Sitting of 12 February 1875

MINUTES.
NEW WRIT ISSUED—For Stroud, v. Henry Robert Brand, esquire, void Election.
NEW MEMBER SWORN—Hon David Robert Plunket, for The College of the Holy Trinity, Dublin.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Public Accounts, nominated.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Adulteration of Food and Drugs * [62].

LABOUR LAWS COMMISSION—FINAL REPORT.—QUESTION.
MR. JOSEPH COWENasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he can inform the House when the final Report of the Royal Commission on the Labour Laws will be presented?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I have communicated with the Secretary to the Labour Laws Commissioners, and I am informed by him that I may expect the Report of the Commissioners to be laid upon the Table of the House some time in the course of next week.

MUSEUM OF PATENTS AND INVENTIONS—SOUTH KENSINGTON.

  QUESTION.
  MR. MUNDELLAasked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether he is able to inform the House of the decision of the Government with respect to the removal of the Museum of Patents and Inventions?
  LORD HENRY LENNOX, in reply, said, the Government had decided upon providing a suitable site at South Kensington. The exact nature and extent of that site he would explain in detail when he asked the House to vote money for the purpose of carrying out the decision of the Government.

PRIVILEGE—OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE REFERRING TO IRISH MEMBERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. SULLIVANsaid: I bog to ask the hon. and learned Member for Frome (Mr. Lopes)—and not, as has been erroneously printed on the Notice Paper, the hon. and learned Member for Tyrone—Whether he is correctly reported in "The Times," September 11th, 1874, as having used the following words, refering to certain Members of this House:—
  "What was the present position of the Liberal Party? In the House of Commons they were deserted by their Chief, who, by his fitful appearance in the House, disappointed their hopes. They were allied to a disreputable Irish band, whose watch-word in the House was Home Rule and Repeal of the Union? "
  MR. LOPES: I had hoped that when the hon. Member described me as the hon. and learned Member for Tyrone he had intended it as a compliment to me. In answer to the Question he has put to me, I beg to state that, so far as my
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  memory can be trusted in respect of words alleged to have been uttered by me six months ago, in an after-dinner speech, on the occasion of a great and successful Conservative demonstration, I say, so far as my memory can be trusted, I believe, that, in effect, I did use the expressions which have been attributed to me. Sir, if it is any satisfaction to the hon. Member for Louth, who appears to be of a somewhat sensitive temperament, I unhesitatingly say that I never for one moment intended to be personally disrespectful to the Irish Members who sit in this House; but, Sir, I meant then—what I repeat without qualification now—that, in my humble opinion, the advocacy of measures calculated to impair the integrity of the United Kingdom is politically "not creditable." Now, Sir, I use the words, "not creditable," advisedly; and if the hon. Member for Louth, in his leisure moments, will do me the favour to refer to that great authority,—Johnson's Dictionary, in three volumes, by Mr. Todd, published in 1827—he will find that "not creditable" is absolutely the only meaning assigned to the adjective "disreputable."
  MR. SULLIVAN: I wish distinctly to ask the the hon. and learned Member whether he withdraws the language "a disreputable Irish band, whose watchword in the House was Home Rule and Repeal of the Union?" Are the words withdrawn or not?—As no answer is given, I beg to give Notice that on Monday I shall call attention to this matter on a Question of Privilege.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES BILL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. DILLWYN (for Mr. DODDS)asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he will postpone the Second Reading of the Friendly Societies Bill for a short time, in order that sufficient time may be allowed for its provisions to be read and considered in the Country?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, that the Bill was almost identical with the Bill that was introduced and read a second time last Session. Some few alterations were made in it, being almost entirely in the direction of recommendations of persons interested in these societies. As regarded the principle of the Bill, it had

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  been so completely before the country, and so well considered, that there could be no reason for delaying the second reading. He admitted there were a good many questions which might arise in Committee, and he therefore proposed that a considerable time should elapse between the second reading and the subsequent stage. Taking the second reading on Monday, he would not fix the Committee till the 8th of March.
  SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not press the Bill so hastily, and in saying that he was expressing the feeling of many hon. Members. He was sure opposition would be offered to proceeding with the Bill on Monday.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

  HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.
  THE COMPTROLLER OF THE HOUSEHOLD (Lord HENRY SOMERSET)reported Her Majesty's Answer to the Address, as follows:—
  "I return you My heartfelt thanks for your loyal and dutiful Address.
  "I rely firmly, as heretofore, on your careful consideration of the Measures that may be submitted to you, and I will willingly co-operate with you in promoting whatever is conducive to the happiness and contentment of My People."

STROUD WEIT.

  MOTION TO ISSUE NEW WRIT.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a New Writ for the Election of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Stroud, in the room of Henry Robert Brand, esquire, whose Election has been determined to be void."—(Mr. Adam.)
  MR. CHARLES LEWIS, on rising to move an Amendment, expressed a hope that if any hon. Member thought a renewal of the discussion of the important question involved in this Motion was rather hard upon the House, and somewhat unauthorized on his part, this feeling would soon be dissipated. Before the previous debate he had unavoidably had little opportunity of becoming acquainted with the precedents which bore upon the subject. He acknowledged, indeed, that he had been quite unprepared to find the question taken up on
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  the constitutional grounds on which it was debated. Since then he had had an opportunity of fortifying himself with precedents which he hoped would be regarded as decisive. He had, however, to point out that the Motion which he now put to the House was a totally different one from that which he presented on the former occasion. He now asked the House to consider whether it ought not, at all events, to pause till it had read the evidence taken at the trial of the recent Election Petition before authorizing the issue of a new writ. He had to ask the indulgence of the House while he referred to a matter personal to himself. It would be in the recollection of the House that after he had replied on the debate the other night, the right hon Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) took what was a perfectly lawful, but, at the same time, a very unusual course in alluding to the precedents which he (Mr. Lewis) had made in his speech, and stated to the House that, on his investigation of the Stafford case, he found that it told against his (Mr. Lewis's) argument rather than in favour. That right hon. Gentleman alluded to the three Bills of Disfranchisement which were presented to the House of Lords, and stated that directly the Disfranchisement Bill in regard to Stafford was thrown out, the writ was issued. The right hon. Gentleman was reported—he believed correctly—to have used these words in the previous debate
  "In 1836 it (the Disfranchisement Bill) was introduced for the third time, and carried by the consent of almost the whole House, but it was rejected by the House of Lords; and as soon as it had been rejected, a writ was moved for. So that the precedent, instead of supporting the hon. and learned Member, told the other way."
  Now, the facts were these—The Disfranchisement Bill in the case of Stafford was thrown out by the House of Lords on the 29th of July, 1836. The House of Commons then took the usual course of having the Journals of the House of Lords searched, and the matter was entered on the Journals of that House on the 11th of August. It was true that on the 11th of August the writ was moved for; but instead of its being granted, the fact was, that it was suspended by the House of Commons. Now, nothing more unfortunate to him and to the cause he was endeavouring to advocate

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  could have occurred than that incorrect statement of the right hon. Gentleman made just before the division the other evening, and he believed it had an important influence on the votes of many hon. Members. So strong was the opinion of the House, that although the Disfranchisement Bill had been thrown out, it had a discretion to suspend the writ, that a Motion was carried by 45 to 6 in favour of suspending the writ until 10 days after the commencement of the next Session; and then, on the writ being moved for, it was carried by the narrow majority of 1—or by 152 to 151. Voting in that minority of 151 they had some men of great distinction in that House—among others Sir George Grey, Lord Ebury, Mr. Bernal, Sir Francis Baring, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Horsman), the late Lord Taunton, the present Duke of Somerset, and Sir Harry Verney. Having been told the other night by the Prime Minister and the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) that he was asking the House to take a most unconstitutional course, and one interfering with the liberties of the people, he referred to the Stafford case as justifying him, not only in the Motion he made the other evening, but in now asking the House so far to reconsider the question as to stay its hand until the evidence taken at Stroud had been printed. It had been urged, and it would probably be repeated, that when the Election Petitions Acts passed, that House gave over the staff of authority to the Election Judge. He hoped that argument would be recollected when they had the Continuance Bill presented to them in the course of that Session. Knowing what was the temper of the House, he doubted whether, when it passed the Election Petitions Act of 1868, it intended to surrender one of its long-established and most cherished privileges into the hands of one man, however eminent, from whose decision there was no appeal, who was as amenable to bias as any of his fellow-creatures, who was liable to make mistakes, and who had none of the infallibility which was imputed to, but never claimed by, the noble Lord who sat near him (Lord Robert Montagu). According to the argument used the other night, they had only to ask Mr. Speaker for what day he would fix the
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  election, and although a Motion was made in that House for the issue of the writ, they would be doing an unconstitutional thing if they voted against it. Had they not really the same privilege now as they had before, or was the thing a mere empty formality, like the congé d'élire in the case of the election of a Bishop? They had to go back, not to the Election Petitions Act of 1868, but to the Corrupt Practices Act of 1852, in order to test that question. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1852 was the Act under which Commissions of Inquiry into electoral corruption were initiated. It was then enacted that upon the Report of an Election Committee that corrupt practices had prevailed, or that there was reason to believe they had prevailed, then, on an Address to the Crown from both Houses of Parliament, a Commission would issue. The only alteration made by the Act of 1868, was to substitute an Election Judge for an Election Committee. There was no other difference whatever. There was nothing in the Act, or in the form of the Act, in any way infringing on that discretion of the House of Commons which had been exercised over and over again both before and since the passing of the Act of 1852. But it was said that because in extreme cases of corruption, there was to be a proceeding taken previous to disfranchisement, in cases of less aggravated corruption the House had no discretion to suspend the writ for a day or for a Session of Parliament. It was of the most vital importance in the consideration of this question, to bear in mind that Government itself had in analogous circumstances taken the very course which he now recommended. In 1859, there was a Petition against the two Members for Gloucester. The two Members were unseated, a Commission of Inquiry was issued, and the Report was laid on the Table of the House on the 24th of January, 1860. He entreated the attention of the House to this fact, that not by the action of any private Member, but by the interference of the Government of the day—the Government of Lord Palmerston—after that Report was presented, there not being a sufficient case for disfranchisement, and no proposal of disfranchisement, the House suspended the writ for two whole years. He would refer to the volume of Hansard for the year

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  1861, in which the late Mr. Thomas Duncombe—who always contended that, however much bribery might be proved against a constituency, they had a right to a writ instanter, unless disfranchisement was proposed—was reported to have asked the then Home Secretary (Sir George Lewis)—
  "Whether the Government intended to bring in a Bill in regard to Gloucester and Wakefield."—[3 Hansard, clxiii. 1070.]
  Sir George Lewis replied that—
  "It was not the intention of the Government to bring in any measure with respect to those boroughs; that the course they had taken had been taken deliberately; and that, as far as the Government were concerned, they intended to withhold the issue of the writ during the present Parliament."—[Ibid.]
  That, he admitted, was not after the passing of the Election Petitions Act of 1868; but he. challenged any legal Member of the House to say whether the effect of the Act of 1868 had been greater or higher than this—that for the old Election Committee of five Members was substituted an Election Judge, who had all their powers, statutory and otherwise. He now came to another branch of the argument. Supposing there had been any alteration made by the conjoint effect of the Act of 1852 and the Act of 1868, was it to be solemnly maintained that, when on the face of the Report of a Judge, the trial of an Election Petition had not been complete, but had been interrupted by the withdrawal of the person petitioned against, and the hand of the Election Judge appointed by statute had been paralyzed by the abstention of the parties, therefore the House was precluded from proceeding any further in the matter, unless it was proposed to disfranchise the borough? He was in a position to show that in neither of the Petitions was the Election Judge able to make a complete inquiry. He found it stated by Baron Bramwell, in reference to the first Petition, that there was evidence of many persons having been guilty of corrupt practices at the election, but that the respondents gave up their defence, saying that they saw that the determination must go against them, and therefore certain evidence that might have been produced was not in fact produced. With respect to the second Petition, Baron Bramwell also reported that there was evidence of bribery against other persons, but that,
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  as the respondent, Mr. Dorrington, had withdrawn from the defence of the seat, he did not think he ought to report that bribery had been proved against them. In the case of the third Petition, the Judge also reported that, as the claim for the seat had been struck out of the Petition, the evidence of corrupt practices was necessarily confined to such acts as could be proved against the respondent's party; in other words, that the petitioner had found it desirable not to press his claim to the seat, lest retaliatory evidence should be brought forward. On the face of those Reports, therefore, it appeared that not one of the three inquiries was complete, be cause of the action of persons who feared to allow the investigation to proceed. Under those circumstances he would, he thought, be committing an outrage on the common sense of the House if he endeavoured to press the point any further on its attention, or to lay further stress on the arguments which, in his opinion, should induce it to vote against the issue of the writ. It had, indeed, on a former night, been said that if the House intended to take any further steps against the borough of Stroud, that might be a good reason for withholding the writ; but that otherwise, no sufficient reason existed. Now, he would, he thought, be able to show that the House possessed, in the present instance, the power, under statute, to take further steps; and if ever there was a case in which the House ought to be careful to do nothing which would load people out-of-doors to suppose that the extension of the franchise had rendered it less careful with respect to maintaining purity of election, it was that, he contended, which it was now engaged in discussing, in which, in consequence of corrupt persons having been permitted to go throughout the length and. breadth of the constituency, a borough which had once been pure, and which had returned eminent persons to Parliament, had been polluted, degraded, and defiled. Unless, therefore, the House wished to impress every constituency in the Kingdom that its desire to put down bribery had been destroyed by recent events, he most earnestly implored of it to take time to deliberate on the question as to the exercise of the power which it undoubtedly possessed under the statute of 1852. By the Corrupt

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  Practices Act of that year, which enacted that on the joint Address of both Houses, a Committee of the House of Commons might be appointed to try an Election Petition, or to inquire into the existence of corrupt practices at any election or elections, reference was made to two tribunals—the ordinary Election Committee, or a special Committee of the House appointed to inquire into those practices. Now, it would be found that under the Election Petitions Act the Judge was substituted for only one of those tribunals, and that the other had not been destroyed. The 15th section provided that, where the Judge reported that he had reason to believe that corrupt practices had extensively prevailed in any county or borough, such Report should have the same effect and be dealt with in the same manner as if the Re port had been that of a Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into an Election Petition. It was therefore clear that the special Committee which might even now be appointed to inquire into the existence of corrupt practices at elections, and to which he had referred, was left undealt with and undestroyed, although it was no part of his case to show whether the House ought or ought not to appoint such a special Committee in the present instance. He would, however, beg of the House to abstain from issuing the writ, in order that it might have an opportunity of carefully considering the evidence which had been given before Baron Pigott, and then it would be for the House, under the advice of its recognized Leaders, to say whether there was sufficient evidence in the course of one of the longest trials under the Act to justify its further action. He would now, with the permission of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), ask the House to let him read another letter. It might, of course, be objected to such a course, as it had been on a previous night, that it was below the dignity of the House to listen to what was termed "street gossip," or to paragraphs in newspapers which were anonymous. But he had got great historic authority in favour of anonymous communications, both in and out of the House. At all events, he would go a little further than the hon. and learned Gentleman. The writer was a clergyman, and that destroyed, at all events,
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  a little of his anonymous character. The communication was rather odd, but its very oddness of expression was perhaps in favour of its truthfulness. The writer said that the injury which had been done to trade in Stroud because of the recent election contests was fearful, inasmuch as the money had been spent on Petitions which would otherwise have gone into the pockets of the tradesmen, and that delay in the payment of their bills was frequently sought to be justified on account of the subscriptions for the purpose of Election Petitions which had to be paid, while party spirit had in many instances caused tradesmen to be deserted by their customers. Now, that was a state of things which it was only natural to expect. Then it was asserted from the front Opposition Benches that the House of Commons had no special right to deal with a case relating to the representation of the people in Parliament. The House was told the other night that for the House of Commons to act without the co-operation of the other House and the Crown would be an infringement of the liberty of the subject, and they were appealed to not to allow such a monstrosity. He (Mr. Lewis) confessed that when he heard the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford the other night he was reminded of something he said out of the House not very long ago in one of those touching monologues with which he entertained his constituents when celebrating so joyfully the defeat and disaster of the party to which he belonged, and in which he claimed with his own hand and pen to have written a new page and chapter of fulfilled prophecy with regard to the disaster which had befallen his own friends. The hon. and learned Gentleman on that occasion made use of some remarkable expressions. He said that the Liberal party had suffered from too much physic—too many potions and too many pills. He went on to say that if they were again to be restored to good health they must have administered to them a few grains of the salt of common sense. He could not help thinking that one of the conditions of the success of that advice was, in the hon. and learned Gentleman's opinion, that he should himself be the head physician. But, as he now found himself not to be in that position, perhaps he would condescend to administer a few

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  grains of common sense to the House of Commons instead of to his party. For his own part, he asked the House to decide the question on the grounds of common sense. It had the right and privilege to say that the writ should not be issued, for it was absurd to contend that it was to be bound hand and foot by the Reports of Election Judges. He did not believe that was a position, when it gave up its privilege of trying Election Petitions to the Judges, the House of Commons ever meant to occupy; and, as the Amendment which he had risen to move was a temperate and a moderate one, he trusted the House would not, by refusing to agree to it, rejoice the hearts of men who lived by bribery and corruption, and perpetuate the misery of many households in Stroud which required peace. He hoped the House by its verdict would prove that it was not careless about one of its highest and most cherished privileges, and one of its most solemn duties—the protection of the purity of our system of Parliamentary representation. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving, as an Amendment to the Motion—
  "That no new Writ be issued for the Election of a Member of Parliament for the Borough of Stroud until three days after the printing and distribution among the Members of this House of the evidence taken upon the trial of the Petition against the return of the late Member which took place before Baron Pigott."
  MR. E. YORKE, in seconding the Amendment, observed, that the case of Stroud was so peculiar, that he was sure the House would re-consider the opinion it formed the other night, which was, that it should not be treated on its merits, but should be judged solely in the light of precedents. He would not attempt to go into the question of precedents. That he would leave to the legal Gentlemen on either side of the blouse, who were so well qualified to deal with it. But he would remark that if precedents were always to be followed in these matters, the range of the discretion of the House would be seriously curtailed. The duty of the Judge who tried an Election Petition was first to inquire into the character of the candidate, in the next case into that of individual electors; and, thirdly, into that of the constituency as a whole. In the present instance, the Judge had reported against
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  individual electors, but he had pronounced in the candidate's favour, and had acquitted the constituency generally. Now the House of Commons had indisputably the power of issuing a Commission of Inquiry when corrupt practices were reported to prevail, and he maintained that it had also the power of suspending a writ, otherwise, as the hon. and learned Gentleman who had preceded him remarked, why was it asked that evening to say "Aye" or "No" on the question? Although it was included in the range of the Judge's duty to try the question of the general purity of a constituency, it was the interest of all parties concerned to contract the scope and minimize the amount of matter submitted to his decision. In most cases, if the Judge had the materials at all for judging of the general purity of the constituency he got them only indirectly. No sooner had the petitioner proved his case, were it only as much as direct bribery to the amount of 2s. 6d., than the defendant's counsel threw up his brief, and the whole matter, by common consent, came to an end. It was unnecessary to refer to the Reports of the Judges in the three Election Petitions at Stroud to prove that this was the case with regard to that constituency. And the case of a constituency or of individuals who had yielded to a first temptation, was very different from that of a constituency or individuals who were found again and again resorting to vicious courses. Only the other day there came before one of the Metropolitan magistrates a "young lady" who had taken something from a shop and sold it, and she was let off to come up for judgment again when called upon. Now, if she had been an habitual thief—and Stroud had, unfortunately, proved itself to be an habitually corrupt borough—the sentence would no doubt have been a severe one. Unfortunately, it seemed that the House of Commons was not very vigilant in exercising its functions, even when corrupt practices were reported to prevail in a constituency. Against the borough of Boston corrupt practices were reported in June last year, and up to the present time no action had been taken on the Report, either by the Government or any other party in the House of Commons. It thus appeared that when corrupt practices were reported, it was by no means the rule that a Commission of In-

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  quiry should at once be issued. As to the ease of Stroud, he would venture to predict that if the writ was suspended, even for a comparatively short time, it would be accepted by the inhabitants of the borough as a warning that they bad nearly reached the limits of the patience of the House of Commons. He believed that the suspension of the writ, if only for a short time, would do the constituency a greater service by allowing their better feelings to re-assert themselves, than any other action that the House could possibly take. It was to be recollected that the last Reform Bill, excellent though it was in many respects, introduced a very large number of persons into constituencies such as that of Stroud, who were peculiarly amenable to temptation of the kind attending elections. Anyone who knew anything of Stroud during the past year, must be aware that for weeks together, it became the practice for men to walk about, sticking up handbills and protecting them against the other party, for wages perhaps double what they would have earned by honest labour. He had thought it right to again address the House on this subject, in the hope that at the eleventh hour it would give Stroud one more chance of redeeming its character, and he believed the strength of the case which had been brought forward by the hon. and learned Gentleman who had preceded him was sufficient to entitle him to meet with success.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "no new Writ he issued for the Election of a Member of Parliament for the Borough of Stroud until three days after the printing and distribution among the Members of this House of the evidence taken upon the trial of the Petition against the return of the late Member which took place before Mr. Baron Pigott,"—(Mr. Charles Lewis,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  MR. CHILDERSwould only remark with regard to the Amendment that while the hon. and learned Member who introduced it (Mr. Lewis) was quite prepared last Tuesday to disfranchise Stroud without reading the evidence, his proposal, now that he had been beaten, was that the writ should not be issued
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  until the House had gone through that process. The hon. Member who seconded him had endeavoured to illustrate the different degrees of criminality in corrupt boroughs by the case of a young lady against whom there was a certain charge, but whose pleasing appearance and respectable connections had induced the magistrate to let her go back to her friends. He hardly thought the inhabitants of Stroud would feel flattered by the contrast which the hon. and learned Member had attempted to draw, involving as it did the suggestion that their appearance was unpleasing and their connections disreputable. With regard to Stafford, if he had not correctly stated the facts of the case on the previous occasion he would now have apologized to the House; but he thought that when they had heard what he had to say they would find that the case of Stafford as against the proposal for suspending the writ was much stronger than he had put it. What happened on Tuesday was this. It was proved by the Solicitor General that the precedents were entirely against the course proposed to be taken by the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry, who, nevertheless, in his reply, referred a second time to the case of Stafford, as if the arguments which had been used in reference to that case were in his favour. At the end of the debate he (Mr. Childers) stated off-hand the facts in reference to Stafford, and on the present occasion the hon. and learned Member implied that he misinformed the House in one respect, by leaving it to be inferred that, the Disfranchising Bills having failed, the writ was then and there immediately issued. What he stated was that, the last of the Disfranchising Bills having failed, the writ was issued; and it did not occur to him to have to explain more minutely that the last Bill having been thrown out at the very end of one Session, the writ of election issued a few days after the commencement of the succeeding Session. The facts in relation to Stafford, stated more fully, were these. At the election in 1833, a prodigious amount of bribery was committed, and two Petitions were presented, but both fell through, so that the two Members continued to sit. Thereupon a Bill was passed to indemnify witnesses who might come forward and give evidence before a Committee which should inquire gene-

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  rally into the corruption of Stafford. That Committee was appointed in 1833, and at the close of its sittings reported that open, general, and systematic bribery having been proved, Stafford should, in the opinion of the Committee, cease to return Members to Parliament. The Chairman of the Committee, Sir Thomas Fremantle (now Lord Cottesloe), was instructed to bring in a Bill to disfranchise the borough. He acted upon that instruction; but the Session had, at the date of the introduction of the measure, advanced so far that the measure was not further proceeded with. The measure was re-introduced on the 11th of February in the following year and passed by the House; but on its being carried to the House of Lords their Lordships proceeded no further with it. The same fate befel a similar Bill introduced in 1835. It passed the Commons, but made no progress in the House of Lords. In 1836 it was brought in for the fourth time, and carried in the House of Commons by 53 votes to 6. It was then sent to the Lords, who for a month took no steps in reference to it. At the end of that time their Lordships appointed a Committee of Inquiry, who at the end of other two months proceeded to take evidence, and, finally, on the 29th of July, their Lordships rejected the Bill. A Motion was then carried in this House that the issue of the writ for a vacancy which had mean-while occurred be suspended for a week to await the decision of Parliament upon a second Bill, the object of which was to disfranchise the burgesses of Stafford as distinguished from the householders and freemen—it having been proved that of the 850 burgesses no less than 700 had been bribed. That Bill was introduced in the House of Lords, and on the 4th of August was also rejected. It was then ordered that the writ should not issue until 10 days after the commencement of the following Session, the object of this being that those who had brought in the previous Bills might have an opportunity of considering and deciding whether or not they would bring in any further Bill in the following Session. On the 13th of February in the following year the question of issuing the writ was raised, and Sir Thomas Fremantle said—
  "The real subject matter for their deliberation was, whether if a Bill were brought for-
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  ward for the disfranchisement of Stafford, there was a reasonable prospect of carrying the Bill. If his hon. Friend the Member for Exeter "—who had moved in the matter—" was prepared to say that he was ready to bring in a Bill for the purpose, and that there was a reasonable prospect of carrying it, he (Sir Thomas Ire-mantle) would vote for suspending the writ until the end of this Parliament; but on the grounds on which his hon. Friend had placed the Amendment, he could not in justice to his own feelings, and in accordance with his sense of duty, vote for it. … The continued suspension of the writ would be inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution."—[3 Hansard, xxxvi. 450–1.]
  This was precisely what was said on Tuesday night in opposition to the proposal of the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry. When it became clear that no further Disfranchising Bill was to be introduced the writ was issued. Therefore, it seemed clear that the precedent of Stafford, which was so strongly relied on by the hon. and learned Member, was opposed to the proceeding which he asked the House to take.
  MR. STAVELEY HILLsaid, that as the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry (Mr. Lewis) had challenged the House to draw a distinction between the state of things now existing and that prior to 1868, he would draw attention to a most important one created by the Act of 1868. He was one of those who last year thought it was desirable that the writ should be suspended with a view to other proceedings; but the House, after considering the Report of the learned Judge who tried the last Petition, did not come to that conclusion. The Act of 1852 provided that when the Committee reported that corrupt practices prevailed a Commission should issue, and the issue of the writ was suspended; the Judge under the Act of 1868 was put in the place of the Committee. The whole power of the Committee of the House of Commons had been handed over to the Election Judges; whether it had been beneficial or not he would not then stop to inquire: but the 13th section of the Act of 1868 provided that the House, when informed of the certificate of the learned Judge, should order the same to be entered on their Journals, and give the necessary directions for confirming or altering the return, or issuing a writ for a new election, or for carrying the decision into execution, as circumstances might require. The House was now completely

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  bound hand and foot to the decision of the Judges to whom had been handed over these matters. In the present ease the learned Judge had reported that there was no reason to believe that corrupt practices extensively prevailed in the borough of Stroud at the last election, and therefore he held that the House had no right to withhold the issue of the writ.
  MR. FORSYTHsaid, that although he felt strongly inclined to support the Amendment, there were reasons why he could not do so. To adopt in that House a practice of reviewing and possibly reversing the decisions of Judges appointed to try election petitions would only have the effect of utterly destroying the authority of the tribunals created by Act of Parliament. If any such practice was to be adopted, then it would be better at once to repeal the Act under which the Judges were appointed. Let it be assumed for a moment that the House was satisfied the Judge was wrong, and ought to have decided that there was extensive corruption; he (Mr. Forsyth) said the House had no power, under the Act of Parliament, to issue any Commission at all. The Act of 1868 provided that if the Judge reported that he believed corrupt practices had extensively prevailed, that Report should have the same effect and might be dealt with in the same manner as a Report of a Committee of the House of Commons under the Act of 1852. Therefore, the Report of the Judge was to have the same effect, and no more, than a Report of a Committee under the Act of 1852. The first section of that Act enacted that when a Committee appointed to try an Election Petition reported that corrupt practices had extensively prevailed, and the Houses of Parliament presented a joint Address to the Crown for the issue of a Commission of Inquiry, then, and then only, a Commission should issue. Suppose the House came to the conclusion that extensive corruption prevailed in the borough of Stroud, the House was powerless, except to suspend the writ. It could not by law issue a Commission. No doubt it could suspend the writ. He would not go into the argument, which was fully exhausted the other night, as to the power of the House to suspend the writ; but he would say this—that the argument satisfied him there was no prece-
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  dent of the House having suspended a writ unless some definite action was to be taken after the suspension had beer voted by the House. The only other possible ground that could be urged for the suspension of a writ was that there was political and social excitement in the constituency. He did not believe his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Londonderry (Mr. Lewis) would be able to point to a single precedent where the House of Commons, because there was excitement in a constituency, suspended a writ. For these reasons, he should, although with reluctance, vote against the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend.
  MR. MILLSsaid, he thought it would be simply ridiculous to waste time on a Motion to do that which the House of Commons had no power to do. But though they could not issue a Commission they had clearly the power to suspend this writ. They were told that a certain right hon. Gentleman was to appear at Stroud who would be agreeable to all parties; but he (Mr. Mills) doubted the likelihood of that now that that right hon. Gentleman's address had been published. It was a very long document, but might be compressed into one line of 10 words, and the moral of it was—"Politics not so much an object as a quiet seat." He (Mr. Mills) believed there were honest Liberals and honest Conservatives in Stroud, and he gave them credit for wanting to fight out their battle. As he thought the longer that battle was delayed the better, he should vote for the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry.
  SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry (Mr. Lewis) had reminded him that he pronounced an eulogium on common sense which seemed to have attracted the hon. and learned Member's attention. It was quite true that he estimated common sense very highly, and it had taught him several things. It had taught him, in the first place, that the House of Commons had better be guided by the decisions of Her Majesty's Judges, to whom they had referred these questions, rather than by the opinions of anonymous writers, even though they happened to be present. It had taught him, in the second place, that these debates gained nothing by bandying personalities. It had taught him that when

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  they were discussing a serious question, it was better to address themselves to those things which had to do with the question rather than those which had not. In the case of Stafford, to which his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) had referred, the writ was suspended over and over again in the hope that the House of Lords would pass a Disfranchising Bill. As soon as that hope was dispelled, the House of Commons felt it was not at liberty to suspend the writ. The House of Commons could say to the House of Lords—"You have three times refused to pass a Disfranchising Bill, therefore we take the matter into our own hands and issue the writ." The hon. and learned Member, who was very unfortunate in his precedents, was equally in-accurate in his statement of the case of Wakefield. Now, the case of Wakefield was a peculiar one. There had been a Committee, which had reported extensive corruption. There had been a Commission, founded upon the Report of the Committee, and the writ for Wakefield was suspended from time to time for various reasons; but during the whole of that period legislation was either, in fact, going on or contemplated, which affected the issue of that writ. The first legislation which was contemplated was in the year 1860. A Motion was made for leave to bring in a Bill
  "to make provision that, at the Election of Members to serve in Parliament for the City of Gloucester and Borough of Wakefield, the Electors thereof give their votes by way of Ballot,"
  and that Motion was negatived. After that there were various other grounds of legislation alleged for suspending the Wakefield writ. Sir George Lewis, when he moved, in February, 1861, that the writ should not issue without seven days' notice, said—
  "It was the intention of the Government to introduce a measure founded upon the Report of the Committee of last Session on the Corrupt Practices Act … and the House would decide whether the measure should he retrospective.—[3 Hansard, clxi. 247.]
  That measure provided that in cases where a Commission had reported that a constituency was corrupt the writ should be suspended for five years. That was a legislative Act to give the very power which the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry called upon them to give that evening. Sir George
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  Lewis said that, though the Government had not introduced a Bill with a retrospective operation with respect to Gloucester and Wakefield, it would be competent for the House to make such alterations in the Bill as would give it a retrospective operation; and this was what the hon. and learned Member said was suspending the writ without the concurrence of the Legislature. On the 28th of June, 1861, Sir George Lewis said it would be competent for the House to suspend the writs for boroughs in the same position as Gloucester and Wakefield for five years, and to include those boroughs in the Bill. That Bill did not pass. In February, 1862, anew writ for Wakefield passed without opposition. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Londonderry said his Motion was different from that which he made the other night. It was really very different, and, if possible, more irregular. If they wished for the evidence, he (Sir William Harcourt) wanted to know what they were to do with it when they got it. If the hon. and learned Member wished the House to discuss that evidence, and to come to a decision the opposite of that of the Judge, he wished the House to exercise a privilege which gentlemen at the Bar did not think themselves entitled to exercise with reference to the decisions of Judges. Was the House to say that witnesses whom the Judge had seen and whom the House had not seen were credible witnesses, although the Judge said they were not; or, on the other hand, was the House to say that witnesses whom the Judge had seen and whom the House had not seen ought not to have credit given to them, although the Judge believed that they were credible? He would yield to no man in his high estimation of the House of Commons, of which they were all so proud. He believed it to be the best legislative Assembly in the world, but he believed it to be the worst judicial body you could form. The House had been of that opinion itself. He felt the scandal of these discussions and the votes to which they gave rise as long ago as the last century, when the Granville Act was passed for referring Election Petitions to the Committees of the House. The hon. and learned Member for Londonderry wanted to bring back the House to such a state of things as existed in the days of Sir

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  Robert Walpole. The House not being satisfied with the trial of Election Petitions by Committees had transferred the subject to the Judges. The hon. and learned Member was dissatisfied with the Judges and with the Election Petitions Act; but he (Sir William Harcourt) ventured to point out to him that, if he was dissatisfied with the Judges, the constitutional course for him to adopt would be to repeal the statute by the assent of the Legislature, and not to evade and set it aside by a Resolution of the House of Commons. Why were Money Bills sent up to the House of Lords and passed through Committee although that House had no right to alter them? The very meaning of the word "unconstitutional" was doing a thing which you might do, but which you ought not to do, if you acted in conformity with the spirit of your institutions; and it had been determined to be a part of the Constitution of this country that when a statute had been passed it could not be got rid of, except by repealing it; yet the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry asked the House of Commons to determine that one Chamber could overrule a legislative Act. What did the hon. and learned Member propose to do when the evidence had been laid before the House? The hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) spoke of lawyers the other day in a not very respectful manner, and a sentiment of that kind was always sure to evoke much popular applause; but the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry now wanted to convert the House of Commons into a Court of Nisi Prius, where all the lawyers were to pull the evidence to pieces and to address the jury upon it, although he was afraid the House would not have the benefit of the summing up of the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair. The House would, in fact, be a jury summoned by the division bell and marshalled by the "Whip." That was the manner in which the hon. and learned Member appeared to think that the dignity and character of that House was to be maintained before the country. As his hon. Friend the Member for Marylebone (Mr. Forsyth) had justly remarked—"If you can go behind the Judge for one purpose, you can go behind him for all purposes." When the Judge had unseated a Member, the House of Commons might move for the evi-
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  dence and re-seat him. When the Judge had declared people to be guilty of bribery, the House might move for the evidence and declare them to be not guilty. If the House could disregard the Judge's finding with respect to a constituency, it might disregard it also with reference to the voters. Therefore the litigious spirit which, as everybody so much regretted, had crept into the borough of Stroud was, under the auspices of the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry, to be introduced into the House of Commons. The hon. and learned Member for Londonderry said a case under the Election Petitions Act was just like a case under the Act of 1852, when Commissions were first authorized to be issued. But the fact was that, as soon as the Act of 1852 was passed, a warning was addressed to Parliament by one who was no longer alive, but whose opinion on such subjects would be listened to with respect in that House, and even by Members who sat on the Conservative benches. In the Canterbury case, Lord Lyndhurst said—
  "It had been their object—a Constitutional and Parliamentary object—to prevent, as far as possible, the House of Commons and this House from exercising any judgment in the case of elections. And why? Because such questions were in general decided upon party motives and as party questions. That was the ground upon which the Grenville Act was passed, and here they were laying down precedents which might be very mischievous, giving the House of Commons the power of saying that, as the Committee had not found that which was necessary to support the issuing of the Commission, they would put a construction upon the Report of the Committee which would bring it within the meaning of the Act of Parliament. He warned their Lordships against the consequence of that proceeding. His experience of Courts of Justice led him to this conclusion.…. The noble Earl had said that their Lordships ought not to look to the evidence taken before the Committee to supply its defect. Undoubtedly their Lord-ships had nothing to do with the evidence for this purpose. Nothing could be more clear than that; though the evidence should show corruption to the greatest extent, they could not supply the defect in the Report. It was the Committee that ought to have drawn the conclusion. They ought to have reported in the words of the Act of Parliament; but, as they had not done so, their Lordships could not, by construction, supply the deficiency."—[3 Hansard, Cxxv. 906.]
  That related to the Canterbury case, which occurred in the first year after the Act of 1852 was passed. In the Clitheroe case, where the House of Commons addressed the Crown for a Commission, the

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  House of Lords declined to join in the petition, and Lord Lyndhurst said—
  "Their Lordships had no right whatever to refer to the Report of a Committee, or to its evidence, for the purpose of extending or varying the terms of that Report. He begged to assure their Lordships that that was no mere technical point, but that it, in effect, embodied a principle—the very principle upon which the Act of last Session was founded."—[3 Hansard, Cxxv. 1110.]
  In the same case Lord Redesdale said—and the remark came with great weight from a person of his great Parliamentary experience—
  "The true and only mode by which to secure a borough against an unjust, and oppressive, and tyrannical decision of a majority in Parliament was to say that they would insist upon the Report of the Committee containing the precise words used in the Act of Parliament. … Parliament has of late years passed several stringent enactments in order to prevent Party decisions of matters of this description by Election Committees, and to secure impartial judgments. If the Committee appointed to inquire reported that bribery had 'extensively prevailed,' it would be known that they intended to subject the borough to an inquiry; but if the Report did not contain these words, the borough should be saved from such an inquiry being issued against it by the tyranny of the Party which commanded a majority in the other House of Parliament. By insisting upon this, not only would their Lordships' House give protection to those who required it, against the possible oppression of a majority of the other House, but they would save themselves from having perhaps very awkward and difficult questions sent up to them in times of great excitement and high political feeling."—[Ibid. 915.]
  These were considerations which every Party would do well not to forget. There was another case—that of the Dublin freemen—in which the proceeding was rather exceptional. The House of Commons sent up an Address for a Commission because the Judge reported extensive corruption among the freemen, though not in the whole constituency. In the course of the debate the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. G. Hardy) said—
  "It was most imperative that the House should confine itself to the Report of the Judge."—[3 Hansard, CXCV. 1278.]
  And the present Lord Chancellor said on the same occasion—
  "What the statute has done is to interpose the Judge as the person who is to decide what is meant by the word 'extensively.' It is not that Parliament is to read the evidence, and form its own conclusion whether the bribery has been extensive or not; if that were so we might have those very painful discussions renewed in both Houses which politicians on all sides have long since endeavoured to sweep away from the action
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  of Parliament—we might have Members coming down arguing on the Report as to whether or not the corrupt practices alleged had been 'extensive.' You have had the Judge interposed to avoid the whole of that scandal."—[3 Hansard, cxcvi. 1396.]
  If this were a case of possible, or probable disfranchisement, he would not maintain—he had never maintained—that the House of Commons could not permit independent measures of its own. They might bring in a Bill, as they had done before, founded on the peculiar circumstances of the case, and proceed to regular action in this matter. But the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry had never attempted anything of the kind; he had never pretended this was a case of corruption which would warrant such a proceeding as that. Twelve men in a constituency of 6,000 were found to have received bribes, a large proportion of them being persons who had had their railway fare paid and there being a few shillings in excess of the fare. Nobody palliated such conduct, or denied that the men ought to be punished and the Member unseated for these acts; but there was no pretence that the disfranchisement of a constituency of 6,000 voters should follow from such a finding on the part of the Judge. The principle for which he had contended was that the rights of the constituency were a high franchise, and that they could not be taken away by Resolution of the House of Commons. The old rights of franchise stood on prescription; those of new boroughs like Stroud stood on Act of Parliament, and rights which were not conferred by Resolution of the House of Commons could not, in his opinion, be taken away or indefinitely suspended by such a Resolution. His hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) had a low opinion of precedents; but this was a point on which the House had already shown its opinion. The Prime Minister said the other day that these precedents were principles embalmed. It was quite plain that if this thing were done it would be done contrary to all precedents. The House of Commons had never done such a thing before. There was a special provision to ask the consent of the whole Legislature in dealing with a case of this kind. If that policy was wrong it could be reversed in a proper and constitutional manner either by repealing the reference of these questions to Judges

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  or by special legislative action, if special legislative action were called for. The hon. and learned Member for Londonderry, however, did not consider the present case as one which would justify him in moving for a Committee of Inquiry, or in proposing a Bill to disfranchise the constituency of Stroud. All the hon. and learned Member asked was that the evidence should be before the House—a step that would be utterly useless, because when the House got the evidence it could do nothing in the matter. For those reasons, he should vote against the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry.
  MR. SPENCER WALPOLEsaid, it had been stated that the House had parted with the power of deciding whether a writ should issue or not; but, in his judgment, the House had parted with no power unless it could be shown that the power vested in this House since it was first summoned to sit, and always without exception exercised by it, had been taken away from it by some specific Act of Parliament. From this point of view, therefore, the question would turn mainly upon the terms of the Act of Parliament commonly called the Parliamentary Elections Act. The hon. and learned Member (Sir William Harcourt) had said more than once that those who supported this Amendment were going to sit in judgment upon the decision of the Judge; that the decision of the Judge upon the point before the House was conclusive; and that Parliament had given to the Judge the power of determining conclusively all questions arising out of the disputed election. He, on the contrary, should be able to show that Parliament had distinctly reserved to the House of Commons the power of further considering some of those questions. This was how the case stood. The Act, by the 11th section, and the 18th sub-section, had made the decision of the Judge final and conclusive in two points, and in two only. It had made the decision of the Judge final and conclusive as to the return and as to the voidance of the election. But if the next sub-section of the clause were referred to, it would be seen that the Judge was to report upon matters which had been brought to his notice—such as where there was corruption; whether it had been practised with the knowledge of the sitting Member; the names of the
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  persons bribed; and whether corrupt practices had extensively prevailed. But in not one of these respects was the decision of the Judge to be conclusive, nor ought it to be conclusive, for if it were so, then—when they had the evidence be-fore them that people were kept out of the way, and that trick upon trick had been played to prevent the Judge from going into an inquiry which he had no means of prosecuting, and that his decision was made under circumstances which could not be conclusive. The House of Commons would be forced to say—"Whatever may have been the amount of corruption practised, we have no longer the power to consider and determine whether some further proceedings are not absolutely necessary to ensure the freedom and purity of elections." That was not all. The hon. and learned Member for Staffordshire (Mr. Staveley Hill) had said that the clause in the Act of Parliament distinctly laid down what powers the House of Commons was still to possess and what had been taken away by inference. That clause, however, did not bear the construction which the hon. and learned Member had put upon it, and had he looked at the next clause he would have seen what powers had been reserved to the House. The clause to which the hon. and learned Member had referred was this—
  "Where the House of Commons, on being informed by the Speaker of such certificate and Report, or Reports and judgment, shall order the same to be entered in the Journals, and shall give the necessary directions for confirming or altering the returns, or for issuing a writ for a new election, or for carrying the determination into execution, as circumstances may require."
  The final determination, therefore, of the whole question was reserved to that House for confirming or altering the Return, or for issuing or not issuing the writ, as circumstances might require. All doubt upon the subject, however, was removed by the next clause, which pointed out where the House had made a special Report. The House should make such order in respect of such special Report as they should think proper. The House was to pay the utmost respect to the Judge's certificate—indeed, they were bound by it; but with regard to the Report they were invited to consider the state of facts submitted to them, and what proceedings they would take with regard to them. If, after that, they

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  were to be told that they were to be bound by the decision of the Judge and were to be controlled by precedent—although he agreed that precedents were the embodiment of principle—yet he should answer that he was willing to follow precedents where they were exactly analagous to the case under consideration and provided they met with reasonable assent. But was that the case here? Was there any precedent which showed them that a borough had had its returns challenged four times in the space of a year and a quarter—that in each instance corruption had been reported—and that in one instance it had extensively prevailed? He had said on rising that this question was one of great importance as regarded the Privileges of the House—and that it was a useful privilege for the House to retain, and if necessary to exercise. He was as strong as the hon. and learned Member (Sir William Harcourt) for not allowing either that or the other House to exercise exclusive authority upon matters that should be determined by the whole Parliament. The House of Commons could not determine any questions which were not legitimately within its province; but when the power of determining questions which were legitimately within its province had not been taken from it by any statute, it had a right to exercise that power; and such a power was that of determining whether the writ should issue or not. Could hon. Members judge of the expediency of issuing the writ in the present instance until they had seen the evidence taken in the case? They were not asked to see the evidence for the purpose of challenging the Judge's decision, but for the purpose of considering whether any further action should be taken in the matter. If that evidence showed that extensive corruption had not prevailed in the borough, by all means let the writ go; but if the evidence was to the contrary effect, it was their duty to determine whether some further steps had not become necessary.
  LORD ROBERT MONTAGUcongratulated the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) that he had at last found out and had proclaimed to the House the little value which he attached to anonymous writing. A letter had appeared in The Times the other day signed "A Sheep without a
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  Shepherd," in which it was urged that the Liberal Party should not be allowed to select their own Leader, and suggested that their Leader should be chosen by Earl Granville and a few other select persons, and it was followed the next day by another, signed "V.", in which it was stated that the Liberal Party was not to be trusted. The hon. and learned Gentleman had now extended his distrust to the House of Commons, which, in his opinion, was not fit to be trusted with the power of issuing writs, but ought to be bound, hand and foot, by the decision of the Judge. Of course, hon. Members were aware that every lawyer that entered the House came there with the object of getting either on to the Woolsack or the Bench, and it was very natural, therefore, that they should think it right that the House should be subservient to the Bench; but he (Lord Robert Montagu) hoped the House would not surrender their discretionary powers. The House had the power of suspending the writ, for otherwise the question would not have been put. Disfranchisement, however, could not take place without the consent of the three Estates. The Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry (Mr. Lewis) was, that the writ shall not now be issued. The House could not suspend a writ beyond the dissolution of the House. Immediately after that Her Majesty could order a new writ to be issued. All that the House was asked to sanction was that the issue of the writ should be delayed until the lapse of three days after the evidence taken by the Judge on the inquiry was laid before them, so that they might be able to form their own opinion whether corruption had extensively prevailed in the borough. To talk of the House of Commons disfranchising the borough in question was mere nonsense and obfuscation of intellect. The right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) thought he had made out his point when he referred to the case of Stafford; but in that case the writ was delayed, and no more was asked for on the present occasion. The House was only asked not to act blindly in the matter, nor to adopt rashly the opinions of certain lawyers, who would make them east away their privileges.
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, remarking that there were a question of

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  law and a question of expediency mixed up in the case, proposed to say at the outset a word or two on the former, as it seemed to him there had been a slight misunderstanding. He did not think that the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) had contended, or had intended to contend, that the House of Commons had given up the privilege of appointing a Committee to investigate this matter. Certainly, he (the Solicitor General), for his part, had never contended, or intended to contend, anything of the sort. What he had said, and what he had adhered to, was, that it would be somewhat unconstitutional on the part of this House to suspend the writ simply for the purpose of inflicting a punishment on the constituency, and without having some ulterior object in view. That was all he had intended to say; and, speaking with deference, he did not believe the hon. and learned Member for Oxford had intended to say any more. Now, with regard to the power of the House of Commons, it was to his mind pretty clear that the House might, if it thought fit, appoint a Committee to investigate an alleged pre-valence of corrupt practices in connection with an election at Stroud, or at any other place. The Act of 1852, under which a Commission might be issued for the purpose of ascertaining whether sufficient reasons existed for the disfranchisement of a constituency, was very plain and specific in its terms. By the first section it was provided that a Commission might be issued upon an Address of both Houses of Parliament, this Address to be founded upon a Report of a Committee appointed to try an Election Petition or to ascertain whether corrupt practices had extensively prevailed or not. Now, the Act of 1868 only placed the Election Judge in the position of the Committee, or, so to speak, in the shoes of the Committee of the House of Commons which formerly tried Election Petitions, and it gave to his Report the same effect as had formerly been given to the Report of that Committee. There was nothing in that Act, or in any subsequent Act, so far as he knew, to deprive the House of Commons of the power, if they thought fit to exercise it, of appointing a Committee of its own to ascertain whether or not corruption had extensively prevailed. So much for the law. He believed he had stated it
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  pretty much as the hon. and learned Member for Oxford had done, and that he had stated it correctly. The question of expediency was quite another matter. On seeing the Notice of the present Amendment on the Paper, he thought it might possibly be of a different character from the Motion brought forward by the same hon. and learned Member the other evening; but when he had examined it attentively, he found it was in truth just their old friend in a new dress, and, for his part, he did not think the new garb was at all an improvement. What was the ulterior object of the hon. and learned Member? Was it that a Committee should be appointed, or that a Bill to disfranchise should be introduced? If he had either of these courses in view, why did he not state it? It was for the House to consider whether any advantage would be gained by suspending the writ till the evidence given before the learned Judge who tried the Election Petition at Stroud had been laid before them. In connection with this question, it was worthy of remark that the hon. and learned Member who had moved the Amendment had not made any application or Motion that the evidence should be printed, nor had anybody else. There would, therefore, be this curious result—that the writ would be suspended till evidence was printed which no one asked to have printed. But supposing it were printed, and the House of Commons had an opportunity of examining it, they could only discuss the evidence which had been offered to the learned Judge, which he had heard from the mouths of witnesses themselves, and when he had the opportunity of judging of their demeanour. The House, therefore, would only be able to consider at second hand what the Judge considered at first. Well, was there a case for the appointment of a Committee of this House to investigate the alleged prevalence of corrupt practices at Stroud? It appeared there had been four petitions and three Reports. The first two Re-ports, although there had been some reason why the Judges could not form a full and definite opinion, certainly contained no statement that corrupt practices had been extensively prevalent. Then, coming to the last Report, which seemed to him to be the one from which the House ought to judge of the conduct of Stroud, it was found that the learned

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  Judge—a very eminent Judge, who had gone into the whole case with remarkable patience—came to the conclusion that corrupt practices had not extensively prevailed. If this House, on an investigation of the matter, came to a conclusion opposed to that of the learned Judge, there certainly would be a state of things presented of a very extraordinary character, and such as had never been contemplated in the legislation bearing on this subject. It might be that Stroud had now repented and become virtuous, and if so there was no reason for suspending the writ, and depriving it of one of its representatives in Parliament. He should vote against the Amendment, for he regarded it as the same in effect as the Motion of the other evening, and did not find it was the intention of the hon. and learned Member to take any ulterior proceedings.
  MR. STANTON, as one of the Members for Stroud, wished to say a few words on this question. He deeply regretted that it had lost so able and valuable a representative as Mr. H. Brand. He admitted that the Reports of the Judges had shown that many things had been done in that borough which had better been left undone; but still the House must remember that in two eases out of three the Judge had reported that corrupt practices had not extensively prevailed. The last trial was not stopped, as had been stated, by the Member surrendering his seat. It was heard out to an unprecedented length, so much so that the Judge described a great deal of the evidence as merely fishing for information. He believed that hon. Members would rather take the opinion of the Judge than care to investigate the evidence themselves. The fact of his standing in that House after having had his return called in question unsuccessfully a second time proved that his was a pure election. No doubt, Stroud had to a certain extent become demoralized, from having been kept so long in such a state of political excitement, and he thought few boroughs whore sharply contested elections had been fought would have fared better under similar circumstances. He, therefore, could not allow that it was a corrupt borough. The proceedings which had been instituted had been vexatious and uncalled for, and the result had been principally to
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  enable the prime mover in them to acquire the proud distinction—if such it was—of having caused greater injury to the town, more annoyance and ill-feeling amongst neighbours, and a greater waste of money than any other person in the neighbourhood. He hoped the House would not allow any further delay to take place in the issue of the writ, which would only add fuel to the already inflammable and excited state of feeling in the borough; and he trusted that it would be long before the borough was again brought so conspicuously before the notice of the House.
  MR. RUSSELL GURNEYso fully agreed in what had been said by the right hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Spencer Walpole), that he would offer but a very few words on that matter. But there were one or two points which he wished to urge on the attention of the House. The hon. and learned Solicitor General asked whether the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry (Mr. Lewis) had announced that he intended to propose any ulterior measure in regard to the borough of Stroud. Permit him to say that brought this case exactly within the precedent more than once quoted in that debate—namely, that of Wakefield. That was exactly the question put at that time to the late Sir George Lewis, who was asked—"Do you propose to do anything with reference to the borough of Wakefield?" and he distinctly said he did not; but that he would propose a general Bill, which would have no retrospective operation, and which would not apply to Wakefield and Gloucester; that no doubt it would be in the power of any hon. Member to propose a clause on that subject, but that he did not intend to propose such a clause. Not a single other Member ventured to say he meant to do so. Therefore, that ease did form a precedent for the proposal of the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry; for the issue of the writ was put off from the end of one Session till the beginning of the next. Thus they had a precedent for the right, and there could be little doubt as to the expediency, in some instances, of having some delay in the issue of the writ. The hon. Member who spoke last called upon them to abide by the decision of the Judge, and no one could be more willing than he was to do so as to the points

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  which the Judge had to decide. The hon. Gentleman said they were not justified in saying that further evidence which might have been given was withheld in consequence of the withdrawal of the claim to the seat; but the Judge himself distinctly reported that that was so, and if they were to abide by the decision of the Judge, they must abide by it on that as on other points. The high ground which had been taken the other night had been abandoned. There was no longer any doubt that the House had the right, in certain cases, to withhold the issue of the writ. But it was said they were confined to the single ground that further measures were contemplated. No doubt that would be the ordinary ground on which they would delay the issue of the writ; but they were not tied down to that single ground. There might be other grounds on which it would be undesirable to issue the writ; and, if they thought it was undesirable to issue it, they had an absolute power to delay issuing it. Much had been said as to the fear that if they refused to issue the writ, they would be throwing discredit on the tribunal which they had themselves created. He should be the last person who would wish to do that. With the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), who spoke the other night on that subject, he took an active part in the Committee from which came the recommendation on which the Bill was subsequently founded. That Committee recommended that the trial of Election Petitions should be removed from the House of Commons and conducted by one of the Judges. He fully acquiesced in that proposal, and was anxious for it to be carried, and he believed it had worked thoroughly well. Having watched very carefully the different cases that had been tried before the Judges, he was perfectly satisfied with the working of that Act. He certainly, therefore, should not take any part in throwing discredit on that tribunal. But were they really asked to throw any discredit on it? There were certain things for the Judge to decide, and on which his decision was absolute, and there was nothing in the Judge's decision in that case that he contradicted. The Judge was bound to report as he did about the prevalence of bribery, as according to the way in which he reported on that would depend the issue of
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  a Commission upon an Address to the Crown from both Houses. He admitted that by the Judge's decision on that point, they were precluded from having a Commission; and nobody proposed that there should be one. But then, were there not grounds for waiting until they had an opportunity of seeing the evidence? The Judge reported that in October, Joseph Workman, with his wife, was induced to emigrate by two persons on the list of bribers who were interested in sending him away; and it appeared that some of those things had been done with the knowledge of one, at least, of the respondent's agents. Those were matters which the Judge had thought fit to report for the information of the House. Again, the previous history of the borough ought to be taken into consideration. The Judge was not authorized to inquire into previous elections, but their history was known to the House; and they knew, as a fact, that there had been no fewer than four Petitions in the course of seven months, and that in all those cases there had been more or less bribery. Then, taking all these circumstances into account, he was most anxious that it should not be held hereafter that they were precluded, either by former precedent or by statute, from entering into a consideration of these matters; and, being at liberty, as they were, to take them into consideration, it was not an unreasonable request to ask that they should delay issuing the writ until they had had an opportunity, at any rate, of looking at the evidence in the case, as well as at the proceedings adopted in other cases, in order to see what ought to be done. On those grounds he should support the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Londonderry.
  Question put.
  The House divided:—Ayes 184; Noes 73: Majority 111.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.
  Ordered, That Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a New Writ for the Election of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Stroud, in the room of Henry Robert Brand, esquire, whose Election has been determined to he void.

SUPPLY.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
  POSTPONEMENT OF NOTICE.
  MR. NEWDEGATEtook occasion to postpone the Notice which stood on the Paper in his name with reference to Public Bills, observing that it would not be convenient to bring it on in a thin House.
FRIENDLY SOCIETIES BILL.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, in reference to an Answer given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer earlier in the evening, appealed to the right hon. Gentleman not to persevere in taking the second reading of the Friendly Societies Bill on Monday. From all that he had heard he felt quite certain that it would be extremely inconvenient if the right hon. Gentleman persisted in that determination. The Bill was one of very considerable complexity, as it dealt with a very difficult subject, and the complexity was still further increased by there being three different matters to deal with—the Report of the Royal Commission, the Bill of last year, and the Bill of this year. He was informed by hon. Members that it was quite impossible that the matter could be satisfactorily discussed—for the Bill was a subject which must be discussed on the second reading, and the debate must be important—on Monday evening. He would therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he would not think it much more for the convenience of Members to postpone the second reading until some future day?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERobserved, that the previous Question which had been put to him placed the matter upon this footing—that if the second reading were taken on Monday there would not be sufficient time to allow of the provisions of the Bill being read and considered in the country. Now, the persons who were particularly interested in the question had been considering the matter all the
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  Recess, and they had had frequent communications upon the subject with the Government. He therefore thought that it was not at all necessary on their account that there should be further delay. But the noble Marquess had put the matter on a different ground when he spoke of the inconvenience to Members of the House. He need not say that he and his Colleagues were anxious, in every possible way, to consult the convenience of the Members of the House; and therefore, feeling that this subject was one which ought not to be dealt with or passed over in a hurry, the second reading would be postponed. He hoped, however, that no long delay would be desired, and that if a day somewhat later than Monday were fixed hon. Members would then be prepared to discuss the matter. The second reading would, therefore, not be taken on Monday; but on that day he would state when they would propose that it should be brought on.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Committee deferred till Monday next.

  SUPERANNUATION ACT, 1859 [SPECIAL RATES OF PENSION]
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it is expedient to grant special rates of Pension to persons who have served in an established capacity in the permanent Civil Service of the State, where such persons have served in an unhealthy place.
  Resolution to be reported upon Monday next.

  ADULTERATION OF FOOD AND DRUGS BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Bill to repeal the Adulteration of Food Acts, and to make better provision for the Sale of Food and Drugs, ordered to he brought in by Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH and Mr. CLARE BEAD.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 62.]

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.
Committee nominated:—Mr. DODSON, Colonel BARTTELOT, Lord FREDERICK CAVENDISH, Mr. CUBITT, Lord ESLINGTON, Mr. GOLDNEY, Mr. THOMSON HANKEY, Mr. O'REILLY, Mr. SALT, Mr. SEELY, and Mr. WILLIAM HENRY SMITH.
House adjourned at half after Seven o'clock till Monday next.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Elementary Education Provisional Orders Confirmation (Caister, &c.) * (14); Patents for Inventions (15).

QUEEN'S SPEECH.—HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.
The LORD STEWARD (Earl BEAUCHAMP) reported Her Majesty's Answer to the Address, as follows:—
"MY LORDS,
"I THANK you sincerely for your loyal and dutiful Address.
"You may be assured that I shall always heartily co-operate with you in all Measures that may be calculated to promote the happiness and contentment of My People."

PATENTS FOP INVENTIONS.

  BILL PRESENTED. FIRST READING.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have so often received the indulgence of your Lordships when bringing before you subjects which were technical and devoid of general interest, that I think I shall not be without your forbearance now when I ask your attention to a subject interesting in itself, which is exciting great interest out-of-doors, and regarding which any legislation which may now be determined upon cannot but be attended with important effects, for good or for evil, upon the manufacturing and inventive interests
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  of the country. My Lords, it may be asked, why it is that Her Majesty's Government at this time propose legislation on the Patent Laws. My Lords, the development of manufactures and commerce in this country of recent years has excited attention in an unusual degree to the state of the laws of this country which afford protection to inventors; and, my Lords, the result has been that there has arisen what I may call a twofold controversy—a controversy conducted, on the one hand, by those who think there ought to be no Patent Laws at all; a controversy, on the other hand, pressed forward by those who, while desiring to retain the protection of patents, seek a considerable alteration in the Patent Laws as they now exist. It is now, I think, 12 years since, in the other House of Parliament, I ventured to propose a Resolution, which was seconded by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Derby), for a Royal Commission to inquire into the working of the Patent Laws. That Commission was issued, and there sat on it men whose names will, no doubt, carry confidence with your Lordships. Lord Hatherley, Lord Overstone, my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir William Erle, Mr. Justice Grove, Mr. Forster, and Sir William Fairbairn were members of that Commission. It heard a great deal of evidence; it made a Report to which I shall have to refer, and it recommended certain changes in the laws regarding patents. My Lords, nothing was done in consequence of the Report of that Commission; but in the years 1871 and 1872 a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the same subject. It sat, and entered into an elaborate inquiry. And, my Lords, having read the evidence given before that Committee, I think I may assure your Lordships that if at any time you desire reading that will afford you both deep interest and much amusement you will find it in the report of that evidence. Some of the greatest inventors and of the most scientific men of the present day contributed to the knowledge collected by the Committee. There were among them Mr. Bessemer, Mr. Schneider, of the Creusot Ironworks, Sir William Armstrong, Mr. Nasmyth, Mr. Bramwell, and many others too numerous to mention; and

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  in addition the Committee had the ad vantage of hearing the opinions of Lord Selborne and Mr. Justice Grove, who stated their views, the result of their long experience as to the working of the Patent Laws. That Committee made its Report and recommended changes in the Patent Laws. Since that time—in 1873—the Universal Exhibition at Vienna was held, and on that occasion what was termed "The International Patent Congress" also assembled in that city. Persons from all parts of Europe who were interested in the Patent Laws met there and gave their opinions, and arrived at certain resolutions, to which I shall have to refer, as the basis on which, in their judgment, the Patent Laws of any country ought to be framed. In the Reports of the Commission and of the Select Committee and in those Resolutions come to at Vienna your Lordships have a large body of evidence on the subject: but you have also in them what appear to me the great landmarks as to the direction in which any alteration of the laws as to patents ought to proceed. Since the date of the Congress at Vienna I have been a witness myself—from the deputations that have come to me on the subject—of the loud and continuous demand from those persons who are engaged in manufactures, that some alterations should be made in order to give effect to those various recommendations which have been made from time to time. This, my Lords, is the reason why Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that some effort should be made to respond to those demands and an attempt be made to improve those laws. I shall endeavour to shorten as much as I can the field over which I have to travel, and I may at once tell your Lordships that I do not intend to enter into any argument upon the abstract question whether patents should exist at all. I have never been an enthusiastic admirer of the Patent Laws in their present condition as suited to this country. I am aware that objections—very serious objections—may be urged against the existence of such laws at all. On the other hand, I know that there are arguments—strong arguments—in favour of the Patent Laws, and that there is now in this country a strong feeling that Patent Laws should be maintained. I
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  believe that between those two extreme propositions the truth lies. The Patent Laws we have may be so amended as to prove beneficial to the country; but, on the other hand, I am convinced that if these laws be not amended, and if objections now urged against patents are not removed, the days of patents are numbered, and an end must come to them altogether. Neither, my Lords, do I intend to occupy your Lordships' time with arguments as to the principle on which Patent Laws, if they are to exist, ought to proceed. I know that there are some persons who hold that inventions are property, and that the owners of inventions should be protected, just as the owners of lands or of other property are protected in their ownership. My Lords, I do not admit the proposition. I believe that if it held good, you must give the inventor protection not for 14 years or any other term, but protection without any limitation as to time. Not only is that so, but if an invention be property in the sense that everybody understands the word, you must admit the right of the inventor who declines to use his own invention to prevent its being used by anyone else. The assumption to which I have been referring seems to me to proceed on a palpable fallacy. A man's invention is his own, and he may proceed to use it; but it is wholly another thing when he seeks to prevent anybody else from using it. The question of allowing him to do this is not one of property or of abstract right, but one of expediency, respecting which the State is quite entitled to make a bargain, and the only consideration is on what terms an exclusive right of user should be allowed to him.
  Now, my Lords, it often occurred to me that if you were to ask in this country by what authority is it that patents are granted, the first idea that would come into any one's mind would be that some Parliamentary enactment was the original authority. But that would be entirely a mistake. It is a somewhat singular thing that at this moment the granting of patents, exercising as it does a most important influence on the whole of the manufactures of this country, does not depend upon an Act of Parliament, but on the old prerogative of the Crown. Your Lordships will recollect a statute well-known as the "Statute of Monopolies;"

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  it was passed in the 21st year of the reign of James I., in consequence of promises made by Queen Elizabeth, but which had not been observed. The object of the statute was to put an end to a number of monopolies, some of which applied to food; but an exception was made in the Act by the preservation of an old prerogative of the Crown, and that was the origin of the Patent Laws which exist to this day. The 6th section of the Act declares that the abolition of monopolies does not
  "extend to any Letters Patent and grants of privilege for the term of 14 years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within the realm to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures."
  That was a reservation to the Crown of its old prerogative of granting monopolies—the reservation, as your Lordships see, being in the granting of patents of 14 years for what could be described as "new manufactures within the realm." That is the origin of the present system of Letters Patent.
  I will now ask your Lordships to pass from the history of these grants to the comparatively recent period of 25 years ago. In the year 1852 the whole sytem of granting patents came to be regulated by Act of Parliament, and three great changes were then effected. For the first time, it was provided that one patent should do for the whole of the United Kingdom. Up to that time three several patents were necessary for England, Ireland, and Scotland. Again, it was then determined that a patent for the United Kingdom should be granted at an expense very much lower than that which had been previously required. Up to that period patents for the Three Kingdoms cost between £300 and £400. Further, the Act of 1852 made another innovation as regards expenses, which has worked exceedingly well. It provided that on the first application for a patent the applicant should have to pay only £5; and that at certain stages, which would run over six months, he should have to make payments amounting in all to £25. He was to pay no more till the end of three years, at the expiration of which time, if he wished to keep his patent, he was to pay £50 more. At the end of seven years, if he wished his patent to run to 14 years, he was to pay £100 more, which, for a
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  patent of 14 years, would make a total payment of £175. The next alteration made by the Act was this—a provision was made that there might be what is called a "provisional protection"—that is to say, the applicant for a patent was to put on paper what is called a "provisional specification," containing the general outlines of his invention. This was to be deposited in the proper office, and during a period of six months he was to be at liberty to make experiments in the use of his invention, without the danger to which he might otherwise have been exposed if he delayed taking out a patent and his invention became known throughout the country. And now, my Lords, let me call your Lordships' attention to some of the results of the Act of 1852 by comparing the receipts in 1859 and in 1873. In 1859 the receipts from patents were £87,300, and the surplus, after all expenses connected with the granting of those patents, was £21,600. In 1873 the receipts had risen to £144,760, and the surplus to £90,000. Now, let me bring under your Lordships' notice the number of patents. I quoted to your Lordships the words in the Act of James, which states the reservation to be in favour of patents for "new manufactures within this realm." How many of these "new manufactures" do your Lordships suppose spring up within the course of a year in this country? No fewer than 4,300 a-year, or nearly 100 a-week, or something like 15 for every working day. If all these be for "new manufactures within this realm" it must be admitted that we have a most fertile inventive genius at work in this country. I will now state what becomes of these patents. I am taking my figures in round numbers, and by a comparison of several years, and I find that of the whole number of original applications for patents, one-third fall off before the time of sealing the patents, the inventions having been found to be not worth the expense of sealing. Of those which have been sealed, at the end of the third year seven-tenths or 70 per cent drop off, it having been found that the invention is not worth the payment of the £50: and two-tenths or 20 per cent of the remainder drop off at the end of seven years, it having been found not worth while to pay the other £100 to secure the patent for 14 years. So your Lord-

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  ships will see that only one-tenth of the entire number of cases in which patent rights are originally applied for remain to run the whole course of 14 years.
  That being the state of things as to patents, will your Lordships allow me to point out the defects which I think it is generally agreed exist in the present system? Those who have not looked into these matters will be, perhaps, surprised to hear as an accurate statement that there is absolutely no examination in this country of an invention before a patent is granted for it. In point of form, there is the presumption of such an examination—and no doubt the Act of 1852 implies that there ought to be such an examination by enacting that the Law Officers of the Crown may call in experts to assist them in granting patents. But, in point of fact, that provision is not, nor cannot be, acted upon. I find that in 1872 only 62 applications, and in 1873 only 78 applications for patents were rejected by the Law Officers. I should say that they were rejected on regulations as to form, and not from any objections as to substance. From my own experience when I was one of the Law Officers of the Crown, I know that an examination of inventions by the Law Officers is found to be impossible, and your Lordships will not be surprised that with their other duties the Law Officers cannot make any real examination of inventions which pour in at the rate of about 100 a-week. The second defect in the system is this—The provisional specification of which I have told your Lordships, and which is the document which describes the character of the invention, is kept absolutely secret during the period of protection. I do not think it was intended in the Act of Parliament that this should be, but in practice it is so. An advertisement appears in the papers announcing that a patent has been applied for by a person of a particular name; but the allusion to the particular invention is as general as possible, and the provisional specification cannot be seen by the world until the patent is sealed. If any one have reason to suspect that his patent or his invention is being infringed on by the person applying for the patent, he is not in a position to take any very effective steps to ascertain whether his suspicions are well founded, inasmuch as he is not allowed to see the specification. A third
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  objection is this—The provisional specification is drawn up in the general way I have described; but when the patent comes to be sealed, it is sealed not in accordance with that specification, but in accordance with the complete and final specification, which is attached to the patent on its being completed. The applicant is permitted, between the time of his provisional and his complete specification to make any changes he pleases in his design, and there is no control over him to see that the complete specification does not depart from the provisional one. The consequence is this—You have granted in this country every year the enormous number of patents I have mentioned, taking one year as an instance of all. And what is the effect upon the industry of the country of a system which allows, without check and without examination, a number of patent rights to be created? My Lords, you will find it described by the Royal Commission which reported in 1865 in words much better than any which I could use. The Commissioners say—
  "From a paper drawn up at our request by the Superintendent of Specifications, it appears that upon examining into the first 100 applications for patents in each of the years 1855, 1858, 1862, the results were, in his opinion, that in 1855, 26 were manifestly had for want of novelty, and six more partly so; in 1858, 14 manifestly old and one partly so; in 1862, seven were old and one would probably turn out to be so. An instance, illustrating the mode in which these patents are used, is given in evidence, where royalties had been demanded, and in most cases obtained, by the patentee of a machine which turned out upon investigation to be identical with one which 19 years before had been well known and publicly used. Other instances will be found in the evidence of particular manufactures and branches of invention which are so blocked up by patents, that not only are inventors deterred from taking them up with a view to improvement, but the manufacturer in carrying on his regular course of trade is hampered by owners of worthless patents, whom it is generally more convenient to buy off than to resist. The evil also results in another practice having the same obstructive tendency—namely, that of combination among a number of persons of the same trade to buy up all the patents relating to it, and to pay the expense of attacking subsequent improvers out of a common fund. From a comparison of evidence, it cannot be doubted that this practice prevails to a considerable extent. We must also conclude that when the obstruction is not to be got rid of without the expense and annoyance of litigation, in a large majority of cases the manufacturer submits to an exaction rather than incur the alternative."
  The Committee of the House of Com-

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  mons gave an opinion in substance to the same effect; and they recommended—
  "That protection for a limited period, and dating back to the time at which it is applied for, should only be granted for an invention on its nature, and particular points of novelty, being clearly described in a provisional specification, and upon the report of a competent authority that such invention, so far as can be ascertained by such authority, is new, and is a manufacture within the meaning of the law."
  The International Congress at Vienna arrived at the same conclusion—that patents ought not to be granted without a preliminary examination of some kind. In fact, if your Lordships only think of the matter for a moment you will see that something of the kind is absolutely necessary. I cannot imagine anything more serious to the manufactures of the country than that 4,300 drag-nets, more or less, should be annually spread, every one of them curtailing to some extent the area of those manufactures, and every one of them exposing manufacturers to litigation, or, perhaps, to the payment of black-mail if they would escape the irksome process of litigation for an alleged infringement of patent-right.
  Now, my Lords, let me explain what Her Majesty's Government propose in the way of amendment of the Patent Laws. The present Commissioners of Patents are the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and the Law Officers of the Crown. The Act of 1852, which created the Commission, contemplated that other persons might be nominated by the Crown to act as Commissioners, but, as it appears, no other persons have been nominated. Now, my Lords, we propose to enlarge the composition of the Commission, not by the addition of paid Commissioners, but by the addition of unpaid Commissioners, who are not to be charged with the examination of details—that is provided for in another way—but who are to superintend the general arrangements of the Patent Office and the Patent Museum, and to define the regulations under which patents are to be applied for and granted. We propose that five other members—three on the nomination of the Board of Trade and two on the nomination of the Lord Chancellor—should be added to the Commission. We expect that men of scientific and manufacturing eminence will be found willing, as a mark of distinction, to serve
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  on the Commission and perform the duties that will be imposed on them. These duties will involve no great sacrifice of time, but the advice and assistance of such persons, conversant with manufactures and the arts, will be of much advantage to the country. In fact, it would be utterly impossible to secure the services of such persons as paid members. There are some men who would be very useful on the Commission, but whom no payment that could be offered to them would induce to resign the occupations in which they are engaged. Well, my Lords, that being the composition of the Patent Commission—very considerable authority will be given to the Commissioners in respect of the conditions on which patents are to be granted. We also propose that there should be attached to the Patent Office officers to be called "Examiners of Patents." The Bill provides that they shall not be fewer than two nor more than four in number. We propose that these Examiners, who are to be gentlemen with competent legal, and scientific knowledge, should give their whole time to the business of their office, and that their duty shall be to acquaint themselves, in the first instance, with the contents of the Patent Office, and all the documents in use in that Office. Then, my Lords, we propose that every application for a patent shall be accompanied by a specification which must describe, not provisionally and in general terms as at present, but as fully as the inventor can describe it, the nature of the invention. We propose that this specification shall be referred to one of the Examiners in conjunction with one or more Referees. We propose that there shall be a panel of these Referees prepared by the Board of Trade, and consisting of men generally skilled in arts, science, and manufactures, who, without giving up the whole of their time to such duties, may be ready to express an opinion on any particular application for a patent. The points to which their opinions will be directed are these:—Whether the invention is a proper subject for a patent within the Statute of Monopolies; whether the specification is sufficient; whether the invention, as far as can be judged from an examination of former specifications and other documents in the Patent Office—they are not to go further than docu-

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  ments enable them to go in this direction—is a new one; whether the invention is wholly or mainly a combination of some known machinery, processes or substances; whether by reason of its frivolous character or for any other reason the invention is unworthy of a patent; whether, in consideration of such combination as I have just alluded to, or because the invention is not of considerable importance, it is expedient that the duration of the patent shall be limited to 7 instead of 14 years. The reason of this is that there are a number of inventions, which though they must be classed as inventions do not amount to more than a combination of some machinery, or process, or substance already in use, and are not worthy of being put on a footing with the great inventions of the country. The opinion of the Examiners in conjunction with the Referees, and the application itself is to come before the Law Officers—because we propose that with the Law Officers shall still rest the responsibility of passing a patent, though they are to have the assistance I have described. If on these materials the Law Officers are of opinion that the patent should be granted it will be granted as at present; but with this condition—that the patent will not be sealed for six months from the first application, and that in the meanwhile any person who may have objection to the granting of the patent may have the opportunity of making his objection, and there will be an appeal from the Law Officers to the Lord Chancellor or one of the officers of the High Court of Justice, to be named for hearing such appeals by the Lord Chancellor. If the Law Officers refuse the application for the patent the applicant will have the opportunity for appeal in the same way; and so also in reference to the question whether the patent shall be for 7 or 14 years in the first instance. There will be a third appeal—one in case the patent has been granted for only seven years; but we propose that in this case there should be no appeal in the first instance, and for this reason—because, whether the patent should be extended to 14 years may depend upon experience gained in the actual working of the invention. But at a certain time before the expiration of the seven years, application may be made with the light of that experi-
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  ence for an extension of the patent to 14 years. These are the proposals of the Bill with regard to the preliminary examination and granting of patents.
  I have told your Lordships that in the first instance the inventor is to make his specification as full as possible; but there will be allowed a term for provisional, as distinguished from complete specifications. Your Lordships will readily understand that experiments made within six months may lead to a considerable expansion of the specification. We, therefore, propose that the applicant should have power to amend his specification before the time of the sealing of the instrument; but the amendment must be made under the control of the Law Officers, who will refuse to allow it if it be any improper extension of the invention, or material departure from the original specification. It is also proposed that even after the patent is sealed there shall be a right of amendment, in order that any technical difficulty may be obviated. There will also be in the Bill a provision for disclaimers. Then how do we deal with the question of prolongation? Your Lordships may be aware that under the present system the owner of a patent may apply to Her Majesty in Council for an extension of the patent beyond the term of 14 years, for 7 years, or even for another 14 years. It has been much debated whether that is a wise provision in the law. The Royal Commission which reported in 1865 stated that in the opinion of the Commissioners no such prolongation ought to be allowed. And, my Lords, it appears to me that the objections to a prolongation are very serious. In the first place, it is very difficult to lay down the principle on which a patent should be prolonged. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have endeavoured to define it, and I know it has been held by them that the patent should be a meritorious one, and that the case should be one in which the inventor had not been sufficiently rewarded. But who are to be the judges whether the invention is so meritorious as to deserve prolongation? One Judge, or one body of Judges, may think an invention very meritorious and deserving of prolongation, while another Judge or another body of Judges might be of the contrary opinion. Again, who is to tell whether the patent has sufficiently rewarded the

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  inventor or not? I am afraid that in practice the result of holding out the expectation that the patent will be prolonged if the patentee has not been sufficiently rewarded is that if the patentee has not made much during the first 10 years of his patent, he takes good care during the nest two or three years not to do anything which may alter that state of things—the doctrine acts as a premium on inertness during the last two or three years of a patent; and can your Lordships imagine anything more calculated to unsettle the trade of the country than this? Here is a patent which, perhaps, deeply interests many of the manufacturers of the country, because, as long as it exists, no one but the patentee can use the invention. The patent is about to terminate, and a number of manufacturers would erect buildings and extend their machinery in order to work the invention; but they are afraid to do so because there may be a prolongation of the patent, which would render all their additional buildings and their extended machinery useless. The consequence is that during the later years of a patent trade becomes paralyzed in respect of that particular article. There is another practical objection to prolongation, though not, perhaps, so formidable a one as that to which I have just alluded. It appears to me that this system of prolongation is a violation of the contract made between the inventor and the State. The granting of a patent is justifiable only on the ground of expediency. The State says to the inventor—"If you have applied your ingenuity to this particular invention, and will explain how it is to be carried into effect, we will give you a monopoly of it for 14 years." The inventor is willing to take the monopoly on those terms, and work his invention. If, after the 14 years have expired, you prolong the monopoly, you give the inventor what he never bargained for. On those grounds the Government are of opinion that the recommendation of the Royal Commission should be acted upon, and that there should be no prolongations of patents beyond the 14 years for which they are granted.
  I now come to a question of deep interest, and one surrounded with difficulty—I mean the subject of licences. Those who are for maintaining the Patent Laws think, nevertheless, that something ought
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  to be done in regard to granting licences under patents; and those who are opposed to these laws think that if they are to be maintained, the granting of licences should be compulsory. I know there is an objection taken to this by those who say, with some show of plausibility—"What right have you to dictate to a man what he shall do with his own property?" But I think there is a fallacy in that. If you give a patent right to an inventor, unaccompanied by any condition, nothing can be more unjust than to annex a condition subsequently: but a patentee has no right to prevent any other person from using his invention, except that which the State confers on him; and the whole question is—On what terms should you confer that right on him? If the State thinks proper to make a stipulation at the time it confers that right, I do not see how any argument based on the violation of property can effect that stipulation; and I believe that a condition of this kind is by no means new, because in Letters Patent now granted the patentee and his executors and administrators are bound to supply, or cause to be supplied, for Her Majesty's service all such articles of the invention as they may be required to supply by the officers or commissioners administering the Department of the service for the use of which the same shall be required. We know that within the last few weeks the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in prolonging the patent of Mr. Henry for rifle barrels, annexed this condition to the prolongation, that these barrels or arms should be supplied to any person who might require them. Now, my Lords, let me ask your attention to what is thought of this question by those who are really the best competent to judge of the feeling of manufacturers upon the subject. The Royal Commissioners considered the matter, and stated the arguments on the one side and on the other, and took a great deal of evidence in reference to it; but the Commissioners did not arrive at a conclusion that they could recommend any compulsory system of licensing. The Select Committee of the House of Commons came to an opinion upon the point. The Committee was a strong one—and I observe that there were upon it many Members who were interested in manufactures, and one who was opposed to the granting of

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  patents. They came to the conclusion that all Letters Patent should have the following conditions inserted in them:—That the manufacture should be carried into operation within a reasonable time within the United Kingdom, so as to supply the demand for the article upon reasonable terms; that licences should be granted by the patentee on fair conditions, such conditions to be determined in the event of disagreement by the Commissioners, due regard being had to the exigencies of foreign competition. I find that the same subject was considered in a very interesting debate at the Vienna International Congress, and a Resolution to the same effect as that to which I have just referred in favour of licences was come to by a majority of 42 as against 17. Well, that being the state of things, I think your Lordships will not fail to observe that it shows that the desire for a provision of this kind comes from the very persons from whom you might have expected opposition, if opposition were to arise. If your Lordships consider the question of licences, I think you will arrive at the conclusion that there may be a considerable difference between one kind of invention and another as regards the subject of requiring licences to be granted. It may well be that the manufacturer of a particular patented article could manufacture that article to such an extent and in such quantities as to supply the whole community, and without any interruption of trade arising from any want of supply. But it is altogether different when the patented invention is part of a process. Let me illustrate what I mean by a reference to a patent of that kind. Your Lordships probably observed, as I did the other day, in one of the ordinary sources of information, mention made as to a discovery in the manufacture of glass. The discovery was said to have been made by a person who was not a glass manufacturer;—and I believe few of those discoveries are made by persons in the trade or art itself. A farmer found out that glass could be made much less brittle in the course of its manufacture by cooling it in oil in place of water, and the consequence, it is said, is that glass can be manufactured much more tough or less brittle than it was before. Now, assuming that to be so—I do not know whether it is or not—and a patent taken
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  out for an invention of that kind, what would be the consequences? It is an invention connected with a process in a particular trade carried on in all parts of the country. If such an invention were made and were found to be as valuable as is suggested, the consequence would be that practically no person would desire to have glass of any other manufacture, and yet no one manufacturer could possibly supply the whole country. Not only that, but if he were able to do so it would suspend the operations of the whole glass manufactories throughout the country—assuming that the patentee insisted on manufacturing himself, and refused to grant licences for the use of the process. That is a case in which a whole trade would be injured and crippled if licences to use the invention were not granted. These considerations, my Lords, have led us to the conclusion that the recommendation which has been made ought to be acceded to; and we propose that there should be a condition upon all patents granted after the commencement of the Act, in consequence of which they should be liable at any time after the expiration of two years from their date to be recalled upon either of two grounds—either that the patentee fails to use or put in practice, either by himself or his licencees in this country, the patented article to a reasonable extent—proof to the contrary lying on him—so that the patent may not lie dormant, unused, and unexercised, or be a patent which, having been taken out here, he puts in practice abroad; and, secondly, if it is made to appear to the Tribunal that in order to insure a proper supply of the article to the public, or proper means for using the invention by the public licences are necessary, and the patentee fails to grant licences on terms which the Tribunal under all the circumstances may think reasonable. I am aware that that provision casts upon the Tribunal a task of some difficulty—namely, the ascertaining of what are reasonable terms; but persons best competent to judge of that matter are of opinion that it is a difficulty which can be surmounted, and that if we provide a system of licences it will go far to remove one of the present objections to the granting of patents.
  I pass now, my Lords, to a proposal which relates to the form in which patents can be revoked or recalled. At

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  present that can only be clone by a cumbrous process, and a worthless patent may be used for the purpose of extortion or embarrassment. We propose to substitute for the present dilatory and cumbrous proceeding by which alone it can be recalled, a petition to the Lord Chancellor upon any of the grounds on which petitions can at present be revoked—want of knowledge, want of utility, or upon the two special grounds I have referred to—which special grounds cannot, however, be alleged until the expiration of two years from the granting of the patent.
  I now, my Lords, come to another subject, one of some difficulty and great interest. I mean the question of foreign inventions, and what is to be done with them in this country. The theory of the Statute of Monopolies and the construction put upon it was this:—There are to be no patents except for new manufactures within this realm. In the construction of that statute it has been held to be the law that any manufacture brought or introduced into this realm, if it was not used here before, was new within the realm, and that the person holding it was the inventor. So that if one of your Lordships in the course of foreign travel saw any machine or process which you had reason to believe was new, you might on your return to this country describe the nature of the invention, and would be entitled to receive a patent in respect of it. There is no doubt that in old times, when travel was not common and when intercourse between countries was not large, it was a very good thing to induce or bribe persons to discover what was being done in other countries and to bring home the result; but I think your Lordships will be of opinion that there is not much necessity for that kind of incentive to discovery in the present day—we know very well what is done in that way in other countries. The evil of the system is this:—There has arisen under the doctrine of law I have referred to this state of things—perhaps I ought not to say that it is actually done, for I might be called upon for distinct proofs, but I will, at all events, say it is supposed to be done and may be done. It may be that there are persons, agents of people in this country, who in foreign countries are on the watch for new inventions and discoveries for which patents are about
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  to be applied; they learn the nature of them, and by telegraph or post transmit the particulars to their principals here, who, to use a common expression, "snap" the patent here before the real inventor can come over here and obtain one for himself. And, again, there are persons on the watch for the publication of patents abroad, and if any person has taken out a patent in the United States, or France, or Germany, and has not taken the precaution at the same time to apply for a patent here, some of those agents transmit the account of the invention home as quickly as possible, and a patent is thus obtained for it in this country. The consequence is, I find, that in 1872 no less than 890 patents were granted in this country to persons who, on the face of their applications, profess that they were communications from abroad; and in the year 1873 there were 870 applications of this kind. Upon this subject we have an almost perfect unanimity of opinion. The Royal Commission express an unanimous opinion that these communications should not be made the subject of future patents. The Committee of the House of Commons express a similar opinion. The International Congress of Vienna were of the same opinion: and so far as I know every country that grants patents, except our own, declines to grant patents for foreign inventions, except to the foreign patentees. We have, indeed, a provision in our law that if a patent is taken out here for any invention which forms the subject of a patent in a foreign country that patent must fall as soon as the foreign patent expires. But we propose that no patent should be granted in future for a communicated invention, and that if a patent has been granted for a foreign invention it should not be granted here except to the inventor himself, and not to him unless he applies for it within a limited time in this country. This change will, I think, commend itself to your Lordships upon every ground of fairness and equity. There is a theory which has spread a little abroad, and has been brought before me by deputations—some persons are calling out for an "international" system of patent rights. I do not myself understand, and I am not sure that these persons understand, what is meant by that phrase. There appears to be some idea that, if a foreign country

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  should issue a particular patent, the title should be communicated and should be received by other countries, and that the patentee should then be entitled to an absolute monopoly in every other country. That, however, would be absolutely impossible. A patent must be granted in any country with regard to the novelty of its invention in that country. But suppose this country granted a patent, could we undertake to say that the invention was a novelty in Russia, in Germany, or in the United States? And if this country took upon itself to determine that the invention was a novelty in those countries, is there any chance that those countries would accept our decision? That is the view taken of patents in all other countries. If it were once held that a patent should pass through all other countries and become a monopoly in all those countries, there could be no more fatal gift to any inventor, because he would have to show before the patent would be granted that his invention was not only new in this country, but new in all other parts of the world—which it would be impossible for anyone to do. If, however, it is meant that all civilized countries are to be invited to grant patents on similar terms, and that the procedure is to be assimilated in all countries, that may be a practicable or possible thing, although it does not concern us much on what terms other countries may grant patents.
  I now pass from the subject of foreign inventions. I regret to detain your Lordships at such length, yet the subject is of interest to so many persons that I do not like to omit anything essential. I now come to ask your Lordships to observe what we propose to do in a matter of considerable interest, and that is the position of the Crown in this country in regard to patent rights. The history of the position of the Crown on this subject is a very curious one. I was too much accustomed when at the Bar to deal with patent cases to have any doubt whether this was an open question. In every patent that is issued it is said that the patent shall be void unless the patentee agrees to supply all that might be wanted for the service of the Crown. "What is the meaning of that proviso if the Crown is free to use the subject of the invention without remonstrance on the part of the patentee? The Crown, however, found itself so hampered with the claims made
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  by inventors for inventions of very little merit, that they determined eight or nine years ago to try this question. The Court of Queen's Bench thereupon decided that the Crown was not bound by Letters Patent, and that the Crown was free to use any invention which was useful to any Department of the public service. That must be assumed to be good law: but the effect of such a decision is very serious. I will take inventions relating to ordnance, to great guns or ammunition. These are inventions in regard to which the only possible customer is the Crown—there is no one else in this country who wants such articles; and therefore it is merely a question whether the inventor shall apply to the Crown in this country or apply to foreign Governments. If you make it absolutely useless to take out patents here for inventions of that kind, you drive an inventor to conceal his invention in this country and to take it to a foreign country where he may get some reward for it. The policy of such a law may well be doubted. But, on the other hand, I am fully alive to the importance of the Crown being enabled to avail itself of any inventions necessary for the service of the country, free and untrammelled by delay arising from claims that may be unfounded. The obligation of the Crown to provide for the defence of the country is so paramount that if it were necessary that litigation should be settled before the invention were used, the State might be so hampered that serious injury might be done to the public service. Under these circumstances, what ought to be done?—because the state of the law is such that it can hardly be left in its present condition. The Royal Commission took evidence both as to the Army and Navy, and their recommendation was this—
  "That in all patents hereafter to he granted, a proviso shall be inserted to the effect that the Crown shall have the power to use any invention therein patented without previous licence or consent of the patentee, subject to the payment of a sum to he fixed by the Treasury."
  I observe that the Gentleman who represented the War Office before the Royal Commission gave it as his opinion that such compensation as the patentee might claim should be settled by the Treasury. We propose to adopt that course, and to provide that there shall be no general exception on the part of the Crown from

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  the obligations of patents; but that, on the other hand, any Department of the public service shall be at liberty to use an invention on terms which, if they cannot be arranged between the Department and the patentee, shall be settled by the Treasury.
  There is another subject of considerable importance—I mean the expense of obtaining patents. There has been a demand for lowering the fees on pa tents—which your Lordships will remember I stated to be £5 at first, £20 at the end of six months, £50 at the end of the third year, and £100 at the end of the seventh year. The testimony against reducing the fees appears to me to be overwhelming. The intervals afford opportunities to patentees to consider whether it is worth while to continue their patents or not. If a patent has run two or three years, and it is worth while to continue it, it is also worth while paying what is required. If a patent runs for seven years, no doubt it is worth even the larger fee required. The testimony against reducing the patent fees appears to me to be overwhelming. While the Royal Commissioners differed in their opinions on some points, they expressed a unanimous opinion on this, and they said they did not find the cost excessive, nor the method of payment inconvenient, but they recommended that patent fees should not be made to contribute to the general expenditure of the State until every reasonable requirement of the Patent Office has been satisfied. The Committee of the House of Commons must be taken to have been of the same opinion. There was a division in the Committee on a Motion made to this effect—that the cost of obtaining patents was needlessly high, and the division was 8 against and 3 for the Motion. It is customary with inventors and manufacturers in this country to refer to the example of the United States. I have been told that there the system is very much better than ours, and that we should endeavour if possible to conform ours to it; particularly in two features—it is said that the cost of obtaining patents is much less there than here, and that in the United States there is an efficient staff to conduct examinations previously to the granting of patents. I quite agree that the United States has a very remarkable staff in-
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  deed; and your Lordships may be interested to hear something about it. I have here the Act of Congress, by which it is enacted that the officers and employés of the Patent Office shall consist of one Commissioner of Patents, one Assistant Commissioner, and three Examiners-in-Chief, to be appointed by the President; 1 chief clerk, 1 Examiner in charge of interferences, 22 Principal Examiners, 22 first Assistant Examiners, 22 second Assistant Examiners, 1 Librarian, 1 machinist, 5 clerks of class four, 6 of class three, 50 of class two, 45 of class one, and 1 messenger and purchasing clerk; and besides these, the Secretary may appoint such additional clerks of classes two and one, copyists of drawings, female copyists, skilled labourers, labourers, and watchmen as may from time to time be required. I cannot at all aspire to a staff of that kind, and those who expect us to imitate the United States' Patent Office in this respect must be disappointed. Your Lordships will be surprised to hear the number of patents issued by the United States. I said that we must be an inventive people when we registered 4,300 patents yearly; but in the United States there are yearly 18,000 applications, and of these 13,000 are granted. The United States' tariff for patents seems to consist of many different items, so that it sometimes takes 15 or 16 American patents to cover an invention that would be covered by one English patent. Take, for instance, Mr. Saxby's interlocking signal; it is said that 14 American patents would be required for it:—so that we must not be led away by what appears to be the expense of granting only one patent in the United States. What is the result of the system in the United States? Is it so very excellent? Does the employment of such a large staff, and the adoption of such a prolific system of granting patents work advantageously? One of the Commissioners, in his last Report says, that each Examiner in charge of a class now works entirely without supervision, and the result is that very many applications are hastily and carelessly examined. In 1871, a patent was granted for packing ground hops in air-tight cases. Airtight eases are not a new invention; and the Commissioner says—"Why such a patent was granted is beyond my comprehension. A mere child could put anything in a bottle, and cover the cork

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  with sealing wax." Another patent was granted for making shovels of cast iron;—surely that is not new. The Commissioner says—"It is a matter of astonishment to me that such patents are ever granted, and of greater astonishment that extensions are favourably reported upon by the Examiner." These are examples of the kind of patents granted under this system, which is so much commended. And observe what occurs under the system. Your Lordships will have experienced the inconvenience of opening envelopes fastened with a seal; an ingenious American took out a patent for attaching a short string to the corner, by means of which the envelope may be torn open. I have seen cartridges made upon that plan before; still it is a device which it is thought worth while to patent in America. But invention did not stop there; another man, of whose ingenuity it is impossible to speak too highly, took out a patent for tying a knot at the end of the string hanging out of the envelope. As against the system of granting patents in America, and the consequences of it, I think the recommendations of the Royal Commission proceed upon the true ground. The fees which we have now are not too high. I hope Parliament will also be of opinion that they ought not to be made a source of revenue to the country, or that, at all events, they should, in the first instance, be appropriated to the maintenance of a proper Patent Office and Museum. The first demand upon the fees should be for a Museum of Patents. I am bound to say that from all I have heard of the Patent Museum at Washington, it furnishes an example we may well imitate. I believe that both the building and the arrangement of the contents are worthy of the highest praise, and I am sorry to think that at present we can have very little chance of competing with it. I would speak in the highest terms of the arrangement of the Patent Office in Southampton Buildings, and of the accommodation which is provided there in the way of indices, and a library and reading-room; but when I turn to the Patent Museum at South Kensington, I look with astonishment on our position. The last Report of the Royal Commission sets out a Memorial to the Treasury, presented in 1858, to which is attached my name as one of the Law Officers of
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  the Crown and one of the Commissioners of Patents. The Memorial enters largely into the necessity for proper accommodation for the Patent Museum; it sets forth that it is necessary to have a new building to house models of inventions which are lying scattered over the country, which have been constructed at great expense for legal and other purposes, for which the owners have no present use, and which they would gladly give to the nation if arrangements were made for placing them so that the public could have free and constant access to them. The Memorial further suggested the appropriation of a site at South Kensington. Your Lordships will agree it is important that a Patent Museum should be put upon the best possible footing. I believe nothing can be more conducive to the technical instruction of the people of this country than presenting them with a well-arranged museum of patent models to which they can have proper access, with proper explanations, so that they may be able to trace the progress of manufactures with reference both to patented inventions and to applications that were not granted. The Memorial of 1858 has not been acted upon to this day. What we call a Patent Museum is really a patent warehouse; there is a store in the South Kensington Museum, where there is no room, where there is no light, where there is no arrangement, and where no person can examine a model—and that is termed a Patent Museum. I am happy to be able to inform your Lordships that within the last few days arrangements have been made by the Treasury for obtaining adequate space in the building immediately behind the site on which the Natural History Museum is being erected, and here the models now in the possession of the Patent Commissioners may be arranged and exhibited in such a way that the public can have convenient access to them.
  Your Lordships are aware how closely related is the subject of patents with the subject of the copyright of designs. The system of copyright of designs has hitherto been under the management of the Board of Trade. The arrangement now made is to transfer it to the Patent Commissioners. It will be more properly under their care, and considerable compression can then be made in the staff of the two Departments. In ad-

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  dition to that, there is a subject which has occupied the attention of Parliament—I moan the registration of trade marks. At different times, measures on that subject have been produced; but it has now become peculiarly pressing for a particular reason—one foreign country at least—Germany—I am told has declined to give protection in its Courts to English trade marks, unless those seeking protection can show that their trade marks have been registered in this country, and thus acquired a status and authority they can recognize. Manufacturers are much alarmed at this, and call loudly for a system of registration of trade marks. A Bill will be introduced by the Board of Trade in the other House for the registration of trade marks; and, if passed, the registration of trade marks will be placed under the Commissioners for the Registration of Patents. I will only add that if your Lordships approve the Bill which I now lay on the Table, and pass it into law, it will produce this further advantage—it sweeps away every other statute on the subject of patents, except that all-sacred clause in the Act of Monopolies, which no person would have the courage to interfere with; and, in the four corners of this measure will be contained the whole law on the subject of Patents. My Lords, I beg leave to move that the Bill be now read a first time.
  Bill for consolidating with Amendments the Acts relating to Letters Patent for Inventions presented by the Lord Chancellor.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, after the remarkable speech we have just heard, I wish to say one or two words. I think all your Lordships must feel grateful to the noble and learned Lord for having introduced so early a Bill concerning which no party feeling can exist, gone so thoroughly into the whole of this important subject, and given a description so singularly lucid of the state of the law, and particularly of past legislation on the matter. I must also acknowledge the moderation—I may say, the judicial character—of his summary of the opinions of different parties with regard to the principles and application of the Patent Law. The noble and learned Lord has given so clear a statement of the contents of the Bill that probably we shall not have much to learn from
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  reading it. So far as I apprehend, the chief points are these—the Bill provides that there shall be a sufficient examination of patents before being granted; and this will be done by the addition of five unpaid Commissioners, by the appointment of two, three, or four paid Examiners and a certain number of Referees—I do not think the noble and learned Lord stated the number, and whether they will be paid or not.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: They are unlimited.
  EARL GRANVILLE: It provides for complete and defined specifications, their being subject to the criticism of the public before the patent is valid. And it simplifies the appeal in either case of the grant or rejection of a patent. It also puts an end to the introduction of patents in this country for inventions already in operation in other places, and it prohibits the prolongation of patents beyond 14 years. It provides for a system of compulsory licenses. The provision also of a proper place and building as a Patent Museum is a most important object. I do not mean now to make any remarks on the Bill; but I take this opportunity of saying that it is a matter which I trust will be fully discussed in this House. The noble and learned Lord referred to two or three Blue Books on the subject;—I may mention the evidence taken before the Committee of your Lordships' House in 1851 as also worthy of reference; and I would take leave to suggest that the noble and learned Lord would consider before the second reading whether it would not be well to send the Bill to a Select Committee, not for the purpose of delay, but solely with a view to arrive at sound conclusions on the subject.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, that at any rate the speech of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had completely established one fact—that the present Patent Law ought not and could not be maintained. But while that was evident, it was by no means equally clear that the law on so difficult and complicated a subject could be easily settled and to the satisfaction of so many conflicting opinions. He would defer any general observations on the Bill till the second reading—lie would only say now, that if they were going to make a Patent Museum he did not see why, instead of

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  accumulating everything of the kind at South Kensington it should not be placed at Manchester or Birmingham, or some great inventive, industrial, and manufacturing centre where it would be readily accessible to those engaged in the arts and manufactures of the country. Their Lordships, he was sure, were grateful to the noble and learned Lord for all he had stated to them; but there were some points on which he might wish further explanation. A man thought he had an idea and he must take out a patent, not for anything he had made or done, but for an idea. When he was at the Admiralty an inventor claimed a patent, and his specification included the use of various materials, such as cork, india-rubber, in connection with iron for the construction of ships, but he had made nothing. It was only by the intervention of the Law Officers that that unreasonable claim was set aside. The person who invented those little perforations which separate postage-stamps went to the House of Commons, and a Committee gave him £2,000 instead of a patent. An ingenious gentleman soon afterwards came to him and suggested that instead of round perforations they should be made oval in form, which he thought would be much more convenient. He recommended him to go to the House of Commons, who would no doubt reward him for his ingenuity. The patent screw-pro-poller was at first square at the corner, but it occurred to an ingenious person that the corner might be cut off, and for that he obtained a patent. So it would be constantly. What he desired to press was that a patent should be granted not for anything that existed in idea only, but for something actually done and workable. He was afraid the noble and learned Lord's experts would not answer the purpose. The difficulty was to find men who could judge of a patent beforehand.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in reply, said, that to grant a patent for an idea would be quite absurd, and one of the duties of the Examiners would be to ascertain whether the invention for which the patent was sought came within the subject-matter of the Statute of Monopolies—which clearly an idea could not do. Besides, the patent might be repealed if it were not brought into use within a given number of years
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  after it was granted. The noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) had said that the Referees would not be able to judge whether an invention would be useful to the world or not. That was one of the things which they would not have to judge. He had carefully excluded the question of utility, because nothing but experience could decide whether a thing would prove useful or not. With regard to the question of the experts, to which the noble Duke also referred, what he proposed was that there should be a list prepared with the assistance of the Board of Trade, and re-settled every two years; that this list should be divided into panels, consisting of persons versed in some branch of science—some in chemistry, some in physics, and some in mechanics—and that along with the Examiners to whom the question of the patent was referred should be associated pro hâc vice one or two out of those panels who should be paid, not by salaries, but for the particular service on which they were engaged. The manner in which they would be selected would be determined by rules.
  Bill read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2a on Friday the 26th instant. (No. 15.)

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (CAISTER, &C.) BILL [H.L.]
A Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Education Department under "The Elementary Education Act, 1870," to enable the School Boards for Caister, Norfolk, and Rochford, Kent, to put in force "The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845," and the Acts amending the same—Was presented by The LORD PRESIDENT; read 1a. (No. 14).
House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.