is very poor; his revenues are small, and the legitimate expenses of maintaining his Government are very considerable. He has never had sufficient means at his command to pay his troops, whose allowances are scanty and always some months in arrear. I have said that I would take no territory from the Afghans; neither would I extend our North-West Frontier over what are called the independent Border Tribes; in every respect we are much better without them than with them. If we annex any of them—more especially those of the Pathan race—we shall sooner or later be forced to subjugate them, disarm them, and keep them down. This would necessitate a considerable addition to our Native Army, and, for political reasons, to our European force also; the consequent increase of expenditure would be a great drain on

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our resources. We might with advantage give some of these tribes moderate retaining fees, and employ more of them than at present as levies on the border; we might establish posts of small size in suitable positions in the Khyber Pass, to be held by them. Should a day of invasion ever come, we shall have ample time to make such preparations with them as circumstances may suggest, and having respected their independence, and treated them kindly but firmly, we should have some reason for calculating on their assistance. They would, with a few English and Native officers to look after them (not to drill them), make good guerilla troops wherewith to annoy the flanks and rear of an invading enemy. With the consent of these tribes, field-works might then be constructed within the mountains, our own forces would be ready in the plains and valleys east of the Passes, and would be near their true base, the sea-coast of Scinde, and would be able to concentrate rapidly at any point by means of our lateral communications. We could keep a considerable portion of our European troops in the adjacent hills in the rear, or in the most healthy parts of the plains, until they were wanted; and then, when the enemy appeared, we should be able to array against him an army, European and Native, fresh and well-found, which would prove irresistible. Now, as regards the present Motion. Of course, in the first instance, the Revenues of India must defray the expenditure; but England alone ought to bear all the costs of the war, as a matter of justice. Unless this be done the general feeling in India will be one of indignation and despair—particularly if additional taxation is laid on an already burdened people. If we borrow the money we shall add indefinitely to the financial difficulties of India, and when troublous times come shall be proportionately over weighted. One word, before I sit down, as to another point. What is the cause of the mystery and secrecy with which everything of importance to India is carried on, both by the Government there and by the Secretary of State for India in England? In 1877 the Duke of Argyll and other noble Lords endeavoured, in this House, to find out if there was any important change in the policy towards Afghanistan. An answer in the negative was given to all our in-
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quiries. We now know, as we then surmised, that the policy which has since brought on the war was being vigorously pursued. The Correspondence also recently published is not compiled in an impartial spirit, for there are many omissions which, were they filled up, would show strong reasons against the course pursued by the Government; for instance, not a word is said of three dissentient opinions in the Governor General's Council to the present policy. Those omissions have led to much of the public anxiety, and ought to be at once remedied. Again, the mode in which affairs are at present conducted in the India Office requires immediate reform. Criticisms which Councillors desire to make are not allowed to appear—it is always too soon or too late. If they are eventually published, the time has passed in [which they might have done good. Whilst maintaining the authority of the Secretary of State, the Councillors should have perfect freedom to make known their opinions; and the people of England would then have some chance of benefiting by their knowledge and experience, and of seeing for themselves in some degree how matters were going on in India. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India, in order to disparage the weight of my opinion on the present war, has alluded to a proposal made by me in the Mutiny, to give up the Peshawur Valley and retire across the Indus; and no doubt the noble Earl, in moving the Address to Her Majesty's Speech, on the 5th instant, had the same object in view when he made a similar allusion. I have hitherto been unwilling to refer to what actually occurred in 1857, because to do so satisfactorily would have necessitated my bringing to light the state of things which induced me to entertain this idea. I will only point out now that the proposal was prospective and conditional, subject to a state of things which might have occurred, and which was likely to occur. If ever openly and fairly challenged, I shall be prepared to show grounds for the line on which I then intended to act. Sir Herbert Edwardes concluded, by mistake, that I had decided to abandon Peshawur at once; but this was not the case; I, in the first instance, only wished that preparations should be made, by the withdrawal of the English women and children to a place of se-

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curity—cis-Indus; so that, should the necessity arise which I had anticipated, our soldiers might be free and untrammelled. In 1858, after all danger from the effects of the Mutiny had passed from the Punjab, I discussed this question with Sir Herbert Edwardes and Sir Neville Chamberlain, when the latter officer expressed an opinion that, under the circumstances in which I had proposed to act, he thought I had resolved advisedly; that had the force before Delhi been compelled to give up the siege and fall back, we could not have continued to hold Peshawur. My views may not have been correct, and Sir Herbert Edwardes's may have been the right judgment; but while he only knew how we stood at Peshawur, I was behind the scenes and knew also the state of things at Delhi. Sir Neville Chamberlain had this advantage also; for he had barely left Peshawur a month or six weeks when I made the suggestion now under consideration to Sir Herbert Edwardes—and he was subsequently Adjutant General of the troops before Delhi. Whatever may be the views of impartial men on this subject, on knowing all the circumstances which in 1857 beset our position in the North-West of India, it was solely the desire of economising our English troops, and thus to enable them to be used in the most effective way in stemming the tide of misfortune which surrounded us, that led me to advocate the abandonment of Peshawur; and as for those who use the resolution I then formed with the object of damaging my reputation, I can only regard their conduct with feelings strongly akin to contempt.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I do not intend to follow the noble Lord (Lord Lawrence), who has so extensive and so practical a knowledge of the question of Afghanistan in all its phases, nor the noble Viscount who moved the Amendment, nor the Secretary of State for India, in the able and exhaustive accounts which, from their respective points of view, they have given of the question now before us. I rise not very willingly, and I shall not trouble your Lordships long; but having been concerned in some of the earlier stages of these transactions, and standing in the unfortunate position of finding myself unable, on the one hand, to support the Resolution of the Government, and, on the other
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hand, unable to agree with a large part of the arguments adduced by a majority of those who oppose it—believing, as I do, that the policy of the Government in 1876 was sound and defensible, but that the proceedings in 1878 are not such as this House ought to support—standing in that isolated and unfortunate position, I do not feel it consistent with my duty to give a silent and unexplained vote. The Secretary of State for India commenced by taking credit, on behalf of the Government of which he is a Member, for having called Parliament together at the earliest convenient date. He had a perfect right to do so; and that, probably, is the only part of these transactions on which the opinion of your Lordships will be unanimous. I think, however, it is impossible not to feel that there is something unreal and unsatisfactory in the state of things with which we have to deal. We are discussing—and we know we are discussing—an issue over which we have no real or practical influence. When a war is begun, to withhold Supplies which are necessary to carry it on, and thereby to expose a British Army in the field to disaster and defeat, is a course outside the limits of what is allowable or possible. We are, therefore, placed in this position—we are bound to support in action a policy which in opinion we may wholly disapprove. The other evening the noble Duke who sits on the Opposition benches (the Duke of Somerset) made a sarcastic comment on the speech of a noble Earl then sitting below him (Earl Granville), because that noble Earl, while disapproving the general policy of the war, yet expressed a hope that nothing would be left undone to press it to a conclusion. Well, that is the sort of language which a great many others of us are holding. It is an inconsistency if you will; but an inconsistency which is forced upon us by the peculiar position in which Parliament is placed. And, my Lords, it is not only to the case of a war that this practical helplessness of Parliament extends. Take the case of a concluded Treaty. If the Government has pledged the faith of the nation to this, that, or the other—no matter how imprudently—we are asked, how is it possible for us to repudiate an obligation undertaken in the face of Europe? My Lords, let me say, in passing, that

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any remarks I may make on this subject are not meant by way of censure upon the Government. They have acted simply in accordance with many precedents. I do not contend that the Government have exceeded Constitutional limits, nor do I even affirm that they have strained them; but I do hold that a country professing to be self-governed, and which supposes at least that it manages its own affairs, is in a very peculiar position when twice in the same year Parliament—once in July and again in December—is called upon to consider decisions of national importance—decisions which may affect the future of the country for many years—those decisions having been taken on the responsibility of the Executive Government without a possibility of any Parliamentary opinion—or, indeed, any opinion at all—being previously expressed upon them—thus rendering all criticism merely retrospective and historical in its character. Most of us believe that before long the nation is to be consulted as to the policy it will sanction. When that time arrives there will be a question to be asked and answered—a question quite apart from Party politics—Can a country be said to be really self-governed which may at any moment find itself engaged in a European or an Asiatic war—not necessarily a defensive war—or which may be committed to some engagement, inevitably involving war in the future; the decision in each case having been taken without anyone knowing anything of it outside the small number of persons who constitute the Cabinet of the day? I do not think it is any answer to say—"You have Ministerial responsibility." What does Ministerial responsibility mean? We all know it means that if a majority of the electors disapprove what has been done, the Government is changed, and the power will pass from one set of men to another. But that result is not a remedy. It does not get us out of the quarrel in which we have been involved, nor does it disengage us from the obligations which we may have hastily and rashly incurred. This question, my Lords, is one upon which I will say no more, but which I think you will find become more and more prominent. My Lords, there has been a great deal of controversy, and much has been said and written
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by members of the two political Parties, as to which Administration must bear the responsibility of having originally alienated the Ameer from us. My Lords, I have examined the Papers; I have read most of what has been written on this subject: and the only conclusion to which I can come is, that it would be utterly impossible, and that even if it were possible it would be utterly useless, to try to single out any one special and exclusive cause for that feeling of jealousy and distrust on his part with which we have undoubtedly to deal. I believe the mischief may be traced back in its origin to a cause for which no one now living is responsible—to the first Afghan War. Everybody now admits that war to have been a folly, and there are a good many who think it a crime. To us it is now mere matter of history—it has almost faded from our memories. But we cannot expect that it shall have equally passed from the recollection of those who suffered from it. The Afghan Rulers and the Afghan people probably know very little of any change of opinion which may have taken place here. What they do know is this—that in the memory of living men their country was invaded by a British Army without cause or provocation; that it was occupied for a considerable time; and that when at last evacuated, its evacuation was accompanied by severities not usual in English war. It seems to me, therefore, that if we were in the position of the Afghan Chief, or of those about him, we should be disposed to look with considerable suspicion and distrust on the proceedings of neighbours who had these antecedents. It may be argued, no doubt, that in 1855 the quarrel was made up and a Treaty signed between the Indian and the Afghan Governments, which was in force up to the late declaration of war. But on looking at that Treaty the other day, it struck me—as it struck the noble Earl who moved the Address the other night—that it was not altogether a satisfactory Treaty to one of the parties concerned. The Treaty consists of three Articles. The first is a declaration of perpetual peace and friendship. The second is a declaration that we will respect the Ameer's territories, and not interfere therein. The third gives the same pledge on behalf of the Ameer, with the important addition that he

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agrees to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies. That amounted to an alliance offensive and defensive with us on the part of the Ameer, while we on our part incurred no corresponding obligation. I know that a few years later it was modified, as the Secretary of State for India said, for a temporary purpose; but this Treaty at least helps to explain why the present Ameer, who succeeded to those obligations, should have assumed towards us that very peculiar tone which is observable in his correspondence—the tone, not exactly of a friend, nor exactly of an enemy, but of a man who feels himself ill-used and has a grievance. I will not go through the history of our past relations with the Ameer. As far as I can judge, the root of the misunderstanding between us and him appears to have been this—that while we offered him occasional help in money and arms and promised him a certain support in his difficulties, the kind of support which he has asked us for, and at various times has endeavoured to obtain, was such as with our ideas of responsibility it would have been impossible for any English Ministry to give. He wanted a pledge that his dynasty should be supported by us against all rivals. The Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook), in referring to that subject to-night, seemed to treat that claim of the Ameer as not altogether unreasonable, and to contend that he had some cause of complaint against us, because we only recognised him as de facto Ruler of a part of his country, and also recognized another Prince who held certain other districts. My answer is, that the Ameer appears to have required from us that which would necessarily have involved our continual interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, and possibly the employment of British troops to put down insurrection against him. The granting of his request would have led to the exercise of constant control over his acts; because if we were to be bound to give him support, we must have taken care that he did not abuse his power. No concession of that sort could, therefore, reasonably have been made. No doubt other questions had their influence—such as the Seistan arbitration and some minor matters—which it is not worth while to mention; but I think that to which I have ad-
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verted was the principal grievance of the Ameer, and the one which raised the strongest feeling of resentment in his mind. Well, in 1873 came the Russian advance on Khiva. The Ameer was naturally alarmed, and a long series of communications passed between him and the Indian Government. What I understand the Ameer to have then wanted from us was an unconditional guarantee of protection from external attack, he making no stipulation in return. The British Government was willing to give him assurances of protection if he was attacked without provocation, such protection to be conditional on his placing himself in our hands. The difference between what was asked for and what was promised appears to have mainly, if not entirely, turned on the conditions upon which the protection should be afforded; and I am bound to say, from a study of these Papers, that I do not draw the conclusion that there is a very marked difference in the attitude of the Ameer to the British Government, before and after these transactions. He is represented to have been jealous, suspicious, and mistrustful after what took place in 1873; but it appears to me that he was jealous, suspicious, and mistrustful before that date, and that there is no apparent change in that respect. Well, in 1874 the present Government came into Office. I am not careful to argue the question of how far, and how soon, they diverged from the policy of their Predecessors. I do not think the divergence was very marked in the first year, because I myself had, early in that year, to state the views of the Cabinet on the subject; and I did so after consultation with the then Secretary of State for India. What I said is on record; and I do not see in it any marked difference from the recorded opinions of the India Office in the preceding year. No doubt, later on, steps of a different kind were taken. But is it necessary to assume, as a matter of course, that either the policy that prevailed before 1873, or the policy that prevailed after that date, must necessarily have been erroneous because they may have differed? My Lords, I do not take that view. I say that you must allow for the lapse of time and for the change of circumstances. You must admit that the establishment and consolidation of Russian power in Cen-

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tral Asia introduce a new element into the question. It may have been wise and right—I believe it was—to have taken precautions after that event, which before its occurrence would have been premature, and possibly mischievous. What were the steps then taken? One of them—the occupation of Quetta—was recommended by various considerations of local security; it violated no right of the Afghan Government; and we had a Treaty right to take it, although it may, no doubt, have tended—and I am afraid it did tend—to increase the irritation and the jealousy of the Ameer. That was no sufficient reason for not taking it; but the feeling is intelligible, and I think its existence, and the cause of it, ought to have been borne in mind when we dealt with him as we have done in the last few months. Then came the attempt to place Agents at Herat and Candahar. My Lords, whatever the result may have been, I am bound to say that in that attempt, so long as nothing more was done to press it than the making of friendly representations, I see nothing that, in principle, was open to objection. It was, and is, eminently desirable that we should know what is passing in Afghanistan. The geographical position of that country, the conditional protection which we had promised, and which, whether we had promised it or not, we could not help giving, in case of foreign attack;—the very fact of the suspicion and distrust with which we were met, were all reasons to make it desirable to render our relations with the Ameer more close and intimate. I think, therefore, the Government was quite right in making the attempt. But, obviously, it was one which had to be made cautiously and temperately. Every Asiatic Prince knows how an English Resident, once stationed in his dominions, is apt to acquire influence, and sooner or later to become his virtual master. Moreover, an Agent who is imposed by force on a Prince who is unwilling to receive him is in a position essentially and thoroughly false. He may be treated with all the outward marks of courtesy and respect, and yet he may be allowed to see and know little of what goes on, and without a word said or a thing done on which a quarrel can be fixed, he may be shown, in a hundred ways, that he is neither wanted nor trusted. I hold, there-
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fore, two things to be proved. First of all, that in the circumstances of 1874 it was desirable to establish English Agents in Afghanistan if it could be done by friendly means; and, next, that if it were done by other than friendly pressure—by force, or by pressure equivalent to force—it would fail in the very object which we had in view. In 1876 I held office, and, though not personally cognizant of the details of Indian Frontier diplomacy—for other matters pressed heavily at that date—I, of course, accept fully the responsibility for what was done. I do not think that the Instructions then given to the Indian Government conflict with anything that I have put before your Lordships, or tended to bring about the war in which we are now engaged. The negotiations which were attempted failed and the result was reported home, and the Secretary of State commented on them in due course. The despatch appears in the Blue Book. The substance of it is, that the negotiations showed that the Ameer now knew clearly what we wanted, and might be left to reflect for a time on the knowledge he had acquired, and that it was not desirable to put pressure on him in a hostile sense. The despatch of October 4, 1877, says—
"The independence of Afghanistan is a matter of importance to the British Government, and, as an essential part of arrangements for its protection, Her Majesty's Government would still he glad to station Agents upon whom they could rely at Herat and Candahar. In the event, therefore, of the Ameer, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your Excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by him, his advances should not be rejected. If, on the other hand, he continues to maintain an attitude of isolation and scarcely veiled hostility, the British Government stands unpledged to any obligations, and, in any contingencies which may arise in Afghanistan, will be at liberty to adopt such measures for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-West Frontier of Her Majesty's Indian dominions as the circumstances of the moment may render expedient, without regard to the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali or the interests of his dynasty."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 224.]
No doubt, the last sentence is open to various constructions; but, taking the despatch as a whole, I think there is nothing in it to which anyone can reasonably object. It appears to be a fair view of the situation temperately stated; and I believe that if subsequent

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despatches had been conceived in a similar spirit we should not now find ourselves in our present position. What was the situation, then, at the end of 1877? We were on terms of coldness and estrangement from the Ameer, but not of actual hostility. He distrusted us. He was afraid of us. He thought he had reason to complain of some things we had done and of other things we had not done; but, my Lords, there is nothing to show that he loved Russia any better than he loved us. It was not in the nature of the case that he should. Considering what had happened in Khiva and Bokhara, it is simply impossible to believe that he really wished well to the Russian cause, or desired the success of the Russian armies. Well, then, at last, when a Russian Mission went to Cabul, why did he receive it? Surely the answer is plain—he did not dare to do anything else. We must remember that he was the head of a feeble State, scarcely master of his own dominions; that he was constantly liable to be held responsible for the actions of tribes over whom he had little control—that he felt himself placed between two aggressive military Empires—for we have been aggressive in India. He was not upon friendly terms with us; he knew that he had offended us; and he probably thought that if he offended Russia as well, he would have made two enemies instead of one. And so—very unwisely as the result has shown, quite unjustifiably considering the agreement by which he had bound himself to us, but still in circumstances, of very strong pressure and very great temptation—he took this unfortunate step of receiving the Russian Envoy. Well, my Lords, what, in the circumstances, ought we to have done? I do not contend for a moment that we ought to have allowed the attitude taken by the Ameer to be permanently maintained; but to hold him primarily responsible for what had passed I think was a very harsh mode of dealing with him. No doubt, he had broken his agreement with us. But had no one else broken an agreement with us? Had Russia held to the undertaking she had given? Has not Russia pledged herself, again and again, not to interfere in Afghanistan? And what was the language we held to her? It was courteous; it was friendly. It was a remonstrance, no doubt;
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but a remonstrance framed in the most amicable terms, expressing a hope that the Mission to Cabul would be at once withdrawn, but making no grievance of its having been sent. I am not here, my Lords, to find fault with either the substance or the style of that document. I think the Government were right in holding the language they did. But we all know that the question which has arisen is the result of the strained relations which existed between the two Governments during the present year. In this country military men freely speculated upon the possibility of our attacking the Asiatic possessions of Russia from India; and I have no doubt Russians speculated equally on the possibility of at least disturbing our Indian Empire by an expedition sent from the North. If such a war had broken out the combatants must have passed through the dominions of the Ameer. The Mission was, therefore, a preparation for war; it was a counter-move to our despatch of Indian troops to Malta. But when the questions which arose were settled at Berlin, the object of the Mission to Cabul ceased; and, in the circumstances, I think the Government were quite justified in simply requesting its withdrawal, and not making a grievance of its having been sent. But what I cannot understand is, why the two parties concerned in this transaction are to be dealt with in so entirely opposite a spirit. Surely, if an offence had been committed against us, Russia was the greater offender of the two; and if reasons of prudence and policy, against which I have not a word to say—which, on the contrary, I altogether uphold—made us determine to condone the offence on the part of Russia, I ask whether simple justice ought not to have led us to deal in a like manner with the party who was immeasurably the less guilty of the two? But we turn round upon the Ameer, saying—"You are in our power; whatever Russia may have done, we cannot reach her—but we can deal with you, and you must pay the penalty for both." Well, my Lords, on the Russian part of the question I shall not say another word—the answer of the Russian Government is vague enough—but when we are told by them that their Mission was of a "provisional" nature, and was one of simple courtesy, I presume we are to

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read the word "provisional" as "merely temporary," and that we may take it, if not as a pledge, at least as an intimation, that in a very short time the Mission will he removed. But look, my Lords, at the position of the Ameer. I do not myself think that there is any great advantage in forcing a Resident upon a Prince unwilling to receive him, however desirable it may be that he should receive him even in his own interest. But if we thought otherwise, look how entirely the matter was in our own hands. We had a claim upon him such as we never had before. We could now say—"You have received a Mission from Russia; in justice and fairness you cannot do less for us." Suppose, my Lords, that we had held that language and given him time to consider it. The Ameer is no fool. He may be irritable and suspicious; but no one who reads the letters of his which are interspersed in the Correspondence will say that he is not a capable and able man. He knows quite well that he cannot fight the British Empire by himself; and if he had received a warning couched in proper terms, is it likely he would have resisted? Probably he would, in the first instance, have consulted his Russian friends. He would have gone to them and said—"A demand has been made upon me. I am threatened with war if I refuse compliance. Do you mean to stand by me or not?" We know perfectly well the answer they must have given—certainly they did not intend to fight for the Ameer, and they must have told him so. Then, disappointed in the hope of foreign help, which he undoubtedly entertained, and knowing perfectly well his own weakness—knowing, too, that by his own act he had placed himself in a false position—is it credible that he would have resisted? Would he not, on the contrary, have embraced the opportunity for effecting a reconciliation, if freely and frankly offered? Of course, I may be told that the Russian Agent would have given advice in the contrary sense to what the Ameer supposed, and so have encouraged him to persevere. I do not believe it; and I will tell your Lordships why. It cannot be imagined that Russia would have promised to stand by the Ameer, and then when the occasion arose have deserted him. Nothing could be more disastrous to the
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influence of Russia than such a course. And, therefore, I say that she would not have given such advice. She would not have urged the Ameer to resist if she did not mean to support him. She would, on the contrary, have advised him to give way, making the best terms he could. But instead of friendly overtures being sent, what happened? The Viceroy telegraphed on the 2nd of August that "the present situation required immediate correction;" that he proposes to insist on the reception of a British Mission; that the Ameer would probably welcome it—if he believed that after all that had passed, it says more for his poetical imagination, of which we heard the other night, than for the shrewdness with which he has also been credited—and he adds, what is more likely, that the Ameer was well aware that we were in a position to enforce our demands. The Government, in reply, approve of his insisting on the reception; but they appear to have left all details to the Viceroy. And here comes the extraordinary part of the transaction. Anybody would expect, if merely as a matter of form and courtesy, that when this question of receiving a British Mission had been for years in dispute, even if it was meant ultimately, and in case of need, to enforce the demand, at least that notice would have been given of the intention sufficient to admit of correspondence on the subject; so that the Ameer, while yielding, in reality, to pressure, should at least seem to exercise his option as the Sovereign of a free State. But the Viceroy gives him no such notice. He appears bent, not merely on forcing the Mission on the Ameer, but on making all India see that he did so force it. He does not leave him the semblance of an option. He selects his Envoy—a very distinguished officer—surrounds him with an escort of 250 men, makes the fact public to all the world, and sends him to the Frontier to demand admission at once. What is, then, the situation of the Ameer? If he admits him, he makes it plain to his own people that he is yielding to coercion. If he refuses, it is war. Surely it might have occurred to the Viceroy that a high-spirited Chief—the head of a warlike race—could not afford to be humiliated, and might prefer to die fighting. If the object were to pick a quarrel—which I

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do not impute—then, and only then, the measures taken were well suited for their purpose. We have heard it said in this House by the Secretary of State, and it has been said out-of-doors—and I think the worst enemies and severest critics of the British Empire in India have never said anything so disparaging—that we could not afford to give a little time for reflection and re-consideration to a Prince who had put himself in the wrong. We, the rulers of the great Empire of India, could not afford to give an Afghan Potentate a little time for consideration, lest the people of India should jump to the conclusion that we were actuated by fear of his military power! I do not contend that this is a war undertaken on our part wholly without provocation. I do not for a moment deny that the Ameer has deprived himself, by his own acts, of the sympathy which we might otherwise have entertained for a Prince in his position. But it is a war which, if there had been any real wish at Simla to avoid it, might have been avoided. You might have had your Mission received at Cabul, and you might have had "peace with honour." But in that case there would have been no chance of what is believed in some quarters to be so desirable—the rectification of an inconvenient Frontier. I hope that that question is not at the bottom of a good deal of these transactions. It is a very old saying—and one which applies to Governments as well as individuals—that when they adopt confiscation as a means of punishment they are very apt to end by punishing as a means of confiscation. But even from the point of view of an advanced or rectified Frontier, I doubt the expediency of this war. It will be very easy for us to overrun and conquer Afghanistan; but what is to come next? To make the Ameer refrain from intriguing with Russia or putting himself under Russian influence is a perfectly fair and reasonable object; but are we likely to secure the confidence and friendship of the Ameer by a march upon Cabul? Probably, if we could ascertain the real feeling of the Ameer we should find it to be one of very impartial dislike, both of the Russians and of us. Now, if we are to establish ourselves at Jellalabad, as has been suggested, while the Russians are hundreds of miles away,
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it needs no great acuteness to see that we, being nearer, shall be the more cordially detested of the two. That is on the supposition that it is intended to leave the Ameer his independence, together with the greater part of his territory. The net result of the war in that case would be that we should be a little more feared and a good deal more disliked than hitherto. If, on the other hand, Afghanistan is to be subdued as well as overrun—and recollect it is not always in your power to stop the war at the precise moment you please, because despair does not reason, and men often fight on when there is no hope of ultimate success—the undertaking will be one of a very serious character. There is not a more difficult country in the world than Afghanistan. It is a complicated mass of mountain ranges, inhabited by warlike tribes constantly at feud with one another, but always ready to unite against a foreign enemy. They do not care for or value peace. They are quite willing to tolerate anarchy, but they will not endure servitude. That we can hold Afghanistan I do not doubt; but the question is, whether we should not hold it at an expenditure of money which, if otherwise applied, would secure to us the goodwill of every Afghan Chief for many years to come? I have only one word to add on the financial aspect of the question. I must confess I heard with some surprise the statement of the Secretary of State for India as to the cost of the campaign. Of course, I speak with respect, and with every wish to accept as conclusive the estimate formed by those most competent to give it; but I remember—and the Secretary of State for India must remember—our last experience of a little war. The cost of the Abyssinian War, it was hoped, would be £2,000,000 or £3,000,000; but it turned out to be not much less than £9,000,000. I hope the same will not be the case now; but if the anticipations of the Government with regard to the present campaign are realized, it will be the cheapest campaign ever undertaken. In connection with this subject I must say I look with some alarm on the present and prospective condition of the finances of India. In my opinion, the danger to our Empire comes from that quarter much more than from any foreign intrigue or threat of invasion. Look at the state

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of things in that respect. You have there a population of 200,000,000 of people, all except a very few of whom are practically trying the experiment on how little food it is possible to keep body and soul together. The great bulk of the people consume nothing but necessaries, and it is on these necessaries that new taxation must fall, because there is nothing else to tax. The Revenue is far from having the elasticity which belongs to our home Revenue in normal times. You have a standing increase of Debt—I do not say from year to year, but from 10 years to 10 years; you have had an enormous increase of expenditure during the 20 years that have elapsed since the East India Company was done away with; you have a people on whom you do not know how to lay fresh burdens to any considerable extent. And, my Lords, this is not all. The Secretary of State for India referred with peculiar satisfaction to the flourishing condition of one part of the Revenue—that derived from opium. Now, that is exactly the most precarious of the whole. Once let the Chinese people take to growing their own opium, or let the Chinese Government make an earnest attempt to put down its importation—public opinion certainly would not allow us to make a second opium war—and by the cessation of that one branch of Revenue there would be at once £6,000,000 or £7,000,000 struck off the Indian Revenue—a loss which could not be replaced, and which would lead not merely to embarrassment, but to insolvency. My Lords, I do not ask you to accept the, it may be rather despondent, views I hold on that point. I only ask you to remember that the financial position of India is grave. If we are to encounter danger, I believe there is less to be apprehended from beyond our Frontier than from the discontent which would ensue upon a greatly enhanced taxation. The burden is already heavy; and what would happen should any unfortunate combination of circumstances require it to be increased? But that is a matter I only touch in passing. On the question before us I have come to the conclusion which I have endeavoured to express. I see nothing to condemn in the policy of 1876—on the contrary, I should have been ready to defend it were defence from me neces-
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sary. But with the Russian Mission matters took a new turn. I repeat it; I do not contend that there has been no provocation; but I cannot but believe that the Viceroy and his advisers have precipitated a war which, by a little more patience and forbearance, might have been avoided. And if I am to express my opinion upon the matter in a word I would say that, in my judgment, this war on which we have entered is unnecessary, and that, being unnecessary, it cannot be either wise or just.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he could not agree with the noble Earl who had just spoken (the Earl of Derby) that their vote could not possibly have any effect on the policy of the Government, for the Amendment must be viewed in connection with a Motion which was made in the other House, and he could not look upon the two as anything but an attempt to displace the Ministry. He had been in Parliament, in one House or the other, for 40 years, and he had known many attacks made by the Opposition on existing Governments; but he did not remember one occasion on which the usual arrangements for the consultation of the Party had led to the proposing of such a Resolution as this Amendment. The noble Lord who moved the Amendment did not care to call his Party together; but it seemed that a few noble Lords must have met in a closet and settled on the Amendment. For what did the Resolution imply? It spoke of bringing the war in which we were engaged to "a safe and honourable conclusion;" and what he complained of was that the opponents of the Government went with one voice to the country and came to this House with another. They excited the country by saying that the war was contrary to all the precepts of morality and all the principles of religion; and yet they came to this House and talked of bringing it to "a safe and honourable conclusion." Of course, the Government wish for nothing else but to bring it to a safe and honourable conclusion; they did not want the assistance of the Opposition to do that. As to the question on which so much discussion had been raised—Who caused the war? the Opposition referred to the taking of Quetta and to the domineering style of Lord Lytton to the

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Ameer, as having been the causes of the war. But that morning they had seen the Ameer's own opinions, and it was that some of our Viceroys had entered into a family quarrel, and had given him some advice and lectured him about his conduct towards his son, Yakoob Khan, who was heir-apparent and a very promising youth. He had murdered with his own hand one or two people, including the Commander-in-Chief, and he was the terror of the country. The Ameer had induced him to visit Cabul, and then, in true Afghan style, took hold of his promising relation, and kept him prisoner at Cabul; and then his followers became indignant, and made a great disturbance in the country. Complaint had been made of the manner in which he condemned the conduct of the noble Lord (Lord Lawrence) in reference to the agitation in this country. He did not wish to have used a discourteous word, for he appreciated the great services of that noble Lord; and, looking at the report of his speech next day, he could not find that he had used a word which should have given offence. He praised the noble Lord for his former conduct in reference to his administration of Indian affairs; but he regretted the course his noble Friend had taken in reference to the affairs of Afghanistan. He felt that he had as much right to express condemnation as to express approbation. Then they were told that the present Government had caused all this disturbance in the minds of the Ameer and his people. The Afghan Papers did not justify that assertion. Those Papers showed that in 1875, in 1873, and before that, the Ameer was only looking to see where he could make the best bargain. He said he must be supported on one side or the other; he wanted to be supported by us or by Russia; he was determined to get some support, for he could not stand alone; and, in the meantime, Russia had advanced to Khiva. What was the good of saying that the Government had departed from the policy of former Viceroys? Circumstances had altered, and we must adapt our policy to those altered circumstances. It was clear enough from the Papers that, when we brought the Indian troops to Malta, Russia regarded that as a menace, and moved towards Cabul and Merv as a counter menace; and that had opened the eyes
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of the country to the dangers by which we were threatened. The question was how that danger was to be met? He was aware, from having heard the Frontier question discussed 40 years ago, that it was one surrounded with enormous difficulties. We must have a safe Frontier. It was of no use saying it would cost a great deal of money. No doubt it would; but was not India worth it? Could India be constantly threatened? We had a duty to its people, and that duty was to protect them. These wide dominions were obtained very often by stratagem and violence; we had to compensate the people of India for former wrong; and the best way was to give them tranquillity and peace. We had done that to a great extent, and he believed we had governed the country to its great advantage. We relieved them in their famines; we continually prevented war within their borders; and we had a further duty, which was to protect them against war from without their border. For these reasons he could not support the Amendment, which did no credit to the noble Lord who had moved it.
THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I shall only detain the House a few minutes. The question on which we have to vote divides itself into two parts, one being the financial, the other the general policy which has resulted in this war. Of finance I will say no more than to express my hearty concurrence in every word that fell from my noble Friend on the cross-benches (the Earl of Derby). The general policy is the real question on which the vote will be taken; and I do not disguise from myself that this vote takes the form of a condemnation of the policy pursued by the Government of which I have been a Member. I hope your Lordships will believe that I am extremely reluctant to join in a vote condemning the policy of those with whom only a year ago I acted as a Colleague, and that I would most gladly, if it were possible, avoid the necessity; but it is not possible. At the same time, as it seems to me, under the circumstances, to be unnecessary and painful to discuss in full the details which lead to such a conclusion, I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I venture for once to give the conclusions at which I have arrived without stating the reasons by which I am quite ready to jus-

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tify them. They are conclusions which have been arrived at as the result of much thought. I cannot, then, in the first place, reconcile this war with any notions or ideas of justice. Adopting the distinction between the policy pursued before 1876 and afterwards, I think the policy which led to the war was erroneous, and that the policy which is the object of that war is unsound, dangerous, and delusive. I believe the expense will be very much larger than the present estimate. I doubt very much what is said about the rectification of Frontier, when I find military authorities differing so largely about it. I hate the word rectification; it seems to me to savour of some of the worst traditions of the worst periods of the French Empire—it is a word borrowed from an evil school; it is a word which has been too often used to conceal wrong and robbery, and that system of stratagem and violence which, to my astonishment, my noble Friend opposite (the Duke of Somerset) just now seemed to eulogize, and against which I, for one, must with my whole strength protest. If wrong and robbery had been the foundation of our Indian Empire, I should look back with shame instead of pride upon those who founded it. To sum up, then, my principal objections to the policy which has been pursued—first, I think the morality and character of the country has been lowered by the recent transactions; and next, with regard to India, for the policy which has so long been adopted by successive Governors General, and which has already borne no insignificant fruit, you have substituted one which is sown with the seeds of hatred, distrust, and future foreign difficulties. It has taken the lifetime of a generation to' efface from the Native mind the recollections of the former Afghan War—these transactions will inevitably revive them. And what is the policy you have substituted? I admit it is a showy, an ambitious, and, to many people, an attractive policy; but I believe it has neither substance nor reality, and sooner or later—probably soon rather than late—it must issue in disappointment and failure. It is at variance with the promises originally given to the Ameer; it is at variance with the patient, and conciliatory, and consistent policy which Lord Mayo pursued; and the only compensating
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merit I can discover in it is that it is an open—I think a cynical exhibition of power, which for a time may have, if successful, an effect on the wavering dispositions and doubtful allegiance of Native Governments. But even this is very uncertain. I have but one word more to say. I can, if I rightly caught his meaning, accept the view of my noble Friend the noble Earl who sits on the cross-benches (the Earl of Derby) with regard to Ministerial responsibility. I, like him, was a Member of the Government at the time these despatches were written, and I would be the last to shirk my fair share of responsibility. But I will say this—that, assuming every one of the despatches to be sound, right, and reasonable, I can see nothing in the Correspondence, as far as I remember, which constitutes a just and legitimate cause of war. Certainly, when the Ameer was urged to establish a British Agency in Afghanistan, the Government never contemplated that that demand was to be enforced at the point of the sword. In that lies the whole difference—between representing, and even urging upon the Ameer what was desirable, and in forcing it at the point of the bayonet. Such being the case, though I can honestly and unfeignedly say that I never gave a vote with more reluctance, I shall vote for the Amendment of the noble Viscount. It is very likely I shall be in a minority—perhaps a small minority; but to anyone who knows the history of this country that is not a very serious trial. There is nothing in it which need dismay any man. It is far more important, when one feels the honour and morality of the country at stake—whether the numbers be few or many—irrespective of Party discipline, that we should be content to record our opinion, in the face of an adverse Parliament, it may be also of an adverse Party—I am not prepared as yet to say in the face of an adverse country.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICKsaid, he was very glad to hear the account which had been given by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) with reference to the surplus of £2,500,000 on the present Indian financial year. The estimated expenditure of the war was about £1,200,000, so that there would still remain a substantial surplus. He

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thought, however, after a period of so much distress in India, that surplus ought to have been devoted to those works of national improvement of which that country stood so much in need. After the admirable spirit which India had recently displayed, the Government ought to have shown more generosity than charging the whole expenditure of the war on the Indian Exchequer. He hoped the Government would reconsider this matter. What India desired was to co-operate with England certainly, the whole burden should not be thrown on India. He approved very much of the able and logical speech of the noble Earl who spoke from the cross-bench (Earl Grey). He contended that although Afghanistan had given some provocation, the main quarrel lay with Russia, and it was to Russia we should address our principal remonstrance. He also said, if the Ameer of Afghanistan had given us a certain amount of provocation, we had acted with undue precipitation, and that if we had given him more time for reflection the quarrel might have been pacifically adjusted. No doubt we had some reason for complaint against Russia—especially at an earlier period in the transaction; but, considering the relations that then existed between England and Russia, and the strong probability of a war between the two countries, he could not say that the sending by Russia of a Mission to Cabul could be found much fault with. Russia did only what we should have done in similar circumstances. Besides, from the first Russia cut off almost all grounds of expostulation or remonstrance on our part, for on the 2nd of July the Russian Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs denied absolutely that any Mission had been sent by his Government to Cabul, or that there was any intention on the part of the Russian Government or of the Governor of Turkestan to send a Mission. The Russian Government could, therefore, always say that the Mission had been sent by the Governor of Turkestan without their knowledge. Further, the Mission was now represented to be simply one of courtesy and compliment. In these circumstances, it was not possible to address any serious remonstrances to the Russian Government. What did our Government do on a similar occasion? In 1840 the Government of Egypt, instigated by
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France, placed the dominions of the Sultan in serious jeopardy. Lord Palmerston, with the greatest secrecy, formed a coalition of the European Powers against France; but did he lead them against France? Not at all. He brought them to bear against Egypt, and by a judicious employment of their forces they expelled the Egyptian army from Syria, and destroyed the policy of France by which Egypt had been set in motion. The refusal to receive a British Resident at Cabul, or the reception of a Russian Mission there, were not the grounds of this war. The grounds were that when a Russian Mission had been received at Cabul with distinguished honour, the Ameer, though repeatedly requested, obstinately refused to receive a similar Mission from us with the same honour. That refusal practically amounted to an act of menace and hostility to Her Majesty's Government. It was always difficult in this country to justify a war not of defence but of policy; but a war might be justified on grounds of policy, and this was such a war. If we had shrunk from action on this occasion we might in a year or two have been placed in a position where we should have to incur far greater expense and suffering. But though the Government had just cause of war, he held that the circumstances were such that, having shown ourselves to be perfectly in earnest and absolutely powerful for the objects we had in view, we ought to take the first opportunity of granting favourable terms to the Ameer. And now a word as to the general question of policy. He found that the successive Governors General aimed at the same policy, though differing as to the means by which that policy was to be executed. The policy on which they were agreed was the maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and independent Government, having aims consistent with our policy. But one party said that was to be secured by a general system of negotiations and assurances to the effect that the Ameer was to be assisted with money and arms, and, in cases of extreme necessity, with troops. By others it was argued that those assurances ought to be put into the form of a definite Treaty. The advocates of the general system of assurances admitted that, in certain circumstances, it would be desirable to sign a Treaty. The only advantage he had ever heard alleged in

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favour of general assurances as compared with Treaties was, that under the former system we avoided the danger of entangling ourselves in distinct and onerous obligations with Afghanistan which it might at some future period be inconvenient to fulfil. He maintained, however, that this advantage was a great deal more apparent than real; for under the system of assurances the Representatives of Her Majesty in India had made arrangements defining the boundaries of Afghanistan and engaging to defend those boundaries, in certain circumstances, by force of arms. Could it be said that after doing this the Government had remained really free, and had incurred no serious or binding obligations? On the contrary, he ventured to say that even if no Treaty should ever be signed, this country was bound, in honour, and in equity by the obligations it had successively undertaken; and that the only liberty it had retained for itself under this system was to violate its engagements and to retire from its obligations with disgrace. In his opinion we had, under this system of assurances, practically incurred the obligation of preserving, in certain circumstances, the integrity of Afghanistan, and of interfering in the internal affairs of that State. We had said that we wanted a strong and an united Afghanistan in which we should have exclusive authority, and in which the influence of Russia should have no exercise. How could this object be attained if we suffered the present State of Afghanistan, which we had created and defined, to go to pieces? The policy pursued by his noble Friend (Lord Lawrence), the Viceroy who preceded Lord Mayo, by Lord Mayo himself, and by Lord Northbrook, virtually established obligations towards Afghanistan from which this country could not escape. The Russians were a great people, with the consciousness of a great past and a greater future, and their Sovereign was by nature in the highest degree humane, liberal, and sincere. But the Russian Government was moved forward on the back of national sympathies and national aspirations. With a Government and a country so constituted we had every reason to maintain relations of amity and alliance. But in order to realize that result it was necessary that our Government should employ judicious means and expedients; and the best means and expedients which they
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could employ were an absolute plainness and a perfect frankness, so that there might exist no doubt or uncertainty as to our relations with the various States with which we were brought into contact. With regard to Central Asia, the experience of the past proved that that effect could not be produced by vague and indefinite assurances and declarations, but only by formal Treaty and guarantee. Another reason why it was requisite to make a binding Treaty with Afghanistan was that such a course would impart an element of permanency and consistency to the policy of this country. There was a danger, incidental to our Parliamentary Constitution, of a fluctuating or uncertain character attaching to our foreign relations, and, therefore, it was extremely desirable to fix the nature of those foreign relations by formal Treaties. Such a Treaty, in reference to Afghanistan especially, would have a tranquillizing effect upon India. In alluding to a certain Memorandum dictated by Lord Lytton, Earl Granville had characterized the Viceroy's language as very imprudent. If that language had really teen intended to be communicated to the Ameer, that reproach might have been directed against it with some reason. But it was not distinctly proved in the Correspondence before their Lordships that the Viceroy's language was meant to be communicated to the Ameer. It was merely used in confidence by Lord Lytton to a British Agent, who was only to convey the general sense of it to the Ameer; and there was no reason why the Native Agent should communicate to the Ameer any particular illustration or expression then employed by his Excellency. Another reproach had been cast upon the Viceroy by Earl Granville. The Viceroy was stated to have said that in certain contingencies we could efface Afghanistan from the map of the world and partition it between two great Powers; and it was complained by the noble Earl that no evidence that any intimation to that effect had ever been conveyed to Russia appeared in the Papers on their Lordships' Table. But the fact that the Russian and the English Governments had formally created the theory that an independent Afghanistan should be maintained between the two countries was believed, although the theory was not universally accepted. But if their Lord-

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ships would read the conversation which took place between Her Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires at St. Petersburg and the Russian Foreign Secretary on the 23rd of June, 1875, and a second held in the following month, they would find the matter alluded to as to which reference, it was said, was made by the Viceroy, and that the idea of a partition of Afghanistan existed, at all events, in some Russian minds. With reference to the defence of our Indian Empire, it could, no doubt, be defended from our present Frontier; but, on the whole, the policy of Her Majesty's Government would furnish a Frontier which was accredited by the highest authorities and had been recommended by the great Emperor Akbar 300 years ago.
THE EARL OF ABERDEENsaid, that the question had been argued, on the part of the Government, as though the policy they had adopted was the only one they could have pursued. But he could not agree in that position. As to the charge of want of patriotism, which had been preferred against the opponents of the Government on this question, it would fall very lightly upon those who felt they were acting in this matter from honest conviction. A severance of Party ties was a matter which no one of ordinary sensitiveness could view with indifference; and it was also very natural that one should be inclined to abstain from any hostile act towards the Administration with a war on their hands. But the present question was not one on which they could be guided by inclination. It involved great political principles; and he was convinced their Lordships would feel it incumbent to vote upon it according to their convictions, without respect to considerations of political convenience. It might appear that some apology was required from one who, without any special qualification, took part in the present debate; but he trusted that the importance of the question would absolve him from the charge of temerity. Some of the distinguished Members of their Lordships' House had been the Colleagues of a Minister whose words were listened to with attention, and whose name he had the honour of bearing; and he could not but think that if that Minister had lived to the present day he would not have failed to endorse the views now expressed by his former Colleagues and supporters.
THE EARL OF AIRLIEmaintained that the merits of the policy pursued by the late Viceroy of India and his Predecessors had not been sufficiently appreciated by the present Government, and that the arguments of the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) in the debate of Thursday evening had not been refuted. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India, who opened the debate, had sought to cast the responsibility of the present state of affairs upon the late Government; and he had said that the assistance proffered to the Ameer by the late Viceroy was hedged about by so many conditions as to make the promise amount to little or nothing. But if their Lordships would look at the Correspondence before Parliament they would see that the offers of the present Viceroy (Lord Lytton) were equally hedged about by conditions and limitations. Looking at what had transpired in the Conferences with the Ameer, it must be admitted that we had placed him in a very false position. We had told him first that if he would not come into our views, Russia would come to an arrangement with us; then we had entered into prolonged negotiations with him; and, finally, we had broken them off. No wonder the Ameer had felt that he was in a corner; that we were not serious in our professions to him; and that it was his interest to come to an understanding with Russia in order to protect himself. It really seemed as if our object had been to get him into a corner. We had gone a very strange way about promoting that which was said to have been "at all times the object of our policy," the statement of which was in curious contrast with the results our action had produced.
EARL GREY EARL GREY moved the adjournment of the debate.
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELDsaid, he saw no objection to the adjournment of the debate; but he thought it would be for the convenience of their Lordships to meet to-morrow at 4 o'clock, instead of the usual hour.
Motion agreed to.
Further debate adjourned till To-morrow.
House adjourned at a quarter before Twelve o'clock, till To-morrow, Four o'clock.