Sitting of 18 February 1870

MINUTES.
NEW WRITS ISSUED—For Roxburgh County, v. Sir William Scott, baronet, Manor of Northstead; for Maidstone, v. William Lee, esquire, Chiltern Hundreds.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Abyssinian Expedition, appointed and nominated; Poor Law (Scotland), nominated.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Poor Relief (Metropolis) [36]; Railway Travelling* [37].
Second Reading—East India (Laws and Regulations [27].
Committee—Report—Dissolved Districts and Unions* [17].
Third Reading—Provisional Orders Bills (Committees)* [19], and passed.

SOUTH SEA ISLANDERS.—QUESTION.
MR. P. A. TAYLORsaid, he would beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, If he will state what course the Government has taken, or intends to take, in regard to the deportation of South Sea Islanders?
MR. MONSELLsaid, he must remind his hon. Friend, in the first place, that
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a very small proportion of the evils which he wished to remove could be, in any way, attributed to the British colonies. The deportation of which the hon. Gentleman complained was confined chiefly to the Fiji, Samoan, and other islands, and what he had said was confirmed strongly by a charge delivered by the Chief Justice of Sydney, in which he stated that the Government of Queensland had used every endeavour to prevent the evils of deportation. Her Majesty's Government, at the same time, were entirely sensible of their responsibility in this matter. His noble Friend (Earl Granville) had addressed a despatch to the Governor of Queensland, impressing upon him the necessity of controlling in the strictest manner possible all immigration from the South Sea Islands into Queensland, recapitulating the recommendations of the Commission which had sat in Queensland on the Amendment of the Emigration Law, and calling the Governor's attention to the proportion of females to males required to be introduced, and to the necessity of having an emigration agent on board of every ship which brought immigrants from the South Sea Islands. His noble Friend had added that he could not too strongly impress on the Governor the necessity of making such an amendment in the existing Act as would make its working safe, and insure beyond controversy that labourers were not brought into the colony against their will, and that faith should be kept with them as to their agreements. His noble Friend had also transmitted to the Governors of Queensland and the other Australian Colonies the copy of a letter addressed by the Earl of Clarendon to Her Majesty's Consul in Fiji, calling for full and accurate information as to the whole subject, and informing him that any suggestions for placing the trade on a sound footing, or putting an end to it altogether, would be well received by Her Majesty's Government.
MR. P. A. TAYLORsaid, he wished to know whether the regulation as to an emigration agent applied to ships going or returning?
MR. MONSELLsaid, he imagined that the Government agent would be on board ship whether going or returning, but that was a matter entirely within the province of the Government of Queensland.

THE FARMER'S ESTATE SOCIETY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HENLEYsaid, that as the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury had been the Chairman of the Private Bill Committee, to which his Question referred, and as it was upon his strong recommendation that the House passed the Bill, he wished to ask, If he can give, or will endeavour to obtain, for the information of the House, any account of what has been done by "The Farmer's Estate Society," incorporated by an Act passed in 1848, to purchase land in Ireland and resell it on credit, if desired, in small quantities? He had not been able to find in the records of Parliament anything about this society further than that in a year or two afterwards they came to Parliament to borrow some money.
  MR. GLADSTONE: Sir, it is quite true, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, that I was Chairman of the Private Bill Committee with respect to the Farmer's Estate Society, and I am sorry to add that I have quite lost sight of the body on whose proposals we were then employed. But I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman, and I feel obliged to his good memory and discriminating judgment for directing our attention once more to the subject. We will cause particular inquiry to be made in Ireland with respect to the society, and all the information that we can obtain will be laid on the table as soon as we can get it.

UNRESTRICTED COMPETITION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.—QUESTION.
MR. SINCLAIR AYTOUNsaid, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury. Whether he would have any objection to lay upon the Table of the House, before the Motion of the hon. Member for Brighton is debated, Copies of any Treasury Minute that may have been passed on the subject of first appointments to the subordinate offices in the Public Service by unrestricted competition, and of any Correspondence that may have taken place thereon between the Treasury and the Heads of the other Departments?
MR. GLADSTONE: It is quite true, Sir, that the Government are bestowing attention upon this subject, with a view to redeem the pledge given to the House
530
of Commons in the course of the last Session; there has been a Minute of the Treasury circulated on the subject, and certain replies to that Minute have been received; but the Correspondence is incomplete, and I am not sure that the whole of it will be official. All I can say is, that we will give the House the best information in our power when the Correspondence is in a condition to be produced, so as to enable hon. Members to approach the subject with every possible advantage.

TURNPIKE ACCOUNTS.—QUESTION.
MR. HARDCASTLEsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, When the Report and Annual Statement of Turnpike Accounts will be presented to Parliament?
MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, in reply, said, that the Report was presented on the 15th of this month, and was now in the hands of the Queen's Printer; and, in a few days, he hoped it would be in the hands of hon. Members. Owing to the attention lately paid to the subject, and to the exertions of Mr. Harrison, the clerk in charge of this department in the Home Office, the Annual Statement of Accounts had been prepared a fortnight earlier than had ever been the ease before, and he had been able to present it also on the 15th. How soon it would be in the hands of Members depended upon the printer, and he would endeavour to obtain its completion as soon as possible.

ARMY—SOLDIERS AND THE TELEGRAPHS. —QUESTION.
MR. HANBURY TRACYsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is the intention of the Government to utilize the labour of Soldiers during the time of peace in the construction, maintenance, and working of the Telegraph systems of the country; and whether there are any Soldiers at present trained in Telegraphy, whose services might be thus economically employed?
CAPTAIN VIVIANsaid, he was happy to be able to give an answer which he hoped and believed would be entirely satisfactory. About a year ago, when it became evident that the control of the

531
telegraphs of this country would come under Government management, his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War put himself in communication with his noble Friend the Postmaster General, for the purpose of discovering how far military labour could be utilized in the maintenance and working of the telegraph system. It was then arranged that employment for somewhere about 100 would be found under the new system. During the last twelve months, 100 soldiers had been undergoing a course of tuition for the purpose of preparing them to perform the duties of the Telegraph Department, and his right hon. Friend was now in communication with the Postmaster General to learn how many men could be ultimately employed in this work, and on what conditions they were to serve.

SAVINGS BANKS SECURITIES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. SCOURFIELDsaid, he would beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he could cause a Return to be made of the exact amount of loss—if any—sustained by the Exchequer from the sale and purchase of Securities in connection with the Savings Banks since the reduction of the rate of interest to three pounds five shillings per centum?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: There is no objection, Sir, to the production of the Return moved for by my hon. Friend.

  INCOME TAX.—QUESTION.
  MR. WHALLEYsaid, he Mould beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he has any objection to state his intentions with respect to the Income Tax on Trades, Professions, and Employments under Schedule D; and, if not, whether he is prepared to make any; and what, reduction in the assessment of such Tax, and supplying the deficiency by an increase of the Property Tax, in accordance with the numerous Petitions presented to this House to that effect?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he was sorry he must de dine to answer that Question. It was part of a subject connected with the general finance of the year, and he would be happy to state his intention when the proper time came. At present it would be quite premature to do so.

MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER BILL.—QUESTION.
MR. T. COLLINSsaid, he would beg to ask the hon. Member for Marylebono, When he intends to proceed with his Bill for Legalizing Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister?
MR. T. CHAMBERS, in reply, said he did not think that the demand for a debate was in the least unreasonable, and he had no reason to dread the result as regarded cither the debate or the division. In consequence of an appeal made to him the other day on the part of the right hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Walpole) who was absent from the House through domestic affliction, he would postpone the next stage of this Bill till Wednesday, the 27th of April, the first Wednesday after the Recess.

THE RED RIVER SETTLEMENT.

  QUESTION.
  MR. MONSELLsaid, he had an appeal to make to the hon. Member for Falmouth (Mr. R. N. Fowler) who had given notice that on going into Committee of Supply he would put a Question to him respecting the disturbances in this settlement. As negotiations were now going on between the contending parties, which he hoped would soon be brought to a close, he thought it would be injurious to the public interest if there were any discussion at present on the subject. He therefore trusted the hon. Gentleman would postpone his Notice.
  MR. R. N. FOWLERsaid, after the appeal that had been made to him by the right hon. Gentleman he thought it would be wrong on his part to press the Question. He was very glad to hear that negotiations were going on in a satisfactory manner, and he hoped that when the Government saw no objection to the discussion of that question they would afford due facilities for its being brought fully before the House.

SAVINGS BANKS BILL, &c.—QUESTION.
In an answer to a Question from an Hon. MEMBER,
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he would not proceed with it this Bill until it had been placed in the hands of hon. Members. For reason

533
which the House might well imagine, he had not been able to get that Bill forward, and he was afraid all the four Bills were in the same predicament. Therefore, for the convenience of Members, he announced that they would be postponed on Monday night.
MR. CROSSasked when they might expect to have copies of the Savings-Banks Bill in their hands?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: To-morrow morning, he hoped.

O'DONOVAN ROSSA.—QUESTION.
CAPTAIN WHITEsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is true, as reported in the "Freeman's Journal" and other Irish newspapers, that corporal punishment—namely, flogging—has been inflicted on the person of the convict O'Donovan Rossa within the last month; if so, for what offence; and was it inflicted with the sanction of the Home Secretary?
MR. BRUCE: Sir, the Question has been put to me without notice, but I think I may answer with as much certainty as if I had received notice, that not only not within the last month, but at no period has corporal punishment ever been inflicted on the convict O'Donovan Rossa; nor do I believe that he ever received the slightest punishment beyond his ordinary imprisonment since September, 1868.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.—QUESTION.
MR. EYKYNsaid, he would beg to ask Mr. Attorney General, Whether Her Majesty's Government will bring in a Bill for the appointment of a Public Prosecutor in England?
MR. BRUCE, in reply, said, he was afraid he could hold out no prospect that the Government would bring in a Bill on that important subject this Session.

SUPPLY.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICES.

  RESOLUVTION.
  MR. HOLMS, in rising according to Notice, to call the attention of the House
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  to the present position of Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Services said, that, considering the manner in which the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands) had dealt last year with the Diplomatic branch of that subject, his observations would now be mainly directed to the Consular Department. Appreciating very fully the evidence the Government had given of their determination to lay a reforming hand where maladministration or extravagance was found to exist, he trusted that the Committee proposed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would have a far more important result than any that had followed the appointment of previous Committees of Inquiry into that subject. A discussion on the question at present would, he believed, not only lessen the labours of that Committee, but enhance their value. Successive Committees had been appointed, but it was remarkable that there had been no debate on that important Department of the State for more than a quarter of a century, and in point of fact no encouragement had been given to the discussion of the subject. Any remarks which he might make he desired to apply, not to individuals, but to the system. The Consular system as it at present existed was regulated by the action taken by Mr. Canning in 1825. At that period the monopoly of trade in the East so long enjoyed by the Levant Company was transferred from that company to the Government, and at the same time the various Consuls in the Levant were also transferred to the Crown, in whose hands their control and their remuneration had since then remained. At that time Mr. Canning laid down the rule that our Consuls abroad should all be paid direct from the Home Government, and should be non-trading. After a few years' experience it was found that system tended greatly to increase the cost of our Consular Department, and representations were made to the Government to that effect, but it was not till 1833 that any relaxation was made in the rule. The Reformed Parliament then reduced the expense of the Consular Service by from £30,000 to £40,000. The cost of the Service in the year 1834 was £83,300. In 1835 a Committee was appointed to inquire into the state of the Consular Service, and especially into the mode of remunerating

  535
  Consuls abroad, and that Committee unhesitatingly condemned the principle laid down by Mr. Canning, and declared that our Consuls should be permitted, at the discretion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to trade or not to trade. In 1838 the expenditure on this Department remained much as it was in 1834; but the attention of the country from 1838 to 1848 being1 engrossed by the great question of Free Trade and withdrawn from financial economy, the result was an enormous increase in our Miscellaneous Estimates. A Committee was then appointed to inquire into those Estimates, and its attention was naturally drawn to the great increase in the charge for the Consular Service, which in 1848 amounted to £123,000, in addition to which £24,000 was required for the services in China and Japan, making the total cost in that year £147,000. The Committee protested against the increase of £4,200 over the Estimate of the preceding year, and that amount was struck off. They also recommended that when the exigencies of trade called for the establishment of new Consulates, investigation should be made into the existing Consulates, to see whether they did not admit of reduction. In 1850, the Committee appointed upon Official Salaries were able to inquire only into the condition of the Diplomatic Service; but they recommended that in the following year an inquiry should be prosecuted into the Consular Service; and if their recommendation had been attended to by the Foreign Office in regard to the Diplomatic Service a saving to the nation up to this time would have been effected of at least £500,000. In 1857–8 another Committee was appointed to inquire into the Consular Service. He must say that that Committee seemed to have been far more moved by the interest of the Consuls abroad than by that of the taxpayers at home. They, however, made several suggestions, which again received little or no attention. In 1859, another Committee was appointed, which also made some most valuable recommendations, but these, in turn, were treated with very little respect by the Foreign Office. The officials of the Foreign Office showed considerable skill in warding off attacks on the present system of diplomacy, from whatever side they came; and there was not much
  536
  inclination on their part to carry out the improvements recommended by the Committees. The House had acquired abundant information on the subject, and what was now wanted was action. The Committee of 1858 recommended that in future all the fees received by the Consuls should be paid into the Treasury, and that they should instead receive salaries and allowances. In 1858 we paid £15,840 to Consuls in Turkey, and the fees amounted to £8,000 or £10,000 more; but last year there was voted £25,700 by way of salaries, and there was returned to the Treasury on account of fees only £968. In the ease of Bucharest, the Earl of Malmesbury, writing before the salary of the Consul at that place was increased, said that for several years the fees had been £220 a-year. Upon this the salary was raised from £900 to £1,000 a year, and there was besides £300 a-year of allowances; last year, however, there was only 40 s. returned to the Treasury for fees, whilst the allowances voted were £800. In Alexandria the fees had been £1,220, but last year there reached the Treasury only £587; and at Cairo the fees had been £300, whilst the sum paid to the Treasury was but £38. The Consular accounts from many other places indicated a similar extravagance. The Committee, after hearing witness after witness in favour of the plan, recommended that a system of stamps should be adopted, and that the Foreign Office, in conjunction with the Treasury and the Board of Inland Revenue, should devise such a scheme. The scheme, however, never had been devised. It had been found that the present system, as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, was most delusive and unbusinesslike. He would now endeavour to show that the natural and proper position for the Consular Service to occupy was that it should be in close connection with the Board of Trade. If the arrangements of the Consular Service were looked at they would be found to be most unsatisfactory. One set of Consuls corresponded with the Superintendent of Trade, or nearest local authority; another set direct with the Foreign Office; others with the nearest Consul General, Chargé d'affaires, or resident Minister; a fourth set corresponded with the Board of Trade; and he believed that there was a fifth class who did not correspond at all. Ever since

  537
  the passing of the Mercantile Marine Act of 1854 the Board of Trade had to communicate with the Consuls about shipping, but the Board had to send through the Foreign Office, instead of writing direct to the Consuls themselves. Now this circumlocution must cause great waste of time and money, and must necessitate the existence of two staffs of officials, one at Downing Street, and another at the Board of Trade. Before the Committee of 1858 Mr. Hammond stated that the correspondence with the Consuls was chiefly of a commercial character, and that such correspondence was always sent to the Board of Trade, and unless there was some important matter it was sent without his seeing it—what he called important matter related chiefly to shipwrecks. Mr. Ward, who followed him as a witness, said that the proportion of communications that even favoured of a political character was small. From this it seemed clear that the correspondence which went to the Foreign Office should go to the Board of Trade—and, indeed, since the Mercantile Marine Act, certain Consuls, as he had said, must write direct to the Board of Trade. If the exigencies of trade demanded new Consulates, the opinion of the Board of Trade was taken; or if any Consul exceeded his duty, or charged improper fees, recourse was had to the Board of Trade; and, indeed, this Board did everything in reference to Consuls after they were once appointed. It seemed to him that the Board of Trade did all the work, while the Foreign Office had all the patronage of the appointments. While this system remained it would be impossible to have efficient control or proper economy. No doubt the Consuls had political duties; but communications in reference to them could be sent to the Foreign Office, whilst commercial correspondence could go to the Board of Trade. A similar system was already in operation in France, the Netherlands, and the United States. Mr. Ward was of opinion that such a system could be easily carried out here. It would, no doubt, be of great advantage to commerce if Consuls were led to understand that their work should be as little as possible of a political nature. This was the view taken by the Committee of 1857–58, which reported that from the earliest period Consuls had been con-
  538
  nected with trade, and though under particular circumstances some Governments might have found it convenient to invest them with diplomatic functions, the commercial interests of the country required that Consuls should be commercial officers occupied in commercial duties alone. It should be remembered that this country was not now in the same relative position to other countries that it was twenty or thirty years ago. Formerly we were far ahead in respect of trade and commerce, but now other nations were nearly abreast of us. To place Consuls in direct communication with the Board of Trade, and to confine their functions to commerce as much as possible, would be quite in accordance with the principles of unity of administration that the Government were carrying out at the Admiralty and the War Office. The cost of the Consular Service in particular countries bore but little relation to the amount of trade done with those countries. In 1868 the total import and export trade of Great Britain amounted to £402,500,000, and last year there was voted for the Consular Service £243,563. That was after deducting £17,888 for fees returned. Of this amount of trade £247,000,000 was done with seven countries, in which the cost of the Consular Service was £32,500, or two-thirds of the entire trade was done at one-seventh of the entire cost. While in 1854 our trade with China amounted to a little more than £10,000,000, at a cost for our Consular Service of £26,400; in 1807, for a trade of only a little over £19,000,000, we paid nearly £136,000 for Consular Service. Lot those figures be contrasted with our Consular expenditure in the Netherlands, where, for a trade amounting to £10,000,000 more than that with China, we only paid £1,500. The cost of the United States Consular Service in China, with a trade only second to our own, was only about £12,000 per annum. But if the case of China was bad, the case of Siam was far worse. Our trade with Siam had averaged for the last five years £10,500 exports and £12,000 imports—excepting one year, when the amount was greater by £115,000, the value of rice exported in consequence of the famine in India—and the expense of the Consular Service was from £4,000 to £5,000 per annum. But last year, with a trade of £3,072 with that place, we expended

  539
  no less than £3,450, being more than the whole value of our trade with that country. The Service in Tripoli, again, cost us £1,766 last year, although for five years we had not traded with that place to the value of a penny, except in 1867, when we dealt with it to the extent of about £8,000; and it would be found that our Consulates in Morocco stood in a similar position. The Committee of 1859 had recommended that the Consulates in Morocco should be closely watched, and that before any vacancy was filled up inquiries should be made as to whether the expected advantage had been derived from these particular Consulates. But since 1859 all these Consulates had been vacant, and all the vacancies, with the exception of one very insignificant one, had been filled up, although our trade with that country had in no degree increased. The expenses were now nearly £500 more than they amounted to when the Committee made that very proper suggestion. He would next take the case of Greece. We expended upon our Diplomatic and Consular Services in that country about £10,000 per annum, being nearly the one-fourth part of the whole cost of the Civil Service of that kingdom, our Ambassador receiving ten times and one of our Consuls three times the salary of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, in America, with a trade, in 1868, of £66,000,000—nearly double that with any other nation—we only expended £6,500 upon our Consular Service, and this result was chiefly owing to the fact that the American nation conducted its Consular affairs in a practical, business-like, and economical manner. He had it upon authority that the Consular Service in America cost that country nothing at all—that was to say, it paid its own expenses entirely. The number of paid Consuls employed by that nation was 120, but they paid more fees into the Exchequer than sufficed to pay the whole of their salaries. If we were to follow the American example, and pay only 120, as was recommended by the Committee of 1859, we could save at least £100,000 per annum in our Consular Department, while its efficiency would be materially increased, the American Government having 600 representatives throughout the world, whereas we had only 430. Having investigated the subject carefully, and without any preconceived notions, he had
  540
  arrived at the conclusion that the Service would be conducted far more economically and more efficiently if it was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade. He had said nothing if the Diplomatic Service, and for this reason—if the control of the Consular Department was removed from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade the breezes of public opinion would pass through the Foreign Office, and a reform in the Diplomatic Department would become inevitable. He was no advocate for a mean and parsimonious economy, on the contrary, he advocated the liberal payment of our public servants wherever there was work for them; but he was strongly opposed to the maintenance of a whole regiment of paid Consuls, some of whom were entirely useless; and he believed that in many places merchants of high standing would be willing to discharge the light duties attaching to Consulships in consideration merely of the honour of serving Her Majesty. He was afraid that some useless and expensive Consulates were maintained chiefly for the patronage afforded by their existence; no Ministry had yet been proof against the temptation which vacancies presented of offering appointments to their supporters. But surely the time was drawing to an end when an Administration required that sort of support, and the time coming when Governments would feel that they might rest their popularity upon a wider foundation. Not a reform of an abuse was effected without the fact reaching the ears of the people and calling forth their gratitude; and in this way strength and honour would be conferred upon the Minister who effected it. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Resolution.
  MR. EASTWICKrose to second the Motion. In doing so, however, he must be allowed to say that he restricted his support of the Resolutions to the second, and even as to that he must make a limitation. He would limit the transfer to Consulates at ports either on the seacoast or on great navigable rivers. Consulates in the interior of countries were comparatively very few in number, and the officers employed there had, most of them, more or less of political duties to attend to, and on that account, and for other reasons which he should mention presently, he

  541
  thought they ought to be retained under the Foreign Office. He supported the transfer of the other Consulates—that was of the Consular Service properly so called—to the Board of Trade, first, on the grounds of general public convenience and utility, and secondly, because he believed this measure would be advantageous both to the Diplomatic and to the Consular Service, and would render the members of those Services more contented and efficient. It was, of course, supposable that the transfer of a Department from one great office of the State to another, though desirable on public grounds, might be prejudicial to the private interests of the officers of that Department. In making the change now advocated, he imagined there was nothing of that sort to be apprehended, but quite the reverse. He presumed it was for the advantage of the public that a Department should be placed where its work could be done as directly and with as little reference to other offices as possible, because references implied correspondence, and correspondence implied delay. That being so, there was primâ facie evidence, from the nature of their duties, that Consuls ought to be under the Board of Trade. Those duties had been classed in the Report of 1858, on Mr. Murray's plan for the revision of Consular fees, under three heads—the notarial, shipping, and State duties. Now, no one could contend that the Foreign Office had any direct connection with notaries and shipping; but the Board of Trade had. There remained the State duties, and what were they? A long list was given of them, but the words trade, commerce, or shipping, occur in almost every line. The only one of those duties which could possibly be twisted into direct connection with the Foreign Office was thus described—
  "Jealously to guard against any infringement being made in our existing treaties by the authorities of the place to which the Consul is appointed to the prejudice of our trade and navigation."
  But Mr. Hammond stated that the Consul could not make any communication on these matters, or, indeed, on any other matter, to a foreign Government, and could address the local authorities only, and oven with them must avoid all political discussion; and if he could not settle the matter with them à l'amiable he must content himself with reporting what had occurred. His report, then,
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  in such exceptional cases might be a duplicate one, and might be made to the British diplomatic officer at the capital of the foreign Government, and through the Board of Trade to the Foreign Office. But from Lord Clarendon's circular, of the 24th of February, 1857, it would seem to be the duty rather of the Secretary of Legation than of the Consul to report such matters as infringements of treaties. After referring to the Consular Reports as of a local character, the circular went on to say—
  "Her Majesty's diplomatic servants residing at the capital have opportunities of ascertaining the grounds on which legislative interference with the course of trade is resorted to, and the effect which such interference is calculated to have, not only on local or general interests in the countries themselves, but also on the commercial relations of those countries with foreign nations."
  He maintained, then, that nothing in the duties of Consuls made it advisable to continue them under the Foreign Office, but that there was evidence from the nature of those duties that they should be under the Board of Trade. He believed the whole of their work, at least of Consuls at ports, had reference to commercial matters; but, admitting only three-fourths of it to be of such a character, it was quite clear many delays and references would be saved if they were under the Board.
  But there were other and stronger grounds for the transfer. It appeared from the statements of Mr. Hammond himself, in his evidence before the Committee of 1858, that there was a distinct line of demarcation between the Consular and Diplomatic Services. Mr. Hammond said—
  "The Consul cannot communicate directly with the Government of the country in which he resides, unless he is Chargé d'affaires and Consul General (that is, unless he is a diplomatic officer). If a foreign Consul were to address the Secretary of State we should not answer him, but we should answer his Minister. If it happened frequently we should give him a hint that it was not a Consul's business to communicate with us."
  Here, then, the line was distinctly drawn between the two Services, and the reason of this was most judiciously stated by Mr. Hammond, when he said—
  "My opinion is this, that if the Consular Body were to look to diplomatic employment, the tendency would be to make them think political business of morn importance than Consular, and that they would be induced to seek to set a reputation for adroitly managing political questions—and we may guess what that would lead to—instead of confining themselves strictly to Consular duties."

  543
  Unfortunately, since those words were uttered events had happened which rendered it no longer matter of conjecture, but of certainty, what results accrued from a Consular officer, with the best possible intentions no doubt, going out of his province, and proceeding into the interior of the country to which he was accredited, for the purpose of discharging diplomatic functions. The Abyssinian difficulty had cost us a sum which would have defrayed the whole expenditure on the Diplomatic and Consular Services for many years, and was an example of the danger of not keeping the Services separate. This was a case in which the danger had clothed itself with such reality that no one could close his eyes to it. But how often had it happened that the political aspirations of Consuls had brought us to the very verge of war. To use the words of Sir Henry Rawlinson before the Committee of 1858, "the interference of Consuls has become a byword." He (Mr. Eastwick) contended, therefore, that the only way of effectually shutting out those dangers was to relegate the Consuls to those peaceful occupations which were their proper sphere, and make them subordinate to the Board of Trade, which was by its very nature opposed to war. This was the sole means of securing their undivided attention to their proper duties, for if they were placed under the same roof with diplomacy, and if their proceedings were shrouded from publicity by holding over them the impenetrable ægis of the Foreign Office, we should assuredly at no very distant period be suddenly called upon to deal with a fresh brood of troubles hatched in China or Japan, or some other unlooked-for quarter by the warmth of Consular zeal. But supposing the transfer to be made, how would it affect the Diplomatic and Consular Services? He believed the separation would be beneficial to both. Each would become a distinct and independent Service, and would, therefore, be less exposed to invasion by gentlemen brought from other professions. The Diplomatic Service would be especially the gainer by being kept distinct from the Consular, for it was very much owing to the intrusions of Consular officers into the higher ranks of the Diplomatic Service that this latter Service was in its present overcrowded state. It appeared
  544
  that from 1858 to 1868 there had been only twenty vacancies in the rank of Minister or Chargé d'affaires, and seven of those vacancies had been filled up by Consuls. The result was that the senior diplomatic officer in each of the lower grades had been about ten years in his present rank. Consequently, any diplomatic officer entering the service now would, in the ordinary course of things, have to wait more than thirty years before he could be a Minister. Now, when it was considered how far more rapid promotion used to be—that Sir Henry Bulwer and Sir James Hudson were Ministers in twelve years, Sir Hamilton Seymour in seven, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in less than five—it was no wonder that there should be some dissatisfaction felt at the difference. Now, by means of this transfer, the plethora in the Diplomatic Service might, it appeared to him, be removed. The Consuls General in South America, who were really diplomatic officers and Ministers in all but name, might, without any additional expense to the public, except for their pensions on retirement, be raised at once to the rank of Minister. In case of their absence, instead of sending up a Consul from a distant port to act for them, it would be a very beneficial step to provide them with a chancelier or archiviste, who might be an attaché, and in some cases succeed, if his length of service entitled him, to the post upon a vacancy occurring. Consulates in the interior of countries might be held in future by junior officers of the Diplomatic Service, and their direct subordination to the Minister or Ambassador would be a salutary check upon over-zeal. At the same time, in such posts they would discharge duties which would fit them for promotion, and which would be a great deal more interesting than copying despatches at head-quarters. In point of fact, junior diplomatic officers did, as he knew from experience, now often act for Consuls, and he was not aware of any objection to the expransion of such a system. The transfer, therefore, might be made extremely beneficial to the Diplomatic Service, and he thought it would be also beneficial to the Consular Service, particularly if the appointments were thrown open to competition. The standard of examination might be raised very considerably, and at the same time

  545
  a class of men would join the Service who would be content with the certainly very moderate salaries given to Consular officers. There would be a few prizes in the Service, such as the Consul Generalship at Odessa; and if it were found necessary to make the Service more attractive, that could be done, and done, he thought, very properly, by shortening the term of service for pension. It was with these views that he had risen to support the Motion of the hon. Member (Mr. Holms). He looked more to the efficiency of the Services than to economical advantages, and he thought the extreme importance of the duties which both Services had to perform justified this mode of regarding the matter.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the expenditure upon the Diplomatic and Consular Services may be reduced, and it is expedient for the promotion of efficiency and economy to transfer the control of the Consular Department from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade,"—(Mr. Holms,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  MR. R. SHAWsaid, he was of opinion that the best course to pursue would be to refer the whole question to the consideration of a Select Committee, as Her Majesty's Government had proposed to do the other night. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms), however, asserted that the House already possessed sufficient information on the subject, and asked it to pass a Resolution—
  "That it is expedient for the promotion of efficiency and economy to transfer the control of the Consular Department from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade."
  Now, it appeared to him that there were two objections to the course proposed by the hon. Gentleman. If the House adopted the Motion they would be acting most unfairly to Her Majesty's Government, who had evinced, both in the last and the present Session, a disposition to aid the House in obtaining a thorough and complete investigation of the subject, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs having moved on Monday last for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the constitution of the Diplomatic and Consular Departments.
  546
  A still more serious objection might be urged against the Motion, which he could not help thinking asked the House to do too much. It asked them to pass, after a very short debate, and when there was but a small attendance of Members, an abstract Resolution transferring the Consular Department from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade. Now, if the only question respecting the Consular Department were the mere question of transfer he should unhesitatingly say that the House was as competent to deal with it as a Committee upstairs; but there were other matters affecting the Department which also required discussion and investigation. For instance, there was the question as to whether our Consuls should be paid by fees or salaries, or partly by fees and partly by salaries. Again, there was the question whether the present fees as regulated by Act of Parliament were adequate for the services rendered, and whether we ought to adopt to a greater extent the American system, which was self-supporting. There was also the question whether we should allow our Consuls to receive the fees in coin, or substitute the use of stamps. At present we had not the slightest check on the Consular establishments, and it was a remarkable fact that the whole of the Consulate foes returned into the Exchequer were less than £20,000. He was strongly of opinion that the wisest course would be to refer the whole subject to a Committee.
  MR. OTWAYsaid, he must admit the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had with great care collected the materials for his speech, but he could not agree with all the statements it contained. He would remind the House of the course taken by the Government on that question. Towards the close of last Session on the discussion of the Civil Service Estimates, the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands) made a very effective speech, and after a short debate, a division was taken on a Motion made by him for the reduction of the diplomatic expenditure to the amount of £10,000. The opinion of the House was so equally balanced that if it had not been for the judgment of the Chairman, those on whom the responsibility of the expenditure lay would have found themselves in a minority. In consequence of that proceeding the attention of the

  547
  Foreign Department was directed, as indeed it ought to be, to the opinion manifested by the House of Commons; and on that occasion, as representing the Department, he informed the hon. Member for Warrington that the allegations he had made should receive a complete investigation by a Committee to be appointed, for that purpose. The Government, having decided upon that step, thought the best course to pursue was to propose a Committee on their own responsibility. Accordingly, on Monday evening last, a Committee, having power to inquire into all the circumstances just touched upon by hon. Members, was appointed by the House without anyone dissenting from the proposal. He must say, therefore, that if the present Motion required to be made at all, it ought to have been brought forward on that occasion, and not by way of an Amendment to the Motion that the Speaker do leave the Chair. He trusted the hon. Member would not go to a division, but if he should do so those who thought the cost of the Diplomatic Service ought to be reduced, might, without sacrifice of principle, vote against the hon. Member's proposal. When they negatived the Motion of the hon. Member they would not be affirming the negativing of his proposition, but simply that the Speaker should leave the Chair. These were just the very questions that it would be the duty of the Committee to inquire into, and, as he believed that its Members were fully competent to deal with the matter, he would not on this occasion say whether he agreed or whether he disagreed with the hon. Member on the question of expenditure. Upon that branch of the subject he would, however, remark that, whatever opinion the hon. Member might have formed of the extravagant action or intentions of the Foreign Office, it was incontrovertible that the sum expended for Diplomatic salaries and pensions had not increased since the time it was originally fixed—as he believed some thirty or forty years ago. With regard to the Consular expenditure, there had, no doubt, been an increase; but the hon. Member had himself assigned sufficient cause for the increase when he alluded to the vast increase which there had been of late years in the trade of this country. In China and Japan, too, we formerly had no Consuls, and he could not help stating
  548
  that his hon. Friend had upon this matter made use of an argument which was calculated to mislead the House, because his hon. Friend instituted a comparison between our Consular expenditure in China and that of the United States; the United States, as he said, ranking second only to ourselves in the amount of their trade with that country. It was perfectly true that the United States did come next to ourselves, but his hon. Friend ought to have shown the great distance which existed between the respective trades of the two countries with China, and unless he did so his statement was calculated to lead to misconception. An idea that there was a complete difference between Consular and Diplomatic functions appeared to underlie all the arguments used by both his hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Falmouth (Mr. Eastwick) who had followed him; but he would be a clever man who could tell where in the conduct of Consular functions a matter ceased to belong to the province of commerce and to enter that of diplomacy. There was hardly a single question a Consul had to treat that might not become a question of diplomacy. The functions of a Consul in any seaport town were not confined to trade, but extended to many other matters, such, for instance, as the intestacy of British subjects, and if we had our Consuls acting under the Board of Trade, but receiving their instructions from the British Minister, who acted under the Foreign Department alone, the result would inevitably be complications and conflicts of authority, leading frequently to other and considerable evils. And he must say when an hon. Member proposed by an abstract Resolution to make a change of this magnitude he ought to adduce some strong reasons in support of the change. If there had been any complaint of the hindrance to trade from the action of the Foreign Office, the hon. Gentleman might be able to assign some cause for the adoption of the course he suggested; but none had been cited, and, so far as he was aware, none existed. The delay to which his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Eastwick) had alluded had no existence, except in his hon. Friend's imagination. Communications between the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade were constant, and were always personal where the subject required it. He believed that, under these

  549
  circumstances, it would be very unwise and very unusual if the House were, by acceding to his hon. Friend's Motion, to interfere with, the province of a Committee who were appointed to investigate into this and other matters, and respecting whose competence to deal with the question there could be no doubt. He would suggest that the better course would be for his hon. Friend to withdraw his Motion.
  MR. SOMERSET BEAUMONTsaid, he was disposed to agree with the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms), that this was not a subject for a Committee. He had given a good deal of attention to the subject, and he believed that ample materials for legislation on this subject had been collected by former Committees. They had the evidence of that great authority, Mr. Hammond. He could not, however, help feeling that the House, or rather a portion of the House and the country were not always very fair towards the Diplomatic Service, for it was to that Service that the Liberals looked whenever they were in want of a grievance. Our Diplomatic Service was in this position—that it was asked to perform duties which did not require to be performed. He believed, for instance, that if the whole system of diplomacy, as far as Western Europe was concerned, were done away with, and we had no permanent representative at the Courts of Western Europe, our peaceable relations with Continental States would suffer no interruption, and our commercial interests would be as well looked after as they now were. It was not exactly fair to institute comparisons between the Service of this country and that of the United States, because the English Service was a profession while that of the United States was not. In America men were appointed on account of their eminence, generally with every change of Presidents, and not because they had been so long in the Service. If there was any complaint to be made with regard to Diplomacy it was not with reference to our Consular servants abroad, but it arose from a certain helplessness on the part of the Foreign Office to readjust the Diplomatic Service in the country to our changing wants. We kept, for instance, Consuls at many places were they were not required, and appointed none in others where their services would be useful. For instance,
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  we had no Consul at Pesth. He believed, however, in opposition to what had been observed in the course of the debate, that the duties of our Consuls were in many instances more of a political than of a commercial character; and that was so especially in the case of Bucharest, Warsaw, and China. He could not agree with the hon. Member that sufficient reason had been given for putting the Consuls under the Board of Trade rather than the Foreign Office. Under all the circumstances of the case he hoped the hon. Gentleman would not press the Motion to a division, as the discussion which he had raised would be more likely than the appointment of a Committee to lead to practical results.
  MR. KINNAIRDsaid, he hoped his hon. Friend (Mr. Holms) would not be discouraged by the reception which his Motion had met with. His speech was an able one, and no Member could regret that he had ventilated the question. He was not surprised, watching the course of public events, that his hon. Friend had no confidence in Committees, which were too often only made the means of shelving a question. An experience of some years in the House had led him to that conclusion. What really might be of use would be that the question should be thoroughly investigated by responsible officers of the Government. So that while recommending the withdrawal of the Motion, he would urge the Government to give full attention to the subject. His hon. Friend (Mr. Otway) had said that this question would come before a Committee. It had been before a Committee, and he quite admitted that it was not so easy of solution as to be settled by a short debate in that House. For instance, whether Consuls should be paid by fees or by salary had occupied the attention of a Committee for a long time, and he did not think that the Foreign Office had come to any definite conclusion as to which would be most conducive to the interests of the country. Certainly the China and Japan trade had made such advances that it ought to be able to pay the Consular Service out of fees. But, on the other hand, in such a country as Franco, no fees were paid at all. And, again, the payment of fees was a heavy tax, and evidence had been brought before the Committee showing the high fees which our merchant

  551
  service paid, when no fees were paid by the subjects of other countries. He would urge his hon. Friend not to lose sight of this question, but to bring it periodically before the House till a change was made for the better.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

TURNPIKE TOLLS.—RESOLUTION.
MR. WHALLEY, in rising to call attention to the Petition of the Wrexham Highway Board and Board of Guardians against the re-imposition of the Turnpike Toll Tax in that district; and to make a Motion; and, with reference to the statement on the part of the Government touching the necessity that requires the introduction of the annual Continuance Bill, to move for Copy of any Correspondence or other Documents explanatory of the necessity for the annual Continuance Bill, either generally as to all expired Turnpike Acts, or specially as to those relating to the Wrexham district, said, the Government was hardly aware of the way in which the country regarded this question. He earnestly appealed to them to give their serious attention to this subject. Repeated promises had been given by the Government to deal with this question, but they had never been performed. The object of his Motion was to get from the Government some intelligible statement of what they intended to do. There was no reason why four-fifths of the turnpikes in the country should not be abolished. When a new turnpike road was cut, Parliament gave the trustees power to levy tolls for a certain number of years, and at the expiration of that period the tolls ought to cease. The practice, however, had been for years to bring in, at the end of every Session, when there was no possibility of obtaining a discussion, a Bill called the Turnpike Acts Continuance Bill; no one paid any attention to it, and it was regarded, and had boon regarded for many years, as a mere formal renewal of Turnpike Acts that had expired. In that Bill was involved, he ventured to say, a greater breach of faith between Parliament and the public, and a much greater violation of all that was regarded as constitutional in the way of taxation, than in any Bill that had, under any circumstances, ever passed the House. To justify so strong an observation, he
552
would refer to an observation that had been made by the late Sir George Lewis when sitting on that Bench—
"It is true," said Sir George Lewis, "that my countrymen in South Wales did rise, the Rebecca riots did occur, and the turnpike gates were annihilated in defiance of law, and of this Continuance Act. But I say such is the phlegm of this House, such their indifference, such the difficulty in dealing with the question, that I see no other remedy that the public have than that they should in every respect take the law into their own hands as they did in South Wales."
Now, what was the hardship complained of? Simply this—that in the case of at least four-fifths of the existing turnpikes which now taxed every person that travelled the country this taxation was continued in violation of a distinct Parliamentary contract between the public and the persons who had made those roads. The two parties affected were, first, those on whom the tax was levied for the repair of the highways, through the turnpikes becoming highways; and, secondly, those persons who held turnpike bonds. Some turnpikes had no debt upon them, in which case one party only would be affected—namely, those who had to provide by rate for the repair of the roads. He contended that it was clear, with respect to turnpikes which were still burdened with debt, that if there was obligation upon anyone to pay off this debt, but which he did not admit, that the Government, were bound to pay off the debt, and so relieve the public in the several districts of the country from the operation and injustice of the toll tax. With regard to the other party affected—the ratepayers for the repair of the roads—he called the attention of the House to the complaint from the Wrexham Highway Board and the Wrexham Board of Guardians. The Petition, in each of these cases for the abolition of turnpikes, was a unanimous one from the members of the respective Boards; and to the same Petition assent had been received from numerous other Boards throughout the country. He now asked whether it was not high time that some pressure should be brought to bear upon the Government, with a view to the Government taking action in the matter. He had himself from time to time brought in a Bill by which, without presuming absolutely to do away with turnpikes, he proposed to afford facilities for all parties interested in that matter to make arrangements between themselves

553
or to come to that House, as the Wrexham Boards had done, for the abolition of turnpikes. He had, from year to year, withdrawn his Bill upon receiving more or less distinct promises from the Treasury Bench that the subject would be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. He asked what excuse the Government had to offer for the continuance of that most obnoxious of all taxes and most wrongful system. The Under Secretary oft State for the Home Department said the Annual Turnpike Acts Continuance Bills were necessary in order to prevent injustice to individuals; but, having paid much attention to the subject, he was not aware of the slightest injustice to any single person that Mould result from allowing those turnpikes to drop out of existence in accordance with the compact entered into with Parliament. If there were really any cases of injustice, let them be fully stated; and he called on the Under Secretary of State to give some explanation why the Government did not, in compliance with repeated promises, deal with the matter. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Resolution.
MR. OSBORNE MORGAN, in seconding the Motion, said, he hoped the Government would see their way, if not in the present Session, at some early future period, to introduce a measure for doing away altogether with the antiquated turnpike system, than which it would be impossible to devise anything more inconvenient, unequal, or unjust. This was not a mere local question, but was of Imperial magnitude, and should be treated accordingly.
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "there be laid before this House, a Copy of any Correspondence or other Documents explanatory of the necessity for the annual Turnpike Acts Continuance Bill, either generally as to all expired Turnpike Acts, or specially as to those relating to the Wrexham district,"—(Mr. Whalley,)
—instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSENsaid, he was not disposed to underrate the importance of the subject, and as evidence of this he had previously introduced, as an independent Member, two
554
Bills which had for their object the abolition of the turnpike; system; and he still believed that its abolition was simply a question of time, and that the Government would arrive ultimately at a uniform system of road management throughout the country. The House would scarcely expect him at that time, nor would it be right for him, to enter into the question of road management or into the question of turnpikes, and he would therefore simply amplify or render more lucid the answer which he had given a night or two back on the same question. The Petition of the Wrexham Highway Board was somewhat remarkable, because it expressed a desire on the part of the ratepayers to take charge of these roads, whereas the complaint against his proposal in past years was, mainly, that he wished to cast fresh burdens upon the rates. He was glad to hear that the people of North Wales were not showing their animosity against turnpikes after the "Rebecca" fashion, alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman, but that they were now willing to abolish them on the only condition on which they could be abolished—namely, that the expense of maintaining the roads should be defrayed out of the rates. The case of the Wrexham Boards was undoubtedly a hard one, so far as he could ascertain its merits, that district being evidently much oppressed with turnpikes; but his hon. Friend must consider that the Government had to deal, not with any isolated case, or with one isolated trust, but with a great variety of trusts and a large number of cases. The Continuance Bill would not, as the hon. Member had said, apply to four-fifths of the turnpikes of the kingdom, but to one-half of them. His hon. Friend recommended that all these trusts should be abolished. What would happen if they were? These trusts divided themselves into two classes—those in debt and those out of debt. With regard to the trusts out of debt, a Committee of that House was appointed last year, on his (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen's) Motion, to deal with them. The Committee bestowed great attention on the subject, and recommended that some of them, the Acts for which had expired, should be abolished during the present year—and they now stood for abolition—and that some should stand over for a further period and for further considera-

555
tion. That showed the difficulty which existed in the minds of the Committee with regard to trusts out of debt. As to those that were in debt, greater difficulty was presented, for whereas in abolishing any one trust it was constantly found that the co-existence of other trusts—which could not be abolished—side by side with the abolished trust diverted the natural course of traffic, and inflicted an injury upon ratepayers, in the case of trusts still in debt an additional element of confusion was imported in the varying circumstances of the different trusts, and the fluctuating value of the debt, while this sudden abolition would inflict a great hardship upon the bondholders. The question of dealing simultaneously with the turnpike trusts had been deferred from year to year, and with every year as the trusts expired the difficulties in the way of dealing with the subject greatly lessened. He might also add that the question had always been narrowly watched, and that every year since he had the honour of holding the office he now occupied he had been instrumental in abolishing a considerable number of the trusts. His attention would in due course be turned to the case which the hon. Member had brought under their attention; although, he must add that there had been no complaints from the trustees themselves. Any simultaneous abolition that might take place would be fraught with injustice unless it were part of a general measure. With regard to correspondence on the subject of the Continuance Bill, he was not aware that any such existed; but if his hon. Friend would point out any letter or paper in the Home Office which would in any way throw light on the particular case of Wrexham, or which would be conducive to the ultimate settlement of the general question, he was not aware of any objection to the production of such document. With respect to any promise to which the hon. Member had alluded, he wished to observe that neither the Secretary of State for the Home Department nor as far as he was aware anyone connected with the Home Office had ever pledged himself to introduce a Bill on the subject during the present Session. The promise which had been given was that the subject would be fully considered, and if the pressure of business would permit the
556
Government would proceed to legislate upon the matter either during this or in some future Session. It would be a very happy day for him when he could introduce a Bill, with the support of the Government, to settle the road question in a manner satisfactory to the hon. Gentleman and others interested in the subject.
Amendment and Original Question, by leave, withdrawn.
Committee deferred till Monday next.

EAST INDIA (LAWS AND REGULATIONS) BILL.— [BILL 27.]
(Mr. Grant Duff, Mr. Adam.)
EAST INDIA (LAWS AND REGULATIONS) BILL.— [BILL 27.]

  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  MR. GRANT DUFFsaid, that the Bill which he was going to ask the House to read a second time was in its main features an old friend, for it made considerable progress both under the late and the present Government, and it was only stopped by want of time, both in the Session of 1868 and last year. It appeared now in a somewhat modified form, because the Government wished, as far as possible, to meet the views of various hon. Members interested in India, who had communicated with his noble Friend the Secretary of State and with himself about it; and the Government were now extremely anxious that if it were the will of Parliament, it might become law as quickly as possible, because they were being very much pressed from India to have it passed as soon as they could. Its principal objects were four in number—First, to effect a better distribution of business between the Legislative and the Executive Councils of the Governor General; secondly, to raise in an important particular the position of the high officers known as Chief Commissioners; thirdly, to give Parliamentary sanction to a procedure in the Executive Council which had long been customary, but had never been actually prescribed; fourthly, to afford facilities for the admission of native Indian subjects of Her Majesty to posts in their own country which had hitherto been closed to them. The first of these objects was carried out by Clauses 1 and 2, and in order to make their drift intelligible but few words of explanation were necessary. The Governor General

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  was ex officio President of two bodies—first, the Supreme Council, which consisted of himself and six other members, all chosen, like himself, for the express purpose of governing, or assisting to govern, the Indian Empire; and, secondly, a body consisting of this same supreme governing or executive Council, plus not fewer than six nor more than twelve additional members, nominated by the Governor General, for the purpose of constituting his Council for the making of laws and regulations, and commonly known as the Legislative Council of India. This last body was called into existence by Parliament in the year 1861. Its primary object was to enact laws of a general character for the whole of India, and its members were chosen, and are chosen, chiefly for the purpose of bringing as many cross lights of experience as possible to bear upon the great general questions of legislation which affect the whole of India; to take care, for example, that when a Bill is being considered relating to one of the great heads of law, there might be some persons to say, "Such and such provisions which are proposed will not precisely suit the case of this or that great province, or this or that great interest." This, he said, was the primary object of adding to the Executive Council when sitting for the purpose of making laws and regulations from six to twelve nominees of the Governor General, and this primary object had been, on the whole, extremely well fulfilled. They had every reason to be satisfied with the success of this part of the experiment of 1861. Parliament, however, while providing for the general legislation of India, was not unmindful that a great deal of local legislation would be wanted for the various provinces of India; and so it established in Madras and Bombay local Legislative Councils for those Presidencies, formed after the model of the Governor General's Legislative Council, and it enabled the Governor General to call into existence local Legislative Councils for the great provinces of Bengal, of the North-West, and of the Punjaub. The Governor General acted on this authority, and did call into existence a local Legislative Council for Bengal, but no Governor General had yet seen his way to call into existence local Legislative Councils for the North-West Provinces or for the Punjaub. The
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  materials, in fact, for such Councils did not yet exist, and Parliament never gave him power to create local Legislative Councils for Oudh, for the Central Provinces, or for Burmah. One of the consequences of the non-existence of local Legislative Councils for any one of the eight provinces, except Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, was that the unhappy Legislative Council of the Governor General had thrown upon its shoulders, in addition to its own proper work, the whole of the local legislation of five out of the eight provinces of India. Perhaps he could make the state of affairs most intelligible by an illustration taken from Europe. The position of the Legislative Council of the Governor General was very much this—Imagine a largo Select Committee of this House sitting-half the year at Dantzic and the other half of the year at the Baths of Lucca, and charged in addition to all its other work—that work being, so far as its principal members were concerned about as hard as the ordinary work of Cabinet Ministers in this country—primarily with the duty of making general laws for the whole of Europe except Russia, and secondarily with the duty of doing the whole of the local legislation required for the following countries:—First, for Great Britain, which is about equal in size to the North-West Provinces; secondly, for the kingdom of Italy, which is about the size of the Punjaub; thirdly, for Belgium and Holland, which might stand for Oudh; fourthly, for Prussia, as she was before the events of 1866, which might be taken very roughly to represent the Central Provinces, though these were considerably larger; and lastly, for Norway, which, also roughly, might stand for Burmah, which huge country, be it remembered, was only accidentally connected with India at all, inhabited as it was by a people differing from the natives of India in race, in manners, in religion—in short in almost every way in which men can differ. The mere mention of such a mass of duties would, he was sure, excite compassion in the minds of hon. Members, already disposed to sympathy by the terrible prospects which were before them for this Session; and they would, he was inclined to think, blame him, not for proposing too much, but for proposing too little, when he told them that all he asked them to do was to relieve the

  559
  Legislative Council of the Governor General of a mere fraction of this local, legislative business. It would, no doubt, have been very desirable to relieve it of more, but for the present the thing was out of the question. It must continue to bear most of its burden till local Legislative Councils could be created in other provinces. The portion of its work, of which it was wished to relieve the Legislative Council, was a kind of work which was not, properly speaking, legislative at all. It was the making of regulations for certain districts of India, which were scattered up and down chiefly in our newly-acquired provinces, and which were not nearly up in point of civilization to the ordinary level of Indian society, to which, in fact, the legislation that was beneficent, say, for example, in Lower Bengal, was just about as applicable as the legislation which was good for Surrey, as Surrey is in the year 1870, would have been to Lochaber or Strathspey in the year 1570. He would continue his illustration from Europe. Suppose there were no Parliamentary institutions in this quarter of the globe, and that all Europe outside Russia was legislated for by a large Select Committee of that House, sitting half the year at Dantzic and half the year at the Baths of Lucca. What it was proposed to enact was that some of the wilder parts of European Turkey, and some of the most brigand-haunted corners of Greece, and some of the more dangerous bits of the Abruzzi, and certain portions of the island of Corsica should not have applied to them precisely the same slow and refined processes of legislation that were thought desirable for Kent, for Normandy, and for the Mark of Brandenburg. The Government proposal was simply this, that the Secretary of State in Council should have power to name certain districts in India to which he thought the ordinary processes of legislation not wholly applicable, and that when he had done so the great officers in India who had the charge of the provinces in which these districts lie should have the power of proposing to the Governor General drafts of regulations for those districts, and that the Governor General should in his turn have the power of enacting, subject to the revision of the Home authorities, those regulations by and with the advice of his Executive or
  560
  Governing Council, and without calling in the assistance of the nominees whom he had appointed to help him and his Executive Council in a totally different class of business. The chief advantages which the Government expected to gain, if the House agreed to their view, were these—First, they Mould relieve the Legislative Council of that portion of its work for which it was least fitted, and so give it more time for that portion of its work for which it was most fitted; secondly, they would avoid the appearance of making everlasting changes in Indian legislation—changes which had a very bad effect upon the native and even upon the European mind, for did they not continually hear it said that we had a great deal too much legislation on our Indian statute book, the fact being that we had very little legislation, properly so called, on our statute book, but that, from the awkwardness of the present machinery, we were obliged to do a thousand things, by a sort of quasi-legislation in the Legislative Council of India, which ought to be done by local Legislative Councils, if only we had the materials for them, or in default of these materials, by the Executive Government; thirdly, under the process which the Government proposed, they looked for increased expedition, which was often very important in dealing with wild and lawless districts; and fourthly, they looked for greater secresy, which, in dealing with such districts, was, he need not say, often quite as important. Some persons had praised the Government and some had blamed them for tending by these clauses towards a more despotic ideal of government in India; but they deserved neither the praise nor the blame, for they were doing nothing of the kind. They were simply altering a clumsy expedient for a more convenient one, and when the day came that something better could be substituted for the present convenient expedient they heartily hoped that it might be substituted. They accepted the phrase that Asiatics should be governed Asiatically, considered as a truism, but they did not accept it considered as a pregnant political maxim; nor did they believe that it was possible to comprise in one formula the systems of government which were best adapted at a given moment of time for the Rajpoot and the Chinaman, for the Arab and the Japanese. Government of the people by the people

  561
  was the ideal to be aimed at in all countries, but of course it was one thing to keep before them an ideal and another to see any prospect of realizing that ideal in any time to which politicians could look forward. The second principal object of the Bill was to give to all Chief Commissioners and to all new Lieutenant Governors, and to confirm to existing Lieutenant Governors, the right of sitting in the Legislative Council of the Governor General as ex officio members when the Legislative Council of the Governor General happened to sit within the territories over which they presided. To this arrangement there could be no conceivable objection. The third principal object of the Bill was, as he had said, to give Parliamentary sanction to a certain procedure in the Governor General's Executive Council. This object was carried out by Clauses 4 and 5, which simply repealed the cumbrous and obsolete provisions of the Act of 1833 with regard to the procedure in cases of difference of opinion between the Governor General and his advisers, and enacted that what had long been the practice should be law. No one would, he thought, object to these clauses, and so he need say no more about them. Now, then, he came to the fourth object, which was carried out by Clause 6, and which was, as he had said, to afford facilities for the admission of native Indian subjects of Her Majesty to posts in the Civil Service of their own country which were not at present open to them. The 6th clause gave power to the authorities in India, who now assigned their various appointments to members of the Covenanted Civil Service, to appoint natives of India to positions heretofore held by members of the Covenanted Civil Service without their having necessarily undergone any examination whatever. Now, the very last thing the Government wished to be understood to say was, that the great experiment that was made at the last renewal of the Company's Charter with regard to throwing open the Civil Service to competition had in any way failed. True it was, that the best men of the English Universities had not rushed in crowds to India, but then, no one who really knew the state of our Universities ever dreamt that they would do so. All reasonable expectations had boon amply fulfilled, and there left our shores almost every year to take part in
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  the work of Indian administration some half-dozen men who had already proved themselves possessed of much more than average application and ability; some thirty or forty men who had proved themselves quite competent for the ordinary duties of an Indian civilian, and among whom the necessities and responsibilities of an Indian career would assuredly bring out far greater powers than as yet appeared in them, and, he feared he must add in the interests of truth, a small sprinkling of men who were not, perhaps, all that could be desired, but who could not be put on a level with the hard bargains, as they were called, of the nomination period. Considering that every system of selection which could be devised was terrestrial and not celestial, the result was eminently satisfactory, because the Indian Civil Service attained a considerably higher average of merit than in former days. It had, however, been gradually borne in upon the minds of the authorities in India that the present system of competition required to be supplemented by some provisions for the benefit of the natives. Young natives who had a little means could come to England and compete with the English for appointments, and were doing so. Then, again, if clever young natives had not means they would be helped by the Gilchrist and Government scholarships, assuming these last to be continued—a point, however, not yet settled. All that was good—nay, excellent for the young, but it was quite inadequate, even for them, and it did not moot the case of the old at all. It was absurd that in a country like India, in which our rule was one vast political experiment, incomparably the most vast and most interesting political experiment now being carried on on the face of the earth, we should not arm our responsible officers with full powers to try any reasonable experiment in the employment of natives. There was no want of civil ability among the natives of India. He remembered having been often told by one who had lived in the closest intimacy with all the leading men of that great Indian generation in which Munro and Elphinstone were the most conspicuous names, that the ablest politician he had ever known in life was a Mahratta Brahmin, and he believed his experience was by no means unique. Of course the

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  services of native administrators could only be used at present in quite exceptional cases, but there were probably a very considerable number of natives who might be employed with great advantage to the State in a judicial capacity. This clause left very considerable latitude to authorities in India, and by no means excluded the power of appointing natives to civil offices after a competitive examination. It would be perfectly competent under it, say, for the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to refuse to admit any young native to the Civil Service unless he had passed so high an examination as to make it certain that he would have been selected by the Civil Service Commission; but as the object of the clause was merely to make possible a series of experiments with a view to find out how natives could be most usefully employed in situations which had been hitherto closed to them, and as those experiments would be most narrowly watched, it would be a pity to fetter the discretion of those who were to make the experiment. He concluded by moving the Second Reading- of the Bill.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Grant Duff.)
  SIR CHARLES WINGFIELDsaid, the Bill came before the House this year in a form which disposed of many of his objections. Last year he moved to refer the Bill to a Select Committee, because it seemed to him to aim at an entire reversal of the Act of 1861, called the Indian Councils Act. The principle of that Act was that the legislative and administrative functions should be separated, and reside in separate bodies though the personnel might be partly the same; and another principle of the Bill was that the Government should cease to exercise the power of legislating for the later acquisitions of our Indian Empire, known as the non-Regulation Provinces on the sole plea that within the area of these provinces there are some rude and uncivilized races, who require to be governed by a rougher and simpler system than that in force in the rest of the Empire. But these rude races were a mere handful as compared with the rest of the population, and it was not well that 30,000,000 of cultivated people should be deprived of the safeguards of enlightened
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  laws, and placed at the mercy of a discretionary power which might err. He was aware authorities could be cited in support of a provision even as sweeping as that. The party in India known as the patriarchal or autocratic school, preferred administering a rough justice, with no other light than that of reason; but having had some opportunities of forming a judgment upon the subject, his conviction was that personal administration was very useful in newly-acquired provinces when warlike populations had to be broken in to British rule, but when habits of peace and industry had succeeded to turbulence, and when wealth had accumulated and complicated interests had arisen, then the reign of good laws should begin. That being his advice last year, he confessed he should have preferred it if the Bill before them had been simply a declaratory Act, enabling the Legislative Council in India to except certain territory, on cause being shown, from the sphere of their own jurisdiction, and to give the Governor General authority to make laws for such territories. There was no reason why the Legislative Council should not be the only source of legislation, nor would such a course weaken the hands of the Governor General, for the Act of 1861 gave the Governor General power, in cases of emergency requiring vigorous treatment, to issue rules and ordinances having the force of law for the period of six months. Since, however, the powers of legislation sought to be conferred on the Executive Governments by the present Bill are so much restricted, and depend on the special sanction of the Secretary of State in each ease, he acknowledged that no sufficient ground was left him to ask for a Select Committee on this part of the Bill. The last section of the Bill referred to a totally different matter; it proposed to offer new facilities for the utilization of native ability, and so far received his entire approbation, for he had long felt it was our duty to offer to the natives of India an honourable career in the public service, on the principle that a Government which excluded natives from high offices of State would soon become odious throughout the land. There were many natives capable of filling the highest posts, and he could not understand why the Governor General had refrained from exercising the

  565
  power he already had in this respect. He feared, however, that the selection of the native candidates for appointment and promotion would hardly fail to create dissatisfaction—that if the appointments were not made exclusively by competition nomination would degenerate into favouritism, and invite jealousy between those who had entered the service by competition and those who had gained appointments by interest. Beside this, the disposition among young natives to come to England and enter into competion would receive a check, and this was the more serious when it was considered that no training was so excellent for a young man destined to administer the laws in India as a study of the workings of English law and life in this country. Last year four natives of India obtained Civil Service certificates. Natives of India were, however, placed under a disadvantage, as compared with Englishmen, in being obliged to reside here, at a distance from their friends and at great expense, while preparing for their examination; and it was desirable to find out, if possible, a means of relieving them from that disadvantage, and placing them on a more equal footing with Europeans. That difficulty was in part met by a scheme which had been devised by the right hon. Baronet the late Secretary of State for India (Sir Stafford Northcote), under which scholarships were established for the support of natives of that country while residing in England pursuing their studies. There were nine of these scholarships, but it was urged against the scheme that it was inadequate. That, however, was an objection on the ground of degree, not of principle, and he, for one, regretted to see it announced in the Gazette of India that the scholarships were to be discontinued. From conversations with native gentlemen prosecuting their studies in England, and from articles in the native Indian Press, he gathered that the native educated opinion was by no means in favour of a nomination system. They asked for no favour. They were prepared to compete with the youth of England. But they would prefer that the first competitive examination should be held in India—a certain number of appointments being allotted to India, and that the selected candidates should be required to reside in England until they passed the final examination, dur-
  566
  ing which time they would receive £100 a-year. This proposition, although he did not mean to say he gave in his adhesion to it, appeared to him to be at all events worthy of consideration. Perhaps in practice it would not be very different from the scholarship scheme. He was not satisfied with the definition of natives of India contained in the Bill, because it might include some Europeans permanently settled in India; but that was a matter for Committee. The question, he might add, of the employment of the natives of India presented many very difficult problems; and he thought it should be referred to a Select Committee. When the right hon. Baronet the late Secretary of State withdrew his Bill containing this clause in 1868, he promised that it should during the next Session be referred to a Select Committee. He could not see the urgency for the passing of this clause. He desired to see the natives of India appointed to fill the highest offices, but a sufficiently wide field could be found at present in the non-Regulation Provinces, containing sixty districts, where the Governor General had power to appoint them to any office. He feared, that although it might be in a small way, the principle of competition was affected by the clause, and he should be sorry to see the principle imperilled. His experience of the working of the competitive system in India was, that it had raised the average of ability and attainments in the Civil Service in a great degree. He did not say that it would produce men more eminent than some whom the nomination system had given us, but it had raised the average of efficiency, while the instances of glaring inefficiency, which under the nomination system were not infrequent, were now entirely unknown.
  MR. KINNAIRDsaid, he concurred in the views of the hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir Charles Wingfield), and would join in entreating the Under Secretary of State for India to adopt the suggestion to submit this important question, affecting the natives of India, to a Select Committee. It was ten years since any Committee had been appointed on Indian affairs by that House, and this was a question requiring great consideration. He regretted what had happened last year, when four natives of India came over to this country for the purpose of a competitive examination, in

  567
  which they were successful, and carried away the first places; and yet, because of some technical flaw about the date of their birth, an objection was taken to them, and they were held to be disqualified. Such an occurrence must spread in India the idea that unfairness was shown to natives. But, if the matter was remitted to a Committee, it would be manifest to them that measures affecting their interests were not resolved on without duo consideration.
  MR. GRANT DUFFsaid, it was true that in the case to which his hon. Friend referred, two young natives had been held disqualified who had succeeded in obtaining places in the examination. The ground of disqualification, however, was not merely technical but vital. A great deal of correspondence had taken place on the subject between the Civil Service Commissioners and the authorities in India; and he was happy to say that within the last two or three days the Civil Service Commissioners had found that it was possible to give to the two young men in question the benefit of the doubt. They would, therefore, be placed in the position in which they would have been had that doubt never arisen.
  Motion agreed to.
  Bill read a second time, and committed for Monday 28th February.

POOR RELIEF (METROPOLIS) BILL.

  LEAVE. FIRST READING.
  MR. GOSCHEN: In asking leave, Sir, to introduce a Bill to provide for the equal distribution over the Metropolis of a further portion of the charge for Poor Relief, it will be convenient that I should state what progress has been already made towards equalization, and what thus far have been its effects, both financially and as regards the administration of Poor Law relief. I am not sure that the results of the equalization have been fully appreciated—partly, no doubt, because, though it is now two or three years since the Act of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gathorne Hardy) passed, only three half-years have come under its operation. The audit always occupies a certain number of months, so that the parishes do not get immediate payment. At present they have received only two payments under
  568
  the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman; but in the course of a few days they will receive a third payment. As regards the general financial statement of poor relief in the metropolis, the situation is about as follows:—The aggregate expenditure for poor relief in London amounts in round numbers for the year ending Lady-day, 1868, to £1,300,000, and for the year ending Lady-day, 1869, it amounts to £1,400,000. But I ought to add, especially at the present time, when, very naturally, great attention is drawn to the expenditure in the metropolis, that, although the year ending Lady-day, 1869, shows an increase of £100,000 over the preceding year, yet the half-year ending Lady-day, 1869, shows only a very slight increase over the corresponding portion of the preceding year. I may also mention that the half-year ending at Michaelmas, 1869, shows a reduction in regard to in-maintenance and out-relief as compared with the corresponding half-year in 1868. Therefore, up to last Michaelmas, there was no increase at all in the items for in-maintenance and out-relief in the metropolis. I attribute this to the circumstance that, although the number of paupers has been slightly greater, corn was cheaper, and a certain economy was effected in that respect. However, irrespective of the question of increase or diminution, these figures represent what I hope we need not consider the normal state of expenditure in the metropolis—because I hope we shall not always be burdened with the present number of paupers—although they fairly represent the average expenditure for the last two or throe years. Now, it is well known to all who are engaged in the administration of poor relief, but not, perhaps, to the public in general, that this large sum which is spent in poor relief is usually divided into five or six heads. First, there is a heavy item for in-maintenance, representing about three-tenths of the whole; another for out-relief, also representing three-tenths; a third for lunatics in asylums or licensed houses, representing one-tenth; salaries of officers about one-tenth; workhouse loans and other expenses about two-tenths. It will, therefore, be seen that it is not only the in-maintenance and the out-relief which form so great a part of the total charge for relief, but a number of expenses which are more or less con-

  569
  nected with poor relief, and in part administrative expenses. As regards equalization, very considerable progress has been made—much more, indeed, as I remarked just now, than is generally supposed. I ought, however, to add that the increase in the expenditure in 1869, as compared with 1808, represented 1d. in the pound, the average rate being 1s. 6¾d. in 1868, and 1s. 7¾d. in 1869. The increase would have been slightly greater, but for some addition to the rateable value. And now to return to the question of equalization. The following items were put on the common fund by the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford:—the cost of lunatics, of children, of fever hospitals, and of medicines and drugs, and a very large sum for the salaries of officers. These are already upon the common fund. When the Act first came into operation, there was some little difficulty in bringing all these items on to the common fund, because the clerks to the Boards of Guardians found themselves in arrear; but the system is now in full operation, and I may say that £400,000 a-year is already charged on the common fund, out of £1,400,000, the aggregate sum paid for poor relief. For the half-year, of which the audit has just been concluded, the sum charged on the common fund is £200,000; in the previous half-year, £170,000 was so charged; and in the half-year before that £130,000. There has been a progressive increase under the head of cost of maintenance of lunatics in proportion to the number of lunatics whom the Guardians have been able to remove to asylums, for hon. Members may remember that it is only when this class of paupers are removed from the workhouses that the Unions enjoy the benefit of coming on the common poor fund in respect of them. The same rule applies when children are removed from the workhouses and placed in separate schools or district schools. So, in proportion to the removal from the workhouses of lunatics and children, the charge on the common fund has been increased, and the charge on the Unions themselves decreased. It may be interesting to some hon. Members, or at all events to the parties concerned, to know what kind of benefit is given to the poor parishes in the metropolis by the equalization up to this time. I will quote a few
  570
  figures relating to the half-year ending on Lady Day, 1869. Bethnal Green is entitled to a surplus of £6,300, Shore-ditch to £4,700, Whitechapel to £3,900, and Stepney to £3,000. Thus the poorest parishes are receiving the most money. Twenty-four parishes receive money from the fund, and about fifteen contribute to the fund. As regards the latter, I may remark that the City of London is called upon to pay nearly £15,000; St. George's, Hanover Square, has to draw a check for £6,500; Paddington has to contribute £5,600, and Kensington about £4,000, so that the Act is by no means inoperative, as some people suppose, but has already conferred a very considerable benefit on the poorer parishes. During the last three half-years, including the one of which the audit is now-being settled, Bethnal Green has received £16,000, Whitechapel £11,500, Greenwich nearly £11,000, and Shore-ditch nearly £9,000; while during the same period the richer parishes have of course paid sums equal to the amount received by the poorer ones. I will now briefly state the items with regard to which these payments will arise in respect of the year ended Lady Day, 1869. The maintenance of lunatics in asylums and licensed houses amounts to £160,000—that item, I am sorry to say, is constantly increasing all over the country—medicines and surgical appliances to about £9,000, salaries of officers to £103,000, maintenance of children in separate or district schools to £91,000, expenses under the Houseless Poor Act to £12,000, and registration and vaccination fees to £15,000. The heavily-rated parishes have not yet reaped all the benefit of the change, but when the system is in full action, and the schools are all ready for the reception of the children, and the asylums for the imbeciles are completed, I hope that they will do so. To a certain extent it must be borne in mind that the tendency of equalizing the poor rates is to increase expense. The salaries of officers, for instance, have increased materially since 1866. In the first year there was an increase of £10,000 under this head, a similar increase occurred in the year following, and last year there was an increase of £15,000. This is a most instructive item as regards the administration of relief. At first sight it points to the conclusion that there has been increased

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  extravagance; but I think the House will desire to look into the matter somewhat closely. How has this increase arisen? I have examined carefully the circumstances as to three classes of officials—the doctors, relieving officers, and nurses. I find that the doctors have been increased in number by eighteen; that the relieving officers, formerly 110 in number, are now 150; and that the paid nurses have been increased by 173, being formerly 213 and now 386. These additions represent very fairly the advantages and disadvantages resulting from placing charges of this description on the common fund. Very few persons to whom the circumstances are known would grudge the increase either in doctors, relieving officers, or paid nurses. But what happened was this. Before the equalization of rates parishes which were overburdened with rates frankly confessed the necessity for an increased number of relieving officers and paid nurses, but were unable to support further expenditure for the purpose; but as soon as the burden of taxation became more evenly distributed, they then recognized the necessity of increasing their staff, and not without good results. I hail the increase in the number of relieving officers as one of the very greatest advantages which has resulted from the introduction of the new system. There ran be no stronger instance than that of Poplar, which has greatly increased its staff of relieving officers, and the consequence has been that while other districts in the neighbourhood have seen their pauperism increase, that of Poplar has been stationary, having been kept down by an improved system of administration. Throughout the metropolis generally each relieving officer, on an average, has to take care of 386 adult paupers, while in Poplar, every such officer has only 176 under his charge, the result being that he has infinitely more time at his disposal to investigate cases properly, to trace out distress, and to deal with any attempted imposition, than he can have in neighbourhoods where he is overburdened with work. There are many districts where the proportion is infinitely higher than 386, and I feel confident there is no better way in which growing pauperism can be dealt with than by increasing the staff of officers and giving them the means of properly inves-
  572
  tigating cases of distress. The want of a proper staff of nurses was one of the evils which was dwelt upon very much a few years ago, and it is not yet entirely removed; but the appointment of an additional number of paid nurses in the infirmaries and workhouses must be regarded as a decided progress. Putting, then, these salaries upon the common fund has not been unattended with good results. But there is another and less inviting aspect of the question. Boards of Guardians have no longer the same direct interest which they formerly had in keeping down the salaries of their officers. This may and does happen; some Union with a good relieving officer at a salary, say of £120 a-year, comes to the Poor Law Board and ask to have his salary raised to £150. Why? "Because if we do not another Union will bid higher for his services, and take him away from us." The Unions find their account in keeping down the general expenses of relief by the activity of the relieving officer, regarding the amount of the salary to be paid to him as a matter of comparative indifference, as it is borne by the common fund. There is only one way of meeting such applications, and that is the way the Poor Law Board have adopted—of refusing their sanction to any such proposal, unless a clear case be made out, either on the ground of length of service, or additional work, or some exceptional circumstances warranting the increase of salary. And this brings me to a point of great importance. Every step in the direction of further equalization of rates must be taken in such a manner that the poorer parishes, or indeed any parish, may not be able to utilize the common fund without the control of those who represent the common interests. That seems to be an axiom from which we cannot depart. It is absolutely necessary that when we equalize the burden we should also equalize the control, and insist upon a certain uniformity. One main cause of the trouble into which the Poor Law Board has got with various Boards of Guardians has boon because these insisted upon increasing the salaries of their officers. "Surely," they argued, "we may be allowed to manage our own affairs, and we must know better what our officers are worth than the Poor Law Board can do." But the answer seems conclusive; they really are

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  not managing their own affairs—at least they are not spending their own money. When they propose to increase salaries, they are proposing to dip their hands into the pockets of all who contribute towards the common fund. The next point is as to lunatics and children. By the removal of the charge for them on to the common fund the Poor Law Board has been able to carry out the declared wishes of Parliament in a way that it never otherwise could have done. The Guardians steadfastly refused for years to provide distinct buildings and separate schools, or to part with the control of a single pauper. But the temptation of transferring to the common fund the charge for the maintenance of the lunatics and children proved too much for them, and the result is that 8,000 out of the 10,000 children in metropolitan workhouses are now in separate or distinct schools, and not in the workhouse itself. Very great advantages to the children themselves, I am convinced, have resulted from this change. With respect to dispensaries, since the clause in the Act of last year was passed, giving powers to the Poor Law Board to stop the charge of the salaries of the medical officers to the common fund if dispensaries were not built, there has been every disposition to meet the Poor Law Board, and I trust dispensaries will soon be established in almost every Union in the metropolis. If there be harmony between the central authority and the Boards of Guardians, and if arrangements are carried out in conformity with the intentions of the Legislature, they will be entitled to payment from the common fund; but if there be resistance to the central authority and to the intentions of the Legislature, they must bear the burden themselves. Where the power is retained of spending common money without central control there is great difficulty in procuring economy; and it is necessary, if the relief of the poor of any class is put on the common fund, to take the necessary precautions to strengthen the hands of those who to a certain extent have control over the whole. That being the case as regards equalization in the past, I think there are few who will not concur with me that if we can take a further stop towards equalization it ought to be done. The burden of paupers in the metropolis is so great, and the changes which occur
  574
  in the places which are chiefly burdened by increase in the number of paupers are so decided, that few object to the principle of equalization up to a certain extent. There was a time when the usual argument against equalization was this, that all the advantage gained by equalization resulted to the benefit of the owners of property in various places, and that they would increase their rents if poor rates were increased. That may be true to a certain extent, but it is certainly not true entirely. The proportions of pauperism change very rapidly in the present day. There are certain portions of the metropolis where there used to be a large number which have ceased to have this distinction; and what with the demolition of houses, the introduction of railways into the metropolis, and the general advance in the number of paupers who come up from the country to the capital, there are parts of London burdened with paupers now which used to be comparatively free from them; so that the argument as to the owners of property breaks down in these cases. The Government are anxious that some further alleviation should be given, it being justly required by the poorer portions of the metropolis, which are not responsible for the pauperism that congregates in those particular localities. We have been anxious to see what further step could be taken in the direction of equalization, without running the risk to which I have alluded of affording the opportunity to certain parishes of being exceeding liberal at other people's expense. I must freely confess that, without a total change in the administration of relief in the metropolis—without superseding local agency altogether—I do not see how out-door relief could be placed on the common fund. Nor have I yet seen any plan that gives sufficient control to the central authority to prevent abuses. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to the Government that they could not place out-door relief on the common fund; we must rather look to the other claim—namely, the in-door relief; and what we propose is to place the whole maintenance in workhouses upon the common fund, less a necessary margin which shall leave a stimulus to Guardians administering the funds of Unions to be economical. We propose that a certain sum per head—a large

  575
  proportion, but not the whole cost of the maintenance of each inmate—should be charged on the common fund. We propose that 3s. 6d. per week, or 6d. per night per head, should be paid in that way. This would be a very large relief to the poorest parishes in the metropolis, and I think it can be shown that no danger is likely to arise from it. I can fancy, at first sight, that objections may be urged. It may be said this will tempt the Guardians of every Union to crowd their workhouses. That is perfectly true; we must therefore enact, it may be in a Bill containing very few clauses, that, once for all, the numbers which any single workhouse may hold shall be settled, so as to prevent that overcrowding which has thrown so much discredit on the administration of relief in the metropolis. While relief is given, it is necessary that an end should be put to overcrowding, and I feel confident that no one can object to this, that the maximum number should be fixed, and that beyond that amount no payment should be given to the Guardians. Then, again, I think we should infringe on the principle of the separation of children from workhouses, if we permitted the Guardians to claim payment in respect of children kept in the workhouses. Children, as heretofore will have to be sent to district schools. Of course, it is necessary that precautions should be taken that if Unions receive the sum of 3s. 6d. per head of adults in the workhouse, they should comply with the general regulations and requirements of the law, and that the relief afforded should be adequate and should fairly represent the average form of relief in the metropolis. At present the salaries of officers are on the common fund, whereas their rations are not. Hence it arises that one Union officer has a salary only, while another has a smaller salary with rations; and the parish which gives the rations loses that amount. But the rations of officers will, on a certain scale, be also placed on the common fund. The House is entitled to know what will be the financial effect of this change. The effect will be this—that when the asylums now building are completed, and when the remaining district schools, which are making rapid progress, are completed, including the effect of the measure we now propose, nearly one-half of the total relief of
  576
  the poor in the metropolis will be paid out of the metropolitan common poor fund, and the sum which will be distributed will be between £620,000 and £650,000. If the present enormous scale of out-door relief should be reduced, the relief afforded will be to the local burden, and not to the burden thrown on the common fund. If there is any margin the local funds will have the advantage of it. The workhouse accommodation in the metropolis is insufficient, and it is difficult to say how far out-door relief has increased in consequence of the impossibility of properly applying the workhouse test. In the great pressure we have just gone through, if the application of the workhouse test has occasionally appeared harsh, yet, as a general rule, the great increase of pauperism has been chiefly in those localities where it was impossible properly to apply that test. It may be objected that by the system we recommend we hold out a premium to Guardians to fill the workhouses, and apply the workhouse test most strenously. The possibility of a more frequent application of the test would not be a disadvantage; but hon. Members must not assume that there is, or will be, a very great margin which the Guardians, however stringently inclined, could fill up. Additional accommodation will be secured, but of that the first result will be that the same scandalous and dangerous overcrowding will not exist which occurred last year, when some 20 to 30 per cent of paupers more than the workhouses could properly hold were taken in. It may be asked—Why not relieve them out of doors? To that we answer, Because it is impossible, even if it were desirable to do so; and I am sure that such a relaxation of the law would not recommend itself to the feelings of the House generally. There is no danger that the workhouse test will be applied too strenuously, for though we do a great deal to increase the accommodation, yet we do not go much beyond the extent which will provide decent room and space for those within the workhouse. The general result of our proposal will be this, that when the Act comes in force the half of the whole charge for relief will be imposed on the common fund. If we are able, as we hope to be, to reduce the amount of outdoor pauperism, to effect some diminu-

  577
  tion in the 50,000 additional paupers now in the metropolis, as compared with the number four years ago, it will be from the local and not from the common fund, so that the equalization will amount to more than a half of the whole charge. I do not know that to those who wish entire equalization this will commend itself. But, at least, it is a step that cannot lead to any increased laxity of administration or extravagance; sufficient interest will be left to the Guardians as representing their own ratepayers; the provisions against overcrowding will be valuable, and the ratepayers will see that their burdens are being partially removed in a way that is not objectionable, while the scheme will not increase the aggregate pauperism of the whole metropolis. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in the Bill.
  MR. SCLATER-BOOTHsaid, he was not disposed to quarrel with the net result of the scheme as stated by the right hon. Gentleman—namely, that one-half of the sum necessary for the support of the metropolitan poor was to be levied on a common fund; and he should have been glad if his right lion. Friend the President of the Poor Law Board in the last Administration (Mr. Gathorne Hardy) had been in the House to hear the good account which had boon given of the partial measure of equalization which he had brought in two years ago. At that time the Government did not expect that would be a final measure, but that something like the present Bill would be necessary. He thought the illustration given by the President of the Poor Law Board of the consequences of placing the salaries of officers on the common fund should induce the House to look narrowly into the details of the Bill, which would put so large a portion of the in-door maintenance on the common fund. This required consideration, and he would suggest that, instead of the sum so placed being a fixed one of 6d. per day per pauper, it should be a certain relative proportion of the whole, because otherwise, in consequence of variation in the price of provisions, the margin which was now considered sufficient to give the Guardians an interest in keeping down expenditure might become altogether insufficient. The way in which the common fund was to be disbursed was very
  578
  important. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the issue out of the common fund should be watched by persons who had an interest in it, and in preventing its increase. It was to be supposed that in this he referred to the Poor Law Board, because there was no representative body which stood in the position to do this work. The ratepayers generally would, however, feel some difficulty in assenting to the proposition that the Poor Law Board had an interest in keeping down the amount of the common fund. The right hon. Gentleman had not said what he considered would be a sufficient margin to keep Guardians within due bounds in the administration of in-door relief, though probably he thought that a trifling amount would be enough. He (Mr. Sclater-Booth) repeated that he should have preferred the amount placed on the common fund being three-fourths or four-fifths of the whole, instead of the fixed amount of 6d. a-day.
  MR. W. M. TORRENSsaid, he conceived that the measure was another step towards transferring power over the relief system from the local bodies to a central and perfectly irresponsible authority. He was not opposed to the principle of equalization, if it were joined with the principle of representation; but he understood that the present proposal was one to take from the elected bodies that control over the inmates of workhouses which they had hitherto enjoyed, and to vest the control of the expenditure for metropolitan poor relief in an irresponsible body. He understood that each workhouse was now to be limited in its accommodation by the Poor Law Board, and they knew by experience what that meant, for there were theories at the Board with regard to cubic space, and of the mischievous effects of whose application they had already had too much experience. They knew that extended accommodation for in-door relief implied gigantic expenditure and debt, and, as in the case of lunatics, idiots, sick persons, and children in district schools, it meant the borrowing of vast sums of money to be expended in Government masonry and to be charged upon the rates. The right hon. Gentleman had been represented as having stated elsewhere that the great object of the Government was to find the minimum of poor relief, and his fixing now 6d. a day

  579
  for in-door maintenance was a practical illustration of the principle which he was supposed to have espoused. When they took away local control over the relief afforded to the sick and insane it opened the door to mismanagement, extravagance, and inhumanity; and he regretted that the President of the Poor Law Board had quoted that as a precedent to be followed in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman had also spoken hopefully of probable fluctuations in the numbers of the poor, but he (Mr. W. M. Torrens) feared that the "fluctuations" would only be from bad to worse. He did not know what number of coroners' inquests would satisfy the right hon. Gentleman, but the fact was that the coroners were almost broken down in the discharge of their painful duty. If the House desired to treat the metropolis as it treated the rest of the country, let the same principles be adopted in legislating for the metropolis which were applied to all England, and let there be in London, as elsewhere, local control coincident with local taxation. As he understood the proposal of the President of the Poor Law Board, the control of the ratepayers over one-half of the total expenditure on poor relief in the metropolis was to be taken away, in order to try a further experiment in centralization—a course which was not desirable for the paupers, the ratepayers, or the nation at large. The tendency, and, he presumed, the purpose of this further step in local disfranchisement was plain. The number in each workhouse being arbitrarily limited; as soon as each was full, an order would be issued to build a new one or a large addition to the old one; and in this way the building speculators of Gwydyr House would proceed flourishingly and unlimitedly: for power of interposition ratepayers and Guardians would have none. The scale of charge for in-door maintenance might then be raised by the same despotic authority whenever it thought fit; and the poorer parishes would be bribed into acquiescence by being told that in this way they might put their hands into the pockets of those that were comparatively well to do. But neither the one nor the other would have any voice in regulating the outlay; for the whole of the in-door maintenance would henceforth come out of the common fund. It was, in fact, a revival of the vicious system of a rate in aid in
  580
  the worst possible form. The right hon. Gentleman apologized for not applying the same rule to out-door relief by saying that such a change would involve the absolute sweeping away of whatever still remained of local government. To that, however, they would assuredly come if they took the present step in the direction so significantly indicated. The provisions of the Bill seemed to be framed with subtlety to put the metropolis out of harmony with the rest of the country, and with what object he could not divine, unless, indeed, wider projects were cherished for the gradual withdrawal of out-door relief; and it was thought prudent to experimentalize on the capital before proceeding to sequestrate the heritage of poverty and to destroy the local rights of industry and thrift throughout the kingdom.
  DR. BREWERsaid, he thought the Bill would bestow increased comforts on the poor, and he would admit that something like equalization could not be avoided; but his opinion was that the public had looked upon the extension of the common fund, without provision for the due representation of the ratepayers, as something quite new to this country, and as a most dangerous innovation; and they would hardly be prepared for the proposal that so large a proportion as one-half of the poor rates of the metropolis should be administered by a body that was not directly responsible to the taxpayers. The common fund, as he said last year, was a means whereby parish A could tax parish B without its exercising any control in the matter, or having the power to tax parish A. The Bill would be a valuable one if the ratepayers could have control over the expenditure of the common fund.
  MR. LOCKEsaid, he had been a strong advocate for the equalization of the poor rates, and he was pleased that this Bill proposed an extension of the principle so far that 3s. 6d. a head for every in-door pauper was to be levied upon the general rate throughout the whole metropolis. This was a step in the right direction, much more so than was the division of the metropolis into districts and parishes for the provision of asylums. He did not believe there was anything in the objection that equalization would lead to extravagance, because each parish or district would al-

  581
  ways have to pay its share of the rate. Twelve or thirteen years ago he had his name on the back of a Bill, along with that of the right lion. Gentleman the Chief Commissioner of Works, the object of which was to equalize poor rates; that Bill proposed to establish committees of magistrates and others to review the expenditure of each particular parish; but that mode of proceeding was deemed a clumsy one, and the Bill was not looked upon with favour by the House. At that time equalization was not so popular at the Poor Law Board as it is now, and there was no one at the Poor Law Board to support it. Now that the Poor Law Board had adopted it, there must be some one intrusted with the revision of the expenditure. The Poor Law Board were not perfect. On the contrary, great objections were from time to time made to them; but somebody must exercise a controlling power, and he should be unwilling, on this account, to throw any difficulties in the way of passing a Bill which would confer great benefits on the metropolis by the further approach to equalization which it contemplated. He should be glad, therefore, to give his right hon. Friend every support in his power in passing the measure.
  MR. WHALLEYsaid, he wished for an explanation from the right hon. Gentleman. He was afraid that the Guardians of parishes would have little control over the district schools.
  MR. GOSCHEN, in reply, said he could assure his hon. Friend (Mr. Whalley) that the Guardians would exercise considerable power over these schools, for the Boards of management would be formed exclusively from the Guardians of the district, and they would be able to watch over the schools and to protect them from any sinister influences. With regard to the remarks of the hon. Member for North Hampshire (Mr. Sclater-Booth), the Bill would provide that as regards the future the Poor Law Board might by order increase the sum of 3s. 6d., subject, however, to the condition that the Board should lay such Order on the table of the House, and that it should not come into effect until six weeks afterwards. This would guard against the the danger which the hon. Member anticipated—namely, that by a rise or fall in the price of provisions the 3s. 6d. might be either too high or too
  582
  low. The hon. Member said it would be better to take a proportionate amount. But if that plan were adopted the stimulus to economy on the part of the Guardians would not be so great as under the Bill. The proposal was that 3d. 6d. per head a-week should be paid, and therefore any economy would be entirely for the benefit of the Guardians, whereas if four fifths were paid from the common fund and one filth by the Guardians, they would only be interested in any economy which might be effected to the extent of that one fifth. The point had been carefully considered, and the advantage that would accrue to the Guardians under the Bill had been anticipated. The hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. W. M. Torrens), was mistaken in supposing that 3s. 6d. was the exact sum to be spent. The 3s. 6d. was to be paid out of the common fund; but at present, and for some time to come, every pauper was likely to cost considerably more than that sum. As to the margin which would be left, it was calculated that £90,000 would still be borne by the local authorities, irrespective of the common poor fund, and that they would therefore still be interested to the extent of £90,000 in economy. The hon. Member said that pauperism in the metropolis was increasing, and asked how many more inquests he (Mr. Goschen) would require to convince him of the fact. No one could be blind to the existence of pauperism in the metropolis, and no one was more impressed with it than he was; but he hoped that better times were in store, and as to the inquests, he would remind the hon. Member that some of them arose from the overcrowding of workhouses—the very point with which he proposed to deal by the provisions of this Bill. The hon. Member was entirely wrong in supposing that the whole control would be taken out of the hands of the Guardians. That would be the case if the Poor Law Board said they would be responsible for the whole administration of these workhouses; but there would be the payment of a fixed sum, and the general arrangements would be no more taken out of the hands of the Guardians than at present. Certainly, there would be this important difference—that, whereas as present, if any Board of Guardians dealt with their poor in such a manner as to call for the interference of the Poor Law Board, an application to

  583
  the Court of Queen's Bench for a mandamus was the only mode of compelling them to do their duty, the Bill would supply a more simple means of effecting this result and of strengthening the hands of the Poor Law Board in this respect.
  Motion agreed to.
  Bill to provide for the more equal distribution over the Metropolis of a further portion of the charge for Poor Relief, ordered to be brought in by Mr. GOSCHEN and Mr. ARTHUR PEEL.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 30.]

  ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION.
  Select Committee appointed, "to inquire into the causes of the great excess of cost in prosecuting the war with Abyssinia over the estimate submitted to Parliament:"—Committee to consist of nineteen Members:—Committee nominated:—Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE., Mr. GRANT DUFF, Sir JOHN HAY, Mr. BAXTER, Mr. EASTWICK, Mr. SEELY, Mr. CHRISTOPHER DENISON, Major ANSON, Mr. HOWES, Mr. WHITE, Lord ELCHO, Sir PATRICK O'BRIEN, Mr. CHARLES TURNER, Captain BEAUMONT, Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE, Mr. MUNDELLA, Colonel BARTTELOT, Mr. HOLMS, and Mr. CANDLISH:—Power to send for persons, papers, and reports; Five to be the quorum.

  RAILWAY TRAVELLING BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. PLIMSOLL, Bill requiring Railway Companies to provide hot-water tins for third class passengers and for second class passengers in certain cases, ordered to be brought in by Mr. PLIMSOLL, Mr. Alderman CARTER, Mr. RICHARD SHAW, Mr. RYLANDS, and Mr. CANDLISH.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 37.]
  House adjourned at a quarter after Nine o'clock, till Monday nest.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Judges Jurisdiction (10).
INDIA—THE 21ST FUSILIERS—INDIAN RELIEFS.—OBSERVATIONS.

  QUESTION.
  EARL DE LA WARRrose to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the great outbreak of sickness which
  500
  occurred in Her Majesty's Royal North British Fusiliers soon after their arrival at Kurrachee in March last; and to ask, whether arrangements might not be made for so carrying out the reliefs in India as would enable the troops to arrive in that country between the 1st of November and the following February? He was aware that it was not customary to introduce in this House matters relating to military administration in its ordinary and usual course, because those questions were in general so mixed up with financial details that they were more usually and constitutionally discussed in "another place." But he had not brought forward this question unduly or inappropriately, because, though it had its financial side, it had for its central and prominent element a due and proper care for the lives and health of Her Majesty's troops. He had also a personal reason to justify the course he had taken. He felt a deep and abiding interest in the regiment which was the subject of his question, for he had served in it for many years, and commanded it during the most trying period of the siege of Sebastopol. He would confine himself as closely as possible to the facts of the case, without hazarding any positive assertion that these facts were the cause of the calamitous results which had ensued; but if they established a reasonable presumption that the efficiency of a gallant regiment had been impaired and the health of the men broken down by their arrival in India at an unpropitious and unfavourable season of the year, he hoped the Under Secretary for War would give him an assurance that measures should be taken to accomplish the relief service for India within such a period as a due regard for the health and lives of the troops would seem to prescribe. He had ascertained from the noble Lord the Under Secretary for War that the responsibility for the sanitary arrangements in India and for the movements of troops rested with the noble Duke the Secretary of State for India (the Duke of Argyll); but there were other Departments of the Government concerned in the relief of troops in India, including the Department presided over by the Royal Duke the Commander-in-Chief, the Office of Secretary for War, and the Admiralty Office, as represented in the Transport branch at Somerset House. It was, therefore, rather diffi-

  501
  cult to steer one's way through, such a labyrinth of Departments in order to reach the fountain head of authority and responsibility; which, however, as he had said, he had ascertained to be the Secretary of State. The facts of the case were these—The 21st Fusiliers left this country in February last, and arrived in India about the latter end of March. Soon after their arrival fever broke out among them, cholera supervened, and the regiment was soon reduced to a condition which had been graphically described in a local paper. According to that account, sickness and death had been the portion of the regiment ever since their arrival at Kurrachee. The entire strength of the regiment was something like 800 of all ranks, but not above 280 men of all ranks represented the regiment on parade—a great proportion even of these being unfit for the performance of duty, as they had hardly recovered from the effects of sickness. Many of them were in the ranks on one day, and in the hospital laid up with fever on the next. The regiment was, in fact, to all intents and purposes hors de combat. They all knew that disease and death always hovered too closely over the cities of India; but if it could be shown that pestilence was more rife at one season of the year than at another, and that it was more deadly at that season in its attacks upon those who were exposed to it for the first time, it was contrary to humanity and to common sense to send out our troops at that time, and to discover too late that we had sent them out only to die. But their Lordships would be surprised to hear that, in spite of the warning which the fate of the 21st Fusiliers ought to have given, there was another regiment now at Gibraltar which was ordered to leave there in March, in order to arrive in India in April, at a time when a burning, deadly, and consuming heat prevailed. It was melancholy to reflect on what would be the destiny of that unhappy corps; but he hoped the noble Lord (Lord Northbrook) would be able to assure their Lordships that the order for the despatch of that regiment had been countermanded, and that arrangements would be made for so carrying out the reliefs that the troops would arrive in India between the beginning of November and the following February. If it was only a question of providing
  502
  more steam transport by the Red Sea route, or of sending some of the troops round by the Cape, he was sure the British public would never allow paltry considerations of expense to stand in the way when the health and lives of British soldiers were at stake.
  LORD NORTHBROOKsaid, that certainly the noble and gallant Earl, having been one of the most distinguished officers of the 21st Fusiliers, had no need to apologize for bringing forward this matter; but he was happy to assure him that the statement in the Indian newspaper, which the noble and gallant Earl had quoted, gave an exaggerated account of the state of the regiment. The regiment arrived at Kurrachee at the end of March, and the medical statistics for the following six months showed that it suffered no excessive rate of sickness or mortality as compared with the general rate in the Bombay Presidency at that time. There was no such connection as the noble Earl appeared to assume between the date of the arrival of the regiment at Kurrachee and the epidemic which subsequently broke out in the ranks of the regiment. The Government had not received precise statistics for the time that had elapsed after the first six months; but he held in his hand two reports from the principal Medical Officer at Bombay, giving full particulars of the epidemic which broke out about December last, and at the date of the last return was very prevalent. The strength of the regiment was then 682, and there were in hospital 195 fever and twenty other cases, making a total of 215. The degree of sickness in the regiment had, undoubtedly, been very great, but that of mortality small; for between November and the 15th of January there were only two deaths, making thirteen since the arrival of the regiment in India. The noble Earl would see that this was by no means an excessive rate for a regiment serving in India. In consequence of a recommendation of the Medical Officer at Bombay the military authorities of India had removed the regiment from Kurrachee to Beypore, which it was hoped would tend to improve its health. The past year had been a very unhealthy one, excessive heat being followed by an excessive downfall of rain in Scinde, the result being an outbreak and prevalence not of cholera, but of a malarious fever.

  503
  The India Office was responsible for the transport arrangements; but in the un-avoidable absence of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) he might state that they were made in 1865, in concert with the different Departments interested, and with the approval of the highest medical authorities, the 15th of September to the 20th March being fixed as the period during which the reliefs should be made; but on the recommendation of the Army medical authorities the dates were altered to the 29th of September and the 1st of April. It was thought bettor for the troops to arrive in March than to start early in the autumn. It would, no doubt, be advantageous if it could be so arranged that the troops should only arrive in the winter months; and it was hoped that next year there would be fewer regiments to relieve, so that the reliefs could be more quickly accomplished. With regard to the 83rd Regiment, it was impossible, as the ship would start to-morrow, to make any alteration in the transport of that regiment to India; and he hoped their Lordships were not convinced that any such alteration was required, because he believed he had shewn that the epidemic in the case of the 21st Fusiliers was not a consequence of the date of their arrival. His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief had communicated with the Indian authorities with the view of selecting for the 83rd a healthy station in the immediate neighbourhood of Bombay. The health of the army in India was not primarily under the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War, but Mr. Cardwell took a deep interest in it, and in the course of last year, in consequence of serious outbreaks of cholera at Peshawur and other stations, he wrote to the India Office, requesting that the attention of the Governor General should be directed to the question of removing troops as far as possible from stations subject to such epidemics. Both the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) and the Government in India were very anxious as to the sanitary condition of the troops, and during the last five or six years large sums had been spent in the improvement of barracks and other ways connected with the health of the troops, which it was believed would result in a diminution of the rate of mortality.

JUDGES' JURISDICTION BILL.

  PRESENTED. FIRST READING.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR, who had given notice, in moving the first reading of the "Jurisdiction of Judges' Bill," to call the attention of the House to the Report of the Judicature Commission, and to the measures about to be brought forward in regard to the re-commendations of changes in the Court of Original and Appellate Jurisdiction, said, My Lords, in presenting to your Lordships a measure called the Judges' Jurisdiction Bill, I can in a very few words state its purport. But the occasion for bringing it forward at the present time induces me to bespeak a larger measure of your Lordships' indulgence than the immediate subject of the Bill would require. Its object is simply to enable any one Judge of any one of the three Superior Courts at Westminster to sit, upon request, in any of the other Courts for every purpose, and with the same jurisdiction and power as if originally appointed Judge of the Court to which he is so invited. It proposes to enable either Chief Justice or the Chief Baron, on his Court being overloaded with work, to invite to his assistance a Judge from any of the other Courts, and to enjoy the full benefit of his exertions. I am aware that by two previous Acts this assistance can now be partially rendered; but it is confined to a particular subject-matter, and the Acts do not give this power in its totality to a Judge of another Court. The Bill further provides that the Judges may sit in Banco in any one Court in two divisions, if they think fit—thus expediting the administration of justice—and that more than two Courts may sit at the same time in London or Westminster at Nisi Prius, that power being at present confined to two. The occasion of the Bill is this—The Court of Queen's Bench happens to be very much overcharged with business in comparison with the Common Pleas and Exchequer, and unhappily one of its Judges, Mr. Justice Hayes, has departed this life. Now, if ulterior measures, to which I shall presently refer, should not be carried into effect during the present Session, this Bill will provide for the emergency which will occur through the vacancy in that Court. It will be in your Lordships' recollection that three

  505
  additional Judges were appointed only two years ago, for the purpose of investigating the petitions which might arise out of the then approaching General Election. They were nominated principally for that express occasion, and it is quite obvious that there is no immediate probability of their services being required to the same extent; and I have no hesitation in saying that seventeen Judges are perfectly adequate to the discharge of all the ordinary duties of the Common Law Courts. It has therefore appeared to the Government expedient not to fill up the vacancy caused by the death of Sir. Justice Hayes. There is another vacancy, which I have the deepest reason to deplore, caused towards the close of last Session in the Court of Appeal in Chancery, by the death of Lord Justice Selwyn. Remembering his extraordinary quickness of apprehension, his retentive and well-stored memory with reference to determinations which had taken place in the Courts of Equity, and his ready judgment in applying those cases to the facts before him, I have great reason to deplore his loss to the Court of Appeal. I may mention that when it first became my duty to sit with him as Lord Justice of Appeal, during the Chancellorship of my noble and learned Friend Lord Cairns, we found, owing to the ill-health of Lord Justice Rolt—who is happily still preserved to his family, though not to the profession—and to other accidental circumstances, arrears of about a year and a half in the appeals then pending; whereas, during the period that intervened between my noble and learned Friend's appointment to the Woolsack and Lord Justice Selwyn's death they were so reduced that on more than one occasion the Court rose on account of having nothing more to hear; and they are still so kept down that, notwithstanding that loss, not more than thirteen appeals are awaiting hearing, the three oldest of those dating from the middle of last December, and the others from only last January. Under those circumstances it did not appear to me advisable that the Government should fill up the vacancy occasioned by the death of Lord Justice Selwyn. The special reason why the two vacancies were not filled up I have now to explain. In March, 1867, my noble and learned Friend Lord Chelmsford being Lord
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  Chancellor, a Commission was appointed presided over by my noble and learned predecessor (Lord Cairns), to inquire into the general question of the state of our Judicature; and there was included in the scope of the Commission power to inquire into the Courts of Equity, the Superior Courts of Common Law, the Court of Probate, and the Court of Divorce, and to recommend such steps as might be thought expedient for the purpose of ascertaining what was the operation and effect of the present separation and division of jurisdiction in the several Courts, as well as of the arrangements for holding sittings in London and Westminster, and sittings and assizes in England and Wales. The composition of the Commission will, I think, satisfy your Lordships that the subject received full and complete inquiry. The Commissioners were Lord Cairns, myself, Sir William Erle, Sir James Wilde (now Lord Penzance), Mr. Baron Bramwell, Mr. Justice Blackburn, Mr. Justice Montague Smith, Sir Robert Phillimore, Judge of the Admiralty Court; Mr. Hunt, Chancellor of the Exchequer under the late Government; Mr. Childers, the present First Lord of the Admiralty; Vice Chancellor James; the present Attorney and Solicitor Generals; Sir Roundell Palmer; Sir John Karslake, the late Attorney General; Mr. Ayrton; Mr. Quain, an eminent member of the Bar; Mr. Rothery, Registrar of the Court of Admiralty; and three eminent solicitors, Messrs. Bateson, Hollams, and Lowndes. The result of the inquiry was awaited with the greatest anxiety; for it had long been the opinion that we had suffered grievously in our whole system of judicature—nay, in our whole system of jurisprudence—from the unhappy separation of our Courts into two distinct branches, administering law on totally distinct principles. I suppose no civilized nation, at any period of its history, has failed to arrive at an epoch when, from the desire; of rendering justice fully and fairly to all persons, according to the various emergencies which arise as civilization advances, it has found itself obstructed by those precautionary measures which tribunals from time to time have thought fit to take in order to secure justice, but which, at length, settle down into a rigidity of practice incapable of accommodating itself to the wants of mankind, and therefore necessarily bring-

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  ing about the very reverse—namely, injustice, sometimes of the most serious description. I do not propose to enter into an antiquarian investigation of the history of the Roman law; but, happily for Rome, hard and severe as her rules of Common Law at one time were, she early learned, as time advanced, and the various interests of civilization required change, to intrust the Prætor with the power of so far mitigating its severity as by degrees to introduce those changes which resulted, at a far later period than that of which I am speaking, in the whole administration of justice being committed to one single tribunal, which had full power over every dispute in the cases brought before it, and was competent to administer full and complete justice. Scotland has had the benefit of that course of procedure in connection with the law of Rome; as have also all the various countries of Europe which have in effect adopted the system of Roman law, though wisely modifying it by various codes of procedure of their own. But in this country it was not so. Originally, I doubt not, we were free from many of the difficulties which have since sprung up. Originally, the great Council of the King, dividing itself into various branches, administered the law, not, as afterwards, by separation into totally distinct Courts having no intercommunion with each other, but simply as the division of labour required, by handing over to one or another branch those particular functions for which it was thought peculiarly competent—still preserving an interchange and intercommunion of the several branches of the judicature. The Privy Council is still framed very much more on that model than any of our Courts, for it never separated itself by hard and definite lines into separate Courts and jurisdictions, but retained the power of intrusting to committees the particular subject-matters thought most expedient for separate investigation—always with the freest power of intercommunion and assistance. I do not intend to detain your Lordships by antiquarian research. From the King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer being intrusted with various functions, it ultimately resulted that each, in many respects, held exclusive jurisdiction, introducing a rigidity and stiffness into the administration of law which was in itself disastrous. When, moreover, the evil
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  became apparent—when the necessities of mankind required far more elasticity than any of those Courts appeared to possess—when property passed more freely, and a greater variety of rights arose—the Court of Chancery, which had for its earliest and principal function the issuing and framing writs of procedure in the Courts of Common Law, and for a time kept pace with the wants of the age by framing special writs for special circumstances was compelled, by the difficulty of determining rights at Common Law according to the strict system which had gradually grown up, to introduce a jurisdiction of its own. It thus not only remedied the severity of the law, which by some is supposed to be its function, though that is not the case unless that severity contains some ingredients rendering it manifestly subsevient to fraud, but adapted itself to the wants of mankind by specific remedies, such as the Courts of Common Law could not grant. In that way it took upon itself a juisdiction wholly separate from the Common Law, and the consequence was that two species of rights co-existed constantly in the same individual, by one of which he was entitled to a remedy against his opponent by summoning him before the jurisdiction of a Court of Common Law; but while doing this, with the certainty of obtaining a verdict against his opponent, he might be declared by another jurisdiction—merely equitable—to be as clearly in the wrong in the second Court as he was clearly in the right in the first. He could not only be arrested in his proceedings in the first Court, where he was entirely right, but arrested on penalty of costs for having attempted to assert his rights in that inequitable manner. Now that surely cannot be a satisfactory state of things. It cannot surely be right that a man on appeal to one tribunal be declared to have right and justice on his side; while his opponent on appeal to another tribunal may have it declared that he is right and his opponent wrong. Further, there is another ground of difficulty with regard to the Courts of Common Law—namely, that they cannot in frequent cases afford an adequate remedy. The Common Law Courts began to administer the law at a time when there was great simplicity in the ordinary transactions of life, even in such small portions of dealing with contracts and mercantile affairs as

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  came before them; and the general result was "aye" or "no" upon a single issue, matters being brought to a simple issue of law or fact, to which result the whole energies of the Common Law Judges were directed. They would scarcely hear of anything which could not be brought to a single point either of law or of fact, and it was necessary therefore that there shall be a regular course of pleading, a regular statement of the case, a plea put in, replication to that plea, and so on, until the case was reduced to a distinct point of law or fact, whereupon the whole matter was one between A and B; no other parties could be introduced, and the question of fact was determined by a jury. The Court of Chancery, on the other hand, could enter into a complete investigation of any matter, however complicated, accommodating itself to every species of right and injury, simply stated in what was called an English bill, from the use at Common Law of Norman-French. It required all parties interested to be brought before it, and gave great facilities for determining once for all the rights of all concerned. It had more-over several means of affording redress of which the Common Law was destitute. One powerful engine for preventing apprehended injustice was the right of granting injunctions—this being an early and beneficial use of its powers; and it could not only give damages for breach of contract, but could require specific performance of a contract into which a man might have entered. For the broach of a contract for buying an estate, for instance, the Common Law could simply award damages; whereas the Court of Chancery could require its fulfilment, no matter whether the estate had since increased or decreased in value. Unhappily, from a very early period there arose a two-fold jealousy of the Court of Chancery, which diminished its popularity—a jealousy on account of its being administered at one time almost entirely by ecclesiastics, and a notion that it introduced the Roman law, and that this was adverse to the principles of liberty. There was a great preference, too, on the part of the great majority of the people, for a decision by a jury over one by a single Judge. But, whatever the causes, the effects were for many years apparent. Thus, on the one hand, the Courts of Common Law by degrees
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  became so rigid in their rules that a man not unfrequently lost his property, not because he was not the owner of the property, or because his opponent did not withhold it from him unjustly, but through a mistake in the pleading or conduct of the case and through the plea being overruled. On the other, great difficulties, I am bound to say, arose in the Court of Chancery through its becoming somewhat more prolix in its proceedings than formerly. Then conflicts occurred in the reign of James I. between the two classes of Courts, arising simply from a misapprehension of the state of the case, the interference of the Court of Chancery being not with the Court but with the plaintiff, in respect of his not being entitled to take advantage of his remedy at Common Law. But it was not until late years that attention was drawn as it ought to have been to the great inconvenience of the separation of the two jurisdictions, which gave but too much ground to the saying that a litigant might be torn into two parts, one half of his case being decided at Common Law and the other in Chancery. It is clear and manifest, and it is daily becoming more so to all men, that a man should have his whole right determined from beginning to end by one Court, whichever it may be, and I think the only plan is to intrust to one Court jurisdiction over the whole subject-matter of any cause. I believe your Lordships also will come to this conclusion. As early, indeed, as 1657, a man of singular quickness of apprehension and foresight, shown by the number of very valuable remarks and pregnant suggestions on the improvement of the law, condensed in a small volume to which Lord Justice Rolt called my attention—I mean Mr. Sheppard, in a book entitled in the quaint language of the day, England's Balm, made this recommendation—
  "That the Courts continue at Westminster as now they be, but that when anything of law doth, arise in a Court of Equity, it be ended in the same Court; and on the other side, if a matter of Equity arise in a Court of Equity, it shall be ended there."
  Mr. Sheppard, who also published a book on Conveyancing, called Sheppard's Touchstone, appears to have been so impressed with this opinion that he recurs to it again at the close of the book; and it is most remarkable that he

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  suggests reforms which were only effected in Bills brought in by Lord Cairns and Lord Justice Rolt a few years ago—the first by my noble and learned Predecessor enacting that the Court of Chancery should have power to try causes and give damages, instead of specific relief; and the other by Sir John Rolt, to prevent the Court of Chancery from doing what they had been in the habit of doing before—sending every question in a cause that involved a point of Common Law for the opinion of a Court of Common Law. I may mention also, as a curious question of prevision on the part of Mr. Sheppard, that he notices the inconsistency of giving damages for injuries to the person to the sufferer alone, and refusing them to his family in the event of his being killed—an anomaly remedied by Lord Campbell; and he recommends that a bankrupt's subsequently acquired property should be available for his creditors—a principle which your Lordships adopted in the Bankruptcy Bill of last Session. The Court of Chancery allowed itself to be so hampered by the rigidity of its practice that one might have supposed the Judges ignorant of the simplest points of Common Law. However simple might be the point of law that arose it was at once sent to a Court of Common Law; and so, on the other hand, in Common Law, if an injunction were wanted or a discovery was to be made, the case was at once sent to the Court of Equity. These things have, it is true, been remedied, but the remedy is a very partial one. A man has never been deemed disabled for the Lord Chancellorship because he has not been trained at Equity, although, when sitting in Equity, he is supposed to have forgotten all the law he ever learned, and would have to consult the Common Law Judges on a legal question. Certainly no such incompetency could have been alleged against Lord Eldon, who was taken from the Chief Justiceship of the Common Pleas to preside in Chancery. Lord Erskine was almost entirely a Common Law man, and of his successors, five received their whole training at Common Law, five their whole training in Chancery, where my late learned and lamented Friend (Lord Cranworth) happily combined both sources of instruction. Taking all these things into account, one cannot be surprised at the appointment of the Commission to consider the whole
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  subject of our judicature. Commissions on the Court of Chancery had been issued from time to time, commencing, I believe, in 1815, by the issue of a Commission by Lord Eldon. This inquiry was of very feeble efficacy, the only result being the appointment of a Vice Chancellor, which, no doubt, was very desirable and necessary. After that, Lord Brougham made, in 1828, his celebrated speech in the House of Commons, to which I had the pleasure of listening, and which stirred the public mind to its very depths, on the difficulties and embarrassments thrown in the way of the administration of justice. One may date from that period the more general interest shown in this confessedly somewhat dry subject. Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, in 1827, commenced reforms in the Court by Orders, and that course has been continued by successive Chancellors. In the time of Lord Truro, a Commission was appointed, mainly at the instance of my noble and learned Friend (Lord Romilly), then Attorney General, over the deliberations of which he for a long time presided. It recommended improvements in Chancery, with the recital of which I need not weary your Lordships, and there was in 1851 a Commission also on the Common Law Courts. Both these Commissions recommended that in whatever Court a cause began there it should end, and that gave rise to some subsequent arrangements I have, mentioned. My noble and learned Friend (Lord Westbury), in a most eloquent and lucid account of the state of the law, has also done much to stir up public opinion in the same direction, and to create a desire that the great evils and inconveniences of the present system should be remedied. Now, inconvenience is caused by a man being bandied about from one Court to another till he ascertains which is the proper Court; expense is entailed through a mistaken selection of the Court, and it is uncertain in many "border" cases where they should be carried. At last, the Commission, the recommendations of which I have now to bring before your Lordships, was issued in 1867; and I think we may take credit to ourselves, considering the numerous duties and engagements of the members, and that our meetings could never commence until after 4 o'clock, that we finished our labours in a year and a half, having made our Report in March, 1869. The

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  Commission was directed to consider the whole question of our judicature—the Courts of Chancery, the Courts of Common Law, of the Admiralty, and of Probate and Divorce; and subject to certain notes appended, to some of the signatures and to the objections of the Judge of the Court of Admiralty as to consolidating his Court we unanimously agreed that all the Courts into which we were directed to inquire should be consolidated into one great Court, and that that Court should have the power of dividing itself into separate divisions—not for the purpose of continuing the system of separate jurisdictions of law and equity, but in order to hand over from time to time, like the Privy Council, any business to that Court which shall seem most appropriate for it, and subject to this reservation—that no one Judge of this High Court shall be irrevocably attached to any one division; and, further, that if at any time it is thought desirable to transfer a cause from one division to another it shall not be done by a new beginning of the cause, but it shall be transferred bodily from one division to the other by the simple process of walking from one room to the other. Great care should, however, be taken to avoid again hardening into a rigid system, incapable of application to the exigencies of the times, which is the besetting sin of all Courts. That, we recommend, should be provided for in this manner—The High Court should, in itself, unite all the powers now vested in any of the Courts, or in the Judges of any one of the Courts. Having these powers, it should then commence the work of distribution of business—not acting in so rigid or settled a manner as to prevent its arrangements from being altered again, if necessary, by the same body, but laying down rules for the guidance and conduct of business; and also laying down rules as to pleading, endeavouring to make them as simple as possible. The Report goes into considerable details, with which I need not weary your Lordships, as to the mode in which these pleadings may be made in the simplest form, and also with regard to the taking of evidence, as to which I shall have another opportunity of explanation when the Bills are brought forward. I may mention, in order to show that we did not overlook any part of the difficulties of the case, that we that we strove to provide, I hope and
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  think effectually, for those difficulties as they might arise. The scheme will resolve itself into this, that you will still have a Court of Chancery, or a Court equivalent to the Court of Chancery—for, as to names, there is no great magic in them; you will have a Court equivalent, in the same way, to the Courts of Queen's Bench, of Common Pleas, and Exchequer; and, lastly, you will have a Court in which the business of the Courts of Probate, of Divorce, and of Admiralty will be carried out in the same division. That being so, I will now proceed to state to your Lordships the alterations we propose shall take place. It was thought desirable that the Court of Appeal should not be constituted of Judges who had already exercised their functions in the Court of First Instance. A few of these Judges, as I shall have presently to point out, may be placed in the Court of Appeal; but, as a general rule, it was thought desirable that the High Court of Justiciary should be constituted of Judges devoted to that particular work. As to the Master of the Rolls, it was determined that he should be a Judge of Appeal, and should be removed from the Court of First Instance; and for this reason. In 1851 two Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery were appointed, who, together with the Lord Chancellor, formed the Court of Appeal; in which Court either the Lord Chancellor might sit alone, or the two Lords Justices might sit by themselves, or all three might be united in the hearing of causes. The Lords Justices were placed in a rank which is assigned to them by the Act of Parliament—that is to say, next after the Lord Chief Baron. The Master of the Rolls, on the other hand, occupies the third place in the roll of legal dignities—the Lord Chancellor being first, the Chief Justice of England second, and the Master of the Rolls third. Accordingly, it has been thought desirable that the Master of the Rolls should not occupy a position in the Court of First Instance; otherwise his decisions, if overruled, would be overruled by two Lord Justices, inferior in professional rank to himself. But if he be removed to the Court of Appeal an additional Judge will be necessary to supply his place in the earlier tribunal; and that is provided for by a provision in an Act of last year. As your Lordships are aware, the Chief Judge of

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  the Bankruptcy Court was appointed specially by a clause in the Act; but it was provided that in any future appointment a Judge of one of the Superior Courts should exercise the functions of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy; in this manner, therefore, the places of the four Judges in Equity, who are at present found sufficient, will be filled up. With regard to the Judges of the Common Law Courts, regard being had to the other changes which are to be made, the recommendation is that there shall be five Judges acting in each division, instead of six Judges, as at present. If five Judges only be retained for this purpose, there will remain three Judges whom we can dispose of for the discharge of the other duties cast upon them. Of these three, one will be placed in the Court which will deal usually with Admiralty, Divorce, and Probate proceedings; and thus we shall have the same tribunal in point of number, and no doubt also in point of ability, as we now have in the Court for hearing appeals in Divorce, which is composed of the Judge of the Divorce Court assisted by two Common Law Judges. After taking one Judge for that Court there will remain two others, who may otherwise be usefully employed. The Court of Appeal is proposed to be constituted as a permanent Court of Appeal, which shall take all cases, Common Law or Equity, indiscriminately. Over this Court the Lord Chancellor will preside; the Master of the Rolls, by virtue of his office, will also be a member; together with the two Judges to whom I have already referred as being disposable for the office. The Court will therefore be constituted of four permanent Judges; but with these we further propose to associate three Judges to be selected by Her Majesty, annually, from among the Judges of the Courts of First Instance. By this means it is hoped that we shall not only secure a permanent body of a very high judicial character, but shall combine with this permanent body Judges who will bring to its deliberations the recent experience acquired from their practice in the Courts of First Instance; the supposition being that the permanent Judges may not have constantly present to their minds the current daily course of decisions going on in the Courts below. Your Lordships will see that I have mentioned one less in num-
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  ber of the Judges than the Report speaks of. I do not now propose to go into details upon the subject, but merely to give a general outline of the plan proposed; but I think it will be found that nine instead of ten will be quite sufficient. The Report mentions three as the quorum in cases of appeals; and if so, with nine Judges, there can hardly be any difficulty in finding a quorum for the Appellate Court. It may be asked whether there are not special circumstances in the case of the Courts of Admiralty, of Probate, and of Divorce; and undoubtedly their functions have been exclusively confined to a course of procedure having reference to those special matters; but eases are continually arising, especially under the enlarged powers which have been granted to the Court of Probate, which on strict examination it will be found may as well be dealt with by one branch of the judicature as another. As regards the Court of Admiralty, there is this peculiarity, that in time of war special and very difficult questions may arise; but in ordinary times it deals solely with questions of property. And with regard to Admiralty practice, it is to be borne in mind that there are two rules based on totally opposite principles now in operation—one, that acted on in the Courts of Law, the other adopted by the Admiralty Court, the results of which are frequently in direct conflict. For instance, if a ship be run down, and an action be brought at Common Law, and it is proved that there have been faults on both sides, the plaintiffs will fail to recover damages altogether; whereas in the Court of Admiralty, somewhat after the Jewish jurisprudence, the two losses are added together, and the Court divides the burden between the parties. To give other instances—they are not very many, but there are other instances of inconveniences arising under the present system—would be tiresome. Let me simply remind your Lordships of the present constitution of the Court of Exchequer Chamber—the Court for Common Law appeals. I cannot better describe the working of that Court than by reading a passage from the Report of the Commission—
  "The Court of Exchequer Chamber is formed by a combination of all the Judges of the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, under such arrangements that errors and

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  appeals from each of those Courts are determined by Judges taken from the other two. The inconveniences of this system are, in practice, very serious. All these Judges having during nearly the whole year pressing demands upon their time for other purposes, are only able to devote a very limited number of days after each term to the hearing of appeals and errors; and each of these periods requires to be broken up into three parts, and the constitution of the Court to be three times changed, in order to dispose of a portion of the appeals and errors from each of the Courts of First Instance. The effect, generally, is so far to reduce the number of Judges who are able to attend in the Court of Exchequer Chamber as, in case of any difference of opinion, to render it possible that the majority of opinions, in the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance taken together, may be overruled by the minority—a result which, as the Judges of Appeal are not appointed or selected especially to act as such Judges, and the Judges who have been overruled to-day may to-morrow themselves sit in appeal from some decision of the Judges who have taken part in overruling them, is eminently unsatisfactory."
  There cannot, I think, be a doubt that the Court of Appeal which the Commissioners recommend would be an improvement upon this system. It is suggested that this Court should be empowered to sit either as a full Court, or in divisions, but that the number of Judges sitting together in any division should never be less than three. The Judges of the Court other than the nominated Judges should always form a majority of the Court. At present the appeal in Chancery lies to the Lord Chancellor sitting alone, if he chooses to hear the case; but I do not think it desirable that there should be in any case a Court of Appeal of less than three Judges to overrule the decision of the Judges of the First Instance. I think I have now stated to your Lordships all that it is necessary to mention with regard to the Report which is proposed to be carried into effect by the Bills which I shall lay before you. The Report, however, deals with other subjects—such as the circuits; but on that point it is not yet altogether complete or satisfactory; so that we do not propose to legislate as to any of these, with the exception of the Home Circuit; and this it is proposed to abolish, in order that all the cases which are now heard upon the Home Circuit may be tried in the metropolis. Further than that it is not now proposed at present to interfere with the circuits. There is another point which is of great interest to your Lordships' House, and to which I wish specially
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  to call attention. I believe the suggestion I am about to make will be found of very great convenience, and that it will not be attended with diminution of the jurisdiction of this House—a matter with which of course the Commission was incompetent to deal. I refer to the possibility of securing a more continuous hearing of appeals by a very simple process—namely, by adopting a practice in this House analogous to that which prevails at the Privy Council. At the Privy Council there is a Judicial Committee which hears and determines cases as far as it is competent finally to determine them; but that determination is not of avail till it be presented to Her Majesty and is by Her Majesty approved. It occurred to me many years ago—as, indeed, the suggestion occurred to others—that your Lordships' House should of yourselves at the commencement of every Session appoint a Committee of Appeal—a Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House. You would place those you thought fit upon that Judicial Committee—probably those who now hear appeals, and probably others you might think desirable should act on that Judicial Committee; and that Judicial Committee would be empowered to hear and report. Their report would be made to the House and would have to be affirmed by your Lordships. The jurisdiction of this House would be preserved intact. The Committee might also be empowered to sit during the Recess and during prorogation should it be found needful. It might possibly have to sit once or twice during the week; but it would not be necessary to continue that practice long, because the appeals would rapidly diminish; and with that power you would be enabled to do justice, which it is now found impossible to do. I have before me a Return of the number of appeals standing for hearing in your Lordships' House at the beginning of the Sessions 1867, 1808, 1809, and 1870. In 1867 they were 43; in 1868, 42; in 1809, 38; and in 1870, 63. No doubt the number was largely augmented by the circumstance of a lady occupying the time of the House for a period of twenty-four days last Session. But I have also a Return of the number of causes set down for hearing. In 1867 there were 40; in 1868 there were 38; and in 1869 there were 56. Your Lordships will find that from the moment

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  any Court falls into arrear appeals multiply; but if the suggestion of a Judicial Committee be adopted, and that Committee be empowered to sit if required at other times than when the House is sitting, the arrear will be cleared off, and justice will be done in cases where parties are really desirous to be heard. I also propose that this Judicial Committee should have power to call in aid any member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the report of the Committee having always to be affirmed by the House. I propose, my Lords, to embody these alterations in two Bills—one applicable to the Court of First Instance and the other to the Court of Appellate Jurisdiction. I have to apologize for entering into these details when I am not prepared to lay the Bills on the table, but I hope soon to do so. I was anxious to call attention to the subject when I could have the benefit of a full attendance of your Lordships, especially of the noble and learned Lords. I have endeavoured to treat the subject as briefly as was consistent with making, I hope, a clear and distinct statement. In conclusion, my Lords, I do rejoice to think there will be great facility afforded to this scheme by the large public work which seems now at last about to be commenced—I mean the providing suitable courts for the administration of justice. You have a noble palace for the purposes of legislation—suitable to the dignity of the body who assemble here and the convenience of those who from various causes are compelled to have recourse to it; but at the present time there is scarcely a court fit to be used as a court of high judicature, and scarcely a court that affords adequate accommodation to suitors and witnesses. Now, there will be besides a physical advantage a great moral advantage in having one building; you will bring under one roof all those who, forming one Court, will sit in the administration of justice. You will give them an opportunity of convenient communication with one another. You will have then a body of men animated with the spirit of improvement, adequate to meet the various exigencies that may from time to time arise, and not fettered or paralyzed by custom or antiquity, beyond regarding, no doubt, anterior decisions with the respect necessary to secure uniformity and certainty in the law. The Judges will
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  thus give new life, spirit, and fresh activity to the improvement of the law. You will have taken a great step when you have secured a whole body of men animated by one common spirit for that purpose—who shall thus have intrusted to them, so far as concerns procedure, the despatch of business—all that is not of the essence and substance of the law; for you will not intrust to them anything beyond administration, but everything necessary for securing the determination of the just rights upon which they are called upon to adjudicate. Having these men in one building, there will be greatly increased facilities for what ought to form the great object of attainment in any administration of justice—the speed, cheapness, and certainty of its administration.
  The noble and learned Lord then presented a Bill to extend the Jurisdiction of the Judges of the Superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster."
  LORD CAIRNS: My Lords, it certainly is impossible to overrate either the interest or the importance of the statement of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack; and if the character of the Bill he has foreshadowed be of interest and importance to your Lordships, it is of equal importance to the whole people of this country. If in a matter so great I might refer to anything personal, I might claim some personal interest myself, because I had the honour of presiding over the Commission to which my noble and learned Friend refers; and I should do less than justice to those with whom I had the honour of serving if I did not testify to the amount of labour and the sacrifice of time which every member of that Commission incurred—labour and attention the more remarkable, nearly every member of it being occupied almost all day and many hours of night also in business of most pressing description. I do not rise in any way to enter into details of the measure recommended by the Commission, and which I understand in its most conspicuous features is embodied in the Bill upon the table. I will refer to only one detail. My noble and learned Friend said he had some reason to be satisfied that the Court of Appeal which the Commission recommended would be sufficiently constituted with nine members instead of ten as recommended by the Commission. The Commission recommended

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  that the Court of Appeal, being only a division of the Supreme Court, should consist of the Lord Chancellor, as President, the two Lords Justices, the Master of the Rolls, three permanent Judges, and three Judges to be selected either annually or every two years from the other Judges of the Supreme Court. In that way there would be seven permanent Judges of the Court of Appeal and three changeable Judges. That was a subject to which the Commission gave the greatest care and consideration. They were extremely anxious to recommend the smaller number, if possible; but, after the most careful examination, they arrived at the conclusion that it was utterly impossible to keep down the appellate business of the country coming from all the Courts with less than Appellate Courts in three divisions. Now, I agree in every word that has been said by my noble and learned Friend as to the immense importance of an Appellate Court keeping down its business, because I believe that arrears of business in any Court multiply in exact proportion to the number of arrears already existing—the more arrears there are the greater they become, because there are always plenty of people willing to run the risks of having to pay costs for the sake of keeping a question open two or three years. We, therefore, thought it of great importance to keep down the appeals; and we were also of opinion that it was a point of great moment that the Appellate Court should obtain a hold, from its strength and character, on the confidence of the country, and it seemed to us that if the Court were successful in obtaining that confidence it would diminish the number of appeals to the House of Lords. With this view we deemed that each of the three divisions of the Appellate Court should be composed of not less than three Judges. If, however, the Appellate Court is to consist of nine members only, one of them being the Lord Chancellor, then, as the Lord Chancellor would be unable to sit on many occasions, and as also casualties might arise preventing some of the other Judges from attending, the number of nine would consequently be reduced, and one division of the Appellate Court would be prevented from sitting. It was therefore thought by the Commission that the Appellate Court should consist of the Lord Chancellor and nine
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  other Judges; so that there might be some certainty of having three Judges for each of the three divisions: and this is a matter which I hope my noble and learned Friend will consider carefully before introducing his Bill on the subject. With your Lordships' permission, I would say a very few words with regard to the other proposal of my noble and learned Friend with respect to the appellate jurisdiction of this House. I am one of those who for some time advocated the idea of having the appellate jurisdiction of the House conducted through a Judicial Committee, in the same way as the appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council is conducted by the Judicial Committee of that body; but I never thought that one of the advantages to be derived from that measure was the advantage which has struck my noble and learned Friend, perhaps more than it deserves—the proposal that such Judicial Committee of your Lordships should sit during the vacation. This subject connects itself very much with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The judicial business of the House appears to have increased during the last few years, and that of the Privy Council has increased enormously. Latterly, the appeals from India have increased to a great extent year by year, and at present the list for hearing is very heavy at the Privy Council. It is requisite to recollect on whom we can rely for taking part in the deliberations of the Judicial Committee of that body. A great number of the members of it are existing Judges engaged in other Courts, who can only give their assistance for a limited number of days, and all my noble and learned Friends who are here present and have judicial functions 1o discharge as Members of this House are also members of the Judicial Committee. Some other members there are, neither Judges in office nor members of your Lordships' House. And here I cannot speak too highly, without intending to make any invidious distinction, of the great care and attention bestowed by Sir James Colvile on every case coming before the Council. Then, with regard to the Judicial Committee of this House, you must remember that most of its members are, during many months when the House is not sitting, in attendance on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Now, bearing in mind that the attention and

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  time of those noble and learned Lords are not merely occupied during the days only when they sit to hear appeals, but that many other days are also given to the study of the cases which have been argued before them, and also that my noble and learned Friends frequently fix the hearing of appeals in the Privy Council at dates during the Recess, I must say I do not think that the Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House could be so composed as to enable its members during the time when the House is not sitting to devote attention to appeals here. I will not pursue this part of the subject further, but with respect to the other matters referred to by the noble and learned Lord, I believe that we are all anxious that the reform should be passed in the best possible form, and that the great blots in the judicature of the country should be as speedily as possible removed.
  LORD WESTBURY: My Lords, I congratulate your Lordships on the very noble and comprehensive plan of reform sketched out by my noble and learned Friend; and I congratulate the noble and learned Lord on the privilege he has enjoyed of bringing forward a measure from which so much may be expected, and which I think will certainly lead to the most beneficial results—though I am sorry to say that it cannot be expected that those results will be immediate. The faults of our system have not boon confined merely to delay, uncertainty, and contradiction in the administration of the law. The unfortunate division of our laws—or of the administration of them—into Law and Equity, has led to a similar division of the education of young men studying for the Bar, some of them studying for practice exclusively in the Common Law Courts and others for practice only in the Equity Courts. The same has been the case in respect to the Judges. The difference between these two branches has in truth been so great that the jurisdiction and principles of the one set of Courts are almost terra incognita to the practitioners in the other. Therefore, I anticipate that a considerable time will elapse before we have the benefit of this great scheme of reform. It is now nearly forty years since the question of what was called the fusion, or the uniting, of Law and Equity was first agitated. At first it was treated as a species of fond delusion, but it has grown up of late to
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  be regarded as a necessity. We now wonder how we could have endured the whole system so long. It must create surprise when I tell your Lordships that about eighteen or nineteen years ago I heard it said at a great dinner given by the Lord Chancellor of that time to persons eminent in the law, that it was the most perfect state of things to have Common Law administered in one set of Courts and Equity in another; and I remember putting it to those present whether it was not unreasonable that one Court should be bound to commit injustice and that another Court should be instituted, the functions of which should be to watch the proceedings of the first Court, to run after it and stop it in its course. A great deal will require to be done. There will be necessity to invoke the Legislature to settle the differences that now exist between the Courts of Common Law and the Courts of Equity, and above all, it will be necessary to do that without which all else will be unavailing—namely, to prepare a simple code of procedure that shall be common to every tribunal. It was the want of that which originally caused the difference that now exists. When the business and concerns of man-kind became more enlarged, it was the duty of the Judges to have prepared further rules and more enlarged formulœ; but they were chained to the common forms and special pleading in which they delighted, and, therefore, they did not fulfil that duty. That caused suitors in search of justice to go to the Sovereign, by whom they were sent to the Lord Chancellor; and that was the origin of the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor and of the difference between the jurisdictions of Equity and of Common Law. We must now have one single form of procedure, and the preparation of that will require considerable care and attention. I hope my noble and learned Friend, when he brings in his Bill, will not content himself with an outline of general principles, but will also tell us that the preparation of a code of procedure shall be entered upon. With reference to the announcement the noble and learned Lord has made of an alteration in the constitution of the appellate tribunal, I feel very considerable difficulty. This is not a time in which the House of Lords should be stripped of any function or public duty,

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  and I see very great difficulty in having a tribunal constituted as proposed. If you call in the aid of those who are not Members of this House you should reserve to this House a majority in the tribunal. The peculiar character of your present tribunal is that it decides appeals in the manner of a deliberative body, and not in that of a judicial Court; and there are several judgments and not one judgment. I am exceedingly glad the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Cairns) has called attention to the state of legal business in the Privy Council. There is an enormous amount of colonial appeals, which seems to be increasing every day, and it is undoubtedly of the highest importance that that business should be promptly disposed of for nothing tends more to strengthen the bond of union between this country and her colonies than the giving due attention to the hearing and adjudication of their causes. One fault of the Judicial Committee is this—that the colonial appellant does not know how the tribunal to which he appeals will be constituted; it may consist of two or three to-day and of four or five to-morrow, but it must always be a subject of great interest to the colonial appellant to know what sort of a tribunal he will have. I trust that this matter will receive the attention of the Government.
  LORD ROMILLY: My Lords, I have listened with the greatest pleasure to the statement of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, and I anticipate great advantages from the carrying out of what he proposes. I wish to enforce on your Lordships' attention the point just mentioned by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Westbury), the importance of establishing an uniform code of procedure. It is from the want of such a code that the present confusion has arisen. The proposed Court will fail unless accompanied with a new and uniform system of procedure, applying alike to legal and equitable interests. This is pointed out by the Commissioners in their Report; this was found to be a necessary preliminary in preparing a code for India, and the late Court of Exchequer was a striking instance of this truth; for that Court, having complete jurisdiction in Equity as well as Law, and having all the machinery necessary, found itself so constrained by
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  the form of procedure, that no Court in this country was more strict in preserving the exact boundaries of Law and Equity. With regard to that part of the scheme which relates to the constitution of the ultimate appellate tribunal, by the formation of a Judicial Committee of this House, I approve of the plan generally, but I do not at present think that it will be wise to introduce into it any persons who are not Members of your Lordships' House. When I gave evidence before a Committee of this House on this subject, I pressed strongly the importance of having lay members to sit on such a Judicial Committee, and that view was shared by several persons whose names I could mention and whose opinions have weight with your Lordships. The opinion expressed by them was that among your Lordships were many, who, though they had not received a legal education, nevertheless possessed a considerable amount of judicial aptitude, which is a rarer and more valuable quality than legal knowledge; that the effect of introducing such persons to the Judicial Committee would be to cause decisions to be ultimately founded more on common sense awl less on legal technicalities, and that in this way those that were not lawyers possessed a considerable power of disposing of judicial business; this is proved by the efficiency with which a number of your Lordships perform judicial functions as Chairmen of Quarter Sessions. I think, therefore, that with a little care and proper selection a Judicial Committee might be formed which would be most valuable for the administration of law and of justice. I entirely coincide with the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken (Lord Westbury) of the value of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It is of great importance to impress upon the colonies the conviction that in England real justice will be well and speedily done between contending parties residing in India and different quarters of the globe, and, I firmly believe that an enlightened and strictly important tribunal on which colonists can rely will do more to bind them to us than any arrangement about military forces in times when they are not attacked from without.
  LORD REDESDALEsaid, that as the Bill of the noble and learned Lord would have reference only to England

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  it might be well to remember that out of forty-eight appeals now before the House twenty-four, or exactly one-half, came from Scotland. Whether that was through any defect in the Scotch Courts he did not know; but comparing the amount of legal business in the two countries, it was clear that if the Scotch appeals were in the same proportion as those of England, the labours of that as an appellate tribunal would be considerably relieved.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORreferred to the County Courts to show the extreme advantage of ready justice, and said the reason why so few appeals came from those Courts was attributed by the County Court Judges themselves not to any merits of the tribunal, but to the extreme desire of all persons to settle their business out of hand.
  Bill read 1a and to be printed.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.