Sitting of 14 June 1875

MINUTES.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—Resolutions [June 11] reported.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading— House Occupiers Disqualification Removal (Scotland) * [210].
First Reading—Parliament of Canada* [209].
Second Reading—Supreme Court of Judicature Act (1873) Amendment (No. 2) [162]; Offences against the Person Act Amendment* [131], debate adjourned.

APOTHECARIES HALL (IRELAND)—LICENTIATES.—QUESTION.
MR. LYON PLAYFAIRasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, How many Licentiates are there of the Apothecaries' Hall in Ireland who restrict themselves to Pharmacy, that is, who do not at the same time practice medicine or surgery; and, is there any other class of chemists and druggists in Ireland who can legally dispense medicines according to prescription?
SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH, in reply, side, there were very few licentiates of the Apothecaries' Hall in Ireland who restricted themselves in the manner mentioned in the Question of the right hon. Gentleman. There was no other class of practitioners in Ireland who could legally dispense medicines according to prescription.

POST OFFICE—OCEAN POSTAL CONTRACTS.—QUESTION.
MR. JOHN HOLMSasked the Postmaster General, What Ocean Postal Contracts are terminable in 1876, and if the requisite notice has been given for their conclusion; and, if so, whether, having regard to the fact that ship owners competent to enter upon such contracts must have time given to them for preparation, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to call for tenders for the ful-
1808
filment of these services; and, whether, seeing that steamers depart almost daily for the United States of America, Her Majesty's Government are prepared to avail themselves, so far as practicable, of any eligible vessel, and give no further subsidies for the conveyance of mails to that Country?
LORDJOHN MANNERS, in reply, side, that three ocean postal contracts would expire next year—namely, that with the Union Steamship Company for the Cape of Good Hope service, and those with Messrs. Cunard & Co., and with Mr. Inman for the American service. The requisite notice had already been given to the Union Company, and would, in due course, be given to Messrs. Cunard and Mr. Inman. Before the American contracts expired the Government would consider the best arrangement to be made; but at present it would be unwise to pledge themselves to adopt any particular course in regard to them.

NAVY—NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF ROYAL MARINES AS SERJEANT INSTRUCTORS OF VOLUNTEERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. GORSTasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether any arrangements have been made by which noncommissioned officers of the Royal Marines are allowed to be transferred to the permanent staff of Rifle Volunteer Regiments to serve as Sergeant Instructors?
  MR. HUNT, in reply, side, that arrangements had been made, and of several recommended for the purpose, three sergeants of the Royal Marines had already been transferred to the permanent staff of the Rifle Volunteers to serve as sergeant instructors.

IRISH FISHERIES—INSPECTORS—REPORT FOR 1874.—QUESTION.
MR. BUTTasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, When the Report of the Inspectors of Irish Fisheries for the year 1874 will be laid upon the Table of the House; and, whether any loans for fishery purposes have been as yet made under the provisions of the Irish Reproductive Loan Act of last year; and whether any, and if so what, progress has been made in carrying out the arrangements contemplated by that Act?
SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, the Report of the Inspectors of Irish Fisheries for 1874 is now all in type, and I am informed that it will be forwarded next week for presentation to Parliament. The Inspectors have been employed for some time past in making the necessary local investigations into the circumstances and bona fides of the various applicants for loans under the Irish Reproductive Loan fund Act, as well as into the solvency of the sureties offered in each case. As many as 2,800 applications have been made. 113 have been approved of and forwarded to the Board of "Works, with whom rests the duty of paying the money. The delay is due to the considerable amount of fresh work which has been thrown by the Act upon the staff of the Fisheries Office.

FRANCE—COOLIE EMIGRATION TO THE FRENCH COLONIES.

  QUESTION.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government have received the recommendations made by the French Labour Laws Commissioners for securing more efficient protection to Indian Coolies who are taken to Réunion, Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Cayenne; and, if so, whether there is any objection to lay upon the Table a Copy of such recommendations and of the draft of any new legislation on the subject which the French Government may have announced its intention to propose?
  MR. BOURKE: Sir, Her Majesty's Government have only received extracts affecting Indian Emigration to the French Colonies from the French Labour Laws Commission's Report, and there is no objection to laying these Papers on the Table of the House; but with regard to the draft of any new legislation which the French Government may propose on the subject, we have only got a Projet de Loi, which may or may not become law, and which we have no objection also to lay on the Table. Perhaps, therefore, the best course will be for the hon. Gentleman to move for these Papers, and if he will privately communicate with me I will arrange with him the form of the Return.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACT—COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE.

  QUESTION.
  SIR LAWRENCE PALKasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to a report in the "Daily Telegraph" of June 7th, that a coal dealer at Wolverhampton named Boxall was summoned by the Local School Board for not sending his children to school; that in consequence of his absence a warrant was issued for his apprehension; on hearing which he came back, and there being only one magistrate present, he was locked up for four days in the police cells; and, whether the statement is true; and whether, if so, such a detention in the police cells was either usual or legal?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, side, that from inquiries he had made, he believed that the facts of the case were substantially correct as stated by the hon. Baronet. With regard to the imprisonment in the cells, he could honestly say that he believed such a course was entirely unusual; but he should not like, in his position, to say that it was illegal. He hoped, however, it would not be repeated.

ARMY—SECOND LIEUTENANT-COLONELS—GRIEVANCES OF OFFICERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. STACPOOLEasked the Secretary of State for War, If he is going to bring forward the case of those Second Lieutenant Colonels who were placed on compulsory half-pay when their regiments returned from India, who are now on full pay, although not in command of a regiment, in order that on their retiring from the service they may receive their over-regulation money?
  MR. GATHORNE HARDY, in reply, side, when he brought forward the Estimates on account of the Army Purchase Commission, it would be his duty to state how far he proposed to address himself to the grievances of the officers in question.

SUGAR CONVENTION, 1864—REFINED SUGAR.—QUESTION.
MR. WAITasked the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Whether he is in a position to state that the communi-

1811
cations between the Government of Her Majesty and the French. Government, in reference to the export of refined sugar, have led to a satisfactory result; and whether he will state to the House the result of such communications?
MR. BOURKE, in reply, side, a Conference had lately taken place upon this subject at Brussels, and the delegates at that Conference comprised the Representatives of various Foreign Powers who were parties to the Treaty of 1864. The delegates had drawn up a Convention which they had submitted to their respective Governments for examination and approval. Until that examination had been made it would be premature to state whether or not in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the result of the deliberations would be satisfactory.

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS AMENDMENT BILL—MERCHANT SHIPPING LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.
MR. GOURLEYasked the First Lord of the Treasury, If he is aware that the uncertainty in reference to future legislation with reference to British shipping is causing depression throughout the Country in the shipbuilding trade; if it be the intention of Her Majesty's Government to proceed with or withdraw the Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Bill; if the former, if he will fix a day for going into Committee?
MR. DISRAELI: Sir, I am not aware that "the uncertainty in reference to future legislation with reference to British shipping," as stated in the Question of the hon. Gentleman," is causing depression throughout the Country in the shipbuilding trade." I am not aware of any uncertainty upon the subject, and my information as to the shipbuilding trade is quite the reverse of that possessed by the hon. Member. Her Majesty's Government intend to proceed with the Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Bill, but I cannot now fix a day for the purpose.

PARLIAMENTARY & c. ELECTIONS—THE LAW OF REGISTRATION.—QUESTION.
MR. HAYTERasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, after the vote given by all the Members of the Government present in favour of the House Occupiers' Disqualification Removal Bill, which purposes to remove
1812
an anomaly from the existing Law of Registration, he will undertake to deal with the Law of Registration as a whole, in order to remove other anomalies and to diminish the uncertainty consequent upon the state of the present Law as declared from the Judicial Bench? He begged to quote an opinion of Mr. Justice Byles pronounced in the Court of Common Pleas in 1868, to the effect that—
"The various existing enactments are such as to expose both. Voters, Revising Barristers, and this Court to many difficulties of construction in which they may be easily entangled."
Justices Keating and Brett took a similar view.
MR. DISRAELI: Sir, I do not see that because Her Majesty's Government the other night supported the removal of a petty grievance with regard to the law of registration they are logically bound to deal with that law as a whole. I, of course, hear anything that falls from the Bench with great respect, and the opinions of the Judges will always have due influence with me; but I must say that, in my opinion, those learned gentlemen are a little too apt to criticize Acts of Parliament. We must remember the circumstances in which many opinions of that kind are given by the Judges. They sit in courts which are not properly ventilated, and in that respect they are not, perhaps, treated as well as they ought to be by the country. Whatever other influences affect their opinions I know not; but I fear it is a fact that the learned Judges do not treat Acts of Parliament with the respect and decorum which I trust we shall always show towards themselves.

THE DEAN FOREST AND HUNDRED OF SAINT BRIAVELS BILL.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL KINGSCOTEasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether, taking into consideration the period of the Session and the state of Public Business, he will withdraw the Dean Forest and Hundred of Saint Briavels Bill, which stands for Second Reading on Monday June 21st; and, whether, seeing how necessary it is that some immediate steps should be taken to improve the state of affairs in Dean Forest, he will at once bring in a Bill, similar to the Act 1 and 2 Will. IV., c. 12, to appoint

  1813
  commissioners who shall visit the forest and report to the House of Commons how, in their judgment, the evils which were shown to exist by the evidence taken before the Select Committee which sat last Session may be best and most speedily remedied?
  MR. W. H. SMITH, in reply, side, that in consequence of the late period of the Session it would not be possible to obtain a proper consideration for the Bill that Session; but still he did not think it would be desirable that a Commission should be appointed to report upon the subject as the matter had been fully inquired into by a Select Committee.

DOMINION OF CANADA—IMMIGRATION OF PAUPER CHILDREN.

  QUESTION.
  MR. EVELYN ASHLEYasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he will lay upon the Table of the House that portion of the Report of the Select Committee of the Canadian Legislature on Immigration which relates to the emigration of pauper children from this country; and to the statements concerning it made by Mr. Doyle, an Inspector of the Local Government Board?
  MR. J. LOWTHER, in reply, side, the Report of the Committee of the Dominion House of Commons to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred only reached his noble Friend the Secretary of State late on Saturday, so that he had not yet had sufficient time to enter into the necessary communication with the Local Government Board upon the subject. He would, however, let the hon. and learned Gentleman know as soon as a decision had been arrived at.

THE SUNDAY ACT—THE BRIGHTON AQUAEIUM CASE.—QUESTION.
MR. ASHBURYasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, having regard to the judgment of the Lord Chief Baron and other Judges of the Court of Exchequer delivered on Friday the 11th June in favour of the plaintiff in the case of "Warner v. The Brighton Aquarium Company," and their Lordships' remarks thereupon, it is the intention of the Government to take any action during the present Session for a repeal or modification of the Act 21 Geo. III., c. 49?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, side, he regretted that this matter had been brought before the Courts of Law and a decision obtained. The matter was one upon which there was a strong feeling upon both sides of the question, and one upon which public opinion must be gradually and perhaps slowly formed. It would be almost impossible for the Government to take up a measure of this character at that period of the Session. It was, however, the intention of the Government to take care that persons should not be vexatiously harassed by an undue enforcement of the law.

CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT (1871)—CONVICTION FOR PICKETING—ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS—QUESTION.
MR. ANDERSON (for Mr. MUN-DELLA)asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been called to a Letter in the "Weekly Dispatch," signed by the five cabinet-makers who were convicted by Baron Cleasby under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871, in which they contradict in the most explicit manner the reply given on the 31st of May as to their treatment while in prison; if it is true, as stated by them, that they were ordered to pick oakum, and threatened with a reduction of diet in case of disobedience, and if, after repeated protests and explanations that they were not sentenced to hard labour, they did pick oakum in their cells at night, after working at their trade by day; and, if so, who is responsible for the excess of punishment?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, side, he had made further inquiries into the case of the five cabinet-makers, and he had sent to the Governor of the gaol in which they were undergoing their sentence an extract from the Weekly Dispatch containing their letter to that newspaper, in which they contradicted the reply given by him on the 31st of May as to their treatment while in prison. He held in his hand the answers not only of the Governor, but also of the warder and sub-warder, and those answers were precisely the same as the reply which he (Mr. Cross) had previously given to the Question. He thought the best course he could take was to refer these answers to the Visit-

1815
ing Justices with the request that they should make a special report on the matter.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT (1873) AMENDMENT (No. 2) BILL— [Lords]— [BILL 162.]
(Mr. Attorney General.)

SECOND READING. ADJOURNED DEBATE.
Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [10th June], "That the Bill be now read a second time;" and which Amendment was, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day three months."—(Mr. Watkin Williams.)
Question again proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
MR. FORSYTHside, he did not altogether concur in the praise which had been lavished upon the Judicature Act of 1873; but he acknowledged that it would introduce many salutary changes. While he agreed in the main object of the Act, which was confessedly to give to the Common Law Courts of this country enlarged powers and jurisdiction, enabling them to deal with equitable points as they arose, and thus to prevent the scandal of suitors being bandied about from Court to Court because they had mistaken their remedy, he wished the House to take that, perhaps the last, opportunity of rejecting those portions of the Act which he thought were not likely to be useful. The object desired, of settling questions brought before the Courts at once effectually and finally, would still be gained if certain sections were omitted. It was a popular delusion to think the object of the Act of 1873 was to fuse Law and Equity. One might as well talk of fusing Civil and Criminal Law as of fusing Law and Equity, and, indeed, he did not think it was intended by the Bill. The distinction between Law and Equity was radical. Separate subjects required to be dealt with in separate Courts. The distinction between Law and Equity was not artificial—it was in the nature of things, and could not be done away with by Act of Parliament. If anything of the kind were attempted, it would take 20 years to explain the meaning of the Legislature. He had
1816
no objection to the provision of the Act of 1873, which declared that where the principles of Common Law and Equity conflicted, the rules of Equity should prevail. But he did object to those parts of the Act of 1873 by which the new name of Division So-and-so would be given to a Court and the offices of the Chiefs of Common Law might be abolished under an Order in Council, and the number of the Common Law Judges would be reduced from 18 to 15. With regard to the latter, their number had hitherto been found by no means too great, and according to their own testimony the work was at present too excessive. He would remind the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government that it was as injurious to disturb the legal as the official hierarchy of an ancient nation. For himself, he held that law reform should be approached in a Conservative spirit, and that they ought to build upon the old lines and construct upon the old foundations. As to the Bill now under consideration, it was, no doubt, necessary for two reasons. First of all, it was necessary as an amending Bill, for it corrected an arithmetical blunder, the number of Judges having been erroneously put down at 22, instead of 21, in the Act of 1873; and, in the second place, it was also necessary in order to do away with the anomalous state of things created by that Act in retaining the House of Lords as the final Court of Appeal in Irish and Scotch causes, while it closed it against the English suitor. That was an arrangement which was generally condemned, and its single and sole apologist was the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford. This Bill, for the first time amongst the various measures on the subject which had been before Parliament during the last few years, established an Intermediate Court of Appeal. He had always been in favour of such a Court, for in his judgment it was essential to the due administration of justice; but then came the question how that Court was to be constituted, and with reference to that point he would impress upon the Government to give due weight to the fact that not one lawyer had risen to speak in favour of the Intermediate Court which the Bill would establish. It was not a Court of Appeal which could either give satisfaction to the profession or be re-

1817
garded with confidence by the country. They had only a certain number of Judges to deal with, and the difficulty would be to constitute a Court. It was proposed that the Court should consist of five ex officio and as many ordinary members. The ex officio members were to be the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and the three Chiefs of the Common Law Courts; while the ordinary members were to be the two Lords Justices, two salaried Judges of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and one other Judge to be appointed by the Crown. In theory that seemed to be a very strong Court, but it would not be found to be so in practice; and the great objection to a Court of Appeal so constituted was that all its ex officio members, with the single exception of the Lord Chancellor, would have their time fully occupied in trying cases in Courts of First Instance, while as regarded the ordinary members of the Court, there appeared in it too much of the Equity element. Therefore, it was extremely desirable that the whole question of the Court of Intermediate Appeal should for the present remain in abeyance, for he thought they could not well devise such a Court until they had settled what the Final Court of Appeal was to be. More than once he had been asked to join the committee which had been established with a view of preserving the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, but he had uniformly declined to do so—first, because he did not wish to commit himself to any opinion before the subject was discussed in the House of Commons; and, secondly, because he was by no means in favour of retaining that jurisdiction as it now existed. It was true that that jurisdiction was just at present exercised by a strong Court; but this was a mere accident, and age, death, disease, or indolence might soon render that tribunal most inefficient. Those who talked most loudly of the House of Lords seemed to be really thinking of the establishment of a new Court, which they wished to make part and parcel of the House of Lords. Two hundred years ago Sir Matthew Hale denounced, in the strongest terms, the idea that the House of Lords, as a co-ordinate part of the Legislature, ought to be the Court of last resort. That eminent lawyer proposed that a certain number of legal members of the House of
1818
Lords should be selected and associated with a certain number of Judges, so that thus a strong Court might be formed. To such a plan there could be no objection. At present, however, he thought that the wisest course for the Government to adopt would be to postpone altogether the question of Appellate Jurisdiction; to bring into operation only such portions of the Act of 1873 as went admittedly in the direction of real reform; and with regard to the other matters—especially with respect to questions of Intermediate Appeal and Final Appeal—to wait until next Session, when they could have a comprehensive measure which would prove acceptable both to the country and to the profession.
MR. LOWEside, his excuse for trespassing on a discussion which had hitherto been entirely forensic was that he did not intend to travel over the ground which had already been so well laboured by those who had gone before him. He desired to deal with the question rather as one having reference to the House of Commons than with reference to any legal distinctions. There was no subject within his memory certainly, and perhaps there had been no subject for many years past, which was at once so momentous and had been so carefully considered as that of the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. The consideration of that subject commenced with the labours of an able and most painstaking Commission. That Commission reported in 1869, and four years were taken to consider its Report. The matter of the Report was referred to a Committee of the House of Lords, which reported against the continuance of the jurisdiction of that House, and a Bill was subsequently introduced in 1873 in the House of Lords itself, which took measures for the abolition of its Appellate Jurisdiction. That Bill was carried. There was some opposition to it. Lord Redesdale divided the House, but had only had very small minorities on his side. When that Bill, having been passed by the Lords, came down to the House of Commons, it was wonderful to see how little difference of opinion there was on a question which might have seemed likely to interest the passions and interests of the House, and the consequence was that it passed with the assent of both Parties. The present and the late Prime Minister, the present and

1819
the late Lord Chancellor, and the great legal authorities of both Houses mostly combined in approving the principles of the measure, and it became law. In 1874 the House of Lords, the parent of of that Bill, produced another measure to extend the abolition of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Lords to Ireland and Scotland, therefore nothing could be more complete than the approval which the House of Lords gave to the Bill, and it was impossible to exaggerate the degree in which all parties and persons in both Houses were bound and committed to its principles. The subject had undergone a most thorough, solemn, and protracted investigation, and so little was it apprehended that there was any difficulty contained in it that the present Lord Chancellor, on the 9th of February this year, introduced the Bill which had been postponed, on account of pressure of Business, from last Session. He did so apparently without any misgivings or apprehensions on the subject; but on the 8th of March the noble Lord felt it necessary to state that, in consequence of certain communications about difficulties in the way, he despaired of being able to pass the measure. Shortly, after, on the 9th of April, he introduced a Bill of an entirely different character, a Bill which was not a modification, but was exactly the contrary of the one he had introduced on the 9th of February, for extending the abolition of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords to Scotland and Ireland. The object of the Bill of the 9th of April was ostensibly to postpone the abolition of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords for a year, but really and in truth to prevent the Appellate Jurisdiction of that House ever being abolished at all. The only ground stated for postponing the Bill was the objection of the House of Lords to the abolition of its Appellate Jurisdiction. Though still nominally a Bill only for postponement, he maintained that it must be treated as a Bill to put an end for all time, as far as the Government had any power, to the idea of ever doing away with the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. In introducing and carrying that Bill through the House of Lords the Lord Chancellor never gave it to be understood that he approved of the principle he was going to give effect to. The noble and learned Lord had always
1820
been thoroughly consistent in the matter, and it was only just to say that, though he had been the organ of the Government in carrying out the Bill, there was every reason to know, from all his declarations on the subject, that he entirely and thoroughly disapproved of the step. Then the case came to the House of Commons, where the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General allowed it to be inferred that he disapproved of its principle, offering as he did no argument in its favour, but studiously avoiding doing so, only saying that an influential portion of the House of Lords desired that the clauses abolishing the jurisdiction of the House of Lords as a Court of Final Appeal should be put off, and that accordingly it was proposed that that should be done. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not say one word in favour of the principle of the Bill he was introducing to the notice of the House. Nay, he said something very strongly against it. He said that he did not consider the Bill a new thing; that the subject had already been fully discussed by Parliament in 1873; and that he could not regard it as a question that was really any longer open to discussion. That was, in effect and substance, what the hon. and learned Gentleman side, and it might fairly be concluded that he also was opposed to the principle of the Bill. It was not merely that the Government were dropping a measure which for want of time they found themselves unable to carry. That was a position in which any Government was liable to find itself, and in which it might fairly withdraw a measure, however persuaded of the justice of its principles they might be, rather than waste the time of the House and their own strength in a futile effort to carry it. But what he complained of in this matter was that the main object of this Bill, so far as it related to the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, was not merely to forbear from any further action, but, in point of fact, to repeal and rescind the whole operation of the Act of 1873 in that respect. He hoped that would be clearly understood, because everything he had to say hinged upon it. The House was asked not merely to forbear from doing a certain thing, but actually to reverse its steps. His present argument did not require him, and he entirely declined to

1821
enter into the legal merits of the case as regarded the jurisdiction of the House of Lords; but what he wanted to point out to the House was that, if the statement he had made as to the proceedings in the matter was true, there was no Parliamentary case whatever for the House entering on the course that was now suggested. No argument was addressed to the House to induce it to commit itself not to do away with the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. He would use a very simple illustration. Suppose the Lord Chancellor sitting in his Court with a case relating to an estate before him. Suppose the counsel for the claimant should say he believed there was nothing in his client's behalf to be said on the law of the case—that he believed, in fact, that law and precedent were against him, but an influential portion of the House of Lords wished his client to have the estate, and therefore he asked the Lord Chancellor for a verdict in his favour. Suppose, further, that the Lord Chancellor should say he agreed with the counsel as to the law of the case, but, since that influential portion of the House of Lords desired it, he would give the judgment requested. That would be a judicial, theirs was a legislative, proceeding; but, apart from that, he failed to recognize any difference of principle whatever. They were identical. The persons who proposed this Bill were themselves opposed to it, but what was said by the hon. and learned Attorney General, and what was said by the Lord Chancellor was, that it was the will of an influential portion of the House of Lords, and therefore they must pass it. Had the Government come down and told the House that they had changed their opinion, that House was always open to reason and argument, and, if it had been addressed in the tones of reason and argument, would have listened with respect. But in place of that the Government simply came down to the House of Commons and said it was the desire of an influential portion of the House of Lords that this measure should pass. There was no Parliamentary ground whatever for doing what the House was asked to do. It was contrary to all Parliamentary practice for a Government to come down and tell the House that, notwithstanding the labours of the Commission, the Report
1822
of the Committee and the decisions of the Parliament itself, it was to surrender its own opinion and consent to repeal the Act of 1873 merely because a portion of the House of Lords desired that it should be so. So far as he knew English history—and he should be glad to hear of a precedent to the contrary from hon. Gentlemen opposite—such language was never addressed to the House of Commons before. The case came before the House absolutely without any support whatever. The merits of the Bill might be what they pleased. The question was whether the House of Commons ought to be influenced by considerations like these. Was it natural, was it reasonable, that the Government should come down and say that the House of Commons should be forced to do that which they themselves had been forced and coerced to do? Why should the Government assume the nominal Leadership of those who had forced and coerced them in this matter? Principles were the life and soul of a Government, if they meant to exist for any length of time. But how could a Government preserve its vitality, if it were ostentatiously and knowingly not only to abandon the principles which it held, but actually adopt the very contrary course, and place itself at the head of those who had coerced it? It might be said that some risk of collision with the Lords would have to be run if the Government persevered in their original intention. He did not believe it. But even to run some risk would be better than to exhibit such a spectacle as the House had before it. It was quite evident what the Government should have done. They should not have allowed themselves to be coerced. Their character for consistency and honour was at stake in not going back; and if it were intimated that an influential body of their supporters would no longer sustain them they should have met it manfully, and obliged those who, it appeared, were superior to Lords and Commons to declare themselves and show who they were—to deal with this matter not by messages to the Government, but by their votes in Parliament. Who they were would then be known; but because the Government had amalgamated themselves with them, nobody knew now what Party, what clique, what conspiracy was at work. If the Govern-

1823
ment had taken that step they would have received the approbation of all honest men, and would not have injured their own position in any way; the public would have appreciated their conduct, and if the measure had failed, no blame would have been attributed to men who had done their best to vindicate their honour. As it was, the matter was in a situation that no friend to Parliamentary government could look upon without the greatest regret. Because it really came to this—their debates, arguments, reasons were all futile and ridiculous if they could be put aside by an irresponsible body in "another place," who could dictate to the Government what the Government should dictate to the House of Commons. It went to the root of Parliamentary government if they were to be told that it became necessary for the preservation of the Government that certain things should be done, and the Government used its strength to force Parliament to do them rather than face the danger which would be incurred by showing a bold front. It was the duty of the House of Commons to act in such a way that this conduct of Her Majesty's Government should not be drawn into a precedent. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford had said the other day that they must take what they could find. He would rather say in questions of this kind, relating to the honour of the House of Commons, that they should leave what they found entire. They had received a noble inheritance, and they should take care that they did not encumber it with false precedents, or squander it by base compliances.
MR. GATHORNE HARDYside, he could not help noticing the regret that the right hon. Gentleman must feel for the peculiar kind of conduct of the Government, as it was apparent from his tone and manner throughout his speech. He was not generally without the power of expression for those high constitutional sentiments; but he, on this occasion, adopted such a faltering tone that there was some doubt as to what he was saying, or perhaps he had some suspicion that the House would not altogether agree with him. What was this grievous crime committed by the Government to which the House was called upon to give its condemnation? He did not object to the historical re-
1824
view of past years given by the right hon. Gentleman; but when he came to state what had been done recently—that was, to contemporary history—the right hon. Gentleman seemed not to have made himself acquainted with the facts, or in the most extraordinary manner to have misunderstood them. The right hon. Gentleman said that he should have had no complaint to make against the Government for having dropped the first Bin in the House of Lords, though he afterwards declared that they ought to have taken a vote on it; but towards the end of his speech he blamed them for allowing themselves to be coerced by an influential body in "another place" into bringing in the present Bill. He said that the reason of their doing so was that there was an irresponsible body in the Lords who had controlled them. Now, he would like to know from the right hon. Gentleman in whose speech he found it used as the argument for the passing of the Bill that an influential portion of the House of Lords was in favour of it. [Mr. LOWE: The Attorney General's.] The Attorney General did not say that alone was the reason; what he did say was that there was a great change of feeling on the subject, which was indicated by the change in the House of Lords. Let him for a moment call attention to what passed in the House of Lords. The Government proposed last year that there should be one Final Court of Appeal for the United Kingdom. That was a point to which the Lord Chancellor had always adhered. At present, the object, of course, was that whatever Final Court of Appeal should be adopted should be for the use and advantage of the Three Kingdoms. What had passed? Last year Lord Moncreiff, who might be taken as representing the Bench, if not the Bar of Scotland, spoke reluctantly in favour of doing away with the Appellate Jurisdiction of of the House of Lords. Lord O'Hagan also, speaking for Ireland, with reluctance, accepted with regret the abolition of their Appellate Jurisdiction. But this year both these noble Lords, representing themselves as speaking the sentiments of the Bench and Bar of their respective countries, were entirely opposed to its abolition. Therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman spoke of an influential

1825
party in the House of Lords, he should remember that that party was backed up by a large body of opinion which had accumulated out-of-doors. It would be absurd to suppose that any number of persons in the House of Lords could have exercised this power unless they found a large body out-of-doors to support them. When the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Denbigh Boroughs (Mr. Watkin Williams) introduced his opposition to this Bill, he protested against dealing with it as a Party question; but his hon. and learned Friend had not been so successful in impressing that view on others as might have been hoped. That was not so carefully done by others as it had been by his hon. and learned Friend, who said that, if there was to be a second Court of Appeal, he was prepared to accept the House of Lords as the Final Court. And his hon. and learned Friend gave very good grounds for it. For what did he say? He said that the Appellate Tribunal of the House of Lords was so admirably constituted that an appeal which had taken him three days before the Exchequer Chamber to do unsatisfactorily he had disposed of satisfactorily in three hours before the House of Lords. It should be borne in mind that the Commission that first reported did not report against the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Lords; and therefore the authority of that Commission could not be cited against them. Further on, no doubt, there was a Report which was, to a certain extent, adverse to that Appellate Jurisdiction; but then the question had not been raised as to a double appeal; and it was supposed that the House of Lords could not deal with First Appeals, because they would be so numerous; but when there came to be a second Court of Appeal the House would, it was thought, have abundance of time for such appeals. These were the reasons which had influenced large bodies of people in reference to what should be the new Appellate Court. He begged to remind the right hon. Gentleman that the Government were not asking the House to recind and repeal that which had been already done. All they were asking it to do was to suspend the operation of that portion of the Bill till next year, when the question would still be open for discussion. He might
1826
have his own opinion as to how that discussion would terminate, but the right hon. Gentleman would not be debarred from stating his views at length. It was clear that in all he said that evening he only wanted to throw discredit on the Government; but he did not give the House any information or suggestion as to what was the best course to be taken: all he thought of was to throw discredit upon the Government with that air of pity and sorrow which so well suited the man who was assuming a high constitutional position. To drop the Bill was an abandonment of principle by the Government. If so, why, he might ask, had the right hon. Gentleman himself abandoned his Savings Banks Bill some time ago? Was it not because of the opinion with regard to it which was expressed out-of-doors? [Several hon. MEMBERS: And the Match Tax.] Yes, and the Match Tax; but the right hon. Gentleman's experience was so great in that way that it seemed to him to be the height of audacity at which he could hardly have supposed that even the right hon. Gentleman could have arrived that he should attack the Government as he had done for the course which they had taken, and call upon them to name any case where such a thing had been done before, when he himself had such experience in abandoning Bills and measures, abandoning them in deference to public opinion out-of-doors, sometimes indeed expressed in a more violent manner than upon the present occasion. And what was the real question before the House? They had to secure a Final Court of Appeal which would be likely to be satisfactory to the country, and if they could not find it in the House of Lords they must look for it elsewhere. But seeing that public opinion in Ireland and Scotland was unanimously in favour of retaining the Appellate Jurisdiction of that House, and that an increasing number of persons in England were in favour of it, it was, he thought, probable that when the question came to be decided the Government might, perhaps, in deference to public opinion, and with the assent of the Three Kingdoms, be enabled to constitute such a Final Court of Appeal as would give general satisfaction. In that state of things all the Bill under discussion would do would be to bring into operation as

1827
soon as possible so much as was admitted to be a great reform. The question of the Final Court of Appeal would in the meantime be suspended, and the right hon. Gentleman would next year have ample opportunity of laying before the House his views on the subject. The Government, with that consideration which was due to a matter of such importance as the administration of justice, would not take a step in advance without being sure that they had the feeling of the country with them, and when they had secured that they would submit their proposals to the House without fear of the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman or of those constitutional principles on which he relied.
SIR HENRY JAMESside, it would be seen that there were two questions involved—the first, as to the necessity for the Bill, and the second, as to the value of the propositions made in it. Several speeches that had been made referred principally to the necessity for the Bill, and the causes from which it had sprung. First, the hon. and learned Member for East Surrey (Mr. Grantham) charged the Government of 1873 with having dealt with the Act of that year without consideration, and with having promoted it as an ambitious scheme of reform. That was a charge that had not the slightest foundation, and to show that it was so, he would make some brief quotations for the benefit of the hon. and learned Member, and some of them would be from those who were most desirous of retaining the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords. The first movement that took place in regard to the matter commenced with one whose opinion would be valued by the hon. and learned Gentleman. He referred to the late Lord St. Leonards. So this measure, far from being an ambitious measure of reform, was one suggested by Lord St. Leonards, and in favour of which he spoke and voted. As early as 1841 that noble Lord, in introducing a Bill in the House of Commons, said—
"The reason why he went so much into detail upon this branch of the subject was, that he might show to the House what the general feeling of the country was with respect to the system now in force, and which could not continue much longer, but must inevitably be reformed; and so strongly was the necessity for this reform felt that no professional man would conscientiously recommend an appeal to be carried to the House of Lords from the Lord Chancellor's
1828
decision, if it appeared at all probable that the same individual would preside in the House of Lords at the moment when such an appeal should come on for hearing.…. Such a proceeding amounted, in his opinion, to a denial of justice."—[3 Hansard, Ivi. 196, 197.]
And he introduced a Bill for the purpose of adding legal strength to the House of Lords. Then the present Chief Baron, giving evidence as to the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords before the Committee that had been so often referred to, said—"Its days are numbered, unless some great change takes place in its constitution." The Lord Chief Justice, too, said the fault of the scheme for the creation of a new Court of Appellate Jurisdiction was, that it was founded on the basis of retaining the jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and added that surely the time had come for the House of Lords to give up a jurisdiction which it had only in name. He could quote from others not likely to be prompted by an ambitious desire to reform. In 1873 this matter came before the Lords, and there was, with the exception of some opposition from Lord Redesdale, general concurrence in the principles of the Bill. That measure was referred to a Select Committee. It was not considered hastily; it was not made a Party question. The Committee consisted, he thought, of all the Law Lords that sat in the House, as well as Lord Salisbury, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and noble Lords of great weight; and the Report of that Committee came back without questioning the desirability of abolishing the Appellate Jurisdiction. Where was the public opinion then? The Bill, as he had side, passed with the concurrence of the Lords, and when it came down to the House of Commons it received no opposition from those who represented the Leadership of the Conservative Party, with the almost single exception of the present Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and the Bill passed without their hearing a whisper of that public opinion which was said to have existed. He would not weary the House by giving a history of how it was left imperfect as regarded Ireland and Scotland; but 1874 came, and, as they were often told, great events happened in the beginning of that year. The Conservative Government found itself under the responsibility of bringing in a Bill to complete the legislation of the previous

1829
year, and the Bill was brought in in the course of the Session. And what did the Attorney General say then? Why that, whatever might be his own opinion with respect to the abolition of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, he accepted the decision upon it at which Parliament had already arrived as conclusive. The Lord Chancellor of Ireland, too, who had previously been silent on the subject, while observing that a great opportunity seemed to him to have been lost of surrounding the jurisdiction of the House of Lords with additional authority and power, went on to say that to reverse the decision on the point which had been so solemnly arrived at would be even a greater evil than the abolition of that jurisdiction, inasmuch as uncertainty and confusion would by that means be introduced into the proceedings of Parliament, and that good reason ought to be shown for any such change. Had any such reason been shown either to this House or the other? Public opinion was so silent that at the commencement of this Session the House of Lords again accepted the principle of the abolition of its Appellate Jurisdiction. The Bill was introduced and read a second time on the 23rd of February without opposition. The Government, having gone so far, had thoroughly accepted the responsibility of abolishing the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Lords. What had happened to make them withdraw from their position? The hon. and learned Member for Salford (Mr. Charley) had given the real history of the change of public opinion on this subject. That hon. and learned Member said he had put himself in communication with the hon. Baronet the Member for Wexford (Sir George Bowyer), and they had called on a most estimable gentleman who resided in St. James's Place; an influential committee was formed, including 40 Queen's Counsel, 30 Peers, and 138 Members of Parliament; and so the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords had been preserved. He gave his hon. and learned Friend all credit for his well-known earnestness, which always displayed itself on behalf of those who were unable to protect themselves—females under the age of 16, newly-born babes, and the House of Lords. That sort of protection, however, might go too far. The power of the hon. and learned Member
1830
for Salford appeared to be very great indeed. The House would remember—he would not say a campaign of rhetoric, but, at all events, a celebrated political campaign—when the First Lord of the Treasury visited the county of Lancashire, which had given him great support, and, in answering one of several deputations which waited on him, he did not exactly ejaculate a prayer, but he said—"Oh that there were more Members for Salford at the present time!" He (Sir Henry James) ventured to think, however, it would be an unfortunate thing for the country to have two junior Members for Salford instead of one if that was to be their power—if that was the way in which the legislation of two Parliaments and the policy of two Governments were to be reversed. The Bill which had now been withdrawn was introduced into the House of Lords after having been mentioned in the Speech from the Throne, and was read a second time on the 23rd of February without substantial opposition; but, notice of opposition having been given on the 1st of March, on the 8th of the same month, the Lord Chancellor announced that the Bill would be abandoned. What had happened in the meantime? If those who had introduced the Bill had changed their opinions, ought they not to have said so—ought not their recantation to have been made in public, and in all the responsibility of their position? There had been no discussion or vote in the House of Lords to account for the changed views of the Government, and they were left to the uncertain sound of the words of the hon. and learned Attorney General the other night, when he said there had been a certain Parliamentary opinion in the House of Lords which had been not expressed but felt. He wanted to know if it was an expression of the opinion of noble Lords in that House who had previously voted for the abolition of their Jurisdiction. He did not blame those noble Lords if, under the direction of his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Charley), they had changed their opinions; but the House had a right to know who they were, and whether they had been influenced by argument or by personal pressure. He was disposed to believe the change of opinion had not extended to Her Majesty's Government; but, if not, why should they change their

1831
policy? Those who witnessed the gestures and heard the words of the Lord Chancellor when he abandoned his Bill knew well he had not changed his opinion. When he expressed the deep regret with which he withdrew the Bill, everyone who heard him knew that was an honest avowal. Ought not that noble Lord, who possessed the confidence of the public and the esteem of his profession, to be allowed to know in the open field who were his opponents instead of having to yield to unknown enemies? Members of the legal profession had always been proud of the noble and learned Lord as one who, unaided by those influences which sometimes made a man eminent in his sphere, was enabled almost before middle age to win his way to the high position he occupied; they knew that, whether in the contests of the Courts or in the political debates of Parliament, or in the pleasant pastures of the Vale of Aylesbury, he had always one great attribute, that of pluck; they knew that he would not have deserted his opinions, but would have had the courage to express them. Yet he had been compelled to yield. It was the old story over again. The enterprizing general of division had been sacrificed either to the doubts of the Commander-in-Chief, or, what was worse, to the timidity of a council of war. It was no secret that the Lord Chancellor had had to give way not to public opinion, as expressed in the Press, in Parliamentary discussion, or to any open means or statements that could be met and controverted, but to the stealthy policy of St. James's Place and the pressure it had produced. Such a method of Parliamentary proceeding was without precedent, and would not add to the honour of Parliament. It was now said that 40 Queen's Counselout of 200—no great proportion—were in favour of retaining the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords. Well, after all, he did not know that much reliance was to be placed on the opinion of lawyers in regard to legal reforms. Indeed, they were generally regarded as the very worst judges of the reforms that ought to be introduced. [Mr. M. T. BASS: Hear, hear!] He recollected that during the year 1873, when they were discussing the Judicature Bill, and when numerous divisions occurred, he appealed to the hon. Member for Derby,
1832
hoping that he would vote with the Noes, as every lawyer in the House was going to vote with them. Mr. Bass—he might mention his name, as the incident occurred in a previous Parliament—Mr. Bass asked—"Are you quite sure that every lawyer is going to vote with the Noes?" He replied he was quite sure, upon which Mr. Bass said—"Well, I am quite sure I shall vote with the Ayes," and with a great deal of activity he saw the hon. Member for Derby going to the Lobby on the right hand of the Chair. In that he believed the hon. Member was expressing the general idea of the public as to the value of lawyers' opinions on legal reforms. If their opinions were worth little, their sentiment was worth less, and he maintained that it was sentiment and old associations rather than opinion which led them to favour Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords. Putting aside the opinions of the Queen's Counsel, what other public opinion remained in the matter? He believed there was no public opinion on the question of legal reform. People sometimes complained a little of legal delay and of expense; but, as a rule, a man who got engaged in litigation, and passed through the ordeal of a lawsuit, felt much the same as the man who had submitted to the operation of having a leg cut off—he never expected to have to go through it again, and was perfectly indifferent as to whether the next comer was to be operated upon by a good instrument or a bad one. The right hon. Gentleman opposite had asked them to wait a year till public opinion was clearly expressed; but they would have to wait a very long time before they knew whether public opinion out-of-doors wished the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Lords to be abolished or not. If there had been any strong feeling on the matter in the country, it would have found expression in that House in 1874. The fact was, that legal reform must come from the action of responsible statesmen, such as had borne the responsibility of this measure. Their policy was now to be reversed because his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Charley) had had too much leisure, and by the merit of his earnestness had been able to bring a number of men together. The Secretary of State for War had argued, to prove that there had been a change in public

1833
opinion—that between 1874 and 1875 Lord O'Hagan and Lord Moncreiff had altered their views on the question; but if his right hon. Friend would refer to the speeches of those noble Lords, he would find that they were equally opposed then to the abolition of the Lords' Jurisdiction. He regretted that the Government had not shown a little courage, and appealed on the question to the votes of the two Houses, on whom the responsibility would then have rested, instead of yielding so submissively to that mysterious influence which the Attorney General said had been felt in the House of Lords. He regarded the present measure not as the Bill of the Government, but as one for which the hon. Members for Salford and Wexford and the committee with whom they acted were responsible. The 4th clause was admittedly bad, and the Attorney General had not found any of the hon. and learned Members behind him to say they could give the slightest adhesion to the principles of this Bill. They were told it was a temporary measure but that was only a stronger reason for not dealing with the matter in such a way. It was not sufficient that, out of circumstances they had themselves created, they should produce a measure evil and inefficient, which they admitted would not be satisfactory, and plead as an excuse that it would only be in existence for a short period until they had ascertained public opinion. It was no pleasing task to contemplate the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal proposed by the Bill. They would be half abolishing the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and taking away the strength of the tribunal to which they compelled their colonists to come. Two of the four Judges constituting the Judicial Committee had for years devoted themselves to Indian affairs, and divide that Committee how they might, they must weaken it, and thus do an injustice to our colonists, whilst it was no undue criticism to say that it would hardly be wise to place Members of the Judicial Committee as Appeal Judges over men whose lives had been devoted to studying the Common Law of England, and who, in that law, had had a much larger amount of practice and experience. It could not be right that such things should be done merely to meet the unfortunate state of things which the want
1834
of courage of the Government had brought about. He appealed to the Government, who certainly had not shown too great a desire to destroy our judicial system for the sake of economy, to say whether the tribunal proposed by the Bill was one which could advantageously receive the sanction of the House. He did not think his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Denbigh Boroughs had laid himself open to the criticism of the hon. and learned Member for Huntingdon (Sir John Karslake); but he would advise his hon. and learned Friend not to press his Amendment to a division. In conclusion, he would remark that he had ventured to criticize, he hoped not too severely, not so much the personal course of the Government as the want of principle and statesmanship which had been shown in the conduct of public men, and, having done that, he would promise the Government, if they persisted in carrying that Bill through the House, he would give them such assistance as he could in putting it into a better and more efficient form.
MR. GATHORNE HARDYside, his reference had been misunderstood by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Taunton. It was in 1874 that Lords Moncreiff and O'Hagan accepted, with certain reservations, the proposal of the Government, and in 1873 that they spoke in opposition to the measure then brought forward.
THE SOLICITOR GENERALside, he quite agreed with his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James) that the consideration of that great question turned upon the Act of 1873. During the discussion the House had had its attention turned in a particular manner to that Bill and the Bill of 1874 had also been much adverted to. The question before the House was whether there was a necessity for any alteration of the measure of 1873, and if so, whether the provisions of the present Bill would meet that necessity? With regard to the Act of 1873, in his opinion and also in that of the hon. and learned Members, with very few exceptions, who had spoken, that Act did accomplish a most desirable measure of reform. He thought the demand for that legal reform came not from the lawyers, who were benefited by the existing state of things, but from those who experienced the defects of the law—the outside public—and

1835
who had clamoured for the removal of these defects prior to 1873, and the Act of that year was the result of this outside clamour. It seemed to him that the Act of 1873 was a most beneficial measure, for it did away with that disgraceful anomaly by which what was law in one Court was not law in another, and conduced to the more speedy administration of justice. It created a system which was at once consistent, harmonious, and simple; but although it deserved all the credit which he thus attached to it, all who looked back on the measure of 1873 must confess that it was marred by one conspicuous blot. That blot was the Appellate Jurisdiction created by the Bill. That Act proposed a Court of Appeal, and abolished the Appeal to the House of Lords. Now that was found to be a great defect in the Act and very objectionable. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Taunton said that almostevery one agreed with the abolition of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords.
SIR HENRY JAMESside, the hon. and learned Gentleman misunderstood him. The question was thus regarded by the House of Lords.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: The question was not one for the House of Lords; it was a question for the public. and if the removal of the jurisdiction of the House of Lords were to meet with general acceptance, it would little matter to him whether they were relieved of it or not. It would, however, be recollected that during the debate which had taken place several eminent Members from the Conservative side of the House had spoken strongly in favour of the retention of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords not, indeed, for all cases but for such as would necessarily flow to the House of Lords in case two Courts of Appeal were retained. The hon. and learned Attorney General, the hon. and learned Gentleman now Member for Frome (Mr. Lopes) the hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke), the hon. and learned Member for Salford (Mr. Charley), and the then Attorney General for Ireland had all spoken to the same effect. For himself he concurred with them; but he distinctly expressed his opinion that there must of necessity be several classes of cases in which a double appeal would be essentially necessary. He quite agreed with the hon. and learned
1836
Member for Oxford that in that portion of his (the Solicitor General's) speech which he had read he said he was averse to a double Court of Appeal; but if the hon. and learned Gentleman had read further—and probably it would have done him some good—he would have found that he had said that in certain cases it was most essential that there should be another Court of Appeal, and he had made bold to suggest to them, as he did now, that the very best Court of Appeal was that tribunal which had given so much satisfaction—the House of Lords. The Tribunal of Appeal formed by the Act of 1873 was for England alone, and it was clear to his mind that in 1873, there existed a distinct necessity for altering in the way of amendment certain provisions of the Act of 1873, in order to provide one and the same Appellate Court for England, Scotland, and Ireland, with, in addition, a second appeal in certain cases. It was not necessary that he should give the reasons for this necessity, for it was only necessary in order to discover them to listen to the speech of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Taunton. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford had stated that the second appeal would, in fact, be a simple rehearing. If a decision in one Court was to be reviewed in another there must of necessity be a re-hearing of the facts, but it was an appeal notwithstanding. In 1873 the Government carried the Bill which became an Act, although it had its admitted defects. The Bill of 1874 was founded on the principle that there should be the same Appellate Tribunal for England, Scotland, and Ireland, but that in certain cases there should be a second Court of Appeal. But owing to unavoidable circumstances the Bill of 1874 had not passed into an Act, and in 1875 another Bill was introduced to the same effect; but between the years 1873 and 1875 an opinion arose in the country—an opinion which appeared to be growing day by day—that it was not desirable to abolish the jurisdiction of that ancient, noble, dignified tribunal, the House of Lords. The hon. and learned Member for Taunton had referred to the part which he supposed the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Salford had played in the matter. What the hon. and learned Member for Salford did was to press his proposal with

1837
his usual energy; but did he convince, against their will, lawyers in Lincoln's Inn and Westminster Hall, and hon. Members who had expressed their opinions on the subject? At any rate he would not convince the hon. and learned Member for Wexford against his will. The opinion of the vast majority of the lawyers of Lincoln's Inn and Westminster Hall was in favour of retaining the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and it must be admitted that lawyers knew something about it, although they might not be "strenuous advocates of law reform." That opinion was shared by commercial men, who had to pay for litigation, and by Members of Parliament, who represented constituents. There was also a strong feeling through out the country that the House of Lords was an excellent tribunal, and that better could not be found. If that opinion had been really formed, and had been brought to the attention of the Government, were the Government to be charged with desertion of their principles, because they did something to give effect to that opinion? He should think that the Government would be open to the charge of not acting up to their principles, if they chose to disregard an opinion of this kind. The Government, therefore, had thought that, as this opinion had been formed by the country, it would be well to let a little time go by, and see whether some more positive and certain opinions were not formed in the interval. If at the end of a year it was thought that the jurisdiction of the House of Lords as an Appellate Tribunal should be retained, then it would be competent to do so. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford had said—"Do not touch the appeal clauses of the Act; let the Bill of 1873 remain, but keep the Exchequer Chamber as that Court of Appeal for Common Law, and the Lords Justices for Chancery." But if that were carried into effect they would have the dissatisfaction or the gratification, whichever it might be, of having no Appeal Court at all. He thought, therefore, it was essential that there should be a Court of Intermediate Appeal of a fresh character, in lieu of the Court of Exchequer Chamber and the Lords Justices. He would now come to the objections of his hon. Friend the Member for the Denbigh Boroughs (Mr. Watkin
1838
Williams). His hon. and learned Friend said he had a great opinion of the Act of 1873; that it was one of the greatest measures of reform ever introduced. He also said he would rather have a final tribunal such as that created by the Act of 1873 than have an Intermediate Court of Appeal. "But," said the hon. and learned Member, "if we are to have a second tribunal, I object to such a second tribunal as is proposed by the Bill, because it is not a good one; because the Judges will not be composed of the ablest men that could be selected; among them will be the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and the three Chiefs of the Common Law Courts, and each of these may have attained his position, not so much because of his eminence as a lawyer as for some other reason." He (the Solicitor General) confessed he was surprised at that objection. Both the hon. and learned Member himself and the hon. and learned Member for Taunton in 1873 spoke in favour of a tribunal the elements of which would not differ much from that which was proposed by the Bill. This Bill proposed that exactly the same class of Judges should form a Court of Appeal as was provided by the Act of 1873, but it proposed that not so many Judges should sit in that tribunal. In a Court of Appeal there must be men of the soundest intellect; and who, being untrammelled by an excess of business, would be able to deal with the cases that came before them as the House of Lords did. In conclusion, he considered that the suggestions which had been made by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford were not feasible, and he hoped that very few of the malcontent party would think it right to follow him and his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Denbigh Boroughs into the Lobby, should the Amendment be pressed to a division.
MR. HERSCHELLside, Her Majesty's Government seemed to admit that the House was in some embarrassment with regard to the matter, because it was dealing with a proposition for the creation of a Court of Appeal without knowing whether that Court of Appeal was to be permanent or merely temporary, and also without the knowing whether it was to be a final Court of Appeal or an Intermediate Court of Appeal, for both of those questions, he

1839
understood, were to be left open. He thought, therefore, that what the House had to consider was how to get out of that embarrassment. The opinion of the public and of the legal profession after the passing of the Judicature Act, began to form itself on two questions in no doubtful manner, the prevalent belief being—first, that all cases ought not to be sent to a Court of last resort without passing through an Intermediate Court of Appeal; and secondly, that in abolishing the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Lords, they were running the risk of abolishing a very efficient and excellent Court of Appeal on the chance of forming a Court its equal, or possibly only its inferior. It was a significant circumstance that these opinions were expressed after the passing of the Act of 1873, and that the more people talked about the proposals it embodied with reference to those two subjects, the less they seemed to like them. For himself, he confessed he shared the opinions of those who desired the retention of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, not because he was actuated by any feeling of sentiment, or by the idea that the Appellate Jurisdiction could prop up the House of Lords as a Legislative Body, but because he did not like to part with a tribunal until a better one was substituted for it. Consequently he could not regret that the subject had been re-considered, but at the same time he agreed with much that had been said by the hon. and learned Member for Taunton. As both Houses so plainly expressed their opinion in 1873 that the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords ought to be abolished, it was unwise for the Government to withdraw the first Bill. They introduced this discussion without having the matter fully discussed in the Upper House. The Government need not have forced that Bill to a division, but they ought to have had it publicly discussed, for next year they would not be in half so good a position to pass the Bill as they would have been if they had allowed that course to have been taken. That course, however, not having been pursued, it was now proposed only to deal with the question temporarily. It was impossible to suggest any course which would not carry with it certain evils, and all we could do, therefore, was to choose the least. He
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was desirous that the Act of 1873 should come into operation as speedily as possible, seeing the manner in which law reform was hung up by the delay which had already occurred, and so far as this measure was directed to that—so far as it expressed the desire of the Government that the Act should come into operation without further delay—he was heartily and thoroughly with them. That Act, although delusive as to some of the advantages expected of it, had many practical and useful provisions; for example, those which improved the present absurd mode of taking evidence in the Court of Chancery, and others that relieved Courts which were clogged with business, by sending cases to other Courts which were not so pressed. It not only amended the law now, but it provided the machinery for future Amendments. Objecting to the statement that the Appellate portion of the Act was its backbone, he thought the other beneficial changes contained in it might be adopted at once, the Appellate Court remaining substantially as at present. As to the Appellate Tribunal constituted by the Bill, no lawyer in the House of Commons excepting the Attorney and Solicitor Generals had approved it. That Appellate Tribunal might consist of three members—two transferred from the Judicial Committee, which heard few English cases, and one new Member; but imagine such a Court overruling the decisions of one of the primary Courts, consisting of three Judges of the highest weight and authority! Surely, it would be better to leave things as they were until you knew what you were going to do; but if this course were impossible, the Bill would be a very unsatisfactory one, unless it were altered materially. He feared that the secret unavowed cause of such a Court being proposed was the desire for an unwise economy in the administration of justice. In his opinion, counting the circuits and the Judges required for town business, the number of Judges proposed under the Judicature Act would be found lamentably insufficient. No doubt, judicial time might be economized, but the proposed reduction would cripple the operation of the Act in the most serious way, and the Act itself would not have that fair chance which every law reform should have. He could not agree with the Solicitor General that the number of

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heads in an Appellate Court made no matter. No doubt the quality of the heads was of more importance; but it would not be well to have judgments of a Court in which there were three heads of good quality overruled by a Court of inferior numbers. He would urge on Her Majesty's Government to do one of two things, either to let this Appellate question stand over until next year, when it could be satisfactorily dealt with, or if they were to constitute a Court of Appeal under this Bill let it be one which would be acceptable to the profession and the public. If they took either of these courses, he could assure them that all on that (the Opposition) side would assist in making the measure as perfect as possible.
LORD ELCHOside, with the exception of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe) that debate had hitherto been carried on by the lawyers, and he should not have ventured to intrude himself on the notice of the House, if it had not been for the fact that the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords was, as it had been justly described, a momentous question, and that a Committee which sat on this subject, and on which he served, had been spoken of in not very complimentary terms. In the outset he could not help asking himself this (question—how the taking away of the Appellate Jurisdiction from the House of Lords would affect their position as a branch of the Legislature? It appeared to him that if the House of Lords were no longer looked to as the Supreme Court of Appeal, their position would be lowered and their prestige seriously impaired. No doubt, if the House of Lords was inefficient as a Court of Appeal, and there were no means of improving it, no one for the sake of its legislative position alone would insist on retaining its Appellate Jurisdiction. But everyone in the course of the debate who spoke of its efficiency as a Court of Appeal was cheered. The hon. and learned Member for the Denbigh Boroughs, in moving the rejection of the Bill, stated that for weight, patience, and attention there was no Court of Appeal equal to the House of Lords, and the hon. and learned Member for Wexford said that their decisions formed a body of law unsurpassed in any country in the world. Looking to the expression of opinions from Liberal and hon. and
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learned Members, and out-of doors, his hon. and learned Friend was justified in saying that opinion had been revolutionized on this subject. Speaking as a Scotch Member, he would point out that the feeling of that country was almost unanimously in favour of its retention, while in Ireland such men as Sir Joseph Napier, Lord O'Hagan, Lord Chief Justice Whiteside, and Lord Justice Christian, and in England, Lord Penzance and others were in favour of its retention. They had thus a general consensus of opinion in favour of retaining that Appellate Jurisdiction. Do not let them, therefore, sweep away an old institution which had done good service in the past. Further, when Lord Cairns brought in this Bill, he stated that they had worked off most of the cases before them, and that at the end of the Session there would be no arrears. By appointing Committees of the House of Lords to sit during the Recess a great deal of difficulty that was now felt would be removed. All great reforms went on this basis—they took what they found and improved on the old ground. We all knew that the eloquence of lawyers occasionally succeeded in getting wrong verdicts, and so the eloquence of Lord Selborne and Lord Cairns obtained a wrong verdict from the House of Lords in 1873. There was then a mania for change. Nothing was settled in Church, in land, in Army, or in law. Their Lordships, like every one else, were carried away, for it was impossible at the time to resist the force of the Government. It was the custom to praise that Parliament, but it was the worst Parliament he had ever seen. It was not so much a Legislative Assembly as a Parliament to register the decrees of an imperious Minister. An hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Sergeant Simon) had admitted that the Bill of 1873 came down to the House of Commons with orders that it should be passed én bloc. There had now, however, been a reaction, not only in the House of Lords, but in the country itself; the feeling had changed, and it was felt that a great mistake had been committed, which must be rectified. How the House of Lords came to surrender its Appellate Jurisdiction, which was not a privilege, but a part of its constitution, he did not know; but if it found it made a mistake in doing so, he could not see

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why it should not endeavour to retrace that mistake now. It would, it seemed to him, be cowardly if, perceiving it had committed an error, it should be ashamed to say 80, and refuse to take back that which the public wished it to retain. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford talked of janissaries and of mutes passing round the Woolsack with the view of causing the Government to change their views on the subject. There was, however, in the matter nothing to conceal. It was the Duke of Buccleuch, representing Scotland, who had placed a Notice on the Books of the House of Lords, and it was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge—a very safe Constitutional Member of the House of Commons—who gave Notice of an Amendment in respect to the Bill as it then stood. In the whole proceedings, therefore, there was nothing of conspiracy or anything which could fairly be described as "hole and corner." And if a committee did meet which was interested in the question, he should like to ask whether there were no meetings ever held at Lord Granville's? Was there never any such thing as the Lichfield House compact; and had not meetings taken place in the Tea-room of that house, and also at Carlton House Terrace? It was idle, he contended, to speak of the committee which met in St. James's Place as unconstitutional, or as composed of persons having no legal or official position, or as being a coalition, or confederation, or cabal. In abusing the committee, however, those who used such language were only following the example of Lord Selborne himself, who, in addressing a number of his friends at Fishmonger's Hall in the course of the spring, said it seemed to him unendurable that measures of great importance to the community, introduced by the Government, should be frustrated, not by mature public opinion, but by the action of cliques and intrigues. Now, when he read that language he, as a member of the committee, could not help feeling that it was to be regretted that Lord Selborne had infused all his Christianity into his Psalmody, and had not reserved a little for his prose. Mr. J. Stuart Wortley, than whom no one was more respected when he was in the House, or would probably have attained a higher position in his
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profession had it not been for the state of his health, wrote a letter in reply to these remarks of Lord Selborne, in which he pointed out that the committee numbered among its members Peers, eminent Noblemen professing various political opinions, Members of the House of Commons, and men of high position both on the Bench and at the Bar, and that their proceedings had nothing in common with those of a coterie or a cabal. Mr. Wortley, in his letter, further showed that Lord Selborne was not always favourable to the views on the question which he now advocated, for he well remembered that when sitting with him on the Conservative benches as a supporter of Sir Robert Peel, he had vindicated the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and had expressed a doubt whether any substitute for it which might be created would be so satisfactory to the country. When, therefore. Lord Selborne used such hard words in reference to the committee which met in St. James's Place, he would remind him that it was a spot remarkable for caves. A cave had once assembled on the other side of the street from that on which the committee held its meetings, whose members Lord Russell had politely called brigands, and who succeeded in throwing out a Bill which had been brought in by the Government of the day. Now, he did not pretend to say that the committee to which he belonged had the slightest influence on the House of Lords or the Government; but if it had, those who endeavoured to show that it was composed of very mean materials cut the ground from under themselves, for it must be apparent that they were powerfully backed by public opinion. It was somewhat extraordinary, he might add, that those who used such language should have forgotten that there were such associations as the Birmingham Reform League, the Anti-Corn Law League, the modern Electoral Reform Association, and such institutions as the Reform and Devonshire Clubs. It was quite true, indeed, that when he walked down St. James's Street he never saw more than one member in the last-named club, and some persons went even so far as to say that he was stuffed; but it was, nevertheless, intended to exercise a powerful influence by uniting under the wing of the House of Devonshire all

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the scattered elements of the Liberal Party. Then there was the Law Amendment Society, the Church Liberation Society, the Education League, and the Contagious Diseases Acts Repeal Association, to which a late Cabinet Minister had given up his life, and the action of which seemed to be to deluge the houses of respectable people with filthy literature. Let them have no more abuse of the St. James's Place committee when they remembered such institutions as those to which he had referred, and which, as long as they were a free country, must exist. With reference to the general principle of the Bill, that, he felt, was a question to be dealt with by gentlemen of the legal profession: and, for his part, he would only say that he had the utmost confidence in the Government as to their dealing with the matter. The action of the Government had at least given time for the consideration of the question of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords; and he believed that, so far as they had gone, they had acted carefully, cautiously, and wisely.
MR. LAWside, he must express his regret that the noble Lord who had just spoken should have used language towards Lord Selborne which was hardly called for in the present discussion. Lord Selborne's character, however, required no vindication, and the injudicious sneer which the House had just heard might, therefore, pass without further notice. Much had been said of a change of public opinion having taken place as to retaining the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords; but he might perhaps be permitted to say that he failed to recognize any such change. Although Conservative principles had triumphed at the General Election, the present Government deliberately introduced a Bill last Session to substitute an Imperial Court of Appeal for the House of Lords. That measure received the assent of both Houses, and when had public opinion been expressed since? Indeed, there was very little doubt that if it had not been for the attention of the House being somewhat suddenly directed to the Public Worship Bill, the Judicature Bill abolishing the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords would have passed into law last year. He could not help feeling that the Government was responsible for the present difficulty.
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When the Judicature Bill of 1873 was being passed, it was felt by many hon. Members on both sides of the House that it was not desirable that there should be a separate Appellate Tribunal for England, while the House of Lords should remain as a separate Appellate Court for Ireland and Scotland. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich and his Colleagues proposed to modify their Bill so as to carry out this view—providing at the same time that there should always be some Scotch and Irish Judges members of the new Imperial Court. That proposal, however, was defeated in "another place." A question of privilege as between the two Houses of Parliament was very needlessly raised, and the result was the confusion in which the subject still remained. Had the clauses proposed by the late Government been accepted, there would never have arisen any of the difficulty they had since had to deplore. For it must be remembered that the present Government fully approved of the withdrawal of their Appellate Jurisdiction from the House of Lords. To effect this they brought in their Bill at the commencement of last, and again at the commencement of the present, Session. But to make some change in the proposals of their Predecessors, they refused to provide that there should be a Scotch or an Irish Judge in the new Court. This must in any case have excited suspicions and jealousies; but the reason given for it was particularly unfortunate—namely, that it might not be possible to get an Irish lawyer or a Scotch lawyer fit for the office. It only needed this to raise a feeling against the whole scheme amongst the members of the Bar in Scotland and Ireland, and thus to mar what it was hoped would be a great legal reform. It was, however, a mistake to suppose that the members of the Irish Bar were all in favour of retaining the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords. A considerable number of them, of whom he (Mr. Law) was one, believed that the House of Lords could not be regarded as a satisfactory Appellate Tribunal. It might be so at the present moment, because it contained some very eminent and able Law Lords; but several of those eminent men had already passed the average number of years allotted to man, and whatever the ability and the despatch

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with which business was now conducted there, it was not probable that it would long continue to be so. Indeed, he might say that when hon. Members spoke of the judicial ability now displayed by the Lords, they were thinking of the present Lord Chancellor and his two Predecessors, Lord Selborne and Lord Hatherley, all of whom had alike pronounced against the continuance of the House as the Final Court of Appeal. A very serious objection to the House of Lords as an Appellate Tribunal was the great cost at which business was transacted there; and, again, it was impossible they could be sure of having the best men to sit on that tribunal, for it was well known there had been lawyers of the greatest eminence in their profession, who from family or other reasons would not accept Peerages. The Lords, in short, at least with existing arrangements, could not fulfil the requirements of a permanently satisfactory Court of Appeal. It was desirable, however, that they should hear from the Government what they proposed doing as to the Final Court of Appeal. It might be that they intended to create life peerages, but if this was so, why could not the fact be stated? It might be that the Government intended to use up in the creation of the Intermediate Court all the available legal material, and then to come down next year and tell the House that all the other material having been exhausted, it must, as a matter of necessity, accept the House of Lords as the Pinal Court. The Government ought to make some clear and explicit statement on this important subject. He was anxious that the Bill of 1873, which was undoubtedly a great advance in legal reform, should be brought into operation at once. He would with that object recommend that the rest of the present Bill be passed reserving the portions which related to the Final and Intermediate Courts of Appeal, and following it up as speedily as practicable with the necessary supplemental measures for Ireland and Scotland.
MR. ALFRED MARTENside, the whole object of the Bill was to bring into operation all matters in relation to the Supreme Court of Judicature, on which their was no disagreement, and to allow that part to stand over to which objection had been taken, and the whole tone
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of the debate was a justification of the course taken by the Government. Every hon. Member had addressed his remarks more or less to an Ultimate Court of Appeal, showing that there still existed a great question that should be the subject of further consideration. The right hon. Member for the London University (Mr. Lowe) had treated the question as a Party one, and had made several caustic remarks on the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in introducing this measure; but he had refrained from stating his views as to the preservation of the House of Lords as a Court of Ultimate Appeal. It had been urged against the Government that, having such a large majority at their backs, they ought to adopt a strong policy, and force the House to yield to their views in this matter; but it was because the late Government had adopted that course that they had offended their supporters. The speech of the hon. and learned Member for Taunton was rather of an oratorial than an argumentative character, and he had endeavoured to insist upon the finality of the Act of 1873, which, he side, was passed without any resistance. The hon. and learned Member, however, appeared to have forgotten that on the 3rd of July, 1873, a division was taken on the question whether the clause which abolished the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords should stand part of the Bill, and that the clause was only carried by 154 to 93, no fewer than 13 Members of the present Government voting in the minority. Under these circumstances, it must not be assumed that the Bill of 1873 passed without opposition and with the general consent of both Houses. The present Bill proceeded upon a very plain principle of allowing that part of the measure of 1873 which gave general satisfaction to come into operation, and postponed the consideration of that part of it with regard to which it was desirable that public opinion should be allowed to ripen. In ameliorating our Judicature it was of the first importance that we should proceed step by step, and avail ourselves of changes made from time to time in the administration of the law, and which were found to work satisfactorily. In that way it would be found that the more slowly we introduced changes into it the more surely we should be advancing towards perfec-

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tion. The Bill dealt with two most important branches—first, the clause which referred to the constitution of a Supreme Court which should come into operation at once; and the second, to create a Court of Appeal, either Final or Intermediate, as Parliament should ultimately determine. It would proceed upon the principle of reforms which had been for many years in force in Chancery, with the beneficial result that the time of the Court of Chancery was now largely occupied in disposing of questions which involved both Law and Equity. The legislation of a long series of years fully suppported his contention that so much of the Acts of Parliament as related to the constitution of the Supreme Court of Appeal should be kept in active operation, thereby welding together the Courts of Law and Equity into one great Court. The House was invited to postpone the consideration of the constitution of an Intermediate Court of Appeal for another year. In his opinion, no sufficient reason had been given for the taking of such a step, and the Government had exercised a wide discretion in adopting an opposite conclusion. In Equity many important questions were decided by a single Judge, and the working of an Intermediate Court of Appeal, consisting of the Lord Chancellor and two Lords Justices, had proved eminently satisfactory. That Court of Appeal was the model of the Court for Intermediate Appeal proposed to be constituted under the Bill by Her Majesty's Government, and 20 years' experience had proved its excellence; while, on the other hand, they had the opinion expressed by the Common Law Bar, that the Court of Exchequer Chamber was not a satisfactory Intermediate Court of Appeal. Then, as to the ultimate appeal to the House of Lords, all that was asked by the Government was, that that question should be allowed to remain over unprejudiced for further consideration, and that course would be in accordance with the recommendation of the Commissioners in their first Re-port in 1869. The general opinion of the House was in favour of the second reading of the Bill, and it would be well to defer the consideration of details to the Committee.
MR. EARLEY LEITHside, it was not his intention to occupy the time of the House by going into the details of the Act
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of 1873. He had voted for that Bill, and should deeply regret if, even though somewhat defaced, it should not come into operation as early as possible. Neither did he intend to discuss the propriety or otherwise of postponing the question of what should be the Supreme Court of Ultimate Appeal. He meant to confine his few observations to the proposals in the Bill which affected the constitution of the Court of Privy Council; and he thought one of these would have a most injurious effect by withdrawing from that tribunal into the new Intermediate Appellate Court two of its salaried Members, which must have the effect of weakening a Supreme Appellate Court with a wide and varied jurisdiction, and lowering the dignity of that tribunal. At present the Privy Council was a Supreme Court of Appeal in all cases brought before it from the Supreme Courts in India, the Colonies, the Ecclelesiastical Court, and the Court of Admiralty in this country. It was therefore placed, as respected these appeals, in the same high position as the House of Lords with regard to appeals from the Courts in the United Kingdom. In, and previous to, 1851 the Court consisted of two ordinary unsalaried Members, with a large number of ex officio Members, including the Lord Chancellor, ex-Chancellors, the Master of the Rolls, the Chiefs of the other Courts—10 in all. In the last-mentioned year the difficulty was so great to obtain the requisite number of ex officio Members, that Act 14 & 15 Vict. c. 83, was passed to reduce the quorum of Members from four to three. This even proved ineffectual to obtain a quorum, and, in 1871, the whole system completely broke down; business came to a dead lock. The ex officio Members had the work of their Courts to attend to, and could evade the summons of the Registrar of the Privy Council to attend. The result was, that remedy was applied by the Legislature in passing Act 34 & 35 Vict. c. 91, which had completely answered its purpose. Four salaried Members were appointed who were able to carry on the business of the Court independently of ex officio Members, and ever since the business of the Court had been despatched without delay, alike to the satisfaction of the suitors from all parts of the Empire and to the members of the legal Profession who practised in that Court. It was now

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proposed to weaken the Court by taking away from it two of these salaried Members—a course which was condemned by their past experience, and would shake the confidence of Her Majesty's Indian and Colonial subjects in this their Ultimate Court of Appeal; and he earnestly hoped the proposal would not be persisted in. If that measure were carried into law, the suitors would have great cause to regret it. He appealed most earnestly to the Attorney General not to reduce the Judges of the Judicial Committee. With regard to the Intermediate Court of Appeal, there would be a great increase of business in that Court beyond what was now transacted in the Court of the Exchequer Chamber, from the increased powers of appeals and the new procedures and practice introduced by the Judicature Bill; and nothing could compensate for the injury that would be inflicted upon the Court of the Judicial Committee if two of the Judges of that Court were withdrawn. It was perfectly clear that the Judges of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, under the former Judicature Bill, were only liable to be transferred into the Supreme Court of Apellate Jurisdiction, to be constituted on the abolition of the House of Lords as a Court of Ultimate Appeal; but this Bill would lower the two Judges of the Judicial Committee, and in doing so would inflict great injury on the suitors in that Court, and would bring back the miserable state of things previous to passing the Act of 1871. That injury was, so far, admitted, as appeared by an Amendment introduced into the Bill by the Lord Chancellor with the object of meeting it, and which provided that any two of the Lords Justices, so far as necessary and so far as the state of business might admit, should sit upon the Judicial Committee. The necessity would be clearer than the possibility; but, were it otherwise, the arrangement was contrary to the intention of the Judicature Act which contemplated these Judges sitting, not in a subordinate Court, but in the Superior Court of Appeal which was now suspended. The only practicable remedy was the appointment of two additional Judges at a cost of £ 10,000, which was a small amount compared with the advantage to be derived by the public, or the injury they would suffer if the present proposal was persisted in. He en-
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treated the Attorney General to pause before he took such a step as that proposed in the Bill.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALhoped he should be excused if he did not reply to all the adverse criticisms upon the Bill, because the arguments of some answered the arguments of others, while many criticisms referred to matters of detail which had better be discussed in Committee. He did not complain of, or object to, the many suggestions which had been offered, for which he had to express his thanks, and all of which should have full consideration. He wished, however, to recall the attention of the House to the purport and object of the Bill. It would call into operation those portions of the Act of 1873 which were based upon the recommendations of the Judicial Commission, and it would suspend the operation of those portions of the Act which were not recommended by the Commission, but which were in excess of what was recommended by the Commission, and which almost ran counter to the views of the Commission, for the passage of their Report which had just been referred to seemed to indicate that, in their opinion, it was desirable to retain the jurisdiction of the House of Lords until such time as it could be ascertained what would be the working of the Court of Appeal which they recommended. With respect to the remarks made by the hon. Member who had just addressed the House (Mr. J. F. Leith), in disapproval of the provision in the Bill to take two of the Judges from the number constituting the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, he might state that the power of that Court would not be impaired by the arrangement; but this would be fully discussed in Committee; he might here remark, that the Bill, if passed, would not come into operation until November next, and by that time a large number of the Indian and Colonial Appeals would have been disposed of. As to what had been said about general concurrence in the Act of 1873, no doubt there was general concurrence of opinion as far as regarded the principles of those portions of the measure which were based upon the recommendations of the Commissioners, and the discussion upon those portions of the Act related mainly to matters of detail; but there was not the same amount of con-

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currence in respect of the principles of those portions of the measure which were not based upon those recommendations of the Commissioners. He was not open to the charge advanced by the right hon. Member for London University, that he had offered no justification for the Bill, for, in moving its second reading, he stated distinctly that one of its principles was that there should be one Final Court of Appeal for all parts of the Empire; he had also strongly urged that there should be an Intermediate Court of Appeal. He believed that the Court which was proposed by the Bill would be the best for the purpose; but that was a matter for the consideration of the Committee. The main principles of the Bill were admitted to be right by those Members who had criticized it, and its provisions would carry into effect the recommendations of the Judicature Commissioners. In these circumstances he appealed to the hon. and learned Member for the Denbigh Boroughs not to ask for a division on his Amendment.
MR. WATKIN WILLIAMS, in asking the leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment, side, the general opinion of the House seemed to be that the Bill should be read a second time; and, therefore, no useful object would be attained by dividing. Moreover, his real object, as hon. Members were aware, in putting his Amendment on the Paper, was to elicit the opinions of hon. Members upon this subject, and that object had been fully accomplished by a long and exhaustive debate. Those opinions would be very valuable in Committee.
Amendment, by leave, wihdrawn.
Main Question put, and agreed to.
Bill read a second time, and committed for Monday next.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

  [BILL 155.] SECOND READING.
  (Mr. Charley, Mr. Whitwell.)
  Order for Second Reading read. Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Charley.)
  MR. P. A. TAYLOR, in rising to move, as an Amendment, that the Bill be read a second time that day three months,
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  said:* Sir, if the Bill proposed by Her Majesty's Government be fairly and sufficiently described as a Bill designed to meet the evil of violent personal assaults by means of stronger, more certain, and more efficient measures of repression, I think no one who sits in this House would be disposed to challenge the second reading. But it is not so. Mr. Herbert Spencer, I think, has said—
  "In the treatment of our criminals there alternate or co-exist an unreasoning severity with an unreasoning lenity. Now we punish, in a spirit of vengeance, now we pamper with a maudlin sympathy."
  The Bill of Her Majesty's Government, then, is based on this principle—namely, that it is wise and politic to attempt to counteract and to stamp out crimes of violence by violence, to meet brutality by a spirit of vengeance, by the brutality of the law; in fact, although euphemistically termed Offences Against the Person Bill, it is known more commonly in the Lobbies and in the House as "the Flogging Bill." It is for this reason that I oppose it. The experience and wisdom of our fathers, after a very long course of experiments in, and experience of, violent punishments, had, as one thought, finally determined that brutal and brutalizing punishments—punishments of torture—were altogether out of date. Those punishments certainly did one thing well—they brutalized society; but they did not by any means stamp out any one particular crime. The Flogging Bill of the right hon. Gentleman is, I am bound to admit, not a very violent or severe measure—for a Flogging Bill; but it does this—it organizes and it further extends the punishment of flogging. It will be in the recollection of the House that some 12 or 14 years ago there arose a sudden panic in this country about a particular description of crime, known as garotting. I suppose there never was a greater amount of panic with a less amount of reality. Under the influence of that sudden panic this House rushed into what might be called experimental legislation. We had at that time given up, it was hoped for ever, the practice of torturing our criminals; but as a remedy for this particular crime, and to stop the panic at this particular time, flogging was introduced, rather as an experiment than otherwise. That experiment has

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  failed as signally as did all the punishments of torture employed by our fathers before us. Yet when the Government might be expected to redress the error made at that time, and to go back to the more wholesome scheme of punishment, finding that the Act had proved an entire failure, they come forward instead and propose to recognize, organize, and complete the system of punishment by flogging. It is hardly necessary for me. Sir, to answer the assertion that we who are opposed to this punishment by torture, are friends of the garotters; that we have a kind of sentimental pity for them, and feel much more compassion for them than for their victims. I deny that entirely. There is nothing I hate more than needless torture for man or beast, but I cannot plead guilty to the soft impeachment. It is not the suffering of the garotter that moves me in this matter so much as the demoralization of society. Our sentiment and passion are rather aroused for our civilization, for our good repute among the nations, for our Christianity. And when I say our Christianity, I am not speaking of any particular dogmatic form of Christianity, but of that inner spiritual life which has done more than anything else to give Christianity its hold upon the world for the past 2,000 years. When we are charged with taking up the sentimental side of this question, I beg most respectfully to throw back the imputation upon those who make it. We are not the sentimentalists. Reason and experience are the groundwork of what we support. The hon. and gallant Member for Mid-Cheshire (Colonel Egerton Leigh) and the other hon. Members who hold the same views are the sentimentalists, if to be sentimental is to disregard the dictates of reason and the lessons of experience, and to be carried away by the temporary panic of the moment. That hon. and gallant Gentleman, forgetful of the lessons our parents learned, has his mind so filled and his ears so stuffed with the sufferings and the cries of the victims of personal violence, that he calls upon the Government to take some steps in the matter, and they reply by an attempt to stamp out by torture and blood these acts of violence. When I first entered this House, some 14 or 15 years ago, I moved year after year for the omission from the Mutiny Bill of the
  1856
  flogging clauses; and, at last, upon the Motion of a Member who I regret no longer sits in this House, my Friend, Mr. Otway, flogging was entirely abolished in the Army. We little thought in those days when we were fighting flogging in the Army that we should have the whole question opened up later on, not merely in regard to the Army, but in regard to the punishment of crime. I well remember the anger hon. and gallant Members used to express against myself and others when we proposed that alteration of the law. They asked whether we thought them less tenderhearted—whether we considered them as disliking torture less than we did—or whether we thought that they were any more likely to desire to return to torture for civilian offences than we were? There were especial reasons, we were told, why flogging was essential for the Army. It was necessary to maintain discipline, without which the Army would be a mob, taken as it was from the refuse of the population. Little did we think then, when we believed we were destroying the last links of the system of punishment by torture, by getting rid of it in the Army, that the time would actually come when Her Majesty's Government would deliberately ask this House to revert to torture for civilian offences. Flogging in the Army came to an end. Why? Because the universal opinion of the country declared that it should exist no longer, because the opinion expressed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) was the opinion of all cultivated men of the day, when he said he was sure "that no man after being flogged was an equal man to what he was before." The late Mr. Buxton, the representative of moderate and sensible men, said—
  "It has been the great blunder which shortsighted rulers in every ago have made, and which has been attended with invariable failure, to suppose that it is by fierce and appalling punishments that crime is befit prevented."
  Well, Sir, and how was it that flogging was done away with? It was never proved that discipline could be maintained without it: it was not competent to be proved that the Army could exist in its then condition if flogging was abolished—it was done away with by the sentiment of the British people, by a burst of indignation which declared

  1857
  that they would not endure this abomination any longer, that this wrong should not be done any person on the bare chance of there being some necessity for it, or of some good possibly resulting from it. The right hon. Gentleman who brought in this Bill (Mr. Cross) appears to think it of no great consequence. It has been kept before us days and weeks, but it is not a Bill to bring forward at an early stage of the evening, and it is not one in whose defence it is worth while to say a word. I venture to differ from him with regard to the importance he attaches to this measure. It is, I think, much more important than some others which we are to be detained here till Christmas, if necessary, to pass. It is for England, practically, a renewal and re-establishment of the principle of punishment by torture, and for Scotland it is absolutely so. ["No, no!"] That is the fact. The Act passed in 1863 did not apply to Scotland, and flogging there was abolished in 1862, after it had for 40 years previously passed into utter and deserved disuse. It had, as Alison side, writing in 1833, gone out of use by the change of manners. Some hon. Members seem to think that they have found a heaven-born remedy for crime, and that the "cat" has descended direct from the skies, as something entirely new in the history of our country. Let me read them a few words of graphic description as to how we have experimented in regard to flogging, contained in The Law Mgazine. The writer says—
  "We flogged men before hanging them; we flogged libellers regularly and mercilessly, we even went so low down in the list of offenders as to flog beggars. The practice grew into one of the arts, and culminated about the reign of James I. The last half of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th, deserve, I think, to be regarded as the golden age of flogging in England. During this period the cat was continually going. In prison and out of it, the warder always had his hand in. We flogged at the cart-tail in the street, almost as often as we flogged in prison. Our fathers were logical, and on the sound principle that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, they flogged women as well as men. 'They warmed her shoulders,' is the expression of one of our facetious Judges. No one, who knows the fact, can deny that they gave flogging a long trial in England; and yet in spite of this trial, and of a fervent instinctive, and as to its origin brutal and barbarous prejudice in its favour, with the firmest conviction that it was a heaven-appointed remedy, our fathers found that it did not answer. Crime did not diminish, brutality rather increased, and the same people
  1858
  were often obdurate enough to be 'warmed' several times without beneficial effect. Reluctantly and with that sorrow with which men always part from long cherished belief, clinging indeed to shreds and fragments of it, they diminished the use of the cat. Something else had to be tried; and not having yet hit upon the right track for the diminution of crime, as we have done in more recent times, they substituted last century wholesale hanging for flogging. They very properly argued that hanging, being a more dreadful punishment than flogging, would be a more powerful deterrent. It had too the additional advantage, no slight one, of not requiring a second application. Accordingly they hanged for almost every offence,"
  Now, Sir, I am no advocate for hanging, but I do think hanging is preferable to torture. Well, to put a man out of existence is a poor and contemptible admission on the part of society, that with all its powers of administration, of restraint, and reformation, we cannot deal with this unhappy criminal, and so perhaps there is nothing for it but to put him out of existence. But it is infinitely worse to brutalize and torture him. I find there are some hon. Members of this House who do not know, or have forgotten, what this really means, and who doubt the justice of the word I use. They tell me—"We were boxed when we were babes, we were beaten when we were boys, we were thrashed when we were students, and to call it torture is altogether absurd." But these are not the punishments against which I am speaking. I may have—I have—my own opinion of the advantage of physical force. We have already discovered that we break in our horses and our dogs better by kindness and by rewards, than by the old system of cruel brutality, we may, perhaps, soon discover that we can do without it altogether with regard to children and boys. I am speaking rather of the punishment of the cat, the most painful instrument of torture the world has ever known. [The hon. Member having read a horrifying description of flogging from The Medical Review, and the opinion of the late Mr. Wakley, proprietor of The Lancet, proceeded.] The Saturday Review puts it thus—
  "The simple question is whether a man who knows that if he commits an assault he will be flogged, is less likely to commit one, than a man who knows that he will only be imprisoned."
  And The Review certainly carries out its principle to the fullest extent, for it says—
  "There can be very little doubt that what is wanted is a periodical flogging—say, once a fort-

  1859
  night—in addition to imprisonment and hard labour."
  All honour to the consistency of that illustrious print; but I do not think the House is prepared to adopt the views of The Saturday Review. Now, Sir, I will ask the House to look at the matter in this point of view. If there is one thing more cruel, more brutal, and more without excuse than the brutality of the individual criminal, is it not the act of society when it gets that criminal within its grasp? Society takes that friendless scoundrel by the throat. It has it in its power to do whatever it will with him; it can restrain him, it can shut him up for life, or until he has proved that he has some right by good behaviour to go out again; it can make him work for his living; it can moderate his rations if he shows too much strength; it can do all that is reasonable in the way of restraint:—and yet what does it do,—it imitates upon him the brutality which the garotter inflicted upon his victim. The lesson that society ought to teach him is that he has committed a crime against humanity. But what it does say is, that it is right and just to do to him all and more than all that he did to his victim, and it teaches him not that cruelty is an infamy, but that the motive, the object which he had in view, was wrong. Mark the lesson this teaches the brutal father who has disobedient children. Society cannot say obedience is not a good thing. How, then, shall he attain this good thing? The right hon. Gentleman teaches him—"Let him boat them until he has forced them into submission." Or the brutal husband has a drunken wife. Assuredly it is a good object to reclaim her, and prevent her from ruining herself and her family. How shall the brutal husband effect this? The right hon. Gentleman teaches him—"Let him beat her till she cannot raise her hand to her head." There is something, to my mind, infinitely mean and contemptible in this way of punishing our lowest class of criminals by brutal violence. Think of what their lives and chances are They are born, literally and morally, in an atmosphere of crime; they have no chance of raising themselves from what they are; they live in the midst of a public opinion that surrounds them and teaches them and educates them in crime. Our system of laissez-faire government, the maintenance
  1860
  of individual freedom, prevents any intercourse between ourselves and these the lowest branch of society. They may live in dens or garrets, but the philosopher or the missionary has no access to them; in fact, we are as much separated from them as though they lived in Central Africa. When a man offends against the law, we have legally and morally all power to deal with him. We can restrain him, we can punish him, we can make him work; we can, in fact, bring our culture, our civilization, our religion to bear upon him, and, if possible, to help to reform him. Yet the first time we come in contact with this wretch we show the excellence of our religion, the beauty of our culture, the charm of our refinement, by tearing his back with the cat. It is upon the demoralization of society produced by the infliction of such punishments as flogging that I lay most stress. Two or three years ago we even had a "torture literature" in the papers, and illustrations of flogging—and the Sheriff of London complained to The Times that when it was known that criminals were about to be flogged he received applications from persons of every degree desirous of witnessing this miserable spectacle. Sir George Grey, in the debate on the Bill of 1863, asked if flogging was so effectual, where was the line to be drawn? I repeat his question. If once you establish the principle that you are ready to attempt to stamp out a particular form of crime by violence, where indeed is the line to be drawn? A distinguished Member of this House, the present Chairman of Committees (Mr. Raikes), in Ms consistency of feeling proposed in two flogging Bills which he had before this House three or four years ago, and which came to nothing, to administer it for certain forms of libel. Why not stamp that out by flogging? What is there in these particular crimes of personal violence that makes flogging or other torture particularly applicable to them? On the contrary an equally good argument can be adduced to show that these are not the crimes most fitly punished by torture, if torture is to be used at all. Other crimes argue at least as much selfishness in their perpetration, and their consequences are a thousandfold worse than individual attacks upon a particular man. Will you flog the fraudulent bank director who takes ruin

  1861
  into hundreds of peaceful homes? Will you flog the debaucher of children under 10 years old? ["Hear, hear!"] There are thousands of such cases, but though hon. Members cry "hear, hear," I tell them that the House of Commons will never flog for such offences, because on the first cut of the lash touching the tender back of a gentleman the punishment will be swept away for ever. There is no limit to the extension of this principle, as the right hon. Gentleman who proposes this Bill will probably find. Will you flog women; and if not, why not? Barbarity, brutality, is not confined to one sex. Our fathers flogged women at the cart's tail. Are you going to do the same? If not, you have not faith in your opinions. Will you flog at the cart's tail; and if not, why not? The very advantage of these punishments is that they are deterrent, and if you really desire their full advantage, let it be known everywhere what suffering they create. It is not enough that the criminal classes should hear that suffering is occasioned by flogging. Let them see for themselves the streaming backs and hear the agonizing groans, or you do not do your duty by society. You inflict pain and cruelty upon the man you flog, because your object is not so much to punish him and prevent him from committing the same crime again as it is to prevent his class from doing the same thing. The poor sophism that because we do not hang in public that therefore we are consistent in not flogging in public is too glaring to need exposure. It is not the agony of death that acts as a deterrent, but the fact that death is inflicted, and this fact is sufficiently known by the announcements in the newspapers. But in flogging a man your principal object is that his class may know the agony he is suffering, and if you do not flog at the cart's tail, in the sight of all the world, as our forefathers did, you do not believe in your principles. I am almost ashamed to argue with a British House of Commons the economical side of this question, but if you flog a man you must imprison him afterwards, or else you turn a tiger out upon society. Further, is it nothing to say that we stand alone at this moment as the retainers or rather the returners to the punishment of flogging? At a Prison Congress, held in London some two or three years
  1862
  ago, this fact came out with the most marked effect. The gentlemen who attended came from every civilized country—they were not doctrinaire prison reformers, but men who had spent years in practically dealing with prisoners. Severity rather than sympathy with scoundrels was the general impression which a visitor would have gathered—but when the subject of corporal punishment came on for discussion, one foreign speaker after another arose and denounced flogging in the strongest terms. We found that England stood alone; that flogging had been abolished in every other civilized nation; and that the prison officials who had been deprived of its use—doubtless parting with their cats with many regrets—had everywhere come to the conclusion that to inflict it was a blunder. Every one Frenchmen, Americans, Germans, Danes, Italians, have given up the cat. Russia even has thrown down the knout, and Her Majesty's Government stoops to pick it up! The whole authority gathered from every quarter was against the policy of the Government—against punishment by torture [and the hon. Member read the opinions of Mr. Hill, formerly Inspector of Prisons, and of Mr. Sheppard, Governor of Wakefield Gaol]. I could go on giving authorities for ever, but that I am afraid of wearying the House. I will just, however, quote two distinguished ones from America. The Governor of Massachusetts State Prison, which contains about 650 inmates, says—
  "I have never known an instance where I thought that a man would he made bettor by the infliction of blows;"
  and the Governor of Wisconsin State Prison, one of the largest and best of American gaols, writes—"Corporal punishment is in no case inflicted." But it is said—"All this is very fair reasoning, but it must give way to the great law of fact. We had a terrible outbreak of garrotting some years ago, we established flogging as a punishment, and it was put down—so all your reasoning must go to the wall." I shall show by, statements and official statistics, which I think hon. Members will not be able either to deny or disprove, that there never was a more utter fallacy than that. I shall first show that garrotting was a panic rather than a wide-spread crime, that whatever it was it had entirely dis-

  1863
  appeared from London months before the Act was passed, and I shall then show that comparing previous and subsequent years to 1863 that the only crimes which have increased are precisely those which are rendered floggable by the Act passed in that year, and that all the other crimes have diminished. I will first call as a witness Lord Aberdare, who says—
  "There was no idea more profoundly fixed in the English mind than that the punishment of flogging had put an end to garrotting. He happened to be appointed to the Home Office, as Under Secretary, in November, 1862, and the outbreak had taken place in the previous July. The streets were filled with police in plain clothes, and in an hour the whole of these garrotters were in custody. In some 26 oases which had been reported, there was only one genuine case, when they came to be examined into, and that was a case of an old woman on Primrose Hill, who was robbed with a certain amount of violence. Every woman who was found drunk in a gutter had been garrotted; every footman who had got a black eye had been garrotted, and there was a great deal of alarm about it. That Act had the credit of having put an end to those offences, which had been entirely stopped by the action taken some eight or nine months before. Robberies with violence had gone on decreasing in number. He did not, therefore, attribute any success in that instance to the punishment of flogging."
  So much for the existence of garrotting as a wide-spread form of violence. The hon. Member then proceeded to read at great length statistics and figures to show that antecedent to the passing of the Flogging Act and Baron Bramwell's "wise severity" crimes of violence had continuously decreased, and that the same diminution had followed that period though the infliction of sentences of flogging were rare; and also reports of local authorities of great centres of population, brutal assaults, wife-beating, and crimes of violence had undergone a continual diminution compared with 20 or 30 years ago. Referring to the effect of flogging upon crimes of violence the figures showed that those very offences of robbery and assaulting to rob, which the Garotters Act of 1862 was passed to put down, increased and not decreased during seven years subsequent to the passing of that Act, whereas of those offences accompanied by violence which were not floggable the numbers of which in 1862 were 2,321, had decreased in 1869 to 2,155. Therefore the only crimes with violence that increased in the year subsequent to the Flogging Act were precisely that
  1864
  form of crime which was made floggable under that Act. And the result of that further is that, taking the 10 years before 1863 and the 10 years after, there were in the former period 3,261 floggable offences, and in the latter 3,380; while, on the other hand, the total number of offences against property with violence was 800 less in the latter period than in the former period. Again, taking the five years before 1863 and the five years after, the floggable offences increased from 1,450 in the former period to 1,910 in the latter. The right hon. Gentleman has not prefaced his Motion to-day with any observations, and it is therefore impossible for me to tell upon what he relies. Perhaps he relies upon the Report of the Judges. Now I do not hesitate to say—and I ask the House to be good enough to follow me in this—that the Report of the Judges is alone amply sufficient to condemn this Bill. If the people of this country are to return to the brutal punishment of their forefathers, and if we are again to go back to punishment by torture, the least we can ask is that there shall at least be something approaching to unanimity upon the bench of Judges. All men must know that, and, most of all, they who have to deal with and sanction by their moral influence, this change if it be necessary. Another ground for opposition to this Bill which I would urge is, that if there be one rule more universally held than another in regard to punishments, it is whether they be severe or not, at all events they must be certain. Yet there can be no doubt that if you have this great diversity of opinion among the Judges, the gambling element enters into the question, and whether a criminal is to be flogged or not will depend upon the accident of a circuit. What are the Judges' opinions? Lord Coleridge, Mr. Justice Brett, and Mr. Justice Denman declared emphatically against flogging. Mr. Justice Keating said that the Act not having made the sentence of flogging compulsory he had himself never passed it; and that the late Mr. Justice Willes, who thought much on such subjects, was wholly opposed to it. The diversity of the Judges in regard to the crimes they would punish by flogging, is yet more marked. Some would inflict it for indecent assaults and rapes upon children, and one Judge would punish stack firing with it.

  1865
  The belief of the Judges in its efficacy is also very varied. One did not believe in it, three declined to express an opinion, and two or three inferred that it did good because offences diminished—that is to say, they took the reports in the newspapers and believed them—while Chief Baron Kelly says it put down garrotting. Mr. Justice Lush says that he flogged everybody convicted of these offences, and so put them down; but Mr. Justice Keating, who toot the circuit next time, said he was obliged to have recourse to very severe punishments, so terrible was the amount of crime which had sprung up. When the Lord Chief Justice pronounces an opinion ex cathedra, it behoves those who are not professional men to regard it with the greatest respect and reverence; but when he gives reasons for the faith that is in him, then even non-professional men may venture to criticize them. Thus, when he says that he is in favour of flogging because it has put down garrotting, "as they saw in the newspapers," we know so far as that reason is concerned that his conclusions are false. The Lord Chief Justice says—
  "In recommending the infliction of corporal punishment in such cases, I assume that the punishment in its infliction will be kept within due bounds of moderation and humanity; and while it carries with it such an amount of bodily pain as shall operate to deter offenders from acts of brutal violence, shall not be unnecessarily severe, or calculated to cause prolonged suffering to the party undergoing it. I presume that the degree of severity with which the punishment is to be inflicted will not be left to the discretion of those who are to inflict it, but will always be under the regulation and direction of the Executive Government."
  The first part of this reminds one of the recommendation of Elizabeth, that the rack shall be used "as gently as such a thing may" How it is to be "always under the regulation and direction of the Executive Committee "I fail to see, unless the right hon. Gentleman proposes to be himself present at every ceremony of the kind, and I have no doubt if he were it would be very much for the advantage of the criminal. It will be seen that this condition of the Lord Chief Justice invalidates and renders worthless the judgment already given, because the punishment will depend for its severity, not upon the Judge or jury, but upon the thews and sinews of the warder who has to administer it, and upon the bodily vigour and strength of the victim. And
  1866
  we know from the testimony of Mr. Wakley that no surgeon can estimate the effect of a flogging. So far as the Judges are concerned, then, there is no justification for the Bill of Her Majesty's Government. Whether the right hon. Gentleman relies upon the Reports of Chairmen of Quarter Sessions and other officials, I really am unable to say, but what strikes me in going over this Return is how skin-deep appear to be the reforms we thought most assured. Our law and punishment reformers, our Romillys and our Frys, and all those others thought they had mitigated the severity of our punishments, and that they had effected a real anchorage in the thought and knowledge of the nation, and yet here we have numberless officials, Chairmen of Quarter Sessions and others, not even impressed with horror that it is necessary to go back to these punishments, but entering into the subject with all the gaieté de caur with which a French Marshal entered the late War. You will find that in a large number of answers the writers know nothing about flogging, because it is limited to crimes of violence, although they approve of it. There are many honourable exceptions, who decline to be made the official reporters of the Government, or to base their knowledge on newspaper paragraphs. For instance, Mr. Philip Sillard, Chairman of the Huntingdon Quarter Sessions—I name his name with all honour—writes—
  "Although opinions have been expressed to me in the affirmative, they seem to me to be based upon reports of what has occurred elsewhere, rather than from any personal knowledge. I can only state that I do not know of a single case that has occurred within my experience in this county."
  The report from Essex is-"I believe from hearsay evidence that flogging has been very efficacious." Hereford says—"No offence under this section has occurred in this district, but we are of opinion that it has worked well." Radnor—"I do not doubt that flogging has been highly efficacious, but I only speak from reports in the papers." Warwick —"I have not seen returns, but I have no doubt," & c., while Kent and Wiltshire write—"Garrotting unknown, but flogging excellent." I am sorry to see that in Scotland—although there they can have had no experience, because flogging was abolished by statute in

  1867
  1862—that these official Returns, based upon paragraphs in the London newspapers, with some honourable exceptions, all go to support the right hon. Gentleman and his flogging measure. Now, Sir, I know we are very apt to deceive ourselves, but I do deceive myself if I have not made out a strong case against this Bill. I have shown that the proposed re-enactment and return to brutal, brutalizing, and exploded punishments has no excuse in the condition of crime in this country, and has still less excuse after the failure of the experiment of 1863. I appeal, therefore, upon these grounds, to Her Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision; failing that, I appeal to the House of Commons to save the country from this abomination, and failing that, one other appeal I make which I know will not fail, I appeal to the honest sentiments and generous intelligence of the British people.
  Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day three months."—(Mr. P. A. Taylor.)
  Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
  MR. WADDYside, that according to the speech which they had just heard, all those Judges who did not entirely agree with the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) did not know anything about the subject; while everybody was entirely misinformed who did not base his opinions solely on the statistics which that hon. Gentleman adduced. Having himself the misfortune to differ from the hon. Member on pretty nearly everything he had side, he was afraid he should be told that he had gone into the subject of flogging with great gaiety of heart. It was impossible to expose all the hon. Gentleman's fallacies, because they were so numerous; but, at the outset, he protested against the attempt to prejudice the whole question by describing what was meant solely for punishment as "torture." When torture was used, it was used for the purpose of extracting the truth, and was altogether different from that which was inflicted as a punishment. He protested also against having a picture drawn to them of the way in which some of their unfortunate countrymen were born upon dung-hills, brought up without educa-
  1868
  tion, and then taken by the throat. Did the hon. Gentleman mean to say, because they had been raised upon dunghills they were not to be punished at all? Were they to tell criminals—"You are ignorant, and therefore do not understand the nature of your crimes. You have been accustomed to look on felony almost as a trade; and therefore we cannot think of thrashing you, although you may have thrashed an innocent person within an inch of his life." Might they not, according to that reasoning, go further and say—"Because you do not understand the difference between meum and tuum, we cannot think of putting you in prison." Let the House not be led away from the real point before them by the tall talk which had been addressed to them. Of course, it was not pleasant to be flogged; and it was because it was not pleasant and they did not like it that men were subjected to that punishment. It was a gross fallacy to compare the infliction of two dozen strokes at the outside on men who had been guilty of the greatest brutality and the infliction in former days of 200 or 300 strokes—which was next door to murder—on soldiers of the Army, who had done nothing but run away to their wives or their sweethearts. Some of them had had experience of what had been the result of the punishments inflicted in consequence of the judgments of Mr. Justice Lush, whose name had been mentioned not altogether in a kindly way that evening. For himself, he could state that in a district where that experiment had been extensively tried, he had observed over and over again at the Assizes that after what was roughly called a "flogging Judge" had been sent round there was a remarkable diminution next time of offences of that character; while, on the other hand, when a Judge of exceeding tenderness of disposition went round, the result had been a wonderful crop of those crimes. He entirely agreed with the general principle of the Bill, which was that where men had committed crimes indicating great brutality, they must be men of an exceptional character, and must be punished in an exceptional way; that they were men so thoroughly hardened that you could only get at them by making them feel corporally what they would never feel in any other manner. In his experience at the criminal bar he

  1869
  had found prisoners curious not as to whether there was any hope of an acquittal, but as to whether they would be likely to "have their backs warmed," showing that this was what they most dreaded. There was no use in being very tender and almost poetical on such a question. Something had been said about periodical flogging. He was quite disposed to think that a very good thing. He believed it had been tried with eminently good effect, and he thought it might be well that the flogging should not be given all at once, but should be carefully distributed over the length of time that the man remained in prison. He would not let them have it all at once, if letting them know that more was coming would do them good. He was bound to say that he felt a very great amount of sympathy with the victims; he could not give all his sympathy to a man who had knocked down a fellow-creature, and nearly kicked him to death; he must give some of his sympathy to the man who had been kicked. A man who deliberately went out with a life-preserver to catch some decent man going home, knock him down, half murder him, and then stamp upon him—such a man would not altogether have his (Mr. Waddy's) sympathy, because, when caught, he would got a good thrashing; but some of his sympathy was with that unfortunate man who was so brutally treated. He had risen to protest against the entirely false air with which this matter had been presented to the House and the glamour which had been thrown over it. As to its being said that we were to flog women, or to flog men at the cart's tail—these things answered themselves. It was not true that they wanted to frighten men by their seeing the blood run down the back; if they knew that the man got a good flogging in prison, that would be enough for them. Criminals of the character he had mentioned should know distinctly that when they were starting off on a dark night, armed with life-preservers or other weapons, they would get a good flogging, as sure as they were born, if they used violence; and such knowledge would have a wonderful effect upon them.
  COLONEL EGERTON LEIGHside, that if speaking up for the rights of women was sentimentalism, he might own the soft impeachment at once. He had been very much suprised to observe
  1870
  that during his speech the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) never mentioned a word about the sufferings of women. The hon. Member jeered at the Press, and said that its accounts of those outrages were not true. When they saw the trials that took place, and noted the convictions in which they resulted, and the places to which the offenders were sent, he thought it right, he admitted, that even a newspaper might sometimes toll the truth. Moreover, if lies were at one time the food of newspapers, they were not so now. In many of these cases the attacks on women amounted almost to "deferred murder." A man, for example, would jump on a woman, though she might be in the family-way; or would kick her in the face; or sometimes would work upon her feelings through her child by putting hot ashes on her baby's head. When he read of such cases he was sorry there should be such brutes in the world; but he felt no sympathy for them. He agreed with the last speaker in denying that there was any just comparison to be drawn between flogging in the Army and as it was proposed to be administered under the provisions of the Bill under discussion. He, for one, deprecated flogging in the Army; but he supported the punishment when it was intended only to be used as the reward of brutal violence, and as a means of protecting women and children, who could not protect themselves. There was no occasion that one man should be punished for an offence of this kind, if he only knew the punishment that awaited him if he did commit it. If a man kicked his wife, put her on the fire, or threw her downstairs, he owned he could not feel the sympathy for the brute which the hon. Member for Leicester felt. It was of no use to urge that cases of this sort were so few. Many of these cases were never heard, because it was in the nature of women to forgive and forget, and many a brute had been saved from punishment by his wife at the last moment telling a lie in his favour. Women themselves could not be trusted to deal with this question. He had a Women's Eights paper sent him the other day, in which they said—"Educate the men," and reasoned in this way, that if they could spell "cat" they would never require to feel it. He really had hoped that there would have been a general

  1871
  feeling in the House in favour of this Bill. In his opinion, we had been at fault in not dealing energetically with these crimes of violence. If the Bill was passed he believed they would in future have very few cases of such brutality, because a man would think once, if not twice, before he brutally assaulted his wife or his children, for it was well known that the greatest bullies were the most arrant cowards. As to the talk of the hon. Member about flogging at a cart tail, and the other exaggerations in which he had indulged for the purpose of arousing the sympathies of the House, all he could say was that he believed their duty was to protect women, children, and weakly persons from such outrageous assaults, and, for his own part, he had not the slightest sympathy with the spurious sentimentality which would let off the ruffians who committed such brutal assaults without condign punishment. The fact that violent assaults were allowed to go without adequate punishment was more likely to brutalize a whole population than the other fact, that the commission of such assaults was certain to be followed by punishment in kind. The measure was purely of a preventive character, and as such it would have his cordial support.
  MR. SHAW-LEFEVRE, in supporting the Amendment of the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor), remarked that in the course he was taking he was not impelled by any feeling of spurious sentimentality as it had been called by the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down. The object of punishment was to deter crime, and if it could be proved to his satisfaction that flogging would have that effect, he would support the Bill; but it was because he was convinced that corporal punishment of a severe kind had always increased instead of diminished those crimes of violence and brutality that he opposed it. For nearly three centuries flogging prevailed both in England and on the Continent, but at the present moment England was the only country in which it was retained. He found that at one time ladies of honour were flogged for breaches of etiquette by the masters of ceremonies at some Continental Courts, and Peter the Great, when he was young, flogged his Court ladies, and when he was older he flogged his generals. Where it had been aban-
  1872
  doned the reason for the abandonment had been that it was found impossible to tame a brutal man by inflicting a brutalizing punishment upon him, or permanently to decrease the number of the criminal classes by retaliatory punishments. He would ask the House whether the amelioration of our criminal law had not produced a great improvement in this respect. In 1842, when our population was 16,000,000, the number of persons convicted and sentenced to transportation or penal servitude was 4,718. In 1872, during which interval great ameliorations had been introduced, and when the population had increased to 23,000,000, the number of convictions had fallen 1,514, or less than one-third in 30 years. It was strange, however, that the Judges had always been the most strenuous opponents of every attempt to humanize our law. ["No, no!"] He said that and repeated it. In 1820, when it was proposed to abolish capital punishment for the offence of stealing goods of the value of 5s., Lord Ellenborough, in the House of Lords, said the Judges were unanimously against the proposal, and he added, if it was agreed to, "we shall not know whether we are standing on our head or our feet." He confessed, therefore, that he was not surprised to find the Judges in favour of flogging. There was something in the position of a Judge which led him to favour retaliatory punishments. ["No, no!"] He repeated there was something in the position of a Judge which inclined him to favour retaliatory punishment—he would not call it "torture." ["No, no!"] Why, he was just reminded by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the City of Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) that Baron Bramwell had made use of the expression that there ought to be a power of retaliation on offenders—of causing them to suffer pain similar to what they had inflicted, and the same opinion was given by many others of the Judges. It had been said that this Bill was justified by the result of the Bill of 1863, which was brought in to put down the offence of garotting and crimes of robbery with violence. It was true that the brutal crime of garotting was put down in a short time, but the brutality and violence was only turned into another direction. Crimes of violence,

  1873
  instead of diminishing, increased, and the figures of the hon. Member for Leicester he regarded as conclusive on this point. From judicial statistics it appeared that for the five years previous to 1863, when the Act was passed, the number of robberies with violence was 290 a-year, while for the five years subsequent to that date the number was no less than 383—nearly 100 a-year more. As to garotting itself, all the evidence pointed to this, that there was a sudden outbreak in 1862, and that only about 90 persons altogether were concerned in it. Sir George Grey, who was Home Secretary at the time, admitted that the outbreak had entirely ceased before the Bill was brought in, and it was also testified by Lord Aberdare that it had ceased by November, 1862. The fact was, that within a few weeks after the outbreak the offenders were all in prison. Lord Aberdare had assured him that the Home Office in December, 1862, was pestered by people who complained of having been the victims of garotting, but that on investigation not one of them proved to be a genuine case. Among the cases which proved not to be founded in truth was one of a young lady who said she had got a black eye and had her hair pulled out by garotters; but it turned out that she did not lose her hair by garotters, but that she had actually sold it. ["Oh, oh!"] He had the fact, and others that he had stated, from Lord Aberdare, who was then Under Secretary for the Home Department. The fact was, that the "panic" from the fear of garotting continued long in the public mind after the crime of garotting had ceased, and in many instances persons who alleged that they had been garotted and treated with great violence were found on inquiry by the police to have fabricated their complaints. It was alleged that brutal assaults had greatly increased during the last few years. The Blue Book contained Returns from the chief constables of the number of such cases, but no total for the whole country was given. Adding them up, he found that the numbers of brutal offences for which offenders were tried and convicted were—in 1870, 371; in 1871, 311; in 1872, 311; in 1873, 312; and in 1874, 351, showing no substantial increase of brutal assaults. The assaults summarily convicted were as follows:—
  1874
  in 1870, 3,076; in 1871, 2,566; in 1872, 3,164; in 1873, 3,212; and in 1874,3,777; and the increase was confined to Lancashire, the West Riding, Stafford, and Durham, where there had been a great rise of wages and a proportionate increase of drinking; but the increase of crimes of violence caused thereby was not necessarily of so permanent a character as to justify a change in our legislation, and now that wages were lower these crimes would probably diminish. Again, certainty was an essential element in criminal jurisprudence, and the Bill would fail in this respect. If there was any class of offences to which the promoters of the Bill would wish it to apply, it was to wife-beaters. He was by no means sure that the Bill was so worded as to apply to them; but supposing that it did, he would remind the House that greater powers had been given to magistrates to punish aggravated assaults upon women than upon men. A magistrate might send an offender of this kind to prison for six months with hard labour, while in ordinary assaults the limit was two months without hardlabour. It was found that if wife-beaters were to be punished at all they must be dealt with summarily, for if the investigation were deferred, the wife would not appear and give evidence against her husband. If the Bill gave power to the magistrates to send these oases to the Assizes, what chance would there be that the wife would give evidence against the husband? And if she did, would any Judge flog the husband and then send him back to the arms of his unloved, but, perhaps, loving wife? After such a punishment the husband could never regard his wife again with affection or respect; and he (Mr. Shaw-Lefevre) put it to the right hon. and learned Recorder whether, after such a degrading punishment, a divorce between the parties would not be advisable as the best course that could be adopted, for they could never be expected to live in peace. He, however, saw no clause in the Bill to that effect. Another element of uncertainty was this—that there were flogging and non-flogging Judges. It was well known that some Judges would not administer flogging—it would depend, therefore, upon what Judge went the circuit whether such punishment were awarded

  1875
  or not. Another element of uncertainty was this—As magistrates might commit either to Assizes or sessions, and as flogging was to be ordered only by Judges, non-flogging magistrates would commit to sessions. Again, juries often refused to convict of offences which carried certain punishments, non-flogging jurors would not find verdicts for the serious offence which was to be punished by flogging. These elements of uncertainty would very seriously affect the administration of the Bill if it became law. The increase of crime was in the less serious class of cases which were dealt with summarily, and to which, therefore, this Bill would not apply. The Judges themselves complained that magistrates dealt with cases they ought to send for trial; and it was a question whether, in the case of wife-beaters, greater power should be given to the justices of dealing with this class of offence. In conclusion, he objected to the extension of flogging as impotent to prevent crime, tending to perpetuate and create a brutal class in the community, and to increase those very crimes it was intended to diminish.
  MR. HENLEYside, when the Bill was introduced he asked himself these two questions—first, whether there had been any increase of the crime it was intended to meet, and, what was more material, how far the existing law had been put in force; for unless the present law was put in force they were acting mischievously if they attempted to meet any spasmodic outbreak of crime by fresh legislation, inasmuch as they were only tempting those who had in their hands the administration of justice to be lax and careless in carrying out their duty. It had been pointed out, and he could confirm the statement, that up to 1873, there had been no increase of this kind of crime in the previous 10 years, cither relatively to the increase of the population or positively in the number of offences sent for trial in the Courts of Record, where they could receive more serious punishment than magistrates could administer summarily. In the live years from 1864 to 1869 the number of cases in Class I., which ranged from murders down to common assaults, was 12,300, and in the five following years the number was 10,797. Assaults attended with bodily harm numbered 3,383 in the first five years and 3,274 in
  1876
  the second. Common assaults fell from 1,231 in the first five years to 929 in the second. Assaults on police-officers fell from 1,100 to 460. Clearly up to 1873 there was no great necessity for legislation. In the Blue Book recently circulated, certain crimes were classified under the head of "Brutal Assaults," but he could not institute a comparison with regard to these, because it was faulty in this respect—that in the areas formerly given were the counties including the large towns, whereas in the Blue Book just referred to, the counties proper, exclusive of the borough jurisdictions, were taken as the areas. The number of aggravated assaults on women and children was 3,203 in 1864 and 2,713 in 1873. These figures again showed a remarkable diminution. There might have been a spasmodic increase in the last year; but it would be better to wait and see whether the law had been fairly put in force within the last 18 months by sending the severe cases for trial, when they would receive proper punishment. They could not shut their eyes to the fact that, during the reign of Her present Majesty, a most remarkable relaxation of punishment had taken place, which, perhaps, had never before occurred in the history of this country. Of the class of offences under consideration, notwithstanding an increase of population of 50 per cent. the number of cases were, in the period of 1834–37, as nearly as possible identical with what they were now. He did not think the House had sufficient evidence fairly to induce them to legislate; because if they did legislate without full knowledge and persuasion, that the law was not, at present, fairly enforced, it would tend to lead to a lax and careless administration of the law. He could not, therefore, vote for the second reading of the Bill.
  MR. HOPWOOD, in opposing the Bill, side, that under the present law 50 lashes might be inflicted, and the punishment might be repeated, whereas the present Bill limited the punishment to 25 lashes. That, he thought, was an indication that the Home Secretary himself did not like the Bill. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Waddy) said that he had considerable experience in criminal cases; but so had others who did not agree with his hon. and learned Friend. The Judges themselves were not agreed. Mr. Jus-

  1877
  tice Keating wrote to the effect that, so far as his experience went, he had not observed the law to be deterrent. That learned Judge remarked of an Assize which had come after a flogging Assize, that he had been obliged to inflict larger and heavier sentences. Mr. Justice Denman had also said that a man came back to him who had been flogged, and he had to give him a heavier sentence and penal servitude, and that, so far as he could judge, flogging was not successful. No doubt there were other Judges who did not take this view, but took that which was almost universal among officials. Flogging was substituted for burning in the hand by the 19th of Geo. III., and by the 7th and 8th of Geo. IV. it was reserved for certain offences. But that statute had never been repealed unless by implication in the Consolidation Statute. In the case of women, whipping was abolished, but not in the case of men. But everybody grew sick of it, and with one consent it was given up. So disused had it become that every one thought it had been abolished by statute. As the punishment had thus been voluntarily given up he trusted the House would never lend itself to re-enact it in the smallest degree.
  MR. PAGETside, he recognized with regret the stern necessity of some legislation in the direction of the leading principle of the Bill. It was necessary, however, and he had no option but to accept the measure. One reason why he did not hesitate to accept the Bill was because he thought that punishments under it would be of very rare occurrence. Only in exceptional cases and to punish exceptional brutality would the lash be resorted to. He believed that the infliction of an exceptional punishment in cases of exceptionally brutal offences would put an end to the practice of brutality, for the reason that men's minds would naturally revolt alike against the crime and the punishment, and both alike would lessen in frequency. He could not for a moment admit that the measure was drawn in a spirit of retaliation. Its framers recognized the principle that the sole end and aim of punishment was to deter from the commission of crime, and had drawn their Bill accordingly. One principle in the Bill, he thought, required further consideration. The principle on which our legal reforms had been framed was that
  1878
  of expediting the administration of justice, and so lessening the expense attendant thereon. If a man were committed in August to the Assizes and there was no Winter Assize he might have to remain in gaol six months before he was tried. There was no reason why courts of quarter sessions should not be empowered to deal with offences of this sort. He therefore hoped the Home Secretary would consent to these eases being dealt with by them.
  MR. MUNDELLAside, that as many hon. Gentlemen desired to speak on this highly important subject, and as the debate had not commenced until half-past 9 o'clock, he would move the adjournment of the debate.
  MR. DISRAELI: The hon. Member for Sheffield has not done justice to his own case in saying that the debate did not begin until half-past 9. I trust he was engaged in a more agreeable manner in another place. Considering that the debate did not begin until half-past 10, I think he is justified in moving the adjournment of the debate.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTside, that they had heard the weighty opinions of his right hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), who always spoke with an authority which was acknowledged by the House, and he (Sir William Harcourt) was surprised at the absolute silence of the Government. They did not attempt to answer the statements made against the Bill. If it were necessary, it was the greatest public slander ever inflicted upon the English people. ["Oh, oh!"] Neither France, Germany, nor America inflicted such punishments. What would they think of England if such a Bill were allowed to pass without discussion?
  MR. ASSHETON CROSShad supposed that the Motion for the adjournment of the debate was intended for purposes of discussion. It was not the fault of the Government that neither he nor the Solicitor General had addressed the House in this debate. He had explained the object of the Bill when he brought it in, and he was quite ready, when he had an opportunity, to defend it.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: I spoke under an entire delusion. I thought that the First Lord of the Treasury opposed the adjournment of the debate.
  Motion agreed to.
  Debate adjourned till Thursday.

  SUPPLY—REPORT.
  Resolutions [June 11th] reported.
  First Six Resolutions agreed to.
  Seventh. Resolution read a second time.
  MR. DILLWYN MR. DILLWYN moved that it be reduced by £ 2,000, the amount for scientific investigations.
  Amendment proposed, to leave out "£ 29,252," in order to insert "£ 27,262,"—(Mr. Dillwyn,)—instead thereof.
  VISCOUNT SANDONdefended the Vote, and explained that it was fully discussed on a former occasion, and he was sorry the hon. Gentleman again brought it forward. There was every reason to suppose that these investigations, from which great advantage might be expected to medical science and thereby eventually to the health of the nation, could not be undertaken by private individuals. The Government, therefore, considered that there could not be a more legitimate expenditure of the public money, and he trusted that, as on the previous occasion, the House would support the Government in this matter of public interest.
  MR. WATKIN WILLIAMSobjected to the Vote, because there was no control over the manner in which it was expended.
  MR. HERSCHELLthought the Government were justified in proposing an expenditure which was so beneficial to society.
  MR. HOPWOOD, in opposing the Vote, side, that the objection was that the work should be undertaken by the Government.
  Question put, "That '£ 29,252' stand part of the said Resolution."
  The House divided:—Ayes 185; Noes 18: Majority 167.
  Resolution agreed to.
  Subsequent Resolutions agreed to.

HOUSE OCCUPIERS DISQUALIFICATION

  REMOVAL (SCOTLAND) bill.
  On Motion of Dr. CAMERON, Bill to relieve certain Occupiers of Dwelling Houses in Scotland from being disqualified from the right of voting in the Election of Members to serve in Parliament by reason of their underletting such Dwelling Houses for short terms, ordered to be brought in by Dr. CAMERON, Sir HENRY WOLFF, Mr. VANS AGNEW, and Mr. MACKINTOSH.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 210.]
  House adjourned at a quarter after One o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (Bromley, & c.) * (149); Local Government Board's Poor Law Provisional Orders Confirmation (Oxford. &c.)* (150); Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (Abingdon, Barnsley, & c.) * (151); Chelsea Hospital (Lands) * (152).
Second Reading—Municipal Elections * (83); Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation (No. 2)* (135).
Committee—Report—Local Government Board's Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 3) * (127).
Report—Landed Estates Act (Ireland) Amendment* (97).
Third Reading—Inns of Court * (140); Public Stores* (110); Public Health (Scotland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 3) * (121), and passed.
Royal Assent—Customs and Inland Revenue [38 Viet. e. 23]; Explosive Substances [38 Vict. c. 17]; Seal Fishery (Greenland) [38 Vict. c. 18]; Bishops Resignation Act (1869) Perpetuation [38 Viet. c. 19]; Public Entertainments [38 Viet. c. 21]; Justices (Dublin) [38 Viet. c. 20]; Post Office [38 Vict. c. 22]; Military Manoeuvres [38 Viet. c. xxxiv.].

PRIVATE BILLS.
Ordered, That so much of the Standing Order of the 15th day of March 1859 which requires "that the Examiner shall give at least two clear days notice of the day on which any Bill shall be examined," and also section 9. of Standing Order No. 178., be dispensed with for the remainder of the Session.

BIRMINGHAM (CORPORATION) WATER BILL.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."
LORD HAMPTONrose to call the attention of the House to the omission on the part of the Corporation of Birmingham to comply in the case of the said Bill with the requirements of the 63rd section of the Birmingham Improvement Act, 1851; and he would move that the Bill be read a second time that day three months. The Bill was one to compel the Birmingham Water Company to sell and to enable the Corporation of Birmingham to purchase the waterworks of that Company. That Company had, he believed, supplied Birmingham with water for many years without any complaint as to their supply, and had always admirably fulfilled its obligations. The

1775
Corporation had obtained the power of purchasing those works by an Act passed in 1851—the Birmingham Improvement Act—by a clause to the effect, that with the consent of the Water Company the Corporation might purchase the works, and if any question arose as to price that was to be settled by arbitration. In 1854 the Corporation gave notice of their intention to purchase, but did not take any further steps, and nothing had been done since in that direction. The Act of 1851 provided that such power to purchase should not continue beyond seven years; and accordingly since 1858 the Company, considering that compulsory purchase by the Corporation under the Improvement Act was out of the question, proceeded to expend £ 60,000 on new works and to double their expenditure. They were therefore entitled to protest against this resumption, contrary to the terms of their own local Acts, of the power to purchase. He resisted the present Motion also on two other grounds—namely, that there was not a single Parliamentary precedent for a Corporation thus seizing upon the property of a company against its will; and, secondly, that there never before was a Bill which arbitrarily fixed the sum to be paid for such a property. The Improvement Bill of 1851 distinctly laid down the principle that the price should be fixed by agreement or by arbitration; and the Chairman of Committees in the House of Commons, in stating that he did not intend to offer any opposition, or recommend any course of action, added that he did not think it right such a flagrant violation of Parliamentary rule and ordinary justice should escape notice, as otherwise the House might unwittingly be drawn into a dangerous precedent. Another objection to the Bill was that the Company had not complied with the requirements of the Birmingham Improvement Act of 1851, which required the consent of the ratepayers to be obtained in a certain form before a purchase such as that proposed could be undertaken by the Corporation. It was true that a meeting of the ratepayers had been held, but not until after the Bill had been introduced, and gone through some, at least, of its stages in the House of Commons. A further consideration which ought to influence their Lordships was that the passing of this Bill might endanger to
1776
some extent the regular supply of water which the Company had given Birmingham, and which it proposed to still further improve. No case was made out for the Bill; and under those circumstances he hoped their Lordships would agree to his Amendment that the Bill be read a second time that day three months.
Amendment moved to leave out "now" and insert at the end of the Motion "this day three months."—(The Lord Hampton.)
LORD ABERDAREhoped their Lordships would not sanction the unusual course proposed in the Amendment of his noble Friend. The objections' were such as might have been urged when the Bill was before the other House, and he thought it unfair not to have taken the sense of the House of Commons on those objections by moving the rejection of the Bill in that House on the third reading. Birmingham had been remarkable for escaping the ravages of cholera in past times, and that freedom had been attributed in a great degree to the excellent supply of water. In the last year, however, the mortality had largely increased, and it had been discovered that of 2,042 deaths which had occurred in Birmingham, 728 were caused by diarrhœa. This led to inquiry, and the local authorities discovered that, according to some witnesses, 70,000, according to others one-third of the inhabitants of Birmingham, had recourse to shallow wells for their drinking water. It was evident, therefore, that the great increase in the density of the population rendered a better supply of water an imperative necessity. He denied, and the Corporation of Birmingham denied, that the compulsory powers of the Act of 1851 had expired. That question had been raised in the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Bill. The reason why the Corporation came before Parliament was that very large sums of money were required to be raised. The only opponent of the Bill was the Water Company. No other body and no individual in Birmingham had petitioned against it. He contended that the sanction of the ratepayers had been substantially obtained, and that was the opinion of the Select Committee of the House of Commons after having heard the object-

1777
tion of non-compliance argued before them. A meeting of the ratepayers had been called, though not till after the Bill was promoted. There was no dissent at that meeting from the course taken by the Corporation. As to the price, he had never heard that the Company objected to the terms at which the Corporation proposed to purchase.
THE EARL OF SHREWSBURYsupported the objections urged by Lord Hampton, and said that the Water Company had carried on their operations with great advantage to the town of Birmingham.
THE MARQUESS OF HERTFORDbelieved it would be much in the interest of Birmingham if their Lordships agreed to the Amendment and rejected the Bill.
THE EARL OF CATHCARTside, it was the tendency of the day to rely more on merits than on technicality. On that ground he hoped their Lordships would read the Bill a second time and send it to a Select Committee in the ordinary course.
LORD REDESDALEside, he did not regard as a technicality compliance or non-compliance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament. He believed that if the objection brought forward by the noble Lord (Lord Hampton) had been made before the second reading of the Bill in the House of Commons it would have proved fatal to the Bill. If there was any opposition on the part of the ratepayers he thought it would be impossible to proceed with the Bill now; but, as there was no such opposition, the objection might now perhaps be regarded as coming too late to induce their Lordships to prevent the Bill from going before a Select Committee by rejecting it on a second reading.
EARL GRANVILLEthought that after the moderate speech of the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees their Lordships would see their way to a decision on the question before them. In giving the Bill a second reading their Lordships would be expressing no opinion on the compliance or non-compliance on the part of the Corporation with the requirements of the Act of 1861. The Select Committee of the House of Commons had had that question before them, and seemed to have arrived at the conclusion that any irregularity in point of form of which the Corporation had
1778
been guilty had been condoned by the ratepayers, and the ratepayers themselves had made no complaint to their Lordships. As the Bill had been passed by the other House, he thought there was no good reason why their Lordships should not read it a second time.
THE LORD CHANCELLORthought the objection should have been made on the second reading. The objection of the noble Lord (Lord Hampton) was founded on non-compliance with a particular clause in a local Act. But the provision in the Act of 1851 was one which Parliament had introduced in Improvement Acts promoted by Municipal Corporations as a cheek on their wasting the public funds in the promotion of Bills, and also as a protection to the minority of the ratepayers. In this case—from an oversight as it would appear—the Corporation of Birmingham had neglected to comply with the form of the provision, because it had not summoned a meeting of the ratepayers till the Bill was already in Parliament. That was an irregularity on which a Court of Law must have acted if its authority had been invoked; but it was not for Parliament to interfere and refuse to allow a Bill to be proceeded with, merely because that had not been obtained in form which in substance and reality had been obtained. The Corporation had run a great risk, because if, instead of assenting to the Bill, the ratepayers had refused their assent to it, the members of the Corporation would have had to put their hands into their own pockets and pay for the promotion of the Bill; but, as there was no dissent on the part of the ratepayers at the meeting held after the Bill was promoted, he thought their Lordships ought to allow the Bill to be proceeded with.
On Question, That ("now") stand part of the Motion? Resolved in the Affirmative; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed.

POOR LAW.—RESOLUTION.
LORD LYTTELTON, who had given Notice to move—
"That it is expedient in the administration of the Poor Law to revert more nearly to the principles laid down in the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry (1833), with a view to the ultimate discontinuance of out-door relief."
said:*—My Lords, perhaps I need hardly

1779
say that I do not much expect—I am not sure that I have any decided wish—that this Resolution should pass at this moment. We know the Parliamentary objection to abstract Resolutions; and this is so far abstract that it does not point to any immediate or specific legislative or executive measure. But we do not disapprove of such a Resolution when it is as a peg on which to hang a discussion on an important subject. The importance of the present subject will be admitted; and so, I hope, will be its special importance at the present time, and that the time is suitable for the discussion. I am glad to find that the same proposition, in principle, with mine, is about to be laid before the other House by Professor Fawcett, whose recent work on Pauperism I venture to commend as a manual of sound doctrine on the question. Now, it is of advantage in a question like this, of such magnitude and complexity, when we can dispense with long historical investigations and with a recurrence to first principles. So here, there are one or two assumptions I shall make, to which I anticipate general assent; and if anyone should think that they are even truisms which it is needless to mention, I would request him to think twice before he maintains that opinion. And the first may be this—that pauperism is an evil, and should be felt to be so by all classes. Is this a truism? Well, I hope it is. But let us be sure that we give a sufficiently wide sense to the word pauperism. It does not mean simply the receipt of doles, alms, for nothing. It means maintenance, as regards the necessaries of life, in return for real work, for sham work or for no work at all, out of a public fund on which one has a right to draw if destitute of any of the said necessaries. And if this is a truism, at least it is a recent one, or a return to what may have been held in old times. Prom about 1600 to about 1800, so far from pauperism, in at least one of its forms, having been an acknowledged evil, the system of public work to be found for all applicants—ateliers nationaux—in every parish, as really such as ever were propounded by French revolutionists—was advocated by a stream of authorities as a specific, if not a panacea, for all our difficulties. But on this I need not dwell. I assume the reverse: that what we all wish is that the labouring class should look more and
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more away from any such compulsory resource, and rely more and more on the natural course and progress of commercial prosperity, on the natural value of their own right hands. The next assumption may be that a Poor Law we must have; and the definition of our Poor Law may be drawn from what I have said about pauperism. I dwell on it for a moment, because it has been sometimes denied or doubted that there is such a legal right to relief as I have stated. But this is a mere question of expression. A right is not less a real legal right because it is contingent. It is, no doubt, contingent on the fact of destitution, and the fact may be denied by the authorities at their peril. But if it exists—above all, if it is proved by the death or serious illness of the applicant—the authorities would certainly have violated the law in refusing relief; and this is virtually identical with the existence of the right. Is this, too, a truism? I fear it is. I say, I fear it, because if we admit that pauperism is an evil, it follows that a Poor Law is at best a necessary evil, or the lesser of two evils; for a Poor Law inevitably generates pauperism. If we have a law declaring that in no circumstances can anyone by law starve or die of cold, it is quite certain that there will always be some to avail themselves of that law. If we have a pauper law, we shall have paupers. Still, I am prepared to admit that the law is right; though I do so on the sole ground of humanity: and I think it may be said that in fact the principle of our law exists in all Christian countries. Mr. Doyle, the Poor Law Inspector, has recently laid before the Local Government Board a series of documents, which may be taken in continuation of a similar work formerly by the late Mr. Senior, respecting the relief of the poor on the continent of Europe; and from his introductory paper I should gather, that where there is not a formal and direct law, the law recognizes and assists charitable institutions in such a way that it comes much to the same thing. It may be interesting to notice in passing, that it seems doubtful if this right to relief is part of our ancient law. It is at least probable that as an express right, it dates from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in 1801. The case was that of a foreigner found destitute; and it is notable that

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Lord Ellenborough, in pronouncing for his right to be relieved, quoted no authority, but placed it on the ground of self-evident common sense and humanity. Such, at all events, has been undoubted law ever since; for if a foreigner possesses that right, à fortiori any Englishman does. Admitting, then, what has been side, we shall surely grant further, as an inference or corollary, that if we must have a Poor Law, it should be such an one as will not stimulate, but, as far as possible, consistently with its essential object, repress and discourage pauperism. And on this basis we may proceed to inquire what has been done? How have we attempted, and how far have we succeeded in the attempt, to repress pauperism by our legislation? In answering these questions, it seems needless to go farther back than the epoch of the only effective attempt ever made as I believe, to repress pauperism by law: the date of the New Poor Law, 1834. I know it is believed by some that the Workhouse Act of 1717, Sir Edward Knatchbull's Act, had a great effect in this way during much of last century. I doubt if this can be made out, though it is possible the Act may have tended to produce some degree of equilibrium in this respect. But, at all events, whatever was done by the worthy Baronet in question in 1717, was wholly undone and reversed by another and much less worthy Baronet in 1796, Sir W. Young; whose Act threw the reins on the necks of overseers and magistrates, as the administrators of relief, and, as we all know, in about 30 years brought to pass a state of things which, had it not been sharply checked and pulled up by the Act of 1834, would undoubtedly have been the ruin of the country. A man of sagacity, when the Act of 1834 was announced, said it would be a very effective measure for 30 or 40 years, when we should begin to relapse. The question is if this was a true prophecy. It is remarkable that the Poor Law Act of 1834 made no direct change in the law. What it did was to establish a strong and intelligent central executive, with large powers to regulate and control the administration of the law. And if our excellent Friend (Sir John Lefevre) who, we rejoice to know, is a still surviving member of that executive commission, had had, with his Colleagues, Sir Frankland Lewis and Sir George
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Nicholls, the resolution—perhaps I should say the power, with due support from Parliament and the Government—to meet more effectually the storm of prejudice and obloquy with which they were assailed, the result might have been different from what it is. As to what has happened, nothing would be easier, for one who had the time and the faculties, than to accumulate a vast mass of figures and facts about it. But in this Assembly, less than in most, can it be requisite to do so. Almost all your Lordships have houses in the country, and are acquainted more or less—many of you very well acquainted—with the state of things; and I can appeal to any one who is so acquainted, whether there is anything like a satisfactory appearance of any approaching extirpation, or even great reduction, of pauperism. For a more particular statement I may refer to an article in the Fortnightly Review for last May, by a gentleman named Roberts. I believe he is a gentleman farmer in Wiltshire. He writes in a plain style, with no attempt at historical or philosophical research, but with knowledge at first-hand of his subject from his own experience as a guardian: and he sets forth what we so well know, the settled and habitual reliance of the working class on their "little annuities," derived from the labour and property of others, instead of any result of their own exertions. Another general statement I will quote, as it is from an authority which will carry much weight; it is from the recent 4th and final Report of the Friendly Societies Commission—
"The increasing disposition of the labouring class to throw themselves upon the poor rates has been of late years a source of no little anxiety."
The Commissioners sent queries to all Boards of Guardians in England and Wales; and they say that—
"Their replies show, that while a feeling of independence may still, generally speaking, be said to prevail among the poor north of the Trent, it exists but to a very slight extent in the south. In some districts, especially in the south, the labourers always look to the Poor Law for relief in old age."
A few figures I may give, such as are always referred to in this question. In 1834, just before the new law, the amount expended on the poor was £ 6,317,255. In 1837, from our "first love" under that law, it was £ 4,044,741.

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In 1873 it was £ 7,692,169. Of course, this must be qualified, in respect of the increase of the population. Looking, then, at the ratio per head of the poor rate, in 1834 it was 9s. Id.; in 1837, 5s. 10 d.; in 1873, 6s. 7½d. The poundage is not given earlier than 1841. In that year it was 1s. 6½d.; in 1872, 1s. 5½d. The proportion of paupers to the entire population is better. In 1841 it was estimated at 9 per cent; in 1849 at 6·2; in 1873 at 3·8. But only three years before, before the great increase in the prosperity of the country, it was 4·7. In 1873 the total number of paupers was 883,688; in 1870, 1,032,800. These results are not very satisfactory; and I would then ask, in the way we work our system, how could we expect them to be so? Let me recall to the House what I said just now, for I am sure it is the key to the whole question; that pauperism should be felt to be an evil by all classes. And surely we do not exclude from the list the labouring class itself. Surely they have much to do—many may think they have more than anyone else to do—with the determination of their own condition; and. I repeat, what do we do to make them feel that pauperism is an evil? Philosophers, men of forethought, politicians, the wealthy and middle classes, the ratepayers, feel it, on grounds too obvious to need repeating: what of the labourers themselves, the very subjects with whom we are concerned? How is it possible that they should feel it, with a system of out-door relief? We must in common sense consider the kind of men with whom we have to deal. We cannot expect them to take a comprehensive view, and act on the principle that in the long run the receipt of relief is not good for their class. For a given individual, indeed, such relief may not always be bad; at all events, there would probably be many in all classes who, if they could have half-a-crown a-week for the asking, would feel very little scruple in taking it on account of remote consequences on the public welfare. The only point on which I would differ from Mr. Roberts's paper is, that he throws too much blame on the labourers themselves. But the question is still, how do we attempt to make Poor Law relief—we must not mince our words—distasteful to the working class? For even if the soundness of what is called the "deterrent
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principle" be another truism, the question is not whether it be admitted as a doctrine, but how we give effect to it in practice? The recipients of out-door relief either can work or cannot. If they cannot work, it is nearly self-evident that the deterrent principle cannot be applied. We must remember the simple object of the law, that no one shall be without the necessaries of life. And if these are fully given in out-door relief, it is manifest that the recipient must inevitably be about as well off as the average of his class, or as he himself was before. Here I may just notice a singular expedient which a few years ago was adopted at Elberfeld, in Germany, in the hope, apparently, that it might be a good substitute for the workhouse system, and equally effectual in in the repression of pauperism. The town was divided into a great number of small districts, each under the charge of what we should call, as to his duties, a relieving officer; but who was to be of a higher social class, and unpaid. Each was to have not more than five or six cases of distress under his charge, and the object of the law was to be attained through a system of examination into the circumstances of the applicants, incessant, minute, inquisitorial, and vexatious to an incredible degree. And it is remarkable that Mr. Doyle, the Poor Law Inspector, who was at Elberfeld on the institution of the system, and then seems to have been rather struck by it, was there again very lately, and he now speaks of it in a very different tone. Indeed, he dismisses it summarily, as obviously impracticable to us. It would be intolerable to those who should try to administer it, and to the poor either intolerable or simply inoperative. On the principle assumed, I can think of no other substitute for the workhouse, unless it be what was once so well-known as the labour test. There is no part of the question more well-worn than this, and I may say that nothing has been more decisively condemned on various solid grounds than the labour test. Here, as elsewhere, I only wish to consider it with reference to the principle on which I am mainly dwelling, that of deterrence. How can pauper labour be made, as the rule, "less eligible" than ordinary labour? Not in quality, for a great deal of the ordinary labour of the country, while quite

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necessary and quite sufficient for a livelihood, is, and must always be, extremely disagreeable; not in quantity, either by smaller wages being paid for the same amount, or a larger amount being exacted for the same wages, because by the inevitable laws of social economy these things are so regulated that ordinary labour can hardly yield more than will fairly support life and health, which by the hypothesis are to be equally attained by the pauper. We come, then, to the workhouse, which, as happily is generally and sufficiently the case, is repellent to the respectable labourer. The feeling of shame and degradation attaches to it, which it is idle to expect should attach, and, as a fact, does not attach, in the minds of the unskilled labourers as a class, to out-door relief. Even the fear of it is very operative, and the power which the working class know the Guardians have, and which always has been possessed, of ordering the workhouse in any case—a power which may have led to the common expression—"He has no prospect for his old age but the workhouse," which, in respect of the real fact, is quite inaccurate. But it is manifest that this merely contingent application of the principle is not enough. It should be observed that it is the workhouse simply as such that is adequately deterrent. I do not at all want to have them places of severe discipline; and it is quite possible that in some respects, as in the ugliness of their outward appearance, which led to their being called "Bastilles," the principle of repulsion may have been carried too far. The mere confinement, the submission to authority, the regularity, and—in this sense—discipline of a workhouse is enough, Old people need not be made uncomfortable there; but, surely it is most undesirable that to them, or to any one else, the workhouse should be made actually attractive, as is occasionally advocated. Able-bodied pauperism is no doubt the worst, and the prohibitory Order by which it is so generally relieved in the workhouse alone, is perhaps far the most valuable result of the law of 1834. But it is evident that many of the evils of pauperism, on which I have not dwelt, as they are among the common places of the subject—such as the discouragement to forethought and thrift, and the deadening of the
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sense of family obligations—apply fully as much to all other classes. Now, referring to the terms of the Resolution, I admit that the Report of 1833 does not explicitly contain the general principle that all forms of pauperism should be deterrent, or the consequent provision that all relief should be confined to the workhouse. But I believe that the real mind of the framers of that Report was to that effect, though they might not actually lay it down; and at all events, I submit that these principles do properly and logically follow from the whole tenor of the Report. Here I may be asked if I mean literally that all relief should be confined to the workhouse. Now, no doubt, to some extent, this must be a question of degree. I should be thankful for any progress in the right direction; if, for instance, as has been recently side, the converse of the present state of things could be obtained, in which in-door relief is the exception, out-door relief the rule. It it is, indeed, manifest that there must be many cases in which, as long as the principle of the law remains, in the first instance relief must be given out of the workhouse. From a sudden calamity, such as an inundation or a famine, there may be no sufficient accommodation in the workhouse; or, as to individuals, a man has a sudden illness or accident, and cannot be moved: he must be relieved at home; or, without the existence of physical impossibility, there are undoubtedly cases in which there is a real moral certainty that the administrators of the law would not be brought to confine relief to the workhouse. Such is that, often mentioned, of "breaking up the home "of a man who only needs temporary relief for a few days. He holds on, perhaps for weeks, and if he really only wants support for one week longer before he recovers his capacity or opportunity for work, it is a pity to drive him into the workhouse. Still, I conceive there is an answer to this, depending on a more accurate view of what we mean by relief. Relief may be said to be what is actually given to a man. "We give him the money or the food, and he walks off with it; it is his, and we hear no more of it. But if you lend it to him, it is different; and I believe that while there is no part of our system which is more feebly and inefficiently worked than "relief by way of loan,"

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which is perfectly well known to the law, there is none from which, with a better administration, much more good might be expected. Nor do I know what objection exists to a more general use of the process, also well known to the law, of attachment of wages; it is actually in successful operation, and it is, I believe, the only case in which it is, in our system of Assisted Emigration to Australia for labourers. This is in fact poor relief by way of loan; and the labourers sign a bond to repay, which is enforced—if necessary—in the colony, if I understand it right, by attaching their wages. This system would have the great advantage, as I look upon it, that in it we should be treating the working class in the same general way as we do others, and not by the application to them of the "paternal Government" principle, as if they peculiarly needed it. For what do other people do when in difficulties? Small tradesmen and the like have just as hard a struggle to live in their way as labourers do; and what do they do? They manage to live on their credit; and so do the poor, and the loan-relief would be only continuing in another way what they have already begun. As long as their own resources or credit lasted, they would go upon them; when these were exhausted the State would step in and become the creditor, if there were reasonable prospects of their acquiring the means of livelihood. And no one would drive the matter to such a point as to say that this would be a gift only because interest might not be charged. Nothing is more annoying than to have a strong man, with not a large family, who has been earning perhaps £ 2 or more a-week, coming for relief the moment he is ill, having saved nothing, for he has had no sufficient inducement—and you must relieve him for he is destitute. Now on this plan, if you cannot make him save beforehand, you will put the screw upon him and bind him afterwards to repay the loan. Further, there is the great resource of voluntary benevolence; for whatever some philosophers and doctrinaires say, it is again another truism that charity will always continue in this country, and I certainly have no wish that it should not. It has always been admitted, nay contended, by all the Commissions on this subject, that charity should continue, and should
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supplement the inevitable shortcomings and severities of the law. Take the case so often mentioned, of the separation of married persons in workhouses. Old couples, it is well known, by the law need not be separated. Others, it is the intention and presumption of the law, are only to make the workhouse a temporary abode; and if even it should be otherwise, or if for other reasons in particular cases, as does sometimes happen, poor persons cannot be induced to enter a workhouse, it might be a case for private charity. The difficulty indeed would be only to regulate it, so that it should not do too much. Then I may be asked what exactly I would do at present? Now, many medium plans, if I may so call them, have been proposed on this subject, but I shall only advert to one, which has lately been recommended on high authority. By an Act passed to extend Mr. Hardy's Act, indoor relief to the amount of 5d. a-day per head, is now charged, in the London district, on the general metropolitan fund, out-door relief remaining as before on the parishes. This has the effect of a direct premium on the former, relatively to the latter, and, I believe, has tended much to increase in-door and diminish out-door relief. And it has been proposed to pass a general measure on the same principle, only introducing the Imperial Exchequer, from which a subvention should be paid to every Union in England, of 2s. a-head per week for every inmate of the workhouse. That this would have a considerable effect I do not doubt; but I do not much like this principle of a direct bribe. If indeed the system were carried further, to the extent of a national rate throughout, the question would be different. Since I read about 30 years ago, the pamphlet of the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) in favour of such a rate, I have always been disposed to believe that it might safely be adopted; but that is not now in question. My belief is, that a very short Act might be passed, simply providing that after a rather distant date—five years, 10 years, what you will—out-door relief should be discontinued as the rule; all regulations in detail to be framed and enforced by some powerful central executive. And now I will venture to adduce a remarkable instance, for encouragement to us to proceed in this

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direction, of success which has already attended an attempt to do so. I refer to the well-known case of the Atcham Union in Shropshire. Sir Baldwin Leighton, the worthy son of a worthy father—for it was the late Sir Baldwin to whose intelligence and energy the successful administration of that Union has been due—has kindly furnished me with many particulars on this subject. I cannot fully give them; but a few simple figures, up to the most recent date, such as I noted before, may be stated. In the whole of England the ratio of paupers to the population was 4·2 per cent; in Atcham, 1·6. In England the cost per head on the population 6s. 11 d.; Atcham, 4s. 5¾d. In England the rate in the pound 1s. 5½d.; Atcham, 3d. In England, out-door paupers to in-door are as 5 to 1; in Atcham, 1 1–5 to 1. And this, notwithstanding that so late as 1871 the whole of the large and pauperized town of Shrewsbury was injected into the small rural union of Atcham. In two years, between 1870 and 1872, the out-door paupers in Shrewsbury were reduced from 519 to 152, or 70 per cent; while in 1870 in Atcham proper the number of in-door was actually greater than out-door, 154 to 139. At the same time, it will be found that the condition of the labourers in that union is peculiarly good. This has been partly attested in the Report of Mr. Stanhope, one of the Commissioners on Agricultural Employment; and it is notable that though wages in Atcham are not very high, and have received no great increase, the agitation of the Agricultural Labourers' Union, while prevalent in many neighbouring districts, made no way in that union. Similar, though not equal, results have been attained elsewhere, as at Brixworth, mainly through the exertions of Mr. Pell and Mr. Bury; at Aston by Birmingham, and in a few London unions, as Whitechapel and Marylebone. The result is due to a strict and careful attention to existing regulations, and to the discouragement of out-door relief, together, no doubt, with what should always accompany it, much general care of the well-being of the poor. There are many obvious advantages in the way of simplification and convenience of administration, which would attend the change which I advocate. There are some questions
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which in our present system, I conceive, will never be quite satisfactorily settled in practice, such as, what to do with paupers who have resources, suppose voluntary pensions or allowances, to which they have no legal claim, but which they are perfectly sure to enjoy. But I will only dwell on one topic in this connection, as it has lately been treated with authority in the Report—to which I have already alluded—of the Friendly Societies' Commission. I strongly recommend the few pages in that Report, on the connection of Friendly Societies with the Poor Laws, to the attention of those interested in the subject. It is well known that Guardians often are in the habit of estimating, with a view to the amount of relief, the sum received from a Benefit Society, at one-half what it is. I believe this is of doubtful legality, and I am sure it is altogether wrong in principle, being a sort of promise or inducement to rely on the Poor Laws, to members of Institutions of which the very object is, or ought to be, to make them be and feel independent of it. But there is a superficial plausibility in it, which will always dispose Guardians to admit it. In the workhouse it is plain that all this difficulty is got rid of. The pauper's receipts from the Benefit Society of course go to his maintenance, and if, which is rare, there is any surplus, it can be kept to his credit. I will now advert to a subject of much interest in itself, and very illustrative of our subject, I mean the Scotch and Irish Poor Laws. I remember the debates in 1838 on the Irish Poor Law Bill. One of the ablest speeches ever addressed to Parliament was made against that Bill by the late Lord Fitzgerald. But that was in respect of the peculiar case of Ireland. It was vehemently attacked by Lord Brougham, on the old grounds of political economy; and I remember his expression of amazement at the double folly of Parliament in disregarding the warnings both of England and Scotland: the one as having a Poor Law, and the other as not having one, or at least one much less operative. But Lord Brougham, though, as knowing everything, he of course knew something about the matter, might have spoken differently had he known what was soon about to be brought to light by a Commission of Inquiry into the condition of

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the Scotch Poor. Both the Scotch and Irish laws were based on what I have always said I conceive to be the only sufficient ground—that of simple humanity. It was felt that Scotland and Ireland could no longer continue to be nearly the only countries in Europe without an effective Poor Law. In Ireland there was a faint shadow of such a law; but so feeble and partial, that it is not even alluded to in the Act of Parliament, and may be disregarded. In Scotland there was a law, which in its theory was meant fully to provide for destitution; but its administration, in the hands of small, local, obscure, and irresponsible bodies, had been so extraordinary, that the result was absolutely grotesque, and hardly credible. It was said that old people in Ireland were found living, as to food, on 6d. a-week; and it is an authentic official fact that the legal relief was often 2s. and 2s. 6d. a-year, the rest of what was requisite to support life being had through mendicancy and other miserable means. And it will be seen on consulting the Scotch Act and the ample debates in the House of Commons on its introduction, that the whole tendency of it was to facilitate relief—to make it more easy, more accessible, more judicable, more public. This may have been right; but it cannot be said that the results have been entirely on one side. The Irish Law was wholly a new one; and it is interesting to observe the variations between the two laws on account of this difference in their inception. The Scotch Law adopted the general framework of the existing law of the country; the Irish Law extended to Ireland, with differences, the general principles of the English Law, and for the first few years it was administered by the English Poor Law Commissioners sitting in London. There are accordingly several points of distinction between these two Acts; such, for instance, as this—that in Ireland the Commissioners are expressly forbidden, as in England, to interfere in individual oases of relief, while in Scotland there is a proviso which is constantly put into practice, for an appeal in such cases to the Board of Supervision. But on the main difference which exists, I must dwell a little more. No Poor Law could be passed in those days which did not in some form or other recognize the
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"deterrent" principle. Accordingly it is found both in the Scotch and Irish Acts, but in very different forms. The Scotch Act, adhering to the ancient usage of the country—I say usage, because, so far from its being expressly the law, it is said that there is a legal decision the other way—gives no right of relief to the able-bodied. It does not declare that they have no such right; it only provides that no such right shall accrue under the Act. This restriction, though it has more than once been recommended on high authority, I conceive to be quite illogical and untenable, assuming the ground of humanity as the basis of this law; for if an able-bodied man is destitute, how can it be more consistent with humanity that he should starve and die, than that any one else should? Such, however, being the principle on which the Scotch Law mainly relies, the workhouse principle, which does exist under the law, is, as might be expected, relatively weak. There is a passage about in and out-door relief in the First Report of the Scotch Board of Supervisors, which might almost have been written by Mr. Cobbett, or by one of the early opponents of the English Poor Law, and which shows on the part of Sir John M'Neill and his able colleagues, a total want of apprehension of what we here consider to be the real object of the "workhouse test." For the present state of things my chief authority is that of a writer in a recent volume published by the Cobden Club, Mr. M'Neill Caird. He writes carefully, and draws from official documents; and he writes as a Scotchman, with no disposition to magnify any existing evils in his country. There are poor-houses in Scotland, but apparently on no regular system; and when they have them they do not always use them as we do. As an example, I may mention that in Kirkcudbrightshire, where poor-house accommodation does exist, of 87 women, with 207 illegitimate children, only 3 with 8 children were in the poor-house, all the rest receiving outdoor relief. I need not say that if there is an absolute rule with us in England, it is that such cases shall only be relieved in the workhouse. If we compare the general state of pauperism in Scotland with that in England, I find that on a given day recently there were 3·3 per cent in Scotland against 3·6 in England,

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"But the figures on which the English calculation is based include 124,925 adult able-bodied, besides their children. As the able-bodied do not receive relief in Scotland, England is heavily weighted in the comparison. Putting aside the able-bodied, the ratio of persons receiving relief was in Scotland 1 in 28, in England 1 in 31."
And even if all "casuals" were deducted on the Scotch side—and without counting the children of the English able-bodied—the result would still be, in Scotland 1 in 30, in England 1 in 31. The pound-rate on the English gross rental was Is. 3½d., in Scotland 1s. 1½d., or within 2d. as much, notwithstanding the difference as to able-bodied and the long-established pauperism in England, and the thrifty habits of the Scotch. In the comparison of Scotland with Ireland, I will only mention one fact. The poor rate collected annually in Scotland, on an average of four years, was £ 815,775, in Ireland only £ 772,322, notwithstanding the same difference as before as to the able-bodied, and that the population of Ireland was 5,402,759, in Scotland only £ 3,360,018. On the general state of the Scotch workpeople, I will again quote a sentence from the Evidence before the Commission on Friendly Societies:—
"There is a growing class in Scotland who fool that they need not insure in any Triendly Society, as the Poor law provides them with a certainty of sick pay."
And I add one more passage, though it has been recently printed, because of its singular force. It is from evidence given by Mr. Briscoe, Superintendent under the Scotch Poor Law—
"Out-door relief in the Highlands has deteriorated truth, industry, morality, self-respect, self-reliance, the natural affections, independence of character: it appears as if the whole of the humbler classes had completely changed their character. There is no shame whatever in demanding relief, even among some of higher station. This state of things in the Highlands is perfectly deplorable, and every person admits it."
It is true that this statement was made 11 or 12 years ago. But I adduce it as an illustration of the tendency of outdoor relief; and in that view, the sooner it was after the change in the law, the more strongly does it show its tendency. In Ireland this deterrent method was provided, as in England, through the workhouse. The whole law was to be found within the corners of the Act; and it expressly prohibited relief being given in any way except as the Act
1794
directed, which was limited to the workhouse. Indeed, it did not even promise relief to all; giving preference, in case of deficient accommodation in any workhouse, to resident destitute, and making no provision at all for the others. But the "destitute" indiscriminately were to be relieved; and, as I have side, that there must be sudden emergencies which anywhere would put to a severe trial the system of in-door relief, it was nearly certain that such would be the event in Ireland, where the bulk of the population lived on the coarsest and cheapest kind of food, with no resource beyond it if it came to fail. The Irish Famine broke down the workhouse system as an exclusive one, and the Extension Act of 1847 gave unlimited power to administer out-door relief, subject only to the discretion of the Commissioners, and to some well-intended provisions for possible future revocation. But, canis à corio nunquam absterrebitur uncto, and it is not likely that such a population as the Irish, having once tasted of out-door relief, will ever abandon it. In March 1848, 50,143 able-bodied paupers were relieved out of doors in Ireland, and the total daily average of all classes was 703,762 outdoor, to 140,536 in-door. This was, no doubt, exceptional, being so soon after the famine; but I find in the last Report of the Irish Poor Law Board that the average daily number of out-door paupers in Ireland rose, by constant yearly increase, between 1865 and 1873, from 12,205, to 27,509—much more than double. The general result of a survey of the effects of the Scotch and the Irish Poor Laws ought to be, I think, to confirm us in adherence to the main principle of our own law. My Lords, I hope I need not say that our main object in all this question ought to be the well-being of the poor themselves. One only point in this relation I will dwell upon, as I am enabled to illustrate it in a particular manner. Ear the worst result of a lax Poor Law, I conceive, is its disastrous effect on the sense of family obligations; and I beg attention to the following extract from a letter I have received from a medical gentleman named Macnamara:—
"I have worked among the natives of India as a medical man for 20 years, and have perhaps seen more of their family life than any European in Bengal; and it is impossible for people

1795
to realize the devotion of children to parents, and the wonderful self-sacrifice practised by the young to support the aged and sick of the family. This feeling is as strong among the lower as in the higher classes; and I need not remind you that there are no Poor Laws nor public charity of any kind in India, but a vast amount of private charity:"
confirming what I have said as to the distinction between public and private aid. Thus does a Heathen country contrast with a Christian one after centuries of a Poor Law. At the outset I ventured to hope that the present time would be deemed a suitable one for this discussion, and for any attempt to wean the working class from reliance on the fatal gift, the doron 'adoron of public relief. It is so because it is a time of prosperity. Should the present promise of an abundant harvest be realized, and should we be further blest with a succession of good harvests, the probability is that the condition of all classes, and of the labourers in particular, will be permanently raised; for of course the law is by no means the only agent that affects that condition. "We are glad to know that from various causes their condition has improved and is improving; our object should be that the Poor Law and its administration should work in the same direction. We know there are serious counteracting evils to the good of prosperity. Nothing in such times is more distressing than the waste of the resources of the labouring class: their not working nearly as much as is perfectly consistent with their comfort and health, and squandering the produce of the work which they do render, so that often their wives and families are no better off in good times than in bad. In my own country I hear of a notable instance of this. We have, as in almost all parts of the country, a system of allotments or field-gardens for the poor. We have had it for many years, and have never found any difficulty in obtaining tenants; but I am now told that from the high wages of the working people, they care but little for their bits of land. Nothing can be, of course, more short-sighted; but we aggravate the evil in so far as by our legal system we weaken the springs of forethought and thrift. Nor can we work effectively in the right direction, except by some self-acting test. In Staffordshire and Worcestershire the nailers are doing better than ever they have been; but they of course, as far as
1796
possible, hide it from the Guardians whenever they choose to apply for parochial relief. There is also, no doubt, an unfavourable effect of such times on the minds of many of those from whom Guardians are chosen. Prosperous and lightly-burdened times tend to make them careless and lax in the custody and administration of public funds. The more important is it, then, to bring to bear upon them a strong central control, and a weight of opinion from the Government, from Parliament, and from the country. My Lords, it will be no small thing for the people of this generation in England, if—to the many triumphs and benefits which they have achieved and received—if to the countless inventions, discoveries, and improvements in science, the great sanitary reforms, the spread of education, the revival of religion, they shall be able to add and bequeath to their posterity some real, effectual, lasting check to one of the most deadly and spreading plagues that can affect a civilized and industrial community—the plague of pauperism.
Moved, That it is expedient in the administration of the Poor Law to revert more nearly to the principles laid down in the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry (1833), with a view to the ultimate discontinuance of out-door relief.—(The Lord Lyttelton.)
THE DUKE OF RICHMONDside, he was far from complaining either of the Motion or of the manner in which it had been supported, and should confine himself to the practical issue raised by the noble Lord, and show how the authorities had carried out the Poor Law Act of 1834. The noble Lord had himself anticipated that his Motion was not likely to receive their Lordships' assent, and he had even understood him to say that he did not know that he entertained any decided wish in that direction. There could be no doubt from the figures produced by the noble Lord—and which were unimpeachable—that out-door relief had increased very largely in Scotland and Ireland within the last few years; but he could not admit the accuracy of his noble Friend's statements made in regard to the Highlanders of Scotland, and he did not believe that the alleged deterioration in the character of the population was capable of proof. A more exact inquiry would, he doubted not, free the character of the Scotch

1797
people from the imputation cast upon them. He did not think, also, that the noble Lord had correctly stated the views of the Commissioners of 1833 as implied in his Resolution. It was quite true that by a decision of the Court of Queen's Bench every man in this country had a right to relief. The noble Lord said in his Resolution, that it was desirable in the administration of the Poor Law
"to revert more nearly to the principles laid down in the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry (1833), with a view to the ultimate discontinuance of out-door relief."
Now, on the contrary, he (the Duke of Richmond) maintained that from the year 1834, when the Poor Law Act was passed, to the present time the successive Governments of this country had, with more or less stringency, carried out the views entertained by the Poor Law Commissioners, and had restricted the system of out-door relief as far as possible. All that the Commissioners of 1833 insisted upon was that "out-door" relief should not be given to able-bodied paupers; and that was practically the rule on which the Boards of Guardians had acted as far as was possible. The subject was one of the most important that could occupy the attention of Parliament, and their Lordships owed a debt of gratitude to the noble Lord for giving them an opportunity of discussing it calmly and dispassionately, and of exchanging the views which they must have derived from a practical knowledge of the working of the system. The Commissioners of 1833 said—
"The great source of abuse is the out-door relief afforded to the able-bodied on their own account, or that of their families,"
and their first recommendation was as follows:—
"That, except as to medical attendance, and subject to the exception respecting apprenticeship hereinafter stated, all relief whatever to able-bodied persons or to their families otherwise than in well-regulated workhouses—that is, places where they may be set to work according to the spirit and intention of the 43d Elizabeth—shall be declared unlawful, and shall cease in manner and at periods hereinafter specified, and that all relief afforded in respect of children under the age of 16 shall he considered as afforded to their parents."
This recommendation, their Lordships would observe, was limited to out-door relief, and it even contained an exception in favour of medical attendance. With respect to out-door relief the Commissioners said—
1798
"That the out-door relief to the impotent, using that word as comprehending all except the able-bodied and their families, is subject to less abuse,"
and there was nothing in the Report to show that they contemplated so severe a measure as that all aged, infirm, and sick persons should be required to come into the workhouse. The Commissioners did not contemplate that the measures recommended by them would be sufficient to abolish pauperism, as the remarks of the noble Lord would lead their Lordships to suppose. In the conclusion of their Report they said—
"It will be observed that the measures that we have suggested are intended to produce rather negative than positive effects, rather to remove the debasing influences to which a large portion of the labouring population is now subject than to afford new means of prosperity and virtue. We are perfectly aware that for the general diffusion of right principles and habits we are to look not so much to any economic regulations and arrangements as to the influence of a moral and religious education."
After the Report of the Poor Law Commissioners the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 became law, and one of its clauses enabled the Commissioners to regulate the relief to able-bodied paupers and their families out of the workhouse. The clause was as follows:—
"And whereas a practice has obtained of giving relief to persons or their families who, at the time of applying for or receiving such relief, were wholly or partially in the employment of individuals, and the relief of the able-bodied and their families is in many places administered in modes productive of evil in other respects; and whereas difficulty may arise in case any immediate and universal remedy is attempted to be applied in the matters aforesaid; be it further enacted that from and after the passing of this Act it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners, by such rules, orders, or regulations as they may think fit, to declare to what extent and for what period the relief to be given to able-bodied persons or to their families in any particular parish or union may be administered out of the workhouse of such parish or union by payments in money, or with food or clothing in kind, or partly in kind and partly in money, and in what proportions, to what persons or class of persons, at what times and places, on what conditions, and in what manner such out-door relief may be afforded."
This clause showed the mild and tentative manner in which the Commissioners were to proceed. He had had the good fortune to peruse the article of the noble Lord in The Contemporary Review, but notwithstanding the large experience claimed by the noble Lord, he admitted that it was impossible to approach the subject at the beginning except in a

1799
very mild manner. It would have been impossible, indeed, at that time to carry out a rigid system of workhouse tests. The workhouses did not exist, and it was only from time to time that these buildings had grown up to meet the necessity for them. The Poor Law Commissioners of that day consequently issued a prohibitory order to various parts of the country. The Act was not applied in all its stringency to the Metropolis or the manufacturing districts, because it was impossible to carry out the workhouse test in districts where the population were exposed to sudden reverses through being thrown out of employment. It was only in the year 1841, or thereabouts, that the prohibitory order was made a general order and became applicable to the whole of the country. He would read to their Lordships the exceptions to the prohibitory order. They were—
"1. Where the relief was required from sudden and urgent necessity. 2. From sickness, accident, or infirmity affecting the pauper or any of his family. 3. For defraying funeral expenses. 4. In first six months of widowhood. 5. In case of a widow having children and no illegitimate child born after widowhood."
That was now the law; and he doubted very much whether it would be possible within a reasonable period to abolish altogether the system of out-door relief. The policy of the central authorities had been to discourage out-door relief; but there had been in various parts of the country a disposition on the part of the Guardians to interpret and administer the law in a rery lenient manner. It was impossible at a time of low wages to expect that the labouring classes could lay by sufficient to maintain themselves in old age or to support their destitute relatives. Their condition had no doubt improved since that time; but although wages had risen, the price of almost all articles of food had risen likewise, and the labouring classes had, therefore, not been enabled to put by a sufficient sum against a season of adversity. The authorities had from time to time called the attention of the Guardians to the necessity of discontinuing the practice of granting out-door relief to the extent to which it had been carried. There had been of late conferences of Poor Law Guardians to consider how the law should be carried out, and directions had been given to the Poor Law Inspectors
1800
to make inquiries and report upon this subject. They had done so, and their Reports—which might be usefully consulted by their Lordships—showed that the state of matters was improving. The administration of the Poor Law in regard to the workhouse test was not without its difficulties. His (the Duke of Richmond's) father was Chairman of a Board of Guardians in Sussex, and articles in the newspapers were written against him complaining of the hardships of the Poor Law and of the manner in which it was carried out by that and other Boards of Guardians. Articles in newspapers did not have much effect upon his father, and a different state of things now existed. It was, however, necessary to watch the administration of the law, and if it called for a remedy, it could be carried out with much greater success when the Government had public opinion in their favour, instead of running strongly against them. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Hardy) had carried into effect an improvement in the law on that subject already begun by his predecessor Mr. Goschen. The noble Lord had referred to a period long anterior to 1870—and that was one of the reasons why he disagreed with the Resolution. The figures would, he thought, show that about the year 1870 the highest amount of out-door relief had been reached, and that we had since been going on more satisfactorily than for several years past. The effect of placing the in-door relief upon the Metropolitan Common Fund had been highly beneficial. In 1870 the amount of out-door relief given in the Metropolis was £ 413,000. In 1874 it had dropped to £ 310,000, being a reduction of 25 per cent. In 1870 the number of out-door paupers was 114,000; in 1875 it was only 69,000. The diminution in the whole of England had also been considerable. In 1870 there was expended in out-door relief £ 2,899,029; in 1874 the amount had fallen to £ 2,801,455—a diminution of 3 per cent. In 1870 the number of outdoor paupers in the whole of England was 876,600; in 1875 it was only 664,114. He could hardly make out whether his noble Friend advocated a national Poor Pate, and he should reserve his opinion on this point until he had read the noble Lord's pamphlet on this subject. The noble Lord had, however, expressed an opinion in favour of

1801
making more use of relief by way of loans. That was a very useful mode of giving relief where it was practicable; but it was difficult to put it into operation. It ought to be resorted to when a man required relief who was usually in the receipt of high wages; but it was by no means an entire remedy for the state of things of which the noble Lord complained. It was a necessity that could not be avoided that from time to time people should go into a workhouse who were of the highest respectability, who had honourably supported themselves by their own exertions up to that time, but who were forced by uncontrollable circumstances to seek an asylum in the workhouse in their old age; and to make the workhouse such a place as the noble Lord had shadowed forth for this class of people would not be in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of the people of this country. The noble Lord said that, assuming that the infirm, the aged, and the disabled must always be admitted, there were others for whom private charity might be left to provide; but to leave them to private charity would be entirely wrong in principle; because if it was the law that no man should be allowed to starve, but that every man should be entitled to sufficient to keep him alive, we ought not to depend upon the charitable views of individuals; but we ought to provide for the able-bodied and industrious man who was, through no fault of his own, out of work and deprived of the means of subsistence. He objected to the Resolution of his noble Friend—first of all, because he did not admit that the administration of the Poor Law was not in accordance with the recommendations of the Commissioners of 1833; he maintained that it was strictly in accordance with those recommendations. He also objected to the Resolution because he did not like, by agreeing to such a Resolution, to admit that it was possible to look forward to a time when there might be a discontinuance of out-door relief.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYside, he strongly sympathized in many of the views of his noble Friend (Lord Lyttelton); but he agreed with the noble Duke the Lord President, that to accept his Resolution would imply a censure upon the administration of the Poor Law Board of late years, and he did not think there was any reason to complain of that
1802
administration under any Ministry. The Board had always been disposed to carry out the principle of the Report of 1833, and to do even more, if public opinion would support them; and the noble Lord the Mover of the Resolution admitted that there were exceptional cases in which out-door relief must be given. In the general proposition, however, that there was a most urgent necessity that we should take advantage of the present improved condition of the labouring classes to enforce an improved administration of the Poor Law and the diminution of out-door relief he cordially concurred. The noble Duke unintentionally misstated the views of the Local Government Board, who had always held as a principle that a difference should be made in the administration of relief to the able-bodied. The noble Duke said he saw no reason why an able-bodied man should be treated in a different manner from the sick and disabled; but he had always held that it was absolutely essential that an able-bodied man should be treated differently.
THE DUKE OF RICHMONDside, that what he meant to say was that the able-bodied man should be relieved from a different fund.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: At all events, the noble Duke would admit it was absolutety necessary that more stringent rules should be applied to the able-bodied than to the sick and disabled.
THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: Hear!
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: For himself, he had not understood the noble Lord the Mover of the Resolution to say that the workhouse should be made more deterrent, or that the treatment of the poor in the house should be made more hard and severe; but that the offer of the workhouse acted in itself as a deterrent, and he wished to offer it instead of out-door relief, because it acted as a deterrent. It was not desirable that the administration of workhouses should be made unnecessarily severe or cruel, and he did not think that that had been the case generally—certainly not of late years. On the contrary, guided by the Local Government Board, the tendency of Guardians had been to increase the comfort, and to ameliorate the condition of the poor in the workhouses. He had no objection to that; but still if we wished to deal effectively with this ques-

1803
tion, we must, in a certain sense, harden our hearts. Those who had to administer the law knew that the difficulty was, in case after case, to apply a general principle; and the moral was, that the Guardians must have strong support from the central authority to enable them to do their duty. He would not in any degree complain of the central authority, which, he believed, was to be trusted in this matter; but he believed this was a most opportune time to evoke public opinion in aid of the central authority, to enable them to support the Guardians in laying down more stringent rules in regard to the administration of out-door relief. It was quite true the prohibitory order had been long enforced; but he wanted to go beyond it; and unless we did, we should not touch the malady. It was not too much to say that large classes of this country were steeped in pauperism. It was not only that we had so many paupers on our roll, but what was much worse was that the curse of pauperism had entered into the minds and social habits of the people. They had lost all sense of shame in asking for relief. We must not impute too much blame to them; all men placed in the same situation would have been similarly demoralized; but having a law which insured relief in certain cases, we were bound to take the utmost care that it did not sap the independence of the people of the country. We had created a vicious public opinion by our law, and we could not expect that certain classes of people would act contrary to the opinion we had created. In nothing was the evil more flagrantly exhibited than in the loosening of the tie between parent and child. Nothing had struck him more painfully than the number of cases in which children who, by a little exertion, might have supported their parents, had neglected to do so, and the indignation with which they had resented any pressure put upon them to compel them to do so. It had been made a complaint against himself and others that they were going to make children support their parents. That showed the state of public opinion; and that such a public opinion existed was the worst thing that could be said. He submitted that we must go further than the mere refusal of out-door relief to able-bodied paupers. In the Eastern Counties generally there had been great
1804
laxity, and the result was a large amount of pauperism. He wished that in his own district he could have shown such a result as Sir Baldwin Leighton did at Atcham; he would have been more proud of that than anything he had done in his life. What not long since existed in his union—and he dared say in a great many unions—was that when the wife of a labouring man was confined there was given, as a matter of course, a certain amount of relief to the family for a period of three weeks, the total being equivalent to the cost of providing a nurse and the other expenses attendant upon bringing a child into the world. A member of the Board succeeded in carrying by a majority of one a resolution against the practice, which was accordingly discontinued; and, instead of there being general dissatisfaction, the reasonableness of the resolution was acquiesced in, the efforts needful to meet those emergencies had been made, and that branch of relief had been cut off. We should aim at restricting out-door relief to the cases in which the head of the family, the breadwinner, was himself ill; always excepting, of course, cases of accident and infectious diseases. He did not say this should be done at once, but it was what we might aim at. He had long felt a change was necessary in regard to members of Friendly Societies. Men said—"What on earth is the use of our saving? If you give us less relief, why should we save?" That was wrong in principle; and in cases in which the Friendly Society's allowance was sufficient, we had better cut off therelief altogether, and encourage all to cultivate the habit of independence. With reference to the loan system, he admitted that such a system might be excellent—he must, however, remind them that it was very easy to make the loan, but uncommonly difficult to recover it—it would probably end in something not very different from gifts. He thought if a great effort were made to restrict the amount of out-door relief, a considerable change in the condition of the people and of pauperism would be effected. Out-door relief should, if possible, be restricted to cases of absolute necessity. Good nature and weakness at the moment might give relief where it was not absolutely required; but an amount of evil would thereby be done altogether incommensurate with the

1805
amount of relief to the pauper. If the law were stringently enforced, private charity would supplement its administration, softening its bearings, and filling up the chinks which the broad strict line of the law had left open.
LORD HAMPTONside, he could not refrain from saying that he entirely concurred in what had been said by the noble Lord who had introduced this subject (Lord Lyttelton), and who was entitled to the thanks of their Lordships for having done so. Last week he had presided over a meeting of the Central Chamber of Agriculture when the question of out-door relief became the subject of discussion; and the opinion was unanimously expressed that they ought to revert to a more strict system of outdoor relief. He was also requested to present a Petition expressing the unanimous opinion of owners and occupiers of land representing a very considerable amount and weight of public opinion, praying that the Government would take steps to enforce a more strict administration of the Poor Law in that respect. His noble Friend (Lord Lyttelton) had made a very able speech, and had shown—and it was his own opinion—that the administration of the Poor Law in this country was much more lax than it ought to be. A period of 40 years had elapsed since the introduction of the present law, and he thought there should be an inquiry whether there could not be a more strict administration of the system. What should be borne in mind in reference to the Poor Law were humanity on the one hand and sound principles of administration on the other. His noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) had said that they must harden their hearts against the system of out-door relief. He (Lord Hampton) did not like to adopt that language; but he thought that they must teach the labouring classes habits of self-reliance, and that they must not apply for out-door relief. He hoped that the Government would turn their attention to the subject.
EARL FORTESCUEside, that he had been engaged in the administration of the Poor Law for 30 years, and he could say from experience that two-thirds of the loans made by the Guardians had been recovered. He quite agreed with noble Lords who had spoken that the administration of the Poor Law was not
1806
so satisfactory as it ought to be, and he could not help thinking that great good would result from the appointment of a Commission to inquire specially into the system of out-door relief. He would suggest that there should be a reprint of the original Report of the Commissioners made in 1833. It was full of sound principles and valuable information, and it was desirable that such an instructive narrative should be made accessible to all and be distributed amongst the authorities all over the country.
After a few words from Lord ORAN-MORE and BROWNE,
LORD LYTTELTONwas understood to explain that he had not suggested that the workhouse should be made uncomfortable, but that the relief which was given should be confined to the workhouse. He begged to withdraw his Resolution,
Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

POOR LAW.—RESOLUTION.
  LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD'S PROVISIONAL OEDERS CONFIRMATION (BROMLEY, & C.) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the Districts of Bromley, Leyton, and Redditch, and the Borough of Totnes—Was presented by The Earl of JERSEY; read 1"; and referred to the Examiners. (No. 149.)
  LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD'S POOR LAW PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (OXFORD, & C.) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Local Government Board under the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1867, with reference to the City of Oxford, the Parish of Stoke-upon-Trent, and the Parishes of Sutton Saint Michael and Sutton Saint Nicholas in the County of Hereford—Was presented by The Earl of JERSEY; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners. (No. 150.)

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD'S PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (ABINGDON, BARNSLEY, & C.) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the Boroughs of Abingdon and Barnsley, the District of Bradford (Wilts), the Boroughs of Colchester, Daventry, and Deal, the Evesham Union, the Borough of King's Lynn, the Districts of Kirkby Lonsdale and Leigh, the Mitford and Launditch Union, the Boroughs of Nottingham, Hastings, and Stafford, the Stockton Union, the Borough of Sudbury, and the

  1807
  District of Todmorden—Was presented by The Earl of JERSEY; read 1"; and referred to the Examiners. (No. 151.)
  House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.