Sitting of 8 July 1864

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Report—On Schools of Art * (No. 466).
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—Committee—R.P.
PUBLIC BILLS—Resolutions in Committee—Isle of Man Harbours Act Amendment [Deficiency of Dues], reported*.
Second Reading—Thames Embankment and Metropolis Improvement (Loans) * [Bill 191].
Considered as amended—Public Schools * [Bill 168] (Lords).

BRITISH MUSEUM.—QUESTION.
MR. HARVEY LEWISsaid, he would beg to ask the right hon. Member for the University of Cambridge, Whether an order has been issued (to take effect from the 1st of September next) prohibiting the attendants at the British Museum from leaving the Museum during the ordinary dinner hour, or at any time between the hours of nine o'clock in the morning and six o'clock in the evening; and, if so, why has such order been issued; and whether any and what provision has been made to enable the attendants to procure their dinner on the premises at a moderate charge?
MR. WALPOLEsaid, in reply, that the order to which the hon. Gentleman referred had been issued. In 1838 the rule was that the attendants should continue in the Museum from ten to seven in summer, and ten to four in winter, and during that time they had only half an hour to go out for luncheon or dinner. The Trustees consented to alter that arrangement by giving them an hour for their dinner. The regulations had since been altered. The

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time of attendance had been reduced, and I was made from ten to six in summer, ten to five in spring, and ten to four in winter. The absence, however, of the assistants at the dinner hour had occasioned great loss of time and great inconvenience to those who frequented the Museum, and accordingly the Trustees, with the consent of the Treasury, had issued the rule referred to, but at the same time had made provision for enabling the attendants to take a comfortable meal. He knew that the assistants had sent in an address thanking the Trustees for the arrangements that had been made, and he hoped everybody would be benefited by them.

THE NEW ZEALAND WAR.—QUESTION.
SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, Whether he has any objection to lay upon the table of the House a statement showing the number of Officers and Soldiers of the Regular Forces, as well ns of the Militia and Volunteers, who have been killed or wounded, up to the last Returns, in the New Zealand War?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONreplied that there would be no objection on his part to give a statement of the officers and men of the Regular Forces killed or wounded up to the last Returns in the Now Zealand war, and he had no doubt that the Colonial Office would be willing to give a similar statement with respect to the Militia and Volunteers.

CHINA—MAJOR GORDON'S RETIREMENT.—QUESTION.
MR. LIDDELLsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any official information has been received of Major Gordon's retirement from the command of the Anglo-Chinese disciplined force, in compliance with the terms of the Order in Council of March last, or whether any "secret orders," or reservations, or discretionary powers, were conveyed to Major Gordon or any other English officer in China along with such Order in Council; and, if so, whether there be any objection to state the nature of such secret orders or reservations, and under what circumstances such discretionary powers were to be exercised?
MR. LAYARDreplied that the Order in Council was dated the 1st of March, I and had not left this country until the 10th of March. There had not yet been time to hear from Sir Frederick Bruce on the subject. There were no secret orders. Instructions were given to Sir Frederick Bruce that Major Gordon should retire from the Chinese service; but, if he could withdraw him from that service, and yet retain him under his own orders for the defence of the thirty miles radius, he was directed to do so.

DENMARK AND GERMANY—SWEDES AND DANES.—QUESTION.
LORD ROBERT MONTAGUsaid, he rose to ask, Whether the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs can now inform the House whether the statement, which has appeared in The Times, that 400 Swedes have been taken by the Germans and received no quarter is true; and also whether the Swedes are taking part in the war with the Danes?
MR. LAYARDreplied, that he was happy to inform the House that he believed there was no foundation for the report that the Swedes had been killed in cold blood. The Foreign Office had telegraphed both to Copenhagen and Berlin on the subject, and it appeared that several Swedes, both men and officers, had been killed, but they were in the Danish service and were the Danish uniform. Several Swedes had also been taken, and Prince Frederick Charles had ordered them to be tried by court martial, but he hoped that that order would be rescinded by subsequent orders from Berlin.

VOTE OF CENSURE— THE DEBATE OF MONDAY EVENING— LANGUAGE IN DEBATE.

  EXPLANATIONS.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I beg to ask the indulgence of the House for a moment, while I make a personal explanation. Yesterday the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Gathorne Hardy) adverted to a word used by me which at the moment could not be exactly specified, but which, he proceeded to say, went beyond the due licence of debate. I was not precisely aware at the time what the word actually used by me was; but I have since endeavoured to refresh my memory by reference to the usual

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  reports of our debates. I find that I stated with reference to a particular letter relating to the Federal Execution that it had been "falsely" quoted by the right hon. Gentleman. My memory does not serve me as to the fact whether this word was used by me or not: as it is, however, ascribed to me, I am bound to suppose it was. I certainly consider that such words have a tendency to do that which is extremely objectionable—namely, to enlarge the due freedom of speech which we already abundantly possess, I think the expression was a very improper one, and I sincerely regret that I have used it.
  GENERAL PEEL: I wish to give the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary the opportunity of correcting a great inaccuracy into which he fell in his quotation from my speech, and which he gave on the authority of his own notes. I do not object to the first part of it—namely, "if such a thing occurred in common life the greatest coward in the world would rush forward to protect the weak against the strong, without even asking the cause of the quarrel." But the hon. Member then omitted four distinct sentences, and then quoted as follows:—"I see no reason why the Foreign Minister should not be guided in the affairs of his office by exactly the same principles." But what did say was this, "I was anxious to maintain the honour and peace of the country," and I added, "I see no reason why the Foreign Minister of this country should not be guided in the affairs of his office by exactly the same principles as those which would guide his conduct in private life."
  MR. LAYARD: It is quite true that I did omit four sentences, but I certainly did not wish to misrepresent the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. The fact, how ever, is that these four sentences compared the breed of men with the breed of horses, and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman said he did not see any difference between the two. ["Oh, oh!"] I did not leave out these sentences from any desire to misquote the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but I admit that they were left out. The House will now, perhaps, allow me to say a few words by way of personal explanation as to the date of the delivery of certain papers about which there was some difference of opinion yesterday. I have informed myself from the printers, the officers of the House, and the Foreign Office, and I find that I was strictly accurate. The papers containing the despatch asking
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  the French Government whether they were inclined to co-operate with us—and it is upon that despatch the whole question turns—it is to be found in Correspondence No. 4—were laid upon the table on the 1st of March, and were distributed on the 3rd of that month; and, therefore, my only inaccuracy was that I said it was on the 2nd. The other papers, which came down to the 25th of March, were laid upon the table before the House separated for the Easter recess. I laid them "in dummy" on the table, because I wished that Members should have them as soon as possible. They formed No. 5, and they were in the hands of Members on the 5th of April,

DENMARK AND GERMANY—VOTE OF CENSURE. RESOLUTION—(MR. DISRAELI).

  ADDRESS TO HER MAJESTY. ADJOURNED DEBATE. [FOURTH NIGHT.]
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [4th July],
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty to thank Her Majesty for directing the Correspondence on Denmark and Germany, and the Protocols of the Conference recently held in London, to be laid before Parliament:
  "To assure Her Majesty, that we have heard with deep concern, that the sittings of that Conference have been brought to a close without accomplishing the important purposes for which it was convened:
  "To express to Her Majesty our great regret, that, while the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has failed to maintain their avowed policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark, it has lowered the just influence of this Country in the counsels of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace."—(Mr. Disraeli,)
  And which Amendment was—
  To leave out the second paragraph of the proposed Question, in order to insert the words "To submit to Her Majesty the opinion of this House, that the independence of Denmark and the possessions of that Kingdom, on the terms proposed by the Representatives of the Neutral Powers in the recent Conference, ought to be guaranteed,"—(Mr. Newdegate,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question,"
  Debate resumed.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNE: Sir, the House will recollect that, at the commencement of the Session, when a question was put to the noble Lord the First Minister, as to when the voluminous papers on Denmark

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  and Germany would be laid upon the table, in complying with the request for their production, the noble Lord, with a prophetic instinct, and I think foreseeing the course which this discussion has assumed, said he would produce them without delay, and he wished the House joy of them. I think I may venture to say that the House has had joy of their production, and that the case, as laid before the House last night by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General, was indeed a very heavy case, and not made lighter by his method of managing it. The House has, indeed, been fairly drenched with despatches and saturated with extracts distilled from the blue-books—so much so that it has nearly lost sight of the question at issue. What are the two Questions before us? The Question before the House is, first, the Address to Her Majesty moved by the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire; and next, the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), to which I shall first very shortly advert. That Amendment, with some difficulty, found a seconder, and when it did it was evident that the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Whalley) seconded it under a total misapprehension; for it was plain from his speech that that hon. Member was under some misty idea that the Amendment moved by his hon. confrère and colleague the Member for North Warwickshire—
  MR. NEWDEGATE: My Amendment was seconded by the hon. Member for Bristol (Mr. F. H F. Berkeley).
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNE: I was under a mistake then, and I apologize to the hon. Member, for he evidently does not like the connection with the hon. Member for Peterborough. Be that as it may, the hon. Member for Bristol made no speech in support of the Amendment, and the hon. Member for Peterborough did make a speech in its defence, and was evidently under the idea that its object was not to preserve Denmark, but to protect this country from some aggression on the part of Cardinal Wiseman. Whoever the seconder, the Amendment will soon expire in its cradle, and will, probably, be followed to the grave by the two hon. Gentlemen, and perhaps by the third. Let it rest in peace.
  Before commencing this adjourned debate, I must remind the House of the denunciations made by the War party at an early period of the Session, and of the
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  loud appeal to arms which was heard from a large part of the House. Now what has become of that great section—the War party? Why, it would appear to me as if the millennium had arrived in this House. The noble Lord the Member for Huntingdon (Lord R. Montagu) is in accord with the hon. Member for Rochdale—"righteousness and peace have kissed each other!" Who can help looking with mingled feelings of admiration and surprise on the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) contemplating with brotherly love the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs? All seem to be of one accord. Everybody appears to be pleased with the present aspect of affairs, though it is all doubtful. Every one is for peace, except the hon. Member for North Warwickshire, whose "voice is still for war." But he is deserted by the most effective and most important member of his party. What has become of the noble Lord the Member for Stamford? He appears to me to have discovered on this occasion that "his party may be counted on one's fingers." I think, therefore, the House is now about to listen to the dictates of common sense and to preserve that peace which the country has determined to maintain. Now, Sir, were I inclined to indulge in a tone of triumph on this aspect of affairs—were I inclined to lay a heavy finger on the mystification and blunders which have occurred from 1852 to 1864, I think the opportunity presents itself; but I am not anxious to snatch a personal triumph when the humiliation of the country is in some degree implicated. No man in or out of the House is able to deny that the failure of the Ministry to some extent involves the honour of the country; and however we may rejoice that they have returned to the paths—if they really have—of peace, all must acknowledge, however grateful we may be for the result, that, as was said of the Peace of Amiens, no one can be proud of the means by which it has been attained. We have had a great many solutions attempted of this Danish-German question; and one remarkable solution was given by an hon. Friend of mine on the other side of the House—I mean the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. The hon. and learned Gentleman seems to have supposed that he had entirely settled this question by telling this House that 40,000,000 of Germans had gone mad. Like the excited Irishman at Donnybrook Fair, he flourished his shillelagh both

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  against friend and foe. But I must say that, when his speech is read in Germany and Schleswig-Holstein, it is not likely to give to Prussia a lucid interval, or to impress the people there with the notion that the eccentric and hon. Member is imbued with much learning on this subject, for he appears to be totally ignorant of the merits of the question, and to have taken no pains whatever to inform himself with regard to it. The hon. and learned Member went somewhat out of his way to attack the noble Earl, the Foreign Secretary. Now, whatever I may think of the noble Earl's conduct in these affairs, I do not think that it is a worthy thing to say of the noble Earl, if he had not been brought up as a statesman he would have been a schoolmaster. The hon. Gentleman might have recollected, when sneering at the profession of a schoolmaster, that there have been schoolmasters who might rank with statesmen—that the name of Arnold, for instance, might stand upon an equality with that of a Roebuck. The hon. Member might further have remembered that this country has received some lessons on civil and religious liberty from the noble Earl which it is not likely to forget. Neither can I admit that the noble Earl is alone to blame for the diplomatic blunders and failures that have occurred. It is very true that the fine Roman hand of the noble Lord may be detected in these despatches, which were to confound Europe at the same time that they put this House to sleep. In reading these despatches, one cannot help seeing that, though the "hands are the hands of Esau, the voice is the voice of Jacob." if any one is to be blamed for the complication and failure of these transactions it is the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown, who has for half a century directed the foreign policy of the country. In treating this question of Denmark and the Duchies, I think that not only the country, but the House, has been too much inclined to listen to sentiment rather than to reason. Sympathy without inquiry is a dangerous virtue for a nation to indulge in. It seems to have been taken for granted that everything the Germans did was wrong, and everything the Danes did was right; while it has been forgotten that for twelve years Denmark has systematically evaded her treaty obligations. Because she is a weak Power it seems to be con ceded in this House that Denmark was to be allowed to presume on that position to
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  violate her engagements. From the outset Denmark appears to have adopted one of the maxims of La Rochefoucauld: she "has promised according to her hopes and performed according to her fears!" The House will recollect that before Easter, so impressed was I with these transactions, and so far from shirking my duty—according to the assumption of the right hon. Member for Stroud—I on two several occasions put Questions and gave notice of Motions on this subject. And how were they met? On April 9, I predicted that the Conference must necessarily be a failure. I did so not pretending to any prophetic inspiration, but from the rule of common sense, which is able to guide us all in such matters. The noble Lord at the head of the Government, shaking his finger at me in a manner so peculiarly his own, said—
  "The hon. Gentleman pledges his political sagacity that the Conference will lead to no good result; I can only say, I trust this day next year he will not be able to remind us of what he is now predicting."
  It is four weeks since I made that prediction, and what has happened? [An hon. MEMBER: Two months.] I give the hon. Gentleman the benefit of that: say it is two mouths. At any rate, it is not a year—and what has become of the Conference? Again, I urged that the Conference should not have for its basis the Treaty of 1852; but the noble Lord said he determinately adhered to the Treaty of 1852. On that occasion I was met by the "previous Question" being moved. I lament that was done, because I think the House would have been put in a fairer position—we should have known better how parties stood—if we had gone into the discussion at that time. If the remarkable speech of the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn had been delivered then, nobody on whatever side of the House could have hesitated who should be his leader on this question. The right hon. Member for Stroud has fortified me by his opinion that a great mistake was committed; but I regret that he has been animated only by that esprit d' escalier which is so peculiarly his own, and that at the time he deserted me altogether, affording neither assistance nor advice. My right hon. Friend now, at the eleventh hour, not only attacks the opposite party for their conduct, but attacks the whole system and theory of Parliamentary Government. I dissent altogether from his proposition. It is not the business of the Opposition to furnish a policy for the

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  Ministry; and the right hon. Gentleman has laid down an entirely new doctrine in that respect. [Mr. HORSMAN: I said so!] The right hon. Gentleman has really said so many things and explained so many, that I may be excused if I have mistaken him. Neither have the Government any right to blame the right hon. Gentleman opposite for having moved his Resolution in its present form. What do the Government want? They object to be destroyed; but, whatever the weapons, or however forged, I fear it would be impossible to please them. The form of words which has been adopted is, at least, conclusive for its purpose. We were told that when the Conference assembled it would set everything to rights, confirm the Government in their place, and maintain peace in the North of Europe—two very important things—the first probably the more important. Well, the Conference met, and has separated. Of course every hon. Gentleman has read the Protocols, which really seem to me to resemble rather the inspirations of the noble Lord's newspaper, The Owl, than the records of such potent, grave, and reverend seignors. Then there is also a summary of the Conference, which is so loosely and inaccurately drawn up, that if I had not known to the contrary I should have suspected it to be the production of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. What has happened within the last day or two with regard to that paper? Why the German Plenipotentiaries have written two letters protesting against that summary of the Conference, and giving their own ideas of it. From first to last this Conference has been a most unfortunate and fatal failure. The language of the Protocols is really very extraordinary. I do not speak of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary as having written it. Take the first day, for instance. The members of the Conference all assembled, after a little delay, on the 25th of April. Protocol No. 1 tells us that the first thing they do is to elect the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary President. The noble Lord then begins with a solemn speech to them, which must remind hon. Members with dramatic tastes of the celebrated scene in the Critic, where the actors are sworn to inviolable secresy. He says:—"With the exception of the communications which each representative will make to his own Government, the most inviolable secresy will be preserved." We have seen how that rule was observed, and, of course,
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  it is not for me to suggest by whom it was broken. In regard to the drawing up of the very first Protocol, I, on behalf of the neutral Powers—although I am not commissioned to do so—must protest against the language used. Here is a sample—"After the exchange of ideas in which all the Plenipotentiaries took part"—but we are not told what time the operation occupied—"those of the neutral Powers guided by an unanimous feeling of humanity," &c. The inference in regard to the other Plenipotentiaries is obvious. That is not, I say, a proper way of putting the matter. We ought to speak of these Powers in respectful language, and the tone of mingled blarney and bluster is most objectionable. At this first meeting the Plenipotentiaries agreed to refer the proposal for a suspension of hostilities to their respective Courts. That was on the 25th of April; and they did not reassemble till the 4th of May, when there was again a reference to their respective Courts. On the 9th of May the suspension was finally agreed upon. The only thing which one can learn from these Protocols is the definition of the distinction between a "suspension of hostilities" and an "armistice," which is given by M. Quaade at page 32. On the 12th of May the Treaty of 1852 for the first time came before the Conference, and was declined as a basis by the Austrian and Prussian representatives. On that occasion there was a very disorderly debate, nearly as much so as ours last night, though there were no "calumnious" reflections. They adjourned to the 17th of May, and again to the 28th of May, when an extraordinary proposal was made by Lord Russell. I think that some hon. Members in this House, and particularly the hon. Member for North Warwickshire, ought to be exposed for the part they have taken in these transactions, and I intend to expose them. Let us first see what took place on the 12th of May. On the 28th of May Lord Russell comes down with a proposition. The House will naturally suppose after all that had been said, that it was to stand by the Treaty of 1852 and to preserve the integrity of Denmark. ["Hear, hear!"] The hon. Member who cheers, and who has evidently not read his book, supposes so; but let me tell the hon. Gentleman what the noble Lord did propose—and it must also be borne in mind that this was a British Minister who had been loud for the Treaty of 1852 and still louder for the integrity and independence

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  of Denmark. The noble Lord comes down to the Conference and he says—
  "In order to prevent a future contest, and to satisfy Germany, it would be necessary, in our opinion"—[that is, in the opinion of the neutral Powers]—"entirely to separate Holstein, Lauenburg, and the southern part of Schleswig from the Danish Monarchy."—p. 39.
  That is the proposition of the English Minister, and he adds that,
  "In order to justify so vast a sacrifice on the part of Denmark, and to maintain the independence of the Danish Monarchy, it is desirable in our opinion that the line of the frontier should not be drawn more to the north than the mouth of the Schlei and the Dannewerke."—p. 39.
  The noble Lord made that proposition, and the House has not had its attention drawn as yet, I think, to the great escape it and the country have had from the next proposition of the noble Lord. What was the next proposition? The noble Lord proposed—
  "If the King of Denmark consents to the sacrifices of territory which are required of him in the name of peace, it would be just that the independence of his kingdom should be guaranteed by the great European Powers."—p. 40.
  So that, if Denmark had consented, we should have been placed in the position of guaranteeing its independence amid a hostile population, and if war had broken out that guarantee must have been redeemed The hon. Member for North Warwickshire has stolen his Amendment verbatim from Lord Russell. The proposal contained in the Amendment is the very proposal made by Lord Russell in the Conference, and the hon. Member comes down now, supported by his hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, and his other hon. Friend who is not his Friend, the Member for Peterborough, and he makes no allusion whatever to what the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs did when he proposed this guarantee from which we have been saved by the obstinacy—thank God!—of Denmark. And now, what has been the result of the twelve meetings of the Conference, for the meetings were twelve in number? There was only one thing on which they were unanimous; but when they did agree their "unanimity was wonderful." They agreed to a vote of thanks to Lord Russell, and they said they left England with the most pleasant recollections. And that, Sir, was the only thing this Conference—assembled from all parts of Europe—was unanimous in agreeing to. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bucks says there was no result from the Conference; but there has
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  been a most important result, and I will point it out to the House. The Conference was assembled to preserve the integrity of Denmark; it separated, having decreed its dismemberment! The Conference was assembled to maintain the Treaty of 1852 intact; it declared its abrogation! The noble Lord the President of the Conference and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was the I person who moved for the dismemberment of Denmark, and he was the President who assented to the destruction of the treaty, I No doubt he did so with great coyness and; with some reluctance. Indeed, I am reminded, by his conduct, very much of; Donna Julia, of whom it is said, as the House will recollect—
  "A little still she strove and much repented,
  And swearing 'I will ne'er consent'—consented."
  We have heard various accounts of this; Treaty of 1852, and I am bound to add that those we have received from the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs are more than I usually inaccurate. All of them have been excessively unsatisfactory and scanty in the materials they afford. The noble Lord the Prime Minister can no longer say that he is tongue-tied, and before I sit down I wish to put to him certain questions, which I have been put to him before, but which he has taken ten years to answer. Now, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Lord Advocate, who generally speaks so well in this House, but who on a late occasion, whether from illness or owing to the weight of the case, was not particularly successful in his defence of the Government, was at last reduced to such straits that he held up his hands and asked, "Who made the Treaty] of 1852?" I will endeavour to give a reply to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and also to explain some of the circumstances attending the making of it. Indeed, that is absolutely necessary, because it will not do to come down to the present day, but we must go a little back for these transactions, and I shall have something to say by and by to the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in reference to the version which he has given of them. We are asked, Who made the Treaty? Its origin, though at first mysterious, I believe is pretty well known now. It was compiled at St. Petersburg, printed at Warsaw, bound in Russia leather, and sent to the noble Lord the present First Minister of the Crown, who was then Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Indeed if you turn to our Parliamentary history I am inclined

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  to believe that we shall seldom find a time when the noble Lord was not Secretary for something. What were the principles of the treaty? Why, the treaty bore in its origin, and on its face, the aspect whence it was derived—namely, the Russian aspect. It undertook to set aside the hereditary claims of Princes and the rights of Nations. It undertook to hand over a large population, like so many serfs, to a dynasty which was hateful to them. It infringed all the rules which are supposed to make treaties valid. Here is the definition which Vattel gives of a treaty, "A treaty made for an unjust cause is absolutely void. No one can engage himself to do things which are contrary to natural law." Sir, this treaty was altogether contrary to natural law. It undertook to manufacture an order of succession which was neither valid nor hereditary. It undertook to deliver the people to the rule of a monarch who had no legal right to reign over them. If I wanted a condemnation of it, I should go to a Member of the Government, and a very influential Member too, who says—
  "In these times it is necessary that a treaty should not only have the signatures of envoys and the ratifications of Sovereigns, but that in its working it should be made to accord with the sentiments and wishes of the people to be governed under it."
  The Member who made use of these words was the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking in another place in June last. It is a pity that the noble Earl had not considered the subject in that light when he undertook to adhere so positively and so fallaciously to the Treaty of 1852. How were the negotiations for the Treaty of 1852 carried on? The treaty itself was supposed to be the crowning glory of the noble Lord, the First Minister of the Crown, although an attempt is now made to shuffle off the responsibility. The noble Lord says, "It is very true that I made the treaty, but it was signed by a noble Lord in another place." But all the important negotiations from first to last were carried out by the noble Lord, and it is hardly fair to the Earl of Malmesbury, who we now hear has written such volumes of excellent despatches, to say that he is in any way responsible for the treaty. He signed the treaty, as any hon. Member would have signed it, in perfect confidence in the wisdom of the noble Lord, the then Foreign Secretary, who at that time was more
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  trusted in foreign affairs than he is at this moment. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs told us last night that the House must take into consideration the policy of 1848, and he would have the House to believe that he gave a correct version of that policy. Now, what was the policy of 1848? The hon. Member says that the policy of 1848 was the natural parent of the results of 1864. But was that so? Although it is not in our blue-books, I am in possession of a despatch from a foreign blue-book, which was written by the noble Lord the Prime Minister when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the 23rd of June, 1848, in reference to the Schleswig-Holstein dispute. This is the proposition which the noble Lord made for the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question. It differs so much from the present policy that I beg the attention of the House while I read the passage. The noble Lord said
  "The future condition of the Duchy of Schleswig shall be settled upon one or the other of the two following plans, according to the choice of the King-Duke."
  The House will remark that the people were not mentioned at all. The note goes on to say—
  "First, the Duchy of Schleswig might be divided into two parts with reference to the German or Danish nationality of its inhabitants, the southern and German part being to be called the Southern Duchy, the northern or Danish part being to be called the Northern Duchy. The King would then become a member of the Germanic Confederation in his capacity of Duke of Southern Schleswig, as well as in his capacity of Duke of Holstein, and Southern Schleswig would, like Holstein, form part of the territory of the German Confederation, and the sovereignty of southern Schleswig would follow the same line of succession as the sovereignty of Holstein. On the other hand, Northern Schleswig would be attached by its laws of succession to the Crown of Denmark, and the sovereignty of that Duchy would be inseparably united with the Danish Crown. Secondly, if this arrangement should not be thought expedient, the Duchy of Schleswig might remain entire and undivided, such as it now is; it might continue to be administered as it has been by an Administration established for Schleswig and Holstein jointly; and there should also be provincial States in which the representatives of the two Duchies would be assembled together in their proper respective proportions. In this case the King of Denmark would remain as he now is, a member of the Germanic Confederation in his I capacity of Duke of Holstein, but he would not become member of the Confederation in his capacity of Duke of Schleswig. No change would in this case be made in the law of succession in Schleswig."
  So the noble Lord was fully aware in 1848 of this matter of the order of the succes-

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  sion, and of how nicely that question ought to be touched. The question of the succession was never mooted by the noble Lord till the 4th of July, 1850; and some very extraordinary events occurred then. The idea of changing the succession proceeded from the noble Lord. In a despatch to Sir Henry Wynn on the 9th of February, 1850, the noble Lord first proposed the idea of altering the succession to the Danish Crown, and it was his suggestion that the son of the Duke of Oldenburg should succeed to that Crown, and be desired Sir Henry Wynn to sound the Ministry at Copenhagen as to bow far that would be agreeable to them. Sir Henry Wynn wrote back what was rather a lecture to the noble Lord, for be said that it was between His Majesty and his subjects that the question of the succession must ultimately be arranged. Nothing whatever had been said at that time about the feelings of the people. Well, in 1851, some interest was excited in this country, and a Question was put to the noble Lord, which I trust he will answer to-night, whether there bad been any negotiation with respect to the succession to the Crown of Denmark, or the succession to the Duchies? What was the answer of the noble Lord. It was this—
  "A good deal has passed in regard to these points; but Her Majesty's Government had studiously and systematically held themselves aloof from taking any share in these negotiations. Her Majesty's Government had confined themselves strictly to the mediation which they undertook, which was a mediation for the purpose of restoring peace between Denmark and the Germanic Confederation."—[3 Hansard, cxv. 221.]
  I want to know how the noble Lord accounts for that answer, he having written the despatch to which I have referred in 1850, suggesting an alteration in the succession, and then told the House that the Government had not interfered in any manner. That is an important point, and, as the noble Lord is now no longer tongue-tied, I think he is bound to explain it to the House and the country. We have heard something of the Protocol of London. That Protocol was signed on July 4, 1850. I am not now speaking of the Protocol of Warsaw. The Protocol I of London of 1850 was represented by the Under Secretary in the history he gave us that night as having been subscribed by Austria and Prussia as mandatories of the Germanic Confederation. I do not want to be afterwards contradicted. Did the hon. Gentleman not say that? The hon. Gentleman nods his head. Well, I
  1210
  say he has totally misinformed the House. Neither Austria nor Prussia did sign that Protocol as mandatories. Austria signed it after some time. Prussia never signed it at all. [Mr. LAYARD expressed dissent.] I maintain what I say. I really do not know how to meet the hon. Gentleman. Will he leave office if he is wrong? I am speaking of the Protocol of July 4, 1850, quoted by the hon. Gentleman, and I pin him to that. I deny that either Austria or Prussia signed the Protocol as mandatories of the Germanic Confederation; and I say that Prussia never signed it at all. The matter is so important that I must read the protest of Prussia on that occasion. Here is the protest which the Chevalier von Bunsen, who then represented Prussia at the Court of England, made to the noble Lord as our Foreign Secretary on July 3, 1850, the day before the Protocol was signed—
  "I deeply regret to be obliged to declare to you, without a moment's delay, that I am not at liberty to join in the Protocol. On the contrary, my instructions prescribe to me positively not to join in any Protocol of this sort, previously agreed upon by the three non-Germanic Powers of Europe, in consequence of negotiations carried on, and commented upon even publicly between those Powers without either Prussia or Austria or any German Government and authority having been consulted or even as much as asked their opinion. Can it be overlooked that this Protocol has been kept studiously, and in spite of reiterated requests as far as Prussia is concerned, a secret to the German Powers? … Germany is excluded from the negotiations which have led to the agreement both here and at Paris, and France is introduced in her place; France who has no legitimate right or claim, or pretext even, to interfere in a question relating to the Baltic and the internal affairs of Germany. Is the world to see, for the first time, a triple coalition against Germany, headed by England? A system of interfering in the affairs of Germany by her great eastern and western neighbour, under the sanction, yea, with the initiative of Great Britain? Are the two German Powers to be slighted by England, whose traditional Allies they have been, and with whom she has fought for the independence of Europe? … Let me then indulge the hope that you will not press any longer a Protocol, nor seem to impose, at the head of an European coalition, upon Germany an arrangement which must by her always be considered as res acta inter alios, as one which disposes of her rights, as if she was to be 'Polonized,' to use an expression coined by you."—Correspondence, 1850–53, p. 13.
  That is the protest of Prussia against this Protocol; and yet the hon. Gentleman comes down to the House and tells you that that Power signed that document. Let us glance at Rome facts connected with the year 1850, because they will materially enlighten us on the reasons for signing the

  1211
  Treaty of 1852. Important events took place in 1850. In January, a blockade, commanded by Admiral Parker, was undertaken by this country against Greece in the affair of Don Pacifico. In the May following there was a protest from all the great Powers, and the French Ambassador was recalled on that account. There was an important division in this House on June 17, 1850, in which the Government was beaten. There was also a division in this House, when the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield acted more the part of a retriever than a watchdog. It was rumoured and never contradicted, that on that occasion the Russian Minister demanded his letters of recall. That brings me down to June; and there was a great fear of a general European war. The noble Lord was in a great difficulty. What was he to do? He signed the Protocol of July 4, 1850, which, from first to last, was a Russian concoction, and the Russian Minister was satisfied and remained. Now, I come to the Protocol of Warsaw, which bears the date of June, 1851, What was that Protocol? A foreshadowing of the Treaty of 1852. It engaged between Russia and Denmark—not that the Duke of Oldenburg should be nominated, for the Duke of Oldenburg was put on one side because he from the first maintained the lights of Schleswig and Holstein, and would not do for the purpose—but it engaged that the Duke of Glucksburg, the present King Christian IX., who was nominated by Russia, should succeed to the Danish Crown. But Russia by that document for the first time reserved her own claims to the Gottorp portion of the Duchies. Well, that was followed by the Treaty of London of the 8th of May, 1852. It has always been a matter of curiosity to me how they contrived to get the signature of the Prussian Minister to that treaty. The Prussian Minister hung back; but at that time Prussia had a great desire to maintain her claim to Neufchatel, and a week after the Treaty of London was signed, Prussia contrived to have her rights to Neufchatel acknowledged by treaty by the Powers. What happened? The treaty respecting Neufchatel was of no use. In 1856, an unsuccessful revolution of the Royalists broke out there—it was rapidly put down; and since then we have heard nothing of the Treaty of Neufchatel. Yet that treaty acknowledgment of her claims was, I believe, the reason which induced Prussia to sign the London Treaty of 1852.
  1212
  I have no doubt the Under Secretary when he next speaks will confirm me on this point. But what is the position of the King we have made by that treaty? Christian IX. undoubtedly is King of Denmark Proper, because he is so in virtue of the Vote of the Assembly of the Estates of Denmark. But he is no more entitled to be Duke of Schleswig-Holstein than the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary is. The Treaty of 1852 can give him no valid right. The Estates of that country never were consulted. Christian IX. may well say—
  "Upon my head they plac'd a fruitless crown,
  And put a barren sceptre in my gripe,
  Thence to be wrenched by an unlineal hand—
  No son of mine succeeding."
  That was the effect of the Treaty of 1852. The noble Lord has, indeed, lately assured us, that when the Danish capital is bombarded and the King taken captive, he will call Parliament together for the purpose of re-considering the situation. What was the first act of Christian IX.? His first act was to decree the incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark, contrary to all his solemn stipulations and agreements. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary turns round and gravely gives the House a lecture on the danger of nationalities as lying at the root of this question. But who so loud two or three years ago as the hon. Gentleman on that very question? Who so loud in the case of the Italians rebelling from Austrian domination in Lombardy? Where is the difference? Are not the same principles to hold good on the banks of the Eider as on the plains of Lombardy. Nationalities lie at the root of this question. I have yet to learn that the House has not the same sympathies with the people struggling in the North as in the South of Europe. It comes to this—after making an excuse, he says the King of Denmark could not help signing the Constitution. But what did he say for the Duke of Augustenburg? He said he accepted compensation as a set-off for his claims on the Duchies. Why, if he had not accepted compensation he would have got nothing. But this compensation was not given for his title—it was a most inadequate return for his estate. The thing was done at the beck of Frederick VII., and if he had not taken that he would have got no money at all, he would have been a beggar. The hon. Under Secretary went on to say that no protest was entered. Why, Sir, there was a protest in March, 1853, against the

  1213
  whole transaction by the brother of the Duke of Augustenburg, and the language of that protest is so just that I will read the concluding paragraph. He protested against the whole treaty. He reserved his rights, and said if he was ever inclined to give them up it should not be for the forwarding of Russian intrigue and Russian claims. He protested at that time; but what happened lately at the Conference? Do not tell me you can get rid of his claims. So sacred and so just are those claims that even now Prussia and Austria have recognized them, and the whole people of Germany are, I believe, unanimous in favour of them. But what happened, I ask, in the Conference? In page 59 of the Protocols of the Conference there is an account of a most amusing scene. At the sitting of June 2, Baron Brunnow, the representative of Russia, made the following communication:—
  "The Ambassador of Russia announces that the Emperor, wishing to facilitate, as far as depends on him, the arrangements to be concluded between Denmark and Germany, in view of the re-establishment of peace, has ceded to the Grand Duke of Oldenburg the eventual right which Section 3 of the Protocol of Warsaw of June 5, 1851, reserved to His Majesty as head of the elder branch of Holstein Gottorp."
  Upon which the other representatives all got up and complimented him on the excellent spirit he had shown, and the amicable intentions of Russia; and it was, I believe, upon this occasion that they shook hands all round. But what are the real facts of the case? Russia, as far back as 1773, had given up all right and title and claim on the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to the Counts of Oldenburg, in exchange for Delmanhorst and Oldenburg: in 1864 she made a merit of renouncing a title which she did not possess. It was not till the Protocol of Warsaw that Russia slipped in her claims. What was the object of Russia? To exclude the Augustenburg line; and for this reason—that female succession not being legal I in the Duchies, by the exclusion of the House of Augustenburg the succession was brought nearer to Russia. Russia, in fact, had thus succeeded in putting aside seventeen claimants between herself and the Duchies. There are now but two claimants to the Duchies before Russia; and what would then become of the Baltic? It would become a Russian lake. That is a short, though somewhat tedious history of these transactions.
  But we are told that Germany has gone
  1214
  mad. I undertake to say, that never at any period of her history has Germany with her 40,000,000 been so united and of one mind as on this question; and if any people are to be reputed to have gone mad it is the people of England and the House of Commons, if they can be persuaded to go into a war on the question of Schleswig-Holstein, in order to thrust on an unwilling people an unwelcome dynasty. What interest have the taxpayers of this country in the question, whether a Prince of the House of Augustenburg or Oldenburg sits on the throne of the Duchies? The taxpayers of England will say of both these Kings and Princes, "A plague on both your Houses." The Lord Advocate took credit to the Government for preserving the peace of Europe. How far is that correct? It is impossible to deny that the Government were in a league to go to war—to involve this country in a great European war—to put an unwelcome Sovereign on the throne of Schleswig-Holstein; there is no doubt of the fact. Who prevented it? That much maligned and ambitious potentate the Emperor of the French. Had it not been for the Emperor of the French, and had the designs of Her Majesty's Government been followed up, we should at present have been engaged in an awful war with Germany. But the Emperor of the French hesitated. And now I come to the question which demands an answer from the noble Lord at the head of the Government. We have heard of certain words spoken by the noble Earl (Earl Russell) in another place as to the designs of the Emperor of the French. I did not hear them, but I am not satisfied with the explanation given of them by the Under Secretary. The words are very remarkable, and the House will not, I am sure, object to hear them. The noble Lord in another place said, on June 28, 1864—I find this in The Times newspaper, which, we all know, whatever Ministers may be, is never in the wrong—
  "The French Government have repeated to us only within the last twenty-four hours, that the Emperor does not consider it essential to the interests of France to support the line of the Schlei; he declares he does not think France would go to war for such an object. I think if that war were successful, France would expect some compensation on account of her participation, which could not be granted without causing general jealousy and disturbing the balance of power."
  Now, I want to know what communications have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government

  1215
  as to the compensation which France has I asked? That is a very material question—we have only been able to get glimpses and snatches of this question; but, whatever may be said by the hon. Gentleman opposite, the progenitor in office of the Under Secretary—(I admit they are very unlike)—I must think that there have been some important secret negotiations going on when the noble Lord so pointedly alludes to the compensation which France was likely to demand. Is not this a warning to us how careful we should be not to meddle in these European matters? Whatever the compensation would be, we are told it would upset the figment called the balance of Power, and possibly saddle us with a considerable addition to our National Debt.
  Sir, I will not go into the question how far the Danish people and Ministry have been misled by the noble Lord and Her Majesty's Government; but the House will agree that the Danes were misled by the articles in the Ministerial press, and especially in a paper which was known at one time to be inspired by the noble Lord, because I have seen the editor frequently leaving his house. I beg to say it is not The Times. ["Name!"] No; I will tell the hon. Member in private. But did not that paper systematically and continuously sound the war trumpet? Were not the regiments named, was not the commander-in-chief pointed at, and can we be very much surprised if the Danes were misled?—because, Sir, I believe they place much greater credence on the English press than on the English Cabinet. But be that as it may, I think I could prove that they relied on foreign aid. Would any Minister in his senses have neglected to adopt some of the new inventions, and have left the defences of Denmark in such a disgraceful state, that in some respects they are only to be equalled by our own country, where we have at this moment a paucity of steel shot and no good guns for the navy? Let this country take warning from that state of Denmark. Denmark would have been in a very different position if she had been done justice to by her Minister. M. Hall boasted, menaced, and threatened after the true Palmerstonian style; but he took no pains to arm his brave and intelligent countrymen. I must remind the noble Lord that his Ministerial career has been singularly hostile to Denmark. Sir, the Danes must look upon him with feelings of dislike and suspicion. The noble Lord made
  1216
  his maiden speech in this House on the 3rd of February, 1808, in defence of the seizure of the Danish fleet. I have the speech behind me. He took office in the following year, and he has continued in office until 1864. He presided at the disruption of Denmark in 1808, and in 1864 he presides over her dismemberment. There must be "something rotten in the state of Denmark." What will be the fate of Denmark? Hon. Members will probably see that now the Danes have lost that most unpleasant thing, the sympathy and assistance of England, they will make peace direct with Prussia; and I shall not be surprised if we have to-night a declaration from the noble Lord that the Danes will probably join the German Confederation as a means of escape, and from the chances of avoiding a Scandinavian kingdom.
  I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden) in his speech laid down the true policy of England. It was not, as was misrepresented by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that my hon. Friend wished to maintain peace at any price, nor has he ever done so. In fact, I have to find fault with my hon. Friend. I think he was a little too warlike when he pointed to Venice in the manner he did. I thought that my hon. Friend, in his more mature views, was manifesting a more warlike spirit, and qualifying for the Cabinet of the noble Lord the First Minister. The time has gone by for presenting this attitude to Europe. The time has gone by for enacting in this way the bluster of Bobadil without the chivalry of Quixote. What has been the fruit of all our intervention in European affairs? Let Poland and Denmark give the reply. What has been its effect? We are isolated in Europe; we are meddling in Asia; we are distrusted by both sides in America; and in Africa even the King of Ashantee resists with effect our ill-planned and ill-conducted enterprises. And this is the history of our spirited foreign policy. I was surprised, in the face of such a state of things, to hear the eulogium pronounced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the success of our foreign policy. The right hon. Gentleman is a great master of character, and has depicted for the first time the noble Lord as the great Minister of peace. But here is a different account by another hand, and I claim the attention of the House, because it is not only amusing but excessively instructive. This is speaking of the policy of the noble Lord—

  1217
  "Indeed it seems as if there lay upon the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) an absolute necessity for quarrelling; if he can he will quarrel with an absolute monarchy: if he cannot find an absolute monarchy for that purpose, he will quarrel with one which is limited; if he cannot find that, sooner than not quarrel at all he will quarrel with a republic."
  I will shorten the quotation; there is a great deal more, but this is very nice—
  "What ought a Foreign Secretary to be? Is he to be like some gallant knight, challenging all comers, having no other duty than to lay as many as possible of his adversaries sprawling in the dust? If such is the idea of a good Foreign Secretary, I for one would vote the noble Lord this appointment for life."
  Who does the House imagine drew this able picture? The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But the right hon. Gentleman has made up his quarrel with the First Minister, and they I certainly now resemble the late noted Siamese Twins. Some question has occurred in the debate as to how far the honour and influence of this country has been lowered. It could not be denied that this country did not occupy quite the position it ought to hold among nations. The want of success alone, independent of the way in which we have managed to bungle and botch, roust of itself reduce the just influence of this country. In my mind it would be very easy to redress that, and to replace this country in a proper position. Members ask, "What is your policy? What would you do?" I will tell you. The noble Lord and the Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench are men of great capacity, but a little past their time, and they bungle; but if they wish to put the country in a proper position with Foreign Powers, and restore the "just influence" of England, it might be easily done by their imitating that custom which is obligatory on unsuccessful officials in Japan. If, Sir, they would enact, in a modified form, that "happy despatch" which we have learnt from the Asiatics, I am sure this country would at once regain its proper position. It would be a subject of regret among themselves and their families for a short time, but it would have the effect of setting matters right. That, Sir, is my policy; but I am afraid they will not take that advice. There sits the noble Lord—sedet, œternumque sedebit—I was about to add, but it would not be true—infelix! But there is another question. What is the position of what is jokingly called the Liberal party? That is the nom de guerre—there is no such thing.
  1218
  But that is between ourselves. We all know that here. There are people out of the House who imagine when we go to the hustings with all our fine professions that we mean it, and that we shall stand by our colours in this House. Well, as an election is near, what is the position of the Liberal party? The old Liberal cries are rather the worse for wear. They used to be something like "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform." Now, as to one of these questions, Peace, it is delightful to see how we are all agreed; even the noble Lord the Member for Stamford (Lord R. Cecil) is for peace. We are all for peace; and occasionally we all nibble at retrenchment! ["No, no!"] Oh, yes; but only occasionally. But on both sides of the House no one wants Reform. Well, Sir, that is the end of "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform." But what is the position of the Liberal party? The hon. Member for Sheffield, who has no preferences, but only dislikes one more than another—and, curiously enough, he dislikes the people among whom he sits more than anybody else—has instituted a comparison between the two benches. I have always been of opinion that there are as good fish in the sea as ever were caught, and if we lost the present Ministry, I do not know why we should regard it with inconsolable regret, for it might be possible to replace them. Now, let us see how this Ministry is constituted. Well, I will take first the noble Lord the First Minister—and I wish to speak of him with every respect, because I believe that a more active or a more able man has seldom existed in this country. I may say that
  "Panting Time toils after him in vain,"
  He is certainly facile princeps, the liveliest, if not the youngest on the Treasury Bench. The noble Lord deserves great credit for his admirable management through so long a time of the affairs of this House. He has acted with all sorts of men, and agreed with all sorts of opinions. He has contrived a most extraordinary feat. He has contrived to conciliate both the Low Church party and the High Tories. The Record acknowledges his inspiration, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire bows to his influence. These are great feats. But what is his policy? Sir, his domestic policy is paternal but stationary; his foreign policy up to this day has been pugnacious but progressive. But now, Sir, he is about to achieve the most wonderful feat of his

  1219
  life—he is about to go to the country as the apostle and minister of peace, and will be supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham. Now, that is the most extraordinary feat of all. I have not been unfair to the noble Lord; but let us go into his Cabinet. His Cabinet is a museum of curiosities. There, Sir, are to be found some birds of rare and noble plumage, both alive and stuffed. But, unfortunately, there is a difficulty in keeping up the breed—for these Whig birds have been very barren, and they were obliged lately to take a cross with the famous Peelite strain. I do them the justice to Bay, however, that there is a very great and able Minister among them in the shape of a Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it is to his measures alone that they owe the little popularity and the little support which they get from this Liberal party. Certainly it cannot be said, either by their enemies or friends, that they have been prolific of measures since they have taken office. Even my right hon. Friend (Mr. M. Gibson), who is not connected with them by family, and somehow got into the Cabinet—but, like the fly in amber, "one wonders how the Devil he got there"—has not been fertile. I must say that his hon. Friends the Members for Rochdale and Birmingham are, I think, disappointed in "this young man from the country." When he married into the family we expected some Liberal measures; but the right hon. Gentleman has become indolent, if not quarrelsome, under the guidance of the noble Lord. Well, Sir, what is to be done? We know by the traditions of the great Whig party that they will cling to the vessel, if not like shipwrecked sailors, like those testaceous marine animals which somehow adhere to the bottom, thereby clogging the engines and impeding all progress. Sir, should a vote of this House displace that Administration, what are the Liberal party to do? Well, Sir, if I might advise the Liberal party, I should say that they may feel perfectly happy as to the issue of this great duel which is being fought. They are somewhat in the situation of Iago in the play, and may say like him, "Whether Cassio kills Roderigo or Roderigo kills Cassio, or each kills the other," they must gain. No, Sir, even should this Parliament decide on terminating its own and their existence, they will find some consolation in the knowledge that the funeral oration will be pronounced by the hon. Member for North Warwick-
  1220
  shire, and that some friendly hand will inscribe on their mausoleum—"Rest, and be thankful!"
  MR. WHITESIDE: After the remarkable speech of the hon. and gallant Gentleman it may not, perhaps, be inappropriate to recall the attention of the House to the precise question before it. The words of the Resolution express regret "that the sittings of the Conference have been brought to a close without accomplishing the important purposes for which it was convened;" and "that, while the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has failed to maintain their avowed policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark, it has lowered the just influence of this country in the counsels of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace." Now, the main question is, whether as matter of fact that Resolution is true, and it lies within a very narrow compass—within a period of about eleven months. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who has last spoken entered upon a minute dissection of the Treaty of 1852, and inquired into matters antecedent to that treaty. He truly stated that that treaty was the work of the noble Viscount. The noble Viscount himself had informed the House that he had conducted a correspondence with the Powers of Europe touching the settlement of Denmark, which reached 6,000 folios, and that this treaty had been the result. When Lord Malmesbury came into office he was called upon to sign it; but he declined until he ascertained that the faith of England was pledged; and the interval of eight or nine months which he spent in office before he signed was employed in the endeavour, in conjunction with Count Bismark, the Prussian Minister, who acted on behalf of the Duke of Augustenburg, to see that the claims of the Duke upon Denmark were satisfactorily adjusted. He did not sign the treaty until it was ascertained that the Duke had renounced his claims, such as they were, to the Duchies. That is the true history of Lord Malmesbury's connection with the treaty. It is true that once afterwards he was appealed to by the Germans in respect of the Duchy of Schleswig, and I believe he answered that the Diet had rights with reference to Holstein, but as for Schleswig that Duchy was to be considered as disposed of by the signataries to the treaty, and thus by their united act rendered the subject of an European adjustment to be modified by the parties who

  1221
  had signed the treaty. At the time of the death of the late King of Denmark it was incumbent on the English Ministry to decide upon a policy, and to pursue it with consistency and moderation. The noble Viscount was then in office; he was the author of the treaty, and in his hands were the issues of peace or war. But Her Majesty's Government, instead of pursuing a policy of wisdom and moderation, had recourse to menaces and threats, unaccompanied by corresponding action. From this inconsistent, capricious, and therefore mischievous policy, has sprung the present condition of affairs. Let us see whether this position cannot be proved. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs read a vast number of documents to the House, but there is one paper which I did not hear him read, and which proves the whole case on which the House must give its decision, because the vote is not a vote of confidence or no confidence, but every hon. Gentleman is called on to vote whether the Address I moved by the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire is true or not. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs said that no intention to make war had existed in the Foreign Office, and I now ask attention to what is my contribution to the quotations already furnished to the House, I presume it may have originated in consequence of the Prussian Minister having possibly informed the Russian Minister at a casual meeting that he had been conversing with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that the noble Earl had in effect threatened Prussia with war. I could suppose that, under these circumstances, the Russian Minister having reminded his colleague of the successful way in which Prince Gortschakoff had disposed of Earl Russell, suggested that the Prussian Minister should call on the noble Earl and ask for an explanation. In the month of January I find Earl Russell giving a description of what passed between him and the Prussian Minister, which proves to my entire satisfaction that in a number of conversations between the Prussian and perhaps other Foreign Ministers and Earl Russell, threats and menaces, not vague but positive, must have been used by the latter noble Lord. On the 14th January, 1864, Earl Russell writes to Lord Bloomfield that he had had a conversation with Count Bernstorff on the subject of the proposition to occupy Schleswig, and adds—
  "That the Count desired to have an explana-
  1222
  tion of some observations made by me on a former occasion, which he said he had not fully understood.
  "I had spoken on a former occasion in the sense that Denmark would resist such an occupation, and might be aided by Great Britain. He wished to have an explanation of what I had then said.
  "It is to be observed that in speaking to Count Bernstorff on the occasion alluded to, I had expressly declared that I could not say what the decision of the Government might be, as the Cabinet had not yet deliberated, and consequently not submitted any opinion to the Queen; but that judging from the general current of feeling in Parliament and in the nation, I thought an invasion of Schleswig by Germany might lead to assistance to Denmark on the part of this country.
  "I now said that, apart from the occurrences of the last two months, I could well understand that Great Britain might fully rely upon two Powers so honourable and so much alive to the interests of Europe as Austria and Prussia. But we had lately seen how little their authority was regarded by the smaller German Powers, and by the popular enthusiasm of the masses."—No. 4, 534.
  This was spoken on the 14th of January, before the application was made to France to make war, and it shows what was passing in the mind of Earl Russell. In writing this despatch to Lord Bloomfield, it is to be observed that Earl Russell admits that, in speaking to Count Bernstorff, he stated that, judging from the general current of feeling in Parliament and in the nation, he thought that the invasion of Schleswig might lead to assistance being given to Denmark by this country. Now, I maintain that anything more decisive and emphatic is not to be found in all this mass of papers, and that despatch shows how vain was the endeavour of the Foreign Under Secretary to prove that the department, of which he is a member, did not do the very thing which it is plain to demonstration that they did. It must be observed, too, that if Government maintain in office any Colleague who holds opinions which they disapprove, they must either disavow and expel him, or else they all become responsible for what he does. Earl Russell then, according to the same despatch, proceeded to explain to Count Bernstorff,
  "That should the Duke of Augustenburg enter into the possession of the Duchies, the occupation would at once be turned into permanent possession, and Denmark would be dismembered; and that, seeing these dangers, and the reckless manner in which many of the German Princes and all the German popular meetings were ready to set the faith of treaties at defiance, Her Majesty's Government could not wonder that the King of Denmark was ready to defend Schleswig, and to consider its hostile occupation as a fatal blow to the integrity of his dominions."—No.4, 535.

  1223
  But, Earl Russell added,
  "That he could not doubt that he would be assisted by Powers friendly to Denmark in that defence."—No. 4, 535.
  Now, what Powers, I ask, were alluded to? The noble Earl had before said that Denmark would be aided by England. Had he any authority to speak for France or Russia? Where does that authority appear? I say he had none; and for whom, then, did he speak but for England? And in the compass of the short document I have referred to, the noble Earl twice, I believe, assures the Prussian Minister that England meant to assist Denmark with material aid. If there is any doubt from Earl Russell's words, there is none from the answer of the Prussian Minister, who, according to the despatch, "shortly but pointedly adverted to the dangers that might be incurred by Europe if Germany and England were to become enemies." Anything more plain to an unsophisticated man, not trained in diplomacy, or in the ways of the Foreign Office, I cannot conceive. That document proves two things. It proves that menaces were held out towards the German Powers, and it proves that there existed an intention to go to war. If that document were read and known in Denmark, could any man there doubt but that the faith of England was pledged to that country, and that the Danes might safely continue the war, and maintain that noble defence which they had undertaken against overwhelming odds? But we were asked last night whether the Government are not at liberty to give advice to Foreign Powers; and I answer that it does not follow that you have a right to give advice to Foreign Powers unless you mean to assist them, if they submit to your advice and follow your dictation. In the whole political history of Europe there is not such a thing to be found as that short document of four lines—signed "Russell"—calling on Denmark to summon a Parliament to repeal the Constitution.
  "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, if the Danish Government should receive a summons from the Diet, or from Austria and Prussia, calling upon them to repeal the Constitution of November last, the King should declare that he will convoke the Rigsraad without delay, in order to submit to that Body a proposal for the revocation of such parts of the Constitution as apply to Schleswig."
  I say the Government had no right to make such a demand as that upon another State, and then desert her in the
  1224
  moment of difficulty. In former days a great Foreign Minister would have burnt his fingers sooner than sign such a document unless he was prepared to act with corresponding firmness. The Attorney General asks whether we are not to remonstrate. Sir James Macintosh, speaking on behalf of Italy, once asked that question of Mr. Canning, when urging him to remonstrate with the great Powers against interference in the affairs of that country. Mr. Canning's reply, in effect, was this—"You, as a private Member, may say what you please. You have a right to speak your mind as regards Italy, Poland, or any other country. But when you call on me, as the Minister of England, to remonstrate with other Powers, I have to consider what must be done if our remonstrances were flung back in our faces. England is too great a country," said Mr. Canning, "to endure such an insult." Therefore, it does not follow, as the hon. and learned Gentleman seems to think, that the affairs of the world are to be managed like a Chancery suit, advice being given at every step, till, after dragging its slow length along, the wordy controversy ends in war. When the Duke of Wellington went to the Congress of Verona, Lord Castlereagh bade him beware how he offered advice in regard to the affairs of Italy, because we never sanctioned the invasion of Naples, which overthrew the Parliament of that State; and because, said Lord Castlereagh, we must not give advice when we are not prepared to act. I have no authority to speak on behalf of the party of which I am an humble Member; but if I were asked what ought to be the guiding principle of the foreign policy of England, I would answer, in the words which Mr. Canning uttered on a memorable occasion. Mr. Canning said—
  "The situation which England holds forbids an exclusive selfishness; her prosperity must contribute to the prosperity of other nations, and her stability to the safety of the world. But, intimately connected as we are with the system of Europe, it does not therefore follow that we are called upon to mix ourselves on every occasion with a selfish and meddling activity in the concerns of the nations which surround us. It is upon a just balance of conflicting duties and of rival but sometimes incompatible advantages, that a Government must judge when to put forth its strength, and when to husband it for occasions to come. Our ultimate object must be the peace of the world; that object may sometimes be best attained by prompt exertions; sometimes by abstinence from interposition in contests which we cannot prevent. It is upon these principles that it did not appear to the Government of this coun-

  1225
  try to be necessary that Great Britain should mingle in the recent contest between France and Spain."
  That is, I say, a very statesmanlike doctrine as to the foreign policy which should be pursued, and it is exactly contrary to the course taken by the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary. If there were nothing else, the immense pile of papers relating to Denmark, which have been laid on the table, is conclusive evidence against the noble Lord. No man could write such an enormous amount of matter without committing himself a hundred times over. The assertion that it was not intended by the Government to go to war is contradicted—as I could easily prove if I were not unwilling to weary the House, by the whole scope and spirit of the despatches, and the war policy was abandoned only when it was found that a peace policy would be safer for Her Majesty's Ministers. In the course of the Debate there have been three remarkable speeches—the able and suggestive speech of the hon. Member for Rochdale, the brilliant but eccentric speech of the right hon. Member for Stroud, and the speech in which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield assailed the theory of Parliamentary government and the Constitution of the country. The speech of the hon. Member for Rochdale filled me, in one aspect of the question, to which I will hereafter advert, with alarm. The hon. Gentleman asked, as a matter of abstract principle, whether it was not wise in a Minister to take every possible precaution not to enter into a Continental war; and I must say I never heard a sentiment in which I more cordially concurred. Then the hon. Gentleman proceeded to express his belief that the conduct of our foreign diplomacy was deplorable and inexcusable; that it had utterly broken down; and whereas we propose to censure the Government in regard to Denmark only, in his opinion England has been subjected to humiliation in every quarter of the globe. Now, that is a most startling assertion when we consider the position and character' of the hon. Member for Rochdale. It has been justly said that a politic Minister would wish to stand well with France, not by forfeiting in the slightest degree the independence of his country, but by conducting our communications with France with courtesy, dignity, and tact. The hon. Member for Rochdale negotiated the commercial treaty, and is known to every political man in Paris and to the whole mercantile interest of France. His opinion,
  1226
  therefore, carries with it great weight in that country; and I ask, can it be wise or safe to preserve in office the Ministry whose conduct he has described in such severe terms of reprobation, and to leave the interests of the nation in such unworthy and imbecile hands? The hon. Gentleman imputes to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary only incapacity, but he charges the noble Lord at the head of the Government with insincerity, because he states broadly that noble Lord intends, when he has demoralized his party, to transfer power to those who are believed to be opposed to the political convictions which he now professes. What will be thought of the Government when that description of their character is read in France, or in other parts of the Continent? Will people abroad not be disposed to say—We know this Gentleman, the Member for Rochdate, well; we have confidence in his capacity and sincerity; and if what he tells us be true, how can such a Government properly be allowed to remain in power only to plunge England into even a lower depth of humiliation, if that be possible, than any she has reached already? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud broached some theories of a very novel and impracticable character. He commenced with a well delivered Philippic against the foreign policy of the Government. Now, I wish to speak of Lord Russell with all possible respect. When he was a Member of this House I think he displayed great learning in his speeches upon historical and constitutional questions, and I often obtained from him instruction which I failed to get in other quarters, Therefore I have no wish to apply to Earl Russell the language applied to him by his friends, and especially by the right hon. Member for Stroud, who exhausted the language of vituperation in describing the contempt he felt for the policy of the noble Lord, although he nevertheless intends to support the Government by his vote. I regret that the right hon. Gentleman is not in his place, because I was anxious to give him an opportunity, before his political reputation as a statesman is seriously damaged, of withdrawing two-thirds of his speech, and giving his vote in accordance with the remaining third. What did the right hon. Gentleman say? He told the House that, in September, 1862, the noble Lord wrote a despatch relating to the affairs of Denmark, and that when the unfortunate Danish Minister to whom it was read heard it he became agitated, and said, "I little

  1227
  thought a British Minister would ever seek to destroy Denmark." The cause of that remark was, that in this document, strange to say, the noble Lord recommended the severance of Schleswig from Denmark. The right hon. Gentleman, having laid great stress upon that part of the conduct of the Foreign Office, said, "That was, Sir, a fatal policy." A fatal policy! Why, such an avowal is a fatal avowal for the right hon. Gentleman; for if the policy is fatal, and the Ministry is in power who have pursued that fatal policy, how does he, the uncompromising patriot—the only one who is awake while the nation is slumbering—continue to support a Government in office whose fatal policy he so deeply laments? The right hon. Gentleman proceeds to say, with singular inconsistency, that the Government is not to blame, but that the blame, in reality, attaches to the Opposition. Those intrusted with the management of affairs are not to blame for the fatal policy, but those who have no power and no responsibility must bear the blame. I hardly know what might happen to the right hon. Gentleman if he were face to face with his indignant constituents at Stroud. Suppose some one amongst his constituents said to him, "Did you say that the policy of Earl Russell was a fatal policy?" "I did." "Did you say that it was blind, rash, and ignorant?" "I did." "Did you censure the conduct of the Minister for Foreign Affairs throughout?" "I did." "And yet you gave your vote to keep him in power." Surely no such theory was ever before propounded by a public man for supporting a Government. How could the Opposition be held responsible for the failures of Earl Russell? The noble Lord the Prime Minister has told us over and over again that the Opposition have no right to interfere with negotiations until they are completed, and all the right hon. Gentleman has been trying to do has been to screen the bad vote he is about to give by an abusive speech. The Resolution of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Disraeli) has been brought forward at the right time in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, and it is not to be met by an excuse that the Opposition are to be blamed for what the Government has done, of which the Opposition knew nothing. The right hon. Gentleman, using a legal phrase, says that we were accomplices before the fact; but in order to be so it should be shown that we knew there was a criminal and a crime, and that we possessed a guilty knowledge, and aided the criminal in his crime. What did I
  1228
  know of these despatches until they were laid on our table? No more than if I had never been born. Yet I should be an accomplice after the fact, and so would every hon. Gentleman on these benches, if, when the right time came, and when the materials were before the House to enable it to form a judgment, we who object to the course taken by the Government did not promptly and effectually bring the question to an issue in the only proper and constitutional manner in which the question can be considered and discussed. The right hon. Gentleman entertains a most extraordinary view of responsibility. He said, truly, that responsibility was the first duty of a statesman; but this is a monarchy, and the negotiations upon foreign affairs are conducted in the name and on behalf of the Crown. Treaties are made by the Crown, and those who act for the Crown are Ministers selected by and responsible to the Crown. That is the first stage of our constitutional responsibility, and the next stage is that the same Ministers are also responsible to the House of Commons. That stage we have now arrived at, and our responsibility now begins. That we assented to the previous question on the Motion of the hon. Member for Liskeard is no argument, because the time was inopportune; but now the time for action has arrived, and we are not only responsible to our consciences for the vote we give, but there is still another stage of our responsibility, and that is to the constituencies who have sent us here. They may rightly call us to account for the vote we give to-night, just as we call the Ministers to account for the conduct they have pursued while acting as the responsible advisers of the Crown. The right hon. Gentleman has mistaken the whole theory of our responsibility. He has confounded the Opposition with the Government, and has also confounded the rights of the Crown with the privileges of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman went the length of saying, that north, south, east, or west, there was no quarter in the civilized or uncivilized world in which the influence and prestige of England have not been lowered and her character humiliated; and I submit to him that the moment he proves those facts to his own satisfaction, he is as much bound as a juryman on his oath to give the verdict which a belief in such facts warrants. A man of the conspicuous ability of the right hon. Gentleman has no right to propound theories in this House which tend to damage or destroy the Constitution of the country.

  1229
  As to the doctrine laid down by the hon. Member for Rochdale to the effect, that the Foreign Minister should lay every despatch upon the table and ask our concurrence in it, that is simply impossible. We have pursued the only constitutional course that was open to us, and those who admit the truth of the charges we make against the Government are bound to vote with us. I come now to the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), and I confess that, if possible, it surprised me even more than any other speech which I have heard in this debate. The hon. Gentleman applied language to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office which I shall not repeat, because it is not respectful to the high position of that distinguished Peer. He may have been placed at the head of the Foreign Office at a time of life when he was not acquainted with the delicate duties which he had to perform, and he has no doubt exhibited a want of sagacity in the performance of those duties; but it is scarcely right or courteous to say that he is only fit to be a schoolmaster. But my hon. and learned Friend, like the right hon. Member for Stroud, was looking for an excuse for his vote, and he laid down a doctrine which I certainly thought the Revolution had settled. He said he knew that the policy of the noble Earl was entirely disapproved by the noble Viscount at the head of the Government; and although the noble Viscount expressed his dissent, my hon. and learned Friend had the modesty to say, "I know how it is much better than you do. You are of one way of thinking, and the noble Earl is of another. If you had been at the head of the Foreign Office these things would never have occurred. It is because the noble Earl is at the head of the Foreign Office that everything has gone wrong. Therefore I will vote for you and I will abuse him." That is called a statesmanlike policy; but is it possible for any reasonable man to subscribe to such a doctrine? The scope of the argument of my hon. and learned Friend is, that the noble Viscount has deliberately kept at the head of the Foreign Office a noble Lord whose policy he disapproves and whose conduct he condemns. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield's excuse for the noble Viscount for having kept the Foreign Minister in his office against the convictions of his understanding and with a knowledge that he was damaging the best interests of his country is, that the
  1230
  noble Viscount differs from his own Foreign Secretary, and we are to assume now, on the day of trial, against the principles of the Constitution, that one colleague is to be sacrificed in order that another colleague may be flattered. Lord Macaulay, in his brilliant sketch book called the History of England, has a celebrated passage in which he says one of the great blessings derived from the Revolution is to be found in this, that whereas before the Revolution each Member of the Government was only responsible for his own department, now the settled and fundamental doctrine of the law and Constitution is, that each Member of the Government is responsible for the conduct of every other Member. That theory and practice, however, the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield endeavours to shatter to fragments by attempting to screen the noble Viscount in a manner that must wound his pride as a statesman, and hurt his feelings as a man. Yet these are the intolerable paradoxes which the hon. and learned Gentleman, with all his peculiar air of superior wisdom, propounds to this House. I can quite understand the argument suggested by the hon. Member for Rochdale, and virtually repeated by many others, as to the effect which may be produced by individual character on the fortunes of a people. It has been so from the beginning of the world. It was the character and genius of individual men which built up and sustained the colossal fabric of ancient Roman power. It was the proud consciousness of heroism which made the old Roman, when asked what would have happened if Alexander the Great had marched against Rome, instead of against the East, reply, that if he had come to Rome he would have found there many Alexanders. The question has been agitated among the biographers of Castlereagh, Wellington, and Alexander Emperor of all the Russias, as to which of those three men it was who exercised most influence in overthrowing the despotic power of the first Napoleon, and in giving, have no doubt, a wholesome lesson to the Third, Some maintain that it was the Emperor Alexander, others that it was Wellington; but M. Thiers gives the preference to the English statesman, the great and fearless Castlereagh. And when I heard the hon. Member for Liskeard, with his peculiar talent for ridicule, describing the late Conference, I could not help contrasting our present Foreign Secretary

  1231
  with that other wise and intrepid English statesman, who, while always exhibiting the respect due to the Sovereigns of Europe, compelled Kings and Emperors to do the thing that was just, and raised the honour and influence of his country to that pinnacle of glory from which his feeble and vacillating successors are dragging it down. What has been the course of conduct of Earl Russell throughout these transactions? I have heard it aptly described by one who has watched it closely as "a protracted Parliamentary manœuvre." Good faith ought to be the foundation of England's foreign policy. The Government might have said either that they would go to war, or that they would not, to maintain the integrity and independence of Denmark. Either statement of policy would have been distinct and intelligible; but they compelled her to yield everything that was demanded of her until her brave and unfortunate people said, "We have nothing more to give but our lives, and those we will sell as dearly as we can in defence of the land of our birth." The spectacle now offered by unhappy Denmark, as brought about—I charge it strongly—by the want of decision and firmness on the part of Government, is one of the most deplorable ever presented to the eye of a humane man. I agree that the smaller free and independent States are among the most beautiful parts of the European system. I regret the downfall of Denmark, and I say her name and example will live in the admiration of mankind when the memory of her unscrupulous aggressors is execrated or forgotten. The conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers in this lamentable business has not been defended by one independent Member of this House, unless, indeed, the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield can be said to have defended it by avowing that it would be impossible for him to find in the English language words sufficiently strong—I was going to say sufficiently ferocious—to denounce the head of the Foreign Office. The hon. Member for Rochdale seemed to think this an ill-timed Motion, and he told us that the noble Viscount was doing our work, and would, when he had sufficiently demoralized his own party, hand over the Government to his political opponents. Sir, we do not desire to possess a tarnished and dishonoured inheritance. We are called Conservatives, and why? Because we are jealous of the honour of our country, con-
  1232
  servative of its glory, as we are of the noble institutions which have made it free and kept it happy. We believe that the Foreign Minister has erred, and greatly erred; we believe that he has lowered the influence of England among the nations of the earth; and we appeal to every right-minded Member of this House, if he thinks that to be the truth, to assert it on this occasion by his vote, and to agree to a Resolution which I am satisfied will be confirmed by the approving voice of an indignant country.
  MR. MONSELLsaid, that before alluding to the speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down, he desired to refer to the speech of the hon. Member for Kildare. In many of the statements of that speech he entirely concurred. He believed that the interests which both he and that hon. Gentleman represented had not been wisely cared for in many instances by the noble Lord; but the best and fairest course to pursue on that occasion was to deal with the question before the House on its own merits. This was the course the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) had adopted, and he had frankly stated that he did so deliberately because, if extraneous faults were to weigh against the Government, extraneous merits would also have in justice to weigh in their favour. With reference then to that subject the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Whiteside) appeared to him to have forgotten what had been the conduct of the Opposition, and how that conduct had influenced the negotiations while they were proceeding. To both sides of the House he thought some blame justly attached for the manner in which they had allowed themselves to be swayed backwards and forwards by public opinion on a delicate and difficult matter about which it was impossible that public opinion could be well informed. Let them remember the speeches which had been delivered in that House during the last few weeks on the subject of Denmark. Take those delivered by the noble Lord the Member for Stamford (Lord Robert Cecil) for example. The only time that he had ever seen the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Osborne) cowed or silenced was, when that noble Lord held up to public indignation those whose sympathies were German, and sought to show the world that in that House almost all were in favour of Denmark, and that there was nothing like a German party there. Had that language no in-

  1233
  fluence on the affairs of Denmark? Had the yet stronger language used by Lord Derby in another place no influence? The effect of their speeches was such as to create a false impression on the minds of the Danes. It appeared to him that in some degree the Government were subject to the same reproach. Those who bad listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Liskeard must be aware that, under the Treaty of 1852, Denmark had entered into most solemn obligations with Germany with regard to the affairs of Schleswig and Holstein. Lord Russell, on the 20th of September, 1862, wrote a despatch which declared the minimum that Germany had a right to claim from Denmark. Was there any Gentleman in that House who would controvert that fact, which went to the very marrow of the question? Was there any demand in that despatch which Denmark was not bound—most solemnly bound—by treaty obligations to yield to Germany? Yet the right hon. Gentleman came down to that House and talked of the interference of the Government. What could the Government do for Denmark till she bad respected her treaty engagements? The Government ought to have said to Denmark, "These are the best terms we can make for you, and we ask you to fulfil your treaty engagements. If you wont do that we can do nothing more for you. Germany, Austria, and Prussia have accepted our terms; the whole matter will be satisfactorily arranged—will you accept those terms or not?" And if Denmark refused to accept those terms, they should have told her boldly that she could expect no aid from England. Earl Russell did attempt to wash his hands of the whole matter at that time, and what prevented him from persevering in that course? Hon. Gentlemen opposite now talked of peace; but who sounded the trumpet in the House of Lords on that occasion? Who denounced that compromise which, had it been accepted, would have placed Denmark in a position of security free from the invasion of hostile armies, and without a disputed succession? A most distinguished statesman in another place, who bad been a Member of Lord Derby's Government, brought forward the subject, and the Earl of Derby stated in the strongest manner that
  "It is our duty as it is our policy to protect her against aggression. And although God forbid that the last extremity should be forced upon us! yet, I say, that if a question arose as to whether the Danish monarchy should be dissolved,
  1234
  or should lose its integrity and be frittered away—(still more that it should be placed by collateral means through indirect influences in the position of a dependency of the German Confederation)—I say there is no alternative which would not be preferable, on the part of England, than that a policy should be adopted which would lead to consequences so disastrous."—[3 Hansard, clxx. 1761.]
  That was the interpretation put by the noble Earl on the recommendations made by Lord Russell in his despatch of September 20, 1862. When Lord Ellenborough was dwelling on the expediency of not consenting to the arrangements proposed by Lord Russell, he was driven by the force of the treaty engagements of Denmark to maintain that treaties extorted by force did not bind; in other words, he invented a new code of international morality to disengage Denmark from doing what she had promised to do; but it should be recollected that the conditions Denmark obtained were made at considerable sacrifice on the part of Germany, because, before 1852, Schleswig and Holstein were so intimately united together that there was a Customs' line between Denmark and the Duchies, and Danes could not pass into Schleswig-Holstein without a passport. He thought, therefore, that for the present unfortunate position of affairs the Opposition were very much to blame. He could not deny that at the present moment this country had not the influence in Europe which fairly belonged to her, and he entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) in attributing that altered condition to our conduct on the Polish Question. He was on the Continent at the time, and he must say the feeling which that conduct had excited was very strong indeed. And who was to blame in that matter? Austria bad been blamed; but in a letter to the Duke de Gramont, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said expressly it was not the fault of the Austrian Government that the proposition of France bad not been adopted. That proposition was an identic note; and if Austria, together with France and England, bad signed an identic note, the whole aspect of affairs would have been changed. Austria would have taken her part with the Western Powers in the cause of liberty and progress; but, in consequence of the outcry made by the Opposition to such a course, she had been thrown back into the arms of Prussia and Russia, and to that was to be traced all the misery that had happened to Denmark, and the still

  1235
  greater misery that was menaced. Hon. Gentlemen opposite were quite as much responsible for that state of things as the Government. What would be the consequence of transferring the conduct of negotiations in this state of affairs to hon. Gentlemen opposite? They absolutely refused to give any idea of the policy they would pursue; and we had to gather it from loose speeches and vague declarations made by noble Lords and hon. Members, and from articles in newspapers. Their organs in the public press were constantly preaching war. He thought, therefore, that nothing could be more dangerous than to hand over the power of carrying on these negotiations where such tremendous interests were at stake to a party who declined to declare their policy. It might be said, "they should not prescribe till they were called in." But that was not in conformity with the course pursued by Sir Robert Peel on the Vote of Confidence, January 31, 1840. Sir Robert Peel then said—
  "I know too well the little value that can be placed on that support which arises from misconception of one's real opinions … I have so little desire to procure a hollow confidence, either on false pretences or by delusive silence, that I rejoice in the opportunity of frankly declaring my opinions."—[3 Hansard, li. 1016.]
  He did frankly declare his opinions, and it was not on any abstract ground, but on a comparison between his principles and those of the Government he wished to supersede, that the vote was taken. The House had not been told on what principles the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite would be conducted, and for that reason alone he felt justified in opposing the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire. He would now say a few words on the foreign policy of this country. He was afraid the intimate alliance of Austria might be lost to this country; but he trusted the noble Lord at the head of the Government would endeavour to renew the warm and cordial relations which formerly existed with France. He knew the noble Viscount set value on the French alliance, but he feared that he was too much guided by the ideas that prevailed a few years ago, and that he was always too eager to gain a diplomatic triumph over France. The noble Lord succeeded in isolating France in 1839, and so gave rise to a bad feeling that nearly broke out into open war; and something of the same kind took place last November and December on the Po-
  1236
  lish Question. He attributed the present position of Schleswig-Holstein to the latter event. If the noble Lord intimated to France his wish that cordial relations should be re-established between the two countries, and satisfied them that there was no desire on our part to trip them up, the peace of Europe would be preserved, the affairs of the Duchies would be satisfactorily arranged, and the clouds which now overspread the horizon would disappear. But so long as there was disunion and suspicion between these great Powers, the peace of Europe would always be in danger.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, that the two most important points to remember in this debate were the relations of Schleswig and Holstein with Denmark and Germany, and the interpretation of the famous despatch of September 24, 1862. He would deal with the first point at once. The right hon. Gentleman said that Schleswig was united to Holstein. This might be true in 1848–9, when the country was upset by revolution and commotion; but for hundreds of years Schleswig had been a part of Denmark, and the Eider had been the boundary, Holstein belonging to the German Confederation, and Schleswig to Denmark. He had already called the attention of the House to an important treaty ratified by the French King in 1720, by which France, in concert with England, guaranteed the Duchy of Schleswig to Denmark. With regard to the despatch of Earl Russell, dated September 24, 1862, and called the Gotha despatch, it was the keynote of all the embarrassments which now surrounded the question. His case was, that the noble Earl (Earl Russell) had lowered the just influence of England, not only by holding out menaces that were not fulfilled, but also by laying down general principles of conduct upon which foreign nations, believing in the Foreign Secretary, thought the English Government would act. Lord Russell on one occasion asserted that when a weaker people were fighting for their homes it was the business of a greater Power to assist them. That general principle was quoted everywhere on the Continent as the guiding policy of the noble Earl, and this was one of the main causes of the embarrassments that had ensued. Acting in that spirit, Lord Russell dictated to Denmark the principles on which that kingdom should be governed, and went into the smallest details in a manner which

  1237
  could not but give offence to an independent nation. Lord Russell returned from his attendance on Her Majesty about the 17th of September, and the despatch was dated on the 24th of September, but it was not communicated until October 11. What became of the despatch during that interval? The noble Earl, writing to Sir Augustus Paget, said—
  "Sir,—I had yesterday a long conversation with M. Bille. He called in consequence of the report of a despatch which I was about to send to the great Courts. M. Bille proceeded to say that this report had caused great alarm in the Danish Government; that they had hitherto reason to believe Her Majesty's Government favourable to the rights of Denmark. The Danish Government, upon the advice of the British Government, and other allies of Denmark, had complied with the requisitions of Germany in regard to Holstein and Lauenberg. Their only stronghold at present was the constitution which bound together Denmark and Schleswig; this gone, the Danish monarchy would fall to pieces."—Correspondence, (1862) 311.
  Now, before it was communicated, the Danish Minister told Lord Russell what effect the mere rumour of such despatch would have upon the Continent. But, in spite of all that, in spite of the difficulty in which he knew he was placing his country, in spite of the warning he had got, the despatch was communicated. On October 14, Mr. Paget writes to Earl Russell—
  "M. Hall was visibly agitated while I was reading the despatch, and when I gave him a copy of it he said that he had never expected to receive such a document at the hands of Her Majesty's Government. Coming at such a moment, he considered it the most disastrous blow that could be inflicted on the cause of Denmark, and as leading most surely, if acted upon, to absolutism, or to the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy. …. He thought, moreover, he had some right to complain that, whereas this despatch had been communicated more than a fortnight to Berlin and Vienna, it was only now communicated to the Danish Government. He had always looked to England as the surest support of Denmark. No one had upheld more strongly than your Lordship that Germany had no rights over those parts of the monarchy not appertaining to the German Confederation, and it was certainly, therefore, not from your Lordship that he expected a project to emanate which suggested the abolition of the common constitution."—Correspondence, (1862) 315.
  Here was the origin of all the embarrassment that had followed. Lord Russell took upon himself to give advice to the Danish Government—he was warned of the bad effect it would have—and in spite of that he gave it, and communicated it to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna. He must say that if the Resolution had been a great
  1238
  deal stronger it would only have been treating the Government with due seventy. He would not trouble the House by repeating that tissue of ineffectual menaces which were afterwards made to the great Powers; but we were now placed in a very painful position in consequence. The hon. Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake) had interposed between the House and the Government by an Amendment, by means of which the Government expected to slip through. But they would not say "Aye" or "No" fairly to the Resolution before the House. This was no party question. [A laugh.] The hon. Gentleman might laugh, but on that (the Opposition) side they did not make it a party question in the least. The Government, however, made it a party question, otherwise they would not have ten Members voting with the noble Lord. If a Gentleman went into the lobby he would meet with hon. Members who would say they were very glad Kinglake had brought forward his Amendment in order to get Lord Russell out of the scrape, because they did not like to throw the noble Viscount overboard, seeing that he had served his party well. But he was surprised that such an Amendment should have proceeded from the hon. Member. His hon. Friend was the author of a most remarkable book, The History of the Crimean War. He had read that book not once but several times, and he had extracted from it an eloquent passage, which he should like to read. It was this:—
  "Any Prince who may be inclined to wrong another State casts his eyes abroad to see the condition of the great Powers. If he observes that they are all in a sound state, and headed by firm and able rulers, who are equal, if need be, to the duty of taking up arms, he knows that the contemplated outrage would produce a war, and unless he be a madman or a desperado he will be inclined to hold back. On the other hand, if he sees that any great nation which ought to be foremost to resist him is in a state of exceptional weakness, or under the governance of unworthy or incapable rulers, then, perhaps, he allows himself to entertain a hope that she may not have the spirit or wisdom to perform her duty; that is the hope—and it may be said in these days it is the only hope—which would drive a sane Prince to become the disturber of Europe. To frustrate this hope—in other words, to keep alive the dread of a just and an avenging war, should be the care of every statesman who would faithfully labour to preserve the peace of Europe. In general, when the world believes England is firm, there is peace; it is the hope of finding her weak and irresolute that tends to breed war. If a Power fails in this duty to itself and Europe, it suddenly becomes lowered in the opinion of mankind; and, happily,

  1239
  there is no historic lesson more true, than that a moral degradation of this sort is"—what?—"speedily followed by disasters."
  This was beautifully expressed, and it was such words as these that he should have expected to hear on this occasion from his hon. Friend, but they were quite inconsistent with the Amendment now placed before the House by their author. It was a sad position in which this country was placed. The interests of a great country found themselves opposed to the great, noble, and generous performance of duty. He did not hesitate to say so, because the interests of this country were always for peace, and always must be. At any rate, war was so terrible a scourge that every nation would pause before making an appeal to what was called the ultima ratio regum. But grant that war was a terrible thing, yet we could not but feel our present humiliation. He had seen to-day the contest between the Schools of Eton and Harrow, and when he beheld those gallant boys he could not but feel ashamed to recall the expressions of contempt which he had heard on the Continent against the policy of the noble Lord. But it was said that, at any rate, the country was still at peace. This was the extraordinary part of the business, for the Government made proposals to some of the great Powers to go to war, and it was made their special excuse for not going to war because France and Russia would not aid them. The noble Lord the Prime Minister could not end his speech the other night without suggesting an occasion which would impel this country to war. The noble Lord was very fond of interfering, but he must say that when the noble Lord was Foreign Secretary this country was respected owing to the energetic character of the noble Lord, with whom it was a word and a blow. But what has become of the civis Romanus now? The noble Viscount's policy was very unlike the noble Earl's. What was now the feeling in Denmark about England, where England used to be loved? In a book written by Mr. Herbert, the brother of Lord Carnarvon, a most touching record was given of the effect of the mismanagement of English foreign policy on the feelings of the Danish people. That gentleman wrote—
  "To be born a Dane is to be born an honest, courteous gentleman. The Danes are sorely hurt at our desertion of their fortunes; they feel it the more severely because between them and England there has existed a silent brotherhood. English
  1240
  is the language that is taught in their schools and colleges; their customs, their feelings, their thoughts are all English. Whatever the Danes feel on the subject of England, they say but little to an Englishman; it always touches me to see how much their courtesy seals their lips. Sometimes, however, the thought escapes them—'I cannot go to England this year; all is too much changed.' They read with great delight the debate on Denmark in the House of Lords. 'It was the old Norse blood,' they said, 'that ran so hotly on that night.'"
  He should like the noble Lord at the head of the Government to explain the fresh menace he uttered the other evening when he said, that if the Allied troops were to occupy the Danish Islands, to bombard Copenhagen, or to take the King prisoner, the Government would take the matter into consideration. What was the force of those words? He hoped the vote of the House to-night would show, not that the country was going to war, but that the House did not approve a policy which had degraded and humiliated England.
  LORD ELCHO: No doubt the noble Lord will give a satisfactory answer to the question just put to him, though it may perhaps not prove to be satisfactory to the hon. Member. As a disinterested spectator of a party struggle, I am anxious very shortly to explain my views on the question submitted to the consideration of the House. The hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Osborne), in an amusing speech resembling a pyrotechnic display, which dazzles the eyes and pleases the senses of the spectators, but which when examined for argument offers nothing but a few bits of burnt paper and charred stick, said that the House had been drenched and saturated with despatches and quotations from the blue-books. As far as I am concerned, I can promise not to cite any single passage from any one of these 1,500 pages which the right hon. Gentleman the late Chancellor of the Exchequer told us he had studied with so much care, but which the present Chancellor of the Exchequer showed that he had studied to little profit. I readily admit that this country stands in a disagreeable position. Failure in a just cause, and even in a bad cause, is always disagreeable; but, because the negotiations have failed, I cannot see any justice in carrying a Vote of Censure against the Government; and if I had any doubt on this point in my mind, it would have been removed by the course of the present discussion. It was my good fortune to listen to the great gladiatorial contest between the right hon. Gentleman the Member for

  1241
  Buckinghamshire and the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and it appears to me that the Chancellor of the Exchequer tore into shreds the web, or rather the net, which the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, the retiarius of his party, had manufactured with so much care and labour. The speech of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire was intended to be a general bill of indictment against the foreign policy of the Government; but it was somewhat strange that in a bill of indictment against the whole foreign policy of the Government no mention was made of Italy, none of Syria. It must have been for one of two reasons that Italy was not mentioned—either because the policy of the Government in regard to Italy was considered sound and unassailable, or because there were circumstances connected with the present debate which rendered it desirable that Italy should not be mentioned on the other side of the House. In Syria the Government obtained a great and undeniable diplomatic success. The greatest credit is, in my opinion, due to Lord Dufferin, who conducted the negotiations on the spot, and succeeded in inducing the French Government, who may be said to have held the keys of St. Peter in one hand and of the Holy Sepulchre in the other, to withdraw their army of occupation from Syria. The present question, however, resolves itself practically into one concerning the conduct of the Government in regard to Denmark. It is not a question of policy. We are all, I think, agreed in favour of a policy of peace. It is simply a question of conduct. What, then, are the faults found with the conduct of the Government in this Danish Question? The main objections urged here and elsewhere against the Government may be summed up as follows:—First, that they did not adopt a decided line in the first instance; second, that they menaced and did not follow up their menaces by action; and third, that they held out to Denmark promises which they were not able to fulfil. Now, I must say that if the Government had at the outset taken what is called a strong course, it would, in my opinion have been of very doubtful policy. It is easy to be prophetic after the event; but how do we know what might have been the consequences of action? Prussia is obstinate and excited on this matter, as much from a fear of revolution at home as from a desire to assist the Germans in Schleswig-Holstein. Prussia is, moreover,
  1242
  a great military nation; and if in midwinter, when the ice was still in the Baltic, we had sent a fleet thither and a contingent of 30,000 or 40,000 men to support Denmark, it is questionable whether we should have been successful in preventing the flooding of the Danish mainland by the hosts of Germany. Without any discredit to us, that policy might, perhaps, have resulted in misfortune and disaster. I do not believe that our honour has suffered in consequence of the failure of our negotiations, or that our influence in Europe is really lessened. I believe that a nation like England, strong in her armaments and known integrity of purpose, will always continue to possess her just influence in the councils of Europe. It is true that we are closely allied to Denmark—it is true that the Rose of Denmark has been transplanted to the English soil, and is now the pride of England—it is true that we felt indignant that Denmark should be used as an outlet for the revolutionary passions of Germany, and that the Danes should be made experimental targets for needle guns; but we are not called upon, either by honour or by interest, to go to war for Denmark, any more than any of the other Powers that signed the Treaty of 1852. I do not feel that we have been humiliated by the course which has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government in this matter. In dealing with the alleged menaces the element of time is generally left out of consideration; but it is necessarily very important. I am not in favour of threats without action. I greatly prefer hard hitting to hard talking, and I am not an admirer of everything that has been said or written by the Government on this subject. At the same time I cannot shut my eyes to the circumstances under which indications of future conduct were given. When the Government used strong language they had reason to believe that the other signataries of the treaty would cordially join with them, and when they discovered their mistake they changed their tone. I do not, therefore, see in the despatches any ground for censuring the Government in regard to the language which they employed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to the analogous case of Spain in 1823, when England, although anxious to prevent the invasion, only looked on. The Opposition then, as the Opposition does now, approved the policy of peace; but that did not prevent them from attacking the Government, They said, "We are against war;

  1243
  but we think you should have used stronger language at the first, and then there would have been less risk of war, for that would have deterred France from going into Spain." That is another feature of analogy between that case and the present which the right hon. Gentleman overlooked. I have not the slightest doubt that, at the present time, if the Government had followed the example of Mr. Canning and abstained from strong language, we should have heard the Opposition making that a ground of complaint, and insisting that a decided tone would have afforded greater security for peace. The third point is as to the Government having deceived Denmark. At the opening of the Session there was great doubt and apprehension on this subject, for it was feared that the honour of England might have been pledged in an unfortunate manner. I, for one, entertained this fear; but, after hearing the speech of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary in another place, I went home comforted. The noble Lord distinctly said that we had not promised material aid to Denmark; and, in confirmation of that, he told the House of Lords that the Danish Minister had declared to him that the Danes expected no material help, but only sympathy from England. Therefore, on none of these three heads of the indictment do I think the Government open to condemnation. I own that we have failed, and failure must be mortifying. It is painful, too, to stand idly by and see a gallant little State bullied by a large nation like Germany. It is sad to see wrong thus rampant and triumphant, and to find Faust-recht—the barbarous policy of Goetz of the Iron Hand—again in the ascendant in the middle of the 19th century: but we are not to blame for this. I attribute our failure to the fact that England was really the only Power ready to go to the assistance of Denmark. We had no arrière pensée—no compensations to seek, no boundaries to extend or frontiers to rectify. We were willing to do our part to protect a small Power from the oppressions of a large one, and to prevent might from becoming paramount in Europe, if the other signataries of the treaty had gone along with us. The Protocols prove that it was from mere accident, consequent on the meeting of the Conference having been held in London, that Earl Russell was the mouthpiece of the neutral Powers. They all endorsed his proposals in the Conference. I cannot, then, admit that my coun-
  1244
  try is humiliated by the failure of the negotiations, or that our influence in the counsels of Europe is forfeited. On this occasion we were not bound to go to war by ourselves single-handed; but that does not mean that England will never again engage singly in war. We showed our readiness to fight, if it were necessary, in defence of our honour in the Trent case; and one can easily conceive that questions might arise in regard to the independence of neighbouring States, in regard to our highway to India, and in regard to other matters, which might lead us to rise in arms in support of our honour or our interests. Our indignation at the treatment which a country so nearly allied to us in various ways as Denmark has received is just and natural; but we alone are not called upon to stand up for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe Nor is the balance of power the figment which some hon. Members imagine. It is the expression of a desire on the part of the nations to live together in peace and amity; but its main principle is, "Take care of No. 1." It would not be right for England to peril her power and authority by Quixotically serving as the sole policeman of Europe. From the way in which hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to luxuriate in a sense of humiliation, it must be, one would fancy, a pleasant and delicious sensation. They appear absolutely to revel in this feeling of humiliation. My hon. Friend opposite cannot even go to the cricket match between Eton and Harrow, which The Times calls a great constitutional game, without experiencing humiliation. What association there can be in the hon. Gentleman's mind between Cricket, the Danish Question, and this Motion, I am at a loss to understand, unless it be that the hon. Gentleman and his friends think they have been fielding long enough, and that it is now their turn to have an innings. I confess that I for one do not feel humiliated, and in looking to this question, and in looking back to the past, I cannot help thinking that hon. Gentlemen who censure the Government for having dishonoured and humiliated the country would do well if they recollected the golden rule, not only to do but to feel towards others as you would they should feel unto you. In 1859, when Lord Malmesbury held the seals of the Foreign Office, I recollect how the policy of the Government was censured. I thought the censure unjust at the time, and I brought forward a Resolution stating that

  1245
  the honour of the country had not suffered in their hands. But there was also the case of the Charles et Georges, which occurred soon after, a matter in which the Foreign Minister of England figured. In both Houses of Parliament—by Lord Wodehouse in one and by the hon. Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake) in the other—was the conduct of the Government denounced, and the hon. Member for Bridgewater went so far as to say that England had not been so humiliated and degraded since the days of Charles II. Although I do not feel humiliated now, I did then; and I cannot help recollecting that hon. Gentlemen opposite, who are so lavish of censure now, were the first to deny that the country had been dishonoured and humiliated then. These recollections of the past should, therefore, make hon. Gentlemen opposite careful how they bring like accusations against their successors. But be that as it may, I cannot think it a patriotic course to endeavour to step into office upon the humiliation of the country, and I will be no party to censure a Government which has earnestly, honestly, and perseveringly, although unsuccessfully, laboured in defence of treaty rights and for the maintenance of peace and order in Europe.
  MR. SCOURFIELDsaid, that when he first heard that it was impossible for Parliament to separate without expressing some opinion upon the Danish Question, he felt it difficult to deny the propriety of such a course; but, at the same time, he felt a secret misgiving as to the nature of the advantage that was to be derived from it. That misgiving was founded upon the remark of a very eminent statesman who once held a distinguished position in this country—that he never felt thoroughly alarmed when he parted with his colleagues, except when they had all come to a determination that something must be done. The same difficulty applied to a determination that something must be said when they had no definite idea as to the nature of what that something must be. Every person who had spoken appeared to be anxious to relieve himself of the responsibility of saying anything in favour of war. Indeed, one hon. Member went so far as to declare that it would be absolute insanity to go to war with Germany for the sake of the Duchies. It was hardly necessary for any man of average common sense to say that he was averse to war, but, at the same time, it would be very im-
  1246
  prudent to make any general declaration against war such as had been made in that House. They could not control events, and a mere declaration in favour of peace had not the effect of producing peace. No Englishman desired to see this country embroiled in a war with Germany, but it was impossible to say what might not be forced upon us. It was hardly possible to avoid the embarrassment which the question now before the House had occasioned. For his own part he denied the necessity of doing something when the something to be done was worse than nothing. It was an axiom of policy with some people, that something must be done; but if that something was radically bad, it was better to remain perfectly quiet than to pass a Resolution which must deceive. He disliked abstract Resolutions, because, under a vague form of words, very false issues might be raised; and for that reason, since he had been a Member of the House, he had almost invariably voted against abstract Resolutions. With, regard to the present Resolution he could only contemplate it in two aspects—interior and exterior. In its interior aspect it meant nothing but the transfer of power from one side of the House to the other; and as to its exterior aspect, the country and the people of Europe generally would scarcely imagine that the House of Commons had met and had had a serious discussion upon the question of Denmark, without stating what was intended to be done. He admitted that we were not bound to say what we would do; but it would be very mischievous if Resolutions of this kind were brought before the House simply for the purpose of making a little political capital out of them. It appeared to him that the House was exercising a sort of criminal jurisdiction, and was now engaged in trying the Government: yet, although he had had some experience as a magistrate, he had the greatest difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion as to the merits of the charges brought against the Government. One night an accusation was made that the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office had declined an offer of mediation; and the next they were told that it was no such thing. The noble Lord at the head of the Government was accused of having stated that, in the event of a war, Denmark would not act alone; and it was said on the other side, that if the context of the noble Lord's speech was examined it would be found that there were two other Powers engaged

  1247
  in backing Denmark to whom the remark applied. It was not want of honour but want of skill that was imputed to the Government, and that was a very difficult matter for the House to decide, although it was extremely easy for any one to say that they might have done better. The House had been in some degree an accomplice in the course pursued by the Government, for it had over and over again compelled the Government to deliver lectures to the Governments of other Nations; it was almost on the point of declaring itself for war on the Polish Question; and therefore it was but fair that some share of the blame should be distributed to the House. He could have wished that the Resolution had been brought before them in a different shape. Even if it were true that "the just influence of the country had been lowered," he did not see how the matter was to be made much better by the House declaring that fact. That reminded him of the celebrated character in one of Shakespeare's plays who wished to be "written down an ass." He did not wish it to be written down by the House that this country's influence had been lowered, and he thought the influence of this House was likely to be lowered if they turn out the Government without expressing an opinion on their policy. Moreover, the Motion was indefinite. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), who was always straightforward, had moved an Amendment which some might think dangerous, but which, at least, meant something; yet if that House went to a division he would probably find that those who agreed with him in that were very few. He saw no practical object that was to be gained by transferring power from one party in that House to the other; and he thought that if they were to come to a solemn Resolution on the question before them, they ought to declare something with regard to the future as well as to the past. In the absence of such a declaration, he could not be a party to a Resolution, although it came from his own side of the House, which simply referred to what was past without affording any practical indication of the course which ought to be pursued.
  THE O'DONOGHUEsaid, the Motion of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire censured the Government for having failed in their avowed policy of maintaining the integrity and independence of Denmark. The Amendment of the hon. Mem-
  1248
  ber for North Warwickshire must be taken a9 a condemnation of the Government for not having avowed their determination to maintain that integrity and independence by armed intervention; and the Amendment by the hon. Member for Bridgewater might be said to mean that, apart from all other considerations, the House ought to be grateful to the Government for maintaining peace, and ought to manifest its feeling by silently and tranquilly adapting itself to circumstances. He believed the original Motion would be supported by a large number on its intrinsic merits, that the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Whalley) would be the solitary follower of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire, and that the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bridegwater would be accepted by the Government as meaning that, no matter what else happened, the integrity of the Treasury bench ought to be maintained. The tendency of the discussion had been to raise a much larger question than any that had actually been brought forward; and the practical result of their decision would be affected by the confidence which the general policy of the Government might have inspired. Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer had admitted that their foreign policy had failed. But those who intended to support them might nevertheless ask, "Can you forget what they have done for Ireland? Can you forget how they have settled the question of tenant-right—how they have both deplored and sought to arrest the depopulation of that country—how they have dealt with the question of the Established Church—how they have secured for Ireland a fair share of the public expenditure—how they have given a charter to the Catholic University—or how, at a moment of unparalleled distress, they have widely opened the public purse, and through the mouth of the Chief Secretary appealed to the inexhaustible treasury of English generosity?" If hon. Gentlemen who meant to support the Government were able to point to such things as these, he could understand the Vote they were about to give. But his own opportunities of observation had not enabled him to discover that the Government had done anything for Ireland which they ought to have done, and he believed that for him to support them would be a violation of the duty he owed to his constituents and his country. It was not fair on the part of the hon. Member for East Norfolk (Mr. Howes) to refer to rumours disparaging to

  1249
  the character of Members of that House, the accuracy of which he doubted. The hon. Member for Kildare (Mr. Cogan) had replied to the insinuations of the hon. Gentleman in eloquent and indignant terms. So far as he was personally concerned, he confessed, instead of being irritated, he was rather amused by these insinuations. There always had been and always would be some persons in that House who would persist in believing that on all critical occasions there were Jesuits in disguise in the galleries and about the lobbies, endeavouring to operate on the minds of Roman Catholic Members. The House of Commons would be incomplete without some persons to represent this peculiar class of delusions. Only yesterday he was given to understand by an hon. Friend of his, a member of the Church of England, that two eminent ecclesiastics had arrived in this country in order to assist at the overthrow of the noble Viscount's Administration. He could assure the House there was no kind of truth in the rumours to which the hon. Gentleman the Member for East Norfolk had referred; and the Vote he was about to give had nothing whatever to do with the fact of his being a Roman Catholic, but was altogether the result of the almost universal distrust which was felt of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Apart from the general question of confidence in the Government, this Resolution contained two propositions which were perfectly true. First, that Government had failed in upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark; and, second, that the just influence of England had been lowered in the councils of Europe. Must not every candid mind acknowledge that all this was true? Had they not inspired the Danes to resist even at overwhelming odds. That fact had certainly lowered the influence of England in the councils of Europe by creating a suspicion in the minds of Continental Governments, that England's character for truth and honour could not be relied upon. Moreover, Continental Governments would believe that England abstained from acting because she was afraid; and they would believe so for this reason—the Government said that England would have to contend against the whole German people, because France and Russia for some reasons seemed determined not to act. It was said that France and Russia were parties to the Conference, and that they had failed as well as England. But they distinctly stated that they were not partisans, and they never
  1250
  threatened in word or deed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had accepted the issue of confidence or no confidence. Speaking, then, of Ireland, of which he knew something, he ventured to say there was not a constituency in that country which had confidence in the Government. There was not an Irish Member who owed his seat to the fact of his being a supporter of the noble Viscount. He believed the time was very near when the noble Viscount and his Friends would experience the consequences of the distrust and dissatisfaction their policy had created in Ireland; and he, for one, would rejoice in the advent to power of those of whom it could be said that they never promised without meaning to perform, or created expectations destined never to be realized.
  MR. BUXTONsaid, the hon. Gentlemen opposite had some difficulty in concealing their aspirations for war—except the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), who had boldly given them the same counsel which a far less respectable Gentleman had given in another place. Almost in the very words of Beelzebub he exclaimed
  "My sentence is for open war; of wiles
  More unexpert I boast not; them let those
  Contrive who need, or when they need—not now."
  The right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite also (General Peel) had, against his will, advocated a war policy—at any rate, the hon. in his speech, lay down so near the lamb that no one could tell which was lion and which was lamb. Then the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) thought the head and front of the offending of the Government was that they had reduced the Naval Estimates. A paper had been placed in his (Mr. Buxton's) hands by the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty which would console the hon. Gentleman. Never was the fleet more efficient. There were now 10 iron-clads in commission 4 more would be ready directly; 9 besides were building; and 4 more were nearly finished—making in all 27 ironclads, besides floating batteries. He had listened with the closest attention on the first evening of this debate to the speech of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, and the conclusion he had come to was that, while it was intended as a solemn indictment of the British Government, the facts were too strong for the right hon. Gentleman, and he turned it into an indictment of the Governments of Russia and

  1251
  France. The right hon. Gentleman laid it down as an indisputable axiom, that if France, Russia, and England combined, war would be impossible. At the same time he employed all his comic powers in travestying the strenuous efforts of the British Government, notwithstanding what he called humiliating rebuffs, to induce the Emperors of Russia and France to enter into that very combination with us by which, according to the right hon. Gentleman himself, war would have been impossible. Surely it followed that the British Government had been unjustly blamed, and that all the guilt—if guilt there were—rested upon Russia and France, who coldly rejected that proposal by which Denmark must have been saved. Now, the right hon. Gentleman, and nearly all those who followed him on that side of the House, had laboriously scrutinized the 1,500 pages of blue-book on this subject, in order to scrape together every word that could possibly seem to bear out the idea that we gave unfounded encouragement to Denmark. The right hon. Gentleman came forward with a Vote of Censure against Government for its shameful treachery to Denmark. He had moved Heaven and earth; he had searched through and through every sentence in those great blue-books for the materials of his censure. For himself he (Mr. Buxton) frankly admitted that, in the conduct of this affair, lasting for many months, involving a huge amount of correspondence and of negotiation, and passing through such a singular variety of phases, things had been said and written, which, with the light of the event upon them, might be looked upon with some regret; but, at the same time, he thought that every one must have noticed the fatal, the ruinous omission in the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman and his supporters who had attacked the Government. How was it that when he came forward to avenge that cruel wrong to Denmark he had not a sentence, he had not a line, he had not a word to quote showing that Denmark herself deemed that she had been treated with treachery? Surely, if England had lured her on by false pretences, and had brought those woes upon her by pretending to hold out her right hand to aid her, and then leaving her in the lurch, surely then Denmark herself would fill the world with the accents of her indignation! There would be some despatch—there would be some appeal—from Denmark to the public opinion of the world
  1252
  —some reclamations against such base misconduct. It was an overwhelming fact, that neither the right hon. Gentleman, nor any of those who had followed him, had pointed to a single word to that effect uttered by Denmark. No doubt Denmark had expressed profound grief and disappointment at finding that we did not come armed to her aid; but that was altogether another thing from expressing indignation at having been deceived. It seemed to him that the position of hon. Gentlemen opposite in that respect partook of the ridiculous. They seemed to be saying to Denmark, in the words of the Friend of Humanity—
  "Drops of compassion tremble on my eyelids,
  Ready to fall as soon as you have told your Pitiful story."
  Whereas the virtual answer that Denmark gave to them was simply—
  "Story; God bless you, I have none to tell, Sir."
  Whereupon exit the right hon. Gentleman in a transport of universal philanthropy and indignation. Now, the mind of that House had been sufficiently saturated with extracts from despatches and questions as to the exact amount of responsibility in which they involved the Government. The phrases used by the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) and by Lord Russell in many of his despatches did—it must in all frankness be allowed—amount to menaces of war against Germany; whereas the palpable fact was that we refrained from war. He did not wonder that Europe should have put those two things together, and jumped to the conclusion that England blustered and threatened without meaning to perform. But he spoke the real conviction of his mind when he said that that conclusion, however plausible, was false. England threatened Germany; that could not be denied. But the essential thing to observe was that all those threats were uttered during the first phase of the affair, when there was every reason to expect that France and Russia would join with this country in resisting the dismemberment of Denmark. Those threats during that period were perfectly sincere, and would have been carried out. After it had become clear that Russia and Franco would not join, then from that moment England ceased to menace Germany with armed resistance, and betook herself to negotiation alone. Those who wished to form a true judgment on the conduct of the Government could not do so unless they fixed their eyes on that vital point of time and circumstances under which those me-

  1253
  naces were uttered; and he could not refrain from saying how glad he was that the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) with that candour and love of truth which distinguished him, had admitted the bearing of those considerations on that famous sentence which had been so often cast in the teeth of the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Out whether those threats were defensible or not, be could not think that the question they had to decide was a mere question of the force and meaning of phrases It would be a most pitiful thing for Parliament to abdicate its functions as supreme judge of the policy of this country, and turn itself into a petty critic of the details of the manner in which that policy had been carried out. The Resolution proposed by the right hon. Gentleman was constructed with subtle skill; but depend upon it, the strong common sense of the people of this country would demand that if Parliament condemned or maintained the Government, they should not do so upon the ground of a few phrases, the real tenour of which might have been misconceived and the circumstances of the utterance of which might have been forgotten. The people of this country—nay the people of Europe—were looking to that House for a discussion and a decision upon the broad policy which the Government had pursued. That policy had, it seemed to him, been marked by three main features. It was marked at the outset by an energetic endeavour on the part of England to induce Russia and Prance to combine with us in guaranteeing the integrity of Denmark, if need were, by force of arms. The second great feature, in the policy of the Government was their determination, after France and Russia had rejected those proposals, not to fight for Denmark alone. The third main feature of their policy was, that after the Government had come to that conclusion, although they had decided against war, they did not stand coldly aloof, but came forward earnestly and strenuously as mediators between the combatants, He would state as succinctly as he could what to his mind were the grounds for a true judgment upon each of these main features of the policy of the Government. With regard to the endeavour made last year by the Government to persuade Russia and Prance to combine with us to secure justice to Denmark, he would content himself with saying that he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bucks
  1254
  that such a combination would have rendered war impossible, and therefore as a lover of peace and humanity he held that the Government had been right. He passed on to that far more complex question, which had perplexed every thoughtful mind during the last few months, the question whether the honour and duty of England required us to go to war for Denmark, although standing alone in her defence. Now, he believed that there were few even of those who clearly held that it would not have been well to fight for Denmark but had come to that conclusion with reluctance, hesitation, and pain. No man could be so cold-hearted as not to have watched with admiring sympathy the gallant bearing of the Danes, and the bold front with which they had met the calamities that had swept over them. They had encountered their fate with dignity, firmness, and valour; and our admiration for them had been enhanced by the shame and disgust with which even those who advocated the German side had witnessed the rapacity, the reckless and brutal violence of the Allied Powers—or rather, he should say, of Prussia. Every generous impulse made us long to protect Denmark by force of arms. But not merely the statesmen, but the people of this country had felt that it was not by impulses of indignation that they ought to be swayed, but that it behoved them to investigate rigidly the whole bearings of the case; and distressing as many of them had felt that conclusion to be to which they had been driven, they could not on that account the less acknowledge, that in refraining from giving material aid to Denmark without any support from cither Russia or France, our Government had acted wisely and well. It was admitted, he believed, on all sides, that if England had intervened on behalf of Denmark it would have been simply a piece of generous chivalry on her part, not a course imposed upon this country by any material interest of our own. Now, be cordially allowed that in many cases such a course might be the right and wise one for England to pursue; but what he ventured to affirm was, that the circumstances of this case did not permit us to adopt that fascinating and attractive policy. At the outset we could not blind ourselves to this, that the case on behalf of Denmark was by no means free from complications. This was not, in its commencement at least, an unprovoked aggression by two great Powers, with the view of spoliation. No one who had studied

  1255
  the matter could deny, however warmly we might feel for the Danes, that they had not been guiltless of their own blood. It must be owned that in a very great degree it was owing to their own want of judgment—nay, more, to their own want of justice—when the power rested in their own hands, that these calamities had come upon them. In their treatment of Holstein and Schleswig they were led by violent partisan feeling to act with deplorable harshness and folly, and that, too, in defiance of the urgent remonstrances of England; and thus they had given to Germany a right, which no man could question who had studied the case, to interfere. Some had talked as if England might have aided Denmark with her fleet alone. But she must undoubtedly have landed a large army to prevent the irruption of the German hosts; and, whatever they might think of England's power of waging war, surely no statesman but must pause at the thought of a collision with the enormous force wielded by the 40,000,000 who inhabit Germany, and whose peace establishment was said to be little short of a million men; and we were to encounter those serious risks for a cause the justice of which was far from clear, at a moment when already our energies were seriously taxed, and the horizon seemed to be lowering with coming storms. At the commencement of the year when these affairs in the North of Europe were their most ominous aspect, we were either actually engaged in war, or war seemed likely to arise in Japan, China, India, and New Zealand; above all, at that time, there was grave reason to fear that the excessive irritation of the Federals might involve us in war with them on behalf of Canada. But then they had been told that we possessed an extraordinary power of assailing Germany in the rear, by stirring up revolution among the oppressed nationalities of Southern Europe; but, even had that task been easy, he asked what British statesman worthy of the name—he asked what man of common sense or common humanity—would have cared to take the awful responsibility of lighting the flames of civil war and filling Southern Europe with bloodshed and ruin? He should shrink with horror from the idea of stepping forward to kindle such a conflagration as that. Then, again, as Earl Russell had more than once hinted, who could say what attempt France might make were we at war with Germany, to seize on the left bank of the Rhine? and no one
  1256
  could think without dismay of the calamities which such a step might bring upon Europe. These considerations might seem ample, but they could not also forget the frightful risks to our commerce which such a war would engender. If honour demanded war, all considerations of expediency must, of course, give way; but without the compulsion of honour or duty it would be little less than wickedness for a statesman to involve his country in a war that must involve a fearful loss of life and fearful suffering. He thought the Government deserved the thanks and not the condemnation of the House, inasmuch as they had kept the country at peace, when there were great temptations to involve it in war. He would now touch very briefly on the third and last main feature of the policy of the Government. In deciding for peace they might have taken either the one or the other of two courses. They might, like France and Russia, have looked on with cold indifference and refused to move a finger to stave off or to soften the disasters that had befallen Denmark. Such a course would have had all the prudence that attends upon unalloyed selfishness; and they had learnt in that debate that such a course would have been approved by some on both sides of the House. As a Member of the Liberal party, he rejoiced that their leaders did not take that cold and selfish course. He rejoiced that they were moved by generous sympathy for Denmark, by an earnest desire to prevent wrong from being done, and to preserve the peace of Europe. Actuated by such motives they came forward as mediators in the strife, and earnestly and strenuously endeavoured to prevent, and then to stop the war between Germany and Denmark. In doing so they had, of course, to urge upon Denmark to make great sacrifices; they had at the same time to force the German statesmen to remember the obligations that bound them and the claims of justice and humanity. It was inevitable that a mediator playing such a part and allaying the pretensions of either side should incur condemnation from all sides, and encounter ridicule and abuse from those who found their schemes opposed. The generous endeavour of England to restore peace failed. It remained for them to bear with dignity the misconstruction to which failure could not but expose them from those who cared little for peace and humanity, but much for seeing what they called the humiliation of England, or of the Liberal Government.

  1257
  His own conviction was that when the excitement had died away, and the policy of England was calmly judged, then, despite some errors, it would be owned to have been a policy statesmanlike and prudent as regarded ourselves, towards others generous and humane.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEsaid, that the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken had fallen into the same error that had been committed by many hon. Members on his side of the House, who had spoken in this debate—he had misstated the nature of the case against the Government, and had misunderstood the arguments by which it was supported. The hon. Gentleman, like others, had argued the question as if the whole matter depended on the production of meagre extracts from despatches. They turned and twisted these extracts as they pleased, and when they had compared one sentence with another, and said that the Opposition had attached too much importance to this or that passage, they thought they had upset the case against the Government. But that was not the way in which this question was to be dealt with. The charge against the Government did not rest upon a few meagre extracts which might be twisted and turned, this way and that, but upon the evidence on which the Resolution was founded affirming that England had been humiliated and her just influence lowered in the recent negotiations. The charge against the Government rested on the want of sagacity and statesmanship shown by them in the whole course of the negotiations, and the supporters of the Resolution maintained, not that England had been humiliated, but that through the conduct of the Administration she had lost a portion of her just influence among the nations of Europe. When the Treaty of 1852 was concluded the best arrangement which the circumstances of the time admitted of was made, but it was an arrangement containing in itself great difficulties, because it involved the maintenance of relations of a complicated description between Germany and Denmark In the course of the ten years which followed, it appeared that neither Denmark nor Germany were prepared to carry out the arrangement of 1852, and by 1862 it ought to have become obvious to any statesman of sagacity that it had become extremely difficult or impossible to maintain that arrangement. What, then, was the position which England ought to have oc-
  1258
  cupied and the course she should have taken? Having no personal or distinct private interest in the maintenance of the treaty, but interested in preserving the balance of power, England ought to have occupied the position of mediator and arbitrator, and thus she would have been able to mediate with effect and influence. Now, what was required of a mediator and arbitrator who desired to act effectually in the matter? It was essential that he should be recognized as impartial and as prepared to take a fair view of the question. Did England, under the guidance of the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office, occupy that position? On the contrary, she had been notoriously placed in the opposite position by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary. In September, 1862, the noble Earl, instead of maintaining this attitude of reserve and inpartiality, stepped forward without necessity, and by the despatch of the 24th of September he expressed his opinion that Denmark was wrong in the questions between her and Germany, and pointed out concessions which she ought to make in order to set herself right. The effect of that announcement was such as might have been expected. It encouraged the German feeling throughout the Continent, while upon Denmark the effect was depressing and discouraging; and she remonstrated, and replied with so much indignation that the noble Earl was obliged in November to send out a second despatch, somewhat modifying the expressions he had previously used. The consequence was that on this second despatch Denmark pretended to found the Patent of March, which was the foundation of the ensuing troubles. He did not say that the despatch justified Denmark in what she did, but it furnished her with an excuse. The consequence was that England no longer stood in the position of an impartial mediator, but was looked upon as a partisan. Was not this an entire misconception of the position she ought to have held? It was one of the chief difficulties, as appeared from the despatches, which the English Government had to contend against when they wished to give advice. In another respect the conduct of the Government had not been such as to maintain the just influence of England. The Government had not gone with a single aim and mind. There had been a double mind. There had been a desire, on the part of one part of the Cabinet, for strong measures, and a desire on the part of another, to remain quiet. If one or other of these

  1259
  lines had been adopted, the dispute between Denmark and Germany might have been brought to some conclusion; but the consequence of adopting both lines and of the vacillation which ensued was to lower the influence of England. So much for the policy of the Government which the Resolution censured. With regard to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bridgewater, which was about to be proposed and accepted, he understood, by the Government, it was his opinion that the address, amended as that hon. Member proposed, would read like an echo of the speech of the noble Lord at the head of the Government on Monday week, when the noble Lord wound up his observations that England might find herself, in the event of an attack on Copenhagen, under the necessity to take other measures; because the hon. Member for Bridgewater did not express any general or universal preference for peace, but only that it was satisfactory that the Government had not advised Her Majesty to go to war at this conjuncture. That was to say that there might be other conjunctures when war would be necessary. The Opposition side of the House had been told to lay down a policy; but the Amendment laid down no policy at all, but merely stated this, that at that particular conjuncture of affairs it would be peculiarly objectionable and dangerous to go to war, while it held out the menace that in certain circumstances England would go to war. So that there was to be kept up that policy of menace which had already brought such degradation upon the country—and that policy would have the sanction of the House. Such would be the consequence of endorsing with approval the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bridgewater. The Opposition had been asked to submit their policy, but they had not the means of laying down a definite and detailed policy, like the Government. They might, however, retort the question, and ask what was the policy of the Government for the future? Did they really mean to go to war if Zealand were invaded and Copenhagen besieged? and did those who voted for the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bridgewater intend to approve that course? The Amendment in question was not so much an expression of confidence in the Government as an approval of their conduct in this transaction. Hon. Gentlemen opposite might say they were not very well pleased with the behaviour of the Ministry, but did not wish to turn them
  1260
  out. Then they might either accept the Motion, appending a rider stating confidence in the Government, or meet it by a direct negative, and propose a Vote of Confidence. If the Government had, as was generally acknowledged, committed the fault of interfering unnecessarily with other countries, and uttering menaces which they did not intend to fulfil, that fault ought to be censured, as a warning for the future to this or any other Government that might happen to be in office. But care should be taken not to mix up approval of a line of conduct which was mischievous and objectionable with a general expression of confidence in the Government.
  MR. CLAY, at this exhausted stage of the debate, would not allude to many topics which had been introduced into it without any very distinct bearing on the matter at issue. He would not even discuss with his hon. friend the Member for Liskeard the state of the Liberal party, further than to say that, when that party had been purified by the defection of his hon. Friend, the poor residuum must do as well as it could without him. He would not even inquire whether a better Government might not be found, taken from hon. Gentlemen opposite, than that which sat below him. Thank Heaven, on either side of the House, England could find a Government in which she and Parliament could place confidence. This was not the question. It was—and a very simple one—has the Government so conducted these negotiations as to sully the honour of England, and forfeit the confidence of the House of Commons? He would state his reasons for the vote he was about to give, and hoped to find a better one than that which he had heard, not without pain, from too many speakers on his side of the House, namely, that they disapproved of the policy of the Government from beginning to end. Before he censured any man for doing badly, he liked to feel some confidence that he in their place, or that others in their place, would have done better. They had heard a great deal of what Government ought not to have done, but next to nothing of what they ought to have done. Hon. Gentlemen opposite had been very niggardly in gratifying the natural curiosity of their opponents, and of saying what ought to have been done in the past, what should be done in the future. Two speakers alone—both distinguished speakers, the one among the oldest in parliamentary age, the other amongst

  1261
  the youngest of their companions, the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield and the hon. Member for Canterbury—had alone had the courage to say what ought to have been done, what they themselves would have done. The hon. Member for Canterbury said, that we should have told the Danes, "Act on our advice, and, if so doing does not secure to you peace and the integrity of your dominions, we will fight for you." The hon. Member for Sheffield says, that we should have told Germany, and this comes to much the same thing, that we should consider the entry of German troops into the Duchies to be a casus belli. They both tell the House that the course they recommend would have prevented war. He (Mr. Clay) could come to no such conclusion. Under all ordinary circumstances this might have been the case, but the circumstances attending this Dano-German question were altogether exceptional. Such was the excited feeling of the German people for their nationality—so strong was it, and so universal—that it was clear that their rulers must either he its leaders or its victims. The German Courts, with perhaps the exception of Austria, were placed between war and revolution; and even last year, when it was commonly said, "Austria and Prussia can never be so mad as to go to war," he had never doubted which alternative they would choose. War was a great evil, no doubt; it was a wound, it left a scar, but it healed. Revolution, from the point of view of a German Court, was a far greater evil. It was the destruction of dynasties, the utter upsetting of the existing order of things, the inauguration of anew order, than which nothing was to be more deprecated. The course, then, which has been recommended by the only two speakers who have had the courage to recommend anything would not have secured peace, but, on the contrary, would have landed England some months back in a war in which she has no very distinct interest. But the right hon. and gallant General the Member for Huntingdon had laid down a principle for the foreign policy of this country in a speech—nor was this any disparagement to other speakers—which received and deserved as much attention as any during the debate. Yet, what did his principle come to, repeated with much variety of illustration? It came to this—In all foreign squabbles England must hold her tongue or be prepared to fight. Nor was it doubtful which course the gallant General would
  1262
  take. He very naturally prefers the sword to the pen. His (Mr. Clay's) answer was, that the country would not permit either of the alternatives which the gallant General presented to the Government. The policy of this country, and no part of that policy more than its foreign policy, was of necessity a reflection, more or less accurate, of the feeling of the people. Imperfect as the representative system might be, it at least secured this much. He might be told that it was the duty of Government to lead popular feeling, and not to follow it. He would not stay to discuss this proposition, but would leave it, with the remark, that any Government which acted on it would be very short-lived. At least, when the issue was whether the honour of the country had been tarnished, it was not beside the question to ask how the country understood her own honour. Well, he believed that the Government in these negotiations had accurately represented the feeling of the country ["No, no!"] No, no, why not? Would the country have permitted its Government to be silent while blood was poured forth like water, and might was over-riding defenceless right in Europe? Would they have been content that Government, with folded hands, should have stood by an unconcerned spectator, while the bloody drama of Poland was acted over again in Denmark? No. The country would have dismissed with contempt the Government which had been unmindful of the call of humanity. On the other hand, would it have been tolerated that this country should have been plunged, single-handed, in a war for a cause which only remotely can concern England? No. The country would have dismissed in wrath the Government which had been unmindful of the interests of England. The feeling of the country was to use every possible means, short of war, to avert its horrors from Europe. Entreaty, remonstrances, search for foreign co-operation, menace, if you please, but not a single-handed war. This feeling had been accurately represented by the Government, and, if so, nothing remained of this mighty matter but a question of style and manner unworthy a serious discussion. It would be strange indeed if, ranging over 1,500 pages of despatches, passages—many of them—were not to be found open to the animadversion of 300 critics, not ill-disposed to find fault. He would now, in the fewest words he could find, consider what the Government had

  1263
  had to do, and how they had done it. They had to deal with a question surrounded by very unusual difficulty. They had to deal with one nation, obstinate to a proverb—with the German people madly excited by the feeling of nationality beyond any parallel, in their history—and with the German courts; nor was this the smallest difficulty, forced, when face to face with revolutions, which he ventured to prophesy were only postponed—to abandon the traditions of a prudent policy which had hitherto distinguished them—they had to deal with Allies having different interests in the matter in dispute. How did they come out of this difficulty? Why, they had approached within a hair's breadth of a settlement, ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen opposite would say, "What a settlement? How unlike the Treaty of 1852!" Yes. But was it so new either in the affairs of private life, or in diplomacy, to start with terms very different from those which would be ultimately accepted. He would ask the gallant General, did he always ask, at first, for his horse the price which he would be contented to accept, or was it the practice in diplomacy to commence with an ultimatum? If he (Mr. Clay) wished to know whether a bargain was a good one, he looked—not at the first terms asked—but at those which might be eventually agreed to. Well, the settlement of this question, to which the Government had so nearly approached, would have been so advantageous, that he ventured to say that England would have found no terms of laudation too glowing for the Government, who while they would have restored peace to Europe, would have satisfied German nationality, and would have left Denmark all the stronger from the loss of a population disaffected to her sway. So nearly had the Government arrived at this great settlement—a mere strip and ribbon of territory dividing the disputants—that he charged it as a crime against the obstinacy of the one and the wicked ambition of the other that it had not been concluded, and that war's torch had again been set a blaze in Europe. Against Denmark he charged a folly—against Germany a crime—against the Government, a failure, if they liked—but a failure which ought to have been a success—a failure which was so near a success that he, for one, would not, on account of it, help to propitiate foreign courts—and it might be their own—by the disgrace of the noble Lord at the head of the Government,
  1264
  and of the foreign Secretary. He, on its account, would not displace a Ministry; still more strongly he refused, on its account, to append his signature on the journals of the House, to the record, to which this Resolution invited him, of the humiliation of his country.
  MR. WALPOLE: Sir, in the graver parts of the very lively speech which we heard at the commencement of the evening, two remarks were made by the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Osborne) which require more than a passing observation. One of those remarks had reference to the causes of the troubles which now unfortunately exist in the North of Europe; the other had reference to the Treaty of 1852. As to the causes of those disturbances which exist in the North of Europe, the hon. Member found fault with the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden) and the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), whose powerful and characteristic speeches appear to me, both upon that and upon other parts of the question, to have exhausted almost everything which can be said upon it. If I have read the papers which have been placed in the hands of hon. Members to any purpose, it is to my mind demonstratively clear that to allege that the populations of Schleswig and Holstein were the cause of the troubles in the North of Europe is to allege that which is totally unfounded in fact. On the contrary, those troubles were an import from a foreign land. They were fomented, they were encouraged, they were excited, and enforced by a revolutionary spirit working in Germany, which, acting on the idea of a fatherland, and adopting the dangerous doctrine of nationalities, determined the German people to appropriate to themselves territories and possessions which never belonged to them. When I look to the conduct of the two Great Powers who ought to have exercised some influence over the minor States of Germany, I own that I feel astonished at the manner in which they have allowed themselves to be home away by that violent current until they themselves became the principal movers in a transaction which history will brand with a mark as black as the partition of Poland. Those Powers seem to me to have been gathering up the shreds of that wild movement which burst over Europe in 1848; and, having done so, they seem to have given to it a force and a consistency which would not be satisfied with anything less than the disrup-

  1265
  tion of solemn obligations which they could no longer keep, because they were under a pressure too great to allow them to be maintained. This leads me to the extraordinary statements of the hon. Member for Liskeard, in reference to the Treaty of 1852. If the observations which have fallen from the hon. Member are really to be the arguments which are to guide the policy of this House with regard to the affairs of Europe and with reference to treaties of this kind—if the alleged discontent of Prussia and the protest she has made with regard to the Protocols is to be a reason why, after putting her hand to a solemn instrument, she is to be allowed to repudiate it, then I say, deliberately, that the public law of Europe is broken up, and with the breaking up of that public law you have no security for the rights of nations, nor for the maintenance of future peace. Although it is true that the name of Prussia does not appear to the Protocol of London, yet the name of Prussia, through her Ambassador, does appear to the Protocol signed at Berlin, which is to the same effect. She is bound by that Protocol. Both Austria and Prussia had given in their adhesion to the Protocols of 1850: both those Powers entered into a correspondence in 1851; both signed the Treaty of 1852; and then, forsooth, they try to import into those treaties something different to supersede them, whereas, if any such object was in their mind, they were bound to communicate it at the time the treaties were signed, and not to insist upon engagements which were never incorporated into such treaties. That is a most serious matter for the House to consider; for if it amounts to anything it amounts to this—that prior engagements contained only in diplomatic notes, and never incorporated in a subsequent treaty, are to supersede and set at nought the most solemn obligations. If such a doctrine were established, you would have no security for the maintenance of international rights. That was the first great blunder in these transactions. I am astonished to find that even these diplomatic notes have had a consequence assigned to them which they do not bear; for Germany seems always to be insisting on the one condition in them—the non-incorporation of Schleswig, but seems to have forgotten the other condition on which alone that first condition was made, namely, the non-amalgamation of Schleswig and Holstein. If you look to these notes, the one fact is as clear as the
  1266
  other; and, to my utter astonishment, it does not appear to have occurred to the minds of all the great Ministers and diplomatists in dealing with this question, until it was mentioned by Earl Russell in the autumn of last year. When it was communicated to the French Ambassador, the French Ambassador was astonished to find that the non-amalgamation of the two Duchies had been so provided for. One false step is sure to lead to another, and this false step led unquestionably to that of which we have heard so much—an interference and an intermeddling with the affairs of a foreign State which would have made that State the abject vassal of the Power who interfered with her. Throughout 1861, 1862, and 1863 this was going on. No doubt, Germany, on the part of Holstein, was demanding too much when she demanded the right to interfere with the affairs of Denmark Proper; but Denmark also demanded too much when she desired to limit to an undue extent the powers of Holstein. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State draws a distinction between intervening and interfering, and says that interfering means intermeddling with the internal affairs of foreign countries, and that intervening is a course taken in the interests of peace. But the charge which I cannot help bringing against the Government is, that during the years 1861 and 1862, they did not intervene in the sense in which you say that they did, but that they interfered to an extent and in a manner which no Government had heretofore done with the affairs of another. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, having, I suppose, lost the opportunity of bringing in a Reform Bill for his own country, proposed no less than three Reform Bills for Schleswig-Holstein, and one of those three was of such a nature that the Minister of Denmark was forced to tell our Minister that it must lead either to anarchy or to absolutism. But, as one false step loads to another, this second false step led on to a third. When Germany succeeded in getting this right to interfere in the affairs of Denmark she set up another pretence for doing so—namely, nationality. Nationalities, indeed! What are they? How can you define them—by natural boundaries, unity of laws, unity of religion, or unity of language? Depend upon it that if you, or if Austria or Prussia set up that doctrine, whether on the ground of natural boundaries or of unity of religion, laws, or lan-

  1267
  guage, the argument can be turned against themselves with tenfold force; and I hope the House and the country will never listen to a doctrine of that kind, which must end in throwing Europe into a state of anarchy. How can Germany set up the ground of natural boundaries? How can she set up the ground of unity of religion? The Thirty Years' War and the Treaty of Westphalia are the answer to that. Then if they take the ground of language, have Prussia and Austria no subjects who may set up a counter-claim against them? And are they going to press these claims where there are people of German extraction in other countries, as, for instance, in Alsatia, Lorraine, and elsewhere? See what difficulties ultimately arose in attempting to settle these matters in the Conference. You could not draw the boundary line between the German and the Danish parts of Schleswig. You got a narrow strip of land, and the only thing you could do was to propose that an arbitrator should fix upon an artificial lino—and you must also remember that a grave and conclusive objection on the point was taken by Denmark, who said, "You cannot decide on the question of boundary without determining for me what is to be my military and commercial security. I cannot part with this portion of the subject without turning for a moment to the monstrous notion, that when Powers claim a right to themselves, they are to make themselves judges and executioners in their own cause, and are to take material possession of the countries in dispute. Different reasons are assigned by Prussia and Austria for this movement. First it is said that they could not control the German people, who, unless this war had been undertaken, would have created a civil war; and next it is said that the movement could not be stopped unless Denmark made a coup d'état and got rid of her too democratic institutions. And now, forsooth, the German Powers have taken possession of these countries and inflicted on them the cruellest wrongs. I need not describe how they have treated the Danish functionaries, nor say that they have established a censorship of the press where it did not exist before. They have also gone into Jutland to collect war contributions and imposts in order to feed the war so unrighteously entered upon. And the climax is that we are now told that war breaks up treaties, and so they may treat their victims, who ought to be secure under those treaties, as
  1268
  they may see fit. Let me ask how, then, the Government ought to have dealt with these questions. I entirely agree with the observation of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Disraeli) that you were perfectly entitled to take either of two courses. You might, on the one hand, have said, "As there is no guarantee, we do not promise to give you material aid, because we did not think we have sufficient interest involved." On the other hand, when such wrongs as I have referred to were committed, you would have been perfectly justified, in the interests of justice and peace, in giving that aid to Denmark which she required. Which of those two courses was the best I will not say. That may be open to different constructions by different minds. The hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden) would never interfere at all. That is an intelligible policy. Others would have interfered, if necessary, by war. That also might have been an intelligible policy. But this, I think, is clear, that you ought to have a definite and distinct policy marked out for yourselves one way or the other. There is no doubt the wrongs committed were so great that if you intend to protect the rights and independence of nations you were fully entitled—and, provided you had the co-operation of others, in my opinion you ought to have exercised your right—you were fairly entitled to arrest or check the perpetration of those wrongs. That is my deliberate opinion. And the reason for it is, I must say, very strong. We have heard much of Poland in this debate. Remember its partition. How has history dealt with that great crime? It has fixed the worst blame on the perpetrators; but it has also blamed France, England, and other Powers for standing by and allowing its consummation. You might have said, then, that you could not allow this wrong to be done towards Denmark without contracting some portion of its guilt. But why did you not take that course? The answer is that you were isolated and left alone. And why were you thus isolated? Because by your own conduct you had estranged France and Russia from you and forced them into the cold reserve of wounded pride. You had irritated and offended the very Powers by whom this great mischief could have been averted. Without their co-operation half your influence was taken away. But the influence which may be exercised—and I trust always will be exercised—by England can only be preserved

  1269
  if, when she threatens, she is prepared in case of need to strike; but you must not threaten with words unless you are ready to follow them up by deeds. And now you have given inducements to Denmark to persevere in a course under the promise of assistance, or very nearly the promise of it, and then you have abandoned her. But, it is said, it ill becomes this House to take notice of these facts. Sir, I think it would ill become this House to be silent when these facts are patent. Had Parliament not spoken, our just influence would have been much injured by obviously shrinking from the duty plainly devolving upon us, just as the influence of England is lowered by the course you have taken. And what is the reason for all this? History often repeats herself, and history is repeating herself now. Remember the Crimean war. What was the cause of your misfortunes then? Divided counsels. What is the misfortune of your position now? Divided counsels. In the case of the Crimean war you went on drifting, drifting, drifting; in this case you have also gone on drifting, drifting, drifting; but there is this difference—in the one case you drifted into war, in this case you have drifted into shame and disgrace. Your motto then was too late! too late into the Principalities, too late into the Black Sea. Your motto now is again too late! too late in applying to France and Russia for the co-operation you would have obtained earlier—too late in not protecting Denmark before the islands are taken—and you will be too late again in protecting Copenhagen and the King, for you will not undertake again to do more than re-consider the question until Copenhagen is taken. I say, then, it is the duty of this House to speak out. And in what sense should it speak out? There is only one sense in which it can speak out, and that is to speak the truth. There is only one way in which it can speak the truth, and that is to say what this resolution says—namely, that you have not maintained the independence of Denmark—that you have not maintained her rights and her integrity, but that you have lowered the influence of England, and you have thereby diminished your means of preserving the peace of the world. Well, but I am told that we on this side of the House ought to declare the policy which we would pursue. The noble Viscount at the head of Her Majesty's Government has had a great career, and his name will go down to posterity
  1270
  I hope honoured and respected; but I will venture to say that throughout the whole of that career the noble Viscount never heard the notion that it was the duty of an Opposition to find a policy for a Government. It is not the duty of the House to interfere in foreign questions till we have the whole matter before us. It is our duty to leave the initiative with the Government. But the duty enunciated by hon. Gentlemen opposite is that they will take counsel only with Gentlemen on those (the Ministerial) benches as to how the Foreign affairs of the country shall be conducted, and that you who are in office will consult with those out of office, and who cannot know all the facts as to what policy you should adopt. That would be, to use Sir Robert Peel's illustration, when the patient is sick and requires aid, you who receive the fees and ought to find the cure will pocket the fees and leave the responsibility with those who, not having full information, cannot give advice. You are, in short, to have the power and we the responsibility. I say that is a doctrine which inverts the order of things. It transfers a question to the House that ought never to be transferred—(namely, the initiative in matters of war)—to it. Then there is another objection which takes a double form—as urged by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—namely, that if we are to have any vote of this kind at all, we ought to go to the old fashioned way, and have a Vote of Want of Confidence—not a vote with regard to any particular point in the Ministerial policy. It is also said, "Do not humiliate the country by placing on the records of the House a Resolution that the influence of the country is lowered." Now, I say it is much better and fairer to bring the matter to a distinct, clear, indisputable point, whether the Government has done right or wrong in a particular line of policy, than to move a general Vote of Want of Confidence. Then, as to the idea of humiliation in placing this Resolution on record: there is no humiliation in the record; the humiliation is in the circumstances that require you to make such a record in your Journals. My right hon. Friend says, Where are the precedents? The same argument was used in the Crimean War, but I myself pointed out precedent after precedent; and I am persuaded if in the retrospect of the past you find anything justly entitled to blame you will do good instead of harm by placing it on record, because you will warn

  1271
  Ministers not to interfere under such circumstances again in the affairs of other countries. If there be humiliation in such a Resolution, it is in your power to avoid that humiliation by placing before the House a distinct Resolution affirming that the House has confidence in the Government, upon the ground that they have upheld the authority and dignity and just influence of the country. Will you venture to do that? If you did, you would not have ten votes on the other side of the House. Your ablest defenders one and all condemn your conduct in the very strongest terms. That, then, is my justification of this Resolution. Your own supporters condemn your policy, though they give you their votes. Sir, when the Session commenced, the one great anxiety in the public mind was that the Dano-German question should be satisfactorily settled; the one strong desire and feeling of the public heart was that Denmark should be saved and peace preserved. The public looked to the noble Viscount, and they had confidence in him that he would effect that double purpose; and what is the result? Their expectations have failed. Denmark has been ruined—a devastating war has broken out—peace has not been preserved—and now we are told we shall have to go to the country. Well, let us go to the country. Will you go to the country upon this question? Will you go to the country? I will venture for once to prophesy. I will venture to predict that if you do go to the country your constituents will say that had the Government employed more firmness and fewer menaces—had they used more vigour and less vacillation—had they shown more consistency and less uncertainty—they would then have supported the policy pursued. But not having done this, I think they will also tell you this—that, as you had right and justice on your side, you ought to have shown yourselves firmer in counsel. You ought to have used language which you were prepared to abide by. You ought to have exercised strong will and an unwavering hand. If you had done that the public law of Europe, which is the best and perhaps the only guarantee for the permanent peace of Europe, would hare been upheld, your own influence would have been unimpaired, and Denmark would not have been ruined. For all these things the country will also add that the responsibility must rest somewhere. According to the Constitution it rests there (the Mi-
  1272
  nisterial Bench). And such will, I believe, be the verdict of a mortified and indignant people.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, if any doubt could have existed when the notice of this Motion was first given as to its object and importance, that doubt must have been fully dispelled by the debate that has ensued upon it; for we are now told, fairly and plainly, that although the words simply imply censure on one act of the Government, it is intended as a vote of "No confidence;" and that the issue which the House is called upon to determine is, whether Gentlemen on this side of the House or Gentlemen on that side shall be charged with the conduct of the affairs of the country. Now, Sir, I object to much that has passed in this debate—but to two things mainly—first of all, to the attempt to separate my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office from the rest of his Colleagues—a most unconstitutional attempt—a most unfair attempt; an attempt which ought to have been reprobated by those who, having been in office, know the joint responsibility of the Members of a Cabinet. Sir, I declare on my own part and on the part of my Colleagues, that we are all equally responsible for what the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office has done; and therefore I trust that we shall not have any more of these personal attacks upon Earl Russell, but that whatever censure any man may wish to cast upon the conduct of the Government may be aimed at the Government itself, and not at any individual member of it. I also, Sir, regret deeply for my country the pains that have been taken, by many of those who have taken part in this debate, to villify and degrade this country. Not content with blaming the Government, which they were entitled to do, and endeavouring to prove that we were wrong—which they had a right to do if they could prove it—in every step of these transactions, they have maintained that England is degraded, and that she has sunk in the estimation of foreign nations. And when forsooth? and since when? Why, since the termination of the Conferences, which closed a few days ago. Sir, I deny, on the part of the Government, the statements that have been made. I say that England stands as high as she ever did. And those who say she has fallen in the estimation of the world are not the men to whom the honour and dignity of England should be confided.

  1273
  Well, Sir, but this bill of indictment was most singularly brought in by the right hon. Gentleman who moved the Resolution; because, in the early part of his speech, he step by step expressed his approval of what the Government had done. He began by admitting that the Treaty of 1852 was, when it was concluded, a wise and good arrangement. He does not deny that all the Governments who were parties to it congratulated each other for having made what they then thought—and there were grounds for the opinion—a settlement that would insure the peace of Europe. And when we are told that the Prussian Minister of that day, the Chevalier de Bunsen, refused to put his name to a certain Protocol, I believe I am right in saying that so eager was the Prussian Government for the treaty, that the draught was sent from Berlin to London, with a special order that he was to sign it as he received it, and was not to make any objections of his own. Well, then, whatever may have been the feelings of the Chevalier Bunsen, who was known to be a very enthusiastic champion of German unity at the time, his feelings were not shared by his Government, and it is a misrepresentation to infer, because of any objections he may have felt, that Prussia was not sincere and anxious for the conclusion of that Treaty. Saxony was equally pleased with the arrangement then made. That arrangement violated no rights. It simply was that the Danish Parliament should be invited to change the law of succession in Denmark legally, which they did—that the King should be empowered, by his prerogative, to name his successor, which he did; and that that successor should be acknowledged by the contracting Powers as heir to the Danish Crown; and that the States which were then and had been for a long time under the sway of the King of Denmark, should (as far as the object of the treaty went) remain united under the Danish sceptre. It was thought that this arrangement was secured by the change in the law of succession in Denmark, and the renunciation of the Duke of Augustenburg, who was next in succession to Holstein. Well, Sir, we know that the reason why that arrangement failed was, that the Danish Government did not give the German subjects of Schleswig the liberal administrative system to which they were entitled, and that the late King of Denmark committed the same errors which the King of Holland committed with re-
  1274
  gard to Belgium, by interfering in their language, laws, religion, and all those things that are dear to man. That has been a constant source of expostulation on the part of the Germans, and those expostulations were not attended to as they ought to have been. The result of it was, that when the late King died these discontents, which had been smothered during his reign, burst forth as to the disputed succession to Holstein. Then came the Federal Execution in Holstein for the purpose of compelling the King Duke to revoke his Patent.
  And that brings me to the point to which I have often been referred—namely, the answer I made to the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. S. FitzGerald) at the end of last Session. It is said that we began at that time to threaten Germany. I deny that what I said implied any threat of war on the part of England, and the words which I am going to read will, I think, prove it. What I said in answer to the hon. Member was—
  "I have said that we concur entirely with him, and I am satisfied with all reasonable men in Europe, including those in France and Austria, in desiring that the independence and integrity, the rights of Denmark, may be maintained. We are convinced—I am convinced, at least—that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow those rights, and interfere with that independence, those who made the attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with whom they would have tocontend."—[3 Hansard, clxxii. 1252.]
  The context shows, and it is quite plain, when I talked of every man in Europe—when I talked of France and Russia—I did not confine myself to this country. But what preceded that passage? I said just before
  "It is impossible for any man who looks at the map of Europe—I did not say the map of Aldershot and Portsmouth—and who knows the great interests which the Powers of Europe feel in the independence of the Danish Monarchy, to shut his eyes to the fact that the war, begun about a petty dispute concerning the institutions of Holstein, would in all probability not end where it began, and might draw after it consequences that the parties who commenced it would be exceedingly sorry to have caused." [3 Hansard, clxxii. 1251.]
  What I was pointing to was an European war, not a war between this country and the German Powers. But, then, what was it that the hon. Gentleman, who is so much against interference, said which called forth the reply I am now quoting? Why, the hon. Gentleman said, "If the Government would say"—he had said that he apprehended danger from the Execution in Holstein—that the entrance of the Federal

  1275
  troops into Holstein upon grounds of execution misfit might involve consequences fatal to the integrity of Denmark, and then he went on to say,
  "If the Government would say that under pretence of Federal rights the Germanic Confederation were not to interfere with the rights of the Danish Crown, and if France and Russia held similar language, the danger to which he had adverted might be obviated."—[3 Hansard, clxxii. 1249.]
  The hon. Gentleman, therefore, wanted the English Government to say to the Diet, "You shall not go into Holstein for the purpose of executing your Federal law." He said, "Even if England were to say it, the danger might be avoided; but if England were to persuade France and Russia to say it also, the danger which he apprehended would be obviated." Therefore, I say, it is not for the hon. Gentleman who attacks us to say that our expostulations to Prussia and Austria against the course they were taking were not justifiable representations, since he would have had us take a still higher course, and try to prevent them doing that which by the law of Germany and the law of Europe they had a perfect right to do. We did not do that; our representations were of an entirely different character. Well, when the occupation took place, the Danish Government was recommended, not by England alone, but by England and other Powers, not to resist. They did not resist; and when the further invasion of Schleswig was threatened, we endeavoured to persuade the King of Denmark to take steps to revoke that constitution which was made the ground of the occupation of Schleswig as a guarantee for its revocation. He promised that he would do what he could, and as early as he could, for that purpose. Well, then, what was the time when, according to hon. Gentlemen opposite, who complain so much, and at the bottom of whose thoughts lies an in terference by force—what was the time when, in their opinion, that interference ought to have been made? The German troops entered Schleswig about the beginning of the year—the middle of winter. That was not a time when any military or naval operations could have been undertaken by this country. Well, what did we do? From the beginning we endeavoured to persuade France and Russia to concur with us in every step which we took. Menacing language is said to have been used. Why, the menacing language was warning to the German Powers of the dangers to Europe and to themselves which might arise from
  1276
  an extension of the war beyond the quarter in which it had arisen. But the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) in his speech approved our conduct up to September. He says it was wise and judicious, because France was with us. But he went on to say, in September a change took place, and then we disgusted France and lost her support. How, according to him, did that come to pass? It was on account of Poland and the Congress. He says, we abandoned France about Poland. But what was our course with regard to Poland? Were we not told in this House over and over again, that we ought only to interfere diplomatically in favour of Poland? Did not the hon. Member for the King's County repeatedly urge us in that direction, and was not his urging backed by hon. Gentlemen who sit near him? Even the mode of representation was pointed out. We were told not to content ourselves with simple remonstrances on the part of England, but to get France, Austria, and Prussia, and all the Powers of Europe, to concur with us in representing to Russia the expediency of dealing leniently with Poland, and acting towards the Poles in accordance with her treaty engagements. We did so; but we did not do that which we never undertook to do—make war against Russia for that object. My noble Friend avowed that such was not his intention, and the right hon. Gentleman approved the course which we pursued; for he said a little time ago, to make war against Russia for Poland would have been an act of insanity. Therefore, it is unreasonable to allege that the course which we pursued with regard to Poland could have justly offended the Emperor of the French. It is a reflection on the French Emperor to attribute to him a feeling of that kind. Then came the Congress; and with regard to that also the right hon. Gentleman says we were quite right. No one of common understanding, I think, could imagine that a Congress under the existing circumstances could have been attended with any success. The right hon. Gentleman says that a Congress ought to follow action, and not to precede it; and a very just distinction it is, and one entirely applicable. Well, when it is alleged that the conduct of France about Denmark was influenced by what the British Government did in these two instances, it is to impute to the Government of the Emperor of the French motives and conduct unworthy a great Power which has a due regard for

  1277
  its own honour and dignity. France was actuated by quite different motives, and she never concealed them from us. We were certainly led in the beginning to expect that France and Russia would join us in pressing strongly upon the German Powers the impropriety and injustice of their conduct. But France very fairly told us, "A war about Denmark to you would be a naval war, to us it would be a land war. We have all Germany upon our frontier. It would be a great undertaking, costly both in men and treasure, and one, therefore, we are not disposed to undertake for an object which is not a French object, and does not concern the dignity, the possessions, or the welfare of France." I think that was a fair argument, and we had no right to press France any further to adopt the course we had suggested. We lost, therefore, the support of France except morally and diplomatically. Russia we also applied to, and Russia gave us answers which amounted to declining any co-operation. And when one considers the bond of union which exists between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, with respect to Polish affairs, he cannot be much surprised that Russia should not be very willing to employ force against her neighbours. Well, then, step by step up to September, the right hon. Gentleman deems that our policy was wise and judicious. And I contend that after that date likewise it was wise, judicious, and honourable to the country. We laboured to persuade the contending parties to come to an agreement; we recommended just concessions to Denmark; and we remonstrated with the Germans for conduct which was unjustifiable towards Denmark. At last a Conference was proposed; the proposal came from Prussia first. We agreed to it. Some time elapsed before it could be assembled. Questions arose whether an armistice should precede it. We should have preferred that it had; but failing of that, we stipulated that it should be the first subject of discussion. We found it impossible to obtain an armistice, and therefore the first point with us was to assemble the Conference as early as possible. Well, Sir, it is said our influence is gone—we have no influence in Europe; yet, remark that we were invited by other Powers to take steps to bring about the Conference. In that Conference, as the Protocols show, step by step the neutral Powers—France, Russia, and Sweden—went in accordance
  1278
  with England. Nothing was done or proposed by England which was not previously agreed on and concerted with those Powers—and then you say that England is degraded and lowered in the eyes of other nations, and that they have no confidence in her.
  Sir, we are accused of having in the Conference departed from the provisions of the Treaty of 1852. They have certainly been departed from. Necessity compelled that. When the Conference assembled, all the Powers acknowledged themselves bound by the provisions of the treaty—at least as a starting point for negotiations. We did not make it the basis of the Conference because we knew that objections were entertained to it by Prussia, and possibly by Austria and by the Confederation, whose assent to it had never been asked. We took the broader basis—namely, that of endeavouring to arrive at a pacific solution of the question, and to restore peace to Europe. Was that an unworthy object? Was that a defective basis? Why, if that object had been attained, would not that have been acknowledged to be a proper basis for the Conference, and would not the result have been satisfactory? The Germans were asked to state what the terms were on which they were willing to conclude peace. There were certain difficulties in getting them to state those terms. They at last proposed a personal union of the Duchies with Denmark, which the Danish Government were unwilling to accept. Then another proposition was made to separate from Denmark, Holstein and the whole of Schleswig. That was deemed objectionable. They were induced to relax from that pretension; and at last the parties were brought to this—that the Danes consented that the question should be settled by the separation of Holstein from Denmark, together with the German portion of Schleswig. No doubt that was a departure from the provisions of the Treaty of 1852; but I am not on the whole sure that it would have been disadvantageous to Denmark to be quit of a population which had long been discontented and was difficult to be governed—as had been shown at the time of the Royal marriage, when the Holsteiners refused to contribute to the dower offered by the King. So far the parties were brought together that they agreed to a division of Schleswig, a certain part of which was to be united to Holstein; and the whole question came at last to this—where the line

  1279
  should be drawn. There was an impossibility to bring the parties to agree on this point. The Danes demanded the line of the Schlei, the Germans the line from Apenrade to Tondern. We proposed arbitration. If the parties had accepted arbitration, and if the arbitrator had been empowered peremptorily to decide, that would have settled the question; and then, instead of the censure and the condemnations we have heard so lavishly pronounced on us in these debates, all mankind would have acknowledged that our exertions had been crowned with success, and that we had made an honourable agreement between the two parties, and that the peace of Europe had been secured. It was not our fault that the two parties objected to arbitration, which was a most reasonable proposition in itself. It has been said that the English Minister promised to the Danes that if they agreed to the line of the Schlei he would not propose any other line, or support any other line if proposed by any other Power, and that the proposal of arbitration was a departure from that promise. He did make that promise and abided by that arrangement; but that did not fetter his hands from proposing arbitration when it was found impossible to bring the Germans and Danes to an agreement respecting the line that should be adopted. Would it have been a sufficient answer if, after the Conference was broken up, we bad been asked, "Why did you not propose arbitration?" to say that, we were bound to propose no other line but the Schlei? I say that it was proper and our duty to propose arbitration, which, if the proposal had been accepted, would have restored peace. The French Plenipotentiary proposed another solution—namely, an appeal to the population of the disputed districts. That proposal though honourably made was not acceded to. Then, I say, when hon. Gentlemen, not looking to the main features of the transaction, pick out sentences in these blue-books on which to found a vote of condemnation against the Government, though that may be a proceeding which may suit those who wish to blacken and displace the Government, I am persuaded that the country will not think that it is the proper way of treating a great European question. I am sure the country will not join in the proposed condemnation.
  Let us examine what the Resolution is—I speak not of the first and second para-
  1280
  graphs, but of the last. The right hon. Gentleman in the last paragraph proposes that the House should affirm that the influence of England is lowered in the eyes of Europe, and that thereby the security for peace is diminished. That is supported by a great number of gentlemen, who maintain that we ought never to interfere in anything beyond our own shores. What, then, is the use of our influence if we are not to interfere, and how is the peace of Europe endangered by the loss of our influence, if that influence is to be confined to influence within these walls? The Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman is an admission that the doctrine of many of those who support it is unsound in the existing circumstances of the world, and that the great interests connecting a country like ours with every part of the world render it impossible for her to be passive or indifferent as to what is passing among other nations, and that circumstances requiring vigilant watching must sometimes cause her to interfere in transactions in which we are not directly concerned. Then we are told that the balance of power is an exploded doctrine belonging to ancient times. Why, it is a doctrine founded on the nature of man. It means that it is to the interest of the community of nations that no one nation should acquire such a preponderance as to endanger the security of the rest; and it is for the advantage of all that the smaller Powers should be respected in their independence and not swallowed up by their more powerful neighbours. That is the doctrine of the balance of power, and it is a doctrine worthy of being acted upon. We have done our best to rescue Denmark from the danger to which she was exposed, first by counselling her to put herself right when she was wrong, and next by endeavouring to induce her aggressors to refrain from continuing their aggression; and by inducing the neutral Powers to join us in adopting the same course. And what said the right hon. Gentleman in his opening speech on this subject? He said that if England and France were agreed upon the same policy, war would be difficult; but that if England, France, and Russia were agreed, war would be impossible. Well, we tried to make war impossible. But France and Russia would not combine with us, and therefore war became possible, and took place. The right hon. Gentleman has therefore pronounced a panegyric upon our policy, and he ought

  1281
  to vote against his own Resolution. We adopted the best means of rendering war impossible, and the failure was not our fault. At the time I answered the question of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, we had reason to believe that Sweden was going to conclude a treaty offensive and defensive with Denmark; but it was not carried into effect.
  Sir, I deny utterly that the influence of England has been lowered. There is no proof of it whatever. It is a mere assertion. Now, the assertion must refer either to the period before or to the period after the Conference. To the period before the Conference it cannot apply, because it was by the influence of England that the Conference was assembled, in the capital of this country. Neither can it apply to the period subsequent to the Conference, because nothing has taken place during the last fortnight on which such an assertion could be founded. It is, therefore, a gratuitous libel on the country. It is a libel by a great party on the country which they want to govern. Why, such a Resolution being voted, if they came into office and went to a foreign Government saying, "Join us in this or that," would not the answer be, "No, you have put it yourselves on record, that your country is degraded!" At all events it might be said, "If, as you allege, the influence of your country is lowered, you are not the people to restore it." It is, I repeat, a most unfounded assertion, and I trust the House will not be induced to countenance it. It is a libel on our country to record by a vote of the House what is not the fact—namely, that the influence and position of England have been lowered. Sir, the influence of a country depends upon other things than protocols and despatches. It depends on its power to defend itself, on its wealth and prosperity, on its intelligence and cultivation of mind, on the development of the arts and sciences, and on all those things which make a nation truly great and powerful. As long as England retains these conditions, so long shall I deny that her influence has been diminished. I contend, then, that the Resolution which the right hon. Gentleman has proposed is not one which it is fitting for the House to adopt. Observations have been made on the Amendment which my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake) has put on the paper, and it is said by some, that it is intended as an escape from voting on the Resolution of the right
  1282
  hon. Gentleman. I have no hesitation in saying that, for my part, I regret that my hon. Friend has given notice of this Amendment, because I should have been better pleased to have met directly the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bucks. We have, however, just been told by the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir Stafford Northcote), that the Amendment of my hon. Friend expresses entirely the statement which I made to the House not very long ago. If that be so, then the hon. Baronet must admit that we should accept the Amendment. The hon. Baronet went through it step by step to show that it tallied with everything which I stated when I announced the result of the Conference. Nobody can say that, in accepting the Amendment, we are in any way shirking the Resolution. At the same time I certainly did express to my hon. Friend a wish that he would not move the Amendment, so that we might vote on the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman. He declined to comply with that desire, and we are now prepared to vote with him. The real character of the Motion has been more plainly disclosed by some of those who have taken part in the debate, and more especially by the hon. Member for Tipperary (The O'Donoghue). It has been acknowledged that this is not simply a censure upon one individual act or course of action of the Government, It is a declaration of a general want of confidence in the Government, and is intended for the purpose for which such votes are usually moved to oust the Government. I do not complain of the object in view; but I complain of the mode in which it is sought to be attained. I think it would have been more manly, open, and straightforward to put that expression of opinion in the constitutional shape of a Motion of Want of Confidence, instead of endeavouring to wrap it up in extracts from these 1,500 pages of blue-book. Hon. Gentlemen opposite might as well have said frankly, "We think you have been in power for a sufficient period; your continuance there any longer is too much for human patience; everything must have its limit; and the time has come when Parliament should be called upon to say, whether the present Government should be retained, or whether it will have us in their stead." I have not the slightest reproach to address to hon. Gentlemen opposite, except that they have not candidly avowed and set forth in

  1283
  plain language what their true aim is. Some complaints have been made that our despatches are not clear in their language; but I think that objection may well be taken to the Resolution. It would have been far more fair, and far more in accordance with the general custom, if hon. Gentlemen opposite had put their expression of opinion into the shape of a formal Vote of Want of Confidence. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Tipperary said very truly, that this being the case, the House ought to look not merely to the limited action of the Government in this particular case, but to their general conduct in other matters. That would be quite proper and fair; and if a Vote of No Confidence had been proposed, it would have led to a discussion of all the measures of the Government. I contend that if the House would take that view of the matter, it would find that in the five years during which we have been honoured with the confidence of the House and have carried on the Government, the country has continued in an unexampled state of prosperity. More has been done in those years in everything connected with the material interests of the country than perhaps was ever done in the same period of time before; and on that ground alone we may stand and defy any attacks that may be made on us from any quarter whatever. At this hour of the night I know that to go into the details which may be applicable to this argument would be encroaching too much on the time and patience of the House. I would, however, beg leave to state two or three facts which bear on the question, by showing what has been the conduct of the Government, what we have done, and what improvements have taken place in the country during our administration. ["Question."] We listened very patiently to hon. Gentlemen opposite in their abuse of us, and I think it is now but fair that they should listen to the reasons which we think may be fairly stated in our general justification. Between 1860 and 1864 we have reduced the taxation of the country by £12,000,000. With the assistance of the hon. Member for Rochdale, to whom I have repeatedly said the country is much indebted, a commercial treaty was negotiated between France and England, which has wonderfully increased the mercantile relations of the two countries; for whereas the imports from France in 1859 were in value £16,000,000 and odd, in 1863 they reached £24,000,000. In 1859 the exports to France amounted to
  1284
  £9,500,000, while in 1860 they had increased to £22,900,000. It is obvious that this great development of the commerce of the country must have been of the greatest advantage at a time when we are suffering so severely from the supply of cotton from America. During our administration, the permanent National Debt has been reduced by £11,000,000—that is, £6,000,000 has been actually paid off and £5,000,000 have been converted into terminable annuities. The private income of the country has increased to such an extent that the assessment of the Income Tax has been augmented by £27,000,000 in the course of those four or five years. Further, the expenditure has been diminished by £3,000,000 odd. [A VOICE: In what time?] I am now speaking of the years from 1860–1 to 1864–5. Nor have we been unmindful of other matters. Our national defences are naturally of great importance, owing to our insular position, and liability to attack from various quarters. We have endeavoured to place these defences on a satisfactory footing. I willingly give hon. Gentlemen opposite the credit of originating the Volunteer movement; but that means of defence has been wonderfully developed during our administration. Our dockyards are now in course of being made secure. We no longer read pamphlets about the perils of Portsmouth, and I trust that that and the other dockyards will soon be rendered safe from any enemy. The foreign trade of the country has risen from £377,000,000 in 1861 to £444,000,000 in 1863—an increase of no less than £67,000,000 in that short space of time. It is not necessary to go into further details, or I could show the various other improvements which have been effected in savings banks and in other matters which are deeply interesting to the working classes. We have been enabled to go through that great calamity, as it was expected to be, which befel us in the Cotton famine with less disturbance than might have been expected, and with less suffering and privation to those who are engaged in our manufacturing industry. And we have not been solely occupied with the concerns of the United Kingdom. My right hon. Friend who has the management of the affairs of India, has also done great things in regard to that empire. I recollect when the change in the Government of India first took place, that it was said that India was inextricably in

  1285
  debt, and that the time would come when this country would be called upon to defray that debt for her. In 1858, the deficit in the Indian revenue amounted to more than £14.000,000, and in 1864–5 there was a surplus of £823,000. Thus, by the wise administration of my right hon. Friend, a large deficit on our Indian finances has been converted into a growing surplus; the employment of Natives has incensed, and the material well being of the people is well known to everybody, railways have been constructed, telegraphs erected, numerous public works commenced, and every improvement which modern science has produced has been introduced into that country. The exports from India, which in 1858–9 amounted to £29,862.871, had increased in 1862–3 to £46,485,169. Well, then, I say that all these indications of national prosperity show that the contentment and well-being which we know to exist among all classes of Her Majesty's subjects have a good foundation, and that the Government of the Queen which has been intrusted during the last five years with the task of conducting the affairs of the country, has not' neglected any of the interests to which its attention ought to have been directed. On the contrary, they have been the promoters of great improvements in all matters connected with the general interests of the country. We have during our period of office also preserved this country from war. There were many people ready to urge us to take an active part in that war which is now being carried on in North America. We were not without reasons and motives which might have afforded us a fair justification for taking part in that contest; but we abstained. No doubt there are some who thought that we ought to have leant more to one side, and some that we ought to have leant more to the other; but our conduct has been that of rigid and impartial neutrality, and we have saved the country from all the calamities which would have been created by a state of war. I know there are Gentlemen in this House who do not entirely approve of the policy we have pursued in China. That may be a subject for discussion; but the result certainly has been a great development of our trade with China, and a good understanding with the Government of China. Therefore I say, that whatever may be said of the steps by which we arrived at that conclusion, no one can deny that the result has been advantageous to the country. We have also
  1286
  preserved good relations with all the countries of Europe. A statement has been made that in the last Speech from the Throne for the first time was omitted the sentence in which Her Majesty stated that she had received friendly assurances from Foreign Powers. The hon. Gentlemen who made that assertion are very ill-read in Royal Speeches; because I can assure them that it is not this year for the first time that that very unmeaning passage has been left out. Indeed, I trust that it will never appear again, because such friendly assurances are never given or received. The only meaning of the passage is, that the Sovereign was in good relations with Foreign Powers, and it is better to say that plainly than to have this roundabout and stereotyped phrase, which for so many years had been inserted as a matter of course. In the present case we could not say so sincerely, because we had differences with Austria and Prussia which rendered it impossible to make that assertion; but when these differences are over, I hope it may be shown in the Queen's Speech that the manner in which affairs of this country have been conducted for some years past have produced that result. Well, Sir, that being the case, I contend that we are entitled to the confidence of this House. I quite admit that hon. Gentlemen opposite are perfectly entitled to make a great struggle for power. It is an honourable struggle, and I make it no matter of reproach. They are a great party, comprising n great number of men of ability and influence in the country; and they are perfectly entitled, whenever they think the prize is within their reach, to make an attack upon those who hold it. But, on the other hand, I say that we have not done anything to deserve that that prize should be taken from us. I think that we have conducted the affairs of the country during the five years we have been on these seats with honour and advantage to the country, with credit to ourselves, and in a manner deserving the approbation of this House and the confidence of the country. ["No!"] Although hon. Gentlemen opposite meet that assertion with "No, no, no!" I am very strongly inclined to think that whatever the decision of this closely packed assembly may be to-night, the country at large will answer in the affirmative, and will re-echo the assertion which I have just made. I think there has been no sufficient ground established for the Motion. It evades and shirks the real object of the

  1287
  Movers; namely, a declaration, which they ought to have come forward and proposed in a manly way, that the Government have lost the confidence of the country. I think this a Motion not founded on justice or on facts. I confidently believe that the decision of the House to-night will be the rejection of the Motion and the substitution of the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgewater; but whatever the decision of the House may be—and I am satisfied it will be in our favour—I am confident that the acceptance of the Resolution would not be in accordance with the general feeling of the people of this country.
  MR. DISRAELI: Sir, on Monday last I moved an Address to the Crown thanking Her Majesty for the papers connected with the late negotiations which had been placed on the table; and at the same time in that Address I made three statements which I trusted the House would accept. The first was that Her Majesty's Government had failed in their avowed policy, which was to uphold the integrity and independence of Denmark; the second was to represent to Her Majesty that by the course of their proceedings the just influence of this country in the councils of Europe had been lowered; and the third was that by the lowering of the just influence of the country in the councils of Europe the securities for peace were diminished. In introducing that Resolution to the consideration of the House I had—as is inevitable under such circumstances—to quote considerably, though in as small a proportion as I could, from the mass of diplomatic Correspondence which had been laid on the table. I have observed that frequently under similar circumstances—in the case of the first China debate, for instance, in which Sir James Graham took a leading part—where the opinion of the House has been asked upon multifarious papers, somewhat needless accusations have been made on both sides of the House that documents have been unfairly quoted. I was therefore careful to avoid such imputations in the present instance. I quoted no passage without at the same time giving the page, so that detection might be immediate; and I never quoted secondhand, but read from extracts copied by myself. I am not conscious of ever having intentionally garbled or misquoted any passage; and having listened with the utmost attention throughout this debate of four days, and having read the
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  despatches referred to by hon. Members on both sides of the House, who have drawn from the same documents different inferences, I am bound to say that, as far as I can judge, there have been no quotations of an unfair character. On the contrary, the documents have been handled in a legitimate manner; and it is my belief that that is the invariable practice of this House. Indeed, it seems to me, totally irrespective of higher considerations, that it would be absurd for any person who founds his arguments on documents of this character willingly to misquote or misrepresent them. What would he render himself liable to? There sit opposite to him hon. Gentlemen who have the very same papers in their hands, and therefore have the means of correcting him; they can instantly refer to the document he is quoting. Therefore, that it should for a moment be supposed under such circumstances that any hon. Gentlemen would attempt to misquote or misrepresent documents appears to me very extraordinary. Therefore, nothing impressed me with the weakness of the case of the Government more than when the most distinguished orator on the Treasury bench rose to answer me, and at once resorted to the old and, I will not say, vulgar habit, because the epithet might be misunderstood—but a habit certainly which ought not to be sanctioned by the House—namely, that of accusing one of misquoting and misrepresenting papers on the table. That person must not only be incompetent, but absolutely silly, who should attempt to address the House of Commons on an occasion of this kind and bring forward a case founded on the misquotation or garbling of public correspondence. I am conscious that I did nothing of the sort. Of course, at this period of the debate, I will not go into any details as to that charge; I should be quite content to meet any half dozen of my opponents in a private room on the matter, where I am persuaded they would acquit me of any intention of that kind. If I refer to one point at all, it is only because the merits of the case are concerned in it; and that is my reference to the despatch to Lord Russell from our Chargé d'Affaires at Paris. I had a copy of that despatch in my hand; but I did not read the whole of it, only as much as I thought sufficiently proved the fact I desired to ink press upon the House. The rest of the despatch confirmed my view, or I should

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  not have copied it; but I omitted it to save the time of the House. What was my object in quoting that despatch? It was the answer from Mr. Grey to Lord Russell, describing a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. What I wished to show was—not as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others who followed him have represented,—that the Emperor of the French, out of mere pique, would not act with the English Government—I do not think that any Prince or Government in Europe would act out of pique—I assume, they understand their own interests too keenly for that; and I should think the Emperor of the French, a very sagacious Prince, is about the last who would be likely to do such a thing. I did not mean to say that the Emperor had washed his hands of all concern about the affairs of Denmark, and would have nothing more to do with them; but I wanted to show—and I think the extract which I read certainly did show—that the Emperor, inconsequence of what had occurred between England and France in regard to the negotiations respecting Poland, had not sufficient confidence any longer in the steadfast policy of the English Government that he would act with them. I did not think it necessary to trouble the House with the whole of the despatch; but the part which I omitted strengthened my position, because, what did it say? The French Minister says you are not to suppose that we are indifferent about Denmark, but we decline to act with you. Therefore, the very passage which I am charged with omitting, actually confirmed my statement. The Chancellor of the Exchequer also accused me of "falsifying" a document. After the gracious manner in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer apologized for that expression, I do not recall it to give him the slightest annoyance; but I ask what was the despatch to which that accusation against me applied? I described a despatch as menacing to the Diet, and I will assume that I may have made the mistake of treating a menace applicable to the decree of the Diet in reference to the inheritance of the Duchies, as being applicable to the Federal Execution. I really have not had an opportunity to verify this point, but it is possible that I may have put the matter in that way. But assuming that, it is evidently a most insignificant point, and one that would by no means justify the serious charge that was made. I dismiss all this idle matter, which
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  has really taken up much too much of the time of the House, and which, through so distinguished a person as the Chancellor of the Exchequer having dealt with it, has led to his example being followed by many other hon. Members in this debate; and I come to the material parts of his speech.
  The right hon. Gentleman says, "There are two positions which I lay down: first, you say that the English Government were acting in a very irregular and impolitic manner; that they were menacing here and cajoling there; that Germany was threatened on one day and Denmark misled on another? But I maintain," he said, "that we did nothing that was not done by the other great Powers,—France and Russia." That was stated broadly by the right hon. Gentleman, and has been repeated since; but there is not a tittle of proof of it. We have had plenty of proof that the Government menaced and cajoled, but we have no evidence whatever beyond this stout statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, reiterated as it has been by the Under Secretary. On the contrary, from all we can judge from the papers on the table, the truth is that whenever we announced to the Courts of France and Russia, that we were going to take a certain stop, they sometimes gave a qualified and reluctant assent, and occasionally there may have been one of those mechanical applications to the German Courts recommending or acknowledging with approbation our policy; but there is no proof whatever that the same tone taken by the English Government with respect to the German Courts or the Danish Court was ever adopted by those Powers. If so, why does not Denmark complain of them as of England? Denmark never pretends that France or Russia misled her. The second position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is, that our Government never renewed their menaces after they knew that other Powers would not join them. That is an admission that they did menace before that time. There is no proof of that second position, but there is an immense mass of proof the other way. Sir, I want to know when Her Majesty's Government ceased to menace. The despatch quoted very properly in the excellent speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Dublin University (Mr. Whiteside)—I mean the letter to Lord Bloomfield from Lord Russell, where he gives an account of his conversation with Count Bernstorff—shows that for nine months from the month of May preceding,

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  Her Majesty's Government were in fact threatening Germany with war; when Count Bernstorff adverted shortly and pointedly to the dangers that would be incurred by Europe if Germany and England should ever become enemies,—Lord Russell fully admitted them and as fully regretted their existence—
  "But I (Lord Russell) said that, since the month of May, Great Britain had warned Austria of these dangers; that Prussia and Germany had likewise been warned; but that the voice of England was unheeded, and little time was now left for counsel, wisdom, and moderation. I hoped it would not be thrown away,"—No. 4, 535.
  I hoped it would not be thrown away! What is a menace if that be not one? What do they mean by saying they have not menaced? What has happened in Parliament this year—in both Houses? Have we not had the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords making mysterious announcements about the Channel fleet? What did that mean? Why should the Secretary of State in his place in Parliament tell us that the Channel fleet was ready, and that he did not think the Prussian and Austrian fleet united would dare to meet it? I ask the House what does that mean? Was it merely a playful phrase, just designed to amuse the Peers before dinner, who are not always so busily engaged as they are tonight? What is the meaning of the Secretary of the Admiralty coming down and hitching his trowsers like a celebrated performer in nautical pieces. ["Oh!"] I assure the noble Lord that I only meant an allusion to the profession of which he is an ornament, and declaring that the Channel fleet was all ready to go anywhere in twenty-four hours—what did that mean?
  LORD CLARENCE PAGET: I beg to say that that was spoken in answer to a question from the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich.
  MR. DISRAELI: I have no doubt it was in answer to a question of my right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich—but it was not the question of my right hon. Friend that sent the funds down the next day one per cent. Well, Sir, I say there has been a continuous system of men aces; and I must remind the House that none of the circumstances to which I have just referred have ever been explained or vindicated. There is another point which has come out very much in this debate and never been satisfactorily met by any speaker on behalf of the Government.
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  All the materials on which they formed their ultimate decision respecting interference between Germany and Denmark were in their possession months and months ago; and yet the decision was never formed until after the Conference, when the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) came down and finally communicated it to the House—and communicated it even then with a gloomy and somewhat terrific proviso at the end of his statement, which certainly did not convey to the country the idea that their policy was even then fixed. I want to have that explained. Why was Europe disturbed and the country distracted with the idea of going to war about Denmark, when all the materials on which the ultimate decision of the Government was formed had been in their possession for months and months? They were perfectly acquainted with the fact that France and Russia would not act with them—they knew the exact determination and policy of the German Courts—all those considerations with regard to our finance and commerce, the effect of blockades upon our mercantile intercourse, all these and other considerations must have presented themselves to them; and yet for months and months, with these materials in their possession upon which to come to a decision, that decision was taken at the last moment, and without any satisfactory explanation? "But," says the Chancellor of the Exchequer, "I object to the course you are taking. If we have mismanaged your affairs, this is not the manner in which a great party in opposition should act. You ought to address the Crown to dismiss its Ministers. In the days of the Norths and the Foxes they addressed the Crown in an unequivocal manner to dismiss the Ministers. They never had discussions on Resolutions as to the conduct of negotiations and matters of detail of this kind. They went forward boldly and addressed the Crown." The right hon. Gentleman says, "Not only do you not act in a straightforward manner and address the Crown to dismiss the Ministers, but you use language in your address unprecedented in Parliament—language which depreciates the position of this country, so unusual, so unparliamentary, so unprecedented—language which it will be a disgrace to Parliament to adopt, and which in the great days of the Norths and Foxes was never adopted." Now, I contest the position taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on both these points. I take the case of the fall of the

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  Administration of Lord Shelburne. A peace had been concluded with France, Spain, and America, the independence of our colonies being recognized. Lord Shelburne negotiated that peace. The papers were laid on the table; the Opposition did not approve that peace; and how did they proceed? Did they address the Crown for the dismissal of Ministers? On the contrary, they took a perfectly different course, but not so decided a course as that I have recommended and am prepared to vindicate. They proceeded by Resolution. Lord George Cavendish moved among others, "That the concessions made to the adversaries of Great Britain were greater than they were entitled to." Why, that is not only a proceeding by Resolution, but by a Resolution which would show at least that the Government had made concessions which they were not entitled to make. We might then have proceeded by way of Resolution. But I now come to the other statement of the right hon. Gentleman, echoed by the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) and received always with a chorus of cheers, that there is something unparliamentary, even disgraceful, in the House of Commons proposing in an Address to the Crown to make an allusion to the just influence of the country being lowered. This, said the right hon. Gentleman, is not the course which was taken in the great days of the Norths and Foxes. Well, I take the Address moved by Mr. Fox on one of the most celebrated occasions of this kind that ever occurred, and I will read it to the House, and if Her Majesty's Ministers will accept I it instead of mine—a more modest Address, adapted to the temperate spirit of our times, I shall be perfectly ready to make arrangements to that effect. Mr. Fox said, in his Address to the Crown—
  "We can neither give any credit to the Ministry for their profession of a wish for peace, nor repose any confidence in their capacity for conducting negotiations to prosperous issues, odious as they are to any enemy and contemptible in the eyes of all Europe from the display of insincerity and incapacity which has marked their conduct."
  These are the expressions used by Mr. Fox in his address to the Crown in 1796. I did not use such language; but I think I have answered the objections of the right hon. Gentleman. ["No, no!"] I have proposed an Address to the Crown, which, because it alludes to the just influence of this country having been lowered, is said to be unprecedented, although Mr. Fox, whom the right hon. Gentleman recommended to
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  me as an authority, moved an Address in which the Ministry of the country, which for foreign nations is the country, are described as contemptible in the eyes of Europe. The right hon. Gentleman complains of our not meeting the question in a more explicit and straightforward way. But are we met in an explicit and straightforward way? I never believed, until I heard the speech of the noble Lord, that the Government were really going to shelter themselves under the Amendment, the Amendment which has never been moved, of the hon. Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake). I thought the Chancellor of the Exchequer met us fairly the other night and said, "The real question at issue is this—Are you or are you not satisfied with our administration of your foreign affairs in these negotiations? That is the interpretation I put upon the question. It is a vote of want of confidence in our conduct of those negotiations?" If that be your interpretation of the position you occupy, how can you fall hack on the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bridgewater? What is that Amendment? It is the previous Question, drawn up by an amateur diplomatist, and moved by the historian of the campaign in the Crimea as a compliment, I suppose, to the Emperor of the French. But the noble Lord who has just sat down, and who is going to support the Amendment of the "previous Question" declines to meet the case at all. ["No, no!"] I understand the noble Lord to say that his opinion is that the Government should support it. But the noble Lord has been very careful, though he shields himself formally under the Amendment of the Member for Bridgewater, to make as wide an issue as possible. What consolation Denmark will have from that last account of the investments in our savings banks, I am at a loss to understand. We have had too the Indian Budget to-night, which usually is not brought forward till late in July; and we have also been treated with the marvellous efforts of Government (Providence, of course, having had nothing to do with it) in alleviating the disasters of the Cotton famine. Sir, the issue before the House will be the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bridgewater, which gives no approbation to the conduct of the Government. As far as I can understand it, although they argue on the merits of their case, the Government will not take the opinion of the House boldly upon it. That, I think,

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  is not acting with the fairness we should have expected from Her Majesty's Government. The House has collectively incurred some very hard words, because acting, I think, from very proper motives, they have not hastened to a decision on the policy of the Government; and therefore, as we have at last, and I think at the right time, asked the opinion of the House, we had a right to expect that Her Majesty's Government would not have evaded a decision. We must remember we have all of us been taunted by the right hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) with absolute complicity with Government in avoiding a decision on this question. I will not trespass now upon the indulgence of the House in detail; but one result of this debate will be, that the House of Commons—I do not speak of the Opposition alone—are completely exonerated from any such imputation. I was rather surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs expatiating on our delay in bringing forward this question. Many of the most important despatches were not in our hands until after the Easter holydays, and, although the right hon. Member for Stroud is of opinion that it was my duty to come forward and step in between the Conference when it was announced as about to sit, and its result, and to call upon the House for an opinion that the Government were not justified in calling that Conference together, I am still of opinion that it was far wiser on the part of the Opposition to take the course we did. When the Minister of the Crown, in his place in Parliament, and speaking on his own responsibility, assured the House of Commons that a Conference had been called together, and that he was not without hopes of a satisfactory result, I think that, if I had proposed to interfere between the Government and the Conference, I should have taken a step the country would not have approved. Yet, for abstaining from this interference, we are made the objects of an invective of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Horsman) of an unprecedented kind. He denounces the Government, he derides the Opposition, he detests the Peace party, he attacks the whole body of the House of Commons, and tells them that they are guilty of complicity with the Ministry because we did not move in this question. But why did not the right hon. Gentleman move in it? He had for three months on the paper
  1296
  a motion which was without exception the most unconstitutional that was ever placed on the table of this House. Why did he not move that preposterous proposition, which struck at the prerogative of the Crown, and would have changed the whole spirit of our constitution? Why, because he knew that if he had moved that revolutionary rigmarole he would have been left without a teller had he gone to a division. And this is the Gentleman who lectures Parliament as a body, and every individual in particular, with a recklessness of assertion unequalled. We know that in private life there is always in every circle some person, male or female, who is regarded as "a superior person." They decide on everything, they lecture everybody; all acknowledge their transcendant qualities; but everyone gets out of their way. The right hon. Member for Stroud is the "superior person" of the House of Commons. I am quite surprised that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), who has been sitting opposite the right hon. Member for Stroud with that colossal lantern which he always uses to find an honest man, has not the ingenuousness to acknowledge that he has at last found the object of his search. The first Minister of the Crown having brought forward the state of the revenue and of our exports and imports, I want to know why he did not bring those interesting documents in to the debate on the Ashantee war—because they were equally applicable there. Her Majesty's Government have mismanaged the affairs of Denmark, but then, they say, our exports and imports have increased. The House will have something to say about New Zealand before long, and I want to know what documents the President of the Board of Trade will furnish the noble Lord with on that occasion. The noble Lord says the influence of the country has not been lowered by the action of the Government, but that influence depends on intelligence, wealth, and so on. If our influence merely depends upon wealth, intelligence, success in the arts, and the development of our industry, I shall begin to think with the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden) that it would be quite as well to do away with the Foreign Office. The noble Lord asks where our influence is lessened? And he reminded the House that I had said that if England and France were united war would be difficult; and that if England, France, and Russia

  1297
  were united war would be impossible. He says the Government have adopted what I laid down as the cardinal principle of foreign affairs. The noble Lord says, "We did apply to France and Russia." Yes; but France and Russia would not act with you. That was the element wanting in the administration of your foreign policy. You failed. I ask you why you failed? We know very well that in July—ten days after the speech of the noble Lord, which he has abjured to-night—the French Government communicated to us that they were eager and anxious to act with us in this matter. You had then the ready sympathy and willing assistance of France. Why did you forfeit it? I say you forfeited it by the manner in which you conducted your negotiations with respect to Poland. And what is your defence on that point? The hon. Gentleman the Member for the King's County (Mr. Hennessy) gave notice of an Address to the Crown in favour of Poland, and there was an apprehension that the Opposition were going to support it. And so our gifted Ministry plunged headlong into these portentous Polish negotiations, which have tended to destroy our influence in Europe, and have been one of the main causes of the fall of Denmark. I say it is impossible that Ministers so experienced could be influenced by a notice given by an independent Member of this House, and by an idle rumour that we were going to support his Motion. I do not believe that men upon whom so much responsibility rests could be influenced and controlled by such slight events. "But," says the noble Lord, "the Motion was very strong and very dangerous." Well, Sir, so far as I was concerned, I recommended my hon. Friend the Member for the King's County to withdraw his Resolution; but when some one tried to induce him to alter it, I recommended him not to follow that advice. I approved it because in its terms it was copied verbatim from the principal despatch of the noble Lord himself, when Foreign Secretary, on Polish affairs. I said, if we are to have an Address to the Crown, let us have the language used by an experienced statesman who has considered this subject in every light; and do not let us make a mistake in an Address which we propose to bear to the foot of the Throne. I deny that the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud, as to the course which I pursued on the Motion relative to Poland, has the slightest foundation.
  1298
  As for the romance of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, it is entirely due to the energy and ardour of his imagination. I dont find fault with those qualities. We must take a man as we find him, and, although we might wish that the hon. Gentleman possessed a little more tact in debate, yet in that case he might never have discovered the bulls of Nineveh. That a man filling so responsible an office as that of Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs should relate to the House that monstrous and marvellous story of a conspiracy to restore Poland and turn out the Ministry, is one of those eccentricities that only occur in prolonged debates. The noble Lord asks, Where is the influence of this country lowered? I say "everywhere." It can be said of you what cannot be said of any other Ministry that this country ever had. Twice within the last twelve months you have made the most importunate appeals to St. Petersburg, and twice they have been rejected, and once with a haughty reprimand. You have not once or twice but many times, applied to France in your difficulties, but France has declined to act with you. I say that proves you have lost your influence. You have menaced Austria—you have menaced Prussia—you have menaced the Diet—and in every instance your representations have been treated with indifference. Is not that evidence that the just influence of this country has been lowered? It is said that my Resolution is retrospective, and does not refer to the future. That is not the case. I have said nothing about indicating a policy, because every one now admits that it is not our duty to go to the foot of the Throne and indicate a policy. But, Sir, I say that the Address which I will in a moment place in your hands is not retrospective, does refer to the future, and is essentially practical. That can be shown in a moment. Suppose we had really pursued the course which had been denounced by the Member for Stroud—suppose when the papers had been all produced we had not asked the opinion of the House upon the conduct of the Government—that, indeed, would have been shameful complicity. Suppose the House had been prorogued without our having solicited its opinion, and suppose that in the interval, before Parliament meets again, some other State in Europe—Holland, Belgium, Switzerland was in danger—what security have we that Her Majesty's Ministers would not pursue towards that

  1299
  State the identical policy which they have pursued with regard to Denmark? They would naturally say, the House of Commons have not disapproved our policy, they have sanctioned menaces at one time, retractation at another. Therefore, I say, we can prevent in the future a policy so disastrous only by passing the Resolution which now, Sir, I place in your hands; and I am confident that it will recommend itself to the opinion of the House, and approve itself to the feelings of the country.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I hope the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) will not put the House to the trouble of dividing on his Amendment. He must have ascertained that the feeling of the House is not in its favour, and it would be very inconvenient to go to a division upon it at this hour. [Loud cries for the withdrawal of the Amendment.]
  MR. NEWDEGATEreplied: It would afford me great pleasure to comply with anything which the noble Lord suggests; but I ask for an answer; the Danish people are a free people, and I wish for a decision from this House as the representatives of another free people, whether this House will consent to afford any assistance to the Danish people in defence of their independence as a nation by adopting the terms proposed by the neutral Powers in the recent Conference? [Continued cries, urging the hon. Member to withdraw his Motion.]
  MR. SPEAKERput the Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question;" and the great majority of voices appearing to be in the affirmative, Mr. Speaker declared that in his judgment the "Ayes" have it. Whereupon the hon. Member for North Warwickshire called that "the Noes have it."
  MR. SPEAKERsaid, that before he again put the Question on the hon. Gentleman's Amendment, he wished to call the attention of the House to a matter affecting their proceeding in verification of the voices. If the hon. Member should persist in dividing the House, inconvenience might result, and it would be necessary to have some change made in their arrangements. It appeared that the "Noes" would form a very small portion of the Members present, and that, therefore, the lobby would not contain all the "Ayes." The difficulty had been foreseen, and considered by himself and the officers of the
  1300
  House; and he proposed a slight change in the arrangements, interfering as little as possible with the established forms. The "Ayes" would go to the right, but the door of the lobby would be kept open; they would pass on and be counted without delay. But in order that the incoming stream might not be commingled in the House with the outgoing stream, the Members as they were counted would pass into the lobby outside of the House; when all should have been told, they would reenter the House. He trusted this arrangement would obviate the inconvenience that must otherwise arise.
  MR. SPEAKERthen again put the Question, and not more than two or three voices declaring in the negative, Mr. Speaker said that in his judgment the "Ayes" have it.
  Whereupon—
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid—I think, Sir, that the decision of the House is now evident. I have no wish to put the House to inconvenience by a division. I therefore withdraw my Amendment.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  MR. KINGLAKE, who attempted to address the House in explanation, but was prevented proceeding by the impatience of the House, then moved his Amendment.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out the last paragraph of the proposed Question, in order to add the words "To express the satisfaction with which we have learnt that, at this conjuncture, Her Majesty has been advised to abstain from armed interference in the War now going on between Denmark and the German Powers,"—(Mr. Kinglake,)
  —instead thereof.
  The House divided:—Ayes 295; Noes 313: Majority 18.
  Main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to.
  Resolved,
  That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to thank Her Majesty for directing the Correspondence on Denmark and Germany, and the Protocols of the Conference recently held in London, to be laid before Parliament:
  To assure Her Majesty, that we have heard with deep concern, that the sittings of that Conference have been brought to a close without accomplishing the important purposes for which it was convened:
  To express the satisfaction with which we have learnt that, at this conjuncture, Her Majesty has been advised to abstain from armed interference in the War now going on between Denmark and the German Powers.
  To be presented by Privy Councillors.

  AYES.

  Acton, Sir J. D.

  Elphinstone, Sir J. D.

  Adderley, rt. hon. C. B.

  Estcourt, rt. hon. T. H. S.

  Annesley, hon. Col. H.

  Fane, Colonel J. W.

  Arbuthnott, hon. Gen.

  Farquhar, Sir M.

  Archdall, Captain M.

  Farrer, J.

  Astell, J. H.

  Fellowes, E.

  Bailey, C.

  Fergusson, Sir J.

  Baillie, H. J.

  Ferrand, W.

  Baring, A. H.

  Filmer, Sir E.

  Baring, T.

  FitzGerald, W. R. S.

  Barttelot, Colonel

  Fleming, T. W.

  Bateson, Sir T.

  Forde, Colonel

  Bathurst, A. A.

  Forester, rt. hon. Gen.

  Bathurst, Colonel H.

  Franklyn, G. W.

  Beach, W. W. B.

  Fraser, Sir W. A.

  Bective, Earl of

  Gallwey, Sir W. P.

  Beecroft, G. S.

  Galway, Viscount

  Bentinck, G. W. P.

  Gard, R. S.

  Bentinck, G. C.

  George, J.

  Benyon, R.

  Getty, S. G.

  Beresford, rt. hon. W.

  Gilpin, Colonel

  Beresford, D. W. P.

  Goddard, A. L.

  Bernard, hon. Colonel

  Gore, J. R. O.

  Bernard, T. T.

  Gore, W. R. O.

  Blake, J. A.

  Graham, Lord W.

  Bond, J. W. M'G.

  Greaves, E.

  Booth, Sir R. G.

  Greenall, G.

  Bovill, W.

  Greene, J.

  Bowyer, Sir G.

  Greville, Colonel F.

  Brady, Dr.

  Gray, Captain

  Bramley-Moore, J.

  Grey de Wilton, Visct.

  Bramston, T. W.

  Griffith, C. D.

  Bremridge, R.

  Grogan, Sir E.

  Bridges, Sir B. W.

  Haliburton, T. C.

  Brooks, R.

  Hamilton, Lord C.

  Bruce, Sir H. H.

  Hamilton, Major

  Bruen, H.

  Hamilton, Viscount

  Burghley, Lord

  Hamilton, I. T.

  Butler-Johnstone, H. A.

  Hardy, G.

  Cairns, Sir H. M'C.

  Hardy, J.

  Cargill, W. W.

  Hartopp, E. B.

  Cartwright, Colonel

  Harvey, R. B.

  Cave, S.

  Hassard, M.

  Cecil, Lord R.

  Hay, Sir J. C. D.

  Clive, Capt. hon. G. W.

  Heathcote, Sir W.

  Cobbold, J. C.

  Hennessy, J. P.

  Cochrane, A. D. R. W. B.

  Henniker, Lord

  Cogan, W. H. F.

  Hesketh, Sir T. G.

  Cole, hon. H.

  Heygate, Sir F. W.

  Cole, hon. J. L.

  Heygate, W. U.

  Collins, T.

  Hill, hon. R. C.

  Conolly, T.

  Hodgson, R.

  Copeland, Mr. Ald.

  Holford, R. S.

  Corbally, M. E.

  Holmesdale, Viscount

  Corry, rt. hon. H. L.

  Hood, Sir A. A.

  Cubitt, G.

  Hopwood, J. T.

  Curzon, Viscount

  Hornby, W. H.

  Dalkeith, Earl of

  Horsfall, T. B.

  Damer, S. D.

  Hotham, Lord

  Dawson, R. P.

  Howes, E.

  Dickson, Colonel

  Hubbard, J. G.

  Disraeli, rt. hon. B.

  Humberston, P. S.

  Drax, J. S. W. S. E. D.

  Hume, W. W. F.

  Du Cane, C.

  Humphery, W. H.

  Duncombe, hon. W. E.

  Hunt, G. W.

  Dunne, Colonel

  Ingestre, Viscount

  Du Pre, C. G.

  Jermyn, Earl

  Edwards, Colonel

  Jervis, Captain

  Egerton, Sir P. G.

  Jolliffe, rt. hon. Sir W. G. H.

  Egerton, hon. A. F.

  Egerton, E. C.

  Jolliffe, H. H.

  Egerton, hon. W.

  Jones, D.

  1302

  Kekewich, S. T.

  Palmer, R. W.

  Kelly, Sir F.

  Papillon, P. O.

  Kendall, N.

  Parker, Major W.

  Kennard, R. W.

  Patten, Colonel W.

  Ker, D. S.

  Paull, H.

  Kerrison, Sir E. C.

  Peacocke, G. M. W.

  King, J. K.

  Peel, rt. hon. General

  Knatchbull, W. F.

  Pennant, hon. Colonel

  Knight, F. W.

  Pevensey, Viscount

  Knightley, R.

  Phillips, G. L.

  Knox, Colonel

  Powell, F. S.

  Knox, hon. Major S.

  Powys-Lybbe, P. L.

  Lacon, Sir E.

  Quinn, P.

  Laird, J.

  Redmond, J. E.

  Langton, W. G.

  Repton, G. W. J.

  Leader, N. P.

  Ridley, Sir M. W.

  Leeke, Sir H.

  Rogers, J. J.

  Lefroy, A.

  Rolt, J.

  Legh, W. J.

  Rose, W. A.

  Lennox, Lord G. G.

  Rowley, hon. R. T.

  Lennox, Lord H. G.

  Salt, T.

  Lennox, C. S. B. H. K.

  Sclater-Booth, G.

  Leslie, C. P.

  Scott, Lord H.

  Leslie, W.

  Scully, V.

  Liddell, hon. H. G.

  Selwyn, C. J.

  Long, R. P.

  Shirley, E. P.

  Longfield, R.

  Smith A. (Herts)

  Lopes, Sir M.

  Smith, Sir F.

  Lovaine, Lord

  Smith, M.

  Lowther, hon. Colonel

  Smith, S. G.

  Lowther, Captain

  Smyth, Colonel

  Lyall, G.

  Smollett, P. B.

  Lygon, hon. F.

  Somerset, Colonel

  Lytton, rt. hon. Sir G. E. L. B.

  Somes, J.

  Stanhope, J. B.

  Macaulay, K.

  Stanhope, Lord

  M'Cann, J.

  Stanley, Lord

  M'Cormick, W.

  Stirling, W.

  Macdonogh, F.

  Stracey, Sir H.

  MacEvoy, E.

  Stronge, Colonel

  M'Mahon, P.

  Stewart, Sir M. R. S.

  Malcolm, J. W.

  Stuart, Lieut.-Col. W.

  Malins, R.

  Sturt, H. G.

  Manners, rt. hn. Lord J.

  Sturt, Lieut.-Col. N.

  Manners, Lord G. J.

  Sullivan, M.

  Maxwell, hon. Colonel

  Surtees, H. E.

  Miles, Sir W.

  Talbot, hon. W. C.

  Miller, T. J.

  Thynne, Lord E.

  Mills, A.

  Thynne, Lord H.

  Mitford, W. T.

  Tollemache, J.

  Montagu, Lord R.

  Torrens, R.

  Montgomery, Sir G.

  Tottenham, Lieut.-Col C. G.

  Mordaunt, Sir C.

  Morgan, O.

  Trefusis, hon. C. H. R.

  Morgan, hon. Major

  Treherne, M.

  Morritt, W. J. S.

  Trevor, Lord A. E. H.

  Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R.

  Trollope, rt. hon. Sir J.

  Mundy, W.

  Turner, C.

  Mure, D.

  Vance, J.

  Naas, Lord

  Vandeleur, Colonel

  Nicol, W.

  Vansittart, W.

  Noel, hon. G. J.

  Verner, Sir W.

  North, Colonel

  Verner, E. W.

  Northcote, Sir S. H.

  Vyse, Colonel H.

  O'Conor Don, The

  Walcott, Admiral

  O'Donoghue, The

  Waldron, L.

  O'Ferrall, rt. hon. R. M.

  Walker, J. R.

  O'Neill, E.

  Walpole, rt. hon. S. H.

  O'Reilly, M. W.

  Walsh, Sir J.

  Packe, C. W.

  Waterhouse, S.

  Pakenham, Colonel

  Watlington, J. W. P.

  Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J.

  Welby, W. E.

  Palk, Sir L.

  Whiteside, rt. hon. J.

  1303

  Williams, Colonel

  Yorke, hon. E. T.

  Willoughby, Sir H.

  Yorke, J. R.

  Woodd, B.T.

  Wyndham, hon. H.

  TELLERS.

  Wyndham, hon. P.

  Taylor, Colonel

  Wynn, C. W. W.

  Whitmore, H.

  NOES.

  Adair, H. E.

  Clay, J.

  Adam, W. P.

  Clifford, C. C.

  Adeane, H. J.

  Clifford, Colonel

  Agar-Ellis, hon. L. G. F.

  Clifton, Sir R. J.

  Agnew, Sir A.

  Clinton, Lord R.

  Alcock, T.

  Cobbett, J. M.

  Andover, Viscount

  Cobden, R.

  Angerstein, W.

  Coke, hon. Colonel

  Anson, hon. Major

  Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

  Anstruther, Sir R.

  Collier, Sir R. P.

  Antrobus, E.

  Colthurst, Sir G. C.

  Ashley, Lord

  Cowper, rt. hon. W. F.

  Athlumney, Lord

  Cox, W.

  Aytoun, R. S.

  Craufurd, E. H. J.

  Bagwell, J.

  Crawford, R. W.

  Baines, E.

  Crossley, Sir F.

  Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T.

  Dalglish, R.

  Baring, T. G.

  Davey, R.

  Barnes, T.

  Davie, Sir H. R. F.

  Bass, M. T.

  Davie, Colonel F.

  Baxter, W. E.

  Denman, hon. G.

  Bazley, T.

  Dent, J. D.

  Beale, S.

  Dering, Sir E. C.

  Beamish, F. B.

  Dillwyn, L. L.

  Beaumont, W. B.

  Dodson, J. G.

  Beaumont, S. A.

  Douglas, Sir C.

  Bellew, R. M.

  Doulton, F.

  Berkeley, hon. H. F.

  Duff, M. E. G.

  Berkeley, hon. Colonel F. W. F.

  Duff, R. W.

  Duke, Sir J.

  Berkeley, hon. C. P. F.

  Dunbar, Sir William

  Biddulph, Colonel

  Dundas, F.

  Black, A.

  Dundas, rt. hon. Sir D.

  Blencowe, J. G.

  Dunkellin, Lord

  Bonham-Carter, J.

  Dunlop, A. M.

  Bouverie, rt. hon. E. P.

  Dunne, M.

  Bouverie, hon. P. P.

  Dutton, hon. R. H.

  Bright, J.

  Elcho, Lord

  Briscoe, J. I.

  Enfield, Viscount

  Brocklehurst, J.

  Ennis, J.

  Brown, J.

  Esmonde, J.

  Browne, Lord J. T.

  Evans, T. W.

  Bruce, Lord E.

  Ewart, W.

  Bruce, rt. hon. H. A.

  Ewart, J. C.

  Buchanan, W.

  Ewing, H. E. Crum-

  Buckley, General

  Fenwicke, E. M.

  Bulkeley, Sir R.

  Fenwicke, H.

  Buller, J. W.

  Fermoy, Lord

  Buller, Sir A. W.

  Finlay, A. S.

  Burke, Sir T. J.

  Fitzwilliam, hn. C. W. W.

  Bury, Viscount

  Foley, H. W.

  Butler, C. S.

  Foljambe, F. J. S.

  Butt, I.

  Forster, C.

  Buxton, C.

  Forster, W. E.

  Caird, J.

  Foster, W. O.

  Calthorpe, hon. F. H. W. G.

  Fortescue, hon. F. D.

  Fortescue, rt. hon. C.

  Cardwell, rt. hon. E.

  French, Colonel

  Carnegie, hon. C.

  Gavin, Major

  Castlerosse, Viscount

  Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.

  Cavendish, Lord G.

  Gilpin, C.

  Chapman, J.

  Gladstone, rt. hon. W.

  Childers, H. C. E.

  Glyn, G. G.

  Cholmeley, Sir M. J.

  Goldsmid, Sir F. H.

  Churchill, Lord A. S.

  Goschen, G. J.

  1304

  Gower, hon. F. L.

  Moncreiff, rt. hon. J.

  Gower, G. W. G. L.

  Monsell, rt. hon. W.

  Greenwood, J.

  Morris, D.

  Gregory, W. H.

  Morrison, W.

  Gregson, S.

  Neate, C.

  Grenfell, C. P.

  Norris, J. T.

  Grenfell, H. R.

  North, F.

  Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.

  O'Brien, P.

  Grosvenor, Earl

  Ogilvy, Sir J.

  Grosvenor, Lord R.

  O'Hagan, rt. hon. T.

  Gurdon, B.

  O'Loghlen, Sir C. M.

  Gurney, J. H.

  Onslow, G.

  Gurney, S.

  Owen, Sir H. O.

  Hadfield, G.

  Packe, Colonel

  Hanbury, R.

  Padmore, R.

  Handley, John

  Paget, C.

  Hankey, T.

  Paget, Lord A.

  Hanmer, Sir J.

  Paget, Lord C.

  Hardcastle, J. A.

  Palmer, Sir R.

  Hartington, Marq. of

  Palmerston, Viscount

  Hervey, Lord A.

  Paxton, Sir J.

  Hayter, rt. hn. Sir W. G.

  Pease, H.

  Headlam, rt. hon. T. E.

  Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

  Heathcote, hon. G. H.

  Peel, rt. hon. F.

  Henderson, J.

  Peel, J.

  Henley, Lord

  Pender, J.

  Herbert, rt. hon. H. A.

  Peto, Sir S. M.

  Hibbert, J. T.

  Pilkington, J.

  Hodgkinson, G.

  Pinney, Colonel

  Hodgson, K. D.

  Ponsonby, hon. A.

  Holland, E.

  Portman, hon. W. H. B.

  Horsman, rt. hon. E.

  Potter, E.

  Howard, hon. C. W. G.

  Powell, J. J.

  Howard, Lord E.

  Price, R. G.

  Hutt, rt. hon. W.

  Pryse, E. L.

  Ingham, R.

  Pritchard, J.

  Jackson, W.

  Proby, Lord

  Jervoise, Sir J. C.

  Pugh, D.

  Johnstone, Sir J.

  Ramsden, Sir J. W.

  King, hon. P. J. L.

  Ricardo, O.

  Kinglake, A. W.

  Robartes, T. J. A.

  Kinglake, J. A.

  Robertson, D.

  Kingscote, Colonel

  Robertson, H.

  Kinnaird, hon. A. F.

  Roebuck, J. A.

  Layard, A. H.

  Rothschild, Baron L. de

  Langton, W. H. G.

  Rothschild, Baron M. de

  Lawson, W.

  Russell, H.

  Leatham, E. A.

  Russell, A.

  Lefevre, G. J. S.

  Russell, F. W.

  Lee, W.

  Russell, Sir W.

  Legh, Major C.

  St. Aubyn, J.

  Levinge, Sir R.

  Salomons, Mr. Ald.

  Lewis, H.

  Scholefield, W.

  Lindsay, W. S.

  Scott, Sir W.

  Locke, J.

  Scourfield, J. H.

  Lowe, rt. hon. R.

  Scrope, G. P.

  Lysley, W. J.

  Seely, C.

  Mackie, J.

  Seymour, H. D.

  Mackinnon, W. A. (Lym)

  Seymour, W. D.

  Mackinnon, W. A. (Rye)

  Seymour, A.

  Mainwaring, T.

  Shafto, R. D.

  Marjoribanks, D. C.

  Shelley, Sir J. V.

  Marsh, M. H.

  Sheridan, R. B.

  Martin, P. W.

  Sheridan, H. B.

  Martin, J.

  Sidney, T.

  Massey, W. N.

  Smith, A. (Truro)

  Matheson, A.

  Smith, J. A.

  Merry, J.

  Smith, J. B.

  Mildmay, H. F.

  Smith, M. T.

  Miller, W.

  Stacpoole, W.

  Mills, J. R.

  Staniland, M.

  Mitchell, T. A.

  Stansfeld, J.

  Moffatt, G.

  Steel, J.

  1305

  Stuart, Colonel

  Watkins, Colonel L.

  Sykes, Colonel W. H.

  Weguelin, T. M.

  Talbot, C. R. M.

  Western, S.

  Taylor, P. A.

  Westhead, J. P. B.

  Thompson, H. S.

  Whalley, G. H.

  Thornhill, W. P.

  Whitbread, S.

  Tite, W.

  White, J.

  Tollemache, hon. F. J.

  White, hon. L.

  Tomline, G.

  Wickham, H. W.

  Tracy, hon. C. R. D. H.

  Williams, W.

  Trelawny, Sir J. S.

  Williamson, Sir H.

  Turner, J. A.

  Winnington, Sir T. E.

  Tynte, Colonel K.

  Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.

  Vane, Lord H.

  Woods, H.

  Verney, Sir H.

  Wrightson, W. B.

  Vernon, H. F.

  Wyld, J.

  Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.

  Wyvill, M.

  Vivian, H. H.

  Vyner, R. A.

  TELLERS.

  Walter, J.

  Brand, hon. H. B. W.

  Warner, E.

  Knatchbull-Hugessen, E.

  Watkin, E. W.

  House adjourned at a quarter after Two o'clock, till Monday next.

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Marquess of Hastings (after the Death of his Father).
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Defence Act Amendment [H.L.] * (No. 193); Judgments, &c., Law Amendment * (No. 194); India Stocks Transfer Act Amendment * (No. 195); Street Music (Metropolis) * (No. 196); Indemnity * (No. 197).
Second Reading—Accidents Compensation Act Amendment * (No. 158).
Select Committee—On Railways Construction Facilities * (No. 160); Railway Companies Powers * (No. 121).
Consideration—Settled Estates Act Amendment * (Commons' Amendments).
Third Reading—Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Acts Amendment * (No. 167), and passed.

DENMARK AND GERMANY. THE ALLEGED CRUELTY OF PRUSSIAN SOLDIERS.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, my noble Friend (the Earl of Shaftesbury) the other evening asked whether any intelligence had reached Her Majesty's Government respecting the alleged massacre of wounded Swedes by the Prussian troops. At that time I stated that Her Majesty's Government had received no intelligence of such an occurrence. Since then I have made inquiries and have received telegrams from both Her Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen and Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin. Our representative at Copenhagen informs me that he has inquired of the Swedish Minister, and that there is no truth whatever in the report which has been circulated. Some four or five Swedish officers were killed, they were in Danish uniform and undistinguishable from the Danish troops. Our account from Berlin states that there was a report that an intention existed on the part of a portion of the army of trying by court-martial some of the Swedes engaged with the Danes, who had been taken prisoners. But it was believed at Berlin that the Prussian Government would not sanction the proceeding. I therefore trust there is no truth whatever in the story we have heard.
DENMARK AND GERMANY—VOTE OF CENSURE—RESOLUTION— (THE EARL OF MALMESBURY).

  ADDRESS TO HER MAJESTY.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, I am sure that on grave occasions like the present but one sentiment pervades

  1077
  both sides of the House—namely, the hope that the debate which is to follow will do honour to the country and to the ancient assembly to which we belong. With this feeling I am sure that both sides of the House will deeply regret the absence of one who illustrates our debates by his ability, his wit, and his eloquence. To me personally it is a matter of still greater regret, inasmuch as I am here to represent him, although unworthy and unable to fill his place; and I must ask of my noble Friends behind me their utmost indulgence, inasmuch as it falls to me to move Resolutions which, had he been present, he would have moved in so much better a manner. My Lords, I trust that in doing so I shall not in the heat of debate say anything unfair I to any Member of the Government, and that I shall not trespass upon your Lordships' convenience by too lengthened a statement.
  My Lords, that being my wish, it is a matter of regret that anything like personal matters should at this moment be brought before your Lordships; but in a few words I must complain to the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of a circumstance that is reported to have occurred in another place last night. It appears that the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs "in another place" ["Order, order!"]—has alluded to a Correspondence which he says was carried on by me upon a former occasion. I shall say no more than this, that if such a Correpondence exists, I wish, and have already expressed my wish, to the noble Earl opposite (Earl Russell) that Parliament should be made acquainted with its contents, and I trust that the noble Earl will produce it to this House.
  My Lords, I turn now to the Resolutions of which I have given notice. I do not I think that any of your Lordships will object to my first Resolution, namely,
  "That this House has heard with deep concern that the sittings of the Conference recently held; in London have been brought to a close without accomplishing the important purposes for which it was convened."
  It must be matter of very great regret to us all, that the Conference has failed, because the circumstances attending it have led to events which will, I am afraid, lead to still further disagreeable complications. First of all we have, I am afraid, lost the goodwill and good feeling of some very ancient allies. We have for many years been allied in very close friendly feeling with Germany and the German Powers, especi-
  1078
  ally with Austria and Prussia. With one of these Powers we are connected by a Royal marriage. My Lords, it must be matter of deep regret to us all, that the events to which the Correspondence which we are about to discuss has reference have for the time completely divorced us from these alliances. Then, again, I am afraid that in consequence of these events we have to lament a great violation of public right, and a violation of—for I can call it by no other name—the Treaty of 1852—a treaty in the conclusion of which both political parties in this country took an interest and a part. This is a matter of very great consequence. The violation of that treaty sets a very bad precedent for the future. It is a great breach of the public law of Europe, and may at any time be quoted as an excuse for violence and wrong. Looking at the details of this unfortunate business, there is one feature in it which must be looked at with a certain degree of apprehension—I mean the appearance of, as it were, a new Power in Europe, the Diet of the German Confederation. It appears to me that that body has overstepped its former attributes, and has, in interfering with an European treaty, taken upon itself an authority which, especially under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it had no right to assume. In fact, my Lords, if the Diet is to be permitted to throw its whole weight against any treaty that may have been signed by Austria and Prussia, on the ground that the general interests of Germany will be interfered with if such treaties are maintained, I do not know who will make treaties with Austria and Prussia, or how any treaties are to be made with any of the German States separately with any hope of their being upheld and their objects carried out. There is another point of great consequence which the events that have occurred have brought before the world, namely, the introduction of a principle which, so far at least as its interpretation is concerned, is a new one; I mean the principle of nationality. And I must express my regret that the noble Earl has not in the many discussions which have taken place—either in the Correspondence or in the Conference—as far as I can ascertain, put a categorical question to the persons who maintain this principle, and asked them for a plain and simple interpretation of what they mean by "nationality." If by "nationality" they mean that a people may rise against a tyrannical Government—that Power abused is revocable—then all Englishmen will

  1079
  accept the principle; but it would appear—unless some other interpretation shall be given—that nationality now means that one nation has a right to invade another, for the purpose of assisting its discontented subjects to rebel. And this nationality is described to be the produce of, or to exist in consequence of, a certain majority in language or religion; and in some way, until now unheard of, to be the foundation which gives a right first to the revolted subjects to rebel, and then to a foreign Power to invade the territory and assist them. Nothing can be more dangerous to the peace of the world than such a principle as this as now defined. Nothing can be more perilous or render it more impossible to maintain peace. I do not know what, under such a principle, is to become of the smaller Powers of Europe. Take, for instance, Switzerland, in which three different languages are spoken—German, French, and Italian. If you were to follow out this principle, Switzerland, which has hitherto been respected as the very cradle of liberty and independence, would be divided between the three great Powers—Italy, Germany, and France. And what would become of our own country if brought under this principle? There are, at least, three languages spoken in the United Kingdom; and if languages are to form the distinction, England would be one country, Scotland another, Ireland a third, and, perhaps, Wales a fourth. I therefore regret that in the many discussions which have taken place the noble Earl has not insisted upon some interpretation of this principle, which seems to me to be pregnant with mischief, in order that we may understand what nationality really means in a political and international sense. Lastly, we must deeply regret the failure of this Conference, from the natural feeling which Englishmen entertain at seeing a very ancient country—a country which has existed for more than a thousand years, whose former monarchs were our monarchs, and whose existence, as compared with that of its invader, Prussia, is as the cedar to the fig tree, invaded, dismembered, and annihilated, under circumstances of gross and unparalleled cruelty and barbarity. That must cause us to feel not only regret at the failure of the Conference, but the warmest indignation when we remember the circumstances to which I am about presently to allude; and I regret to say that the war, since its recommencement, has been carried on in the same shameful manner in which it was
  1080
  before. It is now my duty to show that I am right in my second Resolution, in which I lay the blame for these things on Her Majesty's Government, and declare—
  "That it is the opinion of this House, that while the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has failed to maintain their avowed policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark, it has lowered the just influence of this country in the councils of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace."
  My Lords, before I go into the Correspondence, which I will do as shortly as possible, quoting as little as I can, and as fairly as I can, to the noble Earl opposite and to myself, I must anticipate a question which has been asked elsewhere, and, probably, will be repeated in this House—a challenge to us to declare what our policy is, and what we should have done if we had been in office? Now, I think that a most preposterous and unfair question. Preposterous, because it is impossible for an Opposition to declare what it would do when a question of war or peace is at issue, and while in ignorance of the means at the disposal of the country for carrying on a war, of the Allies on which it could depend, and of a thousand details, without a perfect knowledge of which no man would dream of entering into a war unless he was insane. If that were a fair question, I think I might quite as fairly ask what would the Government do if they occupied the place of the Opposition?—although there is one thing which it is not difficult to predict they would do, and that is, endeavour to turn us out as soon as possible. I, therefore, candidly tell your Lordships that if we, situated as we are, and ignorant of the matters to which I have referred, were to say we were prepared to go to war, we should be unfit to conduct the affairs of the country. Let us to-night, then, say nothing upon that point. That is the reason why those upon whose support we rely in proposing this Resolution are not, I believe, at all anxious at this moment that any Government should proceed to war. And one thing appears to me to be perfectly palpable, that no moment could be more inopportune for going to war than the present. I do not say that the time has not passed when by risking a war, war might have been prevented. Of that I am even convinced, and it is not I only who say so. I have heard it stated by numbers of persons who are good judges of the circumstances to which I have alluded—I have heard it stated by Germans themselves—men as eager to maintain their objects in

  1081
  Denmark as any men could be—that if the Government had taken a firm tone and made a strong demonstration at the outset, war would have been averted. I think, too, I can show your Lordships that that statement was justified. The noble Earl and also the noble Duke who sits on the Government benches (the Duke of Argyll), drew an analogy between the circumstances which have taken place with respect to Denmark and Germany and those which occurred in 1859 in Italy, and also between the Correspondence which I then carried on and that which was carried on in the present instance. The noble Earl was good enough to give me credit for the way in which I endeavoured to preserve peace, and for the policy I pursued. I can assure the noble Earl that praise from a man so eminent as he is is exceedingly pleasing to me; but I can hardly help recollecting that the noble Earl was one of those who accused me, and tried, and condemned, and, I may say, hanged me for that policy. The noble Earl was one of those who drove us from office on the ground of our foreign policy, and who did so before they had read a single one of my despatches, for the papers had not at the time been laid on the table. That, perhaps, was my fault; but I must do the noble Earl the justice to say that, having condemned and hanged me, as a conscientious man he cut me down before I quite ceased to exist. There is, however, a great difference between the result of his policy and that of the Government to which I belonged. In the policy carried on by the noble Earl he has had the misfortune to have no assistance whatever, and to have possessed no influence whatever over our Allies. That was not the case with respect to the Italian question; because, although it is true that Austria, with a stupidity perfectly unpardonable, rushed to her own fate, and lost one of the fairest provinces of the empire, yet we had influence enough to prevent Prance and Piedmont from advancing, and the whole question would have been if not settled, at least discussed in peaceful Conference if Austria had not followed her insane course. I do not accept the analogy, therefore, to which I have referred. We had influence sufficient, at all events, to prevent two great Powers from rushing into war; but in this case the noble Earl seems to have had no influence with any Power what so over. Am I not right, then, my Lords, in I saying that the Government has failed in upholding the independence and integrity of Denmark? Schleswig, which was part
  1082
  of Denmark Proper, and which has been so for some centuries, and not only Schleswig, but Jutland, are now in possession of the Germans; and so complete is the failure of the noble Earl's policy, that it fell to him to carry out the painful and almost humiliating task of being himself the person to propose in the Conference the dismemberment of a kingdom the integrity of which he had declared essential to the welfare of Europe, and dear to the feelings of the people of this country. The noble Earl was obliged to propose in the Conference the division of Schleswig into two parts, and was compelled to submit to a refusal of his proposition on the part of the triumphant Germans. Denmark, indeed, might say to England, in the words of the dying Mercutio to Romeo—"Why the devil came you between us? I was hurt under your arm."
  Now, my Lords, I think this state of things has been brought about by the default of Her Majesty's Government. What accuse them of is this—that of not having made up their minds on any definite course of policy, and of not keeping in view, as a mark from which their eye ought never to have been taken, the invasion of Schleswig. With what I may term the municipal differences in Denmark we had nothing to do. But this was an International question, and this was the point at which England had a right to interfere, even by force, if she thought proper to do so, and this point ought to have been constantly before his eyes. The noble Earl, and the Cabinet of which he is a Member, ought to have been prepared a month before with the course which in that event they intended to pursue, completely warned as they must have been of what was taking place by their Ministers abroad.
  My Lords, the first great fault which the noble Earl, in my opinion, committed, was that he made himself too much of a partisan, and did not maintain that independent character which would afterwards have been of great service to him as an arbitrator and mediator between the parties. He plunged at once into the municipal question. We know the noble Earl's aptitude and power in regard to the making of constitutions and laws for the internal government of a country. In his time he has made himself immortal by a Reform Bill, of which I will say nothing but that it appears to be liked by others better than by himself—for others have accepted it, but he has never ceased endeavouring to alter it. The taste for Reform had not

  1083
  left him when he entered the Foreign Office, should, however, have thought that his experience of the Foreign Office would have shown him that there was quite enough to be done in dealing with the matters which come within the scope of that Department without seeking other fields of business, anxiety, and labour. That, however, was not the feeling of the noble Earl. He had not been long at the Foreign Office when it occurred to him that the great cure for all the evils existing in the case of Germany and Denmark was to propose a Reform Bill. On the 29th of April, 1861, I think he proposed a new Constitution for Denmark and the Duchies. Against that Constitution I have nothing to say, except that it closely resembled that Constitution which he afterwards advised the Danes to give up. That Constitution, like his own Reform Bill, did not please the noble Earl very long; and finding himself at Coburg, and having perhaps less to do than if shut up in the Foreign Office, he constructed another Reform Bill; and on the 24th of September, 1862, he produced what he considered would be the panacea for the existing state of things. The consequence was—as your Lordships may easily guess—that he pleased neither party. The Danes did not like one of these Constitutions; the Germans said it was impossible for them to assent to the other. Thus the noble Earl was placed rather in the position of a partisan than of a judge between Denmark and Germany. He had cut the ground from under his own feet as an independent English Minister to whom both parties, in the event of their being unable to agree, could have referred for an impartial opinion. This was soon followed by a memorable circumstance which bears vitally on the whole question, to which we may attribute much of what has been called Danish obstinacy, which greatly complicated matters, and to which I am firmly of opinion we may attribute the general failure of this unhappy business. I allude to the speech of the noble Viscount at the head of the Government on the 23rd of July, 1863, in which he declared that if Denmark were attacked he, for one, believed that she would not stand alone. That speech was not unprepared; it was made after notice had been given to him of the intention to ask him a question; and the only possible meaning to be put upon it was that which I believe the noble Viscount intended at the time. I recollect well the effect of
  1084
  that speech. Everybody believed it to mean nothing else than this—that if Denmark were invaded, England would assist her. I have been told—or at least I have heard it said—that the noble Lord in that remark meant to allude to Sweden; but it is impossible, because the question put to the noble Lord which gave rise to the answer and the context of the noble Lord's speech, delivered on the 23rd of July, 1863, shows that the noble Lord intended England when he made use of those words. The result of such a statement, solemnly made in Parliament by the Prime Minister of England was, that it was looked upon throughout the recess, and it was dwelt upon by Denmark as of serious meaning, and that it would be carried out in the event of Austria and Prussia entering her territory. That speech must, I think, have greatly increased the difficulties of the Foreign Secretary when he had to press the Danes to give up one thing after another—the Patent and the Constitution, to allow the Eider to be crossed without resistance, and to submit to every possible degradation; and he must have felt the difficulty in the reliance of the Danish Government on the material assistance of England. In the autumn which followed this memorable speech, the King of Denmark unfortunately died unexpectedly and after a short illness; but even before his death the consequences of these differences between Denmark and Germany were apparent. Here again the noble Earl showed that dilatoriness, and I may almost say carelessness, which in a great measure has been the cause of the failure of his efforts. On the 1st of October, Sir Augustus Paget informed the noble Earl that the new Constitution for Denmark was about to be submitted to the Rigsraad in conformity with the Royal Message. Sir Augustus Paget told the noble Earl then, that it was a matter much to be regretted that constitutional changes should be made just at that moment, and that they would be sure to produce great irritation in Germany. Before this the noble Earl knew that the Constitution had already been a matter of discussion, and that it involved the question whether Denmark had kept faith with Germany or not? Again, on the 13th of October, Sir Augustus Paget wrote to the noble Earl enforcing on his attention the danger of this Constitution, in producing irritation in Germany. From all the information which was forwarded to

  1085
  him it was to be expected that the noble Lord would have taken a strong line; but instead of that he replied to Sir Augustus Paget on the 21st of October, that the question was entirely an International question, and could not form a subject of Federal interference. After that the noble Earl took great pains afterwards to induce the King to withdraw the Constitution; but for two months before that, all the noble Earl said was that England would be glad if it were not signed; but he never pointed out the consequences which would ensue from the advice of England not being taken, I should like to show your Lordships some of the warnings which were conveyed to the noble Lord by his different Ministers abroad. Your Lordships will remember that after the late King of Denmark had died, before signing the Constitution, the new King was pressed by his subjects and his Ministry to sign it. The noble Earl attempted feebly to dissuade him, but he did it, and thence arose all those further troubles which resulted in the invasion of Schleswig. These are the warnings which he received from abroad. On the 16th December, Sir Augustus Paget wrote to the noble Earl informing him that the Danish Government had been summoned to withdraw their troops from Holstein, and that in all probability they would be withdrawn with the exception of the tête-de-pont of Frederickstadt, which was the key to the position in Schleswig, and about which, therefore, it was right that some arrangement should be made. On the 14th December, Sir Andrew Buchanan wrote from Berlin, that Austria and Prussia had declined to give any explanation as to the nature of the arrangements which they would accept from Denmark; that they had merely stated generally that they would require the fulfilment of the engagements contracted by Denmark in 1851, and had declared that Schleswig must be withdrawn from the Constitution before the 15th of January. He goes on to say that the Austrian and Prussian Governments had thus followed out the whole policy of the Diet, of which Denmark had so frequently complained. The noble Earl got another warning from Lord Augustus Loftus at Munich, on December 23rd, who told him that the separation of Schleswig from Denmark would be the annihilation of the Danish Monarchy; "and the maritime position of Schleswig is of European importance, as it commands the port of Kiel, which was one of the chief reasons why its position was coveted by Germany." There
  1086
  can be little doubt that the object of the invasion is to take possession of that port. Then, again, Sir Andrew Buchanan writes on the 14th of January—
  "I shall not, therefore, characterize the grounds on which M. Bismark rests his defence of the intended invasion of Schleswig. It will be more reasonable to inquire whether there may not be other causes for that measure, which, if not unobjectionable, present it in a less odious point of view than as a mere wanton interruption of the peace of Europe and a needless infliction upon Denmark of the horrors of war."
  My Lords, the noble Earl received further information on the subject from Lord Wodehouse, who had been sent to Copenhagen, and who, writing on the 3rd of January, says—
  "He was desired by the King to declare that; the occupation of any part of Schleswig by the Federal troops would be treated by Denmark as an act of war, which must at all hazards be resisted by force. If the Danes were driven by superior numbers out of Schleswig, they would continue their existence in Jutland; if they were compelled to retreat from Jutland, they would fight to the last extremity in the Islands, until Copenhagen itself was in the hands of the enemy."—No. 4, 495.
  In the same month Sir Alexander Malet writes—
  "The tension of the public mind is very great, and I am bound to say that there is a wonderful indifference to our representations, while they are at the same time resented as interfering with a cherished project."—No. 4, 516.
  Now, my Lords, with those representations before us, I think we are perfectly justified in saying, in the words of the Resolution, that through the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government the just influence of this country has been lowered. I have shown your Lordships the warnings which the noble Earl received, though I am sure that a man of his quickness of intellect could not have failed to perceive the state of things even without such representations. But, notwithstanding all his means of information, there seems to have been some fatality about, which prevented him from seeing matters in the right light. If he ever intended to defend Denmark from an attack on the part of the German Powers, no doubt the time for him to have done so was when he received those warnings in the middle and the end of December. But what were his replies to all those warnings? On the 24th of December he writes—
  "It would be no less impossible for Her Majesty's Government to enter into any engagement, that if the Federal troops should not limit their operations to the Duchy of Holstein, but should on some pretence or other extend their opera-

  1087
  tions to the Duchy of Schleswig, Her Majesty's Government would maintain an attitude of neutrality between Germany and Denmark."—No. 4, 413.
  Now, one would expect that the noble Earl would have taken his stand on the broad question of the Treaty of 1852, and the great International question, and the balance of power, because the German Powers took to themselves the right to abrogate the treaty signed by five or six Powers, on the ground, forsooth, that Denmark had not kept faith in respect of the engagements which she had entered into with the German Powers by a separate agreement, in which none of the signatary Powers were guarantors. The noble Earl ought to have made his stand on International law and the faith of treaties if he meant to defend Denmark at all. Sweden at that time was strong in her determination to assist. If at the time to which I refer the noble Earl had come forward with a declaration that a certain number of troops and a certain portion of the British fleet would support the Danish army if the German Powers invaded Denmark, he would, no doubt, have had Sweden with him, and with 100,000 men on the Eider ready to receive the invaders I am perfectly convinced that not a single German would have crossed that river. But, my Lords, I am not now going into the question, whether the noble Earl ought to have given such assistance. I am only saying that if ever he meant to interfere actively, that was the time for action; and I am contending further, that if it was considered right by the noble Earl to maintain peace and not to run the risk of war—a risk which, I think, my Lords, was very small indeed—he ought to have said at once to Denmark, "We wont help you; you have not kept your faith in some small matters; but, whether great or small, because you have not kept your faith you must take the consequences." That is the language which, I think, the noble Earl ought to have used if he really never intended to offer material assistance to Denmark. I hope, my Lords, I shall not be accused of anything like vanity if I refer to a despatch which I wrote in 1852 to the Danish Government, when I was informed by Sir Henry Wynn, our Minister at Copenhagen, that he observed some symptoms of an intention on the part of Denmark to slide away from the engagements she had contracted under the Treaty of 1852. At that time there were great intrigues in Denmark, as there are now; and the Treaty had not been signed six months
  1088
  when I was told that some leading persons were trying to persuade the King not to fulfil his engagements, and that he was likely to follow their advice. In that despatch to Sir Henry Wynn, dated December 14, 1852, I said—
  "You will not conceal from M. de Bluhme and from all persons called upon to exercise an influence in the decision of the question, that if his Danish Majesty should from whatever cause find himself unable to carry out the engagements he has contracted, Her Majesty's Government must hold His Majesty and that section of the Danish people who will have been the cause of such inability alone responsible for any dangers which may thence arise to the security of Denmark and the integrity of the Danish dominions."—Correspondence, 228.
  My Lords, I think it is evident that the noble Earl had not made up his mind to any policy whatever; and this want of resolution on his part perfectly explains the faltering tone of his despatches, and the difficulties into which every day he plunged deeper. Now, there is one very remarkable proof of this—namely, a conversation which the noble Earl had with Count Bernstorff, the Prussian Minister in this country, on the 14th of January, twelve days before the meeting of Parliament, and fifteen days before the invasion of Schleswig—an invasion which had been threatened for the previous three months. The Prussian Minister called upon the Foreign Secretary, and the noble Earl wrote an account of the conversation which took place on the occasion to Lord Bloomfield. He says—
  "I had a conversation a short time ago with Count Bernstorff on the subject of the proposed occupation of Schleswig by Prussia. He said he had not fully understood the observations I had made in a former conversation. That the proposed occupation, if it were to take place, would be done under the regular authorities and by the regular troops of Prussia; that no danger, therefore, could be incurred by the King of Denmark; and that when he should have complied with the just demands of the German Powers the Duchy of Schleswig would be again placed under his sceptre. I had spoken on a former occasion in the sense that Denmark would resist such an occupation, and might be aided by Great Britain. He wished to have an explanation of what I had then said. It is to be observed that, in speaking to Count Bernstorff on the occasion alluded to I had expressly declared that I could not say what the decision of the Government might be, as the Cabinet had not yet deliberated, and consequently not submitted any opinion to the Queen; but that judging from the general current of feeling in Parliament and in the nation, I thought an invasion of Schleswig by Germany might lead to assistance to Denmark on the part of this country."—No. 4, 534.
  From this conversation it is clear that at the date of his interview with the Prussian

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  Minister, twelve days before the meeting of Parliament, the noble Earl and his colleagues had not made up their minds as to whether they would give Denmark material assistance or not. At that time the German troops were actually about to march into the Danish territory, and to realize that invasion which had been threatening some three months previously. Do not let me be misunderstood, I do not say the Government ought to have resolved on assisting Denmark; but I am pointing out the time at which they might have assisted her effectively, if assistance were to be given to her at all. I may be wrong in that; but I cannot be wrong in this; here we have the noble Lord's own account with the Prussian Minister, by which it appears beyond a shadow of a doubt that, up to that time, Her Majesty's Ministers had not made up their minds as to whether they should assist Denmark or not. The noble Earl concluded the conversation with Count Bernstortf in this way—
  "Count Bernstorff adverted shortly but pointedly to the dangers which might be incurred by Europe if Germany and England should ever become enemies. I fully admitted them, and as fully regretted their existence; but I said that, since the month of May, Great Britain had warned Austria of these dangers; that Prussia and Germany had likewise been warned; but that the voice of England was unheeded, and little time was now left for counsel, wisdom, and moderation; I hoped it would not be thrown away."
  That is exactly what the noble Earl did; and his policy may be very shortly epitomized. To Denmark he said, "Take care what you are about;" to Germany, "Take care what you do;" and beyond that the noble Earl did nothing. Now, while this Correspondence was going on and while events were proceeding to a crisis, what had become of Russia and France, who signed with us the Treaty of 1852—those mighty Allies from whom the noble Earl expected assistance? They did nothing. In his difficulty the noble Earl turned to his Allies and could not find one, I am not going to defend their conduct, because, as co-signataries of the Treaty of 1852, it was their duty to take more active steps with a view of effecting an arrangement of the question between Denmark and Germany, than those which they really took. But I am afraid we shall find that there were reasons, equally attributable to the policy of the noble Earl, which indisposed these Allies from coming—I will not say eagerly, but willingly forward to assist him. The proof of this may be found, I
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  think, in the answers given by Franco on several occasions when she was appealed to by the noble Earl; but, at all events, France cannot be accused of having acted unfairly towards the Danes, because General Fleury, who went to congratulate the King on his accession, and met Lord Wodehouse at Copenhagen, distinctly and categorically told the Danish Government that France would not help them. France, therefore, cannot be blamed for any of those illusions which were held out to Denmark by England. As to the Danes themselves, not only have they been encouraged to resist the demands, just or unjust, whichever they may be, of Germany, by the speech of Lord Palmerston, but I think they were also encouraged to do so by the language held to them at different times by our representative. When Sir Augustus Paget had a long conversation on the 10th of December with M. Hall, the Danish Minister, trying to persuade him to give up the Constitution, he finds M. Hall obstinate, and says—
  "I replied that Denmark would, at all events, have a better chance of securing the assistance of the Powers alluded to by retiring beyond the limits of the Confederation, than if she provoked a war by resisting what might be considered the legitimate authority of the Diet on Federal territory."—No. 3, 365.
  Now surely, in private life, if a man gives you advice in this way, the inference is that if you follow the advice, and the adversary still persecutes you, you will receive assistance at the hands of your adviser. Then, again, in a conversation with M. Hall as to the revocation of the Constitution—a proposal which the Danes asked six weeks to consider—and which was not acceded to—Lord Wodehouse says—
  "If the time were too short before January 1 to pass a repealing Act, I felt confident that Her Majesty's Government would urge upon Prussia and Austria to extend the term they had named, and it could hardly be supposed that so reasonable a request would be refused."—No. 4, 418.
  Further on he said—
  "It was my duty to declare to him (M. Hall) that if the Danish Government rejected our advice. Her Majesty's Government must leave Denmark to encounter Germany on her own responsibility."—No. 4, 418.
  "If she rejected our advice!" Surely, that was not a prudent way for our representative to express himself. But while this advice would have been very good if it had come six weeks sooner, it was given too late; and I say, therefore, that, not-

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  withstanding the warnings of many months—I may say even the warnings of some years—with respect to this question, and notwithstanding the danger became daily more imminent, he took no strong means to prevent it. He never told the Danes that he would not help them, or the Germans that in a certain contingency he would oppose them. With such a policy, it was impossible that what has happened should not have happened; and I have shown it to be quite true that the Cabinet, within a fortnight of the invasion, had no idea of what they intended to do respecting it
  My Lords, I now come to another question of much importance. It is perfectly well known to those who have conversed with Frenchmen of any rank that they were deeply offended by the noble Earl's refusal of the Emperor's proposal of a Congress—by the manner of refusal rather than the act; that this refusal for a time alienated France from us, and was one of the causes why the noble Earl did not get the assistance which he wished. As to the Congress it strikes me that the noble Earl did not look at events with the sagacity which sometimes distinguishes him, and as to which (his policy in the American war, for instance) I have always been ready to do him justice. That France has not held back from any want of sympathy for Denmark is evident from the strong and pithy language used by the Emperor in reference to that country when he was submitting his proposition for a Congress. In replying to this proposition the noble Earl said that negotiations were in progress between the signataries to the Treaty of 1852, and that the addition of Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and other Powers, as deliberating Powers, would scarcely improve the chances of peace. I must say that, for the sake of an epigram, the noble Earl acted imprudently in risking our relations with the French Government. Instead of seeing the situation in the same grave light as the Emperor of the French, the noble Earl answered his proposal by a sort of jesting language, which was very ill-timed, and could have but one result—to offend the Sovereign to whom it was addressed. No doubt it did offend the French Government. I am not speaking of the Emperor personally, because His Majesty is far above that kind of feeling; but I say the language of the noble Lord has offended the French people who have elected him as their Sovereign, and in his peculiar position nothing could be more
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  ill-judged than for the noble Earl to have placed him before the French nation as a person who may be safely answered with such language. Before this your Lordships all know the Correspondence which took place about Poland; you all know the impression of the Emperor and of the French people that the English Government went so far respecting Poland that they ought to have gone further, and that they left the Emperor in the lurch. That is openly stated by French politicians. I am not going to argue that Her Majesty's Government were wrong in not going to war for Poland. On the contrary, I think we did perfectly right in not making war for Poland, for, much as I feel for that unfortunate people, I never could see what means we had of rendering them material aid. I, however, say that Her Majesty's Government should take more care in their Correspondence—with the Governments of France and Russia in particular. The sort of Correspondence which has recently been carried on with the various Powers has left an impression throughout Europe that we are constantly in the habit of holding out hopes of assistance to weak States and menaces to other Powers without meaning to carry out our threats; that all we say ends in smoke, and that we end by doing nothing at all. The Cabinet had not made up their minds towards the end of January as to what they would do respecting Denmark; but the Germans had made up theirs, and they invaded Schleswig. My Lords, I will not attempt to describe the hardships which were inflicted upon the unfortunate Danes, who appear not to have been at all prepared for the struggle, but to have evinced that want of readiness for war which is the notorious vice of democratic Governments. They were totally unprepared, and they therefore succumbed to the superior resources of their opponents. Then came proposals for negotiations, protocols, and notes—and lastly the Conference. And with what results? From the first meeting of the Conference the Plenipotentiaries appear to have been floating as it were in a balloon. They had no basis; and at last the noble Earl, to whom I must give the credit of leaving no stone unturned to arrive at a peaceful solution of the question, when such a result was no longer attainable, was obliged to submit to the humiliation of offering a proposal for the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy and finding that proposal refused.

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  I think, then, my Lords, that I am right in saying that the just influence of this country has been lowered abroad. I think I might prove it; but it would be a disagreeable and painful task to do so. I might refer to the foreign newspapers to show to you what are the opinions of foreign nations with regard to this country now—I do not speak of German papers, which naturally have a hostile feeling against this country, but I speak of the French newspapers—and I never, in my recollection, saw England spoken of in those organs as England is spoken of now. In former years I have heard England spoken of with hostility, envy, and malice, but with a certain degree of respect and fear. But we are now spoken of by those papers—I do not mean those who have been our habitual opponents, but by the Débats and papers of that character—we are spoken of by them as the betrayer of our friends, cowards, and expressions such as these. Well, my Lords, how then is it possible to say that we are not lowered in the eyes of Europe?
  My Lords, I have detained you now longer than I had intended to do. It is very difficult to condense a subject of such importance in making a statement, I think it will require no further argument on my part to show the position in which England stands in respect to this Correspondence.
  Once more I must refer to the speech made by a noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) in another place. I should like your Lordships to compare it with the last speech he has just made in Parliament on this occasion, and I shall merely invite your Lordships to draw your own conclusions, and you must feel as I do, that our country is deeply humiliated in the eyes of foreign nations. The speech which the noble Lord made on the 23rd of July, 1863, is this—
  "It is an important matter of British policy to maintain the independence and integrity of the Danish monarchy. I am convinced at least that if any violent attempt to overthrow this right, and interfere with that independence, those who made the attempt would find in the result it would not be Denmark alone they would have to contend with."—[3 Hansard, clxxii. 1249, 1252.]
  On the 27th of June, 1864, the same noble Lord speaks in these words—but at this time Denmark was dismembered and abandoned, and the Germans in possession of Schleswig. He says—
  "The contest is as regards Schleswig, and not as regards the independence of Denmark, or the safety of the capital, or of the Danish Monarchy.
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  I do not mean to say, therefore, and I think it right to put in this reservation, if the war should assume a different character—if the existence of Denmark as an independent power in Europe should be at stake—if we had reason to expect to see in Copenhagen the horrors of a town taken by assault, the destruction of property, the sacrifice of the lives not only of its defenders but of its peaceful inhabitants, the confiscation that would ensue, the capture of the Sovereign as a prisoner of war, and other humiliations of that kind—I do not mean to say if any of those events are likely to happen, the position of this country might not be a subject"—for what? "for reconsideration. We might then think it our duty to adopt another course."
  I think, my Lords, I need say nothing more. Contrast those two speeches one with the other, both speeches spoken by the same man, and in the same place, and that man the Prime Minister of England. And now I ask you, my Lords, am I right? The noble Earl concluded by moving to resolve—
  "That this House has heard with deep Concern that the Sittings of the Conference recently held in London have been brought to a Close without accomplishing the important Purposes for which it was convened:
  "That it is the Opinion of this House, that while the Course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has failed to maintain their avowed Policy of upholding the Integrity and Independence of Denmark, it has lowered the just Influence of this Country in the Councils of Europe, and thereby diminished the Securities for Peace" (The Earl of Malmesbury).
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: My Lords, we all knew before this debate began, and if we had not known it we should know it now, that the Resolution proposed by the noble Earl has not for its object to affirm any principle, or to settle any policy. The Resolution itself, as well as the speech of the noble Earl, have been carefully framed so as to avoid and evade all those obligations in respect to great questions of public policy which are not less incumbent upon Oppositions than upon Governments. This is a pure faction fight. ["No, no!" and "Hear, hear!"] Do not let my friends opposite imagine that I am making this a subject of complaint—faction fights are perfectly fair things—though I may think that foreign policy is not the ground on which these battles should generally be fought; because I hold that they tend to compromise the country in regard to its foreign relations. I am not going, however, to complain of this on the present occasion. My Lords, I am but too happy to find that our tongues are at last freed—that we are able to meet our opponents face to face, and to tell them what we have to

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  say for ourselves, and something also of what we think of them.
  But, my Lords, I must ohserve—and I beg the House's attention to the statement—that this Resolution is not so worded as to define the grounds upon which the Government is sought to be censured. Of course the gist of the Resolution is, that by the misconduct of the Government the influence and reputation of this country have been lowered, and at first sight the Resolution might lead the reader to suppose that the grounds stated for this condemnation are the failure of our policy with regard to Denmark. But a careful reading will show that no grounds whatever are assigned. I have my own theory, which I will explain to the House in a moment as to the wording of this Resolution; but I should like to ask the noble Earl who has just sat down a question. I know that the privilege of answering questions is generally confined to Governments, and is not shared in by Oppositions, but I hope the noble Bail will not object to enjoy by anticipation one of those pleasures which may so soon fall to his lot in office. It has been stated, upon what appears to be good authority, that this Resolution is the production of no less than sixteen persons. What I wish to ask the noble Earl is whether he will favour the House with their names. ["Oh, oh!"] If he will, I think that will explain all. I have no doubt whatever that among those sixteen right hon. Gentlemen or noble Lords there was a peace party and a war party. If the Resolution had been drawn, as this one appears to be at first sight, implying that the influence of this country has been lowered because we had failed to maintain the integrity of Denmark, such a Resolution would have pointed to a war policy, and I have no doubt that the peaceful section of the Committee would have said, as one of them has already virtually said, "We shall not vote for such a Resolution, because any policy that is in favour of war would, in our opinion, be a policy of insanity." Consequently, in order to meet that objection, and in order to make the Resolution absolutely void of all principle, the sentences have been connected by the word "while," so as to render what apparently was an expression of opinion merely the assertion of two facts.
  My Lords, the noble Earl appears to suppose that we complain of him for not announcing the policy which he intends to
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  adopt if he comes into office. I can assure the noble Earl that he has entirely mistaken the nature of our objections to his Resolution. We do not ask him what his policy will be if he conies into office. What that policy would be we know well enough already. He would go to the Parliament and the country for his policy, although he has sneered at us for so doing. What we do complain of, however, is that this Resolution does not tell us why he condemns us and what he would have done if he had been placed in our position. I listened carefully to the speech of the noble Earl, and I noticed that when he even touched upon the question of policy, he appeared at once to guard himself. "Do not let it be supposed that I mean we should have done so and so. I only mean that if such a thing had been done, such and such a consequence would have followed." This being the nature of the Resolution, and the present question being merely a trial of strength between parties, I trust I may be allowed to deal with it somewhat in its personal character. The case of the Opposition against the Government appears to be this—first, they say "You were quite right in not going to war." The noble Earl, whose absence we all so deeply regret to-night—[Ironical laughter]—I can assure noble Lords opposite that our regret is perfectly sincere—["Hear, hear!" and laughter]—for whatever may be our party feeling, we all respect the noble Earl and admire his powers; we wish the character and credit of the debates of this House to be maintained; and we regret his absence all the more because of the cause to which it is assigned. The case against the Government, then, appears to be this—"You were right not to go to war." Lord Derby said so distinctly the other night, although the noble Earl who has just sat down carefully avoided saying so.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: I beg your pardon: I distinctly said you were quite right in not going to war at the breaking up of the Conference.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: Very well; then the noble Earl agrees with his leader, he says—"You were right not to go to war upon the breaking up of the Conference." Now, I say that involves the further proposition that the honour and interests of England do not demand that we should go to war. If that be so, I want to know how it is you divide the

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  honour of England from the honour of those who represent the Crown of England? If the noble Earl opposite would have been justified in not going to war, were we not justified in not going to war? I say the one proposition involves the other. The case of the Opposition, then, I apprehend, is this:—You, the Government, have involved yourselves by promises on the one hand, and by threats on the other; and though we do not say the honour of England is concerned, we do say that personally the present Government is compromised, and it would be better we should come into office, as we are at least free from the charge of making those promises and holding out those threats." That, my Lords, is a very pleasant theory for noble Lords opposite; but with the permission of the House I propose to examine how far it will stand investigation. My Lords, very early in October last there was a very remarkable conversation held at Copenhagen between the English Minister at that capital and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that country. It was a conversation which involves the whole secret of subsequent transactions. At that time the new Constitution, which has been the immediate occasion of this unfortunate war, had not been passed, but it was being prepared by the Government of Denmark. The British Minister remonstrated earnestly with M. Hall against the passing of that Constitution. He also at the same time urged the Government of Denmark to revoke the Patent of March. These were subjects intimately connected. Now, I beg the House to observe the language of M. Hall. As to the Patent, he asked, "Will England promise—if we revoke the Patent—will you give us an assurance of her support?" The reply of the English Minister was immediate—his answer was that he could not even forward such a request, as he was sure it would be of no use. Then, as to the Constitution, M. Hall's language was substantially this—"I know there is a war coming upon us from Germany, which I do not wish to avoid, as being inevitable at some time; there can be no better moment for us." What was his reason for saying that? Did he say he relied on the support of the English Government? Not at all. He said—"We do not expect the support of the English Government, but we rely upon the public feeling of England, which is being aroused on our behalf." Now observe
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  the date at which this conversation was held. It was held in October, before the death of the King, and before the Schleswig-Holstein question had attracted such universal attention—before the press of this country teemed with those articles on the subject of Denmark, which, however generous, sometimes exhibit very little knowledge of the details of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute. How, then, was it that M. Hall relied not on the Government of England—but upon the public feeling of England being roused on behalf of Denmark? Allow me to reply—and I do so without hesitation—that M. Hall pointed in that conversation amongst other things, and chief amongst other things, to certain proceedings which had taken place in your Lordships' House. Now, my Lords, in what I am about to say, do not let me for a moment be misunderstood; do not let it be supposed that I think myself entitled to complain, or if I were entitled that I am disposed to complain, of what may be said or done in this House by the independent Members of your Lordships' assembly. My Lords, during the ten years I have had the honour of sitting on this bench there has been more than one occasion upon which I have myself been deeply grateful for the language which has been held by noble Lords, independent of party in this House. I say there have been occasions—aye, more than one—when services in the cause of Europe, and the cause of liberty and freedom in Europe, which could not have been rendered by the Government, and would not have been rendered by the official Opposition, were rendered in this House by independent Members of it. My Lords, I will specify one example of what I mean. When, immediately after the close of the Crimean war, the attention of the world was directed to the atrocious proceedings of the Austrian Government in Italy, upon which subject those who were Members of the Government were necessarily silent, and when, I am afraid, the sympathies of the noble Lords opposite were not sufficiently alive to the interests of the Italians to induce them to speak, the voice of remonstrance, of warning—aye, of threat—was raised by two noble Lords, one of whom is now no more, and the other I deeply regret to see is not present in the House to-night. My Lords, I refer to Lord Lyndhurst and the Earl of Ellenborough. I shall not soon forget the observations which were made by my noble

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  and venerated Friend, Lord Aberdeen, then at the head of the Government, when he listened to the famous speech in 1856 from Lord Lyndhurst, on the wrongs which were inflicted on the Italian people, and when he distinctly pointed out to Parliament and to England that those evils were of such a character that they could not be remedied except by the last resource of war. I well remember the observation made by Lord Aberdeen on the significance and effect of such a speech coming from such a man in your Lordships' House. It is often said that this House is a cold and unimpassioned assembly, and it may be so in some degree; but there are subjects upon which your Lordships seem to respond more immediately to the feelings of the people than even that other assembly which is in intimate contact with the people. So it was upon the Question of Italy. I do not know whether the debates in this House had much influence upon opinion in this country, but I know that they did exercise much influence abroad. Speeches of this character, coming from independent members of the House, from men of great name—of great repute, of mature years, are supposed in foreign countries to speak the mature opinions of the English people. Why, then, do I say that M. Hall trusted to what had been said in this House, and not to the Government? I know he did not trust himself to the Government, for in that very conversation he told us he did not do so. I have now to refer your Lordships to what took place on a remarkable debate in the month of May last; and I wish to remind the House of the circumstances under which it took place. In September, 1862, my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office had proposed, for the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, a constitution, which the noble Earl opposite, absurdly enough—I hope he will excuse me for saying so—called a Reform Bill. This constitution, however, was supposed to be too German in its tendency and adverse to the interests of Denmark. Now, what happened at the beginning of the next Session of Parliament? Your Lordships will not probably have forgotten the attack made on my noble Friend by the noble Earl (Derby). Do you not recollect the joke, "Can't you let it alone?" and I thought the attack of the Opposition was to be made, not that we were doing this or that, but that we were interfering at all in the matter. In the month of May following, the subject was
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  brought forward by Lord Ellenborough in a powerful and eloquent address. Upon that occasion, Lord Derby came forward most handsomely, and said—
  "I imputed to him (Earl Russell) that I thought he had interfered gratuitously, and without sufficient cause, for the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question. I certainly was not then aware of the length and elaboration of the diplomatic correspondence which had taken place, and I was not aware how entirely the noble Earl's interference was justified by the consent of the different Powers."—[3 Hansard, clxx. 1755.]
  These words, I think, entirely dispose of a multitude of the arguments directed against us in this debate. We did not interfere gratuitously. We were asked on all sides to interfere; on the one hand and the other we were asked, in every form of suggestion and request, by all the parties to this dispute, to assist in procuring its settlement. But now, my Lords, I must quote what Lord Derby said with regard to the main Question. These were Lord Derby's words, and I beg the House to listen to their import and to answer whether M. Hall was not justified in his confidence and reliance, not on the language of the Government, but on the language of the Opposition. Lord Derby says—
  "The integrity of Denmark is of vital importance to this country."
  I say no language so exaggerated as this has ever fallen from any Member of Her Majesty's Government. Lord Derby goes on to say—
  "It is policy as well as justice to support against the claims of ambitious nations her fair and equitable rights. It is our duty, as it is our policy, to protect her against aggression; and although, God forbid, that last extremity should be forced upon us, yet, I say, if the question arises whether Denmark should lose its integrity, and he frittered away. I say there is no alternative that would not be preferable in point of fact to a peace which would be considered so disastrous and so destructive to Denmark."
  Those were the words of the noble Earl, and in words as distinct as these he held out hopes to Denmark. And yet these are the men who come here and tell us that we alone, as distinguished from them, have held out hopes to Denmark. They tell us that we have placed the country in a position of humiliation, because we have not assisted Denmark, and that they are free to take office to-morrow and to desert Denmark, whose integrity they have declared to be of vital importance to us. My Lords, I will say more. My own firm conviction is that the Danish Government

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  and the Danish people—and I do not blame them for it—have been speculating on a change of Government in this country. Poor Denmark! She has been expecting, not that we should assist her, but that, for declining to assist her, we should be driven from office by a Vote of Want of Confidence, and then that noble Lords opposite would assist her when they came into power. Instead of which she finds us assailed by a Motion of Want of Confidence because we have ever said a word in her behalf and endeavoured to form an European alliance in her defence. Den mark, entertaining these expectations, has been betrayed, not by us, but by the language of noble Lords opposite.
  Having said so much on the question as between the Government and the Opposition, I wish to add a word upon a point to which the noble Earl only alluded slightly—the contrast that has been drawn between the position of France and that of England. I must do the noble Earl the justice to say that he treated this branch of the argument in a spirit of much greater fairness than others who have attacked the Government; but as this was a heavy point of attack upon us in another place, let me say that I do not see how the assertion can be accounted for, that the position of England is humiliated in consequence of the course we have adopted towards Denmark, whilst the position of Prance is perfectly upright, fair, and honourable, except by those party feelings which lead men to attack their own country through the existing Government. I do not know how this contrast can be drawn between the two countries. We were co-signataries of the same treaty. We were bound by precisely the same obligations. I will go a step further, and, speaking for myself, declare my firm conviction that England has no selfish or material interests what ever in the question. I deny the proposition of Lord Derby, that the vital interests of this country are concerned in the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark. I deeply sympathize with the Danes. There is no Member of this House, I venture to say, who sympathizes with them more deeply than I do; but I say that we in this country have no selfish or material interests whatever in the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852. I do not say the same of France. I think France has a material interest in preventing the advance of the German Confederation along the waters of the Baltic. As to England
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  dreading Germany as a naval Power, the very notion of it is ludicrous. Lord Ellenborough said last year, in the debate to which I have already referred, that a German fleet would be no great source of strength to Germany; but, even if it were, I say it is quite as likely to be friendly to England as the Danish fleet has been. Again, I ask, what is the position of the two countries? England has recoiled before the risk of war with the whole of Germany when that war must be carried on alone. France has recoiled before the fear of a war with Germany which would have been carried on in close alliance with England, one of the greatest Powers of Europe. France has recoiled before that war when her own material interests were nearly concerned, at a time when England who had no interests was prepared to join her. I am not blaming the Emperor of the French—he is at perfect liberty to be the judge of his own interests and actions—but I say that the contrast drawn between the positions of England and of France is simply ridiculous, and founded upon a gross misrepresentation of the relative position of the two countries.
  Referring to France in another point of view, the noble Earl said that France, through General Fleury, had given full notice to Denmark that she would on no account give her material aid in this struggle. The noble Earl no doubt quoted that statement from the blue-book; but it is evident that his study of the blue-book cannot have been very close or complete, because he will find that we made immediate inquiry into the truth of this report, and the French Government immediately contradicted it. They said it was very possible General Fleury might have advised Denmark not to let slip any opportunities for peace at that moment, because at that moment the French Government did not mean to act. But the French Government distinctly stated that nothing had been said which did not leave the hands of the Emperor perfectly free.
  LORD CHELMSFORD: Can the noble Duke tell us the date of that despatch?
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: It is at page 443. I come now to the speech of the noble Earl, which I confess I have very great difficulty in following. I could not, to say the real truth, detect the trace of an argument throughout—I do not know what he was at. At one moment he seemed to say that we had interfered gratuitously, and against that I have only to quote the

  1103
  opinion of his chief (the Earl of Derby), who says we were fully justified in interfering. At another moment he said we held out hopes to Denmark and threats to Germany. It is perfectly true that over and over again we intimated to Germany the dangers which must result from the course she was pursuing, and I hold that we were perfectly justified in holding this language and in pointing out these dangers. But not one word did the noble Earl mention of the attempts made to engage France with us in joint action on this great European question. I say that every one of these intimations to the German Powers was strictly parallel with similar intimations made by France, and that they all had reference to the attempts we were then making, and which it was thought might be successful, to induce France to undertake joint action along with us. At the time we were making these endeavours to secure joint operation, which might possibly end in war, it was our bounden duty to warn the German Powers of the danger they were incurring; and we should have forfeited our duty as Ministers of the English Crown if we had not held out such intimations to the German Powers. Then again, it has been said that all this time we were plotting war. But if there be one principle which has been accepted in this country by all parties more decidedly than another, it is that joint action by England and France in all the great questions of European difficulty is the surest means by which the danger of war can be averted. The noble Earl repeatedly referred to a particular time when he thinks we ought to have adopted a more decided policy. He of course warned the House—as he always took care to do—that he did not say he would have done this himself; but he thinks that if it had been done peace would have been secured. What was the particular juncture at which the noble Earl suggested, though he did not advise, that we should have gone to war? When the German Powers were about to cross the Eider? Think of the position that England would have been in. He did not say a word about France. He said England might have done this, and would have done it with complete success. What was the time of year when the invasion of Schleswig took place? It was in the month of February, when hard frost was prevailing, and the Baltic was entirely inaccessible to our ships. What probability of success, then,
  1104
  had England at that time if she went to war with Germany? In such circumstances England, with her 30,000 or 35,000, or at the outside, 40,000 men, would have been called on to meet the united German force of perhaps 250,000 men, which would have been ranged against her in a single week or ten days. For it must be remembered that we had to deal not with the policy of M. Bismark or Count Rechberg, but with the fanatical feeling which inspired the whole population of the German States. What probability—nay, I will ask, what possibility is there that such a course would not have staved off war? It is very easy for those who are not in a position of responsibility to say they would have adopted this course or that. Early in this Session my noble Friend (Earl Grey) on the cross benches expressed a confident hope as to the result which would have attended such an interference on the part of England. I can only say that I always envy the strength of my noble Friend's convictions. I often wish I could be as certain of things I see with my own eyes as my noble Friend is of the most distant and contingent possibilities. I venture to say that if you go into the probability of war or peace being secured by the efforts of England against united Germany, it is almost absolutely certain that we should have been obliged to go to war with the whole of Germany, having but a very small land force, and with the Baltic inaccessible on account of ice. The noble Earl opposite (Earl of Malmesbury) hinted, though he did not say, that this was the policy to which he would have committed the Government. I beg to remind him of the words of a noble Lord who is likely to be a colleague of his, that such a policy would have been a policy of "insanity."
  There is one part of the subject I wish to deal with before I close. I wish to speak of those opponents of the Government who condemn us, not on the ground which the noble Earl has avowed, that of wishing to drive us from office that he may occupy our position himself, but who oppose us on a definite ground of principle and of policy. These noble Lords are the advocates of a war policy. And again I say I deeply regret the absence of Lord Ellenborough, who has spoken in that sense more than once with all the vigour of his great powers, I do not deny that there is in the country, I will not say a large party, but a great number of persons, who feel bit-

  1105
  terly disappointed that England has not gone to war for the sake of Denmark. This is a feeling which has much of my sympathy, and all of my respect. I confess that in dealing with this subject I feel that the fate of the Government is a matter of very small importance. What is important is that the English people should be satisfied that if we have refrained from war, it has not been merely because we have recoiled from difficulties and dangers to be incurred by ourselves, but from much higher considerations—considerations connected with the peace of Europe and the difficulties which Say in the way of enforcing the cause of justice. I beg noble Lords who participate in this feeling to consider what it is that men mean when they talk of going to war for Denmark. It is commonly said that going to war for Denmark means going to war to support the Treaty of 1852. But those who speak thus seem to have forgotten that practically the Treaty of 1852 has long ceased to be a living question—at all events since the first meeting of the Conference it has ceased to be so. It was not by us but by the Danes themselves that the treaty was abandoned. ["Oh, oh!"] I shall be glad if the noble Lord will answer me in a more articulate manner when I sit down, but I must maintain the position which I have stated. How many of your Lordships have read and carefully studied the Treaty of 1852? It has often been said that it was a treaty of recognition and not of guarantee, and this, at least, is now generally understood. But this is not the point on which I now wish to dwell. It was a treaty of recognition, but what was it that it recognized? It was a recognition of a personal union between the Crown of Den mark and the Crowns of the two Duchies, and not of a union of the countries or their institutions. It was simply a recognition that the King of Denmark should also be the Duke of Schleswig and Holstein—a recognition of what has been called a personal union. But directly the Danes entered the Conference they said—"We will have no personal union; we will not be satisfied with a personal union." Now, my Lords, I am not blaming the Danes for taking up this position. On the contrary I think that they were perfectly right in doing so. It was said last year by Lord Ellenborough that Schleswig was a province which had belonged to Denmark for 400 years. That is perfectly
  1106
  true in one sense, but not in another. It is true that it was a fief of the Danish I Crown, but for many hundred years it was I divided between the different occupants of the throne, and it was not until the year; 1720—the date of our own guarantee of part; of Schleswig—that the whole of that duchy was united to the Crown of Denmark, and then it was united solely by a personal I union. Remember that as long as Denmark was a despotism a personal union was a real union, because, as far as regards external relations with foreign countries, a despotic Sovereign wields the whole power of all his crowns, and in this case the King of Denmark had all the power of the Duke of Schleswig and the Duke of Holstein. But the moment you introduce responsible, liberal, or democratic Government, the case is entirely altered. Personal union ceases to be union for any practical purpose whatever, and unless the three Parliaments agree, the King of Denmark has not, as he formerly had, the power of the three kingdoms united. Now observe the facts of this case. Liberal institutions were adopted in Denmark, the Government of which became not only liberal but highly democratic in the year 1837. The moment that that took place the two populations were brought into contact, and the jealousies and rivalries between the two nationalities and the two peoples had free course to come into collision. What were the facts with regard to the Duchy of Schleswig? At the very first general election—and I take these facts not from a German authority, but from a work of great ability and research written by a Danish partisan, M. Gosch, a gentleman connected, I believe, with the Danish Legation in this country—a large majority of the local representatives were what were called Schleswig-Holsteiners, that was, they were hostile to more than a personal union between the Duchies and the Kingdom. They were, in fact, opposed to the existing Danish Government. The Parliament lasted for six or seven years, and at the next general election the majority in favour of the autonomy of the Duchies, as it was called, was still larger, and at the present moment, the division of parties stands, I believe, as 16 to 27. The noble Earl talked about nationality as if it were a mere question of language and races. Why, we are dealing with separate provinces, having their own institutions, their own national life, their own desire for

  1107
  political autonomy. It is not a mere question of languages and nationalities. The people of the Duchy of Schleswig—I speak of Schleswig especially—wish to keep together. They would not have objected—they do not, I believe, object—to a merely personal union with Denmark; but the Danes say, "We wont have that; we must have you incorporated in the kingdom." That this is a true interpretation of the facts is shown by the language used by the King of Denmark himself in the Patent of 1846, referring to the question of succession, which was afterwards settled by the Treaty of 1852. His Majesty said in that Patent—
  "More particularly, we hereby assure our faithful subjects in the Duchy of Schleswig, that we do not intend by these letters patent in any way to trespass upon the autonomy of the Duchy, such as it has hitherto been recognized by us, nor to make any alteration in those other relations which at present connect it with Holstein. We, on the contrary, hereby renew our assurance that we will, for the future, as hitherto, protect our Duchy of Schleswig in the enjoyment of the rights which belong to it as an inseparable, but yet independent part of our monarchy."
  There is the testimony of the Danish Monarch himself that the Duchy of Schleswig was contending for its own autonomy; that it was under his Crown, but was an independent part of the monarchy, and an independent part of the Danish State. Now, if you are to fight for Denmark in the present war, you would be going to war to force the Schleswigers not to be united, as formerly, by a personal union, but to be incorporated with Denmark. Is that an object for which England could go to war? I will put aside all question as to our power to meet alone the whole German Confederation; I will put aside all questions as to the danger and inconvenience which might be incurred by England in such a war; I will even go the length of supposing that it was within our power easily to effect our object; and I ask, is it an object which we have a right to go to war to effect, or which we have the smallest chance of effecting with any regard to justice or good policy? I apprehend that there can be but one answer. It is not an object that we could propose to ourselves; I believe it is an object that we could not have effected. And I am satisfied that, when the people of England find that this is the only result for which they would have contended if they had gone to war, they will see that the Government has abstained
  1108
  from war not merely from selfish or unworthy considerations, but because we really had not an object which it was within our right or competence to contend for.
  My Lords, I hope that it will not be supposed that in anything I have said I intend to bear hard against the Danish Government or the Danish people, much less that it will be imagined that I have the slightest sympathy with the course taken by the great German Powers. I believe there is not a single partisan of Germany in your Lordships' House. We may think, and we do think, that the Danes have committed great errors and great faults, but we are also of opinion that those errors might have been corrected without violence, and certainly atoned for without blood. Moreover, we especially condemn the conduct of the Prussian Government, because we believe that they have hurried on this war from the worst and most selfish motives. I believe that it is very much in order to enable the present Government of Prussia to trample more effectually upon the liberties of their own people that they have put themselves at the head of this fanatical movement of the German people, and that they have deluged the North of Europe with blood. I say that a greater crime was never committed by any Government; and I would earnestly appeal to the Prussian people, whether they will allow their Government to go on sacrificing and trampling on their liberties, under the pretext of engaging the national feeling of Germany in a crusade against a weak and helpless Power.
  As the noble Earl has referred to a speech which was delivered by my noble Friend Lord Palmerston the other day, in laying the papers upon the table of the House, and severely animadverted upon the tone adopted by the noble Lord, I wish to say one word with respect both to the present position of this country and to the future. All that the Government of England has said, or ought to say, was that we did not think it right to commit this country to war merely for the purpose of settling the Schleswig-Holstein dispute; but that should new objects be developed, or should the war take a new direction, we and those who might succeed us in office would hold ourselves free to deal with any conjuncture which might arise as to them, or to us might seem fit. That was all that was said by the noble Viscount in another place, and all that was said or implied by my noble Friend the Secretary

  1109
  for Foreign Affairs in your Lordships' House. Nay, more, I maintain that the language held by the English and by the French Government on this point are all but identical. The French Government, in writing to decline the proposition which was made to them in January in reference to joint action in support of Denmark, said they were not prepared at that conjuncture to enter into any engagements to promise material aid to Denmark, or to incur any risk of war with Germany; but they distinctly reserved to themselves, in the event of the war taking a new direction, and the balance of power in Europe being imperilled, the right of dealing with that altered condition of affairs as they might deem advisable. This is the position taken by the two Governments, and it is a position, I contend, consistent with the honour and dignity of this country.
  My Lords, I should deeply regret—but more, I must say, for the sake of this House than of Her Majesty's Government—that this meaningless Resolution, involving no principle and no policy—not even condemning the Government on any specific grounds—should be placed on the Journals of the House of Lords. But I will frankly own that, whatever may be the result of the Vote which is to be given tonight, we are not ashamed of any thing which we have said or done. Neither are we ashamed of having forborne to do anything from which we have refrained. I do not regret that we have interfered in this question as we have done, because it was, I think, our bounden duty to take that course. I do not regret that we advised Denmark to fulfil all her promises to Germany. I do not regret that we distinctly intimated to her our opinion as to the particular measures which we thought a violation of the stipulations into which she had entered; or that we warned the German Powers of the dangers that would arise if France and England should be compelled to take up arms against their aggressive movements. I am not sorry that we endeavoured to form a close alliance with France, and to rally her to our support, because my firm conviction is, that if she had advanced as we invited her to do, this war would not have been waged nor all this blood shed. I do not regret that we invited—hoping against hope—the great Powers of Europe to a Conference in Lon don, to see if we could settle this question by means of negotiations; or that, having failed in that endeavour, we refused to com-
  1110
  mit England to a war in which she had no immediate interest, and from which we could expect no results adequate to the evils which it would entail. Above all, I do not regret that we have resisted that temptation to which you (the Opposition) now are yielding—the temptation of identifying our own personal sympathies and our own party objects with the honour and interests of our country.
  LORD BROUGHAMsaid, he would not enter into the details of this Question after they had been so ably handled by his noble Friends on both sides of the House. But he should not feel easy if he did not express his opinion upon the state of foreign countries and our policy as connected with them. The aspect of affairs was far from cheering either in the New world or in the Old. In the New, a cruel civil war to excite our reprobation and our pity; in the Old, much which it was natural to deplore, but much which it was necessary to condemn. I We saw a nation that had from a man, falsely and unreflectingly called great, inherited with his dominions his profligacy and; cunning, but little of his capacity. It has been seized with a love of wealth and power, and for its gratification has trampled I on the weak and truckled to the strong, serving as the tool of the Muscovite through; a course of treachery and cruelty unprecedented even in the history of Russian oppression and Polish suffering. Backed by Austria on no possible principle, on a war of intent hard to conceive, unless it be that she dreamt of gaining influence with, the German Courts, ruled by their mobs fanatical for war, and hoped to make such influence a counterpoise to her difficulties in Italy and her worse embarrassments in Hungary, Thus seeking glory in war, Prussia had not gained the shadow of it, but she had grasped the substance of plunder. Were we to stand by silent and see her butchery and pillage of a gallant people? We should then really be humbled. If we had not felt indignation, we should have been under a delusion. If we had not expressed indignation, we should have incurred everlasting disgrace. People talk of humiliation. There is nothing humbling in being unable to prevent wrong by staying the wrong-doer; but it is humiliating to stand by in silence. All Europe knew that we could not make war single-handed against half or two-thirds of the Continent. To have rushed into such a war, how just so ever the grounds of it, would have been utter

  1111
  insanity. We had a right and a duty to abstain from this, and also a right and a duty to express our indignation. We were not bound, as Mr. Mills has well said, to be chivalrous, but we were bound to be honest and speak out. If the language in which we expressed our honest feelings was strong, stronger than usual in diplomatic intercourse, no harm could be done. Threats, or anything to be construed into threats, we had no right to use, seeing we were prevented by our insulation from acting. He did not find by examining the papers that any such had been used, and he spoke the more confidently on this that he had for the moment been misled by clamour at home and abroad to doubt whether menacing language had not been employed. The examination of the Correspondence and the whole case had convinced him to the contrary, and he gave it as his deliberate opinion that there had been no threats used by his noble Friend (Lord Russell). So it was the grossest fallacy to pretend that promises had been given to Denmark. This was urged from an expression of his noble Friend in the House of Commons (Lord Palmerston), that Denmark should not stand alone if Germany attacked her. But the expression was used in a statement that Russia and France viewed the matter as we did, and consequently the expression only meant that others as well as ourselves would stand by the Danes. He deeply lamented that France had not at the proper moment interfered. She owed incalculable benefits to her wise and politic ruler, whose aversion to all that might slacken her great and rapid progress in the peaceful arts and affect the existing material prosperity she was enjoying, could not be doubted. But he felt confident, as confident as one could be of any event which had not happened, that her interposition at first would have proved effectual without the least risk of hostilities. That the Conference had ended without general pacification he deeply lamented, owing to the refusal of arbitration. He had said, on the first announcement, that there were three ways of refusing an offer to refer:—one was plainly and frankly to say No, as the Danes had done; another was to say Yes, but on condition of a two months' armistice, a thing altogether out of the question; a third was to say Yes, but on condition of not being bound by the answer. These were only roundabout refusals, and, therefore, the German Powers had refused quite as plainly as the Danes.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE: My Lords, I naturally feel considerable reluctance in intruding upon your Lordships on a question of this gravity and importance; but that reluctance is greatly increased when I find myself obliged, for the first time for many years—if not in my life—to differ from the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and I believe I may say, as far as foreign politics are concerned, from my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary. Since 1827 I have always looked for guidance, when I needed it, on foreign politics to my noble Friend at the head of the Government; and I can conscientiously say that I have on every occasion voted with my noble Friend on these affairs, not merely out of deference to his authority, but from a conscientious feeling that I was right in so doing. On the present occasion I regret to say that I cannot support the policy of the Government. When the Resolution of the noble Earl opposite was proposed, I felt myself in considerable difficulty; but with the whole tenor of his speech I entirely agree. He says, if I understand him rightly, that the Government have brought on war, and have led the way to the present unfortunate state of things by their vacillation, indecision, and weakness. In that I entirely agree; but I am forced on this occasion to give my opinion, not upon the noble Earl's speech, but upon his Motion. I was astonished to hear the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), talk of this as what in Irish phrase might be termed a "faction fight." Would it have been becoming in this House to receive in silence the papers laid before us, accompanied as they were by such a speech? On the contrary, we were specially invited by the Government to examine those papers and to give our opinion, and we were expressly told not to be in a hurry. I have examined the papers, and I am bound to say that I do think that they show that these affairs have been greatly mismanaged, and that it is owing to that mismanagement that there is a war, and that Denmark has been almost swept off the political map of Europe. But, my Lords, I cannot vote for the Motion of the noble Earl opposite, because, though undoubtedly it is a censure upon the Government, and as such must be taken, if it is carried, yet its terms are such I cannot support. I do not think, in the first place, that it expresses the truth; and if it does so, that truth is not which this House ought to blazon to the world.

  1113
  I do not think that the influence of England, properly exercised, is one jot lowered in the eyes of Europe. The influence of this country depends on her power, and never did the power of England stand higher than at the present moment. We have the finest fleet in the world; we have an army, which, although small, has never been found inadequate for any necessary purpose; we have financial resources which seem almost inexhaustible; and the commerce of the country, so far from being an impediment to our going to war, adds immense weight to us in any war. If any country with which we have commercial relations happened to go to war with us, it would suffer by the interruption of commerce relatively and comparatively far more than England. We have shown that we can suffer a great interruption to our manufactures and commerce without our resources being impaired. I think, therefore, that the Resolution of the noble Earl, whether drawn up by a council of sixteen, as the noble Duke told us, or by an individual, is mistaken in asserting that the isolation of the English Cabinet implies a want of solid power on the part of England. I perfectly agree there is an isolation at the very moment when we require combined action.
  My Lords, in order to justify my remark that those affairs have been mismanaged, I do not think it necessary to go back to the long period which the noble Earl has referred to; but I must observe that I was astonished to hear the terms in which the noble Duke spoke of the Treaty of 1852. The noble Duke was a Royal Commissioner who sat in front of the throne when a Royal Speech was delivered, in which no less than three paragraphs were devoted to that treaty. Why, my Lords, we have heard of that treaty as the sole ground on which Her Majesty's Government called on the other Great Powers for their co-operation in the matter. They went to France and said, "You were a party to the Treaty of 1852." They went to Russia and said, "You were a party to the Treaty of 1852." They went to Prussia and Austria, and said, "How can you set aside the terms of the Treaty of 1852?" And, after all this, the noble Duke comes forward and says, it is not what you can call a binding treaty.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: I beg the noble Marquess's pardon. I said the Danes had given it up themselves.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE: I do not doubt it. The Danes have given
  1114
  it up! Why, it is torn to shreds. And that was the treaty which was to have preserved the integrity and independence of Denmark. What has become of the integrity and independence of Denmark? About a fortnight ago I observed in this House that, before very long, Denmark would become either a province of Germany or part of a Scandinavian empire. I little thought then how near was the time at which my words would be realized. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) undertook tonight to hold out a similar expectation to that put forward on a previous occasion by my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs—that if those wonderful fleets of the Austrians and Prussians should go to Copenhagen and force harsh conditions and a treaty on Denmark, the Government will reconsider the question of assistance. Well, I have no doubt they will if they should be in office; but I venture to think that when those fleets are before Copenhagen there will be still less inclination in this country for our going to war than there is at this moment, when, I apprehend, there is not a man in the country who thinks we ought now to go to war. My Lords, the time forgoing to war is past; but, looking back, we find there have been different times at which different tones were taken by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the question of peace and war; whereas, as I contend, you ought never to have spoken a word about war without being fully prepared to follow up your words by acts. It is of a want of decision and determination I accuse my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office. It is impossible for any one to read the papers and not see that sometimes the Government were inclined for war. It is impossible not to see that not only the Cabinet collectively, but the noble Earl himself at different times, were, at different times, of different dispositions as regards this question. I beg to have it clearly understood that I do not, by the Amendment I propose to move, or by any observations of mine, mean to assert that at any time the noble Earl in any despatch, or the English Government by any word, spoken by our representatives here or abroad, gave any pledge or promise that England alone, or in alliance with other Powers, would support Denmark in a war. If that had been done, I entertain no doubt whatever that my noble Friend and the Government would have redeemed their pledge; but the question is, have you not, by your whole conduct, given Denmark

  1115
  reason to suppose that you would go to war in her behalf, and afterwards abandoned her in her present unfortunate position? I assert that such is the case. If I were asked at what time the Government might with advantage have declared their intention to go to war—supposing that at any time they had an intention of taking that step—I would name the 18th of September, when Mr. Grey had the interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the particulars of which he reports to the noble Earl in a despatch of that date. I do not wish to read passages from blue-books, and therefore I shall merely state that, on the occasion to which I refer, a proposition was made by Her Majesty's Government to the Government of the Emperor of the French, that a joint representation should be made to the Germanic Confederation on the subject of the threatened Federal execution in Holstein. France refused because, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, if the two nations made such a representation they must "go further." He reminded Mr. Grey of the position in which France and England had put themselves with Russia in respect of Poland, and he stated that France could not join in a formal representation and there stop short. The noble Duke has told your Lordships truly that England and France can command the peace of the world; and if the Government were determined to meddle as much as they did—I do not say whether they were right or whether they were wrong in doing so—when they were saying at Frankfort that they could not see the Federal occupation with indifference, they should have held the same language with the French Minister, and acting on his observation about going further, they should have asked France to combine with England to insist, even by war if necessary, on the fulfilment of the conditions of the Treaty of 1852. Had they done so, they would have placed themselves in a position to keep the peace between the German Powers and Denmark, no matter how fanatic the German people and their Governments might have shown themselves to be. There would have been no such hostilities and no such destruction of the Danish Kingdom as have since taken place.
  My Lords, the noble Duke has spoken of the contrast which has been drawn, he thinks unfairly, between the conduct of England and the conduct of France. Well, a contrast has been drawn, and I think with good reason. France was straightforward all through, but England was not
  1116
  so, because her mind was not made up. The death of the late King of Denmark occurred at a very critical moment, and I think that is the important epoch from which we should look at what has been done by our Ministers. The differences which had existed between Germany and Denmark before that occurrence had been of long standing—had been increasing in acerbity, and had been daily getting more dangerous; but, as has been said by the noble Earl opposite, every one knew—every statesman and every newspaper writer knew—that what was at the bottom of the dispute was the wish of Germany to possess the Duchies and the port of Kiel. What was the language held by my noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse), when, on the accession of the new King, he, like the representatives of other Powers, was sent to Copenhagen, not on a mere complimentary mission—though, of course, that was the pretence—but to take a part in matters connected with the Schleswig-Holstein question, and to observe what was going on? My noble Friend, in a remarkably able and clear despatch to Earl Russell, recounts what had occurred at an interview which he had with M. Hall, the Danish Minister, and says he told M. Hall that if Denmark did not listen to the advice of Her Majesty's Government we should leave her to the responsibility of meeting Germany alone. I do not say that this bound England positively to go to war, but the expression, "If you do not take my advice I leave you to act on your own responsibility," surely can leave on the minds of Englishmen no doubt that the inference must be, "If you do take my advice, you will not be left to act on your responsibility." Well, then, it is said with truth, "But M. Hall did not take our advice." No doubt. But M. Hall was turned out of office because he did not take the advice of England, and the King risked almost his throne—certainly he forfeited for a time his popularity—to bring in a more conciliatory Minister, who, after M. Hall had prorogued the Estates, and when it was impossible constitutionally to revoke the Constitution, took the necessary steps to convoke both Estates again in order that the advice of England might be legally followed. Had the Danes not a right to suppose, therefore, that they would not be left to encounter Germany alone? But is this all? There is a despatch which shows that our Minister at Copenhagen was instructed to keep something back from the Danish

  1117
  Government. But secret diplomacy will not do for England. I am happy to say it is a game at which English Ministers always fail, and they always will be defeated by persons less scrupulous than themselves. Now, I think every word ought to have been shown to the Danish Government; there should have been no mystery whatever. But, in the papers, Lord Napier reports a remarkable conversation which he had at St. Petersburg with Prince Gortschakoff on the 26th of January, in reference to a despatch which Lord Napier was ordered to communicate to that Minister. The despatch appears to have been communicated by telegram, and the Prince remarked that it was better to wait for details—
  "There were, however, two points, said Lord Napier, on which he wished to be particularly informed. First—What was the nature and extent of the material assistance which, in the contingency indicated, Her Majesty's Government designed to afford to Denmark? And, secondly—Did Her Majesty's Government make such assistance conditional on the co-operation of all or of any of the Powers parties to the engagements of London? Would they act with all, or with some, or would they even act alone?"—No.5, 622.
  Thus it appears that there was a contingency indicated in which Her Majesty's Government proposed to afford assistance to Denmark; and not only was there a question of armed and material assistance, but it was even a question left open whether our Government would not act alone. Of course these communications at St. Petersburg became known at Copenhagen, and will it be contended after this that we have not encouraged the Danish Government in their hopes of receiving material assistance from us? It is quite true that, on the 4th of February, the noble Earl made a speech here in which he distinctly stated that he was not inclined to give material assistance to Denmark. But if this were his fixed intention, why had he not said so at once to the Russian Government? Why was there any doubt? Why was there any concealment? The words of the noble Earl in this House were—
  "We have given at no time any assurance or even hope of material assistance to Denmark. The Danish Minister at Her Majesty's Court has repeatedly said to me, 'We expect no material assistance from England, but we do expect sympathy.' That is the extent of our engagements as regards Denmark."—[3 Hansard, clxxiii. 57.]
  Now, if all the noble Earl's language had been like this, there could have been no
  1118
  doubt as to his meaning, but he goes on to add—
  "What the future may bring forth it would be rash for me to say … … I do ask your Lordships that we may be permitted to decide upon events as they arise, and to take such measures" [not excepting military measures, your Lordships will see] "as we may think best for the peace of Europe, for the welfare of Denmark as a separate and independent nation, and for the real good of the Germans as a great Power."—[3 Hansard, clxxiii. 57.]
  This is materially different from the language of France, although it is quite clear that the French Government reserved to itself the right to act at any moment as it might think best for itself. We say we shall do what we think right to secure "the welfare of Denmark as a separate and independent kingdom." Now, on the 11th of February, the Danish Minister at this Court made a formal application for aid. This was after the noble Earl's speech from which I have just quoted; and we will now see what M. Bille wrote to Earl Russell a week after that speech. He said—
  "But the Danish Government need not look so far back in the past to gain the assurance that the active assistance of England will not fail them under the present circumstances. The Treaty of London, in contempt of which the German Powers are at the present moment invading a Danish country, is especially due to the invariable interest which England takes in the maintenance of the Danish monarchy. And of all the great Powers, England has always been that which has endeavoured with most perseverance to remove the prospects of a collision. Recently, too, the Cabinet of London gave it to be understood at Frankfort, that in the case of an attack of Schleswig, Denmark would not be left alone in the contest. Germany has thought she could continue her course and pay no attention to these words, but the Danish Government have not failed to see in them the expression of a determination which the British Government will put in execution with all the energy which characterizes the English nation,"—No. 5, 677.
  There is no use in going back to the words of the noble Viscount the First Minister, and I do not agree with the noble Earl opposite as to the importance which he attaches to words spoken under totally different circumstances from those we are now considering. But from the despatch to which I am referring, and which was written on the 11th of February, Her Majesty's Government seem to have allowed it to be understood at Frankfort, that in case of an attack upon Schleswig Denmark would not be left alone in the contest. Am I to be told, after such a despatch, that Denmark had no expectation of help from England? Well then,

  1119
  on the 19th of February, the noble Earl writes to Sir Augustus Paget in these terms—
  "With regard to the request that friendly Powers should come to the assistance of Denmark, Her Majesty's Government can only say that every step they may think it right to take in the further progress of this unhappy contest can only be taken after full consideration and communication with France and Russia. These Powers are as much interested in the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy as Great Britain; and Her Majesty's Government may fairly have recourse to their advice and concert in any measures to be taken for the preservation of that integrity. In respect to the act of guarantee of the Duchy of Schleswig of 1720, inasmuch as the Austrian and Prussian Governments have made a solemn declaration that they have no intention of disturbing the integrity of Denmark, it is not necessary at the present moment to examine the question of principle—that is, the validity of the guarantee itself."—No. 5, 704.
  As far as the papers go, I believe that this guarantee of 1720, to which the noble Earl here refers, is perfectly valid at this moment. My noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office does not say whether he will or will not defend the integrity of Denmark; but he says that, in case of certain contingencies, which have not yet arisen, the present decision of the Government may be reconsidered. I do not think, for my own part, that we ought to look too narrowly at the literal interpretation of words spoken here and there, but that we ought rather to consider the influence which they may have been calculated to exercise upon Denmark. Well, in March the fleet was moved: was not this in contemplation that Denmark was not to be left alone? On the 9th of March Earl Russell, in connection with the Conference, wrote a remarkable despatch to Sir Augustus Paget at Copenhagen, desiring him to check the expectations of the Danes in reference to material aid from England. The portions of the despatch to which I refer are as follows:—
  "I must request you, before you require on the 12th instant, that the answer should be given on that day, to state to M. Monrad and M. Quaade the very great imprudence, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, of throwing away a fair chance of settling a question in regard to which the whole of the Powers of Germany are ready to contend in arms against Denmark, and neither France, nor Great Britain, nor Russia, nor Sweden are ready, in present circumstances, to fight in her support. … Had Her Majesty's Government been willing to bind Great Britain to afford material assistance to Denmark, Her Majesty's Government would have had the right, in return for that assistance, to prescribe the manner in which Denmark should fulfil her engagements to Germany. But, as Her Majesty's Government have never offered material aid, so, on the other
  1120
  hand, they have never gone beyond offering advice to Denmark with the most sincere desire to enable her to maintain her integrity and independence, but without any promise of material support."—No. 5, 780.
  About the same time, however, the fleet was moved; and the noble Earl, when questioned in this House on the 8th of March as to the cause of this removal, said—
  "All I can say is, that the Government will best consult, according to their own opinion, the honour and interests of this country. They will not make war when the safety and the interests, the integrity and the independence of Denmark can be secured otherwise; and they will not neglect any means by which that safety and independence can be secured. With regard to the fleet, some ten days or a fortnight ago, with a view to have that fleet at command, it was directed to rendezvous at one of the home ports, so that orders might be at once conveyed to it. II it were thought necessary to give any orders to that fleet, it would be at once within our reach, and certainly I could not expect that any fleet of Austria or of Prussia would venture to encounter the squadron of Her Majesty."—[3 Hansard, clxxiii. 1632.]
  Might not it be a fair inference that Denmark was to expect material assistance from England after this declaration, the news of which would reach Copenhagen about the same time as the despatch to which I have just referred? In reference to the intention of the Austrian fleet to go to the Baltic, Lord Russell said, on the 11th of April, when questioned upon the subject—
  "My noble Friend alluded to the Austrian fleet going to the Baltic; that is a question on which Her Majesty's Government have made representations to the Austrian Government. At present the Austrian Government have promised that they have no intention to send their fleet into the Baltic. They say they are about to send their fleet into the North Sea to protect the commerce of the German Powers, which is very extensive. That is a legitimate object. England is quite free to act in such cases, and while we will not act without it is absolutely necessary, and while I am fully conscious of the power of England, yet we do not wish to hurry into war without necessity; and, for my own part, I think that, a pacific policy is our true policy."—[3 Hansard, clxxiv. 764.]
  But why should not the Austrian fleet have gone into the Baltic if the noble Earl was not at that time prepared to take active steps with the English fleet to prevent it? At that time a state of uncertainty prevailed in all quarters, whether it was to be war or peace. I might refer as witnesses to the conduct of the Government to any merchant upon any stock-mart in Europe, or to the whole of the public of the metropolis. Why, in all places of resort for intelligent and educated men in Europe, the question has been from day to

  1121
  day, and from week to week—"Is England going to war or not; why does not the Government make up its mind on the subject?"
  My Lords, I must say that I never heard any speech in Parliament which caused me more distress than that delivered the other night by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His argument was that Denmark's strongholds were gone, and that it was now too late to fight. That, however, did hot prove, that if we had ever thought of going to war we ought to have done so before we had arrived at our present I difficulties. The noble Earl has urged that we ought not to go to war because both Russia and France refused to act with us, although those two Powers were quite willing to give Denmark the benefit of their advice. I, however, believe that, so far I from that being a reason why we should not go to war, it is a convincing argument in favour of a contrary course, because those two Powers have been so far compromised that they certainly would not have acted against us. The noble Earl, however, came down to the House this day week and made a speech which, I will at once avow to him, dissipated the slightest idea I might have entertained of the possibility of going to war, and convinced me that the adoption of such a course would simply be an act of insanity. What are we now to go to war for? There is nothing left for which it is worth our while to engage in such a struggle. The Treaty of 1852 and the integrity and independence of Denmark have all alike disappeared. The only man in the whole country whom I have heard speak of war is the noble Earl himself, who came down to this House the other evening, and stated that the course of the Government might possibly be reconsidered in case certain contingencies occurred. In the case of the bombardment of Copenhagen, there is to be a reconsideration of the subject; but to go to war then would, in my opinion, be the height of insanity. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) chose to be rather merry when he spoke of the manner in which the noble Earl, the Mover of the Resolution, had avoided all reference to the course which he would have pursued if he had been placed in the circumstances which the Government have found themselves compelled to meet. Without dwelling upon the subject, I think that if I had been placed in such a position I would have acted in a more straightforward manner, and would have decided at
  1122
  the outset which course to pursue, and have announced it; whether I would have afforded Denmark protection, or entirely abstained from armed intervention. I may perhaps refer to some words of the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, spoken by him in 1823. The words I am about to quote are general maxims, and I think are even more applicable to the present time than they were to the events of 1823. Lord Palmerston said—
  "We had but two courses from which to choose—neutrality or war in conjunction with Spain; but whichever we had determined to adopt, it became us to adopt it decidedly and adhere to it consistently. Some, indeed, had proposed a middle course, and, strange to say, would have had us use threats in negotiation, without being prepared to go to war it negotiation had failed. Such a course would have been degrading. To have talked of war, and to have meant neutrality, to have threatened an army and to have retreated behind a State paper, to have brandished the sword of defiance m the hour of deliberation, and to have ended with a penful of protests on the day of battle, would have been the conduct of a cowardly bully, and would have made us the object of contempt and the laughing stock of Europe."—[2 Hansard, viii. 1453.]
  In respect to this question, I have framed as mild an Amendment as I could devise; but I believe it is clear, embodying the opinion I entertain—that we have misled the Danish Government, and therefore that we are, in a great degree, the cause of the pitiable position in which Denmark is now placed. If we had said at first we would give no help, Denmark would have done what she seems to be doing now—she would have sent at once to Berlin to obtain the best terms she could make there. And I believe that if she had gone there at first and had expressed herself willing to adopt some such plan as the line of the Schlei, it would have been possible to preserve the Danish Monarchy from the dangerous position which it now occupies. I believe that by the course they, the English Government, pursued, they bewildered our own people, and misled the Court of Copenhagen. The Danes did not believe—no one believed—when they saw our fleet set in motion and our flag hoisted, that that fleet would return to our ports, and that our flag would be only employed to cover our own ships without taking any steps on behalf of Denmark, The Danish Government could not have supposed that the Ministers who had exhibited so much zeal, energy, and determination in their favour upon paper, would have left them in the hour of their distress without lending them

  1123
  a helping hand, or making one effort to save them. My Lords, I beg leave to move the Amendment of which I have given notice.
  Amendment moved,
  To omit all the Words after the Word ("convened") for the Purpose of inserting the following Words: ("That this House regrets that Denmark was allowed to expect from the English Government material Aid in support of the Objects of the Treaty of May, 1852") (The Marquess of Clanricarde).
  THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I think the noble Duke near me (the Duke of Argyll) has so ably defended the course of the Government from the attacks of the noble Earl opposite, and I also think that the noble Marquess who has just sat down (the Marquess of Clanricarde) has so little weakened the statement of ray noble Friend, that I feel it quite unnecessary to attempt any vindication of the Government; for not only is my noble Friend much better qualified by a knowledge of the circumstances for that office, but I do not share the responsibility for the course they pursued during the time they were most active in the affairs of Denmark. Until very lately I knew no more of what was going on than any of your Lordships. Before I became a member of the Government I had no other data upon which to form an opinion than other Peers had; but having formed an opinion from the Correspondence which has been laid before your Lordship, I shall express my opinion upon this question as frankly as if I was addressing your Lordships from below the gangway. In doing so I shall refrain from quoting blue-books, because I assume that all who take an interest in the question have either read those ponderous volumes for themselves, or those who have not had the courage to do so, have read in the newspapers of the last few days the discussions in which all the important points have been fully brought out either for or against the Government. I proceed to state what was my opinion. It was that at the outset of these affairs—before "coming events had cast their shadows before"—I think the Government exhibited foresight and an appreciation of the gravity and European importance which those events might assume. I pass over the communications which took place, the remonstrances with the German Powers, the warnings to Denmark in the last three months of 1863. Most of those communications were, I think, judicious, and all of
  1124
  them showed an earnest desire to prevent war by bringing about an amicable settlement of disputed points. Those efforts would have been successful if they had been met in a corresponding spirit, and a real desire of conciliation on the other side. As time passed, the pressure and vehemence of public opinion in Germany increased, and the determination of Denmark to resist the demands that were made upon her was strengthened. The Government having exhausted all their efforts diplomatically to bring the question to a solution, in January last, applied to the two great Continental Powers, France and Russia, who were, more interested than ourselves in maintaining the Treaty of 1852, which two other Continental Powers, who like us were parties to that treaty, seemed determined to disregard. The Government applied to Russia and to France to know whether, for the sake of maintaining the integrity of Denmark and the balance of power in Europe, they would join with us in giving material aid to Denmark; and, as your Lordships know, they applied in vain. What was the position of the Government in January last? If your Lordships will carry your minds back to that period you will, I think, make allowance for the extraordinary difficulties in which Her Majesty's Government were placed, not alone with having to deal with this question, but also having to decide in what manner they should deal with a question which more than any other in the modern history of Europe has been vexed by ramified complications as to the relations between the Duchies and Denmark, between the Duchies and Germany, and between the Duchies themselves—a question which for a century had perplexed the diplomatists and courts of Europe, and which was suddenly aggravated and brought to a climax by the unexpected death of the King and the rights and acts of his successor.
  Her Majesty's Government having met with no response from France and Russia to their invitation—those two Powers having manifested almost complete unconcern—the fact that the treaty justified no sacrifice on our part, and Denmark not being an idea to fight for, the Government had to choose whether they would coldly imitate the stoical indifference of those two Powers, and folding their arms remain passive spectators of another partition like that of Poland, or whether they would do what the noble Earl opposite quarrels with

  1125
  them for not having done—to warn the German Powers not to cross the Eider—in which case he says there would have been little risk of war. That may be his opinion; but mine is that no course would have been more rash or more ineffectual. You could not have used such a threat without being prepared to act, and act immediately; and, as the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) has said, to send out our ironclads with perhaps 30,000 troops to meet the dangerous fogs upon the icebound const of Denmark. Then, indeed, persistence would have been a point of honour with Germany. If it produced nothing else it would have produced German unity. The result of such a policy would have been absolutely to prevent Austria and Prussia, backed by the enthusiasm and the armed force of all Ger many, quailing before our menace even if they had been disposed to do so. They would have determined, not only to chastise the Danes, but to secure a portion of the sea coast which has been so long an object of desire to the German democracy. We might, indeed, have protracted the struggle, but we should have been at war with all Germany. We should very soon have exhausted all our means of offence or retaliation; and we should have blockaded the ports of the Baltic and Adriatic, with far more real injury to our own commerce than to those with whom we made a case of quarrel. We should have called into life and action all those restless spirits that swarm all over Europe, and we should soon have found ourselves giving direct or indirect assistance to revolution in Hungary and Galicia, and to the efforts which Italy would make to obtain Venetia. The embers now smouldering in the principalities and the other provinces of Turkey in Europe would have burst into flame; and, in point of fact, ours would have been the hand to set fire to the combustibles now scattered about Europe. I ask your Lordships whether a junction with revolution would have been a rightful occupation for England to engage in with her world-wide interest, and with her duties, not only abstract but genuine, to the cause of civilisation, peace, and humanity all over the world. We should, moreover, have engaged in this contest singlehanded, while France would have stood by, a watchful but not indifferent spectator, waiting till events decided into which scale she ought to throw her sword. And with what object should we thus have
  1126
  set fire to the four corners of Europe? For the purpose of assisting Denmark to uphold a treaty and to repel unjust aggression. I have not the least doubt that if we sent out an expeditionary force to any particular point on the continent of Denmark, it would have held and occupied the place to which it was sent; but would it have dislodged one man of the 100,000 or 200,000 men that Germany would have sent into the territories of Denmark? Would they have produced a different feeling in Germany with regard to the Duchies? Would they have altered the intention of those German Powers who were parties to the treaty? I suppose there must have been some limit to the duration of our military occupation of Denmark and of our naval support. Let me ask your Lordships what would be the prospects and condition of Denmark after that force was withdrawn? It seems to me that those who say we ought to have gone to war before the invasion of Schleswig, or that we ought to go to war now, either have not so well calculated the consequences as to make either their advice or their censure of any importance, or else are men who wish to make political capital for themselves by tall talk—if I may use an Americanism—and desire to obtain the vulgar praise by advocating a policy from which they themselves would in office be the first to shrink. My Lords, we all feel, and have felt, the greatest sympathy for the Danes; our desire, our temptation to go to their relief has been very great. But, my Lords, sentiment is no pretext for war, which can be justified only by the very strongest sense of duty; and unless some obligation upon the Government amounting to a duty can be shown, the Government ought not to have assisted Denmark by going to war. The moment the question came to be thoroughly understood, from one end of England to the other, there was not a doubt upon the subject. Prior to the year 1852, the date of the Treaty of London, no one pretends that we had any treaty engagements binding us to support the Danes. My noble Friend admits that the treaty simply bound us to recognize King Christian as King of Denmark, but did not bind us to guarantee the Danish dominions. We should have been no more justified in going to war for such an object than in going to war for the defence of Poland because we were parties to the Treaty of Vienna. But while Her Majesty's Government abstained

  1127
  from going to war, would they have been justified if they had made no exertion—if they had looked on calmly while a great wrong was being perpetrated—if they had taken none of the measures which were in their power for the protection of Denmark? In that case I think they would have greatly deserved to be censured, and I myself, if sitting below the gangway, would have joined in such a vote. What was to be done, I think, was done honestly and in good faith. My noble Friend, like many others both in and out of Parliament, accuses my noble Friend the Secretary of State of using the language of menace, and of using too strong expressions in his despatches, when he had no intention of carrying these menaces out. In considering these the time is very important, because my noble Friend had then no reason to believe that France would be left alone in this business, and that other Powers who were equally bound with ourselves would have shrunk and slunk away from their obligations. I must say I think this charge comes with singular inconsistency from the very persons who charge my noble Friend with not having held strong language, and with not having assumed a decided attitude at the beginning of the war. But I do not think any honest Englishman will blame my noble Friend for having exerted his utmost efforts to avert from Denmark the calamities of war; or, having gone through all the despatches, will stay to question whether one particular expression was too strong and another too weak—whether the right word was always used in the right place—but will sympathize with the Minister writing under the deep anxiety that a British Minister should always feel when labouring in the cause of peace. My noble Friend who brought forward the vote of censure this evening (the Earl of Malmesbury) must remember how bitterly he was censured for his unsuccessful interference at the outset of the war between Austria and France—
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: And turned out. [Laughter and Cheers!]
  THE EARL OF CLARENDON: Not for that particular cause, nor for that policy only, though, of course, my noble Friend takes what belongs to himself. I remember that my noble Friend laboured so energetically that his policy was called "fussy," and his despatches, though they may all have been necessary, were certainly numerous, being from January to
  1128
  June in that year at the rate of a despatch and a half a day; and yet he did not succeed in averting war. I can, however, assure my noble Friend that if any vote of censure had been brought against him for the manner in which he conducted affairs at that time he should have had my vote heartily given, for I thought his policy sound, I thought that he was ill-treated, that he failed from no fault of his own, and that to attack him on the ground of want of success would have been an unworthy proceeding. I now say the same thing in reference to my noble Friend behind me (Earl Russell). Reading the blue-books three months ago I formed the same opinion of the conduct of my noble Friend. It is perfectly true that his efforts to maintain peace have failed, and that the Conference has failed and I know there is nothing so popular as success, and that the want of success is a great boon to political opponents, who are always seeking whom they may devour. Yet I must say I do not think, under the circumstances, it would have been possible to act otherwise than was done by my noble Friend; and I think that the conduct of my noble Friend and his Colleagues has been thus far successful—that it has met with sympathy and approval on the part of the country. The country feels satisfied with the conduct of the Government because they have not allowed England to be dragged into war without a sufficient cause. They have resisted all those temptations, I will call them, which have been more active in this case than at any time I remember; they have disregarded all the provocations, all the appeals—some honest, some very much the reverse—which might have led men to act upon their feelings, to the sacrifice of their duty, and because—I say it boldly because conscientiously—they have secured peace without dishonour to this country. Nobody can re-echo more cordially than I do the sentiment expressed by Lord Derby a few evenings ago, that "much as he loved peace, he loved England far more;" and in that feeling I declare that if I believed peace to be inconsistent with the honour of the country I would advocate war. But there is no reason why we should have war; we are merely bound by treaty with five other Powers to recognize a certain state of things whenever it shall happen. I shall not now discuss whether that treaty was a wise one or not, or how far the rules of prudence and foresight were

  1129
  observed in regard to the stipulations laid down, to which we are not more bound than any other Power, and which we have less means than any other Power of carrying out. But, I ask, why should we alone depart from the policy of non-intervention, which it is the duty of this country as far as possible to observe? My noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) said that advice was given to Denmark. But no advice that was not for her interest was ever given to Denmark, and to that advice no conditions were annexed. Over and over again Denmark was told that she was not to expect material assistance from us, and I do not know how words could be made more plain. Lord Wodehouse said the same when he went to Copenhagen, and the Danish Minister himself admitted that that was the case. My noble Friend and I constantly told the Danish representatives here that no material support was to be expected from England; and on the very last evening before M. Quaade left this country I had a conversation with him, and asked him whether my noble Friend and I had ever varied in our assurance that Denmark could not expect material aid from this country, and whether I had not also urged him to disregard the representations made by persons here for their own party objects, that the pressure of public opinion would compel the Government to go to war for Denmark. M. Quaade admitted that we had assured him more than once that England would not give Denmark material assistance, and that we had never varied in our language. And not being able to give, and Denmark knowing that we should not give her, material aid, my noble Friend did that which was the next best; or perhaps a better thing still, he induced the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1852 to meet in Conference. There were great delays before the Conference assembled—delays originating in the first place with the Danes themselves, who would not give an answer for fear of complications at Copenhagen—and those delays are among the circumstances which in this matter are most to be deplored. The Conference has been treated both in this and in the other House of Parliament with something like contempt, as certain beforehand to be a failure. It may possibly have been a failure, because no arrangement favourable to Denmark was likely to be admitted. But it was the only chance of preventing the absorption of the Danish peninsula;
  1130
  and it was reasonable to expect that when the representatives of the great Powers of Europe were assembled in order to make peace, their labours would not terminate without result. I will ask any candid man whether the protocols do not justify the calling together of the Conference? Why, my Lords, six weeks' escape from the horrors of war—six weeks' time given for reflection, would alone be a sufficient justification for such a measure. Besides that, the territorial question was narrowed down to a few square leagues; and being so narrowed it was in a state in which arbitration would have been an honourable and satisfactory termination. Arbitration was practically refused by the German Powers; it was absolutely rejected by the Danes; but my noble Friend and myself and the representatives of the neutral Powers were so anxious to save Denmark from the result of hostilities, which we knew could only be fresh loss and disaster, that we should not have abandoned our attempts to bring about a satisfactory termination had not the Danes, in consequence of their anxiety to resume the blockade, refused to give another day. I believe that never before in the history of Conferences and Congresses were the representatives limited to a certain number of hours, which was practically the case in this instance, and therefore we were placed at a great disadvantage. That frontier line, the proposal of which to the Danes was, my noble Friend thinks, a humiliation to them, was one which I should have been exceedingly glad if they could have procured, because it is impossible to maintain the treaty by restoring Holstein to Denmark. It would be to Denmark a damnosa possessio. She never could restore her authority over subjects determined to resist it, and would have to rule over a people more and more hostile to her rule. The Danes were left to act as they pleased, but I cannot but regret that they refused the line of frontier—unsatisfactory and insufficient as it was—that was proposed to them by the British Plenipotentiaries. It would have left them Alsen and Duppel and the north of Schleswig, and would have obtained for them a guarantee from the Confederation never to interfere with that territory; and that portion of northern Schleswig would have formed a sort of neutral ground by which German interference would have been kept at a distance; whereas now the Confederation will be brought up to the imaginary frontier of Jutland, and Denmark will have

  1131
  to contend against the absorbing influence, the wealth, the intelligence, and the activity of Germany. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) has attributed the failure of my noble Friend to prevent war, and the failure of the Conference to restore peace, to the imperfect relations which existed between England and France. Upon that I wish to say a few words, because I think that to a great extent it is true. My opinion is that the Danish Question never would have taken its present development, and that the German Powers would have acted very differently, if they had not believed that there existed a coolness between the two Governments of England and France. This is only a fresh proof of the importance, which cannot be exaggerated, of a good understanding between England and France, not alone as regards the magnitude and increasing proportion of their reciprocal interests, but more especially with regard to those matters of dispute which are constantly arising in different parts of the world, and the solution of which depends upon the light in which they are viewed by England and France. I do not think that there could be a better illustration of that than the Trent affair, in which I have no hesitation in saying that, to the opportune and unsolicited expression of opinion on the part of France, England and the United States were mainly indebted for a termination of the quarrel honourable to both parties. Again, my Lords, I believe that the war with Russia was mainly attributable to the obstinate disbelief of the Emperor Nicholas, that England and France could ever be brought to act cordially together. Now, I admit that there was a soreness and irritation between France and England, not unnatural, very much to be regretted, but in reality without foundation. It began, as my noble Friend said, with respect to Poland. We all know that France would have gone to war with Russia in defence of Poland if Austria and England would have joined her. Our co-operation, therefore, was of very great importance. We have not, perhaps, the same chivalrous and romantic feeling as the French. We did not think that it was our duty or our interest to go to war for Poland. But the Government would have been wholly unable to resist the pressure of public opinion last year, and to avoid making some attempt to mitigate the horrors which were being perpetrated in that country. That attempt was made by Eng-
  1132
  land in conjunction with France; but we could go no further. We declined the overtures of France for a war with Russia; and I believe—and I have good reason for saying so—that there is not now a reasonable Frenchman who does not consider that we did France a good service by not undertaking ourselves, or encouraging her to undertake, the Quixotic enterprise of marching 200,000 men across Germany to attack Russia, the people of which would have risen as one man with even greater energy and patriotism than they displayed in 1812. The next matter to which the noble Earl alluded was the Congress. He said that we had insultingly refused to take part in the Congress proposed by France, and that if England had not so refused the result would have been to prevent those complications in the North of Europe that have since arisen. Now here again I believe we did France good service, although at first the course which we adopted produced some irritation. I have not the slightest doubt that the Emperor spoke truly what he thought when he said that the Congress was a work of necessity, and that its result would be pacification; but he overlooked not only the obstacles to the reconstruction of the map of Europe, but the impossibility of the task. I think that it was too much to expect that the Sovereigns of Europe would meet in Congress at Paris upon no other basis than the International law of Europe. It was too much to expect that the desires of the Congress would be submitted to unresistingly, and without the very wars which it was invited to prevent. The difficulties were not diminished by the manner in which the proposal was laid before Europe, without any warning or notice, or any communication with the Powers who were called upon at once to say "Yea" or "Nay." It was declined by my noble Friend in a manner at which I think that no offence could be taken, because reasonable people do not take offence where no offence can possibly be intended. My noble Friend's answer did not contain all those flowery phrases and honied words which were to be found in other replies, and the true value of which no one better understands than the Emperor. My noble Friend, feeling that such a Congress would not induce Russia to give up Poland, Austria Venetia, France Rome, or England Gibraltar, and that it would never have been brought to declare that the International law of Europe was "a worn-out and tattered rag," feeling that the

  1133
  cause of peace and good understanding between nations would be prejudiced rather than promoted by such a Congress, felt it his duty frankly, honestly, and without disguise, to declare his opinion; and I believe that there is no reasonable man in France who will not now admit that our course was neither unwise nor unfriendly, and ought not to impair the good relations between the two countries, upon which the relations and policy of other countries so greatly depend. We should be very wrong if we inferred from the existence of any irritation arising out of these circumstances, that France has been less active than our selves in the cause of Denmark, or that the Emperor has been animated by the petty and spiteful spirit which is attributed to him. The French Government have been perfectly candid and straightforward throughout the whole affair. They have seen from the first that the cases of England and France were not parallel; that whereas we could give naval assistance to the Danes, France could only give military assistance; that she must be prepared to make war on a gigantic scale with United Germany, and that in the present happily peaceful disposition of the French nation that would be an impossibility, unless it was understood beforehand that for that war France would seek for compensation. But what that compensation was Europe in general, and France in particular, perfectly well understood. To suppose that the Emperor did not wish for a peaceful solution of affairs by the Conference, and that he thwarted our efforts to arrive at such a result, would be an entire mistake. The communications between the two Governments throughout the whole time that the Conference was sitting were of the most friendly and confidential character. The Protocols are before your Lordships to attest not only the cordiality but the ability and good sense with which we were assisted by the French Envoys. I may say the same of the representatives of the other neutral Powers. Our relations with all the other Powers of Europe—save the two German Powers—are upon the same footing. I would, under those circumstances, ask my noble Friend in what consists the loss of influence of which he complains? He has quoted French newspapers in support of his statements; but it is not on authority of that description, I hope, that your Lordships are to be called upon to affirm this Resolution. It is not on the diatribes of foreign correspondents, re-
  1134
  echoed here by the parties with whom they have originated, that we are to ground the opinion that England made promises to Denmark which she failed to keep, and that she is become reduced to the position of a third-rate Power. I do not complain of what is written and said abroad in regard to England, because we sometimes say ten times worse of her at home; but I treat such idle attacks as those to which I am referring, and which I will not raise to the rank of calumny, as sheer nonsense. England, my Lords, does not lose caste by not rushing into war without sufficient cause. The statesmen of England know well her resources, both moral and material. They know the enormous development of which her material power is capable, and they are alive to the irresistible force of public opinion. They are well aware how slow the English people are to believe in the necessity of going to war, but how they can, when occasion arises, unite as one man in the defence of the honour and interests of the nation. I therefore utterly disregard all such taunts as have been thrown out against us, come from what quarter they may; they can be of no importance unless they served to goad the Government into the adoption of a course for which there would be no justification; and I trust your Lordships will not this evening give them any weight by allowing them to influence your minds so far as to induce you to record it as your opinion that this country has fallen from her high position among the great Powers of Europe.
  LORD CHELMSFORD: My Lords, I listened attentively to the speech of the noble Duke who spoke in the early part of this debate (the Duke of Argyll), and I must confess that I did not perceive that he dealt with a single point on which the Resolution of my noble Friend near me is based. Perhaps the noble Duke thought it more prudent to avoid ground which he could not touch without danger. But although he kept aloof from the real question at issue, he made one or two observations to which I wish shortly to address myself. The noble Duke suggested that the Resolution of my noble Friend was the production of sixteen gentlemen, whom he called upon him to name, who he thought were probably divided into a peace and war party, inasmuch as different portions of the Resolution in his opinion showed some such difference of view. Now, my Lords, the noble Duke will, perhaps, allow me to

  1135
  ask him a question on the same subject as to Her Majesty's Cabinet, which, omitting the noble Earl who has just spoken, and who only lately joined the Government, is, I believe, exactly composed of sixteen persons. Will the noble Duke tell me whether there is not a peace and war party in the Cabinet? And will he be good enough to name those who are thus divided? I think these are questions which I have as good a right to put as the noble Duke has to demand similar explanations with respect to the preparation of this Resolution. The noble Duke also said something about a "faction fight," and he informed us, if I am not mistaken, that he meant before he sat down to tell us what he thought of the Opposition. He did not, however, perform his promise, and we are still in ignorance what he thinks of us; but with respect to the observations which he made about a faction fight, I would simply say, that if the policy of a Ministry is to be impeached, it is not likely that their friends are the persons who would be the first to move a vote of censure upon them. What many of the friends of the present Government think of them at heart it is not for me to conjecture; but I cannot help thinking that if their votes were on the present occasion given by ballot—a system of voting, however, to which I object—they might not be found to be quite satisfactory to those whom they generally support. The noble Duke went on to contend that he had a right to know what the policy was which the Opposition would have pursued had they been in the place of the Government. I entirely deny that the noble Duke is entitled to an answer to that question, which is not in the slightest degree raised by the Resolution before the House. If the noble Duke had asked what line of policy we would not adopt, I think I could answer him satisfactorily. I have no objection to tell him that in dealing with the two contending parties we should not have held out to one of them, and that the weaker, hopes and expectations which were only meant to be dashed to the ground, leaving the Power whom we had induced to rely upon us in a worse condition than before. And we should not, on the other hand, have used menacing and insulting language to the aggressive Powers, which by our conduct afterwards we should have proved meant nothing, and which, therefore, could produce only disregard and contempt. Such, we say, is the policy which Her Majesty's
  1136
  Government have pursued, and such is the policy which by this Resolution we propose to condemn.
  My Lords, in order that the question at issue may be narrowed within reasonable limits—for there is some danger of our losing ourselves on too wide a field in the discussion—I would first of all consider the state of affairs at the time of the accession of the present King of Denmark on the death of his predecessor, on the 15th of November last. Your Lordships are aware that the succession was recognized by the Treaty of London of the 8th of May, 1852. The object of that treaty was expressly stated to be the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy. I observed a few days ago in a leading journal rather a curious argument on this subject. It stated that, inasmuch as Holstein and Schleswig were no portion of the Kingdom of Denmark, if those Duchies were torn from that Kingdom its integrity would still be preserved. The very terms of the treaty, however, I think, refute any such argument, because it is expressly described as an arrangement by which the succession to the whole of the dominions united under the sceptre of the King of Denmark should devolve on the present King, then Prince Christian. In all the discussions that have taken place on the question of the integrity of Denmark, that State has been regarded as embracing both the Kingdom and the Duchies. Now, the great Powers of Europe, and almost all the minor States with the exception of six, were either originally parties to that treaty or subsequently acceded to it, and Austria and Prussia affixed their signatures to it without any reservation or qualification. This is a point which it is important to bear in mind, because in the course of the discussions which have since taken place it has been asserted both by Austria and Prussia that they signed the treaty with a reserve (it must have been a mental one) against the incorporation of Schleswig with the Kingdom of Denmark; and as to the claims of the Confederation over the Duchies, I think I cannot show better what were the obligations contracted by that treaty than by quoting the words of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who said—
  "Her Majesty's Government have seen with surprise and pain the language which has been held at Berlin with regard to the Treaty of London of May, 1852. The Powers who signed that treaty, or who subsequently acceded to it, must recollect that they bound themselves thereby not to Denmark alone, but to Great Britain, France

  1137
  Russia, and Sweden, who were parties to it, and to all the other States and Powers whose accession thereto was asked for and obtained, and that the declared object and purpose of that treaty was not to regulate the reciprocal relations of Denmark and Germany, but to servo as an arrangement essential for the general interests of Europe."
  The succession thus secured was unfortunately burdened by some unhappy legacies left by the late King. The first of these arose out of what are generally called the engagements of 1851–2; and these arose out of circumstances strikingly similar to those which have since occurred. Holstein and Schleswig had for a long period of time enjoyed a community of administration with respect to their local affairs separate from the Kingdom of Denmark, but never formed a constitutional unity. The King of Denmark proposed to give a free and independent Constitution to Holstein, and also, by a common free Constitution, to unite Schleswig with the kingdom in closer bonds of union. The Diet, under one of the laws of the Confederation, which prohibits any State belonging to it from changing its Constitution without the consent of the Sovereign and the Constitutional Representatives, interposed and demanded the revocation of this Constitution. The King of Prussia was then named the Minister of the Diet for Federal execution. Holstein was occupied. Schleswig was seized upon as a material guarantee. The brave Danes resisted; but after a fight of nine hours they yielded to overpowering numbers, and military possession was taken of the whole of Schleswig. An armistice followed, which lasted till the Treaty of July, 1850—that treaty was followed by the engagements of 1851–2, and ultimately by the Treaty of London. With regard to those engagements, I will quote the noble Earl's own description. He says—
  "The engagements of Germany and Denmark towards each other in 1851 were singularly obscure and indefinite. They were contained neither in treaty nor in a convention, but in notes and despatches exchanged between Denmark on the one side, and Austria and Prussia on the other, to which the two parties assigned a different degree of force and validity."
  But there were two points of those engagements on which there can be no doubt—one was an agreement on the part of Austria and Prussia for the abolition of the community of administration which had subsisted between Schleswig and Holstein; the other was an engagement on the part of Denmark not to incorporate Schleswig in the kingdom, or to take any steps tend-
  1138
  the late King of Denmark, in the Constitution which he had framed for the kingdom and Schleswig, and which was complete with the exception of his signature. The position of the present King with regard to that Constitution was one of great embarrassment. It is well described by Sir Augustus Paget—
  "It ought to be taken into consideration that this project bad been drawn up and brought to maturity without any participation on the part of His Majesty, who, it was well known, was opposed to the policy it indicated: on ascending the throne His Majesty had found it complete, less his signature, which, unless he was compelled to encounter a revolution, and to risk his crown without support from any quarter, it would be impossible for him to withhold."
  But that which immediately endangered the security of Denmark was the Royal decree with respect to the constitutional position of Holstein, which was issued on the 30th of March preceding the late King's death. That Constitution was extremely favourable to Holstein, and again I should wish to describe it in the words of Sir Augustus Paget, who says:—
  "Such being the meaning which, from the reading of the document itself and the explanation which has been given to me by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, I attach to the proclamation of the 30th of March, I cannot but come to the conclusion that it is neither injurious to the interests of the Duchy of Holstein, nor calculated to place the Duchy in a position of inferiority towards the other parts of the Danish monarchy. I believe, on the contrary, that it is the creation of a state of things of which few countries in Continental Europe would be disposed to complain, or with which Holstein itself might well be satisfied if its ideas were confined to the protection of its legitimate interests and national welfare."
  It may be well asked why there was such a desire on the part of Austria, Prussia, and the Diet to have that Constitution revoked? Austria and Prussia objected to it because it gave free and liberal institutions; for the noble Lord opposite (Lord Wodehouse) will recollect that in the course of his mission M. von Bismark told him distinctly that Germany would never be on good terms with Denmark as long as the present democratic institutions of Denmark were maintained. The Diet were opposed to it, because it severed the tie between Schleswig and Holstein; and the States of Germany hoped, by keeping up the connection between them, to draw Schleswig under German influence by means of Holstein. This was the state of things at the time of the King's death.

  1139
  Another circumstance occurred, which it is important to bear in mind in considering the policy of the Government. A few days before the death of the late King the French Emperor had made a proposal to all the Great European Powers to meet in a general Congress for the purpose of settling any disputes which had arisen and were likely to disturb the peace of Europe; and among these were particularly specified the affairs of Denmark and Germany. Your Lordships can have no doubt that if at this critical conjuncture there had been a cordial concert and co-operation between the French Emperor and the English Government, it was highly probable that none of the disasters and calamities which have since befallen Denmark would have occurred. For that I have the admission of the noble Earl who has last spoken—a Minister of great experience, and as likely to be well informed on the subject as any Member in your Lordships' House. For months before the death of the King of Denmark the Diet had had under consideration this Patent of the 30th of March with respect to the Constitution of Holstein, and it was quite evident from their deliberations, and the proposals made by Austria and Prussia, that the Federal Execution would be made the pretext for extending the claim over Schleswig and dismembering the Danish monarchy. Of course it did not escape the sagacity of the noble Earl, that from the first the Diet had these ulterior views, that (to use his own words)
  "Some of the Powers of Germany showed an intention of availing themselves of the execution and the occupation in Holstein and Schleswig as a means of creating a revolution in those Duchies with a view to the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy."
  On the 9th of July a summons was issued from the Diet to the King of Denmark to revoke the Patent of the 30th of March within six weeks. At this critical moment your Lordships will remember the remarkable speech made by the noble Lord at the head of the Government on the 23rd of July at the close of the Session. It was not a sudden impulse of the noble Lord's generous nature. He had ample time for deliberating what he should do and what he should say, for notice had been given him by an hon. Friend of mine (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald) of his intention to put the question. The noble Lord, therefore, was prepared to give an answer; and before the assembled House of Com-
  1140
  mons and, I may say, in the face of Europe, he said—
  "The hon. Gentleman asks what is the policy and the course of Her Majesty's Government with regard to that dispute. As I have already said, we concur entirely with him, and I am satisfied with all reasonable men in Europe, including those in France and Russia, in desiring that the independence, the integrity, and the rights of Denmark may be maintained. We are convinced—I am convinced at least—that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow those rights, to interfere with that independence, those who made the attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend."—[3 Hansard, clxxii. 1252.]
  This was not uttered in the spirit of prophecy, it was a promise and pledge. ["No, no!" "Hear, hear!"] It was so understood by the Danes, and was so meant by the noble Lord. It is most important that we should bear this declaration in mind when we come to consider whether hopes and expectations were not held out to Denmark, because it will give point to all the subsequent language of the noble Earl however guardedly expressed. In a despatch written on the 13th of October, the noble Earl endeavoured to impress on the Danish Government that "they should not forcibly oppose the threatened Federal Execution unless it were extended to the Duchies." What is the meaning of this? Is it not that they should forcibly oppose the Federal Execution if extended to Schleswig? And can any one believe that the noble Lord meant that Denmark should do this alone and single-handed—that the Danes should encounter alone the overwhelming force of the German Powers? The noble Earl well knows that when the war did commence the Germans brought 68,000 men into the field against whom the Danes could only muster between 30,000 and 40,000 men. It was idle to suppose that Denmark would rush single-handed to her own destruction. Again, on the 22nd of October, 1863, the noble Earl says—
  "It seems to Her Majesty's Government that Denmark, with a due regard for her own interest, should at once withdraw the Patent of the 30th of March, and rest her opposition to Federal Execution on the ground that it involves interference in matters relating to the constitution of the Danish monarchy and in the affairs of Schleswig."—No. 3, 171.
  My Lords, we must always bear in mind, with reference to the hopes and expectations held out to Denmark, the warnings which at this time the noble Earl was addressing to the Diet, as to its claims upon Schleswig and the right and duty of Eng-

  1141
  land to interfere. At page 124 of the Correspondence you will find him stating that—
  "If the Diet take steps for a still further object, and invade Holstein for the purpose of compelling the King of Denmark to acknowledge certain rights, which the German Confederation claim as belonging to Schleswig, by virtue of the arrangements of 1851–52, the Diet will be entering upon a grave European question, as to which they have no exclusive competency of decision, and on which it belongs quite as much to every other European Government to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment."—No. 2, 124.
  Again, on the 29th of September, 1863, the noble Earl says—
  "The aim of the Execution consists unmistakably in carrying out the Diet's decrees—that is to say, to establish between the said Duchies, together with Schleswig and the Kingdom of Denmark Proper, a general Constitution, connecting them by a common union. It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to shut their eyes to the gravity of the proposition which the Diet have to consider. Her Majesty by the Treaty of London of May 8, 1852, is bound to respect the integrity and independence of Denmark. The Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia have taken the same engagement. Her Majesty could not see with indifference a military occupation of Holstein, which is only to cease upon terms injuriously affecting the Constitution of the whole Danish Monarchy. Her Majesty's Government could not recognize this military occupation as a legitimate exercise of the powers of the Confederation, or admit that it could properly be called a Federal Execution. Her Majesty's Government could not be indifferent to the bearing of such an act upon Denmark, and upon European interests. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, earnestly entreat the German Diet to pause, and to submit the questions in dispute between Germany and Denmark to the mediation of other Powers unconcerned in the controversy, but deeply concerned in the maintenance of the peace of Europe and the independence of Denmark."—No. 2, 145.
  Well, my Lords, how were these notices—threatenings I suppose we must not call them—regarded by Denmark herself? My noble Friend opposite (Lord Wodehouse), in a conversation which he had with M. Hall, the Danish Minister, was told by him that they had come to a decision not to offer resistance in Holstein in consequence of the representations of Her Majesty's Government. In answer to this communication the noble Lord said—
  "It would be most imprudent to precipitate a war by resistance to the Execution; but he was careful to explain that Her Majesty's Government would not take upon themselves the responsibility of the determination which might be arrived at by the Danish Court."
  After having distinctly advised the Danish Government not to resist the invasion of the Duchies, after the Danes had abandoned
  1142
  Holstein upon the representation of the noble Earl—the noble Lord, acting for Her Majesty's Government, seems here to have backed out of the consequences of the advice which had been given, and upon which the Danish Government had acted down to that period. At this time unfortunately the King had put the finishing hand to the Constitution of the 18th November. I regret very much that this was done. I recognize the difficulties with which His Majesty, who had not been a party to the Constitution originally, had to contend; but I am compelled to admit that if this Constitution was not an actual incorporation of the Duchies, it was a step tending directly towards that incorporation, and therefore it was a violation of the engagements of 1851–2. This increased the embarrassment of affairs, and they became more complicated by the revival of the claims of the Prince of Augustenburg to the succession of the Duchies, which was countenanced by the Diet. There was, therefore, the question of the treaty, and there was the dispute about the succession; and just at this critical moment, the noble Earl, not having before given an answer to the invitation of the Emperor of the French to join in a general Congress, thought fit on the 25th of November, only seven days after this complicated embarrassment had arisen, and when it would have been most important to secure the goodwill and co-operation of the Emperor of the French—at this most critical moment the noble Lord thought fit to send a refusal which, though not intended to be uncourteous, seems to have been in the style usually adopted by the noble Earl who, as has been explained by the noble Earl opposite, is not in the habit of flattering in his correspondence. The prejudicial effect of this refusal is shown by the account given of an interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 29th of December, 444, in which Lord Cowley was compelled to remark that
  "It would be a grievous thing if the difference of opinion, which had arisen upon the merits of a general Congress, were to produce an estrangement which would leave each Government to pursue its own course."—No. 4, 444.
  The embarrassment of the position no doubt rendered it extremely difficult to know how to deal with the question; but Her Majesty's Government recommended, very properly, that the Patent of the 30th of March should be revoked. The Patent was revoked on the 7th of

  1143
  December; but at that time the noble Earl had already been warned by Sir Augustus Paget, that "in sacrifices no concessions, no fulfilment of engagements would satisfy the German Governments, that they were bent upon the dismemberment of the Monarchy of Denmark that they might place the Duchies with the ports belonging to them in the hands of a Prince devoted to Germany." The noble Earl had got the Patent of March revoked, and supposed that he had done a great thing; but Austria and Prussia refused to be satisfied with the concession. They said to Denmark, "It is too late; you have violated your engagements of 1851–2; you must revoke the Constitution of the 18th of November." Then the noble Earl strongly recommended Denmark to revoke that Constitution, saying that, if she rejected this advice, Her Majesty's Government must leave her to encounter Germany on her own responsibility. Now, what is the meaning of this language, "If you do not do this, we must leave you to your own responsibility?" Does it not mean, "If you do it, you may expect support?" What other meaning could be attached to these words? M. Hall upon the noble Earl's advice to revoke the Constitution said—
  "The revocation of the Patent had been asked for—it had been granted; the evacuation of Holstein had been urged—it had been agreed to; if the constitution was annulled, some other concession would be required."
  And the noble Earl thought it reasonable that
  "Denmark should know the limits of the demands of Germany, and be able to bring to a close this long and wearisome dispute."
  Austria and Prussia had immediately, and in the most peremptory manner, demanded the revocation of the Constitution in forty-eight hours, and the noble Earl was to solicit for more time, or their proceedings would endanger the Danish throne. He advised Denmark to summon the Rigsraad at once in order to obtain a repeal of the Constitution, telling her that if she did not adopt that course she would have no chance of averting a contest with the German Powers. At the same time he appealed to Prussia and Austria, and said, "Do not press Denmark so hardly; give her a little time allow her six weeks to enable her to repeal the Constitution in a legitimate manner." But the German Powers were deaf to entreaties. They refused to listen to them.
  1144
  They launched the thunderbolt of war against Denmark; Holstein was occupied; Schleswig was taken as a material guarantee; and an advance was made into Jutland.
  And then, my Lords, a proceeding took place which I must confess appears to me to be the very worst feature in that policy of the Government which we are called upon to condemn. Your Lordships must bear in mind that this invasion of Schleswig had been characterized by the noble Lord at the head of the Government as "an iniquitous aggression." Austria winced under that expression, and asked for an explanation of the noble Earl, who with his accustomed argumentative courtesy said that "an unnecessary war must be an iniquitous war, and that, therefore, the expression of the noble Viscount was a correct one." But when concession after concession had been made by Denmark on the advice of Her Majesty's Government, and after hopes had been held out of material assistance, when Schleswig had been occupied as a material guarantee, and Jutland invaded under pretext of strategical necessity, when Denmark was lying helpless and bleeding at the foot of her conquerors, then—can it be believed?—the noble Earl and Her Majesty's Government attempted to justify to Denmark the possession—the forcible possession—which had been taken of the Duchies. You must remember that the noble Earl is dealing with what the Government considered an iniquitous aggression. Well, in a despatch addressed to Sir Augustus Paget, February 22, 1864, the noble Earl says—
  "Her Majesty's Government are, however, impressed with the conviction that the wish of the Danish Government for the evacuation of Schleswig can only be realized when that Government shall be prepared to give some sufficient security for the good and equal government of the subjects of the King of Denmark of German origin who may be resident in the Duchy. And Her Majesty's Government think it may be fairly asked, whether the Danish Government are prepared to do so, and also whether they contemplate the organization of the Danish monarchy on a different footing? Her Majesty's Government are very well disposed towards Denmark, and would willingly assist her in extricating herself from the difficulties in which she is now involved; but Her Majesty's Government cannot lose sight of the just claims of the German subjects of the King, and they desire to act in this matter in consort with the Allies of Great Britain."—No. 5, 727.
  My Lords, I cannot trust myself to characterize this despatch as I think it deserves. It is calculated to call up a blush of shame upon the cheek of every Eng-

  1145
  lishman. And then, to crown the whole, the noble Earl denies that Her Majesty's Government have ever done more than offer advice to Denmark. This is the language of the noble Earl in writing to Sir Augustus Paget, March 9, 1864—
  "Her Majesty's Government do not pretend to dictate any course to an independent State like Denmark which that State is not willing to follow. Had Her Majesty's Government been willing to bind Great Britain to afford material assistance to Denmark, Her Majesty's Government would have had the right, in return for that assistance, to prescribe the manner in which Denmark should fulfil her engagements to Germany. But as Her Majesty's Government have never offered material aid, so, on the other hand, they have never gone beyond offering advice to Denmark with the most sincere desire to enable her to maintain her integrity and independence, but without any promise of material support."—No. 5, 780.
  It is true that the Government may have given no direct promise of material support, but do not the passages I have quoted convey a strongly-implied promise? Though I the statement of the noble Earl may therefore be true to the letter, I venture to ask every honest man whether it is true in spirit? What, then, should have been the course of Her Majesty's Government? The noble Earl who spoke last (the Earl of Clarendon) intimated that the supporters of this Motion were crying out for war. We say no such thing. In our opinion the Government should have maintained peace; but we think that if they did not mean to assist Denmark they should have distinctly stated so, and should have followed the example set by the Emperor of the French, who clearly gave Denmark to understand that he had no intention to give her material aid in the conflict. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) taunted my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) with not having read the despatches, for (he said) if he bad, my noble Friend would have seen that General Fleury's language had been contradicted by another despatch. Now, the fact is that there is no contradiction at all. According to Earl Cowley, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said—
  "The instructions given to General Fleury prescribed to him to conform his mission as much as possible to the conveyance of Parliamentary messages from the Emperor. Should he be obliged—and it was hardly to be avoided—to speak on political matters, he was to advise all possible concessions for the maintenance of peace. It might be that, with a view of furthering this pacific policy, the General had stated that the support of France must not be expected in the event of war; but he (M. Druyn de Lhuys) was positive that no declaration had been made by the General, which did not leave the Emperor
  1146
  free to take any course which events might render expedient."
  If the noble Duke discovers a contradiction here, his mind is differently constituted from mine. You will find that up to the very last Sir Augustus Paget says to M. Monrad, "The prospect of Foreign support is by no means certain;" and, again, "I told him frankly and honestly there was very little chance of support." Why not have said plainly and honestly that no such support would be given? On this part of the question I ask your Lordships whether I have not established to your satisaction, that hopes and expectations of material assistance were held out to Denmark, and that those hopes have been cruelly disappointed?
  My Lords, I now turn to the course pursued with regard to the aggressive Powers, as to which I venture to think there has been an exhibition of menacing and insulting language followed at times by very submissive conduct, alternations between heat and cold, between weakness and violence, calculated to bring discredit upon the Government and upon the country. It was known perfectly well from the first that Austria and Prussia were making the Federal Execution a pretext for their own designs upon Schleswig. But they spoke in the most plausible manner. The noble Earl talked of "invasion," to which they objected, "Oh, no! It was not invasion; it was only occupation." This puts one in mind of ancient Pistol, when accused of stealing,
  "Steal! convey, the wise it call!"
  Then they say, "A Federal execution is not a hostile proceeding. It may wear the stern face of war, but this is but a mask, and if you look beneath it you will see only the mild countenance of material guarantee." The independence and integrity of Denmark is ever upon their lips; our proceedings, they would say, may look like dismemberment, but it should be remembered that a broken bone often becomes stronger when re-united, and though the tie between Denmark and the Duchies may be severed for a time, the nexus will be stronger after our operations. "It is better for Denmark," say they, "that we should take the matter into our own hands, because if we leave it to the Diet there will immediately ensue the proclamation of the Duke of Augustenburg." But I should like to know what Denmark has profited by this Jacob's voice with Esau's hands? Now, in this state of

  1147
  things, what was the course of the noble Lord? It was a succession of threats and of submission, of violence and of forbearance, without any settled policy. He begins by a little warning to Germany to look at home. He says to Lord Bloomfield—
  "You will communicate these views to Count Rechberg, and tell him that if Germany persists in confounding Schleswig with Holstein other Powers of Europe may confound Holstein with Schleswig, and deny the right of Germany to interfere with the one any more than she has with the other, except as an European Power. Such a pretension might be as dangerous to the independence and integrity of Germany as the invasion of Schleswig might be to the independence and integrity of Denmark."
  Then the noble Earl tries what a threat will do, and in a memorandum read to M. Bismark he says—
  "Should Federal troop9 enter Holstein on purely Federal grounds, Her Majesty's Government would not interfere; but should it appear that Federal troops had entered the Duchy on international grounds, Her Majesty's Government may be obliged to interfere."
  Then the noble Earl seemed to think that he had gone too far, and in order that all apprehension of war might be removed be writes to Sir Andrew Buchanan on December 1, 1863—
  "I have to state to you that the line of policy to be pursued by Her Majesty's Government in the questions at issue between Denmark and Germany is perfectly clear. That policy is to advise Austria, Prussia, and the other Powers who signed the Treaty of London, to adhere to their engagements, and to advise Denmark to observe all the engagements which she has taken to Germany."—No. 3, 393.
  Now as the engagements of Denmark were, in the opinion of the noble Earl, "singularly obscure and indefinite," and Austria and Prussia considered themselves released from their Treaty obligations, this advice was safe at least, though not very practical. I do not, however, object to this advice. But what I do object to are the alternations and oscillations which the noble Earl exhibited. This being announced as his clear policy, he next writes to Lord Bloomfield, on the 8th of December, and tries the effect of advice as to the limits of the Federal Execution—
  "As the Diet seems determined to proceed with the proposed execution in Holstein, Her Majesty's Government consider it to be of great importance that the objects of that measure should be distinctly defined, and that it should be strictly limited to the enforcement within the Duchy of Holstein of the rights which the German Confederation alleges to have been disregarded by the Danish Government. In conformity with this principle the Federal commanders should be strictly prohibited from extending the execution to any parts of the frontier in respect to which
  1148
  any doubt may exist as to whether it belongs to the Duchy of Holstein, and that, more particularly at Rendsburg, no doubtful or mixed territory should be occupied by the Federal troops."—No. 3, 343.
  His advice being received with the most perfect indifference, the noble Earl next tries the influence of a little ambiguous threatening in his despatch of the 24th of December—
  "The Danish Government will, it is understood, offer no resistance to the entrance of Federal troops into Holstein; but that those troops, having entered Holstein on the ground of Federal rights, should be used for depriving the King of Denmark altogether of the Duchy of Holstein, and for transferring that Duchy to another claimant, would be a proceeding of which Her Majesty's Government could not possibly approve. It would be no less impossible for Her Majesty's Government to enter into any engagement that if the Federal troops should not limit their operation to the Duchy of Holstein, but should on some pretence or other extend their operations to the Duchy of Schleswig, Her Majesty's Government would maintain an attitude of neutrality between Germany and Denmark. But Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to the perils of the present state of affairs, and are sensible of the critical character which attaches to the next step to be taken with regard to them."—No. 4, 413.
  This despatch certainly does not adhere to the "clear policy" of advice which was said to have been adopted by Her Majesty's Government. But the threat which it contained not having answered, the noble Lord administered another dose with an additional ingredient of insult. Your Lordships will find the following words in a despatch of the 31st of December—
  "Her Majesty's Government do not hold that war would relieve Prussia from the obligations of the Treaty of 1852. The King of Denmark would by that treaty be entitled still to be acknowledged as the Sovereign of all the dominions of the late King of Denmark. He has been so entitled from the time of the death of the late King. A war of conquest, undertaken by Germany avowedly for the purpose of adding some parts of the Danish dominions to the territory of the German Confederation, might, if successful, alter the state of possession contemplated by the Treaty of London, and give to Germany a title by conquest to parts of the dominions of the King of Denmark. The prospect of such an acquisition may, no doubt, be a temptation to those who think it can be accomplished; but Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that Prussia will depart from the straight line of good faith in order to assist in carrying such a project into effect. If German nationality in Holstein, and partially in Schleswig, were made the ground of the dismemberment of Denmark, Polish nationality in the Duchy of Posen would be a ground equally strong for the dismemberment of Prussia. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the safest course for Prussia to pursue is to act with good faith and honour, and to stand by and fulfil her treaty engagements. By such a course she will command the sympathy

  1149
  and approval of Europe; by a contrary course she will draw down upon herself the universal condemnation of all disinterested men."—No. 4, 445.
  I entirely approve of this sentiment; but what I say is—do not be continually altering your tone; stick to your policy if you have one—but it is perfectly clear that you have none at all. I believe neither at this time nor at any time have the Government had a fixed policy. This will be apparent in the next despatch. It appears the noble Earl had stated to the Prussian Ambassador that Denmark might possibly be aided in the war by Great Britain. An explanation of this statement was asked for; and the explanation, as given by the noble Earl, was certainly an extraordinary one. He says—
  "I had a conversation a short time ago with Count Bernstorff on the subject of the proposed occupation of Schleswig by Prussia. He said he had not fully understood the observations I had made in a former conversation. That the proposed occupation, if it were to take place, would be done under the regular authorities, and by the regular troops of Prussia; that no danger, therefore, could be incurred by the King of Denmark, and that when he should have complied with the just demands of the German Powers, the Duchy of Schleswig would be again placed under his sceptre. I had spoken on a former occasion in the sense that Denmark would resist such an occupation, and might be aided by Great Britain. He wished to have an explanation of what I had then said. It is to be observed that in speaking to Count Bernstorff on the occasion alluded to, I had expressly declared that I could not say what the decision of the Government might be, as the Cabinet had not yet deliberated, and consequently not submitted any opinion to the Queen; but that, judging from the general current of feeling in Parliament and in the nation, I thought an invasion of Schleswig by Germany might lead to assistance to Denmark on the part of this country."—No. 4, 534.
  I pass over the want of caution of the noble Earl in speaking in this unguarded manner without the sanction and authority of the Cabinet. But it evidently appears from this conversation that the noble Earl and the Government were waiting for the utterance of Parliament, and the opinions of the nation, and endeavouring to discover the direction of the wind before they could make up their minds as to the policy which they ought to pursue. Now, I ask your Lordships again if I have not established this second part of my case—that there has been insulting and menacing language, followed by weak and vacillating conduct, which induces foreign Ministers to regard the representations of the Government with indifference and contempt.
  1150
  I will not trouble your Lordships with any observations with regard to the overtures which were made to France and Russia to induce them to join us in affording material aid to Denmark, but I must be permitted to say a few words upon the subject of the Conference. Now, I entirely agree that the Government was perfectly right in endeavouring to procure the concurrence of the great Powers in some arrangement which would settle the unfortunate Danish Question; and I regret as much as any one that the Conference was a failure: but I think the experience of the noble Earl might have convinced him that this failure was probable, because the Conference met without any definite or certain basis. What were the circumstances in connection with the Conference? The noble Earl originally proposed that the Conference should assemble without a basis. Denmark proposed that the Treaty and the engagements of 1851–2 should form the basis of the Conference. But this was refused by Prussia and Austria, who stated that such a proposal would have been accepted by them, before the commencement of hostilities, but that things had now gone too far, and much more would be required. Then the noble Earl proposed "that the basis of the Conference should be simply to find the means of restoring to the North of Europe the blessings of peace." What but failure could be expected from such a vague and indefinite basis? It was, indeed, the very ground on which the noble Earl objected to the proposal of the Emperor of the French for a Congress. In his answer, he said—
  "Her Majesty's Government would feel more apprehension than confidence from the meeting of a Congress of Sovereigns and Ministers without fixed objects ranging over the map of Europe, and exciting hopes and aspirations which they may find themselves unable to gratify or to quiet."
  And now, my Lords, I come to the last scene in this strange eventful history, presented by the extraordinary desire which the Government have shown to lead the public to believe that there is in some secret corner of their heart the lurking intention of going to war in the event of the occurrence of some indefinite contingencies. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) who has given an explanation of their conduct, said that the Danes were trading upon the hope of a change in the Government. Is that the secret motive, then, of the inconsistency of the Government in having peace on their lips, but

  1151
  holding out a dim prospect of distant war, that the Danes may not be altogether thrown into the arms of their opponents? On the 27th June, the noble Earl delivered a speech, in which he said—
  "It is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that we should maintain the position which we have occupied, and that we should be neutral in this war. I do not mean to say that contingencies might not arise in which our position might become different, and in which our conduct might be altered."
  The contemplated events were decently veiled by the noble Earl under the word contingencies; but the noble Lord at the head of the Government rudely tore off the veil, and exposed the events which would provoke interference in the most open manner. He said—
  "If the war should assume a different character, if the existence of Denmark as an independent Power in Europe should be at stake, if we had reason to expect to see at Copenhagen the horrors of a town taken by assault, the destruction of property, the sacrifice of the lives not only of its defenders, but also of its peaceful inhabitants, the confiscation which would ensue, the capture of the Sovereign as a prisoner of war and other humiliations of the kind—I do not mean to say that if any of these events were likely to happen, the position of this country might not be a subject for reconsideration."
  I can hardly believe that the noble Lord was speaking in earnest, and yet the subject is one too serious and painful for jest. I feel if anything were needed to add to the humiliation inflicted upon this country by the policy of the noble Earl it is this declaration.
  And now, I think, I may confidently ask your Lordships whether the justice of the Resolution proposed by my noble Friend has not been completely established—whether the policy of the Government has not failed to secure the integrity and independence of Denmark—whether we have not been humiliated in the eyes of foreign nations? I think I may venture to repeat the words of Lord Chatham uttered in this assembly—
  "But yesterday and England might have stood against the world; now none so poor to do her reverence."
  It is impossible for us to erase the bloody pages upon which the history of this Danish war is recorded; but we can refuse to be accessaries to the dishonour of our country, we can at least raise our voices in reprobation of a policy which has brought us to shame; and we may be able by outvotes to-night to vindicate, though late, the honour and dignity of England.
  LORD WODEHOUSE: My Lords, I am anxious to follow the noble and learned Lord, because if I could agree with him and with the noble Marquess who spoke earlier, that, in the course of the negotiations, promises had been made to Denmark by which she had been induced to engage in an unequal contest, I should say that not only ought the House to adopt this Resolution, but also to affirm that the honour of the country requires that Denmark should be sustained by us in the war. I shall endeavour to prove that we have given no such promise; that the advice we did give to Denmark was sound, and was given in conjunction with the Allies of England, who are equally responsible with us for that advice. There are three principal points upon which advice was given by Her Majesty's Government to Denmark. The revocation of the Patent of March 31, the question of resistance to the Federal Execution in Holstein, and the repeal of the Constitution of November 18. I will first refer to the Patent of March. The Diet having objected to that Patent as inconsistent with the engagements between Germany and Denmark, Her Majesty's Government advised the King of Denmark to withdraw it, and that advice was ultimately accepted. Was that advice accompanied by any promise of assistance? There is a despatch from Sir Augustus Paget, dated October 14, in which he gives an account of an interview with M. Hall, in which you find this statement—
  "M. Hall replied that there was one other condition on which the Patent could be withdrawn—namely, that England and France would give to the Danish Government a formal promise to support them against any further demands of Germany. I (Sir Augustus Paget) said 'I did not think much would be obtained by my forwarding this message.'"—No. 3, 161.
  Therefore, no promise of support was held out as a condition on which the Danish Government were to revoke that Patent. The Danish Government, as I have said, ultimately accepted our advice; but although I should be sorry to say a harsh word against Denmark, with which I have strong sympathies, as all must have with those who are struggling against fearful odds, yet I must observe that that concession to our advice, as well as every other concession of the Danes, was made too late. That was the opinion of M. Hall himself. The Patent was revoked on the 4th of December; and M. Hall then observed to Sir Augustus Paget, that he feared it must be considered as a concession altogether

  1153
  illusory, because the passing of the new Constitution had rendered the Patent of little importance. The next point which was dwelt upon at length by the noble and learned Lord was the advice in which I had some share—the advice to Denmark not to resist Federal Execution in Holstein. In the first place, I would point out that that advice was not the advice of Her Majesty's Government alone, but it was first given by Sweden—a great Friend of Denmark; and it was also given at the same time, and, I believe, in the same manner, by France and Russia. Therefore the Government cannot be held solely responsible for the consequences of that advice, even if I were to admit that those consequences have been fatal to Denmark—which I do not believe, but rather say that the advice was sound and wise. My part in that advice was small. I did not arrive at Copenhagen until nearly the end of last year, and as early as the 2oth of November, Sir Augustus Paget reported to the Government that M. Hall would give the same advice to the present King as he had given to the late King—that no resistance should be offered to the Federal Execution in Holstein. It has been represented, both here and upon the Continent, that it was on account of urgent pressure through me that the Danish Government made that concession, The fact is, that long before I went, the Minister had determined to give that advice, and at my first interview with M. Hall, he told me that it was already decided that no resistance should be made to the Federal troops. I now come to the very material point of the Constitution of November. The noble and learned Lord said he relied not only upon the letter, but also upon the spirit of the despatches relating to that subject, and he added that the spirit of all the communications to the Danish Government was that they would receive material aid. Speaking of what I know, I affirm that, not merely in the letter of what I wrote to my Government, but in the spirit of all the advice I gave to the Danish Government, and I believe of every word I spoke at Copenhagen, I gave the Danish Government no reason to expect any material aid from England. When I gave advice at Copenhagen I was always met with the natural question, "If we act upon your advice, what will you give us in return? Will you give us material support?" That was what I could not promise, and what I did not promise. The
  1154
  material despatch bearing upon this point is that in which I reported the interview I had with M. Hall, advising hint to withdraw the Constitution. Let me just point out what that Constitution was, It has been represented as a kind of Reform Bill; and it has been said, what would have; been the feelings of this country if, after the passing of the Reform Act of 1832, a foreign country had come to us just before the elections were held, and demanded that we should repeal that Act? I think a more just parallel would be if we unfortunately, in consequence of a disastrous war, had entered into engagements with some foreign country respecting the conditions upon which England should be united to Ireland, and then we had passed a Reform Bill changing the conditions of the union notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Foreign Power with which we had engagements. This Constitution was no Reform Bill. There were in it provisions of a liberal character affecting the electoral body, but that was not the spirit in which it wa9 passed and was accepted by the Danish people. Sir Augustus Paget in one of his despatches points out that the excitement about the Constitution was not on account of internal reforms, but that it was chiefly valued by the Danish people because it was looked upon as a step towards the union of Schleswig with Denmark. The Germans, moreover, on that very account, remonstrated against it as a violation of the engagements of Denmark. It was in that spirit it was regarded by Her Majesty's Government, who had to consider what advice they should give. I must observe that when I went to Berlin, on my way to Copenhagen, with instructions to ask what were the demands of the Prussian Government, although I could not obtain any explicit statement from M. von Bismark, yet he did say that, if the Constitution of November were brought into operation on the 1st of January, the German Powers would consider themselves relieved from all their engagements to Denmark. It was, therefore, my object to prevent, if possible, this Constitution from taking effect. That was the position at the time I went to M. Hall. The advice that was then given was not tendered by England alone. The first step I took was to ask the Russian Minister to give me his support. He said he had general instructions to join in the advice I should give, but he would telegraph to his Government for specific authority. The French Envoy also commu-

  1155
  nicated with his Government, and received for answer that he was to support the advice given by England. M. d'Ewers and I went together to see M. Hall, and it was then that I made the declaration which has been so much commented on. I told the Danish Minister that—
  "General Fleury had informed M. d'Ewers and me that he was instructed to tell the Danish Government that France would not go to war to support Denmark against Germany. It was my duty to declare to him, that if the Danish Government rejected our advice, Her Majesty's Government must leave Denmark to encounter Germany on her own responsibility."—No. 4, 418.
  That advice was not tendered to Denmark singly. A little further on your Lordships will find that M. d'Ewers made a similar declaration.
  "M. d'Ewers pointed out forcibly the perilous situation in which Denmark was placed. He was instructed to declare in explicit terms that Russia must leave to Denmark the responsibility of the consequences which might ensue from the rejection of our advice."—No. 4, 418.
  The statement of the French Government, that they would not take part in a war between Denmark and Germany, was not the unconditional declaration which might be supposed from the despatch I have quoted. It is perfectly true that I understood General Fleury to make the statement in an unconditional manner, and that I so reported it to Her Majesty's Government. But Her Majesty's Government having referred the matter to Paris, a most explicit declaration was returned, that the French Government did not acknowledge the accuracy of the representation of the language of General Fleury, but that, on the contrary, France was at liberty to take any course she thought proper. Therefore, I contend that the French, Russian, and English Governments occupy the same position as regards this matter. As the point has been so much referred to, I would appeal to other testimony which I think most important, and that is the way in which this advice was viewed by the Danish Government itself. Sir Augustus Paget saw M. Hall the evening of the same day that my interview with him took place, and while the language I had used must have been fresh in his recollection. What did M. Hall say to Sir Augustus Paget? Sir Augustus Paget reports in his despatch of December 22, that M. Hall said, "There was no prospect of support if Germany continued her aggressions." There is a further despatch, in which I state I had several conversations with M. Hall, and
  1156
  repeatedly endeavoured to shake the resolution at which he had arrived; but M. Hall as constantly declared that I afforded him no equivalent—meaning that I did not promise him the support he desired. Let me refer to another passage in a despatch of Sir Augustus Paget's, which I am additionally anxious to quote, because a wrong interpretation has been put upon some words used by that Minister to M. Hall as to the position of Denmark if our advice was rejected. Sir Augustus Paget, writing on the 3rd of January, details a conversation which he had with M. Monrad—in which the latter, M. Monrad, repeated more than once that there was nothing left but to "lancer le peuple." "I replied," says Sir Augustus Paget, "by stating, as clearly and forcibly as I could, the immense advantage which it would be to Denmark if negotiations could be substituted for war; the support she might expect in the one case, and her en-entire isolation in the other." Therefore it is evident that Sir Augustus Paget in pointing out the alternatives which were presented to the Danish Government could not have meant to allude to any offer of armed assistance in case they followed our advice, but to assistance in negotiation. I may further state that the Danish Government did not in fact follow this advice at once, as has been represented, but a considerable time after it was given, when circumstances had entirely changed. They did not make any promise to set about repealing the Constitution until after they had actually received from Germany a summons to that effect, upon pain of Schleswig being occupied within forty-eight hours. That summons was despatched on the 16th of January, and the advice I ventured to offer was given on the 20th of December. The noble Lord says that no time was allowed by Germany for the repeal of the Constitution; but it thus appears that nearly a month was given.
  I have thus shown that the advice given to Denmark was given in conjunction with our Allies, and in no case was it accompanied by a promise of armed assistance. I wish now to say a few words on the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Of course, it was not possible for me to be acquainted with every stage of the negotiations, as these only came to my knowledge during a very short time; but taking the intention of the Government as exhibited by these papers, it appears distinctly that their endeavour in the first instance

  1157
  was to obtain for Denmark an opportunity for negotiation by interposing their good offices in the character of mediator. Up to the time of the King's death the Prussian Government itself was anxious that Her Majesty's Government should mediate between Germany and Denmark. But, after the King's death, matters became changed, and a much more serious state of affairs arose. The endeavour then mode by Her Majesty's Government was to obtain, by concert and co-operation of the Allies of this country who had signed the Treaty of 1852, such an arrangement, to which the representatives of Denmark and of the Diet would be parties, as might settle the questions in dispute peaceably and fairly. When it was found that this could not be brought about, Her Majesty's Government took the further step of asking our Allies, whether they would give material aid to Denmark in conjunction with England, and whether they would take any steps to prevent the dismemberment of Denmark? Was not that a distinct policy—a distinct course for the Government to take? The answer of Russia was that she could not assist; and the French answer was equally decided. We have no reason to blame the French Government for the course they took in their own interests. But if the honour of England has been tarnished by the course pursued, why are we to consider that France stands in a different position? I take it that France has been largely influenced by a maxim which has guided her conduct from the time of Louis XIV., and that is never to quarrel with Germany when Germany is united; that is a very serious quarrel for France, and she always thinks twice before engaging in it. Her Majesty's Government being left in this position, were they to go to war alone for the purpose of maintaining the integrity and independence of Denmark? I think this House and the country generally are of opinion that Her Majesty and the Government came to a very wise decision—namely, that under the circumstances it would not be the duty of this country in a matter specially concerning the Continental Powers, to engage in a war alone for the support of Denmark. The Resolution of the noble Earl opposite affirms that the just influence of this country has been lowered, and that the securities for peace have been diminished. My Lords, I think the securities for peace are diminished, but I do not think they are diminished by the action or want of action of Her Ma-
  1158
  jesty's Government; but because there has been a wanton disregard on the part of two of the chief Powers of Europe of a solemn treaty signed not many years ago—they are diminished because there is uncertainty and disunion among the great Powers, and that ancient accord which existed between them and preserved peace for so many years, has been broken and permanently impaired. It may be—and in my judgment it probably will be—the duty and policy of this country to abstain more than she has done of late from interference with the affairs of the Continent. But I would ask, considering the Treaty of 1852, which we had signed, and the parts successive Governments had taken in the negotiations between Denmark and Germany, was it possible for this country to abstain from diplomatic interference on behalf of Denmark? I maintain that that interference has not been by promises which bind us in honour to give material support to Denmark; and I ask this House to pause before they give the weight of their authority to a Resolution which affirms that the just influence of this country has been diminished by honest and persevering, though they may have been unsuccessful, efforts to avert from Europe the calamity of war.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My Lords, there can be no doubt that this Resolution amounts to a distinct censure on Her Majesty's Government for the policy which they have pursued; but I have listened—and listened in vain—all the evening, to hear from any one of the noble Lords opposite anything approximating to a real defence of Her Majesty's Government. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) delivered a speech which, with great submission, I must describe as composed of personalities and miscellanies. He told us first that this was "a pure faction fight"—then he spoke of the sixteen Noblemen and Gentlemen by whom he said this Motion was concocted; then he informed us that with those who had principles in this matter, however misguided they might be, he could sympathise; but that he shrank from those who came here to wage a mere party warfare, and for them he could make no allowance. He then travelled into the subject of Italy, and into a great many other subjects into which I will not follow him; and finally he said that he would tell us what he thought, not only of this Motion, but of us who sit on this side of the House. My noble

  1159
  Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (the Earl of Clarendon) spoke in a very different strain; but the pith and point of his speech was, as it seemed to mo, simply an argument on a hypothesis as to what would have been the result if there had been an intervention at the time, not when my noble Friend said that it ought to have taken place, but when he said that it was possible that it might have taken place. And, finally, my noble Friend who has just sat down, instead of a defence of the Government, to my astonishment—and I will say to my concern—has delivered a speech full of censure of the Danes and the Danish Government. I think that my noble Friend might have spared that. Considering the part which we have taken, I think our lips ought to have been sealed against finding fault with the Danish Government. Let it be borne in mind that there is not one single concession which we have asked of Denmark, with one single exception, which came quite at the close of the Conference, and was not unreasonably considered by the Danish Plenipotentiaries inadmissible, that Denmark has not at our instance agreed to. But the censure of the noble Lord is of a piece with the remark of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary at the last meeting of the Conference, in which he stated to the world that it is the obstinacy of Denmark which has proved the insurmountable obstacle before which all the efforts and labours of this Conference have been rendered fruitless. My noble Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy used a phrase which struck me very much. He said that Her Majesty's Government had been labouring in this matter with honesty and with good effect. I do not for a moment doubt the honesty of intention either of my noble Friend or of any one of Her Majesty's Ministers; but I do most distinctly join issue with him on the assertion that they have laboured with good effect. Let me reduce the point to the standard of every day common sense. It is perfectly fair either in public or private life, when an individual for the first time miscarries or fails in the business which he undertakes, to give him the advantage of the supposition that some accident may have occurred, or that some unforeseen circumstances may have defeated his calculations. When even he has failed twice or thrice it is generous at least that he should have the benefit of the doubt; but when failure marks the beginning,
  1160
  the middle, and the end, when every single part of your policy is summed up in that one word "failure," then there is only one inference which Parliament can draw, and it is the duty of Parliament to give expression to it. To each particular measure which Her Majesty's Government urged upon Denmark the Danes have assented, and with what result? They urged the revocation of the Patent of March. The Patent of March was revoked—and what came of it? They pressed the repeal of the November Constitution. That Constitution was repealed—and what came of it? They entreated Denmark to retire from Holstein and submit to Federal Execution. Denmark knew perfectly well what Federal Execution meant, but at your urgent instance she acceded—and what good came of that? They urged Denmark to cede Frederickstadt, and consequently to surrender the whole defensible frontier. Denmark yielded most reluctantly—and what took place? The loss of the Dannewerke, the abandonment of Schleswig, and the final fall of Düppel. But this was not all. Again you pressed upon Denmark a Conference without a basis, and an armistice without equality of terms—a most one-sided and unequal armistice. Denmark, with the greatest reluctance, and at your urgent instance, accepted both the Conference and the armistice—and I say again, what came of it? Failure, failure, failure. The noble Earl the Chancellor of the Duchy indeed seemed to imply that it was from the very first a hopeless and despairing undertaking. But this was not always the view of Her Majesty's Government. Not long ago the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs took me to task and reprimanded me with some sharpness, and with all the weight of his experience, for venturing to say that the Conference was a delusion, and that the armistice would lead to nothing. The noble Earl then appeared to think that I was very foolish; but, with great submission, I think that the result has rather justified my inexperience than his statesmanship. The great fault in the whole policy of Her Majesty's Government which at once strikes one is this—that they never at any time had any definite point; they never drew any line of which they were prepared to say, "so far will we go in this matter and no further." Each single position which they have successively taken up has been successively abandoned. You started by inscribing on

  1161
  your banner the independence of Denmark, You closed the Conference with a modest wish, a most modest wish—that that integrity and independence should be preserved. You started with the Treaty of 1852 as almost the condition of action—and that treaty received its coup de grâce from the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, in the Conference, when he proposed what amounts in fact to a dismemberment of the Danish Kingdom. You started with the declaration of the noble Lord the Prime Minister, which will never be, as it never has been, forgotten in Denmark, that if the German troops invaded Schleswig, "Denmark will not stand alone." But Denmark does remain alone, and not a hand is raised to help her. You start with a very fiery declaration by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, when he warned the Austrian fleet not to venture into the Baltic, and hinted in no obscure terms at what the British fleet would do under such circumstances. You close, as my noble and learned Friend (Lord Chelmsford) has pointed out, with a speech from the Prime Minister in the other House, in which he explains what were the ulterior contingencies to which the Foreign Secretary here alluded, and tells you that when Copenhagen is taken by siege, when the town is subjected to the horrors of an assault, and the King of Denmark is a prisoner, then it will be time "to re-consider the whole of this question." But the truth is that I look upon this catastrophe not merely as the failure of a particular policy, but as the failure of the means which you have consistently and steadily employed towards your ends. You condemn, and justly condemn, the general who in war allows himself to be defeated simply because his powder is wet or his bayonets blunt; how much more justly ought you to condemn the diplomatist who is beaten on his own field of action because the language which he employs—the very essence of diplomacy, the rudiments of his craft—is calculated not to conciliate but to exasperate and excite. Yet this has been the case throughout these transactions. I do not refer to the terms of this or that particular dispatch, but to the language which you have now used for several years. The noble Lord the Prime Minister was, I think it will be admitted, the first during the many years that he was Foreign Secretary, to import this new system of strong expressions into the diplomacy of the Foreign Office; but
  1162
  there was this, at least, to be said for the noble Viscount, that he generally backed up his language by strong action, and, at all events, his strong expressions were for the most part regulated by the conventionalities of diplomatic intercourse. But the noble Earl opposite has very much improved upon the noble Viscount. He has gone far beyond his model. We have heard from the noble Earl during the last two years denunciations against every one of the Great Powers in Europe. He has denounced France, he has denounced Russia, he has denounced Austria, he has denounced Prussia—and I am bound to say that the strength of his action has been exactly in inverse proportion to the strength of his expressions. The language which the noble Earl has used would, in a former generation, have been tantamount to a declaration of war. He has spared no threat, be has abstained from no menace. If, without offence to the noble Earl, I may say so, it really has struck me when I have read his despatches or heard his speeches, that they were not the calm, measured, and deliberate expressions of an English Foreign Minister, but they rather savour of the earlier recollections of the noble Earl. They are, in fact, electioneering speeches, addressed from the platform of the Foreign Office to the free and independent Governments of Europe. We indeed in England know how to appreciate them—we make the proper deductions and the right allowance for all that falls from the noble Earl; but it is too much to expect that this shall be done by foreign nations. At first they were startled—then they were bewildered; and now, when they find that no action follows, their language towards ns is naturally becoming more and more contemptuous. May I recall to the recollection of the noble Earl an exquisite passage in one of the most charming of plays that adorns the literature of this country—I mean Mr. Sheridan's play of The Rivals. The noble Earl will remember the advice given by Sir Lucius O'Trigger to a gentleman who was very much inclined to talk, but was very unwilling to fight. "Sir Lucius, let me be in a rage. Let me be in a passion, dear Sir Lucius; if you love me, let me be in a rage;" and what is the answer? "Pho, pho; do things decently and in a Christian manner, and when you meet your antagonist let your courage be as keen but at the same time as polished as your sword." Now, if the noble Earl had borne that

  1163
  advice in mind, and if his policy had been as polished in its language as it was keen in its temper, the result would, I think, have been different. If, indeed, the noble Earl was unprepared to make use of his sword at all, he would, in my opinion, have better consulted his own dignity and the credit of the Government by keeping it in its scabbard, instead of idly flourishing it in the air. But I must draw a further moral from the present catastrophe; for the result of what has taken place is, that the whole of your foreign policy from beginning to end seems to have broken down. It is now some fourteen years since the noble Lord at the head of the Government declared in the memorable debate on Greek affairs, that the foreign policy of England was founded on the circumstances of each particular case. That fatal doctrine which was protested against by Sir Robert Peel in the last words which he uttered in the House of Commons, and which was denounced in your Lordships' House on the same occasion, has since then been taken up and carried much further by the noble Earl opposite, until at length your foreign policy has become a mere hand to mouth policy regulated by the supposed expediency of the hour, without any prescribed rules, and with no standard or principle whatsoever to which to adhere. The result is that you have stood by as witnesses, sometimes as unwilling accomplices, sometimes even as accessaries, of the wrong-doing which has been perpetrated in Europe during the last few years. During that time we have seen the sanctity of treaty engagements disappearing, forcible intervention in the concerns of weaker nations becoming too much the rule of more powerful States, the law of the strongest growing into the public law of Europe—till at length you find yourselves in the presence of a grievous calamity, the dismemberment of a small State, without a shadow of justice, without the colour of a pretext, by a greater State, because that greater State wishes to annex its territory. If this principle of dismemberment is to be accepted, I cannot see which of the minor States in Europe can be secure. In the words of Sir James Macintosh, employed on a not very dissimilar occasion, they will become an inexhaustible reserve, from which equivalents will be continually drawn; they will be the counters on the chessboard of European polities, to be given, to be taken, to be sacrificed, to be exchanged, in order to
  1164
  rectify a frontier, or to satisfy the ambition of some greater Power. But whatever the foreign policy of the noble Earl may be, he is much too great a master of Parliamentary tactics not to know that when he asks us to swallow this bitter cup of humiliation it is necessary that it should be accompanied by some condiment to make the draught palatable. And what, let me ask, is the condiment with which the noble Lord proposes to furnish the House and country? He holds out to us the equivalent of peace. But when the noble Lord talks of peace, he is not in the position to speak as the exponent of a peace policy. We shall hardly forget that he proposed, not peace, but war against Austria and Prussia, both to Russia and France. He has even endeavoured to disentangle the minor States of Germany from the larger ones, in order to proclaim war upon them. Whatever party the noble Lord's policy may please, it is not a policy which ought to satisfy that party which views war as indefensible and peace to be purchased at any price. My Lords, peace, if it is to be had, ought not to be bought by national humiliation. The great complaint which I make of the Government is that, so far from giving us peace, they, by their conduct, have brought us, to the injury not only of our credit, but of our material interests, to the very verge of an European war. I have said that peace ought not to be purchased by national humiliation; and in this respect the case of individuals and nations is very similar; for the individual or the nation which once suffers the chastity of its honour to be soiled will soon find, to its bitter mortification, that there is but a short step from insult to injury and from injury to open aggression. The argument of the noble Earl, when he told us that if we went to war we should find the floodgates of hostility open upon us in all directions, our commerce cut up, and every man's hand against us, is but a poor compliment to his own foreign policy. But if the argument be good for anything, it is an argument not against this particular war, but against all wars; it is an argument in favour of peace at any and every price. I can understand and respect, however little I agree with the conscientious logic of a limited school of politicians in England, who believe that war is wholly indefensible; but I do not understand and I cannot respect the part which Her Majesty's Government has taken in these transactions. I cannot

  1165
  bring myself to respect what I must call shabby policy, which in the case of a strong Power first provokes war and then recedes from it; which reserves the thunders of British hostility for China, for Brazil, for Japan, and the Kingdom of Ashantee; but which, when Russia throws back in our face the despatch we send her, or America threatens to intervene, bids us look on discretion as the better part of valour, and turn pale at the consequences which may follow on our imprudence.
  My Lords, there is another point on which, with your Lordships' permission, I wish also to say a few words. It has been said, both here and elsewhere, that it is all very well to lay this Vote of Censure on the table of the House, but that those who bring it forward are prepared to declare no policy of their own. They say, "What is your policy?" My Lords, in censuring an existing Government as we propose, we do in reality state that in which our policy consists. Under the form of a retrospective censure we are indicating the course of future action. Sir Robert Peel, on a very memorable occasion, was challenged, and Sir Robert Peel refused to state his policy when he moved his Vote of Censure. But if Her Majesty's Ministers ask for any further explanation, we may fairly reply that they shall have it when they explain to us things which are as yet unintelligible—when they explain to us those many despatches which are omitted and manipulated and extracted and garbled, and which, under the title of a Danish Correspondence, are heaped together into a huge pile of unreadable papers; when they point out to us the reasons of the difference between their language and conduct; when they tell us how they reconcile their war-like manifestoes formerly with their peaceful professions now; and lastly, when they inform us what are those contingencies with regard to which they reserve to themselves liberty of action. When they tell us all this, then will it be time enough for them to ask to be further enlightened as to our policy. But what does this mode of argument prove? Why, it comes to this, that a Government has nothing to do but so to blunder and mismanage matters as to cut off all retreat, to make all escape either to the right hand or the left hand impracticable, and to leave nothing but a narrow groove in which their policy can move; and, then, in consideration of all this, that Government is to be absolutely freed from all Parliamentary
  1166
  censure, and, as a consequence, from all Parliamentary responsibility. We are indeed taunted with the uselessness of our vote to-night in a practical point of view. For my own part, my Lords, I cannot say that I look upon this Vote of Censure as useless. What may be the result of the division to-night is, I think, a matter of comparatively little consequence. This House has a duty to perform. It has, for generations past, been its special province to discuss questions of foreign policy, and when it has formed an opinion upon them, whether favourable to the Government or otherwise, to express their opinion freely and fearlessly. In justice to itself now this House is bound to express its opinion; nor could it on such an occasion as this be silent, without abdicating its rights and its duties. But there is also a duty which belongs to individual Members of this House—and as an individual Peer I venture to claim my right, and duty, and privilege—when a free, innocent, Christian country, allied to us in blood, in religion, in language, is ruthlessly and barbarously trampled down in spite both of the laws of God and man; and when I see this nation dragged into unwilling complicity into this foul deed—to clear my conscience, to express my abhorrence of the crime, to disclaim all participation in it, to wash my hands of this innocent blood, and to shake from my feet at least the dust of this national infamy.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord who has just sat down for having gone somewhat beyond the immediate subject of his Resolution, and travelled into some general considerations affecting the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. I must remark myself, that with regard to the foreign policy of the Opposition it would be indeed a most difficult task to discover what that policy is, or how any two of them agree in their notions of what our foreign policy should be. The other night the noble Earl who is not now present (the Earl of Derby) gave us his view of the state of affairs, which appeared to me to have this result—that it would be wrong to contemplate war with respect to Denmark under any circumstances whatever. That was the only conclusion which could be drawn from his speech. But the noble Earl who has brought forward this Motion (the Earl of Malmesbury) has taken a different view, and has stated his opinion so clearly that there can be no misunderstanding about it;

  1167
  that at a certain period—when the German troops were about to enter Schleswig—he would have preferred a decision in favour of war, which he told us would have been attended with little or no risk, would have prevented all the miseries that have happened, because it would in reality have rendered war actually impossible, without any sort of danger to this country. If that be the case, I cannot be astonished that the noble Earl would have preferred war under such a contingency. But I must find some fault with the noble Earl who spoke last (the Earl of Carnarvon), and who tendered a definition of our foreign policy as one which would exclude war in every case. Now, I really wonder at that assertion; because I have several times had to explain the grounds upon which I think a war inevitable, and the grounds upon which it is a matter of debate and consideration. I have said more than once that if the honour of the country is involved, you can have no hesitation, no weighing of the inconveniences and disadvantages of war; but you must at once make the choice which is alone consistent with honour. I have said, likewise, that if there were some great and paramount interest of the country involved, that there again all minor consequences would be lost sight of, and we must accept war. But, at the same time, I have said that if the question is of minor interest, if some advantage can be gained for another nation by going to war, but if, at the same time, there is some risk, some chance of failure in your object, no great certainty, and the prospect of adding considerably to the weight of your debt, you have a right to set the advantages against the disadvantages, and if you think it unwise or inexpedient you have a perfect right to refuse to enter into a war.
  My Lords, with regard to the Question which is immediately before the House, the noble Earl who has brought it forward is very happy in not having had himself to encounter the difficulties and to consider the perils which have attended this war in Denmark. The Treaty of 1852 was, I believe, a wise treaty in its general objects, and well calculated to promote the peace of Europe; but a treaty more artificial, more exposed to contingencies, and less under the control of the States which were removed from the field of action, never was made. It depended, in the first place, upon the accomplishment by the Danes of all their promises to the German Powers;
  1168
  it depended, in the next place, on the moderation of the German Powers as regarded Denmark, and the Germans asking for no more than they were entitled to, and showing some forbearance towards Denmark. Unfortunately, these conditions, which did not depend on England, France, or Russia, were never accomplished. The Danish Government—I know not whether from necessity or impolicy—governed its German subjects in such a manner as to produce continual irritation, and to excite feelings similar to those existing in Belgium before the Revolution. On the other hand, the Germans, instead of asking no more than they had a right to, asked conditions which were altogether incompatible with the existence of Denmark as an independent State. If, therefore, this artificial treaty was not carried into effect by those Powers principally concerned, it became a matter of immense difficulty when the moment of danger occurred, to preserve Denmark from the consequences of that treaty. The noble Earl who brought forward this Motion, and those who followed him—but more especially the noble Earl who is now absent (the Earl of Derby)—has spoken of our continual promises to Denmark, and threats to Germany; that we threatened Germany first, if there was a Federal Execution; next, if Schleswig was taken possession of; and next, if Jutland was invaded. These statements are plausibly made. We on this side of the House have asked all along for a proof of these statements, and not one proof ha3 been offered. On the contrary, my noble Friends who have spoken before me from this bench have shown that none of these threats have been uttered, and that the charges are entirely without foundation. Just to show the nature of these charges, it was said that we threatened Germany if she proceeded to Federal Execution; but what was the real state of the case? We said that if Germany had reason of complaint against the Government of Denmark in Holstein, that the people of Holstein as to their laws and taxes did not enjoy their full privileges—Federal Execution was quite right; but if that Federal Execution were prolonged, and if under its name an attempt was made to carry on the Government at Copenhagen by this system, that a small minority of the population of the Danish Monarchy should have the same representation as the majority, that, we said, would be a complete departure from the nature of a Federal Execution, and

  1169
  must cause serious remonstrance. But what has occurred? A different demand altogether has been made; Schleswig and Holstein have been asked for a Prince of Augustenburg; and that which for many years was the greatest danger to the Danish Government, being overcome by a German minority in Copenhagen, has entirely passed away. Therefore, this remonstrance was not a mere idle threat. The danger has ceased to exist, and in that respect, therefore, the British Government would have nothing further to demand. I am not finding fault with the noble Earl opposite for any language which he used in despatches, but I may observe that when he found the German Powers were likely to carry things to an extremity, he wrote a circular to say that such a course was calculated to produce grave complication.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: I rise to order. I have no objection to any despatches that I ever wrote being laid upon the table, but I appeal to your Lordships whether it is right that despatches which have not been laid upon the table should be used in debate. I think the rule is a fair and just one. It is not from any personal feeling that I raise the objection; but I think we had better adhere to the rule, and not establish a precedent for its violation.
  EARL RUSSELL: I always understood the rule to be, that should a Secretary of State in either House of Parliament use a despatch he was obliged to produce it. I have no objection to produce the despatch to which I refer; I refer to it not to find fault with the noble Earl, because I think he did right in telling those Powers that they ought to fulfil their engagements, and that by carrying things to an extremity they would produce grave complications.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I rise to order. The rule of the House is that no Member of the Government should allude to a despatch which has not been laid upon the table; and that rule is founded on the ground that noble Lords who may wish to answer comments made upon despatches should have the documents before them. It is very well for the noble Earl to say he will produce the despatch, but he cannot do so for several days, when the whole matter will be forgotten. The course taken by the noble Earl is unfair, because he must have intended to refer to this despatch, and therefore he should have laid it upon the table.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE: I rise to order. If the noble Marquess speaks of an Order of the House, he ought to cite the Order to which he refers.
  EARL RUSSELL: I do not know how far noble Lords opposite would carry this principle. Do they mean to hold that we cannot refer to a matter of historical importance unless the despatch, if the matter referred to was the subject of a despatch, happens to have been laid upon the table of the House? I conceive that such a rule would very much embarrass our debates. I may say that the policy of the present Government may be seen in despatches now on the table of the House. That policy was to warn Germany that Her Majesty's Government could not help regarding in a serious light the beginning of a war in Schleswig, believing that it would be likely to lead to serious complications; and we thought it right at the same time to advise Denmark to fulfil her obligations in order to avoid such a calamity. I do not think I am saying anything disparaging to the noble Earl opposite when I state that, as the Foreign Minister of another Government, he followed a similar course. I think it has been made quite clear that, with regard to promises, there have been no promises made to Denmark, that we would give her material assistance; because when, on the 9th of March, I wrote to Sir Augustus Paget that no promise of material assistance had been given, and that if we had given such a promise we; should have had a right to call upon Denmark to follow our advice as to conciliating Germany, it is quite clear that if Denmark felt—however erroneously—that she had reason to think we had given her a promise of material support, the Danish Minister would hardly have failed to say, "You tell us in March you never gave us a promise of material support; but look at those promises in December—look at those promises in January. How can you assert that you did not give us a promise?" I think it is quite clear that no word of that kind fell I from the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Denmark; he fully admitted no such promise had been made. We know also, from the papers, that when my noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) went to Copenhagen he was reproached by M. Hall because he would not give a promise of this kind. When my noble Friend asked the Danish Minister to repeal the Constitution, the latter said, "Will you assure me that if the Constitution is repealed the German

  1171
  troops will not enter Schleswig?" But my noble Friend refused to give any such promise or to hold out any such hope. And on a subsequent period, when writing to Sir Augustus Paget, I said—
  "With regard to the request that friendly Powers should come to the assistance of Denmark, Her Majesty's Government can only say that every step they may think it right to take in the further progress of this unhappy contest can only be taken after full consideration and communication with France and Russia. These Powers are as much interested in the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy as Great Britain; and Her Majesty's Government may fairly have recourse to their advice and concert in any measures to be taken for the preservation of that integrity."
  The Danish Government must, therefore, have fully understood that we thought we were not bound to give material assistance to Denmark. They must have understood that we thought the matter one of European concern, and that the European Powers should be consulted on the subject. I must beg your Lordships to look to the very different judgment which is passed on the conduct of Great Britain and France respectively with respect to certain proceedings which have taken place within these two last years. Last year Her Majesty's Government were joined with France and Austria in making remonstrances to Russia with respect to Poland. The Austrian Government not only promised "the six points" which were first adopted, but also proposed a seventh point, to which France and England gave their adhesion. However, when the question came to this—whether Great Britain would be ready to consult with France as to the means to be taken if the answer of Russia should be unfavourable, Her Majesty's Government, in concert with Austria, saw very clearly that this would lead to a European war; and they weighed well what were the objects to be obtained and what were the means which must be taken in order to obtain them; they could only be obtained by entering into a mighty contest waged to dismember Russia. Having learned the opinions of Austria, we find that she was equally opposed to this course with ourselves. The result was, that England and Austria declined undertaking such a war for such objects. The Emperor of the French then said, reasonably enough, "I was ready with these two great Powers to enter on a contest with Russia on behalf of Poland; but, as these two Powers wont join with me in rendering material assistance to Poland, I cannot think it is the
  1172
  duty or the interest of France to undertake the contest alone, and, therefore, dear as that object is to France—lively as is the sympathy of France for the Poles—I shall refrain altogether from appealing to arms in support of that people." This year another great question arises. France and England are both signataries to the Treaty of 1852. It is binding on both to recognize the integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark. Prussia and Austria having made up their minds to invade and take possession of certain provinces of that monarchy; we appeal to France and Russia, and say, "Here is a case which interests us as regards the balance of power in Europe, and which we have now declared to be a matter of great importance. Do you consider it is a case in which you can join us in giving material assistance to Denmark, to save her from being overwhelmed." Both France and Russia declined acting in co-operation with the British Government in the case of Denmark, as we had declined an invitation of the previous year—the invitation of France to interfere in the case of Poland. The British Government then says, "We are ready to enter into co-operation, but if we are to be left alone, if France and Russia will not act with us, we declare that there is no obligation on us to act alone; we neither will give a promise of material assistance, nor will we afford material assistance itself to Denmark. We will allow the war in Denmark to proceed." That is exactly acting in the case of Denmark as France acted in the case of Poland. But everybody is ready to say, and more especially the Opposition part of the community, "What grand conduct on the part of the Emperor of the French! How wise of him to refrain from making war in Poland when he could not obtain the assistance of his Allies! But in the case of the Government of Great Britain it is a base desertion by her of the country she hoped to befriend." That, my Lords, is exactly what has happened with regard to Denmark. The war went on, and Jutland was entered. It certainly was contrary to what Austria and Prussia had declared, for they said they would only take Schleswig as a material guarantee. But we never promised Denmark that we would prevent the entrance of the German troops into Jutland, nor had we threatened Germany in any way to make a casus belli of that event. We remained, therefore, in the same position as we had occupied before the Austrian

  1173
  and Prussian troops entered Jutland. At the same time, I think it is impossible not to make some observations with regard to the conduct which Austria and Prussia have pursued. It appears to me, I own, that it would have been fairer—that it would have led to less difficulty—if those two great Powers had taken the bold line which was taken by the German Confederation. If they did not mean to observe the treaty which they had signed, if they did not intend to maintain the integrity of Denmark, it would have been far better if they had said at once, "The sufferings of the German inhabitants of the Duchies have been such, the sympathies of the German people with them are such, the conduct of the Danish Government has been so unfaithful with regard to the treaty, that we declare ourselves entirely free from its engagements, and shall enter the Duchies upon that footing." Such was the feeling of the German Confederation. But Austria and Prussia said, "We enter into Holstein solely for the purpose of a Federal Execution;" and afterwards, when they entered Schleswig, they said, "We enter Schleswig solely for the purpose of occupation as a material guarantee, and we shall not depart from that line unless Denmark should herself continue to refuse justice and fulfil her obligations." Well, they have not adhered to this declaration. Neither of these Powers has kept its engagement; because when the Conference met, and when the question was, on what terms would these Powers make peace? the first proposition that they put forward was that Schleswig and Holstein should have political independence, without naming the Sovereign who was to rule over the Duchies. And when they were questioned on the subject they said, "The Diet at Frankfort must decide who shall be the Sovereign," it being quite notorious that the German Diet would never place the King of Denmark in possession of those Duchies. Thus they did, in fact, though in the manner I have stated, completely violate the Treaty of 1852. I say, therefore, it would have been far better if they had made that open declaration, and if, instead of pretending to enter Holstein for the purpose of Federal Execution, and Schleswig for the purpose of occupation as a material guarantee, they had declared that they meant to violate the treaty and that a German Prince must rule over the Duchies. It would in that case have been similar to the manner
  1174
  in which Victor Emmanuel took possession of the kingdom of the Two Scicilies. He plainly declared that as the people were discontented with their former Sovereign he meant to take possession of those States, in order to comply with their wishes. I think this would have been a much better mode of proceeding than that which Prussia and Austria adopted. When the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury), who was my predecessor in the office of Secretary of State, had to discuss these matters, he pointed out, as he has pointed out to-night, the evils which must follow the adoption of any such principles by Powers like Prussia and Austria. But when the noble Earl says that this principle of nationalities must be altogether disregarded, I cannot agree with him. It is quite true that there is no Power in Europe that can say that it will govern entirely on the principle of nationalities, because there is no Power in Europe in which there are not many nationalities comprised within the same country; and I think it would be going back in the science of government and of civilization if you were to say that a Sovereign could not govern with perfect justice, granting equal rights to his subjects of every nationality. So far I entirely agree with the noble Earl; but at the same time it is impossible not to admit that, whether with regard to Italy, Germany, or other States of which we may hear more hereafter, this principle of nationalities has taken deep root in Europe, and being countenanced and promoted by so great a Sovereign as the Emperor of the French, it is difficult to discard the principle from consideration by the Government of this country. Now, with regard to this case, it is a most powerful consideration that the German subjects of the King of Denmark had at their backs upwards of 40,000,000 Germans, all excited to the utmost pitch on the subject of establishing the separate nationality of their fellow-countrymen. The noble Earl seems to think that it was entirely an object of ambition, in order to get possession of the harbour of Kiel, that the Germans made these efforts, and have expressed such sympathy with the inhabitants of Holstein and Schleswig. But I cannot say that I think it was merely as an object of ambition that they did this. I do believe that there was an honest feeling among the German people—whatever may have been the grounds for it—that the German subjects of the King of Denmark had not the

  1175
  rights which they ought to have, and did not enjoy a protection which they ought to enjoy; and it was with a view of rescuing them from a state which they thought one of degradation and inequality that the German people first took up a question which has become so popular in Germany. This feeling had a material influence in the decision of the question; because after the German armies had entered Holstein and Schleswig—after they had, so to speak, cultivated and promoted these ideas of separation from Denmark and of independence under the Prince of Augustenburg, or any one else—it was impossible to consider the question as being in the same position as it had occupied before. It was impossible to restore those two Duchies to the Crown of Denmark in their integrity; it was impossible to restore those parts of the Duchies, at least, which were inhabited solely by Germans, because those people had become imbued meanwhile, not only with a stronger conviction of their rights, but with a more decided wish for separation from Denmark and for their existence as an independent State. I say, then, that this is a view of the question which has to be considered by Her Majesty's Government. The Emperor of the French has noticed it, partly because he favours the principle of nationality, and partly also because he has a very accurate knowledge of the state of Europe and the different countries of Europe. I say that if after what had occurred we had attempted to drive the German troops out of Holstein, and then had assembled the Diet of Holstein, there would have been an instant declaration in favour of independence by the Diet; and if we had been so unwise as to attempt to go to war we should have had to govern by military force, and subdue the German inhabitants of Holstein by force, in order to reduce them again under the dominion of the King of Denmark. That was a position which it did not become any English Government to take. But, I say, besides that, the question which the noble Earl has put—whether there was not a time when we might have said to the German Sovereigns that they must not enter into Holstein—although it is a question to which I conceive that two answers may be given, yet implied so much hazard, implied the danger of so great a war, was so encompassed by difficulties on every side, it was so likely to lead in the prevailing excitement and enthusiasm of Germany to a war, as my noble Friend has said, against the whole
  1176
  German people united, and the risks of that war, if we had gone into it without the assistance of France and Russia, were so great, that I think any English Government would hardly have been justified in coming before an English Parliament and an English people, and declaring that they had committed this country to all these dangers in the hope and on the chance that the threat might be successful, and that Germany might yield to it. If we had had to deal with the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna alone, I believe we should have found no difficulty in arriving at a peaceful solution of the question. I think that any one who is intimately acquainted with this subject, and even those who have gathered their information about it from a perusal of the papers, must have perceived that it was not much the wish of Prussia, and not at all the wish of Austria, to depart from the Treaty of 1852. On the contrary, it was with the greatest reluctance that the Cabinet of Vienna, after some ineffectual attempts to adhere to the treaty, made some proposition which should have satisfied anybody; but it was, I am convinced, with a very sincere reluctance that they gave the signal for a departure from a treaty to which they, in common with other Powers, had attached their signatures. Austria is not so adventurous in her spirit as to desire to meet danger without a necessity; and it is evident that it would hereafter be open to any one who proposed to depart from a treaty to say, "You departed from the Treaty of 1852, and how can you reproach us for doing the same thing?" Besides, when the German armies entered Schleswig, and when they took so much pride in the rejoicings of German nationalities, the Austrian Government was too cautious not to perceive that there were other nationalities whose pride might also be roused, and whose imitation of the example set by the inhabitants of Schleswig might be encouraged by the departure from the Treaty of 1852. It was, therefore, not because the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin desired to satisfy any ambitious project that they determined to depart from the treaty, but because they yielded to strong popular impulse; being determined, in the first place, not to allow the minor principalities to supplant them as leaders of the German Confederation, and, in the next place, because they dreaded the popular impulse and liberal tendency of the Democratic party in Germany. It was on these accounts they departed from the Treaty of

  1177
  1852. But, in addition to these reasons, I am convinced that the conduct of Russia has exercised considerable influence upon this question. I could not help remarking to the Ambassador how different was the conduct of the present Emperor from that of the Emperor Nicholas in the year 1848. I believe the reason of the change of the policy of the Russian Government to be attributable to a certain sympathy which I believe to exist on the part of Russia towards Austria and Prussia. They all dread the advance of popular democracy in Germany, and therefore they were willing to sacrifice Denmark to carry the popular party in Germany with them.
  Now, my Lords, having spoken at some length upon this question, I must say that, although it may be an easy topic for a personal attack, I believe any Government in our place would have experienced as great a difficulty as we did, considering the excited state of Germany, and the determination of Austria and Prussia rather to assume the direction of the storm than to resist its force. One of the most dogmatic writers ever known, Rousseau, has said very truly, "The science of Government is a science of combinations, applications, and exceptions, according to time, place, and circumstance." There is no invariable rule which you can follow upon all occasions. You cannot neglect time and circumstance, the popular feeling, or the disposition of different Courts; the means by which you can obtain your object may at one time be easy, and at another time difficult. There is a passage in M. Thiers' History of the Consulate and Empire, an example of this fact—which I think is pregnant with instruction for all of us. At the celebrated meeting between Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurt, these two monarchs entered into an agreement with respect to Spain; they determined that the Danubian Principalities should be transferred to the Emperor of Russia, and they decided also upon various other arrangements with respect to the different nations of Europe. By their conduct these two potentates would seem to have had the power of making any disposition of Europe which might have pleased them. What, however, became of those arrangements. Like other projects of the moment they were destined never to be realized. If those two mighty monarchs were unable to carry out the arrangement upon which they agreed, is it at all wonderful that so artificial a Treaty as that of 1852, by
  1178
  which a people had its then future Government decided upon without being consulted, should be found impossible to maintain? The noble Earl has charged us with having no guiding principle in connection with our foreign policy. There is one principle which is as capable of general application as it is useful to mankind, and that is the non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Therefore it was that when, I soon after I first accepted the seals of the Foreign Office, the question of Italy came before us: Her Majesty's Government decided to leave the people of Italy free to dispose of their own destinies—they said that they were the best judges of the Government they would have. That declaration, following the declarations of the Emperor of the French, completely decided the question, and no attempt has since been made to disturb the unity and independence of Italy, which Her Majesty's Government rejoiced to see established. In reference to the great civil struggle now going on in America, there have been from time to time great exhibitions of sympathy on one side or the other, and I cannot but perceive that there exists on the other side of the House the strongest sympathy with the Southern States—the strongest desire to allow the Confederate States to have the greatest advantage in the present contest. This feeling was even so obvious that when men attempted, contrary to Her Majesty's proclamation of neutrality, and contrary to their duty, to consent to the fitting out of expeditions on behalf of Confederates from Liverpool and other ports, those attempts were evidently viewed by the other side of the House with a considerable amount of sympathy. But Her Majesty's Government proceeded on the principle of right—upon the principle of duty towards both belligerents. They took care that such expeditions should not sail—they took care that such vessels should be seized—and if they had not been seized I feel fully convinced that we should now be engaged in war with the Northern States. I have stated the course we have pursued upon general principles; I have stated the course which we have pursued in regard to Germany and Denmark; and if I am obliged to plead to the indictment that has been brought against us, all I can say is that we are guilty of endeavouring to promote peace, that we are guilty of endeavouring to maintain justice, and that we are guilty of promoting freedom in Europe and throughout the world.
  EARL GREY: My Lords, if after the protracted discussions which have taken place, and at this late hour, I venture to trespass upon your Lordships, it is because there are one or two points to which I think your Lordships' attention should be more particularly directed. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde) objects to the terms of the Resolutions, and denies that the just influence of the country has been lowered, because, he says, the influence of a country depends upon its power, and that we at this moment possess a finer fleet and a finer army than we ever possessed at any former time. I would submit to my noble Friend that the influence and power of a country do not depend merely upon physical power. Even with respect to an army, Napoleon said the moral power was more important than the physical. It is still more important among nations; and our just influence and power depend not only upon fleets and armies, but upon the respect and goodwill borne towards us by other nations. I ask your Lordships, Does this country at this moment enjoy the respect and goodwill of the other nations of the world to the same extent as formerly? I ask you whether, as a matter of fact, that is the case or not? My noble Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster indeed denied that this country had fallen in the estimation of other nations, and found great fault with a noble Lord on this side who contended that it has, because he referred to the foreign newspapers in proof of his statement. I have yet to learn that the newspapers of the day are not to be regarded as indications of the popular feeling. But the fact of our having lost character in the eyes of the civilized world does not rest only upon the authority of newspapers. I am sure none of your Lordships are so ignorant of what is now going on in Europe as not to know that the character of this country does stand so well with other nations as it used to do, and as it ought. My noble Friend (Lord Clarendon) himself admitted that there had been a coolness between the French Government and that of England, and he traced to that coolness some of the misfortunes which have occurred. We know that Russia is ill-disposed towards us—we know that Germany is exceedingly irritated against us—and Denmark, which has such bitter reason to rue our professed friendship, entertains towards us almost as much animosity as against the Germans themselves. That
  1180
  we are not regarded with goodwill and respect either by the Governments or by the people of other nations is too notorious to be disputed, and is proved by the very despatches which have been laid on your table. I am convinced that such a state of things cannot have been brought about without some fault on the part of our own Government. No nation falls into such general odium and disrepute without being itself to blame; and I do not think we have to go far to find the causes which have brought us to this unhappy position. My noble Friend (Lord Clarendon) has acknowledged that what happened with respect to Poland produced a coolness between our Government and that of France, and to this coolness the unhappy issue of the negotiations in which we have since been engaged is mainly to be attributed. But our failure with respect to Poland was the inevitable result of the policy we pursued. That policy seems, therefore, to have been the first great error of the Government. It was defended on a former evening by my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, upon the ground that the Government had only followed with respect to Polish affairs the course chalked for them by that which had been pursued in somewhat similar circumstances in 1831. I ventured at the moment, speaking from memory, to deny the accuracy of that statement. Upon referring to the authentic documents which describe the policy of 1831–2. I find I might have made my denial still stronger, and that the policy of the British Government with respect to the Polish war of 1831, instead of affording a precedent for my noble Friend's policy in 1863, was in every respect the reverse of it. I would remind your Lordships that in 1831, while the Polish war was still raging, an application was made to our Government by that of France to join in a proposal to Russia for an immediate suspension of arms, with a view to negotiations for the purpose of re-establishing peace between the contending parties by some lasting arrangement. Remember that in 1831 the war in Poland was a different affair from what it now is. Then the insurgents held the capital for a considerable time, and they had a regular army and a regular Government with whom we could treat. None of these things existed in 1863; and, as Lord Ellen borough justly observed, if we had proposed a suspension of arms there was no one to treat with. Yet how was the proposal made by France in 1831 received by

  1181
  the English Government? The answer to the note presented by Prince Talleyrand was written by Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, and if it bad been written last year against what we then did, it could not have stated the objections to our policy more clearly. In this note Lord Palmerston pointed out to Prince Talleyrand that a simple offer of mediation would certainly be refused by Russia, and that it could not be expedient to make a proposal which there was no ground to hope would be accepted, and which, if refused, would leave to the two Governments the embarrassing alternative of either acquiescing in a rejection of their proposal or of taking measures to enforce it by means of a more direct and effectual interference. As the British Government were not prepared to adopt the latter course he declined to agree to the French proposal. Your Lordships will perceive that in 1831 the British Government refused to adopt the very course that has now been taken, and for the reasons which were urged against it when this subject was brought before the House last year. A Government ought not to take a step of such importance without considering beforehand what it may lead to. In this case the alternative of acquiescence was chosen, and it was decided not to go to war. Thus the very evil foreseen in 1831 has presented itself now. In 1831–2 no formal remonstrance was addressed to the Russian Sovereign on behalf of his Polish subjects; and Lord Palmerston instructed Lord Durham, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to touch upon the subject of Poland with great delicacy, because it was not consistent with the power and dignity of the British Empire to insist too strongly upon points, which, if refused, it might be inexpedient, if not impossible, to support by force of arms. Lord Durham, in reply, said, that in pursuance of these instructions he had abstained from presenting any note upon the subject of Poland to the Russian Minister, saying, that he knew such a note would only lead to a formal repetition of the justice of our reasoning, and that he feared the publicity of our interference would oblige the Emperor of Russia either to take steps of additional severity or to postpone any conciliatory measures he might contemplate towards the Poles, in order to prove to his Russian subjects that he was not controlled in what they consider the administration of their internal affairs by a Foreign Power, I cannot help thinking that that was a
  1182
  wiser course than sending irritating remonstrances to Russia, and, above all, wiser than publishing those remonstrances for general information. What has been the effect? In the first place it encouraged the Poles to continue the war—next it irritated Russia—and lastly it proved to Germany that we could use strong language without any intention of following it up by forcible measures. That was the lesson taught to Germany; and the consequence was that in the autumn of last year we entered on those negotiations under extreme disadvantages. After all that has been said, I certainly shall not trouble your Lordships with further references to the long and complicated Correspondence. It is enough to say that according to the statement of Her Majesty's Government themselves, it has ended in a triumph of might over right. We resisted that oppression by what, at least, must be called very strong language. Some will have it that we did too much, others that we did too little. In my own judgment we did too little, and we asked too much. It is the great fault of this Correspondence that Her Majesty's Government went on too long insisting on the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852, and the arrangements which may be considered as forming part of that treaty. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) has told us that the treaty has long ceased to be a practical question; and the noble Earl says that it was an artificial treaty. According to both their statements—which are quite true—the Government ought to have foreseen that the treaty could not be maintained. They went on, however, maintaining it in words, while at the same time they did nothing to support it. If the treaty were so defective (as I think it was) the Government would have been wiser if they bad earlier accepted the necessities of the case, and had endeavoured to form some arrangement more acceptable to Germany. After twelve years' vain attempts to get the parties to agree upon the meaning of this treaty, and the manner in which it could be best carried into execution, it ought to have been seen that it was impracticable in its character. Moreover, it bad the inherent vice of being framed in total forgetfulness of the principle that all Governments, whether great or small, exist only for the benefit of the governed; and it affected to dispose of the Duchies and to regulate their future, not with a view to the welfare of their inhabitants, but according to the supposed interests of Europe,

  1183
  and to the claims to the Duchies (as if they had been private property) possessed by certain Princes, according to the antiquated principles of feudal law. Little foresight was needed to see that such a treaty could not be permanently maintained, and if Her Majesty's Government had earlier suggested that it should be revised, so as to effect an arrangement fair and just to all parties, they would have placed themselves on irresistible ground, and they would have been able to say that the arbitration of the sword must be postponed until all attempts to settle the question by peaceable means had failed. It is said of those who impugn the conduct of Her Majesty's Government that they are supporters of a warlike policy. I altogether deny the justice of that reproach. One of my objections to the policy of Her Majesty's Government is, that in their over anxiety for peace they have acted in a manner which has in fact exposed the nation to greater danger of ultimate war. The noble Earl the Secretary of State himself admitted distinctly that the securities for peace are diminished; and can any one look at the existing state of Europe without seeing that such is the fact? By the license given to this one unprincipled act of aggression they have destroyed men's faith in treaties and in the existing public law of Europe; they have set loose ambitious desires, and already the air is full of rumours of schemes for spoliation and unprincipled aggrandizement. To suppose that this state of things can continue without involving us in danger of war is absurd. We have been told that we ought never to go to war unless our own interests are immediately affected. I, for one, entirely contest that principle. I am persuaded that if we lay it down as a rule to act upon simply selfish considerations, and never to interfere unless our own interests are affected, whatever schemes of spoliation and aggression are entertained by other nations, giving free scope to that unprincipled ambition by which the councils of nations are too frequently guided, wrong and violence will prevail without check; and if we ourselves should become their object, in the day of our necessity we must expect the rule we have applied to others to be applied to us, and we shall meet with no sympathy or support in any quarter, because we have deliberately withheld our aid from the weak when threatened with oppression. I do not mean to say that we should undertake the general redress of all
  1184
  cases of injustice. Far from it. The circumstances of each case must be taken into account, and it must be considered whether we can interfere with advantage. But the power which we possess and the station which we occupy impose on us the sacred duty of maintaining, as far as we are able, the principles of justice in the international relations of Europe. Looking at the condition of Schleswig before the invasion, it was in the enjoyment of undisturbed peace. There was no serious attempt at resistance to the authority of the Danish Government. But it was perfectly clear that once we allowed the German troops to enter Schleswig, under cover of their presence a system of agitation would be got up which must make it practically impossible to bring about a satisfactory settlement. That is the noble Earl's reason for not interfering now, and I admit its force. It was shown from the first that that difficulty would occur, and therefore I say that that was a reason for our interfering earlier and preventing a state of things arising, in which we are powerless to undo the evil that has been done. But we are told that it was impossible for us even at an earlier period to interfere with effect, that we could not make war against united Germany for the defence of Schleswig, There would have been no question of war. It would have been a question whether Germany should make war upon us. ["Oh, oh!" and "Hear, hear!"] It is not an immaterial difference, and you feel that it is not an immaterial difference at this moment. If you now wanted to assist Denmark you must make an offensive war, and drive the Germans out; and that would be a very difficult operation. But while the Danish army was unbroken, while the strong fortifications were in existence, while Sweden was ready to stand by you, I say that it was not an operation of such great difficulty that we should maintain a defensive position which Germany would be slow to attack. My noble Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy asked how it was possible that we could act at sea, or how we could send a fleet into the Baltic, which was frozen up. I have inquired of very high authority, and I am informed that at that season of the year, when peace is preserved, there is a regular trade in cattle from the west coast of Schleswig to England, which is carried on by large steamers with the utmost facility; and that we had at that

  1185
  time means quite sufficient to have sent between 20,000 and 30,000 men to assist the Danes and Swedes in maintaining a very narrow frontier, of which both the flanks would have been perfectly secure. It would then have been a question whether the Germans would attack us; and I think that the statements of my noble Friends themselves go far to prove that they would not. Because, what has my noble Friend the Secretary of State just told you? He has told you that Austria went very reluctantly into this whole scheme of policy, and that although yielding to Prussia she saw very well the dangers which she was encountering, and the difficult questions which she was starting. I believe that that is perfectly true. I believe that Austria, under the vain delusion that by acting in this manner she would hereafter secure for herself support in defending Venetia, has reluctantly followed Prussia into this scheme. But if she was reluctant to enter into it when she knew that there was no danger from us, is it likely that she would have gone into it if she had known that she would have to attack us? My noble Friend has said that Austria was afraid of disturbing Hungary and Venetia; that she was afraid of the state of her finances. All that is perfectly true; but all those arguments go far to prove that there was not the slightest danger of her venturing upon offensive operations if we had firmly maintained a defensive position. I am not prepared to say that there would not have been some small risk in pursuing such a policy; but in the affairs of nations it is always a question of comparative risk; and I firmly believe, looking at the present state of affairs, that the risk which you have actually incurred is far greater than that which you would have run by following a more decided and more manly policy. But if that was not your intention—if you had made up your minds not to go to war, then I say that it is perfectly clear that you ought not to have used the language which you did. My noble Friend has referred at great length to the text of the various despatches to show that we made no promises to Denmark. I quite agree with my noble Friend that we did not in so many words make any promise that we would interfere: but I ask any fair and impartial man—I ask those of your Lordships who were present when my noble Friend the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde) spoke this evening, whether there
  1186
  can be a doubt, taking the whole course of the Correspondence, that the conduct of our Government was such as to create expectations in the mind of that of Denmark that assistance would be rendered to them. The same is the case with regard to our threats to Germany. My noble Friend said that there were no threats, only warnings. I think that the distinction is a nice one—when warnings are accompanied by language such as that which was used by Her Majesty's Government, it is hardly possible to distinguish them from threats. These reasons satisfy me that, in point of fact, the Resolution which has been moved is completely in accordance with the truth. It is true that the influence of the country has been diminished, and that that has been the result of the Foreign policy of the Government. The noble Marquess said that even if that was true it ought not to be asserted by such a Resolution as this. It appears to me that if the country has been lowered in the eyes of the world by the policy of the Government, the best course that can be adopted to relieve us, as far as possible, from the stain upon our national reputation, is to show that in this matter the Government, who were intrusted with the guidance of the national affairs, have not truly represented the feelings and the will of the nation, and it is only by the two Houses of Parliament that that can be shown. On that ground I think that the Resolution is one which we ought to adopt. It might, perhaps, in some respects have been better worded; but I think it expresses a correct judgment as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and that—a matter to which I attach importance—without expressing any confidence in their political opponents. With regard to the Amendment proposed by my noble Friend (the Marquess of Clanricarde), I cannot help observing that it seems to me utterly inconsistent with the speech which was made in support of it. It only regrets that Denmark was led to expect aid from the English Government; but a good part of the speech of my noble Friend went to show that at one time aid might properly have been afforded. If it had been afforded, no harm would have arisen from the raising of those expectations, and, therefore, the Amendment of my noble Friend is by implication a decided approval of that very timid policy which part of his speech denounced. It is a censure of Her Majesty's Government quite as distinct as that conveyed by the

  1187
  Resolution. I do not know whether he intends to press that Amendment, because as a Vote of Censure it can hardly be adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and as a censure upon wrong grounds it is not likely to be accepted this side of the House. Therefore, I trust that my noble Friend will not press it, but will allow us to divide, "Contents" or "Not-Contents," upon the Motion originally submitted to the House.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, when I make a promise that I will be brief I do not like to break it; and I certainly have no great temptation to do so on the present occasion, because, if I think it hardly necessary to answer at great length the speech of my noble Friend the noble Earl who has with such admirable impartiality objected to everything and everybody in the House; on the other hand, I am so well satisfied with the course of this debate that, although speeches proverbially have not very great influence upon the votes of Peers, particularly of those Peers who are absent from the House, I believe that the statements, facts, and arguments which have been adduced on this side of the House will have the greatest possible effect in showing to the country how futile are the accusations which have been brought against Her Majesty's Government. I shall, therefore, only say a few words with regard to the reasons why I ask your Lordships not to agree to the second Resolution of the noble Earl opposite, or to the Amendment proposed by my noble Friend the noble Marquess. With regard to the Amendment, if the facts were as described, I see no Parliamentary objection to its form; but I do think that what we have heard to-night shows that the facts are not as my noble Friend has stated them. I need hardly trouble your Lordships by again alluding to the speech which was made by Lord Palmerston last year, when he said he concurred entirely with Mr. FitzGerald and all reasonable men in Europe in desiring that the independence and integrity of Denmark might be maintained. When Lord Palmerston made that statement he knew that the great Powers of Europe were co-signataries of a treaty declaring it to be of the utmost importance that the integrity and independence of Denmark should be preserved, and could hardly fail to suppose, at the time he made that speech, that they would join with England in resisting any attempt to destroy that independence. It is, I
  1188
  may add, absurd to contend that the remonstrances addressed by the Government to Germany amounted to a threat that this country would go to war for Denmark; and it is hardly creditable that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) should make the assertion which he has done, to the effect that Denmark had been deluded, in the face of the fact stated by my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the Danish Minister admitted that such was not the case. For these reasons I hope your Lordships will not agree to the Amendment; while, with regard to the substantive Resolution before us, I would say that if the noble Earl who has just spoken (Earl Grey) had not so entirely found fault with it, I should have supposed he had a hand in framing it, from my knowledge of his tactics. I recollect the noble Earl having on one occasion pointed out the advantage of having no meaning in the terms of a Vote of Censure, inasmuch as all the soft Members of the House might in consequence be induced to vote for it; and I can have no doubt that this Resolution, in that respect at all events, completely meets his views, inasmuch as there seems to me to be no policy or principle involved in it. It is, however, intended as a Vote of Censure, and in that light we accept it. The noble Earl who introduced it to our notice blames us for having, as he says, blown hot and cold—but what, I would ask, has been the policy of the Opposition? The noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Argyll) read a remarkable extract from a speech made by Lord Derby last year, in which he went further even than the declaration of my noble Friend at the head of the Government, and said that the independence and the integrity of Denmark were of vital importance to this country. We have heard that speeches have been made in another place by the leaders of a party of a very peaceable character, who have described war as insanity; and we have had allegations made to-night against the pacific policy of the Government. I listened with the greatest attention to the speech of the noble Earl who opened this discussion, and the only suggestions which I heard him make were, that we should have demanded from Germany a definition of the word nationality—a definition which I have no doubt a German Professor would be glad to give him at any length, but which would not, I think, contribute much to the integrity of Denmark—that we had not

  1189
  used language strong enough towards Germany at a particular juncture, and that we should have entered on military operations at a moment when owing to the nature of the weather they must have been singularly useless. Now, if that be not blaming the Government for being too peaceable and not sufficiently warlike I do not know the meaning of plain English. With respect to another point with which fault has been found with the Government—namely, the refusal to enter a Congress on European matters—I venture to say that there is hardly a Member of this House who does not believe that refusal was right. It is said, however, that it was couched in terms discourteous to the Emperor of the French; but I have never yet heard a sentence quoted to establish the justice of that charge. As regards the Conference, there has been a sort of general sneering on the other side with respect to it; but I do not know whether noble Lords opposite really object to our having gone into it or not; but it is, at all events, very remarkable that, with their acute minds, they have not been able to detect a single flaw in the very difficult discussions which took place while it lasted. Certainly they have not objected to our efforts to obtain a suspension of hostilities. As to the allegation that we have lost our just influence in Europe, I, for one, do not believe in the truth of that statement. I feel, on the contrary, that we have maintained an influence. There was the most perfect harmony and concord among the neutral Powers throughout the sitting of the Conference; we parted on the most amicable terms—nay, more, the agreement between us was greater in reference to our policy in this matter than before. This is, I think, better proof that we continue to maintain our just influence in Europe than can be found in reading a few extracts from newspapers, which may represent the daily feeling of the people of the places in which they are published, but which can hardly form a ground on which to base your Lordships' decision in this important subject. It is natural that certain parties in Italy and Germany should wish to see us involved in war with the hope that they may gain some advantages regardless of the difficulties in which we might be involved. And as regards France, though I have not the slightest complaint to make against the Emperor, nevertheless the French people will, I think, be more than human if, with their feelings towards this
  1190
  country, they did not see with satisfaction England embarking alone in a war—a circumstance which might give them a great political pre-eminence and a commercial advantage. But these facts did not at nil go to prove that we have lost our just influence in the councils of Europe. I do trust that this House will not give an opinion which I believe myself to be a false one. We cannot possibly have any official information as to the exact state of public opinion with regard to us on the Continent of Europe; and even if, contrary to my belief, the opinion which we are asked to express were perfectly true—neither in a national nor a public-spirited sense is it desirable that this House should publicly complain of the degradation of the country in the terms proposed by the noble Earl.
  On Question, That the words proposed to be loft out stand part of the Motion? their Lordships divided—

  Contents (Present)

  119

  (Proxies)

  58

  177

  Non-Contents (Present)

  123

  (Proxies)

  45

  168

  Majority

  9

  Resolved in the Affirmative.
  Then the said original Motion agreed to.

  CONTENTS

  (PRESENT.)

  Beaufort, D.

  Grey, E.

  Buckingham and Chandos, D.

  Hardwicke, E.

  Harewood, E.

  Manchester, D.

  Home, E.

  Marlborough, D.

  Lucan, E.

  Richmond, D.

  Macclesfield, E.

  Rutland, D.

  Malmesbury, E.

  Mansfield, E.

  Abercorn, M.

  Manvers, E.

  Bath, M.

  Mayo, E.

  Exeter, M.

  Mount Edgcumbe, E.

  Hastings, M.

  Nelson, E.

  Salisbury, M.

  Orkney, E.

  Pomfret, E.

  Abergavenny, E.

  Portarlington, E.

  Amherst, E.

  Powis, E.

  Aylesford, E.

  Romney, E.

  Bandon, E.

  Rosse, E.

  Bantry, E.

  Rosslyn, E.

  Belmore, E.

  Sandwich, E.

  Brooke and Warwick, E.

  Selkirk, E.

  Cardigan, E.

  Shrewsbury, E.

  Carnarvon, E.

  Stanhope, E.

  Cathcart, E.

  Stradbroke, E.

  Cawdor, E.

  Verulam, E.

  Coventry, E.

  Westmoreland, E.

  De La Warr, E.

  Wilton, E.

  Devon, E.

  Winchilsea and Nottingham, E.

  Graham, E. (D. Montrose).

  1191

  Canterbury, V.

  Dunsandle and Clanconal, L.

  Clancarty, V. (E. Clancarty).

  Dunsany, L.

  De Vesci, V.

  Egerton, L.

  Hardinge, V.

  Farnham, L.

  Hawarden, V. [Teller.]

  Feversham, L.

  Hill, V.

  Grantley, L.

  Hood, V.

  Grinstead, L. (E. Enniskillen)

  Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore).

  Heytesbury, L.

  Melville, V.

  Inchiquin, L.

  Sidmouth, V.

  Kingsdown, L.

  Leconfield, L.

  Oxford, Bp.

  Lovel and Holland, L. (E. Egmont).

  Abinger, L.

  Northwick, L.

  Arundell of Wardour, L.

  Polwarth, L.

  Bagot, L.

  Raglan, L.

  Bateman, L.

  Ravensworth, L.

  Berwick, L.

  Rayleigh, L.

  Bolton, L.

  Redesdale, L.

  Boston, L.

  Sheffield, L. (E. Sheffield).

  Chelmsford, L.

  Churston, L.

  Sherborne, L.

  Clements, L. (E. Leitrim).

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford).

  Clifton, L. (E. Darnley).

  Skelmersdale, L.

  Clinton, L.

  Sondes, L.

  Clonbrock, L.

  Southampton, L.

  Colchester, L.

  Stewart of Garlies, L. (E. Galloway).

  Colville of Culross, L. [Teller.]

  St. John of Bletso, L.

  Conyers, L.

  Templemore, L.

  Crofton, L.

  Tenterden, L.

  Denman, L.

  Thurlow, L.

  De Ros, L.

  Tredegar, L.

  De Saumarez, L.

  Walsingham, L.

  Digby, L.

  Wynford, L.

  Dinevor, L.

  (PROXIES.)

  Cleveland, D.

  St. Vincent, V.

  Northumberland, D.

  Strathallan, V.

  Tweeddale, M.

  Bangor, Bp.

  Winchester, M.

  Berners, L.

  Beverley, E.

  Blantyre, L.

  Bradford, E.

  Blayney, L.

  Buckinghamshire, E.

  Braybooke, L.

  Cadogan, E.

  Castlemaine, L.

  Chesterfield, E.

  Clanbrassill, L. (E. Roden).

  Derby, E.

  Desart, E.

  Clarini, L.

  Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry).

  Cloncurry, L.

  Delamere, L.

  Dormer, L.

  Erne, E.

  Dunfermline, L.

  Hillsborough, E. (M. Downshire).

  Forester, L.

  Hawke, L.

  Howe, E.

  Kilmaine, L.

  Huntingdon, E.

  Lilford, L.

  Morton, E.

  Middleton, L.

  Mount Cashell, E.

  Moore, L. (M. Drogheda).

  Onslow, E.

  Stamford and Warrington, E.

  Petre, L.

  Plunkett, L. (Bp. Tuam, &c.

  Tankerville, E.

  Vane, E.

  Rodney, L.

  Rollo, L.

  Bangor, V.

  Ross, L. (E. Glasgow).

  Doneraile, V.

  Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown).

  Lifford, V.

  1192

  Saltoun, L.

  Wemyss, L. (E. Wemyss).

  Stourton, L.

  Strathspey, L. (E. Seafield).

  Wharncliffe, L.

  Wigan, L. (E. Crawford and Balcarres).

  Tyrone, L. (M. Waterford).

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  (PRESENT.)

  Westbury, L. (L. Chancellor).

  Chester, Bp.

  Cork, Bp.

  Down, &c., Bp.

  Armagh, Archbp.

  Ely, Bp.

  Gloucester and Bristol, Bp.

  Devonshire, D.

  Grafton D.

  Hereford, Bp.

  Saint Albans, D.

  Lincoln, Bp.

  Somerset, D.

  London, Bp.

  Sutherland, D.

  Ripon, Bp.

  Wellington, D.

  Abercromby, L.

  Ailesbury, M.

  Annaly, L.

  Anglesey, M.

  Aveland L.

  Bristol, M.

  Belper, L.

  Camden, M.

  Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery).

  Lansdowne, M.

  Normanby, M.

  Calthorpe, L.

  Townshend, M.

  Camoys, L.

  Westminster, M.

  Carew, L.

  Chesham, L.

  Abingdon, E.

  Churchill, L.

  Airlie, E.

  Clandeboye, L. (L. Dufferin and Claneboye).

  Albemarle, E.

  Caithness, E.

  Clanwilliam, L.(E. Clanwilliam).

  Camperdown, E.

  Chichester, E.

  Congleton, L.

  Cranworth, L.

  Clarendon, E.

  Dartrey, L. (L. Cremorne).

  Cowper, E.

  De Grey, E.

  De Mauley, L.

  Ducie, E.

  De Tabley, L.

  Durham, E.

  Ebury, L.

  Effingham, E.

  Foley, L. [Teller.]

  Essex, E.

  Gardner, L.

  Fitzwilliam, E.

  Harris, L.

  Fortescue, E.

  Hatherton, L.

  Granville, E.

  Houghton, L.

  Harrowby, E.

  Hunsdon, L. (V. Falkland).

  Lichfield, E.

  Lovelace, E.

  Keane, L.

  Minto, E.

  Leigh, L.

  Morley, E.

  Lismore, L. (V. Lismore).

  Portsmouth, E.

  Llanover, L.

  Russell, E.

  Lyttelton, L.

  Saint Germans, E.

  Lyveden, L.

  Shaftesbury, E.

  Methuen, L.

  Sommers, E.

  Minster, L. (M. Conyngham).

  Spencer, E.

  Strafford, E.

  Monson, L.

  Suffolk and Berkshire, E.

  Mont Eagle, L. (M. Sligo).

  Yarborough, E.

  Monteagle of Brandon, L.

  Zetland, E.

  Mostyn, L.

  Eversley, V.

  Overstone, L.

  Falmouth, V.

  Panmure, L. (E. Dalhousie).

  Leinster, V. (D. Leinster).

  Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough). [Teller.]

  Stratford de Redcliffe, V.

  Sydney, V.

  Rivers, L.

  Torrington, V.

  Sandys, L.

  Saye and Sele, L.

  Carlisle, Bp.

  Seaton, L.

  1193

  Sefton, L. (E. Sefton).

  Talbot de Malahide, L.

  Seymour, L. (E. St. Maur).

  Taunton, L.

  Truro, L.

  Somerhill, L. (M. Clanricarde).

  Vaux of Harrowden, L.

  Vivian, L.

  Stafford, L.

  Wensleydale, L.

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  Wentworth, L. (V. Ockham).

  Stratheden, L.

  Suffield, L.

  Wodehouse, L.

  Sundridge, L. (D. Argyll.

  Wrottesley, L.

  (PROXIES.)

  York, Archbp.

  Byron, L.

  Charlemont, L. (E. Charlemont).

  Newcastle, D.

  Portland, D.

  Chaworth, L. (E. Meath).

  Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

  Northampton, M.

  De Freyne, L.

  Dorchester, L.

  Brownlow, E.

  Erskine, L.

  Carlisle, E.

  Fingall L. (E. Fingall).

  Cowley, E.

  Fitzhardinge, L.

  Gainsborough E.

  Gifford, L.

  Ilchester, E.

  Howard de Walden, L.

  Innes, E. (D. Roxburghe).

  Kenlis, L. (M. Head fort).

  Kenmare, L. (E. Kenmare).

  Lindsay, E.

  Radnor, E.

  Kintore, L. (E. Kintore).

  Scarbrough, E.

  Londesborough, L.

  Lovat, L.

  Bath and Wells, Bp.

  Lurgan, L.

  Durham, Bp.

  Manners, L.

  Manchester, Bp.

  Mendip, L. (V. Clifden).

  Rochester, Bp.

  Poltimore, L.

  Salisbury, Bp.

  Stuart de Decies, L.

  St. Asaph, Bp.

  Sudeley, L.

  Worcester, Bp.

  Vernon, L.

  Wenlock, L.

  Broughton, L.

PROTEST
Against the EARL OF MALMESBURY'S Resolutions relating to Denmark.
Die Veneris, 8 Julii, 1864.
Dissentient,
Because the Second Resolution implies, although in vague and ambiguous language, that the Duty of upholding the Integrity and Independence of Denmark was incumbent on the Government of Great Britain more than on the other Powers who were Signataries to the Treaty of London of May, 1852:
Because this implied assertion has no foundation in fact, and no justification in policy:
Because the said Second Resolution farther implies, in a like ambiguous manner, that the Integrity and Independence of Denmark, if they could not be upheld by Negotiation, ought to have been upheld by the Arms of Great Britain alone:
Because any Resolution to this effect ought to be expressed distinctly, and in specific Terms:
Because the said Second Resolution affirms that the just Influence of Great Britain has been lowered in the Councils of Europe, without stating any fact, or giving any reason to justify this assertion:
Because such an assertion, made in such Terms, by this House, is in itself injurious to the Public interests, and is in the highest degree unwise and inexpedient.

SUNDRIDGE

FOLEY

RUSSELL

MOSTYN

SHAFTFSBURY

FORTESCUE

ST. GERMANS

LLANOVER

LEINSTER

EVERSLEY

DEVONSHIRE for the 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th reasons

GRANVILLE

METHUEN

HARROWBY

WICKLOW

OVERSTONE.

ANNALY

House adjourned at a quarter past Two o'clock, A.M., to Monday next, half past Eleven o'clock.