Sitting of 23 March 1863

MINUTES.
SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES—considered in Committee; Resolutions (March 20) reported.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Vaccination (Ireland) [Bill 70], Debate adjourned.
Committee—Marine Mutiny; Telegraphs [Bill 57].
Consid. as amended—Tobacco Duties [Bill 66].
Third Reading—Mutiny; and passed.
Bill withdrawn—Education of Factory Children [Bill 28].

THE RIVER SHANNON.—QUESTION.
COLONEL FRENCHsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, When Mr. Bateman's Report on the state of the River Shannon is to be laid before the House?
MR. PEELsaid, in reply, that Mr. Bateman's Report upon the state of the Shannon had not yet been delivered, and that it was probable some time would elapse before it was ready. When it was sent in, it would, of course, be laid on the table.

SERJEANT MAJOR LILLEY, OF THE INNISKILLEN DRAGOONS.

  QUESTION.
  CAPTAIN ARCHDALLsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether the attention of the War Department or of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, has been called to a recent Court Martial held on the Paymaster of the Inniskillen Dragoons, and to the remarks of the Commander-in-Chief in India on the proceedings of said Court Martial, and on the state of the Regiment; also to certain allegations which have been made in the public press and elsewhere as to the confinement in close arrest and death of Regimental Serjeant Major Lilley, of the above Regiment; whether any inquiry has taken place, and what has been the result of such inquiry? He would further beg to inquire whether the Secretary for War was in possession of any information respecting the remarks of Sir Hugh Rose, when in command, upon the discipline, efficiency, and soldier-like conduct of the Inniskillen Dragoons, and whether a statement has not been made to the effect that the death of Serjeant Major Lilley was attributable to an excess of ardent spirits rather than to the severity of his confinement?
  SIR GEORGE LEWIS, in reply, said, the attention of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief and of the War Department had been directed to the case in question. A full Report from India had been called for, and he understood it had lately been received at the Horse Guards. The matter was still under consideration, and no decision had been come to at present.

MR. SCARLETT AND THE GREEKS.
  EXPLANATION.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE: Sir, I hope the House will allow me to express the regret with which I learn that my remarks the other evening were misunderstood by some of Mr. Scarlett's friends. So far from reflecting on his conduct, I may venture to say that, under great difficulties and with the most ambiguous instructions, no Minister could have acted with greater ability, judgment, and discretion; and, while I retract nothing from my criticisms on Lord Russell's policy, I am still happy to be able to add that it is the opinion of the Greek gentlemen with whom I have been in constant communication that Mr. Scarlett and Mr. Elliot, by their wise and prudent counsels, gave a great support to the admirable attitude of the Greek nation throughout these trying circumstances.

THE CAPITATION GRANT TO THE VOLUNTEER FORCE.—QUESTION.
CAPTAIN GRAYsaid, he wished to ask, Whether the conditions of the proposed Capitation Grant will be soon laid before the House?
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, that the regulations under which the Capitation Grant to the Volunteers would be distributed were in a forward state, and would very shortly be laid before the House.

NEUTRAL RIGHTS.—QUESTION.
MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALDsaid, he would beg to ask the noble Lord at the lend of the Government, If Her Majesty's Government have accepted, or are prepared to accept the proposal stated by President Lincoln in his annual Message to have been made to them by his direction, and which he understood was made as far back as October last, respecting the establishment of a Convention between this country

1745
and the Government of the United States, in order to examine and adjust complaints of the violation of Neutral rights.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, communications have passed between the two Governments in relation to a Convention on this subject. Her Majesty's Government have no objection in principle to such an arrangement, but difficulties have arisen in regard to details. Those difficulties are not yet removed; but I am not without hopes that the two Governments may ultimately come to an understanding on the matter.

THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT.—NOTICE.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERgave notice that he should submit his Financial Statement to the House on Thursday, the 16th of April, that being the second Government day after the recess, and it not being the usage to place any important business on the paper the first night after the re-assembling of Parliament. He also begged to give notice that in the event of the Report on the Tobacco Duties Bill being received that night without opposition, he should tomorrow move that it be read a third time at half past four, in order that it might at once be taken up to the House of Lords, so that the trade might be relieved from suspense as soon as possible.

ASSURANCES REGISTRATION (IRELAND) BILL— [BILL 46.]—NOTICE.
SIR ROBERT PEELsaid, he should not move the second reading of this Bill that evening.
MR. WHITESIDE: Does the hon. Baronet intend to bring on the Bill before Easter?
SIR ROBERT PEEL: No; after Easter I shall bring it on.
MR. WHITESIDE: After the Budget?
SIR ROBERT PEEL: No.

SUPPLY.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

POLAND — THE TREATY OF VIENNA.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HENNESSYsaid, he rose to ask a Question of the First Lord of the Treasury as to the nature of the obligations with respect to Poland involved in the Treaty of
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  Vienna. It was now rather more than three weeks since the House had, in the course of debate, pronounced its opinion on the state of affairs in Poland. On that occasion certain general pledges were given, by the noble Lord, as to the policy which the Government intended to pursue; and the House exercised considerable forebearance in not pressing the Government for immediate explanations on the subject. The time had now, however, come when they were entitled to ask the Government what they were doing. Since the debate on this question, events in Poland had made great progress. The intelligence of the recent defeat of General Langiewicz had been construed by the English press into a serious blow to the Polish cause; but he thought he could show that the event by no means deserved the importance which had been attributed to it. The area of the insurrection in Poland was now three times as extensive as it was when he had the honour of directing attention to the subject; and in estimating the defeat of General Laugiewicz it was neccessary to bear in mind the nature of his position. General Langiewicz had just crossed the Austrian frontier, and held command in, the south-west corner of Poland, and at no time did his operations extend beyond an irregular circle of from forty to fifty miles radius, or a total area of some 1,600 square miles. From General Langiewicz's head-quarters, as straight as a bird could fly, to Bar, in the east of Poland, where the largest number of insurgents was assembled, was a distance of 500 miles. Kiew was 200 miles further to the east. Again, from Skala to Konin was 200 miles. From Bar to Pinsk, in the north, was 250 miles, and to Vilno 500 miles. Polotsk, on the frontier of Lithuania, was 600 miles to the east of Konin. The meaning of those figures was, that while the Polish general, commanding an area of less than 1,600 square miles, had suffered defeat, the insurrection itself, which reigned over about 50,000 square miles, had been extending its area day by day. If the gravity of the rising were to be estimated by the numbers that took part in it, the result would be no less striking. And with regard to Polish affairs generally, he would take the liberty of cautioning the House against placing too implicit reliance upon the details daily furnished by the telegrams of the numbers of Poles disarmed, captured, or slain. There was a remarkable coincidence in two telegraphic despatches which

  1747
  were published in the leading journal of that day. One was dated Warsaw, March 20, and stated that Sokol, the Polish general in the north, was attacked by the Russians and defeated, with the loss of 400 killed and fifty-four taken prisoners. The other was from the Russian Embassy, and set forth that General Langiewicz, in the south had been defeated with exactly the same loss of 400 killed and fifty-four taken prisoners. Such a coincidence was certainly to be accepted as a warning against accepting too readily the statements which came—as he presumed this had done—through the Russian Embassy at Paris. So far from thinking that the defeat of the nominal commander-in-chief—and Langiewicz was no more, for there were fifty independent commanders in different parts of Poland, as perhaps under the circumstances was best for the cause—so far from thinking that the defeat of the nominal commander-in-chief involved the loss of the struggle, he believed that there was no ground whatever for discouragement. He had received information that a landed proprietor who had property worth £80,000 or £100,000 a year, which would be confiscated if the attempt failed, had joined the insurgents. So had a nobleman whose name was well known in England—Count Zamoyski; and so, in fact, was every one doing of character and position that cared for his country. So far from being disheartened by the news just received, he regarded it simply as an indication of the desire of the Russians to get hold of the nominal commander-in-chief—a desire, of course, which was easily gratified, owing to the small number of men under Langiewicz; but he could not believe that the loss of a single feather from the wing of the Polish eagle would seriously affect its flight. Neither did he see that there was any reason, in the actual state of things, for the hope which had been expressed in a leading journal that the Czar would make those benevolent concessions to a defeated people which the editor seemed to think the present was a fitting occasion to offer. With reference to the details of the recent debate, he (Mr. Hennessy) might remind the House that the question he desired to bring before the House was, whether under existing circumstances England had not a moral obligation resting upon her to interfere in the cause of Poland. It was admitted by the noble Viscount at the head of the Government that England had a right, under the Treaty of
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  Vienna, to interfere; but if Russia violated that treaty to the injury of the Poles and to the danger of the peace of Europe, he asked the noble Lord whether to the bare legal treaty right there was not super-added a moral obligation arising from Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington having signed the treaty avowedly for the purpose of protecting the Poles and preserving the peace and security of Europe? What was the language used by diplomatists in dealing with this question? He knew of no diplomatist who was more worthy of attention than the noble Viscount himself; for though speaking in this House he had done what he did not think was often the case with the noble Lord—made use of expressions which were not perfectly accurate; yet in the despatches relating to the affairs of Poland, which were written in 1831 and 1832, but which were not published until 1861, he found that the word "obligations" was used very often, not only by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and by Count Nesselrode, the Russian Minister, but by the noble Lord himself. Writing on the 13th of April, 1831, to the noble Lord, who was then at the head of the Foreign Office, Lord Heytesbury said—
  "Upon the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 22d March, I thought it advisable not to lose any time in informing Count Nesselrode of the nature of the instructions I had received, and in touching upon the several points to which my attention was directed. This I did in the order in which they stood in your Lordship's despatch, beginning with the obligations imposed upon us by the Treaty of Vienna, and the necessity in which England, as well as France, was placed, to watch over the progress of the war in Poland, and to remonstrate in the event of any measures being adopted on its conclusion at variance with existing engagements."
  A despatch addressed by the noble Viscount to Lord Heytesbury, dated November 3, contained the following passage:—
  "The war being now over, and the authority of the Emperor as King being completely re-established in Poland, the time is come when His Majesty feels himself justified, both by his friendship for the Emperor of Russia and by the duty resulting from the obligations which he has contracted under the Treaty of Vienna, in addressing to His Imperial Majesty, in the most amicable tone, and with the deference which is due to his rights as an independent Sovereign, some observations as to the best mode of re-settling the kingdom of Poland under the dominion of the Emperor, on principles accordant with those on which its union with the Imperial Crown of Russia was originally formed, and in such a manner as may be most conducive to its future good government and tranquillity."

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  Here, then, we found the noble Lord repeating the phrase formerly used by Lord Heytesbury—the "obligations" imposed upon England by the Treaty of Vienna. Count Nesselrode answered this despatch at great length, and seemed to think that the several parties to the Treaty of Vienna did not incur the same obligations—for instance, that though Russia might have incurred obligations under the treaty, England had not done so; to this the noble Lord very fairly replied as follows:—
  "It is hoped that upon reflection the Russian Government cannot fail to see all the inconvenient and dangerous consequences which would flow from thus establishing different degrees of obligation among the Powers who have equally signed a general treaty."
  When the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans) in 1831 called attention to the affairs of Poland, the noble Lord said the Government were prepared to fulfil the "obligations" which England had contracted under the Treaty of Vienna, but he refused to tell what they were doing or to publish the papers. There could be no doubt, therefore, according to the noble Lord himself, that a moral obligation was contracted under that treaty, and that it was the duty of England to interfere, of course by diplomatic action and in concert with the other Powers, on behalf of Poland. It was an important fact that throughout the whole history of English diplomacy in regard to Poland the noble Lord had always refused to act in concert with the other Powers. He refused in 1831, when solicited by France to address a joint note to Russia—and here it might be remarked, in passing, that in his despatch asking for the co-operation of England the French Minister spoke of the Poles having the "guarantee" of the Treaty of Vienna. We now knew that at the time of the Crimean war the same overture for joint action in regard to Poland was made to England by France, and was again rejected by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Now, for a third time the noble Lord had the case of Poland in his hands; and the House would probably like to know whether the French Government had solicited the co-operation of England in diplomacy; and, if so, whether its request had been refused. In a recent remarkable speech delivered in the French Senate, M. Billault reviewed the policy of the noble Lord in 1831,
  1750
  and denounced "many words and little actions" as a mode of treatment which should no longer be applied to Poland. That was in fact exactly what the noble Lord's policy in regard to Poland had actually been, and he was glad that M. Billault had publicly condemned it. The speech of the Imperial Minister was said, on the highest authority, to be an accurate interpretation of the policy of the Emperor. M. Billault had, moreover, thrown out a hint which was of great importance — he had hinted that a Congress might be necessary to settle the question of Poland. Were they to believe that the word "Congress" would have been used in M. Billault's speech if it were not considered a matter of serious importance? He would certainly not have ventured to do so if the Emperor was not prepared to recommend such a measure. He should like to know from the noble Lord whether an application had been made to him to address a joint note to Russia with regard to Poland, and whether, if that had been refused, the noble Lord was prepared to reiterate the old exploded argument which he used in 1831, when he declined a similar proposal—namely, that he relied on the benevolent intentions of the Czar? He (Mr. Hennessy) had no faith in the "benevolent intentions" of the Czar. The Czar himself told Count Zamoyski that his future policy in Poland would be one of terror and extermination; and certainly he had kept his word as far as he was able. If the noble Lord praised the Czar and the Grand Duke Constantine in the language held in that House not long ago, the impression would be created that our Government had attempted in 1863 to repeat the course it took in 1831. But he (Mr. Hennessy) ventured to say that the people of this country would be sorry to hear that the Prime Minister was about to follow his old policy—a policy which in his opinion was a mean policy, unsuited to the position of England, and most dangerous also to Europe. If France were left to take up this question by herself, the balance of power and the peace of Europe might be jeopardized. These evils would be averted only by a joint action between the two Powers. If France went alone into this matter, there might possibly be "a rectification of frontiers." On that, which was the lowest ground, the noble Lord ought to be cautious how he refused to co-operate with the French

  1751
  Government. He begged, therefore, to ask the noble Lord whether it was his opinion that no moral obligation existed on the part of England with regard to the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna affecting Poland?
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, the hon. and learned Gentleman gave notice of a very short and simple Question, but he did not give notice of his intention to go into a dissertation as to the relative prospects of the Russian army, and of the Poles who are acting in resistance to that army. I shall not follow him through that dissertation, nor say anything that will imply any opinion as to the probable results and termination of that contest. Everybody has equal means of judging for himself. When, on a former occasion, the hon. and learned Gentleman mooted the question of the obligations resulting from the Treaty of Vienna, I understood him, as I think the House roust have done, to imply that there was in that treaty an obligation upon Great Britain to make war—to interfere forcibly in the affairs of Poland. My answer was, that there is no such obligation. There is a right if she thinks fit to exercise it; but there is no engagement entered into by Great Britain in that treaty which imposes on her the obligation of interfering, by force of arms, to give effect to her interpretation of the articles of that instrument. To that interpretation I entirely and completely adhere. I maintain that it is a just exposition of the effect of the treaty. I said, that where a treaty between different Powers does not contain an express stipulation guaranteeing, on the part of any or all of the Powers, any particular arrangement established by the treaty, there is a right on the part of each contracting party to enforce the arrangement if it thinks the object within its means of doing so; but there is no obligation, unless there is a specific stipulation such as I have named. But the hon. and learned Member now entirely shifts his ground and talks of a moral obligation. But instead of it being a moral obligation to interfere by force of arms, by the quotation he has made from a despatch of mine to Lord Heytesbury he shows that the interposition, which I then contended we were under an obligation to make, was one of a totally different kind from that which he urged on a former evening. What is the despatch which the hon. and learned Member quotes? It is a despatch in which I said that the insur-
  1752
  rection being over, and the Russian Government having re-established its authority in Poland, Her Majesty's Government, in fulfilment of the engagement contracted by them under the Treaty of Vienna, proceeded to represent in friendly terms to the Emperor of Russia considerations as to the arrangements he should make on the restoration of tranquillity in Poland. Well, that is a very different obligation from that which I understood him to argue for on a previous occasion. That obligation was fulfilled in the sense in which it was quoted; because the British Government did at that time make a friendly representation to the Emperor of Russia, urging what they thought it fitting for the Emperor to do with regard both to the obligations he had contracted by treaty, and to what was right and just with respect to the Poles themselves. In that sense I accept the interpretation of the hon. and learned Member; and when the proper time comes to lay before the House the papers showing what has been done and is doing, I am persuaded the House will perceive, that as far as any obligation upon the British Government to make friendly representations to the Emperor of Russia on behalf of the Poles goes, that obligation has been completely fufilled. With regard to the question which the hon. and learned Member has put, as to the communications going on between the French and English Governments in reference to the manner in which any representation should be made, I am sure the House will feel that it would not be useful, even if it were fitting, for me to enter into details as to that which is now passing on this subject. But when the hon. and learned Gentleman reproaches us, and me especially, with not having during the Crimean war consented to a proposal—if such proposal had been made—to transfer the seat of operations from the Crimea to Poland, I think the decision of Her Majesty's Government was the only rational and sensible decision that could have been come to. The war began in a Turkish question; it began for the purpose of protecting Turkey from invasion and attack by Russia. We were occupied, in conjunction with France, in obtaining the security of Turkey from Russian aggression. And be it remembered that that war commenced by a quarrel between France and Russia on a Turkish matter—that, in truth, it was France which began the war, or, at least, the dispute out of which the war originated. France, there-

  1753
  fore, was not a party entitled to ask us—before we had obtained in the Black Sea that security which we thought necessary—to relinquish our half-accomplished enterprise, and embark in another operation totally unconnected with the origin and cause of the war. I contend, therefore, that we acted properly in saying, "Let us finish what we have begun—namely, the protection of Turkey—and when that is ended, we may then see whether there is any ground for engaging in a new dispute with Russia on a question wholly distinct from that which gave rise to the first." We were perfectly justified, then, in not agreeing to suspend those operations in order to embark in a totally different matter. With regard to the still earlier period of 1831, there were at that time considerations which induced us to decline entering into what promised to be likely to lead to serious differences between England and Russia. We did make the representations which the hon. and learned Gentleman has quoted, and although, unfortunately, they were not attended with the success we could have wished, still we did as much as diplomatically we could do. And I beg the House to bear in mind—because it is well to recollect it in the course of these discussions—that the hon. and learned Gentleman now confines his interpretation of the Treaty of Vienna to this:—that we have an obligation, in cases in which the interests of Poland are concerned, to interfere diplomatically on behalf of that country. I believe, Sir, we shall convince the House that we have done our duty in this case, and that our efforts have at all events done some good to those on whose behalf they were made.

COMMAND PAY IN CAVALRY REGI MENTS.—RESOLUTION.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, he rose to move, That this House will, To-morrow, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of an humble Address, to be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that the same command pay shall be granted to Officers commanding regiments of Cavalry as is now given to Officers commanding regiments of Infantry. The hon. and gallant Member said, that his reason for moving his Amendment was, that ever since 1806 every officer commanding an Infantry regiment or the Horse Artillery had received the allowance, while it was not paid to the Cavalry; and he appealed
1754
to the Secretary of War to do justice in the matter. The amount in question was only £500 a year; but this had nothing to do with the justice of the case.
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House will, To-morrow, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of an humble Address to be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that the same command pay shall be granted to Officer's commanding regiments of Cavalry as is now given to Officers commanding regiments of Infantry,"
—instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
SIR GEORGE LEWISobserved, that the hon. and gallant Member had shown his good sense and judgment in making a very short speech on a subject which, in fact, lay in a very narrow compass, and he should imitate his example of brevity. The sum which was at issue was about £920 per annum. The pay of a lieutenant-colonel of infantry amounted to 17 s. per diem, and 3s. command money—making together 20 s. a day. A lieutenant-colonel of cavalry had 23 s. per diem; he had no command money, but was subject to some deductions—the stoppage of 8½d. for the keep of four horses, making 2s. 10 d.; so that the exact amount received was 20 s. 2d. per diem. The only difference, therefore, between the daily pay of the lieutenant-colonel of infantry and the lieutenant-colonel of cavalry was the sum of 2d. He admitted that there were certain expenses which lieutenant-colonels of cavalry were subject to which lieutenant-colonels of infantry were not, and he was not, therefore, altogether prepared to justify the equity of withholding from the lieutenant-colonels of cavalry the difference. The Estimates had passed for this year, and it was not worth while to bring up a supplementary Estimate. What he proposed was this:—He would undertake to consider the question during the present year; and unless the opinion he had expressed underwent a change, he should, if he had again the honour of moving the Army Estimates, undertake to propose that the change suggested by the hon. and gallant Member should be made.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, he was quite satisfied, and was very much obliged to the right hon. Baronet.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

CHINA—GENERAL BURGEVINE.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL SYKESsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the statement of General Burgevine respecting the causes of the late mutiny of the Chinese drilled troops, published in The Friend, of China of the 17th of January, 1863, has been received at the Foreign Office, together with the protest of all his Officers, forty-five in number, against the attempt of the Chinese authorities to obtain his head by the offer of 50,000 taels, or for his secret apprehension, and threatening to resign if he is is murdered? His hon. Friend (Mr. Layard), in answering the Question he put the other evening, denied all knowledge on the subject and charged his correspondent with untruthfulness. The following day (Saturday) the China mail arrived, and brought a confirmation of the accounts he had received by the previous mail, and which led him to put his Questions. General Burgevine published his statement of the causes which led to the mutiny, and his own conduct, which had been arraigned. He stated, that on the 2nd of January, 1863, his troops in garrison at Sung-Kiong were absolutely without subsistence for the want of pay for a lengthened period. On the 2nd of January he went to Shanghai to receive the pay from the Government banker, Takee, who said it was ready to be paid; but, instead of receiving it, he met with the "grossest abuse." On returning to his troops he found they had affixed proclamations in the city, threatening to take the lives of the Mandarins and pillage the city. Fearing these consequences and for the safety of his European officers, General Burgevine pledged himself to obtain their pay in two days, and started a second time for Shanghai, taking now with him a few men of his body guard. He found the money ready packed, and he took it; but an altercation again ensued, and he unfortunately struck Takee, the banker. The Chinese local authorities immediately issued a proclamation charging him with treason and robbery, and deposing him from his command and offering a reward for his head. This official act excited the indignation of his European officers, and on the 10th of January they issued the following Protest, signed by forty-five Europeans, and which appeared in the Friend of China, and other
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  Shanghai newspapers of the 17th of February, 1863:—
  "We, the undersigned officers of the Ward Forces, commanded by General Burgevine, do hereby protest against the late actions of the Chinese authorities in his affairs."
  "We are perfectly satisfied that he has always acted in a straightforward and open manner, and he has never been accused of the slightest offence against the military laws recognised by European Powers: we do not now, nor did we ever, consider ourselves liable to punishment by any others.
  "In reference to the late occurrence in Shanghai, we know nothing more of that affair, than that it was absolutely necessary to obtain the money immediately, for the preservation of the force, and the safety of the European and Chinese officials.
  "We also protest against the brutal attempt of the Chinese authorities to obtain the head of General Burgevine—50,000 taels being the sum offered for it, or for his secret apprehension. Should such a thing take place, we solemnly pledge ourselves, not only not to serve the Chinese authorities any longer, but would make such representation to the Imperial Government at Pekin as would lead to the just punishment of his murderers.
  [Signed by nine Majors, thirty Captains, three Lieutenants, three Gunners and Drivers, Clerks and Storekeepers.]
  "Sung-Kiong, January 10th, 1863."
  These events must necessarily cause a very painful feeling in the minds of many families in England; for Her Majesty's Government, having permitted naval and military officers and other British subjects to take service with the Emperor of China, their lives were never safe from the caprices of the corrupt local officials, over whom the distant Pekin Government had really little control. He must beg his hon. Friend for the future to be more cautious in accusing his correspondents in China of want of truth, founded upon the ignorance of the Foreign Office of events known to every European in China.
  MR. LAYARDsaid, he was afraid he could not give his hon. and gallant Friend a more satisfactory answer than that he had given upon a former evening. It was only that morning that the Foreign Office had received a despatch from Mr. Consul Meadows, enclosing the article from The Friend of China to which the hon. and gallant Member had referred. He could not say whether the facts therein stated were true or not; but it appeared that General Burgevine, having had a slight difference with his banker, broke open his till and took away his money. Whether the General was justified in that proceeding he could not say. It was also announced that the local Chinese authorities had offered 50,000 taels for his head; but

  1757
  whether that offer was known to, or sanctioned by, the Chinese Government he had no information. The Foreign Office had received no official information but; when they did receive any, he would do his best to give a satisfactory reply to the hon. and gallant Member. He might add that all the correspondence relating to China was now upon the table of the House. The hon. and gallant Member had reprimanded the Foreign Office for their ignorance, and made a complaint that the truth of his informants had been disputed. The fact was, that the other evening he (Mr. Layard) had ventured to warn the hon. and gallant Member against relying too implicitly upon information he received from China; and he did so because he remembered that last year his hon. and gallant Friend made a statement in that House of some terrible atrocities committed at Shanghai, and read a letter stating that prisoners had been given up by English officers to the Chinese authorities, and were put to death in their presence. He was persuaded that there was no truth in the statement, because he believed it impossible that English officers could have been guilty of such conduct; but a circular was sent to every Consul in China enclosing the statement made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and asking for information. In reply, the Foreign Office received distinct and positive assurances that not a single word of that statement was true, and he defied his hon. and gallant Friend to state the name of the writer of that letter. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had also told them that the Taepings had established a customhouse, and had published tariff regulations; but the Consuls in China all denied that any tariff regulations had been published by the Taepings. He thought, therefore, he was fully justified in cautioning the hon. and gallant Member against putting too implicit reliance on correspondence he might receive from China.
  COLONEL SYKESexplained that the letter which he had referred to had been first published in India.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.
SUPPLY considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
(1.) Original Question again proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £956,365, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of
1758
the Manufacturing Departments, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1864, inclusive."
Question again proposed, "That the Item of £35,871, for Establishments, be reduced by the sum of £2,000."
SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, that the reduction of £2,000 he had moved from this Vote was the amount of salary paid to Sir William Armstrong. That Gentleman had resigned his office; and as the Secretary for War had not told them how he was going to apply the amount of salary that would be thus saved, there could be no reasonable objection to the reduction of the Vote. He understood that there was some idea of creating a new office, to be held by a general officer, whose duty would be to inspect the various Government establishments. He (Sir H. Willoughby) thought that the only effect of such an appointment would be to shut out the only daylight which the system admitted. He objected to the continual increase in the amount of charges for the nine establishments included in the Vote, which in less than ten years had grown from £15,500 to nearly £30,000. It was expedient, in his opinion, to put some limits on these establishments. There had been a very large decrease in the Vote for Stores, and, as a natural consequence, the charge for establishments ought to be reduced. Colonel Boxer, the head of the laboratory at Woolwich, and a most valuable public servant, had stated that in three months he could supply as much shot and shell as had been expended in the siege of Sebastopol; and therefore, with such resources, it was difficult to conceive why, in time of peace, the establishments should be increased. In the last four years the Elswick Company alone had been paid upwards of £700,000, and £1,100,000 had been paid for iron ordnance. The expenditure was enormous, and he wished to know when it was to be reduced. He agreed in the opinion of Mr. Hawes and Mr. Godley, that to a certain extent Government manufactories were desirable; but that they ought to be watched carefully, and that the public should be assured that they got the value for the money expended. He wished to know what was the amount of the forfeit to be paid under the indenture of 1859 to the Elswick Company, and whether it was now intended to suspend the operation of the gun factory? It would also be very desirable to know the cost of these arma-

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ments. What, for example, would be the cost of a 100-pound shot fired at the Taepings? A 100-pound shell at present costs 17 s. This would give some idea of the cost to the nation of firing these shot at half-savage nations. However well managed these manufacturing establishments might be—and he gave full credit in this respect to certain departments at Woolwich—they were maintained at an enormous cost. But we were very much in the dark as to what those establishments really cost. In 1860, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Arbuthnot, in their evidence, said that the accounts of the store and manufacturing departments were not in a satisfactory condition. The country was kept in the dark because there was no balance sheet—he meant no general balance-sheet. There were balance-sheets for portions of the departments, but not for the whole; and on the 9th of July, 1862, Colonel Boxer admitted that he had never made out a complete balance-sheet. Again, when the Accountant General was examined, he stated that the accounts of 1860–1 had not then been audited. There ought to be duly certified balance-sheets submitted to an independent audit, otherwise the authorities were working in a circle. He moved this reduction because he thought it a reasonable and a wise one, and also because he thought it right that the attention of the House should be called to the costly nature of these establishments. The word "balance-sheet" was not enough; there must be a balance-sheet framed on proper principles, for he had seen plenty of such documents which were not worth a farthing. In the balance-sheet of a private firm allowance was duly made for rates and taxes, insurance, depreciation of plant, and interest on capital; but these items did not usually appear in Government balance-sheets. He believed that the end of the present system was approaching, and he hoped that the Committee would agree to the reduction which he now proposed, of £2,000 on account of establishments.
GENERAL PEELsaid, that the Government ought to be able to show a regular debtor and creditor account, and their establishments ought to be conducted on the same principles of account as commercial men conducted their private establishments. The reduction in the establishments was not in proportion to the reduction in the Votes; for there was a large reduction in this Vote, but the
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reduction in the establishment was only one seven-hundredth part of the reduction in the Vote; and in this and the following Vote the reduction was greater than the difference between the total amount of the Estimates for this year and for last year:—that was to say, that the whole reduction of £1,000,000 shown in the Estimates was in these two Votes. He confessed that he looked upon the explanation that had been given by his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War, with respect to the reduction in these two Votes, with alarm. He saw in them greater cause for alarm as to future expenditure than in all the rest of the Estimates. It was not shown on the Estimates, but the right hon. Gentleman told them that only £5,000 was taken this year for the production of ordnance, the Government having — very wisely—decided to suspend the production of rifled ordnance until it was decided which was the best. The Committee would see that this was only the postponement of a service, and that the postponement must swell the Estimates hereafter; for if Sir William Armstrong or Mr. Whitworth, or any one else, should produce a gun superior to that now employed, it would have to be adopted, and the expenditure involved up to that time would have to be incurred over again. He did not know what number of guns were required for the fortifications now in course of construction, but he believed that the cost of them would not be covered by the fortification loans, but would be chargeable to army grants; and he should like to see a general Return of the number required, to the furnishing of which he did not see there could be any objection, although it might be inexpedient to state the armament of any particular place. There was a Return from the Ordnance Department, showing that the number of guns completed up to the 1st of March, 1862, was 1,935, of which number one-third were 110-pounders; but it was evident from the recent experiments at Shoeburyness, that guns of far heavier calibre would have to be adopted; and not one of these was provided for in the Estimates—indeed, as yet they had got only experimental guns. All these facts went to prove that those who looked for a speedy and permanent reduction of the Army Estimates would be disappointed. There was a difference between the Estimate for the present year and the expenditure for 1858–9 of

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exactly £2,000,000. Part of the increase was to be accounted for by the difference of the manner in which the accounts with the Indian Government were kept. [Sir GEORGE LEWIS: And the militia is included.] So it was in the expenditure for 1858–9. After allowing for the difference in the mode of keeping the Indian accounts, the actual excess shown in the Estimates of the present year, over the expenditure of 1858–9, was between £1,100,000 and £1,200,000; and not one shilling of that excess was caused by any item of expenditure for the regular army; it arose from the manufacture of ordnance stores, rendered necessary by modern discovery. The increase and improvement of ordnance necessarily involved expense; and he feared that the expenditure on account of ordnance, which in 1858–9 was £600,000, was more likely to reach £2,000,000 than to be reduced to £600,000. He did not perceive the probability of the Government being able to make a reduction, nor did he think that the country was in such a state that it could not provide for any necessary expenditure; but if expenditure was not absolutely necessary, there was no degree of prosperity which could justify the Government in incurring it. His present object was to show that the apparent reduction in the Estimates proceeded from a postponement of services which must fall upon future Estimates, rather than from a real reduction in the Estimates themselves; and to press upon the right hon. Gentleman the importance of a debtor and creditor account being kept for the large manufacturing establishments.
MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, that he submitted to the contract Committee, with the sanction of the late Sir Benjamin Hawes, a form of Return for the Enfield establishment, and it was approved by the Committee; but in reporting the products of the establishment the form of Return had been adopted only in one year; so that it was impossible not only to compare the products in point of cost with those made by private contractors, but the cost of the establishment and its productions from year to year.
SIR MORTON PETObelieved that any Government were not in a position to command the skill requisite for the carrying on of their extensive establishments. When the Armstrong gun was invented, it was thought that this country would
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possess a weapon which all the world beside would be without. Great secrecy was observed, and Sir William Armstrong was made a Government officer. But now, after expending £2,000,000 or £3,000,000, and erecting factories at Woolwich and Elswick, Sir William Armstrong had resigned, and the Government had to pay him a very large sum for his manufactory in the North; he possessed the means of supplying ordnance to the whole world, and the Government had thus lost the skill which they heretofore considered necessary for the superintendence of that particular branch of their works. This was a point that ought not to be lost sight of if the Government were determined to be their own manufacturers; but if they would only learn when to buy and how to buy, they need not manufacture at all, but would have-all the manufactories of the world at their command. As it was, the country would soon present the anomaly of a Government unable to trust any of its private manufacturers, who at the same time would be supplying all the rest of the world. All that the Government need do was to have specifications clearly drawn out, and to select contractors of high character, reserving the right to strike off their list those that did not deal honestly. This they had done satisfactorily in regard to the building of marine engines, and in no instance had they been disappointed. A manufacturer must have skill to purchase and to organize labour, and no man would do these so well for Government as he would for himself. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Officer opposite, that as soon as the Government had appointed a successor to Sir William Armstrong, and had made up their minds as to the best kind of ordnance, there would be a large expenditure; and in another year it would be found that the Estimates had not been reduced at all, because this year there was not the same ratio of stores that there had been previously. The only reason that the Estimates of this year were less than the Estimates of last year was, that the Government found themselves at fault with regard to the manufacture of ordnance, and they very properly hesitated before committing themselves further. He trusted the hon. Baronet would divide the House, because it was time a check was placed upon these establishments.
SIR FREDERIC SMITHobserved, that the manufacturing branches at Woolwich were well conducted in themselves, but

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required to be harmonized with each other. In appointing an officer to superintend all the establishments, the Government were taking a very necessary and useful step; and he believed they had chosen a very good man for the post. At the same time, while approving the appointment, he believed that the funds wanted for it might be procured by making a reduction in the staff. He was surprised to hear hon. Members talking as if the Government ought to give up manufacturing altogether. With improvements continually taking place in gunnery, it would be most unwise and unsafe to intrust the manufacture of ordnance entirely to the trade, who had neither the same interest in nor the same means of conducting experiments and keeping pace with the progress of the times. He did not believe that gun-carriages could be made in any private factory equal to those at Woolwich; it was a notorious fact that the trade could not manufacture gunpowder calculated to produce the same results as cheaply as the Government. It would therefore be very unwise to trust entirely to the private trade for the production of commodities which the private trade was not accustomed to produce. The Government establishments could keep pace with the improvements which were from day to day being effected; but the staff employed ought to be reduced in proportion to the reduction in the quantity required from them.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, the Committee would observe that upon the Vote under consideration there was a diminution upon the establishments this year, as compared with the last, of £435,000; and upon the next Vote which was for Warlike Stores, there was a dimunition of £698,000. The complaints, therefore, that had been made with regard to increased items for Establishments and Government Works did not apply to the present Estimates. With respect to the Manufacturing Departments, the Estimate for last year for the Supervising Establishments was £36,500, whereas for this year it was £35,800, showing not a very considerable diminution, but certainly not an increase. They had now only to deal with the Estimates for the present year. He did not undertake to make prospective Army Estimates. Next year they would have to consider the Estimates for that year, and would then see whether upon the whole there would be an increase as compared with the present year. It was sufficient
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if he showed that the Vote that he asked for would leave them with sufficient guns and sufficient stores in the magazines, and that the military service ran no danger of being crippled; and on the authority of the military advisers of the War Office he was enabled to state that those would be sufficient. With regard to the general question of Government manufactories, there were two conditions, which, if it was not necessary, it was, at all events, important, should be fulfilled when an article was manufactured, not by Government, but by a contractor. The first was, that the article manufactured should be capable of easy verification by inspection; and next, that it should be of a sort for which there was a demand by the general public, and was not exclusively consumed by the Government. If hon. Members would cast their eye down the list of articles mentioned in this Vote, they would see that the articles manufactured were exclusively those for which there was no general demand in the country, but which were used exclusively by Government. A manufacturer, before he could lay down plant or machinery for which there was no demand by private individuals, but which was exclusively used by Government, said to the Government, "You must give me a security that my money will not be thrown away; you must guarantee me a certain annual amount of orders; or you must advance money to me for the machinery and plant." Experience showed, that whenever private contractors contracted to furnish Government with articles of which Government was the only consumer, they must in effect be subsidized. If the Government wished to provide itself with a certain number of yards of cloth or cotton, or a certain number of pairs of shoes, there was no such difficulty, because those were articles in general demand, and he could not conceive any justification for a Government setting up manufactories of such articles. But it was different in the case of guns, or gunpowder, or muskets. Those were the general principles that appeared to him to govern the question of Government manufacture. He confessed that when he entered upon his present office, his opinions were that it was expedient for Government, in all cases where it was possible, to employ private contractors; but yielding to pressure of facts, he satisfied himself that it was not so easy as hon. Gentlemen seemed to think, to obtain a regular and cheap supply from

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private contractors. His hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto) said he (Sir George Lewis) had omitted one difficulty under which the Government laboured—namely, the difficulty of obtaining skilled assistance. But he did not admit the justice of the remark. Colonel Boxer, Mr. Anderson, Colonel Dixon, and other heads of departments, were most accomplished manufacturers; and though their pay was not high, their labour was great, and he believed them to be able to compete in skill, with any private manufacturer in the kingdom. He therefore thought that no advantage would arise from giving up the manufacture of ordnance in the Government factories; and that if they did, the guns supplied would not be so perfect in execution, and that no economy would result to the public. Gentlemen connected with the accounts department of the War Office, stated before the Ordnance Committee last Session that they believed that guns of a certain class (12-pounders), produced in the Woolwich factory, cost the Government about 50 per cent less than those supplied by the Elswick Company. He did not wish to make himself responsible for the principle on which the statement was founded, and it was difficult to make a fair comparison between that which was manufactured in a Government factory and that which was manufactured in a private factory; but he had formed the opinion that no advantage would be derived from closing the Government factories. He now came to the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir H. Willoughby), who said the system of accounting was very defective. He must take the liberty of entirety disputing that assertion. [Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY observed, that he quoted from the evidence of Mr, Anderson.] Mr. Anderson's evidence was given three years ago. Mr. Anderson was no doubt thoroughly master of the system of accounts, and when he stated that at that time they were defective, he no doubt stated what was correct. But at present the accounts of the Government departments included in the Army Estimates were audited in the most complete manner. They were audited for the year ending last March, and they could at any moment be laid on the table. They exhibited not only the cash account but the capital account. At the same time they exhibited a statement of all the articles in store, and they also showed how much of each sort was manufactured
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in the course of the year, and what was the cost of each article. Nothing more complete could be furnished. Perfect; securities were taken for the custody of the stores. The person in charge of each store had a list given to him of the articles when he took charge, and he was called upon to account for the articles. Every year a survey was held at all the stations, when not only was the condition of the stores ascertained, but certain stores were counted as samples of the correctness of the stock in hand; that was to say, stock was taken not completely but in the way of sample, and every five years there was a complete stock-taking, and every single article was examined, and was compared with the lists. These checks applied to the foreign stations as well, and the War Office was at any time able to furnish an account of the stores at any foreign station, such as, for instance, the station at the Ionian Islands. He thought that in this respect at least it was impossible to say that there was any neglect on the part of the Government. As far as the skill shown in the manufacture and the mode of accounting for the article produced went, no reasonable objection could be made; the general principle of having Government manufactories was, of course, a matter always open to discussion; but the practical issue of the hon. Baronet's proposal was to reduce the column for establishments by £2,000. The proposal was based on the fact that the office lately held by Sir William Armstrong had become vacant. Now, the vacancy of an office did not necessarily constitute economy. The usual course when an office became vacant, unless it was a sinecure, which the office lately held by Sir William Armstrong certainly was not, was to fill it up. However, he was ready to admit that some economy could be effected in the case of the office now vacant; and he had in contemplation a plan by which a saving could be effected in the gun factory, and at the same time an appointment might be made by which an inspection of the different establishments at Woolwich could be effected which did not now exist. At present, the head of each factory inspected his own work—a system which, though no serious inconvenience could be said to have resulted from it, was hardly consonant with the idea of a proper control over those who expended large sums of public money. He therefore proposed to appoint a military officer as inspector of the artil-

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lery and other articles manufactured at Woolwich. He had no wish to keep up establishments beyond the point which was absolutely necessary, but the Committee should bear in mind, that with respect both to these manufactories and to the army itself, it was important to have a framework which admitted of being called into operation when a sudden emergency arose. What was now passing across the Atlantic showed how an enormous expense might be created by the want of an adequate machinery ready at hand, and one of the advantages which we possessed was that we had such a machinery, capable of being called into activity whenever it might unhappily be needed. He promised, however, that everything should be managed on the most economical standard, and with this explanation he trusted that the hon. Baronet would not press his Amendment. If a division were taken, he hoped the Committee would support the original Vote.
SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, he thought the right hon. Baronet had not succeeded in showing the Committee that it had any real control over the Estimates of that Department. If the reduction now made in the Vote for stores did not involve any sacrifice of efficiency, the corresponding Vote of last year must have been greatly in excess of the public requirements; and if it were true that since the Estimates were prepared an order had been given for 100 Armstrong guns of large size, what became of the reduction? The right hon. Gentleman took a considerable sum this year for guns; yet a Committee had been appointed to determine what was the best gun for the service, or rather, as it would now appear, only to decide between the Armstrong and Whitworth guns, of which the specimens submilted may be of hitherto untried patterns. That was a practical confession that Sir William Armstrong, after all the costly experiments he had made, was not satisfied with the weapon that had been supplied to the service, and was still going on experimenting. The inquiry before the Committee ought to be thrown open to all inventors, and then we might ultimately secure the best gun for the country. It was most important that we should not accumulate a large stock of weapons that were practically obsolete. The right hon. Gentleman proposed to adopt a new system of inspection. Now, it was necessary, before they passed the Vote, that they
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should know exactly what was intended. It was given in evidence before the Ordnance Committee of last Session, that a system of independent inspection was under the consideration of the War Office some years ago; but the late Lord Herbert afterwards addressed a letter to the manufacturing establishments at Woolwich requiring the inspection to be conducted by the persons who were from day to day charged with the responsibility for their manufactures. Any inspection to be effective and real mast be made in the departments where the different processes were carried on, otherwise it would be impossible to tell whether the guns and shells manufactured had flaws in them or not. He wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman in what branch of the manufacturing departments at Woolwich the want of the proposed system of independent inspection had been experienced. In the only branch in which it had been tried, it had broken down. If inspection were to be more than a name, it would cost much more than £2,000 a year. There must, in fact, be a numerous staff, with an inspecting officer for every one of the departments.
MR. MONSELLwas afraid the hon. Gentlemen who were so anxious to go to dinner, hardly appreciated the importance of the subject before the Committee. The real question was, whether they should completely revolutionize the existing system? It certainly seemed to him that unless the statement which the hon. Baronet had made, and which he (Mr. Monsell) now confirmed, could be refuted, it would be absurd to change a system which had been completely successful during the Crimean war, and in spite of difficulties of the most formidable character. He must call upon his right hon. Friend to name the instances in which the slightest failure had taken place in the inspection carried on under the present system. Was the opinion of Lord Panmure, who had seen the working of the existing plan during our great contest with Russia, of no moment? Or was the late Lord Herbert no authority? That noble Lord, when he first considered the question, admitted that his prejudices were in favour of the proposal now made by the Secretary for War; but subsequent investigation had satisfied him that the proposal was dangerous and bad. The right hon. Baronet was going, in fact, not only to create a useless place for some

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military officers, but to multiply the existing expense on account of inspection four or five-fold. He hoped the Committee would not imperil a system which he contended was a perfect success.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he was of an entirely different opinion as to the working of this system. He had the greatest respect for the opinion of Lord Panmure and the late Lord Herbert, but in the present instance he believed they were both wrong. No doubt, the incapacity displayed in the Crimea was the cause of serious military disasters, and the Government were now acting wisely in reversing that policy and placing distinguished military officers at the heads of the several departments, who were well acquainted with the best mode of working them. In the course that he was following he was sure that the right hon. Gentleman was doing that which was for the welfare of the country, and he did not believe that there was a single military man but would back him.
SIR GEORGE LEWISwas certainly rather surprised that the very modest proposal he had made with respect to alterations at Woolwich should have met with condemnation in the House. That it should have been condemned at Woolwich seemed very natural—he was quite prepared for disapprobation from the heads of the Woolwich departments; but that Gentlemen who had the control of the public purse should meet with censure a proposal for the simple inspection of the articles produced in the Government manufactories at Woolwich did fill him with surprise. With regard to the carriage department and the laboratory department, the persons charged with them inspected the produce of their own manufactories. He believed them to be highly honourable men, skilful in working, diligent and industrious; and he was perfectly prepared to say that no serious practical evil had arisen. But the Committee must see that was a system which did not contain within itself the elements of perfect control, and a time might arise when serious practical inconvenience might occur. With regard to the gun-factory, he believed there had been some imperfect external inspection; but it had been very little, and it could not be said that no practical inconvenience had been felt. His proposal was not a revolution, nor did it contemplate an additional expense of £30,000 or £40,000. All he asked was to be allow-
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ed to take £2,000 a year, which was set free by the resignation of Sir William Armstrong, and he would undertake that the whole of that £2,000 should not be exhausted by the system of inspection which he proposed.
SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, that the speech of the hon. Gentleman opened up a new question, which ought to be submitted as a distinct issue to the Committee. He should divide the House on the principle, that whenever a fair opportunity presented itself of reducing the public expenditure without injury to the public service, it should be eagerly seized upon.
Question put.
The Committee divided:—Ayes 45; Noes 94: Majority 49.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
(2.) £838,369, Warlike Stores.
COLONEL SYKESasked, who paid for the shot and shell supplied to the Chinese Government.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, any stores supplied from this country would be paid for, and the amount received by the British Exchequer.
Vote agreed to.
(3.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a sum, not exceeding £810,941, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge of the Superintending Establishment of, and Expenditure for, Works, Buildings, and Repairs at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1864, inclusive."
MR. CHILDERScalled attention to the large expenditure upon the new barracks at Chelsea. For three years the total sum which the work was estimated to cost had been stated in the Votes at £140,000; but this year, for the first time, the amount had been raised to £187,000. The reason assigned was that there had been an excess on the cost of the foundations. But these had been put in long ago, and surely the excess was discovered before this year. The arrangement as to the building of these barracks was very unbusiness-like. Instead of this erection being placed under the authority of an officer of Engineers, a premium was offered to architects, and the successful competitor was allowed a percentage on the outlay. The Department then appeared to have gone to sleep, and let the

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architect do what he liked; and what was thought to be the last year of the expenditure arrived, when the House was told that an additional Vote of £47,000 would be required on account of the unusual cost of the foundations. For this oversight the architect was, of course, responsible; but then he obtained an additional commission on the £47,000. Again, the House had been told in previous years that the total expense of the barracks at Colchester, so far as the Government were aware, was £80,000; but now the cost appeared to be £92,000. There was an item of £15,329 for huts at Gibraltar, on which last year there remained to be voted £4,500 and nothing more. Yet this year £6,000 was asked for on this account. Last year there was what was supposed to be a final Vote for improving the defences at Malta; yet it now appeared, that instead of £172,000, the outlay in this respect was £196,842. Such changes as these ought not to be made without full information being afforded to the House. There was another item upon which further information ought to be given. Without wishing to impute any other than straightforward conduct to the right hon. Gentleman, he must say that the manner in which the Votes for improving the defences of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick appeared to have been drawn looked as if concealment were the object in view. Last year £10,000 was asked for as a total Vote, and now they were told that this £10,000 was only the first instalment of an expenditure of £100,000—this expenditure, too, having been resolved on without communication with the local Government, whose first knowledge respecting it was obtained from the inquiries respecting the land. Greatly improved as was the form of these Votes, he complained that still they did not honestly show the amount to which it was intended that they should pledge the House.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, he had hitherto abstained from speaking on the subject of the fortification Votes; but now, considering the enormous sums to be expended on fortifications, he thought it important to ascertain that proper precautions were taken to secure the health and comfort of the troops placed within them. Last year he was at Eastbourne, at one end of which town there was an old redoubt, which had been repaired for the reception of troops assembled for the purpose of rifle practice. £5,000 had been spent upon
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this work. This redoubt had been occupied a short time since by a garrison of 135 Scots Fusilier Guards, and he (Colonel North) had been informed that the arrangements of the place were so bad, that accommodation of a certain necessary kind did not exist within the fort, so that the arrangements which had to be resorted to by the soldiers at night were too disgusting to be described. He trusted this state of things, which could not have existed for a single day in any gaol in England whilst the right hon. Baronet was Home Secretary, nor in any workhouse, would speedily be remedied, as he (Colonel North) understood a detachment of the Guards were about to be sent to the same place. One day he heard the men complain of the water. On inquiry he found that the men were compelled to drink rain water, which was often both foul and scarce. In consequence, he waited on the secretary of the local water company, his impression being that there must be some great engineering difficulties in the way of supplying the fort, or that the charges were exhorbitantly high; but he found that the company would lay on the water for £28, and supply it at 1s. per thousand gallons, and only charge for the quantity actually consumed. He trusted that the right hon. Baronet would not lose an hour in putting an end to this disgraceful state of things.
MR. W. WILLIAMScomplained of the large amounts which were being expended, or were about to be expended, upon public works in some of our colonies, especially at Ceylon, the Mauritius, and Nova Scotia; and also asked for information as to the places at which the amounts proposed to be taken for military schools and chapels, accommodation for married soldiers, sanitary services, and other similar purposes were to be expended.
SIR FREDERIC SMITHconcurred with the hon. Member for Lambeth as to the right of the Committee to receive information on this subject. It appeared to be the desire of the Government to reform the east face of the Tower of London, and £10,000 was the amount taken for this work. This seemed to be wholly unnecessary, because the Tower could scarcely be considered as a work of defence, and was merely used as a great store warehouse; it was all very well to repair, but this was altering the character of the work, and was a whim that should not be indulged. At page 47, under the

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head "Various Stations," regimental schools and chapels and other works were mentioned. He (Sir Frederic Smith) should be glad to see the places specified by name where these works were to be constructed. The next item upon which he would remark was that of £450,000 for the defence of commercial harbours. He thought this was a very proper outlay, and that the works proposed were most important and most necessary. But he believed, that if this outlay were required, it had better be made at once. The whole cost intended to be expended was £450,000 — a sum of £206,000 had been voted, but only £121,900 had been expended. In consequence of this mode of procedure, the expense of superintendence was greatly increased. It would be much better to expend the money at once, and have done with it. He should also like to know of what materials these forts were to be constructed. If they were to be built of earth or stone, considering the increased power of modern artillery, a great mistake would be committed; but if they were to be constructed of iron, no one would complain of the system. He found also an item for additional accommodation at the Cape of Good Hope. For whom, he would ask, was this additional accommodation required? Then, again, there was the re-appropriation of the barracks at Warley, £10,000. He remembered the re-appropriation of Warley barracks three times over. Would the right hon. Gentleman state why this appropriation was to be made, and what was about to be done? Another item to which he wished to draw attention was that of £8,000 for the alteration of drainage and the utilizing of sewage at Aldershot. His experience in a Committee of this House last year had convinced him, that unless the circumstances were exceedingly favourable, no attempt to utilize sewage by its application to land would pay, and he was sure that in the case of Aldershot any expenditure with that object would be money thrown away.
SIR HENRY STRACEYsaid, he also desired to make a few remarks upon the dilatoriness of the Government with regard to the erection of forts for the defence of commercial harbours, and he would particularly instance the case of Yarmouth. The late Lord Herbert in 1859 promised that two batteries should be erected to protect Great Yarmouth, and his consti-
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tuents had been led to expect that that promise would at once be acted upon; but, up to the present moment, the batteries had tot even been commenced. Lord Herbert had, moreover, admitted that the roadstead at Great Yarmouth was of the utmost importance, and that he did so was not to be wondered at when it was borne in mind that no less than 600 or 700 vessels frequently took refuge there in certain winds; that the same winds might bring an enemy into the harbour; that it was easy of assault by gunboats, and that is commerce in the north seas had greatly increased of late years. No port on the east coast was so defenceless, no port was so easily defensible, and for no port had so little been done. The Defence Committee, he might add, had recommended that, in addition to building new batteries, the old ones at Great Yarmouth, which were in a dilapidated condition, should be repaired, and Lord Herbert, supported by the best professional anthority, had so far acquiesced in that recommendation that land had been purchased for the purpose of carrying it into effect, which was now in. the possession of the Government. He should wish, under these circumstances, to know why that port was left in its present defenceless state, and upon what ground the present Secretary for War refused to act upon the decision of Lord Herbert and the Engineers by whose opinions he was influenced? The hon. Baronet, in conclusion, moved that Great Yarmouth should be included in the Vote as one of the commercial harbours of the country, at which works of defence ought to be erected.
THE CHAIRMANsaid, that as the Motion involved an increase of the Estimates, it could not, in accordance with the rules of the House, be put.
SIR HARRY VERNEYdesired to press on the right hon. Baronet the expediency of establishing institutes for soldiers, and suggested that the old hospital at Aldershot might with advantage be converted to that purpose. He thought, he added, that it would tend to the promotion of the health, morality, and efficiency of the men encamped at Aldershot, if they were during the summer months to be placed under canvas as far as possible.
COLONEL SYKES, with reference to the note appended to the item of "Gibraltar," that "the change of site had caused an excess over the original Estimate," complained that greater care was not exercised

1775
in the first selection of a site for the purpose.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, that the Vote under this head last year was £995,000, and this year £810,000, being a diminution of £184,000, which could not be easily accomplished in this branch of the expenditure. Formerly these Votes were printed in a single column, showing the amount proposed to be voted in the course of the year. In consequence of the reasonable demands of the Committee, columns were added showing what was the original Estimate, how much had already been voted, and what additional sum was required. Unfortunately, it happened that Estimates were not unfrequently inadequate, and indeed it was almost impossible that the predictions which officers made of the amount required for works of the kind should invariably be realized. Unforeseen events occurred in the progress of the works. A change in the head of a department caused a change of intention. With an officer newly appointed new views were taken, fresh recommendations were made, and the plan originally submitted was departed from. This was not only the case in public affairs, but in private works, and any hon. Gentleman who had any experience in building would remember how he sometimes changed his mind in the progress of the work. He feared, that until they arrived at a period of ideal perfection, they could not expect to have immutable Estimates. He could certainly assure the Committee that the Estimates had been prepared with great care; and although it was difficult to insure perfect completeness, there was no intention to deceive. As to the barracks at Chelsea, he was free to admit that they will probably cost £47,000 more than the original Estimate, but it was an exceedingly good barrack, in the building of which modern improvements had been introduced; so that it was more commodious, more healthy, and far superior in every respect to the old barracks, such as Knightsbridge. As to Colchester, there was an excess of £2,000, but that was upon a total of £80,000. As to Walmer, it was converted into an Indian depôt, and the expense might be deemed to be met by the capitation grant. With regard to Nova Scotia, the Vote was for the expenses of fortifications at Halifax and St. John's. The fortifications at Halifax were looked upon as principally fortifications for naval pur-
1776
poses. It was one of our principal naval stations in the Northern Ocean, and the fortification of it was a matter of Imperial interest. With regard to St. John's, it was the place at which the troops were landed, and some expenditure there was of importance. It was for the Committee to consider whether they would vote these sums. He was quite aware that it was questioned whether we should spend any money on fortifications for the Colonies. He could only say, for his own part, that he was most unwilling to propose the expenditure of a single hundred pounds for the fortification of the Colonies which did not appear to be of Imperial interest. If Gentlemen were prepared to lay down the principle that they thought it desirable or that they were willing to entertain the question of emancipating the Colonies or handing them over to some foreign Power, he could understand the proposition; but it was hardly possible to renounce the duty of providing, to a certain extent, for the military defence of the Colonies as long as they formed an integral part of the Imperial dominions. There was one point to which he thought it right to advert, because he misled the Committee last year by a statement that £10,000 or £15,000, which was then voted, would be sufficient to complete the defences of the Mauritius. He was at the time under that impression; but on conferring with Sir John Burgoyne he found it was impossible, without more money, to place those defences in a state of tolerable efficiency. He therefore proposed this year an additional sum of £15,000, with the prospect of a further Vote to the extent of £34,000. With regard to Eastbourne, they were not regular barracks, and he would inquire whether it was possible to discontinue that item of expenditure. With regard to Great Yarmouth, he proposed this year to take a Vote for fortifications in the commercial harbours of the Mersey and the Humber; so that the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir H. Stracey) would see that the east coast was not neglected. He did not propose to take any Vote to fortify Great Yarmouth, for it was impossible for the Government to undertake to fortify the whole coast. The principle on which they had gone was to fortify our arsenals and those places wherein our military and naval strength resided, and to make them safe against the sudden attack of an enemy. With regard to the Tower, the expenditure for this year was

1777
£3,000, and the receipts from the Tower armoury were £2,636 for the year. Though of no great importance for defensive purposes, yet the Tower was connected with so many historical associations that the Committee, he thought, would not grudge the sum required for necessary repairs and alterations, especially as so large a portion was covered by the receipts.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, that the explanation of the right hon. Baronet with regard to Eastbourne Barracks was very unsatisfactory. He should make further inquiries; and if he found that nothing had been done, he should bring the subject before the House in a distinct form.
SIR HENRY STRACEYsaid, the War Office had undertaken to defend Great Yarmouth by building two batteries, and he thought they were bound, in good faith, to carry out that undertaking.
MR. BAXTERsaid, he was not satisfied with the explanation as to the expenditure proposed for colonial fortifications. Last year the House, with the complete assent of the Government, agreed to Resolutions affirming that the self-governing Colonies ought to be called on to provide for their own defences. Earl Grey and Lord Herbert were examined before the Select Committee on this subject, and both of them stated that a large part of the expenditure on colonial fortifications was entirely wasted, and that frequently the sums voted were not fairly chargeable to the Imperial Exchequer. He himself, had moved a Resolution on the subject, but he had not pressed it, having been satisfied by the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, and the Under Secretary for the Colonies, that the Government were of the same mind as himself. Having looked very carefully through the Army Estimates, he was not at all satisfied with what the Government were doing this year to carry out the Resolutions agreed to last Session. It was proposed to vote £14,300 for fortifications and store-buildings in the Colonies which were self-governing. There was an increase in the item for Halifax, Nova Scotia. He should like the House to notice the fact, that, of a sum of £10,000 voted for those fortifications last year, only £1,891 had been expended. He was told that it was the intention to bring the whole outlay up to £100,000; but as only £1,891 out of the £10,000 already granted had been actually spent, the House had now an opportunity
1778
of expressing an opinion that this was not a proper application of British money. He did not think that in the Estimates before them, the right hon. Gentleman was carrying out the previously expressed intention of the House of Commons; and he therefore begged to move the reduction of the Vote by a sum of £10,000.
MR. HALIBURTONsaid, he had before taken the trouble of setting the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) right on the subject of the fortification of the Colonies, but found that he immediately got into the wrong path again. The hon. Gentleman set himself up in a manner to excite the reverence of the Colonies as a roan of wonderful integrity and extraordinary disinterestedness. There was a foreigner who came to this country once, and whom, no doubt, many hon. Members had heard performing on the fiddle—he meant Paganini. He had only one string, and on that he played many tunes. The hon. Member for Montrose was more fortunate, for the Scotch fiddle he played on had two strings. There were two questions that he had taken under his particular patronage—namely, subsidies to ocean steamers and fortifications in the Colonies. Upon these strings he played the same tune every Session. He would ask whether the possession of a representative government was the gauge by which they could judge of the duty of a Colony to pay for her own fortifications? At Halifax there was a very large dockyard without a dock. There was a harbour there, and the place was a great military position; but he believed that no harm would be done to the people of Nova Scotia if the whole town was burnt. It consisted principally of wooden houses; and the only improvement it had undergone in his time was that which had succeeded several large fires. He complained very much of those continual discussions about the Colonies in an assembly where they were not represented.
MR. ARTHUR MILLSsaid, he thought that the conduct of the British Government on the occurrence of the Trent affair showed that this country was not disposed to repudiate her obligations towards the Colonies; but it was quite a different question, whether we were bound to maintain the fortifications in all these Colonies; and he should therefore support the Motion for the reduction of the Vote. Those who held the doctrine that the Colonies should be defended by this country, and were

1779
prepared to grant large sums for that purpose, would do well to consider whether the construction of fortifications was likely to effect the object they had in view. Since the year 1815 over two millions sterling had been expended on fortifications at Bermuda, and yet there was not one fort there capable of resisting the attack of two French frigates. Sir John Burgoyne stated, in his evidence before the Committee, that the works at the Mauritius would require a further expenditure of about £300,000, and a garrison of 6,000 men. With such a number locked up in them these fortifications were elements rather of weakness than of strength. He believed that the true way to defend our colonial empire was to maintain command of the sea. Before the Committee agreed to that Vote, they ought to consider whether they were not about to involve themselves in an expenditure which was worse than fruitless.
MR. DODSONsaid, that the arguments used in favour of the Amendment might be well founded, if applied to the erection of small fortifications to be held by small garrisons; but such was not the proposition submitted to the Committee. He quite concurred with the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. Mills), that the maintenance of our colonial possessions depended on our naval supremacy; but that was a reason not for opposing, but for supporting the Vote—for, in order to retain that supremacy, it was necessary to have arsenals and dockyards in different parts of the world where a fleet could, in case of necessity, be refitted. Works and fortifications of the kind proposed, so far from scattering, tended to the concentration of our troops. If this country was engaged in hostilities in India, it would be found very convenient to have a considerable force at the Mauritius, which could be made available as the necessities of the case might require.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, his only objection to the Vote was that it was much too small. He thought the experience acquired last year, when troops were sent to the colonies, demonstrated the necessity that existed for having fortifications such as those which had been referred to in the course of the discussion.
SIR GEORGE LEWISassured the Committee that the items composing this Vote had been carefully revised with a view to their reduction. He had been described by the hon. Member for Mon-
1780
trose (Mr. Baxter) as having stated, in the last Session, that it was not advisable to erect new works in the Colonies, or to make very expensive additions to existing works. By new works he must have meant works in places not at present fortified, and he believed that it would be found that it was not proposed by this Vote to fortify any place not yet fortified. With regard to the additions, he believed that what was proposed, so far from being extravagant, was of the most moderate description. The charge in Part 1, for "New Works Abroad" over £1,000, was £72,000, which could not be deemed an excessive sum when the objects in view and the cost of building were considered. Then, in Parts 2 and 3, the outlay for new works, additions, and repairs under £1,000 each, was only £9,800 in the former, and £15,057 in the latter case. About £2,800 was spent on Canada, and £884 on Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. As we had a considerable force in those parts at present, that expenditure was really very reasonable. The new works at Halifax and St. John's would be of great service for military and naval purposes. It was not in the power of the Government to compel the Colonies to pay these sums; and if the Committee would not vote the money, there was no prospect that it would be forthcoming elsewhere.
MR. BAXTERsaid, he must take the sense of the Committee on the matter.
MR. BUTTsaid, that to refuse to defend the Colonies was in effect to abandon them. If the Vote was rejected, the House should either compel the Colonies to construct works or leave them undefended. Having given them self-government, the House would not, by taxing them, raise again the question out of which the North American war of independence had arisen. If the Colonies were attacked, this country would have to protect them, and it was therefore an act of prudence to construct fortificatious by means of which the defence of our possessions would be effective.
Motion made, and Question put,
"That a sum, not exceeding £800,941, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of the Superintending Establishment of, and Expenditure for, Works, Buildings, and Repairs at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1864, inclusive."
The Committee divided: — Ayes 43; Noes 75: Majority 32.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
(4.) £172,201, Military Education.
COLONEL NORTHasked, why it was that marks for good conduct did not count in the final examination of cadets. He thought that they should not only count, but should take precedence of all other marks. He thought, also, that in the selection of prizes a sword or something of that sort would be more valued than books.
SIR GEORGE LEWISadmitted the importance of good conduct, but said there was great difficulty in giving it value in an examination.
MR. W. WILLIAMSinquired, how it happened that the payment to the Lieutenant Governor of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich had been increased from £500 to £1,000.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, the real increase was only £200. The remaining £300 was paid by way of compensation for allowances.
SIR FREDERIC SMITHobserved, that the Lieutenant Governor had now double the amount of duty and responsibility which he used to have. He noticed that the expenses of the Council amounted to £8,174. Why were the Indian Government not called upon to contribute more than £360 towards that amount?
SIR GEORGE LEWISreplied, that any change by which the Indian Government should contribute a larger sum would have his entire concurrence.
SIR MINTO FARQUHARhad been told that the new buildings at Sandhurst were damp, and that the cadets had suffered in consequence.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, the cadets were under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, and not that of the War Department.
MR. W. EWARTasked what steps had been taken to introduce gymnasia into the army.
SIR GEORGE LEWISpointed out that there was a Vote for an instructor of gymnastics, and also one for sanitary purposes.
Vote agreed to.
(5.) £85,441, Surveys, &c.
MR. WYLDinquired why the Ordnance Survey for England was not completed, and that were the intentions of the Government with regard to the recom-
1782
mendations of the Committee of last year in reference to the survey upon a larger scale.
SIR GEORGE LEWISexplained that the 1-inch map was finished for all England, with the exception of a few of the northern counties, and the survey in those counties was now being completed. There was a large part of Scotland in which the survey was incomplete. The 6-inch map for Ireland had long been perfected. With regard to the survey of England on the 25-inch scale, which was limited at present to the six northern counties and a large part of Middlesex, the Government had decided that that survey ought to be continued. No Vote was asked this year for that purpose, but it was their intention next year to propose one.
COLONEL DUNNEwanted to know whether the advantages of the 25-inch scale were to be extended to Ireland, and whether the expense of the survey for England was to be placed upon the county rates?
SIR GEORGE LEWISbelieved that it was proposed to extend the survey to Ireland.
MR. AYRTONunderstood that there was nothing in the present Vote which pledged the Committee to the 25-inch scale, his opinion of which was, that it would be perfectly useless.
MR. SCULLYbelieved that a 25-inch map would be a work of great national importance, and hoped that when the survey for England was perfected, a map of Ireland upon the same scale would be prepared.
Vote agreed to.
(6.) £88,135, Miscellaneous Services.
COLONEL DUNNEcomplained of an increase from £830 to £1,215, in the pay to the staff for the German Military Settlers at the Cape of Good Hope, and inquired how long this charge was to continue.
SIR GEORGE LEWISobserved, that these men were sent to the Cape at the termination of the Crimean war, and he could hold out no immediate hope of the charge being removed from the Estimates.
COLONEL DUNNE, referring to the item of £1,000 for medals, asked how it was that medals which had been earned years ago by soldiers, had not yet been delivered. He thought that this was a disgrace to the country.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, that if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would specify to what particular medal his observation applied, he (Sir George Lewis) would inquire into it.
COLONEL NORTHobserved, that the officers of the First Bengal Fusiliers, and the whole of the Artillery, had not yet received the medal for Delhi, which was captured five years ago.
Vote agreed to.
(7.) £213,177, Administration of the Army.
SIR JOHN TRELAWNYasked for an explanation of the rule on which the Government acted towards officers of the Staff. Those officers were said to hold their offices for five years only; but several exceptions to that had been made in favour of particular officers at home. He wished to know whether these matters were regulated upon any fixed principle; and, if so, what was that principle? There were three officers now holding high offices in the administration of the army to whose appointment it was distinctly understood the rule would be applied.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, the rule was as the hon. Baronet had stated. One of the three officers to whom, he supposed, reference was now made was the Commander-in-Chief. Was that not so? [Sir JOHN TRELAWNY: Yes.] Well, he had never understood that that was an appointment which should come within the rule of being tenable only for five years. He thought it quite unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of the rule that it should be applied to his Royal Highness. The other two officers also holding situations at the Horse Guards had held their offices a sufficient time to contravene the rule. They came, strictly speaking, within the rule.
COLONEL NORTHobserved, that it was always understood that the Secretary of State for War had the power, and would exercise it, of continuing those officers so long as he deemed necessary for the public service.
MR. W. WILLIAMSnoticed several items in this Vote which had never appeared before. For instance, there was allowance for forage to the Commander-in-Chief, £976. This was the forage for forty horses. His Secretary also received £244 forage money. On referring to former Estimates he found that neither Lord Hill, the Duke of Wellington, nor Lord Hard-
1784
inge had such allowances, which, he held, were altogether preposterous.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, the same allowance had been made to the Commander-in-Chief last year.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he would certainly take the sense of the-Committee on the Vote, although he was sorry to do so, from the high respect he entertained for his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.
COLONEL NORTHpointed to the fact that the Estimate last year was £4,432, which included this allowance, the sum being identical with that to be voted this year, with the exception of £9 9s. 6d. for an additional day in leap-year. Every officer in the army was allowed forage.
SIR GEORGE LEWISassured his hon. Friend that there was nothing new in this Vote. His Royal Highness had precisely the same allowance for forage last year as the Estimate proposed to allow this year. The Estimates were made out with greater detail this year, but the pay and allowances for forage amounted together to the same sum as last year.
MR. W. WILLIAMShad referred to the Estimates for the last five years, and found no such charge for forage.
GENERAL LINDSAYasked, if it was not the fact that the Commander-in-Chief, although made recently a Field Marshal, received exactly the same pay as before, and that the allowance for forage appeared in previous Estimates under another head, while this year it was included under this Vote in order to bring the whole more clearly before the Committee.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, that statement was quite correct. All officers of a certain rank received a certain amount of forage. When the Duke of Cambridge was made Field Marshal he would, according to the regular scale, have been entitled to higher pay and allowances; but he understood and agreed to the arrangement that he should not claim any additional pay or allowances, but only receive the increased rank of Field Marshal. His Royal Highness received identically the same allowances that were enjoyed by his predecessors in office.
SIR JOHN TRELAWNYcalled attention again to the rule which laid it down that Staff officers should be changed every five years. He referred to the questions which had been asked upon the subject of re-appointments by the hon. Member for King's County (Colonel Dunne) on the

1785
Military Committee, which recommended the change of system; and unless he received some more satisfactory explanations with regard to certain exceptions to the rule than had been given by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, he should move a reduction of the Vote by £5,569, being the salaries of certain Staff officers who had been re-appointed after five years' service contrary to the recommendations of the Committee.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, he thought he had given a very distinct answer to the question already. He had said, and would again say, that he never understood the rule to be applicable to the office of Commander-in-Chief. The offices of Quartermaster and Adjutant General came strictly within the rule, but it was, in his opinion, competent to the Commander-in-Chief, with the consent of the Secretary of State for War, to abstain for a limited time from enforcing the rule in extraordinary and important cases. He could only say he considered himself answerable for the discretion that had been exercised in the cases referred to, and that he was perfectly justified in the re-appointments.
LORD HOTHAMconsidered that the recommendation which had been made by one of the Military Committees, and adopted by Lord Herbert, was most unwise with regard to the officers in question. It was much to be regretted that the proposition should have been laid down so broadly, that all Staff officers should be changed every five years. There were two offices especially in which a change every five years would be fatal to their efficiency. He did not know whether the Military Secretary was included in the rule; but, to be efficient, the Military Secretary should know every officer in the army, and that was a thing which would require grout experience. If they were to change the Secretary every five years, what chance would the Commander-in-Chief have of doing justice to the army? for it was upon the information which the Military Secretary gave him he had to rely. Then as to the Adjutant General; he might be called the court of appeal of the army, and ought to have served in every part of the world, so as to know the duties to be performed in every station in which a part of the army might be placed. If he were changed every five years, he would not know his business. He, for one, thought that the Secretary for War had exercised a most wise discretion in the course which he had
1786
taken in this matter; and if he wished for good and efficient officers in the situations just alluded to, he would disregard the recommendations of the Committee; for so long as he found an officer efficient, he would do good to the whole army by continuing him in his post.
COLONEL DUNNEquite agreed with the noble Lord who had just spoken that, with respect to the Staff at headquarters, it would be most injurious to lay down any such rule. But the object which he had in view when on the Military Committee was to prevent the evasion of the rule by the transfer of officers from one staff to another.
Vote agreed to.
The following Votes were also agreed to:—
(8.) £25,933, Rewards for Military Service.
(9.) £77,782, Pay of General Officers.
(10.) £464,895, Pay of Reduced and Retired Officers.
(11.) £172,157, Widows' Pensions and Compassionate Allowances.
(12.) £32,843, Pensions and Allowances to Wounded Officers.
(13.) 33,776, In-Pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals.
(14.) £1,142,702, Out-Pensioners of Chelsea Hospital.
(15.) £144,964, Superannuation Allowances, &c.
COLONEL DUNNEwished to know whether any decision had been come to with respect to the superannuation of barrack-masters. He trusted there would be no civil appointments to this office in future.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, barrack-masters were not soldiers. [Colonel DUNNE: They ought to be.] Whether it was desirable to appoint old soldiers or not was another question. As civil officers, however, they came under the rules of Civil Service Superannuation.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, that if soldiers were appointed barrack-masters at forty, fifty, or sixty years of age, they had very little chance of superannuation under the Civil Service regulations.
Vote agreed to; as was also—
(16.) £32,786, Disembodied Militia.
House resumed.
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
Committee to sit again on Wednesday.

SUPPLY.—REPORT.
Resolutions (March 20) reported.
SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, that the Secretary of State for War was understood, on the Vote for the Volunteer Force, to say that there were only 40,000 bayonets in the country for its defence. [Sir GEORGE LEWIS: Of the regular army.] He was glad to hear the correction, because he had met officers belonging to the militia who regarded the statement as a slur upon that branch of the service. There were 95,000 militia of all ranks who were supposed to be trained.
SIR GEORGE LEWISwas quite certain he had added the words of "the regular army" to the statement in question. What he said was that there were only forty battalions of the regular army in the country. He might have added the Yeomanry if he had been recapitulating the force available for the defence of the country.

MARINE MUTINY BILL.—COMMITTEE.
(Progress 20 th March.)
Bill considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
Clause 28 (Power to inflict Corporal Punishment).
MR. WHITEsaid, he would not recapitulate his objections to this clause, but Would move that it be expunged.
Question put, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
The Committee divided:—Ayes 86; Noes 31: Majority 55.
Clause agreed to.
Clauses 29 to 38, inclusive, agreed to.
Clause 39 (Marking Deserters).
MR. COXmoved the omission of the clause. He considered branding even a worse mode of punishment than flogging.
Question put, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
The Committee divided:—Ayes 97; Noes 22: Majority 75.
Clause agreed to.
House resumed.
Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read 3° To-morrow.

TOBACCO DUTIES BILL— [BILL 66.]

  CONSIDERATION.
  Bill, as amended, considered.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that the Amendments which
  1788
  he proposed were purely verbal, with one exception, namely, that when tobacco was warehoused for ships' stores, the drawback should be paid on admission to the warehouse, and not upon export.
  Amendments agreed to.
  Bill to be read 3° To-morrow, at half past Four of the clock.

TELEGRAPHS BILL— [BILL 57.]

  COMMITTEE.
  (Progress 19 th March.)
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clause 6 agreed to.
  Clause 7 (For Underground Works in Metropolis and Large Towns Consent of Street Authority requisite).
  MR. BLACKBURNmoved an Amendment, the effect of which was to limit the power of telegraph companies to take up any road without the consent of the authorities in trust of that road.
  Amendment proposed, in page 4, line 39, after the word "street," to insert the words "or public road."
  MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, the Committee should remember that they were not now conferring powers; they were merely regulating the exercise of powers already conferred. This Bill was analogous to those Acts which contained general clauses to be embodied hereafter into special Acts. If the assent of every public body having power over the roads was to be necessary before those roads could be touched, there would be no need to come to Parliament at all. The object of coming to Parliament was to obtain special powers to execute certain works without the assent of the parties interested. Parliament had already granted these powers, and the Committee were now asked to apply to the exercise of those powers such regulations as they thought desirable. It would not be expedient that it should rest with some small board in the country to determine whether a line of telegraphs should be laid down between, say, London and Liverpool; what was desired was that care should be taken that all interests should be properly protected in laying down wires.
  MR. HENLEYwanted to know why the same regulations that applied to works above ground should not apply also to works under ground. He did not think that small corporate towns, or trustees of turnpike roads more than thirty miles long, should have a right to stop impor-

  1789
  tant lines of telegraph. He thought, therefore, that there ought to be an appeal to the Board of Trade.
  LORD ALFRED CHURCHILLsaid, the different telegraph companies were all subject to stringent restrictions of one kind or another. Unless it could be shown that they had greatly abused their powers, it was unjust to add further limitations.
  MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, if Parliament were to impose arbitrary conditions of a nature not at present known to the law upon companies hereafter to be formed, the effect would be to give a practical monopoly to telegraph companies already in existence. It was not impossible that in the present instance, as sometimes happened before Railway Committees, vested interests might be seeking to protect themselves by affecting zeal for the public welfare.
  MR. BLACKBURNsaid, he neither held a share in a telegraph company himself, nor did any friend or relation of his hold a share; but he thought the proposed clause did extend to existing companies. As far as the clause itself was concerned, it either went too far or not far enough. Either the companies should have power to go where they pleased, or the rights of the road trustees should not be limited in any part of the country.
  MR. HENLEYcould not understand why, if this were a Bill to remedy inconveniences admittedly felt under the present system, the right hon. Gentleman should shrink from endeavouring to guard against evils of a practical character.
  SIR JOHN SHELLEYcomplained of the roving commission apparently enjoyed by the telegraph companies. In the town of Preston, where he had some property, persons purchasing and intending to build upon land found the company's workmen putting up poles exactly in front of their drawing room windows. No notice whatever had been given of their proceedings. If Parliament had given improper powers to the companies, those powers ought to be properly regulated; if they had been surreptitiously obtained, they ought to be restrained. As the existing powers were so obnoxious and unfair, he trusted they would not be extended to new companies.
  LORD ALFRED CHURCHILLsaid, it was not the fact that the powers which had been conferred upon the telegraph companies last year had been surreptitiously obtained.
  LORD HOTHAMsaid, there was no
  1790
  doubt that some of the powers conferred upon the companies were excessive and unwarranted. It was obvious that with the forty-eight hours' notice now permitted by Parliament, it was only necessary for the promoters of the telegraph to watch a man away from his home on a visit, and when he came back he might find the posts stuck up in front of his house. Some years ago he had the honour of being chairman of a Telegraph Committee. The Committee granted the line, which was at that time opposed. Another Committee sat in the following year, and the powers then granted were greatly enlarged. A year or two passed, and a friend of his asked how the Committee over which he presided could have given such powers; and it turned out that the succeeding Committee had granted these powers on the understanding that they had been sanctioned by his (Lord Hotham's) Committee. Upon investigation, however, it turned out that this was a total mistake. The very reverse was the fact. He (Lord Hotham) represented the circumstances to the then Vice President of the Board of Trade; but the matter could not be remedied. After that he felt justified in saying he should not be very delicate in dealing with the powers of these companies.
  MR. REMINGTON MILLSsaid, that nothing was further from the fact than that the powers granted by the Bill which was approved by the Committee of which he was a Member had been unfairly obtained.
  Question put, "That those words be there inserted."
  The Committee divided: — Ayes 45; Noes 67: Majority 22.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 8 (Depth, Course, &c. of Underground Works to be agreed on between Street or Road Authority and Company, or else to be determined by Justices or Sheriff).
  MR. DALGLISHmoved the insertion in the 13th line of the word "twenty-eight" for the word "fourteen," his object being that the former instead of the latter number of days should constitute the term of the notice to be given to trustees and public bodies generally when it was proposed that a telegraphic wire should be run through the properties under their control at a particular level.
  MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, he thought fourteen days' notice would be

  1791
  amply sufficient, inasmuch as the question whether a telegraphic wire under ground should run one inch above or one below a certain level was one of so little importance that it would, in the majority of cases, be decided by the surveyors of public bodies without there being any necessity of assembling the bodies themselves to pronounce a judgment upon it. He had acted on the best information which he could obtain; but if hon. Gentlemen thought that fourteen days' notice was too short, he would accept the Amendment.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clause 9 agreed to.
  Clause 10 (No Telegraph over Streets, except above Houses, and with Consent of Street Authority).
  MR. HENLEYasked how it was proposed that the expenses of references to the Board of Trade were to be paid. Were the parties to come to London, or was a Special Commissioner to be sent to the spot? Both would be very expensive processes, and the Committee ought to understand from what funds the cost would be defrayed.
  MR. MILNER GIBSONreferred the right hon. Gentleman to the 24th and 25th clauses.
  MR. HENLEYsaw plenty of provision for the payment of the officials of the Board of Trade, but was there any provision for the payment of innocent parties who might be put to a great deal of trouble?
  MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, that if the right hon. Gentleman would allow the question to stand over, he would consider it.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clauses 11 and 12 were also agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Committee report Progress; to sit again on Thursday.

VACCINATION (IRELAND) BILL.

  [BILL 70.] SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  SIR ROBERT PEEL, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, it was intended to supply the defects of various other Bills which had been passed within the last thirteen years. Within the last few years there had been a great falling off in the number of children vaccinated
  1792
  in Ireland, and he proposed to assimilate the law in Ireland to that in England, employing for the purpose the machinery of the Registration of Births and Deaths Bill, which had recently passed through the House. England was not the only country in which vaccination was compulsory, for in most countries of Europe there was a compulsory system. From the Census Returns he found that no fewer than 50,000 persons had died of small pox in Ireland since 1841; and in 1860 there was a diminution of 33,000 in the number of vaccination cases as compared with those of the previous year. The cost of the proposed measure would be very trifling. The Registrars of Births and Deaths would also act as Registrars of Vaccination. The Treasury would bear the expense of the books, but in cases in which the registrar himself was not the vaccinator he was to be allowed a fee of 3d. for making the registry. Under an existing Act dispensing doctors were allowed about a shilling a head for each child they vaccinated. There were about 200,000 children born in Ireland each year, and it was calculated that, of these, three-fourths, or 140,000, would receive gratuitous vaccination. The total expense imposed on each of the Poor Law unions (of which there were 163) by the Bill which he now proposed would be about £3 16 s. 8d.—a mere trifle compared with the benefits which it would confer on the country. He begged to move the second reading of the Bill.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."
  SIR EDWARD GROGANthought, considering the Bill had been so short a time in the hands of Members, it ought to be postponed till the opinion of the people of Ireland on its provisions could be obtained by their representatives.
  MR. BAGWELLsaid, this was the third Bill on the subject which had been introduced within a very few years, and he thought it was quite unnecessary.
  COLONEL DUNNEbelieved the measure would mischievously disturb the existing arrangements. He moved the adjournment of the debate.
  SIR ROBERT PEELappealed to the hon. and gallant Member to allow them to proceed. The measure would be of great benefit to the poor of Ireland. The burden imposed by the Bill would be only

  1793
  1–21 of a farthing in the pound on the total valuation roll of Ireland.
  LORD NAASsaid, the expense of the measure was not the most serious objection to it. To attach a legal penalty to non-vaccination would tend to make that very important and necessary operation exceedingly unpopular. Moreover, the Act of 1858 had not yet had a fair trial. All that was wanted at present was, that the Poor Law Commissioners should take care that the dispensary doctors did their duty.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned."
  The House divided:—Ayes 16; Noes 37: Majority 21.
  Original Question again proposed.
  MR. WHITESIDEsaid, when the right hon. Gentleman brought forward a Bill of a novel character at one in the morning he must expect to see it opposed. He thought there ought to be time for further consideration. He moved that the House do now adjourn.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."
  LORD CLAUD HAMILTONthought it not courteous to the Irish people to bring in a Bill on the Friday and read it a second time on the Monday.
  MR. WHITESIDEsaid, he would withdraw his Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question again proposed.
  Debate arising; Debate adjourned, till To-morrow.
  House adjourned at a quarter after One o'clock

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Trustees (Scotland) Act Amendment (No. 53); Alkali Works Regulation (No. 55).
Committee—Illegitimate Children (Ireland) (No. 50); Consolidated Fund (£10,000,000) (No. 46).
Report—Salmon Exportation (No. 51); Consolidated Fund (£10,000,000) (No. 48).

UNITED STATES.

  THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.
  LORD CAMPBELL, in rising to call attention to the question of acknowledging the Southern Confederacy as an independent Power, in concert with other neutral States, and to the Despatches of Mr. Mason, the Southern Envoy, on the subject, said: My Lords, although I know that no apology is requisite for calling the attention of the House to the papers for which I moved in August last, and which have lately been presented, I am anxious and impatient to point out the exact view with which the Motion is submitted to you. It is not in order to raise a question on the course which Government have taken as regards American affairs during the autumn. The question I propose is wholly seated in the future. The facts which lead to it are known and easy to recall to you. During the whole of the last Session France and Great Britain were alleged, and were believed to act together on the difficulties which the civil war gave rise to. Since then they have diverged, or rather in the memorable phrase of a noble Friend now absent from his place (Lord Clarendon), although their objects are the same, have seemed to drift from one another. In November we restrained the French Government in a course which they desired to take; in January the Emperor by himself pursued a second line of action, meant, like the first, to terminate hostilities. That line of action having failed, all thoughts of intervention, mediation, and remonstrance being exploded by the insolent reply of Mr. Seward, the Emperor being anxious still to close the war

  1715
  as he has proved himself, and having paid to the Government of Washington every debt of justice and of courtesy, the question of recognising the insurgent may at any moment come before us as the question of attempting to obtain an armistice was urged upon the country in November. Were it not that for some weeks past Poland has engaged the world, before now it might have reached us. As things stand, it would find us in the worst condition to receive it, without conviction one way or the other in either party of the State by the avowal of their leaders. A fatal error might arise not from a mistaken but a hesitating judgment. It is at such a moment, if ever, that Parliamentary debate is useful and admissible; when of two opposite opinions on a question rapidly impending, neither can be said to prevail over the other, and no man on earth foresees by which our conduct will be guided. It is therefore to contribute to a practical result that I have given noble Lords the opportunity of speaking on America; and it could not have been done in any other form, because a Resolution or Address to pledge the action of the Government would have justly been resisted, and its withdrawal or defeat would prejudice the 8,000,000 men whose claims are now before you.
  The opinion I am anxious to maintain is that the divergence of France and Great Britain on America ought not to go further, but to cease; and that when France invites us to acknowledge Southern independence, we should neither hold her back nor let her move alone, but on the contrary, act with her. And by acknowledgment, I mean the course of sending an Ambassador to the insurgent, or of receiving his Ambassador, or of engaging in a treaty with him, or of seeking exequaturs from him for the consuls in his territory. The first impression I should wish to combat very briefly is, that the acknowledgment by neutral States of Southern independence would have no practical effects and no important consequences. It seemed to be that of a noble Earl over the way, who lately held the Foreign seals, at the beginning of the Session. But if acknowledgment is wholly immaterial, why has the South continued to demand, and the North so long and pertinaciously endeavoured to avert it? Why are Southern Envoys now in London and in Paris, and why was the Government of Washington prepared at every cost but that of war to intercept them? Why have the Envoys, on
  1716
  arriving, made acknowledgment the simple object of their mission, and why has Mr. Seward sent to the different Powers a volume of despatches to resist it? It has reached me from credible authorities that last year the planters began to grow cotton when acknowledgment was looked for, and ploughed it in when the hope expired. It happened in this manner. The planters viewed acknowledgment as the road to peace, and were ready to invest their capital in the ordinary way when that road was likely to be opened. And it may well occur to them as having such a tendency. From the Northern mind it would take away the hope which lingers yet of Southern subjugation. From the Government of Washngton it would take away the power of describing eleven communities contending for their liberty as rebels. The people of America are influenced by phrases, and will not come to terms with what they have been hounded on to look at as rebellion. But they can see a fact when Europe blazons it before them, and they may be awakened by her judgment to the nature of the foreign war on which their treasure and their happiness are wasted. When Europe has acknowledged it, the independence of the South may be debated in the Senate and the House, where no one now can venture to advert to it. A probable result of such a measure, if pursued by France, Great Britain, and other neutral States together, is that it would weaken in the Executive at Washington its borrowing ability, because their loans are founded on the chances of re-conquest; and re-conquest would then appear what it is, a shadow and a dream. And it would do so with good reason. Victorious already, animated then, the Southern armies would be doubly irresistible. They would not have, if they retain it now, the power to be vanquished. Another practical effect of recognition—the belligerents might then endeavour to negotiate, which it is clear they cannot do at present. A separate result would be to put an end to all the idle views of reconstruction and of union which are floating in America, and which serve to prolong the war, because they disincline the North to the only basis upon which the close of it is possible. A yet more serious result the measure promises is freedom to the Government of Washington from the necessity of hopeless war which weighs on it at present. As soon as Europe sanctions its retreat, the greater portion of its evils are annihilated. As

  1717
  long as Europe sanctions its attempt, to renounce it is to suffer an indignity which never fell upon a State engaged in war with insurrection since modern history opened its varied scenes to our notice. Noble Lords who recollect how, after it had lasted forty years, the civil war between Spain and Holland was influenced in 1607–9 by the diplomacy of France and England, may be led to think in what form the present struggle might adjust itself. But they will also see that the efforts of the two Powers would have been as vain as they were brilliant and successful, unless Europe had before acknowledged the insurgent. I will not dwell upon the instance. It must engage the study of every Minister or Sovereign who aspires to the lofty task of closing the hostilities before us. And if I, wanting power to go on, should do nothing more than point to it to-night, the Motion might not be a useless one.
  If noble Lords are not entirely satisfied as to the practical effects which recognition tends to, let me refer them to the despatch of Mr. Mason to the Secretary of State, dated August 1, in No. 2 of the papers lately given. He treats the point with that knowledge of the country, and the war itself, which must give weight to his expessions. The next doctrine, which stands in the way of the conclusion to which I am pointing, is even more important to consider, because in this House it received a kind of sanction on February 5 from the noble Earl who leads the Opposition, and who had the manliness to state that in espousing it he differed from the mass of his supporters. It has been laid down that you should recognise insurgent Powers only when you are going to give material assistance to their cause, or when the civil war is over;—that neutrals should reserve their voice until arms have fallen from the weak and fainting hands of the belligerents. Whether or not such ought to be the principle, it is not, as examples show, that on which the Powers of either world have generally acted. So far from the cessation of hostilities preceding the acknowledgment of neutrals, the acknowledgment of neutrals has, in nearly every case, preceded the cessation of hostilities. In combating this tenet, no doubt the cases of Belgium, under Lord Grey, Greece under the Duke of Wellington, Holland under Queen Elizabeth, ought to be excluded, because, in all three, material
  1718
  support and diplomatic intercourse were blended. But the United States acknowledged Nicaragua, under Walker, before hostilities had ceased to menace the existence of his Government. They acknowledged the South American Republics rising against Spain before the effort to reduce them was exhausted. When Colonel Mann was sent by the Government of Washington to Hungary, in 1848–9, he was instructed to acknowledge the seceding kingdom, not when hostilities had ceased, but when its independence could be counted on; and he reserved the voice he was invested with, not because he was controlled by the presence of Austrian troops, but by the chances—and he reasoned well—of the insurgents being reconquered. He did not find a settled, but a migratory Government, which fled from post to post, instead of meeting the invaders at its capital. But if we pass to Europe, France acknowledged the United States revolting against England before Lord North renounced his efforts to subdue them. It is idle to assert that Lord North engaged in war on such a provocation. All who read the memorandum drawn up by Mr. Gibbon for the Government, and do not fancy themselves better versed than him in the opinions of the statesmen who instructed him, know that Lord North began war with France on a different provocation. And what if he did not? Is Lord North, after he had marred his reputation by a civil war which all the men who formed the glory of that epoch denounced as wicked and demented, to be held up as a master of public law, and an oracle on international proceedings? Is the Minister of the day, no matter what may be his character, or what may be his errors, virtute officii an heir to the authority of Bynkershoek or Grotius? So much for France. Great Britain was tardy in acknowledging the South American republics. But that tardiness was reprobated by a brilliant and enlightened Opposition, of which the noble Lord the Secretary of State was not an inconsiderable ornament. And that tardiness was partially imposed by a generous regard for Spain, invaded as she was in 1823. It was justified, moreover, by the hazard of breaking with the great allies with whom, long after 1815, we had been acting, to whom, in 1823, France had become subservient, and who viewed the cause of the South American repub-

  1719
  lics with aversion. My noble Friend the President of the Council, well versed in the career of Mr. Canning, at that time the Foreign Secretary, cannot have forgotten, that in that particular transaction to acknowledge the insurgents was to brave the greater portion of the world; that the despotic Powers made it almost a personal affair; that neither public law nor abstract rules, but special facts, and policy and prudence, at once delayed and fixed the hour of acknowledgment. The next and last example I shall give will make me independent of the others I have mentioned. It surpasses all the rest in magnitude and clearness; it tallies with the question now before the world in nearly every point, and it is one in which not a single State but Europe may be said herself to have delivered—and that in times far more monarchical, and therefore more averse to revolution than our own—a judgment on the question of acknowledgment. Great Britain, France, Sweden, Holland, all formed treaties with Portugal, seceding from the rule of Spain in 1641, a year after the Duke and Duchess of Braganza had proclaimed its independence, a quarter of a century before the Crown of Spain resolved to acquiesce in it. At that time Prussia had not come into existence as a State. Russia had not begun to mingle in the politics of Europe. Austria was attached to Spain by ties of family, and therefore the four recognising States may be fairly said to have composed a general tribunal of the Continent. So far from having ceased, the Spanish effort to reconquer by intrigue, conspiracies, and arms went on till after 1665, with a variety of fortune. The Duchess of Braganza, who became Regent, and on whose fortitude and judgment the success of the insurgents hung—as indeed her spirit and ascendancy had been the mainspring of the enterprise—employed the celebrated Schomberg as a general. Don John of Austria led the Spanish armies against Portugal. The battle of Villa Vicosa took away at last the hopes of the invaders. The war lingered on. In 1668, Spain and Portugal negotiated peace with one another. Was Europe acting then, in 1641, against the principles which ought to have directed her? Is there anything in Grotius, Bynkershoek, Vattel, Von Martens, Wheaton, to condemn her? It was an obvious duty upon my part to examine all these writers on the question of acknow-
  1720
  ledgment. But it is not a duty to inflict quotations on your Lordships. The references are with me here, and they will be at the command of any Member who desires them. A shorter method will enable me to show that the authorities agree in holding the power to maintain its independence—not the close of efforts to subdue it—to be the condition upon which a neutral may acknowledge an insurgent. Sir James Mackintosh, in a celebrated speech of 1824 upon the South American Republics, insists with glowing approbation on the case of Portugal, which I have brought under the notice of your Lordships. He does not question, but applauds the conduct of the recognising Powers. He does not hold it up to be avoided as an error, but, on the contrary, to be regarded as a brilliant lesson in his day. And your Lordships well know that Sir James Mackintosh was the disciple, the exponent, the successor, and the equal of the great men who have moulded public law into a science. You well know that what he sanctions they have sanctioned, and that when he unreservedly subscribes to what Europe did in 1641, Europe must have acted on their principle. What is it? The principle appears to be that the hazard of re-conquest is the only bar to acknowledgment when such a measure is likely to accelerate a peace and benefit the country which extends it. Should the insurgents yield after the acknowledgment of neutrals, their judgment is rebuked, their action vain, and they have given useless umbrage to the power ultimately dominant. But it is not correct, according to the law of nations and the history of the world, to aver that the struggle must be over; the last army routed; the last shilling spent; the last drop of blood exhausted by the combatants. And it is not consistent with humanity. The vocation of acknowledgment is rather to preserve than to destroy, and by diplomacy to give a quicker passage to the end, which the long and sanguinary road of arms would ultimately point to. When you cannot advise the older State to presevere, when you denounce its efforts, and when you prophesy its failure; and when you cannot recommend the younger State to yield, what can be more irrational or cruel than to prolong hostilities between them? But by the reservation of acknowledgment you do prolong hostilities between them. The effort to re-conquer has never been renounced, and scarcely ever been supended,

  1721
  until neutrals had acknowledged the insurgent, from the civil war between Switzerland and Austria in the Middle Ages down to that which stagnates at this moment. And such a general result is what the plainest reason would have led us to anticipate. While neutrals countenance his hopes, is the invading Power likely to recede from them? Can he proclaim, without suggestion, his defeat? Can he embrace, without authority, his own humiliation? Can he assure bystanders he has sunk, while they by silence loudly tell him he may rally? It is not therefore easy to defend the conduct of a neutral who indirectly calls out for battles, and imposes expeditions, with a foregone conclusion that they must be useless for their purpose. But it is said, may you acknowledge an insurgent destined to succeed, while hostile armies are encamped in portions of his territory? My Lords, if you may not, you should withdraw your representatives from any country which becomes the seat of war. We ought, at least, to have withdrawn our minister from Spain in 1823, when France, unfortunately, marched without resistance on its capital. In accordance, therefore, with experience, authorities, and reason, I submit to this House—you may acknowledge the insurgent as soon as no doubt remains upon the issue of the struggle.
  And is the issue doubtful? The capitalists of London, Frankfort, Paris, Amsterdam, arenot of that opinion. Within the last few days the Southern loan has reached the highest place in our market. £3,000,000 were required, £9,000,000 were subscribed for. The loan is based upon the security of cotton; and it has been well known for a twelvemonth that as far as the invaders march, that security must perish. But what is the opinion of military men upon the issue? The Emperor of the French, having been brought up as a soldier—having given a long life to military science, and having recently commanded the greatest armies of the day at Solferino and Magenta—in the despatch of November last did not conceal from the Government of Washington that subjugation was impossible. The Princes of the House of Orleans, who served with General M'Clellan, are thought to have inspired the excellent account of the campaign which appeared on October 15 in the Revue des Deux Mondes, and which has also tended to disperse the vision of re-conquest. To the same scale of judg-
  1722
  ment General Scott appears, by recent revelations, to contribute. And this, too, is remarkable. Not one military person in the North is known to view re-conquest as attainable. Neither General M'Clellan, Burnside, Rosencranz, M'Dowell, Halleck, or Buell, have ever publicly declared, so far as it has reached us, that the object of the Government they serve under is feasible. The ignominious task of prophesying triumph has been wisely left to the voluminous despatch writer, who, whatever his accomplishments, or merits, is no more qualified to judge the issue of campaigns than he is to guide the movements of battalions. But, after all, it may be granted in the abstract, that re-conquest is attainable. To genius nothing is denied. The only question it becomes the neutral Powers to consider is, can it be attained by Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues? It is by Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues, if at all, the South is to be conquered. There is not any person in their armies, such as Britain proudly watched in the Peninsula, able to control a Government behind, and overwhelm an enemy in front of him. If there was, they would recall him. It is therefore necessary to inquire what proof of its ability has this aggressive Cabinet developed. Is it in its choice of expeditions or of viceroys? Is it in appointing, superseding, or replacing the commanders it must lean on? Is it in their firm adherence to a principle? At one time they were opposed to the invasion they have plunged into. Is it in their conduct about slavery? At one time they boasted of their disposition to maintain it. Soon after, they desired the Border States to be delivered from it. After that emancipation was declared, but only in the States which were resisting them. The loyal region might preserve the institution—but seceders must renounce it. It ought to flourish where they reign—but not to stand beyond the limits of their sovereignty. But next, a bankrupt treasury would buy it by an outlay equal to the public debt of our country. But, after all, a servile war was indispensable, and so were armies to enforce it. A servile war, however, was proclaimed. The proclamation cannot be considered as unprecedented. The model was before them. Lord of Nature, as he deemed himself, Xerxes ordered lashes to be given to the waves. Swelling with omnipotence, Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues dictate insurrection to the slaves

  1723
  of Alabama. Are these the movements of a Government by which the broken fragments of the Union can be welded, a mighty Continent subdued, 8,000,000 free men braced into a unit, robbed of home, of honour, and of liberty? But who are they arrayed against? The House ought not, indeed, to join in the encomiums on the Southern President, which heat and sympathy have prompted. As no one was deemed happy by the ancients until his life had closed, no one will be stamped as great by us until his enterprise has triumphed. But so much may be hazarded of this extraordinary person that, gifted amply by nature, he has made the union of political and military excellence his object; and that, as far as Europe has observed, in the midst of danger and of care such as few men have the power to imagine, fewer to sustain, he has exhibited the patience and the enterprise, the ardour and the coolness, the heroism and urbanity, from which it generally happens that nations draw their birth and civil wars accept their destination. And this is most important to remember. If we look back to such conjunctures we do not find an instance in which mind, character, capacity have yielded to the want of all, no matter how well sustained the latter as regards forces, numbers, and revenue. The Roman Commonwealth, in spite of territory, population, armies, and resources, was destroyed from wanting any mind by which the mind of Caesar could be balanced and encountered. Holland was lost to Spain when the Prince of Orange and Prince Maurice were superior to all the viceroys and the captains the mother country could oppose to them. Her South American dependencies were gone when she had no opponent of Bolivar. Your Lordships do not want to go back to the enlightened page of Davila or Sully to remind you that the civil wars of France, after ever kind of knot and of vicissitude, all closed in the pre-eminence of Henry IV.; in head and heart the master of his epoch. The Carlists had not any match for Espartero. The Sardinians had not any equal of Radelzky. The same lesson is impressed on us by the unfortunate collision of Washington and George III., of Charles I. and Cromwell. It is true, indeed, that history need not repent itself, and that events are neither bound by theories or precedents. But such experience at least may forcibly suggest to us, that had Southern subjugation belonged to the decrees of fate, an instrument more power-
  1724
  ful than that of Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues would be seen conducing to the sentence. It is not going beyond the bounds of caution to allege that a new chapter will be opened in the annals of mankind, if on this unrivalled scene the qualities which they regard with scorn are found triumphant over those which they agree to follow and to reverence. But, last of all, if Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues could succeed against the leader and the armies which oppose them, could they succeed against their own consciousness—revealed to us by many signs—of incapacity to do so?
  If noble Lords agree, therefore, with the financial world, with military men, and with the Government of Washington itself, that the issue is not doubtful, and if therefore Great Britain has the right to acknowledge Southern independence, why ought she to exercise it? The first answer is:—Because honour calls on her to do so, and it rests on a detail which may be rapidly presented to your Lordships. British Consuls have remained during the war at Mobile, Charleston, and Savannah. They are there for the protection of our subjects, who reside by thousands on the seaboard. In times like these their presence is essential. Were it not for Consuls to identify them, the severe enlistment laws of the Confederacy might at any time descend on our people; or in the sudden turns of war their goods might be destroyed without a clue to ownership or means of compensation. They are also there to witness the blockade, and to report upon its efficacy. And these Consuls draw their exequaturs from the Government of Washington. They are a standing derogation to the Power which receives, which shelters, and endures them. We are not inclined to withdraw them. We ought, therefore, to accredit them to the insurgent who permits them to reside. And if we do, he is acknowledged. Honour forbids nations, as it does men, to run up a score of gratitude themselves, and to create a score of just resentment, in its object; to offer insult at the moment they are profiting by favour. In one sense alone do the Confederacy gain by the arrangement. We give them all the grandeur of forbearance. They allow our Consuls to reside, and we withhold the recognition which public law entitles them to ask of us. But is not our aspect, with regard to them, a poor one? We deny their rights over their territory, and yet at their hands

  1725
  receive the safety of our citizens. The Southern Congress is about to entertain the question of any longer tolerating our Consuls in this attitude. And what will be the situation of Great Britain if led by-and-by to do by interest and by convenience, what self-respect, and pride and justice dictate at this moment.
  The neutrality we vaunt is the next consideration, which, if fairly viewed, would lead Great Britain to the course I have adverted to. The noble Lord the Secretary of State, in his despatch to Mr. Mason, dated August 2, has pointed out that the great controversy on the right to secede, so long and frequently debated in America, cannot be resolved by foreign Governments. It is not for them to decide between the arguments of Webster and Colhoun. They ought rather to reserve their judgment, considering the balance of the argument and the intricacy of the circumstances, than to pronounce in favour of secession or against it. But by withholding recognition when the issue no longer seems to be a doubtful one, when the danger of re-conquest is not the restraining fact, Great Britain does pronounce against the title to secede, does stamp the Southern movement as illegal, does therefore part with the neutrality which orders silence on that question. On what other ground is she refusing to acknowledge? And let your Lordships mark that by acknowledgment you do not for a moment stamp with your authority the claims of the insurgent—you give no verdict in his favour. If you did, the history of the world would have to be re-written. If you did, this country would never have been able to acknowledge the Revolutionary Government of France in February, 1848, which derived its short-lived power from neither throne, nor law, nor parliament, nor people—flung up by the delirium of Paris to sink at once with its repose, and no more to be regarded as the legal rulers of the country than the men in livery who cross the stage to take away the furniture between two acts of an eventful drama which absorbs us can be mistaken for the heroes of the scene or owners of the theatre. Acknowledgment is not a tribute, therefore, to the rights of the insurgents. But when the hazard of re-conquest is dismissed, it is a tribute to the rights of the invader—to withhold it. We are now declaring on the question of a title to secede on which the noble Lord himself, on which neutrality forbids us to be umpires. But even if it did not, the Con-
  1726
  federacy, as Mr. Davis in his recent message has perspicuously explained, have suffered wrongs—although not meant to injure—from Great Britain. Our Government—however conscientiously—held back the Emperor of the French from a proposal which might have eminently served them. With the best intentions and designs they refused to allow the despatch of Mr. Mason on acknowledgment in August, for over six months, to reach the eye and judgment of the country. By denying our harbours to both sides when both might have had access to them—no doubt from a laudable desire of tranquillity—it has compelled the Southerners to burn their prizes on the waters, has thus destroyed their chance of raising privateers, and vastly limited their powers of self-defence against the country which invades them. After inducing the Confederacy, by a transaction which I described a year ago, to pledge itself to the observance of certain rules laid down at Paris in 1856, the British Government has not been ready to maintain them in the vital point that blockades must be effective to be binding. But illustrations of the kind may be dismissed. Partiality to the United States has been avowed in a despatch of March 27, 1862, from the noble Lord to Mr. Adams, and which the Government of Washington have brought before the world in page 62 of the volume they have recently distributed. In resisting the extortionate demands which Mr. Adams had addressed to him, and which, indeed, he manfully exposes, the noble Lord, as a set off to his austerity, declares that allowance has been made for the difficulties which the United States had to contend with in the war; and that public law has been liberally interpreted in their favour. The book is here if noble Lords desire to refer to it. Allowance bus been made for the difficulties of the United States in a war which both humanity and policy forbad, and which their own aggressive faithlessness created. Public law has been interpreted, and liberally, in favour of a Government which supports the infamous M'Neil, lays waste the houses of distinguished adversaries in Virginia; which ruins havens in Savannah and in Charleston; which is ready to let loose 4,000,000 negroes on their compulsory owners; and to renew from sea to sea the horrors and the crimes of St. Domingo. But let it be so. I did not come here to impugn the decisions of the noble Lord. He is not called upon to vindicate them.

  1727
  I mention these unfavourable actions to the South, without a view to censure of the Government. The only inference I draw is, that if neutrality directs us, they require an instant course of reparation and of balance. Acknowledgment is the only form in which Great Britain can propose, or in which the injured Power is willing to accept it.
  But I will not build up an argument, sufficient as it stands, and go on to the next consideration, which demands (and loudly) such a measure. It is our own security in Canada. A noble Earl who gained his laurels in the East, well pointed out to us last Session, that whenever the war closed Canada would be endangered. If victorious, the Northern States might attack it in the drunkenness of pride; if defeated, in the bitterness of failure. Some men, out of doors have been so infatuated as to hold that by carefully abstaining from anything which gives umbrage to the United States, we should defend it. As if aggressive Powers had ever been restrained, by wanting pretexts, from the wars they were inclined to. The security of Canada is quickly seen by your Lordships to reside in one circumstance alone—the danger of attacking it. That danger will at least be greater when the Southern Power is friendly to Great Britain than when it is estranged, inasmuch as the aggressive State will then have to contemplate the chance of an attack upon his rear as well as the bombardment of his cities and destruction of his commerce. No doubt, Canada is safe while the civil war continues; but we are neither able nor entitled to prolong it for her safety. The civil war may close after the acknowledgment of Southern independence by the Emperor, although Great Britain has not shared that manifesto. We may not be able much longer to keep back the virtue and humanity, as well as all the interests, the fears, and wants which tend to force the measure upon Europe. From the moment separation was inevitable, no statesman could be blind to our want of an ally on the other side of the Atlantic. The United States can never possibly become one, not only because they are embittered, or because our interests are clashing, or because our institutions are repugnant, or because a rivalry is forced upon us in manufactures, and in ships, but because no alliance has ever yet occurred between the mother country and the Power who had violently broken from it. The friendly
  1728
  disposition of the South is therefore necessary to us. It is attainable. And if we wantonly forego it, if we allow the war to close before we have acknowledged, both the separated Powers being irrevocably hostile to us, we may be forced, now to guard Canada from one, now the West Indies from the other. Our diplomatists, moreover, would have no influence or voice in the Confederacy, whether they attempted to soften the resentments which the war had left behind it, to gain legitimate advantages in trade, to deprecate aggressive views, or to improve the situation of the negro. But on this point noble Lords who have been our representatives abroad have the materials of thinking far more strongly than myself in the direction I have pointed to.
  Dismissing policy, I need touch but briefly on the moral obligation to acknowledge, because, on grounds already stated, it applies generally to the case of neutrals and insurgents, when the hazard of re-conquest is exhausted. It arises from the circumstance adverted to before, that in the civil wars of Europe, since the time of Charles V. (and to these may be added that of the Swiss cantons and the House of Austria in the middle ages), the acknowledgment of neutrals has preceded the conclusion of hostilities; and while that preface is withheld, that close is not to be anticipated. It is only requisite to glance at the special circumstances which enhance an abstract duty as regards Great Britain and the war which is before us. The first and most striking is the Lancashire distress, which is not likely to pass off until cotton falls in price, and rises in abundance. And that can hardly be expected to occur until the war is over. No man, conversant with political economy, supposes that cotton crops will start into existence in other portions of the world, while an avalanche of 4,000,000 bales impends upon the market from America. But that it does so, our Consuls in the South, Mr. Bunch and Mr. Molyneux, have recently informed us in public letters, known to all the trading world. The impression that the price will be depressed during the existence of the war is strengthened by what has fallen from Mr. Bazley, Mr. Bright, Mr. Mangles, and Mr. Laing, the highest practical authorities, who have all addressed the public on the topic. Another special circumstance is, that the present war—waged between descendants of Great Britain — appears to be unequalled in the records of

  1729
  the annalist, or the conceptions of the poet, for the masses exposed to death, the area through which the carnage is extended, the amount of families divided and bereaved, the bitter and relentless passions which exasperate the combatants. Beyond this, the Government of Washington are more incapable of making peace spontaneously than any other which has ever grappled with insurgents, considering the pledges they have made, the debts they have incurred, the hosts they have annihilaled. As well might you require a man to perform a useful amputation on himself against the influence of others, as expect that Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues can terminate the war against the South, whilst Europe still excludes it from the family of nations. The duty to give the strife a possibility of closing, is immensely heightened by the fact that they appear to be pursuing it in the midst of well-founded despair, and under a necessity which only neutrals can annihilate. That they are doing so will appear to those who watch the tone of Mr. Greeley in The New York Tribune, who observe the desperate expedient of enlisting negro regiments, and who reflect that West Virginia would be useless as a State unless the two belligerents were separated. But let any one recall the past, and reason for a moment on this question. Would Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues have embarked upon the war had they foreseen the tenor of its history? If, on the eve of crossing the Potomac, a higher Power had revealed to them the panorama of disaster and disgrace which they were doomed to bring upon their country; the panic of Bull Run; the scared and broken columns falling into Washington; the long and dreary autumn of paralysis which followed; the victories which took away the hope of any Southern party for the Union, and which as loudly as defeats proclaimed the madness of their enterprise; the cotton blazing on the Mississippi as they reached it; the capture of New Orleans without a practical result beyond the indignation of the world at the revolting tyranny which held it; had they caught a glimpse of the engagements which drove General M'Clellan to his gunboats—the scions of a Royal house partaking his confusion—and seen the tide of war rolled back upon their territory, and then another host sent out to dissolve itself, to put an end to the anxiety of Richmond, and to perform the tragedy of Fredericksburg;
  1730
  and, last of all, had they been able to forecast, with eighteen vessels hot in their pursuit, the Southern cruisers roaming on the sea triumphant and implacable;—would they have been deaf to the commissioners in the spring of 1861? would they have scorned a peace? would they have sent their expedition to Fort Sumter? would they have trampled on the law to plunge into hostilities? Then, are they not reluctantly pursuing them without a choice, till neutrals have acknowledged the insurgent? Shall Europe any longer chain them to the effort? Or, rather, when the Emperor desires to release, ought we to keep them inert and helpless victims on the lake of fire their blunders have created?
  My Lords, these grand considerations of honour, of neutrality, of policy, and duty, would lead the people of the country to require an acknowledgment of Southern, independence, were it not for the delusions as to slavery, which for a month or two have been promoted, and which, unless I am enabled to confront, I should seem, perhaps, to have avoided. To confront is to expose them. And the shortest method which occurs to me, is at once to drive these puny agitators to an issue. They have deceived the working classes of the country by confounding questions about slavery, which ought not to be discussed, with the only one which it behoves the British public to consider. We may go on eternally debating whether the desire to extend and to preserve it was at the bottom of secession; whether the desire to abridge or to eradicate it was at the bottom of invasion. These points, involving the recesses of the human heart, are little known even in America. History may discuss: Omniscience only can determine them. And it is idle mockery to force them on a mass of operatives, divided by 3,000 miles from any clue to the inquiry. The legitimate, the only issue is (and they will not venture to deny it), whether separation or reconquest will be most conducive to the welfare of the negro; the prosperity of Africa, and the attainment of the objects which have long engaged the Buxtons, and the Wilberforces, and other admirable men who scorn to be connected with this diminutive machinery for prolonging war on one side of the ocean, by spreading fiction on the other. We should therefore trace, and it is quickly done, the natural results of the alternatives. In the event of separation, there will no longer be the possibility of extending negro bondage into territories in

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  which it Joes not now exist. Already it is settled in New Mexico. And no boundary you can well conceive will give the Southern States uncultivated land beyond that Northern limit. In the event of separation, the North will not return the negro fugitives who cross over its border. And the planter must retain them, not by law and terror, but by judgment and humanity. There will be a premium on benevolence, a penalty on inattention and injustice, which has not heretofore existed. Slaves will be contented, or escape. Under the Union they found a prison in a continent. In the event of separation, the whole question of black labour may be impartially considered by the Southerners. Whereas, during the last decade the violence of the Northern Abolitionists had fixed the system, had inflamed into a point of honour, or a passion, the opinions against which they were crusaders. In what manner would re-conquest operate upon the negro? A servile war would be its melancholy preface, in which murder confronts the slave and rapine the proprietor. In such a conflict, many blacks must be exterminated, and nearly all the higher classes driven from the country. The dismantled houses and the confiscated fields become the property of Northerners. The conquerors at once discover that the soil is worthless unless the labour of the black may be applied to it. The negroes who survive, demoralized and scattered, will not be all of them recaptured; and if they were, would be inadequate in number to the purpose. How are the new proprietors, desiring wealth and jealous of sterility, to find the labour which is wanting to them? Africa is open. Africa contains the millions they are seeking. The flag of the United States before now has unfortunately been a shelter to the slave trade. The want of the United States may prove its resurrection in America. And this, too, is unanswerable. During the last few years, while the Union went on undivided, the efforts of Great Britain on the subject were defeated. As soon as ever the civil war divided it, the Government of Washington conceded the right of search; while their organs insolently told us that it would be withdrawn as soon as Southern subjugation was accomplished. After this, what man can be so mad as to declare that the friends of Africa and of her race ought to concur with the invaders and advance pleas in their behalf, which they themselves have not the forehead to resort to?
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  The only further sentiment which in the event of other neutrals being prepared might indispose the country to acknowledgment is a lingering idea that the cause of freedom is involved in the retention of the Union. It is just therefore to inquire for whose advantage it would come again into existence. We have seen it would not be for that of Africa or of the negro. It could not be for that of the seceders, as the miseries of New Orleans have explained, where that rule has been established, and those terrors have been felt, which would then apply to all the cities of their territory. Who says they ought not to perish rather than submit to a yoke more bitter and degrading than was ever known yet in Warsaw or in Venice? But language shrinks from such a topic. Then, would it be restored for the advantage of the North? At least they can only gain their object, if it is attainable, through the medium of a general who, when he had attained it, must rank among the highest conquerors — with Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon. Would such a character be likely to resign his arms to Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues? What temptation could he have to conduct so derogatory and to sacrifice so thankless? It was thought by many that General M'Clellan at the time of his dismissal might have turned his regiments on the capital with safety. And there were not wanting those who loudly censured his forbearance. In this war there has been no fact more pregnant and instructive than the disposition, in spite of his reverses, to exalt him. For many months a halo has surrounded his inaction. Would the army then refuse to follow one who had performed marvels instead of shrinking before obstacles; who had given them the plunder of the south instead of leading them through hardships and privations to their starting-point; who had won affection, not by his designs and his retreats, but by his actions and his progress; whose title rested on the fact, not that Baltimore was safe, but that Montgomery had fallen. A tide of arguments would rush into the mind of such a general, to dissuade him from surrendering his power to institutions so discredited, so trampled on, and so remote from those which Washington bequeathed, as he would find subsisting in his country? But the impulse from within would be exceeded by the pressure from without. In a sickened and disorganized society which only pants for rule, he would not

  1733
  choose but be coerced into the part of a dictator. And is it for a despotism that the people of the North are pouring out their blood, and tarnishing their glory? Already it exists. It had its birth in war, and it would take its immortality from conquest. Then, would the Union be restored for the advantage of the world? What country would be safer? Would Brazil? What country would be freer? Would Poland gain when the only patron of the Czar recovered his original dimensions? At first, indeed—for facts will ever guide the calculation of your Lordships—the necessity of Southern garrisons might tend to keep them in repose. But in a few years—they do not labour to conceal it from us—a power more rapacious, more unprincipled, more arrogant, more selfish and encroaching, would arise than has ever yet increased the outlay, multiplied the fears, and compromised the general tranquillity of Europe. And on this overgrown, on this portentous form of tyranny and egotism, many countries would depend for the material of that important industry which languishes at present.
  My Lords, the latter point might be explained by statistics I have with me. But it will hardly be impugned, and it is more important to remind you that not much more than five years have elapsed since France and Great Britain were united to withstand a Power which overshadowed and assailed the general security of nations. To gain their object it was requisite to interrupt a peace of forty years, and squander noble lives upon the trenches and the battle-field. In order now to reach equivalent results and parallel advantages, they are required not to lavish, but to save; not to arm battalions, but disperse them; not to open conflict in the world, but snatch an hemisphere from misery. What in Russia wanted toil, outlay, unmeasured risks, and endless combinations, for aught we know may be accomplished by a fiat in America. And the presence of a noble Duke on the bench (the Duke of Newcastle) might have suggested to me, that there are some inherent evils in the partnership of arms which have not any place in the alliance of diplomacy. The initiative will belong to France. But if it did not, should Great Britain be ashamed of it? Whoever contemplates habitually her place or aspect on the globe, will sometimes think that it imposes a double task on her career to urge on civilization from its Eastern cradle to
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  its Western home, and also as the firm and watching outpost of the sea, to stand between the older Powers and the evils which the other side of the Atlantic may occasionally threaten. Long has she fulfilled the first, and nobly may she now sustain the second part of the vocation which belongs to her. And if it suits the dignity of empire to compass large results by trifling exertions—instead of wasting giant means upon invisible achievements — the day will be a proud one, when in a voice which Europe has re-echoed her message rolls over the waters to guard the freedom of the Old World, and limit, if not arrest, the sorrows of the New. But whether we resolve to lead or hesitate to follow, whether we retard, or join, or suffer isolation from the continent, I shall be indebted to your Lordships for permitting me to show to-night, that the neutral Powers have at once the right and duty to acknowledge the Confederacy, and that according to the only lights their rulers are possessed of until that measure is adopted, the war can never end.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I suppose there is no Member of either House of Parliament who does not wish for the termination of the civil war in America. It disturbs commerce, it puts to hazard the peace of the world, and it afflicts America herself; and if anything could be usefully, and, I must add, justly done to bring that war to a termination, I repent there is no Member of either House of Parliament, and no person in the country, who would not gladly see such a consummation. But, after having listened to my noble Friend, I must confess I remain in the-same persuasion as before at the present moment—and I speak only of the present moment—that there is nothing this country could do usefully and wisely which would tend to the termination of the hostilities on the other side of the Atlantic. My noble Friend has somewhat mixed different topics, and he has alluded to three different modes of intervention of States in the affairs of other countries. One — which is the minimum of interference—that of advice, good offices, and mediation another, the mode proposed by my noble Friend to-night, that of recognition; and the third, one which we have sometimes resorted to, and which other nations have more frequently had recourse to — that of forcible intervention. My noble Friend says, and says truly, that since I had the honour of addressing the House last sum-

  1735
  mer there has been some divergence between the views on this subject of the Government of this country and that of the Emperor of the French. The Government of the Emperor of the French conceives that it might tend to the termination of the war if three Powers—France, Great Britain, and Russia—were to propose a suspension of hostilities with a view of negotiation between the two belligerents. Her Majesty's Government, after carefully examining that proposition, came to the conclusion that its adoption by us would not be likely to lead to its acceptance by the Government of the United States of America; while, if that should be the case, by causing irritation, it would not increase but diminish the chances of our seeing a termination of the contest. The French Government has since proceeded in accordance with its views, and has actually proposed to the Government of the United States to negotiate with the Southern States. That proposition has not been adopted; and I think your Lordships will judge from what has happened with reference to the proposals of France, and with reference to suggestions thrown out in other countries, that this policy of good officers and mediation is not, at the present moment, likely to tend to promote peace, but rather to provoke measures of opposition; and thus the reproach would be cast upon this country that we had aggravated the evils of the present lamentable state of affairs in America. It does not appear, at the present moment, that this contest would be likely to be terminated by an offer of our good offices. I say at the present moment, because it is impossible to say that in the course of events a time may not come when both the contending parties would be desirous of the good offices or wise counsels of friendly Powers. I do not see any probability of that at this moment, but I wish to guard myself against being supposed to speak positively of the future. We come, then, to the course proposed by my noble Friend—namely, that of recognition. My noble Friend alluded to several cases—not very happy illustrations of his argument, I think—in which the United States of America have recognised insurgent countries which they believed likely to be able to maintain their independence. One was the revolted State of Hungary, whose independence had ceased to appear—it had sunk like the island in the Mediterranean—had disappeared before the despatch reached Vienna
  1736
  by which the United States recognised it. Another instance referred to by my noble Friend scarcely comes within the category of recognition, though it has been quoted by a gentleman who has written some very able letters under the title of "Historicus,"— I mean the recognition of the United States themselves by France, two years after the war with this country, in 1772, had begun. If any one will examine that precedent, and the important documents which have lately come to light, he will see that the French monarchy of the day had for some years—most unfortunately for itself—been exciting democratic passions in America, and had been endeavouring to raise opposition there to the Government of Great Britain. It had prepared means of concert with these States; and even in the letter, so courteous in appearance, but so exceedingly hostile and bitter in its spirit, written by the French Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, it was stated that the French Government had not only made a treaty of commerce with the United States, which they had already recognised, but further, that they had a right to carry that treaty into effect, if necessary, even by force. This was a threat to take part in the war between Great Britain and her revolted colonies. But we know, that besides this open threat, there was a secret treaty signed, by which France pledged herself to lend her support to the revoked provinces; and the Government and the Opposition of this country, which was then as decided as ever any Opposition was, agreed that the threat was one of war, and that by war only could it be met. This, therefore, was not a case of recognition, but a ease of interference. It was, I think, a most unjustifiable interference—an interference for the purpose of spreading those democratic principles, which afterwards reacted on France, and produced so many excesses and crimes during the Revolution. Well, then, with regard to the other cases to which my noble Friend has alluded, those of Portugal and Holland were cases of forcible intervention. There is hardly more than one case in which the question was limited to simple recognition—that was the war carried on between Spain and her revolted colonies, which went on from 1808 to 1822 or 1823 without any proposal for a recognition. This case is one worthy of the attention of your Lordships, because it was illustrated by the mild wisdom of Lord Lansdowne, by the profound research of Sir James

  1737
  Mackintosh, and by the dazzling genius of Canning. We have therefore, upon this question of recognition, as much light as can possibly be thrown upon any subject. Now, I beg to refer your Lordships to the words of Lord Lansdowne. He was zealous for the recognition of the South American Provinces; he thought it would be a great advantage to this country to recognise them, and he was entirely free from any trammels of office, or any obligation to consult the interests of the Minister of the day. But, with that wisdom and forbearance which characterized every act of his public life, he stated, "The first point to consider is whether you have the right; "and he went on thus—
  "It will be my duty this night to point out to your Lordships the great advantages which may result from the establishment of South American independence. I hope I shall never stand up in this House to recommend your Lordships to adopt any course of policy inconsistent with those principles of right which are paramount to all expediency, and which compose that great law of nations any departure from which, to answer a selfish and ambitious policy, never fails to recoil upon its authors." [2 Hansard, x. 973.]
  These are words upon which this House may well reflect; and we may well consider upon what grounds Lord Lansdowne founded the views which I have just brought under the notice of your Lordships. In the first place, he stated it was necessary that a country which required to be recognised should have established its independence. In the next place, that it should be able to maintain that independence for the future. And lastly, that it should be able to carry on with all foreign nations those relations of peace and amity which form the general international law of the world. Now, examine the state of the revolted provinces of Spain at that time, as Sir James Mackintosh and Mr. Canning did. We find that the greater part of South America had been some twelve or fourteen years entirely free from the presence of Spanish armies. We find that with regard to those provinces in which that was not absolutely the case—namely, Mexico, where Vera Cruz alone was occupied by a Spanish garrison, and Peru, where there were 4,000 or 5,000 Spanish troops, although the cause of Spain seemed hopeless — it was agreed that their recognition should be deferred; and that only in the case of Buenos Ayres, and those parts of South America which had clearly and for a number of years established their independence, would it be right for Great
  1738
  Britain to proceed to the step of recognition. Besides this, Mr. Canning took care to inform the Spanish Minister that such recognition would not be very long delayed; that if the Spanish Government wished to recognise them, they ought to take that step, and that Great Britain was willing to give time before proceeding to recognise them herself. Well, here is a great precedent for our consideration—here is a step taken by the Government of the day after considerable care and examination; here is a course recommended by the Opposition of the day—not in any harsh spirit, but notwithstanding the conviction which this country generally entertained that the cause of Spain was hopeless, and that the independence of those provinces was firmly established. Well, now, if we look to the present position of North America, and compare it with that of the States of which Lord Lansdowne spoke, we find that the war in North America is still carried on with the utmost vigour—I had almost said with the utmost fury. We find some of those provinces which were the first to proclaim their independence—a great part of Louisiana, New Orleans, and the banks of the Mississippi, occupied by the Federal armies. There are very considerable Federal armies menacing cities of the Confederation, such as Charleston and Savannah. So that no man can say it is a case of hopeless war. For my own part, and speaking according to my limited vision, I do not believe those efforts of the Federals will be successful. No man can say that the North will subdue the South; but no man can say that the war is finally over, or that the independence of the Southern States is established. Well, then, what is the present state of the case? Although great efforts have been made in vain, the great Federal Republic seems unwilling to accept the decision of events. So far from it, we find the last acts of the Congress which has just expired are to place, by conscription, every man fit to carry arms at the disposal of the President of the United States, and to vote sums of money amounting to no less than £180,000,000 sterling for the purpose of carrying on the war. Then, in this state of affairs I should say, that looking to the question of right, it would not be a friendly act towards the United States, it would not be to fulfil our obligations to a country with which we have long maintained relations of pence and amity—a great country which says it can

  1739
  still carry on the war—it would, I say, be a failure of friendship on our part if at this moment we were to interpose and recognise the Southern States. I have endeavoured to guard myself by saying that I speak now with reference to the present aspect of affairs, I hardly know any moment in which my noble Friend could have brought forward his Motion with less encouragement from events. It may turn out that these immense efforts which are being made by the Federal Government shall be made in vain; that the spirit of the South is unconquerable as their determination never to be united again with the Northern States is final and irrevocable; and that a time may come when the duty of this country will be totally different from what it is at the present moment. All that may be the case—all I maintain is, that it is our duty at present to stand still and not to proceed to an act so definite, be positive—an act so unfriendly to the United States as the recognition of the South. My noble Friend spoke of various topics—of danger of Canada being attacked by the Northern Republic, and of the West Indies being attacked by the Southern. My Lords, I cannot follow my noble Friend into these suppositions. I do not venture to say what may be the future course of events. I confine myself to that which I think to be our duty now, which I think is right; and if that be so, we must be content in future days to meet with future dangers, and it will not enfeeble our arms if we have it in our power to reflect that we have never failed in our obligations to those which have been great States in peace and amity with us, and that it has not been through any fault of ours that a great affliction has fallen on them. Well, my Lords, I know not that there is anything in what my noble Friend has said to-night which would make it necessary for me to go much further into this question; but at the same time there were allusions in parts of his speech to former occasions and former instances of interference on our part, as if my noble Friend and some of those who looked forward to his Motion to-night expected that there should be some interference on our part in this war. Now, my Lords, I wish to say only a few words upon that which we have done in former days by way of intervention. We, too, like other States, though not so often as some, have at times taken upon us to intervene. We interfered in the case of
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  Holland to save her from the religious tyranny and political despotism of Philip II. That contest was hallowed by the blood of Sir Philip Sydney, and by the part we took we contributed to her independence. In another case—the case of Portugal—we interfered. Charles I., Cromwell, and Charles II., all agreed in that interference. We declared ourselves ready to send 10,000 men to the aid of the new Government of Portugal, and we helped the Portuguese to relieve themselves from the Spanish tyranny under which they groaned, and to establish the independence of their State. In more recent times, when Greece endeavoured to establish her independence, we aided her in her contest with Turkey; we rescued her from the destruction which threatened her, and helped her to found a free and independent monarchy. Take the case of Belgium again. When the Belgians declared that they were unable to remain under the Government of Holland, in accordance with the Treaty of Vienna, we interfered by force, in conjunction with France; and the wise and happy arrangement was made by which the freedom of Belgium was secured. Now, my Lords, in all these instances, whether the intervention was carried on by our ancestors or in our own times, there is nothing of which an Englishman need be ashamed. If we have taken part in interventions, it has been in behalf of the independence, freedom, and welfare of a great portion of mankind. I should be sorry, indeed, if there should be any intervention on the part of this country which could bear another character, I trust that this will not be the case, and that no interests, deeply as they may affect us—interests which imply the well-being of a great portion of our people, but interests which may affect also the freedom and happiness of other parts of the globe—will induce us to set an example different from that of our ancestors; but that when we feel ourselves bound to interfere—and may it be seldom—it will be an interference in the cause of liberty and to promote the freedom of mankind, as we have hitherto done in these cases. It is with this conviction that I have addressed these few remarks as to what has been done by this country in former days; and I trust that with regard to this civil war in America we may be able to continue our impartial and neutral course. Depend upon it, my Lords, that if that war is to cease, it is far better it should cease by a

  1741
  conviction, both on the part of the North and the South, that they can never live again happily as one community and one republic, than that the termination of hostilities should be brought about by the advice, the mediation, or the interference of any European Power. I repeat, I have spoken only of the duty of the Government at the present time, and I trust that there will now be no further debate on this subject.

SALMON EXPORTATION BILL— [No. 51.]

  REPORT.
  mendments reported (according to Order).
  Clause 3 (Prohibition of Export of Salmon at certain Times).
  THE EARL OF DALHOUSIEmoved to omit the words—
  "No unclean or unseasonable Salmon and no Salmon caught during the Time at which the Sale thereof is prohibited in the District where it is caught, shall be exported or entered for Exportation from any Part of the United Kingdom to Parts beyond Seas,"
  for the purpose of inserting other words, the effect of which would be to prohibit the importation of salmon from abroad during the close season.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYopposed the Amendment.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBUEYsupported it.
  On Question, Whether the words proposed to be omitted shall stand part of the Clause? their Lordships divided:—Contents 8; Not-Contents 6: Majority 2.

  CONTENTS.

  Newcastle, D.

  Torrington, V.

  Somerset, D.

  Foley, L. [Teller.]

  Granville, E.

  Harris, L.

  St. Germans, E.

  Stanley of Alderley, L. [Teller.]

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Malmesbury, E.

  Colville of Culross, L. [Teller.]

  Powis, E.

  Eversley, V.

  Panmure, L. (E. Dalhousie.) [Teller.]

  Redesdale, L.

RAILWAY THROUGH GREENWICH PARK.—QUESTION.
VISCOUNT TORRINGTONcalled the attention of the House to the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Bill (No. 1)
1742
and its proposed interference with the Greenwich Park and the Observatory at Greenwich; and asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether they have made a Report upon the Bill to the Board of trade, and, if so, moved that such Report be laid on the table of the House.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, the Admiralty had written to the Board of Trade, forwarding a Report which had been received from the Astronomer Royal in reference to the Bill referred to by the noble Viscount. It was pointed out by the Astronomer Royal that the proposed course of the railway lay within 1,000 feet of the Observatory; that if its course passed above ground the concussion of the air thereby produced would be very injurious to any observations which might be taken; but that danger was, of course, much lessened by the fact that trains would pass through a tunnel at that point. At the distance of 1,000 feet he was not sure that it would do any harm at all. It was proposed that experiments should be made during the Easter recess near railroads already in existence, for the purpose of discovering what effect would be produced by the subterraneous passage of trains upon astronomical instruments placed within 1,000 feet; and having thus gained information with regard to the extent of the tremor of the earth, he should, if necessary, move an instruction to the Committee to whom the Bill would be referred after Easter. He should be sorry to interfere unnecessarily with a railway in which a large number of the inhabitants of Greenwich took a great interest; and, on the other hand, it was necessary to see that no damage resulted from works in connection with any private enterprise to an institution so valuable as Greenwich Observatory.

RAILWAY THROUGH GREENWICH PARK.—QUESTION.
  TRUSTEES (SCOTLAND) ACT AMENDMENT BILL.
  Brought from the Commons, and read 1a. (No. 53.)

  ALKALI WORKS REGULATION BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill for the Regulation of Alkali Works—Was presented by The Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY, and read 1a. (No. 55.)
  House adjourned at half past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.