Sitting of 20 May 1864

MINUTES.
— NEW WRIT ISSUED — For Gloucester City v. J. J. Powell, esquire, Recorder of Wolverhampton.
SUPPLY — considered in Committee — CIVIL SERVICE ESTIMATES.

NAVY—THE GUNS OF THE "ROYAL SOVEREIGN."—QUESTION.
COLONEL C. P. LESLIEsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether it is true that the Royal Sovereign,
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cupola ship, is to be armed with smoothbore guns; and, if so, what reason there is, after the decided superiority of rifle guns has been recognized, that a smoothbore armament should have been decided upon?
MR. CHILDERS, in reply, said, the Royal Sovereign was at present armed with five twelve-ton 150-pounder guns of the smooth-bore, but as soon as the best system of rifling was decided upon she would be armed with 300-pounder rifled-bore guns. At present that system had not been finally decided upon, and until that time the guns in use would be exclusively of smooth-bore.

DENMARK AND GERMANY—PRUSSIAN EXACTIONS IN JUTLAND.—QUESTION.
MR. WHITESIDE: Sir, seeing the noble Viscount in his place, I beg to repeat a Question which I put to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday. I wish to know, Whether the Government have received communications to the effect that exactions and contributions have been levied by the Prussian army pending the armistice; and whether it is in accordance with the terms of the armistice, as defined by the Conference, that these contributions or exactions should be levied?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, the conditions of the armistice were quite clear as to this—that no fresh contributions should be levied. There is some ambiguity as to the understanding between the parties, whether contributions which were ordered before the armistice were to continue to be levied. But my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office is in communication with the Prussian Government on the subject.
SIR MINTO FARQUHAR: Was it not understood that provisions were to be paid for during the armistice?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, Yes, clearly.

ARMY—THE GUARDS IN CANADA.

  QUESTION.
  MAJOR KNOXsaid, he wished to ask, Whether it is true that the Guards have been ordered home from Canada, and whether other troops have been ordered out in their place?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, it has been decided that two battalions of Guards and one battalion of the Military Train should come home from Canada without relief.

SUPPLY.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

ARMY—CAPTAIN GRANT'S SYSTEM OF COOKING.—ADDRESS MOVED.
COLONEL NORTH, in calling attention to the services of Captain Grant, and moving an Address to Her Majesty praying for the grant of some suitable reward, complained that the Board which had been appointed to inquire into the merits of Captain Grant's invention had not been fairly constituted. Captain Grant's apparatus had been spoken of in terms of approval by several distinguished general officers, by official Boards, and by two Secretaries of State. It was now said that improvements had been made in the apparatus; but he should like to know the invention in which improvements had not been made. The man who originated the principle ought to be rewarded; and Captain Grant said that his principle had been adopted, though there were alterations in the details. His noble Friend the Secretary for War had spoken of the great reduction caused in one item of the Army Estimates by the saving in the consumption of fuel. As Captain Grant's apparatus had been in use for the last eight years, there could be no doubt that much of the saving was to be attributed to the invention for which the gallant captain claimed remuneration. His hon. and gallant Friend (General Lindsay) had proposed that the remuneration to Captain Grant should be equal to the amount saved in one year's consumption of fuel. In reply to that proposition, the late Sir George Lewis said there was no precedent for making a grant of £25,000 or £30,000 for services like those of Captain Grant; thereby acknowledging that by Captain Grant's invention from £25,000 to £30,000 had been saved in the annual consumption of coal. He wanted to know whether Captain Grant himself had been shelved, although the service and the public had the advantage of his invention. Only two years ago, when a force of 12,000 was sent to Canada, Captain Grant was sent for to know if he could prepare cooking apparatus for the force; and within one month he prepared the necessary kitchens for that number of men. Sir. Rowland Hill had been rewarded, and properly so,
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for his improvement in the postal system; and within the last two or three years Parliament had voted a sum of £5,000 to the gentleman who had enabled us to separate our postage stamps without tearing them. We were spending millions sterling for improving the arms used in the destruction of our enemies; and he thought the House ought not to refuse a fair recompense to a man who had contributed so much to the comfort of the soldier, and effected such a saving in our army service. Under these circumstances, he begged to move that this House would, on Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of an humble Address to be presented to Her Majesty.
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House will, upon Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of an humble Address to be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to consider the services of Captain Grant, and order him some suitable reward for his services in improving the system of Cooking in the Army, and effecting a considerable saving in the Public Expenditure for Fuel,"—(Colonel North,)
—instead thereof.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, this question had been before the House for a long time, and the House had on a previous occasion come to a decision after full discussion and consideration; and he did hope that if his hon. and gallant Friend divided on the present occasion the House would come to a final conclusion on the subject. He hoped they would pronounce an opinion that would be decisive, and would show they were not willing that Captain Grant's claims should be perpetually coming before them. The question was originally brought forward on a Motion by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Wigan (General Lindsay) declaring that Captain Grant ought to receive remuneration. That Motion was negatived, but only by a narrow majority; and on subsequent occasions in the same Session the subject was brought before the House. Later in the Session, the hon. and gallant Member for Wigan again asked Sir George Lewis whether, considering the narrow majority against his Motion, the case ought not to be deemed one for a Commission? Sir George Lewis promised that an inquiry by Commission should take place. A Commission was appointed; and the Commissioners came

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to the conclusion that no further remuneration ought to be given to Captain Grant. Again, last Session, the hon, and gallant Member for Wigan brought the subject forward; and his noble Friend (Lord De Grey) and himself having considered the case, came to the conclusion that although Captain Grant had received all he was entitled to under the conditions upon which he had offered his services, although he had been allowed his expenses, and although different sums of money had been paid to him which were intended by the Government of the day to be payment in full for his services, still as he had devoted a good deal of time to the public service his case was one which might be inquired into with the view of seeing whether Government would be justified in offering him further remuneration. His hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel North) had criticized the constitution of the Board to which this last inquiry had been intrusted; but, as he understood, General Lindsay before he went to Canada expressed himself satisfied with its constitution. Captain Grant did not say he asked remuneration for any benefit or increase of comfort he had conferred on the soldier—he said he rested his claim on one point—namely, that he was entitled to compensation for the annual saving in the consumption of fuel which had been effected by his apparatus. Now the Commission had examined into that point; and they said in their Report they were unable conscientiously to declare that any saving of fuel was to be attributed to Captain Grant's apparatus independently of other causes. He rested his claim on a Report of 1856 received from the garrison of Woolwich, by which it appeared that a very large consumption of fuel had taken place there. The quantity stated in the Report as to what had been consumed was in excess of the regulations; and if it had been used, the excess must have been paid for by the men and not by the Government. Other reports were made from other stations; and at Brompton Barracks, for instance, it was found that under the old system 80 lb. of fuel was sufficient to cook for eighty men, being 1 lb. per man, which was under the allowance given for Captain Grant's system. The saving of fuel was not due so much to any particular apparatus as to the men being instructed in the economical use of fuel. It was admitted that Captain Grant deserved great credit for having called attention to the defective state of the ar-
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rangements formerly existing; but in 1858 the Commission on the Sanitary Condition of the Army went fully into all questions of this sort, and it was absurd to suppose that if Captain Grant had not called attention before to the subject, the attention of the Commission would not have been directed to it, and that all the improvements subsequently made would not have been made in 1858, even if Captain Grant had not brought forward his apparatus. Captain Grant's system was merely an adaptation of a system formerly known, and there was no inherent saving of fuel in it. It was not placed in any new barrack now erected. A system was now in use much more like the old one, by which steel boilers were substituted for the old cast iron ones; and the consumption of fuel did not exceed from ½lb. to ¾lb. daily per man. It was quite understood by the hon. and gallant Member for Wigan last year that the Commission was to settle the question, and he was surprised that the hon. and gallant Gentleman should have brought it forward again. Any hon. Gentleman who would take the trouble to read through the evidence would see that the case on which Captain Grant claimed so large a remuneration had not been made out. The Commission, however, took into consideration that, for several years, Captain Grant's suggestions had been encouraged by Lord Panmure and other Secretaries for War, and that he had been employed, with little intermission, for several years, and they were of opinion that though no engagement had been made with Captain Grant, and though it was never understood that he should be entitled to anything beyond the expenses he incurred, still there was no reason why he should not be remunerated for his services. If Captain Grant had asked for any such remuneration the War Office would probably have given him the full pay of his rank, which was that of a captain of artillery, while he was employed on his experiments. It was thought now that £1,000 would be a fair sum to offer him, and that sum had been offered to him. Whether that offer had been accepted by him he was not aware; but he submitted that Captain Grant's own claim, founded on a supposed saving of fuel, had not been made out by him.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
The House divided;—Ayes 104; Noes 70: Majority 34.

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.—OBSERVATIONS.
MR. BAXTER, in rising to call attention to the state of affairs in China, and to put a Question to the First Lord of the Treasury on the subject, said, he was unwilling to take any course which might be considered unfriendly to Her Majesty's Government. He did not share in the general dissatisfaction which had been expressed by hon. Gentlemen opposite with respect to their recent management of our foreign policy; on the contrary, he entirely approved of the course Her Majesty's Ministers had pursued in Europe and America, and which had ensured the continuance of our peaceful relations with those countries. But it was because he approved of their policy of peace and non-interference in Europe and America, that he disapproved of their policy of war and interference in China. He believed the time had come when a stop ought to be put to a course of proceeding which was not creditable to British arms, and which, if it were much longer persisted in, might lead us into difficulties, the importance of which it would be hardly possible to exaggerate. He objected to the policy of assisting the Imperial Government in China for two reasons: in the first place, because he believed that in doing so we were acting on a bad principle; and, in the second place, because he did not think our efforts in that direction were likely to be attended with success. He did not, however, deem it necessary, after the exhaustive speeches which had been made on the subject by the hon. Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) and the noble Lord the Member for Cockermouth (Lord Naas), to enter very largely into details on the present occasion. As a merchant owning goods in the treaty ports of China, he did not hesitate to confess that he naturally wished those goods to be protected; but it was, he admitted, a doubtful question whether he was justified in calling upon the general body of the taxpayers of this country to contribute their money with that object, under the exceptional circumstances in which China was placed. Be that, however, as it might, he felt perfectly convinced that he was not, as a representative of the people, justified in voting away their money to assist a dynasty in that country which he looked upon as utterly effete and tottering to its fail. He should, no doubt, be met at the outset by the argument, that Her Majesty's Government had done nothing more than defend the treaty ports; and the Under Secretary
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of State, indeed, had over and over again maintained that we had been guilty in China of no breach of neutrality; but if the hon. Gentleman would read the speeches which he had made on the subject, he would find that while seeking to justify everything that had been done there, and everybody by whom it had been done, and doing so with great ability, he had admitted more than once that our policy in China had been neither impartial nor uniform. The papers which had been laid on the table of the House did not, at all events, bear out the statement that we had been guilty in that country of no breach of neutrality. In the first despatch of Mr. Hammond to Sir Edward Lugard, in April 1863, he found it stated that Earl Russell did not deny that there was inconvenience in the state of things pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief, but that Her Majesty's Government could not allow British officers who were only temporarily detached from their regiments to be making war on the Taepings all over China. Again, in March of the same year, Sir Frederick Bruce wrote to General Stavely to the effect, that he was very anxious it should be borne in mind that we were not making war on the Taepings; while, in the month of June, the Secretary for the Admiralty, in writing to Mr. Hammond, said he was commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send for the information of Earl Russell a copy of a letter dated 14th of the previous April from Admiral Kuper, respecting the proceedings of Captain Dew, of the Encounter, at Show-Shing, and to state that the Admiral had been instructed to inform Captain Dew that he had exceeded his instructions in taking part in hostilities beyond the prescribed limit of thirty miles. Now, these instructions were all very well; but there were unfortunately other letters of the noble Lord which have a different aspect, as well as two letters from the Foreign Office, in the latter of which Mr. Hammond stated that he was directed by Earl Russell to say that, during the then existing state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, British officers on full pay should be allowed to join the force under Major Gordon's command, and to serve beyond the thirty miles' radius. There wag, besides, among the papers for 1862, a curious despatch setting forth the opinions of the noble Lord with respect to the discipline to be observed in the British contingent in China. So that the instructions given on the one side of the question

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might, he thought, very well be set off against those given on the other. He would, however, appeal from the instructions to the facts, and he believed the facts justified him in saying that, if the instructions enjoined upon our officers a policy of neutrality, those instructions had been violated times without number; and what ever might have been our professions, our policy had been one of actual co-operation with the cruel and corrupt Government of the Mantchou Tartars. We had broken our neutrality by our early operations within the thirty miles' radius round Shanghai, and subsequently by our operations at Ningpo, which was taken by a force com mantled by Captain Dew. Our neutrality was again broken when the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces at Shanghai appointed Major Gordon to the command of the Chinese auxiliaries. What was the character of these allies of ours, and what had been the proceedings of the men with whom it had been thought right to associate the soldiers of a Christian nation? The barbarities which were committed at Soochow were a sufficient answer to this question; but the blue-books were full of instances of the cruelty and perfidy of the Imperialists, and Sir Frederick Bruce had over and over again remonstrated with the Chinese Government upon the subject of the barbarous cruelties committed by their soldiers, which cruelties were defended by Prince Kung, the very man who was held up in that House by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs as a man of humanity and enlightenment. He now came to his second objection to the policy of upholding the Tartar dynasty —that it was not likely to succeed. In point of fact, we had been endeavouring to uphold a foreign dynasty which had never established itself in the affections of the people, and which those who had travelled in China told us would have fallen long ago if it had not been for foreign interference. This was a fact which had a strong bearing on the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government. Abbé Hue, a French missionary who had long resided in China, wrote that of late years morality, arts, and industry had decayed, that poverty and destitution were making rapid progress, and that since the accession of the Mantchou dynasty Chinese society had undergone a great alteration for the worse. Captain Blakiston, in his work entitled Five Years on the Yang-tze, declared that since the accession of the Tartar dynasty everything in the empire had fallen into a
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languishing and expiring condition, and that the rebellion against the Government was by no means confined to the Taepings, but extended very generally over the population; and he protested against the British Government making this confusion worse confounded by interference in their internal affairs. He had rather accept this testimony, agreeing as it did with the evidence of all missionaries and travellers, than the statements of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who represented everything as couleur de rose.; Sir Frederick Bruce and our Consul at Shanghai told a very similar tale. It had been asked, How it was that if the Mantchou dynasty was so weak it had held power so long? The answer was, that it was a noticeable fact that no revolution had ever been accomplished in China until after years of convulsion, insurrection, and civil war; and he, in his turn, might ask how it happened, if the Taepings were so universally detested as had been represented in that House, that fears were so generally entertained lest the Imperialist troops and the auxiliary forces themselves should go over to the rebels. He had observed with regret the support given by the Government to the expedition sent out under Captain Sherard Osborn, and more particularly the parting benediction of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and he rejoiced at its failure because it opened to us an escape from a situation of great embarrassment and difficulty. He hoped that we should date from that event a total change: in British policy in China. Our whole policy with reference to China had for many years past been not a "comedy of errors," but a "tragedy of errors." He freely admitted that the whole blame did not rest with the present Government or the late Government, but must be shared by both Houses of Parliament and by the country; and his object was not to cast reproaches upon anyone for what had been done in the past, but to provide security for the future. In the last sentence of a despatch written in June, 1860, Sir Fredorick Bruce said—
"No course could be so well calculated to lower our national character as to yield our materia support to a Government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness."
That was what we had been doing, and our Ambassador still adhered to his opinion of the impolicy of our conduct. Only the other day his hon, and gallant Friend the Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) brought out the fact that in June, 1863,

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Sir Frederick Bruce, in concert with the other Ambassadors at Pekin, signed a memorandum in which he expressed these same views, and complained of the employment of British officers in the Imperial service. That memorandum had been presented to the American Congress; but it had been suppressed by our Foreign Office, because if it had been produced the House would have seen the difference between the course recommended by our Minister in China and the Government at home, and the Government would have been forced to change their policy. In June or July last year, the noble Lord at the head of the Government, in replying to the noble Lord the Member for Cockermouth (Lord Naas), entreated the House to wait for one year and see the result of the policy which was then being pursued. They had waited a year—they had seen the result of that policy—and every word of warning which was spoken by the noble Lord the Member for Cockermouth had been proved to be true. Therefore, the Question which he had to ask the noble Viscount at the head of the Government—whom he was sure that they were all delighted to see again in his place—was, whether the Government meant in future to adhere strictly and honourably to the defence of British property in the treaty ports, refusing every kind of aid, direct or indirect, to the Imperialists, and abandoning altogether the attempt to bolster up and support the Government of Pekin? He should also like to know what instructions, if any, had been sent to Her Majesty's servants in China with reference to this important Question; and whether they had been enjoined for the future, not only not to accept employment under the Imperial dynasty, but to take no step, however indirect, to support the Government of the Emperor? Every one acquainted with the history of India must be struck with the remarkable analogy between the position of that country when English merchants resorted to it in the time of Hastings and Clive, and our present position in China. We had only just begun to develop the civilization of India, which had so recently been transferred to the Government of Her Majesty, and we ought to beware of increasing our responsibilities by mixing up ourselves in the internal affairs of so vast a country as China.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I am quite ready to answer the Question of my hon. Friend, but I must be allowed to say I regret, that though my hon. Friend says that
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he has studied with great attention all the blue-books on the subject of China that have been presented to Parliament, and notwithstanding the acuteness of his mind and the ability which he shows on all occasions, he has come to conclusions which are not supported by the materials which he says he has searched and digested. My hon. Friend started with a general theory; but nothing is so liable to mislead as a general theory. My hon. Friend said that the principle upon which the British Government ought to act is that of non-intervention in the affairs of other States; a very plausible principle, and one which in many cases ought to be strictly adhered to; but my hon. Friend forgets that there are cases in which we have treaty rights—that there are cases in which we have national interests—and if his doctrine were to be applied rigidly and in every case, our treaty rights would be abandoned and our national interests would be sacrificed. It is not true that non-intervention is the principle invariably acted on by the British Government. We have interfered with great success in the affairs of other countries, and with great benefit to the countries concerned. We so interfered, for instance, in the affairs of Greece, and we established the independence of that State. We interfered in the affairs of Belgium, and we established the independence of Belgium as a separate State. We interfered in the affairs of Portugal, and enabled Portugal to obtain a free and Parliamentary constitution. We interfered in the affairs of Spain with like success and with a similar result. We interfered in the affairs of Turkey, of Syria, and of Egypt, and we maintained the integrity of the Turkish empire. We interfered in the Crimean war, and I do not think any man in this House will say that in that struggle we were unsuccessful. We have interfered in the affairs of China. Why? Because our treaty rights were endangered and our national interests were at stake. See how inconsistent my hon. Friend was at the beginning of his speech and in its conclusion. At the beginning he said he would never, as a Member of this House, consent to throw on the taxpayers of this country burdens for the sake of protecting his own individual interests in China.
MR. BAXTERsaid, the noble Lord had not properly caught his meaning. His observations referred to upholding the Imperial dynasty in China.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: My hon. Friend said it was quite true he had mer-

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chandise and interests in China, and that he would not call on the taxpayers of this country to protect them.
MR. BAXTER: I said that might be an open question.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: My hon. Friend now says that would be an open question. But, at all events, in the question which he put to me at the conclusion of his speech, there was no uncertainly whatever; because he asked whether the Government would confine themselves to maintaining the security of our establishments in the treaty ports, in one of which I suppose his property must lie. I am bound to say that I quite concur in the propriety of maintaining and defending the security of British interests in the treaty ports. But what has been the history of our interference in China? See the inconsistency of these mercantile gentlemen. They are constantly urging the Government to make treaties of commerce with foreign countries, and to extend the range of our commercial intercourse. Only the other day I received a deputation from the manufacturing districts urging that a re-organization of the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade should take place, for the purpose of enabling the Government more adequately to extend the commercial relations of this country. And the feeling no doubt was honestly entertained, because everybody must know that on the extension of our commerce depends, in a very great degree, the prosperity of our country, the accumulation of our capital, the abundance of our revenue, and the strength and prosperity of the nation. Any measure, therefore, calculated to increase the commercial relations of the country, so far from meriting the censure which my hon. Friend, as a commercial man, thought fit to pass upon it, is deserving of praise, because it accords with the wishes and interests of the country. It was long felt that trade with China would open a vast field of commercial enterprise to us; and there can be no doubt that, among other things, the great expansion of commerce with that empire has contributed to enable us to meet without disaster the unfortunate obstructions to our commerce and manufactures occasioned by events still going on in America. My hon. Friend says that the Chinese, especially the Imperialists, are a cruel people. Well, I have myself said in this House, and I repeat it, that the characteristics of the Chinese population are cruelty and perfidy. But those qualities are not confined to
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Imperialists — they are shared in a far higher degree by the Taepings, who are peculiar objects of interest to some hon. Members of this House. My hon. Friend talks of a massacre at Soochow. There was no massacre. ["Oh, oh!"] There was a very treacherous act committed towards the Whangs, who were decoyed into the power of the Tartar commander, the Footai, who revenged upon them what he stated to have been an act of great barbarity committed by them on a former occasion. I will not justify in any degree what the Footai did. I am merely stating the extenuation put forward by him. But what happened the other day? — and this is a specimen of the acts of which Taepings are capable—there was a little steamer called the Firefly, which they seized and carried off, and it was stated and not contradicted, that four or five unhappy persons who were on board the vessel, were roasted to death.
COLONEL SYKES: By whom?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: By the Taepings.
COLONEL SYKES: No, no!
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I believe their bodies were found in a charred state, but there is no other proof of the fact. Of course persons in the interest of these people—who like to carry on a contraband trade with the Taepings, and to make a profit by supplying them with arms and ammunition—send home to their acquaintances high-flown panegyrics on the Taepings; but every impartial person writing from China, bears witness to the desolation marking the track of the Taepings. The districts which they occupy are laid waste, the people reduced to starvation; and only the other day we heard of a place in which the people were obliged to eat human flesh as a last resource. Is that a state of things conducive to British commerce? Is that a state of things the extension of which to the immediate neighbourhood of our treaty ports we ought to permit? My hon. Friend does not deny that as far as the radius of thirty miles from these ports extends, we are justified in what we have done, and that it is our duty to keep these marauding Taepings from making piratical incursions within those limits. But my hon. Friend who says he has carefully studied the blue-books, has not studied with equal care the history of China. He talked of the present dynasty as a foreign dynasty; and though he did not say, he certainly implied that it had

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been recently established in a conquered country, and, therefore, had no root in the affections of the population. If I am not misinformed, I rather think the dynasty has been the best part of 500 years in possession of the throne. [Colonel SYKES: No, 250 or 260 years.] Well, when a dynasty has been established in a country for 250 years, I think that we, in England at least, ought to admit that it is well rooted, has a good hold on the population of the country, and is no longer entitled to be called a foreign dynasty. I say that it is greatly to the interest of this country to maintain those commercial rights which the treaty concluded with China assured to us. When first the war with China began, Sir James Graham, a sagacious man, warned this House of the danger that must arise from entering into war with a third portion of the human race. I return that argument to my hon. Friend, and I say what must he the commercial advantages to this country if it can have an unimpeded, uninterrupted commerce with one-third of the human race? It is, therefore, for our interests that tranquillity should be restored in China. My hon. Friend says that the Mantchoo dynasty is tottering to its fall. I can only judge from what reports reach us; but I should rather be inclined to say that the rebellion is more likely to end than the dynasty to be overthrown. No doubt in so large an empire as China there are parts which are always threatened or disturbed by rebellion more or less violent, but that, I am sorry to say, is the normal state of many of those Oriental Governments which lack the organization and energy necessary to maintain order throughout their entire dominions. Such has been the condition of Turkey; such has been peculiarly the condition of China, whose central government has always had the greatest difficulty in maintaining order in its remoter provinces. But I can assure my hon. Friend that, as far as we can trust the accounts which reach us, the Taeping rebellion has been narrowed to a much more restricted circle than it occupied some years ago; and that if we are to speculate on the future it will be safer to reckon that the rebellion is tending towards extinction, than that the Imperial dynasty is tottering to its fall. Besides, what must happen if the Imperial Government be overthrown? You would have nothing but extensive anarchy. The Taepings are perfectly incapable of ruling the empire, and if they attempted to do so there would soon be fresh rebellions against
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them. In reply to my hon. Friend, I have stated that our interference as a direct interference has been limited to the treaty ports; but we certainly did give to the Chinese Government the assistance of British advice and arrangement in collecting their Customs and improving their revenue, and great benefits have resulted to the Chinese Government from that assistance. Last year we issued an order authorizing Captain Osborn and others acting under Mr. Lay to raise a squadron for the purpose of restoring order in the waters of China, and getting rid of the pirates who endanger navigation. My hon. Friend says that when the expedition started he foretold its failure. Perhaps in that respect he was a better judge of Chinese character than we were. It certainly did fail, owing to the jealousies which existed between the central and provincial Governments, and to their desire to subject Captain Osborn to restraints and restrictions which he felt it would not be for his honour or for the advantage of this country that he should submit to. I regret very much that the expedition of Captain Sherard Osborn did not succeed, because I believe that if it had gone on, and if Captain Osborn had been allowed to direct it according to his views, it would have put an end to that piracy which is now desolating all the coasts of China. That Order in Council has been revoked, and there is no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to issue such an Order again. Then there was another Order in Council, authorizing British subjects to enter into the service of China. Major Gordon was one of those who took advantage of that Order in Council. It has, however, been revoked, and there is no intention of renewing it. Major Gordon, I am sorry to see by the last accounts, has sustained a check, and has been wounded—I hope not severely. He is a most able and distinguished officer, and one who has performed great services for the Imperial Government. My conviction is that if the Imperial Government could by his or any other means put down the rebellion, not only would they gain a great advantage for themselves, but they would confer an immense advantage upon the commercial interests of this country. All I can say is that it is not our intention to authorize any direct interference in the military or naval service of China as between the Imperial Government and the Taepings, beyond the protection to be

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afforded within a radius around our treaty ports. That is a duty which Her Majesty's Government owe to the commercial interests of this country, and I am quite convinced that if the commercial interests were assembled and were asked their opinion, they would say, "For Heaven's sake protect our commerce in China in the treaty ports." That commerce is daily assuming more and more importance, and is one of the means by which this country has weathered the difficulty arising out of the diminished supply of cotton from America. I trust my hon. Friend will be satisfied with what I have stated, although I cannot agree with him in the conclusions he draws or the objects he desires to attain. My opinion is that the country at large will be of opinion that the Government are doing their duty in protecting the commercial interests of this country in China, as de fined by the treaty with China; and so far is it from being desirable that the Tartar dynasty—that is, the Imperial Government—should be overthrown, and that these ragamuffin Taepings should get the ad vantage, I am convinced that those who know anything about China will feel it to be an object of immense importance that order and tranquillity should be restored in a country in which our commercial relations are so extensive.
MR. LIDDELLsaid, the noble Lord had expressed a hope that his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) would be satisfied with the explanation which he had given to his statement. He (Mr. Liddell) trusted that the House of Commons would not express themselves contented with the answer just given by the noble Lord, for a more unsatisfactory answer than that of the noble Lord he had never heard. He (Mr. Liddell) felt himself compelled to offer a few observations in reply to some of the most glaring inconsistencies it had ever been his lot to listen to from a responsible Minister of the Crown. The noble Lord spoke with the natural pride of an Englishman of the extension of our trade in China, which extension, the noble Lord said, was due to the policy of Her Majesty's Government; and in the very next sentence the noble Lord spoke of the desolation of the country, owing to what he called the inroads of the rebels. But he (Mr. Liddell) would ask, in whose hands had been the great producing districts of China? When the noble Lord accused his hon. Friend behind him of not having read the despatches, he (Mr. Liddell) must, with great deference, accuse
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the noble Lord of not having studied the question himself, for if he had he must have known that the great producing districts from which there had been that increase of trade, in which the noble Lord took such natural pride, had been in the hands of the rebels for many years. The hon. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs shook his head at the statement. Did he mean to deny it? If the hon. Gentleman did mean to deny it, he would find it a matter of great difficulty to prove the contrary of what he (Mr. Liddell) had just asserted. Then the noble Lord told the House that the rebellion was waning; and in the next sentence he said that our disciplined troops headed by a distinguished English officer had received a severe check, and that that officer had been wounded. He (Mr. Liddell) learned from the last accounts that the French contingent had also received a check; and in the opinion of persons on the spot there was a great probability of Major Gordon being cut off with his whole force. Now, it did so happen that the successes of the rebels had been very considerable of late, and had followed each other in rapid succession, even since the last debate in that House. Those were facts which went to prove that at any rate the rebellion was not now in so waning a state as the noble Lord appeared to suppose. The noble Lord had defended the policy of the Government in China, and said it was intended to continue it. He (Mr. Liddell) wished to ask the noble Lord whether he had studied the advice given him by his own Envoy? because, if he had, he would find that the Government policy on many important points had been absolutely disapproved by his own Envoy. Sir Frederick Bruce was opposed on many material points to the whole of the Government policy in China. He desired to ask the noble Viscount whether he had or had not confidence in his own Envoy? Did he intend to abide by his advice or to recall him? Sir Frederick Bruce was the representative of British interests in China, and seemed to have omitted no opportunity of expressing his objections to the policy of the Government. Now it behoved the Government to do one of two things—either to listen to the despatches of their own Ambassador, or to recall him in consequence of the advice which he had given. There was one sentence in the noble Lord's speech which was particularly significant. The noble Lord began by saying that general theories were likely to mislead. He (Mr. Lid-

539
dell) did not know whether that observation of the noble Lord was applicable to the speech made the other night from the Treasury benches in his absence. If it were, he ventured to express his belief that if the noble Lord had been present those very misleading general theories, which had been uttered very recently by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would very possibly not have been heard in that House. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Question, question.] Well, he (Mr. Liddell) admitted that that reference did not bear precisely upon the immediate question before the House. He must, however, say that he was disposed to agree in opinion with the noble Lord, that general theories were very apt to mislead. He thought after what had passed—after the experience they had had of the working of the Government policy in China—that they had a right to expect from the lips of the Government a more complete enunciation of their policy in the interest of the trade which they professed to protect. Now, it had been over and over again stated in China, as well as in this country, that the policy pursued by the Government in China was prejudicial to the interests of our trade in that part of the world. The noble Viscount said that the Government interfered because our treaty rights were in danger. He wanted to know in what single instance had our treaty rights or our trade been endangered? He had asked that question before, and he now repeated it. He wished to know any instance in which either the property or the life of a British subject had been placed in danger, except on the recent occasion of the reprisals in the case of certain persons taken on board the Firefly. But the House should recollect that those reprisals were in consequence of the murders committed in Soochow. Those were the sort of acts which civil war naturally gave rise to, and in China the civil war had been pushed beyond its limits by our unhappy interference.
LORD NAASsaid, he was unwilling to go at any length into this subject, because he could not do so without interfering with the discussion which must come on upon the Motion of the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden); and at present there was no Question before the House except that the Speaker leave the Chair, and, therefore, it was impossible to ask the House to give an opinion on the subject.
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But though he should limit his observations on the present occasion, he was, nevertheless, fully alive to the importance of the Question. He could not, however, refrain from entering his protest against some of the assertions made by the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston). He confessed he felt disappointed at finding that the events of the last year had made no impression upon the minds of Her Majesty's Government. When he heard the Question put by the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), he was in hopes that the noble Lord would have informed the House that the new policy inaugurated in China was a failure, and would be given up, and that the Government intended to return to the policy followed about two years and a half ago. But the noble Lord, so far from making such a statement, had defended the policy of the Government, and actually told the House that they were determined to walk in the same path which they had been pursuing for the last eighteen or twenty months, observing, at the same time, that they were bound to protect our treaty rights as well as the property of British subjects in China. But what he (Lord Naas) said was, the policy of the Government went far beyond that. It was a policy calculated rather to endanger our treaty rights than to maintain them. Her Majesty's Government were interfering in every way in China and against the interests of the country. When the noble Lord talked of maintaining our treaty rights, he entirely misapprehended the question and the objects which those who took a comprehensive view of those subjects had really at heart. The object of those with whom he (Lord Naas) acted was to maintain and protect the treaty rights, but, at the same time, not to interfere in the internal or domestic affairs of the country. Now, Her Majesty's Government had interfered very actively in those affairs— had fitted out a fleet for the Imperial Government, and had lent them upwards of 100 officers to command the forces, not of the Emperor, but of the local and provincial authorities. It was an utter fallacy to say that those with whom he (Lord Naas) acted objected to the maintenance of treaty rights. He should be able to show on a future occasion that the Government had actually endangered those treaty rights, and that our merchants themselves were of opinion that our policy in China had risked the security of our trade in that quarter; and that our policy had been in direct con-

541
tradiction to the opinion not only of our naval commanders, but of many of our most eminent representatives. No one acquainted with the affairs of China but must see the danger of the course which the Government were now pursuing; and all who were competent to give an opinion on the matter were anxious that we should go back to the principles laid down by Earl Russell in his despatch immediately after the Treaty of Tien-tsin—those principles; being in favour of non-interference in any way in the internal affairs of the empire. As he thought it quite impossible to go at length into the Question at that moment, he had only to express a hope that an early opportunity would be given to the House for a more general discussion upon the subject. It was one of the most important Questions that could be considered, and he believed when the time came, for its calm consideration, both the country and the House would be made fully aware of the enormous danger of the policy which the Government were now pursuing in China.
COLONEL SYKESsaid, as there was a prospect of a full discussion upon this subject, he would limit himself to a few remarks. The noble Viscount justified his interference in China by saying that he had interfered in other countries, but he had overlooked the motives for interference, on those occasions. In Europe we had interfered to protect the rights of the people against oppressive Governments, and that interference was to our honour in the cases of Belgium, Portugal, and, to some extent, Spain; but in China we had interfered in behalf of a Government which had been described by Sir Frederick Bruce and others of our representatives there, as the most corrupt, treacherous, and cruel Government on the face of the earth. He held in his hand extracts from a despatch of the American Minister at Pekin, which contained the real views of the representatives of the four great European Powers in China, namely Russia, France, America, and England—and which despatch had been presented as an official communication by the American Secretary of State to Congress. He (Colonel Sykes) came to a knowledge of the existence of Mr. Burling-hame's despatch in this wise. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs on a recent occasion had quoted a passage from Mr. Burlinghame's despatch to the American Secretary of State. To verify that quotation he (Colonel Sykes) consulted the
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despatch in the library, and to his amazement found reports of lengthened conversations between Mr. Burlinghame and Sir Frederick Bruce on the desirableness of the great European Powers pursuing a neutral policy in China—Russia and France entertained the same views. Mr. Burlinghame asked, whether Sir Frederick Bruce would inform the British Government of the views held in common, and his reply was, that he would not only do so, but give Mr. Burlinghame a copy of the despatch on the sole condition that it was not published in America until it had been published in England. It was for this despatch, part of which had been quoted for his own purposes by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the rest suppressed, that he Colonel Sykes had asked and was told that it could not be produced without injury to the public service, although Congress had been informed of Sir Frederick Bruce's despatch and of its contents. He (Colonel Sykes) would read to the House some passages in Mr. Burlinghame's despatch of the 20th of June, 1863, and the House would then see, that the policy proposed was that which he (Colonel Sykes) and other Members had advocated in the House of Commons for the last four years. Mr. Burlinghame says—
"I expressed a warm desire that he (Sir Frederick Bruce) would present them (his views) to his Government, that they might become the basis of our future co-operation."
Mr. Burlinghame went on to say—
"He accordingly wrote the powerful despatch marked A, which he communicated to me for my private use, and which, with his permission, I send to you confidentially, with the most positive request that it is not to appear until it is first published in England. The three Ministers hailed with delight this frank avowal. The policy upon which we are agreed is briefly this, 'That while we claim our treaty right to buy and sell and hire in the treaty ports, subject, in respect to our rights of property and person, to the jurisdiction of our own Government, we will not ask for, nor take concessions of territory in the treaty ports, nor in any way interfere with the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government over its own people, nor ever menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. That we will not take part in the internal struggles in China, beyond what is necessary to maintain our treaty rights. That the latter we will unitedly sustain against all who may violate them.' To this end we are now clear in the policy of defending the treaty ports against the Taepings or rebels, but in such a way as not to make war upon that considerable portion of the Chinese people by following them into the interior of their country. In this connection, while we feel desirous from what we know of it to have the rebellion put down, still we have come to question

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the policy of lending Government officers to lead the Chinese in the field, for fear of complication among ourselves growing out of the relations to the employed, &c. That while we wish to give our moral support to the Government at the present time, the power in the country which seems disposed to maintain order and our treaty rights, we should prefer that it would organize its own people as far as possible for its own defence, taking only foreigners for instruction in the arts of peace or war, and these as far as possible from the smaller Treaty Powers."
Other parts of the despatch are worthy of the attention of the House; and it is to be lamented that with a knowledge of its contents the noble Viscount should justify our breaches of neutrality. It was stated by the noble Lord at the head of the Government that the Taepings had roasted four Europeans; but there was testimony from a person in China to the effect that those four persons said to have been roasted in December were alive in January. In contrast with the assertions made of the desolation which accompanied the march of the Taepings, he directed the attention of the House to the following description by Dr. Legg of the proceedings of the Imperialists. Dr. Legg is a most highly respected Missionary, who has been many years in China, and his letter is dated 1st October, 1862. He says—
"It behoves the British Parliament—the British people—to look to the new complication of affairs in China, to look it fully in the face. If we are to pacify the Empire, we shall require 50,000 troops, and may then find again that we have undertaken more than we are equal to. But, I ask, in whose interest are we to put down the rebellion? Hitherto, Admiral Hope has been acting in the interest of the Imperial Government. Now, I protest against our putting down the rebellion on behalf of the Imperial Government on two grounds. The first is, the ground of its cruelty. I have read harrowing accounts of the devastations of the rebels—how the country is blasted by their march. The accounts are, no doubt, true. But I have seen also the ways of the Imperial braves, and kept company with them for hours together. Their march over the country was like the progress of locusts and caterpillars. Their thirst for blood was quenchless; their outrages on the young and old were indescribable. On the score of cruelty the case must be about equal, inclining to the Imperialist side, if we may judge on the principle that the more cowardly are the more cruel."
Well, but the noble Viscount and others assert that the Taepings are desolators. Now I would make an appeal to the common sense of the House. If they were the desolators described, alighting like a swarm of locusts, and having destroyed the country taking a new flight and only alighting for more desolation, surely a most important article of export from China—
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namely, silk, could not have increased. There is, probably, no article of produce that requires more careful, persevering, and peaceful manipulation than the whole processes of silk production, from the hatching of the eggs, rearing of the worms, cultivation of the mulberry tree, and winding of the silk, to the bale packing; and yet the silk districts since they fell into the hands of the Taepings on the 26th of May, 1860, by the capture of Soochow, have annually sent an increasing amount to the Shanghai market, for I hold in my hand not only the annual Returns of the export of silk from Shanghai, but the monthly Returns. I will not enter into details, but give the general results for a few years past. In 1853, when the Taepings captured Nankin, the export from Canton and Shanghai was 25,571 hales, in 113 vessels. In the year 1851–2, the year before the Taepings captured Nankin, the export of silk from Canton and Shanghai was 23,040 bales, in 117 vessels. In 1857–8 the export from Canton and Shanghai was 60,736 bales, in 149 vessels. In 1860, when Soochow was taken by the Taepings, the export from Shanghai alone had risen to 69,137 bales; and, in the year 1862–3, to the 31st of May, the export was 83,264 bales; and for the last and present year, since Soochow was treacherously obtained from the Taepings by Major Gordon, the export of silk has fallen off to 44,000 hales, owing to the plunder of the country by the Imperialists, by the aid of Gordon and the British authorities; and yet, in the face of these facts, the friends of the Imperialists have the hardihood to assert that the Taepings are only hordes of banditti and ruthless desolators.
MR. GREGSONsaid, he was satisfied with the noble Lord's declaration, that the Order in Council had been withdrawn, and that the policy of the British Government would be confined to defending the treaty ports and defending British life and property, and would not be in any way directed to hostilities against either party in China. The expedition of Captain Osborn had, as stated by the hon. Member for Montrose, failed; but he regretted that that was the case, for its purpose was a noble one. The Chinese Government were very sincere in their application for that force, and promptly remitted the whole of the money to pay for the ships; but afterwards some interference took place on the part of the officers of the Chinese Government, and Captain Osborn would not

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submit to be placed under any Chinese authority. He must say that he regretted that the Chinese Government had not acted more consistently with their first intentions; for he believed that the valuable assistance which Captain Osborn's expedition might have afforded would have been of the greatest benefit to China, With regard to the silk districts, to which the hon, and gallant Member had just alluded, it was his opinion that they had been destroyed by the Taepings.
MR. KINNAIRDbelieved that Admiral Hope had the utmost desire to act with perfect good faith towards the Taepings, but experience showed that those people would not keep faith themselves. He concurred in thinking that Captain Osborn's expedition would have been of great benefit to the Imperial Government, and of great advantage to our trade in clearing the livers of pirates; but, under the circumstances, Captain Osborn acted with great discretion in withdrawing his ships, though that step was a great loss to the Imperial Government in China.

THE ASHANTEE WAR.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: According to my notice, I rise to ask from Her Majesty's Government some explanation with regard to the war in which this country is engaged with the King of Ashantee—a subject which requires explanation no less than the more important question of the state of our relations with China which has just now been under discussion. I very much doubt if many lion. Members were aware of the fact that we are at this time engaged in a war with Ashantee, until a question relative to it was put the other night by the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay). At that time I did not consider the answer of the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary was quite satisfactory; and since that time I have not only seen some very interesting and remarkable letters and statements in the public papers, but I have myself received private communications relative to the subject, and I have also had an opportunity of reading some private letters, which have convinced mo that the time is come when the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government ought to be directed to this subject, and when Parliament has a right to expect that some information should be given re-
  546
  garding it. I want to ask, what are the causes and what are the objects of this war—if war it can be called—in which, according to the information which I have received, our brave countrymen are being sent to die, not by the hands of the enemy — for an enemy they have never seen— but through the effects of exposure to the deadly and pestilential climate of that country? Statements have reached me, which I hope will be contradicted, that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government—or I might say of the Government of Cape Coast Castle rather than of Her Majesty's Government, for I almost doubt if Her Majesty's Government are very fully informed of what is going on in that country—I understand it is the intention of the local Government to invade the territory of the King of Ashantee, a prince who, I believe, has always evinced a friendly disposition towards the people of this country, for the purpose of taking possession of his capital. If this be a true story, I think that of all the wild visionary schemes I ever heard of this seems one of the most hopeless and impossible. I have heard that the King of Ashantee has at his disposal a very considerable army; but whether he has or not, I believe his natural position makes him entirely independent of the services, of any army—at all events, to resist our attack; for he can have no army so strong nor any fortress so impregnable as the dreadful climate and the pernicious atmosphere that prevail over the 150 miles: which lie between his capital and the sea coast. The accounts which have reached me—I may be told the facts are exaggerated, but of that I cannot judge; I can only give them as I have them—are that the effects of this climate on the European constitution are of a most peculiar and painful kind. Life appears to be worth in the interior of the country not more than three weeks' purchase. When the dreadful disease of the country attacks an European the too deplorable consequence is loss of life. And another most painful peculiarity is, that in those cases in which life is not sacrificed reason very often is sacrificed, and many of our officers are said to have left that country in a state of idiotcy the most painful and depressing. Another peculiar fact is, that the negroes who have been bred and reared in the West Indies appear to suffer as much from the effects of the climate as Europeans. I have seen a gentleman who

  547
  lately left that country, who informed me that the wing of a negro West India regiment taken there in order to aid in the prosecution of this distressing war, numbering 700 strong, was landed on the Gold Coast, and five days after no fewer than 120 of these 700 negroes were hors de combat. I will only mention one other fact to illustrate the hopeless circumstances under which this war must be carried on. It is well known that the interior of the country is still more pestiferous and deadly than the coast; but in order to prosecute their idea of invading the territory of the King of Ashantee, I am told that a force of 400 men was sent 100 miles up country, and encamped on the banks of the river Prah. Out of that number, when the accounts I received left, 200 of these troops were hors de combat, and there were not, I was assured, more than eighty who could, in case of an action coming on, carry a musket into the field; out of nineteen field officers fifteen were disabled. These are most painful facts, and it is obviously the duty of the Government to take some steps in the matter. Brave men ought not to be exposed to such a dreadful fate. The letters I have seen have been written by officers attached to our forces, and more touching — more distressing letters I have never read—letters written by men with a spirit of endurance and calm resignation honourable to our army, but by men who felt they were sent to die an inglorious death. One officer, in writing to his family, said that he almost wished he could be exposed to a volley from his own company, for he should then know the worst; but no man could anticipate the horrors of being quartered in this deadly climate for an indefinite period. And then let me ask what is the expense of this war? I have heard it calculated that the military expenses of this absurd expedition is not less than £1,000 a day, and from reliable information I have received I should say the outlay must be at any rate from £12,000 to £14,000 per month. I hope the Government will be able to give a satisfactory explanation in regard to this subject; and to offer some assurance that this folly—I may say worse than folly—will be put a stop to. I trust the language of the right hon. Gentleman may afford some comfort to the many unhappy persons in this country who are daily expecting to hear of the sacrifice of dear friends or relatives in Africa, who have perished not like soldiers
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  in the field, but under the fatal effects of a horrible climate.
  MR. CARDWELL: I entirely recognize the justice of the appeal which has been made to me, that I should state fully and frankly to the House all that I know on this subject. I am also glad that the right hon. Baronet has taken the opportunity of introducing the topic on the Question of the Motion for Supply rather than by a Question in the usual form, because I am thereby enabled to give a fuller explanation than I could have given to a Question to which the rules of the House permit only a categorical answer. The state of the case is as follows: As hon. Members are aware, the British forts on the Gold Coast constitute the whole of the actual possessions of the British Crown in those parts; but there is a wide territory, extending for some seventy miles up the river Prah, which separates what is called the British Protectorate from the territory of the King of Ashantee. In December, 1862, the Governor of the Gold Coast wrote to the Duke of Newcastle that the King of Ashantee had demanded the surrender of two persons fugitives from his dominions. One was a boy—an escaped slave—and the other was an older person, charged with having misappropriated a piece of rock gold, which by the law of Ashantee is the property of the Sovereign, and has to be accounted for to the King of Ashantee. The Governor of the Gold Coast examined into the allegations against the two fugitives, and found that there was not a tittle of evidence that either had been guilty of any crime which would justify his being given up to the King of Ashantee. There was, on the contrary, abundant reason to know that death was the fate that awaited them should they be surrendered. He accordingly declined to surrender these fugitives, saying that if he did so their blood would be on his head—a feeling in which I believe every Member of this House will sympathize, for no one would wish to see fugitives who have sheltered themselves under the protection of the British flag surrendered under such circumstances. The conduct of the Governor received the approval of the Duke of Newcastle. In the spring of 1863 a force of the King of Ashantee invaded the protected territory. They were met by forces partly organized and commanded by British officers and partly consisting of Native troops. The army of the King of Ashantee extended its ravages

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  to within forty miles of the British possessions on the Gold Coast. About thirty towns or villages, as they are there called, consisting of Native settlements, some very small, and others comprising several hundred families, were destroyed. Many lives were sacrificed, and much agricultural produce was carried off. In the autumn of 1863 the Governor announced that the Ashantee forces had retired, threatening, however, to renew their incursions into the British territory as soon as they had; planted their own crops. As a measure of defence the Governor suggested to my noble Friend that he should be authorized to carry on war, if necessary, across the river Prah, and attack the territory of the King of Ashantee. To this request my noble Friend gave his assent in terms which I will read to the House —
  "The principle of all military proceedings on the West Coast of Africa should be that of defence, and not of aggression. It is upon this principle alone that the Governors are authorized to make war, and no invasion of neighbouring territories can be sanctioned, unless it can be shown that it is really a defensive measure, safer, less costly in blood and money, and more likely to be decisive in its results than waiting for an attack which is being prepared. His Grace feels, therefore, that he cannot refuse to Governor Pine a conditional authority to strike a blow within the Ashantee territory, if such a blow can be struck without making any other or further advance than, in his own opinion and that of the officer in command, may be consistent with the utmost consideration for the safety of the troops."
  I am prepared to lay the whole document on the table, but I have read that passage in order that it may be seen that the principle authorized by my noble Friend was defence not aggression, and that no aggression on the territory of the King of Ashantee was contemplated by him. Reinforcements were ordered to be sent from the West Indies to assist the Governor of Cape Coast Castle in the proposed expedition, and every precaution was taken to secure the health and wellbeing of the troops, so for as having a first-rate commissariat, medical aid, and proper means of transport was concerned. When a Question was put to me the other night by the hon. and gallant Member for Wake-field (Sir John Hay) this was the amount of the information which had reached the Colonial Office—that our military commander was on the Prah, waiting for reinforcements, which he expected, but which had not reached him, from the West Indies, and that on their arrival he
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  intended to begin the operations authorized by the Duke of Newcastle. Since that time, however, we have received another mail from the West Coast of Africa; and now I have to relate the story up to the latest advices. Last year the rains were unusually light, but whereas they commonly begin in May, this year they set in with unusual violence and severity in March, and the consequence was that the transports with re-inforcements from the West Indies had not reached the: Gold Coast when the rains began. With the rains came sickness, and with sickness came the necessity for sending back to the coast all the troops which had been gathered upon the Prah for the purpose of making the intended expedition into Ashantee, excepting those companies—three in number—which were left to protect the stores and provisions collected upon the banks of the river. The last despatch I received from Governor Pine, dated April 5, contains a statement to the effect that he was afraid it would not be practicable to leave those companies upon the Prah, and the last despatch of all that has reached me, written only two days later, was not from Mr. Pine himself, but from an acting Governor, and it informed me that the Governor not having been able to carry into effect his purpose of having a personal conference with the military commander as to the state of affairs and the proper measures to be taken, had been compelled to take a cruise in the Rattlesnake for the restoration of his health. Such is the state of information in which we find ourselves placed by the last mail. I may be fairly asked what is the course we intend to take in these circumstances? The last mail, as I have said, has only reached me within the last few days; but since its arrival I have been in communication with my noble Friend at the head of the War Department, and also with his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, as to what ought to be done in the present state of affairs; and now I have to inform the House that the determination at which we have arrived, and which I propose to announce to the authorities on the spot by the mail which leaves England on Monday next, is this—that transports shall be immediately despatched to remove from the Coast troops to the amount of those who have recently been sent there, so that the number may be reduced to that which can be accommodated with the means ordinarily available upon the Gold Coast, due regard being had to health and comfort: that the

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  forces shall be altogether removed from the interior; that the stockades which hare been erected shall be handed over to the Native chiefs interested in the protection of the country; and that the stores shall be removed so far as the circumstances of the case may render it practicable to do so. I believe, however, it will not be any considerable pecuniary sacrifice to give those which cannot be removed to the friendly Native forces which may be told off to garrison the stockades erected on the banks of the river. But even if such an act did involve a considerable pecuniary sacrifice, I am sure the feeling of the House will be that a sense of duty would compel us to incur it rather than to put in peril the lives of our officers and men in such a climate. I have stated what was the origin of the war. I have stated what were the views and objects with which my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle sanctioned an incursion on our part into the territory of the King of Ashantee, and that it was not any aggression upon the territory of the King of Ashantee. I have stated that he had no intention to undertake any war of conquest or of vengeance; that his only desire was to ward off a threatened attack, and that no measures have been taken except with that view. With respect to what has occurred since I have had the honour of filling the office I now hold, I have stated the contents of the mail received only a few days ago, and have informed the House that, in conjunction with the War Office and the Horse Guards, I have taken measures for withdrawing our troops from the interior of the country and placing the defence of the Prah in the hands of those Native chiefs whose duty and interest it-is to protect their own territories from hostile incursions. We also propose, as far as possible, to provide for the safety, health, and well-being of our troops on the Gold Coast. Though it is impossible to speak with any certainty as to unknown and unforeseen occurrences, I entirely sympathize with the feeling that it is not our duty to make expeditions into the interior in such a climate as that of Africa. We have no desire whatever for any extension of territory; we have no wish to make wars of conquests or of vengeance; and as the rains have put an end to the late warlike preparations, so it is not our intention to renew them for the purpose of invading the territory of the King of Ashantee. I have already presented a Return, which, so far as I know, will give the information asked for by the right
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  hon. Gentleman, but if any further information is required I shall he most happy to furnish it.
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he was sure it would be extremely satisfactory to the House to know that the war with the King of Ashantee was about to terminate. He was afraid, however, it would not terminate with either honour or advantage to our arms. It appeared to him that some blame attached to the Government for the want of provision for the troops sent to the hot climate of the Gold Coast. The Colonial Secretary had talked of having sent an excellent commissariat officer to Cape Coast; but it was not possible to provide supplies for British troops in such a country, and the excellence of the officer would hardly make up for the want of food. He knew from personal experience that cattle could not live on the Gold Coast, and that it was necessary to kill and salt them as soon as landed. In that hot climate, where a fourth of our men were within a short period laid up with dysentery, how was it possible to feed them with salted provisions? He trusted measures would immediately be taken to remove our officers and men to some climate in which they would have a chance of being restored to an effective state. There was one point upon which the Colonial Secretary had not touched. At present the friendly Native forces were subsidized to assist us in the Ashantee war. He was informed, however, by persons recently returned from the spot, that the chiefs never expressed any desire for the protection we were affording them, and that they were only induced to aid us by liberal pay. He was also informed that the value of all the villages destroyed by the Ashantee forces, which appeared so formidable to English notions, did not exceed £400, and that the friendly Native chiefs would rather have that sum paid in money than the defence and protection of our arms. If that information were correct, the House would probably agree with him that the payment of £400 would be far more economical than either the prolongation of the war or the continuance of the subsidy to the Native chiefs.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY — CIVIL SERVICE ESTIMATES.
SUPPLY considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
The following Votes were agreed to: —

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(1.) £517, to complete the sum for Embassy Houses, &c., at Paris and Madrid.

(2.) £3,201, Embassy Houses, &c, at Constantinople.

(3.) £75,000, New Foreign Office.

MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHsaid, in the present thin state of the House, he doubted whether it was proper to proceed with the discussion of the Estimates, that the Estimate for this work had been increased since last year from £200,000 to £228,000, and there was an extra item of £4,899 now brought forward for the first time for abortive designs. He supposed that those designs had been prepared on the sole authority of the Board of Works.
MR. COWPERsaid, that last year, when the Estimate for the new Foreign Office was brought forward, he stated to the House that the Bum of £200,000 was the total amount which Mr. Scott, the architect, reckoned the erection of the building would cost. Since then, however, tenders had been received, the lowest of which amounted to £223,516. He stated at the time that the sum he named was the best estimate which Mr. Scott could furnish, but that the only real test would be the tenders. He did not now think that they had any reason to find fault with Mr. Scott's estimate, which he believed would have turned out correct if the work had been executed at the time it was made, But since then the price of labour and materials had risen in the market, and that fact accounted for the tender being higher than the estimate. The item of £4,899 charged for "preliminary expenses of designs for a Foreign Office which were not adopted "was not submitted to Parliament before because Mr. Seott abstained from sending in his claim until a final decision had been come to with regard to the Foreign Office. In that item was included the charge for the designs prepared by the direction of his predecessor the noble Lord opposite (Lord John Manners) in the Gothic style, which style the House, after full consideration, deliberately determined to reject. That rejection, however, did not deprive Mr. Scott of his right to fair remuneration for his labour, because his designs enabled the House to judge of what would have been the character of the building in case they had adopted the Gothic style.
MR.W. WILLIAMSasked when it was likely the new Foreign Office would be
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finished, and the enormous coat of hiring temporary accommodation put an end to?
MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHwished to know whether he was to understand that £5,000, in round numbers, had been expended without any previous sanction from that House, in preparing designs that were not adopted. That mode of bringing forward items of charge incurred four or five years ago was highly objectionable. There was very little check or control exercised by the Treasury over the expenditure of the offices immediately subject to it, and more particularly of the Board of Works. Indeed, as a check in these matters, the Treasury seemed of very little use. He thought that it would be extremely improper to proceed with the Estimates in so thin a House, and moved that the House be counted.
Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; Committee counted, and 40 Members not being present,
MR. SPEAKERresumed the Chair.
House counted, and 40 Members not being present,
House adjourned at half after Seven o'clock, till Monday next.