Sitting of 12 March 1877

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Commons, nominated.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—NAVY ESTIMATES AND NAVY EXCESS ESTIMATE, 1875-6.
WAYS AND MEANS—considered in Committee—Exchequer Bond (£700,000).
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Provisional Orders * [108].
Committee—Report—Justices Clerks (re-comm.) [5]; Universities of Oxford and Cambridge [113].
Considered as amended—Third Reading—Treasury and Exchequer Bills [88], and passed.

CRIMINAL LAW—THE MURDER AT ROCHDALE.—QUESTION.
MR. JAMESasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, in the case of the recent atrocity at Rochdale, where, according to the reports in the newspapers, the drunken murderer slowly kicked his wife to death, for which he has since been convicted and sentenced to death, If steps have been taken to ascertain whether drink was supplied to the murderer in any public house or beershop when already in a drunken state; and, if so, what means are being taken to prosecute those who have thus contravened the Law?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, that before he had written on the subject, the local authorities, after due inquiries, had come to the conclusion that the convict had been improperly served with drink in a public-house while already in a drunken state. An information had been taken out against the offending publican and the case was to have been heard before the magistrates

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that day. Every endeavour would be made to obtain evidence so as to convict the offender.

POLICE—DEVONPORT WATCH COMMITTEE.—QUESTION.
SIR WILFRID LAWSONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the Devonport Watch Committee still adhere to the practice of
"forming a Committee to select what reports, against publicans and beer retailers, shall be allowed to be summoned before the magistrates;"
and, whether the above practice has not been more than once condemned by Captain Willis the Inspector of Constabulary, and also by the Home Secretary himself; and, if so, whether he proposes to take any steps in the matter?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, he had received information from the clerk of the Devonport watch committee, relative to the practice of that body as to cases against publicans and beer retailers brought before the magistrates. According to it, the reports of the police were read at the regular weekly meetings, and proceedings were directed to be taken in those cases which did not appear to be of a frivolous character, and with regard to which there appeared to be evidence sufficient to secure a conviction. The committee had called his (Mr. Cross's) attention to a communication which they had received from Lord Normanby, when Home Secretary, who took the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown as to the practice which prevailed at that time. Their opinion was that the justices did not appear to have any legitimate control over, or interference with, the watch committee, but that the committee did not possess any exclusive right of directing information to be taken out against offenders. It also appeared that the subject had been noticed by Sir James Graham. As far as he (Mr. Cross) was concerned, though the practice which prevailed at Devonport might be legal, he was bound to say that the exercise of the discretion which that practice involved did throw upon the watch committee great responsibility. He also thought that the Reports of Captain Willis, as well as the evidence given before the Select Committee on the Superannuation of the Police of last
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Session, would cast considerable doubt as to the manner in which that discretion was exercised. He (Mr. Cross) had himself stated last year that, in his opinion, it was an isolated case; but if it were not so, it would be his duty to take some steps in reference to it. He hoped the practice would not be carried to any excess.

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1876— EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT, 1875— THE "THOMASINA M'LELLAN."

  QUESTION.
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEYasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether the Department is informed of the case of the ship "Themasina M'Lellan," which, carrying passengers, sailed from London for New Zealand on the 3rd of June last, laden with 532 tons of coal and with 800 kegs of gunpowder, cases of matches and turpentine, all stowed in close proximity to the coal; and that when about six weeks out the coal ignited and the ship was only saved by throwing overboard all the gunpowder and by taking her into the harbour of Rio, where the remainder of the inflammable cargo was discharged, the cost of the jettisoned gunpowder having been charged to general average, so that the loss, instead of falling on those responsible, has to be borne by the owners of the cargo, or their underwriters; and, whether the Board of Trade does not consider itself authorized and bound to stop a vessel so improperly loaded?
  SIR CHARLES ADDERLEY: Sir, I believe that the circumstances of the case are correctly stated in the Question. The ship, not being an emigrant ship, the case did not come under the Passengers Act, and therefore, she was not altogether prohibited from carrying explosives. The Explosive Substances Act of 1875 was certainly broken by the shippers in the mode of packing, and the improved bye-laws under that Act had not then been put in force by the Thames Conservancy when this ship went to sea in June 1876. The Merchant Shipping Act of last year makes it the duty of the Board of Trade to detain any ship going to sea improperly loaded; and with that provision, it being the interest of crews and shippers and underwriters to inform the Board of

  1757
  Trade Inspectors of any such improper loading, and the improved Conservancy bye-laws, which the Board of Trade sanctioned last November, it is scarcely possible that such a case as this could occur again in the port of London.

THE ORDNANCE SURVEY.—QUESTION.
MR. PAGETasked the First Commissioner of Works, When the Revised Ordnance Survey for the county of Somerset will be completed and available for general use; by what date the whole of the Revised Ordnance Survey of the United Kingdom will be completed if the work be continued at the same rate of progress as at present; what would be the shortest time in which the Survey could be completed if sufficient funds were forthcoming for that purpose; and, what is the estimated sum of money required for such conpletion?
MR. GERARD NOEL,in reply, said, he would read the following communication, which he had received from the Director of the Ordnance Survey in regard to points on which the hon. Member desired information:—
"The survey of Somersetshire according to present arrangements will not be completed in less than 15 years, excepting the northern portion of the county, which as it contains part of the Bristol coal-field will have precedence, and will probably be completed and available for general use in six or eight years. I estimate that it will take from 18 to 20 years to complete the cadastral survey of England and Wales. The time in which the survey could be completed might probably be reduced to 16 years by increasing the annual Votes for the survey; but this course does not seem desirable, since we cannot obtain trained surveyors, draughtsmen, and engineers from outside, and there would be an additional expense incurred in training new men. The probable cost is estimated at from £1,800,000 to £2,000,000.

SCOTCH HISTORICAL RECORDS—THE GRANT.—QUESTION.
MR. MACKINTOSHasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the Grant of £1,000 to the Lord Clerk Register of Scotland for the publication of Calendars and Scotch Historical Records has been discontinued in whole or in part; and, if so, to state the causes of its discontinuance?
MR. W. H. SMITH: The grant, Sir, has not been discontinued, either in whole or in part. If the hon. Gentleman
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refers to the Estimates of last year, he will find there is there a Vote for £1,000, and a similar Vote for £1,000 is proposed for this year. The whole of the money was not spent in 1875-6, in consequence of the death of one of the editors employed in the work, and therefore a considerable portion was surrendered to the Exchequer.

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1876.—UNSEAWORTHY SHIPS.—QUESTION.
MR. E. J. REEDasked the President of the Board of Trade, If he would state whether one-half of the ships detained (by Board of Trade officers) as unseaworthy were ships classed at Lloyds; if he has observed that several of the ships classed at Lloyds were detained for "overloading," for which Lloyds were not responsible; and, whether the Parliamentary Returns will in future be so prepared as to enable the House to distinguish between ships arrested when under repair, or in port for purpose of repair, and ships otherwise arrested?
SIR CHARLES ADDERLEY: Sir, my statement that one-half of the ships detained for defective hulls and equipments by Board of Trade officers are ships classed at Lloyds, is taken from a Return of vessels detained during the three months of November, December, and January, since the Act of last year came into force. The following are the details: — Fifty ships were detained during those three months after the Act of last year came into force in November. Of these, 22 were classed. Twelve were detained for defective hulls and equipments, of which six were classed at Lloyds. No ships are detained under the Act of last year while under repair, or in port for repair; but only when proceeding to go to sea.
MR. E. J. REEDgave Notice that on the Vote for the Board of Trade Surveyors he would call attention to the subject.

HARBOURS OF REFUGE—THE NORTH EAST COAST.—QUESTION.
SIR EARDLEY WILMOTasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether his attention has been directed to the very disastrous effects of the late severe gale on the north-east coast, whereby in one night, as reported in the

1759
"Standard," thirty-six fishing boats were wrecked and 215 men and boys were drowned, leaving, as stated, 88 widows and 164 young children destitute; and, whether, having regard to this and numerous other disasters to shipping, Her Majesty's Government will provide, at the national expense, additional harbour accommodation on that coast?
SIR CHARLES ADDERLEY: I must say, Sir, that I think a worse case could hardly have been cited as an argument in favour of a harbour of refuge on the East Coast, for the gale referred to was partly from the West and West-north-west. The beats fishing were on the Dogger Bank, off the Dutch coast. If the hon. Baronet thinks that, under those circumstances, they could try to beat up against the gale to get to a harbour of refuge on the East Coast, I must say I cannot agree with him. However, as regards the general question of harbours of Refuge, Her Majesty's Government and their Predecessors have both expressed a decided opinion that the money for these harbours should not be provided at the national expense, but only aided as far as may be by loans under the harbours Act.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY BILL—PETITIONS.—QUESTION.
MR. GOSCHENasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether a Petition has been presented to Lord Salisbury from resident Graduates in Oxford, with reference to the removal of all clerical restrictions upon College emoluments; and, if so, whether that Petition can be laid upon the Table of the House; whether there will be any objection to take the necessary steps to obtain, for the information of this House, Copies of the Petitions of various Colleges in Oxford, presented to the House of Lords or to the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, with reference to the Oxford University Bill last year?
MR. GATHORNE HARDY,in reply, said, he had communicated with his noble Friend.(Lord Salisbury), and had ascertained from him that a memorial had been presented to him, which the right hon. Gentleman no doubt had seen, signed by 109 resident graduates on the subject. That, he presumed, was the document to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, and, there
1760
being no objection, he would be ready to facilitate in every way its production, if the right hon. Gentleman would move for it. His noble Friend had no other memorial except that printed document which had been generally circulated. As to the Petitions to the House of Lords, it would be thought very irregular to ask for them, and most of them had, he believed, been laid in the same form before the House of Commons. Certain Memorials, presented to his noble Friend by different Colleges, were moved for in the other House last year; and if the right hon. Gentleman would move that they be communicated to the House of Commons, there would be no objection to that course. While he was speaking on the subject of the University Bill, he might state, for the convenience of hon. Members, that he proposed, with the consent of the House, to go into Committee on the Bill pro formâ, with a view of inserting Amendments in it, and so shortening the proceedings when the time came for taking the Committee in the regular way.

RUSSIA—THE POLISH PROVINCES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. O'CLERYasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If it is intended by Her Majesty's Ministers to urge upon the Czar the desirability of effecting such reforms and ameliorations in the Government of his Polish subjects, by the introduction of representative and constitutional institutions as may serve by way of precedent for the guidance of the Government of the Sultan in the work of regeneration in the Ottoman dominions, so earnestly desired by the Emperor of Russia in the cause of humanity and civilization?
  MR. BOURKE: In reply to the hon. Member, I have to state that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make any such representations to the Emperor of Russia.

THE HOME OFFICE—RECEPTION OF DEPUTATIONS.—QUESTION.
MR. MITCHELL-HENRYasked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether any steps have been taken or will be taken, at the Home Office, to improve the accommodation for the reception of deputations?
MR. GERARD NOEL: In answer, Sir, to the Question of the hon. Gentleman, I am happy to inform him that, with the consent of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, an arrangement will at once be made to improve the accommodation for the reception of deputations. The present reception room will be considerably enlarged by adding to it one of the adjoining rooms. I trust this will be found to be satisfactory, and afford ample accommodation for the large and important deputations which attend the Home Office.

COMMON LAW COURTS (IRELAND).

  QUESTION.
  MR. PARNELLasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If the Chief Judges of the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer at Dublin have presented a Memorial or other document to Her Majesty's Government respecting the patronage to the principal offices in each of those Courts, which has been heretofore vested in the Lord Lieutenant; and, if so, whether he will lay upon the Table of the House Copies of such Memorial or document, or state the reasons alleged by the Memorialists why such transfer of patronage should be made?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. GIBSON), (for Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH): The Government, Sir, has received no such memorial as that referred to in the Question of the hon. Gentleman from the Chief Judges of the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer at Dublin. The only official communication made on the subject to the Government was contained in a joint letter of all the Common Law Judges, including the Chief Judges, dated April 27th, 1876. That was printed last Session as a Parliamentary Paper, on the Motion of the right hon. and learned Baronet the Member for Clare.

  UNITED STATES—EXTRADITION—BRENT'S CASE.—QUESTIONS.
  MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY (for Mr. MELDON)asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, At what date Charles Ennis Brent was surrendered to the United States Government; whether there was any consent or undertaking
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  on the part of the United States Government not to try Brent for any crime save that for which he had been committed for extradition; whether the cases of Winslow and Gray in any respect differed in principle from that of Brent; and, whether Winslow and Gray have been surrendered; and, if not, why they have not been committed for extradition?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS,in reply, said, that Charles Ennis Brent had been surrendered to the United States Government on the 20th of December, 1876, under the circumstances stated in the Papers, "North America, No. 1," which had been issued. There was no direct undertaking on the part of the United States Government; but as a matter of fact Her Majesty's Government knew that no additional crime would be charged against the prisoner. There was no difference in principle between the case of Brent and those of Winslow and Gray, but they, having gone out of the country, could not be surrendered.
  MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY (for Mr. MELDON)asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there has been any further correspondence respecting extradition with the United States Government since the month of December last; and, if so, when the same will be laid before the House?
  MR. BOURKE, in reply, said, there had been some further correspondence since the time specified in the Question of the hon. Gentleman; but as the negotiations on the subject bad not been concluded, he did not think it would be advisable to lay it on the Table of the House at the present moment.

THE CATTLE PLAGUE—OUTBREAK AT HULL.—QUESTION.
COLONEL KINGSCOTEasked the noble Lord the Vice President of the Council, Whether it is true that there has been a fresh outbreak of Rinderpest or Cattle Plague since that which occurred at Hull?
VISCOUNT SANDON: I very much regret, Sir, to say that my hon. and gallant Friend is right in his surmise. On Friday, the 9th instant, in the afternoon, a Report was conveyed to the Privy Council through the local Inspector, that a case of cattle plague had been discovered in Lincolnshire, about

1763
nine miles from Great Grimsby. The Chief Inspector of the Privy Council was sent down on Saturday morning, and he reports that there is no doubt whatever of the disease being cattle plague. There were 24 animals on the farm, several of which have been affected. They are all being slaughtered now, and the Inspector remains on the spot to investigate the origin of the outbreak.

PARLIAMENT — ORDER OF PUBLIC BUSINESS—THE EASTER RECESS.

  QUESTIONS.
  MR. BERESFORD HOPEasked, Whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer was prepared to state the course of Business for the next fortnight, and when the Easter Recess would commence?
  MR. HANKEYalso asked the right hon. Gentleman, Whether there would be any inconvenience to the Government in commencing Business at a quarter past 4 o'clock?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I propose, as it is at present rather early in the Session to talk of commencing Business at a quarter past 4, to defer my answer to the Question asked by the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. With regard to the course of Business for the next fortnight, I do not know that I am in a position absolutely to foretell what the House may do. The present intention of the Government is to take Supply on Thursday next, and on Monday we hope to proceed with the Committee on the Prisons Bill. I am not able to say what length of time the House may take for that Business; but if we shall have succeeded in disposing of that Bill on Monday, the Universities Bill, which stands next in order, will come on; but I do not like to forecast too much. Now, with respect to the Recess, as I stated the other day, something will depend upon the progress of our financial Bills; but if we make the reasonable progress with them that we anticipate, I hope the House may be able to adjourn on Tuesday, the 27th instant, in Passion Week, until Thursday, the 5th of April. I trust the House will not object, in that case, to give facilities for proceeding with the Business which the Government desire to dispose of
  1764
  before the Adjournment for the Easter Recess.
  LORD ESLINGTONasked, Whether it was the intention of the Government to proceed with the Maritime Contracts Bill before: Easter? He believed there was considerable objection on the part of hon. Members to the referring of that important Bill to a Select Committee without an adequate debate upon it.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, with regard to the Maritime Contracts Bill, I am sorry to find that there is not so much probability of its speedily passing the second reading as I had at one time anticipated; but, of course, if it is thought desirable to have a discussion upon it, we must arrange to fix the second reading for a time when the Bill may be fully considered. Whether that can be done before Easter or not, I am not in a position to say.
  In reply to Mr. BERESFORD HOPE,
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, the Easter holiday which he had indicated certainly was longer than a week, and he hoped that at Whitsuntide the House would be able to take a longer holiday.
  SIR JOSEPH M'KENNAasked the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the Valuation of Property (Ireland) Bill would be taken before Easter?
  MR. W. H. SMITH: I hope to be able to take the second reading of that Bill, but it will depend upon the feelings of the Irish Members.

SUPPLY-NAVY ESTIMATES.

  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

NAVAL PENSION FUND.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  CAPTAIN PRICE,on rising "to call attention to the proposed scheme for raising a fund to provide pensions for the widows of seamen in the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines," said, that last year, when the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had introduced the Navy Estimates he had been kind enough to

  1765
  say that this subject should have the careful consideration of the Board, so that he had the authority of that right hon. Gentleman for considering it a question of considerable importance. It was hardly necessary to remind the House of the peculiar dangers to which our seamen and Marines were exposed in war and peace, or of the poverty and distress which followed in the train of such fearful disasters as the blowing up of the Thunderer and the foundering of the Captain. It was, however, only when disasters of that character occurred that a general sympathy was aroused, and the public acknowledged the claims which the widows and orphans of the sufferers had upon them. These women and children formed no small portion of the paupers in the workhouses at Portsmouth and Devonport. There were, too, the widows of those men who died in such unhealthy climates as the West Coast of Africa, while they were putting down the Slave Trade. Again, there were the widows and orphans of men who were drowned at sea, and of those who were killed by accident. Whenever a subscription was got up on behalf of these poor people, it was a remarkable fact that invariably a large amount was subscribed by the men themselves. For instance, in the case of the Thunderer, there was a subscription of about £10,000, and of that sum at least one-fourth was raised by seamen and Marines. A very large sum was also raised in the seaport towns, and the remainder chiefly in London. Little or nothing, however, was contributed by the inhabitants of the great inland towns which were the centres of our commercial wealth. He did not complain of this, but he appealed to the Representatives of those towns to assist him in securing the object he had in view, inasmuch as the Navy had done much to enable them to amass their wealth, and to give them the peaceable enjoyment of it. The seamen and Marines were unwilling to be continually appealing to charity, and therefore some 10 or 12 years ago a number of petty officers conceived the idea that the men, by subscribing in large numbers a small amount monthly, might raise sufficient money in the aggregate to provide pensions for their widows and orphan children. The only question for the House to consider was, whether they would be able to do that
  1766
  of themselves, or whether they should have the assistance of others. It was his opinion that they could not carry out their object without assistance; and he would now proceed to show how that assistance could be given to them without putting the country to the expense of a single halfpenny—nay, in a way which would put a large sum annually into the pockets of the taxpayers. The movement to which he was calling attention did not make much progress until the great disaster of the Captain, in 1870, gave an impetus to it, and several eminent naval officers took it up. Schemes more or less elaborate were forwarded to the Admiralty, but various objections were raised to thorn. Finally, in 1874, the men again put their heads together and produced a scheme which was sent to the Admiralty, and which the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord alluded to in 1876. In the introduction to that scheme it was stated that the men desired a deduction to be made from their pay in order to enable their widows to receive a pension at the rate provided by the accompanying rules. The first rule was that every man should pay 6d. a-month as long as he received any pay or pension from the Service. Then it was proposed that a widow should be entitled to a pension of £24 a-year, and that certain amounts should be given to the children. The Admiralty were pleased with the scheme, and sent out a Circular, the replies to which showed that no fewer than 22,000 men agreed to subscribe to this fund on the basis proposed. The scheme was next submitted to Mr. Finlaison, the eminent actuary, who issued a clear Report, the pith of which was that the amount the men proposed to subscribe would not be nearly sufficient for the purpose. The men were disappointed, but they were not disheartened, and accordingly set themselves to re-consider the matter. They accordingly resolved to modify the scheme, and agreed that they would subscribe 1s., or even 1s. 6d. a-month if necessary; that they would be content with a pension beginning with £20 a-year to widows; and that the children should not be included in the scheme. This amended scheme had been presented to the Admiralty, but he did not yet know what Report had been made on it, or with what amount of favour they regarded it. He had, however,

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  made certain calculations which showed what would be the probable working of the fund. Taking an average force of 20,000 men, of whom 15,000 were on active service and 5,000 on the pension list—which would really represent the number on the pension list for many years—the death-rate in this force, according to the last Returns, would be about 285—namely, 135 on active service and 150 on the pension list. It was not proposed that the latter should be called upon to subscribe anything, that was, the existing pensioners; but for the future the men who passed from active service on to the pension list would be subscribers. What number of widows would these men leave? It was almost impossible to ascertain the number; but taking the Captain as a test, the 433 seamen and Marines lost in her had left 120 widows, or less than one-third of the whole number. One-third of 285 would be 95, but taking a large margin, he would assume that 120 widows were likely to come on the fund every year. Allowing a reduction of 6 per cent in the course of the year for death and re-marriages, which would disqualify them for taking advantage of the fund, he calculated that the number of widows at the end of the second year would be 233, and so the number would go on increasing by the annual increment of 120, minus the 6 per cent, until, at the end of the 90th year, there would be about 2,000 widows on the fund, and from that year the numbers would be perpetually recurring. For each widow there would be required a pension of £20 per annum, and the maximum charge on the fund for these widows would be £40,000. Towards this sum he proposed that the men should subscribe 1s. 8d. a-month, or £20,000 a-year, which should be supplemented by another £20,000 from extraneous sources, making in all £40,000 per annum. The pensions for the first year would amount to £2,400, leaving a balance on the year of £37,600. On this he would allow 3 per cent interest, which would bring it up to £38,916. So it would go on accumulating until, at the end of the 17th year, the estimated amount of accumulation would be £571,000, after defraying the charges of the year. The interest on this accumulation at 3½ per cent would be £20,000, just equal to the grant from extraneous sources, which
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  might then be dropped. Now, he might be asked what were the extraneous sources from which he proposed to raise the second £20,000. There were, as a rule, fewer fines in the Navy than in the Army. In the Army, for example, there was an extensive system of fines, amounting to £90,000 a-year, of which £35,000 went back into the soldiers' pockets in the shape of rewards for good conduct and long service. In the Navy, however, the fines only amounted to £2,500 a-year. Here was one source. Then the Government now gained no less than £65,000 a-year from the difference between the money paid to the men in respect of provisions saved by them and the actual cost of those provisions. Surely the Government were not acting quite fairly towards the men if they surrendered provisions worth 1s. and the Government only returned them 9d. A considerable part of this sum might be applicable towards the purpose he had mentioned. Then there were the clothing and unclaimed money of men who died at sea, and the effects of deserters. These would produce £3,000. The skimming from the boiling of the men's provisions now produced £1,000, but as the men had no interest in saving it, a great deal now wont overboard. This honestly belonged to the men, as it came from their own provisions, and would produce another £2,000. These amounts, taken together, would fully satisfy the demand. The desire of the men that such a fund should be started was very much increasing throughout the Navy, and, if established, it would effect a saving to the country instead of involving any loss, because it would lessen the number of desertions. The desertions in the Navy numbered 1,000 a-year, and it was variously estimated that each man cost the country from £200 to £300 or £400 a-man. Taking the loss at £150, which he thought was quite within bounds, we had here a total of £150,000 a-year, one-half of which he believed might be saved by establishing a widows fund. In the port of Plymouth alone he found that 117 widows of seamen were receiving parochial relief. With a scheme of the kind which he proposed, we should encourage in our seamen provident habits, general respectability, and matrimony; for though marriage might be of doubtful advantage as regarded the

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  Army, in the Navy he thought the more married men we had the better. Such a scheme would also attract the best men from the Merchant Service, which was very desirable. There was only one serious objection which he had heard of to the proposal. It might, no doubt, be said that if they did this for the Navy they should also do it for the Army; but it was to be remembered that, while each Service had some advantages which the other had not, the difference in those advantages was entirely a difference in kind, and not a difference in degree. He did not wish that the Navy should have greater advantages than the Army; but there were many reasons why they should look upon the Navy, in a totally different aspect, in this respect, from the Army. The Army might be described as a short-service corps, which the Navy was not; and, of course, this scheme would apply only to the continuous-service men of the Navy. Moreover, soldiers were often allowed to have their wives with them, and their children were supported and educated by the State. As seamen were deprived of most comforts during their lives, they were at least entitled to ask the assistance of the State for those they left behind them. In conclusion, he begged to thank the House for having heard him with so much patience. He thought he had said sufficient to show that the subject was one which deserved attention; and he believed the plan which he had sketched contained within it the germs of a system of co-operation which would be beneficial to the country and productive of great advantages to the Navy, and to the seamen whom we employed.

  NAVY—H.M.S. "VANGUARD."

    OBSERVATIONS.
    DR. CAMERON,in rising to call attention to the history of the Admiralty Negotiations for the raising of H.M.S. "Vanguard," said: The loss of the Vanguard occurred on the 1st of September, 1875. She had sunk on the Kish Bank in such a depth of water that it would evidently be a matter of the greatest difficulty to raise her. The tide swept over her at four miles an hour, carrying in its stream the sails and cordage in such a manner as sometimes to endanger the lives of the divers who went down to the wreck. On two separate
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    occasions were divers hauled up apparently lifeless; and on one of these it required the united strength of seven or eight men to pull the diver clear from the wreck in which he had got entangled. And these risks had to be encountered, not in connection with the most difficult, but most important operation of surveying the hull of the vessel and the bed on which she lay, but in connection with the comparatively easy work which lay above her deck. A survey of the vessel was of course attempted, and on one occasion, according to the Annual Register, two divers
    "successfully reached the hull, which lies in deep darkness, and measured the hole in the side by means of notching a wooden lath carried down for the purpose and placed against the aperture. The Denayrouze lamp," the account goes on to say, "which had been materially useful in removing the rigging of the ship, was not taken down on this occasion, inasmuch as the divers required to use both hands in endeavouring to escape entanglement by some stray rope."
    Well, Sir, it is evident that the survey thus described could hardly be regarded as a very satisfactory one. Now, my enumeration of blunders in the conduct of this business commences at this point, and I have here to point out that, notwithstanding the all-importance of obtaining an accurate survey of the vessel, the authorities neglected what was probably the most obvious means of securing information. The depth of water in which the vessel lay was 120 feet—a depth at which it could hardly be expected that the Dockyard divers, who are not accustomed to deep-sea work would find themselves at home, and at which only divers of exceptional experience, expertness, and daring could hope to exceed. Gentlemen conversant with salvage operations tell me that under such circumstances the choice of men is very restricted, and that they would have to pay the proper men as high as £5 per dive to induce them to undertake such a task. The Admiralty, however—if I am rightly informed—never attempted to avail themselves of the assistance of these experts, and contented themselves with the services of Dockyard men utterly unaccustomed to deep-water work, and paid only a few shillings per hour. The result was that I am assured by practical men that they regard the Report as to the vessel being sunk into the sand, which was put forth as the reason for the Admiralty abandon-

    1771
    ing the attempt to raise her, as unreliable, and probably founded in error. On the 6th of December, the Admiralty advertized for tenders for raising the Vanguard and delivering her in dock, on certain conditions. Among these were—1st, the very necessary one that all parties tendering should furnish satisfactory evidence of their financial ability to undertake the work; 2nd, That no payment was to be made to the contractor, nor any claim to payment arise, until the delivery was complete; and 3rd, That in the event of the rate of progress not being satisfactory to their Lordships, their Lordships should be at liberty to cancel the contract, and that the parties whose tender should be accepted should sign a contract to be prepared at the Admiralty, binding them to give effect to their tender on the conditions advertized, and such further or other conditions as might be agreed on. All tenders were to be for a lump sum, and they were to be sent in not later than February 1st of last year. My information as to the result of this competition is devived from an article in The Standard newspaper of April 10th, 1876. According to that article, the advertizement for tenders had elicited 450 replies, and a contract for raising the vessel had been entered into with a French engineer who had for a considerable time been resident in England. The plan on which the vessel was to be raised was described as being a combination of air balloons, inflated in the interior of the vessel, and caissons attached to her externally; but the writer added that the plan proposed had never been tried in practice. The article then proceeded to give quotations from the agreement entered into between the French engineer and the Admiralty, of which Articles 10 and 11 were as follows:—
    The [Admiralty] Inspector appointed to watch the operations, should he disapprove of any procedure on the part of the contractor, may give him notice to discontinue the work; and, if the Admiralty wish, all operations are to cease and. the plant to be removed; and should the Admiralty find the modus operandi inapplicable, they are at liberty to cancel the agreement."
    The article concluded that the contractor was to commence operations in earnest in May. Who, then, was this French engineer who had been successful among 450 competitors, who had such confidence
    1772
    in his scheme that he was prepared to set to work without any advance, and venture the success of his project at any moment up to its full completion on the irresponsible caprice of an unknown Inspector to be appointed by the Admiralty? The engineer in question was a M. Louis Othon, of 8, Victoria Chambers, Westminster, formerly acting partner of Messrs. de Valbams & Company, a concern carrying on business as a long firm —or something very like it—in the City, and at that moment hopelessly insolvent. He knew nothing whatever about salvage operations, and, if I am rightly informed, had adopted the plan which commended itself to the Admiralty from one of the numberless specifications of inventions connected with the raising of ships, procurable from the Patent Office. What conceivable motive—hon. Members will ask—could such a man have in putting in such a tender? Sir, M. Othon was too experienced a financier not fully to appreciate the importance of credit. His credit had of late been very much out at the elbows, and he believed that the confidence reposed in him by the Admiralty would result, if not in the raising of the Vanguard, at least in the restoration of a marketable value to his note of hand. I think, Sir, it was an unfortunate nobleman, not unknown to the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Whalley), and at present languishing in Dartmoor Prison, who remarked that Providence having endowed some men with money and no brains, and other men with brains and no money, surely the men with money and no brains must be intended for the benefit of those with brains and no money. It was this great principle which M. Louis Othon, the unknown French engineer, proceeded to carry into practice, at the expense of the august and redoubtable Lords Commissioners of the British Admiralty.
    MR. WHALLEYrose to say that as the hon. Member had referred to a sentiment said to have been expressed by the unfortunate Tichborne Claimant, he begged emphatically to deny that the Claimant had ever in speech or writing given expression to such a sentiment.
    DR. CAMERON: I am sorry that the hon. Member has dispelled my illusion as to the authorship of the maxim I quoted, for I have always considered the sentiment so tersely expressed as one of the most remarkable sayings of a very remarkable man. However, the manner in which

    1773
    M. Othon proceeded to turn his negotiations with the Admiralty to account was so ludicrous, that I trust the House will pardon me if I describe it at some little length. At the very time when the Admiralty were advertising for tenders—in December, 1875, before M. Othon became a civil engineer, when he was still a member of the long firm, ordering everything that was offered to him, and paying in acceptances—he had obtained, under the name of H. de Valbams & Co., a consignment of corks from a Bordeaux cork merchant, and paid for them in the usual manner, the acceptances being—as usual —dishonoured. As de Valbams & Co., M. Othon had apparently found corks a commodity easy to float in all states of the market, and possibly he thought they might assist him in floating the Vanguard. At all events, no sooner had he acquired a reflected credit from his dealings with the Admiralty, than he cast his eyes once more to Bordeaux, and made a bid for another consignment of corks. Accordingly, he wrote the Bordeaux merchant a letter dated May 6, 1876, of which I hold a copy. In this letter, after informing the cork merchant that he had formerly been a partner in De Valbams & Co., and reminding him that he (the cork merchant) held the acceptances of that firm for about £300, M. Othon goes on to say—
    "Seeing that these all bear the signature of H. de Valbams & Co., adhibited by me, and that said house is insolvent, owing to my having retired, and seeing that I have accepted the responsibility of this affair, I wish to fulfil the engagements towards you into which that house has entered. You cannot be ignorant that I hold a contract from the English Government for the raising of the Vanguard, for which I receive £50,000 for the ship alone, beside 50 per cent on all that is found in her, such as guns, boats, provisions, cables, munitions, arms, effects, plate, money, &c., everything, in fact, which is not the carcase of the ship, and as the value of these is estimated at £200,000, there is £100,000 to add to the £50,000, or in all £150,000. The salvage operations will not cost more than £15,000, and as I divide my profits with the capitalists who assist me, in this affair, there is still a sum of £60,000 at least which remains for my share.… Here, then, is what I propose. One may find people who will give one £20,000 to raise the Vanguard, but one can find few people to lend one £300 to pay one's debts, and, moreover, you can hardly ask for £300 to pay private debts from gentlemen who guarantee £20,000 for a great affair like this. In short, you have notes of the house of H. de Valbams & Co. for about £300. I do not expect to be able to meet these notes at their maturity, because my work will not be sufficiently advanced; and what I propose is
    1774
    that you should send me £300 worth of corks, to cover which I shall give you my acceptance at 3 months, and for the notes in circulation I will pay £150 when they fall due, and will renew for the other £150. It is understood that the bills shall bear my signature, L. Othon, civil engineer, 8, Victoria Chambers, Westminster, a circumstance which will assist their negotiation, for now people in France as well as in England know the Laureate of the Admiralty, and my reputation has a value of its own. It is of course a speculation, but at the price which you charge for your corks you can afford to risk something.
    (Signed) "L. OTHON.
    "8 Victoria Chambers, Westminster."
    The cork merchant, however, had had enough of business with Messrs. do Valbams & Co., and instead of forwarding to him more corks, took steps for the capture of M. Othon, sending over among other documents the letter I have read, and an affidavit in which he plainly states "that the manner in which his goods had been obtained was simply a fraud." Now, Sir, might I ask the right hon. Gentleman how it came that the Admiralty—the first condition in whose advertisement for tenders was that the tenderer should satisfy them of his financial ability to carry out his proposal—might I ask how it came that the Admiralty allowed from February to May to elapse without satisfying themselves as to the financial inability of M. Othon to perform what he was so ready to undertake? Can it possibly be true, as stated in The Broad Arrow, that he referred their Lordships to a bank in his native town, but that they never took the trouble to inquire whether that bank had any existence? Well, towards the end of June last, I observed in the papers a statement to the effect that the Admiralty had definitely adopted Dr. Rutherford's plan for raising the Vanguard, and had advertised for tenders, and, in consequence, I asked the right hon. Gentleman whether the statement was true, and, if so, whether the contract alleged to have been entered into with M. Othon had been rescinded. In reply the right hon. Gentleman informed me that no definite contract had been concluded with M. Othon, although there had been negotiations with him. These negotiations had, however, been broken off, and the Admiralty were at that moment negotiating with two other parties. One of the parties was Dr. Rutherford, of Newcastle, with whom, I understand, the Admiralty kept up

    1775
    communications for several months, at one time objecting to the sum he named, then when he had consented to modify his demand, laying down an entirely new basis for negotiations, and finally breaking off with him altogether. The other day I wrote to ask Dr. Rutherford some particulars of the negotiations with the Admiralty, and this is his reply—
    "Most of the Admiralty letters to me are in London, otherwise I should send you a copy of the whole correspondence, which extended over three months or more. I got out working drawings and specifications, which were furnished to the Admiralty. Gentlemen of financial experience and standing undertook the establishment of a company to carry out the contract if I got it. And to this hour I do not know why the negotiations fell through. No reason whatever was assigned. I cannot conceive anything more unbusinesslike, or anything more fitted to drive away men of ability and integrity from Admiralty contracts. The entire history reveals the utmost infirmity of purpose."
    At length, on August 11th, their Lordships once more advertized for tenders, this time for the purchase of the vessel as she lay. This time the conditions of the purchase were two-fold; first, that two-thirds of the purchase money should be paid within 14 days of acceptance of offer, and the remaining third within six months afterwards; and secondly, that the buyer was to hand over to the Government all guns, projectiles, anchors, and chain cables brought from the wreck at certain fixed prices. Now the prices offered were very far below the market value. For ten nine-inch 12½-ton guns, the value of which would not be far short of £10,000, it was proposed to pay only £2,500; and for the four 64-pounders, four 12-pounders, and one 9-pounder, which constituted the rest of her armament, only £384 for the lot. Nine-inch projectiles were to be taken over at £5 per ton, and chain cable at £1 1s. 6d. per ton. Tenders for the purchase of the vessel under these conditions were to belodged not later than November 1st. I need hardly say how important it was that a definite arrangement as to the tenders in terms of this advertisement should be come to without delay, so as to admit of preparations being made for the salvage operations during the approaching summer. In so simple a transaction as the sale of a vessel as she lay, it should have been an easy matter to select the highest bidder, and the fact
    1776
    of two-thirds of the purchase-money requiring to be deposited within 14 days should, one would think, have limited the amount of delay possible. And yet one tender having been accepted—again, I understand, from a gentleman financially unable to carry out his undertaking—instead of insisting on the deposit of two-thirds of the purchase-money within 14 days according to the terms of the advertisement, their Lordships prolonged this term again and again, and apparently only broke off the negotiations finally in the middle of January, after another two months of invaluable time had been wasted. In January they opened up negotiations with Captain Coppin, a gentleman of very large experience in raising sunken ships, and an understanding so definite was arrived at that I believe the necessary capital was in large part raised, and Captain Coppin and his friends believed that nothing remained to do but to sign the contract. The terms of this proposal were, that the contractors should pay for salvage the sum of £20,000 for a complete transfer of the vessel with everything on beard; that if the vessel was raised and placed in dry dock the Government was to have the option of purchasing her for £175,000, and that if she was not raised Government would allow the contractors two-thirds of the value of the guns and such other stores as might be recovered. Well, here again precious time was wasted in the most wanton manner, and when the contract came to be drawn up, it was found to contain conditions exposing the contractors to constant Admiralty interference, and providing that valuations, by whatever official they might appoint, should be taken as final — conditions which were never contemplated by the contractors, and to which no prudent man would submit. The result is, that we are now near the middle of March, another couple of months have been wasted in these negotiations, which, so far as I know, have as yet resulted in nothing, and practically, I fear, another summer has been lost. The Vanguard will certainly not improve by her long sojourn at the bottom. A lightship has to be stationed over her to warn passing vessels off the wreck, and only the other day an hon. Member asked the right hon. Gentleman a Question relative to the wreck of a vessel and the loss of

    1777
    several lives through her having mistaken the light placed over the Vanguard for the Kish light. What I protest against is the utter business incapacity which has been manifested throughout these negotiations, the result of which is that, after 18 months' delay, no single step has been taken to recover any of the £500,000 worth of national property which lies on the Kish Bank. The Admiralty have naturally no experience in such salvage operations. Why did they not go to the underwriters and find out some man who had? If they had got such a man—and from everything I hear they could not have got a better man than the very Captain Coppin with whom they are now negotiating—if they had followed the practice of underwriters, defraying his outlay and paying him either a percentage on salvage or a certain sum on the successful docking of the vessel, I venture to say that the chances are the Vanguard would have been got up last summer. But after a brief and feeble effort the Admiralty chose to abandon the attempt themselves, and advertised the vessel for sale. I confess I cannot see the smallest difficulty in the conduct of such a negotiation as the sale of the vessel as she lay. The Admiralty need care nothing about the plan of the contractor, nor the probability of success. All they had to do was to select the highest solvent bidder. But they must needs encumber the contract with all sorts of conditions which no rational man would undertake. In the worst case, I am assured there is little doubt about the possibility of getting up the guns and stores. Well, if the contractor was allowed to deal with them as he liked, he could afford to pay a price for the wreck on the chance of recovering her altogether, and the all but certainty of recovering so much stores as would repay a great part of his outlay. But no, the Admiralty must stipulate at one time that the guns, shot, cables, and so forth, must be handed over to them at a mere fraction of their value; at another, that the hull must on no account be broken up. Now, Sir, I do not attribute the bungling which has taken place in this affair to anything worse than carelessness and want of business aptitude among the officials entrusted with the negotiations, but I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that a much less charitable view of the matter is taken by dis-
    1778
    appointed contractors outside, and that they openly declare that the explanation of the whole thing is that the Admiralty, having failed to raise the vessels themselves, do not wish any one else to succeed, and that what would please the Department best is that the Vanguard should lie where she is till the day of doom. I have called attention to these negotiations, not in any spirit of hostility to the Government, or to the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, but in the hope that he himself will look into the matter, and that if unfortunately we should have occasion to raise some other vessel, or if perchance a hope still survives of raising the Vanguard, negotiations will in future be so conducted as to give the enterprize and inventive talent of the country something like fair play.
    MR. A. F. EGERTONsaid, that as the negotiations for raising the Vanguard had been conducted through his department of the Admiralty, any blame for that which the hon. Gentleman opposite (Dr. Cameron) had called "business inaptitude" must be laid to him. He would briefly state the history of the matter, and he would endeavour to show that the Admiralty had done the best in its power throughout the whole of these negotiations. The Vanguard was sunk on the 1st of September, 1875, and steps were immediately taken by means of a force of divers under one of our best officers to ascertain what was the state of the ship and what was to be done. The hon. Gentleman had found great fault with the Government divers, and he said there were other divers to be found who could have done, in all probability, a great deal more than the Government divers. He (Mr. Egerton) ventured altogether to traverse the statement. The French divers under M. Denayrouze who were consulted would not have anything to do with the ship, as they said she was so deep in the water, and the pressure was so great as to render it all but impossible for divers to work. As to the Admiralty divers, only two could be found to work, as there was great difficulty in working at the depth at which the ship was sunk. The pressure of air was so great that a man could remain below no longer than a quarter of an hour at a time. Only once had a man been on the deck of the ship since she was sunk, and that

    1779
    was by accident; he slipped from the bridge and was got up with difficulty, being nearly suffocated by the coiling of a rope round his neck. The Admiralty continued operations to see what they could do with the ship till early in December, when, in consequence of the necessity there would have been for building pontoons and withdrawing men from the dockyards for the works, it was thought wiser to give up all idea on the part of the Government of working on their own account, and to endeavour to induce parties outside to offer for raising the ship. On the 6th of December they invited offers, and in answer several hundred offers were made, some of them being of the wildest and most insane description. Three only were deemed worthy of consideration, and they were those of M. Othon, Mr. Sowerbutts, and Dr. Rutherford. M. Othon offered to raise the ship for £50,000, but the Admiralty were not satisfied as to his ability to obtain the money required, and the negotiation with him was closed on the 5th of June. The hon. Gentleman had given the House an amusing account of the financial operations of this gentleman; but with that the Admiralty had nothing to do. In the other two cases, Mr. Sowerbutts named £140,000, and Dr. Rutherford £150,000. Mr. Sowerbutts was asked to reduce the amount he had named, as was also Dr. Rutherford, who, in reply, asked the Admiralty to advance £5,000 and find the ships that would be required in connection with the work. That was a totally distinct offer, introducing conditions which the Admiralty could not entertain, as they had resolved not to advance a single halfpenny until the ship was delivered over to them, and, therefore, they declined the last offer on the 30th June, 1876. On the 1st of July Dr. Rutherford offered to raise the ship for £130,000, but that was thought too much, and with the decline of that offer, the negotiation was considered closed. It was then determined to advertise the ship for sale as she lay for a lump sum, and 11 tenders were received. While the advertisement was being drawn up, Dr. Rutherford reduced his offer to £100,000, but that was considered too much; he was informed the vessel would be offered for sale, and nothing further had been heard from him. He therefore failed to see what that gentleman had
    1780
    to complain of. Ultimately, negotiations were opened up with Captain Coppin, who thought he had discovered a plan by which men could continue to work at the depth at which the Vanguard was lying, and if a satisfactory arrangement were not entered in a short time, he should feel disappointed. He had given to the House as full an account as he could of the whole course of the negotiations, and considering all the difficulties and the length of time that had been required to examine the various plans sent in and the nearly absolute necessity there was of being very careful of any contracts they entered into, he really did not think that any opportunity had been lost, and he hoped the explanation he had given would be considered satisfactory.

  NAVY — WARRANT OFFICERS — THE ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1875.

    OBSERVATIONS. QUESTION.
    MR. GORST,in rising to call attention to the Order in Council of August 1875, relating to the pay and pensions of warrant officers, and to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether it can be so revised as to give the full rate of pay to all warrant officers employed in training, receiving, and Coast Guard reserve ships, and also in sea-going ships, such as the "Thunderer" and "Dreadnought," while fitting for the pennant, so as to place the warrant officers upon the same footing as all other officers employed in the above mentioned ships? said, there was a distinction between sea-going ships and what were called "other ships, and a distinction in the rate of pay of 1s. a-day was made between warrant officers and others serving in the two classes of ships. What made the grievance the more serious was, that it was confined to warrant officers only, every other person in the Navy, from the Admiral down to the sea-boy, receiving the same amount of pay, whether upon a sea-going ship, or what was called an "other ship." The origin of the practice seemed to be that in times gone by warrant officers who were not fit to go to sea, were placed in charge of hulks, and shut up on harbour duty. These men were at home and in the neighbourhood of their families, and it was reasonable, under the circumstances, they should be placed on a lower scale of pay; but at the pre-

    1781
    sent time those "other ships," as they were called, comprised some of the most important ships of the British Navy, including those of the First Reserve of the Coast Guard Squadron, training ships, and ships fitting for the pennant. The duties performed by the warrant officers were most important, and whether the ships were in port or at sea, he was quite sure when the matter was brought under the notice of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, steps would be taken to redress the grievance, and put an end to a state of things sanctioned by the Order in Council of August, 1875, and which was an injustice to the warrant officers. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by asking the Question.
    MR. CHILDERSsaid, before the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty replied, perhaps the House would allow him to say a few words in answer to the suggestions of the hon. and gallant Member for Devon-port (Captain Price), and the hon. and learned Member who had just spoken (Mr. Gorst). The proposal of the hon. and gallant Member for Devonport was not a new one, and so far as the Admiralty and the House were concerned, the question of whether widows' pensions should be granted to the widows of men in the Navy had been discussed and considered for a long time past. In regard to the warrant officers, he thought the Admiralty had changed its mind three times within the last generation, and Parliament had meekly approved each volte face. It was quite true, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman had stated, that the case of the men in the Navy was a peculiar and exceptional one. In no other Service were widows' pensions granted upon a system to officers. In the Army they were only granted in exceptional cases, and the same with the Civil Service; but in the Navy there was a complete system of pensions applicable to commissioned and warrant officers. Therefore it was quite a fair and legitimate question to ask in that House, whether, as the granting of pensions was the rule in the upper ranks, there was any distinct reason why the advantage which was conceded with respect to the widows of the officers should not be allowed also with regard to the widows of the men. He ventured to think, however, that the hon. and gallant Gentle-
    1782
    man's proposal to make deductions from the pay of the men in order to form a fund was open to grave objections. A similar scheme had some years ago been adopted in the Civil Service, and had altogether failed. Every deduction from pay to form a fund out of which pensions were to be granted was sure to be unsatisfactory, for no one would believe that the percentage deduction fairly represented his prospects of pension; and if, on the other hand, it proved inadequate, it would be impossible to increase it. He, therefore, warned the House not to constitute an accumulating fund, which was certain to be a failure. Whether any contribution should be made from public funds, was for the Treasury and Admiralty to decide; but he would suggest that if the Government thought fit to deal with the question, there was a perfectly simple way of doing it, which would be entirely voluntary on the part of the men themselves, by which nobody would be aggrieved, and by which, whether assisted or not from public funds, they would get an exact equivalent of the contributions they made. The plan would be this—that at or after the marriage of any seaman, either while in the service or after his pension was assigned to him, he should be able to apply to the Admiralty and request that a pension of £10 or £20 should be paid to his widow, provided she survived him, and that at the time of his death he was either in the service or a pensioner. An actuary would then calculate what sum should be deducted every month from his pay or pension, which would depend on his and his wife's age; and some part of this might be charged on public funds, in consideration of the cases where the men would leave the service before reaching pension, in which case his widow would get nothing. He now wished to say a few words on the subject of the Question of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham which to him was a perfectly simple one. In former days the warrant officers were on two classes of payharbour-service and sea-service pay. When he first went to the Admiralty he found there were no less than six different scales of pay. The harbour-pay men received from 4s. to Gs. per day, and the sea-service men from 5s. to 7s. per day, and there were three classes of each service. He very much improved the

    1783
    position of those officers, and made two classes instead of six—putting harbour and sea-service on the same footing. That gave a great been, and that reform was, he believed, approved by the whole Service. He would be the last to quarrel with the right hon. Gentleman, if he had thought it necessary to raise the scale still further; but he had gone back to the old system, and still further aggravated it by establishing seven rates of pay, again distinguishing sea-service from harbour-service. When the hon. and learned Member for Chatham placed his Notice on the Paper he (Mr. Childers) tried to find the Order in Council referring to this change in The Gazette, but he was unable to find it. Therefore he was not in a position really to understand what reason was given in the Order. He regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had gone back to the old system, to which there was so much objection, and he was confident that it would not satisfy the service. At all events, he believed it was a change for the worse, and he would join the hon. and learned Member for Chatham in pressing on the Admiralty to revert to the former system.

  NAVY—NAVAL CRIMINAL RETURNS.

    RESOLUTION.
    MR. P. A. TAYLOR,in rising to move—
    "That, in the opinion of this House, it is desirable that more detailed information should be furnished to Parliament in regard to crime and punishment in the Navy, such as was afforded by the Returns for the years 1863, 1864, and 1865,"
    said, that it was about 12 years ago since there were prepared and presented to the House for three successive years what he might call absolutely model Returns of crime and punishment in the Navy. That, however, had been stopped; in introducing these Returns Lord Clarence Paget stated that he intended to lay on the Table an annual Report of crimes and punishment in the Navy. This was no question of politics. There was in the country very great pride felt in the Navy, and he (Mr. Taylor) contended that it was most desirable that the fullest Returns should be presented, so that the country might ascertain the real condition of that arm of the Service. During
    1784
    the last 20 years a system of training our sailors had been organized; they were manufactured in a most artistic and deliberate way, and were made valuable man-machines. The deserters from the Navy numbered about 1,000 a-year, and the loss to the country was about one-third of a million sterling, and therefore it was essential, even on economic grounds, that they should know what was going on in the Navy, and how far the Service was benefited by the distribution of good-conduct money. The sum given for that purpose amounted to £60,000 or £70,000, and the House ought to know what benefits the country also derived from that large premium. The House ought further to know whether the Navy was effective, and whether those who constituted it were well treated and contented. The Admiralty Returns to which he had referred gave a record of every crime and every punishment in every ship and on every station, showing the average amount of crime, and naming the ships which were above or below the average, and they gave that information in an admirable manner; but they were suddenly stopped in 1867 by Sir John Pakington (now Lord Hampton) the only reason given being that the Returns were offensive to some of the commanding officers. Now he (Mr. Taylor) contended that that was one of the strongest reasons why the Returns should be given. The officers who objected to the Returns were not likely to be those for whom the country would have most consideration, and the excellent officers whose ships showed a good Return would be encouraged by such information being given to the House and the country. In France a most elaborate Report on the subject had been recently presented to the President by the Minister of Marine, embracing the most minute details; but in France they were alive to the importance of making such information known. The last Returns which had been presented to the House fell very far short of the Returns which had been previously given, for they classed all the crimes and punishments under two heads—namely, on the ships at home, and on the ships abroad. Now there might just as well be no discrimination at all, because it was impossible to ascertain from these Returns on which ship or at which station the crime was committed, or in what

    1785
    ships bad government or good government was going on. There were 65,264 summary punishments inflicted according to the Returns; but from the meagre information now supplied by our Government there was no means of ascertaining the nature of the offences for which, under the Naval Discipline Act, a system of Draconian severity, punishments—such, for instance, as that of flogging—were inflicted. The power of officers was enormous, and all that was asked was, that they might see how it was exercised. The officers had more to do with the discipline of the ship than the men themselves. But the ships varied at the same station in the amount of crime. For instance, at one station, in 1862, three ships had no convictions at all for minor offences, while one had 2899 per 1,000. At the same station, in 1863, there were none in two ships, while the highest was 4339 per 1,000. For insubordination, in 1862, at one station three ships had no convictions, while one had 200 per 1,000, and another 417 per 1,000. In 1863, on a foreign station, while 14 ships had no flogging, the highest had 200 per 1,000. In conclusion, he would say that ours was the only service in which the punishment of flogging was retained, and for that reason he trusted that the Returns would be granted, because he thought the House ought to have the fullest opportunity of judging of the character both of the officers and the men. He begged to move the Resolution of which he had given Notice.
    Amendment proposed,
    To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, it is desirable that more detailed information should be furnished to Parliament in regard to crime and punishment in the Navy, such as was afforded by the Returns for the years 1863, 1864, and 1865."—(Mr. P. A. Taylor,)
    —instead thereof.
    MR. HUNTsaid, that as the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) had raised a distinct question upon the Amendment, it would be convenient to reply to him at once, and leave the other subjects to be dealt with after the decision of the House had been taken on this point. The hon. Member had expressed a desire that the Returns presented to the House with regard to Crime
    1786
    and Punishment in the Navy should be similar to those furnished for the years 1863 and 1864. The Return relating to the latter year was presented to the House in 1866, and he was inclined to think that no similar Return had since been presented. The Returns had not been renewed by the Admiralty under the Administration of his noble Friend Lord Hampton (then Sir John Pakington), nor under the administration of his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), and of his right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen). When the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leicester brought forward the subject two years ago, it appeared to him (Mr. Hunt), on thinking the matter over, that it was not desirable that such detailed Returns should be presented but he thought it reasonable that the House should have some information respecting crime and punishment in the Navy; and, accordingly, he directed that a Return should be prepared and laid on the Table last year, believing that it would satisfy the House upon the subject. He should have thought that the Return would have given a great amount of satisfaction to the lion. Member, because the hon. Member would discover from it that corporal punishment, though not abolished by law, was nearly extinct in the Navy, and that courts martial rarely had recourse to that punishment, which, in his own opinion, should be resorted to as little as possible, and only where the cases were of a very aggravated character. The hon. Gentleman wished, however, to have the very detailed account which appeared in the Returns for 1863 and 1864, giving a statement as to the amount of crime and punishment not only on every station, but on every ship. The experience of the Admiralty was that those costly Returns did not produce a good effect. Instead of being found advantageous they were found to have the opposite effect, for they put such a pressure on commanders of ships that some of them shrank from doing their duty. In one instance it appeared that there were many cases of theft on a particular ship and none at all on another. Did the hon. Gentleman think this depended on the disposition of the commanding officer? Was it not clear that there were more thieves on one ship than on

    1787
    the other? No commanding officer would ever overlook a case of theft. Again, it might happen that in some ships there was a greater number of young men than in other ships, and, as hon. Members were aware, boys were much more troublesome at ages between boyhood and manhood than they were at other periods of their lives. When one commanding officer had on board his vessel a large proportion of these young ordinary seamen, he found a great deal of trouble in dealing with them; and was, in some cases, obliged to resort to flogging. The consequence was, that because he had more of these boys than other commanding officers had, he seemed to be gibbetted, and shown up by this unfair comparison. Ought he to have his capability as an officer called in question by the House of Commons? This consideration had weighed very much with previous Boards of Admiralty. The Administration which preceded him did not think proper to renew the Returns, and no Return had lately been presented till last year, when he laid on the Table a Return which he proposed to continue, and which, in his opinion, gave the House sufficient information on the subject. For the reasons he had given, he thought it was not desirable to go into all the details which had been given in the Returns for the years 1863 and 1864, and which had given the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leicester so much satisfaction.
    MR. GOSCHENsaid, he had never shrunk from supporting Her Majesty's Government in reference to questions of discipline in the Navy when he had shared their views, even though his opinions differed from those of many hon. Members with whom he generally acted. No inconsistency, therefore, could be imputed to him by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, on the present occasion, for supporting the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor), in opposition to the views of the Government. It was true, as the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had said, that Returns such as were asked for had not been given by previous Administrations; but it was equally true that they had not been asked for; and there was a great difference between volunteering Returns and refusing them after they had been pressed
    1788
    for by the House. The argument of the First Lord of the Admiralty he (Mr. Goschen) appreciated only to a limited extent. It was possible that some meritorious officers might be misunderstood, when they had the misfortune to have ships on board which there was a considerable amount of punishment inflicted, and when the discipline of those ships was shown in the Returns to be bad; but, like other people, naval officers must put up with being misunderstood, and with having motives attributed to them which did not actuate their conduct. The right hon. Gentleman had put forward no such case as having happened during the years that the Returns in question had been published; but if ever any unfair attacks were made against officers, he was sure, as far as the present question was concerned, that the right hon. Gentleman opposite, or his Successors, would be alike able and willing to defend their subordinates from wilful misrepresentation or misunderstanding based upon insufficient knowledge of facts. The House, in his opinion, had a fair right to ask for the Returns which had been moved for by his hon. Friend the Member for Leicester.
    MR. JACOB BRIGHTsympathized with his hon. Friend the Member for Leicester in what he desired to obtain, and thought that the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty were singularly weak, for it struck him as being remarkable that commanders of ships could not perform their duty properly, if it was possible for what occurred in their ships to become known to the public. He hoped his hon. Friend would press the Motion to a division.
    Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    The House divided:—Ayes 121; Noes 65: Majority 56.—(Div. List, No. 32.)

  STATE OF THE NAVY—BOILERS.

    OBSERVATIONS.
    SIR JOHN HAY,in rising to call attention to the Iron-clad Navy, and the condition of its boilers, said, that a Departmental Committee had been appointed three years since to inquire into the entire subject, and that so far as he could learn

    1789
    no Report had yet been received from the Committee by his right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty. He trusted that when the Committee had reported, the House would be put in possession of the facts which they had ascertained and the conclusion at which they had arrived. Of this there could be no doubt—that the boilers of several of the Iron-clad Fleet, the Lord Clyde, the Caledonia, Ocean, Prince Consort, Royal Oak, Zealous, Favourite, Enterprize, Royal Sovereign—[Mr. HUNT: You may add the Royal Alfred]—were worn out and not worth repair, making with the Vanguard a decrease of 11 ships removed from the list. Ten of these were the dummy ships alluded to and condemned by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty when he took office. Of the 23 broadside iron-dads they possessed, 13—Agincourt, Minotaur, Achilles, Black Prince, Alexandra, Warrior, Hector, Valiant, Defence, Resistance, Audacious, Shannon, and Lord Warden, according to the information they had before them—were all that were perfectly efficient, and 12—Northumberland, Bellerophon, Hercules, Sultan, Penelope, Invincible, Iron Duke, Swiftsure, Triumph, Repulse, Pallas, and Research—still required considerable repair. Then, again, of the sea-going iron-dads, the Monarch—a turret sea going ship—required new boilers; the Dreadnought was not yet completed; the Devastation had had her boilers in so long that they required repair. [Mr. HUNT said, his right hon. Friend was mistaken in regard to the Devastation.] Well, he was glad to hear it, but he had been so informed. This, he thought, would be found to be the case—that we had 13 broadside iron-clad ships in perfect order, three turret ships—Dreadnought (not quite ready) Thunderer and Devastation—in the same satisfactory condition, 12 broadside iron-dads that required repair, and four turret ships—Monarch, Rupert, Hotspur, and Glatton—that needed attention to their boilers. There were, of course, the 13 ships for harbour defence—Viper, Vixen, and Scorpion at Bermuda; Abyssinia and Magdala at Bombay; Cerberus at Melbourne; but these were of no use for any purpose but the defence of the harbours where they were stationed; and for English defence, the Wivern, Waterwitch, Prince Albert, not very efficient, and the Cyclops,
    1790
    Hecate, Gorgon, and Hydrœ; but the fact ought not to be lost sight of that of the 13 iron-dads, six were abroad and only seven at home for coast defence. That was the whole iron-clad Navy of England. The hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) had, in an article published in his own name, adopted an unsound basis of comparison. It was not enough that our Inflexible, if she caught two inferior vessels of the enemy, should be able to make "mincemeat" of them. Two of these second-class vessels of the enemy might appear, one before Liverpool and the other before Aberdeen, and command contributions, and as the Inflexible could not be at both places the fact that she was superior to them both together would not save one of the towns attacked. Our first-class ships could not be in two places at once. He would take another illustration. The Turkish Navy contained 15 iron-dads, which might be considered good ships. It could be imagined that the English Fleet, lying in Besika Bay, might have received instructions under certain contingencies to take possession of the Turkish Navy. That Navy was commanded by an Englishman, who would, no doubt, in such an event have given up the command to a Turk. But 15 Turkish sail could not be expected to give themselves up to nine English ships without fighting, and thus the loss of life and property at Navarino and at Copenhagen would have been again incurred for want of an overwhelming English Fleet. He did not deny that we were the strongest Naval Power in the world; but we must always have an iron-clad ship in China, in the Pacific, and in North America. It was not possible for the First Lord to have added more than four vessels to the nine in Besika Bay, and it might have been important to have more than 13 vessels in the Mediterranean to arrest and lay hands upon the Turks. We should have in time of war our coaling stations abroad to protect. Malta, Gibraltar, Aden, and Halifax were armed, but the Cape of Good Hope and other stations were undefended, and our iron-dads would only be strong and powerful if upon distant stations they could obtain coals which the vessels of other Powers could not procure. We had not above 20 iron-clad ships that were thoroughly and entirely efficient,

    1791
    and of these not more than 17 that could be regarded as available for service in European waters, because three or four must be away on distant service. Of these 20, some required considerable repairs. Upon the whole, it would have been, he thought, more prudent for the First Lord of the Admiralty to have asked for a little more money, so that he might have built a few more ships, and thus have placed the country in a stronger position among the Naval Powers.
    MR. BENTINCKsaid, he had been accused of telling tales out of school, and showing the deficiencies of our Navy to foreigners. Upon the subject of the Navy, however, you could tell no tales out of school, for every foreign Government which had any interest in knowing the naval strength of Great Britain knew to a ton, to a gun, and to a man the strength of every ship in the British Navy. It was sad to see that the people who seemed to know or care nothing about the subject were the British nation and the House of Commons, and one proof of this indifference was that during great part of the speech of the right hen. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) only 12 hon. Members were present. Some information might be kept secret with advantage, but the practice now was to allow foreigners free access to our dockyards, and put them in the way of learning everything, and he could not think that this was a reasonable or a rational mode of proceeding. It had been his intention to call attention to "the great variety of the form and properties of the ships of the same class in Her Majesty's Navy." The subject, however, was so complex and scientific that he thought he should be best consulting the convenience of the House by abstaining from entering upon it, leaving it to others, and especially the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed), to say whether it was not possible to make the British Navy a little more homogeneous in point of construction. His own belief, whether right or wrong, was that no ship could fairly be called a man-of-war available for all purposes which was not able to take care of herself under canvas. We had, however, with a few exceptions, a number of lumbering, unwieldy batteries, covered thickly with iron, unmanageable under
    1792
    canvas, and unfit, in his opinion, to leave the Channel. Vessels propelled by steam only were hardly fit to be sent to any part of the world, being dependent on fresh supplies of coal every few days. But an efficient man-of-war should be fit to be handled independently of her machinery. Of course, there were great difficulties in the way. After a ship had used a certain number of tons of coals she was so out of trim that she could not be handled efficiently under canvas, and though you might by means of water ballast steady the ship as a platform for guns, you had not under certain circumstances which were likely to occur in time of war the certainty of obtaining in distant seas the necessary propelling power. Then most of our ships were too long to handle under canvas; they would not come round. The answer was, that it was necessary in order to obtain the required displacement; but that was met by the reply that the struggle between guns and armour had been nearly brought to a completion in favour of the guns, and that being so, would it not be possible to protect by armour-plating the machinery and magazines of ships of war, leaving the two ends unencumbered by armour, and thus getting rid of the weights at the two ends, which were the great obstacle to the sailing qualities of a vessel? The Northumberland, for example, was perfectly unmanageable under canvas, and could hardly be steered under steam. You ought to be able to put a ship under canvas and at the same time possess all the advantages of a steam iron-clad. He would like to ask whether science had so completely failed that we were unable to devise a ship which would combine the protection of iron to certain portions of her hull with the sailing qualities of the old line-of-battle ships? We had heard very lately a good deal about the casualties which had occurred to Her Majesty's ships at anchor either in bringing their anchors home or parting their chains. If he was not mistaken, these casualties were much more frequent than in the olden time, when line-of-battle ships were said to be able to ride out almost any weather, but that was not the case now. Some time ago experiments were made with great care by the Admiralty of the day as to the holding powers of anchors, and the result was that the best was declared

    1793
    to be Trotman's anchor, and the worst that which was known as "the Admiralty anchor." It was the Admiralty anchor which he believed was supplied to Her Majesty's Navy, except under exceptional circumstances, or when some other kind was applied for by the officer in command of the ship. Latterly he believed that a good many of Her Majesty's ships had been supplied with Martin's anchor, on the singular ground that it was stowed away much more snugly and easily, and that it did not interfere with the line of fire of a turret gun. But the use of an anchor was not when it was stowed, but when it was let go. He did not ask that the Trotman anchor should be forced on the officers in command of Her Majesty's ships, but the Admiralty should not refuse to adopt it on the ground of cost. The Great Eastern was rather more than double the tonnage of the largest vessel in the Navy, with about double the displacement, and pretty nearly double the weight to hold. And yet that vessel had been knocking about the world with a seven-ton Trotman anchor which had never started. If the Admiralty was not satisfied with the former experiments on this matter let them direct new experiments to be made. Then as to cables, it was notorious that the chain cables supplied to the Navy frequently parted, and the reason was that the chain cable of the present day was not in proportion to the size of the ship. The Great Eastern worked a 3-inch chain cable, and, as far as he was informed, had never parted a chain on more than one occasion, and, in his opinion, a heavier description of chain would prevent the many casualties arising from this cause. On the whole, looking to the present aspect of European affairs, he maintained that neither in regard to numbers nor efficiency was the Navy in accordance with the requirements of the country. In conclusion, he must say that whether it was from apathy or parsimony he could not tell, but he had witnessed the fact with the deepest regret — he could not trace in the Estimates which his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty had placed on the Table the spirit which animated his views when he first addressed himself to the condition of the British Navy on his acceptance of office.
    MR. SHAW LEFEVREbelieved that the condition of the boilers of our iron-clads was not quite so unsatisfactory as it had been represented to be by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay). His (Mr. Shaw Lefevre's) object in publishing the article to which allusion had been made was to meet remarks such as had been made on that and on former occasions, tending to depreciate the condition of our Navy as compared with the Navies of other Powers. When fair and dispassionate comparisons were made, he believed it would be shown conclusively that the iron-clad Fleet of England was at the present moment stronger relatively to the Fleets of other countries than it had ever yet been; but the same rigid tests must be applied to other Navies that were applied to our own. As to the objection that he had confined himself to first-class vessels, he believed that those with less than six inches of armour plate which could be penetrated by ordinary guns could hardly be considered as first line-of-battle ships, though he by no means under-rated their value for certain purposes. But if vessels of the second class were to be included in comparisons and equally rigid tests were applied to all, he believed that comparisons would still be in our favour. Take the French Fleet, for example. With rare exceptions, the vessels which composed that Fleet were built of wood, and many of them had been constructed before 1865, and had less than six inches of armour on their sides. He did not know what the state of the boilers of those vessels might be, but he felt confident that a number of them must be in a worse condition than was the case in regard to the English Navy. Altogether, he had no doubt that the French Fleet was far from being in so satisfactory a state as our own was at present. Again, as to the Turkish Fleet. He believed he was right in saying that there was not a single vessel in that Fleet which had ever had its boilers replaced at all, although the vessels had been in continuous employment. Several, therefore, he considered, if not most of them, must be in a most unsatisfactory condition; so bad, indeed, that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would probably strike them off the list if they were our property, or consider them as dummies. In the course of the discussion which had taken place

    1795
    it had been said that we ought to have in Besika Bay a fleet not only sufficiently strong to destroy that of Turkey, but a fleet so strong that it would positively overawe the Turks by its very presence; but that appeared to him to be an exaggerated view of the necessity of the position. What it was necessary England should possess was a fleet able to meet any case of urgency which might arise within reasonable expectation; and it seemed to him that, in its present condition, our Navy was adequate to that requirement. The great advantage, it should be recollected, which we had over other Powers was that our vessels had so many stations at which they could coal, while other nations, he believed, had no coaling stations beyond their own shores. He thought it was a pity the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had not pressed on more quickly the Report of the Boilers Committee. The Committee had now sat for three years, and it would have been better if their Report had been issued as quickly as possible, because it was a matter of urgency and importance that the cause of the rapid deterioration of boilers should be discovered, in order that, if possible, a remedy might be applied.
    MR. E. J. REEDthought that if hon. Members opposite had erred on the side of exaggeration, the last speaker (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) had slightly erred on the other side of the question. He thought we should make a great mistake if we plumed ourselves on the excessive strength of our Navy at the present time. He would give the House an illustration of the weakness of the Navy in the matter of iron-clad ships. Some years ago the Admiralty thought it necessary, with the view of maintaining our influence in the Pacific, to place an iron-clad on that station; and when its time was expired another iron-clad was commissioned. The Admiralty, however, had now considered it better policy to despatch an unarmoured vessel as the Admiral's flag-ship. Only recently the Shah had been sent out, whereas she ought to have been kept at home, where her peculiar powers of speed would find infinitely better employment. That showed a change of naval policy, and was one reason which led him to think that we ought not to place all our dependence on iron vessels. Swift ships like the Shah were essential in their
    1796
    way, and the due proportion of their number to slower and more formidable vessels ought not to be lost sight of; yet he felt that the Shah would have been of greater service in Europe. He thought that if we applied the same tests to foreign Navies as the right hon. and gallant Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) had applied to our Navy we should have to put a great number of ships off the Active List. Reference had been made to the Turkish Fleet; but in opposition to the criticism that had been urged, it was to be borne in mind that as their boilers were very little used, a contrast ought not to be drawn between them and the boilers of our own vessels. If the boilers on beard the Turkish ships deteriorated, it was more from negligence than use, whereas ours were really worn out by hard service. He was not fond of censuring men in authority; but if the First Lord of the Admiralty deserved censure for anything, it was for the comparatively heedless manner in which he had allowed the subject of the boilers of iron-dads to be dealt with. In first introducing his Estimates that right hon. Gentleman had assured them that that question of boilers was one of a most serious nature; and a Committee was appointed to examine into it. They had bad presented to them a preliminary Report from that Committee, which was of about as absurd a kind as could have been produced, considering the grounds upon which the Committee had been appointed; and from that time to this they had had nothing more. As he (Mr. Reed) had understood the right lion. Gentleman, the object of having that Committee was to ascertain how our boilers lasted a much shorter time than those of other countries, and then to find out some remedy for that serious evil. But they were now still without any assurance whatever that any efficient step had been taken for that purpose. They had had a Committee sitting for three years, and however valuable its inquiries might be, they had not fulfilled the just expectations of the House. He could not believe that this country was so deficient in practical men, who knew all about boilers, that, if the First Lord had applied himself to the production of proper results, we might not have been in a very different position from what we were in now. He entirely agreed with the hon.

    1797
    Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) as to the futility of attempting to keep things connected with our naval proceedings dark from foreign Governments. Persons in this country who took great interest in these points were kept much further off from information regarding them than foreigners. In one instance he remembered himself being called on by a Committee to give the results of an investigation of considerable importance which he had kept strictly private, and he found the report of his evidence in the hands of foreign Governments months before he had had any opportunity of seeing it, and before it was placed in the hands of hon. Members of the House of Commons. The attempt to keep information secret caused it to assume a fictitious value, and ho thought the time had arrived when information connected with our Navy, which could not be kept from the knowledge of foreign Governments, should be communicated freely to the House. He knew it was denied by the Italian Government, but the dates and facts proved that, some time before they built the Dandolo and another ship, they had in their possession the design for English ships of the same kind. He did not say that different minds might not possibly have hit on the same design; he merely stated a fact, and he maintained that when British naval arrangements of importance were thus known to foreign Governments it was idle being squeamish about such matters in that House. The hon. Member for West Norfolk spoke of our modern ships as inferior to the old wooden walls, because they were not such good sailors, and to that extent less seaworthy. He (Mr. Reed), however, did not agree with the hon. Member that no ship could be ranked as a thoroughly efficient man-of-war which could not take care of herself under canvas. Steam had, for various reasons, become the great propulsive power, and sails had simply become an auxiliary, and the more that fact was recognized the more it became conclusive that the means of keeping up an increased and efficient coal supply was absolutely necessary. That being so, it was wrong to argue that our Fleet whilst it was in Besika Bay was weak, because our strongest arm of offence was represented by a mastless ship—the Devastation. With respect to the question of speed, he
    1798
    thought we had attempted to do too much. If we had only been content with getting 11 or 12 knots under steam we might have had better sailing vessels. The real problem was to neutralize the want of sails by increasing the capacity of coal carrying, and it was to the honour of the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) that when he presided at the Admiralty he came to the conclusion that it was idle to put sails on certain vessels, but that the supply of coal must be augmented. He (Mr. Reed) was, therefore, of opinion that the Government had been right in accepting not only the inferior importance of sail power in certain ships, but the total absence of it in others, provided always there was a proper supply of coal. Still, in certain vessels intended for remote stations, where efficiency under canvas was of great moment, considerable improvements might be made in that respect, and he believed that those improvements had been made, as, for instance, in vessels of the Swiftsure and the Triumph class, which had considerable power of proceeding under canvas. A great deal had often been said about the speed of the Confederate ship the Alabama, but she was nothing more nor less than one of the ordinary sloops of the British Navy lengthened 10 or 12 feet to enable her to carry extra coal, and he might say that there were 100 Alabamas in the British Navy. On a recent occasion a comparison was made by an hon. Member between ships of the British Navy and the great mercantile fleets of this country. It was his (Mr. Reed's) fate lately to perform a journey in a vessel of one of the great steamship companies of this country. When he went on beard that vessel the tiller was broken. When the vessel got to Alexandria the rudder was broken in more places than one. The vessel was brought from Alexandria to this country to get her tiller and her rudder-head repaired. He never saw a statement in the newspapers about this, and not a single Question was put in Parliament about it. In a week or two afterwards he travelled in another ship of one of the great steamship companies. In four days that ship averaged something like four knots. He admitted that the weather was very bad; but he was quite sure if the same thing had happened to any of Her Majesty's ships in

    1799
    like circumstances there would have been several statements in the newspapers, and not a few Questions in Parliament to bring out the facts. Without at all concurring in the views of those who seemed disposed to exaggerate the shortcomings of our Navy, he thought good might be done to the Public Service by considering whether the forms and proportions of certain classes of iron-dads and other vessels might not be improved with reference to their sailing qualities. In the construction of modern vessels so many views had to be met, and so many requirements to be provided for, that they should view with great care and consideration any alleged defects. Still he viewed it as a fortunate circumstance that two hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House did not shrink from rising to call the attention of Parliament to questions which they considered of importance in connection with the present position of the Navy. The hon. Member for West Norfolk had drawn attention to what he considered the excessive shortcomings of anchors and cables, and he appeared to speak as if it were something peculiar that iron-dads were obliged to get up steam to enable them to keep off a lee shore in rough weather. Ho (Mr. Reed) did not know why this should be brought as as specific and peculiar complaint against iron-clads—that they should have to do that which was done in the days of wooden vessels; and, beyond that, as our modern ships were more costly than our old wooden vessels were, it was the more important that they should do so, if it was thought desirable in order to avoid risks they would otherwise incur. A great deal had been said about Trotman's anchors. The whole merit of Trotman's anchors lay in a very slight modification. It was the slightest invention ever made, and not a very important one. The question of anchors was never neglected within the Admiralty walls, and the difficulties with which the Admiralty had to deal in regard to anchors were shown by the fact that very often from two ships with anchors of the same kind, they had Reports which were in flat contradiction to each other. The hon. Member for West Norfolk had asked whether the time had not arrived to leave armour off our ships. That was not the first time the suggestion was made, and he (Mr. Reed) took exception to it. It was made
    1800
    every time a gun proved its superiority to the armour against which it had been tried. What had been our position throughout the last 20 years by virtue of the adoption of armour? Never since we adopted armour had the guns of any foreign Navy been able to pierce the sides of any British vessel. By advancing from time to time and never falling behind, we had always been able to secure positive pre-eminence, which was precisely the thing we wanted to purchase by our naval expenditure. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had once stated that to send seamen to sea in wooden vessels would be to send them to sea in slaughter-houses, but it would be far worse to send them to sea in vessels insufficiently armoured, which, filled as they were with gunpowder and steam boilers, would be at the mercy of every projectile that would penetrate their sides. Complaint was made that we were spending more and more upon our guns and armour-dads. It might be a very expensive and disgusting race that we were running, but at the same time it was a very necessary one, for it imposed upon the enemy the necessity of either making or purchasing these enormous guns and heavy armour, and if we were to give up the struggle we could no longer pretend to maintain our naval pre-eminence. It might be imagined that we had reached the highest point in the development of our guns and armour, and the hon. Member for West Norfolk had spoken as if he felt that armour-plating must sooner or later be abolished; but he (Mr. Reed) did not believe that, for a class of facts had recently come to our knowledge which had opened up a new vista in connection with this subject, and before long we might have powerful guns at sea on ships protected by three or four feet of armour, and even protected against the favourite projectiles of the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford. He objected to this question being regarded as foreclosed against us on the ground of expense. We had started with four inches of iron armour, and we had now such armour 24 inches thick, and yet our present ships were not more expensive, seeing that we built them in a smaller and better form. On the whole, therefore, he did not despair of our pursuing the development of our Navy to the satisfaction of the Profession as well as of the public.
    MR. GOSCHENsaid, he did not wish to interpose more than a few minutes between the House and the right hon. Gentleman's Statement; indeed, he rose in the hope of enabling the right hon. Gentleman to make his Statement on another occasion earlier than he would be able to make it to-night. His purpose was to make a few remarks on behalf of the House of Commons and of the British Navy. The hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) had complained while his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) and himself were bringing forward their important Motions to-night, that only about 12 hon. Members besides themselves were present, and therefore he assumed that the House of Commons did not take an interest in naval affairs. For his own part, he demurred entirely to that assumption, and he believed that if the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had been able to make his Statement earlier in the evening, and this formidable list of Motions —all of which, with the exception of one, emanated from hon. Members opposite—had not been placed upon the Notice Paper, and so intercepting it, the House of Commons would have evinced interest enough in the subject. Year after year, however, the same Motions were put down for discussion, and the same views were advocated by the same speeches, delivered in the same tones. As no man would care to go night after night to see the same piece performed at the theatre, so hon. Members of the House could not stand the same wearisome iteration of the same old play and the same old speeches in which the hon. Member for West Norfolk lamented "the decline and decay of the British Navy." The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Stamford again, reminded him of one of those calendars, in which by turning a handle the date of the year was altered, while the figures beneath remained the same. For the last five years the right hon. and gallant Member had been answering the speech of the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), which was delivered in 1870; but somehow or another, he had failed to answer it when it was delivered. He trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had made his last reply to that speech, but he was afraid that we should have it
    1802
    again next year. The matter, however, had its serious as well as its amusing side. The serious side of the subject was, that the hon. Member for West Norfolk and the right hon. and gallant Member for Stamford were always complaining that the strength of the British Navy was inadequate for its requirements. He could very well understand hon. Members holding that opinion, but what he could not understand was that, holding such an opinion, they should content themselves year after year with merely drawing attention to the subject. How was it that they never ventured to test the feeling of the House upon the point by going to a division? The matter was undoubtedly a most important one. They had to deal with their own Friends and with the Conservative Party, and why should they fear to test the opinion of the House upon the question? Were they so weak in argument that they feared that they could not persuade their audience to agree with them, or was their case so weak that they could not trust their Friends to deal with it? [Sir JOHN HAY remarked that it was not their case, but the Navy that was weak.] Yes; and yet, with the Conservative Party in office, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, fully believing that the Navy was adequate to the requirements of the nation, felt himself unable to test the opinion of the House upon the matter. In his opinion, Her Majesty's Government conscientiously believed that the Navy was inadequate for our requirements, or they would propose larger Estimates. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman brought a heavy charge against his Friends, because it would be a grave misdemeanour of the Government to keep the Navy below its due strength. He, however, believed that, prudent as the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was, he would not, even if the finances of the country were not in a satisfactory state, refuse the sums which the First Lord of the Admiralty might deem necessary for maintaining the efficiency of the Navy. The question for the House, therefore, was this—were the right hon. and gallant Gentleman and his Friends and Supporters, the hon. Member for West Norfolk and the hon. and gallant Member for Gravesend (Captain Pim) right, or were the Government right, in. their

    1803
    estimation of the strength of the Navy? It was time that those hon. Gentlemen who came down year after year should do one of two things—either to seriously urge these matters upon the House by testing the opinion of the House; and, if the House rejected them, then they should cease to put these strong and highly-coloured accusations against the British Navy on record, or to establish them in a different way. He had no desire for one moment to trench upon the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hunt), but when the hon. Gentlemen referred to had pronounced their annual dirge with regard to the British Navy, he would ask the Government if they thought themselves in a position to reduce the Estimates by £300,000. He had thought it right to vindicate the British Navy from the charges brought against it by the hon. Member for West Norfolk. Speeches of that kind only led to long discussions, which prevented the First Lord of the Admiralty from making his Statement. The hon. Member for West Norfolk had endeavoured to show that no ships ought to belong to the British Navy except those which were able to sail, and he instanced the case of the Thetis. But the fact was that the Thetis could sail, and was far from being entirely dependent upon her machinery alone. True it was that a steamer had gone out to her assistance, but it was equally true that colour was always laid on in the case of accidents happening to vessels of the Navy. Similar accidents happened to vessels belonging to great steam-ship companies, which were not brought before the public, and it was not necessary or desirable that so much should be made out of them. In the course of the discussion the Navy had been attacked by the right hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for Stamford and the hon. Member for West Norfolk, while there remained behind the Notice which stood on the Paper in the name of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Gravesend. In reference to these attacks, and the Notice to which he had adverted, he might allude to the recent demonstration which had been made by the Navy in Besika Bay—a demonstration made in sight of squadrons selected from other Navies, and one which showed that the British Navy was by no means the weak and contemptible Force it was represented to be by several
    1804
    hon. Members of that House. On the contrary, it was felt that our Navy was in a position of which the House and the country were not ashamed. If it had been in the weak condition ascribed to it, he was sure that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty would have asked the House to make grants of money sufficient to put the Navy upon a thoroughly efficient footing.
    MR. R. W. DUFFsaid, that engineers and warrant officers were very properly appointed to ships before they were put into commission, in order that they might become acquainted with the machinery; but the last man appointed was the captain. He was put on beard a ship, say, with 30 engines, and before he had the least time to become acquainted with the ship he was sent to sea. Was it surprising, then, that disasters happened? He thought it important that captains should be sent on beard their ships at least six weeks before the vessels were sent to sea the difference between the half-pay and full pay for that small period of time would not make a very appreciable difference in the Estimates.
    MR. HUNT: Sir, I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen), that it is not very convenient that the Financial Statement of a Minister in explanation of the Estimates should be deferred till the latter part of the evening. That it should be so tonight is the result of our Rules and Orders; but I do not despair that a time will come when those Rules will be altered, and some arrangement will be made for a Minister to introduce Estimates without any preliminary discussions, except where there are grievances to be complained of. I value the old constitutional doctrine that grievances should go before Supply; but I have been sitting here for five hours and have heard not a scintilla of anything like a grievance, except from the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), who complains that certain warrant officers have not the same pay in harbour ships as they have in seagoing ships. That, no doubt, is an important subject, and one worthy of consideration, but it might have been postponed until after the Speaker had left the Chair. A great many of the

    1805
    other topics which have detained us, important and interesting as no doubt they are, might also, I think, have been discussed in Committee, after the Statement on the Estimates had been made. With regard to the grievance of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Gorst), the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) says that we have made a mistake in making that difference, which he did away with in 1870, and reduced the system to greater simplicity, having only two classes while we have seven. The fact that he had classes in 1870 proves that the present is not the only Board of Admiralty which considered there ought to be a distinction. My hon. and learned Friend suggested that this distinction was accidental; but I can assure him that it was made with a purpose, and because we considered that the duties in sea-going ships were greater than those required in harbour ships. With regard to the simplicity which we abolished, it is obvious that schemes which seem simple are not always satisfactory, and when we came into office we found the greatest dissatisfaction with regard to the simple scheme of my right hon. Friend. That scheme divided the warrant officers into two classes only, and paid them according to those classes. We, on the other hand, pay according to length of service, with a difference between harbour and sea-going ships. Our rate is—up to five years, 5s. 6d. per day; five years to 10 years, 6s. 9d.; 10 to 15 years, 7s. 9d.; and 15 years and upwards, 8s. 3d. I believe the warrant officers generally were well contented with the change, as it benefited all of them, except in the case of officers of 15 years' standing of harbour ships, who were reduced from 7s. 6d. to 7s. 3d., with the proviso, however, that no one should be reduced who had been paid the higher rate. Since that time, however, some inequalities have been pointed out which were not foreseen; and without making any promise at all, I can assure my hon. and learned Friend that I will see if any of those inequalities can be removed. The hon. and gallant Member for Devonport (Captain Price) called attention to the movement originated by the men of the Fleet rather more than two years ago, with regard to establishing a fund as provision for their widows. I then said the Admiralty regarded that
    1806
    movement with great favour. We sent a circular through the Fleet to see how far the men would join in it, and we had actuarial calculations made as to what contributions would be necessary. The scheme did not prosper for want of that support, although, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman stated, the men were willing to contribute larger subscriptions, but still they did not offer sufficient for the purpose. The calculations of Mr. Finlaison showed that in the case of a young man and his wife it would be necessary to secure to the latter £24 a-year, to pay in an aggregate sum of certainly more than twenty times that amount; and even then a monthly contribution of 10 s. or 15 s. would be enhanced when the period of middle life was approached by the seaman. The House will see, therefore, that it would be quite impossible to carry out the scheme suggested. It has been suggested"` by the hon. and gallant Member that a certain amount of assistance should be I given by the Admiralty in carrying out the pension system. I think it would be an advantage to the Service if such an inducement were held out. But when we come to the question of the Admiralty contribution, it should be remembered that it makes a fresh charge on the Exchequer, and in that view I do not know that all the sources of income will necessarily be maintained. The only one of any amount is the saving on provisions. A Committee sat on the subject in the year 1870, and were not able to come to any consent as to what they would recommend. My hon. and gallant Friend has told the House that there is dissatisfaction as regards the present system, but that Committee agreed upon this point—that the present system, by which the men had some choice as to their provisions, was popular in the Service. It is possible, however, that that may not be a permanent fund. However, whether you take it from that or any other fund, it comes to this—that there roust be a contribution from the Exchequer in some shape or other. But when I meet my right hon. and hon. Friends who occupy that very important building called the Treasury, I am told, if I speak on the subject, that I am raising a question not only of the Navy, but of the Army, not only of the Army, but of the Civil Service—and really the question is one of such huge

    1807
    dimensions that it is very difficult to grapple with it. It would be impossible for me, representing one Department, to pledge myself to anything like the proposal which has been made; and most desirous as I am in the position which I hold to encourage thrifty habits on the part of our sailors, I cannot say that I have any pledge or promise to make in the direction which has been so well pointed out. I may say, however, that whenever the House of Commons is ready to receive such a proposition favourably — whenever we are in easier circumstances than we are now—it is one well worthy of their consideration. My right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) has spoken of the condition of the iron-clad Navy and the state of the boilers. Well, that is a very important question, and I am very properly asked why I have not discharged my duty in seeing that the Report of the Boiler Committee has been laid on the Table? I can only say that no exertions of mine have been spared to extract that Report short of personal violence. This I know, that the Committee has taken extraordinary means to make their inquiry perfect and exhaustive, and that certain experiments, chemical and otherwise, are being made, the result of which will not be known for some little time. I have requested that a Report—not the final Report, but one which will be of some service—of the Committee shall be furnished to me, and although promised it has been delayed, I regret to say, owing to a domestic affliction to one of its Members, so that instead of receiving it, as I expected by the end of the month, it will have to be still further deferred. When, however, it is in my hands, it will be immediately furnished to the House, and I think it will be of use not only to the Royal Navy, but to the Mercantile Service in general. My right hon. and gallant Friend also went into the question of the different ships whose boilers are not in good condition. Now, I do not think it would be altogether advantageous to disclose for the benefit of the world at large the exact position of the boilers of every vessel in the British Navy. I do not, therefore, think I can give my right hon. and gallant Friend the Returns he asks for. With respect to foreign Navies, we get readily the tonnage and armament of the ships,
    1808
    but we have no account of the condition of their boilers. Indeed, if we had, I believe I might ask the House of Commons to vote Estimates smaller in amount than it will be my duty to do. This, however, I will say, that my right hon. and gallant Friend has an exaggerated idea of the defective character of the boilers of our iron-dads. It is true that a few of the ships have to steam at a reduced pressure, and that some have been ordered home for new boilers; but it is impossible to bring such ships home at once. But I may state generally that I believe that every ship but one is in the programme for having two boilers in the coming year. He says that the pressure has been reduced in respect of the boilers of the Devastation. It has been reduced not on account of any defect in the boilers, but simply from prudential motives, and we have no Report that her boilers are defective. The observations of my hon. Friend the Member for West Norfolk have been, I think, pretty well answered by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen), and I fear that my hon. Friend always takes a very gloomy view of everything connected with the British Navy. He is, however, at least impartial in his criticisms, as they are pointed as much at right hon. Gentlemen opposite as they are at me. I flatter myself that in respect of anchors, cables, and other matters to which my hon. Friend has alluded, I have done a good deal to mitigate the state of things to which he has referred. He tells us that the chain cables are always parting. Now, since I have been in office, I remember only one instance, and that was owing to a slight misunderstanding as to the stopping of a ship. I think his remarks with respect to the non-sailing power of the ships, and the valueless character of ships which cannot face the sea under sail, have also been fully disposed of by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed), but I may add that many officers prefer ships which carry no sail at all. With regard to Trotman's anchors, all I can say is, that if a captain asks for a Trotman's anchor he can have it; but if, as is generally the case, he does not, then it follows that the anchor is not as valuable, or the captain is not as prudent as my hon. Friend supposes. The hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. R. W. Duff) alluded to the propriety of ap-

    1809
    pointing captains to ships some time before they were required to take command of them. Well, I concur with him on that point, and have acted on that view in the case of the Thunderer, and also in the case of the Alexandra. With regard to the engineers also, I have made a change. Formerly, it was the practice to appoint the chief engineer just before going to sea. I thought that system wrong, and that he ought to have time to become more intimately acquainted with his ship, and now the senior engineer is appointed some time before his predecessor leaves the ship. I trust that the House will excuse me for not going into greater detail at this hour of the night (20 minutes past 10 o'clock) as I naturally wished to introduce the Navy Estimates in Committee of Supply, and have but little time left for that purpose.
    CAPTAIN PIMsaid, that although the question as to the condition of the Navy was one of paramount importance, he had no wish to interpose between the right hon. Gentleman and Supply, but lie wished to refer to two matters connected with the personnel of the Navy. The first was as to the naval cadets—of educating their young officers for future admirals; and respecting that, it appeared from a Return before him, that the cost to the State of educating each naval cadet on beard the Britannia was £308, to which was to be added the sum of 70 paid by the parents of each cadet and £5 to the naval instructor. The cost, therfore, was enormous. He was glad to hear that the Government were about to dispense with the Britannia; but regretted to learn that they were going to establish an expensive College on shore, at Dartmoor, because it was quite unnecessary. The cadets could be just as well educated at the Royal Naval School at New Cross, at the expense of their parents, and without costing the nation a single penny. From that school had issued no less than 300 naval officers and 82 marine officers who had served with credit. He had headed a deputation to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers), on the subject of the education of the young gentlemen, and he said it would interfere with his patronage—
    MR. CHILDERS: The hon. and gallant Member is quite mistaken.
    CAPTAIN PIM: The right hon. Gentleman will find that I am quite correct,
    1810
    if he will refer to The United Service Gazettte for 29th of January.
    MR. CHILDERS: I am not responsible for what may be written in a newspaper; but what I said was that under the plan of the deputation all nominations to the Navy would be in the hands of the governors of a private school, instead of in those mainly of naval officers, and that this would injure the service.
    CAPTAIN PIMsaid, that he must be allowed to adhere to the account given in The United Service Gazette. He hoped the Government would take into serious consideration the best means of improving the education of the Navy. The next point he was desirous of drawing attention to was the question of Reserves. From a Paper on the Table it appeared that our Mercantile Marine had dwindled down in a few years from 120,000 men to about 13,000 able seamen. Two-thirds of the crews of our ships were foreigners, and a friend of his who had brought a merchant ship home the other day told him that not less than 16 languages were spoken on his forecastle. The loss of the London was attributed to the fact that so many of the sailers were foreigners, who could not understand the captain's orders. These 13,000 able seamen had joined our Reserves; but not one of them could possibly be forthcoming in the day of trial, because they would be wanted to bring home the grain ships necessary for our food supply, and therefore as a Naval Reserve were useless.
    Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

  SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES AND NAVY EXCESS ESTIMATE, 1875–6.
  SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  MR. HUNT: I must say, Sir, in rising to move the first Vote for Men—which will be the same number as in the previous year—that it is a great satisfaction to me to ask the House for a less sum than I did when I stood here last year on a similar occasion. It is a double satisfaction to me, because, in the first place, I never wish to make a larger demand on the British taxpayer than is absolutely necessary, and every reduction that can be made is in accordance with

  1811
  my views as an economist; and, in the next place, it is a satisfaction to me that the state of the Fleet is so far advanced since I addressed the House when the Navy Estimates were last before it, that it is quite safe for me to make some reduction in the sums required for the coming year. The Committee will remember that last year I made some very exceptional demands, which were very liberally responded to. The supplies then voted went a long way to satisfy those exceptional demands, and there is no necessity to renew them on the present occasion. The total amount of the Estimates for 1877–8 is £10,979,829, showing a net decrease in the current year of £309,043. Of this sum there is a charge of £168,820 for services connected with the Army Department in the conveyance of troops. On the other hand, the sums taken in the Army Estimates for the Navy amount to a larger sum than that taken in these Estimates for the Army, amounting to £291,343. Therefore, in order to ascertain what is the total cost of the Navy, I have to add the difference between these two sums—or £123,063 — when it is found that the total gross cost of the Navy is £11,102,892. I have, however, to deduct the sum of £217,000, credited as extra receipts and the contribution of the India Government—which is £5,000 less than the amount of extra receipts last year. We then arrive at £10,885,892 as the net estimated cost of the Navy for the current year. Out of the 19 Votes it will be found that there is an increase on nine of them, amounting to £134,084, and a decrease on 10, amounting to £443,127. The net decrease of £309,043 will about correspond with the decrease this year as compared with last in the amount taken under Vote 10, Section 2, for steam machinery and ships built by contract, while the increases and decreases on the remaining Votes almost counterbalance each other.
  Having now for the last three years held the office of First Lord, which obliges me to make this annual Statement, it will probably be interesting to the House if I state what has been done in the shape of shipbuilding work and repairs during that time, and I am the more anxious to do so from the remark made the other night by the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely), whom I do not now see in his place, to the effect
  1812
  that the Navy was now in no better state than when first I took it in hand. During the last three years 54 ships, excluding yard craft and other small vessels, have been laid down. Of these 4 are iron-dads, and 47 others are designed for fighting purposes. These latter comprise 13 corvettes, 8 sloops, 4 gun-vessels, 21 gun-beats, and 1 torpedo boat. Of the 54 vessels, 30 have been launched. Of these 30 again, six have been completed, 12 are in a forward state, and all it is estimated will be completed in the year 1877-8. Taking now the amount of tonnage calculated up to the end of this month, so as to complete the financial year, I find that during the three years there will have been built of armoured ships 37,000 tons, old measurement—28,500 in dockyards, and 8,500 by contract. Now, what does that amount to in armour-clad ships? According to the calculation of the Department the amount of armour-clad tonnage built within the last three years amounts to 10 Vanguards, or 7 Sultans, or 8½ Devastations. I think the hon. Member for Lincoln, if he was in his place, would admit that that is a considerable addition to the strength of the Navy. During the same period there will have been built of unarmoured ships, old measurement, 29,000 tons—namely, 13,500 in dockyards, and 15,500 by contract. Thirty-one sets of new boilers have also been ordered to be built, and have been actually completed in dockyards, since March, 1874, in addition to the completion of those ordered previously, and many other sets are now in hand. The new machinery for propelling ships constructed by contract during the same period amounts in value to 92,340 indicated horses, and consists chiefly of the new and expensive type of engines. The repairing work during the three years I have referred to has included the placing of new boilers in 48 ships and the partial completion of new boilers for 11 others. Of those 48, 28 were fighting ships and 8 iron-clads. I hope my right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) will be satisfied that we have done something towards putting the ships which I ventured to call "dummies," by reason of their having defective boilers, into an effective state of repair. The question of training ships supported by voluntary contributions has not been neglected,

  1813
  but great encouragement has been given to the different societies who have taken in hand the training of boys for the Merchant Service, and though a great part of the expense of preparing these ships has fallen on the societies, considerable assistance has been given by the Admiralty in repairing and altering the ships. The Exmouth has been completed to replace the Goliath as straining ship for boys under the Forest Gate Society, and the Conqueror has replaced the Warspite under the Marine Society. The Nile replaces the Conway at Liverpool, the latter being too small, and the Frederick William replaces the Worcester in the Thames for the same reason. Then the Mount Edgecumbe, formerly the Conway, has been established as a new training' ship for boys at Devonport. The Clio has also been established in North Wales and the Worcester at Cork for the same purpose. So that, while not neglecting the interests of the Navy proper, we have done something towards satisfying the opinion of the House and the country that encouragement should be given to training establishments for the Merchant Service at different ports.
  Having stated the amount of the tonnage, I now wish to show how far individual ships have progressed. The Alexandra has been completed and commissioned, and, as I have heard to-day, has just arrived at Gibraltar on her way to Malta. The Thunderer is now ready for commission. When we came into office she was almost complete, but we have improved her fighting efficiency by the introduction of hydraulic machinery, and this has caused some delay. Of course, the terrible calamity to which I alluded the other day contributed to delay her completion, but that is remedied so far as the ship is concerned. I am sorry to say that it cannot be remedied in other respects. Three ships for coast and harbour defence, the Cyclops, Hecate, and Hydra, were nominally completed, there being but little to complete them to make them ready for sea, but they are now absolutely ready for commission if required. Of course, I am speaking of ships which had attained a certain state of progress, but which were not available for service. Then the Dreadnought, the Temeraire, the Shannon, the Nelson, and the Northampton—three of which were in progress three years ago, and two of which I commenced myself—will, ac-
  1814
  cording to our Estimate, be completed in the coming financial year. Under these circumstances, I hope my right hon. and gallant Friend, even if some of the boilers in the commissioned ships are in want of renewal at the end of the year, will be satisfied, at all events, that we shall have something to take their place. Considerable progress, again, has been made in the Inflexible. She will be ready to have her engines tried this year, and will, I suppose, be ready for sea some time in the following year. The Ajax and the Agamemnon, too, have made some progress; the Ajax will, I hope, in the course of the year be advanced to 36-100ths, and the Agamemnon 44-100ths. A great deal has been said on many occasions as to the programme for shipbuilding in the Dockyards and by contract not being completed, and it has been said that although the Estimates look well on paper the actual results have not corresponded to the promises. I was obliged to confess, after being a year in office, that I was no better than my Predecessors, and that my shipbuilding programme had fallen short of my anticipations. After a year's experience I thought I had learned how to prevent that happening in future; and the result I will state to the Committee. Last year I was able to state that the programme was practically fulfilled, and I am happy to inform the Committee that it will again be fulfilled at the end of this month. The programme was in the Dockyards 13,497 tons, but the Estimates have been revised, and that makes a little difference. The actual work that will have been completed is 13,451, which is 46 tons less than was anticipated; but, if calculated according to the original Estimate, it actually would have been 13,966, or 469 tons in excess of the Estimate. As regards contract work we estimated to build 10,265 tons, and we shall have built actually 10,838, or 573 tons more. The new boilers were estimated to represent 20,000 horse power and will actually represent 20,967, so that in that item too the estimate will be exceeded. I was anxious to state these figures because the Committee have been very liberal in granting supplies, and I desired to show to what use those supplies have been put. I hope the hon. Gentleman the Member for Lincoln, if he deigns to cast his eye over the statement I have made, will be satisfied that I was justified the other

  1815
  night in saying that he was in a state of ignorance as to the progress made.
  Perhaps, while I am on the subject of ships, it will be convenient for me to indicate what we propose to do in the coming year. Fault has been found with me on both sides of the House with regard to the variety of types of ships that are laid down. I do not think that these criticisms are altogether just; for, if you are always to build a ship exactly on the lines of the old type, you must give up all the improvements that have suggested themselves in the meantime; and you must give up meeting, by defensive works, the improvements made in the mode of attack. To say, then, that your ships should always be built on the lines and according to the types of the previous ones would, I think, be a great mistake. We can only deal with our present state of knowledge. With respect, however, to the ships that have been laid down while I have been at the Admiralty, I think, as regards the iron-clads, at all events, that the criticism I allude to cannot justly be made, for two of them have been of the Nelson class, and two of what I have heard called the "young" Inflexible class — namely, the Ajax and the Agamemnon. I propose to lay down at Chatham another Agamemnon, following the type that commended itself to the Committee the year before last. But I am bound to say I must incur that criticism to which I have referred with regard to the ship that I propose to lay down and which will be of a kind as yet unknown in any part of the world, but which has been much talked about, and has been much pressed upon me by that gallant officer who stands at the head of the veteran list of the Navy—I mean Sir George Sartorius—who has shown that although his age is great his mind is still youthful, and that he is willing to receive new ideas and able to inculcate them. Well, the ship we propose to lay down is called a torpedo-ram. I am not in a position to give the exact design. A design has been prepared, but modifications are in contemplation, so that I cannot give it exactly, or state the cost. But the cost, I take it, will be very considerably less than that of the iron-clads which have recently been laid down, and I hope that as a weapon of offence it will prove very destructive, indeed, if need be. I should be disposed to ask, even if the design were completed, that I
  1816
  might be excused from giving the particulars of it to the Committee. I know it is excessively difficult to keep any design or invention secret, and that when the work is going on in the dockyard that is next to impossible; but while the design has not gone beyond the Admiralty, it is possible to keep it secret, at all events, to a certain extent, and I do not think we ought to let it become known to the world before we need. I may say generally that it is proposed this torpedo-ram should carry armour, but not gulls. Beyond that, I hope the Committee will not expect me to go. This vessel must, of course, to a certain extent, be regarded as an experiment, and even supposing it to be a success I could not propose it to the Committee as likely to supersede all other kinds of fighting ships, but only as a useful adjunct to a fleet in case of war. It is, of course, impossible that the torpedo-ram should serve for general cruising purposes. She will only be a battle ship, and, probably, it would not be desirable that she should be kept at sea for a long period at a time, but I venture to think she will prove a very formidable weapon, and if she should become a success, it may perhaps be regarded as a sort of rival to those monster ships with tremendous armour that we hear spoken of as likely to be built in some foreign ports. Well, I propose to lay down a corvette at Chatham, which will be, I think, something of the Boadicea type, with, perhaps, some little corrections, which at present I cannot exactly state. Also, I propose to lay down at Sheerness another sloop of the Osprey class. Besides these I propose to lay down two sailing brigs at Pembroke. As far as our means have allowed I have endeavoured to send our young seamen out to sea in sailing vessels to get practice; but the ships suitable for the purpose have been limited in number. The Eurydice, an old sailing ship, has been re-fitted for that duty and has just been commissioned, and I hope that, with the use of the brigs, when they can be spared, there will no longer be ground for complaint that the young seamen are kept too long in port instead of being sent out to learn their duties at sea. The tonnage that is proposed to be built at all the Dockyards in 1877-8 is 14,240, of which 8,621 will be iron-dads and 5,619 will be unarmoured As regards ships to be laid down under

  1817
  contract, I propose one composite sloop, two gun-vessels of the Kestrel class, three gun-beats of the Mallard class, and 15 torpedo-vessels, which will be for the use of the War Office, and will be employed for harbour defence. We have already made a commencement in producing these special beats for defending our harbours, but it is necessary, in order to be completely prepared for that kind of defence, that we should have a small flotilla of torpedo-vessels. The tonnage to be built by contract is 6,248, of which 961 will be iron-clad, and 5,287 unarmoured. Therefore, the total tonnage to be built during the year, both in the Dockyards and under contract, will be 20,488. Of this 9,582 will be iron-clad, and 10,906 unarmoured.
  In connection with the torpedo question, I should like to mention that an independent torpedo school had been established for experiments and for the instruction of officers. The Vernon, which was a tender to the Excellent, gunnery ship, has been used for this purpose. I do not know that I need give the establishment that will be requisite; but I may say that there will be two courses of torpedo instruction given on beard the Vernon, the longer course for commanders, lieutenants, &c., and the shorter one for petty officers and seamen. While on this subject I may mention that in Vote 10, Section two, there appears a new item, a sum of £80,000 for the purchase of torpedoes. The War Office has generally made provision for them in its Estimates, but I have become a little alarmed lest we should be behind other nations in this matter; and, therefore, with the consent of the Treasury, I gave an order last year for a considerable number of torpedoes from Mr. Whitehead, and by the terms of the engagement we are to have the advantage of any fresh improvements that he may make in the meantime, and as he has been continually making discoveries, I think the arrangement will be very satisfactory.
  Hon. Members are aware that since last Session I have made regulations with regard to the performance of navigating duties, under which officers of a certain rank of the navigating class may be transferred, at their option, to the executive list. The question has been beset with difficulties, because of the existence of two different classes of offi-
  1818
  cers. I am quite aware that the scheme which, after very careful consideration, was adopted, is open to criticism, but it is utterly impossible in a transition period to prevent all inequalities between one man and another. We will endeavour to do the best we can in this matter. I have no doubt that for some time there will be a certain amount of discontent, and possibly in some cases there may be an appearance of hardship. But I venture to think that in the course of a few years the transition will be made and this temporary inconvenience will be got over.
  I stated some time ago that I had great difficulty in getting boys for the Fleet, and that as an inducement for them to enter the Service we had tried the plan of giving them free kits. We not only did that, but for some time we found it necessary to reduce the standard of height and, to a certain extent, of education. That, however, lasted only for a certain period, and when the need for it ceased, the old standard was restored. I was extremely anxious to know what kind of boys were admitted under the lower educational test, and consequently during my inspection of the training ships last autumn, I made it my duty to inquire into the matter. I had the boys themselves, in a great many instances, pointed out to me, and I asked questions of the instructors with regard to them. The answer generally was that, although those boys had given a great deal of trouble to the schoolmaster, as one would naturally expect, a great many of them were the smartest lads in the ship. It is, then, I think, so far satisfactory to know that if in case of difficulty we relax the test, we shall be able to get boys who will be efficient for the ordinary purposes of our ships without a very high standard of education, and a reserve to fall back upon, if need be. But during the last few months the number of boys anxious to enter the Service has exceeded the number we require, although in the critical state of European affairs I did not deem it desirable to check the entries. The result is that, although there are fewer boys for Service than the number proposed in the Estimates, we have more entered for Training, while the number of men has swollen beyond the number contemplated when the Estimates were being prepared. In order to check the entries,

  1819
  we have raised the physical standard. We had already returned to the educational standard; but we have recently raised the physical standard by one inch for boys between, I think, the ages of 15 and 16, half an inch being added to the chest measurement. By that means I hope the entries will be kept down to the legitimate number. I may here observe that although we have taken the same numbers for the Fleet, we have divided them rather differently. We have taken fewer boys and more men. The fact is, we have got a greater number of men, and by entering 300 boys fewer than we used to provide for, we thought we should be able to keep up the number of men. The difference in rating, I may add, between a boy and a man causes a considerable increase in Vote 1. There are also other causes for that increase. There are more officers in employ, the number of ships being greater, and those employed are on a higher rate of pay.
  There are also other causes of increase to which I shall advert presently; but I am sure my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), who brought the question before the House more than once, is anxious to hear what it is I am going to do with regard to the Marine officers. I am sorry to say I am not able to give him as full information to-night as I should wish, but I will give him all that is in my power. My hon. and learned Friend has, I believe, thought me somewhat slow in acknowledging the grievances under which Marine officers laboured. I can, however, assure him that I had been little more than three months in office when—it was, I think, in June, 1874—I became so impressed with the necessity of alleviating the grievances of those officers that I laid their case before the Treasury. I was, however, unable to induce the Treasury to do anything in the matter until the Report of the Army Commission upon the subject of promotion and retirement was received. But as soon as I got that Report I instructed the officer at the head of the Marine Office to submit a scheme to me on the subject based on the principles of that Report. I got that scheme; but it was obvious to me that it was one which was not likely to be sanctioned by the Treasury as it stood. It seemed to me, from an Admiralty point of view, that we
  1820
  should make some alteration in it, and I was anxious not to lose time. Suppose I had set to work to alter the scheme in that point of view, and that it then went to the Treasury to be considered by them in a Treasury point of view, there would, I felt, be that hope deferred which maketh the heart sick, and that another Session might elapse before anything was done. I proposed, therefore, to the Treasury to have a joint Committee to examine the scheme. This Committee is now sitting. I also proposed—a proposal which was assented to—in order that there might be no mistake as to our intention, to make pecuniary provision for the scheme by putting a lump sum in the Estimates to give it effect. That being so, I have, I think, fulfilled the pledges which I gave my hon. and learned Friend last Session, and I may, I believe, hold out to him the hope that he will know what the scheme to which I have referred is in the course of the Session, for I saw the Chairman of that Committee this morning, and he told me that I might promise that I would be able to announce to the House the proposal which it would make before the close of the present Session.
  I now come to the question of the engineers, the importance of improving whose position forced itself on my attention some time ago, and in September, 1875, I appointed a Committee, of which Admiral Cooper-Key was the Chairman, to inquire into the subject. That Committee made a most valuable Report, from which I may, perhaps, be permitted to read the following extract:—
  "We have entered on this inquiry with a full sense of the importance of the subject. No arguments are needed to prove that the efficiency of our Fleets, on which the strength and security of this country depend, become daily more and more intimately connected with the question of the machinery of our ships of war."
  That is the view taken by the Committee and also by the Admiralty. The Report is a long one, and I cannot undertake to read more than that extract, but the Report itself is on the Table, and hon. Members who are interested in the subject will find it well worthy of perusal.—[Mr. CHILDERS: The Report is not yet on the Table.] Then it will be in a short time. The Report points out that it is necessary, in order to attract men to the Service, to

  1821
  improve the condition of these officers, both as regards pay and position; and we have accepted the principles of that Report. We have not, however, accepted all the details. The proposals of the Committee with regard to increase of pay have been somewhat modified, and there has been some slight modification also as regards the question of relative rank. But as far as the main principle of the Report is concerned, I think I may say we have accepted it entirely. We propose to improve the pay of the engineer officers and of the engine-room artificers. It is also proposed to give them in many cases improved relative rank, and we shall endeavour altogether to put them on as good a footing as we can. As regards the engine-room artificers, we propose to make increases of their pay and to appoint a new rating —that of chief engine-room artificer. Then the Committee took much evidence as to the necessity of having so large a complement of engine-room officers, and made a recommendation, which we have adopted in great part, that the number of engineer officers should be reduced, and the number of engine-room artificers augmented. Unless we were able to do this, the financial results of accepting the recommendations of the Committee would have been serious; but with that modification, I think we have brought the proposal within moderate limits. The Committee have pointed out, what it is impossible to overlook—namely, the difficulty of treating engineer officers on an equal footing with the executive officers of the Navy as long as they are drawn from a much lower social stratum. This, perhaps, is a delicate matter to speak about, but it is referred to in the Report as raising a serious difficulty. The Committee recommend that we should endeavour to attract persons of a higher social position to this branch of the Service, and I propose to try the experiment, though I do not mean to say that the subject is free from difficulty. But, looking to the history of civil engineering in this country, I remember the time when it was deemed derogatory to the dignity of gentlemen to send their sons to learn that business. I have lived, however, to see the day when gentlemen, and even Peers of high rank, have sent their sons to learn it, and in order to learn it to any purpose they must necessarily go through the manual and prac-
  1822
  tical part of the business. I cannot see why, therefore, if they are treated with proper consideration and due regard to their habits at home, we should not be able to induce gentlemen and Noblemen to send their sons to follow what I consider to be a very honourable profession. The Committee have recommended that greater pains should henceforth be taken in the selection of candidates. I propose, therefore, that there shall be a free competition among those candidates who are approved by the Admiralty, but that great pains should be taken in regard to their vouchers of respectability. It is likewise proposed that for three years they should pay £25 a-year for their instruction. The Committee recommend that certain privileges should be given to them in the dockyards, and that a distinction should be made between them and the workmen in regard to the way in which their names are entered on coming through the gates. Other privileges will also be accorded to them. But these details will require consideration, and I will only say now that we shall endeavour to make their apprenticeship in the dockyards, which must involve them in a great deal of manual work, as pleasant and easy as in the circumstances it can be made. As regards the increased pay, the Chief Inspector of Machinery Afloat—whose title will be modified by dropping the word "afloat"—will, it is proposed, have his full pay increased from £1 5s. a-day, or £456 5s. a-year, to £1 12 s. a-day, or £584 a-year. The half-pay is raised from 16 s. to 18 s. per day; the maximum retired pay from £450 to £500 a-year; and these officers will be permitted to count for retirement all confirmed time served in the junior ranks from the age of 20. The number of Inspectors of Machinery will be increased from five to seven, should their services be required. We also drop the word "afloat" from their title. Their full pay will be increased from 25 s. to 28 s. per day, and their half-pay from 16 s. to 17 s. They will also be allowed to count towards retirement all confirmed time served in the junior ranks from the age of 20. The number of chief engineers will be gradually increased from 170 to 220, and chief engineers will be employed in ships not at present authorized to carry them. Their full pay will be increased. It will in future commence at 13 s. instead of 12 s.

  1823
  a-day, going up by steps. Their half-pay will be increased from 6s. to 6s. 6d. for a period under five years' service. I should only weary the Committee if I went into further detail upon these points, but they will gather that a substantial improvement has been made. [Mr. GOSCHEN: We shall see it in the Report?] The Report will be laid upon the Table; but I have indicated some of the changes as to the nature and scale of the advantages we propose to confer in these cases. As regards pensions there will also be some improvement. The pay of engine-room artificers will be increased, and there will, as I said before, be a new rating of "Chief engine-room artificer." This Force will be a means of promoting the best men in the service to higher pay and posts of greater consideration. Some complaint has been made as to the mode of obtaining leave, the care of their mess-places, and the size of their sea chests, and endeavours will be made to meet their wishes in this respect and make them more comfortable when afloat. As far as practicable a separate mess-place will be provided for them, and in some cases there will be an improvement in their relative rank. Altogether there has been an endeavour to consider this valuable class of officers and artificers and to raise their pay to a rate which may be considered commensurate with the position they ought to occupy in the ship. As to the entry of students, it must be considered only tentative. It is the recommendation of a Committee, and I hope in the course of a very short time to bring out regulations on the subject and invite students to enter. Some persons are not sanguine as to the success of the plan. Others—I myself among them—hope we shall be able to induce the sons of parents of higher position to enter this Service, and I shall consider myself fortunate if I am able to inaugurate such an improvement in the Service. We have also found it necessary to make another new rating—a rating of wood and iron shipwrights, and also to give increased pay to various classes of artificers on beard ship. We found a great want of men competent to deal with the new class of ship—skilled shipwrights, and we therefore thought it necessary to establish this new rating with a higher class of pay; but artificers under the old rating will have an opportunity, if able to pass the neces-
  1824
  sary examination, of succeeding to this higher rating.
  Another point, for which the printed Estimates will have prepared the Committee, is the proposal to increase the pay of 2d. a-day to the re-engaged men of the seamen class. The want of the Navy is a superior class of men to set a good example and perform the duties of petty officers. Great complaints are made by naval officers of the difficulty of getting good petty officers for the Fleet. The other day, when a ship of importance was about to be commissioned, we were 18 petty officers short, and could not get them, except by taking away men who were re-qualifying as gunners. In the case of another ship we were 14 petty officers short. This is a serious matter, because these men are the back-bone of the Service in point of discipline and example. All the naval officers with whom I spoke on this question recommended me in the strongest way to give an additional inducement to men to re-engage in order to supply what we want—men to set a good example to others who have not had the same experience in the Service, and are not so well accustomed to the discipline.
  It may be interesting to the Committee to see what the entry of 100 boys amounts to as years go on. Experience shows that the entry of 100 boys results in the entry of 88 ordinary seamen. They re-engage for a period of 10 years as men, and at the end of that period what is technically called "waste"—the diminution of numbers from deaths, invaliding, discharges, and desertions—reduces the number to 40. It appears, then, that at the expiration of 10 years the 88 who enter as ordinary seamen become only 40. The expense of training boys for the Service is very great. I think it is £65 a boy; at all events, it is something like that sum; but when you have got him at the end of his 10 years' service as a man he is a highly manufactured article, a good seaman, whom we should try and keep; and I say it is sound policy to spend the money on his training. But though we have many re-engagements, those who decline to re-engage form from 25 to 35 per cent, and if we could induce a larger proportion to re-engage it would be very good policy to spend the amount which I propose in effecting that object. The cost of the present number re-en-

  1825
  gaged is £10,500. I do not suppose that the extra inducement which I have indicated will prove sufficient for every man who now refuses to re-engage; but I am sanguine enough to believe that it will attract a good many. There is a feeling amongst the men—and a very natural feeling—that after their 10 years of service they are worth more than before and that they ought to experience pecuniary benefit with the lapse of those years. Of course, it may be said that they get pensions; but they have a feeling that they ought to be paid more in actual wages, and the inducements to them to leave the Service by reason of the lucrative offers they get on shore are very great. A man whose constitution has stood the work for the 10 years' period of service, and whose moral character is such as would not only enable him to remain in the Service, but to get a good rating, will obtain on shore a very good employment. Therefore, if the Committee should sanction my proposal, I look forward with confidence to its being of great advantage to the Service in the direction I have indicated. The entry of boys for the Fleet this year has been even greater than our requirements; and that, I think, is a very satisfactory state of matters. I do not, however, dwell too much upon it. We all know that trade has been in a depressed state, and, perhaps, that may be one cause of the satisfactory state of matters to which I allude. The same thing has been stated by my right hon. Friend as regards the Army; there has been a larger number of recruits, and no doubt the cause which has affected the Army has affected the Navy also. But, in any case, it is gratifying to know that while on a former occasion I was obliged to complain to the House of the difficulty of getting boys I have now a very different statement to make.
  I believe I have now called the attention of the Committee to the most important matters as regards the personnel of the Fleet which involve an increase of expense, but there is one matter which I should like to mention, and that is the state of the Naval Reserves. On that subject an interesting Report has been made by Admiral Tarleton, late Superintendent of Reserves, which has been laid on the Table. I will not trouble the Committee by going through the Report at length, but will just state
  1826
  the numbers of the Naval Reserves at the present time. At the time of the last Return they amounted to 17,919, or, in round numbers, 18,000, and that is an increase of more than 4,000 since the 1st of March, 1874. As regards the Second Class, we should be able to enter more men if we wished it, but we were obliged to refuse. With respect to the First Class, we should be willing to enter more. Admiral Tarleton, in his Report, states that he thinks we can get from the Mercantile Marine any men we want not disqualified by age, character, or other matters. That is a very important matter. I have directed inquiries to be made and statistics to be prepared to elucidate the subject. And here I may mention, what I am sure will be gratifying to the Committee to hear, as it will be gratifying to the Royal Naval Reserve, that His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has taken such interest in that body that he has expressed a wish to hold an honorary commission in the corps, and I hope in a few days to see His Royal Highness gazetted as an honorary captain of the Royal Naval Reserve. I am sure that will give great satisfaction to the corps, and that it will derive additional honour from having the name of His Royal Highness connected with it. And here I may mention officially, what I believe is known already to many hon. Members—that while His Royal Highness is going to enter the Naval Reserve, his two sons, the young Princes, are to be placed on beard the Britannia for their education, with the view of one of them at a future time, at all events, becoming an officer in the Royal Navy. The number of men in the First Class of the Naval Reserve is 12,461, and in the Second Class 5,458, making a total, as I have said, of 17,919. The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers number in London, 370; in Liverpool, 385; and in Bristol, 80; making in all 835.
  A Question was asked some while ago by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) whether the tons weight of hull I gave were builders' measurement or not. I am now able to answer. The number of tons was 20,488—that is, 22,586 tons builders' measurement.
  I cannot conclude without noticing the return of the Arctic Expedition. The Arctic Expedition started with the hope of many in this country that it

  1827
  would be successful in reaching the Pole. That expectation has not been realized, but I think it would be a mistake to suppose that the labours of the Arctic Expedition have been thrown away. It is difficult at present to estimate exactly all the advantages that have been reaped; but as regards geographical knowledge I think we know exactly what has been obtained. First of all, a much higher northern latitude has been reached than ever was before attained. The highest latitude reached was 83 deg. 20½ min.—that is, 35½ miles higher than Parry attained in 1827, and he attained the highest latitude ever previously attained—namely, 82 deg. 45 min. N. The extent of new land traversed exceeded 300 miles—on the west 220 miles, and on the east 80—beyond the northern opening out of Smith Sound, all lying between the 82nd and 83rd parallels of north latitude. The western shores of Smith's Sound between the 79th and 82nd parallel were closely examined in the progress of the ships to and from their winter quarters near the 82nd parallel, and thus the coast line of the northernmost land adjoining the American Continent is now accurately charted. The conjectural open sea northward of Smith Sound and the land assumed to be there have been proved not to exist, and we now know from the condition of the ice in this region that the Pole is here unapproachable, at least by any means now known. This is a substantial gain as narrowing the limits within which Polar enterprise is feasible. As regards the scientific discoveries which have been made, it is impossible at this moment to say what their precise value is; but in connection with the Expedition great labour has been bestowed on many branches of science, particularly on physics and natural history. The scientific results are in process of being formulated, and will, I know, be found very valuable. In one branch of science, that of the tides, sufficient from a cursory examination has even now been ascertained to pronounce them of the highest value in solving a hitherto perplexing but important problem in connection with the movement of great bodies of ocean water. Of course, the popular idea of the Expedition was that it should reach the Pole; and undoubtedly a great triumph would have been gained to this country, in addition to advantages of a
  1828
  scientific nature, if that result had been accomplished. Unfortunately, the Expedition broke down in consequence of the outbreak of scurvy; but, dreadful as were the sufferings which that outbreak imposed upon the men, it cannot be said that it prevented the Expedition reaching the Pole. It would have been impossible as the officers and men were then placed—with the hardships which they would have been required to undergo, and the limited time available for the purpose—for them to have reached the Pole. The Report of the Committee which I appointed to inquire into the cause of the outbreak of scurvy has not yet reached me. I have seen a draft of it, but I have not yet received the official Report with the signatures of the Members, and I cannot, therefore, more particularly refer to it at present. But I could not help adverting to the Expedition, because, whatever errors of judgment may have been committed in regard to the sledge dietary, I think we must recognize the indomitable pluck and energy displayed by all those who took part in the Expedition, and the great skill and ability with which the captains of the ships navigated their vessels through those frozen regions and brought them home in almost as good a state as when they left this country. Of course, there are many topics which may present themselves in considering the Votes in detail; and upon those topics I shall be happy, when they arise, to give the Committee all the information I can. I now beg leave to propose the Vote for 60,000 Men and boys, including 14,000 Marines.
  (1.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That 60,000 men and boys he employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1878, including 14,000 Royal Marines."—(Mr. Hunt.)
  MR. E. J. REEDsaid, he should move that Progress be reported, as there had been no opportunity of discussing the points raised by the explanatory Statement of the First Lord. That Statement was a very important one, and deserved ample consideration.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."— (Mr. E. T. Reed.)
  SIR JOHN HAYhoped the hon. Member for Pembroke would not press his Motion before the first Vote was taken. It was usual to vote the number of men on the first night.
  MR. ANDERSONexpressed his surprise that some reference had not been made to the navigating officers.
  MR. HUNTsaid, that he had referred to those officers when the hon. Member was not in the House. He understood from his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury that it was very important the Vote for the money should be taken at once. Perhaps he would state his reasons.
  MR. W. H. SMITHput it to right hon. Gentlemen opposite whether it had not been usual to vote the number of men? It was necessary to have the Votes for both men and money before Easter, and in time for the Mutiny Bill to pass.
  MR. GOSCHENsaid, he did not remember any occasion when the men and money had been taken simply on the Statement of the Minister without the opportunity of continuing the debate. He understood that the University Bill was to be taken on Thursday week, but he thought it would be advisable not to begin any new Business before Easter. The Government should remember that most of the Motions which had been brought before the House had not come from the Opposition Benches.
  MR. HUNThoped the Committee would allow him to take the Vote for the men. He would not at present ask for the money.
  LORD ESLINGTONsaid, they were placed in a most inconvenient position by the number of Motions which had been made by hon. Members on the Question that the House go into Committee on the Naval Estimates. Those Motions were, no doubt, very interesting and important in their kind, but they would be far more appropriately discussed in Committee. The House was debarred for five hours from hearing the Statement of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty; and he must say that a more important or a more interesting Statement he had never heard than that of the right hon. Gentleman that evening in laying the Navy Estimates before the Committee. It was a statement that contained much that was new, and one which he believed
  1830
  would be read with deep interest by the country.
  MR. T. E. SMITHurged the importance of entering as many boys as they could obtain for the Navy, and also of taking more practical steps than those now contemplated for training them in seamanship. They should be trained by being sent to sea in steam vessels, but worked under sail. As to the engineers, they wanted some definite and immediate improvement in their position, in order that they might share in the advantages proposed to be conferred on that class of officer.
  MR. WHALLEYwished to draw particular attention to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman in regard to the cost of boys on training ships. The cost had been stated by the right hon. Gentleman to be £65, and he had announced his intention of providing a sum of £25 for each boy on the training ships about to be established. That was a fact which ought not to be lost sight of; and, speaking for the training ships with which he was intimately connected, he could say they were perfectly satisfied with that £25. He wished to acknowledge the great courtesy of the right hon. Gentleman to all who had occasion to communicate with him, either on the subject of training ships, or of the Naval Volunteer Service.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVREasked if it was the intention to add to the total number of engineer officers? The right hon. Gentleman had stated his intention of increasing the total number of chief engineers from 170 to 220; and whether before the subject was again under the consideration of the House, the right hon. Gentleman would take care that the Report as to engineer officers should be in the hands of hon. Members?
  MR. HUNT: I think I stated it was proposed. to decrease the engine-room complements of certain ships, and to have fewer engineer officers and more artificers.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  (2.) £75,511 2s. 3d., Navy (Excess), 1875-6.
  CAPTAIN NOLANasked how long the printed Paper on the subject had been in the hands of hon. Members?
  MR. HUNT: It was delivered several days ago.
  Vote agreed to.

  EXCHEQUER BONDS.
  (3.) £700,000, Exchequer Bonds.
  MR. W. H. SMITH,in moving—
  "That, towards raising a Supply to Her Majesty, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorized to raise any sum not exceeding £700,000 in Exchequer Bills or Bonds,"
  said, the Exchequer Bonds issued last year would become due on the 28th of this month. It would be necessary to pay those bends. This was not a new loan, but merely a renewal of amounts required for the purposes of the Public Works Loan Commissioners, under the Act of 1875.
  Vote agreed to.
  On Question, "That the Chairman report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"
  MR. CHILDERSasked when the debate would be resumed?
  MR. HUNTsaid, he could not say at present whether the discussion would be renewed before or after Easter. The discussion, on going into Committee, had lasted so long that he should have to consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the future course of Business.
  MR. CHILDERShoped it would be either on Monday or Thursday—not on Friday.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.

TREASURY AND EXCHEQUER BILLS BILL — [BILL 88.]
(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. William Henry Smith.)
TREASURY AND EXCHEQUER BILLS BILL — [BILL 88.]

  CONSIDERATION. THIRD READING.
  Order for Consideration, as amended, read.
  MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, it was important that this Bill should go up to the other House without delay. The Bill was one to which no objection was made, and he trusted that the House would not
  1832
  object to pass it through the remaining stage.
  Bill, as amended, considered; read the third time, and passed.

WAYS AND MEANS.
Considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
1. Resolved, That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorised to raise any sum of money, not exceeding £700,000, by issue of Exchequer Bonds.
2. Resolved, That the principal of all Exchequer Bonds which may be so issued shall be paid off at par, at any period not exceeding five years from the date of such Bonds.
3. Resolved, That the interest of such Bonds shall be payable half-yearly, and shall be charged upon and issued out of the Consoldated Fund of the United Kingdom, or the growing produce thereof.
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow;
Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.
House adjourned at One o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Beer Licences (Ireland) * (23); Open Spaces (Metropolis) * (24).
Second Reading—Exoneration of Charges (16); Contingent Remainders [17]; Irish Peerage [15].
Royal Assent—Consolidated Fund (£350,000) [40 Vict. c. 1].

EXONERATION OF CHARGES BILL.
(The Lord Chancellor.)
EXONERATION OF CHARGES BILL.

  (NO. 16.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR,in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that according to the law of this country, up to a very recent period, a state of things might happen which he should best describe by an illustration. The owner of a landed estate worth £5,000 a-year, which was mortgaged to the extent of £50,000, had also personal property to the extent of £50,000; on his death he left the real estate to one son and the money to another. It was, of course, the intention of the testator to divide his property equally between the two sons. But up to the period to which he had referred it would have been in the power of the son to whom the real estate was devised to call upon the son who had the personal property to apply the latter to paying off the mortgage;—and in that way he would become the possessor, not merely of the estate, but of the £50,000 applied to paying off the mortgage. In 1854 an Act—the 17 & 18 Vict., c. 113—amended in 1867, was passed, which provided that unless there was specific direction by the testator to that effect, this right
  1736
  to have the real estate exonerated out of the personal property should not exist. Those Acts, however, extended to freehold property only; and as, in some recent instances, the same injustice had arisen in respect of leasehold property, the object of the present Bill was to extend the former Acts to leaseholds.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

CONTINGENT REMAINDERS BILL.
(The Lord Chanccllor.)
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS BILL.

  (NO. 17.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR,in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that the measure had been introduced, like the preceding Bill, to remedy any injustice in the operation of the existing law. As the law now stood, if a man left an estate to Brown for life with remainder to the first son of John Smith who attained the age of 21 years, and if Brown died before any son of John Smith attained that age, the contingent remainder would be void. The Real Property Commissioners reported on that state of things in 1833, and strongly recommended that the law should be altered. Since then an attempt had been made to revise the law, and put it in a more satisfactory shape, but that attempt had not been successful. The object of the Bill before their Lordships, which was a very short one, was to limit the operation of the law. The necessity for this had been forcibly illustrated by a recent case in the Courts of Law, which showed that the present doctrine of law had worked serious injustice in the devolution of family property.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF THE METROPOLIS.

  MOTION FOR RETURNS.
  EARL DE LA WARRrose to call the attention of their Lordships to the operation of the law with reference to the local government of the

  1737
  Metropolis; and to move for certain Returns relating to the expenditure of Vestries and District Boards within the Metropolitan District. He desired to bring this matter before their Lordships, having observed that the discussion which had recently taken place in their Lordships' House with reference to the Metropolitan Board of Works did not embrace some important points connected with that subject. The question as submitted to their Lordships by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Camper-down) was confined to the constitution of the Metropolitan Board and the mode of its election. That was, doubtless, a matter of considerable importance, and he regretted that what was proposed by his noble Friend had not been assented to by their Lordships. The subject to which he now wished to call attention—namely, the operation of the law in the local government of the Metropolis—included, he was aware, many interests, and was one which, perhaps, could not be approached without awakening a certain amount, he might say, of prejudice, as touching upon what might be considered ancient custom and long-existing practice. These considerations threw some difficulties round the question. But at the same time they could not shut their eyes to the fact that changes must sometimes be made in local as well as in other institutions to adapt them to the requirements of the times. Now it seemed to be a want of this policy which had kept back improvements in the Metropolis, which consequently had only been partially carried out. It had been attempted, to unite the ancient form of local government, when the population was counted by hundreds, with what was rendered necessary by the increasing wants of a population almost unexampled in number and in the vastness and variety of its occupations. This work was attempted in the year 1855, when the Act was passed which constituted the Metropolitan Board of Works. Previous to the passing of this Act the Metropolis had been mainly under the government of Vestries—with the exception of the comparatively small area which, as now, was under the jurisdiction of the Corporation of the City of London—and as might be expected, there were hardly two parishes which were governed alike. The object of this Act was to produce greater uniformity of local government.
  1738
  No doubt a great deal had been achieved, but the evil had only been partially cured. Before the appointment of the Metropolitan Board the subject had been for many years under the consideration of the ablest and most practical men; Parliamentary Committees and Royal Commissions had sat and reported upon it; Bills were introduced by the Governments of the day and by private Members of the Legislature, which were afterwards withdrawn; and the question seemed to be beset with difficulties—one of which, and he thought not the least, was the attempt to amalgamate the City of London with the surrounding boroughs and parishes. It was, therefore, wise in the Metropolis Management Act of 1855 to exclude almost entirely from its operation the City of London. He admitted that the City of London had been well governed — for, while the rights and privileges of that ancient Corporation had happily been respected by Parliament, they had adapted their practice to the wants of the present time, and had set an example of local government which was worthy of being followed. But the area and population included within the City boundary were comparatively small and were numbered by thousands, while outside they came to millions. Excluding, then, as he proposed to do in this discussion, the City of London, what did they find existing under the Metropolitan Act? There was a divided jurisdiction in many important matters affecting public interests and public convenience. If they looked outside the City boundaries there was a population approaching 4, 0 00,000. with an area extending into four counties, and inclosing nine Parliamentary boroughs. Under the Act of 1855 this immense district covered with houses was placed under the joint government of 38 Select Vestries or District Boards and the Metropolitan Board of Works. The smaller parishes were grouped together and formed District Boards; the larger ones being divided into wards having members according to their size. These Vestries or District Boards had under their management branch drainage, buildings to some extent, streets, water supply, lighting, and sanitary arrangements. The Metropolitan Board had entrusted to it the main drainage, the control over the construction of sewers by the Vestries, over the forma-

  1739
  tion of new streets and buildings, and general metropolitan improvements. The larger works were carried on by committees: thus there was the Building Committee, the Fire Brigade Committee, the Open Spaces and Commons Committee, the Cattle Diseases Committee, and others. Now he was at a loss to see how it could be for the advantage of the ratepayers or the public that there should be this divided jurisdiction, and these numerous centres of management. He would mention an instance—that of drainage. Could it be a good, or convenient, or economical arrangement that the main drainage should be under the Metropolitan Board and the smaller drainage under Parochial or District Boards? Or to take the water or lighting. Was it desirable to leave important matters like these, which required unity of action, in the hands of different Boards, with perhaps more or less different interests. It was argued" You will interfere with the parochial system if you take away the jurisdiction of Vestries." But was not that done already? They had District Boards formed by the union of parishes instead of Vestries, and it was but a small step further to unite these in one central Board, to be elected by the ratepayers, who would thus be directly represented, and would exercise more the rights which they were intended to have than they did under the present system. He came now to the practical results of this divided authority as existing in the Metropolitan Board of Works and the 38 Vestries or District Boards. And here he wished distinctly to state that in the remarks which he might offer ho desired in no way to attribute maladministration either to the Metropolitan Board or to the different Vestries and Local Boards. He regarded the defects in practice to which he might ask their Lordships' notice as the natural and in many instances unavoidable consequences of the existing divided authority and jurisdiction. Take the street question. The Metropolitan Board of Works had no control over many of those matters which materially affected public interests and public convenience; but in the work of the Local Boards streets were continually disturbed and broken up in different districts for gas or drainage pipes or other reasons at inconvenient seasons of the year, new paving was
  1740
  sometimes laid down in one street and not in another which equally required it; the paving of one street was often of a totally different kind from that in the other adjoining—so that horses suddenly passed from a macadamized street to a slippery wood or asphalte pavement; large masses of broken granite were laid down in some streets at a time when the carriage traffic most required an even road. Now, if they had one central authority there would be one kind of paving for all alike. Again, steam rollers were worked at all hours of the day: streets in the summer were frequently imperfectly watered; and he had heard of an instance where one parish insisted upon watering its side of the street in the morning, while the other watered it in the evening, thereby having dust all the day. These, he believed, were the words of the Act giving power to the Vestry to water the streets —"as often as they think fit." This, of course, admitted of very wide interpretation. So also as regarded crossing-sweepers to be distinguished by their dress as public servants, the Act allowed them to be appointed, but did not make it compulsory; consequently it was never done. And with reference to clearing the streets of dust or snow, the Act required it to be done at "such hours as fixed by the Vestry." It was too well known how imperfectly this was carried out; and as to cleaning the streets it was frequently done by aged and infirm persons instead of by the improved machinery now in use. And here he could not omit to notice the subject of the gas and water supply of the Metropolis. These were, as their Lordships knew, in the hands of Companies, and consequently Vestries and District Boards were dependent upon those Companies, both as regarded the quantity and quality of what was supplied. The gas of London, as was well known, was inferior to what was used in many other large towns; and there were instances of successful management, as in Manchester, where the gas was made a source of income to the town. In like manner, the quality of a considerable portion of the water as now supplied was not what it ought to be, and what it might be, in such a City as London. He believed both would be better if the supply was in the hands of a central authority. Then, what an unfavourable

  1741
  contrast did London and other large towns of England afford when compared with towns on the Continent with regard to markets? Where were our meat markets, our fish markets, our general markets? The few which we had were frequently small and ill-managed, and were not accessible to a large portion of the population, and the poor as well as the rich had often no choice but dealing with tradesmen at a disadvantage. These were some of the inconveniences, and others might be enumerated, which arose from the divided jurisdiction of so many Vestries and District Boards; and he could not but think that what he had ventured to suggest would in a great measure afford a remedy—that was, if the management of the Metropolis were placed under the control of a central Board such as or similar to the existing Metropolitan Board, and to be elected in a direct manner by the ratepayers. He believed it would be more economical, that the work would be better done, and that it would be greatly to the advantage of the public. He had to thank their Lordships for listening to what he felt was but an imperfect statement of a large question, and which he trusted might be supplemented by other remarks, in the hope that Her Majesty's Government might be induced to give their attention and consideration to that important subject. As he proposed to move for a Return of the sums expended by Vestries and District Boards of the metropolis during the past three years, he might mention that there was, he believed, a Return of the period between 1856 and 1870, showing a total expenditure of upwards of £7,000,000.
  Moved, That there be laid before this House—
  "Returns of the sums expended by vestries and district boards within the Metropolitan district, exclusive of the City of London, upon paving, lighting, drainage, water supply, sanitary arrangements, and other works not under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Board, during the years 1874, 1875, and 1876.—(The Earl De La Warr.)
  EARL BEAUCHAMPsaid, that, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, there was no objection to the production of the Papers for which his noble Friend had moved. Their Lordships would, no doubt, expect that he should say something in answer to the observations of
  1742
  his noble Friend; but he had some difficulty in doing so, because he had been unable to find from the Notice on the Paper, to what particular point his noble Friend intended to address his remarks. Now that his noble Friend had made his observations, he (Earl Beauchamp) desired to point out that the main proposition of that speech had been, perhaps, sufficiently discussed when the Motion for the second reading of Lord Camper-down's Bill was before their Lordships. No one could contend that there were not imperfections in the present system of managing metropolitan affairs; but he thought that if regard was had to what had been accomplished, since the passing of the Metropolis Management Act, it must in candour be admitted that the Vestries and District Boards had not laboured without success, and that, on the whole, the management of the Metropolis would compare favourably with that of Continental towns. The Metropolis Management Act of 1855 contained the provisions in accordance with which the Vestries were elected and transacted their business. In 1870 a number of questions were addressed to the various Vestries of the Metropolis relative to the sanitary condition of their districts; and the answers to those questions showed that between the date of the passage of the Metropolis Management Act and that year the sanitary condition of the Metropolis had changed very considerably for the better, that the gas and water supply was improved, and that much property of an inferior and insanitary condition bad been replaced by dwellings of a more modern and healthy sort. Rome was not built in a day; but, considering the vastness of the work they had to do, the Metropolitan Board of Works and the Vestries might congratulate themselves on having taken most effective and successful steps in embellishing the Metropolis of this great Empire. He was far from denying that much remained to be done; and those who had done so much would be far from denying it; but still the improvement and beautifying of the City had proceeded to a considerable extent. The death-rate also of the Metropolis had been considerably diminished, but there was no reason why it should not be diminished still more. He could not very well follow the noble Earl through all the details of his

  1743
  speech—there seemed nothing too great, or too small for his criticism. As to what his noble Friend had said with regard to the pulling up of streets for the purpose of laying and repairing gas and water pipes, all that, no doubt, was disagreeable, but the Vestries had no jurisdiction to enable them to prevent it. Then his noble Friend had complained that there were different descriptions of paving in adjoining streets; but in reply to that, it was to be said that as yet no one kind of payment was acknowledged to be the best, and it must be remembered that the sort of pavement which answered very well in one street might not be suitable to another in which, perhaps, there was much more traffic. As to markets, it would be very hard to hold the Vestries accountable in that matter—they had no power over the markets; and if they had, it was not certain that they would act prudently or economically. A noble lady, whose name was always mentioned with respect (Lady Burdett Coutts), had founded a market in the densely populated district of Shoreditch, which, for some reason or other, did not command the approval of the population of the district and had proved a failure; and if they were to take that instance as a guide, they could not argue that the erection of markets for the various districts of the metropolis was the best thing to advocate. The noble Earl complained of the way in which dust and snow were removed from the streets. During the last great snowstorm the possibilities of the various Vestries were strained to the utmost. So that they must not take that as a fair sample of their normal capacities. But Mr. Hayward had shown by statistics, that to make provision for the immediate removal of the snow, after a heavy fall of snow in the Metropolis, would involve an expenditure out of all proportion to the object to be achieved. It was impossible for the very best arrangements to succeed in a season of great emergency; but, if it were found that the general working was efficient, he thought that was all they could fairly ask of any public body. There was, as he had said, no certainty that a central Board such as that suggested would produce more favourable results. The more they inquired into the manner in which the duties of the various local authorities
  1744
  were performed, the more it would be found that they redounded to the credit of those to whom they were entrusted.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETthought that if he took his "intelligent foreigner" through the West-end of London, that personage would be very much astonished at the way the public thoroughfares were dealt with by Vestries and by Gas and Water Companies. In dealing with our streets the Vestries ought to act under the control of a central authority, such as the Metropolitan Board of Works. They ought to be placed by law under such an authority; and, if that were done, a great deal of local inconvenience would be spared.
  EARL FORTESCUEsaid, that a system could not but be defective, under which, not only the Vestries, but Gas and Water Companies had power to take up streets. The Companies acted independently of the Vestries. Two Companies might be pulling up different portions of a street at the same time; and he had known instances in which no sooner had one Company taken up a street and put it down again, than another Company entered and performed the same operation over again. He was glad to find that the noble Earl who had spoken on behalf of the Government (Earl Beauchamp) did not speak of the management of the Metropolis as being absolute perfection; but he regretted that the admissions of the noble Earl were so very qualified. He could not agree with the noble Earl that things had been done so well. On the contrary, he held that at the present moment the state of the Metropolis was far from creditable to the greatest capital in the world. It was very far from being equal to Paris in its pavements, though, when he first knew the French capital, it was far behind London in that respect, as well as in its sanitary arrangements. He was of opinion that as the duties of the Vestries were administrative, the members of those bodies were too numerous. He must, in conclusion, solemnly enter his protest against regarding the present state of administration in the Metropolis as being either satisfactory, efficient, or economical.
  Motion agreed to.

CAPTAIN BURNABY—RECALL FROM RUSSIA AND ASIA.

  QUESTIONS. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD DORCHESTERasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, By whose authority—and for what reasons, the leave of Captain Burnaby, of the Royal Horse Guards, granted by Her Majesty to travel in Russia and Asia, was rescinded; and by whom the cost of a telegram conveying an order to that officer to return was borne? He said that in putting these Questions, of which he had given Notice a week ago to the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he wished to disclaim all intention of raising any political question or causing any controversy between the two sides of the House. He was aware that the discussion in reference to the atrocities perpetrated in Bulgaria had created a great deal of interest, and he only regretted that, side by side with the compendious Blue Books on the subject and the able Report of Mr. Baring, they had not a list of the horrors that occurred in Poland in 1863, and the like of which he believed had also occurred in Circassia. He had read a letter from a remote town in Asia Minor in which it was stated that Bashi-Bazouks had returned from Bulgaria, and the vindictive propensities which were displayed in Bulgaria had been aroused by the remembrance of what took place in their country when it was subjugated. But it was not his wish to open up a sore which they all hoped was in process of being healed; and speaking from those (the Opposition) benches, he believed that the Government were entitled to the greatest consideration and a favourable verdict for the firmness and moderation and dignity with which they had conducted the affairs of the Conference at Constantinople. It had been said by a great master of the English tongue that "it is not in mortals to command success;" but he felt sure that the Government had done what they could to deserve it. He had not, however, risen to address their Lordships on that subject, but to ask two Questions which affected, he thought, the basis of the individual and personal liberty of every Englishman who sought recreation abroad, and liberty to travel under the passport of the British Foreign Secretary. In this instance they had a British
  1746
  officer who applied to the commanding officer of his regiment, that application was forwarded to the Brigade office, thence to the Divisional office, and thence to the Horse Guards, and from the Horse Guards to the War Office. [A laugh.] That, at least, was the system when he knew it, and he had some experience; and he did not know that the recent alterations in our military system had had the effect of simplifying matters —he should rather say the reverse. Well, this officer openly and avowedly sent in his application, which passed through all the necessary channels, and eventually what was called "Queen's leave" was granted to him to proceed to Russia and Asia. The officer left in the most undisguised manner and proceeded to St. Petersburg, where he took up his quarters at one of the principal hotels. He took letters of introduction from the Russian Ambassador here to his brother at St. Petersburg, and called upon the British Ambassador and the military attaché; and he (Lord Dorchester) could not imagine how more publicity could have been given, or a more open announcement of his intentions made than were made by Captain Burnaby. He proceeded by railway as far as the last station on the route, at Orenburg, and finally rode some 900 miles across the Desert. He was not bound, either as a British officer, or a man of honour, to specify to the Russian Government at what precise point he was going to emerge from their Empire into the neighbouring territory of the Khan of Khiva—but what he did, he did without taking advice or permission from the Russian Minister. In that consisted the sin and offence of Captain Burnaby. When he was at Khiva, he received a message by two Tartars telling him that he was to return to the fort of Petro Alexandrovsk, where a message was awaiting him from His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief. That he (Lord Dorchester) believed was the tenor of the message; but, at any rate, a message awaited him from England. Believing in the honour and truthfulness of the parties from whom he received this message, he accompanied the Tartars back to Fort Alexandrovsk. The two Tartars never allowed him out of their sight; and, further, he learned at Khiva that the Khan had heard of his enforced departure, and that a party was to escort him to

  1747
  the fort. It was little more than an open arrest—it was very like sending a common soldier with a file of men to the rear. At Petro Alexandrovsk a communication was made to him by the commandant, stating that he was to return to his country by the way which he came, and that he had strict orders to refuse him permission to proceed as he wished, either through Tashkend or by the Caspian Sea—than which he (Lord Dorchester) could not imagine more harmless routes. There might be some difficulty in determining the precise limits of the leave granted to Captain Burnaby, but he was not aware that he exceeded the limit permitted when he went to travel in Russia and Asia; and he did not think that the Commander-in-Chief would punish him for exceeding it by about 20 miles, the extent to which he travelled beyond the Russian boundary. Captain Burnaby had a great knowledge of Arabic, and was a first-rate Russian scholar; and he regretted that when he (Lord Dorchester) was in the Crimean War in 1854 he had not that knowledge, for he might say that the number of Englishmen in the Crimea who could speak the Russian language might be counted on their fingers. He did not think that the knowledge of languages was an objectionable acquirement to officers of the British Army—he thought that nothing could be better than that English officers should learn modern languages — it would be much better for them than the new-fangled examinations of officers. If they could only put them through their facings as a drill-sergeant did the recruits, it would be more useful than so many examinations. A very curious thing happened to him that day. He went to a certain scientific society to ascertain the exact distance that Captain Burnaby had travelled under his passport. The gentleman with whom he conversed said—"Of course, you have not come for the purpose of making the examination paper public—but your inquiry bears directly upon a question which is going to be put in an examination in one of the Departments." That gentleman gave him the distance from St. Petersburg to Khiva as about 2,300 English miles. The Questions he desired to put to the noble Earl were of serious importance, and he only put them from the sense of dignity which was due
  1748
  to officers in the English Service. No British subject should have been treated in this manner, far less a British officer so accomplished a linguist, and so conversant in the manners and customs of Oriental nations, who had such a laudable spirit of inquiry and so great intrepidity as had been exhibited by Captain Burnaby, who, travelling quite alone without any English servant, with merely those servants whom he could pick up in the country through which he was attempting to push his way—travelling in the East as Edwards, Burns, Abbett, Stoddart, and Conolly had done before him. Such an expedition was not considered a crime in the days of Lord William Bentinck, and he did not see it should be considered a crime now-a-days. He should not have put the Questions if he had been able to discover the reasons for the conduct that had been pursued. If their Imperial Ally had thought it necessary to stop Captain Burnaby, he should have done this before he left the Russian territory. It could only be for one of three reasons that Captain Burnaby had been sent back—having misconducted himself in this country; or secondly, having misconducted himself in that country; or thirdly, that the exigencies of the public service of this country required him at home. Those were the only three reasons which he could find for what had been done. He had no doubt the noble Earl would enlighten their Lordships on these points. He should regret if it were spread abroad in the East that a captain of the Queen's Guard—a man of high rank, who had become friendly with the Khan of Khiva, and, indeed, upon the best possible terms with him, for on the very morning he was recalled he had received as a present a dressing-gown from that Chief—should have been sent home in a manner in which a guardsman left a public-house with a corporal's picquet. He begged to ask the Questions of which he had given Notice.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I think your Lordships are much indebted to the noble Lord for putting these Questions, and for the amount of entertainment which he has extracted out of matter extremely simple, and not of very large or general interest. I am glad that the feelings which seem to exist in the noble Lord's mind are not shared in by your

  1749
  Lordships generally, or, as I hope, by other persons out-of-doors. The noble Lord has spoken in high terms of the merits of Captain Burnaby; but he has evidently put a construction upon what has been done which is entirely different from that which the War Office, or those who are aware of all the circumstances, can accept as just. The noble Lord has spoken of the high character of Captain Burnaby, and with that I entirely agree. I have always heard him spoken of as a very efficient officer; and—though I am not acquainted with him personally—I believe that he is a very popular officer; and to these qualifications he adds the distinction of being an adventurous traveller and a successful writer. And, I may now say, once for all, without enlarging on the point, that there is absolutely no offence charged against him, nor the slightest stigma put upon him by the course which has been adopted. The noble Lord speaks of Captain Burnaby having been treated—as I understand—in an ignominious manner by Russian officers, or other persons in the Russian service who were appointed to accompany him on his return home. He also spoke of the conduct adopted towards Captain Burnaby by the Russian authorities, and of his being placed under arrest; and he likened the manner in which, he says, Captain Burnaby was brought back to this country to the taking away of a soldier from a public-house by his comrades.
  LORD DORCHESTER: I read it from his book.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I have not had the pleasure of reading his book, and therefore cannot decide how far these remarks are justified; but what I can say on the subject is this—that if Captain Burnaby has any complaint to make against the Russian authorities, small or great, with regard to their treatment of him, let him make it to the Foreign Office, and we will take care that if he has in any way been improperly treated reparation shall be asked for. More than that I cannot promise. I cannot hold myself and the Government responsible for acts done by foreign Governments or their agents, when no complaint of those acts has reached us at the Foreign Office. The noble Lord went out of his way to vindicate the conduct of Captain Burnaby in matters in which I have never
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  heard it attacked. I never denied that he had gone on his journey publicly, and not in a secret or underhand manner. I cannot, however, agree with the contention of the noble Lord when he says that the recall of Captain Burnaby from his travels was a personal slight put upon him, and that because the route he contemplated following was laid down, and he had permission to travel on leave, we had no right to interfere with his movements. If Captain Burnaby had not held an appointment under the State, but had been a private person, we should have had no right to interfere with his movements; but he was an officer of the Queen, to whom leave had been granted, and it is impossible to say of a person so situated, when political considerations render it necessary or desirable that he should be recalled, that it can be considered in the light of a violation of his personal liberty to require his return. The simple facts are these: —The first we heard of Captain Burnaby was from our Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the 18th December, 1875. He stated that a British officer had passed through St. Petersburg without communicating with the Embassy. There may have been some misunderstanding about that, as there is contradictory evidence on the point, but that is the statement which I received. Of course he had a right to report himself or not at the Embassy as he thought fit. But he applied direct to the Russian Minister of War, who promised to give him facilities for travelling throughout the Russian dominions, but said he could not give his consent to his crossing the Russian frontier into the independent Central Asian States, inasmuch as it would be impossible for the Russian Government to guarantee his personal security beyond the Russian lines. It was afterwards reported from St. Petersburg that Captain Burnaby had passed over the Russian frontier into Central Asia, and was then travelling among the independent States, visiting on his way the capital of Khokand, which country was at that time at war with Russia; and it seemed to us undesirable that a journey of that kind should be undertaken through those independent provinces bordering on the frontier of Russia by a person who was known to be a British officer; because it was certain to lead to misconstruction by Russia on the

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  one hand, and by the native populations on the other. Captain Burnaby was a British officer, and I need hardly tell your Lordships that the notion of a man in that position travelling through a wild and dangerous country on his own account, without orders, for the mere love of information and adventure was a thing entirely unintelligible to Oriental people. He would be regarded as a political agent, and any denial of the fact, so far from causing it to be disbelieved, would only have created greater belief in its truth; any outbreak occurring in those parts would have been ascribed to the intrigues of this British agent; the mere presence of such a person amongst them would have led to rumours of foreign interference, and these rumours again, probably, to disturbances amongst the people. But more than that; if any mishap had befallen Captain Burnaby himself the Russian Government would have disclaimed all responsibility, and the British Government would have found it practically impossible to interfere with effect. The noble Lord says it will not redound to our credit when it is stated all over Asia that a British officer has been turned back on a journey of this sort; but I think it would be much less to our credit if a British officer, known to be such, had been murdered, or detained for ransom, by a barbarous people not far from the Indian frontier. It would not have been possible to have allowed such an insult to pass by without notice; yet it would have been practically impossible to send an expedition to release him or to obtain redress. That has been felt so strongly by the Indian Government on similar occasions that they have done, more than once, precisely what the Russian authorities did—they have discouraged and tried to prevent to the utmost of their power a British subject adventuring without permission amongst the semi-barbarous frontier tribes. I have nothing more to add; but will repeat that Captain Burnaby was not a private tourist, but an officer on leave, who was recalled for reasons of a political nature. As to the message sent to him, it was simply a message to return home. Of what was done to him by the local authorities I know nothing. As to the question by whose authority was he recalled, of course it was by the act of the military authorities; but the re-
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  sponsibility rests with the Foreign Office. As to the last part of the Question—by whom the cost of the telegram conveying the order to return is to be borne—I am not prepared to answer it further than this—that the telegram between London and St. Petersburg was on the public service, and will be charged upon the public funds. As to what was the precise mode of transmission between St. Petersburg and Khiva I am not aware; but I have no doubt that information can be obtained if the noble Lord wishes to have it.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERYasked how the information reached Captain Burnaby at Khiva?
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I do not like to answer that question offhand, but my impression is that it reached him either through the Russian War Office, or direct from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. I may say, once for all, that I have never received at any time any communication on this subject from the Russian authorities.

IRISH PEERAGE BILL—(No. 15.)
(The Lord Inchiquin.)
IRISH PEERAGE BILL—(No. 15.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  LORD INCHIQUIN,in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, that the present measure was confined to the single object of putting an end to the further creation of Irish Peerages—a power which their Lordships were aware was vested in Her Majesty, with certain limitations, by the Act of Union. He had confined himself to this single object because, however desirable it might be to make other alterations in the laws relating to the Peerage of Ireland, he thought that after the discussion which took place last year on the Bill which he then introduced, considerable diversity of opinion had been shown to exist as to what alterations ought to be made. And even if their Lordships were to agree to any changes in respect to these laws, he thought it would be undesirable at the present moment to include them in this Bill, as the effect would very probably be to endanger its passage through the other House. There was sufficient reason why it was desirable that this Bill should become law. because at the present time there was one, if not

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  two, vacancies which it was in the power of the Crown to fill up. If their Lordships agreed to the Bill as it now stood, the effect would be to place the Scotch and Irish Peerage on the same footing. Under the circumstances, he would not trouble their Lordships further. but would conclude by expressing a hope that Her Majesty's Government would be able to see their way to assist the passing of the measure through the other House of' Parliament.
  Moved," That the Bill be now read 2a." —(The Lord Inchiquin.)
  LORD DENMANsaid, that having last year opposed the Bill, he was sorry to speak against it as he had done on the 4th April, 1876. He could not easily change his opinion. He thought the whole subject should be dealt with; and if, unfortunately, the number of Irish Peers should fall so low as 28, there would be no electors left. He felt that his opposition would be useless.
  LORD CARLINGFORDcomplained of the mode in which the Bill of last Session had been treated in the other House. He thought that, considering the circumstances that then occurred, the question should have been taken up by Her Majesty's Government. It was a measure of considerable constitutional interest, materially affecting the Act of Union, and its introduction had been sanctioned by the Crown in accordance with an Address to the effect which had been presented by their Lordships' House. In these circumstances, he was of opinion that the measure should have been brought forward under the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, and should not be left this year, as it was last year, hanging about the two Houses of Parliament in a doubtful manner, resulting in a very lame conclusion. If the Bill was not to be in the hands of the Government, he hoped at least that they would give some assurance that it should be supported by the Government—he did not say in this House, but in the other House of Parliament—so that the House might feel an assurance that the change which the Government were, of course, now as much committed to as his noble Friend (Lord Inchiquin), or any who sat on the Opposition side of the House, should no longer be delayed; and that this mea-
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  sure, which, though a small one, was of great importance in its purpose, should become law.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Friday next.
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.