Sitting of 13 July 1863

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Malt (Excise Duty, &c.), nominated—(List of the Committee.)
SUPPLY—Resolutions [July 10] reported.
PUBLIC BILLS—Resolution in Committee—Fortifications (Provision for Expenses) [Payment to Bank of England.]
Ordered—Expiring Laws Continuance; Pauper Lunatic Asylums; Petty Sessions (Ireland).
First Reading—Turnpike Trusts Arrangements * [Bill 227]; Turnpike Acts Continuance, &c. * [Bill 228]; Jurisdiction of Justices (Lords) * [Bill 232]; Statute Law Revision (Lords) * [Bill 233]; Pauper Lunatic Asylums * [Bill 234]; Petty Sessions (Ireland) * [Bill 235].
Second Reading—Union Relief Aid Acts Continuance * [Bill 199].
Committee—Fortifications (Provision for Expenses) * [Bill 213]—R.P.; Companies Clauses * [Bill 209]; Railways Clauses * [Bill 208], on re-committal
Report—Companies Clauses * [Bill 229]; Railways Clauses * [Bill 230].
Considered as amended—India Stock * [Bill 212]; Nuisances Removal Act (1856) Amendment * [Bill 203 & 231].
Third Reading—Sydney Branch Mint * [Bill 217]; Alkali Works Regulation (Lords) * Bill 220]; Waywardens' Contracts (Lords) *; and severally passed.
Withdrawn—Court of Session (Scotland) [Bill 221].

CASE OF MR. CLARE—THE "WARRIOR."

  QUESTION.
  MR. CONINGHAMsaid, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether a Petition addressed to the Queen by Mr. John Clare, jun., the inventor and patentee, as alleged, of the Warrior description of vessel, and praying for a settlement of his claims, has been received at the Admiralty, together with three Peti-

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  tions presented this Session to Parliament; also, the printed Affidavits of Mr. John Morrison and of Mr. Clare, respecting the evidence given by Sir Charles Fox, in the case of "Clare v. the Queen;" and whether these have been reported upon by the Legal Adviser to the Admiralty, and what that Report is?
  LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, in reply, that the Petitions referred to had been presented to the Admiralty. The case of Mr. Clare had been tried by a Court of Law, and the jury found a verdict against him on all the issues. Subsequently, Mr. Clare moved for a new trial, and the Court of Queen's Bench unanimously refused the application. Therefore, so far as concerned the allegation of an infringement by the Admiralty of Mr. Clare's patent, that question appeared to be set at rest by the Court of Law. The affidavits respecting the evidence of Sir Charles Fox had been referred to the Admiralty solicitor, who was of opinion that Mr. Clare had no claims on the public, and he had been so informed.

BATTERIES AT BOMARSUND.

  QUESTION.
  MR. R. LONGsaid, he wished to ask, Whether the Government has received any information of the re-construction by Russia of the batteries at Bomarsund; and, whether they have forwarded any remonstrance to the Russian Government on the subject?
  MR. LAYARDreplied, that no information to the effect stated had been received by Her Majesty's Government.

THE ARMSTRONG AND WHITWORTH COMMITTEE.—QUESTION.
SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, Whether the Armstrong and Whitworth Committee are likely soon to report; what the cause of the delay has been; and whether both competitors have completed the Guns ordered to make the experiment?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, in reply, that the cause of the delay which had taken place, and was still likely to take place, was that the guns which had been ordered for the purpose of making a practical experiment between the two systems had not yet been supplied. In February last the Committee ordered the guns which they thought necessary for the experiments—namely, three Whitworth 12-pounders, three 70-pounders, and three
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muzzle-loading guns; and had also ordered a like number of Armstrong 12-pounders and 70-pounders, and breech-loading guns. Mr. Whitworth had explained that the reason why he had not been able to supply his guns was that he depended on the manufacturer for the metal, and that a considerable time might still be expected to elapse before he would be able to supply them. It therefore appeared that there was not much chance of a trial of the two systems being completed for three or four months.

INDIA—THE MHOW COURT MARTIAL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. E. P. BOUVERIEsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, Whether the Additional Memorandum presented to Parliament on the 1st of July last, respecting the Mhow Court Martial, is the only further Memorandum which has been sent to the Commander in Chief in India on the subject; whether that Memorandum was signed by the Adjutant General; and, if not, whether a further Memorandum, duly signed by that public Officer, has not also been sent to the Commander in Chief in India, which can be laid upon the table of the House?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON, in reply, said, that after making every inquiry in his power, he had only to repeat the statement he had already made—that no memorandum whatever could be found that at all answered to the description given by the right hon. Gentleman. A great deal of correspondence, some of which was private, had taken place between the Commander in Chief and the military authorities in India, and the right hon. Gentleman would seem, from his repeated questions, to be aware of the existence of some memorandum or letter of the kind. If the right hon. Gentleman would state the date of the letter, and describe more fully its subject, the correspondence could again be examined; and if any such letter should be found, the War Department would then be able to say whether they could lay a copy of it on the table.

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN.

  QUESTION.
  LORD NAASsaid, he would beg to ask, Whether, in case of the Forces of the Tycoon of Japan becoming engaged in hostilities with either the Forces of the Spiritual Emperor or those of the Native Princes, the instructions issued to the

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  Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's Fleet will authorize him to take part in such hostilities?
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that it was the invariable rule, founded on the best possible reasons, never to publish instructions sent to the Naval and Military Officers of the country, until the operations to which they referred were completed, and not often in that case. Therefore, he could not give an answer to the Question just asked.

THE STATUE IN LEICESTER SQUARE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ADDINGTONsaid, he wished to ask the First Commissioner of Works, Whether his attention has been called to the mutilated condition of the Statue in Leicester Square, and to the present neglected state of the space inside the railings of the Square; and whether he will state upon what conditions a site is granted in the Metropolis to private bodies for the purpose of erecting thereon a statue or other monument, and when such grant has been made, whether the designs for the proposed work are submitted to him or to any other public functionary for approval previous to its commencement?
  MR. COWPERsaid, that when he last passed through Leicester Square his attention was arrested by the very horrible mutilations which the Statue of George II. had been subjected to. It had only one leg, and that crooked, and only one arm, and that not the sword arm. This was, perhaps, owing to the fact that the statue was not made of sufficiently strong materials to bear the crushing weight of the Great Globe which was lately placed over it. This statue was not, however, under the jurisdiction of any officer of the Government, and it was not therefore in the power of Government to remove the figure or mend its legs. It was erected in the reign of George II. himself, and it was not till subsequently that the Statute was passed, prohibiting the erection of any statue in any public place without the written consent of the First Commissioner of Works. He conceived that it was the duty of the First Commissioner not to give his sanction in such a case unless he was satisfied that the proposed statue was suitable to the site and in harmony with the architectural features of the locality. As the law at present stood, the First Commissioner was entitled to impose such conditions as he deemed necessary for the preservation of
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  the beauty of the metropolis, before sanctioning the erection of any statue in a public place.

MALTA DOCK.—QUESTION.
SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, When the Papers relating to Malta Dock will be in the hands of Members of this House, the Papers having been withdrawn from the Printer by the Admiralty, with the object, it is said, of correcting the proof?
LORD CLARENCE PAGET, in reply, said, the inference which his hon. and gallant Friend seemed to draw was that the correspondence had been abstracted by the Admiralty in order that it might be mutilated. That was entirely a mistake. It was usual when a correspondence was complicated and voluminous, as in the present instance, that the Department which furnished it should receive proofs for revision. This had been done with regard to the correspondence in question, and he hoped it would be laid on the table in the course of a day or two.

CIRCUITS—INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF JUDGES, &c.—QUESTION.
MR. HADFIEDsaid, he wished to ask, If anything has been done for the rearrangement of the Circuits, for an increase in the number of Judges, and for the purpose of holding the Assizes in additional towns, and whether any Bill will be introduced on the subject?
THE SOLICITOR GENERALsaid, in reply, that he believed a Bill enabling Her Majesty to re-arrange the circuits had been or would be immediately introduced into the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor with every hope that it would be passed this Session. He was not aware of any proposal to increase the number of Judges, or to effect any extensive alterations in the existing Assize arrangements.

MILITIA OFFICERS.-QUESTION.
COLONEL DICKSONsaid, he would beg to ask the Under Secretaty of State for War, Upon what principle Officers of the Militia receive less pay when called out for twenty-one days than when embodied for a longer period?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, in reply, that the rates of pay were fixed some time back, when the present Act was passed, and it had not been deemed necessary to make any change. It was only

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the higher Officers of Militia who received a lower rate of pay when called out for a short period of training, and they were usually gentlemen who accepted commissions for the sake of the position which they thus obtained, without regard to the amount of pay. No difference whatever was made in the pay of subalterns. He had heard no complaints in regard to the present rates.

CASE OF MR. EASTWICK AT TEHERAN.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HENRY SEYMOURsaid, he rose to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he will produce a Copy of the Memorandum communicated by Earl Russell, on the 9th day of July 1863, to Mr. Eastwick, late Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affairs at Teheran, and of Mr. Eastwick's Letter to Earl Russell, requesting him to reconsider his decision dismissing Mr. Eastwick the service, for bringing charges of a gross nature against Mr. Alison, Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, which he was not able fully to prove?
  MR. LAYARDsaid, that as at present advised it would be very objectionable to lay the Memorandum upon the table.
  MR. HENRY SEYMOUR: Then, Sir, I beg leave to give notice that I shall bring the subject before the House at the earliest opportunity.

UNITED STATES-RECOGNITION OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

  ORDER FOR RESUMING ADJOURNED DEBATE DISCHARGED.
  On Order for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [30th June].
  MR. ROEBUCK: Sir, I rise for the purpose of moving that this Order he now read, in order that it may be discharged. Sir, I brought forward the Motion under the feeling that I was about to ask the House to take a step which would be likely to put an end to the terrible carnage now going on in North America, and which would also be of infinite advantage to the commercial interests of Great Britain. For making this Motion I have been subjected to much obloquy. That obloquy came from a very noisy and not very wise party, and I must say, Sir, that my present determination has not been influenced thereby. The noble Lord at the head of the Government, however, has
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  stated that the continuance of the debate would be an impediment in the way of the good government of the country and its interests. Feeling that respect which is due to the noble Lord's belief and wishes, I have induced my hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Lindsay) to forego his own desire in the matter. When the noble Lord sat down on Friday last, he and I were perfectly, or, at least, very nearly satisfied with what the noble Lord had stated; and if nothing more had been said, there would have been an end of the matter. But, Sir, official arrogance is a plant of portentously rapid growth. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has thought fit to bring a charge against my hon. Friend which he believed his honour called on him to answer. A little cool reflection taught him that insinuations like these coming from a quarter such as this did not need to be regarded. My hon. Friend then felt that the considerations submitted by the noble Lord at the head of the Government were so grave that he ought not to give way to any feeling on his own part of wounded pride, as I may call it, and solely to regard the interest of his country, as pointed out by the noble Lord. And now, Sir, when the matter is about to pass entirely from my control and my dealings with it, there is one observation I would make to the noble Lord. He has at the present moment the greatest responsibility on his shoulders. It has been said that the time has not yet come for the consideration of this question. I have yielded to that suggestion, but let the noble Lord bear in mind that there are two dangers before us which the Government and the country will have to meet. There is the possibility of a reconstruction of the Union upon a Southern basis, and there is the possibility of an acknowledgment of the Confederate South by the Emperor of the French alone. These are two great dangers for England. The noble Lord will, I have no doubt, with his long experience fully justify the confidence of the people in his consideration of these two great questions. I leave them, Sir, without hesitation in his hands, though I must say that my own feelings are against the withdrawal of this subject at the present time from the consideration of the House. England and English interests, it seems to me, demand the decision of the House, and it is only under a feeling of great respect for the noble Lord that I now withdraw my Motion.
  Moved,
  "That the Order for resuming the Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [30th June] be read, in order to its being discharged."
  MR. LINDSAY: Sir, I wish to say only a few words. There seems to have been some great misunderstanding on this question. The Motion now to be withdrawn is to the effect that the House invites Her Majesty to enter into negotiations with other Powers for the recognition of the Southern States of North America. That Motion stood on the paper for about six weeks, I heard a rumour ten days or so before the Motion was to come oh that the Emperor of the French had changed his mind in regard to the expediency of then recognising the South. How that rumour originated I know not, bill it was very general. I did not, however, pay any attention to it. My hon. Friend also heard a similar rumour, and wrote me a note asking me to ascertain, if I could, what truth there was in it, because, as he said, it was very important that he should know, lest, when he brought forward his Motion, some Member of the Government should rise and ask, "What is the good of this Motion when one of the chief Powers- is not prepared to join in the recognition of the South?" My hon. Friend added that he would like, if he could, to see the Emperor and learn the fact from himself. I wrote on the subject to a friend in Paris, without any idea that my letter and its enclosure would reach the Emperor. The better, however, did get to His Majesty; and I received an answer stating that I might give an Unqualified contradiction to the rumour. The Emperor adding, "I have not changed my mind as to the desirability of recognising the South, and I shall be glad to see Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Roebuck on the subject should they visit Paris." I handed that note to my hon. and learned Friend, telling him that he could read it in the course of the debate if the rumour were referred to in the House. My hon. and learned Friend, however, thought that the note would not be sufficient." I should like," he said, "to ascertain the fact for myself;" adding—"the House will believe me." That was upon the 19th of June. I replied that in my opinion the note would be enough, and that the House would believe it had come from an authoritative source; but the hon. and learned Gentleman still persisted in his desire to go to Paris. I must say, considering the high authority through whom
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  the contradiction was received, that I had no wish to trouble the Emperor; but as my hon. and learned Friend was anxious to learn his intention from His Majesty himself, as he thought it important for the success of his Motion that he should do so, and as I shared the anxiety to see this Motion carried, I accompanied my hon. Friend, at great inconvenience, to Paris. An audience was at once granted to us; but I presume the House does not for a moment suppose that I would make public beyond what is, under the circumstances, utterly requisite, any conversation which the Emperor of the French has been pleased to hold with me, either at that interview or at any other, without his special permission. After what has taken place, I may therefore merely state that during that conversation, which lasted a considerable time, my hon. and learned Friend pointed out to the Emperor the importance of having it clearly understood, that if it should be the pleasure of Her Majesty to negotiate with him on the subject of the recognition of the Southern States, he would be prepared to enter into that negotiation, and my hon. and learned Friend asked that he might be permitted to make a statement in the House to that effect. His Majesty replied, "Take any means you think proper to let it be known that I am prepared to negotiate, and that there is no truth in the rumour prevalent in England in regard to any change of nay views on this question," All the Emperor meant, so far as I understood him, was, that if the House of Commons should pray Her Majesty to address him on the subject of the recognition of the Southern States, he would be only too happy to enter into negotiations with that object, believing, as he did, that if the great Powers of Europe thought it advisable to recognise the Southern Confederacy, the moral effect would be such as to stay the terrible carnage now going on in America. That is the substance of what took place. So far as I am concerned, I Was quite satisfied with the statement of the noble Lord at the head of the Government on Friday evening, although, as the House is aware, the course pursued by my hon. and learned Friend has been the subject of much comment in the public press, and I have shared with him the obloquy. We are all exposed to remarks of that kind; and though we feel we have not done wrong, we are often obliged to bear with them, for prudential reasons, in silence. I

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  did not, however, pay a great deal of attention to the comments of the press in the present instance, and after the statement of the noble Lord on Friday evening, and the few words I offered in reply, it was my wish that this very delicate matter should be allowed to drop. But the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs did not seem at all satisfied; in fact, he appeared to be quite dissatisfied with what his noble chief had said. He felt it to be his duty to raise some fresh matter, and taunt me, as the organs of the Government have done, with being an amateur diplomatist and a special envoy—and he thought it necessary to read me a moral lesson, telling me to take care not to fall into the same trap again. I think the remarks of the hon. Gentleman were wholly uncalled for after the statement which the noble Lord at the head of the Government had made to the House. The noble Lord had said that no one had any right to cavil at the course which my hon. and learned Friend and I had taken. He had stated that Her Majesty's Government were well aware that for the last three years and a half I had been labouring in a very important question—a question of great interest to this country as well as to the people of France in regard to the maritime relations between the two countries, and that I had been labouring, moreover, not merely with their knowledge, but with their sanction and on their introduction. I may now state that during the whole time I was engaged in that business I never said anything to any one on the subject, except to Lord Cowley. The fact never crossed my lips that I had seen either the Emperor or his Ministers. I laboured for the good of my country in a quiet and unostentatious manner; and if I am an amateur diplomatist, it was Her Majesty's Government, of which the Under Secretary is a Member, who made me one. It was they who sent me to Paris and desired me to do the work which they ought to have done themselves. As might be expected, during the interviews with which I was favoured the Emperor was pleased to speak to me on various subjects, but I invariably reported every word to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and I invariably told the Emperor that what he might be pleased to say to me would be so communicated to Lord Cowley. The Under Secretary taunted me on Friday evening by saying that on one occasion I came from Paris saying I was sent home on a special mission by the Emperor, but that he received a telegram
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  contradicting the statement I made. Who was that telegram from? It is the first time I have heard of it. Was it from the Emperor or any of his Ministers? If so, it was passing strange. But I am not going to explain the circumstances; they are far too delicate to be handled in this House. They must have been so, or a private individual would not have been made the medium of communication. I have always been anxious to maintain the friendly relations between the Governments of the two countries, and would be the last to say or do anything that would cause any misunderstanding between the Emperor of the French and Her Majesty's Ministers.
  MR. NEWDEGATE: I rise to order. The House must now be aware that the course which has been pursued by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield and the hon. Member for Sunderland is not only highly improper, but is likely to be fraught with serious consequences.
  MR. ROEBUCK: Is the hon. Member speaking to order?
  MR. SPEAKER: It does not appear to me that what the hon. Member has said can be considered as bearing upon the question of Order. The Question before the House is that an Order should be discharged; and nothing has occurred in the debate on that Question which, in my opinion, can be regarded as out of order.
  MR. NEWDEGATEagain rose.
  MR. SPEAKER: And, as what I have now said appears to receive the sanction of the House, it is the duty of the hon. Member to acquiesce in it.
  MR. LINDSAY: I hope nothing will Fall from my lips which can be deemed unparliamentary, or against order. No one ever heard a whisper from me of any conversation I have had with the Emperor of the French until the 23rd of last month, when, incidentally, I obtained liberty to make certain statements. I have refrained from making those statements, and will not make them now. I prefer to bear the reproaches of the Under Secretary rather than let one word fall from my lips that would tend to disturb, in however slight a degree, the harmony which is generally supposed to exist between Her Majesty's Government and the Emperor of the French, and which really exists between the Emperor of the French and the people of England. I shall not make the facts known unless Her Majesty's Ministers drive me to make the statements referred to—and I am inclined to think they will

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  not do so. But as the Under Secretary has said that he received a telegram from Paris contradicting me—whether from the Emperor or by his orders, or from his Ministers, I do not know—I may briefly state that the conversation in question took place on the 11th of April 1862. It was on the subject of American affairs, and was of a very grave character. It related to the past, but had reference also to the future. I listened to what the Emperor said to me with considerable pain. He asked me to report the conversation to Lord Cowley. I said that I was to dine with Lord Cowley the same evening, and would probably have an opportunity of doing so. I had not then the opportunity, but on the following morning I repeated to Lord Cowley the whole of the conversation, and I said to him in the most distinct manner, "In sending notes of the conversation to Earl Russell, take care to state in the clearest possible way the reasons why the Emperor has been pleased to have this conversation with me; and the reason why he has thought proper to adopt so unusual a mode of communication; there must be no misunderstanding on that point." I said to him further that the Emperor had asked me to return to him with any remarks which his Lordship might be pleased to make upon the conversation. Adding—"In this case, anything you say I will report to the Emperor at his desire; therefore say as much or as little as you like." I returned to the Emperor and repeated to him what Lord Cowley had said, and he seemed satisfied with the manner in which I had carried out his wishes. I was then requested on my return to London to repeat the conversation to Earl Russell and the noble Lord at the head of the Government. I felt, when that request was made, that I was asked to perform a very delicate duty, and, anxious to avoid it, I said to his Majesty that Lord Cowley had reported the conversation already to Earl Russell. It is exceedingly unpleasant to me to be obliged to make even these statements. I was, however, not allowed an opportunity of repeating the conversation to Earl Russell or the noble Lord at the head of the Government. A correspondence passed, and I returned to Paris. It was His Majesty's pleasure again to see me. By his request I wrote to the noble Viscount on my return to London, and I sent to Paris a copy of the letter which I had written to the noble Viscount, and also a copy of his answer,
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  by the noble Viscount's desire. The correspondence ended with the following words:—"I have performed to the best of my ability this very delicate duty, and no person shall ever know from me what transpired." And the House does not know even now what transpired. I have not even mentioned the subject to any one until it was incidentally alluded to the other day. I may in conclusion add, that if it be the case, as the hon. Member says, that he received a telegram by order of the Emperor such as he described, why did His Majesty, when I returned to Paris, not say, "I can't see Mr. Lindsay again?" If I had been the imprudent person, the busybody, that the hon. Gentleman endeavoured to make me out, what would have been the Emperor's message for me when I returned the second time to Paris? Why, this—" Tell that gentleman, when he calls, that I am not at home." Therefore, it is strange indeed if the hon. Under Secretary received the telegram he spoke of. With these remarks—and I have been obliged in self-defence to say more than I desired to say—I now leave this truly delicate matter, and I hope the Government will not force me to say any more.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I think my hon. and learned Friend has judged rightly in moving to discharge the Order. The reasons which I stated the other evening, to show that no good could arise from a debate and a division on the Resolution of my hon. and learned Friend, are still, I hope, present to the minds of hon. Members. I must, however, express my regret that my hon. and learned Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) should have mixed up with this well-considered decision of theirs au attack upon my hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. ["Oh, oh!"] My hon. Friend did on Friday what he deemed to be his official duty, as arising from what fell from my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, after I had spoken and towards the conclusion of the discussion. I will say nothing on that subject, except only that I hope this will be the last time when any Member of this House shall think it his duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may have passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country. I sincerely say that I do not mean to impute the slightest blame to my two hon. Friends. I am persuaded that they acted with the best intentions, and according to what they

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  felt to be their duty as Members of Parliament, and for the good of the country. At the same time, I wish to impress upon their minds, and upon the minds of the House, that the proceeding which they have adopted is most irregular—to use no stronger language. The British Parliament is accustomed, as one of its functions, to receive messages and communications from the Sovereign of the United Kingdom; but we are in no relation to, we have no intercourse with, no official knowledge of, any Sovereign of any foreign country. Therefore, it is no part of our functions to receive communications from the Sovereign or the Government of any foreign State, unless such communications are made by the responsible Minister of the Crown in consequence of official communications held by order of a foreign Government with the British Government. If the Emperor of the French and the Queen of England have any communications to make to each other, the Emperor has his Ambassador in London, and the Queen has her Ambassador in Paris. Those Ambassadors are the proper organs for such communications. Sovereigns and Governments communicate with Sovereigns and Governments, but they do not communicate with the Legislatures of other countries. If either the Emperor of the French or the Queen of England have any statement which they wish to make public to all the world, or any intentions which they think fit to announce, they have Ministers in their respective Parliaments to make those announcements; or, if those Parliaments be not sitting, the Emperor of the French has his official organ—the Moniteur—through which to make public any statement of his intentions, any denials, or any assertions. We have not in this country a corresponding official organ; yet everybody knows that the Government have the means of making widely known any important statement which they may wish to give to the world during the Parliamentary recess. Therefore, nothing can be so irregular as proceedings of this sort, and for this obvious reason—setting aside the constitutional objection, which I hold to be very grave—that when the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, or my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office here, makes a communication to the country, that communication is made by a responsible Minister, who is bound to take care that that which he states is an accurate description of the communication which it is intended
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  to make, so that no question can at any time arise as to the authenticity of the statement or the correctness of the report which is made. It cannot be the same with such communications coming through private individuals. I think it right, therefore, to place it upon record, as far as a statement in this House can do so, that the proceeding is utterly irregular, and I trust it will never be drawn into a precedent. I do not in the least find fault with my hon. Friends for communicating with the Emperor of the French on any matter on which they think they ought to do so. Only they ought to have followed the course which my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland said he followed on a former occasion—namely, that of communicating to Lord Cowley that which had been stated to them, and that which it was important should be made known to the Government. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland said, very truly, he had been in communication with the Emperor of the French for the last three years on subjects connected with commerce and navigation. He rather implied that he was employed by Her Majesty's Government for that purpose. That is not exactly the case. The hon. Member stated that he was going to Paris, and thought, from his commercial knowledge and his acquaintance with navigation, that he might be able to convey to the Emperor information which might be useful to him in framing his measures for the alteration of the French Navigation Code. He stated that to me and to my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office. We said, "We should be very glad that you should employ your special knowledge for that purpose." We did not ask him to do it. He offered and we accepted, and we gave him an introduction to Lord Cowley in order that he might procure access to the Emperor for that purpose. So far what he did was perfectly regular, well-considered, and founded on the best intentions. Of course, my hon. Friend has information which we have not in the same detail, and from his own practical experience he could give useful information to the Emperor, with a view to the framing of future legislation on the French Maritime Code. But then my hon. Friend went on to say, that having returned to this country, he offered to communicate to my noble Friend and myself the result of his communications with the Emperor, and that he got a letter from me which was written, I think, from the country. As far as I can recollect, for I have

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  not refreshed my memory by looking at that letter, I have no doubt that what I then stated was what I state now—namely, that if the Emperor of the French, in consequence of the representations and information laid before him by my hon. Friend had any proposal to make to the British Government, that proposal ought to come through some responsible channel—either through the Emperor's Ambassador here or through our Ambassador at Paris. It is not the habit of the English Government to carry on what may be called a double diplomacy. We have public and official organs of communication with foreign Powers; and I think it highly objectionable to have private communications made through individuals touching those matters which ought to be the subject of official communications. That was what I stated—I trust courteously—to my hon. Friend; and that was the reason why I thought it better that we should not receive any communication coming from the Emperor through him. I did not intend to offer any discouragement to the useful exertions of my hon. Friend in seeking to infuse more liberal commercial principles into the French Government. I simply meant to say that it is objectionable for Her Majesty's Government to be employing private persons, however honourable or intelligent, in carrying on communications with foreign Governments, instead of conducting them through the official and legitimate organs. This case is entirely different from that of my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden), because he was employed by the Government to negotiate in concert with our Ambassador at Paris; and although he was too high-minded to receive any actual appointment or salary, he was clearly a diplomatic agent, employed specifically by the Government for a special purpose. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland did not hold that character. He was a private gentleman, going to Paris to give information which he possessed in an eminent degree, and which would be very useful; but he was not employed by the Government; and therefore I thought, and my noble Friend (Earl Russell) also thought, it was not desirable that we should have backward and forward communications between Her Majesty's Government and the Emperor of the French through my hon. Friend. I should hope, Sir, that this discussion may end here. I think my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck) is right in the decision he
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  has taken; and I trust we shall have no further debate as to what was said by the Emperor, or what was said by my hon. Friends. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland said, that if the Emperor had thought him a busybody, the next time be knocked at the door of the Tuileries His Majesty might say, "Not at home." Well, I think that these discussions in this House are not encouraging to a ready opening of the door of the Tuileries to those whose presence there and whose opinions and information might really be found very useful.
  THE O'DONOGHUEsaid, that the tone which had been taken by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) on the present occasion was very different from the tone which he took when he brought the subject before the House, But he wished, before the Motion was withdrawn, to enter his humble but emphatic protest against the spirit of hostility to America in which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield's Motion had been conceived, and also to free himself from any possible imputation of sharing in the smallest degree in the vindictive feelings which had manifestly taken possession of that hon. and learned Gentleman's mind. His feelings towards America, both North and South, were very different from those of the hon. and learned Gentleman. His feelings were those of unbounded gratitude and the warmest affection; and he ventured to say, in his place in Parliament, on behalf of the majority of his countrymen that they entertained similar feelings towards America, both North and South. ["No, no!"] There might be a difference of opinion; he had stated his—and he must say he did not think they would so far forget what they owed to America as to become consenting parties to a policy which ostensibly had for its object the recognition of the independence of the South, but in reality sought, by recognising the South, to take the surest and safest means of striking a deadly blow at the greatness and prosperity of America. He should say no more on this occasion but that he was sorry the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman had not received an emphatic denial by the House. Though his sympathies leaned more to the North than to the South, it was simply because the object of the North had been the reconstruction of the Union. If, however, by the triumph of the South the Union should be restored, he would equally rejoice, considering that one

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  of the greatest calamities that could befall, not only America, but the world, had been averted.
  MR. WHITESIDEsaid, that no country in Europe had more interest in a full discussion of the American question than Ireland, for the simple reason that thousands of her sons had been slaughtered in the contest now going on in America, and for a cause not their own. Owing to some want of energy on the part of Her Majesty's Administration, it was stated that at the present moment the subjects of the Queen were being daily enlisted to engage in that fratricidal war. He did not think that the hon. Member could have convinced any one, much less the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, that the people of Ireland did not want the subject discussed. He did not object to the withdrawal of the Motion; but he did not think there was any room for a sneer on the occasion, seeing that the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated many months ago—in October last year—as plainly as he could speak, that the South had shown all the qualities of a great nation. The Government of America complained of that statement as a breach of the laws of neutrality; but it could be no reflection on any Member to think that the South was a nation now, when the most eminent Member representing Her Majesty's Government, making capital for the Northern States, proclaimed the greatness of the South in October last, whatever might be the opinion of the Government now.
  MR. NEWDEGATEquite agreed with the noble Lord at the head of the Government in the constitutional answer he had given to the hon. Member for Sunderland respecting the mode of communication between Sovereign Powers; and he felt thankful to the noble Lord for warning the House against a repetition of the proceedings which had been adopted. Such proceedings were not only in derogation of the prerogatives of the Crown, but, as any one could easily foresee, might lead to the gravest complications between this and other States.
  Motion agreed to.
  Order read, and discharged.

FORTIFICATIONS (PROVISION FOR EXPENSES) [PAYMENT TO BANK OF ENGLAND].—COMMITTEE.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
MR. HENNESSYstated that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had told him, that in consequence of the debate on the American question taking place that night, he should not be able to grant him Thursday to bring on his Motion regarding Poland; but inasmuch as the American debate had gone off, he wished to ask the noble Lord, whether, as he would be able to get into Committtee on the Fortications Bill that night, there would be any objection, in the altered circumstances of the case, to accede to his proposal to devote Thursday to the Motion of which he had given notice?
MR. SPEAKERintimated that the question had better be asked before going into Committee, on the Fortifications Bill.
SIR FRANCIS GOLDSMIDsaid, that before they went into Committee he wished to call the attention of hon. Members to one point. Whatever might be the first cost of the fortifications, it would bear no proportion to the expense they would entail on the country. According to the Report of the Defence Committee, the new works, would not be manned so extensively by Volunteers as was the opinion of the Commission. It might, he thought, he contended that the proportion of regular troops required would not be less than one third of the whole number, and that would involve an annual charge of £1,300,000. If that sum were capitalized, the assumed expense of the works would be just about one-fourth of what they would really cost the country. With regard to the Dover fortifications, the schedule of the Bill of last year gave the estimate for the three different works separately, and the second clause of the Act declared that there should not be expended in the year any greater sum than the total estimated cost, He found, however, by the Bill of the present year, which gave the total expenditure up to March last, the items were given together, and one of the works, the fortifications on the western heights, had grown from £149,000 last year to £191,000 this year, while the second clause of the present Bill imposed much smaller restrictions upon the expenditure than the Bill of last year.
COLONEL DICKSONsaid, he wished to appeal upon one matter to the noble Viscount, in the absence of the Irish officials. He would not again dwell upon the absurd extravagance of the fortification scheme, but he would observe that a Report had recently been made to the Government by

675
an eminent engineer respecting public works in Ireland, the construction of which would be of great value to the country, and would afford a means of relieving some of the distress unhappily prevailing in that country. That Report had been laid before the House too late in the Session for Parliament to take any action upon it, but he hoped the winter would not be allowed to pass over without some steps being taken to carry out the suggestions contained in that Report, the total expenditure recommended by which did not exceed £280,000.
Motion agreed to.
Fortifications (Provision for Expenses) [Payment to Bank of England] considered in Committee.
Resolved,
That the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorized to direct the payment to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of the sum of £600, as an allowance for the expense of management of the contributions to be received by the said Governor and Company under any Act of the present Session for providing a further sum towards defraying the expenses of constructing Fortifications for the protection of the Royal Arsenals and Dockyards, and the Ports of Dover and Portland, and of creating a Central Arsenal.
House resumed.
Resolution to be reported To-morrow, at Twelve of the clock.

FORTIFICATIONS (PROVISION FOR EXPENSES) BILL— [BILL 213.]

  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

AFFAIRS OF POLAND.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. BENTINCKsaid, he rose to claim the attention of the noble Viscount to the request that had been addressed to him by the hon. and learned Member for the King's County (Mr. Hennessy). The noble Viscount had stated on a former evening that he could not give the hon. Member an earlier day than the following Monday for his Motion concerning Poland, as the important discussion upon the American question would occupy the attention of the House on that Monday. That discussion having gone off, he would ask the noble Lord whether he could not allow the Polish debate to come on on Thursday? At that period
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  of the Session every day saw a diminution in the attendance of hon. Members, and therefore a better attendance might be looked for on Thursday than on the following Monday. Having been, up to a recent period, impressed with a belief that further discussions upon the affairs of Poland were undesirable, he wished to state that recent events had altered that opinion. After the remarkable statement made by the noble Lord as to the ultimatum or the proposals sent to the Russian Government the position of affairs was quite changed, and he now believed that a discussion upon the subject was indispensable, and also that the sooner it took place the better. It appeared to him that they were much in the same position as in 1855, and that they were drifting into another war with Russia. Unless the House had some clear and satisfactory explanation from Her Majesty's Government as to the course intended to be taken upon that question, and also as to the position in which this country stood with France and the other great Powers in regard to the Polish question, it would be impossible for any man to tell what consequences might ensue. He believed, that some decided expression of opinion was required from that House to prevent a war, and he hoped the noble Viscount would facilitate that object by enabling the debate to be taken on Thursday. He should, as a matter of form, to put himself in order, move the adjournment of the House.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Mr. Bentinck.)
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, he had every desire to accommodate the hon. Member for the King's County, but it was most important to get on with that portion of the business which regulated to some extent the duration of the Session. The Government were anxious to go on with Supply on Thursday, and hoped to finish that business on that day, or at all events on Friday. Every one was aware that upon the terminating point depended the closing of the Session. He had stated, and he repeated, that Monday next should be placed at the disposal of the hon. Member, and he could hardly conceive that the difference between Monday and Thursday would have any material effect upon the attendance in that House.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEasked whether the Vote for the packet service would be taken on Thursday.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Yes; they are the only remaining Estimates.
  MR. HENNESSYsaid, he begged to remind the noble Lord, that if Supply was put down for Thursday, it would be in his power, or that of any hon. Member, to bring on a discussion of the Polish question upon the Motion for going into Committee of Supply. When the noble Lord on the former evening said that that evening would be occupied by a discussion upon the American question, it appeared to be understood that there would be but one night that week for the disposal of Government business. But the noble Earl the Secretary of State, on the same evening in another place, declared that in his judgment the time had come when a discussion upon the affairs of Poland should take place. If the Foreign Secretary invited discussion upon the subject in the House of Peers, it was not possible for that House to forego discussing it. He had yielded to the Government night after night, and had allowed the discussion to be delayed for the convenience of the Government, and he had therefore no other course to pursue than to place his notice respecting Poland upon the Motion for going into Committee of Supply, and he should bring it on upon that occasion.
  MR. HORSMANsaid, he wanted to understand if the giving-up of Thursday by the Government would really make any difference in the conclusion of the Session. He understood that two nights, Thursday and Friday, would finish Supply. And under those circumstances he should have thought that Friday and the following Monday would have been equally convenient? If so, then he thought the hon. Member for the King's County would be justified in pressing his Motion; but if the noble Lord would say that such a course must lengthen the Session, then upon that ground the arrangement should stand.
  MR. CARDWELLsaid, he believed there was but one Estimate left, but the hon. Member must he aware that the Government could not command Friday. Unless they went into Committee of Supply on Thursday, there would be the risk of its being thrown over until the following week.
  MR. HORSMANsaid, he thought the answer was satisfactory, but he would ask whether the noble Lord would give an assurance that the Government would take the same pains to keep a House on Monday as if it were needed for its own pur-
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  pose. [Viscount PALMERSTON assented.] Upon that understanding, he would recommend his hon. Friend not to press his Motion on Thursday.
  MR. PEACOCKEobserved, that as long as Supply was on the paper, independent Members having Motions to submit were masters of the Government. He wished to know whether the Government intended to place Supply on the paper for Thursday, and then the hon. Member for the King's County might state whether he would proceed with his Motion respecting Poland on that day.
  MR. HENNESSYsaid, after the appeal which had been made to him by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud, he was quite ready to fix the Motion, on the subject of Poland, for Monday.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clause 1 agreed to.
  Clause 2 (Appropriation of the Money so issued to the Expenses of constructing Fortifications, and providing a Central Arsenal).
  SIR FRANCIS GOLDSMIDsaid, he wished to inquire why the clause was different from the corresponding clause in the Bill of the previous year.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that the clause in the previous Act prevented the Government from entering upon arrangements for more than that portion of the work for which a certain sum was voted, and had been found very inconvenient. An alteration therefore had been made in the Bill before the Committee. Every one must know that to contract for one portion of a work one year, and another portion another year, must always be done upon disadvantageous terms; because, if the contractors were uncertain as to the amount of plant and labour that would be required, they would raise their estimates accordingly. He had explained the matter before to the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford and to the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham, and he thought he had satisfied them there was no good reason for including the restriction in the present Bill.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, there was undoubtedly great force in the observation that it was not desirable to make contracts piecemeal; but the Committee ought to be made acquainted with

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  the extent to which the contracts were likely to be made, or otherwise the House would probably find itself very seriously compromised.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clauses 3 to 17 agreed to.
  Clause 18 postponed:—Clause 19 agreed to.
  Clause 20 (Accounts to be laid before Parliament).
  SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFEsaid, he had to complain that the Returns before the House were not sufficiently explicit as to the works which had been undertaken by virtue of preceding Acts, and he thought the House ought to be informed what money had been expended upon them. It was stated that a considerable tract of land had been purchased at Redhill in the neighbourhood of Reigate for the purpose of erecting a fortress, which was to serve also as a military prison. He wished to know if that was the case; and, if so, from what district the money was to be taken. He also wished to know whether it was intended that under the powers of the Act before the Committee fortresses might be erected all over the country without information being given to Parliament on the subject? He understood, that although the land to which he referred had been acquired and the money paid, no Vote had been taken, and certainly no mention was made in the Returns of such a work.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, be would take care, when the next Returns were laid upon the table, that the fullest information should be given to the House as to the way the money was expended and as to the progress of the works. The land purchased near Reigate had not been bought by any money to be raised under the Bill before the Committee, but by money granted under a former Act. None of the money to be raised under the Bill now before the Committee would be expended otherwise than was specified in the schedule. In reply to the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham, he begged to say he did not think the House could possibly be pledged to any expense it was not aware of, because there was a distinct proviso in the Bill that no money should be expended upon any works not contained in the schedule, nor beyond the total estimated cost of the works.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, what he objected to was this:—The Committee were asked to vote £650,000 for certain works; but if the Government were
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  to enter into contracts to the amount of £1,300,000, in what position would the House be? He did not wish to cripple the Government, but contracts ought not to be entered into, the money to carry out which the House would have to vote on compulsion. He thought it a great error to introduce into the preamble or clauses of the Bill anything about a central arsenal, when it was not intended to apply any of the money that might be voted to such an arsenal. The House was bound to tell the truth as well as anybody else, and why should they pretend to provide for a central arsenal when they did no such thing?
  SIR FRANCIS GOLDSMIDsaid, he apprehended, that in consequence of the arsenal being mentioned in the schedule, any money not required for some of the works might be expended on the arsenal.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEsaid, he agreed that it was undesirable to make contracts piecemeal; therefore, he had not insisted on the clause which he proposed last year when it was pointed out that it would be inconvenient to the Government. But there was a great deal of piecemeal proceeding in the way in which the Government asked for the money required for the fortifications. The original scheme was this:—Instead of voting year by year half a million, or three quarters of a million, or a million, it was suggested that the Government should propose some different plan, and state how much it would cost to put the country into a good state of defence, and also that the whole amount should be raised by way of loan. Now, what had happened? A plan had been laid before the House, but instead of asking for power to borrow all the money necessary, the Government had asked for a portion, and had gone on year after year obtaining small sums. They were then asked to vote only such sums as in former years it was usual to vote in the Estimates under the head of fortifications. The House was going on voting money piecemeal, although the Government did not make their contracts piecemeal. There was no knowing how long the House might be asked to go on voting these small sums, and he must enter his protest against the system.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, that after the positive assurance of the noble Lord at the head of the Government that it was not intended to proceed with the central arsenal, he naturally imagined that the terms of the Bill would be adapted to that declaration;

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  and so perfect was his confidence in that declaration of the noble Lord, that he had never thought of looking at the clause. It must certainly have been an oversight on the part of the Government, after they had assured the House that a certain work should not he completed, to have placed such a provision in the Bill, and he trusted that at a future stage the mistake would be corrected, and all reference to that work would be struck out of the Bill. He had a distinct objection to the proposal respecting a central arsenal, which, according to the Reports of the Commissioners, was to be adapted for a fortress.
  SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, he thought that the hon. Member for North Warwickshire was the only person who conceived that the Commission recommended, or that the Government intended, the formation of a central fortress in this kingdom. It was suggested that there should be a central arsenal, and all he could say was, that if there was to be a fortress, his humble vote should be against such a proposition.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, that if the hon. and gallant Officer would look to the Reports, he would see that the country around Cannock Chase had been surveyed with the view of selecting a spot with a large open space such as was necessary to surround a fortress.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he believed that the reason why Cannock Chase had been selected for a central arsenal was that it would not require fortifications. It was not proposed to vote any money for Cannock Chase that year, and it was wasting the time of the House to discuss a matter which was not before it. With respect to contracts, his opinion was, that if the Government did not contract for works as a whole, they would be badly constructed; for if two or three parties were employed, nobody would be really responsible. The amount to be spent in each year was shown in the schedule, and the sum now asked for was an instalment for the works for the next twelve months.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNEsaid, the question of a central arsenal was left in considerable doubt, and the Committee had no means of knowing whether it was the intention of the Government to proceed with the formation of such arsenal or even to purchase the land for it. It was therefore only proper that some precise information should be given as to the intentions of the Government on the matter. Woolwich certainly was not adapted for the purpose
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  of a central arsenal. If one Member of that House had been worse treated than another in respect to the central arsenal, it was the hon. Member for North Warwickshire. The hon. Member had protested against the raising of a fortress, and he was quite right. When he (Mr. B. Osborne) contradicted the hon. Member the other night, he had not looked into the papers so accurately as he ought to have done; but on turning to the correspondence relative to the intended site of the central arsenal or depôt, he found that the hon. Gentleman was warranted in what he stated; and he hoped the hon. and gallant Officer the Member for Westminster, who, followed in his wake, and had likewise contradicted the hon. Gentleman, would make the same apology as he did then. What was the opinion of the President of the Commission relative to the site for an arsenal or central depôt? He said—
  "A new arsenal, involving, as it must, considerable outlay on fortifications, as well as the maintenance of a large garrison, should be so situated as to form a rallying point for the defence of the country in the event of London falling into the hands of an enemy."
  He hoped the hon. Member for Warwickshire would put himself at the head of an opposition to the central arsenal. It appeared that they were to have, not only a central arsenal, but also a central fortification, to which the Government, the Speaker, and the leading authorities might retire should London be taken. All along the House had taken too much for granted on the bare statement of the Ministry. Hon. Members had taken no pains to master the question, and, with one exception, they appeared to have passed over the appendix to the Report of the Commissioners. Some explanation ought to be given as to whether the central arsenal was to be proceeded with; and, if so, whether it was intended to act on the advice of the Commissioners? He referred particularly to a letter in the appendix to the Report from Sir Harry Jones, addressed to the Secretary of State for War. He hoped the House would press the noble Lord to give some answer to this question.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: When, in 1860, I proposed this arrangement to the House—that certain points should be defended, and that the expense should be borne by terminable annuities, instead of charging it to the annual Estimates—I stated, among other things, that we considered it necessary to have a central

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  arsenal. That opinion has been very much confirmed by military authorities, and among others by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster, by whom it has been represented that Woolwich in its present condition is a very unsafe place for our stores. The Commissioners reported that to fortify Woolwich would require such an extent of works and of garrison as would render the proposal altogether unadvisable. We are asked whether by a central arsenal we mean a central fortress? And I answer that question by asking, what is the name now given to Woolwich? It is now called Woolwich Arsenal; and the reason why we want another is that Woolwich is not a fortress, and cannot be made a fortress. That shows that the word arsenal does not mean a fortress. We have no intention of proposing to Parliament to erect a great central fortification for the shelter of the Government in the case of an invasion. We do think, however, that among the arrangements necessary for the purpose for which this Bill provides, it would be desirable to have, in some central position, an arsenal—a depôt for stores, where some of the things which are more easily made can be manufactured. Therefore, as it was a part of the original proposal made to Parliament, and sanctioned by its Vote, the project of a central arsenal still appears in the schedule to the Bill. The Committee will see no sum is proposed to be voted this year for that. We do not intend to take any step at present for the purchase of land. Before the land can be purchased, it will be necessary to come to the House again, and the House will have an opportunity of determining whether they will buy land for a central arsenal; and then, if they do, every step for its construction will require the sanction of the House from year to year. Therefore, there can he no well-grounded alarm that we are stealing a march on the House by taking authority to erect a fortress in the centre of the country without sanction of Parliament.
  With regard to contracts, it has already been explained that it is impossible, without great inconvenience to the public service and damage to the works, to make contracts piecemeal for particular portions of the works. What we have done in the present case is to propose to add to the £800,000 still unexpended of the sum voted last year, a Vote of £650,000, and that will give us money to meet all the demands that will come on the Government between
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  this time and the end of July next year, when we shall have to propose another Bill, and Parliament will see, by a Return, what has been expended and what remains to be expended on each particular work. I cannot imagine that Parliament will sanction the beginning with a certain work, and then stop short when it is half completed.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, that on the Report he should move as an Amendment to the Bill to strike out of it the sum proposed for, and indeed all mention of, a central arsenal, because he did not understand the sense of the House voting that there should be an arsenal, when they did not intend to provide the means for it. He was exceedingly glad that he had succeeded in calling the attention of the hon. Member for Liskeard to the terms in which the proposal for the arsenal stood in the Bill, because they were confirmed by the statement just made to the House by the noble Lord. He said that Woolwich was not adapted for fortification, and therefore it was proposed to remove the arsenal to Cannock Chase, which was adapted for fortification, and Sir Harry Jones, in the appendix to the Report on the Defences, said of Cannock Chase, that on that site a considerable expense must be incurred for fortification, and that a considerable expense for the garrisoning of the fortress would be required. It was plain to demonstration, therefore, that the intention was to construct a central fortress. He had before mentioned that he thought the construction of a fortress in the centre of England would excite distrust among the people. They had ceased to be jealous of standing armies; they had ceased in any way to oppose the construction of fortifications for the defence of our coasts; but if a central fortress were constructed, they would begin to think it was intended, not only for so remote a contingency as the capture of London and the sudden retreat of the authorities to a place of security, but they would suspect it was intended as a standing menace to the people. At all events, they would regard it as an expression of distrust of their power and will to defend the heart of England as the Confederates had defended the centre of their States. He was a strong advocate for the defence of the coasts, but he believed that in the time that must elapse between an enemy's landing and reaching the centre of England, there would be time enough to throw such earthworks

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  as would be necessary. He had not yet learned so far to distrust the courage of his countrymen as to suppose that a foreign force landing on our shores would be likely to march from end to end of England in so short a period that they could not throw up earthworks, anywhere towards the centre of England, in defence of their homes.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: The hon. Member has entirely misunderstood what I stated. He says my statement was, that whereas Woolwich could not be converted into a fortress, therefore we are taking a central point in order to make it a fortress. I said no such thing; nor did any of those who argued in favour of a central arsenal say that. What we stated was, that Woolwich, from its position, is exceedingly exposed; and that if a hostile force were to make its way up the Thames, Woolwich is at their mercy. Therefore, we wish to have a depôt somewhere, removed from that point of attack, and where, from its central position, it may be secure from that danger of a coup de main to which Woolwich is exposed. It is not at all necessary to make a fortress; there will be plenty of men and bayonets for its defence between the coast and the central arsenal.
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he had so often opposed the fortification of some portions of the coast that he was glad to say a word in favour of a central depôt. The use of the word arsenal appeared to have conveyed the idea of a central fortification, which was not contemplated by the Government. As it was impossible by external works to defend the dockyards and the arsenal at Woolwich from a raid made by an enemy, it was doubly necessary to remove the depôt to a place at some reasonable distance from the coast, where the stores for the defence of the country would be safe from aggression of that kind. Therefore, whether at Weedon or Cannock Chase, he thought it desirable that there should be a central depôt for stores not immediately in use.
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, that the Report of the Commissioners had been quoted against themselves in a manner not warranted by the text. Any one would suppose, from the statements of the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Osborne), and the deductions of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), that the Commissioners had recommended the formation of a central arsenal involving considerable fortifications; but the reverse was the fact. Sir Harry Jones's letter was
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  in answer to an inquiry from the War Secretary as to the eligibility of Weedon for the site of an arsenal. That was negatived. The Commissioners were then instructed to select a site for a central arsenal that should fulfil several conditions, one of which was that it should be capable of cheap and ready defence, and the Commissioners chose Cannock Chase, because it was capable of permanent or temporary defence at a small expense. There was not a word in the recommendation of Cannock Chase indicative of its being a place that would require a large expenditure; and it was evident that it was not intended to fortify it at all, except so far as might be necessary for the protection of the valuable articles to be stored there.
  SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, the hon. Member for North Warwickshire had been misled by the letter referred to, as in the actual Report there was not one word recommending that the central arsenal should be fortified. He hoped the noble Lord would not abandon his intention to provide a central depôt.
  VISCOUNT GALWAYsaid, he wished to know if any arrangement had been made with the proprietors of the land at Cannock Chase, what number of acres the £150,000 which had been already voted was intended to purchase, and whether a further sum was to be asked for. The land would rise in value when it became known that Government wished to purchase it.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNEsaid, that the Commissioners recommended Cannock Chase as the best site for the proposed arsenal, because it was in an open moor-land district and contained about 3,000 acres of land, and offered great capabilities of defence. There could be no doubt that they meant defensive works to be built there, and that that would involve an enormous outlay.
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, there was all the difference in the world between a recommendation to fortify the central arsenal and the fact that its site was capable of being defended. The Commissioners selected Cannock Chase as a place which, in case of necessity, could be easily and cheaply put in a state of defence.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: If my memory does not deceive me, the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Bernal Osborne), when this question was under discussion the other evening, expressed a decided

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  opinion in favour of a central arsenal. Why he has changed his mind I know not. He Bays a central arsenal means a central fortress. I stated a few minutes ago that it did not, and I proved it did not by showing that Woolwich is an arsenal, and could not be made a fortress, and that the central arsenal, while in a stronger and less exposed position will be no more a fortress than Woolwich is. In reply to the noble Viscount (Viscount Galway) I have to state that no arrangement has yet been made for the purchase of the land. Until we come to make a bargain for it, we cannot tell what sum will be required for the purchase.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he understood that there was no intention to have a fortification at Cannock Chase. The place must be enclosed by a wall, and engineers would know how to make it defensible by the form and line which they gave to that wall.
  CAPTAIN JERVISsaid, he could not comprehend how it was that a central arsenal had not been selected and provided before then, because at Woolwich there were millions' worth of property that could be easily destroyed by a hundred men in half an hour. The hon. Member for Liskeard would have been one of the first to have found fault with the Commissioners if they had recommended a site for a central arsenal that could not be easily defended. Canals and railways could not be called defensive works. Before voting money for works at Spithead they ought to know something about a depôt in lieu of Woolwich, and he hoped the House would insist upon something being done to provide a central arsenal.
  Clause agreed to.
  Remaining Clauses agreed to.
  Schedule.
  MR. C. BERKELEYsaid, he wished to call attention to the schedule of the Bill of the last Session, in which the sum of £50,000 was stated to be the estimated expenditure for incidental expenses, and which sum had been voted, and to ask the Under Secretary of State for War why it was stated in the schedule of the present Bill that £120,000 had already been voted for these incidental expenses. When he made a few remarks on the same subject last year, he received in reply nothing but a volley of personal abuse from the noble Lord at the head of the Government. It appeared, however,
  688
  by a Return made on the 27th June last year, the estimated cost of the whole works was put down at £5,680,000, including the expenses of the extra staff for designing and executing the works. Last year there was an evident error in the accounts which he felt convinced was owing to a sum of £70,000, described as a balance available for the works, being applied to incidental expenditure. In consequence, the unusual expedient of "cooking the accounts" had been resorted to, and he called on the Government for an explanation.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that the schedule of last year in the 4th column, purporting to give the estimated cost of works and land, showed on the face of it that the whole expenditure was not there included, because the item of incidental expenses was only taken up to the 31st of July 1862. There was at the same time a sum of £70,000, out of the £670,000 voted, not required for the purchase of land, and therefore available for incidental expenses. That sum, added to the item of £50,000, made up £120,000 for incidental expenses—an amount which he did not think was excessive in proportion to the entire outlay, but which he believed would yet be amply sufficient. The hon. Member had the acuteness to discover a mistake in the schedule of last year, but it should be remembered that it was the first time that the items of expenditure had been scheduled. In the present year there was, he thought, no ground for complaint of any want of clearness or definite information in the schedule.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, the Government had £800,000 in hand, and the sum they were now called upon to vote was £650,000. That made the total amount which the Government could expend in the year, £1,450,000. He wished to know whether they conceived that they had power to make any contracts beyoud that amount.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONreplied, that no doubt the Government would be able to enter into contracts for sums not exceeding the total estimated cost of the works, the general scheme of which the House had sanctioned. At present, they asked only for the money intended to be expended in the year.
  MR. C. BERKELEYsaid, that as to the £70,000 the explanation of the Government was so far satisfactory. But he would call the attention of the Committee

  689
  to the fact, that, according to the Act of last year, it was not lawful for the Government to expend money otherwise than mentioned in the schedule, and they ought not to have applied money voted for works to incidental expenses.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he wished to remind the hon. Member that the money was voted for "land purchased" and "incidental expenses."
  CAPTAIN JERVISthought, that if the the explanation of the noble Marquess as to the making of new contracts was correct, it was idle for the Committee to discuss these questions, for it had no effective control over the Government.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Of course, if the House does not vote the money, we cannot spend it; but I suppose that when the House has voted money for the foundations, they do not intend to forbid the Government from building upon them; I therefore say that the Government must be justified in entering into contracts for the whole works. Of course, if the House will not vote the money, the contractors cannot be paid.
  COLONEL DICKSONsaid, the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for War, and the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, had reiterated the argument, that if they begun the work, they must complete it. That really amounted to saying, that on finding out in the progress of the works that they had committed an error, they must nevertheless go on with it. In short, every word which had fallen from the Treasury Bench had rendered the subject more difficult, and made it imperative to look into the Estimates with more particularity. He wished to ask why they should bind themselves to the item of £150,000 for a central arsenal at Cannock Chase? An enormous price was proposed to be given for what was said to be waste land at Cannock Chase. This would be a perfect waste of public money. Instead of one large central arsenal at Cannock Chase, he would have two or three central arsenals.
  SIR MORTON PETOsaid, he rose to move the omission from the schedule of the following items, relative to the works at Spithead—namely, Horse Sand Fort, £25,000; No Man's Land, £25,000; and Stourbridge, £25,000. He was aware that he made the proposal under a great disadvantage. It must be remembered, however, that the Government had invited discussion. If he had depended upon his
  690
  own knowledge, he should have despaired of carrying the Committee with him. The Government, however, had published the Report of the Commission, and given the whole of the evidence upon which that Report was founded, and he relied upon these documents, as showing two things:—First, that the Commission practically condemned the works for which the Votes in question were asked; and second, that the evidence upon which the Report was founded did the same thing. He hoped also to show that nothing had occurred to alter the position of the question since the House had decided, on the Motion of the hon. Member for Liskeard last year, which he had the honour to second, to delay the construction of the works until the value of iron-clad vessels for purposes of defence had been more fully considered. The noble Lord the other evening had, indeed, stated, that they had guns which would penetrate the Warrior target at a distance of 800 yards, and that, no doubt, that distance would soon be increased to 1,000; but unless they had guns that would penetrate at a distance of 1,000 yards, these forts would be practically useless; because, while guns would only penetrate at 800 yards from forts on either side, a channel of 400 yards would be left in the centre through which a vessel could pass in safety. The noble Lord had also referred to the experience derived from America, during the last year. He was prepared to submit that there had been nothing which had, in the slightest degree, affected this question. Iron-clads had passed the forts on the Mississippi comparatively unhurt; and, with regard to Charleston, the harbour was so shallow that the Confederate forces were enabled to drive rows of piles, which not only prevented further progress, but kept the iron-clads for thirty minutes under the fire of the fixed forts. At Spithead, however, it was utterly impossible to form any such obstruction. He wished to call the attention of the Committee to one point on which the whole question turned. It was almost impossible to hit a vessel running fourteen knots an hour from a fixed fort. Why, even at twelve knots an hour the vessel ran nearly 400 yards a minute. And that presented an almost insuperable difficulty in the way of fixed forts, so far as the protection of harbours was concerned. He begged to call attention to the evidence of Captain Sullivan, Admiral Dundas, and Captain Hewlett, who did not think that forts would prevent the passsage of iron-clad

  691
  vessels. Captain Sherard Osborne's opinion was equally strong and even stronger. He stated, that with wooden gunboats running eight knots an hour he would undertake to pass between the forts, and not one shot in two hundred would have the slightest chance of taking effect. The Commissioners themselves stated their conviction that no practical amount of fire from batteries could be depended upon to stop the passage of steamships if the channel were clear. The case remained, therefore, just where it was last year, and the Government were bound again to suspend these works until some fresh evidence or some new light could be thrown on the subject. He entirely admitted the importance of sea defences; he would be the last in the slightest degree to weaken them; but he did not think the forts, if constructed, would practically add to the permanent defences of the country. No additional defence would be incurred by the delay of another year with regard to them, and in the mean time they might proceed with those works which were not objected to. The hon. Baronet concluded by moving the omission from the schedule of Horse Sand, No Man's Land, and Stourbridge Forts.
  Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "Spithead.—Horse Sand Port, £25,000."—(Sir Morton Peto.)
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, he was afraid that the prejudices of the hon. Baronet who had just addressed the Committee against the construction of marine defences were so deeply rooted that nothing could ever remove them, if nothing which had occurred within the last twelve months had been able to remove them. The very witnesses whom the hon. Baronet had cited to establish his case gave as their chief reason for objecting to such defences as were proposed at Spithead the great uncertainty that existed at that time as to any improvement that might be made in guns, and they said it would be folly that large sums of money should be expended upon forts, until it was ascertained whether those forts could be armed with guns that would be effective against armour-plated ships. The hon. Baronet was indifferent as to any improvement, but he thought he could show that the objections which the hon. Member had made were unfounded, and that the authorities upon which he relied were really against him. The hon. Baronet had referred to an isolated case, in which iron-cased vessels had passed the
  692
  forts on the Mississippi with impunity. But it was well known that in the case referred to the exploit was only performed with extreme difficulty and after many failures. The vessels which did pass the batteries on the Mississippi only succeeded in slipping by them in the darkness of night, and at a place where no obstructions could be placed such as formed a necessary part of those defences. But the great bulk of arguments founded upon the experience of America were against the position which the hon. Baronet endeavoured to maintain, who had again asserted what had been repeatedly denied, that the Federal ships were prevented from entering the harbour of Charleston by fixed obstructions. The noble Lord the Under Secretary for War had told them that he did not believe there were any such obstructions, and it was certain that the Federal ships never got as far as the place where the obstructions were supposed to be laid down. The hon. Baronet said no obstructions could be placed at Spithead, and quoted the Defence Commissioners to that effect. That was an instance of the garbling of quotations, and of reading evidence the wrong way which had been indulged in upon this subject. In the audacious pamphlet published by the hon. Baronet last year he quoted a passage from the Report of the Royal Commisioners, to the effect that the utility of a boom across so broad a channel was doubtful. But the opinion of the Commissioners was given only with reference to the proposition of one witness, and applied only to the case of a boom unsupported by forts at either end. But at Spithead it was proposed to build there new forts which would prevent a boom from being burned by a hostile fleet. The hon. Baronet quoted the hon. Member for Wakefield (Sir J. Hay) whenever it suited his purpose; but they did not agree in their views. The hon. Baronet the Member for Finsbury despised wooden ships, and thought nothing would do but iron ships, while the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield recommended that the fifty or sixty wooden line-of-battle ships now lying in our harbours should be coated with iron plates, and thus be converted into blockships. The hon. Baronet said that forts would do nothing for the permanent defence of the country, but none of the witnesses agreed with him, although some of them thought that an increased number of ships would be better. When it was jointed out that an increased number of ships would be more costly than forts, they

  693
  said that they did not consider the question of expense; but the House must consider expense; and believing that the Spithead forts would afford an effective means of defence at the least cost, he proposed that those means should be adopted. He did not wish to say anything harsh of the hon. Baronet's pamphlet, although in it very strong language was applied to other parties; but the contents were so extraordinary, that he could not believe the hon. Baronet had written it himself. He rather thought that the hon. Gentleman kept a poet who had undertaken to garble the evidence which he professed to quote. There was an extraordinary mis-statement of one portion of the Commissioners' Report. Sir William Armstrong was represented as saying, preference to the difficulty of hitting moving objects, that vessels would offer so small a mark at a distance that even the increased accuracy of our most improved rifled ordnance would offer little risk to vessels in motion. But Sir William Armstrong said "such vessels," referring to small vessels armed with a single gun each. The great point in regard to these forts was that heavy ships must keep in a certain channel, and therefore must pass within a certain distance from batteries which, by their converging fire, might sink them. But in the Report of 1860 it was assumed that the forts would bean assistance to the ships in case a fleet inferior to that of the enemy were lying in Spithead roads. The evidence of the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield had been quoted by the hon. Baronet to the effect that the forts would not be a very cheap defence, and he recommended a boom; but that would not do for the hon. Member, who was all for iron ships. The hon. Baronet quoted Captain Sullivan as having said that he always considered the outer forts as secondary to the inner line; but he omitted to say that Captain Sullivan added that with a new range of guns the forts would be so open to attack by a flotilla that we should have to depend upon our naval forces to keep it off, and therefore he looked upon the forts as likely to afford great assistance to any naval force defending the entrance. The hon. Baronet also quoted Captain Hewlett as having said that no forts could prevent iron-built ships entering and taking possession of the dockyards; but he omitted an answer in which he stated that forts would be a valuable assistance to ships taking refuge, to an inferior fleet, or in case of sorties. The hon. Baronet also
  694
  quoted the hon. and gallant Member for Chatham. But that hon. and gallant Gentleman had stated, that for twenty years he had been considering the question of defence, and he never doubted that forts should be constructed for the defence of Spithead and Portsmouth harbour. It was only since the battle between the Merrimac and the Monitor that the hon. and gallant Gentleman changed his opinion, and said that the defence of Portsmouth might in a great measure be left to such vessels and to shore batteries, which might be heavily armed. But when the hon. and gallant Gentleman was asked whether his preference for Chatham had influenced his mind in wishing to see the Spithead works stopped, he candidly admitted that it had. It had been pointed out by the Commissioners that the great advantage of having such a harbour as Portsmouth defended would he, that if our fleet at sea were greatly damaged, it might take refuge there, and refit in perfect safety. The hon. Baronet the Member for Wakefield being asked whether the forts would be useless, said he did not think so at all, but he would like to see enough of them built closely together. If they studded the anchorage at Spithead with forts a thousand yards apart, so that an attacking ship would be only five hundred yards from a fort, the hon. and gallant Gentleman said it would be a good defence. But at that time they did not believe they could pierce the Warrior target at two hundred yards' distance, whereas now it had been burst at the distance of eight hundred yards, and its back set on fire by the Whitworth gun. Sir William Armstrong stated that he was perfectly convinced that he should make his largo gun equally effective at 1,300 yards, and that the same gun rifled would accomplish the same results at 3,000 yards. He consequently maintained that those conditions which the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield and other officers required had now been attained, to such an extent that not only a much greater force of artillery might be expected, but that even with the present force the forts would prove most powerful. He had stated, on a former occasion, that it would be absurd for this country to stand alone in a disregard of what was being effected by all other nations in respect to fortifications; and he wished to direct the attention of the Committee to a valuable report which was sub-

  695
  mitted last year to the American House of Representatives, and which showed how efficiently forts and floating defences supported each other. This country desired to keep peace with all mankind, but it had to protect the most valuable commerce in the world, offering the greatest possible temptation to an enemy; and it would be a fatal thing if by any mischance the British navy should meet with a check, and nothing then should be left between an invader and the peaceful homes of the people of this country.
  THE LORD MAYOR (Mr. Alderman ROSE)said, that as representing the views of his constituents, he wished to observe that if the question before the Committee had been a question of the original selection of Portsmouth as the great naval arsenal and shipbuilding emporium, it might have been open to debate; but when that naval yard had long existed, and had grown to its present dimensions, and when the House had voted large sums of money to correct the natural disadvantages of its situation as regards inland defence; it would be unwise and suicidal to leave that great establishment open to approach from the side of the sea. So long as power of artillery against armour plates was in dispute the policy of erecting forts might also be doubtful; but that question having, in the interval of time which Parliament had taken to consider, been decided in favour of gunnery, there could be no doubt as to the importance of the forts. It had been shown that they had got a gun now that could smash through the Warrior target at 800 yards, and it did not require a professional man to discover that hostile ships approaching Portsmouth would be stopped at the very point where these guns would tell with effect. The only condition to make them absolutely effective was a firm flooring to give certainty to the aim, and that object was to be obtained only by a fixed battery, for the smallest ground swell made the aim from a floating battery uncertain. As to the matter of speed, the whole thing had been demonstrated in America. The American fleet had had to force rivers with all sorts of impediments thrown in their way, and it was notorious that the screw of a line-of-battle ship was the most vulnerable thing in the world. Similar obstructions could be provided at Spithead to bring an attacking vessel up at point-blank range. The only objection raised to these forts, and it was a serious one, was, that a foundation
  696
  had to be got; but if the hon. Baronet (Sir M. Peto) had the contract for the work there was no doubt he would find a firm foundation. The only question was one of expense, but after all the money that had been spent at Portsmouth he deprecated any abandonment of those works which were necessary for its defence merely because certain persons were enthusiastic in favour of iron-plated ships. He believed that the proposed forts would be placed in such a position as to protect the Solent and the entrance to Southampton as well as Portsmouth, and he should therefore support the plan recommended by Government.
  CAPTAIN JERVISsaid, that they were dealing with a sum of £750,000, and the real question was whether £27,000 spent in foundations should be relinquished and the works not proceeded with. Last year the House was unanimous upon the point, and he denied that since that time there had been any fresh information which should lead them to change their opinion. Much stress was laid upon the power of the Armstrong gun in 1859, but since then great improvements had been effected in the construction of iron-plated ships. Almost all authoritative witnesses, whether military men or civilians, concurred with remarkable unanimity in the opinion that you must come to close quarters with the enemy in order to give full effect to your artillery. With all their endeavours they had as yet not got a gun which could pierce an iron-plated ship at 1,000 yards, while hostile vessels could keep out of the range of the proposed forts, and yet attack their shores. It was absurd to waste money on immovable masses of masonry, when they might have ships which could follow the enemy. There was no comparison whatever between Charleston and Portsmouth; and he had not observed a single feature in the operations of the American war which furnished an argument in favour of forts. He trusted the Committee would not agree, in a spirit of false economy, to throw away more money on these works, merely because so much had been sunk in them already.
  MR. LINDSAYsaid, he altogether objected to the assumption upon which the debate seemed to proceed, that they had no ships capable of meeting invaders at sea, and had consequently lost their naval supremacy. As to the re-

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  spective powers of ships and forts, he knew that foreign commanders declared that they would have no hesitation in running the gauntlet of forts, each 1,000 yards apart, with an iron-clad ship. A young naval officer who took part on the Confederate side in the operations at Charleston, told him that if the Federals had only had ships as good as ours, and had known how to handle them properly, they could not have been kept out of the inner harbour. As it was, the Federals suffered more from the temporary obstructions thrown in their way, than from the permanent works. He held the fortifications now under consideration to be quite unadvisable as an unnecessary expenditure of the public money.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, that they ought first to see what was required to be done, and then what they could afford to do. The question before the Committee was not one of mere science, for although science might prescribe a sufficient number of iron-plated ships to protect every port in the country, England would not bear the expense of maintaining a sufficient number of ships in commission to guard the whole coast constantly in that way. There could be no doubt, that if any attempts were made against this country in the way of invasion, descents or feints would be made on various parts of the coast at the same time. What they had to do was to provide for the protection of the whole coast, and that they could not do without forts, because these forts would diminish the number of ships necessary for the defence of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the other centres of our naval strength, and every ship thus spared from the defence of Portsmouth or Plymouth would be available for the defence of other places. They might depend upon it that they could not give the required protection to the country more cheaply than by the construction of the maritime defences recommended by the Committee on the National Defences. It was idle to say that the power of artillery was not to be measured against the power of resistance possessed by forts. All the circumstances of the case must he taken into consideration in deciding upon a question of that nature. If they could, by the construction of forts, and by liberating a large number of iron-clad vessels, satisfy the people that they were providing for the defence of the coasts and outports, their feelings would be enlisted in favour of
  698
  the plan. The House might vote any practical sum for the construction of ironclad vessels; but the maintenance of ships with their crews, was a far greater and more constant expense than that of forts; the temper of the people might change, and then the value of having provided permanent defences would be manifest. The people would then see that Parliament had done what it could do for the defence of our shores, on the most economical terms, and would be content, if our harbours required additional defence, that more ships must be provided for the purpose.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that although he did not think a great many arguments had been used which required answering, he rose for the purpose of continuing the debate, because by-and-by 'when the dinner-hour had passed, they would probably have a lively and amusing speech from the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Bernal Osborne), who was not over-fond of addressing himself to rows of empty benches. It had been said by the hon. Baronet the Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto) that nothing had happened since last year which should induce the House to change its opinions on the subject of forts. Now, although he did not rest very much upon the events which had taken place in America, yet he thought that what had occurred at Charleston told quite as much in favour of the views entertained by the Government as the occurrence in Hampton Roads last year between the Merrimac and the Monitor told against them. Charleston was in one or two things analogous to Spithead. The forts were the same distance apart. It was true the iron-clad vessels were not of the same quality as they would probably have to encounter, but he maintained that the artillery mounted on the Charleston forts was not of the same quality as that which would be mounted upon the proposed ports. He might also observe that it was perfectly competent to place obstructions at the entrances of English harbours considerably stronger than those put down at Charleston, and it was an entire misrepresentation of the recommendations of the Commissioners to say they proposed to neglect putting obstructions at the entrance of Portsmouth Harbour. The Committee ought to remember, moreover, that when the question was before the House last year, the Warrior target had not been penetrated at any distance greater than 200 yards. Such was no longer the case. Interesting experi-

  699
  ments had been made at Shoeburyness, and the following was an account of them from the Report of the Iron-plate Committee, of which the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield (Sir J. Hay) was Chairman:—
  "The most conclusive experiment as yet made was on the 13th of November 1862, when the Whitworth 120-pounder rifled gun, at a range of 800 yards, sent two shells, each weighing 150 lb., and containing a bursting charge of 5 lb. of powder, completely through a box target of the Warrior section, bursting in the backing, and making a hole 7½ inches in diameter in the armour plate, and 10 inches in diameter in the inner skin, and throwing many fragments of iron inside, amounting after the first shell to eighteen bolt-heads, eight rivets, and eleven pieces of plate and angle iron; and after the second shell, to twelve bolt-heads, seven rivets, and five pieces of plate and skin. The first shell broke into twenty-three pieces, the second into nineteen. A shell weighing 130 lbs., with a bursting charge of 3 lb. 8 oz., penetrated the armour plate, and seemed to burst just as it broke the skin, making a large irregular hole 14 inches in diameter on the inside, and the whole of the fragments, nineteen in number, passed through to the inside; twelve bolt-heads, seven rivets, and a great many pieces of plate and skin were found inside in fragments. A solid shot weighing 130 lbs. completely penetrated the target, making a clean hole 8 inches in diameter in the armour plate."
  It had been said by the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Bernal Osborne) that the gun burst afterwards. Not only that gun, but a great many other guns burst, but that fact only proved that those particular guns were not perfect. The experiment showed what a gun could do, and he might say that to prevent a gun from bursting the only thing was to put a little more metal in it. He understood that the Armstrong gun had not been tried at the same range; but no doubt, if it had, the effect would have been still more striking. The following on that point was a deduction from the Report of the Iron-plate Committee:—
  "There is no doubt that a much greater effect would be produced with the Armstrong 300-pounder at the same range, and with a missile of the same description of metal. The velocity with which the Whitworth 120-pounder shell, fired with a charge of 27 lbs. of powder, struck the target, was 1,180 feet per second. The initial velocity of the Armstrong 300-pounder is about 1,300 feet per second, and allowing for a diminution of 100 feet in its flight through 800 yards, it would at that range have about the same velocity as the Whitworth 120-pounder, with two and a half times the weight of missile. There is, therefore, now no doubt whatever that at 1,000 yards, which is the greatest distance at which a ship can pass between the two outer Spithead forts, her sides could be pierced by projectiles from 300-pounder guns."
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he wished to ask by whom the deduction had been drawn?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he did not know, nor was it of any importance, seeing that the facts were indisputable. He had no doubt that the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield would admit that the deduction was a perfectly correct one. Hon. and gallant Gentlemen had accused the Government of being as one-sided and narrow-minded as he would venture to say they were themselves upon the subject. It was, of course, very natural that naval officers should be of opinion that for attack or defence there was nothing like ships. Every officer was inclined to exaggerate the importance of his own particular branch. Neither the Commissioners nor the Government had ever recommended, that floating defences for their harbours and dockyards should be neglected. On the contrary, in their first Report the Commissioners asked leave to appoint, and they afterwards did appoint, a sub-Committee of naval officers to consider what was the best form in which such floating defences should be provided. The Government were not narrow-minded advocates of forts alone. All they recommended was, that a system of Forts should be combined with floating defences. If hon. Gentlemen would look over the evidence taken, they would find that with the single exception, he believed, of Captain Coles, there was not a witness who did not at least acknowledge that forts would be a valuable auxiliary. He said, then, that the opponents of forts were somewhat narrow-minded, because they saw no advantage whatever in anything but their favourite floating defences, and ignored the value of fixed forts when properly used. It might be said that they ought to trust to the navy alone, and that if the navy were made sufficiently strong, they would not want either fixed defences for their harbours or fortifications by land, or even Volunteers or militia force, and might reduce the army to the lowest possible amount. But if they were to trust to the navy alone, they must make it superior not only to the navy of any one other Power, but superior to the naval strength of any combination of Powers which might be brought against them. They must have a navy able to go to the strongholds of the enemy and destroy his fleets there—which would not be found so easy a thing to do, because other nations, wiser than they had

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  been, would have defended their arsenals, dockyards, and roadsteads by fortifications—or they must keep at sea a force equal to encounter any force which might meet it, and also maintain for the protection of their arsenals and dockyards a force equal to any force which might slip past their fleet and come in to attack them. Some hon. Members would, perhaps, be prepared to vote the increased Estimates that would be necessary to support a navy of that kind; but he did not think that the hon. Member for Rochdale, who was so angry at the scheme for fortifications, or any of his friends, would be inclined to do so. But, supposing such a large extension of the navy to take place, how would it he regarded by other States? However strictly defensive they might themselves deem it, it was to be feared that other Powers might view the naval preponderance it would give them as something in the nature of a menace. They might look upon it as some evidence of an intention to commit aggression, and therefore proceed to bring up their own navies to the same standard as that of England. If, then, the House were not ready enormously to increase the naval force, the most prudent and economical course was to adopt the system recommended by the opinions of the best professional advisers the Government had been able to obtain—namely, not to trust for the defence of the dockyards and roadsteads, which all acknowledged to be vital points, exclusively to the ships which they might at any moment be able to get together to resist an attack, nor either to trust to fortifications exclusively. The Government proposed to rely first and mainly on the navy, which must be their foremost line of defence; next they proposed to trust the defence of the arsenals also to the small and less expensive class of iron-clad floating batteries; but they likewise proposed to assist and strengthen these other means of defence by the erection of fixed batteries. His noble Friend did not wish to do anything to impair the efficiency of the navy. Let that arm of the service be kept up at as high a standard as they pleased. Yet that ought to be done out of the revenue of the year. No ships, of whatever materials constructed, could last for ever, or anything like it. Besides the first heavy cost of building them, they would have to meet a considerable annual expense for their repair. On the other hand, forts once erected, would permanently endure, and the outlay upon
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  them might, therefore, to a certain extent, be fairly thrown upon posterity. But to increase the navy in such a way would be to act upon a principle which they had never yet adopted, and which, he thought, the Committee would not be inclined to adopt then.
  SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, that while be would admit that he was practically unacquainted with the details of the construction of forts for sea defence, he could not help arriving at the conclusion, from all the accounts he had seen, that the great garrison of Portsmouth was peculiarly exposed, and that there was practically no means of defence in the event of any sudden war taking place. Under those circumstances, be thought the Government were perfectly right, relying on the counsel of scientific advisers, in providing some means of defence for that most important post, even at the risk of incurring some necessary expense.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, he was quite as anxious as his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir De Lacy Evans) to see Portsmouth perfectly secure. At the same time, he wished that hon. Members could seethe works which already existed for the defence of the Solent. If they had seen them, they would not come to the conclusion that there was any want of protection in that quarter, inasmuch as there was a line of fortifications extending for several miles along the shore. There were several most powerful forts, such as Fort Monk ton, Black Horse, Eastney, Lump's, Fort Cumberland, Southsea Castle, &c., and he should be glad to know from any hon. Member what more was wanted for the defence of the Solent than was already provided; and if the works were so strong and so powerfully armed that vessels could not remain there within fair bombarding distance of the dockyard, was it, he would ask, likely that they would come there for the mere purpose of a bombardment? So far as the ranges at which targets had been hitherto pierced was concerned, it should be remembered that at Shoeburyness the targets were at right angles to the shot; but in the case of ships it would strike on a curved line, in which case it would generally fly off, and not penetrate. They had been for the last four years trying experiments, but they had not yet tried them at 1,000 yards, nor had they ascertained what the result would be of shot falling on a curved surface. Much had been said, as if it were supposed that an

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  enemy's ships would come in by daylight to attack Portsmouth; but would they not, he would ask, come in by dark, and if they did come in by dark, would they be likely to be seriously damaged by the fire of the proposed forts? It was proposed to have 360 guns in the Spithead forts, but it should be borne in mind that a great many of them would not bear at the same time on the same point. Then again, let the Committee consider the number of experienced artillerymen which would be required. They could not make good artillerymen in a hurry. It was a process which required time, and to strike vessels passing with any velocity would require most expert artillerymen. It was stated on the authority of Colonel Bingham, the Adjutant General of the Artillery, that they would require ten men to work each gun; and that being so, it was quite clear that there would be great difficulty in manning the forts with first-rate gunners. They were told that Charleston was to be a lesson to them, and that the battle there proved that ships could not force a passage. How was it to be a lesson to them? They were told, forsooth, that the guns at Fort Sumter were of a light character, and that they even had done good service. But they were 10-inch Columbiads and 8-inch Dahlgrens. The 8-inch Dahlgrens, they were told, would throw 68 lbs., and of course the 10-inch would throw shot of heavier weight. In the case of an attack on Portsmouth they would have ships heavily cased with armour, and they would have in the forts perhaps the largest Armstrongs and Whitworths which could be contrived; but it should not be forgotten that beyond a certain distance those guns would not act very injuriously on a vessel. They would wound her, no doubt, if she came in by daylight, but there were instances innumerable of wooden ships being repeatedly struck by an enemy's shot and still fighting on. For his own part, he ventured to say that the forts, however useful—and he did not mean to contend that they were of no use—would not be of a use commensurate with their cost. The noble Viscount had talked the other evening of libelling the Volunteers. So far from wishing to libel that force, he thought its establishment would prevent invasion, and supersede the necessity of constructing the expensive works of fortification now proposed by the Government. When the panic first seized the Government, the navy was in a most unsatisfactory state: they were about to reconstruct it. There
  704
  was no Militia. There were no Volunteers. Now they had a Volunteer force of 150,000; and those who had seen them under review must admit that they had made great progress, and were very efficient. What was of greater importance, the artillery was in an excellent condition. When Lord Hardinge was at the Ordnance as Master Genera), he reported to the Government that they had no field artillery. They had, in fact, only a very small number of guns fit for the field. Now, their artillery was most efficient. The few field guns they had then were inadequately horsed; now they were well horsed. Nothing in the world could surpass their artillery. They could, without the slightest difficulty, send 120 or 130 guns down to the sea coast in a few hours, and where was the enemy that could bring such an artillery force and land it for immediate action? Then, as to cavalry, the noble Lord knew what force they had in the country. Invasion he therefore held to be utterly out of the question. Bombardment was another thing. The bombardment of Portsmouth dockyard would not involve its destruction, but only that of storehouses in a limited degree. An enemy could not come into the Solent and remain there long. The Channel fleet might be dispersed for a time it is true, but they would speedily concentrate, and would run into the Solent and catch the enemy there. The enemy would also be exposed to the heavy guns along shore. The coast defences were armed with guns of the best description and the heaviest calibre. They had 13-inch mortars which ranged 5,000 to 6,000 yards, and no ships could long remain under their fire with impunity, and the harbour gunboats would assail them in force, and drive them from their anchorage. But the noble Marquess said those who supported the Amendment were narrow-minded; well, but the noble Marquess had himself voted for a similar proposition, he must therefore have met with advocates who had persuaded him to change his opinion. He hoped they would have another year to consider the matter. It did not press. There were other points, enough on which to expend the money the House was prepared to Vote. With regard to Woolwich, the noble Lord could not recently have read the Report of the Commission. There schemes were recommended which would cost £3,000,000, or £1,500,000, and £500,000 respectively. The latter sum was reported to be sufficient to construct a work on Shooter's

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  Hill, which would entirely prevent any hostile force getting into Woolwich, and would also act on the flank of an enemy marching upon London. He hoped it was not contemplated to remove the factories at Woolwich, which it would cost £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 to establish elsewhere. He trusted the plan of the Government was merely that stores as completed at Woolwich should be removed to Cannock Chase, or somewhere else inland, where they should be safe from a coup de main. The approach to Woolwich might be made perfectly secure. Batteries well placed in the narrow parts of the river Thames could stop ships, though they could not when the interval between the batteries on opposite shores exceeded 1,500 yards. He hoped some of the money in the schedule, instead of being applied to the proposed Spithead forts, would be applied to Woolwich, where the property was as valuable as at Portsmouth, and more likely to be destroyed. An enemy must be in possession of Portsmouth for some time to destroy the dockyard. It was extremely difficult, as shown in the case of Sebastopol, to destroy solid masonry wharf and dock walls. It required great art and considerable time. He thought he had stated strong reasons why Government should not press forward these forts. If asked whether Chatham had any influence with him, he would admit that it had a great influence; because Chatham might be made secure without difficulty and at a comparatively very small expense, because it was clear that an inland dockyard must be more secure than a dockyard on the seaboard. He should certainly vote with the hon. Baronet who had proposed the reduction of the Vote. He did not doubt the accuracy of the Estimates, which he knew had been very carefully prepared. His hon. Friend had spoken of difficulty about the foundations, but he did not think that there was any difficulty in that respect which engineering skill could not surmount, and he knew that before the plans were matured very precise soundings were taken. At the same time, he hoped the noble Lord would see that the moment had not arrived for the construction of these forts, for that moment could only arrive when our navy had ceased to be as formidable as that of France. One word more. The question of the probable issue of engagements between ships and shore batteries was often not clearly stated, and sometimes not understood. As a general rule, it might be received, that iron-clad vessels, with the tide
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  in their favour, could run past within range of any battery, however heavily armed; but that if they could be detained for any length of time opposite to a formidable shore battery within eight or nine hundred yards, they would receive serious injury, unless they could be rendered shot and shell proof. Again, in an action between an iron-clad vessel at anchor or under weigh and heavy guns ashore, the advantage would be with the latter, if protected by iron shot proof parapets; and the more especially if the shore guns, instead of being placed in one battery, were separated, and placed in two or three contiguous batteries; and with this arrangement the result would be in favour of the shore armament whatever the range might be.
  MR. BONHAM-CARTERsaid, he thought the speech of the hon. and gallant Member, so far from being against the forts, offered the best apology for them. One argument advanced was, the great improvement in artillery, which would enable the land forts to fire 300-pounders with a range that would make it very dangerous for a fleet to run in. But that was an argument in favour of those forts which could fire 300-pounders at a less distance. Then again, it was said that each gun would require ten skilled artillerymen, who would require at least eighteen months' training; but he thought that only two or three of the men at each gun would require to be so highly trained. But much of the opposition to the forts was based upon the assumption that all conditions would be favourable to an enemy, and that there should be nothing but these forts to resist an attack. It was argued that vessels running twelve knots an hour would incur no great risk, and that moreover the attack would be made in the darkness of night. That, of course, was assuming that all their own vessels were absent, and that an enemy had such entire command of the sea as to choose the day or night at his pleasure without any interference on our part. But in fact the power of the navy would be increased by the construction of these forts. It was said that their ships ought to be watching Cherbourg or any port in which a hostile force might be collected, and they would be so employed. What would be needed at home would be floating batteries to defend the fair way, and of course vessels of that kind would be provided according to the Commissioners' recommendation. The range of guns was continually increasing, and ha found that for every additional

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  100 yards' range an additional area of 120 acres was covered. It had also been argued, that if wooden ships could run by forts, so much more easily could iron ships do so. But the latest experience showed, that while a shot striking a wooden vessel seldom inflicted any injury greater than could be remedied by plugging, a shot striking an iron plate damaged the whole plate and caused it to "buckle." In America an iron-plated vessel had recently been disabled by five shots. In the modern iron ships there were turrets or other contrivances to protect the gunners; but a single shot would be sufficient to damage the machinery of the turret and to render it immovable. Thus, although there might be less loss of life on board iron ships, the fire from forts might do them greater injury. Another fact in favour of forts was that they were a greater evidence of a desire for peace than ships, which might be used for aggressive purposes; and, manned as they probably would be to a great extent by Volunteers, they would be in strict conformity with the Volunteer motto, "Defence, not defiance."
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNE: I apprehend that the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury does not call upon the House altogether to refuse the Vote, but to suspend the consideration of it for the present. I must beg to point out that this is a totally new question. It is true, that on the 4th of April 1862 a Motion was made to suspend the consideration of this question until we had further experience of the effects of improved gunnery and iron-plated ships. I have never myself denied that the protection of our dockyards against attack from sea should be the first consideration in providing defences. But the Government have not given us any plan to prove the immediate necessity for the erection of these forts, and my complaint has been, and is, that the Committee is not in possession of any evidence to warrant them in wasting these enormous sums of money, and that no reasons have been given by the noble Marquess the Under Secretary why he should now term narrow-mind ed the arguments which were used last year when he supported me in two divisions. These forts were suspended in April last year in deference to the almost unanimous wish of the House, and in the month of July in the present year, when the edge of the Session has been taken off, the noble Lord comes down to the House and asks us to vote for
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  these forts, without showing any reason for a change of views. The noble Lord appears to have totally forgotten that the Commissioners to whom the question was referred back said, that, under all the circumstances, the doubt which appeared to have taken possession of the public mind as to the expediency of the two forts at Spithead was not unreasonable. If the Commissioners acknowledge that it is not unreasonable for the House to doubt whether these forts should be erected or not, it is not unreasonable to suspend operations until we know more of improved cannon and iron-plated ships. My objection is that the estimate is incorrect and imperfect. When the forts were first projected, the Commissioners recommended the construction of five forts. For some reason, unknown to the House, the number has been reduced to three. The total estimate for the defences of Portsmouth, including five forts, was £1,192,000. But the forts were to be formed of granite alone. What do they propose to do now? They propose to reduce the forts from five to three, and to have the forts of granite faced with 10-inch wrought-iron plates. I say that the addition of the iron plates will double, if not treble, the cost, and that there is no correct plan and no correct estimate of these forts.
  I was surprised to hear from a gallant Officer opposite (Sir J. Fergusson), not a criticism on the forts, but a laboured, long, and tedious criticism of the book of my hon. Friend, and I was surprised to hear him use extraordinary terms. He talked of garbling evidence. I think I never heard an instance of garbling evidence more glaring than that with which the hon. and gallant Member favoured the Committee tonight. He quoted Captain Hewlett as an authority in favour of these forts, and he stopped at question 250. He should have read question 252. Captain Hewlett is an officer who was in command of the Excellent, and must necessarily have a better idea of gunnery than any other man. To show what a tremendous garbler the hon. and gallant Member, who talks of garbling evidence, is, I will just read question 252. Captain Hewlett is asked whether, supposing the largest possible sum to be granted, he would not appropriate a part of it to permanent defences, and he says, "I am not sure that forts would be of sufficient service to warrant any large sum being spent upon them."
  The additional reasons given for resum-

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  ing the works at Spithead are two. The first is the Charleston attack. The reason of the noble Under Secretary closely resembles the reason of Fluellen—that Mace-don and Monmouth were very much alike. There was a river in both, and salmons in both rivers. What similarity is there between Charleston and Portsmouth? I am advised that the approaches are entirely different. The approaches to Charleston are circuitous. The distance between Port Moultrie and Fort Sumter is 1,700 yards. The distance between the two Spithead forts is 2,200 yards—a most material difference in considering this question. Charleston is not a naval arsenal. At Portsmouth there must necessarily be free ingress for ships. At Charleston, I am told, the entrance was blocked up, only leaving sufficient entrance for a single ship. At Spithead the entrance is quite straight, with a tide-way three miles broad, and ten fathoms' depth of water. The Commissioners say expressly that it is not physically possible to impede the entrance without the risk of destroying the harbour. The hon. and gallant Gentleman, who imputes garbling to my hon. Friend, says, "Why not lay down a boom;" and it seems to be assumed that this House will have no regard to what money is spent. As to the cost of a boom the Commissioners say—
  "The cost of a barrier of this description, without the battery, 2,200 yards long, is shown by the estimate accompanying the plan to be nearly £508,035, including the shore moorings; with the battery, irrespective of the guns and their fittings, the cost would be £761,717. The Committee do not believe that floating barriers, affording great probability of success when attacked, or of withstanding the stress of weather to which they would be subjected, could be constructed at a less cost than the sums estimated for the Channel between the Horse and No-man's-land shoals at Spithead, upon which the Committee understand it is intended to erect powerful forts; and at high water there would still be a broad passage of sufficient depth for the largest vessels between each of the shoals and the land, which, unless blocked up, would render the floating barriers useless."
  No one is so mad as to propose to block up the channel at Spithead, which must always be a place of anchorage, and the Commissioners prove that it is impossible to block up the channel without you block up the harbour altogether. So much for the likeness between Charleston and Portsmouth.
  Let us see what was the powerful Federal fleet which attacked Charleston, and what was the armament and what the speed. This Federal fleet consisted of
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  only ten vessels, and their armament was Dahlgren guns—very inferior to any guns which we have; and the speed, having no masts or sails, was not more than seven knots an hour, and the plating was of the worst possible construction, being of various thicknesses of iron, bolted together, such as we have reported against long ago. Is this the sort of fleet which you would expect to attack Spithead? By an ingenious contrivance the Federal ships were all made stationary within a range of 500 yards, and, of course, the forts punished them at their leisure, and the result of the firing from the ships was that only one man was killed and nine wounded in the forts. So much for the Charleston argument.
  Let us come now to the "great gun" argument, which, after all, is the first point for the Committee to consider. I am ready to grant, if the noble Lord has got a gun which will pierce a vessel in motion at 1,000 yards, my argument is gone, and you may build the forts at once. But first catch your hare, and you have not caught it yet. I deny that you have got a gun which will pierce a moving object at 1,000 yards. We have gone to an enormous expense in these guns. I believe I am under the mark in saying that we have spent £3,000,000, and I believe that at this present moment you have not got a gun above a 40-pounder of which you can say that you know what it is worth. I believe all those Armstrong 100-pounders are given up now even by the Government, and acknowledged to be failures. What does the Duke of Somerset say. He says—
  "I used to think that no plates could resist the rifled guns; but I have changed that opinion. We have found that they are not so effective as we supposed, and that we must arm our ships with heavy smooth-bore guns, the velocity of which at 200 yards is much greater." [3 Hansard, clxvi. 442.]
  I will ask the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty this—Is there a captain who would go to sea with a broadside of these Armstrong guns, except merely as chase guns? We have heard a good deal of the trial of the Whitworth and Armstrong guns, and I have here the account given by the special reporter of The Times of this trial, which is really worth the attention of the Committee. The Whitworth gun was a 70-pounder, and was placed at a distance of 600 yards. The Armstrong gun, a 120-pounder, was placed at 800 yards; it had been wished to place it at 1,000 yards, but this would have re-

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  quired it to be placed in a proximity supposed to be dangerous to a clergyman's house. The experiments began with the 120-pounder, and—
  "Nearly an hour was consumed in trial shots at a wooden target in order to lay the gun properly, which led to curious conjectures as to what the Warrior, steaming at fourteen knots would have been about with her guns while such a battery was trying to hit her."
  Is not that conclusive? Here they were an hour getting the range for a fixed object, and yet they tell us that at 1,000 yards these forts, armed with these guns, are to hit and destroy vessels in motion. The 70-pounder was fired first, and here is what the reporter says of the effect—
  "As soon as the stifling smoke allowed an examination of the interior of the target, it was seen that the shell had passed completely through the plate, the eighteen inches of teak backing, and inner skin of iron, bursting inside. The bursting, however, seemed to have taken place too soon and while the shell was still in the armour-plate, as the base or heel of the shell was fired out backwards and fell in front of the target, while the fragments that penetrated through appeared to have been deprived of their force, and fell almost harmless in what may be called the between decks. The surrounding timbers inside certainly bore no signs of damage worth speaking of. Of course, the splinters must have flown about with violence, and the concussion of the explosion must have been tremendous; but as evidence of the shattering effect of the shell between decks there was little or nothing to be seen."
  This is the account of an experiment which was said to be successful, but which I believe was no success at all. I hope the chairman of the Iron-plate Committee (Sir John Hay), whom I see opposite, will give us his opinion of these experiments; and if he can tell us that he is perfectly satisfied of their success, I have no doubt the Committee will consent at once to the building of these forts. Then there is a similar account of the Armstrong gun, which is claimed to be such a wonderful achievement. Does the noble Lord, who now that he has got on that bench seems to have forgotten the vote he formerly gave on this subject, and the reasons for it, know what these guns cost? He treats that part of the subject very lightly. Is he aware that a 600-pounder Armstrong gun costs as much as £4,000? He says we will go on making guns, and at last we shall get one that will do all we want. When you have got an effective gun, I say then you may build your forts, but not before. The noble Lord treats very lightly, too, the fact that one of these guns was disabled, but I believe that in no instance
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  with these charges of 50 lb. of powder can you rely on these guns not being, like the elephants of old, as dangerous to your own men as to the enemy. The House is at present called on to go blindfold into this question. You have spent £3,000,000, but you have not got a weapon which would justify you in building these forts; and you have had experiments, the results of which warn you against going into expense such as that which is now proposed. I entreat the Committee to pause. Nothing will be lost by delaying this Vote a little until you have more successful experiments. We are rushing now into expense of which we cannot see the end, and I hope the Committee will join with me in an endeavour to stop this expenditure before it is too late.
  SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFEsaid, he wished to say a few words in support of the proposition of the Government. He agreed in the opinion that the great naval arsenals should be made as safe as possible. He thought that the result of the great gun question, as the hon. Member for Liskeard had termed it, had shown that the course taken by the Government was that pointed out by prudence, and that it would end in success. The hon. Member had asked how it was that there were to be only three, instead of five forts, and the answer was that since guns had been made more effective for greater distances the three forts would be as useful as the five would have been with inferior guns. His hon. Friend (Sir Frederic Smith) seemed jealous in reference to the attention bestowed upon Portsmouth, as compared with Chatham. The introduction of steam into ships of war had rendered Chatham dockyard a place of much more importance than it used to be, but it must he borne in mind that in the event of a war the first thing would be to get the command of the Channel, and Portsmouth in reference to that object would necessarily be of more importance than Chatham could possibly be. The great object was to make forts do the work of ships at Spithead. He thought that they might go too far in having harbours of refuge minutely defended; such harbours should be commanded by a battery, but more should not be attempted to be done. They might, in his opinion, clearly do too much at Dover and at Portland, but not at Plymouth, Portsmouth, of Chatham. They could not make the great arsenals too secure. He was sorry to observe that Woolwich had, somehow or other, dropped out of those proposed. He

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  believed that in reference to the defence of the country Shooter's Hill was a very important point to fortify. The Duke of Wellington had said, that he never could consider the capital of this country as a certain number of acres covered with houses, but that Woolwich, containing their means of defence, was the real capital of the country. He should have liked to see a proposal for Woolwich; but approving the scheme of the Government as far as it went, he should give his vote in its favour.
  LORD CLARENCE PAGET: Every hon. Member of this House is likely to agree with my hon. Friend who spoke last, that however important Chatham may be, after all our great naval arsenal is Portsmouth; and therefore, as a primary condition, Portsmouth ought to be fortified. I listened very carefully to the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Bernal Osborne). As I understand, he is of opinion that our case is made out if we have guns sufficiently heavy to stop iron-cased ships from coming in between these two forts; and that if my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield (Sir J. Hay) says there is a probability of our having guns that will strike at a thousand yards, that would be a strong argument in favour of those forts. My hon. Friend who brought this Motion forward says it may be necessary hereafter to build these forts; but let us wait. What does he want to wait for? We have had certain experiments with regard to those guns; and I can assure the hon. Gentleman and the Committee that I have it from artillery officers who are residing at Shoe-buryness, and who are engaged in carrying on those experiments, that they confidently believe you will yet have a 300-poun-der gun which will do more than my hon. Friend requires. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: Have you them now?] You must remember that a series of experiments are going on; and here I may observe that not one of these guns have burst. The danger of cast-iron guns is that they burst and kill the men who are serving them. The consequence is that men are afraid of them, and the bursting of one gun may lose you a battle. But these new guns have not burst.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNE: Do I understand my noble Friend to say that none of them have been disabled?
  LORD CLARENCE PAGET: No; I quite agree with my hon. Friend that guns have been disabled in those experiments;
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  but my hon. Friend has no right to argue from the circumstance that certain flaws have shown themselves after very heavy firing that we will not get over our difficulties. At present the material in the inside of those guns is iron; but it is believed, that if the chambers be made of steel, you will get over the difficulty of those guns cracking—for, mind you, they do not burst, and not a man would have been hurt by them, even if the firing had been continued. I believe you will have those guns brought to a state of great perfection. In the mean time you must take something for granted on the opinion of those artillery officers; and assuming that they will produce, as they expect to do, a 300-pounder, or even a 600-pounder gun which will fulfil all the duties required of it, I ask the Committee to consider what position we are in. Will any one tell me that Spithead is in such a state of defence as it should be, when a frigate coming in there by night could shell the dockyard? Is that a state of things we ought to be satisfied with? I think the Committee has been misled by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chatham. He says that there are guns at the Isle of Wight and other places which would prevent ships from bombarding Portsmouth harbour, [Sir FREDERIC SMITH: Which would prevent them from lying at anchor in Portsmouth harbour.] I contend that there are no shells and mortars to prevent a ship from lying there and shelling the dockyard. The proposed forts will be 2,200 yards apart, and consequently I admit that a ship may pass in at a distance of 1,100 yards from either side. But a Whitworth gun has already pierced a 7½-inch plate, I think it was, at a distance of 800 yards, with a velocity in round numbers of 1,200 feet per second. We have every reason to believe that a gun will be produced to carry a 300 lb. shot at the same velocity; and, from its additional weight, the projectile fired from such a gun will have a much greater penetrating force. The shot of the Whitworth gun penetrated at the distance which has been stated, and a shell also penetrated. I admit that the latter did not do any great damage within, but it was the first shell tried, and it is intended to make great improvements. Already there is this fact—that you have a gun which at 800 yards has pierced a 7½ inch plate, the thickness of the armour-plates on the iron-plated vessels being about five inches; and those artillery officers have

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  every confidence that a 300-pounder gun will be able to do at 1,500 yards what your present gun does at 800 yards. If you are able to pierce an armour-plated ship at 1,500 yards, it will be impossible for a ship to lie at Spithead and shell the dockyard without being at the mercy of the forts. My hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard puts it that a ship might succeed in making her way in; but before going into a place we all of us are in the habit of seeing how we are to get out; and I think any ship would hare been pretty roughly handled before she succeeded in passing those forts, and when in she would probably meet with one or two floating batteries. What is to happen to the enemy's ship when she tries to go out again? Why did not we go into Sebastopol or Cronstadt? Because we knew it was probable that we should never come out again, those places having been wisely fortified. Sebastopol supplies one of the strongest proofs of the importance of both land and sea defences. If the Russians had fortified the place on the land side, as they ought to have done, how many thousand more lives would have been lost in taking it? But they had the wisdom to erect forts on the sea shore, and the consequence was, we were never able to take them. Let the Committee look at what is going on elsewhere. Every point of the French coast of any importance is defended, or is in process of protection; and are we to neglect this precaution, relying on our naval prestige, and trusting solely to our fleet? Let the Committee remember the difference which exists between the state of things now and that which existed in our last war. We had a powerful fleet, and could blockade a French port—that is to say, if the wind was on shore we knew that the enemy's fleet could not come out, and that we might then keep away; while, if the wind was off the shore, we kept close up and prevented them from coming out. But in these days of steam I defy anything like an efficient blockade to be maintained; for it is impossible that you may not at one time or other find that the enemy has got out before you are aware of it. Is it not wise, then, to leave an important arsenal in such a state, that if your fleet is in search of the enemy, you may have the satisfaction of knowing that that arsenal is safe?
  A good deal has been said of the comparison between Charleston and Spithead, and my hon. Friends have declared that unless you can put stakes across the en-
  716
  trance to the harbour you can offer no obstruction to an enemy's squadron. But there is no greater mistake in the world. I believe that stakes would be useless against these powerful ships; but what would obstruct them is floating coils of rope on the surface of the water, which would foul their screws. And this you could do with effect between the proposed forts. My hon. Friend (Mr. Bernal Osborne) says that you would then have no entrance for your own ships. But is the hon. Gentleman who was so long at the Admiralty so utterly ignorant as not to know that a private passage is always kept up in such cases, and that there are always certain marks by which a single ship can be steered backwards and forwards? That was the case at Sebastopol. A frigate from that harbour came right out in the midst of us. But we did not know the passage in, and the consequence was, that what with the obstructions and the forts, nobody would venture in, and very wisely. The House has already determined, once for all, to make our harbours secure. The people of this country have confidence that the House of Commons is going to make our harbours secure, and the consequence is that we hear no more of panics. I say that by the measures we are now proposing we are going to put a stop to these panics; but the longer you delay, the more expensive the completion of these works will be. If these fortifications have to be constructed, let us construct them at once, and put the country in a state of security. Do not let us wait until the French, or somebody else, come upon us. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: Wait for a gun.] I would almost engage that by the time the forts are finished there will be a gun ready for them. Well, then, my hon. Friend complains that this is not a correct estimate, and says that ten inches thickness of iron would not be sufficient. But in ships we are limited to a certain weight of gun, and therefore you have only got to make a fort of such a strength that it will resist the guns of the ship, not the guns of the fort. Of the guns which a ship can carry, there will probably not be one which will send a shot through a ten-inch plate. The estimate made with regard to these forts is therefore a sufficient one. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: What is the estimate?] My hon. Friend will see it in the shedule. Bear in mind this also—that the Channel is full of merchant ships; and what is to become of them if at Spithead you cannot protect them? Assuming that

  717
  our fleet was at sea in search of an enemy, you would have hundreds of ships putting into Spithead for shelter, and there is nothing to stop a smart officer from going in with two or three men-of-war, and bringing out your merchant ships by the dozen. All these are things to be looked to while we are at peace. I do hope that the Committee, after having undertaken this great work, will not forfeit the good opinion of the country by now stopping these fortifications, which the House approved two years since by a large majority.
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, that he was unwilling that the Committee should go to the vote before he had said a few words on the question. The object of the forts at Spithead, as he understood it, was first to defend Portsmouth arsenal and dockyard from bombardment, and secondly to protect their merchantmen or their fleet, if inferior to that of the enemy. The forts were to be placed 2,000 yards apart, there being three of them, and it had been shown that with no gun which then existed would it be possible to impede the entrance of an ironclad ship. The noble Lord said last year that certain persons had promised him that by-and-by a gun would be forthcoming for this purpose. But though a gun might be effective at long ranges, the use of such exceptional charges that nobody would stand near while the gun was being fired, led with perfect certainty to its being eventually disabled. Practically, the 50 lb. charges were totally useless. On a very recent occasion at Shoeburyness a gun which was fired with that charge was disabled, and he had understood the noble Lord, who was with him on that occasion, to agree that a 35 lb. charge was the utmost that would be used for these guns. The fact was that those exceptional charges were not safe to be used with any gun as yet constructed, whether a breech or a muzzle loader, whether constructed by Whitworth or Armstrong. Even the gun named after his hon. Friend (Mr. Horsfall), which did wonders at 800 yards, succumbed to the enormous charges which were requisite. These ranges had never exceeded 800 yards, and yet 1,100 was the range which it would be necessary to gain from the forts in order to secure the penetration of an iron-clad ship. Now, he did not see that there was any possibility of obtaining that range, according to any knowledge which they had of modern artillery. If he saw any possibility of a gun with such a range being constructed, he should retain
  718
  the opinion he held some years ago, that the Report of the Commissioners was a desirable one. At the same time, it should be remembered, that when that Report was made, the fleet entering Portsmouth was supposed to be a wooden one, and a wooden fleet would be set on fire by such forts. Neither the noble Lord nor any other officer who commanded a ship in the Black Sea thought it advisable to go into Sebastopol harbour, because the converging fire from the forts would have sunk his ship. With an iron-clad ship, however, there was nothing in the position of the proposed forts to prevent an enterprising officer from passing between them and entering the roads of Spithead. Then they had guns which, 1,500 yards outside the forts, would throw shell into the dockyard, while there was not a gun which would penetrate ships at 1,500 yards. Ships, then, could lie and attack the dockyards with impunity, and the forts were therefore not a sufficient protection for the dockyard or for the merchantmen assembled at Spithead. For that reason he should oppose that portion of the schedule which related to the Spithead forts.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: It seems to me that the balance of argument is completely on the side of those who are for the erection of these forts. Even the argument of those who support the Motion couples the forts with floating batteries. But when we had to determine what we should propose to Parliament we thought that the floating defences, being of a perishable nature, ought to be provided for by annual Votes, and therefore we did not include them in the arrangement which we made for permanent works only. But it never was contemplated by anybody to rely entirely upon forts alone. The proposal which we made and make now is for the combined use of forts and floating defences, and I have not heard a single Member supporting the Motion of my hon. Friend who does not say that forts may be very useful, but they think there should be floating defences also. Well, that is just what we say, and therefore in this respect there is no difference between the two parties. But they say, "The thing is useful; don't do it; delay till Heaven knows when." We, on the contrary, say, "This is a thing of considerable importance; do it in time; make hay while the sun shines, and don't wait till the moment arrives when the forts will be wanted for use." Arguing, therefore, on the as-

  719
  sumption that our proposal consists of having both forts and floating defences, the question arises whether those forts would not be useful as supports to the floating defences. Hon. Gentlemen say, "Trust entirely to your navy." But that argument has been refuted by every person who has spoken on the other side of the question, because we have shown that to maintain a permanent defensive floating force for Portsmouth would require that your navy should be not merely superior to the navy of any other country, but you should be in superior force everywhere—at Portsmouth, at Plymouth, in the Channel, in the Mediterranean, in every place in which your adversary might concentrate a large force for offensive operations. But that is impossible. Your floating force is liable to be called from one place to another, and therefore you cannot depend on having that force superior to the force of the enemy on every possible point. But then it is said, "You have not guns of sufficient range to penetrate iron-cased vessels at a distance of 1,000 yards." But, in the first place, you are assuming that the ships passing between the Horse Sand and No Man's Land would go so accurately in the middle between the two forts that they would be exposed to only an equal fire from the two. But that is not an easy thing to do. It might, perhaps, be done by a few vessels, but not by a considerable force attempting to go through. Suppose a large flotilla attempted to get through, and they tried to place themselves so as not to be much exposed to the fire from the forts, and that a floating force was sent to encounter them, between the fire from the latter, and from the forts they might get into a very embarrassing position. Well, it is said, "You cannot hit a moving body." But that is not the fact. It is a well-known practice of gunnery to fire from a moving body to a fixed object, which is equivalent to firing at a moving object from a fixed body. A ship going at the rate of twelve knots an hour would move at the rate of about a mile in five minutes, and a shot moving with the velocity of 1,200 feet in a second would go a mile in some four seconds. The difference of velocities being so great, what would happen? At the distance of 1,000 yards, if you aimed at the bow of a ship, you would hit the body before she had moved the whole of her own length. There is therefore no difficulty in the matter. The
  720
  hon. and gallant Member says, "What a number of artillerymen would be wanted. You would require ten men to each gun." But the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows very well, that if you have two trained artillerymen for each gun, you have all you want. The great labour is the handspike work and moving the guns, and those who have to load soon acquire skill sufficient to perform that operation. Well, then, I hold that all the arguments in favour of protecting our dockyards go to show that those forts are, and must be, an essential part of any arrangements made for the defence of Portsmouth. It was said the other day, "Look to your sea defences. Don't trouble yourselves about defending Portsmouth from the land side." An hon. and gallant Officer said that the batteries from Cumberland Fort, Southsea Castle, and other points, with the cross fire from the batteries of the Isle of Wight, would command Spithead. But the distance from those points is rather more than three miles; and if the fire from our guns should crose halfway, the distance of the Spithead forts being only 2,000 yards apart, that surely would be much more effectual. I think really the case is so clear that I cannot have a doubt as to the decision of the Committee, and I trust that decision will be arrived at by such a majority as to show that the House is of the same opinion as the nation, and that both are determined that the chief dockyard and arsenal of the country shall be properly defended.
  Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Schedule."
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 135; Noes 52: Majority 83.
  SIR FRANCIS GOLDSMIDsaid, he wished to ask for an explanation of the increase in the expenditure as compared with the estimate for the works on the Western Heights at Dover.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that the expenditure on the works on the eastern side of Dover was considerably less than the estimate; but the works on the western side greatly exceeded the estimated cost, in consequence of large expenses having been incurred, owing to the soil having been found to be of a different nature to what was anticipated.
  Schedule agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow, at Twelve of the Clock.

UNION RELIEF AID ACTS CONTINUANCE BILL— [BILL 199.]—SECOND READING.
Order for Second Reading read.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. C. Gilpin.)
MR. TOLLEMACHEsaid, he thought that the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board had met the objections from the distressed unions very fairly and properly. He understood, that instead of having to borrow money with restrictions at a high rate of interest, the right hon. Gentleman proposed to enable them to borrow money from the Exchequer Loan Commissioners at the low rate of 3½ per cent. His constituents would rather have no rate in aid at all; but as they were to have it, they desired to have it extended to the whole country. He could not say he agreed with them on that point. He thought that, under the circumstances, the Government should have power to enforce a rate in aid, but it should be enforced as a last resource. He would suggest that they should raise the amount for putting the rate in aid in operation from 5s. to 6s. 6d., or 7s.
MR. C. P. VILLIERSwas sorry that he was not present when the Order was called. As the principle of the Bill had received the sanction of the House on two occasions during the year, it would not be necessary for him to make any remarks. He would therefore confine himself to a consideration of the Amendments which had been urged on the attention of the Government, and which they were willing to introduce. He would remind the House that this time last year anxiety was felt lest there should be a failure of the means of maintaining the poor in the distressed districts. The destitution was then very great, and was continuing; and the Act, exceptional as it was, was deemed necessary. It provided, in the first place, for the practical application of the old principle of the Poor Laws in this country, that when any parish or district should be unable to maintain its own poor, it should be entitled to levy a rate in aid on the other divisions of the county, or even on the whole county itself; and secondly, when a certain point of expenditure was reached, then power was given to the unions to meet any excess by loans. The Act had proved successful in its operation, and had been of advantage to the distressed districts. Under it £80,000 had been raised by loan, and £34,000 contributed
722
in aid by different unions. A considerable amount of dissatisfaction had, however, been caused by some of the provisions of the Act; and an influential deputation, headed by his hon. Friend opposite, offered a number of suggestions to the Government. These gentlemen did not dispute that the measure had been of much benefit, but contended that the sources of supply were not to be relied upon. They objected especially to the rate in aid, arguing that one union ought not, when distressed, to cast its burdens on other unions who were on the eve of becoming equally embarrassed. Although the arrangement by which a union could come upon the county for relief might answer very well in some cases, it was said that there were peculiar circumstances in Lancashire which rendered it objectionable, for Manchester and some other large towns did not contribute to the county rate. It was maintained, therefore, that a distressed union should call upon the other richer unions for assistance, and not on the county. It was alleged that there were now nearly half of the unions of Lancashire exempt from contributing to the relief of the others, and these were the richest in the county. It was pointed out that the unions had a motive in raising their rates to a certain point, for it procured them exemption. The Public Works Bill would, perhaps, increase this difficulty. It was said that some of the unions would not apply for contributions in aid from a sense of their injustice, and that there had been a good deal of litigation on the subject. These were all, no doubt, arguments for putting the provisions on this point on a different footing. The provisions made with regard to the repayment of loans and the badness of the security were alleged to have deterred individuals and companies from advancing funds in many cases to the guardians. It was also said, that in many cases the rate of interest demanded was very high, and that in one case—Stockport, he believed—they had been unable to raise the whole amount required. There was probably some exaggeration in the description of the difficulties of obtaining money, and also of the inconveniences of the rate in aid. Substantially, however, the statements that had been made were true. These inconveniences he had mentioned were felt throughout the country, and the suggestions which had been made deserved attention. The first suggestion was that districts should be relieved from any motive for raising their rates to escape contribu-

723
tions. It had been considered that a slight rise in the amount of expenditure, which would give little inducement to the unions to go upon the county, would have that effect. Several unions had levied contributions upon the county at an expenditure of 5s. in the pound, and he had been assured, that if the amount were raised to 6s., accompanied by increased facilities for borrowing, no apprehension would exist, unless in the event of great distress, of being called upon to contribute. He thought there could be no doubt that 6s. in the pound would relieve the unions. The suggestion had been made of allowing boards of guardians to place themselves in the category of those parochial authorities who, under the new Poor Law, were entitled to apply to the Loan Commissioners. There were several purposes for which money was advanced by the Loan Commissioners—emigration, buying land, the repair of buildings, and the erection of workhouses. It was alleged, and he believed correctly, that the loans so granted had been punctually repaid. For the temporary purposes for which this Bill was intended it had been suggested that the mode best calculated to give facilities for borrowing was to allow boards of guardians to apply to the Loan Commissioners for the money they required, binding them to repay the loans within a limited period. The subject had been well considered by the Government; and when the Bill went into Committee, he should be ready with clauses to meet the objects in view—in the first place, to raise the amount upon which unions would be entitled to levy contributions in aid from 5s. to 6s. in the pound; and secondly, to empower boards of guardians to apply to the Loan Commissioners for the money they wanted. He hoped that would be satisfactory. This Bill, he believed, was well calculated for its purpose. The existing Act had already relieved the ratepayers under the sudden and severe pressure to which they had been subjected, and there never was a time when it was more needed than at present, owing to the unfortunate position in which many of the solvent ratepayers were placed. There was no real ground for apprehending the lack of means for maintaining the destitute people. He did not take a gloomy view of the prospect of the distressed districts in the coming year. Employment was becoming more plentiful, to which must be added the extraordinary cheapness of food and the likelihood of an abundant harvest,
724
which always augmented the wealth of the country. Moreover the large funds still in hand, voluntarily subscribed, relieved one from all anxiety as to there being adequate means for the support of the destitute. Those who suffered most were the ratepayers—that intermediate class between the operatives and those in comfortable circumstances. Having settled in different parts of the northern districts to supply the necessities of the operatives, they had lost the operatives as customers, and were now obliged to maintain them as pensioners. They had given credit largely, they had paid high rates, they had invested their savings in cottages, for which they now got little or no rent; and if hitherto any forbearance had been shown to them in the collection of the rates, the time had arrived when that forbearance could no longer be exhibited. Great uneasiness prevailed among this class of ratepayers; and although it was said that they did not pay higher rates than persons belonging to the same rank of life in the south and west of England, yet that was not altogether a correct statement, inasmuch as the rate was estimated upon an assumed ratable value, and an assumed solvency of the ratepayers. Now, the fact was that many of those who formerly paid rates were without the means of maintaining themselves; and to make up the necessary sums, those who were still in a condition to pay rates were now assessed to the amount of 10 s., 12 s., and even 15 s. in the pound; and it was particularly with a view to relieve them that this Bill would be of assistance. It would lighten the charge which fell immediately upon them for a considerable space of time, and enable boards of guardians to find the means of relieving the poor without resorting to extreme and harsh, though legal, modes of enforcing payment of rates. Looking, therefore, at the operation of this Bill, the employment of the people, and the law already in force, he doubted whether the House could have acted more wisely in this matter than it had done. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the second reading of the Bill.
MR. E. C. EGERTONsaid, he cordially thanked the right hon. Gentleman for having acceded to the wishes of the influential deputations from Cheshire and Lancashire which had recently waited upon him. At the same time, he would express his belief, that if the existing rate in aid were continued for a few months longer, it would lead to disastrous results.
MR. PACKEsaid, he wished to call attention to the distress existing in the Midland districts in consequence of the cotton famine. He hoped that those districts would be permitted to partake in the benefits arising from the Bill. Many of the unions were anxious that its provisions should be extended to them.
MR. HUMBERSTONsaid, he also thanked the right hon. Gentleman for the course he had adopted. He was opposed in principle to a rate in aid, but the right hon. Gentleman had to a certain extent conceded the principle for which he contended, and removed his objections still further by raising the scale of the rate. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would still further consider the subject, and raise the standard from 6s. to 7s. 6d.
MR. HIBBERTsaid, that the concessions made by the right hon. Gentleman would give great satisfaction to those who had to deal with the distress in the manufacturing districts during the ensuing winter.
MR. A. F. EGERTONobserved, that the President of the Poor Law Board had met the deputations that had waited upon him in a very fair spirit. The modifications which had been introduced into the Bill were great improvements.
SIR BALDWIN LEIGHTONsaid, he thought, that as the landlords in the manufacturing towns of Lancashire and Cheshire had seen the value of their land increase more than that of any other county except Middlesex, it would only be fair and just that they should pay any excess of poor rates beyond a certain amount. It was a great hardship upon the farmers of South Cheshire that they should have to support, in addition to their own poor, the poor of the neighbouring towns, who received a much larger amount of relief, and who were kept round the mills by the mill-owners instead of being allowed to go elsewhere in search of work.
Motion agreed to.
Bill read 2°, and committed for To-morrow at Twelve of the clock.

VOLUNTEERS BILL— [BILL 225.]

  LORDS' AMENDMENTS.
  MR. HENNESSYexpressed his satisfaction that the House of Lords had introduced into the Bill an Amendment providing for the holding of courts of inquiry.
  MR. COXsaid, he was very glad that a change had come over the spirit of the Government's dream, and, notwithstanding his
  726
  democratic notions, with Mr. Cobbett he thanked God that they had a House of Lords.
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, he considered the alteration a great improvement, but he regretted that the Government had opposed it with so much obstinacy in that House.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he was glad if the hon. Member for the King's County and the hon. Member for Finsbury were able to congratulate themselves on the clause which had been introduced into the Bill in another place, and he should be quite content if that alteration afforded any satisfaction to the Volunteer corps. But as to that clause making any difference in the law as it stood before, he hoped that neither those hon. Members nor the Volunteer corps would flatter themselves that it did anything of the kind.
  MR. HENNESSYsaid, that the Secretary of State for War was reported to have informed a deputation that upon reflection he thought it was desirable the law should be altered, and he accordingly procured its alteration in another place. Now, however, the House was told by the noble Under Secretary for the same Department that what the House of Lords had done was of no importance, and that no real alteration of the law had been made. He believed that the noble Marquess was wrong and his chief was right, and that a valuable improvement in the law had been effected in regard to courts of inquiry.
  MR. SELWYNsaid, he regretted that the measure had been mutilated in the other House by the omission of certain provisions which had been agreed to by that House for facilitating the acquisition of rifle ranges by Volunteer corps. At a time when so much was spent in furnishing the army with the most approved and costly weapons, it was highly essential that proper provision should be afforded in the establishment of rifle ranges for acquiring a thorough knowledge of their use. He deeply regretted that the House of Lords, under what be believed to be a misapprehension of the rights of landowners should have rejected a part of the Bill which was calculated to do much for the benefit of the Volunteer force. If the noble Lord who had charge of the Bill would move that the House disagree with the Lords' Amendments, he would support the Motion.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he concurred with his hon. and learned

  727
  Friend in regretting that the clauses to which he referred had been struck out. That they had been struck out was, he thought, owing to a misconception in the Committee of the other House as to their real scope. At the advanced period of the Session, however, he was unwilling to risk the passing of the Bill by moving that the Lords' Amendments be dissented from.
  Lords' Amendments agreed to, with Amendments.

MALT (EXCISE DUTY, &c.)
  NOMINATION OF COMMITTEE.
  Select Committee on Malt (Excise Duty, &c.) to consist of nineteen Members:—Sir FITZROY KELLY, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, Colonel BARTTELOT, Mr. HUTT, Mr. COBBOLD, Mr. CHILDERS, Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Mr. CAIRD, Mr. KER SEYMER, Mr. BUXTON, Sir FREDERICK HEYGATE, Mr. CALTHORPE, Colonel DUNNE, Mr. DODSON, Mr. BEACH, Mr. PULLER, Mr. EDWARD EGERTON, Mr. COBBETT, and Mr. STIRLING:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.
  TURNPIKE TRUSTS ARRANGEMENTS BILL.
  Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders made under an Act of the fifteenth year of Her present Majesty, to facilitate arrangements for the relief of Turnpike Trusts, presented, and read 1°. [Bill 227.]
  TURNPIKE ACTS CONTINUANCE, ETC. BILL.
  Bill to amend the Law relating to the repair of Turnpike Roads in England, and to continue certain Turnpike Acts in Great Britain, presented, and read 1°. [Bill 228.]
  EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. PEEL, Bill for continuing various Expiring Acts, ordered to be brought in by Mr. PEEL and Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER.
  PAUPER LUNATIC ASYLUMS BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. SCOURFIELD, Bill to amend the Lunacy Acts in relation to the building of Asylums for Pauper Lunatics, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SCOURFIELD and Mr. PUGH.

  PETTY SESSIONS (IRELAND) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL for IRELAND, Bill to amend the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act (1851) and the Petty Sessions Clerks (Ireland) Act (1858), ordered to be brought in by Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL for IRELAND and Sir ROBERT PEEL.
  House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock.

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Report—Land Drainage (Provisional Orders) (No. 100); Port Erin Harbour (Isle of Man) * (No. 160).
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Greenwich Hospital (Provision for Widows) * (No. 207); Metropolitan Main Drainage Extension * (No. 208); Growing Crops Seizure (Ireland) * (No. 209); Navy Prize Agents * (No. 210); Fisheries (Ireland) * (No. 211); Alteration in Judges Circuits [H.L.] * (No. 212); Colonial Acts Confirmation [H.L.] * (No. 213).
Second Reading—Prisons (Ireland) * (No. 195).
Committee—Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) * (No. 198);Metropolis Turnpike Roads Acts Amendment * (No. 145).
Report—Sir Robert Hitcham's Charity * (No. 105); Ruthin Charities * (No. 166); Police and Improvement (Scotland) (Provisional Order) * (No. 194).
Third Reading—Colonial Letters Patent [H.L.] * (No. 189); Poor Law Board Continuance * (No. 187).
Royal Assent—Bakehouses Regulation [26 & 27 Vict., c. 40] *;
Sale of Mill Sites, &c. (Ireland) [26 & 27 Vict., c. 42] *;
Security from Violence [26 & 27 Vict., c. 44] *;
Innkeepers' Liability [26 & 27 Vict., c. 41] *;
Postmaster General (Sale of Land) [26 & 27 Vict., c. 43] *;
London Coal and Wine Duties Continuance [26 & 27 Vict., c. 46] *;
Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Act Continuance [26 & 27 Vict., c. 50] *;
Mutiny (East India) Act Repeal [26 & 27 Vict., c. 48] *;
Courts of the Church of Scotland [26 & 27 Vict., c. 47] *;
Duchy of Cornwall Management (1863) [26 & 27 Vict., c. 49] *;
Vaccination (Ireland) [26 & 27 Vict., c. 52] *;
Passengers Act Amendment [26 & 27 Vict., c. 51] *;
Militia Ballots Suspension [26 & 27 Vict., c. 53] *;
Walmer Vesting [26 & 27 Vict., c. 104] *;
Inclosure (No. 2) [26 & 27 Vict., c. 18, 39] *;
Thames Embankment (North Side) [26 & 27 Vict., c. 45] *.

THE CHANNEL FLEET IN THE BALTIC.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he wished to put a Question to the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, of which he had given him private notice—namely, whether an article which appeared in The Observer on the previous day was correct. The Observer had the reputation of being patronized by the Government, and of being a reflection of their opinions and intentions. That might or might not be the fact; but the belief had the effect of attracting public attention to statements which, if published in another paper, would fail to obtain any credence. The paragraph was as follows:—
  "We must await the arrival of Russia's reply to the joint notes of the three Powers. In the mean while our Channel fleet is ordered to cruise in the Baltic. The Defence, Resistance, and Royal Oak, are not only suggestive in name, but exceedingly mighty in the power to do mischief. Perhaps their appearance in Russian waters on a peaceful cruise may have a good effect."
  It was impossible to misunderstand the feeling evinced in this paragraph. It was one of menace to Russia; and although that might not be the intention of the noble Earl, yet, if our fleet were at this time going to the Baltic, it was certain that the same inference would be drawn by Europe generally, and by the Russian Government in particular, as was drawn in this article. The noble Earl might say that the fleet was gone to the Baltic for a summer cruise, which was usual at this time of the year; but it would, nevertheless, he must be permitted to say, show a great want of tact and judgment to send the fleet into the Baltic, considering the position in which the two countries stood, and the diplomatic negotiations which were being carried on with Russia on the Polish question. He wished, therefore, to ask the noble Earl, Whether it was true that this demonstration on our part had been made, and whether the English fleet had been sent in all its strength to the Baltic?
  EARL RUSSELL: In answer to the Question of the noble Earl, I beg to state that there is not the smallest foundation

  615
  for the paragraph which he has seen in The Observer. Whatever information The Observer may obtain occasionally, the editor must certainly have been misinformed as to the intention of the Government in this case.

GREECE.—QUESTION.
THE MARQUESS OF NORMANBYwished to inquire of the noble Earl (Earl Russell), Whether there was any truth in the statement which appeared two or three days ago in some of the French semi-official papers, to the effect that the family of the young King of Greece had declared in London, that His Majesty would not start for his destination until some arrangement had been made between the English Government and the National Assembly of Greece for the temporary occupation of that kingdom by British troops?
EARL RUSSELLsaid, that no such intimation had been made to the English Government.
THE MARQUESS OF NORMANBYsaid, the statement appeared in La France, a paper supposed to be as official in Paris as The Observer was in London.

THE BURIAL SERVICE.—QUESTION.
LORD EBURYsaid, the House would recollect that six weeks ago he moved an Address to Her Majesty, praying Her to appoint a Commission to consider what steps should be taken to obviate the scandals which arose from the present compulsory state of the law in requiring the indiscriminate use of the Burial Service of the Church of England. It appeared to be the unanimous opinion of the House, that the evils were so intolerable that they ought to be put an end to as soon as possible. Eventually the most rev. Prelate (the Archbishop of Canterbury) said he would do all that he possibly could to devise a legislative remedy. Unfortunately, while this matter was pending, the scandals went on as they did before. Only the other day, he received a letter from a gentleman in Warwickshire relating to a case in which a man had put an end to his existence by deliberately walking into a pond. An inquest was held, and the result was a verdict of insanity, and an order by the coroner for the burial of the body. The curate of the parish said he dared not read the appointed service, and the service was ultimately performed by a clergyman from a distance,
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who was ignorant of the circumstances, A similar case had happened in a more populous place. In that instance, the Burial Service was performed amid the murmurs of the people assembled; and when it was over, a woman went up to the clergyman and said to him "Sir, the man you have buried is my husband. You may say what you please, but I know that he is gone to hell." Cases of this kind showed the necessity for the Question which he now put to the most rev. Prelate—namely, What steps had been taken towards devising a remedy for the evils in question?
THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYsaid, he had no difficulty in answering the Question. In the course of the debate to which the noble Lord had referred, he was asked to pledge himself to bring forward, before the end of the Session, a measure which would be satisfactory to the House. Such a pledge he declined to give; but he undertook to say for himself and his right rev. Brethren, that they were prepared to give their serious attention to this important subject, and they were resolved to ascertain as soon as possible the views and feelings of the clergy. In fulfilment of that promise, a large assembly of Bishops took place four or five weeks ago, which was attended not only by Prelates of the United Church of England and Ireland, but also by a considerable number of Colonial Bishops. A prolonged discussion took place, but no decision was arrived at; the meeting was adjourned, and would be resumed. Meanwhile, the Lower House of Convocation had, with the concurrence of the Upper House, taken the subject into their consideration, and their views with regard to it would be communicated through their Prolocutor. He hoped that when Parliament met again he should be able to inform their Lordships what was the result of the discussion of the matter, and that some satisfactory conclusion would be arrived at.
THE EARL OF DESARTsaid, he retained the opinion that the question should have originated with Convocation; adding, that no one could doubt the possibility of repentance at the last moment.
THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORKsaid, after what had passed in Convocation, and the correspondence which had taken place on the subject, he did not entertain any sanguine hope that the bench of bishops would be able to lay before their Lordships in the next Session of Parliament any measure to meet the difficulties complain-

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ed of. No doubt there was every intention to meet the question fully and fairly; but if there was one thing more than another which came out clearly at the meeting to which the most rev. Primate had referred, it was the great difference of opinion as to the remedy to be applied. On the one hand there was a strong desire to retain the service as it was, and on the other a wish to make changes which did not seem calculated to meet the cases which were complained of. The burial service was used over three classes of persons—first, those as to whom there was no moral doubt that they were passing from the trials of time to a happy eternity; secondly, those about whom the clergyman could form no definite conclusion; and lastly, those as to whom very little hope could be entertained. A great variety of remedies had been proposed. The first suggestion was that discipline should be restored, that evildoers should be excommunicated, so that their position might be known during life, and the use of the service withheld when they were dead. Upon this he would only say that he did not think that any measure of that kind was to be expected at present. Indeed, a complete system of discipline could only be maintained in a small sect; and any attempt to restore discipline in that sense to the Church of England would result in denationalizing the Church. The next proposal was that a discretion should be vested in the clergyman, who should read the service or not, as he thought right. The feeling of their Lordships, a8 evinced in the last debate, was decidedly against giving such a discretion. Here was one instance of what might happen under such a discretion. A clergyman in the diocese of a right rev. Prelate who was then present in one case omitted the words "as our hope is this our brother doth," the reason why he did so being that it was reported that the person whom he was burying had died in a state of drunkenness. The matter was brought before the right rev. Prelate, who thought he was not warranted in the course he had pursued. The clergyman submitted himself to the judgment of the Bishop; and he was obliged to confess that the information on which he had proceeded was perfectly fallacious, and that there was no ground whatever for saying that the man had died in a state of intoxication, so that an irreparable wound had been inflicted on the friends of the deceased person without any gain to religion. Another proposal made was to vest a kind of joint discretion
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in the bishops and clergy in this matter. But with this scheme geographical considerations had something to do. Some Bishops were much more erratic, and were less easily found than others; in some dioceses railways were less numerous; and a question of Church discipline ought not to depend upon these accidents, To meet this geographical difficulty, it had been proposed that the Bishop's power should be retrospective, and that the clergyman might refuse to read the service on his own responsibility, and then throw the matter into the hands of his Bishop. But very painful consequences might possibly result from this arrangement. A clergyman might rely on the support of the Bishop, and in the end find himself disappointed and deprived of that support. Another proposition found favour with a great many people—that there should be an explanatory or declaratory rule or declaration inserted in the articles, stating that the words of hope were only general words, and ought not to be taken as a judgment upon the state of the particular individual. But he thought it very unsafe to say that words were not to be taken in their natural meaning. It was impossible to say that these words did not express a very high strain of hope in the future happiness of the deceased person. He was sorry to weary their Lordships, but it was impossible, without going through these suggestions, to point out the difficulties of the case. Another suggestion, and one of the most practical, which had been forwarded to him by a clergyman, was the following:—That the service for communicants should be exactly the same as at present; but that in the case of persons who had voluntarily excluded themselves from communion, a service should be prepared for them in which there should be no allusion to the deceased person, but only words of general recognition of the hope of immortality. He now came to the suggestion of the noble Lord (Lord Ebury). Their Lordships had been told in the last debate on this subject that the remedy for all our difficulties was to be found in the American Prayer Book; and they had been told that the American service might be read over the most reprobate criminals—such as a burglar who had been killed in the act of committing a burglary. The words were these—
"Forasmuch as it has pleased Almighty God in His infinite mercy to take out of the world the soul of our dear brother, we commit his body to the ground—earth to earth—ashes to ashes—dust to dust—

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looking for the general resurrection and the second coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."
But he appealed to their Lordships whether such a service could be considered applicable to such a case? If they had to deal with the case of a criminal such as he had mentioned, the only service to be used must be a service of profound silence. The hope of a general resurrection ought not to be suffered to apply to these cases at all. To say that these words would make all our difficulties easy was a complete mockery. No doubt the difficulties which attended the question were very great. He had honestly considered the subject, to redeem the pledge given in a former debate, but he could not say that he was prepared at present with any suggestion. He thought it would be inconvenient if the House were to separate with any idea that a pledge existed on the part of any Member of their Lordships' House that a measure would be brought forward again next Session. He did not believe that any recommendation tending to remove this difficulty would emanate from the bench of Bishops, or that any improvement could be expected to emanate from a Royal Commission.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he greatly regretted that the most rev. Prelate should hold out no hope of a solution of the difficulties to which he alluded, and thought it would be a very great mistake to give up the matter in despair.
THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORKsaid, he did not wish it to be understood that all consideration of the question must be abandoned. He wished simply to convey that no pledge could be given that a satisfactory solution would be found before next Session.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he still entertained the opinion that it would be a great mistake to give up the matter in despair; and he was not without hope that a solution of this difficulty which would prove generally acceptable would ultimately be arrived at.
THE BISHOP OF EXETER(who was very imperfectly heard, and who spoke the latter part of his speech from his seat) said, he had frequently hoped that some solution of this difficulty would be discovered, but at present he entertained no such hope. At the same time, he knew that his Friend the most rev. Prelate would do his utmost to give the subject the most deliberate and anxious consideration; and there was no part of Her Majesty's subjects whom the bench of Bishops would be so glad to satisfy in this matter as their Lordships. But he did not think that any solution of the
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question would be arrived at when Convocation took it into consideration after the recess. If it were possible, he hoped they might get out of this dilemma. Were they prepared to say that the burial service should not continue as an expression of Christian hope over those who were brought to the grave. ["No!"] He thanked their Lordships for that expression of opinion. That being so, they must regard it as an essential part of the funeral service that it should contain the express language of Christian hope. But was that language to be used indiscriminately? It had been suggested that the use of this expression of hope should be left to the discretion of the clergyman. He sincerely hoped that this would never be, that there would never be an inquisitio post mortem at the grave. Then came the question of whether a clergyman who omitted to use the service should be made liable to punishment. He hoped the matter would in this respect be left as it was. At present a clergyman who omitted to peform the service was liable to ecclesiastical proceedings. And so it ought to be. The question then arose, whether a clergyman would lay himself open to ecclesiastical punishment who professed himself unable to use this language over men men who had cast off their Christian allegiance, or who had died, it might be, blaspheming their Redeemer. The utmost punishment that could be inflicted on a clergyman for such an offence was not a heavy one—it consisted of suspension for three months; and he could not doubt that in cases of this kind, where the clergyman admitted his offence against the law, and submitted himself to his bishop to award his sentence, that sentence would be a lenient one. He thought the matter should be left there, unless they were prepared altogether to eliminate the language of hope from the service.

POLAND—ADDRESS FOR PAPERS.
EARL GREY: My Lords, I should infinitely have preferred that my noble Friend near me (the Marquess of Clanricarde), who first gave notice that he would call your attention to the affairs of Poland, should have resumed his Motion on his return to London; but as he does not wish to do so, and as I think it important that it should be brought before your Lordships, I have undertaken the task. I have less hesitation in doing so because I shall occupy a small portion of your Lordships' time, and I know that whatever importance the dis-

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cussion may have it will derive not from what I may say, but from the explanations of Her Majesty's Ministers and from your Lordships' expression of opinion in this House. It is, I think, of great importance that we should have such explanations of the views of the Government and such an expression of your Lordships' opinion, because I cannot look at the present state of things as regards Poland without entertaining very serious apprehensions as to the consequences to which it may lead. I do not forget that my noble Friend the Secretary of State, in discussing the subject not long ago, declared a strong opinion against armed intervention on behalf of Poland. He stated that he thought, that instead of any good likely to arise from such intervention, it would most likely lead to calamity and confusion, and he trusted the tranquillity of Europe would not be disturbed by any appeal to arms in behalf of Poland. I believe that in expressing that opinion my noble Friend expressed an opinion which is shared by a great majority of your Lordships and of the nation. I believe that there are few persons who have carefully considered this critical question, without coming to the conclusion that it is one upon which a war would not be likely to lead to any good result; and therefore I am persuaded that if the question were put distinctly to Her Majesty's Ministers, to Parliament, and to the nation, "Will you, or will you not go to war on behalf of Poland?" the answer would on the part of each be "No." Although I believe that there is a general concurrence of opinion, and that every person in this country is convinced that it is not a case in which we ought to go to war, still I cannot read the papers which have been laid upon the table without feeling great alarm, lest, while we are very far from intending it, we may yet gradually and step by step be led to that most awful conclusion of war. I believe that that is a danger at this moment of a most serious character, and I believe it can only be averted by this country acting upon a clear and well understood line of policy. I therefore regard it as above all things necessary that Her Majesty's Government should not take any, even the smallest, step in this matter, without the fullest consideration as to the ultimate result to which it may tend, and that they should constantly bear in mind how difficult it is, when once embarked upon the wrong track, to know when or how to stop; so that by a single false step they may be betrayed into a
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course which, if they had been asked to adopt in the first instance, they would have refused without hesitation. I believe that their policy, deliberately adopted and firmly adhered to, should also be understood by the nation and by Europe, and that there should be no mistake as to what line this country will ultimately take upon the question. I am confirmed in that opinion by remembering what formerly happened. It is just ten years ago since we were placed in a position with regard to Turkey and Russia not very different from that which we now occupy with regard to Poland and Russia, and at that time both your Lordships and the public would almost unanimously have declared that there was no danger of our going to war with Russia in the Turkish quarrel. I remember being myself so convinced of this, and that it was therefore better to leave the matter in the hands of the Government, that I was one of those who joined in dissuading my noble Friend near me (the Marquess of Clanricarde) from raising a discussion upon the subject. The result, I think, proved that my noble Friend was right in thinking that such a discussion would have been useful, and that we who induced him to abstain from bringing it on were mistaken; for, in consequence of there having been no such public declaration of the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government as would have been elicited by a debate in this House, both Turkey and Russia were left in doubt as to what the policy of this country really would be; and thus it happened, that whereas there would have been no war if it had been distinctly known from the first that we either would or would not support Turkey by arms in her refusal of the demands of Russia (because in the one case Russia would not have committed herself to insist on what she asked, and in the other Turkey would have yielded), the perfect uncertainty which was allowed to hang over our intentions until a very late period encouraged both parties to commit themselves so deeply in the controversy that neither could withdraw, and war was the unhappy consequence. With this experience before me, I feel most anxious that we should have a clear understanding what policy Her Majesty's Government intend to pursue; and I must confess that after carefully looking through the papers I have failed in making out what their policy is. The points on which I wish for some explanation from the Government are, first, what is their expectation with regard to the communication which

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they have made to Russia—what ground have they for believing that those communications, and especially the last, are likely to lead to any practical result? To those who know no more than can he collected from the papers before us, it does appear extremely difficult to make out in what manner the proposals which have been made to Russia are likely to lead to any satisfactory result. I wish to hear from Her Majesty's Government some explanation of the grounds which lead them to believe that Russia is likely to agree to their proposals, or that it is, indeed, in her power to do so. On a former evening the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellen borough) pointed out the difficulties there were in regard to an armistice. He asked—and I have never yet heard the question answered—with whom is the armistice to be made; how are its conditions to be settled; and within what limits is it to be confined? As he truly observed, an armistice requires that there shall be contracting parties, and that there shall be limits fixed within which it shall prevail. Even if Russia were disposed to consent to an armistice, what steps would she take for the purpose? The Russian Government may be perfectly willing to say, "If we are not attacked, we shall be ready to allow things to take their usual course; we are practically in possession of the whole territory. There is no portion Of that territory in which there exists a force capable of maintaining itself against a Russian force." We cannot expect Russia to say, "If persons in arms in any part of Poland attack our authority where it is actually established, we will abstain from resisting them." On the other hand, I do not understand how the insurgents, on their side, are to say, "We will abstain from making those attacks;" because, if they do, it is practically giving up the insurrection. As the noble Earl opposite very justly observed, an insurrection is not a thing which can he carried on in this manner; if it is suspended, it may become extremely difficult to resume it. Again, with regard to an amnesty, I always believed that an amnesty was a measure which followed pacification, not that it preceded it. How is it possible to grant an amnesty until a pacification is attained? Then, with regard to the establishment of free institutions and an administration vested in the hands of the natives of Poland, I think we ought to know from the Government what ground they have for believing that the Poles are prepared to concur in such an arrangement.
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I need hardly remind you that free institutions and a national administration are only practicable provided you have the co-operation of the governed. If they are determinedly opposed to the Sovereign, such a system cannot work, even for a single day. Therefore, before these national institutions can be granted, the Poles must be ready to accept them. All that the public know upon the subject at present is that the Poles utterly repudiate the acceptance of a National Government under Russian authority within the limits of the Kingdom of Poland, as defined by the Treaty of Vienna. They ask for something much more. They ask for the old limits of Poland and complete independence. While the Poles decline to accept national institutions on the terms on which we ask for them, and on which alone we have a right to ask for them, I cannot understand what advantage is likely to result from pressing them upon Russia. Then, again, I would wish to ask whether the Government have sufficiently considered whether experience leads to the conclusion that the interference of third parties between a Sovereign and his subjects, when there are differences between them, is likely to lead to useful results? My own opinion is that useful results only follow when third parties interfere by the strong hand—determined to enforce on both sides the adoption of some middle course. If they interfere merely by advice, it generally happens that such an interference, however well meant, has the same fate as that which proverbially follows interference between man and wife. Concessions which, if offered spontaneously by the Sovereign, would be received with gratitude, when only granted at the instance of some foreign Government are generally received without any gratitude at all, and are used merely as the means of obtaining something more; while, if they are rejected, the fact of their having been pressed upon the Sovereign by a foreign Government increases the dissatisfaction and discontent. Not being able to see, as far as the papers before us contain any information, in what manner the propositions which have been made to Russia are likely to be attended with advantage, I think it is most essential that the Government should explain their views in making them, and what result they expect will follow. I hold it to be beyond doubt, that in cases of this kind, if diplomatic interference does no good, it must do mischief. It certainly must do this mischief—it must encourage hopes on the

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part of the insurgents which, if they are not to be fulfilled, it is cruel to them to hold out. Your Lordships will have observed in the papers that Colonel Stanton three months ago reported to Her Majesty's Government that diplomatic intervention did encourage the hopes of the insurgents, and that their determination to continue the unequal contest might be in part attributed to their expectation that diplomatic intervention would in the end be followed by stronger measures; and therefore that by maintaining themselves for a certain time they had much to hope from foreign countries. If this insurrection is not to succeed, if the Poles are in the end to submit to the overwhelming power of Russia, every man of humanity must desire that the contest should not be unnecessarily prolonged. I dare say most of your Lordships have read a very interesting account of the last attempt at an invasion of Volhynia, which appeared in The Times from its private correspondent. Can anybody wish that such purposeless bloodshed as is there described should be continued? And is there not a grave responsibility incurred by any nation or individuals who act in such a manner as to encourage the continuance of such utterly fruitless contests? There are other dangers connected with this diplomatic intervention. If it goes on, we must look to what the possible result may be. What would happen suppose Russia should send a decisive refusal to comply with your propositions? I do not anticipate that such a refusal will come, for it seems to me, from all we can learn from the usual sources of information, that her returning such an answer is unlikely. But, suppose Russia should positively refuse to agree to your proposals—are we to accept that refusal and to take that rebuff without doing anything more? Can we do that without serious injury to our reputation and to our position in Europe? If we send a rejoinder, if we press our demands with greater instance than ever, are we not taking a very serious step in that course which necessarily leads directly to a rupture of diplomatic relations? Suppose Russia abstains from any direct refusal, and professes her readiness to meet our views, and asks us to join with her in considering what practical measures could be adopted. If that is her answer, in what serious difficulties should we not be involved? We should then have imposed on us the responsibility of suggesting practical measures for the settlement
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of this question. Upon the bases which you have laid down, are there any practicable measures by which a settlement can be arrived at? My Lords, I think there is every reason to believe that even in 1815 the system laid down with respect to Poland was not a practicable one. In 1815 Russia was required to give a constitutional government to Poland. Is there any strong reason to believe that even at that time we imposed upon Russia a task which it was possible for her to perform? But now after half a century of struggle—of mutual wrong on both sides—of turbulence on the part of Poland, and of repression, not to say tyranny—but I am afraid I must call it tyranny—on the part of Russia—after half a century of such proceedings on both sides, is it possible to arrive at a practical settlement upon the bases which my noble Friend has laid down? But if not, and if still we enter into negotiations on these bases, what will be the result? We shall get into interminable discussion; we shall have all the jargon of diplomacy again resorted to; but we shall waste our time without any practicable advantage, and the struggle will be renewed between the parties unless, in the mean time, Poland shall have been subjugated by Russia. My Lords, will not such fruitless negotiations gradually assume the tone of hostility? There will be more and more acrimony on both sides, till, at last, both parties arrive at that state of mind when all peaceable negotiation must come to an end. And, remember that it is not the Governments alone that are concerned in the matter—if it were only the Governments, my apprehensions would not be so great; but I am persuaded that in this country, if the people are taught by Her Majesty's Ministers and by Parliament to believe they have a right to demand a different treatment of Poland by Russia, and to press that right by negotiations which gradually become more angry—if they are taught to believe this, and that these negotiations go on for weeks and months with no practical advantage arising to the Poles, the inevitable result will be that passions will be excited in the public mind which no Minister will be able to restrain, and which will force England into a war. The same may be said of France. Your Lordships will remember that significant observations have already appeared in a French newspaper, which is said to receive official inspiration. That journal has stated that no vague answer from Russia will do—that her reply must

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bear practical fruits, or, if not, France and Europe will not be contented. We must remember, too, that in Russia also this subject excites deep interest among the whole population. Your Lordships may have observed in the papers on your Lordships table that Lord Napier, some time ago, reported that this question of Poland touched all the national and religious feeling of the Russian people. He says that the first symptom of this patriotic feeling was manifested by the nobles at St. Petersburg, who expressed in very strong language their willingness to come forward in support of the Emperor. Lord Napier informs us that a meeting took place, and that at that meeting a strong determination was expressed by those assembled to come forward with their lives in support of the Czar and their religion, on condition—I am not, of course, quoting the exact words—that no concessions were made to Poland. That is a most significant statement of Lord Napier. It was made two or three months ago, and he adds that the example which has been set at St. Petersburg will be followed in the rest of the empire, and that the people will everywhere come forward to support the honour of Russia. He says also, speaking of the time at which he writes, that recruits in the Russian provinces are coming forward with unusual alacrity, and consider that they are going to a holy war. I have seen private accounts of a much more recent date, and they confirm Lord Napier's statements. In one of them it is stated that the same national feeling as that which the Russians exhibited in 1812, and which led them to support their Government with such ardour against foreign aggression, and to make such sacrifices as they did at that period, is showing itself at the present moment. I think, my Lords, that is a very grave symptom; and it is not unnatural that I should feel desirous to know from my noble Friend what is the course which Her Majesty's Government intend to pursue. I could understand the despatches which have been sent to Russia, and the propositions which have been made, if you intended them to lead to a quarrel—if you meant to make out a case of war against Russia under the Treaty of Vienna. I could perfectly understand them if that were your object, though the Treaty of Vienna confers no right on this country to interfere except with respect to the arrangements made at the time that treaty was drawn up. But if that is not the intention—and I am convinced it is not the
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intention—of my noble Friend, then I think this House ought to have explained to it the grounds on which the Government are taking a course which seems so likely to lead to that result, Let it not be supposed because I hold this language that I am more indifferent than any other Member of your Lordships' House to the present state of Poland. I have seen with the same indignation as your Lordships the measures which ultimately produced the revolt; I have observed with as much horror the frightful bloodshed which is now going on; but, at the same time, my Lords, I think a great nation like ours ought not to act on mere impulse. We are bound to consider what we can do and what we ought to do. I do not believe it is the duty of this nation to set up as a general redresser of grievances all over the world, nor that we can undertake the mission of setting right everything we see going wrong in any of the States of Europe. We have acted—I think most wisely acted—on this principle with regard to America. We have there seen with the greatest sorrow and with the greatest surprise a most bloody and what appears to us a most purposeless civil war going on for two years; but Her Majesty's Government have thought—I believe with the almost unanimous assent of the nation—that it would only make matters worse to interfere, and that therefore things ought to be left to themselves. I cannot but think the same is the case with regard to Poland. When I look to the extreme difficulty of interference—to the calamities which a war between this country and Russia would bring on the world—to the almost positive certainty that the flame of war once kindled in Russia would spread all over Europe—to the sacrifices which would be imposed on the people of this and other countries, and the extreme uncertainty whether a successful war would lead to any permanently good result—to the question whether Poland would be able to organize a stable or really independent Government, capable of conducting the affairs of that country in such a manner as to preserve peace and order—when I look to the extreme doubt which must be entertained on that head, and the certainty, on the other hand, of great suffering and bloodshed in attempting to bring about by force any settlement of this question, and to impose some new arrangement on Russia, I do most cordially concur in the opinion of my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs that this is not a case for armed intervention. But

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if it is not a case for armed intervention, I do hope Her Majesty's Government will not, by interference of another kind, aggravate the evil which they would gladly put an end to. It is on these points I am most anxious to obtain information from Her Majesty's Government, and with that object I beg to move, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copies of any further Papers with regard to Poland.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I have no fault to find with my noble Friend either for bringing forward this question or for the tone and temper with which he has addressed your Lordships. If I had asked him to postpone this question, it could only have been on the ground that an answer had not been received from Russia; and if I had asked him to postpone the question, on that ground, I should no doubt have had to ask him to postpone it again, because this is a question on which Her Majesty's Government are not acting alone, and I should not have been entitled and should not have ventured to give an answer as to the effect of the Russian reply to Her Majesty's Government without further communication with the allies with whom we are acting. Such a postponement would have brought your Lordships to nearly the end of the Session, when it would have been hopeless to have had any sufficient attendance on a subject so important. Therefore, I say that I have no fault to find with my noble Friend for now bringing forward this question; and still less could I find fault with him for the tone and temper with which he has addressed your Lordships. His remarks have been made with the hope of preserving the peace of Europe, and at the same time they have been made with the moderation and the fairness which becomes a Member of your Lordships' House, and which becomes the high character of my noble Friend. With regard to the question itself, I confess that I do not agree in the views of my noble Friend. But there are others whose views upon the subject are entitled to attention, and I propose to deal with their views before coming to those of my noble Friend. Although my noble Friend agrees with me that this is not a case for armed intervention, and that armed intervention would be more likely to produce fresh calamities than to put an end to those which now exist, there are many who think that armed intervention should take place, and that the cause of Poland is one of such long-suffering and grievous persecution, and
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that the success of Russia would be so injurious to the fair settlement of Europe, that we ought to be prepared to use arms, or, at all events, to use our fleet for the purpose of menace and intervention. Now, my Lords, when a country has to defend its honour or to stand up in behalf of its independence, one can understand that there should be no previous calculation of chances and consequences, for the very existence of a nation may then be at stake. But when a country is called upon to interfere—first for the sake of humanity, and next for the purpose of re-arranging or redressing the balance of power in Europe—it would then become those who propose to undertake such a war to consider, with great deliberation and with the utmost gravity, its chances and its prospects. At all events, if force is to be used—if money is to be spent and life sacrificed—there should be some clear expectation that an adequate result will be secured in return for the cost and the sacrifice. Now, with regard to the Polish question, directly you begin to examine it there appears to be every difficulty in the way of, and almost every objection which can possibly exist against, a war of that kind. When you are told that a war on behalf of Poland would be justifiable, the question arises, what is Poland? There is a Poland of the Treaty of Vienna, well defined, in regard to which the Powers of Europe have certain rights of interference or remonstrance. But that is not the Poland which is looked to by those who are urging a war on its behalf. So far is this from being so, that from the very beginning of this agitation, when Count Zamoyski made his representations to the Emperor of Russia, the claim has been that the ancient Kingdom of Poland should be restored, and that that kingdom should consist of the various countries and provinces in which any great number of Poles are to be found. I say "any great number of Poles," because there are some of these provinces claimed by Poles in which the Pales are clearly not in a majority. Then, if we look at the matter historically, we find that the Poles who have been rising in insurrection, or who say they have been driven into insurrection, are not confined even to those provinces which belonged to Polands in 1772 at the time of the first partition. As your Lordships are aware, attempts at insurrection have been made in Ukraine, which was yielded by John Sobieski some time in 1720. Now, is this country, is France, is Austria, to under-

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take a war in behalf this indeterminate Poland? You may say, "Here is a homogeneous race which in a particular part of Europe goes to form the kingdom of Poland." But are you to interfere in behalf of the minority where the Poles form only a minority? Are you to say that they shall predominate there over the other part of the population, and to make war that they shall predominate? Then, again, what is the Government on behalf of which you would fight? It is an invisible Government, having no assured existence, no dwelling place, no council with whom you can properly treat. Moreover, what would be the kind of Government which they would establish if you succeeded in interfering in their favour? Would it be the regular and legal authority of a constitutional monarchy? If it was not a monarchy, and if the democratic party in Poland should get the upper hand, are those who intervene in their favour to assist in establishing the democracy? These three monarchies—England, France, and Austria—might well hesitate in so doing. And then the result would be that those in behalf of whom you interfered would immediately turn round upon you and say that your oppression was worse than the Russian oppression, and that your endeavour was to fix upon them a Government which they detest more than the viceroyalty of the Grand Duke Constantine. Many of the Poles themselves have this feeling, and say, "Whatever may be done, let us have no armed intervention; because we know that armed intervention leads to a protectorate, and a protectorate implies interference in all our internal and domestic concerns; therefore, for God's sake, whatever you do, don't give us armed intervention, or establish a protectorate in Poland." But, if even there was not in Poland a Government of which you disapproved, who can say that you would not establish there—surrounded by Russia, by Austria, and Prussia—a focus of disorder, a regular school of agitation with respect to every neighbouring country, so that, instead of a blessing, you would be inflicting a curse upon Europe? I need not proceed further upon this subject, and I do not mention this because there is any considerable party for armed interference; but I say it rather in the prospect of the state of things which my noble Friend apprehends. He apprehends, certainly more than I do, that the time will come when diplomatic correspondence may lead to a demand for war against Russia. I say, that if ever that subject
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came to be considered, all these circumstances must be fully deliberated upon, and the Government must have a clear object before they can venture to come down to Parliament and proposea war against Russia on behalf of the Poles. I now come to the general view of my noble Friend, and I think he will not deny that the gist of his whole speech is that we should do nothing. My noble Friend spoke of examples; but the only example which he quoted was that of the negotiations with Russia which led to, or rather preceded, the Crimean war. Now, in the case of almost every European war there have been previous diplomatic negotiations. One of the most recent cases was the rupture of the Peace of Amiens. A long correspondence took place before that rupture; and I repeat that in almost every case in which war has been undertaken there have been long negotiations, with the hope that war might be averted. So that to say that there were negotiations before the Crimean war, and therefore that negotiation must lead to war, is not a very conclusive argument, nor ought it, I think, to influence your Lordships upon this subject. My noble Friend talks of his plan of doing nothing, and of not entering into correspondence upon this subject, as if that course of policy were certain to insure peace. Now, let my noble Friend consider what took place just seventy years ago upon this question of peace and war. In February 1792 Mr. Pitt, who, I believe was sincerely desirous of peace, said, it was impossible that any man should have the foresight to predict with certainty that this country would have fifteen years of peace; but that looking at the state of Europe, he had never heard of or known the time in which the prospect of fifteen years of peace was more favourable than it was at that time, in February 1792. Now, mark! The French Revolution had then run a great part of its course, and many of the powers of Europe had determined to invade France. Much later in the year Lord Grenville, writing to his brother, gave his views of what was the state of Europe—
"I bless God that we had the wit to keep ourselves out of the glorious enterprise of the combined armies, and that we were not tempted by the hope of sharing the spoils in the division of France, nor by the prospect of crushing all democratical principles all over the world with one blow."—Nov. 7, 1792.
Lord Grenville goes on in this letter to describe what different countries were doing, and he ends by saying, "Other countries may do what they please, we shall do no-

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thing." That is the very policy which my noble Friend now recommends. In November 1792, Lord Grenville mentioned the course of doing nothing as being likely to maintain the peace of Europe. Lord Grenville was a statesman whose authority was much respected—he had it sincerely at heart to maintain the peace of the world, yet he found himself obliged within three months to recommend to Parliament a war that continued for twenty years—a war, the burden of which we are still paying, and which is double the amount of the present income tax—a war during which rivers of blood flowed and millions of treasure were spent. I am not, however, going to advance the opinion that that was a case in which, if there had been an interference a little sooner—or if Mr. Pitt had told the Powers of Europe that he would not interfere with the internal concerns of France—I do not say we should have had peace, though that is my opinion; but this I do say, that the policy of doing nothing and of not interfering does not always save you from war, for it did not save you from the bloodiest and most expensive war that this country ever had. My noble Friend says, that if you go on negotiating, passions will be excited which it will be impossible for you afterwards to restrain. Were there not in that case passions excited that no man was able to restrain? Lord Macaulay compares Mr. Pitt, during the war with France, to the tall man in the crowd who appeared to control its movements, but who was really pushed on by the immense mass of people behind him. If, however, there is danger that if negotiations go on passions may be excited, is that the only danger? Do not tell me that doing nothing will prevent passions from being excited. On the contrary, I believe that would be the very way in which passions would be excited. What has happened? There has been a Russian party, of which Lord Durham told us, in 1831, that it professed the most violent hatred to the Polish nation. Suppose England declared that she would not take a part in the dispute, that she would not whisper a word in behalf of the Poles, or against the atrocities that might be committed by the Russians—that Russian party would probably overbear the Russian Government and the Russian Emperor, and they would say, "We have nothing to do with the Poles but to exterminate them." France would probably not bear that; I do not believe that Austria would bear it. But that Russian party might go on; then
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it would be found that a war with France and Austria could not be averted—a war, moreover, in which the whole of Europe might be forced to take a part. Passions would then be excited. It would be said, let not England play so inhuman and dastardly a part as to stand aloof; and therefore we should at last find ourselves obliged to take part with the other nations of Europe. Observing what great statesmen of this country have done, I have no confidence in this policy of doing nothing; nor can I imagine that a great country like this can separate itself from all the affairs of the world, and say, "Let not our voice be heard or our influence prevail. We must look only to ourselves, and take no part in the politics of the world." We had a great Minister in Sir Robert Walpole, who was peculiarly a Minister of peace. He was continually using the influence of England in the quarrels of France, Germany, and other parts of Europe. He sent a fleet of several sail of the line to Lisbon to secure peace; and he did secure peace, not by being indifferent to what was going on in Europe, for he was constantly using the influence of England. There is, then, according to my noble Friend, the alternative of making war with Russia or doing nothing. I believe that both courses would, in the present case, be inexpedient For Poland. What we have been doing is this:—We have entered into communication with France, which has always shown great sympathy with Poland, and has always been ready to use her influence on behalf of the Poles. We have consulted Austria. The Government of Austria is a wise Government, and I, for my part, rejoice to see that Austria is resuming that power and greatness which she has long preserved in the Councils of Europe. I shall be happy to see her finances restored, to see the discords that have lately prevailed in Austria and her various provinces much abated, to see that she is prepared with a renovated Government in which the voice of the people may find expression in a free Parliament, and to see that Austria is ready to take that high part—and, I believe, it will be a still higher and greater part than she has ever yet taken—in the Councils of Europe. I rejoice unfeignedly in that prospect. The opinions of Austria do not agree with the opinions of Russia or of Prussia with reference to Poland. But it is the opinion of Austria that her Polish subjects ought to be governed with as much attention as possible to their natural distinctions of

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race, their religious observances, and to their customs, habits, and feelings. The result has been, that when the National Parliament met, although some questions were put by Polish Members as to the policy pursued by the Government, and though they made the Address somewhat stronger in some passages, yet the leaders of the Galician and other Polish provinces were, on the whole, satisfied with the Austrian Government, and with the policy which that Government is pursuing in Austrian Poland. When, then, I am told that any self-government is impracticable, I ask why the Russian Government cannot show the same temper, wisdom, and moderation as that of Austria? Why is the Russian Government constantly attempting to suppress the language and change the religion of its Polish subjects? Why do they not indulge the feelings and wishes of Polish subjects? It is, therefore in union with France and Austria that we have made our propositions to Russia; and my noble Friend was therefore mistaken in saying that our interference is like an interference between the Northern and Southern States of America. The North and South have been long fiercely engaged in civil war; but neither to one or the other is England at all pledged or engaged to pursue any particular course of policy. Whereas, in regard to Poland, it is not only on questions of internal government that we have a right to interfere; Russia, having acquired Poland by treaty in 1815, bound herself to certain conditions on behalf of Poland, to which all the Powers of Europe were parties and witnesses, and which they are almost pledged to maintain. Therefore, I say that this is not a case in which it is our duty to be silent, to show complete apathy, and to wash our hands of all concern in the government of Poland. Austria was anxious to propose certain terms; but they were such as, in the opinion of other statesmen, the Russian Government could not well accept. Austria is most desirous of preserving the peace of Europe; but she is most desirous at the same time that the Poles under Russian sway may be contented, and have the rights and advantages which were secured to them by treaty. Combining, therefore, these two things—the interests of peace on the one hand, and the interests of the Polish race on the other—Austria was a party to the proposals that have been made. My noble Friend says there is no Government in Poland with which Russia can make an
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armistice. But so far as an armistice or a suspension of hostilities is concerned, it can be made without any regular agreement by an understanding on both sides. Suppose you have an army in China, and it is desirable for any reason to have an armistice. The leaders of the two armies would not refer this matter to their respective Governments. The leaders of the two armies would enter into a suspension of hostilities with a view to the conclusion of peace; and so this might be done, if it were not that there is, I am afraid, on the part of the Russian Government, and also on the part of the Poles themselves, a disposition to make terms and conditions as to such an armistice which the other party would not be willing to accept. In the first place, the Russian Government say that they cannot treat with the Poles as if they were a regular body—that they are nothing but a rabble. The Poles, on the other hand, if they agreed to a suspension of arms, would expect that some person representing them should be recognised and received in the conferences of the European Powers. It is clear, that when such are the views of the two sides, an armistice is not likely to take place. But there is not the same reason why the other proposals made by the three Powers should lead to no result. The first proposal is that there shall be a complete and general amnesty. That was the first proposition made by Austria to Her Majesty's Government. If there was a complete and general amnesty, it would, I suppose, put an end to all inquiries, trials and punishments for past offences up to the date on which it took effect. That is what it ought to be, and that would, at all events, establish a basis for pacification. I can see no reason why Russia, if she means to have her subjects contented, should not agree to that proposal. Next, we have proposed that there should be a national representation, similar to that which the Emperor Alexander gave to Poland. The Austrian proposal—and this is the only one in regard to which there is any difference—differs from that of France and England. It proposes that there shall be a national representation, participating in the legislation of the country, and possessing efficacious means of control. The third proposal is that Poles shall be appointed to public offices, so as to form a distinctive national administration, inspiring the country with confidence. I do not see why Russia should not agree to those terms. They appear to

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me to be, in the first place, in complete agreement with the intentions of the Emperor Alexander I., and, in the next place, to be the only terms upon which a lasting peace can be established between the Russian Government and the people of Poland. All that we have seen from 1815 to the present time tends to show that the Russian Government, acting by the Russian laws and Russian agents, and holding at naught the religion and the language of the people, can never secure permanent peace in Poland. Well, then, why not attempt another mode? We are bound, I think, according to our view of the Treaty of Vienna, to suppose that Russia is to govern Poland; but has she governed it according to the wishes and according to the nature of the people of that country? My noble Friend thinks that that could not be; and then he asks—which is, no doubt, applicable to all these proposition—"Are the Poles ready to accept them?" That, no doubt, is a question; but it would be impossible for us to propose terms other than those which suppose that the Russian Government is to prevail in Poland. When it is said that the Poles will not accept these terms, that word "Poles" which describes 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 of people in Poland, cannot be applied to every party who is to be found in Poland at the present time. There are the leaders of the insurrection, who have hopes of its success, and who, of course, would not agree to the terms; but there are others, who might say in the words which Livy has put into the mouth of Hannibal—Melior et tutior pax certa quam sperata victoria. For some months the Poles have been endeavouring to establish an independent government. They have weakened, impaired, and almost destroyed the regular action of the Russian Government in Poland; but they have not a single town, they have no Government that they can avow, they have not any regular army which can hold the field against the Russian forces; and many of them would, I should think, be inclined to say, "If we can obtain tolerable terms from Russia, if we can obtain an amnesty, if we can obtain free institutions and the use of our own language in our courts of justice, it is better that the authority of Russia should be restored than that we should go on with a contest which appears to us not likely to result in success." No doubt there will be men who will say, "We can conquer in this war," and who would be ready to listen to the advice of the noble
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Earl, who spoke upon this subject with great eloquence—"We will go on fighting, and we hope to succeed." Looking to the past history of Poland, looking to the force by which the partition of Poland was originally effected—looking to what has been done since 1815 by the Russian Government, I certainly cannot blame any Poles who with the least glimmer of hope continue in the field with the expectation of gaining their independence. But, not blaming them, I say that we can neither assist them in arms, nor can we propose the independence of Poland to the Russian Government. It is only in case—a case which is far from improbable—of there being a considerable majority of the nation which is willing to accept fair terms that these six propositions could be of use. In that case they would be of service to the Poles. They would be a sort of charter to the Polish nation. If the Emperor of Russia were to accept them, they would be a sort of engagement on his part that he would for the future govern Poland on certain bases. It would be his interest to adhere to these terms, because they would give him the best chance of preserving peace in Poland, and preventing that country from being a source of weakness to his empire. It is likely that he would observe them, because any notorious violation of them, any attempt to exterminate the Poles in the Kingdom of Poland, or to destroy their religion and their nationality, must excite the opposition of Europe—an opposition not confined to England, France, and Austria, but combining all the Powers which signed the Treaty of Vienna, and also other Powers which feel the wrong of endeavouring to exterminate that brave and gallant nation. My noble Friend says that any such interference must do mischief. Is he borne out by experience? We know that in 1831, when not much was done, Lord Heytesbury wrote to Lord Palmerston, and said—
"Although your terms have not been accepted, do not imagine for a moment that your representations have been without influence. In those provinces of Russia which are inhabited by Poles most severe punishments have been inflicted. Not a man of the least distinction who was caught in the ranks of the insurrection has escaped without many years of imprisonment or banishment to Siberia; but in the Kingdom of Poland, with the exception of those officers who had violated their oaths, hardly any have been subjected to severe punishment."
That is the testimony of Lord Heytesbury with regard to what occurred then, and my

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opinion is that that experience applies to the present case, and that so far from doing mischief, if anything is obtained for the Poles, it will be obtained by the three great Powers of Europe representing to the Emperor of Russia what justice and fairness and the good faith of treaties demand. Far be it from me to predict what may be the effect of the answer of the Emperor of Russia, or what course, after having received that answer, we may think it our duty to pursue. Everything depends not only on the terms, but the tone of that answer, and on the proofs of sincerity which the Imperial Government may give. There are, I must own, some unfavourable symptoms—more especially the appointment of General Mouravieff as Governor of Lithuania, and the decrees issued by that General, which I have read to-day, ordering the Polish landowners to reside on their estates in order to give help to the Russians, and then exposing them to have their estates devastated by the peasantry, or distributed among that peasantry, if they do not betray the Poles who are in insurrection, and with whom they must have sympathy, although they have not themselves risen. The appointment of such a man as General Mouravieff, and the issue of these decrees, are not favourable to the hopes we may entertain that the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers will act a liberal and merciful part towards Poland; but still I think that it was our duty to make these propositions, and I believe that with regard to the kingdom those proposals will have great effect in keeping up the nationality of Poland. No man expects—Lord Castlereagh did not expect in 1815—that the Poles would ever lose the hope of establishing their national independence. That hope will still cling to them, as it has clung to them for nearly one hundred years, and no doubt if they are tranquil subjects of the Emperor of Russia their national independence will in time be conceded. But if we are so far successful as to prevent this war of extermination from going on; if we are so far successful, in conjunction with France and Austria, as to restore to the Poles a form of Government that at least shall be moderate and just, that shall preserve not only in the homes of Poland, but in her municipal councils and in her national assemblies, that spirit of the Polish people which I believe will never die—which I hope will never die—if we are so far successful, then our diplomacy, I con-
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tend, will not have been exerted in vain, and for my part I shall never be ashamed of having taken part in such negotiations.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, he had great doubts whether his noble Friend who had just spoken, or the noble Earl who preceded him, had fully and adequately stated the position in which we stood in reference to the question under discussion. His noble Friend had referred to the declaration made by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville in 1792; but the situation which he now occupied was entirely different, making the avowal which he did with respect to the impossibility of having recourse to armed intervention—an avowal made, be it borne in mind, at the very moment when the Russian Government was deciding what answer it should give to the six propositions. [Earl RUSSELL: It has decided. The despatch will be sent out from St. Petersburg to-morrow.] The noble Earl proceeds on the assumption that the despatch will be sent from St. Petersburg tomorrow; but it should not be forgotten that what was taking place in the House that evening would, in all probability, reach St. Petersburg before the despatch had left; for the Russian Government, no doubt, had notice for the last fortnight that the debate in which their Lordships were engaged was coming on, and would not unnaturally delay the reply until they received an account of what had occurred to-night. It would then go out to St. Petersburg that, come what might, armed intervention was out of the question; and that, he could not help thinking, was an announcement which was likely to have a vital effect, not only on the tone and manner, but on the substance of the Russian answer. At the same time, he quite concurred with his noble Friend in the opinion that armed intervention was entirely to be deprecated; nor would it be supposed that he took that view from any coldness towards the Polish cause. His association with that cause dated back for half a century—to the time when, with his late lamented friend, Prince Czartoryski, he stood forward in its support at a critical moment. At that time he had no seat in Parliament and could not therefore plead the cause of the Poles therein; but, in concert with that distinguished man, he had communicated his opinions on the subject under the title of An Appeal for Poland—an appeal which he had good reason to suppose had some affect on those to whom it was addressed, It was an appeal, not for armed interven-

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tion, but one to the Allies, by means of which he hoped to gain his point—the independence of Poland. But to revert to the position of the country at the present day, he must observe with respect to the armistice which had been talked of, that however much noble Lords might desire that it should take place, it was hardly to be expected, inasmuch as it would put a stop to the whole proceedings of Russia, and give the Poles a decided advantage. Who, he might add, was to be the negotiator in the matter for the Poles, or who was to give the requisite guarantee?—a difficulty which applied not only to an armistice, but which belonged to the whole of the negotiations connected with the existing struggle. As for this country, we were not in a position to undertake offensive operations. We were, indeed, bound to pay the uttermost attention to our defensive preparations, and he confessed he had heard with astonishment and regret that in some most highly respectable quarters objection was taken to the expenditure as a needless expenditure because they said there was not the least danger of our being attacked. When a man insured his house against lire, he did not neccessarily imagine that a fire must take place. He simply took reasonable precautions against the result of neglect on his own part or that of his neighbour, and thus stood the case with respect to our system of national defence.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I confess, my Lords, that I seldom hear this subject of Poland broached without reluctance, and, for my own part, I have seldom or never taken any part in the debates. I now approach the subject with reluctance, because our judgment and our feelings are apt to be brought into painful conflict. It is impossible not to feel the deepest sympathy and the warmest admiration for the continued struggle of a brave and generous people, suffering under a painful sense of their own denationalization—if I may use the word—and under a feeling of oppression from the Government under which they have been placed. It is impossible not to admire the firmness, the perseverance, and the deathless courage with which, against forces incalculably superior, they have sustained for so many years what they believe to be the cause of their nation. And, on the other hand, I never approach a debate upon the subject of Poland without thinking and fearing that language used in this House and elsewhere may do much
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more injury to that gallant people than it can do good—that it may raise expectations of external assistance, that it may lead the Poles to believe in intervention armed or unarmed, that it may lead to the hope of active interference to obtain that which is their dream—the restoration of their nationality; and that the hopes and expectations so raised may lead to the continuance of a hopeless struggle, only to plunge them into deeper mortification and deeper despondency when they find that those hopes and expectations have—and can have—no possible foundation. My Lords, I confess I was somewhat surprised at the willingness which the noble Earl (Earl Russell) expressed to enter upon this discussion at this moment; because it does not appear to me the most opportune moment for discussing the vain question of the propositions which have been submitted to the Russian Government when we are expecting the answer of that Government, and when it is possible that the language used here may affect that answer either in one way or the other. On the one hand, the Russian Government may be justly irritated if any language is used in this House holding forth the intervention of England by armed force, and so with the conjunction of her allies to force on Russia a policy of which she may not approve; and, on the other, they may be led to treat with less consideration the proposals of the Government than they would otherwise do if they have a declaration that under no circumstances will this country go beyond diplomatic representations. Whatever disinclination, however, I may have felt to express such an opinion, it has been entirely removed by the very clear and explicit declaration of Her Majesty's Government, that, whatever may be the answer of the Russian Government, Poland must not expect any aimed interference on the part of this country for the re-establishment of her liberties. I say, that if Her Majesty's Government think it consistent with their duty to make that statement in the present state of affairs, I can have no hesitation in declaring my entire concurrence in that declaration, and my conviction, moreover, that it is the deliberate determination of this country that they will not willingly and knowingly be drawn into hostilities for the purpose of maintaining the liberties of Poland. That being the case, I confess I have some apprehension as to the possible consequences of the course which Her Majesty's Government

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have adopted. The noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs sees before him clearly the difficulties which surround an attempt at negotiation; and what I apprehend, and what the noble Earl who commenced the discussion (Earl Grey) apprehends is, that although this country, and although Her Majesty's Government may be determined not to be drawn into a war as a consequence of their representation, yet that gradually the effect of diplomatic negotiations may be such as to bring about disagreements, difficulties, and complications which, in spite of us, as in the case of the Crimean war, may, sooner or later, end in hostilities. It is a question whether this country may be dragged into a war, not for the sake of Poland, but into a war against Poland. If we impose certain conditions on Russia and Poland—if we find those conditions impracticable—if we find that Russia has acceded to those conditions, but that the arms placed in the hands of the Poles are used against Russia and for the destruction of Russian power, Russia will have the right to come and say, "You compelled me to make these promises, and you compelled me to adhere to them. I have adhered to them, and am now suffering from following your advice." I do not say that we shall have to give our active support to Russia in going to war against Poland—that may be too extravagant a supposition—but we shall be bound in such a case to throw into the hands of Russia the whole of our moral influence and the whole of our moral support. But the danger that suggests itself is this:—When the Government agreed to submit to the consideration of Russia these six propositions, did they come to any understanding with their allies as to what course to pursue in reference either to their acceptance or their rejection?—because it is most important that you should not take one step without being well aware what will be the consequences of that step, It is in that manner that we are drawn into complications. It is in that manner that we are drawn into war. It may be that Austria, France, and England are perfectly agreed upon the next step in the event of rejection. If that be so, I have not a word to say. But if there be no such agreement—if it be left to each separate negotiation to settle what shall be the next step when the answer is received, then I think that the Government have entered upon an improvident course, and that it is impossible to foresee what European complications
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may not arise out of it. For this reason I think it is more to be regretted that the noble Earl should have taken a course in framing his proposals quite different from that of either France or Austria, and that he should have based his demands upon the obligations of the Treaty of 1814. If the noble Earl had said, as France and Austria have said, that it is a matter of European interest—that it is a matter in the interest of Russia herself—that this bloody and devastating insurrection should be put an end to, and that they have united to consider some mode of putting an end to it and finding a remedy for these grievances, I could understand that language, and that, whether the advice were accepted or rejected, it would not lead to any ultimate consequences. But when he appeals on the ground that he has the right to demand the fulfilment of treaty obligations, if he is met by a refusal on the part of Russia to accede to that demand, he is placed in a position not creditable to a first-rate Power. You make a demand, you meet with a refusal, and you are obliged to accept the rebuff that is given you. I therefore regret that the noble Earl should have founded his requisitions upon the obligations of the Treaty of 1814—with regard to which treaty it cannot be denied that many other important provisions have been violated, not only without any step on the part of this couutry, but almost without protest. I do not say whether we can fairly call on Russia to fulfil those obligations, when we have not granted but confirmed to her since that time her dominion over the Kingdom of Poland. I do not hesitate to say that, in my judgment, Russia has not fulfilled the obligations of the treaty and we may fairly call upon her to fulfil them; but what I object to is that it places this country in a position different from the other Powers, and that it makes a refusal by Russia not merely an ungracious act, but an act which very nearly approaches an insult. I will not enter upon a discussion of the six points, as I think it will be inconvenient to do so while the answer of Russia is in abeyance. I am quite aware of the difficulties with which diplomacy is surrounded; but the noble Earl knows not for whom he is acting—he knows not who are his clients. I know whom he wishes to make his clients—the inhabitants of that portion of Polish territory which was handed over to the dominion of Russia by the Treaty of 1814. The noble Earl says that with regard to every-

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thing else we have no right to interfere, and that our requisitions must be limited to giving increased liberty to the Poles in the Duchy of Warsaw. But the great body of his clients reject his propositions altogether. They deprecate the subjection of any of their fellow-countrymen to Russia, and they say they will not recede from this terrible revolution until the Polish nation is made entirely independent of Russia. It is not a very promising position for the noble Earl to start with propositions, when the parties whom he wishes to serve are unwilling to be bound by the terms which he offers. The noble Earl has admitted to-night the difficulty, if not impossibility, of an armistice, which were pointed out so forcibly a few nights ago by my noble Friend near me (the Earl of Ellenborough); in short, it is perfectly clear that it is impossible where you have two parties engaged in a sort of partisan or guerilla warfare—on one side regular forces broken up into small fractions, and recently, I believe, broken up into smaller, and on the other side a body of independent partisans acting for themselves, under the control of a Government—for it is a Government—with which you have no communication. The noble Earl himself allows that the Poles would not enjoy the benefits of an armistice unless they refrained from hostilities of every kind. He tells them, that if they will give up the insurrection and take no further steps, no attack will be made on them; that there will be no fighting when they have laid down their arms and there is nobody to fight. But the Poles' hopes are in their arms; and the noble Earl, in his letter, tells them an armistice, which means that they are to lay down their arms, is an absolutely necessary preliminary to all other measures. He goes on to say—
"In an ordinary war the successes of fleets and armies who fight with courage, but without hatred, may be balanced in a negotiation carried on in the midst of hostilities. An island more or less to be transferred, a boundary more or less to be extended, might express the value of the latest victory or conquest. But where the object is to attain civil peace, and to induce men to live under those against whom they have fought with rancour and desperation, the case is different. The first thing to be done, therefore, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, is to establish a suspension of hostilities."
That is just the thing which, on the confession of the Government, is utterly impossible; and, the preliminary being gone, away goes, of course, all that was to be built upon it. The noble Earl goes on—
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"Tranquillity thus for the moment restored, the next thing is to consult the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna. Prussia, Spain, Sweden, and Portugal must be asked to give their opinion as to the best mode of giving effect to a treaty to which they were contracting parties. What Her Majesty's Government propose, therefore, consists in these three propositions:—1. The adoption of the six points enumerated as bases of negotiation. 2. A provisional suspension of arms to be proclaimed by the Emperor of Russia. 3. A Conference of the eight Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna."
Having dealt with the armistice—which, on the noble Earl's own showing, is at once an indispensable and an impossible preliminary—the noble Earl comes next to deal with the general amnesty, and he says there can be no difficulty in showing that there might be a general amnesty satisfactory to all parties. That was not the language which the noble Earl used when the Emperor of Russia did proclaim an amnesty. The noble Earl was forward then to say that the Poles were perfectly in the right to take no notice of it; and he informed the Government of Russia, in a despatch, that an amnesty could only take place under two circumstances—first, where one party had obtained a complete preponderance and had suppressed the revolt; and next, when the party amnestied had full confidence in the good faith of the Government.
EARL RUSSELL: I said, certain terms must accompany an amnesty to make it satisfactory.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I think the noble Earl also laid it down that the subjugation of one party must be complete, which certainly was not the case then, and is not now. My Lords, I see equal difficulties in carrying out these negotiations whether Russia accept or refuse these propositions. I do not share in the apprehensions that she will refuse, though she might do so with perfect safety after the declaration of the noble Earl that nothing would induce him to go to war. I anticipate she will profess her perfect readiness to enter into a discussion of these points, which will be referred, of course, to a Conference of the eight Powers. Considerable delay, of course, will take place, difficulties will be raised, suggestions will be made, objections taken, and all this time this desolating war will be going on, and not a single step will have been taken by you except this, that by holding out hopes of diplomatic intervention you have given additional stimulus to efforts which cannot lead to any practical result. I do not dis-

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sent from the propositions of the noble Earl taken by themselves, but I object to our entering into any new engagements with Russia, or making ourselves responsible for the performance of obligations which we have imposed, and for the consequences which may result to Russia. Suppose that the consequences should be that the arms which she places in the hands of the Poles should be turned against her, that there should be a state of disloyalty throughout the whole population, that the Polish nationality should be not pro-Polish, but anti-Russian, bound together and determined to contravene all the policy of Russia, you would have placed yourselves in a very embarrassing position, and the consequences might be serious complications for Europe, which less direct interference might have avoided. The noble Earl, speaking of the manner in which this country was led into war in the latter part of last century, and referring to the policy of Mr. Pitt, said, that though we did nothing then, we got into a great war immediately afterwards. But surely the noble Earl does not mean to argue that it was by doing nothing that we got into war? That is an argument, I must confess, much less logical than I should have expected from a great constitutional authority such as the noble Earl. The noble Earl quoted the comparison of Mr. Pitt to the tall man in front of the crowd flattering himself that he is leading them, when, in fact, he is being pushed on from behind. I am very much afraid that the noble Earl is the tall man in this matter. I am afraid, that while in this diplomacy of his he flatters himself that he is leading all Europe, he—the unfortunate tall man—is, in fact, being pushed on by those behind him. If the objects of the noble Earl can be gained with the good will of Russia, and with a studied determination on the part of Russia to act upon them with good faith—if they can be attained to the satisfaction of the Poles, and the suppression of those dangerous dreams of nationality which can only be accomplished at the cost of a European war, I shall be ready to admit that the noble Earl has done good service. But I see great danger in the course on which he has entered. I am afraid that he may do more harm than good; and I should be disposed to regret that this discussion had taken place, except that it has elicited that which I trust will be an effectual answer to the exaggerated hopes which have
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been raised—an assurance, that if the object of those dreams—a national and independent Kingdom of Poland—is obtained, it must be obtained not by armed intervention, not by the assistance, not even with the good-will, but contrary to the judgment, the wish and the desire of England, as well as of the other Powers more immediately concerned, I do not complain of the opinions the noble Earl has expressed, or the principles he has laid down, though I look with some apprehension to the course which he has taken.
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government have no ground to complain of the discretion with which this debate had been conducted. Natural sympathy has been expressed with a gallant and injured, nation, and at the same time the discussion has been marked by a full sense of what is due to the honour and interests of England. But the conduct of the House as a whole, has been somewhat inconsistent on this matter. As soon as the Polish insurrection was announced, eloquent appeals were made to the Government to take their right place by putting themselves at the head of the public opinion of Europe, which inclined so manifestly on the side of Poland. Similar appeals were made in subsequent debates, and we were told of the immense influence we might exercise on the Russian Government by taking this course. Now, however, when the Government have moved, and when they have taken the steps which appeared to them judicious, the two noble Earls who have been the principal speakers this evening have blamed the Government for what they were doing, and tell us that the wisest course was to do absolutely nothing. At times it may be possible for the Government to lead and to check public opinion; but on a matter which they have so deeply at heart I do not believe that the people of England would allow the influence which belongs to this country to be set at naught by their Government, and that no efforts should be made by them to remedy a great and acknowledged evil. I believe it would be perfectly impossible, however desirable it may be held to be, to indulge on all occasions in that dolce far niente policy which my noble Friend (Earl Erey) so ably advocated. Well, then, my Lords, I think that the discussion of to-night has, on the whole, been satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. I think that the principles laid down by my noble Friend (Earl Rus-

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sell) have met with general acquiescense from both sides of the House. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) certainly made some objections. He said that he was much relieved by the declaration of my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary that it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to enter into armed intervention in favour of Poland; but he went so far as to say that the course actually taken by my noble Friend (Earl Russell), with a view to securing the independence of Poland, might have the very contrary effect, and might eventually lead us into a war against Poland. Now, as to the danger of drifting into a war against Poland, in consequence of our remonstrances against the Russian Government, he confessed he was rather surprised to hear such a danger suggested by the noble Earl. He thought it rather too ideal to discuss.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I admit that the expression used was somewhat exaggerated. But what I wished to convey was, that in consequence of the propositions made to the Russian Government by the noble Earl we might ultimately be obliged to throw the whole weight of our influence into the scale against Poland.
EARL GRANVILLE: I do not think that the moral influence of this country can be affected by any such contingency as the noble Earl suggests. The noble Earl also finds fault with my noble Friend (Earl Russell) for having insisted so much on the obligations of the Treaty of 1815. But, my Lords, it appears to me that is really the strongest ground we can take. In relying on the obligations of that treaty we have had the concurrence of Austria; and, in addition, we have had the concurrence of France, which, for certain reasons, is not so strongly in favour of the maintenance of the Treaties of 1815. The whole three Powers have thus been brought to bear in one focus. And it is quite clear the Treaty of Vienna, contracted by Russia as well as by the other European Powers, gives us the right to speak with force on conditions imposed by that treaty. Again, the noble Earl put forward, as one of the hypotheses with which we have to deal, the case of Russia refusing to treat on the bases of our propositions. Now, my Lords, is that possible? Russia, having invited us to interchange opinions on the basis of the Treaty of 1815, can she turn round and say she will not treat at
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all? The noble Earl said he wished to know from the Government whether they had come to an understanding with the other Powers as to the course which should be pursued after the answer of Russia was received. I cannot conceive anything more imprudent than it would have been for Her Majesty's Government to enter into an agreement with other Governments as to our future course, while we were in utter ignorance as to what the answer of the Russian Government might be. The course which Her Majesty's Government have taken is, not to anticipate events, but to deal with cases as they arise; and I believe that is the correct policy for the country, whatever Government may be in power. I think the Russian Government will entertain our propositions. They may, at the same time, take a course that may lead to delay. It would therefore he most unwise in us to come to any positive decision in the case until all the facts enabling us to form a proper judgment in the matter are before us. The noble Earl made a great attack on the proposal for what he called an "armistice." There is no such thing as "armistice" in the despatch. It is a suspension of hostilities. I admit that there may be difficulties in the way of such a suspension, but I do not think it is impossible; and if it is possible, then for the sake of humanity it is a thing which ought to be included in the propositions. One noble Lord has expressed an opinion that this proposition is in favour of Russia, and another believes that it is entirely in favour of Poland. If it is really something half-way between those two extremes, I do not think it will be impossible to obtain this suspension of hostilities—for though this is a guerilla warfare, carried on in various parts of the kingdom, we know it is under one general direction, and that if those who direct the Polish movement are so inclined, they can suspend hostilities on their side. At all events, I am sure your Lordships will be of opinion that we were right in endeavouring to bring about what would, at least for a time, terminate those atrocities which are said to be committed on both sides. The noble Earl spoke of the inconsistency of my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary in not attaching to an amnesty which was spoken of on a former occasion the value which, by his proposition, he shows he would attach to an amnesty now. But I am unable to see any inconsistency in the conduct of my noble

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Friend in reference to this matter. The amnesty offered by the Emperor was on the condition that the Poles should lay down their arms. There was no other condition. But now there is a comprehensive plan, including a Conference of the Powers, submitted to the Emperor, and an amnesty is proposed as one of the measures which should be adopted by His Majesty; and therefore the circumstances of the two cases are entirely different. In conclusion, my Lords, I will say that I think this debate has been conducted in a manner particularly creditable to this House, and that though different views have been expressed, I do not think anything which has occurred here is likely to add to the difficulties which my noble Friend has in carrying on these delicate negotiations.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEwas of opinion that the negotiations had originated in an entire mistake. It appeared to him most inexpedient to say that in any event we would not go to war; yet the honour of the country might be so far engaged in the matter as to make it impossible for us to retract. His noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had endeavoured to show that a do-nothing policy would be an extremely ruinous one, and could not save us from war. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) thought such a policy would actually lead us into war. What was the policy of the noble Earl as laid down in his despatch? He wanted, after all that had happened of late years, to go back to what had been established by the Treaty of 1815. That was a fundamental error. He agreed that we had a right to insist on the terms of the Treaty of Vienna; but the question was as to the expediency of interfering for that end. The circumstances of 1815 were totally different from those of the present day. In 1815 the Emperor Alexander was supposed to favour the Poles, being influenced by the eminent men of that country who composed his Government, and there was none of the enmity which existed now between Russia and Poland. It was impossible then to suppose that the Emperor of Russia should have a Polish kingdom under his sway with free institutions and a free Government; and what was impossible at that time was infinitely more impossible now. In 1815 the Emperor allowed a Polish army to garrison the country; but where was the Polish army now? He certainly entertained grave apprehensions as
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to the results which would flow from negotiations which he thought were founded upon an erroneous basis. It had been said, that an attempt should be made to procure from the Emperor a proclamation suspending hostilities. Why, he would be most delighted to issue such a proclamation, because that would virtually be the end of the war. Our allies would not take it so coolly as his noble Friend seemed inclined to take it if their propositions were not agreed to. But he did not see that it was possible that the propositions made by Her Majesty's Government could tend to the tranquillity of Poland. Whether wisely or unwisely, the Poles seemed determined to fight to the death for their independence. Hitherto, though sharing the universal feeling of this country in their favour, he had said nothing, because so long as we were determined not to interfere by arms in their behalf, it was right to say nothing which would lead them to rush into a contest which he always thought must lead only to bloodshed and misery. But now the case was different, and the question was, not what would happen to Poland or to Russia, but to England. In his opinion we had too many guarantees on hand already, and any new ones should be avoided as far as possible. But if we went side by side with France in this matter, he did not see how we could draw back, and the result very likely would be that we should be drawn into war. He agreed with those who thought that we ought not to go to war about Poland; but while he was afraid that our present interference would not have a good end—and no prospect of such an end had been held out on either side of the House that evening—there was one thing for which we ought to go to war—namely, the honour of this country.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, he wished to make a correction upon a point of historical interest. It was stated that Lord Aberdeen repeatedly declared that nothing would ever induce him to go to war in defence of Turkey. Now, he was pretty intimate with Lord Aberdeen, who, he was persuaded, never said this, and was too well acquainted with public affairs not to feel that circumstances might arise in which it would be necessary to go to war for the honour of this country. Lord Aberdeen certainly hoped and believed that the negotiations then going on would not lead to war; but he never made any declaration half so definite as the one attributed to him—namely, that it was not the policy of this

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country to go to war for the sake of maintaining the independence of Turkey. With regard to the subject before the House, though his noble Friend (Earl Grey) had advised a do-nothing policy, this was not the language of the noble Earl opposite, nor yet of the noble Marquess. But unless we were in a position to do absolutely nothing, and to say not a word in favour of Poland and in reprobation of the cruelties of which she had been the victim, no other course could be taken than that pursued by Her Majesty's Government. If it was their duty to speak at all, they were bound to limit their suggestions within the four corners of the Treaty of Vienna. But his noble Friend (Earl Russell) had not maintained that we were bound to restore Poland to the position in which it was constituted by the Treaty of Vienna; he merely said that the Treaty of Vienna gave us a locus standi, which entitled us to speak on the Polish question along with the other Powers of Europe. It followed, however, that we could not propose to the Emperor of Russia to part altogether with his Polish empire. As to the policy of doing nothing, silence under certain circumstances might not imply assent. We might have no relation with a part of Europe which was the scene of great horrors, and in which great cruelties were being perpetrated; but if we had a locus standi for speaking upon the condition of that country, and yet offered no opinion, we were guilty of a great dereliction of public duty. This was the position of the Government in the present instance. He did not know what the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde) meant by the speech he had just made, but he seemed to advocate a doctrine which ought to be repudiated—that England ought never to speak unless she was prepared to follow up her speech by broadsides of shot and shell, and ought never to use her moral influence on the side of any people, unless she was prepared to go to war in their favour. Now, we were often inclined to exaggerate our advantages as compared with those of former times; but one of the advantages and the blessings which we now enjoyed was certainly an increase in the power exercised by public opinion. In our day, public opinion acted much more powerfully and rapidly, and with much greater certainty, upon the councils of the world than it ever did before, and it would be a grave dereliction of public duty if England, representing as she did to a great extent the
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feeling of Europe, had held her tongue upon the subject of Poland. It was worthy of remark, that during the whole debate no course had been pointed out other than that pursued by the Government, except the policy of total and, he must add, of ignominious silence.
THE EARL OF HARROWBYthought that England could not possibly have stood still and said nothing, while the public voice of Europe was raised against Russia; and in this instance he believed that the noble Earl (Earl Grey) had rather followed the instinct of his nature, which led him to criticise what had been done, than indicated the course which he would himself have pursued in such a case. He must admit that he was far from being sanguine that the propositions made by the Governments of England and France to Russia would be accepted, or if they were accepted, that they would be adhered to. They might, however, lead to some mitigation of the abominable cruelties perpetrated on the Poles, even if they led to no political consequences. It was said that moral force ought alone to be employed; but moral force always meant that there was something else in the background. It did not follow that this something else was always to be used, but it acted on the minds of those with whom statesmen were arguing. He had regretted to hear the impolitic extent to which the leaders on both sides of the House had carried the doctrine of non-interference. Lord Castlereagh was not in favour of revolutions or demagogy, yet at the end of a long war we were at the very point of war with Russia on the subject of Poland, and perhaps nothing but the return of Napoleon from Elba prevented that war from actually taking place. The good Government of Poland was, in fact, a European object, and the object of every European statesman. Her Majesty's Government had in these negotiations too exclusively confined themselves to the Duchy of Warsaw, the pacification of which would settle nothing. It would be the pacification of 5,000,000 Poles in the midst of other large Polish communities, and would lead only to confusion and disorder. It was therefore only with a view to other results that he looked upon the action of Her Majesty's Government with any satisfaction. If it led to a suspension of the scourge which now hung over individuals and communities, it was at present the most that could be hoped for. Express treaty stipulations

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were made in favour of the Poles, that they should receive the rights of self-government, that free intercourse should exist between the different provinces of Poland, and that they should have power of access to each other as Poles. The Treaty of Vienna was the only recognition, on the part of Europe, of the partition of Poland. As Russia had disregarded the stipulations of the treaty in favour of the Poles, her only title to Poland now was the sword. He thought that Her Majesty's Government ought to have gone further than they had done. Austria required some security against an overpowering neighbour, and as long as the noble Earl was content with so narrow an issue as that which he had raised, he could not expect the hearty support of Austria. The only title of Russia to Poland, he would repeat, was the sword, and the sanction of the Government to the Russian occupation of Poland ought to be from that moment withdrawn.
EARL RUSSELLsaid, he desired to explain that he had at present no papers to produce with regard to Poland. As soon as the Russian answer arrived, Her Majesty would direct it to be laid before Parliament.
EARL GREYsaid, that under these circumstances his Motion must be, of course, withdrawn. He objected to the Government asking, not for a real restoration of Poland, but for the re-establishment of the system of government that existed in 1815. He believed that this was an impossibility, and that neither Poland nor Russia would consent to such an arrangement. The course adopted by the Government was a combination of all that was objectionable, and was just one of those middle courses which could lead to no result. He had not, as the noble Earl had suggested, condemned negotiations tinder any circumstances, nor could he admit that doing nothing was the cause of the great Revolutionary War. He still believed, that if the Government had not encouraged the coalition against France and the invasion of that country, that war would never have taken place.
Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

ALTERATIONS IN JUDGES CIRCUITS BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to enable Her Majesty in Council to make alterations in the Circuits of the Judges—Was presented by The LORD CHANCELLOR, and read 1a. (No. 212.)
LAND DRAINAGE (PROVISIONAL ORDERS) BILL.
Report from the Select Committee, That the Committee having found that the Petitioners had no locus standi before them, had not proceeded with the Consideration of the Bill; read, and Ordered to lie on the Table: The Orders made on the 2nd Instant and Tuesday last, discharged; and Bill committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

COLONIAL ACTS CONFIRMATION BILL [H.L.]
A Bill to confirm certain Acts of Colonial Legislatures—Was presented by The Duke of NEWCASTLE, and read 1a. (No. 213.)
House adjourned at a quarter before Nine o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.