Sitting of 9 March 1871

MINUTES.
— SELECT COMMITTEE—East India Finance, nominated;Westmeath, &c. Unlawful Combinations, nominated.
PUBLIC BILLS — Ordered—Game Laws Amendment (No. 2)*.
Second Reading—Army Regulation [39], debate adjourned.
Committee—Report—Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister [2]; Fairs* [60].

IRELAND — MR. DALY AND THE COMMISSION OF THE PEACE FOR DROGHEDA.—QUESTION.
COLONEL STUART KNOX, before putting his Question, said, that certain words had been struck out of his Question since he gave Notice of it. He was not sorry for that, as he had been informed by a Friend that the retention of the words would have given offence to his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, which was the last thing he desired to do. His Question was to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether he has thought it desirable to make any further inquiry into the appointment of Mr. Robert Bedford Daly, publican, holding a retail licence for the sale of beer and spirits, to the Commission of the Peace for the borough of Drogheda; whether it is true that up to the 1st of this month no application has been made to the Clerk of the Peace for that borough for the transfer of his licence by the said Robert Bedford Daly to any person; whether it is not necessary under the Acts of Parliament thereunto referring, that a publican's licence should be transferred before the Magistrates at Petit Sessions; and, if so, at what Sessions and before whom did the transfer take place; whether, if the alleged transfer did take place, the person to whom it was granted was Robert Bedford Daly, who by the parish re-
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gistry appears to have arrived at the age of twenty-one years on the 19th December 1870; and, if so, if this individual is a near relative of the new Justice of the Peace; whether he is aware that the President of the Board of Trade was misinformed in regard to Mr. Robert Bedford Daly, viz. That Mr. Daly is not a publican and retail dealer in spirits and beer, that the Lord Lieutenant of the county recommended him for the Commission of the Peace three years ago, that the "Irish Times" newspaper withdrew the paragraph in reference to the appointment, and that they inserted a highly complimentary article; whether this Mr. Robert Bedford Daly is the same person who, at the Spring Assizes in 1866, had an action brought against him by one Thornton for work and labour performed, and money paid for hiring mobs at Mr. Whitworth's Election, and who lodged £15 in Court; and, whether, under all the circumstances, he is prepared to sustain the appointment of Mr. Robert Bedford Daly as a magistrate for the borough of Drogheda?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, in reply, said, he had made further inquiries in reference to the appointment of Mr. Daly since the hon. and gallant Gentleman gave Notice of his Question, and he found that in all essential particulars his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade was correctly informed when, in answer to a similar Question a fortnight ago, he said Mr. Daly was not a publican in the ordinary sense of the word. Mr. Daly had a large business as an auctioneer, and was also a member of a grocery firm carrying on an extensive business, in which was included a wholesale and retail wine and spirit trade, but this was managed entirely by Mr. Daly's partner. Mr. Daly was under some misapprehension in regard to the transfer of the licence. He took what he supposed to be the requisite steps, with a view to procuring the transfer; but it turned out that all the necessary formalities had not been executed, and the transfer had not been completed. The President of the Board of Trade was not misinformed when he said that the Lord Lieutenant of the county recommended Mr. Daly for the commission of the peace three years ago, and it was true that The Irish Times published a complimentary article

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in reference to the appointment. It was true that an action was brought against Mr. Daly by a person named Thornton; but the jury found no verdict. With regard to the Question as to whether he was prepared to sustain the appointment, he had only to repeat that, as the result of inquiries he had made, he agreed with the opinions of his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, that Mr. Daly was a fit person to receive the commission of the peace, and he believed the appointment had been received with very general support and favour by politicians on both sides in the borough.

FORTIFYING WINES IN BOND.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JAMES LAWRENCEasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether 10 per cent of proof spirit is allowed to be mixed with wines in bond for the purpose of "fortifying;" whether the Board of Customs can allow and have allowed a greater proportion than 10 per cent of spirit to be mixed with wines; and, whether also it be true that during the years 1868, 1869, and 1870, numerous cases have occurred of persons receiving permission from the Board to mix with sherry and other wines in bond 15 per cent of spirit, amounting in quantity to 17 gallons of spirit to each butt of wine?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The duty of the Customs as to the fortifying of wines in bond is regulated by the State. It is necessary to distinguish between wines in bond intended to be imported into this country and wines meant for exportation. In the case of the former the Customs may, under the Act, permit them to be fortified to the extent of 10 degrees of proof, provided that the whole strength of the wine does not exceed 40 degrees. In regard to the latter, the Customs are allowed by the Act to go beyond the 10 degrees, if it shall appear to them to be necessary in order to prevent the wines fermenting on the voyage. Under these powers, wines meant to be exported are frequently allowed to be fortified three or four—or in some cases perhaps as much as five—degrees additionally. No limit is placed on the discretion of the Customs in the matter; but all that they do is in strict accordance with the powers conferred on them.
  SIR JAMES LAWRENCE: I beg to give Notice that I will ask, Whether the Board of Customs also have equal powers over the trade to authorize the introduction of substances other than spirits, and whether special sanction cannot be obtained for adding ether and other chemical preparations to wines in bond, provided that the owners satisfied the Board of the necessity of such preparations to refine the wine?

COURTS OF JUSTICE AND APPEAL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HEADLAMasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, When the Bills on the Courts of Justice and Appeal, mentioned in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech at the commencement of the Session, will be introduced; and, whether, if it be intended to introduce them into the other House of Parliament, they will be pressed forward without delay so as to give this House full time for the consideration of them?
  MR. BRUCEsaid, in reply, that the Bills were in a forward state of preparation, and it was the present intention of the Government that they should be introduced by the Attorney General at an early date; but that must depend upon the state of Public Business. He would promise, however, that if the Bills were introduced in the House of Lords, such progress should be made as would afford the House of Commons ample time to consider them.

IRELAND—EXTENSION OF THE POST OFFICE TELEGRAPH SYSTEM.

  QUESTION.
  MR. KAVANAGHasked the Postmaster General, When we may expect to have the post office telegraph system extended to the different country post offices in Ireland; and whether it is intended that the town of Borris, in the county of Carlow, which is a money order office and a railway station, should have the benefit of that system?
  MR. MONSELLsaid, in reply, that in the course of about three months from 80 to 90 additional post-offices would be opened in Ireland, and that by the end of the year all the county towns and the larger villages would have telegraphic communication. As to the second Ques-

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  tion, with regard to Borris, he was happy to inform the hon. Gentleman that telegraphic extension had been made to that town; but, at the present moment, the office of postmaster was vacant, the postmaster having been dismissed, and until the appointment of a postmaster the telegraph wires, of course, could not be put into use.

CLERKS OF CONVICT PRISONS.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL GILPINasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Upon what grounds the Treasury refused the payment of money voted by the House of Commons to the Clerks of Convict Prisons?
  MR. BAXTERsaid, that the sum had been inserted in the Estimates without the sanction of the Treasury, and refusal of payment had been made because the Treasury was not satisfied with all the particulars of the account.

THE BALLOT.—QUESTION.
MR. PIMasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether the provision of the Elections (Parliamentary and Municipal) Bill, for taking the votes of the Electors by ballot, are intended to be applied to the election of Commissioners for Towns under the Local Government Act, and the Towns Improvement (Ireland) Act, or under private local Acts; and, if not, whether he will consider the propriety of extending the scope of his Bill so as to include all elections for Town Commissioners as well as Town Councillors?
MR. W. E. FORSTER: Sir, I think it will be scarcely possible to extend the scope of the Bill so as to include any elections except the Parliamentary and municipal ones. But I have little doubt that if the principle of the Ballot is—as I hope it will be—adopted in those elections, it will ultimately be extended to others.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION—CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OFFICES.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOSEPH BAILEYasked the First Lord of the Treasury, With reference to the Order in Council of the 4th June last, and the recent announcement
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  of the Civil Service Commissioners detailing the names of persons who had passed the preliminary examination to enable them to compete for appointments in the First and Second Class Public Offices, whether the Public Offices have yet been classified; and, if so, which offices it is proposed to include in the First and Second Class respectively: what steps have been taken towards carrying into effect the intention expressed in his speech of the 25th February 1870, of
  "re-organizing the several departments of the Public Service, with a view specially to the separation of duties which are mechanical and formal, from those duties which require high mental training;"
  and, whether there will be any objection to laying upon the Table of the House any Correspondence which has passed between the Treasury, the Civil Service Commissioners, and the various public Departments on these subjects?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, the hon. Baronet would allow him to answer, as these details fell rather under his eye than that of his right hon. Friend. The hon. Baronet had been led into an error with regard to the public offices. What the Civil Service Commissioners had done had been to recommend that the preliminary examinations should be divided into a first and a second class. Accordingly, the examinations were divided, one being a higher examination than the other. But there had been no intention to divide the public offices into a first and a second class, and, of course, he could give the hon. Baronet no information as to their division. As to carrying into effect the intention which had been expressed of re-organizing the Departments of the Public Service great progress had been made in that work, which was one of much time and much labour. The re-organization of a great many of the present Departments was completed; but the work was not yet finished, and when it was he should be very happy, in the most convenient form he could devise, to lay the result before the House, and he ventured to think it would be satisfactory to them. He could not produce the Correspondence between the Treasury and the different Departments, because it was entirely of a confidential nature.

TREATY OF PARIS (1856)—THE CONFERENCE.—QUESTION.
MR. GLADSTONE: Sir, in conformity with the Notice which I gave on Tuesday, I wish to put a Question to my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea, as to his intention with respect to the Motion which stands in his name for to-morrow relating to the Conference now sitting in London, or, rather, relating to the conduct of the Government in having agreed to the appointment of that Conference. I think it is right I should repeat what I then stated—that we have reason to anticipate a speedy conclusion of the labours of the Conference, and, what is more directly to the purpose—but it is entirely for my hon. Friend to judge what course he may think most consistent with his public duty, that we ought to inform the House beforehand that it will be impossible for us to state our views completely, and lay the matter in a satisfactory manner before the House during the time when the Conference is sitting, and its labours are unfinished. I have also to inform my hon. Friend and other Members of the House that they will have some difficulty in obtaining a day for the discussion of Motions; but, of course, if my hon. Friend tells us that he considers it his duty to propose a Vote of Censure on our conduct, so far as depends on us a day shall be found for bringing forward his Motion.
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: Of course, in a matter of this importance, I am entirely in the hands of the House. The Question of the right hon. Gentleman is not strictly accurate. He states that my Motion relates to the Conference now sitting in London. My Motion relates to the conduct of the Government in having accepted that Conference. While the Conference was still sitting there were two discussions upon it, and the right hon. Gentleman has taken part in those discussions. At the same time, I am entirely in the hands of the House; and if it is thought that the subject will not suffer by being postponed for a short time, of course I do not object to a postponement.

THE NAVY ESTIMATES.—QUESTION.
MR. CORRYasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether he is aware that the Navy Estimates for the ensuing financial year do not bear the signature
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of the late First Lord of the Admiralty, but are signed by the Junior Lords only, who, under the Order in Council of 14th January 1869, do not form part of the responsible Government of the Navy, but are executive subordinates under the First Lord; and whether, as the Estimates have not been presented on the authority of a responsible Minister, he will undertake to give them a careful revision, and to satisfy himself that they have been prepared with due regard to the national interests, before proposing them to Parliament?
MR. GOSCHEN: Sir, the right hon. Gentleman is somewhat premature in addressing me as First Lord of the Admiralty, as I have not yet formally received that appointment. However, I am prepared to answer his Question. If the Navy Estimates, which have been laid on the Table, do not bear the signature of the late First Lord of the Admiralty, he was responsible, to a great degree, for the policy embodied in those Estimates; and not only that, but he submitted that policy to his Colleagues in the Cabinet, and the Government are responsible for that policy. As regards the details of the Estimates, the right hon. Gentleman may rest assured that I shall propose nothing to the House without being satisfied myself that it has been prepared, as he expressed it, with a due regard to the national interests.

IRELAND—WESTMEATH, &c. UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS COMMITTEE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. M'MAHONasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether the Select Committee to inquire into the state of Westmeath, and certain parts adjoining of Meath and King's County, and the nature, extent, and effect of a certain unlawful combination and conspiracy existing therein, will be authorized to inquire into the causes thereof?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON Ibeg to remind the hon. Gentleman that the Order in reference to this Committee has been decided by the House, after full discussion, and I do not think it would be proper on my part to give any further interpretation of it. I will only say that it is not the intention of the Government to propose any alteration in it.

DEFENCES OF CANADA.—QUESTION.
SIR CHARLES ADDERLEYasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether, in completion of our engagements to Canada, the works at Quebec are being armed and the north works in progress; whether Canada, on her part, is fortifying Montreal, for which her Parliament voted a loan Imperially guaranteed; what progress has been made with the Canadian Militia; and, how soon the Intercolonial Railway may be expected to open their communication between Halifax and Quebec?
MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSENsaid, that the Estimates for the present year would contain an item of £9,000 for the completion of the fortifications of Quebec. The guarantee for the loan passed the House in August last, and he had not received any information of any steps that had been taken by Canada, as to entering upon the fortifications of Montreal. The condition of the Militia was very satisfactory. In March of last year the number of active Militia was something over 43,500, which, by this time, had risen to about 45,000; and if any emergency should arise—which he was far from anticipating—to call for their services, the Commander-in-Chief would only have to give the order, and in a few hours upwards of 40,000 thoroughly efficient men would be able to take the field, and they would be hourly augmented by a large number of Reserve Militia. There were six or seven training colleges for the Militia, which were in an excellent condition. With regard to the last Question, he was able to state that the works—extending over about 400 miles—were in a most satisfactory state of progress. More than half the line would be completed before the end of the year, and they had every reason to hope the whole would be finished before the end of 1872, or within a period of only four years from the commencement of the undertaking.

EDUCATION—THE NEW CODE—MUSIC.

  QUESTIONS.
  MR. REEDasked the Vice President of the Council, Why it is proposed in the New Code to omit Music from the extra subjects included in the Fourth Schedule?
  MR. W. E. FORSTERreplied that he had to state that after careful considera-
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  tion the Education Department had decided that the best mode of encouraging music in elementary schools was not to include it in the extra subjects. Music was taught to a considerable extent in elementary schools, and the New Code might be said to encourage it, because it increased from 4s. to 6s. the sum given for average attendance for instruction in secular subjects, including music. Hitherto it had been permitted to the schoolmaster to send up pupils for instruction in music as a special subject; but that power had only been made use of to a very slight extent. In only 43 schools last year was music sent up as an extra subject, and in only 37 even children passed, and the whole sum paid was £77, scarcely any of which was earned by special examination of individual scholars. It had been found desirable to make the premium for special subjects depend upon the special examination of the scholars; and on that ground it had been resolved to exclude from the special subjects for this year drawing and music. Drawing was excluded because it was better attended to by the Department of Science and Art, which had a large number of elementary drawing schools; and with regard to music, the difficulty was that the education not merely of those who attended elementary schools, but of the upper and middle classes, had been neglected, and it was difficult to find gentlemen competent to examine in the notation of music. Therefore, though the Education Department were most anxious to promote the study of music, they could not make it a condition of the appointment of an Inspector, so many other qualifications being required. He would consider whether any other mode of promoting the study of music could be introduced into the Code next year; but at present he thought the object would be better attained by encouraging singing classes throughout the schools than by including music among the special subjects.
  MR. DIXONasked the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education, Whether the Government will arrange for a Morning Sitting for the consideration of the Motions for alterations in the New Code of Regulations issued by the Committee of Privy Council on Education, on the ground that the power of Parliament to modify the said code will expire on the 17th of March?
  MR. W. E. FORSTER, in reply, said, that though the Code would not come into legal operation till it had been a month on the Table of the House, it would afterwards be in the power of Parliament to modify it through an Address to the Crown. There was every reason to hope that the hon. Member would have an opportunity to-morrow night of bringing forward the points with reference to which he had given Notices.

IRELAND—RAILWAYS.—QUESTION.
CAPTAIN STACPOOLEasked the First Lord of the Treasury, If it is the intention of the Government to bring in any measure with reference to the purchase of Irish Railways this Session?
MR. GLADSTONEreplied that Her Majesty's Government had not prepared any measure for the purchase of Irish railways, nor was he sanguine that it would be in their power to make a proposal in any form on the subject this Session.

WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA—SIERRA LEONE.—QUESTION.
COLONEL BERESFORDasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether, in consequence of the Governor Generalship of the whole of the Western Coast of Africa having been conferred upon the Governor of Sierra Leone, the latter Colony has not been taxed to the amount of £2,000 per annum for the maintenance of a yacht for his Excellency's use?
MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSENsaid, that the hon. and gallant Gentleman was under a complete misapprehension as to the Colony of Sierra Leone having been taxed to the amount of £2,000 a-year for the maintenance of a yacht for the Governor's use. The fact was that the Committee which sat on the subject of the African Settlements in 1865 recommended, among other things, that those several Colonies should be brought under one head — Governor at Sierra Leone. That recommendation was adopted, and was part of an economical arrangement which enabled the Government to withdraw troops from those settlements, and save expense in other ways. But inasmuch as the expense of the local governments was thus increased, it was thought right, in carrying out
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that arrangement, that steam communication not at the expense of the Colonies, but of the Imperial Exchequer, should be provided, and a charge of £5,000 for that purpose had appeared on the Estimates ever since.

ARMY REGULATION BILL—REPAYMENT OF REGULATION PRICE.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL C. H. LINDSAYasked the Secretary of State for War, In what way he has taken powers, in the Army Regulation Bill, with reference to the repayment of the customary price of an Officer's Commission, who is either dangerously ill or who has died, as intimated by the honourable and gallant Member for Truro to the honourable Member for Bedford on Monday evening?
  MR. CARDWELL, in reply, said, he had taken no powers in the Army Regulation Bill to give any sum of money out of the public funds which would not have been received by officers under the circumstances if the Bill should not pass into law. What his hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Vivian) meant to say the other evening was, that a provision in the Bill which imposed a limit on the number of sales, operating in connection with the regulation with regard to those who died or were sick, might possibly inflict upon officers inconvenience and loss to which, under present circumstances, they were not subject, and that the limitation would, with the sanction of the Treasury, be open to consideration. For his own part, he wished to say that the limit would be open to consideration in Committee. It certainly was not intended by him to inflict any inconvenience or loss upon any officer to which he would not be subjected if the Bill did not pass.

RINDERPEST IN FRANCE.—QUESTION.
MR. M'LAGANasked the Vice President of the Committee of Council, Whether, considering the prevalence of the rinderpest in France, he is prepared to take any extraordinary steps to prevent its introduction into this Country?
MR. W. E. FORSTER, in reply, said, the matter had received the constant and anxious attention of the Privy Council, because we certainly had been in very considerable danger from the introduction of the cattle plague. France

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and Prussia, in which, from good administration, the cattle plague had before scarcely existed, had, in consequence of the fearful war, become exposed to its ravages. Up to a year or two ago Prussia, by its excellent administration, had kept out the cattle plague almost entirely; France had done so altogether; and, consequently, France was not included among the countries from which animals coming would have to be killed. Germany was included not on account of danger from Germany itself, but because it was the country from which the Steppe cattle might possibly arrive in England. But upon the cattle plague breaking out, and evidently following in the track of the German Army in the autumn, the Privy Council found it necessary to issue three Orders one after the other. The first was on the 9th of September, which put France among the scheduled countries, the cattle from which were liable to be killed at the port of landing. The second was issued on the 20th of September, which extended the provisions with regard to cattle, to sheep and goats, from both Germany and France, because it was possible, and even probable, that the infection might be conveyed by these animals. At the same time, a very strong restriction was put on—which was done with the greatest possible reluctance by the Government, because it might have considerably interfered with the food supplies of London—that cattle landing in London should be killed at the place of landing, and not be taken to Islington Market. On the 28th of November the same Order was applied to animals from Belgium, which appeared to suffer from proximity to France and Germany. The House would understand that the Government felt a great difficulty in the matter. On the one hand, it was necessary to take every step to prevent the introduction of the plague; on the other, it was a very serious matter to interfere with any trade, especially the trade of food for the people. But the accounts the Department had received, both from public sources and also from private inquiry, made them come to the conclusion that they should now take the strong step of prohibiting altogether for the present the importation of cattle from France, and also, he was sorry to say, from Belgium. However, there would be no real inter-
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ference with the trade, because there had been scarcely any importation of cattle from France, and not much from Belgium of late. The French Government, within the last few days, had repealed their prohibition to export, which was another reason why it was thought necessary on our part to prohibit the import.

INDIA—NORTH-WEST FRONTIER MEDALS.—QUESTION.
MR. KINNAIRDasked the Under Secretary of State for India, When the North West Frontier Medals of the 81st Regiment are likely to be given, and what has caused the long delay in their distribution?
MR. GRANT DUFF: The medals about which my hon. Friend asks were sent to the War Office for distribution to the 81st Foot on the 7th of March. The delay has arisen partly at the Mint, partly with the contractor who mounts the medals.

ARMY—BREECH-LOADERS.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL NORTHasked, When the Returns which he had moved for on the 10th February with respect to the number of Regiments armed with breechloaders will be ready?
  SIR HENRY STORKSsaid, the Returns were ready as far as regarded the troops serving in the United Kingdom and the Colonies; but, as his hon. and gallant Friend intimated that he wished to have the Return extended to India, it was necessary to send to that country for information. He had been informed by the Under Secretary that a letter was written on the 23rd of February to the Government of India requesting the information to be sent home with the least possible delay.

HIGHWAY BILLS.—QUESTION.
MR. G. BENTINCKasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce, and to proceed with, during the present Session any Bill relating to Highways?
MR. BRUCEsaid, in reply, that he had already stated that it was his intention to bring in a measure making compulsory the provisions of the Highway Act.

ARMY REGULATION BILL— [BILL 39.]
(Mr. Secretary Cardwell, Sir Henry Knight Storks, Captain Vivian, The Judge Advocate.)
ARMY REGULATION BILL— [BILL 39.]

  SECOND READING. ADJOURNED DEBATE. [SECOND NIGHT.]
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [6th March], "That the Bill be now read a second time;" and which Amendment was,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the expenditure necessary for the national defences and the other demands on the Exchequer do not at present justify any Vote of Public Money for the extinction of Purchase in the Army,"—(Colonel Loyd Lindsay,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  Debate resumed.
  LORD ELCHO: The narrow issue to which, as I think, unfortunately, this question has been confined on the matter raised by my hon. and gallant Friend behind me (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), to whose liberality and exertions during the late war suffering humanity owes so much, has placed it, in my opinion, on too limited a basis. The consequence has been that this debate has run almost entirely upon the question of Army purchase. Now, though the abolition of the system of purchase may form a very large part of the Government measure, I venture to say that it is but a very small part of a very great subject. The question at issue before the country is the passing of a Bill for the purpose of placing its military resources on a proper footing, and it is therefore a question affecting the honour, power, influence, nay, even the very safety of England; and I venture to think that in comparison with this question not only does purchase sink into insignificance, but the questions which engaged us for two Sessions of Parliament, momentous though they were—I mean the measures dealing with the Irish Church and the tenure of land in Ireland—are also questions that sink into comparative insignificance. The House will therefore, I trust, bear with me while I endeavour to place this question—which my hon. and gallant Friend behind me, though representing a broad-
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  gauge county, has shunted, I cannot help thinking unwisely, on to a narrow gauge—upon its true basis. I cannot say that I was either pleased or disappointed at the speech made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War in introducing his proposals to the House. It could not have pleased me, notwithstanding the ability and clearness of his statement, to hear him shadowing forth measures which I believed to be totally inadequate to the occasion. I was not disappointed, because, knowing the turn of my right hon. Friend's mind, and being aware of what was thought by that gentleman who is acquainted with everything—I mean "the man in the street"—as to the course which the Government would take in this matter, I was in that state of beatitude which is the condition of those who expect nothing; therefore the measure shadowed forth, so far as I was concerned, was no disappointment to me. It seems to me, having read the comments which have been passed on this scheme by the public prints—comments which, in the case of the leading journal, went to the extent of saying that the speech of my right hon. Friend was received with enthusiasm, desirable to ascertain, if possible, what are the grounds for that enthusiasm: I have read that speech line for line; I have searched the provisions of this Bill diligently, and I must confess I can find in neither sufficient cause for any such feeling. In order to ascertain the value of this measure we must, I think, first of all establish an adequate gauge. My right hon. Friend has given us his gauge. He stated that the measure was intended to lay deep the foundation of a system—and I beg the House to mark this—"which would render danger, or the apprehension of danger, altogether unknown in the future." Now, that is a magniloquent, but a somewhat vague mode of expression; and the worst of it is that you cannot apply my right hon. Friend's gauge to his Bill until the danger has actually arisen; in short, until it is too late. "Too late!"—those unhappy monosyllables which were written up over the doors of the War and Commissariat Departments during the Crimean War, and which have been written on almost every page of our military history. I, for one, reject this gauge, and seek for some other. What, then, should

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  be the proper gauge of a measure for the organization of the military forces of the Crown?—for that is what the question comes to after all. In answer to that question, I contend that you must establish, in the first place, a proper standard for your Army; you must severally see what your present armaments are; and, in the third place, find out what are your chief wants. As to a proper standard for our Army, I would, in dealing with that point, though I may refer to our foreign policy, not say a single word which might alarm any hon. Member, especially the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). I am not going to open up the question of the Conference, or of British interference, but this question of what should be our foreign policy lies at the root of the whole subject of Army organization, and it may, I think, be discussed and dismissed in a very few sentences. The events which have occurred in Europe during the last six months have brought to the front the views entertained by different sections in this country as to what should be the character of the foreign policy which we should adopt. We have, on the one hand, the advocates of non-intervention, and first comes the Peace Society, of whom I see a distinguished representative sitting on the Benches opposite. Now, do not imagine that I am going to speak sneeringly of the members of that society. On the contrary, I have the greatest respect for those gentlemen, because they are men who have opinions, and who are not ashamed to own those opinions, at the risk of being laughed at by their fellow-countrymen when they advocate disarmament, which they are always prepared to do even in time of war. But the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor), favourable though he is to peace, has told us that he is not prepared to secure it at any price, and that he is ready to pay for it the price of war. This party, however, cannot, I think, be said to represent anything like the majority of the people of this country. We have also among us men who are at one time for non-intervention, and who petition the Government against intervention, but who, at another, are found assembled in fantastic garb round the base of Nelson's Column dancing a moral war dance and whooping like Red Indians in their desire to urge on the
  1682
  Government to engage in hostilities. I am glad the Prime Minister has had the courage to bar the door against his allies in Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park. Again, we have a more literate and philosophic class of Englishmen, who are fond of giving utterance to sentiments no less bloodthirsty in the pages of some popular reviews. Now, I do not believe that any of those parties represents the deep-seated feeling of the people of this country. But there is another class of men for whom much is to be said. The views of this class are most ably put forward in a pamphlet called Happy England, which I recommend hon. Members carefully to read. The author is Sir Edward Sullivan, a man who has written admirable articles on social reform, and his view is, that the people of this country ought not to be the sole policeman of Europe; that we should have nothing more to do with treaties; and that we should content ourselves with maintaining such a fleet and such a number of marines as would enable us to protect ourselves and our colonial possessions. That also is a view which, in my opinion, does not represent the real feeling of this House, or of the public out-of-doors. On the other hand, we have interventionists of the purest and bluest blood, who are ready to interfere on every occasion in the affairs of the nations beyond that "silver streak," for which, as I do not happen to look upon it from the serene battlements of Walmer Castle, I venture to suggest "leaden" would be a more appropriate epithet. The class of interventionists of whom I am speaking would have us maintain such a military force as would enable us to renew the glories of Agincourt and Cressy; but neither is theirs, in my opinion, the view of the majority of the people of this country. I now come to what I believe to be the real feeling of the majority of Englishmen on this subject. It is this—They hate war as much as the Peace Society; they remember what the wise man has said, that "he that passeth by, and meddleth with strife belonging not to him, is like one that taketh a dog by the ears." They at the same think that the safety and honour of England may sometimes oblige us to interefere, and that we might be bound by the faith of treaties to take part in struggles which we would give almost anything to avoid. While hating war, they are men who,

  1683
  when honour is at stake, may always be appealed to with success, for they feel that, though death may be a fearful thing, a shamed life is hateful. That I am right in this view is shown by what occurred at the close of last Session, when we showed our readiness to interfere for the defence of Belgium, and Parliament was asked to vote a sum of money for the purpose of increasing our military force. Such being our policy, we must place ourselves in the position of keeping our Army in such a state of efficiency that, without waiting for five or six months, we might be enabled effectually to carry out those treaty obligations in which the honour of England is engaged. As to our colonial policy, it may be wise to bring troops home in time of peace; but in the event of war, unless you are prepared to give up your Colonies, you must send troops to defend them. In case of war you must be prepared to increase the garrisons of fortresses like Malta, Gibraltar, and Halifax. It is, therefore, a mistake to say you are strong because you have in this country a certain number of men, when, in the event of the outbreak of a war, you would have to send abroad a considerable number of them for the purposes of your colonial garrisons. Then there is India. I suppose no one wishes to give up India. But you may have to put down a mutiny, or, in case of differences with Russia about the Black Sea question, you may have to defend the frontier of India. Looking, then, to foreign and colonial policy—I say nothing at present about home defence—you must have an Army, small, indeed, but easily and rapidly expanded. Now, such an Army at the present moment we certainly have not got. As regards our home policy, I need not speak of our home defences, because the wish of every Englishman must naturally be that we should be absolutely unassailable at home, and that if we think it right to adopt as our foreign policy, a policy of concession instead of resistance, it should not be supposed that our concession is caused by the weakness of our military armaments. I come now to the second part of my gauge—the state of our Army. I am not going to weary the House by entering into Army statistics. I will ask it to accept certain things as accepted facts. Now, what is the state of our Army? I have jotted
  1684
  down certain facts which I believe to be indisputable. We have an Army organized in regiments only. I do not call your district organization anything as yet. It may become so; it is not so now. You have an Army organized in regiments only; and those, skeleton regiments and cadres. You have no Reserves—that is to say, nothing worthy of the name. You have a Militia Reserve of 20,000 men, to get which you have reduced the standard, and have not insisted on medical examination, so that many of these men, if examined now for re-enlistment in regiments, would be rejected, whereas, by going into the Militia Reserve, they escape medical examination, and can be re-attested without it. You have no certain supply—I mean no absolute supply—of men. The men you get are not of sufficient physique—that is to say, they are too young. I have extracts from the Report of the recruiting officer laid on the Table, which my right hon. Friend has quoted with reference to enlistment and other matters in his own favour, though if I wanted a document which shows the rottenness of our system, especially in the matter of recruiting, I should take this as a textbook. It seems that these boys enlist nominally at 18, but really often at 17, and sometimes—though the Report does not say so—at 16 years of age. The Report says they increase one inch in height, two inches round the chest, and 16lbs. in weight in the course of one year. On the other hand, a most able pamphlet has been written by Major-General Sir Lintorn Simmons, than whom, from the variety of his knowledge and experience, no higher authority exists, and this officer points out that what with the boys who are unfit for long marches and hard service, and what with the comparatively old soldiers who re-enlist in order to obtain their pensions, you must, for actual, reliable service in the field, make a deduction of from 15 to 20 per cent from our Army, 20 per cent being, as he says, much nearer the mark than 15. Then what is it you may have to meet? Every correspondent, and every private individual who has seen the troops engaged in the war, has been struck by the physique of the German soldiers. Their active, mobilized war Army consists entirely of men from 20 to 27 years of age; and it is against this Army that

  1685
  you might possibly have to send your raw youths of 16 and 18, along with men who, towards the close of their 20 years' service, are only fit for garrison duty. As regards the class of men, you do not get the right quality. Our Army is not during peace trained for war as the Prussian Army is. The Militia, like the Regular Army, exists only in regiments. It is not formed into brigades, with officers attached to learn their duty. They, too, have no certain supply of men; and they, too, have the same class of men I have referred to as being in the Regular Army. Then, again, I can refer to the Report of the recruiting officer, to which I have already alluded. He points out the evil of the competition which now exists between the Militia and the Line for the same class of men—a competition attended with great injury to the service; and, owing to the localization of the force, the Militia recruiting sergeants, on the whole, get better men than those of the Regular Army. The training of the Militia is admittedly insufficient; the force is also, to a certain extent, short of officers. Now, as to the Volunteers. They also exist only in regiments. They are insufficiently trained; their officers, as a whole are also not up to the proper standard; and, above all, the Government have no hold over the force, in consequence of which you cannot compel that degree of training and discipline which is absolutely essential to make it a reliable weapon for the defence of England. This is what is; I do not say what might be. I come now to probably the most important of all the branches of our military forces, and that is the artillery. At the close of last Session my right hon. Friend—I do not blame him, for he went to his present office new to the work, and naturally says on such questions what those in his Office, or the authorities whom he consults, tell him—spoke in this House in the most contented manner about our armaments, and the House went away satisfied. My right hon. Friend was not only satisfied; he spoke proudly and boastfully of the state of our artillery. And what did he say? That we had artillery sufficient for 60,000 men—not a gun more. It was upon this assurance that Parliament separated, with the chance of having to drive the Prussians or the French out of Belgium.
  1686
  It turned out that, according to our field equipment, we had not artillery for 60,000 men with Reserves on a war establishment, but only had artillery for 40,000 men. I again say that I do not blame the right hon. Gentleman. He spoke as he was told. But it is desirable that the House should know accurately what is the real state of our artillery. The result of further deliberation during the Recess was this—that whereas my right hon. Friend was satisfied with the state of our artillery at the end of August, he doubled it in the course of the Recess between September and February. Here is a statement made out from various sources, upon which the House may rely as absolutely correct. The proportion of artillery in the Prussian service is 2·7 per 1,000 men. In our service, according to the field equipment, with Reserves, the proportion was set down at 3·10, showing, on paper, a larger proportion than that in the Prussian Army; but a Committee which investigated the subject lowered the figures to 3 guns to every 1,000 men, including the artillery themselves. I take this as the standard. My right hon. Friend says we have this year 336 guns and 72 depôt guns—in all 408 field guns. At 3 guns per 1,000 men this is equal to an Army of 136,000 men. The artillery got 1,456 of the 20,000 men voted in August of last year, with 724 horses, to complete the then existing batteries, so that they were not complete at the time my right hon. Friend comforted the House. A further increase was made on February 1, 1871, of 3,798 men and 2,110 horses, to form six new batteries of horse artillery and 20 new batteries of field artillery. This increase in the artillery has been made not simply by raising men, but by converting to a certain extent garrison batteries into field batteries; so that of 20 new batteries, 8 are wholly formed from garrison batteries, and 2 are wholly officered from garrison batteries; the result being that the garrison batteries are short of officers, consequent on last year's reduction of one subaltern, and the raising now of garrison brigades to 162 men per battery. Let it be remembered that a garrison gunner is a mechanic, who has to raise from the ground the 35-ton gun, place it on the carriage and work it; and, therefore, by converting the garrison artilleryman into a field

  1687
  artilleryman, you put a skilled workman to do inferior work. These garrison gunners when made field artillerymen will have to discharge stable duties and teach riding and mounted drills, though I believe not one of them has been on horseback. Notwithstanding this absorbing of garrison artillery, an increase of 2,512 men and 5,440 horses is required to place our artillery on a foreign war establishment. We have a foreign war establishment and we have a home war establishment. To complete the home war establishment we require 1,192 men and 3,088 horses. To complete these batteries the Government would have to take the whole depôt brigade of 2,600 men, and these will have to meet the whole of the Indian drain and the requirements of the Colonies. Of the 72 guns in depôt or reserve, only 30 are now horsed and manned, and those on the peace establishment. When the House is told of these things it may well shiver at the state of things existing, knowing what the expenditure would be to place matters on a proper footing. However, considering what has recently been going on abroad, it is desirable that these figures should sink deeply into the minds of hon. Members. We require on the standard of 3 guns to 1,000 men for the home forces alone, 135,000 men, 405 guns; for the Army of Reserve of 60,000 men of the first and second class, 180 guns; and 60 guns for the Militia Reserve of 20,000. Therefore, you require 645 guns for the Army alone, and you have now only 405. There is no difficulty in the manufacture of the guns, for they can be turned out at Woolwich at the rate of a battery a week; it is the men and the training of them that are wanted. You should have a sufficient Reserve, and not have to wait for six months to get 18,000 men. My right hon. Friend boasts of his battalions of Reserved forces—the Militia and Volunteers. Now, how many guns would they require? The 120,000 men of the Militia would require 360 guns; the 14,000 Yeomanry would require 42, and the 170,000 Volunteers would require 510 guns, or, altogether, 912 field guns if they were put into the field on the footing you have supposed as proper for meeting an enemy having 3 guns to 1,000 men. I admit that a certain amount of the men would be locked up in depôts; but to say that
  1688
  you have the requisite number of guns in reserve would not be doing justice to the Army, and would only be throwing dust in the eyes of the country. We ought to take care that, in applying this test to the Bill, we have a Reserve force of artillery. The great secret of success abroad has been this—that, although the proportion is under 3 guns to 1,000 men, considering the mass of artillery in the German Army, they can concentrate it, and bring the fire to bear on certain points; so that the Duke of Mecklenburg had guns in the proportion of 6 to 1,000 men in his Army. Besides all this, we have no general field organization, and we have forts comparatively without guns. My right hon. Friend boasts of a 35-ton gun, and says we shall have the best guns in the world. But we have only got one of them, and I am not sure that that has been proved. My right hon. Friend also said that we have the best field gun in the world; but how many guns of that kind have we got? Only two. As regards the rifle, my right hon. Friend stated that we likewise possessed the best specimen of that arm. I have the satisfaction of saying that the Snider is better, or, at least, as good as the Chassepôt. My right hon. Friend also referred to the Martini-Henry; and I will accept his statement, that it is the best arm in the world. But the pattern of this arm has not been decided upon, and further experiments are being made to make it lighter. But you must recollect that you have got to arm your troops with this weapon. What is supposed to be the proper stand of arms in this country, exclusive of those in the hands of troops? There ought to be 800,000 in store. No doubt the Snider will be the store arm for emergencies, and that other arms will be put into the hands of the troops for service. Whether we regard the big guns or the small arms, the whole matter must be admitted to be in a state of transition; and, unless money is spent on these primary objects, it will be years and years before we get into a satisfactory condition. We have only one arsenal, and our system of supply is very unsatisfactory, and would entirely break down in time of war. My right hon. Friend referred to the expedition into Canada, and quoted the letter of Colonel Wolseley; but that was no test whatever. That expedition to the Red River was nothing like an expedition in

  1689
  the ordinary war sense—it was a mere caravan going out into the desert, carrying all its supplies with it, having no base, and requiring none, and there was no expenditure of ammunition attending it, so that, therefore, it is absolutely worthless as a test. I now come to show what our state is as regards our wants. There are two kinds of wants. There are wants which are secondary, and there are wants which are primary and essential. What I call a secondary want, assuming it to be a want at all, is such a matter as that which occupied the attention of Parliament a week or two ago for a whole night; it is a secondary point in military reform whether the Military Secretary is to be appointed for life or for only five years. I hold his salary to be equally a secondary matter in the question of military reform. I hold it a secondary question whether the tenure of the Commander-in-Chief should be for life or for five years. Those are all secondary as compared with our really primary wants. Individually, I believe that the present Commander-in-Chief, from his knowledge of all military details, is the fittest man in this country to hold the office which he now fills; and what I see, on the part of those who are agitating this question, is a wish, a desire, an attempt to degrade the Commander-in-Chief into the mere creature of the Secretary of State, whom they may, perhaps, some day succeed in making—what he is not at present—the slave of the House of Commons. To show the House that I am not wrong in that view, I may say that three years ago, after the discussion on purchase, I met an ardent young Army reformer, and expressed to him my surprise that there was such an anxiety to get rid of the Duke of Cambridge, who, on every Committee and Commission, had shown that he knew more of the details connected with the administration of the Army than any other man, civil or military, in the country. What was the reply of this ardent young military reformer? "That's it!" he said. "That is why we must get rid of him. He is too powerful." "Why?" I asked. "Because, under our Constitution," replied my friend, "we are enabled to have a Secretary of State who is not very well versed in military matters, and, therefore, he may become a mere tool in the hands of such a Commander-in-Chief
  1690
  as the Duke of Cambridge." I shrugged my shoulders, turned on my heel, and said—"I am glad to have learnt your views on this question, and it comes to this—that because by the Constitution you are able to have an ignorant Secretary of State, you must therefore saddle the Army with an incompetent Commander-in-Chief." I think the hon. Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan) will not deny that this is a correct statement of the views of Army reformers at the time I speak of, three years ago. I say, nevertheless, the tenure of the Commander-in-Chief, whether for life or for five years, is secondary, as a question of military organization. Then another question which I deem to be wholly and absolutely secondary is the question of purchase. Does anyone deny it? No, it is not denied; but, in case it should be, I will anticipate the denial and prove that my view is right. Suppose that when this war broke out, and the nation was in an excited and alarmed state, the Secretary of State had come down to this House, and told us that he had added 20,000 men to the Army, and a certain number to the artillery, and had said further—"This is an European crisis of the gravest character, and we shall meet it by altering the tenure of the office of Commander-in-Chief to five years, by similarly altering the tenure of the Military Secretary's office, by reducing the Secretary's salary, and by abolishing the system of purchase." If he had done no more than that, should we have accepted such proposals? No. We should have said—"This is all very well in theory, and it is, no doubt, a right thing to make our house sound in all its joints and crannies, but these are all secondary questions; what we want to do is to make arrangements for our primary and essential wants, or otherwise the country will not be secure." Now, what are our primary wants? They are, in the first place, men for the Army, a certain, absolute supply of men of proper physique. We want Reserves for the Army, and that these Reserves should not come in by driblets of 1,000, 2,000, or 3,000 a-year, and taking 10 or 20 years before an Army of Reserve is formed, but that steps should be taken to bribe men to come into the Army at once; otherwise where would you be if another emergency should happen? Then, with regard to the Militia, we

  1691
  want a certain supply of men to stop the competition with the Army, and these men should be sufficiently trained to meet foreign troops, in case, at any time, we should be invaded. As to the Volunteers, the whole matter may be summed up in one word—you want to get a hold of them which you have not yet got. And, now, having got my gauge, let me apply it to this measure. I have made an analysis of this Bill. It consists of 36 clauses, of which eight go to purchase, 16 to the auxiliary forces. There remain power to take railways one clause; barracks and land, five clauses; penalties and saving clauses, three; definition, one; preliminary one. There is only one clause relating to the question of Reserves; yet the title of the Bill is "Army Regulation." Now, it appears to me that the whole of this Bill deals recklessly and wantonly with what is secondary, while it almost ignores, as I shall show, what is primary and essential in what this country needs—military organization. An hon. and gallant Friend of mine the Member for Bewdley (Major Anson) asked the Secretary of State to divide his Bill, but he very naturally refuses; because if he did divide it into measures affecting purchase and its other questions, there would be nothing left of it, and my right hon. Friend naturally and wisely objects to bring that result about. The question of purchase is the very pith and marrow of this Bill. I am not a defender of purchase in the abstract; no man is; but I find that it works well in practice. Three years ago I ventured to address the House on the question. I never thought of the subject till then; but I read during the Easter Recess all that had been said in the House on the subject, and I came to the deliberate conclusion before I made my speech that, perhaps, the only sound thing in our military organization is this regimental system, of which the life-blood is this question of purchase. I do not defend purchase in theory; but as a practical man wishing to do the best for the Army, for my country, and for my constituents, I am forced to the conclusion that it works well—I shall not discuss the details of the matter at all. I assume that the interests of the officers are safe, and that the House of Commons, if it abolishes purchase, will do full and ample justice to the vested
  1692
  interests of the Army, and that over-regulation, as well as regulation prices will be paid to clear this debt which you have allowed to grow up. I will only say a few words on the general question. I think purchase can be defended on the broad question of principle. What is the good side of purchase? It is this—that it gives you young and physically efficient officers, so that you have a great deal younger officers in your Army than are to be found in any other Army, and you get this at no cost to the State, and on the very small payment which you make to your officers. Our officers, there can be no question, are very badly paid; but as they are willing to serve it is not for the House or the country to complain. You get the very best and most efficient officers, and they are not discontented with their position, but are proud of it. The purchase system also gives you a check against anything like favouritism, and it is the very root and basis of what is called the regimental system; but that is the wrong expression; we should rather call it the esprit de corps, or regimental esprit, as it was well termed by the hon. and gallant Member (Captain Talbot) who spoke the other night immediately before the adjournment. It is impossible to set too high a value upon this regimental esprit, and your new scheme proposes to destroy it. An hon. Member whose reputation for ability stands high in this House—the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread)—has spoken of the hardships to officers under the existing system. Why, whether purchase or non-purchase, all officers alike are in favour of the purchase system. The hon. Member also said that no officer under the purchase system could be passed over without his consent, and that in cases where he was unable to purchase his step promotion must of a necessity come to a stop. But the answer to the objection is a very simple one, because I maintain that such a man will get to the head of his regiment sooner under the existing system than he would do under the proposed one. Well, those are some of the good results of the purchase system, and now let us see what are the objections which have been raised against it. The hon. Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan) who has shown so much ability and perseverance in connection

  1693
  with this subject, maintains that by abolishing the purchase system we shall obtain these five advantages. In the first place, he says, we shall obtain efficient officers in every grade of rank. Admitted. Secondly, he says that no man will be able to obtain the command of a regiment who is not efficient; thirdly, that there should be an opening afforded to non-moneyed men who have ability and zeal, and who wish to get on, but who cannot afford to pay for promotion. Fourthly, that under the new system we shall have promotion from the ranks of non-commissioned officers. We have heard very little on this subject lately, and I shall have something more to say upon it by-and-by; and, lastly—and this is the Government reason for asking us to spend this enormous sum of money—that we cannot officer our Reserves or amalgamate our forces without the abolition of the purchase system. [Captain VIVIAN: No.] I am in the recollection of the House; but if it is denied that this is the Government reason, I say they have no reason at all for it. I maintain that every one of these advantages can be obtained without our going to this expense; if they could not, I should be the first to support it. Let us consider the first of these advantages which it is said we are to obtain under the new system. It is said we shall obtain efficient officers under it. Now, I maintain that under the existing system you can train your officers up to any standard you choose. You can, if you wish, screw them up to the Prussian standard, or even above it. Therefore, there is nothing in the argument that you can obtain efficient officers by the abolition of the purchase system. But it is most important that our officers should be trained on a war footing. You have never done that, and you make no provision for it under your new system. Thus you have absolutely neglected the most important part of the training your officers ought to receive. Then it is stated that under the new system the command of a regiment will be prevented from falling into incompetent hands. But under the existing system the Commander-in-Chief has a veto upon the appointments to the commands of regiments, and he has confidential reports placed in his hands which tell him the character of every officer in the Army. If you choose to do so, you can say at
  1694
  the present time to every officer that they shall undergo a general examination before they are appointed to the command of regiments. Then as to the veto possessed by the Commander-in-Chief. It may be said the Commander-in-Chief does not exercise that veto; but if you find he fails to exercise it where he ought to, withdraw his letter of service, and be thankful that you are enabled to do so, as he has not got a five years' tenure of office. Appoint some other Commander-in-Chief, and go on appointing fresh ones, if necessary, until you get one who will carry out his duty properly; for it is the duty of the Commander-in-Chief not to be deterred by the "Dawkinses" of the service, but to exercise the veto intrusted to him by the Constitution in such a way as will add to the efficiency of the service. As regards the opening of the Army to poor men who cannot afford to buy their promotion, there is nothing in the present system which prevents that being done. The Artillery and the Engineers are open at the present moment to that very class of men. I need not read the figures I have in my hand, because it is needless to weary the House by doing so; but here is a statement of the number of commissions given at Sandhurst without purchase, and of the number at the Universities which are paid for. Therefore it is absurd to say that you cannot throw open the Army to poor men under the present system. Then comes the question of the promotion of non-commissioned officers. But did not the hon. Member for the Border Burghs himself point to what occurred in the Crimea, and say that upwards of 100 non-commissioned officers had been raised from the ranksthen, and had received commissions. That statement begs the question on my side, because it shows that, under the present system of purchase, you can give commissions to whatever number of noncommissioned officers you think right. I said just now that we heard very little now about commissions being given to non-commissioned officers, and with good reason. What was the sort of language used upon this subject three years ago? The hon. Member for the Border Burghs said—
  "If we could once prevail upon the War Office to set aside some fixed proportion of vacancies, say one-third or one-fourth, for men promoted from the ranks, all else would in good time follow."

  1695
  But the French and Prussian War has occurred since then, and the non-commissioned officer question "won't wash" now; and, consequently, we have heard nothing in this debate about the giving of commissions to non-commissioned officers under the new system. It would certainly be a great inconsistency to say that while our great want is trained officers, we intend giving commissions to non-commissioned officers. We need not enter into the aristocratic question—do not let us talk such rubbish as that—but the class of officers we want is that which we find in the Artillery and in the Engineers. Sir Robert Anstruther took up this question rightly when he said that we want officers from the middle class of society. But the object of the hon. Member for the Border Burghs is to democratize the Army. Three years since the hon. Member said—"We could not go on much longer officering our Army from the froth, and manning it from the dregs of society." That was said by the hon. Member in this House three years ago. But he finds it desirable and convenient to change his tone now. [Mr. TREVELYAN: No.] The hon. Member adjured his friends to "provide us with a national and, in the truest sense, a democratic military force." It is not for me to stand up here to defend the officers of the Army—God knows they want no defenders. Looking at their acts, whether before regular armies or savage tribes, or in the Indian Mutiny, is there a man in this House who will say that our Army is officered by the froth of the nation? Even in the heat of debate such language would be strong; but when the hon. Member calmly reiterates the charge, I can only say that I do not take the view of the question which he does—my nature, thank God, does not fit me for it. There remains, then, but the fifth point for me to deal with—namely, that which relates to the officering of the Reserved forces. I maintain that the Reserved forces can be officered without getting rid of the purchase system. Glancing over the Army List yesterday, I found that in the Essex Rifles out of a total of 15 officers eight, including the honorary colonel, are men who have served in the Army, and that in the Royal Glamorganshire Regiment, which has no honorary colonel, out of 16 officers nine have served in the Army.
  1696
  Those were the only two regiments I looked at; but I dare say they were a fair sample of the rest. Therefore it is a mistake to suppose that in the Militia we have not numbers of officers who have served in the Regular Army. If you have not enough now, why do not you get more? You have only to say that officers on half-pay shall serve in the Militia as a condition of their half-pay, and you would obtain any number you thought fit to accept. I know numbers—I am afraid to say how many—of officers who have asked over and over again for employment in the Militia, and have been refused. As regards the Volunteers in like manner, I am proud to say that officers in many of the regiments have been in the Regular Army. I myself have the honour, unworthy as I am of it, of commanding the holder of a Victoria Cross in the person of one of my majors, who was aide-de-camp to Sir Hope Grant, and my other major was aide-de camp to Lord Clyde during the whole of the Indian campaign. Therefore, upon all these points the difficulty can be met, if the Secretary of State chooses, without doing away with purchase. Now what are the sums that will have to be paid. The Secretary of State has given an estimate of from £7,000,000 to £8,000,000, but he did not touch upon the question of retirement. And why did he not do this?—because, as he said, he was no prophet. Non meus hec sermo. Far be it from me to say whether he is or is not a prophet; but I will say it is a thing almost unheard of for a Secretary of State for War to ask the House to sanction an expenditure of £8,000,000 for the abolition of purchase, and to add that there would be a further charge for retirement, but he had no notion what it would be because he was not a prophet. There have been many extraordinary things spoken in this Session from the Treasury Benches, but none of them have been more extraordinary than the statement I have just quoted. If there is one parallel, it is to be found in what my right hon. Friend said last year. He was trying to get rid of purchase by buying up the first steps in promotion; and in the course of his speech he said that the whole system of purchase was one which no man could understand. My right hon. Friend will forgive me for saying that he did not quote accurately—the words should have been, "which no

  1697
  fellow can understand." But upon this question of retirement my right hon. Friend has no excuse for not being a prophet, for he sits among the prophets, and, by mesmeric or other influences, he might or ought to have been endued, to some extent with the spirit of prophecy in regard to this subject. I find that in 1868 a speech was made in this House having reference to the state of things in 1856, and the speech contained the following calculations as to the regulation value of commissions:—Cavalry, £1,335,290; Foot Guards, £610,110; and Infantry of the Line, £5,180,630; total, £7,126,030. Having quoted these figures, the hon. Member who was speaking proceeded to say that—
  "Justice required them to pay not only the regulation price, but also whatever additional sums had really been paid under the system now connived at. Mr. O'Dowd had gone pretty closely into that matter in his pamphlet."—[3 Hansard, cxcii. 536.]
  Mr. O'Dowd—who, I would remark, is now Deputy Judge Advocate, and therefore a Government official—made out that the over-regulation prices of commissions were—Cavalry, £1,735,000; Foot Guards, £435,000; and Infantry of the Line, £2,849,000: a total of £5,019,000; which, added to the regulation prices—£7,126,030—gives a grand total of £12,145,030. [Mr. OSBORNE: That does not include the artillery.] Do not be in a hurry. We have the retirement to come, and with it the prophecy. This Gentleman said he took the grand total I have just mentioned "as representing the real value of the vested interests in the Army," and then proceeds to say—
  "He took off 20 per cent as a fair deduction for promotion to the rank of general, retirement on half-pay, and other vacancies. Therefore, the House must be prepared—not in the course of a generation, but at most in 20 years, to spend first of all £10,000,000, in round figures, to buy out the vested interests of the Army;"—[Ibid, 537.]
  which is only different by the sum of, say, £1,500,000 from the sum which my right hon. Friend gave the House the other day as the anticipated cost of the Government scheme. Then the prophet proceeded to say—
  "But that was not all it would cost them to get rid of purchase; for they would have to revise their whole system of retirement."—[Ibid.]
  He did not say they would have to increase the pay of the officers, though
  1698
  that must be done; but he said a revision would be necessary to "increase the flow of promotion." I particularly ask the attention of the House to these figures. They have not been laid before us by the Government, and I maintain that they ought to have been. He goes on to say—
  "In addition to paying the sums he had already stated, they would have to provide for a system of retirement on full pay after 22 years' service, instead of on half-pay after 25 years' service. … . He thought he was much below the mark when he said that besides the £500,000, that would be added to the Estimates for 20 years at least"—to get rid of regulation and over-regulation purchase—"they would have to pay £1,000,000 a-year, or, in other words, an additional 1d. of income tax for ever."—[Ibid.]
  Now this prophet, not satisfied with this very clear and I think valuable and effective statement, which supplements the deficiency of the Government scheme, drew a moral and uttered a warning, as prophets usually do. This moral or warning was not addressed to the House in general; but to those hon. Members who sat below the Gangway, who were most active and urgent on such questions, and who believed they were doing their duty to their constituents by voting for a Bill like that now under discussion. The hon. Member's moral and warning was couched in these words—
  "Surely, it was idle complaining of the extravagance of the Estimates if, in the pursuit of a chimera, they were to saddle the country with that increased expenditure. He confessed that he should feel much surprised at finding such a proposal supported by the Members of the Liberal party, who had always been the strenuous advocates of retrenchment."—[Ibid.]
  ["Name!"] I do not think it would be kind to mention the name, though the whole point of the observations I have quoted from the hon. Member lies in the fact of his name. ["Name!"] Well, then, these statements were made by no other authority than the present Financial Secretary to the War Office (Captain Vivian), who sits by the side of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. But I will say more. These figures have a great value, because when my hon. and gallant Friend was appointed to his present office, he appeared in the Order in Council almost on a level with the Commander-in-Chief and Controller General. He was appointed in consequence of his financial knowledge and ability, and on his appointment he told his constituents that he was responsible for

  1699
  the finances of the Army. These figures, therefore, have a very peculiar value. They have a value which no figures that may come again from the hon. and gallant Member can possibly have, for they are unofficial figures. They are the product of the pure and virgin financial mind of my hon. and gallant Friend before he was corrupted by office and debauched by the Secretary of State. Now, Sir, I am inclined to think that this addition of 1d. to the income tax for ever is one of those measures which are like a fence — the more you look at it the less you like it. That is why I do not intend to vote on this question. I intend to walk out of the House, because I do not think the issue has been fairly sifted; but when it has, I think, the House will find the Government proposal to be the chaff and not the wheat. The more hon. Members who advocate economy look at it the less they will like it. When the hon. Member for the Border Burghs was speaking the other night, he was cheered very loudly by an hon. Member who was near me at the time. I said—"I am glad you like it; but do you know that it will cost the country £10,000,000 down and at least £500,000 a-year for ever?" What was his remark in reply to this? "The deuce!" A deputation came up to me from the country, and, amongst other matters, we spoke of the question of Army purchase. I asked if they knew what it would cost? They had not an idea; and when I gave them some information on the point, they did not answer in the same terms as my hon. Friend, but their remark was one which will have even more effect upon hon. Gentlemen opposite. They said—"But do the constituencies know this?"—I said—"No, they don't." ["Oh, oh!"] They certainly would not know it from the figures put before them. "But," I said, "there are some of us in the House who will take good care that it is known." My impression is that when this question comes to be well sifted in Committee by men who are conversant with the details of the subject the Government will fail to carry their proposal as to Army purchase. At any rate, it is the most wicked, the most wanton, the most uncalled for waste of public money that in 30 years' experience I have ever seen. The proof of that is, as I have demonstrated, that there is not a single thing
  1700
  which you say it is necessary to get by the abolition of purchase that you could not get without it. I will pass on to some of the other provisions of the Bill. The next important question is that of the Ballot. You have 10 clauses for the Ballot, and 44 provisions. That part of the Bill is an absolute waste of paper, in this sense—that the Ballot is to come in force in case of an emergency. Now, I should like to hear my right hon. Friend define what an emergency is. Judging by what has taken place on the Continent, an emergency now-a-days means your capital occupied by the enemy, and a treaty of peace such as has recently been signed at Versailles. Any Bill that comes before us with the word "emergency" is almost self-condemned, even if the means of meeting the emergency were effective. The effect of these 44 provisions will be simply this—that when the emergency in the opinion of the Secretary of State has arisen — and we know how long it is before the Government think an emergency has arisen by the experience of the past—Parliament is to be called together to see that these clauses are to be enforced; and from the time that Parliament meets to decide whether this Bill is to be put into operation, a minimum of 30 days must elapse before you get a single man to meet your emergency, and that man not a trained soldier, but a man whom you then begin to train before he can be put into the ranks to meet Prussian or French soldiers—by that time the French will not be worse than Prussian soldiers. I should like to have the value of 30 days for the purposes of training defined by M. Gambetta, by General d'Aurelles des Paladines, by General Chanzy. They will tell you it will take much more than 30 days to make any man fit to be put into the ranks to defend a nation's safety and honour. I say, then, deliberately, this proposal about the Ballot has been introduced to throw dust into the eyes of the country. It is an absolutely dead provision as it stands. I am an advocate for some arrangement in connection with our military system; but I would sweep such provisions as these away, knowing them to be entirely worthless. I want to see every man serve in his own person; but in this Bill there is a clause that leaves it in the discretion of a magistrate to impose a fine of £100 in case of failure to answer

  1701
  the call under the proposed system. What is that provision but a device to enable a man to get rid of the necessity of personally serving in the defence of his country? I come next to the saving clauses; I thought they might save the Bill. I find one of them is specially introduced for the benefit of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Gilpin), as its object is to exempt Quakers from the operation of the Bill. But that is not necessary, as I have just shown. As to the Army Reserve, there is nothing in the Bill which offers any greater inducement than exists at present to men to enter the Reserve. The Secretary of State proposes that there shall be power to transfer men to the Reserve after one year's service, instead of three years, as before. The idea of transferring a man into the Reserve after one year's service never before entered into the head of anyone. Therefore, I maintain this Bill does absolutely nothing in the way of giving us immediate Reserves. The Report of the Commission shows this. It shows how slowly these Reserves have come in. The Bill does not prevent competition with the Militia; it does not give you men with better physique, and it only provides for 14 days' increased drill. With regard to the Volunteers, it gives you no hold over them. We are told that the Mutiny Act has been applied to the Volunteers by this Bill. The impression conveyed by the statement of the right hon. Gentleman was that the Bill was intended to give the Government increased power over the Volunteers; but it does nothing of the kind. You cannot force a Volunteer to attend parade, or to go to Wimbledon, Brighton, or anywhere else. All it does is to require a year's notice before a man can leave the force, and as the Ballot is a dead letter, that provision is of no effect. If, however, Volunteers are brigaded with the Regular military, they are both under the Mutiny Act. Now, I have a strong feeling on that point. I wish to see the Volunteers as highly disciplined as it is possible for a force to be. I believe that the Volunteers might be made one of the finest and most reliable forces in the country; but you must get a hold over them if you wish to make them so. You must be able to train the men. But, instead of proposing to get a hold over them, all that the Government do is to endorse all that has been
  1702
  said falsely with reference to their want of discipline. The powers in the hands of the commanding officers for the maintenance of discipline among Volunteers are extreme when they are out; but the difficulty is to get them out. When you get them out you have complete power over them. If a Volunteer be insubordinate, the commanding officer may put him under arrest. He is kept under arrest during the whole of the parade, whether at Brighton, at Wimbledon, or in camp. The commanding officer has complete power to dismiss an insubordinate Volunteer—he has greater power in that respect than a colonel of Militia or of the Army. Therefore, I contend that for the maintenance of discipline among Volunteers the proposition of the Secretary of State is wholly unnecessary. I must say that this country deals discreditably towards the Volunteers. At one moment the country extols us to the sky, and at another moment it insults us. We have undertaken for our country's sake to do a duty that is incumbent on all, and we ought not to be unfairly treated if, accidentally, some want of discipline occurs among a small portion of the force. I am astonished not that you should have had one or two cases of want of discipline in the Volunteer force, but that you should have had 170,000 men, for 11 years with arms in their hands, assembling in large bodies, and yet that during all that time you have had so few cases of that kind. It is a most wonderful instance of the power of moral influence, moral restraint, and a sense of public duty. And what is their reward for all this? The Government endorses every falsehood that has been said against them, and puts in these Mutiny clauses. The Government goes out of its way—I will not say to insult them—but to pay them a very poor compliment. That is the view, in the main, of the officers with whom I have conversed on this matter. These Mutiny clauses give you, as I have said, no hold upon the Volunteer force. Therefore, whether you look at the Army, or the Militia, or the Volunteers, this Bill wholly fails in its intended purpose; and in everything, excepting that portion which relates to the abolition of purchase, is unnecessary and absolutely worthless. I apologize to the House for having detained them so long; but I do not think that the time has been wasted

  1703
  if it has enabled hon. Gentlemen to gain a correct view of this question. At the close of last Session the Secretary of State stated that our defences were satisfactory. But public opinion has pressed them during the Recess, and this measure which they have brought in is a tribute to public opinion. It appears to me that this is a political and not a national measure. The whole soul of it is in this purchase question, and that, if I am not mistaken, has been introduced to silence the hollow sound from the Provinces that we have heard during the winter, and to satisfy a section of the Liberal party. The Under Secretary of State said that his right hon. Friend had stated publicly, and in a solemn manner, the fact that the House needed no assurance of, that efficiency and economy went hand in hand. Now in this Bill, I see neither efficiency nor economy. Is it economical to waste for any purpose public money to the extent to which this House is to be asked to waste it, when the objects to be attained can be attained by cheaper and surer means? And is there anything in the Bill which tends immediately—I may almost say remotely—to the efficiency of the Army? All that it does with regard to military organization is to take a leaf out of the Fenian book, to establish a system of "head centres" who are to have charge of what are called brigades of 20,000 men—that is to say, to establish a position in peace which will have no counterpart of any kind whatever in war. It is nothing else but inspection under another name. I say that this money, which is going to be wasted on a secondary question altogether, might be, and ought to be—and it is a breach of trust on the part of the Government that it is not—employed in furnishing greater inducements to men to come out of the Army into the Reserve, greater inducements to men to join in completing your artillery, in giving protection to your commercial harbours, in building a second arsenal, in providing reserve stores of guns, and in arming your forts. What the Government have done is this—they have added 20,000 to the Army. I think so little of these 20,000 men, that if there should be a Motion made by the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Leatham) to strike off this 20,000 I intend to vote with him—that is, to a certain extent. He will
  1704
  move to reduce the number by 20,000. I should like it to be reduced by 10,000, and that the other 10,000 should go altogether to the artillery, in which you are utterly wanting, which is absolutely essential, and without which you cannot pretend to exist as a nation. But these 20,000 men in addition to your Army are neither here nor there. They are here to-day and gone to-morrow, and if you want proof of the soundness of the words of the Resolution which I have put on the Paper, but which the forms of the House do not allow me to move, that proof is to be found in the total inadequacy of such an increase to meet a great European crisis. Would it have enabled you to have driven the Prussians out of Belgium; would it have enabled you to have fulfilled your treaty obligations? It would not. I maintain, therefore, that this Bill, while entailing further permanent charges on the people of this country, fails to establish a military system on a sound, economical, and enduring basis. These 20,000 men are not enduring; they will be off, and you have nothing to supply their places with. You will also have no certain Reserve. Now, Sir, I hope that this Bill will not pass. I hope I have said nothing in the course of my remarks which could in any way bear a party character, and if right hon. Gentlemen on this (the Opposition) side had brought in this measure, I should have spoken in exactly the same sense. I hope it will not pass, because I think that the honour, the dignity, and the safety of my country at this present moment are at stake. It is for my country's sake that I hope this Bill will not pass. Pass this Bill and you throw away this golden opportunity of once and for ever settling this great question of your Army organization on a sound, an economical, and an enduring basis. Pass it as it stands, every provision, every line, every word; and three years, six years, ten years hence, if we were to find ourselves in the position in which we stood in the month of August last, and during this fearful war, what would it be worth? If, during the years I have mentioned, the teeth of the French were to be cut anew and we were to be engaged in war with that Power with which they have now made peace, if, possibly vivisected daily by the Engllsh Press, they were to look across "the silver streak" and threaten us, not a

  1705
  word, not a line, not a provision of this Bill is calculated in any way to meet the emergency or to save us from panic and alarm. Try it by the gauge of my right hon. Friend. According to my right hon. Friend, this measure is intended "to lay the deep foundations of a system which may render danger or the apprehension of danger in the future altogether unknown." I say try it by that gauge, and this measure will be found absolutely wanting. My right hon. Friend in this Bill, so far from laying foundations such as he would lead the House to believe, is inviting Parliament to sow salt on the seashore—to cast millions fruitlessly away. He is endeavouring to build up a military system on which the honour, the influence, nay, perhaps the safety of our country depend; but which I maintain is nothing but quaking bog and shifting quicksands.
  CAPTAIN VIVIANsaid, in replying to the speech of the noble Lord who had just sat down, he would confine himself strictly to the question which was, or ought to have been, under discussion. Yet his noble Friend had made this task difficult, for for one hour and 20 minutes by the clock he had talked upon every subject under the sun connected with military organization except what related to this Bill. His noble Friend began by a long dissertation on foreign policy; but into that subject he did not believe it his duty to follow the noble Lord. But the very last thing which he should attempt was to reconcile the noble Lord's opinions with his acts. His noble Friend had told the House that he was its most independent Member. [Lord ELCHO: I never said that.] His noble Friend had not said so now; but he had frequently heard the noble Lord say so before. His noble Friend had gone so far as to say that he was the only "unwhipped" Member of the House—using that word in a Parliamentary sense. But, if his noble Friend was not "whipped," he begged to remind him of the old nursery phrase—"Spare the rod and spoil the child." He was ready to give his noble Friend credit for the greatest amount of independence that he could assert Nay, he would go so far as to say that if his noble Friend lived in the days of Noah, sooner than enter the Ark with Shem, Ham, and Japhet, he would prefer to "paddle his own canoe." His noble
  1706
  Friend had told the House that the proposal of the Government to abolish purchase was a most wicked and uncalled-for waste of public money; and yet what was he going to do? How could a noble Lord, representing an English constituency—[Lord ELCHO: Scotch]—reconcile his opinion of the conduct of the Government in proposing a most wicked and uncalled-for waste of public money with what he had told the House in the next breath, that instead of voting he would walk out of the House? How, then, was it possible to reconcile the noble Lord's acts with his words? His noble Friend said — "You don't provide men. What I want is men;" and in the next breath he told them he was going to vote with the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Leatham), who proposes to reduce the number of men by 20,000. [Lord ELCHO: I want Reserves.] Reserves could not be made in a day, unless his noble Friend could propose a scheme by which, with the wand of a magician, he could conjure up armed men from the earth. His noble Friend was as impossible to understand in his actions as in his arguments. When at last his noble Friend came to deal with the provisions of the Bill, he told the House they contained the whole scheme of the Government. He would lead hon. Members to believe that outside these provisions his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War had done nothing to create Reserves, or to re-organize the Army. He would ask the House to ignore the fact that last Session a Bill had been brought forward by the Government for the purpose of establishing a system of short service—a system not previously existing, and from which only the formation of a Reserve could be expected. His noble Friend did not, he might add, hesitate to say that purchase was the backbone of our military organization; and, having said that purchase would not be defended, he set to work most elaborately to defend it. [Lord ELCHO: In theory.] A system that could not be logically defended must be practically wrong. The Government, his noble Friend went on to contend, had only two reasons for abolishing purchase—the one being the wish to conciliate the favour of hon. Gentlemen sitting below the Gangway, the other the desire to amalgamate the forces. When at that point of his speech he ventured to

  1707
  interrupt his noble Friend he became very emphatic in his action; but he could assure him there was another reason besides those which he had given. Did not his noble Friend remember that when last year the Secretary for War came down to the House with a very small proposal in the way of the abolition of purchase—namely, to abolish the rank of cornet and ensign—he was met by the obstacle presented by vested interests, and was unable to carry his proposal into effect? There had been since then a Royal Commission, of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northamptonshire (Mr. Hunt) was a Member, and that Commission had unanimously reported that the system of over-regulation prices had been so tacitly admitted that it was no longer possible that they could be ignored. What, then, he would ask, would have been the position of the Government if they had not faced the question of over-regulation prices? They could not have ignored them after the Report of the Commission, and the result would be that they must have asked the House to legalize them. What, again, would be the effect of taking that course? Why, that a colonel's commission, worth £4,000 or £5,000, would have risen in value to something like £7,000, and that a further limitation would be placed upon the class from which our officers were drawn. He did not for a moment mean to contend that our Army was officered by what was known as the aristocratic class; but it was alleged, and he thought with truth, that it was officered by the moneyed classes, and that it was necessary to have money to get on in the service, as, indeed, his noble Friend had himself admitted. It was, indeed, a misrepresentation to say, as had been stated on a former evening by the mover of the Amendment, that a man could get on in the military profession by means of money alone; but he should like to know whether any instance had of late years occurred in which a man having paid his money to obtain promotion was passed over. He, however, took a different ground for wishing to abolish purchase; it was not because a man with money and the necessary qualifications could get on in the Army, but because a man, however great his qualifications might be, could not get on because he did not happen to possess money. An hon.
  1708
  Member (Mr. Buxton) gave as an instance the other evening the case of two of our most famous generals—Lord Clyde and Sir Henry Havelock—who had been, passed over dozens and dozens of times because they could not purchase their promotion, and who, there was no doubt, ought in the bloom of their youth to have been in the highest grades of the service because of their great military talents. Such instances as these were, he maintained, of themselves sufficient to condemn the system of purchase. Some of his noble Friend's arguments in favour of the system were, he might add, the most extraordinary to which he had ever listened. He said that purchase enabled us to obtain the services of officers of great physical capability; but, for his own part, he was at a loss to know how health or strength were to be bought. The noble Lord then went on to refer to a speech of his, and had twitted him with inconsistency, although he was kind enough to spare his feelings so far as not to mention him by name. He would, however, beg to remind his noble Friend that the speech in question was not one in favour of purchase, which he proposed should be abolished in every grade except the lower, the reason why he did not propose abolition in the junior ranks being that at the time there was no scheme in contemplation for the amalgamation of the Militia with the Army in any considerable numbers. It was now, however, proposed that officers of Militia should, under certain conditions, get commissions in the Line, and he should like to know how it would be possible to take officers under a non-purchase system and place them side by side with officers in the Regular Army, each of whom had paid £450 for his commission? His noble Friend had proceeded to refer to the cost of buying up the vested interests of officers, observing that the Secretary for War had no right to bring forward any plan involving so large an expenditure until he was prepared to show what the scale of retirement under it was likely to be. Now, as to the cost of abolishing purchase, the figures he had given on a former occasion were pretty much the same as the figures given by the able actuaries, on which the Government calculation was made, and which amounted, in round numbers, to a total of £7,995,000. He must also remind his noble Friend that on

  1709
  the occasion to which he had referred he was speculating on a state of things which would involve promotion by seniority, and not by selection as was now proposed, and when it was not contemplated that a large number of officers should be removed from the Army to serve in the Reserve forces, thereby creating a flow of promotion. As to the flow of retirement under the present scheme, it was impossible to mate any reliable calculation with respect to it, until there were sufficient data upon which to proceed, for what would be the state of things two years hence must be a matter of mere speculation. Certain hon. Gentlemen said the other night—"Look at the artillery, and see what you are obliged to do for them." The cases of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers were by no means analogous to that of the Army. And for three reasons—first, the scientific corps were in an abnormal condition, because during the time of the Crimean War, and the Indian Mutiny of 1856, those corps were very largely and suddenly increased, and large numbers of officers were introduced into them, all at once, from the colleges, all exactly of the same age, and who were now naturally stopping—blocking promotion. When those blocks of officers, numbering about 70 of the same age, were broken up and dispersed, and the artillery got into its normal condition, there was no reason why promotion would flag. Again, promotion in the artillery was purely by seniority; whereas it was proposed to introduce, to a certain extent, into the Line the element of selection, which would make a material difference. A third reason why there was no analogy between the officers of the scientific corps and those of the rest of the Army was that the former, who had to undergo the severest examinations, and to be as highly tempered and as highly educated as possible, stayed in these corps and made them a profession to a much greater extent than officers did in other branches of the service. He was glad that some hon. Gentlemen had referred to the principle of selection, because he was very near missing it, and it was a point of very great importance. His noble Friend had said tonight that our regimental system was the best thing for the Army. No one could echo and repeat that opinion with more sincerity than he did. He believed
  1710
  every word of it. There was nothing in the whole of our military matters in which we were so superior to other nations as in our regimental system. But, then, the question that he wanted to ask was this—Did the regimental system depend on the officers going up from the bottom to the top of the regiment? In the first place, hon. Gentlemen must remember that, at the present moment, the authorities, who were responsible for the proper condition of the Army and for the regimental system, sanctioned, to a very large extent, exchanges in the Army. He apprehended that if the regimental system depended so much upon officers staying in the regiment, those changes would not be sanctioned to so great an extent. His noble Friend opposite echoed the sentiment, that the regimental system entirely depended on promotion. He held in his hand a Return, most carefully prepared, showing the present condition of the Army, in which mention was made of the number of field officers now serving in their regiments who had risen from the lowest commissioned rank in them, and the number of those who had come in from other regiments, exclusive of the non-purchase regiments. This Return showed that the number of lieutenant colonels who had stuck to their regiments was 80; those who had joined, and were now in command of regiments to which they did not originally belong, were 86. Going a stop lower, he found the majors who had stuck to their regiments were 175; those who had joined from other regiments were 137. Therefore, in round numbers, they might fairly say that one-half of the Army at the present moment were commanded by field officers who were not originally connected with their respective regiments. [Colonel NORTH: You have accounted for 166 lieutenant colonels; but we have not so many.] The Return was perfectly correct. There were 80 lieutenant colonels who had gone from other regiments, and 86 who had not. He could not say when the changes took place. He did not learn that these regiments were less efficient than such as were commanded by field officers who had passed through their respective grades in the same regiment, and it was therefore fair to conclude that the regimental system they all admired did not depend upon the rise of officers through their grades in the same

  1711
  regiment. In the regiment in which he had the honour of serving—the 11th Hussars—the colonel established an admirable system, and no regiment could be in better order. Afterwards Colonel Fraser came into the regiment, and, finding a perfect regimental system, never changed a bit of it; the system remained exactly the same as that instituted by Lord Cardigan. Therefore, general promotion, if it were adopted to some extent, would not affect the regimental system. The Surveyor General would by-and-by reply to the figures of his noble Friend affecting the Control Department; but with regard to the Martini-Henry rifle, whose fault was it if we had not yet a sealed pattern? If it was anybody's fault, it was the fault of his noble Friend. Almost every day they heard of changes of pattern, screws, and so forth, which made it absolutely impossible to have a sealed pattern, or adopt a rifle on the merits of which the Committee had not reported. As to the Ballot, his noble Friend said he would try the Government by his gauge, and asked—"What are your armaments, and what should they be?" Now, before discussing the question of compulsory or voluntary service, it was necessary that the House and the country should make up their minds what they really wanted. Gauging his noble Friend by what he required the Government to buy in the shape of artillery, one thing was clear—if his advice were followed, the Government would have a most astounding bill to present to the British taxpayer. His noble Friend wanted 645 guns, all manned and horsed and fully equipped, and always maintained upon a war footing. If this advice were followed, there must be a standing Army to match the guns. If we were to have an Army ready at any moment to cope with the great Powers of the Continent, he admitted at once that our system would not meet any such requirement, and nothing short of a conscription on the Continental system would meet it. But what did they want? Did they want to keep up the traditional policy of England—the policy based on making their Navy their first line of defence—certain and undoubted supremacy of the sea, and keeping an Army to protect us against invasion, and supplying an ordinary contingent for foreign requirements? If they said this was what they wanted, then he
  1712
  said the Government scheme would meet it, and provide all that was required. He regretted that his noble Friend did not go into the state of our home defences. We had now in the Estimates at home 108,000 Regular soldiers; 139,000 Militia; 9,000 Army Reserve; 44,180 Militia Reserve and Pensioners—a total of 300,180 men, or, adding a force of 170,000 Volunteers, 470,180 men. He was not defending the Reserve as it stood. It was not on a proper footing, and that was the reason why his right hon. Friend had proposed a short service system, in order to establish a fitting Reserve. You could not bring trained men up through the floor all on a sudden; but his right hon. Friend hoped to create a proper Reserve by means of the short service system. The next thing was to see whether this force could not be maintained by voluntary enlistment. They had got on the Estimates a total of Regular forces amounting to 197,111, and that produced of rank and file 180,939. If that system was to become popular, the recruiting system must be largely extended. Last year the House of Commons had to add 20,000 men to their forces. He held in his hand a Return from the Adjutant General of the recruits who had joined in each month from the 1st of August. It was as follows: — During August, 1870, 5,523; September, 4,449; October, 3,410; November, 3,190; December, 4,268; January, 1871, 3,715; February (to 15th), 2,222—total, 26,777. So that if they wanted to get up the strength of the Army to that which he had described, he had no doubt that they would be able to get 32,000 men by voluntary enlistment. With regard to the Militia, communications from the commanding officers showed it to be their almost unanimous opinion that there would be a better chance of obtaining recruits by voluntary enlistment than by compulsory measures. His noble Friend trod very lightly on the question of compulsory service. [Lord ELCHO: I will give you another opportunity.] He knew that every step we took was dangerous—
  "Fools rushed in where angels feared to tread."
  The noble Lord had proved himself an angel that night. His opinion as regarded the Ballot had undergone considerable change; and he did not appear to have quite made up his mind about it.

  1713
  In October, 1870, he spoke of the compulsory service as a bugbear, and said the Militia should be recruited by voluntary enlistment, and supplemented by the Ballot; but in a more recent letter the noble Lord expressed his opinion that there should be compulsory service without any substitutes. In September his noble Friend was for the supplemental Ballot; and in October he was for the Ballot pure and simple; to-night he did not state what kind of Ballot he supported. But after the criticism to which he had subjected the plan of his right hon. Friend, the noble Lord ought to have told the House what it was he proposed to substitute for it. He would now refer to the effects of the Ballot with substitutes. In 1807 there were 22,956 substitutes to 3,129 men serving in person. In 1810, 8,101 substitutes to 797 men serving in person. In 1807 the price of a Militia recruit was in three counties from £41 to £45; in six, from £16 to £20; in the Isle of Wight, £10; and, in all other counties, from £20 to £40. In 1810 the price in Merioneth was £15; Tower Hamlets, £12 12 s.; the rest of Middlesex, £20; Yorkshire, £46 to £55; Wigton, £48; and in addition to these bounties the substitutes in 1810 received £10 10 s. from Government. On the whole, the aggregate bounty of Army Reserve substitutes and Militia volunteering to the Line cannot be taken at a lower average than £40 per man. Those enrolled for the Militia in 1810 may be taken at £50. The Ballot for the Army Reserve and Militia commenced about August, 1803, and continued till July, 1804. During that period the recruiting for the Army, which in the month preceding the Ballot had raised 1,827 men, dropped down to an average of 688 men per month. During the first six months of 1807, when there was no Ballot, the ordinary recruiting produced 10,418 men more than it had produced in the whole year of 1804, when there was a Ballot for half of the year. During the last six months of 1807 there was a heavy Militia Ballot for about 37,500 men. The ordinary recruiting produced 7,342 men, or above 3,000 men less than in the preceding half-year. The following arguments against raising recruits for the Army by Ballot were advanced by Mr. Windham in the debate on the military establishments of the country in 1806:—
  1714
  "Do we mean a conscription which, proceeding by ballot—the only mode I presume to think of—shall be conclusive as to the person on whom the lot falls, and compel him, whoever he may be, to served for a limited term as a soldier? If we do, the hardship would be found to be such as no country could endure."
  He compares this to a tax of £1,000,000 divided into 20,000 shares of £50 each, or 50,000 shares of £20 each, levied on persons selected by lot, and remarked that it was easy to see what calamity it must produce. Nothing, he thought, could be so false in principle or oppressive in practice as measures of compulsory service, "which so many without consideration are perpetually calling for." He declared that the feeling of the country was decidedly against the renewal of any measure of the sort for the Army of Reserve, the effect of the trial not encouraging a repetition of the attempt. He added—
  "I will not pretend to say that no such measure can at any time be resorted to. It is impossible to say to what the exigencies of the times and the necessity of the State may drive us. But of this I am sure, that without a more urgent necessity than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects and so injurious in their lasting consequences, should not be resorted to till it was seen that milder and more legitimate methods were incapable of succeeding."—[1 Hansard, vi. 652.]
  These were the feelings which operated upon his right hon. Friend, and which had induced him to put aside the question of the Ballot. The noble Lord had railed against every part of the military organization, and said that the right hon. Gentleman had done nothing whatever to reform it. The noble Lord said the whole proposal might be thrown on one side if the abolition of purchase were given up. But, under the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman, it was proposed to establish, by means of short enlistments, a system of Reserves calculated to come into operation with great rapidity. It was further proposed to localize regiments, and to connect them more closely with the places from which they took their names; to form camps of instruction, where the soldier could learn what he had not the opportunity of learning now—almost every description of work that might be expected of him in the field; to provide for regimental depôts; and the removal of the patronage from the Lord Lieutenant to the Crown — a proposal involving

  1715
  an almost constitutional change; but because the scheme did not involve the Ballot—the noble Lord's panacea for all the evils in the Army—he treated all those proposed changes as mere trifles, unworthy of notice. What could be more important than that the Militia should be brought directly under the control of the Secretary for War, and that Militia officers should hold Her Majesty's Commission? Then came the question of the Reserve. It was admitted that it was desirable to increase the number of men in the Reserve as speedily as possible, and how did the noble Lord seek to accomplish that object? Why, by moving that the number of men in this year's Estimates should be reduced by 10,000. The right hon. Gentleman proposed that during peace the Army should feed the Army of Reserve, by passing men through the former as rapidly as possible, in order that in time of war the Reserve might feed the Army. If that principle were adopted, the number of the regimental cadres might be safely reduced, as a supply of young and trained soldiers would be forthcoming whenever they were required. The noble Lord had proposed a plan of his own which he had got Sir Hope Grant to endorse; but before he adverted to that proposal, he must be permitted to state that this question was simply one of actuarial calculation to be based upon the maximum which could be arrived at. The calculations which he relied upon were made by two eminent actuaries at the War Office, and had been approved by Mr. Finlaison, the well-known actuary. The plan of the Government was as follows:—That in artillery, engineers, and cavalry one-fourth of the men shall serve for 21 years with the colours, the remainder serving eight years with the colours and four in the Reserve; also that in the foot guards and infantry, one-fourth shall serve with the colours for 21 years. That, as regards the other three-fourths, the regiments for foreign service shall serve six years with the colours and six in the Reserve. That the balance of infantry at home shall serve three years with the colours and nine in the Reserve. Under the plan of the noble Lord the troops would have to serve seven years with the colours, seven years with the first Reserve at 4d. a day, and seven years with the second Reserve at 8d. a
  1716
  day, making a total of 21 years with a pension of 1s. a day. Taking the Regular Army, as it stood in the Estimates, to number 180,989 non-commissioned officers and men, the Government plan would require an annual supply of 32,449 recruits, while the noble Lord's would require only 28,203, and therefore it must be admitted that the latter had the advantage of the former to the extent of 4,000. In the Reserves the Government plan would provide 13,674 men in the fourth year after the system commenced, which number would rise to 61,266 in the seventh year, up to which time the noble Lord's plan would have produced none. In the eighth year the noble Lord's Reserve would reach 22,528, while the Government would have 81,811. The Government Reserve would attain its permanent maximum of 178,964, all under the age of 31, in the thirteenth year. The noble Lord's would reach its permanent maximum of 152,253 in the fifteenth year. In the twenty-second year the noble Lord would have a second-class Reserve of 139,088, consisting entirely of men aged from 33 to 40 and not liable to general service. There would be in the country under the Government plan, under the age of 40, trained men to the number of 202,120, on whom the Government could draw in time of emergency, but who, in the meantime, would cost nothing for pay or pension. The Government Reserve, when full, would cost £1,266,884 a-year. The noble Lord's Reserves would cost: first Reserve, at 4d. a-day, £926,163; second Reserve, at 8d. a-day, £1,692,281; total, £2,618,444. Pensions.—The Government plan would give 36,285 Pensioners, who, at an average pension of 1s. 4d. a-day, would cost £882,923 a-year. The noble Lord's plan would produce 519,410 Pensioners, who, at only 1s. each a-day, would cost £9,479,240 a-year. The total charge for Reserve and Pensioners would, under the Government plan, be £2,149,807, or £12 0s. 5d. per man in the Reserve, while the noble Lord's would reach £12,097,684, or an average of £41 10 s. 6d. per man in the Reserve. He doubted whether his noble Friend had ever submitted his plan to actuaries, and was glad, therefore, to be able to lay before the House and the British taxpayer a statement of what they might expect when his noble Friend resigned the command of the London Scottish Volun-

  1717
  teers, of which he was so brilliant an ornament, in order to take charge of the War Department of the State. He thought he had shown that the time had not come for introducing a system so unendurable by a free people as the Ballot, and believing that the principle on which the Government scheme was based was the only one which would secure, at the same time, efficient Reserves and economical Army Estimates, he recommended that scheme to the House, in the language of the noble Lord, as being at once sound, economical, and endurable.
  MR. J. S. HARDYsaid, the Secretary of State might have in the recesses of his mind, or pigeonholes of the War Office, the economical plan of Army re-organization of which he had spoken; but, so far as the present Bill was concerned, there was no indication of it, and no one could doubt that the real object aimed at was the abolition of the purchase system in the Army. He was sufficiently Conservative to object to the policy of destruction. When people attacked a system which had worked well, provided a satisfactory system of retirement, and excited the admiration of officers in the Army which had recently run so victorious a course in France, they should at least find something to replace it. It was acknowledged on all hands that benefit had resulted from purchase. Although no one could defend the system theoretically, its practical advantages were so great that one was naturally led to ask what were the causes of the present Bill. The causes were only two. Either the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the War Office had been convinced by arguments adduced against purchase and its evils, or, yielding to the great outcry raised by him, he had found it necessary to outbid a certain ex-Member of the Government. There were no advantages likely to arise from the abolition of purchase that justified such an enormous outlay of public money. The very worst and weakest arguments against the abolition had been used by military men who were supposed to know most of the subject. It had been said that it was unfair to call upon an officer to go into action with the price of his commission hanging over his head, and that an officer so situated might perhaps neglect his duty on account of his responsibilities
  1718
  as the head of a family; but if the present measure passed, and the Army was officered by a poorer class of men, the same result would be more likely to follow, because the officer would go into action with the knowledge that he and his family had only his pay to depend upon. He was surprised to hear that there was no way of rewarding deserving officers, because the system of brevet was very well known, although no civilian could understand it. The Judge Advocate General (Mr. Davison) had referred to the cost of commissions; but that was only the theoretical argument tried over again. The Financial Secretary at the War Office (Captain Vivian) had used a most extraordinary plea, contending that it would be impossible to amalgamate the Militia and the Army if purchase were continued. After the Crimean War, it was constantly the practice to draft officers from the Militia to the Army, and a first cousin of his own went directly from a Militia regiment of artillery into the Regular Army; and he (Mr. J. S. Hardy) had been himself introduced to a regiment without purchase over the head of, and in the same Gazette with, an officer who had purchased his commission. In the cavalry, where large prices were paid, promotion was rapid; in the infantry, where commissions brought a moderate price, promotion was fair; while in the artillery stagnation prevailed which threatened evils to the country, and which it would be very undesirable to perpetuate. By the abolition of purchase, selection or the seniority system must be adopted. The latter could be recommended by nobody, and it had been carried too far even in the purchase time. If selection were adopted, no system of confidential reports could put the Commander-in-Chief in a position to know the minutiæ of officers. He believed that confidential reports from others than the colonels of regiments would create an ill feeling between officers of every grade, and would be unsatisfactory both to Commander-in-Chief and all parties. He thought they must allow the lower grades to be put in nomination by the commanding officers. If field officers were to be brought in from other regiments, the result would be that the field officer, for at least a year, would have no knowledge of the officers belonging to the regiment to which he

  1719
  was removed, and he would be totally unable to give advice to the general commanding-in-chief. He (Mr. J. S. Hardy) had served in the Rifle Brigade for a short time, and would have declined to take promotion in another regiment, because he preferred to remain in his own regiment. Reference had been made to the exchanges which were constantly taking place, and the Financial Secretary had calculated that a large number of the colonels did not originally belong to the regiments; but he did not state from what rank they had exchanged, or from what cause they had exchanged. There were many causes for exchange. There were some few in which ambitious men exchanged, thinking they would get on better by the purchase system. Some exchanged for the benefit of their health, and many because they did not like their regiment. He believed that if officers were promoted from one regiment to another, as proposed by the right hon. Gentleman, the esprit de corps of regiments would be totally destroyed. At present there was a great demand for commissions, and whilst that demand existed he thought the Government might force upon the officers of the Army a more extended education, so as to improve their military knowledge; but he considered it unnecessary to force this enormous cost upon the country when the benefit would be little or nothing, and the disadvantage to the Army would be very great. With respect to the period of service, he had no doubt that if short service became popular it would be a valuable improvement. The change with regard to the Militia was an enormous change for the better, and also the change in the system of nominations by the Lords Lieutenant, although it might, in some respects, be regarded with suspicion. There was one change that would do immense good if it did not stop the supply of recruits. No one could doubt that the system of taking them for six months for drill would put into the ranks of the Militia a set of men who, when they joined the ranks, would be as well drilled, as the recruits joining the Army. But he warned the right hon. Gentleman that it would be useless to attempt to improve the condition of the Militia so long as the system of billeting was pursued, a system which was enough to ruin the discipline of the best regiment in Her Majesty's service in the
  1720
  course of a month. Nothing could be more absurd than the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman that counties should provide the cost of building barracks for the good of the country. That was a national object, and the nation, not the counties, ought to pay the cost. As to the Volunteers, he believed they would never be made a thoroughly satisfactory force until the War Department had a hold over them. The Bill proposed that if a man enlisted for a year he should be exempt from the Ballot for the Militia; but it was stated that except in case of war the Ballot was not to be resorted to. If a Volunteer, however, enlisted for a year and then wished to leave the corps, he simply ceased to attend drills, and the commanding officer had no power over him, except that of turning him out of the corps, and that was exactly what he wanted. Unless some better system than that was adopted, he (Mr. J. S. Hardy) thought the Government would not be justified in making the alterations as to the capitation grants, &c., which the right hon. Gentleman hinted at in his speech on the introduction of the Bill. He could not help thinking that in the present Bill the Government were throwing away a great opportunity. In favour of the purchase system as he was, he should not have opposed the Bill had he seen in it the elements of the future increase of strength in the Army and of prosperity in the country. The right hon. Gentleman had had an opportunity which might never occur again, for many parts of the country were prepared for a much stronger measure than the present. He regretted that the opportunity had been thrown away, and that a parrot cry raised by a Member of the House of Commons should have been taken up by Her Majesty's Government, who were the responsible parties. He regretted that something more solid and beneficial to the country had not been introduced. Had that been the case he should have supported the measure. He should vote with great regret against a Bill which contained so many good clauses; but felt bound to support the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay).
  MR. RYLANDS, having complimented the Secretary for War on the ability and clearness with which he had introduced his scheme of Army reform to the House,

  1721
  expressed his disappointment at the fact that the country was to be called upon to bear increased burdens for the purpose of military defence. Past schemes for the re-organization of the Army had not been very encouraging in their results. There had been numerous Royal Commissions, Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament, and departmental committees, and yet the only results of their labours had been continued dissatisfaction with the state of the Army, combined with a constant increase of expenditure for military purposes. It was certainly most disheartening that, although this country paid such enormous sums in comparison with Continental nations, we were yet told that our Army would be found entirely useless for the defence of our shores. The noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), in a letter to The Times, said that—
  "Without the Ballot our whole military system must continue to be what it now is—an extravagant and wasteful sham, that gives us no real influence abroad, and fails to save us from periodical and well-founded panics at home."
  It was, perhaps, true that the vivacity of declamation of the noble Lord, which so often charmed the House, was not always associated with exactness of expression, and in this case there was, probably, some exaggeration; but he was bound to say that many persons believed that there was a considerable substratum of truth in the remarks of the noble Lord, and that, notwithstanding the vast sums expended upon them, our military forces were not in a satisfactory position. What, then, must be the feelings of the poorer taxpayers throughout the country when such things were told them of a system which they were called upon to support by taxes drawn from the labour of their hands and the sweat of their brows? The scheme of the Government, in fact, left untouched the main evils of the present system, and it was proposed largely to increase the expenditure instead of diminishing it. It was, however, maintained by some of his hon. Friends near him, and would no doubt be urged by the Government, that the abolition of purchase—the cardinal feature of the present Bill—would make up for all deficiencies; but even that abolition might, in his opinion, be purchased at too great a cost, and the House ought, at all events, to be made ac-
  1722
  quainted with what it was proposed to give us in exchange. It was proposed to leave the administration of the Horse Guards untouched, and to place in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief a great increase of patronage and influence. Under those circumstances, he (Mr. Rylands) felt no security that evils might not spring up as great as those of purchase. He was aware that the House had, by a large majority, expressed its confidence in the administration of the Army by the Horse Guards; but out-of-doors a very different opinion prevailed, and if under the rule of the present Commander-in-Chief, and after the large sums of money expended upon it, the Army was considered nothing but a "sham," it was but natural that the blame should be laid upon those who were at its head. In dealing with the question of the abolition of purchase, there was one point upon which he wished to lay great stress—he alluded to the proposal of the Government to give compensation for over-regulation prices. Now, what were over-regulation prices? They were illegal prices, to give compensation for which would cost at least £3,000,000. That proposal the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the War Department sought to justify by reference to the Report of the Royal Commission. He said—
  "They reported unanimously, and he thought he might, without fear of contradiction, say that their Report was strongly in favour of over-regulation prices."
  He (Mr. Rylands), having carefully read the Report, ventured to dispute the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Member for Morpeth (Sir George Grey), who was the Chairman of the Commission, had said in that debate they had no right to make any recommendation in favour of over-regulation prices, and his hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz), who was also on the Commission, did not consider that their Report bore the character attached to it by the Secretary for War. But they had the Report actually before them, and what did the Commissioners say? They reported that—
  "The practice has received no formal or express sanction from any public Departments or officers, and the regulation price only of commissions has been recognized and paid by the War Department in the case of payments to the families of officers killed in action, and of purchase of commissions by means of the reserve fund."

  1723
  That, he thought, could scarcely be considered to be reporting "strongly in favour of over-regulation prices." But no doubt the Secretary for War would urge that the Royal Commission reported that the authorities made no attempt to stop the practice by enforcing the law against it. The Commissioners did say—
  "There has been no real discouragement of the practice by any authority,"
  and then concluded by saying that there has been—
  "A tacit acquiescence in the practice, amounting to a virtual recognition of it by civil and military departments and authorities."
  That conclusion was scarcely consistent with the fact previously stated by the Commissioners in relation to officers killed in action. If in any case the practice should have received a "virtual recognition" on the part of the authorities, it should have been in the interest of those men, who, fighting as they believed for the benefit of their country, fell in the field of battle and left widows and families, to whom the value of their commissions would be of considerable importance. But even in those cases the Government only paid the regulation prices, and refused to recognize the over-regulation value. Further than this, the Commissioners quote with approval the Report of the War Office Committee of 1859, to whom had been referred the question of the value of commissions, and when it was complained that they had omitted to take into calculation over-regulation prices, they said—
  "It would ill become them as members of a public military department to put forward an estimate of the sum which the public would have to pay as reward or compensation to those who, for their own convenience or their own interests, had deliberately violated one of the most positive and stringent enactments in the statute book."
  He commended that opinion of a Committee, composed of distinguished officers, to the attention of the right hon. Gentleman and of the House. The simple fact had been, that the authorities had failed to do their duty in administering the law; but the Commissioners, in reporting upon that fact, cannot surely be taken as reporting "strongly in favour of over-regulation prices." The argument in favour of compensation rested entirely on the plea that the authorities had "winked at" the practice; but why did they not enforce the law? They tell us distinctly that they did not know the law was broken. The
  1724
  Duke of Cambridge, in his evidence before the Committee on Military Organization, in 1859, said—
  "I can positively state that, officially, I know nothing of it, and that it is impossible that we should, for if we did know it officially we should instantly take notice of it."
  He subsequently said he should be very glad if he could see any way in which they could officially put a stop to it. Again, he said—
  "A military authority can only take cognizance of what comes to him officially, and as such, I state positively that we are not aware of any more money being paid."
  General Forster, the Military Secretary, gave similar evidence before the Royal Commission last year. He said "in the position he held he knew nothing of the matter whatever," and if it were found out the offenders would be punished. Bnt he went further than that, because, in reply to a further question, he said that not only could they not obtain any any evidence sufficient for a conviction in a Court of Law, but they never acquired any moral certainty of the existence of such transactions. But the fact that the authorities profess to be unable to detect and punish the violation of the law is surely no argument for treating positive and stringent enactments as of no effect. Just consider what had been done by Parliament and the Crown to put down this practice. For 150 years there had been a succession of measures, all directed to that end. The Army regulations in 1720 prohibited over-payments, and in 1766 any officers who so offended were threatened with the "highest displeasure" of the King. In 1783 a remarkable general order was issued, under which every officer who bought or sold a commission was bound to make a solemn declaration, on the word and honour of an officer and a gentleman, that neither directly nor indirectly was anything beyond the regulation price paid or received for the commission; the commanding officer being also required to state, that, to the best of his belief, the regulation price had been adhered to. The order was rescinded in 1824, but during this period, officers and gentlemen were able, by some subterfuge, to make this solemn declaration, paying over-regulation prices all the while. In 1804 the Duke of York sent out a circular to Army agents,

  1725
  who were warned against being parties to such transactions, and informed that the commissions so obtained would, on discovery, be immediately cancelled. The Mutiny Act of 1807 contained clauses on the same subject, and penalties were imposed upon Army agents guilty of the offence. In 1809 an important Act of Parliament was passed, and still remained the law of the land, providing that any officers paying or receiving over-regulation prices should be cashiered; the commission sold, the informer should receive £500 from the proceeds, and persons knowingly abetting should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour. Every officer, therefore, who had taken part in these transactions was liable to two years' imprisonment. Yet the right hon. Gentleman proposed that the taxpayers of this country should pay £3,000,000, or, as competent persons believe £4,000,000 or £5,000,000, in order to compensate officers, who, for their own convenience and interest, had deliberately violated the law. The right hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. Gathorne Hardy) said yesterday, upon a Bill then before the House, that that was the first time he had known the Legislature called upon to sanction a deliberate breach of the law; yet the Secretary for War now called upon the House not only to sanction such a breach, but to compensate those who had been guilty of it. If this proposal for compensating officers for breaking the law were carried into effect he (Mr. Rylands) believed it would have a bad moral influence on the working classes, and would lessen their regard for the sanctity of law, when they saw an influential class of society were not only allowed to break the law with impunity, but were rewarded for so doing, and allowed, in addition, to retain the rank illegally purchased. He admitted that it was a vulgar prejudice to say that the Army was an aristocratic service, for there were a number of wealthy men connected with the middle class of society in it. Nevertheless, a large number of the people whose class had no representatives in Parliament, would not be satisfied when they were told that the House was prepared to vote several millions, to pay men for having broken the law of the land. He found already that this feeling was being expressed out-of-doors, for he had seen a news-
  1726
  paper representing the sentiments of the working classes — he alluded to Reynold's Newspaper—and in a leading article the remark was made that the principal ground on which the Royal Commission recommended the payment of this great sum was because the violation of the law had become a system, and because the Commander-in-Chief was fully aware of the practice, and, by not stopping it, was supposed to countenance and sanction it. The article went on to say that it was intolerable that the country should be giving so many thousand pounds a-year to the Royal Commander-in-Chief for encouraging breaches of the law; and if he could not prevent this payment being made, another instance would be afforded of how easily the law was overridden when the interests of the privileged orders were at stake. He knew it was said that the abolition of the purchase system could not be obtained unless the Government were supported in their proposition to pay the over-regulation price; but in his opinion it was far better to wait for a good measure than do wrong to carry a good measure. In 1785 a statesman came down to that House and proposed the disfranchisement of 36 boroughs with compensation; but in 1832 a great number of rotten boroughs were disfranchised without any compensation at all. An additional argument against the proposal of the Government to give compensation for these payments was furnished by the fact that, if such compensation were granted it would offer a great encouragement for the breach of future regulations, and for the growth of another system of illegal payments. Nothing could be clearer than the expression of opinion from competent authorities on both sides of the House, that it would be almost impossible to prevent illegal payments for promotion in future. There was also the distinct evidence of the Duke of Cambridge, who stated before the Committee on Military Organization, in 1859, that if you did away with purchase to-morrow he believed that those officers of the Army who were rich would somehow or the other induce those above them to leave in order to make room for them. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War was quite alive to this difficulty. He said, in laying his scheme before the House, that—

  1727
  "There was one important consideration at the root of this part of the question—namely, that if you did not retain selection at every part of the system, you would immediately find, as soon as you had spent a large sum of money in abolishing one system of purchase, you had laid the foundation of another. The security against the growth of another system of purchase was first a rigid enforcement of the law. The next principal consideration would be, that the successor should never be known until his predecessor had left his place; and the third was that, wherever there was the slightest suspicion that any corrupt pecuniary arrangement had formed the basis of retirement, selection should be vigorously exercised to put it aside."
  But it must be remembered that all these securities upon which the right hon. Gentleman relies have been tried for a century and a half and have failed. The very Act of George III. which is embodied in the Bill now before the House, is the Act enacting penalties now in operation, but which have been entirely disregarded. Nay, more than this, the Secretary for War does not propose even as many securities as at one time existed, for he omits the declaration upon the honour of an officer and a gentleman which had formerly to be taken. Then he relies upon the principle of selection; but even upon the plan, as laid down by the Government, it is intended that promotion up to the rank of captain shall be regimental, and clearly that promotion must be by seniority, unless in extremely exceptional cases of surpassing merit or extreme incapacity. The Horse Guards could never be justified in passing over a subaltern, for no fault of his own, in favour of another officer of slightly additional merit. You must be careful to insist upon the necessary qualities and attainments in all those who acquire first commissions, and then, practically, in almost every case, seniority must form the basis of promotion. But the right hon. Gentleman says he will stop regimental promotion at the captaincy, and that all higher grades must be Army promotion. He (Mr. Rylands) did not venture to express any opinion upon questions of that character, upon which he had no sufficient means of forming a judgment; but he had been much struck with the fact that, in the course of the debate, hon. Gentlemen of authority, on both sides of the House, had urged very strong arguments against removing officers on appointment, to higher ranks from the regiment with which they had been previously con-
  1728
  nected. The plan of the Secretary for War, as regards promotion, would not have the force of law, and if, as would be probably the case, the pressure of interests within the service, as well as that of opinions outside, forced the Horse Guards to carry regimental promotion, in most cases, up to the lieutenant colonelcy, the main securities relied upon by the right hon. Gentleman would disappear. If you have regimental promotion chiefly by seniority, no Acts of Parliament, however penal, and no Royal Warrants, however stringent, could prevent the junior officers in a regiment clubbing together a sum of money to induce a senior officer to clear out of the way so as to secure a flow of promotion. But how did the public suffer by a proceeding of that kind? He was unable to see the slightest public disadvantage in this system of bonus on retirement, which prevailed both in the Indian Army, and in the non-purchase regiments at home. Now, he wished the House to consider for a moment what the nature of regulation prices was. It was simply that the Government, finding that commissions in the Army were articles that could be bought and sold, determined to fix the market price of the commodity, and naturally failed as Governments always have failed, when they have sought to fix by law the market prices of commodities, which necessarily rise and fall with supply and demand. The over-regulation prices represented, in fact, the premium which the commissions commanded in excess of the regulated market price, and this premium rose and fell with the fluctuations of the market. In time of war it disappeared altogether, for men were disinclined to pay a heavy premium for the privilege of being shot at. In the Crimean War there were no over-regulation prices, whilst at the present moment, when the prospects of peace were greater than had been known during that generation, the value of commissions was at its maximum. It was under these circumstances that the Government asked the House to buy up these over-regulation prices—not as a prudent merchant would do in purchasing goods when the market was at the lowest—but at a time when the market value of the commodity was exceptionally high. If the House sanctioned this impolitic proposal, what would be the consequence? The right hon.

  1729
  Gentleman might entirely fail in preventing bonus payments taking its place, and in that case the expenditure, on account of over-regulation prices, would clearly have been useless and wasteful. But supposing he were to succeed, what would be the consequence? You must either find money out of the public purse to induce the retirement of senior officers, or you would have a block in the Army without any flow of promotion. You would then have the Secretary for War coming down to the House asking for a Vote for retirements, amounting to a large sum, estimated by competent authorities at from £500,000 to £1,000,000 a-year. He (Mr. Rylands) strongly urged upon the Government that they should content themselves with paying the regulation prices and abolishing the purchase system—that would get rid of the vicious element in the system, by means of which deserving officers were bought over by young men whose only qualification was their wealth. The over-regulation prices, in the mode in which they now existed, would disappear without any cost to the public, and then would only remain the system, under which, by the voluntary contributions of his juniors, compensation would be given to a senior officer on his retirement, and so the flow of promotion would be secured, which was necessary for the contentment and efficiency of the service.
  COLONEL LEARMONTHsaid, he thought that the House would admit that the present subject was a most serious one, for it was neither more nor less than an entire revolution in the whole system of our national Army. He had some practical knowledge of this matter, having spent some years in the Army. The re-organization of the Army had been brought before the country during the Recess, and the Government had no course open to them but to bring in some scheme, and their scheme should have calm consideration on both sides of the House. Having listened to the whole of the debate, and considered what had been said, he must say that he had heard nothing that at all altered his opinion that it was a most serious thing to interfere with the present system of officering the Army. He had served both in the Crimea and in the Indian Mutiny with his regiment, and he felt bound to stand up in defence of the regimental system, to which he at-
  1730
  tributed the great success of our Army both in the Crimea and also during the Mutiny, where that system was tried most severely. Our regimental system was as near as possible perfection, and it was a most serious thing to attempt to interfere with it. While protesting against the total abolition of purchase in the Army, he must express his still stronger disapproval of the system of promotion by selection. He was convinced that such a system would really work very badly for the interior economy of regiments. An officer entering the Army under the present system had a certain prospect, if he did his duty and arrived at the position of senior captain, of becoming major, and a very good prospect of obtaining the command. This was a great inducement for the right class of men to enter the Army and to remain in it. Under the proposed system an officer would have no such certainty; he would have the chances both of seniority and selection against him, and this would throw a cloud over the prospects of every officer and damp the esprit de corps that now existed. An officer would say to himself—"This is not my regiment; I have no chance of succeeding to the command of it; I do not care about the regiment, and I will take things easy." At present a man's regiment was his home, and it was his one idea to act so in his military career that he should be a credit to the regiment which he hoped to command. Our Army was totally different from those of other countries, and no hon. Member must try to model our Army upon the German and the French system; it was the British system that they must look to—that, and that alone. Our Army was different from all others in this—that it was a voluntary Army. We had no conscription, and he hoped that we never should have. We had the highest gentlemen in the land, men from the middle class, and even from a lower rank still, as officers for our Army; so that different classes were very properly thrown together. We had officers whose whole care and thought were for the benefit of their men, and their men would follow them anywhere in the world. No task had ever been set to our Army that they had not performed. The Government said they were prepared to pay the regulation price and the over-regulation price; but this was

  1731
  wasting the time of the House. He wished that hon. Gentlemen would hesitate before they meddled with the present system. The Financial Secretary for War had given details of colonels having commands of regiments who had not risen from the lower ranks in their regiments; but, no doubt, most of those cases resulted from the fact that second battalions had been added to the regiments in question, or that the officer had returned to his regiment after a temporary absence. In his own regiment not one officer had risen to the command who had not risen from the lower ranks. He knew at the present time a regiment, second to none in the Army, where the officer at present in command of it had not purchased a single step, except his first commission as cornet. There were doubtless anomalies in the purchase system; but with all its faults it was a system which had worked admirably. The Army had never failed. It had always performed its duty. Why, then, alter it? They had officers of the very best kind; but they wanted men. It was a step in the right direction to have cadets attached to regiments in the way which had been proposed. They wanted re-organization, a proper system of transport, the supply of provisions and medical comforts. It was the civil element that failed. The chief lesson which he had learned from the late war between France and Germany was, that in the German Army care was taken that the fighting men were at the front provided with everything necessary to keep them in the field. This was a point where the English failed. They nearly failed in the Crimea from the foolish economy of starving the soldier. In Abyssinia we had not a very great enemy to contend with; but the country was unhealthy. And how was that war made successful? The general had everything that was wanted; and the honour of the country was saved.
  MAJOR DICKSONregretted that Estimates should have been laid upon the Table which did little more than restore the men removed by the Estimates last year, which made no provision for the increase of the Militia, and which made no additions to the purchase of war material. Even those whose interest in the Army extended no further than a desire to see a good defence of our shores
  1732
  maintained, would be disappointed by a measure which simply trifled with the great question of the re-organization of the Army. The world had just witnessed events which had no parallel in history; and those events showed how necessary it was for a country wishing to preserve its position in the world to be prepared for war even in the time of peace. Was the first duty to be provided for to place England in a position not only to defend our shores, but to guard the honour of England under any circumstances? Did it mean the maintenance of any treaty to which we had become a party, believing that its maintenance was necessary for the welfare of mankind in general? How were they to organize a body of trained soldiers, so that they might be able to resist an invasion? The affairs of Europe were never more critical. Undoubtedly, in theory, the purchase system was wrong; and, if about to establish a new Army, he would not introduce it; but in practice it had worked well, and this was not the opinion of merely English officers, but of the officers of Europe, General Blumenthal among the rest. Ought they not, then, to pause before they put the country to this enormous expenditure, to abolish a system admitted on all hands to work well, and especially as the abolition of the system was not accompanied by anything like an extensive system of re-organization. He could not think the experiment was worth the cost; while in establishing in the Army two classes of officers—the paying and the nonpaying—it would raise difficulties greater than could be at present imagined. It was not consistent in the right hon. Gentleman to refuse to allow more than a certain number of officers to realize their commissions in any one year; for many private and domestic reasons might render such a realization necessary. Under the Bill, an officer could not retire, no matter how urgent might be his case, unless he was prepared to sacrifice his money for the benefit of the State, and if the right hon. Gentleman thus refused to do justice to the officers who were now serving he would be insulting a body of brave men. The right hon. Gentleman, on introducing the Bill, truly said that the purchase system was co-existent with the Army, and under that system English officers had, with rare exceptions,

  1733
  done their duty. The difficulty of providing a sufficient amount of promotion under the non-purchase system was one that would inevitably have to be encountered, yet the Government had not come forward with any adequate scheme of retirement. That very fact was in itself an admission of weakness, and an evidence of want of statesmanship. The rules and regulations which were intended to supplement the abolition of purchase were looked upon with alarm by officers, who feared that those rules would lead to favouritism; and, although the right hon. Gentleman might not desire to work injustice, he must remember that he was legislating not for himself only, but also for those who would have to follow him. The arguments usually alleged in support of selection were fallacious, and would not bear examination. In the case of the Indian Army the system had been introduced under circumstances sufficiently familiar to hon. Members, and which had no parallel in the circumstances of our own Army. And even in that instance the officers were selected not in the manner now proposed or possible, but from the great mass of officers thrown out of employment. The regimental system was involved in the present proposals of the Government, and the sacrifice of that would involve the destruction of the esprit de corps which was so indispensable an element of a satisfactory Army. He could not congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the manner in which he proposed to re-organize the auxiliary forces. For many years we had maintained a Militia which was of little more use than to afford a field for the exercise of patronage by political Lords Lieutenant, and the Volunteer force, in its present stage of organization, only gave the opportunity to a few local celebrities to assume military rank. The proposals of the right hon. Gentleman would fail to re-organize these forces. The Militia and Volunteers were the most unsatisfactory of our Reserves. They were badly officered, had little discipline, and their interests were antagonistic. If the Volunteers were to be of real service, they should be placed under military discipline and control. By all means let gentlemen play at soldiering as much as they pleased; but if men received the money of the State they were bound to render in return real and substantial
  1734
  service. Every Volunteer, he considered, ought to be bound to serve for a fixed period, and during that time the State ought to have the absolute power to command his services in case of invasion. In regard to the Militia, the Bill fell far short of his expectations. He had hoped that the line of demarcation between the Militia and the Line would have been absolutely swept away. He believed that England required only an Army composed of two parts; the first drilled and disciplined for garrison work at home and abroad in time of peace; the second, an Army of Reserve; but, unless under any other system that might be adopted they were prepared to adopt compulsion, short service might be a failure, for they would never have the bloom of the youth of the country in their ranks. It was his conviction that permanent service abroad demoralized both officers and men, and that it was succeeded by insubordination. When he first landed in India he found a state of things that was enough to make his hair stand on end; there was insubordination to an alarming degree, and he understood that it was ultimately succeeded by mutiny. In regard to the proper method of military re-organization, he considered that every regiment in the Line ought to have two battalions; that England ought to be divided into military districts, to be sub-divided into regimental head-quarters, at which either the first or second battalion should always have quarters, and that each regiment should have a reserve battalion formed by the re-organized Militia. But he found that this Regulation Bill would unsettle everything, and would regulate nothing. He opposed the Bill, because it put the country to an enormous expenditure with no equivalent results; because it abolished purchase without doing full justice to officers; because it contained no comprehensive scheme of retirement; and because the substitute provided by selection would introduce favouritism and political patronage into the Army. Had the right hon. Gentleman called to his counsels practical military men he would have found no insuperable difficulty, but he would have given the country an Army which would have commanded confidence at home and respect abroad.
  SIR HENRY STORKS: I have listened with great attention to the speeches made on both sides of the House in

  1735
  support of the Amendment of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay); but I have heard no solid reason or good argument why that Amendment should be supported, and why the second reading of this Bill should be rejected. I am not going to trespass on the House with any lengthened statement of the merits or disadvantages of the present Army system; but I may be permitted to observe that it does appear a strange anomaly that this House should be called on annually to pass an Act regulating the numbers and discipline of the Army, which Act commences by stating in its Preamble that the keeping of a standing Army in time of peace without the consent of Parliament is contrary to law; and, at the same time, that officers of that Army should have acquired vested rights and pecuniary interests requiring the Government to come down to this House for an Act of Parliament and for a large Vote of public money with a view to their extinction. The purchase system is conducted according to a procedure so complex, so extensive in its ramifications, and so varied in its transactions, that I do not hesitate to say that the dealings and transactions of the Stock Exchange, with its bulls and its bears, its script and debentures, its time bargains and its contangoes, are much more intelligible than the rules and regulations which govern the system of purchase in the Army. Moreover, it is not only the system of purchase and sale of commissions, but there is also the question of exchanges between officers on full and half-pay, and between officers in one regiment and in another. These transactions are conducted by irresponsible agents, and extended even to adjutancies of Militia and Volunteers. I hold in my hand a paper published last month, and headed "Army Arrangements." Now, I find that almost every rank in the Army is here represented. We have colonels, seven lieutenant colonels, besides those on half-pay, seven majors, besides those on half-pay, 26 captains, besides those on half-pay, and 19 lieutenants. One person offers to give a bonus, and so the list goes on. Now, all those transactions and Army arrangements have a pecuniary value attached to them, and therefore they are equally as complicated as the system of purchase and sale in the Army. I may mention
  1736
  that this paper is published by an unauthorized agent; but I do not choose to give his name in public, though I shall have no objection to give it to any hon. Member who may feel interested in the matter. I ask hon. Members whether they think transactions of this kind conduce to the efficiency of the Army? Certainly no one can defend the principle of such transactions. I can only regret that such dealings, whether in the sale and purchase of direct commissions or in exchanges, have got to the pitch and height at which they have now arrived. My right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Headlam) adverted the other night to the position of officers ordered either on active service in the field or to the Colonies, and I entirely agree with him in what he said as to the position of officers so circumstanced. I do not believe any officer goes on foreign service, or on active service in the field who does not think of the danger he runs in connection with the price of his commission. The Government have found, in considering every project submitted to them for the re-organization of the Army, that these vested interests presented themselves at every turn. No reform in regard to the organization of the Army can be effected until these obstructions have been removed. My right hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Cardwell) came down to the House last year and proposed the abolition of the rank of cornet and ensign — a proposal which emanated from my right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) when he was Secretary of State for War. My right hon. Friend was, however, obliged to withdraw his proposal in consequence of these obstructions. Even if you want to raise a new battalion you experience difficulties of the same sort, for if you do not give the promotion in the regiment you interfere with the vested interests in the promotion. Thus, whenever the Government attempted to do anything, they always found these vested interests in the way. The experience of modern warfare, and the great events we have lately seen, have shown that a professional class of officers in the Army is absolutely required; not only officers who are sufficiently instructed in the ordinary regimental duties of their grade, but officers professionally instructed in the more or less scientific

  1737
  parts of their profession, and who, when they take the field, will be thoroughly capable of performing their duty in every situation in which they may be placed. Now, it is very difficult to get that class of officers under the purchase system ["No, no!"]; because it is difficult under that system to get a class of officers who are determined to remain in the Army, as many persons enter the Army with the intention of retiring from it after the lapse of a few years. I appeal to my hon. Friends in the military profession on both sides of the House to say whether this is not the case. The Government, under these circumstances, have come forward with a measure of a very liberal character. It is not intended in any way to improve the condition of purchase officers; but it is intended to meet every equitable and just claim which may be brought forward for compensation. Nevertheless, I hold that the proposals of the Government do improve the position of the purchase officer. Under the present system, an officer, wishing to retire from the service, has to wait till he can find a purchaser, and, as many of us very well know, it is often very difficult in regiments to "make up the money;" but, under the Bill, a purchase officer who wishes to retire from the service will not have to wait till he can find a purchaser, as he will always find the Government ready to purchase both with regulation and over-regulation prices. The Government had been charged with acting unfairly because it limits the number of officers who will be permitted to sell out. It is obvious, however, why this restriction was introduced. If every officer had a right to sell, great inconvenience to the public service would result. The Government, therefore, determined to limit the number of sales, and their proposal is based on the average number of sales during the last five years. A clause has, however, been inserted in the Bill enabling the Government to deal with any extraordinary cases which may arise. I hold, therefore, that no injustice is done to the officers in the Army by the limitation. It has been mentioned, in the course of this debate, that it would be a right thing immediately to reimburse the purchase officers the money they have expended in purchase. But I cannot help thinking there would be great injustice in that, independently of the fact that it would stop promotion.
  1738
  Perhaps, I may be pardoned for illustrating this personally. When I was a lieutenant, I purchased over four lieutenants and became a captain; when I was a captain, I purchased over four captains and became a major. Now, according to the theory laid down in the course of this discussion, I ought, under these circumstances, to get all my purchase money back, and still retain my commission, pay, allowances, prestigé, and everything. Why, what would my brother officers, over whose heads I passed, say to such an arrangement? I would also ask hon. Gentlemen who propose such an arrangement what would become of officers who have gained the money value of their commissions by length of service—£100 a-year for every year of foreign, and £50 a-year for every year of home service? Are all these claims to be liquidated? With reference to promotion, the proposal is that ensigns and lieutenants should be amalgamated. Having looked very carefully into the question of selection, I do not think it is open to the objections which have been urged against it. If general officers commanding districts and divisions do their duty, I cannot see that selection will be a very difficult thing. I do not think there is that objection to confidential reports that has been suggested. They now exist; they are made every half-year; but when a report is not in an officer's favour, he ought to be told what is wrong, in order that he may have an opportunity of amending. I never made a confidential report against an officer without informing him of it. It is very important he should know what is defective on an inspection, because by the next inspection he may improve so as to be worthy of promotion. I really cannot see there is any difficulty in the matter. The system prevails in other countries; it exists in Austria. I have seen a good deal of the Austrian Army, and I never heard any objection urged against the means instituted to test the capabilities and the qualities of officers. We have heard a good deal said about the regimental system, and it may be viewed in two aspects—military and social. With regard to the military aspect, if we understand by the regimental system the superintendence of the men by their officers, I cannot see why they should not be as well looked after under a non-

  1739
  purchase system as they are now. I doubt very much whether it is desirable that officers should continue to serve in the same regiments. By doing so I think officers are apt to get narrow ideas; to think nothing of the general service and only of their own regiments; and to become restricted in their views like persons who live in small communities. On this point I will, with the permission of the House, quote a letter I have received from a distinguished officer who has seen considerable service. He says—
  "I am entirely in favour of the abolition of purchase, and think the Government have acted in the matter with the greatest liberality. The purchase system is, in my opinion, bad in every way. It has a tendency to make officers think less of their obligations to the public and the duties of their profession in time of peace; they are apt to look on their commissions as their own property, and there is great reluctance in getting rid of inefficient officers on account of the large sums they may have invested. Our best officers are frequently lost to the service (especially when married and with families) rather than risk the money they have paid. … Under the regimental system, by which an officer, as a rule, rises from ensign to lieutenant-colonel in his own corps, his ideas become prejudiced and confined, and he has less at heart the interests of the service at large than those of his own regiment. There are a sensitiveness and touchiness about regiments which render officers of other corps extremely reluctant to act up to the Queen's regulations in checking irregularities which come under their notice on duty and otherwise. It must strike everyone the great want of unanimity among military men on the most important subjects of the day in connection with their profession, and, consequently, the little weight our opinions have with the public; and this is more or less traceable to the present system, and the difficulty an officer has in freeing himself from the prevailing opinions of the regiment he has spent his life in. … For an Army to be successful in the field it must be carefully trained in time of peace, requiring all the care, energy, patience, and professional pride of which officers are capable. … In time of war there is no self-sacrifice or privation that our officers are not equal to; but in these days of rapid campaigns—of railroads and telegraphy, and other means of improved communication and locomotion—there is no longer the time to train on the commencement of hostilities, as in the long wars of former days, when organization was pretty much on a par among the armies of Europe, and no breech-loaders and arms of precision existed, which render mistakes so fatal, and call for the most intimate knowledge of their profession and the art of war from officers of every rank. It is admitted on all sides that our officers do not make a profession of the Army in the same sense as abroad; off duty military topics are looked on as so-called 'shop,' and considered by the junior ranks rather a bore. I really think that the purchase system tends so much to impair the efficiency of the officers of the Army, especially
  1740
  in the junior ranks, that the country ought to get rid of it at any expense."
  It is only fair I should mention who my correspondent is, and he has given me permission to mention his name; it is Colonel Cameron, of the 4th Regiment; and perhaps I may trespass on the indulgence of the House by stating what are his claims to attention, as recorded in The Army List—
  "Colonel Cameron served in the Grenadier Guards during the Eastern Campaign of 1854, including the battle of the Alma and the siege of Sebastopol, as Assistant Engineer, Right Attack. He was severely wounded on the 20th of October, while in command of the Volunteer Sharpshooters of the 1st Division (medal with two clasps, Knight of the Legion of Honour, fifth class of the Medjidie, and Turkish medal). Commanded the 3rd Regiment German Legion, with commission of lieutenant colonel, from May, 1855, to November, 1856, out of which time seven months in Turkey. Commanded the 1st Battalion 4th King's Own Regiment throughout the Abyssinian campaign, and was present at the action of Arogee and the capture of Magdala (mentioned in Lord Napier's despatches as having won his admiration by the manner in which he has commanded his excellent regiment, and the soldierlike spirit which, by his teaching and example, he has so well fostered and maintained); brevet of colonel, C.B., and medal."
  Even now officers do not always remain in the same regiment, and there are some who have been in many regiments, and my hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Vivian) quoted a Return relating to field officers now serving with their regiments which showed that while there were 80 lieutenant-colonels who had risen from the lowest commissioned rank of their present regiment, there were 86 who had joined them from other regiments. I do not think that what is called the regimental system will in any way be injured by the abolition of purchase. I am sure that every hon. Member will agree with me that the social system of the British Army is, on the whole, excellent, and that there is a good feeling among the officers. If anything can be done to stop extravagance and expenditure it would be most important not only as affecting the happiness of the officers, but also as affecting the well-being of the men. Coming to the second part of the Bill, I may say I do not believe compulsory service to be possible in England. In the Bill there is a clause empowering resort to the Ballot in an emergency. My noble Friend (Lord Elcho) has asked what an emergency is. I should think it would be anything like a threat of invasion. Although you may have in

  1741
  your Bill power to resort to the Ballot, which means compulsory service for the time, such is the feeling of this country that it would be quite unnecessary to resort to the Ballot, because men would voluntarily come forward to defend their country in such numbers as to supersede the necessity for the Ballot. As to Reserves, time is required to form them. That could not be accomplished in a day. What is wanted is sustained and not spasmodic effort — constant, steady, persevering effort to arrive at perfection. Such is the system pursued in Prussia and in the German Army. When we see the great results of the recent war, we cannot but admit the perfection of that system which Prussia has been steadily completing since 1806, after she had suffered very great losses. Our policy ought to be continued, steady, persevering efforts until we arrive at perfection. To arrive at that the abolition of purchase is the first step. I cordially concur in what has been said about improved organization; a great deal has been done in that direction, but much remains to be done. The object we have in view is to define duties and fix responsibilities. Our endeavour has been to decentralize the Army, and to make general officers commanding districts responsible for the discipline and efficiency. They should be held responsible, and should not be able to blame either the Horse Guards or the War Office; and the policy of enabling them to discharge their duties properly and of holding them responsible is that which it is intended to pursue. Before sitting down, I wish to say a few words on another branch of the subject. I wish to live with the times, and to see the Army, like other institutions, reformed; but as a great deal has been said against officers in the Army, I wish to say for them that I think they should be treated with some indulgence. I can recollect the day when a professionally educated Army was decried, and I have been told that I am acting contrary to constitutional principles when I say that we really do require an Army of men educated for their profession, and not an Army officered by men competent to perform ordinary duties only, and who, when those duties are performed, retire to the enjoyment of the special pleasures belonging to their social station. The officers of the British Army have done
  1742
  their duty on all occasions, and under all circumstances, although they are placed in a position different from that occupied by the officers of any Army in Europe. They are called upon very often to perform duties of a very distasteful character, involving long exile in unhealthy stations, and with none of "the pomp, pride, and circumstance of glorious war." I am not a laudator temporis acti; but I must be permitted to express an opinion that in all cases they have done their duty with zeal, loyalty, and efficiency. I would also, with the permission of the House, say one word in favour of the rank and file. The rank and file of the Army, no matter how they have enlisted, or whence they come, have proved themselves brave men in battle, patient under privation, loyal to the Crown and country, devoted to their officers. They have been brave men, and I think the Army of the future—if I may so style it—will do their duty with equal zeal, efficiency, and courage. But, Sir, I think it will be well also if the Army of the future turned occasionally to the page of history, and learnt to emulate the great deeds of those who have gone before them.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTONsaid, he was bound to admit that the opinions of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down were worthy of respect; but he could not agree with the opinions he had expressed in reference to the abolition of purchase. In the few remarks he intended to make he should consider the question—firstly, in the interest of the officers—in the interest of those men who had invested large sums of money in the purchase of their commissions; and, secondly, in the much wider interest of the nation. He should consider whether they were likely to obtain so much more efficiency in the Army, by adopting the proposals of the Government concerning it, as to justify the expenditure of the enormous sum necessary to effect the abolition of purchase. He admitted there were anomalies in the purchase system; but the blame for them was due to successive Governments, who had been paid large sums of money for commissions by officers, and who believed the conditions of their contract to be that if they remained in the service and proved themselves efficient, they would one day command the regiments in which they had the honour to serve.

  1743
  The Government now, however, sought to break their contract, and ought, therefore, to bear the consequences of so doing by compensating the persons injured by the line of action they proposed to take. The Government Bill would, by abolishing purchase, place officers of great experience and length of service under great disadvantages as compared with their juniors, and even if it would effect reforms in some directions it would be unwise to cause officers to associate these reforms with the Bill which had, in their opinion, inflicted great personal hardship upon them. He was, therefore, in favour of the proposal of the hon. Member for North Lancashire (Mr. Stanley) that Government should either compound at once with the officers, or enter into an engagement to pay them a certain sum of money in the shape of compensation at the expiration of a stated time. He had thought before hearing the speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had last addressed the House, that Government expected after their Bill passed to draw the officers from the same social rank which now supplied them; but the right hon. and gallant Gentleman expressed a wish to have in the future a professional class of officers. [Sir HENRY STORKS: "Professionally instructed" was the phrase I used.] By such an officer he should understand one who was dependent for the means of sustenance solely on his pay, and, if he was right in so thinking, the successor to the present Lord of the Admiralty in the post he lately held would have his hands full of work in attending to the large number of applicants for out-door relief who would be called into existence by the working of the plan. It had been said that the regimental system would not be affected by the adoption of the new mode of promotion proposed by the Government; but his experience taught him that the contrary would be the case. Now that a man knew he would be promoted in the regiment in which he had served he would remain in that regiment, though, as in the Rifle Brigade, promotion was slow, and would do his utmost to maintain and improve the efficiency of the regiment whose traditions he so much loved. The case of the 11th Hussars, to which Colonel Fraser had been appointed from another regiment, and in which the excellent service in existence before Colonel
  1744
  Fraser's appointment had been maintained and continued by him, was alluded to in support of the theory that the Government plan would not effect the regimental system. But it simply proved, if it proved anything, that Colonel Fraser was a practical officer, for, if the officer appointed had, instead of being sensible and conciliatory, been cross-grained and self-opinionated, he would probably have thrown over the traditions of the regiment in favour of his own views, and nothing but dissatisfaction and heartburning would have resulted. On a previous evening the hon. and gallant Member for Hereford (Major Arbuthnot) called attention to remarks made in a preceding debate by the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) to the effect that Government could not expect competent engineers to go out to India for a miserable annual pittance of £240, and he asked how, then, could they think it likely men would enter the Army for pay amounting to only £90 a-year. This was a very clear and convincing way of putting the point. It was a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence. If Government wished to secure the services of professionally educated soldiers, who were entirely dependent on their pay, they must construct an increased scale of remuneration, and so entail much additional expense on the country. One of the objections raised against the purchase system was that under its operation incompetent officers could not be got rid of; but those who brought this objection forward forgot or chose to ignore the fact that the Commander-in-Chief was bound to rid the Army of any officers who proved themselves to be either incompetent or inefficient. It was the height of absurdity to talk about the competency or incompetency of the men in the lower ranks in the Army. To ensure an efficient and economical Army some practical test should be applied to the heads of Departments, because it was absurd to lay down regulations for the lower grades of officers when it was well known that the heads of Departments appointed were entirely ignorant, as in the present instance, of the wants of the services over which they were to preside. The right hon. Gentleman the present War Minister had, however, during the two years he had presided over the War Department, applied his great ability to the subject, and had

  1745
  succeeded in becoming pretty well acquainted with the subject, and he had no doubt the present First Lord of the Admiralty would do the same. At present heads of Departments had entirely to rely for information on subordinates, which was a bad system. As long as their subordinates knew that they were dependent on them for information, they would take a great deal more upon themselves than they otherwise would do. As to the proposal for the abolition of purchase, he could not see in whose interest it was made. If we were to have exactly the same class of officers hereafter as now—that was to say, officers in the same social grade — men with some slight means of their own, and the majority of our officers were such—and who did not object to the purchase system, it was perfectly clear there was no use in abolishing purchase for their sake. As to non-purchase, or poor officers, it was perfectly clear the abolition of purchase would not benefit them, because they rose more rapidly under the present system than they would under that which was proposed. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down gave a few instances of officers who had been unable to rise on account of a want of money, and he thought it was the hon. and gallant Member for Truro (Captain Vivian) who said that no man, whatever his qualification, could ever rise in his profession unless he had money. Now, in the regiment in which he (Lord George Hamilton) had the honour to serve, there were two gentlemen who had risen from the ranks; one of them was a Staff officer and the other was paymaster. The Staff officer was a most distinguished man. He had served in almost every part of the world, and he had requested, him (Lord George Hamilton) to oppose the proposed change—it worked well for the Army, and in his case it represented many thousands of pounds. Turn whichever way he would, he could not see in whose interests this proposal was made. It might be said that clamour out-of-doors had urged the Government to make this proposal; but he should have imagined that the Government was strong enough to have resisted clamour out-of-doors. No doubt the purchase system was wrong in principle; but every practical man knew that it worked well. The more men examined into the purchase system
  1746
  the more they became in favour of it. Strange to say, a Vote was to be taken on the Estimates of £5,000 to pay out old captains and lieutenants out of the artillery, in order to give some impetus to promotion, and it does seem absurd that we should pay an immense sum of money to abolish a system which has worked well for one which, as this Vote clearly demonstrates, has not worked well. If the present proposal were carried, it would be impossible to go on with the regimental system, and hon. Members on the Treasury Bench were aware of that fact, for nothing would give greater dissatisfaction, and destroy that esprit de corps that at present prevailed, than to adopt a system that would put young majors over the heads of old captains in the same regiment. The House had been told that the officers of Her Majesty's Army were opposed to all reform. He denied that they were opposed to reform; but they had a great dread of civilian interference, and he thought the reasons were obvious. It was just possible that in the wars in which the Army had been engaged during the present century the generalship was not so good as it might have been, and that there had been a little want of stratagem. That, however, was made up by hard fighting and valour on the part of officers and men; but everyone of those departments in which the civilian element predominated was characterized by incapacity and inefficiency. During the Crimean War the Commissariat broke down in a manner almost unparalleled in history Committee after Committee were appointed to examine the cause of that break-down, and if the officers of Her Majesty's Army had a dread of civilian interference, they had a greater dread of the influence of the hon. Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan) than any hon. Gentleman in England. They had been told he was an hereditary Army Reformer, and it would no doubt be recollected that a certain relation of the hon. Member had accomplished a reform—namely, the transfer of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Office, but it was an involuntary reform, and only accomplished after the Crimean Army had been almost destroyed. It was not, therefore, surprising that the officers and men of the Army looked forward with some dread to any proposal that came from

  1747
  a member of the same family. He was afraid that hon. Members below the Gangway had not paid sufficient attention to the merits of the purchase system, which had certainly acted well in practice. He felt bound, as representing a constituency which would have to pay a considerable portion of the sum that would be required, to point out his objections to the proposed scheme, which were that it would not conduce to efficiency, that a system of selection must be a system of favouritism, and that it would be the means of introducing politics into the Army. Whichever way he looked at the proposal, he found it to be more and more objectionable, and that it combined, in a manner which he thought nothing but the most perverted ingenuity could devise, the elements of confusion, inefficiency, and extravagance.
  MR. STAPLETONsaid, that the Amendment the House was asked to support was so drawn that hon. Members opposite could vote for it, and yet afterwards when in office carry a measure similar to that of the Government. It was no such great exaggeration to say that commissions were put up to auction. Rich and ambitious officers bought over the heads of those who could pay customary over-regulation price, giving them money to withdraw their names, and when they could not get on in one regiment by this means they exchanged into another. He thought it would be better to discuss the mode by which the Government proposed to carry out the scheme rather than the necessity of the scheme itself, that being beyond further argument. The Government proposed to repay to each officer the over-regulation price of his commission; but that payment would be deferred, contingent, and conditional. It would be deferred, because only a certain number of officers would be allowed to sell out in any one regiment; it would be contingent, because if an officer should die before his time of selling out came he would lose the whole of the purchase money; and it would be conditional, because in order to obtain the money the officer would have to relinquish his profession. But surely the immediate payment of the regulation price would be preferred by many persons to the deferred contingent and conditional payment of the over-regulation price. By paying the regulation price at once we should do
  1748
  justice to the officers; by withholding the over-regulation price we should avoid the scandal of rewarding men by Act of Parliament for violating the law. Coming to the expense of retiring officers under the new system, he did not think it was necessary that the whole expense should be borne by the country, for what could be easier than to require that each person obtaining a commission should place a sum of money in a sort of insurance in the hands of the Government, to be returned to him, with increment, when he was superannuated. Of course those officers who died, who left the service before the time for superannuation, or who attained the rank of major-general, would not have the money returned at all. He considered that these points were worthy of the attention of the Government. What the House wished was to have our officers better educated, so that they should be able to act if left to themselves as the Prussian officers described in The Times were said to be.
  Moved "That the debate be now adjourned."—(Sir John Pakington.)
  MR. GLADSTONEsaid, as it appeared to be the wish of the House that the debate should be adjourned, he did not rise for the purpose of objecting. But he hoped there would be an understanding that if the debate was adjourned now it would be finished on Monday evening. [Cries of No; no understanding.]
  Debate further adjourned till Monday next.

MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER BILL— [BILL 2.]
(Mr. Thomas Chambers, Mr. Morley.)
COMMITTEE. [Progress, 8th March.]
Bill considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
Amendment again proposed, in page 1, line 8, to leave out all the words from the word "heretofore" to the second word "or," in line 9, both inclusive."—(Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.)
MR. GATHORNE HARDYsaid, it would be well that the Committee should understand the question before it. The effect of the clause as it stood would be to legalize the marriage of persons who had taken it upon themselves to act in violation of the law, and that was a

1749
most important question, upon which they ought to have the opinion of the Government. There were many cases in which persons who had thus married had afterwards separated, and the question was, were these persons to be held as married in spite of themselves?
MR. G. B. GREGORYsaid, that these marriages up to 1835 were not void, but voidable, by the action of the Ecclesiastical Courts; but since then they were void ipso facto.
MR. BERESFORD HOPEsaid, a great deal of confusion had been caused by, and much misrepresentation employed as to the word "voidable." Every marriage within the prohibited degrees was only voidable up to 1835; so that the most horrible alliances of the nearest kindred belonged to that class up to that date, and equally with the one now under discussion, could only be prevented by a sense of common decency. All the argument used on the other side on that subject tending to show that any particular indulgence was shown to this particular degree was simply misrepresentation.
MR. BARNETTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what he would say supposing some person should turn up who demanded a return of legacy duty on the ground that, being a son of a deceased wife's sister, he would be bound to pay 10 per cent on the property left him; whereas being now legitimate, he would be entitled to the property free of duty?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, the answer would be that the money being lawfully paid would not be returned.
MR. HUNTappealed to the Prime Minister to state his opinion and that of the Government upon the question of giving to the Bill the retrospective action proposed, observing that if it were passed in its present shape others who happened to contract marriages hereafter within degrees remoter, but yet forbidden, would come to Parliament with an irresistible claim to have these marriages legalized.
MR. GLADSTONE, having remarked that no Government had hitherto been called upon to declare its views on the question, and admitting that it was far from being free from difficulties, thought his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. T. Chambers) had exercised a wise discre-
1750
tion, on the whole, in giving validity to the marriages referred to in the clause. The Act of Lord Lyndhurst for the first time gave validity by retrospective action to what was undoubtedly a violation of the law. It became certain that such an example would be followed by continuous efforts to alter the law in some respects, and they were bound to take that into consideration in making allowance for persons who had contracted these alliances since 1835. It appeared to him that the dictates both of equity and policy were in favour of the course taken by his hon. and learned Friend, always supposing that he had—as he believed he had—provided completely for the protection of proprietary rights.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
The Committee divided: — Ayes 133; Noes 98: Majority 35.
Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read the third time To-morrow.

WESTMEATH, &c., UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS.—COMMITTEE.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON moved the nomination of the Select Committee on Westmeath, &c., Unlawful Combinations.
Select Committee nominated: — Marquess of HARTINGTON, Mr. DISRAELI, Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL for IRELAND, Mr. HARDY, Sir GEORGE GREY, Colonel WILSON PATTEN, Mr. DOWNING, Viscount SANDON, Mr. JAMES, Mr. PEMBERTON, Mr. MAGUIRE, Mr. RUSSELL GURNEY, Mr. GREGORY, Mr. BRUEN, and Mr. Serjeant SHERLOCK:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.
MR. NEWDEGATE: Sir, when the noble Lord the Chief Secretary of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland moved the appointment of this Committee, the noble Lord intimated that it was to be a Secret Committee; but in subsequent discussions the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury declared that the Committee was to act upon the ordinary powers vested in all Select Committees of this House, whereby they would exercise a discretion as to whether they would suppress any parts of the evidence given before them in their Reports to this House. But the right hon. Gentleman added that, although this was a Select Committee, it would not have power to report its opinion with

1751
respect to any remedy for the present disturbed state of the county of Westmeath, and the adjoining counties, to the House. Now, Sir, I have examined the precedent which was established in 1852, and I find from the Report of the Committee in that instance that it was appointed at the instance of Mr. Napier, at that time Attorney General for Ireland, in these terms—
"To inquire into the state of those parts of the counties of Armagh, Monaghan, and Louth, which were referred to in Her Majesty's Speech, into the immediate cause of crime and outrage in those districts, and into the efficiency of the laws, and of their administration for the suppression of such crime and outrage."
In the Journals of this House I find entries from which I learn that this Committee was appointed on the 19th of March, 1852, and that on the 4th of May following, it was ordered by the House that the Committee should have power to report their opinion, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to this House. Now, it appears to me that this is a case precisely in point. Whenever the House appoints a Select Committee it appoints what is a delegation of its own; and I believe it to be consistent with all usage that, inasmuch as such Committee emanates from this House, so, as its delegation, it is reponsible to the House, and that its Report must be made to this House, as the sole source of the authority by which it calls for persons and Papers, and enters into an examination of them. If the Committee now proposed to be nominated by the Government is not, or if there is to be an understanding that it is not, to report the evidence it takes, or its own opinion, to the House, then it will have been appointed upon terms different from those I have ever known in any previous case of the appointment of a Select Committee, because, in this instance, a Select Committee of the House will have been appointed, as it were, to be an assistant department of the Executive. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. Well, if that is not the case, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will explain that this Committee is to have the power of reporting to the House any portion of the evidence it may think fit—[Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!]—and to report any opinion it may arrive at to this House. [Mr. GLADSTONE:
1752
Hear, hear!] Because, as far as the debates have gone hitherto, the inference to be drawn is directly the reverse. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No, no!] And if the right hon. Gentleman, in the present disturbed state of the districts concerned in the Inquiry, had come down to the House and announced that he wished to appoint a Royal Commission, under the powers of the Crown, and had selected certain Members of the House to serve upon it, I feel convinced that the House would not have objected. Or, if he had brought in a Bill to constitute a Parliamentary Commission, under the provisions of such a measure, the House might have directed the Commission to report to Her Majesty. Then the Government would have had full discretion as to whether they would report any part of the evidence taken, or the opinions of the Commissioners, to the House. I beg now to move, in accordance with the precedent of the year 1852, to which I have referred, that the Select Committee on Unlawful Combinations, &c., in Westmeath, and adjoining parts of Meath and King's County, have power to report the evidence taken before them, together with their opinion thereon, to this House. I make that Motion, because it is the impression not only on my own mind, but on the minds of other Members of the House, that this Committee is appointed in unusual terms, and unless the right hon. Gentleman shows that it is not, I shall take the opinion of the House upon the question.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That the Select Committee have power to report the Evidence taken before them, and their Opinion thereon to the House,"—(Mr. Newdegate.)
MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that as the Motion was now framed he had no objection to it.
MR. ASSHETON CROSSasked whether the Order of Reference would enable the Committee to inquire into the question of how the Government had exercised the powers which they already possessed?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONunderstood that this must form part of the Inquiry to be entered upon by the Committee.
Question put, and agreed to.

WESTMEATH, &c., UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS.—COMMITTEE.

  GAME LAWS AMENDMENT (NO. 2) BILL.
  On Motion of The LORD ADVOCATE, Bill to amend and assimilate, in certain respects, the Laws of England and Scotland relating to Game, ordered to be brought in by The LORD ADVOCATE and Mr. Secretary BRUCE.
  House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock.

MINUTES.
— PUBLIC BILL—First Reading—County Property* (35).

IRISH LAW REFORM.—QUESTION.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEasked, What Bills for the Improvement of the Administration of Justice in Ireland the Government intend to propose to Parliament this Session, especially in regard to the Common Law, Bankruptcy, Matrimonial Causes, and County Courts? Reforms in this direction were urgently

1603
required, and would encounter little or no opposition—particularly the extension of the Bankruptcy Law to non-traders, and the extension of the jurisdiction of County Courts.
LORD DUFFERIN, in reply, said, that the legislation intended to be proposed by the Government relating to Ireland would exceed, he believed, even the expectations of his noble Friend. Her Majesty's Government would be prepared in the course of the present Session to introduce five Bills relating to Ireland on the following subjects:—a Bill for the abolition of Imprisonment for Debt, one for the amendment of the Law of Bankruptcy, a Bill to amend the law relating to Matrimonial Causes, one to amend the law respecting the execution of decrees in the County Courts, and, lastly, a Bill having reference to the law respecting Juries. It was impossible for him at present to give his noble Friend more information than the mere titles of the Bills, for as a layman he was unable to judge more than the general scope of them by their names.

PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA—ALLEGED SECRET TREATY.—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he ventured to ask the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a Question, the urgency of which justified his putting it without Notice. The day before yesterday the Prime Minister was reported to have stated in the House of Commons that he was not informed of the existence of any secret treaty between Prussia and Russia, either immediately previous to or during the continuance of the late war. The question had been raised whether the words "not informed" referred merely to official information. This morning a very specific statement appeared in one of the London morning papers, asserting the existence of a secret treaty or engagement, concluded between the two Powers named just prior to the outbreak of the war, and with reference to certain contingencies to which the war might give rise. Now, inasmuch as to-morrow was appointed for the last meeting of the Conference, when a certain portion of the public law of Europe would come under revision, he hoped it was not too much for him to inquire
1604
whether his noble Friend was, directly or indirectly, officially or otherwise, aware of any such treaty, convention, or understanding between the two Powers in question?
EARL GRANVILLE: It would have been more convenient if the noble Earl had given me a longer Notice of the Question he proposed to ask me. His Question relates to the truth of a statement which appears in The Morning Post of this morning. I have no knowledge of any such treaty as that referred to by The Morning Post. As to rumours on the subject, I have heard rumours of every sort and description, some of the most contradictory character; but I have no knowledge of the existence of anything of the kind. Perhaps, as the noble Earl has put a Question to me, he will allow me to ask whether the treaty described by The Morning Post is the treaty of which Members of the Opposition seem to have some knowledge?
THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I know nothing of the treaty beyond what is stated by The Morning Post.

CONVICTS FOR POLITICAL OFFENCES—RELEASE OF FENIAN PRISONERS.

  ADDRESS FOR PAPERS.
  EARL GREY: My Lords, your Lordships will remember that in the debate on the Address at the opening of the Session, reference was made to the release of the Fenian prisoners, and that the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) did not give more than a very slight and general reply to those observations. I have no complaint to make of his so treating the subject, as it had only been cursorily referred to; but, as I think a very serious mistake has been committed by Her Majesty's Government in the matter, it appears to me only right that they should have an opportunity of offering a fuller explanation in this House. I am aware that the amnesty is now an accomplished fact, and cannot be recalled; but it is not without its use that any mistakes which may have been made by the Government in the exercise of their powers should be noticed in Parliament, for such notice is no unimportant check on the commission of similar mistakes again. The facts of the case are very simple. Your Lordships are aware that two years ago a considerable number of persons who

  1605
  had been convicted of treason-felony and other offences received a remission of their sentences, but that 32 prisoners were reserved. We learn by the newspapers that since the end of last Session all—or, at all events, the majority—of those prisoners have been released. I trust not all—because one or two of them were concerned in murders of a very aggravated description, and I cannot suppose that they have been pardoned; but this will be shown by the Return for which I am about to move. It appears to me that the discharge of these prisoners was a measure which requires explanation. It has for many years been almost an axiom among all who take an interest in the effectual administration of the criminal law, that there should be the utmost certainty of punishment; nothing being so mischievous as that criminals should be led to believe that, when convicted for crimes, and the punishment duly awarded by the Courts of Law, they have a chance of escaping the infliction of such punishments. So strongly has this been felt that of late years the Government, with the full assent of Parliament, have acted on the principle of reducing the remission of a portion of the sentence of persons condemned to penal servitude—a remission which had been usually made as the reward of good conduct—to such strict and stringent rules that there should be no doubt or uncertainty as to the amount of punishment every convict was to undergo. Now, the discharge of these prisoners seems to me to be a direct violation of this first rule of criminal policy. And yet this was a case in which it was peculiarly important that the rule should be adhered to. I would remind your Lordships that these men had been the objects of very great and unusual clemency. In olden times men who had been concerned in such an attempt to overturn the Government would undoubtedly have expiated their offence on the scaffold. I believe there is hardly a country in the world in which even now the Government would abstain from inflicting capital punishment on persons guilty of such an offence. But Her Majesty's Government acted, as I think, with a wise clemency in proceeding against these men not for treason, which would have made a capital sentence the necessary consequence of their conviction, but for treason-felony, and
  1606
  they were consequently sentenced for the most part only to long terms of penal servitude. Now, the necessary effect of the course taken by the Government of releasing them after the expiration of a comparatively short portion of the punishment to which they were sentenced, is to lead other persons disposed to engage in similar treasonable plots to say—"Oh, there is no reason to be alarmed if we fail in an attempt to overthrow the Government, hanging is out of the question, and though penal servitude for life sounds very terrible, we know very well that after a time we shall be discharged; so that if we succeed there is a grand prize for us, and if we fail we run, after all, no great risk." Observe, moreover, how difficult it will be to future Governments, in case of the recurrence of similar attempts against the safety of the State, to practise the same clemency as has been shown in this instance. For the vindication of the law, for the creation of that wholesome fear which is necessary for the safety of the State, the measure now adopted will tend to compel future Governments to have recourse to capital punishment much more largely than would otherwise be necessary. Such, is the tendency of the measure; and I find it the more difficult to understand why such a step can have been taken by the Government when I remember the description given of these very men by a right hon. Friend of mine who lately held the office of Chief Secretary for Ireland. Two years ago, after a part of the prisoners had been discharged, the O'Conor Don pressed on the Chief Secretary in the House of Commons the claims of other prisoners; and Mr. Chichester Fortescue gave his reasons for declining to entertain the application. He stated that all the cases of the Fenian convicts then undergoing punishment had been carefully considered, and that 49 of them would be unconditionally released, while 32 were still to undergo their sentence. In justifying the refusal of the Government to include them in the list of those who were to be pardoned, he thus described the latter class—
  "This list of thirty-two prisoners included almost all the main founders, leaders, and organizers of the Fenian movement. It included men who were deeply responsible for the attempted revolution of the last two or three years, and men whom the Government and the Lord Lieutenant felt it would not be consistent with their

  1607
  duty to discharge, or whose freedom would be compatible with the public safety—men, he might add, with regard to whom the Government had no reason to believe that they might not, if discharged, attempt again to renew their unhappy and criminal, although desperate enterprize, and to whom, therefore, the Government, while rejoicing, as they did, and as Lord Spencer did, that they had been able to reduce the lists so largely, felt that the clemency of the Crown should not be extended."—[3 Hansard, cxciv. 159.]
  That was the opinion of the Government in February, 1869, and I shall be anxious to hear from my noble Friend opposite why they have altered it? It appears to me that, while the release of these prisoners was in itself injudicious, the mode in which it was carried out was, if possible, still more injudicious. If they were to be discharged, the reasonable course would have been to discharge them freely, requiring no other condition than the simple one of their taking the oath of allegiance, and binding themselves in writing not to engage in any future attempts against the peace of the kingdom. Had they been discharged in that manner, and allowed to remain here, the bad example of the remission of punishment would have remained, but the men themselves would have been powerless for evil. They would not have even a plausible case of grievance against the Government, they would not have been raised into any factitious importance, and had they attempted to renew their treasonable proceedings they must have committed direct perjury; and I cannot but think that this would have diminished their influence even among the Fenians. The Government, however, thought fit to act differently. They would not allow the prisoners to remain in the United Kingdom, but they gave them first-class passages in the finest vessels which cross the Atlantic to the United States. They sent them to the very place where they were most able to injure us, bound to no engagement whatever. They had raised them into consideration by showing them that they were afraid of their influence at home, and by treating them in a special manner, and they sent them to the United States, where the large Fenian societies work infinitely more mischief than in the United Kingdom. I will not trouble your Lordships with an account of what you remember followed the arrival of those persons in America. It is sufficient for me to say
  1608
  that those occurrences furnish conclusive proof that the mode of discharging them was a mistake. We have had as yet no explanation from the Government, of their reasons for the course they have taken, and the main object of my Motion is to elicit one; but, judging by the few words which have been said, and by what has been stated out of Parliament by those who have defended the measure it appears that the grounds relied on by the Government are these—It is argued that persons who have committed political offences are by common consent to be looked on in quite a different light from persons who have committed ordinary crimes against the law of the land; it is urged that in the United States, for instance, the persons engaged in the great Civil War were not punished as criminals, and that we have on various occasions taken upon ourselves to recommend to other nations clemency towards persons suffering punishment for political offences. Now, it is true that the common feeling of mankind has long decided that when nations are unhappily divided so that civil war breaks out, both parties probably believing their cause a just one, it is not right to treat the large number of persons engaged in such a war as criminals and rebels; and the United States only acted on that view in not punishing the Confederates with severity. I admit, also, that, when men conspire against some Government, under which the people have been suffering grievous wrong, and fail in their attempt, sympathy is often felt for them. I admit, moreover, that in countries where there are continual revolutions, in which hostile parties successively drive each other from power by violence, it is felt that those who, for the moment, by a turn of the wheel are brought down, are hardly fit subjects for extreme punishment. I believe it is true, too, that the Government of this country has in some cases taken upon itself to recommend such persons to clemency—though I am not sure that the propriety with which this has been done has been in all cases unquestionable; and I doubt very much whether such remonstrances or representations have been addressed to powerful States, or to Governments of a stable and respectable character. Admitting that to this extent allowance is, in certain cases, to be made for political offenders, I utterly deny that any principle on

  1609
  which such indulgence has hitherto been thought proper applies to these men. They were not honourable adversaries in civil war, for there was no civil war in question; still less were they patriots, risking their lives to free their country from some detestable and grinding tyranny. Whatever may have been the faults of the English Government towards Ireland in bygone centuries, nobody can deny that for many years past it has been the sincere desire of the English people, and of the Imperial Parliament, to do justice to Ireland in the fullest sense of the word and to raise it to happiness and prosperity. There may still be bad laws in operation, but it is not true that those laws could not be got rid of by peaceable means. Now, one of the first conditions which is indispensable to give any claim to indulgence to men who incur the responsibility of risking all the calamities of civil war in a country which is enjoying peace and tranquillity, is that there should have been no fair chance by peaceable means of obtaining redress. That was certainly not the case with regard to Ireland. The attempt of these men was one of a very different character. It was an attempt to upset by violence the settled government under which the people of Ireland were enjoying peace and political liberty in as full measure as ourselves, at the price of bloodshed and confusion. Nor is this all. They have avowed in various writings and speeches that they were prepared to attempt this object by the most atrocious means—by the secret assassination of the civil and military servants of the Crown, the burning of barracks with soldiers in them, and the most cruel and barbarous modes of destruction that could be devised. All these things were deliberately recommended, and not only recommended, but, in many instances, put into operation. Your Lordships know that constables have been secretly shot at night in Ireland, and that murders of other kinds have been committed. We know that the persons engaged in the conspiracy prosecuted their object by such acts as the murder of a policeman engaged in his duty at Manchester, and by that most fiendish outrage the explosion at Clerkenwell. We know, moreover, that the men engaged in these atrocious crimes have been treated by the Fenian body not as criminals and persons whom they ought
  1610
  to disavow, but as martyrs in the cause of their country and as men entitled to honour and glory. Their acts have been adopted by the Fenian society, and that brotherhood, as they call themselves, must be regarded as art and part in all these proceedings. I say, then, that the persons convicted of participation in this conspiracy have incurred far greater moral guilt, as they have also done far more injury to the State, than any ordinary robber or murderer; and that, instead of being entitled to special consideration and indulgence, they ought to have been subjected to special severity. By the discharge of these men in the present state of Ireland, you have taught the Irish people to believe that an attempt to overthrow the authority of the Crown by force is regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a venial offence. You are teaching them that a rebellion or a conspiracy of such a description is not regarded as depriving them of a claim to indulgence on the part of the Government. They are looked upon as on the same level with the Neapolitan patriots, who suffered imprisonment in loathsome dungeons for endeavouring by very different means to get rid of a system of dreadful tyranny, and with any of the men who in recent years have been punished by other Governments of the same kind. Now, this, in the present state of the country, is a most dangerous lesson to have taught the people of Ireland. What is the real condition of Ireland? Your Lordships have been told, on very high authority, that the general condition of Ireland is highly satisfactory, although it is admitted that in one particular district the state of things is "intolerable;" and we have been told on the high, authority of a Chief Justice that the state of things in that part of Ireland is getting from bad to worse. But then we are told that all this is purely local, that in general the country is prospering, that the remedial legislation of the last two years is beginning to produce its effect, and that prosperity, peace, and loyalty are general throughout the country. I fear that even with regard to agrarian outrages this is too favourable an account of the state of Ireland; already these outrages are not so strictly confined to one locality, as Her Majesty's Government have assumed. I am afraid that in at least two or three other counties

  1611
  similar atrocities to those which have disgraced Westmeath have been committed. I am, however, willing to leave agrarian outrages out of consideration; but I want to know what is the evidence to justify the description given by the Government of the present condition of Ireland? It is correct, indeed, in one respect. I believe that there is at this moment great material prosperity in every part of Ireland, and that good harvests and good prices have made the farmers generally highly prosperous; though I am afraid that that prosperity is not what it might be, and that the feeling of insecurity which still exists prevents that great development of the resources of the country which ought to occur. Still, compared with former years, Ireland, I believe, may be said to be prosperous. When, however, I come to inquire about loyalty and the effect of recent legislation in reconciling the great bulk of the population to this country, the answer is not so satisfactory. Instead of proofs of increasing loyalty I see a change in the other direction. We cannot look to the result of recent elections, to the language used at public meetings, or to the tone of the Press, without seeing that there are graver symptoms than I remember at any former period of a disposition among the Irish people to sympathize with any who are supposed to be the enemies of England, and to rejoice at anything which appears like danger and misfortune that befalls us. I see a greater disposition than ever to struggle for a disruption of the British Empire. We have against the Imperial Government not merely those who call themselves Nationalists, who have become increasingly powerful, but other parties, which while they disclaim any desire for the disruption of the Empire, have for their object measures which would inevitably lead to it, and include in their ranks men of character and standing in the country, who did not formerly espouse these views. Under the guise of "Home Government," or other names, these persons are putting forward proposals for measures which would result in the disruption of the Empire. Some of your Lordships are old enough, like myself, to remember that 40 years ago when there was the great agitation for the repeal of the Union, those who promoted it professed loyalty to the British Crown,
  1612
  but said they must have a separate Parliament. English statesmen of all parties however agreed that this was a mere pretence — that were repeal granted separation must inevitably follow, and that separation and every step towards it must be resisted to the last. I trust that is the opinion of statesmen of all parties still. I trust Her Majesty's Ministers and all of your Lordships are prepared to resist to the utmost not only the rending asunder of the British Empire, but every minor measure which would by the surest steps conduct us to that result. There ought to be no mistake about the feelings of Parliament, of the Government, and of the country on this point. Are we not all convinced that the separation of Ireland from this country would be even a greater calamity to Ireland than to ourselves? When we observe the manner in which Ireland is distracted by rival factions, and the bitterness of their hostility towards each other—when we observe that even among those who concur in the object of pulling down British authority, and who unite in the United States or Canada for this treasonable object, the disposition to division is so strong that the Fenians across the Atlantic have become two hostile bodies, bitterly assailing each other—when we look at the passions which prevail, and the difficulty experienced by the Executive Government in preventing rival factions from flying at each others' throats, does anybody doubt that if these men were to succeed in their object, and to throw off the connection with the British Crown, Ireland would speedily become a scene of internal anarchy and bloodshed? This would almost inevitably lead to some foreign Power being called in to govern them, and we should see the establishment close to our own shores of some Power hostile to this country. Our duty, then, to the large number of loyal Irishmen, as well as regard for our own safety, will not permit us for a moment to tolerate such a state of things; any attempt at the disruption of the Empire must be resisted to the very last, and nothing but such a complete overthrow by a conquering enemy as that which France has lately suffered would be sufficient to justify us in submitting to such a result. This being the case, is it possible to disguise from ourselves that there are

  1613
  symptoms now in Ireland of a state of feeling which threatens, sooner or later, to produce a fearful struggle, and that those feelings are becoming spread among the population to a dangerous extent? I wish I could doubt that this is an accurate account of the existing state of things, and that I could see any grounds for believing with Her Majesty's Ministers that the disaffection to the British Crown which prevails in Ireland is only the consequence of former misgovernment and is now gradually dying out. I admit that among nations the effects of long-continued errors cannot be removed in a short period of time, and that the healing influence of a wise policy must at first be slow. I admit that rapid improvement from a change in the system of government is not to be looked for; but if our measures have been wise, whatever change they have produced ought to be for the better, and I do not see any sign that this is the case; on the contrary, I believe that so far from tending to improve, things are getting from bad to worse. In 1868 a Motion was made in the House of Commons for a Committee on the state of Ireland, which gave rise to a very remarkable debate, in which men of very great ability on both sides of the House took part. All the most eminent speakers on that occasion concurred in giving a description of the then condition of Ireland, which we cannot compare with what now exists without seeing that the comparison is greatly to the disadvantage of the present state of things. And this, I venture to say, is no unnatural result of what has since occurred. There has been a change for the worse from the time when, by the introduction of Mr. Gladstone's Resolution, the Church of Ireland became a party question, and an instrument for overturning the existing Administration. I do not deny that Ireland had grievances to complain of both in regard to the Church and the land; but you have unfortunately dealt with those subjects in such a manner as to deprive the concessions you have made of their real value. With regard to the Church, it is almost 40 years since in the other House I avowed my conviction of the necessity of an entire change in the policy of England in that respect. I never receded from that opinion, and I am persuaded that had the question been dealt with in a statesmanlike spirit
  1614
  a measure might have been passed which would have had a most beneficial influence. Unfortunately, however, it was made a party question, and the Irish people have been impressed with the conviction that they owe what they have gained, not to your good will, but to these very Fenians, whose outrages were said by Her Majesty's Ministers to have opened the eyes of the people of England to the necessity of a change of policy. With regard to the land, a great reform of the law was necessary; but I greatly fear that the measure you adopted departed far more than was necessary from most important principles, and the result will hereafter be difficulties and inconveniences, of which symptoms are already perceptible. I need not, however, go back to these old topics. For good or for evil, the Church Bill and the Land Bill are now law. All I wish to point out is that however beneficial you may think your legislation to have been, however confident you may be that by degrees it will have a good effect on the temper of the Irish people, for the present, at all events, it has not done so; and that, on the other hand, there is a feeling which makes it in the highest degree dangerous that by such a measure as that which I have brought before you we have taught the Irish people this fatal lesson—that a conspiracy to overthrow by violence and by the most atrocious means the authority of the Crown is regarded by the Government as only a venial offence. Those who have taken a step calculated to produce this impression on the minds of the people have incurred a responsibility of the heaviest kind. I am far from imputing to my noble Friends opposite, or their Colleagues, that they have wilfully done that which they knew to be injurious to the nation for the sake of any temporary convenience, or of gaining favour with any section of their supporters—I could not for a moment dream of imputing to them such guilt as would be involved in such conduct; but I can only acquit them of it by attributing to them an error of judgment so flagrant and with so little to justify it as to leave them little claim to the confidence even of those who have hitherto been the most ready to repose confidence in them.
  Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for,
  Return of the names of any convicts who may have been specially discharged from custody since the 1st of August 1870 as having been political offenders; together with a statement of the crimes of which they had severally been convicted, and the dates of their conviction: Also,
  Copy of any instructions given by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the conditions on which such convicts were to be released, and to any arrangements made for sending them away from the United Kingdom."—(The Earl Grey.)
  LORD DUFFERIN: My Lords, no objection will be offered by the Government to the production of the documents for which the noble Earl has moved; and in making this announcement my task might have been considered at an end, had not the noble Earl indulged in such severe criticisms upon the Government not only as regards the amnesty extended to the political prisoners, but their general policy towards Ireland, that I must bespeak your Lordships' indulgence while I endeavour—not, I am afraid, to modify his opinion, to which I am quite unequal—but to submit to the House arguments which, in my opinion, militate against it. I do not propose to follow the noble Earl into those topics which, though having reference to Ireland, have no reference whatever to the subject of his Motion; for I do not see what benefit could arise from re-opening ancient controversies as to the Land Bill and the Church Bill, on which your Lordships during the past two Sessions expended so much time and attention. Still less do I see what benefit could arise from a premature examination of the effect of recent legislation, the good effects of which, its warmest advocates admitted, would, in all probability for some years be only partially apparent. I will pass from what I may call these extraneous subjects with only this observation, that as far as my own observation goes the operation of one at least of those measures, the Land Bill, has exceeded my anticipations. In proceeding to combat the noble Earl's opinion that the amnesty granted to the Fenian prisoners was ill-advised, mistimed, and likely to be fraught with disastrous consequences, I wish to assure him and the House that no man is more sensible than I am of the heinous nature of the crime of treason. It is a crime which carries, as it were, in its bosom
  1616
  the guilt of almost every other crime which can be committed, and its evil consequences on the unfortunate population in whose midst it is committed are such as words can hardly describe, or any lapse of time obliterate. I am quite at one with him also in thinking that it is the bounden duty of every Government to exact from those unhappy persons who may have been betrayed into such offences the utmost penalty which the law demands, so far and so long as the exaction of such penalties is likely to prove conducive to the maintenance of tranquillity and the restoration of order among the people amongst whom they are committed. I submit, however, that by the common and universal consent of mankind—as admitted, I think, by the noble Earl—the moral guilt of persons convicted of political offences is not of the same type or character as that of ordinary criminals, and that every Government called upon to deal with them is at liberty so to deal with them as not merely to satisfy what are technically called the ends of justice, but it is bound to consider what may best effect the main object to be kept in view—namely, the assertion of their authority and the restoration of peace and order. Let us for a moment consider the exact circumstances of the case with which the Government had to deal. A few years ago a certain number of persons, many of them possesssing considerable literary ability, and all, I believe, men of unblemished private character, brought themselves within the power of the Treason-Felony Act by a series of seditious newspaper articles. They were arraigned, convicted, and sentenced to different terms of penal servitude. A few months afterwards the seeds of disaffection, which they had thus disseminated, bore disastrous fruit in various abortive and insignificant outbreaks in different counties of Ireland. Immediately the Government put forth its power, and in the course of a very few days it—I will not say reasserted its authority, for that was never for a moment questioned — but, reestablished perfect tranquillity and security from one end of the country to the other. In the meantime all the leaders and principal agents in those disturbances were relegated to prison, where they were allowed to remain for a considerable period. Last year, however, Her Majesty's Government, acting

  1617
  on its discretion, extended the clemency of the Crown to a certain proportion of those prisoners who, in their individual capacity, were perfectly insignificant, and who had taken but a very subordinate part in the transactions in which they had been engaged; and I cannot but think, in reference to this event, that the completeness with which they, and their agitation, have disappeared is in itself a sufficient confirmation of the advisability of that step, and a proof that no disastrous consequences whatever, at all events as far as those persons are concerned, have resulted from it. At the same time, pari passû with the total extinction of that agitation and those demonstrations in every part of Ireland, Parliament entered upon a course of remedial legislation in regard to that country such as was entirely unparalleled in its annals, and it also armed the Government with ample powers for the maintenance, north, south, east, and west—of political tranquillity. I especially use the word "political tranquillity," because it would be most unfair and unreasonable—and I do not think that any person acquainted with Ireland would do so—to attempt to confound the Riband confederacy, and the unhappy circumstances now existing in the county of Westmeath, with any movement of a political character or with the Fenian conspiracy. On the contrary, I am prepared, from my knowledge and experience of the circumstances of the case — and in this matter I hope I may be thought to speak with some authority—to say that never for many years has political tranquillity reigned so completely and so undisturbed in Ireland as at this moment. In the first place, the whole of that military organization which had such extensive ramifications in many of the western and southern counties has entirely vanished, the notion of a Fenian rising has become simply ridiculous, and I believe that the expectation of being able either to assault or overthrow the constitutional union of the two countries has altogether disappeared from the minds of its most enthusiastic partiazns. Of course it is very difficult to prove that this is a correct description of the state of Ireland at the present moment; but, at all events, there are two circumstances which I may adduce in confirmation of the view I have taken. I believe it is well known that for several months
  1618
  during the present winter the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in Ireland has been able to give his attendance in England, and to reside in London without the slightest misgiving as to anything that might happen in his absence. That, certainly, is not a circumstance that could have occurred for many years previously. In the next place, Her Majesty's Government, after consulting the Lords Lieutenant of the various counties in Ireland, and acting, as I believe, on their advice and recommendations, and on their appreciation of the state of the country, have determined in every county in Ireland to call out the Militia. These two facts, I think, speak pretty plainly as to what is the condition of Ireland as respects its political tranquillity. It was in the presence of such circumstances as these that the question of what was to be done with the Fenian prisoners who still remained in their hands forced itself upon the attention of the Government. At the same time a very strong interest—a very intense feeling as to their future fate was expressed by the great mass of the Irish people; and that feeling was exhibited not merely, or in the greatest degree, by those who might be supposed to sympathize more or less with their unfortunate proceedings, but was shared by men of every class and creed in the country, and by persons of the highest respectability, who, I am sure, entertain as great a horror of the treasonable and felonious acts committed by these prisoners as any of your Lordships. Meanwhile, however, years had been rolling on, and those unfortunate men who were incarcerated in 1867 and 1868 had been subjected to all the inevitable rigour and discipline that are inseparable from imprisonment under penal servitude. And here there is a consideration to which I do not myself attach very much weight, but which ought not to be left wholly out of sight in the discussion of this subject. When, in 1848, the Treason-Felony Act was passed, the punishment contemplated by it was transportation either for life or for various terms; but when that punishment ceased to exist under a subsequent Act of Parliament, nothing but penal servitude in this country could be substituted. Now, in the mode in which transportation was applied in our penal colonies a certain amount of elasticity

  1619
  existed under regulations which enabled political prisoners, whose antecedents were of a particular character, to be treated in a way which was universally admitted, where it was possible, to be desirable. But the moment that method of punishment was changed into penal servitude at home, any consideration of that kind was, of course, no longer practicable; and for the sake of their security, as well as from the necessity of maintaining discipline among the whole batch of prisoners confined within the walls of the same prison, it was impossible to distinguish in any degree between men with such antecedents as these political prisoners and the grossest and most brutal criminals who had committed murderous acts. And further, so exceptionally was this discipline thought to tell on those very persons whose case we are now considering, that the Commission appointed to investigate the truth of the allegations preferred by their friends in Ireland, as to the harsh treatment to which it was said they had been subjected—although they fully exculpated those who had them in charge from any undue severity, yet they called the attention of both Houses of Parliament to the fact that, from the nature of the case, it was impossible but that such persons should be subjected to greater rigours than might be desirable; and I believe they recommended to Parliament that if these unfortunate persons were to continue to be incarcerated, or if others should afterwards take their place, they should be relegated to a separate place of confinement, and their imprisonment regulated according to somewhat different rules from those hitherto adopted. I merely mention this circumstance to disprove the allegation of the noble Earl that these persons have got off almost scot free. But, be that as it may, and quite independent of any reference to this consideration, but taking into account the complete suppression of the attempted insurrection — taking into account the perfect political tranquillity which has been maintained for some time in Ireland—taking also into account that the demonstrations formerly made on behalf of these prisoners had ceased—remembering, further, the general feeling prevalent on the subject in Ireland itself, and looking likewise to what in all probability would be the effect of their liberation in assisting to maintain
  1620
  the future tranquillity of that country, Her Majesty's Government determined to commute the sentences of these prisoners not into an absolute pardon, but into a qualified pardon, subject to their removal from the United Kingdom, rather than to retain them in prison to be objects on whom, perhaps, would be concentrated a considerable amount of agitation in future, and a great deal of sympathy on the part of a large body of their fellow-countrymen. In arriving at this conclusion I believe the Government came to what, on the whole, was a right conclusion. At all events, they merely followed the precedents set not only by other European Governments, but by every Government which has had to deal with a similar case in this country. In 1848, Mr. Smith O'Brien, Mr. Martin, and their companions were convicted of treason, and condemned to transportation for life; but in a few years afterwards—I believe in 1856 — their sentences were commuted, and two years later a free pardon was granted to them; and at this moment one of those persons is the representative of an Irish county and a respected Member of the other House of Parliament. Questions of this kind must he left to the discretion of each successive Government, and certainly the question under discussion was one of the most anxious that could be submitted to any Government. But, on taking into consideration the points which I have submitted to your Lordships, I cannot help thinking you will come to the conclusion that the clemency extended to these unfortunate persons was most wisely conceived, and was eminently calculated to compose the agitation which the proceedings of the Fenians had created. There is but one other topic upon which I shall venture to address your Lordships. The noble Earl (Earl Grey), in concluding his speech, described in language very weighty, and very eloquent, what, in his opinion, would be the consequence of separating Ireland from this country. I cordially concur in all that he has said upon that point. I am glad also to express my entire concurrence in all that the noble Earl said respecting the movement for "Home Government." I see by the papers that this question is occasionally agitated in Ireland; but, living in the neighbourhood of Belfast, and being in continual communication with persons residing in all

  1621
  the northern counties of Ireland, I find that movement has attracted, so far as I have been able to learn, not only no sympathy, but no attention whatever. I cannot but think, therefore, that the noble Earl has greatly exaggerated its importance, and greatly overstated the consequences which are likely to arise from it.
  LORD CAIRNS: My Lords, it was hardly to be supposed that an act of the Executive Government, such as that referred to by the Motion of the noble Earl (Earl Grey), should pass unnoticed by Parliament, and it was hardly to be supposed that it would be possible to refer to or comment upon that act of the Executive without at the same time referring to the condition of the country to which that act especially related. I am therefore somewhat surprised at the complaint made by the noble Lord (Lord Dufferin) that the field of discussion had been widened by the noble Earl who commenced the debate beyond the scope of his Notice of Motion; and I am the more surprised, because Her Majesty's Government are avowedly at present in search of a policy for Ireland. They have appealed, we are told, to a tribunal "elsewhere" to obtain suggestions and advice upon that head; and I cannot see why Her Majesty's Government should not be willing also to accept suggestions at the hand of any of your Lordships who may be prepared to make them. The question introduced by the noble Earl is, I venture to think, one of extreme importance not merely as regards the condition of Ireland, but as connected with the whole system of the administration of our criminal law. I have endeavoured to inform myself of the grounds upon which Her Majesty's Government has proceeded in this case. I am aware what are the grounds stated by the Prime Minister, and I will presently refer to them; but before doing so I must remark that the ground stated by the noble Lord (Lord Dufferin) this evening, is one which, upon reflection, the Government would be scarcely prepared to support. The noble Lord has gravely told us that one of the leading reasons which led to the release of the Fenian prisoners was that the prisoners found the system of prison discipline extremely disagreeable. That reflection would have applied with equal force as a reason for not putting them in prison at all. But what is the ground
  1622
  on which the Prime Minister based this act of the Executive Government? Mr. Gladstone says—
  "What we have done is this; we have acted upon the principle which we have invariably recommended to every other country in Europe; we have acted upon the principle which every truly civilized country in the 19th century has never hesitated to act upon, and that is that a political crime, when it has ceased to be dangerous, and when suffering has been undergone, should be treated with the utmost leniency."—[3 Hansard, cciv. 1181.]
  If I were to complain of a certain vagueness in the expressions used in this passage it would be only repeating what is often said with regard to statements coming from the same source. What is the meaning of the term "undergone suffering?" Does it mean imprisonment for one, two, or three years, or imprisonment for life? And what is meant by "treated with the utmost leniency?" Does it mean commutation of the sentence of imprisonment or absolute release, with an outfit of clothes and a supply of money? But let us consider the advice which it has been our habit to render to other countries. There have been and, I believe, are countries in Europe where, according to their system of laws, it has been in the power of the Executive Government to imprison offenders without bringing them to trial; there have been other countries where it is in the power of the Executive to conduct those trials in a manner entirely at variance with our ideas of justice to the prisoner; and there are some countries which include in the catalogue of political offences acts which we do not regard as criminal, and which have for political offences a scale of punishment which any of us would regard as entirely excessive. I believe it has been the case that, when we have found countries so circumstanced dealing with political prisoners in a manner different from that in which we should deal with them ourselves, we have interfered to remonstrate, and to solicit some remission of sentence or some speedy trial. In doing so we have been quite right; but I do not believe we have gone further than that. If we have gone further, and in dealing with a constitutional Government like our own, with a system of laws as wide as ours, and fixed principles for conducting the trial and punishment of offenders, we had interfered to deprecate the severity of the punishment inflicted, we have

  1623
  overstepped our duty. The true principle is this—We should not eliminate from our criminal law all offences which ought properly to be found there under the head of political offences or under any other head; we should take care that our system of law provides most speedy and fair trial of those charged with the offence contained in it; we should take care that our punishments are not excessive—and our course for years past has been to diminish the severity of punishments; but when we have done all that, I maintain it is of the essence of a good and wholesome system for the administration of law to maintain the certainty of the law—to insist upon the certainty of the law and the certainty of the execution of the punishments when once pronounced. Now, my Lords, I would assume for a moment that the persons of whom we are speaking are political prisoners, and I would ask your Lordships to consider for a moment whether, upon the principles laid down by the Prime Minister, the release of these prisoners was a politic or reasonable act. Had the dangers represented by these prisoners passed away at the time of their release? Was there no danger to be apprehended from the prisoners themselves? I answer that question by calling your Lordships' attention to a fact which the noble Lord relied on who has just sat down (Lord Dufferin). These prisoners were not pardoned unconditionally — they were obliged to leave the country; and if no danger was to be apprehended from their liberation why was that condition imposed? I will, in further illustration of this point, take a description of these prisoners from the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville). Two years ago, on the 18th of March, 1869, a conversation arose in this House upon the release of the Fenian prisoners who were at that time liberated, and the noble Earl described the condition of those who were detained in these words—
  "The Irish Government made repeated scrutinies into every single case, and there were three classes of offenders whom from the first they determined not to release—the criminal, if I may so distinguish them, as against the purely political offenders—the class which comprised those who were known to be habitual conspirators, and those who, from their energy or talents, as soldiers or men of letters, might, if released, prove a source of danger in the present dormant state of Fenianism."—[3 Hansard, cxciv. 1638.]
  That was the description given two years
  1624
  ago of persons from whom it is now said no danger can be apprehended. But I will go further. We have had a still more recent description of these persons from the Prime Minister, in a reply to Mr. Moylan, of the Canadian Government Emigration Office in Dublin, who addressed a letter to the right hon. Gentleman, by way of remonstrance on behalf of Canada, in relation to the liberation of the Fenian prisoners, cramped, as that act of grace is, with the condition of exile. The following is Mr. Gladstone's reply:—
  "10, Downing Street, Whitehall,
  "December 22.
  "Sir,—I am directed by Mr. Gladstone to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th inst., which he has read with attention. Mr. Gladstone has every confidence in the motive which dictated it, but does not consider that Her Majesty's Government would be responsible for allowing persona, of whose future obedience they have no assurance whatever, to remain in the midst of the community whom they had sought, and probably would seek again, to disturb.
  "I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
  "J. G. Moylan, Esq. ALGERNON WEST."
  Therefore, as to there being an absence of danger, as far as the character of the persons released is concerned, we have the authority of the Prime Minister that they are dangerous persons, and that the Government had no information which could lead them to believe in their future obedience to the law. But where were these men sent? They were sent to the United States. You remember the history of the Fenian insurrection, and I ask, where was our greatest danger to be looked for? It was not so much in this country, because here these persons were under the control of the law; but the place which was the greatest source of danger was to be found across the Atlantic, where Irishmen, as the centres of the movement, were conducting machinery which was developing itself in Ireland. Therefore, as regards the persons released, I do not think it can be said that they were set at liberty because no danger could be apprehended from them. I do not go into the mode and form of their release. The noble Earl who spoke first (Earl Grey) has reminded your Lordships, with great justice, that if the prisoners were to have their release they could hardly have had it in a more inconvenient and unhappy way. They were released and sent out in a body to that place where

  1625
  it was known they had thousands and hundreds of thousands of sympathizers. They were sent out in a sort of state, and it was the mere accident of the delay of a week which prevented the occurrence of their being in the same ship which carried out the noble Earl the President of the Council, and the other Commissioners; in which case—if he had found himself along with those gentlemen in the steamer which carried them across the Atlantic—one reception at Washington and one triumphant meeting at Brooklyn would have sufficed. As to the danger to the country, let me ask your Lordships to go back a few months, because here, again, I do not want any further information than that which I have from the Prime Minister himself. Exactly 12 months ago, the Government introduced into the House of Commons a measure for the better preservation of the peace in Ireland, on the ground of the state of three counties—Meath, Westmeath, and Mayo—not, observe, their state as regarded Fenianism, but with respect to the Riband conspiracy, which the noble Lord who has preceded me has said is so entirely distinct from Fenianism. It was upon the ground of the Riband conspiracy in these three counties that the Peace Preservation Bill was brought in. And I remember that when it was suggested that the county of Tipperary was not in a healthy condition, the Chief Secretary said he only sought for powers on the ground of the state of those three particular counties. I may remind your Lordships that we have heard of three counties being now in a similar condition as regards the prevalence of the Riband conspiracy. Mayo has been dropped out, but King's County has been put in. But, passing by that, what was the statement of the Prime Minister? On the same night that the Peace Preservation Bill was brought into the House of Commons, Mr. Gladstone had to answer the application which was then made for the release of the Fenian prisoners, and he said—
  "The hon. Member asks whether we think the time has now come when the amnesty which was partially conceded not by an arbitrary choice, but upon particular grounds of selection, somewhat more than 12 months ago, may be extended to the whole of the political prisoners taken up in Ireland. I am sorry to say that my answer must be most repugnant to my inclination; but, at the same time, most imperatively imposed by duty. I
  1626
  must point to the state of Ireland, where we are engaged in what I hope is materially and morally important remedial legislation, but are compelled to interrupt this beneficent, and, at all events, well-intended process, by a Motion which will presently be submitted by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Chichester Fortescue) for special powers with a view to the security of life and property in Ireland. I do not think it would be possible for us to announce in this House, or to hold out elsewhere, any hope whatever that it would be consistent with our duty to open the doors of the prison on behalf of those prisoners, until we can see a different and better state of things in Ireland. … . It would be cruel to encourage the friends of these prisoners to cherish any hopes whatever with regard to their release, until we are able to see a state of things in Ireland when Her Majesty's peaceable and well-conducted subjects may be enabled to pursue the ordinary avocations of life with that degree of comfort and confidence which is the best test and criterion of a civilized and a Christian country."—[3 Hansard, cc. 80.]
  This was 12 months ago, at the time when the only disturbed districts of Ireland were said to be the three counties I have mentioned, and the only disturbance complained of was their connection with the Riband conspiracy. I ask your Lordships—What is the difference between the danger that now prevails and that which prevailed 12 months ago? What is the state of things in Ireland now? I am sure your Lordships were pleased to be told in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech that the state of Ireland was peaceful and satisfactory, and that if there was an exception to that general condition, it was a spot so isolated that—we might gather from the tone of the Speech—it was scarcely worth referring to. We were told that all Ireland needed was repose, and that no measure was intended to be brought forward regarding Ireland which could provoke controversy or animosity. Unfortunately, we have received very different information since that Speech was pronounced in this House. I do not intend to enter into any statistical examination of the number of offences in Ireland; neither do I wish to enter into any controversy as to the effect that may be expected from the legislation of the last two years. The noble Lord (Lord Dufferin) said what was very fair when he remarked that even those who were opposed to these measures must admit that the time had hardly come for us to judge of what their operation would be. He also said they had succeeded beyond his expectations. But when I remember that the noble Lord told us last year, in

  1627
  words of great eloquence and solemnity, that he expected the reverse from the passing of the Land Bill, I do not think the success beyond his expectations manifests, on the whole, a great result from that measure.
  LORD DUFFERIN: I beg pardon for interrupting my noble and learned Friend, but I must emphatically say that was not the effect of my speech. If my noble and learned Friend did not hear my remarks, I will send him a copy of my speech.
  LORD CAIRNS: My noble Friend need not send me a copy of his speech, for I heard it with the greatest pleasure. I do not pretend to remember or to quote the words; but it certainly left in my mind the impression that the noble Lord performed somewhat the reverse of the part of the prophet in the Old Testament—he was brought to bless the Bill, but he ended by cursing it altogether. However, I will not go into that which is debateable ground, nor will I occupy time in canvassing the two reasons which the noble Lord assigned in proof of the improved condition of Ireland at the present day. Those two proofs seemed to me to be singular ones. The first was that the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland was able to spend the greater part of his time in London; the second was that the Government intends to call out the Militia regiments in Ireland. The first is, no doubt, a matter of fact; the other is only the intention of the Government, and we shall be better able to judge of that by its result, whatever that may be. I will turn to things as to which there can be no dispute, and which cannot give rise to controversy. But before I do so, allow me to ask your Lordships to bear in mind two reflections with regard to the condition of Ireland, which all who are acquainted with that country will know to be well-founded. In the first place, mere numerical calculations as to the number of crimes in particular districts of Ireland are by no means a complete test, but are very frequently an entirely fallacious one of the state of the country. If it be the case, as the Government have announced, that there is a conspiracy in a particular district of Ireland affecting life and property—a conspiracy against law and order, and one which seeks to substitute rules of its own for the laws
  1628
  of the country—the absence of crime in that district may indicate nothing but the complete and perfect triumph of the conspiracy. It is when a conspiracy seeking to assert its own rules, comes into collision with those who have not succumbed to its power, and when the latter appeal to and insist upon the law of the country that crimes occur; and, therefore, crime is or may be a proof that the conspiracy is not so triumphant as it would be if no crime occurred. Another observation to be borne in mind is this—very great emphasis is laid by Members of the Government upon the isolated spots in Ireland where they think the conspiracy exists. I do not think a greater mistake can be made. The Riband conspiracy is not a local organization—it is general throughout the country — it crops out and makes itself known for particular reasons in this place or that; but those who are acquainted with Ireland know perfectly well that almost as a universal rule the perpetrators of Riband outrages are not persons who live on the spot where the outrage occurs, but are brought from a distance, and that circumstance shows that the conspiracy has ramifications throughout the country and has the command of agents in all parts. What is the state of the country? I will refer shortly to the state of Westmeath—but I am greatly afraid that it is not by any means in Westmeath and Meath and King's County only that outrages are occurring. What do we read in the newspapers? I find that on Tuesday night, in Tipperary, five men attacked the house of Mr. Howes, a resident in the district, and fired five or six shots into the house, fortunately without injuring any of the inmates. The next day, in Donegal, a steward was shot dead. Only the other evening the President of the Board of Trade, till recently Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, stated officially that Ireland never was more contented, never more tranquil than at the present moment. But at the very time that he was speaking, the house of a tenant of one of your Lordships in the County Clare was attacked by an armed party. Fortunately they did not succeed in committing murder. But in the County Limerick, at the same hour, the steward of Mr. Conyers was shot dead. This was at 7 o'clock in the evening — the very moment that the

  1629
  President of the Board of Trade was speaking in the House of Commons. Let me refer to the County Mayo. I do not know whether your Lordships read in the newspapers the history of what oc-occurred in that county; but I confess it impressed my mind with deeper feelings of pain than anything else which I have perused with regard to the state of Ireland for many months. At Foxford, in the county of Mayo, there was a man whose name was Davis; he seems to have been a respectable peasant, having a servant in his house, and living with his wife and children. It was night time, and he was in bed; his wife was sitting by the bedside nursing a child. A shot was fired through the window which fatally wounded him in bed; he raised himself up and showed his wife that he was shot, and she was so paralyzed with fear, that she was unable to give the alarm till next morning. After a couple of days the poor man died, and a coroner's inquest was held. I will read to your Lordships what we find as to the proceedings in the leading London newspaper—
  "Sixteen of the jury returned a verdict that the deceased was killed by the accidental discharge of his own gun. There were joyous demonstrations in Foxford when the verdict became known, and it is stated that some friends of the man who was shot were warned to return home as quickly as possible, as violence was apprehended from the populace. Satisfaction is felt in the district at the verdict. Had it been one of wilful murder, as was expected, a tax would have been levied to compensate the family of the deceased."
  What do your Lordships suppose was the evidence on which the jury proceeded? There was the evidence of the wife, who stated that she was in the room when her husband was shot; the evidence of the servant, who, hearing the shot, ran into the room and saw the window broken, which had not been broken before, through which the shot had entered; there was the evidence of a man who had been getting water from a well outside the house, who heard the shot and saw two men running rapidly away, men whom, of course, he did not know; and there was the evidence of the constable of police, who had found broken pieces of metal and glass scattered about the bed, who also found the gun of the deceased standing in its accustomed place, without any symptom of its having been discharged, and who, in fact, drew the charge from the gun upon the day of the
  1630
  inquest, and stated that he believed the gun to be at the time in exactly the same condition as it was on the night of the murder. Upon that evidence I blush to say that 16 men, with the widow and orphans before them, found that this man had come to his death by the accidental discharge of his own gun, lest the neighbourhood should have to compensate the orphans and the widow. That, be it observed, is away from the disturbed and disaffected part of the country; that is in the peaceable and calm and well-regulated part of Ireland. These things are done in the green tree; now let us see what is done in the dry. What does the Chief Justice Monaghan say at the assizes which are now going on in the county Westmeath? These are his words—
  "I feel it my duty to say, looking over the returns which have been furnished to me by the constabulary of the county, that the county is in that state that must be a source of annoyance and grief to everybody interested in its welfare. When I was last here it was in an unpleasant state; but I indulged in the hope that things would mend. I find now, on the contrary, things have got from bad to worse, and the very deplorable state the county is in it is almost impossible to conceive or to describe. One cannot wonder that it has engaged the attention of Her Majesty's Government, and I can only trust and hope that the proceedings that are now being taken in Parliament will result in devising measures that will be productive of improvement, and will afford some safety to the inhabitants of this county. In the list that is before me I find that in the months of November and December last two men were shot. One of the name of Dowling was shot, and died immediately from the results of the wound. A man named Waters, a police constable, was also shot. Another man of the name of Heney or Hyney was wounded and assaulted, which terminated with his death."
  Then the Chief Justice goes on to describe other offences, which had not terminated fatally, but offences committed in the light of day, witnessed by scores of persons, without anyone being brought to justice for those crimes. I will pass from the Chief Justice, who, no doubt, was shocked by the state in which he found the county, and I will take the evidence of the Roman Catholic Bishop, who, from living in the county, is intimately acquainted with all the people. And what does Dr. Nulty say. He says—
  "Every man now fears that scores of assassins are secretly and stealthily lurking about in the very midst of us. The mystery in which they have shrouded themselves, and with which they have hitherto successfully concealed themselves,

  1631
  has spread terror and alarm among all classes of society. Every man is in terror for his life, and trembles for his safety."
  And then the Roman Catholic Bishop goes on to say—what hardly shows a grateful spirit on the part of one in his position—that he thinks the Government a very weak and pusillanimous Government. Bad, however, as the state of the country is, according to the language of the Chief Justice in his Charge to the grand jury, I am sorry to say that the result of the assizes just held in that county seems to be even more alarming. For what do we find? I have taken four cases almost at random, and they show it to be utterly impossible to obtain a conviction in the district. Four men were indicted for attacking a corn mill, and assaulting a man who had taken a situation from which another had been dismissed. The prosecutor had identified all the prisoners at the petty sessions; but, when confronted with them at the assizes, said he did not know them, and they had to be discharged. A much worse case, I think, was one which your Lordships may have observed—that of Constable Supple, whom a man named Bray had tried to murder. The case proved to demonstration was this—Constable Supple was standing outside his barracks, beside the yard of the chapel, there being a wall between: a man fired at him from over the wall. Though wounded the constable was able to jump over the wall, and saw Bray making off. Bray again fired, but missed him; and the constable grappled with him, wrested the revolver from him, and threw him down. While struggling on the ground Bray pulled out another pistol and snapped it in his face, but it did not explode: the struggle continued for some time, and ultimately, the constable becoming exhausted, Bray got away—but I think it was one of the most manly endeavours to arrest a criminal that I ever heard of. But now observe. Bray was no stranger to the constable, who swore to him positively, and had known him for five years; they were face to face, at one time their faces almost touching each other, and he had seized him by the hair of his head. There was not the slightest doubt that he was the man who had tried to murder him. Not only that, but a labourer of Bray's had left Bray standing in the chapel yard shortly before the time of this oc-
  1632
  currence. An attempt was made to prove an alibi; but it was no alibi at all. Somebody came forward, and said that they had seen Bray about the time of the attack, but not at any very great distance from the place. Moreover, the person had neither clock nor watch to tell him the time. The Judge evidently disregarded his evidence; nevertheless, the jury, after a few minutes deliberation, acquitted the prisoner. In the next case, in which a man was charged with breaking into a house and assaulting the inmates, an alibi was set up and the jury returned a verdict of "Not Guilty." And then occurs this remarkable circumstance — the Chief Justice cautioned the prisoner to be more careful in future, as the great probability was that if tried again he would not escape. In the case of Robert Black, who was indicted for firing at Mr. Blagrove, with intent to murder him, the jury disagreed. The prosecutor swore positively as to the identity of the prisoner, whose father held a farm from which he had been evicted. These cases, I contend, show a state of things which is even worse than that which would exist if those prisoners had not been apprehended at all. It is deplorable if, when they commit crimes, they cannot be arrested; but I believe it would be better for ten criminals to escape in that way than for one man, duly arrested and having had the crime clearly brought home to him, to escape either through sympathy or through fear on the part of the jurors. And this, my Lords, leads me to ask why the powers which were entrusted to the Government last year have not been exercised with regard to offences of this kind? One power, and a very valuable one, which was given them was to remove particular trials from the county which was the scene of the offence and to have the cases tried elsewhere. I want to know why the Government did not remove those trials to Dublin, where a proper jury might have been obtained, free from feelings, on the one hand, of sympathy, or, on the other, of fear. I venture to think the Government, from that point of view, have been chargeable with very great neglect in the manner in which these prosecutions have been conducted; and I therefore am justified in asking the Government what it is they now propose to do? From the records of the other House of Parliament,

  1633
  we are given to understand that a Committee has been appointed on the subject of the Riband conspiracy in a particular district in Ireland. I will not enter into what those same records tell us of the alterations which from time to time have been made in the proposals of that Committee—how it was at first to have been a Secret Committee, and to have suggested the best mode of remedying the condition of that country; those parts of the Motion, wisely or unwisely, have dropped out, and I will not discuss a matter which is more properly for the other House of Parliament. But now we understand that the matter is reduced simply to this—that a Committee of the other House has been appointed to inquire into the condition of this disturbed district of Ireland. Is that, I will ask, to be a substitute for legislation, or a prelude to legislation; or is it to supersede all legislation on the subject? Here is the view taken by a Member of the Government, who ought to be well informed on the subject—I mean the late Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, who is now President of the Board of Trade. Mr. Chichester Fortescue says—
  "It is perfectly well known in Ireland that we have succeeded beyond expectation, and almost beyond hope in improving the condition of the country, and that at no time within memory has Ireland been so prosperous, so calm ["Oh, oh!"]—I know what I am speaking of—I repeat, so prosperous, so calm, so confident of the future, so contented, so loyal as she is at the present moment."—[3 Hansard, cciv. 1020.]
  No qualification, you will observe. The right hon. Gentleman went on—
  "Although I readily admit that the information so to be obtained will be of value to the Government, still I believe it will be of equal value to the House as enabling them to ascertain beyond dispute the facts and causes of this want of success, which, as I have said, has been limited and exceptional."—[Ibid. 1021.]
  Therefore, according to him, the object of the inquiry is to show that although the Government have failed in their legislation with regard to Ireland, yet their failure has been most exceptional. And now let me direct your Lordships' attention to the opinions expressed by a legal Member of the Government. What does the Solicitor General for Ireland say?—
  "I do say that it would afford to me, and that it would afford to Her Majesty's Government, the greatest satisfaction if, as the result of the labours of the Committee, it should clearly appear that Westmeath may be safely left to the
  1634
  operation of the law as now existing. … When the facts are reported to the House, and the House and the Government have seen and considered them, whatever the Committee may then reoommend—even if it should be legislation of the most penal character, or no legislation at all—the Government will bring an unbiassed judgment to bear upon the question, and will deal with it as they have dealt with all measures relating to Ireland, from a broad and statesmanlike point of view. And if it should be shown that no necessity for exceptional legislation exists, no one will be more gratified than the Members of Her Majesty's Government. They will rejoice if Westmeath can be safely left to yield to the same healing influences that have made themselves felt in all other parts of Ireland."—[Ibid. 1241–3.]
  Well, judging from these declarations alone, I should have supposed that the Government were quite at sea; that they were equally prepared for legislation or no legislation; and that they had no opinion as to what the legislation ought to be; but I am bound to say that the expressions which fell from two other Members of Her Majesty's Government were more satisfactory. The present Chief Secretary for Ireland, after referring to his "painful dismay" at being obliged to introduce the subject, went on to say—
  "Now, if this state of things really exists—and it can be too readily proved—the Government say, and I say to the House, that it is an intolerable state of things. The Government are prepared to admit it, and we say that we are determined to apply to the House for a remedy. … We have no desire to ask the Committee to suggest a remedy. Upon the facts so established, as I believe they would be before a Committee, the Government will be prepared, as I have said before, to legislate. The Government think the state of things intolerable, and a remedy they are determined to find, if not within, then without, the ordinary limits of the Constitution."—[Ibid. 995–8.]
  That is a declaration of the most explicit kind on the part of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and I have not a word to say against it. Neither is there much exception to be taken to the view of the Prime Minister, who says—
  "I, for one, am not prepared to allow, and my Colleagues have at no time asserted, that the state of Westmeath at this moment, taken all in all, is worse than it has been in any former years. We do not found ourselves on that allegation. I will not, even for myself, presume to say that it is worse than it was 12 months ago. But we do say that the state of Ireland, and of the Government of Ireland, is, and has been—I am speaking of the Executive Government—necessarily in many respects defective and even deplorable. The Government have been obliged to wink at a state of crime or intimidation which, in well-governed countries, is intolerable. … It is not so much because we assert that the state of Westmeath is now worse than in former times that we propose a Committee

  1635
  of Inquiry; but it is because we think that the state of Westmeath is a disgrace to a civilized country, that we are of opinion its condition demands the attention of Parliament. … . But, independently of that, there is another matter which we should wish to examine by aid of the Committee, and that is, how have the Government used the powers given them under the Peace Preservation Act? Seeing that Parliament last year entrusted us with large stringent powers, and seeing that we declare that still more stringent powers are required in reference to the state of Westmeath, is it not right that the House of Commons should inquire whether or not we have neglected properly to use the powers given us?"—[Ibid. 1192–4.]
  From these declarations I gather the following conclusions:—that the Government find in Ireland a state of things which is described as intolerable; that the Government are obliged to wink at a system of crime and intimidation; and that they may, perhaps, ask Parliament for further and more stringent powers. But when are they going to do that? Do they mean to wait for the termination of the inquiry by the Committee? And what is the Committee to do? Is it to take evidence? Why, whatever evidence can be procured from members of the police, from magistrates, and from civilians who are in office the Government are already possessed of. They have at the present moment the means of examining all the evidence which from these sources can be obtained. Besides, the Government in Dublin Castle possesses secret information which they could not disclose, and which it would be their duty not to disclose to a Committee of the House of Commons, for the simple reason that the disclosures of the information would defeat the object for which it was given. Under the Act passed last year, and by means of the stipendiary magistrates, the Government possess powers more stringent than was ever before given to the Executive in this country. When an outrage occurs, and even before anyone is accused, the magistrates are empowered to summon any or every person in their district, to examine such person or persons on oath with reference to all subjects connected with the outrage, and to commit them to prison if they refuse to answer. These are powers which a Committee of the House of Commons cannot have; and, therefore, for the Government to say that they are waiting to obtain information is to make a suggestion which will not bear examination for a single mo-
  1636
  ment. Is it an answer to people who reside in these unfortunate districts, and who are in the state which Dr. Nulty and the Government describe, to say—"You must wait one, two, or three months, or perhaps till nearly the end of the Session, before we can venture to propose any legislation to Parliament?" Then it must be borne in mind that there are some Members of Parliament who do not think any legislation of this kind is necessary, and they, of course, will endeavour to prolong the investigation. Therefore the Government will be confronted with a rival movement in the Committee, which will lead to a prolonged inquiry, with a view to procure evidence which, after all, the Government does not want. I have now to ask your Lordships to consider the effect upon this Riband conspiracy and on the disturbances in this particular part of the country, of the doctrine which the Government has manifested by the release of the Fenian prisoners. We have heard a great deal to-night of the distinction between Fenianism and Ribandism. Well, I have no doubt there is a difference in the details of organization; but both Fenianism and Ribandism are organizations having for their object the overthrow of our rule and of our laws, and the substitution for them of the laws and rule of the organization itself. I have often heard it said that the two cannot be the same, because when Fenianism prevails Ribandism droops down to a minimum. I have no doubt of the fact; but I take it to be a proof that the two societies are cognate and allied. Fenianism is the larger organization of the two, and when it is in the ascendant Ribandism falls into abeyance, as it were; but only to be resuscitated and to rise in fuller vigour again after Fenianism has disappeared. Lord Hartington said in the speech to which I have referred that the origin of Ribandism was political, and Dr. Nulty said very much the same thing. The original object of the organization was to bring about a change in laws considered at the time to be injurious to Ireland. Now, if this were its original character, remember what a tendency there is in Ireland always to elevate crime into politics, and to convert every criminal, if possible, into a political martyr. The other day I noticed a statement that when one of the released Fenian prisoners was bidding

  1637
  farewell to his friends at Cork, he said—"I am going to America, but I have one consolation. The Prime Minister has admitted that all the good legislation for Ireland is owing to the Fenians." I do not know whether he was referring to any particular expression of the Prime Minister, or to the current of the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman—but the observation is important as showing the way in which people in Ireland reason in these matters. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) spoke of the "National Party"—God forbid I should suggest that the National Party are Fenians; but what I would call attention to is this—that crime is committed in order to attain a political object, and in that way it becomes a political crime. It seems to be assumed that if a political criminal becomes a political prisoner, he must be treated, as the Fenians were, with the utmost consideration. Hence these men say "Let us take the strongest steps we can to oppose English rule; our first chance will be the grand jury won't find a true bill; our second chance will be a jury won't agree to convict; if we miss both these chances, we shall be convicted, and we shall become political prisoners. But Mr. Gladstone says we must be treated with the utmost leniency while in prison; and in a short time we shall receive an outfit, and, with a supply of money in our pockets, we shall be put on board, a first-class steamer and sent to the United States, where we shall be received with acclamations by the populace, thanked by the House of Representatives, and interviewed by the Press. After all, it is not so bad a career, and we will at once engage in it." I ask the Government, in all sober seriousness, what is the course they mean to take in regard to legislation for these disturbed districts? Parliament is ready to give them all the power they require. I only lament that the power they possess and the power that may be conceded to them may be found to be so much weakened by the acts of the Executive which are the subject of the present notice.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) has undoubtedly evinced the greatest rhetorical talent in passing "from grave to gay, from lively to severe"—by placing in juxtaposition two subjects which are essentially different, with the view of throwing upon the
  1638
  course which has been taken with regard to one set of political prisoners that degree of obloquy which would naturally attach to similar leniency adopted towards those guilty of the crimes instigated by Riband associations. I shall not attempt to rival my noble and learned Friend's humorous description of the voyage of the liberated prisoners to America, in a steamer possibly conveying one of Her Majesty's Ministers, for I think the subject is really a very grave one. I entirely sympathize with the feelings of the noble Lord who introduced the subject (Earl Grey)—it deserves the gravest discussion; but the two classes of crimes referred to ought to be entirely separated in argument as they are in fact. No doubt, it was a dexterous move on the part of my noble and learned Friend to tack on to the Motion of the noble Earl a question which intimates a species of connection between Ribandism and Fenianism, which is so wholly imaginary that it could be scarcely attempted otherwise than as a rhetorical juxtaposition: in attempting to connect the two he signally failed. I will advert for a few moments to the release of the Fenian prisoners. My noble and learned Friend, at the outset of his speech, assumed that the Government are on the look-out for a policy, and that they ought to be thankful for any assistance which discussion may afford them, and thereupon my noble and learned Friend himself volunteered argument and evidence on the subject of the Riband conspiracy. It is not difficult to state exactly the course the Government propose to take; indeed, I thought it had been sufficiently expounded in that discussion "elsewhere" from which he made quotations. With regard to Fenianism, the Government found prevailing in Ireland a tranquillity which might be called all but absolute. They found a great improvement in general feeling towards the Union with England and towards the Government, which they attributed to the good impression produced by the legislation of the last two years. But, as stated in the Queen's Speech, there existed in a certain part of Ireland, as there has existed for 40 years, a system of Ribandism that forces itself on the attention of the Government, now that remedial legislation has eliminated discontent, and the exercise of exceptional powers has extinguished Fenianism. Last

  1639
  year separation from this country was advocated by the organs of the Fenians in no measured and gentle terms, and a main object of exceptional legislation was to meet this evil. Incidentally, it would affect other secret societies and other forms of violence besides those of Fenian origin; but these being got rid of, it found there was a remainder of a spirit of insubordination, which has existed for a long time in a particular part of Ireland, and which has not been eradicated. It became the duty of the Government to make full and complete inquiry as to the character of these Riband associations, and to consider the best remedy to be applied. But this is an evil which has existed nearly for a century, and has engaged the attention and foiled the efforts of every successive Administration. Last year large powers were granted to the Irish Executive; but it was found they were not sufficient to deal with this evil—though they bore excellent fruit in that thorough suppression of Fenianism which, no doubt, was mainly due to them. What, then, became the duty of the Government? It is certainly a proper question to ask—Have you used the powers with which the Legislature intrusted you? It is right this question should be answered before new powers are applied for. The Committee to be appointed will very properly inquire whether these powers have been exercised; if so, with what result, and in what respect they have been found deficient. They will also inquire into the extent of the evil, and whether it is limited to a certain district, or whether, as the noble and learned Lord seems to think, we are in error in supposing it is confined within certain limits. The noble and learned Lord has taunted the Government with their original intention of making the Committee a secret one; and with asking for its advice. But he also said that these points had been raised and discussed in the other House. My Lords, they were raised, and the taunt was triumphantly answered by the majority in favour of the appointment of the Committee; by a Resolution conformable to that which was explained to have been from the first the intention. It was not the intention of the Government to ask the Committee for any special directions to govern them with regard to the course of legislation. They ask the Com-
  1640
  mittee to sift to the bottom the existing condition of Ribandism, but they reserve to themselves the full power, immediately when it is thought necessary, and without waiting for further inquiry, if new circumstances should arise to render it necessary, to apply at once to Parliament for measures of a remedial character. We are in no way fettered by the inquiry, and in no way bound to wait for it. On the other hand, assuming the evil to be limited, as we believe it to be, we do not think it right to ask immediately for those measures of which we do not perceive necessity so urgent as to prevent due inquiry. It is probable the result of the inquiry will be that the Government will ask for such powers in excess of those granted on a former occasion as shall, in their judgment, be absolutely necessary to meet the occasion. So far, the Riband question may be considered as being separate from Fenianism and Fenian prisoners. Ribandism is so entirely antagonistic to the principle of Fenianism that my noble and learned Friend's laboured attempt to connect the two was, in the state of facts, an entire failure. It is not only that where Fenianism has prevailed Ribandism has not prevailed; but it is well known that the Riband conspiracy is of a totally different character from Fenianism—not directed to any change in the Government, and not seeking foreign aid to accomplish it, but confined to one special object, an alteration of the law with regard to the occupation of land, which has now become no longer a desire on the part of the large mass of the people of Ireland, who are well content with the measures that have been passed on that subject, but which still remains a fixed idea with those who have been bred up to it from infancy, and who, as members of the Riband association, have taken strong vows and religious obligations of a specific character. Those who belong to the Fenian organization, on the other hand, take no oaths. There is no religious element associated with it. My Lords, I now come to a much graver question—the exercise of the Royal clemency in the case of the Fenian prisoners. My noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) laid down certain principles which are correct as far as they go—that law should be certain, and punishment certain, speedy, and defined. No one will dis-

  1641
  pute these principles; but if they were not modified in practice, their mischievousness would be equally undeniable. The proposition is no doubt true in the abstract, but there is another proposition of equal truth—that punishment should never be excessive, so as to enlist the sympathy of the governed on the side of the offender rather than of the law. That is a principle of human nature which no wise statesmen will forget. Let me point out that, with regard to punishment, you had formerly the system of transportation, which afforded an adequate and far more convenient remedy than imprisonment. When you were driven back on imprisonment, you had to place these men in prison for a certain term of years. You could not sentence them to a life term of imprisonment; but the sentence must be for a considerable number of years. During that period, as years run on, the offence has passed by, the danger has passed by, the public forget all the alarm and distress occasioned by the conspiracy, and the tide of sympathy turns towards the offenders, and their sufferings are more remembered than their crimes—thus showing how essential it is that the prerogative of the Crown should be exercised, even at the risk of their being some outcry on the score of uncertainty of punishment. These persons had been placed in custody, they had been punished, they had suffered, their punishment was definite and certain; but when the tide begins to turn, and when, from the nature of the offence, there is no probability of its repetition, then is the time for exhibiting leniency and relieving them from their imprisonment. My noble and learned Friend asked—What is suffering? Does it consist in being sent out to America with new clothing, with money in pocket—in being made martyrs of, and feted on arrival? But is that, I ask, a fair description of the facts? The crime of which these men were convicted was political. However mischievous, it was not of a sordid character—persons accused of political offences, bad as they may be, and great as the evils they may produce, are generally by comparison men of education, of high moral sensibility, and of good feeling towards those with whom they were not brought into immediate political antagonism. Are these men to be placed in the condition of
  1642
  common felons, thieves and murderers? "Hear!"] The noble Duke cheers; but does he know of any country in the world which, within the last half-century, upholds consistently that doctrine? It has been tried in more countries than one, but abandoned. Austria tried it, and acquired a bad reputation for her treatment of political prisoners; but I am happy to say there is not at the present moment a single political prisoner in Austria. It is, I hold, simply a play upon words to speak of political offences and thefts and murders being placed in the same condition. When, therefore, you have fearlessly punished the political offences, you must take care that the just measure of punishment is not exceeded. This was the principle acted upon in 1849. Again, I say that imprisonment to men of education is a much severer punishment in every way than it is to the common felon, who often finds in prison that regular food and lodging which he never enjoyed when in freedom. The universal instinct of modern civilized nations draws a line of distinction between the two classes of offenders. Do we not all know a case in which an attempt was made to overthrow a great monarchy, and a homicide was committed in the course of it? Failure took place, and the author of the attempt was not executed, but he afterwards escaped, and attained the highest station in his country. His life was justly forfeited, and perhaps no one could have blamed the authorities if they had taken it; but they abstained. If we turn nearer home, I may remind your Lordships that this is not the first Government, or the only one, that has treated Irish political offenders with leniency. The noble Duke who now presides over the fortunes of his party in this House was, I believe, concerned in the liberation of four of the prisoners of 1849; and one of them, named Doran, was, if I am not mistaken, implicated in a homicide.
  LORD CAIRNSsaid, that he had a list of the prisoners, and no charge of felony was associated with Doran's name.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: You had the crime in its worst form in the Manchester case, where an unarmed man was murdered in a cowardly and atrocious manner. The guilty men were justly condemned to death. But, even in that case, processions were formed,

  1643
  and the name of martyr was very liberally applied—a degree of sympathy was excited in favour of the men. It was said you did not do this to get a purse; you did not rob or set fire to a house—you did it for a different purpose, for a public principle, however mistaken you may have been. And there were other persons who, though utterly opposed to Fenianism, and what is called the popular agitation in Ireland, made the conduct of the Government in the Manchester affair a subject of accusation on totally different grounds. To have invested these prisoners with a "sham" glory would have been ten times more mischievous in reproducing their offence than any course that could possibly have been adopted. I submit that we do not act wisely or justly in punishing men of education and refinement, guilty of political offences, beyond a certain stage when sufficient had been done to vindicate the law; and a continuance of the punishment is only calculated to turn the tide of sympathy in their favour, and ultimately to produce a state of feeling in the public mind ten times more mischievous in its effects than any amount of clemency the Government might show to such prisoners. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) said that the Government, before releasing those prisoners, should have exacted a promise from them that they would hereafter bear true allegiance to the Government, and then should have set them free to wander about the country. I think my noble Friend, as a statesman, would hesitate, if in office, to follow such a suggestion as that. If that had been done, instead of the sympathy with these men dying out, as it is now doing, it would have been revived by their reception at demonstrations and public dinners; and, if any one of them had happened to die, his funeral would probably have been attended by a vast mass of people to bear witness to his martyred dignity. It was surely far better to release them, and send them out to a place where any sympathy they might meet with would be very harmless. When the Irish vote ceases to be in question, you will find that these men will sink into the entire obscurity into which the large body of Fenians has sunk in America. The reception given to these men in America has been spoken of as something wholly novel and unprecedented;
  1644
  but at different times many refugees have come to England from other countries in which they might have been executed as rebels, and yet they obtained a hearty welcome here. I recollect that a noble Lord now no more (Lord Dudley Stuart), long the representative of a large metropolitan constituency, took a very active part in presiding over public meetings held to enable some of those refugees to tell their grievances. From Poland, Italy, Spain, France, and other countries political exiles have come to England—their own Governments, in many instances, with a wise clemency, conniving at their escape; and they have often been warmly received. The desire for the liberation of these Fenian prisoners was not, as has been stated, confined to their co-conspirators, but was evinced by persons in every class of society—some of them highly educated, and in a considerable position as to wealth, and who would suffer most severely if any attempt at insurrection were made, as was once anticipated. Men of every class were anxious that these prisoners should not be made martyrs of, but that they should be placed far from Ireland, and not allowed to return there. True wisdom, as my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government said, suggested that we should first seize them, treat them with severity, and make them suffer; and when their suffering has been such as to make the loyal part of the community think that they have endured enongh, then to remove them from the society of those whom they have corrupted, and might again corrupt, to a place where they may be harmless, and where they may also be useful to themselves and their families if they will live a sober life; and thus to make them monuments not of your vindictiveness, but of your clemency, as well as of your justice.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he did not think that justice had been done to the leniency which had been shown to these Fenian prisoners by this country. Last May a complaint was made in the House of Commons that these political prisoners had been improperly and harshly treated. Well, a Commission was appointed, over which the Earl of Devon presided, to inquire into the truth of those complaints; and, after three months' investigation, the Commissioners reported that they had con-

  1645
  sidered everything they could for the good of those prisoners, and all that they could find out in the way of harshness practised towards them was that hot rations had not been invariably issued to them for their Sunday's dinner. The Fenian prisoners should have received not only meat every day, but hot meat every Sunday—and cold rations had been occasionally substituted. The Commissioners also found that the tea supplied to them was not quite so good as it might be; not that the tea was of bad quality, but because it was kept too long in the cauldron before it was used. He believed that many of their Lordships at that moment were in a condition to appreciate the grievance of food being kept a little too long before it was used, and therefore they could sympathize with the Fenian prisoners. On the ground of that cruel treatment some wonderful speeches were made in "another place," exciting the minds of the Irish people on that subject. He wished the Irish people to know—in case there should be anymore Fenian outbreaks, such as an attempt made to blow up Dublin Castle, or any other venial offence—that the guilty persons when imprisoned would be very well treated, and would always have hot roast beef on Sundays.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, in the very few words which I shall address to your Lordships, I hope I shall make the fullest allowance for the difficult position in which those are placed who have to administer affairs in Ireland. I do not complain that they have at all overrated or exaggerated that difficulty. On the contrary, I confess that I should have been very willing if, in the only speech delivered to-night from the Bench opposite, my noble Friend (Lord Dufferin) had recognized more completely than I think he did what I fear is the real gravity of the situation of affairs in that country. My noble Friend said that never was the political tranquillity of Ireland more undisturbed than it is now, that the very idea of a Fenian rising is ridiculous, and that, in fact, all danger and all apprehension on that score are at an end. Well, I should be very glad if I were able to take an equally rose-coloured view of the situation. I quite admit that there have been many times when the anti-English feeling in Ireland was
  1646
  more violent than it is at present, and many times when the surface of society was more disturbed; but I doubt if there ever was any time when that which lies at the bottom of the feeling against England—the desire for a separate nationality—was stronger or more deep-rooted than it is now in Ireland. Unfortunately, you have deprived yourself of the means of knowing what the strength of that feeling really is. The state of the Irish Press became such last year that the Executive had to appeal to Parliament to put upon it a restraint totally at variance with our ordinary practice; but nevertheless necessary under the circumstances. But that is a state of things which cannot last for ever. It is in the nature of the case a temporary expedient, and when it ceases you will have a recurrence of this treasonable writing. It is an inseparable inconvenience of what you have done, that you cannot really gather the state of feeling in Ireland, and you have not sufficient warning of what may occur. I will put it in another manner. Is there a public man in this or the other House of Parliament who would at the present time more than at any other time in the memory of man like to submit to a plébiscite the question whether the two countries should be separated? You know perfectly well you could not do it; you know that the lower classes would vote for separation. And I am sure that feeling would not be confined exclusively to the lower classes. The feeling cannot be ascribed to want of material prosperity, because never has the material condition of Ireland been more satisfactory than it is at present; it cannot be ascribed to a State Church, because that grievance has disappeared; you cannot ascribe it to unjust land laws, because if the laws are unjust in any direction they are certainly not unjust in the way of refusing any reasonable claim made by the tenant. The Legislature, by the Bill of last year, has put an end to every grievance on that score. I am afraid, my Lords, the cause lies deeper, and is one of a more enduring type. We cannot fail to see that ever since 1782—or rather, I should say, ever since the beginning of that movement which culminated in 1782—there has existed in Ireland a belief in an incompatibility of feeling between the two races, which leads the people of Ireland

  1647
  to desire independence. While that feeling exists, and while it is widely felt, I say that, whatever you may have done in the way of relieving the people of burdens, the Irish difficulty still remains, and the Irish problem is still unsolved. Look at the various classes in Ireland, and consider the attitude they bear towards this country. You have, indeed, with you the Protestant clergy; they are wealthy and energetic, but they are not, perhaps, in particular good humour at this moment, or disposed to feel very cordially towards the English Parliament; but, still, their interests are identical with ours, and they will come round in time. You have the Roman Catholic hierarchy, a great social and political power, to which great concessions have been made; but considering that the United Kingdom, of all countries in Europe, most emphatically opposes itself to ecclesiastical pretensions in any form, and insists upon ideas of social organization widely different from what we suppose the Roman Catholic hierarchy to maintain, we cannot look to the representatives of that power for cordial co-operation. I do not mean to say they are, as a body, in favour of separation, or endeavour to promote it by violent means—indeed, I believe they are thoroughly frightened by the power of the Fenian agitation; but I say your relation with them must necessarily be one rather of political calculation than of sympathy. The landlords of Ireland, though by no means satisfied with the measure passed by the British Legislature last year, are, I believe, generally speaking, warm friends to British connection. The middle classes, however, in Ireland, being unhappily, almost everywhere the centre of all political agitation, feel strongly interested in this question of separation, and they are ranked against you. Unhappily, that party in Ireland, which is everywhere the steadiest opponent to all agitation, whether political or religious, is neither numerous nor powerful; and if you come to the peasantry they have only two guides—the one, the priesthood, of whom I have spoken; the other, that Press which you have, at this time, put under restraint, and you know that restraint cannot be permanent. When I look at the situation generally, I see something painfully hostile to this country, and I see mere force on the other side. It is clear, my Lords, that,
  1648
  in the way of political conciliation, there is nothing more to be done—there is no other interest in the sister country to be satisfied. The one thing which so very large a proportion of the Irish people want is, unhappily, the one thing which it is utterly impossible for you to give them. They want nationality; they want, at least, legislative independence. A great deal of that marked hostility to law, traceable in the act of the Ribandman quite as much as in the act of the Fenian, is due not to the feeling that the laws are bad or unjust in themselves, but to the feeling that they are laws made for you and not made for them. If you ask me in what manner this should be met, I would say I see only one way. In the long run—though I admit it is often very long first — men give up schemes and ideas which protracted experience has taught them to be utterly impracticable. If you could once convince the Irish people that they might just as well sigh for the moon as ask for Repeal, then in the course of generations — I can hardly hope for it earlier—that longing might die out. But if you take that line, there should be no mistake either as to the policy or the language you hold. This is not a time, with this feeling to which I have alluded deeply felt and widely spread, when you can afford to allow yourself the gratification of branding those who are styled political offenders by exceptional denunciation. You have but to create in Ireland a feeling, not existing there now I am sorry to say, that rebellion, or attempt at rebellion, is a dangerous game for the individual who plays it, and a grave offence against society. You are dealing with a nation where, as we have had abundant proof, law is not respected, where order is not desired, where human life is not held sacred, and where the general sympathy of the population go with the assassin and not with the law. I say for that very reason, in dealing with these men as a class, you should punish them not in a spirit of undue severity, but certainly not in a spirit of exceptional leniency. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack argued this question at some length, and in the course of his remarks he said—"If you are too severe in your punishment of political offenders, you will defeat your end, because you will create a feeling of sympathy for the offender; whereas

  1649
  by more merciful dealing, you will have public sympathy with you." I accept that argument where it is applicable; but I do not believe it is applicable in a country where, to begin with, all popular sympathy is with the offender. The noble and learned Lord proposed to justify the course pursued by the Government in another way. He told us that when the punishment inflicted had produced a sufficient effect upon the country, the remainder of that punishment might be safely remitted. I take the liberty of dissenting altogether from that view. It is not very wise to say you will punish a man not for what he has done, not in proportion to the magnitude of his offence—but in consideration of the state of feeling which may exist among the people after the sentence has been passed. The noble and learned Lord has expressed sympathy for the political prisoners of foreign countries, and I should be quite prepared to justify such sympathy as a general rule. No doubt some Governments run to excess in dealing with political offenders; but the prisoners with whom the British people have always been so ready to sympathize have been men sentenced, without trial, at the arbitrary will of the Executive, often for acts which we should not regard as offences at all. Now, we have to contend with the feeling that, although the British Government could not, for decency's sake, avoid giving the prisoners some punishment, still they pitied the offenders, and thought them persons deserving of great commiseration, and in whose favour much might be said, that they were persons not so much morally guilty, as that they were persons who had shown their patriotism in an indiscreet and undesirable manner. I know that many persons are inclined to take that view of political offences in general, though, of course, the term "political offences" is a very wide and vague one. Any man who undertakes to subvert a Government by means of armed force contemplates as a matter of course and as a necessary incident to the execution of his plan murder, or many murders, according to the resistance he meets. For my own part, I confess I do not see that the offence of murder is in any way expiated or lessened because the crime is committed in the prosecution of treason. If there is any sympathy at all to be
  1650
  shown, I confess mine would be given to those who are the innocent victims of attempts of this kind. Let us look at the state of things which exists. Take the case of any man who has made himself conspicuous on the loyal side; and in the streets of Cork, or perhaps of Dublin, his life is not worth a week's notice. Putting aside, however, this general question of the degree of demerit belonging to the political offenders, I think there is something peculiarly unfortunate in the circumstances of the release of these men. I have heard many people, on all sides of politics, say that what has been done during the last two years in the way of remedial legislation for Ireland has been done at such a time, under such circumstances, and in such a manner that the universal feeling in that country is that these concessions have been granted not as a matter of justice or policy, but as a matter of fear. The bulk of the Irish people maintain that if it had not been for Fenianism they never would have got rid of the Irish Church Establishment, and that if an agrarian war had not been carried on they never would have had a Land Bill passed. Though we may know perfectly well in our own consciences that the feeling of fear which they impute to us is entirely imaginary, still we cannot deny that there is an amount of plausibility in the statement that neither of these measures would probably have passed, or not so soon, tad it not been for the continual direction of English attention to Irish affairs by the disturbances and disorders that were continually occurring. They argued from these premises—and not without some plausibility. They said—"Let us go on as we have begun; let us keep the game up a little longer; let us wait till we have rendered government in Ireland impossible; we have got a good deal, and by-and-by we shall get the rest." That is the feeling you have to dissipate if you can, and I think you can only do it by making them see that insurrection is regarded by the Legislature of this country as a serious crime, and one which will involve a heavy punishment. I have heard in discussions outside this House reference made to what occurred after the American Civil War. It is said—"Look at what the Americans have done after the gigantic struggle in which they were engaged during four years; they have ended with an almost complete am-

  1651
  nesty." That argument would be good if the cases were parallel to any degree. But in America there had been a gigantic civil war, in which hundreds and thousands of lives had been sacrificed, and the whole country had been desolated. The American Government might very reasonably say that after the punishment which had been inflicted there was not the slightest danger that the attempt would be renewed. But we cannot say that heavy suffering or penalty has been inflicted upon or endured by the Fenian leaders or followers, and we cannot speak so confidently about their not renewing their attempts. As to the reception at Washington I say nothing, because, considering the great honour with which they were treated by our own Government, I do not admit that there is anything unfriendly in the House of Representatives having continued that courtesy and honour to them. In the next place, it is more a matter for them than for anybody else to judge what kind of company it suits them to keep; and if they are willing to give a similar measure of cordiality to the too numerous body of persons who issue from our gaols, they will help us very materially in solving the difficult and perplexing question—"What are we to do with our criminals?" I find no fault; but I regret the act of our Government, because we often see that those who spare themselves the pain of punishing—and pain it is—when punishment is necessary very often undergo it because they have to punish over and over again. I hope, rather than expect, that it will not be so in this case.
  LORD O'HAGAN: My Lords, my only reason for rising to address your Lordships is a supposition that you would naturally expect someone to speak who has a personal acquaintance with the subject which is now under your consideration. The noble Earl who has just spoken (the Earl of Derby) has taken a disheartening view of the condition of Ireland; but to my mind it does not precisely bear upon the question before your Lordships at this moment. With reference to that view I shall only say this—assume that the feeling to which the noble Earl had referred does exist to a large extent in Ireland, the fact is—and I can say it with a perfect knowledge of the evidence—that that feeling which was heretofore exhibited in forms
  1652
  of sedition and violence, now, at least, if it continue to exist, has ceased to wear those forms. What the Government ought to do in the first instance is, I apprehend, to put down all external force, all resistance to the law; and when that has been accomplished, and when, whatever may be their view, the people proceed to assert it constitutionally and within the law, the Government has accomplished that which is much for the benefit of the country. And I say further that, when that has been accomplished, whatever may be your view as to the remaining feeling, which may not be dissipated all at once, you have advanced a great and an important step towards its extinction. And I shall say this only upon this part of the matter, before I approach what seems to me to be the real question in dispute—that it is a very disheartening view of the case to say that you are at the end of your remedial measures—that all the measures you have taken have produced no good result, and that you are to despair of the country with which you are connected. I confess I am of a different view. In 1782, 1798, and at various other periods of Irish history, we have read of Coercion Acts, Special Commissions, and abridgments of the liberty of the subject. Now we have begun to try the remedy of justice. It was time that that beginning should be made. I believe the experiment has actually succeeded as far as it could within the time; and if that experiment succeeds, and if justice is administered to Ireland as it never has been administered before, Irish nature is human nature, and justice will succeed in pacifying Ireland. It is not very long ago since the condition of things which has existed in Ireland prevailed to a more flagrant degree in Canada. You had in Canada those Catholic Bishops with peculiar views; you had Bishops on the other side with their peculiar views also; and you had a divided population in a state of open and flagrant rebellion. The country was dealt with in a certain way which the Imperial Government considered was necessary. Justice was done according to the views of the Canadians, and I believe that England has now no more loyal defenders. I do not see why that which was accomplished in Canada should not be accomplished in Ireland, and I for one do not despair. Let justice

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  be tried, and completely tried, and I believe you will not be sorry for the experiment. There are two points which appear to me to be legitimate subjects of discussion in this House. The first is with reference to the question of the liberation of the political prisoners, and the next is my own convictions as to the condition of Ireland, and as to the measures to which so much reference has been made in the course of this discussion. I differ from my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) as to the identity of Fenianism and Ribandism, because I know historically that the origin of one was wholly different from the origin of the other; and I know practically, from having had the conduct of affairs in Courts of Justice, that the nature and objects of the two organizations are absolutely different. Ribandism originally grew up in Ulster as a form of combination among the Roman Catholics to resist the combination of Orangemen upon the other side.
  LORD CAIRNSwas understood to say that Orangeism was itself an organization of defence.
  LORD O'HAGAN: From that view I venture to differ. But no doubt there were hostile organizations—"Hearts of Oak" and "Hearts of Steel," and a number of other things — previously. Ribandism, however, originated in Ballymena, some time before the commencement of this century. The object of Ribandism is a social object—or, I should rather say, an anti-social object. But it has assumed, as all secret societies will assume, various forms at different times; at one period it has worked as a species of trade union, at another it has taken the form of agrarian combination; it has assumed all sorts of shapes for the purpose of influencing the better classes of society, and accomplishing the purposes of its abettors. Fenianism, on the other hand, is essentially a political combination for political purposes—framed expressly and exclusively for the purpose of separating the two countries, England from Ireland. Anyone familiar with Courts of Justice in Ireland must at once appreciate the difference. You cannot deal with one as you would with the other; you may even put down one without putting down the other. It is no very long time since, in the north of Ireland, in the neighbourhood of Newry, Fenian and Orange lodges actually came
  1654
  into collision, and fought it out like men in the open field. I give that as a matter happening within my own experience, and which I have on the best possible authority. As to the charges brought against the Government with reference to the liberation of the Fenian prisoners, I will not repeat the able and elaborate observations of my noble and learned Friend upon the Woolsack; but this I will say, that I know of no country in which civilized men have dealt with political prisoners, in which it has been found possible to maintain in its integrity and fulness the doctrine that if, on particular occasions, and under special circumstances, you allow a mitigation of punishment, you thereby interfere with the reasonable certainty of punishment. Every case must be dealt with on its own merits; and, in this case, you have to consider whether the Government had sufficient reason for the course which they adopted. Some of these men had undoubtedly been guilty of very grave offences, and of these the worst have not been released; others, who were enthusiasts—["Oh!"]—one or two of them were not I admit; but to the mass I think the term applies—have been liberated. And, although these men were guilty of treason—the highest crime on account of the evils which it brings in its train—they yet were enthusiasts, men who looked only to a political object, and were prepared to sacrifice themselves to its attainment. And when you come to consider this question in connection with their discharge, although they were men who forgot their duty to the Crown—although they forgot the absurdity of opposing and encountering the full power of this mighty Empire, and forgot that, within the Constitution and the law, the people of Ireland have the fullest opportunity of achieving everything which they can legitimately desire—still you must remember that these men had an object which was pure and good to them at the time, and in considering whether they are to be dealt with mercifully or hardly you must take this circumstance into account—otherwise it seems to me that you shock the common feelings of humanity. These people had been convicted in numbers and very heavily punished, and the result was a complete subsidence of seditious organization and a great peace in Ireland at the time.

  1655
  Application was thereupon made to the Government to release these people. The Prime Minister, having at the beginning of last year two measures, admittedly of the highest importance, either in actual operation or in immediate prospect, said—"Let us observe what will occur within the next 12 months, and if during a certain period the condition of the country appears to be peaceable and quiet, I think it will be for the benefit of the country that an act of mercy should accompany the passing of great legislative Acts of such moment to the country." This occurred about April or May last year. Time passed on, and the country undoubtedly got into a better condition. With the exception of the black spot to which reference has been made, Ireland undoubtedly became exceedingly tranquil and quiet. Whatever sentiment may have continued to exist in the country, it undoubtedly did not continue to manifest itself in a seditious form. When that state of things had been brought about the Premier had to consider this question—Had the time arrived when these men might safely and beneficially be discharged? I need not repeat what has been said so often, that what we have done was in accordance with the ordinary custom of different countries of the world; beyond a doubt what has been done in this instance by the Cabinet has been done by France over and over again, by Austria repeatedly, and by America upon a late occasion. I am unable to understand the force of the argument used by the noble Earl who opened the debate (Earl Grey) and of the noble and learned Lord who followed (Lord Cairns) that it is proper to release men who have been engaged in open conflict, slaughtering their fellow-men, and burning and destroying all before them, as men must do who engage in civil war, and yet that it is wholly improper to release men who have committed no acts of open violence, however evil their intentions may have been. That argument does not appear to me to carry much weight or force. What was done in this case was done undoubtedly with the cordial consent and concurrence of the country most to be affected by the step. Beyond all question the policy of the Government in releasing these prisoners from detention was sustained by the great body of the
  1656
  Irish people. Anybody who read the Irish newspapers at the time must know that the step was not condemned by any important section of the Irish people; and that circumstance, which is perfectly and absolutely true, goes far to sustain the view of those who express approval of the conduct of the Government. Taking a low and merely utilitarian view of the matter, what was done was really a relief to Ireland. A nucleus of agitating disturbance had grown up in connection with the amnesty movement, and this was injurious in many ways. No doubt it may be said that what was done was, to some extent, a yielding to pressure; but, taking this step in connection with other matters, we believe that the yielding in this particular has resulted in very great advantage to the maintenance of the public peace. It is easy to say that one ought not to yield under any circumstances to combination or agitation; but when by doing a certain act you have a fair prospect of advancing the peace and prosperity of the country, the mere existence of agitation ought not to restrain you from doing what you would do under other circumstances. To take higher ground—when two great measures were being launched in Ireland, and you desired that they should become practical working measures, was it an undesirable thing to appeal to the generosity of the people, and to show that you were disposed to trust them? I believe that in the appeal to their generosity conveyed in this act of mercy you did a great deal to advance the peaceful solution of those troublesome questions which have formed so great a check upon the progress of the country. Much serious misconception, I think, exists as to the legislation of the last two years, and it is desirable that discussion upon them in this House should be carried on with an entire absence of party feeling. This is a question which ought to be discussed solely on its own merits; for however much the two great measures I have referred to were debated in their passage through Parliament, they have now become accomplished facts and have passed from the region of political discussion. It now becomes the duty of every man, however much he may have formerly battled about those measures, to say that they constitute part of the law of the land, and to endeavour to derive from them

  1657
  the greatest possible advantage to the general community. That, in my judgment, is true statesmanship and true patriotism. This being so, let us consider for a moment what has been said about the effect of those measures of concession. It has been asserted that the Church Bill has produced no effect on Irish crime; but surely it was never intended to operate in that particular way. Again, the Land Bill was never intended to operate upon those who were engaged in committing these offences—it was intended to draw together the farmers and the higher classes, and in that way to operate indirectly upon the lowest class of the community. In Ireland, as in other countries, public opinion descends from above to below; and if you can by such a measure induce habits of peace, order, and respect for law in the middle class you will eventually reduce to order and prosperity that low and debased class of wretches who are now perpetrating outrages in the county of Westmeath. I believe Ireland is in a better condition now than at almost any time within living memory. If you take the judicial statistics, and the charges of the Judges generally at the present Assizes, you will find—although there may be exceptions here and there—the mass of the counties in Ireland are in a healthy and prosperous condition. It was said by my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) that Ribandism is not a local conspiracy; but I must beg to correct him on that point. There was an inquiry instituted in 1852 as to the state of the counties of Armagh, Louth, and Monaghan. These three counties were at that time exclusively the seat of Ribandism in Ireland. But there is no longer any trace of Ribandism there. It passed from county to county, and I believe that at this moment its head-quarters are in Westmeath, and portions of the neighbouring counties. Therefore, though I admit outrages have occurred in certain districts, I deny that there is any such thing as general outrage in Ireland. I will now revert for a moment to the great measures recently passed. First of all I may say that the Church Bill has been an infinitely more successful measure than could have been reasonably anticipated at the time it passed. It was natural to suppose that a sword would have been brought into the country and
  1658
  not peace; but I believe the measure has been accepted by all parties in a spirit of calmness, temperance, dignity, and moderation, and that it will tend to break down the barriers which have too long divided Irishmen. Then the Land Bill, which only came practically into operation in August last, is working fairly and well; and I believe there will be none of the difficulties which were anticipated while the measure was passing through Parliament. We must not, then, despair of Ireland. The country is in a transition state, and whatever may be the issue of the experiment, it is, at all events, worth trying. We are only beginning to make that experiment, and I would appeal to my noble Friend (Earl Grey) not to interrupt the progress which has already commenced. When the people of Ireland are saying that they believe what you have done for them will be of advantage to them, do not let us here or "elsewhere" tell them that it will be of none. I think it is a great duty of legislators, and of those who hold high positions in society, to encourage the peaceful revolution which is being wrought in Ireland. If it be allowed, to proceed — if the people be taught by self-interest to respect the law—you will find them a loyal and a law-respecting people. In modern times loyalty is founded not merely upon sentiment, but upon substance. What makes people loyal is that they will derive advantage and protection from the Government and the institutions under which they live. As sure as you make them believe that they derive these advantages under the existing system, so surely will they cling to that system, and so surely will law prevail and peace exist in Ireland. If that be only done—if the experiment which has been made be allowed to proceed—you may hope to see falsified that prophecy which was recorded by Edmund Spenser long ago—that it seemed as if Ireland had been left by the Almighty to be a secret scourge to this country; you may hope to see the people of Ireland, contented by justice, and by fair and equitable laws, adding greater security to the Throne, and more and more manifesting a disposition to be comprehended in a consolidated British Empire.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: My Lords, I yield to no one in admiring the eloquent speech to which we have just

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  listened; but the noble and learned Lord (Lord O'Hagan), while he began by saying that it was too early to look for beneficial results from recent legislation, closed by attributing to that legislation the condition of Ireland, and by expressing the hope that the experiment just begun would be allowed to proceed. That remark was unnecessary, because no one on this side has manifested any desire to interfere with that experiment, as he calls the passing of the two measures affecting the Church and land. But while the noble and learned Lord anticipated the greatest benefits from the Church Bill and the Land Bill, I, for my part, consider the former a most wanton destruction of the Irish branch of our Church, and the latter, one of the most revolutionary measures ever passed by this or any other Parliament. I listened in vain to the speeches made on the part of the Government for the special reasons which induced them to liberate the Fenian prisoners, and it was not until the Lord Chancellor for Ireland spoke that I learned that their release was a relief to the country, inasmuch as it terminated the agitation which had been got up for their release, and that in yielding to that agitation the Government found themselves extricated from a difficult position. But was it wise to yield, in opposition to the belief entertained that too much concession should not be made to agitation in Ireland? Agitation has taken a very wide range for many years, and I had hoped that we should not have heard agitation adduced on the part of the Government as a reason for releasing Fenian prisoners. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack told us that, as regarded Fenianism, there was absolute tranquillity in Ireland, and that the Government measures which have been passed during the last two years had pacified the country; but other authorities tell us it is too soon to look for the fruits of those measures. To my astonishment the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack credited the Peace Preservation Act of last Session with some share in the extinction of Fenianism; but in introducing the measure in the other House Mr. Chichester Fortescue stated that it was designed to put an end to agrarian outrages in Meath, Westmeath, and Mayo; and the measure was passed through both Houses as one directed against agrarian outrages and
  1660
  not against Fenianism. Attempts have been made to distinguish between what are called political offenders and ordinary criminals. I confess I cannot draw the distinction in these cases. There is a distinction, no doubt; but unfortunately within the last few years there has been a very slight demarcation between political crime and ordinary crime. I am justified in making this remark, when I reflect that the political offenders have not stopped at any crime in order to gain their ends—they have not been deterred from perpetrating some of the most heinous and outrageous crimes. What description of crime do you call shooting the policeman at Manchester? Was that a political or an ordinary crime? No doubt it was murder, but it was in connection with the Fenian conspiracy. What was the crime of attempting to blowup Clerkenwell Prison, and involving in death, or injury, hundreds of persons who had no connection with Fenianism? Was that political or ordinary crime? What was the attempt to seize the arms stored in Chester Castle? What is the shooting of policemen in their barracks? Political and ordinary crime seem to be so mixed up that you cannot distinguish the one from the other. But I will go further and will ask what would have been the condition of Ireland and of this country if the Fenian movement had been successful? Would there not have been bloodshed all over Ireland? Was not its avowed object civil war against law, order, and government? If so, I cannot draw the distinction between political and ordinary crime that has been suggested. I cannot recognize the distinction in the type of one crime from that of another which has been alleged. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack holds that there is tranquillity in Ireland due to the absence of Fenianism; but the First Lord of the Treasury still thinks it may be dangerous. The noble and learned Lord who has just spoken referred to what was said by Mr. Gladstone last Session. I conclude that he referred to an answer given to the late Mr. Moore to the question whether he would grant a general amnesty. The answer has been already quoted to-night, but I will read it again to correct the misapprehension as to what Mr. Gladstone really did say. He said he could not hold out any encouragement to the expectation of the release of the Fenian prisoners until they

  1661
  were able to see a state of things in Ireland when Her Majesty's peaceful and well-conducted subjects might enjoy that degree of comfort and safety which is the best test and criterion of a civilized Christian country. Is that the state of Ireland now? Is that the condition of the "black spot," as the noble and learned Lord described it? Is that the state of Limerick, of Clare, of Tipperary, of Donegal, of Mayo? I apprehend not. Can the description of the right hon. Gentleman apply to a country in which crimes, such as the noble and learned Lord has referred to, can be committed with impunity? The crimes are bad enough, but the inability of the Government to procure any punishment for them is certainly no criterion of a civilized and Christian country. The noble Lord who spoke second (Lord Dufferin) took credit to the Government for calling out the Irish Militia; he stated, with some triumph, that the state of the country was such that the Government were justified in calling out the Militia, which had not been done for some time. Judging from what I have read in the newspapers I could not help feeling some surprise. I observe in the newspapers that in the county of Donegal, when a noble Lord holding a commission in the Militia was doing what he could to assist the recruiting for one of the regiments, which had not been so successful as he wished, he received a letter threatening that he should be shot if he continued his efforts. I do not think that an example of the benefit of calling out the Militia in Ireland. The fact is, the Government have played fast and loose with Ireland. Their system has been one of alternate indulgence and punishment. They first indulged the country with a Church Disestablishment Bill, and then came down to Parliament with the Peace Preservation Bill, which the late Chief Secretary for Ireland described as one of the most severe enactments that has been passed within the memory of man. The Land Bill followed—a measure, as I think, very revolutionary in its character; and having alternately passed these measures of concession and coercion, they now come down to the other House and ask for a Secret Committee of Inquiry into the state of part of Ireland, to know how they may govern it. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack tells us that parts of that proposition have been departed
  1662
  from; but why they have been departed from Her Majesty's Government can alone tell. If Ireland is in the condition described by the Prime Minister, who tells us it is "deplorable"—in the condition described by the Chief Secretary, who tells us it is "intolerable," the Government are bound to come forward with measures of their own, and not fall back on a Committee of the other House. The Government, on this occasion, have endeavoured to answer the speech of the noble Earl on the cross Bench (Earl Grey) with regard to the reasons for releasing the Fenian prisoners; but they have given no answer whatever to the question put by my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns). I wish Government had followed on this occasion of dealing with the "black spot" of Westmeath and the other counties, the doctrine laid down by the noble Earl the Secretary for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) during last Session of Parliament, who, with reference to the Peace Preservation Bill, in the course of a very eloquent speech, used these words—
  "I think the House will admit that there is no duty more specially the province of the responsible Government of the Queen to determine than at what particular period it may be necessary to ask Parliament to pass measures of extraordinary coercion and repression."—[3 Hansard, cc. 817.]
  My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Earl in that. It is the duty of the Government to come forward and ask the House to pass those measures of coercion and repression that may be necessary to meet the present state of things. But I venture to say that the mode in which they have governed Ireland has not been successful. They have released these Fenian prisoners, and have sent them to a country where they can do us more harm than anywhere else. In assuming office the present Government also assumed that they were the only body of Gentlemen capable of dealing with the subject of Ireland. But is their policy one which is likely to succeed with a clever, keen, sharp-witted people like the Irish—they are not so easily deluded. They are taught that they have only to clamour loud enough and long enough to obtain what they desire; and that if, in the pursuit of their object, they should unfortunately wander out of the paths of ordinary crime, and roam into the regions of treason, they will still

  1663
  find themselves sheltered under the paternal shield of a Liberal Government.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: I wish, my Lords, to say a very few words on this occasion. The noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond) has quoted some words of mine—and no doubt he quoted them accurately—with respect to the duty of the Government specially to determine at what period measures of coercion should be introduced into Parliament. Now I entirely adhere to that doctrine, and I believe the Government undertakes entirely the responsibility of determining when such measures should be brought forward; but at the same time they think they have a right to introduce them if they think proper after an inquiry by the other House. That, I apprehend, is not inconsistent with the doctrine I laid down in the extract quoted by the noble Duke. The noble Duke spoke as if the whole of Ireland was in a disturbed state; but I need hardly remind your Lordships that that statement is entirely unsupported by the facts; for the testimony that has been brought forward shows that, with the exception of one county, and two small portions of the adjoining counties, the country is decidedly improved. No doubt agrarian crimes have been committed; but it is not a fair inference to draw from occasional crimes of that kind that the general condition of the country is not improved. Whatever opinion your Lordships may entertain in regard to recent legislation for Ireland, all must admit that it is all important that those measures should have a fair trial; and never was it more important than it is now that you should be able to suppress those peculiar crimes which interfere with the well-working of such a measure as the Land Bill. Nor can anyone deny that such a state of things as now unhappily exists in Westmeath—even although I believe it is not so bad as it has been at some periods of Irish history—is peculiarly dangerous, because it interferes with that on which the future well-being of the country so much depends. What is the situation of Westmeath? It is placed in the very centre of Ireland; and I confess my own fear is that just as a small sore may extend by mortification until it involves the whole body, so the gangrene now prevalent in the county of Westmeath may,
  1664
  if not effectively dealt with, gradually spread into the other parts of the country. I know it may be said—"Then why does the Government not come down to Parliament at once and propose to apply a sufficient remedy to the evil?" Well, last Session we proposed a very severe Act, which was passed; and I am told it has failed in its effect in Westmeath, where the state of intimidation is most complete. It therefore, I think, becomes especially requisite that we should be able to bring forward all the facts, and examine all the evidence on the subject, in order that Parliament, if it should be called upon to adopt such measures as may be necessary, and such measures as, perhaps, were never adopted before, should understand fully the state of things with which it has to deal. I think that a great confusion of ideas exists when it is commonly said, as it is this case, that the Government are called upon to deal with this Riband conspiracy, as they have been called upon to deal with other conspiracies before, by bringing in some such measure as the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act to put it down. Now, in the case of political conspiracies, to which the remedy of a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act has been applied, the Government, being aware that the conspiracy exists, and knowing that it may break out at any moment into rebellion, comes down and asks Parliament immediately to pass a measure to prevent the conspiracy so breaking out into rebellion. But the present is not such a case at all. I regret to say that the malady that now afflicts Westmeath is a chronic one, which has existed for a long course of years. This, therefore, is not a sudden emergency, calling upon us not to allow four-and-twenty hours to pass before we come down to ask for exceptional powers from Parliament; but the evil is one of long standing, and the measures requisite for dealing with it may be such as would have to be continued in force for a considerable length of time.
  LORD STRATHNAIRNwas understood to say that the very first proclamation issued by the Fenians, on the occasion of their rising, declared it to be necessary for the good of Ireland that the Duke of Leinster and the Marquess of Ormonde should be sacrificed and their property confiscated. The noble

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  Lord also related one or two instances which had come under his own observation, while in Ireland, to illustrate the cruelty and the intimidation practised by the Fenians.
  House adjourned at Ten o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.