Sitting of 8 April 1878

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBER SWORN—William Ewart, esquire, for Belfast.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Parliamentary and Municipal Elections (Hours of Polling), Mr. Mundella and Mr. Charley added.
PRIVATE BILL—Manchester Corporation Water, reported from Select Committee. [No. 136.]
PUBLIC BILLS—Resolution in Committee—Conway Bridge (Composition of Debt)*.
Resolution in Committee—Ordered—First Reading—Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation (No. 1) * [148].
Ordered—First Reading—General Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act, 1862, Amendment* [147].
Committee—Public Health Act (1875) Amendment (re-comm.) * [144]—R.P.
Committee—Report—Bills of Exchange (Acceptance) * [135].
Considered as amended—Metropolis Management and Building Acts Amendment * [132].

QUESTIONS.

  THE NAVAL STRENGTH OF THE COUNTRY—ARMING THE MERCAN TILE MARINE.—QUESTION.
  SIR EDWARD WATKINasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is true, as stated in the "Pall Mall Gazette" of Saturday, that, at a meeting of the Society for the Aid of Russian
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  Maritime Commerce, held at Moscow, on Thursday, it was unanimously resolved to organize a volunteer fleet of light vessels to destroy the enemy's commerce, to form committees and open subscriptions for that purpose all over Russia, and to request the Cesarewitch to accept the honorary presidency of the Central Committee; whether it is also true that the chief of this society (Count Kameroffski) has consulted Professor Bluntschli, of Heidleberg, on the question of public law in Europe, with regard to capture at sea in time of war, and that the Professor has given the same opinion which he gave at the outbreak of the Franco-German War to the Government of Prussia—namely, that merchant vessels might be turned into cruisers or other war vessels, provided their crews were organized in a military manner and placed under responsible officers; also, whether, in view of possible war, the Government propose to consider measures for arming and commissioning the Mercantile Marine of Great Britain and the Colonies, in order thereby to augment the Naval strength of the Country, to enable the Mercantile Marine to protect itself against privateers and pirates, and to facilitate the early capture of the ships of the enemy in the various waters of the world?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, Her Majesty's Government have received no information that would enable me to answer the first part of the Question of the hon. Member. With regard to the second part, I can only say that we are well aware of the fact that this country possesses in her Mercantile Marine a very powerful reserve of maritime force, and that, in the event of any necessity arising, Her Majesty's Government will take measures to gain the full benefit of that reserve.

ARMY—QUARTERMASTERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. STACPOOLEasked the Under Secretary of State for War, Whether it is intended to improve the position of quartermasters by giving them increased rank after certain service—the same as other staff and departmental officers?
  COLONEL LOYD LINDSAY: Sir, the Secretary of State for War does not feel himself justified in holding out any expectation

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  that an alteration will at the present time be made in the position of Quartermasters in the Army. Their case has repeatedly been under consideration. The late Secretary of State decided not to propose any alteration in their position, in January, 1877. Recent changes, caused by the appointment of Army Quartermasters to the linked battalions of Militia at Brigade Depôts, will have opened to Quartermasters a large number of appointments of a comparatively stationary nature—appointments which have always been considered of a very advantageous character.

ARMY—THE MILITIA RESERVE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. J. HOLMSasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the Militia Reserve now called upon by Royal Proclamation to enter upon Army Service, and to serve until their services are no longer required, are to be retained after the emergency has passed as a part of the Regular Army or not; and, whether, as by "The Militia Reserve Act, 1867," their places in the Militia are deemed vacant when they are called upon to enter upon Army Service, it is the intention of the Government to fill such vacant places immediately, or not?
  COLONEL LOYD LINDSAY: Sir, under Section 10 of the Militia Reserve Act—
  "Militia Reserve men, who have entered upon Army Service shall, as soon as their services are no longer required, return to serve in the Militia regiments to which they belong."
  This arrangement will be strictly carried out according to the Act. The second part of the Question touches a matter of policy. It is asked whether the Government intends to fill up the vacant places in the Militia caused by calling up the Reserve? Yes, it is intended to allow the Militia to fill up the vacancies occasioned by 30,000 Reserve men having been transferred to the Line; but, of course, this will be gradual and not an immediate process.

  INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS.—QUESTION.
  MR. O'REILLYasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is his practice, when asked to certify an Industrial School, to certify
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  it for as many children as the Inspector reports it is adequate to accommodate, or for what other number?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, as a general rule, the Secretary of State would certify for such a number of inmates as the school could adequately accommodate; but he must be satisfied that the additional accommodation asked for is actually required to satisfy the demands of the particular locality where the school is situated. Circumstances sometimes render it desirable and sometimes necessary to restrict the number of children.

  THE NATIONAL DEBT—THE NEW SINKING FUND.—QUESTION.
  MR. GORSTasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he has any objection to state what precise amount of the National Debt Charge of £28,000,000 will, in the year 1878–9, be actually required for the payment of interest on the National Debt, and what portion will be, in fact, applicable to the extinguishment of Debt by the operation either of the Terminable Annuity Scheme or of the new Sinking Fund?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, it would require an actuarial calculation, which I have not had time to make, in order to answer in a precise form the Question of my hon. and learned Friend. But I may state, in general terms, that probably about £23,000,000 out of the £28,000,000 will be required for the payment of interest and management of the Debt, and that about £5,000,000 would be applicable to the redemption of the Debt, either by the operation of the Terminable Annuity Scheme or of the new Sinking Fund.

  SOUTH AFRICA—THE TRANSVAAL TERRITORY.—QUESTION.
  MR. COURTNEYasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he can lay upon the Table any Papers on the re-organization of the Transvaal Territory, and, particularly, whether he can indicate the sources of revenue out of which the Expenditure of the Government of the Territory can be met?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, I fear I am unable at present to produce any Papers specially bearing on the re-organization of the Transvaal

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  Territory. I may remind the hon. Member, that Sir Theophilus Shepstone has for some time past been detained at the extreme south of the Transvaal, his attention being mainly occupied by the dispute as to boundary between the Colony and the Zulu King. Mr. Sargeaunt was sent out in October last by my Predecessor as a Commissioner to inquire into the sources from which the revenue is derived and the mode of its collection and audit, and to consult with Sir Theophilus Shepstone as to the future administrative establishment of the Colony. His Report has not yet been received; but I may state that we have reason to believe that since the annexation the receipts from revenue have borne a very satisfactory proportion to the expenditure.

  BORNEO AND SULU.—QUESTION.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true, as stated in "The London and China Telegraph" of April 1st, that an English Company, represented by the Baron de Overbeck, has obtained from the Sultans of Borneo and Sulu a large cession of territory in their respective Dominions; whether the cession in Sulu was made in the presence of the Governor of Labuan and Consul General for Borneo; and, whether a Vice Consul in Her Majesty's Service has been appointed resident of the Company in the ceded district?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, I believe that the facts stated in the hon. Baronet's Question are substantially correct. They are now under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and it has not yet been decided whether the proceedings are such as can properly be sanctioned.

  EGYPTIAN FINANCE—MR. RIVERS- WILSON.—QUESTION.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is to be quite understood that Mr. Rivers-Wilson was not designated by Her Majesty's Government to inquire into the affairs of Egypt, but was lent on an application for his services?
  MR. BOURKE: Yes, Sir; that is so. The Khedive asked for Mr. Rivers-Wilson's
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  services, and Her Majesty's Government have given Mr. Wilson leave of absence in consequence.

NAVY—H.M.S. "VANGUARD."

  QUESTION.
  MR. D. JENKINSasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If all hopes of raising the "Vanguard" have been abandoned, and, if so, what steps are proposed to be taken for the removal of the wreck?
  MR. W. H. SMITH: Sir, hopes of raising the Vanguard are not abandoned. A contract was entered into with Captain Coppin more than a year ago, and he has until the 31st of October to raise the ship. We are told that he has made preparations for that purpose, and great hopes are entertained that something will be done; but, until after October, it will not be possible for us to take any further steps.

  LAW AND JUSTICE—JUDGES' SUBSTI TUTES.—QUESTION.
  MR. DILLWYNasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether, in cases in which from the continued illness or infirmity of a Judge, a substitute is appointed to act on his behalf, the remuneration given to such substitute is paid by the Treasury or by the Judge for whom he acts?
  SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETS0N: Sir, when a Judge is prevented by illness from going Circuit the payment of a substitute or deputy appointed to go in his stead does not fall upon public funds, but on the Judge himself. When, however, a Judge is prevented by continued indisposition from discharging his duties in London, there is no power to provide a substitute at all; but his duties, if performed, devolve upon his brother Judges.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN—ARMY RESERVE FORCES.
  Her Majesty's Message [1st April] considered.
  Message again read.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I rise to move that an humble Address be presented to Her

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  Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her Most Gracious Message, which has just been read at the Table. I presume that it is quite unnecessary for me to state for the information of hon. Members what the character of the measure is which Her Majesty has been advised to take; but, in order that there may be no misapprehension on the subject out-of-doors, it may be as well to remind the House that the step which Her Majesty has been advised to take has been that of calling out, under the Acts which regulate the present system of the Army Reserve, certain portions of the Reserve Forces of the country. The House will bear in mind that that is a necessary incident of the present system of our Army Service; that instead of having, as in old times was the case, an Army recruited for long periods of service, we have now an Army which is recruited for short periods of service, and which is divided into the portion which is actually under service, and the portion in reserve, which is liable to be called out; and that when an occasion arises which, as described in the Act of 1870, is one of emergency, it is in the power of Her Majesty, whether Parliament be sitting or not, to take measures for immediately calling out the Reserve to join the ranks. When Parliament is sitting, that step is announced by Royal Message, and when Parliament is not sitting, it is announced after an Order in Council by Proclamation, and in either case it is carried into effect by Proclamation. It will be understood, of course, that in taking such a step, it is not intended on the part of Her Majesty or Her Advisers to alarm the country by stating that there is any emergency such as might arise in any moment of great national peril. It is not, for instance, an emergency of the character which arose when the Army of the First Napoleon was encamped upon the heights of Boulogne, and when an invasion of this country was threatened. Nor is it such an emergency as that which arose when our Armies were called out to hasten to India to suppress the Indian Mutiny. But it is an emergency of such a character as renders it desirable in Her Majesty's opinion that Her Army should be put upon a footing which permits of it being made use of, if necessary, without delay. Now, it is obvious that, supposing the services of the Army, which is maintained on the
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  footing that is necessary for the discharge of its duties in time of peace—supposing it is necessary that the Army so organized should be called into active service, it is obvious the necessity would very speedily arise for supplying the demands of those portions of Her Forces which Her Majesty might be advised to send abroad, and that that could only be done in one of two, or perhaps I might say three, ways. It might be done by recruiting. To bring in raw recruits would take some time, and when brought in, they would be of comparatively little value if hastily called out; or it might be done by taking men from one regiment to strengthen another, which would be greatly to the disadvantage of the former regiment; or, thirdly, it might be done by the system now established by the wisdom of Parliament—that of calling out the Reserves which are available for such occasions. Well, Sir, it is with the view of so mobilizing the Army of this country that this step has been taken by the Government and the Crown, and it is a measure very similar to, and should be treated in the same spirit as, the measures taken when the Vote of Credit was passed by this House. At that time we asked for a Vote of Credit in order that we might be supplied with the means of moving, if necessary, an Army Corps, and that we might have all the materials necessary for the service of an Army Corps, if its services should be required. If we did not at that time ask for an addition to the number of men in the Army—and it was remarked that we did not do so—it was because it was known that we had these Reserves to fall back upon, and that we could easily and quickly avail ourselves of them if occasion should arise. Sir, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that occasion has now arisen, and it is necessary that the Reserves should be called out, not in any sense as a measure of war, but simply as a measure of precaution, in order that if occasion should arise, we may quickly avail ourselves of the services of the Army, and that there should be no delay or difficulty in making any of the necessary arrangements. It may be asked why at this moment we should think it necessary to take such a measure of precaution as that; and it may be asked, and it has been asked by some, why, if we were content to sit quiet

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  while the war between Russia and Turkey was proceeding, now, when that war is at an end, we should think it necessary to take measures of precaution which appeared to be superfluous during the continuance of hostilities? There were reasons why it was objectionable to take such measures while war was proceeding. Her Majesty's Government had taken up a position of neutrality during the war, and that was an attitude which it appeared to be right for them to assume on behalf of this country, and it was an attitude which they faithfully observed during the continuance of those hostilities. It was obvious that if a measure of this kind had been taken during the continuance of hostilities, it might have given occasion to both parties to believe that we were about to depart from that attitude; and, considering that the neutrality which we observed was a neutrality under certain conditions, which conditions were observed during the course of the struggle, it would have been impossible for us without apparent inconsistency to have taken measures such as those which we have since found necessary. Since the war has come to an end matters have assumed an entirely new aspect, and it has become necessary for this country to consider her position and the duty she might be called upon to discharge. The war is at an end, and the war has been concluded by the Treaty of San Stefano. Well, now, we ought to bear in mind that the whole settlement of South-Eastern Europe has rested upon Treaties to which the Great Powers of Europe, and this country among the rest, have been parties. Those Treaties have settled for many years the basis upon which the European system was to rest, and, according to which it was believed the interests of Europe, as a whole, and the interests of separate countries, might be best secured. But that system has virtually come to an end. That system has broken down, and a new one must be put in its place; and it becomes necessary for this country to consider what the new system should be. The Treaty of Paris has been virtually set aside, and it is proposed to substitute the Treaty of San Stefano for it. But, if that is the case, if the Treaty of San Stefano is to be made the basis of the future European system, it is necessary that those Powers who are interested in the maintenance
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  of European peace, and in the various matters which affect the settlement of what has been included in all those arrangements which were the subjects of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, should take counsel and consider what is the nature of the settlement to which they are asked to be parties. And this country, among others, must claim, and does claim, that she should have a voice in the settlement of those Treaties which are now to be put aside and the other Treaties which are to be put in their place, that we may know what the arrangements are which we are called upon to agree to. We approach this question in no mere narrow desire to guard the peculiar interests of our own country alone. It is our desire to consult the general welfare of Europe, of which this country is a component part and a very important part. We have interests which are, more or less, separate and peculiar to ourselves; but we have, above all, interests in which others are equally sharers—interests in the maintenance of peace, interests in the maintenance of good government in countries which it is most undesirable should be exposed to insurrections and disturbances, and interests in the fair, full, and free development of the different nationalities and different elements of which those countries are composed. It is impossible that all the questions arising out of a settlement of this kind can be dealt with at all, or dealt with satisfactorily, unless the nations of Europe, meeting in free, open, and unreserved discussion, are enabled to take a general view of all that is proposed by way of settlement, not only to consider each individual article of the proposed Treaty, but to consider the Treaty as a whole, and in its bearing on every party to the Congress. That is the sort of Conference to which we consider Europe is invited, and to which we desire, at all events, she should come. It has been said by some that England is throwing obstacles in the way of the assembling of a Conference. There is nothing more untrue than that England is in any way throwing obstacles in the way of a Conference. What England desires above all is the opening of a free Conference—of a Conference that will be able and willing to undertake the settlement of these great matters, What we do object to

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  above all things is the opening of an unreal Conference—of a Conference which would feel itself in some way or other tied or hampered in approaching the settlement of questions, which are all cardinal questions and cannot be passed over. We should feel it was a serious evil, and a very great cause of danger to Europe, if we should find ourselves in a Conference from which, in consequence of the mode in which it was conducted, we should find it necessary to withdraw. "We should feel it to be a still greater evil if we found ourselves in a Conference in which great questions were opened, but were smothered over with ambiguous phrases and terms which might be construed in one way by one and in another way by another, and which left open dangerous questions, and left untouched the seeds of future wars and disturbances. We desire that there should be no ambiguity in what we are about. We desire that we should be allowed to go into this Conference with full and free powers to discuss what is to be the future charter of Europe as regards all that portion of the Continent, and that we should do that with the full and free understanding beforehand that there should be no let or hindrance to our proceeding in that way. I think it is altogether unmeaning to find fault with Her Majesty's Government, as being over-particular or over-susceptible with regard to the phraseology that is to be used in settling the terms upon which the Conference is to meet. Undoubtedly, we should be guilty of a most gross violation of duty, if we were to allow any question of phraseology or any point of vanity to prevent our taking part in a great, substantial, and beneficial settlement. But in these matters, words are things, and it is of the highest importance that we should be clear as to our words—that we should be clear, at all events, as to the meaning to be attached to them. We know what evil consequences might arise from a misunderstanding. I have myself known the evil consequences which have sometimes arisen from being too ready to accept an understanding which never, after all, was understood to be an understanding. I can remember cases—I do not wish to make more special reference to them—in which, even in diplomatic transactions, difficulties have arisen subsequently, because there was too much
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  readiness to endeavour not to see a difficulty, and to assume an understanding when understanding has not been arrived at. We ought to take warning from cases of that kind. There should be no possibility of a misunderstanding arising in the Conference to which we and Europe are now invited, and we believe that it is for the interests, not of ourselves only, but of Europe generally, and we are convinced that it is also for the interests of Russia herself, that there should be a clear and distinct agreement between us all; and that the Conference, which, we trust, is to be held, should be a real and final one, and should not leave open those matters of which Russia, as well as others, had found the inconvenience of leaving open. The language of Russia from the beginning of this question has been pointed in that direction. When first she called attention to the difficulties arising in Turkey, the argument she advanced when, upon the failure of the Conference of Constantinople, she took up arms to enforce what could not be settled by argument—her argument was that it was impossible for her to allow the turbulence and the discontent that had been going on so many years on her immediate borders to continue, as they led to excitement among her own people and neighbours, and to that condition of things she could not submit. But if there is to be an unreal and sham Conference—an attempt to gloss over difficulties and shrink from boldly grappling with them—we should leave Russia exposed to the very danger from which she said she had suffered so much, and we shall run the risk, of course, in a very few years, of seeing the whole of these matters re-opened, and the opportunity now offered will be lost for ever. I wish most carefully to abstain in anything I may say from using language that can be regarded as in the slightest degree irritating or offensive to a great country like Russia. There is no question whatever that Russia has gone through a struggle, has made sacrifices, and has endured suffering which entitle her to great consideration, and entitle her to claim that what she says should be listened to with attention, and that due allowance should be made for feelings that naturally are engendered in a great contest of that sort. But, at the same time, we must speak frankly, and must say that we cannot permit the

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  pretensions put forward in a Treaty like that of San Stefano to pass unchallenged, or without a most complete and searching examination. We know very well what the effect of that Treaty will be. We see that if that Treaty is allowed to pass as it is, Russia will have a complete grasp over the whole of that which has hitherto been known as the Turkish Empire. It seems that the Treaty places Russia in a position which will enable her to make use of the commanding position it gives her in such a way as may be most dangerous and most inconvenient to the general interests of the European Powers. If that settlement is acquiesced in, it cannot continue for ever. We know that difficulties and jealousies will arise, that there will be before long disturbances and quarrels, and that wars will probably break out. Then, if we look at some of the individual arrangements of the Treaty, we see there is an absence of consideration for all populations except those of Slavonic origin. Although the question of the Greeks and of the Mussulmans is partly touched upon by the Treaty, it is by no means adequately provided for; and we see that if the country is left in the position in which that Treaty would leave it, there are almost certain to be jealousies, almost certain to be heartburnings, almost certain to be insurrections and quarrels between the various nationalities which are more or less affected by it. Sir, we think it is the duty of this country to use her influence in the Councils of Europe to endeavour to have that Treaty so carefully and so fully considered, as that we may be enabled to get upon a footing that will make it more consonant with the maintenance of the European system than it at present promises to be. And in making that request—that demand—we are only asking for that which, in point, of fact, Russia has always, I believe, from the beginning of the war contemplated. We have always understood, and certainly at a comparatively early period we were distinctly informed by Russia that, after the war was over and the preliminary conditions of peace arranged, Europe would be invited to a Conference for the consideration of the final conditions of peace. That statement was made to Colonel Wellesley by the Emperor at the beginning of the month of August or the end of July last year. That is
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  precisely what we have always felt assured would be the case, and it was in the confident assurance that it would be the case at the end of the war, that England maintained the neutrality which she had proclaimed, and which has certainly not been otherwise than beneficial to Russia. Therefore, all that we are asking that Russia should do now is that which in the month of August she said she was prepared to do—namely, that Europe should be consulted in Conference to settle the conditions of peace. And we are in hopes even now, although difficulties have arisen for the moment, that those difficulties may be but apparent, that they may be surmounted, and that we may find ourselves invited to a Conference upon what shall be a satisfactory settlement. It is, however, idle to conceal from ourselves that that is not the position at the present moment. It is idle to conceal from ourselves that—disguise it as you may, soften it as you will—Russia has not at the present time agreed to that full discussion of the Treaty of San Stefano in all its Articles in relation to their bearing on existing Treaties that we desire and that we think essential. Even now Russia may, when she considers the matter more calmly, come to a different conclusion, and may see that in making this demand upon her there is no arrière pensée on the part of England, that it is from no selfish object or desire to interfere with a proper and reasonable settlement that England is thus particular in insisting upon the terms upon which alone she will go into a Conference; but that it is with a sincere wish to enter into a settlement which shall be beneficial to Europe as well as to Russia as a part of Europe. I am sure, at all events, that the sentiment of Europe is in accord with the sentiment of Her Majesty's Government, and that Europe desires to see an end put to these great and disadvantageous distractions. I am satisfied that the voice of Europe is entirely in accord with us in a desire for the settlement of the Eastern Question upon a broad and—as far as anything human can be called final—a final basis. It desires to see a Conference entered upon which should seriously treat every Article by itself, and also every Article in relation to the whole. It is absurd to say that——"You can treat one Article by itself,

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  and as this is a matter which relates only to the interests of Russia and Austria, let Russia and Austria settle it, and we have nothing to do with it. Here, again, is an Article that relates to the interests of Russia and England, let Russia and England settle it between themselves and let the other Powers stand aside. Here, again, is an Article that relates simply to the interests of Russia and Turkey, let Russia and Turkey arrange it together, and let the other Powers stand aside." It may be that one Article may more especially affect one country and another Article may more especially affect another country. But to leave the consideration of the whole out of the case—to leave the consideration of the general effect of a Treaty which involves these Articles on one side would be to leave the whole matter open to danger and unsettlement. Probably a partial settlement may be made here and another partial settlement there; and in that way separate interests are created and separate feelings are aroused which may make joint action more impossible. In these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government must continue to press for the condition which they have insisted upon. We believe that we may be successful; but if it be not so, at all events it is our duty to consider what are the special and peculiar interests of England; and if we are denied the advantage of taking part in a general European settlement such as we desire, it is the paramount duty of those who are charged with the administration of affairs in this country to see that the interests of England should take no damage. The House knows as well as we do—because it has been repeated over and over again—that it is a cardinal point of our policy to maintain the integrity of the Empire, to maintain the communications between its different parts. They know that we look to the maintenence of our communications with India and with the East; that we desire to establish ourselves on such a footing that there should be no danger either of the interruption of those communications or of such a threatening of our position as may cause them embarrassment or difficulty. I do not go into the minute questions of routes and lines of invasion and attack. I, for one, am as well disposed to think lightly of them as anyone in this House. I have, indeed,
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  often agreed with what my hon. Friend the Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) has said with reference to particular lines of possible attack on or invasion of India. But, on the other hand, we have not been able to conceal from ourselves the moral effect which might be produced on our position in India from changes that might be made. We have not been able to conceal from ourselves the effect that possible changes might have on the routes and communications that are now kept open to our Eastern Dominions. And it is our duty to be prepared, if, unfortunately, occasion should require it, to defend by our own right hands, and our own means, the communications which we think essential. Although I am obliged to use words of that sort to justify the position which we might have to take, I trust that no occasion of that kind will arise. I trust that the spirit which has animated this country, and which has manifested itself throughout these transactions, will continue to the end and will bring its reward with it. Whatever may have been our feelings of anxiety and of uneasiness during some of these transactions, we have invariably endeavoured to follow one rule, and one rule only—namely, to ask ourselves on each occasion which was the right and the proper course for us to pursue. We have endeavoured to do that which is right, and to leave the issue to a higher Power. We maintained an attitude of neutrality during the great struggle which has been going on, because we felt it was a war in which we should not have been justified, and in which the feeling of the country would not have justified us, in taking a part. We have now endeavoured not to take any selfish line in that which remains before us. But we stand up and assert, with full confidence in the energy, the courage, the resources, and the patriotism of this people, that we shall be able—and that we are as determined as we are able—to maintain the interests of our Empire if those interests should be threatened. The policy which prompts the step which has been taken by Her Majesty's Government on the occasion which has now brought us together is the same policy which led Her Majesty's Government to call on Parliament some few months ago for support by means of the Vote of Credit, which Parliament granted with such very decided approbation, and with

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  so marked an effusion of patriotism. I believe that the same spirit which prevailed then will prevail now. We believe it is a spirit as far as possible removed from a desire to provoke or to cause war; but it is a spirit of determination to stand by our rights, and to stand by our duty. That spirit, reflected as it will be by both Houses of Parliament, I trust, in the course of this evening, is a spirit which I believe will go far to secure both the rights of England in time of peace, and also to maintain her credit in the eyes of Europe and the world.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her Most Gracious Message communicating to this House Her Majesty's intention to cause the Reserve Force, and the Militia Reserve Force, or such part thereof as Her Majesty should think necessary, to be forthwith called out for permanent service."—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
  MR. GLADSTONE: My first duty, Sir, is to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) for having kindly waived the precedence to which he was entitled as the Mover of an Amendment. I have also to express my thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) for a similar act of kindness. Their indulgence enables me to state the course that I individually intend to take, and my reasons for taking it. I have listened to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer with this feeling. Had it been a simple exposition of the policy of the Government on his own authority given in the way of explanation, and having no Motion, no measure connected with it, and standing in no relation to other and yet more authoritative expositions of the policy of the Government, I, for my part, should have been contented either to sit silent, or, at all events, to take but a limited exception to the terms of that speech; because by far the greater portion of the sentences that have fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer were sentences such as I, for one, should not have had the smallest scruple or hesitation in using. Sir, the speech, whether in accordance with a special measure or not, was a speech introducing a Motion, and that Motion has
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  direct reference to a measure which has been explained, not only in this House, but probably "elsewhere," by another speech, which I hope may resemble the one we have just heard. But, more authoritatively than either of these, that policy has been explained by a despatch which has received the approval and sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and which has gone abroad as an authentic commentary on the measure they have adopted. ["Hear, hear!"] lam glad that the proposition I utter is so freely recognized on the other side of the House. In these circumstances, it is not possible for me to confine myself to the limited observations which the speech of the Leader of the House alone need have drawn forth. It is necessary to consider the situation, not only in connection with the measure proposed to us, but in connection with what has preceded it, with what may follow it, and especially with what accompanies it—namely, the declaration of policy contained in the despatch of Lord Salisbury. At the same time, while claiming that right, and exercising that duty—for, as my right hon. Friend says, our rights and our duties are inseparably associated, both nationally and individually—I have no intention of asking the House, by a Motion in the nature of an Amendment, to contest the Address which my right hon. Friend has proposed. We have had past opportunities of declaring our opinion by our votes upon what I may call the military policy of Her Majesty's Government; future opportunities will occur to us when the Government submits to us the Supplementary Estimates required by their military measure; and, undoubtedly, where there is a choice, the reply to a Message received from the Crown does not offer the occasion most desirable and most appropriate upon general grounds for raising an issue to be decided by a division. If that be so, I have the further satisfaction of admitting that as the speech of my right hon. Friend was undoubtedly the very mildest speech which, in connection with the measure which he has proposed, it would have been possible for him to deliver, so that Message is the very mildest Message that, for the purpose which it had in view, it was possible to frame. I was very glad when I saw, after the ominous declarations which we have heard elsewhere

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  about a restoration of the balance of power in the East, which appeared to me, if they had a real meaning, to point to the building up again of that fabric of iniquity—the Ottoman Empire—that no allusion to this subject was made in the Message. Her Majesty has been pleased to assure us that she has called out Her Reserves, and that she makes her communication to us, in the interests of peace. I am quite certain that even if there had been something equivocal in the attachment of the Government, or of any Member of the Government, to peace, that the Government could never have advised that these words should be put into the mouth of Her Majesty without intending to convey to her Parliament and her people by the use of these words a strong and solemn assurance. I will, therefore, Sir, neither move any Amendment, nor can I recommend any Friend who may look to my advice that any Amendment should be made upon this occasion, or that when the question is put from the Chair, any issue should be raised. I frankly own that, in so doing, I am making no boon to right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Gentlemen opposite. I know perfectly well, in addition to the reason which I have just given, that it is not in my power, by means of any Amendment that I might move or support, to check effectually upon the instant the military policy of which I so much disapprove. That is the position in which I, for one, stand in reference to the present debate, and I hope that I have made it sufficiently clear. I will now proceed to state the views I take of the measure of Her Majesty's Government, and likewise of the important document—the too important document—in which the grounds of that measure have been explained by the Foreign Secretary. I cannot admit, with my right hon. Friend, that what the Act of Parliament describes as a great emergency, has arisen in the present case. I observe, that by an omission on his part—unintentional, no doubt—he speaks not of a great emergency, but of an emergency; while the language of the Statute is not an emergency, but a great emergency. This is a question of the utmost importance and moment. Our Queen rules over an Empire, and our fellow-subjects are concerned in an Empire, not, like
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  other Empires, limited to one part of the globe, but so spread and distributed over all its surface that no great disturbances can anywhere arise without raising questions of serious concern for the British Empire. If we are to give a lax construction to this Act of Parliament—which I believe contemplated the use of the phrase, and I may speak as one of those responsible for its selection and its application in that cautious and reserved manner which has been the habit of former Ministers in former times—we may change its real meaning; and it is most important to consider how often we may be in the unhappy predicament of having a great urgency alleged by the Government for calling out the Reserve Forces; and, I am sorry to add, whatever be the intention, and whatever the re-assuring character of the speech of my right hon. Friend, thereby disquieting the world, I can only say that within the last 12 or 15 years there have been at least three occasions upon which, in my opinion, if this be a great emergency, the principle of great emergencies might have been applied. Of course, I am aware that not till the year 1870 the present words were introduced into the Act; but that is not my point. My point is that if the circumstances now existing in the East constitute a great emergency, I have known within the last 12 or 15 years, at least, three occasions which, in my judgment, would likewise have to be contemplated as great emergencies if similar cases occurred in the future. I, therefore, wish to see what would be the significance of this interpretation of the terms should the course of events in the future be marked as it has been in the past, and as it must be from time to time by the re-occurrence of disturbances in various parts of the world. Most certainly it would have been a great emergency when, by the American War, 2,000,000 of our population had the bread taken out of their mouths, and were reduced to starvation or charity. Most certainly it would have been a great emergency when, at the time of the Franco-German War, a treacherous document was discovered, of which, naturally, no man has been eager to claim the paternity—I mean the instrument, not so much known or so much remembered as it ought to be, for the partition of Belgium and the absorption

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  of a free country, and the suppression of its independence—a country which has offered an example of free government, combined with order, to every country in Europe. I will say, again, that the occasion of the Danish War would have been à fortiori a great emergency, if the present circumstances constitute one; for, in that Danish War, we came nearer to military measures than Her Majesty's Government have yet gone on the present occasion. We went so far as to make a formal proposal to France, that England and France should join and say to Prussia and Austria—"You shall not settle the question of the Danish Succession except by juridical and legal means." That was a proposal which, in similar circumstances, would have been made by the present Government; for I recollect that the present Foreign Minister attacked us for not going further than we went. As Lord Robert Cecil, he expressed that view of our policy; and, therefore, when such an occasion occurs again, it might undoubtedly be for him a great emergency. I contemplate that, if we are to have a lax interpretation of this phrase, the military machinery of this country may be put into extended motion upon grounds such as are now alleged of the necessity of defending British interests, which no one has attacked—which no one has expressed any intention of attacking—and which I say, advisedly, it is against the plain and palpable interests of any one of the Powers interested in this question to attack. If, under such circumstances, we are to have a great emergency, in my opinion, within three, four, or five years, the people of this country, should this principle receive permanent sanction, may expect to have a great emergency, and, while their heart is set upon peace, to discover that they have been led almost to the brink of war. My right hon. Friend says that this measure is a measure parallel to the Vote of Credit. Permit me to say that he has not referred to the express declarations with which the Vote of Credit was introduced, and by which it was recommended by himself as well as others. We were told by the right hon. Gentleman who is now Secretary of State for War that of that Vote of Credit no portion would be required. ["No, no!"] We were told that that was his opinion. I took the words
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  down at the time, and, if my right hon. Friend opposite is not aware of that, I am sorry that he should have to depend upon my infirm memory for the declaration of his Colleagues. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the greater part of the Vote of Credit would be restored to the Exchequer. But I do not depend so much upon that as upon the declaration which accompanied the Vote. It was proposed to enable Her Majesty's Government to go into a European Congress on an equality with the other Powers, and not, therefore, in the slightest degree with military views. But is that the language held now? On the contrary, the world has been under the belief, and we are still under the belief, notwithstanding the faint glimmer of hope to be gathered from the speech of my right hon. Friend, that it was not to enable Her Majesty's Government to go into the Congress armed with what they called a Vote of Confidence—that they have had long ago, and everything it could give them they have long ago enjoyed—but that the present proposal points undisguisedly to military preparation. Unless we are much mistaken, the measure directly contemplates an expedition beyond our own shores. Surely, therefore, I am justified in saying that the proposal now before us comes before us in a different aspect from the former, and has an advanced purpose altogether distinct from it. I believe Her Majesty's Government have wrongly advised the Crown upon the use of the words "great emergency"—words clearly intended to have reference to some great danger to the interests or the honour of the country, neither of which are in danger at the present moment. Now, Sir, I heard with great satisfaction one declaration of my right hon. Friend, and I must say it would give me a degree of pleasure I can hardly describe were it in my power to substitute the speech we have just heard for the despatch lately laid upon the Table. [A laugh.] The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) smiles, as though I had thought of some practical proposal for that purpose, and imagined there was some Parliamentary Form through which it could be carried out. Let me suggest to the acute mind of the hon. Member that what I meant was that if I could

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  substitute something conceived in the spirit of the speech of to-day for the despatch conceived in the spirit in which it was composed, it would give me indescribable pleasure. Sir, my right hon. Friend, for the first time, on the part of the Government, has given scope to his feelings on the subject of the Congress. He said, in substance, that it was his earnest and warmest desire to find himself honourably placed in a Conference of the Powers of Europe. All along, during these discussions, I have gathered up every crumb of comfort I could. I have never heard a syllable falling from the lips of a Member of the Government in the public interest, as it appeared to me, without endeavouring to turn it to account; and so I gladly record the words of my right hon. Friend. I believe it is to this point we should address our principal consideration to-night. I believe that the heart of the vast mass of the people of this country is set upon having such a Congress. As to having it upon honourable terms, that is a matter of course; no one would dream of having it upon any other terms. My right hon. Friend tells us—and again I thank him for it—that he has yet some hope the Congress may meet. I rejoice to receive that limited assurance in a matter of such profound and vital interest to us. Why, I ask, is it not to meet? Because, says Lord Salisbury, of the reservations laid down by Prince Gortchakoff in his most recent document—that is to say, the document in which he says that any Power may propose for discussion what it pleases, and that Russia—like any other Power, I presume—will reserve it to herself to accept or not accept the discussion. What do these words mean? Do they mean that Russia claims a title to limit the discussions of the Congress, or simply a title to limit her own share in it? These two things are essentially different. I have again and again endeavoured to obtain from the Chancellor of the Exchequer an explanation upon that point. Tonight a great portion of the speech of my right hon. Friend has been a denunciation of ambiguity. He tells me of the necessity of leaving everything clear and of not going forward blindfold. Why, then, does the Chancellor of the Exchequer decline to give me the meaning of these words? It is one thing for
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  Russia to limit the discussions of the Congress; it is another to do that which Turkey may do, which France, Italy, England, Austria, Germany can do—that is to say, to make herself the judge of the share she should take in those discussions and in the proceedings of the Congress altogether. In vain have I asked whether the Russian Minister intends to claim the right of withdrawal, which every Power possesses, or the right of veto, which no Power possesses? If the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the latter was the power claimed, it would be something gained in the way of clearness; but that explanation was steadily withheld in the answer the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave me across the Table. I endeavoured to find out whether the Government were willing or not to give consideration to the German proposals for a preliminary Meeting of the Powers. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says it is most important to have a clear understanding before we enter the Congress. If so, why do the Government refuse the German proposal? If they want a clear understanding, why do they limit it to themselves and Russia? The German Government have pointed out to Her Majesty's Government the right and sound and common-sense way of proceeding. Why can they not in some shape or way meet by their Ministers or Plenipotentiaries, as was done at Vienna, and clear away all ambiguities before the Congress assembles? What is the use of controversies carried on by telegram in brief sentences, showing how curtly men can write, and showing, too, that they are not men accustomed to carry on such proceedings in a manner calculated to lead to a satisfactory result? Why not, I say, meet together to consider your doubts and misgivings, and contrive to find out what you can of the general sentiment? If you settle the matter with Russia, another Power may find out some other ambiguity, and enter into the same angry—perhaps, that is too strong a word; but, at any rate, not very good-humoured or friendly—correspondence on the subject. We have set ourselves up as the organs of, and the substitutes for, Europe. We call out for the rights of Europe, and we call out justly for the rights of Europe against Russia, and we will not allow her to

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  compromise them; but we make ourselves the judges of what Europe ought to require before going into Congress. ["No, no!"] No! If you do not, then meet before the assembling of the Congress the Representatives of the Powers, and determine what the method of procedure should be. That is the way, as it appears to me, that doubt and ambiguity may best be got rid of. I never heard sounder doctrine on that point than what the Chancellor of the Exchequer laid down; but, all through, it appeared to me a severe criticism on the letter in which the British Government told the German Government that it saw no benefit to be derived from a preliminary discussion with the Powers on this point. Sir, some of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government I have had occasion to notice—included in the speech of my right hon. Friend and the Message under consideration. I observe with very great pleasure the promise given by Her Majesty's Government to the Kingdom of Greece, which obviously was a promise, not to the Kingdom of Greece in its isolated and separate capacity, but the Kingdom of Greece as the natural, although informal, representative of the Hellenic race beyond that Kingdom. Before saying anything in a hostile sense in reference to the despatch of Lord Salisbury, let me say, with pleasure, one word upon an important part of it. As long as I can I will cling to the belief that the definition of policy towards the end of the despatch is one which contemplates truly British objects. I refer to the definition which states that the true policy must be one to secure "good government, assured peace, and freedom" for the populations living in the Christian Provinces of the Porte. There is, indeed, one passage which might excite alarm in Turkish quarters, if the construction which it seems to me to bear be the right one. It is that which refers to "the Government of Constantinople," and which has caused a great deal of attention. About the middle of page 4, it will be found that the noble Marquess is taking objection to the Treaty of San Stefano, as
  "threatening almost the entire subordination of the political independence of the Government of Constantinople."
  I, for one, have never seen that phrase used before. I have heard of "the Ottoman Porte," "the Sublime Porte," "the
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  Sultan," "the Padishah," "the Turkish Government," and so forth, but never of "the Government of Constantinople"—a phrase which seems to me to disassociate the possession of Constantinople from all connection with the Sultan and with the Turkish race. I make no comment on the phrase beyond calling attention to it. Its use may have been accidental; but it has drawn attention, and it may or may not have considerable signification. I view, as I have said, the definition of policy with satisfaction, and I have no greater desire than to assist Her Majesty's Government by any feeble efforts I can make in the prosecution of the policy so defined. What I feel in regard to the Government is this, and I am speaking of them as a whole—I do not speak of the Prime Minister—is that we cannot reconcile their different proceedings. They appear to me to move to-day in one direction, and tomorrow in another; so much so, that whenever, for a long while past, anything has happened that has given pleasure, I have said—"Oh, let us take care; tomorrow there will be something different;" and, whenever, on the other hand, something has happened that has created apprehension and alarm, I have said—"Probably, in the course of a few days, it will be balanced by something of a better character." I will now give the reasons for this difficulty which I have felt. With regard to our position to-night, I must ask the House to enter with me into a short retrospect. I am not going back to any former discussions on the Eastern Question, nor to the period when the present Eastern Question arose, but only to that portion of the present transaction which has occurred within the last four or five months—since it has been clear that Turkey must succumb in the war. I hope the House and the country will recognize over how very much ground we have travelled during that period of a few months. At times, various causes have led to great apprehension—painful apprehension, I believe, in most quarters, exulting apprehension in others, and notably in the offices of some of the London daily newspapers, which are very far from being unimportant factors in the conduct of the present question. Apprehensions prevailed a short time back tending to the idea that the country was going into a war which, as I believe,

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  the heart of the country detests and abhors, and which, I believe, can be avoided. The country was, however, reassured by the remarkable speeches of the Earl of Derby and the Earl of Carnarvon, when they were Members of the Ministry. But, let us follow the course of events since those speeches were delivered. From that time we have been sliding onwards upon a declivity, and it is most needful for us to consider where our movements are to end. First of all, came the disappearance of the Earl of Carnarvon from the Ministry, and the disappearance produced no inconsiderable check upon the confidence of the public. Secondly, came the presence, and, at length, the abiding presence, of the British Fleet in the Sea of Marmora. It is true that in the first instance—and English Governments always strongly insist upon their own veracity, and cannot admit England to be less virtuous than any other country—we were told that the Fleet only went up for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of British subjects; and that declaration has never been recalled or qualified—the Fleet remains, and the effect of the fact on the public mind has been to bring us a step or two nearer to the precipice. Then, as soon as the Fleet was comfortably settled in the Sea of Marmora, we had the Vote of Credit for £6,000,000. That Vote was the result of an appeal from the Government; and, whatever may have been said as to its sole object being to send us into the Congress with appropriate and adequate dignity, its undoubted effect has been to produce a disposition towards, and a craving for, war. Whatever may be the self-command and moral and mental equilibrium of the people, the Executive Government of this country is nearly as absolute—and from necessity—as in a despotic country in exciting the people towards war. On all the occasions that I can recollect when we have had war, such as the great Revolutionary War of Mr. Pitt, and the Crimean War in 1853, and on occasions when we might have had war, such as the very menacing quarrel, though from a very trivial incident, that arose between us and France in 1844, respecting the Island of Tahiti, the whole bearing and energy of the country have been addressed to repressing the first movement of the martial spirit, and
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  to endeavour to secure calm and strict peace until the time of dire necessity arises. I am bound to say that it has not been so on this occasion. I cannot refrain from saying it has not been so on the present occasion. The peaceful declarations of one Member of the Cabinet have been qualified or have been overruled by declarations of another kind from the Prime Minister, or from other quarters. Therefore, Sir, partly from that, and partly from the special cause I have mentioned, I feel that has tended to bring us nearer to a warlike frame of mind. Then came the rupture of the Congress negotiations—that was another step in the same direction, which I hope the speech of to-night may do something to redress; and then came the disappearance of Lord Derby—another important step; for now two men were gone from the Cabinet upon whom, both for their disposition and their firmness, the hopes of the country had been, if not exclusively, yet principally, placed. Now comes the calling out of the Reserves; and I ask the House whether, amid the peaceful declarations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made in terms the sincerity of which no one can doubt, we are not drifting towards war? "Drifting" is a phrase which has now become historical, and I contend that it is a true and accurate one to apply to the movement of the mind and temper of this people and the Government during the last four months. There remains to us this abstraction, that there is no cause for war; at least, that a great many of us have looked into the facts of the dispute, and we find that there is no cause for our going into war. I would remind the House that, in the opinion of all thoughtful men, a causeless war voluntarily incurred is one of the greatest and most abominable crimes of which a country can be guilty. Now, I must ask what effect the important despatch which has been written by the Marquess of Salisbury has had on the disposition of this country? I ask the House to consider the important character of that despatch—about some of its arguments and the character of its assertions I shall have something to say presently. But I ask the House now to consider the time at which the reproaches it contains have been produced, and have been launched at the other party in the controversy. As to the spirit of

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  that despatch, and the spirit in which the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano have been considered, I cannot describe them so well as they describe themselves. But that spirit is well summarized in one of the newspapers of this day, which says that—
  "Lord Salisbury proved, in the most conclusive manner, that until either we retire altogether from India, or else obtain the mastery of the entire portion of the Globe between us and India, there will be opportunities for making a great emergency whenever the Ministry is disposed to make it."
  I feel that to be a correct designation of the logical argumentative triumph effected by a portion of that despatch. In that despatch I find the Congress spoken about; but not one word to show that the writer set any value on the Congress, or had any such feeling about the Congress as the Chancellor of the Exchequer describes to be his own feeling. I am now going to make a charge, which, as I see the Secretary of State for India is making notes, I beg he will note. I shall endeavour to make myself perfectly clear, and I crave the indulgence of the House when I say that I intend to charge Lord Salisbury's despatch with misstatements. I do not doubt that these misstatements have been committed involuntarily; but, at the same time, I do not think they are creditable to the Foreign Minister of this country. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen may cry "Oh, oh!" but I would ask them, are misstatements creditable? I disapprove of certain statements in the despatch, and all I ask is that hon. Gentlemen who disagree with me should listen to my proof. After having done that, they may, if they like, rise in their places, and, if they think fit, attempt to disprove what I may say. But, to pass on—what says the despatch upon the important question of the choice of a Prince of Bulgaria? It says—"Bulgaria is to be subjected to a Ruler whom Russia will practically choose." But what says the San Stefano Treaty? Can anyone believe that a Secretary of State should have made this assertion, when there is nothing in the Treaty which secures to Russia as a separate Power the right of choosing this Ruler of Bulgaria? The stipulations of the Treaty on this head are three in number, and they are to be found in Article VII. In the first place, this Prince of Bulgaria is to be freely
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  elected by the people. His election is to be confirmed by the Porte, and that with the assent of the other Powers. I put it to Parliament, whether those being the stipulations of the Treaty, they think it candid or honourable to state as a result of the terms of the Treaty that a Prince of Bulgaria is to be one whom Russia will practically choose? If the case were reversed—if we had been making these stipulations for the choice of a Ruler of Bulgaria, and we had provided for the free election by the people, and confirmation by the Porte, and confirmation by all the Powers of Europe in the final arrangement, I should like to know what would be thought if Prince Gortchakoff had said that the Prince of Bulgaria would be a Ruler who would be practically chosen by England? We should not have allowed it to be said, because by the Treaty it would have appeared different. The next misstatement I have to notice is, perhaps, not quite equal in importance to that I have just pointed out; but I think it is worth noticing, because it is most inequitable. It is most important, in conducting diplomatic controversies of this kind, which may affect the peace of the world, that every statement should be equitably made. What is said in this despatch with regard to the Christian Provinces other than Bulgaria? It states that the laws by which they are to be governed are to be framed under the supervision of the Russian Government. That is the whole description given of the provisions of the Treaty for framing the regulations for the government of any Province. But what does the Treaty say? Turn to Article XV. It deals first with the question of Crete. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that in that Article, the Russian negotiator, whoever he may be, appears to have had it in mind to pay a special compliment to Her Majesty's Government, by following out the organic Law of 1868 for Crete, which was framed with the approval, and with the large participation, of the Party opposite. That was a very defective law indeed. The Russians have cut down that law lower than they ought to have done in justice to the Christian population of Crete, for the purpose, evidently, to soothe and conciliate Her Majesty's Government. They have, however, I must say, improved upon the Treaty of 1868, for they have not

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  said simpliciter that the basis shall be the Law of 1868; but they have likewise introduced the previously expressed wishes of the population, which are also to be taken into account. Well, now comes something else. With regard to the other Provinces—Thessaly, Epirus, &c.—the Treaty says there are to be analogous arrangements. How are they to be made? They are to be made by special Commissions—Commissions appointed by the Porte, with the Native element largely represented. The plans are to be submitted to the Porte, and the Porte is to consult Russia before carrying them into effect. Those are the terms. The organic Law of Greece is the basis. A special Commission is to be framed by the Porte, in which the Native element is to be largely represented; the plans are to be submitted to the Porte, and the Porte to consult Russia before carrying them into effect. Then, is it a fair description of that state of arrangements to say the plans shall be framed under the supervision of the Russian Government? Is that a method of proceeding, or a method of description, that any one of you would follow with his friend in a private contract? Would you adopt such a mode of proceeding with a friend? I call it a contentious mode of proceeding. I will not call it attorneyism, because none but the meanest of attorneys would have adopted it. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite laugh at that statement. I am sorry that they should do so, because I am not aware that this is a subject for ridicule, and I do not know that the hon. Members who laugh have done much to elucidate this question. I am doing my best to do so, and by the course they are taking they are making my task more difficult than it need be, and therefore I must request their forbearance while I continue my observations. Now I go on to what follows in this despatch. It is stated in the portion of the despatch which follows the portion to which I have just referred, that the Treaty contains engagements for the protection of the members of the Russian Church. In the first place, the members of the Russian Church are nowhere mentioned in the Treaty. Certain members of the Russian Church undoubtedly are mentioned, they being the ecclesiastics, clerks, pilgrims, including the monks of the three communities of Mount Athos,
  884
  who are of Russian origin. The members of the Russian Church number some 60,000,000, whereas the members of the Russian Church living in the Southern Provinces cannot number more than 200,000 at the outside; while those in Turkey itself cannot exceed 2,000. This is a perfect sample of the ordinary stipulation made by one Power in treaty with another to secure immunities for its subjects—those known as the most favoured nations—immunities for its subjects when away in the territory of that other Power. I ask whether there is any other Article, however treated, besides Article XXII., to which Lord Salisbury alludes. I ask whether the Government are aware, or if the Secretary of State for India is aware, of any other Article? I do not wish to take up the time of the House unnecessarily. Then, if you cannot find, I cannot find any Article except Article XXII., and I think I hardly can be wrong. I do not wish to impute gross carelessness in a document without examination, and therefore I wish to feel the ground under me. The despatch of Lord Salisbury goes on to say that the Treaty contains engagements for the protection of members of the Russian Church. I have shown that that is a most improper phrase, for the words cannot be more limited in their scope than those in the Articles of the Treaty of Kainardji, which were the foundation of the Russian terms of 1854, and which were put an end to by the Treaty of Paris of 1856. If my opinion be a unanimous opinion or not, when I see a grave official statement of this character upon a matter so important as that Russia had endeavoured to dispose of the whole Treaty of Kainardji, not more limited in their scope, and suggesting that they were even more limited, I read those words with the greatest pain. Why, Sir, the Russians must have been doing some act of madness in inserting such stipulations as these in the Treaty. But what is the fact? The Treaty has nothing whatever to do with the Treaty of Kainardji. The Foreign Secretary cannot have read the Treaty of Kainardji, and no Member of the Government can have read it. There is a clause in the Treaty of Kainardji as to the Russian subjects. That was not the important clause of the Treaty of Kainardji. It was that

  885
  which gave the Russian Emperor the right of requiring that the Sultan should protect the Churches of whatever denomination through the length and breadth of his Empire. It was on the Treaty of Kainardji that the Emperor of Russia founded the exorbitant claim which led to the Crimean War; and when there is not one solitary syllable in the Treaty before us to that effect, the Foreign Secretary of England, in the name of his Government, and with the concurrence of his Government, has brought this charge against the Government of Russia when the public mind is in an inflammable state, and when, if a match were applied, mischief might be produced far beyond his or my power to calculate or to check. I beg the right hon. Gentleman will observe the statement I have made, and will reply to it. I should be very sorry if he omitted an opportunity of making a satisfactory reply. What are the principal complaints contained in this despatch? The principal are these—They refer, in the first place, to Bulgaria; in the second place, to Thessaly; in the third place, to Bessarabia; in the fourth place, to Armenia; and in the fifth place to the indemnity. Now, of these five points or complaints upon which this formidable despatch is built, the indemnity is one that does not, as appears to me, belong to the consideration of Europe, except in so far as provision is made for a commutation of the indemnity. Territorial commutation is, I think, obviously, of European concern. Bulgaria, Thessaly, Bessarabia, and Armenia, are the other counts of the indictment. As to the taking of Bessarabia from Roumania, it appears to me impossible to conceive an act more impolitic or more culpable than that spoliation would be. [Ministerial cheers.] I am heartily glad to have sympathy with the other side of the House. I entertain a very sincere and a very strong opinion with regard to that spoliation. I think it quite unworthy of Russia. It is a step suggested apparently by considerations of national vanity, and what is called prestige, to which, unfortunately, other people are apt to be subject. Considering the gallant conduct of Roumania, the aid which she rendered to Russia at a critical moment in the history of the war, I shall not believe, until I see it in a Congress of United Europe, that Russia will adhere to this proposition. It is,
  886
  however, clearly a question for the consideration of United Europe, which would have a right to do what it pleased in the matter of Bessarabia. England might not have the power to ensure that little bit of Bessarabia to Roumania, but Europe has the power and ought to use it. The question, however, appears to cut a very secondary figure, indeed, in the despatch of Lord Salisbury. I come to my last point, on which I am sorry to detain the House. I invite the attention of the Secretary of State for India. If you want to show that these stipulations endangered the peace and tranquillity of the world—that you must take military measures in consequence of them, why did you keep your resentment shut up from the month of June, 1877? There is hardly anything in the despatch of Lord Salisbury which in the summer of last year you were not made clearly aware of. Of course, there must be provisions in a Treaty which cannot possibly be communicated in a preliminary conversation. But let me give you the facts. The first point in the indictment appears to be that connected with Bulgaria—with the grandest and noblest part of the noble work of liberation which has been done without our participation, and with our hostility and displeasure. What are the points of objection taken by Lord Salisbury to the provisions of the Treaty with regard to Bulgaria? First of all, the extent of Bulgaria. I must say a word on that by-and-bye. Gentlemen opposite will admit, though I have troubled you and taxed your patience, yet on this particular subject I have not intruded much on you within the last few weeks. The first objection taken is the extent of Bulgaria. Now, the extent to which Bulgaria will be carried was substantially made known by the Russian Government to the Government of this country on the 14th of June, 1877. It was not contained in the original Memorandum of the 8th of June, but on the 14th of June it was made known. Lord Salisbury objects to the control Russia is exercising. I perfectly agree it would be very much better if you would make it a joint control as far as possible, but the completion of the work must appertain in a great degree to Russia. It has grown out of the necessities of the case, and it is impossible for Russia absolutely to withdraw without making some provision for the

  887
  time during which the military occupation is to continue. The army of occupation, again, Lord Salisbury objects to, but an armed occupation was distinctly announced to the British Government on the 7th of August, 1877. It was distinctly stated that there must be an army of occupation in Bulgaria. And then, lastly, he makes complaints with reference to Armenia and other Provinces, and Constantinople. I agree that is a very fair subject for consideration at the Conference; but there are two sides to it, and there are also two sides to the question of the extent of Bulgaria. At the same time, I do not recollect to have seen a map of the Bulgaria proposed at the Conference of Constantinople, but I am inclined to believe that that Bulgaria was not materially different from the Bulgaria against which Lord Salisbury now brings this heavy indictment. Thessaly is another subject of complaint, but you were informed about the proceedings as to Thessaly on the 8th of June last year. The Emperor of Russia stated that the best possible regulations would be made for its regular administration, and that the European Powers should be parties to those regulations. How could he stipulate on the part of the European Powers what arrangements they would make for the government of Thessaly? This lamentable idea of the detachment of Bessarabia from Roumania was distinctly conveyed to you on the 8th of June—nine months ago. Armenia is another subject of horror and alarm, and forms a great count in Lord Salisbury's indictment. Now, I am determined not willingly to deviate from justice in this matter. I know what it costs a man if he makes a proposition. The cost of making any proposition is that a man is to have it cast in his teeth at the end of a long life by men of authority and rank as a Russian agent. I know that. Yet, in the face of that, I say here and now that as far as I can form an opinion—it may be erroneous or not—the stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano in regard to Armenia are fair and moderate. But, whether they are fair and moderate or not, I can show that Her Majesty's Government were made privy to the whole of those stipulations which form the entire basis of the late inflammatory despatch of Lord Salisbury. How were they received by Her Majesty's Government in June, and again in
  888
  August? Did they then consider that they threatened permanently to disturb the East, to set the several populations by the ears, to endanger the Suez Canal, and, in fact, to throw a vast portion of the globe in confusion? If so, why was there not a word of warning given? There is not one syllable of the kind in the despatches of Her Majesty's Government. Let us see how these terrible proposals of Russia were received by the Government. It is important in this controversy to bear in mind that Russia at the present time has concluded with Turkey—when within a few miles of Constantinople—a peace which, with, the exception of the indemnity, is substantially the same, is based substantially on the same terms, as Russia announced to our Government in June and again in August, when the battle raged on nearly equal terms and before she had crossed the Balkans. I must say, I think, that in the case of Bessarabia Her Majesty's Government ought to have warned Russia. On some occasions they have said too much; on this occasion I think they said too little. There are objections to be taken to the Treaty of San Stefano, and it would have been a friendly thing on their part to have indicated to Russia that it would be their duty to object to some of those terms. However, on the 9th of June, a despatch was sent to Lord Augustus Loftus without one word of blame or of warning against those stipulations. I will make good what I say; I will show how these terrible propositions of Russia were received by Her Majesty's Government. I have heard Her Majesty's Government blamed for not publishing them in time, but I confess they could not have published them in time. There were objections to be taken to the Treaty of San Stefano, and that happened on more than one point, and it would have been a friendly act if Her Majesty's Government had indicated to Russia the probability that it would be their duty to object. They, however, indicated no such probability. On the 11th of June, Lord Derby wrote, saying he refrained at present from expressing any opinion on the terms proposed by Russia. A despatch was also sent in June to Mr. Layard with those terms without the least reprobation of them. In that instance I must say I think Mr. Layard might, if you had let him, have been of

  889
  some use to the Government, because Mr. Layard wrote back the thunder and lightning despatches on this subject which figure in the Papers before us. On the 18th of June, Lord Derby says he does not understand that any expression of opinion upon the terms is asked from Her Majesty's Government. Lord Derby saw nothing in them to make it his duty to consult his Colleagues upon them. He only remarked that, under the circumstances, it was hardly to be expected that the Turkish Government would accept them. In July, when he had got all these dreadful propositions of Russia—all these horrible schemes for aggrandizement and absorption in his hands, Lord Derby writes that—
  "Her Majesty's Government receive with much satisfaction the statement that the Emperor has authorized Colonel Wellesley to say that he was ready to treat for peace if the Sultan would make suitable propositions."
  Her Majesty's Government knew perfectly well then what the Emperor meant by suitable propositions, and they expressed their great satisfaction at hearing this. In the next paragraph Lord Derby said that—
  "Her Majesty's Government will be ready to use their influence in concert with the other Powers to induce the Porte to terminate the present disastrous war by acceding to such terms as, while they were honourable to Russia, would yet be such as the Sultan could accept."
  But if the terms they had in their hands were in themselves mischievous and bad, was it right, was it natural, was it honourable, to keep the knowledge and description of them locked up in their own breasts, and never to give Russia any intimation of it? I charge the Government with no dishonourable motive in the suppression or omission of this information. My own impression is that at that time Her Majesty's Government probably thought these two things—first, that before long Russia, after all, must, in all likelihood, succeed; and, secondly, that, subject to discussion and adaptation in detail, the demands which Russia had sketched out were not unreasonable. But then, the whole of Lord Salisbury's despatch rests on a totally different basis. About the 12th of August, when they learnt that the Russians were to enter upon a military occupation of Bulgaria, Her Majesty's Government wrote—
  890
  "That they received with satisfaction the statement made by the Emperor of the objects of the war, his disclaimer of any idea of an extended annexation, and also his readiness to enter into negotiations for peace."
  They expressed their dissatisfaction at his disclaiming ideas of extended annexation, when they had in their possession the official declaration from him that he meant to re-conquer the piece of Bessarabia, and meant to have territorial compensation for Armenia! These are grave facts, especially taken in conjunction with what has since followed. Before Russia had crossed the Balkans she told you her intentions. You receive them again and again as they are unfolded to you—first in their main features, and afterwards with some supplementary points; you receive them with perfect complacency, and you never give her the smallest idea that you will object to a Treaty founded on that basis. She crossed the Balkans, and she crushed her enemies. You did not object to her terms before she crossed the Balkans, and now when she is satisfied with substantially the same terms as she communicated to you before she had crossed the Balkans, although she might have then raised them, you turn round and produce this despatch of Lord Salisbury's, making all these charges against Russia. For my own part, Sir, I must say that I do not know how the act of advancing these charges at this time is to be reconciled with our national honour after the reticence of the last six or nine months. I am sorry to have to say so, but I think it is better to speak out what a man feels than to produce it six or nine months hence. I can understand that at the time to which I am referring, and before Russia had gained some of her greatest successes, the remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government against these terms, if they had been made, would have been entitled to be listened to with great respect. The neutrality of England had been declared to be conditional. If you had wanted your remonstrance to tell, then was the time for making it. Therefore, whether on the ground of honour or of prudence, I am equally at a loss to reconcile the conduct that was then pursued with the course which we find pursued in Lord Salisbury's despatch. When I read Lord Salisbury's vigorous argument I confess it appeared to me that all this argument showed

  891
  how imperative is the necessity for going into a Congress, and yet he chooses to make it a disqualification for not going into it. This appears to me to show what an immense responsibility is incurred by those who shall do anything to obstruct or defeat the Congress except upon substantial ground, and I will venture to say except upon grounds on which they have something like support from the other Powers of Europe. The Congress will have much to do with Bulgaria, and with regard to its extent, which will, I hope, not be reduced. Bulgaria might be a security against undue Russian influence, and Russia would find it easier to deal with a small than with a large Bulgaria. This is not the first lesson we have had on that subject. In 1858 I moved the Motion in this House for the union of the Danubian Principalities. It was then opposed by hon. Gentlemen opposite, who said—"Do not make a large Roumania, because if you have a large Roumania it will be under Russian influence," and so forth. Happily, in spite of their opposition, it was done, and you have now seen that in Roumania you have planted the true seed of national life, that Russia is not predominant, and that the principle of freedom and the desire for self-government are far stronger than any previous relations between the Principalities and Russia. In the same way, I believe, that though a large Bulgaria, with ports on the Ægean, might not be just to the Greeks, yet a large Bulgaria would be less in danger of coming under Russian influence than a small one. With regard to the Hellenic Provinces, they are now the scene of a bloody act. We see the absence of civil government; we see outrages, terrorism, carnage, and massacre; and a distinguished countryman of our own has unhappily fallen within the sweep of these terrible calamities. To the Congress alone you can look for the pacification of Thessaly. It is not in the power of Her Majesty's Government to pacify the Hellenic Provinces by their solitary action. For Heaven's sake, let us have done with these ambiguities! which the Chancellor of the Exchequer denounces, but which, when he is challenged, he declines to explain. I know not in the least degree what is the real point upon which you have come to a rupture with Russia. Do not
  892
  let us have needless delays and difficulties as to the meeting of a Congress, the authority of which must necessarily be great. They have raised no preliminary question which ought not to have been raised till the Congress met; and if the Government wanted to throw away their chance they have taken the best method to destroy it. Now, we have the Straits to deal with, which, though it is not part of the present contention, is clearly part of the general settlement. There is another duty attaching to the Congress besides all these, and that is the sacred duty of watching sedulously and vigilantly over its whole proceedings against any invasion or disparagement by Russia or by Austria, united or singly, of those local liberties of the populations which are the only security you can take for a pacified and contented East. I will release hon. Gentlemen in a moment. I object to this resumption by Her Majesty's Government of the most unhappy and ill-starred system of solitary action which has been their bane all through. They began with it, and it seems as if they were determined to end with it. They began by objecting to the joint intervention of the Consuls in the Herzegovinian rebellion. They went on with it when they destroyed the Berlin Memorandum. They continued it when they released the Porte by their own communication from all fear of coercive consequences with respect to the Conference at Constantinople. Now again, instead of frankly referring to the other Powers that which they had to say with regard to the proper mode of carrying on the Congress, and thus putting down any pretensions of Russia to narrow its deliberations, they have, without the authority of any other Power in Europe, and after having distinctly rejected a most rational proposition of the German Government, taken the correspondence with Russia into their own hand and brought it to an untimely and unhappy end. Sir, the worse the Treaty of San Stefano, the more need there is for the Congress. I should have been better pleased if my right hon. Friend had pointed out what I think in fairness he ought to have done, that, so far from the Treaty of San Stefano being ushered in as a final settlement, it has been put into our hands with the marked and significant title of a preliminary Treaty. Sir, these are the reasons which

  893
  compel me still very greatly to object to Her Majesty's Government's method of procedure—not uniformly, because I do not think the method of procedure is unform. We are told of the great difficulties through which the Government has to guide us—God grant that they may guide us aright!—but it must be by a better policy than the policy of the Government. If they do not so guide us, the historian, looking back upon this question with all its outs and ins—with all its zig-zag movements, will say that, though the subject was not without difficulties, yet there was a sufficient union both of interest and feeling to have made it practicable to attain a fair solution without disturbance and disquietude; they have chosen when there was a path along a plain, safe, and open country to conduct us along the very brink of the precipice. I shall be glad if they guide us safely along that brink, and if they do not get us any nearer than we are at present, though I perceive that we are a good deal nearer than we were four months ago. If Her Majesty's Government will consent to that which I really believe to be described in a few words of the despatch—if they will work for the ends of justice and of freedom—if they will be content so far to humble themselves as to work with Europe, and not without or against Europe—my belief is that they will receive the support of a united people, that they will earn the gratitude of a nation that is never slow to yield it, and that they will escape the immeasurable guilt of a causeless war.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSON,in rising to move at the end of the Question, to add the words—
  "But that this House regrets that Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it right to advise the calling out of Her Majesty's Reserve Forces, considering that no great emergency has been shown to exist, and that such calling out of the Reserves is neither prudent in the interests of European Peace, necessary for the safety of the Country, nor warranted by the state of matters abroad;"
  said, that no one felt more keenly than himself the importance of the question, but he feared that the temper of the nation was becoming more warlike. He felt it to be his duty to raise his voice in season and out of season against unjust and unnecessary wars; and he now
  894
  came forward to prevent, if possible, the country from drifting into such a conflict. He desired to say that he alone was responsible for the Amendment he intended to move. If it came to any good, those who supported it would have the credit; if it came to any harm, he alone should bear the reproach. He and many other hon. Members could have wished that the noble Marquess at the head of the Opposition could have seen his way to move an Amendment to the Address. He knew, however, the difficulty with which the noble Marquess had to contend, and was not there to blame him. The noble Marquess had been "rattened" by a number of the Gentlemen who sat behind him. They had elected him as their Leader, but sought to make him their humble follower. The question they had to consider was, what was the reason for the warlike step on which the Government had determined? They had it on the high authority of the Secretary of State for India, that the desire to plunge the country into war was a criminal state of mind. He should not have gone quite so far; but, accepting the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, he could not but think, if such were the case, there were a great many criminals about. He very much blamed the conduct of the Government for the state of things which existed just now. It had created the "War Party," which consisted of medical students, Whitechapel roughs, and Lord Mayors. This War Party was openly encouraged by Leaders of the Government. When by force, they had broken up a public meeting, they proceeded to the residence of the Prime Minister, who thanked them for their patriotic conduct, and they then marched to the residence of the late Prime Minister, and broke the windows of his house. That was called patriotism, but, for his part, he did not consider it a very patriotic proceeding. He might say that at the outset many of his friends blamed him for the opinions he held on this Eastern Question. When Russia went to war, those who thought that the war meant annexation as well as emancipation, might not have been very far wrong. He could not concur with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich that we ought to have joined in coercing Turkey by force. He believed in the doctrine of non-intervention, and could

  895
  not understand how it was that when a case arose, advocates of non-intervention came to think it was an exceptional case. Far from blaming Her Majesty's Government for what occurred in the early phases of this matter, he admired Lord Derby's calmness and courage. Many of the despatches of the noble Lord were worthy of the dignity of a great nation, and he should always remember with pleasure that saying of his, that the greatest of all British interests was the interest of peace. But they had not the same Ministers now they had at the beginning of the year. Lords Derby and Carnarvon were gone, and Lord Salisbury, in whom they had all put their trust, remained; but he appeared to be absolutely mesmerized by the influence of the First Lord of the Treasury. The noble Marquess who had protested against the folly of fighting against a nightmare, who had told Russia that the best course she could adopt was to study a big map, had fallen from his high estate and issued a despatch full of the "balance of power," the "integrity of Turkey," the "eternity of Treaties," and all those fictions which had for centuries lured nations on to their ruin. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, whose speech last year was an epoch—a turning-point—on the Eastern Question, had also fallen away. They all remembered how he came down and in tragic tones and tremulous accents assured the terrified House of Commons that the Russians were advancing; but it turned out that they were advancing in due order and in the proper course of things. The Government had adopted what he might call a "nagging policy" towards Russia—never satisfied, always distrustful, always finding fault, always discovering some shade of unveracity. Last year the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary said that a lying spirit was abroad. Well, there was a lying spirit abroad, and it sent home a great many lies for home consumption. If the Russians were now and then unveracious, were our hands quite clean? In that House they were told on the first night of the Session that we had a Cabinet united on the Eastern Question; but now it was known there were the grossest and widest differences between them. Strict accuracy, indeed! Did they not hear that the Fleet was sent to the Dardanelles solely to protect British life and
  896
  property, and were not the newspapers within three or four days declaring that the Fleet was sent out as a threat to Russia? Our policy towards Russia of late had not been a word and a blow, but a word and a threat of a blow. The Vote of Credit; was not that meant to be in the nature of a threat? Again, the presence of the Fleet in the Sea of Marmora was most dangerous. Apart from the question whether its presence there was or was not an infraction of a Treaty, he thought it could not be denied that the Government, in ordering it to go through the Dardanelles, had taken as rash, uncalled-for, and reckless a step as was ever taken by an English Government. It was precisely the same step as that which, according to Mr. Kingslake, had convinced the Russians in 1853 that England had a settled determination to humiliate them, and had rendered the Crimean War inevitable. The third step of the Government, which, as the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) had said, had led us nearer to the precipice, was calling out the Reserves. He understood that though the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made a very moderate speech, much more fiery language had been used. The Reserves had been called out, it was said, because there was an emergency. But that step had been announced last Thursday, and then put off for four days. Surely, if the danger was great, it was the duty of the Government at once to have taken the necessary steps for the protection of the country? Her Majesty's Government was a most extraordinary one, for when it had summoned Parliament it had made the announcement that they were preparing for an unexpected event. They would now go down to posterity, he believed, as the Government which had prepared for an unexpected event and postponed a great emergency. It was to his mind a humiliating spectacle to see free and prosperous England setting the example of arming to other nations, or taking part in a course of conduct which was turning Europe into a vast camp. What was it all for? He hoped at least before the debate ended the House would hear from the Ministry what it was proposed to do with the new iron-clads. He would like to know also who were going to assist us if we went to war; for any Government who went to war alone would be perfectly insane.

  897
  Were they going to fight along with Turkey? If they were it would only be on the understanding on the part of Turkey that she was to be reinstated as a European Power; and if we fought for the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Her Majesty's Government might be perfectly well assured that the whole country would soon join the right hon. Member for Greenwich in declaring that British blood and treasure should not be employed for any such purpose. Would France help them? No; for France was in a very different position now to 25 years ago, when a Despot was on the Throne, who found it necessary to bolster himself up by a military alliance with a free people. Was Germany going to help them? Why, the fact was, that Prince Bismarck was laughing with contempt at the feeble fidgeting of our diplomacy, and Germany was thinking—"What fools those Englishmen are to put their paws in the fire to pull out our chestnuts." Possibly Her Majesty's Government might secure Austria as an Ally, for that country was accustomed to do wicked things, and would probably be inclined to take almost any step that would promote her own selfish ends. But if Her Majesty's Government got Austria as an Ally, they would lose another ally in the shape of his hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen), who had been all his life opposing such Governments. What were they going to fight for? He had understood that the Government would fight for nothing except "British interests." That was an elastic term; but he understood it to mean freedom, prosperity, and good government of all the nations of the world. If that were accepted as the definition, the Government would have no warmer supporter than himself. Even if the Home Secretary's definition of the route to India were accepted, he contended there was not a shadow of a reason for going to war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in referring to that matter, had said that he would not go into details as to the routes to India. But the whole question was whether those routes were in danger; and the Government had proved no such danger. As to the demand for the retrocession of Bessarabia, he would grant that it was a great injustice and a wrong on the part of Russia; but if this country were to
  898
  undertake to redress every act of injustice or oppression which took place in the world, we should never be at peace. He was for protecting the 30,000,000 of people at home. Those were the British interests he wanted to look after, and if the House of Commons devoted itself to that it would do more good than by interfering in any foreign quarrels. He should be told that was a policy of isolation, and everyone just now was terribly afraid of that new word, but he should not at all object to isolation from all the Governments of Europe in any of their cruel enterprizes. He would rather have isolation than a declaration of war. That, he supposed, would be called cowardice, for it seemed to be considered that everyone was a coward who did not want to kill other people. He thought, however, that the cowards were the writers in the newspapers who sat in their club rooms, and hounded on their fellow-countrymen to slaughter and death. More than that, he contended that there was something cowardly in the Members of the House of Commons sitting there to vote the money of other people, that they might go to be killed, while they themselves intended to live quietly at home. From all parts of the world the cry arose that we ourselves were the greatest of freebooters. There was no clime in which, in former days, we had not taken possession of and annexed countries. And now, should we, the Pharisees of Europe, having done all this, stand up and say—"We thank Heaven we are not like this Russian?" To do so would be a pitiable exhibition of hypocrisy. It had been said lately that one nation might annex the Transvaal, whilst another might not look over the Balkans. Were we going to fight because we could not make suitable arrangements for holding the Conference? He confessed he could not understand what was the real point in dispute—it seemed to be whether the Treaty should be laid on the Table or laid on a chair. If there were all these difficulties in arranging what was to be done at the Congress, it was clearly the duty of the Government to agree to the preliminary Conference proposed by Germany, and their refusal was quite sufficient to condemn them. He supposed we were to fight about a question of phraseology. There had been wars for an idea, for

  899
  plunder, and for defence; but was it reserved to the Government of this Christian nation in 1878 to go to war for the sake of mere phraseology, and to take steps which would lead to the deluging of Europe with blood? It was said that there was no immediate danger of war; but on this point he could only reecho the words of the right hon. Member for Greenwich, and say that all these steps—these steps of bluster, which might be mere brag—were leading us daily nearer and nearer to the precipice, and must at length plunge us into war. This was a pitiable state of things. We had all read something about the paths of honour; but the path we were treading was to offer to Russia a petty, paltry, and pitiable provocation, which was unworthy of the British nation and of the Government which led us. We had called out our Reserves; and he believed that last Sunday, when the people went to hear the words of peace and goodwill, they saw on the church-doors the summons calling them to bloodshed. It now remained for those who deprecated the course taken by Her Majesty's Government to call out their reserves, in the shape of the common sense, the common humanity, the common honesty, and the common justice of this country, to save, ere it were too late, this nation from the commission of a senseless and a stupendous crime.
  Amendment proposed,
  At the end of the Question, to add the words "but that this House regrets that Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it right to advise the calling out of Her Majesty's Reserve Forces, considering that no great emergency has been shown to exist, and that such calling out of the Reserves is neither prudent in the interests of European peace, necessary for the safety of the country, nor warranted by the state of matters abroad."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there added."
  SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTobserved, that all hon. Members who addressed the House on this question must feel the momentous character of the issues which were raised by it. Hitherto he had not said one word upon the Eastern Question, because he felt that Her Majesty's Ministers had a very difficult and delicate duty to perform, and that they were acting under a sense
  900
  of grave responsibility, and that they should have full confidence and trust reposed in them while they were discharging that task. He had listened with marked attention to the eloquent speech of the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), and he must say that he should have been better satisfied if that right hon. Gentleman had concluded his speech with an intimation that he thought it right not to offer any opposition to these measures which Her Majesty's Government had considered it necessary, in the best interests of this country, to ask Parliament to adopt. Let them look at the position in which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich and his supporters would have been placed if they had been in power now, and had been asked to tear up the Treaties of Paris and of London, which they had been mainly instrumental in drawing up. Would it have been so certain they would have been able to have kept the country out of war—would it not have been more probable they would long ago have been forced into war? One thing was quite evident—that up to the present time Her Majesty's Government had completely succeeded in keeping us out of war; and, in his humble opinion, we were not likely to go to war in the near future, because he believed that by taking these proper measures of precaution Her Majesty's Government were more likely to keep us out of war than by sitting still and letting matters take their chance. The proposal of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, if adopted, would tend to the degradation and the humiliation of this country. While agreeing that it was not desirable to re-establish the Turkish Empire on its old footing, he could not help regarding this Treaty as an Act of spoliation in favour of one country alone. Russia had declared that her only object in going to war was the amelioration of the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey, and, according to universal admission, she had not treated those populations fairly. They knew that the object of Russia was to become dominant in New Bulgaria, and that Greece was to be excluded from the exercise of all influence at Constantinople. If this Treaty was carried out, what was to become of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Epirus, and Thessaly? And what would the position of Turkey be, having

  901
  to pass through a hostile Bulgaria when she wanted to get to her Northern Provinces? He had no hesitation in saying that our Government, knowing in June last what the terms were that were to be asked for by the Russian Government, ought to have said—"If you occupy Adrianople the Turks must be hopelessly beaten, and you must make Peace there; but if you advance beyond Adrianople we shall occupy the lines about Constantinople, as well as Gallipoli and the Boulair lines." The Russians had, however, now advanced to the gates of Constantinople. These considerations demanded that every portion of the Treaty should be examined, and that the claims of Greece should have fair consideration. He thought the course of the Government was plain. They had decided to call out the Reserves, not for the purpose of war, but for the purpose of being prepared if an eventuality should arise that might lead to war. He was glad to see the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), because he honoured the principle which that right hon. Gentleman had always advocated with regard to the Crimean War and to this war. But he should like to ask him plainly, whether he did not think the whole country was against him with reference to the Treaty of San Stefano? He believed the right hon. Gentleman was of opinion that that Treaty should be altered, but that he was against going to war to compel an alteration of it. The only way to deal with a Power like Russia was not to ask her to do a certain thing, but to show her that we were prepared to take action in case of necessity. He ventured to hope that peaceful councils might still prevail. Some hon. Gentlemen always talked about the isolation of England, and expressed their anxiety that she should co-operate with all the Powers of Enrope. No one was more anxious than himself that she should do so. But things had changed since 1870. We were, he might say, almost the only nation that could inaugurate a movement against Russia, and if we took that course no doubt other Powers would come forward—and had already come forward—to co-operate with us. He hoped that we should be able to keep in check the designs of Russia, whose aim and object had been for generations past to obtain Constantinople for her own. In calling
  902
  out the Reserves, it was, as he had said, not necessarily war, but to test whether our present military system was a good one, and that we could depend in moments of danger or necessity on obtaining the force that the Reserve was intended to create. While we prayed for peace, we might be forced into war; and he was sure that if such a fate was in store for us, we should be able to maintain those great and historic interests that had been handed down to us from our ancestors.
  MR. GRANT DUFFsaid, that the situation in which the country was placed was a great deal too serious to allow anyone to treat it in a Party spirit, and he need hardly say that he had not the remotest intention of doing so. On the contrary, he thought that the task to which we should all set ourselves was to help those who were at present charged with the affairs of the country towards wise decisions. In order to effect that, we must know in what direction they were going to move, and the few remarks which he proposed to make would be directed to try to obtain as clear an answer as circumstances would permit to the question—What was their policy? The only indication of their policy, which we had had for some time past, was contained in the Circular Despatch of Lord Salisbury, an extremely clear and well-written document, which showed, as other documents from the same hand had shown, that it was not for nothing that its author graduated in the school of the English Buloz—the late Mr. John Douglas Cook. He could not, however, assert that he found the contents of that document quite as interesting as its style, and he agreed, indeed, with an observation that had been made about it—that it would have been an excellent report on the situation if it had been made by his secretary; but that it was in no way the kind of despatch one expected to see signed by the Secretary of State himself. It set forth no policy, and hinted no policy. It showed, indeed, that the writer would like to return to the position of affairs which existed before the Constantinople Conference; but that was not a policy, it was a mere feeble velleity. When the Government took the unhappy step which had brought them on to that shifting sand, they ought to have known that they were abandoning the right of initiative which they had had up to that moment, and were

  903
  putting their policy at the mercy of events which they could not control. He knew it would be said that that step had been very generally approved by many persons in the Party to which he belonged, but he differed from them on that point. "Amicus Plato magis amica veritas." Now, the position of Her Majesty's Government, before they went into Conference, was this—they had, after some demur, adhered to the Andrassy Note. They had done this with the support, not only of their own Party, but with the support of Lord Granville, who held the Seals of the Foreign Office when their Opponents were in power. By that Act, and others to which he need not allude, they had expressed their opinion that immense reforms were required and ought immediately to be carried into effect in the government of Turkey; but they had done nothing to detract from the position of the Sultan as a weak, but still independent Power. The status quo was maintained in essentials, although in some respects modified. Further, they had declined to accede to the Berlin Memorandum, and this they had done likewise with the assent of Lord Granville, expressed in his place in the House of Lords. Although, then, a vast amount of angry clamour had been directed against them from various quarters, they had a right to say, at the end of the Session of 1876, that their Eastern policy had been acquiesced in by the most authoritative exponent of the views of their adversaries as to questions of foreign affairs. Then, however, broke forth the agitation about the Bulgarian massacres, and that agitation, and the circumstances which led to it, produced, it was clear, a considerable effect as well upon the Government as upon the Opposition; for Lord Derby's despatch was at least as much stronger in its condemnation of an independent Power than most diplomatic documents, as the pamphlet of the right hon. Member for Greenwich was than most documents which he (Mr. Grant Duff) recollected to have been produced by a leading Member of the Opposition. Meantime, the German Government had taken up this attitude. It had said—"You have not seen your way to adhere to the Berlin Memorandum, which seems to us, on the whole, the wisest step to take at the moment we took it. What, then, have you to propose? We will agree to anything in reason." It was evident
  904
  then that, at that moment, the Cabinet of St. James's, if it had known its own mind, was master of the situation. It could have taken either of two diametrically opposite lines. It might have said—"Badly as the Turk has behaved, we will be no parties to interfering with his independence. We have spoken our mind to him as distinctly as one Government ever spoke to another, but further we will not go, or encourage anyone else to go. If Russia thinks fit to go further, we shall act as we deem best, but we take our stand upon the status quo, as modified by the Andrassy Note." That was one course. He did not say it would have been a right one, but it would have been intelligible and logical. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government might have taken a precisely opposite course. It might have argued, after the publication of the pamphlet and the speech of the right hon. Member for Greenwich, that if we took our stand on the status quo, and broke off all negotiations with Russia, which had reference to Turkey, sooner or later we might have to go further and assert our views by force; but it was idle for an English Government to dream of going to war in the teeth of a very large and active minority of its own people, and they would be blind, indeed, if they did not see that the pamphlet and the speech of the right hon. Member for Greenwich, whether they were wise or unwise, represented the views of an extremely powerful minority. Might we not all, then, have assured British interests, saved the Turk from great calamities, and conferred immense blessings upon all South-Eastern Europe, by recognizing that on us was to come the hard necessity of dealing with that terrible question of Constantinople, which had been so long the nightmare of statesmen? If Her Majesty's Government had come to this conclusion, and had grasped the whole European situation, it would have tried whether it would not have been possible, in concert, especially with Germany, to arrive at some arrangement for the future of the Balkan Peninsula, which, while it gave all that Russia had a right to ask, guaranteed civilized government to the populations of the Balkan Peninsula, recognized the fair claims of Greece, assured the Mussulman inhabitants of those countries of perfect protection, safeguarded

  905
  the interests of Austria, and made, in short, the arrangement that would be the least inconvenient to everybody concerned. He did not believe that it would have been impossible to arrive at such an arrangement, which would have saved a most enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, and prevented not only many evils that were past, but many that were yet to come. But nothing of the kind was attempted. The Cabinet thought it consistent with their honour and duty to float feebly on the surface of events, not mastering them, but mastered by them. Thus it was that they allowed themselves to drift into the Conference, which ended in nothing, and enabled Russia comfortably to tide through the bad weather, and arrive at the season of the year that was favourable for moving her armies. When the war had broken out, the Government, as he thought, once more fell into a good, though certainly not a glorious, line of policy. They maintained an attitude of absolute neutrality, and said they would maintain it till British interests were threatened. Nothing could have been better under the circumstances. They had missed, as he believed, in the autumn of 1876, a great opportunity, and there was nothing to be done in the summer of 1877, but to watch events. It was something, and something considerable, for a Government to be able to say—"We admit that we have not been able to do anything great in the East, but, at least, we shall keep the country out of the war, unless, and until, circumstances arise which will make the vast majority of Englishmen desirous to take part in it." That reasonable, if not very magnificent policy was pursued till Plevna fell; but then commenced a series of small, fussy, meaningless acts, which were fresh in the memory of them all, and which had ended in depriving Her Majesty's Ministers of two of their ablest Colleagues. The secession of the second of those Colleagues seemed to have set free the hands of Ministers, for we had immediately thrown at us the Circular Despatch, which was apparently intended to be a new departure. We heard nothing in it of "British interests" or neutrality. The question was raised to a higher level, and Her Majesty's Government once more appeared as a great European Power, claiming to have a
  906
  potent voice in the re-settlement of South-Eastern Europe. He wished that they had never abandoned that attitude; but, as they did abandon it, it seemed to him difficult beyond measure for them to return to the point where they missed the right road. We were told, in that document, that every material stipulation which the Treaty of San Stefano contained involved a departure from the Treaty of 1856. The writer of the dispatch objected to the Russian character of the New Bulgaria, to the Russian colour to be given to the improved institutions of the population of Thessaly and Epirus, to the engagements for the protection of members of the Russian Church, to the territorial severance of the Provinces left to the Porte in Europe, to the compulsory separation of a portion of Bessarabia from Roumania, to the extension of Bulgaria to the shores of the Black Sea, and to a great variety of other things. Well, but, if the Government were going, at the end of the war, to take up this kind of attitude, why, in the name of wonder, did they not announce it long ago? For his part, Russia, who was told for so many months that we cared for nothing but "British interests," had surely been rather hardly used. What had "British interests" to do with the great majority of the stipulations of the Treaty which were impugned? He wished not to be misunderstood. He objected to a great many of these stipulations; but then he never agreed with Her Majesty's Government in thinking that we had no duties to discharge in South-Eastern Europe, except to protect "British interests." He would, when we came to "the parting of the ways" in the autumn of 1876, have insisted, either on the maintenance of the Treaties made 20 years before, or on a new order of things being put in place of those Treaties, by virtue of a European arrangement. But Her Majesty's Government turned its back upon the Treaties of 1856, and proposed nothing in their place. They had now, however, if that Circular Despatch was a new departure, and not one more mistake, seen their way to return to the position of claiming a right to have a potent voice in the re-arrangement of South-Eastern Europe. He gave them joy, for it was a great deal better to be wise than consistent.

  907
  What, then, was now their leading idea? He did not ask for details; but their constituents, who paid the greatly increased taxation which their policy, or want of a policy, had rendered necessary, had a right to ask for some sort of general notion as to the objects for which their money was to be expended. What, in short, were they driving at? Did they think that the prosperity of South-Eastern Europe could be assured by leaving all its Provinces, or any of them, under the Turks? If they did, he replied that it was too late. There was a time when, by a wise application of diplomatic pressure, that might have been done; but that time had gone by for ever, and the curse of history lay at the door of those whose negligence omitted to apply that pressure, and brought upon the world the horrors we had been witnessing. He would not, for a moment, imagine that the Government had any such idea, if it were not for some unlucky expressions in the despatch. We read, for instance—
  "Large changes may, and no doubt will, be requisite in the Treaties by which South-Eastern Europe has hitherto been ruled."
  Large changes! He should think so! Had the writer been spending the last two years in the cave of the Seven Sleepers?
  "Totius rei fontem atque caput ignorat,"
  one was almost inclined to say. He and his Colleagues had stood by while the Ottoman Empire in Europe had been mortally wounded, and they did not seem even to have found it out. It was no question now of a "Sick Man," whose health was to be watched, and whose heritage was to be kept for his natural heirs. They had to deal with a man in the last gasp, in whose house those who were not his natural heirs had got a footing from which it would be very difficult to dislodge them. If the policy of Her Majesty's Government was to try to give good government and freedom under the Porte to these Provinces, it seemed to him that they were possessed with the wildest dream that ever misled statesmen. Or, if that was not their idea, was it to enlarge Greece, and try to re-create in that way the Eastern Empire? He hoped not. That idea had had its advocates of late among English politicians, but it seemed to him an altogether mistaken one. He
  908
  should like to see Greece increased by the addition to it of any purely Greek districts upon the mainland which were conterminous with it, as well as by Crete and a number of the other islands; but his notion of the future of Greece would be that it should listen, as did Greece of old, as much as possible to "those two old voices of Liberty—the voice of the mountains and the voice of the sea," that it should remember as much as possible its pre-Roman, not its post-Roman, day; that its dreams should be of resuscitating Athens, not of reconquering Byzantium. If it was attempted to set up Greece against Slavonia in the Balkan Peninsula, that attempt would perish and come to nought. It was the same attempt to fight against the nature of things which was made by the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and others in 1864, when they tried to set up Denmark against Germany, an attempt on which destiny stamped with an iron heel, as it had done, by the way, on most of the non-Indian hopes and projects of that noble Lord since first he entered public life. Or was the idea of the Government merely to pare down in a feeble way the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano? He, for one, heartily hated the whole scheme of that Treaty; but the notion of spending British gold and British blood to carrying into effect peddling objections to it was altogether abhorrent to him. The whole scheme of the Treaty was devised in pro-Russian and anti-West-European interests; but no sort of good could be done by amending it in detail. Or, if none of these hypotheses as to the policy of the Government were correct, could there be any sort of truth in the rumour of an alliance with Austria, and of a desire on the part of that Power to extend itself down to the Ægean at Salonica, and to rule the whole of the western half of the Balkan Peninsula? He knew that that idea had partizans, and influential partizans, at Vienna. But could it have prevailed, even at Vienna; or, if it had prevailed there, could it possibly have prevailed with Her Majesty's Government? Of course, if Austria were a homoge-geneous body like France, much worse arrangements might be devised; but the very first effect of such an arrangement would be to upset the whole system of policy under which Austria had been

  909
  living since 1866—a policy which, if it had not given the Empire prosperity, had, at least, given her much more peace than had fallen to her lot during the 18 preceding years. None knew better than the wiser inhabitants of Austria themselves that Austria was a reed on which no man could lean without having his hand pierced. That they should do all they could to uphold Austria as a most useful member of the European system he most earnestly believed; but he deprecated their attempting to build any large scheme of policy on the duration of Austria. Or again, if none of these ideas was the mot de l'enigme of the Government policy, was it conceivable that they should see their way to erecting in the Northern half of the Balkan Peninsula a powerful civilized State, with its centre at Constantinople? On that idea, which he had put forth in many ways and many places, he would not now dwell; because he thought it was far too good to be hoped for under those who at present guided our affairs. They rejected it when it was comparatively easy of accomplishment, and were not likely to take it up now. Or were they to see all questions as to the final adjustment of affairs in the Eastern Peninsula adjourned to a more convenient season? Were they going to do that to which their military preparations—which seemed destined rather for small than great operations—appeared to point? Were they going to say—"We don't recognize the Treaty of San Stefano; the Russians may stay where they are if they please; but we shall seize Gallipoli and one or more islands, and perhaps a harbour in Crete, and encourage the Khedive by a promise of our protection to break off all connection with the Porte, if, indeed, we do not insist on his accepting our control instead?'' Well, by these steps "British interests" would be safeguarded, and more than safeguarded, and the right hon. Gentleman opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) knew as well as he did that it was absolutely within the power of the Government at that moment to take those steps with the acquiescence of the most powerful of European States. Well, but if only those steps, or a fraction of those steps, were what they had got in their mind, why that Circular Despatch? The old cry of British interests, of which we heard so much in
  910
  the five nights' debate of last year, was quite enough to lay a foundation for such a policy as would be carried into effect by those steps. To write that tremendous Circular, opening out the whole Eastern Question with a view to taking those steps, was like cracking a nut with a Nasmyth's hammer. Or lastly, was the House to think of this great despatch that it was, as someone said of its author the other day—"a lath painted to look like iron?" Were Ministers still floating feebly on the surface of events, paralyzed by fear of Germany's intentions—the offspring of the most blessed ignorance of that country in its past, in its present, in its hopes and fears and tendencies—which had been the key to so many of their errors in the past two years? He trusted that the despatch was really iron, and not lath—that England's policy was not going to be as feeble in the future as it had been in the past. He trusted it was a new departure, and that Lord Salisbury, whose Indian policy had been respectable, was anxious to prove that he could be, for once, right in a non-Indian question, and unaided by a council of experts; but he repeated, that the despatch might be laying the foundation for a variety of different policies, and he wanted to know not only where they were, but what, as a nation, they were to be asked to do under these circumstances? He hoped everything, but he feared much; for, whereas his notion of the way in which the settlement of this great European Question should be approached by an English Minister, might be summed up in the words—
  "Sine Germaniâ nulla salus,"
  he saw the Seals of the Foreign Office in the hands of the man who had been hitherto, of all English statesmen, the most consistent and bitter enemy of Germany. That could not be said of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he hoped that the influence of the right hon. Gentleman would be sufficient to neutralize that very mischievous policy. He trusted, after listening to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that evening, that it was his more conciliatory temper which was to prevail in their policy.
  MR. GOLDNEYsaid, the affectation of the last speaker, in pretending he could not tell what policy the Government

  911
  had, was ridiculous. It was a policy which they had announced from the beginning of these transactions—namely, neutrality, which, although sometimes praised and sometimes blamed, had been adhered to with the strictest fidelity. The Government had announced from the first, that unless British interests were interfered with, and the signatories to the Treaty of 1856 were consenting parties, that neutrality would be observed. By the Treaty of 1856, Russia agreed that no action should be taken as to the integrity of Turkey without the assent and consent of the other Powers. In 1856, just after the Crimean War, when portions of the Russian territory were in the hands of the Allies, preliminaries of peace were entered into at Vienna, subject to a Conference which afterwards met at Paris. Count Walewski, its President, stipulated that the Treaty should be taken item by item, and each considered, discussed, altered, passed, and finally adopted. That was agreed to and acted upon; and Her Majesty's Government, on the present occasion, while asking for no more in reference to the Treaty of San Stefano, felt that they would not be justified in accepting less. It was the fashion to accuse the Government of being averse from the Conference, but they had done all they could in its favour. On the 7th of March it was proposed by the Austrian Government, evidently after communication with the Russian Ambassador at that Court, to hold a Congress at Vienna, at which all questions of the peace shortly to be concluded between Russia and Turkey should be considered. Our Government immediately assented. A question was raised as to the place of meeting, and Baden-Baden was proposed, to which our Government at once acceded. Shortly afterwards it was proposed to be held at Berlin, and our Foreign Minister again wrote to say that he saw no objection, if nothing was to be considered as acknowledged and valid without the assent of the Great Powers; and, up to the 16th of March, when Prince Gortchakoff began to introduce novel conditions, no difficulties existed. It was evident that what Russia had won by the sword she intended to keep by the sword, and she desired in entering the Conference to retain a power of vetoing any discussion upon
  912
  such stipulations of the Treaty as she might think fit to regard as final. Was it possible for a great Power like England to enter on the Conference under such conditions as that? He contended that Turkey was not a free agent when she signed the Treaty of San Stefano. If hon. Members would look at the map, they would see that there was scarcely a single point of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 that this recent Treaty between Russia and Turkey did not violate. By the later instrument, it was agreed between the signatories, that no alteration of a Treaty was to be effected without the concurrence of all the parties signing it; and yet, in the face of that solemn international engagement, Russia, by the Treaty of San Stefano, had sought to set aside nearly all the fundamental provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Russia had attempted to create a New Kingdom of Bulgaria, extending far beyond the limits of Bulgaria, and embracing a large population of the nationalities other than Bulgarian. The Prince of this New Province was to be elected with the approval of Russia, the territory was to be occupied by Russian troops for two years, its laws and its course of government were to be framed by Russia, and in fact it was to become a Russian Province. Russia further stipulated that the port of Batoum, in the Black Sea, was to be ceded to her, which would give her the absolute control of our commerce with Persia, the value of which exceeded £4,000,000 per annum. Then, again, Russia demanded that she should have the control of the mouths of the Danube placed in her hands by the cession of Bessarabia. The result of the recent Treaty would be to create a dominant Power in Europe, which must be injurious to European nations as a whole, but especially so to England. The demand of the Government, under these circumstances, was that the whole of the new Treaty which was to abrogate the old should be submitted to the Congress. That demand was, in his opinion, perfectly reasonable, and was more likely than any other course that could have been adopted to preserve peace. Her Majesty's Government had adhered in this proposal to the course of policy they pursued throughout—that of preserving a strict neutrality on condition that Russia carried out her portion

  913
  of the contract. If England had not continued its refusal to aid Turkey, Russia would never have been in the position to enforce the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, which he hoped the Congress would show she had been unwise in putting forth. He should be sorry to see the House divided at a time like the present, but hoped that a gracious answer would be unanimously returned to the Crown on this occasion.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, his sympathies were with the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), but he regretted he could not give him his vote. He had the strongest objections to what had been done in calling out the Reserves, but he objected rather to the manner of doing it than to the measure itself. He voted against the Vote of Credit, from its being a dangerous Vote; but when £4,000,000 of that sum had been spent in warlike preparation, it would be hardly consistent to refuse the men when they were really wanted. They must then make use of the materials, and the cost of the men would be, comparatively speaking, not great. The Government must not suppose, however, because they had flourished their trumpet and called out the Reserves, that this country was a great military Power. He thought it right to warn the Government that they must not trust to India for a great addition to our Forces. Some had said that 300,000 men could be got from India, some had said 80,000, and some had said 50,000. He believed he would not be contradicted by military men, who knew more of the matter than he did, when he said that even 50,000 could not be got from our present Forces in India. The Native Army was not as large as was supposed. Perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 of that Army were fit for war in Europe, and more might be raised; but it would be a very dangerous thing to employ large numbers of Indian troops in war in Europe, and then send them back to India. If that were done, an addition would have to be made to the Native Army, which would embarrass us in several ways. He had placed an Amendment on the Paper, which, however, he could not propose to the House; but, nevertheless, he would read it as showing his view upon the question. He had proposed, instead of the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle,
  914
  to add to the Motion for an Address, the following:—
  "And humbly praying that Her Majesty will accept the Preliminary Conference proposed by the Government of Germany; and, while abstaining from any isolated action in a matter in which this Country has little direct interest, will intimate to the other European Powers that Her Majesty's Government is prepared to support them in any concerted action which they may take to resist the act of undisguised perfidy and spoliation which the Russian Government has threatened to perpetrate on Roumania."
  He thought it was most extraordinary that Her Majesty's Government should have refused to accept the rational and common-sense suggestion of Germany that they should have a Preliminary Conference of second or some other Plenipotentiaries, to talk matters over and see if there was any substantial difference between the Russian and the English positions in regard to the holding of the Congress. He could not understand why our Government should have cried off and declined, a proposal dictated, as he believed, by an honest desire for peace. Our Government, like the boy who refused to go into the water because he had not learned to swim, had refused to go into the Congress until they were quite sure that they were agreed with Russia as to what questions should be discussed by the Congress. While he was opposed to an isolated policy of hectoring other Powers and riding the high horse, he was equally averse from our wrapping ourselves up in a selfish isolation which refused to join in protecting the weak against the strong. He hoped the time was not far off when Europe, as a quasi-confederation, would come together to decide disputes arising between different States, and would also enforce its decisions. He thought that the Conference of Constantinople ought to have enforced its decision upon Turkey, and that as the Conference had failed Russia was justified in making war. The Treaty which Russia had extorted from Turkey, he regarded as for the most part just and fair, although, no doubt, there were points in it to which objection might be taken. Her Majesty's Government ought not to have denounced that Treaty as a whole, as they had unfortunately done in a despatch bearing the name of Lord Salisbury; but which he was convinced, from that noble Lord's conduct at the Conference of Constantinople, was not his composition, but perhaps

  915
  that of a higher Member of the Cabinet. Inasmuch as Russia, in June last, announced almost in so many words her intention to regain Bessarabia, if Roumania had consented to that transfer we could hardly have objected to it. But we knew that Roumania appealed to Europe against the transaction; while Russia threatened not only to take Bessarabia by force, but threatened, if Roumania would not allow her troops to go through that Principality, to disarm and destroy it. The present Emperor of Russia had done good service to humanity; but he should be taught that on that matter his personal wishes in regard to the honour of his father or himself could not prevail against the feelings of 500,000 Roumanians, who ought not to be denationalized and transferred to another country against their will. That would be a very great wrong; and, although he was not so Quixotic as to wish that our Government alone should right it, yet he was slow to believe that Germany, which was largely interested in the mouths of the Danube, would not desire to prevent the perpetration of that wrong. A war against Russia, waged by us in alliance with Austria, would be a war in which we might be called upon to make immense efforts, very injurious to us, and ending in objects that would not be ours, while we might not obtain the support we expected from that military Power. With regard to the limits and the population of Bulgaria, the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) seemed to think that the Bulgaria proposed to be constituted by the present Treaty was not larger than that which was proposed by Lord Salisbury in the Conference of Constantinople. From careful inquiry, he might say that, to some extent, this statement was incorrect, and that the Bulgaria now proposed was considerably, though not very, much more extensive than that projected at the Conference. Russia, being isolated, had made Bulgaria too large, leaving room for snippings and cuttings. It was not the case that there were no Bulgarians South of the Balkans. The ancient capital of Bulgaria was in that part, and the Bulgarians there were to the Greeks as six or seven to one. There was no reason why Bulgaria should not be extended to the Ægean, and if she had a port or two on that sea, she would be brought into commercial relations
  916
  with England. But the settlement of Bulgaria was expressly reserved for the consideration of Europe, and, consequently, no injustice had been done. He could not discuss fully so large a subject as Armenia; but it was his opinion, on the whole, that Russia had been tolerably moderate in annexing Kara and Bayazid, provided that she did not claim a protectorate over the rest of the country. The Persian trade through Trebizonde had been gradually dying out, and it now went through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Whatever we did, he trusted that we should not take any of the islands as a military or naval station. He regretted he was not able to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice; but if the Government would accept the first part of it, he would reserve the second half for a confidential communication at another time.
  COLONEL BARNEcontended, that it would be very much better to have Austria as an Ally than to go to war single-handed. Indeed, Austria was our only possible Ally amongst the Great Powers in the present state of Europe, and it was, to say the least, impolitic, to abuse and disparage her. The plain facts of the case were that Russia was already virtually in posession of Constantinople, and of other territory in which it would be impossible to allow her to remain. Clearly, if the Treaty of San Stefano were to be carried out, she would remain in Bulgaria for two years; but we had no guarantee except her pledge that her stay would not be longer. Russia was not a Power to be trusted, especially considering the manner in which her solemn pledge respecting the annexation of Khivan territory had been disregarded. Her Government respected Treaties only as long as the signatories were able to enforce them, and her conduct in 1871 was the proof of that statement. How, again, could we trust a Power so deceitful to Roumania, and which, after using her to the utmost—for the Roumanians saved the Russians a heavy reverse before Plevna—turned upon her to take away her territory? The truth was, that the Treaty of San Stefano was fraught with great danger to England, both in Europe and in Asia, what was to prevent in another 10 years the Russian game being

  917
  repeated, and rebellions springing up among the Christians in Asia Minor. It appeared to him that, sooner or later, we should be driven to fight Russia, and that we were in a better position to do so now, after her severe losses of men and money, than we were likely to be 10 years hence. At present, we should be able to enforce our demands, for, whatever might be the inclination of the Turkish Government, the Turkish people would not go against us, and the Turkish soldiers, led by British officers, were the best in the world. They marched for ever, required much less to eat than British soldiers, and, in the cause of their religion, rather liked being killed than otherwise, as they believed they went straight to Heaven, and had beautiful houris at their disposal. In a war against Russia at the present time, they could get any number of Indian Mussulmans, than whom there were no finer men, and under British officers they would be equal to any number of Russians. If they now had to go to war, they should encounter Russia near Constantinople, and it was not likely that Austria would stand quietly and look on, seeing that she could not allow the mouths of the Danube to become Russian property. We could now, therefore, not only hold our own against Russia, but drive her to the Arctic circle, which was her natural home. In the future, it appeared to him, that it should be an essential part of our policy not to allow Russia to advance any further in Central Asia. At present, the Russian boundary was not more than 240 miles from our Indian Frontier; and, though it was a 240 miles of mountains and valleys, the distance was so short that, in the event of war, Russia might threaten us in India while we were fighting her in Turkey. We should also prevent her gaining any greater influence in Persia, as Persia constituted one of the best approaches to India, and Russia might in that way threaten us most seriously in India. What we wanted was to prevent Russia becoming too powerful in Europe, and, by overawing the European Powers, seize Asia Minor, march down on the Suez Canal, and so cut our Empire into halves. The best thing we could do to prevent such a proceeding would be to seize on Gallipoli, which we could hold
  918
  against all the world. He hoped, therefore, if we were to have war, the Government would, as their first step, seize on Gallipoli.
  SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, he hoped that the present crisis would be met by the united front of a united Government, an almost united Parliament, and, as he believed, by a united country. But of one thing he was certain, that whether the Government and the country be or be not united, the House was with the Government in the opinion that great questions were not to be decided on the principles of the Permissive Bill. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) had seriously attacked the despatch of Lord Salisbury, and had bestowed the whole of his praise for conscientious dealing on those two Ministers who, having unfortunately great sympathy with himself, had retired from the Government. He believed the despatch of Lord Salisbury had done more to preserve the peace of Europe and protect the interests of this country than anything which had happened during the last 14 years. We had no longer a Minister who had told us in 1875, three months after the insurrection had broken out, that we should hear little more of it, and that our interests lay rather in China than in Turkey; who, in 1876, had informed us that Russia could not go to war on account of financial difficulties; a Minister, who was the intimate friend and associate of the Russian Ambassador, and who had told the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) and a deputation of his Party, that they were his employers, and from them he received his instructions; a Minister, who in that House, was obliged to shelter himself under the wing of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). He believed the country was alive to its danger; but there was one point, which had been referred to by the right hon. Member for Greenwich, in which he thought injustice had been done to Lord Derby. He had reproached the Government with not having pointed out what they objected to in the terms of peace, which had been submitted by Count Schouvaloff in 1877; but if the right hon. Gentleman had read the despatch of Lord Derby of June, 1877, to Lord Augustus Lofus, he would have seen that Lord Derby, when asked

  919
  by Count Schouvaloff whether he proposed to give any opinion on those proposals, said, that he must consult his Colleagues before doing so, but that his own opinion was that it would be better for Count Schouvaloff not to ask for a reply to his communication—to which his Excellency agreed. It was idle, therefore, to charge the Government with collusion in regard of any pretensions of Russia in 1878, on the ground that Lord Derby had never given any answer to the projects of the peace they intended to ask. The country was happily alive to the situation, for it was aware what had been the policy of Russia for more than 100 years. In 1768, Russia had no settlements on the Black Sea; then she had undertaken a war against Turkey on the same pretence as the recent war—informing other countries that it was undertaken in the cause of their common Christianity. Then had come the Treaty of Kainardji, and the first annexation on the coasts of the Black Sea. The same plea had been put forward on behalf of the Greeks in the Morea, in 1828, and the war had ended in the Treaty of Adrianople, giving still further territory to Russia in Asia. The result now was that Russia had gone 1,000 miles south-east, annexed Batoum, and made such advances in Central Asia that, as the House had just heard, her boundary was only 240 miles from our Frontier. In a passage of Lord Salisbury's despatch, it was pointed out that Prince Gortschakoff had declared that only European questions should be submitted to a Congress. But what were those European questions? Bessarabia was a European question, but it was not to be submitted to the Congress. It might be paradoxical, but he would ask whether African or Asiatic questions might not be European questions? As they knew, the Dardanelles divided Europe from Asia. ["Hear, hear!"] He was glad to have told hon. Members opposite something they did not know before. Again, the whole question of the Egyptian Government succession was settled by a European Treaty; and, in fact, if all the questions that had or could arise were gone through, it would be found that British interests, properly so-called, would be thrust out into the cold unless they could be considered as affected by our relations not only in and with Europe, but with Asia also. The hon. Member for
  920
  Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) said that Bessarabia might be settled by Russia and Roumania, without reference to Europe; but that was not the fact. In 1856, the Congress of Paris decided that, in consequence of the defective administration of Russia with regard to keeping open the mouths of the Danube, that district should be taken from them, and the duty of keeping open the mouths of the Danube devolved upon a mixed Commission. If hon. Members would refer to the Correspondence between this country and Russia during 1849 and 1853, first by Lord Palmerston and then by Lord Clarendon, they would find complaints of the unremoved obstructions which prevented our ships entering the Danube; and, on one occasion, there were 25 English ships so hindered, because the Russians refused to take the most ordinary means to clear the mouths of the Danube. The right hon. Member for Greenwich glanced but slightly at the question of the Straits. The matter was one which had been discussed before in the House; and it had been suggested—he believed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham—that a compromise should be effected, by limiting the number of ships of war that should be allowed to pass through the Straits at the same time. This was a sort of artificial restriction, which had been unsuccessfully tried in the Black Sea, and he should be sorry to see the system again resorted to. It was a curious fact that neutralization was first commenced by Russia herself, who, in 1813 and 1828, forced the Persian Government to make Treaties, by which no war flag was allowed to fly in the Caspian Sea except that of Russia. The right hon. Member for Greenwich had, in the course of his speech, accused Lord Salisbury of stating opinions unworthy of the meanest attorney—language which he thought scarcely proper to be used in that House. With regard to the allegation of misstatement, he maintained that a more unfounded charge was never brought by one public man against another. The right hon. Gentleman had often, when he had spoken early in a debate, said that attacks were made upon him which it was known he could not, in consequence of the rules of debate, answer. Similarly, he felt justified in saying of the right hon. Gentleman, that he had that

  921
  evening made charges against Lord Salisbury which he would not have made if the noble Lord had been present in the House. The right hon. Member said that in Lord Salisbury's despatch there were statements which were not creditable; but comments were not misstatements, and, whether creditable or not, that did not depend on any opinion expressed by the right hon. Member. The first accusation of mis-statement was that the future Ruler of Servia would be practically chosen by Russia; but if the right hon. Member had consulted the Treaty itself, and quoted Article VII. properly, he would have seen that Lord Salisbury was perfectly justified in that remark. A brief study of history, and an application of it to the present case, would show that the choice was to follow the precedent established in the Danubian Principalities in 1830, when the Councils were chosen by Russia, and administered the Principalities under the superintendence of high officials appointed by the Russian Government, the Porte solemnly undertaking to confirm the administrative regulations laid down by Russia. The right hon. Member was very severe on Lord Salisbury's remarks upon Article XVIII., which he said was beneath the meanest attorney. But, anyone who read the Treaty, must see at a glance, that Lord Salisbury was justified in saying that it would practically put the Greek inhabitants of Epirus and Thessaly under the supervision of Russia. He would not discuss the boundaries of the New Bulgaria. But no one could deny that they were to be very large; that they were to extend from the Danube and the Black Sea to the Ægean, and that they would give Russia access to the Mediterranean. Well, if Russia were to have the administration of this new Province, if she were to have the education of the children, if she were to have possession of the mouths of the Danube, and if she were to be allowed to remain in the new Province for two years, the natural end must inevitably be that there would be no difference between Russia and Bulgaria. And what would be the result? Russia, the only really despotic Government in Europe, which had destroyed the Constitutions Poland and Turkey, and had crushed the rising freedom of Hungary, would be brought into the Mediterranean, to
  922
  overawe, it might be, constitutional nations, whose liberty had been partly established by English arms and English influence. What he wanted to see was the peace of Europe secure, and the interests of this country made safe. These objects, he believed, would be secured by Lord Salisbury's despatch; because it made known our wishes, in a clear, straightforward, and manly way, to foreign Powers. We should experience in the Government no more drifting or resigning. If the Government were determined to do its duty, he hoped it would be supported by a united Parliament, as he believed it was by a united people.
  MR. GOLDSMIDtrusted that the recent change in the Ministry would mark a change in our policy on this question. He could not help remembering that the late Foreign Secretary had long had notice of the intentions of the Russian Government, and that he had taken no step to let it be known that we could not assent to their being carried into effect. He hoped that the Government would now be united in opinion, because he would rather see them go wrong, holding together, than disunited and changing their opinions from day to day. He did not care for that judicial sort of mind that saw so forcibly both sides of any question that it could never arrive at any decision, and he hailed this despatch of Lord Salisbury as indicating, at all events, energy and vigour on the part of Her Majesty's Government. He agreed, however, with the right hon. Member for Greenwich, that Her Majesty's Government were bound to do everything possible to induce the other Powers to go into the Congress before they even thought of war. For himself, he certainly was no admirer of Russia. He had read and listened with deep regret to several pro-Russian speeches from various hon. Members, and, above all, to that of the right hon. Member for the London University (Mr. Lowe), and he could only tell the right hon. Gentleman, in whose election he (Mr. Goldsmid) had taken an active part, that on this subject he by no means represented the opinion of the University which had elected him. But, strongly as he felt that Russia had gone to war for selfish purposes, he thought that it was the duty of the Government to do all they

  923
  could to avoid the mischiefs of war, which would spread grief and sorrow in many homes throughout the country. On one point he entirely disagreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. The right hon. Gentleman endeavoured to make out that Lord Salisbury was inaccurate when he said that the influence of Russia would predominate in the election of the future Sovereign of Bulgaria. But it could not be forgotten that there was to be an army of occupation, consisting of at least 50,000 Russian troops, in Bulgaria for two years. Anyone who took an interest in foreign affairs knew very well how matters were managed when there was an army of occupation. He remembered, when Savoy was annexed to France, how things were arranged at the ballot-box, and how great the numbers were for union with France; yet, nevertheless, he ventured to say that the annexation of Savoy and Nice was made against the feeling of the Province and the whole Italian people. When Russia had an army of occupation in Bulgaria, Russia would have no difficulty in so manipulating the ballot-box, even though it were to be used in an assembly of notables, that the man of her choice would be chosen; and the statement of Lord Salisbury, though strong, was justified. It was the duty of Her Majesty's Government to create a true and real Conference, and to say that they would be no parties to any so-called settlement of the Eastern Question which would simply transfer great Provinces from Turkish misrule to Russian despotism. There were two kinds of freedom—one which relied on the intelligent co-operation and choice of an active population, and was regulated alone by their just regard for each other's right; the other, which depended for its nominal existence on the beck of an absolute monarch. No British Government should be found supporting the latter sort of freedom. Consequently, he urged the Government to let that be clearly understood, and to do everything to create a public spirit in Eastern Europe. For that, Russia had little regard. Her treatment of Roumania was an example. He was not prejudiced in favour of Roumania, for the Government and people of Roumania had treated very cruelly the Jewish population; but he liked to give
  924
  honour where honour was due. He could not but admire the gallantry of the Roumanians in the recent contest. If they had not given aid to Russia at a critical moment, the result of the war might have been very different. Roumania entered upon that contest in consequence of the pledge of Russia that her territory should be inviolate. How had that pledge been kept? Another instance was Russia's treatment of the United Greek Church. Consequently, he thought he was justified in urging that if the rising Nationalities in the East required the support of stronger States in their infantile period, let them be under European and not under Russian supervision; for Russia was not likely to consider the welfare of those populations alone, but her own future opportunities of aggrandizement. He trusted, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government would be strong in holding that the enlarged Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and other Principalities, must be self-supporting, and not merely dependent on the beck of Muscovite despotism. Let them be really free, independent alike of Sultan and Czar. The Government ought also to insist with a strong hand and a loud voice that the fortresses of the Straits should be razed and dismantled, and that ingress and egress should be given to all nations to and from the Black Sea, and egress to Russia from the Black Sea. Every Power should have free access both for ships of war and merchant vessels to that sea, and then we could, practically, hold our own against Russia, and she would have more to fear from us than we to fear from her. Under these circumstances, he would not join in opposing Her Majesty's Government; but their responsibility was very great at the present moment. If the Government said they considered it their duty to call out the Reserves in the interests of the British Empire, and for the preservation of its honour, he did not think he should be justified in refusing; though, of course, they would be held responsible for the course they pursued, and would hereafter at the proper time be called strictly to account.
  MR. GATHORNE HARDY: Sir, my hon. Friend who has just sat down (Mr. Goldsmid) has taken a course somewhat different from that which has been adopted by many preceding speakers; for

  925
  while he called upon the Government, on their responsibility, to state that they have in the past endeavoured to preserve peace, and that in the future they will be guided by a consideration for the honour of the country and of that which is due to its interests, he has called upon us also to say that we are desirous that there should be a European guarantee in the East of Europe and not a Russian one alone. I think I may assure him on all these points, that the Government have acted in the past, are acting in the present, and will act in the future, in accordance with the sentiments which he has expressed. It was not my intention this evening to trouble the House; but, unfortunately, during the speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone), something that he said so strongly attracted my attention, that I took up a torn envelope from the floor and took down what he said. This led to a series of challenges, which the right hon. Gentleman expected me to reply to, and which I have waited to reply to until he himself was present. The right hon. Gentleman is an ex-Prime Minister of the Crown, and he is one who, by his great talents and the great part which he has played in this country, must always command and attract attention, not only in the House, but in the country. And the right hon. Gentleman, as I understand him to-night, has told us that his great object in speaking has been, if possible, to bring about a Congress of the European Powers for the purpose of settling the Eastern Question. Well, Sir, when the right hon. Gentleman rose, interposing between the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) and the House, taking the place which is usually occupied by one who moves an Amendment, I imagined that he, as, vir pietate gravis, was to get up, and, with a judicial and calm spirit, was to give to the House such information and guidance as would bring it to a right and safe conclusion; and, indeed, the right hon. Gentleman wished for unity, for he was against a division of the House, but he was not against division in the country. His whole tone was one which was to depreciate the Government that represents the country, to convey to the country that it had a Government which had been unable in times past to guide it with success, and which, in asking its confidence now, was
  926
  demanding of it that for which it had no justification in the past and no promise in the future. Therefore, while he was asking for a Congress, I venture to say that he was doing all that was possible for him to prevent a meeting of European Powers as far as his influence was concerned; but I am thankful to say, that by the course he has lately taken, that influence is not what it was in times past. I cannot but feel that when the right hon. Gentleman will not appeal to a division of the House, it is because he knows that he will not be followed by those who were his Friends in times past, but who have repudiated his policy and thrown aside his views and his Leadership. I say that the right hon. Gentleman in the course he has taken in condemning to-night the policy of the Government, as set out in the speeches of Members of the Government and in the Circular of Lord Salisbury, has taken his opportunity to show that he opposes our measures; and, it is not merely because he fears he will be put in a minority, that he will not face a division, but because there is division among his own Friends. So he cannot support his views by his vote. But if he holds sincerely the views he has stated, it is his duty to protest against the action of the Government, not only by his voice, but also by his vote. The right hon. Gentleman seems to me to be in that position. He has told us that he is convinced that the country almost unanimously is in favour of a policy of peace, and he has told us that that is his policy. I know not whether the country then considers that the Ministry is a Ministry of peace, as we have said; because, as far as I can ascertain, both in borough and county, we have not found so unanimous a desire for opposition to the Government. The elections which have recently taken place in counties and boroughs do not show it. At this moment one Metropolitan county is vacant, with a constituency representing all classes, and largely those to whom the right hon. Gentleman has been at times inclined to appeal, and yet, so far as I have heard, my noble Friend (Lord George Hamilton), whose talents and politics are deserving of the honour, is at present standing for the county unopposed. Now, I must go further, and tender my tribute of thanks to those who act so differently from the right hon. Gentleman—to

  927
  the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington), not because he has deserted his duty, or is doing anything in favour of this side of the House; but because, in the exercise of it, he has declined to be a party to such vague and wild declamation, and to statements so depreciatory of the Government. There is a Government which he cannot displace; so, while he fairly criticizes, as is his duty, he does not resist it—with a fair right, hereafter, to challenge the policy which it has adopted, when he understands more fully all those circumstances and negotiations to which at present he must needs be somewhat of a stranger. I say this, not to make any attack upon those who act differently and who come forward, like the hon. Member for Carlisle, against us not only on one particular point, but on many points—such as the reduction of the Army. I am only sorry for his sake, that mankind still remains quarrelsome, and that we should still be obliged to arm ourselves. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) told us that we had no Army worth considering in India, that we were in no sense a military Power, and, that, so far as we were concerned, it came to this—that unless we could get somebody to fight for us we had better hold our peace. Well, that is not the opinion of the Government. The Government has thought it its duty, its imperative duty, that it should prepare itself for contingencies, believing that England, like the rest of Europe, has a deep interest in what has occurred in the South-Eastern part of Europe. That is in passing. Now, the right hon. Gentleman went through the different points on which he relied, and I will endeavour to reply to him. He said we had put a very lax interpretation upon the Statute. He said there was no great emergency, that the time had not come for us to act as we are acting, and that in 1870 it was never meant that the Act then passed under his Government for calling on the Reserves should be so used. He then gave certain instances in which he said that during the last 15 years there would, under our view of the case, have been great emergencies. Well, let us see what they were. There was, in 1870, the Franco-German War. There were no Army Reserves at that time, and what did the Government and the right
  928
  hon. Gentleman do? They came down to the House for a Vote of £2,000,000, and called out 20,000 additional recruits. Was that a great emergency? Was the Trent affair in 1861 an emergency? It was such an emergency as this, that strong action was taken—Lord Palmerston not only got troops together, but he actually sent them to Canada. Then comes the War in 1864. I confess that I speak with hesitation of it, for neither France nor England made a very creditable exhibition. That was the fatal cause of much of the European trouble that has followed. I have a great sympathy with the drawing together of the German Empire—a great sympathy for the ties of blood which made that great Empire; but I cannot say but that I regret that the Forces of Prussia and Austria should have been used to crush that gallant little State, Denmark. I cannot but regret that that first instance of might taking its place against right was the one which has given an impetus to the same sort of thing in Europe since, and particularly to the condition of things in which we now find ourselves. These were the right hon. Gentleman's three instances. In 1861, I say there was the action of the Government which showed there was a case of great emergency; in 1870, the right hon. Gentleman acted as if there was a case of great emergency by calling out 20,000 men; of 1864, I will say nothing. Then the right hon. Gentleman compared the speech of my right hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) with the Circular of Lord Salisbury. Well, what was the course my right hon. Friend took? Impressed with the gravity of the situation—Europe all suspense, awaiting to know what is about to happen—my right hon. Friend, with an anxious desire to bring about peace; speaking in a tone consistent with the gravity of the situation, used not a word which could by any possibility offend any nation; not a word which could give to Russia any irritation; carefully abstained from saying anything which could impair the hope of bringing about the Congress. How was the speech of my right hon. Friend followed? By the calm, judicial speech of the right hon. Gentleman? The right hon. Gentleman took an entirely different tone, and used language with respect to

  929
  Lord Salisbury's Circular, to which I will call attention by-and-by. He alleged that we had changed our position. He said that—"You asked for these £6,000,000 to go with might into Conference." Be it so. But, surely, the £6,000,000 are meant to be spent in warlike preparation, for the purpose of being ready for war, if the occasion should arise. It was treated as a precautionary measure. It is true we were ready to go into the Congress, if it was to be a real Congress. We are prepared to go into a Congress to-morrow, provided only that it is real and genuine, so that we may probe these things to the bottom. But I will ask any hon. Gentleman, whatever side of the House he sits on, whatever his sympathies, whether, when he first saw the map which laid down the limits according to the Treaty of San Stefano, he did not hold up his hands in amazement and stand astonished at the difference between the professions to which we have listened and the Treaty which was concluded, so far as Russia and Turkey are concerned, and which was not to be submitted, as a whole, to the Congress for investigation? The right hon. Gentleman then goes on to another point, and I should like to refer to documents which are conclusive on the subject. The right hon. Gentleman, in his long speech on Friday, asked whether Russia was at liberty to withdraw from the Congress at any period she pleased, and were the other Powers at liberty to do the same? Certainly. We have never disputed that in any way. Any Power that goes into the Congress is at liberty to withdraw from it. But that is not the point of Prince Gortchakoff. There is no ambiguity about Prince Gortchakoff. He understands it, if the right hon. Gentleman does not. We objected to such vague terms as "appreciations and judgments," which are not English, but French terms—terms of art—and which did not give us a clear apprehension of what the Russian Government meant to insist upon; we desired to have them made so clear that those who ran might read. What we also asked was this—was the Treaty to be considered altogether? Not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered what Articles required acceptance by the other Powers and what did not. What was the answer? The Russian Government,
  930
  by Prince Gortchakoff, said—
  "It leaves to the other Powers the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they may think fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting, or not accepting, the discussion of these questions."
  Is there anything to be disputed about that? Suppose that any Member of the Congress was to discuss the question of Bessarabia. Russia says—"Oh, that is excluded from the discussion—we will not accept the discussion." That would be in accordance with what Prince Gortchakoff says. The right hon. Gentleman talks about the liberty of withdrawal. Can anything be conceived more absurd or even ridiculous than that Russia, on arriving at a particular point, should say—"I am going to withdraw it from discussion. I will have nothing to say to it. Discuss it; but as between Turkey and ourselves it is concluded." What would be the use of such a Congress as that sitting? Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say, on the other hand, that if England were to withdraw from the Conference, the other Powers should be at liberty to settle everything as against England without England's concurrence, and that England was to be bound by their act? I hope I live in an England which would refuse to be so treated and bound. England is desirous of peace and loves peace, but England has a European connection, an Asiatic connection, an Empire which extends to every part of the earth; and England, if driven away from the discussion of a question in which her interests are involved, is she to depart from the Congress, to be driven away from the discussion of points in which she takes a material interest, and leave them to be settled behind her back, and without her concurrence? Sir, I say that is an impossible condition of things—one to which no House of Commons would agree. On the contrary, any English House of Commons would insist on our being heard in respect of Treaties to which we are a party. Well, it is hardly worth while to touch on the little points to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. One, however, he surprised me by referring to. He said that Lord Salisbury in his Circular threw over the Ottoman Empire, because, in one clause, he spoke of the Government of Constantinople. Well,

  931
  the right hon. Gentleman is a great writer, and I daresay he has often changed about his terms with a view to avoid tautology; and if he will read the clause, he will see what Lord Salisbury did. The use of the phrase was merely a form of expression, and meant nothing in particular, but was adopted in order to avoid tautology, and is fully explained by the context. Then, the right hon. Gentleman has complained of the way in which the Government has conducted this business. He says that it has pursued a vacillating course, that when he has heard anything bad from one of its Members, he has been content, knowing that something good must speedily follow, and vice versâ. Now, having heard something which he will doubtless think very bad to-night, can he not be content and expect something good next week? If he would only do this, he would save us a great deal of trouble. Then the right hon. Gentleman said much harm was done by the resignation of two of my noble Colleagues, whose speeches had fostered the feeling in favour of peace. Possibly their speeches may have had that effect, and may have been acceptable to numbers of people in this country as viewed in that light; but can he point to any of the speeches of their Colleagues which had a contrary effect? I do not think they spoke in a more conciliatory tone than my right hon. Friend. A noble Duke has made some allusion to a speech of mine, in which I mentioned trumpets and drums, but I did not make use of the words in a warlike sense at all. In order to give an idea of the extent of the Empire, I said that in some part of the Queen's Dominions, the drum was heard at every hour of an English day and night, and I said, or meant to say, nothing more, and was far from using it with reference to any warlike purpose whatever. From the time of the resignation of my noble Friends, the right hon. Gentleman says, we have been on a declivity, and among other things as showing this, he mentions the fact that we have a Fleet in the Sea of Marmora. A great deal has been said on this subject, and we have been told by Russia that, except for strategic reasons, there would be no approach to Constantinople. But was there a single strategic reason for the approach either to the lines at Gallipoli
  932
  or to Constantinople? There was an absolute surrender by Turkey at Kezanlik, and there was no occasion for ever advancing beyond Adrianople. In spite of that, there was an alarming advance in both directions, and great consternation prevailed on the subject. Though at the time at which the Fleet entered the Sea of Marmora, there was no danger to British subjects, there had been danger, and it had been the invariable practice of this country to send its Fleets wherever British subjects are in danger. At the same time, I would be uncandid, if I said that the Fleet was there for that purpose only. The Fleet is there as a fair representation of the power of England—a fair representation of the intention of England to have its share in the settlement of the Eastern Question. So far as I understand, that was the reason why we sent the Fleet into the Sea of Marmora. Not in a spirit of hostility to anyone there, for there is no desire on the part of the Government that the Fleet should come into collision with anybody; but it is only reasonable that, having the Fleet there, other ships should be so stationed at Gallipoli as to make it easy for the Fleet to re-pass the Dardanelles when the time comes for it to leave the Sea of Marmora. Then the right hon. Gentleman referred to the rupture of the Congress negotiations; but that is no fault of ours. We were co-signatories of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, and we entered into an agreement with Russia in the latter Treaty, that no one Power should withdraw from them without the consent of the other; but she has withdrawn from them by the Treaty of San Stefano, and has raised our right to take part in every single point which is an alteration of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. If we are going to enter the Congress, existing Treaties must be re-organized, for they are the groundwork, or we shall refuse to go. I am quite sure that a great many right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite feel quite as much as I do, that when we are accused of having broken up the Congress, we have only asked for what we have a perfect and absolute right to ask. The right hon. Gentleman himself has said, when the time comes, demand what is right, and stick to it; and I say to the nation, if you enter into Treaties, insist on the discussion

  933
  of every point in these Treaties which are now proposed to be affected without any reference to you as a cosignatory. The right hon. Gentleman then said—"But your Foreign Secretary leaves you?" Quite true; but it should be borne in mind that he was with us and assented to every one of the items on which the right hon. Gentleman has laid stress as being objectionable, and that he consented with us—nay, more, he urged in the strongest manner the terms which we laid down as conditions precedent to our entering the Congress—terms without which it would be perfectly hopeless and futile to enter the Congress at all. It has been suggested that a second Plenipotentiary should have been sent to settle the preliminaries of the Congress, and that, no doubt, would be all very well as far as mere technical preliminaries are concerned; but the preliminaries upon the settlement of which disagreement has arisen were matters which go to the whole base and substance of the matter—namely, whether you were to submit the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 as well as the Treaty of San Stefano to the consideration of the Congress, and we said if you do admit them, we will go into the Congress, but if you will not we refuse to go into the Congress. Well, then, my noble Friend the late Foreign Secretary was in agreement with the rest of his Colleagues also in reference to the Vote of Credit; and in reference to that matter, I may mention that England is not the only European country which has asked for such a Vote, but that there is another country which has done so—a country which is deeply interested in this matter. And now we are told, again and again, that we are isolated; but I say—Wait! Do not be too hasty in coming to that conclusion. There are deep interests involved in this question, and I venture to say with regard to the Circular Despatch of Lord Salisbury that it will live, and that its influence will be felt not only in this country, but throughout Europe. It followed, no doubt, the Vote of Credit, and it has been followed by the steps which we are now taking; but I say that, so far from our taking those steps being drifting into war, it is the bringing to an anchor, it is the placing ourselves in a position where we are understood and intelligible. These steps
  934
  which we have taken, therefore, will be, in my opinion, the most conclusive for peace which have ever been taken. It is the drifting of unpreparedness which we have to fear. We find that the right hon. Gentleman opposite objects to the use of the word "drifting" as applied to the Crimean War; but if we did not drift into that war, shame and woe be upon the heads of those who went into it so unpreparedly! Why did Lord Derby stay with us? Because he felt that the course we were pursuing, at least up to the time he left us, tended towards peace, and that the object in view was peace. I now come to the question raised with regard to the calling out of the Reserves. In 1870 a change was effected in our Army, and instead of having long service in it we introduced the system of short service in the Army, and subsequent service in the Reserve; so that, instead of having an Army of 100,000 men, we might have an Army of 160,000 or 180,000 men—60,000 or 80,000 of whom might be in the Reserve, who might be called up in time of necessity. What with sending out our best men to the battalions stationed in India and in the Colonies, we have at home only young soldiers, and we fill up the home battalions in time of emergency from the old, seasoned soldiers who form the Reserve. The consequence of the system is that, ordinarily, you have a number of young men in the ranks, and none of your battalions are filled to the full measure until a time of war. The moment that is threatened, it is an essential step at once to put the Reserves into motion, otherwise you might call upon them too late. If there is one point more essential than another, it is that the men of a regiment should know one another; and if you waited till war was proclaimed, and then called out the Reserves, you would fill up regiments with men who are unacquainted with them, and with those whom they are to join. Moreover, the Reserves have been absent from their work for some time; and, of course, they are, to a certain extent, out of the practice essential to make good soldiers. But they very quickly regain their old habits, and soon become fit for the work entrusted to them. When you talk about our calling out our few Reserves having alarmed Europe, it is simply absurd, when other countries have been doing the same

  935
  thing. Why, look at the state of Europe! You may hear the tramp of armed men in every corner. There is not a square mile in any part of it in which you may not hear the tread of armed men taken from peaceful pursuits. So much is this the case, that even the country which has had enormous sums paid into its coffers finds itself poor on account of the immense Forces which it keeps under arms. We, in this country, have taken a different course. We have only a small Army; it is true it is an expensive Army, because it is a Volunteer Army. But I believe it is a system which will commend itself to us in the strongest way, if it really comes out as we expect. I cannot help thinking that those who hesitate about calling out the Reserves on this occasion might well hold their hands and see whether we really have the Reserves. Some people say we have not, but I believe in it. I believe these men will appear in the ranks; but, at all events, it is a beneficial thing that we should see whether we can rely on these regiments which are now in the background, but which I hope will come forward and show that England has a reliable Force. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of Government being chivalrous in taking up the cause of the injured; but there is a chivalry which, I am sorry to say, is sometimes neglected, and that is the chivalry of standing up for what you have a right to, even if it is supposed that you will have to stand alone. I am told by some that we shall have no Allies. That is the question of the future. I hope we shall not require them; but this country has before now engaged in a war without Allies, and when we were weaker than we are now. This country has been able to maintain its position on every sea, and has shown itself not without effect on many shores. It is true, I believe, that we have never sent out a greater Force than about 30,000 or 33,000 men; but if the need now arises, I believe we should be able to send out English soldiers to a very much greater extent; and that, moreover, a military spirit now exists very much among the Volunteers, which makes us infinitely stronger than in any former time. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that peace is a great object which the majority of the people of this country have at heart. But anxious as the people are for peace,
  936
  they say—"For Heaven's sake, do not let us preserve it by any dishonourable means; give up nothing you are justly entitled to, and, above all, do not give up anything which would make peace secure. Our object should be to make peace so sure that nothing will break it as far as human ingenuity can settle affairs." Well, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman then went on from those points to attack the despatch of my noble Friend, and I cannot help thinking that the remarks he made were somemhat harsh and undeserved. Nor do I think that the right hon. Gentleman, when he recalls some of the terms he used, will think they will conduce to the fairness of controversy in this House, or that they will be such as will be looked back upon by himself with that due regard to his position and his dignity which, I am sure, none of us would wish to see diminished. But when the right hon. Gentleman said the language in that despatch was not consistent with decency and honour—that it was inconsistent with national honour—that it showed the spirit of a mean attorney, and the meanest of attorneys—surely, that is language which is hardly deserved by my noble Friend who is well known in this House, and such as the despatch in no degree merits. Now, let us take these points, though my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) touched on them. As the right hon. Gentleman called my attention to them, I should be sorry not to answer those points on which he addressed the House. Now, with respect to the Treaty of Kainardji, there has always been a dispute upon it; but I will say this, that the decision upon the Treaty of Kainardji by the Great Powers was this—that Russia had no right of Protectorate in any sense of the Christiana of Turkey. I know the right hon. Gentleman takes his view of it. In Article 7 of that Treaty, the Sultan promises to protect the Christian religion in all its churches.—and also agrees that the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia may make representations in favour of the church to be erected at Constantinople, as well as those officiating therein, and promises to receive those remonstrances as coming from a friendly Power. The Sultan makes a general promise, and makes a specific engagement with Russia. Anybody reading that would see that Russia

  937
  was excluded from making any interference in the domestic government of Turkey, except in the case of the Christian church at Constantinople. That exception proves that all the rest were excluded. But Russia claimed, under the Treaty of Kainardji, a general Protectorate of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey. Upon that, decisions were come to by the Great Powers, whereby that claim was disposed of. And now let us see whether my noble Friend is wrong in saying that this Treaty is not more limited than that of Kainardji? The Treaty of San Stefano gives Russia the right of interfering on behalf of certain Christians all over the Turkish Empire. Does this Treaty, or does it not, afford an opportunity to Russia—I do not say she would use it—of carrying on intrigue in Turkey, and of bringing about its ruin? I ask any candid person to say, does my noble Friend describe it unduly when he describes this Treaty as not more limited than that of Kainardji? Then, as to the indemnity—I will not differ from what the right hon. Gentleman said. The mere point of money I will not take up, but the question involved—as respects territory, he himself said—must come under the consideration of the Powers. With respect to Bessarabia, the right hon. Gentleman says we do not enter into that subject with sufficient minuteness. We say the compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania and the acquisition of the important harbour of Batoum will make Russia dominant over all the Black Sea. The right hon. Gentleman—having this distinct intimation from Russia of what she is determined upon, and Russia having declared that if she cannot have Bessarabia otherwise, she will take it by force—appears inclined to do on behalf of Roumania what is, no doubt, a chivalrous act on his part. And it is one of those chivalrous acts in regard to which he says he could sympathize with the Government, if it would draw the sword for these grand sentimental objects. Well, Sir, sentiment is a hard master; and I do not know where it might load us. The real fact is, that Bessarabia has a very material influence on the Danube and the Black Sea, and a most material influence on the well-being of Roumania; and it cannot be wondered at that Roumania has taken the course she has done in existing circumstances.
  938
  The right hon. Gentleman says the terms were known to us with respect to Bessarabia before. That was prior to the interference of Roumania in the war. But it was treated then very differently by Russia, and it was on the supposition that Roumania was not to help her in the war; but she did help her at a most material point, and in a most material manner. And, therefore, so far as that is concerned, Roumania has a good deal the best of the argument. And here I would remark that the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the importance of a large Bulgaria, which he compared with a large Roumania, as a check to Russian influence. That is a most extraordinary argument, because Roumania became, first, a road for the Russians; and, secondly, became their most important Ally. Yet, we are told, that we are to erect a large Bulgaria, under Russian supervision and control, and to say that such a Bulgaria is to be a real and effective resistance to Russia. After the experience of Roumania, I cannot say that I have any great faith in that. Well, the right hon. Gentleman, with great justice, said that at the time these terms were communicated by Count Schouvaloff, of course it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to publish them. That is quite obvious on the face of the documents. But the right hon. Gentleman says we took no part in respect to these terms at that time, and that thus we misled Russia. I should like, for a few minutes, if the House will bear with me, to explain what really took place. On the 8th of June these terms were first spoken of to Lord Derby; and observe what the communication of Count Schouvaloff was to Lord Derby! Count Schouvaloff said that in addition, and as a separate matter, he was authorized to offer an exchange of ideas on the question of possible conditions of peace, supposing the Porte—now mark these words—to be willing to come to terms before the Russian Forces had crossed the Balkans. It was all founded on this point—whether the Porte would be inclined to listen to terms—possible terms—at all? The terms mentioned by Count Schouvaloff were never regarded as possible terms by Her Majesty's Government. That was quite obvious from the course we took. They were sent to Mr. Layard, who was

  939
  asked whether there was any probabibility of the Porte acceding to the terms? otherwise any attempt at mediation would be useless. The Porte was not only not disposed to listen to these terms, but would not then listen to any terms at all—for, according to Mr. Layard's despatch, the Porte was confident of being able to drive the Russians back across the Danube, and also of finally repulsing them in Armenia. Therefore, Turkey was not disposed to listen to any terms of peace at that time. Lord Derby, writing to Lord Augustus Loftus, said he did not understand the terms to be put before the British Cabinet for an expression of opinion, and before he could express one upon them, it would be necessary for him to consult his Colleagues, which he would be ready to do if it was thought desirable; but his Lordship added, that in his personal judgment, it was impossible to expect the Porte to accede to those proposals until it was reduced to the last extremity. It was finally distinctly understood upon both sides that the communication was to be of a personal and private character. Therefore, the thing fell to the ground. Besides that, when we got a little further into August, what was the course of conversation between the Emperor and Colonel Wellesley? Was it said that these terms were to be strictly adhered to as they had been expressed by Count Schouvaloff? How does he put it? He says—
  "The terms of peace required by the Emperor are those lately communicated to Lord Derby by Count Schouvaloff, and will remain as long as England maintains her position of neutrality. His Majesty has no ideas of annexation, beyond that, perhaps, of the territory lost by Russia in 1856, and, perhaps, of a certain portion of Asia Minor."
  Again, the Emperor will not occupy Constantinople for military honour—but he is near enough already. Again, His Majesty was ready to treat on suitable terms with the Sultan; but as for England, her mediation in favour of the Turks could not be entertained. What was the use, then, of considering these terms of peace? As soon as it was known that the Porte would not listen to them, England was compelled to wash her hands of them. The important thing is that the Emperor qualified his statements to Colonel Wellesley with the word "perhaps;" and, in addition, said that he looked to a Conference for
  940
  a final settlement of the question. I have gone through some of the points to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, but my notes are incomplete. It seems that the right hon. Gentleman is full of apprehension. He says—first, do nothing without Europe; and we have endeavoured to do nothing without Europe, and we have done everything in our power to bring Europe to one mind, and to bring things to a satisfactory issue. What does the right hon. Gentleman say? He says, look to the Congress to pacify Thessaly; and we do look to the Congress, but we do not know what will be subjected to it, and what will not. We will do all we can for the pacification of Thessaly, and to bring freedom to Mussulmans, Slavs, and Serbs alike; and I trust that any settlement will ensure good government that cannot be broken up by the intrigue of any selfish Power. As for the other points, I must remark that I do not think this the time for a discussion on the Straits, though I quite admit that they have been specially spoken of as subject to the Conference. But what the right hon. Gentleman is most afraid for is the local freedom of the Bulgarians. He says—"Watch Russia." What, watch the Liberator! And—"Watch Austria." Watch Austria! Why, it struck me with astonishment, that we were to watch half Europe. And yet the right hon. Gentleman told us that it was a mis-statement to speak of the election of the Prince of Bulgaria as under Russian influence. Surely, the Prince of the Bulgarians will want watching, for, although he is to be elected freely among the Bulgarians, they are to be assisted by 20,000 Russian troops. And we have these words that the re-organization is to be made "under the superintendence of an Imperial Commissioner, and in the presence of an Ottoman Commissioner." My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch referred to the Danubian Principalities; and it is not too much to say that my noble Friend did not use too strong language, when he said that the Treaty would practically make Russia the Ruler of Bulgaria. But, after all, this is matter of opinion, and it is not a point which is to be spoken of as contrary to decency and honour. Surely, in our interpretation of the Treaty, we are not to be bound by the view the right hon. Gentleman

  941
  may take—and quite conscientiously, I have no doubt, my noble Friend takes his own view and our view. It is open to everyone to say whether it is the right one. There is no concealment on the part of my noble Friend when he puts forward this as his view of Article 7; and I object that such language as has been used by the right hon. Gentleman should be applied to my noble Friend in the House of Commons. Nobody, Sir, can doubt that there is at this moment, assuming the Treaty of San Stefano to stand, that there is a great darkening overshadowing the South-East of Europe. No one can doubt that one Power in Europe is supreme there at this moment. No one can doubt that Turkey has by that Power been absolutely crushed. The right hon. Gentleman speaks of what was done at the Conference; but the right hon. Gentleman himself more than once said that he was desirous that Turkey should exercise dominion over those States, with proper guarantees for their good government. That was the tone taken at the Conference; but there was no question of this creation of vast independent States. The circumstances are altogether different. Sir, I feel deeply the gravity of the situation. I trust I have not said a word to bring about a collision of opinion or feeling, or which might hinder the establishment of a secure peace. My strong desire has been otherwise. I have endeavoured to confine myself to the points mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman. Is it possible that an English Minister, having the interest of England at heart, could possibly wish for war? It is simply absurd that, with our interest in commerce throughout the world, in trade at home, our interest in the happiness of the people, in their freedom from bloodshed, in the quietness of their homes throughout the country—it is, I say, simply impossible that we could be desirous of war. Sir, it is so ridiculous an accusation, that I am almost ashamed to answer it. But, Sir, there are worse evils than war. Worse evils arise from the degradation of a country that is asserting its position and claiming its rights—degradation from the refusal to that country of the right to exercise its just influence in the settlement of the administration of a State in which it has held great interests. It is an insult
  942
  to such a country to be driven from the free discussion of those points to which it had committed itself by its own adhesion and its own signature in conjunction with other Great Powers. It then becomes the duty of such a country, even at the risk which I, for one, am most anxious to avoid, of some bloodshed to maintain its position. It will only, by deferring the time, weaken itself for future effort, when war will come down upon it heavily and earnestly and against its will. It is better to take time by the forelock; and, if this country is unjustly excluded from its rights, to place itself in such a position as to show that it means to maintain them, and not to allow the Empire of England to be trodden down and dishonoured even by the greatest Empire or by any Power in the world.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. E. Jenkins.)
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I hope the House will continue the discussion this day, as we are getting now near the period of the Holidays, and there are still matters to be discussed in connection with the financial measures of the Government. I hope, therefore, it will be convenient to go on with the debate this evening, and that hon. Members who have Motions on the Paper will allow it to take precedence.
  Motion agreed to.
  Debate adjourned till To-morrow.

  CONWAY BRIDGE [COMPOSITION OF DEBT].
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to compound the Public Debt and Interest due by the Conway Bridge Commissioners, and to make arrangements for the payment of the amount for which such Debt is to be compounded.
  Resolution to be reported upon Thursday.

  PIER AND HARBOUR ORDERS CONFIRMA TION (NO. 1) BILL.
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Board of Trade under "The General Pier and Harbour Act, 1861," relating to Auchenlochan (Kyles of Bute), Carrick Castle

  943
  (Loch Goil), Conway, Falmouth, Filey, Folkestone, Hythe (Southampton), Margate, Plymouth, Port Seton, Sea View (Isle of Wight), Shanklin, Southend, South Uist, and Walton-on-the-Naze.
  Resolution reported:—Bill ordered to be brought in by Viscount SANDON and Mr. J. G. TALBOT.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 148.]

  GENERAL POLICE AND IMPROVEMENT (SCOT LAND) ACT, 1862, AMENDMENT BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. M'LAGAN, Bill to alter the time of electing Commissioners under "The General Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act, 1862," ordered to be brought in by Mr. M'LAGAN, Mr. ORR EWING, and Colonel MURE.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 147.]

  THAMES RIVER (PREVENTION OF FLOODS) BILL.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend 'The Metropolis Management Act, 1855,' and the Acts amending the same, so far as relates to the protection of the Metropolis from floods and inundations caused by the overflow of the River Thames; and for other purposes."—(Sir James M'Garel-Hogg.)
  Debate adjourned till To-morrow.
  House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Earl of Ravensworth, after the death of his father.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Local Government Provisional Orders (Bristol, &c.)* (53). Third Reading—Marine Mutiny *, and passed.

MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN—ARMY RESERVE FORCES.
Order of the Day for the consideration of the Queen's Message, read.
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, in moving an humble Address to Her Majesty, thanking the Queen for the Gracious Message which we have recently received from Her Majesty, I think it will not be considered unreasonable that I should make a few remarks on the circumstances in which that Message has been addressed to Parliament. I assure your Lordships I shall not ask you to follow me into any narrative of the war between Russia and Turkey, or of the course which has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government during that war. When last I had the honour of addressing your Lordships on this subject—which, was on the occasion of the meeting of Parliament—I remarked that during that war no noble Lord opposite had challenged the policy which we had pursued, and I thought, therefore, that I was entitled to assume that the policy on which we had acted had been generally approved; and I believe I may infer, from what passed on that occasion, that noble Lords opposite assented to my statement. But it so happened, my Lords, that at almost the very moment I was then addressing you, circumstances were occurring which gave quite a new aspect to affairs; and I think that upon those circumstances, and upon all the conduct of Her Majesty's Government consequent to those circumstances, your Lordships have a legitimate, Constitutional, and Parliamentary right to declare your opinion. With one exception, I will ask your Lordships attention only to what has occurred from the moment to which I have been alluding.
My Lords, before I enter into the details with which I shall have to trouble

761
your Lordships, I ask permission to read an extract from an important despatch, which extract it seems to me to be necessary you should have in your minds before you can form an impartial judgment on the statement which I am about to submit to your Lordships' House. My Lords, in that State Paper, which was an answer to the Circular from Prince Gortchakoff announcing and vindicating the commencement of the war between Russia and Turkey, the Secretary of State (the Earl of Derby) argued with great ability the many reasons and considerations why we could not agree with his Highness, and why he thought the Government had made out no case for their belligerent conduct; and, finally, having given many reasons for this opinion, the Secretary of State concluded—
"The course on which the Russian Government has entered involves graver and more serious considerations."
That is, graver and more serious than those which he had already alleged.
"It is in contravention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris, of March 30,1856, by which Russia and the other signatory Powers engaged, each on its own part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In the Conference of London, of 1871, at the close of which the above stipulation, with others, was again confirmed, the Russian Plenipotentiary, in common with those of the other Powers, signed a Declaration affirming it to be an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting parties by means of an amicable arrangement. In taking action against Turkey on his own part, and having recourse to arms without further consultation with his Allies, the Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European concert hitherto maintained, and has at the same time departed from the rule to which he himself had solemnly recorded his consent."—[Turkey, No. 18, 1877.]
My Lords, the reply from which I have read that extract is dated as far back as the 1st of May, 1877, and it is of the greatest importance that the House should bear in. mind that at the commencement of the deplorable war which, I trust, has now ceased, this announcement was so deliberately made, and this principle was vindicated in a manner so distinct by Her Majesty's Government. My Lords, the extract which I have read conveys the keynote of our policy; it is, I may say, the diapason of our diplomacy
762
upon it our policy was founded' and had not those engagements been entered into by Russia, and had we not held her bound by those engagements in the face of Europe, no policy of neutrality would have been sanctioned by this country. I believe, my Lords, I may say that not alone for this, but for other countries which adopted the same policy. Well, since I had the honour of addressing your Lordships at the beginning of this Session, circumstances which were at that very time occurring, and which continued afterwards have given a new aspect to the state of affairs. Those circumstances were as follows:—About that time Her Majesty's Government received private information that negotiations were commencing, or were about to commence, between the belligerent Powers. No sooner had that information reached us, than the Secretary of State addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord Augustus Loftus, instructions, which were as follows, and were dated the 14th of January:—
"Her Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to state to Prince Gortchakoff that, in order to avoid possible misconception and in view of reports which have reached Her Majesty's Government, they are of opinion that any Treaty concluded between the Governments of Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be an European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties."—[Turkey, No. 3, 1878, p. 8.]
My Lords, on the 23rd of January, having received no answer from Russia with respect to those representations, the Secretary of State, pressing for an answer, telegraphed to Her Majesty's Ambassador in these terms—
"Have you received an answer from the Russian Government to the communication which you made on the 15th inst., respecting the validity of any future Treaty? "—[Ibid. p 12.]
On the 24th of January—10 days after the original representations—Her Majesty's Ambassador writes to say he had received no answer himself, and adds—
"I presume Prince Gortchakoff regarded the communication as a statement to record the opinion of Her Majesty's Government which required no answer. If an answer was to be given, it would probably be made through the Russian Ambassador in London."—[Ibid. p. 14.]
Accordingly, my Lords, on the day after that message was received, Count Schouvaloff read to my noble Friend

763
the Secretary of State the following extract of a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff:—
"We repeat the assurance that we do not intend to settle by ourselves (isolément) European questions having reference to the peace which is to be made (se rattachant á la paix)."—[Ibid. p. 15.]
Meanwhile, my Lords, information reached us that negotiations were now being carried on between Russian and Turkish delegates at Kezanlik, and that those negotiations were being conducted with the utmost secrecy—I may say mystery—which secrecy, we were pained to find, extended to those who had religiously and honourably observed that policy of neutrality which had been promised by the Secretary of State. In consequence of this, my Lords, on the 29th of January the Secretary of State addressed the following despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus:—
"I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Russian Government that Her Majesty's Government, while recognizing any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish delegates at Kezanlik for the conclusion of an armistice and for the settlement of bases of peace as binding between the two belligerents, declare that in so far as those arrangements are calculated to modify European Treaties and to affect general and British interests, they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they are made the subject of a formal agreement among the parties to the Treaty of Paris."
At the same time, my Lords, the Secretary of State sent the following Circular in identical language to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at the Courts of Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome. Your Lordships will perceive that it contains an additional paragraph, but in other respects is substantially the same as the communication to Lord Agustus Loftus—
" I have to request that your Excellency will inform the Government to which you are accredited that Her Majesty's Government, while they are prepared to recognize any arrangements which may be made by the Russian delegates and those of Turkey at Kesanlik with a view to the conclusion of an armistice and the settlement of the bases of peace as binding between the two belligerents, declare, nevertheless, that in so far as such arrangements may be found calculated to modify European Treaties, or to affect general interests, or those of Great Britain, they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they shall be made the subject of a formal agreement by the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris.
"Her Majesty's Government entertain the hope that the view of the case above stated, which is entirely based upon the Treaties, and
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more especially upon the Treaty of London, of 1871, will receive the assent of the other Powers who were parties to those Treaties."—[Turkey, No. 5. 78. p. 5.]
At length, my Lords, there came the following reply from the Russian Government, in a despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus to the Secretary of State:—
"St. Petersburg, January 30, 1878.
"I have received your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, containing a declaration relative to the question of the validity of the bases of peace, and I have this morning communicated the substance of it to Prince Gortchakoff. His Highness replied that to effect an armistice certain bases of peace were necessary, but they are only to be considered as preliminaries and not definitive as regarded Europe. His Highness stated categorically that questions bearing on European interests will be concerted with European Powers, and he had given Her Majesty's Government clear and positive assurances to this effect."
Those positive assurances were repeated in communications made by the Russian Ambassador in London; and, I am bound to say, as so many remarks have been made on the conduct of that Plenipotentiary, that, so far as my personal experience is concerned, I believe he has made no representations to Her Majesty's Government which are not to be found in the instructions which he received from his own Government. Well, my Lords, this carried us through the month of January—the month in which Parliament assembled, the month in which those negotiations between Russia and Turkey commenced, and the month in which we received that declaration from Prince Gortchakoff which Her Majesty's Government was induced to regard as satisfactory. And that it was deemed satisfactory by the Government of Austria, also, I think there can be no doubt; because, immediately after its receipt—that is to say, on the 4th of February—a formal invitation was received by Her Majesty's Government from the Government of Austria to a Conference to be held at Vienna. That communication was made with the knowledge of Russia—or, to use the language of a despatch of the Austrian Ambassador, Russia "fully appreciated it"—and the object of the Conference was stated to be the establishment of "the agreement of Europe on the modifications which it might become necessary to introduce

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into the above-mentioned Treaties," in order to mate them harmonize with the present situation. Your Lordships will observe that the character in which this Government—the Government of Austria—addressed our Government and the other Governments that were to take part in the Conference was a character which did not exist, except by the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. Avowedly, it was in her character as a signatory of the Treaties of 1856, that Austria addressed the invitation to the other Powers, and it was in their character as signatories of those Treaties that the other Powers received that invitation. That carried us to the commencement of February, and the month which follows is not rich in diplomatic documents. But, my Lords, it was not an uneventful month. During the whole of that period, Austria was busy in conferring with the different Courts of Europe, and in making arrangements for the meeting of the Conference. There were many suggestions made—there was the scheme of its meeting at Vienna; there was the objection of some of the Powers to the meeting being held in a capital city; there were discussions as to the presidency, as to the locality, and as to the name of the Assembly—whether it should be called a Congress or a Conference; as to whether it should be held in a capital city or in a place of more obscure character; and as to whether it should be presided over by a Secretary of State or by some other Minister. All those questions occupied the minds of Governments; but they did not occupy the mind of Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government never made the slightest difficulty on these heads. There were persons proposed whom we might not have approved as the best President of the Congress; there were localities proposed which, perhaps, we did not approve as the best; but we never made any objection of any kind. We thought too much of the interests of peace and of the magnitude of the considerations involved in a meeting of a Conference or a Congress; so that whether it was to be a Conference or a Congress—which, I believe, are exactly the same—or whether it was to be held at Vienna, as originally proposed, or at Baden, or at Berlin, or who was to preside over it, were matters which Her Majesty's Government put on one side—because we
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were anxious that there should be such a meeting, believing that its meeting was the only means then apparent by which the peace of Europe might be maintained. Well, my Lords, early in March, an invitation arrived to meet in Congress at Berlin—the objection which had been made to Vienna, as the capital of one of the signatory Powers, seems to have been waived in the case of Berlin, and a Congress at the latter city was invited. Without a moment's delay we stated that we would accept it, and we did not for a moment ask why Berlin should be preferred to Vienna—all we wanted was that there should be such a meeting. But, in order that there should be no delay—mindful as we were of the events which had been occurring during the month of February—and I ought to have reminded your Lordships of them before—when Austria was carrying on those negotiations—remembering that during the whole of that time secret negotiations were being carried on between Russia and the Porte—remembering the fact that, during the whole time while those secret negotiations were proceeding, the Russian Army was advancing, and, if not occupying, encircling the capital of the Sultan; and, remembering that we had felt it our duty to advise Her Majesty to send a portion of the Fleet to the Dardanelles and into the Sea of Marmora—we considered it was of importance that, when we assented to attending a Congress at Berlin, the policy of Her Majesty's Government should be stated in an unmistakable form. Accordingly, the Secretary of State, on the 9th of March, while signifying his agreement to the proposition for a meeting at Berlin, expressed to Count Beust the views of Her Majesty's Government in these terms—
"Her Majesty's Government, however, consider that it would be desirable to have it understood in the first place that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey should be considered as subject to be discussed in the Congress, and that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by Treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it has received the assent of the Powers."—[Turkey, No. 24, 1878, p. 4.]
Therefore, my Lords, I think I have shown, that during the eventful month that elapsed from the time to which I before alluded, Her Majesty's Government were consistently maintaining that great principle which they had vindicated

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before the war commenced, which they had repeated on other occasions, and which, on this occasion, when the meeting of the Congress appeared to be settled upon generally, they felt it their duty to again affirm in the terms I have just read to the House. A day or two afterwards—on the 13th March—in consequence, probably, of some rumours which may have reached us, or of some slight indications of feeling which it was impossible to record, but which the observant critic would not fail to remark—the Secretary of State wrote in this language to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna—
"I have to request your Excellency to inform Count Andrassy that, in order to avoid any misapprehension as to the meaning of their recent declaration contained in my note to Count Beust of the 9th inst., Her Majesty's Government desire to state that they must distinctly understand before they enter into Congress that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what Articles require acceptance or concurrence by the several Powers and what do not."—[Ibid.]
Now, my Lords, after some slight delay, we received a Memorandum from Prince Gortchakoff, which was communicated by Lord Augustus Loftus on the 17th of March—
"In answer to the communication by Lord Augustus Loftus of the despatch in which Lord Derby has answered the proposal of Count Beust respecting the meeting of a Congress at Berlin, I have the honour to repeat the assurance which Count Schouvaloff has already been instructed to give to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty—namely, that the Preliminary Treaty of Peace concluded between Russia and Turkey will be textually communicated to the Great Powers before the meeting of the Congress, and that in the Congress itself each Power will have the full liberty of its appreciations and of its action ('la pleine liberté de ses appréciations et de son action.')"—[Ibid. p. 9.]
Now, my Lords, I am not a diplomatist, and may not, perhaps, be an impartial judge; but I must say that the phrase, "la pleine liberté de ses 'appréciations et de son action" was one of which I was not able to form that clear conception which in matters of such importance is necessary. As to what "appreciation" and "action" may be, no doubt, different interpretations may be furnished. It is a phrase involved in some degree of classical ambiguity. Delphi itself could hardly have been more perplexing and more august. This did not satisfy Her
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Majesty's Government, and, therefore, the Secretary of State addressed to Count Schouvaloff on the 21st, the following Note:—
"Her Majesty's Government have considered the communication which you were authorized by Prince Gortchakoff to make on the 19th inst. Her Majesty's Government cannot recede from the position, already clearly defined by them, that they must distinctly understand before they enter into the Congress that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what Articles require the acceptance or concurrence of the other Powers, and what do not. Her Majesty's Government are unable to accept the view now put forward by Prince Gortchakoff, that the freedom of opinion and action in Congress of Russia, more than of any other Power, would be restricted by this preliminary understanding."
To this we received a conclusive answer. Count Schouvaloff says—
"I lost no time in communicating to Prince Gortchakoff the tenour of the letter which you did me the honour to address to me on the 21st. As different interpretations had been given to the interpretation of 'liberty of appreciation and action,' which Russia thought it right to reserve to itself at the Congress, the Imperial Cabinet defines the meaning of the terms in the following manner:—'It leaves to the other Powers the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they might think it fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting, or not accepting, the discussion of these questions.'"
Well, my Lords, Her Majesty's Government could place only one interpretation on that communication. However ambiguous he language of previous despatches—however various the expressions that had been used—there was nothing in the previous Correspondence between the two Courts to induce us to assume that there would be a refusal on the part of Russia to that which England believed to be a natural, just, and indispensable condition of her entering into the Congress.
My Lords, let me make now one or two remarks on the character of this Treaty of San Stefano, which Her Majesty's Government felt so necessary to be submitted to the Congress, and which we believed—and I think we believed so in common with the other Powers—Russia was bound by her previous engagements as one of the signatories of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 to submit for discussion to the Congress. The Treaty is in your Lordships' hands, and therefore I will not

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enter into a minute criticism of its every Article; but it is necessary that I should put before your Lordships some of its principal provisions, because, unless they be clear in your Lordships' minds, you would hardly be in a position to impartially decide as to the consequences to which the Treaty would lead, and as to the course which in respect of it Her Majesty's Government have thought it their duty to pursue. The Treaty is one of 27 or 29 Articles, and, with the exception of a merely technical one, every one of them is a deviation from the Articles of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. I do not say that every Article of the Treaty of San Stefano would be a violation of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, because that would be a harsh phrase. If the Government of Russia had been prepared—as we believed they were prepared—to place the Treaty of San Stefano before the projected Congress, I should look at the deviations between the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, not as violations, but rather as suggestions on the part of the Russian Government to be laid before the Congress, in order that they might be considered in a spirit of conciliation, and, if just, be adopted by the other Powers of Europe. But let us look at what this Treaty of San Stefano does—this Treaty, which was negotiated in such secrecy and encircled in mystery from the beginning to such a degree, that the Porte was commanded by Russia not to let a single Article of it be known to the neutral Powers—the neutral Powers who were the Allies of Russia—without whose neutrality she could not have gained the advantages she enjoyed, and which would not have been shown unless it had been believed that, as regarded the other Powers, Russia would feel bound by the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. Well, my Lords, in the first place, the Treaty of San Stefano completely abrogates what is known as Turkey in Europe; it abolishes the dominion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe; it creates a large State which, under the name of Bulgaria, is inhabited by many races who are not Bulgarians. This Bulgaria reaches the shores of the Black Sea and seizes the ports of that sea; it extends to the coast of the Ægean and appropriates the ports of that coast. The Treaty provides for the government of this New Bulgaria under a Prince
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who virtually is to be selected by Russia; its administration is to be organized and supervised by a commissary of Russia; and this new State is to be garrisoned—I say for an indefinite period—but, at all events, for two years certain, by Russia. My Lords, it is not merely this vast district, this vast space of country, which is taken from the Porte—and in which the power and the government of Russia are substituted for that of Turkey by the stipulations in this Treaty; but the distant Provinces of Epirus and Thessaly and Bosnia, now almost entirely cut off from Turkey, are invested with privileges—that is to say, new laws which are to be devised by Russia, and afterwards supervised by Russia; so that we may fairly say that all the European dominions of the Ottoman Porte are taken from the Porte, and for that Power is substituted the administration of Russia herself. My Lords, it is no different in Asia. It is not difficult to see that the effect of all the stipulations combined will be to make the Black Sea as much a Russian Lake as the Caspian. The harbour of Batoum, which has not been acquired by conquest, but is still in possession of the Porte, is to become Russian; all the strongholds of Armenia are seized by Russia; and the same process which is to be applied to European Turkey is to be applied to that portion of that great Province nominally left to Turkey—is to be subjected to laws devised and supervised by Russia. My Lords, the next point which I would bring under the consideration of your Lordships is that of the claim of Russia to that district of Bessarabia of which she was deprived after the Crimean War. My Lords, I need not recall to your recollection the distressing circumstances which are now occurring with reference to that portion of the Treaty of San Stefano; but I want to point out to your Lordships that here it is not a matter of trifling or local interest which is at stake. The Clause in the Treaty of Paris with regard to the cession of Bessarabia was one on which Lord Palmerston placed the utmost stress, and to which he attached the greatest gravity. It involved, he said, the freedom of the Danube, and, accordingly, Lord Palmerston treated it as an Article, not of local, but of European interest. It was inserted in the original Preliminaries of the Treaty, and an attempt was made

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subsequently by Russia to evade it; but Lord Palmerston attached such importance to it that, at one time, the Congress of Paris was near breaking up because of the efforts made by Russia to escape from that Article. The great interest felt at the Congress of Paris in taking security against the closing of the seas, and the great rivers, and especially of the Danube, the freedom of which was the great boast of the Congress of Vienna, and is almost the only remaining achievement of that Congress, is a matter which your Lordships will bear in mind when examining the Treaty of San Stefano. It concerns the whole navigation of the Black Sea, it concerns our commerce in those waters; for, should the Treaty of San Stefano take effect, the large European commerce which is now carried on from Trebizond to Persia and Central Asia may be stopped at the pleasure of Russia in consequence of cessions in Kurdistan. But what would be the consequence of the Treaty as regards the navigation of the Straits? By that Treaty, the Sultan of Turkey is reduced to a state of absolute subjection to Russia. I cannot reconcile such a condition either with the freedom of the Straits, or the free navigation of the Black Sea, or with those rights and privileges which Europe has hitherto enjoyed with regard to those waters, while the Sultan has been an independent Sovereign bound to Europe by European Treaties. It is to the subjugation of Turkey, it is against an arrangement which practically would place at the command of Russia, and Russia alone, that unrivalled situation and its resources which the European Powers placed under the government of the Porte, that we protest.
Now, my Lords, this Treaty was signed on the 3rd of March—but it was not delivered to Her Majesty's Government till the 23rd of March. I do not say that during the interval we had not by extraordinary means obtained some knowledge of its provisions, but that was knowledge on which we could not absolutely rely; it was knowledge which, like all knowledge acquired in an indirect way, was likely to be in some degree erroneous; but, at all events, it allowed us to avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity of conferring as to the means by which such mischievous results might be averted—results equally disadvantageous to Europe as
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to England. My Lords, we still hoped and still believed that a Congress might be obtained, and we looked to it as the best and only means by which the unsatisfactory state of public affairs might be remedied. We were prepared, if all the Powers entered into the Congress, and if it were a bonâ fide Congress, and in accordance with the positive engagements, as we held, of Russia—we were prepared, I say, to see the Treaty of San Stefano submitted to the discussion of that Congress in order that, to use the words of the Austrian Government, a règlement définitif of the conditions of future peace might be arrived at. My Lords, it appeared to us that the circumstances of the world at that time were not unfavourable to such a course. All the Great Powers of Europe during the last 10 years, except England, unfortunately for them, had been involved in fearful wars, and were suffering from the exhaustion attendant on such wars; and we believed that, with the general and natural inclination for peace arising from such circumstances, the discussions of a Congress—the unimpassioned discussions and the adroit experience of a Congress—were favourable—considering that it was the natural inclination and the actual interests of the Powers—to bringing about a settlement. And, my Lords, we, as far as we were concerned, had a due consideration for the circumstances in which Russia was placed, in consequence of the war between her and Turkey—because we could not expect that Russia would appear at the Congress merely in the same character as she assumed when she became a signatory to the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. We were prepared to consider the events that had occurred and their legitimate consequences; and having regard to the temper with which we expected that the proposals of Russia would be considered, having regard to the desires and interests of all concerned, and the abilities engaged in devising bases of reconciliation—we believed that Russia would not disappoint the other Powers. We regarded it as being for her own advantage to comply with the engagements into which she had entered, and that, acting as she had agreed to act by the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, she would have placed before the Congress the stipulations of all the Articles of the Treaty. My Lords, you

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have heard from me, in my previous narrative, how these hopes were disappointed. My Lords, it was when these hopes were disappointed, and when we found there was no chance by the aid of Treaties, or by the public law of Europe, to bring about a settlement of these great affairs—it was then that we had to consider what was our duty. My Lords, the Congress could not meet after that refusal on the part of Russia to conform to her engagements under previous Treaties, and the conditions which England put forward as the terms of her joining in the Congress—that the Treaty of San Stefano should be placed before the European Powers—were conditions which she could never relinquish. The justice of them has been universally acknowledged. It is not denied even by Russia. What, then, was the state of affairs? No Congress was to meet, and a most important portion of Eastern Europe, and a considerable portion of Western Asia, were in a state of anarchy, either occupied by an invading army, or in a state of rebellion. It was wholly impossible to foresee what might not occur in circumstances of such difficulty and distress. My Lords, the country in which these events were occurring is a country which has always been subject to strange and startling vicissitudes. In the East there is only one step between collapse and convulsion. It was impossible not to foresee what might occur. Had not the English Fleet been ordered into those waters, the chief highway between Europe and Asia might have been seized, and the commercial road from Trebizond to Persia might have been stopped. We know that—if not in the memory of the present generation, certainly in the memory of Members now sitting in your Lordships' House—armies marched through Syria and through Asia without firing a shot, and held Constantinople in a state of trepidation. Why not march armies in the same way, and hold Egypt and the Suez Canal in the same state of trepidation as Constantinople and the Bosphorus were held at that time? In those circumstances, there was, in our opinion, only one course to take. When everything was unsettled, when there was no prospect of a settlement—for there can be no prospect of settlement where Treaties are violated, and public law is set aside—when there seemed no probability of the Treaty of San Stefano
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being submitted for discussion to the European Powers, and of the public law being vindicated; when all Europe was arming—or, rather, when all Europe was armed—was England alone to be unarmed? Was England to be deterred from doing her duty to herself and to Europe by taunts and threats—because we were told that we were menacing when we thought to conciliate? My Lords, our Fleet, which has reached the waters of the Dardanelles, has acted in a manner worthy of it, and in the manner it might have been expected to act; but I have always thought that when it is found necessary to show our strength, certainly England should not be limited to one of her Services—that she should appeal to her Army to maintain her honour and her interests as well as to her Marine. Well, my Lords, in those circumstances, we felt it our duty to advise Her Majesty to send that Message to your Lordships' House the Answer to which I am about to propose.
And here let me make one remark upon the act of the Sovereign in that particular. It is the first time the Sovereign of this country has sent down such a Message to Parliament, because this message is in virtue of an Act of Parliament which was passed only a very few years ago. That Act was in consequence of the great military reform which was inaugurated by the last Government, and particularly by the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Card-well). My Lords, that great military reform gave rise to much controversy and opposition in the country; but, as has been the case in respect of all great Acts of our Legislature, when it had been passed by the Parliament and the Sovereign, and became law, every man on both sides, without reference to his opinions, exerted himself to carry into effect—and into vigorous effect—its provisions. I am sure that during the duration of the present Government—and that has now scarcely been a short one—there has been an unceasing effort to carry into effect the measures and policy of the noble Viscount opposite. As for myself, I can speak without prejudice on this point, because it was my lot to differ from many of my Friends in this matter. The great principle which' is the foundation of the Reserve system—the principle of short service—is one which I have had the honour to support. Well, my Lords, it

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is in consequence of that reform in our military system, and the institution of short service, that we were obliged to recommend Her Majesty to call out our Reserves. Under the new military system, it was laid down that a battalion in time of war or on active service should consist of not less than 1,000 men. A battalion in time of peace consists of only 500 men; and, therefore, the machinery of Reserves—the arrangement introduced by the noble Viscount opposite—that there should be with this short service a means by which, when men passed through their short service and left their colours, they might become, under another title, the soldiers of Her Majesty, was the only means by which you could convert our battalions of 500 men, in case of emergency, into battalions of 1,000 men, who should not be mere raw recruits. Unfortunately, the name for this Force is not a very felicitous one; it is called the Reserve Force, and it is called the Militia Reserve Force. But the world associates with the word Reserves some resource that is left to the last, that is only to be appealed to in great emergency, and is to be the ultimate means by which you can effect your purpose. But this is exactly the reverse of what the Reserve Force instituted by the noble Lord opposite is. It is not the last resource, but it is the first resource under our system. At this moment you really cannot put a corps d'armée into the field in a manner which would satisfy the country, unless Her Majesty was advised that the circumstances justified such a Message to the House from the Crown as I brought up the other day. Well, my Lords, if it was necessary in this state of Europe that Her Majesty should have a sufficient Naval and Military Force, we could take no step but that which we advised the Crown to adopt. And what are the consequences of this step? Her Majesty will be able in a very brief space of time to possess an Army of 70,000 men, fairly and even completely disciplined. It is double the force of Englishmen that Marlborough or Wellington ever commanded; but it is not a force sufficient to carry on a great war. If England is involved in a great war, our military resources are much more considerable than those you may put in motion by this Statute; but this is the only way in which you can place at
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the disposal of the Crown a considerable and adequate force when the circumstances of the country indicate an emergency. The noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition (Earl Granville), the other night, in his lively and satisfactory answer to one of his own supporters, defended the Government, and admitted and approved the satisfactory state in which the country was with regard to defence. He said—
"We happen to know from the Secretary of State that he has a corps d'armée ready, and that in a short time he can have another."
These make up the 70,000 men of whom I speak; and, therefore, the noble Earl admitted it was not an unreasonable amount of force we were calling upon Parliament to grant. The question, therefore, between us and the noble Earl is this—I should not say between the noble Earl and us, but between us and any who differ from the policy of the Government in this respect—the question is, are the circumstances which exist in the East of Europe at this moment—do the circumstances that prevail in the Mediterranean—constitute an emergency which justifies and demands that Her Majesty shall not only have a powerful Navy in these waters, but shall command, if necessary, not a very considerable, but an adequate and an efficient Army? Now, my Lords, I would say that this is a question which comes home to every man's bosom. I cannot understand—I cannot conceive myself—that in the position in which this country now finds itself, when an immense revolution has occurred in the Mediterranean Region—a revolution which involves some of the most important interests of this country; I may say, even the freedom of Europe;—I say, I cannot conceive that any person with a sense of responsibility in the conduct of affairs could for a moment pretend that, when all are armed, England alone should be unarmed. I am sure my noble Friend, whose loss I so much deplore (the Earl of Derby), would never uphold that doctrine, or he would not have added the sanction of his authority to the meeting of Parliament, and the appeal we made to Parliament immediately for funds adequate to the occasion of peril which we believed to exist. No, I cannot think such things of him; for to the individual of whom I did, I should say, Naviget Anticyram; only I trust,

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for Heaven's sake, that his lunacy might not imperil the British Empire! I have ever considered that Her Majesty's Government, of whatever Party formed, are the trustees of that Empire! That Empire was formed by the enterprize and energy of your ancestors, my Lords; and it is one of a very remarkable character. I know no example of it, either in ancient or modern history. No Cæsar or Charlemagne ever presided over a Dominion so peculiar. Its flag floats on many waters; it has Provinces in every zone; they are inhabited by persons of different races, with different religions, different laws, manners, customs. Some of these are bound to us by the tie of liberty, fully conscious that without their connection with the Metropolis they would have no security for public freedom and self-government. Others united to us by faith and blood are influenced by material as well as moral considerations. There are millions who are bound to us by military sway, and they bow to that sway because they know that they are indebted to it for order and justice. But, my Lords, all these communities agree in recognizing the commanding spirit of these Islands that has formed and fashioned in such a manner so great a portion of the globe. My Lords, that Empire is no mean heritage; but it is not a heritage that can only be enjoyed—it must be maintained—and it can only be maintained by the same qualities that created it—by courage, by discipline, by patience, by determination, and by a reverence for public law and respect for national rights. My Lords, in the East of Europe at this moment some securities of that Empire are perilled. I never can believe that at such a moment it is the Peers of Engand who will be wanting to uphold the cause of their country. I will not believe for a moment but that your Lordships will unanimously vote the Address in Answer to the Message which I now move.
Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty thanking Her Majesty for Her most gracious message communicating to this House Her Majesty's intention to cause the Reserve Force and the Militia Reserve Force, or such part thereof as Her Majesty should think necessary, to be forthwith called out for permanent service.
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I will preface the few observations I pro-
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pose to make on the present occasion by stating that it is not my intention—and I am not aware that it is the intention of any noble Lord occupying the benches by my side—to offer any opposition to the Motion. My Lords, the noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield) commenced his speech by assuming that the Opposition, by not challenging the conduct of the Government, entirely approved their policy during the last two years. I deny the soundness of that proposition. I deny the fact; I deny the inference as to the past, the present, and the future. If we abstained in times of difficulty from bringing forward Votes of Censure against a Government whom we could not hope and have no wish to displace, it does not in the slightest degree follow that we approved of their policy. I think I can adduce a better authority than my own on that point. In 1854 a memorable Message came down to both Houses of Parliament—it was, indeed, at the commencement of the Crimean War. The noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield), the then Leader of the Opposition in the other House of Parliament, then made a very powerful speech, and he began that speech by giving his own reasons and by quoting Canning to show that it was perfectly consistent for him to concur in the Motion and at the same time condemn the policy of the Government that proposed it. I trust, therefore, it will be seen that I am perfectly justified in the course I am now about to take—the more especially as there is a difference between the Answers to the two Addresses, inasmuch as that of 1854 embodied and adopted all the considerations and reasons which that Message embraced; whereas, in the present case, Her Majesty's Government have—I think, most judiciously—confined the proposal which they make to us to language similar to that of the Address at the opening of Parliament—merely thanking Her Majesty for the Message. I trust the precedent I have related will not be repeated, and that it will not lead to another Crimean War; and I will shortly give some of the reasons on which I base that, perhaps, too confident hope. Another sense in which I hope it will not be a precedent, is that certainly I have no intention of making any personal or political attack on the Government, as the noble Earl did at that

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time—I merely desire to state the reasons why I do not wish to commit myself and those who act with me to anything, but to leave on Her Majesty's Government the responsibility of the course which they have taken. Her Majesty's Government, it has been stated by the noble Earl, has decided, and has acted on the decision, to advise Her Majesty to call out the Reserve Forces, under the belief that there is a great emergency, and that anyone must be a lunatic if he did not see that there is such an emergency. Well, my Lords, I heard it last week pertinently stated that we had in the Cabinet the 12 picked Members of the great Conservative Party of Great Britain, and that one-sixth of that number had given the most signal proof of their condemnation of the measures which Her Majesty's Government then proposed should be adopted. Now, it appears that one of those is the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), who was cognizant up to the last moment of the policy and intentions of the Government. Your Lordships will agree with me that, as a political opponent of the present Government, it would be very bad taste in me to pay any personal compliment to the noble Earl at the moment of his, no doubt, painful secession from the Colleagues with whom he has been so long associated; but I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that it was not a hasty, but a well-considered, description of the noble Earl, when the Prime Minister expressed to this House his admiration of the penetration of his intellect, his capacity for business, and, above all, the judicial impartiality of his mind. Now, I do not think that the noble Earl can be considered a lunatic, and yet he certainly does not agree with the measures Her Majesty's Government propose. The noble Earl stated—I was unfortunately absent, but he is reported to have stated—that the measures upon which they had decided were not, in his opinion, prudent in the interests of European peace, or necessary to the safety of this country, or warranted by the then existing state of affairs. Now, it may be permitted to me, under such an authority as that, and with such imperfect information as I possess as to the real policy of Her Majesty's Government, to express a doubt—which doubt has not been removed by the speech which,
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although it ended by such an eloquent and magnificent piece of declamation, consisted, as to the first half, mainly of extracts and summaries of the Papers laid before us, and which we have had the advantage of going through, as the noble Earl said, the ceremony of reading. The noble Earl dwelt in some detail on the character of the Act of Parliament—with regard to which he so justly complimented the noble Viscount behind me—under which the Reserve Force is formed; but I must say, if there is any truth in the opinion of the noble Earl the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that there is no "emergency" at present, I think that my noble Friend on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) was justified in pointing out the hardships on the men called out—always supposing there is no absolute necessity for doing so, of abandoning temporarily, and more often permanently, the situations by which they maintain not only themselves, but their families. I wish to point out that when there was no Reserve it was intended to create a Force of from 60,000 to 80,000 men; and when that body is formed, it will be much easier for the whole body of the Force if, when say 10,000 men are required, one-sixth are called out instead of every man of the Force. I am afraid that if the necessity is not such as has been stated, it will have a very bad effect in discouraging intelligent men from putting themselves under the obligation to enter the Reserve. My Lords, I now proceed to a much graver and more important question. I will call attention to some of the Papers which have been laid before us. And, first of all, to those Papers which have reference to the great diplomatic failure which has taken place in regard to the Congress, which it was hoped would settle the Eastern Question. No doubt there has been a diplomatic failure as regards Austria. She proposed the Congress, and certainly desired it to be entered into. With regard to ourselves, there is some doubt as to what our wishes were. With regard to Russia, it has been really somewhat of a diplomatic triumph. It was stated, when this Congress was proposed—and it has never been contradicted—that Russia was never much inclined to enter it. She thought—indeed it is rather confirmed by what has fallen from the

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noble Earl—that her interests would be better answered by entering into negotiations with the different Powers separately, instead of meeting them collectively in a Congress; and certainly the noble Earl has mentioned some great difficulties that she would have to encounter in entering into the Conference. With regard to ourselves, I had some doubts whether we were sincerely anxious to enter into it, and the suspicion I entertain has been rather confirmed by the dissensions which we now know existed in the Cabinet. It appeared to me that Her Majesty's Government were not very clear themselves as to what proposal they would make in the Congress. That notion is entirely dispelled by what has fallen from the noble Earl, and he has shown what importance he attached to the meeting, and what confident hopes he entertained that it would lead to a satisfactory settlement. This being the case, I own I do not think Her Majesty's Government have been quite fortunate in the way they have dealt with this question of the Conference. The state of the case is this—a Treaty has been concluded between Russia—omnipotent as far as Turkey is concerned—and the Porte. That Treaty is one which I believe everyone present would wish to see modified in several important points. It is one that Russia herself has announced she is ready to modify—that she expects to make modifications. The question is—Is it to be modified by going to war, or by the united action of Europe, and by those rules which regulate the diplomatic relations of nations, and which would comprehend, among others, all English interests? Now, I confess I think it more desirable to resort to the latter than to the former mode of modifying the Treaty. We asked the other day for Papers which might give us some information of the views taken by the European Powers as to the course best to be adopted. The only Paper which appears to me to be an answer to the question is of the most inapplicable character that can be imagined. It is a small extract from a despatch, quoting Prince Bismark's very important, very satisfactory, and sensible remark, that the Conference could not be satisfactory unless this country took part in it. The inference I draw from this mass of Papers is, that there is not one Power of Europe
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which expresses an exact agreement with the course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued in this matter. The noble Earl bases his principle on a particular Declaration of great importance—namely, the Declaration preliminary to the revision of the Treaty of 1856, which was made in 1871. Now, I attach considerable importance to matters of form, and I am glad of the immense importance that is now attached by the noble Earl to that Declaration; but I do not remember that any such enthusiasm was manifested by him at the time. If my memory does not deceive me, even the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, with as much of a sneer as was compatible with the courtesy with which he treats every Member of the House, rather ridiculed us for attaching so much importance to a mere matter of form. But it appears that there is somewhat of a change in the opinion of the Government in that respect. Tonight they base their policy on the principle of that Declaration; whereas last year it was grounded entirely on a certain despatch written in May, specifying and defining certain British interests with which alone we were to be exclusively concerned. Now, with regard to the Declaration of Paris, had we tried to thrust it single-handed down the throat of Russia, we should have entirely failed; and we must take some credit to ourselves for the patience and perseverance with which we induced all the other Powers to concert and combine; and it was that concert and combination which induced the Emperor of Russia to accept the Declaration, and make a retractation which would have been of a most humiliating character—if it were possible to say that that was humiliating which was merely the acknowledgment of flagrant error. I confess I do not see why we have not been more active in the present case in entering into concert with the other Powers. I now come to another point—why did we get into direct communication with Russia? Austria proposed the Conference and undertook the preliminary arrangements. It was hers to learn the views of the other Powers, and every country of Europe was bound to let her know the sine quânon conditions on which they would enter the Conference. If they had done that, I believe that Russia would have been more ready to agree to the proposal

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coming from Austria in the name of all the other Powers than when it was proposed by a direct communication, and almost a threat, from one nation which she pretended to believe was bent on humiliating her. In saying this, I cannot help thinking—knowing now the divisions that have existed in the Cabinet—it is not impossible, that if the noble Earl who has left the Government had been unhampered by his Colleagues, he would have been able to bring about a satisfactory arrangement of this question of the Congress.
My Lords, I shall now refer to that remarkable Circular which has produced so great a sensation both in this country and in Europe, and the ability of which I fully allow. There seems to be an impression abroad, and I have heard from individuals, and it has been stated in the Press, that this Circular was written by the noble Marquess propriomotee, and on the spur of the moment—that immediately after he took Office as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he examined this Treaty, analyzed it, and wrote an admirable Paper upon it, which obtained the sanction of the Cabinet and the appoval of the Sovereign. My experience of Cabinets and of the Foreign Office does not lead me to believe that this view is correct. Her Majesty's Government, more than nine months ago, were informed by the Russian Government of the terms which they were ready to make with Turkey; and it is rather remarkable that, in the indictment against Russia brought forward by the noble Earl, he entirely omitted any reference whatever to this important communication. I may mention, also, that those terms indicated, though in a general character, the terms it was intended afterwards to impose and which were afterwards contained in the Treaty of San Stefano. They were, no doubt, largely extended after their great successes, but in their general character there was a great similarity; and there was one very remarkable similarity—namely, that the cession of the port of Batoum is expressly mentioned as a point on which Russia would insist. Strong attacks were made on Her Majesty's Government for not making public at the time the communication which had been made to them by Russia. Those attacks were made chiefly by the supporters of the Government, not by their
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opponents. I disagreed with those attacks. It was a confidential communication, which I do not think the Government were bound, or which it was even allowable for them, to present to the country at that particular time. But I must own that I am extremely surprised at the silent acquiescence with which Her Majesty's Government received so important a communication. There was one or two courses which they could have pursued. They might have said that the terms were fair and reasonable, and in that case Her Majesty's Government ought to have diplomatically pressed them upon the acceptance of the Turks; and if the Turks had persisted in resisting them I think Her Majesty's Government would have been justified in saying—"We cannot force the Turks to accept these terms, and as we think them fair and reasonable we will not object—but let us clearly understand—if, in consequence of successes, you increase your demands on a subsequent occasion, let it be clearly known that these are the terms of which we approve, and that if you go further you will entirely lose our support." Or, on the other hand, if the terms against which so formidable an indictment has been made were such as you could not possibly assent to, you were bound, and could have done it with immense effect at the time, to have communicated to Russia your insuperable objection to those terms, and your intention to oppose them. My Lords, I have never admitted that in wisdom Russian diplomacy is so greatly superior to the diplomacy of the other great countries of Europe; but what I do lay great stress upon is, that our English diplomacy, which stands so high for straightforwardness and justice, should be so scrupulously conducted that it would be impossible for any Power to have the right to make objection to it. Now, nine months ago you were in possession of those terms, and some weeks ago you had a real though not an official knowledge of the terms of the Treaty, and a little later the authentic terms of the Treaty were before you. I cannot positively believe that such was the indifference of the Cabinet on the subject that they had never asked the Foreign Office to examine the terms of that Treaty and place some analysis of it before them—it would be a matter of great curiosity if the noble Earl (the

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Earl of Derby) should find himself able to inform your Lordships of the course he was inclined to pursue, and whether he concurred entirely with his Colleagues in their objections to the most important portions of this Treaty. With regard to the Circular of the noble Marquess, I concur in a great many of his criticisms on the Treaty, and these induce me sincerely to hope that the Treaty will be modified. The noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield), in his statement this evening, would lead us to think that the opposition of Her Majesty's Government is to be of such an uncompromising nature as to be absolutely destructive of the Treaty of San Stefano. But I cannot for the life of me believe that that is the opinion of the noble Marquess who now holds the Office of Foreign Secretary. I read with great interest a speech he made in Bradford about two months after I was there, in which, with great good humour, he turned some remarks of mine into ridicule. He said—
"You must always remember that this is a war not of Sovereigns but of peoples. There is an intense feeling on both sides—it may be fanatical, it may be of national hostility—but it is not one of those wars that Sovereigns can begin, continue, and end, according to the views of policy which in the Cabinet they may form. The war began on certain principles and with a certain aim, and before it is finished, if it be finished while military strength is still unexhausted, the Sovereigns must carry back to their people something with which they will be able to convince them that the object with which the war was fought and the passions on which it reposes, has been in some degree carried out."
These are sentiments in which I agree, but which are absolutely incompatible with the position that a Treaty accomplished after great efforts by Russia should be swept away and the whole matter become a mere tabula rasa. There is no one who knows better than I do that silence is desirable in regard to diplomatic negotiations, and I think the noble Earl the late Foreign Secretary will confirm me when I say that, although I have been a somewhat pertinacious Questioner, I have never insisted on putting Questions which I had the slightest reason to believe he might think disadvantageous to the public service to answer. I sincerely hope that I may be able to make a similar appeal, with the same confidence, at the end of the Session, to the noble Marquess who now occupies that post—but there is one
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instance in which I think silence has been most unfortunate. I think it most unfortunate that when the Berlin Memorandum was rejected by us, the Government remained absolutely silent on that matter; that we refused to announce any policy of our own. We thus broke up the concert that up to that time had existed in Europe. On the other hand, to have remained silent, instead of assuring the Turkish Government at the time of the Conference, that Lord Salisbury's remonstrances would certainly not be backed up by coercion; and it certainly would have been wise before the war began to maintain silence, instead of boasting, as the late Secretary of State for War actually did, that Her Majesty's Government had announced to all Europe, and therefore to Russia, that if war did begin we should give no assistance whatever to the Turks. Nothing would tempt me to press the noble Marquess opposite to give, at this moment, any details as to his views respecting particular Articles of the Treaty; but, at the same time, I think we are entitled to have some general information as to the great principles on which the Government intend to act in this matter. In the year 1854—in the very same speech to which I have already referred—the noble Earl, now Prime Minister, described, with great truth and accuracy, two different Parties with regard to the Eastern Question, and the remarks are so important that perhaps your Lordships will allow me to read them. The noble Earl said—
"Two theories have always existed, and each has been maintained by statesmen of eminence. There are statesmen who are of opinion that there is vitality in Turkey—that, far from being exhausted, it is a country full of resources, and of resources hitherto only imperfectly developed. There are statesmen, and the noble Lord opposite (Viscount Palmerston) is one of them, who believe that Turkey is a country not only qualified for independence, but absolutely capable of progress. Statesmen of this school, upholding these opinions, have been of opinion that, with wisdom and with firmness, Turkey might form a substantial and a real barrier against Russia."—[3 Hansard, cxxxii. 285.]
Nothing could be fairer than that description. He went on to say—
"Then there is the other school which believes that there is no vitality in Turkey—that it is decaying and decrepit—that its resources, always imperfectly developed, perhaps, are now virtually exhausted, and that it is totally impossible that it can long exist as an independent or

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quasi-independent community; and these statesmen, not wishing to hand over this rich prey to its powerful neighbour, have been of opinion that, by encouraging the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and by advancing the civilization and increasing the right of these classes, you might in time prepare a population for Turkey which would prevent that intermediate state of anarchy which otherwise would happen between the fall of a great Empire and the rise of a new Power."—[Ibid.]
So impressed was the noble Earl with this contrast that he repeated it in stronger terms in a subsequent part of his speech, with which I will not trouble your Lordships. Although the noble Earl did not expressly say so, the whole tenour of his speech was entirely in favour of the first theory. About four years later, a young Member of Parliament, of great ability and promise, made a speech, in which he advocated the second theory, and he was answered by his Leader, who described that theory, not as one held by eminent statesmen, but as a crude theory which could only be uttered by a person who had absolutely not given any thought to the subject. The promising young Member has entirely fulfilled the promise then entertained of him, and he is now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Many things have happened and many persons have changed their opinions since then; but, as far as I can judge from the speeches and writings of the noble Marquess and from his conduct at Constantinople, there is no reason to think that recent events have changed his former opinions. It is equally clear to me from the speeches he made during the last two years—including that delivered in November last—that the noble Earl the Prime Minister also strongly adheres to the opinions which, in common with other eminent statesmen, he formerly held. It is a curious thing, that in the Circular just issued there are two sentences, one relating to the independence of Turkey and the other relating to the welfare of the Christian populations. The sentences appear to reflect both theories, and to a superficial reader they suggest the notion of a happy compromise having been arrived at on the subject. But this is not a matter for compromise. At a time when we are called upon to make military preparations, we have a right to know which of these important principles Her Majesty's Government intend
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to adopt. I have said I have some hope of peace, and I will state my reasons for entertaining such a hope. In the first place, the hope is based on the undoubted fact that peace is the interest of everyone concerned. With regard to England, I am glad that England has repudiated with just indignation, as being an infamous insult, the suggestion that we had a desire for war. I feel that a great blow would be dealt at the dignity, the honour, and the interests of this country, if we alone, without an Ally, were to embark in any war of which the purposes were not quite clearly defined and of an absolutely necessary character. As to the other countries of Europe, of course, I speak in perfect ignorance; but, as far as I can perceive, neither France, Germany, Austria, nor Italy, has the slightest intention of joining with us at any time in a war against Russia. Again, take Russia herself. Is it possible that the Emperor of Russia can desire another war? Look at the state of exhaustion in which Russia is. Look at her pecuniary exhaustion—although it is not always safe to rely upon that as an antidote against war. Lately, the Emperor of Russia has witnessed all the miseries of war, and it is impossible to think he can wish to commit his subjects to a renewal of them. It is impossible to think that, having obtained so much, he should wish to run the risk of losing all. He must be perfectly aware by this time that it is in the power of Her Majesty's Government—wisely or unwisely, rightly or wrongly—at any moment, to begin operations against Russia; and he must be likewise aware that, when this country is once embarked in a war, it clings to its purposes with a tenacity which belongs to our race. On the other hand, I cannot believe that if Europe combined can approach him with a just and reasonable limit of alterations, he will refuse to yield to such pressure. I can only say that Her Majesty's Government will probably succeed in attaining the object they have in view, if they act within just and reasonable limits—not assuming the position of preponderating dictation, which was so admirably ridiculed by the noble Marquess in the Autumn, but acting in real concert with the other European Powers, and taking care to preserve to the Christian races without distinction any advantages which

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they ought to derive from recent events, and, at the same time, freeing them as much as possible from foreign intervention. If Her Majesty's Government succeed in the work, I am pretty certain they will have the support of every moderate and intelligent man in the country, and I am quite certain they will have the support of my Friends who are now sitting near me.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, your Lordships will, I am sure, believe me, when I say, that if I could in honour do so, I would much rather avoid taking any part in this debate; but, considering the position which I have held during the last four years, it seems to me, that absolute silence on such an occasion with regard to matters which have necessarily been so much in my mind, might be open to the construction, either that I had no fixed opinion on the question, or, that, having an opinion, I was afraid to express it. My Lords, the position which I have taken up in regard to this matter has given rise to many reproaches. I have heard much of indecision, of vacillation, and even of cowardice. If, however, I may judge from my own feelings, it requires infinitely more courage for a man to stand up in his place and to express views which he knows are unpopular among the great body of his Friends, than to sit at a desk in Downing Street, and thence to issue orders which bring to him no danger and no unpopularity, but upon the giving of which may devolve the responsibility of a European War.
My Lords, before I go into the general question, I should like to say one word upon a personal matter. I have been referred to by my noble Friend at the head of the Government, and by newspaper writers and others, as having resigned Office in consequence of the calling out of the Reserves. Now, I feel bound to tell your Lordships that, whatever I may have thought of that step, it was not the sole, nor, indeed, the principal, reason for the differences that unfortunately arose between my Colleagues and myself. What the other reasons are I cannot divulge until the propositions of the Government, from which I dissented, are made known.
My Lords, I need hardly say I have no thought of asking your Lordships to object to the proposition that has been
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made by my noble Friend at the head of the Government. I do not think it right, except in very extreme cases, that Parliament should refuse such a request, when it is made upon the responsibility of the Executive, who necessarily are more conversant than anyone else with the requirements of the case. But I cannot quite agree with one or two of the observations which my noble Friend made upon the subject. Why, he said, should anyone object to England increasing its Force when all the rest of Europe was either arming or armed? Well, my Lords, my noble Friend does not usually forget the existence of the British Fleet. We have never adopted the Continental system of vast Land Armies; and, if we were, unfortunately, to engage in hostilities with Russia, those hostilities, as far as we were concerned, would be mainly conducted by sea. Now, the British Fleet is not only the most powerful Fleet afloat, but is nearly equal to that of all other Powers put together. Then, my Lords, I must, with all deference, dissent from the appeal which my noble Friend addressed to me when he said—"How can you doubt the policy of this measure—the calling out of the Reserves—when you assented to the early calling together of Parliament, and to the Vote of £6,000,000, which were only parts of the same policy?" My noble Friend knows that I did not very willingly acquiesce in the early summoning of Parliament, and that the date ultimately fixed was a compromise on a proposition that Parliament should meet even earlier than it did. My noble Friend is also aware that I expressed grave doubts as to the necessity for this Vote of £6,000,000; at least, to its full extent. I remember that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer endeavoured to remove my doubts, by assuring me—which I have no doubt he did in perfect good faith—that we wanted the money principally as a Vote of Confidence, and that only a small portion of it would be spent. No doubt, I acquiesced in the Vote of £6,000,000; but, if I am to make a clean breast of it, I will explain that when that question came forward, I had temporarily retired from the Cabinet. My resignation was in my noble Friend's hands for a period of 48 hours. Meanwhile, public notice had been given of the Vote. I could not but feel, in these

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circumstances, that it was impossible for the Government to recede from a step which they had publicly announced; and, feeling the great inconvenience of breaking up the Cabinet at such a moment, I acquiesced in what I had previously opposed.
My Lords, I think this is a time when the whole situation may be fairly reviewed; because, until the Treaty of San Stefano was made public, the materials for discussion were wanting; and if, now that the terms of the Treaty are known, discussion were further delayed, it might be too late to serve any useful purpose. Well, the Government determined to call out the Reserves, and the formal declaration is accordingly made that the present state of affairs is one of emergency. Now, my Lords, I am not quite satisfied on that point. I want to know what the emergency is, and who has created it? I can interpret that announcement only in one manner—namely, that the Government consider that negotiations with Russia either have been or are shortly to be broken off, and that immediate war is an event which must at least be looked forward to as probable. My Lords, I cannot take that view of the case; it is not the fact that diplomatic means are exhausted. The negotiations for the Congress, it is true, have come to a dead-lock; but I do not know that that fact, by itself, is much to be regretted. With the single exception of Austria, I do not know that any single Power has ever been anxious that the Congress should be held. Russia objected to it in the first instance; Germany came into it with some reluctance; the French Government did not disguise their aversion from it, giving the somewhat characteristic reason that they would appear there in a different position from that which they held in 1856. Now, my observation is—and I believe it to be the opinion of most diplomatists—that a Conference or Congress is a very convenient agency for putting on record, in the most formal manner, international decisions which have already been come to in substance; but in these days, when we can ask a question and get an answer from the furthest end of Europe within 24 hours, it is just as easy to ascertain opinion, and almost as easy to conduct negotiations, outside a Congress, as within. If I had to deal with the matter, I should endeavour to
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keep the Congress alive, saying and doing nothing to prevent its ultimate meeting, but letting it stand over until the way was smoothed by private and separate negotiations between the Powers concerned. Now, my Lords, looking at the question from that point of view, I regret the steps which the Government have taken. They put forward a series of objections to the Treaty of San Stefano—objections of a most comprehensive character—and they communicate those objections not only to other European Governments—which is perfectly reasonable—but to the people of this country and the entire public of Europe. Now, my Lords, when, in addition to that, we proceed to arm in such a manner as to indicate an expectation of war, the general impression must be that the English Government demands that the Treaty of San Stefano should be torn up, and is preparing to support that demand by force. This is said to be a spirited and decided policy. So it is. But what is the next step to be taken? There are only three possible issues; and, of these three, one, I am afraid, is hardly within the range of possibility. It is possible that our demands may be acceded to. That would be a signal diplomatic triumph, on which I should be the first to congratulate my noble Friend; but that Russia should give up most of the results of the war, and that she should undergo what the public opinion of Europe would pronounce to be a diplomatic humiliation, is a result which I can hardly conceive can be hoped for. The second possibility is that we, on our side, may withdraw or greatly modify the objections we have taken. But, in that case, the diplomatic failure would be on our side. It would be well enough, in a private communication between two Powers, or in a private bargain between individuals, to ask, in the first instance, a great deal more than you meant to get—but, after a declaration of that kind is made public, and after you are prepared apparently to support it, to drop it, or to recede from the position you have taken up, creates a situation of an almost ridiculous character.
As to the Circular of my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office, if it had been addressed—as I have no doubt it was originally intended to be addressed—to the British Representative

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at the Conference as a summary of what the British Government desired to see accomplished, I should have no criticism to make upon it. But I am afraid, that when the Government put forth its programme to all Europe as that which they intended to follow, and when they accompanied that announcement with military measures, not in themselves unimportant, and the effect of which will be enormously exaggerated abroad, they are making concessions on the part of Russia much more difficult than before. I go so far as to say that if Russia were willing to take back her Treaty—although I do not contend that operation would not be beneficial to Europe—it would, at least, be a strong proof that she is not so aggressive and dangerous a Power as we have been in the habit of thinking. On the other hand, if Russia, as I believe, is not willing to cancel the Treaty; but, if, as I also suppose, she is prepared, in deference to European opinion, to consent to a considerable modification of what she has proposed, then I think the difficulty has been increased in two ways—first, by the publication of these negotiations; and next, by the appearance of menace which that publication involves. We all know how difficult it is in private life, when anything like a threat has been used, to yield that, which if such pressure had not been brought to bear, would have been readily yielded.
I may be asked, however—What, in the circumstances, would you do if you were consulted? My answer is, that I would not have pressed matters on in such hot haste. There is just now great irritation against us in Russia, and I do not think I am wrong in saying that in this country a very strong feeling of irritation against the Russian Government exists. I am speaking of public opinion in both countries, and not of their Governments. I do not believe that there is any very strong ground for that irritation on either side. By giving an opportunity for that feeling to subside, it appears to me that no harm could be done, while some good might be effected. I should have placed our views directly before the Russian Government, and discussed them point by point. The opinions of other Governments would not have been difficult to obtain—on many points we have got them already; and I think that many of the results of a Congress might
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be attained without the rather cumbrous machinery of a Congress itself. No doubt, I may be told that while we were doing all this we should be losing time. Well, it is certainly an evil to prolong the state of anxiety and suspense in which we have already so long continued; but where military measures are concerned, I own I do not see on the English side what good reason there is for haste. Assuming that the worst happens—that we are not able to settle this question peaceably, and that war is proclaimed, who, I would ask, would lose most by delay? Russia has an enormous Army to keep up. She will not only be compelled to keep that Army up to its present numerical standard, but even to add to its numbers. We all know that she will be ill able to bear the expense. As to ourselves, we are free, in a military point of view, to choose our own time and place. The seas are ours, and no Russian men-of-war are likely to be seen there once a war breaks out. No English Dependencies can be even threatened by any Russian Army. I do not, therefore, understand what reason there is for exceptional haste in strengthening our Land Forces in face of a war which, even if it come, ought to be mainly a naval one. My noble Friend has certainly suggested that the Russian Army, if it could once get across the narrow strip of sea, might march through Syria and threaten Egypt. Now, we have always, in considering points of this kind, borne in mind the fact that we are mistress of the seas, and that we could sufficiently defend Egypt by naval means. I do not see how the remarkable operation of which I am speaking is to be executed. I am at a loss to understand how a Russian Army could march all through Syria and reach Egypt before a British man-of-war could leave Besika Bay and arrive at Alexandria. I do not, therefore, understand this haste in calling out our Reserves. I could understand it if it were simply the object to strike while the iron is hot —in other words, if it were for the purpose of taking advantage of the military feeling which is now so strong throughout the country, but which, probably, may cool down in the course of a few weeks. But my noble Friends would, I am sure, disclaim that imputation, and I give them credit for entire sincerity. There are, in this connection, three

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questions, which must be answered sooner or later. Have you settled what are your means of fighting; who are to be your Allies; and what it is you are fighting for? The first question is one to which I do not profess to be able to give a clear answer. The only thing I see plainly is, that we believe England and Russia now may go on for a very long time without inflicting a vital injury on either side. You may very easily bring Russia to a state of bankruptcy; and, when you do that, you will have brought ruin on English holders of a considerable number of Russian securities. There is not, however, I believe, on record, a case in which any war was stopped in that way. Poor though Russia may be—and, no doubt, she is poor—she has an enormous territory, and can always find men and food. Now, when these two requisites are supplied in unlimited abundance, and a martial spirit animates a people, defensive fighting may go on for a very long time. You may blockade the Russian ports; but the losses sustained will not be all on one side. You may keep Russian corn out of this country, by which your own people will be the chief losers; but in these days of railroads the power of blockades is, except in very special cases, greatly limited; and with the German ports open, all you could accomplish by means of the most rigorous blockade would be to compel the commerce with Russia to make a considerable circuit. It has been said that a war between this country and Russia, no other Power taking part in it, would be not very unlike one of those duels between German students of which we used to hear, fought with sword blades of which only an inch or two at the ends was left bare. They might inflict a cut here and a gash there, they might cut off a nose, or do injury to an eye, but they were powerless to inflict any vital wound. All this you cannot help; nor, can you do anything serious by land against an enemy whose strength was only half developed when the First Napoleon invaded the country with 500,000 men and failed. We, on the other hand, are absolutely free from risk of attack by Russia, except in so far as intrigues and secret negotiations may do something to weaken our authority in India. Now, my Lords, I assume that there is not one of us here who desires a war at any time.
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But, I may observe, that, in a popularly governed country like this, where the people are easily excited, and where they are apt to complain if their Armies do not perform impossibilities—remembering, as we do, the excitement and agitation at the time of the Crimean War—the most inconvenient kind of war to enter into is one which is very prolonged, very costly, and which is likely to be ultimately indecisive. Now, my Lords, I come to a question, in dealing with which I feel more at home. In the event of a war against Russia being undertaken, whom are we likely to have for Allies? Now, that is a matter upon which we have abundant means of forming a judgment, and I can tell you with certainty who will not be our Allies. In Germany, so far as the Government is concerned, the feeling has been from the very beginning of these transactions, —as is abundantly proved on the face of documents which have been laid before Parliament—one of warm and undisguised sympathy with Russia. That may not be the feeling of the German people, and there is every reason to suppose that, so far as a large portion of the German people is concerned, that is not the feeling which exists. But we have not to deal with the German people—we have to deal with the military oligarchy that governs Germany; and, as a matter of fact, neutrality, and that which would not be called a benevolent neutrality, is all I think that we could expect from Germany. From Germany, I pass to France. What is the line likely to be taken by the French Government? That is a question which I can answer without the slightest hesitation. I can do so, not because of any private or exclusive information, but judging by what we all know of the state of feeling in that country. There is not, I believe, a single French politician of any party who would accept the policy of another Crimean War. The fact, so far as I am able to form an opinion, is that the Crimean War was never popular in France. We all know that that war, however useful or beneficial in its results, was made by the late Emperor of the French for personal and dynastic objects. He at the time stood in a very peculiar position. He exercised supreme power, but he found it very difficult to get any respectable men to come near him. The little transaction of the Paris Boulevards

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was fresh in men's minds; the recollection of it had to be effaced; and, in these circumstances, he, as an absolute Sovereign, no doubt, thought it a wise policy to sacrifice 100,000 French lives, in order to secure the prestige and respect which he expected would accrue, and which undoubtedly did accrue, to him, from an alliance with this country. That régime has, however, collapsed, as everybody knew that it would sooner or later, and in the present political situation of France, it seems to me that there is little prospect of her joining us in a policy of war. From France, I pass to Italy. There, no doubt, the circumstances are extremely different; but the result is, I am afraid, the same. Sardinia, in 1854, joined the Allies in a most gallant and spirited manner. Sardinia in 1854 was just in that position in which an adventurous policy is sure to be popular. She wanted a great deal, and possessed very little. But Sardinia is now absorbed in Italy. Italy is complete, and is content; her finances require to be re-organized, her administration to be consolidated; and I am sure neither my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office, nor any one else, entertains much hope of common military action with us in the case of Italy. There remains, no doubt, one great Power, and that is Austria. I fully admit that if you are to seek, with a chance of success, for an Ally anywhere on the Continent, Vienna is the quarter to which you must look. But it is, I think, fairly open to doubt, whether it would be safe for us to rely much on Austrian co-operation. I am only stating that which everyone knows, when I say that there are very close and intimate ties between the three Emperors. In the next place, situated as Austria is, she would hesitate before embarking on anything which might be regarded as a rash policy, and would hardly come to a rupture with Russia unless she were previously assured of the support, or at least the neutrality, of Germany. Her population, too, is divided into a great many races not very friendly to one another; and, in fact, Austria is a country which a single unsuccessful campaign might not impossibly break up. Then you have to look to the internal divisions of the Empire. No doubt, the Magyars have strong sympathies with Turkey, but a directly opposite view is
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taken by the Slavs. Then, you have the Austro-Germans, who want only peace. With two independent Parliaments pulling different ways, with an Army partly Slav—and to that extent dangerous to use against Slavs—with finances in such a state that I understand she had considerable difficulty in raising the £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 required for the first mobilization of her troops—with all these elements of weakness, of confusion, and of discord, Austria, it seems to me, is a country on whose efficient aid we cannot fairly count. Then, my Lords, admitting, as I undoubtedly do, that the Austrian Government are sincere in their professions; assuming, if you please, that she is more efficient as a military Power than I, individually, believe her to be, the wide divergences between Austrian interests and those which we consider ours are such that, even if she were to enter into alliance with us, a compromise might at any time be effected between her and Russia by which we would lose that alliance. You cannot be sure that if Austria will come into the field with us as an Ally—we cannot be sure that if she does so she will not go out of the field without us—we may not have to go out of the field without her. Such is the state of things; and, in the circumstances, I am compelled to ask, if we are—I do not say drifting, but—rushing, into war, what it is we are going to fight for? What is to be the result of the war, assuming it to be successful? I know, at least, what it will not do. One class in this country, and it is rather a numerous class, will be sure to be equally disappointed, whatever happens. Those who profess admiration for Turkey, those who lament the fall of the Turkish Empire, are out of Court. You might have kept that Empire alive for a time, but you cannot now restore it. My noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would be the last person to wish to do so. England would not allow it, and all Europe would be against it. If, then, you cannot restore the Turkish Empire, what are you to do? Are you to go to war to cut off something from the pecuniary indemnity which Turkey has to pay to Russia, or to make various modifications in the details of the Treaty of San Stefano? Those are results which may be fairly attained by means of

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diplomatic negotiations; but the objects, it seems to me, are not of such transcendent magnitude as to justify the Government in preparing to enforce them by war, or by threats of war. We know, however, that there is a good deal more behind than any modifications of the Treaty. Consult the public—ask the first man you meet, and he will tell you, nine times out of ten—"Oh, we have lost influence in Europe, and we must fight to regain it." Well, I do not admit the fact. If it is any satisfaction to us to know it, from one end of Europe to the other, England's movements are watched with intense anxiety. That is a satisfaction which we may enjoy at the present, whatever anybody may think of the transactions of the last two years. Whether they think we have done too much, or too little, or not done what we ought, there is one thing certain—that during these two years England has not in any quarter been regarded or treated as a feeble Power. I own that individually this is not a kind of glory I care very much for; but, such as it is, you have it. I would say more than that. If it were true in any respect that English influence in the East were diminished, I should say it was diminished by a course of action which we deliberately and of our own free choice adopted. We chose to stand neutral—conditionally neutral, if you please, but the condition did not lessen the neutrality—we chose to stand neutral when we knew that Turkey must be defeated; and it is almost ridiculous now to say—"Oh, that is quite true; but then, you see, when the war began, we did not count upon Russia obtaining such an accession of military prestige." If you did not expect that, what did you expect? The truth is, that those whom I was once taken to task for calling our employers—the public—have not, from the beginning of this business to the end, known their own minds for six months together. Two years ago, it would have been almost dangerous for any man to get up at a public meeting and express in plain terms his doubt as to the disinterested philanthropy of Russia. Now, the cry is all the other way; and, as I believe, I have been an object of criticism in these two agitations, I may speak with impartiality; and I must say, that the foolishness and the virulence of each does not leave much to choose between
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the two. If I could from this place address the English people, I would venture to ask them how they can expect to have a foreign policy—I do not say far-sighted, but even consistent and intelligent—if, within 18 months, the great majority of them are found asking for things directly contradictory? When we might have saved Turkey if we had chosen, not a voice was raised in favour of that course; and now, when the enemy—if you choose to call him so—is inside the fortress—when the Russian Army is at or near Constantinople—nearly everybody is crying that we ought to turn them out. I venture to ask whether a war for the sake of influence would be a war worthy of us? We have seen the experiment tried on a great scale not so very long ago. That was the motive—you may say the avowed motive—which led the late Emperor of the French to pick a perfectly purposeless and senseless quarrel with Germany. We know how that ended, and I do not think the author of that war was much pitied, however much we might sympathize with the people who suffered with him. Grant that we should be more fortunate, that we were successful, and obliged Russia to give back nearly all she has taken. What then? You will not have gained the greater part of your object. You will not have destroyed Russian influence or substituted English influence in European Turkey, because Russian influence in that country, which is now to be called Bulgaria, rests only in a slight degree upon military success; it rests on what you cannot take away—identity of race, community of religion, similarity of religion, traditional historic sympathies, and the common hatred felt against the common enemy. These are influences which you cannot take away; they will continue when not one Russian soldier is left in Bulgaria; they would continue even if English or Austrian soldiers had taken the place of the Russian Government. I say, therefore, if you go to war for the sake of influence over these populations, you are fighting for a shadow, and even that shadow you will not secure.
My Lords, I thought this was a convenient time to offer these general remarks on the policy which lies before us. I admit, of course, there are circumstances by which we may be forced into war; but I think

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that, primâ facie, there is a great objection to undertaking to accomplish by war that, which if you are to gain your object in the most complete and efficient manner, will have to be done again in 20 or 25 years. We thought the work was done in 1856, and we know how far that expectation was disappointed. I certainly shall rejoice if my noble Friends, by peaceable and diplomatic action, obtain those results for which they hope. I shall not be inclined to reproach them, if, still confining themselves to the use of peaceable means, they obtain results considerably inferior to those put forward. But I must say I require something more than any of the reasons and arguments I have heard, either in this House or out of it, to show me that, in the circumstances which now seem likely to arise, there is a casus belli. Unless such a war be absolutely forced upon us, I object to it, because it will be a war undertaken without necessity, because it will be a war undertaken without a clear and defined object, because it will be undertaken with a divided country, and, in all probability, without an Ally.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I rise after my noble Friend, not to reply to his speech, but to make some observations on the speech of the noble Earl (Earl Granville) who preceded him. I may differ from my noble Friend as to the means by which the objects that I know both he and I have at heart may be attained, and I may differ from him—and I do differ widely—as to the fitness, and even as to the fairness, of many of the statements which he has now thought it right to make; but I have lived too long in friendship and council with him not to be well aware of the pure and patriotic motives by which his mind is inspired. But, lest there should be misunderstanding, I will refer to one or two of his remarks. If I understood him rightly, my noble Friend said England had never been in the habit of maintaining vast military armaments, and he seemed to imply that we were about to depart from our usual custom; but the noble Earl is well aware that the calling out of the Reserves will only put the country substantially in the position it occupied previous to the recent legislation as to our Military Forces. I am sorry to hear that my noble Friend does not regret that the Congress is not to meet. I was not aware that that
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was his view; it certainly is not mine. I regret very much the difficulties that have arisen in the way of the meeting of the Congress, and I believe the majority of the people of this country share that regret. I cannot foretell what might have been the consequences of its meeting, but I am confident that throughout the Continent—if you except perhaps one of the late belligerents—there is a firm and deep desire for peace; and I believe that in no way could this feeling have found expression more readily than in a Congress, where the feelings of the different countries would have been known, and strenuous efforts—and I believe successful efforts—made to overcome the difficulties which have arisen.
Turning to the criticisms of the noble Earl (Earl Granville), I am glad we have the concurrence of the noble Earl in the opinion that the Treaty of San Stefano is open to objection on many points. The noble Earl, however, is anxious to establish that, although he has not opposed the policy of Her Majesty's Government, he has not assented to it; and he maintains that an Opposition is not bound to express any opinion as to the policy which the Ministry of the Crown think it right to pursue. But I own, my Lords, that I cannot see any analogy between his present position and the case of the Crimean War, which he brought forward in justification of his view. Where the Crown has declared war, and appeals to Parliament for support, it may be very patriotic for the Opposition, even if they do not approve their policy, to support the Government. But we are not at war. During the last two years we have been at peace—the conditions on which the policy of the Government was based were again and again explained and asserted—and yet, during the last two years, the noble Earl and his Friends have not thought it desirable to move a Vote of Censure. My Lords, I must leave it to the noble Earl to reconcile his conduct as best he may to his sense of duty. But what I understand to be the duty of an Opposition is this—if they believe the policy of the Government to be wrong, they are bound to challenge it.
The noble Earl then re-produced our old friend the Berlin Memorandum. I thought we had heard the last of that. Whenever any speaker during the last twelvemonth has found nothing else to

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say against the Government, he has always wound up with—"Why did you not agree to the Berlin Memorandum?" It has always seemed to me that those who make this inquiry had never read the document, for I thought it had come to be agreed throughout Europe—even by those Powers who were parties to it—that it was one of the happiest things for Europe that the Berlin Memorandum had not been agreed to, and had, in fact, been abandoned. But, certainly, it is now too late to re-open the Berlin Memorandum.
I now come to what is more relevant to the present occasion. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) said the Government are now attaching too great importance to the Protocol of 1871—of which I believe the noble Earl was the author. He says it was treated very lightly at the time; we did not look upon it as a masterpiece of statesmanship, but that now we are treating it as a landmark in public law. I remember very well what was said about it at the time. It appeared to the people of this country that, when we were surrendering to the demand of Russia what was always considered a very important stipulation in the Treaty of 1856, it was a very poor compensation to obtain from her a Declaration that no alteration should be made in an European Treaty without the assent of the signatory Powers. But what we now say is this—We made the surrender—we got this Declaration in return; and, having got it, we want to make the most of it—we want to enforce it.
The noble Earl says, if we wished to have this Treaty of San Stefano considered by all the signatory Powers, why did we not address ourselves to Austria, which called the Congress together? That is a very reasonable question, which ought to be answered. I quite agree with the noble Earl that it was to Austria in the first place that our communication should have been addressed. It was Austria that invited the Congress, and stated its object—to consider the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, and how far the Treaty of San Stefano was in accordance with those earlier Treaties; and it was quite right, the Congress having been proposed by Austria, that we should apply to Austria for a clear understanding as to what was to be the scope of the Congress. Well, we did
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communicate with Austria. We applied to Austria in the first instance; and it was in consequence of that application that we became aware of the misunderstanding which seemed to exist on the subject. Russia apparently made a communication to Austria, which she certainly did not make to us in similar terms. Your Lordships will find the history of this misunderstanding in the Paper relating to Turkey No. 24, in the despatch of the 14th March. [The noble and learned Lord read extracts from the despatch.]
The next comment of the noble Earl was of a different kind—and I should like to state it as fairly as I can, because it appears to me to open up a subject extremely worthy of your Lordships' careful attention. The noble Earl says it is about nine months since you had a communication from Russia of a general character, containing the terms of peace she would propose—which terms were afterwards extended in the Treaty of San Stefano, and the noble Earl says that we ought then to have informed Russia of the objections we entertained to those terms. Now, what is the fact? In the first place, I think the observation may fairly be made, that it would not have been the wisest thing in the world, before it could be known that Russia would be victorious and in the condition to dictate terms of peace, to enter into a controversy as to what those terms should be. But the fact is, that very shortly after we received that communication, we had a further communication from the Russian Ambassador, in which he stated that he did not wish any opinion to be expressed on those terms until he was officially desired to ask what our opinion was. But I am very anxious that your Lordships should observe the cardinal difference between those terms of peace and the Treaty of San Stefano. As I read the terms, proposed in July last year, they had, almost every one of them, the very ingredient we desire to see in those of San Stefano. Russia is named as the arbiter of every arrangement in the Treaty of San Stefano—whereas, Europe and the Powers were to be the arbiters under the terms of July last year. The whole terms are changed. In July, Bulgaria was to be a vassal Province under the guarantee of Europe; now she is to be a Province under the administration and

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constitution of Russia. There is the greatest difference between the terms which Russia said at first she would accept and the Treaty of San Stefano.
But that is not all. Immediately following the communication of the original terms, another most important communication was made to Her Majesty's Government. Colonel Wellesley was the military attaché present with the Russian Army; and, when he was coming home, on leave of absence, he was charged with a communication by the Emperor of Russia himself. The Emperor was graciously pleased to give Colonel Wellesley an interview for the purpose of making an important communication which he wished Colonel Wellesley to explain to Her Majesty's Government; and, that there might be no mistake in the matter, it was reduced to writing by Colonel Wellesley, who submitted the Memorandum so prepared to the Emperor, and His Majesty said it was correct. His Majesty repeated what he had said to Lord Augustus Loftus, and then comes this clear and distinct statement—
"The conditions of peace required by the Emperor are those lately communicated to Lord Derby by Count Schouvaloff, and will remain the same as long as England maintains her position of neutrality. But if England should depart from that neutrality"—
(We have not departed from our position of neutrality)—
"the position would assume a new phase. His Majesty has no ideas of annexation, beyond, perhaps, the territory of Russia lost in 1856 and a certain portion of Asia Minor."
And now, my Lords, I beg your Lordships to observe the promise which follows—
"Europe will be invited to a Conference for the final settlement of the conditions of peace."
The conditions of peace! That is, the whole of the conditions of peace. We have the solemn promise of the Emperor that Europe will be invited to a Conference for the final settlement of the conditions of peace. But, I ask, how can those conditions of peace be finally settled by a Conference, if one of the parties to those conditions is to exercise an option either of restricting or not admitting the discussion of any one of the conditions? My Lords, it was because the conditions of peace communicated to us in June were widely different
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from those in the Treaty of San Stefano, and also because we had the promise of the Emperor that even those conditions were to be finally settled in a Conference of Europe, that it would have been unfitting in us to express, and we did not express, a disapproval of, or an opinion on, those conditions.
The next criticism of the noble Earl (Earl Granville) was one which may be easily disposed of. He said that the Treaty of San Stefano occupied a considerable time in negotiation—the Foreign Office must have known tolerably well the nature of the Treaty, and yet it was not until the Circular of my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) that any criticism was expressed by the Government upon it. Now, I believe the Treaty was not given to Her Majesty's Government in an authentic form until last Saturday week, and the Circular of the Secretary of State was issued on the Monday week following—that is, a week was taken by Her Majesty's Government to consider and express an opinion upon the Treaty.
Then, the noble Earl says—"Your Circular criticizes and points out objections, but does not make any counter proposition to replace that to which the objections are taken." My answer to that is, that any proposal of an alternative would have been entirely out of place in the Circular. We wanted to make it quite clear why the Congress is not proceeding, and the argument of the Circular is that the Treaty of San Stefano must not be considered one clause here and another there, but that the Treaty must be looked at as a whole by the Congress. The noble Earl says—"You go too far—your Circular is virtually an attack upon the Treaty of San Stefano. It informs not only the people of this country but the populations of Europe that you intend to demand its sacrifice." Now, I entirely demur to that interpretation being put upon the Circular—nobody who has read it can fairly come to that conclusion with regard to it. If I understand it rightly, nothing is more clear than this—that, although the Circular appeals to the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, it admits the logic of facts; it admits that there must be great changes in the Treaty laws of Europe—it does not in any one line suggest that there are not to be these

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changes—but it says that those changes must not be the subject of stipulation between two of the signatory Powers, but must be the subject of discussion, and, if possible, of agreement, between the whole of the signatory Powers. The question is not, and the question need not become, a question of war—it is a question whether those great changes are to be made in Europe with a high hand by one Power without the consent of the nations of Europe. It is not a question of England seeking to dictate to the nations of Europe. We believe the interests of England are the interests of Europe. These interests are to have a peace which will be permanent—a peace which will secure the happiness of the nations affected by those arrangements, and we believe that the Treaty of San Stefano cannot secure such a peace. We believe that, if fairly considered by the Powers of Europe, the conditions of the Treaty will be held not to accomplish that end; and it is on that account England has declined to enter into a Congress where she would be unfairly fettered.
LORD SELBORNEsaid, their Lordships had heard the reasons assigned by the noble Earl who was until recently the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his retirement; and when their Lordships recollected that the noble Earl had been in a position to understand whether the tendency of the course taken by the Government was really in the direction of war or not, the mere fact that the noble Earl had been obliged to sever his connection with the Government was a strong reason why we should all believe that the danger was a real and a serious One. Everybody who was acquainted with his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack knew that his desire must be in favour of peace; but still he had heard nothing from the beginning to the end of the speech just delivered which gave a ground of hope that these measures could have been taken without creating rather than removing the danger in the presence of which we were placed. The noble Earl the Prime Minister claimed the support of the House, on the ground that no Resolution had been proposed in either House of Parliament condemnatory of the course pursued by the Government; but he (Lord Selborne) contended that if we were to bring the present steps
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and measures of the Government to the test of their past policy, it would be found impossible to reconcile the two—at all events, the arguments hitherto offered with that object were wholly insufficient. The Opposition was not called upon to offer any opinion on the past policy of the Government in a Party sense, because it was professedly a policy of peace and neutrality. Being agreed with Her Majesty's Government in their main policy of peace and neutrality, and also in the desire which they professed, to ameliorate the condition of the Christians in the Turkish Provinces of Europe, it would not have been proper for the Opposition to embarrass the Government as long as they were pursuing a policy of that character. But it appeared to him that the character of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government had now entirely changed. It was much too late for Her Majesty's Government to attempt, as the Prime Minister had done that evening, to fall back upon the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, and to call the reference to those Treaties, in Lord Derby's despatch at the beginning of the war, the "keynote of their policy, and the diapason of their diplomacy." If those Treaties bound Great Britain or the other Powers, under the circumstances of this war, to anything, they bound them to guarantee to the Turks, if necessary, by armed assistance, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But Her Majesty's Government, and all the other Powers, had absolutely refused to recognize that obligation, or to fulfil that guarantee. Both before and after the commencement of the war, it was stated, and repeated continually, in and out of Parliament, in communications with the Porte, and also in communications with Russia and every other European Power, almost ad nauseam, that they would leave Turkey to her fate; that they would be neutral in the war, though distinctly foreseeing the dismemberment, not to say destruction, of the Ottoman Empire as its consequence; that they would do nothing for the sake of Turkey, and would limit themselves to watching over British interests. He (Lord Selborne) failed to see how that policy could be reconciled with the policy which Her Majesty's Government now seemed resolved to pursue. If they were to look at the long negotiations that had

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preceded the Russian Declaration of War, could it be said that Russia was without a justification for the course she had resolved to adopt? We ourselves declared, when Turkey refused—first, the propositions of the Conference, and afterwards the Protocol—that she had put herself in the wrong before all Europe; and that the engagements, which she had refused to fulfil, were engagements on which all the Powers, parties to the Treaties, had a right to insist. The war broke out; and we publicly declared our neutrality. How was it possible to reconcile that fact with the present contention that we were to go to war with Russia on the ground of her non-observance of Treaties which were in force; but on which, at the outset of the war, and even since, up to the recent conjuncture, we had refused to act. The communications that passed between England and Russia in May and June last year seemed to him to add to the gravity of the present situation. In May, Lord Derby wrote to define British interests, and on the 8th of June an answer was received in which Russia declared within what limits she would comply with our request, and what were her views as to the terms of peace, provided her Armies did not cross the Balkans—adding, that if her Armies were obliged to cross the Balkans, the terms would probably be more severe. He did not see that that communication had ever been modified to any material extent. The conditions mentioned in that despatch were the retrocession of Bessarabia, the cession of Batoum, and a part of Armenia not defined, the independence of Roumania, and the autonomy of Bulgaria, &c.—in fact, they corresponded very much with those of the Treaty of San Stefano. Under these circumstances, he was somewhat astonished to hear his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack say that there was nothing in the terms of peace communicated last year that was at all alarming to Her Majesty's Government. At that time the Russian Armies had not even crossed the Danube. If a Treaty of Peace, on those terms, was to be a casus belli now, why not then, when a demonstration on our part might still have saved the Turkish Empire? Good faith, even towards Russia, required that some hint, at least, should be given, in reply to such
810
a communication, of the attitude which we were going to assume. But not a word was spoken in that sense; on the contrary, we still continued, in the communications which followed, to dwell solely on British interests, as before defined, and upon the security of Constantinople. Was it not evident that Her Majesty's Government had since that time changed their policy? There had been no change on the part of Russia; she had said from the first, that if her Armies passed the Balkans, the stringency of her terms might be increased; and she had never refused to go, on equal terms, into a Congress. For his part, he (Lord Selborne) was not convinced by anything he had read in the papers, that Russia at this moment intended, or had ever intended, to refuse a voice to the European Powers in the Congress on any of the points that might reasonably be argued to be of European interest in the Treaty of San Stefano. It was entirely an assumption that Russia intended to recede from the position laid down in the despatch foreshadowing the terms of peace. Neither could he omit to remind their Lordships, that even before that communication of the terms of peace was made, Her Majesty's Government had already received from Mr. Layard a letter in which he expressed his opinion as to the dangers of the war, as to its probable issues, and as to the necessary preponderance which Russia would obtain over Turkey in Europe—and, when we got those terms of peace, what was done? They were sent confidentially to Mr. Layard, who wrote two more despatches, which seemed almost to have inspired the speech of the Prime Minister to-night. Then, it was not too late to have done something; but we adhered to our neutrality, and let the war go on with these results staring us in the face. It was hardly possible that it could have been our policy to look on while Russia was destroying Turkey, intending all the time to turn round upon Russia when she should be weak and exhausted, like—if he might use a homely illustration—one of three boys in the street, who stands by while two others are fighting, and, though he never moves a finger to save his friend, reserves his own strength, without any notice, for an attack upon the conqueror when he is tired. That could hardly be called a magnanimous

811
policy, or one worthy of Great Britain. When he heard the Prime Minister, tonight, sketching the possible advances of Russia, he could not help thinking of the speech of the present Foreign Secretary, about a year ago, in which he had ridiculed the idea of Russia reaching certain points by successive steps, the impossibility of which would be evident if reference were made to large maps.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I was answering a noble Lord (Lord De Mauley), who, in supporting his Motion for the appointment of a British Consul in some city of Central Asia, had made reference to the possibility of a Russian invasion of India. It was in reference to the noble Lord's argument, that I made use of the expression regarding the use of large and small maps.
LORD SELBORNEthought, if he remembered rightly, that the noble Marquess had spoken of the absurdity of a series of moves which might ultimately land us at the Cape of Good Hope; and that, of that series of moves, the Suez Canal and Egypt certainly formed part. That speech of the noble Marquess appeared to his mind to be quite an answer to the Prime Minister's present alarm. It was very important to observe that the communication of Count Schouvaloff, containing the terms which Russia would exact if she were successful, was not met by any declaration on the part of this country to the effect that those terms were dangerous to our interests. When the war was going on, no mention was made of Armenia as a British interest, although Mr. Layard strongly insisted upon it, as opening a road to India, and furnishing a base of operations against our Indian territory; our only anxiety was then to prevent an occupation of Constantinople. And when we were asked by Russia, whether we desired to enlarge the scope of British interests, we did not offer to do so. Even, after the fall of Plevna, when we were asked whether there were any other interests we were concerned about, we only mentioned the Dardanelles. It was, therefore, impossible for the Government, consistently with the course they had followed, to assume an attitude of hostility against Russia merely on account of the character of the Treaty of San Stefano. But, it was said the state of things was
812
altered, not by the making of the Treaty, but by the refusal of Russia to go into the Conference on reasonable terms. He could not see that Russia had done any such thing. We made a demand which was perfectly reasonable, as it was explained; but it would not have been at all reasonable without that explanation. We asked that every Article of the Treaty should be laid before a Congress—
"Not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered what required acceptance or concurrence, and what did not."
That seemed to him a perfectly reasonable request, and he should have thought it good policy on the part of Russia to give a simple and absolute assent to that stipulation. In the condition so explained, there was no substantial difference from what Russia was willing to give; but she preferred to do it in her own terms. He was afraid the fact was, that both Governments had assumed an attitude of suspicion and alarm, which had been the real obstacle to a mutual understanding; and Russia, perhaps, imagining that some trap had been set for her, desired to give no engagement except in her own terms; but, the substance of that which the Government asked for, when explained, was assented to by Russia. He was totally unable to discover any practical difference between that stipulation and the assurance which Russia had before given to Austria, and through Austria to all the Powers; and why we were not content with that assurance, he could not conceive. Our own explanation admitted that there might be some things which would not require European concurrence; and Russia distinctly admitted that every part of the Treaty which affected European interests would require such concurrence; that the Congress would have to examine what were the Articles of the Preliminary Treaty which affected the interests of Europe, and that all the points which were found to be of European interest, would be submitted to its deliberations. It was worth notice that the Treaty was called "Preliminary," which clearly implied that the settlement of the final terms of peace was regarded, even by Russia, as requiring the concurrence of Europe. He could not conceive, in spite of the explanation from his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, what

813
was the reason why the Government, having received a sufficient assurance from Russia through Austria, which issued the invitation to the Congress, was not satisfied with the assurance so given. It was admitted that no Power was to be bound by the vote of a majority; and it could not be contended that Russia was to be bound more than any of the other Powers. The other Powers might bring forward for discussion whatever Article of the Treaty they might think affected European interests or their own interests; but Russia reserved, and he thought it was most obviously reasonable that she should reserve, her right to object. He did not see any substantial difference between the position as laid down to Austria and that expressed by Russia to this country. If both sides had been desirous of avoiding the Conference and breaking up the European concert, they could not have taken a course better fitted to have that effect than that which they had taken. It was deeply to be regretted that anything should have happened to prevent the Conference, after the substance had already been conceded to Austria, and even to ourselves, with the exception of the form. Austria was satisfied with the assurance she had received; did Germany, France, or Italy refuse to go into the Conference unless they received a separate assurance such as we had insisted on? What would have been the effect of going into the Conference? If Russia had put her finger on one Article after another of the Treaty, and refused to allow any material Article to be discussed, we should have known who was responsible for breaking up the Conference. There was nothing to give the slightest colour to the notion that Russia would have been so unreasonable as to withdraw any material Article from the discussion of the Conference, except that very extraordinary Correspondence about Roumania and Bessarabia. But, if the alleged conversation did occur, and had not been misunderstood or misreported, still it would not be his own conclusion, that Russia could really have endeavoured to withdraw the question of Bessarabia from the consideration of the Congress, there being no one Article in the Treaty more undeniably of European interest than this was. In the first place, the integrity of Roumania, including that part
814
of Bessarabia, was expressly guaranteed, as a matter of European interest, by the Treaty of 1856; and, in the second place, Russia had not only been at peace with Roumania—she had concluded with her, only last year, a solemn and positive Concession, by which, in return for the right of passage granted to her troops through Roumanian territory, she had herself separately guaranteed the integrity of that territory, without excepting the part of Bessarabia in question. It might be that a tone had been used, for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the Roumanian Government to that part of the Treaty, which he, for his part, could not reconcile, either with generosity or with good policy. If so, it was very much to be regretted that Russia should have endeavoured to put any such unworthy pressure on her Ally; but he could not accept that as a reason for believing that there would be an attempt to withdraw from the Congress either the Article with reference to Bessarabia, or any other question which was really an European one. With reference to the despatch of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), he would only say it was quite possible to display too much ability in a despatch. Its brilliancy might be admired; but if it did harm to the interests of peace, those who composed it would hereafter find in it little cause for satisfaction.
"Ridenda poemata malo
Quam te, conspicuæ divina Philippica famæ."
He could not but think that, by condemning in such universal terms a Treaty not essentially differing from what was known many months before, the Circular might produce effects in Russia which it would be difficult for any system of policy to countervail. The despatch itself erred in some at least of its details. For example, it said that the Ruler of Bulgaria was to be chosen by Russia. But the Treaty made his choice subject to approval by the Powers. It made a great deal too much of the mention of Russian Commissioners here, there, and everywhere, which might be absolutely necessary, to fill up blanks in a preliminary Treaty, meant to be immediately operative between Turkey and Russia; but which, on the first opening of a Conference, might be found to offer no obstacle to

815
the admission, on equal terms, of Commissioners from all or any of the other Powers. He took exception, also, to the argument that the effect of giving large autonomous institutions to the Christian Provinces would be to make Russia practically mistress of those countries. It was remarkable that the noble Marquess, writing from Constantinople after the Conference, anticipated that to the arrangements which the Conference had proposed, and which he himself had strongly recommended, similar objections might be made. The noble Marquess said, that though Russia had extended her territories during the last half-century over many tracts, and had brought under her rule many peoples, he had never heard that any of those peoples had, of their own accord, willingly submitted to her. The noble Marquess himself said that these people had no wish to be the slaves or the instruments of Russian ambition, and he thought it required very little observation of the facts to arrive at the same conclusion. And the noble Marquess, apparently, then thought that though some portions of European Turkey might receive some kind of self-government, that would not necessarily throw them into the arms of Russia. It was known, of course, that Roumania would, on all occasions, side with any Power that would obtain independence for her. But now we saw Roumania, so far from being the tool of Russia, stoutly remonstrating because the Emperor desired—very naturally, perhaps—to recover that part of Bessarabia which had been taken from him, and we saw her emissaries going round to all the Courts of Europe protesting against it. The attitude of Greece was not less significant. We might depend on it, that what all these people wanted was self-government and independence—they did not want to remain under the domination of Turkey, nor to fall under the domination of Russia. If we entered into what he could not but regard as a most causeless, wilful, and unjustifiable war, we must take a course which would end in one of two things—either, in retarding the independence and frustrating the hopes of these rising nations, upon whom we must ultimately rely for maintaining the balance of power in the East of Europe, or in our undertaking ourselves to re-organize the Turkish Empire in a manner which could not, without a
816
great sacrifice of our own consistency, and of the stipulations of those Treaties on which we were now professing to take our stand, answer the requirements of Europe, and satisfy the just aspirations of those races.
THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My noble Friend below me (the Earl of Derby) has expressed so clearly and so ably a very large portion of my own views upon this question, that I am, at all events, dispensed from travelling over the same ground. It is rather for my own comfort and satisfaction that I would wish to make a few remarks on this grave matter. So far as the military preparations of the country are concerned, and even as regards the Reserves, I am not inclined to object to the line Her Majesty's Government have taken. I have always been in favour of a considerable addition to the military and naval armaments of this country, which, in critical times like these, need to be strong; and I may indeed say, in proof of this, that I was long ago in favour of the purchase of two of the iron-clads which Her Majesty's Government have lately bought. My noble Friends on the Treasury bench will bear me out in that. How far indeed the money necessary for an increase of military and naval armaments is now being laid out to the best advantage is another question, and what the object and purpose of the present increase is a different question, which cannot be separated from the course of policy which the Government is adopting, and which needs anxious consideration. With regard to the Circular of the noble Marquess, I admire its ability, and, so far as it is a summary of the criticisms on the Treaty, I agree with a considerable part of it. More than that, I do not concur in all the objections which I have seen raised against it for not putting forward a counter-policy. I see no very serious objection to the reticence of my noble Friend, on one condition—that he has a distinct and sound policy. The criticism which I will make upon the Circular is this—that my noble Friend makes his case too good, that he leaves neither to his opponent nor to himself a road of retreat, that he does not specify particular portions of the Treaty which may be amended by mutual understanding, but objects to the combined effect of all the parts of the Treaty with so much logical force as to amount to a total revision,

817
perhaps a total rejection, of it. That is the construction put on it in other countries. The question is, how far it is wise that Russia should put such an interpretation on it?—how far is it prudent, as a negotiator, to put Russia herself into this great dilemma, by the publication of a Circular-despatch which has too much the ring of an ultimatum about it? I am no partizan of Russia, nor have I any sympathy with her government or her policy; but I ask your Lordships to consider what the position of Russia at this moment is. During the last two centuries there have been 12 to 13 wars between her and Turkey; and there are, therefore, traditional hatreds, animosities, and bitterness between them—there are a people animated by religious enthusiasm, an Army flushed with success, and an Emperor whose personal honour is bound up with the national credit. Is it likely or reasonable that a great Power, and a successful belligerent, be her cause good or bad, will agree to come to a discussion, if you tell her that you require the whole of this Treaty, on which she prides herself, to be torn up? Should we, under similar circumstances, listen to such an invitation? At the time when the German Armies marched into Paris, would they for a moment have accepted such a proposal? And the cases are not so entirely different. Then there is another point. If we go into the Conference—and the speech of my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack appears to hold out some slight encouragement—if we go into the Conference with that despatch we go there with our hand upon our sword. Is that a wise or prudent course? On the other hand, if we do not go into the Conference then that despatch remains the last word spoken, and an angry word. This is the position at home, whilst abroad we have, as I have more than once said, our Fleet in the Turkish waters and the Russian Army near at hand, both straining in the leash, both ready to come into collision—a hazardous condition of affairs. There is one further point with regard to the Conference which I wish to put before the House, as it seems to me that a great deal turns upon it and that a great deal of misconstruction has arisen out of it. There seems to be a confusion in the popular mind as to what the real power of a Conference is. People constantly
818
speak as if a Conference were a kind of court or judicial tribunal, whereas the fact is that a Conference is an entirely free meeting. It has no power of compulsion and no judicial authority whatever is vested in it. Its whole value is a moral one; its weight arises from the circumstance that the opinions of the different Powers collected together are expressed there. It is, I apprehend, a reluctance on the part of Russia to accept any decision of a Conference as judicially binding upon her that has led on her side to the present difficulty; on the other hand, inasmuch as the Conference has no power of enforcing its views, and as we must rely upon the moral weight of European opinion, it seems for the interest of both parties not to allow a matter of form and procedure to stand in the way. But, after all, these questions are but preliminaries, and there is a much larger question which this Message has to-night raised. Are we really at this moment on the threshold of hostilities or not? That is the main question which must force itself on everyone's mind. Such a question is very much influenced by what the feeling in the country is; and much allusion has been made to that feeling to-night. I am quite aware that there is in the country a certain party who are disposed to rush into war. They are the persons who go into war with light hearts and come out with heavy burdens—with them it is useless and unnecessary to reason. There is, however, a much larger class in this country who, I apprehend, are doubtful and perplexed in mind at the present state of affairs, but who are perfectly ready to go to war if either the honour or the interests of the country require it. They have a suspicion that Russia has been playing us false, that England is being placed in a discreditable position, and that the interests of this country are being seriously jeopardized. I would urge them to inquire calmly before they affirm any one of these propositions. As regards Russia, I am bound to say I do not think Russian diplomacy is by any means so skilful as it is sometimes said to be. The recent despatch with regard to Roumania is sufficient evidence on that point. As regards discrediting this country, I think my noble Friend near me has sufficiently answered that statement. Our alliance is courted,

819
and the unquestioned readiness of the country to go to war is ample proof that there is little discredit attaching to our position; whilst, as regards English interests, I wish those who talk so loudly about them would try to descend from generalities and discriminate between those interests which are really British and those which are merely secondary. If we go to war, what conceivable advantage are we to gain by it? Assuming an unbroken chain of successes, assuming that the crowning success—that Constantinople falls into our hands, what are we do with it? If we were to keep it, it would be necessary to create a machinery for the purpose, and this country would have to submit to sacrifices greater than any which have as yet been dreamt of. If we hand Constantinople over to someone else, we should fall back at once on the Conference, and by the nature of the case be compelled to act in concert with Russia, the very Power with which we shall have been engaged. The real difficulty of the case meets us at every turn. We have to deal with a Government which is absolutely dead, and which has no power of being revivified, side by side with younger, living, and more active communities. Here is a difficulty which will always recur, although you may put it off for the moment. In attempting to overcome it you are fighting against history, the course of which, though you may possibly delay, and which, I believe, you may guide, you cannot turn back any more than you can turn back the rivers to their sources. There is one other point to be observed. If this country should, unhappily, be engaged in hostilities, how different are the circumstances from those that existed when we entered into war some 25 years ago. Look at the altered position of Europe. Then, for months before the Crimean War broke out, we had the whole machinery of collective notes and diplomatic pressure applied, not to Turkey, but to Russia. Now, on the contrary, the whole opinion and the diplomatic pressure of Europe have been exercised, not upon Russia, but upon Turkey. The public opinion of Europe is exactly in the opposite direction from what it then was. Then we had France and Sardinia as Allies, whereas now we neither have an Ally, nor are likely to have one. Lastly, it is impossible to
820
blind ourselves to the serious fact that this country is not now unanimous in favour of war as it was 25 years ago, but that we should now go to war with opinions and feelings broadly divided. I can conceive no greater evil and no greater risk to the country than such a state of things. But, possibly, my Lords, you may say that Russia may be humiliated, and that so far the political and military credit of this country may, by a successful war, be greatly raised. But it is a most dangerous policy in public just as much as it is in private, to seek the humiliation of your opponents. I do not make these criticisms because I am afraid of the material results of war. I am satisfied that the resources of this country are very great, and I should not be afraid in another cause and for other reasons of incurring much greater risk than these. At the same time, I look with undisguised dismay to the idea of any action which shall tend to perpetuate and crystallize all those evil traditional animosities which there was reason to hope were dying out, but which are unquestionably the result and legacy of the last war between this country and Russia. It required two generations to eradicate the jealousies and hatreds engendered by the old French War, and France was then as Russia is now, an object of excessive and irrational animosity. Nor do I desire to pass any censure on Her Majesty's Government. I trust they will not abandon an observance of peace. At the same time, I feel bound to say—and this is my last word—that the ground they are treading on seems to me to be very hollow ground, and that the expedients they are adopting are expedients, to say the least of them, that are very hazardous. My Lords, they have taken upon themselves a great responsibility, but it is one which Parliament must accord to the executive Government under such circumstances as the present. It is as heavy a burden of responsibility as can well be laid upon the shoulders of any men—responsibility to the country, responsibility to the Sovereign, and responsibility to the yet higher tribunal of conscience.
LORD HOUGHTONsaid, he differed considerably from his noble Friends with whom he usually acted—he could not for the life of him conceive why the tone of the debate should have been so

821
entirely warlike. For his part, the attitude which his sense of duty compelled him to take up was one of respect for Treaties—which, as he had said on a previous occasion, were the title deeds of nations. From the first he had maintained that we were bound to follow the lines of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 until we were released from them; and he was glad to find that this line of policy had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government, as the speech of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) showed, and that it had not been disputed by a single speaker in the course of the debate, with the exception of his noble and learned Friend below him (Lord Selborne). In following out the lines of those Treaties, he believed they were acting in the simplest and most appropriate manner. We defied no one; we attacked no one; we placed ourselves in the attitude of men who thought that a great wrong had been done, and who were ready to remedy it if called upon to do so by the other signatories to the Treaties. He entirely dissented from those who thought that this country had no Allies; and the reason he did so, was that her attitude was based, not on purely national but on large European interests. Austria, for instance, had still greater interests involved in the Eastern Question than we. He also dissented from the argument of the noble and learned Lord below him (Lord Selborne), that the terms of peace laid down last year were substantially the same as those of the Treaty of San Stefano. In the one case, Russia proposed to submit her conditions to the decisions of a European Conference; in the other, she refused. Looking at the map of Russian conquest in Turkey, who could deny that the European settlement effected by the Crimean War was completely overturned? Who could doubt that the new Province of Bulgaria would pass completely under Russian control, and that, by-and-by, the Russian power would be openly proclaimed from the Black Sea to the Ægean? Some people asked, Why should we go to war? Well, he trusted we should not go to war at all, and he saw nothing whatever in this present act of Her Majesty's Government indicating any intention or desire on their part to go to war. But if we did go to war, we should do so not for any single English interest
822
—we should not go to war for any selfish purpose, but with the object of assisting as far as we could the other European Powers to place those nationalities which had been separated from Turkey under the united influence and power of Europe, instead of the exclusive power of Russia. With regard to the action of Her Majesty's Government, he felt bound to say that, in his opinion, their rigid adherence to the principle of neutrality was one of the great causes of the unfortunate position in which we found ourselves placed. If they had occupied the Straits at the time when Russia crossed the Danube, she would, he believed, have been able to exercise a powerful influence in dictating the terms of peace between Russia and Turkey. In thanking Her Majesty, however, as their Lordships had been called upon to do that evening, an opportunity had been afforded them of at once setting their country right in the face of Europe, and showing that, although in some quarters, her neutrality might have been construed to mean cowardice, she never hesitated when the question was put fairly before her to follow the course of truth and justice. If our Government were to enter a Congress, he hoped they would do so with some hope of a pacific solution of the difficulties with which they would have to deal; but, at the present moment, he did not think a Congress was likely to be attended with any satisfactory results. He would, therefore, rather say with Prince Bismarck, Beati possidentes; never, however, for a moment, giving the sanction of England to a hold over the Provinces of Turkey, which she considered to have been unjustly acquired. Let Russia keep those Provinces by force if she would, but let us tell her that there was a point beyond which she must not go—leaving her with her unjust gains to the execration of Europe.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, that no one could have listened to the debate without feeling that the dread issue of peace and war was trembling in the balance. The noble Earl at the head of the Government has advised a warlike measure, and he has introduced it in a corresponding tone. In almost every speech, indeed, which had been delivered by any Member of the Government, the desire to maintain peace

823
was professed; but from the noble Earl at the head of the Government not only was there no profession of that kind, but that, in discussing the substance of the Treaty of San Stefano, there was a distinct appeal to passion and prejudice. The danger was not diminished when their Lordships heard the reasons—half divulged, half concealed—assigned by the noble Earl the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for resigning the Office he lately held. He did not do so, it appeared, merely because of the calling out of the Army and Militia Reserves, but upon grounds which he did not at present think it right to reveal. The House was, therefore, officially or semi-officially informed that it had not the whole case before it, and that the country was deliberately being led, step by step, to a conclusion the nature of which was concealed from Parliament, and which even those—the Ministers who had lately felt it their duty to leave the Cabinet—are not fully in possession of. Now, there was one remarkable feature in the speech of the noble Earl to which he must refer at once, as in the highest degree significant of the spirit and the intention of the Government. He had said that the noble Earl the Prime Minister referred to the Treaty of San Stefano in language which was nothing else than an appeal to passion and prejudice. For what were the terms in which he described it? First of all, be it observed, that the Circular of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State, in so far as it dealt with the Treaty of San Stefano, dealt with it for a specific purpose—namely, as an argument that it should be submitted to a Congress. But the noble Earl at the head of the Government dealt with it apparently with a different view. What was his language? The Treaty of Europe, he said, abrogates Turkey in Europe. Another expression was, that "it established the vassalage of Turkey." Were they, then, to understand that we were to go to war for the purpose of maintaining the independence of Turkey in Europe? Was that the real case of emergency in the present position of affairs? Now the appreciation of emergency depended very much on the state of mind of the person who had to consider the question. If their Lordships were to come to the consideration of it in the state of mind represented
824
by the language of Mr. Layard, or of others who believed that the independence of Turkey was necessary to English interests and to the maintenance of the Empire, then he could understand that a case of emergency might be made good. If such as he had indicated was the object which the Government had in view, the position of affairs was, indeed, one of the most pressing emergency, and it would be necessary to call out not only the Reserves of the Army and Militia, but to embody the Militia at once, and to give a commission to the illustrious Duke at the head of the Army to prepare at least a force of 200,000 men. If the maintenance of the independence of Turkey was the object of the Government, that object he believed to be unattainable—and he rejoiced that such was the case. His own feeling was that the Sovereign of this country and the Empire of India could live and flourish without the Grand Turk. There were many, however, who identified themselves with the opposite sentiment, and he confessed he had felt humiliated when the other night he heard a murmur of relief and delight at the announcement that the Turkish Fleet had not been handed over to Russia. Now, his own belief was that if those six old iron-clads had been delivered to Russia, Admiral Hornby would be able to give a very good account of them, and he felt no particular delight at the fact that Russia had not got that little Fleet to waste future years in idleness. The House might depend upon it that Russia would not waste in future as much time as she had done since 1871 in building a Fleet in the Black Sea. She will in a short time put as powerful a Naval Force there as Turkey now had. No English interest would suffer if the Turkish Empire in Europe was brought to a final end, and that opinion was deliberately expressed by the Duke of Wellington in the height of his power, for he said it was a pity that in 1829 the Russians had not taken Constantinople. He regretted that the noble Earl the Prime Minister had used the language he had used in regard to the Treaty of San Stefano. He began his detailed criticism of the Treaty by saying that "every material stipulation is a departure from the Treaty of 1856." Now he (the Duke of Argyll) must confess that he did not, on reading the

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Circular of the present Foreign Secretary, attach the grave meaning to it that had been assigned to it in the Press and on the Continent; for he remembered that its author represented England at the Constantinople Conferences, the proposals of which were in principle quite as much a departure from the Treaty of 1856 as were the Articles of the San Stefano Treaty. Those proposals included a foreign occupation of Bulgaria, and, when Belgian soldiers could not be had, the noble Marquess proposed that England should occupy it. Was Russia to be satisfied after the war with terms less severe than those proposed before it? The difference was, those terms were proposed by Europe and these by Russia—a difference which no one regretted more than he did. But whose fault was that? We refused to help her in pressing reforms on the Porte, and could we be surprised at the inevitable consequence of our own act and folly? On the 30th of December, General Ignatieff proposed that the Powers should sign a common Note of the terms they agreed to impose on the Porte; but, when the noble Marquess telegraphed for leave to sign it, the Government refused to commit themselves by granting such permission. That was the conduct which had thrown the whole question of Eastern Europe into the hands of Russia. It was their own faint-heartedness that had done it all, and it was too late to threaten war with Russia to maintain those Treaties intact. He agreed with noble Lords opposite that the exclusive protection by Russia of the Christian subjects of the Porte was open to the gravest and most serious objection; but this was among those very conditions which diplomacy would be sure to reach in a Conference with the Powers. With regard to the technical point on which the Conference had been broken up, he thought the Government had been perfectly right to demand that the whole of the Treaty should be placed before the Congress; but when they asked if she accepted discussion on every part of the Treaty, they really asked her to say that there was no part of the Treaty on which she was not open to negotiation. They had no right to ask Russia to make that declaration. He could not but express great surprise that the Government had not accepted
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the proposal of Germany of a preliminary Conference to consider what parts of the Treaty should be discussed. His own belief was that a good understanding would have arisen from such a discussion. With regard to the warlike measures, of which they had heard tonight, he must congratulate his noble Friend the noble Marquess on his new discovery that England could do something in bombarding Stamboul. When he (the Duke of Argyll) urged on the Government the duty of insisting that Turkey should adopt the reforms proposed at the Conference, the noble Marquess asked—"What would you have us do? We have only got a Fleet—did the noble Duke propose that we should bombard Stamboul?" Well, the noble Marquess now proposed to bombard Stamboul; but if Government had acted vigorously against Turkey, when she was admitted to be the delinquent of Europe, the position of the Fleet in the waterways of Constantinople would have been an effectual estoppel of the war—Turkey would not have got her Egyptian contingent nor her Asiatic levy, and they would have gained all the objects they proposed at Constantinople, which were sacrificed by their faint-heartedness. He need not repeat the arguments which the noble Earl the late Foreign Secretary had used to-night as to the military difficulty in which they were now placed. They were taking warlike measures when the enemy was not in the gate, but in the fortress. He listened some weeks ago with great interest to the graceful courtesies which passed between his noble Friend the late Secretary for the Colonies (the Earl of Carnarvon) and the head of the Government. He heard his noble Friend explain the language which he had used to a now celebrated deputation when he said that a repetition of the Crimean War would have been little less than insanity. His noble Friend went on to say that, though he did not apply that language to the Crimean War when it did break out, yet he was bound to say, looking to the present condition of Europe, he failed to see what effect the Treaties that followed it had had. That reminded him of an officer who had been told off to defend some strong place, and who, in consultation with his comrades, came to the conclusion that it was better to evacuate the place than to

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fight. When they were descending the hill, every foot of which ought to have been a field of battle, he looked back upon the sky line and saw the columns of the enemy filing into the place. Then, like Nelson in one respect, but unlike him in another, he lifted up his glass to his blind eye, and said he failed to see why the engineers erected that strong place at all. But those who made the Treaty of 1856 thought that their strong place would be held by a garrison who would have defended it against any odds. He turned now for a moment to the other Articles of the Treaty of San Stefano, and would refer to the two cessions of territory mentioned in it. With regard to the cession of Bessarabia, he was bound to say that it was an eminently shabby thing to be proposed by the Russian Government. At a moment when the Russian Army was discouraged, repulsed, and almost defeated by the gallant Osman Pasha, the Roumanian Army was undoubtedly a most effective contingent, and the success of the Russian arms at the time was mainly due to the assistance of Roumania. It was a bad return to brave comrades-in-arms to demand from them territory which had been in their possession for many years, and which had been accustomed to some sort of Constitutional government. He hoped that second thoughts, and the magnanimity and good feeling of the Emperor of Russia would induce him to forego that, demand. He understood the personal feeling which had led to the demand. No doubt, in that terrible Crimean War, which brought the proudest head in Europe with sorrow to the grave, the Russian people had to yield up what they now claimed, and they wished to vindicate the memory of their Czar. But, though such feelings were natural, there were other considerations which ought to weigh with them, and this was precisely a matter with respect to which in a Congress Russia was not likely to prevail. But, with regard to Armenia, he was bound to say frankly that, considering the immense sacrifices which Russia had made, the small cession of Armenia which she demanded was much less than she might have been expected to ask for. He denied that any European or English interest was concerned in that cession. His noble Friend based his objection to the Treaty of San Stefano
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upon what was done in 1871. But the case, which actually arose in 1871, was that Russia, without war, chose to declare that she was no longer bound by the Treaty of 1856. The Declaration of 1871 had no reference to a case like the present. People never said that they desired war. What they desired was that some other Power should give them something which they knew would never be yielded without war. If it were their determination to tear up the Treaty of San Stefano altogether, and to denounce it in the unmeasured language which had been used to night by the noble Earl at the head of the Government, that would be equivalent to telling Russia that, after her immense sacrifice of blood and treasure, we considered every part of the Treaty to be objectionable. Then, he said we would be obliged to go to war, and we would go to war under circumstances of every conceivable difficulty. We would have no Ally in Europe; and one of the immediate results of our conduct would be that the Russians would take possession of Constantinople. Before sitting down, he wished to say that the result of every consideration he could give to this question was that no settlement could be hoped which rested upon maintaining in any degree the independence of the Ottoman Porte. The sooner the Porte was dead and buried, as a European Power, the better. He was not talking of the individual Turk. Well, there was a great difference between the government of the Pashas and the Mahomedan population. He would not deprive any Mahomedan of a single acre he possessed; but, on the contrary, he would protect him from one of the worst governments that ever existed. If we entered into a war with Russia for any of the reasons adduced to-night, and above all, if we entered into a war out of mere spite and hatred, for the purpose of destroying her influence, all he could say was—" The blood be on your heads, not on ours."
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Duke who has just sat down has, of late, delighted to apply the powers of his distinguished eloquence to the interpretation of Treaties, and I cannot help regretting that he does not collect some of those interpretations into a book—for such a gem of International Law assuredly does not exist. The other night

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he made a speech, the resources and eloquence of which I could not help admiring through all the fallacies by which it was distinguished, in which the thesis he sustained was, that whereas in the Treaty of 1856 Russia had promised to respect the independence and integrity of the Porte, the only party which had broken the Treaty of 1856 was the unfortunate Porte itself. To-night, the noble Duke, after telling us that the Treaty of 1856 was intended to be worked by other men, and that those who prepared it—that is to say, I suppose, Lord Palmerston—would have insisted upon going to war for the purpose of coercing the Turk—a piece of posthumous criticism which, on Lord Palmerston's behalf, I venture to repudiate. The noble Duke now applies himself to the interpretation of the Treaty in the framing of which he had a distinguished share—namely, the Treaty of 1871. In that Treaty the Powers of Europe declare that no one Power has the right to depart from existing Treaties without the leave of the other contracting Powers. One would imagine that Russia had done something of that kind in the Treaty of San Stefano. But it appears that we were entirely wrong. It appears that the only thing the Government of 1871 objected to was one Power doing it pacifically. If a Power went to war and would only violate the homes and properties of the persons with whom it quarrelled, then it was at liberty to violate as many Treaties as it pleased. After that interpretation, coming from so authoritative a source, I am somewhat surprised at the tones of self-gratulation with which the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) referred to that achievement of his diplomatic skill. My Lords, the noble Duke is a man of vivid imagination, and the pictures which his imagination produces fix themselves indelibly on his mind. Unfortunately, a year and a-half ago, he was induced to devote his attention to the question of the Turk, and the Turk has become for him what the Jesuit is to some other persons we have known. He sees the Turk in every question. The fate of the Turk is the test to him of whether any policy is right or wrong. The poor Turk is in a bad way. I had hoped, if only from regard for the splendid valour he had shown, and from compassion for his misfortunes, which, whether deserved or not, have undoubtedly been marvellously
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intense, the Turk, with his merits and demerits, might have been banished from our debates—at least, for a time; certainly, they can have very little influence in the issues which we have now to try. But as the noble Duke has thought fit to refer to him, and has gone at some length into a criticism of the Conference at Constantinople, I must, in my own defence, say a word or two on that subject. I assure the noble Duke that the sentiments at the Conference—and I take the liberty of observing that my sentiments at the Conference represented the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government—and my sentiments now are as strong as any by which I have ever been actuated, and I entirely refuse to acknowledge that in anything to which I have given my consent, or to which I have ever been a party, in regard to the Eastern Question, there is the slightest departure from the sentiments which I have always expressed. But though I desired, and desired intensely, as my Colleagues did, the welfare of the subject Christian populations of the Porte, I was never prepared to allow this proposition—which has passed into an axiom on the other side—that there could be no happiness and no good government for any of those populations unless they were subject to the government of Russia. That is a doctrine which may be urged for or against—I do not propose to enter into it—but I decline to admit, that though we demur to the unlimited extension of Russian influence over populations which are not by religion or race related to Russia, we are, therefore, indifferent to their welfare. Now, as to the Conference at Constantinople. The noble Duke lends the weight of his authority to a suggestion which I have seen elsewhere—that this huge Bulgaria, which is the great blot of the Treaty of San Stefano, derives some authority from the Conference at Constantinople. Well, the Conference of Constantinople agreed, in the first place, to impose nothing upon the Porte. It proposed certain things for the acceptance of the Porte; but it differed from the Treaty of San Stefano in this—that whatever was done was to be done exclusively by the consent of all the signatory Powers. Further than this, the Conference at Constantinople constructed, not one Bulgaria, but two Provinces of Bulgaria. In one of those

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Provinces the Slav element would have preponderated; in the other the Slav element would have been in a minority; and the mass of the Greek population, as well as the shores of the Euxine and the Ægean, would have been in the hands of that Province in which the Slav element did not preponderate. Again, the Conference took abundant security for the local self-government and the good government of the different populations, but it did not destroy the political or military authority of the Porte—the governors of these Provinces, subject to certain conditions, were still to have been appointed by the Porte, so that those Provinces would still have remained a barrier to invasion from without. Now, all these provisions which were proposed at the Conference at Constantinople, were as far removed as possible from the provisions for this large Bulgaria which form such a serious item in the Treaty of San Stefano. My Lords, the Conference at Constantinople passed away. The Turk, by his extraordinary folly, neglected the chance of safety which the English Government held out to him. Well, my Lords, I will not follow the noble Duke into his reflections upon the way in which England, as he says, might have prevented the late war. He imagines the case of the English Fleet preventing the passage of Turkish troops from the Asiatic to the European side of the Bosphorus, while the Russians march on Constantinople. Well, has the noble Duke's imagination ever carried him further, and enabled him to see what the Russians would have done when they got there? It would have been no worse then than now, no doubt, except to this extent, that we should then have had Russia fresh, instead of Russia weary. In any case, it would have been an enterprize into which England, a party to the Treaty of Paris, could not have entered safely. Besides, at the time to which the noble Duke refers, it is doubtful whether it could have secured the support of one-tenth of the Members of either House of Parliament. Well, the Conference passed away, and at the commencement of the war we thought it necessary to define the conditions of our neutrality, and to lay down certain points by which that neutrality would be compromised if passed. The noble Duke, and several other speakers, seem to hold that those conditions constituted
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the only things that we were to care about in the whole of South-Eastern Europe and in Western Asia. When the war passed, our neutrality ceased. Neutrality is a state of things which never exists except in war. When neutrality ceased, the conditions on which it had been founded passed away as well. When we agreed upon the conditions of our neutrality, we were not contemplating any such instrument as the Treaty of San Stefano. At that time we had, unexplained and undiminished, an assurance from a high and authoritative quarter that no territorial annexation was intended. When, later, in July, that assurance was qualified by the insertion of Bessarabia and Batoum, we were then assured that all the conditions of peace would be settled in a Conference. It was not necessary for us then to go forward and to determine what we should do when that Conference met. It was enough for us that the Conference was admitted, that these pledges had been given, and that we had adhered to a most loyal and honest performance of the neutrality which we had promised to observe. But we reserved to ourselves the right of having a voice in the final settlement of affairs. The noble Duke has dwelt a good deal upon this—that it is impossible for us to ask Russia to abandon all the results of the war. No such demand has been advanced on our side. What we have said is this—that all the conditions of the peace form a united and connected whole, that we would not consider any unless we were to consider and discuss all of them, and that the withdrawing any one Article from discussion would be to distort the discussion on the whole of the Treaty put together. I will not dwell on the sort of semi-vindication by my noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Selborne) with respect to the demand made by Russia on Roumania. I can only say that the truth of the statement is guaranteed by the Roumanian agent, and that we have no official knowledge, of its being denied by the Russian Chancellor. If we had such knowledge it would be our unpleasant duty to determine each in his own mind to whom the most credit was due—the Russian Chancellor, or the Roumanian agent. I am very much pleased to think that on me, at all events, that duty does not fall. Another most remarkable

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event this evening was, no doubt, the speech of my noble Friend who preceded me in the Office which I now have the honour to hold (the Earl of Derby). It was the most remarkable speech I ever heard in either House of Parliament, for I never before heard one who was a Cabinet Minister speak so freely of that which passed in the Cabinet. I listened to the speech of my noble Friend with ever-increasing astonishment. I would, however, represent to him, that statements of matters which have passed in Cabinets involve the opinions of others, and must be exceedingly unsatisfactory to those who are without, because no record is made of that which is said in Cabinets. My noble Friend's recollection seems to be very active. I have no right to assume that his memory is worse than mine, nor have I any right to ask anybody to believe him rather than me. I only cite the difference of opinion between us for the purpose of relying on the Constitutional practice that such matters should not be mentioned in public. My Lords, my noble Friend pointed out several measures of the Government to which in the public eye he was an assenting party. He did not, he said, in reality assent to all; one was a compromise, while to another, he was persuaded by some observations which fell from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which appeared to be founded on a mistake. Now, my Lords, am I not defending a great Constitutional principle, when I say that, for all that passes in a Cabinet, each Member of it who does not resign is absolutely and irretrievably responsible, and that he has no right afterwards to say that he agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he was persuaded by one of his Colleagues. Consider the inconvenience which will arise if such a great Constitutional law is not respected. Supposing all the Members of Cabinets were to rip up the history of their proceedings, and to ask who was responsible for this inaction or that neglect—a question which it might be impossible to answer—what, I should like to know, would be the result? It is, I maintain, only on the principle that absolute responsibility is undertaken by every Member of a Cabinet who, after a decision is arrived at, remains a Member of it, that the joint responsibility of
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Ministers to Parliament can be upheld, and one of the most essential conditions of Parliamentary responsibility established. I make these observations because my noble Friend placed an interpretation on the Circular which, if it is thought to be a portion of his revelations as a Member of the Cabinet, may do considerable harm. I am bound to protest against such a misrepresentation, and to tell the House the real state of the case. My noble Friend suggested that the arguments employed in the Circular were intended by us at one time to be instructions to our Representative at the Conference. It would be wholly unfit—it would give rise to most serious misapprehension, and would be entirely inconsistent with the position taken up, if we were to admit that particular account of the origin of those arguments to be true. Of course, my noble Friend is as much entitled to affix to them any character he pleases as any other Member of your Lordships' House who speaks entirely outside the Cabinet. But, I am forced to point out that, in the present instance, my noble Friend could not reveal anything which passed within it on this point, because he knew nothing whatever about it. The instructions were not given to me to prepare the Circular till after my noble Friend had left the Cabinet. What, therefore, its intention was, he could only judge, and I am bound to say that the particular interpretation which he attaches to it has no validity whatsoever. My noble Friend spoke of the Circular as "tearing up the Treaty of San Stefano;" and I think my noble Friend the late Colonial Secretary, whose speech was conceived in a very kindly spirit towards the Government, and of whose criticisms I have not the slightest right to complain, appeared to read it in the same sense. I have to thank one of my opponents for a much truer reading. The noble Duke who spoke last (the Duke of Argyll) argued that the one purpose of the Circular was to show that the Treaty must be considered as a whole, and that no part of it could be considered by itself; and the speech of my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Carnarvon) sustained the same thesis; and the notion of tearing up the Treaty has as little foundation in his case as in my own. This misconception with respect to the Treaty has pervaded the

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debate. Another misconception has done so equally, and it is that there is anything warlike in the step we are taking. The noble Lord who spoke last but one (Lord Houghton) seemed to have a clear and sound view upon the subject; but I am afraid it will afflict him to know that anyone agrees with him. Our position is not a warlike position; we are simply taking measures of precaution. Are you prepared to say that you will never take them unless you are resolved on war, or contemplate the certainty of war? No one in this House would maintain so impossible a position. But what must strike the most favourable critic of Russian proceedings is that, during the last few weeks, we have drifted away considerably from Treaty landmarks. What is it that saves all the nations in Europe from the duty of maintaining their military preparations at the highest point of efficiency and from the necessity of being always in a condition of absolute precaution? What is it but the existence of International Law and respect for Treaty rights? When they are disregarded—when International Law loses its force—you revert to an older and a simpler condition of society—the condition where each man depends for his safety upon his own strong right arm. It would be an exaggeration to state that, even in respect of South-East Europe, we have arrived at that condition; but, in proportion as the guarantees of Treaties have been withdrawn, it has been our duty, and it will continue to be the duty of the Government, to take all necessary precautions. These precautions do not involve any settled design of war, still less any menace to any Power in the world. My noble Friend the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs used language implying a doubt whether any of the objects called in question by the Treaty of San Stefano would be worth the risk of a war. It is difficult to imagine, on abstract principles, what is worth a war. You must consider the state of public feeling; you must consider the proceedings of which the individual act you complain of forms a part; you must have regard to the character of the Power by whom the act is done; you must have regard to the character of the nations among whom the act is done. At all events, my noble Friend has furnished me with a standard by which I
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can judge. I remember to have heard him say in this House that we had declared that the occupation of Constantinople would be a casus belli. I do not know precisely under what conditions my noble Friend consented to that view; but, having been that of the Cabinet, it must be taken to be his view, and I will ask any sensible man whether the possession of Constantinople is more threatening to English interests than the possession of the Ægean Sea? Everyone must be aware of the extraordinary difficulty under which a person in my position must speak under a crisis such as this. I hope I have avoided any language which could be construed into the language of menace. I hope I have also avoided gratifying the curiosity of noble Lords opposite as to what it is we intend to do. I feel at the present moment I need only rely upon that word "precaution;" being quite sure that if ever the time should come which should turn precaution into more active measures, the spirit of Englishmen will supply what is wanting and will dissipate all petty cavils into the air. My noble Friend the late Colonial Secretary spoke of a friend who regarded Russia with as much abhorrence as if she were about to take away his books and pictures. I venture to hope that there are things more important in the world than the loss of books and pictures. I venture to hope that the people of this country, in spite of their views of material prosperity, still recognize national sentiments leading to exertions and to self-sacrifices for the sake of which, if the need should arise, they must renounce for the moment the enjoyment of that prosperity itself. How far off that occasion may be it is not for me to say. I earnestly hope—nay, I may say, I have ground for hoping—it is not within the ken of the present generation; but if it be not, depend upon it it will not be because Englishmen are not stiff and determined in the assertion of their legitimate rights and the maintenance of their ancestral honour. Englishmen are moderate, careful to avoid unnecessary offence, slow to come to a dangerous and violent conclusion, and tenacious and resolute when the conclusion has once been arrived at; and such qualities and spirit I hope you will find in the Government of this country, whoever it may be that sit on this bench.

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We have, undoubtedly, inherited great duties. We are bound to foster the aspirations of the rising races of the South-East of Europe; we are bound to consolidate their nationalities; and in their patriotism, in their love of their own traditional history and past glories, to find a security for future stability and peace. But we have more important interests than all these. We are trustees for the British Empire. We have received that trust with all its strength, all its glory, all its traditions; and the one thing we have to care for is that we pass them untarnished to our successors.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he had listened with great satisfaction to the latter part of the speech of the noble Marquess. He was not by any means a member of the Peace-at-any-price Party, but he was glad to hear the noble Marquess's disclaimer—that his despatch was in effect the "tearing to pieces" the San Stefano Treaty. At the same time, he thought the Government had shown great inconsistency in their conduct with reference to the Eastern Question. They appeared to think that the British Empire was in danger from the preponderance of Russia. The noble Marquess said the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) was alarmed at the bugbear of Turkey; but the Government were alarmed at the bugbear of Russia. They might have gone to war for Turkey—that would have been an intelligible policy. Another, and perhaps the wisest, policy would have been to join Russia in insisting that Turkey should reform her administration—but we did not do so; we proclaimed absolute neutrality, which he thought was a great mistake. Now it seemed that we found it to be our duty to defend Treaty rights, and England alone was to maintain them. But he thought the noble Duke was to a great extent justified—for he did not go with him altogether—in the view which he took of the Treaty of 1871. Russia, no doubt, was not entitled of her own free will to set aside Treaties made with other Powers; but, at the same time, the occurrence of a great war must modify those Treaties. The noble Marquess said that no country in Europe could enjoy happiness if it came under Russian government. Neither his noble Friend nor himself had any desire that those people should come
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under Russian government; but he did not believe that the granting of autonomy to Bulgaria meant necessarily the extension of Russian government to that Province. If it were not so late, he would refer in proof of that position to the despatches of the noble Marquess, who had stated that there was no instance of any people wishing to come under Russian government. There was the most conspicuous proof of that in the case of Roumania. He would admit the Treaty of San Stefano required modification in some parts; but he regretted that the action of Her Majesty's Government in this matter had been marked by haste and precipitation. There was a real difficulty as to the submission of the whole Treaty to the Congress; but, after all, the divergence was not on the face of it hopeless. The Russians by no means had said that they would withdraw any particular part of the Treaty—they had merely laid it down that they would not pledge themselves to take part in the discussion of any part of the Treaty. He thought this was a matter which might have been settled by a preliminary interview between the Ministers of the different Powers. It would have been an interview "without prejudice," to use a legal phrase. The Ministers would probably have discovered in the course of conversation the points which the Russians were anxious to withdraw from the Congress, and they would have been able to determine whether those points ought to be brought before the Congress. What possible harm could have come of such a preliminary interview? It was a matter of regret that this course was not adopted as an expedient by which the difficulty might have been smoothed away. The late Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that we were not drifting, but rushing into war, and the noble Earl at the head of the Government had made a speech full of power, eloquence, and fire, and calculated to rouse the passions of the people of this country; but this was a matter which ought to be discussed with calmness and not with passion. The danger was that neither the English nor the Russian people would be actuated by policy, and that they would be driven on by passion. Those who mixed much with men at the present time knew that many persons laid it down as a general

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proposition that a check must be given to the growing power of Russia. Surely nothing could be more insane than to rush into war for such a purpose as this. No doubt we might be successful—we might do Russia great damage; but Russia could not be reduced from the position of a great Power—she was a great nation, and could not be obliterated. She must always continue to exercise great power and influence. Then, was it not reasonable to endeavour to come to an understanding with her? The war could not be a naval war, and he would ask whether the country had ever gone to war without an Ally? It was extremely inconvenient that they should have at the commencement of the Session declarations of unanimity in the Cabinet, when unanimity to the extent implied did not exist.
THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: I never in any way conveyed that the Cabinet was unanimous. The words I used were that our policy had never changed—that it had always been the same—namely, conditional neutrality.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, no doubt the noble Earl was correct in what he said, but still an erroneous impression was created, and it would have been better under the circumstances had the noble Earl refrained from referring to the matter at all. The noble Marquess had taken on himself the task of rebuking the late Foreign Secretary for his revelation as to the divergences of the Cabinet. He would suggest to the noble Marquess that, on the one hand, if it was inconvenient to make revelations as to the divergences of the Cabinet, it was also extremely inconvenient to have assertions made in the House about the unanimity of the Cabinet. The noble Marquess spoke very slightingly of the word of one of the principal Ministers of Europe.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: If the noble Earl alludes to Prince Gortchakoff, he had always spoken with the greatest possible respect of Prince Gortchakoff.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, the noble Marquess had spoken of the divergences of opinion between Prince Gortchakoff and the agent of Roumania. Hypothetical questioning of the assertions said to have been made by the Foreign Minister of one country by
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the Foreign Minister of another country was not prudent. He was perfectly certain that the noble Marquess did not intend to impute untruthfulness to Prince Gortchakoff in the smallest degree, and he was sure the noble Marquess would be obliged to him for referring to the words he used.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, that nothing was further from his intention than to make any attack on Prince Gortchakoff's honour. He should be very foolish to do so, because he had had a very short experience of the noble Lord.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, with regard to the broad question at issue, he hoped the Government would pause before they involved this country in war, and that they would not embark in war on such a chimerical notion as that a Russian army might march through the Syrian desert to Egypt.
LORD STRATHNAIRN*: My Lords, the speech of my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) to your Lordships' House on resigning Office has given rise to an almost universal feeling of regret and surprise. Instead of following the usual course adopted on such occasions, of observing silence, or of tendering to Parliament the explanations which he considered due to himself, and which would, at the same time, have safeguarded the State interests, foreign and domestic, concerned in his retirement from Office, the noble Earl, in his speech, of which it is difficult to say whether the indiscretion, the breach of confidence, or the inconsistency are the greatest, has, by publishing and making Cabinet information and affairs which are held by all Governments to be perfectly confidential, the subject of Parliamentary debate, compromised those State interests in the most dangerous and critical phase of the Oriental Question that has ever come under the consideration of a British Government. I should be sorry to impute bad intent to my noble Friend. I believe that the very trying state of affairs, his political failures, and the painful feelings which he describes, of entertaining views which he knew were unpopular among the great body of his Friends, have led his better judgment astray. But let that be as it may, the unfavourable result is the same. The noble Earl has done injustice to his country and to an ancient and good Ally, amongst the numerous classes who are

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not well informed of the true state of affairs, and assisted Russian policy in essential respects—firstly, by his announcement that England has only one Ally, Austria, and that for the reasons he alleges she is a useless one; secondly, by his declaration that—
"Those who profess admiration for Turkey, those who lament the fall of the Turkish Empire, are out of Court. You might have kept that Empire alive for a time, but you cannot now restore it."
My noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be the last person to wish to do so. "England would not allow it, and all Europe would be against it;" thirdly, that the present crisis of Eastern affairs does not justify the calling out of the Reserves. As regards the first point, that Austria is our only Ally, but that in case of a war she would practically be of no use to England, the noble Earl adduces three reasons in support of this opinion—firstly, that Austria is composed of "two independent nations pulling different ways." To this I beg to reply, that Austria and Hungary cannot be called independent, when in many cases they must depend on one another, and when both are under the same Sovereign; that under the present form of government the revolutionary spirit which formerly arrayed Hungary against Austria, has not re-appeared, has died out. The noble Earl's second reason is "the Austrian Army could not be trusted against the Slavs." Everybody in this country will condemn and regret this unwarrantable assertion of the noble Earl, respecting the Austrian Army; conspicuous as it is in history equally for its loyalty and discipline, called in question by the noble Earl, as for its steadfast bravery. Such an opinion evinces as much bad taste as it does ingratitude, coming from the noble Earl, who, speaking on his authority as late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informs us that, "if we are to seek with success for an Ally on the Continent, Vienna is the quarter to which we must look." Thirdly, as regards the noble Earl's opinion that Austria's financial difficulties stand in the way of her success in the field, the example of Russia having, with as great, if not more embarrassed finances, carried on, at an enormous expense, successful campaigns in different
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quarters of the globe, with armies of unusual strength and at a great distance from home, is a proof that it is not a valid reason against her carrying on successful military operations. And my noble Friend is not borne out in saying that Austria is our only Ally; for, although France could not give England in case of necessity military aid, English policy has, on the other hand, derived most valuable support from the talented and independent articles in the French Press on the Eastern Question. The English Army never forget the gallant support which they received from their faithful Allies, the French Army, in the Crimea, and they are perfectly aware of the political position of France, which would render it difficult at the present time for her to give England more than moral support. I now come to the noble Earl's declaration that Turkey has fallen, and that her recovery is impossible. This declaration of Turkey's dissolution must be a prediction, as Turkey has not fallen; for the Treaty of San Stefano allows Turkey, with Constantinople, to exist, although so reduced by that Treaty in important territories and influences of every description, and so crushed by indemnities which she cannot possibly pay, that if that Treaty, or any modification of that Treaty, which gives Russia an undue preponderance of power in European Turkey, becomes International Law, Turkey and the Eastern balance of power can only be said to exist, as is shown in Lord Salisbury's admirable Circular to foreign Courts, at Russia's pleasure. But, as the noble Earl has ventured on the hazardous ground of prophecy, and what is still more hazardous, on that of the fall of Turkey, which has been fatal to so many political seers, it is apposite to submit to your Lordships a prophecy of a great authority, no less a one than Voltaire, Peter the Great's intimate friend and biographer. Voltaire, writing so long ago as 1696, says—"The time has now come when Peter the Great will raise himself sur les ruines de la Turquie;" but, so far from this prognostication coming to pass, Voltaire had to announce his own failure as a prophet, and he tells us in 1711, 15 years afterwards, that Peter the Great, instead of raising himself on the ruins of Turkey, had, when invading Turkey, been out-manœuvred by a Turkish Army under the Grand Vizier,

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his communications cut off, and his position commanded by Turkish artillery from surrounding heights. To escape being made prisoner or destroyed with his Army, Peter the Great had to sign a discreditable Treaty, by which he agreed to restore to the Sultan Azoff and Taganrog, strong places which he had taken as bases of maritime operation against Constantinople. Then, again, a great Russian Sovereign, the Emperor Nicholas, predicted to Sir Hamilton Seymour many years ago, that the Sick Man was dying, and that the time had come to divide his inheritance. But, in consistency with the unvarying object of Russian policy to possess Constantinople, the key of the balance of power, His Imperial Majesty stipulated that whatever part of the inheritance, Egypt, &c., England might acquire, Russia must have Constantinople. It is superfluous to observe that, in a strategic and political sense, Constantinople, with the Bosphorus and Dardanelles positions, is of vastly more importance than Egypt or any other position in Turkey. This prophecy remained unfulfilled for nearly 40 years. The Sick Man, instead of dying, was in possession of a formidable iron-clad fleet in 1876, and for the reasons so unanswerably stated in my noble Friend's despatch of the 1st of May, 1876, and which showed that Russia was much more to blame than Turkey, Russia went to war with Turkey. It is of paramount importance to bear in mind those reasons, to which I shall recur again, which were expressed with all the straightforward logic of Lord Palmerston when describing Russian diplomacy. Well, my Lords, Turkey opposed by sea and by land Russia's invasion of Turkey in Europe and in Armenia with such unusual vigour and naval and military resources as showed that the prophecy of the Emperor Nicholas was as fallacious as that of Voltaire in 1696. She had a formidable iron-clad fleet, which gave her the command in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, whilst Russia could not show a ship of war on either, numerous armies, a corps d'armée, which was under Osman Pasha, universally acknowledged to be the best general on either side in the war. Turkish officers are inferior, but the high military qualities of Turkish soldiers have won for them the admiration of the military
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world. At first the Turkish Army achieved great successes both in Asia Minor and in Europe, and the brilliant and devoted defence by Osman Pasha of Plevna against the united Russian and Roumanian Armies' repeated attacks entitled his services and those of his heroic troops to be mentioned in the annals of undying military fame. Osman Pasha's total defeat and surrender, with the collapse of the Turkish Army, show how completely nations can recover from military overthrows—from Pavia, when Francis I. said "he had lost everything but honour," to "Jena" and "Sedan;" when the total defeats of the two greatest military Powers of the world caused the prostration of Prussia and France. And the argument that Turkey could also recover from her military disasters is the stronger, if the Aulic Council of War had not in its infatuation insisted on Osman Pasha not carrying out his plan, founded on the sound strategy of retiring to a strong position near Sofia, and his reserves and supplies, drawing the enemy away from them. The Russian Army might not have been able to leave the Balkans. But, independently of abortive predictions as to Turkey's collapse, of her recovery when her state was generally considered to be hopeless, it is of the utmost importance for a statesmanlike consideration of the stability of the Turkish Empire, on which the safety depends of the interests of the general peace, and of the interests and rights of the then leading Powers of Europe in the East, to pass in brief review circumstances and causes which prove that great injustice has been done to the Government of Turkey, and particularly to her administration of her Christian populations by Russia's policy and diplomacy of double purpose—one legitimate and avowed, to sign Treaties and compose despatches pledging Russia's support of the integrity and independence of Turkey, and, at the same time, pursuing sedulously the illegitimate and unavowed object of her policy, which is proved by English and Foreign Office records, by Blue Books, to foment disaffection amongst the Porte's Christian subjects, and especially her co-religionists, with a view of discrediting and upsetting the Sultan's Government, and of paving the way to obtaining

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possession of European Turkey with the Black Sea, Bosphorus, and Dardanelles, or gain a preponderance of influence and strength which must ultimately transfer all of these elements of the balance of power from the Sultan to the Emperor of Russia. I was Her Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires at Constantinople before the Crimean War during Prince Menschikoff's special mission to the Sultan, when he demanded that the Porte should bind herself by a secret Treaty to cede to Russia Turkish rights which Lord Clarendon said would render the Sultan "a mere vassal of Russia." It was only on my acceding to the Porte's solicitation that I should request the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's Fleet, then at Malta, to make his appearance in Turkish waters that the Turkish Government refused to sign the dangerous Treaty. At the same time, Bulgaria was agitated by an encyclical letter from the Synod of the Greek Church at St. Petersburg to the Clergy of the Bulgarian Christian Churches, calling on them to rise for the sake of their holy religion in favour of the Emperor of Russia. The noble Earl himself stated, in debate in 1876, that the insurrectionary movement of the Christian populations in European Turkey was caused "by domestic intrigue, but still more by foreign intrigue." The Blue Books of 1875–6 show that the Russian Consuls excited the intrigues in Bulgaria, which had such disastrous consequences, and English travellers of well-known names addressed reports of these intrigues to the authorities. Two of these gentlemen travelled with a Russian colonel in uniform, who gave them his name, and boasted of the success of his agitation. It is needless to urge that it is impossible that mutual confidence, the basis of good government, can exist between the Sovereign and the subject when the subject is taught that it is a sin to serve the Mohammedan Sovereign, whom Providence has placed over him, and the Sovereign learns from the subject's disaffection and revolt caused by Russian agency that he has forfeited his subject' loyalty and confidence. No one is more aware than myself of the great defects of Turkish administration, of which corruption is a prominent one, and I abhor the spirit of fanaticism and gross injustice of the laws towards the Christians which disfigured their Statute Book.
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One of my chief diplomatic duties, like those of all Her Majesty's servants in the East, was to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte from the effects of those laws, and to aid, by my continued representations to my superiors, in their abolition. The great object of Lord Palmerston's Eastern policy was to remove these defects, to civilize Turkish administration, and to erase from the Turkish Statute Book intolerant or fanatical laws which interfered with the civil and religious liberty of the Christians or their welfare. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's efforts to carry out these wise and humane instructions were attended with as much success as can be expected in a country under Oriental government; he even succeeded in forming a school of honest and enlightened Turkish statesmen under Rechid Pasha, the Grand Vizier; and Her Majesty's Consuls in Turkey were, at his suggestion, allowed by the Porte to make representations, with the consideration due to Turkish susceptibilities, to the local Turkish authorities in cases when the Sultan's concessions to the Christians were not carried out. The Christians of Turkey appreciated and experienced all the advantages of Rechid Pasha's humane and tolerant government. And the archives of the Embassy and Consulates in Turkey show how constantly and successfully these representations were made and gratefully acknowledged by the Christian communities; but the revision of certain stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 by the Treaty of London of 1871 was followed by the fall of British and the rise of Russian influence on its ruin. The so-called wicked—it would be more charitable to call him insane—Sultan Abdul-Aziz came completely under Russian influence, and in the train of the Russian Embassy appeared Turkish bankruptcy, a repudiated British loan, and the populations of European Turkey in arms against the Sultan. It was in this worst phase of Turkish misrule that the Bulgarian outrages occurred, as well as the important change of the Treaty of 1856, that the misrule of Abdul-Aziz, acting under the influence of the Russian Embassy, had given a bad name to Turkey which was heightened by his misrule, having done away with the good effects of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's policy, that an English Party spirit under its impassioned

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leader, with humanity outraged in Bulgaria for its cry, co-operated with Russian diplomacy in attacking the ancient policy of Great Britain in the East; and, with all the eloquence and bitterness of which his powers of oratory were capable, in denouncing and agitating the country against Turkish rule. How entirely, for the time, he succeeded is well known to your Lordships. This unpatriotic alliance weakened the influence of the Government at a moment when, for the good of the country and in the interest of peace, it should have been the strongest, and strengthened the war Party and dangerous Panslavist and secret societies in Russia. The author of this agitation created such a feeling in favour of Russian policy amongst the ill-informed but influential masses, and amongst the higher classes in considerable degree also, that the Eastern policy of England became discredited. I now come to the Conference, and I beg to submit to your Lordships that the Conference in which the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, who had played so very prominent and interested a part in the subject of their deliberations, sat as a member, and naturally a most influential one, was not suited in any way to judge the Eastern Question—firstly, for the reasons stated so clearly by my noble Friend to-night, on giving his opinion of the attributes of a Conference; and, secondly, because even if it had been of the competency of the Conference, none of its members would have allowed the Porte to adduce proof in extenuation of her misrule, of Russia's complicity in the insurrectionary movement amongst the Christian populations of Turkey. The instructions of my noble Friend of the 30th November, 1876, lay down emphatically that the basis of the deliberations of the Conference was to be the integrity and independence of Turkey, which, I need not say, has always been the basis of English Eastern policy. In this sense it is a disappointment to see that, in the telegraphic despatch from Sir Andrew Buchanan to my noble Friend, he states that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed him that the plan for the Conference was a Russian plan; and, certainly, to say nothing of the withdrawal of the 16 concessions proposed in the first instance to the Porte, the two that remained bore
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the stamp of General Ignatieff's conception. Both, whether in a legal or equitable point of view, were infractions of the independence of the Sultan. They took out of his hands duties and appointments of his special competency as a Sovereign, and transferred them to foreign authorities. My noble Friend seems to have been aware of this fact, for more than once he states in his instructions that if a better plan could be found he would accept it. I was present in the House when my noble Friend, in answer to a Question, stated that he had given no answer to the Porte; and it cannot be a matter of surprise that the silence with which my noble Friend received the complaint of the Turkish Government must have added to the mortification, caused by the proceedings of the Conference, and inspired them with the conviction that the complaint stated in the Circular to the Powers was unanswerable. This circumstance, and the proceedings of the Conference, engendered an unfavourable feeling in Turkey towards England; and it was this feeling which caused the unpopularity which my noble Friend said necessitated the appearance at Constantinople of Her Majesty's Fleet, for the purpose of protecting British subjects, So much did the Porte feel aggrieved by the Conference proceedings, that they addressed a complaint, in a circular despatch to the signatory Powers, of the treatment to which Turkey had been subjected by them, implying even that the Powers had not treated her with good faith. I need not point out the great disadvantage of Turkey entering the dangerous category of alienated friends. Amongst all the causes which I have submitted, which contributed to make Turkey and her administration unpopular in and out of England, none came near the effects produced by the Bulgarian outrage agitation, which has exercised a dangerous feeling against our Alliance with Turkey, and the support we give her in order that she may protect our all-important interest in the East—that is, our communications with India, our possession of that country, and our rights in the Mediterranean. I will not enlarge upon the dangerous influence which such a feeling may exercise upon the Government of Turkey, who hold the equipoise of power in the East in their hands, which is a necessity

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for the support of our rights in the East, as well as those of Austria and France, and, I may add, for the interests of Christianity in the East, the effect of which has been to lessen in many and influential quarters the desire to uphold a Government so universally condemned. It is true that a re-action has taken place in favour of England's former policy in the East; but the anti-Turkish Party in this country, although weakened, are equally active in and out of Parliament in incessantly dwelling on and re-asserting the opinions in the pamphlet on Bulgarian outrages that the inherent vices of the Turks disqualify them for government, especially of Christians, and they endeavoured to strengthen these arguments by pointing to the defeat of the Turkish arms, which must be followed by the fall of Turkey as a nation. I have already shown that history proves that military defeats, however serious, and of the greatest military nations, have not prevented their resuming their former position in the world, and I shall now adduce official facts which prove that Russian cruelties were worse than those committed by Bashi-Bazouks, because committed by Russian regular troops and officers, and that greater intolerance has been displayed by Russia towards her own Christian subjects than Turkey was ever guilty of, certainly in latter times, towards her rayahs. The author of the Bulgarian agitation must have been officially aware that Lord Raglan assembled a court of inquiry to investigate the charges that Russian soldiers, acting under command, had committed a crime which made humanity turn pale and chivalry hang its head by assassinating no less than eight English officers lying helpless and wounded on the field at the battle of Inkerman. Then there is of a recent date the general order of the Russian Commander-in-Chief in Central Asia that men, women and children of a Turcoman tribe were to be put to the sword. The Correspondence of Her Majesty's Embassy and Consuls in Asia, presented to Parliament, record the prosecution by the Russian Government of Russian subjects of the United Greek Roman Catholic Church, which I must think have not been equalled in severity by the conduct of the Turkish Government; and there cannot be a better or more practical proof of this
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than the fact that the late virtuous head of the Roman Catholic Church openly declared that he would prefer that his congregations should be under Turkish than Russian rule. There are equally as official proofs that the Montenegrins, who are the most favoured people of Russia in the East, are not inferior to Bashi-Bazouks in cruelty. This is a clear refutation of the cry that Turkey's misrule has no parallel; but, my Lords, who can deny that many European and Christian Governments present a parallel? In fact, I may say, where is the Government which is not discredited by atrocities or misrule in some portion of their dominion? I could name Christian countries in which travelling is not so secure by any means as in Turkey, where, except in the districts bordering on robber tribes—Kurds, Arabs, &c.—single travellers may journey in security. I have arrived at my noble Friend's observation, that "the present crisis of Eastern Affairs does not justify the calling out of the Reserves," and to his query—"What are you fighting for?" I should have thought that the noble Earl's despatch of the 1st of May, 1876, and Lord Salisbury's late unanswerable Circular would have rendered this inquiry unnecessary; but, as this is not the case, I venture on a few words which will show the emergency of the political situation. The present threatening military position of Russia, with virtual command of Constantinople and of the Bosphorus, endangers the equipoise of power which protects the safety of British, Austrian, and French interests in the East. This circumstance, together with the antecedents of Russian policy up to the present day, I venture to call "an emergency." But it is apposite to observe that England, Austria, and France entertain no apprehensions of the aggrandizing or ambitious policy of the Porte. A long experience has taught them that the Sultan is a trustworthy tenant of his great trust—that is, the territories and waters under Ottoman rule, of vast strategical, naval and military, commercial and political, importance. It is, my Lords, this safe guardianship of this all-important trust, whose integrity and independence is guaranteed by the Christian Powers, which bears the name of the much-used, but ill-understood, name of the equipoise of power. This is not what my noble

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Friend says Her Majesty's Government are fighting for, because England is not fighting, is not at war with Russia. England is only taking most justifiable military and naval precaution to protect from impending danger Ottoman territories and waters which she has engaged, with the signatory Powers, to uphold. I have been frequently asked, my Lords, the cause of apprehension of Russian's possession of Constantinople; and the strategical answer is that, if Russia were in possession of Constantinople, she would lose no time in making the Dardanelles stronger than Cronstadt, which one of our best Fleets could not a few years ago approach, much less attack. With plated armour, modern defences, and rifled artillery, efficient land defences are now proved to be able to resist, as a rule, attacks from the sea. She would concentrate a Fleet of iron-clads in the Black Sea, which would remain there in safety, protected by the Dardanelles, till English Fleets—I am speaking of the case of war between England and Russia—have been called away from the Mediterranean to distant seas by the necessities of the service, when she would leave the Dardanelles with a force of iron-clads and transport ships with requisite troops. An iron-clad Fleet without transports, and steaming at the rate of nine knots an hour, would steam from the Dardanelles to the Suez Canal in 70 hours, where hulks would be sunk to block up the canal, a descent made by the troops at a strategical point on the coast, and entrench. I venture to think, my Lords, I have said enough to show the vast importance of the Turkish dominions for the security of the rights and interests of England, Austria, and France, whose policy in the East is as legitimate as it is avowed and honest. Their rights and interests are, it is clear, not the same, as they are geographically different in some respects; but they are perfectly identical as regards their common object—the balance of power—which is the Turkish equipoise for the protection of their different rights and interest. Under all the circumstances that are stated in my speech, it is impossible that I can agree in any way with my noble Friend either as to England's giving up Turkey or the irreconcilable fall of Turkey, cannot sufficiently express my astonishment that my noble Friend should have made so extraordinary a statement, which
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is in contradiction with all the opinions which he, all the Governments, all the eminent statesmen who have filled the Office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, have hitherto held as incontrovertible, and almost everybody who is animated with patriotism and the desire that England should not lapse from being a leading nation of the world into a second or third-rate Power. The most statesmanlike Circular of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, supported by a united Cabinet which asserts the rights of Treaties with a vigour and a thorough knowledge of the value of the English and European rights which they protect—induces the conviction that the Treaty of San Stefano will be replaced by a Treaty which will maintain the peace of the world, and protect the liberties, independence, and rights of the nations of the European family. These convictions are strengthened by the policy of the present Government, which can alone avert that general conflagration, that chaos, that war, and disunion among the nations of the world which the wisest politicians and statesmen have always foreseen would ensue from the fall of Turkey and the partition or spoliation of its coveted inheritance; and that amongst these calamities they have always apprehended that the Christians scattered and helpless over this vast range of Ottoman rule would be the first victims of Islamism in arms for the defence of her faith and her rule.
LORD DENMANsaid, that he hoped a Congress would meet, and like a Court of Justice, which always had the record before it, would have the Treaty of San Stefano placed on its table. He would—

"In its season bring the law,

That from discussion's lips may fall

With life that working strongly binds,

Set in all lights by many minds

To close the interests of all."*

He found † that at the Congress of Sistovo (1791) every Treaty bearing on the subject was required to be read, and the Plenipotentiary there (Sir Robert Murray Keith) received no instructions from home for five months, and his Excellency was fully trusted by his Government. Indeed, it
* Tennyson's Poem, Love thou thy Land.
† Sir Robert Murray Keith's Letters and Correspondence, 1st edition, vol. II., pp. 421–2, published by Colburn, 1849.

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took two months to receive an answer by return of special messenger; but our Representative was equally trusted by Her Majesty and her Government, and answers to questions and instructions might be received in a few hours, and he hoped very much that a durable peace might be the result of its deliberations.
Address agreed to, nemine dissentiente.
Ordered, That the said address be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.
House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock A.M., till half past Ten o'clock.