Sitting of 1 August 1878

MINUTES.
— SELECT COMMITTEE — Report — East India (Public Works) [No. 333].
PUBLIC BILLS — Second Reading — Marriages (Fiji)✶ [285],
Committee—Report—Locomotives on Highways (Scotland) [271]; Consolidated Fund (No. 4) ✶; Arranmore Polling District (Ireland) ✶ [270].
Considered as amended—Endowed Schools and Hospitals (Scotland) [157].
Third Reading—Prison (Officers' Superannuation) ✶ [269]; Statute Law Revision (Ireland)✶ [122]; British Museum (Transfer of Collection) ✶ [236], and passed.
Withdrawn—Valuation of Property✶ [94],

EAST INDIA (PUBLIC WORKS).
Report from Select Committee, with Minutes of Evidence and an Appendix, brought up, and read; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 333.]
NOTICE OF QUESTION.

  GREECE—ALLEGED AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY.
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEY: I beg to give Notice that to-morrow I will ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether there is any truth in the statement made by Safvet Pasha to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, as reported by the Special Correspondent of The Standard of to-day, to the effect "that England had promised. Turkey that she would not permit Greece to receive any additional territory, and that without this assurance Turkey would not have ceded Cyprus to England?" I will also ask whether the second secret document we hear of to-day, as having been signed at the Foreign Office on the 31st of May, had any reference to the future limitation of Greece?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I think I had better answer the Question at once; but the hon. Member can repeat it again to-morrow, if he likes. There is no report, and there is certainly no document, of the character alluded to by the hon. Member.
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEY: Do I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that there was no secret document signed on the 31st of May at the Foreign Office, or that it had no reference to the affairs of Greece?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: There was no document signed on that day that had reference to the affairs of Greece.

QUESTIONS.

  CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE ACT —DEPRECIATION OF MACHINERY.
  QUESTION.
  MR. HIBBERTasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Commissioners for general or special purposes have agreed upon the scale of deductions which they propose to allow under section twelve of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act of the present Session for depreciation of machinery or plant; and, if so, whether he can inform the House what such deductions are?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, it was never contemplated that the Commissioners should fix any hard-and-fast scale of deductions; but it was proposed that they should have a certain latitude in the matter, and the scale of deductions would necessarily be determined by the circumstances of different cases and different trades. It was impossible for him to inform the House what the deductions were.

SCIENCE AND ART MUSEUM (DUBLIN).

  QUESTION.
  MR. M. BROOKSasked the Vice President of the Council, If he can state,—the title of the body which is to be intrusted with the local supervision of the Department of Science and Art in Dublin; the mode of appointment of such body, and the names of the persons already selected to form it; the powers and duties, with regard to the promotion of Science and Art in Dublin, and through the rest of Ireland, which such a body is to exercise?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: At present there are no Commissioners in any way associated with the Department of Science and Art in Dublin; but an arrangement has been made by which the administrative work there will be carried on by a Director, as in the ease of Edinburgh, who will be directly responsible to the Education Department for the disbursement of the sums annually voted by Parliament. The body to be intrusted with the local supervision of the Science and Art Museum is a Board of Visitors, consisting of 12 Visitors—four nominated by the Lord Lieu-

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  tenant, five by the Royal Dublin Society, and three by the Royal Irish Academy. Their duties will be to make annual Reports to the Education Department, which are to be laid before Parliament, on the condition, management, and requirements of the Museum, and to advise upon points affecting the administration. The Board consists of the Duke of Leinster, Lord Rosse, Sir Arthur Guinness, Sir Charles Lanyon, Sir Samuel Ferguson, Dr. Jellett, Sir Robert Cane, Mr. Uniacke Townsend, Professor Emerson Reynolds, Dr. Molloy, Professor Percival Wright, and Mr. Alfred Jones. Their duties will be confined to the Dublin Art and Science Museum; the other art and science schools and establishments in Ireland remain as they were.

INDIA—FAMINE IN CASHMERE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. RALLIasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he can give the House any information as to the extent and causes of the famine which was stated by the "Times" of India, as quoted in the "Observer" of Sunday last, to be existing now in Cashmere?
  MR. E. STANHOPE: No, Sir; we have not at present received any official information upon the subject.

  ARMY—PROMOTION OF GENERAL OFFICERS.—QUESTION.
  MAJOR O'BEIRNEasked the Secretary of State for War, If the senior Major in the Army is entitled to brevet promotion as Lieutenant Colonel, under paragraph 20 (P) of Royal Warrant for Promotion, on the death or retirement of a General officer of 70 years of age, although the vacancy may be absorbed and no Colonel promoted to the rank of General?
  COLONEL STANLEY: On the death of a general officer of 70 years of age, no promotion of any kind is made. On the retirement of a general officer of 70 years of age, the senior major in the Army could not be promoted, unless a colonel were promoted to the rank of major general in succession.

THE LUNACY LAWS—LEGISLATION.

  QUESTION.
  MR. DILLWYNasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department,
  866
  Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce a Bill in the next Session of Parliament to carry out the recommendations of the Select Committee on the Lunacy Laws?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I am bound to say that I have not at present had time to give any attention to this question. It is my intention to consider it in the course of the Recess, and at the beginning of next Session I may be able to answer the Question.

  NAVY—MR. HENWOOD.—QUESTION.
  CAPTAIN PIMasked the Eight honourable gentleman the Member for Pontefract, Whether he has seen the Petition of Mr. Charles Henwood, ordered by this House to lie upon the Table, and subsequently printed in the Appendix to the Twenty-third Report on Public Petitions, No. 392, complaining of erroneous statements which have seriously prejudiced his professional reputation and prospects, in the Minute written by the Eight honourable gentleman in reference to the "Captain"; whether he was not led into error when stating in that Minute that the plan described for the "Duncan," and illustrated by a "curve of stability," was "Mr. Hen-wood's design;" and, whether, if such is the case, he will take steps to remove the stigma which has in consequence so long attached to Mr. Henwood's professional reputation?
  MR. CHILDERS: I might decline altogether to answer this Question, as I am not a Minister, and it does not relate to any Bill or Motion of mine; but if my answering it will save the time of the House, which has already been a good deal taken up by Mr. Henwood's grievances, I will do so. I have read Mr. Henwood's Petition, in which he complains of a Report on his plans made by the professional officers of the Admiralty in 1867, long before I was First Lord, and published in extenso by me in a Parliamentary Paper of the year 1871. I neither had then, nor have I now, the means of determining whether those officers were accurate or not in their professional criticisms of Mr. Henwood's plans which my Predecessors had received and acted upon; and if it is any satisfaction to him to know that it was not my business, nor within my competency, to review

  867
  these scientific calculations submitted to a previous Government, he is welcome to the admission.

  CRIMINAL LAW (IRELAND) — PRISON DISCIPLINE.—QUESTION.
  MR. MITCHELL HENRYasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether the attention of the Government has been directed to the observations of the Chief Baron at the late assizes at Naas, and to his refusal to sentence women to imprisonment, except for crimes of violence, because they will have to pass many nights lying on a deal board, or plank bed, as it is called; whether this regulation of lying on a deal board is not a novelty introduced from England for the first time into Irish prisons; whether the Government is not aware that it has excited wide spread dissatisfaction amongst those who have to administer the Law in Ireland, and has been publicly characterized by Mr. Baron Dowse as a form of torture; and, whether the Government will forthwith revert to the use of beds or hammocks in Irish prisons?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. GIBSON) (for Mr. J. LOWTHER): I have seen the remarks of the Chief Baron. I am unable to state since what time plank beds have been in use in the Irish prisons, but they have been used in many English prisons for a great number of years. The Irish prison rules have established a uniformity of practice in this respect. A great deal of misconception exists as to this particular incident of the sentence, and there appears to be some exaggeration in some of the statements that have been made. An adequate supply of bedding is invariably furnished to each prisoner, and under no circumstances is a prisoner obliged to sleep in his clothes. The working of the rule will be watched in the closest possible way, and I hope it will be found to be worked with consideration, and without any unnecessary harshness.
  MR. MITCHELL HENRY: The reply of the right hon. and learned Gentleman is no answer to my Question. I shall repeat it to-morrow, in some form or other; and shall, before the Session ends, endeavour to get a vote of the House on the subject.

INDIA—THE INDIAN BUDGET.

  QUESTIONS.
  MR. BRIGGSasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, When the debate on the Indian Budget will take place?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: In reply to a Question which was put to me on this subject some time ago, I expressed a hope that the Indian Budget might be taken at the beginning of this week; but since then the debate on Eastern affairs has come on, and has rendered it impossible that that hope should be fulfilled. We are now in such a position with regard to Supply, that it has become absolutely necessary that we should proceed with the remaining Votes as soon as possible; and it is, therefore, not in the power of Her Majesty's Government to name any particular day upon which the Indian Budget will be taken. We propose to take the Education Vote on Monday, and the Army Supplementary Votes on Tuesday, and to proceed with the other Estimates throughout the week.
  MR. CHILDERSinquired, Whether the Education Vote would be taken before or after the right hon. Gentleman's Statement in introducing the Supplementary Estimates?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I think that my Statement will have to be deferred until Tuesday. The right hon. Gentleman will see that with regard to the Education Vote it is a matter of urgency; and, probably, the question of the policy of the Supplementary Estimates should rather follow than precede that Vote.
  MR. CHILDERSasked, What was the gross amount of the Supplemental Civil Service Estimates?
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSONsaid, that the amount of the Supplemental Civil Service Estimates would be about £80,000. He hoped that the Papers relating to them would be in the hands of hon. Members shortly.

  THE TREATY OF BERLIN—ARTICLES 2 AND 61.—QUESTION.
  MR. E. JENKINSasked Mr. Attorney General, Whether the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, assented to by England and Turkey at a period subsequent to the secret Convention of the 4th of June, did not supersede the second

  869
  clause of the first Article of that Convention, and substitute the surveillance of the Powers for any special right granted to England under that Convention?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER): In my opinion there is no inconsistency between the Articles referred to in the Question of the hon. Gentleman. The general reforms in the administration of Asiatic Turkey, provided for under the Convention of the 4th of June between England and Turkey, will of necessity include those particular reforms in Armenia which are prescribed in Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. The Porte will be under an obligation to make known these latter reforms to the Powers, and they will superintend their application. This latter provision is not likely to interfere with the policy of Great Britain, whose only object is to secure by every possible means the due execution of the reforms required.
  MR. E. JENKINS: I beg to point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that he has not answered my Question. I did not ask him with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Turkey, but with regard to the interpretation of the two documents. I asked him whether the second document does not supersede the first?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER): I am sorry I did not answer the Question so as to make myself intelligible to the hon. Member; but I should say most decidedly that the second Treaty does not supersede the first.

  VALUATION OF PROPERTY BILL.
  BILL WITHDRAWN.
  In reply to MR. HIBBERT,
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that there appeared to be no use in keeping the Order of the Day respecting the Valuation of Property Bill upon the Paper, and therefore it would be read and discharged.
  Order for Committee read, and discharged.
  Bill withdrawn.

IRELAND—LONDONDERRY AND BELFAST—PAY OF CONSTABULARY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CHARLES LEWISasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether
  870
  he will state why the county and sub-inspectors of the Londonderry Royal Irish Constabulary force do not receive the same pay and allowances as the officers in the same position in Belfast; whether the men of both forces do not receive the same amount of extra pay; whether a recommendation in favour of the Londonderry officers was not made by the late Inspector General; and, whether the Government has any objection to lay such recommendation, and any correspondence relating thereto, upon the Table of the House?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. GIBSON): The men of the Royal Irish Constabulary who are sent to Belfast and Londonderry receive the same amount of extra pay, but the officers stationed at Londonderry do not receive the same pay as the officers at Belfast. Recommendations in favour of the former officers have been made, and are under consideration, and the Irish Government hope soon to be able to bring them under the notice of the Treasury. The Papers relating to the subject are confidential, and not such as it is usual to produce.

  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY (IRELAND) BILL.—QUESTION.
  MR. MELDONasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, When he proposed to give facilities for the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday (Ireland) Bill; and if he could name a day when he could give such priority to the third reading of that Bill as would enable a discussion to be taken?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, he was sorry that, in the present state of Public Business, it was not in his power to name a day for that purpose.
  MR. MELDONgave Notice that, on Monday next, on going into Committee of Supply, he would move that this House should resolve itself into Committee of Supply when the Order for the third reading of the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday (Ireland) Bill had been disposed of.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE — EDUCATION (SCOTLAND) BILL.—QUESTION.
  In reply to Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL,
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, that a Notice of opposition to this Bill having

  871
  been placed upon the Notice Paper, the Committee upon it could not be taken after half-past 12 o'clock to-night; but he trusted that that Notice would, upon further consideration, be withdrawn, in which case the measure might be proceeded with to night.
  Ordered, That the Orders of the Day> which are appointed for To-morrow, at Two o'clock, be deferred till To-morrow. —(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  EASTERN AFFAIRS.—RESOLUTION.
  ADJOURNED DEBATE. [THIRD NIGHT.]
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [29th July],
  "That, whilst this House has learned with satisfaction that the troubles which have arisen in the East of Europe have been terminated by the Treaty of Berlin without a further recourse to arms, and rejoices in the extension of the liberty and self-government of some of the populations of European Turkey, this House regrets:—
  "That it has not been found practicable to deal in a satisfactory manner with the claims of the Kingdom of Greece, and of the Greek subjects of the Porte:
  "That by the assumption under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of a sole guarantee of the integrity of the remaining territories of Turkey in Asia, the Military liabilities of this Country have been unnecessarily extended.
  "That the undefined engagements entered into by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the better administration of those Provinces have imposed heavy responsibilities on the State, whilst no sufficient means have been indicated for securing their fulfilment:
  "And that such engagements have been entered into, and responsibilities incurred, without the previous knowledge of Parliament.—(The Marquess of Hartington.)
  And which Amendment was,
  To leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to insert the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for communicating to this House the Treaty of Berlin, the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, and the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey; assuring Her Majesty that this House has learned with deep satisfaction the termination of the late unhappy War, and the conclusion of a Treaty between the Great Powers of Europe; and expressing an earnest hope that the arrangements made and sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government may, under the blessing of Providence, avail to preserve Peace, to amelio-
  872
  rate the condition of large populations in the East, and to maintain the interest of this Empire,"—(Mr. Plunket,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  Debate resumed.
  MR. LOWE: Mr. Speaker, the question before the House, as I understand it, is not one of general criticism upon the Treaty of Berlin, but as to what estimate we are to form of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government from the time of the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano down to the present time. That appears to me to be the question which is clearly before the House, and to that question I will clearly confine myself, as far as the nature of the argument will permit. The Government have come back from the negotiations which have resulted in the Treaty of Berlin, after having obtained what they call a most complete triumph. They say that they have brought back with them honour and peace. No Government could, I think, wish to claim more for itself under such circumstances. It occurs, however, to me to inquire in what, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the honour of the Government consists? Now, I think the honour of a Government under these circumstances would consist in its carrying out in the main the policy which it has always advocated, and in being able to give effect to that policy without doing anything that it would be ashamed to avow, or that this House would have reason to disapprove of. That is my notion of the honour of a Government returning from difficult negotiations; and what I propose to inquire is whether the Government has satisfied that condition? What were the views with which Her Majesty's Government entered into these negotiations? We have been told what those views were over and over again, and so we can have no doubt with regard to them. The view of Her Majesty's Government in entering into these negotiations has been to maintain the integrity and the independence of the Turkish Empire; and it is by that that they must stand or fall. I am not anxious to catch at words in this matter, because the language on this subject

  873
  held by the Earl of Beaconsfield, the First Minister of the Crown, has been entirely consistent throughout. The noble Earl has always said that that was the object of the policy of Her Majesty's Government—nay, more, so completely has he been imbued with that idea that, since he has returned home, at the banquet which was given to him on Saturday last, he said that the Powers had come to the conclusion that there should be no partitioning of Turkey, and that the existence and the strengthening of that Empire were necessary for the peace of Europe. That is the language of the noble Earl uttered since the signing of the Treaty of Berlin? What I want to inquire into is, whether Her Majesty's Government, holding as they do that opinion, have reason to be satisfied with the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. The notion, of course, that anything could be lost by Turkey has been vigorously repudiated, and the word "partitioned" is scorned.; but I maintain that not only has Turkey been partitioned, but that she may fairly be said, so far as Turkey in Europe is concerned, to have been dismembered; and as a proof of that, I would only refer to the several Powers amongst whom 11,500,000 people have been divided. No less than seven Powers have received some of the legacy, and received it under the auspices of Her Majesty's Government. They are Russia, Austria, Roumania, Servia, Greece, Montenegro, and, I am sorry to say, England. Seven Powers have received donations more or less large out of Turkey; and yet the noble Earl the Prime Minister tells us that the object of the Powers was the strengthening of Turkey, and that that object, we are to assume from their claiming all the honours of the proceeding, has been attained. Another point which strikes me as very remarkable is this. The one point which the Government has striven to attain has been the separation of Bulgaria into two parts. That point has been attained. I will not stop to say at this moment whether Russia would not have been much more effectually encountered by one large State than by two small ones; but that point, at any rate, the Government may claim to have attained. But look how the Government has been obliged to dress up that achievement in order to make it palatable
  874
  What they say is, that two-thirds of Bulgaria have been placed under the direct political and military rule of the Sultan. That statement has also been introduced into the Congress; but putting things in the Congress will not alter the fact, and I appeal to the House whether there is the least ground for saying that two-thirds of Bulgaria, or whatever it may amount to, has been replaced under the direct political and military rule of the Sultan? This is a question, of course, of the honour of the Government. If it is so, they are entitled to honour; if it is not so, then not only have they no right to honour, but they deserve the more blame for deluding people by pretending to have done that which they have entirely failed to do. Now, the first thing I observe is that this country, which is under the direct political and military sway of the Sultan, will have administrative autonomy. As far as I understand the word, that cuts off the political part of the Sultan's rule at one blow. If a country is to govern itself, it is not to be governed by the Sultan in the way the Sultan understands government. Then order is to be maintained by a local gendarmerie and local Militia. Here, again, you get a Constitutional force, a force not at the will or disposal of the Sultan, and evidently connected with the autonomy that is to be granted. Then, again, there are to be no Bashi-Bazouks or Circassians to garrison the frontier. There are, however, to be regular troops; and so complete is the military control of the Sultan over this Province, that the regular troops are not to be billeted on the people, but are only to be allowed to go up and down certain garrisons, where if they happen to quarrel with the people behind them, they will run the risk of starving. A Christian Governor is to be appointed; but he is only to be appointed with the consent of the Powers; so that the very person who is to govern is not in any sense the Delegate of the Sultan. Perhaps it may be said the Sultan will have to do with the internal organization? The Great Powers are to organize the powers and functions of the administrative, judicial, and financial systems, and this is called placing the Province under the "direct political and military rule of the Sultan." I maintain that it is not creditable on the

  875
  part of the Government to hold this language. It is seeking by mere words to controvert facts; and it is the less creditable, because the attempt is so exceedingly transparent that it really can deceive no one, and must re-act in discredit upon those who attempt it. There is no doubt that the Government has succeeded in separating this Province from Bulgaria, and perhaps, in some degree, diminishing the influence which Russia would otherwise have over it; but to say that they have placed it under the political and military rule of the Sultan is in the most direct contradiction with the facts, and facts supplied by the Government themselves. Then we come to what has happened since the Treaty of San Stefano. Is it quite clear that Turkey was not better off as the Treaty of San Stefano stood? Turkey has been divided into I know not how many portions which were not contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano; and I am not sure that the labours of Her Majesty's Government have not tended to make matters worse than they were; but anything more unsatisfactory to the Turkish mind I cannot conceive, and well might Turkey say—
  "Quæ regio in terris nostri non plena cruoris?"
  They may say—"Who has not had a slice of our country?" So far, then, I think I am correct in saying that the Government have not succeeded in establishing any great claim to honour in connection with these transactions. It appears to me that it is very doubtful whether all these efforts of Her Majesty's Government have not left matters rather worse than they found them; and it will take a great deal of reasoning, indeed, to prove that they are better. I now come to the next point, which has been much dwelt upon, and that is the case of Greece. Now, as far as Greece is concerned, the case has been fully stated. Greece had to choose between two alliances. She might have chosen to associate with Russia, or she might have chosen to associate with England. In an unhappy hour for her own prosperity she chose the alliance of England. ["No!"] She chose the alliance of England; and most unwisely, as I think, she took the advice of England. There are occasions when it is necessary for people to be bold, as there are occasions when it is necessary for
  876
  them to be cautious; and if ever a nation was challenged to the utmost to exert itself, and to come forward and assert itself and its liberty, that nation was Greece, in the war between the Sultan and Russia. She might have sustained heavy losses. She might, perhaps, have lost some of the pillars of the Parthenon—for what I know our schoolboy feelings might have been wounded— but undoubtedly, if she had come forward, she would not have been in the position she is in to-day. As an Englishman, I am grieved to say that had she allied herself with Russia, her position, when the partition or dismemberment took place under the auspices of the Government, would have been a very different one from what it is now. I do not merely assert this; but look at what happened? The noble Earl the First Minister of the Crown undertook to advocate the cause of Greece, to bring it into the Congress, and it was understood that he was to advocate it. When you look at the Protocols you will see that he had hardly a word to say in favour of it, but everything against it. Listen to his language. He said—
  "An erroneous opinion has been attributed to the Congress, an intention to proceed to the partition of a worn out State, and not to strengthen, as I assume it has done, an ancient Empire which it considered essential to the maintenance of peace."
  So that Greece was quite mistaken in supposing that there was anything going, or that that was the policy of the Powers, although she saw them doing it before her eyes, and saw only six other Powers receive portions of the Turkish Empire. That was entirely a mistake of Greece. She did not understand the policy of the Powers—that policy being, according to the undoubted authority of Lord Beaconsfield, to strengthen, instead of dismember and destroy, Turkey; and when she came to England, England's whole view was entirely against anything like giving a share of Turkey to any other Power. The Earl of Beaconsfield said the Greek Government was entirely mistaken as to the views of Europe; that " States, like individuals who have a future, can afford to wait."
  "Thine be the joyless dignity to starve,"
  must have been the advice given to Greece. All I can say is, that if the

  877
  Greeks, instead of taking the advice of one poet, the Earl of Beaconsfield, had taken the advice of another poet, Lord Byron, they would have stood in another position—
  "Trust not for freedom to the Franks.
  They have a king who buys and sells.
  In native swords and native ranks
  The only hope of freedom dwells.
  But Turkish force and Latin fraud
  Would break your shield, however broad."
  I may be prejudiced, or I may be wrong; but I think we have got very few laurels in that respect. I now come to a very unpleasant part of the duty I have taken upon myself, and that is to consider a number of secret arrangements. It will be remembered that we were for three or four months negotiating with Russia, in order to induce her to make a clear statement of her views before we went into Congress. The notion of anything being held back was to us utterly intolerable, and we risked the chance of going to war in order to have everything fair and above board. Such were our splendid and magnificent views. I am going to speak of two secret Treaties, and I should have supposed myself that that was all that might have been spoken of. But something has occurred this morning that looks extremely like a third secret Treaty. I really do hope that if any Member of the Government should rise in the course of this evening's debate, he will have the kindness to tell us, at any rate, whether there is another secret Treaty or not, and how many more there are? If we are not to know anything about them, at any rate, it would be a satisfaction to know how many there are. It may be a childish wish; still, I hope the Government will tell us. We come, then, to two secret Treaties. I consider that when England went into the Congress she went there with the appearance, and certainly with the belief on my part, and I expect on the part of most of the Members of the Congress, of absolute disinterestedness. She went there in a judicial capacity, utterly disinterested as regarded herself, to do the best she could to avert the horrors of war, and give a fair, a judicial opinion on everything that came before her. That, certainly, was the attitude which, in my simplicity, I attributed to England at that time. But how utterly mistaken we were, when we found there were two litigants in this
  878
  case. Russia was one litigant, and Turkey was the other. I will not split straws as to which was the plaintiff and which was the defendant. That might be a difficult matter to settle. England professed to act impartially; but she went into this Congress with a secret Treaty with one of the litigants in one pocket, and with a secret Treaty with the other litigant in the other pocket. I ask you, if any of you were arbitrators between two persons, and those persons found out that you had made a secret agreement with regard to the subject-matter of their dispute, not with one, but with both of them, and you happened to all meet together, what sort of language do you think would be used by them? I shall not press that further for the moment. I hold it was a gross disrespect to the other Powers; it was a violation of the understanding on which the Congress was held—that the Powers who went there went avowedly with the intention that everything was to be submitted to them as a Congress possessing all the dignity and authority of Europe. It was a violation of that understanding when you previously withdrew practically from their consideration, as a judicial body, questions of enormous importance and difficulty, and carefully concealed the fact from those with whom you were to act. It was a species of dissimulation which cannot be sufficiently reprobated. It would be intolerable if practised by individuals; and I have yet to learn that States, although their consciences may be rather dull, are to be entirely exempted from the laws of morality. This was, as we all know, a Treaty in which England agreed with Russia that she would give up the notion that Batoum was to be restored to Turkey. That, I think, was the main effect of the Treaty. But, then, the most extraordinary thing happened. We were not content with the Treaty, but we actually issued a despatch in which we directed that a sort of comedy should be acted for the benefit of whom it might concern. The Treaty having been signed, sealed, and agreed to, by which we formally conceded Batoum, as far as England could do it, to Russia, the Marquess of Salisbury wrote these instructions to Lord Odo Russell. Here is the first instruction given to Lord Odo Russell, who, we are told, knew about it—

  879
  "There is no ground for believing that Russia will really give way."
  Not much, I should think, when we had given up all claim to resist. Then the despatch continues—
  "It is possible that you will not be able to shake her resolution."
  Observe, this is the third page of the Blue Book with regard to the Protocol and so we have the agreeable reflection that this, coming in the very front of the battle, will leave a witness against us to all time, and every future historian will make the infamy of the thing conspicuous. The despatch goes on—
  "You are not on that account to abstain from earnestly pressing the matter."
  Certainly not; for if the fact that you have given up a matter altogether does not make you abstain from earnestly pressing, I do not see that anything else should. The instructions proceed—
  "In case of failure, you will be made acquainted with the course which the Government has determined to pursue."
  That makes the thing complete. Here you have the suggestion that failure was possible, but by no means certain, and that Lord Odo Russell would be made acquainted with the course to be pursued; while, to make the thing quite plain, we are informed that Lord Odo Russell had been made acquainted with everything already. This might be very good in a play; but think of it being done in real life! Imagine any of us being found out acting such a part! And what makes it worse is this—I should have had more feeling for it if anything was to be got by it; but the thing appears to have been done merely to see how many falsehoods could be put in a despatch. [Cries of"Oh!" "Order!" and "Withdraw!"]
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I rise, Sir, to Order; because I think that the word "falsehood," as applied to the Government, is not Parliamentary language.
  MR. LOWE: I think the word has Ministerial authority. [Cries of " Withdraw!"]
  MR. SPEAKER: If the observation of the right hon. Gentleman is intended to apply to any Member of this House, of course, it is un-Parliamentary.
  MR. LOWE: I will not repeat anything that is offensive to hon. Gentle-
  880
  men. [Cries of "Withdraw!"] The Speaker, I understand, has ruled that I am not obliged to withdraw.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman. On the point of Order I did not quite understand your ruling, Sir; but what I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say was, that in a certain case the Government have introduced certain expressions with a view to see—or, as if they wished to see —how many falsehoods they could put into a despatch. And I imagine that, as Members of the Government are sitting in this House, such a charge made against the Government collectively is un-Parliamentary.
  MR. LOWE: The answer is, that I said nothing about the Government.
  MR. SPEAKER: I understand that the right hon. Gentleman does not intend to apply that expression to the Government or to any Member of the Government. If that is so, the expression might be allowed to pass without his being called upon to withdraw it. If that is not his meaning, then I am bound to call on him to withdraw it.
  MR. LOWE: I bow, Sir, to your ruling and withdraw the expression. The result of this transaction was that Russia obtained Batoum, and the Earl of Beaconsfield was at great pains to show that what had been parted with was good for nothing. But I will not pursue that point any further. I assure hon. Gentlemen that I have said everything I intended to say about it. I will now turn to the second secret Treaty— that is, the Treaty between us and Turkey; and that, of course, is a still more serious affair. It is treated as a very light affair, as if it really meant nothing at all; whereas I maintain it is the most serious document that could possibly be imagined. It is said to be a Guarantee—that is, an engagement to assist another person. No doubt it is; but that is not the whole. It is a great deal more than a Guarantee. It is a bilateral contract with Turkey. A mere engagement to another person might be treated very lightly; but this contract is one of the most solemn kind. We undertake, on the one hand, that we will fight for the Turks. They undertake, on the other hand, to do two things—they undertake to give us the Island of Cyprus, and to put in force

  881
  such reforms as may be agreed upon between us. Observe, these two terms are not executory, but executed. The Island of Cyprus has been given up to us; we have had what we asked—we have had the consideration; we are absolutely bound by this; and it is quite ridiculous to say that this is a mere executory Agreement. It has every feature that an executed Agreement can possibly have, and we are bound by it in the very firmest manner. The Treaty is, of course, of the very highest consequence; because, as has been already shown, it fixes us to a particular point where we are bound to be to await the attack of Russia. The champ clos is fixed, and we cannot be absent; we must be there to meet her whenever Russia chooses. Even poor Bob Acres was obliged to do that; but we must not only be there, but we must always be ready. We must have a Force always ready to give effect to this Agreement whenever it is demanded. It is an Agreement, therefore, which touches most nearly and vitally the interests of England; because it does amount in some shape or other to a permanent increase to our Army, and it obliges us to place our Army in some situation where it can easily reach the point of attack, if any attack is made. It is therefore, I repeat, an Agreement of the most serious nature; and I cannot express too strongly my regret that it should have been made without the slightest intimation of it being given to Parliament. Then, the next point is to my mind even more extraordinary, and that is our taking the Island of Cyprus. Now, we had been the patrons and assistants of the Turk in all his evils and all his miseries. We had been a sort of Good Samaritan to him. But when the Good Samaritan found the man who had fallen amongst thieves, he pulled out his purse, took out 2d., and gave it to him. Ourcharity seems to be of a different kind. We say to him—"You have not got such a thing as half-a-crown about you, have you?" and so take what he has. Now, I maintain that Cyprus is in no way a station fit for the purpose for which we pretend to use it. That purpose is that we may obtain a depot for our Forces, from which we may act in performance of our engagements with Turkey. Will anyone tell me how Cyprus will assist us in that operation? Granted that we have a large Force in Cyprus. Granted
  882
  that Russia advances from Batoum into the territory of the Turks. How could we resist her by Forces from Cyprus? Where should we land them? When we had landed them, how should we get them across the country? It is rugged, it is swampy, it is a desert, it has no roads and bridges. How are we to bring artillery, and all the machinery of modern Armies, from Cyprus to fight Russia by that way? and if we could do it, how long would it take us to do it? And how much would be left of the Turks by the time we arrived on the scene? The Island of Cyprus was wanted; but not for this purpose. We wanted something for a flourish—something to make a figure—to excite a little enthusiasm, to gratify what the Marquess of Salisbury calls the "Imperial instincts of the country"—some wretched thing of that sort, in order to excite the imagination of mankind, and show what great people we are; what great conquerors; and how we are treading in the steps of those great people who have conquered in the East. I am bound to say that there is one thing to be stated for Cyprus, and that is, that if it is not very valuable, we have got it very cheap; but I think not wholly unattended with that which is sometimes supposed to follow cheapness. Let us look a little further. The country which we are to defend is a country entirely different from that which has been the scene of operations. It is not a country where there are many different races. It is a Mahometan country, in which there is no disaffection. People talk about Asia Minor as if that was the only country in question; whereas our Guarantee extends, not only over Asia Minor, but over Syria, Mesopotamia, and Turkish Arabia; and it appears to me that to suppose by anything we can do we can really reform those countries is simply ridiculous. Their people do not want reforms in our sense. They are in the extremity of misery; they are nearly starving; they are almost skinned alive by soldiers who receive no pay; they are robbed by brigands; they are plundered by Pashas who received no pay— those are their grievances, and I ask you how are you to remove them? You may reply—"Nothing can be easier. Go to the Sultan, and say to him—make roads over these places, pay your soldiers so that they may not plunder, put down

  883
  by armed force these brigands, make roads, bridges, and railways, open up trade and commerce, and everything will go on well." The Sultan will reply—"Nothing can be more true than what you say, but I have not got a shilling to do it with." What is the answer which would be given? Why, the answer which is always given in Turkey, "Backsheesh." All this raving about Asia Minor merely comes to this—that England, in exchange for the honour of being allowed to shed her best blood at any time at the call of Russia—in consideration of being allowed this splendid privilege, is allowed the further privilege of spending any number of millions in relieving the miseries of the Sultan's subjects. It is not a question of the goodwill of the Sultan, it is a question of his power. The country is utterly drained and destroyed. You cannot go on year after year drawing from the resources of a country and the people without utterly destroying that country. The thing cannot be redressed by good government or anything else—what is wanted is money, money, nothing else. We have purchased for ourselves the liberty of spending any quantity of English money in helping these people; and, when we have done it, so far as I can see, we shall have left them very nearly as we found them. I am perfectly satisfied that when the people had been enabled to accumulate their savings, there would arise somebody who would think that money much better transferred to his pocket, and the old process be gone through again. The fall of the Roman Empire was due to a system of plunder under which the country suffered—plunder not, as was generally supposed, by the Goths and Vandals, but by their own Governors. The whole system, from beginning to end, was one of organized plunder. It was from no defect in the administration of justice; but owing to the simple fact that the Government took to itself so much of the produce of labour that it left nothing for the people to exist upon. That is, and always will be, the case so long as you have Oriental Governors. Nothing can be more vain than to suppose that by any amount of money or paper you can alter that state of things. I need not trouble the House by saying anything of what exploits we may perform in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Tur-
  884
  kish Arabia. I think it extremely probable that there may be found gentlemen who will induce the Government to make a railway for some 900 miles across that howling desert, with a suitable guarantee from the Government to its friends in the City who agree with the Marquess of Salisbury that trade never flourishes so much as under the influence of an Imperial despotism. I want to know why we should be called upon to be so particularly happy at having obtained the liberty of going into all this expense and trouble? Will anyone show me how the thing can be done other than by a lavish expenditure of money? If it is necessary, of course we must submit to it; but can it be shown to be necessary? So far from being a thing to be proud of, and to be called Imperial and all that. I say you have put upon us a calamity which will destroy finances already not in good order; which will increase the demands for the Army; and which will bring us into collision with all manner of persons with whom, in our insular position, we have no business to be brought into collision at all. The question, then, is—What is the necessity that forces us to all this? What pressing necessity is there? Is it, as I understand it, that Russia wants to take Turkey in Asia into its own hands? I do not believe it. That Russia would like to do anything which would suit her own ends I can well believe; but you will find it to be a true observation, that no poor country ever did itself any good by taking a poorer. It is not land that a poor country wants, it has plenty of that itself; what it wants is money—a country from which it can got plunder. Take the classical instance of the men who came to urge the Ionians to help them to fight against Darius, and who were told to leave off their disputes among themselves, in order to get rich on the gold and silver of the Persians. Russia would not profit by Asia Minor, and will actually have to incur expense to maintain her own conquests. I hold it absurd to suppose that Russia has an desire for Asia Minor. But then, it is said, Russia is going to India. That is a subject which has been so admirably treated by a noble Lord "elsewhere," that I will not go into it at length here. The reason that we hold India is that we got Indian money to take it with. It was not taken by England,

  885
  but by the East India Company. But India is virtually an island. There is really no means of reaching India with a modern Army and appliances except by sea. The only other way, even seriously suggested, is by Persia and Afghanistan. Everybody knows that Russia could take Persia any day she liked, and. thus the only possible or conceivable road to India is already within her reach. Why, then, should we incur all this expense, trouble, and danger, for the purpose of preventing her from getting that which she does not in the least want, because she has got a better thing already? If India is to be taken, it must be taken through Afghanistan; and, so far as Persia is concerned, Russia has now the right of conquest. But if we were to remove all manner of difficulties out of her way, it is impossible that Russia should do that which we have, as it is said, provided against. How did Alexander get into India? Why, by climbing over the Hindoo-Koosh. Imagine a modern Army, with artillery, trying to climb the Hindoo-Koosh. The thing is a perfect delusion. If these are the considerations which are to influence us, I think I have shown some cause why we should have paused —why, I am quite sure, we should have been consulted—before a step of this kind was taken. But, Sir, suppose all this is to go for nothing, the question still remains—Have we a right to adventure on such a scale? We are told it is Imperial policy. Well, when anything very foolish is to be done, we are always told it is an Imperial matter. When we took over Cyprus we were told we had regained our military character, and that under an Imperial system trade flourishes, commerce extends, wealth increases. For the sake of argument only I am willing to admit that; but this I say—an individual has a perfect right to go on any romantic expedition he pleases. He may devote his efforts with perfect liberty to any object he thinks right, if he only makes suitable provision for his wife and family, and no one has the right to blame him for it. But have those who are answerable for the conduct of the affairs of a great country a right so to deal with the money of the poor? You may take credit for spending money on this Imperial policy; but who are the people who make the money? Have you con-
  886
  sulted them on the subject? Have you asked them whether they are ready to hand over their hard earnings to pay for such expeditions? Are you quite sure you are doing your duty towards those people, when, without consulting them or those who represent them, you, by a stroke of the pen, change altogether the whole system and policy of the country, and adopt an entirely new policy, the very reverse of that which has hitherto been pursued, throwing, as you must do, the burden on millions of poor people whose Representatives have never heard a word about it? Sir, I entirely deny that war is the mother of commerce in any sense. It is the enemy of everything that is good, and of many other things besides. Take all the incidents of history. Rome pursued her course of conquest, and conquered the world. "These are Imperial works, and worthy kings." But what was the result? The power of Imperial Rome was broken in conquering the world; it dwindled away, century after century, because commerce would not nourish. It was so Imperial that its people were robbed to sustain the Imperial policy. Take, again, Louis XIV. Did he leave France in a better state than he found it? He left it in a state of the most abject misery. Napoleon took advantage of the enthusiasm of his country to become Imperial; and, therefore, according to that doctrine, commerce ought to have flourished. But he destroyed a generation of men, and, after all his conquests, he left France infinitely weaker than he found her. To conquer is not the vocation of England. The East India Company, by means which I will not stop to consider, conquered India; but that was not the act of England. England has been a colonizing, not a conquering, country. The last time when England sought to be a conquering country was during the Hundred Years War between England and France. From that time, England has been a commercial, a manufacturing country—a country of seamen and traders. It has not been a conquering country, it has grown rich by other means. Why, then, are we to be told that under this new system we are to become the envy of the world? Why is all this to be changed? I have only one point more, and that touches a question on which I feel deeply. We are in the habit of considering ourselves

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  the freest country in the world. We have long led the van in that direction. Well; let us see what has been done within the last few weeks. We have had formed, by twelve Gentlemen of whom I desire to speak with all respect, but among whom I recognize no moral or intellectual superiority to make them my master and me their slave—we have had formed, and studiously concealed from us, I will not say a great conspiracy, but a great plan—a great scheme for entirely altering the whole policy of this country, for transforming it from what it has hitherto been—a country of peace, industry, and commerce—into a country afflicted with, the wildest schemes of conquest. ["No!"] Yes, I say the wildest schemes of conquest. We have to leave the pursuits which have been congenial to us, and under which we have become great, to go into that path which so many nations have trod before us— that of entering upon distant and unprofitable visions in search of glory and prestige. That has been done. It may be quite right, it may be perfectly proper; but I say it is an absolute change from anything that has ever been done in this country for the last 400 or 500 years. We have never been, it is our pride that we are not, a military nation. We are a nation of seamen, traders, manufacturers, workpeople. We have not been, since the Middle Ages, a military nation. Now, Sir, I say that, by a Treaty absolutely concealed from us, a change has been effected which has placed us in a position to act with armed forces in Syria on the smallest notice. We have undertaken to keep order in an enormous portion of the earth's surface. That may be right; but I ask, is it right that the obligation to do so should be incurred without the people of this country, who will have to pay for it, in whose scanty earnings it will make a most serious inroad, who find that taxation is growing heavier and heavier, while public expenditure is becoming more and more reckless, having, through their Representatives, had an opportunity of saying whether such an obligation should have been under taken? What has this House of Commons done—we, on whom you are throwing all the unpopularity of finding the money for this lavish expenditure—what have we done that this should be forced upon us without our having had an opportunity of saying
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  a word on behalf of the thousands and hundreds of thousands whom we represent? What justification, I ask, is to be offered? What was the extreme and overbearing necessity, what the tremendous urgency, which compelled us to occupy Cryprus and enter into the Convention with Turkey which was so carefully concealed from the House of Commons? I claim on behalf of the House of Commons that it should be consulted when money is to be spent and on the causes of money being spent. It is a mockery and a delusion to say that the House of Commons holds the purse-strings of the nation, when 12 Gentlemen sitting in a single room hold the power of bringing about the events which compel the money to be spent. If the House of Commons is intrusted with this right, it is also a part of our Constitution that we should be placed in a position by those who, for the time, are the Ministers of the Crown to be able to discharge our duty fully and effectually. This is not a small matter. It is not as if I were objecting to a merely trifling item of expenditure. It is really a complete and entire change in the system we have heretofore carried out. How, I ask, did this come to pass? Who gave you this power? Time was when the Kings of England not only reigned, but conducted in their own persons the principal affairs of government. At that time, it was part of the Common Law that the Prerogative of the Crown should be absolute— that the King should have the power within his Prerogative of doing what he liked. That was the law, and it is the law. But, of course, we know that after the Revolution the King ceased to administer the government himself. It was administered more and more by his Ministers, until at last it was administered wholly by them. As long as the King administered the Constitution, he had a great reason for exercising moderation, because he had a great stake in the country. Our ancestors were not inclined to be treated by their Kings as we have been treated by the Ministers of the Crown. They had a knack, when the King unduly stretched his Prerogative, of putting him aside and setting up someone else in his place. Though he was in theory absolute, yet he had a very considerable motive to use his Prerogative with moderation. The Revo-

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  lution came, and the change that I have mentioned followed—the administrative government of the country was placed in the hands of the Gentlemen who, for the time, possess the confidence of the House of Commons. Now, so far from that mending the case, it has to some extent been a great deal worse. And why? Because those Gentlemen have not the same stake in the country that the King had. If they do anything that displeases the House of Commons and the country, they know pretty well what is the worst that can happen to them— and what happens to us all, sooner or later—they lose their places. Therefore, they can produce the most enormous results—they can dare the most extremely audacious things, without having to suffer anything very severe in consequence. Therefore, the use of arbitrary power has become much easier and stronger against the people than it was in the old times before Ministers governed the country. If that is so, "How comes it," you will ask, "that there has been no complaint; that we have sat still for 200 years under this Prerogative, and never said anything against it?" The reason is extremely plain. We have had a succession of statesmen who knew their duty to the Crown and to the country. They knew that their duty to the Crown was so to manage its Prerogative as not to give it the arbitrary character that has been strained to the utmost in very recent times; and that their duty to the country was, so far as they could, to discourage any sudden or violent alterations, or, indeed, anything that could tend to cut down authority. Therefore, both Whigs and Tories have agreed to use sparingly and with great caution the enormous powers which are dormant in the Prerogative of the Crown, so as to take away all excuse for making any further attacks or inroads upon our ancient Monarchy. They were men who put their country above their Party; and they were above the notion of getting any advantage, however great, at the expense of turning public anger or dislike against the Crown. We have lived, no doubt, in some sense under a sort of Republic for many years; but it has been a Republic which recognized the origin from which it sprung, and has been faithful to the traditions of the English Monarchy, as far as possible.
  890
  But what have you done? For the first time in English history, I believe, you have devised in your own minds an enormous scheme of innovating policy. It may be very good, but it is thoroughly new and unthought of. You carefully concealed it from the people of England, and then by means of this antiquated weapon called Prerogative—a weapon which everyone respects, but which nobody expected to see again drawn from the scabbard—you have made a Treaty, and have used the power not as it ought to have been used. The effect of that policy will have to be fully considered by the people. You have used it to surprise them against their will and against their interest, and have taken from them the power which they possessed, and have probably saddled them with an immense burden and loss of life. This you have done studiously and deliberately, without giving them the means of expressing their opinion. It is perfectly manifest, if this state of things may be supposed to be permanent, the liberties of this country are not worth a day's purchase. Of course, if it was a question of ship money or general warrants, there would be many people in this country who would be willing to spend their last shilling to fight the matter to the utmost; but unfortunately the law is against us. The good sense and the wisdom of those who came before us have left this old law in existence, in the full belief that their confidence would never be betrayed. That has now passed, and the Government has by its action put the Prerogative face to face with the interests and feelings of the people. You have done all in your power to drag Royalty into collision with its subjects. If any evil comes of this matter, it is to you that it must be attributed. Is it likely, or is it possible, that this great country, which sets an example of freedom to the whole world, will submit to have these things done for it, to have these things thrust down its throat — not by triumphant majorities, those we must submit to— without being allowed to say a single word on the other side? Are we to be told that we must cause the Queen to falsify engagements into which She has entered, or submit to that which many of us think now—and more of us will think before long—is contrary to the best interest of this country and of

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  those whom we represent? What right have you, or has any body of men, to place the House of Commons in such a position? What is the right to deliberate upon a decision which is already taking effect, and with regard to which we are told we must tamely submit, or appear to be offering factious opposition? That is the plain question to which I have called the attention of the House; and I do hope that some hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side will show how it is consistent with the rules of the English Constitution that we should be in this manner deprived of the right of deliberating upon the matter in hand before a decision is arrived at. I would ask some hon. Gentlemen opposite to tell us why the Government, with an undoubted majority, have employed all these manœuvres, have taken all this trouble, and have adopted all the strange proceedings, if their object was not to deprive us of the power to make a single remonstrance? Anything more wild or dangerous I cannot imagine. It is vain now to remonstrate. The thing is done, and we must get out of it as well as we can; but I am bound to say that, in my opinion, it is perfectly impossible, if this Convention is to stand, that the English people can be content to leave this matter of the Prerogative in its present position. Look at what it means, if you are to take these old laws and interpret them literally. The Queen has the undoubted Prerogative, and could let loose every felon now confined in Her gaols, without anybody having the right to say anything against it; the Queen has a right to make Treaties, and She could make a Treaty ceding the Isle of Wight to France, without anyone having the right to object; the Queen is the fountain of honour, and She could make an Earl of every cobbler in London, if She thought fit, equally without any person having the right to object. These powers might have been treated as one of the curiosities of the law in old times; but they are now come to be absolutely earnest. It is in your power, by a mere exercise of the Prerogative, absolutely to shut the House of Commons, and deprive us of the possibility of giving that opinion, which we are bound on behalf of our constituents to give in regard to the objects you have in view. This is the most serious part of the case. The rest we may pass for the present; but
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  this, I hope, we shall not allow to go on. I will not blame our ancestors for it. We have been too confiding. We have looked upon a proceeding, such as we have witnessed in connection with this Convention, as being so improbable as to differ in nothing from the impossible. We have been mistaken and deluded, and it is our own fault that we have suffered such things; but I hope we shall not suffer ourselves to be still further deluded.
  LORD JOHN MANNERS: The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down promised the House that he would make a disagreeable speech, and he has kept his promise; but whatever may have been the feelings with which his Friends and Supporters listened to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, we, on this side, who have so often heard disagreeable sayings from his mouth, accept what he has said to-night with the greatest good humour and complacency. At the end of his speech, the right hon. Gentleman threatened us with a revolutionary campaign—so much the worse for him and his Allies. Standing up, as we do, for the old established rights of the Crown, and the accompanying immunities of the people, we need apprehend no very great or serious attack from the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues. If, because Her Majesty's Government, in the undoubted exercise of their rights, and acting in accordance with long-established precedent, have taken a course, suggested a policy, and negotiated a Treaty, which do not meet with the approval of the right hon. Gentleman, he is to get up, and in the face of this House announce that he will agitate for a revolutionary re-settlement of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, all I can say is, let him go to any constituency he pleases on that particular platform. Before I sit down, I shall show that what the right hon. Gentleman calls a secret Treaty was negotiated in accordance with the strictest precedents; but, before doing so, I will make some few comments upon the opening accusations of the right hon. Gentleman. He complains of the Government because we have not, he says, maintained our honour. We are, I am sure, very much indebted to the right hon. Gentleman for the superabundant care which he takes of our honour; but we are, on the whole, of opinion, that we ourselves

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  can take care of it without any assistance from him. And why, I would ask, does the right hon. Gentleman say that the Treaty of Berlin is inconsistent with the honour of the Government? Because, forsooth, a few months ago, it was stated to be their object and wish to maintain and uphold the independence and integrity of Turkey! Now, I would ask, was the Government of England alone, when the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, to ignore the fact that by its provisions the independence and integrity of Turkey were most seriously impaired? It was, indeed, because we recognized that fact that we did not cease to struggle to bring that Treaty before the assembled Powers of Europe in Congress at Berlin, and in that Assembly to fight a stiff battle to restore to Turkey, to a great extent, her integrity and independence. The right hon. Gentleman went on to quote the language of the Marquess of Salisbury's despatch, to the effect that the result of the Treaty of Berlin had been to strengthen Turkey, and to contend that, on the contrary, it had greatly weakened and impoverished her. But is the Marquess of Salisbury, I should like to know, the only great statesman who took that view of the effect of the Treaty? We have all read what Prince Bismarck said on the subject, as well as the opinion of the First Plenipotentiary of France, which coincided with the view taken by Count Schouvaloff, which was that Turkey had gained rather than lost by the new stipulations. Eight hon. and hon. Gentlemen may dispute the proposition; but, cavil as they please, there can be no doubt that, as far as Turkey in Europe is concerned, the Treaty of Berlin has restored, to a great extent, strength, vitality, and independence to the Ottoman Empire. I admit that, in our view, that was not sufficient; and therefore I come to the Convention of Constantinople, and am prepared to contend that by those two acts, which ought to be taken together, Turkey is sufficiently strong and independent to fulfil those great objects which have been the objects of English statesmen from time immemorial—namely, that the Power established at Constantinople should be sufficiently strong and independent to maintain the guardianship of the Dardanelles. The right hon. Gentleman then went on to criticize with extreme severity
  894
  the statement of the Government, that Eastern Roumelia is now under the direct military and political rule of Turkey. I do not know in what excess of language the right hon. Gentleman did not indulge in contradicting that statement; but Article 13 of the Treaty said—
  "A Province is formed south of the Balkans, which will take the name of East Roumelia, and will remain under the direct military and political authority of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, under conditions of administrative autonomy."
  Why, then, is Her Majesty's Government to be told that they are wanting in consistency and honour, because they describe Eastern Roumelia as being constituted under the political and military rule of the Sultan—the exact words of the Treaty of Berlin? The right hon. Gentleman says he wants to know how the political and military rule of the Sultan is maintained? Why, by the exercise of all the attributes of Sovereignty. He declares war and peace; he has the right to negotiate Treaties in Eastern Roumelia; he appoints Governors, and every military commander in that Province. He appoints all the civil officers; and yet the right hon. Gentleman tells us we have forfeited our honour because we have described Eastern Roumelia as being under the direct political and military rule of the Sultan. The right hon. Gentleman then told us, as we have been told before, that Turkey, instead of being strengthened and re-invigorated, is absolutely partitioned. My answer is, that she is no more partitioned than almost every other Great Power of Europe has been in the course of years. Nearly every one of the Great Powers has had from time to time to submit to the loss of Provinces, and such an operation, no doubt, Turkey has undergone; but she is not partitioned. She herself feels and acknowledges that she has greatly gained by the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for that of San Stefano. I now come to what the right hon. Gentleman has said as to our conduct towards Greece. Greece, he tells us, did not go to war because she trusted to England, and the result is that she has now got nothing. He asks whether Greece would be as she is now if she had not followed our advice? No, Sir, undoubtedly Greece would not be

  895
  as she is now if she had not followed our advice. She would not have been with her territory untouched by the tread of conquering armies and. her coasts unbombarded, with her people contented and happy; and, above all, with the prospects of very considerable accession of fertile territory to her small Kingdom. No, Sir, Greece would have been, doubtless, in a very different position, although the right hon. Gentleman seems inclined to think that she would have been happier if she had suffered all the horrors of war. I do not think that the people of Greece or the Government of the country will take that view. Her Majesty's Government believes that Greece, when she receives this large accession of territory, will most cordially thank them for the wise counsels which we gave them during those distracted months, not only to her, but to Turkey; for it must not be forgotten that Turkey had just ground of complaint against Greece. Does anyone suppose that at the end of the war Turkey would not have sufficient mililary and naval force at her disposal to carry fire and sword into Greece if she had been so disposed? It is notorious that Her Majesty's Government strained every nerve, and used their utmost influence, to prevent the outraged Government of Turkey from proceeding against Greece, from whom she had so often received provocation. The right hon. Gentleman says Greece has received nothing, while Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro have received an accession of territory. Why, Greece will receive more in point of territory than any one of the States to which he has referred. I pass now from the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech to what I think the House will say is the most serious charge he has made. He was pleased to talk of what he termed two secret Treaties. I deny, in the first place, that there were two secret Treaties. There is one Treaty which has been entered into in accordance with universal precedent which, of course, may be said to have been secret until it was signed; but it is, as far as I am aware, different from no other Treaty of the kind in that respect. But the right hon. Gentleman talks of another secret Treaty with respect to which my lips, I fancy, are to a great extent sealed. After what oc-
  896
  curred in the House the other evening, I hardly know how I can allude to it. But what the right hon. Gentleman, in the exuberance of his fancy, is pleased to term a secret Treaty I should prefer to give this account of. It is now perfectly well known to every Member of this House that Her Majesty's Government made every possible effort to bring the Treaty of San Stefano under the consideration of all the Powers of Europe assembled in Congress. Now, to bring those efforts to a successful issue, it was necessary to follow the wise rule of the Earl of Derby—that if you want to go into Congress successfully, you must go into it with some definite propositions. We thought it expedient to follow that wise counsel; and, therefore, we approached the Russians in a friendly spirit to see what possibilities there were, if a Congress were once assembled at Berlin on the Treaty of San Stefano, of our bringing about a peaceful result. Nothing could exceed, I am glad to say, the cordial anxiety of Count Schouvaloff to smooth away difficulties and to co-operate in this attempt to come to an understanding on the negotiations which might be undertaken, and a series of amicable conversations resulted. Suppose there had never been any record of these conversations between Count Schouvaloff and Lord Salisbury, would there be any justification for saying that we had entered into a secret Treaty? But there was a record kept; and is there anything in that record which forbids any other Power in Europe, or which forbids even Russia and England, from maintaining in the Congress at Berlin any course they might think fit on the subjects brought under the notice of that Assembly? All that the Agreement amounted to was this—that if on certain points which might arise Russia and England were not able to come to an understanding, they agreed that none of those points should form a casus belli. That is the explanation of what the right hon. Gentleman calls the secret Treaty. The right hon. Gentleman talked of the "comedy" which was being played at Berlin when the English Plenipotentiaries contested at the Congress the acquisition of Batoum by Russia. The right hon. Gentleman seems to forget that but for those amicable conversations, that "comedy" might have ended

  897
  in a tragedy. Fortunately, however, the Emperor of Russia authorized a great concession on the subject of Batoum, and agreed, instead of making it a second Sebastopol and a constant menace and threat to the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, that it should be simply a commercial port. I think the House will see that this was a great concession; and it shows how the Great Powers were influenced by the representations of our Plenipotentiaries, and that this question of Batoum was seriously discussed and re-considered at the Congress at Berlin. The right hon. Gentleman, following his usual course, and taking a legal view of the case, asks what would be said by two litigants if, on coming into Court, they found that their Judge had entered into a secret arrangement with each of them beforehand? In the present case, he says, England was acting the part of the Judge as between the two litigants, Turkey and Russia, with each of whom she had previously entered into a secret arrangement. The right hon. Gentleman has denounced those secret arrangements; but I know what is the opinion entertained with regard to them by the two Powers most interested in them. From neither Russia nor Turkey have come those disagreeable expressions of opinion on the subject which we have heard from the right hon. Gentleman tonight. I will now turn to the Anglo-Turkish Convention, which has excited so greatly the wrath of the right hon. Gentleman, and which has induced him to utter his tremendous threat of a revolutionary campaign being opened throughout the country. In the settlement arrived at by the Congress at Berlin Her Majesty's Government thought what had been done was, upon the whole, sufficient to maintain the position of Turkey in Europe, and that by enabling Turkey to guard the passage of the Balkans with her regular troops, by authorizing the Governor General of Eastern Roumelia to call in the aid of the Turkish troops when necessary, and by permitting Austria to assume a position to command the approach to Constantinople, enough had teen done to secure Turkey against any further attempt on the part of Russia to advance towards that city. But, no doubt, matters were very different with
  898
  regard to Turkey in Asia. In spite of the very important concession made by the Emperor of Russia with reference to the port of Batoum, it was impossible not to see that the possession of that port, of Ardahan, and of Kara, with their adjacent territories, laid Turkey in Asia open to future invasion by Russia. Therefore it was that Her Majesty's Government gave Russia notice that, in the event of her retaining those acquisitions, we should take steps to meet the danger which we saw might arise in the future. Russia, having persisted in retaining those acquisitions, the steps which Her Majesty Government took were such as were strictly in accordance with precedent, and were only calculated to enable us to fulfil the obvious obligations and duty which, in our opinion, lay upon us. I have heard it said—and, indeed, the right hon. Gentleman has said it himself—that Russia will be deterred from advancing further south in Asia Minor by the difficulties presented by the physical conditions of the country. What right the right hon. Gentleman has to anticipate what will be the action of Russia in the future I am sure I do not know. Her Majesty's Government, however, must judge of the future with reference to the past. "We do not find that even the arid deserts of Central Asia have stopped the tide of Russian conquest; and we have yet to learn that there is anything to prevent her from advancing south of Kars and Ardahan when she thinks right to do so. Her Majesty's Government must not only look to the past and the future, but they must act for the present; and we have acted for the present. And what has our action been? The right hon. Gentleman has denounced our action by saying that it will impose a burden of taxation upon the children of millions yet unborn, which no people could hope to sustain. But the whole object of the Convention is expressed in half-a-dozen lines. [Mr. LOWE: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman says "Hear, hear!" but was there no ambiguity in the Tripartite Treaty of 1856? Was that Treaty laid upon the Table of the House before it was signed, and did it impose no burdens upon the children of millions yet unborn? Did not that Treaty move forward the frontiers of England to the Caucasus? Why, the Anglo-Turkish Convention

  899
  actually diminishes, instead of extending the obligations of this country as far as Turkey in Europe is concerned. The Tripartite Treaty of 1856 guaranteed the whole area of the Turkish Empire. Does the right hon. Gentleman contend that there were no dangers ahead at that time; that all was serene in the European and Asiatic sky; and that there was no danger then of entering into a Guarantee by a secret Treaty about which Parliament had never been consulted? The very year after the conclusion of that Tripartite Treaty and Guarantee there broke out the Indian Mutiny. And see what this Convention has done. It has limited our conditional Guarantee to Turkey in Asia. The right hon. Gentleman says that this Convention will never come into operation. Well, I do not say that it will. The right hon. Gentleman has told us that Russia is far too wise ever to dream of marching her troops from Kars and Ardahan down to Constantinople and to the Persian Gulf. In that case, the Treaty will never come into operation; and all the horrors the right hon. Gentleman has anticipated as certain to flow from it are imaginary, and the children of the millions yet unborn may sleep in their beds in peace, and will escape the terrible burden of increased taxation which the right hon. Gentleman predicted they would have to endure. I am very much inclined to think that the right hon. Gentleman is right on this point, and that this Treaty will do much to maintain peace in Asia Minor, and that it will give great influence to the party in Russia who are in favour of peace and civil progress. I think, moreover, that this Treaty will enable these great improvements in Asia Minor to be carried into effect which Her Majesty's Government are so anxious to secure. The right hon. Gentleman, following the example of the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), denounces the secret Treaty as if it were the first time we had ever entered into one. I have already referred to the Tripartite Treaty of 1856; let us take another, which was a favourite Treaty with him, the Treaty guaranteeing Belgium. Although the right hon. Gentleman, in the pursuit of parsimony, had cut down the Army and weakened the Navy, in 1870 he felt himself compelled to propose an addition of 20,000 men to the Army, in order that he
  900
  might maintain and vindicate the Guarantee given to Belgium. My noble Friend the President of the Board of Trade (Viscount Sandon) told us of the Treaties guaranteeing Sweden and Norway and of the Treaty guaranteeing Portugal. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe) has told us that England has not been a military Power for the last 500 years. To listen to him, one would think that Marlborough never existed, and that the Duke of Wellington was a Quaker. We have had no military experiences on the Continent, and at the end of these long campaigns, in which some thought that England played no inglorious part, it is to be concluded there were no Treaties of Guarantee. Was there no Guarantee with Portugal? Is the Guarantee with Portugal in existence or is it not? Did Mr. Canning in 1826, or did he not, send 6,000 men to Portugal to maintain our Guarantee? Does not the House feel that this accusation of imposing burdens on the people by Treaties of Guarantee is one of the wildest inventions that ever occurred to the fertile brain of the right hon. Gentleman? Passing to the acquisition of Cyprus, the right hon. Gentleman says it is badly situated for carrying out the object in view. No doubt, he is a great authority on all military and naval subjects; but he will permit me to place more reliance and confidence in the military and naval advisers of the Government than we do in him. We believe that, for the legitimate purposes in view, Cyprus is well and admirably situated. We have at least the consolation of knowing that Lord Napier of Magdala is of a different opinion from the right hon. Gentleman. We are content with the choice which has been made, and it is no little satisfaction to know that the people of Cyprus are content also. The right hon. Gentleman says—"Tell us how you propose to apply Cyprus to these purposes. Where do you mean to send your naval expedition? What will be the point at which you will land your military force? " I hope the right hon. Gentleman and the House will think we exercise only a due and proper discretion if we decline to give answers to these fishing questions. The right hon. Gentleman pictured in the most alarming fashion the awful consequences which would follow from any

  901
  military expedition we might send out under his guidance and advice. Well, we are not likely to follow the advice of the right hon. Gentleman, or to be guided by his opinion as to where an expedition should be sent, if the necessity should occur, which I sincerely trust and believe will not be the case. The right hon. Gentleman gave us a woful picture of all the horrors which awaited our Forces. I was reminded of a parallel anticipation which preceded the Abyssinian campaign. The right hon. Gentleman took a leading part in that debate. There was no disaster he did not prophesy; no success he thought possible, and the unfortunate English soldiers were doomed, by a relentless and stupid Government, to lose their lives in the Abyssinian mountains. Coming to the obligation Turkey has entered into to reform her administration in Asiatic Turkey, the right hon. Gentleman says in effect—"The people are happy in their intense misery and do not want to be reformed; they are harassed by brigands, pillaged by pashas; they have not a sixpence left; they have no roads and no railways; they have not the comforts and they have hardly the decencies of life, and yet you have entered into a covenant with the Sultan that their condition shall be improved." Well, it is so; we have entered into a covenant with the Sultan—he has entered into that covenant with us—and we are in hopes that, before long, very great and beneficent results will follow from the terms of that Convention. The right hon. Gentleman seems to think that all that part of Asia which belongs to Turkey is involved in utter, hopeless, irremediable misery. But that is not the opinion of some authorities. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman has read a remarkable paper in The Times by Mr. Geary on the Valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, describing the capacities of those fertile lands. He does not give a dreadful picture of pillaging pashas and devastating brigands; what he says is, that only a little more power is wanted to put down brigands and to keep order; and, contrary to the persistent statements of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, he says that it is to the regular Turkish troops and to a better police that the people have to look for a revival of their prosperity. The terms of this Conven-
  902
  tion will, we hope, enable the people of these vast and interesting countries to derive the benefits which Mr. Geary speaks of. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe), with a grand climax of fireworks, denounces us for having invented a novel policy running counter to all the principles which have made England great. We are told that we resemble Louis Quatorze and Napoleon I., and that we have plunged England into a policy of interminable war. Can anything be conceived more wild than such language in reference to a Convention, the object of which is the improvement of the condition of the people of these regions and the reformation of their government? Can any project be more humane, more sensible, and more likely to develop the blessings of peace? The right hon. Gentleman says the Convention clashes with the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, by which all the Powers are to superintend the reforms granted by the Sultan to his Armenian subjects. If that be so, then all the Powers have entered into a wild crusade. Have Russia, Austria, and Germany done so? No; according to the right hon. Gentleman they are quite justified in undertaking to superintend the reforms the Sultan may grant; but England has embarked on a policy of aggression by entering into this peaceable Convention. We are told the two things do not agree. The right hon. Gentleman was evidently in some perplexity when he asked whether the Treaty of Berlin did not override and put an end to the Convention? The answer is, the two things run on parallel lines. By the Treaty the Sultan undertakes to grant reforms to his Armenian subjects, and to communicate them to the Powers; and, by the Convention, he covenants with us to agree to certain reforms which will be applicable to the Asiatic Dominions. We have the right to agree with the Sultan as to what the reforms shall be; and when they are granted, it is open to the Powers to supervise them so far as they relate to Armenia. I believe, Sir, I have now answered the main charges of the right hon. Gentleman. There are, with the permission of the House, one or two observations I should wish to make respecting the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. In the course of that speech, he spoke of the British

  903
  Plenipotentiaries at Berlin as favouring the cause of servitude against that of freedom. That is a startling statement to make. It reminds me of a saying of the late David Urquhart, that one-half of the miseries and blunders of mankind arise from the misuse of language. I think, if ever there was an illustration of Mr. Urquhart's aphorism, it is to be found in that astounding statement of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman said this—
  "I have already said that, as a general rule, the British Plenipotentiaries took the side opposed to that of freedom. Now, let us see what part they actually played. When the Congress came to deal with Bulgaria, which was to have full practical emancipation from the Turkish rule, what do we find? We find simply that they directed their attention to limiting in the utmost possible degree the local area of the new State, even to the extent of taking from it districts inhabited by a pure Slav population. …. Next, when I look to Roumelia, I find that the British Plenipotentiaries laboured to extend its limits as against Bulgaria, but at the same time, to limit its internal liberties as against the Porte."
  What can be the right hon. Gentleman's notion of servitude? It proceeds upon this—that every acre of land of European Turkey that is not handed over directly or indirectly to the influence of Russia or the Slavs is taken from the side of freedom and carried over to the side of servitude. According to this notion of the right hon. Gentleman, the Treaty of San Stefano ought to have been held sacred; we had no right to interfere with it, except to enlarge its boundaries and hand over all European Turkey to Bulgaria. In this House there are Gentlemen of varied religious opinions— there are Gentlemen of the Jewish persuasion—there are Roman Catholics— there are those connected with the Established Church, and Protestant Dissenters of all shades of opinion. Well, I would put to them this question—As far as civil and religious freedom goes, would they rather live in Eastern Roumelia, under the direct limited rule of the Sultan, or in the new Bulgaria? Let us hope that the new Bulgaria will be all her friends hope; but we cannot —we dare not—shut our eyes to the fact that up to this time there have been bitter and gratuitous religious persecutions going on there; and I thought it a strange comment on this that the right hon. Gentleman twitted the Great Powers assembled in Congress at Berlin
  904
  with doing so much to secure for the future civil and religious liberty in Rou-mania, Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. One more observation I venture to make on the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. At great length, and with immense pains, he endeavoured to sow the seeds of discord between this country and France. The right hon. Gentleman gave the House, the country, and Europe to understand that, in consequence of the conduct of the Government at Berlin and Constantinople, there is great alienation between the two countries—that, in fact, there is great exasperation. Sir, I give to that statement the most unqualified and explicit denial. Throughout all these long and perplexing negotiations, not a cloud has arisen to disturb the good feeling that has existed between France and England; and the Government upon their part ever sought to consult the feelings, the wishes, and even the prejudices of France. The right hon. Gentleman, in the same spirit, quoted a paragraph from the Journal des Débats; but I do not know—I do not believe— that that journal is the representative of the French Government or the French people. But will the right hon. Gentleman enter into a covenant with me with respect to the Journal des Débats? I should like to ask, is he prepared to take that paper as an authoritative exponent of French opinion with respect to himself? Will the right hon. Gentleman say that the description which for now two years has weekly appeared in that journal respecting his conduct, motives, character, and career is such as the House may take and implicitly believe? If he will say that, we may be prepared to consider what it says about the conduct of the Government. Well, Sir, we have proceeded throughout all these difficult and entangled negotiations in complete harmony with the French and Italian Governments. The right hon. Gentleman has done his best to replace unity and harmony by discord and alienation; but I tell the right hon. Gentleman he will fail in his attempt, as he has failed in all his attempts in the past. He will fail, because France and Italy know that he does not represent the feelings and opinions of the great people of England. They know that he represents a minority, that is dwindling and dwindling every day. They know that the longer he

  905
  proceeds in his course, the more violent and ferocious his speeches, the more he denounces the conduct and vilifies the character of the Government, the more he misrepresents the opinions and feelings of the English people. The right hon. Gentleman says that the Prerogative of the Crown in making Treaties has hitherto been safeguarded by the conduct and character of the Ministers who have advised its exercise, and that it has been so maintained; because up to this day the Ministers of the Crown had an accurate knowledge of the public sentiment of the people. That is precisely the case now. I tell him it is because the present Government possesses the knowledge of the prevalent sentiment of the people of England that Her Majesty's Ministers, the Advisers of the Crown, are sitting where they are, and that the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends sit in Opposition. It is in spite of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, that the Prerogative of the Crown is safe. We have done nothing to strain or stretch it; and that is more than can be said by Gentlemen who sit opposite. And now, setting aside personalities and carping criticism, I ask the House to consider the simple question before us—which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London never once touched in his speech. The real question is, what for the future shall be the policy of England in Eastern Europe and Western Asia? Shall it be that policy which is adumbrated rather than expressed in the Resolutions before us? Shall it be that policy alluded to rather than explained in the speeches of the right hon. Gentlemen—a policy of insular isolation and calculating selfishness—a policy which, shrinking from all risks and refusing all responsibility for the future, will probably end in the failure to discharge those responsibilities which we have already incurred—a policy which will again doom this great country to a position of sterile impotence in the Councils of Europe; or is it to be the policy which Her Majesty's Government adopt, approve, and maintain—a policy which, in the course of a long series of years, has created, has made, out of a barren Island in the Northern Seas, a great and a growing Empire—a policy which, in a
  906
  just cause and for a worthy object, will not shrink from risk, and will not avoid responsibility—a policy which, we think, believe, and hope, if adopted and carried out, will bestow upon the regions of Asiatic Turkey some, at least, of those blessings which North America, Australasia, South Africa, and India have learned to associate with Western civilization, and the name, and power, and influence of England?
  Mr. CHAMBERLAINsaid, he was especially anxious to draw the attention of the Government to one or two points that had been raised in the course of this discussion. The noble Lord (Lord John Manners) who had just sat down, in the course of his speech, stated that the Government had restored the strict integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, which for four centuries had been so abused. But if that were so, he (Mr. Chamberlain) did not think their action would permanently conduce to the honour and credit of the Government. He wanted to ask the hon. Gentlemen who sat opposite, and especially their supporters, whether they really had in contemplation the results which had been arived at, at the time they voted those liberal Supplies, when they made certain declarations to those who were unpatriotic, and who had the misfortune to differ from them on the question? The noble Lord had told them that Turkey had not suffered any partition or dismemberment other than that which other Powers had suffered. But history did not afford him any instance of this—where any country had lost two-thirds of its territory, which had been distributed amongst the several Powers. If the demands of England had been reasonable, did anyone suppose they would not have been conceded to ordinary negotiation, or that there would have been any necessity for those secret proceedings and menaces which had kept the country in a state of ferment so long? He asked the House, now that the Treaty was before it, to consider the question. He said, broadly, that in no single case in which Russia had shown an intention of insisting upon her demands had she now been compelled to concede anything. In the conditions of the Treaty of San Stefano there were alterations of points which Russia admitted her readiness to consider before the Powers of Europe, and

  907
  accept the decision of the Powers. Sir Austen Layard, writing in June, 1877, said that to form Bulgaria, as far as the Balkans, into an autonomous Province, would be to bring under Russian influence and rule the inhabitants of that part of European Turkey; and to take away from the Porte the fortresses of the Quadrilateral would place the rest of that part of the Empire and Constantinople at the mercy of Russia. If that statement was true, how could it possibly have been the interest of Russia to fight against conditions so favourable to herself? Upon a review of the whole matter, they now saw the results which had been obtained. There never was a worse investment in this country than the £6,000,000 which was voted to the Government. The noble Lord who had just sat down exhorted them not to shrink from the responsibility that was before them, and employed a great part of his remarks in minimizing the responsibility, and stated that only a detachment of Metropolitan police was required to civilize Asia. But, assuming that work was to be done, he must say that was not an appeal which could be made with safety to hon. Members of that side of the House. He was willing to admit that the wealth and power of nations, like the wealth, power, and influence of individuals, were trusts to be used for the benefit of others, but not merely for selfish advantages or privileges. There were obligations which they had to fulfil, and if the Government were asking their support to undertake such a responsibility as this he would not object, although their responsibilities were great enough, and, in the words of the poet—
  "Already the too weary Titan daggers under the too vast orb of fate."
  It would be better to fall under a heavy load of unselfish responsibility than to turn aside and not touch with the little finger the burden which others were called upon to bear. But he asked those Members of the Government, who now taunted other hon. Gentlemen with unwillingness to undertake responsibilities, how it was, that only 12 months ago, the Government refused to consider a much less responsibility? He recollected the then Secretary of State for War (now Viscount Cranbrook) lifting his eyes to the skylight, and asking from whence
  908
  we derived, from Heaven above, or the earth beneath, a commission which would justify us in undertaking the civilization of the Turkish Provinces in Europe?—and yet now the Government, which strained at this gnat, had actually swallowed the camel of the Turkish Convention which landed them into liabilities not contemplated. Think what the conduct of the Government had cost this country and Turkey. Turkey, encouraged by the tacit acquiescence of this country, now saw its Exchequer in a complete state of bankruptcy, saw itself stripped of its bravest soldiers; it had lost 1,000,000 lives, and its population, whether Christian or Mahomedan, subjected to the unheard of miseries arising out of one of the most dreadful wars of this century; whilst this country had lost £10,000,000, at a time when the people could hardly spare it, and at a time, also, when trade was in a stagnant and paralyzed condition. They had seen the state of things which had been brought about by Her Majesty's Government, and they were now told that we ought to undertake these new and extraordinary obligations. He did not think so much of the money. England was, no doubt, a very wealthy country. She could afford to have her fling, and, if she pleased, could spend £10,000,000 to satisfy the vulgar patriotism of the music halls. But he thought the principal point they had to consider was the matter upon which the future judgment of the people would go —how far in the operations of the Government they had safeguarded the interests of the subject-populations of the Porte. A short time ago, there was presented to Parliament a map showing the amount of territory restored to Turkey; but the restoration of territory was much more imaginary than real. The deprivation of territory was, fortunately, effective enough. Millions of people had been relieved from an oppressive and crushing rule which had pressed upon them for years, and millions more were entitled to appeal to one or other of the Powers of Europe when next oppression became too heavy to be borne. The sacrifices of the late terrible war had not been altogether without compensation. Blood had been poured out like water, but it had not been altogether fruitless. The result had been that independence and freedom, with all

  909
  the blessings which follow in their train, had been permanently assured to large populations who for long had been misgoverned and misruled. What was really unsatisfactory in these proceedings was this—that throughout the Protocols they saw evidence, and behind the Protocols they suspected evidence, that the British Plenipotentiaries, he would not say leaned in the direction of servitude, in deference to the susceptibilities of the noble Lord, but showed themselves the ready and willing champions of the selfish fears and jealousies of great despotisms; and that, on more than one occasion, they repressed the aspirations and limited the claims of the subject-nationalities. They had seen territory restored to Turkey, and they had given over large populations to the care and government of Austria-Hungary. We had even done something for Persia, although they had been told by a noble Lord that Persia was the worst-governed country in the world. On the other hand, we had taken from Servia some of the territory reserved to her by the Treaty made by Russia. And much worse than that was an action of which we should have to be ashamed, and that was, we had wrested from Montenegro the hard-won spoils of the valour and patriotism of her citizens, and taken from her the territory which she had acquired and held against enormous odds. On the other hand, England had made a warm protest against the retrocession of Bessarabia. The Plenipotentiaries had simply rehearsed a comedy in private, which was afterwards performed in public at the Berlin Congress, to the scorn of Europe. Our Government had opposed, and caused to be rejected and reduced, and afterwards ridiculed, the claims of Greece. Such action by this country towards Greece he could only describe as being most unwise and most ungenerous. English statesmen, from the time of Canning, had left it upon record that it was to the interest of England that the claims of Greece should be respected, and, when possible, promoted; and that it was to the interest of England to keep on friendly terms with that little maritime nation. And even the present Prime Minister spoke of the brilliant future before the Greeks, yet they had reason to believe he had thrown them over, in order to create an alliance with the cor-
  910
  ruption and despotism of the Turkish Empire. England had long owed a reparation to the Greeks. We had confined them within so small a territory that they had no room for development, and we had also burdened them with a heavy debt. In the circumstances, it would be a grievous thing if Italy and France undertook the championship of rights and claims which were confided orginally to our guardianship. They made a two-fold charge against the Government. In the first place, they did not take at the right time the necessary steps in order to secure for the Greeks a full hearing of their case at the Congress; and, in the second place, when the question of Greek's claims came before the Congress, the action of England reduced the concessions which would have been otherwise made. Ho particularly wished to draw the attention of the Home Secretary to this matter. There were two propositions before the Congress. The proposition of the French was to the effect that the Greek Delegates should be admitted to the Congress when the question of the Border Provinces was discussed; and, secondly, that they might be called in by the Congress whenever any point in which they were likely to be interested was under discussion. To the first of these proposals the English Plenipotentiaries moved an amendment to the effect that the Delegates should be called in when questions affecting the Greek Provinces were under discussion; because it was urged that otherwise their presence, when Crete, Macedonia, and Thrace were being discussed, would be impossible. It appeared that the French proposition reserved full liberty to the Congress to call in the Greek Delegates whenever it thought fit to do so; and Prince Bismarck showed that when the question of Crete, Macedonia, and Thrace was brought forward, it would be seen who were the friends of Greece and who would vote for her being heard. Well, when that question was discussed the English Plenipotentiaries were absolutely silent, and did not in any way suggest that the Greek Delegates should be called in. Whatever might be the reason, this was what actually occurred, and surely it was a most unfortunate result. The English Plenipotentiaries prepared a Memorandum fully dealing with the cession of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; but there was not

  911
  a word applying to the transfer of Crete to Greece. The English Representatives were able to support the selfish claims of Austria-Hungary, and at the same time to appropriate by secret Treaty an Island in the Mediterranean, and could do nothing whatsoever for the population of Crete, who had placed such profound confidence in the generous intentions of the British Government. Within the last century there had been five revolutions in the Island of Crete. Could there be any better evidence of the kind of government to which the inhabitants had been subjected? Yet we had found it impossible to do anything for them, and had handed them over to the tender mercies of the Porte. The next charge he had to bring against the Government was yet more serious, and it had already been mentioned by his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). It amounted to this—Whereas the Representatives of France and of Italy were willing that Epirus and Thessaly should be absolutely annexed to Greece, the English Representatives opposed this suggestion, and reduced the proposition until it became—that which appeared in the Protocols—a mere suggestion to Turkey that she might consent to rectify the frontiers of Greece.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, the hon. Member had stated that the proposition of Italy and of France was that Thessaly and Epirus should be given up wholly. On what page was that to be found?
  MR. CHAMBERLAINsaid, it was not in the Protocols; but his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea stated that he had received private information on the subject. At the same time, his hon. Friend said the information had been confirmed by statements in some of the leading German newspapers. He was aware that the Home Secretary was not going into newspaper reports; but hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House, who got everything that was worth having from newspaper reports, could not afford to be equally independent. The peace which the noble Lord had brought us from Berlin was only an armistice, and not a permanent settlement. That Eastern Roumelia would, he did not doubt, ultimately unite with Bulgaria in obtaining their complete independence; and he was equally certain that Epirus and Thessaly would in
  912
  due time become united to Greece, as certain as the unity that had taken place in Italy and in Germany. He supposed the Prime Minister would not be cynical enough to tell Greece to be patient, unless he thought in due time she would meet the reward of her patience, and that her aspirations, although postponed, would not be entirely and for ever extinguished. He wished to say a word or two upon the subject of the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and, first of all, he wanted to know of hon. Gentlemen opposite whether they thought that the policy of warlike preparation, which had been adopted, was necessary to obtain that Convention? He took it for granted that Turkey would only have been too glad to make that Convention without the necessity of calling out our Reserves, or bringing the Indian troops to Malta. If it could have been seen that this was to be the policy of England, he could not help thinking that the Crimean War might have been avoided; because we could then, as we were doing now, have joined in the partition of Turkey. The noble Viscount (Viscount Sandon) had told them there was no ambiguity in the Convention; but he considered there was great ambiguity in the way in which the Government had described it. Throughout the whole of the proceedings the Government had been speaking with two voices, and he did not know which was the true voice. The noble Lord had told the House that we had only given a limited and conditional Guarantee; and the Home Secretary told them on Tuesday that we had undertaken to protect Asia Minor from Russian attack only upon the express condition that Turkey reformed herself, and that we did not undertake to reform her. These statements appeared to be perfectly clear and decisive when taken by themselves, and if they were true it was hardly worth while to discuss the matter much further, for this was a sham Convention, perfectly useless, and not worth the paper on which it was written. About the same time, Lord Salisbury was stating in "another place," that the policy pursued by the Government had given to our diplomacy a character of plainness and frankness which, perhaps, within recent years, it had been in danger of losing. The expression, "recent years," was surely a slip for "recent months." If the Guarantee was based

  913
  upon the promises of Turkey, which experience had shown over and over again were not to be relied upon, how could it be anything but misty and shadowy, and how could it possibly give a plain and unmistakable character to English diplomacy? Her Majesty's Government, it seemed to him, were on the horns of a dilemma. If the Convention was necessary to protect British interests, it ought not to rest upon such a broken reed as Turkish promises. If it was not necessary, then what excuse could there possibly be for committing this country to these new and vast and onerous obligations? No one in this country believed that Turkey would reform herself. The noble Lord had given them a very favourable description of the state of things in Asia Minor; but even according to his account, they wanted what we were accustomed to consider essential to good government. They wanted a policy; they wanted an administration of justice, which was mere extortion, a tax which was legalized robbery, and officials who were corrupt; and it was inconceivable that the Central Authority at Constantinople, bankrupt and discredited, and torn by internal dissensions, could ever institute the reforms required of it. And if Turkey was not to reform herself, who was to reform her? The President of the Board of Trade anticipated that Her Majesty's Government would do so. The other day, the noble Viscount (Viscount Sandon) invited them to join with the Government in bringing commerce, and civilization and prosperity, happiness, and peace to the hapless populations of these neglected lands. Well, he was not sure but that when Her Majesty's Government seriously undertook that work they would find in himself an earnest supporter; but at present they seemed to suppose that they could accomplish it— that is to say, educe order out of chaos —by a stroke of the pen, and by virtue, forsooth, of that increasing wisdom which, according to the President of the Board of Trade, the Sultan had been showing from month to month. It was not in that way that our Indian Empire had been formed. The care, prudence, foresight, and skill of our ablest statesmen had all gone to the making of it, backed by the personal influence and authority of England herself; and the same results were to be achieved in
  914
  Asiatic Turkey by what?—by the stroke of a harlequin's wand. The Government could not maintain that they were entering upon a great work of civilization, and at the same time deny that they were undertaking new responsibilities. They must either accept or reject both propositions. If they rejected both, then the Convention was a sham, intended merely to cover their retreat from an awkward position. If they accepted both, then he could only say that never in history had this country been called upon to take so momentous a step with so little information. He would not venture, having no knowledge and experience himself, to speak at any length on the military side of our responsibilities; but, at the same time, when he found that some of the most considerable of military authorities, that some of our best Indian administrators, and many of our own statesmen doubted and denied the necessity of the course that had been pursued by the Government, it was open to him, ignorant as he was of the subject, to doubt also. He would point out that even the Government themselves had not ventured to rely on the importance of Asia Minor in this matter. They had been told that that would lead to something dim and distant in the future, and that Russia wanted to have possession of it, and would then have a recruiting ground. The Opposition had been taunted with having no alternative policy. If he might suggest one, it would be this—to ascertain where the vital interests of England really lay, and where her real defence properly began, and to wait till those interests were menaced, instead of rushing to meet a danger which possibly had no existence. They were told by the Government that they were pursuing a policy of duplicity. Duplicity was bad enough; but there was one policy which was worse, and that was to rush at full steam on to the rocks. The Government were following the latter course. In his opinion, it was clearly shown that while, on the one hand, the possession of Asia Minor by Russia would bring with it numerous involvements to her of a very serious and embarrassing kind, and not bring her one step nearer to a practical attack on India; but by assuming the Protectorate of Asia Minor we brought our defence of India up to the very jaws of the Russian

  915
  fortresses, leaving to Russia—what we ought jealously to have prevented her getting—the choice of time, place, and circumstances for attacking us. He felt, therefore, under such circumstances, the Opposition had only one and a clear duty to perform, and. that was to protest against new obligations and liabilities which had been cast upon us without our consent or knowledge. The Government had been doing on this occasion what they had done on many previous occasions. They had been deferring liabilities which they did not themselves like to perform. They had drawn a bill on posterity for the defence of Asia Minor, and it would be for posterity to judge their conduct and decide when the bill fell due, whether they felt bound by the obligations contracted in their name, but certainly not with their consent. For himself, he had no doubt as to what the result would be. Her Majesty's Government could not stem permanently the tide of events, and all they could do would not save the Ottoman Empire from its well-deserved and inevitable fate.
  MR. ALDERMAN COTTONprofessed himself at a loss to understand the policy of the Opposition. A few short months ago their cry was peace, and some of them on that side of the House were disposed to join in the cry; but now they had obtained peace—a peace beyond their expectations — in terms of great moment to this country, hon. Members opposite were speaking as if they would have preferred the alternative of war. The origin of the late war was certainly not due to the Government, but rather to the speeches of hon. Members opposite and their friends, who led Russia to suppose that this country would not go to war for Turkey. Peace with honour used to be the incentive words for war. Now they were a sublime truth—an accomplished fact. Peace had now been restored, and he unhesitatingly said, a peace with honour, and he wanted to know why hon. Gentlemen opposite did not put the pipe of peace between their lips, and join us in the happy song. He denied emphatically that the Government had acted ungenerously towards Greece. From its foundation as a Kingdom that country had always enjoyed the sympathy of the English people, and would continue to receive it. Five thousand miles of frontier
  916
  was proposed to be given to Greece; and he thought the Greeks, when they came to consider the results of the Congress, would admit they had received great consideration, and received quite as large an accession of territory as they had expected to obtain. He would say to Greece—" Be patient. As a nation scarcely half a century old you have done great wonders to hold your Kingdom and your power against a nation whose people hated you, and were hated thoroughly by you in return. The time will come when Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly will, in all probability, be added to Greece; but that cannot be done in a day." The object of the Congress was the consideration of the San Stefano Treaty, and not the partition of the Turkish Empire. Had Russia succeeded in her advance to Constantinople, and established herself there, what would have become of the Kingdom of Greece? "We could not suppose that Russia would have tolerated a Kingdom of Greece for a moment. Greece would at once have become a tributary State. But now we had required Turkey not to attack Greece, and had put Russia further away from her. Russia, in his humble judgment, had been put back many years. At the present moment her position was not an enviable one. She was confronted by the discontent of Poland, wars and rebellions on her Chinese frontier, the conquered but disaffected tribes up to Persia, the wide-spread ramifications of secret societies all over the Empire, and the varied and conflicting interests of north and south. It would not, therefore, be to her advantage to break the provisions of the Treaty, or to rush needlessly into a fresh war. He felt that we should have some difficulty in managing the Turks; but was England one whit the worse for taking possession of Cyprus, or for the Convention she had entered into with Turkey? He believed that nations in the East had had quite enough of war, and would hesitate before they entered into it again. He believed that the Government, in going for peace, had studied the wishes of the people of England, and that the people of England were in accord with the acts of the Government, and did not go with the hon. Member opposite in denouncing the Convention or what was done at the Congress. Some hon. Members talked about secret agreements. Did they think

  917
  it was possible that Russia would have attended the Congress if something like an understanding as to the course at the Congress had not been come to? Much had been said about the susceptibility of Italy and France. He did not think they felt aggrieved at the Convention between England and Turkey. What was the object of the Government in printing the Anglo-Turkish Treaty some few days before the Congress separated? It was to give the Plenipotentiaries there present an opportunity of communicating with their respective Governments, and of protesting, if they thought fit. But not one protested. The only protest that had been made proceeded from hon. Members on the other side of the House. The whole plan of the Opposition had been to throw discredit on the Treaty because it was made without the sanction of the House. Did they suppose that if the Treaty had been submitted to the House it would not have received the sanction of the House? It would have been sanctioned by a large majority; but to have submitted it to the House would have involved the loss of much time, a time when the world was on tiptoe to hear peace proclaimed from the Berlin Congress. There had not been a foreign journal—except some out-of-the-way paper—which had complained of the action taken by the noble Lords at the Congress; he had never known acts of such, importance as these, done by public men, meet with such approbation both at home and abroad. As to Cyprus, it would be a most valuable acquisition to the English nation. Through Cyprus the civilization of England would be more and more opened to the people of the East. The Treaties, he was sure, would redound to the honour of England, and lead to an ever-widening path to our civilization and commerce.
  MAJOR NOLANsaid, he could not blame the Government for the course they had taken in many matters. For instance, he approved their conduct in calling out the Reserves, and he did not consider that they could well have acted otherwise. He also thought the Government were quite right in securing such a position as Cyprus, and he did not blame them much for their conduct at the Congress at Berlin, where they could not have achieved much more than they had done without seriously risking a war. But he contended that Russia
  918
  had retained all she fought for in Asiatic Turkey, and in European Turkey she conquered up to the very gates of Constantinople. He believed Russia entered into the Congress with a splendid military plan, and although she had given way in certain particulars she had got an equivalent for it. He considered the question of Greece to be to a very great extent a sentimental question. England was not able to secure all she wanted in her own interests in the Congress, therefore she could not be expected to secure those of Greece. Having said so much in approval of the policy of the Government, he would revert to one point which seemed to him to outweigh all others, and that was the Anglo-Turkish Circular. Why we should have bound ourselves hand-and-foot to go to war on a future occasion, it might be very likely at a cost of as much as £200,000,000, for the protection of Turkey he could not understand. He could not see any sufficient military reason whatever for such an engagement, but he saw many objections to it. The Crown at the present moment was in such a position that it would have to go to war for Turkey if Asiatic Turkey was attacked; but he hardly thought that the country was so much in the hands of the Crown that it could not get out of such an engagement. He expected that the Government on this occasion would receive a majority, probably of 120, and in that case the House of Commons would have agreed with the Treaty. It might even then be said that the House of Commons was five years old, and a future Government might say that they would not accept the judgment of the House of Commons of 1878. He was not at all sure that the country would not be appealed to on a question of such gigantic importance; and even then, being unaware of the immense responsibilities that had to be undertaken, the country might again return the Government opposite to power. If that were so, the country would have ratified the Treaty; and that being so, if at any future time Russia invaded Turkey, England would be bound to go to war. In the late negotiations they shrank from the responsibilities of going to war. He did not say they were not right in doing so. The country, he had no doubt, would have consented to war; but it was not eager for

  919
  it, and, therefore, if Government had engaged in war, they would have undertaken a very great responsibility. The fault he had to find against the Government was, that if they wanted war they should have gone a year ago, when Turkey was in a much better position than at present, and not have left it to a future Ministry, who would be in a comparatively disadvantageous position. Before the late war Turkey had all the resources of European Turkey; but at the present time, roughly speaking, she had only one-half of those resources. She had been deprived of a formidable position—namely, the largest river in Europe—as a frontier, which was always considered the principal protection Turkey had against Russian advance. If England went to war with Turkey against Russia she would have to fight without the Quadrilateral, with the Balkans as the Turkish frontier. In "another place" a good deal had been said by the Prime Minister; but the greatest military writer—Jomany—simply laughed at the Balkans as an immense military position, and Count Von Moltke attributed little importance to the Balkans as a Turkish frontier unless Turkey held certain places; in fact, in future, Turkey would be fighting without any real frontier, the Balkans in their present condition offering no formidable obstacle. The next war would, he believed, be one for the possession of Constantinople and Gallipoli. In reference to Asiatic Turkey, the noble Lord the Postmaster General had given it to-night as the opinion of Count Schouvaloff that Turkey was actually in a stronger and in a better position than before. That, of course, was a polite thing for Count Schouvaloff to say, but nothing more. The Postmaster General had also given it as the opinion of the French Plenipotentiary that Turkey was now more compact. Certainly it was; but he considered it rather strange that the noble Lord should read out the extract, which was to the effect that Turkey, at the expense of the sacrifices, was more compact. Whatever might be said of the results of the Congress, it might be taken as certain that Turkey had been very materially weakened, both in Asia and in Europe. Of her strength in Asia, the Home Secretary had, he believed, spoken erroneously; for in that part of her Dominions there was no continuously
  920
  defensible position, but only mountains which, considering the general elevation of the country, were almost insignificant. On the other hand, it was to be borne in mind that Russia had constantly been overcoming the natural obstacles in her way. She had now got what it had always taken the first year of her previous wars with Turkey to obtain; and in case of a future war with Turkey she would, as it were, commence with one year's fighting to the good. He had, therefore, no confidence in the present military situation of Turkey. The noble Lord at the head of the Post Office had said that precedents were not wanting for our protective alliance with Turkey, and had instanced among others the Tripartite Treaty. But that Treaty, compared with the Treaty of Berlin and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, was easy of accomplishment and fulfilment, especially as it provided us with powerful Allies, while the new Guarantee would have to be maintained by us alone and in all probability at a vast cost. Also, as the noble Lord had said, there were the Treaties for the protection of Portugal, and Sweden and Norway; but in both cases we had in our favour either strong Allies or a defensible position. In short, England had entered into a very bad bargain, and into an engagement the fulfilment of which, at no very distant date, would probably cost as much as £200,000,000, and that would affect his, as well as other constituencies; therefore, it was not to be entered into with a light heart. The hon. and gallant Member concluded by remarking that he did not blame the Government for many of their acts, which he considered wise and unavoidable; but he believed that they had simply postponed the engagement, and in doing so they had left England in a much worse position to fulfil it than that which she previously occupied.
  SIR JOHN HAYcontended that by concluding the Convention which they had done with Turkey, the Government had pursued a wise course. They had defined a clear and distinct boundary, which they declared that Russia should not pass. Until a boundary line was drawn between Canada and the United States, causes of embroilment were constantly arising; but since the boundary had been clearly defined, peace had been maintained between England and the United States without a fear almost of

  921
  its being broken. He carried his mind into Asia, and he believed the same policy there would be attended with success. He did not believe that it would be impossible to compel Russia to respect the boundary so drawn by the Government. As he read the Convention, it meant this. Hitherto Great Britain had engaged with other Powers to protect Turkey in the work of reform; but other Powers had not always found it convenient to support England in the desire for reform. In Asia Minor, none of the Powers were willing to assist England, and it was in Asia Minor that England's great interests lie. They said to the present Sultan, whose conduct was guided by the instincts of humanity— "We will show you the way this country may be reformed;" and they said to Russia—"You must not cross the boundary line while those reforms are going on." To the eastward of this territory lay Persia, and they knew how vast were their interests in that quarter; and he thought a railway to our Indian Possessions was quite within the bounds of possibility. Then a hostile advance by Russia on India would be easily threatened by our position on her flank —a position which would enable England to expose Russia to the greatest danger. He, therefore, differed from the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Major Nolan) who distrusted the Convention. Again, the possession of Cyprus appeared to him to be of the greatest possible advantage to England. It was quite true that in Cyprus there was no harbour for large ships; but no difficulty was experienced in landing troops, and the position was invaluable in making it easy for England to protect the Suez Canal. With regard to Greece, he did not see what there was to complain of. The Greek Government had been fostered by this country from the beginning until now, but the Greeks had not shown themselves very capable of governing. There were, no doubt, many causes for the failure; he was not blaming the Greeks for the failure. When he had the honour of serving in those parts, and visiting Greece, he could then ride to Marathon or Thermopylæ with as much safety as he could now ride to Wimbledon or Epsom; but within the last few years it had become hazardous work travelling in Greece. There was a noble Lord in the House who could
  922
  speak with authority on this subject, and they all knew how many excellent British subjects had lost their lives while travelling in the most innocent manner in that so-called civilized country. They looked forward with great hope to an improvement in Greece; and, no doubt, if her territory was extended—if they gave her larger responsibilities—they would enable Greece eventually to take a higher place in Europe than she now held. Several of the hon. Members on the Opposition side who had addressed the House spoke frequently of the Berlin Treaty, but they altogether omitted to consider the Treaty of San Stefano. They forgot that when that Treaty was made, Russia had her hand on her victim's throat, and that her Army was on the point of seizing Constantinople, with a huge Bulgaria in the rear taking up the heart of Turkey, and reaching down even to the Mediterranean. If that Treaty had been allowed to stand, it would have been impossible to hope that Greece would reach the height of her ambition. If Greeks had been incorporated in a new Slav State, there would have been no chance of their being transferred to Greece in case its expansion should ensue from the failure to regenerate Turkey, and of the success of the efforts to do so he had no very strong hope. Yet, if the arrangements which Russia had based upon her conquests had been completed, the Greeks would have been debarred from any increase of territory. We might entertain the hope that Greece would be enabled, by experience of good government, to claim the confidence of Europe and of her own people, and that, by acquiring Thessaly and Epirus, and Byzantium for her capital, she might become a Power strong enough to restrain Russian designs on Constantinople; but to say that we neglected Greek interests when we enabled her Representative to appear at the Congress, and when we saved a possible part of future Greece from absorption by Bulgaria was to exhibit a desire, not to benefit Greece, but to damage Her Majesty's Government; and the clause of the Resolution of the noble Marquess which contained this charge ought to be withdrawn. He confessed he had heard with regret that the European Plenipotentiaries generally had permitted Russia to seize that portion of Bessarabia which the

  923
  Treaty of 1856 had assigned to Roumania. He had not, however, much sympathy with Roumania. That State had been created that it might be an Eastern Belgium, and that Russia might not have access to the Danube; England, France, and Austria uniting, in the Tripartite Treaty, to make invasion of Roumania a casus belli. But the misconduct of the Turkish Government, the barbarities that were committed—not all on one side — and the appeals made to popular passion, rendered it impossible to carry out the bargain that had been made to defend Turkey. No one had ever expected Roumania to resist the power of Russia in her late advance to the Danube by force; but she had thrown herself into the arms of Russia, and assisted to break the peace of Europe, and, having benefited by such alliance, she had no right to come and ask Europe to defend her against her Ally. He thought the conduct of Russia had been infamous; but it was not our business to go to war to protect Roumania after she had neglected the duty for which she had been created. If Prince Charles had been true to his pledges, Roumania would have had a fair claim on Austria and England, and on France, if she had been able to unite with them. As it was, Roumania had fallen among thieves and had associated with them, and she must make the best of her bargain. There was even one advantage in what had occurred between Roumania and Russia, since it was a lesson to all the States of Europe in regard to what they had to expect from the promises of Russia, which were limited entirely by her earth hunger; territory she would have from friends who were foolish enough to trust her, or foes who could not resist. He entirely concurred with what the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Major Nolan) had said on the subject of Batoum. It was a great misfortune that port should have been given to Russia, and a hardship, because it had not been taken by force. Though he had not been at Batoum, he had served in the Black Sea and studied the charts, and he knew that away from the Crimea there were only two good harbours, Batoum and Bourgas. If the Treaty of San Stefano had been maintained, Turkey would have been left without a port; but by the Treaty of Berlin she had gained Bourgas, which
  924
  was in a better situation, and a better harbour than Batoum. That was an enormous gain to Russia. As to the talk about keeping it a commercial port, it was naturally a strong place, and landing a few heavy guns and planting torpedoes would make it impregnable. The great advantage to Russia would be that they would now have a terminable harbour for the railway from Tiflis to Poti. The reason why the cession of Batoum, which had not been conquered by Russia, was a loss to us was that we were the natural opponents of Russia. The conditions in Europe, Asia, the Mediterranean, and all over the world, made us antagonists; and he did not believe there would be peace except for so long as, for her own purposes, and from fear of the power of England, Russia chose to maintain it. The gain of territory by Servia and Montenegro was advantageous, and he had always felt that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria would be the surest guarantee for peace in that quarter of Europe. It enabled Austria to cut off a source of an enormous expense to her from the constant disturbances on her frontier, while it enabled her to assume a military position which would make it much more dangerous in future for Russia to attack Constantinople by land. For these reasons, he should support the Amendment; and he hoped his explanation would satisfy the hon. and gallant Gentleman who last spoke, and secure for the Amendment the votes of the Irish Members.
  MR. J. HOLMSsaid, that the observations he had to make to the House had reference entirely to the Convention between England and Turkey, and he wished, as a humble Member of that House, to enter his most emphatic protest against that Convention. In his opinion, it entailed upon the people of this country unseen difficulties and interminable evils. At that moment, most thinking men in the country were considering what was likely to be the outcome of that Convention. He confessed that he had heard, with no small surprise, that the Government were not in earnest, and that in all probability the Convention would not be carried out. Now, he for one, would protest against any such course being pursued by the Government of this country. They had taken Cyprus as a

  925
  pledge that they would carry out certain real and well-defined duties. Those were, first, that they should protect the Dominions of the Sultan in Asia against any encroachments by Russia; and the second was, that they should take care that the Sultan's Government was properly administered in that part of his Dominions. But there was something a little more even than that. In the despatch of Lord Salisbury to Sir Austen Layard, of the 30th of May, England clearly undertook another duty, and that was to protect the Sultan against his own subjects. But now another additional duty had been cast upon them by the speech of the hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Plunket). Following, as the hon. and learned Member did, the very able speech of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, who, in his opinion, disposed entirely of that bogus, the attempt of Russia to take India, he explained to the House, and his views were endorsed the following night by the Home Secretary, that we were not undertaking this duty merely to protect our Indian Possessions, but in order to safeguard Constantinople against Russia. If that were not done, Russia might go through Armenia and take Constantinople; so that now they had four duties imposed upon them. He would venture to say that a policy of that magnitude should not only have been submitted to the House of Commons, but, in his humble opinion, it was a matter that should have gone much beyond the consultation of the Legislature; for he doubted very much whether the consideration and the wisdom even of the Legislature was enough in a case of that nature, involving, as it did, such enormous responsibilities, without first putting the whole case clearly and fully and understandably before the people of England. By that Convention the Government had undoubtedly pledged 34,000,000 of people of this country to defend the undertakings they had entered into. Now, he ventured to believe that if they were to submit the question to the calm consideration of the people of England, that they would look at it by the light of homely wisdom and common sense, they would not support the Government in entering into that Convention. He only wished the Government would test the question.
  926
  He thought the very first question the people would ask would be this—Was it wise to enter into partnership with such a partner as Turkey? He thought they would inquire whether it was a safe sort of partnership, and whether such a Government as that of Turkey, which was either unable or unwilling, or perhaps both, to protect the lives and property and the honour of her peaceful and industrious subjects; and which, during the last 20 years, had squandered every penny of money she could obtain in loans from any Government. But if this new partner was in a hopeless state of bankruptcy a few years ago, what was his position now? He had lost the tributary States of Roumania and Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina were now in the hands of Austria, and Bulgaria would have 50,000 Russian troops to maintain for the next nine months. Now, the direct consequence of that state of things was, that just as there was an increase of pressure of taxation, so there would be an increase of bad government. The Sultan regarded himself as the Vicegerent of the Prophet; the Pasha was the image of the Sultan; and the soldiers were the servants of the Pashas; and, consequently, the soldiers would do whatever they were ordered to do by the Pashas in order that they might return to the Sultan the amount of taxes which was demanded of them. The truth was that England was emulating Russia in her weak point. Russia had an enormous and wide-spread territory. He thought that the extension of the Empire by adding Colonies was one thing and was a safe policy, because the Colonies were self-governed. But the addition that was now proposed was of the worst kind. It was of the same character as that of India, which, at the present time, gave us no small amount of trouble. It was even worse than that, because they would not only be subjected to the control of their own Government or even to the control of the Sultan, but they would be subjected to something beyond that; for, undoubtedly, Russia might at any moment step in with something to say. With the permission of the House, he would quote one other extract from Mr. Crow's book, The Greek and the Turk, which would show the character of the administration England was undertaking in the East. The author said—

  927
  "That taking the worst that was said of the treatment of the Christian rayah in Europe, he was 10 times more prosperous and happy than the inhabitants of the land which the Turks might he said to have to themselves."
  It had taken all the European Powers to obtain justice for Turkey in Europe, while England was about to attempt single-handed to govern Asia Minor. Something had been said about the commercial advantages of this acquisition, and when he first heard of the new task we had undertaken, he was prejudiced in favour of the scheme. Now, however, that he had examined the matter carefully, he could only consider such an idea a hopeless delusion. It was impossible to have trade where people were so lawless as they were in Asia Minor, where there were no roads, and where the hope of having roads was most remote. So far from this Convention promoting trade, he believed it would tend greatly to throw the Persian trade into Russian hands, and tend to place Russia in possession of the shortest routes to India. There was no chance whatever of trade being developed under present circumstances. But then they would probably be told of railways and guarantees of railways. Well, first as to the Persian Gulf. Dr. Evatt said of it, that its shores consisted of mountain ranges running parallel with the sea, and having between their bases a small shelf of land, probably the hottest part of the known world. Without rain, without rivers, and without vegetation, it was impossible to imagine a land more barren or more desolate in appearance; while the climate was most trying to Europeans. As to the Euphrates Valley scheme, the same writer said that if ever it were constructed it would be constructed purely as an English undertaking. Turkey was unable to build it, and no other nation wanted it. Turkey was not wealthy enough to build it, and even if she were, a line through a desert would never pay. Such a railway could not be made without a guarantee from our Government, and if it were made, who would it be made for? Then, again, if they had a fear of Russia reaching India, how were they to guard the railway? How many soldiers would be necessary for the purpose? He would ask hon. Gentlemen opposite whether, if the people of this country were consulted, they would not consider the finan-
  928
  cial aspects of this question to be of a serious character. We had undertaken the Protectorate of a great territory, and we should have never-ceasing applications for money for railways, fortifications here and there, and other purposes. We had undertaken the guardianship of 1,350 miles of coast along the Mediterranean, more than once-and-a-half the mileage of the coast of Spain and France. And at Cyprus we were a vast distance from the point as to which the Prime Minister had declared to Russia —"Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther." It was difficult to say how many soldiers would be required. The Prime Minister had said that the late war was a great war, and that 1,000,000 of soldiers had been engaged in it. If that were true, were we to have that which all European countries had—a conscription? Let the Government put conscription before the country, and the working men would quickly thoroughly understand this question. Conscription once proposed would make the people more thoroughgoing politicians than this country had ever seen before. The Prime Minister went to the Congress, and he found it necessary to bring home something. The noble Lord was like Moses Primrose in The Vicar of Wakefield, who went to the fair and brought home as the price of the horse he took to sell a gross of shagreen spectacles. We sent the Prime Minister to the fair, and he had to bring something back; but what he brought back was scarcely what we expected. The more the subject was investigated the worse we should see it to be. Viewing the matter by the light of facts, we must admit that we were much damaged in the eyes of Europe. He thought the Government of England ought to have consulted the people of England before coming to so serious a determination.
  MR. STAVELEY HILLsaid, that there were really two questions before the House. The first was the conduct of the Government before and during the war, and the second their acts in relation to the peace. In regard to the first point, it had often been said that if the Government had supported the united action of Europe on the basis of the Berlin Memorandum the war would have been avoided, and results almost as satisfactory as those of the Treaty of Berlin

  929
  would have been obtained. He ventured to say that no one who looked at the real position of the combatants would share such an opinion. The war had its origin, not in the Bulgarian rising, but in the ambition of one man, and in the determination of Russia to bring that conflict about before Greece had placed herself in a position which would have prevented Russia from arriving at Constantinople. Nowhere in the Resolutions had the Opposition ventured to say that Her Majesty's Government had been guilty of any neglect or want of due precaution or foresight in what they did before or during the war. The main question which arose in the debate related to the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the peace. The first Resolution, which seemed to bear the impress of the hand of the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), dealt with Greece. It appeared to be assumed that this country entered into a compact with Greece to do all we could for her at the Conference. In point of fact, however, the Correspondence in the Blue Books showed that the compact which existed had been loyally fulfilled by England. That Correspondence clearly showed that the question which the Greeks desired to bring before the Congress was the boundary question, and no other. The English Government also promised to use their best influence in order to secure for the Greek populations of the Turkish Provinces any administrative reforms and advantages which might be conferred on the Christian population of any other place. Looking at what had occurred before and at the Congress, he had no hesitation in saying that our Plenipotentiaries had fulfilled the engagements of the Government, and had done everything for Greece that it was possible to do. And who was it, after all, that complained? Not the Greeks. It had not been suggested for a moment, to his knowledge, by any Greek subject or by any Greek newspaper, that England had been disloyal. No; the charge came from hon. Members opposite, and not from those whose interests were at stake. What was it that Greece might be supposed to complain of? Not being allowed to go to war? Why, she was bankrupt in purse and lean in population, and had great cause to be thankful that she took the advice of England.
  930
  Greece must solidify her own country, and that she was only just accomplishing, before she sought to extend her power. Could she hope to gain at once what others had only gained in time? She might thank Europe for preventing Russia barring against her the walls of Stamboul. If she only had patience, "the mulberry leaf would become satin." She had an inheritance still left open to her, and her wisest policy was to wait and learn how rare in the annals of history were the instances of national rejuvenescence. He would pass now from Greece to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. First of all, as to the mode in which it had been obtained. It had been said—"How dare you abuse Russia for having a secret Alliance with Turkey, and yet go with a secret Alliance yourselves with Turkey into the Congress?" It was all very well to put the proposition in that way, but a very serious consideration had been omitted by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. What Her Majesty's Government said to Russia was not—"You shall not have a secret Agreement with Turkey," but—"You shall not have a secret Agreement which contravenes the public Agreements of Europe." If the Anglo-Turkish Convention did in any way contravene the Treaty of 1856, then it ought to fall to the ground. It was because it was absolutely a step in the direction of carrying out that Treaty that we were allowed to go into the Congress, although we had an Agreement with Turkey in our pocket; and it was because the Treaty of San Stefano was in direct contravention of the Treaty of 1856 that England objected to it. But it was said the Prerogative of the Crown had been considerably abused, because the Anglo-Turkish Convention was agreed to without the consent of Parliament. With regard to this, there was one hon. Member opposite who must have been surprised to hear the language of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. He alluded to the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), who, on bringing forward a Motion to the effect that Commercial Treaties, at all events, should not be signed without the approval of Parliament, was met by the right hon. Member for Greenwich with the following words:—
  "The question is too large to attempt to discuss it now. It goes really to the root of one

  931
  of the most important parts of the Prerogatives of the Crown."
  That was the view taken by the right hon. Gentleman, when it was proposed that Commercial Treaties should be discussed by Parliament before being signed; but it was one which did not seem to have occurred to him in the present case. The Treaty with France in 1860, again, was concluded amid the greatest secrecy—a circumstance, which only showed how the right hon. Gentleman could alter his views according to the circumstances in which he happened to be placed. There were other instances of a similar kind, and to accuse Her Majesty's Government of improper secrecy was altogether too monstrous. As to the right hon. Gentleman's remarks upon Cyprus, he could only say that our acquisition of the Island was perfectly in accordance with the Treaty of 1856, whereas the seizure of Constantinople by Russia would have been a breach of it. The second part of the Anglo-Turkish Convention referred to the work which had been undertaken in Asia Minor. Of this, it had been said that it was the most gigantic task that any nation ever undertook. While he did not know that that need frighten them, it would be seen by anyone who chose to look at a despatch of May, 1876, setting out the Turkish code of reform, how easy it would be to see whether that code was properly carried out or not; but he thought his right hon. Friend the Homo Secretary had put the matter in the best possible way, when he said—
  "Surely what Russia can do England can do; surely if Russia is to he believed in stating she could undertake all these duties, England is not so far inferior in administrative qualities that she cannot do what Russia can do."
  The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) told them they must not point to India as exhibiting a state of things to Asia Minor. No; they pointed to India to show what England had done under far more difficult circumstances than now existed, and they said that the men who could do the work they had done in India could do the work that was still to be done in Asia Minor. He would ask the House which would be the more difficult task—to bring about a proper state of administration amongst a loyal people, or amongst the ruined and estranged people of Bulgaria? He would call as a wit-
  932
  ness, Count Schouvaloff. It was recorded, on page 68 of the Protocols, that—
  "Count Schouvaloff desires to give to the Congress a general idea of what has been done in Bulgaria since the Russian Army entered it, and what remains to be done there. The late Prince Tchekersky was struck with the fact that the Turkish legislation was well suited to the wants of the country, only the laws and regulations were not known to the public functionaries who were to put them in force."
  What Russia undertook to do in Bulgaria, surely we, with our not inferior administrative qualities, might undertake to do in Asia Minor? If it could be done, they would all agree that it should be done. If England had such a work before her, she would not grudge a little labour or a little cost in carrying it out. But he would even take a lower ground, and say that while the markets of the Continent were being more and more closed to us by an insane love of great armaments, we could find markets in those old countries if they were educated in the arts of peace. By such means, England would be well repaid for whatever cost the task she had undertaken would involve. One word as to the attack which had been made upon Austria by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. It would not be forgotten that when the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced, a few weeks since, that Austria was our Ally, the right hon. Gentleman, in reply, and on the spur of the moment, bitterly attacked Austria, and endeavoured to sow the seeds of discord between that country and England. He wondered to see such a departure from the loyalty he owed to his country on the part of a right hon. Gentleman. No one had more respect with regard for the right hon. Gentleman than he had; but he could not remember anything that he more regretted than that attack upon Austria. The Government of Austria was now very far from being what it was 20 years ago. Even in Cracow the people were well governed, free from police espionage, and at full liberty to worship according to their conscience. It was not fair to say that Turkish Provinces were handed over to the tender mercies of Austria, and least of all by one who seemed to have given in his adhesion to the despotism of Russia. One word he wished to add as to the relations of England and Russia.

  933
  He did not believe that the result of this struggle, though it might have alienated them for a time, would be to separate Russia and England. He might, perhaps, be thought to be speaking with some especial reasons for such a hope; but, bringing to bear upon this subject such means of knowledge as had occurred to him, he regarded it in this light. The war was counselled and planned by one whose policy it was to guide his august Master and his country along the path of ambition, and consequent distrust of England. The day was coming when the advancing years of one whose age did not, however, interfere with his doing his country good service at the Council Board of Europe, would necessarily remove him from his high position. Who should succeed him in that high place? The advance of the Armies of Russia to the Straits, and the occupation of their strong places, the further weakening of Turkey, and the thwarting the will of England, would form a claim almost irresistible. That step had failed, and had brought serious losses on his country, and Europe was freed from the dangers which would attend such a succession to Prince Gortchakoff. Who then was to take his place?—for upon that would depend the future of the relations between Russia and England. He was glad to hear the words of appreciation used by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Second Plenipotentiary of Russia. Most carefully had he guarded the interests of his country; but upon those interests he had brought to bear his insight into the views and power of this country. Count Schouvaloff knew well that England aimed not at conquest, but progress; and under his counsels, grounded, as he believed they must be, on the value of friendship between England and Russia, the older country would, while she might sometimes restrain, lead her younger rival along the path of a real strength and greatness.
  MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSENsaid, that the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down had advised the Opposition to study somewhat more closely the religion of Russia. He would retort by advising the hon. and learned Gentleman to study somewhat more closely the religion of Christian charity, and not to impute a want of loyalty to their country to those who
  934
  were unfortunate enough to differ from him upon some particular point. During the last two years, he (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) had not deemed it necessary to trouble the House with speeches, or the Government with questions, upon Eastern affairs. He had known that delicate and difficult negotiations were going on; he had felt that the access to information possessed by private Members was of necessity limited, and he shrank from the responsibility of making newspaper paragraphs the basis of a question, or of building up a speech upon club rumours, which often turned out to have no substantial foundation. But to-night there was no question of idle rumours or newspaper paragraphs. With authentic documents before them —though neither so full nor so complete as they might desire—they were called upon to review the policy of Her Majesty's Government; and he would ask for the indulgence of the House but for a very few minutes whilst he sought to justify the vote which he intended to give after such review. Now the Resolutions which his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) had submitted to the House embodied two separate sets of questions—the one connected with the Berlin Treaty, and the other relative to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. He regretted that those questions should have been mixed up as they had been, because he felt a disposition—and he knew many Liberals who shared the feeling—to express general approval of the Berlin Treaty, while expressing utter disapproval of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The former appeared to have been built up upon a series of compromises between the Great Powers, and he had some reluctance to take hold of any one compromise out of the whole quantity, and to diminish a general approval by a particular expression of regret. As regarded the Convention, he believed there were so many strong reasons against it that it might very well have been separately brought before the House. With reference to the allusion which was made in the Resolution of his noble Friend to Greece, it had been hinted that that reference was unfortunate, inasmuch as it might give rise to the idea that there was a Party in this country which would be ready to support the Greeks if they saw fit to enter upon a struggle in opposition to

  935
  Turkey; but it could not be too fully denied by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House that any such Party existed, or was likely to exist, in England. The danger—if danger there were— arose from the Prime Minister having told Greece that she had a future if she would only wait, and those words— when interpreted by a Greek—could only mean, under the circumstances, an accession of territory by Greece. If it was to be obtained by peaceful diplomacy, why was it not done now? He feared that the words of the Prime Minister and the action of the Congress upon this point would give rise to future disturbances in Greece; whilst if it was true that whilst the Slav populations who had followed Russia had received a large measure of freedom, the Hellene populations, who had trusted England, had received nothing but fair words; he also feared that they had given a great and unnecessary power and prestige to Russia at the expense of this country. He was not prepared to express disproval of the Berlin Treaty as a whole, or join in the condemnation of the Plenipotentiaries who took part in settling that Treaty. As soon as those two Noblemen had been appointed Plenipotentiaries, he had shut out from his mind altogether the fact that they had ever been political antagonists, and had endeavoured to remember only that they were the Representatives of his country. And he felt bound to say that, although they might have committed mistakes in some of the difficult details with which they had to do, yet as a whole, he believed they had acted as they thought best to sustain the honour and reputation of this country, and he did not grudge them the public approval which they had received. He condoned any faults in the manipulation of the Congress. He thought that it was the duty of every Englishman to support and wish well to the peaceful solution which had been reached, and he trusted that the peace which the Plenipotentiaries had brought home might be lasting and satisfactory to this country and to Europe. He did not blame the proceedings within the Congress; but, turning to the words and actions of the Plenipotentiaries outside and beside the Congress in contrast to those within it, he gave them his unqualified disapproval. When he turned to the Anglo-
  936
  Turkish Convention, he said at once that the longer he looked at it the greater astonishment did he feel both at the manner and the matter of that Convention. It would really seem as if they had been living in a mist and a fog during the last two years. During that time they had constantly had dinned into their ears stories about the duplicity, the intrigues, the secret diplomacy of Russia. They had heard these things in private conversations, they had read them in public speeches, they had seen them in the columns of the Press; even the very boards of our theatres had been employed to depict the system of espionage attributed to Russia, and the wily arts by which she was supposed to conduct her diplomatic strategy. But what would the theatres of St. Petersburg justly produce next year? There was no secret act of Russia which Government had not equalled in their recent action; and he said, more in sorrow than in anger, that they had dragged down the name of English diplomacy and statesmanship, and had committed a double offence against the Great Powers of Europe, and against the Constitution of their own country. How had they sinned against the Great Powers? Because they had concluded a Convention behind the backs of the other Plenipotentiaries, and had studiously kept it from them. At the very moment when they were sitting together in Congress upon those Eastern affairs to which that Convention related; at the very moment that our Plenipotentiaries were using conciliatory language and with a patronizing benevolence were patting the Russian Plenipotentiaries on the back for their conciliatory language and demeanour, our Government was concluding a secret Convention which could only be justified upon the supposition that Russia was not only not conciliatory but was both aggressive and treacherous. If this Convention was of any importance, why was it not to be submitted to Congress as well as the Treaty of San Stefano? That Treaty had been won by Russia at the point of the sword after enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure. But their Convention was also a result of the war, for they had told them that but for the war the Sultan would never have signed it. Why was not one Treaty as well as the other to be submitted to Congress? But the noble Lord

  937
  the President of the Board of Trade (Viscount Sandon) had told them that the Great Powers were not offended, because none of them had protested. But Great Powers who had an adequate sense of their own dignity did not always protest unless they were prepared to follow up their protest by other action, and the absence of a protest did not necessarily imply any satisfaction or approval. But if the Government believed that the other Great Powers really felt satisfaction and approval, what a pity it was that they had not obtained the expression of such feelings in a regular and legitimate way by submitting their Convention to the Congress. And when the words of M. Gambetta were triumphantly quoted to the effect that Austria now stood as a sentinel at one end of the Eastern arena and England at the other, he would beg to remind the House of the vast difference between the two. Austria stood as the sentinel duly appointed by the will and authority of the Congress of the Great Powers. Austria was the keeper's dog appointed to watch the game, whilst England represented the poacher's dog who came to bay at the game without any authority, and might possibly be suspected of some sinister intentions. But whether or no the manner of making this Convention had been an offence against the other Great Powers, he maintained that it had been a grave offence against the Constitution of England. Parliament had no knowledge of this Convention till it had been made and ratified. He knew well the answer which would be made. In the first place, it was said that the Crown had a right to conclude Treaties without consulting Parliament; and, secondly, that if the present Convention had been submitted to Parliament, there would have been a delay, which would have defeated its objects. Let him deal with both assertions. He did not deny—no one denied—that the Crown had this right. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Lowe) had never denied it; and he would observe that, amid all the gibes and jeers with which the noble Lord the Member for North Leicestershire (Lord John Manners) had answered this part of the speech of his right hon. Friend, he had not been able to disprove or deny one of his assertions. This right of the Crown existed, but it existed upon sufferance, and its frequent
  938
  and incautious use would inevitably endanger its existence. It was a right which should be used sparingly, and with great caution and judgment. The Government would find it dangerous to put Prerogative in the place of Representative action. They might quote to him precedents, as had been already done; but his reply was simple. This right was one, every exercise of which should be specially depending upon each particular case, and no precedent was of value unless they could show that a necessity for the exercise of the right had existed in the present case equal to that which had existed at the time of the precedent, and that the surrounding circumstances were identical. Not only should the right be sparingly exercised, but there were two conditions of affairs in which it should not be exercised at all. The first was, when the Treaty concluded without consultation with Parliament involved the adoption of any new policy which had not been submitted either to the Hereditary or the Elective branch of the Legislature; the second was when it involved a large additional expenditure of public money, or, in other words, a large addition to the taxation of the country which had not received the sanction of those Representatives of the people who were specially charged to watch over the taxation of those whom they represented. What did Mr. Fox say upon this point? Speaking of the Sardinian Treaty in 1794, he made use of these words—
  "He should perhaps be told, that the treaty being concluded by his Majesty, the proper representative of the country in all transactions with foreign powers, the House could not refuse to ratify it, without subjecting themselves to the imputation of a breach of faith. This doctrine he must peremptorily deny. If the House was considered as bound to make good every treaty which His Majesty, by the advice of his ministers, might think proper to conclude, there was a complete surrender of the public purse to the executive power."—[Parl. Hist., xxx. 1312–13.]
  Now, no amount of eloquence and no intrepidity of assertion on the Treasury Bench would convince any impartial mind that they had not entered upon a Convention which would entail a vast additional expenditure upon the country. They had done more. He (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) would say emphatically that they had made an approach to personal government which, unless noticed and checked, might work infinite mis-

  939
  chief. There were great advantages in personal government; the concentration of power, the easy wielding of authority, the facility of the execution of plans—all these were found of advantage in countries where absolutism existed. But our forefathers had arrived at the deliberate conclusion that the blessings of a free Constitutional Government outweighed all the advantages of any other system. Their opinion had been emphatically endorsed by the people of this country, and we ought to watch with a vigilant and jealous eye any encroachment upon our Parliamentary Privileges or our Representative system. Why was the Sovereign of this country so popular with all classes of Her subjects? He did not refer to those individual and personal merits which would secure affection to the present Occupant of the Throne, even if She were an absolute Monarch. But She was popular as the Sovereign of the country because in Her the nation recognized the Constitutional Head of a free people; in her they saw the embodiment and personification of their own liberties; the stay and support of their freedom at home, and the exponent of their free and unfettered opinions in Her intercourse with foreign nations. Weaken the link which bound together Sovereign and people through the action of the elected Representatives of the latter, and they struck a blow at the whole system of our Constitution. By every step they took in the direction of personal government —that is, of the assumption of an authority apart from and without the Representatives of the people—they gave the strongest encouragement to any Revolutionary or Republican Party which might exist in this country; and if, happily, none such did exist, they took the surest and most direct way to create it. They might laugh at and disbelieve this statement; but unless he (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) was greatly mistaken, these things would not be forgotten in the country, and the Government would find that they had entered upon a dangerous experiment. And what had been the necessity for their secrecy? Why could not they have waited until the Congress had concluded its labours, and then considered their position with regard to Turkey? If they had intended to trick or deceive anybody, of course the motive was explained; but no one
  940
  would wish to impute such an intention to Her Majesty's Government. He supposed the motive was to be explained in Lord Beaconsfield's words—"The objects we had to attain could not have been realized except by secrecy." What was that except saying in other words that they wanted something which they knew the Congress would not give them, and so they took it behind the back of the Congress. They put every moral pressure upon Russia to make her obey the decisions of the Congress, whilst they acted on their own behalf without submitting to any decisions. He could but think that the manner in which this Convention had been obtained, behind the backs of the Congress and of Parliament was, though hon. Gentlemen might not like to profess it in the House, something which the country gentlemen, who were the main supporters of the Government, would regret, and which would detract from the high character of English diplomacy, making it no longer possible to repudiate as heretofore, the epithet which was applied to it by the First Napoleon. What was the real object of the Convention? After all, it might come to nothing. No doubt we were bound by it to go to war if Russia attacked the Asiatic Dominions of the Porte; but if such an occasion arose, it would be for the England of that day to decide whether the war should be undertaken without reference to the Convention which had been obtained behind the back of Parliament. If this were true, the words were mere bravado, and insulting to Russia. But Russia would not protest. Russia was not dissatisfied. She had obtained much more by the aid of those who had always professed themselves the friends of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire than she would have done if we had gone hand-in-hand with her to enforce the decisions of the Constantinople Conference. But what, after all, was the object of the Convention? It could not be to effect reforms in Turkey, for the Government had told them that they had obtained a safe Northern barrier for Turkey, and that her power would be concentrated, so that she could have no difficulty in reforming herself. It had been said that the object of the Convention was to safeguard India by safeguarding Asia Minor; but the theory of any danger to India arising from that

  941
  quarter had long since been exploded. In old days there had always been those fears; but the answer to them had been given in better words than he could use, which he would quote to the House. They had been told that Russia already possessed the only land-road to India— namely, by Persia and Affghanistan. Now, many years ago, we went to Affghanistan to depose Dost Mahomet, who was said to have been seduced by a Russian agent. In 1842, a Motion for Papers on this subject was made by Mr. H. Baillie, and seconded by a Gentleman who afterwards obtained some authority with the Conservative Party. This Gentleman ridiculed the idea of Russian invasion, and said that—
  "He did not believe, that we should be deprived of that Empire either by internal insurrection or by the foreign invader. If ever we lost India, it would be from financial convulsion."—[3 Hansard, lxiv. 450.]
  And then, deprecating war, he went on to use the following remarkable words:—
  "Would they tell us that it was necessary to create a barrier for our Indian empire? When he looked at the geographical position of India, he found an empire separated on the east and west from any power of importance by more than 2,000 miles of neutral territory, bounded on the north by an impassable range of rocky mountains, and on the south by 10,000 miles of ocean. He wanted to know how a stronger barrier, a more efficient frontier, could be secured than this which they possessed, which nature seemed to have marked out as the limit of a great empire? But they wanted a barrier. A barrier against whom? .… The foe could not be Russia. For the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston). …. had stated that the explanations of Russia were perfectly satisfactory."
  Taking advantage of an interruption of Lord Palmerston, he continued—
  "Oh, then it was Russia. …. The noble Lord did want a barrier against Russia—with the noble Lord's peculiar views he was not surprised at this."—[Ibid, 455–6.]
  He concluded this part of his speech by protesting against the idea that if Russia had designs upon our Indian Empire, she was to be resisted in Asia; it would be our duty to stop her in the Baltic and the Black Sea, not by the invasion of neutral nations or intermediate regions. The hon. Gentleman who spoke thus was Mr. Disraeli, now the Earl of Beacons-field, Prime Minister of England. [An hon. MEMBER: What was the date?] The date was June 23, 1842; but the
  942
  mountains had not moved—the sea was the same—it was only Mr. Disraeli who had changed, and he (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) would appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober, from the Earl of Beaconsfield, intoxicated with a diplomatic triumph and wishing to make a great impression on the theatre of the world, to the Mr. Disraeli who, at the time he spoke of, was applying his great talents to this question in a more unprejudiced spirit. Then, it had been said what alternative policy did the Opposition suggest? Was ever such an absurd doctrine preached in the House of Commons? A Government on their defence must be miserably weak indeed to expect those who criticized their policy to provide them with another, and to rely upon such an argument as a defence. To a similar retort, Sir Robert Peel had replied that he would prescribe when properly called in. Mr. Disraeli himself had said he would wait to see what he found in the pigeon-holes of his Predecessors before he announced his policy. The Party opposite had been ready enough to take their—the Opposition's— principles with their places; but they could hardly expect them to be green enough to supply them continually with a policy. He would, however, be generous, and would supply the Government with a policy. Was there no such policy as "leave it alone?" This, he thought, would have made a good impression on the taxpayers of the country. They had accused the late Government of "meddling and muddling," and now they themselves were doing so, to an extent which would greatly increase the public burdens. No doubt, the Government had already a large consensus of public opinion outside in favour of their policy, and that inside the House they were backed by a large majority. He knew well that Ministers would be followed into the Lobby by a large and compact majority. He did not grudge them the majority or the triumph. His own disappointment was that the Motion was not a specific Vote of Censure, instead of being one of regrets, as he confessed he was in favour of meeting his opponents face to face. But though the Government might have a majority now, they would find public opinion against them growing as the question became more understood. He should support the Resolutions of his noble Friend, be-

  943
  lieving that the Opposition was only performing a public duty in challenging the action of the Government; and although they knew they should be defeated in the coming division, yet, confidently relying upon the Constitutional principles which they had advanced, and the justice of their cause, they would appeal from the verdict of that House to the calmer and more matured judgment of an enlightened people.
  MR. BALFOURhad supposed that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, during the last two years, exhausted almost every form of invective against Her Majesty's Government; but since this debate began he had learnt that his resources were by no means exhausted. Formerly, the right hon. Gentleman scourged them with whips, and now he scourged them with scorpions. He did not believe there was any accusation which could be brought against the Government which was not implied in the indictment put forth by the right hon. Gentleman in his speech on Tuesday. He said that our policy at home was arbitrary, that our policy abroad was characterized by insanity; and, as far as he (Mr. Balfour) understood, by that low cunning which usually attended insanity. He should begin his remarks by alluding to the views expressed by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite as to the course which Her Majesty's Government had pursued with regard to the Treaty. In dealing with that subject, he would first refer to a point raised first, he thought, by the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), and afterwards discussed by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain). They alluded to some story that M. Waddington wished Thessaly and Epirus to be given to that nation, but that Lord Beaconsfield had objected. They also appeared to think that the proposal for the admission of the Greek Representatives to the Congress as made by the French Plenipotentiaries was more favourable to Greece than that which was adopted. [An hon. MEMBER: Infinitely.] That was not the opinion of M. Waddington. A reference to page 77 of the Blue Book would show that M. Waddington concurred in the view of Lord Salisbury. It was not so much a question of what they would like to give Greece, but of what could be obtained
  944
  for her. Professions of generous and noble sentiments could be very easily made; but the important question was, what was actually done at the Congress in favour of the Greek claims? They all knew that the late Mr. Joseph Surface professed to be a great admirer of everything noble and virtuous, but that his practice by no means agreed with his professions. The course which the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition took with reference to the discussion of the claims of Greece at the Congress was one of the most extraordinary that he ever heard of. The noble Lord read a number of extracts from speeches made by various Members of the Congress, and because he thought the sentiments expressed by other Powers—he was going to say the clap-trap uttered by them—were more favourable to liberty than what the British Plenipotentiaries said on the subject, therefore he concluded that the British Plenipotentiaries were on the side of servitude. As to the suggestion about Thessaly and Epirus being given to Greece without at the same time suggesting how they could be got to be given to Greece, they might as well suggest the giving of the moon to Greece. He now turned to the Anglo-Turkish Convention—that centre around which all the controversy now revolved. He must say that he thought the criticism on some part of it did not come very well from hon. Members opposite, as that criticism was inconsistent with what they had urged for the last two years. Hon. Gentlemen opposite appeared to have found it very difficult to extract a plain meaning out of what after all was a short and not very obscure document. Some of them seemed to think that the Convention obliged us to have a conscription, to contract an enormous debt, to increase the Army and Navy, and so on; others thought that they had made a mere paper Convention which had and could have no other object but to hand over Cyprus to the English nation. Neither of those views of it was founded in fact. The meaning of the Convention was that we were bound by legal obligation to go to war for Turkey against Russia if her territory in Asia Minor was attacked, provided that Turkey on her part showed a disposition to carry out real reforms in her administration. That was the whole extent of our legal

  945
  obligation. But, in addition to that, a guaranteeing Treaty was also a strong declaration of policy and intention. In 1871, the right hon. Member for Greenwich made a speech which contained much useful information on the subject of guaranteeing Treaties, and which the right hon. Gentleman himself might read with some advantage, and derive from it some information of a calming character. In that speech, he expressed the opinion that most guaranteeing Treaties were, more or less, strong declarations of policy and intention. Well, by the Anglo-Turkish Convention, England had made a strong declaration of her policy and her intention. That declaration was that we regarded the State of Asia Minor as being a question in which we were nearly concerned and had a right to interfere, and also that we had the strongest interest in the welfare of its population. Turning to the advantages which they hoped to derive from the Convention, but scant justice had been done to their object by hon. Gentlemen opposite. They might expect by that Convention to do a great benefit to Turkey, to do, also, a considerable benefit to Russia herself, and even, it might be, to exert some beneficial influence on the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite. The Treaty of 1856 failed, as the noble Lord the President of the Board of Trade had pointed out, partly from the neglect of the English Government during a series of years, and partly, also, because no inducement was held out by that Treaty to Turkey to perform her promises respecting reforms. The present Convention, on the other hand, gave Turkey the strongest inducement to effect reforms, because such reforms were made the condition of our assistance to her in keeping her Asiatic Empire together. There was no corresponding condition in the Treaty of 1856, and no argument as to the failure of that Treaty could be said to hold good with respect to that of 1878. Then, with regard to Russia, he held that by that Convention they would confer a benefit on her, even from a Russian point of view. Even giving Russia all the credit which her enthusiastic friends claimed for her, it could not be denied that she had progressed in point of absorption of territory most rapidly during the last two centuries, and that the law of her progress in that
  946
  respect had been constant. Around the edge of her frontier there was always a rim of discontent, sometimes caused by intrigue, and sometimes there were conflicts of hostile races and tribes; and the power of Russia became extended over the districts so disturbed. He looked on that as a sort of mechanical law guiding the Russian Government. He would assume that they were not responsible for this, but that it was imposed on them by an external law. How, then, should we strengthen their hands in that matter? That Convention would make those intrigues less probable, because it would make them less easy and less profitable. It would be far less easy for any designing persons to spread dissension among the tribes of the frontier if they knew that Russia would not interfere. On the other hand, the Russian Government, knowing that the result of advancing beyond her frontier would be a war with England, would resist the pressure put upon them by military authorities. He came next to the effect which he hoped the Convention would have on hon. Gentleman opposite. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), and other speakers, had loudly, but he hoped hastily, announced their conviction that in a few years England would not consider herself bound by this Treaty. Whether they did that in the interests of that public morality which they supposed the present Government had lowered he did not know. But he thought better of them than they apparently did of themselves. He did not believe that any English Government would at any time think itself absolved at its own free will from a Treaty entered into by Constitutional means; and he trusted that in future we should be preserved from the uncertain, mechanical policy which had been practised and recommended by hon. Gentlemen opposite during the last 10 years. The advantage of the arrangement to Turkey in Europe would be enormous. Russia, knowing that we had a consistent policy, would not run counter to it; while Turkey, under constant diplomatic pressure from our Envoys, and having given a pledge, the fulfilment of which we had a right to look forward to, would, he hoped, do something towards rendering that justice to her Asiatic populations which she had

  947
  too often failed to do to her European populations. These were some of the advantages which he hoped would result from the Convention; and, taking that in connection with the Treaty of Berlin, he could not but think that the Government had attained a triumph of which they had reason to be proud. The diplomatic difficulties which they had to undergo seemed to him of the most arduous character. Of the difficulties they had sustained, not abroad, but at home, everybody in that House could form a judgment for himself. Through the most constant and bitter opposition, attacked weekly, almost daily, in the most bitter harangues by hon. Gentlemen who, he was afraid, remembered too much that they belonged to different Parties, and too little that they belonged to the same country, Her Majesty's Government had, nevertheless, been able to bring these negotiations to a successful and peaceful termination. How it might turn out in the future he could not say, not having those gifts of prophecy to which hon. Gentlemen opposite had laid claim; but he thought that, as far as human foresight could go, they had ground for believing that the result would be in the direction of preserving the peace of Europe, improving the condition of the populations which the changes effected, and preserving the honour, dignity, and welfare of this country.
  MR. LAINGasked the indulgence of the House while he addressed himself almost exclusively to that branch of the subject on which he was able to speak with a certain amount of experience, owing to his connection with Indian affairs. There was one point, however, in connection with the Treaty of Berlin on which he had to remark, deeming it important that the public should not be left under any misapprehension with regard to it. He referred to the indemnity to be paid by Turkey to Russia. He addressed a Question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other evening with the view of ascertaining whether there was any foundation for the assurance so positively made in Lord Salisbury's despatch, that the payment of this indemnity was absolutely postponed till after the payment of the whole existing Turkish debts. His tight hon. Friend referred him to the Protocols. These, however, he had read before putting the Question. He had read them care-
  948
  fully since, and he thought it would be found that Count Schouvaloff, on the part of Russia, distinctly guarded himself in his expressions, and only pledged himself to the postponement of this indemnity in favour of the anterior existing special hypothecations. If the right hon. Gentleman would refer to the Council of Foreign Bondholders of the Stock Exchange, to the Chairman of the Bank of England, or of any of the banks in the City of London, he would find that the statement in Lord Salisbury's despatch was inaccurate, and that the public would be misled if they were to invest in Turkish Funds on the strength of it. He would find it perfectly clear that all Russia had done was to postpone that claim to the previously-existing special hypothecations. There was absolutely nothing in this to prevent Russia at any moment claiming payment, or taking payment in ships, if there should be a change of Government at Constantinople, and if the Sultan and his Government were favourable to such a mode of paying the debt of Turkey. The form of the claim for indemnity effectually destroyed the future credit of Turkey, for the only way of raising any money requisite for carrying out the schemes proposed for the fortification of the frontier would be to make fresh special hypothecations, which would be expressly contrary to the engagement made to Russia. As to the general question, it was a question which, after all, must be considered by the light of Indian experience and the opinions of Indian statesmen. In India, schemes precisely similar to this had for the last 50 years been the subject of general discussion, and by actual experiment we had there tested the comparative wisdom of the two policies. India was the keystone of the argument in favour of this Convention. No one would suppose that England would have entered upon such onerous engagements, or incurred the expense involved by such a Convention, for any other reason than that it was necessary to defend our Indian Empire. In order to justify the Convention with Turkey, it was necessary to prove that any Russian advance on Asia Minor was a real danger to India, and that the policy of the Convention was the best means of arresting the danger, if danger there be. The first point was to be decided by the authority of experience, and

  949
  by those plain arguments of common sense which, every man could appreciate. It was mainly, however, a question of authority, because the conditions of Asiatic society and Indian society were so different from those of this country. He could corroborate what he had said by an array of Indian authority, and, what was more remarkable, an array of Indian authority beginning with the same illustrious name as a right hon. Gentleman opposite had begun his catalogue of authorities—namely, the Duke of Wellington. Lord Hardinge, a man who was particularly qualified to express an opinion on this question, was intrusted to draw up a Report of the danger that might occur to India from Russian aggression. Lord Hardinge came to the conclusion that there was only one practical route to India— namely, through Herat and Affghanistan, and by passes into the Punjaub; but he gave reasons why that route would be impossible to any modern army. He said that if anyone entertained the idea that a modern army could invade India by that route, they might dismiss the idea as a political nightmare. The Duke of Wellington fully endorsed that opinion. He wrote upon it—"Hardinge is perfectly right." At that time the position of Russia in regard to armed collision with the English in India was vastly stronger than at present. Since that time, Russia had not advanced a single point. On the contrary, she had considerably receded. At that time, Persia was as much under the ascendancy of Russia as she was now. The Persian Army was officered and managed by Russian officers. They had beseiged Herat, the first stage on the road to India, and that place was only saved by an heroic young English officer, Poltinger by name, who happened to be in the town at the time. We did not now require to make any Convention to let Russia know that if she meant to take Herat we should be ready to defend it. The position of this country was infinitely stronger in a military point of view now than then. At the time when Lord Hardinge wrote his Memorandum, Scinde and the Punjaub were independent States, and might turn against us. They were, therefore, a cause of the greatest danger. Now, Punjaub and Scinde were parts of our Indian Empire. They were about the
  950
  most loyal and best-affected parts. They were the parts that supplied us with the best and most trustworthy soldiers. In this and in other respects our position had improved enormously. By the construction of railroads through India, and by the opening of the Suez Canal, we were practically very much nearer to our base of communication than we were in former times. In Lord Hardinge's time, reinforcements could only have been forwarded to resist invasion by sending them round by the Cape to Calcutta, and on by bullock waggons to the frontier. Now we had the Suez Canal, where steamers could be run through without change to Bombay; and, practically, we could concentrate the whole resources of the Empire on India in a very short space of time. Practically, the Guards could march out of Hyde Park and proceed to Peshawaur in six weeks, without disturbing a button of their uniform. Russia would have to traverse immense distances, through passes and over hills that were almost insurmountable. Occupying this position, it had been the policy of Lord Dalhousie, Canning, Lord Mayo, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Northbrook, to maintain—what had been so well called— a policy of masterly inactivity. That was, trust to your own resources first, and to the great distance between you and Russia. Rather than get within striking distance of Russia, or allow Russia to get within striking distance of you, you should trust to your own resources. He would like to read the opinion of a man of the highest authority—he meant Lord Lawrence—who had had special experience of India, and was well entitled to speak on this question. Lord Lawrence was the man who saved us during the crisis of the Mutiny. In 1869, writing on the proper policy to be pursued in India, he said—
  "That should any foreign Power, such as Russia, endeavour to stir up India to disaffection, our true policy would be to have full reliance on the highly qualified and disciplined Army stationed within our own territories. By strengthening our lines and consolidating and multiplying our resources, we should prepared for all those contingencies which no Indian statesman could disregard."
  If he wanted a later authority than the Governor General of India, he should quote the opinions of a distinguised Member of Her Majesty's Government —no less a man than Lord Salisbury—

  951
  uttered little more than 12 months ago. The noble Lord said that—
  "I can assure the noble Lord that any danger of a Russian inroad on the frontier of British India is not quite so far advanced as he seems to imagine. The nearest point on the Caspian … . is over a thousand miles from our Indian frontier."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxiv. 1564–5.]
  If the noble Lord had had a large map, he would have seen that the distance between Russia and India was not to be measured by 1,000 miles. There were mountain chains and deserts which were not easily crossed. It was said by hon. Members opposite— "If you object to our policy, tell us what is yours." He said the Liberal policy was that which he had quoted. Their policy was the policy of Hardinge, Wellington, Dalhousie, Lawrence, and Northbrook, and that which, until 12 months ago, was the policy of Lord Salisbury himself. Was that no policy? It seemed to him as if hon. Gentlemen opposite had been so stimulated by constant scenes that they were like a parrot that had so long been accustomed to stimulants that nothing weaker than brandy would induce him to talk. The Opposition had a policy of common sense, the Government had no policy at all. They had a right to ask the Government what counter authority they could bring on their side to justify their position? Surely, the first thing a solid and sensible statesman would have done, if he was considering the policy of such a measure as the Anglo-Turkish Convention and how to give it effect, would have been to consult some Indian statesman, who would have given him the best advice on the subject. There were two men in England now whom the Government might have consulted—one was Lord Lawrence and the other Lord Northbrook. The way in which he would challenge the Government was this—he would ask them to produce some authority, such as he was able to produce on the other side. Of course, he could hardly expect the Leader of the House to notice the points made by all hon. Members in that House; but he might fairly challenge the Government to give him the authority on which they relied in opposition to the authority which he had quoted. He might ask whether they had consulted, or had they not consulted, Lord Northbrook or Lord Lawrence. But that was not the ques-
  952
  tion. It was said that if we made with Affghanistan a similar Convention to that we had made with Turkey, we should have a powerful Ally against Russia. Did hon. Members remember when the Expedition against Cabul was started, and what the result was? It was a blow more fatal to us in India than all the difficulties in Asia Minor had been during the last half-century. Suppose they took a large scale map, and put one finger on Peshawaur, and another finger on Erzeroum, and let anyone tell him which was the most available for operations, Peshawaur or Erzeroum? At which would an English Force fight with the greatest advantage, and at which with the greatest disadvantage? The thing spoke for itself. At Peshawaur, they could concentrate an Army of 100,000 English troops and 100,000 Native troops, without any great pressure on the resources of the Empire. Those Forces could be maintained there, and fed by reinforcements from the whole military strength of the Empire, while Russia could not put on that line a single soldier. They would have to march 1,000 miles over a desert country, a country destitute of fixed population, or inhabited by predatory tribes whom it would be difficult to prevent from interfering with communication. They would have to go slowly on through mountain defiles, which would present most serious obstacles to transport. Physical obstacles would make it impossible for Russia to attack India on that position. It would take a camel and a-half for every man to reach that place. Compare that with Erzeroum. If war broke out between Russia and England, Peshawaur would have been inaccessible; but now we should have to take Erzeroum. If war broke out between Turkey and Russia in Asia, Russia would concentrate the bulk of her troops in that region, because we could not attack her in Europe without violating the Treaty recently made, and without bringing Austria and Germany upon us. Russia would concentrate her Forces upon the Asiatic frontier, and with Kars, Alexandropol, and Ardahan, she could bring up her whole force, and choose her own time and opportunity. We could not abandon the Turks without dishonour. If we sent a small Force, it would have to retreat, and could not stop until we got our ships of war to bear on

  953
  Russian ports. Russia could compel us to fight a pitched battle, on the result of which the fate of the whole of Asia Minor would depend. Compare that with the situation at Peshawaur, and then tell him what had been done for the security of our position. The great drawback of the Convention was that we had lost our liberty of action as regarded Russia. Before that Convention was signed, we occupied an impregnable position. Then, we need not have fought Russia until we chose. We should have selected our own time, place, and opportunity. Meantime, we need not have spent a single penny. We could have sent our Reserves, and prepared ourselves for the war if it came. Now, how different was our position. We had become partners in a concern, the signature of either partner in which might bind the firm. Suppose Turkey was to renew the war? She had nothing to lose, with England at her back. What was so easy for her as to force our hand in some part of that frontier where a collision was almost certain to occur? It was a matter of every-day experience that in the plains of Peshawaur predatory tribes came down and plundered, and the Government had to send expeditions up into the hills to punish them. Russia would be in a similar position at Batoum. There was a tribe called the Lazes, whose principal industry it was to transport their own daughters to the harems at Constantinople. When these failed, they would plunder, and take women wherever they could, and send them off to Constantinople. Suppose these people crossed the frontier, and some colonel of Cossacks followed them into Turkish territory and burnt their villages. Were we to be committed to a war with Russia on that account? Another consideration was, that in the event of war breaking out between Russia and Turkey, we lost, to a great extent, the co-operation of other Powers. We had strenuously striven to leave Asia out of European Treaties and European concert. In all former wars between Turkey and Russia, war in Asia had been a mere episode. The field of operations had been Europe, and if Russia went too far, the European Powers, who had a joint interest with ourselves, had come in. But here they were all shut out. They would say that Asia was England's care. The temptation to Russia would be to
  954
  make war in Asia because we could not get any other Power to come into the field and make an alliance with us. We should have to bear the whole brunt, and that upon 100 miles of frontier of a difficult country, against an Empire like Russia, that could bring 500,000 men into the field. That was what would be the result of this Convention. He did not wish to go into the question of how we had behaved to France in this Treaty. He valued the French alliance so highly that he would not go into the question; but he might remark that he did not approve of that part of the Treaty which extended our power in the Mediterranean. In the Levant, we had France and Italy backing Greece, while we were left in the position of backers of Turkey; and that was an anomalous position to be left in. He now turned to another point—the responsibility which we had incurred in our endeavours to introduce good government into Asiatic Turkey. Here, again, our Indian experience came to our assistance by teaching us the lesson that a system of protection must be supported by paramount power. If we had undertaken to protect Native Princes in India against internal, and possibly external aggression, it had also been proved that we were powerless to produce good government. A case exactly in point was that of Oude, in which we were at first reluctant to interfere with the internal administration; but this, at last, becoming so atrociously bad, we were obliged to annex the Kingdom. If, again, we considered the question of our relations with the Nizams, it would be found to be notoriously the fact that we only got on tolerably well with them; because, by a happy accident, they were possessed of wise ministers, who knew they must govern according to our ideas. But the state of things would be very different if there existed at Hyderabad or in Scindia any equality of force or scope for intrigue. The first question which presented itself was, what are we going to do with the Porte? If the Porte was to appoint its own Pashas and officers, and in its own way to collect taxes and administer justice after its own fashion, the task which we had undertaken of introducing good government was simply and absolutely impossible of execution. The appointment of the Pashas was the key of the whole question, and this was at present

  955
  effected, mainly by harem intrigues or by bribery at Constantinople, where every second or third year after an appointment when the money paid for this bribery was exhausted, a fresh candidate came forward and squeezed the old man out of his place. That system, as everyone knew, had been the ruin of Turkey. Unless the appointment of the Pashas, rested with us, of what earthly use was the forwarding of diplomatic notes and remonstrances? Take the Province of Asia Minor, which, by the Treaty of Berlin, had been taken from Russia and given back to Turkey. The introduction of order and good government into this Province alone of all the others in Asiatic Turkey was most important, and, at the same time, most difficult. It was most important, because it was inhabited, to a large extent, by a Christian Armenian population, as well as by some of the wildest tribes; in short, the condition of the Province was such that, in his opinion, the establishment therein of good order and good government would tax the energies and abilities of all the statesmen who had administered affairs in the Punjaub. He repeated that unless we took into our own hands the nomination of officers in the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, our diplomatic remonstrances would be treated by the Grand Viziers as the last Grand Vizier had treated the despatch of Lord Derby, who wrote in the strongest terms demanding the punishment of Chefket Pasha, and charging our Ambassador to read the despatch to the Sultan personally. The result of that remonstrance was that Chefket Pasha was not only not punished, but actually promoted. Again, if we worried the Porte with angry remonstrances, we should make the ruling class our enemies, and they would be only too glad to turn towards Russia. Taking the other alternative, and supposing it were possible to get over that initial difficulty of prevailing on the Porte to give us carte blanche, and to allow us to appoint British officers, he admitted the organization of the Asiatic Provinces on an Anglo-Indian footing to be possible, inasmuch as it was within the resources of the Empire, which could not, however, fail to be strained by that enormous task. He thought he could prove that fact in a moment. Let them compare the situation of Asiatic Turkey
  956
  with the situation of India. Nobody who knew anything about India could doubt which was the easier to govern. In India we had a large, and, in the great majority of cases, a peaceful and industrious population; all internal enemies and warlike tribes had been pretty well suppressed; we had railways and river communications throughout the country, an increasing commerce, and a large and certain revenue; yet, with all these advantages, how much did the maintenance of India cost us? In Asiatic Turkey there was the reverse of all these advantages. The country, which was as large as France, Spain, and Italy together, was to an enormous extent barren, interworked with mountain chains, and possessing but a scanty population, a large portion of which consisted of predatory tribes. In India we had but one North-Western frontier to guard, whilst in Asiatic Turkey we must defend against Russia the whole line extending from Batoum to the Persian frontier, thence by the plains of Mesopotamia till we reached Egypt, where we must keep watch and ward against the Bedouins of the Desert. He desired the House to consider for a moment the extent of the frontier which he had just traced. If we wanted to introduce into Asiatic Turkey anything like order and good government, we must divide the country into administrative districts or circles not to large for the personal supervision of District Commissioners, who would have to be appointed to every one of these circles, and who must be supported by a reliable police force in addition to a small and reliable military force. By the term reliable, he meant that these forces should be officered and paid by England. In addition to that, there must be stationed at all the principal towns brigades or divisions of regular troops in considerable force, so that we might be prepared, in the case of any internal movement becoming serious, to march out and support the Assistant Commissioners. Again, we must have one or two great general reserves either at Cyprus, Trebizonde, or some other place to back up the district reserves, and secure our hold upon the country. There were 3,000 miles of a most difficult and impracticable country to be guarded, a task which, although it was within the resources of the British Empire to at-

  957
  tempt, could not be seriously contemplated unless we were prepared not for one or two years, but for one or two generations, to put up with Estimates that would make the shades of Peel and Cobden shudder. India had a revenue of £50,000,000, and we had to maintain there an Army of 200,000 men, the charge for which we could hardly meet owing to our state of financial tension, which obliged us, in the case of a failure of the opium crop, for instance, to apply for British subsidies in order to avoid bankruptcy. But would the revenue of Asiatic Turkey, even if we paid nothing to the Porte, exceed £10,000,000 for a long time to come, and would anybody say that 250,000 men were more than sufficient to guard the frontier of that country? He asked, what was likely to be the amount of the deficit after providing for these expenses of government? The real danger, as far as India was concerned, in his opinion, lay in the question of taxation. We talked of our prestige; but prestige in India meant the conciousness on the part of the Natives that within the limits of that country we were all-powerful. Supposing the Native knew that Russia had annexed some portion of the Sultan's territory, what did he care? He felt that we were near and ready to strike hard if necessary, and he knew that other peoples, like the Russians and the French, were too far off to come to his assistance. There could be no greater fallacy than to suppose that the Natives in India would be conciliated by an undertaking to defend the Asiatic Provinces of the Sultan. Everybody who knew anything about India must be aware that more than two-thirds of the population was not Mahomedan at all. If this part of the population had any feeling in our favour, the Indian Mutiny afforded them an opportunity to come to the front; but instead of that they were proved to be the ringleaders of the rebels, and actually set up a Mussulman at Delhi to contest our authority. But the great majority of our Mussulman subjects in India were perfectly loyal; because they felt that they were well governed, and that our rule protected the free exercise of their religion. The Natives cared very little about what was going on in distant lands; but they cared a great deal about having to pay income tax, the licence tax, and the salt
  958
  tax. Of course, it was only reasonable that we should be able to impose upon them increased taxation when it became necessary to do so; but, on the other hand, our popularity would be extended by a reduction of taxation. The conditions of the repeal of the salt tax and licence tax was economy, and economy in India meant military reduction; indeed, there was no other large economy that could be effected. Without wishing to occupy the time of the House unnecessarily, he would quote the words of Lord Canning who, when he met him for the first time in India, made the remark that "danger for danger, he would rather undertake to govern India with 40,000 Indian troops without the income tax than with 80,000 with it;" or, in other words, that our policy in India ought to be to keep our military expenditure to a minimum, and to allow the old military spirit of the warlike tribes to die out. How far had the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government been consistent with the policy indicated by Lord Canning? If the policy of the Government were to be carried out—and he admitted that it was possible—greatly increased taxation must ensue; for it was idle to suppose it could be done with anything like the Estimates of the present time, and it was equally idle to suppose that such increased Estimates could be met by raising the income tax. Then, by how much would they increase the malt tax, and other imposts? The country could, no doubt, afford to bear a large additional amount of taxation, but he maintained that it should not be made to do so with-out clear and absolute necessity; because, as we were likely soon to encounter the full force of foreign competition in all matters of trade, it was most important that the country should not be handicapped in the race. By striking in this way at the roots of our commerce and manufacturing trade, we struck at the power which could be founded upon them alone. On the other hand, by husbanding our resources, and acting on the maxims of common sense, we should establish a power which would enable us to defy, not the might of Russia alone, but that of the whole world united.
  MR. CHARLES LEWISsaid, that during these great transactions which had taken place during the last three

  959
  Sessions, it tad been his pride and satisfaction to give his support to Her Majesty's Government in the policy they had pursued. There had been many who, like himself, had refrained from putting forward their own individual views and suggestions at such a great crisis of time, when Her Majesty's Government was engaged in transactions involving the most grave and anxious considerations to the country. But the time had now arrived when they were free to express their individual views upon what had been done in the name of the country by the responsible Ministers of the Crown. It was satisfactory to him, as an humble and independent supporter of Her Majesty's Government, that at the conclusion of these great transactions—at the end of this great crisis—he was able to offer them his hearty individual support, in the belief and conviction that what they had endeavoured to accomplish was likely to result in complete success. This debate had been conducted in a most remarkable manner; they were in the habit of supposing that at least one of the most important points in any Resolution was to be found in its conclusion. But, in the case before them, the noble Marquess who had so powerfully brought forward the Resolution had passed that part of it over with disdain. The same course had been taken by the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) and the right hon. Member for Greenwich. But very different was the manner in which the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) dwelt on the same subject. He, at least, could not understand how it was that this most important part of the Resolution had been passed by with such disregard. For his own part, he (Mr. Charles Lewis) could understand exactly how it was that the noble Marquess did not refer to that part of the Resolution. The noble Marquess recollected that he had been a Member of a Government which had produced the Alabama Treaty; he recollected that he had been a Member of a Government which, by that Treaty, altered the international rule by which the conduct and liabilities of this country were to be guided. He remembered that the Treaty produced by his Government fixed upon the country a liability of £3,500,000, which, by no possibility of international law, could the country
  960
  otherwise have been forced to pay. They had heard, in the course of that debate, many denunciations of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the Prerogative of the Crown. It was a most remarkable thing that Liberal Ministers, when they went out of Office, generally got very uneasy and critical about the Prerogative of the Crown; but when in Office, they were by no means backward in using the Prerogative of the Crown, even for the purpose of overbearing the voice of Parliament. It must be recollected, when they heard these great denunciations from the right hon. Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe), and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), that it was the Administration of which they were Members which, by Royal Warrant, overbore the Constitutional action of Parliament with reference to Purchase in the Army. It could, therefore, be well understood how it was that the noble Marquess passed over in the way he did that part of his Resolution relating to the non-sanctioning of this Treaty by Parliament before it was made by the Crown. Passing by that, there were one or two preliminary observations, which must have occurred to many in the progress of the debate. At the end of the Berlin Congress, and when peace had been secured to the country, what had the Opposition to say with reference to the policy of the Government? Merely a succession of vain regrets—merely a succession of violent attacks and suggestions of deceptive conduct on the part of the Government. One would have thought that their love of country, or, at least, their love of commerce, would have prompted many hon. Members opposite to offer to the House some suggestion as to the mode by which this great and advantageous opening up of the East might be utilized with the greatest benefit to the country. But when they remembered what happened at the end of all those transactions, they could not help going back to make a remark or two as to the way in which the country was treated while the Eastern Question was occupying the attention of the Government. What had been the real cause of all the difficulties of the country with foreign nations? What had caused the vacillation of Austria, the aggressive spirit of Russia,

  961
  and the holding back of France and Italy? For the first time in the history of this country, grave questions of foreign policy—the supreme question of peace or war—had been relegated to hysterical public meetings in all parts of the country. A great display had been made by ministers of religion, who denounced the Government, and misled the people by drawing upon their Christian sympathies and upon those kindly feelings which existed in all and especially in the English people. They had endeavoured to draw the people aside from the primary object of the policy of the Government and involve them in a political controversy and attack. True, all that had been passed by, and during the last two years the country had seen Her Majesty's Government, by a series of wise and judicious steps, consolidating the power and advancing the influence of England in the Councils of Europe. Although there might have been in the earlier stages of these affairs some sort of vacillation and some want of consistency in their policy— which he was not prepared to deny— yet, during the last year, and especially during the last six months, hon. Members sitting on that side of the House had seen with the greatest satisfaction that the Government had been gradually progressing towards that point to which the country had now attained—namely, a peace, which in its terms was creditable to the Powers which obtained it— and secured to England, after its many sacrifices, important collateral advantages which would be useful and creditable to the nation in time to come. He would merely refer in passing to the fact that the three great steps that had caused the most violent discussions in the House—namely, the demand by the Government and the grant by the House of the Vote of £6,000,000, the calling out of the Reserves, and the transport of a small contingent of Indian troops to Malta—these three great measures of policy had been the object of the most violent attack on the part of the Opposition. Yet he believed, and he thought the nation understood, that this series of measures had placed the country in the position in which it now found itself in the Council Chamber, planting down its firm foot and receiving the admiration and respect of Europe. After the speech which they had heard with so much pleasure from the right hon. Gentleman
  962
  the Home Secretary, it would be impertinence in anyone sitting on that side of the House to attempt to go into the general questions which were involved in this Motion. If the country desired an intelligible, unanswerable statement as to the policy of the Government, he had the greatest confidence in feeling that a deliberate and careful reading of the speech of the Home Secretary would at once dissipate any doubts and difficulties that might remain in the mind of any impartial person desirous to be informed what the policy of the Government had been, and how it could be supported. But he desired to refer, though not at any great length, to that part of the address of the noble Marquess, and to that part of these transactions in which, owing to the peculiar circumstances by which they were surrounded, was to be found the most vulnerable part of the Government case— he meant the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It had been said not only that it was bad in principle, but that it was insulting and deceptive with regard to the mode of its working, as regarded the other Powers; that it was ineffective, and must be ineffective for any good, and would increase the military and pecuniary responsibilities of the nation. Now, he would say with reference to the charge of its being insulting and deceptive to other Powers, that they might at least have expected that those who had been so seriously injured and subjected to such conduct would have been the parties complaining of it. But, so far from that being the case, none of the foreign Powers, said to have been treated so badly by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the entering into this Convention, had made any complaints. On the contrary, so far as they were able to discover any evidence on the subject, it seemed that foreign Ambassadors and Plenipotentiaries had been actuated by the same reasonable views with which Her Majesty's Government were possessed, and that they looked upon the undertakings of the Convention as having reasonable objects in view which were to be carried out in a legitimate way. It had been said by a great authority that this was nothing short of an insane Convention, and it had also been alleged and repeated by many hon. Members on the other side of the House that the great responsibilities of this country had been enor-

  963
  mously increased by that Convention. That was an abstract statement, and might or might not be perfectly true; but the question which the common-sense people of England would ask was not whether additional responsibilities and obligations had been undertaken, but whether it was necessary that they should be undertaken? That question would depend upon a great many considerations with reference to the peace of England, the route to India, the encouragement to Russia, and the possibilities of a successful advance by that Power, in the event of any difficulties hereafter arising, and other matters. With reference to the difficulties that might hereafter arise, it was in the power of anyone to produce such a marvellous bundle of prophecies as that to which the House had listened from the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing). In the course of a speech occupying an hour and a-half, that hon. Gentleman, who was accustomed to speak with great advantage to the House, had that night delivered himself of nothing more nor less than a series of prophecies in which, as their fulfilment was in the womb of the future, it was not in their power to checkmate him by the hard incidents of fact. When they listened to that long list of prophecies presented by the hon. Member for Orkney, they were inclined to remark that he was not the only Indian authority in this country; and it was a most remarkable circumstance that while a great authority like Lord Lawrence was in England, he had taken no part in this controversy, nor, so far as they had as yet heard, had he expressed any opinion against the policy adopted with reference to the route to India or Indian affairs. One or two observations of the noble Marquess had particularly struck him. Speaking with reference to our Indian Empire, he referred to the chain of mountains which formed the natural bar of India against incursions from one quarter, and he suggested that the safe proceeding for England to take was to wait until the enemy had arrived at those mountains before taking any measures to stop him. He would allow Asia Minor and Persia to be overrun, and yet say that no possible incursion could be made into India, because the chain of mountains would be an invincible barrier against the foe. But what would be thought by the people of India if, during
  964
  the next quarter of a century, they heard that Russia was year after year pushing forward her boundary in Asia Minor and Persia, and arriving at the narrow barrier that separated her from the Peninsula? Was it not likely that the Indian people would take alarm, and that the prestige of England would be destroyed, if there was the slightest feeling of doubt as to the chance of the loss of her great Empire by the advance of Russia to its very gates? He confessed himself that he looked with great regret upon the course taken by the Opposition with reference to India. On the flag which heralded in many of the meetings they had heard so much of during the last year or two—"Perish India" was a motto not unfrequently found. To pay an extra income tax of 6d. in the pound, for the sake of maintaining our Indian Empire, was a wasteful piece of extravagance which a great many hon. Members opposite would not think of incurring. But, just at the very crisis of their fate, as it were, and when the extent of the influence the country would be able to maintain in the Councils of Europe was in the balance— when the question of the influence and effect upon their Indian fellow-subjects of that great act of policy—bringing the Indian troops into Europe—was waiting to be considered—one who stood most prominently forward as the late Leader of a great historical Party, and who might be considered with justice as a great orator, thought proper to rush to a magazine for the purpose of explaining his views on the condition of India, and on the conduct of this country towards it. When he felt it his duty to refer to this subject, and to the article written by the right hon. Gentleman, he (Mr. Charles Lewis) wrote a letter to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich—which he politely acknowledged—stating that he should refer in this debate to the article sent by him to a well-known periodical. No one, he ventured to say, could have read that article through without feeling the greatest distress and dismay as an Englishman. It was not the case of a man who had no forum to which he might go—it was not the case of a man of great authority, but who had no opportunity of making his views known, and of placing them before the country in a regular Constitutional form—for, as they

  965
  well knew, there was no man the charm of whose oratory was so great in that House, or no man who could so certainly maintain the most complete silence when he addressed the House, as the right hon. Gentleman. But, instead of expressing his views as one who had been a responsible Minister of the country, he thought it his duty to go to the magazines, in order to inform them of his views with regard to India. The arguments thus presented to their Indian fellow-subjects with reference to the conduct of the English Government and people, he (Mr. Charles Lewis) had thrown into a short summary. It was not to be wondered at that the right hon. Gentleman had certain peculiar views with reference to restraining libels in the Vernacular Press of India. They were told by the right hon. Gentleman, in that article, that the people of England were not the masters of India; and he described their rule as being worked by an exceptional and, perhaps, a provisional character. The article went on to remark that 30,000,000 at one end of the world governed 300,000,000 at the other, and doubted whether the maintenance of British rule was in the interest of India. There was, further, an elaborate description of the wrongs of India in connection with its Military Service, and other matters; and, on the one hand, was set out the advantages derived by England from India, and, on the other, the burdens and distress to which India would be subjected in case of a war. Then they found the oft-repeated questions—Can India be content? Will India be content? Ought India to be content? The English nation was described as perpetrating the greatest injustice, and was distinctly told that it must be prepared for the results to which that would lead. Then the Indian soldiers, at that time being used in Europe, were informed that they were considered an inferior order. Finally, what England was doing in India with reference to the present rate of charge for an Army was characterized as a swindle. The article summed up the matter by saying that the English nation were not ordinary swindlers, but their case was as flagrant as that of a guardian who was unfaithful to his ward. Now, he maintained it was not in the interests of this country that such an article as that should go unrepu-
  966
  diated in that House, and he ventured to say it was very unfortunate that, owing to Parliamentary Forms, the opinion of Parliament was never asked, and could not be asked, with respect to that article. But he would make this remark, that the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman had once been the head had sent many men to prison for writing words not stronger than those. One looked with dismay at what must be its influence and effect upon the people of India, when they could read such an article as that written by one of England's foremost statesmen. The Ministerial side of the House had been taunted with the opinions expressed 36 years ago by the Prime Minister. It was not necessary for him to defend the noble Lord against the attacks of the right hon. Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen); but, knowing that at the time the Government was conducting important and delicate negotiations with foreign countries, the question of peace and war, and the conduct of the Government was canvassed on country platforms, and disposed of by speeches made on waggons at country railway stations, he thought it necessary that great debate should not close without someone, however humble, rising in his place and giving the right hon. Gentleman an opportunity of justifying the statements he had made deliberately and in writing. Although he did not wish to trouble the House at any length at that hour, he must make one or two observations on the challenge thrown down by hon. Gentlemen opposite. It was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich—"Why don't you dissolve?" "Why don't you test the opinion of the country?" But had hon. Gentlemen on the other side any doubt as to the opinion of the country upon the result of these great transactions? Had they any serious doubt about it? He believed himself that the reason of the suggestion was the fear that there would be a Dissolution, and the dread of having to meet it on the part of hon. Members opposite. Speaking for himself, he had no hesitation in saying that if anything depended upon individual opinion he would strongly advise and desire that the country should be appealed to, not merely on the conduct of the Government, but also on the conduct of those

  967
  who had been attacking it for so many-months; and as to what the result would be, he had no manner of doubt. Then came the modern innovation of his hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain)—the National Confederation of Liberal Associations—which was under the immediate patronage of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, who signalized its introduction into one of the Metropolitan boroughs by appearing as the leading supporter of a local shoemaker. What had been the course pursued by the Birmingham Confederation of Liberal Associations? When the Anglo-Turkish Convention came out, that Association issued a document, which he believed had not been brought to the attention of the House. They rung an alarm-bell, evidently being desirous to obtain possession of the consciences of the Liberal constituencies, and keep them under lock and key. Consequently, they issued this Manifesto, which, as it was short, he trusted the House would allow him to read. The Circular said—
  "The action of the Government, in concluding an alliance with Turkey for a Protectorate of her Asiatic Possessions, renders it imperative that no time should he lost in eliciting the opinion of the country, both as regards the policy itself, and the secrecy with which it has been adopted and enforced."
  And then—missing a sentence — the Circular went on—
  "That such an alliance, involving this country in responsibilities incalculable in their extent and their possible results, should have been concluded between the Governments of the Queen and that of the Sultan, at the request of the former, and without the knowledge of Parliament, is inimical to the interests of the nation and dangerous to the liberties of the people. It is absolutely necessary that a protest should at once be raised throughout the country against the secrecy of the transaction which is of such momentous importance—against the policy of engagements into which, without its knowledge or consent, the Ministers have entered on behalf of the nation, and against the acquisition by the practical annexation of the Island of Cyprus, notwithstanding the professions of the Government that England desired no advantage for herself, but that she entered the Congress solely in order to maintain the faith of Treaties, and to protect the general interests of Europe."
  What was the result of this Manifesto? Absolutely nothing; for he believed it was a fact that the promoters of it did not venture to call a single public meeting. Immediately the Treaty and Convention were published, this Circular
  968
  was sent to every one of the subsidiary and affiliated Associations—which had sprung up like mushrooms—in the great boroughs of the country, under the immediate guidance of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. The result of the Circular had not been to arouse any feeling in the strong Radical classes; and, that being so, did the House believe there was any substantial question as to what was the opinion of the vast majority of the thinking people of England upon the subject. He ventured to believe that, while right hon. and hon. Members, who were opponents of the Government, had been hurling at the head of the Prime Minister the personal desire of plunging the country into a terrible war, to waste its resources, and spill the blood of its people—he believed that even with this charge against them, and which had been delivered from one end of the country to the other, the majority of the people of England believed in no such wickedness as having been at the bottom of the policy of the Government; but that, on the contrary, they, in their course of action, had been guided by their own conscientious convictions of prudent considerations, and had been desirous to obtain a peace honourable to them, and honourable to the country, whose servants they were. And if, instead of success attending their efforts at Berlin, they had had the miserable result of having to bring home a failure, he believed the vast majority of the English people would still have thought they deserved well of their country. But having brought home, as he had previously described, a glorious peace, they did not understand how it was that the only thing they heard from the Opposition were regrets at that peace. He ventured to say, in conclusion, that when this great transaction came to be recorded in the pages of history, it would be said that, under the auspices of a Government which was subjected to the most incessant and unsparing attacks, England had emerged from obscurity clear as the sun, and powerful as a strong man, aiding oppressed communities and consolidating them under its own beneficent rule.
  SIR JOHN LUBBOCK: Sir, our countrymen often remark with surprise that while our foreign policy is essentially peaceful and unselfish, foreign nations,

  969
  so far from giving us credit for our disinterestedness, persist in looking on us as grasping, and—in one case, at least—have fixed on us the epithet perfidious. I must say, however, that we have, to a certain extent, ourselves to thank for this unfortunate result; and the events of the last few weeks will, I fear, strengthen an impression which, if essentially unjust and unfounded, is, nevertheless, not inexplicable. The foreign policy of England—not only the right, but the wisest policy—is to be frank and to be unselfish. I do not say that we have been selfish in taking Cyprus; on the contrary, I believe it will be a burden to us; but it certainly has the appearance of selfishness; and again, in spite of the elaborate explanations of Government, it is, to say the least, unfortunate that, while the Congress of Berlin was to settle these questions by European concert, we entered that Congress fettered by two secret Agreements. Hon. Members opposite appear to consider that the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano have been very much improved by that of Berlin; but, for my part, I am by no means clear that this is the case. Lord Salisbury, in his despatch of July 13th, inclosing the Berlin Treaty, congratulates us that nearly two-thirds of Bulgaria "have been replaced under the direct political and military rule of the Sultan." The noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government has also told us that, in great measure through his exertions, 2,500,000 of people have been restored to the government of the Sultan. Bulgaria, as constituted by the Treaty of San Stefano, was a powerful State. It contained more than 50,000 square miles, and 4,000,000 of people, with harbours on both seas—on the Archipelago and on the Euxine. Under these circumstances, both from its natural resources and its geographical position, it must necessarily have exercised a predominant influence in that part of the world. Hon. Members opposite will not question this, because the words are Lord Beaconsfield's, not mine. But, as Lord Salisbury observes in his despatch of June 13th, apparently as a matter of congratulation, in consequence of the changes made since the Treaty of San Stefano, "the new Slav State is no longer strong." Surely, however, this is rather a misfortune than an advantage. A strong and free Slav
  970
  State would have been a bulwark against Russia; but a weak one will rather be a temptation to fresh interference and renewed aggression. Among the points in the Treaty of San Stefano most strenuously objected to by Lord Salisbury, in his celebrated despatch of the 1st April, were the compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania, and the acquisition of the important harbour of Batoum, which, Lord Salisbury said—
  "will make the will of the Russian Government dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea."
  But, Sir, Bessarabia has been compulsorily alienated from Roumania, and Russia has acquired Batoum, though it is true that this important harbour has now shrunk to a miserable tenth-rate port—if it be a port at all—which will
  "only hold three ships at once, unless they were packed like the London Docks, in which case it might hold 10 or 12."
  At any rate, Sir, I cannot regard the changes which have been effected in the Treaty of San Stefano as at all an equivalent for the immense expenditure, the check to our commerce and manufactures, the risk of war, and, above all, the bad feeling which has been created between this country and Russia. To my mind, however, the Convention with Turkey is, in an English point of view, even more important than the Treaty of Berlin. I regret the acceptance of Cyprus, which, I believe, will involve us in considerable annual outlay, and the acquisition of which is a bad precedent. But the possession of Cyprus sinks into complete insignificance by the side of our Protectorate of Turkey in Asia. By this we have put it in the power of Russia to involve us in a war at any time. For we cannot honourably evade the responsibility, having once accepted the shilling, in the shape of Cyprus. Suppose, moreover, that Turkey refuses reforms which we think necessary, rejects our remonstrances, and exercises an oppression against which we feel bound to protest. Are we going to force her to adopt our views? I presume not; but in that case we must surely give her notice that we do not consider ourselves bound to defend her. She then will certainly call upon us to restore Cyprus. "We ceded Cyprus to you," Turkey will say, "as

  971
  the price of your promise to protect us against Russia. If you are not going to help us, you must, in honour, restore the Island to us." But, in the meantime, no doubt, the population will largely have increased, works will have been carried out, and capital invested. How can you then, in equity, hand these people over to Turkey? They have come to Cyprus, confiding in English law and English justice, and it would be a hard case indeed that they should, against their will, be placed under the Turkish Government. We hear a great deal about the engagements of Turkey, and the reforms she has undertaken to make. But what has she really promised? On this we have no definite information. In fact, it seems to be the policy of the Government to keep us in the dark. I do not, however, dwell on this; because I infer, from what has been said "elsewhere," that the Government really knows no more than we do. We are told that we are acting with an "independent" Power—that these arrangements are immature. But surely they are a most vital part in the proceeding. We ought not to have given our guarantee—if at all—nor to have accepted Cyprus, till we had a clear and explicit understanding on these questions. Promises alone are not sufficient. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department characterized Turkish promises as "waste paper currency." In a most important document—namely, the general instructions given to Lord Salisbury when proceeding to the Conference at Constantinople—Her Majesty's Government say—
  "That the mere announcement of reforms by the Porte cannot be accepted as sufficient, and that even if Her Majesty's Government would be disposed to accept such an announcement, no other Power would do so."
  And again—
  "It is in vain for the Porto to expect that the Powers will be satisfied with the mere general assurances which have already been so often given, and have proved to be so imperfectly executed."
  Further on, in the same document, it is stated that—
  "The whole history of the Ottoman Empire since it was admitted into the European Concert, under the engagements of the Treaty of Paris, has proved that the Porte is unable to guarantee the execution of reforms in the Provinces by
  972
  Turkish officials, who accept them with reluctance, and neglect them with impunity."
  Lord Salisbury himself, in his despatch to Lord Derby from Pera, on the 13th January, 1877, says, after referring to previous promises of reform—
  "A renewal of these promises, if it is accompanied by adequate guarantees of performance, would he a valuable concession; but without any such guarantees, little practical advantage is likely to be obtained by reiterating the proclamation of these reforms."
  And again, a few days later—on the 20th January—
  "Without proper guarantees, any list of reforms, however promising, would have been exposed to the fate which attended the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856, the communication of which was recorded by the Conference of Paris. I am of opinion that a scheme, from which both these guarantees were omitted, would have been illusory."
  Indeed, the miserably bad government of Turkey, and the non-fulfilment of many previous promises, was the only, though sufficient, justification for the Conference at Constantinople, and the line England took there. At that time, so little were we satisfied, that we were scarcely disposed to leave her alone; now, having passed from one extreme to the other, we have such implicit faith in her assurances, that on the strength of them we undertake to defend her. The noble Lord the President of the Board of Trade, in his eloquent speech, saw nothing but progress and prosperity in the future. He could foresee no danger. He thought we had undertaken no responsibility, and he entered, if not into war, into an engagement to make war, like M. Ollivier, with a light heart. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department does not go quite so far; but he says—"In this particular case the danger was not created by entering into the guarantees; the danger was there." Sir, I deny it. A danger was there, but not the danger which Her Majesty's Government have created for England. It was, of course, always open to us, if we thought it expedient, to resist any further aggressions of Russia in Asia. The Government might have notified this to Russia; but what we object to is that we have placed ourselves under Treaty obligations to Turkey. The present Government have committed not only themselves, but future Administrations also.

  973
  They have imposed a tremendous responsibility on the people of this country without their knowledge or consent. We are told that this course is necessary for the protection of our Indian Empire. But I cannot forget the words of Lord Salisbury in June last year. He said—
  "It has generally been acknowledged to be madness to go to war for an idea; but, if anything, it is more unsatisfactory to go to war against a nightmare."
  In June, 1877, it was proposed that a British Consul should be appointed to some town in Central Asia, with a view to watch any possible intrigues of Russia; and what did Lord Salisbury say? He pointed out that between India and the Russian territories "there are deserts and mountainous chains," and that the danger " may possibly interest a future generation of statesmen, but is not of such imminence as to render necessary" the appointment of a Consul in Central Asia; and yet we are now told that it is so imminent that we must assume this tremendous responsibility. Our Indian frontier is, perhaps, the strongest in the world. A lofty range of mountains and an immense desert. We have thrown away this advantage. We have abandoned the fortifications provided by nature, and committed ourselves to fight Russia on her own ground—and what is worse, at her own time also. If we ever have a period of weakness, internal misfortunes, a rebellion in India, a desperate war—at that moment we are liable to be called on to fight Russia on ground of her own choosing, at her own frontier, 2,000 miles from ours. For my own part, I feel very grateful to Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon for the efforts they have made to prevent the adoption of such a course. Speaking last year at the Merchant Taylors' School, Lord Salisbury used words which I should like to recall to hon. Members opposite. He asked—
  "Which is the wiser course—to allow your enemy to choose his own ground and to follow him through his deserts and impassable mountain chains, or to wait until he comes within your own range, where your armies will be able to deal with him with invincible effect?"
  No doubt, a nation so happily constituted and so fortunately situated, as we
  974
  are, has a duty to the rest of the human race. But, Sir, are we not endeavouring to fulfil it? We are even at present responsible for more than 400,000,000 of men of less civilized nations. Surely, this is as much as we are bound to undertake? It would be most unwise and imprudent to attempt more than we are reasonably sure of being able to perform. To defend India, we should husband our resources; but every year the present Government adds largely to the expenditure of the country. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is the parent of a measure for the reduction of the National Debt; but, Sir, I fear that policy has become a thing of the past. Since the present Government came into Office, the expenditure of the country has increased more than £11,000,000. In 1873 it was £70,700,000; last year it rose to £82,400,000; and what it will be this year, no one yet knows. Of course, I do not object to the whole of this increase. Of the amount devoted to Education, for instance, we in this part of the House certainly shall not complain, though I should have liked to see increase of expenditure in some Departments—partly, at any rate—made up for by economy in others. But, Sir, if we look at our military expenditure, we shall find that, from under £25,000,000 in 1874, it has risen in 1878 to over £30,500,000, or no less than £5,500,000; upon the top of this we are to have an additional burthen, the amount of which we cannot as yet at all foresee. Our National Debt, again, is still the highest in the world; and you would do more to increase the strength of the country by reducing the Debt, than by the barren, or rather the costly, honour of owning another Island in the Mediterranean. Our fiscal system, though, no doubt, better than that of most other countries, is still far from perfect. There are taxes which it would be most desirable, if it were possible, to remit. The removal of the duty on tea and coffee, for instance, would be an immense boon, and probably do much to encourage temperance. Again, the tax on tobacco is so high as to offer dangerous temptation to smuggling. Our manufacturers are not now so prosperous that we ought lightly to impose on them additional burthens. The pressure of our National Debt, and of our heavy expenditure, already puts us at a disad-

  975
  vantage in competing with other countries less heavily burthened—such as the United States, and even our own Colonies. Apart from any hypothetical contingencies, apart from the possible complications and dangers in which we may find ourselves involved, one thing is certain—namely, that the policy of the Government necessitates a great addition of expenditure. Suppose we put it at £10,000,000, what does that mean? Ten millions sterling would enable you to take off the tea duty, the duty on coffee—in fact, all duties except those on fermented liquors and tobacco, and the whole of the income tax. Or, if it were thought more prudent, £10,000,000 a-year would enable you rapidly to pay off your Debt. I ask myself, then, and I ask this House, to consider which course would be most prudent, which course would best promote the interests of the country; that we should be relieved from the income tax, from all duties, except on fermented liquors and tobacco, on the one hand; or that we should guarantee Turkey? I cannot doubt what the reply ought to be. Russia will have no difficulty in finding an excuse for war, if she is disposed to do so. She can at any time place 50,000—nay, 100,000— men on the frontier of Armenia. Nay, by a feint, or a threat, or even an innuendo, she will be able to impose a heavy expense on us, to compel us to prepare for war, to send troops to the East; all of which will, of course, necessitate increased taxation, and check our commerce and manufactures, while scarcely putting Russia to the slightest inconvenience. For my own part, Sir, I feel strongly that Her Majesty's Government are departing from the lines of a wise and prudent policy. I believe that they are allowing themselves to be dazzled by the temptations of vanity and ambition, that they wish to make this country a great military Monarchy, that they wish to make our gracious Sovereign, not the Queen of England and the Empress of India, but, first, the Empress of India, and, secondly, the Queen of England. Sir, I doubt not that this House will support Her Majesty's Government by a large majority; not the less I make my most earnest protest against a policy which is full of peril, and which, I fear, sooner or later, we shall bitterly repent.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."— (Lord Elcho.)
  MR. MUNDELLAobserved that it was becoming only too obvious that hon. Members on that side of the House who were most deserving of a hearing were listened to with a scandalous impatience which was most discreditable to hon. Gentlemen who sat behind the Treasury Bench. His hon. Friend was continually interrupted in the course of his speech by noises, which he was sure, in one case, came from an hon. Member occupying an official position. It was true that they should be protected against such conduct, and more particularly for this reason—that if his hon. Friend had moved the adjournment of the House, hon. Members on the Ministerial side would have cried "Go on! " but because he gave the House an intellectual treat, he was subjected to persistent interruptions. In his opinion, it was high time someone sitting on the Front Bench should interfere to restrain the indecencies of those who sat behind it.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, he had not observed any interruptions beyond a certain amount of conversation which went on while the hon. Baronet was speaking. [Mr. MUNDELLA: Not conversation, but interruption.] He had not noticed any interruption; and, for his own part, he was much obliged to the hon. Baronet for the very interesting speech he had made.
  MR. GREENEsaid, that there was no man in the House who more frequently interrupted hon. Members when speaking than the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella). It ill became him, therefore, to lecture the House on that subject. He had used the word "scandalous," but he would wish the hon. Member to understand that he was not the dictator of the House of Commons.
  MR. O'DONNELLhoped that, before the debate closed, there would be sufficient opportunity given to Irish Members to express their opinions on this question. There was a good deal of opinion amongst Irish Members on this subject, and in some cases they did not like to be considered to have arrived at these conclusions by the reasons advanced on one side or the other. If

  977
  the debate were to be completed the next night, he trusted that Irish Members would be allowed an opportunity of speaking.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERhoped that all hon. Gentlemen who wished to speak would have an opportunity of doing so; but this would depend, to some extent, on the length of the speeches.
  Motion agreed to.
  Debate further adjourned, till To-morrow.

  ENDOWED SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS (SCOTLAND) BILL— [Lords.]
  (The Lord Advocate.)
  [BILL 157.] CONSIDERATION.
  Bill, as amended, considered.
  Clause A (Commissions to submit conditions of distribution of Parliamentary Grant with view to promotion of higher education).
  MR. RAMSAYmoved, in page 4, line 9, after the word "promoting," to insert "elementary," and in the same line to leave out "in," and to insert "and so as at the same time to secure adequate attention to the teaching of." He said, that the system of education that had been hitherto pursued in Scotland had brought the elementary schools into connection with the higher schools, and the higher schools with the Universities. If anyone were to be appointed under the Bill to take exclusive charge of the higher schools, it would indicate a desire on the part of the House to sever elementary from its past historical connection with the higher education. He, therefore, felt that if the Government should see fit to insist upon the insertion of this clause, it ought to be amended on the principle he had suggested. Instead of opposing the Amendment, he thought the Government should be pleased to have the opportunity of obtaining an indication of opinion from persons conversant with education in Scotland as to the means by which it could be best promoted. The connection between elementary and higher education was now so close that anything to interfere with that connection was, in
  978
  the opinion of the people of Scotland, to be much deprecated.
  Amendment proposed, in page 4, line 9, after the word "promoting," to insert the word "elementary."—(Mr. Ramsay.)
  THE LORD ADVOCATEregretted that he was unable to accede to the Amendment. Under the Act of 1872, a Board of Education had been established to look after the elementary schools, and in order to complete its work it had been continued during the past year. It would expire next month. The purpose of the present appointment of Commissioners was not to superintend elementary education in Scotland, but to deal with endowed foundations, and they would have to deal almost exclusively with the question of higher education in Scotland. They would thus hardly be in a position to make those representations to the Government provided for by the Bill; for, in the course of the discharge of their functions, they would gain but little information as to the necessities of elementary education in Scotland. It would be too much to expect an unpaid body of Commissioners to make themselves acquainted with educational wants outside the scope of their duties.
  Question, "That the word ' elementary ' be there inserted," put, and negatived.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEthen moved that the Bill be amended by increasing the number of Commissioners from five to seven.
  SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKEreminded the Home Secretary that the names of the Commissioners had been promised.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I am now able, with the permission of Her Majesty the Queen, to give the names of the Commissioners. They are Lord Moncreiff, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, Sir James Watson, of Glasgow, Mr. Ramsay, M. P., Mr. James Campbell, Dr. Donaldson, and Professor Tait.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Bill to be read the third time Tomorrow.

  LOCOMOTIVES ON HIGHWAYS (SCOTLAND) BILL— [BILL 271.]
  (The Lord Advocate, Sir Matthew Ridley.)
  COMMITTEE.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clauses 1 to 4, inclusive, agreed to.
  Clause 5 (Steam locomotives to be constructed so as to consume their smoke).
  MR. W. HOLMSmoved, in page 2, line 24, after "smoke," to insert "and so as to consume its own smoke." He said, that as the clause stood at present it was only necessary to have a locomotive constructed on the principle of consuming its own smoke. He wished the clause to be amended, so that locomotives should actually have to consume their own smoke. In his opinion, there was no reason why locomotives on roads should not consume their own smoke as well as those on railways.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEwould appeal to the hon. Member not to press his Amendment, for this reason. An understanding had been come to, upon which hon. Members were fairly entitled to rely that the Government would bring in a Bill for Scotland on this subject in the same form in its clauses as the Act for England. As the Bill at present stood it was in accordance with that understanding, and, no doubt, many hon. Gentlemen who took a different view from the hon. Member were relying upon the clause remaining in its present form. He could only say that an attempt was made to put a provision similar to that proposed into the English Bill, but after discussion it was not pressed. For these reasons, he could not consent to the Amendment being made.
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYsaid, the proposal now made was almost impracticable. It was impossible to construct engines which should, under all circumstances, consume their own smoke. It was well known that, although the law was that locomotives on railways should consume their own smoke, they did not do so. Nevertheless, he thought the adoption of the principle of smoke consumption should be compulsory on every locomotive.
  MR. W. HOLMSsaid, that after the statement of the right hon. and
  980
  learned Lord Advocate, he would withdraw his Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 6 (Power to local authorities to make orders as to hours during which locomotives may pass over roads).
  MR. W. HOLMSmoved, in line 34, after "use," to insert "and speed." He said that he was a Member of the Select Committee with reference to the use of locomotives on tramways. Two of the points to which the Committee directed its attention were the consumption of smoke and the regulation of speed. In his opinion, it was desirable that powers to regulate speed should be placed in the hands of the local authority.
  THE LORD ADVOCATEsaid, he must object to this Amendment on the same ground as the others, and would ask his hon. Friend not to press it. The Amendment proposed was not in the English Bill, and those who had relied upon this Bill being the same as that would have reason to complain if the Amendment were introduced. On the other hand, he must not be understood to speak upon the assumption that there was no power to regulate speed, for he considered that the general power of regulation naturally applied to speed.
  MR. W. HOLMS: Do I understand that, as the clause now stands, the local authority has power to make bye-laws and to regulate speed?
  THE LORD ADVOCATE: Yes, in my opinion, it has that power.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 7 (Power of county road authority to licence locomotives).
  MR. J. W. BARCLAYmoved that the clause be omitted.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause struck out.
  Remaining clauses agreed to.
  Bill reported; as amended, to be considered To-morrow.
  House adjourned at Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading— Duke of Connaught and of Strathearne (Establishment)✶ (180); Commons Regulation (Expenses)✶ (181); Elders Widows' Fund✶ (182).
Second Reading— Admiralty and War Office (Retirement of Officers) (176); Highways (177).
Committee—Report—Naval Discipline Amendment✶ (175); Parliamentary Elections (Returning Officers' Expenses) (Scotland)✶ (174).
Report—Debtors Acts Amendment✶ (163).

H. R. H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT AND OF STRATHEARNE.

  THE QUEEN'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.
  THE LORD STEWARD OF THE HOUSEHOLD (The Earl EAUCHAMP)reported Her Majesty's Answer to the Address of Thursday last, as follows:—
  "VICTORIA R.
  "Your loyal and dutiful Address affords me sincere pleasure.
  "It is most gratifying to mo to be assured that you join in my feelings with regard to the intended marriage of the Duke of Connaught, and I trust that with God's blessing this event may prove an additional source of happiness to my family and also to my people."

THE MINISTRY—THE MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS.

  PERSONAL EXPLANATIONS.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My Lords, I am at all times reluctant to trouble your Lordships with any statement regarding myself, but I think it necessary to ask the attention of your Lordships to a few observations which I think it my duty to make in reference to some words which are reported to have fallen from the noble Earl the Prime Minister on Monday night last. I should have taken an earlier opportunity of making these observations, but that I have been absent from London. I may at once say that the passage in the noble Earl's speech to which I wish to draw attention refers both to my noble Friend Lord Derby— who is not now in his place—and to my-

  851
  self; but what I have now to say relates simply to myself, though I have no doubt that if my noble Friend had been present he would have taken much the same objection to the words as I do. Now, my Lords, on Monday evening the noble Earl at the head of the Government is reported to have said—I take the report from The Times newspaper— which I have compared with the reports of the other newspapers, and I find them to agree substantially, though there is a slight difference of expression—
  "As long as those two noblemen"—
  meaning the Earl of Derby and myself—
  "remained in the Cabinet, we adhered to the policy which they had accepted, and on which we understood they were prepared to act; we adhered to the policy which, when the time came, they shrank from the responsibility of carrying into effect."
  Now, I think that these words, with whatever intention they were used, are calculated to give a very false impression. I admit they are somewhat ambiguous; but if the noble Earl means by these words that we, as Members of a common Cabinet, after travelling for some time on the same road at length finally diverged on questions which had arisen —if he meant that, despite some Cabinet differences and some divergence of opinion, we held together within the lines of a common policy, and at length separated when a greater and irreconcilable difference arose—of course, I will not object to his words, though I think that moaning might have been expressed a little more considerately, if not a little more courteously. Or, again, if the noble Earl means by these words that it is a matter of argument whether the policy of 1878 is identical with the policy of 1877, I have nothing to say on that ground. There are Blue Books, and speeches, and despatches, to which all have access, and by which every man may judge for himself whether there is that identity or not. But if the noble Earl means—I am speaking for myself now —that I, having agreed to particular measures of policy—having agreed to some one thing—when the moment of difficulty, anxiety, and danger arrived, flinched from that to which I had pledged myself—if he means that, with a clear perception of the end and of the means in view, to which I had pledged myself as a Member of the Cabinet, I,
  852
  when the moment arrived, shrunk from the responsibility which that act and those measures involved—then I must, with all courtesy, but in the strongest language I can command, and Parliamentary usage allows, give the statement an absolute and unqualified contradiction. I must go a step further, and affirm that whilst I was in the Cabinet, never directly or indirectly— never as regards matter of detail or policy—never as regards any particular measure or a general conclusion —I never, so far as I am aware, advocated or consented to any course of action, and then recoiled from the responsibility of giving effect to that action. When, on the 25th of January, I troubled your Lordships with the reasons of my resignation, I stated them to he the divergence of opinion that had unfortunately arisen in the Cabinet, and which was shown by the fact that I had twice tendered my resignation. The moving of the Fleet into the Dardanelles, the Vote of Credit, followed by the calling out of the Reserves, constituted the reasons which induced me to resign the Office I held. Obviously, as I stated at the time, they were not part of the general policy to which I, or the other Members of the Cabinet, had, in the early days of our discussions, pledged ourselves. My Lords, those were comparatively new resolutions; and when those resolutions were arrived at, I stated that I could not be a party to them. I think it is a pity that if the noble Earl held the view which the words spoken by him on Monday night would seem to indicate, my statement of the 25th was not then contradicted. It seems to me strange, and rather hard on me personally, that this matter should be brought up by a side-wind, and that, in a discussion of a totally different matter, this imputation—for I consider it as grave an imputation as can be made— should be cast upon me. My Lords, I can conceive no imputation graver to a public man than to be told that he was a party to one particular thing in the Cabinet, and that, subsequently, when the moment of danger and anxiety arrived, he retired from the Government and fled from the resolutions for fear of the responsibility attached to giving it effect. It would-be unworthy—it would be base—it would be cowardly— it would be dishonest—it would be, not merely an

  853
  act of irresolution, but it would be an untruth both in act and in word. My Lords, I cannot suppose that the noble Earl has any wish to go into questions of Cabinet discussions and Cabinet confidences. I have avoided them, and I have no wish to enter upon them now, unless the noble Earl himself desires it, in which case I shall be happy to meet him. All I wish is personally to clear my character and position from words which I think were very inconsiderately cast out. If the noble Earl denies—as I hope he may—that he attaches to those words the meaning which, I think, 99 out of every 100 men would attach to them, I am perfectly satisfied, and have no more to say. If, on the other hand, the interpretation of them is such as I have given to them, then I have but one course—a duty I owe to myself—in the plainest, most distinct, and simplest words, to give the statement the most unqualified and absolute contradiction.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, any remarks which I have to make on the statement of the noble Earl will be founded on information which is in your Lordships' possession and founded on facts known to all. There will be no necessity for me to enter on a narrative of Cabinet conversations and Cabinet proceedings. I have endeavoured—and I trust successfully—at all times not to enter on ground of so doubtful a character, and I shall, if possible, keep to the same determination. As I understand—so far as I could understand the noble Earl—he complains that I stated he had supported a certain policy in the Cabinet, and that when, from the necessity of affairs, the Cabinet was called on to carry that policy into effect, he declined to carry into action the opinions he had sanctioned. That I believe to be his complaint. Your Lordships are perfectly aware of what was the declared policy of the Cabinet during the two years when these considerable events occurred. That policy was described in a despatch which is on your Lordships' Table, and, therefore, I am not betraying Cabinet secrets in referring to it. The Government of Her Majesty declined to enter into the controversy between Russia and Turkey unless British interests were endangered. That was the avowed policy of the Cabinet, and they acted on it. Among the
  854
  British interests enumerated, was any alteration in the possessors of Constantinople. Any change in that respect, it was declared, would involve British interests of the highest importance, which we could not view with indifference. Everyone understood what the policy of the English Government was. If Constantinople was endangered, British interests were involved in such a contingency, and the course to be pursued in such a contingency would be to guard them. Well, when the collapse of the Turkish defence after Plevna occurred, and when, shortly after that, the Army of Russia was arriving at the gates of Constantinople, the time had come when, in the opinion of the Cabinet, we should carry into effect a policy which had been so long avowed—a contingency which had entered into our calculations had arisen, one of the British interests involved in that policy was endangered— and the Cabinet determined to act on that policy. It was not by calling out the Reserves we first acted. My Lords, the Reserves, if I remember right, were not called out for a considerable period —I think for many weeks—after the noble Earl resigned. The recommendation we made in the circumstances was the natural one, if our policy was to be carried into effect. It was to order Her Majesty's Fleet to enter the waters of Constantinople. That was, and had been, our policy in defending British interests involved in the possible capture of Constantinople. That had been our policy for a long time; and, therefore, it had been sanctioned when the noble Earl was our Colleague. When the time came, we felt it our duty to carry that policy into effect. The noble Earl felt it was inconsistent with his views to act with us, and he quitted the Cabinet. That was the simple statement which I think I was justified in making the other night.

  ADMIRALTY AND WAR OFFICE (RETIREMENT OF OFFICERS) BILL.
  (The Viscount Cranbrook.)
  (NO. 176.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  VISCOUNT BURY, in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, that his noble Friend now at the head

  855
  of the Indian Office, and who was lately at the War Office (Viscount Cranbrook), had taken the question of Promotion and Retirement into his consideration. The result was that the present Bill was introduced into the House of Commons, and it dealt both with the War and the Admiralty Departments. In the House of Commons no alteration of any moment was made in it. The Bill dealt with the compulsory retirement of officers. It had been acknowledged in the House of Commons, and he thought it would be acknowledged in their Lordships' House, that it provided liberal compensation for those who should compulsorily retire—as liberal as was consistent with a due regard to public economy and the interests of the Public Service. As the matter had been fully debated in "another place," he would content himself with simply moving the second reading.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a" —(The Viscount Bury.)
  LORD TRUROwas very glad that there was to be a reduction in the expenses of the War Department; but he would like to know if that reduction was to be accompanied by an increase in delay? He did not merely refer to the delay which took place in regard to the Regular Army, but to that in reference to the Volunteer Service. Everyone must admit that these officers should be adequately remunerated, and while he rejoiced that steps had been taken in the direction of reform, he hoped that a diminution in the staff would not result in further delays.
  VISCOUNT CARDWELLsaid, he did not know that any improvement could be effected in the principle of the Bill, which he hoped would be read a second time.
  LORD HAMMONDsaid, that the effect of this measure, as he understood it, would be a considerable reduction in the existing staff of clerks, and probably an increase in the number of copyists and writers. He was not sufficiently acquainted with the nature of the business transacted in these Offices, or with the principle on which it was conducted, to be able to form an opinion as to the expediency of the proposed changes. After what had recently occurred, he did not think anyone would recommend the introduction into the Foreign Office—
  856
  with which he was acquainted—of a lower class of clerks. He was not prepared to discuss the general principles of the Bill; but he was glad to take that opportunity of calling their Lordships' attention to the case of copyists and writers in the Public Service. They must be all more or less educated, they must be regular and punctual in attendance, orderly and industrious in their conduct, and decently attired, and being thus qualified, could they be considered to be sufficiently paid by the pittance of 10 d. an hour, earning thus about 5s. a-day, or less than the earnings of an ordinary mechanic? They had nothing to look forward to; they had no assured tenure of office, for they might be discharged any day; they had no expectation of improved position or increased pay; they had no provision to look to if incapacitated by sickness or by age—in short, they had no encouragement whatever for fidelity or industry. He trusted that their Lordships would agree with him that the class of public servants to whom he alluded might with justice be more liberally dealt with, more especially as without them the Public Service in many Offices, under the present system, would be brought to a standstill.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOKstated, that what had been said about writers did not apply to the War Office. As to the complaint about delay, he thought the War Office had more cases to deal with than any other Department. There must be some delay, because they had to deal with men all over the world. There was no real delay in working the Department. It was worked with efficiency and regularity. Every case had to be thoroughly inquired into. Everybody connected with it had to be consulted. He hoped their Lordships would give a second reading to the Bill, which was intended to improve the Department and diminish the expenses.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday next.

  HIGHWAYS BILL—(No. 177.)
  (The Viscount Cranbrook.)
  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, in moving that the Bill be now read the second

  857
  time, stated that the main point almost of the Bill was that whereas, when Highway Boards existed, the district rates were only applied now to the salaries of the officers and disturnpiked roads, it was proposed that they should be applied to the maintenance of all the roads — that there should not be separate parochial rates for parochial roads, but that the district rates should be applied to the whole district with one exception. There was never any proper audit provided for under the Highway Act. The Poor Law auditor under this Bill would have power to examine the highway accounts. The highway authorities, in case they put the roads under Highway Boards, were counselled by the Bill to make the districts coterminous with sanitary districts. If the Highway Boards neglected their duty, the Local Government Board could interfere. There were two Acts existing— the 24 & 25, and 28 & 29 Vict.—with respect to locomotives on the roads, and in this Bill there was some provision for altering the conditions mentioned in those Acts, especially in regard to the use of a flag and the size of the locomotive. It provided that the locomotive should be so constructed as to consume its own smoke. That provision was not compulsory with regard to the consumption of all the smoke, as that was practically impossible. There was power for the local authorities to make bye-laws restricting the locomotives to a certain number of hours in which they could be employed on the roads, and he thought it would be a very advantageous thing to know the hours during which the locomotives would not be on the roads, for many horses were much disturbed by them. The Bill did not lay down any great principle, but rather contained a number of Amendments, to which he would invite their Lordships' attention in Committee.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a" —(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
  THE EARL OF REDESDALEsaid, he had no objection to the Bill; but mentioned that at the beginning of this Session he moved for a Return of all complaints to public officers in connection with the co-extension of districts, arising from the union of parishes belonging to the different counties. No Return was made,
  858
  and he presumed that no complaints had been received.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

ARMY —THE AUXILIARY FORCES —THE HAMPSHIRE RIFLE VOLUNTEERS.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD TRUROasked Her Majesty's Government, Whether it was true that a Lieutenant Colonel commanding an administrative battalion of Rifle Volunteers in the Southern district called on his Adjutant to sign a false return in the latter end of 1877; that the Adjutant refused; that the case was reported, and decision given, after a delay of five months; that the Adjutant was held justified, but told he was to be transferred; whether that transfer had taken place; and whether the Lieutenant Colonel still retained his command? The decision of the Committee of the War Office, to which the matter had been referred, was that the Adjutant was to be sustained—whatever that might mean— he supposed it was a new military term —but was to be transferred to another regiment—that was to say, the Adjutant was declared to be right, but in the face of the whole regiment was to be removed to another corps. It seemed to him that the Adjutant had acted honourably in refusing to put his hand to a Return to the War Office which contained a false statement. When the Volunteer Force asked for a Royal Commission to inquire into how these things were dealt with it was refused, and a Departmental Committee was appointed. The Committee was composed of three officers—whose military antecedents showed that they would not be unduly prejudiced in favour of the Volunteers—and of two others, who, in a matter of this kind, were not likely to prove too stubborn.
  VISCOUNT BURYwas understood to ask who these two Gentlemen were?
  LORD TRUROsaid, he referred to the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for War and the Financial Secretary to the Department. His complaint against the Departmental Committee was that it did not satisfy Volunteer requirements. The Volunteer Force should be represented on the Committee by men who were thoroughly imbued by the sense of what the

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  men required. As it was, the Volunteer Force thought it was not of such a character as to tend to the development of the Service, or the interests of those composing it. To go back to the subject of his Question. As this Adjutant had been removed to another corps and the Lieutenant Colonel allowed to retain his position, one of two things was clear —either the Lieutenant Colonel was not justified in requiring the Adjutant's signature, or the Adjutant had refused to comply with the order of his commanding officer; but if the Adjutant was right, it passed his comprehension why he should be transferred to another regiment, which was a great indignity to him. He would repeat that the Departmental Committee would not satisfy those requirements which the Volunteer Corps thought to be essentially necessary for a proper development of the interests of the Service; and if it should so turn out that their recommendations were not satisfactory, he should think it his duty to urge for the appointment of a Royal Commission, for the purpose of effecting a complete revision of the conditions on which the Service was administered.
  VISCOUNT BURY, replying for the Government, said, he was aware that a considerable degree of indulgence was always extended to noble Lords desirous of bringing subjects before their Lordships' House; but he protested that the noble Lord opposite, having asked his Question—whether it was true that a certain Adjutant had been required by his commanding officer to sign a false Return?—had no right to go off into the entirely irrelevant question of the constitution of a Departmental Committee. He spoke of two Members of that Committee as being distinguished for their pliancy; and when he (Viscount Bury) asked for their names, the noble Lord replied—"The Financial Secretary of the War Office and yourself." He was obliged to the noble Lord for his opinion, but would not at that moment take any further notice of his observation. If the noble Lord chose at some other time to bring the matter before the House, he should be prepared to defend both the Committee and himself against the charge of pliancy, or any other charge.
  LORD TRUROsaid, he did not use the word "pliancy." What he said was
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  that the Members of the Committee referred to were not "too stubborn."
  VISCOUNT BURYassured the noble Lord that he would be found sufficiently stubborn for all the purposes of those who appointed him to the Committee. Now, in reference to the Question that had been asked, he knew quite well who were the officers to whom the noble Lord referred. They were Adjutant Cope, of the 2nd Hants Administrative Battalion of Rifle Volunteers, and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, the Commander of the battalion. The two gentlemen had both served in Her Majesty's Regular Army, and might, therefore, be presumed to know what was required of them in their military capacities. The statement of the noble Lord was incorrect in almost every particular. It was true that there had been a quarrel between the two officers, and that it had been pursued by each with considerable acrimony. Neither was entirely in the right, and both had received a certain amount of blame from the War Office. The dispute took a long time to decide; and the only point upon which the noble Lord was correct was that the Adjutant was removed from the battalion. The Adjutant was never asked by his commanding officer to sign a false Return. What happened was this. The Return of efficients made at the end of 1877 was sent in to the War Office in the ordinary way; but it was accompanied by a note from the commanding officer, pointing out that the Adjutant had not included him in the list of efficients. The Adjutant also sent a letter explaining that he had declined to include his commanding officer on the ground that he had not made himself efficient. Therefore, the War Office wrote to Colonel Gordon, asking him if he had attended the requisite number of drills; and what followed arose out of the different constructions placed by the parties on the Volunteer Regulations. By those Regulations, it was laid down that the attendances of a colonel or field officer or non-combatant officer, not being honorary, might include drills of any kind. After an investigation, the War Office decided that the commanding officer ought to have been returned as efficient, and it wrote an authorization to the War Office to that effect. But the Adjutant again refused, stating that he did not believe that Colonel Gordon

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  had attended the requisite number of drills. The War Office replied that, having decided that the commanding officer was efficient, it must require the Adjutant to include him in the Return; but they added that if it hurt his conscience so to do, he might add a rider saying that he inserted the name not on his own responsibility but by authority of the War Office. These were the circumstances up to that point; and it would have been much better if the noble Lord had taken the trouble to ascertain them, instead of coming down to the House and making a flaming speech about an Adjutant having been asked to violate his conscience by making a false Return. But further, notwithstanding that the War Office had a second time commanded the Return to be made, the Adjutant still refused, whereupon the Correspondence was sent down to General Sir John Garvock, commanding the Southern district, with instructions to investigate the whole circumstances. He did so, and examined a number of witnesses on both sides; and in the end he decided that Colonel Gordon had made himself efficient, and ought to be returned as such. Still, the Adjutant remained stubborn; but eventually, after a peremptory order, he did make the Return, accompanying it with a note that it was not done on his own responsibility but by authority of the War Office. In adding that explanation the Adjutant was, no doubt, perfectly right; but he was certainly wrong in putting himself in opposition to the War Office and the other authorities who had communicated with him on the subject. Had the matter stopped there, the conduct of the Adjutant might have been attributed to undue zeal; but he went further, by stating in company that his commanding officer had been guilty of falsehood in declaring himself efficient. That, of course, did not beget a very good feeling between the two officers; and, eventually, they got off speaking terms. At last, the Adjutant so far forgot himself as to refuse to salute his commanding officer in the street, or, indeed, to take any notice of him whatever. What was the War Office to do under such circumstances? Feeling that it was impossible they could serve together in the same regiment, the War Office took the earliest opportunity of transferring the Adjutant to another regiment. That was the full account of
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  what had occurred; and the noble Lord knew quite well that if the same thing happened in the Regular Service the offender would have been tried by court martial, and probably cashiered. The leniency shown in the present case he did not consider altogether wise; but it certainly cut away the suggestion of the noble Lord that there had been any harshness of treatment in the case of the Adjutant. He was sorry the noble Lord should have made himself the mouth-piece of exparte, instead of inquiring for himself into the circumstances, or of communicating with the War Office—it was very difficult to obtain any information but from the War Office—upon the subject.
  LORD TRUROsaid, the positive statement was made to him that the Colonel of the regiment asked the Adjutant to sign a Return which he—the Adjutant— considered to be false. He (Lord Truro) had no account whatever of the War Office having sent down instructions for the investigation of the matter on the spot, and certainly no information that the Adjutant had refused to obey orders or had been guilty of breaches of discipline towards his superior officer. It seemed to him that the War Office was ignoring its own regulations.
  THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLANDrose to Order. The noble Lord had already addressed the House, and, as there was no Motion before it, was not justified in doing so a second time.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, if the noble Lord had submitted a Motion he would, according to the practice of the House, be entitled to reply. There fore, without their Lordships' indulgence, he could not speak a second time.
  House adjourned at half past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.