Sitting of 8 July 1873

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Report—Noxious Businesses [No. 284]; Game Laws [No. 285].
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 2)* [229].
Committee—Supreme Court of Judicature [154]—R.P.; Military Manœuvres* [215]—R.P.; Public Health [113]—R.P.
Considered as amended—Militia (Service, &c.)* [216]; Tramways Provisional Orders Confirmation* [218].
Third Reading—Highland Schools (Scotland)* [202].
Withdrawn—Habitual Drunkards [11].
The House met at Two of the clock.

INDIA—THE FOREST DEPARTMENT—COMPETITIONS.—QUESTION.
Mr. RAIKESasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether it is the fact that the offer of five or more posts in the service of the Forest Department in India for public competition in November next, which was contained in the prospectuses issued in July 1872 and March 1873, has been cancelled since the terms were publicly announced, and the number of such posts reduced to two; whether it is not the fact that, after the next appointments are made, the maximum of age in candidates competing for such posts is to be reduced from twenty-three to twenty-two years; whether the Secretary of State for India has considered the great hardship inflicted on those who have devoted some months to qualify themselves for an examination from which they will probably be excluded; and, whether he will not take steps to remedy the injury thus inflicted on young men desirous of entering the public service by reverting to the offer of a number of posts, not less than four and perhaps six, contained in the prospectus of March last?
MR. GRANT DUFF: In answer, Sir, to the hon. Gentleman's first Question, I have to say that it would appear that some of the prospectuses alluded to, but only a few, were issued without the lines specifying the number of appointments having been struck out. In reply to his second Question, I have to answer "Yes;" and to add that, eventually, the maximum age will be reduced to 20.
36
In reply to his third Question, I have to say that I do not see that there is any hardship, notice having been given so long beforehand, and every candidate having been warned in the published paper of particulars that the regulations were liable to alteration in future years. In reply to his fourth Question, I have to say that the Government of India has informed us that only two Forest officers for 1873 are wanted, and I am sure the hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be quite outrageous deliberately to create two or four useless appointments merely for the convenience of young men. It ought to be remembered that this Forest service is quite a new service, and that, till we have more experience of its working, changes with regard to the age and qualifications of candidates are, I fear, inevitable.

THE TICHBORNE CASE—THE QUEEN v. CASTRO.—QUESTION.
MR. WHALLEYasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, with reference to the Tichborne prosecution, Whether he has taken any steps with a view to detect and punish the author of the letters which, in the course of the pending trial, have been recognized by the Court as forgeries; and, whether it is the fact that witnesses have been brought to London to identify the defendant as not being Roger Tichborne, and that on such witnesses declining to give evidence to that effect, they have been sent away and their expenses paid? The hon. Gentleman added that so far as the question contained a statement of fact, that statement was made upon the very best information that the case admitted of, and he believed it to be true.
MR. BRUCE: I trust, Sir, that my hon. Friend will acquit me of any intentional disrespect to him when I say that I decline answering his Questions. I do not presume to scrutinize the intention of my hon. Friend in asking these Questions; but their effect is obviously to throw doubt and suspicion on the manner in which this prosecution is conducted, and so to influence the pending trial, and I altogether decline to contribute to any such result.

THE ORDNANCE SURVEY.—QUESTION.
MR. WHALLEYasked the First Commisioner of Works, with reference

37
to the Ordnance Survey, To state the reasons why the progress of this work is stopped at the borders of Montgomeryshire and the staff transferred to Staffordshire; and, what are the claims of Staffordshire to precedence under the circumstances?
MR. AYRTON,in reply, said, he had more than once explained to the House that this Survey was being conducted upon certain principles which were easily understood—namely, that it should first he completed in those parts of the country where industry was most active and where there was the greatest necessity for it. This was the reason why Staffordshire was preferred to Montgomeryshire, Staffordshire being a mining district, where it was of importance that the Survey should be soon finished?

PARLIAMENT—QUESTIONS—RULES OF THE HOUSE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE: I beg, Sir, to ask your opinion upon a question of Order. I placed a Notice of a Question upon the Paper which I find has been so altered by the Clerk as to remove all meaning and justification of the interrogation I desire to put. As it is printed, the Question stands thus—To ask the Secretary of State for War, If it is in contemplation to purchase additional accommodation for the War Department in Pall Mall, or if it is intended to erect a suitable edifice for the concentration of the War Department? Now, as I wrote out the Question, I distinctly stated that I wished to know whether it was the intention of the Government to perpetuate a state of things, in the shape of office accommodation, which the War Secretary himself had acknowledged to be most inconvenient. I wish, Sir, to know whether it is in accordance with precedent that Notices of Questions should be thus altered?
  MR. SPEAKER: One of the established Rules of the House with reference to Questions is that no argumentative matter should be introduced; and, if such matter appears, it is always by my authority struck out of the Question. It is on this ground, and on this ground only, that the Question of the hon. Member has been altered.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE: In that case, Sir, I beg to put the Question in the shape in which it appears on the Notice Paper.
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN,in reply, said, that a Bill providing for the erection of buildings suitable for the concentration of the various branches of the War Office was introduced early this Session, but that it had not been proceeded with. It was still the intention of the Government to erect such a building as that specified in the Bill; but in the meantime, any additional accommodation which might be required would be obtained by hiring, and it was not intended to purchase any additional accommodation in Pall Mall.

PARLIAMENT—RULES AND ORDERS OF THE HOUSE.

  CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1871.—QUESTION.
  MR. MONCKTONwished to put a Question to the Speaker on a point of Order. The hon. Member for Nottingham (Mr. Auberon Herbert) had a Notice on the Paper for that night to call attention to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871, and to move a Resolution declaring the desirability of repealing that Act. But there was a Bill upon the same subject put down for a second reading to-morrow, and, that being so, he wished to ask if the Motion of the hon. Member for Nottingham was in conformity with the Rules of the House?
  MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member for Nottingham has given a Notice of Motion for this evening in the following terms:—
  "To call attention to the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871, and to move, That, in the opinion of this House, it is desirable to repeal this Act."
  There is now before this House a Bill to repeal the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871, which the House has ordered to be taken into consideration on the second reading to-morrow. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the hon. Member for Nottingham will be out of Order in moving his Resolution this evening, seeing that the matter is already before the House.

  SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE BILL—(Lords.)— [BILL 154].
  (Mr. Attorney General.)

  COMMITTEE. [Progress 7th July.]
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)

  PART III.
  Sittings and Distribution of Business.
  Clause 31 (Assignment of certain business to particular Divisions of High Court subject to Rules).
  Amendment proposed, in page 20, line 34, to leave out the words "and the London Court of Bankruptcy respectively."—(Mr. Attorney General.)
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he found by consultation with the highest authority that by withdrawing the Amendment—should the Committee assent to it—the clause might be postponed. He was willing, with the assent of hon. Gentleman, that that course should be adopted.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause postponed.
  Clause 32 (Option for any Plaintiff (subject to Rules) to choose in what Division he will sue) agreed to.
  Clause 33 (Power of transfer) agreed to.
  Clause 34 (Sittings in London and Middlesex and on Circuits) agreed to.
  Clause 35 (Rota of Judges for election petitions) agreed to.
  Clause 36 (Powers of one or more Judges not constituting a Divisional Court).
  MR. VERNON HARCOURTmoved, at end of clause, to add—
  "And within twelve months after the passing of this Act rules of court shall be made defining what proceeding, causes, or matters shall be deemed proper to be heard by a single judge."
  THE SOLICITOR GENERALagreed in the spirit of the proposal; but he hoped the Amendment would not be pressed, as it was quite intended such rules should be made.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 37 (Divisional Courts of the High Court of Justice) agreed to.
  Clause 38 (Divisional Courts for business of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer Divisions) agreed to.
  Clause 39 (Distribution of business among the Judges of the Chancery and Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divisions of the High Court).
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALmoved in page 24, line 35, to leave out "the London Court of Bankruptcy."
  Amendment agreed to.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSsaid, this clause raised precisely the same question as had been raised last night. He asked that it be postponed.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALexplained that it did not raise precisely the same question.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 40 (Divisional Courts for business of the Chancery Division) agreed to.
  Clause 41 (Divisional Courts for business belonging to the Division) agreed to.
  Clause 42 (Appeals from Inferior Courts to be determined by Divisional Courts).
  MR. HENLEYexpressed a doubt whether "cases" sent up from Quarter Sessions would come under the term "appeals" provided for in this clause.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, both "cases" and "appeals" would come under the 13th section.
  MR. STAVELEY HILLregretted that provision had not been made in the clause for cheap and easy appeals from the County Courts. An appeal might be provided to the Court of Assize.
  MR. ASSHETON CROSSthought that such an appeal would be very inconvenient, as the Judges of Assize had already plenty to do.
  MR. VERNON HARCOURTjoined in the regret expressed by the hon. and learned Member (Mr. S. Hill.) It was quite clear that the present Bill must be followed by another measure localizing jurisdiction and improving the local administration of justice.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 43 (Cases and points may be reserved for or directed to be argued before Divisional Courts) agreed to.
  Clause 44 (Provision for Crown Cases reserved).
  MR. VERNON HARCOURTmoved, in page 26, at end to add, as fresh paragraphs—
  "Where a petition is presented to a principal Secretary of State praying for a remission, commutation, or alteration of a sentence passed upon a person upon conviction for any treason felony or misdemeanor, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty, if Her Majesty in Her discretion think fit, with the advice of a principal Secretary of State, to refer the matter of the petition to Her Majesty's Court of Appeal for their consideration and advice in the matter of the petition.
  "The Court to whom a petition or the case of any person is referred as aforesaid may in their discretion and with the consent of such person direct a new trial, either upon the same or upon a different indictment or information, and either for the same or for a different offence of which the person appears to the court to have been guilty, in such manner and upon such conditions (if any) as they think fit, and may order the person to be detained in custody pending such new trial or to be discharged upon such terms as to bail or otherwise as they think fit; and any new trial so ordered may be had in all respects as if the person had not been convicted upon the former trial, and no plea of autrefois convict shall be allowed in respect of his conviction upon such former trial.
  "Subject to any roles of court, petitions referred to the court under the provisions of this section shall be considered in such manner as the court may from time to time determine, either with or without hearing witnesses or arguments, and either in open court or otherwise."
  The hon. and learned Gentleman said, this Bill had dealt largely and he hoped efficiently with civil procedure; but it was remarkable that the Bill left our criminal procedure very much where it was. In questions of law affecting criminal trials it did not meet the justice of the case. Cases were constantly occuring of capital offences and sentences in which the public mind was so dissatisfied with the judgment given by the Judge and jury that in the absence of anything like a regular jurisdiction of appeal a most irregular appellate jurisdiction was created in the Home Secretary. Nobody was satisfied with the manner in which that appellate jurisdiction had arisen. A man was tried for his life and condemned to death. A Petition was sent to the Home Secretary, who had to review the sentence, not on any miscarriage of law, but on some allegation either that the facts at the trial were not accurately decided upon, or that the sentence was extreme. The Home Secretary had cast on him a most responsible and painful duty which he
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  had very little means of adequately discharging. He had to receive the statements of parties and come to a decision, which, in many cases, reversed the sentence of a responsible Judge and jury on what, after all, must be unsworn and only ex parte evidence. He had been strongly impressed with the mischief of this state of things by what had occurred in the case of Smethurst, which came under the consideration of his right hon. Friend the late Sir George Lewis. It was a case which depended on medical testimony, and the Judge and jury had come to the conclusion that the man was guilty, and he was sentenced to death. That sentence, however, was reversed on medical testimony tendered to the Home Secretary by other doctors of perhaps equal eminence, but whose evidence was unsworn. He did not propose to interfere in any way with the Prerogative of mercy; but in many cases where the Prerogative of the Crown was concerned, the Crown did not desire to be inops consilii. A great part of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council rested on the prerogative of advice from the Judicial Committee; and it was quite possible, without departing from the doctrine of Prerogative, for the Crown to obtain responsible advice in a manner more satisfactory than that of seeking it from the Executive Government. What he proposed was that Her Majesty might, at her discretion—it was not to be compulsory—refer the Petition of a person convicted of treason or felony to the Court of Appeal for consideration and advice. He believed that this course would relieve the Home Secretary from a painful responsibility by handing over to persons conversant with questions of this character the authority to recommend to the Crown the exercise of the Prerogative of mercy. His object was, not to limit the Prerogative of the Crown, but merely to secure that it should have competent advice. He knew that some of the most eminent of the Judges were favourable to a change of this character. For the present, he would be satisfied with an assurance that the matter would be considered between this time and the Report on the Bill. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by formally moving the first paragraph of his Amendment to carry out his views.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, the question was a most important one—indeed, one of the most serious that could be raised; but it was not germane, and ought not to be raised at this stage of the Bill. He would give to it the attention which its importance called for. As his hon. and learned Friend had mentioned Sir George Lewis, he would recommend him to read a speech by that distinguished man, made when he was Home Secretary, which was an exhaustive argument against the principle of the Amendment. He hoped his hon. and learned Friend would not at present press the matter further on the attention of the Committee.
  DR. BALLcalled attention to the State trials of O'Connell, Smith O'Brien, and Mills, and to the procedure in cases of the writ of error, as sued out in Ireland. In that country the initiative in State prosecutions was taken by the Attorney General; and he (Dr. Ball) was desirous to know whether, under this Supreme Court of Judicature Bill, the practice with regard to the writ of error in Ireland would continue as at present?
  MR. STAVELEY HILLconsidered the question, relating as it did to cases of criminal appeal, was a most important one, and thought that a clear explanation ought to be given to the question put to the Attorney General on the subject by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley). He was prepared to vote for the Amendment if his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Harcourt) went to a division.
  MR. BRISTOWEwas of opinion that in Crown Cases Reserved the questions in issue might be brought under the consideration of, and adjudicated upon by a smaller number of Judges than under the existing system was required to constitute the Tribunal of Appeal.
  MR. VERNON HARCOURTsaid, he could not agree with the Attorney General that this question was not germane to the case now under consideration. With regard to the question put by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), in reference to cases of criminal appeal, he considered it a most serious one, and hoped it would receive all the attention due to it.
  MR. BUTTreferred to the state of the law governing questions of appeal in cases of conspiracy, felony, and misdemeanour prior to Lord Campbell's Bill, and said, looking at the clause in the present Supreme Court of Judicature Bill, it was identical in its provisions and objects with Lord Campbell's Bill, which was a great improvement in the law on the question of appeal.
  DR. BALLconsidered the case a most important one, and suggested that a clause might be introduced on the Report to amend the Bill.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALagain intimated that the matter should receive consideration.
  MR. VERNON HARCOURTsaid, that, although he would not press the Amendment, he would take the opinion of the House upon it on the Report.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 45 (Motions for new trials to be heard by Divisional Courts).
  MR. MATTHEWScalled the attention of the Committee to the importance of the clause, and moved, in page 26, line 33, after "divisional court," to leave out to end of clause.
  MR. GREGORYsaid, from the clause, as it now stood, there was no appeal whatever. In his opinion, the words "and no appeal shall lie from any judgment," &c., ought to be struck out.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he would carefully consider the question raised.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 46 (What orders shall not be subject to appeal).
  MR. LOPESsaid, the word "procedure" admitted of very wide interpretation, such as discovery, interrogatories, &c., and suggested that it should be struck out.
  MR. MATTHEWSsaid, the word "practice" also admitted of wide and various interpretations, involving questions of costs, &c., and submitted that it, too, ought to be struck out.
  DR. BALLsaid, he would be contented with the clause if it were confined to a Divisional Court.
  MR. WATKIN WILLIAMSsaid, that as the law now stood a plaintiff

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  making affidavit might swear before a Judge in a private room that the defendant had no defence, and the Judge might issue execution and debar the defendant from adopting proceedings in his defence. If this clause passed with the words "practice" and "procedure" in it, there would be no appeal.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALintimated that the view taken of the clause was correct, and agreed to confine the application of the section to "costs" only.
  Amendment accordingly made.
  MR. WHALLEYmoved that the word "costs" should also be struck out.
  MR. LOPESobserved that as the Committee had already left out the words "practice" and "procedure" the clause would become altogether useless were the hon. Member's Amendment agreed to.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 47 (As to discharging orders made in Chambers) agreed to.
  Clause 48 (Provision for absence or vacancy in the office of a Judge).
  MR. AMPHLETTmoved, in page 27, line 13, leave out from "during" to "of any such judge," in line 16; in line 19, leave out "the judge so absent," and insert "any judge absent from illness or any other cause;" in same line, leave out "the" before "judge," at the end, and insert "any."
  Amendments agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 49 (Power of a single Judge in Court of Appeal) agreed to.
  Clause 50 (Divisional Courts of Court of Appeal).
  MR. GREGORYmoved, in page 27, line 32, after "either" leave out "by the whole Court or."
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALprotested against having to repeat all the arguments with which he had combated the Amendments on Clause 6. The Committee having passed Clause 6 had virtually passed this clause, which was its natural consequence.
  MR. WATKIN WILLIAMSsaid, the clause gave an intermediate appeal in cases of magnitude and difficulty, with-
  46
  out giving an absolute right of appeal in frivolous cases for the purposes of delay or of defeating justice. If an absolute right of an intermediate appeal was given all the inconveniences of the present system would be reproduced.
  MR. AMPHLETTcomplained that no answer had yet been given by the Law Officers of the Crown to the objections which had been urged as to the great evil that must arise from having several Final Courts of Appeal. What he should have liked to see established would be a Court of five of the first men that could be obtained as a Final Court of Appeal, and then to have an Intermediate Court of Appeal, consisting, say, of three Judges, with this restriction—that there should be no appeal from that Intermediate Court if it should agree with the Court below, at least in interlocutory matters. In the event of there not being an agreement with the Court below, the case in dispute might be heard by the full Court.
  MR. VERNON HARCOURTdenied that hon. Members by accepting the 6th clause were precluded from objecting to this one. On the contrary, he had agreed to Clause 6, with the avowed intention of raising the question of the judicial strength of the Court of Appeal on Clause 50. The proposal of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Amphlett) that a minimum of seven Judges should sit at the hearing of appeals might meet the difficulty, but then it would set up an Intermediate Court of Appeal, to which he objected. They had abolished the House of Lords, the Exchequer Chamber, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and they were now going to substitute for them a tribunal of three Puisne Judges. The thing was ridiculous. Under the clause, those three Judges, of whom they knew nothing, would have power to set aside a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, and by such Judges as Mr. Justice Blackburn. It would be most unwise and rash to sanction any such thing. He would not allow of there being more than two Divisions in the Court, and he would make the attendance of five Judges the minimum.
  MR. LOPESsaid, he was surprised to hear the Attorney General say that the Intermediate Court of Appeal had been conceded; because at an earlier stage of

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  the debate he had referred to the latter part of the 50th clause as already providing what was tantamount to an Intermediate Court of Appeal.
  MR. HINDE PALMERdenied that the Committee were precluded from considering this section, because they had, by accepting the 6th clause, settled the constitution of the Court of Appeal. He would suggest that the clause should not be confined, as it was at present, to re-hearing before decision, but that it should be extended to re-hearing after decision. No case ought, however, to be re-heard except within a specified time and with the consent of the Court itself.
  SIR RICHARD BAGGALLAYsaid, he thought that in certain cases there should be a re-hearing of an appeal. It was incorrect to speak of such a proposal as retaining the present system of intermediate appeal. A decision below might be reversed by the Appeal Court by a mere majority of three against two, or two against one; in such a case it should be subject to a re-hearing. He would propose to add at the end of the clause a Proviso that the judgment of a Divisional Court of Appeal, if all the Judges concurred in it, should be final; but that if there was only a majority, the aggrieved person should be entitled to have the case re-heard before an increased number of Judges.
  MR. OSBORNE MORGANadded his protest against the dictum laid down by the Attorney General that the Committee was precluded from considering the clause.
  MR. RATHBONEsaid, the commercial community were extremely anxious that there should not be in Common Law cases any intermediate appeal whatever.
  MR. JAMESsaid, he hoped the Committee would be able to see its way to supporting the Amendment which stood in the name of the hon. and learned Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Amphlett). A Court of Appeal which was not stronger in its constitution than the Court appealed from was no Appeal Court at all.
  MR. W. H. SMITH,as the representative of a commercial community, said, he hoped the suggestion of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Amphlett) would be adopted. If there was no appeal from the second tribunal a
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  strong feeling would prevail in the commercial community that wrong would be done. At the same time, he thought it would be a great mistake to overload the ultimate Appellate Court with business.
  MR. W. FOWLERobserved, that under the new system there would be the possibility of having three Appeal Courts deciding in three different ways, and that in such an event there ought to be a guarantee that the party aggrieved should have an opportunity of having the whole matter re-argued. He hoped the Government would yield to the Amendment.
  DR. BALLsaid, that all the Irish, Scotch, and ecclesiastical appeals would go to the new Court, and that this would render the Judges inadequate to their duties. He thought that the judgment below should not be reversed by a mere majority; but he would make a unanimous decision on appeal final.
  MR. LEEMAN,as a member of the lower branch of the legal profession, supported the Amendment before the Committee, on the ground that it would have a tendency to keep down the cost of legal proceedings, which gave an advantage to rich suitors as compared with poorer ones. The right of appeal was inherent in every subject of the realm, and he therefore objected to any proposal which would vest in the Judges the power to veto the right of appeal.
  MR. GREGORYbegged to withdraw the Amendment, in order that his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Amphlett) might move his.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. AMPHLETTsaid, he collected from the general expression of opinion that seven would be rather too many for a full Court. He should have no objection, therefore, to make the number five. He begged to propose, in page 27, line 32, to leave out "the whole Court," in order to insert "a full Court consisting of the whole or any number not less than five." And should this Amendment be carried, he proposed to move, in line 35, to leave out from "any appeal" to "direct," in line 38, in order to insert—
  "The judgment of a full Court shall in all cases be final; the judgment of a Divisional Court shall be final if it affirms the order appealed from, but in other cases any party ag-

  49
  grieved shall be entitled to have such appeal re-heard by a full Court."
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 27, line 32, to leave out the words "the whole court," in order to insert the words "a full court, consisting of the whole or any number not less than five."—(Mr. Amphlett.)
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of' the Clause."
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALobserved that what he said before, and what he would now repeat, was that the Committee in passing Clause 6 virtually settled how many persons should sit on the Court of Appeal. The Committee was informed that, though it was desirable that the Court of Appeal should sit in two Divisions, it might sometimes be necessary that it should sit in three. Now, it was impossible to get more than four and two threes out of ten—the number of which the Court of Appeal would be composed, and therefore if the Committee were to say that the Divisional Court should consist of five, it would be impossible to have three Divisions. As for the argument that three strong Judges of the Court below might be overruled by three weak Judges of the Court of Appeal, something similar might happen if the Divisional Court were to consist of five or seven. In the one ease, three strong Judges of the Court below and two weak Judges, as they were called, of the Court of Appeal, might be overruled by three weak Judges of the same Court of Appeal; and in the other case three strong Judges of the Court below and three weak Judges of the Court of Appeal might have their decisions reversed by four weak Judges of the Court of Appeal. If the Committee were to accept the Amendment, the whole scheme of the Bill would be altered, and it would be almost impossible to go on with it.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 177; Noes 144: Majority 33.
  MR. MATTHEWSproposed to substitute "five" for "three" as the minimum number of Judges in a Divisional Court. It seemed to him to be a perfect satire to substitute for the Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords a Court presided over by three Judges, of whom two might be Indian Judges.
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  An insufficiency in the number of Judges was no reason why an unsatisfactory and inconclusive Appeal Court should be inflicted on suitors.
  Amendment proposed, in page 27, line 33, to leave out the word "three," in order to insert the word "five."—(Mr. Matthews.)
  Question proposed, "That the word 'three' stand part of the Clause."
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, the satire, if there were any, came from the highest authority—the House of Lords. As the Committee had determined, after full and fair discussion, that the number of ordinary Judges should be 10, or at most 11, it was utterly impossible to have 15 Judges. He had no preference for three over five, or five over seven; he would rather have an abundance than a scarcity of Judges; but great men were not to be had for the asking.
  MR. VERNON HARCOURTprotested against the fallacy, repeated over and over again, that the number of Judges would be so limited. If it were, what was the meaning of ex officio Judges and of additional Judges? By the fixing of the lower number these Judges would be encouraged to stay away from the Courts. If, after what the house had been told as to the constitution, numbers, and character of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Bill should pass, it would effect anything but an improvement in the existing state of things.
  MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCKsaid, that these morning sittings were unsatisfactory in one respect—that the Members who voted were not those who had heard the debate, but who, when the division bell rang, rushed in and voted whichever way they were told. He hoped the Amendment would be pressed to a division; if so, he should vote for it.
  MR. W. FOWLERsaid, that if the Bill did not provide enough Judges, it was the duty of the Legislature to see that there were enough. The public were not to be put off with a bad Court of Appeal because there were a certain number of Judges contemplated by the Bill, and because the authors of the Bill held out that the number was not to be increased. In order to render his pro-

  51
  test articulate he should vote for the Amendment.
  MR. C. E. LEWISsaid, that under the clause as it stood, if an inheritance to a great estate in Ireland wore in question, the decisions of the Court of Queen's Bench and the Exchequer Chamber in that country might be upset by three Judges in the Appellate Court of this country, or, indeed, by the decision of two out of three. Could such a state of things give satisfaction to the suitor? In the case of the Amendment proposed by his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Amphlett), it was possible that the Court might sometimes be weak, but under the Bill the probability was that it would always be weak.
  MR. WHITWELLopposed the Amendment, which he thought to imply not a very high compliment to the Judges and the hon. and learned Gentlemen he saw around him, all of whom would one day adorn the judicial Bench.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 161; Noes 129: Majority 32.
  MR. PIMmoved, in page 27, line 38, at end of clause to add—
  "The court of appeal shall sit in Edinburgh for the hearing of appeals against the judgments or orders of any court in Scotland, and shall sit in Dublin for the hearing of appeals against the judgments or orders of any court in Ireland."
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, this was a matter to be dealt with in the clauses relating to Scotland and Ireland, to be brought up on the Report, if the understanding to that effect could be carried out.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 51 (Judges not to sit on appeal from their own jugdments) agreed to.
  Clause 52 (Arrangements for business of Court of Appeal, and for hearing Appeals transferred from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).
  SIR RICHARD BAGGALLAYmoved in page 28, line 6, to leave out from the word "appeal" to the end of the clause. He objected to the clause, because it provided that a particular class of appeals should be heard in a particular Divisional Court, one of the two into which the Appeal Court would be practically divided, and that the time of that Court should be exclusively occupied
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  with the hearing of those appeals. He also objected to the constitution of the Court.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, it was of importance that Indian and Colonial Appeals should come in form, not before the Court of Appeal, but, as heretofore, before the Queen in Council, whose judgment the decision of the Court would be. The clause gave to the Queen the power of taking the advice of the Court of Appeal, and of referring appeals to one Division of Judges, being Privy Councillors, who would sit throughout the year so far as was necessary, disposing of the business which the Judicial Committee now transacted. This was what might be called a political clause, and its object was to show respect to our great colonial dependencies, and take away none of the advantages which they now enjoyed with regard to appeals. As to ecclesiastical appeals, it had already been decided that they should be heard only by Judges, not by ecclesiastics, and this clause would provide that they should be heard by the same Judges who before heard them, excepting the Bishops.
  MR. BERESFORD HOPEsaid, he did not desire to see retired Indian Judges stereotyped into lay Archbishops. There was nothing peculiar in the climate of India to make men good ecclesiastical lawyers.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause agreed to.

  PART IV.
  Trial and Procedure.
  Clause 53 (References and Assessors) agreed to.
  Committee report Progress; to sit again upon Thursday.
  The House suspended its Sitting at ten minutes to Seven of the clock.
  The House resumed its sitting at Nine of the clock.

INTERNATIONAL LAW—ARBITRATION.

  MOTION FOR AS ADDRESS.
  MR. H. RICHARD,in rising to move—
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to instruct Her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter into commu-

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  nication with Foreign Powers with a view to further improvement in International Law and the establishment of a general and permanent system of International Arbitration,"
  said: *Mr. Speaker, I venture to bespeak the kind indulgence of the House while I attempt to bring before its attention a subject which all, I think, will acknowledge to be one of great importance, and which no one feels more deeply than myself to be one of great difficulty. It is no affectation of modesty, but a very unaffected sense of my own in competency, which prompts me to say that I cordially wish the treatment of this question had fallen into hands more qualified to do it justice than I can pretend to be. Twenty-four years ago the late Mr. Cobden submitted to this House a Motion in some respects similar to the one I am about to submit this evening. Would that he had been spared to us to bring forward the subject again with the authority of his great name and illustrious services, and under what I venture to believe are rather more favourable auspices than existed at the time to which I refer. My only title for dealing with this matter arises from the fact that. I have spent some 25 of the best years of my life in humble endeavours to promote this cause—the cause of peace on earth and goodwill among men, if not with much success, at least, I hope, with entire sincerity. It is a great satisfaction to me to feel that the question is one which stands quite apart from—may I not say that is raised far above—all considerations and interests of party. It appeals to great principles of justice, humanity, and religion, in which all parties are equally interested, and to which all parties are equally prepared to do willing homage. Indeed, I am strongly encouraged by the consciousness that I am sustained on this occasion by a large amount of public opinion not only in this country, but in all countries of the civilized world. Since I gave Notice of my Motion, I have received many communications from excellent and distinguished persons on the continent of Europe and in America, expressing their warmest sympathy with the object of my Motion, and the earnest hope that it may find acceptance with the British Parliament. The Petitions that have been presented to this House indicate in some degree the interest excited out-of-doors in our own country
  54
  in reference to my proposal. But numerous as those Petitions have been, I believe that they afford but an imperfect representation of the depth and extent of that feeling. Many—I think I may say most—of the large religious bodies in this country at their annual assemblies or conferences have passed resolutions or adopted Petitions to this House in support of the Motion. It gives me very sincere pleasure to add, that some of the most distinguished Prelates of the Church of England and many of its clergy, have declared with no less earnestness and emphasis, in favour of the general principle of arbitration. But above all, the working men have thrown themselves into the movement with an ardour and unanimity that are quite remarkable. At Trades Union Councils and Congresses, at conferences of different trades, and at all sorts of representative meetings of the working men that have been held in various parts of the kingdom for the last two years, this question has been brought forward, and resolutions in support of the movement have been carried with scarcely a dissentient voice. From a Paper that has been circulated among the Members, it appears that the number of working men who have petitioned for the proposition, either directly or through the representative bodies to which I have referred, amounts to upwards of 1,038,000 persons. And I feel bound to say that this agitation has been perfectly spontaneous on their part. It originated with themselves, it has been organized by themselves, and conducted by themselves, and conducted, I am happy to add, for I have had ample opportunity of watching its course, with a good sense and moderation, as well as an earnestness and energy very honourable to the working classes themselves, and full of encouragement and hope to those who are engaged in promoting this object. I must premise one other remark. It will not be necessary for me this evening to put forward any of what are called extreme peace views. It is the pleasure of some persons to describe the party with which I have the honour to be associated as the "peace-at-any-price party." I do not know exactly what that means. No doubt it is intended to mean something very bad and opprobrious. If what is charged against us be that we hate war too much and love

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  peace too well, I must own that the accusation lies lightly enough on my conscience. But be that as it may, I need not on this occasion affront anyone's prejudices by maintaining or assuming anything, which all reasonable and humane men are not prepared frankly to admit. I presume all will admit that war is an infinite evil inflicting such manifold mischiefs, material and moral, upon mankind—and its moral mischiefs are in my opinion deeper and greater even than the material—that it is our duty to do everything we possibly can to avert its recurrence. Most of those who hear me will, I believe, also admit that the present state of things under which so-called civilized and Christian nations, when differences arise between them, and those often differences of very trivial import, are ready to plunge into wholesale and mutual slaughter and rapine, is deplorable and disgraceful, an affront to reason, an outrage on justice, a scandal to civilization, and especially a reproach to that religion of peace and charity and brotherly love which these nations profess to receive and reverence. Why is this? It is owing largely, I think, to the fact that no precautions are taken, no provisions made to meet those contingencies which occur, and must occur in the relations of States. Differences will arise between nations as between individuals, and they may arise, and I believe often do arise, without any unfair or unjust intentions on either side, from imperfect acquaintance with facts, from simple misunderstandings, from differences of opinion as to the nature and extent of international obligations, all no doubt somewhat aggravated by that obliquity of vision which affects us all, individuals or communities, where our own interests are concerned. But unhappily no means, no regular and recognized means exist, no stated tribunal to which such differences can be referred for an honourable and pacific settlement. The only acknowledged solvent of international disputes in the last resort is the sword. The consequence is that Governments are driven, or imagine themselves driven, to that fatal system of rivalry in armaments which, in my opinion, is at this moment the greatest curse and calamity of Europe. They argue thus—that if there are no other means but force by which nations can defend their rights or
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  redress their wrongs, then each nation must provide itself with the largest possible amount of force, and when one Power adds to its armaments, all the others with headlong haste rush to a proportionate augmentation of theirs. This has at last culminated in the state of things which we now witness, under which it is calculated that there are, some say 4,000,000, some say 5,000,000 of men in the armies of Europe—men in the prime and vigour of life, for war will accept as its servants and victims only the picked men of society. The result is that the nations are weighed down by burdens of taxation that are so enormous as to be almost intolerable. It is not very easy to estimate what is the cost of these armaments. But a very respectable French writer, M. Larroque, who has written an able and elaborate work on The Standing Armaments of Europe, and has taken great pains to procure authentic data for his calculations, estimates the cost at £400,000,000 sterling. This sum he divides under three items. First, the naval and military budgets—the sums directly extracted from the pockets of the people for maintaining these armaments he estimates—and I believe considerably under-estimates—at £120,000,000. Then he takes the interest on capital invested in various military property, such as fortifications, barracks, ships of war, arms and munitions, capital wholly unproductive, and this item amounts to £30,000,000. The third, and the most important item, which is very apt to be overlooked, is the loss to society by the withdrawal of such a host of able-bodied men from all the occupations of productive industry—for a soldier produces nothing, only helps to consume the productions of other men—and M. Larroque estimates this at £250,000,000. If to this be added the interest, and the cost of management of the National Debts of Europe, nearly the whole of which has been contracted for war or warlike purposes, and which may be taken at £150,000,000, we have a grand total of £550,000,000 annually taken from the capital and industry of nations for the cost of past wars, and the preparations for future wars. And what is the condition of the people in the various countries from which this prodigious sum is annually extracted for war purposes? That they are a wonderfully ingenious, energetic,

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  industrious population is proved by the fact that they are not absolutely crushed beneath these burdens laid upon them by their Governments. But it is rather a melancholy reflection that, admirable as are the enterprise, invention, skill, and laborious industry of the producing classes in Europe, they are deprived of so large a proportion of the fruits of their labours by the perpetual drain made upon them to sustain this armed rivalry kept up by their rulers. Let us picture to ourselves these toiling millions over the whole face of Europe, from the Rock of Gibraltar to the Oural Mountains, and from the Shetland Islands to the Caucasus, swarming forth day by day to their labour, working ceaselessly from early morn to dewy eve, in the cultivation of the soil, in the production of fabrics, in the exchange of commodities, in mines, factories, forges, docks, workshops, warehouses; on railways, rivers, lakes, oceans penetrating the bowels of the earth, subduing the stubbornness of brute matter, mastering the elements of nature, and making them subservient to human convenience and weal, and creating by all this a mass of wealth which might carry abundance and comfort to every one of their myriad homes. And then imagine the hand of power coming in and every year sweeping some five hundred millions of the money so laboriously earned, into the bottomless abyss of military expenditure. But there is something worse than even this pressure on the means of life, I mean compulsory military service. The House, of course, is aware that in every country in Europe but our own, the naval and military services are recruited, not by voluntary enlistment, but by the conscription. Now this is becoming a tyranny so terrible as almost to provoke an insurrection in some countries. Even in Germany, which has given the example—in my opinion, the evil example—of sweeping the whole male population into the Army, there is a strong reaction setting in against the system. Some months ago, I read this in one of our journals—
  "The German Government continues to be much disquieted by the large dimensions of the emigration to America. It is stated that according to authentic advises from Berlin, the numbers are growing in such proportions that by the 1st of January the figures will be double what they were in the years preceding the late war. As usual, the bulk of the emigrants are
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  young men anxious to avoid military service. It was in reference to this movement that the Circular from the War Minister, by the Emperor's order, was issued last July. As it has seemingly had no appreciable effect in checking the ever-widening stream, a second Circular, couched in more threatening terms than the first, has just been issued. At the same time, a special service is being instituted for the more effective surveillance and supervision of the districts from which the emigrants mainly come. But in spite of all this, the emigration to America has been only slightly affected."
  And, indeed, those who profess to be acquainted with the feelings of the working classes on the Continent, assure us that there is a general and growing feeling of discontent among them on this subject, of which the Governments will do well to take account. They feel that in past times their lives have been used as mere pawns, with which Princes and Governments have been wont to play their own selfish games of ambition and intrigue. And there is an angry muttering among them that they will not submit to this much longer. But there is another view of this subject which those in authority ought to take to heart. In spite of the enormous sums I have described constantly extracted from the pockets of the people, the finances of many European States are in a normal condition of embarrassment and deficit. In Austria there has not been a year since 1789 in which revenue has come up to expenditure. The accumulated deficits of that State from 1851 to 1866 amounted to £130,000,000. France, even before the last terrible war, was sinking rapidly into debt; her debt increased from £213,000,000 in 1851 to £550,000,000 in 1870. The new kingdom of Italy is absolutely reeling and staggering beneath the burdens of her military expenditure. The annual deficit from 1861 to 1869 was £22,000,000. Spain, I need not say, is in a still worse financial condition. Turkey, we are told, was brought into the European family of nations by the Russian War, but the only privilege she has seemed to derive from that is the privilege of borrowing of money and sinking into debt. From 1854 there has been a continued series of deficits at the rate of about £5,000,000 a-year, covered with loans in two years out of three. Even the condition of Russian finance is one of chronic deficit. The revenue has increased £14,000,000 in four years, and yet the deficit continues. Mr. Dudley Baxter, in his valuable work on National

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  Debts, has shown that the national indebtedness of the world has increased within 22 years to the prodigious amount of £2,218,000,000. Europe's part in this increase is £1,500,000,000. What is the cause of this alarming condition of things? The cause is mainly war and warlike armaments. Mr. Baxter has calculated that only 12 per cent, or one-eighth of the National Debts of the world have been raised for productive purposes; 88 per cent has been for war, warlike preparations, and other unproductive purposes. And what aggravates the absurdity is, that while all this is going on, the nations of the world are being constantly drawn into closer relation of mutual dependence and friendly intercourse. Railways and steamships, to employ the bold image of the Prime Minister, are like gigantic shuttles rushing to and fro over the earth and weaving the nations into one. Men of different races are being combined in common enterprises, not only of trade, but of art and science and philanthropy. Men will always seek some justification for their conduct, however absurd. They seek their justification on this matter in an old Latin proverb—Si vis pacem Para bellum. Now, I venture to say that an axiom more absurd than this, more at variance with common sense, with all our experience of human nature, and with the testimony of history never was palmed on the credulity of mankind. You may just as well say, that if you wish to preserve your house from fire, the best thing you can do is to accumulate any amount of gunpowder and petroleum and lucifer matches in your cellars, and let a number of mischievous boys go to play at hide-and-seek among them; for these boys may well represent the Princes and diplomatists of Europe, who do play the strangest pranks in the midst of the inflammable materials they have heaped around them, and which yet they say are the only true security against a conflagration. Now, Sir, the state of things I have thus described seems to me utterly deplorable and humiliating in the heart of what calls itself Christendom in the 19th century. Every Government in Europe is spending beyond all comparison the largest proportion of its resources upon the art of destruction, while myriads of its subjects are sunk in pauperism, ignorance, and degradation. The people ask for bread,
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  and the Government offer them bullets; they ask for a useful education, and they offer them the military drill; they ask for better dwellings, in which they may lead a decent domestic life, and they offer them barracks and fortifications. Science, which ought to be the handmaid of civilization, has sold herself to the devil and exhausts her skill and invention in devising infernal machines of more and more destructive power, which have no other result than to exhaust the wealth of nations, since in two or three years they are superseded by other inventions still more infernal and destructive. And let the House observe that there is absolutely no limit to this process—that not only it may, but it must go on repeating itself at an accumulating ratio. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that the military expenditure of Europe has doubled within the last 30 years, and there is no reason in the world why it should not, but every reason according to the system now in vogue why it should, double itself again within the next 30 years; and so through every 30 years to the end of time. Now, is there no remedy for this? Cannot the human reason be brought to bear upon this monstrous system of mutual waste and ruin? Is the combined statesmanship of Europe equal to nothing better, as international policy, than playing on a more and more gigantic scale this miserable game of "beggar my neighbour," by which they exhaust their resources, embarrass their finances, and oppress their peoples, while they leave themselves at the end of the process comparatively and proportionally just where they were at the beginning? While spending so much of time, thought, skill, and money in organizing war, is it not worth while to bestow some forethought and care in trying to organize peace, by making some provision beforehand for solving by peaceable means those difficulties and complications that arise to disturb the relations of States, instead of leaving them to the excited passions and hazardous accidents of the moment? No doubt something has been done, and something very considerable has been done—which I gladly and gratefully recognize—in the way of settling disputes by arbitration, after those disputes have arisen. Quite enough has been done in this direction to prove that such a method is practicable, and that

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  there is no necessity for mankind to cut each other's throats by way of trying to decide questions of disputed right. It is an entire mistake to imagine that the recent instances of arbitration between this country and the United States are the first and only, though no doubt they are the most significant and conspicuous, examples of the successful application of this principle. There have been many other cases within the last 50 or 60 years. Indeed, I am not sure, if using the word arbitration in its broadest and most generic sense as expressing every kind of reference for settling differences without having recourse to the sword, that within the period I have mentioned arbitration has not been the rule and war the exception. But there is this difference—that whereas war is loud, noisy, demonstrative, making itself seen and heard by the whole world, arbitration is often carried on in a quiet, unostentatious manner that escapes general observation. I will not trespass on the time and patience of the House by enumerating all the instances of that kind that have occurred. But I may be permitted to cite a few cases by way of illustration. There was the question known as the Portendic claims between England and France, arising out of the blockade of the Portendic coast by the French during their wars with the Moors in 1834–5. These claims, after occasioning considerable trouble to the two Governments, were referred to the arbitration of the King of Prussia, and his award was cheerfully accepted by both countries. In 1853, all outstanding claims that had arisen between Great Britain and the United States since the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, were referred to two Commissioners, who were empowered and instructed to choose an umpire or arbitrator when they could not agree. The claims connected with the brig Creole, which had been the subject of long diplomatic discussion, the claims of the Florida bonds, the M'Leod claims, and many others, were included in this reference. Mr. Joshua Bates, of London, was chosen as umpire, and all these claims, after careful consideration, were finally and satisfactorily adjusted. Questions of considerable difficulty between the United States and New Granada, and between the same Power and Costa Rica, as well as Paraguay and Peru, have at different times been settled by
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  arbitration. In 1863, a dispute between this country and the Empire of Brazil, which had previously given occasion to a great deal of angry and irritating diplomatic correspondence, was referred to the arbitration of the King of the Belgians, and disposed of without difficulty. I will mention another case which may be considered as a crucial example of successful arbitration. In 1868–9, as hon. Members will recollect, the relations of Turkey and Greece became full of danger on account of the insurrection in Crete. There was everything in this case to exasperate animosities between the two parties—difference of race, difference of religion, terrible memories and sinister traditions of the past. But at the suggestion of Prussia there was a Conference of the Great Powers at Paris, who agreed to certain resolutions to be submitted to Greece for her acceptance. These, be it borne in mind, were offered merely as recommendations, and not backed up by any threats of force on the part of the mediating Powers; and yet in spite of the forebodings of the prophets of evil, who loudly prognosticated failure, the success was complete. Greece accepted the resolutions, and the danger passed away. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, speaking in the House in reference to that case, spoke of it most justly as "an evidence of real advance in civilization." I have the greatest pleasure in citing the words he used on that occasion—
  "Here is a case where two Powers, exasperated by traditional animosities, and with their respective transactions entangled by various sympathies and antipathies of race, were on the point of resorting to the arbitration of force and bloodshed for the settlement of their differences—and where the employment of purely moral interference has been sufficient to avert that calamity. Now, I am quite certain that if there exists one sentiment more unequivocal than another on both sides of this House, and on every bench of it, and throughout the country, it is that, without resorting to arbitrary doctrines or pedantic rules, we may be enabled quietly and steadily to make progress towards establishing in Europe a state of feeling which shall favour and facilitate that common action among the Powers of Europe whereby, becoming the organ of legitimate and strong opinion, they may be able by this kind of influence alone to avert the great calamity of war."—[3 Hansard, cxciv. 76–77.]
  Now this is precisely what I want the right hon. Gentleman to help in bringing about—namely, a common action of the Powers to avert the calamity of war.

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  Perhaps it may be said in reference to the cases of successful arbitration I have cited that they referred to comparatively small matters. My answer is, that they could not possibly refer to smaller matters than those which have often led to long, bloody, and desolating wars between nations. They were not smaller matters, for instance, than the question whether the cupola of a particular church at Jerusalem should be repaired by Greek or Latin monks, and yet that was the quarrel which, through the infinite un-wisdom of some of the Great Powers, led to a war which cost Europe, according to Mr. Kinglake, 1,000,000 of human lives and some four or five hundred millions of money. But. I may be told, in reference to this and similar cases, that the avowed and apparent causes of a war are often not the real ones, that they are mere superficial pretexts, but that there are occult forces at work which impel nations irresistibly into collision with each other. But all this talk is mere fatalism, the elaborate attempts of men to find some justification for their follies and crimes by referring them to the operation of natural or providential laws, instead of their own evil passions. Men love to believe that they are driven into ill-doing by necessity. This is the plea of justification which Milton represents the author of evil as putting forward to extenuate his own revolt—
  "Who with necessity, The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds."
  I do not believe in necessity to do evil, to commit crime. It is a profane, an impious, an atheistic doctrine. And I can quote the authority of the most experienced statesman of his time as respects, at least, all recent wars. Lord Russell has said—
  "On looking back at all the wars which have been carried on during the last century, and examining into the causes of them, I do not see one of these wars in which, if there had been proper temper between the parties, the questions in dispute might not have been settled without recourse to arms."
  But I must refer also, as an evidence of progress, and as an indication that even the Great Powers are beginning to recognize that there is some principle in the world besides force for regulating the intercourse of States, to what took place at the Conference of Paris in 1856. England had the honour of taking the initiative on that occasion, through the
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  mouth of her Plenipotentiary, Lord Clarendon, who submitted a proposition to the Conference, which was accepted unanimously, and expressed in the following language:—
  "The Plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express, in the name of their Governments, the wish that states between which any serious misunderstanding may arise should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power."
  The Conference instructed its President, Count Walewski, to communicate this declaration to other civilized Governments, and to invite their adhesion; and about 40 other Governments did adhere to it. The right hon. Gentleman the present Prime Minister, speaking in this House soon after, referred to that Protocol in these words—
  "As to the proposal to submit international differences to arbitration, I think that it is in itself a great triumph. It is, perhaps, the first time that the assembled representatives of the principal nations of Europe have given an emphatic utterance to sentiments which contain at least a qualified disapproval of a resort to war, and asserted, at least in qualified terms, the supremacy of reason, of justice, of humanity, and religion."—[3 Hansard, cxlii. 99.]
  The late Lord Derby also referred to the principle of arbitration as
  "The principle which, to its endless honour, was embodied in the Protocol of the Conference of Paris."
  Unhappily, it has hitherto remained inoperative. But in spite of that I still believe, with the right hon. Gentleman, that it was a great gain to have elicited from the leading Powers of Europe, and to have placed on permanent record such a declaration as that. This is the history of all human progress. Men labour long to get from those in authority the distinct recognition of some great principle. It may be long after that before it is reduced in practice. But the acknowledgment of its justice and importance remains, and may be pleaded against themselves. We have an illustration of this in the condemnation of the slave trade, pronounced at the Congress of Vienna, and repeated in a yet more rigorous form at the Congress of Verona in 1822, principally, I believe, through the influence of the Duke of Wellington. That condemnation did not lead to the immediate abolition of the slave trade; unhappily it is not yet abolished. Still that act of the Great Powers was of the greatest possible value to

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  those who were, and are, engaged in a crusade against the slave trade. It placed the accursed traffic under the ban of the civilized world, and rendered it impossible for any Christian State again openly to defend it, though some of them have continued wickedly to connive at it. So I believe the Declaration of the Protocol of Paris, though not immediately operative, is not without great value. As has been recently said by a distinguished French statesman, M. Drouyn de Lhuys—
  "In trying to realize the idea embodied in the Treaty of Paris, we obey a sentiment which, evoked at that epoch, will not cease to manifest itself among civilized nations until it has obtained satisfaction."
  I come now to the Geneva Arbitration. I own that my views on that subject are as wide as the poles asunder from those expressed by some hon. Gentlemen in this House, a very small minority, I am happy to believe. I look upon that transaction as one eminently honourable to the spirit of our age, and especially to the two great nations principally concerned in it. And I have no doubt that in spite of the little irritations which have for a moment ruffled the temper of a few of our countrymen, that it will be regarded hereafter as constituting, a landmark in the history of civilization. No doubt some mistakes were made in connection with this great work of international peace, and that is no wonder, considering that the proceeding was somewhat an untried and unwonted one. But are there no mistakes made in connection with international war?—unless, indeed, the right thing to say is that the whole of that bloody business is one huge and monstrous mistake. No doubt some portions of the Treaty of Washington might have been expressed in language less ambiguous and more precise. No doubt the Three Rules themselves were somewhat vague, though I question if there is any form of words which human ingenuity could devise upon which clever and practised lawyers could not put two or three different constructions if it suited their purpose to do so. No doubt the interpretation put upon those Rules by some of the distinguished men who acted as adjudicators at Geneva was of rather dangerous latitude. No doubt there were also still graver errors on both sides, which I forbear to refer to lest they revive feelings that had better be let sleep. But after all these deductions are made, the fact, the signal, the glorious fact re-
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  mains that these two great kindred and Christian nations, each of them with abundance of pride and self-assertion, for John Bull and Jonathan are in that respect as like as two peas—each of them conscious of having almost inexhaustible resources at command wherewith to inflict injury upon each other—that these two nations, in regard to a question that had strongly excited public feeling on both sides of the Atlantic, and notably on the other side, were content to lay aside their prejudices and passions, and allow their case to be referred to the arbitration of reason and justice, instead of running the risk of having to refer it at any future time to the blind and brutal arbitrament of the sword. This fact remains, unaffected by the petty jealousies and passions of the hour, affording a grand and memorable example to the nations, which I have no doubt will be fruitful of beneficent results. The attitude of the two nations has been noble. During many months of irritating suspense while the two Governments were negotiating as to the true meaning of the Treaty of Washington, these 70,000,000 of people maintained their calmness and self-control. This, I believe, was in great part owing to the conduct of the Press. No doubt there were exceptions; but, as a rule, the Press on both sides did itself great honour by the way in which it conducted the controversy. I must especially pay my humble tribute of respect and admiration to what is called the leading journal in this country, for the calm, judicial spirit which it preserved throughout, and by which I have no doubt it contributed largely to the peaceable and satisfactory settlement of the matter. I remember the late Lord Derby some years ago when administering a severe rebuke to the Press for stimulating one of those dishonourable panics of French invasion, by which we have been so often affected in this country, making this remark—
  "That journalists in these times exercised something like the influence and power of statesmen, and that therefore they ought to feel something of the responsibility of statesmen."
  To my mind one of the most hopeful signs of the times is in the fact that the Press is evidently beginning to recognize this responsibility. For my part, I must say, in reference to this American Arbitration, that I feel more grateful than I can express to Her Majesty's

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  Government, and especially to Lord Granville, for the combined firmness, patience, temper, and tact with which he persevered, in the face of great difficulties and some provocations, in seeking to extricate the two countries from embarrassments, which at one time threatened to wreck the arbitration. And I feel no less grateful to the Leaders of the party opposite for their wise and patriotic forbearance during the whole of those difficult and delicate negotiations. I confess that when I saw the Notice of Motion placed on the Paper some weeks ago by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. G. Hardy), I had some apprehension lest in the discussion that would ensue, something might have been said to rekindle animosities happily allayed, or to discredit the principle of arbitration, or to bring into question the judgment at Geneva. But nothing of the sort took place. The speech of the right hon. Gentleman, which gave a tone to the debate, appeared to me as admirable in temper as it was in ability, and proved, as did that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), which followed in the same discussion, that they at least were determined not to convert this great international question into an arena for party strife. If they should ever come into office again—and I suppose that is a contingency that is on the cards, and have to deal with any difficult question of foreign policy, I hope the course they have taken on this question will not be forgotten by those who now sit on this side of the House. But some people say the judgment has gone against us. Well, I suppose judgment must go against somebody in every suit or trial at law. I hope the House will not misinterpret my meaning when I say that I am almost glad that it did go against us, because it afforded the people of this country a noble opportunity, which I believe they have nobly embraced, of showing their respect for law and their readiness to submit to a judicial decision even when it is against their own interests. By this dignified acquiescence in the judgment of Geneva—and I contend that the great bulk of the people of this country have so acquiesced—they have done more to consecrate the principle of arbitration than if the verdict had been ever so much in their favour. But we are sometimes told that only
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  England would have the sense of justice and dignity to submit to such a decision. Well, it is a very pleasant thing to have a high opinion of ourselves, and if it soothes our vanity and helps us the better to bear our defeat to think so, I have no objection. But I am bound to express my own belief that if the judgment had gone against the United States the great body of the people of that country would have done the same. Let me ask the attention of the House to the noble words uttered by Mr. Colfax, the Vice President of the United States, at the time when difficulties had arisen between the two Governments owing to conflicting interpretations of the Treaty of Washington, and before the tribunal had been opened at Geneva—
  "Though the arbitration were to adjudge to us not a single dollar, I will stand up before my fellow-citizens, and will cry to them, Accept the resolution and renounce all indemnity rather than recede one hair's-breadth from that high moral position in which you have placed yourselves along with England before the face of the other nations of the world.'"
  All this is, no doubt, highly encouraging. But the disadvantages of leaving the arbitration to be provided for after the quarrel has arisen are obvious. The original difference often becomes greatly complicated and aggravated by angry diplomatic recriminations, and the clamorous outcries of popular passions; whereas if there were some stated means of reference, these disturbing influences need not at all come into operation. And undoubtedly the mere existence of such stated means would prevent many quarrels from coming to a head. "The great end of law," it has been truly said, "is not to decide, but to prevent disputes; for every dispute which British civil law, for instance, decides, there are thousands of eases in which disputes are prevented from arising by its certainty and clearness." What is wanted is that the Great Powers of the world should take some steps towards the establishment of something like a regular and permanent system of international jurisdiction. That I may not be charged with indulging in mere chimerical visions beyond the range of practical statesmanship in saying this, I let me cite the words of the present Lord Derby. Speaking in this House in the I year 1867, apropos of the question with Spain about the ship Mermaid, he said—
  "Unhappily there is nothing in the nature of an international tribunal to which all cases of

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  this kind might be referred, and there is no International Law by which parties can be required to submit such cases to arbitration. I do not hesitate to say that it would be one of the greatest benefits to the civilized world if such a tribunal existed."—[3 Hansard, clxxxviii. 1752.]
  No statesman living is less likely than Lord Derby to indulge in longings after what is impracticable and Utopian. And yet such are his views as to the importance and value of an International Court. It is well known that such a Supreme Court does exist in the United States to adjudicate between different States of the Union and between States and the Federal Government. A great man who has recently passed from among us, Mr. John Stuart Mill, referring to that institution says—
  "The Supreme Court of the Federation dispenses International Law, and is the first example of what is now one of the most prominent wants of civilized society—a real international tribunal."
  I do not say that the world is ripe for such an institution in its completeness at the present moment. But surely we may take some steps in that direction. I ask the Government to communicate with the other Powers with a view to the appointment of an International Commission to examine into the present state of International Law, and to reduce it into something like a clear and coherent system. This is a great necessity of civilization. Perhaps, indeed, if we use the word law in its rigid sense, we may say that there hardly exists such a thing at present as International Law. What passes under that name consists of custom and consent, provisions in Treaties between nations, judgments of Prize Courts, and the opinions of eminent jurists from Grotius downwards. I am very far from saying that even in its present imperfect form all this has not been of the greatest possible service in regulating the relations and intercourse of States, in diminishing the frequency and mitigating the ferocity of war. And it is impossible not to admire the noble enthusiasm of humanity by which Grotius was inspired in the composition of his great work—a work, as Mr. Hallam says, the publication of which is acknowledged to have made an epoch in the philosophical and almost in the political history of Europe. Still what now exists can hardly be called law in the strict sense of that term, seeing there is no enacting authority to give it force, and
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  no recognized tribunal by which it can be administered. At any rate, it will not be doubted that the present state of International Law is far from satisfactory; that there are many important points connected with the relations and intercourse of States, which are unsettled, ill-defined, or unprovided for; and that the whole system of International Law requires to be revised and digested and brought into something like consistency and harmony. There is an almost entire consensus of opinion among authorities on this matter. An American gentleman recently visited Europe expressly to put himself into communication with the leading jurists and publicists of the Continent and of this country on this very subject, and he found among them an almost universal concurrence of opinion on this—that there exists urgent necessity for further mutual understanding and consent among nations as to the principles and rules of International Law. Now we have a precedent for what I want to be done as the first step, in what took place at the Congress of Paris in 1856. When the Great Powers came to negotiate terms of peace, they did not restrict themselves to matters arising out of the war just concluded. But they found certain points of international maritime law in such a condition as urgently to require consideration and decision. Accordingly, they adopted a Declaration, to which they attached the following Preamble, which I especially commend to the attention of the House:—
  "That maritime law in time of war has long been the subject of deplorable disputes. That the uncertainty of the law in such a matter gives rise to differences of opinion, which may occasion serious difficulties, and even conflicts. That it is consequently advantageous to establish a uniform doctrine on so important a point."
  Therefore, as Lord Russell said, the Governments, in order
  "to prove the sincerity of their wish to give permanence and fixity to this part of the Law of Nations,"
  adopted the Declaration abolishing privateering, defining the rights of neutrals in maritime warfare, and settling the law of blockades. Other Governments were invited to accept the Declaration, and some 39 Governments did send in their adhesion, so that now, as between these 46 Governments, and as respects the matters treated of in the Declaration, there is something like positive and

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  authoritative International Law. Now, is there any reason why the work thus begun in Paris in 1856 should not be continued? No one denies that there are other points of International Law in a condition as unsettled and unsatisfactory, and as likely to give rise to differences of opinion, leading to difficulties and conflicts, as those dealt with in the Declaration of 1856? Is it well to wait until those difficulties and conflicts arise? or, would it not be wise to avail ourselves of the present lucid interval of peace to try to come to a common understanding as to some of the principles and rules of International Law, and so, by gradually preparing a system of law, to lay the foundation for a general and permanent system of international jurisdiction? There is a remarkable experiment now in progress in Egypt, which, if it succeeds—as I cordially hope it may—will furnish a practical illustration on a limited scale of the kind of international Tribunal for which I contend. The subject was brought forward in the early part of the Session by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane). It is admitted on all hands that the present mode of administering justice in that country, especially as between natives and foreigners, is utterly unsatisfactory. This has been long felt by the European Powers. With a view to remedy this an International Commission was appointed, and has been sitting at Constantinople, the object of which was to draw up a code of laws, and to prepare the constitution of an International Court, to administer justice both in civil and criminal cases. The Powers represented on that Commission, as stated by the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, were—Great Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Italy, Russia, Belgium, the United States, Holland, Sweden, Norway, and Turkey. The Commission has completed its labours and presented its Report, and is only waiting for the approval of the Governments to come into operation, when we shall have a real International Court, administering an international code of laws. Now, all I ask the Government to do at present is to enter into communication with foreign Governments, with a view of doing something for Europe and the civilized world like what they are actually doing for Egypt. It seems to me that each of the two great parties in this
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  country are at the present moment groping—and not very successfully groping—for a policy. Would that one of them had the courage to aspire to become the leader of a real peace party in Europe, to take the first steps towards establishing peace on sure and firm foundations—the foundations of law and jurisprudence. They would meet with a response of which they have little conception. The world is growing weary of war. The nations are groaning under the burden of military expenditure and military servitude, and are longing to be delivered. I believe even that the Governments, and especially the minor Governments of Europe, would most gladly and gratefully follow the leadership of England. A distinguished Member of a foreign Legislature wrote to me some time ago in reference to my Motion—
  "I believe you are hitting the right nail on the head. It will be impossible for the nations to enter upon the process of mutual disarmament until first of all they shall find some means presented to them by which they can settle their disputes without arms, and I feel convinced that England, of all nations in the world, is the right country to take the initiative in this matter."
  I also, Sir, have the ambition to secure the honour of this great initiative for my own country. There are people who charge us of the peace party with being careless of, or indifferent to, the honour of England. I repudiate and repel the imputation. What possible reason can those who make the imputation, and who arrogate to themselves the credit of an exclusive patriotism to love England and her dignity and glory, have, that we have not in an equal degree with themselves? Is not England also our country, the home of our childhood's joys, the place of our fathers' sepulchres? Are not her name and character and greatness closely intertwined with our dearest earthly affections in the memories of the past and in the anticipations of the future? Do we not also feel that we rise with her renown and sink in her degradation? Of course, there may be differences of opinion as to what constitutes honour for a great country. I do not believe that the honour of a Christian nation consists in being conspicuous for deeds of violence and blood, though even if it were so, we have had enough of that in past times to glut the most insatiable appetite for military glory. But to my mind the honour of England consists in this—that she is the birth-place and home of freedom; that

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  she has been able to teach the nations by her own example how to combine order and liberty in her political life; that she is the mother of free communities which perpetuate her ideas and institutions in all parts of the globe; that she was the first to strike the fetters off the slave and bid the oppressed go free, and that she is stretching forth her hand to scatter the blessings of civilization and Christianity among the nations to the uttermost ends of the earth. These are the things which, in my opinion, honour England, and it will be a still greater honour if possible—a signal, a crowning honour if she becomes the harbinger of peace to the world, if she takes the first step towards the organization of that peace on solid and lasting foundations, so as to do something to realize the glorious vision of our poet Laureate—
  "When the war-drum throbs no longer and the battle-flag is furled,
  In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.
  When the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,
  And the kindly earth shall slumber lapt in universal law."
  The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.
  MR. MUNDELLAseconded the Motion.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to instruct Her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter into communication with Foreign Powers with a view to further improvement in International Law and the establishment of a general and permanent system of International Arbitration"—(Mr. Henry Richard.)
  MR. GLADSTONEsaid, his hon. Friend was right when he stated that this was not the first time that the present subject, which was one of profound interest, was introduced to the notice of the House. In 1849, Mr. Cobden first formally drew attention to it, and made a Motion not very different from that of his hon. Friend. The Motion of Mr. Cobden differed mainly from that of his hon. Friend in this respect—that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was to enter into communication with foreign Powers, and invite them to make treaties binding the respective parties, in case they should have any future misunderstanding which could not be arranged
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  by amicable negotiation, to refer the matter in dispute to the decision of arbitrators. His hon. Friend invited them in the same manner to communicate with foreign Powers with the same object in view. The communication was to be general, and it was to contemplate a further improvement in International Law, and the establishment of a permanent system of International Arbitration. In truth, his hon. Friend had very considerably widened the scope of Mr. Cobden's Motion as to the means he prescribed. He could not say, however, that the change made by his hon. Friend was an improvement. If progress was to be made in this direction, it was more likely to be made in ordinary times and under ordinary circumstances, by beginning in particular cases with particular countries in regard to particular subjects, as occasion arose, rather than by an ambitious attempt to draw all the civilized nations of the globe into general communications on a matter involving changes so great in their extent, and so very difficult, of necessity, in the mode of their operation. His hon. Friend had referred to a great variety of cases in which, as he said, the principle of amicable arrangement, in one shape or another, whether by formal arbitration or not, had been usefully employed. All the cases he had enumerated were just and true. But his hon. Friend might have added other instances. He might have cited the case of the King of Holland, who undertook to effect an arrangement with respect to the San Juan Boundary which had recently been settled by the good offices of the Emperor of Germany. He might have referred to an analogous instance—namely, the arrangements with respect to the navigation and international rights at the mouths of the Danube. He might likewise have quoted the case of the unfortunate difference which arose between this country and Greece in 1849–50, when our neighbour France offered, not a formal arbitration, but her good offices to this country, and those good offices were beneficially employed. In fact, so far as this country was concerned, and to a great extent other countries, there was gradually growing up a series of precedents which we might hope—but it must be by degrees—would harden into rule. But the real duty which could fairly be imposed, and the performance

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  of which could reasonably be expected from any Government of this country was that it should avail itself of every opportunity as it arose, and of all the I means which it possessed, to bring to a peaceful issue differences between other States, or between this country and some other State, which if not peacefully settled might threaten great international evil and calamity. If he went on to examine minutely the history of the last few years and the transactions of the Foreign Office, with which he had necessarily been closely conversant, he could add very considerably to the instances mentioned by his hon. Friend. His noble Friend the late Lord Clarendon had not for many weeks assumed the seals of the Foreign Office at the end of 1868 when he was enabled to intervene, with the utmost tact, good feeling, and ability, in a question, apparently of a paltry and trumpery character, with respect to the railways between France and Belgium, and. by his intervention not only a most perplexing and prolonged, but possibly a very dangerous, controversy was got rid of. In the ease of Luxembourg, also, the exertions of Lord Derby would be justly remembered to the credit of the preceding Government. In truth, speaking without reference to any one Government, it was the practice of the Foreign Office, and would be a duty which Parliament would exact, that it should accept as a principle that very rule the adoption of which by every nation in the world his hon. Friend sought to procure. At the same time, it was important to consider not only what we preached, but also what we practised, not only that we should recommend with zeal to other countries to resort to arbitration, but still more was it a matter of consequence that we should examine whether our own proceedings were in all cases wise, and before they had assumed the form of menace, quarrel, or controversy, whether they wore governed by the rules of good sense and moderation. Because, if the settlement of disputes was good, the prevention of disputes was better; and the best mode of prevention was the careful observance of that rule which was enjoined for the government of our private and personal conduct, to do unto others as we would be done by, and to expect from them no more than we were prepared to give. When we had acted in this way we should have laid the founda-
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  tions of the most important parts of a good and sound foreign policy. There was, indeed, another part, and that was a vigilant defence of the honour and interests of the nation, whenever circumstances might call for it; but that was a point on which it was less necessary to insist, because it was a portion of our duty with respect to which this country never had failed, nor did he think it was likely to fail in the future. When Mr. Cobden made the Motion to which he had referred, Lord Palmerston said he entirely agreed with the hon. Gentleman in attributing the utmost possible value to the Motion, and in feeling the greatest dislike and he might say horror of war in any shape. He need in this case only substitute for Mr. Cobden's the name of his hon. Friend on whom the mantle of Mr. Cobden had fallen, and he fully adopted the words of Lord Palmerston. But Lord Palmerston was not prepared to adopt the Motion of Mr. Cobden. He did not think it would practically contribute to the object in view, and he moved the Previous Question; but so satisfied was Mr. Cobden with the tone of his declaration that he said in his reply the noble Lord had led him to suppose there was not much difference in their views. Mr. Cobden, however, pressed his Motion to a division. It was seldom that he looked upon any proceeding of Mr. Cobden otherwise than with warm approval not only of its purpose, but of its judgment; but he ventured to doubt whether Mr. Cobden exercised a wise discretion in this instance. A division was taken, and the result was—Ayes, 79; Noes, 176; so that a very large majority of the House of Commons was announced to the world as repelling and refusing the Motion of Mr. Cobden at a time when the person who had spoken as the organ of the Government was declared by Mr. Cobden himself to have delivered sentiments which differed but little from those he had himself expressed. He was not prepared to ask the House to join in the adoption of his hon. Friend's Resolution. At the same time, he now stood in some respects in a position of greater advantage than Lord Palmerston did when he addressed the House; because while Lord Palmerston was compelled to rely principally on a perfectly frank, sincere, but still somewhat abstract, declaration of concurrence of opinion, it was now in their power to point to a

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  course of facts and events which gave strength to those declarations, and enabled him to found himself on a solid basis when he pointed out that he had but one motive for declining to request the House to adopt that Motion—namely, that its adoption would tend to put in jeopardy the progress of the very cause his hon. Friend had at heart. For, while they had much gratifying progress to refer to, they had also many painful circumstances to recall. It was true that in our relations with the United States of America we had been enabled, in a case of primary importance and moment, to adopt and carry through to its conclusion the principle of preferring a settlement by arbitration to a settlement by war, or to what was practically much the same thing—that of leaving unsettled a controversy which in the long run must eventually lead to war. But did the state of facts they perceived on the Continent indicate such a progress in the general mind of Europe as would justify us in departing from the course we had hitherto pursued—namely, of seizing every opportunity of recommending, where we had the title to do so, that method of peaceful procedure, and also of resolving to give the most marked instances we could of our own practical adoption of the principle? For himself, he did not think so. He saw opinion growing in some quarters in favour of that principle; but as yet it was sectional opinion rather than national sentiment. It had not extensively found its way into the Cabinets of statesmen, or into the popular mind of Europe. They must not conceal from themselves the state of facts which characterized the times in which we lived. His hon. Friend himself had described the monstrous and portentous development of armaments they had seen of late years in Europe, and had justly referred to the natural consequences of that development in that vast growth of National Debt and that anticipation of future resources which, when they reached a certain magnitude, became themselves among the most formidable menaces, both to internal tranquility and the general peace. He held in his hand the work of that eminent Belgian author, M. Laveleye, on the existing causes of war in Europe, written manifestly in the sense and with the object of his hon. Friend. M. Laveleye recognized the obstacles in his
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  way. He alluded almost with exultation to the Treaty of Washington and its results, and spoke of the Arbitration of Geneva as having re-animated the hopes of the friends of peace throughout the world. But such was the sense that gentleman entertained of the dangers of Europe that, towards the close of his most able and luminous disquisition, he urged, with his usual earnestness, that, for the sake of liberty itself, considerable armaments must be maintained, and that the people both of England and Belgium would do well to submit to the law of compulsory and universal military service. He was not able to follow M. Laveleye in that opinion; but it showed what must be the pressure of the motives which led such a man to a conclusion that must be so painful to him. M. Laveleye, however, in discussing the methods of giving effect to pacific views, looked in the first place to a gradual formation of a code of International Law, and then eventually to the formation of a High International Court. That Court was to be one entirely devoid of any command over physical force. It was to trust to moral force alone. That presupposed a condition of nations in which moral force, they must assume, would be strong enough to induce each of them to give up the prepossessions and predilections connected with its own particular interests and passions, and to adopt a judgment proceeding from some impartial source. Well, we might fairly say with respect to ourselves, and in an equal degree to the United States, that in a matter of the utmost difficulty and delicacy, touching most intimately both the honour and the pride of two great nations, we had fearlessly applied the principle of arbitration. His hon. Friend was glad the Award had gone against us, because it gave us a better opportunity of showing the value we attached to the principle; and he (Mr. Gladstone) thought there was great force in that declaration. If it was a gain to mankind that the people of this country, in conjunction with those of the United States, should resort to the process of Arbitration adopted both at Geneva and Berlin, it was still more important, now when the whole question at Berlin had been given against us, and likewise a modified judgment at Geneva, that the world should see that our attachment to the principle

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  of arbitration was not a vulgar and sordid attachment founded on a confident expectation of success; that we valued it for its own sake; that we valued it far more than either the territory or the money involved in the dispute; and the opportunity of testing that value by the unhesitating acquiescence—nay by the cheerful and uncomplaining acquiescence—which we had endeavoured to show in those Awards, was that something might go forth to the world as a proof that there must be some real vital force in the principle that indicated and prompted conduct such as that. But let them look at another case. He did not wish to speak in tones of Pharisaic superiority, moral or intellectual, over the civilized nations of Europe. Providence had endowed England and America also with immense advantages and facilities for the propagation of the principle of arbitration, and rendered it far easier for them to apply them than in the case of Continental nations. There was really an enormous difference in all those questions of international conflict between insular and Continental Powers. It was probably owing to the great difficulties arising out of their close contact with their neighbours, and all the historic associations connected with it, that it had been found much less practicable for the nations of the Continent to give effect to Arbitration than for England and America to do so. But let him call to mind one remarkable instance of the failure of that principle which, although it came and went like a flash of lightning, was yet deserving of historical record. He referred to the outbreak of the war of 1870. What was its immediate occasion? The Hohenzollern candidature for the Crown of Spain, followed by an allegation, and with that allegation an undoubted belief prevailing in France of something in the nature of a slight or an insult personally offered. If those questions were judged in the abstract, it would be impossible to conceive questions better qualified to be disposed of by arbitration, because it was in those matters of feeling that a sensible man in private life would endeavour, when he could not settle his difficulty, to obtain the intervention of a. friend. That was the view which the British Government took in reference to the relations between Germany and France. Even
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  upon the spur of the moment they did not scruple to press upon the two Powers concerned the objects of the Treaty of Paris. Reminding them that they had given in their adhesion to arbitration as a principle, and that it was impossible there could be a more suitable occasion for the application of that principle than that which unfortunately had arisen. They were all aware of the result. However earnest and well meant the efforts of Her Majesty's Government were, they entirely failed, and the result had been written in blood upon the history of Europe. What he wanted to point out to his hon. Friend was this, that there was a practical duty connected with the Treaty of Washington that still remained unfulfilled, namely—that which related to what were called the Three Rules. In consequence of the controversies which arose last year, the proceedings connected with those Rules had been suspended. Nor was there, so far as he was able to judge, an immediate likelihood of their being resumed. He could not but think there was some advantage in bringing to a close the proceedings more immediately connected with the Arbitration before they considered the steps to be taken in relation to the Three Rules. The adoption of those Rules if they were sufficiently clear—with amendment if they were not—was a step in the direction in which his hon. Friend desired to go. But there was the utmost apprehension and danger of engendering jealousies and producing re-action by anything like precipitate proceedings in matters of this kind. He was sure that there was even now more or less of an opinion afloat among the various countries of Europe that the Three Rules were meant to give selfish expression to that which was for the interest of Great Britain and America, and not for the benefit of the States of Europe generally. The House would see the great risk we ran if, while a question of that kind was pending, we set about so extensive—he might say so ambitious—a matter as inviting the Powers of the world to adopt an arrangement for the construction of a Code of International Law and a general and permanent system of International Arbitration. Lord Palmerston saw great value in the Motion of Mr. Cobden; he (Mr. Gladstone) saw great value in the Motion of his hon. Friend; but he was convinced that this question for a long

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  time to come would only make practical progress by a steady adherence on the part of those Powers who were rightly inclined and convinced and persuaded on the subject to the principles—first, of governing themselves by justice and moderation, and next by losing no opportunity of recommending the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. He did not wish to damp or chill generous aspirations like those of his hon. Friend. There was, he knew, something invidious in endeavouring to rein him in in his career of benevolence and philanthropy. It might seem that they were jealous of his voluntary aid; but he trusted to his hon. Friend's sense of justice to attribute the course they adopted to a better motive and truer conviction. They felt the duty that was incumbent on them of doing all in their power, when the occasion arose, to recommend the principle and practice to which he had referred. But, on the other hand, there was the apprehension that the recommending even of the soundest proposition under circumstances which might give rise to a suggestion of selfish motives—however unfounded the suggestion might be—would not advance the object which they all had in view. He hoped therefore his hon. Friend would not invoke the judgment of the House on his Motion. The sentiment his hon. Friend had expressed was, he believed, the sentiment of all who heard him; but there must of necessity be great difference of opinion as to the policy and expediency of endeavouring to give effect and formal expression to that sentiment in a manner which might tend to force the Government to act and make itself responsible for submitting recommendations at an inopportune time having regard to the existing state of the circumstances of nations. Having used so many expressions tending perhaps to damp the expectations of his hon. Friend, he wished to acid one cheerful word. He felt convinced, with a sentiment to which he might almost give the elevated name of faith, for all the hope he had for humanity was so closely associated with it—he felt convinced that there was reserved for this country a great and honourable destiny in connection with this subject. They must be content to proceed step by step. They must by degrees make a character. It was to be recollected that they had not always been in the history of their
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  foreign policy distinguished for remarkable forbearance or sedulous regard for the rights of others. If they were to become effective missionaries of those principles they could only derive authority by making them their own, and by giving to them practical effect by acting on the principles of moderation, good will, and justice. If they did so, then every year would add more and more weight to the abstract doctrines they preached. It would be in this case as it was in that of Free Trade. At first it was suspected that they were Free traders only so far as it was for their advantage to be so, but they persevered, and soon it became known that the microscope could not discover the smallest remnant or fragment of exclusive privilege in their Commercial Code, and progress in the principles of Free Trade was consequently made in other countries. So also would it be here. It might not be given to those who were engaged in that discussion; it might not be given to those who then sat within the walls of the House to witness the ultimate fruit of such a course. Great and desirable results in the mixed and chequered world in which they lived were only to be achieved by the patient and persevering use of rational and appropriate means. There was not much which excited or appealed to the imagination in preaching lessons of that kind. Still, they were lessons of practical wisdom, and if happily they adhered to them, sooner or later they would not lose their reward, and nations who would profit from walking in the same path would not lose the benefit of our example.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSON *said, that as the speech of the Prime Minister seemed to be so much in favour of the Motion, he was surprised to hear him say he should vote against it.
  MR. GLADSTONEexplained that what he had recommended his hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr to do was to withdraw it.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONsaid, he did not think there was a prospect of their doing very much more; but he believed that if they could carry this Resolution, it would be one good done. He supposed that nobody would dispute the evil which was so ably depicted by the hon. Member who had brought forward this Motion; but the worst of it was that the system of keeping up enormous

  83
  hosts of armed men for the purpose of settling international disputes appeared to be getting worse instead of better. It seemed to him, moreover, that it had become the settled policy of this country, for when during last Session they challenged the large number of men kept up by the present Government, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War told them it was absolutely necessary to maintain this large body of men in the presence of the enormous military forces of the Continental nations. That meant that this country and the other nations of Europe bad as yet no better way of settling their disputes than by finding out which was the strongest—which had the greatest number and the best body of fighting men. He thought such a state of things was utterly deplorable and miserable. Why, he wondered what the Shah thought of them? They bad him over in this country the other day, and he supposed that his Majesty was brought over that they might civilize him and send him back to do good to Persia. They had taught him a number of things. They taught him to drink champagne. They carried him about and showed him all that they thought most noble. They showed him guns at Woolwich, ironclads at Portsmouth, warriors at Windsor, boxers at Buckingham Palace. In fact, they took him all round, and showed him their power and might. But there was one place they did not take him to—they did not take him to church where he might have heard a sermon proclaiming that the national religion taught them to love their enemies. He did not believe that if the Shah had been taken there, he would have believed the interpreter who told him that that was the principle of their religion. International Law was in what might be truly called a state of international anarchy. Every nation had now a law of its own. There was no overruling law to decide who was right and who was wrong and they knew what would happen if every man in every case which affected himself should be his own judge, his own jury, and his own executioner. That was the case at the present moment with regard to International Law. He ventured to differ from the Prime Minister in thinking that the Motion brought forward by Mr. Cobden 24 years ago was practically the same as that which they were now considering. That in-
  84
  structed the Minister to make treaties, whereas this Motion left him virtually free to act on the policy which he might think the best. He dared say hon. Gentlemen had read the debate which took place in 1849. On that occasion the present Lord Russell said he could not himself believe that, connected as the nations of Europe now were, we were destined to have a revival of those wars which, he thought, had been a disgrace to civilization, a disgrace to humanity, and a disgrace to that Christianity which the nations of Europe professed. There was no more far-seeing statesman in that day than Lord John Russell, but how had his prophecy been fulfilled? Why, since 1849 every one of the great European Powers had been engaged in one kind of war or another, and he did not suppose that they were near the end of them yet. They seemed to be on the brink of a mine. Look at Prussia, look at France, and they saw them ready to explode on the shortest possible notice. The main objection to any system of International Arbitration was to be found in the question, where is the power to enforce the decrees of the arbitrators? No doubt that was the great objection—he thought he should be justified in saying the only valid objection, to a measure of this kind. But if they looked to their own country, what did they find had brought about all the great changes which they had seen during the past two generations? Why, public opinion. And although the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government said he did not find that public opinion was growing on this subject, he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) ventured to think that passing such a Resolution as his hon. Friend had proposed in that House would be the way to stimulate and increase the growth of that public opinion. What they wanted in this matter was to create an international opinion. No doubt opinion in international matters, as in other matters, ultimately was supreme. It might be said that the Foreign Secretary would be repulsed in making overtures to other Powers respecting an agreement of this kind. He should say that it was better to try and fail than never to have tried at all. The dishonour would not be with those who made a rational proposition; it would remain with those who refused to accede to it. It could not lead to any more expenditure than they were carrying on at

  85
  present for warlike purposes. He regretted to say that the current of opinion in this country had prevented those who would be anxious to check great expenditure on warlike forces from doing so. Nobody supposed that the Prime Minister really was satisfied with the expenditure of this country. Nor did anybody suppose that the leader of the Opposition really approved of it. They had heard the sentiments of both on the subject. They had heard the Prime Minister's sentiment before he came into power at the last election; and they had heard the leader of the Opposition condemn, in eloquent language, the bloated armaments which were so extravagantly kept up. Now, they could not, he imagined, raise up any hostility on the part of, or give affront to, other nations by adopting a course of action which was so manifestly dictated by feelings of peace and goodwill. It might be said that they should give up the honour of the country. He did not understand that any honour was to be gained by entering into wars when they might settle matters in any other way The honour and the true statesmanship consisted in keeping out of war. He had heard what was called the "Manchester School" described as mercenary—that they did not care about the honour of the country. His hon. Friend had ably vindicated them that night. They were not mercenary, they were not blood-thirsty, and he believed that school would rather give up large sums of money than they would shed one drop of the blood of the people of this country. They did not say this country was not to be defended. They only said that there was a more excellent way of defending it than by keeping up enormous hosts of men for the settlement of any international disputes which might arise. But the greatest reason of all for attempting something of the kind proposed that night was that the present system had avowedly failed. All these preparations for settling disputes by war had not given a sense of safety and security to the people of this country. Although now and then they were told that they had everything necessary to meet any emergency which might arise, yet ever and anon they were rudely awakened by some authority stating the contrary. Why, the other day, when that great fleet appeared at Portsmouth, it was felt that now, at any rate, they had a perfect fleet, equal to all the fleets
  86
  of Europe, and that they might be satisfied. But two or three days after came a letter from Sir Spencer Robinson saying it was all sham—it could not fight. He did not say he believed Sir Spencer Robinson—but nothing satisfied them—nothing of this sort in the way of armament kept them at peace. Why, as regarded their Navy, they kept a constructor and a re-constructor of the Navy, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich. He did think that the precedent which had been alluded to already for the settlement of the Alabama Claims by means of arbitration, was in favour of the House accepting this Motion at the present time. ["No"] Somebody said "No;" but why should they say "No?" That was a longstanding, a bitter, and an envenomed dispute, and it was settled, as they knew, by arbitration; and he was ready to concur that nothing which the present Government had done had been really more widely popular with the people than the settlement of that question in the way in which it was settled. And he was entitled to say so. Who was there in that House who had dared to impugn the principles upon which that question was settled? They had had Notices given about passing votes of money for the purchase of pieces of plate for the arbitrators, and paltry things of that kind; but nobody had got up, and nobody, he believed, would get up, to make a Motion condemning the system of arbitration which was carried on on that occasion, and which would be the most honourable duty to be hereafter commemorated in connection with the present Ministry, and honourable also to hon. Gentlemen opposite and the party to whom they belonged, for they could not forget that Lord Stanley was the first to propose that arbitration. If that were so, and having gone into that arbitration and come out of it, as he freely confessed, second best, having been to a certain extent done in the matter, but having nevertheless freely and fully accepted the Award, did they not go with clean hands before other nations and say—"Now we support this system of arbitration, not that we can gain more than we have lost, but we believe the saving of blood and bad feeling and international hatred is so great that we are ready to press it upon other nations also?" He believed that Lord Granville would be willing to

  87
  accept this Motion. He did not think the right hon. Gentleman was justified in saying that his hon. Friend advocated any precipitate action in the matter. He simply wished to strengthen the hands of the Government in trying to get other nations to agree to this plan. If it would meet the views of the Prime Minister, and prevent a division on the question, he would venture to suggest that it might be well to let the Motion read thus—
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She would be graciously pleased to instruct Her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter into communication with Foreign Powers with a view to further improvement in International Law,"—omitting that part which said—"and the establishment of a general and permanent system of International Arbitration."
  He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman would agree to that. If he would, he thought the House would agree to it also. All he had to say, in conclusion, was that he did trust that the Government would not oppose this Motion, but would agree to it, so that they might do something to get rid of the present evil system, and hasten the time when the settlement of international disputes should no longer be carried on by brute force, violence, and bloodshed, but conducted in accordance with the dictates of justice and the principles of common sense.
  MR. H. RICHARD *said, that after the kind and patient attention with which the House had listened to him at the opening of this debate, he should feel that he was wanting in courtesy to the House if he were to detain it by commenting at any length upon matters of reply. He had to express his gratification with the whole tone of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. He thought the sentiments which the right hon. Gentleman had expressed would produce a salutary effect throughout Europe and the civilized world. At the same time he thought the right hon. Gentleman misinterpreted the scope of his Motion. He seemed to think that he (Mr. Richard) wanted to do something, suddenly, and violently, and extreme. But he (Mr. Richard) took pains to explain in the course of his remarks that he did not expect that what was the ultimate aim of this Resolution could be attained at once. He said they looked forward to
  88
  the time when there should be something like a Code of International Law agreed upon by the nations, and a tribunal or High Court of Nations established to administer that law. But he said at the same time that he had no expectation of realizing the hope at once, and all that he wanted was that the Government should make one step in advance by entering into communication with other Governments, with a view further to define, and settle, and adjust disputed rules of International Law, and upon that ground he felt he was bound to ask the judgment of the House upon his Motion. It could hardly, perhaps, be expected that the Government should accept at once the Resolution he had placed before the House; but it would be a great stimulus and encouragement to them if the House should affirm the Resolution, and hand it over to them as an Instruction.
  VISCOUNT ENFIELDmoved the Previous Question.
  Previous Question put, "That that Question be now put."—(Viscount Enfield.)
  The House divided:—Ayes 88; Noes 98: Majority 10.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.
  Resolved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to instruct Her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter into communication with Foreign Powers with a view to further improvement in International Law and the establishment of a general and permanent system of International Arbitration.
  To be presented by Privy Councillors.

  AYES.

  Allen, W. S.

  Colman, J. J.

  Anderson, G.

  Cowen, Sir J.

  Balfour, Sir G.

  Cunliffe, Sir R. A.

  Bass, A.

  Dalrymple, D.

  Bassett, F.

  Davies, R.

  Bazley, Sir T.

  Dent, J. D.

  Brewer, Dr.

  Dickinson, S. S.

  Bright, rt. hon. J.

  Digby, K. T.

  Bright, J. (Manchester)

  Dimsdale, R.

  Brinckman, Captain

  Dixon, G.

  Brogden, A.

  Dodson, rt. hon. J. G.

  Buckley, N.

  Ewing, H. E. Crum-

  Burrell, Sir P.

  Eykyn, R.

  Cadogan, hon. F. W.

  Fawcett, H.

  Candlish, J.

  Forster, C.

  Carter, R. M.

  Fowler, R. N.

  Cave, T.

  Fowler, W.

  Chadwick, D.

  Gilpin, C.

  Cholmeley, Captain

  Goldsmid, Sir F.

  Clifford, C. C.

  Gower, hon. E. F. L.

  89

  Gower, Lord R.

  Morrison, W.

  Grieve, J. J.

  Onslow, G.

  Hardy, J.

  Palmer, J. H.

  Headlam, rt. hon. T. E.

  Parry, L. Jones-

  Herbert, hon. A. E. W.

  Pell, A.

  Hermon, E.

  Pim, J.

  Hodgson, K. D.

  Potter, E.

  Holland, S.

  Ronayne, J. P.

  Holms, J.

  Rylands, P.

  Hoskyns, C. Wren-

  Samuelson, B.

  Illingworth, A.

  Sartoris, E. J.

  James, H.

  Seely, C. (Nottingham)

  Johnston, A.

  Shaw, R.

  Lawson, Sir W.

  Sheridan, H. B.

  Lea, T.

  Simon, Mr. Serjeant

  Leatham, E. A.

  Smith, E.

  Leeman, G.

  Stevenson, J. C.

  Leith, J. F.

  Stuart, Colonel

  Lloyd, Sir T. D.

  Taylor, P. A.

  Lubbock, Sir J.

  Tollemache, hon. F. J.

  Lush, Dr.

  Tory, J.

  M'Arthur, W.

  Tracy, hon. C. R. D.

  M'Clure, T.

  Hanbury-

  Marling, S. S.

  West, H. W.

  Melly, G.

  White, J.

  Miall, E.

  Whitwell, J.

  Milbank, F. A.

  Wingfield, Sir C.

  Miller, J.

  Mitchell, T. A.

  TELLERS.

  Morgan, G. O.

  Mundella, A. J.

  Morgan, hon. Major

  Richard, H.

  Morley, S.

  NOES.

  Adderley, rt. hn. Sir C.

  Forster, rt. hon. W. E.

  Agnew, R. V.

  Foster, W. H.

  Akroyd, E.

  Galway, Viscount

  Amphlett, R. P.

  Garnier, J. C.

  Ayrton, rt. hon. A. S.

  Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

  Baker, R. B. W.

  Gore, J. R. O.

  Barrington, Viscount

  Grant, Colonel hon. J.

  Barttelot, Colonel

  Grosvenor, hon. N.

  Bates, E.

  Guest, M. J.

  Bateson, Sir T.

  Hambro, C.

  Beresford, Colonel M.

  Henley, rt. hon. J. W.

  Bourne, Colonel

  Hibbert, J. T.

  Brassey, T.

  Hick, J.

  Brise, Colonel R.

  Holt, J. M.

  Bruce, rt. hon. H. A.

  Hutton, J.

  Bruen, H.

  Jardine, R.

  Campbell-Bannerman,

  Jones, J.

  H.

  Kavanagh, A. MacM.

  Cardwell, rt. hon. E.

  Kay-Shuttleworth,

  Carington, hn. Col. W.

  U. J.

  Cartwright, W. C.

  Kinnaird, hon. A. F.

  Cavendish, Lord F. C.

  Laird, J.

  Cavendish, Lord G.

  Liddell, hon. H. G.

  Childers, rt. hon. H.

  Lowther, J.

  Corrance, F. S.

  Lyttelton, hon. C. G.

  Corrigan, Sir D.

  Macfie, R. A.

  Cowper, hon. H. F.

  M'Lagan, P.

  Dalway, M. R.

  Maxwell, W. H.

  Dillwyn, L. L.

  Mellor, T. W.

  Duff, M. E. G.

  Miller, W.

  Dyott, Colonel R.

  Monckton, hon. G.

  Egerton, Adml. hn. F.

  Newport, Viscount

  Enfield, Viscount

  Parker, Lt.-Col. W.

  Ewing, A. Orr-

  Powell, W.

  Fielden, J.

  Read, C. S.

  Fitzmaurice, Lord E.

  Russell, Lord A.

  90

  Samuda, J. D'A.

  Wheelhouse, W. S. J.

  Simonds, W. B.

  Whitbread, S.

  Smith, F. C.

  Wilmot, Sir H.

  Smith, R.

  Winn, R.

  Stanhope, W. T. W. S.

  Winterbotham, H. S. P.

  Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.

  Wynn, C. W. W.

  Starkie, J. P. C.

  Yorke, J. R.

  Tipping, W.

  Wallace, Sir R.

  TELLERS.

  Walter, J.

  Adam, W. P.

  Whalley, G. H.

  Glyn, hon. G. G.

  PUBLIC HEALTH BILL.— [BILL. 99.]
  (Sir Charles Adderley, Mr. Francis Sharp Powell, Mr. Whitbread, Lord Robert Montagu. Mr. Stephen Cave, Mr. Richards.)

  COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  SIR CHARLES ADDERLEY,in moving that the House do go into Committee on this Bill, stated that its main object was a preparation to consolidate the law relating to the public health, and with this view to make certain amendments in various parts of the existing law which the Commissioners in their Report had declared to require alteration. It was desirable to complete amending before consolidating. The Acts of the last two Sessions had completed the machinery of local Government, and the digests of Sanitary Law made by the Department had enabled that machinery to work. This Bill proposed to fill up all that that digest showed wanting in the law, so as to put it in condition for consolidation. The Amendments of which Notice had been given were not numerous or hostile to the Bill. If the House went into Committee he should not press any portion of the measure against what he found to be the sense of the Committee.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair"—(Sir Charles Adderley.)
  MR. CORRANCE,as a sanitary reformer, opposed the Motion with great reluctance. He had formerly stated his reasons for opposing this Bill, and he would not repeat them at that late hour. The Bill was injudicious, especially in its machinery and the extraordinary powers which it gave to those who were to administer its provisions. The Bill would add to the burdens of the ratepayers, and, what was more objectionable, to the power of the Central Government. It gave the Central Govern-

  91
  ment a dangerous power—a power to override the authority and liberties of the local Government. The right hon. Gentleman was trying to thrust this Bill down their throats against the feeling of the people out-of-doors. He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman would withdraw those clauses of the Bill which conferred additional powers on local boards. There was not the smallest chance of the passing of the measure this Session in the face of the fact that the Government felt themselves obliged at that late period of the Session to withdraw many of their own important measures. He would therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw it. He would at once do so, he believed; but he was supported by the President of the Local Government Board. But it was that right hon. Gentleman's duty to bring forward a Bill on so important a subject, and not leave it in the hands of a private Member. He moved that the Order for Committee be discharged.
  MR. F. S. POWELLreminded the House that the Bill was introduced at an early period of the Session, and was delayed to this comparatively late period by the opposition of a single Member under the operation of a well-known Rule of the House. He would remind those country Gentlemen who opposed the Bill that this was not the time to oppose themselves to proposals which went to improve the social condition of the agricultural classes of this country. They had three powerful diseases to contend with—namely, consumption, rheumatism, and typhoid fever, and this Bill was intended to deal with them effectually by measures carefully devised, with a view to their prevention. The country Gentlemen of England desired to improve the health and the wealth of the people, and particularly of the agricultural labourers, and he did hope they would not refuse the boon which they were asked to grant. He was old enough to remember the time when the cry of "foreign competition" was raised in answer to arguments in favour of a free trade policy. That cry degenerated into a panic and in the end was derided as a mere hobgoblin argument. Taught by this experience he hoped the local taxation hobby-horse would not be ridden too hard. Hon. Members might depend upon it that if
  92
  they did not take heed this cry likewise would become a mere hobgoblin. They did not desire to increase the taxation of the people, and no increase, he thought, would be necessary under this Bill, which did not create one new office, or render necessary the appointment of one additional officer; but even if it were, then, he said, let them consider whether the game was not worth the candle. He desired to increase the physical energies of the people, being well assured that there was no resource more productive of wealth than the energies of a vigorous and stalwart race.
  MR. PELLsaid, that as yet the rural sanitary authorities of the country had not had time to master the digest of the sanitary laws which had been sent to them; and he hoped there would not be an undue disposition to rely too much upon legislation on the matter, but that greater attention to cleanliness would be paid. He would allow that legislation, so far as it had gone on this subject, had not been altogether satisfactory, and it was almost trifling with it to attempt at this period of the Session to proceed further with the Bill. There were provisions in. it of which he could not approve, especially those which depended upon chemical analyses. He would advise that the Bill should not be carried further, and would therefore support the Amendment.
  MR. D. DALRYMPLEsaid, that though he did not approve of the Bill, he did not take upon himself the responsibility of opposing it, as it was a measure that at least went in the right direction, and any delay in passing it would be, so far, a circumstance to be regretted.
  COLONEL BARTTELOTconsidered that at the present advanced period of the Session it was utterly impossible to discuss with any practical result a measure of this extensive scope and magnitude. The question was one to be introduced by the Government, and not by a private Member.
  MR. STANSFELDsaid, that his right hon. Friend (Sir Charles Adderley) was the Chairman of the Sanitary Commission which sat for two years, and whose invaluable Report was the basis of the measure which the Local Government Board passed last year. The rest of the Report of the Commission was embodied in the clauses of the present Bill. He

  93
  had fully explained, when asked whether he intended to bring forward a measure on this subject, that the pressure of other business did not leave him sufficient time for undertaking the task. He had always declined to make this a party question, and held himself as free to give his support to a measure brought forward by a hon. Member on the opposite side of the House as to one emanating from the party to which he had the honour to belong. Considering the position of his right hon. Friend opposite on this question, it was due to him in point of courtesy and fairness to allow him to take his Bill into Committee. One objection to the Bill was that it would add to local burdens. But let them go into Committee and test that objection. He maintained that there was no clause in the Bill which would add one farthing to local rates in respect of the appointment of any new sanitary officers, and he hoped hon. Gentlemen would withdraw their opposition, and allow it to go into Committee.
  VISCOUNT GALWAYsaid, great credit was due to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Charles Adderley) for the services he had rendered to the country on this question; but, inasmuch as the Bill of last year was working well, and looking at the advanced period of the Session, he should support his hon. Friend's Motion against the House going into Committee on the Bill.
  DR. LUSHsupported the Motion for going into Committee.
  MR. J. G. TALBOTsaid, he appealed to the hon. Member for East Suffolk (Mr. Corrance) not to press his Motion to a division, and suggested that the object of the hon. Member and his Friends might be attained upon the clauses in Committee. With regard to the country and town districts, in his opinion the towns were much more in need of sanitary reform than the country. He should be sorry if it were to appear to the country that any section of the Members of that House was opposed to sanitary reform; and he therefore hoped his hon. Friend would not divide the House on the question.
  MR. CLARE READconcurred with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Charles Adderley), that this question of sanitary reform thould not be made a "party" question; but he must remind the right hon. Gentleman that he op-
  94
  posed the Birmingham Sewage Bill, the object of which was sanitary reform. It was only last year that an Act was passed repealing 25 or 26 Acts of Parliament. Instead of tinkering with this matter, the House ought to have a thorough reconstruction of the Acts of Parliament upon this subject, and the Government might advantageously turn their attention to the subject in the Recess.
  MR. HIBBERTsuggested a compromise—namely, to allow the Bill to go now into Committee, and merely to pass the Preamble of the Bill on the present occasion.
  MR. HENLEYsaid, it was most unfortunate that these sanitary systems were being patched, and he did not think the right hon. Gentleman would like to have another patch next year. He was not responsible for this Bill, which referred to clauses in another Bill, and the result of that kind of legislation was to produce a fresh batch of Bills to amend other Bills. Many of the clauses imposed conditions which were utterly impracticable, and he very much doubted whether at that period of the Session it was prudent to press such a measure.
  MR. DIMSDALEsaid, he thought it was impossible to consider the clauses of a Bill of this importance at so late an hour. He should therefore move the adjournment of the debate.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. Dimsdale.)
  The House divided:—Ayes 36; Noes 92: Majority 56.
  Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
  MR. KNIGHT,believing that the Local Government Bill of last year had proved a curse instead of a blessing to the country, and that the present Bill would only make matters worse, begged to move that the House do now adjourn.
  Motion made, and Question, "That this House do now adjourn,"—(Mr. Knight,)—put, and negatived.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHappealed to his right hon. Friend (Sir Charles Adderley) not to press the Bill further. It was ridiculous to go into Committee at 1 o'clock, especially as every clause of it would be objected to.
  SIR CHARLES ADDERLEYsaid, he would consent to reporting Progress so soon as the Preamble was postponed.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  Committee report Progress.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House will, upon Friday next, again resolve itself into the said Committee."
  Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "Friday," in order to insert the words "Tuesday the 12th day of August,"—(Mr. James Lowther,)—instead thereof.
  Question put, "That the word 'Friday' stand part of the Question."
  The House divided:—Ayes 74; Noes 24: Majority 50.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.
  Resolved, That this House will, upon Friday next, again resolve itself into the said Committee.

  HABITUAL DRUNKARDS BILL— [BILL. 11.]
  (Mr. Donald Dalrymple, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Akroyd, Mr. Clara Read, Mr. Miller, Mr. Downing.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  MR. D. DALRYMPLE, in moving that the Order for the Second Reading be discharged, said, he hoped that when he brought forward the measure next Session he might obtain some assistance from the Government.
  MR. BRUCEregretted that his hon. Friend was unable to proceed with the Bill this Session, but was pleased to find that it was his intention to re-introduce it next Session. All the evidence proved there was a real want to be supplied; but of the machinery for supplying it he could not as yet express an opinion.
  Order discharged; Bill withdrawn.
  House adjourned at half after One o'clock.

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Report—Improvement of Land.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Gas and Water Works Facilities Act, 1870, Amendment* (201).
Second Reading—Canada Loan Guarantee (183); National Debt Commissioners (Annuities)* (191); Blackwater Bridge* (197); Prison Officers Superannuation (Ireland)* (192).
Committee—Report—Slave Trade (East African Courts)* (187); Slave Trade (Consolidation)* (188).
Report—Ecclesiastical Commissioners* (200).

PRIVILEGE—THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THIS HOUSE—SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE BILL.
EARL GRANVILLE: Before we proceed to the Orders of the Day, I wish to make an appeal to the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Cairns). I prefer doing it now to waiting till his Notice comes on, and I make the appeal with the more confidence because it re-
2
later to a Bill on which the noble and learned Lord co-operated with great fairness with my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, in order to attain an object of importance to this House, and of the greatest importance with regard to the administration of justice in this country. The noble and learned Lord proposes—
"To call the attention of the House to the change in the proposals of the Government in reference to the Appellate Jurisdiction of this House which has been made since the Judicature Bill passed through this House, and to the consequences involved in this change; and to ask the Government whether they intend, and at what time, in the present Session to lay before this House a complete scheme for regulating appeals in Scotland and Ireland analogous to the appellate system for England contained in the Judicature Bill."
It is impossible not to understand that the first portion of this Notice refers to certain proceedings going on in the House of Commons at the present moment. Now, I have always been led to believe that, though the practice in matters of this kind is similar in both

3
Houses, and though, in some respects, we are much more loose in the observance of points of Order than the other House, we ought in anything that regulates the relations of the two Houses to be equally scrupulous with them as to the mode in which we act. I have taken some pains to ascertain, and a combination of authorities satisfies me beyond all doubt, that such a Notice would not have been allowed to remain on the Votes of the other House. I think it is obvious, therefore, that it cannot be in accordance with the practice of your Lordships' House. I am quite aware that it is easy by ingenious devices to overcome any difficulty as to reference to the other House. I should deprecate that on the part of any Member of this House, and I am quite sure that the noble and learned Lord, in his position in this House, and having occupied with great distinction a post in which he superintended our discussions, would avoid any practice of that sort. I am informed by one of the most distinguished Members of the House of Commons—a Member perfectly independent of Her Majesty's Government—that the person of highest authority there would feel himself in considerable embarrassment in maintaining the universally acknowledged practice with regard to references to this House if Notices of this kind were given here. It is obvious that if we begin, retaliation will follow; and that, however convenient for us to anticipate a discussion to come on on any particular Bill, inconvenience and mischief would arise with regard to the mutual practice of the two Houses. I therefore venture to point out to the noble and learned Lord the difficulties of the position in which we should find ourselves, and to appeal to his sense of what is right in this matter not to go against the practice in the House of Commons, and which, I believe, is equally the practice of your Lordships' House.
LORD CAIRNS: I feel grateful to the noble Earl for the caution which he has been kind enough to give me, and shall endeavour to profit by it. I should have thought it more convenient if the noble Earl had waited to hear what I had to say before suggesting that what I was about to say would be out of Order. There is, however, this difference between the noble Earl and me. I have
4
had the advantage of hearing what he has said, and I venture to suggest that nothing is more out of Order than for the Leader of this House to tell us that he has consulted the authorities in the House of Commons, and that when their practice differs from ours our duty is to follow it.
EARL GRANVILLE: I protest against the remark of the noble and learned Lord. Wishing to know what was the undoubted practice of the other House, I ascertained it from those most likely to tell me; and to imagine that to ascertain a fact in that way is an insult to your Lordships' House shows the very great difficulty which the noble and learned Lord has in making the slightest answer to the points which I submitted to him.

CANADA LOAN (GUARANTEE) BILL.
(The Earl of Kimberley.)

(NO. 183.) SECOND READING.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY,in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, that the purpose of the Bill was to guarantee the payment of a loan to be raised by the Government of Canada for the construction of public works, and to repeal the Canada Defences Loan Act, 1870. He would remind their Lordships that during the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Washington, the Dominion Government abstained from pressing their claim to compensation for the Fenian Raids, on account of the resolute refusal of the United States Government to entertain it; and they subsequently suggested that a guarantee by this country would be a mark of goodwill to Canada, and would facilitate the steps necessary to give effect to the Treaty. They also suggested that the guarantee authorized by the Canada Defences Loan Act, 1870, to the loan of £1,100,000 to be raised by the Dominion Government for the purposes of fortification and defences—no part of which had, however, been borrowed—should be cancelled or rather transferred to the execution of works of a peaceful character. They further proposed the commutation of a certain sum promised for armaments—bringing up the total sum proposed to be guaranteed to £4,000,000. Her Majesty's Govern-

5
ment agreed to transfer the guarantee of the sum for defences to the execution of works of a peaceful and productive character, but they did not think the sum for armaments could properly be included; and they ultimately agreed to propose a guarantee of £3,600,000—that was to say, of a further sum of £2,500,000 in addition to the £1,100,000 already guaranteed—to be expended in the improvement of canals and in the construction of a railway connecting the present railway system of Canada with the Pacific—connecting Canada with the Hudson's Bay territory, the North-west territory, and British Columbia. The Government, while thinking Canada bound to use its utmost efforts to defend itself—as it had gallantly done—thought this an exceptional case in which some assistance should be given; for the Fenian Raids, though as contemptible in their execution as they were wanton and unprovoked, and though repelled by the Canadians themselves with some help from the Imperial Government, involved an expense not to be measured by the actual injury perpetrated; and they were not directed against or caused by any Canadian policy, but arose out of the relations of this country with Ireland. However wise, moreover, it might be to abstain from guarantees, it must be remembered that the Dominion Government had undertaken the government of vast territories—a task which necessitated efficient means of communication throughout—and for this purpose this gigantic railway, which would be 2,900 miles in length, had been undertaken. The territory to be traversed had been described as barren, but there were few richer territories than the belt of the Saskatchewan. They were decidedly superior to Minnesota, whose progress had been unequalled in American colonization; and though the climate was rude there was no difficulty in producing corn and cattle. He believed a stream of emigration would before long be directed thither. The Dominion Government proposed to raise the sum of £8,000,000 sterling, to be expended in the construction of the Pacific Railway, and on the enlargement and improvement of the Canadian canals, and to make concessions of land for the line, the construction of which within 10 years was a condition on which British Columbia had acceded to the Confeder-
6
tion. The Imperial guarantee would enable Canada to effect a loan at lower interest than would otherwise be necessary, and her finances were in a condition which caused no misgiving as to her ability to bear the expense. It was not unreasonable, therefore, that we should to a certain extent help her with our own credit. The Canadian Government intended hereafter to construct the fortifications for which the loan of £1,100,000 was proposed; but they thought it inopportune to do this at a time when relations with the United States had been put on a mature and. amicable basis, and. one of the most eminent of Canadian statesmen (the late Sir George Cartier) had expressed to him strongly his opinion that the defence of a small portion of frontier would be useless until complete and efficient communications between the different parts of the Dominion had been effected. With respect to the allegation that this guarantee was a bribe to the Canadians to forego their claims upon the United States on account of the Fenian Raids, he altogether repudiated such an imputation. The Bill was the result of Imperial policy—it was based on sound and sufficient grounds, and would place Canada and the other provinces of the Dominion in a state of permanent peace and tranquillity. That policy was not attributable to any one party or Ministry in this country. It had been promoted by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon), by his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs when he was at the head of the Colonial Office, and by his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War; and since he had himself been at the Colonial Office he had done his best to carry it out. The Treaty of Washington was on the whole greatly beneficial to Canada—in particular the provisions that secured to the Dominion the free import of fish and fish oil into the United States. Canada, moreover, was interested in the settlement of the differences between England and the United States, and though this country had reserved its right to bring forward the Canadian claim at a future time, there was no outstanding question between the Dominion and the United States. Congratulating his predecessors and the country on the confederation of the North American Provinces, he would

7
further express his hope that the work would soon be completed by the adhesion of Newfoundland. He thought it a matter for congratulation to the colonists that they had thus risen superior to local jealousies; and he would conclude by inviting the House to show its goodwill to the Dominion, and promote the accomplishment of the work by passing the Bill.
Moved that the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Kimberley.)
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he would join his noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies in repudiating the unworthy suggestion that had somehow gained circulation, that this guarantee was in the nature of a bribe. He knew that the Government of this country—from whatever party it might be constituted—was incapable of offering any such inducement; and he was equally convinced that the Government of the Dominion was equally incapable of accepting one. It was a matter of Imperial policy, and was one of the conditions for the entry of British Columbia into the Confederation. He had no special love for guarantees, and if his memory did not deceive him the right hon. Gentleman now at the head of the Government and his Chancellor of the Exchequer had both in former times been eloquent in denouncing them; he should nevertheless give his support to the present proposition, believing that it was calculated to produce great advantage in consolidating the Empire. He did not think the proposed railway so doubtful a scheme as some people considered it; for, notwithstanding the enormous tract of country through which the line would pass, the engineering difficulties were few, while there could be no doubt it would open up a vast country of great fertility and mineral wealth. He dissented, however, from the noble Earl's opinion that the construction of the fortifications would be inopportune at the present moment; for notwithstanding the good understanding that now prevailed, he held that every country had a right to fortify its frontier without being supposed to menace its neighbours. He had doubts as to the propriety of the transfer of a former guarantee, though his last conversation with Sir George Cartier partly removed them; but he supported the Bill
8
in consideration of the difficulties under which Canada had accepted the Treaty of Washington, and the vast importance of the consolidation of the Confederation. When he considered, moreover, that the loan was to be borrowed by the Canadian Government on the security of the consolidated revenue fund of Canada, so that, should the railway prove a failure in a pecuniary sense the loss would not fall on us, he thought the guarantee might be given without much danger.
THE DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOSsaid, that having some personal knowledge of the subject from his former connection with the Colonial Office, and from his acquaintance with eminent Canadian statesmen, he desired to express his full approval of the Bill. He approved especially of the diversion of the guarantee, given for constructing fortifications, to the construction of railways and reproductive works. He had always regretted that the first step of the Canadian Government should be to apply her resources to the erection of defences, which, however valuable in a military point of view, could only protect isolated parts of the frontier. He maintained that the strength of the Dominion rested in developed resources, increased population, and perfect means of communication, and that a railway promoting these objects would be the best provision for a contingency which recent transactions, though not altogether to be approved, had made very remote.
Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a acordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Thursday next.

RAILWAY AND CANAL TRAFFIC BILL.—(Nos. 172–211.)

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS CONSIDERED.
  Commons amendments to Lords amendments and Commons reasons for disagreeing to one of the amendments made by the Lords considered (according to order).
  Commons amendments to Lords amendments agreed to.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONasked their Lordships to waive the Amendment in Clause 25, to which the Commons disagreed. The clause as originally drawn gave power to the Commissioners, "if they think fit," at the instance of any party to the proceedings before them,

  9
  to state a case in writing for the opinion of a Superior Court upon any question of law. Their Lordships, however, struck out the words "may also, if they think fit," and inserted "shall," making the direction absolute instead of discretionary. To this Amendment the Commons disagreed, giving as their reasons that the Amendment would give rise to vexatious and costly litigation, which might he made use of to render the Bill inoperative; and secondly, because the matter might safely be left to the discretion of the Commissioners. The Government had been willing to accept the Amendment with some alterations; but both sides of the other House were agreed in treating it as inexpedient. He certainly thought that the absolute power of appeal would give an immense advantage to the Railway Companies, who possessed a power of the purse with which it would be vain for an individual to contend. He thought, further, that it was not clear whether this power did not extend to arbitration cases.
  Moved, not to insist on the Amendment in Clause 25 to which the Commons have disagreed.—(The Lord President.)
  THE DUKE OF RICHMONDsaid, he was sorry he could not agree in the course which the Lord President proposed, and which was not that which had the sanction of the Lord Chancellor on a former occasion, for the noble and learned Lord supported the Amendment which made the granting an appeal compulsory. As to the argument about the power of the purse possessed by Railway Companies, if it applied at all it applied universally, and a Railway Company ought not to be allowed an appeal on any occasion whatever. Under these circumstances, he hoped their Lordships would insist on their Amendment.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, it was true that, on a former occasion, he gave an opinion that it was desirable there should be a right of appeal in all cases; but it would be an exaggeration of that opinion to say that he would accept the responsibility of advising their Lordships to resist the other House on such a matter. He would not advise their Lordships to differ from the Commons, though perhaps if he had been in the House of Commons he should
  10
  have advised that House not to differ from their Lordships.
  LORD CAIRNSthought it most undesirable that the appeal should be left to the discretion of the Commissioners. One man might grant it in every case, while another, resenting the notion that he could be wrong, would endeavour invariably to refuse it. He urged that the security to be given for costs would prevent improper appeals, and would propose the insertion of words which in arbitration cases would leave an appeal to the discretion of the Commissioners.
  LORD HOUGHTONadvocated adherence to the Amendment, on the ground that if the Commissioners had the power of refusing appeals they might incur discredit by being supposed to exercise it unduly.
  On Question, Whether to insist? their Lordships divided:—Contents 79; Not-Contents 63: Majority 16.
  Resolved in the Affirmative.
  An amendment made to the said amendment; and a Committee appointed to prepare reasons to be offered to the Commons for the Lords insisting on their amendment: The Committee to meet on Thursday next, at a quarter before Five o'clock.

PRIVILEGE—THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THIS HOUSE—SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE BILL.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD CAIRNSrose, pursuant to Notice, to call the attention of the House to the change in the proposals of the Government in reference to the appellate jurisdiction of this House which has been made since the Judicature Bill passed through this House, and to the consequences involved in this change; and to ask the Government whether they intend, and at what time, in the present Session, to lay before this House a complete scheme for regulating appeals in Scotland and Ireland analogous to the appellate system for England contained in the Judicature Bill, and said: My Lords, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at an earlier part of the evening called your Lordships attention to a question of Order to what he said I was about to state. Now, my Lords, it appeared to me then as it appears now, whether I should not have done

  11
  right to bring on my Notice as a question of Privilege before the Orders of the Day; but as the Orders were not numerous, and were not likely to occupy much time, I was content to allow them to pass unchallenged. Referring, then, to the Notice I have given, I wish to call your Lordships' attention to a matter which, in my opinion, deeply concerns, not only the Judicature of this country, but also the Privileges of your Lordships' House. The Judicature Bill is so fresh in your Lordships' mind that I need do nothing more than mention one or two circumstances with regard to it which are necessary for my present purpose. The Judicature Bill, which was introduced in this House, was founded mainly upon the recommendations of the Judicature Commission. As to the majority of the proposals contained in that Bill it may be truly said that the public opinion was to a great extent fully matured. That Bill dealt with the Superior Courts of the First Instance in this country—it consolidated them—it amalgamated or "fused" the systems of law which they had to administer. It also proposed to deal with what, up to the time of its introduction, had been the intermediate Courts of Appeal—it amalgamated and strengthened the elements of which they were constituted—and formed one Court of Appeal, the decisions of which should be final and irreversible. The system, so far as England is concerned, which that Bill provided was a complete system. I do not now intend to enter upon any questions which might arise as to the various provisions of the Bill. I am well aware that many of your Lordships were not altogether satisfied with that part of it which—to use an expression somewhat common, though perhaps not altogether correct—took away your Lordships' jurisdiction. But whatever may have been individual opinions as to that or other parts of the Bill, no doubt the system provided by the Bill was, so far as England is concerned, clear, distinct, and complete. The measure, however, made no provision which dealt with any part of the Judicature of Scotland or Ireland, and—without in any way wishing to raise any argument ad hominem against my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, but with the view of reminding your Lordships of the nature of the information which we received from him, I shall take the liberty of
  12
  mentioning what fell from my noble and learned Friend upon this part of the question. The noble and learned Lord in introducing the Bill to your Lordships' House in that part of his most lucid and able speech in which he entered at length into the advantages of a system under which we should have a Court of First Instance and one irreversible appeal from that Court, said—
  "I do not propose to deal by this Bill with the appeals from Scotland or Ireland. Those countries have each their own system of jurisprudence and judicature, with which, so far as their original jurisdiction is concerned, this Bill does not in any way deal. Furthermore, the evidence given before your Lordships' Committee last year by gentlemen conversant with the practice of appeals from Scotland was to the effect that no change was desired in that country. I think the views entertained by the people of Scotland on this subject are entitled to very great respect; it would be an unwise and unnecessary thing to propose changes applicable to that country which the public opinion of that country does not require. As to Ireland, there was also no evidence that any change was wanted. I do not, of course, conceal from myself that if you establish in England a thoroughly good appellate jurisdiction, and find that it works as we hope it will work, opinion both in Scotland and Ireland may probably hereafter tend to the application and adoption of the same system in those countries."—[3 Hansard ccxiv. 348–9.]
  Nothing can be more satisfactory than that exposition of the principle on which my noble and learned Friend acted, and I have no doubt that these are still his views on the matter. But upon the second reading of the Bill the noble and learned Lord went a little further. He said—
  "With regard, however, to Irish and Scotch appeals, there were constitutional objections to transferring that portion of their Lordships' jurisdiction to what might be represented as an English Court, unless that transfer were made by the desire or with the approval of the two countries. The Act of Union with Scotland expressly provided that no appeals from that country should be decided by an English Court. With that provision standing in the Act of Union with Scotland it would have been a more dangerous question than he should like to raise in this Bill if the Government had proposed to transfer to the new Court of Appeal the power of reviewing the decisions of the Scotch Courts without first ascertaining that such a transfer would be approved by the people of Scotland. A similar objection also applied to Ireland. It could hardly be forgotten by their Lordships that in the last century a sharp controversy between the English and Irish Bar arose out of the authority assumed by the Court of Queen's Bench in England to act as a Court of Appeal

  13
  in Irish cases. That was ultimately solved in favour of the authority of the Irish House of Lords, and in the Act of Union it was provided that Irish appeals should be brought to the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. If it were now proposed to transfer Irish cases to the Court proposed to be established, the Government might inadvertently and unadvisedly revive that controversy which was settled by the Act of Union, and in the ever-varying currents of opinion in Ireland, with the demand for Home Rule, they might have brought a hornet's nest about them if they had raised that question. If, however, Parliament should now establish a Court such as may commend its judgments, its constitution, its wisdom, and its authority to public opinion both in Scotland and Ireland, and especially if the Court should be established in such a manner as to admit of the introduction of the best elements of the Scotch and Irish Judicatures, they might, after ripe experience, look forward eventually to the further development of that as well as of other parts of the measure. At present it seemed better that their Lordships should begin to do what they saw to be practicable, hoping that if the new Court began well all further improvements would in the result naturally follow, seeing that such improvements, once begun, had a natural tendency to increase and develope themselves."—[3 Hansard, ccxiv. 1738–9.]
  These observations of my noble and learned Friend were well known throughout the three kingdoms; and so far from giving rise to any disappointment or disapprobation in either Scotland or Ireland, I ant not aware that they have been received otherwise than with approval by the people of those countries. Your Lordships may recollect that the Bill was referred to a Select Committee of the House. Upon that Committee I had the honour of serving. It was a very large Committee, and upon it were several of my noble and learned Friends; in addition to whom, however, was a very large number of what I may call the non-legal Members of the House; and I can only say that in my experience of Select Committees of this House I have never seen a Committee where the attendance was so full, and where the consideration of a Bill was so careful. The Committee sat front day to day, the Members of it assembled at the earliest possible hour, and sat through the whole of the day; the Bill having been so considered was reported to your Lordships' House, and passed the third reading. I recollect, that at the conclusion of the Committee, the noble Earl opposite said—and the statement is one in which your Lordships will all concur—that the passage of the Bill through this House was creditable to the House;
  14
  that the great object of all appeared to be to facilitate the passage of the measure, subjecting it to a fair, proper, and wholesome criticism at the right time for doing so. But before the Bill left this House a circumstance occurred to which I must refer. Immediately before the third reading of the Bill the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees (Lord Redesdale) proposed a Resolution of which he had given Notice, and that Motion he pressed to a division. The Resolution of my noble Friend was to the effect that one tribunal of ultimate appeal for the hearing of disputed suits from the Courts of all the three kingdoms is more advantageous than separate tribunals for such appeals. Some discussion occurred on that Resolution. I recollect saying that I regretted not being able to support the proposal of the noble Lord, because it appeared to me that its ultimate consequence would be to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to be created by the Bill to appeals from Scotland and Ireland, which I considered that the House had clearly indicated its intention not to do. I must assume that an opinion on the subject similar to my own prevailed also with Her Majesty's Government, for I find that on the division the Motion of the noble Lord was voted against by my noble and learned Friend the Lord. Chancellor, the Marquess of Lansdowne, the Earl of Camperdown, the Marquess of Ripon, Earl Granville, the Earl of Kimberley, the Earl of Morley, Viscount Halifax, the late Lord Chancellor, and others, Members of Her Majesty's Government. The result was that the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees was placed in a minority, and his Resolution was rejected. We are now informed—indeed, I believe I may say we have Parliamentary Notice, being furnished with the proceedings of what goes on in the other House—but, at all events, we know that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government now is that the Court which was created by this Bill as it passed your Lordships' House is to be made a Court of Appeal for Scotland and Ireland as well as for England. That is to say, that that which it was so expressly stated was not to be done will now be done, and that the vote of this House which declared the adoption of the Resolution of the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees to be inexpe-

  15
  dient is to be overruled. The first observation which I wish to make on the subject is that, in my opinion, the course which has been taken by Her Majesty's Government, though no doubt undesigned, is at the same time a clear, a palpable, and a most serious infringement of the privileges of this House. I have always understood the rule to be this—that it is a Privilege of your Lordships' House that any Bill affecting the limits of the jurisdiction of the House must be commenced in this House, and that having commenced here it cannot be altered elsewhere. This privilege of your Lordships' House is by no means an antiquated privilege which has abated from desuetude, or been abandoned from indisposition to assert it. It never has been departed from in any manner, but has, within the memory of many noble Lords around me, been asserted and allowed. In 1851, when there was before the House of Commons a Bill for the improvement of the Court of Chancery, which contained a clause empowering this House to require the assistance of the Equity in the same manner as it required the assistance of the Common Law Judges in hearing appeals, Lord Lyndhurst called the attention of your Lordships' House to the proposal, which he declared to be a breach of the privileges of your Lordships' House. That appears to be a tolerably harmless provision. It was taking away nothing from the power of this House, but Lord Lyndhurst called the attention of the House to it as a question of Privilege. I find that on the 23rd of June in that year a debate took place on the subject, and Lord Lyndhurst on that occasion, in moving that it be referred to the Committee of Privileges to consider and report what course should be taken, said—
  "This House and the other House of Parliament had been always jealous of any invasion of their privileges, and it was certainly important (particularly at the present moment, when they saw what was passing around them) that their Lordships should exercise caution and vigilance in the maintenance of their just rights and privileges. He had always understood that it was a principle and part of the policy of Parliament that no Bill, affecting in any manner, even remotely, the rights of the Peerage, or of their Lordships' House, the jurisdiction and authority of this House, the manner in which that jurisdiction should be exercised, or the parties employed to sit in that jurisdiction, should originate in the other House of Parliament. That was a principle stated in very distinct terms by
  16
  Sir William Blackstone (1 Blackstone, 168), and by many other writers who had directed their attention to the subject of the constitution; and in consequence of that principle he now took the liberty of addressing their Lordships."—[3 Hansard, cxvii. 1069–70.]
  It may be as well that I should read to your Lordships the statement of Sir William Blackstone on the subject. It is somewhat fuller than it was necessary for Lord Lyndhurst to quote for the purpose which he then had in view. The statement of Sir William Blackstone was as follows—
  "All Bills likewise which may in their consequences any way affect the right of the Peerage are by the custom of Parliament to have their first rise and beginning in the House of Peers and to suffer no changes or amendments in the House of Commons."
  Lord Lyndhurst continued on the occasion to which I am referring—
  "Their Lordships were aware (it was a matter of perfect notoriety—it had appeared in the Votes of the other House")—
  That, my Lords, can scarcely be out of Order in 1873 which was perfectly in Order in 1851—
  "That a Bill had been brought into the other House for the purpose of improving the administration of justice in the Court of Chancery."
  Lord Lyndhurst went on to say—
  "Thus far he concurred in the objects of the Bill. The question which remained was, how this assistance was to be obtained? He was quite sure, with reference to the principle he had before stated, it ought not to be obtained through the medium of any Bill introduced into the other House of Parliament. The Bill to which he had referred contained a provision that certain persons should attend their Lordships' House to hear appeals; that they should be summoned; and that, in accordance with such summons, they should attend their Lordships and give their advice and assistance. Could anything be more inconsistent with the known privileges of their Lordships' House, than such a provision in a Bill introduced in the other House? It related to their Lordships' jurisdiction—it related to the manner in which that jurisdiction was to be exercised—it related to persons to assist in the exercise of that jurisdiction. Applying those facts to the principle he had before stated, he begged to say, with some confidence, that it was a direct invasion of the privileges of their Lordships' House."—[3 Hansard, cxvii. 1071.]
  At the time the late Marquess of Lansdowne was the Leader of the Government in this House, and the noble Earl the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who now leads the House, sat beside the Marquess of Lansdowne as a Member of the Government. The

  17
  discussion continued, and the Lord Chancellor of the day (Lord Truro) said that—
  "The Bill was prepared with an earnest desire to avoid all infringement upon their Lordships' privileges. Although it was quite true that the ancient Judges were in the habit of attending that House, they were in truth the persons who prepared the Bills. When the House had resolved that a law should be adopted for a particular intent and purpose, the Judges prepared the Bill, but this practice not being the case in modern times, the Judges only attended when summoned. The purport of his clause in the Bill which gave occasion to his noble and learned Friend's observations was that the Vice Chancellors and the Master of the Rolls should attend in like manner as the Judges of the Courts of Common Law, and should in like manner give advice and assistance by their opinion upon all questions prepared for their consideration. If the clause should be found to interfere with their Lordships' privileges he trusted it would be so modified as to secure those privileges from any interference whatever.
  "Lord LYNDHURST stated that he had no objection to the substance of the clause; he only wished it to be carried into effect in a constitutional way. It ought not to be introduced into a Bill coming from the House of Commons.
  "The Marquess of LANSDOWNE said. He could assure the noble and learned Lord that the clauses of which he complained had not been inserted in the Bill with any view of violating the privileges of their Lordships House; nor could it be accurately stated that their privileges had been violated until the Bill came up to them containing this objectionable clause. Until the Bill came up to them from the House of Commons, their Lordships were not in a state to say that any clause had been improperly inserted in the Bill by the House of Commons. He had no objection to the Motion.
  "Lord STANLEY vindicated the course pursued by his noble Friend. …. But the argument of the noble Marquess was entirely opposed to the argument of the noble Lord on the Woolsack, who did not consider the clause one violating their privileges, but one which had been studiously framed not to infringe them in any respect.
  "The Duke of RICHMOND claimed the right of the House of Lords to insert money clauses in their Bills. It was a privilege which they always claimed, although it was contested by the House of Commons. The latter Assembly had given directions that any Bill with money clauses inserted should be kicked to the Bar by their Speaker. Of late they had not been so uncourteous. But if this Bill came up with the clause referred to contained in it, he would move that the Lord Chancellor kick it to the Bar.
  "The Marquess of LANSDOWNE intimated the intention of the Government to have the clause withdrawn."—[3 Hansard, cxvii. 1073–75.]
  The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) requires a precedent for the course which I am now pursuing, and I think I have furnished hint with one, which it
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  is not only allowable but absolutely necessary to follow in the present instance. I say so because if we wait until the Bill comes back to us we shall be too late—I mean too late for those who have any good will towards the measure, as I have; because, if the Bill comes up from the other House with a provision which infringes the Privileges of your Lordships' House, it will not become a question of agreement or disagreement with the Commons' Amendments, a question of a Conference or advancing Reasons one way or the other—for no House of Parliament would submit to have its privileges thus dealt with by the other branch of the Legislature. Each House of Parliament is the judge of its own privileges. Let me remind your Lordships of the rule which has been laid down by Lord Coke, and which has been invariably acted upon—
  "Whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament ought to be discussed and adjudged in that House to which it relates, and not elsewhere."
  Now, if a Bill which infringes the Privileges of this House comes up from the other House of Parliament we cannot amend it and we cannot disagree from the Amendments made in it on a question of Privilege. There is only one course which, as far as I know, can be adopted by this House, and that is, to lay the Bill aside. It would be too late to do anything else when the Bill conies up here; and it is therefore important that attention should at once be called to the matter, in order that the provision to which I am referring may be withdrawn while it can be withdrawn.
  And now, my Lords, I want to know what is the reason why this infringement of the Privileges of this House should be attempted? Is it to carry out to its logical consequences anything that has been done by your Lordships already? I will show you that not only is that not the case, but that the proposed change will entirely overthrow the principles on which we have proceeded. What were the grounds on which your Lordships were called to agree to the cessation of appeals from England coming to this House? The grounds were two. One ground was advanced much more by my noble and learned Friend the late Lord Chancellor in connection with the measure which he brought forward last year than by my noble and

  19
  learned Friend on the Woolsack this year. That ground was that so long as you have in this country a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council hearing appeals from the Colonies, and this House hearing appeals from the United Kingdom, you have two co-ordinate and final Courts of Appeal, both of whose decisions are irreversible, and that there was therefore a possibility of collision between those two co-ordinate powers. The ground—and, as I think, the more solid ground—urged with great force by my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack this year was that it was a good thing in itself to have as perfect a hearing in a Court of First Instance as could be secured, and as strong a Court of Appeal as could be created. My noble and learned Friend urged that the multiplication of appeals was an evil, and that a second appeal was not a good thing in itself. That is a view which has largely prevailed among those for whose opinions I entertain a great respect—among members of the Bench—it is a view which was urged with great force in this House some years ago, and which has been largely adopted by the Press of this country. There is much, I think, to be said in favour of it, although it does not perhaps carry with me the weight which it does with many other persons. Such, however, was the argument which was urged very strongly by my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack this year. Let us consider it for a few moments. I have always maintained that this was the turning point of the question—where the appeal should he and where it should be heard. It is not necessary to show that so long as there were only some 50 or 60 appeals to be disposed of every year, there was nothing whatever to prevent this House from disposing of them with perfect facility. It was absurd to talk of the inconveniences arising from any irregularity of attendance, because they could easily be obviated; but if you are to have only one Court of Appeal, to which every subject of appeal must come—and I think I mentioned last year that there would be some 400 or 500 of them—perhaps more—it would be quite impossible for this House to undertake that duty and to discharge it satisfactorily. How is that principle to be applied to Scotland and Ireland? Is it a part of the proposal of the Government that
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  they are to deal with Scotland and Ireland as they have dealt with England? Nothing of the kind. We are told that the Government have not quite made up their minds as to what is to be done in the case of Scotland and Ireland in regard to intermediate appeals, but there is a suggestion that they should continue as they are at present. If so, the whole reason that exists for dealing with the English appeals in the way the Bill deals with them fails entirely to apply to the case of Scotland and Ireland, by your leaving them the intermediate appeals they possess. Take the danger of the possibility of a conflict between two great co-ordinate Courts of Appeal—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the House of Lords. What is the proposal with respect to Scotland and Ireland? I understand that the Court of Appeal to be established by the Judicature Bill is to have a paid member from the Scotch Bar and a paid member from the Irish Bar, and at least two ex officio members from Scotland and two from Ireland; and the reason given for that is that, coming from those countries, they should hear Scotch and Irish appeals. The consequence is that, the Court sitting in Divisions, which are not to consist of less than three members—and they are not at all likely to consist of more—you will have Scotch appeals heard by a Division with at least two Scotch members, and the Irish appeals heard by a Division with at least two Irish members. The Indian appeals will be heard by a Division in which at least the two Indian Judges who at present sit in the Judicial Committee will be found; and I suppose you will have the English appeals heard by the English Judges. Thus you will have—not two co-ordinate Courts of Appeal, because the decisions of every one of those Divisions will be irreversible, but you will have a quadrilateral Court of Appeal—four Courts of Appeal deciding according to different grooves and running in different channels of thought; and the possibility suggested to us last year as a reason for making a change—namely, of a difference of opinion between the Judicial Committee and this House in an English case,—will, I say, be turned into the certainty of a difference of opinion between the various Divisions of your Court of Appeal. Well, when this ob-

  21
  jection is taken, what do we find? Why, that the Government ridicule that idea, quote the example of the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords, and say, "Only look; for 100 years you have had two great co-ordinate Courts of Appeal sitting side by side, yet they have never come into collision; no practical man would take into account such a possibility; you are not to suppose these three or four Divisions are more likely to come into collision than the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords." So that the reason assigned last year as a ground for our parting with our jurisdiction is actually ridiculed this year when it is shown that that possibility has become a certainty in reference to a collision between the different Divisions of your new Appellate Court.
  Now, my Lords, is this infringement of our Privileges called for by the public opinion of Scotland and Ireland? The evidence taken before your Lordships' Committee last year may be taken as a fair indication of the feeling of the profession, at all events in regard to Scotch and Irish appeals. No stronger evidence could be imagined of the contentment of the Scotch and Irish with their appeals coining to this House. I think the present Lord Advocate deprecated any change taking the Scotch appeals from this House. Well, your Committee of last year reported accordingly. Has there been any manifestation of public opinion in consequence of the announcement at the beginning of this Session that Scotch and Irish appeals were to be retained in this House? I am not aware of any. I have searched for the opinion of Scotchmen on this great and important proposal. One gentleman representing an important constituency and a supporter of the Government (Mr. Macfie), I find, says—
  "A great amount of ignorance prevailed upon the subject, and that ignorance had been rendered more profound by the misleading articles that had appeared in some of the newspapers which ought to have known better. The amendments which would make the Bill applicable to Scotland had only just been put upon the paper, it would be next week before they could be proposed and discussed, and therefore he thought that on the whole, it would be better to postpone, at any rate until next Session, the proposal to bring Scotland within the scope of the measure. His own view was that the best course to adopt, instead of bringing Scotch appeals to England, and so necessitating a cost which would give the rich suitors an advantage over the poor, would be to create a
  22
  well-paid and thoroughly efficient Appellate Court in Scotland which should have jurisdiction over all appeals relating to that country."
  My noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack did not use too strong an expression when he said the Government would be bringing a hornet's-nest about their heads if they opened that question of Scotch and Irish appeals. I see that some Resolutions were adopted the other day at a meeting of the Bar of Ireland, and they amounted to this that it would be a very good thing to have a Central Court of Appeal in London, provided it could sit in Dublin; and it should be profusely ornamented by members of the Irish Bar and Irish Bench. That was very patriotic and sensible, though, perhaps, hardly consistent in expression. Now, there are three views which might be taken in this matter. Scotland and Ireland might say—"We would like to be as you are going to be in England—namely, to have only one hearing and then a great Court of Appeal, extinguishing all intermediate appeals, which cost much money." A second view would be this—"Oh, we are quite content with our Primary Courts; we like our intermediate appeals, and don't want them taken away; and we are willing to go to London for an ultimate appeal." But the third, and much more serious view would be if Scotland and Ireland should say—"How did we ever come to London with our appeals at all; how dill the thing begin? Scotchmen never went to London before the Treaty of Union; and the reason was that whereas they had their own Parliament and their own House of Lords at home until you absorbed them, and since then we have followed them, and come to the House of Lords in London." And suppose the people of Ireland should say—"We did once go to the Court of Queen's Bench in England; but the country was very nearly in rebellion, and in 1780 you had again to legislate and give the thing up. We would not endure it; and we had our appeal to our own House of Lords." The Irish people would not stand it; and the only footing on which they came to London was that their own House of Lords was absorbed in your Lordships' House. But suppose the Scotch and Irish should say—"If that arrangement is to come to an end, we should like to do our own business at home; we should like to have a well paid and thoroughly

  23
  efficient Court of Appeal in Scotland—as Mr. Macfie suggests. What is the use of two Scotch Judges and one English Judge sitting in London to hear a Scotch case? It would be just as easy to send the English Judge down to hear it in Edinburgh, instead of requiring all the parties, the writers and agents, to come to London with all the consequential expense; would it not be better to have the Scotch appeals heard at home, letting your English Judge go to Edinburgh for the purpose?" An outcry is being raised in Ireland already—I judge from the Press of that country—and being raised, too, by a part of the Press which is not in the habit of demanding "Home Rule"—against the centralization of the proposal now made; and it is being asserted—a thing which is, at least, intelligible—that if there is to be a Court of this kind, it ought to sit in Dublin, and be a strong Court of Appeal. Are these views, my Lords, to be silenced by a complete change in the proposals of the Government made at 24 hours' notice and without any public intimation or discussion? The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) intimates that there is a Constitutional objection to this discussion. Well, my Lords, I had a letter this morning from a gentleman in Scotland reminding me of what I had forgotten, of the most singular wording of the Act of Union. Here is the wording of one Article—
  "That no causes in Scotland be cognisable by the Courts of Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, or any other Court in Westminster-hall; and that the said Courts, or any other of the like nature, after the Union, shall have no power to cognosce, review, or alter the acts or sentences of the Judicatures within Scotland, or stop the execution of the same."—Article xix.
  Now, my Lords, do you suppose that the Court which you propose by the Judicature Bill to set up is not a Court "of like nature" with those which the Act of Union stated should not be cognoscible of Scotch causes? Do you suppose that the writing in between two lines of the words "Imperial Court" will alter the nature of the Court? I do not say that, after clear announcement, upon a plain understanding, after full opportunity given to the country to express its opinion, no alteration could be made. What I do say is, that it cannot be clone upon 24 hours' notice, and that what is proposed to be so
  24
  effected is a clear breach of the Privileges of your Lordships' House. It is a breach of Privilege which if carried into effect will not only not be a logical consequence of what we have agreed to, but will run counter to the principle on which we have acted, and by agreeing to which we shall stultify all that we have done. Further, it is a breach of Privilege which is not even said to be called for, as to which there is no assertion made that the country at large requires it. Indeed, the country at large appears to be profoundly ignorant as to the proposals of Her Majesty's Government. I have no doubt that the proposal has been inadvertently made by the Government. I cannot but think that they have no desire to infringe the privileges of your Lordships' House. I should be sorry indeed to treat this as a party question. The position and the jurisdiction of your Lordships' House may, out of doors, be a matter of party agitation; but inside this House I am unable to conceive a difference of opinion arising between us as to the propriety of our maintaining our just and clear privileges. I am unable to picture to myself a division in this House in which would appear on the one side those who would maintain the Privileges of your Lordships' House, and on the other those who would destroy them. I am equally unable to imagine Her Majesty's Government proposing to lead a party of that description. If they do, of this I am quite sure—that they will find few indeed to follow them. I have, my Lords, shown already that I was justified in calling attention to the subject, and that it would be too late to do so when the Bill came again before your Lordships' House. Then the question would be whether the Bill should or should not be laid aside. I own—speaking for myself—I should regret being obliged to come to the conclusion at which I should then be forced to arrive, and to see a Bill in which I recognize so much good lost for this Session. My Lords, in point of form, I wish to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they intend, and at what time, in the present Session, to lay before this House a complete scheme for regulating appeals in Scotland and Ireland analogous to the Appellate System for England contained in the Judicature Bill.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, whatever else I may think of the nature of the important subject to which my noble and learned Friend has directed your attention, I can most sincerely say I regret that from ally cause whatever the harmony which has prevailed in your Lordships' House with respect to this important Bill should have been disturbed. Whatever may happen, I shall at all events retain a grateful recollection of my noble and learned Friend's services in promoting the Bill in its earlier stages in your Lordships' House; nor, my Lords, shall I forget the candour and fairness with which this House generally met the proposals of this Bill and endeavoured to bring them to a successful issue; and I shall most deeply regret if for any cause it shall appear to your Lordships, in any contingency that may happen, to be your duty to take a different course. I feel therefore a great difficulty in replying to my noble and learned Friend who has, I think, placed your Lordships and the Government in a position of unprecedented embarrassment by the course he has taken tonight. My noble and learned Friend, in treating of this question, has, I think,—although he has endeavoured to avoid it—made himself fairly amenable to a charge of breach of Order. I do not profess to have had so much experience in your Lordships' House as he has had, but I have been told by some upon whose opinions I rely, that it is a breach of Order in your Lordships' House to refer to speeches delivered in this House in reference to a Bill promoted during the present Session. Whether that be so or not, it will not, I think, be denied that it is in the highest degree inconvenient to enter into a discussion here as to what has passed or may now be passing in the other House of Parliament. My noble and learned Friend has not, to my mind, given any satisfactory reason for taking the course he has adopted in that respect. My noble and learned Friend has said something as to the communication to your Lordships of the Votes and Proceedings of the other House of Parliament; but, my Lords, I am not aware of any Vote passed by the other House upon the subject to which my noble and learned Friend has referred, and I infer, therefore, that my noble and learned Friend alluded to a Notice which may have been placed upon
  26
  the Papers which by courtesy have been communicated to us by the other House. But, my Lords, I think you will be of opinion that Notices placed for discussion upon the Paper of the other House of Parliament cannot and ought not to be made the subject of discussion in your Lordships' House. It would involve the risk of very serious inconvenience in the way of mutual comment and criticism in each House as to what is going on in the other; and, I venture to think, would greatly increase the difficulty of dealing with any question subject to such treatment. But my noble and learned Friend has not only favoured us with observations on what has appeared on the Votes of the other House, but with what, I presume, were remarks upon observations supposed to have been made in the other House of Parliament. My Lords, to do justice to a subject of this kind its whole history ought to be before us, with all the considerations which may have suggested the taking of a certain course in "another place." But I must decline to follow what would otherwise be my wish—namely, to go fully into that which may have occurred elsewhere. I will endeavour as best I can to answer my noble and learned Friend without transgressing the rules of Order to which I have before referred. Whether my noble and learned Friend was in Order in quoting them or not, nothing could be more accurate than the extracts he read from the observations I made in introducing the Bill and on its second reading in reference to Scotch and Irish Appeals. I have no desire whatever to recede in any way from anything I then said. I stated that on principle I was in favour of bringing all appeals, whether from Scotland or from Ireland, to one Final Court, but that, though I anticipated that ultimately the opinion of Scotland and Ireland would tend that way, I did not yet see signs of such a state of opinion as would justify me in then making that proposal. My noble and learned Friend says that since the Bill left your Lordships' House the Government have made certain proposals. How can I explain the position of that matter without going into an account of what has passed, or may be passing, in "another place?" All I can say is, that the Government did not originate any such proposals. They originated elsewhere;

  27
  and the Government did not acquiesce in them until they were in possession of certain grounds—what they thought sufficient grounds—for believing that Irish and Scotch opinion desired them, and that the representatives of those opinions were, indeed, prepared, with the aid and concurrence of the party to which my noble and learned Friend belongs, to force those proposals on the Government. That is what I am authorized to state, and what I do state with perfect confidence. I will abstain from going further into what passed within the walls of Parliament, but I am at liberty to state what has occurred outside the walls of Parliament. My noble and learned Friend has referred to a public demonstration of opinion which has occurred in Ireland—first, on the part of the Bar, and, next, on the part of a considerable number of the Judges. I cannot but think that it was a somewhat rhetorical artifice of my noble and learned Friend to comment with much humour and effect upon some of the suggestions of the Irish Bar, which were not of a very practical character. Adopting the principle that there should be one Court of Appeal for the whole country—and not only one Court in the abstract, but the particular Court proposed by the Bill with some additional members—they recommended that that Court should occasionally sit in Dublin. It did not appear to the Government, in estimating the weight of that expression of opinion, that that particular incident or episode was at all of the essence of the matter. Substantially the opinion expressed was, that they apprehended that the efficiency of this House as a Court of Ultimate Appeal would not be permanently as great as heretofore if the stronger elements were withdrawn from it to the great Court of Appeal in England, and that under the circumstances which would be created by the passing of this Bill, they desired that appeals from Ireland should be brought to the same Court. This opinion on the part of the Bar of Ireland, spontaneously expressed, and backed by the opinion of the Judges, and, further, not involving—at all events, as the Government understood—any unreasonable or impossible condition, did go a long way to satisfy one of the conditions necessary to be satisfied before the Bill could be extended to Irish appeals—namely, that if it were done it should be done rather at the request
  28
  of opinion in Ireland, than forced upon that country by a proposal of the English Government. With regard to Scotland, information reached the Government, in a manner which the Government are accustomed to consider authentic—and I may mention that it related to matters outside the walls of Parliament, in order that I may be consistent in referring to it—that that proposal was desired by those who were naturally looked to as representing opinion in Scotland. I believe that not less than 32 gentlemen in that position met together, without any selection of persons, and were unanimously of opinion in favour of this proposal. I am further informed that since that time—indeed, as recently as Thursday last—a meeting of the Faculty of Advocates was held in Edinburgh, when the same proposition was carried, and that by so large a majority that the minority were not willing to have their numbers ascertained by anything like a division. The practical result is that there has been every indication of a unanimous expression of opinion in favour of the proposal from all who have spoken for Ireland and Scotland, after the very considerable lapse of time which occurred since the Bill was introduced, and after the large opportunities which have been afforded for its consideration, and without the least hint from the Government that their inclination was that way. In the absence, indeed, of any such inclination whatever, these expressions of opinion, apparently without a dissentient voice, were pressed upon them. My noble and learned Friend has only done justice to the Government in saying that if there had been any infringement or any neglect of any Privilege of their Lordships' House, it had been entirely by inadvertence. No question of any breach of Privilege ever occurred to any Member of the Government, nor, as far as I know, to anybody either in your Lordships' House or in the House of Commons. I must state that if my noble and learned Friend had intended to present the question of Privilege in such a very serious aspect, and if such very important consequences might follow front it, it is to be regretted that it did not appear on the face of the Notice; so that we on our part might have been able to look into the matter and see whether the precedents of Parliament

  29
  to which he referred were altogether such as he supposes. If the matter be such as my noble and learned Friend has represented, it ought to receive, and it will receive, the serious and deliberate consideration of the Government; but we have not been placed in a situation to search for precedents in answer to what has been urged by my noble and learned Friend. But of this I am perfectly sure—that when there has been no intention to invade your Lordships' privileges, your Lordships will not be obliged in their defence to adopt any such extreme course as that which my noble and learned Friend suggested with regard to the Bill when it might be returned to your Lordships' House. It will always be in your Lordships' power to exercise the discretion now frequently exercised by the other House of Parliament when money clauses have inadvertently crept into Bills which have originated in your Lordships' House. The modern practice in cases of breach of privilege has been this:—Each House, when in a clear case its Privileges have been intentionally invaded, will of course have to discharge the duty of maintaining those Privileges; but when they have been invaded unintentionally, and when there is no reason to imagine that any disrespect has been intended, each House, regarding the public interests as well as its own dignity, has indeed always objected to those matters which have been introduced into a Bill, which it deemed to touch its Privileges, but has never thought itself under the necessity of depriving the public of the benefit of a measure otherwise salutary and unobjectionable, on the ground that this is the only proper way of marking its sense of a proposal inconsistent with its Privileges. When Blackstone went the length of saying that not only no Bill affecting the Privileges or the powers of the House of Lords could be introduced in the other, but that not even changes or Amendments could be made in a Bill of that kind by the House of Commons, be went beyond what is justified and warranted by the practice of modern times. I venture to say, with great deference to my noble and learned Friend, that the doctrine that no Bill affecting the Privileges or powers of your Lordships' House should be introduced in the other House would be very
  30
  inconvenient; and that it would also be very inconvenient if your Lordships were not allowed to introduce an amendment into any Bill, whereby the Privileges of the Commons might be affected. Your Lordships know that a very highly important Bill, affecting the representation of the people, having come from the House of Commons, was altered materially in your Lordships' House. It will require much greater authority than my noble and learned Friend has adduced to induce me to believe that a different rule would be applicable on the part of the House of Commons in the case of Bills originated in your Lordships' House—and this Bill was originated in your Lordships' House. It never entered my mind for a single moment that when the time came for Ireland and Scotland bringing appeals to the same High Court of Appeal as England, Ireland and Scotland should lose the benefit of their local Courts of Appeal. I do not think your Lordships will deem it your duty to take a course which would destroy the Bill. As to the course which has been adopted by the other House with reference to this Bill. I do not think it is inconsistent with the Privileges of your Lordships' House.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I shall not venture to join issue with the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack on a question of law; but the noble and learned Lord appears to think that if Scotch and Irish Judges are added to the Court of Final Appeal to be created by this Bill, there will be an end of all objection to the change made in the other House in the Bill which is complained of by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Cairns). But, in my judgment, such a course will by no means solve the difficulty, because in that case either the Court must be divided into nationalities, or else we shall have Irish and Scotch Judges sitting to hear English appeals, which will certainly be an absurdity. With reference to the constitutional aspect of the case, charges have been made against the present course of the Government. First, that they are invading the Act of Union; and secondly, that they are committing a breach of the Privileges of this House. There can be no doubt that the Act of Union may be repealed or altered by Act of Parliament; but such an Act could only be passed after the people of

  31
  the country interested had been consulted on the subject. And what are the noble and learned Lord's views as to the proper method of ascertaining the wishes of the people of Scotland and Ireland on this question. Why, a meeting of lawyers is held at Dublin, another in Edinburgh, and a third in a dining-room in London; and the opinion expressed at those meetings is held to be that of the people of Scotland and of Ireland. The noble and learned Lord (the Lord Chancellor) appears to be under the impression that the law is the property of the lawyers, and that no one else should be allowed to say a word in the matter. But, in my opinion, something more than the opinion of a few lawyers is necessary before you can proceed to repeal the solemn Act of Union. There are many means of ascertaining the opinion of the people on this subject. It can be arrived at by means of an inquiry conducted by either a Royal Commission or by Committees of the Houses of Parliament, or else in an informal manner by leaving the subject over for discussion by the people during the Recess. But the Government are going to proceed without any inquiry whatever. Why, if you were going to alter a sewer in Edinburgh under the Local Government Act, you would take more care to ascertain the feelings of the people on the subject than you do when you are going to alter the Act of Union. If you were going to alter the Edinburgh sewer, you would send down a Commissioner, who would hold a Court, would hear both sides, and would invite an expression of opinion generally; but in the present case nothing of the kind has been done in order to ascertain the sentiments of those who will be affected by the measure. This is not the way to deal with a sensitive, and perhaps I may say an irritable, people like the Irish; because, however quiet they may be now when they do not thoroughly understand the point at issue, the time may arrive when the real nature of the change will come home to them, and great dissatisfaction on their part may be the result. Under these circumstances, therefore, it behoves us not to attempt to deal with this subject rashly and without due and careful consideration. In dealing with the question of Privilege, the noble and learned Lord showed considerable skill. The question
  32
  of Privilege is one of real importance. The privileges of this House extend to matters which concern our own constitution, and it would be rather hard if, while we are debarred from originating or altering Money Bills, and from originating measures dealing with the constitution of the other House, we should be debarred from determining in what manner our own constitution should be changed. I defy the noble and learned Lord to point out one case in which the House of Commons has passed over a breach of its Privileges. This very year the House of Commons ordered a Bill to be laid aside on account of a breach of its Privileges. If we once pass over a breach of Privilege the privilege is gone for ever, because it is a mere matter of usage and precedent, and once it is neglected it disappears altogether. I only ask this House to be as particular with respect to its Privilege as the House of Commons is with regard to its own—and we know that the business of this country is completely blocked because of the pertinacious assertion by the House of Commons of its Privileges, which prevent this House from commencing a considerable number of measures of importance. Should the House of Commons after this notice persist in sending up the Bill, with the clauses relating to the Appellate Jurisdiction of Scotland and Ireland in it, we shall have no alternative left us but either to renounce our Privilege or to assert it. It was a great wrench to some of us to pass this Bill, because it takes away a certain portion of our jurisdiction; but because we thought that it contained much that would be of advantage to the country, and because the legal and general opinion of the country was in its favour, we considered it would not be right to reject it; and I appeal to the testimony of noble Lords opposite to show that no party feeling has prevented us from giving it our heartiest support. We have been asked whether we think it right that all the labour that has been bestowed on this Bill should be thrown away. We have no choice in the matter. The fact that the Bill originated in this House, and that the House of Commons have merely inserted clauses in it, makes no difference in the breach of Privilege which has been committed. The House of Commons does not allow us to introduce

  33
  clauses into a Money Bill; and should we attempt to introduce clauses into such a Bill the House of Commons would reject it. Under these circumstances, unless we are willing to sacrifice our privilege altogether, if the House of Commons sends up this Bill containing these clauses we shall be compelled to reject it. The result will be that a great reform, much desired by the people of this country, will be postponed, and if the Bill is lost it will be lost not through our act, but through the fault of the House of Commons.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Marquess is in error in assuming that were we to introduce money clauses into a Bill, not exclusively a Money Bill, the House of Commons would reject the entire Bill. They would probably reject the clauses, but not the whole Bill.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLLagreed that the Act of Union was an instrument that ought to be treated with the greatest respect, though the truth was it had ceased to have much application. The clause in the Act of Union which related to the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords was applicable to a totally different state of circumstances from the present. It applied to a state of things under which appeals were supposed to by heard by the House of Lords sitting as a House, and not as a kind of Superior Court; whereas, when exercising their appellate jurisdiction, the House now sat as a mere Westminster Hall Court. He thought, he might add, the Members of the Government had some cause to complain that no Notice had been given by the noble and learned Lord that he intended to raise the question of Privilege—it was quite a new idea that had not occurred to any Member of the Government—and they had consequently been deprived of the opportunity of looking into the question, or even of providing themselves with a single book of reference. It was, in fact, a question resting on the opinion of the noble and learned Lord whether there had been a breach of Privilege or not. The matter, however, would be carefully inquired into, and assuredly their Lordships' privileges would be upheld.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMONDpointed out that, so far as the House was in possession of the views of the Scotch people on the subject, they were in favour of maintaining the jurisdiction of the House
  34
  of Lords over their appeals—so that if it were true that the House of Lords sitting on appeals were a mere Westminster Hall Court, that was the Court the Scotch people preferred. As to the complaint that his noble and learned Friend near him had not given sufficient Notice of the questions which he might raise in the course of his speech, he would merely remark that it was not usual to place an analysis of the intended speech on the Notice Paper; and in the present instance his noble and learned Friend's Notice was intended merely as a warning, and no immediate action was to be taken at the close of the discussion. He hoped that warning would not be lost on the Government, for he was sincerely anxious that the Judicature Bill should become law; for he had always been of opinion that it was not very creditable to the House that the attempts which year after year had been made to deal with the question should have turned out failures. He trusted, therefore, the Government would find the means of preventing the recurrence of any such failure, without, at the same time, seeking to commit a breach of the Privileges of the House, and that the Bill would be speedily passed into law.
  LORD CAIRNSdefended himself against the charge of not having given sufficient Notice as to the course which he meant to pursue. It was impossible for him to have entered more into detail in giving Notice, than that it was his intention to comment on the changes which had been made in the Bill elsewhere.
  EARL GRANVILLEthought it would have been much more convenient if the noble and learned Lord had given some indication that he intended to raise the question of Privilege. Such a course would, in his opinion, have tended more to the edification of the House and the public.

  GAS AND WATER WORKS FACILITIES ACT, 1870, AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to extend and amend the provisions of the Gas and Water Works Facilities Act, 1870—Was presented by The Earl COWPER; read 1a (No. 201.)
  House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, to Thursday next, half past Ten o'clock.