Sitting of 27 June 1864

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—On Expiring Laws, appointed and nominated (List of Committee.)
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—MISCELLANEOUS ESTIMATES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Registration of Deeds (Ireland)* [Bill 176].
Second Reading—Contagious Diseases * [Bill 163]; Portsmouth Dockyard (Acquisition of Lands)* [Bill 152]; Sheriffs Substitute (Scotland)* [Bill 164]; Inclosure (No. 2)* [Bill 170]; Mortgage Debentures* [Bill 169] (Lords)
Referred to Select Committee—Contagious Diseases * [Bill 163]; Portsmouth Dockyard (Acquisition of Lands)* [Bill 152].
Report of Select Committee—Cattle Diseases Prevention, and Cattle, &c. Importation * [Bills 27 & 28], Report* (No. 431).
Committee—Greek Loan [Bill 114]; Factory Acts Extension* [Bill 55]; Naval and Victualling Stores* [Bill 178] (Lords); Joint Stock Companies (Voting Papers)* [Bill 62] —R.P.
Report—Cattle Diseases Prevention * [Bill 27] (re-committed); Highways Act Amendment* [Bill 177] (re-committed); Greek Loan [Bill 144]; Factory Acts Extension* [Bill 55]; Naval and Victualling Stores* [Bill 178] (Lords) (re-committed).
Considered as amended—Settled Estates Act Amendment* [Bill 142] (Lords); Weights and Measures (Metric System)* [Bill 165].
Third Reading—Chimney Sweepers Regulation* [Bill 148] (Lords); Railway Construction Facilities* [Bill 111], and passed.
Withdrawn—Cattle, &c. Importation* [Bill 28]

POOR LAW RELIEF,

  QUESTION.
  MR. WARNERsaid, he wished to ask the President of the Poor law Board, Whether he will lay upon the table of the House in the present Session a Bill to carry into effect the recommendations of the Select Committee on Poor Relief?
  MR. C. P. VILLIERSsaid, in reply, that the recommendations of that Committee had reference to matters of various kinds, and not immediately connected with each other, and it would probably be convenient to introduce several Bills to carry them into effect. He had directed the Report to be sent to the different Boards of Guardians, with the view of ascertaining if there were any practical difficulties in the way of adopting some of the Amendments proposed. He should shortly be in a position to inform the House what course the Government would adopt with regard to the Report. At all events, if he could not introduce any Bill this Session he should be prepared at the earliest moment of the next Session to introduce a Bill on the subject.

STATE OF PARK LANE.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOHN SHELLEYsaid, he would beg to ask the hon. Member for Bath, as a Member of the Metropolitan Board of Works, Whether that Board has come to any decision as to the opening of Hamilton Place to public traffic, with the view of relieving the crowded state of Park Lane?
  MR. TITEsaid, in reply, that the Metropolitan Board had had under its consideration the crowded state of Park Lane, and had come to the conclusion that the

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  best, if not the only, mode of relieving it would be by the opening of Hamilton Place. They had communicated this opinion to the First Commissioner of Works. There were difficulties in the way on account of the opposition of the tenants of some houses, who were Crown Lessees; but since all that was required in order to effect the improvement was a slip of land only 100 yards in length, he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would lend his aid in carrying out this great metropolitan improvement.

EGHAM RAILWAY ACCIDENT.

  QUESTION.
  SIR RICHARD BULKELEYsaid, he rose to ask the President of the Board of Trade, Whether his attention has been drawn to the evidence given at the inquest on the sufferers by the late Railway accident at Egham by Mr. Robert Archibald Scott, Traffic Manager of the South Western Railway, in which he says—
  "Ordinarily, I should think there would not be the slightest danger in starting them (the trains) at an interval of five minutes, allowing the first train to make a first stoppage at a distance of eight miles. It is quite an ordinary working of the trains. Some lines allow only three minutes."
  Also to the evidence of Thomas Gibbard, office porter at Egham, whose duty was to note the arrival and departure of the trains, and who states—
  "That the Royal train (containing their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales) passed through Egham in the morning at 12·51, and that Lee passed through at 12·47."
  Whether the President of the Board of Trade would inform the House on what lines trains are started at intervals of three minutes only; whether starting trains on the same line at intervals of three minutes is done with the knowledge and sanction of the Board of Trade; and whether he considers the safety of their Royal Highnesses was sufficiently protected in allowing a heavy passenger train to precede them by four minutes only?
  MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, that the Board of Trade had no legal authority to interfere with the traffic regulations of railways, and therefore any regulations in force could not be said to have had the sanction of the Board of Trade. Nevertheless, the Inspectors of Railways gave information to the Board of Trade from time to time on which the Board thought
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  it right to send letters to the Railway Companies calling attention to any representations that might be made in regard to regulations of a dangerous character. With regard to the third Question, he had asked Colonel Yolland what was the state of the case, and he told him that it was quite exceptional to allow so small an interval as three minutes between trains, the ordinary practice being to allow at least five minutes between the starting of trains. Colonel Yolland added, however, that the question of time was not material if proper precautions were taken. With regard to the last Question, as to the safety of the Royal train in going from London to Ascot, he had to state that circumstances under which that train was proceeding were quite different from the circumstances under which the trains were proceeding in the case where the collision took place. The other trains were stopping at the various stations, but the Royal train and that which preceded it were going through to Ascot without stopping. As a matter of fact, he believed there was only an interval of four minutes between these two trains.

CHURCH LIVINGS (IRELAND).

  QUESTION.
  MR. O'REILLYsaid, he would beg to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, in reference to Return No. 267 of this Session, "Established Church (Ireland), number of livings in each diocese in Ireland, value of living, &c." Whether the net annual value of each living which is given was exclusive of the glebe house and land, and whether in the possession of the incumbent or let to tenants?
  SIR ROBERT PEELsaid, in reply, that in the Return in question the net annual value of the livings was exclusive of the value of the glebe house, but was inclusive of the net value of the glebe land, whether in the occupation of the incumbent or not.

GUNS FOR THE NAVY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CORRYsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, with reference to his recent statement that a large order had been given for the manufacture of 10½-inch smooth-bore Guns for the Navy, throwing a spherical shot of 150lb., Whether the Admiralty will consider the advisableness of having those Guns rifled on

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  the shunt principle, so as to admit of their being fired either with round shot or with elongated projectiles?
  LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, in reply, that the right hon. Gentleman was under some misconception. What he had stated on a recent occasion was, that a large order had been given for 110-pounder rifled guns for the navy, and that likewise a certain number of 10-inch guns were in preparation, some of which were already on board the Royal Sovereign. It was the intention of the Admiralty to rifle those guns, and the mode of rifling them was under the consideration of the Ordnance Committee.

EXPIRING LAWS BILL.
Select Committee appointed,
"To inquire what temporary Laws of a public and general nature are now in force, and what Laws of the like nature have expired since the last Report on the subject; and also what Laws of the like nature are about to expire at particular periods, or in consequence of any contingent public events, and to report the same, with their Observations thereupon, to the House:".—Mr. PEEL, Mr. MASSEY, Sir STAFFORD NOTHCOTE, Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Mr. ADDERLEY, Mr. COWPER, Sir WILLIAM JOLLIFFE, Colonel FRENCH, Mr. BARING, Mr. BRAND, Mr. WILLIAMS, and Lord JOHN MANNERS:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Three to be the quorum.—(Mr. Peel.)

DENMARK AND GERMANY. THE CONFERENCE.
Copy presented, of Protocols of Conferences held in London relative to the Affairs of Denmark [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, I rise to move that these papers be printed. In doing so, I am quite aware that there never was an occasion, probably, on which a Minister of the Crown had to make a statement—short and simple as I intend to make it—to this House of Parliament, and through it to the public, on which the feelings of the country, the sympathies of the country, the aspirations, and, I may say, the anxieties of the country, were more deeply engaged than in the question on which it will be my duty for a short time to detain the House. Sir, the sympathies which the British nation feel in the cause of Denmark will do honour to them in all time wherever they are recorded. ["Hear, hear!"] I stand here, however, not to excite those sympathies or to profit by them. I stand
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here upon this occasion simply to communicate to the House in a short abstract the substance of those proceedings of the Conference, which are recorded in detail in the papers now laid upon the table—and although on Friday I doubted whether the record of the proceedings of Saturday would be sufficiently ready to be laid before Parliament in conjunction with the papers relating to the preceding events, I am now able to say that they will be delivered to Members to-morrow morning, together with the papers relating to the other proceedings of the Conference. Among them will be found an abstract of the proceedings of the Conference drawn up by one of the Plenipotentiaries, which will greatly assist hon. Members in making themselves masters of the more detailed negotiations recorded in the Protocols.
But, to explain more fully, and to make this House understand completely the nature of the questions which were treated of in the Conference, it will be necessary for me to go a little further back, and to offer some remarks as to the points upon which the subsequent controversies and the proceedings of the Conference turned. The House, however, is sufficiently familiar with those transactions and their origin to make it unnecessary for me to do more than give a general outline of the affairs to which I refer. The Treaty of 1852 was negotiated by myself and by Lord Granville, who succeeded me, and was concluded by Lord Malmesbury, who succeeded him; so that, as far as the policy of that treaty is concerned, all parties in this country are equally bound by it. It was founded upon European considerations. It did not originate simply with England—it was an arrangement dictated by European interests. ["Hear, hear!"] The state of the matter was this:—The law of succession in Denmark admitted females to the throne; the law of succession in Holstein confined the right to males. If, therefore, any case should arise in which there was a default of issue male in Denmark, it was clear that, by the operation of those conflicting laws, Denmark and Holstein would be separated. But the late King of Denmark, being advanced in years, had no offspring; the Prince who would have been his immediate successor, had he outlived the King, had no offspring either; and therefore the Powers of Europe felt it necessary to take into consideration the threatened splitting up of the Danish

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monarchy, which they held to be inconsistent with the general interests and the balance of power in Europe. For this purpose it was necessary to assimilate the law of succession in the two parts of the Danish monarchy. To alter the law in Holstein was impossible, because it was the law of the Germanic Confederation of which Holstein is a member. The other expedient therefore was adopted, and it was agreed that the lex regia of Denmark should be altered so that males only should succeed to the Crown. It was also agreed that the King of Denmark should have the power of naming his successor to the throne of Denmark, and that arrangements should be made by which that successor should inherit the Duchy of Holstein. These arrangements were the object of the Treaty of 1852. The King of Denmark chose as his successor Prince Christian of Glucksburg; and there being a question of the right of the Duke of Augustenburg to Holstein, that right was commuted by a pecuniary indemnity. The Duke of Augustenburg having been in rebellion against his Sovereign on a former occasion, his estates were confiscated; but the value of those estates was now given to him on condition that he renounced for himself, his heirs, and successors all claim to the Duchy of Holstein. The Treaty of 1852 provided, therefore, as far as the foresight of the parties to it could go, for the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy as then constituted, by the possession on the part of Denmark of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. That treaty was greatly approved by all the parties who were concerned in it. A question, however, arose whether, as Holstein was affected by the treaty, it should be submitted for the concurrence of the Diet at Frankfort? The asking for that concurrence was at first objected to by all the Powers concerned—by the German Powers, by Russia, by Sweden, and by Denmark. My noble Friend Lord Granville, when he held the seals of the Foreign Office, did, however, propose that the treaty before it was concluded should be submitted to the Frankfort Diet. But that proposal met with no assent. On the contrary, as will be seen by the papers now in the hands of Members, some parties expressed their dismay at such a proposal—dismay arising from the delay which they held would be the consequence of such an application—and a different course was adopted, namely,
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that, whereas the Diet consists only of representatives of the different German Powers, application should be made to those Powers themselves to accede to the treaty which had been concluded. The application was made, and several States acceded; but it is right to say that some other States, including Bavaria and Baden, declined to assent to the treaty in consequence of feelings connected with German opinion as bearing upon the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig. Well, Sir, that treaty was preceded by certain diplomatic communications between Germany and Denmark, which led to various arrangements; but the material arrangement was this—that whereas, on the one hand, the great object of Denmark had always been to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark, and whereas, on the other hand, the great object for which the Germans had always contended was the political and administrative union of Schleswig with Holstein, both should give up their respective pretensions—that the King of Denmark, on the one hand, should engage not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark, and the Germans, on the other, agree no longer to require the political union of Schleswig with Holstein. So stood matters at the conclusion of the treaty, in which, if all the parties had been equally animated by a spirit of conciliation—and I must say of justice—it would have been better for them, and I am not aware that any serious complications would have arisen. But during the ten years which elapsed between the conclusion of that treaty and the death of the late King of Denmark a series of mutual complaints arose between the parties. The Germans contended, and I am afraid not without some reason, that the Danish Government had not acted fairly in its treatment of the German population of Schleswig—that in their extreme desire to extend Danish influence and rule they had in some degree interfered with the free exercise by the German population of that duchy of those privileges which belonged to them as the subjects of a free State. It is also to be borne in mind that in March of last year a Patent—that is to say, a Constitution—for Holstein was proclaimed by the late King of Denmark, which the German Confederation stated to be in its details at variance with the general laws of the Confederation. Moreover, in November a Constitution was passed by the Parliament at Copenhagen for Denmark

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and Schleswig which the Germans contended was at variance with the engagements given by Denmark in 1851–1852 not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark. It was contended that an arrangement for united representation and the united action of deputies at Copenhagen was virtually an incorporation pro tanto of Schleswig with Denmark, The late King of Denmark died while these questions were still under discussion between Germany and Denmark. The Patent of March for Holstein in the meantime remained in force; and the present King, from considerations connected with internal matters, found it necessary upon his recent accession to the throne to give his sanction to that Constitution of November, which up to that period had wanted the Royal Assent, and was not complete until the Royal Assent had been given. Germany remonstrated against all those arrangements. In October the Frankfort Diet had passed a Resolution that Federal troops should enter Holstein for the purpose of compelling the late King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein, to revoke the Patent of March.
I will deal with the political question first. Matters stood in the position which I have described towards the conclusion of the year. Her Majesty's Government, thinking and believing that there were grounds for the German objections to that Patent, urged the Danish Government to revoke it, and by so doing to place them selves in the right in regard to that question. The Danish Government did so, ["Hear, hear!" from the Opposition.] But the Diet changed its ground, and, instead of contenting itself, as it had done up to the death of the late King, with disputing the right of the Duke of Holstein to give a Constitution which they maintained was at variance with the Federal law, they took up another ground, and contended that the question had fairly arisen who should be Duke of Holstein; they denied that the King of Denmark had succeeded legally to the Duchy of Holstein; and a proposal was made in the Diet to occupy Holstein by Federal troops until that question should be decided by the Diet. In my opinion the Diet had and has no right to consider and decide that question. There is nothing, in my opinion, either in the Treaty of 1815 constituting the Diet and giving to it birth and origin, or in the final Act of 1820 completing the Diet arrangements, which entitles the Diet to
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determine who should succeed in any State within the Confederation; and I am not aware that when an Emperor of Austria resigned, and was succeeded by a member of his family, the Diet claimed any right to interfere in that matter. But Austria and Prussia moved in the Diet, not that the Federal troops should not enter Holstein, but that the entrance of these troops should be what is called an "execution" and not an "occupation." By the term "execution" is meant an act of the Diet, in accordance with the Powers of the Diet and German law, to compel any Sovereign of territory belonging to the Con-federation to adapt his legislation to the laws of the Confederation, if those laws should have been broken. Austria and Prussia carried their proposal, and the Diet resolved, not that the entrance of the troops should bear the character of an occupation to hold the Duchy of Holstein until the rightful heir should be determined, but that the entrance of the troops should be an act of execution, to compel the existing Duke to alter the Patent and revoke it as not being in accordance with German law. The entrance, therefore, of the Federal troops into Holstein as a measure of execution was a distinct acknowledgment by the Diet at that time that the King of Denmark was Duke of Holstein, and it was to compel him to alter or revoke the Patent of March that that execution took place. It is also to be remembered that whereas it would have been perfectly legitimate for an execution to take place if the King of Denmark had persisted in refusing to revoke the Patent, yet in point of fact the Patent was revoked before the German troops entered the Duchy of Holstein; and consequently that entrance was unjust in itself, though founded on a plea which would have given a warrant to it had the plea still held good. Well, these troops having entered on the distinct understanding that they were there to compel the King of Denmark (Duke of Holstein) to revoke the Patent, those proceedings then took place which are known to everybody, and which led to the super session of the authority of the King Duke, and to a declaration in favour of the Duke of Augustenburg.
Then came the case of the Constitution, uniting to a certain degree, as we were compelled to admit, Schleswig with Denmark, in violation of the engagements entered into by Denmark in 1852. Her Ma-

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jesty's Government felt all the evils which would arise from an occupation of the territory of Schleswig by the German troops. I should say that though the Government of Denmark had engaged, at the suggestion of England and, I believe, the other Powers, to take the earliest means constitutionally possible to revoke that Constitution, the Germans determined to enter into and take possession of Schleswig as a material guarantee for the performance of that engagement. We proposed that some diplomatic transaction—some engagement on the part of Denmark taken in the presence of the other Powers parties to the treaty—should be accepted by the Germans as a sufficient security that the engagement would be fulfilled: but that proposal was not accepted, and the German troops entered Schleswig. When the Federal troops entered Holstein, the Danish Government, partly on advice and partly from considerations of prudence, refrained from offering any resistance to the Germans, and there was no war arising on that occasion; but when the German troops entered Schleswig the feelings of the Danish nation were too strong to admit of a similar course being pursued, and resistance—an obstinate and heroic resistance—was made against the very superior numbers which the Germans brought to bear. Up to that time, all the parties who had signed the Treaty of 1852 continued to admit its validity, and to acknowledge that they were bound by its engagements, so far as related to the acknowledgment of Christian IX. as King of Denmark and to the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark, and all the territories then held by the King, Even Prussia up to that time did not refuse to admit the binding nature of the treaty; but it is only fair to say that she intimated that if resistance should arise, and if different events should take place, then it would be possible that the German Powers might have to reconsider the engagements of the treaty. Not to weary the House by a recital of military operations which are familiar to everyone, I will state that the course of war led to the occupation by the Germans of the whole of the continental part of Schleswig, and such part of Jutland as they thought fit and expedient to occupy.
In this state of things it occurred to the Powers who were parties to the treaty and not engaged in the war, that it was desirable that a Conference should assem-
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ble, composed of the Plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, and of the four neutral Powers—England, France, Russia, and Sweden—to consider the means of reestablishing peace on a solid and permanent footing. That proposal was agreed to, and on the 25th of April the Conference met. It continued its labours until last Saturday. The first proposal made in the Conference was for a suspension of hostilities, because it was felt by the neutral Powers, England, France, Russia, and Sweden, that until the fighting ceased there was no fair prospect of a satisfactory conclusion being come to. We wished that a suspension of arms should precede the Conference; but we found it impossible to obtain an assent to such an arrangement. Well, after some delay, and a good deal of discussion when the Conference had met, a suspension of hostilities was agreed upon, to take place on the 12th of May, and to last for a month. The next thing was, that the belligerent Powers were asked on what conditions they were willing to put an end to the war and come to an amicable conclusion. The Germans, of course, were the parties on whom the question was pressed. There was some delay in extracting from the German Powers what their intentions were. They first proposed—still maintaining the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy as settled by the Treaty of 1852, or at least not departing from it in words, though in substance they were thought to do so—that there should be a political and legislative union between Schleswig and Holstein, and that the connection between these united Duchies with Denmark should be the link, simply, of the Crown. They coupled that, however, with another condition, namely, that the arrangement should be reserved for the approbation of the Diet; and there was some reason to suppose that under that condition it was intended to include a discretion on the part of the Diet to decide whether the united Duchies should still continue united with Denmark, or whether the claims of some other party pretending to their possession should be considered. The Danish Government would not agree to that proposal. The German Powers then made a different proposal, but one far more objectionable—namely, that Schleswig and Holstein should be separated from the Danish Crown. That, of course, the Danes would not agree to. The neutral Powers con-

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certed among themselves, and—seeing that Schleswig and Holstein were actually in the occupation of an overpowering military force, that it did not suit the views of Franco or Russia to take any active steps to dislodge that force, that Denmark was unable to do so, and that, I need not I say, England was not willing singly to enter into the undertaking ["Hear, hear!"]—agreed to propose to Denmark the separation of Holstein from the Danish Crown, together with such parts of Schleswig as might be agreed upon; and the line of separation settled and proposed on the part of the neutral Powers was the line running along the Schlei down to Husum on the other coast. That proposal, coupled with other conditions which I shall not trouble the House by going into, but which will be found in the Protocol, was accepted by Denmark. Denmark said that, however unwilling to make a territorial cession, she was willing to agree to the proposal ["Hear, hear!"]; that, feeling all the inconvenience of perpetual disputes between herself and Germany, she wished to be quit of all interference on the part of the Diet in her internal affairs; and, provided she had assigned to her a frontier which in a military and commercial point of view was consistent with her interests, she was willing to accept the line I have mentioned, separating Holstein and the southern part of Schleswig from the Danish territory. The German Powers refused that arrangement. [Opposition cheers.] They asserted that the line would not include a sufficient amount of the purely German population; that there would still be a large number of Germans subject to Danish rule, and that their desire was to draw such a boundary that the great bulk of the German population should be included with Holstein. In regard to Schleswig, the fact, I take it, is this—that the extreme northern part is entirely Danish; that the extreme southern part is purely German; and that between the two there is a large extent of district in which the population is mixed—mixed not only as villages, but even as streets in the villages. It is, therefore, absolutely impossible to draw any line in the centre of Schleswig which shall entirely separate the German population from the Danish. Consequently the ground taken by the Danish Government appeared to be a fair one—that, it being impossible to draw the line with regard to nationality, it should be drawn so as to give to Denmark such
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a frontier as was susceptible of military defence, and would insure those commercial advantages which she was naturally anxious to secure. The Danish Government, therefore, I say, accepted the line of the Schlei. ["Hear!"] The German Plenipotentiaries, on the contrary, having given up part of Schleswig, were directed to insist on the line from Apenrade on the cast to Tondern on the west coast. Between these two lines lies a district of considerable extent as compared with the extent of Schleswig, but in an European point of view of no great importance. In the course of the discussions the Prussian Plenipotentiary, Count Bernstorff, on his own authority, stated that, seeing how small the difference was which prevailed between the two parties, he would undertake to recommend to his Government to depart from the northern line of Apenrade and Tondern, and to be content with a line drawn from Flensburg to the west coast. That recommendation, however, his Government rejected, and he was obliged to say that his Government and Austria stood by the northern line, originally proposed, from Apenrade to Tondern. In the meanwhile, time pressing, the Plenipotentiaries naturally wished for a prolongation of the armistice—or, rather, I should say—for there is a technical difference between the two—the suspension of hostilities, which was to expire on the 12th of June; and with great difficulty Denmark was induced to agree to an extension for another fortnight. The German Powers were willing, as might have been expected, to extend the suspension to the beginning of winter. [Opposition cheers.] Denmark, on the other hand, grudged every fortnight of the summer that was withdrawn from her naval operations. ["Hear!"] The Danes, therefore, said they would not prolong the suspension beyond the fortnight, unless in the meanwhile some agreement should have been come to, with regard to the frontier and other things, that gave an assurance that the negotiations would result in a peaceful and satisfactory arrangement. The suspension was accordingly extended for a fortnight, which ended yesterday.
In the whole course of these negotiations I may say there was perfect unanimity between the neutral Powers—[Ministerial cheers]—between England, France, Russia, and Sweden; and although my noble Friend Earl Russell was chosen as President by the Conference at

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the outset, and although it may therefore have fallen to him to make several of the proposals which were submitted, these proposals must all be regarded as the proposals of the neutral Powers, because they were discussed, arranged, and settled, at meetings of the neutral Powers before they were brought before the Conference. [Ministerial cheers.] That is a very important point. ["Hear, hear!"]
As there was no possibility of bringing Germany and Denmark to agree upon any middle line between the two lines which they respectively stood by—the Schlei line being demanded by Denmark, and the Apenrade line by Germany—a last attempt was made by the neutral Powers to induce the belligerents to refer the question in dispute to arbitration. The dispute, it will be observed, had really been narrowed to a comparatively small point. It was no longer whether Holstein should be governed in a particular manner; it was no longer whether or not Schleswig should be united politically and administratively with Holstein, and whether the two Duchies should be connected by the link of the Crown with Denmark. Denmark had consented to the alienation of territory, Germany had been content with that arrangement, and the only question was, whether that arrangement should be carried out by dividing Schleswig in one part or by dividing it in another. It appeared to the neutral Powers that the territory lying between the two lines proposed was not so important to either party as to justify the resumption of the war, and that it might fairly be deemed, in accordance with the recommendation of the Conference of Paris, a question for the decision of an arbiter. Accordingly my noble Friend, as the organ of the neutral Powers, proposed that arrangement to the belligerent Plenipotentiaries. Each party, naturally, took time to refer the question to their respective Governments, and on Friday their answers were to be given. The answer of the German Powers was that they looked to the words of the Conference of Paris, which recommended the "good offices" of a friendly Power, and that the Protocol having been quoted by the neutrals, they accepted the reference of the question in dispute to a friendly Power, provided they were allowed to reserve their decision as to whether they should accept or refuse the line which the friendly Power might fix upon. [Laughter, and ironical
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cheers from the Opposition.] That was at variance with the proposal made ["Hear, hear!"]; because my noble Friend, as the organ of the neutral Powers, in recommending the adoption of a reference as suggested by the Conference of Paris, distinctly stated that it was with the object that a friendly Power might decide and determine the line to be drawn between the two parts of Schleswig. ["Hear, hear!"] Therefore, the answer of the German Powers would have been more frank and candid if they had simply declined the proposal, instead of accepting it with a condition which nullified it. ["Hear, hear!"] On the other hand, the Danes, who throughout the whole transactions have certainly clung more to their decision and principles than they have shown pliability in adapting themselves to the force of circumstances, declined the arbitration, and said that they had accepted the line of the Schlei, and further north they would not consent to go. [Opposition cheers] There seemed now to be an end to all further attempts to effect an understanding; but the Ambassador of France, by order of his Government, made another and a last effort. He proposed that, whereas the Danes had agreed to give up as far as the Schlei, and the Germans not to pass northward beyond the Apenrade line, an appeal should be made to the population of the intermediate district in order to ascertain, first of all, their relative nationality, and then what their wishes were and what arrangement they would like. ["Hear!"] That proposal the British Plenipotentiaries agreed to; but it was negatived by Denmark. [Opposition cheers] A proposal of the same sort had been made in an earlier stage of the negotiations, but had not found favour with any party, except Prussia, who was willing to try it; Austria and Russia had decided objections to it [a laugh]; and, therefore, the idea of ascertaining the views of the population in that way was not adopted at any time in the course of the proceedings. My right hon. Friend near me reminds me that a portion of the proposal was, of course, that there should be perfect freedom of choice on the part of the population, and that such freedom could not exist unless the occupying troops were withdrawn during the voting. Prussia, as I have said, would have been willing to accept, but Austria took a different view, and thus the labours of the Confer-

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ence were brought to a close. We have endeavoured by every possible means, in conjunction with the other neutral Powers, to bring the two parties to an agreement, and we now lament, as everybody must, that war should begin again, for a matter which might so easily, we think, have been adjusted, and on a question not involving the existence of a nation or of a Government, but simply relating to the possession of a comparatively small strip of territory.
Sir, the Conference having unfortunately ended in the manner I have stated, it became the duty of Her Majesty's Government to take into serious consideration the course which it behoved them to adopt. We felt great sympathy for Denmark; we remembered that, although she had at the beginning been in the wrong, yet another Sovereign had succeeded to the throne, a different Ministry had the direction of her affairs, and that there had been manifested by acts a strong desire to set right that which had been wrong [cheers]; we believed that, from the commencement to the end of these last events, Denmark had been ill-used [cheers]; that might had overridden right [renewed cheering]; and we knew also that the sympathies of almost the whole of the British nation were on her side. [Continued cheering] There is a natural disposition in all who have proper feelings to take part with the weak against the strong, especially if the weak are oppressed, and if the strong are acting unjustly and tyrannically. We should, therefore, for these reasons have been glad if we had found it possible to advise our Sovereign to take part with Denmark in the approaching struggle, lint then, on the other hand, it was to be considered that, whatever wrongs Denmark may have sustained—and they are many—she had in the beginning been wrong herself ["Hear, hear!"]; that at the very last of the Conferences she had rejected a proposal reasonable in itself, and one which, if accepted by the two parties, would necessarily have led to a peaceful solution of the question in dispute. ["Hear!"] Her fault in that, no doubt, was equally shared by her antagonists [cheers]; but still, in considering the position which England ought to occupy, that matter could not altogether be left out of sight. we had also to consider what really was the matter in dispute for which hostilities were to be begun, and it did not appear to us to be one of very great im-
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portance. It did not involve the independence of Denmark; it went little beyond what Denmark had herself agreed to, and related simply as to whom a particular strip of territory should belong. On the other hand, as men who were considering what advice in a very important European crisis—and I do not wish to disguise its importance—should be given to their Sovereign, we could not lose sight of the magnitude of the resistance which had to be overcome, and the comparative means which England and her supposed antagonists would be able to bring to bear in the struggle. It had been ascertained early in these transactions that France—for reasons of which she was entitled to be the judge—declined to take any active measures in support of Denmark, and we knew that her resolution in that respect still continued unchanged. We had likewise ascertained that Russia, for reasons of which she also was entitled to be the judge, was not inclined to take any active measures in support of Denmark. We knew, therefore, that the whole brunt of the effort, whatever it might be, requisite for dislodging the German troops and those which might come to their assistance from the rest of Germany, from Schleswig and Holstein, would fall upon this country alone. Under the circumstances, we have not thought it consistent with our duty to advise our Sovereign to undertake such a task. We know the honourable sympathy which the people of this nation feel for the unhappy condition of Denmark; but, at the same time, we do not think it consistent with our duty to recommend Parliament and the country to make those great exertions, and to undergo those great sacrifices, which would have been the necessary consequence of entering into a conflict with the whole of Germany. I assume that, in the present state of things upon which our decision was made, the real contest lies between Germany and Denmark with respect to—I am afraid I can hardly say that part only of Schleswig which was in dispute before the Conference closed, because it is not impossible that the whole of Schleswig may be involved in the struggle. It would be more honourable on the part of the German Powers to be satisfied with that they have demanded, but we know that strength and success frequently carry men beyond the line which, on cool reflection, they might be disposed to stand upon. Still, the contest is as regards Schleswig, and not as regards

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the independence of Denmark, or the safety of the capital of the Danish monarchy. I do not mean to say, therefore—I think it right, indeed, to put in this reservation—that if the war should assume a different character; if the existence of Denmark as an independent Power in Europe should be at stake; if we had reason to expect to see at Copenhagen the horrors of a town taken by assault, the destruction of property, the sacrifice of the lives, not only of its defenders, but of its peaceful inhabitants, the confiscations which would ensue, the capture of the Sovereign as a prisoner of war, and other humiliations of that kind—I do not mean to say that if any of those events were likely to happen the position of this country might not be a subject for re-consideration—[Renewed cries of "Oh!" laughter, and ironical cheering from the Opposition followed by counter cheers from the Ministerial Benches]—we might then think it our duty to adopt another course. But this I say on the part of the Government, that if any change of policy be thought advisable, such change shall be communicated to Parliament if Parliament is sitting, and in any case the earliest opportunity shall be taken of asking the judgment of Parliament upon the matter. ["Hear, hear!"]
I have now to apologize to the House for having gone so much into detail. It was not my wish to provoke discussion. My desire simply was to explain as fully as I could the state of the matter. The papers, which will be in the hands of hon. Members to-morrow morning, contain full accounts of all that passed in the Conference. All the events which took place before are recorded in the papers which have now for some time been before Parliament; and, therefore, every hon. Member upon looking at those two sets of documents, will be capable of forming a proper opinion of the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government in regard to Danish affairs. [Cheers]
MR. DISRAELI: I quite agree with the noble Lord that it would be very inconvenient if the House on this occasion were to enter into a general discussion respecting the transactions that have taken place between Denmark and Germany, and the policy of the English Government with regard to them. One of the reasons why I now rise is to remind the House of the exact position which it occupies at this moment. As far as the negotiations of Her
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Majesty's Government with respect to the dispute between Denmark and Germany are concerned, the House has incurred no responsibility whatever. ["Hear, hear!"] Since the end of last Session the House has given no opinion upon the subject. ["Hear, hear!"] Considering that I have myself taken some part in bringing about the position which the House now occupies, I trust I may not be deemed presumptuous in reminding the House of it. On the first night of the Session, interpreting the feelings of Gentlemen on this side, I expressed my want of confidence in the foreign policy of the Government, and my disapprobation of the manner in which their negotiations had been carried on, especially in the North of Europe, as well as of the results which had been realized. Had the papers been presented to the House on the meeting of Parliament, according to custom, and as we now know they might have been, there would have been no difficulty before April in asking the opinion of the House upon the conduct of these negotiations; and, indeed, what has occurred in the Conference—judging from the narrative, perspicuous though not satisfactory [a laugh],which the noble Lord has given of it, and from what otherwise has reached the ears of many Gentlemen—has very little to do with the great question upon which the House ought to give its decision. I may say here, by the way, that the origin of the Conference has not been correctly described by the noble Lord. The Conference was not called at the desire of the neutral Powers, but was called by one neutral Power, and that Power was Great Britain. ["Hear, hear!"] It met without hope, and it rises without hope; it met without a basis, and therefore it leads to no result. ["Hear, hear!"] But let me remind the House that from the period when Parliament met until the meeting of the Conference the House expressed no approbation whatever of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to these transactions. On one occasion alone its opinion was asked for in the shape of a formal Motion by an hon. Gentleman opposite. On that occasion I myself interposed, and moved the Previous Question, on the ground that the circumstances which prevailed rendered it, in my judgment, not expedient for Parliament to give any opinion on the subject. And, therefore, Her Majesty's Ministers did not enter the Conference with the confidence of Parliament, but with the Previous Question. That

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was the basis, as far as Parliament was concerned, on which they entered into the Conference. Well, it is necessary that the House should understand clearly they are not in any way committed to any approbation of the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers in the matter. But, Sir, I think that the time has arrived when some opinion ought to be pronounced by this House. [Cheers] Although five months have elapsed since the period at which, as it now appears, that opinion might conveniently and properly have been taken, I myself do not regret the delays that were occasioned, because they were occasioned on both sides of this House by those feelings which, I think, do honour to the House of Commons. I have always believed that one of the principal reasons why the House of Commons, as a political institution, has been so successful and so marked out in its practical character from all other popular assemblies may be found in the respect which it entertains for the prerogatives of the Crown and the functions of constitutional Ministers. Therefore, Sir, I think that the course we then pursued was a wise, a temperate, and a patriotic course. ["Hear, hear!"] At the same time, I must say it is my conviction that we should forfeit all claim to the respect of our countrymen, and not fulfil one of the most important functions of Parliament, if, in the present critical position of affairs, we hesitated to give our opinion upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers on this question. [Cheers] And having on several occasions expressed that conviction, I must say now that it is my intention on an early—I would say even the earliest—opportunity to ask the opinion of the House on that subject. I have no doubt that I shall find no difficulty raised by the noble Lord opposite in fixing on the period which I may think most convenient to the House for that purpose. [Viscount PALMERSTON: Not a bit.] Sir, I would add no more were it not for the closing observations of the noble Lord, which, it appears to me, ought not to pass unnoticed. I must say that I heard them with astonishment. [Renewed cheers] Are we, then, to be taught to-night by the noble Lord that it is the Islands only of Denmark that are necessary to the independence of that country? Then why is it that we have been committed to a policy which has so long and so pertinaciously declared that the possession of Holstein and Schleswig by the Crown of Denmark
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was necessary to the balance of power and to the maintenance of the public law of Europe. Sir, it is too much for us now to hear, under those circumstances, that war may be impending at any moment, and that the Parliament, which is soon to be prorogued, may be suddenly called together because the noble Lord and his Colleagues, who for a considerable period have been defining the grounds upon which the balance of power and the maintenance of the public law of Europe alone depend and ought to be vindicated, find at the last moment, while they recede from the scene of action, the possibility of a smaller issue which may arise, and in the interval agitate Europe and distract the public mind. ["Hear, hear!"] After the experience that we have had on this subject, I can really look on this only—and it is some consolation to adopt that view of the question—I can look on this only as a continuation of those senseless and spiritless menaces [loud cheers], which have impaired the just influence of this country in the councils of Europe, and, by impairing that influence, have diminished, the most effectual means of maintaining peace. [Cheers] I think that the noble Lord might have spared that contingent menace to the House, to the country, and to Europe. I must say myself that, judging from the past, I would prefer that the affairs of this country should be conducted on the principle of the hon. Members for Rochdale and Birmingham than on the policy which is avowed and announced at least by the noble Lord. [Cheers] I think that in that case, as the consequences would almost be the same, our position would be more consistent; it would certainly be more profitable and in my opinion it would really be more dignified. At least those hon. Gentlemen would threaten nobody ["Hear!"]; at least, they would not tell Denmark that if she is attacked she will not find herself alone [cheers]; at least they would not exasperate Germany by declaiming in the full Parliament of England against the "aggravated outrages" of her policy [cheers]; at least they would not lure on Denmark by delusive counsels and fallacious hopes. [Renewed cheers] I declare that, in my opinion, the position of England would be more dignified if the policy which those hon. Members profess regulated our affairs' rather than the policy by which the noble Lord seeks to guide us. Why, have we not now, for months upon months, been

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menacing almost every country in the world? [Laughter and cheers.] And yet, when we thought that we had at least secured the blessings of peace—when we supposed from the gloomy narrative of disappointment and discomfiture which we have received this evening, we were at least in an intelligible position, and enjoying what some may have thought to be purchased at a great cost, but which was a clear result—namely, the possession of peace, we are at the same time to have that announcement accompanied by the continuation of these unsatisfactory menaces, and told that absolutely at this moment the whole country is to be agitated by the possibility of Parliament being called together suddenly in order that the noble Lord may commence a policy of action which, if ever justified and called for, ought to have been commenced long ago. [Loud cheers.] Sir, I trust, however, that these questions will be entered into fully and completely. When I listened to the narrative with which the noble Lord favoured us to-night of these transactions—of the continued sacrifices of Denmark—of the continued approaches of the enemies of Denmark—I confess, Sir, that I was not myself much surprised—though the point naturally awakened some curiosity and interest—that the noble Lord should have entirely omitted any notice of the inducements which made Denmark submit to these sacrifices, or any mention of those menaces addressed to the aggressive Powers which were always treated with contempt. But I should certainly have liked, while his précis of the proceedings on this question was being given us by the First Minister, to have had some account of the causes of the dreary consequences which he communicated to us. ["Hear!"] Sir, we shall soon have an opportunity of entering into that matter. I accept the noble Lord's courteous promise that he will make no difficulty respecting the day on which I shall venture to ask the opinion of the House of Commons on the policy of the Government, and I shall take care that no unnecessary delay occurs before I avail myself of it. [Loud cheers.]

SUPPLY.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

ANNUITY TO THE KING OF GREECE.

  RESOLUTION.
  MR. AYRTONsaid, he desired to bring under the notice of the House a matter of considerable importance, bearing in mind the precedent it involved, and the effect it might have on their future proceedings. In 1832, after the British Government of that day had adopted the decisive policy of establishing the independence of Greece, they determined, in conjunction with Russia and France, to afford such material assistance to the new kingdom as might enable it to organize a regular Government. In fulfilment of that design, a Convention was entered into between those three Powers for the purpose of enabling Greece to raise a loan sufficient to meet the financial necessities of that country. By that Convention it was provided that a sum of 60,000,000f., or about £2,400,000, should be raised by way of loan in three separate instalments. The first was to be raised immediately; the other two as the circumstances of Greece might require. The Government of that day took care that the Convention should preserve to the House the opportunity of expressing its judgment on the transaction, and, accordingly, while the Emperor of Russia bound himself at once and unconditionally to guarantee one-third of the loan, the constitutional sovereigns of France and England only bound themselves, the one to recommend to the French Chambers, and the other to recommend to Parliament, the expediency of giving a similar guarantee. Some three or four years afterwards, in 1846, a question arose whether the British Government were bound to guarantee the second and third loans, if the other Powers did not adopt the same course; and the Government of that day, instead of taking it on themselves to decide the question, applied to the House of Commons for an Act to amend the original proceeding and to resolve the doubt. From 1832 to the present time no less than £977,000 had been paid out of the Consolidated Fund on account of the Greek loan. The treaty undoubtedly contained provisions for the repayment of the loan, which was to be a first charge on Greek revenues, but until the year 1847 the Greeks did not pay anything. In 1848, the attention of the Government having been called to the fact, some pressure was put upon that country, and about £40,000 was paid on account of the advances they had received. Greece

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  was then allowed for some years to go to sleep again and to disregard its obligations, but in 1860 the British Government, in conjunction with the other protecting Powers, was moved to make a strong remonstrance against its disregard of the duties imposed by the Treaty of 1832. An investigation was made into the resources of Greece, and recommendations were made that she should forthwith set apart some 900,000f., equal to £36,000 a year, in discharge of her obligations. In the same year the Greek Parliament voted £36,000 as a first instalment in accordance with that requisition, and £12,000, the third of that amount, was paid into the Consolidated Fund. But from that time Greece had been in a very troubled condition, and her troubles culminated in what he might call the politest revolution that had ever taken place, the King having been escorted on board ship and informed that he might go upon his travels to any other country. Negotiations were then set on foot to find him a successor and the country a King, and when the Prince of Denmark ascended the throne one of the terms of the proposal signed by the protecting Powers was, that out of the £36,000 a year which the Greek Government had engaged to pay annually, £12,000 a year should be paid to the Prince of Denmark, of which sum the proportion to be given by Great Britain would be £4,000 a year. When that proposal was laid on the table he called attention to the peculiar language in which it was couched, no reservation being contained as to the right of Parliament to express any opinion. The Under Secretary of State undertook that the matter should be considered, and the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Seymour Fitzgerald) having reminded the Government of their promise to explain, on the 8th of July the Chancellor of the Exchequer said it was intended to afford Parliament an opportunity of expressing its views, but as it would be necessary to reduce the transaction into the form of a diplomatic act, that might not be accomplished before the close of the Session. After it had expired, the treaty which had been negotiated on the 13th of July was published, and as regarded the annuity to the King of Greece it was precisely in the same terms as the Protocol itself. Another treaty subsequent to the cession of the Ionian Islands was made, with a proviso that it should not endanger or in any way impair the obligations of the Treaty of 1832, or the transactions relating to the
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  loan. The House, he thought, could hardly doubt that the making of treaties, disposing of the public money in those absolute terms, and without reserving any right to Parliament of expressing an opinion, was a matter which they were bound in some manner to notice. Nothing could be more clear than that all casual receipts, either derived from revenues at home or from foreign countries, belonged to, and ought to be paid into, the Consolidated Fund. An Act was passed in 1854 to abolish the practice of intercepting the public revenue in its way to the Consolidated Fund. In order that everything should go into the Consolidated Fund, Parliament also provided that hereditary pensions and other hereditary claims should be no longer paid out of special sources of revenue. The Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 6th of July last year, in the fullest manner, accepted the doctrine that it was the duty of the Government to obtain the sanction of Parliament in all matters of this kind, and yet seven days afterwards Earl Russell signed a treaty by which the doctrine was set at naught, because, instead of reserving to Parliament the right of expressing an opinion, the treaty was made in absolute and definite terms that gave to Parliament no option. The prerogative of the Crown had, in fact, been exercised in a manner which set at naught the privileges of the House of Commons. Parliament had for many years interested itself in the right of the Crown to grant annuities out of the public revenue. In 1782 it was provided that no pension should be granted by the Crown of a greater amount than £1,200 without a previous Resolution and Address of both Houses of Parliament. It was further provided that no pension should be payable out of any particular source of revenue, but that all pensions should be paid at the Exchequer, so that they could not escape observation. There was one exception in favour of the families of the reigning Sovereign. It would be seen that the treaty in question violated both the rules laid down. At the end of the reign of George III. another Act was passed further to check the extravagance of the Sovereign. In that and every succeeding Act for the settlement of the Civil List, Mr. Burke's Act of 1792 was cited and made one of the regulating statutes. There could be nothing more clear than that Parliament had restrained the right of the Crown to grant annuities. The question

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  of pensions again excited the attention of the House of Commons at the beginning of the reign of William IV., and a Resolution tending to restrain the power of the Crown in this respect was the cause of the change of Administration which placed the Whigs in power. That Resolution was in 1834 followed by another of a more stringent character—namely, that no pension should be granted by the Crown except for public services which were to be particularly stated. On the accession of Queen Victoria, and the arrangement of the Civil List, that Resolution was cited in the Act as the rule for the future granting of pensions. The Act further provided, that instead of the Queen having a large fund available for pensions she should have a stipulated sum of £1,200 a year for this purpose. Parliament had strictly limited the authority of the Crown in regard to the granting of pensions, but notwithstanding all these statutes the Government by this treaty had bound itself to grant an annuity to the King of Greece in a manner which deprived the House of Commons of all legitimate opportunity of expressing an opinion on the subject. It was true that the Government had submitted to Parliament a Bill for confirming the annuity; but it was idle to ask the House to give an opinion on the Bill, as it was impossible to set at naught a treaty which had not only been ratified, but partly carried into effect. This treatment of the House of Commons contrasted forcibly with the liberty which had been given to the Ionian Parliament. The Protocol reserved to the Ionian Parliament the right of expressing an opinion on the dotation of £10,000 a year to the King of Greece. The Ionian Parliament formed an opinion of its own, and determined that the dotation should not be a separate charge on the Ionian Islands, but should be only a temporary charge until Greece and the Ionian Islands came to an agreement on the subject. The treaty had, consequently, to be altered in this sense. Her Majesty's Government were by no means so desirous to make provision for the public servants of Her Majesty in the Ionian Islands, for they had left them to be dealt with by a convention with the Greek Government, so that it might possibly happen that our pensioners in the Ionian Islands might be left to be paid out of the revenues of this country. The question was, whether before passing the Bill the House would not place on record some distinct declaration
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  in regard to the power of the Crown to enter into engagements which affected the revenues of the country without first eon-suiting Parliament. If the House were to allow this Bill to pass unchallenged it would form a most dangerous precedent. He was desirous of asking the Chancellor of the Exchequer to explain how he could reconcile the terms of the treaty either with precedent or his own pledge; and if he could not do so, the House ought to place on the Journals some record of its opinion of such proceedings. In conclusion he begged to move that the grant to the King of Greece of an annuity of £4,000 out of moneys belonging to the Consolidated Fund by treaty not made subject to the sanction of Parliament was a violation of the privileges of the House of Commons.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the Grant to the King of Greece of an Annuity of £4,000 out of monies belonging to the Consolidated Fund, by Treaty not made subject to the sanction of Parliament, is a violation of the Privileges of the House of Commons,"—(Mr. Ayrton.)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he would give the hon. Gentleman all the explanation in his power. He believed the hon. Gentleman had challenged the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government—first, with regard to the promise stated to have been made by them last Session; and, secondly, with respect to precedents in analogous cases. With regard to the promise, it had, he believed, been fulfilled, both in the letter and the spirit. In the record of the proceedings of the House he found that, in answer to a question put by the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. S. Fitzgerald), he stated that the sum in question, £4,000, must, I in the first place, be the subject of diplomatic arrangement, and, as it would not be until after such an arrangement that Her Majesty's Government would be able to apply to Parliament for an Act, he apprehended they would not be able to submit a Bill upon the subject during that Session. Therefore, he stated distinctly that there would be an Act of Parliament, but that it could not be introduced until after the negotiations then pending, nor probably during the Session then drawing to a

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  close. He spoke on the 6th of July, the treaty was signed on the 13th, but it was not ratified for a considerable time after. If, however, it had been ratified on the 13th of July, it would not have been possible or becoming to bring before the House, at such a late period of the Session, a question which, in a constitutional point of view, was one of a high order. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, had done exactly what they had engaged to do. But the hon. Gentleman had asked whether such a proceeding was in accordance with practice? It was fully in accordance with practice that when a sum of money to which the Crown of this country was entitled was surrendered by the Crown, that the surrender should be made by treaty, and it was not customary to make that surrender contingent upon the assent of Parliament. He admitted in a constitutional point of view that the assent of Parliament was necessary, but it was not usual to make it a condition in the diplomatic instrument. On the contrary, when the Crown undertook to pay a sum of money, it was customary to make that payment conditional on the assent of Parliament. But there was, in a formal point of view, a broad distinction between engaging to pay a sum of money which was to be levied upon the people and surrendering money which had never formed part of the revenue of the country. The difference between the Ionian Parliament and the British Parliament was founded upon that distinction which he had pointed out. Of this practical distinction it would be easy to give instances. There might be a distinction between surrendering a sum of money once for all, and making a surrender which would extend over a series of years. In the case of the Ionian Parliament, the question was to provide an income for the King of Greece out of the Ionian revenue, to be raised from year to year in the Ionian Islands. In this case the question was to provide him with a portion of his income, not out of the revenue of this country, but out of money due to us as part of a debt. There were two precedents which might be cited for the course which the Government had taken in this matter; the one in respect of the remission of certain claims upon Austria, the other of a similar remission with regard to Portugal. On the 22nd of January, 1815, a treaty was signed at Vienna, in which the King of England remitted to Portugal certain outstanding
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  payments in respect of a loan of £600,000, which had been spent in the service of Portugal in the year 1809. In that instance the grant was never challenged or called in question by Parliament. He believed he was correct in saying, that no application was made to Parliament on the subject, and that the remission never received its sanction. Her Majesty's Government did not seek to cover themselves by that precedent, which, however, more than covered them. The other case was that of the Austrian loan, which was, perhaps, more immediately in point. In the year 1823 a convention was made between His Majesty the King of Great Britain and the Emperor of Austria, by which the latter engaged to pay £2,500,000, and the King agreed to accept that sum in satisfaction of all claims whatever on the Emperor, a much larger sum having been due to us under previous engagements. That was by a treaty signed at Vienna on the 27th of November, 1823, and in March, 1824, an Act was passed which recited the original proceedings, the raising of money on behalf of Austria, and likewise the convention to which he had just referred, and then it proceeded to enact in conformity with the provisions of that convention itself. Therefore, as far as precedent was concerned, he had shown that Her Majesty's Government had followed exactly that precedent which was before them. His hon. Friend might possibly say that it was the duty of Government to come down to Parliament with a proposal anterior to making the arrangements. But when last year he stated the course which the Government intended to pursue—namely, first to enter into a convention, and then to come to the House for its sanction, that explanation seemed satisfactory. Indeed, he did not think it would have been possible to come to Parliament for its sanction beforehand, for one peculiar reason, that the dotation, as it was called, of £4,000 a year was not a single arrangement; it was a small and limited portion of an extended political negotiation involving transactions with other parties. The hon. Gentleman appeared to apprehend that in a certain case this sum of money might have to be reimbursed out of the revenues of this country. He was not aware of any contingency in which such an obligation would arise. The money was not received and accounted for as part of the revenues of this country, and paid over into the hands of

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  the King of Greece. The English Government were not bound, as far as he was aware, to see that the King of Greece received it; but in the terms of the convention they remitted so much of their claim on Greece as was represented by it. Therefore there was no engagement to pay the money in any contingency out of the revenues of this country. The question still remained, whether it would be possible to introduce any improvement into the established practice with regard to cases of this kind. That was a very fair matter for consideration, but it was not the subject at present before the House; and as the proceeding which had been taken was in accordance with the announcement made by the Government before the end of last Session, and with the course taken in former cases, he hoped the hon. Gentleman would withdraw his Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LAW COURTS.—OBSERVATIONS.
MR. MONTAGUE SMITHsaid, he rose to call the attention of the House to the buildings and sheds used for the Superior Courts of Law and Equity, and to the inadequate accommodation afforded by them. He had hoped to be spared the necessity of directing notice to this grievance, as last year the Government intimated that some steps would be taken to remedy it; but the introduction of their promised measures was still delayed. The House took great interest in the discussions relating to picture galleries or museums for the exhibition of art, but he was sure the country would think it of much greater importance than spending money even on such desirable objects that the courts in Which justice was administered should be made worthy of the nation. The state of made worthy of the nation. The state of the Courts of Law was as bad as it possibly could be, and the word "sheds" fairly described many of the buildings used as courts. Last Session he called attention to this subject on account of the Second Court of Queen's Bench being obliged to close its sittings, because the Chief Justice stated that it was utterly unfit for a Court of Justice, and detrimental to the health of all attending it. In the present year the Judges of the Queen's Bench had again had occasion to complain of the places allotted to them for the purpose of exercising their functions. On a recent occasion, when a necessity arose for having a
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Second Court of Queen's Bench, no other place was at the time available for the purpose but a miserable room, with access by a dark staircase, which it was almost impossible to find. Justice on that occasion was certainly in a state of vagrancy, and had to hide her head from the suitors endeavouring to follow her, in an obscure chamber, where Mr. Justice Blackburn said that it was not possible to see, hear, or breathe. The state of the Courts at Westminster was shortly this, that eight courts were sometimes required, and there were only two fit for the despatch of business—the Court of Queen's Bench and the Court of Exchequer. The Court of Common Pleas, which was built when the Serjeants only had audience there, was now much too small for its business, which amounted to one-third of the whole legal business of the country. The Bail Court, in which jury cases were now tried, was intended original^ for the sitting of a single Judge to dispose of what were known as "bail cases," and might be likened to the "black hole," for it was below the ordinary surface of the ground, and had only one entrance. The Bar were accustomed to the annoyance, and had got in some degree acclimatized to it; but the public who had to discharge the duties of jurors and witnesses, had had no such training, and felt most severely the inconveniences to which they were subjected in consequence of the heat and want of ventilation. He did not know anything more painful than to address a jury in an incipient state of apoplexy. The Courts of Equity were, he believed, in some respects no better. [Mr. MALINS: They are worse.] His hon. and learned Friend near him said that they were worse, and certainly he could say with regard to two of them that they might very properly be called sheds, or places of temporary shelter. Such sheds, with better ventilation, might make good cavalry barracks. In Guildhall matters were no better, some courts there being built on the model of cucumber frames with glass at the top. In Edinburgh and Dublin there were excellent courts, with libraries for the use of the Bar; but in London there was no court which had a library, or any room in which those attending the courts could study during the intervals of their engagements. There were also no waiting rooms for witnesses, so that they had either to sit or stand in court, or haunt the purlieus of Westminster Hall. There was not the

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slightest accommodation for jurymen. Frequently jurymen had to wait in court for several days before the cases on which they were summoned were called on. A merchant who had been summoned as a special juror wrote to him to say that he had to wait in court from ten till half past four, and that during the greater part of that time he was unable to obtain a seat; and he suggested that with the view of providing a room to which professional men, while waiting for the cases on which they had been summoned as special jurors, might retire for the purpose of writing letters and seeing their clerks on urgent business, special jurors should be paid only £1 instead of £1 1s. per day, and the odd shilling should be devoted to the providing of such a room. Was it not a reproach to those who had the management of these affairs that such a suggestion should have been made by a juror? Several spasmodic efforts had been made to build new courts, but the evils which had been so long felt and so frequently complained of still remained. Bench, Bar, jurors, witnesses, and suitors had equally a grievance in the present state of affairs. A Commission—consisting of Sir John Coleridge, Sir W. P. Wood, Sir George Lewis, Sir R. Phillimore, and Mr. John Young, a solicitor of eminence—inquired into the subject in 1860, and, although attempts had been made since then to improve matters, they remained much the same as before. The Commission reported that the Bail Court was wholly unsuited for jury trials, that the Common Pleas was too small for the convenient discharge of business, and had sometimes to borrow a Parliamentary Committee-room or a Chancery Court for the purpose of a second court, that the Court of Exchequer was also inadequate, and that in the Queen's Bench, as in the other courts, the accommodation for Bench, Bar, and other parties was very defective. He thought he was entitled to expect from what was said when he drew attention to the question on a former occasion, that something would before now have been done. His hon. and learned Friend the present Solicitor General owned that there was a crying grievance, and the Attorney General also condemned the present state of the courts, declaring that an immediate remedy was required, and that, in his opinion, there were sufficient funds in hand for the purpose. The Chancellor of the Exchequer also said that the Government were waiting only for the concurrence of
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the House, and that after the encouragement which had been given he had no doubt they would not be unwilling to discharge the duty to which attention had been called. He was sorry that the Government had not as yet fulfilled that duty, but he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not plead that his words were uttered in the heat of debate, but would give effect to them. The lawyers were a long-suffering race, but he trusted that something would be done, without delay, to meet their just expectations in this matter. At the beginning of the Session the Chief Commissioner promised to bring in a Bill for the erection of new Law Courts between Carey Street and the Strand, but that promise had not yet been fulfilled. And on three other occasions the Government assured the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck) that they would bring in a Bill on the subject. Something had been said about a financial difficulty, but he believed that means could easily be found, and, at all events, it was the duty of the Government to provide for the decent administration of justice. Luxurious accommodation was not asked for. Nothing more was required than such accommodation as would be consistent with the dignity of the country, and would promote the despatch of business, without occasioning inconvenience to those who were engaged in it. Quiet as the Session had been no stop had been taken, and now, unfortunately for the question, more exciting times were in prospect, but he hoped that the reproach which now rested on our legislation in this respect would speedily be removed.
MR. MALINSsaid, he regretted the absence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because he wished to hear that right hon. Gentleman explain why the present state of things was allowed to continue. This was not a subject on which there was any difference of opinion. All agreed that the present state of things was disgraceful to the country. There were only two Equity Courts that were fit for the purpose, the Lord Chancellor's Court and the Lords Justices of Appeals' Court. As for the Equity Courts, no one would say that any of the three Vice Chancellors occupied a court fit for the administration of justice. And what accommodation was there for the transaction of that enormous mass of business which was referred to the Judges' Chambers? He reminded the House that four years ago, when he name down with

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the intention to put a question on this subject, his noble and learned Friend the present Lord Chancellor told him that the Government were going to bring in a great scheme, and that in two years they would have new courts open. Since that time not a single step had been taken on the subject. He had asked the right hon. Gentleman the Commissioner of Works again and again when the Bill was to be brought in, and he had been assured that it was intended to do it speedily. He had asked the Lord Chancellor on more than one occasion what was the cause of the delay. He could, however, get no satisfactory answer; and he concluded it arose from the consideration of money. The Attorney General had agreed to the necessity of the measure, the Solicitor General had agreed to it, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whose duty it would be to see that public accommodation was duly provided, had agreed to it. For three if not four Sessions notice had been given by the Government to owners of houses between Searle Street and Fleet Street, that they would require their property, and the inhabitants there were in a state of great inconvenience and uncertainty. One lady, who was the owner of property in Boswell Court, was almost reduced to a state of destitution, for she could not find tenants for her property because the Government would not make up its mind. His hon. and learned Friend had represented the condition of the Courts of Common Law. The Courts of Equity also were extremely bad. There were no Waiting-rooms for witnesses, no retiring-rooms for juries; the Judge himself was obliged to retire to a room eight or nine feet square; and, in short, the whole state of things was a disgrace to the country. And what was the excuse offered? The Society of Lincoln's Inn had made a proposal to build three Vice Chancellors' Courts within the Inn, and lay out on them £100,000 if the Government would pay them £4 per cent on that outlay, and he confessed he would rather accept that proposal than that the present state of things should continue. If the Lincoln's Inn scheme could not be successfully promoted, he, for one, would concur in a general scheme which would place all the Courts of Law between Lincoln's Inn and Fleet Street. He thought that a case had been made out so clearly that the Government owed some explicit explanation to the House. The Government ought either
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to bring in a Bill at once, or declare their intention to abandon the question, so that the Courts of Equity connected with Lincoln's Inn might take their own course.
MR. ARTHUR MILLSsaid, he was unable to understand what could be the obstacles to the introduction of the Bill on that subject. The dilatory pleas which had so often been put forward were hardly becoming, and the Government ought not to give reiterated promises if they had no bonâ fide intention of fulfilling them. The owners of property on the proposed site of the new Law Courts had been exposed to great loss, owing to the notices which had been constantly served on them during the last three years, and they had good reason to complain of the suspense in which they were kept, as well as the serious injury they sustained while the Government were making up their minds either to proceed with or abandon the scheme. He had asked before Easter whether it was intended to proceed with the measure, and he was told that the Bill would be brought in immediately after Easter, but it had not yet been introduced.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, the intentions of the Government had been perfectly bonâ fide. Difficulties had, however, interposed which, very much against the will of the Lord Chancellor and everybody else concerned in the preparation of the measure, had caused it to be delayed till the present time. It would be possible, he believed, to bring the Bill in within a very short time, although at that period of the Session he was aware it must depend on the goodwill of the House whether it could pass that year. But, even if it did not then pass, there would be some advantage in having the plan, upon which the Government had at last determined, submitted to the House, so that it might be maturely considered by all who were interested in it before another Session commenced. He agreed that the evil and scandal of the present state of things could not possibly be exaggerated, and that it was an object of the most pressing importance that the Courts of Law and Equity and all the offices connected with the administration of justice in its various departments should be put on a worthier and more satisfactory footing. He was thoroughly convinced that no scheme could be satisfactory which did not aim at bringing the whole of the Courts together, thereby contributing to the greatest possible despatch, the saving of the time of

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suitors, and facilitating communication between all persons engaged in every branch of the administration of justice. It was true the Government two years previously brought in a Bill founded on the recommendations of the Commission of 1860. That Bill was met by an opposition mainly arising from the preference which some members of the legal profession felt for the plan proposed by Lincoln's Inn as to the Equity Courts. The Society of Lincoln's Inn was anxious to retain the Equity Courts within its own precincts, and desired their peculiar inconveniences to be remedied as soon as possible, whatever became of the case of the Common Law Courts. It would not, he thought, have been an expedient or long-sighted course to agree to that proposal. It would have tended to perpetuate one portion of the evil incident to the existing state of things, by separating one branch of the administration of justice from the rest, and interposing a real obstacle to the final and worthy settlement of that question. On the other hand, fears were expressed by some hon. Members—by the hon. and learned Member for Cambridge University amongst others—that the Government were about to launch on a boundless sea of expenditure, as had been done in regard to the building of the Houses of Parliament, and the House hesitated, chiefly on that account, to commit itself to their scheme. Before introducing another Bill on the subject the Department of the Government concerned in the matter had been very anxious to be quite sure of their ground, especially as to the pecuniary arrangements. The necessary inquiries had occupied, undoubtedly, a longer time than was anticipated at the beginning of the Session; but they were confident of being able to recommend to the House, and eventually they hoped to secure the adoption of, a measure which would obviate all the principal objections raised to the former project. In the first place, the Government had taken pains to ascertain by competent and independent opinions, whether the views of the architect consulted in the first instance, and who no longer had anything to do with the matter, could be safely relied on, and whether the estimates for the purchase of land and erection of buildings between Carey Street and the Strand were adequate. He was happy to state that the original estimate was fully borne out; they were confident that it was an outside
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estimate, and were confident it would not be exceeded even if the entire plans were carried into effect. A change had been made in the proposed method of dealing with the funds, which would obviate the necessity of throwing any charge upon the public purse. Instead of taking the whole of the funds considered to be available in Chancery, amounting in round numbers to £1,500,000, a portion would be reserved in order to recoup to the public any advances which might have to be made on account of annual charges. The difference it was proposed to make up partly by taking into account the value of the present buildings and sites for building, which would be gained to the public, and partly by having money advanced from time to time by the Public Loan Commission. It was proposed to spread the reimbursement of that portion of the loan over a considerable number of years, and to raise the moderate annual sum which would be required to pay interest and instalments of principal by fees of small amount to be laid upon the several steps and processes taken in. those Courts deriving benefit from the now building which were unconnected with the Court of Chancery, and did not contribute any portion of the funds taken out of that Court. In that way the funds connected with the Court of Chancery, which were owned by no one and belonged to the public, would still contribute the principal portion of the cost, and the remainder would be distributed in the way he had explained. The necessary investigations relating to the plan of which he had given the outline had unavoidably occupied a considerable period of time; but if the House, generally, should be willing to entertain the project, there might be still time to pass it into law. At all events, it should be laid upon the table with as little delay as possible, and an opportunity of considering it afforded before the Session closed.
MR. SELWYNsaid, the hon. and learned Gentleman, in his narrative of the reasons which induced the House to reject the former proposal, had overlooked one or two great difficulties which were felt at the time. He had also been very much surprised at the description which he gave of the Suitors' Fee Fund as a fund that belonged to nobody, and was the property of the public. Without discussing that question, he would assert that if the origin of the fund were considered, the

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purposes to which it was devoted, and the numerous claims continually made upon it, it would be impossible to maintain that view. Moreover, if the total expenditure of the court were placed on one side and the total receipts on the other, it would be seen that instead of an enormous surplus of a million and a half there was really but a balance of £200 or £300 a year; and this was obtained by taxation upon every stage of a cause,—the bill, the answer, the evidence, and the decree of the judge being all taxed. It was idle to talk of £1,500,000 being available. Proposals had been made to the Government to provide some of the requisite courts without any expense whatever to the State. It was only with regard to two out of the six Equity Courts that complaints were really tenable, and the Society of Lincoln's Inn had offered to erect the buildings requisite upon receiving from the Suitors' Fund an annuity of 4 per cent for the money they expended. The society made an alternative proposal to give the ground and to allow the Government to build courts for themselves. Therefore the reasons why the House rejected the original proposal were, among others, because they believed upon economical grounds that it was right to do so. It had been stated that the plan had been brought before the Earl of; Derby's Government and rejected by them; thus, so far from having been rejected, it was in 1859 embodied in a Bill which was read a second time in the House of Lords, and backed with the official title of the then Lord Chancellor. He denied that the benchers of Lincoln's Inn had any personal influence whatever in the decision of the question. If the whole revenues of the Inn were confiscated, they would not be a sixpence the poorer; and they would gain nothing if those revenues were doubled or trebled. The idea of a gigantic building in which all the courts could be assembled was only an idea which could never be realized. Would the House of Lords, for instance, sitting in its judicial capacity, be removed to that building? Would the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council hold its sittings there? Was it proposed that all the Committees of both Houses of Parliament should institute their inquiries within its limits? If the Government were really in earnest in the matter, let them at once introduce the measure of 1859, which would pass without opposition, and before that time next
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year the courts which it contemplated would be built. The arguments in the Treasury Minute, which had been moved for by the hon. Member for Lewes, were conclusive against the proposed gigantic scheme. They showed the vast expenditure which would be necessary in order to buy up the houses between Carey Street and the Strand, the small surplus existing as between the income and expenditure of all the funds under the control of the Court of Chancery, and the large increase which was sure to take place between the estimate and the actual outlay. These arguments were just as applicable now as they were when the Minute was framed, and the Government would, therefore, do well to settle the question of the Courts of Equity at once and without delay, and afterwards it would be much more easy to find a site for the rest of the Law Courts, which possibly might be formed on the new Thames Embankment. He would therefore urge upon the Government the propriety of discarding their present scheme, as it had alone prevented a practical measure from being adopted, and to carry forward the Bill to which he had alluded.
MR. COWPERsaid, the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman was a good illustration of the difficulties which beset the question, and which had caused a delay that most persons deplored. The hon. and learned Gentleman spoke with great authority, and he entirely repudiated the general grounds upon which the whole of the legislation in the matter proceeded. Nothing, he said, was wanting in respect of accommodation for the Equity Courts, except two or three Vice Chancellors' Courts. But, from what he (Mr. Cowper) had been able to gather, the hon. and learned Gentleman's proposal was totally insufficient as regarded even the Courts of Equity; and with respect to the Law Courts, the wants of the profession and of the public quite prevented the Government from acceding to such a wretched piecemeal proposal. Why not, he said, adopt the scheme suggested in 1859 by Lord Chelmsford, by which two Vice Chancellors' Courts and certain chambers were to be erected? But, in that matter, he (Mr. Cowper) was content to walk humbly in the footsteps of the Earl of Derby's Government. In 1859, instead of adopting the scheme proposed by Lord Chelmsford, they appointed a Royal Commission upon the question of concentrating the Law Courts. The Report of that

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Commission met with such general approval on the part of the public, that it became the duty of the Government to endeavour to give effect generally to the recommendations contained in it; and the Government would not be doing what was expected from them by the profession and by the public, were they to abandon a great scheme which would be received as a boon by the profession at large—by solicitors as well as by counsel—for the sake of meeting the inconveniences felt by learned gentlemen practising in these two Vice Chancellors' Courts. Although the delay which had taken place had not mitigated the opposition of the hon. and learned Member, he was glad to say that some other persons thought better of the proposal, and the important aid of his hon. and learned Friend opposite, encouraged him to think that there might be a probability of obtaining the assent of the House to a scheme which was not open to the objections formerly urged against the proposal of the Government.
LORD HOTHAMsaid, he wished to know whether the Government had decided as to the choice of an architect?
MR. COWPERsaid, that he had stated from the beginning that the Government did not intend to select any particular architect, but meant to have a general competition.

BRITISH TROOPS IN CANADA.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. ADDERLEY,who had given notice to move—
  "That in the opinion of this House it is inexpedient that detachments of British troops should be stationed upon exposed posts on the Canadian frontier unless adequately supported by Canadian Forces"—
  said, that when he mentioned that there were at this moment along the North American frontier 9,000 British troops, it would be seen that the subject was not one of slight importance. Still, in the present state of the House, he could not expect to raise a debate; he would content himself by making a brief statement, which he hoped would induce an expression of opinion from the Government. These British troops were scattered in battalions, half-battalions, and companies, along a frontier of about 1,000 miles, with little power of communicating with each other, still less of communicating with the mother country. That was a hazardous position for
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  British troops to occupy, and it endangered also the honour of this country should any emergency arise. These troops were not placed in Canada to guard against a rebellion. Canada could no longer rebel—for this simple reason, that she had nothing to rebel against. In common with most of our other colonies, she was now her own mistress almost completely; and this country was very little more than her tributary in respect of soldiers and money. The northern frontier was safe, for it was bounded by the Hudson's Bay territory, and was only liable to the invasion of polar bears. The western frontier along the sea was also free from danger. The southern frontier was in reality the only part where forces were needed for the defence of the country. That frontier embraced a territory 1,000 miles in extent, and it could not be imagined that such an area could be defended by troops from England further than in aid of the Canadians themselves. He might fairly presume that both parties desired to maintain that frontier. He believed that England was desirous of maintaining her connection with Canada from the fact that the noble Lord opposite was sanctioned by the opinion of this country in sending reinforcements to the rescue of the Canadians in 1861, when it was supposed that the Trent affair might possibly involve us in hostilities with America. Parliament approved his sending troops across the Atlantic at the most trying period of the year, and he believed he might conclude from that fact that we had no intention of allowing that frontier to be invaded with impunity. On the other hand, he believed he might conclude that Canada was equally desirous of maintaining that frontier and her relations with us from the way in which she had lately raised Volunteer and Militia forces. The question, however, was whether the present state of things was safe in spite of the precautions that had been taken; whether the precautions were at all sufficient. It had been maintained by some that there was no danger; but, if such were the case, they were hardly warranted in incurring the expense which they had already sanctioned. If there were no danger, we ought to withdraw our troops, and not leave 9,000 soldiers scattered needlessly through the country. But would anybody maintain that there was no danger in the present state of the American continent? A perusal of the publi-

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  cations of the country would suffice to dispel such an illusion, and show how strong was the feeling against England. Anybody who observed the preparations which America was at present making must perceive that such preparations were dictated by the anticipation of a rupture with this country. It was maintained by some that even if there be danger, it is wholly the affair of England, but that was a position which he entirely disputed. Apart from the fact that it would be impossible for us to defend the country alone, he believed that the affair was far more theirs than ours; the Canadians were much more likely to involve us in a war than we to inflict one upon them. They had as free a constitution as ourselves, the Executive represented the same Sovereign power of peace and war, and their legislative action was as likely to lead to war as ours, and as capable of refusing or granting supplies. It was again urged that allegiance and protection were reciprocal duties, but military service was part of the British allegiance. The English could not undertake the defence of all their fellow-subjects over the world, relieving them of raising troops of their own for that purpose. The noble Lord had said only a few minutes before, in reference to the Danish question, that England could not adopt the course to which her natural impulse might prompt her, because she had not the force sufficient to hazard a European war; and if England were involved in an European war, she certainly would have to withdraw her troops from Canada. Canada must look to her own defence, for the very situation rendered the protection of the Canadian frontier by England impossible. Out of the 1,000 miles of frontier 600 miles were along the lakes, and these lakes were largely covered with an American mercantile marine ready for warlike use. A large extent of the remainder of the frontier was composed of a river averaging two miles in width, but studded with islands, while the river during a considerable portion of the year was so severely frozen as to allow of the carriage of the heaviest artillery. For the rest of the distance the boundary was merely imaginary. He wished also to point out the fact, that though it might be desirable to have a few British troops stationed in Canada as a nucleus for the defence of the country, it would be very dangerous to have them scat-
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  tered in distant positions. They ought to be concentrated in one spot, and that spot ought undoubtedly to be Quebec. And yet Quebec at that moment was utterly insecure. The right bank of the river was, he believed, wholly unfortified, and the fortifications of the place generally were in such a state that a well-disciplined army with present means of war would, he believed, find little difficulty in making themselves masters of it. The duty of the local troops was to drill and to acquire something like training and organization, which, at present, they did not possess. Their basis of operations ought to be either Montreal or Toronto, which places should be immediately put into a state of defence, but that should be clearly stated to be their own affair. Sir Francis Head, some years ago, had recommended Toronto as the real military basis for Canada, and had also recommended the fortification of Montreal as a connecting link with Quebec. With respect to the navy, although the English fleet could render valuable support to Canada, yet it could not act in the interior, and by treaties we were debarred from keeping gunboats upon the lakes. Sir Francis Head had stated that in the event of a contest the Americans would be able to wage war at a cost of a shilling where it would cost us a guinea. When the antagonists were equally matched in courage and skill the elements of additional cost was not to be overlooked. It was true the English navy might retaliate on the seaboard for any injuries done to Canada, but it would be very unsatisfactory to have to trust to that kind of warfare whilst the interior of the country was ill-defended. He would say that before any emergency arose the troops of England should be placed in garrison at Quebec, leaving the Canadian troops to defend all the rest of the frontier; and if the Canadians were not disposed to take measures for the defence of their own country, then he would recommend the withdrawal of the English troops; but as those troops were now placed it would be impossible for them even to withdraw in case of sudden war without disaster or disgrace. With respect to the navy, he would observe that in these days of iron-clads it was much better to build ships of war on the spot than to have to transport them 3,000 miles across the Atlantic; and if we undertook the naval defence of Canada against the United States from this country the

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  Americans would have a great advantage in this respect in the proximity of their resources. It was often put as a reason why the connection between this country and Canada should be maintained, that if Canada was annexed to the United States she would become the nursery of a great marine for that Power. He would ask why Canada should not now become a nursery for seamen for us? Why should we not develop her naval power? Reverting to the troops in Canada, he found that they numbered about 9,000, of whom 6,000 were at Montreal and Quebec, 1,000 at Kingston, and the remainder at Toronto, London, and other places. The Volunteer militia amounted to 35,000 men, the number having been raised under recent Acts from 5,000, which was the original proposal. That circumstance, he thought, showed that Canada, if properly called upon, was willing and able to develop her own resources. Nothing prevented that development but the ill-defined relations existing between Canada and the mother country. We allowed indefinite and deceitful expectations to paralyze their action. If England undertook to garrison Quebec and to maintain a certain amount of naval force, leaving the remaining defences to be provided by Canada, there was no doubt that there was sufficient spirit in the Canadians to insure these defences being provided as soon as they saw clearly that the responsibility rested with them. The Volunteer militia were now distributed—15,000 in the west, 5,000 in the central districts, and 15,000 in the eastern, but the drill was only for six days in the year—an amount of training that was obviously insufficient. In addition there was the ordinary militia, which amounted upon paper to 150,000 men, but which force, at present, was nothing but an abstract; liability existing only upon paper. The results of such a system had been seen in the United States at the beginning of the present war, when an enormous militia, upon paper, afforded neither officers nor men. Lord Monck had shown his usual good sense in applying the small sum voted by the Canadian Parliament for the militia to the instruction of officers, who were even of greater importance than men. He trusted that the emergencies to which he had alluded would never arise, but it was neither safe nor prudent to close their eyes to possible dangers. He wished the Government to remove from the minds of hon. Members a feeling of anxiety as to
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  the position of the troops in Canada, and to assure them that our troops in that important colony, and at that critical period, should not be left in a position which would expose them to the risk of a discreditable withdrawal.
  MR. CARDWELLsaid, he entirely agreed in the statement and language of the Motion—
  "That it is inexpedient that detachments of British troops should be stationed upon exposed posts on the Canadian frontier, unless adequately supported by Canadian Forces;"
  and with respect to the observations made by his right hon. Friend, there was really much in which he was also enabled to concur. He began by paying a just tribute to his noble Friend at the head of the Government for the decision and vigour he displayed in sending, at a moment of emergency, a large reinforcement of British troops to Canada. His right hon. Friend also admitted that the main defence of Canada must ultimately rest in the spirit, vigour, and determination of the people of Canada, as must be the case in every country. He therefore held with his right hon. Friend that a nucleus of British troops, supported by the energy and determination of the Canadians, was the natural and just defence of Canada; and such he believed to be the feeling of the Canadians themselves. His right hon. Friend had paid a just tribute to the Governor of Canada, and did justice to the improved spirit of Canada itself. In all these points he entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend. Perhaps, however, it would not be uninteresting to the House if he were to state the changes which had recently been made, leading in the direction of insuring the defence of Canada by the Canadians. In October last the Canadian Legislature passed Acts for the new organization of the Militia and the Volunteers, declaring that the public defence was a duty binding on every member of society, providing the machinery for insuring the performance of it by each individual; making provision for securing the thorough education in military duty of all militia officers, and compelling all candidates for commissions to attach themselves for instruction to British regiments. Provision was made for additional pay from provincial resources for the officers and men of Her Majesty's forces who should assist in this training. Lord Monck, in one of his despatches, described that legislation as

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  "Sound in principle, calculated to have a most beneficial effect on the present efficiency of the militia force, and to create and foster in the future a taste for military pursuits among the population."
  The general effect of these measures will be to give us in the province service battalions of militia to any amount the Commander-in-Chief may from time to time think desirable, with a machinery constantly in existence for the indefinite increase of their numbers; a body of thoroughly well-trained officers attached to the service battalions of militia, living among men of their battalions, and competent to train them in their drill, and command them when called out for exercise or duty. For the purpose of training officers the House would be glad to learn that schools had been established at Quebec and Toronto for the reception of candidates for the militia, and the attendance had been as large as was considered desirable. Writing in the month of April last, Lord Monck said—
  "The schools for the instruction of the militia officers are working well. The officers of Her Majesty's army who have charge of these schools appear to me to work with great energy and judgment, the candidates for commissions are coming forward in larger numbers than we can at the moment admit to the schools, and display great industry and intelligence in the acquisition of military knowledge; and I am very sanguine in my expectations that we shall have, before long, scattered over the entire colony, a body of well instructed men capable of commanding the provincial militia should their services be required."
  He entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend that the first and foremost object was to provide trained, energetic, skilful, and spirited officers; but his right hon. Friend spoke of the numbers of the Volunteers without any allusion to the number fixed for the Militia. That number had been fixed at 88,000. There was, therefore, now an organization usefully existing in Canada which contemplated the provision of a body of trained officers—a body of Volunteers to which his right hon. Friend had referred, and a body of Militia capable of indefinite extension according to the discretion of the Governor General, but at the present moment fixed at 88,000. That was only a preliminary organization; but it proved that at least the Canadians were alive to their duty and interest, and he hoped they would soon see existing in Canada a Native force capable of rendering efficient aid to the Queen's trained soldiers, which, in the opinion of both sides of the
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  House, was the proper mode of providing for the defence of Canada. He entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend that, without entertaining any special fear as to any danger to the foreign relations of this country with our neighbours in that part of the world, the dispersion of British troops in small numbers in distant parts of Canada was not a policy wise in itself or expedient under the circumstances. That was his opinion, and it was also the opinion of his noble Friend the Secretary of War. When the Guards were withdrawn from Canada, an opportunity occurred for greater concentration, and he would read an extract from a despatch written by his noble Friend to Lieutenant General Sir F. Williams, dated May 25, 1864—
  "This decision will render it possible to concentrate the troops remaining under your command by the withdrawal of those now stationed to the westward of the very extended line of the Canadian frontier; and I am directed to inform you that Lord De Grey requests that you will take the earliest steps to effect such a concentration, as Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it is highly desirable to retain the troops in Canada in two principal masses at Quebec and Montreal, and to diminish as far as possible the number of scattered stations in that colony other than the small posts occupied by the Royal Canadian Rifles for the purpose of checking desertion."
  His right hon. Friend, indeed, went further, and would concentrate the troops exclusively at Quebec. That was an opinion in which he could not entirely concur. The Government thought that Montreal and Quebec were the natural points for the concentration of Her Majesty's forces in Canada. He also thought it might be very wise and expedient that a clear and definite policy should be laid down by Her Majesty's Government, and communicated to those in Canada who were responsible for the well-being of the province; and that the co-operation of the Canadian people should be invited in any measures which they thought it expedient to provide for the defence of the country. It was an important question. It had engaged the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government, and he had stated the principles on which it ought to be conducted. He cordially agreed in those views, and he cordially concurred in thinking that this country, in directing the foreign policy of her colonies, ought to furnish the nucleus of the force for the defence of those colonies, but that their main defence must turn upon the spirit and energy of their own people; and he thought that a frank communication between the Imperial Govern-

  381
  ment and the Government of Canada would suggest the best mode of arranging the just proportion of the burdens to be borne by the Home Government and the dependencies of this country.
  LORD ROBERT CECILsaid, that the House and the country would be disposed to concur in the principles which the right hon. Gentleman had just laid down, and to be of opinion that the line of policy which he indicated that it was his intention to take was the safe one for this country to adopt. But his fear was, that the right hon. Gentleman and the Canadian Government were not sufficiently alive to the exigencies of the period in point of time. No doubt if they all lived long enough, and if peace should last as long as they hoped it would between the United States and this country, the measures which he had sketched out would bring a satisfactory solution of the difficult question of the local defence of Canada. But his fear was, that the right hon. Gentleman's plan contained the germs of great delay, and the right hon. Gentleman's tone made him fear that he was not sufficiently alive to the great promptitude necessary, and the imminent risk of dangers which no one liked to contemplate. The right hon. Gentleman began by describing the preparations which the Canadians were making for defence. As he understood the right hon. Gentleman, the Canadians were contemplating a training college and a militia.
  MR. CARDWELL: I said that the training schools are actually in progress, and are training so great a number as to lead the Governor General to express a hope there would shortly be a sufficient number of trained officers to lead the Militia.
  LORD ROBERT CECILsaid, it appeared that, as soon as the schools had trained the officers, and as soon as the Canadian Government had got round them the organization of the militia, and as soon as the Canadian Parliament had proceeded to vote sufficient supplies, then by that time the militia would be in existence. But his fear was, that the emergency would be a little too pressing for such a lengthy process. The right hon. Gentleman and Earl De Grey agreed that our forces ought not to be scattered, but that with the exception of a certain number of posts they were to be massed in Montreal and Quebec, in neither of which cities he believed were any fortifications
  382
  that would enable a small number of troops to hold their ground against a large force. They all hoped that hostilities would not break out with America; but still they were possible, and they ought to look to the dangers that awaited them if war were declared. They knew the dangers which they had to face. They knew that the Northern army in the field was estimated by hundreds of thousands, and that it had been able, in spite of the resistance of another army almost equally large, to force its way through an extended frontier, and, at all events, to occupy a considerable portion of territory. There was no force in Canada equal to that of the Confederates. Suppose that at the end of the year there should be a termination of hostilities between the North and South—suppose the exigencies and existence of a large armed force, the pressure of political difficulties, and the confusion consequent upon the termination of a civil war, should lead the Northern statesmen to find an issue from their difficulties in making a raid upon Canada. He would not say that was likely, but it was possible, and then Ave should have to defend that enormous frontier, partly without natural defence and partly consisting of lakes upon which we were forbidden to have warlike ships, but which the warlike ships of America might reach. The British Government and the Canadians would in that case have to defend that enormous frontier against the army which had crushed the heroic army of the South. That was a very serious danger; but if the Canadians did not choose to make preparations, and allowed their territory to be overrun, it was their affair and not ours. If the result of the neglect and delay, after the warnings they had received, should be that their country was overrun, then, although of course the people of England would be sorry for what might happen, yet he did not think we could cast any great blame upon ourselves for the result. But the terrible thing would be if any considerable body of British troops were surrounded and made prisoners. The feeling which such a disgrace would occasion would be very humiliating; it would stimulate us to enormous exertions; it would embitter the war between the two countries, and make us feel that we bad contracted a stain on our escutcheon, which it would require some very extraordinary military achievements to wipe out. He thought the right hon. Gentleman's measures were perfectly

  383
  sound, but he was not sufficiently alive to the imminence of the danger of our position—namely, that while the British troops were slowly massing in Montreal and Quebec, the whole of the coast would remain unfortified and exposed to the attacks of any such army as the Northern States might bring against them. While that was going on, and while the Canadians would be going through these dilatory preliminaries and these measures of rudimentary self-defence, some great disaster might fall on our arms which no one would regret more than the right hon. Gentleman, but for which regrets would be a vain and idle remedy. Perhaps it might be owing to the suavity with which the right hon. Gentleman habitually conveyed everything to the House that he had misunderstood the tendency of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. [Mr. CARDWELL. The orders have already gone out!] Yes, but what he doubted was whether the orders were sufficiently prompt for the occasion. He should be happy to hear that orders had been sent out to fortify immediately the two posts of Quebec and Montreal, or, if that was not possible, that one only should be occupied, and that not one post should be held except what British troops might safely hold with such aid as Canada might furnish. Anything short of that would expose the British army to the risk of almost irreparable disgrace. The House could not hope for a more detailed account of the right hon. Gentleman's policy, but he would venture to press upon him the suggestion that precautions of that kind ought not to be left until the moment when danger arose. The requisite concentration which the military policy of the Government would require would then wear an aspect of fear, and it would look as if we were deserting our colonists. Promptitude in these matters was requisite above all things, and if he might refer to the debate of that day week he thought the right hon. Gentleman would recognize that if the virtue of promptitude had been more thoroughly exercised; and if, in the moment of security, something more of forethought had been shown in regard to the impending dangers, the disgrace and the disasters which were then discussed would never have occurred. He trusted that no such disgrace and disasters would occur to our army in Canada.
  Mr. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, he would remind the noble Lord that in his estimate of the dangers to which Canada
  384
  was exposed and her means of protection, he had omitted one of the most important elements of her safety. The noble Lord seemed to have forgotten that war with Canada on the part of the United States meant war with England also, and that the United States in deciding upon an invasion of Canada, would have to take into account not merely the preparations made for the defence of Canada, but the serious and tremendous consequences to herself, her coasts, and commerce, consequent upon engaging in war with England. With regard to the arrangements made for the improvement of the militia of Canada, he believed them to be of a very valuable character, although still imperfect. The whole province of Canada would now be covered by a military organization, and would be defended by militia of a certain class, containing no soldiers above the age of forty-five. Every man would know the battalion to which, he belonged, where he must resort for purposes of drill and muster, and the officers under whom he was to serve. They would be drilled for a period of the year which, he would admit, was not sufficiently long, but still drilled so as to give them such a knowledge of soldiering as would in a short time turn them into good troops. Lord Monck and his Government were engaged in providing a number of first class-officers, and the result, it was expected, would be a highly efficient militia in Canada. In Toronto and Quebec, where two of the finest regiments in Her Majesty's service had been placed, there were military schools in which as large a number of officers as there were means of instructing were undergoing military training. With respect to another question, which was now one of great importance, the House, as the right hon. Gentleman knew so well, had long looked with great suspicion upon the subject of colonial fortifications, and those who had charge of colonial affairs in this country had been very shy indeed in proposing to the House any expenditure for that purpose. It was admitted, however, by the right hon. Gentleman, and would be allowed by the House, that Quebec was an exception to the general rule, and there was hardly a place within our colonial dominions in which Parliament would see with less jealousy the expenditure of money for making the place fit for the reception of Her Majesty's troops. The Government had recently received a

  385
  Report from a skilful officer on the defences of Canada, and especially with regard to Quebec and Montreal. With regard to the concentration of the troops, he believed they were 'actually, or with a slight exception, in Quebec and Montreal—that exception being small parties of the Canadian Rifles, who were sent to certain parts of the colony to prevent desertion. Preparations had thus been made to prevent future danger. Some of them were already in progress, and the remainder were under the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

UNITED STATES—CLEARANCE OF BRITISH SHIPS AT NEW YORK.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. CAVEsaid, he wished to call attention to a subject which was of considerable importance to a branch of colonial trade—that, namely, between New York and Jamaica. A New York firm, Messrs. Cordova and Co., had been in the habit for a considerable time of shipping provisions to Messrs. Levy and Co., a mercantile house in Jamaica, to the extent of £100,000 a year. These provisions were disposed of by Messrs. Levy in the ordinary course of business in Jamaica. These gentlemen had informed him (Mr. Cave) that they had no trade whatever with the Southern States, and it was, of course, extremely unlikely that they would ship contraband of war from the port of New York. The trade, in fact, was of a most legitimate and ordinary character. However, a short time ago, Mr. Levy, the head of the Jamaica firm and a member of the House of Assembly in that island, now in England, received a letter from his New York correspondent, dated May 28, informing him that the ship Leonard Berry, consigned to his firm, together with the Perilia, another ship loaded for the same destination, and all other vessels clearing for Jamaica, had been stopped by the Collector of Customs, under a regulation requiring captains and shippers to furnish bonds to the United States, not that the vessels would sail for the port named in their papers, which would be right enough, but that the cargoes were intended for the consumption of Jamaica, and would never be used for the benefit of the Confederate States; that three bonds were required, with sureties qualifying in real estate to the amount of twice the value of the cargo, or in the case of the Leonard Berry to 100,000
  386
  dols., or in round figures to £20,000, and that there was no provision for cancelling these bonds, even upon the certificate of the United States Consul in Jamaica that the cargo had been landed, but the bonds were to insure for all time, subject to the production of some evidence which might lead to their forfeiture. The writer probably did not exaggerate when he called this an embargo on Jamaica ships; and it must be a prohibition to the trade, as no trade could exist under such restrictions. It seemed, however, that a novel trade in bonds had sprung up under this regulation, and that people were willing to run the risk of being sureties at a price of 2½ per cent on the value of the cargo. The same regulations applied to Nassau, Bermuda, and Matamoras with more reason, perhaps, because those places had notoriously imported far more than their population warranted, but still contrary to international law, or, at any rate, to the comity of nations. Jamaica, however, had a population of 400,000 to be supplied, and had always carried on a considerable trade with New York; and if it was argued that blockade runners had sailed from Kingston, the same might be said of Liverpool, and fifty other ports. Similar restrictions had been placed on the trade to Halifax and St. John, New Brunswick, but they had been removed, as contrary to the Reciprocity Treaty. They had also been applied to Havannah, but had likewise been withdrawn on the Captain General of Cuba threatening that he would refuse clearances to American vessels in every port of Cuba. In this case the British Consul tried in vain to obtain a relaxation of the rule, and an appeal had been made to Lord Lyons. Since the letter of May 28 was written, intelligence had arrived that in this special case the security of the shippers had been received, and so the 2½ per cent payment had been saved, but the regulations remained unchanged. He (Mr. Cave) had no sympathy with those who, in defiance of the Queen's proclamation, supplied munitions of war to either belligerent. Those who carried contraband of war must also run their chance, but it seemed unjust that fair traders should be subject to these arbitrary restrictions, and certainly unworthy and impolitic in the British Government to submit to them. The letter to which he had referred stated that our quiet submission to such arbitrary conduct had excited anything but respect

  387
  on the other side of the Atlantic. He therefore wished to know whether any information on this subject had been received from Lord Lyons, and whether instructions had been sent, or, if not, whether they would be sent to him to protest against a system so injurious to an important branch of our colonial commerce?
  MR. LAYARDsaid, the subject which the hon. Gentleman had brought before the House had given considerable trouble to Her Majesty's Government and to Lord Lyons. He was not aware that the particular case described by the hon. Gentleman had been reported to the Government; but Lord Lyons had informed them that those restrictions had been imposed upon vessels going to Jamaica and the West Indies. The opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown had been taken on the subject, and it was to the effect that the restrictions were illegal and vexatious. As for requiring that goods which had been landed at a neutral port should never find their way to the Confederate States, there was no doubt that those terms were altogether beyond the competence of the United States Government to impose, and in consequence of the representations of Her Majesty's Government those restrictions had in many cases been removed. One or two of those cases were under the consideration of the Law Officers of the Crown, and instructions would be sent to Lord Lyons to make strong representations to the United States Government on the subject.

RECRUITING FOR THE ARMY.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid he rose, pursuant to notice, to call attention to the subject of Recruiting for the Army. The question was one of the highest importance and demanded the utmost consideration of the military authorities, inasmuch as the fact was notorious that enlistments had been gradually decreasing for the last few years, and if something were not done to check the downward course it was obvious that the efficiency of the army would be seriously impaired. He held in his hand a Return, which showed that a great falling off had taken place within a few years in the number of men enlisted. In 1860 the number enlisted in the United Kingdom was 21,664, but in 1863 the number was only 6,924, and in the year before that
  388
  the number was 4,642. In 1859, on the Motion of the then Secretary for War, a Commission was appointed to examine the subject, and that Commission, which was presided over by a distinguished officer, made several recommendations, all of which, he believed, were carried out, though not to the full extent; but there were several causes which tended to prevent an increase in the number of men enlisted. One of those causes was the high wages generally received in England by the class of men from whom the recruits for the army were taken. That cause did not operate in Ireland, but on the other hand the vast immigration which was carried on from that country and the consequent diminution of the population made it difficult to get recruits there. Then there were certain proceedings which acted on the feelings of the people, and discouraged them from joining the army. There was, too, great uncertainty in the service, the army being sometimes increased to a considerable extent and then suddenly reduced. Then there existed great uncertainty in reference to pensions. Men who had become soldiers were frequently thrown on the world without a pension, because, if they were disabled by disease, they were told that they had the seeds of the disease in them when they enlisted. He thought that when a man passed the medical officer he ought not to be subject to the contingency of losing his pension by an attack of heart or other disease. Another cause which deterred men from enlisting was the concentration of troops in large camps, such as had been formed at Aldershot and at the Curragh. Formerly, when a regiment returned from foreign service, it was quartered in some town where the men had an opportunity of meeting their friends, or, at all events, of mixing with persons of their own class and obtaining some relaxation; but in these camps the drill was so constant and severe that many men regarded foreign service as a relief. Other objections arose out of the method of reckoning service, and the deductions which even after the improvements that had recently been introduced were still made from the nominal pay of the men. The pay of an infantry soldier was 1s. 1d. a day, including the 1d. beer money. From even that small sum there were many deductions, leaving him only about 4d. a day for himself. Another cause of difficulty arose from the limitation of the period of enlistment. According to

  389
  the evidence of Sir George Wetherall, when examined before the Commission, the diminution of the period of service to ten years would render it necessary that we should, exclusively of the men required for India, enlist annually, instead of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, 23,000. He doubted whether our population would supply us with enough men to meet all our wants The standard had been lowered from 5ft. 7in. to 5ft. 5in., but we had not got the number of recruits that were needed. He knew that recruiting had lately very much increased, but that arose from the circumstance that the militia had recently been out for their annual training, and we could not anticipate any continuous flow of men from that source. He now came to the encouragements to men to enlist, and to the changes which he thought ought to be made. One great encouragement, that of promotion from the ranks to commissions, had singularly failed. The Commission stated, that although, in ten years, 570 men had been promoted from the ranks, recruiting had during that time been more active in the Indian service and the artillery, in which no such promotion was offered. One great reason why men did not enter the army was the insufficiency of the pay, and it was necessary that both that and the marching allowances should be increased. When men were on the march they often suffered much from the insufficiency of their pay and the want of food. When men were fed well they drank less. As to the time of service, in the cavalry men were en listed for twelve years, and in the infantry ten years. He confessed he could never understand the distinction. It was, he thought, most desirable that men should, if they chose, be allowed to enlist in the infantry for a longer period than ten years. If a man entered the army at the age of sixteen or eighteen years, he was, after he had served ten years, fit to go into any other business, and had great inducements to leave the service; but he was then at his prime as a soldier, and it was most desirable to retain him in his regiment. Sufficient inducements were not, in his opinion, held out to lead men to re-enlist in India. Many men who took their discharges there and came home no doubt afterwards re-enlisted; but the State was put to the expense of paying their passages to this country and out to India again, it would, therefore, be good economy to hold out inducements to them to continue their
  390
  service in that country. The best thing, in his opinion, that could be done was to raise the pay of the soldier as his period of service increased. He believed that would prove more efficacious than adding to the bounty as an inducement to men to enter the army.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he was glad the hon. and gallant Member had called the attention of the House to the subject, as it would give him an opportunity of removing the misapprehension which seemed to prevail in the public mind regarding it. The Returns of men enlisted at the various recruiting stations to which reference had been made no doubt showed that a considerable decrease had taken place since 1860. These Returns, however, were confined to the recruiting stations, and did not embrace the number of men who were enlisted at head-quarters. If in 1861, 1862, and 1863 the number enlisted at the stations was extremely small, it was because more men were not wanted, as the strength of the army was being gradually reduced. There was, therefore, as far as these Returns were concerned, not the smallest ground for alarm. That was the first year since 1860 in which there had been any pressure whatever in supplying the demand for recruits. A large body of men would be entitled to their discharge, and it was no wonder if the recruiting machinery, which had during the last year or two become rather rusty through disuse, should not be capable all at once of meeting the requirements of a sudden emergency. It therefore became necessary for the Horse Guards to issue fresh instructions on the subject; but there was nothing in the Horse Guards' Circular at all of a novel character. It was intended only to remind officers in charge of recruiting parties of various things which were formerly well known, but which had been somewhat forgotten of late years, owing to the limited operation of the system. He did not think that there was the slightest ground far apprehension as to the number of men required for the army that year not being obtained, as the increased efforts consequent upon the issue of the Circular had proved entirely successful. In the end of the last and the beginning of the present year the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities in charge of the recruiting department were rather afraid that there might be difficulties in raising the establishment to its proper figure. The number of recruits, however, for whom

  391
  levy money was asked did not exceed 21,300, including the Indian service and all the men entitled to take their discharge. Of that number a little over 10,000 were the men entitled to their discharge; but from past experience it was calculated that between 50 and 60 per cent of those men would re-enlist; and if only 5,000 out of the 10,000 should realize that expectation, the actual number of recruits required during the year would only be 16,000. But during the last three weeks, when recruiting had been commenced with increased activity, there had been obtained an average of 353 men each week, which would give 18,356 for the year. There was no reason to fear that that rate of recruiting could not be kept up, because this was the worst season of the year for it. It was the period of the hay harvest, which would be followed by the corn harvest, and there was more abundant employment throughout the country than at any other time during the year. Under these circumstances, it was scarcely necessary to follow the hon. and gallant Member through his remarks as to the means which ought to be taken to induce men to enlist. He had shown that recruits were not at present deterred from joining the army. The hon. and gallant Member had alluded to the recommendations of the Commission appointed by the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon. Some of the recommendations of the Commission had been adopted, but some of them—such as that in regard to increase of pay for increased service—had not yet been carried out. The Ten Years' Act ought to have a fair trial before any alteration was made. It was quite possible that after further experience of the measure it might be found necessary to re-arrange the terms of service, but it was extremely undesirable to adopt a new system when there was no pressure, and the existing plan had not been fully tested. He was sorry the hon. and gallant Member had spoken of the 1s. a day as if it represented the soldier's pay in the same way as the 1s. 6d. or 2s. earned in other employments. Everybody must, he thought, admit that so far as food, clothing, and pocket-money went, our soldiers were in a much better position than almost any class of labourers in the country. He did not, of course, mean to compare the position of the soldier with that of the skilled labourer. In seeking for recruits the Government did not pretend to com-
  392
  pete with the demand for skilled labour; all they could do was to enter into competition with the ordinary labour-market, and a minute investigation of the pay and allowances which a soldier enjoyed would, he felt assured, be sufficient to convince any man that his position was superior to that of the unskilled labourer. He received good rations and his clothes and lodgings for nothing, besides other advantages. The only other point in the speech of the hon. and gallant Member to which he thought it necessary to refer was that in which he stated that men in the regiments serving in India and the colonies were brought home, at great expense to the nation, only, perhaps, to be re-enlisted in this country. Now, with respect to that point, he could only say that a sum was taken in the Estimates for increase of bounty to men re-enlisting in the colonies. In India a man received a considerable sum for re-enlisting on the spot, instead of putting the country to the expense of bringing him home. He did not know what other plan could be adopted in order to attain the object which the hon. and gallant Member seemed to have in view, because a soldier naturally wished to come home at the expiration of his ten years' service. The only way of preventing him from doing so was to offer him a sum which he would be likely to consider it worth his while to accept. In conclusion, he had simply to observe that he felt obliged to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for having brought the subject forward, because from certain letters which appeared in the newspapers it would seem as if a general impression prevailed that recruiting had come to a stand-still, whereas, as he had stated, it was progressing at a rate which if kept up, as there was every reason to hope it would be, would more than meet the wants of the service.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY—CIVIL SERVICE ESTIMATES.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
(1.) £94,222, to complete the sum for Establishments in China, Japan, and Siam, agreed to.
(2.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £27,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum neces-

393
sary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, for the Extraordinary Disbursements of Her Majesty's Embassies and Missions Abroad."
MR. DODSONsaid, he wished to call attention to the inconvenient form in which the Votes for the diplomatic service were submitted to Parliament, and to the inadequate information as to the real cost of that service afforded to the House. All that hon. Members generally knew on the subject was that there was a sum of £180,000 a year charged on the Consolidated Fund for the purpose of paying diplomatic salaries, which sum was entirely at the disposal of the Foreign Office, and over the expenditure of which the House had no control. He held in his hand, he might add, a Return which showed that in the year ending the 31st of March, 1863, there was spent on the diplomatic service a sum of £111,000—the actual sum voted, he believed, being £157,000—in excess of the £180,000 to which he had alluded. In order, however, to find how that money had been disposed of, it was necessary to hunt over five different classes of Estimates, while the expenditure of some of it was to be found under the head of Consuls, some under that of Consular Compensations, and some under the head of Miscellaneous Expenditure, Now, the various items of the outlay for the army and navy were presented to the House in a consecutive manner, and he should like to know why the same course should not be pursued with regard to the diplomatic service. He objected, too, to having any portion of that expenditure withdrawn from the cognizance of the House of Commons by being charged on the Consolidated Fund, and should wish to see the whole of it annually submitted to the House for its approval. If not, the information with respect to it ought, at all events, he contended, to be supplied in an intelligible manner. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the reduction of the Vote by £10,000.
Whereupon Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £17,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, for the Extraordinary Disbursements of Her Majesty's Embassies and Missions Abroad."—(Mr. Dodson.)
MR. LAYARDsaid, his hon. Friend had brought the question forward during several Sessions, but he begged his hon.
394
Friend to bear in mind that while many other Votes showed an increase, the Vote for diplomatic salaries had remained stationary, with the exception of the charges for China and Japan; and the missions to these two countries were of a mixed political and commercial character, our minister in China being ambassador and superintendent of trade, and our representative in Japan being both envoy and consul general. The confusion in the accounts which the hon. Member seemed to think existed arose from the arrangement made some years ago for charging the cost of the diplomatic service upon the Consolidated Fund. It frequently happened that diplomatic officers under the Foreign Office were employed as consuls, and whenever that occurred their salaries appeared under two different heads. The embassy houses were under the direction of the Board of Works, for what precise reason he could not tell, but he supposed that arrangement was adopted with the view of securing economy.
MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHstated that the diplomatic expenditure, so far from having remained stationary, had been increased under every head. The present Vote, for example, had been raised since 1851 from £16,800 to £37,000. It would be far better to give our representatives abroad a fixed sum for house rent than to provide them with embassy houses. He was of opinion, moreover, that many embassies, particularly in Germany, might be suppressed with advantage; and he complained that our Minister Plenipotentiary in Prussia had been elevated to the rank of an Ambassador with a corresponding increase of salary. In these days of railways and telegraphs it was no longer necessary to maintain large diplomatic establishments in all parts of the world. At the smaller courts all we wanted was a mere charge d'affaires instead of large and expensive diplomatic establishments. The cost of the embassy at Wurtemberg was £3,000; Saxony, £3,300; Hanover, £4,000; Bavaria, £5,000. It was high time that there should be a reduction in this expenditure. He would support the Motion for the reduction of the Vote.
MR. LAYARDthought the hon. Member was mistaken in his view as to the increase of expense on account of the embassy houses. The practice of taking these establishments for a series of years was found to contribute both to convenience and economy. He hoped the Amendment

395
would be withdrawn, the money being required for actual expenditure.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, the Vote did not bear on the argument of the hon. Gentleman. It was a Vote for the contingent expenses of the different missions, which expenses were regulated by certain rules, and depended upon services performed. It did not touch salaries, but was for messengers, postages, and other things, expenses that must be incurred. The only effect of curtailing the Vote would be to deprive the department of what was required for carrying on the service of the country. The estimate in one year was founded upon the expense of the year preceding. The amount of the expenses was examined at the Foreign Office, so that no expense should be incurred that was not in accordance with some standing regulation, and for some service performed. The only result of the proposed reduction would be to prevent the service being carried on.
MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHsaid, the only result would be that the Government would be obliged to economize and husband that sum of £180,000, and pay the expense of the diplomatic service out of it. This was the only way in which they could prevent this large increase of expenditure.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: The hon. Member is entirely mistaken. We have no authority to misapply to this service money which is voted for a different purpose. That is for salaries, pensions, and allowances, and for nothing else. The Government would be acting against the law if we were to apply it for this purpose.
MR. DODSONsaid, he thought that the explanations of the noble Lord and the Under Secretary were most unsatisfactory. He would divide the Committee on the question, and hoped to be supported.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, the only effect of curtailing the Vote would be to starve these different missions, and prevent their performing work essential to the public service.
Question put,
The Committee divided:— Ayes 37; Noes 113: Majority 76.
MR. VANCE: While we are upon the subject of our embassies, I should be glad to know who conducts in this country the relations between his Holiness the Pope and the Government of Great Britain? We had a long discussion the other night on the conduct of the diplomatic relations between this country and the Papal States,
396
and it was admitted that the responsibility of carrying on these relations at Rome was divided between Mr. Odo Russell and the Consul at Rome. We all know who protect the interests of the Pope in the House of Commons, but I wish to know who in this country conducts the relations between the Pope and the Government?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I can only answer the question which has been put to me in the negative. There is no person accredited in this country to carry on diplomatic relations between the Government and the Pope.
MR. VANCE: But there is no one accredited in Rome; and yet Mr. Odo Russell conducts the relations. Who in this country has a corresponding position?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: No one that I am aware of.
MR. F. S. POWELLsaid, he wished to ask for an explanation of the items for board wages and servants' wages at the embassies in France and Turkey. He also remarked that the Vote contained items for chapels and chaplains in France, Turkey, and Greece; but not in Russia and Spain. How was it that in a country where the Protestant religion was proscribed, no sum for Divine service was included in the Votes? When travelling abroad he found that in some places there was no Church of England. He hoped that the Roman Catholic Members of that House, who spoke so much about religious liberty and freedom of conscience, would express their disapprobation concerning the manner in which those principles were ignored in Spain.
MR. TORRENSsaid, he thought that some explanation was required as to the expenses of the embassy at Constantinople.
MR. LAYARDsaid, that the sums allowed for chapels depended upon the number of British residents in the different places. The charge at Constantinople was rather large for diplomatic services, but he believed that the expense for the year following would be decreased by nearly £2,000.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
(3.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £20,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, for Special Missions, Diplomatic Outfits, and Conveyance and Entertainment of Colonial Officers and others."
MR. BUTTsaid, he wanted to call attention to an item of £52 in connection with the mission of Commodore Wilmot to the King of Dahomey; and to express his opinion that no British officer should have consented to or sanctioned by his presence the horrible massacre which that gallant gentleman had witnessed, and which had been ordered by the King as a sacrifice to the spirit of his Majesty's father. The proceedings of Commodore Wilmot had outraged the feelings of a great number of persons in this country; and in asking Parliament to vote the money for the mission they really asked it to be a party to these barbarous practices. Thinking that Parliament should assert the principle that no prospect of gain from trade ought to Lave induced the representative of the Queen of England to sanction such a scene by his presence, he moved the reduction of the Vote by this sum.
Whereupon Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That the Item of £52 4s. 4d., for Seamen's Clothing supplied to Commodore Wilmot from the Rattlesnake in January, 1863, for presentation to the Chiefs, &c, at the Court of the King of Dahomey, be omitted from the proposed Vote."—(Mr. Butt.)
MR. LAYARDsaid, that Commodore Wilmot was an officer of the greatest humanity, who had devoted a great part of his life to the welfare of Africa, and had undertaken a perilous journey to Dahomey for the express purpose of getting the King lo give up the slave trade, and put an end to the barbarous "customs." Unfortunately, he arrived at a time when the great annual ceremony was performed, at which human beings were sacrificed. His object was not to break with the King, but to obtain a personal influence over him; and in this Commodore Wilmot had succeeded. His (Mr. Layard's) impression was that Commodore Wilmot was not present at any of those scenes, and he would certainly have looked with horror on anything of the kind. His visit had some result, for the King released some unfortunate captives who were taken by the Commodore down to Lagos, and there had their liberty given them. Commodore Wilmot had received no remuneration in respect of this mission, and he was entitled to every praise for the courage, humanity, and devotion he bad exhibited in Africa.
MR. KINNAIRDsaid, he had understood the hon. and learned Gentleman not to reflect on Commodore Wilmot's conduct
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so much as to wish to protest on the part of the House against scenes which had shocked the whole kingdom.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he wished to refer to an item of £1,796, being the "balance of expenses of the special mission of the hon. H. G. Elliot to Greece," and another item of £1,000 for an outfit allowance to the "hon. H. G. Elliot, Her Majesty's Minister at Turin." The initials were the same, but those two items occurring in one year could hardly refer to the same person. He wished to know whether the Dromio of Athens and the Dromio of Turin were the same persons?
MR. LAYARDsaid, that Mr. Elliot was sent to Athens on a special mission, and was afterwards appointed to Turin. These items contained the necessary expenses, and referred to the same person.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
(4.) £3,649, to complete the sum for Third Secretaries to Embassies, &c.
(5.) £123,280, to complete the sum for Superannuation and Retired Allowances.
(6.) £728, Toulonese and Corsican Emigrants, &c, and American Loyalists.
(7.) £325, Refuge for the Destitute.
(8.) £1,959, to complete the sum for Polish Refugees and Distressed Spaniards.
(9.) £50,700, to complete the sum for Merchant Seamen's Fund Pensions.
(10.) £25,400, to complete the Bum for Relief of Distressed British Seamen.
(11.) £2,607, to complete the sum for Miscellaneous Charges, formerly on Civil List.
(12.) £1,272, to complete the sum for Public Infirmaries, Ireland.
(13.) £1,600, to complete the sum for Westmoreland Lock Hospital.
(14.) £700, Rotunda Lying in Hospital.
(15.) £200, Coombe Lying-in Hospital.
(16.) £5,600, to complete the sum for House of Industry Hospitals.
(17.) £1,500, to complete the sum for Cork Street Fever Hospital.
(18.) £600, Meath Hospital.
(19.) £100, St. Mark's Ophthalmic Hospital
(20.) £300, to complete the sum for Dr. Steeven's Hospital.
(21.) £245, for Board of Superintendence of Dublin Hospitals.
(22.) £5,693, to complete the sum for Concordatum Fund, and other Charities and Allowances, Ireland.
(23.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £29,670, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, for Non-conforming, Seceding, and Protestant Dissenting Ministers in Ireland."
MR. HADFIELDremarked that the Vote had increased 60 per cent, although the number of the Presbyterian ministers who received it had diminished 20 per cent in the course of as many years. It was a curious fact that the only body of Nonconformist clergy who received aid from the State had diminished in number, while all other Dissenters in the United Kingdom who received no aid from the State had increased in number. He should move the reduction of the grant by the sum of £29,000.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £670, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, for Non-conforming, Seceding, and Protestant Dissenting Ministers in Ireland."—(Mr. Hadfield.)
MR. DAWSONsaid, that the Presbyterians of Ireland were not a rich body, as, except in the case of a few places, the great bulk of Presbyterians consisted of persons whose means were too limited to enable them to provide for themselves the means of religious instruction. The grant was in accordance with a compact and a practice long established, since James I. induced a number of Scotch families with their ministers to emigrate to Ireland.
MR. COXsaid, that from his experience, he was not of opinion that the Presbyterians of the North of Ireland were too poor to support their own clergy. He, as a member of the Church of England, always voted against church rates, because he did not think it was right to tax a Dissenter for the support of his Church. Therefore, he objected to being taxed himself for the support of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland.
MAJOR STUART KNOXcomplained that the hon. Member for Finsbury had again insulted the Presbyterians of Ireland. He wished to know from the noble Lord at the head of the Government whether he had given a favourable consideration of the application for an increase of the grant?
MR. COXdenied that he had insulted
400
the Presbyterians of Ireland. He had only stated that they were a wealthy and well-to-do body.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, an application had been made for an increase of the grant, but he had not given any encouragement to the suggestion.
MR. HADFIELDremarked that more than 4,000,000 Catholics in Ireland supported their clergy without State aid.
SIR HERVEY BRUCEobserved, that the Motions for withdrawing this grant from the Protestant Nonconformists in Ireland originated not with Irish, but with English Members. It was said no other class of Dissenters received an endowment from the State. The Presbyterians in Ireland, however, stood on a different footing from other Nonconformists. The three denominations in Ireland received national grants; why should not the religious body in question? He should support the Vote.
SIR FRANCIS CROSSLEYsaid, he objected to grants of public money for the support of any man's religion. He believed the endowment, instead of doing good, was doing harm in Ireland. The Protestant Nonconformists in that country were able to support their own ministers, and he hoped the House would stand by his hon. Friend in resisting the Vote.
Question put,
The Committee divided:—Ayes 21; Noes 127: Majority 106.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
House resumed.
Resolutions to be reported this day.
Committee to sit again on Wednesday.

INLAND REVENUE (STAMP DUTIES) BILL— [Bill 159.]—CONSIDERATION.
Order for Consideration as amended, read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be taken into Consideration this day."
MR. HENNESSYsaid, he had an Amendment to propose.
The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The Motion is to postpone the older.
MR. HENNESSYsaid, he was quite aware of the fact, but being anxious to move that its consideration be postponed to that day week, he desired to give reasons in favour of that course. The Bill had been introduced on the 17th of June, and until it arrived at the stage of Com-

401
mittee no conversation took place in the House upon its provisions. It was introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was founded upon three Resolutions, none of which authorized a very important portion of the Bill relating to the brewing and sale of beer. He would not discuss the regularity of the mode in which it was sought to deal with a very important trade in Ireland; but he thought it very desirable that an opportunity of considering the scope of the measure should be given to that trade. On Friday last the right hon. Gentleman, in reply to a question, intimated that the Bill, so far from imposing greater penalties upon brewers in Ireland, was a relieving measure. What was the fact? Section 9 repealed a number of Irish Acts, for which others in force in England were substituted by Section 10. Among these was the 7 &c 8 Geo. IV. c. 52, s. 54, requiring brewers to make entries of all their brewing utensils, vats, &c, under a penalty of £100. For that section the English Act, 1 Will. IV. c. 15, if substituted, would impose a penalty of £200. The 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 52, s. 50, as to the entry of quality of malt, contemplated a penalty of £100 for infringement. That was to be done away with, and the 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 22, s. 1. substituted, by which in like manner the amount of penalty would be doubled. With reference to washed malt, in the same way the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to double the present penalty. Every Irish Member present would corroborate the statement that not a brewer in Ireland could be aware of the nature of the Bill before the House. He therefore moved that its consideration be postponed to that day week.
Amendment proposed, at the end of the Question, to add the word "week."—(Mr, Hennessy.)
Question proposed, "That the word 'week' be there added."
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he would not follow the irregular example of the hon. Member in discussing the details of clauses on a Motion to postpone the consideration of the Report—a very unusual Motion, he must add. The usual practice was to allow the Member in charge of a Bill to name a time, and then, if disapproved of, to object at that time to its being proceeded with. But his object in pressing the Bill was to obtain a decision of the House upon a clause which, for the convenience of hon.
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Members, he had delayed for some time—namely, that relating to an Act under which prosecutions for illicit distillation were conducted in Ireland. If the Report were agreed to he had no objection to postpone the third reading of the Bill, which would, in fact, be giving every opportunity for consideration. If thought desirable the recommittal of the Bill might be moved as an Amendment to the third reading. The hon. Member for the King's County was entirely wrong in the view which he had given of the effect of the Bill. He should be prepared on the next occasion to make good his statement, that the alterations introduced were in favour of the brewing trade in Ireland.
SIR HUGH CAIRNSsaid, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had spoken of irregularity, but it would be found that the irregularity rested wholly with himself. There would be another opportunity of considering the grave question, whether the Resolutions adopted by the House warranted the propositions contained in the Bill; at present, all he desired to say was that the Bill had been exactly one week before the House, and from its title was not at all likely to attract the attention of the brewing trade. The right hon. Gentleman had, on the introduction of the Bill, not vouchsafed any explanation which would show to those interested in the brewing trade what the real intention of the measure was; nay, more, two or three nights ago, when explanations were asked, there was very great difficulty in getting any at all, and the explanation ultimately given was that the Bill would have no operation at all upon the brewing trade, or if it had, that it would be solely for their advantage. The Chancellor of the Exchequer shook his head, but he had heard him repeat the statement only a moment before. He had only been able to look very hastily into the Acts which were quoted in the Bill, but he undertook to say, that in one instance certainly, and he believed in a considerable number, the statement of the hon. Member for the King's County was perfectly borne out. The very first penalty dealt with in the Bill was doubled by being increased from £100 to £200. The Chancellor of the Exchequer evidently was not aware of the effect of his own Bill, or he would not have made his former statement and repeated it that evening. A cloud of statutes were dealt with in what he must call a most slovenly way, the whole English law as to brewing being extended to

403
the Irish trade in a space of three or four lines. It was a matter which required serious consideration by the trade. Nothing had dropped from the Government to direct attention to it, and it was only that day and the day before that hon. Members had been able to send copies of the Bill to the persons whose interests it affected. He thought the postponement asked for a very fair one. On the third reading Amendments could not be moved or a particular clause struck out, if that should appear desirable, and to recommit a Bill at such an advanced period of the Session would be a perilous proceeding.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he would consent if the particular clause to which he had referred were sanctioned on the following day to defer the consideration of the rest of the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question put, and agreed to.
Ordered, That the Bill be taken into Consideration this day.

GREEK LOAN BILL— [BILL 144.]

  COMMITTEE,
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clause 1 agreed to.
  Clause 2 (Power for Treasury to relinquish £4,000 a year).
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he wished to move, at the end of the clause, a proviso to secure the payment of certain pensions due to British subjects. The pensions to which he referred were charged as an offset against the remission of £4,000 under the Bill, and his Amendment provided that the sum should not be remitted until the salaries were paid.
  MR. LAYARDsaid, there was no practicable mode of effecting the object which the hon. Gentleman had in view. The treaty was in specific terms, and the Bill merely ratified the treaty. It was not possible to add the present proviso to the treaty, as it would be a breach of good faith.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, that if the Government made an improper use of their power that House was not bound to ratify it. He hoped the Committee would be no parties to such dishonesty, and he asked them to condemn the conduct of the Government with regard to it. Those gentlemen had subscribed for years to a fund;
  404
  they had served the Ionian Republic, and Her Majesty's Government were bound to guarantee these pensions.
  MAJOR HAMILTONsaid, this country was bound to give the3e officers security for their pensions. The pensions were granted under a stipulation that these officers should not be employed by the English Government, and that had been carried out. He loped the Committee would be no party to such a fraud.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he did not know an instance in which such liberal care had been taken of the private interests of individuals. After a short term of service they found themselves in possession of incomes which were by no means applicable to such a case in this country. Assuredly the hon. Member could not intend that the private interests of those gentlemen should be mixed up with our diplomatic engagements. Her Majesty had made an engagement with other Powers to surrender a certain sum, and that was a matter entirely distinct from the case of those pensioners. Perhaps the hon. Member would say that it was only in case of breach of faith that the proviso would come into operation; but we had no right to make that a ground for not fulfilling an engagement on our part. We had solemnly engaged to give the King of Greece £4,000 a year, and any breach of faith on the part of the Greek Parliament would not in the slightest degree relieve us from the obligation of paying this personal dotation.
  LORD ROBERT CECILsaid, if he understood the right hon. Gentleman he asked the House to consent to a treaty, when the Crown of England was already so unconditionally pledged that if the consent of the House was refused a breach of faith would be incurred. He could not understand how any decision of that House upon a question proposed to it by the Government could be determined in one way or another by the argument of a breach of faith. With regard to the liberal provision made for those gentlemen, it might be a liberal provision if the money were paid; but if not paid it could not be called a liberal provision. If the faith of England were pledged to the payment, it would, indeed, be a liberal provision; but with the faith of Greece pledged it was quite another thing.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, if the noble Lord had been in his place in the early part of the evening he would have heard a discussion of the

  405
  whole question, and would have learnt that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government was in entire accordance with precedent. Whether that was a proper course or not was a question which it was quite competent for the noble Lord to raise. Twelve months ago he explained to the House that the grant would be founded upon diplomatic arrangements which would be made on the responsibility of the executive Government, who would then appeal to the House for its approval, and that explanation was received as perfectly satisfactory. The course which had been taken was in conformity with established practice, and the effect of it undoubtedly was that the Crown had entered into an unconditional engagement. The noble Lord might make it an occasion for censure if he pleased.
  MR. AYRTONsaid, the discussion which had just taken place would illustrate the state of things which he had endeavoured to bring under the notice of the House, when hon. Members were too absorbed in another matter to attend to anything else. The House found itself in this ridiculous position, that when anyone got up to express his opinion he was told it was most impertinent to do so. The Chancellor of the Exchequer exhibited an instance of Chinese politeness. He offered a Bill for the consideration of the House, with the clear understanding, however, that the House was not to consider it at all. That was evidently an unsatisfactory state of things, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, knowing it to be so, had said he hoped it would not occur again, and he was good enough to suggest that there were precedents—which were very bad precedents—in accordance with which the Government had acted. But if the Government had acted as it ought to have done, in fulfilment of the pledge given by the right hon. Gentleman, he would venture to affirm that the House of Commons would never have consented to pass the Bill before them without some provision by which the money to be paid to the servants of the Crown would be made an antecedent charge. But in the position in which the House was placed he believed they had no alternative but to pass the Bill, as Her Majesty had entered into a treaty by which her faith was pledged.
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, he would suggest that if his hon. and gallant Friend would leave out the last line of his Resolution the National Treasury would
  406
  have to pay, in default of that of Greece, and there would be no occasion to make any deduction from the £4,000 a year.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he differed from the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the length of time those gentlemen had served. Many of them had passed half their lives in our service. We were parties to the seizing of the fund which guaranteed their pensions, and should now take care that they did not suffer through our neglect.
  LORD ROBERT CECILsaid, he would move that the Chairman report Progress.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Lord Robert Cecil.)
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 48; Noes 58: Majority 10.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he would move the addition of the first part of his Proviso only, namely—
  "Provided always that certain sums for pensions and compensations, payable to British subjects and others who were employed in the service of the Ionian Republic when under British protection, and guaranteed by the said treaty, shall be regularly paid."
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that the alteration would not remove the difficulty.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid that what he desired was, that the King of the Hellenes, as our pensioner, should not be paid unless he paid our pensioners.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that such a proposal would be most inequitable. The claims of these persons was not against the King of the Hellenes in his personal capacity, but against the Greek State and Government, and it was under the custody and charge of the British Government to see it satisfied. The arrangement, however, was not with the Greek Government or the Greek State, but was an arrangement for the benefit of the King of the Hellenes personally, and attached to him irrespective of the Greek State, or of his being at the head of it. If he were to cease to be King of the Hellenes, his right would remain the same, and if the Greeks were to put him out and then refuse to pay these pensioners it would be very hard that he should not receive the money.
  LORD ROBERT CECILsaid, that after what had just fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer he should recommend his hon. Friend to withdraw his proviso. The right hon. Gentleman said that there

  407
  was a charge upon the Greek Government, and that it was under the custody and charge of the British Government to make the Greek Government pay it. That was a pledge from a Minister of the Crown to go to war if it was not paid. Those who were present would remember the pledge, and he thought that his hon. and gallant Friend might safely withdraw his Motion.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, that he should take the advice which the noble Lord had given to him. The arrangement was for a remission of the debt to the Greek Government, and he thought that if the King was kicked out he would be very clever if he ever got his pension.
  MR. HENNESSYsaid, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had rebuked the hon. Member for Stamford for not understanding the Question; he would show how little the right hon. Gentleman knew of his own Bill. The right hon. Gentleman said that the money would be paid to the King, not only during but after his reign. The words of the Bill, however, were— "It shall be lawful to pay the said sum to George I., King of Greece, during his reign."
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that he was speaking from recollection on the diplomatic arrangement, and his impression and belief was that the remission was intended as a personal dotation to the King individually. The words "personal dotation" were employed in the treaty, and the essence of the matter was that the dotation should be independent of his retaining the throne of Greece.
  MR. AYRTONsaid, that the treaty made it a personal dotation, and gave it to the King for his life. Her Majesty's Government had confined it to his reign, and had put an interpretation upon the treaty which the King would not have placed upon it.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, it did so appear from the Bill itself, and therefore by the next stage of the Bill the error could be remedied.
  MR. L0NGFIELDsaid, then in that case the Government ought to consent to the Chairman reporting Progress. He should therefore move, That the Chairman report Progress.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. LYGONasked, what course the Government intended to take to bring the Bill into harmony with the treaty?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that the question was, whether or not he was right in his construction of the words "personal dotation?" The terms of the Bill as they stood were against him. His hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs would ascertain before the next stage of the Bill came on what was the construction that ought to be placed upon these words.
  Clause agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read 3o on Thursday.
  House adjourned at a quarter after Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Duke of Cleveland, after the Death of his Brother.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Superannuation (Union Officers)* (No. 154); Civil Bill Courts (Ireland) (No. 67); Servants Hiring (Scotland)* (No. 146); Coventry Free Grammar School* (No. 153).
Committee—Army Prize (Shares of Deceased)* (No. 106); Countess of Elgin and Kincardine's Annuity * (No. 149).
Report—Army Prize (Shares of Deceased)* (No. 106); Countess of Elgin and Kincardine's Annuity* (No. 149).
Third Reading—Beer Houses (Ireland)* (No. 134), and passed.

DENMARK AND GERMANY. THE CONFERENCE. MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I have to lay upon your table, by command of Her Majesty, the Protocols of the proceedings of the Conference upon the affairs of Denmark and Germany, which has just been brought to a close. In laying these papers upon your Lordships' table I propose to follow the course which was pursued by the Earl of Liverpool in 1823, and I am confident that in following that example I am pursuing a course which is perfectly fair to this House and to the country. In that case the English Government had been carrying on negotiations first at Verona, the Conference at which place was attended by the Duke of Wellington, and afterwards at Paris, on the subject of the invasion of Spain. The Government of that day declared that the invasion of Spain was contrary to all the principles of English policy, and that it was an interference which was entirely opposed not only to the sentiments of this country, but to the settlement of Europe which had been come to some years before.

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They, therefore, protested against it, while at the same time they thought it advisable to preserve peace and declare a neutrality between this country and France. Upon the present occasion I have to discuss a question which is of a very intricate nature, and which for a long time was considered to be one that might go on for many many years without raising any exciting interest, and which was almost too complicated and too wearisome to engage much of the public attention. For the last year, however, that question has been in a very different condition.
My Lords, before I refer to the proceedings of the Conference it is necessary to take some notice of those engagements which have been the origin of these disputes, though they were intended to put an end to all differences between Germany and Denmark. Your Lordships are well aware that in these times it is necessary that a treaty should not only have the signatures of envoys and the ratifications of Sovereigns, but that in its working it should be made to accord with the sentiments and wishes of the people who are to be governed under it. A remarkable instance of difference in this respect has occurred with regard to the operation of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 with respect to Lombardy, and the operation of the same treaty with reference to Genoa. Your Lordships are aware that for many years great discontent prevailed in Lombardy, which was only removed by the separation of that province from Austria. On the other hand, in Genoa, by the wise and patriotic conduct of the Kings of Sardinia, all the objections, all the repugnance, which originally existed in Genoa against their rule have been finally overcome and removed, and Piedmont and Genoa are now in perfect harmony. Unfortunately the Treaty of 1852 in regard to Denmark, and the engagements which were entered into in the previous year, 1851, with respect to an arrangement between Germany and Denmark, were in their operation exceedingly unsatisfactory. It was declared, and has lately been repeated in the Conference, that an attempt was made by the King of Denmark, contrary to the engagements of 1852, and contrary also to all sound policy, to make the people of Schleswig change their national character, and so to interfere with their churches and schools as to keep up a perpetual irritation, thereby violating the spirit of the engagements
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between Denmark and Germany. How far those accusations were true as regards the exact letter of those engagements I will not stop to inquire; but it is quite certain that there was prevailing in Schleswig great dissatisfaction at the manner in which the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were governed, and that great complaints were made on that account against the Danish Government. It was for a long time the public opinion in this country that Germany had no reason to complain of Denmark as violating her engagements; but I am afraid that, by an impolitic course at all events, the Danish Government produced the feeling in Germany that the subjects of the King of Denmark of the German race were not fairly governed. Oppression there could not be said to be. The Government was a free Government, and, generally speaking, the people living under it were prosperous; but there was in the two Duchies much of that irritation which prevailed in Belgium previous to its separation from Holland. On the other side, it must be said that the German Governments, instead of asking that which might fairly have been demanded—instead of asking that the engagements should be kept in their spirit, and that arrangements should be made (which could easily have been devised) to give satisfaction to the people of the Duchies—made proposals inconsistent, as it appeared to me, with their engagements, pushing beyond their legitimate sense the words of those engagements, and suggested arrangements which, if they had come into operation, would have made Denmark completely subject to Germany. Among other proposals—indeed, one of the chief—was that the 900,000 people who were said to be of German race, and even the 50,000 of the Duchy of Lauenburg, should have a representation equal to that of the 1,600,000 inhabitants of the kingdom of Denmark. This was evidently so unfair and calculated to be so destructive of Danish independence and nationality, that Denmark refused to accede to it. It was, in fact, such a proposal as if Scotland and Ireland were to demand each an equal number of representatives with England in the Imperial Parliament. The consequence of these disputes, unfortunately, was, that instead of the treaty taking root and fully satisfying the wishes of the people of the Duchies, there was a kind of never-ceasing irritation which burst forth as occasion

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arose; and, as Germany was greatly more powerful than Denmark, it was but too probable that the latter would have to Buffer one day on account of the complaints which were made by the Germans. It was impossible not to foresee that such would probably be the consequence, and that the irritation to which I allude would not go on for ever without exciting great dissension and perhaps war. Therefore in September, 1862, when I was at Brussels in attendance on Her Majesty, I explained to Sir Augustus Paget, who was shortly about to return to Denmark, a plan of pacification which it appeared to me would keep the Duchies under the rule of the King of Denmark; which would be satisfactory to themselves; which would give them a Minister for Schleswig and a body of representatives; a Minister for Holstein and a body of representatives, and would thus put an end for ever to the demand that at Copenhagen there should sit a majority of representatives for the Duchies. The Danish Government—as I think unfortunately—utterly rejected that proposal, and matters went on in the same unsatisfactory state. The diplomatic correspondence which the British Government proposed should take place did take place between Germany and Denmark, but it only produced increased bitterness and further irritation. At length in October, 1863, the German Governments at Frankfort declared that they must proceed to Federal Execution. If, my Lords, that Federal Execution had been founded on any infringement of the rights of Holstein—if it had been founded solely upon the misgovernment of Holstein, or on any violation of the rights of the Confederation, no Power would, I think, be entitled to complain of it. It embraced, however, a point which had nothing to do with Federal rule—the point of an equal representation at Copenhagen. It was, then, that the British Government declared that that could not be a matter of indifference, because it aimed, in fact, not only at the integrity, but at the independence, of Denmark. Things remained in this state until the death of the King of Denmark, which produced an entire alteration in the state of affairs. It was then contended on behalf of Germany that, after looking closely into some very intricate questions of representative and hereditary succession, they were bound to declare that the King of Denmark had no right to succeed to the Duchies, but that by the law
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of the Confederation the Prince of Augustenburg was the proper heir to the throne. This declaration, adopted almost throughout the whole of Germany, was received with applause not only by the popular, but by the Conservative party; by persons of the highest rank as well as by the general mass of the community; and every Government that pretended to adhere to the Treaty of 1852 was denounced as recreant to the cause of Germany. In this state of affairs the Governments of Austria and of Prussia took a somewhat singular and not very defensible course. In the beginning they declared in the Diet that, having a majority in favour of this declaration, they would proceed to Federal Execution—thereby, to all appearance, making the present King of Denmark responsible for that which was done by the late King, and to all intents and purposes, as it would seem, acknowledging his sovereignty over Holstein. They, at the same time, however, somewhat privately and without the general knowledge of Europe, declared that they reserved the question of the succession. It did not appear to the Danish Government, nor did it appear to Her Majesty's Government, that Federal Execution could be resisted without increasing the complications of the position. But, immediately after that took place, Austria and Prussia declared that they must occupy the Duchy of Schleswig in order to obtain the fulfilment of the engagements of 1852. Your Lordships are well aware that shortly before that declaration the Government of Denmark announced that they were ready to repeal the Constitution of November, 1863, which was the apparent ground of the proposed Federal Execution. Unfortunately, they had not acceded to that proposal when Lord Wodehouse went to Copenhagen, and when the concession might have been effectual. The German Governments, in their hurry to go to war, and being evidently determined on going to war—in the first place in order to gratify the German sentiment on the subject—took no heed of the proposal which was made by the British Government, and which was supported by France and Russia, that a protocol should be signed by the different Governments, binding Denmark to a repeal of the Constitution of November, and the German troops of Austria and Prussia entered Schleswig. I think it was impossible for the British Government to give any advice on this occasion. It was evidently the invasion of a

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territory which did not in any way belong to Germany, and a territory to which according to our view the King of Denmark had the fullest right. It was said that it was to be occupied as "a material guarantee;" but no country is, I conceive, obliged to submit to an occupation of its territory which it believes it has the power and right to resist. Your Lordships are fully aware of the events of the war which subsequently took place. It resulted, as must naturally be expected, in the defeat of the Danes and the occupation of the Duchies by an overwhelming force of Austrian and Prussian troops. That being so, and the Austrian Government having always said that they were ready to agree to a Conference, and Prussia assenting to that proposal, Her Majesty's Government proposed that a Conference should be held. The Danish Government refused an armistice, but declared themselves ready to enter into a Conference. The Austrian and Prussian as well as the French Government expressed a wish that it should be attended by a Plenipotentiary of the German Confederation, and after some delay one was sent. The Conference was not assembled regularly until the 25th of April, and some delay then took place with a view of obtaining, if not an armistice, at least a suspension of arms for a considerable period. The Danish Government would not agree to an armistice; but a suspension of arms they did agree to, which was only to last for the period of four weeks. My Lords, it was difficult in matters so intricate, and on which passions had been so much roused, to come to any agreement beforehand; but Her Majesty's Government thought it their duty to proceed to the Conference, in the interests of peace, even without any such agreement. On the 12th of May, after the suspension of arms had been agreed to, I asked the Austrian and Prussian Governments to declare what it was they asked for in the interests of peace. Now, be it observed that although the Prussian Government, and the Austrian Government likewise, had continually declared that they had certain engagements to insist upon which had not been fulfilled, they never yet had agreed to specify what these engagements were which would secure peace, and by which they would be bound. When Lord Wodehouse went to Berlin on his way to Copenhagen he endeavoured, according to the instructions he had received, to obtain some explanations from the Prussian Government
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on this point. The Prussian Government replied, "Let the Danish Government first repeal the Constitution of November, and we will afterwards see what arrangement they propose to put in the place of that; we will judge of that proposal and give our opinion upon it." Nothing, I must say, could be less explicit, or a less justification for the course they were pursuing; because at the same time they were ready to carry on war to the extremity, to use all their means to invade Schleswig with all the dreadful consequences, without making a distinct declaration of their terms. When, however, the Powers were assembled in Conference, and the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia were obliged to meet the Plenipotentiaries of Russia, France, and Sweden as well as of Great Britain, they found themselves compelled to make some statement of the terms which they would require. Be it observed that throughout—even up to the 31st of January—the two German Governments had declared that they adhered to the Treaty of London, and the execution and occupation were proofs that they still adhered to the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, had no reason to suppose that their proposal would be of a different character. We were told, however, upon authority so high as to be almost official, that there was an intention on their part to propose what was called a personal union; and that personal union was to be of this nature—that the whole Duchy of Holstein and the whole Duchy of Schleswig were to be united; they were to have a separate army and navy from those of Denmark; that they were to have complete self-government; and, in fact, that the King of Denmark was to have scarcely any influence over the two Duchies. In one of the last meetings of the Conference M. Quaade, one of the Danish Plenipotentiaries, declared that if that personal union had ever been proposed, it would have been impossible for the Danes to agree to it. Indeed, it was likely that, with the disposition which prevailed in Germany, German agitation would have produced a declaration of separation on the part of the two Duchies, and German arms would then have supported the Duchies in that wish for separation. Therefore, though nominally maintaining the integrity of Denmark, and though nominally adhering to the Treaty of 1852, the proposition of a personal union would have been, in fact, a separation of the Duchies from Denmark

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under a very thin transparent disguise. That, however, was not the exact proposal of the German Plenipotentiaries. In the meeting of the 17th of May the first Plenipotentiary of Prussia declared that—
"What the Austrian and Prussian Governments wished was a pacification which would assure to the Duchies absolute guarantees against the recurrence of any foreign oppression, and which, by thus excluding for the future any subject of dispute, of revolution, and of war, would guarantee to Germany that security in the North which she requires in order not to fall again periodically into the state of affairs which brought on the present war. These guarantees can only be found in the complete political independence of the Duchies and their close connection by means of common institutions."—Protocol, No. 5.
Now, this declaration on the part of the two Powers is not a little remarkable. Your Lordships will observe the phrase, "guarantee against foreign oppression." That oppression meant the oppression of the Government of the King of Denmark. But he was Duke of Holstein de facto and de jure, his title had never been disputed, and his government, if it was oppressive, could only be a domestic oppression. The two Powers, therefore, of Austria and Prussia, to whom Europe had a right to look for respect for the faith of treaties, declared at once that the government of the Danish Duchies was of the nature of a foreign oppression. At the same time, the declaration "for a security against any subject of dispute, war, and revolution," was so ambiguous that none of the Plenipotentiaries could tell what its meaning was. The Russian Plenipotentiary said he was quite at a loss to know what it meant. The French Plenipotentiary followed in the same tone; and for a long period we were quite unable in the Conference to say what was really the intention of the two Powers. We asked who was to be the Sovereign of these two Duchies which were to be thus governed? The answer of the German Plenipotentiary was that that was a question to be decided by the Diet. Austria and Prussia, but more especially Austria, had declared hitherto that the Treaty of 1852 was a question that was decided—that the late King of Denmark had a right to settle the succession, and that his decision in favour of Prince Christian, the present King of Denmark, would be respected by those Powers. It was equally notorious that the Diet, if it met, would, by a considerable majority, declare against the title of the King of Denmark. Count Bernstorff did not deny that, and the Plenipotentiary
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of the German Diet declared at once that the majority of the Diet would never consent to an arrangement which, even in an eventual or conditional form, would sanction a union between the Duchies and Denmark. Thus, while the two Powers, Austria and Prussia, were in appearance consenting to the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852, telling us that the Diet might ultimately decide in favour of the King of Denmark as the legitimate heir, the German Plenipotentiary, who, in fact, had greater Power than either the Plenipotentiaries of Austria or Prussia, because they never at any time ventured to oppose that which he declared to be the will of Germany, declared that Germany would never consent to the restoration of the Duchies to Denmark.
My Lords, at the next meeting of the Conference, which took place on the 17th of May, there was a more positive declaration. Austria and Prussia then declared that they could no longer acknowledge the King of Denmark as Sovereign of the Duchies; that the whole of the two Duchies ought to be separated from Denmark and placed under the sovereignty of the Prince of Augustenburg; that he should be declared the rightful possessor of the throne of these Duchies, and that that was a declaration which would be hailed throughout Germany and would meet the wishes of the German people. Before this declaration was made, in preparation for such an event, the Plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers had met to consider the situation. The Government of France had had some communication with the Government of this country. The French Government had declared that they thought the personal union could not be the foundation of a lasting peace, and that the only mode of obtaining such a peace would be to separate the Danish nationalities in the Duchies from the German nationalities. After these communications I consulted the other neutral Plenipotentiaries, who met at my private house for the purpose of considering the matter. We came to the conclusion that it was useless to propose that the two Duchies should remain under the King of Denmark. It was quite obvious that unless we had been prepared— I should say all of us prepared—to carry on a great war for the purpose, after the hostilities which had taken place, after the declarations which had been made by the German Powers, if anything like a personal union had been established there would at once have been a declaration on

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the part of the Duchies and on the part of the German Confederation, supported by Austria and Prussia, that the Prince of Augustenburg was entitled to hold the Duchies, and that he was the rightful Sovereign; and that if the Danish troops entered to dispute possession of the Duchies, they would be opposed by Austria, Prussia, and the whole Confederation. We had therefore to consider what we could propose which would be most favourable to Denmark under the circumstances which I have stated to your Lordships. Of course we could only propose something of a diplomatic nature, which we thought likely to be accepted. We accordingly prepared a proposition, which I as President of the Conference was to submit, and which I was assured would be supported by the Plenipotentiaries of France and Sweden, and as far as possible by the Russian Plenipotentiary, though he had not then received definite instructions. What we proposed was that the King of Denmark should yield to Germany the Duchy of Holstein and the Southern portion of the Duchy of Scheawig—that the boundary should be drawn as far as the Schlei, and should go along by the Dannewerke; that there should be no menacing fortresses on the boundary; that the German Powers should not interfere any further or any more in the internal affairs of Denmark; and that a general guarantee should be given by the European Powers for the rest of the Danish possessions. With regard to this proposal, the Danish Plenipotentiaries made a declaration which I think did that Government the highest honour. They declared that the King of Denmark had accepted the Crown of that country according to the Treaty of 1852, thinking that his doing so would tend to the peace of Europe and to preserve the balance of power; but, as the surrender of a great part of his territory was now demanded, he was ready to make that concession, provided that entire independence and self-government were left to the remainder of his dominions. The King of Denmark declared he was ready to accept the line of the Schlei as proposed; and without defining it he declared it was necessary there should be a military and commercial line drawn for the sake of the independence of Denmark; and he declared moreover that there should be an European guarantee for the possession of the remainder of his territory. The German
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Governments, while they accepted the proposal for the partition of Schleswig— while they no longer demanded the whole of that Duchy—declared that, according to their views, the line of demarcation must go much further north. They said that the line must be from Apenrade to Tondern; and that they could not assent to the line proposed on the part of the neutral Plenipotentiaries. They declared, at the same time, they were perfectly ready to agree that, with regard to the territory to be left to the King of Denmark, there should be no right of interference and no interference whatever with the independence of Denmark. I confess, my Lords, it appeared to me that the proposal we submitted was the best arrangement that could be made. It was not to be expected that those Duchies could be retained under the nominal sovereignty of the King of Denmark without giving rise to fresh disputes and fresh complications. It was obvious, also, that if that sovereignty had been admitted to be vested in the King of Denmark, there would be constant interference on the part of Germany, and that interference, which has gone on for the last twelve years, giving rise to continual disputes, would cause constant contentions in future. It would be far better that Denmark should have a restricted territory, with the understanding that in her restricted territory her own Government should have absolute control, than that she should be subject to perpetual interference and control on the part of the German Powers. The French Government more especially took that view. The French Plenipotentiary declared it had always been the opinion of his Government that the division of the nationalities was the cause of all the complications which had taken place, and that nothing could be settled satisfactorily until there had been a separation of the nationalities; but he declared in the name of the Emperor, at the same time, that it was necessary great forbearance should be shown towards Denmark as the weaker Power; that the part evidently and confessedly German should be given to the Duchy of Holstein; and with regard to the mixed districts, as well as the Danish part, they should be left to Denmark as a means of preserving her independence, and giving her a mercantile and military line. Unhappily, my Lords, upon this occasion, as throughout those questions, the German Powers, instead of taking

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those views of generosity and forbearance which were urged so well by the Emperor of the French, determined to insist on what, undoubtedly, was their right if the right of conquest was the only one to be considered. They stood on the right of conquest; they stood on the victory they had gained on the disputed territory; but with respect to generosity and forbearance towards a Power so disproportionate to themselves—with respect to a due consideration for the peace of Europe—with respect to the absence of a desire to rush again into war in order to retain that which by right of conquest they might say they had acquired—I should not be treating your Lordships with sincerity if I said there was any such forbearance, any such generosity, any such regard for the peace of Europe, manifested on the part of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation. I must say likewise, my Lords, that there was an assumption which was not justifiable on the part of Denmark, and in reference to which my noble Friend Lord Clarendon made a clear and pointed statement at a subsequent meeting of the Conference, The Danish Government considered that the line which we had proposed in the name of the neutral Powers, and after consulting the neutral Powers, as a basis of pacification, was an English proposal—an English proposal by which England was bound to abide, and which she was bound to maintain at all hazards. Nothing of the kind, however, was ever stated by the British Plenipotentiaries; nothing of the kind had Denmark a right to expect. I did inform the Danish Plenipotentiary, when there was a question of continuing the Armistice, that I should not propose nor support any division but the line of the Schlei without the consent of Denmark; but I never gave him to understand that England would support that line otherwise than by urging its adoption in conjunction with the other neutral Powers at the meetings of the Conference. The last suspension of arms was only for a fortnight, and it remained for us to consider what should be done—the two parties being obstinately bent on the maintenance of their different rights—the Germans insisting on the line from Apenrade to Tondern, and the Danes insisting first upon a line extending more to the south than that which the British Plenipotentiary had proposed in the Conference, and afterwards agreeing to that line, but declaring that they would make no further concessions. What could
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be done to bring about an amicable understanding? In this situation of affairs, knowing that Denmark would not consent to any other line—indeed, not knowing whether the German Powers would concede any other line—the Prussian Plenipotentiary said that he was ready to recommend to his Government a line which should proceed from the north of Flensburg to Tondern, but that he was not authorized to propose that line in the name of his Government. The Austrian Plenipotentiary did not accede at first, but afterwards said that he would recommend it to the consideration of his Government. But the Danes at once refused it, and the proposal fell to the ground. It then remained to be considered whether, without proposing any other line, some means could not be found by which peace might still be preserved. We considered that question very anxiously, and it came to be a subject of reflection whether we could not, even at the last moment, propose something which might bring the two Powers to an agreement. It was obvious that many and great difficulties had to be removed. The King of Denmark was ready to yield a part of his dominions of which he had been deprived by war. The German Plenipotentiaries were ready to say that a part of the Duchy of Schleswig should remain under the rule of the King of Denmark. Both Powers were ready to accept the proposal that there should be no interference in future in the internal government of Denmark; and all the Powers, I think, would have been ready, if there had been an agreement on other points, to give a guarantee—a European guarantee—to Denmark, which would have left that Power, indeed, without any sovereignty over the German population, but still possessed of an independent territory, and still possessed of a free and happy Government, not subject to foreign interference. Well, the question was, whether, there remaining only this line of frontier to be decided, it could not be arranged in some way to which both Powers would agree. We thought it possible that in that case the spirit of the Protocol of Paris might be adopted. The Protocol of Paris said, that when serious differences arose between any Powers, and there was danger of those differences being carried to hostilities, the good offices of a friendly Power might be resorted to, and it appeared to us that if this principle could be brought into action, the continuance of the war might be obviated. It was stated at the same

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time by the French Plenipotentiary at Paris, and by others, that where the honour or the essential interests of a country were mainly concerned, it could not be expected that such differences should be submitted to a friendly Power. But, in our opinion, this was not such a case. It appeared to us that sooner than rush into war—sooner, above all, than expose Denmark again to such an unequal contest—it was possible to propose the good offices of a friendly Power, with this condition—that both Powers should submit to the decision respecting the line of frontier offered by the arbitrator to whom the matter might be referred. In fact it was to be an arbitration rather than good offices. Now, I cannot but believe that any impartial arbitrator would have fixed upon a line far more favourable to Denmark than that which the German Powers had proposed. A Power which was impartial and without passion would probably have given, not the line as far as the north of Flensburg, but a line to the south of Flensburg, whereby that important town might have been preserved to Denmark, and that Power would have had a port in the Northern Sea by which her independence might have been maintained. It was, however, entirely a question for the two Powers to accept or to refuse that arbitration. I may say further that my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and myself, who were the British Plenipotentiaries at the Conference, thought that after the fairness and the impartiality which the Emperor of the French had shown throughout this question, his friendliness, and at the same time his wish for the maintenance of peace, the two Powers might well have accepted his good offices. The opinion was, however, expressed by one of the Plenipotentiaries—an opinion afterwards confirmed by an official declaration—that no Power represented at the Conference, and therefore committed to a certain degree as to the questions before the Conference, could properly be accepted as the arbitrating Power. It then appeared to us, and we so informed the Plenipotentiaries, that in our opinion the King of the Belgians, whose impartiality is likewise well known, and whose long experience of European affairs makes him most desirous to preserve the peace of Europe, might perform these functions to the satisfaction of the Powers concerned. But the question of who should be the arbitrator never arose. Austria and Prussia said that they could accept the good
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offices of a friendly Power in accordance with the Treaty of Paris, but that they could not accept the decision of that friendly Power as final; and in the mean time they asked for a long armistice. Now, my Lords, it appeared to us that if that proposal were accepted, then, after a period of two or three months of armistice, during which the naval operations of Denmark would be suspended, a decision would have been announced which, if it in any way displeased the German Powers—if it did not go to the full extent of all their demands—would have been refused by them. The Plenipotentiary of the German Confederation completely confirmed our view of this question by declaring that in his opinion this territory of Schleswig belonged altogether to the Prince of Augustenburg, or rather belonged to the competency of the German Confederation; that they could therefore accept no arbitration, and could not be bound by anything that was decided. They evidently meant that every foot of territory in Schleswig might, if they chose it, be demanded at the end of the good offices by the German Confederation. Thus, according to what I am sorry to say has been the usual manner of the German Powers, their refusal was not a direct and straightforward one. It is somewhat like their declaration at the beginning, that they went into Holstein for the purpose of Federal Execution, that they went into Schleswig for the purpose of material occupation, and that they wished the question of the sovereignty of Holstein and Schleswig to be decided in the German Confederation, knowing perfectly well how that decision would be made; and then, lastly, they wished to have the appearance of accepting the good offices of an arbitrator without really intending to accept them. The Danish Plenipotentiaries, most unfortunately in my opinion—most imprudently in my opinion—gave a decided refusal to the proposal. Of course, it was for them to judge as to the security of their own country and the prospects of war; but I certainly regret deeply that they should have rejected the arbitration. The proposal that I made certainly did not exactly agree with the line of the Schlei, but it was a proposal which we, the British Plenipotentiaries, thought was for the benefit of Denmark, and was most likely to obtain for the Danes a peace which would have been satisfactory to them. And now, my Lords, all other means having failed, one other proposal

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was made on the part of France by the French Plenipotentiary, who was directed to make this proposal—that, leaving the Danish part of Schleswig to the Danes, and the German part to the Germans, the line to be drawn in the disputed district should be decided by a vote of the population, to be taken in some fair manner, the details of which might be considered afterwards. [The Earl of CLARENDON: The votes were to be taken in each commune.] Yes, and these votes were to decide the line to be drawn and the district which was to belong to Germany and to Denmark respectively.
THE EARL OF DERBY: May I ask the noble Earl if that decision was to be taken during the occupation of the province by the German troops?
EARL RUSSELL: No; the French proposition was clearly that the Prussian troops should evacuate the district before the vote was taken by means of Commissioners. At the same time, it was the opinion of the Danes—and I believe that opinion to have been well founded—that although the people of Schleswig generally were perfectly satisfied to remain united to Denmark, such had been the effects of the occupation, such had been the agitation on the part of Germany, the political societies in Germany having sent persons to agitate all over the country, that the decisions would through that influence have become corrupted, and the plan of the Emperor, which otherwise might have been successful, would have been rendered unjust. The proposition was accordingly refused. My Lords, it was with great regret that the Plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers received this decision.
My Lords, I must say that my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and I have received from France and from the other neutral Powers the firmest support during the continuance of the Conference. We held frequent private meetings with the neutral Powers, in which we discussed the proposals to be made. There was nothing exhibited in those meetings but the most earnest desire to provide for the safety and independence of Denmark, and I must say that the utmost harmony prevailed on all sides; and the French, Russian, and Swedish Plenipotentiaries alike did all in their power to contribute towards the success of the proposals we made. We shall, therefore, leave the Conference with a strong sense of our obligations for the support which we received from them.
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After this decision there remained nothing more for the Conference but to accept the declaration which was made at the last meeting—and which has been repeated to me to-day by the Austrian Ambassador— it is simply that the two Powers, Austria and Prussia, have no intention of carrying on hostilities with the view of obtaining possession of any territory beyond the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and that they have no intention of making any conquest of any portion of the Danish territory on the continent or of the Danish islands. That declaration is purely voluntary, and is not in any way extorted as to the manner in which these Powers propose to act. At the same time it comes rather late—though they make the declaration I suppose they cannot intend us to accept it—and we certainly cannot accept it as one upon which we can implicitly rely. After that which has happened with respect to the Treaty of 1852, and after that which has happened with respect to the treatment of the Danes after the pledges given, but more as I am afraid owing to German popular opinion, which Austria is desirous to conciliate, which Prussia is desirous to conciliate, which the German Confederation, above all, is anxious to conciliate, I am sorry to say that, greatly as I have respected Austria, greatly as I have respected Prussia, we can no longer rely, as we have done, upon their declarations.
Well, my Lords, but the question comes as to what, at the end of the Conference, is our position, and what will be our course? And without intending, or being able to pledge, the Government in case of contingencies which have not arisen, I think it is due to Parliament and to the country—especially at this period of the Session—to declare what is the view which the Government take of the position, the duty, the interests, and the future policy of England. My Lords, with regard to our honour, I conceive that in honour we are in no way engaged to take part in the present war. Although it has been stated to the contrary on the part of Denmark more than once, there has been at no time any pledge given on the part of this country or Her Majesty's Government promising material assistance to Denmark in this contest. Three times Her Majesty's Government during the period I have held the seals of the Foreign Office have endeavoured to induce Denmark to accept propositions which we regarded as favourable to her interests. In 1862 I made propo-

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sitions to her, but those propositions were rejected. When Lord Wodehouse went to Denmark, he and the Russian Plenipotentiary proposed that Denmark should repeal the Constitution which she had concurred in but a few days before; but she would not at that time receive the proposal. We believe that, if she had consented to the arbitration which we proposed in the Conference, the result would have been as favourable to her as, under the circumstances in which she was placed, she could have expected. My Lords, I do not blame Denmark for the course she has thought fit to pursue. She has a right—I should be sorry to reproach her in any way in her present state of weakness—she has an undoubted right to refuse our propositions, but we on our side have also a right to take into consideration the duty, honour, and interests of this country, and not to make that duty, that honour, and those interests subordinate to the interests of any foreign Power whatever. My Lords, our honour not being engaged, we have to consider what we might be led to do for the interests of other Powers, and for the sake of that balance of power which in 1852 was declared by general consent to be connected with the integrity of Denmark. My Lords, I cannot but believe that the Treaty of 1852 having been entered into, if there had been at an early period—say in December or January last —if France, Great Britain, and Russia, supported by the assistance which they might have counted upon receiving from Sweden, had declared for the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852—the succession of the King of Denmark might have been established without difficulty, and might have been peaceably maintained, and that the King and his Government would have remedied all the grievances of which his German subjects complained. I believe the King of Denmark would have found it to his advantage to grant to his German subjects that freedom, those privileges, and that self-government in their internal and domestic matters which they had demanded, and that they would thus have become quite contented as subjects to the King of Denmark. That desirable result, however, could not be brought about. In reference to the Treaty of 1852, I have to repeat what I stated on a previous occasion—that it was not a treaty of guarantee, that the Governments of France and Russia were competent to acknowledge the treaty, but that they had not pledged themselves to
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maintain the connection of Schleswig and Denmark, that not being a question of the general balance of power in Europe. Well, the French Government have frequently declared and have repeated to us only within the last twenty-four hours, that the Emperor does not consider it essential to the interest of France to support the line of the Schlei. He declares he does not think that France would be inclined to go to war for such an object. He urges that a war with Germany would be a most serious thing to France, that our armies would not be marshalled to oppose the invasion of Denmark, and that such a war would consequently be attended with great cost and great risk. I think that if that war were successful, France would expect some compensation on account of her participation, and that compensation could hardly be granted without exciting general jealousy among the other nations of Europe, and thus disturbing the balance of power which now exists. I cannot deny that if the Emperor of the French puts forward these considerations—if he declares that for these reasons, though he would give us moral support, he would afford us no material assistance in such war—I must say I think he is justified in that refusal, and in adopting such a line of conduct. I cannot but admit that if a great war with Germany arose, whatever might be the issue, it might reproduce those great contests which took place in 1814, and which led to such unsatisfactory results. The Emperor of the French is a Sovereign singularly wise and sagacious, and I will say valuing, as he has proved that he values, the peace of Europe, I am not in a position to find fault, nor can Her Majesty's Government find any fault with the decision to which the Emperor has come. But the Emperor of the French having thus declared his policy, and the Emperor of Russia having constantly refused to join with us in affording material support to Denmark, our position, of course, must be greatly influenced by those decisions. In the first place, is it the duty of this country—if we are to undertake the preservation of the balance of power in Europe as it was recognized in 1852—is it a duty incumbent on us alone? The French Government sees very clearly the dangers to which France might be exposed by interfering, but it says at the same time that it would be an easy operation for England; that England, with her naval power, might

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add most materially to the strength of Denmark and assist in bringing the war to a conclusion. My Lords, I must say there are many considerations which induce me to arrive at a different conclusion. I cannot but think, in the first place, that we should suffer perhaps considerably if our commercial marine was exposed to depredations such as might take place in the event of our being at war with Germany. That is one consideration which ought not to be overlooked. But there are other considerations of still greater moment. One is—Would our interference bring this war to a conclusion? Without giving military aid could you recover Schleswig and Holstein, and even Jutland from the Austrian and Prussian forces? Well, my Lords, we have for a long time in our conduct of foreign affairs shown great forbearance and patience. I think we were right in being forbearing, and think we were justified in being patient. But if our honour or our interests or the great interests of Europe should call upon us to interfere, I think such interference ought to be clearly effectual, as nothing would more tend to diminish the influence of this country than a course of action which would show that while we were predominant at sea, and that no Austrian or Prussian ships of war could venture to leave port, yet at the same time our interference could not insure, as we hoped it would, the safety of Denmark, nor lead to a speedy termination of the war. But, my Lords, the whole position and influence of this country with regard to foreign countries ought to be fully considered by Parliament and by the country; for we have great interests with multiplied complications arising from various connections and various treaties with every part of the world. It is no longer a question with reference to the balance of power in Europe. There are other parts of the world in which our interests may be as deeply involved, and which we may some day or other find it necessary to maintain the honour and interests of this country. The civil war now raging in America, ending how it may—whether by the establishment of an independent republic in the South, or whether it ends most unexpectedly, as it would be to me, I confess, by restoring the Union—still the United States of America or the Northern States, or whatever they may be called, will then be in a totally different position to that which they were in a few years ago. A great army will then be maintained by the
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United States, A formidable navy will also be kept up. Our relations with that Power are liable at any moment to interruption. I hope and trust that our friendly relations may continue uninterrupted; still, those relations must be considered and kept in view as well as our interest in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. My Lords, let us look at other parts of the world. Look at the great commerce which has grown up in China, where it is necessary for us always to maintain a considerable naval force to protect it. Look at our immense possessions in India and see how necessary it is that they should be considered at all times. In any question, therefore, of peace or war—while it is very probable that this country with allies could carry on a war successfully—yet when it comes to be a war to be carried on by England alone, there are other contingencies to be looked at, and the position of this country is to be considered with reference not to Europe alone, but with reference to our interests in every quarter of the world. My Lords, these are considerations to be borne in mind with respect to this question of Denmark. It may be said that other combinations might be made—that although we could not ourselves attack the German Powers with any great amount of success, yet there are vulnerable points upon which they, and especially Austria, may be open to attack; that those doctrines and theories which Austria and Prussia have put forward, with regard to foreign nationalities, may be retorted upon them, and especially upon Austria with effect—they may be applied to other parts of Europe than Schleswig and Holstein; that the German nationality is not the only nationality in Europe; that the Italian nationality has as much right to be considered as the Germans; and that if we were to enter upon a course of supporting nationalities, we should be perfectly justified by the doctrines and conduct of Austria. This, no doubt, would be sufficient if the object were merely to show to Austria and Prussia that they are vulnerable on their own ground. But, my Lords, I think it is the duty of England to show a greater attachment to peace than Austria and Prussia have shown, and not, if possible, to light a flame which might extend to every part of Europe, but rather to endeavour to confine the war within the narrowest limits possible. Therefore, my Lords, with regard to this question, it is the opinion of Her Ma-

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jesty's Government that we should maintain the position which we have occupied, and that we should be neutral in this war. I do not mean to say that contingencies may not arise in which our position might become different, and in which our conduct might be altered. It may be said, "Will you allow these German Powers to act as they please? If, contrary to their professions and promises, they should decide upon sending a combined Austrian and Prussian force to Copenhagen with the declared object of making Denmark assent to terms which would be destructive of her independence—will you then remain entirely indifferent to such proceedings?" My Lords, I can only say in answer to such a question, that every Government in this country must retain to itself a certain liberty—as long as it possesses the confidence of Parliament—a certain liberty of decision upon such points. All I can now say is, that if the Government should think it necessary to come to any fresh decision—if the war should assume a new character—if circumstances should arise which might require us to make another decision, it would be our duty, if Parliament were sitting, immediately to apply to Parliament upon the subject; and if Parliament should not be sitting, then at once to call Parliament together in order that it may judge the conduct which Her Majesty's Government should pursue.
In the meantime, my Lords, I have given you an outline of the course of these negotiations. I have given you an account of the efforts we have made for peace, which, like the efforts made in 1823 by the Governments of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Canning, have been unfortunately unsuccessful. I say that our policy at the present time is to maintain peace. If there is any party in Parliament—if there is any individual in Parliament—who thinks as Lord Grey thought in 1823 that we ought to go to war, it will be competent for them to ask Her Majesty to interfere materially in the contest. If they think that in any respect we have failed in our duty, it is competent for them to take any line of conduct they may think proper. But, for ourselves, I say with confidence that we have maintained the honour of the country, that we have done everything in our power to preserve the peace of Europe, and that, those efforts having failed, we can rest satisfied that nothing has been wanting on our parts which was needed by the honour or the interests of this country—that nothing has
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been left undone which it was our duty to do.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, the almost unprecedented attendance of your Lordships on the present occasion clearly indicates that you are keenly sensible of the gravity of the statement which has just been made by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. My Lords, it is impossible to overrate the magnitude and importance of the interests involved in that statement. Interests of such vast importance are hanging in the balance at the present moment—the peace of Europe—I do not say the present, but the ultimate peace of Europe—is placed in fearful peril—anything which may pass in this House may have for good or evil so serious an effect—that if I have risen to follow the noble Earl in the statement he has made, it is not for the purpose of going through the various topics on which he has touched, or commenting on the different parts of his speech, but for the purpose of expressing my earnest and anxious hope that your Lordships may see, not only the propriety, but the absolute necessity, of abstaining on the present occasion from all partial and, consequently, unsatisfactory expressions of opinion. The noble Earl has entered at very great length upon three distinct topics, which he has treated, no doubt, with very great ability and with great clearness. He has entered on a justification of the course which Her Majesty's Government has pursued in relation to the Conference; he has given a statement of what has passed in the Conference; and somewhat vaguely, certainly, but with sufficient explicitness for the present, he has stated what is the policy which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to pursue in the position in which we are now placed. My Lords, of the first part of the noble Earl's statement I have no complaint whatever to make. It was perfectly natural that in laying on the table, by Her Majesty's command, the Protocols of the late Conference held in London on the affairs of Denmark he should have brought under your Lordships' notice the circumstances in which the Conference originated, the position of Europe at the time it assembled, and the result at which it has arrived. And I do not complain of the general statement which the noble Earl has made, although, undoubtedly, there were some very material facts he altogether omitted, and some circumstances to which, perhaps, he gave a colouring in

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which I can hardly concur. But, as I said, I am not going to enter upon a discussion of the statement of the noble Earl as to the position in which we are placed; still less of the more important, yet totally different, circumstances to which that position may be owing—to what conduct on our part or on the part of foreign Powers, to what policy pursued by the Government, it may have been owing that we were placed, at the period of the assembling of the Conference, in the unfortunate position in which we now stand. My Lords, that may—probably will—form the subject of further discussion, if not in this, at all events in the other House of Parliament —and probably in both Houses of Parliament. But on the present occasion, certainly, your Lordships would not deem it expedient to enter on all the various phases which the Schleswig Holstein question— simple enough in its commencement and complicated enough in its progress—has presented since 1852, or from an earlier period. But I must say the noble Earl has taken a course this evening not in accordance with ordinary practice, and perhaps not with the ordinary procedure of the House, when he proceeded to enter on a discussion and give his own account of various proceedings which passed in the Conference, reading from a number of papers which he laid on the table, but of which, not being yet in the hands of any one of your Lordships, we are bound to accept his statement without discussion. But I confess, for my part, my Lords, while I think the most important part of the question which Parliament has to consider is the course of policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued—whether they have taken the course best suited to effect their own objects—namely, to obtain a satisfactory arrangement between the different belligerents and, at the same time, maintain inviolate the honour of England—while I say they are of the utmost importance, I think all these questions must have much greater reference to an earlier period—namely, to that before the commencement of the Conference, and to things which then took place of which we know nothing. Because, with all respect to the opinions of the noble Lords and the right hon. Gentlemen who have stated that as soon as you could get the Plenipotentiaries assembled around the table there would be no sort of difficulty in coming to a satisfactory conclusion—without in the slightest degree
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disparaging the ability which the two noble Earls engaged in the Conference have conducted its affairs—I think I may venture to say that, beyond the limited circle of the Members of Her Majesty's Government, there were few, if any, persons who could anticipate from the circumstances under which we entered upon that Conference any other than a signal and lamentable failure—although many there were, of course, who wished for a very different conclusion. Why, what were the circumstances? There were at that moment eight parties who had been called to the Conference, which was composed of thirteen gentlemen representing eight different interests. Of these eight different interests four were belligerents—three engaged on one side and one on the other; and there were also the four neutral Powers—England, France, Russia, and Sweden. With regard to the belligerents, what was the position of affairs on which they were invited to enter? It is true that with regard to the three belligerents on the one side, their aims, their notions, their ulterior objects appear to have had considerable diversity; but all three were from various motives unitedly bent on destroying the Kingdom of Denmark—all three were not quite so equally united, perhaps, in the ulterior objects of their spoliation, or their portion in the division of the spoil; but all were combined in the determination to carry war and spoliation into the territories of Denmark. It was at this moment when, flushed with the triumph of their arms, and with the glory of their successes, which had been gained by their enormous numerical superiority, and the superiority of their ammunitions and artillery—it was at this moment when flashed with the prospect of success, proud of the military, glory they thought they had obtained, and seeing before them nothing but a feeble and more than half-vanquished enemy, they consented most reluctantly to be arrested in their career, and they hardly yielded—from no unappreciable motive— to the pressing solicitations of England— not of the four neutral Powers, but of England alone—to a temporary suspension of hostilities, and would not even consent to an armistice between the belligerents. On the other hand, there was the Kingdom of Denmark—a small, gallant nation, who were fighting with the inmost determination and the courage of despair in behalf of all they held dear and sacred—in behalf of their homes, in behalf of their constitu-

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tion, in behalf of their King, in behalf of their families—fighting against overwhelming odds—and seeing themselves deserted by the whole European community, from which, whether with or without reason, they had undoubtedly entertained strong hope that they would receive support—finding themselves pressed to the very uttermost, I say, in their position the courage despair would give might naturally induce them to refuse another suspension of hostilities which they might naturally consider unfavourable to themselves at the moment, and say, "Rather than enter into such discreditable terms, let us die in the face of day and in the face of Europe, which, to its shame, has permitted us to do so." Now, such were the circumstances under which the Plenipotentiaries came to the Conference—unwillingly, all of them— with different views—three on one side and one on the other—the subject of oppression and violence—on the part of the small and weak Kingdom of Denmark. On the other hand, the four neutral Powers entered into discussions without the slightest previous agreement between themselves as to what they should ask, what they should recommend, and what they should insist upon. Eight different interests were collected together in Conference in the middle of the excitement of a war, without any previous basis of negotiations being agreed upon, without anything being settled, except that which the noble Lord at the head of the Government is reported to have described when he said that the basis of the Conference was the restoration of the peace of Europe. On that basis, and on that basis only, you entered into the Conference, without previous communications, without previous agreement, without previous understandings—and you profess to be astonished that the Conference led to nothing but failure! It is a matter of comparative indifference—the two noble Lords charged with the interests of England may have conducted the affairs of the Conference with more or less ability, with perfect sincerity, no doubt, to maintain the peace of Europe—I have not the slightest doubt on that subject—Prussia and Austria may have been more or less unreasonable, Denmark may have been more or less firm in her decisions, the Diet may have been more or less exacting—the belligerents may have placed themselves more or less in opposition to all their previous declarations before entering into the Conference—all these questions are matters of compara-
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tive indifference, because, in my judgment, from the time the Conference began to sit it was a doomed Conference from which it was impossible to hope any practical result could arise. Therefore the absence of these Protocols do not place your Lordships under the slightest disadvantage in judging of the position and policy of Her Majesty's Government in bringing this matter to the position in which it now stands; still less will the imperfect statement which has been made, and in the absence of any important information as to the facts of the case, enable you to express any opinion whatever upon that most important decision which it appears Her Majesty's Government have arrived at—namely, to acquiesce in the present state of affairs, and remain in the position of passive neutrality. At the commencement of the Session I ventured to express, in terms as strong as it was possible for man to use, the infinite danger which I saw in even the possibility of a war with Germany—with that Power with which we had been so many years associated—which has been, and, unless modern aggressive ideas have too far prevailed, is the great conservative central counterpoise to the ambitions of the East and of the West—a Power naturally connected with us by many ties, and a war with which could not but be productive of the most lamentable consequences, not only to them but to ourselves also. But, my Lords, what I also said was this. I feared—and that is the great question that we shall have to discuss hereafter—I feared the Government had, by the course of policy they had pursued, placed us in the position in which we must be subjected either to the lamentable consequences of such a war or to the discredit in which we should be held—and in which, I fear, we are held—by the whole of Europe, not for having abstained from war now, but for having for a long period held out to the contending parties menaces on the one hand, and encouragement on the other—a course entirely inconsistent with that policy which Her Majesty's Government now profess, and properly profess—namely, an earnest desire and determination to maintain unbroken the peace of this England, so far as that can be done with honour. That is the question on which serious discussion must take place; that is the question the decision of which will solve in the mind of Parliament and the country whether Her Majesty's Government have maintained inviolate the honour of the country,

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or whether, on the other hand, their policy has not been such as to expose them to the charge of a feeble and vacillating opposition, yielding at every step when encroachment was threatened, always suggesting that that encroachment would be met by a firm resistance, but whenever the encroachment took place yielding and protesting only that further encroachment would not be tolerated. That is the charge against which Her Majesty's Government —not now, but hereafter—will have to defend themselves. That is the feeling which I believe is very prevalent in the minds of the people of this country. That is the feeling which has taken deeply hold of the Parliament and of the country. And if I wanted any confirmation of its application to the course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued, and to the course which they may be expected to pursue, I should find it in the concluding portion of the noble Earl's speech, in which, after elaborately discussing all the disadvantages and all the dangers of going to war—all the injury we should sustain, all the loss to our commerce, and all the serious consequences, not merely present consequences, but even the fear of consequences as possibly leading to a rupture with the States of America at some future time— the noble Earl, to my astonishment, concluded by saying—not "Nothing on earth shall induce us to go to war," not "We hold ourselves altogether aloof from this question," not "Our interests are so vitally concerned, our commerce is so extensive, our relations so various, our treaties so numerous that we are determined, coûte qui coûte, to keep the peace, and we appeal to the country to give us credit for having maintained the country in a state of peace, prosperity, and wealth" —but "We reserve to ourselves, if further steps should be taken, a perfect right to alter our course," to sacrifice all these considerations upon which he laid so much stress, to enter upon that war which he so justly and so seriously deprecated, and altogether to depart from the principles which the Government have laid down, and upon which they have acted for the last two years. Why, my Lords, that is exactly what the noble Earl and the Government have been saying all along. First of all, Germany is to take into its serious consideration the dangers which must ensue, and must incur all the responsibility of Federal Execution in Holstein. Then Denmark is recommended, "As this
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is only Federal Execution in Holstein, we advise you to submit to it; but if the Germans go beyond Holstein, if they once cross the Eider, if they enter Schleswig, if the Diet is permitted to turn Federal Execution into an international question, then the case will be altogether altered; then Her Majesty's Government may see the necessity of departing from the course which they have hitherto laid down in certain contingencies, and afford you material assistance." Schleswig was occupied; but we were assured it was taken only as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of certain other engagements. "Oh, if it is only occupied as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of other engagements, that alters the question; but if you mean a permanent occupation of Schleswig, that is a thing the Government cannot for a moment tolerate." Schleswig was occupied. "Then, at all events, you cannot pass into Jutland; you must not think of Jutland." Well, into Jutland walked the troops—for strategic reasons, as the noble Earl has observed, which he does not presume to justify; but the entrance of troops into Jutland was not a contingency which, although it was seriously threatened before, induced Her Majesty's Government to depart from their pacific intentions. Now, I ask the noble Earl, what is the contingency which will? And I think that Parliament is hound to have some assurance on that point. "We will not go to war," says the noble Earl, "but we may see reasons to alter our course." I think the noble Earl went so far as to say that if Copenhagen should be blockaded and bombarded, then possibly—possibly Her Majesty's Government might think that the contingency had arisen which should induce them to depart from their prudent resolutions. But, short of the capture of Copenhagen, we want to know, and the country wants to know, how far the noble Earl will be—I was going to say—driven before he departs from the prudent resolutions—and I do not deny that they are prudent if they can be maintained with honour—which he has laid down. I hope I may be pardoned for having gone as far as I have in pointing out the questions to which I think it will be the duty of Her Majesty's Government hereafter to give a distinct answer, and upon which I hope that Parliament will insist upon having, not only a distinct answer from the Government, but a distinct decision upon the

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judgment of Parliament. For the present, however, I confess that I should be very sorry that this discussion should be prolonged. Perhaps, as I certainly have gone beyond my own intentions, I may have gone beyond what was desirable in the temptation of following the noble Earl for the purpose of pointing out, not that which we are to discuss now, but that which we shall have to discuss, and must discuss hereafter. For the present, I repeat, I earnestly hope that, neither with regard to the past, nor with regard to the more important future, will your Lordships be led, upon the partial statement which has been laid before you, to enter upon an impromptu discussion, still less to pledge yourselves individually or collectively to any line of conduct, either of condemnation of the Government for the past or of assent to or dissent from the course which they have propounded for the future.
EARL GRANVILLE: I think that the House ought to come to a clear understanding as to the course which it intends to pursue; whether it is to be that which was recommended by the noble Earl at the commencement and again at the end of his speech, and cheered by the House, of abstaining from any discussion upon this great subject until your Lordships have in your hands the papers which are necessary to explain it, or that which the noble Earl has adopted in the course of his observations, touching upon all those points which appear to him most vulnerable, and making statements and using arguments with reference to the Conference which appeared to me to be applicable to any Conference whatever which might be assembled for the purpose of establishing peace between a stronger and a weaker nation, the stronger nation being flushed with victory and the weaker one not assured of the support of the neutral Powers. That may go on. On both sides of the House declamatory arguments may be used without reference to facts, which may create popular prejudice, but cannot affect the reason of the country; and we may all imitate the example of the noble Earl who has put into the mouth of my noble Friend statements which neither in his speech today nor in the course of the negotiations has he ever made. To such alternatives as the noble Earl has put to us, asking us either to declare to Europe and the world that, whatever our honour and interests may require, we will pronounce ourselves determined never to go to war at all, or
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that we should—as has often been demanded by Members of the Opposition— pledge ourselves as to the future, our answer must be that we should not be justified, as representing Her Majesty's Government in this House, in exactly defining every possible contingency without knowing what course events may take in the future. I cannot help thinking that the feeling of the House is in favour of the course recommended at the beginning and end of the noble Earl's speech, and that your Lordships do not desire to discuss this question at present. All that I can say on behalf of Her Majesty's Government is, that if the House is of a different opinion we are ready at once to take the whole discussion, but we beg that it may not be of a piecemeal description.
LORD BROUGHAMwas understood to express his regret that the belligerent Powers had refused to submit the questions in dispute between them to arbitration, and especially to condemn the roundabout manner in which the German Powers had intimated their refusal.

CIVIL BILL COURTS (IRELAND) BILL.

  [No. 67.] SECOND READING.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE EARL OF LEITRIMsaid, that the Bill did not embody all the improvements which were desirable. The Bill proposed a very important alteration in law; but it was very imperfect.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, that although undoubtedly the Bill was very imperfect, still he thought it was a measure which deserved the support of the House. He would further express a hope that the Government would go still further in the path of law reform, and that they would not abandon the Irish Court of Chancery Bill, which had been introduced into the other House.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREwas understood to remark upon the power given to the sheriffs to appoint the bailiffs who were to execute the civil bill decrees.
  THE EARL OF BELMOREsaid, that he wished to make two or three observations before the Bill was read a second time. He quite agreed with all that had fallen from the noble Earl who spoke last; and from his own experience as a magistrate, he found that a great part of the crime to be dealt with in his part of Ireland consisted of assaults committed in resisting

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  the execution of civil bill decrees. It was, therefore, very important that the bailiffs who executed these decrees should be under proper control. By the 37th clause of this Bill it was provided, that the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench should have the power to make and alter rules with regard to appeal cases stated for their decision. Now, his (the Earl of Belmore's) attention had been called to the fact that appeals were made to the other Superior Courts of common law as well as to the Queen's Bench. He would, therefore, give notice of an Amendment in Committee to provide for those cases. By the 6th clause of the Bill the Chairman was to have power to fine the bailiffs for neglect or misconduct. These bailiffs were generally taken from a very low class, and not possessed of any property, so that the power to fine them would not be productive of much effect, and he thought that the Chairman should have some further control over them. These were minor points, and he would give due notice of Amendments to be proposed in Committee.
  After a few words, in reply, from The Lord CHANCELLOR,
  Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock till to-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.