Sitting of 20 July 1866

MINUTES.
NEW WRIT ISSUED—For Eye, v. Sir Edward Clarence Kerrison, baronet, Manor of Northstead.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN—Right hon. Lord Claud Hamilton for Tyrone; Right hon. Henry Thomas Lowry Corry for Tyrone; Right hon. Viscount Royston for Cambridge County.
PUBLIC BILLS — Ordered — Traffic Regulation (Metropolis)٭; Turnpike Trusts Arrangements٭; Turnpike Acts Continuance٭; Naval Discipline.٭
First Reading—Traffic Regulation (Metropolis)٭ [227]; Naval Discipline٭ [231]; Turnpike Trusts Arrangements٭ [228]; Turnpike Acts Continuance٭ [229].
Second Reading—Hares and Rabbits (Scotland) [210]; Parochial Buildings (Scotland) Act Amendment٭ [222].
Committee—Militia Pay٭; Drainage and Improvement of Lands Act (Ireland) Provisional Order٭ [216]; Courts of Justice٭ [217]; Public Works, Harbours, &c.٭; Public Works Loans (Ireland)٭ [219]; Tramways (Ireland) Acts Amendment (re-comm.)٭ [213]; Paupers (Scotland)٭ [197].
Report—Militia Pay٭; Drainage and Improvement of Lands Act (Ireland) Provisional Order٭ [216]; Courts of Justice٭ [217]; Public Works, Harbours, &c.٭; Public Works Loans (Ireland)٭ [219]; Tramways (Ireland) Acts Amendment (re-comm.)٭ [213]; Paupers (Scotland)٭ [197].
Considered as amended—Thames Navigation٭ [205]; County Assessments٭ [179].
Third Reading—Oyster Fisheries*> [169]; Straits Settlements٭ [176]; British Columbia٭ [186]; Thames Navigation٭ [205], and passed.
Withdrawn—Tests Abolition (Oxford)٭ [15].

DUTY ON DOGS.—QUESTION
MR. WALDEGRAVE-LESLIEwished to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the Government have any intention of bringing in a Bill this Session for the reduction and better collection of the Duty on Dogs? He must remind the Government of the present high value of sheep and of the great loss to a farmer from the destruction of even one sheep from the worrying of a stray dog. He believed that the late Government had prepared a measure on the subject, which he hoped the new Government would take up. Farmers, flockmasters, and the public generally had expressed a strong desire on the subject, and he would, therefore, put the Question of which he had given notice.
MR. HUNTsaid, that it was not the intention of the Government to pass a Bill this Session. The Inland Revenue Department had prepared a measure for trans-

1163
ferring the collection of the tax from the assessed taxes branch to the Excise branch of the Inland Revenue. But he thought some of the proposals in the Bill likely to be vexatious to the owners of dogs. The matter was a difficult one, but he hoped to introduce a Bill next Session.
MR. DARBY GRIFFITHwould like to ask the hon. Member for Pontefract, whether he had prepared a Bill?
MR. CHILDERSsaid, that before he left office he received from the Inland Revenue Department a draft of a Bill reducing the tax on dogs. It had not been finally revised, and he thought it better to leave it for his successor, in the shape in which he had received it.

LAW OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AMENDMENT BILL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. EWARTsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, What course the Government intend to pursue with regard to the Law of Capital Punishment Amendment Bill?
  MR. WALPOLEsaid, in reply, that, as the provisions of the Bill varied considerably from the recommendations of the Commissioners, owing to the great diversity of views upon the subject, Her Majesty's Government did not propose to proceed with the measure during the present Session. At the same time, they were of opinion that it would be better to go to a first reading, in order that the Bill might be printed.

CATTLE PLAGUE (SCOTLAND.)

  QUESTION.
  MAJOR WALKERsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, in view of the great decrease of the cattle plague in Scotland, and of the very extensive interests concerned, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government so to modify the restrictions imposed upon the transit of sheep in Scotland as to permit the holding of the annual sheep and lamb fairs during the ensuing autumn?
  MR. WALPOLE,in reply, said, the question was a very important one. There were no orders of regulations to prohibit the holding of fairs, but there were to prevent the moving of sheep in different parts of Scotland. It would just at this moment, when the cattle plague was spreading in one or two counties, be
  1164
  highly injudicious to make any great change in the regulations. It was very important, before any greater facilities were given for the movement of sheep from one place to another, that the disease should be watched, and that would be done. There was every desire on the part of the Government to relax the regulations, provided it could be done consistently with checking the disease.

THE IRISH SOCIETY ESTATES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. KENNEDYsaid, he wished to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, When the Returns relating to the Irish Society Estates, ordered on the 8th of May last, are to be presented to the House?
  LORD NAASsaid, in reply, that notice of the Returns referred to by the hon. Member had been served upon the Irish Society by the officers of the House in the usual manner. The Irish Society was not under the control of any Department of the Government. He would advise his hon. Friend to renew the Motion for the Returns, with the addendum that they be laid upon the table forthwith.

CATTLE DISEASE—FOREIGN CATTLE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. FREVILLE-SURTEESsaid, he wished to ask the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education, Whether it is the intention of Government to make any relaxation of the Order in Council which now compels all cattle coming from abroad to be slaughtered within four days after their landing in this country?
  MR. CORRYsaid, in reply, that at a meeting of the Committee of Privy Council which was held yesterday it was decided not to relax the Order in Council at present.

SURVEY OF COAST OF CEYLON.

  QUESTION.
  MR. MARSHsaid, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to cause that portion of the East Coast of Ceylon to be completely surveyed which is put down in the Admiralty Charts as "partially surveyed," and which lies in the track of the Mail Packets between Galle and Calcutta, and also in the track of Transports taking Troops by the overland route?
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON,in reply, said, he had applied to the Hydrographer's Department of the Board of Admiralty, and he found that there had been surveys of the greater part of the coast of Ceylon, which were considered quite sufficient. The west coast, the south coast, and the southeast coast had been carefully surveyed, and the only part not minutely surveyed was that between the south-east coast and the Bass Rock, extending over about 230 miles, which was very rarely frequented by merchant vessels. He had heard of nothing which would justify the Admiralty in withdrawing from the survey of this line of coast the vessel which was engaged in correcting the former surveys.

ARMY AND NAVY—MEDICAL OFFICERS.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL NORTHsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, If he would object to lay before the House the Report of the Committee presided over by Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Milne relative to the Medical Officers of the Army and Navy; and whether it is intended to adopt the recommendations of the Commission in favour of the Medical Officers of the Army?
  GENERAL PEELsaid, in reply, that there could be no objection to lay the Report of the Committee on the table. It had, in fact, been moved for that very evening, and granted as an unopposed Return. It was not only the intention of the Government to adopt the recommendations of the Commission in favour of the medical officers, but to go beyond them. There would be no additional pay given this year, as it had not been provided for in the Estimates. It would not be necessary to publish a Warrant in order to introduce the new regulations.

  ARMY—MILITARY STORE DEPARTMENT.—QUESTION.
  MR. OLIPHANTsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether there would be any objection to lay upon the' table of the House Returns of the names of the officers of the Military Store Department; departmental grade; relative rank; length of service, distinguishing the periods served in each grade, including the time passed in a clerical capacity; nature of duties at present as-
  1166
  signed; pay; amount of charge pay in those cases where an officer is in charge of a station; approximate value of stores under the officer's charge; the period which has elapsed since last promotion; rate or amount of retiring pay; and whether any steps are being taken to remedy the anomalies and hardships complained of by the officers of that department, the existence of which was admitted by the late Secretary of State for War?
  GENERAL PEELsaid, in reply, there would be no objection whatever to lay upon the table the Returns relative to the officers of the Military Store Department, with a trifling exception. He was happy to say that his predecessor had already submitted to the Treasury remedial measures with regard to these officers, and perhaps the hon. Gentleman would do well to wait the action of the Treasury before taking any further step in the matter.

  COMPULSORY CHURCH RATE ABOLITION BILL.—QUESTION.
  MR. HENLEYsaid, he would beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Lancashire, Whether he proposes to bring on this Bill for second reading that night—it stood fifteenth on the list—and, if so, at what time?
  MR. GLADSTONEsaid, he would not bring it on later than twelve o'clock.

NAVY—THE "ROYAL SOVEREIGN."

  QUESTION.
  MR. OSBORNEsaid, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, If the experiments commenced by the late Board in firing at the Royal Sovereign will be completed as originally contemplated—namely, by firing flat-headed steel shot or shell from the Whitworth 7-inch gun, thereby ascertaining the penetration as compared with that of the round-headed shot fired from the 12-ton gun?
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Sir, in answer to the Question, I beg to say that I do not exactly know what the hon. Member refers to by the words "originally contemplated." I am not aware that anything passed privately between the Duke of Somerset and Mr. Whitworth; but I have made inquiry in the office of the Admiralty, and I find no trace of any intention to renew the firing at the Royal Sovereign. To fire again at the same turret would, I

  1167
  apprehend, be very useless, and I am not aware of any intention on the part of the former Board to fire at any other of the turrets of the ship. In answer to the latter part of the Question, I apprehend that any comparison between the 7-inch gun and the 12-ton gun would be unfair. But as regards the question between the flat-headed shot and the round-headed shot, I believe there is no doubt whatever of the penetrating power of the flat-headed shot. The real question with regard to this shot is, whether or not its shape does not prevent its passing with accuracy through' the air at long ranges, so that its flight is very uncertain. As the penetrating power of the flat-headed shot has been ascertained, any further trial against the cupola of the Royal Sovereign would be quite useless; and, to test the question that really remains with respect to the flat-headed shot, it would be far better to fire at a target at Shoeburyness than again to fire at one of the cupolas of the Royal Sovereign. Under these circumstances, it is not the intention of the Board of Admiralty to order any further firing at the Royal Sovereign.
  MR. OSBORNEsaid, he would call the attention of the House at the earliest opportunity to our system of naval gunnery.

  DUTY ON DOGS.—QUESTION.
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, he would beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone), Whether he has come to any decision on the subject of the Dog Tax when he was in office?
  MR. CHILDERSreplied, that before the late Government left office it received from the Inland Revenue Department the draft of a Bill reducing the tax on dogs, but as it had not been revised, they thought it better to leave it to their successors in the shape in which it was.

STATE OF THE FINANCES.
  OBSERVATIONS.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I think it will be convenient to the House if I mention that on going into Committee of Supply on Monday I propose to make a short statement, showing the additional charge upon the Exchequer since the general Financial Statement made by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone), and what course we intend to follow in consequence.

  SUPPLY.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

RAILWAYS (IRELAND).

  MOTION FOR RETURNS.
  MR. GREGORY said: In bringing forward his notice he was sure the present Government was aware that he had no intention of trying to extort from them any assurances on a subject which they could have hardly fully considered as yet, beyond the assurance that they would, during the recess, give it their fullest attention. The text on which the short sermon which he was about to deliver to the House was derived, emanated from the late Chancellor of the Exchequer at no more distant date than last February. The right hon. Gentleman, speaking on the subject of Irish railways, said—
  " It was true that the difficult problem of intervention by Government in the concerns of railways, was, to a certain extent, limited in Ireland by the circumstances of the case."
  And he added—
  "No boon could be secured to Ireland so free front all taint, so free from all partiality, so comprehensive and effective in its application, as by some measures taken to secure to Ireland the benefits of cheap transit."
  With such strong authority as that to support him, with the unanimous and earnest desire of the whole of Ireland that the railways in that country should pass through the heads of the State, he (Mr. Gregory) would venture to lay before the House some portions of the remarkable evidence which had been taken before the Duke of Devonshire's Commission, and which fully sustained the strong language of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the boon that might be conferred on Ireland, and as to the eagerness with which that country looked forward to the action of Government, which alone could deal with such a subject. If any one took the trouble to read the evidence before the Commission, he would remark a strange circumstance in a matter connected with Ireland; and that is a virtual unanimity of opinion both as to the abuses which prevail in the Irish railway system and as to the remedies which should be applied; for, after all, Mr. Haughton, Chairman of the South Western, is the only witness who is enamoured with the present system. He looks upon

  1169
  men and women and goods to be created to give shareholders the largest dividends with the least possible inconvenience to directors—as for a public, that is an ingredient which he altogether ignores. Forty-three witnesses were examined, the greater number officially conversant with railways and their traffic, either as directors and managers or as large customers. These witnesses testified to the universal dissatisfaction which prevailed throughout the country at the exorbitant rates of fares exacted, superadded to a most remarkable want of accommodation; in short, the minimum of convenience combined with the maximum of extortion. It would appear that the object, the successful object, of the present system was (to employ almost the words of a contemporary writer) to take care—
  "That to as few people as possible, and not to as many, he conceded the privilege of passing from place to place; that such an extravagant charge be laid upon the conveyance of the very necessaries, let alone the conveniences of life, as to enhance exorbitantly their selling price, and put some of the most essential of them permanently out of the reach of the bulk of the population; that the traffic of the country be regulated by a number of distinct co-operations, without any show of concord among themselves, generally with a distinct show of mutual rivalry and antipathy, exhibiting a perplexing variety of fares, charges, bye-laws, and modes of action occupied ceaselessly in hindering each other."
  Such will appear to be the results of Irish railway mismanagement—mismanagement not in all cases to be attributed to the fault of directors, but to circumstances over which they have no control. Now for the evidence to substantiate this. It came out that in the poorest of the sister kingdoms the fares are often much higher than in England, and invariably higher than in Scotland, as regards passengers. The two great lines of Ireland—the South Western and Midland—exact higher rates than any of the great English lines; but the case is still more remarkable on looking to foreign countries and comparing the tariffs of third-class passengers. We must bear in mind that the produce of third-class traffic is larger, even on Irish railways, which are essentially managed so as to check this source of income, than either of the two other classes:—1863, first-class, £201,000; second-class, £260,000; third-class, £325,000. In Prussia the rate is 3s. 2d. per 100 miles for third-class passengers; in the Rhenish railroads 3s. 10 d.; Belgium, 5s.; Great Britain and Ireland, 8s. The result of these charges is this,
  1170
  a most lamentable impediment in the way of the poorer portion of the Irish public getting into the habits of travelling. It appears, as Mr. Galt shows in his evidence, from the recent Returns of the Board of Trade, that the number of travellers in England and Wales for 1864 was 197,014,661; in Scotland, 20,205,455; and in Ireland, 11,902,049. Taking the population of Ireland at 6,000,000, and that of England and Wales at 20,000,000, we should expect to find three times the amount of passengers, whereas there is twenty times the amount on the part of England and Wales. There ought to be double the amount of railway passengers in Ireland as compared with Scotland, whereas there is double the amount in Scotland. And as for the Continent, Mr. Mulvany's evidence is very striking. He shows how large a proportion of the traffic in foreign railways is derived from third-class passengers. He says—
  "You see the German women coming in with their large baskets of vegetables or fruit a distance of ten or fifteen miles into a market town at a cost of three-eighths of a penny per mile, and they make their marketing before twelve o'clock in the day, and go away in crowds. That is not so in Ireland, except in the neighbourhood of Belfast, where it does partly exist. The third-class passengers in Ireland are charged the same fare as the rich part of the people are charged in Germany, who travel in upholstered second-class carriages, and the anomaly to anyone who frequently visits both countries is so striking as to remove every shadow of doubt as to the impropriety of the rate which exist in Ireland, and the want of accommodation for the poorer classes."
  In fact, on the Rhine a second-class passenger is carried for 100 miles for 8s. 9d., and as by these carriages persons almost invariably travel who would be first-class passengers in England, it comes out that in England and Ireland a third-class passenger has to pay only 9d. less in his miserable mode of conveyance than a German passenger would have to pay in his comfortable second-class carriage. And now to show the unwillingness of Irish directors to take a single forward step to provide the immense advantage which facilities for travelling give to every country. Mr. Haughton, the Chairman of the Great Southern and Western line, stated that he was opposed to the issuing of third class return tickets, on the ground of fraud. He objects to them even on market days. He says, "It is of no use to issue them, nor is there any traffic of that kind." This is the system on which the greatest Irish railway is managed!

  1171
  On the other hand, Mr. Forbes, traffic manager of the Midland Great Western, says—
  "They tried the experiment of carrying third-class passengers at a single fare for the double journey, and the result has been that the trains which then ran empty are now crowded every market day; and I believe that if that system was carried out every day in the week it would be greatly to the advantage of the country."
  Other witnesses, among them Mr. Hemans, the eminent engineer, gave similar evidence, and proved that everything was done to deter people from going third-class rather than to encourage them. Now, to show a little more the spirit which animate directors. At the Great Southern and Western last half-yearly meeting the Chairman thus delivered his views to the shareholders—
  "It is the decided opinion of the directors that if they consulted solely your interest, and not the expectations and gratifications of the public, they would never run an excursion train. The worry, the expense, and the risk attendant on these trains outweigh any problematical profit we derive from them."
  But the Rev. Mr. Bagot, in a lecture to the Farmers' Club, at Athy, stated that he organized excursions trains in 1865 on that very line, and that for five successive weeks they started from Athy carrying an average of 230 passengers each train. The average from Carlow was 300 per train; from Sallins, 450. Mr. Bagot stated positively that the company netted £500 by these trains; yet in spite of that, we see the hostility of the directors to any such undertaking, or, in short, to anything "giving worry," to employ the words of the Chairman. Then as to goods. Mr. Barrington, Lord Mayor of Dublin, deposed that, owing to the high fares and want of accommodation, it was cheaper for him to send his goods to Liverpool, and thence by sea to Sligo, rather than from Dublin to Sligo direct. Mr. Bagot, another merchant, makes this remarkable statement:—He complains that parties can actually send goods from England, viâ Dublin, or through Dublin, to various towns of Ireland cheaper than they an get them delivered from Dublin to those towns. He adds—
  "We consider that that is most injurious to us, and that it saps and undermines our trade; in fact, we frequently are obliged to send our goods to other ports in England, and have them stored there and re-shipped, in order that they may be delivered to the western parts of Ireland cheaper than we can have them delivered from Dublin."
  1172
  How can any country emerge from its difficulties with such impediments in the way of its internal traffic? Mr. Forbes, a gentleman of great experience, and manager of the Midland line, stated that the rates of the carriage of agricultural produce was prohibitory; that in the county of Galway they were selling potatoes at 3d. a stone within a few miles of a railway station; whereas in Dublin they were selling at 7d. a stone; and that if the high fares were lowered they would establish an immense traffic with Dublin in grain, potatoes, poultry, bacon, and eggs. He calculated that if the rates were reduced to one halfpenny a ton per mile the traffic would be increased ten-fold, but the directors were frightened and would not hear of it. Mr. Meldon, a gentleman, solicitor to two or three lines, and a large proprietor, gives similar testimony. He states that potatoes come up to London from .Cornwall by rail; but, though his property is on the railway, he is unable to send the produce to Dublin. Mr. Cooper shows that not more than one-seventh of the store cattle in Ireland are sent by rail; they travel on foot, owing to the charges. Mr. Pollok (a Scotch gentleman), the largest farmer in Ireland, has actually taken farms between Ballinasloe and Dublin, as ho is obliged to drive his cattle by the road owing to the high charges of the railway; and Sir Percy Nugent, one of our largest gentleman farmers, sent word to the Commission that he, too, was obliged to drive his cattle by road alongside of the rail—the cost of carriage being so great as to deprive him of all profit. Lord Lucan stated that in his parts all the cattle went by roads, and he was convinced that a reduction would bring every one to the rail. The evidence of Mr. Mallett, President of the Institution of Civil Engineers in Ireland, and of Professor Sullivan, is also most valuable, showing the extent to which the development of the material resources of Ireland might be carried under a better system, and how prejudicially these resources are affected by the present railway policy. In fact, it is perfectly needless to pursue this subject further. Judgment goes by confession. Even the directors themselves acknowledge the evil. They say, however—and they say with truth—that the shareholders would not submit to temporary loss for a problematic advantage. The loss to them of 1 or 2 per cent would not be at all compensated by the patriotic reflection that

  1173
  Mr. Barrington was driving a brisk trade in Irish soap, or that Sir Percy Nugent's bullocks were riding instead of being driven to market. It was unnecessary to go further into this branch of the subject. The evidence already alluded to, although an infinitesimal portion of what might be quoted, was sufficient to show that owing to the high rate of freights both passengers and goods traffic was generally impeded, and in some cases actually prohibited. Now, he (Mr. Gregory) came to another grievance connected with the Irish railway system. He meant the want of accommodation to travellers, and the difficulties interposed by the numerous small companies in the way of through journeys. These small companies, generally in difficulties, always jealous of their neighbours, and very often at war were a perfect nuisance. The annoyance, delays, and impediments placed in an unfortunate passenger's way by these wretched little corporations, reminded one of the tales of Italian travellers some seventy years ago, where a stoppage of more or less duration had to be made in the district of every little potentate. Mr. Tinsly, Mayor of Limerick, showed the extreme inconvenience to which the people of Limerick were subjected by the want of unanimity between the Great Southern and Western and the Waterford and Limerick Railways, which commands the exit from, and the ingress into, Limerick. Mr. Ryan showed that it took four days to enable a third-class passenger from Ennis, the capital of the county of Clare, to devote a day to business in Dublin and to return; and on being asked to explain this extraordinary statement, he shows that the passenger has to pass over six different lines. To use his words—
  "Each of those lines is very short, and they have local directories, and they do not hit it off well. They appear not to understand each other, and I have not the slightest doubt that if all those lines of railway were under one central management, the times of the trains could be so adapted to the convenience of the public that it would induce a large amount of additional traffic."
  This cry from the West is re-echoed from the North. Mr. Macfarlane shows that you cannot go from Omagh to Dublin, and remain long enough to transact a day's business, without being absent three days from home, and yet Omagh is but eighty-six Irish miles from Dublin. If better accommodation were given be was convinced there would be six times the traffic on the line, for the expense was now so
  1174
  great of being forced to pass two nights in Dublin, that men of business would wait for a fortnight or three weeks to allow commissions to accumulate. Other witnesses deposed to cars being established, say recently running along side of and competing with railways, and others stated that quite as much accommodation was obtainable in the old coaching days. So much for the acknowledged grievances, and now for the remedy. He (Mr. Gregory) already had stated that there was a marvellous unanimity both as regards the evil under which Irish railways were labouring, and as regards the remedy. By that he did not mean that there was no difference of opinion as regards particulars. Judge Longfield proposes that where certain companies reduce their fares, they should be guaranteed against loss by the Government. Judge Longfield considers that the loss would be temporary; but as it might be permanent, and as the loss might fall on the public, he (Mr. Gregory) could not advocate this plan, although backed by such weighty authority as Judge Longfield. Mr. Malcomson's aspirations took a wider flight. He proposed that Government should lend money at 3½ per cent to companies who were unable to borrow at less than 5 or 6 per cent. But, as Mr. Malcomson fails to offer any guarantee, either as to reduction of fares or as to better accommodation, that proposal may be dismissed. All witnesses, however, seemed to agree that the State must interfere, as the only possible means of extricating Irish railways from their present embarrassing condition, and of making them a blessing to the country. In that opinion he (Mr. Gregory) cordially concurred; but he thought there were certain principles to be laid down without which it would be impossible for the State to interfere. If it should be determined to purchase up the Irish railroads, the basis and foundation of the transaction must be this:—1st. That the State shall not lose by the transaction, but, as the purchase has been made for Ireland's benefit, Ireland must be responsible for any temporary deficit which may arise. 2nd. That the railways so purchased shall not be managed by the direct action of the State. These postulates were absolutely necessary, as, no doubt, English and Scotch Members would by no means approve of their constituents being taxed for that from which they would derive no benefit, and Parliament would be naturally unwilling to place in the hands of Ministers

  1175
  the extensive patronage connected with the railway system of Ireland. Now, it would appear at first sight a bold proposal to advocate the purchase of all the railways in Ireland; but the whole of the Irish railways in mileage but little exceed that of the London and North Western, and as to traffic theirs is about equal to that of the Great Eastern. Compare the smallness of Irish railroads with the greatness of English. The Irish capital is between £20,000,000 and £30,000,000; the English capital, £400,000,000. The gross receipts from Irish, £1,518,000; from England, £30,000,000. The difficulty of dealing with Ireland is but as the levelling of a molehill. According to the generally received calculations it would take about £25,000,000 to buy up all the working railways, together with those being actually constructed. This calculation takes a very liberal view of dealing with the share-holders, and as many of the working lines are entirely unremunerative to the original shareholders, and as many of those in process of construction can hardly be said to be progressing from want of funds, it is very clear that most shareholders would gladly come to terms. Now comes the question, what could be saved by such a transaction, or rather, what would be gained for the public benefit. There have been different calculations made, but be (Mr. Gregory) would take Mr. Galt's as it has been deeply considered, and was thoroughly sifted by the Committee. Mr. Galt divided the Irish railways into three classes. He says there are forty railways in full operation. Of these fourteen pay dividends on original stock, and consequently on preference shares and loans. The second-class are those who pay dividends on preference and guaranteed stock; of those there are thirteen. The third-class, ten in number, pay no dividends either to the original or preferential share-holders. Mr. Galt is of opinion that by offering the holders of preferential shares and debentures in the three classes 3½ per cent Government stock and a bonus of 10 per cent in lieu of their present securities, there would be made a profit on Class 1 of railways which pay dividends to the original and preferential shareholders of no less than £95,000 per annum, out of Class 2 by the same process £34,000 profit would be made, out of Class 3 £11,000, in all £140,000 per annum. Then he looks to £110,000 annual saving from amalgamation, taking a lower esti-
  1176
  mate than Mr. Dargan—the total annual saving being thereby £250,000 or one-third of the present working expenses of the Irish railways which amount to £750,000. But now to the debtor side of the account. Of course the first object of this operation is the reduction of fares. It has been calculated that a great relief would be given by a reduction on passenger fares to two-thirds of the present tolls that is throwing the chief reduction on third-class passengers, and by a reduction on goods one-half. Nothing less than that would be satisfactory. But this would involve an immediate though not an ultimate loss of about £200,000 per annum on passenger traffic, and of £100,000 on goods traffic. But there remains another item not yet considered; and that is, the payments that would have to be made to holders of railway stock which has absolutely no marketable value at present, and which does not, and will not, in all probability, ever pay the original shareholders one shilling. Still they live in hope, and their shares cannot and ought not to be confiscated. The amount of these shares come to £3,836,000, or £4,000,000 in round numbers. Now, if these shareholders were offered 5s. in the pound for their shares they would be most handsomely treated, and the offer would be received with thankfulness. That would amount to £1,000,000, and would represent an annual sum of £35,000. Now, by this transaction, if the charge on passenger traffic were reduced one-third, and the charge on merchandise one-half, that would be equal to a reduction of Irish taxation to the amount of £1,000,000, and the holders of nonpaying stock would receive one-fourth of their original outlay, which is now apparently worthless. And what would remain to be made up? Here is the balance-sheet—

  Dr.

  £

  Cr.

  £

  To Loss on Passenger Traffic

  200,000

  By Profit on Class of Railway 1

  95,000

  To Loss on Goods

  100,000

  By Profit on Class 2

  34,000

  Annual Interest on £1,000,000 at 3½ per cent

  35,000

  By Profit on Class 3

  11,000

  By Profit on Amalgamation of Railway roads under One Management

  110,000

  £335,000

  £250,000

  The loss, therefore, would be under £100,000, and could be provided for by an additional penny in the pound income

  1177
  tax. But this loss would be no more than temporary. Reduced fares always increase the amount of goods and number of passengers; and if the history of conflicts memorable in railway annals be perused, it will be seen that, even with the most extraordinary lowering of fares, the loss in dividend is but small. One of the most memorable of these battles was that of 1857, between the London and North Western and the Great Northern during the Manchester Exhibition. Excursion tickets were given between London and Manchester; the distance run was 400 miles. The first-class fares were lowered from 60 s. to 7s. 6d.; second-class from 40 s. to 5s. The loss was only ½ per cent on the dividend. Some years since another contest arose between the Edinburgh and Glasgow and the Caledonian for the Edinburgh and Glasgow traffic. The fares which was 8s., 6s., 4s. for first, second, and third-class passengers were reduced to ls. 9d. and 6d. The battle raged for a year and a half. Yet the Edinburgh and Glasgow paid a dividend less than ordinary of only 1 per cent, the Caledonian of ½ per cent. These were exceptional eases no doubt, but there could not be a difference of opinion but that a lowering of fare would increase the traffic. Take the other side of the question and see how the raising of fares decrease traffic. Mr. Chadwick read a paper at a late social science meeting and showed the effects of railway fares in various cases, of which two may be quoted. In 1858 the receipts per train at ld. fare from Shrewsbury to Upton were £11 15 s. 8d. The fare was raised in November, 1859, to 3½d., and the receipts per train fell to £4 4s. 11 d. The receipts per train in the same year from Shrewsbury to Walton at 1d. fare were £14 17 s. 7d., but they were raised to 6d., and fell to £4 5s. 8d. All the chief witnesses, except Mr. Haughton and Mr. Ennis, agree that the lowering of fares would be only temporary loss. Such were Mr. Dargan's views. Mr. Bidder is asked Question 4,391—
  "It has been represented to the Commission that the traffic of the country is a fixed quantity, and that there is really no prospect of any material increase even under the inducements held out by lowering fares—is that your opinion?"
  To that Mr. Bidder gives this remarkable answer—
  "I do not believe in that; on the contrary, I am certain that if the whole of the Irish railways were under one management, traffic would grow
  1178
  up through the country that nobody has any notion at all of; and if you could quote a rate for the transport of materials and produce according to the fluctuations of the market I am certain that freight would arise, and other sources of income and traffic present themselves of which there is no appearance now.
  "4,392—The same thing might have been said before the days of railways as to the traffic of this country?—Yes; in the Great Eastern district we have increased at the rate of about £80,000 to £100,000 a year in agricultural produce, but the increase was arrested for many years before additional facilities were given and the charges lowered."
  Lord Clancarty, one of the directors of the Midland line, is so confident of the rise of receipts by the lowering of rates that he offered to guarantee his board from all loss by a reduction of 10 per cent on the charges on passenger traffic. The offer was refused, but Lord Clancarty still remains of opinion that a large increase of traffic might have been expected. Now, of course, it would be very foolish and rash to assert that the loss on such reductions as he (Mr. Gregory) contemplated would be immediately recouped. The habits of a people cannot be changed in a day. They must be, as it has been said, uncrystallized of the freezing restrictions which have hitherto confined them, and this holds particularly good of the third-class passengers, who will be so materially benefited by this operation. It will therefore be necessary to give time, and to look to time, to establish the new system with success. To sum up, he therefore would propose that the State should become the purchasers of the Irish railroads; that they should be intrusted to a paid board appointed by the State, but exercising all its functions and patronage free from Ministerial control; the board should be composed of men of the highest character, experience, and intelligence; it should be appointed for five years; that a large reduction in fares should be made; that the lines in process of construction should be finished and come into the system, and that no new line should be constructed without the approbation of the Commissioners during their term of office. There might be short lines necessary to complete a system, and those might be undertaken, but certainly if Ireland could get her unfinished lines completed, and her finished lines made available for public use, she would have done enough for the next five years. At the expiration of that period the lines might be handed over to three or more companies under

  1179
  certain stipulations. Now, he (Mr. Gregory) had concluded his observations. He was aware that he had laid himself open to the remark that he might as well have awaited the Report of the Commissioners, but he demurred to that objection. In the first place, the evidence was before them, and the people of Ireland were unanimous in opinion that the evidence amply sustained the views he had expressed. In the second place, he knew not when the Report of the Commissioners might be issued, and it was all essential that this important subject should be considered before the recess; and lastly, but not least of all, the Report of the Commissioners might, and probably would be, influenced by the views of several witnesses who insisted that the loss should be borne by the Imperial Treasury, but all doubt on that point was removed by the proceedings of the great meeting held in Dublin in February last, of which the Commissioners could not take cognizance. At this meeting, attended by most influential persons from all parts of Ireland, it was unanimously resolved that Ireland, and Ireland alone, would be responsible for any loss occasioned by the transaction. He (Mr. Gregory), therefore, sincerely trusted that the Government would favourably consider this proposal. He was confident they would have the valuable assistance of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was the boast of Conservative Governments that while their antagonists rested their claims on Irish gratitude, from concessions in abstract politics, they rested their claims on the sedulous desire to improve the material prosperity of the country—to put, in short, pounds and shillings in those pockets where only halfpence had congregated before. It was the laudable desire to improve the country that had endeared Lord Eglinton to men of all classes and creeds and politics in so short a space of time; and he (Mr. Gregory) sincerely trusted that, by the manner with which they would treat this great question, the principles of Lord Eglinton and their success had not been forgotten by those who now directed the Government of Ireland.
  MR. PIM,in seconding the Motion, said, he could bear testimony to the strong feeling which existed among the mercantile classes in Dublin with respect to the importance of the proposition brought before the House. There existed such a number of small railway companies in Ireland that he thought the good management of the
  1180
  lines was, under the circumstances, impracticable, and if these lines were amalgamated, he believed that they would not even then be conducted so well and usefully as under the arrangement proposed by his hon. Friend. A large reduction of fares would without doubt tend to develop the resources of Ireland. If any large numbers of persons in Ireland travelled, it must be at low fares. It was well known that in consequence of the high fares on the Irish railways many persons travelled by the second or third-class who might fairly be expected to go by the first or second. Between Belfast and Dublin there were three railway companies which had not always co-operated very harmoniously. The arrangements for communication between those two important towns was therefore by no means so good as it would be if the three lines were in the hands of one company. The fact that there is only one train in the day by which a third-class passenger could perform the journey must greatly interfere with the number of travellers. There might no doubt be an apparent loss for some time if the Government interfered in the manner proposed, but it would be made up by the increased number of persons travelling, the consequent improvement of trade, and the increased consumption of taxable articles. Ireland had certainly improved within the last ten years; but that improvement was, after all, so slow, as compared with the improvement of England and Scotland within the same period, that she appeared to the casual observer to have gone back. The relative difference between the prosperity of Great Britain and Ireland was much greater at the present moment than at the time of the Union. In such a state of things dissatisfaction and jealousy must naturally arise. It was, therefore, incumbent on the Government to endeavour to raise the condition of Ireland, as far as lay in their power, without injury to any other portion of the Empire, in order to bring it as nearly as possible to the same level with England and Scotland; and in his opinion there was no way in which that improvement was so likely to be effected as by fully and fairly carrying out the proposition which had just been submitted to the House by his hon. Friend the Member for Galway.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words

  1181
  "there be laid before this House, a Return of all Foreign Railway Tariffs which may be in the possession of the Board of Trade,"—(Mr. Gregory,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  MR. DUTTONsaid, he had listened with much attention to the statement of the hon. Member for Galway, and he trusted that the Government would take the matter into their consideration, and be prepared with some scheme next Session which was likely to raise Ireland from the difficulties of the position in which she was now placed. It appeared to him that unless something effectual was soon done many of the Irish railways must stop their traffic altogether. Those difficulties had, he thought, arisen in a great measure from mismanagement. As compared with the English railways that management was very bad indeed. For a poor country like Ireland the passenger fares were undoubtedly too high, and unless they were very greatly reduced it would be impossible to tempt the people to make much use of the railways. With respect to the conveyance of goods, although the farmers in some parts of the country, from the great demand that now existed for their produce, and the high prices they obtained, might be able to pay the charges according to the present scale, those charges were, nevertheless, far too high. If the Government intended to interfere with the management of the Irish railways, he trusted that in doing so they would observe great deliberation and caution. What they wanted was not any increase of Irish railways at present, but that the lines already existing should be developed, put into good order, and their credit re-established. At present the Irish railways had no credit. If those advantages were secured English capitalists would be only too glad to invest their money in Ireland. Considering that the Irish railways had been admirably constructed and at the small cost of about £5,000, £6,000, or £7,000 a mile on an average, there was no reason why they should not pay a good dividend if placed under a proper system of management. But Ireland had not the means to throw open the existing lines. Government might help them without any loss to the State. The scheme pointed out was therefore worthy of consideration. The rate of interest now payable was 5 per
  1182
  cent; but debenture-holders who were unable to get any return for their money would be glad, on Government security, to leave it for five years, at 3 or 3½ per cent, with the certainty that these debentures would be paid at the end of that period. Unless the Government stepped in mortgages would foreclose and some of the railways would be shut up altogether.
  LORD NAASthought that every one who took an interest in Irish affairs must feel very much indebted to the hon. Member for Galway for having brought this important subject under the consideration of the House. All must admit the great evils which exist in respect to the management of Irish railways. The arterial lines in existence are quite sufficient for the main wants of the country. They have been constructed in the best possible manner, on admirable principles, and at no very great cost. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Irish railway system, as a whole, has failed in a great measure to give that accommodation to the public which the public naturally expect. It appeared to him that the present condition of Irish railways was largely due to the divided state of the management. He believed there were between thirty and thirty-five different railway companies, and that their affairs were arranged by about five-and-twenty different boards. The operation of such a system as that must be patent to everybody, and nearly all the witnesses who were examined before the Commission expressed themselves strongly adverse to this plurality of small boards. Mr. All-port, the manager of the Midland Company, and who was one of the most experienced railway managers in this country, is of opinion that there is no difficulty in amalgamating the present Irish boards of railways to this extent that in a short time the whole might be intrusted to two or three boards at the most. Mr. Cawkwell, the able manager of the London and North-Western Railway, gave a similar opinion; while Mr. Dargan, who, perhaps, knew more about Irish railways than any other man, stated that £200,000 or £250,000 might be saved at once in the working expenses by an amalgamation of the boards; and when it is recollected that the working expenses of the whole of the Irish railways amount to £750,000 a year, and that the dividend paid in 1864 only amounted to £434,000, the House would see what a very large proportion the sum of £200,000 a year bears to the expenditure.

  1183
  Mr. Dargan, though very much in favour of Government interference to a certain extent, stated, that even supposing the Government were unable to see their way to take such a step, he apprehended no very great difficulty in an amalgamation taking place by the spontaneous action of the companies, and had no doubt that, though not yet quite prepared for such a course, they would be so before long. Now, if at Borne future time whatever Government happened to be in power, might see their way to assist in the establishment of a better state of things, in approaching such a question the difficulty would be very much diminished if they found these undertakings in the hands of fewer bodies than at present existed, and he hoped that during the recess the railway companies would themselves take this view of the matter, and would to some extent agree to an amalgamation of the different boards. Two propositions, he believed, were submitted to the late Government in this matter. The first proposal was that they should put in operation the provisions of the Act of 1844, which was passed at the instance of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone), and at once buy up the whole of the railways in Ireland. The other proposal which was afterwards submitted to them was that they should extend assistance to the companies on a very large scale, and that in return for such assistance a great alteration should be made by the railways in the fares both for goods and passenger traffic. He understood, however, that the late Government did not feel themselves in a position to consider either of these schemes, and in coming to that conclusion he certainly thought that they acted with great prudence; for the House would recollect that a Royal Commission, composed of gentlemen of the greatest experience and presided over by the Duke of Devonshire, was at present investigating the subject, and that consequently it was impossible to expect that any Government could come to any decided conclusion on such an important matter until the Commission had made their Report. He did not know what prospect there was of the Commissioners coming to a speedy conclusion of their labours, but he thought the recommendation of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that the Commission should take the Irish case first, was a very wise one, the result having been that a mass of the most valuable
  1184
  evidence had been collected, so that by the time the Report was presented the matter would be thorougly understood by all interested in it, and the Government would be in possession, not only of the opinion of the Commission, but of that which had been expressed in the most authoritative manner by competent persons. Great difficulties would no doubt present themselves in the consideration of the question. Every one must admit that direct Government interference with such undertakings as these was open to strong objection; still, at the same time, it was possible that a scheme somewhat similar to that enunciated by his hon. Friend (Mr. Gregory) might be found practicable. It was quite clear that such action on the part of the Government and the Legislature was contemplated in 1844, and there was no doubt that many of the objections, and he thought they were almost insuperable, which existed to the Government taking advantage of the provisions of that Act as far as English railways were concerned did not apply to Ireland. The whole railway interest in Ireland was comparatively small; the capital was very limited compared with the enormous amount invested in this country; and the lines, moreover, had been made at such a moderate cost that many financial difficulties which would attend the English question would not arise in dealing with the Irish question. Great objections, nevertheless, existed to such a measure, and he believed no little difficulty would be found in devising a scheme that would be generally acceptable to the public on the one hand and to the proprietors on the other. The House, he was sure, would not expect from him now any definite opinion on the subject, but he could only say that during the recess the Government would be in possession of valuable information on the subject, which would receive its most serious consideration. They were cognizant, however, of the great difficulties in which the question was involved, and if they were not prepared in another Session to deal with it it would not be on account of any indisposition to devote all their energies to its consideration, but because those difficulties had been found to be insuperable.
  MR. GLADSTONE: As my hon. Friend the Member for Galway made a reference to me, I am desirous to say a very few words before the Motion is disposed of. The noble Lord opposite has spoken very fairly on the question before

  1185
  the House. But I think that on one point he slightly overstated one of the points that bore upon the case—I mean with regard to the intention with which Parliament passed the Act of 1844. The noble Lord said that interference with railways by the State, of the nature of their purchase or a step in that direction, was contemplated in that Act. The fact, however, is that words were inserted in it for the express purpose of preventing any Government at any subsequent period acting upon the assumption that such an intention was entertained at that time. The opinion of the Parliament of 1844 was that it was desirable to take measures for leaving their successors in a condition of perfect freedom to interfere with and acquire property in railways in case such a measure should be thought advisable. As I had myself some of the responsibility for that Act, the noble Lord will excuse me for pointing out the exact conclusion which was then arrived at, the matter having been the subject of much consideration, and, indeed, of contest between the Government and the railway companies of that day. I am also desirous that no exaggerated construction should be put upon some expressions which fell from the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other evening in referring to a measure which had been prepared by the late Government, and which had, he said, been very properly adopted by the present Government. I was apprehensive lest it should be supposed that some considerable advances to the Irish railway companies were contemplated. The measure, however, is really one of moderate scope, for the total sum contemplated to be advanced under any circumstances is within the limit of £500,000, and the Treasury Minute now adopted is only capable of being applied to a considerably smaller sum. The general policy of the Treasury, especially of late years, has been to confine advances at low rates of interest to cases where new undertakings were set on foot, it being obviously proper that the public funds should be applied, not in extricating existing undertakings from pecuniary embarrassment, but rather in stimulating new enterprizes. In this instance there is undoubtedly a deviation from the principle; but it is not one which has taken place for the first time. Similar measures have been adopted before, especially in the case of Ireland, and such measures may be justified. In the very peculiar state of the money mar-
  1186
  ket of this country, combined with the unsatisfactory condition of the Irish railway system, and always, of course, upon the assumption that no advances should be made except with absolute certainty of the sufficiency of the security, it was thought that we might be justified in taking some steps to prevent severe pressure upon some of the Irish railways. In point of fact I apprehend that, though I do not refer to any railway in particular, there were fears that, unless some such steps were resorted to, the great accommodation which the public derive from the railway system of Ireland, even in its imperfect development, might be suspended by absolute inability on the part of some of those bodies to meet their engagements, and possibly, therefore, by a temporary stoppage of their lines. As regards the question raised by my hon. Friend, it would be premature to pass any opinion upon the main point involved. Considering the fact that a Commission is sitting, considering the manner in which that Commission is composed and the amount of labour they have bestowed upon the inquiry, I think that none of us would be wise in giving any opinion upon the subject without reserving perfect freedom to re-consider the matter when the Report of the Commission shall be published. One conclusion, however, I have certainly come to. I know of no boon that could be conferred upon Ireland so comprehensive in its application, so impartial, so free from the taint or suspicion of ministering to any particular interest or to the views or convenience of any particular class, so far-reaching in its effect upon all classes and conditions of persons without distinction—I know of nothing that would be so universal in its effect as a better development of the railway system of Ireland. We must not be led, through entertaining that conviction, to any premature conclusion as to the measures which should be adopted. The Irish railway system, however, is so free from some of the most complicated considerations which belong to the English system, that we may say that the question has not grown out of our reach. At all events, it is in a state in which it may be carefully and impartially considered. Whether it is desirable, as the noble Lord seemed to think, with a view to consideration by the Government, that the first step should be the amalgamation of the Irish Boards I do not feel altogether sure. But there cannot be the least doubt that whether it

  1187
  is desirable or not with a view to its consideration by the Government, in the interests of Ireland, it must be most desirable that the weakness, the inconsistency, the want of continuity in arrangement, and the immense waste of resources both in money and material which is inherent to such an extreme division and subdivision of interests should be got rid of. I heartily concur with the noble Lord in his opinion that, quite irrespective of the question whether we shall or shall not find it practicable to resort to any kind of satisfactory interference, the parties connected with the management of the Irish railway interest should, for their own interest and that of the country, seriously consider that most important subject. Beyond these few remarks, I think this is a matter in which—I will not say party opinions, because about that there need be nothing said, but in which abstract ideas and mere theories should be cast aside, and we should look the question fairly in the face, when the proper time arrives, in order that we may deal with it upon practical grounds alone. If, after maturely considering the difficulties of the question and the Report of the Commission, the Government think it is a matter which they can in any way approach with a prospect of conferring real benefit upon Ireland, I can only say that any proposal issuing from them will receive the fairest and most candid consideration from those who sit on this side of the House.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

STATE OF THE NAVY.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. SAMUDA,in calling attention to the present state of the navy, and comparing this with the navies of other States, said, that on a former occasion he had pointed out that our iron-clad fleet consisted of thirty vessels, of which ten might be regarded as of the first class, being wholly protected, eleven were formidable vessels, but, being only partially armour-plated, could only be put into the second rank, while the remaining nine were small and slow, and might be wholly disregarded in the comparison which he proposed to draw on the present occasion. The whole of those vessels had been ordered prior to July, 1863, and since then only three large
  1188
  vessels had been ordered. The practical result was, that it had taken seven years to procure twenty-one vessels, which was at the rate of three per annum. The three which had been ordered since 1863 were in the earliest stages of progress, and could not be added as efficient vessels until the end of next year. Thus, during the last three years no more than one vessel per annum would have been added to our fleet. Practically, all our wooden vessels were useless for war purposes. Improved artillery, especially shells, had entirely settled that point at the time of the Crimean war. He had been told by one of the Russian officers who commanded at Sinope that the destruction or burning of the Turkish ships was settled generally by the first broadside. Some of the vessels received a second, but only one remained to receive a third. This was significant of the destructive powers of modern guns upon wooden ships. Another fact revealed to us during the Crimean War was that armour-plating would restore to vessels the defence which had been rendered impossible by improved artillery. No time, therefore, should have been lost in replacing our wooden fleet, which had become useless, by iron-clad vessels. All countries in Europe were making exertions, wholly disproportioned to their previous position as maritime States, to substitute new fleets of iron-clads for the old fleets which had become obsolete. Even Spain had been building iron-clads in England, France, and at home. Italy had no less than sixteen iron-cased frigates in commission. Russia, probably with the view of withdrawing her operations from the knowledge of the world, had abandoned her previous practice of coming to England, and sometimes to France, and had taken to building in her dockyards at home. The amount that she was building there ho was not acquainted with, but it was said to be very large, generally cupola ships of very great size. Turkey, who lad no money to spare, in addition to four iron-clads, most formidable frigates, which she already possessed, and a fifth building of extraordinary size, was building smaller vessels in her own yards. France was so formidable already, and was so industriously adding to her navy, that it excited in him, and, he fancied, in all who desired to see England fill her proper station in the naval world, a great deal of uneasiness. From our insular position, and the extent of our Colonial Empire, that we should desire to remain the foremost naval Power in the

  1189
  world could not give rise to the slightest jealousy on the part of any other nation. From the latest information he had been able to obtain, France had no less than forty-two iron-clad vessels built and building, and the whole of the latter were intended to be completed by the end of next year. Of these forty-two, twenty-eight were large and fourteen small, and the whole would fight no less than 770 guns protected by armour. Now, the whole of our fleet, whether built or building, represented, large and small, thirty-three, and the guns which we could fight under protection 522, or not two-thirds those of France. And so vigorous had been the action of the French that, while by the last Return which he had obtained at the end of the past year, and to which he had called attention in the spring, the number of their vessels built and building was only twenty-nine, thirteen had been since added, of which ten were most formidable. Three of these were vessels fighting sixteen guns, protected by 8-inch armour, and with a speed of fourteen knots, and seven would fight twelve guns protected by 6-inch armour, and with a speed of twelve knots. In the case of America we had an instance of what could be done by a maritime country making a great effort to right itself. He had no statistics of the American navy, but he found by an article in The Times the other day on the Miantonomoh that the Americans had eighteen Monitors, carrying each four guns, and when their fleet was completed they would have seventy-five of various tonnage; and then The Times added, "Their iron-clad fleet is now larger than the whole of their naval force was in 1861." He begged to call special attention to that remark, viewed by the light of our present experience. Such, then, is a sketch of what the other great nations are doing, and it becomes important as defining in a large degree the exertions we are called upon to put forth to keep pace with them. Had our shortcomings been such as could be set right by increased exertions upon vessels now upon the stocks, or by an extra amount of vigour when the Estimates were brought in next year, he would not have troubled the House with the subject at this late period of the Session, but this matter could not be met in the ordinary way, so much were we behind-hand. The minimum strength of our fleet ought to be at least equal to that of all the fleets of Europe put together. With less than this England ought not to be satisfied
  1190
  and cannot be safe. Recollect all the Powers in Europe except ourselves are military Powers—the use of a navy to them is of very secondary importance. Not only their defence, but all their means of warfare rests entirely on their armies, and these armies have swelled to such gigantic proportions that at this moment three States—not one of which has been usually accounted as of first-rate importance—have between them brought upwards of a million of soldiers into the field. Combinations and alliances are constantly shifting; we have seen France throwing her whole force into the scale to assist Italy against Austria one year, and the next threatening to turn it against Italy and in favour of Austria; and when such extraordinary combinations are even spoken of—happily he was not obliged to refer to them as having been acted on—how very dangerous it was to leave this country in a state incapable of resisting with promptitude and certainty any aggression that might be made on her through any such combinations or sudden changes of views of European Potentates. But it must be remembered that in any such event it would be utterly hopeless for us to look to our army for the chief portion of our defence. Our army was too small to cope with the hordes that might be brought against us, if only a base of operations could be secured for the invading force; but it is also manifest that an absolute and overwhelming command of the sea would entirely prevent any base of operations being secured and maintained, and that of itself would render every attempt at invasion abortive. But, altogether apart from this view of the question, there exist so many circumstances that require an augmentation of the navy as to render further arguments in support of this unnecessary. It is demanded by the great increase of our commerce, and the extended area of our colonies, and by the necessity of British interests being properly represented in the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the China seas, in India, and in our North-American pos. sessions. If this be so, the question was, what would be the best means of augmenting our navy, of what size should the vessels be, how many and of what character? It was impossible that our present deficiency could be immediately supplied—that was a work of time; but he would submit that twelve vessels might be added of a nature which he would presently describe, if he could only induce the First Lord of the Admiralty to look at the matter

  1191
  in the same light as he did. He would suggest, therefore, to the right hon. Baronet to bring in a supplementary Estimate to enable him to commence operations, and £400,000 would be sufficient for that purpose. And now he would describe the kind of vessels that should be added. We should add two of 3,500 tons, 1,000-horse power, and carrying two cupolas each, each cupola capable of fighting two vast guns—600pounders, if we could produce them; if not, the largest we could make. They should be protected by an armour-plating of six inches in thickness, and have a speed of fifteen knots an hour. He would also suggest that ten smaller vessels should be put in hand of 1,500 tons and 350-horse power, and that they should be protected by six inches of armour-plating. These smaller vessels should carry two cupolas, each cupola containing one 12-ton gun, and they should have a speed of thirteen knots. The total cost of these vessels would be £1,600,000. A more favourable time for proceeding with them in the Royal Dockyards, and of obtaining any assistance that might be required from the private yards, could hardly be desired. Yet it was impossible to expect that they could be produced in less than two years. If so, the Estimates for their construction would not exceed £800,000 for each financial year, and the supplemental Estimate of £400,000 which he had suggested would not be additional, but would be in .anticipation of the first £800,000. It might be thought that he had proposed too large a proportion of small as distinguished from large ships. Lord Clarence Paget told the House that these large ships were necessary for taking the sea and keeping the sea. There was something in this, but the necessity for having a large number of these ships had been much modified by subsequent experience. In former times when vessels relied solely on the wind for their motive power it was necessary that every ship should possess a large self-contained force. The difficulty of acting in combination was so great that one man-of-war fighting in line of battle was often unable, for want of wind and other causes, to come to the assistance of another. But with steam three of these small vessels could be as easily manipulated and brought to bear upon a single point as three regiments upon a field of battle could be directed against a single fortress. The advantage in a commercial point of view was also increased. The risk was diminished
  1192
  by increasing the number, and a number of small vessels might possess the same weight of metal as a single large ship, and they might be placed in such positions as to destroy a large vessel more easily than if the same force were concentrated in one large ship. He did not apprehend that the same objections could be taken to cupolas as he had been met with on previous occasions. The only remaining experiment which a large portion of the public and, he believed, the Admiralty also desired to see had been tried. The cupola of the Royal Sovereign had been fired at. The points desired to be hit were struck with the greatest precision, and all fear of damage to the machinery of the cupola was set at rest. The warmest advocates of the cupola could not have expected it to come out of the trial in so satisfactory a manner. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: Hear, hear!] His opinion had long been known on the subject, and indeed it really amounts to this—you can protect a vessel with armour if a cupola—you cannot if it be a port-hole ship. He doubted whether even an armour-clad ship however cased could be called a protected ship if it had port-holes. Every port-hole invited a shot, and if the same accuracy could be obtained in battle as in the late experiments with the Royal Sovereign, there would be an end to all the advantages of armour-plating, because an enemy's shell could pass in at the ports at will and so destroy the ship. Of course, they could not expect the same amount of precision to be obtained in war as on that occasion, yet, if a vessel were once in position, a certain proportion of shot or shell—say one in ten—would enter the ports if the gunners fired with their eyes shut, and a larger proportion if they fired with their eyes open. The cupola ship had the further enormous advantage of turning the gun away in a different direction when the men were loading than that in which they were firing. This would give them much greater coolness in action than was attainable in vessels having port-holes, through which the enemy's shot might enter and destroy the men. The cupola had also an advantage in the arc of fire which ranges over 300 out of 360 degrees of horizon, instead of the ninety degrees which could alone be obtained for guns fired from port-holes. Looking to these points of superiority, he could not see the possibility of these port-hole

  1193
  ships holding their own against the cupolas. If it were to be regretted that our fleet was in so inadequate a condition, there was some compensation, on the other hand, by knowing that we had now an opportunity of considerably improving its character and efficiency. He was of opinion that the navy was immensely too small for the wants of the country, yet he knew the difficulties against which the Government had to contend, and was prepared to make every allowance for them. He had quoted from The Times some particulars about the American Monitor now in this country, but there were certain points about that vessel upon which he felt bound to express an opinion. Formidable she certainly was, but the extremely slow speed she possessed materially detracted from her qualities as a fighting ship. She also laboured under an immense disadvantage in requiring a system of artificial ventilation. Her thickness of armour-plating—of from ten inches to twelve inches—had an imposing sound, but that armour in point of defensive quality was not equal to that of numbers of our ships. Her armour-plating was composed of a number of plates rivetted together, while that of Her Majesty's ships consisted of a solid plate. The experiments on this subject showed that the resistance of these plates was pretty nearly as the square of the thickness of the single plate, so that the 5-inch solid plate was much more than equal to a number of 1-inch plates rivetted together, though making in all double that thickness. Such, then, from the information he had been able to collect, appeared to be the relative strength of our own navy and that of other States. By adding those twelve ships which he had mentioned, they would turn the scale with regard to their nearest neighbour. They would then have forty-five ships and 570 guns; and, although the amount of guns would not be equal, yet from the character of the ships they might rest content that progress would continue to be made on a somewhat similar scale until all their deficiencies were supplied. In conclusion, he begged to say that when he gave notice of his intention to call attention to that subject his own political Friends were in power, and he had expected to make his speech on the Ministerial side of the House. He hoped, therefore, that his right hon. Friend op-
  1194
  posite (Sir John Pakington) would not believe that he sought in the slightest degree to interfere with any arrangement which he might think right, that he would acquit him of all party motives, and give him credit for having no other object than that of offering any experience which he might have acquired and any assistance which he could afford to the Department over which his right hon. Friend opposite now presided to enable them to carry out their most difficult and arduous task. As far as he had had an opportunity of judging, he felt convinced, from the great interest which his right hon. Friend took in that matter, and in naval science generally, both in and out of that House, the country would find that the great interests committed to his charge would not suffer in his hands; and he had no doubt whatever that they would have a development of the navy on which the nation would feel that it could respose with safety.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Sir, I have listened, as I am sure the House also has done, with the greatest possible interest to the speech of my hon. Friend opposite, and I am likewise confident that the House will feel with me that in the course which lie has taken he is in no degree influenced by anything like party spirit. I can quite bear out from personal knowledge his assertion that some time ago, and before there was any prospect of a change of Government, he intended to bring before the House the question which he has introduced to our notice to-night; and, instead of imputing anything like party motives to my hon. Friend, I am extremely glad he has not been deterred by what has occurred in the interval from making the important statement which we have just heard. Having had the pleasure of acting with my hon. Friend opposite for some years in an institution of naval officers of which we are both members, I know how very competent lie is to bring forward a question of this kind. I could have wished that some Member of the late Board of Admiralty had answered him with a view to meet such parts of his speech as referred to their past conduct. It is for me to look more to the future; and, after his remarks, I am sorry that I am bound to say, speaking from the official knowledge within my reach, that, instead of overstating the disadvantageous situation of this country with regard to the navies of other nations, he has rather understated it. In referring to

  1195
  the navy of Italy my hon. Friend opposite did not mention the number of ships which are building, as well as those in commission—a course which he took with respect to some other nations to which he alluded. The Italian navy, young as it is, at this moment possesses fifteen or sixteen ironclad ships in commission; but to these must be added nine more which are building; so that we must reckon that the Italian Government has of armour-clad ships twenty-four, instead of fifteen. My hon. Friend also understated the strength of France. He said that France has forty-two iron-clad ships; but taking the ships built and building, and also taking the small vessels as well as the large ones, the strength of France in armour-clad vessels is no less than fifty-eight. I believe that some of these vessels, which are called batteries, are competent to act for coast defence; and I am sorry to say that we do not possess the same class of vessels to nearly an equal extent. Again, there is the Russian Government. At this time, if I am correctly informed, that Government has no fewer than thirty armour-clad vessels, a considerable number of which—I do not know the exact proportion—are turret ships. Then the American Government has no fewer than seventy-three ironclad ships. I think my hon. Friend said the number was seventy-five. But the American Government is in the most spirited manner sparing no expense or trouble to strengthen its armour-clad fleet; and only this morning I received an interesting account of a ship now building at New York which I believe it is intended to provide with three distinct means of attack—namely, the broadside, the turret, and the ram bow. Of course, it was yet to be shown how far those attempts would prove successful; but, at all events, it showed how enterprizing the American Government were with respect to strengthening their national defences in this important particular. And even the smaller States of South America are not neglecting this part of their defence. Brazil already has five iron-clad ships, Peru has two, and Chile also two. Well, with this array on the part of European and American Governments, I am sorry to say the position in which England stands is this—she has thirty-three of this class of ships, thirty of which, if I am correctly informed, are afloat, and only three in the course of construction. I have no idea of availing myself of this opportunity to indulge in any
  1196
  attack upon the late Board of Admiralty—an attack which, from a person in my present position, would be unbecoming, and I believe also unjust. I should only be doing justice to the Duke of Somerset in saying that in regard to many parts of his administration he has left behind him an example which any of his successors will do well to follow. I agree with my hon. Friend opposite in thinking that, although our progress in respect to these armour-clad ships has not been such as we must all desire it should be—and I have taken the opportunity, when sitting on the other side of the House, repeatedly to make the same remark—yet great allowance ought, in justice, to be made for the difficult position in which the late Board of Admiralty were placed owing to the novelty of this question. In addressing the House when Lord Clarence Paget was Secretary to the Admiralty, I have again and again said that I thought it was the duty of the Board of Admiralty to spare no expense in trying all such experiments in regard to this important subject as might afford any fair chance of success. No doubt for a considerable time past we have been obliged as it were to feel our way, almost every ship that has been built within the last few years being experimental. There was, therefore, every excuse for the late Board of Admiralty not progressing more rapidly. The only point upon which I am disposed to express regret in regard to the course taken by my predecessor in this matter—and here I am but reiterating what I have said frequently from the other side of the House—is this—namely, that the late Board of Admiralty were so long in making up their minds with respect to the turret system. I do not wish to cast any censure upon them, and I repeat that I desire to make every allowance for their difficulties; but they did admit four years ago that the turret system was worth trying; and that being so, I have always regretted that the Government were so long in making experiments upon the turret system as applied to sea-going vessels. At length the late Board of Admiralty did decide to allow Captain Cowper Coles, the inventor of that system, to build a ship according to his own designs. Since I entered upon office, I have laid upon the table a supplementary Estimate for a sum of money to be applied to the construction of that ship, and in doing so, I have only done that which I know the late Board of Admiralty, if it had remained in office,

  1197
  intended to do. That ship will be proceeded with as fast as possible. My hon. Friend opposite expressed a hope that the recess would be utilized. I agree with him in that wish; and I trust that the recess will be utilized in the sense, if not exactly in the manner, which he indicated. My hon. Friend expressed a wish that we should during the recess proceed with the construction of the class of vessels which he recommends. If I understand him rightly, he would have us build a certain number of ships at 3,500 tons, carrying each two turrets, and with a speed of fifteen knots. Now, in replying to so very competent a judge on this subject, I shall not presume to say that such a ship as he has sketched cannot be built, but he will, at the same time, I am sure, agree with me when I state that no armour-clad man-of-war of 3,500 tons, with or without turrets, has as yet attained that speed. It is an extraordinary speed, and it is no doubt desirable that it should, if possible, be secured. I may add from private conversations which I have had with my hon. Friend, that it is, if I am not mistaken, his opinion that a ship of 3,500 tons, with two turrets, could not be built for less than £280,000. When, therefore, my hon. Friend expresses a hope that I should come down to the House before the close of the brief remainder of the Session and propose a supplementary Estimate of £400,000 for the purpose of the construction of such vessels as he describes, I think it is but fair to remind him that it was only on Monday last I entered upon my duties at the Board of Admiralty. I feel confident the House, as well as my hon. Friend, will on reflection be of opinion that I may utilize the coming recess—if not in a manner quite so rapid as he indicates, at all events in a manner which may ultimately turn out to have been more effectual and more prudent than taking at once so serious a step as he suggests. In the meantime, I can only assure the House that I am deeply sensible of the extreme importance of the comparison between the navy of England and that of other countries to which we have listened this evening. I beg to say further that I am fully alive to the importance of the turret system. I think the recent experiments to which my hon. Friend has referred were very judiciously and very properly made. The firing at a short range at the turrets on board the Royal Sovereign, whatever injury might be done to them or the shot itself, has been productive of very
  1198
  useful results, inasmuch as it has, in my opinion, tended unanswerably to confirm the value of the turret system, and must go far to remove any hesitation which might previously have existed in any one's mind as to the extensive adoption of that system. The ship which Captain Cowper Coles is now being intrusted to build must, no doubt, be looked upon as an experiment to test the sea-going qualities of vessels carrying turrets, but I must state it to be my own conviction that we cannot afford to wait for the trial of that ship. We have, I think, already seen enough from what has taken place in foreign nations, as well as from the experiments made by ourselves, to lead us to the conclusion that the time has arrived when experiments should cease and action commence. We have, it seems to me, gone far enough to show that the turret system must not be neglected, and that if we desire—as the members of all parties must desire—to see the navy of England occupy the position which it ought to hold, it must not be allowed in that respect to remain unequal to that of foreign nations. Such is the spirit in which I undertake the arduous duties which have been imposed upon me, and it is by acting in that spirit that I hope to be able to utilize in the best manner the approaching recess. When, on the re-assembling of Parliament, it falls to my lot to state the result of the deliberations of the Board of Admiralty on the subject, I trust that Parliament and the country will be of opinion that I have not been unmindful of the great interests committed to my charge.
  MR. BARING,having observed that it was convenient for the proper discussion of the question which had been brought forward by his hon. Friend behind him that his speech should have been at once replied to by some Member of the present Government, who were responsible for the policy now to be pursued in reference to our navy, hoped the House would not think a few remarks with respect to the past administration of the affairs of that service would be out of place. In dealing with that subject he laboured under very great disadvantages, for the noble Lord who had preceded him in the office which he had just vacated had been conversant with the business of the Admiralty for many years, and could speak with the greatest authority upon all the questions relating to it, whereas his own experience at the Admiralty had been extremely brief. He might, nevertheless, take it upon himself to say that

  1199
  no charge of having neglected their duty in connection with the building of armour-clad vessels could with justice be made against the late Board of Admiralty, for he could confidently assert that they were as studiously and constantly alive as any set of men could be to the necessity of our having a fleet of such vessels creditable to the country, and of gradually superseding our old naval force. The observations of his hon. Friend the Member for Tavistock seemed to him to have been mainly directed to proving that England ought to possess a number of armour - plated ships equal to that of all the nations of Europe combined. That, however, was, he believed, a position which no Administration had ever taken up. It involved the supposition that the entire naval power of Europe might at a given moment be arrayed against us, and that we should be prepared for such an event; and his hon. Friend went oven so far as to contend that we should take into account not only the ships which foreign nations might have built, or which were in course of construction, but also those which had merely been ordered—mere ships on paper—and that we should rush into a great expenditure in order that we might put ourselves on a level with the whole of the rest of Europe, on the ground that we might have to meet all these ships at a particular crisis. That was the main foundation on which the observations of his hon. Friend were based, and from his argument on that head he begged, speaking simply for himself individually, to express his dissent. The hon. Gentleman, having referred to a former speech of his, said be would not, for the reasons which he had then given, take into account sonic of our ships which he had mentioned, and thus reduced the number to be dealt with in a way which he, for one, was entirely unable to explain. The House must, however, when making a comparison between the number of our ships and that of other countries, take care that it was not deceived. A comparison might, for instance, be instituted between the number of ships afloat or ships ordered, or one class of ship might be compared with another; but in the observations which lie was about to make he would confine himself to the sea-going armour-plated fleet of this country, premising that we had not, in his opinion, the slightest right to object to other nations constructing vessels for purposes of defence. Now England possessed, he maintained, a sea-going armour-plated
  1200
  fleet far superior to that of any other country. He entirely concurred, he might add, in some remarks which had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckingamshire in that House, and from the Duke of Somerset in another place, to the effect that it was inexpedient to raise questions based on a comparison of the naval force of England with that of other nations with which we are allied in bonds of cordiality and amity; but the great French nation would not, he thought, object to be told that a larger proportion of its armour-plated fleet consisted of ships constructed entirely for defensive purposes, so much so that he believed a considerable number of those vessels which had been compared with ours were unable, from their construction, to bear the increased armament which now, in days when artillery had assumed so gigantic a form, was absolutely necessary to constitute an effective offensive weapon. His hon. Friend, in drawing a comparison between the French iron-clad ships and our own, set down the former at forty-two and the latter at thirty-three. But, setting aside ships on paper, and limiting the comparison to sea-going armour-plated ships, he believed he was stating the facts of the case correctly when he said that we had at the present moment nineteen first-class ships of that description, the French only sixteen; while we had of the second class seven, and the French but one; so that we had altogether twenty-six armour-plated sea-going ships, against seventeen possessed by France. In making that comparison, he had not included the Scorpion and the Wyvern, which were, he admitted, very good sea-going ships for certain purposes. He also omitted two other turret-ships, the Royal Sovereign and the Prince Albert, considering that they were not to be put in comparison with sea-going ships, being more peculiarly adapted for service in the Channel and for defensive purposes. Therefore, he said, in contradiction to the assertion of the hon. Member for Tavistock, that this country had a very considerable superiority in armour-plated sea-going ships. He would not refer to ships for defensive purposes, because with respect to them this country had no right to feel jealous of its neighbours; but if he were to make a comparison on that head, he would be able to show that this country had a considerable superiority over ships of the same class belonging to other countries. Confining, then, the comparison to sea-going vessels, which

  1201
  were the more important class of vessels for this country, he maintained that the state of the British navy did not approach to anything like the description given by the hon. Member for Tavistock. He entirely concurred in great part of the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Admiralty. With respect to the progress of armour-plated vessels in this country, it was necessary to consider, as the right hon. Gentleman had remarked, that the matter was one of experiment, and in course of time great changes had taken place. The right hon. Gentleman stated the number of iron-plated ships belonging to the French, large and small, building or built, to be fifty-eight; but, in order to make up that number it was necessary to include some old floating batteries built for the Crimean war and not very useful for any purpose now, and also two iron boats, which could be taken to pieces and put together again, and which were prepared for the Italian war, but which, fortunately, were not needed, both classes being vessels that ought by no means to enter into a comparison with the sea-going armour-plated ships of this country. Therefore, it was requisite, in making a comparison between this country and France, to take into consideration the character of the vessels compared with each other, in order to arrive at a correct conclusion as to the actual force of the navies of the two countries. After having shown that in respect to the force of the sea-going armour-plated fleets of the two countries, England was in a very superior position, he would now remark that another important point was the way in which the fleets were armed. To this matter the Duke of Somerset constantly paid a personal attention, and was the first to suggest, while the discussion about the Whitworth and Armstrong guns was going on, that the main thing was to produce a gun which should throw a heavy shot with a large charge of powder. The result of that suggestion was the introduction into the navy of the smooth-bore gun, which filled up a gap that had not been filled up before. Since that time the advance made in the construction of guns had been such that the Admiralty had been able to place on board some of Her Majesty's ships a 12-ton gun, which every one acquainted with the subject knew so well, and which was the gun fired against the turret of the Royal Sovereign. Consequently, the armament of the English fleet by means of the 12-ton gun and the 6-ton gun was
  1202
  eminently satisfactory, and when the hon. Member for Tavistock compared the number of guns belonging to the English fleet with those of the ships of another country he had compared two weapons, one of which was many times superior to the other, so that in a numerical comparison of this kind it was difficult to arrive at a correct conclusion. As the hon. Member for Tavistock said that the late Board of Admiralty should have proceeded with greater rapidity in ordering and building iron-plated ships, he desired to inquire at what particular period ought they to have done so? No doubt it would be a good thing to have at the present moment a perfect iron-plated fleet, but how was it to have been obtained? When the late Board of Admiralty came into office the whole matter was in an experimental condition. No doubt the French had the start of this country, they having ordered three iron-plated ships in 1858, and three in 1859. The first iron-plated ship belonging to this country, the Warrior, was ordered in 1859, while the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who also provided for another iron-plated ship, the Black Prince, was at the Admiralty. The Board of Admiralty which succeeded ordered in the course of the year two more iron-plated ships, and from that time forward iron-plated ships bad been ordered to such an extent that the slight start possessed by France in the construction of iron-plated ships was rapidly got the better of. Now, if at any particular moment during this experimental period—at the time, for instance, when the right hon. Member for Droitwich was in office—ten or twenty ships of the class of the Warrior had been ordered, would the House be now satisfied? Undoubtedly when the Warrior and Black Prince were ordered they were the best ships of the time, but in the present day they would have a defensive strength utterly inadequate to resist the shot now employed against iron-plated ships, and had any considerable number of them been built, this country would now be in possession of a class of vessels quite unsuited for the requirements of the present day. About last Christmas the hon. Member for Tavistock recommended to the Admiralty that six large cupola ships should be built instead of two large ones, and ten small ones; but if the Admiralty had ordered those vessels to be constructed they would have been inadequate to resist the artillery now produced. These ships were to have

  1203
  two cupolas, each cupola weighing 120 tons, the weight of the two being 240 tons; but it was found the other day that a turret much heavier than 120 tons was not strong enough to withstand the shot from a 12-ton gun. The turret of the Royal Sovereign weighed 168 tons, and the Board of Admiralty were having another turret made which would weigh 200 tons. There was no greater authority on shipbuilding than the hon. Member for Tavistock; but so recently as last Christmas he recommended the Admiralty to build six ships which, he ventured to think, it would have been a great mistake to order. He would add that the plates, the backing, and the skin of the ships proposed by the hon. Gentleman were weaker than those which had been adopted in the case of the Hercules, which had been found to resist the shots fired from the heaviest guns that had been made up to the present moment. In the target of the Royal Sovereign the iron skin was 5-8ths, the backing 18 inches, and the iron plates 4½ inches; but in the Hercules target the iron skin was 1½ inches, the teak backing was 32 inches, and the plates 8 inches and 9½ inches. He, therefore, asked the House whether it would have been right or wise of the Admiralty to have incurred a larger expenditure for the purpose of building iron-plated ships, which, he believed, if they had been constructed, would have proved very inadequate to the requirements of the present time. That remark applied with still greater force to ships constructed for coast defence; because it was of the greatest importance that you should have the largest-sized gun in these ships; and if, when the Armstrong 100-pounder was the largest of our guns, coast defence ships had been constructed which would only carry a gun of that weight, those ships would have been quite unsuitable for the 12-ton gun, not to say the 22-ton gun, which he believed would shortly be placed on board our ships. As the question of the cupola principle had been alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, he wished to say that from the first there had been no disposition on the part of the Board to prevent a practical trial of that principle. In fact, it was the Admiralty who introduced it first. Captain Coles had been in communication with the War Department on the subject of a shield, and in 1860 the Admiralty requested the War Department to hand the matter over to them. The first
  1204
  of the cupola ships, the Prince Albert, was ordered of the hon. Member for Tavistock in March, 1862, which was before the action between the Merrimac and the Monitor. She was a long time in process of construction, owing to an almost complete alteration of the system. What had been a cupola was changed by Captain Coles into a turret, and many other alterations were made during the construction of the ship. Captain Coles was one of the first who foresaw that guns of great size would ultimately be introduced, and at his suggestion turrets of larger dimensions were adopted. There could be no doubt that the Admiralty made a trial at once by ordering one ship of greater size, and constructing another for Channel service and defence purposes. From that time down to the present neither this nor any other country had produced the class of ship which we should desire to see afloat—namely, a sea-going cupola ship, carrying defensive armour of the weight which we believed now-a-days defensive armour ought to be. Captain Coles offered to do one of two things—either, in conjunction with a draughtsman, himself to prepare the lines of an iron-plated turret ship, or to prepare one in company with some eminent ship-builder. He was allowed to act on the first plan; but a committee of naval officers having examined the lines which he laid down, came to the conclusion that his vessel was open to objection on the ground that she was only a one-turret ship. That was the reason why that vessel was not constructed. They recommended the experiment of a two-turret ship; and that recommendation led to the order for the Monarch; she was now under construction, and he believed she would prove to be such a ship as that to which he had just referred as the sort of one it was desirable to see afloat. The late Board of Admiralty thought that, as a difficulty had arisen, Captain Coles should be allowed to adopt his second alternative—namely, to lay down the lines of a turret ship, in conjunction with an eminent shipbuilder. He was happy to learn that Captain Coles, having put himself in communication with the firm with which the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird) had been connected, the lines of such a ship had been produced; and if the late Board of Admiralty had remained in office they would, have brought in a supplemental Estimate in order that her construction might at once be undertaken if she met with their approval.

  1205
  He did not know that he need say anything more with reference to the remarks of the hon. Member for Tavistock (Mr. Samuda), some of whose later arguments seemed to be in contradiction to those which he had advanced in the earlier portion of his speech. The hon. Gentleman gave at the beginning of his speech a formidable account of the American iron-plated ships, but at the close he reassured the House by giving an account of the American Monitors, which did not show that those vessels would, in his opinion, be effective against us. The hon. Member also alluded in terms of great respect to the iron-plated fleets of the nations of Europe, but they knew, and the hon. Member admitted, that a great many of those ships were not of a description which the Admiralty of this country would be justified in building. The iron-plated navy of England, both collectively as a fleet, and individually with respect to the ships of which it was composed, was vastly superior to that of any other Power in the world—speaking of it as a sea-going armour-plated fleet. From what took place at the late Board of Admiralty during the very short time with which he was connected with it, he was perfectly satisfied there was no subject to which they gave a more constant and diligent attention than to their system of constructing armour-plated ships. They deliberately declined taking the course of other nations in ordering a large number of such ships at once, because they thought the question should be dealt with gradually and experimentally, and as from year to year changes were taking place, those changes should be taken advantage of so as, in the end, to establish some system that would be satisfactory, without embarking in speculations enormously expensive upon vessels which would not be a credit to the country. In conclusion, he would only add, as far as his humble opinion went in that House, he could assure the right hon. Gentleman opposite that any measures he might desire to take in connection with this subject, and which he might think necessary and advantageous, would receive his best consideration, with the fullest disposition to give them his support. Having been but a short time connected with the late Board of Admiralty, he regretted that he could not afford such ample explanations on this important matter as the noble Duke who was at its head would have been able to give had he been a Member of that House
  1206
  —for it was a question to which, during the whole time of his administration, his Grace devoted the most constant attention.
  SIR JOHN HAYhad no wish to detain the House by entering into any lengthened discussion on this interesting subject. He must, however, say that he was extremely obliged to the hon. Member for Tavistock (Mr. Samuda), himself one of the greatest authorities in the country, for having introduced the question, and he had also to thank the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken for the manner in which he had treated the subject. The hon. Gentleman began his statement by saying that the speech of the hon. Member for Tavistock rather seemed to cast some imputation on the late Board of Admiralty. Now, he (Sir John Hay) hardly thought that was the intention, but he could assure him of this—that on that side of the House there was no such feeling; and what fell from his right hon. Friend must have shown him that all the desire for the future was to derive advantage from the experiments the late Board of Admiralty made, and avail themselves of the concurrence, assistance, and support which the hon. Gentleman had promised on their behalf. No doubt there was a great necessity for increasing the force of ships in the service of this country. Although not perhaps going the length of the hon. Member for Tavistock, that we ought to have a fleet in this country quite equal to all Europe, it was quite evident the public service required in all parts of the world that the ships we sent there should be such as would be respected. Apart from the hesitation which had been very naturally and properly entertained to building ships of the new construction, and apart from the very proper economical desire not to spend money in building more wooden ships, there was this fact plain—that we had arrived at this position, that we had not got ships of the old construction, nor had we ships of the new construction; and the time had come when the Board of Admiralty must consider the question how the navy of England was to be brought up to a sufficient number of ships to perform the duties of peace in the various parts of the world. The fact was obvious from what very recently occurred in the Pacific. The United States of North America had an iron-clad ship there; the Spaniards had two or three iron-clads; the Chileans and Peruvians had iron-clad ships in their navy; and yet the navy of England in those seas was represented by wooden ships, admirably com-

  1207
  manded and manned, no doubt, but no match for any of those iron-clad ships. It could not be at all satisfactory to the country to know that our ships on distant stations were inefficient for the purposes for which they were sent to those stations, and it was necessary to have iron-clad flagships instead of wooden ships for that purpose, without diminishing the force required for the Channel and home service. The Brazilians, also, had several iron-clad ships, and yet the flag-ship and squadron of England in that part were wooden ships. On the North America and West India station we had only one partially iron-clad ship, the Favourite, that could maintain the honour of the English navy in presence of that great nation whose number of iron-clads he need not recapitulate, but which had already been stated to the House as of a most formidable character. It seemed to him, therefore, that the time had come when either we must go to the necessary expense of repairing our old wooden ships to perform inadequately the duties required of them, or make iron-clad ships, which would efficiently do the duty required of them in those distant seas. He agreed with the hon. Member for Tavistock, that it was desirable to build ships of great speed not of too large a size for this service. In that case they must sacrifice something to the weights the ship must carry. They could not have ships plated with armour, and carrying heavy guns, but of that size that they must be costly to build and maintain. The proposal of the hon. Member, however, seemed to meet the necessities of the case. He (Sir John Hay) was quite sure that a ship of thirteen or fourteen knots speed and under 3,000 tons burden could be constructed, to be armed with two turrets, carrying the haviest cannon in the world, and be perfectly able to take care of herself, while performing the duties required of her in a distant station, and although not plated with the heaviest armour, would prove thoroughly efficient to maintain the honour of the English flag. He was very glad to think that now, at last, after seven years of controversy, carried on by experiment and argument, the cupola, which had long been a pet theory of his, had arrived at the position in which it was, he believed, almost recognized as that which was to be the salvation of the navy. Speaking for himself, and not from official authority, he would say that he felt quite confident that, if they had not already solved, they were on the eve of solving the question
  1208
  of the construction of cupola sea-going ships, and he was certain when the arangements were completed both sides of the House and all degrees and orders of men in the country would approve of the conduct of the Administration which should create a sufficient number of those ships to maintain the honour of the English navy.
  MR. LAIRDbelieved that one cause of the great outlay for the navy, and of its present inefficiency, arose from the determination of the old Board of Admiralty to resist the introduction of the cupola system. His hon. Friend who had just spoken, and others also, had for long advocated the system, but it had been resisted by the Admiralty step by step and year by year. Another matter had been frequently urged by the hon. Member for Bristol (Sir Morton Peto) and also by himself, and that was the imprudent preference of the Admiralty for building wooden ships, though they were quite inefficient against the new war missiles. If the opinions of practical men out of the House, who knew the difference of cost in maintaining wooden and iron-ships, had been acted upon, the system of building wooden ships would have been abandoned long ago. The expenditure in the dockyards arose not so much from the cost of new work as from the cost of the continual repairs which were going on. The late Secretary to the Admiralty had alluded to the Scorpion and Wyvern, and he would take those vessels to illustrate the way in which things were managed in the dockyard. It had been stated by most competent men that if they were altered they would make very good sea-going ships, and would carry the heaviest offensive armament of any ships afloat of their tonnage—namely, each ship four 300-pounders; that they would have a very light draught of water, and would be made very valuable ships. He concurred in this opinion. But what had been the course of procedure at Portsmouth? The alteration of the Scorpion was ordered at the end of last year, upon which she was put into a dry dock and her deck and upper works pulled to pieces. But if the report of The Times were correct, although she might be required for service any day, no further progress had been made. Only a few thousand pounds were required to make her one of the most efficient vessels in the navy. He asked if this was a state of things the country would tolerate. He understood that the Wyvern, a sister ship, without the alterations having been

  1209
  made, which were necessary to fit her for sea-going service, had been ordered to proceed to the coast of North America; but if, on arriving at her destination, she did not answer the expectations which had been formed of her, it would not be from the want of knowledge of what was required, seeing that in November last every defect in this ship was known and reported on. He agreed with his hon. Friend that the Miantonomoh could not be numbered among the class of sea-going ships, for her speed was not more than six or eight knots an hour. Such vessels would be valuable for the defence of harbours and the coast. Many harbours were now open to attack, and a merchant the other day told him that though there was property of the value of millions at Hong Kong, there was neither a fort constructed nor a man-of-war stationed there. He regretted much that cupola ships had not been earlier adopted, but, nevertheless, did not agree in all that had been said on this point. Of their general qualities there had been ample experience, for such vessels had made voyages across the Atlantic, and Captain Osborn two or three years ago presented a report respecting the Royal Sovereign which should have been sufficient to have induced the Admiralty to proceed in their construction. He had often pressed upon the Government the necessity of having cupola ships at foreign stations. They went at great speed, carried heavy guns, and as two-thirds of the usual crew would be sufficient to man them, a great saving would be effected by their adoption as contrasted with broadside vessels. The House had been informed by the late Government that they were about to build six wooden vessels of the Amazon class; they were to be similar to the Alabama, possessing great speed, and intended for the protection of our commerce. He trusted the new Board would thoroughly investigate the subject of proceeding with the construction of wooden vessels, and then he believed they would see reason for putting a stop to the enormous amount of repairs which were annually going on. Old wooden hulks, after alterations entailing great expenditure, were being put to sea, though they never could be a match for the armour-plated ships of other nations. Instead of continuing this process, he hoped a number of small armour-plated vessels carrying the heaviest guns suitable for foreign stations would be constructed. He did not think
  1210
  so many of large size and the thickest armour were at present requisite, because ships with eight or nine inch armour-plating were not to be met with in all parts of the world. He anticipated most satisfactory results from the recent change in the Admiralty, and he believed that in a few years the House would wonder why the old system of wooden shipbuilding had not been abandoned earlier.
  SIR MORTON PETOsaid, he was glad to find that that question was regarded by the House as one removed beyond the reach of mere party politics. He could state for himself that although he sat on the Opposition Benches, he rejoiced to see the change which had just been made in the Board of Admiralty, and he was exceedingly glad to see his right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) in the position he at present occupied. He was unable to look back to any period during the last six years with any degree of satisfaction at the course the Admiralty had pursued, for never had they kept pace with the improvements in science and the progressive spirit of the age. From the discussions which had taken place in that House, it was evident that the adoption of the cupola had been forced upon the Admiralty, and that the claims of Captain Coles had only been recognized when it was felt that they could no longer be ignored. The question the House was now discussing was one of the utmost importance. The present humiliation of Austria was owing to her not having kept pace with science. Whether regard was had to the army or the navy, the public would never have confidence in any Administration that was not prepared to take advantage of every scientific discovery, from whatever quarter it might come, and that did not place the honour and well-being of England above every other consideration. He trusted his right hon. Friend opposite would not be governed by a single mind, however experienced it might be. In these days, when science had such an immense range, and practical skill had such enormous results, no Board of Admiralty was safe which did not accept information, no matter whence it came, whether from official sources or not. During his recent visit to the United States, he inspected the dockyard and other arrangements of that country, and had examined the whole system of naval administration, and it was scarcely possible to conceive anything more humiliating to an Englishman than the superiority of that

  1211
  system to the one adopted in our own country. Their navy, however, was not in a position to compete with us, for their seventy vessels were chiefly constructed for operations on the coast during the late civil war, and, though the Miantonomoh was visiting our shores, they were not thoroughly sea-going vessels. The American position was nevertheless a very powerful one, and we had no ship in the Pacific which could contend with the Monadnock. Moreover, the noble Lord who for the last few years had been at the head of the Admiralty (Lord Clarence Paget) was now on board a vessel in the Mediterranean which, though well adapted for hospitality, but with which he would at once go into harbour, and the crew of which he would disband, if we were engaged in a war with any great naval Power. Surely, however, ships should be constructed for fighting, and it was high time that these questions were grasped by the Admiralty, connected as they were with the honour and well-being of the country. He (Sir Morton Peto) did not indeed agree with the hon. Member for Tavistock that we ought to have a fleet equal to the united vessels of all the other Powers in Europe; but he thought that we ought to have a fleet able to meet the forces of any two Powers that might combine against us, and it should be adequately represented in every part of the world, so as to protect our commerce. This was not our present position, but he trusted that the right hon. Baronet (Sir John Pakington) would so utilize the recess, and would so frame the next year's Estimates, as to show that the honour of the country was safe in his hands. They were told that a certain number of vessels were to be built of the Alabama class; but one of those ships—the Amazon—had been destroyed within the last few days, in consequence of her coming in contact with a mercantile vessel, and she could not, in point of fact, be regarded as at all a war ship. He hoped the advice of the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Laird) on this point would be adopted, for it was much cheaper in the long run to put aside vessels which would never be efficient than to spend more money in completing what ought never to have been commenced. There was another point to which he wished to call the attention of his right hon. Friend, and that was the state of our dockyards. He regarded the management of our dockyards as a disgrace to the country. He
  1212
  believed that there was nothing more profligate in the shape of expenditure in any nation in Europe. We got hardly any return for our money, because we were continually altering and repairing, and the consideration which appeared to influence the authorities was not how much ought to be expended, but how many men could be employed. He felt convinced that if an examination were instituted into the results obtained by the £50,000,000 or £60,000,000 spent by the late Board of Admiralty during the last six years, it would be found that we had got very little value for our money. We had no force in the Mediterranean or on other foreign stations adequate to the maintenance of our national position. A grave responsibility rested on the new Board, and he would promise the right hon. Baronet that those on that side of the House who dealt with practical questions would render him their cordial support, irrespective of party considerations, if they found him studying improvement and efficiency, and desirous of placing the navy in a satisfactory condition.
  LORD JOHN HAYsaid, he thought that Englishmen who compared their own navy with that of the United States need feel no humiliation or alarm. The whole of the United States navy, with a very few exceptions, had been built within the last few years, and had been built by one half of the country for the purpose of subduing the other half, and without any reference to the exigencies of foreign service. These States had at present only about five in-clad sea-going vessels. Out of the many iron-clads vessels belonging to the United States, he would take as a specimen the Roanoake. That vessel rolls so much in a slight swell that great apprehensions had been felt for her safety. There were five or six vessels of the same character as the Miantonomoh. Now that was a class of vessels which could not give us much apprehensions. The Miantonomoh might be found very useful if she arrived safely at her destination, but as a sea-going ship those who knew her best considered it dangerous to trust her across the Atlantic without being attended, as she was, by two vessels of another class. The greater proportion of their seventy-five vessels were well adapted for cruizing along the coast, and going up rivers or creeks, but were not always successful in keeping afloat when engaged, according to report. Well, if that were the case, he

  1213
  did not think that we had any right to feel humiliated at the prospect of being outnumbered by the American Government so far as iron-clad vessels were concerned. What had happened to the Amazon showed the advantage of waiting, and not completing ships hurriedly, and there was now an opportunity of securing greater speed and efficiency. The vessels of this class were not intended to compete with the large American ships of 3,000 tons—other vessels having been devised by the Admiralty for this purpose, and the construction of one having been already ordered. As to the criticisms of the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird) on the speed of the Amazon, it should be remembered that it was greater than that of the Alabama, which was, nevertheless, thought a very fast vessel, and which rendered such great service to the Confederate States. Reference had been made to Captain Coles, whom he admired very much, but he wished to express his opinion that he had been by no means a persecuted man. He was not one of those who disliked turret vessels, but, at the same time, he did not think they would ever occupy a very large space in the navy, not even if the present First Lord of the Admiralty continued in his office for a long time. He believed turret vessels would be found useful for coast defence, but he did not agree with his hon. and gallant Friend opposite that it was an easy matter to make a sea-going turret-ship. Until they could make turret-ships capable of going comparatively long voyages it would be inexpedient, in his opinion, to continue building them largely. He did not think that Captain Coles had been treated in a manner otherwise than was due to him. That gentleman had been somewhat at fault in his correspondence with the Admiralty; probably he was irritated that everyone did not at once appreciate the qualities of his invention; but, whatever the cause, he said and did many things which would have been better left undone. On the whole, he was of opinion after a careful perusal of the whole of the correspondence that Captain Coles had very little to complain of. He (Lord John Hay) confessed he could not join with the hon. Member who made the Motion under consideration, in the alarm and terror which evidently inspired him when he remarked that other nations were building fleets as well as ourselves. He felt with his hon. Friend who had spoken in behalf of the late Government, that it was scarcely possible
  1214
  England would find herself pitted against the whole world, and that the late Government could not be blamed for having failed to provide for a contingency which no one had anticipated. The last speaker seemed to imagine that the dockyards were very expensively worked. Similar statements had often been made before; but in no case had the allegations been substantiated by facts. As he had been so short a time in office with the late Government, he could not take credit to himself for anything that had been done in the Department; but he could bear testimony to the care with which the accounts of the dockyards had been managed by the arrangements set on foot by the late Board. Although no doubt improvements could still be made in the management, it was now more perfect than it had ever been before, and he was of opinion that the present Board of Admiralty was quite as able as any other to make what further improvement was necessary in the administration of the Department.
  SIR MORTON PETOexplained that when he said England's position was humiliating, he referred to the management of her dockyards, and not to her navy, as compared with the navy of other nations.
  MR. GRAVESsaid, he considered that this was a question of the deepest interest. But there was one point of great importance, especially in connection with seagoing vessels, which had not been touched upon, and that was the construction of vessels and machinery with a view to the economy of fuel. Allusion had been made to American vessels, and especially to the Miantonomoh, which it was important to notice had steamed the whole way from New York to Ireland, notwithstanding her small size, maintaining throughout an average of eight knots. He very much doubted whether we had any vessels in our service, either large or small, capable of steaming from England to New York. As one having had some experience in connection with steam vessels of the most improved type, he highly commended the new class of machinery coming into extensive use in the merchant service, as tending to economize fuel to a most important extent. He feared sufficient attention had not been given to this point in the designing of our fleet, as very few of our ships could keep under full steaming power beyond some six or seven days. The most recently constructed, the Bellerophon, could not carry fuel for more than four or

  1215
  five days, so great was her consumption. Some experiments had been made by the Admiralty and exhibited with remarkable clearness the economizing qualities of the different kinds of machinery. Engines of the improved type to which he was alluding were ordered by the Admiralty in 1860. They were placed in the Constance in 1863. In 1865 they were tested and experiments made to try the steaming powers of three vessels constructed very much on the same principles—namely, the Constance, the Octavia, and the Liverpool. The conditions laid down were that those vessels were to run 100 miles at ten knots an hour, then to run at eight knots; and lastly to run at the rate of six knots an hour. The three started together, and whilst running the distance at ten knots an hour the consumption of fuel used by them was as follows:— The Constance fourteen tons, the Octavia 18 tons, and the Liverpool 32 tons. In the race at 8 knots the consumption was for the Constance 9 tons, the Octavia 14 tons, and the Liverpool 23 tons. In the race of six knots an hour the consumption of coal was—the Constance 4 tons, the Octavia 4 tons, and the Liverpool 12 tons. This was the relative consumption of coal by those vessels during the ten hours' steaming, and he obtained the results of these trials from the columns of The Times. A further trial was deemed indispensable, and a paper which had been presented to Parliament, in accordance with his Motion, gave the results of the trial of the Constance with the Octavia and Arethusa, three vessels as nearly identical in build, displacement, and speed as it was possible to get them, but each having different kinds of engines. The Constance had the same as was tried in her before; the others had engines such as were more commonly used in the Government vessels, and all had, as nearly as possible, the same quantity of fuel put on board. The three vessels started on the afternoon of the 30th September, at six p.m., for Madeira. The result was—the Constance arrived at Madeira, having steamed the whole way, on the 7th October at three o'clock p.m., the Octavia on the 9th October, at forty-five minutes past six o'clock, having on the 6th October stopped her engines with only fifteen tons of fuel; and the Arethusa arrived at Madeira on the 10th October, having stopped her engines on the 6th October, with only thirty-one tons of fuel remaining. Now, he should have thought
  1216
  that those trials would have been followed up by further experiments if any doubt existed as to the superiority of the principle on which the Constance's engines were designed. In place of that those vessels were dispersed to various parts of the globe, nothing further was done in the way of experiment, and up to this hour not another engine like the Constance's was ordered. He mentioned those facts with the view of inducing the Board of Admiralty to investigate this question of fuel economy on board our steamers as thoroughly as possible. He spoke from no small experience being connected with a company having sixteen sets of these engines running on the West Coast of South America, where fuel was a matter of importance, and he did not hesitate to tell the House that their adoption had made that company a highly prosperous one. He would take one of their vessels of 2,000 tons called the Limena, of 400 nominal horsepower, and 1,600 tons. That vessel went from Liverpool to Valparaiso, a distance of over 8,900 miles, in 31 days and 4 hours, with 973 tons of coal on board, and steamed the entire distance at the rate of 9¼ miles per ton of coal, its average speed throughout the passage being 12 knots per hour. He would take another vessel, the Payta, of 1,822 tons, which steamed from Panama to Valparaiso, a distance of 6,000 miles, on 430 tons of coal, running 13¾ miles for every ton of coal on board, its average speed throughout the passage being 10 knots per hour. To show the House even more plainly the difference between the old and the new types of engines, he would merely instance one vessel that originally had engines of the old type, but that was now provided with engines of the new type, in fact, it was found to be economy to discard any engine of the type usually in use and replace them with the double cylinders. Formerly, with her old engines, the vessel used to consume 1,226 tons of coal, where now she made the same voyage upon 663 tons, and in shorter time. It would be apparent that that, putting expense altogether out of the question, was an additional guarantee for and element of strength in the power of those vessels. The matter was one, of deep interest, and he thought it was a fair subject for the consideration of the Board of Admiralty. He thought it was the duty of those who were charged with the construction of our fleet to have taken more pains to satisfy themselves as to the merits

  1217
  of these engines, and whether they did not combine all the requirements of the service with an economy of fuel which would give an advantage to our ships, scarcely secondary to the best guns or armour-plating. The subject, he believed, had not yet had the consideration which it ought to have had, and he hoped the Admiralty would not object to take a lesson from the mercantile marine, and from the results achieved by the Constance since when great improvements had been made in the carrying out the principle of the double cylinder engines.
  MR. ALDERMAN LUSKasked the Government to remember economy when dealing with this subject. From all that had been said it might be imagined that we had not a ship fit for service, and if that were the case he would ask what we had done with the £12,000,000 per annum which had been expended on our navy during the past fifty years? It was absurd to go on building numbers of large and expensive vessels which might become obsolete almost before they were finished. He hoped we should never have another war, and never need our navy, except for the purpose of protecting our commerce in such waters as the China seas, where it was threatened with pirates. He hoped the Admiralty would be economical, and do their duty well, and he was sure that if they did not it would not be for the want of plenty of good and cheap advice.

  FOREIGN POLICY.—QUESTION.
  MR. LAINGtook this opportunity of putting the Question which stood in his name to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Having a lively recollection that this country drifted into the Russian war chiefly owing to a want of frank communication between the Government and Parliament of the time in the earlier stages of diplomatic negotiations, he thought the House would be neglecting its duty if it did not obtain from Her Majesty's Government some definite assurance as to the course they intended to pursue with regard to our foreign relations in the present critical state of Continental affairs. On the other hand, having a confident feeling that the assurance they would receive from the noble Lord would be satisfactory, he wished to avoid, if possible, making any form of Motion in the shape of an Address or Resolution which might have the effect of hampering the
  1218
  Government in any of its negotiations with foreign Powers, a result which be would be the very last to bring about. He felt the more confident that the assurance the House would receive from the noble Lord would be satisfactory, inasmuch as the country had had already some intimation that the Government intended to adopt a general policy of non-intervention. Both the noble Earl at the head of the Government, in another place, and the noble Lord opposite (the Secretary for Foreign Affairs), in addressing his constituents, had defined the meaning they attached to a policy of non-intervention in terms in which he (Mr. Laing) cordially concurred. He agreed with those noble Lords that a policy of non-intervention did not mean a policy of peace at any price under any circumstances, but a sensible determination not unnecessarily to mix ourselves up in foreign complications, a resolution which it was practicable for an insular nation like this to carry out. Notwithstanding all he had heard that night, he believed the British nation to be sufficiently strong not to feel nervous or alarmed at any complications that might occur on the Continent, as long as she could keep herself from becoming a party to them. If her honour or her interests were touched, of course this country would know how to defend them, but as long as these were unassailed it was her policy to propagate her ideas rather by commerce and by civilization than by the sword. He was glad to find that the noble Lords added to their admirable enunciation of the principles of non-intervention the very important supplement that if we do not mean to interfere by force we should abstain as far as possible from proffering useless advice, and thus avoid mixing ourselves up in affairs which we did not intend to carry into execution—or, in other words, that "we should not bark when we don't intend to bite." By following that course the country would avoid the difficulties which beset her in connection with Poland and Denmark, as her interference on behalf of those countries only brought additional disaster upon those whom she wished to befriend, and some degree of discredit on ourselves. The general principles of nonintervention having been so fully assented to, all that remained for the House to do was to ask for some assurance that those principles would be kept in view and would be practically applied to existing circumstances. He thought it might safely be

  1219
  assumed that after the experience this country had had, and after so full a recognition of the principles of non-intervention by that House and by the country generally, no Government would willingly and with its eyes open, adopt a policy of intervention, and if, unfortunately, we did find ourselves entangled in foreign complications, the danger would approach in some insidious form which we should believe we had no reason to dread. He thought the most dangerous form in which intervention could be disguised was that of mediation. He did not mean to say that under no possible or conceivable circumstances were we to offer to mediate between contending countries, but merely that we should beware of it as being intervention in its most seductive form. The natural and humane desire participated in by all to stop the effusion of blood and a wish to keep up the influence of the country in Europe, combined with the traditions and pre-possessions of the Foreign Office, which taught that the honour of the country was lost if we did not exchange a certain amount of correspondence with other countries whenever a fresh settlement took place in Europe, rendered that office peculiarly inclined to offer the mediation of this country in cases of foreign disputes. Whilst mediation presented itself in that seductive form it was clear that in the great majority of cases it was open to the greatest possible dangers. Mediation might answer very well in cases where a quarrel arose out of a point of honour, or where no great interest was at stake, in such a case, for instance, as in the trumpery dispute which took place some time since between this country and Brazil in consequence of the arrest of two of our midshipmen when in plain clothes; but where great national interests and principles were at stake, it was scarcely possible to conceive that active mediation might not become intervention on one side or the other. Proposals of mediation had recently been before the world which it was apparent, if carried out and acted upon, would have been tantamount to the most direct and active intervention in the present quarrel, on one side or the other. Another great danger to be apprehended from forcible and threatening mediation on the part of some great neutral Power was the tendency it had to patch up a hollow peace, and thus, in the desire to avoid the effusion of blood at the moment, the belligerent Powers were left in a position which rendered a future war at no very distant
  1220
  period almost inevitable. Thus, even unarmed mediation was often calculated to involve the country tendering it in great and unforeseen complications. He need not go very far back in the past to find instances in illustration of his remarks. Had this country, in its anxiety to stop the effusion of blood, offered mediation after the battle of Solferino, in the Italian war of 1859, how greatly we should have been involved in the present complication! We should have been obliged to become parties to the Treaty of Zurich, and have been entangled in the question of the annexation of Savoy and Nice in a manner which might have endangered our friendly relations in quarters in which it was most important for us to preserve them. Again, take the case of the American war. If we had mediated between North and South, what complications, embarrassments, and difficulties any such mediation would have given rise to! Having pointed out the probable results of mediation, he would proceed to apply the principles he had laid down to the present aspect of affairs, and he believed that there never was a juncture at which they applied with greater force. What was the question really at issue in the war on the Continent? He thought that war was a most remarkable instance of the way in which Providence frequently overruled events for great purposes. Out of an almost imperceptible quarrel, out of a cloud no bigger than a man's hand, had sprung a disastrous war, in which were involved the largest and widest questions affecting nationalities and the territory of Empires. The questions at issue in the present war evidently were, whether we should have an independent Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, and whether they should have an united Germany, constituted as one great political body. He had never, at least in the House of Commons, been disposed to regard the question of nationalities as one of sentiment. Not that he was indifferent to these great movements—not that individually be did not feel a strong sympathy with the countrymen of Dante and Michael Angelo, of Göethe and Schiller, and wish that they could have the same national unity as more favourable circumstances had secured for the countrymen of Shakespeare and Milton. But sympathy was out of place in the expression of opinion in the House of Commons. What they had to look to was the solid and substantial political interest of those countries with regard to the state of Con-

  1221
  tinental politics. Now, the interest of this country with regard to Continental politics was, in the first place, that there should be a steady and effectual balance of power in Europe; and, in the next place, that this balance of power should be so arranged in respect of territorial limits and nationalities as to afford fair hope of a permanent and stable settlement in Europe. He did not use this phrase, "the balance of power," in the old sense of perpetual interference with every little change that took place upon the Continent. The distinctive characteristic of modern European civilization was the establishment of several independent families of nations. There was not, as in the Roman Empire or in China, one great stereotyped system, but several independent national existences had sprung into being, each with a life of its own, and each independent of the other. Our greatest wars had been in aid of European Confederations against some attempt by one aggressive Power to establish an overwhelming preponderance in Europe. Such were the wars in which we took part against Philip II., Louis Quatorze, and Napoleon. England always headed the combination of independent States which warred to vindicate the system of independent nations. Our interest, therefore, was for the establishment of such a broad, substantial balance of power, and such an adjustment of the nations, that no one Government should find, in the divisions and the weakness of its neighbours, a temptation to go beyond its own territory, and aspire for more than its own proper share of influence in the Councils of Europe. That was the object sought for by the Treaties of 1815, but no one who had watched the history of Europe since that time could say that that settlement had been either a satisfactory or a permanent one. He had heard those treaties commended on the ground that, though they might have violated the rights of nations and the principles of justice, at any rate they had given us half a century of peace. But the assertion was quite inaccurate. From 1815 down to 1830 they gave us, indeed, a precarious peace, because the great military States which formed the Holy Alliance were then all-powerful in Europe. But that short and uneasy peace was interrupted by a war in Spain, the suppression of a constitutional movement in Naples, and the crushing out of all the aspirations of the great German nation for constitutional freedom. Since that period
  1222
  there had been two great European revolutions, a succession of wars, and finally, what was almost worse than war, an armed peace, which was ruinous to the resources of almost every country in Europe, and was fast leading them to the verge of bankruptcy. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his Budget speech, gave a very striking and instructive picture of the result of this system upon the National Debt of various European countries. From his statement it appeared that the National Debt of nine of the principal countries of Europe had accumulated by no less a sum than £1,500,000,000; that the great bulk of this debt had accumulated in time of peace; and that six of those countries had managed to increase their debts during peace at the rate of £61,000,000 a year. He (Mr. Laing) once had occasion to go into some statistical calculations of the amount expended during the ten years preceding 1863 either in war or by exaggerated armaments beyond the scale of former years, due to the apprehension of war, and he found that the sum thus spent during these ten years was not less than £1,000,000,000. That expenditure had been going on at an accelerated pace of late; and, with the solitary exception of England, he believed it had led all the countries of Europe into a condition from which there was no outlet but that of financial bankruptcy or such a settlement of the affairs of Europe as would justify moderate armaments and reduced expenditure. Again, looking at the question as one not of money but of life, it would be found according to the statistical researches of a learned German, that between 1815 and 1864 no fewer than 2,225,000 persons had lost their lives in war, and these were Europeans, for the calculation did not include Asiatics and others who had perished by war during the same period. He simply mentioned these facts to show that there now existed in Europe what might be called an unstable equilibrium. It was a state of things in which the resources of peace were wasted in war, or the preparations for war, and which had now become almost intolerable. The reason why the Treaties of 1815 had failed to secure an effectual settlement of Europe was not hard to find. Those treaties were founded on artificial as against natural rights; they were founded on the claims of princes as against those of peoples; and they ignored altogether the principle of

  1223
  nationalities. He knew that some Gentlemen thought that the question of nationalities was a very disagreeable one, and that nationalities were very unreasonable for not allowing themselves to be entirely suppressed—a result which would certainly save a great deal of trouble. But the prominence of the nationality question now-a-days was, to a great extent, the inevitable result of modern progress and civilization. You could not extend education and the press, you could not introduce railways, steamboats, telegraphs, and cheap postage into a country without bringing together people who spoke a common language or felt that they had common interests and ought to be a common nation. Another reason why the feeling of nationality in modern times had become stronger than before was that, owing to the improved modern armaments, small States could no longer maintain a position of secure independence. They had now lost much of their relative importance. The days had gone by when a handful of brave men under a Leonidas or a Miltiades could resist the wealth and resources of a Persian Empire. However great their valour, Armstrong guns, shot, and shell, would clear them all away. For the solid independence of any people it was necessary that they should be formed into a considerable political State. Now, the present great Continental struggle raised in the broadest way the question of a new European settlement, based on nationalities, and the mediation of any neutral Power not implicated which tended to an imperfect settlement of this question, smothering it up and putting it out of sight for the moment, would produce results diametrically opposed to those which we ought to desire. It was infinitely better that the feeling which, right or wrong, had been raised in Italy and Germany should be so settled by Italians and Germans themselves as to give hopes of a lasting peace hereafter. Well, everything indicated that, if there was no interference by other Powers with the natural course of events, the result would be the establishment of a great independent Italy and Germany. Viewing this result by the practical tests which he had tried to apply, it would, in his opinion, be one eminently favourable to the interests of Great Britain. With regard to the balance of power, was it not notorious in history that the effacement of Germany, owing to the duality of Austria and Prussia, and the division
  1224
  into small and insignificant kingdoms had been the cause of the greatest wars which had been witnessed in Europe? The Thirty Years' War, the War of the Succession, the Seven Years' War, all originated in that specific cause, and were wars fought between the two factions into which Germany had been split. Even the Continental wars in which England was engaged were brought about indirectly by the powerless, because divided, condition of Germany, which led certain European States to entertain schemes of aggrandizement and ambition that would never have been entertained if Germany had been strong and united. In considering the balance of power it was not unimportant to remember that the North of Germany, which would constitute one strong political body, would be, like ourselves, a Protestant Power. Happily, the days were over when war was waged for religion. Still, taking a comprehensive view of the situation of Europe and the prospects of a substantial and permanent balance of power, it was important that since two of the great Continental States, France and Austria, and several of the States next in rank, such as Italy and Spain, Bavaria and Belgium, were Catholic, we should not remain the only great Protestant Power in Europe. More especially would that be desirable as the other Protestant Powers which used to form a counterpoise to the Catholic Sovereigns bad, owing to various circumstances, lost their relative importance. Sweden, Denmark, Holland, the great Protestant Powers leagued with us on former occasions, were no longer of the same weight in the scale of politics; while a great North German Power, being Protestant, would, with ourselves, establish a very fair equilibrium, religious as well as political. With regard to Italy, and speaking with a view only to the balance of power, he held that the creation of as many independent Powers as possible in the Mediterranean—a sea in which we should never claim a preponderance—would be greatly for the benefit of this country. In that point of view he looked upon the establishment of the Italian kingdom as favourable to the balance of power. Then nothing could tend to promote the prospects of a permanent and stable equilibrium in which we might hope to see disarmaments effected more than the establishment of these great nationalities. Germany and Italy, if once constituted great nations, must be Conservative. It was hardly within

  1225
  the scope of imagination to conceive Italy crossing the Alps to attack 35,000,000 of Frenchmen or 45,000,000 of Germans. The Germans, on the other hand, would form a complete nationality, and would have no motive for passing beyond their own frontiers to win territory inhabited by people of a different race. The Germans were like ourselves a sober and peace-loving people, and, however warlike on a great occasion, more likely to prosecute the pursuits of peaceful industry than of grasping ambition. If, therefore, those nationalities were established, we might fairly look forward to the time when the equilibrium in the politics of Europe would enable us to escape from a false position to reduce our excessive armaments, to avoid panics, and to enjoy a real instead of an armed peace. Our interest in such a state of things was by no means a selfish one, because, if we felt the pressure in a slight degree other countries, such as France, Russia, and Spain, felt it in a much greater. These nations had a vital interest in such a settlement of Europe as might enable us to turn our swords into pruning-hooks, and permanently to cultivate the arts of peace. Finally, a real settlement of the great question now raised might, not by the intervention of Foreign Powers, but by the action of the parties themselves, prove to be for the true interest of that Power which might at first sight seem to suffer by it—namely, Austria. Her true position lay towards the East. Any one who knew anything about the condition of the Austrian Empire must be aware what a vast fertile territory spread out in Hungary and along the valley of the Danube. There was to be found ample scope for creating an Empire greater than already existed within Austrian limits. The true mission of Austria was in the cultivation of those vast regions which had been wasted by the protracted wars between Turkey and Christendom. Nothing could be more injurious to her interests than the establishment of peace through the intervention of a Power induced to interfere by the cession of Venetia. But that was a question for Austria, not for us. His great object in asking the present question was to obtain in that House an official assurance somewhat in the nature of that given unofficially by the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary to his constituents the other day. He would not ask or expect the Government to give any absolute pledge under no circumstances whatever to be
  1226
  parties to any scheme of mediation. But the House might receive an assurance that nothing in the nature of armed mediation would be assented to by the Government without consulting the House of Commons. The House ought also to be assured that any scheme of mediation on which they might embark should be accompanied by such reservations made to foreign Powers as might leave the Government free, if at any time they found themselves drawn into a position where more active intervention on their part might possibly be sought. [Lord STANLEY: Hear, hear!] In giving that assurance the Government would not diminish the real weight of this country in any negotiations. On the contrary, if beyond all reasonable expectations any contingency should arise out of the present state of European politics in which the interests of England were really affected, if Her Majesty's Government called Parliament together without regarding any inconvenience which might arise from the season of the year, and stated frankly the reasons which led them to the conclusion that active intervention was demanded, then he felt persuaded that Parliament and the country would be disposed to go with them hand in hand in taking whatever steps might be necessary for vindicating the interests of this country. The old martial spirit of England was far from being extinct if solid reasons could be shown for a just and necessary war, and we were just as ready to go into it heartily—Parliament, Government, and people, all united—as we were determined to carry out the principles of non-intervention as long as we did not feel an imperative necessity calling on us to depart from them. It was with that view that he begged to ask the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he can give the House an assurance that no step will be taken which might commit this country to any intervention in the war now proceeding on the Continent without giving Parliament a previous opportunity of expressing its opinion as to the policy of such intervention?
  MR. HORSMAN: It may be for the convenience of the House, as the noble Lord to whom my hon. Friend has addressed this question cannot rise to speak a second time, that I should now introduce the subject which stands in my name on the paper. It is only the consideration that it is for the general convenience that

  1227
  the discussion on foreign affairs should be continuous and uninterrupted that I am induced to interpose between the House and the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Watkin), who has a Motion to make of great interest to other hon. Members as well as to himself. I beg, therefore, to tender my acknowledgments to my hon. Friend for allowing me to rise before him. I have been anxious to put certain questions to the noble Lord, because I feel that this is a very critical moment in Continental Councils, and that the war which is now raging in Central Europe may either be brought to an early and durable peace, or may be so dealt with by other Powers as to acquire larger dimensions, and involve all Europe in its flames. England is as yet neutral, but she is not unconcerned, and if this war spread, she may be more than interested, she may be materially affected. It is for that reason that I feel that on this occasion it is desirable to have some discussion, because one of those contingencies which my hon. Friend regards with so much alarm has already occurred—the intervention of England has already or is about to be invoked by one of the neutral Powers, and when the diplomacy of England is called into action it is the duty of Parliament to express its sentiments, and, if need be, to extract the sentiments of the Government. I am anxious to extract its sentiments because the incidents of this war have been so rapid that they have absolutely confounded the Councils of the neutral Powers, and while they are doubting and hesitating I feel that a timely declaration of the views of the English Cabinet, especially if found to be in accordance with the sentiments of Parliament, may go far towards confirming hesitating Councils and promoting that which we all desire—the re-establishment of peace. Now, there has been a great and unlooked-for change in the situation since the discussion raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Kinglake) on the impending war about five or six weeks ago. Sir, we felt, at that time, that Prussia and Italy were the aggressors and peace-breaking Powers, and there was a universal sympathy with Austria, because she was the Power in whose moderation and forbearance we discerned a sincere desire for the preservation of the general peace. There was a sympathy with Austria, because—and it is an honour to us rather than a reproach—that in every Continental struggle, when opposing principles
  1228
  are at stake, Englishmen will have their sympathies, and those sympathies will find a voice in the House of Commons, and more especially as we know that foreign Powers will construe the diplomacy of England by the utterances in Parliament. I say, therefore, that when this German-Italian question was last before the House my sympathy as between Austria and Italy was, as it always has been, entirely on the side of Italy, and as between Austria and Prussia—Prussia represented by Count Bismarck—my sympathies were wholly on the aide of Austria. It was impossible for the friends of Italy not to regret, and, to some extent, to blame the determination of Italy to attack Austria, and so to precipitate a sanguinary war; but, at the same time, we could not be blind to the fact that the relations between Austria and Italy were rather those of an armed truce than a settled peace. Austria has never recognized the kingdom of Italy. Austria was one of the great obstacles to the evacuation of Rome. It was Austria that compelled Italy to keep up her great armaments, which exhausted her resources, and impoverished finance, and it was, in fact, the strong and irresistible crush of public feeling against Austria that drove on the King of Italy and his Ministers to make that attack which we all deprecated. But, as regards Prussia, there was no such excuse. On the part of Prussia it seemed to be a deliberate and wanton aggression, without cause and without excuse, and by a Minister whom we then regarded as rash and reckless, and who had shown himself the enemy of liberty at home and of national rights abroad. And therefore the general opinion of Englishmen at that time might have been summed up in one sentence—a hearty desire that the war might be limited to a short campaign, at the termination of which we might see Italy in possession of Venice and au Austrian army quartered at Berlin. But all this is now changed. Events have falsified every calculation. A campaign of ten days paved the way for greater changes in Europe than had been made since 1815. Germany was revolutionized in a shorter time than we took in England to construct a Cabinet, and Austria, defeated and helpless, retiring from Italy, flying from Germany, and trembling for her capital, addressed herself to France, and appealed for her interposition. And France, to the astonishment of all the world, and probably to no one more than her Emperor, unheeded by Prussia, re-

  1229
  buffed by Italy, turned to England and asked for her co-operation to save Austria by staying the progress of the victorious armies that had routed and were pursuing her. Now, Sir, I think we have reason to be well pleased that the Emperor of the French has addressed—if he has yet addressed—this invitation to England. I know it must place our Government in a position of great difficulty, and, as regards the Emperor of the French, in a position of great delicacy; but I have no doubts as to the result. I believe we shall find the Emperor of the French at this conjuncture a man of great sagacity and moderation, and I place great confidence in the noble Lord who is intrusted with the administration of our foreign affairs. I read with great pleasure the speech which the noble Lord lately addressed to his constituents at Lynn, in which he stated his views of the relations and duties of England to foreign Powers. And I saw with pleasure that the noble Lord in his first official utterances was at pains to repudiate all sympathy with those who maintain that England has no concern in Continental affairs. That doctrine of non-intervention to which my hon. Friend has just alluded debars us, and very properly, from all interference with the internal affairs of other States, and where English interests are not concerned we are equally bound to abstain from all interference, unasked, with their external relations. But the interests of England are, however, so varied and widespread, and so easily affected by troubles in all quarters of the globe, that I hold it to be the first duty of an English Minister to study to maintain the influence of England at the highest point in every Cabinet of Europe, and, remembering that England is a great Power, and with a responsibility equal to her power, our Minister should be ready—nay anxious, to cooperate, in all times and all places, in every work by which he can promote the interests of liberty and progress combined with peace. I must presume that the Emperor of the French is addressing himself to England for a no less worthy object, and with the knowledge that the co-operation of England can only be given by a strict adherence to English policy. Now, I do not know—and if I did know, I should not put the question to the noble Lord—the precise nature of the communications that have passed between France and England. Some weeks ago it was stated in journals which are understood
  1230
  to speak with authority that a joint note had been addressed by France, Russia, and England to the belligerent Powers. But as there has been no confirmation of this statement I suppose it was unfounded. Nor has it transpired on either side of the Channel that there has been any official invitation addressed by one Government to the other. I should rather suppose that there have been certain preliminary communications, and that, in fact, the Emperor of the French has sounded the English Cabinet to know how far and for what purpose they might accept an invitation to a joint action, and probably, if these communications are still going on, it will add rather to the interest and utility of the present discussion. My hon. Friend has some idea of mediation, and one of the rumours is that France has invited England to join her in a friendly mediation. If so, I can anticipate the answer of the noble Lord—that a friendly mediation in the midst of a war is a call on the victorious Power to desist. Again, it has been said that the Emperor of the French was meditating an armed mediation. But our Foreign Minister would of course tell him that an armed intervention by France at the present moment would be giving the signal for a European war. And therefore I assume that the Emperor of the French would not seek the co-operation of England unless he had determined to abjure all such designs. But, for some purpose or other, the joint action of England will be invited by France, and whether that invitation has been received or is only on its way, there are two questions which will present themselves to the mind of the English Minister. First, are the relations of England to the belligerent Powers the same as those of France? And secondly, are England's views of policy as regards those Powers identical with those of France? Now, both these questions must at the first blush be answered in the negative, although I am prepared to hear that the British Cabinet has received such assurances from France as will greatly modify the situation—and first, as to our relations with those Powers; they are very different from those of France. France, by accepting Venetia, has departed from her neutrality. Austria's object in ceding Venetia was to release the Austro-Italian army, and enable it to reinforce Benedek, and thus, by accepting that cession, the Emperor of the French did, in effect, send a reinforcement of 150,000 men to the

  1231
  relief of Austria. In so doing he abandoned his neutrality, and became the ally of Austria and the enemy of Italy, and therefore it would be impossible for England to act with him or to recognize him as a neutral Power. But, on the other hand, our Government may have received, and I hope they have received, assurances from the Emperor of the French that he has only received Venetia in trust, and that he intends to transfer it to Italy without conditions; and, if so, one great source of difficulty will be removed. Then, as to our views of policy towards the belligerent Powers, are they the same as those of France? Unfortunately, there is a still greater divergency, because the policy of France has been avowedly and ostentatiously the policy of intervention, which England repudiates and condemns, and the intervention of France has been for purposes the very opposite of that which England desires. In Italy, the policy of England has been to promote the freedom, independence, and unity of Italy. But the policy of France has been to keep Italy unsettled, divided, and dependent. Again, England would desire to see in Germany a free, well-governed, and strong Power—compact, progressive, and weighty in European Councils. But France has always been partial to weak neighbours, against whom she could protect herself by enlarging her boundaries and rectifying her frontiers, and she has had a particular predilection for a weak and divided Germany. And, therefore, it would appear that unless the Emperor of the French were prepared to review his policy, it would be very difficult for the two Governments to act together for a common object. I hope the Emperor of the French is prepared to review his policy, and to bring it into accord with the policy of England. What course is it open to the two Governments to pursue? Prussia and Italy never rejected an armistice. They were ready to accept it on condition that the bases of peace were defined beforehand. As regards Austria those conditions were two. Italy requires that Venetia should be surrendered to her by Austria without conditions; and Prussia requires that Austria should cease to be a member of the Germanic Confederation. Austria has but to accept these two conditions and peace is secured to her at once, and the integrity of her Empire is preserved without the intervention of a foreign Power. Are they unreasonable conditions? Let us see. The surrender of Venetia has
  1232
  already taken place, and its passing by a fiction into the hands of France, instead of into those of Italy, makes no difference at all in the situation of Austria. France had no right to accept Venetia for herself, because it was no longer Austria's to give away. Austria only pretended to give it, because she knew she could not hold it. It seems to have been mistaken policy on the part of France to accept it, seeing the irritation her acceptance has caused among the Italians. At any rate, we must assume France only holds Venetia in trust for Italy, and that it is entirely lost to Austria. Then as to Austria remaining a member of the Germanic Confederation, that is purely a German question, and we cannot see in what way either France or England has a right to interfere in it. The war has been waged for supremacy in Germany. The long rivalry between the two chief Powers had wasted and weakened Germany, and their incessant intrigues for leadership had harassed and demoralized the smaller States. The experience of one terrible week has destroyed the prestige of Austria and given to Prussia a predominance which she is determined to maintain. Since 1815, no Power in Europe has made such solid progress as Prussia, and none has receded so rapidly and hopelessly as Austria; and the war has only developed the contrast between a fresh, hopeful, and progressive Power, and one that is decrepid and decayed. It is idle to tell us that Prussia owes her success to the needle-gun. Was it the needle-gun that enabled her to overrun Saxony and penetrate the passes of Bohemia without meeting a foe? Was it the needle-gun that enabled her commanders, with a smaller army, to concentrate a larger force on the critical field that decided the war? Prussia has been victorious because she has abler Ministers as well as better generals. The headship of Germany has passed to Prussia because she was enabled to give to the German people assurance of a Power capable of securing the unity and the headship they had long desired; and the King of Prussia, now at the head of 30,000,000 Germane, has a right to warn off foreign Powers from interfering in German affairs, and to say that the map of Germany shall not be recast in Paris, and the Italians have a right to say that the boundaries of Italy shall not be dictated by France. Whether it was prudent in them to say so is another thing; whether it was wise in them—whether it was safe in them to

  1233
  brave France by so unflinching and uncompromising an attitude is a question they had, no doubt, well considered. But it is evident these two Powers are both in earnest. Prussia has been chafing under the insecurity of her frontier from an encroaching neighbour, and Italy has been smouldering under a hard taskmaster, so they have both determined to cut the knot. Prussia will not discuss with France her position in Germany, and Italy will not barter Venetia at the price of Italian territory, and there is no doubt that they have both reason and justice on their side. The Emperor of the French is too wise a monarch not to admit it; he knows he has no right whatever to interfere either in Italy or Germany. He is the man above all others who will be quick to appreciate the change. He has no longer to deal with Sovereigns and their Ministers, but with enthusiastic populations fighting for nationality and determined to achieve it. Whether Austria is to remain a member of the German Confederation, as I have already said, is entirely a German question, to be settled without reference to France or any other Power. The Emperor of the French, at an earlier stage and in a very different state of things, did express a very strong opinion that Austria should remain a great German Power; but events have been too rapid and too strong for him. Austria has ceased to be a great German Power. When she was routed and driven from Germany by a Power with less than half her population, and had to call in a stranger to protect her, then her fall from the station of a great German Power was an accomplished fact, which neither diplomatic phrases nor fiction could disguise, and which no human authority could revoke. It is evident that Prussia will not consent to restore Austria to her place in Germany, and the German people will not permit it. What is France to do? Does Austria really think that France will attempt to restore Austria to her place in Germany by force? Does she think that France could do it if she attempted? I will not say that the Emperor of the French is too wise to attempt it, but I believe he is far too wise to wish it. I said at the outset that I did not sympathize at the beginning of this war with Prussia as represented by Count Bismarck. I felt it to be, as I believe almost every man felt it to be, a very bad war, waged, as it appeared to me, by an absolute and unscrupulous Minister, with an oppressed
  1234
  and discontented population and reluctant army. But now, as events have gone on to develop more completely his real character and policy, it is impossible to deny that Count Bismarck is showing himself a man of rare powers, and of a high purpose, and that he is achieving a great work, in which I, for one, wish him God speed. He is regenerating Germany, he is crowning the edifice in Italy, he is driving Austria to seek real power in the contraction and consolidation of the Empire. The Emperor of the French sees this, and he knows England sees it; and he knows, as we all know, that when 30,000,000 of Germans are determined to unite themselves under one head all the Emperors in the world are powerless to prevent it. I hope and believe that the Emperor of the French, more than any other ruler in Europe, is interested in the maintenance of peace, who is prepared to accept accomplished facts; I hope his addressing himself to the Government of England is evidence of that. I rejoice, therefore, that he has addressed, or is about to address, to England an invitation to co-operate with him. I trust he will be met cordially by the British Government, and that the good offices of the two Governments will be joined to press upon Austria, in the most earnest and friendly spirit, the wisdom of her also accepting accomplished facts, and terminating a war which she can have no interest to prolong. I have heard one objection made—that the aggrandizement of Prussia will destroy that to which my hon. Friend referred, the European equilibrium. I might attach importance to this objection if I knew where the European equilibrium was to be found. I have made the attempt, but I have never been able to discover it. I see Russia, a colossal Power, overshadowing her neighbours on -one side; I see France, the overruling Continental Power, disquieting her neighbours on the other; but I do not see where the balance is to be found. Austria and Prussia, since 1815, have figured as second-rate precarious despotisms; the petty Sovereigns of Germany have been so many tolerated nonentities; Italy has been treated as a vassal of France. Now we are about to see all these elements of weakness—this anomalous aggregation of palsied protectorates moulded into force under three strong Powers—Italy, shaking off her dependence on France, and walking in her own strength; Austria, driven to abandon her obsolete policy, and seek her

  1235
  safety and her strength in the good government of her dominions and the prosperity and love of her people; and Prussia at the head of Germany, an intellectual and aspiring nation, awaking from a long lethargy, and working out its political freedom with new national life, a new great Power in Europe, and a new guarantee for the peace of Europe. This is the consummation to be desired by the English Ministry. It is worth the highest ambition of the greatest Minister; it is one which I trust the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) will use his utmost efforts, in co-operation with the Emperor of the French, to promote; it is a consummation which will redound to the lasting honour of the noble Lord if he contributes to accomplish it. I conclude by asking the noble Lord whether the Government of England has received an invitation from that of France to address any joint communication to the belligerents; and, if so, whether the English Government has expressed its readiness to concur with that of France in recommending Austria to accept the two conditions proposed by Prussia and Italy as to the surrender of Venetia, and Austria ceasing to be a member of the Germanic Confederation?
  SIR GEORGE BOWYERhad listened with admiration to the able speech of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, although he had heard much of what he had said with great regret. The right hon. Gentleman had stigmatized the war as unjust and aggressive, and had said that he should like to see the Austrian army at Berlin. He agreed with the right hon. Gentleman in that respect. The right hon. Gentleman was, nevertheless, so much influenced by the power of success — by that power which so often made the difference between a hero and a scoundrel, that he actually concluded his speech with a panegyric upon Prussia and a bitter invective against Austria, not the less bitter because accompanied by friendly observations which only served to make the bitterness more disagreeable. Now, he would venture to say that whatever might be the political opinions of the people of this country, he believed that there was no Englishman who did not regard with reverence, and admiration the heroic conduct of Austria. [" Oh, oh !"] An hon. Member bad cried " Oh, oh !" Well, for his own part, all he would say was that he was ashamed of him. He maintained that a person who could not
  1236
  respect valour, military prowess, and the endurance of misfortune and defeat with undoubted pluck and undiminished resistance, and who could receive an expression of respect for those qualities with a cry of " Oh, oh!" did not deserve any observation which he could address to him. At this moment, Austria presented what in ancient times was said to be a spectacle worthy of God—namely, the spectacle of a just man suffering under undeserved misfortune. However, he would dwell no longer upon that subject, because he thought it was one on which there could not possibly be two opinions; but he must make a few remarks upon the extraordinary position in which France was placed at the present moment. For some time past, the Emperor of the French had held himself out to be the arbiter of the destinies of Europe. He had held, or at least had professed to hold, with regard to the condition of Europe, the position of a political Jupiter, who, by his mere will, could influence human affairs. Now, what had happened with regard to the present war? Look at the famous speech at Auxerre and the other oracular utterances which had amazed and astonished politicians, and upon which no one, even at the present day, could put an intelligible construction. All those utterances had been addressed to the world for the purpose of impressing it with the belief that the Emperor of the French had the whole situation in his hands. And what had occurred? Austria suffered a great, and, he feared, to a great extent, a decisive, defeat. What happened next? There appeared in the Moniteur a statement to the effect that the Emperor of Austria, having satisfied his military honour in Italy, and concurring in the opinions expressed by the Emperor Napoleon's letter of the 11th of June to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, had ceded Venetia to France and referred all the matters in dispute to the mediation of the Emperor Napoleon. Well, Venetia having been ceded to the Emperor of the French, became, in fact, French territory, and the Emperor of the French accepted the office of mediator. But the Prussians told him to mind his own business, and in reality treated him with contempt. The Italians, too, continued their operations—which, by the way, had been singularly unsuccessful — and continued to invade Venetia, which, by the cession, had become French territory, so that the Emperor of the French was completely re-

  1237
  jected and snubbed by both parties. All Europe waited to see what would happen. Everybody supposed that the Emperor of the French would have intimated to the authorities at Florence that they were not to advance on Venetia, and that he would have done something with the view of stopping Prussia. But nothing of the sort happened, for the Emperor accepted the rebuff in the face of all Europe, and the whole thing came to a standstill. In fact the Emperor of the French had been completely defeated, and there was no doubt that he had succeeded in taking the famous step from the sublime to the ridiculous. Some persons said there was a conspiracy between the Emperor Napoleon, Prussia, and Italy, but for his part he could scarcely believe it, nor indeed would it be proper in the British House of Commons to utter such an opinion with regard to a great neighbouring Power. Such an opinion, however, had been uttered elsewhere, and there could be no doubt whatever that there was a conspiracy between Prussia and Italy. Well, about a week ago a speech was delivered by Prince Napoleon, who was the nearest relation of the Emperor, there being but one line between him and the Imperial Throne. The policy proclaimed by the Prince was this. He remarked that—
  " The French Empire was, in point of fact, the triumph of modern democracy; the triumph of the Revolution, which had been retarded for fifteen years by the Restoration, and by Parliamentary Liberalism, but which now moves on, in spite of impediments to arrest its course. People have been too hesitating and too prudent hitherto. They should have allied themselves with Prussia and Italy a year ago. The time is, however, now come when the banner of the Revolution, or, which is the same thing, the banner of the Empire, must be unfurled. The programme of this revolution is the struggle against Catholicism, which must be carried on; the constitution of the great national unities on the ruins of factitious States and of the treaties which founded them; democracy triumphant, founded on universal suffrage, but which needs for at least a century to be directed by the strong hands of Cæars — Imperial France on the summit of this European situation; war, a long war, as the condition and the instrument of this policy. The first obstacle to this policy is Austria; but this obstacle must be overcome. Austria is the most powerful support of Catholicism in the world. She represents the Federal form as opposed to the principle of united nationalities. She aims at the triumph at Vienna, Pesth, and Frankfort of Liberal and Parliamentary institutions as opposed to democracy. She is the last refuge of Catholicism and feudality; she must, therefore, be beaten down and stamped out."
  1238
  It was a significant fact that immediately after that speech had been delivered Prince Napoleon had been sent to Italy as the ambassador and representative of the French. This, then, was in the first place a religious war — a war against one particular phase of Christianity —namely, Catholicism; and in the second place it was a war on the part of democracy against Parliamentary Government, or what the Prince termed Parliamentary Liberalism. Now, he believed that those hon. Gentlemen who were most opposed to Catholicism would not join in a religious war against any phase of Christianity, and that no Member of that House would wish to see democracy, based on universal suffrage, triumphing over Parliamentary Liberalism. This led him to the doctrine of non-intervention, which had been so eloquently advocated by the hon. Gentleman who commenced this debate. He did not want to see England plunge into any war on the Continent in which neither her interests nor her honour were involved; but he could not shut his eyes to the fact that the time might come when this country might be included in that denunciation of " Parliamentary Liberalism," and when she might be called upon by two great foreign nations to subscribe to the principle of " democracy founded on universal suffrage," and to conform herself to the rule which appeared to be laid down by the French Emperor, and to which Austria was made to succumb. He understood the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last to concur in the exclusion of Austria from the Germanic Confederation, for that was one of the principles contended for by Prussia. It was all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to talk of nationalities and the other principles he had enunciated, but the real grounds on which Austria was attacked, and one which it was sought to blot her out of the map, or, at least, to shut her out of the Germanic Confederation, were those which he was describing. That was avowed by Prussia herself, and he said it was a thing which England ought to discountenance. Whatever diplomatic action she took, he trusted that she would set her face against principles which were inconsistent with the peace of nations and with her own Constitution, that Her Majesty's Government would have their eyes open to that union—perhaps he might call it that conspiracy between France and Prus-

  1239
  sia and the Government of Florence —undoubtedly he might call it that conspiracy between Prussia and the Government of Florence; and that they would not sanction the oppression of Austria, but would hold the scales even and maintain the rights of our ancient ally, Austria, and recognize the wonderful valour and heroism displayed by her. The outrageous and unprincipled conduct of Bismarck had been truly stigmatized. It had been justly laid down by the greatest writers on International Law that in carrying on a war it was necessary to consider all through it the purpose and cause of that war, and that when a belligerent had obtained the object of the struggle and an idemnification for the loss which had been inflicted upon him by his enemy, he ought to desist from the contest and rest satisfied. How did that apply to the case of Prussia? The object of the war in which she engaged was the vindication of her right to the Elbe Duchies. Whether it was a just cause of war or not, it was a fair cause of war; but Prussia, having been successful by means of the needle-gun, not so much by her military skill or valour, as by the ingenuity of the gunmaker—had pushed her advantage and practised a system of utter buccaneering. Talk of Germany and Fatherland! Prussia had been devastating and overturning Fatherland, imprisoning princes and forcing their troops into capitulations. She had acted on a system of complete and lawless buccaneering. And here he must say a great deal of blame attached to the late Government and the Government of Lord Palmerston. It was they who overthrew those principles of public law on which the peace of civilized nations rested. It was they who first established the principle that a country was to get whatever it could, by fair means or foul—that what it got even by perfidy and violence it was to keep, and that it was to be applauded for getting it. Those principles they first encouraged in the person of Count Cavour, and now M. Bismarck was following in the footsteps of Count Cavour, and because he was more powerful, was prosecuting his designs more effectually. The result was the unexampled state of things now witnessed on the Continent—countries being attacked without any cause of war at all, and wholesale devastation, butchery, and violence being rampant in Central Europe. The Governments of Lord
  1240
  Russell and Lord Palmerston looked only to success, and they had really demoralized European politics. They had done all they could to subvert those principles on which statesmen used, at least, if only for decency's sake, to pretend to act. They had openly flung aside those principles—they had told nations and Governments that they need not mind right and wrong—that as long as they were successful, that was all that was required; and that in that career of buccaneering, while they were successful they should have the support of the British Government. It was non-intervention, it was true, because our Government never actually used violence in carrying out their policy, although they sent a fleet to support the landing of Garibaldi in Sicily, and they employed underhand arts of every sort. He said that for whatever confusion and bloodshed had occurred in Europe within the last month the Governments of Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell were responsible. The late Government must, he maintained, be held to a great extent responsible for the misery and misfortune which had attended the recent wars on the Continent. He understood that an appeal had been made in another place to Lord Derby with respect to the present state of affairs on the Continent, and that the noble Earl very justly replied that he had only very recently come into office, and that events which everybody regretted had been caused by the policy of his predecessors, for which he was not responsible, adding that it was too late to call upon the present Government now to take any action in the matter. He trusted, however, that the noble Earl and his Colleagues would be actuated by more generous sentiments than those whom they succeeded, and that they would not be led away by that enthusiasm for success by which the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken seemed to be influenced. He hoped they would do everything in their power to bring about an honourable peace, taking into their consideration the interests and rights of our ancient ally, Austria, and not giving their sanction to any proposal for excluding her from the German Confederation, while they resisted the outrageous pretensions of Prussia and declined to fall in with the views of France, which appeared to be founded on some agreement between that country, Prussia, and Italy, for the purpose of making a profit out of the misfortunes and troubles of Europe. He trusted also that the Government would take care not to forget what was done to

  1241
  Italy The Italians, as they were called—[A laugh]—he did not admit that the Government at Florence constituted the Italian people—had not earned the cession of Venetia, by any successes of their own. If they acquired that province it would be only by means of corrupt bargain and conspiracy with Prussia, at the head of whose affairs was a Minister who had violated public right, and who had completely snubbed the Parliament of his own country. The Government would not, he hoped, lose sight of the claims of the South of Italy to have its own autonomy and independence. The South had not because of the lawless aggression of the North forfeited its ancient right to be governed by its own princes, He did not mean to contend that the Government should interfere to effect those objects by force of arms; but the moral influence of England ought, he maintained, to be exercised for the righteous purposes which he had indicated, and not to promote revolution.
  MR. GLADSTONE: It appears to me that my hon. Friend who has just spoken has been somewhat severe and unsparing in his denunciations. He has been so liberal in pouring them forth against those with whom I have had the honour to act in particular, that I hope the House will not deem me otherwise if I make some comments upon his speech. My hon. Friend has delivered a tirade against the Emperor of the French of such a nature and character that I cannot help thinking intelligent Frenchmen, when they read the report of what has fallen from him in the columns of the English newspapers, will regard his remarks with somewhat of the same feeling with which we peruse the speeches of the Marquis de Boissy. It is, Sir, with no resentment and with no sentiment of displeasure, but still with considerable amazement, that I find a Member of the legislative body go so far as my hon. Friend has just done in the exercise of his deliberative faculties. The hon. Baronet has denounced the Emperor of the French, Count Bismarck, Count Cavour—but it seems there are men who are even worse than those distinguished personages in his estimation. They are, according to him, but secondary representatives of the true principle of evil, which, in his opinion, has resided all the time with the late Government. [Sir GEORGE BOWYER: Hear, hear !] My hon. Friend, I may observe in passing, has one faculty which is truly admirable, and that is
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  the power of giving utterance to accusations in themselves the most violent and invective the most severe with a degree of good humour which is absolutely surprising. I only wish my hon. Friend had exhibited that unbounded good humour on the present occasion more fully towards us and towards that country of which he never speaks but to malign her—I mean Italy. When my hon. Friend came to that part of his speech in which, addressing Her Majesty's Government, he appealed to them not to forget what was due to Italy, I thought to myself—recollecting all that has happened—that I was about to witness the strangest of metamorphoses, the hon. Member for Dundalk raising up his voice on behalf of that country. I almost expected for a moment that he was about to advocate her claims, struck with admiration of the endurance under defeat, and the great fortitude displayed by the Italians in their early struggles. The hon. Gentleman has not, however, one grain of admiration, or pity, or sympathy to spare for Italy. When he came to explain what was, in his opinion, due to her, he at once destroyed all ground upon which a charge of inconsistency against him could be founded. That which, according to him, we owe her is that the influence of the English Government should be used to tear her to pieces; to undo, as far as it lies in our power to accomplish that end—I thank God it is neither within our power nor will —one of the noblest works of recent times —the gathering together the fragments of an ancient and distinguished Empire, and the making a country which was formerly the battle-field of contending States in Europe, assume a form of solid unity, and give promise that it would ere long become itself one of the great pillars of European order. I, for one, am satisfied that Her Majesty's Government will not forget what is due to Italy, but then I feel assured they will remember it in a sense the very opposite of that which my hon. Friend has indicated. The hon. Gentleman undertook at the commencement of his speech to declare what the sentiments were of the people of England on this subject, and all through his remarks he urged as an argument against the adoption of a particular course that the English people would be sure not to support it. It is something quite new to find my hon. Friend constituting himself the representative of the people of England on questions of foreign policy, and I am bound to

  1243
  say that I should have thought his inspiration would have been drawn from some more distant quarter. The hon. Gentleman accuses my right hon. Friend the Member for Stroud of being a sharer in that capital sin, which he also lays to the charge of the late Lord Palmerston, admiration of success. Now, it is due to the memory of Lord Palmerston, who was certainly the animating spirit of the late Government in its Italian policy, to remember that his attachment to the cause of Italy did not begin on the occasion of Italian success. It began in times when Italy was trodden under foot, not merely by the iron despotism of the petty Governments which were scattered here and there over her surface, but by the force of that great Power which stood behind every one of them, and had entered with them into a secret network of treaties. My hon. Friend has spoken of conspiracies, but there indeed was a conspiracy binding these States not to give liberty to their subjects, and it was when that state of things of which the hon. Gentleman is so warm and enthusiastic an admirer and which he so severely denounces us for having contributed to overturn, prevailed—it was in the very spring tide of that condition of her affairs that Lord Palmerston attached himself to the cause of Italy. I think, too, the hon. Baronet was scarcely fair in charging the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) with having made a speech tonight which was prompted by no other sentiment than that of mere admiration of success. My right hon. Friend was himself the man who drew attention to the remarkable change which has occurred not only in the condition of Europe, but also in the condition of English public opinion since the time when the discussion on the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater took place. There has been a great change in public opinion on this subject, but I cannot think that it is to be attributed to the mere operation of success. I cannot imagine that we are so blind or so base, that the favours of fortune have the power to shake the settled judgment of the country, or to make us libel to-day that of which we yesterday approved. It appears to me, on the contrary, that the great events which have taken place, independent of those of a military character, have not only changed much which before existed, but disclosed much which was not observed before. My hon. Friend who has just sat
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  down said that the object which Prussia had in view in the war with respect to the Elbe Duchies, was, if not a just, at any rate, a fair object—a distinction which I do not understand. But he said that she had a fair object in view, and that the war only became abominable and execrable in his eyes when it assumed the double character, first that it became associated with the liberation of Venetia, and secondly, it came to be a war for the unity of Ger-many. [Sir GEORGE BOWYER: I did not say—] That, at any rate was the construction I put on the words. If the hon. Baronet wishes to explain them, I shall be happy to hear the explanation.
  SIR GEORGE BOWYERexplained that what he said with respect to the Elbe Duchies was that whether the object of the war in that quarter was legitimate, if not just, was a fair subject of dispute; but that after Prussia met with great success she went on with what he called a system of buccaneering, overthrowing Sovereigns and making wanton conquests in a manner which were utterly inconsistent with International Law and the objects of the war itself.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I am glad the hon. Gentleman has stated distinctly what he meant, but it does not alter the case, because we do not know that up to this hour Prussia has overthrown a single Sovereign. I know it not. [Sir GEORGE BOWYER: Saxony and Hanover.] I know it not. It may be that she has coerced those States for the purposes of the war, and there is no doubt at all about that; but the future political condition of the Sovereigns of those States remains a matter yet undetermined, and no person could say whether in respect to the States in 'question Prussia deserved the charge of buccaneering until we know what is to be their ultimate condition. But what I wish to point out is this. About two months ago it appeared that Prussia intended to make war on Austria in order to obtain possession of the Elbe Duchies. As my hon. Friend says, upon that issue there were not two opinions in this country. We had unanimously condemned the joint conduct of Austria and Prussia at a former period in reference to the Duchies; and when Austria adopted the course of public right with regard to the Elbe Duchies, opinion in this country was unequivocally declared in opposition to it. But when the war began the case of the Elbe Duchies was completely absorbed and swallowed up

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  in a far greater question; and we must now look at the cause of the war, not merely or mainly with reference to mere condemnation, as if we were to set ourselves up to be judges of nations and of Governments—a position, I think, we have no right to arrogate to ourselves; but we must look at the great issue involved with reference to the well-being and happiness of Europe; and in the share which it gives to this country in promoting that wellbeing and happiness, and to the mode in which we should exercise that influence. I, for one, entirely disclaim any title to condemn or to sympathize with anybody except in the sense of giving a private opinion, which all men are entitled to give in passing their judgment upon the conduct of others. But let us now consider the question in that point of view. There was one sentence in the speech of the right hon. Member for Stroud which I heard with, some jealousy, though, perhaps, I did not distinctly gather its meaning, but he used an expression, much and long in favour in this country, in stating that it was the duty of the British Government to endeavour to maintain the influence of England at the highest point in every Cabinet in Europe. Now, I venture to say that the influence of England is best maintained by refraining from continued interference. The influence of England, so far as it is genuine and useful, does not depend on elaborate schemes for magnifying our old reputation and our old performances. It does depend, first, on the strength of the country, and secondly, upon the credit that may be given to the country for the honesty of its purpose, and for the disinterestedness that is so favoured by our insular position. I dare say the difference of opinion between my right hon. Friend and myself is on this point, and it is a verbal difference more than anything else. I wish to express an opinion that I strongly entertain, that just as between man and man you do not make your friend attached to you and admire you by any elaborate effort to draw forth his attachment or his admiration, so I think in regard to our influence, it is more likely to be the spontaneous growth of the greatness of the country, and of the confidence which by our good conduct we shall lead others to have in us, than by incessantly setting before us questions of policy which do often tend to involve us, if not in intrigues, in petty rivalries and struggles for local objects, and for the attainment of weight in the Councils of this or that Sove-
  1246
  reign, and which lead often to our own disadvantage. Speaking of British influence in its proper sense, of course, it will follow that in the case of any great European complication British influence will at one or other time come to be employed. It is difficult to define accurately that principle of non-intervention which the hon. Member for Wick (Mr. Laing) invites us to adopt. Non-intervention, no doubt, if we are satisfied with anything less than metaphysical strictness of definition, and if we take it as indicating that spirit and temper, I heartily subscribe to it; but the experience of us all shows that the instances in which we have interfered by diplomatic correspondence in the transactions of Europe have been eminently fruitful of good to many nations. If we go back so far as the constitution of the Belgium kingdom we shall find an evident instance of this. Take another case, to which I should appeal with more confidence if the hon. Member for Dandalk were not in the House. With respect to Italy, the share taken by England in 1859 and 1860 in the diplomatic transactions of Europe, and between the preliminaries of Villafranca and the peace of Zurich, was alike beneficial and important. The noble Lord, no doubt, will be called on to exercise influence in some shape or other, and as I have said, we should endeavour to put out of our minds, so far as we can, the perplexities involved; exercising moral influence in matters beyond our control, and in which we have not necessary information and no title to act. Let us take a practical and perspective view, and ask ourselves what are the objects and desires which we should propose to ourselves in exercising, whether as Ministers or Members of this House, and in whatever capacity that share of influence in our country may have in bringing about any European settlement. And here, I must say, that the hon. Member entirely failed in his impeachment of the description, not less just than brilliant, given by the right hon. Member for Stroud of the position of the three parties to this struggle as they are likely to emerge from the conflict. I look first to Italy, and I trust the noble Lord will never forget that the cause of Italy is dear to the people of England. If I may for one moment constitute myself, like the hon. Member for Dundalk, their organ, I will say with confidence that they will never forget or forgive any deviation on the part of the Government from the straight path

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  on this great question — from that path in which the influence of England, 'such as it may be, shall be uniformly and steadily exercised for the promotion of the unity and independence of Italy on grounds the most strictly germane to every definition, however rigid of the objects and the limits within which our share in foreign politics ought to be confined, because we hold, the British Government and the British people hold, that a united and strong Italy is an element of immense power added to the guarantees of European order. It is not necessary that we should take a narrow or selfish view adverse to the greatness of this or that European Power; but the more the countries of Europe are solidly constituted under Governments, I will not say all great—because the small States are matters of fact, and ought to be respected as eminently beneficial—but under Governments that are associated in heart and will with the sentiments of their people; Europe so constituted is a guarantee for peace, for order, for civilization, and for the happiness of mankind. And I place confidence in the noble Lord in this respect, and in the Government as constituted. I think it unnecessary to refer to expressions that have been used by Members of that Government in former years, and from which adverse inferences on some points bearing on Italy might be drawn. Well then, Sir, as to Germany. Let my right hon. Friend descend fairly into the arena of argument and consider what has been the condition of Germany. In my judgment, so far as I can form an opinion on the events of the last century, it has been a deplorable condition. Germany instead of being a strength has been a weakness to Europe. Germany has been a perpetual cause of difficulty and apprehension. The time has been when millions have been added to the Military Estimates of this country, chiefly on account of what might take place in Germany. But that is not a position in which such a Power as Germany ought ever to be placed. Germany contains the most numerous race in Europe; one of the most intelligent, and, perhaps, the most highly intellectual—a race united by its juxtaposition, famous in history, having traditions inferior to those of no other people. Surely Germany, with all those great advantages, ought to defend herself. And why has Germany been weak? Because she has been subjected to the constant struggles and rivalries of two Powers to neither of
  1248
  which has the position of Germany been beneficial; while on account of those difficulties and struggles Germany has not been able to attain to her proper position in Europe, and has been prevented from giving to Europe those solid advantages which Europe ought to have derived from her. It is not for us, I think, to presume to determine in what way the great German problem ought to be solved. So weakened has she been by internal disunion and by the struggles and rivalries of Prussia and Austria that it would be impossible for any Englishman to determine in what way that problem should be solved; but other influences are determining that question. It is not for us to say a word as to the manner in which those influences have been brought to bear; but looking at what is going forward as a matter of fact—judging drily, as we ought, as to its probable effects on the European system —I believe that if, instead of Prussia and Austria contending for power in Germany, one Power only shall be in a position to wield an influence there, that influence will be beneficial to Germany at large. It will be beneficial, no doubt, to the Power that wields it; but I believe it will be also beneficial to the Power which has been worsted in the struggle, and which has been obliged to yield. When my hon. Friend calls upon us and calls upon the Government to use our influence to maintain the power of Austria in the Germanic Confederation, I could understand him perfectly well if he could convince me that the old state of things had been beneficial to any one. Now, has it been beneficial to any one? What has been the position of Austria for many years? A most unhappy one. In her own immediate dominions, inhabited by races which it is difficult to combine under one political and Executive constitution—I hope she will combine them —I am satisfied, as my right hon. Friend said, that her chances of combining them will be greater when once she is relieved from her false position in Germany and her other false position in Italy. But the politics of Austria of late years have been chiefly external to herself. Her struggles for supremacy in the German Bond and her attempts up to 1859 to maintain all her influence in Italy have prevented the accomplishment of the main purpose for which Austria has existed; while, at the same time, no progress has been made in settling those questions which must be settled, and to bind together in one harmonious union

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  the people of Hungary and the peoples of the other different countries which compose the Austrian Empire. And has not her position in Italy been a false one? Has her position in Venetia been of good to any one? The Austrians never have been able to pretend that they are one people with the people of Venetia. The people of Venetia have to pay taxes; they have to serve in the army and they have to discharge other duties, the fulfilment of which a strong Government can enforce; but in point of feeling there never has been the smallest proximity of feeling between the Austrians and the Venetians. Has my hon. Friend read the address of the Archduke, who is general of the Austrian army, on his retiring from the army of the South to join that of the North? In that you read clearly undeniable evidence of the hopeless state of things existing as between Austria and Venetia. Whom does he address to defend the Austrian possessions in Italy? He addresses the people of the Tyrol and the garrisons of Venetia; but he makes no address to the Venetian people. He knows that if he did so he would find no echo. Has my hon. Friend seen the monument to Marshal Radetzky? Has he seen those painful words—I admit they were deserved—which record that soldier's victory over his fellow-countrymen? If unhappily there were an insurrection in this land, and any commander won a victory at the sacrifice of the lives of thousands of his fellow-countrymen, would a monument be raised in Westminster Abbey or in any of our public places to record such a triumph? Fellow-subjects of Marshal Radetzky's those Italians might have been by accident and for a time; but fellow-subjects of his in heart and will they could not have been; fellow-subjects of his in tongue, fellow-subjects of his in tradition, fellow-subjects of his in hope and feeling they could not have been. They were foreigners in spite of mere conventions and written documents. Something deeper than written documents is required to make men fellow-subjects; and as foreigners the Venetians feel towards Austria as strongly as she feels that she is a foreigner towards them. My hon. Friend appeals to us strongly when he asks us to look at the present position of Austria. The loss of dominion is not pleasant to any State. We ourselves have gone through the operation. None of us are old enough to know the feeling which prevailed here at the time of the
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  separation of the American Continent; but we are able to look back and see that painful as that separation was—though it pierced the heart of England through and through—yet it was not less beneficial to England than it was to the inhabitants of what are now the United States. To be relieved from a false position may be a most painful process to the country which obtains the relief; but that is no reason why there should be an interference such as my hon. Friend asks for. The long account between Austria and Italy it is unnecessary to open. It is time that account should be closed. And deeply do I regret the great error which, in my judgment, has been committed by Austria in introducing a political element into the present contest by making a cession of Venetia to France. I believe it to be a transaction without example, parallel, or precedent of any kind that in a state of war one of the belligerents should hand over a territory, which is a part of the matter in question, to an indifferent party, not engaged in the war, for the purpose of raising some artificial barrier against the enemy. I regret that, but not because I think it will have the effect of keeping Venetia in the hands of Austria. The cession I look upon as definite and settled; but whether it now exists in any shape, perhaps the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will be able to tell us. As far as I am able to judge of the cession to France, I believe that the shadow has melted away. I cannot suppose that General Cialdini is engaged in an invasion of the French dominions. I believe that the cession of which we have heard was the thought of a moment and the fiction of an hour; but though I believe that thought of a moment has passed away, and that fiction of an hour has ceased, and though I believe Venetia is still Austrian territory, yet I also believe Austria must feel that her dominion over the Venetians is at an end. And what I regret is this—that Austria has lost the opportunity which a direct cession of Venetia would have given her to lay the foundation of a most solid friendship with Italy. I know that my hon. Friend cannot go with me in this sentiment; for he cannot speak of Italy with even the courtesy which is due from a British subject. The Queen has been pleased to recognize the kingdom of Italy; but my hon. Friend, like the Austrian Government, is unaware that there is a kingdom of Italy in existence. I repeat

  1251
  that I am sorry there has not been a direct cession, which might have laid the' foundation of that solid friendship which I hope to see one day existing between Austria and Italy; because I think the finger of Providence has written that between the Austrian and Italian kingdoms there ought to be no rivalry, but that they ought to be in perpetual harmony and alliance. Well, Sir, I cannot but hope that out of this tremendous carnage good is to result. I assume, and I ought to assume, that Prussia will not render herself obnoxious to the charges made by my hon. Friend when she comes to the adjustment of the difficult question of what should be 'the Constitution of Germany. If Prussia does proceed in that buccaneering spirit which she proceeded in with respect to the Elbe Duchies, two years ago, hand in hand with Austria, the censures of my hon. Friend will be deserved. But let us hope for better things. It may be possible when the rivalry in Germany is at end there may be established between Prussia, the leading Power in the Confederation, and the Minor States such relations as will do justice to these States, and give Germany her proper position in Europe. That, I think, is the problem to be settled in Germany; and we should not by act, or even by word, offer any obstacle to the solution of that problem. Now, Sir, suppose Austria ceases to be a German Power—that is, in the sense of being a member of the German Confederation—I confess that does appear to me to be a following up of the transition which resulted from the policy which Austria adopted 100 years ago, and of the transition which took place when the Emperor of Austria gave up the ancient and venerable title of Emperor of Germany. That was an enormous change. It appeared to some to consist only in name; but it involved the fame and the power of ancient and venerable tradition. Since that she has had nothing to sustain her against Prussia excepting her own policy and strength, and undoubtedly there has been a tendency on the part of Prussia to aggression, and she has appeared constantly to gain ground upon her. But supposing that Austria loses altogether Venetia—that Venetia ceases to be an Austrian province —what will be the position of Austria? Will the position of Austria be deplorable? She will still have a population of 33,000,000. She will still have countries of enormous fertility. She is not so favoured as other countries with regard to the command of sea coast, but I
  1252
  take it for granted that she will retain her great seaports in the Adriatic, which may perhaps include Trieste. I do not say what would be reasonable after a long protracted war; but if these things are to be settled by equity or any other principle but the sword, it appears only fair that no nationality or historical geography would justify them in including Trieste in Italy. She will have vast spaces of undeveloped territory—vast amounts of undeveloped resources. She will have all these millions of her subjects to bring together and bind together under the influence of good institutions. She has shown—and I give her the greatest honour for it—she has, under the influence of an enlightened Ministry within the last twelve months, shown herself superior to one of the most dangerous prejudices that still fetter the human spirit in regard to freedom of commercial intercourse. It is impossible too highly to commend her statesmen for the spirit which they indicated at the time when they assented to a Treaty of Commerce with this country. Has she not a hopeful and noble task? Is there anything to prevent her continuing to be—what she so long has been, and which I hope she will always remain—one of the great Powers of Europe? Is it not even possible that she may find that this curtailment of her territory—this cession of certain parts and characters which she was unable adequately to fulfil, though apparently a loss, proved to be a real gain? I know not whether this is too hopeful a picture in times of wholesale bloodshed—perhaps it may be an unnatural deduction of the mind to anticipate favourable results to be wrought out through the miserable process of a bloody war. But when these favourable results do appear to rise up before us it is not too much to hope that the three parties to the war—namely, Germany on the North, Austria, and Italy, will be both stronger and happier and in better harmony together after the war than they were before it. That blessed consummation we all desire, and whether much or little be in our power we should do nothing to impede or prevent it.
  LORD STANLEY: Sir, this debate has lasted for some time, and, as was to be expected, many and various opinions have been expressed by those hon. Gentlemen who have taken part in it. I hope it will not be supposed that on the one hand I necessarily agree or acquiesce in those opinions which I do not expressly mention for the purpose of saying I differ from

  1253
  them, or, on the other hand, that I differ from those opinions in which I do not go out of my way to express agreement. I think that in the actual state of Europe the House will hold me justified if I do not think it expedient to go into a general detailed discussion of the political situation, and the more so as that situation is changing not merely from week to week, but from day to day, and I may say, from the telegrams received, almost from hour to hour. I shall confine myself, therefore, as closely as I can to the questions which have been put to me in the course of this discussion. First of all comes the question of the hon. Member for Wick (Mr. Laing). He wants some guarantee that no intervention is contemplated on our part. He wants some assurance that this country will not be dragged into a war as it was in the Crimean case. He admits the policy of the Government is intended to be that of nonintervention; but he fears that it may be possible to drift into a quarrel without intending it. But I suppose when the hon. Member speaks of intervention he means either armed intervention or intervention of such a nature as, though not immediately, yet in ultimate result might lead to an appeal to physical force. If that is what he refers to, all I can say is that if the speech which Lord Derby about a week ago delivered in another place—if the opinions which I myself have invariably expressed on that subject, not merely when occupying the position I now hold, but for many years past when these questions were under discussion—if, what is infinitely more important, the unanimous feeling (for I believe it to amount to unanimity both of Parliament and the people out of doors)—the feeling that we ought not to be dragged into these Continental wars—if all these things, taken together, do not constitute a guarantee that ours will be a pacific policy, a policy of observation rather than of action—then I am unable to understand in what language a stronger guarantee can be given. But if what is meant is intervention of a different character—intervention in the shape of friendly advice tendered by a neutral Power, then I think the question whether intervention of that kind is under particular circumstances desirable or not is a question which must necessarily be left to the discretion of the executive Government. I am not personally very fond of the system of giving advice to foreign countries. I entirely agree with what
  1254
  has been said by the right hon. Gentleman opposite upon the subject, when he said that you are never more likely to lessen the influence of England than when you are constantly endeavouring to increase it by giving advice. I think that the right of giving advice has of late years been largely used; and that it has sometimes been not only used, but abused. Still, there is truth in the proverb which says that lookers-on see more of the game than the players; and cases do occur when warning given by a friendly and neutral Power—by a Power which is well-known to haves no interest of its own to serve—by a Power desiring nothing more than the restoration of peace, and that that peace shall be permanent, may do something to shorten the duration and limit the extent of a war that might otherwise spread over the greater part of Europe. As to the state of affairs at the present moment—for that, I apprehend, is the practical question on which the House wishes an answer from me, I wish distinctly to assure hon. Gentlemen and the country that the British Government stand, as regards the European controversy, free, unpledged, and uncommitted to any policy whatever. The sole diplomatic act which the present Government have taken—and it was almost the first act of any kind they had to perform —was that of supporting in general terms at Florence and Berlin the proposition made by the French Government for a temporary cessation of hostilities. It seemed to us that to support that proposition was on our part simply an act of humanity and common sense. The House will recollect what were the circumstances of the case. Venice had been ceded, not indeed to Italy, but ceded by Austria. A great battle had been fought—a decisive victory had been gained —Austria had invoked the mediation of France. France had accepted the post of mediator. She asked us to support, not the terms of peace—that would have been premature—but merely the general proposition for an armistice in order that the belligerent parties might have time to consider whether, under the totally altered state of circumstances, it would not be possible to substitute negotiations for further bloodshed, and to obtain the results of the war without continuing the war itself. We did not feel it in our power to refuse our assent to that principle. But, while in general terms we have supported the proposition of an armistice, we have pledged ourselves to no terms or conditions

  1255
  of peace whatever. We have pledged ourselves to nothing beyond the general advice that an armistice should take place. The circumstances under which that advice was given have passed. Our mediation and our advice have not been officially asked by the combatants, and we have abstained from giving it. That is the present state of the matter. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) has asked me whether there is any expectation of an armed mediation on the part of the French Government. Well, it is not my duty, nor is it in my power, to answer for other Governments, but only for our own. All I can say is, I have not the slightest reason to believe that any step of that kind is in contemplation, and I have strong reasons to believe that no such step is contemplated. [Mr. HORSMAN: I did not ask that question. It was another hon. Member.] Then the question was asked by the hon. Member for Wick (Mr. Laing). Then these two questions were put to me—first, whether the British Government has been invited by that of France to address joint communications to all or any of the belligerent Powers? The French Government have taken up the matter and it now rests with that Government. The French Government may or may not ask us to join in that work of mediation; but, should they do so, I do not think it would be the duty of the British Government to join in any such mediation, unless we have a distinct understanding as to the terms the French Government will propose. The second question of the right hon. Gentleman is, whether the British Government has expressed its readiness to concur with the Government of France in recommending Austria to terminate the war, by accepting the two conditions proposed by Prussia and Italy as to her surrender of Venetia, and ceasing to be a member of the German Confederation. Now, Sir, as to that, Venetia has been, I understand, ceded by Austria, and whether or not any questions will arise as to that settlement being absolute or conditional, I do not know, still I apprehend that none of us can entertain a doubt that the final result will be that Venetia must pass from Austria. Venetia has been, in effect, conquered not by Italy but for Italy; Venetia has been conquered in Germany. Whatever the manner of the transfer may be—whatever may be the precise nature of the measures adopted by France — I do not
  1256
  think any reasonable man can entertain a doubt that Venetia, at Do distant period, will belong to Italy. Then, with regard to the question as to whether we have recommended Austria to terminate the war by assenting to the proposal of ceasing to be a member of the German Confederation, I must remind the right hon. Gentleman that that proposal has never been made, so far as I am aware as the sole condition of peace, that Austria should cease to be a member of the German Confederation. No doubt various preliminaries have been discussed between the two Governments. If the question were narrowed to the issue whether Austria would conclude peace by ceding Venice and by consenting to quit the Confederation, that, no doubt, would be a question upon which we should be in a position to give an opinion; but since we have no reason to think that the acceding to those two conditions by Austria would terminate the war, and since we do not know accurately and precisely what are the terms which would be likely to be accepted by one or other of the belligerent parties, it would be clearly premature on our part to express an opinion on the abstract question as to what conditions might or might not be accepted. With regard to the general policy of the Government I have only one remark to make. I think there never was a great European war in which the direct national interests of England were less concerned. We all, I suppose, have our individual sympathies in the matter. The Italian question I look upon as not being very distant from a fair settlement; and with regard to the other possible results of the war, and especially as to the establishment of a strong North German Power — of a strong, compact Empire, extending over North Germany—I cannot see that, if the war ends, as it very possibly may, in the establishment of such an Empire—I cannot see that the existence of such a Power would be to us any injury, any menace, or any detriment. It might be conceivable enough that the growth of such a Power might indeed awaken the jealousy of other Continental States, who may fear a rival in such a Power. That is a natural feeling in their position. That position, however, is not ours, and if North Germany is to become a single great Power, I do not see that any English interest is in the least degree affected. I think, Sir, I have now answered as explicitly as I can the various

  1257
  questions which have been put to me. I think, in the first place, I may assure the hon. Member for Wick that there is no danger, as far as human foresight can go, of Continental complications involving this country in war. I think, in the next place, that if we do not intend to take an active part in the quarrel, we ought to be exceedingly cautious how we use menacing language or hold out illusory hopes. If our advice is solicited, and if there is any likelihood that that advice will be of practical use, I do not think we ought to hesitate to give the best advice in our power; but while giving it under a deep sense of moral responsibility, as being in our judgment the best, we ought carefully to avoid involving ourselves or the country in any responsibility for the results of following that advice in a matter where no English interest is concerned. I do not think we ought to put ourselves in such a position that any Power could say to us, " We have acted upon your advice, and we have suffered for it. You have brought us into this difficulty, and therefore you are bound to get us out of it." We ought not, I say, to place ourselves in a position of that kind. And now, Sir, I have stated all, I think, that it is possible for me to state at this time, and it remains for me only to assure the House—knowing, as I do, how utterly impossible it is for any Member of the Executive to carry on his work effectively without the support of public opinion—it only remains for me to say that, as far as the nature of the case allows, I shall always be anxious that the House shall be conversant with everything that is done.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he had regretted to hear some of the opinions expressed by hon. Gentlemen opposite in discussing the question. They were all of them talking of non-intervention, and yet, in point of fact, they all seemed to be in opposition to that principle. He sincerely hoped and believed that the policy of the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Her Majesty's Government generally, would be opposite to that of the late Government, for it was impossible to deny that the present state of the Continent—the sanguinary war that was now being carried on there—was mainly owing to our intervention in the affairs of the Continent during the last ten or fifteen years. There were only two occasions on which a country was justified in inter-
  1258
  fering; one was where a Power from its geographical position, or from natural causes, became a menace, as in the case of the first Napoleon; and the other was where opinions were propagated that might lead to sedition in another country. The noble Lord enunciated a policy that would maintain the honour of the country and be beneficial to Europe.

THE PRESSURE IN THE MONEY MARKET.

  MOTION FOR A ROYAL COMMISSION.
  MR. WATKINrose to postpone the following Motion, of which he had given notice:—
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to issue a Royal Commission directed to the investigation of the causes which have led to the late severe and protracted pressure in the money market, and to the continuance, for a long period, of a minimum rate of discount of 10 per cent at the Bank of England; and also to investigate the Laws at present affecting Currency and Banking in the United Kingdom, and to report further what (if any) alterations have become expedient therein; and, further, that it be an Instruction to the Commissioners to present their Report and the Evidence taken by them on or before the 1st February, 1867."
  He said he was placed in rather an awkward position. He had promised to give way for his right hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, who had a notice relative to Austria on the Paper, and at that late hour (quarter past twelve o'clock), he (Mr. Watkin) did not feel himself justified in bringing on his Motion. He had appealed to the Government to assist him, but they had told him he could put it down on the Motion for Supply on Monday. He then asked for a morning sitting on Monday, but he had been refused.
  MR. WALPOLEsaid, there were already two morning sittings appointed—namely, Tuesday and Friday. He thought the hon. Gentleman would have no difficulty in bringing forward his Motion on Monday.

  LORD CLARENCE PAGET AND THE HOLY FATHER.—QUESTION.
  MR. WHALLEYput the following Question to the First Lord of the Admiralty:—Whether he is prepared to contradict certain unfounded statements which had appeared in the Continental newspapers, and thence copied into English papers, as to the proceedings of the Commander of the Fleet in

  1259
  the Mediterranean, and particularly the following:—
  "That Lord Clarence Paget, the Commander of the Fleet in the Mediterranean, in passing through Rome, requested an audience of the Holy Father, which was granted, and lasted above an hour; and, afterwards, that he directed his way to the Farnese Palace, where His Majesty Francis II. granted him an audience, as desired."
  He was himself in a position to state there was not a word of truth in it, but it was desirable that it should receive official contradiction.
  LORD HENRY LENNOXsaid, it appeared to him to be quite unnecessary to give any answer to the hon. Gentleman; for not only had he answered his own question, but he was fully answered before he put the question on the Paper. It was not, however, a question which the Admiralty could answer, because if Lord Clarence Paget visited Rome in his private character there would necessarily be no record of it at the Admiralty. If Lord Clarence Paget had gone to Rome no doubt he would have done what other distinguished visitors did when there, pay his respects to the Head of the country in which he found himself. Knowing how sensitive the hon. Member was on all matters connected with Rome, he was happy to be able to inform him that his (Lord Henry Lennox's) noble relative had not been near that city. By a curious coincidence, Rome was the only Court he had not visited. He went from Marseilles to visit the King of the Greeks, and he was now on a visit on which, it was to be hoped, the hon. Gentleman would feel no alarm, to the Sultan at Constantinople.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Committee deferred till Monday next.

  HARES AND RABBITS (SCOTLAND) BILL,
  (Sir William Stirling-Maxwell, Lord Henry Scott.)
  [BILL 210.] SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  SIR WILLIAM STIRLING - MAXWELLsaid, in rising to move the second reading of the Hares and Rabbits (Scotland) Bill, I will only trouble the House with a few words of explanation. For some years past there have been considerable complaints of the depredations committed in Scotland by game, and of the damage done to the property of the tenantry. I have carefully inquired into these complaints, and have endeavoured in the
  1260
  present Bill to apply a remedy. The object of the Bill is to give to the tenants, with the permission and by co-operation with the landlords, the same facilities with regard to killing hares which they have now with regard to killing rabbits. The present law affords a remedy in the case of those tenants who are themselves fond of shooting; but in other cases, where the pursuits of the tenant do not allow him to use a gun, the remedy is entirely nugatory, because he is not permitted to employ another person to kill the hares on his farm, without having a gamekeeper's license, or incurring an expense which he does not choose to incur. The object of this Bill is to enable tenants to kill hares on their farms by registering the names of the persons whom they depute for that purpose. I am perfectly aware that in touching the question of game at all, considerable differences of opinion may arise. Many may say that it is not desirable to meddle with the question at all; while others, for whom I have a great respect, will say that considerably more than the provisions contained in this Bill ought to be done. Considering the grievance to be a real one, I took counsel with many proprietors and tenants in Scotland, and having enjoyed the benefit of their advice, I beg to submit the Bill which I hold in my hand as a contribution to the settlement of the question. I believe the limited object this Bill proposes to gain will be obtained by the clauses which I venture to propose; but I am not entirely wedded to the particular provisions of the Bill, and I shall hear the observations of hon. Friends upon the subject with great interest and deference. I am quite sure they will agree with me that it is most desirable to endeavour, if possible, to take some course which may remove any unpleasantness of feeling which may possibly arise upon the subject between the landlords and tenants in Scotland.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, " That the Bill be now read the second time."—(Sir William Stirling-Maxwell.)
  MR. KINNAIRD: I am very glad to have heard the statement of my hon. Friend the Member for Perthshire, admitting as it does the existence of this grievance. My only regret is, that the Bill will be inoperative in carrying out the wishes of my hon. Friend, because it is practically really of no advantage to the tenant, it being a Bill to enable him to kill

  1261
  game with the consent of the landlord. It is all very well for us who have the enjoyment of the game to desire its preservation; but I would ask anybody whose living depends on the culture of the land, whether there is not the most inordinate preservation of game carried on, by means of which, in the damage done to crops and otherwise, very great injury is done to the tenant. The preservation of game in Scotland, where the agriculture is improving generally, has long been a great annoyance to the tenant, as well as a loss to him in the damage done to his crops, incurring as he does great expense in adopting the most improved methods of agriculture. It is a great hardship that he should have a considerable portion of his energies destroyed, and I am very glad indeed that this Bill has been brought forward. This Bill will, in my opinion, do great service in Scotland. At the same time, I do consider that it will require very considerable amendment, and I hope that my hon. Friend will help us in rendering this Bill perfect.
  Mr. CARNEGIE: It is not my intentention to oppose the second reading of this Bill. If I did so, it would give rise to considerable misapprehension. So far as I understand it, the principle of the Bill is this—that it is highly desirable that some change should be made in the present law of Scotland with regard to the preservation of hares and rabbits. My hon. Friend the Member for Perth (Mr. Kinnaird) has not exaggerated the evil which is suffered by the tenants from the present system; and I think the thanks of the House are due to the hon. Baronet opposite for having attempted to grapple with the subject. I believe the Bill originated in the fertile brain of an hon. Baronet who was defeated at the last election for Aberdeenshire. The hon. Baronet had declared that any attempt to alter the game laws was humbug; but after his defeat he altered his mind and suggested this Bill. I do not wonder, therefore, that there are many hon. Gentlemen who look upon the Bill with suspicion. But to have opposed the second reading of this Bill would have been likely to create some misapprehension with regard to many Gentlemen on this side of the House. I therefore consider it to be only right that the Bill should be read a second time. At the same time, I must be allowed to say that it is capable of very great amendment, and I hope that Amendments will be placed upon the paper, so that we shall be
  1262
  able to go to our constituencies and explain the nature of those Amendments, asking their opinions as to what they think ought to be done in the matter, then in a future Session it will be in our power to introduce a good Bill. In the present Session I do not think we are able to do much upon the subject.
  SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKE: I quite agree with the last words of my hon. Friend who has just spoken, that the difficulties of dealing with the question are so great that it will be impossible to dispose of it in the present Session. I agree also with the opinion which has been expressed that some considerable change in the present condition of things is required, and I do not think we ought to stand in the way of the very moderate measure introduced by my hon. Friend opposite. With this view, I do not think we should overload the Bill with Amendments, such as to render it impossible to pass this small measure this Session, leaving the larger question to be dealt with subsequently. In the high state of our present cultivation in Scotland, some legislation is required in the interest of those who are engaged in the actual cultivation of the land, and I think there is no means we can adopt short of taking this class of game out of the special protection enjoyed by the others. I trust that we may be able to deal with the whole question in a future Session, and therefore I will not enter now into the reasons why a broad distinction may be drawn between this and other kinds of game. I shall be glad to join with other hon. Members in doing all in my power to put a stop to this great nuisance, and to place hares and rabbits beyond the pale of the protection of the law.
  MR. FORDYCE: Representing as I do one of the largest agricultural districts in Scotland, I feel bound to say that this Bill gives great satisfaction to the tenant farmers. For some years the onus of keeping the hares and rabbits from the tenantry has been thrown upon the proprietors, because, although the law has given them to the tenants, the leases have taken them away again. At the same time, I must say that this Bill does not provide a remedy for all the grievances complained of. It does not, for instance, deal with deer, which occasion, I believe, quite as great an amount of destruction as hares and rabbits. In point of fact, it only nibbles at a very small portion of the great question of game preserving. Upon these grounds I

  1263
  for one object that the measure does not go far enough, but I think that its deficiencies may be made up in Committee. The state of the law of Scotland at present is quite sufficient to enable any complaints of the tenant farmers to be met; and if the landlords would only avail themselves of it, and grant their tenants permission to kill game, we should hear no more of grievances, and the proprietors would receive ample remuneration for any sacrifice they might make in the increased good feeling which would spring up between landlord and tenant.
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSON: As there is a real and substantial grievance concerned in this question, I think the House will not be indisposed to afford an opportunity of redress. This Bill has an honest origin, whatever may be thought of it by any hon. Members. It is an attempt to settle a question which has given rise to a great deal of bad feeling between classes which ought always to be cordially allied. It crops up every day, and I really do not wonder at it. A man takes a long lease of a farm, and he finds large quantities of game feeding on the crops which he regards a s his own. In England the matter is made a matter of covenant between the landlord and tenant; and, in the absence of a covenant, provided that the tenant takes out a licence to shoot game, all the game is as much his property as his beasts and ordinary stock. In Scotland that is not so; the game is the property of the landlord unless he gives liberty to his tenant to shoot it. It is in the presence of an anomaly like this that my hon. Friend the Member for Perthshire (Sir William Stirling-Maxwell) has introduced this simple measure, the object 'of which is merely to remedy a substantial grievance. If this Bill passes in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the tenant will be able to destroy the game to which he objects. There are some hon. Gentlemen who say that this Bill does not go far enough; but are they prepared to say that no agreement should be made between the landlord and tenant? Are they prepared to keep up a bad feeling between landlord and tenant; and, for the sake of others who have objects which are merely chimerical, to refuse to accept a measure which in itself has all the elements of a fair settlement?
  MR. M'LAGAN: I could have wished that if ever legislation had been attempted on the game laws, a much larger measure would have been introduced than the Bill
  1264
  now before the House. It falls far short of the exigencies of the case, far short of what will be necessary to satisfy those who complain, and complain justly, of the evils arising from the game laws. It deals only with one part of those laws, and leaves untouched other parts as important, and as much the cause of offence as the part treated on. I feel convinced that, if the legislation of the hon. Member for Perthshire had been as liberal as I know his practice is on his estates as regards game, his Bill would have given much more satisfaction than this is likely to do. But, notwithstanding the shortcomings of this Bill, I do not agree with those who think that no benefit would be derived from it if passed into law. It is a step in the right direction; and the very introduction of it is evidence that the proprietors of Scotland are now alive to the necessity of amending the game laws. Now, before we can suggest any remedy, we must know the evils complained of. It is well known that where game is kept in moderation, and where a good understanding exists between landlord and tenant—and I am happy to say that such is the case in many parts of Scotland—there is no complaint or dissatisfaction; but where there is an excessive preservation of game, or where large quantities of game are sold off an estate, there invariably are great dissatisfaction and agitation. Hence I am led to believe that the dissatisfaction is not so much with the game laws as with the excessive preservation of game, though no doubt this is encouraged by the game laws. And I am not surprised at the dissatisfaction of the farmers where there is this excessive preservation of game. I am not surprised that a farmer who has devoted his whole time, energy, skill, and capital to the proper cultivation of the farm, and who pays a high rent for it, should be irritated that his crops, the fruits of his careful labour, are destroyed by the hares and rabbits at every stage of their growth, from the expansion of the first leaf to the maturing of the seed. I am not surprised that he should still more be irritated when he learns that his landlord, in addition to the rent received by him, is paid another rent for the same land by a game tenant, or, what is the same thing, receives a handsome income by the sale of game which had been reared and fed on the crops of the agricultural tenant. It is still more aggravating for a tenant to know that while his landlord and he are on the best of terms, his crops situated contiguous to the preserves of

  1265
  another proprietor are destroyed by the game of that proprietor, who receives an income for animals fed on another man's property, and on another man's crops. The best remedy for this evil is to allow hares and rabbits to be dropped from the game list. I am aware that it will be said that it is a mere matter of agreement between the landlord and tenant; and that the tenant has no right to complain, as he took his farm on the distinct understanding that the landlord reserved to himself the game and the right to preserve it. No doubt this is in most cases true; but such an agrement entered into in the beginning of a lease is generally found to be most unsatisfactory afterwards, as one of the contracting parties enters into a contract for subjects the value of which he knows nothing about; for no tenant, a stranger in the district, when he takes a farm, can estimate aright the number of game kept on the farm, and the damage likely to be done by it throughout the lease. I am therefore not surprised that generally dissatisfaction is felt by the tenants of those farms in the vicinity of preserves, and often disputes arise, even though arrangements had been entered into by the parties in the beginning of the lease in perfect good faith. There are other parts of the law which I should like to see introduced into any Bill professing to amend the present Game Laws, such as cumulative punishments, the jurisdiction before which game cases should be tried, and the mode of procedure for assessing damages for the injury done to tenants' crops. However incredible it may appear, it is no less true that a man may be punished five times in Scotland for the same offence. I shall not, however, enter upon these parts of the law at present, as I expect to have an opportunity of doing so early next Session, when I shall move for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the laws relating to game in Scotland. On consulting with some Members we have thought it advisable not to oppose the second reading of this Bill, but rather to move Amendments to the Bill in Committee, of which Amendment I shall avail myself in my Bill next Session. As this Bill is an assimilation to the English laws as regards hares and rabbits, it would have been much better if, in any attempt at legislation at all, the tenants of the two countries had been put in the same position—namely, that the same privileges as regards game generally had been extended to the Scottish tenants as are
  1266
  enjoyed by their English brethren. I do believe that the best way to preserve game, and that which will be most satisfactory to the landlord in the long run, is to give the same privilege to the tenants as is enjoyed by the landlord; and if a preferable right were to be given to one party more than to another, he surely on whose crops the game feeds is clearly entitled to the right. There can be no doubt that the English law as regards game is founded more on justice than the Scotch. I hope that all the Scotch Members, regarding this law more in 'the light of justice than of territorial right, and throwing aside all party and political differences, will next Session endeavour to make such amendments in the law as to remove what at present is the plague spot of our agricultural social system.
  MR. DYCE NICOLsaid, while giving every credit to the promoters of this Bill for an anxious desire to allay the agitation which had recently arisen among the tenant farmers in Scotland from the excessive preservation of game, and although unwilling to oppose the second reading of the Bill, lie begged to say that its provisions did nothing to meet the substantial grievance now felt in Scotland. The opinions of, he believed, a large majority of the tenant farmers in Scotland was embodied in a petition from the Scottish Chamber of Agriculture presented to the House; nothing less would be satisfactory, and he thought that the concessions there asked should be made in a liberal spirit. He was glad to hear from the hon. Member for Linlithgowshire (Mr. M'Lagan) that he intended bringing in next Session a comprehensive measure; and at this hour of the morning he would only add that it would be of such a character as would put a stop to the ill-feeling on the subject of game, which at present unfortunately existed in so many parts of Scotland between landlord and tenant.
  Bill read a second time and committed for Thursday next.

  TRAFFIC REGULATION (METROPOLIS) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. Secretary WALPOLE, Bill for regulating the Traffic in the Metropolis, and for making provision for the greater security of persons passing through the streets; and for other purposes, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Secretary WALPOLE and Mr. HUNT.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 227.]

  TURNPIKE TRUSTS ARRANGEMENTS BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. Secretary WALPOLE, Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders made under

  1267
  an Act of the fifteenth year of Her present Majesty, to facilitate arrangements for the relief of Turnpike Trusts, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Secretary WALPOLE and Mr. HUNT.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 228.]

  TURNPIKE ACTS CONTINUANCE BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. Secretary WALPOLE, Bill to continue certain Turnpike Acts in Great Britain, and to make further provision concerning Turnpike Trusts, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Secretary WALPOLE and Mr. HUNT.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 229.]

  NAVAL DISCIPLINE. BILL.
  On Motion of Sir JOHN PAKINGTON, Bill to make provision for the Discipline of the Navy, ordered to be brought in by Sir JOHN PARINGTON and Lord HENRY LENNOX.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 231.]
  House adjourned at half after One o'clock, till Monday next.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Postmaster General (75); Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation (No. 2)٭ (187); Extradition Treaties Act Amendment (200).
Committee—Standards of Weights, Measures, and Coinage٭ (208); Sheriff Court Houses (Scotland) Act (1860) Amendment٭ (57); New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land Government٭ (195); Revising Barristers' Qualifications٭ (196).
Report—Sheriff Court houses (Scotland) Act (1860) Amendment٭ (57); New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land Government٭ (195); Revising Barristers' Qualifications٭ (196); Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation٭ (185).
Third Reading Crown Lands٭ (114), and passed.

THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE,in rising to move for papers respecting the Danubian Principalities, said, that he desired, in the first place, to offer some explanation with respect to the delay that had occurred in bringing forward the Motion. The notice had been on the paper for some weeks; but in the interval circumstances had occurred, over which he had no control, that had obliged him to postpone it; and finally, when he was about to fix a day on which he thought he could rely he was requested by the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to postpone the Motion still further, as the negotiations were then going on and inconvenience might have arisen from the subject being brought forward. Of course, he complied with the noble

  1147
  Lord's request. The matter was again put off on the change of Administration, when his Motion shared the general fate of all public business. He confessed, indeed, that so many delays had occurred that at one time he doubted whether it would be worth while to bring the subject forward at all at so late a period of the Session. After careful consideration, however, he had come to the conclusion that the reasons for proceeding with the matter preponderated over those which could be urged on the other side. The subject related to countries with which, notwithstanding their great distance from England, we had connections which ought not to be overlooked. Whether we approached the Danubian Principalities by Russia or by Austria, no doubt the distance was very considerable; but their geographical position was not sufficient to destroy those interests which brought them into connection with this country. We had sufficient commercial intercourse with these countries to justify our taking peculiar interest in them, and we also had with them political interests of great importance. Their position between Austria, Russia, and Turkey was alone sufficient to give them a considerable importance in our eyes, connected as we were with the Turkish Empire. They had also an importance belonging to themselves. We could not view without interest a number of communities joined together by ties of race, language, and religion, and at the same time connected with a Power so very much at variance with them in all these respects. He presumed that there were but few persons of liberal minds in this country who did not desire that they should be in a situation to enjoy as much as possible the advantages which nature had designed for them; but the connection they had with the Turkish Government was one which had been sanctioned by the Conference to which Great Britain was a party, and that connection tended to considerably modify, if not to neutralize, the advantages which they had derived from their position. At the same time it was one which could not be easily set aside, inasmuch as we had guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Treaty of 1856, and inasmuch as the withdrawal of the Principalities from the Turkish Empire would inflict a considerable blow on the maintenance of that integrity. Moldavia and Wallachia stood in an interesting relationship, not only
  1148
  towards Turkey, but likewise towards her neighbours. In respect to Russia they had stood for a long time as a kind of barrier, or something interposed between what was thought to be the tendency of Russian encroachment and the integrity of the Turkish Empire. A population which coincided with them in race, language, and religion still formed part of the Russian Empire; while in the same manner there was a considerable population of the same description within Austrian territory. There had, he believed, been two treaties which affected their position; but it must be borne in mind that from the very remote period when Trajan conquered their barbarous Princes they had never enjoyed national independence. They were at one time connected with Transylvania, and also with the kingdom of Hungary; but at last they found it more convenient to enter into a voluntary connection with the Turkish Empire. They accordingly did so, and thereby secured at a small sacrifice their independence and their own separate Legislature, while they enjoyed a sort of protection which was given by the Turkish Empire. Indeed, there could be no doubt that their position was thereby improved. With regard to any danger which might possibly arise to Turkey in consequence of the establishment of the two Provinces, he might remark that the union of the two Provinces with their population of about 5,000,000 would in itself give activity to their desires, and tend to develop their resources. Of course, however, there would be a proportionate danger to the Turkish Government from which they were divided by religion and language. The difficulty connected with the union of the two Provinces was settled by giving each of them a separate Administration under the common government of one Hospodar. But a great deal of dissatisfaction having arisen in consequence of the manner in which Prince Couza had governed the Principalities, an insurrection had taken place, and he was driven from power. After that an invitation was sent to more than one person connected with Royal Families, asking them to accept the office of Hospodar. Prince Charles of Hohenzollern was one of those invited, and he accepted the invitation. It was said at the time that Prussia had nothing to do with his election; but circumstances which had since occurred bad thrown considerable doubt on that assertion, and

  1149
  which certainly did justify the strong suspicion that if Prince Charles had not been sent to the Principalities by the Prussian Government, at least the experiment had been sanctioned by them. It appeared that after some discussion and some difference of opinion Prince Charles of Hohenzollern was accepted not only by the Natives themselves but also by the Conference of Paris, and, notwithstanding the strong objections which were entertained on the part of the Turkish Government, though he was not actually installed, he was in the way to being installed in the office of Hospodar. This would seem to be in direct contravention of the arrangements of the Convention of 1858, and therefore it was desirable the country should be informed what was the real position of the English Government in the Conference of Paris. There appeared to be no visible reason for inducing the English Government to favour the views of those who supported Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, and, therefore, some might feel inclined to ascertain the reason which induced the English Government to give their consent to the proceedings which had taken place. Of course, if we had acted from consideration for others, in contradiction to the previous arrangements to which we had been parties, it was of consequence that Parliament and the country at large should be acquainted with the reasons which justified the change. All these facts derived additional importance just now from the present state of affairs in other countries. It was impossible to look around us without seeing that there was a dissolving principle at work which attacked in the strongest manner, though sometimes by invisible agencies, those relations between State and State on which the peace of Europe had been based during the last thirty years, and owing to which we had enjoyed a long period of tranquillity. When we saw the war that was now raging in Germany, when we called to mind the debates on the Danish question, and when we thought of the principles put forward to justify the aggressive policy of Prussia, he must say there was enough to induce us to carefully reflect on the present state of things and what those things now going forward might bring about. Was it not desirable to anticipate danger, and to give to Parliament and the country an opportunity of expressing an opinion on this subject? God forbid that he should recommend anything which should lead to hostilities between
  1150
  this and any other country; but if there was contingent danger we ought to consider how far we should be doing our duty and providing for our future interests if we remained silent and unconcerned when such a state of things existed around us. Men who had lived through the past half century might well be surprised at the events which now astonished the world—they must perceive that what was now taking place surpassed in consequence everything which had occurred since the French Revolution. Were we to see a great Power struck out of the list of nations without showing some interest, or intimating that we entertained some opinions on the subject? Was it possible for us to view without concern what had already taken place? We could not arrest the progress of the war—we could not, perhaps, prevent the catastrophe which now seemed to threaten one of the great Powers of the Continent—but, at the same time, when established principles had been so strongly violated, it behoved this country—and, he would say, it especially behoved their Lordships' House to give expression to an opinion in favour of those principles. It was said that in the war now going on in Germany the great success of the aggressive Power was due to an arm of peculiar construction; but he must say that from the accounts which he had read it appeared to him that it was due more to a scheme of aggressive policy concocted and prepared for a number of years ago. No doubt the sentiments of this country had rarely gone with the administration of affairs in Austria—we had little sympathy with her in a variety of respects; but there was one ground of sympathy which he trusted would never be lost sight of in this country—respect for principle and the consideration of right. And if ever there was a clear right on the part of any Government it was that of Austria to exercise her discretion—however erroneous that discretion might be—in regard to the possession of Venice and in regard to the affairs of Germany. If the great battle which was about to be fought should be in its results only a repetition of those already fought, were we prepared to see a great Power like Austria struck out of the list—were we prepared to see so great a change in the European system? It might be that, without our being able to prevent it, so great a change might take place; but what we had to complain of was the open violation of principle and the manner in which treaties had been torn asunder and

  1151
  thrown aside. Other principles might be established as the result of the present war; but we ought not to allow existing treaties to be torn up leaf by leaf without protesting against such a proceeding, and maintaining that as long as the principles upon which the European system was based were supposed to be in existence, no sanction should be given to an aggressive policy which was in plain violation of those principles. It might turn out that the danger to which the attacking party was exposed would produce a degree of moderation and tend to peace, and that, with the assistance of that Power which appeared to have exerted itself as a mediator, this very desirable end would be effected. It would be a sad and melancholy thing if the historian of these times should have to describe the fate of that great country—which, with all its faults, had been so useful to Europe—in the language which had been familiar to their Lordships since their schoolboy days—
  "Hæc finis Priami fatorum; hic exitus illum Sorte tulit, Trojam incensam et prolapsa videntem Pergama, tot quondam populis terrisque superbum Regnatorem Asiæ; jacet ingens litore truncus, Avulsumque humeris caput, et sine nomine corpus."
  In that event there would be reason to look back with regret to the beginning of the second series of negotiations in respect to the Duchies fifteen years ago, when, perhaps, by a word properly spoken, a judicious, temperate, non-compromising word, Prussia might have been made to understand that if she persisted in the enterprize she might have to face a danger which, in all probability, would be overwhelming. While on this subject, he wished to say a word or two on the wellknown principle of interference or noninterference. Now, the idea of a great country like ours pledging itself to noninterference in an unlimited sense was to him perfectly absurd. He did not think it was possible for a country situated as England was to carry out the principle of nonintervention altogether. We must have friends with whom we sympathized, and there would be times of danger and circumstances which might compel interference. What was required of a Government, whatever its politics, was that everything should be done to avoid war which could reasonably be done without the loss of national honour and dignity; he would even go as far as to say that
  1152
  great sacrifices of a certain kind might be necessary in order to the preservation of peace; but though from our insular position we might be better placed for carrying out the principle of non-intervention than other nations, and although we might have every desire to avoid war, yet it could not always be done without sacrifices which no great country could afford to make. There were times and circumstances when war might be avoided and peace preserved by combination with other Powers. There was also another subject on which he desired to make a few observations—namely, the subject of nationalities, which was a word which had been introduced into the political dictionary within the last fifteen or twenty years. In carrying out the principle of non-intervention he would ask where a stop could be made? No country had a greater claim to act on this principle than Italy; but even she had not been able to realize her expectations under it without seeking the dangerous assistance of another Power, and making a great sacrifice. There were also similar difficulties with regard to the Danubian Principalities and Germany. Supposing Prussia to gain her end—which seemed probable—was it supposed that these difficulties would be removed, and that she would be able calmly and quietly to sit down in the uninterrupted enjoyment of what she had obtained? He believed that this would not be the case. Territorial considerations and commercial interests would go much further in securing peace with neighbouring nations than anything arising from nationality. The principle in question appeared to have originated in what was a family feeling in the early stages of mankind, and expanded into its present dimensions. But under present circumstances, if it was to be acted upon, where, he asked again, was it to stop? Might not the Fenians find in it something to support them in their endeavours to raise an Irish Republic? He doubted whether France even, the most compact of European countries, would be free from danger under the action of such a principle. During the last month Bohemia, having discovered an old traditional name, had made a claim for national independence. What he contended was that, although some States had a stronger case for acting on the principle of nationality than others, it was a principle fraught with much danger, and at the same time brought but little advantage to the com-

  1153
  munity. Nothing could be further from his intention than to say anything likely to increase the prospects of a general war. His were merely the words of an individual, giving expression to nothing but his strongest convictions, respecting which he could not consent to be silent. He trusted that he had said enough to justify the Motion which he intended to make. If Her Majesty's Government would consent to furnish the House with the whole of the papers he asked for he should be glad; if, however, they resolved, from sufficient reasons, to withhold some of them, he would cheerfully consent to their decision. He could not profess to be in possession of special information beyond what was in the possession of the public; but he confessed that he was under the impression that the negotiations with respect to the position of Prince Charles were so far completed that no inconvenience would arise from presenting the papers to Parliament. If he were mistaken on that point, his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) would doubtless have the kindness to correct him. Seeing that their Lordships were in a great measure shut out from dealing with matters connected with the taxation of the country and supplying the necessities of the State, and were in other respects less closely associated with general legislation, they were, in his opinion, more particularly called upon to express opinions with regard to those high matters of national honour and good faith to which he had alluded than they would otherwise be; it thus fell to their lot to fulfil the higher duties of the statesman's office, in expressing with a fearless voice opinions which might support those who were suffering from unjust aggression. He trusted he would be permitted to enjoy some share of their Lordships' concurrence and sympathy in the task he had undertaken, and with that hope he moved for the production of the official papers relating to the subject.
  Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for all official Papers of an ostensible Character relating to Negotiations which have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and any other State or States respecting the Two Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, whether in the Form of Conventions, Protocols, or diplomatic Correspondence, dated subsequently to the Paris Convention of 19th August 1868, and hitherto not communicated to Parliament.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I certainly did not anticipate from my noble
  1154
  Friend's Notice, which simply consisted of an announcement that he would move for Papers respecting the Danubian Principalities,that he would have thought it necessary to refer to so many subjects as he has. Having regard to the respect due to my noble Friend's long experience in foreign affairs, and the intimate knowledge lie possesses, more especially of the affairs of the East, I trust it will not be deemed disrespectful upon my part if I decline to follow him over the wide range of subjects on which he has commented, but rather confine my observations within a narrow compass, and above all if I abstain, in the present state of the affairs on the Continent, from following him into a general discussion of the affairs of Europe. I must confess that some of the principles laid down by my noble Friend were listened to by me with some surprise, because, if they were followed to their natural conclusions, I cannot but think that his object must have been to impress upon your Lordships' mind his opinion that it was necessary, in vindication of our own character and our own principles, to take an active and prominent part in the unfortunate war now raging in Europe. [Viscount STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE made a gesture of dissent.] My noble Friend shakes his head, but did he not say, "Will you allow Austria to be humiliated? Will you permit her to have Venetia taken from her?"
  VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE: I asked, Will you view these things with unconcern and indifference?
  THE EARL OF DERBY: Be it so then; but my noble Friend knows what that means. He asks whether we will allow Austria to be placed in a position of humiliation and have Venetia wrested from her? and he asks us whether we will, with indifference, permit treaties to be broken through? My noble Friend must know perfectly well that if his question were followed to its legitimate conclusion it would lead to the inquiry—shall we interfere with the war that is now taking place in Europe, and shall we by active interference stay the triumphant progress of Prussia and the realization of the ambitious views of Italy. Now, my Lords, I say the spirit of these questions is entirely at variance with the principles entertained by Her Majesty's Government. I do not pretend to lay down the principle of absolute non-intervention and non-interference with the affairs of foreign countries, no country

  1155
  holding the position of England can afford to do so; but I believe I express the opinion of all on both sides of the House, of whatever particular shade of opinion they may be, when I say that nothing could be more inconsistent with our public duty than that we should take an active part on either one side or the other in the present conflict—much as we may lament the events now taking place we should not be justified in interfering by force or by remonstrance which must lead to force: The Emperor Napoleon has been appealed to by one of the belligerents for his mediation and good offices. He has offered that mediation and those good offices; but with what success remains to be seen. If our assistance or good offices should be needed to co-operate with those of France for the purpose of restoring peace to Europe, nothing would be nearer the desires of Her Majesty's Government than to afford them. But until our good offices or mediation have been applied for, I hold that we should be stepping out of our proper province if we were obtrusively to interfere between the conflicting parties, and still more so if we were to hold out a threat or menace to enforce our views with regard to the differences between the belligerents. I will not, besides, discuss those principles which my noble Friend has laid down with regard to nationalities, but will confine myself to the subjects which more immediately concern his Motion. If I had proposed to deal largely with them, I should have cause to regret even more than I do the absence through indisposition of my noble Friend the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Clarendon); because it rests more with him and with his late Colleagues to vindicate the course which has been pursued with reference to the Danubian Principalities than with myself and those with whom I am acting. But I may very shortly state to my noble Friend what course has been taken, and what is the present actual state of affairs. My noble Friend has referred very minutely to the provisions of the Treaties of 1856 and 1858, whereby the Danubian Principalities were guaranteed, not by a single Power, but by a Conference of the- six great Powers of Europe, their independence and privileges consistently with the maintenance of the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey. It is quite true that at a very early period those objects were departed from with the acquiescence and consent of the Powers which had composed the Conference, because in
  1156
  the first instance it was thought desirable that Moldavia and Wallachia should continue to form two separate and independent Principalities unconnected with each other; and it was thought that the union of these provinces would be a source of weakness to Turkey, while their separation would be adding to her strength. The second proposition which must be borne in mind was that the Hospodarship should be in the hands of a native and not of a foreigner. Now, the first infraction of these principles was the election of the same individual Prince Couza by the two Principalities. This deviation from the original terms agreed upon was, however, sanctioned by the Conference, and if any danger be likely to arise from the union of the two Provinces, that danger has now lasted for at least eight years, and the present course of events does not in any way tend to its increase or its diminution. For my own part, I think this union of two Provinces forming together not a powerful country, is more likely to prove a source of strength than of weakness to the frontiers of Turkey. These Provinces continued under the administration of Prince Couza until the 22nd or 23rd of February last, when Prince Couza was deposed, and was compelled to abdicate on the following day. The revolution which brought about the event was perhaps the most peaceful, quiet, and bloodless recorded in the history of the world. Prince Couza was permitted to depart unmolested from those Provinces over which he had for some time held sway. There was no symptom of disturbance among the population; and immediately after his deposition a Provisional Government was formed. After these events had occurred the Conference assembled, and its members at once laid down the principle that, notwithstanding what had been done on former occasions, it was, nevertheless, desirable to leave the Provinces themselves to decide in favour of separate or of united Government. In the meantime the Provisional Government had offered the Hospodarship of the united Provinces to the Comte de Flandres, by whom it was distinctly refused. Throughout the whole of the proceedings everything that was done was communicated and made known to the Conference, and from first to last the Conference laid down the doctrine that while the rights and independence of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be respected regard was equally to be paid to the rights

  1157
  of Turkey. Whatever difference there might have been as to matters of detail that principle was always upheld. After the refusal of the Comte de Flandres the offer was made to Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, by whom it was accepted. My noble Friend has expressed an opinion that this offer was an underhand proceeding on the part of Prussia, and that it was in fact instigated by Russia. But Prussia has entirely and absolutely disclaimed having supported the candidature of Prince Charles, and there is nothing in the papers relating to the subject which would tend to throw any suspicion upon that statement. A communication was made by the Provisional Government to the Conference. The Conference—I think very properly—declined to recognize the election of Prince Charles, or to notice the communication. It was determined that the principle of the union or the separation of the two Provinces should be decided by the new Parliament which was about to be elected, and in order that there should be no suspicion of collusion, or of any attempt to overbear one Province by the voice of the other, it was further determined that the Provinces should decide for themselves whether their decision upon this subject should be given by separate or united Legislatures. It was still further decided that in case either Moldavia or Wallachia objected to a union, that should be held a conclusive argument for separate Legislatures. The result was that neither Wallachia nor Moldavia would consult separately on the question of union: an united Parliament assembled, and 110 out of 166 Members decided in favour of the union of the two Provinces under the Hospodarship of Prince Charles. This decision was communicated to the Conference. There was no doubt that the proceeding was irregular, and at variance with the understanding of the Conference. But the question was, shall we proceed by force to support the claims of Turkey, if she should desire it, against the united wish of Moldavia and Wallachia—and shall we force upon those Provinces at a time when all Europe is in a state of convulsion a Government to which they are opposed—and by so doing add to the state of disturbance that already exists? The course which has been pursued is this:—The parties to the Conference have not recognized the accession of Prince Charles; but we have endeavoured successfully to induce the Government of Turkey to abstain from pressing by force
  1158
  of arms the rights which she might have enforced; and we have recommended Turkey to ascertain whether terms cannot be agreed upon between the de facto Government of the two Provinces and herself, that while they maintain their own independence they will respect the rights of the suzerain Power. That is the state in which things remain. There are negotiations going on between Turkey and these Provinces, and an agent has been received at Constantinople. He has been consulting with the Turkish authorities, and I believe there is every prospect of the result being satisfactory; the rights of the people of the United Principalities will be maintained, and at the same time the rights of the suzerain Power will be maintained. I hope in the course of a short time the matter will be brought to an issue. But in the meantime it would be inconvenient to lay before the public all the negotiations that have taken place, and it will be better to wait until the negotiations are brought to a close or broken off, when the whole course of proceedings will be laid before Parliament. Under these circumstances, I hope my noble Friend will not press the Motion.
  EARL RUSSELLsaid, he thought their Lordships would acquiesce in the decision at which the noble Earl had arrived—that until the negotiations were brought to a termination it would be unwise to produce the papers which had been asked for. He desired, however, to make a few remarks on the subject, as he and his Colleagues had been concerned in the recent negotiations. Under the Treaty of 1858, which contained five. Articles in reference to the Danubian Provinces, their rights and privileges and those of the Porte were clearly and precisely laid down—the chief point being that with the exception of paying to the Porte a small sum of money by way of tribute, the Principalities should be entirely free and independent. The Convention of 1858 determined that no foreign Prince should have any power in the Principalities, but that a Native Hospodar should be elected. There were fifteen or twenty Princes from amongst whom the selection could be made, and, unfortunately, that had led to a series of jealousies amongst them, and hence the election of a foreign Prince. That being the case, and the Convention of 1858 having declared that no foreign Power should interfere in the internal affairs of the Principalities, when the Powers came together they were obliged

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  to recognize that obligation, and they would not depart from it. But he confessed that his own opinion was that if the Porte acknowledged Prince Charles of Hohenzollern as Hospodar, and if he should turn out to be a man of sense and judgment, he would be far more likely to administer the Provinces successfully than any Native Prince would do. It had for a long time been the favourite wish of the people of the Principalities to have a foreign Prince to rule over them. It was a matter upon which they had set their hearts; and, according to the general principle which had been laid down in modern times for action in these matters, the rule was, that the wishes of the people ought to be consulted and ought to prevail, but not so far as to threaten the security of other States. He therefore hoped that the Porte would be induced to recognize as Hospodar Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, the Prince agreeing to the terms of the instrument of 1856 by paying tribute and obtaining a firman from the Sultan. On the other hand, if the Porte were to send an army into the Principalities there was the great danger that hostilities would extend farther, and that a war of religion might arise should the people of the Principalities think that it was intended to interfere with their religious liberties. Therefore, he was glad to hear that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to advise the Porte not to interfere by force of arms. As the other question had been raised, he could say that he thought it would be most unwise for us to interfere at present in the affairs of Central Europe; but, at the same time, he fully admitted the force of the general principle that had been accepted by all the statesmen of this country, that no one State of Europe ought to have such a preponderance over other States as to threaten their independence and security. This was not the moment to pass any opinion upon the policy of Her Majesty s Government, but nothing had been said to lead them to suppose that the Government would not exercise the vigilance and patience which it was their obvious duty to exercise in existing circumstances.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, he would take the earliest opportunity of laying upon the table the papers connected with the subject.
  Motion (by Leave of the House) withdrawn.

  POSTMASTER GENERAL BILL.
  (The Earl Nelson.)

  (No. 75.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  EARL NELSON,in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, that its object was to legalize the holding of the office of Postmaster General by a Member of the House of Commons. The 25th section of the 6th of Anne disqualified the holders of certain offices for sitting in the House of Commons; but from time to time nearly every office in the Government had been freed from the operation of that Act—beginning with the Presidency of the Board of Control, and ending with the Secretary of State for War. There was no reason why the office of Postmaster General should not be held by a Member of the House of Commons; and, remembering the difficulties the present Prime Minister had in forming his Government, it was expedient to give additional facilities to the First Lord of the Treasury in the organization of an Administration, while the passing of the Bill could not by possibility be construed into a reflection upon the noble Duke (the Duke of Montrose) who had so lately accepted the office.
  Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly;. and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

EXTRADITION TREATIES ACT AMENDMENT BILL—(The Lord Chancellor.)

  (No. 200.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD TEYNHAMdirected attention to the change which the measure would effect in the law of evidence, and expressed a wish to know whether, under cover of this alteration, it was intended that the magistrates before whom the accused parties were brought should alter the view they had hitherto taken in determining whether the accused were primâ facie guilty of the offence alleged against them. He desired also to point out that no provision had been made for ascertaining the relation of the depositions sent over with the crime charged in the warrant of arrest.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that in order to remove any alarm from the mind of the noble Lord, be might state that there was no foundation whatever for the notion that any change in the law of

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  evidence would alter the opinion which the magistrate might entertain of his duty. It was sufficient, he thought, to give that answer to the noble Lord, who, he regretted, had not urged his objections yesterday, on the occasion of the Bill being introduced and read a first time. For his own part, as he had taken up so much time yesterday in explaining the objects of the Bill, and taking into consideration the deserted state of the Benches on the side of the House where the noble Lord sat, he hoped the noble Lord would not consider it disrespectful if he declined to trespass any further on their Lordships' time.
  Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

REFORM MEETING IN HYDE PARK.

  NOTICE OF MOTION WITHDRAWN.
  THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY,who had given Notice—
  "To call the Attention of the Government to large Placards stuck up in various Parts of London, announcing the Assemblage of vast Numbers of the People in Hyde Park, on Monday, the 23rd, under the Summons of the Reform League,"
  said: My Lords, when I gave the notice which appears upon your Lordships' Paper, I was not aware that the subject of the proposed Reform Meeting in Hyde Park had been discussed in the House of Commons, where a satisfactory answer was given by the Secretaries of State, both of the present and of the late Government. I hope and trust that the Government will persist in reserving the Parks exclusively for the recreation of the people. Let them be kept solely and entirely for the recreation of the people without any respect to partizans, whether of Reform, or of Garibaldi, or of the Pope. I do not say this because I am adverse to public meetings, for perhaps no man in England is so much indebted to public meetings as myself. I have carried a great portion of my measures by their means, and it is my intention, if God gives me health and strength, to hold a great many more. But I have always held them at convenient times, and in convenient places; and therefore I hope that the working classes will respect the rights of others, and not inflict upon others an inconvenience which they would be the first to resent if inflicted upon themselves.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.