Sitting of 11 April 1864

MINUTES
NEW MEMBER SWORN—The Right Honourable Edward Cardwell,for Oxford City.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Scientific Institutions (Dublin).
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—ARMY ESTIMATES.
PUBLIC BILLS — Ordered— Church Building and New Parishes Acts.
First Reading—Thames Conservancy * [Bill 60]; Church Building and New Parishes Acts Amendment* [Bill 61].
Second Reading—Common Law Procedure (Ireland) Act (1853) Amendment * [Bill 43].
Referred to Select Committee—Government Annuities [Bill 11], Adjourned Debate [17th March] resumed.
Third Reading— Warehousing of British Spirits* [Bill 54], and passed.

THE HIGHWAYS ACT.—QUESTION.
MR. LIDDELLsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to move for the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry into the operation of the Highways Act, previous to introducing further legislation on the subject, or any amendments of the said Act?
SIR GEORGE GREY, in. reply, said, he thought an inquiry would be desirable before they attempted to make any ex-

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tensive change in the law relating to Highways; but although the Act was in operation in a great many parts of the kingdom, yet it had not been so for a sufficiently long period to test its effects. He was, therefore, afraid that an inquiry by a Committee would necessarily be an imperfect one, owing to the want of experience of the working of the measure. He could not, therefore, propose a Committee of Inquiry in the present Session. The amended Bill, which he hoped to introduce, would not be an extensive measure, but only intended to remedy some defects found to exist in certain districts of the country, and which were said to interfere with the useful operation of the law.

DENMARK AND GERMANY—THE CON FERENCE.— QUESTION.
MR. HORSMAN: Sir, I have a question to put to the noble Lord at the head of the Government with respect to the coming Conference on the affairs of Denmark. I assume that in the Conference our representative may undertake certain engagements on the part of England which will not be valid until ratified by the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative under the advice of its responsible Ministers. The question I have to ask is, Whether Ministers, before they determine upon the advice they shall give to the Crown, will submit such engagements to the consideration of Parliament, so as to obtain the consent of Parliament before they advise their ratification by the Crown?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, my right hon. Friend is no doubt well aware that, in a mixed Constitution like ours, each branch has its separate functions, though those functions are very often so interwoven with one another that it is very difficult to draw a definite line between them. Nothing but great forbearance on the part of each branch enables the aggregate whole to work harmoniously as a Government. But there are matters in respect to which the line is distinct, precise, understood, and acknowledged. Such is the case with regard to the functions of negotiating and making treaties with Foreign Powers. That function is known to be distinctly with the Crown, acting under the advice of its responsible Ministers; and if the case should arise which is contemplated by my right hon. Friend, of which I am not at all aware, we should deem it our duty to adhere
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strictly to the spirit and practice of the Constitution.
MR. HORSMAN: I hope the noble Lord will excuse me, but I am afraid I have not made my question quite intelligible. I know, of course, that the Government would adhere, in whatever course they may adopt, to the principles and practice of the Constitution; but my question has reference to the practice of the Constitution so far as this, that the Crown exercises its prerogative under the advice of its responsible Ministers, and that those Ministers act under the control and advice of Parliament. I therefore wish to know whether Her Majesty's Ministers, before tendering their advice to the Crown, will give Parliament an opportunity of considering it?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I thought my answer went precisely to that point. It is not the practice, nor is it in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, that the Crown should ask the advice of its Parliament with respect to engagements which it may be advised are proper to be contracted. I ought, perhaps, to have added something with regard to the question of my right hon. Friend, whether, if the Plenipotentiary of England in the Conference should agree to certain engagements which would afterwards have to be ratified by the Crown, Parliament would be consulted between those two events. My right hon. Friend must be aware, that by international usage, the only ground upon which a Sovereign can refuse to ratify engagements made by a duly authorized Plenipotentiary, acting of course upon instructions, is that he has entered into such engagements either without instructions or against instructions. There is a Conference to be held in London, and it is not to be supposed that my noble Friends who are to represent this country will act either without instructions or against instructions.
MR. HORSMAN: Is there any case of exceeding instructions?
VISCOUT PALMERSTON: If a Plenipotentiary goes beyond his instructions he does that which is not authorized by his instructions, and therefore he acts either without instructions or against instructions.

THE ARMY ESTIMATES.—NOTICE.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he wished to give notice, that in the event of his not being able to get Votes to-night

789
in Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates, he should ask the House to pass a Vote on account to-morrow evening.
LORD HOTHAMsaid, he wished to know whether the noble Lord intended to limit himself to-morrow night to asking for a Vote on account, or whether he proposed to take his chance of the double event of getting a Vote in Supply and taking a Vote on account?
THE MARQUESS HARTINGTONsaid, they hoped to be able to get a Vote in Supply that night, but if they were not able to do so, he would ask the House to give them a Vote on account.

GOVERNMENT ANNUITIES BILL— [BILL 11].

  COMMITTEE. ADJOURNED DEBATE.
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [17th March], "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair;" and which Amendment was, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words" The Bill be committed to a Select Committee," — (Sir Minto Farquhar,)—instead thereof.
  Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  Debate résumed.
  MR. AYRTONsaid, he should be glad to promote any proceeding which might lead to practical legislation on the subject of Insurances for the working classes, but the question before the House was not whether they should legislate for the evils that had long existed in regard to the conduct of Assurance Societies, but whether they should at once pass the Bill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer without any inquiry, and without satisfying themselves by any authentic means or evidence of the reasonable character and necessity for passing that Bill. He was in favour of the proposition of the hon. Gentleman opposite for a Select Committee. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had thought proper to make important statements involving very grave imputations upon existing institutions. No doubt hon. Members connected with those institutions would be able to defend whatever admitted of defence in the conduct of their affairs, but he was bound to ask himself whether, supposing the statements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer were true, they afforded
  790
  any reason for the Bill under consideration. Supposing, as stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, there had been an immense collapse of Life Assurance Companies within the last eighteen years, it only proved that there had been great eagerness to carry on that business; for, besides that great collapse, no less than 220 companies were projected in the same time, and did not even take root so far as to be regarded as having been founded. It proved that thousands of persons had been ready to embark in business of assurance of all kinds, but the market was so overstocked by the companies already formed, of standing and position, that they were not able to obtain sufficient custom to keep them alive. But if that was so, what necessity was there for the Government to interfere in that business? The right hon. Gentleman said that many of these societies conducted their business badly, but he really had not entered sufficiently into the merits of the question. Many Assurance Societies with large capital, and resting on a solid foundation, rejected for the most part the small premiums paid by the working classes, because they knew that that branch of business was attended with such risks and difficulties as would probably involve more loss than gain to them. Surely, then, the State ought to hesitate before it embarked in operations which men accustomed to large undertakings shrank from. The right hon. Gentleman sought to enlist the favour of the House for the measure by citing the success attained by his Post Office savings banks; but so far from the results of their legislation relating to savings banks affording any support to the Bill, they went rather to establish an opposite conclusion. There used, no doubt, to be great abuses in the management of savings banks, and it was necessary to legislate on the subject. Chancellors of the Exchequer, some time ago, without correcting these evils, brought forward measures which those who managed these institutions thought necessarily tended to put an end to them. Consequently, the proceedings of those Chancellors of the Exchequer were opposed in that House; and the right hon. Member for Wiltshire (Mr. Sotheron Estcourt), in order to defeat the late Sir George Lewis, moved for a Committee of Inquiry. The Committee sat, and found that the savings of the whole body of the working classes were, to a considerable extent, imperilled from defective legislation. The Government

  791
  ought at once to have taken the Report of that Committee into consideration, and proposed a law giving adequate protection to the deposits of the people. But, though asked to bring in a Bill founded on that Report, the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused; and why? Because he had conceived the project of establishing Post Office savings banks. He, therefore, felt himself at liberty to neglect all the warnings given by that inquiry, and contented himself with setting up a rivalry between the Government and the existing savings banks. That was an abandonment of the duty incumbent on a responsible Minister of the Crown, of watching over the general interests of the people; and it ought to operate as a caution to them against a repetition of the same error in regard to Friendly and Benefit Societies. It had been left to him and one or two other private Members to deal with the subject which the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to have taken up, and they had to bring in a Bill to amend and consolidate the law relating to savings banks. The first difficulty they had to encounter was the impossibility under which private Members laboured of passing through the House a Bill of that character, unless they cut it down to the narrowest possible limits; and, therefore, they were obliged to reject several valuable provisions for a reform of these institutions. The hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hibbert) had proposed that the savings banks might be made to facilitate the system of small Life Assurances for the people; but the promoters of the Bill were unable to entertain that suggestion. The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not undertake the responsibility of dealing with it; and so the people were deprived of that most legitimate opportunity of using the savings banks effectually for carrying out the very objects which the right hon. Gentleman now had in view. That illustrated the necessity of keeping the Government from operations like this, which could be and were managed by institutions wholly apart from the State. But the right hon. Gentleman said the Post Office savings banks had been very successful, and by their rivalry had improved the administration of private institutions. Now, he denied that proposition. In 1858, when the agitation which had existed against the savings banks generally was put an end to, the deposits in the savings banks were
  792
  £36,200,000; and from 1858 to 1860, being a period of only two years, after confidence had been restored, they increased no less than five millions sterling. From 1860 to the present time, since the Chancellor of the Exchequer declined to take upon his shoulders the responsibility of watching over these institutions, and set up as a rival in their business instead, what had been the result? In 1860 the gross capital was £41,258,000; and in 1863 that gross capital was £41,237,000; being a decrease of £21,000, It was a great question, then, whether the Post Office Savings Banks Bill had been any great advantage at all. But a possible future evil might arise from the Post Office savings banks. Let them once reach the position of having a capital such as could be felt in the money market in London; let them be as successful as other savings banks had been, and let there be 40 millions accumulated and payable on demand, and he ventured to predict that it would be in the power of any man, however insignificant, in a time when the interest for money was high and the wealthy got 5 or 6 per cent, to raise a cry that the poor were only getting 2½ per cent, and that cry would re-echo through the kingdom, and there was not a merchant or banker in that House who would not go down on his knees and beg that that 2½ per cent should be made 3 or 4 per cent to save the country from the consequences of the demand that must necessarily arise for the payment of that money. The danger incident to that mode of legislation was that it brought the people face to face with the Government, and there would be no intermediate moral influence operating such as existed in regard to all other savings banks, in the case of which, moreover, there were legal restrictions which would prevent such a contingency arising. The whole tendency of these transactions with reference to savings banks warned them to be careful as to what they should do on the present occasion. To his mind they afforded a conclusive argument in favour of the most full and complete investigation of the merits and application of the Bill before them. He wished the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in moving the second reading, had not made any reference to the efforts of working men for improving the condition of their fellows; for, whatever he might think of the labours of such

  793
  persons, there could be no doubt they had been far more useful than extreme freetraders were apt to imagine. No doubt there had been an immense development of industry as the result of free trade; but, to use the language of Adam Smith, the higher they carried organized industry the greater the degradation they might inflict on the people; and he believed that result would have been seen in England but for the labours of those who had associated themselves for the purpose of having their labour respected, and compelling employers to conduct themselves with some regard to moral restraints. It was a pity, then, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had spoken in so disparaging a tone of Mr. Potter, a man who was admired and respected by the working classes, and those who were associated with him. Such remarks were likely to give reason to suspect the motives for the introduction of the measure, and it was to be regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had not made a more complete and frank apology to the House than he had yet done. He had evinced an amount of ill-feeling which was wholly unnecessary for the purposes of his Bill. With respect to that class of Assurance Societies that were likely to be affected by the Bill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had thrown a cloud of odium upon them by speaking of them as creatures of the State, subsidized by considerable bounties; but he did not explain in his usual clear manner what he meant by those statements. Friendly Societies received, some of them, rates of interest higher than those which now prevailed; but that was only the result of past errors of the right hon. Gentleman's predecessors in office, and was not to be regarded as a boon given at the present moment. The Government had no alternative but to adhere to its engagements to these societies. These were founded upon the then current rate of interest, and no precautions had been taken that, when it was reduced, the societies should submit to a corresponding reduction in the rate they received. It could not, therefore, be said that these institutions were subsidized by the State, but that the country was paying for the errors of past legislation. It could not be said that these institutions were really subsidized by the State in the shape of small exemptions from taxation; they were rather relieved from what would otherwise be an unjust and oppressive
  794
  burden. When it was recollected for what purpose they were established, he did not think these institutions should be described as protected societies, using the old shibboleth of Protection in its invidious signification. They were not protected in the sense of an abuse of protection; they only enjoyed the requisite securities for carrying out their most beneficent design. But these institutions, it was said, were badly managed, and the only way to remedy that evil was for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have a model institution of his own, and leave some 20,000 institutions, in which hundreds of thousands of persons were interested, entirely at the mercy of accident and circumstances on the grand principle that free trade would bring about a cure. That was a most dangerous doctrine to accept in all the latitude of its announcement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. What were the evils of the Friendly Societies? If they carefully and minutely examined into the matter, they would be able to arrive at the conclusion that there were specific general heads of mismanagement, which being cured, all the rest that was necessary would follow as a consequence. They might be summed up in two or three remarks, and illustrated in a thousand different ways, but they would result in two or three simple points in the end. He granted that it was true that they were ignorantly established with insufficient tables to accumulate the funds necessary to meet liabilities; and great loss and misery had in some instances ensued. But was there no remedy? If the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Bill was sound, they would be told there was an ample remedy. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was said, had arrived at a theory and a principle that he could construct a table for working men's assurance that would operate of itself without any special knowledge of circumstances, and free from all risk and danger. If there was that patent table—if the nation could adopt it and make it the foundation of a new law, and work it out for all the people of England, was it not the duty of the House to see that the same table was made compulsory on these Assurance Companies? But others would say that the Bill was unsound, and that they could not have a universal table that would be self-working without loss or inconvenience. If so, there was an end of the argument. That was one difficulty. Then it was said the people suffered on account of lapsed policies.

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  He was really surprised to find the Chancellor of the Exchequer had fallen into this error of puffing Assurance Companies. The objection was evidently unsound when it came to be examined in detail. Of course, every one who paid and allowed his policy to lapse contributed something and got nothing in return; the accumulated fund was thus greatly increased; and if there was no lapse the companies would be obliged to charge a great deal more. In order to show how fallacious was the great argument about lapsed policies, he would refer to what had taken place under the present system. By the existing law a man could purchase an annuity absolutely, without any claim to a contingent return of payments, or he might purchase one upon certain conditions, giving him the power to receive back a certain amount. Thus it appeared from the Government tables, that if a man aged twenty-two wished to secure himself an annuity of £12 when he attained the age of sixty, and was willing to run the risk of the policy lapsing before the time of his receiving the benefit derived, he would have to pay 2s. per month. If, however, he desired to reserve to himself the power of getting back, under any contingency, the money he had paid, he would be required to pay 3s. per month. Thus, by the Government system, as it now existed, a man who chose to run the risk of his policy lapsing, could insure for 50 per cent less than under the other arrangement. But if there was a doubt of the view taken by the great bulk of the people as to this great evil of lapsing policies, he would again refer to the practice under the existing system. There had been, up to the present time, 10,800 annuities granted, amounting to £219,000 per annum, for which no less than £2,522,000 had been paid. But under the other arrangement, of insuring against the lapse of policies, only £59,000 had been paid for annuities. It was plain, therefore, that the boon of guarding against lapse of policies was regarded by the public as merely nominal and illusory. Then again, it had been said that the expense of the management of the Friendly Societies had been very great. That was true, but he feared that it was impossible for any society to avoid large expenses when engaged in minute transactions with the people. It was impossible to persuade people that it was for their interest to take their pence every week or
  796
  month to the Insurance Office to pay the premiums; but they would have a collecting agent to call at their houses, although the cost of such a proceeding entailed upon them a charge of 25 per cent. If the officers of any of those societies were asked upon that point, they would state that if they did not go themselves to gather the pence, their business would speedily come to nothing. It was the same with these offices as it was with the baker, and although it was possible for him to make a 41b. loaf, the people were not satisfied they had their weight unless they had a bit of bread over. It was impossible to alter the habits of the people, and it was useless to complain that the present mode of insuring was expensive, nor was that a reason for Government interference. Another objection, and a strong one, was that the smaller Friendly Societies conducted their business at public-houses. That was an objectionable state of things, but it was not an evil that could not be got rid of. If Parliament were to enact that it should be illegal for these societies to hold their meetings at public-houses, an end would at once be put to the system, and school-houses and similar places would be selected instead. But it must be recollected that the working classes were not without excuse in the example of other classes who met in taverns to discharge their business. In the City of London there was a great corporation which seemed to exist only for the purpose of feeding people; and, in our courts of justice, the Judges and barristers had to qualify themselves by the processes of eating and drinking, and a Queen's Counsel could not rise to the dignity of the Bench unless he almost swam in wine up to the table at which he sat. These things no doubt had an effect upon the people, but they were no arguments for the Chancellor of the Exchequer setting up an opposition establishment. He wished, however, to call the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what was really the source of this proposal — the opinion of Mr. Tidd Pratt. That gentleman was invested with the authority over all the Friendly Societies, but from want of moral influence he was incapable of exercising that authority. He was, doubtless, an active and intelligent gentleman, but the people all over England would not be governed by a person in an office in London. The consequence was that Mr. Tidd Pratt's communications were disregarded.

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  But there was a remedy other than this Bill. If the moral weight of a recognized officer of the Crown holding a position in the country was brought to bear upon the Friendly Societies, there could be no doubt but that those societies would be managed as well as the Poor Law Board, or any other Government department was managed. When it was found that the Manchester Unity Friendly Society was badly managed, their central committee having great influence, remonstrated with the branch offices, the result of which was that reforms were introduced which made the society the best managed in the country. But what kind of a remedy would the Bill be for the evils now complained of? Were all the existing members of these societies to be left exposed to those evils, or were private Members of Parliament to be expected to take up that subject? It seemed to him that Mr. Tidd Pratt himself had suggested a scheme which was worthy of consideration. That Gentleman had proposed a Bill to place the supervision of those societies in the Boards of Guardians. The Bill was introduced into the other House, but as it was to some extent a taxing Bill it could not be passed; and he (Mr. Ayrton) had intended to introduce it with some modifications into this House. It would be well that the provisions of the Bill should be explained to the Committee before any decision was come to as to the Bill now under discussion. The area over which the system would extend would be enormous, though not so large as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated. He believed, however, that without limitation or diminution it would include 9,500,000 persons. If the Bill were successful, the result would be that in every parish and hamlet a stipendiary officer of the Crown would be located, whose duty it would be to institute an examination into the private affairs of individuals. The services of medical men and employers of labour would also be enlisted in the same direction, and such an organization would, he believed, be an unfortunate thing for all classes in the country. The Government would pursue a much better plan if they were to encourage the establishment of associations among the people themselves, for it was through the exercise of local administration that a nation became most fitted for the enjoyment of political rights. What they needed was a thorough and searching
  798
  inquiry into the real character of the Bill, and not an examination into the mis-doings of all the Insurance Societies in the country, the result of which would only afford matter for contention, and tend to the gratification of rival companies. The Committee ought to examine such men as Mr. Tidd Pratt, to have the evidence of practical and independent persons who had made such subjects the study of their lives. There was no reason why that course should not be adopted, because there was not the slightest necessity for passing the measure hurriedly through Parliament. The measure did not press; it did not matter whether the Bill were passed in three months' or twelve months' time. He did not desire to defeat legislation on the subject. On the contrary, the Bill he had intended to bring in might be considered as hostile to the Friendly Societies now existing, but it was on a principle different from the present Bill, and more in accordance with the character and spirit of our institutions.
  MR. HUBBARDconsidered, that much of the hostility displayed towards the Bill, was excited in consequence of its being introduced under a title which neither explained its real nature and character, nor the intentions of the Government in bringing it forward. He believed, however, that the defect had been atoned for by the right hon. Gentleman's speech, in which he had given the requisite information. Any prejudice which had existed against the measure arising out of the mode of its introduction had passed away, and there was much in it that commended it to the acceptance of the House. The principle that Government should not interfere with schemes which could not be satisfactorily undertaken by individuals or private societies was generally good, but there were undoubtedly cases in which the interference of Government would be attended with benefit. The establishment of banks for the receipt of the small savings of the labouring classes was an instance of this, for the security elsewhere could not be so great as that afforded by the Government, and the increased security would probably be the occasion of attracting more deposits, the result of thrift and frugality. He therefore thought it was a measure the House might fairly entertain. He looked upon it as an extension of the Post Office savings banks principle, which had received the sanction of the country. When Government pro-

  799
  posed to establish a rate of interest which could in any way be supposed to compete with the operations of other societies, jealousy would not unnaturally be excited; but in a case of that kind such a feeling need not arise. At present the Government paid upon these deposits the moderate rate of 2½ per cent interest, and repaid the capital in only one way—namely, at call. They now proposed to leave to the depositors the choice of receiving their money in the form of deferred annuities, or in a sum payable at death. No doubt, Government would incur a strong risk, but he did not regard that as an objection to the measure. If the Government thought they could accept the responsibility, and carry out the system without endangering the finances of the country, he for one should not object; but he would strongly impress upon the Government the advisability of paying the same rate of interest upon the deposit money, in whatever form it was to be withdrawn. It was his intention to support the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir Minto Farquhar), but he believed that there would be no difficulty in so framing the Bill as to meet at once the purpose of the Government and the views of those who were at present opposed to the measure.
  COLONEL SYKESsaid, that he had received many letters both for and against the Bill, and in this conflict of testimony he must necessarily pause before he gave his vote. The question ought to be considered dispassionately in a Committee, and the House would be better able to form a judgment after that Committee had reported. One of the soundest principles of political economy was that the Government should never do that for the people which the people could do for themselves; and the question was whether the maxim had not been violated by the Government measure. On the other hand he was quite sure it would be to the advantage of the working classes to get the Government security, because the Government would be able to pay. He should vote for the Amendment.
  MR. THOMSON HANKEYsaid, he objected altogether both to the inquiry proposed and to the principle of the Bill. According to the practice of the House, to vote for a Committee was to sanction the principle of a measure, and that he was not prepared to do. There was great danger, if the Bill passed, of overloading that already
  800
  overloaded department—the Post Office, and of incurring great risks and liabilities hereafter on the part of the State. His vote would be given both against the Committee and against going on any further with the Bill.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: This discussion appears to have arrived now at its natural close, and this is the less to be regretted because possibly the Amendment of my hon. Friend does not present to the House any difference of opinion. The effect of the Amendment will be that the House, at its discretion, will name a competent number of Gentlemen as a Select Committee. These Gentlemen will meet and probably will appoint me, as the author of the Bill, the Chairman of the Committee. I should then have the opportunity of giving all the information which it is in my power to afford respecting the Bill, and the views with which I should endeavour to act upon it, assisted by such officers of the Government as were able to render me assistance. After the Committee had been nominated, a further question would arise—namely, whether the Committee should have power to send for persons, papers, and records. Upon this proposal would arise practically the question, whether the Committee shall be a Committee upon the clauses of the Bill, or a Committee of general inquiry into the subject of the Bill. I certainly could not agree to any general inquiry, and it is but right we should have a clear understanding upon the point. I see no mode by which if "persons, papers, and records" were to be sent for, the Committee could avoid falling into great difficulty. The officers of the Government, and persons favourable to the Government plan, who would be examined, would give evidence upon a very complex question, involving an immense amount of detail, and then the Committee would say very naturally that they were bound to hear persons of intelligence and information who entertained opposite views. Now, that is a kind of investigation which it would be totally impossible to undertake. In the first place, it would amount on my part to an entire abnegation of the regular and ordinary duties of my office were I to become in any degree the organ of the Government in conducting an investigation of this sort. In the next place, great practical evils would arise from an investigation which it would be impossible to separate from a great deal of controversial matter. It

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  would be said that it was necessary to inquire into the manner in which the Bill would operate upon the interests of existing societies, and this would essentially involve the inquiry how these societies were conducted, and whether it was a good part or a bad part of their management which would be affected. We should thus in effect become a Committee of investigation and inquisition into the management of these societies, and Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to become responsible for such an inquiry. But we may accept the Amendment as it stands, with the limitation I have mentioned, the fact being, I believe, that the appointment of a Committee is supported by some hon. Gentlemen who agree in thinking that a general investigation would be far from expedient. I will now notice two or three of the points which have been touched upon, with his usual ability, by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Ayrton). Let me remind the House that this Bill was met by a powerful concerted and organized opposition. There is nothing in the fact discreditable to the parties with whom the opposition originated, for they had a perfect right to organize an opposition if they thought right. But I certainly never remember a case of a Bill which was the subject of such an opposition out of doors, and yet gained ground by long delay. Generally speaking a long postponement is fatal, but in this instance during the considerable interval which has elapsed since the Bill was introduced there has been a remarkable development of public opinion in its favour. I appeal to the opponents of the Bill as well as to its supporters, and I ask whether the opinion of the press has not been declared in a very singular degree in favour of the measure, irrespective, so far as I know, of party interests and opinions. Certainly, in my public life of thirty years, I have never received so many letters upon any one measure as I have with reference to this Bill, expressing approval and even gratitude from all classes of the community, and especially from those who have a strong interest in the question. At the commencement of the discussion upon the Bill there was a great number of petitions against it, many of them drawn up in a common form. Now, meetings are held in favour of the Bill, and petitions in its favour are coming forward—petitions from working men, who can have none but the most disinterested motives in supporting it. My hon. Friend (Mr. Ayrton) lately
  802
  presided over a great meeting at Exeter Hall, called in opposition to the measure; but the independent working men mustered so strongly on the other side, that my hon. Friend could not determine on which side the majority lay, though some who favoured the Bill said that, had they been in the chair, they should not have been at all doubtful. And lastly, I must say, I have observed with peculiar satisfaction, that not only some public meetings, but also boards of guardians in the country are beginning to give their minds to this matter, and from many places petitions have been presented on behalf of the boards of guardians, expressing a hope that this House will not withhold so great a boon to the working classes as they think this law will prove. Under these circumstances, I most cordially wish to return to the position in which we stood when this Bill was introduced, and to free the discussion from the controversial element. It was not of my will that this element crept into our debates on the Bill, and what I did afterwards I did under the pressure of a public necessity. I think, however, that this necessity has passed away, and therefore I have not a word of accusation or reproach to utter against any society or public company. But I wish to define the precise extent to which I meant to carry my remarks in respect of living societies. I do not mean dead societies, of which I introduced examples, but such societies as the Royal Liver, the British Prudential, and other societies. I did not presume to attach, nor do I think I should be justified in attaching to any of these societies a fraudulent character. What I meant to do was this—the societies adopted certain language. They said, "We are quite aware there is a great field for insurance among the people of England; it is quite true that there is a great portion of that field unoccupied; it is quite true that the Friendly Societies, notwithstanding the large numbers of their members, leave the unoccupied portion of that field untouched;" but they also said, "we are ready to do the work, and therefore we claim that you should leave us to do it, and not have the Government enter upon it." That being so, as against that exclusive claim, I thought it right, by reference to the manner in which the most staple and respectable Life Assurance Companies were conducted, to show that those societies were not entitled to set up so high a claim, and that they could

  803
  not give the working man so positive a security after his twenty, or thirty, or forty years' payments as the great Insurance Societies give to the wealthy classes where they made a judicious selection of an office for that purpose. That is the extent to which I went. I would not be justified in saying that any of the existing societies were fraudulent societies. I disclaim the imputation that I said so before, and certainly I do not say so now. But, when I used language which I regret to say I am not prepared to retract respecting the heartless iniquity that had been at work, I did not mean it to be understood that any such language was applicable to existing societies. I further said, and I repeat it now, regarding the Professional Society, and every other society to which I alluded, that, though I believe all my statements to have been correct, no one shall be better pleased if it can he shown that the construction I put on my facts was an erroneous one, and that although there may have been a want of prudence and a want of care, still no corrupt motives have been at work. I am told by my hon. Friend the Member for York that he is of that opinion with respect to the Professional Society, and I am glad to accept my hon. Friend's opinion on the point. I think the case was one of the most reckless, hazardous, and. even unjustifiable management; but still I am willing to believe that the facts are not incompatible with the absence of fraudulent intention on the part of the managers. My hon. Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets has alluded to what I said on the subject of working men's trades unions, and expressed his regret that I had not made a full explanation and apology. My reason for not having made a more full explanation is, that I have not had the opportunity of doing so since I first spoke on the subject, though I intimated in two words my wish to do so. The explanation is briefly this:—On a former occasion I adverted to a meeting which had been held under the presidency of Mr. Potter, at Exeter Hall; and, as far as my memory serves me, I stated that the name of Mr. Potter had been very much connected with that sort of agency, and those proceedings on the part of trades unions which were believed by the public to imply the coercion of the minority of the working class by the majority of the working class. I have been assured since I made that statement that my description would
  804
  not be a true description of trades unions as they exist at present. I am told that there was a great deal of that character attachable to them in former times; but that the real advances which the working class has been making, not only in intelligence and in the means of existence, but in the whole view of their social duties, has essentially and materially altered the character of these societies, and that there are few of them, if any, against which the charge would lie. I can only say I made those observations out of no hostility or indifference to the working class. I believe that to this hour, in certain cases and in certain parts of the country, there are instances in which a portion of the working class still tyrannizes over its own members. Those proceedings, I am glad to hear, are certainly alien to the views and feelings of the trades unions of London; and, therefore, I am extremely glad to believe that there is no foundation for any charge of that description being made against them. My hon. Friend has also referred to two other points. He mentioned the question of tables. He said I had not overcome the difficulty which arose on that point, and he then referred to a plan by which it might be overcome —namely, by proposing to this House to enact that the use of a certain set of tables should be compulsory; but my hon. Friend seemed to lose sight of a grand distinction between assurance by Government and assurance by private societies. The grand difference in favour of private societies arises from the fact that, after all, the rate at which assurance business can be done depends in the main upon the rate at which the managers can, with prudence and propriety, be allowed to make investments. Private societies working for themselves can make investments at a rate which it is impossible to aim at. You cannot say to the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day and those who advise him that they are prudent men, and you will allow them to go into the money market and invest the public money to the best advantage. You compel them to invest in securities on which they can get only 3 or 3¼ per cent; but it would be a very great hardship if we were to come down to this House with a set of tables which would absolutely preclude any private societies from adopting any other investment. My hon. Friend, moreover, anticipates great danger from the successful working of this Bill, and he denies that

  805
  the Post Office savings banks have succeeded, alleging that all the money they have got has been filched from the old savings banks. Now, I take the liberty of saying that this last conclusion of his is one which he will not be able to prove by figures. Then, he says, if the time ever comes when a vast sum of money is in the hands of the Government on account of the Post Office savings banks, and if at the same time the rate, of interest is high, there will be what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire once called, I think, "an ugly rush," and we shall be called on to reimbuse those funds which will be only bearing 2½ per cent interest. [Mr. AYRTON: Or to pay a higher interest.] Yes, of course, that is an alternative. The rate of interest allowed on money deposited in the Post Office savings banks is now 2½ per cent; and I am not prepared to say it ought ever to be higher. At the same time, I do not altogether exclude from my mind the hope that some addition may yet be made in that respect, compatibly, of course, with the essential requisite that the public is not to subsidize the Post Office savings banks to the extent of a single farthing, but should even reserve to itself a margin sufficient for its own perfect security. Within the last few months we have had a singular example of the preference of the public for low interest on Government security, rather than high interest in other quarters. The Birmingham Savings Bank determined, in consequence of the Act of last year, to close their establishment. At that moment the rate of discount in London was 8 per cent, and there were, of course, plenty of people in Birmingham to make by advertisement to the depositors offers of high interest, to the extent of 5 and even 6 per cent for the money at call. There were 35,000 depositors, but I believe two-thirds of the whole number and of the entire capital, went to the Post Office banks, giving only £2 10 s., rather than to other banks giving much higher terms. I feel the greatest confidence in the political security of these banks, and even if the argument of the hon. Member were good as regards these institutions, it would not hold good in regard to the present measure. If a man chooses to insure with the Government a sum of money payable on death, he cannot very well fulfil the necessary condition and claim his money just because there happens to be a high rate of interest in the market, I
  806
  judge from the tone of the debate that the House thinks we have gone sufficiently into this subject, and I hope my hon. Friend opposite understands exactly from my explanation what the Government is prepared to do.
  SIR MINTO FARQUHARsaid, that supposing they agreed to the Committee without a division, he should at a future period propose the Committee to the House, and, in doing so, should follow it up by asking for leave to send for persons, papers, and records. He thought it desirable that the Committee should examine such gentlemen as Sir A. Spearman, Mr. Chadwick, Mr. Scudamore, Mr. Tidd Pratt, several actuaries, and three or four gentlemen connected with Friendly Societies and Industrial Insurance Offices. He should like that evidence to be distinctly taken and printed for the benefit of the House, so that they might be assisted to come to a decision on the subject.
  SIR FITZROY KELLYsaid, he rose to say a few words on behalf of certain societies to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made allusion on more than one recent occasion in that House. The right hon. Gentleman had indulged in a series of observations regarding these societies which the House was little accustomed to. He stated that the Professional Society had transferred its business to the European Society, but that, in order to make themselves safe, the European made it a condition that the amount of liability should be inscribed on each policy, in a manner and under circumstances which the right hon. Gentleman described. This, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, was no better than wholesale robbery. And wholesale robbery it would have been if there had been a particle of truth in the right hon. Gentleman's description of the transaction. The Chancellor of the Exchequer went farther, and said that a good many of these proceedings were worse than wholesale robbery, and that many persons who had never seen the inside of a gaol were fitter to be there than many a rogue convicted ten times over at the Old Bailey. Did the right hon. Gentleman apply this to the European?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he had applied that expression to many transactions of the kind, namely, amalgamations, but not to that particular case.
  SIR FITZROY KELLYsaid, it was then a misfortune that so great a master

  807
  of language should have expressed himself in such a way that there was not a man of common understanding who would not imagine that the right hon. Gentleman had referred to one or the other of those societies, or to both; but he was glad to receive the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman would, he was sure, feel gratified when he (Sir FitzRoy Kelly) stated that there was no ground whatever for imputing the slightest impropriety of conduct to either of those two societies. He did not understand what the right hon. Gentleman meant by saying that, supposing there was a policy for £1,000, the outstanding value was £600, and the premiums paid £200. How could a policy of assurance, while the person was in life, be worth more than the aggregate amount of premiums paid upon it? The Professional, owing, perhaps, to undue expenditure in the management, and the misfortune of having a defaulting secretary, who embezzled a large sum of money, was obliged to suspend its payments and resort to the Court of Chancery for winding up. The affairs of the society were investigated by the Master of the Rolls, and the very transactions which the right hon. Gentleman had condemned— the combination of the Professional and European — was made with the express sanction of that learned Judge. That transaction did not involve the principle that a policy of the value of £600 should be treated as worth a great deal less. At the time the Professional Society was wound up there were outstanding policies to the amount of £1,500,000, and debts amounting to £150,000, £100,000 of which was for ordinary liabilities and money borrowed, and £50,000 necessary to make up to the European the difference between the value of the policies upon which certain premiums had been paid and the policies upon which for the first time the European should then assume a liability. And this, so far from coming to anything like 60 per cent, if there had been any loss, which there was not, would amount to only 3 or 4 per cent. That which the right hon. Gentleman described as loss to the extent of 60 per cent amounted to only between 3 and 4 per cent, but was no loss at all, for the directors, who must have considered themselves in some respects responsible, in a pecuniary point of view, for the misdeeds of their officers, advanced £50,000 to meet their liabilities; and out of the £150,000 of liabilities £100,000
  808
  had already been discharged, a contribution of 2s. 6d. in the pound had been paid on the other £50,000, and a further call had been made under which every shilling would be eventually paid. He (Sir FitzRoy Kelly) was not a defender of all these Insurance Societies. He listened to the opening speech of the right hon. Gentleman, when introducing the. measure, with much gratification. He thought the Bill, if it passed, would effect a very great public benefit if judicious amendments were introduced into it in Committee. All that could be said in favour of the Bill he was prepared to say, with some modifications and qualifications; but, with regard to the Professional Society, there was no ground for imputing to the managers misconduct of any kind, or anything beyond that misfortune which might happen to any company. He was quite sure the right hon. Gentleman would take some opportunity of doing justice to those gentlemen.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he had paused for a moment before rising to reply, in. the hope that some Gentleman would say something about the society to which the hon. and learned Gentleman had referred, but he regretted that superior attractions had drawn Gentlemen away from the performance of that duty. He trusted, therefore, that after what the hon. and learned Gentleman had said, the House would allow him to make a few remarks by way of explanation. In the strongest part of the language which the hon. and learned Gentleman had quoted he did not refer particularly to the Professional Company, but alluded to other societies, which he did not think it necessary to name. When he spoke of the wholesale loss inflicted upon holders of policies of the Professional Company he meant to describe the effect of rash and reckless speculation, without imputing any improper motives. It too frequently happened that persons of great respectability involved themselves in undertakings of this kind, which had the effect of deluding and robbing others, without the smallest impurity of motive on their own part. He believed, after what the hon. and learned Gentleman had stated, that there was no impurity of motive on the part of the Professional directors. It was also to be hoped—and might, indeed, be believed—that nothing would ultimately be lost to such of the policy-holders as might have kept their policies alive; while

  809
  he did not think that the ruinous loss inflicted upon the shareholders was in the slightest degree attributable to any intention on the part of the Directors.
  Question put, and negatived.
  Words added.
  Main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to.
  Ordered, That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee.

  SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.
  SUPPLY considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  (1.) £5,708,983, General Staff and Regimental Pay, Allowances and Charges.
  GENERAL PEELsaid, he rose to make a few remarks on the subject of recruiting for the army. It might appear to some that the question was one of those respecting the discipline of the army with which that House ought not to interfere, but the recruiting for the army was governed by an Act of Parliament, and it was to the effect of that Act he wished to draw attention. He regretted that a Return for which he had moved had not been laid upon the table, because it would have shown whether the alarm which had been expressed with respect to the working of the Limited Enlistment Act was well founded or not. On a previous occasion, the Under Secretary for War had stated that the War Office had no alarm whatever on the subject, because there were only about 4,000 men who would claim discharges on expiration of service during the year. For his own part, however, when he looked at the manner in which it was proposed to meet the requirements of the service, he confessed he felt the greatest possible alarm. If it was necessary in time of peace to reduce the standard of the army by one inch—in other words, if the ten years' service men were to be replaced by recruits of a lower standard—he thought things could not be regarded as in a satisfactory condition. He did not mean to say that good men could not be got at 5ft. 5in.; but his alarm arose from the War Office being obliged in time of peace to resort to a measure which ought to be reserved for some great emergency. Nor did he believe it to be absolutely necessary to reduce the standard at the present moment. Additional men were not wanted for the Artil-
  810
  lery. Recruiting for that corps might be checked by raising the standard; and then the standard for the line might be kept at 5ft. 6in. But, looking to the inevitable consequences of the Limited Enlistment Act, he should wish to see a more intimate relation established between the militia and the regular army, and he thought it could be established with advantage to both. Hitherto the line alone had derived all the advantage. He well recollected the great benefits which the line derived during the Indian mutiny from the volunteers and the militia; but he wanted to see those advantages increased and made reciprocal. Was it impossible to obtain for the militia the services of those limited service men who, after the expiration of their service, should decline to re-enter the line? By this means the militia would get many good non-commissioned officers, and a reduction could be made in the permanent staff, in the corps of enrolled pensioners, and in that army of reserve of which he never saw anything except in the Estimates. At present, by the Limited Enlistment Act, men for the artillery and the cavalry were enlisted for twelve years, whereas men for the line and for the Guards were enlisted only for ten. He did not see why they should not all be enlisted for twelve years, the men in the line at the expiration of ten years being allowed to commute their two years' remaining service in the regular army for five years' service in the militia. The expenses of recruiting for India were very high. He found, on reference to the Estimates, that although the regular army in India was only one-third of the whole army, the expense of recruiting for that portion was larger than for the remaining two-thirds. That might be because of the great wear and tear of the regiments in India. If so, nothing could be worse than reducing the number of the depots to a hundred men. If a regiment was ordered to India, any man within a year and a half of the expiration of his ten years' term of service was not allowed to go out, because the Indian Government would have to pay his passage there and back. But why should not such a man be passed into a militia regiment? The estimate for furlough pay was £130,000 last year, and for the ensuing year was £137,000. With respect to the capitation rate of £10, he could not help thinking that it would be found, if the matter were strictly examined into, that they had now to pay more than

  811
  the £10 would cover. With respect to men volunteering in India, he admitted the propriety of offering men who volunteered there from one regiment into another more inducements than the ordinary bounty; but who paid the expense for men who volunteered in India? There was a small sum put down in the Estimates for enlistments in the colonies, but that could not apply to India. He wished to ask, what were the items covered by the capitation rate; and what, after two years' experience, was the opinion of the War Office as to its being sufficient to cover the amount now paid by that department?
  COLONEL DUNNEthought it extraordinary that the War Department remained ignorant of the fact known to every officer of the army, that there were something like 20,000 men whose period of service expired in each year. They had no right to calculate upon these men re-enlisting, and there was not an officer in the service who would not recommend that the first enlistment should be for twelve years for the line as well as for cavalry and artillery. The suggestion of the right hon. and gallant Member who had just spoken, for securing a more intimate and advantageous relation between the regular army and the militia, was one well worthy of the attention of the Government. It was one of the most important subjects that could engage their consideration. As things stood, a great number of men were discharged from the army, perhaps without a pension, and then spread discontent where they resided. At any rate they were entirely lost to the service. As the ten years' men were not sent out to India with their regiments if they had only a year or two of their term to serve, and as a year or a year and a half was required to make soldiers of them, it was clear that the country enjoyed but a short period of efficient service from them. If these men who could not be sent out to India were transferred to militia regiments, they would improve the efficiency of the militia, and be retained in the service of the country. The capitation rate was, he thought, a very bad bargain for this country. He noticed at page 12 of the Estimates, an item of £44,500 for the clothing of two Indian regiments in China. He wished to have some explanation of that item. The whole of the clothing system was in a most unsatisfactory state. No army in Europe was clothed in so expensive a manner as ours;
  812
  and no commanding officer could at that moment tell what was the price of a single article of clothing; and the department, though presided over by an officer of great talent for organisation and great experience, was not in the condition it ought to be. He believed that the work would be better done by contract, and that the large Government clothing establishments should only exist as a check to extravagant outlay. He thought it quite practicable to make a large reduction in these Estimates without at all diminishing the efficiency of the army. With reference to the purchase of horses, they would require to alter their system, or the cavalry would soon be dismounted. But he felt it was perfectly useless going over items; they talked there year after year on the subject, but nothing was done.
  MR. O'REILLYsaid, that although reduction could not be well looked for that year, he had no doubt that a proper, well conducted inquiry would lead to very considerable economy in the general expenditure on the Army Estimates; but instead of reduction he saw symptoms of their increase. In the observations he was about to make, it might appear that he differed from two axioms laid down by high authorities. The first was that of the right hon. and gallant General opposite (General Peel), that the cost of the army might be taken to be, in round numbers, £100 per man; but he presumed the gallant General did not mean that such was the necessary calculation, but only that of late years it might be accepted as a fact. If they went on as at present, he believed the gallant General would agree with him that the expenditure would not be limited to £100 per man. The second maxim was laid down by the late lamented Secretary of State for War, that there was nothing whatsoever to be gained by a comparison with other services. He could not agree that a careful comparison in particular items between the administration and management of the French army and our own would be altogether futile. The totals were certainly sufficiently striking. The British army might be taken in round numbers to consist of 147,766 men; the number of horses, 13,693, or one horse to every 11 men. The total estimated cost was nearly £15,000,000; but if they deducted Votes 8, 9, 10, and 11, for auxiliary forces, £1,209,509; Vote 14, for fortifications, £73,000; Vote 16, for surveys, £88,345; and Vote 27, for disembodied

  813
  militia, £31,213 — in all, £1,402,167, they would arrive at the conclusion that £13,442,721 represented the cost of the army, which gave £92 2s. 6d. per man. The total number of men in the French army was 400,000; horses, 85,705, or one horse to 4⅔ men. The total Estimate was 430,260,367f., which was equal to £17,210,414, or about £43 per man. The causes generally assigned for the greater cost of the English troops were:—1st, higher pay and allowances; 2nd, the cost of recruiting as compared to conscription; 3rd, the extra expenses of troops in the colonies; and 4th, the extra cost of transport of troops to and from colonies. He would discuss the first cause, which was the main one, later. The total cost of the recruiting service was £102,471, or very nearly 14 s. per man. The French recrutement et réserve was 739,479f., or If. 80c., or 1s. 6d. per man; therefore the extra cost of recruiting was 12 s. 6d. per man. The extra cost of our troops in the colonies comprehended, as allowance for high price of provisions and allowance for wives whose husbands were abroad, a sum of £47,000, and extra allowance for China, £49,395. This amounted to 13 s. per man. But in the French budget, under the head solde et entretien des troupes, he found allowances special to Africa—namely, allowance to officers entering on campaign and indemnity for campaign rations a sum of 2,822,859f., which was 7f., or 6s. per man. Therefore the extra cost of English troops in the colonies was 7s. per man. Then, as to the extra cost of the transport of troops to and from our colonies, the total English transport service, as given at page 17, was £179,330. To this should be added allowance to discharged soldiers to take them home, £18,000, and travelling-expenses of officers, £7,000, making the whole £188,759, or equal to about £1 8s. per man. The total of the French service de marche was equal to 14 s. per man. Therefore the extra cost of English troops was 14 s. per man. The amount of excess in the English Estimates, accounted for under these heads, was:—Cost of recruiting, 12 s. 6d. per man; troops in colonies, 13 s. per man; transport to colonies, 14 s. per man—in all, £1 19 s. 6d. The cost of the British soldier—namely, £92, might be divided into the heads of the Votes; but this would neither enable them to compare it with the French, nor, in some cases, give an accurate idea. Thus the Vote for regimental pay and allow-
  814
  ances might give the idea that it meant all that the men received; but, in reality, for this purpose they must add the item, "cost of provisions above amount of stoppages," which came under the Vote for Commissariat, but which was substantially an addition to the men's pay. So also Vote 1, "General Staff," to be compared with French Vote for Etats Majors, must be augmented by 159 generals who came under Vote No. 20, and by the honorary colonels commandant of regiments, because the French Vote comprised all "generals in reserve," and all officers except those serving with their regiments. And the French of "Etats Majors "must be diminished by "Intendance Militaire," which corresponded to part of Vote 18, and by several items which corresponded to parts of our Votes for "manufacturing departments," "works," and "education." The House would understand that he was making a comparison of the items which were common to both services. Thus the expense of the general staff was about the same in each country—£2 a head. Regimental pay and allowances for food cost in England £41 15 s. per man, and in France £20. The Commissariat charges were in England £1 1s. per man, and in France 14 s. Clothing was a remarkable item, for it could not be said that wo were disadvantageously placed in that respect, and certainly the French soldier was as well clothed as the English; but while the cost of the former was only £2 2s. 6d., the latter cost £4 6s. When the Committee came to discuss those Votes in detail, he would take an opportunity of pointing out the differences of cost with greater minuteness; but he believed one all pervading cause of greater expense here, was to be found in what was called the establishment. He might, however, instance some other difference between the cost of similar items in the two armies. Thus martial law in England cost 6s. per man, and in France only 2s. 6d. But, the cost of medical attendance was more nearly alike, being £1 16 s. in the English army, and £1 10 s. in the French, proving that on those matters which concerned the well-being and efficiency of the soldier, the French were not behind us. In the article of stores there was a remarkable difference — the cost being in the French army £1 10 s. per man, while in the English army it was about £8 10 s. The total of the votes would give a sum of £10 10 s. per man; but he had made a deduction for

  815
  the amount supplied to the navy based on a calculation of the late Sir Gr. C. Lewis. Small arms in England cost £1 6s. per man, and in France only 7s. 2d.; while gunpowder which cost us £1 8s. per man, only cost the French 16 s., although they were not more sparing of that article than we were. Then came an item of considerable importance. The House would admit that French military education was quite equal to ours, and yet the cost there was 6s. as against £1; 4s. here. Probably if any one was asked what would be the cause of any greater charge for military education in this country as compared with the cost in France, the answer given would be that our young men were more expensively lodged and fed. The fact, however, was, that the cost of living and clothing in the French colleges was as great as it was in England, but the cost of teaching and administration in our military colleges was double that of the French. The administration of the French army cost 4s. 6d. per man, as compared with £1 7s. in England. Rewards and pensions cost us £14 4s., and the French only £6 6s., but he thought we got value for our greater expenditure in that respect. These facts certainly required consideration, for there could be little hope that the cost of the pay of the army would be reduced. On the contrary, it was more probable that it would become politic as well as just to increase the pay as the general prosperity of the country increased, but that fact rendered increased economy in the administration of the army more necessary. The cost of a French army of 400,000 men if paid, lodged, and pensioned as well as the English army, with as costly medical attendance, would be, instead of £17,200,000, as at present, £31,050,000, or an additional cost of £34 12 s. 6d. per man. And if to that were added the English rate of clothing, law, stores, education, and administration, the cost of the French army would be £5,350,000 more. On the other hand, if our Estimates were reduced to the French standard, with regard to these items the difference on 147,000 men would be a sum of £1,966,123. Allusion had been made to the charge for horses, and he had found that horses cost as much in France as here; but, while the cost of our staff for purchasing was one-ninth of the whole sum expended, in France it was only one thirty-fifth, although the expenses of maintaining the College of Alfort was included. The cost of the transport service
  816
  in this country was large, simply because no pains were taken to look clearly into the subject. In one instance 200 men had to be removed from Yarmouth to Deptford, and they were sent by way of London on their return. It was, however, suggested by an officer that the troops should be embarked on board a steamer which would stop opposite the barracks at Deptford, and this course was adopted at a saving of about three-fourths of the expenses which would by the other route have been incurred. A similar case occurred in Ireland, where it was proposed to remove a regiment from a town on the eastern coast to Aldershot by sending them by rail to Dublin, marching across the town, then going by rail to Kingstown, and then by steamer to Liverpool, instead of at once embarking the troops at the port where they were stationed for Liverpool, a plan which was ultimately adopted with much less expense. He also might refer to a case in Ireland where the War authorities paid £500 to obtain lodgings for some of the troops, while within an hour's distance there was an unoccupied barracks. He was not prepared to propose the reduction of any specific Vote, for nothing was easier on the part of Government than to meet such a proposition. If he pointed to any particular clerk as one whose services might be dispensed with, the Government would find no difficulty in proving that that particular clerk was the most important man in the service. The duty of individual Members of the House was to point out the grounds on which reforms should be introduced, but to leave their management to those with whom the responsibility rested. It was by those means that the reduction in the Customs had been effected. The simplest method of accomplishing this end would be through the agency of a great Minister, one sufficiently long at his post to be so thoroughly master of all the details as to resemble Carnot, the organizer of victory. Another would be by means of a Royal Commission, which had produced such valuable results in connection with the Indian army. The last course would be the appointment of a Committee of the House. The last plan, however, he considered to be undesirable, as a Committee of the House was always belligerent, and he did not think any good would result from its inquiry. He believed that the Government would act in the matter if the country, supported by the House, were to call upon them to do so.
  COLONEL NORTHsaid, he wished to call attention to a recent regimental order, which he could only characterize as a piece of contemptible economy. It appeared that the veterinary surgeon at Aldershot, who looked after the horses of the staff and the mounted officers of regiments, had applied for assistance, and that, after a long correspondence, an assistant was granted to him, who was to receive 1s. 1d a day, or £18 5s. a year. They were now dealing with a Vote which amounted in the whole to nearly £6,000,000. The Committee would scarcely credit it, but it, was the fact, that an order was issued for the deduction from the pay of every officer receiving forage at Aldershot, a farthing a week, or a penny a month towards the payment of the salary of £18 5s. of the assistant to the staff veterinary surgeon. He did not know who had suggested that reduction, but whoever the person was, he showed that he might take a first-rate place in a competitive examination on the subject of practical economy. There was also an item of £1,460, allowance to an instructor for the men in cookery. He wished to know whether there were more than one instructor? He would also observe that the hon. Member who had just spoken was in error in attributing the mismanagement he had referred to the negligence of the Horse Guards. The Horse Guards only superintended the discipline of the army, and the facts mentioned by the hon. Member would come within the province allotted to the Secretary for War.
  MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, that having voted the number of men, it was not possible to reduce materially the amount of the Vote; but he could not help thinking that the policy of Her Majesty's Government being to keep the country out of a war, the sum which was now demanded for the army was an extravagant one, and that a much smaller force and a much smaller outlay would be sufficient for the defence of the country. He also wished for some explanation as to the item of £1,435 for the director of gymnastics and fencing, and for sergeant instructors. He saw no necessity for such an expenditure.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, he wished to call attention to the inconvenience of discussing so large a Vote as £5,708,000, and to suggest that it should be subdivided. It was utterly impossible for private Members to do more than express their opinions upon the Vote in its present shape. It appeared that the Bri-
  818
  tish troops in India were 146,700; but according to a marginal note, 1,532 Indian troops had to be added, making a slight increase over the number last year. He wished to know whether the 1,532 were to be considered as British troops, subject to the Mutiny Act.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he knew no reason why the Vote should always appear in its present gigantic form. It certainly could be more easily discussed in separate items. He was quite prepared to point out how an extensive economy might be practised; and if the noble Lord would turn his attention to the various items he was sure a reduction of £500,000 might be made in the Vote. He regretted very much the intention to make a reduction in the number of the Royal Artillery. The line might, perhaps, be reduced to a small extent, but a reduction of the Royal Artillery affected the most important element in the service; and yet this was, it seemed, to be attempted for the sake of a miserable economy. It required two or three years to make even an intelligent man a good gunner. When the last attempt of this sort was made, many of the men went into the Life Guards; but, of course, the experience they had gained as gunners was not of much use to them as cavalry soldiers. If the noble Lord desired to weed the Artillery he should take care not to lose efficient men. Why was it that our service was deficient in staff knowledge? The fact was that we had not selected a sufficient number of men from the higher ranks to receive instruction in staff experience, but in consequence of the arrangements now being carried out we should have a class of staff officers second to none in Europe. In the Peninsular war, no doubt the staff was equal to all the service it was called to fulfil, but they were placed under the direction of a great captain. The expenditure on that branch of the service might not appear to be useful at the moment, but at a critical moment, and in the present state of Europe no one could tell how soon that time might arrive, its use would be made apparent. The Crimean war was a war of siege and not of campaign, and there was no movement of troops there which could teach a single lesson. He approved very much of the establishment at Aldershot, which was an excellent strategic position, for troops could be transported thence to the most important points on the coast in a few hours, and on that very ground it was singled

  819
  out by Lord Hardinge. He hoped the Government would keep up that establishment in efficiency; it was an admirable school for the army, and many officers who had visited the continental armies had expressed peculiar admiration of the way in which the troops were moved at Aldershot.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he rose to reply to the questions he had put to him. As he did not then see the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon in his place, he would defer for a time his reply to the observations of the gallant General, as he hoped to be able in some degree to calm the apprehensions which he entertained in regard to the probable effect of the Limited Enlistment Act. The hon. and gallant Member for Queen's County (Colonel Dunne) asked what was the meaning of the Vote for pay and clothing for certain native Indian troops. The fact was, that the Home Government did not pay the expenses of these regiments in detail. The Indian Government sent in the account and the amount was paid in a lump sum. It had been alleged that the great source of extravagant military expenditure was the establishments. That was a very vague term, but he had a Return of the expenses of what he might call the establishments, and he had ascertained that the commissariat staff eost£l04,000; clothing staff, £24,000; barrack staff, £53,000; purveyor's staff,£28,000; stores, £218,000; War Office and Horse Guards, £202,000; and the chaplains, if they could be included in the list, £50,000, making in all £679,000. That was, no doubt, a large item, but not so great as the sweeping assertions which had been made would lead one to imagine. It was obvious that any reduction in the establishments would not make much impression on the total amount of the Estimates. He should be glad if any hon. Gentleman would inform him whether he had omitted any establishment from his list, and how any diminution could be effected. Reference had also been made to the depôt battalions which had been described as one of the most extravagant parts of our system. It was, no doubt, a question well worthy of discussion, whether some more economical system could not be devised, and he did not know any on which the attention of gallant Members could better be bestowed. He had not, however, as yet heard from them any practical suggestions on the subject, or, indeed, anything more than wide general statements.
  820
  He concurred in the laudatory remarks on the speech of the hon. Member for Longford, who appeared to have entered deeply into the question of the comparative cost of the French and English armies. That was a subject which had not escaped the attention of the War Office; and he agreed with the hon. Member, that although it did not follow that we could reduce our expenses in the same proportion as the French, a comparison of the accounts of the two armies would disclose where our expenditure was in excess and might lead to useful results. But, as he had said, his noble Friend at the head of the War Office had not overlooked the importance of such an inquiry, and had received valuable assistance in conducting it. However large the cost of our army might be, it would not be difficult to show that the additional expense was to be attributed, not to extravagance, but to causes easily accounted for. With respect to the relative cost of a French and an English soldier, it was very difficult to arrive at an exact comparison, because he believed the French Budget did not include all the expenses which were incurred for the army, and which were embraced in our Estimates. It was necessary to take out of other parts of the French Budget some expenses which were properly chargeable to the army in order to make a fair comparison. The general conclusion at which the War Office had arrived was not very different from that which had already been stated to the Committee. It was that the French soldier cost about £47 18 s. 10 d. per annum, while the English soldier cost about £91 17 s. 2d. In France the expense of the staff, putting together various items scattered through the French Budget, might be stated at £1 12 s. 11 d. per man, whereas in England it amounted to £2 5s. 7d. The great secret of the higher expenditure in England as compared with that of France was to be found in the fact that not only our soldiers but also all persons connected with the administration of military affairs, were better remunerated for their services than the same class in France. In the French War Office, for example, there were 479 employés, with salaries ranging from £72 to £1,000, There were no fewer than 382 whose salaries did not exceed £144 per annum. He did not know whether any hon. Member was prepared to say that we could find gentlemen capable of performing the responsible duties intrusted to the officials in our War Office for so small an

  821
  amount of remuneration. He did not believe we could; at any rate, it had hitherto been found impossible to do so. Again, taking the items in the French Budget for pay, allowances, beer and wine, recruiting service, gymnastic and musketry instruction, good conduct money, and other matters, and comparing them with the corresponding items in our Estimates, the result was, that the French soldier cost £18 4s. 10 d., and the English soldier £30, It thus appeared that the cost of the English soldier was very nearly double that of the French soldier; and that proportion might he said to run through the whole comparison. Moreover, it ought to be borne in mind that a great part of the administration of the French army was carried out regimentally, and not departmentally, as with us, and hence the charge for actual pay and allowances should be taken at a lower rate as regarded the French army and at a higher rate as regarded the English than appeared on the face of the comparisons laid before the Committee. The hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) had referred to a charge of one farthing per week against infantry officers, and, in connection with it, had accused the Government of practising a miserable economy. It would be found, however, on inquiry, that the charge in question had been in existence for a great many years.
  COLONEL NORTH: Not with respect to infantry officers. The date of the order applicable to them is the 16th of October last.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, the deduction had been made in the case of cavalry officers ever since 1815, and it had only been extended to infantry officers when the latter received the advantages for which it was originally enforced. The hon. and gallant Member had also asked him a question with respect to cooking. In reply, he had to stale that the greater part of the item—£1,460—would go in extra pay to sergeants-instructors, of whom there were now 170, and the number was being increased. A considerable saving had been effected in the article of fuel, chiefly in consequence of the improvements made in cooking, which improvements were mainly due to the exertions of the sergeants instructors. The hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Henry Willoughby) suggested that the Vote might be very advantageously subdivided, He did not exactly see how. A great many of these items were very small, and they were given in great detail.
  822
  It would be perfectly competent to more that the Vote be reduced by any one of them, if it was considered desirable; but the great bulk of the Vote was for the pay of the men, and he did not see how that could he advantageously subdivided. The form of the Estimates had been altered only two years ago, Hon. Members were generally agreed that a great improvement had been effected in the form in which the Estimates were now presented to the House; but if it was thought that any real advantage would be obtained by a greater subdivision, he did not suppose there would be any great difficulty in carrying it out. The hon. Member for Lambeth had asked a question about gymnastics. They had taken a very small Vote under that head, but he believed it was the commencement of a system to the army which he thought would be most important. A Committee had inquired into the whole subject of gymnastics as carried out in the armies of other nations, and they had reported that they were of opinion that it would be of immense advantage to the soldier if we had facilities for putting recruits through a regular course of gymnastics as part of their drill. Gymnastics for the amusement of the soldier were, no doubt, beneficial, and they were good in the way of providing a healthy recreation; but what was really required was that the soldier should go through a certain course in proportion to his strength as a part of his drill. It was difficult to estimate the advantage that would be attained by developing the muscles of our troops, and enabling them to undergo hardships to which many now succumbed. He regretted very much he had not been able to lay on the table the Return for which the gallant General (General Peel) had moved, and which he certainly did hope to be able to produce before proceeding with the Estimates. But if that right hon. and gallant General had been present, and he was sorry he was not, he would he was sure have agreed with him, that it was not desirable to postpone the Committee on the Army Estimates until he was able to lay on the table a Return which had been longer in preparation than he anticipated. The fact was, that although it was very easy to tell the number of men enlisted in particular years, it did not at all follow from these numbers that that was the number of men who would be entitled to take their discharge at the end of ten years. For instance, ten years ago, during the Crimean war, a very large number enlisted under the

  823
  Ten Years Act, but a very large number of these men died in the Crimea; a very large number, when discharged, were re-engaged, and a considerable number had died since then. Therefore, the large number of men enlisted that year did not represent the number of men entitled to take their discharge this year. The right hon. and gallant General said he had felt considerable apprehensions in regard to the number of men taking their discharge this year. Their information was not complete up to the present time, and the only way in which they could estimate the number that would probably be entitled to their discharge would be by considering the effect of the Limited Enlistment Act on previous years. They had Returns of the effect of the Enlistment Act up to the year 1860. Up to that time, 7,335 men had completed their term of service, and were therefore entitled to take their discharge. Of these, 3,845 were re-engaged; leaving 3,490 who were discharged. Of these 3,490, 650 re-enlisted within six months, and the total loss up to 1860 was only 2,340 men. This had been going on three years and a quarter, the annual loss was therefore only 860 men. There was no reason, he was aware of, to suppose that a larger proportion of men were about to take their discharge than in the three first years when the Act came into operation. They might assume that the same proportions would be maintained. It was quite true, as stated by the right hon. and gallant General, that considerable apprehensions were felt by the Commander-in-Chief and the officers of the army as to the number of men the army was likely to lose; but, although they were under some apprehension, the Commander-in-Chief and the Adjutant General had not estimated the number of men who would be entitled to take their discharge this year at more than 10,400. Now, applying the calculations he had just made to that number, the army was not likely to lose more than 4,000, retaining 6,000 of that number in the ranks; 4,000 would be the total loss at all likely to occur in the ensuing year, owing to the operation of the Limited Enlistment Act; and he asked the Committee to consider for a moment the advantages they had up to the present time enjoyed connected with it. By the Returns of 1850, 1851, and 1852, it appeared that the annual deaths in the army were over 29 per 1,000, while according to the same; Returns of 10 years subsequent, 1860,
  824
  1861, and 1862, the deaths were reduced to 18 per 1,000, showing in the death vacancies of the army a reduction of 11 per thousand. Now, the average number of men serving during the last years was 195,730, and the difference of the two rates of mortality would cause in these numbers an annual saving in death vacancies of 2,200 men. He was quite aware that they could not attribute all that saving to any particular cause. No doubt, the improved sanitary and medical regulations had done something, and he hoped a great deal; but the great bulk of the saving of 2,200 in the death vacancies annually was to be attributed to the fact that in 1860, 1861, and 1862, we had a much younger class of men than in 1850, 1851, and 1852. After our army had suffered great losses in the Crimea and the Indian mutiny, a very large number of young men joined it. Still it was quite evident that the army was to a certain extent composed of younger men, and, therefore, of a class of men less likely to die rapidly. In that view he was borne out by some medical statistics which had been drawn up, from which it appeared that in the army the number of deaths of men under 30 years of age was 7.06 per 1,000, while of men between 30 and 40 it was 15.99 per 1,000. In India the comparison was still more striking, for serving in India and China the mortality of men under 30 was 25.66 per 1,000, and of men between 30 and 40 it was 43.79 per 1,000. It was clear, therefore, that in an army composed of younger men the mortality was less than among older men. Against the loss occcasioned by the discharge of the 10 years' service men, must be set the saving arising from the diminished mortality. As he had before said, some years' further experience of the working of the Act would be necessary to ascertain what were its actual results. When the Legislature passed that Act it must have intended that a certain number of soldiers should take their discharge under it at the expiration of 10 years' service. But, besides the actual gain to the service by the diminished mortality, there were many other ways in which that subject must be regarded. There could be no doubt that men who had served for 10 years in the army must have been improved by the training they had received, and as they would generally remain in the country they might be available for re-enlistment, should an emergency arise. Still, in the uncertainty which ex-

  825
  isted as to the actual number who would take their discharges, and the certainty that a larger number than hitherto would be entitled to avail themselves of their right, Lord De Grey had had under his consideration a measure which, he hoped, would have the effect of inducing a larger proportion to re-enlist. It was hoped that the necessity for such additional inducement would only be temporary, but it had been decided to offer to the soldier who re-enlisted, not only the bounty which he would now receive, but also an additional £1, which would be the cost of a recruit to replace him. It was also intended to encourage the re-enlistment of soldiers who had taken their discharges, by extending the period of re-enlistment for six months after the discharge to twelve months, and then to allow them to reckon all their past service towards a pension on twenty-one years' service. The right hon. and gallant General (General Peel) had said he thought that alarm must have existed upon the subject, or the authorities would not have been induced to lower the standard in a time of peace. That measure, perhaps, was hardly necessary, and was not caused by the expectation of a greater number of vacancies, but the recruiting was proceeding at a slower rate than was desirable. Much of that slowness was attributable, he believed, to the stringency of the medical regulations, which threw the whole travelling expenses of a recruit rejected by the regimental surgeon upon the surgeon who had originally passed him. The consequence of that regulation was that the surgeons attached to the recruiting staff were over careful in passing recruits, and in order to encourage recruiting so as to obtain the ordinary number, it was intended to relax the regulation he had referred to, and to reduce the standard by one inch. The right hon. and gallant General had alluded to the item of levy money. It must be admitted that that item was not so clearly stated in the Estimates as it might have been. The item was made up in the following manner: — The levy money at home, £32,200, was for 15,000 recruits, and was the real expense of raising that number. The £5,800 for Indian depôts was the same charge for 2,700 men. But the item of £27,000 to make good casualties in India, ought not properly to have been called levy money. Of that amount only £9,000 was really levy money for 4,000 men, but the remaining £18,000 was for the passage of men to India, The
  826
  gallant General had inquired whether it was intended to pay the extra bounty to men who re-enlisted in India. The fact was, the Indian Government did pay the extra bounty, and it was right they should, as they saved the cost of the passage home of the men who re-enlisted. With respect to the capitation charges, they were, as the gallant General was aware, the result of a comparison of the gross charges paid by the Indian Government with the total number of men stationed in India. That rate would expire in April, 1866, when they could revise it on much more correct data than they had possessed at the time that the rate was first adopted. They sometimes thought at the War Office that they were losing money by it; but he believed that they would find that there had not been much either gained or lost. The explanation of the great increase of furlough pay was that the furlough regular turns for officers only came into force just before the Indian Mutiny. Of course, during the Indian Mutiny, very few of the officers took, advantage of those regulations, and, therefore, it was impossible in the first year to arrive at any correct estimate.
  GENERAL PEELsaid, he wanted to know whether the supplementary Estimate of £40,000 for the yeomanry, was the exact sum that appeared in the original Estimate. The ground upon which the noble Lord had consented to call out the yeomanry was that the war in New Zealand was nearly at an end, and he should like to hear whether the sum of £40,000 was the saving from that cause.
  LORD HOTHAMsaid, he desired to say a word upon the Limited Enlistment Act. The opening observations of the noble Lord upon that subject had afterwards been materially diluted by the statement, that in consequence of the number of men who might claim their discharge at the end of their period of service, the Secretary for War had thought it necessary to offer inducements to these men beyond those to which they would have been previously entitled. The inducements that would have to be given, would depend very much upon the service on which the men were engaged. One of the objections which he had always entertained to the Act, that it might be the cause of the country being taken by surprise by great numbers of men leaving the army at times when it was very inconvenient to part with them, had, at length, been acknowledged by the Go-

  827
  vernment. At the close of the Peninsular war a large number of men, whose service had expired, claimed their discharge, and he well remembered being employed for three days in the duty of counting out the bounty monies to the men to induce them to re-enlist, at the rate of £16 16 s. per man. He had the honour two or three years ago to be employed as Chairman of the Royal Commission on the subject of recruiting for the army, and after a good deal of information had been obtained, it appeared to the Commissioners that, although there might not be any necessity for repealing the Limited Enlistment Act as it stood, yet inasmuch as a man was, perhaps, in the best of his soldier's life when he could claim his discharge under that Act, there was no reason why those who were willing to enlist for fifteen or sixteen years, should not have the opportunity of doing so. It was a mistake to suppose that men enlisted from a military feeling, or from a fondness for military life; they enlisted, for the most part, under the pressure of private circumstances; and there were very few who cared for what period they were to serve, or to whom it would be any inducement to enter for ten years rather than for fifteen. On the contrary, many were deterred from entering the army, now that the period of service was only ten years, by the fear that at the end of the time they would be thrown upon the world without any means of support. The Government might, without the slightest interference with the Limited Enlistment Act, to which they were very much attached because it was a favourite project of Lord Panmure's, carry out this recommendation of the Commission.
  COLONEL DICKSONsaid, that when he found that there was a reduction of only £215,000 upon an expenditure of nearly £15,000,000, and that the supplementary Estimates for the embodied militia amounted to a much larger sum, he thought they could not look with much favour upon the economy of a Government, the Chancellor of the Exchequer of which had, the other night, given them so severe a lesson upon the subject, especially when they found that that economy was accompanied by the reduction of 1,500 men belonging to the most valuable portion of the service. In the War Office the increase for clerks was £4,000, and in that monstrous establishment 409 clerks were employed at an average salary of £270 a year. There were
  828
  two kinds of economy—the one of expenditure and the other of management—and he wished to call the attention of the noble Lord to the advisability of not making the reduction of six men and four horses per troop of cavalry, and he hoped the noble Lord would take the matter into his most serious consideration. If the army really was to be reduced, 816 trained cavalry soldiers and 1,372 artillerymen were not exactly the men who should be selected for that purpose. The proposal only showed that they ought not to have at the War Office men unconnected with the service. The noble Lord would acquit him of any personal allusion, for when they considered the noble Lord's position — when they remembered that, with the whole world at his feet, the noble Lord had renounced the frivolities of life—they could not but regard such a course as being alike honourable to himself and advantageous to the country. He considered, however, that when men who had no practical knowledge came to decide upon such arrangements as the one proposed, they ought to consult those whose professional experience and education would have enabled them to form a trustworthy opinion upon the subject. The reduction of six men and four horses per troop would be most disadvantageous to the efficiency of the cavalry regiments. It might appear anomalous to say that horses were the less important part of a cavalry regiment, and it would have been better to have taken off double the number of horses to the same number of men. At present the strength of a cavalry regiment was 621 men and 400 horses, and yet it was almost impossible—the casualties averaging from 160 to 200 men—on any occasion to mount the whole of the horses. The fewer horses there were, the more they could be attended to, and the better instruction would the men receive. A horse, too, could be purchased at any time, and it would be ready for the ranks in six weeks or two months; but a man could not be replaced under a year and a half. If reduction were essential, it would be better to reduce six horses and four men, but it would be still better to leave the men as they were.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that the proportion of men to horses in which the reduction was being made was the proportion previously existing in the cavalry, so that if it were wrong, then it must have been wrong before. He quite admitted that at the War Office they were

  829
  not always qualified to judge of these matters, but when that was so they sought advice from those at the Horse Guards who were competent to judge. He did not mean to say that the Commander in-Chief or the Adjutant General would recommend the reduction of the army, But, when once that reduction was decided upon, the purely military authorities were consulted as to the best way of carrying it out. In this caso, the Adjutant General, than whom he did not think there could be any better authority, was of opinion that the efficiency of these cavalry regiments was not impaired by the proposed reductions, further, of course, than by the numerical decrease which would take place in their strength. Since the Crimean war, there had been a great change in the organization of our cavalry force, and a considerable increase in the strength of the regiments. Formerly a regiment of cavalry consisted of three squadrons; now it consisted of four. In 1853 the number of privates in the regiment was 304; in 1863 it was 504, and the reduction proposed would bring it down to 456. The force of cavalry was 9,132 in 1853, and in 1863 it was 11,331. He did not think that any just complaint could be made as to the manner in which the reduction was to be effected. With regard to the artillery, it was the fact that in the enormous French army there were no more than 30,000 or 40,000 artillerymen, while in our army there were 20,000.
  COLONEL NORTHsaid, the noble Lord seemed to forget the fortifications, and how they were to be manned.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: By the militia and Volunteers.
  COLONEL NORTH: The militia and Volunteers! Oh, oh!
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he wished to ask the reason for the increase of the Vote for fire brigade, musketry warders, works in the field, &c., from £500 in the last year to £3,700 in the Estimates before them.
  THE MARQESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, his only explanation was that he supposed the sum taken last year was not found sufficient.
  Vote agreed to.
  (2.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £1,319,047, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of
  830
  the Commissariat Establishment, Services, and Movement of Troops, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, inclusive."
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, that the Vote stood upon the Estimates at £1,352,047.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that was one of the Votes alluded to by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, when he stated that the extra cost involved in calling out the Yeomanry would not cause an increase on the total Estimates. The Vote had been reduced by £33,000—a reduction warranted, as the Government thought, by the accounts from New Zealand. That reduction was chiefly in the items for commissariat transport to the colonies, which was taken at a very high rate indeed, because while the army was actively engaged in New Zealand, the cost of transport was enormous. There might be a considerable saving on the Estimates which had reference to war in New Zealand, although the war might not come to a conclusion for some little time. The Estimates were framed on a supposition that the war would continue over the whole of the financial year; and though the war was not yet at an end, there was reason to believe that it would not last for more than a year from the date of the last accounts, which dated hack for a considerable period. The Government had estimated that the war would continue to April, 1865, and its cessation before that period would cause a corresponding decrease in the Estimates.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid he wished to ask, what was the reason of the great increase of £46,000 in the cost of forage?
  MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he thought the item for buildings and incidental expenses connected with the commissariat excessive.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that the increase in the item for forage was due to the high price of it in New Zealand. There were commissariat branches in all parts of the world, and the officers had a variety of duties to perform, and the amount referred to by the hon. Member for Lambeth was very reasonable.
  MR. HUNTsaid, he thought it desirable they should report Progress. For the sake of regularity he would suggest that, as an alteration had been made in the amount of

  831
  the Vote, an amended Estimate should be submitted.
  MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHsaid, he took the same view. He would also observe that the charge for provisions was very high.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, an explanatory paper had been published on the subject of the increased price of provisions in certain parts.
  COLONEL BARTTELOTsaid, he was quite surprised at the amount charged for forage. How many horses were there in New Zealand?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he could not tell the exact number of horses there, but there could he no doubt that forage was very scarce, as it had been found necessary to send out a certain kind of it from this country.
  MR. ARTHUR MILLSurged the Government to prepare an amended Estimate. He believed the cost of the New Zealand war had been much underrated, and at the end of the year it would be found to be nearer a million than half a million.
  MR. HUNTsaid, he would move that the Chairman should report Progress.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, the original Estimate was framed on the supposition that the war would last for three quarters of a year from that month, but later advices had led them to believe that it would be concluded in a shorter time.
  MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHsaid, he wanted to know the items on which a reduction had been made.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, he hoped the Committee would not insist upon reporting Progress. Estimates of future expenses were necessarily conjectural, as were those of savings. The fact simply was that they thought, from the latest advices, that the war would not continue as long as they at first imagined.
  MR. HUNTsaid, he wanted an explanation of the items of reduction.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, the chief reduction was in the item for commissariat transport. There was further a reduction in the cost of forage for the colonies, and also in the charge for provisions.
  MR. ARTHUR MILLSsaid, there would be a difficulty in comparing the items with those of the last and of the next year, if no new Estimate were prepared.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONobserved, that there would be a sum total for this year to be set against that for next year.
  ADMIRAL DUNCOMBEsaid, he thought previous notice ought to have been given of the reduction of an Estimate.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEsaid, that the remark of the noble Viscount opposite, though true as regarded the Appropriation Act and the total amounts, yet, on a comparison of the Estimates of one year with those of another, it was more convenient that they should know what the items were.
  Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"—(Mr. Hunt,)—put, and negatived.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  (3.) £596,694, Clothing.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he had tried for the last three or four years to obtain from the Government the prices at which the army was clothed, but he had never received any satisfactory reply on that point. He believed the reason was that the accounts were not kept as they ought to be. The system of a great central establishment for clothing the army was a very costly one, and that, under the existing system, the clothing for the army cost double what it otherwise would. Mr. Hume used to find fault with the system of Government establishments, and used to protest that, except in special cases, Government should not undertake any manufacture. He wished to know whether the accounts of these establishments were kept on any system, and whether the noble Lord could state the prices of the articles manufactured?
  MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he wished for an explanation of the item of £13,000 for the purchase of buildings for inspecting contract clothing. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Member that the cost of clothing the army was excessive, and ought to be diminished.
  MR. O'REILLYsaid, he gave a preference to the system of clothing adopted in the French army, where the materials were supplied to the different regiments and manufactured by the men themselves. The result was that the clothes of the French soldier were of better materials than those of our troops—they fitted better, and were supplied at a more economical rate. In the Sanitary Report on the Indian army it was proved that the men suffered very much from the misfits of shoes sent out by the contractors. He would press on the Government the advantage of employ-

  833
  ing the soldier in his idle hours in some trade. From the Report of the Committee it appeared that all the officers examined were in favour of this except Sir George Brown, who maintained that when the soldier was not on drill he might spend his time in the canteen. Sir George Brown was decidedly opposed to the soldier being employed in trade. [An hon. MEMBER: He said nothing about the canteen.] He said that after drill the soldier should have his time to himself. It would be a great improvement if the clothing were made, as in other armies, by the soldiers themselves. He besought hon. Gentlemen who objected to Government establishments to have a care what they did. It was desirable to keep up a system of promotion in the army, and these central establishments offered to soldiers a sort of promotion to which the degree of their attainments rendered them eligible.
  MR. CARNEGIEobserved, that when the hon. Member for Longford drew a comparison between the French army and ours, it should be recollected that the French army was raised by conscription and ours by voluntary enlistment. The French army, therefore, had a much larger number of skilled mechanics than our own. He had always found there had been ample employment for all tailors and shoemakers in making alterations and repairs, without setting them to actual making of regimental clothing. If the clothing were attempted to be made in the regimental workshops, he believed it would not be attended with good results. He quite agreed as to the advisability of rewarding efficient non-commissioned officers, but he did not see how the introduction of the system of manufacturing in regiments the clothes to be worn by the soldiers would at all tend to that desirable end.
  COLONEL NORTHsaid, that the duty required from the English soldier was much more than that required from the foreign soldier. He would also observe that if there was one thing more than another which would give offence to officers and soldiers in the army, it would be interfering with the buttons and facings of their uniforms. Civilians had no idea what were the feelings in the army on that subject, and he therefore hoped the day was far distant when the Government would interfere in such matters.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he believed it to be the opinion of many French officers that their own system was a bad
  834
  one. No fewer than 30,000 men were employed in making up clothing and shoes for the French army, and about 1,000 in making caps. These men never took part in action, or left the depots of the different regiments. Was the clothing of our army badly made just then? He did not think so. It was much better made than it used to be when the colonels of regiments had it made up and got a profit by it. Then nearly every suit had to be unmade and made up again in order to fit the men. It would be much better to leave the present system as it was, than attempt to make the clothing and shoes of a regiment by those who ought to be fighting men.
  MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he wished to know whether it would not be more economical to hire buildings for their manufactures than to build great establishments at Pimlico?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONadmitted that the sum required for new buildings in Pimlico was very large, but those buildings were finished, and he could not see how it could be more economical to hire buildings when they had got what they wanted. It was said they could not tell the cost of any article; but they knew the cost of materials and the other expenses, and, therefore, they could calculate the cost of the articles made. Since they had manufactured clothing themselves, the cost of that portion which was still got from contractors was materially diminished. In 1859 the contract price of a private's tunic was £1 1s., but in 1863 it was only 16 s. 5d., such reduction being caused by the Government competition. Comparisons had been made between the cost of clothing in the English and the French armies; but, even admitting that the French soldier was equally well clothed as our men, it was certain that he did not receive so many articles of clothing, and had to wear them much longer. He really thought the clothing of the English soldier was the point least open to attack.
  GENERAL PEELsaid, he was surprized to hear complaints of the clothing, as he had thought that if there had been any improvement in any department of the army, it wan in the clothing. When he established the Pimlico manufactory he believed experience would prove what it had done, that by that means army clothing would be produced both better and cheaper. He thought that the Royal Artillery had always made their own clothes.

  835
  When he filled the position of War Secretary he had caused Returns to be made, showing the expense of the clothing in every regiment in the army, and he should be glad if such a Return were placed before Parliament every year. It would afford much useful information.
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he believed that the establishment at Pimlico clothed 30,000 men, besides the Irish constabulary and the London police, but he did not think that one establishment would be sufficient to clothe the whole army. Although he did not object to a moderate establishment to operate as a check upon contractors, he deprecated too large an establishment as uselessly expensive.
  MR. HUNTsaid, there appeared to be a reduction in the cost of the clothing. Tunics that formerly were charged a guinea, were now supplied at 16 s. 5d. If they had had published the cost of the clothing in 1859 in the present Estimates, they would have been able to have formed some idea whether the new clothing department had had any effect in reducing the expenses in that department.
  MR. CARNEGIEsaid, he wished to call attention to the item with regard to clerks. The military store clerks appeared to have been got rid of and pensioners employed in their stead.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEasked, what was the meaning of the entire abolition of the military store clerks? A number of clerks had been engaged for a considerable time as temporary clerks, but he believed it was the feeling of the late Sir George Lewis and former Secretaries for War, that it was desirable to absorb them as much and as often as possible into permanent clerks. He asked if all the temporary clerks in the department had been so absorbed, or if they had been disposed of in any other way. Temporary clerks, so called, but who had discharged their duties as such for a number of years, and as such they were deserving of much consideration, should be dealt with tenderly.
  MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHsaid, that taking the number of men in the Estimates, and dividing with them the cost of the clothing, it gave a sum somewhat less than £4 for each man. He, however, admitted that that was not a fair way of arriving at the individual cost.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, there had been no alteration in the Pimlico staff. Some of the store clerks had been removed, and absorbed in other de-
  836
  partments, as vacancies occurred; but he was not aware until that moment, that any of them had been only temporary clerks.
  Vote agreed to.
  (4.) £611,165, Barracks.
  COLONEL NORTHasked, to what cause the saving in the use of fuel, referred to in the Vote, was to be attributed?
  COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he wished for an explanation of the alteration with regard to the payment of the ranger of the Curragh of Kildare.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that as the Curragh had become a military station, it was thought better to transfer the charges to the military department, instead of continuing them with the office of Woods and Forests. The Curragh, up to that time, had hitherto been held by the Crown at a nominal rent, but now it was proposed to take a lease of the property. In answer to the question of the hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North), the saving in the fuel had been effected partly by the use of improved grates in the barracks, and, still more, by better management in the cooking department. The plan of allowing the men a profit upon the price of the fuel burnt under the regulation quantity had in many cases been eminently successful.
  COLONEL NORTHasked the amount of the pay and allowances of the Inspector.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, the Inspector's (Mr. Marriner's) salary was £150 a year, and his travelling expenses actually expended. Captain Ross, Assistant Quartermaster General at Aldershot, who was not exclusively employed in the cooking department, was included in the general staff, the expense of which, when completed, would be about £1,750.
  Vote agreed to.
  (5.) £45,433, Divine Service.
  (6.) £40,549, Martial Law.
  LORD HOTHAMsaid, that although he could count a length of service in the House, only exceeded by that of the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government, and, he believed, by that of two other hon. Members, he could truly say he had never risen with so much reluctance as he felt on the present occasion. That reluctance proceeded from many causes, but he would trouble the Committee with, only two—one was, because the question was one of military discipline, and

  837
  the other, because he had to take exception to the conduct of the two high individuals to whom the Queen, in the exercise of her Prerogative as head of the army, had confided its management, and who it had always been both his desire and his habit to support. He felt, as he always had felt, that except under circumstances of an; extraordinary nature, questions of military discipline were not adapted to the consideration of popular assemblies; but Her Majesty's Government, having asked for a grant of money to cover the expenses of the late court-martial at Aldorshot, had created the necessity for a discussion, which it was impossible to avoid. If any hon. Member were of opinion that the money so asked for had been unnecessarily or wastefully expended, or that in its expenditure the efficiency of the service for which the House was called upon annually to sanction the disbursement of such enormous sums had been injured, it would be his imperative duty to say so. He was glad to be able to say (and this was the only occasion when he would thus express himself) that to Sir Hugh Rose, Sir William Mansfield, and Colonel Crawley, he was a total stranger. He could, therefore, be influenced by no personal feelings in the course he was taking. He wished it also to be borne in mind that he stood there to speak his own sentiments, and not those of any one else. He had been asked by no one to be his mouthpiece, or to say a word on the subject. And, above all, he desired to disclaim all wish to shelter any one from the consequences of his misconduct; for in his (Lord Hotham's) opinion, every soldier should do his duty properly, and if he did it not, he should be compelled to do it, He believed that both the House and the country had great reason to complain of the conduct of the military authorities in withholding information which they must have had in their possession, and which ought, on every principle of justice, to have been published. He did not mean. to impute any intentional error to those high authorities to whom he had already referred, but he believed that they were appalled by the fire of the battery opened upon them by the hon. Gentleman the late Member for Brighton (Mr. Coningham) and others, that they thus became victims to the common misfortune of overanxious and over-sensitive minds, and that they did injustice from the fear of being thought not willing to do justice, and
  838
  wrong, from the fear of being accused of not doing right. It would be remembered that great excitement prevailed in the country during the last year, in consequence of information which came from India respecting the Mhow Court Martial, and that the subject was brought forward in this House by the hon. Member for Andover (Mr. Dudley Fortescue), on the 5th of June last year. On that occasion, appeals were made by the hon. Gentleman to the sensibilities of every one, and attention was particularly attracted to such sentences as these: —"The prisoners had been confined in a bomb-proof building, unfit for habitation," "more like an oven than a human habitation," that "these facts were not imaginary, but that he had drawn them from documents placed in the hands of the military authorities." The hon. Member also stated that as to the brandy which it was said Sergeant Major Lilley had consumed, "the evidence of the sentries and of the medical officers proved conclusively that there was not the slightest symptom of excess, and that this had been endorsed by His Royal Highness the Commander-in Chief." With regard to the prisoner's quarters, it was now a matter of public notoriety that General Sir William Mansfield, the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, was at Mhow in March, 1863; and that being so, he must have reported to the military authorities upon what he saw and knew to be the case on the subject, and information supplied by General Mansfield contradictory of the account given by the hon. Member for Andover must have been in possession of the Government at the time. Unless the noble Lord stated, of his own personal knowledge, that no such information was then possessed by the Government, he must be excused for remaining of that opinion. The noble Lord confirmed the greater part of what th hon. Member for Andover had said, and further stated — though his statement, strange to relate, seemed to have made no impression—"that the sergeant major had grossly derogated from his duty in not bringing to the knowledge of his commanding officer what was going forward in the regiment," and he assured the House that, "although he could not produce to them a victim, nothing would induce the Secretary of State to depart a hair's breadth from the strict rules and principles of justice." Soon after, it was announced that Colonel Crawley would be

  839
  tried by a court-martial; and subsequently, that he would be tried—not in India, but in England. A portion of the press took credit for having caused this change. It was monstrous, said they, that Colonel Crawley should be tried by a court nominated by Sir Hugh Rose, who had approved the proceedings of the court-martial at Mhow; and yet these lovers of justice said it was quite proper that the members of the court should be named by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, by whom Colonel Crawley had been condemned, in language such as he (Lord Hotham) never remembered being used towards an officer of Colonel Crawley's position, and to which it would be his (Lord Hotham's) duty, before he sat down, to allude. Several inquiries were then made as to the propriety of the course announced. The hon. Member for West Norfolk asked if it was legal, and if legal, whether it did not involve a reflection on, if not an insult to, the officers of the army in India. The hon. and gallant Member for Limerick (Major Gavin) said that he had, not long ago, served in India, and that he considered it as an insult to say that the case could not be tried fairly there. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli), with the natural feeling of an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, asked whether the expenses would not be very great. Of this there was no doubt, as was shown by the Vote of upwards of £18,000, now under consideration. On the 25th of June it was asked by the Member for Brighton, whether a second memorandum, embodying the opinion of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief on the Mhow Court Martial, had not been issued, to which the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) answered in the negative, adding, "no public memorandum at least." Following these inquiries, a right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bouverie) said, he wished to know distinctly whether any communication had been addressed to Sir Hugh Rose, through the Adjutant General, the purport of which was to qualify the memorandum issued by the Commander-in-Chief on the 18th of the previous December. And now he (Lord Hotham) came to a point of very serious importance—a point involving not only the proceedings of which he had spoken, but involving the relations of the Government with the House of Commons. In replying to the question of the right hon. Gentleman, the noble Lord stated that if he would put
  840
  the question on another day he would answer it, but he apprehended that he should be compelled to repeat the answer he had already given, "that there was no public or official memorandum existing on the subject excepting that which had been published." The inquiries made about the second memorandum attracted the attention of the public, and, curiously enough, on the very day when the noble Lord denied the existence of any second memorandum, there appeared in The Times a letter signed "Civilian," in which the writer said—
  "I believe I can assist Mr. Bouverie in describing the document bearing on the Mhow Court Martial which he asks the War Office to produce. Two memoranda, emanating from the Horse Guards, have been read by Colonel Crawley to the assembled officers of the 6th Dragoons. They are, therefore, clearly not private letters, but public documents, which the House of Commons is entitled to see. The first of them is dated December 18, 1862, and has been published; the second, which was communicated by Colonel Crawley to the regiment at Mhow about the end of April or the beginning of May, 1863, is probably the document which Mr. Bouverie wishes to elicit. I have a resumé of it before me. It cannot possibly be identical with the letter dated Horse Guards, February, 1863,' privately sent to the Commander-in-Chief in India by the Duke of Cambridge, which has since been produced, inasmuch as a private document of that nature would certainly not have been formally read to the assembled officers of any regiment."
  He believed that there was no public office the heads of which were not promptly informed of anything which appeared in the papers affecting or reflecting upon them; and therefore it was impossible to surmise that not one of the numerous gentlemen employed in the War Office had called the noble Lord's attention to that letter, and that he should not have renewed his inquiries whether he had not been misled as to the existence of the document in question. On the 29th of June— four days afterwards — the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bouverie) repeated his inquiry, so worded as apparently to prevent all possibility of mistake. He asked whether any communication or memorandum signed by the Adjutant General has been sent to the Commander-in-Chief in India modifying the opinion on the proceedings of the court-martial at Mhow contained in the memorandum of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, now upon the table of the House, or in any way relating to the same subject. To that inquiry the noble Lord replied—
  "The only document which at all answers the description of it given by my right hon. Friend

  841
  is a communication or memorandum which was last March forwarded by the Adjutant General to the Commander-in-Chief in India, and which was covered by private letters to Sir William Mansfield and Sir Hugh Rose. The private letters that covered the memorandum were marked 'Private,' and they were addressed, 'My dear Mansfield,' and 'My dear Rose.'… I hope I have made it sufficiently clear to the House that when I stated there was no 'public memorandum' on this subject I was perfectly correct,"
  This question touched very importantly the relations between the House and the Government. It would be recollected that, Government had a great advantage in respect of the production of papers. It was the practice to give implicit credence to the assurance of any Member of the Government in such cases. If a paper were asked for, and the Government said it was prejudicial to the public interest to produce it, then it was taken for granted that the answer was a proper one, and no Member would venture to push his inquiry farther; but it was a matter touching the relations of the House of Commons and the Government if it should turn out, after repeated denials of the existence of a particular paper, that that paper had been in the possession of the Government at the time its existence was denied. With respect to this document nothing further took place until the present Session, when he moved for the production of "any paper or memorandum other than the one previously presented," and the Committee would be surprised to learn that the Return to that Motion was the very identical paper for which the right hon. Member (Mr. E. P, Bouverie) had made such repeated applications last year, and the existence of which was so constantly and perseveringly denied. He could carry the matter a step further, because they now knew that the paper of March the 14th was an answer to a letter of Sir Hugh Rose of the 20th of January, which, as hon. Members would doubtless remember, appeared in the proceedings of the Mhow Court Martial. The importance of the paper was very great, for if it had been produced, the statement of the hon. Member for Andover, as to there never having been any suspicion, either before or during Lilley's confinement, that he had taken spirits, could have been flatly contradicted, It was written in reply to the letter of Sir Hugh Rose, enclosing the addendum of the medical officer of the Inniskilling Dragoons, dated the day after the post mortem examination, which said—
  842
  "In addition to my report of yesterday, I have the honour to add that it has been brought to my notice that the deceased was in the habit of drinking a considerable quantity of brandy daily while in arrest, and on inquiry I find this to be true. It is my opinion that this, in conjunction with the other exciting causes before stated, was calculated to increase the predisposition to apoplectic seizure of which he died."
  Having stated these things, the conclusion which he drew was, that this court-martial need not, ought not, and if the whole truth had been told, would not have taken place in England. The noble Lord would no doubt refer to the excitement which existed, but to this, he (Lord Hotham) would reply, that that excitement was mainly created by the silence of the Government upon these points. If they had told the House and the country what they knew, but what they carefully concealed, he did not believe that there would have been half the excitement, or any of the scandal which they had witnessed during the last twelve months, nor should they have had to pay a Bill of £18,000. But other reasons had been given for holding the court-martial in this country. One was, that "grave charges had been brought against Colonel Crawley in the public press and in Parliament on the authority of persons entitled to confidence." The hon. Member for Andover was entitled to be implicitly believed as to anything which he stated of his own knowledge, but as in this instance he had received his information from others, and as the Government had responsible officers whose reports they had already received, he did not think that that was any reason for departing from the ordinary course. Then it was said, that the refusal to hold the court-martial here would have operated against recruiting, but there might be found in the proceedings of the court-martial at Aldershot ample evidence to set at rest any such apprehension. Again, the Secretary of State for War and the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) had given as another reason for holding the court-martial in England, that Colonel Crawley had admitted and confessed that he had committed an act of inhumanity. But any one who would take the trouble. of looking at the Mhow Blue Book would see that what Colonel Crawley said was that "if" he had been guilty of the act imputed to him, or had had any knowledge of it, it would have been an act of inhumanity on his part. Was that a reason for holding the court-martial in this country? It was also said that an-

  843
  other reason was to be found in a letter from Lieutenant Fitzsimon, complaining of Colonel Crawley, which Paymaster Smales had delivered to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief. It was well known to be one of the first principles of military discipline, that no complaint should be forwarded otherwise than through, and accompanied by, the explanation of the commanding officer. And yet the Commander-in-Chief had received the letter in question from the hands of one, then only known as one just cashiered by the sentence of a court-martial, and had acted upon it without any previous communication with the Commander-in-Chief in India. And this was the more extraordinary, inasmuch as only a year before, on March 18, 1862, His Royal Highness had directed Sir William Mansfield to inform this same officer (Smales) that "he had been guilty of a great error and breach of discipline in forwarding a letter to the Secretary of State for War direct, instead of through his immediate commanding officer." When the court-martial met, Colonel Crawley earnestly prayed that he might be tried on every charge that had been made against him, but his prayer was not granted. Colonel Crawley then appealed again to the Commander-in-Chief, who replied, coldly, that it was not proposed to make any addition to the charges. Colonel Crawley then naturally thought that, at least, he would be allowed to show why he had done certain things of which he had been accused. The prosecutor objected, on the ground —first, that it would be irrelevant to go into these matters, and that if they did "the inquiry would be altogether endless." This was an unfortunate observation to proceed from the prosecutor. What would have been said of the Solicitor General if, when recently prosecuting seven foreigners (of whom five had since been executed) for piracy, he had made use of such language? He would have been execrated from one end of the country to the other; and yet, of what value would Colonel Crawley's life have been to him if he had been convicted of such charges as were brought against him? Then again, as to the prosecutor's reply. How was that to be characterized? He (Lord Hotham) had the advantage of possessing a large acquaintance among lawyers, and he had availed himself of it to ask whether the course pursued at the court-martial on Colonel Crawley would have been tolerated
  844
  in any court of law. They one and all declared that any attempt on the part of the prosecutor to introduce new matter in the reply would have been instantly stopped, and most probably reprehended, by the bench. What could have been the object of attacking, in the reply, the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Commander of the Forces in Bombay, who were not there to defend themselves, except to make a last expiring attempt to obtain on any terms a conviction, and to make such conviction apply to all that had been said and done against Colonel Crawley? When the result of the court-martial was known, every one expected that the Commander-in-Chief, in announcing it to the army, would deal handsomely with Colonel Crawley. He had been acquitted in the fullest and most honourable manner, without any defence except that which the prosecutor had made for him, and after a trial which would have been stopped in Westminster Hall, at the end of the prosecution, on the ground that there was nothing to go to the jury. He (Lord Hotham) felt sure that the Commander-in-Chief would take a wide and extended view of the whole of the proceedings, from their commencement to their end, and if it appeared that he had previously said against any persons that which they did not deserve, or in favour of others more than they deserved, he would take that opportunity of setting matters right, and putting everything before the army and the country in a way which no one could misunderstand. The object of military, like that of civil, punishment was not vengeance, but to deter others from committing the like offences. If a regiment or its officers were proved to be guilty of extraordinary misconduct, the fact ought to be published to the whole army. If, as in the present case, the commanding officer of a regiment was put on his trial and honourably acquitted, common justice required that the whole army also should be made cognizant of the fact. Cases of this kind were fortunately rare, but there were two which he would mention. In 1814, the commanding officer of the 10th Hussars was brought before a court-martial on the complaint of his officers, and although reprimanded on a point of small importance, the charges substantially failed. The proceedings of the Court being laid before the Prince Regent, he ordered the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of York, to announce His Royal Highness's opinion on the sub-

  845
  ject, which was that all the officers should be removed, and that the letter embodying his Royal Highness's commands should not only be read at the head of each regiment, but be entered in its order book. In the case of the 85th Regiment, also, in 1813, there was a solemn adjudication of the Prince Regent to the same effect. Surely, if there had ever been held a court-martial, the result of which ought to have been notified in the most solemn and formal manner, the late court-martial at Aldershot was one. No such notification, however, had been made to the army, nor had any thing appeared but a memorandum published in the newspapers— addressed, apparently, to no one, and remarkable for its deviation from the ordinary course of proceeding in being signed by the Military Secretary; whereas the universal rule was that all letters and orders on the subject of discipline should be signed by the Adjutant General. And when he looked at the contents of this memorandum, he (Lord Hotham) could not help saying that, considering that Colonel Crawley had been fully and honourably acquitted of the charges preferred against him, considering also the character he had received from innumerable witnesses—a character of which any officer might well be proud, it would have been more generous, and certainly more conducive to the good of the service, if instead of speaking of Colonel Crawley in the way he had done, His Royal Highness had seen fit to signify to the army his determination to support him in the exercise of his just authority, and to convey, privately, any further admonition which the case might have seemed to require. But how have matters been left by this memorandum? There remained the recorded and unrevoked opinion of the Commander-in-Chief that the regiment had always been in excellent order until Colonel Crawley took the command of it. The Committee, however, could not have forgotten a question which was put on the court-martial to which the prosecutor objected, and a letter which was asked for by Colonel Crawley, and of which, after two days delay, it was stated that it would be "detrimental to the public service" to admit the production. It was clear, therefore, what were the contents of that document, but in addition to this, it was also clear that His Royal Highness had been misled on this point, inasmuch as it was now matter of general notoriety
  846
  in India that, from the period of the arrival of the Inniskillings in that country, or shortly after, the state of its officers had been reprobated by Sir Henry Somerset, then Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, and by every, or nearly every, other general officer who had had the regiment under his command. And yet it was left on record that the Commander-in-Chief considered the regiment to have been in perfect order until it got into the hands of Colonel Crawley. And how stood the case as regarded Sir Hugh Rose and Sir William Mansfield? Personal compliments had, indeed, been paid them, and credit for good intentions given; but in no instance that he (Lord Hotham) had been able to discover, had any reliance been placed on their judgment. Sir Hugh Rose had reported, on the authority of Dr. Turnbull, Assistant Surgeon Barnett, and Mrs. Lilley, that the unfortunate Sergeant Major had, during his confinement, drank daily a sufficient quantity of brandy to "compromise" his life; and this was corroborated by two Inspectors General of Hospitals, Dr. Beatson and Dr. Linton. His Royal Highness gave his opinion that
  "Had Sir Hugh Rose been better acquainted with some of the facts of the Sergeant Major's case, he would have taken a different view of it."
  And again, His Royal Highness said that "there was no proof that he took brandy to such an extent as to cause his death." Sir William Mansfield had reported that the
  "Clandestine, unsoldierlike, and improper proceedings of the three non-commissioned officers might be fairly interpreted by Colonel Crawley into a conspiracy."
  And Sir Hugh Rose, in a letter dated April 16, 1863, referred to
  "Evidence in proof of a cabal on the part of the three non-commissioned officers having been already forwarded to the Horse Guards."
  His Royal Highness had given publicly his opinion that there seemed "not to have been a shadow of foundation for a charge of conspiracy." Again, Sir Hugh Rose had reported that Sergeant Major Lilley
  "Had, on more occasions than one, acted with great impropriety, and want of discipline; that he was not by any means the superior non-commissioned officer described by the Commander-in-Chief to have been."
  And that Sir William Mansfield had stated that he was "a very ill-behaved noncommissioned officer." And that there exists

  847
  "An official, recorded, and public proof of his misconduct already forwarded to the Horse Guards."
  Sir William Mansfield had also reported the use by Sergeant Major Lilley, of
  "Objectionable and opprobrious language, in presence of other non-commissioned officers, towards Colonel Crawley."
  That he
  "Hoped that there might be some mistake as to the use of those beastly and abominable expressions against his commanding officer, which had been attributed to him."
  And that he had ordered him to be deprived of his "situation of regimental sergeant major." Of these serious reports, the Commander- in - Chief had taken no other public notice than to say that
  "The character of Sergeant Major Lilley for sobriety and good conduct, previous to his arrest, seems to have been undoubted.
  All these circumstances were well known in the regiment, and every hon. Member could judge what effect was likely to be produced on the minds of the officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, when they found that the Commander-in-Chief had thought them undeserving of notice. But a great question still remained to be considered—namely, on what principles was the army, henceforward, to be governed. If it was to be governed on the principles which had been applied to this case, he (Lord Hotham) had no hesitation in stating that, before many years had elapsed, its discipline would be such as, to quote an expression of the Commander-in-Chief, "to render it worse than useless." An officer who received a commission in the army was bound to devote his best energies of mind and body to the service of his Sovereign, but he had a right to expect something in return. He had a right to expect that a liberal interpretation should be put on his actions — that allowance should be made for the difficulties under which he might be placed, and that he should receive protection and support from the Crown, at all events, until it had been proved that he had been guilty of any crime. That rule had clearly not been acted upon in the case of Colonel Crawley. The Government had had it in their power to protect him from much of the obloquy which had fallen upon him, but they had stood by, and by their silence allowed him to be condemned by public opinion for almost every offence, except cowardice and desertion, of which an officer could be guilty. He (Lord Hotham) need not tell the Committee how much,
  848
  in military operations, may depend on the exercise of promptitude and vigour in times of emergency. How could they expect officers to act with vigour and decision in such times, if they had to stop and think, not what should be done, but what the hon. Members for Brighton or Andover would say of them, and how much protection or support they would receive from their superiors!
  Sir Hugh Rose and Sir W. Mansfield were not "bloated aristocrats;" they had not got to their present high positions by influence or high connections, but as the result of their services in the field. They were officers who had rendered good service to their country at the time when the fate of the Indian Empire hung trembling in the balance, and to whom the country would look in any future war. He (Lord Hotham) took leave to say, that if they had been so utterly deficient in judgment as the orders issued from the Horse Guards had, not unnaturally, led the public to consider them, they ought, long since, to have been recalled. But although the authorities had not thought fit to remove them, they had allowed their representative at the court-martial to discredit the authority and to damage the character of these officers in the estimation of the army and the nation, by perverting their language and misrepresenting their conduct. He entirely agreed with the author of an able pamphlet, to which much reference had been made, in asking whether
  "It is in this manner that the authority and influence of Commanders-in-Chief are to be maintained in the eyes of their subordinates, and whether such treatment of such men is compatible with the well-being of the English army, or the safety of the Indian Empire."
  He (Lord Hotham) was deeply grieved to be compelled to make these observations, but the subject to which they referred was much too important to be allowed to pass unnoticed. What had been done by the Government had created general regret in the army, and it would require a long time, and a very different course of action, to restore to the Executive that confidence in its firmness and in its decisions which it ought to possess, and which had been so rudely and so lamentably shaken by its conduct in this case.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he hastened to dissipate the very natural apprehension of the Committee by stating at the outset that he did not intend to follow the noble Lord through the able but

  849
  very long statement he had made on the question of the trial of Colonel Crawley. It was with some surprise that he recollected that the noble Lord on a former occasion, when the Amendment was put that it was not expedient to produce any further correspondence on the subject, did not make a point of being present to return a negative to that question. [Lord HOTHAM: I was in my place.] Then he was still more astonished that the noble Lord did not cry "No!" [Lord HOTHAM: Does the noble Lord mean to say I did not?] At any rate, the noble Lord did not call for a division. No one could have assented to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite without also assenting to the principle he laid down, that such subjects ought not to be discussed in the House. Moreover, the noble Lord had an opportunity of expressing his views, but he made only a short speech, saying, as he understood, that he would not ask for more papers, and that he thought further discussion of the matter unadvisable. [Lord HOTHAM: No, no!] The noble Lord would not make his statement then, but waited for two or three weeks, and then delivered a very long speech, replying to many of the arguments used on the former occasion. What would be said if the hon. Member for Andover (Mr. D. Fortescue) took a week or two to consider the noble Lord's remarks, and then came down and answered them? The noble Lord asserted that the Government, when the subject was first brought before the House, were in the possession of information which ought to have enabled them to refute the great part of the hon. Member for Andover's charges. The other night he stated that the Government and the Horse Guards were no doubt in the possession of evidence which showed that the dwelling in which Sergeant Major Lilley died was one similar to that in which he would have lived if not in confinement. He regretted to find, in regard to his speech last year, that he either omitted to state that to the House, or, at least, that he mentioned it in such a manner that it escaped the notice of the reporters. He certainly never understood that the hon. Member for Andover wished to assert that Sergeant Major Lilley was confined in a black hole, or that the house differed from his ordinary dwelling. He was sorry, however, that he did not put the point to the House with sufficient distinctness last year. That was the only portion of the statement of the hon. Mem-
  850
  ber for Andover which last June he was in a position to dispute. As to the essential charge against Colonel Crawley, and that on which he was eventually tried—that he caused sentries to be posted in Lilley's quarters so as to render the punishment unnecessarily aggravating and severe—he had not then the materials on which he could contradict it. It was further said that there was a great deal of hesitation and delay about the production of papers. The fact was, that having to deal with such a mass of correspondence, the Government had great difficulty in knowing exactly what were the documents asked for. It had been asserted that it was wrong to give any papers at all; but the Government certainly desired to give only those which would enlighten the House. They were quite aware that the publication of one led to a demand for another, and that, therefore, it was very essential that none should be given except those which were absolutely necessary. As to the memorandum asked for, speaking on the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, he stated he did not know of any memorandum answering the description given of that required, except a private one. He believed that the memorandum asked for in the House was stated very clearly to be one in which the Commander-in-Chief modified the opinion given on the whole case in the first memorandum. His Royal Highness, conscious that he had never materially modified his first opinion, very naturally said he did not know of any memorandum of the kind. [Lord HOTHAM: What is the meaning, then, of the words, "very much modified?"] It was, he owned, unfortunate that these words were ever used, for they had led to great misapprehension. He believed many hon. Members and the public read those words without perusing the rest of the memorandum. The second memorandum modified was the Commander-in-Chief's opinion on Sir Hugh Rose'a remarks; but he did not think any document existed that materially modified his Royal Highness's view of the general merits of the case. As to the letter on which the noble Lord opposite laid so much stress, it was not a memorandum at all. His Royal Highness undoubtedly did not know what was the document which hon. Members wished to obtain when the delay arose as to the production of the memorandum. His Royal Highness, as he had told the House, was most anxious that all he had

  851
  written to Sir Hugh Rose modifying his opinion should be made known, and that led him to desire that certain passages of the letter referred to should, if possible, he given. The noble Lord was not correct in stating that the court-martial would cost £11,000 more than the House had yet heard of. He did not believe there was any sum including even the Indian allowances for witnesses in this country, of the slightest importance which was not comprised in the account already laid on the table. The noble Lord had complained of the narrow charge upon which Colonel Crawley was tried. Last year it was stated over and over again that Colonel Crawley was not responsible for the arrest. In that respect he was covered by the orders of his superior officer, but it was thought that there were circumstances connected with the manner in which the arrest had been carried out which ought to be made the subject of further investigation. Eventually that investigation assumed the form of a court-martial, and even before Parliament was prorogued last autumn the charges upon which it was intended to try Colonel Crawley were known. The noble Lord had also referred to the fact that the result of the court-martial was not promulgated in a general order. He did not know whether it would have been in accordance with precedent to issue a general order, but, at all events, the Commander-in-Chief had published a document in which the full and complete nature of the acquittal of Colonel Crawley was recorded, in which several hostile witnesses were severely censured, and in which others were subjected to punishment. It was not his intention to follow the noble Lord further. The whole question had already been decided, and he did not think any useful object would be gained by re-opening it.
  SIR WILLIAM FRASERsaid, he wished to call the attention of the Advocate General to what he submitted was the inexpediency of making the colonel of the regiment the prosecutor in the event of a court-martial upon an officer of his regiment. The practice was, in his opinion, most objectionable, as putting, it might be, a distinguished officer in an unpleasant position, and likely to breed ill-feeling in regiments. Supposing that an adjutant was brought before a court-martial and acquitted, how could the business of the regiment be properly carried on with the adjutant in daily communication with his
  852
  colonel who had tried, without success, to convict him of what had been laid to his charge. He trusted that some other arrangements would be adopted in future.
  MR. HUNTsaid, he thought that the whole question of the administration of military law required investigation. The present system worked well enough in ordinary cases, but, as had recently been proved, it broke down under unusual pressure. The duties of the Judge Advocate, he thought, wanted revision, for it was his duty to advise the prosecutor, whilst, at the same time, he was legal assessor to the tribunal that had to adjudicate on the matter. Surely a person who acted as assessor should not be connected with the prosecution; and probably it would be better to have a legal assessor to give his assistance to the court. It was also desirable that the practice of writing out questions should be done away with, and that witnesses should be subjected, when necessary, to a sharp cross-examination. There was another point as to the assistance given to a prisoner by legal gentlemen. If legal assistance was allowed to be given, why should it not be regularly recognized by the Court? In the case of Colonel Crawley, he was reprimanded by the Court for putting a certain question to; a witness, and he was obliged to explain that the question was not drawn up by him, but was first placed in his hands by the; gentleman who sat next to him—his legal assistant. Then the prisoner had to read a long defence, which was written for him by a legal gentleman the day before; but he did not see why, when the defence was to be made, the legal gentleman should not make his speech as in any other court. He thought the whole question of sufficient importance to be dealt with by a Royal Commission.
  LORD LOVAINEobserved, that the recent trial had shown the great inconvenience of the present procedure; because words had been placed in the mouth of an officer attributing injustice to one of the highest military authorities in India, and folly to another. With reference to the speech which had been read by the prisoner in this case, that it was quite clear, from a note that subsequently appeared in The Times, it had been sent to that newspaper before it was delivered in court. As published, it contained passages which were omitted when the speech was actually read before the court.
  COLONEL DICKSONsaid, he thought that the worst thing that could happen would be the introduction of an extra legal authority into courts-martial. He trusted that the time would never come when regimental or military courts-martial would be conducted by other than the colonel of the regiment; for, however much courts martial were blamed for their decisions, it generally turned out that they had been right after all. He hoped they had heard the last of the court-martial on Colonel Crawley. The continued discussion of the question was calculated to have a very deleterious effect upon the discipline of the army.
  MR. HEADLAMsaid, that when the subject was formerly before the House, he had expressed his opinion that in ordinary cases justice was well administered by courts-martial, but that the legal machinery of the Judge Advocate General's office was not sufficient to conduct such a trial as had lately taken place. At the same time, he could not admit many of the statements which had been made as to the manner in which that trial had been conducted; but that was a subject he would not go into at that time. It might be very easy to say that no legal assistance should be given, but he did not see how it was possible to preclude it. The whole subject of courts-martial was under consideration, and every effort would be made to place it on as sound and satisfactory a basis as possible.
  MR. HUNTsaid, he hoped that the noble Lord would take care that the Votes were amended in consequence of the favourable news from New Zealand.
  Vote agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
  Committee to sit again on Wednesday.

  CHURCH BUILDING AND NEW PARISHES ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.

    LEAVE. FIRST READING.
    THE ATTORNEY GENERALmoved for leave to bring in a Bill to consolidate and amend the Church Building and New Parishes Act.
    MR. HADFIELDsaid, he believed that the measure was intended to secure the payment of church rates in certain parishes. He thought that the Attorney General ought to explain its objects before he asked for leave to introduce such a Bill.
    THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, the Bill wag recommended by a Select Committee and the same as introduced last year. It would not in any way interfere with church rates. The law would be left as it stood. If any Amendments could be suggested he would be most happy to consider them.
    Leave given.
    Bill to consolidate and amend the Church Building and New Parishes Acts, ordered to be brought in by Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL and Sir GEORGE GREY.
    Bill presented, and read 1°. [Bill 61.]

    LISBURN ELECTION.
    MR. ADAIRsaid, he rose to move as a Resolution—
    "That the Minutes of the Proceedings of, and the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Lisburn Election Petition be laid before this House."
    The petition on the subject had been referred to a Committee, of which he was the Chairman. Up to the 22nd of March, the day on which the Committee adjourned, the proceedings had been regular and legal, and the evidence on both sides had been completed, and all that remained to be done was to hear the reply of the Petitioner's counsel on the whole case; but in consequence of the adjournment having, been made to a day which the statute did not authorize, a Report could not be made to the House, and the Committee also decided that they were unable to pass any Resolution. The Committee felt great regret at the position in which both parties had been placed. The petitioner had incurred great expense without obtaining that which he conceived he had a right to expect, the decision of the Committee as between himself and the sitting member, and owing to circumstances over which he had no control, he was afraid that the petitioner was without redress. With regard to the sitting member, he ventured to say that the result could hardly he satisfactory to him and his friends. He had been induced to make those observations because the circumstances attending the Committee had been such as were worthy of the consideration of the House, and it was for the House to decide whether some legislation was not necessary to remedy such a state of things.
    MR. HUNTseconded the Motion.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That the Minutes of the Proceedings of, and the Evidence taken before, the Select Committee on the Lisburn Election Petition be laid before this House."—(Mr. Adair.)
    MR. MACDONOGHsaid, the subject was one of considerable importance. He did not object to the production of the proceedings of the Committee, but resisted the production of the evidence as a thing unheard of and illegal. The Committee had not reported the evidence to the House, and, therefore, it would be irregular to lay such evidence before them. No sufficient reason had been urged for the adoption of the Motion. The proceedings of the Committee, and also of that House, with reference to Election Committees, were regulated by statute, and Mr. May's excellent work stated that the House had parted with its functions by the passing of the Act 11 Vict., and had delegated it to a Committee, and he would put it to the Attorney General to state whether the present proceeding was regular or not, and whether in these days of economy the House should be called on at ten minutes past one o'clock to discuss a subject which if carried would be irregular and entail useless expense. It was no party question, for the Motion had been moved by an hon. Member on the Government side of the House, and seconded by a Gentleman on the Opposition side. It was impossible to resuscitate that defunct Committee, and he objected to the publication of the evidence that had been taken in relation to a variety of matters connected with the election, unless it was strictly regular to do so. Two cases only of a similar character had occurred since the passing of the Act. One was the case of Great Yarmouth and the other Beverley. In the first case, the Committee declared the election void, and reported to the House that the place ought to be disfranchised. It was then ordered that the evidence should be laid upon the table of the House, but that was ordered to be done to enable the House to say if they would disfranchise the borough or not. With regard to Beverley, a similar course was taken in order to instruct the Attorney General to prosecute Mr. Glover for signing a false declaration. The Report of the Committee in each case was first laid upon the table, and the evidence was afterwards ordered to be printed and submitted to the House.
    THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he so far agreed with his hon. and learned Friend that this was no party question, and he hoped the House would not make it so. It appeared to him not to be irregular but in the highest degree regular and proper that the evidence taken by the
    856
    Committee should be laid upon the table of the House, and there was not one word n the Act which was an obstacle to its being done. There was a much greater reason for its being done in this case than there was in those which had been referred to, because an occurrence of an unprecedented nature had taken place. The Committee, with the best possible intentions, had miscarried, and were unable to come to a Report after they had taken all the evidence which had been adduced be-Fore them; and after the case, upon the evidence, was closed on both sides. What, therefore, was the House to do? Was the House not to inform itself of everything that had taken place regularly before that Committee whilst its powers were perfect and legal and nothing had occurred to suspend them? They had taken evidence to show whether bribery or corruption was or was not practised by the sitting Member; and it might be that it completely exonerated him and his friends and the constituents of the borough, or it might be that a state of things had prevailed in the borough which deserved the attention of the House. Under circumstances so unprecedented, it would be a dereliction of duty if the House did not take care to have all the information which the publication of the proceedings before the Committee could give them.
    MR. WHITESIDEsaid, he would appeal to the right hon. Gentleman the Speaker whether the Committee had not ceased to exist, and whether the present proposal was irregular. The Act said the Committee might report, and by the next clause they were permitted, after having first reported, to bring any matter in connection with their inquiry before the House, and take their opinion upon it, but it must be as a Committee. The Committee had ceased to exist, and therefore this proceeding was irregular. In the other House of Parliament it was enacted that if a Committee reported the existence of corrupt practices the House should recommend the appointment of a Royal Commission. But in this case there was no Report. Still, the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite said the House had the same authority to proceed as if there was a Report. If so, the last Act was useless. Was there, he asked, any precedent for taking steps on the Report of a Committee which had ceased to be a Committee?
    MR. COLLINSsaw no reason why the evidence should not be laid before the

    857
    House, for the use of those Members who desired to peruse it. No action could be founded on the evidence without a special Act of Parliament, and he did not think that any case would be made out for dealing by Act of Parliament with the borough of Lisburn. Still, if the House thought they ought to know all the circumstances of the case, the evidence could be printed and afterwards become lumber.
    MR. GEORGEsaid, he had no objection to the Committee setting themselves right with the House, but he did object to the evidence being printed. The Committee, when once appointed by the House, derived its power from the statute, and was no further under the control of the House. If a Committee neglected to perform its duties, and thereby became defunct, there was an end of it, and its proceedings. The very counsel for the petitioning Member in his book on election law said that in the case of an illegal adjournment the Committee was defunct. The Committee had never expressed an opinion. The investigation was in the nature of a criminal proceeding; and the law presumed the innocence of a man whose guilt was not proved.
    SIR GEORGE GREYsaid, there was no question of the appointment of a second Committee, nor as to the validity of the last election for Lisburn. The question was whether the Chairman, having reported that the Committee were not competent to proceed, the House had not a right to know what were their proceedings while they were a competent Committee under the Act of Parliament. The House did not call on the extinct Committee for the evidence, but upon the officer of the House, in whose custody that evidence was.
    MR. LYGONcontended that the evidence and the proceedings altogether of the Committee were all null and void. No action could be taken by the House except on the Report of the Committee, and in that case there was no Report. The Minutes ought to be laid before the House, because grave inconvenience might follow if that were not done. Upon that ground he was anxious that they should be produced, so that then they might take action, in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar failure of justice. He would move, as an Amendment, the omission of the words "and the evidence taken before."
    Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "and the Evidence taken before" —(Mr. Lygon.)
    SIR HERVEY BRUCEsaid, he was of opinion that the evidence could not be produced, because no one was in a position to say that the inquiry had been completed.
    MR. HUNTsaid, he hoped the hon. Member for East Worcestershire would withdraw his Amendment. This was a very anomalous and exceptional case. The evidence was complete. The sitting Member was not in this country, but his father, who was in the House, was anxious that the evidence should be printed.
    MR. WHITESIDEsaid, no answer had been given to the argument. The question for the House to consider was upon what ground it was that the evidence should be printed. He asked for information from the Speaker, the highest authority on the subject.
    MR. NORTHsaid, he considered it would be advisable to print the real facts that had come out during the inquiry, because they had already appeared in the newspapers in a garbled form. The House might possibly, on receiving the evidence, address the Crown for a Commission to inquire into the corruption of the borough.
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, that it was for the House to decide the question. If he had seen anything in the proposition contrary to the rules of the House he should have considered in his duty to call attention to it.
    MR. HASSARDsaid, he should support the Amendment on the ground that the Committee alone could decide upon the value of the evidence.
    Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    The House divided:—Ayes 114; Noes 22: Majority 90.
    Main Question put, and agreed to.
    Ordered,
    That the Minutes of the Proceedings of, and the Evidence taken before, the Select Committee on the Lisburn Election Petition be laid before this House.—(Mr. Adair.)

    THAMES CONSERVANCY BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. Hutt, Bill to amend the Laws relating to the Conservancy of the River Thames; and for other purposes relating thereto, ordered to be brought in by Mr. HUTT and Mr. PEEL.
    Bill presented, and read 1°. [Bill 60.]

    SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS (DUBLIN).
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the condition of the Scientific Institu-

    859
    tions of Dublin which are assisted by Government aid."—(Mr. Gregory.)
    Debate arising,
    Motion made, and Question, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"— (Mr. Whiteside,)—put, and negatived.
    Original Question put, and agreed to.
    Ordered,
    That a Select Committee be appointed, "to inquire into the condition of the Scientific Institutions of Dublin which are assisted by Government aid."—(Mr. Gregory.)
    And, on Monday, April 18, Committee nominated as follows:—
    Mr. GREGORY, Lord HENRY LENNOX, Sir ROBERT PEEL, Mr. LUKE WHITE, Mr. LYGON, Sir COLMAN O'LOGHLEN, Mr. COGAN, The O'CONOR DON, Mr. O'REILLY, Mr. DILLWYN, Sir EDWARD GROGAN, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. LEADER, Mr. LEFROY, and Mr. WALDRON:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.
    House adjourned at Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS— First Reading—Regius Professorship of Greek (Oxford) [H.L.] (No. 44).
Second Reading—Charitable Assurances Enrolments [H.L.] (No. 38).

REGIUS PROFESSORSHIP OF GREEK (OXFORD) BILL— [H.L.] (No. 44.)

  FIRST READING.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of presenting to your Lordships a Bill which I sincerely trust will meet with a favourable reception from the House. It is a Bill for the better endowment of the Regius Professorship of Greek in the University of Oxford. As your Lordships are aware, in the time of King Henry VIII., five Royal Professorships were founded in that University, and the Regius Professorship of Greek was one of the number. Similar foundations were also made in the University of Cambridge. The holders of the other four Regius Professorships at Oxford which accompanied the Regius Professorship of Greek have been more fortunate than the occupiers of that chair. To every one of them has been attached some ecclesiastical preferment, or some mastership or other endowment. To the Greek Professor there is nothing but the original stipend of £40 a year. That sum was at that time adequate, but it continues to the present moment, the only remuneration given for the Professor's labours and exertions in the cause of Greek literature. To each of the Regius Professorships of Greek and Hebrew in the University of Cambridge a statute, passed in the year 1840, has annexed a canonry in Ely Cathedral. Now, your Lordships are aware that in the ecclesiastical patronage of the Lord Chancellor are included several canonries—I think they are twelve in number—in the cathedral churches of Norwich, Rochester, Bristol, and Gloucester. The average vacancies are generally one in every six years; and as there has not been a vacancy for four years, there would be, according to the average, a vacancy in somewhat more than a twelvemonth from the present time. In consequence of recent circumstances, to which I will not further allude, it appears to me that it would be an act of justice, and also an act of general expediency, if one of those canonries in the patronage of the Lord Chancellor were annexed to the Greek Professorship at Oxford University. But in bringing in this measure I have not for a moment presumed to attempt to come to any understanding—much less to make any bargain—with the University of Oxford. In that body, and in its sense of justice, I have the greatest confidence; to it I bear the highest possible reverence and grati-

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  tude, and I have no doubt that a Bill which proposes to accomplish this endowment will be received by the University in the same spirit in which it is offered by the Crown and by the Ministers of the Crown; and I may be permitted to express a hope, and even an expectation, that the University of Oxford will, if this measure passes, hasten to provide for the present Regius Professor of Greek an adequate endowment until that canonry shall have fallen vacant, which, by the passing of this measure, I trust he will receive. In conclusion, I beg leave, my Lords, to move the first reading of the Bill.
  Bill for the better Endowment of the Regius Professorship of Greek in the University of Oxford, presented and read 1a. [No. 44.]

CHARITABLE ASSURANCES ENROL- MENT BILL— [H.L.](No. 38.)

  SECOND READING.
  LORD CRANWORTH, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, its object was to extend to a further period of two years the time of enrolment for charitable assurances, as provided under the 24 Vict. C. 9 and 25 Vict. c. 17. Within the last two years 1,146 more deeds had been enrolled than before, and there was a continual progress of enrolment going on. He also proposed that where the original deeds had been lost, as was often the case, and therefore where it was impossible to enrol them, the Clerk of Enrolments shall be required to enrol any deed appointing trustees of property the subject of such charitable trusts, or any deed reciting the original deed of conveyance, provided the deed required to be enrolled shall not bear date less than thirty years prior to such intended enrolment, and the enrolment shall be as effectual as if the original deed of conveyance had been duly enrolled.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsuggested that it would be necessary to ascertain beyond doubt that the original deeds had been lost, and sufficient time should be allowed to elapse before the right proposed by the Bill could be exercised.
  LORD REDESDALEthought that the time in which deeds might be enrolled should not be extended beyond one year. Under the first Bill one year was given, then two, and now it was proposed to give two years more. If they went on in that way they would never come to an end.
  Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

DENMARK AND GERMANY.

  RESOLUTIONS.
  LORD CAMPBELLrose to call the Attention of the House to the Correspondence upon Denmark and Germany which has been presented to Parliament; and to move—
  "That, in the Opinion of this House, if the Demand made by Denmark for Mediation, according to the Principle laid down in the Protocol of Paris, 1856, had been more decidedly supported by Her Majesty's Government, the Bloodshed and the other Evils already occasioned by the War in Denmark might have been prevented, and there would have been less Danger than there now is of a more extensive Disturbance in the Peace of Europe:
  "That, in the Opinion of this House, a Conference upon the Danish Question in order to lead to a practical Result ought to be accompanied by such Steps as may convince the Powers of Europe that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the Treaties in which the Duchy of Schleswig has been guaranteed to Denmark by Great Britain."
  My Lords, before adverting to the Resolutions I have put upon the paper, I cannot but thank the noble Earl on the cross benches (Earl Grey), for the declaration he elicited from the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary on Thursday last. I shall venture also to congratulate that noble Lord himself, on having, by what he then said, withdrawn, so far as it depended on him, all obstacles to Parliamentary debate upon this question. At no time, looking to the facts, was debate more practical and called for. A Conference impends. The very day is mentioned. As things stand, all the world proclaims its uselessness, and counts upon its failure. And it is certain that nothing will be done to give it better prospects of succeeding, unless Parliament is brought to bear on the Executive. Can it be said that Parliament by interfering will embarrass a proceeding which is doomed to fail, unless Parliament in some degree controls it. We cannot forget either that debate was long averted because the papers were not all completed; that the last of the series has only just been given to us at the very moment that the Conference is mentioned. If, under such circumstances, the Conference were made a pretext for arresting all discussion, it might well appear to be intended for that purpose; unequal as it seems to the accomplishment of any other.

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  My Lords, the first Resolution merely recites that, if the principle of arbitration laid down in the protocol of Paris 1856 had been insisted on more gravely by Great Britain, the existing bloodshed might have been prevented. And it cannot be denied, that the Danish Government impressed that principle upon our own. They did so in a despatch from Bishop Monrad, the First Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Bille, the Danish representative in London, dated January 5, 1854, to be found at page 523, of No. 4 in the correspondence. It cannot be said from what appears before us—it might, perhaps, from what is hidden —that Her Majesty's Government have acted on the doctrine so enforced. The despatch of Bishop Monrad is given both in French and English, and, therefore, we have no excuse for overlooking it. My Lords, this Resolution would not, I trust, appear an exaggerated tribute to the principle laid down in the Treaty of Paris. It cannot escape the House that that principle has never yet been recognized in action. There seems to be a steady disposition to overlook and to ignore it, whenever any opportunity occurs of giving it effect. The second Resolution states what is very obvious, that some further steps are necessary to give the Conference the prospect of succeeding it does not now enjoy. But in order to pave the way for such a proposition, it seems but natural and just to pass a guarded and a moderate opinion on the past diplomacy which this transaction has elicited. Had that diplomacy been one unbroken scene of tact, of energy, and of achievement, it might be uncalled for in the House to betray solicitude about the issue of the Conference. Unless what has lately happened afforded topics of regret, it might seem harsh to give an admonition on the future. Abrupt and irrelevant advice no doubt verges upon censure, at least it claims superiority. At the same time—harmonizing as they do—the Resolutions are independent of each other. The second may commend itself to those whose feelings are a bar to the reception of the other, and as the second bears upon the vital question of what ought to be done, my subsequent remarks shall be exclusively directed to it. And the very first point to be remarked is that the Conference abounds in elements of failure. What Power goes into it with any disposition to assist us? Austria and Prussia no longer profess a regard for the Treaty of 1852.
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  The Cabinet of St. Petersburg is too much allied with those of Berlin and Vienna to be counted on. Prince Gortschak off has declared in the very papers now before us, that they are acting, and that they ought to act in concert. All Europe recognizes the alliance, and sees that Poland is its victim. While Austria and Prussia are essential to the Czar, as regards the insurrection he is struggling with, he is not likely to control them. Can we rely on France when the language of its Government has more than once discouraged any Conference as useless; when they disclaim adherence to the Treaty of 1852, and point to universal suffrage in the Danish Duchies as the means of a solution? Sweden, no doubt, may be faithful to the objects we pursue. But it is clear, in spite of her support, that if France and Prussia and the German Powers are adverse or indifferent, the burden of the Conference is thrown upon Great Britain. The burden might not be too great, if the other Powers were convinced of her unalterable loyalty to the treaties which were framed to secure the integrity of Denmark. But can they do so at this moment? The language of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, in this House on February 15, and his despatch of February 19 about the guarantee of Schleswig, make it utterly impossible. They may he chosen from a mass of evidence converging to the point that Her Majesty's Government, although they are not ready to dispute the obligations of the treaties, are not obedient to their spirit, or prepared for their demands. But as a crowning test of how far a satisfactory solution can be expected from the Conference, have we any reason to suppose that the Danish Government anticipate it? Are there not abundant signs of the despair with which they enter it? And do they not correctly represent the Danish people in that feeling. The temper of that people is not a melancholy or desponding one. Hope seems to have a larger place than fear in their complexion. But in all climes and all societies, men fighting against odds, and overwhelmed by embarrassments, will catch at frail, inadequate, and evanescent means of a deliverance. The scepticism with which the Danish Government and people look upon this measure augurs badly for its efficacy; since they would be the first to overrate the chances it includes. It is not irrelevant to ask, therefore, will the obligations of Great Britain be answered by an unsuccessful

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  Conference? The obligations of the country, no doubt, are founded upon treaties. But these books contain facts which seriously heighten them. It is now seen that the despatch of September, 1862, raised the German spirit of encroachment, and acted in a manner most disastrous to the interests of Denmark. It is seen that the Danish Government were eager for the Congress which the Emperor of the French proposed, and to which Great Britain was an obstacle. In deference to our views, and in reliance on our action, the Danish Government revoked the proclamation upon Holstein of March 30, and made concessions well remembered by the world. The attack of the noble Lord on the Danish Constitution of November 18, and which is found in a despatch to Lord Wodehouse dated December 17, could not but do much to aggravate their difficulties, and to encourage their assailants. It certainly appears a harsh and also a gratuitous proceeding, since the question is most intricate, is altogether Danish, and one on which the Foreign Office has no mission to decide. Can it be said that we have any measures in reserve to provide against the failure of the Conference? And if it cannot, will an unsuccessful Conference fulfil the obligations which the treaties have imposed and circumstances have extended. But will the dignity of the country bear an unsuccessful Conference, Our diplomacy has now gone through a series of reverses on this question, which it would be invidious to enumerate and dangerous to increase. The Conference is not a French, a Russian, a German, or a Danish, but a British proposition. The reluctant and desponding Powers are dragged into it, not indeed by British force, but British importunity. Its failure will not be divided. But there is also this to be considered. To meet the Austrian and Prussian representatives, while the aggression we denounce is still proceeding to its climax, while Schleswig is disorganized and trampled on, while Sönderburg is under a bombardment, is not entirely consistent with the attitude of protest and remonstrance. It verges more upon indulgence of the crime which is going on. Success is indispensable to requite Great Britain for the loss of pride she undergoes in entering the Conference, and to guard against the new misfortune which its failure would imply.
  But will the tranquillity of Europe lose nothing by an unsuccessful Conference? If no result arises from it, the war in
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  Denmark only seems to have a choice of dangerous terminations. If it ends in the dismemberment of that ancient monarchy, Europe receives a blow, the balance of power suffers, and new causes of hostility arise. If France or Russia intervenes, no man can calculate the limits of the struggle. Again, unless it ends in a solution, a Conference—according to the reasoning of the noble Lord upon the project of the Emperor—must leave behind it seeds of animosity and discord. An unsuccessful Conference would therefore seem to menace the general tranquillity of Europe, as well as to run counter to the duties and impeach the honour of this country.
  My Lords, I have already ventured to advert to the conditions of succeeding— namely, that as all depends upon Great Britain in the Conference, the other Powers should be convinced of her unwavering adherence to the treaties by which Schleswig is maintained. And there is more than one mode by which the condition may be satisfied. A diplomatic manifesto, wholly different in its spirit from that of the noble Lord on February 19th, or an instruction to the British representatives at Berlin and Vienna, similar to that which Lord Westmoreland received in 1848, might very possibly inspire the necessary confidence. But after the despatches which have already gone abroad, such expedient would hardly be admissible. At least, the presence of the noble Lord as Foreign Secretary, would be a fatal bar to their effect. The noble Lord is now associated with the despatch of September 1862, which all the world regarded as a German one in spirit— with the despatch of February 19th, which tries to evade the guarantee when Denmark had insisted on it—with the attack upon the Danish Constitution, which he hurled against it in December—with the refusal of the Congress, at which the whole of Germany rejoiced. Right or wrong, the noble Lord is not regarded as the friend of Denmark on the Continent of Europe. Diplomatic measures would not, therefore, have the necessary influence. But does it follow that the noble Lord ought to deprive the country of his assiduous services and well meaning exertions? Another course presents itself. A British fleet appearing in the Baltic—although the noble Lord was still the Foreign Secretary—would make the powerful impression which is wanted, assure the world that our engagements to Denmark had not been forgotten, and so pave the way for the results

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  to which the Conference aspires. But having barely indicated such a course, I would ask leave to guard myself against absolute concurrence in all that has been said in this House and elsewhere upon the subject. Some noble Lords have recommended, that in order to protect Sönderborg, a fleet ought to be despatched into the Baltic. It has also been advanced that the Austrian and Prussian ships, if they appear, ought to be watched, pursued, and hindered, in those waters. Intelligent observers out of doors have held that a naval force established in the Little Belt would be a proper step to guard the island of Funen. By some who have lately quitted it, it is thought that Flensburg might be usefully selected as a maritime position for our vessels. But all these measures are attended with a hazard of collision. Such a remark would not be applicable to the presence of a British fleet in the port of Kiel, unless the Danish Government objected to the proceeding. No one will deny, that were this course pursued, Great Britain would command a higher aspect at the Conference than belongs to her at present. But there is also this distinct consideration. It is known to every one conversant with the subject, and it is clear too from these papers, that Prussia has been drawn into this war, in some degree by other motives, but in a great degree by maritime ambition, to which Kiel is indispensable. As soon as it is seen that that point is wholly unattainable, maritime ambition ceases to prolong the strife; the motives which govern Prussia no longer exceed the motives which govern Austria; both the German Powers are impelled against Denmark by the fear of a popular opinion, which gradually exhausts itself. Neither are lured on by the hope of a material advantage, which sentiment would otherwise remain. The upshot appears to be, that Great Britain would rise in power to control the war, as much as Prussia sank in aspiration to pursue it. The Conference would then have, what it now appears to want, the prospect of succeeding. Would such a mode of acting lead to war? As I contend, it would be more likely to avert it. Those who raise a pacific cry the moment any naval demonstration is suggested, assume this paradox as granted —namely, that timid counsels always lead to peace, and that decisive measures always tend to conflagration. Would such a paradox if nakedly advanced, instead of co-
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  vertly assumed, be tolerated for a moment? Have not the events of our own time sufficiently refuted it? If timid schemes, or fair spoken despatches, or amiable remonstrances were a security for peace, why is Northern Europe now in flagrant war, and Southern Europe looking for it? Can we forget that, in 1826, Mr. Canning and his colleagues averted war by sending an expedition to the Tagus? Can we forget that the reserve and hesitation, not unconnected with sagacity which in 1853 withheld the fleet from the Black Sea when Colonel Rose demanded it, never led to the advantages they counted on; and that the ships of the Allies were only in the Bosphorus when the disaster of Sinope made war with Russia unavoidable. No one who reflects upon American affairs and the constant risks to which their civil war exposes us, and which in 1862 were narrowly escaped, could recommend a step adapted to involve Great Britain in a war upon the Continent. But to send a fleet to Kiel may have a very different operation. Suppose, in consequence of our slackness and inertness, the German Powers, indirectly sheltered by the Czar, were to gain possession of that harbour. Regard to interests and treaties would forbid Great Britain to acquiesce in such an occupation, and war would then be necessary to dislodge it. But would the step be open to exception as regards public law and international propriety? Can it be an act of illegality or violence to despatch a fleet into the harbour of a Power which is friendly, of a Power which is outraged, of a Power you have guaranteed, of a Power which invokes the aid it is entitled to receive from you? Day by day we are initiated in the secret that it is not an act of illegality or violence to plant a devastating army in his territory. If Austria and Prussia are entitled to a material possession upon land in order to pursue a shadowy and doubtful right, has Great Britain no title to a material possession on those waters, in order to discharge a clear and undisputed obligation? If they, without making war, may overrun a line of defence, revolutionize a Duchy, besiege Duppel, and force the Danish army into Alsen; if in a friendly spirit and with a peaceable design they can dismiss the servants of the King of Denmark, arrest his subjects, forbid his currency, bombard his towns, insult his flag, and alienate his revenues, might not either France or Great Britain, or the two together, irreproachably possess a single harbour on the Baltic, with the sanction

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  of the Power it belongs to. Except as regards material possession, the cases would not have indeed a similarity. They have moved through the path of wrong, of spoliation, and of bloodshed to gain a maritime position on that coast; Great Britain would move in the path of law, of policy, and treaties to prevent them.
  I have but a further view to submit upon this measure; and it addresses itself in no way to the sympathies but to the coldest calculations of the House. A few ships in the Baltic might enable Great Britain to become a party to arrangements which European interests may sanction, and which existing difficulties may require, but which she could not entertain unless her faith to treaties and her loyalty to Denmark had been previously asserted. Supposing it were found essential as a safeguard against future wars to make the Eider the southern boundary of Denmark, and to form a clearer line than is observed between the German and Scandinavian territories, our present attitude disqualifies us for going into such questions. If Great Britain had a certain status on the Baltic, she would have the power to resist, and power to concede; at present, she has neither. At the same time, my Lords, although such a course appears to be the one which circumstances indicate, the Conference requires and the guarantee imposes, these Resolutions in no way bind the House to an approval of it, should any other line of action be preferred as safer or as more effectual. They only ask your Lordships to affirm that the principle of 1856 might have been usefully insisted on with greater firmness and tenacity, a proposition few as yet have ventured to dispute. But should it be deemed unnecessary or imprudent to declare it; at least no difference of opinion can well exist upon the second—namely, that the Conference does not meet under just auspices, or promise satisfactory results, while Europe doubts our loyalty to those treaties of which Schleswig has been so long and so conspicuously the object. With equal truth it might be said, perhaps, that in such circumstances a Conference is likely to bring on Denmark further wrongs, on Great Britain new humiliations, and on Europe darker clouds than those which menace its horizon. The noble Lord concluded by moving to resolve:—
  "That, in the Opinion of this House, if the Demand made by Denmark for Mediation, according to the Principle laid down in the Protocol of Paris, 1856, had been more decidedly supported
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  by Her Majesty's Government, the Bloodshed and the other Evils already occasioned by the War in Denmark might have been prevented, and there would have been less Danger than there now is of a more extensive Disturbance in the Peace of Europe.
  "That, in the Opinion of this House, a Conference upon the Danish Question, in order to lead to a practical Result, ought to be accompanied by such Steps as may convince the Powers of Europe that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the Treaties in which the Duchy of Schleswig has been guaranteed to Denmark by Great Britain."
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, that before proceeding to the discussion of the noble Lord's Motion, he wished to call their Lordships' attention for a few moments to the circumstances under which it was brought forward. The other evening his noble Friend on the cross bench (Earl Grey) asked the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, whether the same objections which existed before Easter to a discussion of the Dano-German question still applied. To that the Foreign Secretary replied that he had no wish to interfere with the discretion of the House. Under the circumstances, no other reply could have been given; but it was a great mistake to suppose that it was ever either the desire or for the advantage or the interest of a Government, for its own sake, to interfere with a Parliamentary discussion on a question such as that now brought under their Lordships' consideration. The Constitution of this country gave to the responsible executive Government the most formidable power which could be given to any body of men— the power of committing the honour and the credit of the country, either for peace or war, without the previous know ledge or consent of Parliament; and not only did the executive Government possess the power, but Parliament had occasionally shown itself jealous of any attempt on the part of the Government to cast off that responsibility. On the very first night of the Session, the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) had declared that it was the business of a Government to have a policy of their own, and not to seek one from Parliament; and in that doctrine he (the Duke of Argyll) fully concurred. The Government, therefore, were bound in these matters to exercise the greatest amount of caution and circumspection, and it was no hardship, but an immediate advantage to the Government to have a discussion of these questions before Parliament; and his noble Friend (Earl Russell) had always courted, rather than deprecated, discussion on matters of public interest. Still, the

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  Government were called on to enter into this discussion under circumstances very disadvantageous to themselves. In a few days they were about to meet in conference the representatives of Europe, called together by themselves, for the purpose of restoring peace to the North of Europe. It would be inexcusable, therefore, for them to appear as partisans either of one side or the other, or to say one word which would lessen the chances of peace. There must be, then, many parts of the subject on which the Government were bound to hold their peace, or to speak with the greatest caution. The history of the noble Lord's Resolution seemed a curious illustration of the Darwinian theory of development. Some days ago the Notice on the paper was "to call attention to the Correspondence recently presented to Parliament." On Thursday last the second Resolution, having reference to the Guarantee of 1720, made its appearance in the paper; and the day following, after the conversation of that night, the full-blown Resolution, as it was now placed before their Lordships, appeared. On the subject of the Guarantee of 1720, the noble Lord had already addressed their Lordships some weeks ago—that subject was his own, and no doubt the second Resolution, which had reference to that question, was his own. But in the first Resolution he had not the least hesitation in saying he recognized the hand of his noble Friend near him (Earl Grey). With regard to the speech and Motion of the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) he had some difficulty in following all his arguments, because the greater part of them referred to the future —to the manner in which the Conference was to be conducted. Now he (the Duke of Argyll) was of opinion thatit was the duty of the Government, under the circumstances, as far as possible to avoid a discussion of the future, and confine themselves to the discussion of the past. As to the second Resolution—his noble Friend's own Resolution —the wording of it was not quite correct, for the Guarantee of 1720 was not a guarantee of the whole of Schleswig, but only of that part of it which then belonged to the Sovereign of Denmark. It would hardly, therefore, be for the interest of Denmark that instructions should be given to the Government to insist upon that guarantee. His noble Friend to whom he attributed the drawing up of the first Resolution (Earl Grey) had on various occasions spoken very freely of the conduct of
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  the Government. He had given the House what was called "a bit of his mind" on the subject, and he wished very much that he would give them the whole. He was anxious to hear what his noble Friend meant by more decided action in support of the Protocol of 1852? What did the noble Earl mean by "more decided" measures? He had no doubt that the noble Earl meant that the Government might have prevented the war altogether, if, in fact, they had only threatened to take part in it. The question put was, Why did not the Government prevent the war? but the real question which his noble Friend wished to put was, Why had not the Government taken part in it? The critics of the Government had always one story; they never avowed that they were in favour of a war policy; but they said, that if the Government had done this or the other, they would have prevented war. But it was equally open to the Government to say, that if they had adopted a different course they would have increased the chances of bloodshed and the miseries that have resulted. He maintained that it was sufficient for the Government to show that they had adopted and had adhered to some definite line of policy, which they were able to support and maintain in that House of Parliament and to justify before the country. He submitted that the Government had a ready answer to the charge made against them, because they had not prevented war, or since they could not prevent it that they had not taken part in it. He protested against the doctrine that, primâ facie, there was any case against the Government of this country for not preventing a continental war, even supposing it might have broken out under circumstances of much injustice. England had a great position in Europe—the noble Earl smiled—England had a great position in Europe, not only on account of her material power, but from the just impression which prevailed that, on the Continent at least, she had no selfish interests whatever to serve; and that so far as our interests, which were principally commercial, were concerned, they were bound up with the prosperity of the whole world. But England was not the general arbitress in the quarrels of continental nations. There might be wars under circumstances of the greatest injustice waged there; but that was not a primâ facie case against the English Government for not having interfered in them. He would take the

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  case of the Italian war. It so happened that at that time the Liberal party were not in office, but rather a party more opposed to the objects of that war than we were; yet the noble Earl then at the head of the Foreign Office (the Earl of Malmesbury), did everything in his power to prevent that war; and he believed that no Minister ever acted more earnestly or faithfully as far as that object was concerned. The hand of the noble Earl was hardly ever off the telegraphic wires; his messages jostled each other on their way to the various capitals of Europe. And not only did he exercise all his influence in deprecation and remonstrance, but the noble Earl then at the head of the Government (the Earl of Derby) also made a powerful speech in their Lordships' House, in which he went very near to threaten that the power of England would be brought into action, if that war broke out. Noble Lords now present would doubtless remember the intimation conveyed in that remarkable speech to France and to the Government at Turin, that if we were to be neutrals we must be in a position of armed neutrality; and that England had interests in the Adriatic which they were determined to defend. Noble Lords would remember that this speech was received with cheers from both sides of the House. But what was the effect? The language ended in nothing— and the war took place in spite of all their efforts. He (the Duke of Argyll) never heard that the noble Earl felt any humiliation at having failed to prevent that war, though it was one which in its circumstances was considered by them to be unjust. Then he maintained that it was no primâ facie case against the existing Government that they had not prevented the present war, and any case against the Government must arise from special obligations in respect to the position of Germany and Denmark. Consequently, in order to see whether there was any case against the Government, it was necessary to refer to the documents in which the obligations of the English Government were defined. Now, if noble Lords would look into the documents, they would find that we were under no such obligations, He was surprised that the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) should have said that those obligations were mainly to be found in the guarantee of 1720. He (the Duke of Argyll) denied that, and asserted that they were to be found in the Treaty of 1852, which was not a treaty of guarantee,
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  but simply of recognition, signed not by England alone or even principally. It was a treaty in which we were co-signataries with all the great Powers of Europe, and some of the smaller Powers, There was, indeed, a passage in the preamble which referred to a question of policy, and announced as a principle that the existence and integrity of Denmark formed a necessary part of the balance of power; but to that declaration all the other Powers were signataries. Therefore the duties and obligations of the English Government, arising from that treaty, are duties and obligations which run exactly parallel with those of the other Powers; and nothing in that document could compel or induce the Government to go in advance or in front of the other Powers, or to act independently of them. This, then, was the principle on which Her Majesty's Government founded their policy—to rally the other Powers to act with them in this matter, but not to advance before them. He asked the House whether they could conscientiously say that the Government had failed in this duty? His noble Friend (Earl Grey) said yes—he (the Duke of Argyll) called upon him to prove it. Without troubling the House with a mass of quotations from the blue-books, he would direct attention to a few facts, which would prove that the Government had done all they could to ally themselves with the other great Governments of Europe, and induce them to act along with this country in preventing the war. Those who had attended to the Schleswig-Holstein quarrel must know that one of the transactions which had most tended to complicate the matter, and to render war almost inevitable, was the resolution of the German Diet to assume authority, not merely with respect to Holstein, but also with respect to Schleswig. This Resolution was dated the 25th March, 1852, at a time when public attention was very little directed to the subject. The moment that his noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office was aware of that, he addressed to the great Powers a despatch directing attention to this Resolution of the German Diet, and soliciting a joint protest against that assumption of power. This communication was sent to the two great non-German Powers—France and Russia—and it expressed a hope that an intimation would be conveyed from them to the German Diet respecting the gravity of the step they had taken. That attempt on the part of his noble Friend failed,

  735
  because France and Russia declined to join in the proposed protest, which Russia, at least, thought might seem to assume somewhat of a threatening nature. Therefore, if that joint action failed, it was not owing to want of vigilance on the part of his noble Friend. In November last occurred the death of the King of Denmark; and then arose the question about the right of succession. It was mainly due to the exertions of his noble Friend that the principle of the Treaty of 1852 had been recognized as a surviving principle by the two great German Powers, in spite of the disputes which had arisen. No one who had read the papers could doubt or deny that there were the gravest apprehensions that the two great German Powers were about to retreat from their former position and call in question the Treaty of 1852, and, on the other hand, that it was mainly owing to the remonstrances of his noble Friend, seconded no doubt by the Emperor of the French, that these two great Powers had admitted that the principle was still in force. In the present year his noble Friend made still greater efforts to avert any hostile action on the part of the German Powers. He would refer the House to the propositions made to the Russian and French Governments on the 5th, 10th, and 18th of January. The answer of the French Government was given on the 19th of January, and in still greater detail on the 30th; and though he did not wish to cast any blame on the French Government for declining to co-operate, because they had the right if they chose to keep the issues of peace and war in their own hands, yet he could not help thinking that if the two great non-German Powers had accepted the proposals of his noble Friend, the danger of war would have been averted. It would be admitted by any candid person who read the correspondence, that if Her Majesty's Government had been ready, to use the language of his noble Friend, to take any "more decided measures"—if they had thought it their duty to threaten, that in the event of the German Powers crossing the Eider a casus belli would arise, they would have had to make that declaration alone, and we should have involved ourselves in the danger of war with the whole of Germany, and especially with the two great military Powers, Austria and Prussia, without any ally to fight on our side. He would not waste the time of the House in pointing out the many objections which militated against
  736
  many of these. Such a course would readily occur to the mind of every noble Lord. With respect to the assumption that such a declaration would have prevented war, it should be remembered that we were not dealing with the Governments of Germany alone. We were dealing to a great extent with forces which took their origin in the revolutionary passions which were now existing on the Continent; in short, he did not believe it would be too much to say that we were dealing with two fanatical democracies. These were not Powers accessible to reason; and he was therefore convinced, in spite of the arguments of his noble Friend, that if we had taken that course, we not only should not have averted war, but we should have been forced to join in the war, should have increased the bloodshed, and brought on new and complicated dangers. It would be admitted that any course which isolated us from France would be very dangerous. As long as both countries went together there were few things which they could not secure in the way of peace; but if isolated action were once adopted by either, there were contingencies which might impel them more and more in opposite directions, and might lead to the greatest perils to the peace of Europe. He should be guilty of great affectation if he were to say that he apprehended any danger to the Government from these Resolutions. The aspect of the benches opposite did not indicate that the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had any intention of giving a very active or warm support to the Motion, unless, indeed, the noble Earl's forces had been routed by General Garibaldi. But whatever opinion might be expressed by the House upon the Resolutions, he hoped that one opinion only would be expressed by every Member who might speak that night upon one part of the subject, and that was the lamentable bloodshed which was now taking place. He was sure it was with feelings of absolute affliction that every Member of the House read the daily accounts of the cruel and useless slaughter which was going on. It was absolutely certain that every object sought by the war might have been obtained by negotiation. During the last ten years we had witnessed three great wars in which there had been great bloodshed, but in respect of all three great issues had been at stake. In the case of the Russian war, in which we were parties, the question was whether the same

  737
  Sovereign should reign at St. Petersburg and Constantinople. In case of the Italian war the question was whether one of the greatest nations in Europe, with an ancient literature and a noble history, and the highest capacities for political life, should continue to be for ever nothing but the favourite camping ground of German soldiers. With regard to the war now raging on the other side of the Atlantic, however they might deplore it, extending as it did over such a vast territory, and as yet giving no indications of its approaching end, no man could deny that there were great issues raised, all of which probably could only be settled by the results of war. But, in contrast to these, the war in Denmark had for its object issues that could certainly be settled by other means. What was the object set before them by the German Powers? He did not depreciate to the Schleswig-Holsteiners the value they set upon their liberties; they had as good a right to their liberties as we had to ours; but was there a single object in respect to them which could not be as well obtained by negotiation and without any effusion of blood? We were going to the Conference with three great objects. The first was to restore peace to the North of Europe; the second to secure the legal rights of the Duchies; and, the third, to reconcile with those rights the integrity and independence of Denmark. There was one argument which might be fairly urged against taking what was called a "more decided course," and that was that there was some doubt as to the merits and justice of the original quarrel. He would not dwell upon the weak points of the Danish case. The Danes were a gallant people, more sinned against than sinning. But those who had read the papers must remember that we had been compelled to make admissions on the subject of the constitution which was the immediate cause of the war—admissions which raised some doubts as to whether the Germans might not have had some fair grounds of dispute with the Danish people. But feeling the duty of impartiality in the present position of the Government, he was much more disposed at present to point to just grounds of complaint against the German Powers. He did not know whether many noble Lords had read the engagements of 1851–2, which Denmark was accused of having broken. In those engagements, Denmark had made two promises to the German Powers, the one that a common constitution should be
  738
  provided for the whole monarchy, the two Duchies included; and the other, that certain local liberties should be guaranteed to the people of Schleswig and Holstein. There was also a third, that Denmark should not incorporate, or take any steps to incorporate, Schleswig. It had been vehemently asserted by Germany that the Danes had broken those three engagements. But what he wished to direct the attention of the House and the country to was this—that, in his opinion, it was equally demonstrable that the promises made by Germany to Denmark had not been faithfully adhered to. The Germans said that the correspondence of 1851–2 constituted a series of diplomatic engagements. If they were diplomatic engagements, however, they were equally binding on both parties. He had selected three distinct promises made to Denmark, all of which had been more or less violated. The first promise went to the whole root of the matter, and it was this— that what was called the theory of Schleswig-Holsteinism should be abandoned. That declaration was not only conveyed by Germany to Denmark in general terms, but was also made in the most explicit manner. He would ask whether the Germans had abided by that promise? Was it not the fact that the theory of Schleswig-Holsteinism had been made a perpetual engine against Denmark from day to day, and was it not the real cause of most of the difficulties that had occurred? Another most solemn promise had been given by the Emperor of Austria, to which he was anxious to direct their Lordships' attention. It was to the effect that the Austrian Government would never allow the Federal Power to be exercised in Holstein in any manner in which it might not be equally exercised in every other part of the Confederation. Her Majesty's Government had admitted, and indeed could not deny, the legal right of the German Diet to put in "execution"in Holstein; but he would ask the German Powers to say whether, in the circumstances which had occurred, they had faithfully adhered to the promise of the Emperor of Austria? That execution took place by way of securing to the people of Holstein certain local privileges and rights. But were there not in other parts of the Gorman Federation local privileges and rights which had been violated, and did the German Diet exercise their power in respect to those rights? Why should the Diet enforce against the Duke of Holstein powers which they did not dare to enforce against

  739
  the King of Prussia? So long as they acted unequally and unfairly in this respect they not only violated their promises, but also the fundamental principles of all Federal Constitutions. The object of the Federation was the mutual defence of its members; but if the power of the majority was always to be brought to bear against the weaker members, then the Federation would become the means of anarchy, and the Great Powers would be setting the most dangerous precedent against themselves. The third promise was a distinct and emphatic repudiation of any right or competence on the part of the German Diet in the Duchy of Schleswig, The Diet had, however, now asserted its competence. In all these respects Germany had violated the promise of 1851–2 more certainly and more clearly than the Danes. It was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to go into the Conference, not as partisans of one side or the other, but impartially. They desired nothing but to restore peace to Europe—no doubt compatibly with the local rights of the two Duchies, and consistently if possible with the integrity of the Danish monarchy. They wished the balance of power in Europe to be maintained, and the rights of all the parties to be preserved. These were the objects which Her Majesty's Government had in view in times past; and in their efforts to avert war he believed they had had the approbation of the country, and would have the support of Parliament.
  EARL GREYsaid, his noble Friend who had just sat down (the Duke of Argyll), had taken very unnecessary trouble to prove what he (Earl Grey) had no wish to deny or conceal, that he had advised the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) to add the first Resolution to that which he had originally proposed to move, and he would now state why he thought their Lordships ought to agree to it. In doing so, it would be necessary for him to give some slight account of the proceedings which had led to the war now going on, but he would do so as shortly as possible. Fortunately, he need not weary their Lordships with the long and complicated question, as to what were the respective rights of Germany and Denmark and of the Duchies themselves with reference to the matters in dispute; it was sufficient to say that, on the 1st of October last, the dispute had arrived at such a point that the German Diet thought it necessary to adopt a resolution for
  740
  enforcing its demands against Denmark by what was called "execution," which meant the military occupation of Holstein. In the interval before this decree was carried into effect, Her Majesty's Government exerted themselves strenuously to avert its being acted upon; nor had he any fault to find with that part of their proceedings. It seemed not impossible that they might have succeeded in their efforts when, unfortunately, the death of the late King of Denmark occurred. That event produced an immediate change in the state of affairs. A violent agitation arose in Germany with respect to the right of succession in the Duchies, and a large party insisted that Prince Frederick of Augustenburg was the rightful heir. Into that question, however, he was happy to say it would not be necessary for him to enter; but, whatever might be the truth on the subject, it was clear that the Austrian Government, at all events, held that the title of the present King of Denmark was a good one; because their Lordships would find in the papers a very remarkable diplomatic correspondence between the Governments of Austria and Bavaria, in which the former Government showed—or considered that it showed — by reference to various documents, that the present King of Denmark was the rightful Duke of Holstein, not by virtue of the Treaty of 1852, but by virtue of a law legally passed by the late King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein, regulating the future succession to the Duchy. The Austrian Government went on to say that the validity of this law was by implication recognized by the Diet itself. He would farther remark, that to the present moment the German Diet— the only competent authority in Germany —had never decided against the right of the present King of Denmark to the Duchy of Holstein. When it ordered the federal troops to occupy Holstein, it professed to do so under the resolution of the 1st of October, which had decreed "execution" for the purpose of enforcing the performance of his engagements by the King of Denmark, with an express declaration that his rights to the Duchy were to be maintained. But, though these were the professions of the Diet, what was done was little in accordance with them. There was a good description of what had taken place in one of the despatches of Sir Augustus Paget. He stated that, when the German troops entered Holstein, the Federal Commissary declared that they did so to enforce

  741
  certain orders of the German Diet, that they did not intend to interfere with the rights of the Sovereign, that those rights were reserved, and that eventually his power was to be restored. Notwithstanding this, the Federal troops entered Holstein with bands playing the revolutionary air; they allowed the Augustenburg colours to be displayed in all directions, while they removed the arms of Denmark from the public buildings and took away every symbol of Danish authority; and while nominally prohibiting any attempt to assert the rights of the Pretender, they allowed the proclamation of the Prince Augustenburg, as Duke of Holstein, to take place in the presence of the Federal Commissary and of the Federal troops. He confessed that he regarded these proceedings as utterly irreconcilable with good faith. At the same time, he was not sure that it would have done much harm to Denmark had matters stopped here, and certainly there would have been no war if the German measures of spoliation had been confined to Holstein, because the Danes, acting upon our advice, had wisely determined not to resist by force the occupation of that Duchy, and as the Federal troops advanced those of Denmark retired. But, unfortunately, before the Federal troops entered Holstein another cause of quarrel had arisen. His noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) had informed their Lordships that one of the main subjects of dispute was as to how a joint Legislature for the different divisions of the Danish monarchy should be established. After the failure of many attempts to form such a Legislature, the King, in the year 1855, established such a body under the name of the Rigsraad. His authority to do this in the manner in which he did it was contested; but the Assembly continued to meet, and until the year 1858 members from Holstein, as well as those from Schleswig and Denmark, sat in it, and the Rigsraad did practically act for the whole of the Danish Monarchy. In that year the representatives of Holstein withdrew, but the Rigsraad continued to he the joint Legislature for Denmark and Schleswig. Holstein was thus practically separated, so far as legislation was concerned, from the rest of the kingdom. In the beginning of last year the late King of Denmark determined formally to establish this state of things, and he issued the patent of the 30th of March, which separated Holstein, for legislative purposes, from
  742
  the rest of the monarchy, and gave it power to manage its own affairs. Great objections were raised to this measure, but he need not discuss the question of its justice or injustice, because the patent was ultimately revoked. Later in the year the patent was followed by the presentation to the Rigsraad of a Bill for altering the constitution of that body. This Bill made no change in the respective functions of the Rigsraad and the provincial assemblies; it left to the States of Schleswig, and the Legislature of Denmark Proper, precisely the same powers they had previously exercised, and made no alteration or increase in those assigned to the Rigsraad in acting for the common interests of these two divisions of the kingdom. All it did was formally to sanction the exclusion of the Holstein members from the Rigsraad, and to make important changes in the manner in which the members of that body were appointed. The Bill, which was in fact a Reform Bill, was introduced in the autumn of last year. It underwent considerable discussion, but with some difficulty the necessary majority of two-thirds—that is, the majority necessary to authorize a constitutional change— was obtained, and at the death of the late King it had been read a third time, and only required the signature of the Sovereign to make it law. The King died on the 15th of November; and on the 16th the Prussian Envoy presented to the Danish Government a despatch protesting against this law being allowed to come into force. It could only be stopped by the refusal of the Royal Assent, and that assent was not refused. On the 17th of November the new King signed the Bill, and on the 18th it was proclaimed as the law of the land. It was acknowledged on all hands that the King of Denmark had practically no option in the matter. When in a constitutional country a measure of reform has after much debate passed the Legislature, it is no easy matter for the Sovereign to refuse his assent. Every one knew that in 1832 William IV. had practically no power to withhold his assent from the Reform Bill, and the King of Denmark was equally precluded from refusing his sanction to this Bill. If he had done so, the result would have been an immediate revolution and his expulsion from the country. Was that the reason for the presentation of the Prussian dispatch? We could not look into men's hearts and see what were their motives; but if we

  743
  were to judge the motives of the Prussian Government by their acts we could hardly resist the conclusion that the reason why this protest was presented at that particular moment was that Prussia desired to pick a quarrel with Denmark, which she could not escape. What were the facts? The Bill had been under discussion for six weeks, and all that was going on was perfectly well known at Berlin, and yet not a hint of an objection had previously been let fall. Nay, more; only three weeks before the protest was delivered, M. Bismark held language which induced both the English and Danish Envoys at Berlin to believe that this Bill was the very thing that he desired. Sir Augustus Paget, in his despatch of the 18th of November, reported distinctly that his opinion was that this Bill would carry into effect precisely the arrangement which M. Bismark described as most desirable—namely, a free and united Denmark up to the Eyder, and a free Holstein beyond that river. Having thus allowed the Bill to pass, not only without objection, but with implied approval, no sooner was it known that the power of arresting the measure, except by refusing the Royal signature, was gone by, and that in Copenhagen the greatest excitement had been created by the mere doubt that the King might refuse his assent, than the Prussian Envoy presented a peremptory and overbearing despatch protesting against the law coming into force. Was it possible to understand this conduct otherwise than as intended to produce a rupture? Sir Augustus Paget, in his despatch of the 18th of November, reported that he had had a conversation with the Prussian Envoy, and that when he pointed out how inconsistent his protest was with the previous conduct of the Prussian Government, he did not attempt to deny the accuracy of this statement, but said that he must act upon his instructions. There could be no doubt what those instructions were. They must have been to keep back the objections to this Bill until it was out of the power of Denmark to deal with them, and when the power to yield had passed away to press them with the greatest possible violence. That was what took place. From the moment that the despatch of November 16 was presented, Prussia continued to urge this demand upon Denmark. Somewhere about the close of December the first intimation of which he found any notice in the papers was given to Den-
  744
  mark that those demands would be enforced by an armed occupation of Schleswig. On the 28th of December a formal motion to that effect was made in the German Diet by Austria and Prussia, and was referred to a committee. It was again brought before the Diet on the 14th of January, when the proposition of Prussia and Austria was rejected; but these Powers declared they would proceed with the measure they contemplated, notwithstanding the decision of the Diet, and that Schleswig would be at once taken possession of as "a material guarantee." Much negotiation took place before that measure was carried into effect. These negotiations were continued until the beginning of February, when the German army crossed the Eyder; and in the course of them Denmark applied for the mediation of England and other friendly Powers under the Protocol of 1856. Their Lordships would no doubt remember that, during the Congress of Paris in 1856, the representatives of the European Powers recorded in a Protocol the wish of these Powers that in future, when serious differences arose between nations, an attempt should be made to settle them by the good offices of a friendly State before appealing to arms. Referring to this Protocol, Denmark asked for the mediation of England and other European Powers. The noble Duke who had just spoken (the Duke of Argyll) indeed disputed the accuracy of that statement; but if he referred to the papers he would find that they contained a despatch addressed by the Prime Minister of Denmark to the Danish Envoy in this country, dated the 5th of January, and communicated to his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the 13th of that month, in which there was distinct reference made to the Protocol of 1856 and application made under that Protocol for the mediation of England. A similar despatch was also sent to France. Her Majesty's Government supported the application, and proposed that a Conference should take place, and that in the meantime no appeal should be made to force. The proposal was, however, rejected—he might almost say contemptuously rejected —by Austria and Prussia. Then followed an application that if the German Powers would not consent to that, time, at least, should be given to Denmark, in order that she might obtain a legal repeal of the law that had given so much offence; but that proposal was also summarily rejected, al-

  745
  though Her Majesty's Government had gone so far as to tell Prussia that the continuance of friendly relations with this country would be endangered by the rejection of the proposal. But the Prussian Government, having apparently a very just notion how little real resolution was implied by these big words, treated the remonstrance with utter disregard, and proceeded with their preparations for the invasion of the Duchies. While these preparations were going on, there was a whole series of despatches from his noble Friend opposite, not, he thought, written in a tone which became a Minister of this country. The British Minister complained in a tone of great irritation of the conduct of the German Powers, but, at the same time, made it clear that no interference on the part of England would take place. In the meantime, Her Majesty's Government had been pressing hard upon the Danes in order to induce them to repeal the law of November 18, which afforded the pretext for the threatened invasion. His noble Friend whom he saw on the bench below (Lord Wodehouse) was instructed to inform the Danish Government that, if they did not accede to what was proposed, they could not look for support from us. Now, if it had been intended to aid Denmark in the event of her adopting our advice, his noble Friend the Secretary of State would no doubt have been perfectly justified in laying before her the terms on which that aid would be granted. He might have said to her, "We intend to take up your quarrel; but there are certain weak points in your case, and we should wish to see them removed before we can give you our support." That, however, was not the course which his noble Friend had taken, and he (Earl Grey), for one, could not think it either generous or just towards a little nation like Denmark, unwarrantably attacked by two great Powers, unless we meant to assist her in the end, to embarrass her by such advice as we had given, and to place her at the moral disadvantage of having communicated that advice to Germany, thus encouraging Germany to proceed by telling her that Denmark was in the wrong. The reply of the Danish Minister that the law afforded no just ground of complaint to Germany, as it made no substantial alteration in the relations of Schleswig and Denmark, was, he might add, in his opinion, quite unanswerable. He did not mean to say that it was prudent on the part of Denmark to pass the law of November, or
  746
  that Her Majesty's Government might not very fairly have represented to her that it would be well to repeal it; but it seemed to him that the argument of the Danish Government, to show that this law gave no valid ground of complaint to Germany, had never been answered, and, at all events, even if the law were one to which Germany might, in the first instance, have fairly taken exception, the fact that no objection had been made to it at the proper time, that on the contrary the Prime Minister of Prussia had used language implying his approval of it, destroyed all claim on the part of the German Powers to insist on its immediate repeal. It was, therefore, most extraordinary that, while this country was acting as the self-constituted friend of Denmark, and while we were professing to give her our assistance, that by far the strongest point in her case had never been adverted to. When his noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) passed through Berlin in his way to Copenhagen, on his special mission, he had a long conversation with M. Bismark, of which he has given a very able Report. In this conversation, respecting the demands made upon Denmark by the German Powers, not the slightest allusion was made by his noble Friend to the remarkable statement in Sir A. Paget's despatch of the 18th of November, as to the implied assent given by Prussia to the new law until it was practically irrevocable, nor is this statement noticed in any of the other communications between our Government and the German Powers that he could find recorded in the papers. He repeated, it was neither just nor generous towards Denmark thus to play the part of an over-candid friend, to give up in argument with her opponents the strong points in her case, to make the admissions most damaging to her, to force her to act against her own judgment, by saying that if she refused to follow our advice she must not look for our support; and then, after all, when she had taken our advice, and when the German Powers still persevered in their aggression—an aggression which we had declared to be an outrage—to refrain from raising a single finger in her defence! If we were determined to give Denmark no aid beyond words, it would have been far better for her that we should have abstained from interfering at all; that we should have imitated the wise and dignified conduct of France, whose Minister, when congratulating the King of Denmark on his accession, told him frankly that France

  747
  did not intend to go to war for his protection, and that they had no advice to give except that Denmark should act in a conciliatory manner. It would have been better for Denmark, and still more would it have been better for our own dignity, if Her Majesty's Government had taken that course. Instead of this, after holding language towards Prussia, going to the very verge of threats—indeed, the Prussian Government said we had gone beyond the verge—we passively looked on while the outrage we had condemned was perpetrated, and this country had thus been lowered in the eyes of the whole civilized world. The effect of such conduct had been the more damaging to our reputation, because the Prime Minister, in his place in the House of Commons, had said in the last Session of Parliament that, if Denmark should be attacked by Germany she would not find herself alone. His noble Friend who spoke last (the Duke of Argyll), had defended our policy on the ground that we could not have acted differently without the risk of war. He could not admit this argument to be sound; he was convinced there was a course open to us by which we should have escaped all the indignity we have endured, and have prevented the oppression of Denmark, without incurring so much danger of being involved in war as we are now exposed to by the consequences of the policy that has been pursued. Denmark, as he had mentioned, had claimed the application to the disputes between herself and Germany of the rule laid down by the Congress of Paris, that in case of differences arising between nations an attempt ought, in the first place, to be made to settle them by the good offices of a friendly State. We supported this demand, and proposed that the differences should be referred to a Conference, all hostile operations being in the mean time suspended. We might have made this proposal in such a manner as to command respect, instead of to invite rejection. We should have been fully entitled to say that this was a case which came directly within the rule laid down by the Congress of Paris; and that looking to the great interests involved, and to the great importance of preserving the peace of Europe, we required of the German Governments that no hostile operations should be commenced until the good offices of friendly Powers had been tried. He was quite aware that we could not have held that language without being prepared for action. We must, of course, have been
  748
  prepared, if the necessity for it had arisen, to send a British force to the Eyder to assist the Danes in defending their territory. But he utterly denied that any such contingency was probable. Such a policy could only have led to hostilities in the almost impossible event of Germany being insane enough to make an offensive war against England. All that was necessary was that we should have made Germany clearly understand that if she attempted to cross the Danish frontier she would find that frontier defended by English troops. There would have been no difficulty in defending that frontier. It was less than fifty miles in extent, strong by nature, and strengthened by strong fortifications; and though the Danes were not able to man those fortifications themselves, no great force would be necessary on our part to enable them to defend them. Nor would England have been alone in the matter. For even if no other great Power had joined us, Sweden was prepared to do so. In these papers there were several despatches in which the Swedish Government state that, though they were unable to protect Denmark themselves, they were perfectly willing to stand by the side of any great Power in doing so; and he was persuaded that a force such as England, Denmark, and Sweden could have easily raised, would have been amply sufficient to defend the frontiers of Schleswig against any force that Germany could have employed. The seat of war was but two days' steam from the mouth of the Thames, and unless our naval and military establishments were in a very different state from that in which they ought to be, considering the very large grants Parliament had made for their support, and very different also from that in which he trusted they were, there would have been no difficulty in sending out a force amply sufficient for the purpose. It would have been an easy operation compared with that undertaken by Mr. Canning in 1826, when he met a threatened aggression on Portugal by Spain by sending, at a very brief notice, a British expedition to Portugal, which had the desired effect. But, in truth, there never would have been the slightest chance of a war. It would have been sufficient to make Germany clearly understand that if she attacked the Danes she would find the warning of Lord Palmerston made good, and that she would not have to fight with them alone. He was quite persuaded that the statesmen of

  749
  Austria would have thought twice before they sent a larger part of their army than had been necessary to contend with Denmark only, (and a much larger force would have been required) to so great a distance from their own territory to attack a British army upon the Eyder. They would have reflected that the first shot fired at a British army would necessarily have been the signal for the appearance of a British fleet in the Adriatic. They would hare remembered that the whole population of Venetia is ready to rise as one man to seize the first favourable opportunity to throw off the yoke of this new champion of nationality; that the army of Italy now raised to 300,000 men, is panting with impatience to assist in freeing their fellow-countrymen from their galling bondage; that the whole Italian nation,—King, Parliament, and people,—are burning with desire for the moment when prudence will allow them to release this gallant army from the restraint which now prevents its rushing forward to drive the hated foreigners from the soil of Italy; that a state of siege is necessary in Galicia; that Hungary is discontented; and that the Austrian finances are in such a state that the first sound of a war with England would have produced a national bankruptcy. In such a state of things, he firmly believed that prudence would have prevailed, and that the rulers of Austria would not have been so reckless, and so deaf to the dictates of common sense, as to commit an act of aggression obviously unjust and in direct violation of the understanding of 1856. And if Austria would not have acted thus, he thought it was pretty certain that Prussia would not have done so single-handed. Neither the internal nor the external situation of Prussia were such as to encourage her to enter upon such a contest, and she would hardly have ventured, under such circumstances, to send her army to conquer for the people of Schleswig those constitutional rights which she refused to her own people. These considerations convinced him, that even without other assistance than that which was offered by Sweden, we had it completely in our power to protect Schleswig from invasion without any real risk of war. But he must add, that the correspondence laid before them left little doubt in his mind that we might have obtained the support of France. He was aware that when General Fleury was sent to compliment the new King of Denmark on his accession, he was instructed to say that France did
  750
  not intend going to war for the protection of Denmark. He was also aware that when the French Government was asked by our own to concur in giving a vagne assurance of material aid to Denmark in certain circumstances very obscurely described, this request was refused, and it would have been matter of surprise to him if any different answer had been returned to such an application by so sagacious a ruler as the present Emperor of the French. But he did not find in these papers that France was ever asked to join with us in requiring both parties to adhere to the understanding come to by the Powers of Europe in 1856, and to postpone, at all events, an appeal to arms till an attempt had been made to settle the dispute by friendly mediation. This he thought was all that there was any occasion for asking, or that it would have been right to ask. He was no such partizan of Denmark as to pretend that she stood altogether free from blame in the controversy that had led to the war. On the contrary, he believed that if from the year 1852 to the present time Denmark had governed the Duchies more wisely, and in a more conciliatory spirit, the circumstances never would have arisen which gave Germany a plausible pretence for interfering; but as the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) had observed, if Denmark was wrong, Germany was still more wrong, especially in insisting on deciding this question by the sword. The more clear it was that there were faults on both sides, the more clearly was the case one for the interference of friendly Powers; and if France had been asked to join in prohibiting hostilities till endeavours had been made to settle the dispute in a peaceable manner, he thought she would have done so, and that we should have succeeded in preventing war. He wished to call their Lordships' attention to some facts bearing upon that point. They would find a remarkable despatch from Lord Cowley, bearing date the 5th of January, in which his Lordship recounted a conversation he had had with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had been instructed to ask the French Minister to join him in making a strong remonstrance against a resort to arms. In the course of their conversations, M. Drouyn d'Lhuys asked, "If the Germans refuse, what then?" Lord Cowley must hare been deeply mortified that his instructions did not allow him to answer that question as it ought to have been answered. But, of

  751
  course, he was bound by his instructions, and all that they enabled him to say was, "In that case it seems to me further deliberations will become necessary; but why anticipate difficulties which may never he realized?" That answer was characteristic of the policy of Her Majesty's Government throughout the whole of these negotiations. "Why anticipate difficulties?" Was it not the great object of a statesman's life to anticipate possible difficulties? He made or ought to make no move whatever without considering what counter moves might be made on the other side. To talk of a statesman not anticipating difficulties, was as if one talked of a chessplayer not anticipating difficulties, but always making his moves on the supposition that his opponent would not endeavour to defeat them. Not a whit more senseless would be the conduct of a statesman who should not attempt to foresee the possible consequences of the policy he adopted. He was not in the least surprised that after receiving such an answer, M. Drouyn de Lhuys dropped the conversation and said he would report it to the Emperor. A few days afterwards the conversation was renewed, when M. Drouyn de Lhuys reminded Lord Cowley of the answer which France and England had received in the case of the remonstrances they addressed to Russia in reference to the Polish insurrection, when having represented to Prince Gortschak off that if Russia did not adopt a certain policy towards Poland, she would be held responsible, the Prince replied that Russia accepted the responsibility before God and man, and the French minister added that he was not willing to again expose himself to such a rebuff as that. He must say he thought M. Drouyn de Lhuys was right, and he was surprised that his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when he determined to abstain from all serious measures, did not at the same time give up writing the sort of despatches they found in the papers. Why go on making proposal after proposal to the German Powers and remonstrance after remonstrance, which only served to provoke answers, in which sneering contempt is hardly concealed by the mere form of diplomatic politeness. It was clear beforehand all this writing would be fruitless, for to do the Prussians justice they had been candid, and had never concealed their real objects. M. Bismark told his noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) in so many words, that there never could
  752
  be a good feeling between Prussia and Denmark while the latter maintained her democratic institutions, and he therefore recommended a coup d' êtat. In another conversation with Sir A. Buchanan he said that the honour of Prussia would not be satisfied till she had proved that she was not afraid to draw the sword, thus clearly avowing that a peaceable settlement was not the object of Prussia. But to return to the question as to how far France would have been disposed to join us in restraining the German Powers from the use of force against Denmark, he would remind their Lordships of a further conversation between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley on the 19th of January, in which the former, after saying in reply to Lord Cowley that France had already used diplomatic means to maintain the integrity of Denmark, and would continue to do so, proceeded to ask—
  "Does your proposal go further, and have you the application of force in contemplation? We must reserve our answer; we do not say no, but we cannot say yes. We are not hound by any guarantee to maintain the stipulations of that treaty. For instance, if we have to choose between its modification and the commencement of a war, uncertain as to its duration, and dubious as to its results, to speak frankly we prefer the former alternative."
  This was a judicious answer, and certainly did not imply that we should have met with a refusal if the proposition then submitted to the French Government had been the one which, he (Earl Grey) contended, ought to have been made. What in his opinion this country ought to have asked France, was to join in saying to Prussia and Austria, "We think this is a case for compromise, and we insist on it that there shall be no fighting until an attempt has been made to bring about a peaceable settlement." He believed there would have been no danger of war if that course had been taken. But who could say there was not much danger to Europe in the present position of affairs? A war commenced in bad faith had been carried on in a manner which could only be described as savage. The pretence had been that Schleswig was to be taken as a guarantee; Austria had had the hypocrisy to say that it was taken in the interest of Denmark; and then, because Denmark resisted with our concurrence, (for their Lordships must remember we had expressly disclaimed offering her any advice against resistance to the invasion), they proceeded to treat Schleswig as a conquered country, and

  753
  to remove in that Duchy, as they had done in Holstein, every semblance of Danish rule. They removed all the local officers who were loyal to the Danish Crown, and they warred even against the dead, pulling down the monument erected to the Danes, who had in the former war fallen in the service of their country. This was a perfectly wanton and gratuitous outrage to the feelings of the population. They invaded Jutland and went beyond the sternest rules of war in cruelty and violence, compelling the inhabitants to support the troops by whom they were oppressed, levying large contributions not only of food and forage, but of money, and enforcing the payment by arresting and threatening to shoot the principal inhabitants of the villages if the contributions were not paid. Nothing more marked the spirit with which the war was carried on by the Prussians, than an account he read in the newspapers the other day, describing the manner in which they had revenged themselves for a military disadvantage on the unarmed population. By a well planned and well executed surprise a small detachment of Prussian cavalry was captured by a Danish force, and this feat of arms, as fair as it was bravely done, the Prussians, by their own account, punished by burning the farms and laying waste the property of the inhabitants of the district where it occurred, because the troops by whom it was effected were beyond their reach. Was that the way in which honourable soldiers carried on even a just and necessary war? Then, again, there was the bombardment of Sönderborg, which his noble Friend (the Earl of Shaftesbury) denounced the other evening in just terms; and he perceived that the second edition of that day's Times contained a letter describing the atrocious barbarity of that bombardment, and the wanton cruelty inflicted thereby on the unarmed and peaceful population as having been even worse than his noble Friend supposed. It was now said that the Austrian fleet was to go to the Baltic; but were the Germans to be allowed to use their forces both by land and by sea to the absolute destruction of Denmark? He believed that a little moderation and firmness in the first instance might have prevented affairs reaching their present condition; but now, when the passions of the contending parties have been inflamed, and all the difficulties increased by the German troops being in possession both of Schleswig and Holstein, it was
  754
  difficult to see how, without the actual use of force, it would be possible for this country to arrest or limit the barbarous war that was going on, before it had led to consequences most dangerous to the general peace of Europe. This danger is greatly increased by the fact that those transactions have had a most unhappy effect on the opinion entertained of this country in the world. A great nation cannot forfeit her reputation for courage, and for a determination to maintain her rights and her honour—cannot become suspected of irresolution and timidity, without provoking wrongs and insults which she cannot always continue to endure. He could not, therefore, believe it to be of good augury for our permanent enjoyment of the blessings of peace, that the conduct of our Government as to Denmark, following so closely what had occurred with respect to Poland, should have created, as it notoriously had, a general impression on the Continent of Europe, that this country is no longer animated by its old spirit, and is so afraid of the pecuniary losses and sacrifices which war would impose upon it, that it would prefer submitting to almost any wrong or any insult rather than appeal to the sword. No doubt this impression is a false one— there cannot be a more complete misconception of the real feeling of the nation, but unhappily the mischief such a belief may do depends little upon its being correct, and that it generally prevails at this moment among foreign nations is too certain to admit of doubt. Thus the timid and vacillating policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in their too great fear of war, is directly calculated to bring upon us in the end the very evil they have been anxious to escape, and which a more manly policy would, in all probability, have averted.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, it now appears clearly, I think, from my noble Friend's speech, that we are arraigned, not for not having prevented the war between Austria and Prussia, and Denmark, but for not having ourselves joined in it. The real substance of my noble Friend's arraignment is, that we are now at peace. My noble Friend has read most discreetly the papers laid before Parliament, referring only to those parts which told in favour of his own views, and omitting to notice anything which militated against them. My noble Friend began by saying that he would not enter into a long discussion of

  755
  what is called the Schleswig-Holstein question; but I must say that without a consideration of that question it would be difficult to say why the German and Danish Powers should now be at war. It has been my task to attend to this question. In the year 1862 I offered proposals for the settlement of that question, which if they had been accepted would, I believe, have prevented the possibility of the war which is now being waged. But I was then told that it was really a matter which had no danger or importance, and that I was interfering in a question which might very well be allowed to sleep for a century, or half a century, without the fear of disturbing the present state of affairs. My Lords, I never took that view of the subject. I always thought it was a serious matter, which, unless satisfactorily disposed of in time, might lead to deplorable eventualities. In looking into the history of this question, it seemed to me that the arrangements made in 1851 between Prussia and Austria on the one side, and Denmark on the other, were most unfortunate and almost contradictory. They gave not only to Austria and Prussia, but to the Powers of Germany, either a right, or, at all events, a pretext for interference in the internal and domestic concerns of the Danish Monarchy, which, unless perfect good temper and a spirit of the greatest conciliation were shown on both sides, could not but engender discussion and controversies of the angriest kind, and perhaps the ultimate outbreak of war. That, my Lords, has been the history of these transactions for the last ten years. For my own part, looking carefully at this subject, I will say that with regard to this matter, as with regard to other matters of great importance in which this country has been interested, I have deemed it my duty, holding the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to divest my mind of all partisanship, to endeavour to view the question, between the Powers at enmity with each other, with a fair and impartial mind, so as, if possible, to form a clear and just judgment upon it. Nothing, I think, would be more discreditable to English statesmen than to rush at once into a strong decision on the one side or the other, without carefully investigating all the circumstances of the case. Now, with regard to this treaty, the Danish Government promised, in 1851, that it would hold Schleswig very much as a separate State—that it should have separate provincial Estates
  756
  for its own affairs, and a representative body; that it should have a Minister, and that its administration should be conducted solely in Schleswig. It was very difficult to keep to all these engagements; Denmark had entered into them in a moment of necessity, when foreign troops occupied part of her soil. I will not now, in this time of her distress, point out in detail where I think that her promises were not fulfilled. Instances of it are to be found in the papers on your Lordships' table, and I will not further refer to them. But Germany, on the other side, took the most unfair advantage of what was done in detail by Denmark, on every occasion putting forward propositions to which it would have been impossible for Denmark to accede, because they would, in fact, have set up a German authority at the very seat of her rule, and thus would have destroyed not only the nominal integrity, but the real independence of Denmark. Well, my Lords, such being the unfortunate state of affairs, neither party, I think, having been entirely in the right, and neither being able to say that it was free from all blame, the dispute went on until, on the 1st of last October, Germany resolved on a Federal execution in Holstein. That decree for Federal execution, according to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Diet had a right to issue, on the ground of the Federal pact. But whatever might have been the previous difficulties on that subject, they were aggravated tenfold on the death of the late King of Denmark. It might have been supposed — those who thought favourably of the pretensions of Germany might well suppose—that the late King, having been governed by counsellors of what might be deemed ultra-Danish principles, and having himself not only a great love for his country but taking a somewhat prejudiced view of the question with respect to Danish and German interests, might have judged partially on these matters. But the new King was not liable to that suspicion; and I am persuaded even to this moment, that if Germany had temperately urged the claims of the German subjects of the King of Denmark to certain rights and privileges which Denmark had agreed to maintain, King Christian IX. would have so governed and so administered his dominions that all real ground of complaint would have been removed by fair discussion and reasonable concession. But the course taken was very different, and I confess it appears to me, as it has been argued by my noble

  757
  Friend who has just sat down, that the Powers of Germany did seem rather disposed to excite a quarrel than to exhibit a conciliatory temper. Well, as we wished above all to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe, it was our object so to counsel both parties that an amicable settlement might be arrived at. My noble Friend finds fault with the advice that we gave to Denmark to abolish the November Constitution; but as the engagement of Denmark was such as I have just stated to your Lordships—namely, that Schleswig should have a separate Constitution, and should not part with that Constitution unless with the consent of her own Estates, it appeared to us, upon study and examination, that the November Constitution was inconsistent with the obligations which Denmark had taken to Germany. My noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) who proceeded to Copenhagen, and who had no prejudice in favour of Germany and against Denmark, came to the same conclusion, and urged it, as his own opinion as well as the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, on the Government of Denmark, Surely, even in befriending the cause of Denmark by negotiation, it was our part to see that she was in the right. We could hardly go to Germany, to Prussia, and Austria, and say, "Denmark is quite in the wrong, but we beg you not to insist on her doing right." We could not urge that course; and, therefore, to enable us to make due representations to Germany we proposed that that Constitution should be revoked. My noble Friend found great fault throughout his speech with our making representations without being at once ready to commence hostilities. It is clear that where your honour is attacked, and the representations you make are not listened to, you must defend your honour. If you have great interests at stake, and wish to prevent their being sacrificed, you must defend those interests. But where you only seek to pursue the benevolent design of maintaining peace between other Powers, and enabling each State to maintain its own sovereign rights, I cannot think there is any humiliation; indeed, I think there is a decided advantage, in urging over and over again as we have done by friendly advice, that peace should be preserved, and that those Powers should not injure one another. Well, my Lords, in viewing this subject, it seemed to me that unless we were prepared alone to make ourselves the defenders of the liberties of Europe,
  758
  unless we were to take a course which no great statesman who had adopted a European policy for England has ever advocated, we were bound on a question of European policy to endeavour to obtain allies. Now, the allies to whom we naturally looked were France and Russia. I am now maintaining that it would have been unwise for the Government of this country to have committed itself to hostilities without having the aid and assistance of other European Powers. My noble Friend read part of the correspondence which we carried on with other Courts; and he read up to the 5th of January, when he found that Lord Cowley, having been asked by M. Drouyn de Lhuys what more we proposed besides a Conference, stated that he was unable to answer that question, and that it was unnecessary then to consider more than the present proposition. But as we heard that the French Government desired to know what it was that Her Majesty's Government proposed to do, I immediately wrote a despatch conveying the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. I also wrote a similar despatch to Russia. What I said in effect was this:—There is a project evidently conceived in Germany for depriving Denmark of the States of Holstein and the Duchy of Schleswig. Supposing that project is persevered in, will you, France, will you, Russia, agree with us in giving material assistance to Denmark? That is my answer to my noble Friend's reproach. The very thing which he blamed us for not doing, if he had had the good ness and the patience to read a few pages further on, he would have found that we actually did.
  EARL GREY: I expressly mentioned that despatch, and said its terms were so vague that the application could have had no other answer than that it received.
  EARL RUSSELL: My despatch referred distinctly to a plan conceived for the dismemberment of Denmark, and went on to say, that to prevent the execution of that plan we sought the co-operation of France, of Russia, and of Sweden, in order to give material assistance to Denmark in resisting that dismemberment. My noble Friend calls that vague, and says that we did not propose to give material assistance. Certainly we did not specify the number of troops and ships that we proposed to give, but what we did propose to give was material assistance. It appears to me that nothing could be more clear and plain than

  759
  the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and the French Government so considered it, because M. Drouyn de Lhuys spoke at great length to Lord Cowley on the subject, and stated that the Emperor of the French expressed his approval, and more than that, he wrote a long despatch, of which you will find a summary in the papers; but the answer of France was to this effect, that France was not opposed to the integrity of Denmark, but she thought it might be that some change would, perhaps, be preferable to the maintenance of that integrity, just as in 1831 it appeared to the British Government that the setting up of Belgium, as an independent country, was preferable to the maintenance of the integrity of the Netherlands. It went on to say that the question of war with Germany was a very serious question for France, and that France would prefer to keep herself at perfect liberty as to any future measures she might take if the balance of power were actually in danger; but, at present, she did not think it necessary to give the assistance required. My noble Friend then makes a most extraordinary supposition. He says, that if instead of asking France whether she would assist us in preventing the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy, she had been asked whether she would give material assistance in preventing the Austrian and Prussian troops from entering Schleswig, we should have obtained her aid. A more extraordinary, a more wild or unfounded supposition I never heard made in this or the other House of Parliament. The answer of Russia was not so plain and distinct, but the effect of it was clear— that she wished to preserve her liberty of action; that she wished to know exactly what the proposition of England was, but she did not feel at present that her means and resources would admit of the policy of giving material assistance to Denmark. And then the question comes to this— which, however, my noble Friend never put—whether England, France, Russia, and Sweden having made a treaty, by which they did not guarantee or agree to guarantee the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, but to respect and acknowledge the Prince who was to succeed to the throne of all the Danish states and dominions, we alone, without France and Russia, should take upon ourselves to maintain the integrity of Denmark. Now observe, our object was to maintain the balance of power and the peace of Europe;
  760
  but the balance of power and the peace of Europe are questions of as serious importance to France and Russia as to England, and, therefore, it was not the business of England alone to undertake their defence. But when I heard my noble Friend explain the manner in which this was to be done, I own I was much more impressed than before with the danger of the alternative course which he thinks we ought to have pursued. In the first place, my noble Friend thinks that in the month of January we should have sent a squadron to the Baltic. We might have done so in the month of March, for in that month we sent an expedition to Copenhagen, and in the Crimean war we sent a fleet to the Baltic; but if you were to send a fleet to the Baltic in the month of January, you would have destroyed your ships and lost your fleet. My noble Friend also says that Venetia was panting to go to war with Austria, that Gallicia was disturbed, and that Hungary was disaffected. But, my Lords, only consider in what a state Germany was. It was in a state of violent enthusiasm, bent upon having Schleswig and Holstein separated from Denmark, looking to that end above all, not caring much, perhaps, about the Prince of Augustenburg, but putting him forward to serve as her instrument for that purpose. This was also to be taken into account— that Prussia and Austria, afraid of altogether thwarting the wishes of Germany, were executing them in such a way as they thought would be still conducive to peace and order in Germany, while they made Denmark suffer from their attacks. Well, then, we should have had on one side Germany, carrying, at least, Prussia, if not Austria, along with her, invading Denmark, and we there to defend it; we should have had Venetia making war in the Adriatic, and should have had the people of Hungary rising in delight that England was at war with Germany; and every violent and revolutionary plot coming to its completion under English auspices. And all this disturbance in Europe—this general war—a general war was to be undertaken in the name of peace, and in order to prevent Schleswig from being invaded. Not the least consideration in this matter was that France was taking a very different view from ours. While we looked to the integrity of Denmark, France was looking to the interests of nationalities, and what should be done for the people of Schleswig and Holstein. I do not blame

  761
  France for that, but that was another element of danger; for, while we were supporting nothing but Denmark, and supporting her right or wrong in the things which she maintained, France might have taken an opposite view, and then these two nations, whose united action is of so much importance to Europe, might have been brought into collision, though having no interests that were rival, but, on the contrary, the utmost interest in living at peace. Well, that is the prospect which my noble Friend holds out; and I can only rejoice the more that we have not thrown the firebrand into Europe, and not caused the extensive conflagration which my noble Friend has indicated. Now, my Lords, it is necessary to consider a little what we have effected. All those representations which my noble Friend holds so cheap, and which he says produced no result, as they have not prevented the war from breaking out, have, at all events, produced this effect—that on the 31st of January, before they went into Schleswig, those Powers who had been constantly thinking and suggesting that the maintenance of the Constitution of November had dissolved the Treaty of 1852, and set themselves quite free to take any course they liked — the Powers who held these views did, on the 31st of January, inform England, France, and Russia that they held to the Treaty of 1852, and respected the integrity of Denmark. Well, that, I think, is a very great point gained. It appears to me that, instead of the total dismemberment of Denmark, we can now go into the Conference with every Power except the Confederation, clearly bound to respect the Treaty of 1852, and clearly bound to respect the integrity of Denmark. We have made great steps in advance since the month of January. I own when I heard the language talked in London, and still more at Berlin, I was constantly afraid that the King and Government of Prussia would declare that the Treaty of 1852 was at an end. But by the firmness and moderation of our language, we have obtained from them the declaration that they will maintain that treaty, and in the Conference will consider that as the object to be always kept in view. My noble Friend has contrasted the position we are now in with that of Mr. Canning in 1826. Well, there is a very great difference between the power of Spain in 1826 and that of Germany in 1863. Austria and Prussia and the whole of Germany, with 44,000,000 of people, are very different from Spain
  762
  at that time. But, besides this, England was bound by treaty to defend Portugal as if she were England, and Mr. Canning felt under that treaty, and very justly felt, that the honour of England required that she should send her troops there, and that where the English standard was no invasion should come. He was perfectly justified. With regard to Spain, I recollect perfectly well hearing Mr. Canning say, "I am told that we must have war sooner or later. If that be the case, I say later." My noble Friend says just the reverse. He says, "We must have war sooner or later, and I say sooner." I say with Mr. Canning, "later," and I am quite content to abide by that. As the Conference is to meet on the 20th of this month, I know not that I need enter—or, indeed, that it would be right for me to enter—upon the questions that must there be agitated. The object of England is, and, I think, ought to be, to modify the extreme pretensions and, if possible, abate the animosities of different nations. I hold that to be a fitting object for England to endeavour to attain; but if I wish to do that, I must not begin by laying severe blame on the different parties to this war. With regard I to the conduct of this war by Austria and Prussia, I entirely agree with much that has been said by my noble Friend. But we have already stated in our despatches our opinion on this point, and my noble Friend at the head of the Government has declared that this is an iniquitous aggression on the part of Austria and Prussia, and that the resistance of Denmark is justified by the conduct of Austria and Prussia, I know not that anything stronger could have been said, even by my noble Friends opposite. With regard to the whole subject, I must consider the many interests we have spread over the whole face of the globe, and the danger that if we were at war with Germany that other wars might spring out of it, that our commerce might be intercepted by privateers sailing under any name or flag, and scouring the ocean to destroy our commerce. It may be a low and unworthy consideration in the eyes of my noble Friend, but when I reflect on the exposition made by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other night of the magnificent situation of this country, I am not inclined to hazard and imperil that situation without a clear case of honour, or without great and mighty interests being at stake, calling for our armed intervention. Also, we must con-

  763
  sider that by the side of that exposition of flourishing trade, and of the improvement of our finances and all our material interests, there remains the fact, which was stated then, and must be stated every year, that there is more than £26,000,000 interest of debt to pay, and that that £26,000,000 interest of debt has been caused almost entirely by war, the greater portion of it having been caused by the two last wars which this country undertook. In 1764 the interest of our debt was £4,600,000; it is now £26,200,000. May we not be unwilling —may we not fairly be cautious—before we add to that debt? One of those wars, the American war, was one which no man in these days will defend. The other of those wars, the father of my noble Friend (Earl Grey) most eloquently opposed as unjust and unnecessary. Whether these wars were justified or not, the cost and burden of them have been immense; and, while that is no reason why we should desert any cause in which we are bound to go forward, or why we should abandon any friend whom we have obligations to support, they are reasons, I think, why we should pursue a pacific, and not a warlike course. I confess, for my own part, that while I have the authority and adopt the policy of the great men to whom I have referred, and who held that the balance of power ought to he maintained, I likewise agree with them when they sought alliances in order to support the balance of power, and in thinking that the destruction of one of the States of Europe is not only a great outrage, but a peril to the independence of all the other States. But at the same time, I do think that a policy the least hostile that we can make it, and the least disposed to make a quarrel where it can be avoided, ought to be pursued by this country. I cannot, therefore, agree with my noble Friend in his Motion, that, "in the opinion of this House, if the demand made by Denmark for mediation, according to the principle laid down in the Protocol of Paris, 1856, had been more decidedly supported by Her Majesty's Government, the bloodshed and the other evils already occasioned by the war in Denmark might have been prevented." Now, I do not believe that that is the opinion of this House, and I shall, at all events, feel it to be my bounden duty to oppose that part of the Motion. With regard to the other Resolution of my noble Friend, "that such steps ought to be taken as may convince
  764
  the Powers of Europe that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the treaties," it is unnecessary to attempt to convince them that we adhere to the treaties. The Treaty of 1720 is, indeed, one which has been disputed by persons of great learning, and we are not called upon to assert the validity of that treaty. But, with regard to the Treaty of 1852, it is our object to maintain that, and to have it recognized by the Powers of Europe. I trust that will be the result of the Conference. With respect to the policy of France, I shall say this one word — that we were not ready last year to adopt the course proposed by France—namely, to send an identical note to Russia, and afterwards to concert measures in case Russia did not agree to our proposal. We were rather satisfied with the terms proposed by Austria, and which would leave upon Russia the responsibility of her refusal. We did not think it wise to go to war with Russia in the cause of Poland, and we therefore informed France of our determination not to do so: the French people have great sympathy with the Poles. There is besides the tie of religion, which makes a close connection between France and Poland. With regard to Denmark again, we have a great feeling with a gallant people—a maritime people like ourselves, professing the same religion with ourselves, and constantly connected with us by maritime commerce. Therefore, while France sympathized more with Poland, the sympathies of England have been more with Denmark; and while we refused to join France in the proposal regarding Poland, she refused to join us in the proposition with regard to Denmark. We have no reason to find fault with France on that ground; but still I must say, that if we are to interfere—if we are to defend Denmark on the grounds of the interests of Europe and the balance of power, the Powers of Europe ought to go together, and not to leave that great task to be undertaken by us alone. There are other matters requiring consideration. My noble Friend alluded to one—that of the Austrian fleet going to the Baltic. That is a question on which Her Majesty's Government have made representations to the Austrian Government. At present, the Austrian Government have promised that they have no intention to send their fleet into the Baltic. They say they are about to send their fleet into the North Sea to protect the commerce of the German Powers, which is very extensive. That is a legiti-

  765
  mate object. England is quite free to act in such cases; and, while we will not act without it is absolutely necessary, and while I am fully conscious of the power of England, yet we do not wish to hurry into war without necessity. And, for my own part, I think that a pacific policy is our true policy.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, as this discussion has turned upon the policy and conduct of the Government, and as many Peers are absent from town, I think it is a matter of regret that the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) did not give longer notice of his intention of bringing forward this subject. But I apprehend — and I am confirmed in my opinion by the state of the House—that it is not the intention of the noble Baron to ask the House to pronounce any opinion, but that his object was to express his own individual opinion, and to enable any other Members of your Lordships' House to express their opinion, on the policy and conduct of the Government as they appear from the voluminous papers on the table. That being the case, I apprehend that the peculiar wording of his Motion is a matter of minor consideration, and in the few words which I shall I address to your Lordships I will confine myself not to the terms of that Motion, but to a consideration of the state of affairs as they now stand. I have gone through the dreary waste of these interminable papers; I have plodded through them with the greatest possible patience; I have gone through the greater part of the 800 and odd pages which comprise those extracts which Her Majesty's Government have been pleased to lay before us from the correspondence which has taken place upon this subject during the past year; and I can assure the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that the last accusation which I should think of making against the Secretary of State is one of want of diligence—because I perceive that the noble Earl has during the last year written, exclusive of duplicates, no less than 170 despatches upon the subject of Denmark and Germany. And although certainly I have not been struck with admiration of the style of these despatches—although I have seen them characterized by what I consider a most forcible weakness—I must say that I have been struck with astonishment and admiration at the persevering industry with which the noble Earl has gone on spinning day after day thread by thread his political cobwebs, utterly regardless of every single thread
  766
  being swept away one after another—spinning, spinning, spinning on, but at the same time not making the slightest progress towards the completion of his web, and not having been able to catch a single diplomatic fly. I have no great fault to find with the tone and character of the noble Earl's speech, and I have no wish to increase the difficulties of the position, great and serious as they are, in which Her Majesty's Government and Europe are placed. I entirely concur in what the noble Earl has said with regard to the policy of this country being essentially a peace policy —a policy of avoiding the horrors of war; but I think that the noble Earl placed that policy on the lowest and humblest ground when he rested it simply upon pecuniary considerations. There are considerations which impress me with a greater horror of war than does the risk of impairing the flourishing state of Her Majesty's Exchequer; and although I consider war a great and grievous evil, yet there are evils greater than war, and among them are the sacrifice of the honour of the country and the abandonment of the interests of a friend who has placed himself in your hands. The question is, what is a warlike policy? Is the course which Her Majesty's Government has pursued under the auspices of the noble Earl more likely to aggravate the danger or to remove from us the evil of war? I am afraid that the course which the Government have pursued is one which in the end is more likely to lead to serious complications and a general disturbance of the peace of Europe, than if they had in the first instance taken a more decided, a more straightforward, and a more determined course. It is, of course, impossible, looking back at these negotiations, to say that a particular course taken at a particular time would have produced this or the other effect, It is, of course, open to the noble Earl to hold his opinion, that if we had made stronger remonstrances, with the view, of course, of acting upon them, we should have been more likely to incur danger of war; and, on the other hand, it is open to the noble Earl on the upper bench (Earl Grey) to argue that if we had adopted a more resolute tone, the probability is that it would have imposed upon Europe the obligation and necessity of maintaining peace. But, my Lords, that of which we do complain, and which we feel to be the course least creditable to this country, is that of holding out menaces, threats, and remonstrances to

  767
  foreign countries, and at the same time conveying to those countries and to Europe generally the impression that they may safely set at defiance our representations, our threats, and our remonstrances, because nothing will induce us to give any material aid, or to take any part further than these querulous remonstrances with which the noble Earl is assailing every Court in Europe. I admit fully the great danger of the position, and I admit what was stated by the noble Duke—and it is a consideration which ought not to be lost sight of—that its dangers are greatly aggravated, because they are not under the control of statesmen and monarchs who act under the guidance of reason, but are under the control of democratic influences and revolutionary parties, who are acting not upon reason, but from passion, who are desirous of driving all matters to extremity, and who, I am afraid, are exercising great influence at the present time. I admit that there is something of that same feeling on both sides; but what is the mainspring of the course of action which is pursued by Austria and Prussia? It is not that Prussia and Austria—certainly it is not that Austria—desire to pursue an aggressive policy; but, it is this, that there is a revolutionary party abroad who are anxious to create disturbance throughout Europe for the purpose of their own selfish and revolutionary ends. They are exercising an influence upon the minor Powers of Germany, partly of persuasion, partly of ambition, partly of fear; and these minor Powers, carried away by a torrent which they are unable to stem, have placed themselves in a perilous position for their own interests at the head of the democratic movement, fomenting and encouraging plans which can only be fraught with the most imminent danger to themselves. Well, but two great Powers like Austria and Prussia might, one would think, safely defy this revolutionary influence. They might, but there are many motives which operate with them. Prussia may have—we know she has—motives of personal ambition to be gratified by the extension of her possessions and the acquisition of a naval harbour. Prussia also entertains great jealousy of Austria; and Prussia desires to take the sting out of the democratic movement by placing herself at the head of it, and, strange to say, placing herself at the head of that movement, being herself a despotic country, for the purpose of putting down the liberties
  768
  of a neighbouring country which she considers too democratic. That is the anomalous position of Prussia; what is that of Austria? Why, Austria fears that if Prussia is allowed to take this lead, Prussia will, in point of fact, be the ruling Power, and maintain a paramount influence in the Confederation over these minor Powers, and that she herself will be hereafter compelled to play a subordinate part. Therefore, it is first the power of the revolutionary party acting on the small States; next, the small States acting on the mutual jealousies of Austria and Prussia; and lastly, those jealousies themselves which will not allow either to take a single step in which the other shall not go side by side with her. These are the circumstances which really constitute the great and imminent danger to the peace of Europe, whatever course of policy any Government may pursue. I do not quarrel with the way in which the noble Earl has spoken of the case as between Denmark and Germany, nor will I enter into a discussion of the Schleswig-Holstein question, which I think he has stated very fairly. There have been violations of the engagements entered into on both sides; neither party is free from blame, and any British Minister is perfectly justified in holding the balance evenly between the two, and not throwing himself and the weight of his authority exclusively into the scale of either. With respect to the obligations entered into by Denmark, I recollect that the noble Earl on a previous occasion used the expression that it was not open to Denmark to use the argumentum ab inconvenienti, because if she had entered into these obligations she was bound in honour to fulfil them. But if Denmark has entered into engagements which, taken in the sense put upon them by Germany, places her in a state of absolute paralysis as to her internal condition, and practically subordinate the whole Monarchy to one portion which happens to be a part of the German empire, it is not an argumentum ab inconvenienti, but there is a manifest impossibility of fulfilling to the letter the conditions entered into. Denmark has made many efforts to relieve herself, with justice to her subjects, from the painful position in which she has been placed; but every one of her propositions has been rendered futile by the positive refusal of Holstein to enter into any compromise whatever, and the persistent manner in which Prussia has backed Holatein

  769
  in these extreme views, and has maintained that, without her assent, no arrangement can be entered into. What can be more absurd than that there should be four portions of one monarchy—one of which contains 1,500,000, and the other three about 500,000 inhabitants — but that each of these several divisions should have an equal voice in the administration of the affairs of the whole monarchy, and that upon the ground that no one of these divisions should be made wholly subordinate to another? I am glad to see that the noble Earl recognizes the monstrous injustice of that proposition; but here is another, which is not less impracticable—that is to say, that if Holstein (or Lauenberg, which would be a stronger case) if Holstein refuses her assent in any one of these four assemblies to any measure passed by Denmark, or the other three portions of the monarchy, for the general advantage of the whole country, not only shall that measure not take effect with regard to the whole country, but it shall not take effect with regard to those three divisions which have passed it and adopted it, because the fourth refuses to accept it; and that fourth claims that there shall be one constitution for the whole; the consequence of which is that every measure, great or small, must be based upon the separate convenience of the four several divisions. If that is the case, Holstein, as a fief of Germany, exercises an absolute prohibitory influence on all legislation in Denmark. Denmark is placed at the foot of Holstein, and Holstein is at the foot of Germany. Now, my Lords, I care not that that may be the literal or technical interpretation of engagements entered into. No court of equity would say that such engagements could be supported to the letter. It is obviously a case not for intervention by arms, but for friendly negotiation by a friendly Power; and that is the course which Germany ought to have taken. I will not repeat what the noble Earl has said this evening with regard to the ungenerous way in which Germany availed herself of the increasing difficulties which pressed upon Denmark, with a view to cause her to accede to conditions with which it was impossible that she could legally comply. I think the course taken by Germany in that respect was wholly unjustifiable. But the question with which we have now to deal is the effect which was produced by the policy which Her Majesty's Government pursued in the en-
  770
  deavour to prevent or mitigate the danger which threatened Denmark, and the position in which our influence and interests stand in Europe, owing to the positive declaration made by the noble Earl of pacific principles. In looking through those papers, I find that to almost every country we have addressed successively representations, remonstrances, and threats, going almost to the length of a warning that non-compliance with our recommendations would be followed by a war. We have gone to the very verge of saying to Denmark, "if you act on our recommendations"—as she studiously did—"you will have our material aid." We went thus far, I maintain, by putting the converse to her, and telling her that if she did not obey our instructions we could render her no assistance. Now, would it not, I would ask, have been more generous and fair, and candid to say to Denmark, "We advise you, as friends, to take such a course; but, at the same time, you will adopt that which, in your own judgment, you consider the best; for you must bear in mind that from us you are to expect nothing more than our moral influence." I entirely concur with the noble Earl in the opinion that we were not bound by the terms of the treaty to come forward to protect and maintain Denmark, or called upon to support the integrity of an instrument which our co-signataries were not prepared to uphold. But, then, we ought not to have held out to Denmark the expectation that it was our resolve to see that the treaty was preserved, and the Prime Minister ought not, in his place in Parliament, to have stated that in the event of her territory being invaded she would not stand alone. By making that statement the noble Earl conveyed something more than an intimation; he gave a distinct and direct pledge, on which the Danes placed reliance; and from that moment they said to themselves, "No matter though there are 40,000,000 against two; we know the power of England: we have the promise of the Prime Minister of England that that power will be exerted in our defence in the case of exigency. The honour of England has hitherto been held inviolable, and we have the utmost confidence that it will be so on the present occasion." When, however, we look to the other Powers of Europe, we find that they do not judge us quite so favourably as Denmark. Here are a few of the representations made by the noble

  771
  Earl opposite, and of the answers which he received. On the 31st of August, 1863, he writes as follows:—
  "I have caused M. Katte to be informed… that if Austria and Prussia persist in advising the Confederation to make a Federal Execution now, they will do so against the advice already given by Her Majesty's Government, and must be responsible for the consequences, whatever they may be."—Correspondence, No. 2 (1864), p. 123.
  "Responsible for the consequences" seems to be a favourite phrase of the noble Earl's; but the States of Europe have learnt to regard it as nothing more than a mere brutum fulmen, which he is on every occasion ready to launch. The noble Earl is informed, in answer to his representation, that the matter was in the hands of the Confederation, that Austria and Prussia would not further interfere, and that execution would go on. The next application is one in which still stronger language is used, and in which the tone assumed is of a more warlike character. It is addressed to the Diet, and a copy of it was ordered to be presented officially to the President of the Diet on the part of Her Majesty's Government. In this despatch the noble Earl says—
  "Her Majesty's Government could not see with indifference a military occupation of Holstein, which is only to cease upon terms injuriously affecting the Constitution of the whole Danish monarchy…. Her Majesty's Government could not be indifferent to the bearing of such an act upon Denmark and upon European interests. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, earnestly entreat the German Diet to pause."—Correspondence, No. 2 (1864), p. 145.
  Now the phrase, "Could not see with indifference" is one which in diplomatic language assumes very serious import; but the German Diet nevertheless treated it with profound indifference, because they quietly say in reply, that "they are not in a position to take any action on the communication of Her Majesty's Minister," and request the President to communicate a copy of their decision and of the report of the Committee in answer to it. Such is the simple reply of the Diet which amounts to this—that they did not deem it necessary to take any notice of the noble Earl's communication. On the 9th of November the noble Earl writes—
  "As matters now stand, Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion, that it is inexpedient for them, at least for the present, to make any further proposal to the Diet.…. At present Her Majesty's Government can only leave to, Germany the responsibility of risking a general war in Europe, which the Diet seems to be so bent
  772
  on provoking. —Correspondence, No. 3 (1864), p. 199.
  Again, we have the noble Earl writing as follows to the Government of France:—
  "If the Government of the Emperor of the French are of opinion that any benefit would be likely to follow from an offer of good offices on the part of Great Britain and France, Her Majesty's Government would be ready to take that course. If, however, the Government of France would consider such a step as likely to be unavailing, the two Powers might remind Austria, Prussia, and the German Diet that any act on their part tending to weaken the integrity and independence of Denmark would be at variance with the Treaty of the 8th of May."
  M. Drouyn de Lhuys having a lively recollection of the case of Poland last year, when the French Government had joined us in making strong representations— [Earl RUSSELL: Joined in the proposals with Austria.] Yes; but they took the step conjointly of throwing upon the Emperor the responsibility of the course they were about to take; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, no doubt bearing all this in mind, replies to the noble Earl that the offer of good offices would, in his opinion, be useless. He adds—
  "The second mode of proceeding suggested by his Lordship would be in a great measure analogous to the course pursued by Great Britain and France on the Polish question. He had no inclination to place France in the same position with regard to Germany as she had been placed with regard to Russia. The formal notes addressed by the three Powers to Russia had received an answer which literally meant nothing, and the position in which those three great Powers were now placed was anything but dignified; and if England and France were to address such a reminder as that proposed to Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation, they must be prepared to go further, and to adopt a course of action more in accordance with the dignity of two great Powers than they were now doing on the Polish question."
  [Earl RUSSELL: That has reference to Poland.] He draws a contrast between the case of Poland and that of Denmark. France has strong Polish sympathies, as I have already observed, and England has strong Danish sympathies; and if we did not show ourselves inclined to join France with regard to Poland, it was not unnatural that France should show a disinclination to join us with reference to Denmark. Now, I never did call upon the noble Earl to make war for Poland; but then I think that when one great Power calls upon another and demands the fulfilment of treaty obligations, which was what the noble Earl did last year in reference to Poland, that Power must naturally expect

  773
  either to be called upon to give effect to its menaces, or to withdraw them under such humiliation as the noble Earl's policy on that, as on too many other occasions, has entailed on this country. There is another paragraph in the document to which I have referred that does not relate to Poland, but to the great Powers and I am surprised, after the rebuff which he had received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the noble Earl should again have pursued precisely the same course. As to what the noble Earl said about "the heavy responsibility," if by any precipitate measures the Powers should break the peace of Europe, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes that he has not forgotten that when the case of Russia in reference to Poland was under the consideration of France, Great Britain, and Austria, she was warned of the "heavy responsibility," and that Prince Gortschakoff replied that he was quite ready to accept that responsibility; and that he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) did not wish to provoke another such answer, or to be again treated with such indifference. I do think M. Drouyn de Lhuys has shown a much truer sense of what is due to a great country than the noble Earl has, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said—
  "I will anticipate a difficulty; I will look forward and see what is to take place in the event of an unfavourable answer, and if I can see that you will continue your course notwithstanding an unfavourable answer I will act with you; but if in the event of an unfavourable answer you are to get out of the strait and leave me in the difficulty, I must say—though you may not think much of it, because you are so used to it, yet that I do not look upon it in the same light."
  Now as to the amount of influence which this country has, under the noble Earl, exercised in Europe, let me say that a good deal of light is thrown upon this subject by a despatch of Sir Andrew Buchanan. When the noble Lord, whom I see in his place (Lord Wodehouse), left Berlin on his way to carry out his hopeless negotiations, Sir Andrew Buchanan was left behind, and received some instructions as to applications to be made to the German Powers in obedience to the noble Lord. Sir Andrew Buchanan says—
  "I regret also, with reference to representations which I have made by your Lordship's order to M. Bismark during the last fortnight, on other subjects connected with the question, that I have failed in obtaining compliance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. I was instructed to suggest that time should be given to Lord Wodehouse to negotiate with the Danish Government before the Federal execution is carried into effect. The execution will take place within six days of
  774
  his Lordship's arrival in Copenhagen. I was instructed to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that no disputed territory on the frontier of at Rendsburg would be occupied. Rendsburg will be occupied, with the exception of that portion which is on the north side of the Eider."
  And here I must remind the noble Earl that his geography is rather weak, and that the mouth of the Eider is not in the Baltic.
  EARL RUSSELL: I never said it was.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I beg the noble Earl's pardon. My noble Friend near me had been speaking of the ease with which a British fleet might be sent to the Eider; and the noble Earl replied that it was impossible to do that because of the extreme difficulty of sending ships into the Baltic at this time of year. Sir Andrew Buchanan then went on to say—
  "I was instructed to state that the execution should only take place for Federal obligations violated. The execution will take place in virtue of a decree of the German Diet, against which Her Majesty's Government have formally protested at Frankfort, by a despatch communicated officially to the Governments of Austria and Prussia. Lastly, I was instructed to request that the Prussian Government would consult with that of Austria, and state to Lord Wodehouse precisely what Austria and Prussia will require to bring about a friendly disposition on both sides, but they have declined to give any explanation of the arrangements which they would accept from Denmark."
  Here, then, are four or five points on which the noble Earl has desired Sir Andrew Buchanan to make strong representations in the hope of staying the war, every one of which is contumeliously rejected by the German Powers. And here I find two lines on which I think it would have been wiser if the noble Earl had employed his scissors, which have been so freely applied in other parts of the papers. I find Sir Alexander Malet writing thus to the noble Earl from Frankfort—
  "There is an absolute persuasion that England will not interfere materially, and our counsels, regarded as unfriendly, have no weight."
  I think the noble Earl did succeed in frightening for a moment one Minister— the Prussian Minister. On the 14th of January the noble Earl thus describes, in writing to Lord Bloomfield, what had passed between him and Count Bernstorff—
  "I had spoken on a former occasion in the sense that Denmark would resist such an occupation (of Schleswig), and might be aided by Great Britain. He wished to have an explanation. It is to be observed that, in speaking to Count Bernstorff on the occasion referred to, I had expressly declared that I could not say what the decision

  775
  of the Government might be, as the Cabinet had not yet deliberated, and consequently not submitted any opinion to the Queen; but that, judging from the general current of feeling in Parliament and in the nation, I thought an invasion of Schleswig by Germany might lead to assistance to Denmark on the part of this country……Her Majesty's Government could not wonder that the King of Denmark was ready to defend Schleswig, and to consider its hostile occupation as a fatal blow to the integrity of his dominions. But I could not doubt that he would be assisted by Powers friendly to Denmark in that defence.— Correspondence, No. 4 (1864), p. 534.
  Now the charge made against the Government is that, being without any decided policy of their own, they came to Parliament for a policy, and without having formed any judgment of their own, they deliberately resolved to be guided by the apparent views of Parliament and the country. Here is a statement which throws the strongest light on this charge. We have the noble Earl informing the Prussian Minister that Her Majesty's Cabinet had not consulted on the subject, and that consequently they were not prepared to recommend any policy to the Queen. To Denmark, therefore, we have the noble Earl holding out expectations that if she complied with certain advice she will obtain material assistance, and to Prussia we have him saying—and he caused this apprehension in the mind of the Prussian Minister—that in the event of Schleswig being occupied, Denmark would find herself assisted in her defence by friendly Powers. The Prussian Minister seemed rather startled at first, having in the course of the correspondence pressed upon the noble Earl the special evils of Germany. To that the noble Earl replied that he was quite aware of that; but that Germany had had plenty of time to consider that, and must take all the responsibility. As soon as Count Bernstorff heard the old familiar words, "take all the responsibility," he was relieved at once, and drew the very natural conclusion—England will never interfere, and will content herself with throwing on us the responsibility. So it has been throughout all these transactions. Step by step the measures protested against in the strongest terms by the noble Earl and his Government, are adopted; the modest application for delay that the King might do that legally which he could not do otherwise, was rejected; the Federal execution grows into a material guarantee, and at last into an invasion and occupation of the country without a declaration of war, and accompanied with
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  scenes of barbarity and ferocity almost unparalleled in civilized war. I regret to find that that spirit of destruction is not yet extinct in the Prussian army, which caused so much anxiety to the Duke of Wellington in 1814, and which he had so much difficulty in restraining. The bombardment of Sönderborg is an act of unparalleled ferocity if it be true, as I have heard, that after the bombardment had once ceased, and the inhabitants were tempted to return to seek among the ruins for the remnants of their property, they found themselves in a trap, and the bombardment was again opened on them. I hope the noble Earl will be able to tell us, that from the information forwarded to him he knows that this atrocious story is not true, or, at least, that it is greatly exaggerated, and that the Prussians have not drawn upon their arms the ineffaceable stain which would rest on them if this atrocity had been committed. I wish I could see in the proposed Conference any prospect of a prosperous issue. It certainly does not assemble under the most favourable auspices. The two principal parties concerned come out with declarations diametrically opposed to each other. One party declares that she will not listen to any proposal for the abrogation of the Treaty of 1852, and the others insist that Denmark shall perform the engagements of 1851–2, yet say that they will be by no means satisfied to leave Denmark in so desirable a position as she was left in by that treaty. Now the engagements of 1851 and 1852 were different. [Earl RUSSELL: They were one arrangement.] No; the arrangement of 1851 was between Russia, Austria, and Denmark; whilst that of 1852 was between all the great Powers, and did not make the slightest reference to the previous arrangement. Besides, one was a treaty, and the other was a sort of agreement, sanctioned by a correspondence of a very loose character, capable of various interpretations, and by no means a sound basis for such an important matter. Therefore, while I hold that the engagements of 1851–2 are very fair and legitimate grounds for conference negotiation, and mediation if necessary, they must never be confounded with the Treaty of 1852, the sole and only object of which was to settle the succession, and to ensure the continuance of the Danish dominions under one sovereign. I was glad to hear that the noble Earl used the expression which showed that he did not

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  confine himself to what should be done to maintain the integrity of Denmark, but that I the object was also to ensure the independence of that country. I can conceive that, there might he arrangements to secure the dominions under the same sovereign, and i yet those arrangements might be such that: the independence of Denmark might be altogether sacrificed. From the statement of the noble Earl we are entitled to hope, that England will go into this Conference with no undue preference for either party, and that her whole endeavour will be to secure fair and equitable terms for both sides. I wish I could feel the same confidence with regard to some of the other Powers, and in the motives and objects with which they will enter into the Conference. Above all, I wish the Conference had not been delayed so long, and that if i an armistice could not have been obtained before the Conference assembled, it had been determined that at its first sitting, and as a preliminary, terms should be proposed by which an end would be put to this bloodthirsty war. I do justice to the motives which have actuated the noble Earl throughout the whole of this correspondence. I cannot, however, conceal from myself my conviction that, by the strength of his remonstrances, and the; feebleness of his acts, he has confirmed the impression so prevalent throughout Europe, that we have ceased to be a great Power, that our military and naval position has been made subordinate to our trading and commercial interests; and that, however England may bluster, and however loudly she may talk, there is not the slightest danger of her interfering materially to exercise the slightest influence or control in the affairs of Europe.
  LORD WODEHOUSE: My Lords, as I have been referred to several times in the course of this debate for the part I have taken in some part of these transactions, I must be allowed to say a very few words by way of explanation, without wishing to enter at length into the discussion which has taken place. The noble Earl who has just sat down referred several times to the assurances which, he said, though they might not have been directly given, were to be inferred from the language which I held at Copenhagen — assurances that the Danish Government might expect the material support of this country if they followed our advice. The noble Earl said that care had been taken not to give direct assurances. Now, I
  778
  think the best proof that the Danish Government have not understood my language in this sense, is to be found in a despatch written by Sir Augustus Paget to the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, on the 22nd of December. In that despatch you will find that the Danish Minister had never inferred that such a promise was given to him, for Sir Augustus Paget mentions that in the interview he had with M. Hall, immediately after the joint interview M. d'Ewers and myself had with him, M. Hall complained that "there was no promise of support if Germany continued her aggressions; there was no prospect even of the execution being arrested," My instructions, certainly, were not to give any such promise, and if I had done so, I should not have obeyed my instructions. I think a conclusive proof that no such assurances were given, is to be found in the constant complaints of the Danish Government that Her Majesty's Government would not give them a promise of support, although they advised them to make certain concessions to Germany. I wish to say a word or two on another point. My noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has said, I not only advised that the Constitution should be revoked, but he thought my own opinion was the Constitution ought not to be carried into effect. In that supposition he is quite correct. My noble Friend, knowing that my sympathies were not very strong with Germany, asked me to examine carefully the Constitution of November, and, having done so, I came to the conclusion that it was expedient for the Danish Government to revoke it. My sympathies were with the Danes, and I would not have undertaken the mission which Her Majesty was pleased to confide in me, if I thought the advice which I was authorized to give was not such as Denmark ought to follow. I think no advice was given to her which it would not have been for her advantage to follow; but, though she did ultimately consent to follow the advice we gave her, unfortunately she consented too late. Throughout those negotiations—not only those which took place while I was discharging my mission, but throughout the whole of them—all the concessions made by Denmark have invariably been made when they were too late. I pressed that very strongly on the Danish Government. I said, "If you make concessions, make them early;" but I cannot conceal from myself, while no man admires more the

  779
  courage and constancy of the Danish people, that they have not been well advised by the Government which has presided over their destinies. In the first place, the Danish Government attempted more than Denmark could accomplish; they attempted to bring Schleswig into closer union with Denmark, in order to consolidate the kingdom, but not remembering that, however desirable, as regards Denmark, that might be, they had entered into engagements with Germany, the non-fulfilment of which, however onerous and inconvenient they might be, must lead to a very unequal contest. The opinion which I held when I was advising the Danish Government I now, viewing matters with the light of subsequent events, hold more strongly still. I think that it would have been far better for the Danish Government, by making timely concessions, to have entered into negotiations, while in the possession of Schleswig, than to have provoked a war and been compelled to enter into them with Schleswig in the hands of the German Powers. It may be very fairly said in reply, that the conduct of the German Powers has been bad. I admit that it has been marked by great duplicity as well as violence; but I still think that if Denmark had pursued another course, she would have had a fair chance of obtaining a Conference before Schleswig passed out of her hands. My noble Friend (Earl Grey) expressed his surprize, that in my conferences with M. von Bismark, and others, I did not make use of an argument which he suggested. I am exceedingly sorry that it did not occur to me, as perhaps it might have produced more effect than those which I did use. I used a great many arguments, but, I regret to say, they appeared to make very little impression upon M. Von Bismark. I think the fact is that the Prussian Government materially changed their policy at the last moment. When the death of the late King of Denmark took place, the Prussian Government, alarmed at the strong democratic feeling of the, party which was making use of this Schleswig-Holstein question for its own ulterior purposes, thought that the best way out of the difficulty was to attack Denmark. Having acquiesced in the proceedings of Denmark with regard to the new constitution up to the King's death, Prussia found out suddenly that she could not acquiesce in them for a single day longer. The noble Earl who has just sat down (the Earl of Derby) pointed out most
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  truly that it would be a complete mistake and most impolitic to admit that the engagements of 1851 were to be connected with the Treaty of 1852. The engagements of 1851–2 were entered into by Austria and Prussia with Denmark, and the other Powers of Europe were not parties to them; whereas the treaty of 1852 was a European engagement, entered into by the Great Powers, in which no reference was made to the engagements of 1851–2. It might be all very well for the German Powers to argue, that it was because they entered into certain engagements in 1851–52 that they signed the Treaty of 1852. That might have been in their minds; but it was not in the treaty, and by that treaty they were bound. I now wish to say one or two words with respect to the difficult question as to what ought or ought not to have been done to prevent the war. In alluding to that subject, I must say that I cannot conceal from myself that the position of the Government has been materially injured by the policy pursued with respect to Poland. When that policy was under discussion in your Lordships' House, I abstained from saying anything on the subject; but it then seemed to me from the first that serious consequences must follow if, after entering into a diplomatic correspondence with Russia in conjunction with Austria and France, the Government should be compelled to withdraw — wisely, I admit, but under circumstances which could not but weaken, to some extent, the good understanding which exists between this country and France; an understanding which I deem essential, particularly in the present state of Europe, to the maintenance of treaties and the balance of power. At the time, I thought it not probable that Russia would give way to any mere remonstrances with respect to the Poles; and that being so, it would in my opinion have been far better if our Government had confined itself to a protest and had not exposed itself to that rebuff. I hope that in the case of Denmark this country will have again the full cooperation of France, without which I despair of seeing this question satisfactorily and speedily settled. If this co-operation should not be obtained, and if the Conference should unfortunately fail in settling the question, a grievous shock will be given to the whole system under the protection of which the treaties of Europe exist; because these treaties exist and are preserved by the concert and understanding which

  781
  exist among the Great Powers of Europe; and if that understanding be permanently impaired, Europe will he thrown into a state of anarchy. I do not agree with my noble Friend (Earl Grey), that it would have been better to have attempted, by a display of force, to prevent the attack by the German Powers on Schleswig, and I concurred in all that has fallen from the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as to its not being obligatory on this country to interfere alone. It may be said that the despatch of a body of British troops to the scene of action would have stopped the German invasion but a wise statesman would consider what must have been the result if that policy failed. Neither the interest nor the honour of this country was engaged in such a manner that the Government ought to have incurred so great a risk as a war with Germany. It is, of course, possible that we might have averted the war by announcing our determination to take a part in it if it should be commenced by Germany; but we had no right to presume that such a result would have followed; and the Government were quite right not to come to any such resolution upon the mere chance that it would have saved us from responsibilities which we were not absolutely prepared to encounter. The position in which this country, France, and Russia are now left inspire me with considerable doubt as to the expediency of such treaties as that of 1852, which, although they have not directly the character of guarantees, are quasi-guarantees, the non-fulfilment of which casts a certain amount of discredit on those Powers who are parties to them. The reputation of this country on the Continent has been referred to, and I entirely concur in the remark that this country should not unnecessarily interfere in the various affairs of Europe. My opinion is that the British Government should interfere in them as seldom as possible; but, if led to interfere, it should be in a manner to make the country respected.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, when my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs appealed the other night to the discretion of this House, I own it appeared to me that on this question there was one of two courses to be taken. If the House were of opinion that the present Ministers have so entirely neglected the interests and honour of the country in the negotiations which have been carried on, and are likely to neglect them for the future, then the House should take some strong mea-
  782
  sure for the purpose of removing them from office; but if the House were not of that opinion, the other course, obviously, is to endeavour to strengthen their hands in the Conference in which they will have to meet the representatives of the other Powers. The speech of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) gave me in many respects great satisfaction. The noble Earl certainly showed a desire not to raise difficulties in the way of the success of the Conference; but, at the same time, I must say I think the noble Earl would have done better if he had abstained from throwing doubt on the probability of the Conference terminating successfully. I must express my satisfaction at hearing the noble Earl declare that he had read the whole of the papers laid on the table. We all know what an acute eye the noble Earl has to discover a flaw, and, therefore, it was very satisfactory to find that the blame attributed to my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, and to the Government, was so very small. The noble Earl opposite began with the regular cut and dry phrase about my noble Friend's style, and then he gave my noble Friend credit for diligence; and, though the noble Earl spoke with something like contempt of the continued attempts of the Government to prevent the war and bloodshed which have taken place, and to stop it for the future, I think that he would have expressed great indignation if it had appeared that we had not used every exertion in our power to prevent so unfortunate a state of things. The noble Earl says we are perpetually spinning cobwebs and never catching flies. I entirely deny that, and I say we have caught some flies. In the first place, we secured those declarations from Austria and Prussia with regard to the Treaty of 1852, and the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Denmark which, I think, are of very considerable importance. By our endeavours we also got Austria and Prussia to agree to an armistice, although Denmark, for reasons of her own, declined to accede to that armistice. Moreover, chiefly, I believe, owing to the exertions of my noble Friend, seconded as he has been by France and Russia, we are going in a few days into a Conference, and it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, and the opinion, also, not only of France and Russia, but of Prussia and Austria, that one of the first objects of the Conference should be to secure an armistice. The noble Earl has tried to pick out the plums from an enor-

  783
  mous cake; but he has sought to draw some inferences from these papers which I entirely dispute. He says he could not find in them anything to show that we had given any pledge of assistance to Denmark. That is sufficiently disposed of by the speech of M. Hall, to which my noble Friend has referred. With regard to another most important point—namely, that we had given the Germans to understand that by no means and on no score would we go to war on this question, I defy the noble Earl to point out any passage in the papers before Parliament, indicating that we have given any such assurance whatever. On the contrary, these papers show that we actually pledged ourselves that, if France and Russia would agree with us, we would render material aid to Denmark. That was a species of combination which, I believe, would have tended entirely to avert the existing difficulties. The noble Earl (Earl Grey), speaking certainly without any evidence derived from the papers, thinks that France was prepared to give material aid. Now, I believe that France was quite determined from the beginning to do nothing of that kind; and when the noble Earl says that we ought to have used menace, and grounded his opinion principally on the assumption that that menace would have been effectual for its purpose, I must say I cannot at all concur with him. How has this war been decided upon by Germany? It is a remarkable fact that various reasons, some of them aristocratic, and some democratic, have combined to carry away these States into a war which is deeply to be deplored, but which I think it would have been impossible for any statesman to prevent; and I am not in the least convinced that the menace of sending a few men to Denmark and ordering a squadron to cruise outside —for it would not have been able to go into—the Baltic would itself have sufficed to stop all chance of war, especially when the States of Germany were intoxicated with delight at finding that there existed one subject on which there was perfect union among them; and when, moreover, they knew that France was determined not to join us, and that Russia, too, was unwilling to separate herself entirely from Austria and Prussia. Then the noble Earl (Earl Grey) told us that this country has lowered itself in consequence of its unwillingness to go to war.
  EARL GREY: I never said anything of the sort.
  EARL GRANVILLE: The noble Earl in a previous debate gave me a similar contradiction to this, and I found afterwards, on looking at the report of his speech, that I had correctly quoted him. Now, I cannot help feeling struck by the contrast presented by the language held by the noble Earl on this question and that which he has for many years held with respect to the policy which ought to be adopted by this country. If any Member of this House has more strongly than another condemned menaces of war, or uttered more eloquent denunciations against the Quixotic idea of England's undertaking to redress injuries and injustice throughout the world, it is the noble Earl himself. I have heard him argue that this country was all the stronger not only for abstaining from going to war, but even for not spending her money to prepare the armaments necessary for war; yet now, he comes down and twits us because we have acted in consonance with the language held by every statesman who has governed this country for close upon half a century, every one of whom having announced in the clearest way to Europe and the world that, although they should always be prepared to uphold the honour and interests of the nation at all hazards, said that nothing but urgent necessity should draw them into war. The noble Earl referred to Mr. Canning's conduct in respect to Portugal. In the very speech in which he defended the expedition to Portugal I think Mr. Canning distinctly stated, that but for the necessity imposed by treaty engagements, he would not have gone into that war—that he felt that war ought not to be undertaken because it was just, but, to justify entering into it, it must also be urgent and expedient. The noble Earl's father, whether in Opposition or in office, clung on every possible occasion to the policy of maintaining peace. Lord Aberdeen's earnestness in the same endeavour is well known; and the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) and his Colleagues when in power exhibited equal anxiety in their foreign policy for the preservation of peace. I am surprised, then, at the noble Earl coming down to the House and holding up the Government to derision for having hitherto kept their hands quite free, as I maintain they now are, to take any part in European matters which they may think fit. By our carefully avoiding to involve ourselves in war up to this moment, I believe that much advantage is gained to the country and to

  785
  Europe. We wish it to be understood that we are desirous for peace; that we are unfettered by any engagement which could prevent us from taking any course that we might deem expedient; but that as long as we can see any chance of securing our object without war, we will not depart from a policy which has been perfectly consistent both before and since the meeting of Parliament.
  EARL GREYwished to explain. His objection to the policy of the Government was, that it was a policy of expedients, which could lead to no useful result. He held that if we had taken a more decided part in the first instance we should have rendered an attack unlikely, and have been in a position to speak to the Powers of Europe with greater weight and authority.
  EARL RUSSELLwished to say a few words relative to the bombardment of Sönderborg. There was no doubt as to the fact of that bombardment; the only question was as to the notice given. It was stated by the Prussian Government that they had given a general notice—I think, some weeks ago—that Sönderborg being part of the fortress of Duppel was liable to bombardment. It appeared to him that that justification—if so it was called—was perfectly insufficient, because the people of Sönderborg naturally would not act on a general notice, but supposed they would have received, according to the usages of war, a special notice of twenty-four hours.
  LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he could not expect to gain the indulgence of the House at so late an hour, as they were not expecting a division and none was likely to occur. The remarks of a noble Duke, now absent from his place (the Duke of Argyll), called imperatively for a word of observation, or he (Lord Campbell) would be silent. The noble Duke, a Member of the Cabinet, had openly endeavoured to overthrow the guarantee of Schleswig, as bearing only on a portion of that duchy. It was true that in one of the instruments containing it, it was confined to that part of Schleswig "now in the possession" of the King of Denmark. But in other instruments there was no such limit. And those who had referred to this ancient point were of opinion that the whole mainland was in possession of the King of Denmark in 1720 Beyond this, it was admitted on all hands that the guarantee applied to the southern portion of the Duchy. It came into force, therefore, the moment that the Eider was crossed by an invader. If the position of
  786
  the noble Duke was tenable, the guarantee would not have found fifteen years ago, in the First Minister and Foreign Secretary of the present day, unreserved and unhesitating champions. Whatever the noble Duke had urged, if applicable now, was applicable to that period. As regards the debate, he (Lord Campbell) saw no reason to regret it. Not one noble Lord had answered his remarks as to the necessity of further measures to give the Conference a prospect of succeeding. And neither the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, nor the noble Lord the President of the Council, had objected to the specific course which he proposed, namely, that of occupying Kiel by British vessels.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eleven o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.