Sitting of 5 February 1863

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before Two of the clock.
Message to attend the Lords Commissioners;—
The House went; — and having returned;
MR. SPEAKERacquainted the House that he had issued Warrants for New Writs, for Stoke-upon-Tent, v. John Lewis Ricardo, esq., deceased; for Southampton Town, v. Brodie M'Ghie Willcox, esq., deceased; for Totnes, v. Thomas Mills, esq., deceased; for Andover, v. Henry Beaumont Coles, esq., deceased; for Kent (Eastern Division), v. William Deedes, esq., deceased; for Totnes, v. Earl of Gifford, deceased; for Reigate, v. Hon. William John Monson, now Lord Monson.

NEW MEMBERS SWORN.
For Andover, William Cubitt, esq.; for Southampton Town, William Anderson Rose, esq.; for Totnes, John Ponder, esq.; for Stoke-upon-Trent, Henry Riversdale Grenfell, esq.; for Kent (Eastern Division), Sir Edward Cholmeley Dering, bart.; for Totnes, Alfred Seymour, esq.
NEW WRITS.
For Devonport, v. Vice Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, Chiltern Hundreds; for Cambridge Borough. Andrew Steuart, esq., Manor of Hempholme; for Somerset (Western Division), Charles Aaron Moody, esq., Manor of Northstead; for Cambridge County, Edward Ball, esq., Chiltern Hundreds.
Ordered, That a Committee of Privileges be appointed.
OUTLAWRIES BILL.
Bill "for the more effectual preventing Clandestine Outlawries," read 1°.
THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.
MR. SPEAKER reported, That the House had been at the House of Peers at the desire of the Lords Commissioners appointed under the Great Seal for opening and holding this present Parliament; and that the Lord High Chancellor, being one of the said Commissioners, made a Speech to both Houses of Parliament, of which Mr. Speaker said he had, for greater accuracy, obtained a copy; which he read to the House.

ADDRESS TO HER MAJESTY ON THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.
MR. CALTHORPErose to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in reply to Her Most Gracious Majesty's Speech. The hon. Member said, that although the Government of this country was a popular and constitutional one, it could not be doubted that the personal character of the Sovereign exercised a most important influence upon the country; and in no instance had that influence been more deeply felt or widely extended than during the beneficent reign of Her present Majesty. Under these circumstances, looking to the fact that in the course of nature they might expect at some future period—which he prayed might be a remote one—His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales would sit on the throne of this country, he thought that it was the duty of the House, upon what might be termed the commencement of his public career—His Royal Highness having this day taken his seat in the House of Peers— and also upon the occasion of so important a step as the marriage of His Royal Highness, which was an event of the highest consequence in the life of any man, whatever might be his rank in society, to offer their congratulations to Her Majesty, with, a renewed expression of their loyalty and good-will. When, moreover, all had heard of the beauty and the winning grace of the Royal lady whom His Royal Highness had chosen for his bride, and knew that it

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was a union which was not the result of dynastic motives or political consideration, but was founded on mutual affection, arising from an intimate knowledge of each other, he thought they might look forward with confidence to the future and lasting happiness of the Royal couple. Then there was another member of the Royal Family to whom the Greek nation had offered their crown. When we recollected that only seven or eight years ago we, in concert with our allies the French, occupied the Piraeus, that at that time Russian influence was paramount at Athens, that we had always been the staunch ally of that Power which the Greeks regarded as their mortal enemy and old oppressor, and had always sternly opposed any aggressive extension of their frontier, the unanimous election of Prince Alfred to the Greek throne could only be attributed to the appreciation of the personal character of Her Majesty, to a desire to compliment the gallant Prince her son, and to a conviction that a constitutional system, as it worked in this country, was most conducive to personal liberty and to the material progress of a nation. They were informed in Her Majesty's Speech of the reasons which had induced the Prince to decline that offer. It was not for him to express any opinion of the reasons which had induced Her Majesty's Ministers to give the advice that the offer should be refused; but he might state, that one result of the events which had taken place in Greece was, that the British Government had proposed the cession of the Ionian Islands to the Greek nation. The intelligence and mercantile energy of the Greeks were so great that he had no doubt, that if they could only obtain the services of a chief of ability and of honest purpose, and, following the example of Piedmont under the guidance of Count Cavour, would turn their attention to the internal improvement of their country, they might yet become one of the most prosperous countries in Europe. To such a people the addition of a territory containing a population of 230,000, speaking a common language and sprung from the same race, with the territory of the Seven Islands, could not fail to be of most material advantage. Individually, he congratulated the Government upon having taken the first opportunity of relieving this county from a reproach which had of late years been frequent in the mouths of our ene-
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mies. Since the revolution of July we had always maintained the principle that the governed had a right in the choice of their rulers; but of late years, whenever we had given our moral support to those who were carrying out this principle, we had been met by the sneering reply, "Why, the very Representative Assembly which you gave to the Ionian Islands have repeatedly voted for their annexation to Greece and their release from your yoke, and yet you have refused to comply with their wishes." That this reproach was unmerited there could be no doubt. We were not in the ordinary position of ruler and governed. We had been placed in these Islands by the great Powers of Europe as their Protectors; but if the great Powers would consent, he hoped that the Government would adhere to their expressed intentions, and would concur in the wishes of the Ionians. He believed that this proposal had been a successful stroke of English diplomacy, because our detractors could only say of what was an act of justice that it was a whimsical fit of generosity.
Some months ago a dark cloud of famine lowered over the heads of half a million of the most industrious of Her Majesty's subjects. How that cloud had been lightened, not only by the brilliant generosity of the people of this country, but also by profuse contributions from Her Majesty's subjects in all parts of the world, was well known. From every colony, however distant, from every people, however remote, from all races and from the members of all sects of religion, wherever the flag of England waved, there had come substantial aid and assistance. We had also to acknowledge with thankfulness the munificent offering which was now on its way to these shores from the Northern States of America. It was a cheering sign that, at a moment when the Northern press and Northern politicians were displaying a pettish and almost childish hostility to this country, there were to be found many Americans who, in the midst of their financial difficulties, and with their hearts torn by the dreadful carnage in their armies, in the midst of all the sufferings they were enduring, could feel sympathy with, and offer assistance to, those of our people who were suffering from no fault of their own. The suffering operatives themselves had, by their patient endurance and their law-respecting resignation, proved to the world the signal advantages

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of extended education, cheap literature, and the complete absence of any real political grievance.
The Speech from the Throne informed us that, notwithstanding the distress which prevailed in the manufacturing districts, the state of the revenue was not unsatisfactory. He took that to mean, not only that there was no deficit, but that there might be a surplus, and he trusted that he was not out of order in expressing a hope, that should that be the case, and should a reduction of the Estimates be possible, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would take into consideration the weight with which the income tax pressed upon the poorer portion of the middle classes. That in a year during the whole of which half a million of people had been out of employment, and during five months of which they had been on the verge of starvation, the revenue should be pronounced to be in a state not unsatisfactory was a proof of the buoyancy and elasticity of our resources. He should think that even the opponents of the commercial treaty with France must admit at least that the moment of its conclusion was opportune, for by its action and by its action alone had the deficit which must have resulted from the paralysis of our trade with America been made up and supplied. If the commercial treaty with Belgium only had the same success as had attended that concluded with France, the advantages of which would, he believed, be materially extended in future years, we might fairly say that we had before us a prospect of sound prosperity.
He cordially supported Her Majesty's Government in their determination to adhere to a policy of non-intervention in America. He could understand that at any period of last year they might have been induced to join the Imperial Government of France in proposals of mediation; but after the 1st of January of this year, the day on which the proclamation of freedom to the negroes was issued by Mr. Lincoln, he thought that no Government of this country would have ventured to interfere. It might be said that Mr. Lincoln proclaimed freedom to the slaves over whom he had no control, and that those who were in his power he rather consigned to slavery than attempted to free. But in this he believed that Mr. Lincoln had remained strictly within the Constitution. As President of a great
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federation of States, he had no power to act against any institution in those States; but as Commander-in-Chief he had a right to adopt any measure which might tend to the complete discomfiture and discouragement of those whom he regarded as rebels. Hence this proclamation must be regarded as a military expedient, and not as the result of any moral obligation to the cause of freedom, which of course would operate to the liberation of all slaves in all the States of America. It was also true that the proclamation had not been issued till other means had failed, and was not prompted by a strong feeling against slavery in the North. Indeed, it seemed as if the majority of Northern Americans were indifferent, or at least not unfavourable, to the continuance of slavery; and unless the proclamation exercised a most important effect during the remaining two years of Mr. Lincoln's presidential office, the Democrats, on coming into power, would probably make peace with the Southerns on any conditions they liked to impose. Still the great fact remained that freedom had been proclaimed to millions of black men by the President elected by 30,000,000 of whites. It was difficult not to entertain some feeling of contempt for the Federal Government, for they had brought into disrepute the great principle of self-government. Grosser extravagance, more corruption, and peculations to a larger amount, had been permitted by them than were ever before seen in the world. They had committed frequent violations of personal liberty, of freedom of speech, and of the freedom of the press. They had exhibited to the world a financial system so reckless, so desperate, that it would be ludicrous if it had not involved the most disastrous consequences. But the worst feature of all displayed by the Northerners was the abject moral cowardice of the well-informed classes. From the letter published in connection with the New York State election it was known that at the commencement of the war General Scott counselled a peaceable separation; and from other sources—especially from that self-evidently truthful book of Mr. Russell's—they learnt that these men, who in any other country but the United States would have exercised a commanding influence—statesmen, diplomatists, historians, literary and scientific men, and travellers, nay, even Members of President Lincoln's own Cabinet —

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would gladly have consented to a peaceable separation. Ought not people in this country to believe, or at least to hope, that the most respectable portion of the Abolitionists would gladly wash their hands of the sin and crime of a connection with slavery? And yet throughout the whole country there was not found one man with moral courage enough to stand up and attempt to stem the torrent of popular lust of power—not one who dared to come forward in the hope of softening, reasoning with, or calming the popular frenzy of the moment. Indeed, it seemed as if no American ventured on any public platform who was not prepared to advocate the most extreme opinions in the most violent and virulent language. On the other hand, it was impossible not to feel admiration for the unanimity and patriotism shown by the Southerners, for the dauntless courage and patient endurance of their troops, the consummate generalship and brilliant strategy of their superior officers. Neither had their civil administration nor their fertility of resources proved inferior to their military exploits. The knowledge that they personally were not answerable for the detestable institution of slavery had likewise its share in the sympathy aroused by their deeds. They inherited that institution—they did not originate it—they were born to it; and the result of the meeting of the bishops and clergy lately held made manifest what moral obliquity of vision must be induced by constant intercourse with slavery. Neither was England quite faultless in this matter. Though she had done much for the repression of slavery and the slave trade, and she expended £20,000,000 in the manumission of her own slaves, her people eighteen years ago were such energetic free-traders that, in order to render their free-trade policy symmetrical, they abolished the differential duty upon slave-grown sugar, and thereby gave a fillip to that very slave trade which they were spending a million annually, besides valuable lives, to check by the squadron in the West Indies. It might be said that it was hard on the Southerners that they should be continuously deprived of their means of living. It was hard, no doubt; but in all countries in a state of transition there must be suffering and misery; and how much harder were the sufferings of the slaves, how many generations had gone through similar treatment; and if the system were
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not terminated, how hard would be the sufferings of generations yet unborn! For years the philanthropists of Europe and America had been racking their brains to discover some solution of this vast problem, but they had always been beaten by numbers. How were they ever to buy up 4,000,000 souls? A means at last offered itself unexpectedly. Already more than 100,000 slaves had escaped, and they were told the other day that planters in exposed positions, such as the coast, and banks of navigable rivers, were entering into pecuniary bargains with their labourers. Remembering what the United States were only three years ago, the warm hospitality which they extended to the unfortunate and oppressed of all nations, and that in their population was to be found a larger proportion of prosperous, educated, happy, and contented human beings, enjoying a larger amount of personal independence and personal freedom—of a certain sort— than was to be found in any other country of the world, those who believed in the beneficent acts of an all-merciful Providence were at a loss to account for the infliction of evils so grievous, of miseries so monstrous, as those brought upon that unhappy country by the civil war, unless it were to work out and develop the deliverance and redemption of a race which had suffered so horribly as the negro. The proclamation of President Lincoln was not addressed only to the slaves of the Southern States. Its influence would extend beyond the bounds of the United States. There were three great slave-holding Powers in the world—Brazil, Spain, and the Southern States. It was useless to argue with either of the smaller Powers as long as a nation either of 30,000,000 or of 8,000,000 kept 4,000,000 negroes in bondage. But if President Lincoln's proclamation had the effect of liberating these unhappy beings, he believed ten years would not elapse till Spain and Brazil would cease to be slave-holding countries. In the midst of diverging opinions and conflicting arguments, of reasons based on the same premisses, but arriving at different conclusions, through the chaos of hopes and fears, they still saw shining with steadfast brilliancy the sacred light of human freedom, and the hope of moral elevation for that race which hitherto had been treated as accursed. He had attempted to advocate a great cause, which he believed was the real—though, possibly, the indi-

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reet—origin of this war; and he felt convinced that that the good sense and right feeling of the people of England would always prevent any Government from attempting to interfere with or counteract the possible—and, he hoped, the probable—effect of such a proclamation. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving,
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to thank Her Majesty for the most gracious Speech delivered by Her Command to both Houses of Parliament:
"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing ns that She has declared Her consent to a Marriage between His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and Her Royal Highness the Princess Alexandra, daughter of Prince Christian of Denmark; and for commanding that the Treaty which has been concluded thereupon with the King of Denmark should be laid before us:
"Humbly to express to Her Majesty our full participation in Her sentiments on an event so interesting to Her Majesty, and which, with the blessing of God, will, we trust, prove so conducive to the happiness of Her family, and the welfare of Her people; and to assure Her Majesty that we will make provision for such an establishment as may be thought suitable to the rank and dignity of the Heir Apparent to the Crown of these Realms:
"Humbly to assure Her Majesty that we cannot fail to be highly gratified and deeply to feel the unsolicited and spontaneous manifestation of goodwill towards Her Majesty and Her family, and of a due appreciation of the benefits conferred by the principles and practice of the British Constitution, which has led the Greek Nation to express so strong a desire that Her Majesty's son, Prince Alfred, should accept the Greek Crown:
"To thank Her Majesty for informing us that the diplomatic engagements of Her Majesty's Crown, together with other weighty considerations, have prevented Her Majesty from yielding to this general wish of the Greek Nation:
"To assure Her Majesty that with Her we trust that the same principles of choice which led the Greek Nation to direct their thoughts, in the first instance, towards His Royal Highness Prince Alfred, may guide them to the selection of a Sovereign under whose sway the Kingdom of Greece may enjoy the blessings of internal prosperity and of peaceful relations with other States; and to express our thanks to Her Majesty for informing us that if, in such a state
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of things, the Republic of the Seven Islands should declare a deliberate wish to be united to the Kingdom of Greece, Her Majesty would be prepared to take such steps as may be necessary for a revision of the Treaty of November 1815, by which that Republic was reconstituted, and was placed under the protection of the British Crown:
"Humbly to express the gratification with which we learn that Her Majesty's relations with Foreign Powers continue to be friendly and satisfactory:
"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us that She has abstained from taking any step with a view to induce a cessation of the conflict between the contending parties in the North American States, because it has not yet seemed to Her Majesty that any such overtures could be attended with a probability of success:
"To assure Her Majesty that we share in the concern with which She has viewed the desolating warfare which still rages in those regions, and in the heartfelt grief with which She has witnessed the severe distress and suffering which that War has inflicted upon a large class of Her Majesty's Subjects, but which have been borne by them with noble fortitude and with exemplary resignation; that we trust with Her Majesty that this suffering and this distress are rather diminishing than increasing, and that some revival of employment is beginning to take place in the manufacturing districts:
"To express to Her Majesty our deep gratification at the abundant generosity with which all classes of Her Subjects in all parts of Her Empire have contributed to relieve the wants of their suffering fellow-countrymen, and the liberality with which Her Majesty's Colonial Subjects have on this occasion given their aid, proving that, although their dwelling-places are far away, their hearts are still warm with unabated affection for the land of their Fathers; and to convey to Her Majesty our sense of the value of the constant and laborious attention with which the Relief Committees have superintended the distribution of the Funds intrusted to their charge:
"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us that She has concluded with the King of the Belgians a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and a Convention respecting Joint Stock Companies, and for directing that Treaty and Convention to be laid before us; together with Papers relating to the Affairs of Italy, of Greece, and of Denmark, and to occurrences which have lately taken place in Japan:

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"To thank Her Majesty for having directed the Estimates for the ensuing year to be laid before us:
"To express our satisfaction at learning that notwithstanding the continuance of the Civil War in North America the general commerce of the country during the past year has not sensibly diminished; that the Treaty of Commerce which Her Majesty concluded with the Emperor of the French has already been productive of results highly advantageous to both the nations to which it applies; and that the general state of the Revenue, notwithstanding many unfavourable circumstances, has not been unsatisfactory:
"That with Her Majesty we trust that these results may be taken as proofs that the productive resources of the country are unimpaired:
"To convey to Her Majesty the expression of our deep gratification at the spirit of order which happily prevails throughout Her Dominions, and which is so essential an element in the well-being and prosperity of nations:
"Humbly to assure Her Majesty that we will give our most serious attention to the various measures of public usefulness and improvement which may be submitted for our consideration, and that with Her Majesty we fervently pray that the blessing of Almighty God may attend our deliberations and guide them to the promotion of the welfare and happiness of Her people."
MR. BAZLEY: Sir, in seconding the Address, which has been proposed in answer to Her Majesty's most gracious Speech, I am exceedingly glad of the opportunity afforded for expressing my satisfaction at the general feeling and sentiments displayed in that Speech. We have in it the satisfactory intelligence that we are at peace with all nations, a blessing which I hope may be long continued to us; and it is most gratifying not only to the Legislature, but I believe also to the people of the United Kingdom, that the Prince of Wales is about to form that happy connection which, whilst it secures his own happiness, and will add to the happiness of his Family, has secured the approbation of the country. I believe that His Royal Highness is the worthy son of a worthy sire, and I do not doubt that he will be a solace to the illustrious parent who is spared to him, and an honour to his country.
In common with every feeling man, I deplore the grievous calamity that has
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befallen our brethren on the other side of the Atlantic, where the grievous spectacle is witnessed of brother meeting brother in mortal combat. I wish I could see any prospect of an early termination of that fatal strife. On the contrary, the war, for all I can see, may be continued for a long period, and its continuance cannot fail to be attended by a prolongation of the distress in our own manufacturing districts. The sufferings of the people there have been very acute, but they have borne them with loyalty and resignation; but deep as has been their distress, and much as they long for the restoration of peace, they are still firm in their desire that their labour should not be renewed with material which is the produce of slave labour. The consequences of the struggle between the Northern and the Southern States have fallen upon us in two ways— first, by the loss of the raw material; and, secondly, by the closing of a great market for our manufactured products. We must now, therefore, look not only for new fields of supply for our raw material, but also for new markets in which to vend our products. The distressed operatives of the manufacturing districts have received the kind sympathies not only of their own countrymen, but of every people on the face of the earth. We have had substantial assistance afforded to us from every part of the United Kingdom. I have received important information from Mr. Farnall, the Poor Law Commissioner, on the subject of the prevailing distress, with which I will not trouble the House, as I have received more recent information from Mr. M'Clure, the Hon. Secretary of the Relief Committee. It appears that in the week ending January last—that is, a few days ago—the guardians of 147 unions in the manufacturing districts were affording relief to the amount of £15,612, which was distributed among 221,045 persons. From the Relief Fund during the same week the sum of £39,474 was expended in the relief of 374,630 persons. The total relief was therefore £55,086, which was distributed among 595,675 persons. The total contributions from all sources—the spontaneous contributions of the people of the United Kingdom, of the colonies, and of foreign countries up to the end of January —amounted to the large sum of £760,692. It is quite true that the cotton operatives have been slightly better employed of late

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but I fear that there is no possibility of any improvement at present to any great extent. I regret, too, that the distress is increasing to a lamentable extent among the class of small tradesmen, and other classes who have not hitherto received assistance from the Relief Fund. The fact is, that for the last two years a large portion of the people of the manufacturing districts have been living upon their capital. The workpeople have been compelled to part with their furniture and their clothing, and both they and the middle class of tradesmen have, little by little, exhausted all the means they possessed, so that the provident and the improvident have sunk to the same common condition of distress and destitution. The Savings Bank of Manchester is principally resorted to by domestic servants and other classes than those employed in the cotton trade, and does not therefore afford a fair criterion of the distress among the operatives. The cotton operatives are for the most part spirited individuals who look to building clubs as a more eligible investment, who save money with a view of commencing some little business, and who would not accept the low rate of interest of the savings banks. The distressed labouring classes are now asking for a supply of the raw material; they do not want charity; they only ask for the means of prosecuting their labours and obtaining a subsistence for themselves. I trust that the Government will do something to obtain from our vast colonies an increased supply of cotton. There are many colonial dependencies from which it might be obtained—Australia, the British West and East Indies—and I trust that a year or two will put us in possession of a largely increased supply. There is a prospect of a sufficient supply of cotton being obtained to enable the operatives to work half-time during the ensuing year; but it must be remembered that the inferiority of Indian cotton is so great, that even if they work half-time, the operatives will not be able to earn more than one-third their usual wages. I trust that the producers of East Indian cotton and the authorities of India will be induced to exert themselves, not only for the benefit of the ryot, but of the labouring classes of Lancashire. I may be permitted to refer to the great difference between our cotton trade in 1860 and that in last year. The exports of cotton to all parts of the world were in 1860 £56,000,000 sterling, while
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last year they only reached £37,000,000 sterling. This is a frightful diminution; but the money value of the exports is not a correct indication of the diminution in trade, because, as the price is somewhat increased, quantity and not value is the more accurate test. The fact is, that last year only half the usual quantity of cotton was manufactured. The textile exports of 1860 consisted of two-thirds of all the exports, of which cotton manufactures supplied much the largest portion. So that the importance of the trade in a national point of view is greater than those of iron, woollen, linen, and silk put together. It is true that the industry of the country was generally in a prosperous condition, and that the cotton trade is the only branch of industry under a cloud. The iron trade, the woollen trade, the linen trade, and the silk trade are all in. a state of considerable activity; and if the cotton trade had remained in its ordinary state, there would have been almost too much prosperity for the kingdom to hear with temperance and moderation. In our distress, generous contributions have flowed in from all classes and from every part of the kingdom; but it is only justice to the manufacturing districts to state that up to the end of last year they had contributed very nearly one-half the total amount raised for the relief of the distress. The manufacturing districts have contributed £260,000 for this purpose, besides supporting a multitude of persons at a cost that had never been published. The other parts of the country have contributed £275,000; the colonies £53,000; and from foreign countries the sum of £5,000 had been received. It is with great pleasure that I state that the contributions of the North American States have been most liberal, that they have been received in the manufacturing districts with the greatest satisfaction, and that the utmost gratitude has been expressed for the supply of food which had so timely arrived. I congratulate Her Majesty's Government that they have at length achieved a commercial treaty with Belgium. I know how great are the difficulties that have to be overcome in concluding commercial treaties; but the example which was so beneficially set by the commercial treaty between England and France, having been now followed with respect to Belgium, I hope that the President of the Board of Trade, and the other members of the Government,

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will do everything in their power to extend these beneficial arrangements to the other countries of Europe. In respect of the French Treaty, I do not know how too much can be said in its praise. The advantages derived from the treaty of commerce with that country have nearly compensated for the loss of our American trade. In the year previous to the commercial treaty with France the value of the exports to that country amounted only to £4,754,354, but in the first year after the treaty it was no less than £9,901,179. And here I am glad to acknowledge the gratuitous services rendered by my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden). No greater triumph has ever been achieved by any individual than has followed from my hon. Friend's efforts in bringing about this treaty. I hope the same enlightened policy will spread, and that the nations of the earth will derive the benefit. It will be a satisfaction to the country to see that the Estimates are to be framed on a principle of strict economy. A prospect of a reduction of expenditure at this particular juncture would be most welcome to the country. I trust that Her Majesty's Government will strain every nerve to reduce the public burdens and to make the taxes fewer and lighter to the people. At this particular time—and in the manufacturing districts in particular—the people could ill bear the burden they have to sustain, and I therefore trust that we may have fewer exactions made upon us. I cannot here avoid expressing my trust, that as the labouring classes have conducted themselves with such extreme propriety under extreme suffering, when the day comes for Parliamentary Reform their conduct will not be forgotten. I think it only an act of justice to state that that is my hope, and I believe it is the general wish of the country that the suffrage should be extended in some degree to the operatives in the manufacturing districts. The resources of the British Empire are vast—they are immense; in fact, they are wonderful; and I am sure I only express the wish of the House and of the country when I say that I sincerely hope that those resources may be developed to the honour of the Crown and to the great prosperity of the nation. The hon. Gentleman concluded by seconding the Address.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That," &c. [See page 73.]
MR. DISRAELI: Mr. Speaker, I am sure that there is no passage in the Speech of the Lords Commissioners which will be received with more complete and more cordial sympathy by this House than that in which the persuasion is expressed by the commands of Her Majesty that this House will sympathize with, the sentiments which Her Majesty feels on so interesting an event as the marriage of the Heir Apparent of these realms. Sir, there was a time when Royal marriages were the perplexity of politicians, and it was supposed that by the adroit negotiation of such transactions we might often control and sometimes even change the balance of power. Those times, happily, are for ever passed. But, Sir, it would be, I am sure, a great error to believe that in a country like England, where happily the domestic affections are cherished and venerated, a Royal marriage might not conduce greatly to the power and influence of a Prince. We have seen in our time and in this country what may be the effect in that respect of a Royal alliance. Sir, his Sovereign parent offers to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales an example which, if followed, will, I am sure, endear him to the hearts of all Englishmen; and, Sir, I am equally confident that at this moment he will not forget that other parent whom a year ago in this House we met to mourn, who built up a Royal hearth on the principle of household love, and who yet, by his refined and profound intelligence, elevated it above the majesty of thrones. Sir, there is another matter in the Speech in which this House must deeply sympathize. I refer to the communication which has been made by command of Her Majesty as to that portion of our fellow-countrymen who have been subjected of late to so great a vicissitude in their fortunes. But, Sir, when we remember the fortitude with which they have endured that visitation, when we remember the spirit with which our suffering fellow-subjects have been sustained, I think there is, if I may so express it, some moral compensation for the material losses; and if it prove, as I hope and believe it may prove, that ultimately this trial may conduce to the sounder and more permanent prosperity of the community, I hope we may be justified in treating this great visitation rather as a misfortune than a calamity. Sir, I will not stop to panegyrize the conduct of any

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particular class. I will not offer now a needless, perhaps a fulsome tribute of admiration and approval to any particular body of Her Majesty's subjects. What in this terrible trial is of good cheer for England, is the proof it has furnished of the mutual trust and the entire affection that subsist among all classes of Her Majesty's subjects, and which indicate, whatever may be our form of Government, the existence of a real Commonwealth. If even, Sir, that question had not been touched upon in the Speech of the Royal Commissioners to-day, it would have been impossible, on the re-assembling of Parliament, to avoid inquiring what prospect there is of the cessation of this great misfortune. Her Majesty has not felt herself justified in offering to Parliament any prospect of an immediate termination of the causes of these difficulties. I know that there is nothing more difficult than to ascertain the precise character of contemporary events, though all will admit there is no knowledge more valuable to the statesman and the politician. For my own part, I am bound to say that from the first—and subsequent events have only confirmed my conviction —I have always looked upon the struggle which has occurred in America in the light of a revolution, and of a great revolution. Great revolutions, whatever may be their causes, are not lightly commenced, and are not concluded with precipitation. Before the civil war commenced, the United States of America were colonies, and we should not forget that such communities do not cease to be colonies because they are independent. They were not only colonies, but they were colonizing, and they existed under all the conditions of colonial life except that of mere political dependence. But oven before the civil war I think that all impartial observers must have been conscious that in that community there were smouldering elements which indicated the possibility of a change, and, perhaps, of a violent change. The immense increase of population; the still greater increase, perhaps, of wealth; the introduction of foreign races in large numbers as citizens, not brought up under the laws and customs which were adapted to a more limited and homogeneous race; the character of the political constitution, consequent perhaps on these circumstances, which became intolerable; the absence of any theatre for the educated and refined intellects of the
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country, which deteriorated public spirit and lowered public morality; but, above all, the increasing influence of the United States upon the political fortunes of Europe—these were all circumstances which indicated the more than possibility that the mere colonial character of these communities might suddenly and violently be subverted, and those imperial characteristics appear which seem to be the destiny of man. I cannot conceal from myself the conviction that whoever in this House may live to witness the ultimate conclusion of the consequences of this civil war will see, whenever the waters have subsided, a different America from that which was known to our fathers, and from that even of which this generation has had so much experience. It will, I believe, be an America of armies, it will be an America of diplomacy, it will be an America of rival States and manoeuvring Cabinets, of frequent turbulence, and of frequent wars. With these views, I have myself, during the last Session, exerted whatever influence I might possess in endeavouring to dissuade my Friends from embarrassing Her Majesty's Government in that position of politic and dignified reserve which they appeared to me to have taken up on this question. It did appear to me—looking at these transactions across the Atlantic not as events of a mere casual character, but as being such as might probably influence America as the great French revolution influenced, and is still influencing, European affairs—that there was on our part due to the existing authorities in America a large measure of deference in the difficulties which they had to encounter. At the same time it was natural to feel, what I would not attempt to disguise, great respect for those Southern States who, representing a vast population of men, were struggling for some of the greatest objects of existence—independence and power. It appeared to me that the course which Her Majesty's Government had apparently resolved upon was one which, on the whole, was honourable to this country, and would prove beneficial to all classes of the community. I was therefore surprised and, individually speaking, somewhat mortified, when I found that in the course of the autumn Her Majesty's Government commissioned one of their Members to repair to the chief seats of industry in the country to announce, as I understood it, an entire change in the policy which they

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had throughout supported and sanctioned. It was not an accident; the declaration was made formally, and it was made avowedly with the consent and sanction of the Government. Now, Sir, what did that declaration mean? If it meant anything, it meant that the Southern States would be recognised; because, if it be true that they have created armies navies, and a people, we are bound by every principle of policy and of public law to recognise their political existence. It appeared to me that upon the face of that declaration there was a great inconsistency. I thought that a course of conduct was then recommended by the Government which nothing had occurred in the interval to justify. It is most inconvenient that, upon a subject of such importance, arid upon which the Government appeared from the first to have taken up a correct and dignified position, Her Majesty's Ministers should have exhibited such contradictory conduct and such conflicting opinions, and that during the autumn they should have felt it their duty to communicate this vacillation of purpose and this inconsistency of judgment to the whole nation. At the commencement almost of the struggle we were told by one Minister, who, above all, ought to be best informed on these topics—namely, the noble Earl the Minister of Foreign Affairs—what in the opinion of the Government, were the motives of this civil war. We were told that on the part of the North there was a desire to establish dominion, and on the part of the South to achieve independence. It may have been perhaps indiscreet on the part of the Government to make that public declaration of their opinion; but what are we to say of the subsequent definitions of this contest which have also been supplied by the Government? It is only a fortnight since one of the Cabinet Ministers told us that the whole cause of this war was the existence of slavery, and he vigorously denounced it as a pestilent institution. What agreement is there, then, between the President of the Board of Trade, who spoke but a fortnight ago, and the Foreign Minister, who ought to be the highest authority on matters of this character? What are we to say when one day we find an eminent member of the Cabinet recommending the recognition of Southern independence, and the next day another equally important colleague telling us that none of the conditions on which independence should be recognised
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exist in the Southern States. These varying opinions are so prevalent among the members of the Government that only a day or two ago one of them, not yet admitted to the Cabinet, but whose lips are steeped in the gravity of the Privy Council, told us that in the opinion of the Government the "Lord of Hosts was on the side of the Southern States." Sir, I think it is very much to be regretted that the Government did not adhere to that reserve which distinguished them last Session upon this subject, and that it is much to be regretted, that unless a change has taken place in their policy, there should not have been more silence during the recess as to their individual opinions.
But whatever may have been the disinclination of Her Majesty's Government to interfere in the conflict between the Northern and Southern States, there does not appear to have been any objection to interference in other States. So far as we can judge of the state of affairs, they have employed the autumn in interfering in almost every part of the world, except America. Their objection, therefore, to interfering is not an abstract one. We are promised in the Speech of the Royal Commissioners papers in reference to Greece, Italy, and Denmark. I should say that on all those subjects papers are very necessary; they may throw some light upon transactions and communications which certainly startled and perplexed us during the recess. But there is one country which is not mentioned in the Royal Speech, respecting which I should be glad to get some information and some particulars as affecting the popular question of the day—non-interference—and that is China. I wish we had a more accurate, or rather, I should say, a more precise idea of what our relations are with the Chinese, and what is going on with the Chinese, than seems to be in the possession of Parliament, and I wish we could command more knowledge on the subject than is to be obtained from the Royal Speech. So far as I can judge from the communications which arrive by every mail, there is constant fighting going on in China, and that fighting appears to be supported in a great degree by our fellow subjects. By one mail we learn that a British Admiral is severely wounded. Another mail informs us that an English Colonel has been killed. A great deal of slaughter is oc-

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casioned by causes at present unknown to us. But in the recess there was a communication made to the public by a member of the Government on the subject of China, which was of a startling character. There was a meeting of a scientific society, the Geographical Society, and it was attended by some very distinguished officers in Her Majesty's service, and these officers informed the meeting that they were going to China, having been engaged by the Emperor of China, to enlist their fellow subjects to fight in his behalf—in fact, another Spanish Legion. That was a communication which created a considerable effect, and there seemed some doubt on the part of the eminent chairman whether it could be depended upon; so, seeing a member of the Government present, he ventured to appeal to the right hon. Gentleman whether there was any authority for the statement made to the meeting, and that right hon. Gentleman rose and said it was perfectly true; he entirely agreed in the operations and enterprise, and wished all success to the gallant Englishmen who were enlisting their countrymen to fight for the Tartar dynasty of China, and he trusted that they would completely accomplish their object. There is, then, war in China. Officers in Her Majesty's service are enlisting British subjects, in order to interfere between the Emperor of China and his rebellious subjects; and I want to know whether that is a policy which the House approves, and whether they do not think it requires some explanation? Let me remind the House that about twenty-five years since our Chinese policy commenced. The noble Lord, the present First Minister, may be said to be its author. It began by attempting to put down the Tartar dynasty, and the noble Lord when informed by the late much respected Sir James Graham, then a Member of this House, that the population of China was very considerable, nearly half the population of the globe, and that it was not so very easy to put down a Government commanding resources of such magnitude, said it was very true the population consisted of about 300,000,000, but half the population consisted of secret societies; that the great body of the subjects of the Emperor of China were discontented with his Government, and he was confident they would have support of which the House had no knowledge; the Government was
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well informed, and the House might depend upon it the war would be successful. The war was successful. It was successful in developing ever since these secret societies, which have taken other names familiar to the House. Twenty-five years have elapsed, and the noble Lord who made war against the Tartar dynasty is now supporting the Tartar dynasty and making war against these rebellious subjects of the Emperor of China. We have completely changed our position. We are making war against the Taeping insurrection. There has been a great controversy in this House as to the origin of the insurrection. Who are the Taepings? What are the Taepings? Sir, I maintain that we have nothing to do with the Taepings. Whether they are patriots, or whether they are brigands, is nothing to the people of England. The status of the Taepings is a question for China, not for England; and if we attempt now in this illegitimate and roundabout manner to support the Tartar dynasty, we shall ultimately be involved in another Chinese war for a different object and on a different side from that which we have hitherto taken. I say it is a matter of great importance, at a moment when we hear for the first time of a reduction of public expenditure, that we should not got involved again in a China war. Chinese wars have been one of the most considerable causes of financial embarrassment in this country, and have led very much to that increase of taxation against which we have heard so many murmurs lately. We are promised in the Speech a reduction of the public expenditure, and no doubt it will not be inconsiderable, or it would not be announced in a Speech from the Throne. I am extremely glad to hear it. I ventured last year, knowing what must inevitably occur, to call the attention of the House to our expenditure. We were then told retrenchment was impossible, because if we retrenched, we should be subservient to France. I am happy to hear now that retrenchment does not involve subserviency to a foreign Power. But if we want any real retrenchment, it is not by a careless and hasty cutting down expenditure, which possibly may be necessary; it is by taking care that our policy is a policy which, does not lead to expenditure. Chinese policy and some other policies lead to expenditure, and we must take care to check such a policy if we want any re-

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duction which is not mere moonshine. We hear a great deal of the frugal Government of the Duke of Wellington, The Duke of Wellington was not a Prime Minister who would have starved the army. The Duke of Wellington, it is well known, had an equal admiration and feeling for the other branch of Her Majesty's service. It is quite clear the army and navy under the Duke of Wellington would be in an efficient and complete state. We are told that in those days we had not the Empire which we now possess. We have some colonies which we did not possess in the days of the Duke of Wellington, but I believe that the colonial expenditure then was greater than it is now, because those considerable changes in the government of colonies, which have led to a reduction of expenditure, had not then been carried into effect. Therefore the Duke of Wellington had a, great army and navy to maintain, and our establishments abroad and our colonies, and yet was a frugal Minister. Why was he a frugal Minister? Because he did not follow a diplomacy of intrigue—because his policy was a truly Conservative policy. It was not a policy of sensation. It was not a policy of surprise. Such a policy may suit Continental nations, where public opinion only takes in the consideration of external affairs. Such a policy may suit new dynasties; but a diplomacy of intrigue and a policy of sensation and surprise are not necessary for a country like England, where liberty and industry occupy sufficiently the energies and minds of the people, and where we are blessed with a Constitution deeply rooted in the convictions of the country and supported by the traditions of centuries. It is necessary clearly to understand this. Let it not be supposed that because we advocate a frugal and economical administration of the public funds, we are opposed to an efficient state of the public service or the maintenance of those establishments abroad which are necessary to maintain our position; and let it be remembered that the inevitable result of a restless policy must be an expenditure very incompatible with the permanency of the reductions which are now promised us.
Well, we are to receive these papers on Denmark, Italy, and other places, I will wait until they are before us before I touch on those subjects, certainly
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before I touch on the subject of Denmark. I may say I think with due humility that Denmark is a subject of which I am not entirely ignorant. I remember in the year 1848 taking the liberty of bringing the subject of Schleswig-Holstein before this House, and I was supported at least with the sympathy of the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I think by a speech from the noble Lord the First Minister. I will not venture to introduce that subject on, this occasion. Not being entirely ignorant of it, I will venture to say of the Schleswig-Holstein question that it is one which few understand and none can explain. Who, then, could have supposed that the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would, during the recent autumn, when we supposed him to be in the enjoyment of that relaxation which I am sure nobody could have grudged him, have thought it discreet and necessary to revive this interminable question—that he should, at a moment when there were so many other points of importance to engage his attention, have deemed it his duty to write a despatch into the merits of which I will not now enter, but of which I must be permitted to say this, that it laid down doctrines apparently contrary to the policy which the noble Lord advocated when he was the most responsible Minister of the Crown? Now, I will hardly make a remark upon what occurred at Rome, because I imagine we must have some information on the subject. I deem it but right, however, to remind the House that two years ago, on an occasion when I thought it my duty to speak in reference to some of our relations with Italy, suggesting that the settlement of the Roman question might not be found to be so easy as some hon. Gentlemen seemed to suppose, I added, that the question of the residence of the Pope was not one to be disposed of offhand; that it was one which involved his independence, one which was equally interesting to Protestant as to Roman Catholic States, and peculiarly interesting, as had always been held by our greatest statesmen, among Protestant States, to the Sovereign of the United Kingdom. I also ventured to say that the selection of the country in which the Pope should take up his permanent residence would, before it could be arrived at, result in considerable and distressing misunderstanding.

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What did the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, who was then a Member of this House, say on that occasion? He said that the fears to which I gave expression were merely imaginary, and that I contemplated the occurrence of contingencies which would probably never come to pass. Now, however, although twenty-four months have not since elapsed, we find Roman Catholic and Protestant Powers in active competition on the very question where the Pope is to take up his residence and under whose influence he is to remain. I shall postpone adverting to the more important considerations connected with this theme until another occasion, but I thought it my duty to remind the House to-night of the remarks which I once made on the subject, and which have been completely justified by the event. Something will, I take it for granted, appear in the papers to be laid on the table which will explain, or at least mitigate, the alarming and intolerable absurdity of the position as it now presents itself to impartial observers. Well, the noble Lord, in this mellow harvest of autumnal indiscretion to which I have been alluding, was not content with disturbing the waters of the Baltic, but appears to have been very active in the Mediterranean; and here, I think, we arrive at a point in reference to which much information ought to be expected from Her Majesty's Ministers. Controversies have often taken place with respect to the foreign policy of the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Very different opinions prevail on the subject, and very different descriptions are given of it. Sometimes the foreign policy of the noble Lord is called spirited, sometimes it is pronounced turbulent. Sometimes the noble Lord is described as the incarnation of Liberalism; at other times he is denounced as the ready tool of any despot, provided only the despot be powerful. We shall, I suppose, have some information in a few days respecting the incredible intelligence which has within the last few hours reached us relative to the conduct of the Government in the case of Brazil. But, be that as it may, there is one point on which the noble Lord has been fortunate enough not to have been misconceived in the course of his life—a destiny which awaits few eminent men. The noble Lord, at all times and on whichever side of the House he happened to sit, has had the credit of being a con-
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sistent and determined and most able supporter of the independence of the Turkish Empire. The noble Lord maintained not only that this independence was of the utmost importance to this country, but went much further, and contended that the resources of Turkey, if they had but fair play, were amply sufficient to uphold her integrity and independence, without the ultimate assistance and contrivance of Foreign nations. The noble Lord was, in short, supposed by some to have taken even an exaggerated view of her case. He opposed, for example, with, great warmth and ardour, the undertaking of a French gentleman to effect the penetration of the Isthmus of Suez. That the noble Lord deemed to be an enterprise dangerous to the Turkish empire. It would, he contended—to use his own expression—cut the territory of the Sultan in two; and he offered, therefore, to the project his strongest opposition. When he took that course, the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs dissented from his view of the question. He was in favour of penetrating the Isthmus, and he gave expression to many opinions which were considered quite heretical by those who took up the same view of the matter as the noble Lord opposite. When, therefore, the present Government was formed, and the noble Lord made choice of the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs to fill the important office which he holds—the very statesman who seemed so widely to differ from him as to the expediency of maintaining the existence of the Turkish empire—great anxiety was felt among some of those by whom the opinions of the First Minister on the subject were shared. But in the course of this extraordinary autumn an opportunity presented itself to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary to relieve the public mind of Europe and Asia from all anxiety with respect to it—an opportunity, which perhaps no Minister has had for a considerable time, of in the most formal manner expressing the policy of the Government on this vital question of the maintenance of the Turkish empire and the general disposition of political influence in the Levant. It so happened that shortly after the House rose there took place in Turkey a series of what I should term artificial insurrections—I mean insurrections got up by foreign agents and patronized and paid by foreign Governments. One of considerable importance took place in Montenegro. That

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insurrection was put down promptly and effectively by the Porte, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, who was supposed—perhaps unjustly—to be a very enthusiastic patron of the Prince of Montenegro, generously wishing to cover his discomfiture and retreat, wrote a despatch to our Government in which he complained of the hard terms which the Sultan exacted from the conquered rebels. Now, I do not think there was any necessity to answer that despatch. That, however, is of course a matter of taste, and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is not a Minister who passes over an opportunity of writing a letter, as we all know. He did, at all events, answer the despatch in question, and very conclusively as to the immediate point of complaint, because he said he did not think the terms were more severe than any conquering Power would, under the circumstances of the case, have exacted. He, however, went further, and said he would take the opportunity of entering into the whole question of our policy with regard to the Turkish empire. Now, all temperate men are, I suppose, anxious for tranquillity in the Levant, as of importance, not only to English but to European interests. That desire is at the same time consistent with the belief that in the case of the subject races of the Porte there should be at least progress, and, for all we know, ultimate independence. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs was, however, not at all satisfied with this moderate opinion. He accordingly laid clown in his despatch, as an absolute alternative, that the Turkish empire must be maintained, or that the subject races—Slavonian and Greek —would be involved in internecine struggles; and that finally, after cutting each other's throats, the country would be partitioned, and that the partition would probably lead to a general war. Not satisfied with this—the despatch is dated the 27th of September, 1862, only four months ago—the noble Lord warns these poor Slavonians and Greeks, representing many millions of an industrious population, that they are not to indulge in what they call great ideas. He says to them, "You aim at terminating your allegiance to the Porte and ultimately reviving the Greek empire, but these are views which we shall never tolerate. They must end in general disaster. They are views which will lead not only to the destruction of the Porte, but which will subvert every
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other throne in Europe." Well now, Sir, a few weeks after this a revolution occurred in Greece, and one of their first steps was to elect an English Prince for their Sovereign. What encouragement the Greeks had to elect an English Prince of course it would not now be convenient to inquire. From what reaches me, I apprehend, however, that that subject will sooner or later occupy the attention of the House of Commons. We were told to-day by Her Majesty's Speech that the diplomatic engagements of Her Majesty's Crown prevented the acceptance of the throne of Greece by Prince Alfred; but if that was the case, why were the Greeks kept in suspense?— a suspense most injurious and most trying under the circumstances in which they found themselves. Diplomatic engagements are precise and positive; they are not engagements more now than they were four months ago. Therefore, this is a passage in the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which requires some elucidation. But that to which I now wish to call the attention of the House is the extraordinary circumstance that about the same time the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—who is opposed to creating any ideas amongst the Greeks of extension of their borders and increase of their territory, to the destruction of the Turkish Government, and ultimately, perhaps, to the convulsion of Europe—should have taken that opportunity to announce the intention of Her Majesty's Government greatly to increase the territory of the Greeks, and that in a very peculiar manner, by reducing the territories of Her Majesty. Upon this subject I hope that we may receive some information to-night. I know that we are told that public opinion has decided in favour of the cession of the Ionian Isles to Greece. I think that the gradual and mature opinion of an enlightened and inquiring people ought to receive the vigilant attention of an English Minister, and should greatly influence his conduct, but I deny that the gabble of clubs is public opinion, or that public opinion is the irresponsible chatter of a desultory multitude. Public opinion upon such a question as the cession of provinces cannot be formed except after mature inquiry, with ample knowledge and the grave deliberation which becomes Cabinets and Parliaments. We are told that this is no cession of territory whatever —merely a resignation of a Protectorate

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intrusted to us under the treaties of 1815. This is very dangerous ground to take; and I most earnestly recommend the House to pause before they accept representations of this kind. The treaties of 1815 intrusted the Ionian Isles to England about in the same manner that they intrusted Paris to the French people. Both parties previously possessed what was intrusted to them. We possessed the Ionian Isles before the treaties of 1815, and it becomes us to consider how we possessed them. We possessed them by right of conquest, and the question immediately arises why were they conquered? You do not conquer places out of mere wantonness or for amusement. The Ionian Isles were conquered because the great men to whom was intrusted the duty of guarding British interests and maintaining British power in those waters represented most earnestly to the English Government that they could not accomplish their behests so long as these insular harbours were in possession of our powerful rival and enemy. It is, or it should be well known, that the occupation of the Ionian Isles by the French was part of the secret negotiations of Tilsit, and it was only in consequence of an arrangement with Russia, before war was declared between that Power and England, that French troops were landed from Russian ships on these Islands, where the injurious influence exercised by them during the war upon British shipping and British interests was so great that no less a man than Lord Collingwood impressed upon the British Government that it was absolutely necessary that these harbours should be in our possession. And they were in our possession. Corfu was not seized in a military sense, but six of these islands, including Cephalonia, which was described by Sir Charles Napier—no mean authority on this or any subject—as possessing the most considerable harbour in the Mediterranean, had been conquered, and had been even years in the possession of England at; the time of the peace. And why was not Corfu in our possession? Why, Corfu was a thorn in our side. We had not succeeded in taking Corfu, but we had strictly blockaded it; and when Napoleon suddenly fell, the French surrendered it to England by a military convention. It was in every sense a military surrender, and therefore, when the Congress of Vienna had to deliberate upon the settlement of Europe, we were in military
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possession of these islands, which we had in fact conquered and occupied, because in the possession of our enemy we had found them most injurious to our power and our interests. The noble Lord proposes that these islands shall now be given to Greece. See what is the effect of that! You are favouring that very policy which, on the 27th of September of last year, the noble Lord denounced with, I think, such unnecessary warmth in his despatch to Prince Gortschakoff. You are increasing the resources, the population, and the wealth of Greece. What interpretation the Greeks put upon this cession you may learn from the meeting which immediately took place in Corfu, and in which they, to use a phrase well understood in this House, intimated to you that they accept the Ionian Isles as an instalment. You are encouraging them to aspire to the possession of Albania, Thessaly, and other provinces, and to develop that great idea which the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary says is full of such fetal consequences, commencing with an attack upon the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, and bringing about possible partition and certain war. It may be right to do all this, and this is not the occasion on which to enter into a discussion as to what our policy ought to be; but let us clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government are now following a policy different from that which they have hitherto pursued upon the Eastern question. They have changed their course. It is not the policy which the noble Lord has always upheld in this House with regard to Greece; it is not the policy which the Foreign Secretary only in September last advocated in such burning terms in his despatch to Prince Gortschakoff. You are entirely changing your course, and you are encouraging the Greeks to occupy that position and to pursue that career which you have denounced as most injurious to the interests of England, and perhaps hostile to the tranquillity of the world. It is said that the Government will not give up these islands without conditions, but the very fact that you are going to exact conditions proves that you ought not to give up the islands; because if the surrender can only be made upon conditions, it proves that the surrender without conditions would be injurious. And then what security have you that your conditions will be fulfilled? What are your

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conditions? To my mind no Minister ever plunged into a deeper abyss of absurdity. Your conditions are that Greece shall have a constitutional monarchy, and at the same time shall not disturb her neighbours. But what is the immediate result of a constitutional monarchy? A constitutional Government immediately produces parties, and is it not quite obvious that the principle upon which the Opposition, or as it will then be called "the Liberal" party, will be formed in Greece, will be the extension of the territories and carrying out the great idea? And therefore when the noble Lord talks of conditions, his conditions will perpetuate the very conclusions which he opposes. If this be true, then, so far as regards Greece, you have changed your policy; so far as regards Greece, you are pursuing a policy which will produce results which you yourselves have deprecated and denounced. So much as to your policy upon Greece. Now, what is its influence upon England? I have shown the House that these islands were taken by us because their possession by an enemy was injurious to our interests, and therefore it is quite absurd to maintain that their possession by England is not conducive to our interests. It is idle to meet us by arguing the case on a technical term and to tell us that we are not the possessors of the islands, but only the protectors. You might as well say that the treaties of 1815 made Prussia the protector of the Rhine, and not the possessor, because the Rhine was given to Prussia for the specific purpose of making a barrier against France; you might as well say that the Italian provinces were only intrusted to Austria for the common good of Europe, as was alleged at the Congress; but Prussia and Austria believed, and believe, that the possession of the Rhine and of the Italian provinces contributed to their power, or do you think they would have retained them? We are told that we are only protectors. Are difficult questions like the cession of a province to be settled by technical special pleading such as this? I am sure the House of Commons will never sanction such a spirit of dealing with public interests. Within the last twenty-five years the route to our Indian possessions has been changed; and, whatever the intention of the treaties of 1815, the country has been constantly congratulated on having a chain of Mediterranean garrisons, which secured our Indian empire. I
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am perfectly aware that there is a school of politicians—I do not believe they are rising politicians—who are hostile to the very principle of a British empire. But I have yet to learn that Her Majesty's Ministers have adopted the wild opinions which have been prevalent of late. Professors and rhetoricians find a system for every contingency and a principle for every chance; but you are not going, I hope, to leave the destinies of the British empire to prigs and pedants. The statesmen who construct, and the warriors who achieve, are only influenced by the instinct of power, and animated by the love of country. Those are the feelings and those the methods which form empires. There may be grave questions as to the best modes of obtaining wealth—some may be in favour of protection of domestic and colonial interests, some of unrestricted competition, or some, of what I am quite surprised has now become so modish— commercial treaties and reciprocal arrangements for the advantage of commercial exchange — propositions which used to be scouted in this House; but there can be no question either in or out of this House that the best mode of preserving wealth is power. A country, and especially a maritime country, must get possession of the strong places of the world. I have heard no argument to justify the course Her Majesty's Government has hitherto pursued, or the expectations they have held out relative to the Ionian Islands. The language of the Speech leads me to hope that the arrangement alluded to is by no means matured. As far as I can understand, from what I have read in other places, a considerable period must elapse, under any circumstances, before that arrangement is effected; and in that time much may happen. You propose to give these settlements, which have been fostered by the power of England, and which abound in wealth and public spirit, to the Provisional Government of what at present certainly is a distracted country. Whatever the present posture of affairs, I trust we shall not precipitately adopt a policy which appears to me to have been taken up with some caprice, and may lead to serious consequences. The noble Lord will have an opportunity of informing us as to the intentions of the Government. I understand that we are not at all pledged by the mode in which the Address is framed to give any approbation to the policy

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indicated in the Speech, With that feeling, I shall, of course, offer no objection to the passing of the Address. But after the formal announcement which has been made I felt it my duty to throw out these suggestions to the House, to show that the question is not one of that simple character which some are apt to suppose—that it may lead to very dangerous consequences, and involve some of the gravest considerations that can possibly be brought before public men.
COLONEL SYKESsaid, he was sorry to say his Indian experience inclined him to strengthen the doubts which he had formerly expressed regarding the likelihood of a perennial adequate supply of cotton from that quarter, and he expressed these doubts in the interests of the helpless operatives in Lancashire, lest the generous public might relax in its efforts to mitigate human sufferings, which, if left to themselves, might give rise to dangerous results. He must warn the House that the present supply, he feared, was only spasmodic, as, owing to the high prices attained in the Liverpool and Manchester markets, the whole of the cotton ordinarily used in India for domestic purposes was finding its way to this country. But was there any reason for believing that the field of culture had been in any great degree enlarged? For the most part in India the cultivators were also the proprietors of the soil, whereas in this country tenants were bound usually by their landlords to a rotation of crops; the Indian farmers were absolutely unfettered by any analogous regulations, and the Government had no power of interference. In case the cultivator thought he could profit more by raising cotton than sugar, indigo, oilseeds, or the cerealea, he might be induced to do so; but otherwise the ordinary instincts of man told us that he would not sacrifice his own interests to the wishes of others. There was no doubt but that India, with its area of 1,488,070 square miles, possessed diversities of soil and climate adapted to the production of all the ten known species of the cotton plant, but whether the farmer would engage in their cultivation depended upon remunerative prices in Europe; and as long as the present prices lasted in Europe, a good deal of cotton would come from India, but he feared they could not flatter themselves that the turning point in Lancashire distress had yet been reached. His hon. Friend the Member for Man-
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chester (Mr. Bazley) had said that we were at peace with all the world. But what was the fact? We were actually at war, contrary to our professed neutrality, with nearly one-third of the Chinese empire, at least a hundred millions of people. The cost of the position which the English Government had taken up in China was not less than £1,000,000 per annum, and the cost of our past Chinese wars, according to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was seven million five hundred and fifty-four thousand pounds, which enormous sum had been spent to compel the Chinese to legalize the traffic in opium for the benefit of the East Indian revenue and the amassing of millionaire fortunes for individuals. The Tartars and the Chinese had been in hostility for the last two centuries, and secret societies had been in constant action in China against the Tartar or Foreign Government. The indigenous Chinese or Taepings, who are now at war with the Tartar Government, were men who professed Christianity, who asked the British nation to accept their friendship, and who had shown that they knew how to conduct trade, notwithstanding the statements of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The truth was, there had been a systematic suppression of all that was favourable to the Taepings and an exaggeration of all that was damaging. It was a fact that since these insurgents had been in possession of the districts from which green tea and silk were obtained, 20,040 bales of silk for the year ending October 31, 1862, had been exported from Shanghai in excess of the usual quantity. That was effected by European agents traversing these so-called desolated districts with money in their hands wherewith to make their purchases, and they were protected and encouraged by the Taepings. This fact alone illustrates the animus that prompts the statement that they are universal desolators. We were now drilling the Tartars—putting arms into their hands, and supplying them with shot and shell, allowing foreigners to command them, and the chances were, from their past perfidy, that they would take an early occasion to turn these arms against ourselves. It was alleged that it was a mockery to call by the name of Christianity the religion which the insurgents professed, and it was said that they ought to be exterminated as blasphemers and desolators. Much blood had been shed, and the Taepings had

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been overwhelmed by our shot and shell, yet they had never retaliated, though provoked by acts at which humanity shudders. He would read an extract from a letter from Shanghai, which he had received by the last China mail—
"S—told me that he was at Tsingpoo at the capture, and had to hold the heads ot fourteen women whose throats were being sown up. There were many more, but he held the heads of fourteen with his own hands."
Sir, said the hon. Member, this is but a microscopic illustration, so to say, of the gigantic horrors that have occurred in our Chinese wars; and the blood both of Tartars and Taepings is reeking up to Heaven in judgment against us. The House was told that the Taepings were blasphemous, and that their Emperor was especially blasphemous. But he (Colonel Sykes) held in his hand the first copy which hurl reached England of a Taeping Bible and Testament. It had been printed at Nanking, by order of this so-called "blasphemous Emperor," and had his Imperial seal upon it, who thus at all events gave his followers an opportunity of judging of his pretensions. All the books of the New Tetsament were complete, and of the Old Testament the Pentateuch was also complete. The translation was the work of one of the ablest of our Chinese scholars, Gutzlaff. So much then for the blasphemous character of the Taepings. With regard to the Tartar boy Emperor, his authority, or rather that of Prince Kung, did not extend far beyond the walls of Pekin; and of this we had a patent illustration by tea boats being stopped above Hankow, and double duties levied, contrary to treaty; which provoked the exploit of Lieutenant Poole, in the gunboat Havoc (appositely named), who not only released the tea boats without paying any duty at all, but brought away as prisoner the custom-house officer of Tan-kau, and seized the Mandarin and Imperial war junks! Yet we were engaged in supporting Prince Kung. At Shanghai we collect the customs duties, and they ought to be sent either to the Emperor at Pekin, or to the local viceroy. But they were instead used in paying Mr. Lay his £4,000 or £5,000 a year, and his forty-one European custom-house assistants; in purchasing gunboats and munitions of war in England, and in paying Captain Osborne and British officers to go out as mercenaries If we went on as we had been doing, we should become the
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rulers of China, as we had become the rulers of India; and how would that be regarded by Franco and Russia? We should inevitably get into disputes, if not into hostilities, with those countries. He was very glad the question had been raised by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, and he hoped that daring the Session a definite vote of the House would be taken on the subject.
LORD ROBERT MONTAGUsaid, that the hon. Gentleman the Mover of the Address had in his speech shown a strong sympathy with the Southern States of America, defended the institution of slavery, and manifested his dislike to the Northern States, his hatred of popular institutions, and his aversion to liberty. The speech of the Mover of the Address was, it was well known, always inspired by the Government; in this case it was of course suggested by the Tory Leader of the Radical party. There was one thing that surprised him in the Royal Speech, and that was the announcement of a reduction of expenditure. He was surprised, because, remembering the antecedents of the Government, he had never expected any reduction in the Estimates. He must confess that he was offended at the tardiness of this act of justice; for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) had shown last year that the expenditure might have been reduced by £5,000,000; many other hon. Members had added their entreaties to the denunciations of the right hon. Gentleman; but Her Majesty's Government turned from them with scorn, and despised both proofs and denunciations. Her Majesty's Government were strong then; but what had happened since? The Home Secretary had nursed and bred up a gang of Thugs, so that it was unsafe to go abroad at night in the metropolis of civilization. The Secretary for India had been threatened with impeachment, and was, it was reported, about to be put in a place of safety, by being stowed away in the pleasant refuge across the lobby. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for Ireland was unpopular in that country. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had been disappointed in his revenue. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs had hedged his real opinions with regard to Denmark, he had meddled with Greece, and got into difficulties in America. The noble Viscount still held the undulating reins of power, but it was with the feeble and senilc

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grasp of a palsied hand. The hon. Mover of the Address had stated that a surplus was anticipated. If there was a surplus, it would be the first that Her Majesty's Government had had to boast of. He (Lord Robert Montagu) however anticipated not a surplus but a great deficiency. It must be remembered, in the first place, that last year had been a very bad year; this was then taken for an excuse; it may not be used as a foil to this year. The Revenue must always be compared with the Estimated Revenue. The total Estimated Revenue was £70,190,000. Three quarters of this was £52,642,000, while the actual receipts in three quarters of a year had amounted to only £51,389,000, thus showing a deficiency of a million and a quarter in three quarters of a year. In 1858–9 there was an expenditure of £60,961,315, and a surplus of £813,401. In 1859–60, when the Estimates were also prepared by Lord Derby's Government, there was a surplus of £1,587,379. But in 1860–1, under the Government of that financial reformer the noble Viscount, the expenditure was £68,354,611, and there was a deficit of £2,558,384. In 1861–2 there was another deficit, to the amount of £2,412,006. What was taken out of the pockets of the people in 1858–9 was less by £4,000,000 than in 1861–2—a year in which there was misery in Lancashire, want in Warwickshire, and starvation, he believed, in Ireland. The expenditure in 1860–1 was eight millions greater than in 1858–9, which increase was owing chiefly to naval and military expenditure. In the years 1858–9 the surpluses amounted to two millions and a half. In the two succeeding years, under the noble Viscount's Government, there were deficits to the amount of five millions, besides which the Exchequer balances were reduced; while we had anticipated all our extraordinary resources—war taxes on tea and sugar, war income tax, and war duties on spirits. This he would prove to have arisen from the meddling foreign policy of the noble Viscount. Sir Richard M. Bromley said, in his evidence before the Committee on Public Accounts (149)—
"The last ten years hare been an exceptional period; it has been a race for building, a race for getting in stores, a race for getting men into the service," hence "Parliament has lost the control which it had," when the "Votes were of the usual amount."
The hon. Member for Finsbury (Sir Mor-
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ton Peto), said, in his book on Taxation, that we had spent £150,000,000 more than we should if expenditure had regained as in 1853. The Duke of Somerset (1408) said—
"The excesses are almost always owing to unforeseen circumstances of an uncertain character —demands made upon the Admiralty for naval force by the Foreign Office, and by the Colonial Office, in different parts of the world."
Afterwards (1522–7) he showed that secret and illegal meddling with other countries was the cause of all this extra expenditure. Mr. Gladstone (1543) said—
"That in 1853–4 the expenditure of the army and navy ran within certain accustomed channels," while "for the last three years either military operations, or political operations approximating to a military character, have been in progress," so that "the Estimates have ceased to be mere financial questions, and have become political questions of the first order."
He afterwards explained this (1554) by saying that it was difficult to estimate when, the country not being in a "recognised state of war," we "had important military operations in hand;" but that before 1853 "questions ran in an easy and established course." This meddling foreign policy might be traced to another cause, also fostered by the present Government. He alluded to the question of foreign loans, which he had brought before the House last Session. It was reported that we were going to guarantee a debt of five millions for the construction of a railway in Nova Scotia. As the Grand Trunk Railway did not pay, he did not see what benefit the country would receive for raising this money by imperial debentures. Last year this country had lent half a million to Morocco and eight millions to the Porte, and the success of both of these loans was secured by the direct interposition of the Government. There was a loan to Venezuela, the interest of which the consul was to gather; besides upwards of eighteen million in loans to other countries. These loans bring us into unpleasant contact with other nations, and cause this constant meddling and expense; besides which, this money, which goes in unproductive works, is withdrawn from the capital which employs labour. If this money did not go abroad in loans, it could not lie idle, but must be invested in industrial works at home. It might be urged that these loans are private matters; yet the Government encouraged the system, when a Commission was sent to one

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country; treaties were made with others, mortgaging the customs to the bondholders, and when an ambassador received the interest in one place, and a consul in another. He was sure he would be answered, as he was last year, by hearing quoted Lord Palmerston's Circular to the Representatives at Foreign States—
"It has hitherto been thought by the successive Governments of Great Britain undesirable that British subjects should invest their capital in loans to foreign Governments, instead of employing it in profitable undertakings at home."
He was glad to be supported in his opinion by the noble Viscount's words; all he complained of was that the noble Viscount did not act up to his words. If he had, we should not have gone to war with Mexico last year for the sake of the bondholders. These guarantees and securities caused meddling; for a security was given only where a debtor had no credit. Now, in the case of a State, how was a security to be realized? By sending ships and armies, and fitting out expeditions. Thus it was that loans caused meddling, while a meddling foreign policy caused expense. He now came to the gravamen against the Government—namely, the proposed dismemberment of the empire. His principal objection to the cession of the Ionian Islands was the suddenness and secrecy with which it had been resolved upon. It was said in excuse that the cause of it was sudden and unexpected—namely, the revolution in Greece; but he contended that Her Majesty's Government must have foreseen that event. No papers had been laid before Parliament to explain it; but the able correspondent of The Times— General Eber—who was now in Greece, had pointed out that one of the main causes of the revolution was the disposition of the Government to centralize the whole administration of the country. Centralization, by increasing the number of boards and of paid functionaries, of course augments the expense of the county; while it took from the people all participation in the management of affairs. If this, then, was the cause of the Revolution, it was not sudden. The cause had operated gradually until the crisis or culminating point was reached. Moreover, the Revolution had begun in Thiotis, where "ignorant peasants, and illiterate men, without one political idea," had all shouted for Prince Alfred. They could know nothing of his character; hence their choice was not made on personal
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grounds. They had not a political idea; and therefore it was not on political grounds. It must have been the result of some intrigue. For revolutionary agents were merely the tools of other Powers; and outbreaks were the anticipated results of intrigues; while the Power who was readiest could possess itself of the passions which were aroused, but which were blind. On this point he could not forbear quoting words used at Sunderland last October, by the Member of the Cabinet who, being the most eloquent, uttered most fully the thoughts of the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had said—
"And if under peculiar circumstances, in his humble sphere, he had been either a promoter or a favourer of revolution, he did not disclaim the responsibility."
He would, however, not press this point. All he contended was, that the pretended cause or simulated occasion of the cession was not sudden nor unexpected. In former days it used to be the practice to uphold the Constitution, to respect the rightful authority of the Sovereign; and non-interference used to be the Whigcry. The year before last, the astounding doctrine had been propounded by Lord Russell, that a people was at liberty to get rid of its rulers; that the sovereign's authority was not to be respected, nor the Constitution maintained. This was followed by ballot-box hoaxes, and annexation decrees. This year we had gone a step further: a people was not to choose its own rulers, nor settle its own affairs; and yet the Constitution was not to be maintained, nor its sovereign to be respected. But the Great Powers (if there were any such) were to impose a King and overturn a Constitution; while the ballot-box hoaxes were still to be practised. And this bitter dose was to be sugared down by the gift of the Ionian Islands. States before now had intrigued to acquire territory, without waging war, without incurring expense, and without running risks. But he had never heard of a Government intriguing to lose a territory which had been gained by the flow of British blood and by the creation of an enormous debt. What right had the Government to give away, without sanction, that which had cost so much money? The money had each year been spent for some object, which was now to be given away without the nation's consent. What right had the Government to contract the landmarks of the Empire? That which had

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been received in solemn trust should not be repudiated in secrecy and haste. The duties arid liabilities of trustees were not pleasant; they were often costly. But when once a trust had been accepted, it was neither safe nor honourable to shirk it. What was founded on international compact remained binding until we had been absolved by the same authority which was a party to it. And if Parliament had voted supplies on the faith of those treaties (which it had done in 1817), then Parliament also should be consulted before the treaty is broken. However, what he especially objected to was the secrecy and haste which had been used, in order to evade the scrutinizing eye of the House. When the House had separated, no one dreamt that the Empire would have been dismembered, shorn, and clipped, before we had again assembled. If such a step were necessary, it could easily have been foreseen, and advice asked of Parliament. Or if Government had no forecast or prescience, then the House could have been assembled in December. He had always observed, however, that these great events were done in the recess, and were accomplished facts when the House met. With such contempt was the House usually treated; so despised on the part of the Government! He would now notice some arguments which had been used in favour of the cession. The Seconder of the Address had brought forward Lord Russell's despatch of August 1860; or rather that of October 1860, which had proclaimed a disregard of law and constitutional government and a scorn of treaties; that of August had proclaimed the sanctity of treaties, and the divine rights of Kings. Soon after the despatch of October had been published Signer Dandolo demanded that, in accordance with its doctrines, the Ionian islands should be ceded. Lord Russell answered by another despatch, in which he refused, on the ground that we had "paramount interests in the Adriatic." On this point he was questioned in the House just before he left it with a peerage, when he proved in reply that Corfu was "a very important position" to us, because of the danger of an insurrection in Greece, and of an attempt being made to extend the Greek Empire. However, that despatch of October, 1860, did not apply to this case; for the Ionians were not Greeks. Their language was Italian. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had addressed
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their assembly in Italian; and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Layard), on May 7, 1861, had said—
"If they could assort nationality, might not Malta and Gibraltar do so too? or even some island with which it might be still more inconvenient for us to part?…. We ought first to define in what nationality consists. Does it mean identity of race, of language, of religion, and of geographical limits? If identity on all these points were required, the Ionian islands had no right to claim nationality with Greece." [3 Hansard, clxii. 1699.]
We had therefore no opening to brag of our consistency, to brag of our generosity to Greek nationalities. Besides, to this desire to do something to brag of, he would apply the old proverb:—"Brag may be a very good puppy, but old Holdfast is a far better dog." We never could persuade other countries that we acted from motives of generosity. For no nation had ever surrendered territory, except on compulsion, or else in exchange for some material benefit. Besides, we piped, but Corfu would not dance. For Corfu resented the notion of being separated from this country. Why, then, should we ignominiously haul down our flag; and let our prestige suffer in the East; where this surrender would be regarded as a sign and symptom of weakness? It was said that the cession of the islands was a financial measure, in order to remedy our state of chronic deficit—to which he had alluded. If that were so, the House of Commons, whose privilege it was to decide on what objects public money should be expended, was, by this measure, being robbed of its control over the expenditure. Again, if the surrender took place merely to relieve our finances, then we certainly had nothing to brag of; we were selfishly consulting our own profit, and foisting off on the Greeks that which it was inconvenient for us to retain. Besides, what saving would be effected? We should not keep one soldier or one sailor the less, after the cession of Corfu. Again, it had been objected that the Ionians were turbulent and discontented, and ungovernable. Yet the Greeks, who could not govern themselves, were not likely to govern those restless islanders better than we could. Again, it was objected that an increase of territory was necessary to the improvement of Greek finances. They certainly were sorely in want of improvement; seeing that for thirty years they had paid no interest on their debt. Yet how an expenditure of £280,000 a year, in keeping up Corfu, would be

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of advantage to Greek finance was not very clear. If it were answered that the expenditure hitherto made on Corfu were not necessary, it would be an admission that the British taxpayer had "been robbed for years to the extent of £280,000 a year. This argument proved too much: for it established this dilemma; either the Government had for years robbed the British taxpayer, or else they would ruin Greece with their baneful gifts. The Greeks had not paid the interest of the loan; yet their financial depravity was to be rewarded by an increase of territory. The Turks had always paid the interest of their debt; and if the boon were to be accorded to any one, it should be to the Turks. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Layard), on May 7, 1861, after saying that "in Albania there are very few Greek families," continued, "Corfu is not Greek, but Albanian; and if given up to any Power, it ought to be surrendered to Turkey." [3 Hansard, clxii. 1700.] Yet Lord Russell, on the contrary, had empowered Mr. Elliot to treat with Turkey for the cession of Albania and Thessaly. Whereupon The Times Correspondent (General Eber) said that this would be "fraught with immediate danger to Turkey," that it would "lead to a dismemberment of the Empire," for that the vassal slates would throw off the suzerainty of the Porte. "Hence this negotiation indicates a complete change of our policy in the East." The strategic objection had now to be considered. The opinion of the Great Napoleon as to the importance of Corfu in a military point of view had been contested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his evidence before the Committee on Colonial Expenditure. The soundness of the opinion of the First Napoleon on that military mutter had been disputed by the right hon. Gentleman; but he had never heard any independent military opinion in conformity with that of the right hon. Gentleman, and it would moreover be hard to invent an argument with regard to Corfu, which did not equally apply to Malta or Gibraltar. The strategic value of Corfu was, however, fully proved by the eagerness with which Corfu had been always seized and grasped by contending Powers in time of war. France had first held it, and it was confirmed to her by the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797. It was then taken from France and erected into a Re-
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public, by the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. Russia then seized it in 1804, and planted 7,000 troops there; France again seized it, and was confirmed in the possession by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807; Lord Collingwood took it in 1809, and it was finally put under our protectorate by the Treaty of Paris, of November 15, 1815. The objection might be quite true that distant positions weaken a state; because that the secret of war, as of a battle, was the power of rapid concentration at a single point. But a strong place, which could be held by a small body of men, acted as a diversion, and had the effect of keeping idle a large force of the enemy, which had to be employed in watching it. History showed that this was more especially the case with an island off an enemy's coast; for as the garrison may effect a landing at any point of the coast, an equal number of the enemy must be posted at various positions. This was clearly proved by the memorandum of the statesman Turgot, written for the use of the, French King, during our war with our American Colonies. Thus Corfu might threaten the whole coast of the Adriatic; and, if surrendered, would be a menace to Trieste, to Italy, or to the Turkish coast of Albania. In this light the Chancellor of the Exchequer regarded the cession of Corfu in 1861. For after saying that—
"It would be a matter of great and serious risk to remove the Ionian Islands from the British protectorate,"—
he continued—
"And I believe it would be nothing less than a crime against the safety of Europe—(I might even say against its immediate tranquillity—as connected with the state and course of the great Eastern question)—if England were at this moment to apply to the Powers of Europe to be allowed to surrender the protectorate of the Ionian Islands for the purpose of uniting them to free Greece. I must confess I think there would be great risk indeed—nay, that it would hardly be compatible with good faith to Turkey, if we were to allow Corfu to become under present circumstances, a portion of the Greek territory." [3Hansard, clxii. 1688.]
The object of Greece in obtaining an extension of territory was merely to carry out the "Greek idea." This was fully proved by the Address of the Ionian Legislature to the Legislatures and Governments of Europe (of March 11, 1861). They used these words:—" The right is practically desired of placing the Cross over the Crescent." And "the first step" (in "the

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emancipation of the whole Greek race,") is "the restoration of the Seven Islands to Greece." Again, the Deputation to the Lord High Commissioner on December 23, 1862, used these words in the Address which they presented—
"We add a hope of seeing magnanimous Albion, who now, by the annexation of the Ionian Islands, strengthens the central home of the liberty of the Hellenic race—a hope, we say, of seeing England also co-operate in the future contest which the Hellenes will have to sustain in the East in the interest of Christian civilization."
It was true that certain vague conditions were appended to the promise of cession. But these conditions had been invented a month after the promise had been made. They were as follows: —
"If the new Assembly of the representatives of the Greek nation should prove faithful to this declaration, should maintain constitutional monarchy, and should refrain from all aggression against neighbouring States."
Now, for how long were they to prove faithful before they were to obtain Corfu? for how long were they to maintain constitutional monarchy? for how long were they to refrain from their projected aggressions? And when Greece had already received the Ionian Isles—if she no longer remained within bounds but fought for her "idea," what would then be our course? How, then, should we coerce her? Should we occupy Greece, while the Russians went to Constantinople, and the French to Syria? Or should we jointly occupy Greece, and quarrel among ourselves in that little corner of the Earth? If we were once to endorse this principle, there would be no end to the claimants and their demands; Jersey would seek a union with France, Gibraltar must be annexed to Spain, and Malta to Italy— unless Malta, indeed, were reserved as a refuge for the Pope when driven out of Rome. The press had been already preparing the way for the cession of Gibraltar. It had been spoken of by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), whispered in the lobbies of the Cortes, and discussed in the Spanish Chambers. The English are said to be so fond of grasping and having that they swallow down unjust annexations in India. Should we, then, now submit to a cession of territory r Should we lose our hold on a strong place like Corfu, Gibraltar, or Malta, on which we had, year by year, spent so much money? Nay, should we allow it to be
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handed over slily behind our backs, and ourselves treated with contempt, as if we were not worth consulting; as if our efforts to assort our rights were puny, weak, miserable, and to be despised? And should we be further insulted by being assembled to see the ink dry on the deed of British dishonour, and the sign of British weakness? On the other hand, what words could be more appropriate than these?—
"To abandon possessions gained at the cost of so much blood and treasure—many of them important outposts for the protection of our commerce and the security of our dominion—would be a violation of public faith and a forfeiture of national honour."
These were the words of the noble Viscount.
MR. MAGUIREdiffered from the noble Lord on the question of Ionian cession, which he thought was a wise and prudent act, and it was one which Sir John Young, the British Governor, had long since recommended. With respect to Lancashire distress, he was glad to learn that it had abated. He, as chief magistrate of one of the principal cities in Ireland, had done everything in his power to evoke sympathy for the operatives; he had, however, now to state that Lancashire distress was very far exceeded by the misery that prevailed in Ireland. The statements which he made last year were evaded or denied, but he had since had the honour of laying upon the table papers proving the truth of all that he stated. But however bad the state of things might last year have been, it was now infinitely worse. There was not, he believed, a single man in Ireland, whatever his rank might be, who was not filled with alarm at the prospect which was before his countrymen for the next twelve months. The last harvest was a melancholy failure. Ireland was an agricultural country, not possessing the resources that this country enjoyed, and she had suffered from a long succession of failures in the crops, of which the last dealt the crushing blow. Some few estates, no doubt, continued prosperous, but generally speaking rents could not be paid with anything like punctuality or to any large amount this year. The small farmers throughout the country were almost annihilated because they were crushed under the weight of an accumulated load of debt, and they had no prospect before them but that Providence might give them an abundant harvest this

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year, which would to some extent compensate them for the successive failures of the previous years. The labouring classes had no employment in the towns, the mechanics and artisans were reduced almost to a state of starvation. The state of things might be indicated by the fact that last year there were 65,000 or 70,000 people leaving Ireland, notwithstanding the war raging in America, and the awful slaughter of their countrymen in that disastrous contest. He solemnly believed, that if there were peace to-morrow in America, and in this he spoke the opinion of many thoughtful and far-seeing Irishmen, that the next census would not show the population of 1845, which was approaching nine millions, but would show something nearer four millions, and he should not be surprised if it did not far exceed three millions. Three bad harvests in succession would tend to bring down the most prosperous nation in the world, but it was absolutely a crushing calamity to a nation like Ireland. Although the state of the workhouses might be, to a certain extent, an indication of the condition of that country, it was no real proof of its prosperity or adversity, because there was no out-door relief there. Would it not, for instance, be a most fallible test to judge of the number of poor in Lancashire by the number of persons in the workhouse? Yet, in Ireland there was no other test. People would not break up all family ties till they arrived at the last extremity, and many of the people of Ireland would rather suffer the direst torments of hunger than go into the workhouse. There was that sense of pride and decency still existing in the crushed-down people of Ireland, but still the number in workhouses was increasing—the number was larger than last year, and fifty per cent over what it was the year before. He rejoiced that the commercial treaty with Prance had produced such great results as they were told it had; but he rose with the one object only of telling the Government in the face of the country that the condition of Ireland was imminently dangerous, and he challenged any Member for Ireland to dispute the statements he had brought forward. It was well when the distress in Lancashire was talked of that he should tell the House what was the state of things in Ireland. He made no suggestion on the subject, but the Government were responsible; and the same people of Ireland who sympathized
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with the distress in Lancashire were entitled to the protection of the English Government and the sympathy of the English people. He believed that employment was the best remedy; but the means of the gentry of Ireland were restricted by the very extent of the calamity with which they had to grapple, and it was to the Government, with the recollection of the struggles and sacrifices of the Irish people to maintain, the honour of the British Crown, that they must look for aid in the existing distress.
MR. C. FORSTERsaid, he was rejoiced to hear of the flourishing state of the revenue, and the country would receive that announcement with great gratification. He thought it unnecessary to remind the Government, in the face of the depression and stagnation now unhappily prevailing in a largo portion of the country, that it was their duty to take advantage of the present state of the finances to give to that portion of the community the relief from the pressure of taxation to which they were entitled. His object, however, in rising was to remind the House of a very serious question which must soon command their attention, he meant the Income Tax; and to press upon the Government the necessity of making some provision to meet the just expectations of the country in that respect. He regarded the Income Tax as a powerful engine at the command of the Government to meet emergencies, and for the remission of indirect taxation; but, looking to the present condition of the revenue and the undue amount of that tax, as well as to its unjust, offensive, and inquisitorial character, he felt bound to declare that the time had arrived when it should be materially modified. He was aware that the Committee which was appointed upon the subject had reported adversely to such a proposal, but he warned the Government that the country would not be deterred by the Report of that Committee from agitating the question, and from insisting upon the relief which was justly their due. He knew that there was a deeply-rooted feeling in the country upon the subject—many cases of undoubted hardship had been brought under his notice, and he was anxious, therefore, not to allow the first night of the Session to pass without calling attention to the matter, and expressing his hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the disposal of the surplus, which

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he believed might be now regarded as a matter of certainty, would direct his attention to the Income Tux as a matter demanding his first notice.
MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he should not have risen in the course of the present debate but from certain observations made by the noble Lord who had recently spoken (Lord R. Montagu). He did not think that this was a time to discuss the question of the Ionian Islands, as there were papers to be produced in regard to it, when it could be more satisfactorily entered upon and the whole details would be better understood. The noble Lord spoke of the attitude and conduct of the Greek nation in reference to the proposed concession. Now, he (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) thought those observations of the noble Lord were most unfair towards the Greek people, who amid the greatest difficulties exhibited the most becoming moderation, prudence, and discretion in their conduct. He was anxious that Her Majesty's Government should inform the House of the negotiations that were going on with the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, as it was of the utmost importance that the present state of uncertainty in regard to the crown of Greece should be removed—whether it was likely that that Prince would accept the sovereinty of that country; and if so, what those mysterious conditions hinted at were, which were connected with the acceptance of the kingly office. After the King left Greece, Her Majesty's Government proposed that a note should be written to the three Powers in the terms of the protocol of February 1830, excluding any member of the reigning families from the Greek throne. It was understood that Russia objected to the note being signed. But the strangest thing was, that it was currently reported in Greece, and generally believed, that Her Majesty's Government suggested Prince Alfred to the Greek nation, or, at any rate, did not discountenance in any way his candidature. Indeed, evidence of this was furnished by the leading articles of the Morning Post, which had long been regarded as the confidential organ of the noble Lord opposite. Some of the earlier articles in that paper were distinctly in favour of Prince Alfred, and were well calculated to mislead the Greek nation. In one of these it was said—
"It is for the Greek nation now to choose whether they will have Liberalism and Conservatism united in the person of Prince Alfred, or
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whether they will have the uncertainty and dangers which must surround the candidature of the -Due de Leuchtenberg."
M. Drouyn do Lhuys, in his despatch of December 4, says:—"The organs of the English Government supported the candidature of Prince Alfred." The evil that had resulted from this supposition was very great. He understood that the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary prided himself on what he had done; he had taken advantage of the Russian Government, and in this manner he had got rid of the Duke de Leuchtenberg; and he considered that he had practised a clever dodge on the Powers. But they must remember the injury done to the Greek nation by keeping them so long in uncertainty, when it was perfectly easy to say at once that the Government could not accept the candidature of Prince Alfred. Why was not Mr. Scarlett instructed in the first instance to express himself distinctly on that point? Deputations waited upon him daily, and he replied that he had received no instructions. His object, however, in. rising was to protest against the language of the noble Lord the Member for Huntingdonshire respecting the Greek nation. The position of the King of Greece was entirely different from that of any other Monarch. He was not elected by the people, but was nominated by the Great Powers on positive guaranteed conditions, which he never fulfilled. The strong monarchical tendencies of the people were shown by the application which they made at once to this constitutional country for a King. In doing so he did not think the Greeks were animated so much by a sense of the advantages which they might obtain from the English alliance as by the knowledge that this country had always carried out a just policy towards them, and that its representatives never took part in the miserable disputes and intrigues which used to agitate the Greek Kingdom. He trusted the noble Lord at the head of the Government would tell them the position of the Duke of Coburg, and allude to the charge that the Government did not discountenance the candidature of Prince Alfred.
SIR JOHN HANMERsaid, that as a Welsh representative he wished to take that opportunity of saying that the Welsh people regarded with great interest everything relating to the Prince of Wales; and, on the part of the Welsh people, he

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begged to express their loyalty, their sympathy, and their gratification at the announcement that had been made that day.
SIR PATRICK O'BRIENsaid, he rose to confirm the statement of the hon. Member for Dungarvan with regard to the present lamentable condition of the tenant farmers in Ireland. Successive bad seasons had rendered them unable to pay more than a portion of their rents, and although landlords had allowed them to occupy their farms for two years under these circumstances, they might feel that their first duty was to their own families, and refuse to allow them to continue in possession a third year. Anything like a system of universal ejectment would too probably be followed by an increase of crime and of those unfortunate assassinations which had lately disgraced the country. He did not say that the Government could interfere beneficially by legislative proposals, but they might very fairly consider whether it would not be possible to give extensive employment on works of a reproductive character.
MR. HENNESSYsaid, he was anxious to express his sense of the state of things existing in Ireland and the impending condition of the country. He wished to make an appeal to the House, not to the Government, for the Government of Ireland was a perfect nonentity—willing, but incapable to do anything. At its head, no doubt, was an accomplished, eloquent, and experienced statesman, but he was surrounded by some half-dozen of the old school of Irish Whigs, who prevented Lord Carlisle from learning the true state of things. The noble Lord was assisted by a Chief Secretary, likewise very able though not experienced, very eloquent, and in that House and in England, he believed, very popular. But of late years there never had been a Chief Secretary of Ireland more unpopular with all classes in that country, or more incapable of understanding Irish interests than the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tarn worth. Why the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, who knew more about Ireland than any other Member of the Cabinet, should have selected the right hon. Gentleman to govern that country he could not understand. Everything that indicated prosperity was wanting in Ireland. The population was declining. The money spent ill works of a reproductive character was every day diminishing. The quantity of live stock, the acreage of
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land under cultivation, the money in the savings banks were all in course of reduction. Ireland had 105 Members, not one of whom was found on the Treasury bench. Could the present be called a representative Government, which did not contain a single Irishman? [An hon. MEMBER: Colonel White.] This proved that the people of Ireland differed from the Government as to the policy to be pursued towards Ireland. He was not surprised, therefore, that under these circumstances there was no mention of Ireland either in the Speech from the Throne or in the Address. There was another topic to which he begged to direct the attention of the noble Lord at the head of the Government. England was bound by solemn treaties which had been violated, and the effect of this treaty violation was being felt in a part of Europe in which the people of this country felt a lively interest. He had during the last Session asked the noble Viscount, and he begged now to repeat his question, whether during the Crimean war overtures had not been made by Austria to the Allies with reference to Poland? A most eminent European statesman had authorized him to state that Austria had offered to join the Allies on condition that Poland should be declared independent, and that an army of 100,000 men should be sent into Poland. The present was a moment when England was bound to look into this subject, seeing that England was mainly responsible for the existing condition of Poland. Within the last two years despatches that had been concealed for thirty years had revealed the startling fact, that when in 1831 Poland was in, arms to demand the performance of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, England refused to join Prance in using her influence on behalf of Poland. That country exhibited the rare spectacle of a united people. Princes, peasants, the clergy of all denominations, were of one mind, and all desired to see the ancient kingdom of Poland restored. He contended we were bound to ask for this restoration, because the treaty to which we had been a party had been violated by Russia. During the last three or four years the people of Poland had shown more than usual symptoms of nationality. The Russian Government felt that they were about to be beaten by moral force, and they therefore determined to drive the people into insurrection. An order was made for a

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further and heavier conscription. Some of the municipal bodies remonstrated with the Government, but in vain. The conscription went on, and was directed, not against the lowest, but against the middle classes. In the middle of the night houses were entered, and the young men were sent to Siberia as soldiers. Still the people submitted, and only broke into insurrection when the final insult was passed upon them by the Russian official journal of Warsaw, which declared that the people of Poland took up arms joyfully for the Russian Government, and that they viewed the conscription with satisfaction. We were bound by treaty to protect the interests of the Poles; and when he found they were not mentioned in the Royal Speech, he felt so keenly that he was inclined to move an Amendment to the Address. He trusted that the subject would again come before the House. He believed, that if the people of this country knew of the engagements of England and the present position of Poland they would insist on something being done. He trusted, however, that the subject would again come before the House. Another question which he wished to address to the noble Viscount referred to certain proceedings which had recently taken place at Rome. They had heard that Lord Russell had sent a message to the Pope, and they were also told that the papers would be laid before Parliament. It would be very interesting to know whether the blue-book would include all the papers that had been sent either directly or indirectly to the Pope, because it appeared, from the French despatches on this extraordinary proceeding, that the final act was conveyed by Mr. Odo Russell in a private letter from Lord Russell to Cardinal Antonelli. Now, private letters might be useful in diplomacy, but it would only be fair to allow Parliament to have a glance at that private letter, as if seemed to have conveyed a threat or menace. Now, what was the account of the transaction given by the French Minister? Why, that Mr. Odo Russell, having urged upon His Holiness the propriety of quitting Rome and taking refuge in Malta, concluded by saying that he had reasons for believing that His Holiness would in a very short time find himself under the necessity of doing so. Cardinal Antonelli abstained from making any reply to that communication, and he did right not to make a reply, because the communication
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did not degrade the Papal Government or annoy them. But it did degrade another Government. When a Government like that of England threatened another Government supposed to be weaker, and when it was known to the Minister who did so that he had not the power to carry out his threat, it was a degradation to the Government whence it proceeded. He (Mr. Hennessy) was inclined to think that such an offer as had been made by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was a piece of extraordinary hypocrisy, seeing that it had been made by the author of the Durham letter, and that he did it as he said in the interest of the Catholic Church, So profound was the noble Lord's interest in the Catholic Church that he recommended the Pope to quit Rome, and accompanied the recommendation with a threat. English policy on the Roman question from beginning to end had been a disgrace, it had been inconsistent, feeble, and a failure. The basis of that policy had been laid down by the noble Viscount himself. In March, 1849, when the Pope was at Gaeta, and the question was whether he was to be restored or not, the noble Lord laid down the basis of English policy on this subject. On the 9th of March, 1849, the noble Viscount at the head of the Government addressed the following instructions to Lord Normanby:—
"Her Majesty has many millions of Catholic subjects, and the British Government must therefore be desirous, with a view to British interests, that the Pope should be placed in such a, temporal position as to be able to act with entire independence in the exercise of his spiritual functions.… It seems to Her Majesty's Government that a strong and unanimous manifestation of the opinion of the Catholic powers, in support of order on the one hand and of constitutional rights on the other, would bring to reason the minority who now exercise paramount authority in Rome, and would give courage and confidence to the majority, who have been hitherto intimidated, and overborne. Her Majesty's Government have learnt with much pleasure that France has been included in the invitation addressed by the Pope to some of the Catholic Powers, requesting them to take an active interest in the present condition of Ms affairs. It would be desirable that every endeavour should be made to bring about a settlement between the Pope and his subjects by negotiation and moral influence before resorting to the employment of force."
In another despatch of Lord Palmerston, March 27, 1849, he speaks of "the deep regret with which Her Majesty's Government witnessed the proclamation of a Republic at Rome." All that took place before the French Government determined

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to send their troops to Rome, which was done in the following month. Now, though he (Mr. Hennessy) entirely concurred with the noble Viscount in thinking that the Pope should be placed in such a temporal position that he would be able to act with entire independence, yet he was not at all certain that any English statesman was justified in meddling in the matter or in laying down the proposition that the Pope must have a temporal position for any purpose whatever. That the noble Viscount was justified in going that length he very much doubted. He had said that the policy built up by the noble Lord was a failure; it was also treacherous, and he thought so for those reasons. While the French troops were at Rome, Cardinal Antonelli, as appeared over and over again from the despatches of Lord Lyons, was anxious that the French occupation should cease, but it could only cease when the Pope had got an army to repel the Garibaldians. What was the conduct of England on this subject? There again she went out of her way. She advised, admonished, and even threatened. At the Paris Conference, in 1856, Count Cavour prepared a memorandum, which was approved by Lord Clarendon, and communicated to Cardinal Antonelli by Lord Lyons. That memorandum stated that it was desirable the Pope should have an army to be composed partly of foreigners and partly of natives. When it was suggested to the Cardinal to increase the strength of the foreign regiments, and if necessary to meet the expense by reducing the number of native troops, his Eminence objected, on the ground that it would show distrust on the part of the Government if the native troops were reduced. The advice of the British Government was followed, except in this respect, that Cardinal Antonelli preferred to have a larger proportion of natives than of foreigners in his army. When Mr. Odo Russell went to Rome, he also urged on the Pope's Government the necessity of employing a foreign army, and, acting on the advice of the British Government, an army was at length formed, and the time came when the French troops might be ordered to withdraw. Many persons would be surprised to hear that notice to quit actually was given to the French troops. On the 22nd of February, 1859, according to the Moniteur, Cardinal Antonelli announced to the Ambassadors of Austria and France that the Papal Government felt itself able
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to suffice for the preservation of peace within its own dominions; and that they were ready to concert measures with Franco and Austria for the simultaneous evacuation of the Roman States by their troops. Up to this time the Pope's Government had acted with perfect loyalty towards the British Government. They had raised an army amounting to 18,000 men, composed of two-thirds natives and one-third foreigners. Lord Russell about this time had brought in the Foreign Enlistment Bill, and had defended the employment of foreign mercenaries; and the noble Viscount, when he was Secretary at War, had often proposed Votes for more foreign mercenaries than the whole number of the Pope's forces. Well Count Cavour got an intimation that the French troops had notice to quit, but it did not suit the policy of Count Cavour, and of a greater personage still, that they should leave. The Emperor of the French raised some difficulties, which, however, were cleared away; and Count Cavour then began to make speeches in the Turin Parliament, and to write despatches on the subject of foreign mercenaries. In a short time matters got to such a pitch that the Turin Cabinet sent a despatch to Rome summoning the Papal Government to disband all its foreign mercenaries. And yet Count Cavour, who sent this despatch, was the very person who had suggested the employment of foreign mercenaries. In a few days after, General Cialdini entered the Roman territory with 35,000 men, attacked the army which the Government had formed with such care and labour, and completely destroyed it. The effect of that was that the French troops could not withdraw. The occupation would have terminated long since but for that act of the Piedmontese Government. Every European statesman protested against that act but one, and the only statesman who defended the destruction of the Pope's army was Lord Russell, who had recommended its formation. The policy of the noble Viscount towards the Papal Government would not tend to strengthen our cordial alliance with the people of France. Every one knew that the people of France were completely unanimous on this point, and that they must be deeply offended at the conduct of the British Government. No one would dare to appear on any hustings in France, or wherever the election of deputies were conducted, who approved the policy now

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advocated by the noble Viscount and who did not approve the policy Lad down in his famous despatch of March, 1849. He (Mr. Hennessy) entreated the noble Viscount to make the papers complete, that the people of England might not be supposed to sanction the disgraceful conduct of Piedmont in destroying the Pope's army under a pretext which they themselves created, and that the alliance by which England had something to gain and everything to lose might not be imperilled as the noble Viscount was imperilling it. He had referred to Poland, and he wished to contrast the conduct of the Pope with the conduct of Victor Emmanuel. Two messages arrived in Italy about the same time from the Emperor of Russia. By one the Pope was requested to remove the Polish bishops, who appeared to be patriots, on pain of the Czar recognising the kingdom of Italy. To that request the Pope replied that he was not prepared to interfere with the people of Poland, who, for years, had borne their sufferings with patience and resignation. The other despatch promised the recognition of the kingdom of Italy if Victor Emmanuel would dismiss the Polish emigration out of Italy, and close the Polish schools. General Durando, who was the Foreign Secretary at Turin, in reply, said that the King of Italy had received a despatch in which the Russian Government expressed concern at the presence and conduct of the Polish emigration in Italy, and requested that plots against the integrity of the Russian empire might be put an end to; that the formation of a Polish legion might not be allowed; and that the Polish schools should be controlled. These desires were conformable to the usages established by all civilized nations, and the schools would be closed in July, and not re-opened. The Emperor Alexander was perfectly satisfied with General Durando's note, and sent an envoy to Turin. This was the history of the recognition of disunited Italy by the Czar. The Pope would not interfere with the patriotic sentiments of the Poles; but Victor Emmanuel obtained the recognition upon these conditions, and not, as the noble Viscount had stated, unconditionally. He mentioned this for the purpose of illustrating that in the Papal question the strong power was the Sovereign Pontiff, and the weak power was Victor Emmanuel.
MR. SMOLLETTsaid, he hoped that an early opportunity would be taken to bring under discussion some prominent topics connected with British India. It was a great misfortune that the members of the Council of India were excluded from the House, as the effect was to make the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for India dictator over 180,000,000 of people. With the single exception of the hon. Member for "Windsor (Mr. Vansittart), he was unable to induce any hon. Gentleman to join in the debate at the close of last Session, upon the question of land tenure in India; gentlemen whom he had personally solicited excused themselves on the ground that they were utterly unacquainted with the subject. It was a very good reason for not speaking, and he only wished it was acted upon more strictly on other occasions. As soon, however, as Parliament was prorogued, meetings were held in Manchester, Glasgow, and other large places, where, in strong language and in the presence of persons of influence and position, the right hon. Baronet (Sir Charles Wood) was stigmatized as perfectly incompetent, and Members of Parliament were required to demand his impeachment or to dismiss the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Treasury from his office. A deputation from one of these meetings waited, in October, upon the noble Viscount at Cambridge House, and they were introduced by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bazley), who had so ably seconded the Address. It was derogatory to the character of the House that gross charges of misconduct should be made against the right hon. Baronet in his absence and where he could not defend himself, and he felt strongly that those charges, if made at all, ought to be made in Parliament.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON:—Sir, I am not going to follow all the hon. Gentlemen who have spoken in the course of the evening into the many and desultory topics upon which they have made their observations; but there are a few remarks which I think it my duty to address to the House. In the first place, I am sure the country must be gratified by the manner in which this House has received the announcement of the approaching marriage of the Prince of Wales—a matter of the deepest interest, not only to the Royal Family but also to the whole nation; of the deepest interest for the present and of

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augury of good for the future. And I may remark that His Royal Highness has been peculiarly fortunate in this respect—that whereas the common fate of Royal marriages has been that persons are contracted together who have had no previous knowledge of each other, and with whom political considerations are the guiding principle of union, in this case the marriage may, in the fullest sense of the word, be called "a love match," while the amiable and excellent qualities of both parties give the fairest promise of permanent and complete happiness.
The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) who spoke immediately after the Seconder of the Address took a wide range of attack upon the foreign policy of the Government. That appeared to me to be the topic uppermost in his mind. He made broad accusations against the Government—some really, I must say, of a very disagreeable kind. He accused the Government of an intriguing policy. I could not help thinking in my own mind that the right hon. Gentleman must have had a sort of recollection of the policy of some former Government, of which he has, doubtless, more knowledge than of the proceedings of the present Cabinet; or that, by some confusion of ideas, he was reflecting rather upon the conduct of certain leaders of the Opposition than upon that of the Government of the day. All I can say is, that I utterly deny and repudiate the accusation of the right hon. Gentleman; and I will venture to add that there never was an accusation brought against any Government more completely unfounded than that comprised in the words he used. If any proof were wanting of the influence—the just influence—which this country possesses over the opinion of other nations, without intrigue, without any underhand or other than honourable conduct, it would be afforded by that which we have seen lately passing in Greece. The whole nation—not simply that portion of it which inhabits Greece, but also those members of the Greek community who are scattered over every country in Europe—has with most astonishing unanimity declared in favour of a Royal Prince of England, on account of the high character of the Royal Family of England, and on account of the fair and honourable policy which England has pursued. A curious instance of that happened the other day in the Moldo-Wal-lachian provinces. A deputation of the
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Greek merchants and other persons residing in one of the towns of those provinces called upon our Consul—a person they did not know except by name—and said their object was to tell him that the Greek nation were unanimous in their desire of having a British Prince as their ruler, because, they stated, of the honest and straightforward policy of England, and because England was the only Power which invariably protected the weak against the strong. I shall take first of all the topic which the right hon. Gentleman referred to in his speech—our relations with China. The right hon. Gentleman found fault with the Government for not having mentioned China in the Speech from the Throne. If there are any papers which anybody wishes to have relating to recent transactions in China, there will be no difficulty in producing them to the House. But the right hon. Gentleman said that the policy we were pursuing in China is inconsistent with that which we originally followed, and is a policy leading us into a Chinese war. The policy we have pursued in China from the beginning is to protect our trade and commerce with that country; and those who know anything of China will not hesitate to admit that our commerce with that country is a most important outlet for the productive industry of these islands. Whence in the outset proceeded the obstructions to our commerce in China? From the Imperial Government. It was the duty of the Government of this country to endeavour to remove those obstructions, and to insist that those rights and privileges to which our subjects resident in China were entitled should be afforded to them. At that time, therefore, we were in conflict with the Government of China. We are no longer in conflict with the Government of China; on the contrary, our Minister and officers there are on the most friendly footing with the Government, which, having its eyes opened to its true interests, namely, commercial relations with European nations, are now desirous of promoting trade and commerce. The prejudices which in former times operated to keep "the outside barbarians," as they were pleased to call us, from the interior, having been seen to be mere delusions, the barriers which kept us from entering have been removed, and the Chinese Government now does all it can to promote the commercial interests of the empire. Who now are the obstacles?

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The Taepings. My hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes) will forgive me for holding very different views from his with regard to the Taepings. All the information we can get from China goes to show that wherever the Taepings pass peace, commerce, industry, are destined. Their course is marked by murder, by bloodshed, by plunder, by everything that destroys commerce and the elements of commerce. But we are not making war against these Taepings, except so far as this—we require them to respect the neighbourhood of those cities in which our commercial establishments are fixed. We are withdrawing troops from China, instead of sending them there. It is true, indeed, that we have authorized British officers to engage in the service of the Emperor of China, to organize in his service and his pay certain small bodies of men who, by drilling and instructing his troops and his navy, may enable him to restore tranquillity in his dominions. You may depend upon it that there is a strong English interest in that. Until tranquillity and order are restored in the provinces of China, we cannot expect that development of British commerce which otherwise could not fail to take place. So much for our policy in China, which is not in contradiction to, or inconsistent with, that which we originally acted upon, but is entirely in unison with it. The result has shown the success of our policy, because we have converted an enemy into a friend, a suspicious and jealous people into friendly and eager traders.
Passing from China, the right hon. Gentleman touched upon the question of Denmark, and he said—which, no doubt, was true, with reference to the person speaking—that he found it impossible to understand or to explain anything relating to that subject. If he had extended that observation to those other topics upon which he dilated, perhaps we should not have been much disposed to question the accuracy of his description of his own comprehension, because he certainly showed in his remarks how essential it is that the Government should do that which they have announced their readiness to do — namely, lay explanatory papers on the table of the House. Here is a right hon. Gentleman of undoubted talent and genius, who has turned his attention very much to these questions, whose study of the ordinary sources of information has brought him into that sort of
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hazy condition of mind with respect to them, which shows how much he would be benefited by a perusal of the papers which we have intimated our intention to produce. But the right hon. Gentleman is mistaken in supposing that the despatch of Lord Russell, to which he referred, and which appeared in the autumn, was a sudden act, unconnected with anything that passed before, and that my noble Friend suddenly dashed, as it were, into a transaction with which we had no previous connection. The fact is entirely different. We had for several years previously been engaged in attempts to mediate between Denmark and Germany. It had been my lot while in the Foreign Office to endeavour—but, I am sorry to say, without much success—to accomplish that object. Our mediation was invited by the two parties; but they were found so completely at variance, and the question was encompassed by such difficulties, that all that could be effected was a sort of provisional arrangement which prevented the worst consequences of the dispute. But in the course of last year there was a threat of what was called "execution" on the part of the Diet at Frankfort. The Diet of the German Confederation threatened to march troops into Holstein with the object of carrying into effect their view of the matters then in dispute. My noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office prevailed on them to suspend that operation; but in having so prevailed lie was bound, at all events, to make suggestions by which a permanent arrangement of a friendly character might be established between the two parties. We cannot say that we succeeded in our endeavour; but that endeavour was a link in the chain, and not a sudden thought unconnected with the transactions that had previously taken place. Papers will, however, be presented on that subject, and the House will then see upon what ground the step was taken to which the right hon. Gentleman adverts.
Then, with regard to Greece, the right hon. Gentleman hopes that we took an early opportunity to inform the Greek Government that it was impossible that Prince Alfred should accept the Greek crown. We did make the fact known as early as occasion required. The very first moment that the Greek nation indicated a desire to elect Prince Alfred we communicated with France and Russia, the other two protecting Powers, and stated our opinion that the Protocol of 1830 was still in force, by

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which no member of the reigning families of either of the three protecting Powers can ascend the throne of Greece. There was, undoubtedly, some delay, arising, I will not say from an objection on the part of the Russian Government to admit the principle, but from a hesitation to admit its application to the Duke of Leuchtenberg, to whom, however, it was ultimately admitted that it undoubtedly does apply. But the Greek Minister was informed at the earliest possible moment, and by myself, that in our opinion the Protocol applied to Prince Alfred, and excluded both him and the Duke of Leuchtenberg from being elected as Sovereign of Greece. I am asked what is the present state of the question in regard to the Duke of Coburg. I am not able to answer that question, because communications are still going on, the result of which I am not yet acquainted with. The right hon. Gentleman expatiated at great length on the intimation made by Her Majesty's Government of a readiness, under certain circumstances mentioned, to recommend a revision of the treaty by which the Ionian Islands were placed under the protectorate of Great Britain. The right hon. Gentleman really treated that question in a manner that surprised me. He said that the Ionian Islands were by the Treaty of 1815 placed under the British Crown in the same way as Paris was placed under the protection of France. The right hon. Gentleman is not a man who speaks in this House without knowing what he is saying; he knows the value of words and the nature of things; but I was astonished at his making an assertion of that kind. He compared it to Piedmont and to the Prussian Rhenish provinces. Why, he himself stated that which negatived that general assertion. The Ionian Islands were, as he said, six of them, occupied militarily by a British force at the time of the termination of the war, and Corfu surrendered at the downfall of Napoleon. But their fate was determined, like the fate of many of the countries of Europe, by the treaties concluded in 1815; and to those treaties, and especially to the treaty in regard to the Ionian Islands, Great Britain was a party. Well, what did that treaty do? Did that treaty say that the Ionian Islands were to be, what the right hon. Gentleman stated—a British territory, and to belong to the British Crown as one of its possessions? Quite the contrary. It stated that
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the Septinsular Republic was to be a separate and independent State, but, as a separate and independent state, was to be placed under the protection of the British Crown. But it is no part of the dominions of the British Crown. The Queen is not Sovereign of the Ionian Islands. Our treaties do not include or bind the Ionian Islands. When a treaty of commerce is made, there must be a separate act on the part of the Ionian Islands to give them the benefit of that treaty. They have a separate Legislature of their own; we do not make laws for them. They are to all intents and purposes literally and legally a separate State, forming no part of the British territory or dominions, but under the protection of England, by virtue of the treaty concluded between England and the other great Powers of Europe. Therefore, all the argument of the right hon. Gentleman founded on the supposition that Corfu and the other Ionian Islands were to England what Paris is to France is, if he will allow me to repeat his own words, a perfect absurdity, and has no bearing whatever on the question which the House may have to consider with reference to these Islands. It is not now the time to discuss the policy of making that cession under the circumstances contemplated by the paragraph in the Queen's Speech. My own opinion is that it would be a wise measure. I think it would be a generous measure. I think it is due to that Ionian State, which was placed under our protection for its benefit and not for our advantage. We were bound to do the best for it. I believe we have done the best for it hitherto by maintaining the Protectorate. But I think if Greece is established under an enlightened Sovereign, who will develop her internal prosperity and maintain her external peace, it will be for the benefit of those Islands to be united with their fellow countrymen. I think, too, that it is an example which may not be lost upon other countries. There are other questions pending in the world, in Europe especially, with regard to which an example of generous disinterestedness on the part of Great Britain, for the benefit of those whose fate has been committed to her charge, may not be without result, and I trust it may have a salutary effect on the solution of those questions.
The right hon. Gentleman adverted, as other hon. Gentlemen have done, to cer-

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tain communications which, have taken place in respect to Italy, and especially with respect to Rome and the Pope. Now, the statement which has been quoted appeared in a book published by the French Government, and was contained in a despatch from the French Minister at Rome, which was founded upon a complete misapprehension and misinformation as to what had really occurred. The statement made to the French Ambassador, and by him conveyed to his Government, was that Mr. Odo Russell one fine day asked for an audience of the Pope, and having been admitted, recommended His Holiness to leave Rome and to accept a refuge which the British Government offered him at Malta. Now, the course of the transaction was exactly the reverse of that. It was the Pope who sent for Mr. Russell, and, Mr. Russell not knowing what he was sent for, it was the Pope who in conversation expressed a wish to know whether, in the event of his being compelled by circumstances—which he, of course, did not then think likely, but which were possible—to leave Rome, he would be received and protected in England. An hon. MEMBER: In England?] Yes, in England. Well, Mr. Russell could not, of course, give any other answer than that he had no instructions, but that it was the custom of the English nation to receive, and hospitably to receive, all those who might from any circumstances feel it desirable to take up their abode in their country. Mr. Russell was then on the point of coming home to England. When he returned in November to Rome he carried a despatch, which was to be communicated to Cardinal Antonelli, in which Earl Russell instructed him to say, that if circumstances should occur which would lead the Pope to leave Rome, and he should not think fit to take refuge in France or in Spain, the British Government would provide for him a suitable residence at Malta, where he would be received and treated with all the respect due to his rank and position. I think that was a proper communication, and it was one that was received apparently with great satisfaction by the Pope, as a proof of the goodwill and friendly feeling of the British Government towards him. The hon. Member for the King's County (Mr. Hennessy) has gone into a long dissertation on transactions which took place in the year 1848, and he accuses me especially of inconsistency in the views which
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I have at different times entertained in regard to the occupation of Rome by the French. The hon. Gentleman should recollect that the circumstances of 1848 were totally different from the circumstances of the present time. The hon. Member says that the Pope had no army in 1848. Why, if my memory does not very much deceive me, the Pope declared war against the Austrians, and sent his army to assist Piedmont in attacking them. I think I am not mistaken in stating that. But, no doubt, in the then state of Italy, it was thought desirable for the peace of the country that that revolutionary Government which had been established at Rome should cease, and that the Pope should return into the possession of his dominions. I believe there was a great deal of unjust accusation brought against that revolutionary Government. It was a much better Government than that which has since prevailed, but the state of things was very anomalous, and we thought it wise and useful that it should be terminated. It does not follow, however, that because we hold it to be an unobjectionable move on the part of the French in 1849 to restore the Pope, we should think it advisable that the French troops should continue there from that time to this, with the appearance of remaining till Heaven knows when, for the purpose of maintaining a Government which, in our opinion, is distasteful to the majority of the people of Rome. There is no inconsistency in that. At any rate, if we are to be condemned for having approved the entrance of the French into Rome, we may fairly be acquitted of any desire for the continuance of foreign bayonets in that city in order to maintain a Government which the people do not wish to have.
Allusion has been made to certain recent transactions in Brazil. They arose from a just claim for compensation for British losses and injuries to British subjects. The Brazilian Government would not agree to meet that claim until reprisals were commenced. Communications are still going on, but I believe that a satisfactory understanding has been come to on the subject. A very legitimate tribute has been paid by the hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. B. Cochrane) to the Greeks for their recent conduct. They have certainly shown as much self-restraint and moderation as the Italians, and higher

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praise can scarcely be bestowed on them than by comparing them to that nation. The Greeks have behaved with great good sense, and I trust that when they have obtained a King fit to rule them, and a permanent Government, they will become a prosperous and successful State. Their ancestors were distinguished in every department of intellectual power. They produced the first warriors, the first statesmen, the first poets, the first orators, the first historians, philosophers, painters, and sculptors. I see no reason why the descendants of those great men should not follow in their steps. In the history of nations we find that there is some influence at work, not easily to be explained, by which the people who inhabit a country continue, notwithstanding immigration and changes of population, to exhibit the same qualities; and there is no cause why the Greeks, when they get a good Government, should not become one of the most enlightened and distinguished nations in Europe. It is said that in giving up the Ionian Islands we are changing our policy towards Turkey, and are encouraging the Greeks to be aggressive towards the Turks; we are told, that if we were bent on making a present of them, it should have been, of all the people in the world, to the Turks. That would certainly have been a singular way of changing the distribution of population and the limits of States. But I wish to say that we have not altered our policy towards Turkey. We hope that under the present Sultan Turkey will set her finances in order, and establish a sound Government and just laws, fairly administered to all classes of the people of his vast empire. We trust that Turkey will then become strong both within and without. I certainly cannot see how the union of the Septinsular Republic to Greece can have any tendency to disturb the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire.
There is one topic which has been adverted to, and which is calculated to excite great regret—I mean the statements made by various hon. Members from different parts of Ireland as to the distress which they say prevails in parts of that country. There is no doubt that Ireland has had three bad years; and no country can endure three bad years in succession without suffering severely. My information, however, does not go so far as some of the statements which have been made to-night. I am told that the potatoes and
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oats were not generally bad in Ireland last year. The people were also able to save their turf. The crops were certainly shorter than the average, and doubtless there is a good deal of pressure in many parts of the country. I think, however, that some of the assertions which have been made are exaggerated, and, at all events, the appeal which has been made for a grant of money for public works would require to be supported by stronger evidence of its necessity than we have yet received. It is impossible that English Members should not feel deeply for the miseries of any portion of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. we sympathize as heartily with the sufferers in Ireland as with those in Lancashire. There is, however, this distinction between the two cases, that the misfortune in Ireland is the result of the act of Providence in the ordering the seasons, while that in Lancashire is the result of human causes, which, however, are beyond our control, and were not to be expected.
I am glad that the Address is likely to be voted without more than a discussion upon it; and I will no longer interpose between the House and the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. S. FitzGerald) who, I see, is anxious to address it.
SIR GEORGE BOWYERsaid, he thought it his duty to direct the attention of the House to that part of the speech of the noble Lord in which he had spoken in praise of the Government of the Sultan and in condemnation of that of the Pope. The former was universally considered to be the very worst Government in the world. He could never have supposed that in a Christian country a preference would have been given to a Mahomedan Government over that presided over by a Christian Bishop; and he thought that that preference had shown a most unjustifiable partiality. The noble Lord had given a very inaccurate version of Mr. Odo Russell's interview with the Pope. The noble Lord had told the House that the Pope had sent for Mr. Russell and had asked him whether, if he were obliged to leave Rome, England would give him an asylum? The statement of the French Minister gave a different description. He (Sir George Bowyer) would tell the noble Lord what really occurred. But first he must remind them that Mr. Odo Russell was not an accredited minister at Rome, but an English agent residing there. Until recently he was Secretary of Lega-

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tion at Florence, but allowed to reside at Rome. Since that Legation had been abolished he did not know how Mr. Odo Russell could be diplomatically described. [Viscount PALMERSTON: He is attached to Turin.] He is attached to Turin in more senses than one—to the Legation and to the Turin policy. At any rate, he had no diplomatic character at Rome, and could only see the Holy Father as any other stranger or traveller obtained admission to him. And in that capacity, and in no other, did he visit the Vatican. During one of these audiences, as Mr. Russell was leaving, no other person being present, the Holy Father said good-humouredly, but without any political meaning whatever, —"Well, my dear Sir, if ever I am in trouble, I may perhaps ask you for assistance." That was all that really passed. What Mr. Odo Russell wrote home to the Government, the noble Lord knew, and he (Sir George Bowyer) did not; but subsequently, after communicating with the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Russell went back to Rome, and having obtained another audience, told the Holy Father that he was commissioned to state from the British Government that in case he should leave Rome he should have an asylum at Malta; and he went further, and advised him to leave Rome and go to Malta, saying that if he did not do so, he might be compelled—it was not exactly a threat, but very much like one or a warning. Now, what had been the result? Why, it had given great offence to the French Government, for it seemed to imply that that Government was not able to maintain the Head of the Church in his dominions, or that they were going to act in bad faith towards him. But all these matters must be thoroughly sifted. He had the statement of the French Minister. [Mr. ROEBUCK: He was not present at the interview.] His hon. and learned Friend said that the French Minister was not present, but he had the means of obtaining the best information, and there could be no doubt that Mr. Russell made a great mistake, and that the noble Earl (Earl Russell) had deviated from his doctrine of non-intervention which he had professed to act upon. The noble Lord had been pleased to pronounce a great eulogium on the Government of Mazzini and the other Triumvirs at Rome during the republic, and he remembered Earl Russell pronouncing a similar eulogium. He was, however, ready to show that there never
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had existed a more atrocious Government; for it murdered some of the most excellent and exemplary priests wholesale, merely because they were priests and ministers of religion. A more sanguinary and atrocious Government never existed since the days of Robespierre. The noble Lord had said that the population of Rome was adverse to the Government of the Pope. He denied that most emphatically. Of course there were some discontented spirits in Rome as elsewhere—there was discontent in England even under our blessed constitution, but there were less of them now at Rome than formerly, because the Romans found that they were taxed the tenth part of the taxation of the rest of Italy, and were subject to no conscription. Let the noble Lord look to Naples. There thousands of people had been imprisoned, some of them for two years without any trial, and without knowing the charge against them to the present day. Fourteen towns in the Kingdom of Naples, containing a population of 39,000 had been destroyed by the Piedmontese. The people were driven out of their houses to starve, and to become what was called brigands. These were the loyal people, struggling and fighting against foreign dominion of a most galling and intolerable nature. The British Government had produced, through their influence, a state of things in Italy which was not liberty but enslavement, and they would be cursed eternally for it. [Laughter.] Those hon. Gentlemen who laughed, laughed because they knew nothing of the subject—it was the laugh of ignorance. Let them read the history of that country. When, he should like to know, was Italy great? Was it in the days of her unity? It was rather in the days of the Medicis and—[Cries of "Borgia!"] Would hon. Members, because there happened to be one bad man, ignore the glories of Florence, and Venice, and Genoa, and the great artists and poets which Italy, though not united, produced? The greatness of Italy, he for one should maintain, was due not to unity, but to the national development and the municipal liberty fostered by individual States. He would go further, and say that the unity which would be the result of placing the whole country under the iron heel of Piedmont would turn out to be to Italy not a blessing but a curse. The noble Lord at the head of the Government seemed to imagine that the Roman people were entirely opposed

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to the authority of the Pope; but in that opinion the noble Lord was grievously mistaken; and if the French garrison were withdrawn from Rome to-morrow, and the Piedmontese prevented from taking possession of it by military force, the rule of the Pope would, he felt assured, be as safe as that of Queen Victoria was in England. Indeed, the sole reason why it was expedient to keep a French garrison in Rome was because she had at her gates a piratical Government which knew no respect for law. The noble Lord did not, perhaps, concur with him in that view, but he should mention a circumstance which had taken place some days before in Turin, which ought, he thought, to make men pause before they endorsed the sentiments which the noble Lord entertained on that subject. An attack was made on the Piedmontese Government in the Parliament at Turin because, it was said, they had not sufficiently encouraged the revolutionary cause in Italy. Count Pepoli, a friend of the Government, however, rose, and contended that they had done everything they could in the direction; adding that Bologna would never have overturned the rule of the Pope if he had not been furnished with very large supplies by his Government at Turin to effect that object. Count Pepoli, moreover, stated that his Sovereign had been so good as to send him from his privy purse a considerable sum with the view of bringing about a change in the Government in Bologna. There was an instance of rebellion being promoted by secret service money, and revolution excited by a Sovereign in a neighbouring State, against which he had no cause of quarrel.
MR. WHALLEYrose to protest against such statements, affecting, as they did, the character of a foreign Sovereign, while they were irrelevant to the subject-matter before the House. ["Order!"]
SIR GEORGE BOWYERcontended that he had a perfect right to mention an occurrence which had taken place in the Parliament of Turin, and to show how it supported the view which he had advanced when he mentioned that the Piedmontese Government and Sovereign were conspirators against the peace of other nations from which they had received no provocation. He might further observe that the Romans, seeing discontent prevail in all directions in the territories subjected to Piedmontese rule, were very far
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from being desirous of being reduced to the same condition. He must also protest against the doctrine that that which styled itself the Liberal party in Italy was entitled to claim Rome as the capital of the country. When, he should like to know, was Rome the capital of Italy? Never. In the time of the ancient Romans Rome was not the capital of Italy in the sense in which it was now sought to make her the capital—she was then rather the conqueror and mistress of Italy. Italy rather belonged to Rome than Rome to Italy. They might as well claim Constantinople because that was once the residence of the Emperors. Rome was the scat of the most ancient dynasty in existence, the dynasty of the Popes; and if the dynasty were overturned, there would be no safety for the Throne of any country in Europe, no matter how long established. If, he might add, any Sovereign had an interest in maintaining a dynasty consecrated by innumerable treaties, it was the Queen of England, who was herself the wearer of an ancient Crown.
MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALDsaid, that he should not have risen to address the House at that late period of the evening but that he was anxious that it should not be thought that he avoided the discussion of the subjects alluded to by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, or acquiesced in the manner in which he had treated them. The noble Lord's speech, remarkable as it was for the dexterity with which he had dealt with some topics, was still more remarkable for its omissions. If there was one topic referred to in the Speech of the Royal Commissioners which above all others interested the public mind at the present moment, it was the struggle which was going on in America; yet, notwithstanding that that conflict had inflicted the greatest injury upon a large portion of our population, notwithstanding that there were circumstances connected with it which must appeal to the heart of every man in this country, although it had been made the subject of a most important diplomatic communication from our most important ally, and although the Government had taken upon itself, perhaps wisely, the gravest responsibility in declining to accede to the proposal of the Emperor of the French, yet the noble Lord, in addressing the Commons of England for the first time this Session, had passed over everything connected with the civil war

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in America and the propositions of Franco, and, preferring to address himself in a light and jocular tone to other questions, had omitted any reference whatever to this the almost paramount topic of the day. There was another omission which did not altogether surprise him, but which must be rather distasteful to the House. The hon. Member for the King's County (Mr. Hennessy) had again addressed the House upon a subject on which he took great interest, and upon which he had on a previous occasion spoken with great force and ability—the case of Poland. When revolutions were going on in other parts of the world Her Majesty's Government were sure to be found either taking them under their patronage, or, at all events, speaking with commiseration and sympathy of the sufferings which had caused them; but with reference to Poland the noble Lord had on a former occasion, when the hon. Member for the King's County brought forward the subject, devoted his whole speech to an apology for the Russian Government, without one word of sympathy or commiseration for the Poles. Now, the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office could address letters to Denmark complaining that not more than three persons could sign a petition, and that there were restrictions upon the freedom of the press; but when a long-suffering and gallant people were by the proceedings of Russia driven into revolution, and the noble Lord at the head of the Government was challenged upon the subject in that House, he made a reply in which he entirely omitted any reference to the question. The noble Lord had entirely misrepresented the observations which were made by his right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) with reference to the correspondence with the Court of Denmark. The complaint was not, as the noble Lord had represented it, that the Government had without rhyme or reason, without any excuse whatever, rushed into a correspondence with the Crown of Denmark on the subject of the Danish Duchies; but it was this—that a persistent and uniform policy having been adopted by the Government of this country in respect to Denmark, and it having been the language of the noble Lord himself that the German Confederation had no right to interfere in the question between the Duchy of Schleswig and Denmark, the noble Lord the Secre-
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tary of State for Foreign Affairs had suddenly, without any reason whatever, changed the whole course of policy, and with all the affairs of his own country and all the business of the office pressing upon him, had sat down and in a very few lines had traced a new Constitution for the kingdom of Denmark. It was all very well for the Government of the noble Lord to say that they were a Government of non-intervention; but that the Foreign Minister of England should sit down and tell the Danish Government that their representations as regarded the state of their own population were utterly inaccurate and fallacious, that he should think it necessary to call the attention of the Danish Government to the fact that in the Duchy of Schleswig only three persons could sign a petition, and that the freedom of the press was somewhat restricted, although probably not so much as in other countries of Europe, and certainly not so much as in Paris—that he should think it necessary to address himself to these petty questions, and reverse the whole policy of England, taking up the cause of the strong against the weak, that he should do this at the very moment when it was of the greatest importance to the interests of this country and of Europe that an independent and strong Scandinavian Power should be raised in the north of Europe— that he should side with Germany in a manner which could only weaken the Danish Crown, and encourage those who opposed the just rights of Denmark to enforce their unjust pretensions by military power—that was the complaint which his right hon. Friend had made, and that was the complaint which the noble Lord had not attempted to answer. He could not omit to notice the extraordinary manner in which the noble Lord had dealt with the question of the cession of the Ionian Islands. A proposition more impolitic, more inexpedient, more unjustifiable, more contrary to the interests of this country and those of the Ionian Islands, and more fatal to the peace of Europe, was never made by any Government of any country. He was not going to take up the position which the noble Lord had unfairly attributed to his right hon. Friend, that the Ionian Islands were part and parcel of the territory of this country. The case against the cession was much stronger, because they were not part and parcel of that territory. Under what circumstances did we hold the Ionian

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Islands? The circumstances of the conquest of six of them, and the cession of another, had been accurately stated by the noble Lord and by his right hon. Friend. In the year 1814 the British Government represented to the Plenipotentiaries who were negotiating the Treaty of Paris, that they were alive to the importance and value of these Islands, not to England, but to Europe; they pointed out that, from their geographical position, they might be made the means of aggression and of constant menace, either against the Venetian provinces, against the frontier provinces of Austria, or, what was still more important, against the Turkish empire; consequently, upon the character of the Power which had possession of the Ionian Islands depended the tranquillity of the East; and they proposed that these Islands should be placed under the protectorate of Austria. That was opposed by some of the Powers, and, ultimately, in the year 1815, the Islands were handed over to England, which was to be the protecting power of an independent Republic. At the same time, all the fortresses and strong places were put into the absolute possession and under the absolute dominion of England. He was not fond of referring to Hansard, because public men might change their opinions upon important public questions; but when the expression of opinion was very recent he thought that such a reference was justifiable; and he was now about to quote expressions which were far more eloquent than any which he could use, and in the justice and logic of which he thought that no one could refuse to concur. He wished to refer to the language used eighteen months ago by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose absence that night they all regretted, and still more the reason to which that absence was attributable. Apart from the distinguished position occupied by the Member for the University of Oxford, his opinion on this question was entitled to the greatest weight, having been sent upon a special mission to the Ionian Islands to inquire into the feelings of the inhabitants and the course of policy which he would desire to see adopted. The right hon. Gentleman expressed himself thus—
"England must look to the exact and regular fulfilment of the obligations which she contracted with Europe. The obligation she has contracted with Europe," he repeated, "was for the benefit of Europe. She undertook that protectorate be-
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cause it was deemed to be safest in her hands. She contracted then an obligation which she can never surrender until it can be surrendered in a manner that is likely to conduce to the benefit of Europe. I am asked why do we not apply to the other Powers, and see whether they will agree to release us from our obligations. But, Sir, there are conditions preliminary to any such application. You must be convinced in your own mind that it is desirable in the interests of Europe that you should be so released." [3 Hansard, clxii. 1687.]
The question was not whether the change would be for the benefit of Greece—and in some of the earlier language of the Government there was considerable vacillation on this point; the question was not whether the transference would be in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands—and from the information which had reached him he believed that any such change would be opposed to their wishes—but the question was whether it would be for the interest of Europe that the Ionian Islands should be surrendered by England, and surrendered, as the proposition now stood, to a people without any government at all. The importance to Europe of the Ionian Islands was twofold, arising from political and military considerations. Into the military part of the question he was incompetent to enter; but the noble Lord knew very well that there was no officer of distinction connected with either the naval or military service who did not consider the occupation of the Ionian Islands as of the greatest importance to this country in case of war. A despatch of Sir John Young's, which attained great notoriety from the fact of its having been stolen from the Colonial Office, contained the following remarks:—
"The best illustration of the importance of Corfu is afforded by the fact that at the commencement of the Crimean war a Russian frigate and two corvettes were cruising in the Adriatic, and with the knowledge that there was only one vessel in the harbour of Corfu, they did not dare to sail the short distance separating Corfu from Trieste, but preferred to take the vessels to a neutral port, and to send the crews overland to St. Petersburg."
As to the political importance of the Ionian Islands there, were authorities which he did not think any Gentleman in that House would be inclined to dispute. As his right hon. Friend had already stated, those Islands came into the possession of France by a secret article of the Treaty of Tilsit, and it was now clearly known that the understanding was that there would be a partition of the European provinces of Turkey. That

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was the great object which Napoleon had in that treaty. In the correspondence with his brother Joseph his whole energy was directed to the retention of Corfu, which he spoke of as the key of the Adriatic, as a position without which his great projects of aggression against Turkey could not be carried into execution, as an acquisition which he would not change a thousand times over for the Island of Sicily. If their possession was of such importance to the Emperor Napoleon in 1807, were they quite certain that they might not be turned to advantage by some other Power in our own day? And was it at a moment when the Greek nation was absolutely without a Government and in the throes of revolution, when we knew, that even if a monarchical Government were formed, it must take years before its power was consolidated and its position in Europe asserted —was it at such a moment that we were going to surrender a post declared by the greatest authorities of modern times to be of the utmost political and military importance—such a post to such a people? The noble Lord with great adroitness had passed by one point in the speech of his right hon. Friend, who, after paying a just tribute to the policy which the noble Lord had followed through good report and evil report—that of securing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire— pointed out that this new proposal was in direct opposition to the course which the noble Lord had so long and so successfully pursued. Whether they regarded the dissatisfaction which would be excited in other States, or the discontent that would be stirred up among the Greek subjects of the Porte, the result of the change must be equally mischievous, if not fatal to the Turkish empire. And here again he would quote the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who said—
"I believe it would be nothing less than a crime against the safety of Europe—I might even say against its immediate tranquillity—as connected with the state and course of the great Eastern question, if England were to apply to the Powers of Europe to be allowed to surrender the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands for the purpose of uniting them to free Greece. Consider, again, the bearing of this union, if it took place, upon the condition of what I may call the Greek provinces of Turkey. What are we to say to the people of the Ionian Islands? 'It is so intolerable that you should remain apart from the kingdom which has its capital at Athens that we will disturb the European arrangement and remove forthwith the protectorate of England
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in deference to the principle of nationality;' and could we at the same time say to the people of Candia, of Thessaly, and of Albania, 'You shall remain not under a Christian protectorate but under a Mahomedan sovereignty, and your desire for nationality shall remain ungratified. A Christian protectorate was too bad for others, a Turkish domination is good enough for you.'" [3 Hansard, clxii. 1688.]
Whether it might be from any desire of popularity, or because the inducement held out would possibly lead the Greeks to attach greater importance to the candidature of a member of our Royal Family, was it fitting that we should refuse to fulfil the sacred obligation we had contracted in the face of Europe, and should take a course with regard to the Ionian Islands imperilling not only the safety of conterminous countries in the East, but running the risk of throwing the whole of Europe into the flames of a long and bloody war? He thought the concluding observations of his right hon. friend (Mr. Disraeli) deserved the attention of the House, and he was sure they would impress themselves upon the country. If we were to have a foreign policy vacillating and uncertain, at one time maintaining and at another ignoring the great and important reasons which led to settlements in Europe for the interest of all the world — if we were to disregard treaties—if we were to see the correspondence of the country carried on in the flippant and almost rude manner in which it had been conducted for some months back—Her Majesty's Government might talk of reduction in the public expenditure as much as they liked without effecting any permanent retrenchment. It was only by the adoption of a policy more in consonance with the faith of treaty obligations—more in consonance with the interests of England—that such a retrenchment could be secured for this country.
MR. WHALLEYsaid, that if the Ionian Islands were to be ceded, they could only be ceded after further deliberation and with the consent of the other Powers interested. It was, however, his belief that the policy of the Government in respect to the Ionian Islands had been adopted quite irrespective of any views connected with the candidature of Prince Alfred or of any member of the Royal Family. His principal object in rising, however, was to deprecate the making that House a platform for the exposition of statements regarding the Pope and his affairs. He was convinced that the hon. Member for the King's County (Mr. Hen-

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nessy) and the hon. Member for Dundalk (Sir George Bowyer) had been entirely imposed upon in regard to the statements they had been induced to make.
Motion agreed to.
Committee appointed,
To draw up an Address to be presented to Her Majesty upon the said Resolution:—Mr. CALTHORPE, Mr. BAZLEY, Viscount PALMERSTON, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, Sir GEORGE GREY, Sir GEORGE LEWIS, Sir CHARLES WOOD, Mr. MILNER GIBSON, Mr. CARDWELL, Mr. VILLIERS, Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Sir ROBERT PEEL, The LORD ADVOCATE, Mr. PEEL, and Mr. MASSEY, or any Five of them:—To withdraw immediately.
Lords Commissioners' Speech referred.
House adjourned at a quarter before Twelve o'clock.

MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENT.
THE PARLIAMENT, which had been Prorogued successively to the 24thOctober, thence to the 13th November, thence to the 13th January, and thence to the 5th February, met this day for Despatch of Business.
The Session of PARLIAMENT was opened by Commission.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES.
ALBERT EDWARD The Prince of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Duke of Saxony, Duke of Cornwall and Rothsay, Earl of Carrick, Earl of Dublin, Baron of Renfrew, Lord of the Isles, and Great Steward of Scotland) having been created Prince of Wales and Earl of Chester, was, in his Parliamentary Robes, and wearing the Collars of the Order of the Garter and of the Star of India, introduced in the following Order:

Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod.

Garter King of Arms, bearing His Royal Highness's Patent of Creation.

The Lord Kingsdown.

The Earl of Derby, K.G.

Lord Chamberlain of the Household.

Lord Steward of the Household.

Deputy Earl Marshal.

The Lord Great Chamberlain.

Lord Privy Seal.

Lord President of the Council.

The Coronet of the Prince
On a Crimson Velvet Cushion, borne by The Honorable Robert Henry Meade, one of the Gentlemen of His Royal Highness's Household.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES
Carrying his Writ of Summons, supported by

The Duke of Newcastle, K.G., in his Robes.

H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge, K. G., in his Robes.

Attended by

The Earl of Mount Edgcumbe,

The Earl Spencer,

All in their Robes;

And proceeded from the Bar up the House with the usual Reverences,—the Writ and Patent were delivered to The Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack; His Royal Highness then proceeded with his Supporters to the Table, the Rest of the Procession standing
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near; the Letters Patent and Writ were read by the Clerk of the Parliaments at the Table, where His Royal Highness took and subscribed the Oath; after which His Royal Highness was conducted to his Chair on the Right Hand of the Throne, and His Royal Highness being covered as usual, the Ceremony was concluded, and His Royal Highness received the Congratulations of the Lord Chancellor.
(The Knights of Orders were their Collars.)

ROLL OF THE LORDS.
Garter King of Arms attending, delivered at the Table (in the usual Manner) a List of the Lords Temporal in the Fifth Session of the Eighteenth Parliament of the United Kingdom.
The same was Ordered to lie on the Table.

TOOK THE OATH.
The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York.
WRITS AND RETURNS.
Writs and Returns electing The Viscount Hawarden a Representative Peer for Ireland, in the room of the late Viscount Dungannon, deceased; with the Certificate of the Clerk of the Crown in Ireland annexed thereto—Delivered (on Oath), and Certificate read.
SELECT VESTRIES.
Bill, pro formâ, read 1a.

THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.
THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS—namely, The LORD CHANCELLOR, The LORD PRIVY SEAL (The Duke of Argyll), The LORD STEWARD of the HOUSEHOLD (the Earl of St. Germans), The LOED CHAMBERLAIN of the HOUSEHOLD (the Viscount Sydney), The LORD STANLEY of ALDERLEY (Postmaster General)—being in their Robes, and seated on a form placed between the Throne and the Woolsack, commanded the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod to signify to the Commons "The Lords Commissioners desire their immediate attendance in this House."
Who being come, with their Speaker;
THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in pursuance of Her Majesty's Commands, delivered the Speech of THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS to both Houses of Parliament, as follows:—
"My Lords, and Gentlemen,
"HER Majesty commands us to inform you that since you were last assembled She has declared Her
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Consent to a Marriage between His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales and Her Royal Highness The Princess Alexandra, Daughter of Prince Christian of Denmark; and Her Majesty has concluded thereupon a Treaty with The King of Denmark, which will be laid before you.
"THE constant Proofs which Her Majesty has received of your Attachment to Her Person and Family persuade Her that you will participate in Her Sentiments on an Event so interesting to Her Majesty, and which, with the Blessing of God, will, She trusts, prove so conducive to the Happiness of Her Family, and to the Welfare of Her People.
"HER Majesty doubts not that you will enable Her to make Provision for such an Establishment as you may think suitable to the Rank and Dignity of the Heir Apparent to the Crown of these Realms.
"A REVOLUTION having taken place in Greece, by which the Throne of that Kingdom has become vacant, the Greek Nation have expressed the strongest Desire that Her Majesty's Son, Prince Alfred, should accept the Greek Crown. This unsolicited and spontaneous Manifestation of Goodwill towards Her Majesty and Her Family, and of a due Appreciation of the Benefits conferred by the Principles and Practice of the British Constitution, could not fail to be highly gratifying, and has been deeply felt by Her Majesty.

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"BUT the Diplomatic Engagements of Her Majesty's Crown, together with other weighty Considerations, have prevented Her Majesty from yielding to this general Wish of the Greek Nation.
"HER, Majesty trusts, however, that the same Principles of Choice which led the Greek Nation to direct their Thoughts, in the first instance, towards His Royal Highness Prince Alfred, may guide them to the Selection of a Sovereign under whose Sway the Kingdom of Greece may enjoy the Blessings of internal Prosperity and of peaceful Relations with other States; and if in such a State of Things the Republic of the Seven Islands should declare a deliberate Wish to be united to the Kingdom of Greece, Her Majesty would be prepared to take such Steps as may be necessary for a Revision of the Treaty of November 1815, by which that Republic was reconstituted, and was placed under the Protection of the British Crown.
"HER Majesty's Relations with Foreign Powers continue to be friendly and satisfactory.
"HER Majesty has abstained from taking any Step with a view to induce a Cessation of the Conflict between the contending Parties in the North American States, because it has not yet seemed to Her Majesty that any such Overtures could be attended with a Probability of Success.
"HER Majesty has viewed with the deepest Concern the desolating Warfare which still rages in those Regions; and She has witnessed with heartfelt Grief the severe Distress and Suffering which that War has inflicted upon a large Class of Her
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Majesty's Subjects, but which have been borne by them with noble Fortitude and with exemplary Resignation. It is some Consolation to Her Majesty to be led to hope that this Suffering and this Distress are rather diminishing than increasing, and that some Revival of Employment is beginning to take place in the manufacturing Districts.
"IT has been most gratifying to Her Majesty to witness the abundant Generosity with which all Classes of Her Subjects in all Parts of Her Empire have contributed to relieve the Wants of their suffering Fellow Countrymen; and the Liberality with which Her Majesty's Colonial Subjects have on this Occasion given their Aid has proved that, although their Dwelling Places are far away, their Hearts are still warm with unabated Affection for the Land of their Fathers.
"THE Relief Committees have superintended with constant and laborious Attention the Distribution of the Funds intrusted to their Charge.
"HER Majesty commands us to inform you that She has concluded with The King of the Belgians a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and a Convention respecting Joint Stock Companies, That Treaty and that Convention will be laid before you.
"HER Majesty has likewise given Directions that there shall be laid before you Papers relating to the Affairs of Italy, of Greece, and of Denmark, and that Papers shall also be laid before you relating to Occurrences which have lately taken place in Japan.

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"Gentlemen of the House of Commons,
"HER Majesty has directed that the Estimates for the ensuing Year shall be laid before you. They have been prepared with a due Regard to Economy, and will provide for such Reductions of Expenditure as have appeared to be consistent with the proper Efficiency of the Public Service.
"My Lords, and Gentlemen,
"WE are commanded by Her Majesty to inform you that, notwithstanding the Continuance of the Civil War in North America, the general Commerce of the Country during the past Year has not sensibly diminished.
"THE Treaty of Commerce which Her Majesty concluded with The Emperor of the French has already been productive of Results highly advantageous to both the Nations to which it applies; and the general State of the Revenue, notwithstanding many unfavourable Circumstances, has not been unsatisfactory.
"HER Majesty trusts that these Results may be taken as Proofs that the productive Resources of the Country are unimpaired.
"IT has been gratifying to Her Majesty to observe the Spirit of Order which happily prevails throughout Her Dominions, and which is so essential an Element in the Well-being and Prosperity of Nations.
"VARIOUS Measures of public Usefulness and Improvement will be submitted for your Consideration; and Her Majesty fervently prays that in
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all your Deliberations the Blessing of Almighty God may guide your Counsels to the Promotion of the Welfare and Happiness of Her People."
Then the Commons withdrew.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ADDRESS TO HER MAJESTY ON THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.
THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' Speech having been reported by The LORD CHANCELLOR,
THE EARL OF DUDLEYsaid: My Lords, I rise to move an Address to Her Majesty in answer to Her gracious Speech. In doing so I am relieved from much of that anxiety which has frequently attached to persons who have undertaken the same duty, by the knowledge that many of the propositions contained in the Address will meet with your Lordships' unanimous approval. Upon this occasion, my Lords, I cannot but express my regret that the Speech to which we are about to reply has been delivered, necessarily, through Commissioners, and not by her Majesty in Person; for it has thereby lost the great charm which your Lordships have so often experienced when the Speech has been delivered from the Throne by Her Majesty personally, and which I trust your Lordships will again experience in many future years.
My Lords, the first point in Her Majesty's Speech to which I will refer is one possessing the greatest possible interest for Her Majesty herself, for the Prince of Wales, and for the nation at large. It is of the deepest interest to our Sovereign, because across that cloud which has overshadowed the Royal circle it will throw some rays of light, which I trust will diffuse themselves around until they have dissipated the gloom in that chamber of sorrow, leaving but one dark corner withdrawn from public gaze in which one name, one idea, must ever remain, veiled. I turn from this grave subject, my Lords, to say that there can be no more pleasing duty to your Lordships than to receive among you the future Sovereign of these realms, and to welcome that illustrious Prince to his seat among the Peers of England, and the more especially so as the Sovereign has just made

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known to us that an act the most important to his future life has been determined on; and we are therefore enabled to ex-press publicly our warmest hopes for his future happiness in an event which has hitherto been only the subject of rumour. Your Lordships, I am sure, all trust that many years will elapse before the Prince of Wales shall be called upon to take the highest position in the State; but we may hope that his Royal Highness, in the step he is taking, is about to enter upon a course of domestic happiness, of far more real importance to his future welfare. And if for the attainment of that happiness the most careful training, received with filial obedience, of intelligence and mental power, whereby such training could be fully developed, can prepare a Prince for such a future as seems to be before His Royal Highness, and for so fair a Crown as awaits him, then can no one be more justly envied in every respect, both public and private, than the Prince of Wales, whom I have the honour of addressing. I may even go a step further, and touching upon more personal and delicate ground, I may express a hope that His Royal Highness in his married life may enjoy all the advantages which those less gifted in respect of position or power derive in the struggles and trials of life from a perfect understanding between man and wife. To the advantages already enjoyed by him the Prince has been able to superadd another, that among the limited number of Princesses with whom it was possible for him to form an alliance, he has found one in whom not only beauty, elegance, accomplishments, and high training are united, but who possesses that necessary element of union and happiness in domestic life, the same feeling in regard to religion. I may indeed say, that if there be any ground for the common belief that marriages are not designed upon earth, it may be fairly inferred that the marriage about to be contracted by our future Sovereign is of Diviner origin.
From that subject I will pass to another, with which the country at large is more particularly interested, although the interest of the Sovereign is a direct and personal one in it, for it cannot be otherwise than a source of gratification to our Queen in her retirement to find that the training which her children have received has been such that a foreign nation seeking for a Sovereign was prepared to accept for their King one of her sons, a
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Prince only just verging into manhood, and consequently quite inexperienced, but who by faith in his education and training was deemed qualified to occupy the important position that has been offered to him. That it should not have been possible to accept the offer of the Kingdom of Greece, in consequence of existing diplomatic engagements, is only saying that England, however flattering an offer might be, would not hesitate to decline it when contrary to the faith of treaties. Had it been otherwise, and had it been possible to comply with the wish of the Greek nation, it might have been a great advantage to Greece; but as opposed to diplomatic engagements, it has necessarily been declined. The mention of Greece naturally leads me to refer to the proposition which, however startling it may at first sight appear, has actually been made—namely, that the Ionian Islands shall be ceded to the future Constitutional Sovereign of Greece, whoever he may happen to be. I have no doubt, when that proposal was heard for the first time, it may have been regarded as a proposal to hand over some portion of Her Majesty's dominions to another Power. But that is not so. I need scarcely state, in your Lordships' House, that it is only as Protectors under special treaties that we stand in any relation to those Islands; and if with due regard to their future these Islands can be given up, it will speak highly for the days in which we live, that without detriment to England from the transference, they can be safely handed over to the new Sovereign of Greece. It is, I must say, a matter of almost painful curiosity to know how the problem of who shall fill the throne of Greece is to be solved; but I cannot help thinking, that if Greece were true to herself, there must within her own realm be found one capable of taking charge of her national interests; and if the natural jealousies which attend the setting up a Royal House were once over, one holding the same religion and speaking the same language as the Greeks themselves would have a far better chance of ruling with power and dignity than any foreign Prince, come from what quarter he may. My Lords, the Royal Speech informs us on this occasion, as we have happily been informed on many previous occasions, that "Her Majesty's relations with Foreign Powers continue to be friendly and satisfactory."

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Our earnest desire must be that they shall so continue. It is of the greatest consequence to the country that it should be so, for it is to that friendship more than to our armies and navies that we look for the peace of the world. In one quarter that peace, unfortunately, has been broken, and Her Majesty declares that she "has abstained from taking any steps with a view to induce a cessation of the conflict between the contending parties in the North American States, because it has not yet seemed to Her Majesty that any such overtures could be attended with a probability of success." In my opinion, the proposal which was made to Her Majesty's Government to intervene in order to bring to an end the civil conflict in America has been most rightly rejected, inasmuch as any proposition of that sort must have fallen uselessly to the ground from the temper which at that time prevailed on both sides in America; and I cannot say that even since that offer was rejected any great change towards a better state of sentiment and feeling has occurred, so as to afford any likelihood of bringing the two parties together. It must not, however, for a single moment be supposed that it is not for the interest of this country that that war should cease. Putting humanity out of the question altogether, and speaking of the interests of this country merely commercially, we cannot look to the distress existing in these realms, and know how to a great extent the cessation of that war would cause that suffering to cease, without an earnest desire that the present unfortunate contest in America should be brought to a close. But I do think—especially looking to the feelings which were created by our declaration that we would adhere to a course of strict neutrality between the parties—that anything we can do is more likely to embitter than allay the bitter animosity which at present seems to exist towards this country. Why such a hostile feeling should exist I do not know, for in all truth and honesty our neutrality has been a real one. It may perhaps be natural that both sides should be disappointed by the course we have determined to pursue; for both sides— both the North and South—have made efforts to induce us to a breach of our declared neutrality, and to giving to the world some outward and visible sign of that breach. But I do say, neither here in the House of Lords, nor in the
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other House of Parliament, nor in the country at large, certainly by none who have the honour and dignity of this country at heart, has there been any other sentiment felt or expressed than that this war should cease. Our desire for the future of America herself, for her people, for her power, leads us to hope; for the termination of this unnatural contest. If, despite all we have said and done, there still exists on the other side of the Atlantic such bitter animosity against this country, we must bear with it—we must be prepared to receive, as arising from the excitement of war and the general disturbance of the public mind, imputations and expressions not founded in truth or justice, feeling that the uprightness and dignity of this country can afford to pass them by in silence. My Lords, Her Majesty refers "with heartfelt grief to the severe distress which that war has inflicted upon a large class of Her Majesty's subjects, but which have been borne by them with noble fortitude and resignation." No such blow has, indeed, before fallen upon England; and it has been met in the most noble spirit of munificent charity; but we cannot look forward to a chronic state of things such as that described in Her Majesty's Speech, in which a large portion of the most industrious of our population are maintained merely by the outstretched hand of charity, without feelings of apprehension. There must be an end to such a state of things, and that end is to be found by bringing about a peaceful solution of the difficulty on the other side of the Atlantic. But whatever is done by England to that end must be done only in a manner consistent with our honour, and only attempted when the proper moment shall seem to have arrived. I must say— though that is but small consolation— that the result of the distress in the cotton districts has shown that in the days in which we live more confidence is to be placed in the people at large, in their good sense, courage, and forbearance, than in times gone by could have been expected. It was scarcely possible that a greater trial could have visited a very large body of the people than that which has now fallen on Lancashire; yet it has been borne without an outrage or crime, so that their conduct has excited the admiration of the world at large. It has been said over and over again, but still I must repeat it here—for what

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comes from your Lordships on so important an occasion as on the night of your first meeting, must come with great weight—it would have been impossible for the country at large to have escaped that disturbance and violence which has prevailed during periods of distress in times past, but for the good sense and patience which have characterized the suffering classes. Speaking of the re-relief of so great a distress as this, I should be wanting both in memory and gratitude, if I did not say that not England only in its length and breadth has nobly done her duty, but that England's sons all over the world, especially in her colonies, have been among the most ready to send contributions home to relieve it. I may go one step further, and say, that if there has been one bright spot upon the troubled surface of America itself, it is that her citizens, in the midst of all their troubles, have not forgotten that the claims of charity are paramount. What has been done, and, I fear, what remains to be done, has thrown on many an amount of work, of anxiety, and of organization, which there are men, and women too, I must add, in this country always prepared to exhibit, but which have been better shown in this emergency than perhaps on any former occasion. While the magnitude of the distress was scarcely yet known, there was a cry of distress; but before that cry met with a wide and general response, a distinct determination was expressed throughout the country at large that all parties, as far as they could be reached, should be called on to bear their part, and that the funds should be administered as purely and as satisfactorily as possible; and, from all I can learn, but one sentiment is to be heard, of deep thankfulness to those who have come forward to contribute and to administer those funds. My Lords, Her Majesty informs us that She has concluded a Treaty of Commerce with the King of the Belgians, and without doubt such treaties, when they come into operation, will contribute, as other commercial treaties have already done, to the prosperity of this country. But, independent of treaties, there are other relations with foreign countries, and which Her Majesty refers to in the Speech, on which this country has set its heart. I trust that England adheres to the principle of non-interference, and that other countries will be induced to adopt the same. There is
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one country which will never be itself till foreign intervention is removed. I am sure that I speak the sentiments of the great majority of the English people when I say that they desire to see Italy left to its own course, that it may once more take its place among the nations of Europe; and that as it is now, from its climate and natural beauty, a very Paradise of the earth, it may become equally distinguished for the freedom and prosperity of its people. This, I venture to say, is the sincere desire of your Lordships, as it is of the nation at large. That this will be so I have no doubt, though when it will be must depend upon those who can move only as the affairs of the world move, neither hastening nor retarding them, but accepting events as they arise.
My Lords, having now touched on some of the principle paragraphs of Her Majesty's Speech, I must, before I sit down, turn to a matter more personal to your Lordships, and lament that one has passed away from this (the Ministerial) side of the House, who has long enjoyed the deep respect of all who have been either politically associated with or opposed to him, for in private life there was not one of your Lordships who had the honour of knowing him who has not been his sincere friend. The Marquess of Lansdowne stood in your Lordships' House rich in all the experience of years, and invested, as they rolled on, with an authority which could be derived only from length of years and vast experience. It will be remembered that not many years ago he took formal leave of official life, and intimated that it was not his intention again, except very occasionally, to take a part in the debates of this House. His voice is now closed in death, and that calm judgement and mild wisdom which lent so much force and weight to the counsels he gave are lost for ever.
For myself, my Lords, I must be allowed to add that whatever claim the importance of my subject may have on your Lordships' attention, I am indebted solely to your kind indulgence for so patient a hearing of these very imperfect remarks.
The noble Earl concluded by moving that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, as follows: —
MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,
"WE, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble

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Thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has commanded to be made to both Houses of Parliament.
"WE humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that Your Majesty has declared Your Consent to a Marriage between His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales and Her Royal Highness The Princess Alexandra, Daughter of Prince Christian of Denmark, and for commanding that the Treaty which has been concluded thereupon with The King of Denmark should be laid before us.
"WE humbly express to Your Majesty our full Participation in Your Majesty's Sentiments on an Event so interesting to Your Majesty, and which, with the Blessing of God, will, we trust, prove so conducive to the Happiness of Your Majesty's Family and the Welfare of Your People; and assure Your Majesty that we will make Provision for such an Establishment as may be thought suitable to the Rank and Dignity of the Heir Apparent to the Crown of these Realms.
"WE humbly assure Your Majesty that we cannot fail to be highly gratified and deeply to feel the unsolicited and spontaneous Manifestation of Goodwill towards Your Majesty and Your Family, and of a due Appreciation of the Benefits conferred by the Principles and Practice of the British Constitution, which has led the Greek Nation to express so strong a Desire that Your Majesty's Son, Prince Alfred, should accept the Greek Crown.
"WE thank Your Majesty for informing us that the Diplomatic Engagements of Your Majesty's Crown, together with other weighty Considerations, have prevented Your Majesty from yielding to this general Wish of the Greek Nation.
"WE humbly assure Your Majesty that with Your Majesty we trust that the same Principles of Choice which led the Greek Nation to direct their Thoughts, in the first instance, towards His Royal Highness Prince Alfred, may guide them to the Selection of a Sovereign under whose Sway the Kingdom of Greece may enjoy the Blessings of internal Prosperity and of peaceful Relations with other States; and express our Thanks to Your Majesty for informing us, that if in such a State of Things the Republic of the Seven Islands should declare a deliberate Wish to be united to the Kingdom of Greece, Your Majesty would be prepared to take such Steps as may be necessary for a Revision of the Treaty of November 1815, by which that Republic was reconstituted, and was placed under the Protection of the British Crown.
"WE humbly express the Gratification with which we learn that Your Majesty's Relations with Foreign Powers continue to be friendly and satisfactory.
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"WE humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that Your Majesty has abstained from taking any Step with a view to induce a Cessation of the Conflict between the contending Parties in the North American States, because it has not seemed to Your Majesty that any such Overtures could be attended with a Probability of Success.
"WE assure Your Majesty that we share in the Concern with which Your Majesty has viewed the desolating Warfare which still rages in those Regions, and in the heartfelt Grief with which Your Majesty has witnessed the severe Distress and Suffering which that War has inflicted upon a large Class of Your Majesty's Subjects, but which have been borne by them with noble Fortitude and with exemplary Resignation; and we trust with Your Majesty that this Suffering and this Distress are rather diminishing than increasing, and that some Revival of Employment is beginning to take place in the manufacturing Districts.
"WE humbly express to Your Majesty our deep Gratification at the abundant Generosity with which all Classes of Your Majesty's Subjects in all Parts of Your Empire have contributed to relieve the Wants of their suffering Fellow Countrymen; and at the Liberality with which Your Majesty's Colonial Subjects have on this Occasion given their Aid; proving that although their Dwelling Places are far away, their Hearts are still warm with unabated Affection for the Land of their Fathers; and we humbly convey to Your Majesty our Sense of the Value of the constant and laborious Attention with which the Relief Committees have superintended the Distribution of the Funds intrusted to their Charge.
"WE humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that Your Majesty has concluded with the King of the Belgians a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and a Convention respecting Joint Stock Companies, and for directing that Treaty and Convention to be laid before us, together with Papers relating to the Affairs of Italy, of Greece, and of Denmark, and to Occurrences which have lately taken place in Japan.
"WE humbly express to Your Majesty our Satisfaction at learning that, notwithstanding the Continuance of the Civil War in North America, the general Commerce of the Country during the past Year has not sensibly diminished; that the Treaty of Commerce which Your Majesty concluded with The Emperor of the French has already been productive of Results highly advantageous to both the Nations to which it applies; and that the general State of the Revenue, notwithstanding many unfavourable Circumstances, has not been unsatisfactory.

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"THAT with Your Majesty we trust that those Results may be taken as Proofs that the productive Resources of the Country are unimpaired.
"WE humbly convey to Your Majesty the Expression of our deep Gratification at the Spirit of Order which happily prevails throughout Your Majesty's Dominions, and which is so essential an Element in the Well-being and Prosperity of Nations.
"WE humbly assure Your Majesty that we will give our most serious Attention to the various Measures of public Usefulness and Improvement which may be submitted for our Consideration; and that with Your Majesty we fervently pray that the Blessing of Almighty God may attend our Deliberations, and guide them to the Promotion of the Welfare and Happiness of Your Majesty's People."
THE EARL OF GRANARD: My Lords, it is with, considerable diffidence that I rise to second the Address, so ably moved by the noble Earl beside me, for it may be truly said that that noble Earl has so fully exhausted the subject that there is little left for me to comment upon. I trust, however, that in the few observations which I shall make I shall receive your Lordships' usual indulgence.
My Lords, most naturally does the Royal Speech allude to the topic now foremost in the minds of Her Majesty's subjects—the marriage of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales;—and I am sure it is unnecessary for me to ask your Lordships whether you participate in the language of the Speech in regard to an event so interesting to Her Majesty, and which, with the blessing of God, She trusts will prove so conducive to the happiness of Her family and the welfare of Her people. My Lords, as the nation sympathized with Her Majesty in Her bereavement and sorrow, and would gladly give her every consolation in its power; so it also sympathizes in the joy She must feel at seeing the Heir Apparent about to enter into those engagements which, from the character of the high contracting parties, promise to bring about a renewal of that spectacle of unalloyed happiness and uninterrupted good example which so eminently distinguished the married life of his Royal parents. And, though it is awkward to speak on such a subject in His Royal Highness's presence, I venture to Say, without any fear of contradiction, that no British Prince has ever had the same advantages in beginning life as, un-
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der the prudent guidance of Her Majesty and Her illustrious Consort, His Royal Highness has enjoyed, in being able to make himself acquainted with those subjects which would fit him at some future—it is to be hoped distant—time, to assume the Crown of these realms. He has, after careful study, been enabled to read in that best of books, the world, under different aspects and in different climes. He has visited regions that would have been deemed inaccessible by many private gentlemen in the last century, and he has had an opportunity of judging by personal observation of many of the Governments and nations of the Old World and the New. In the one hemisphere he has wandered among the relics of a bygone civilization, while in the other he has seen—what in all human probability none of us will ever see again—the great Republic of the western world in its pristine entirety; and no doubt His Royal Highness has, in his own mind, contrasted these things with those home institutions which have now stood for centuries, vigorous and unimpaired, that greatest test, the decaying hand of Time.
My Lords, your Lordships will next, no doubt, recognise with satisfaction the compliment paid to Her Majesty and to this country by the spontaneous offer made of the crown of Greece for Prince Alfred; and you will also see with satisfaction in that offer an additional proof that the present aspirations of the nationalities of Europe tend more to the principles of sound constitutional government than to those principles of anarchy and disorder which produced such disastrous results in the years 1848 and 1849. Still, your Lordships will, I think, agree in the wisdom which dictated the refusal of the vacant throne of Greece, however tempting the offer. It was not for Her Majesty's Government to disregard the engagements from time to time entered into by wise Administrations relative to the affairs of Greece. But, even taking it upon lower ground, it would scarcely have been advisable to place a British Prince in a position which, from its peculiar nature, might have brought the policy of this country into closer contact with the entanglements of that Eastern question, the solution of which is so fraught with danger to the peace of Europe. We can, therefore, in the language of the Speech, only continue to show our goodwill towards

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the Greeks, and trust that the moderation which has hitherto prevailed in their councils may lead them to choose such a Prince as will not only give them the happiness they deserve, but will also develop the neglected resources of their country. Should that happen, I trust that your Lordships will agree in the prudence of the proposal that Her Majesty should negotiate with the other Powers to permit the Ionian Republic to be added to Greece, thereby correcting the mistake made by former treaties in restricting too much the territory of that kingdom, proving also our appreciation of the goodwill manifested towards us by the spontaneous election of Prince Alfred, and proclaiming our interest in the welfare and prosperity of Greece.
My Lords, your Lordships have no doubt heard with satisfaction that Her Majesty's friendly relations with Foreign Powers have suffered no diminution.
My Lords, I come now to a topic of the Royal Speech to which renewed prominence has been given by a late French despatch—I mean the question of mediation in the civil war now raging in America. However much your Lordships deplore the continuance of a war so materially affecting ourselves, and however much we hope for its speedy termination, yet I think your Lordships will approve the prudence which dictated a policy of non-intervention to Her Majesty's Government, and will agree that our interference in American affairs would only have produced intense irritation among the American people. It might have given rise to unpleasant complications, revived ancient jealousies, and certainly would have had no effect in putting an end to the strife. It was, therefore, much better to leave to the Emperor of the French the task which he had imposed on himself, with the hope that his generous intentions and good counsels might be accepted by the contending parties.
My Lords, the natural sequence to the paragraph on the American war is an allusion to the sad and unmerited affliction which has fallen upon our operatives in Lancashire. And here I cannot refrain from paying my humble meed of admiration to the noble manner in which those sufferings have been borne. Formerly the news of distress in the manufacturing districts filled the public mind with serious apprehension; but nothing could have more
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strongly proved the gradual improvement which has taken place among the operative classes during the last twenty years, than the way in which they have endured their present affliction. There are many noble Lords present who may remember past distress in the manufacturing districts, the bitter array of class against class, the infuriate complaint, and the armed repression of the sufferers. Wow, the only struggle is a most noble one—it is only who shall be most forward in alleviating the distress, and, among the labourers, who shall show the best example of patience, fortitude, and manly resignation. You have seen Her Majesty's name foremost in the list of subscribers, and all your Lordships must have noticed the princely donation of the noble Earl opposite, whose historic name is so intimately connected with Lancashire, and to whom that county is oven more deeply indebted than for his generosity for the able management he has brought to bear upon the distribution of the relief fund. It must be a matter of satisfaction to your Lordships to reflect, that if the cry of distress has gone far and wide, the response has reached the length and breadth of the land likewise, and it has come not only from this country but from the uttermost parts of our vast colonial empire, proving, in the words of the Royal Speech, "that although their dwelling-place is far away, their hearts are still warm with unabated affection for the land of their fathers." As an Irishman I am proud that Ireland has responded to the prompting of gratitude; that she has not forgotten the helping hand that was stretched forth to her when the dark cloud of adversity swept over the land. If I may be permitted to say so, the contributions from Ireland are the more creditable he-cause at the present moment considerable distress exists in that country. There have been three successive bad harvests, the trade of the country has proportionately declined, and I am afraid that many of the farmers will be without the means to crop the land this season. I therefore venture to express a hope that Parliament will during the present Session give its sanction to measures authorizing works of arterial drainage, and to some such useful measures as will enable them not only to develop the resources of the country, but to alleviate the existing distress. Your Lordships will have learned

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with satisfaction that Her Majesty has concluded a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the King of the Belgians. Tour Lordships are also told that various measures of public usefulness and improvement will be submitted for your consideration; and no doubt one among them will probably be a measure embodying the recommendation of the Royal Commission now inquiring into the subject of convict management. I trust your Lordships will bear with me if I state that I think an erroneous impression is now abroad respecting the relative merits of the English and Irish systems of convict management. I do not wish to cast any reflections on any particular person or measure; but although, in common with most people, I give the preference to the Irish system of gaol and convict management, yet I think that the difference between the classes of criminals with which the two systems have to deal has not been sufficiently taken into account. In Ireland most of the crimes are committed from passion or impulse. Hence there are fewer relapses into crime than in England; and to that circumstance, and also to the fact that ticket-of-leave men are kept under police surveillance, I ascribe the more satisfactory results of the Irish convict system.
My Lords, Her Majesty ends Her most gracious Speech by praying that the blessing of Almighty God may guide our counsels to the promotion of the welfare and happiness of Her people. May I now also fitly conclude by a prayer, in which I am sure your Lordships will join with me?—that Almighty God will continue His blessing on Her Majesty and Her Royal House, and on him whom for the first time we have the pleasure of seeing among us this evening! My Lords, it only remains to me to second the Address which has been moved by my noble Friend. [See Page 14.]
THE EARL OF DERBY:—My Lords, there is one topic touched upon in the Speech delivered from the Throne with respect to which there will be, most decidedly, no difference of opinion among your Lordships, and with regard to which we may freely express our feelings without any mental reservation, any arrière pensée, or any protest with a view to future proceedings. This time last year it was our melancholy duty to present to the widowed Sovereign of this country a tribute of respect, condolence, sympathy,
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and affection, as deep and genuine as was ever offered by a great nation to the possessor of its Throne. This year a different and a more pleasing duty devolves upon us. In place of the language of condolence upon the direst calamity which could afflict our Sovereign's heart—a calamity which still bows her down in sorrow—a sorrow that will never cease—we have to substitute the language of congratulation upon an event which in every point of view must be a source of consolation, of comfort, and even of rejoicing to Her Majesty, as it must be to Parliament and the country at large. We have now to congratulate Her Majesty and the country upon the approaching marriage of the heir to the Throne, of that illustrious Prince whom we have had the honour and the happiness of receiving within our walls this day; we have to congratulate Her Majesty and him upon an event which, as far as human foresight can tell, promises to His Royal Highness the greatest amount of happiness which can be enjoyed in this life. It is not to him alone as heir to the Throne, however, that we tender our respectful congratulation. We congratulate one who has already by the courtesy of his demeanour and the amiability of his manners won the regard and affection of those who have been privileged to approach him; one who at a very early age, when placed in circumstances of no inconsiderable difficulty, has displayed a tact, a judgment, a discretion which promise well for the results of his future career. My Lords, we congratulate Her Majesty and His Royal Highness upon his approaching union with a Princess of whom all who have the happiness of knowing her personally speak in terms implying their conviction that, endowed with every gift of person and of mind, she is fully qualified to take upon herself that high lot which destiny has assigned to her, and to become the partner of the Sovereign of the greatest empire in the world. We rejoice also in reflecting that Her Royal Highness comes from a country between the inhabitants of which and our own there are many points of similarity of character, many natural and national ties, and much community of interests; a country enjoying a constitutional monarchy, and that constitutional monarchy one the integrity and independence of which, I may venture to say, is a matter which, never can be regarded with indifference by the Parliament, the people, or, I hope,

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the Government of England. I can express upon this subject no better wish for His Royal Highness than that in the approaching most important event of his life he and the Princess whom he has chosen to share his high position may enjoy happiness as unalloyed—God grant that it may be far more lasting!—as that which fell to the lot of his illustrious parents.
My Lords, turning from this to a certain degree personal, but yet most deeply interesting and important topic, I am happy to be able to say, touching a subject which engages the attention of all men in all parts of the world, that I have no fault to find with, no objection to raise to, the course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued with respect to what is justly called the "desolating warfare" now raging in the hitherto United States of America. I may regret, indeed, that Her Majesty's Government did not feel themselves justified in joining in the attempt, however hopeless that attempt might appear, to which they were invited by the Sovereign of France; not, as the noble Earl who has just spoken, by a slip of the tongue, said, for the purpose of putting an end to the war, but with the view of endeavouring by good offices to obtain such an armistice or cessation of hostilities as might lead the two parties themselves to reflect upon the miseries and hopelessness of the war in which they are at present engaged. I think it is matter of regret that Her Majesty's Government did not feel themselves justified in acceding to the wish of the Emperor of the French; but before I censure the course pursued by them, it is only fair I should say that they were in possession of much better means of information than any I can pretend to as to whether such an interference as the one contemplated, intended to put an end to the war, might not rather have aggravated the bitterness of the strife by the irritation arising from any foreign intervention. Upon that point, which doubtless they considered in all its bearings, they were probably enlightened by the despatches of our Minister at Washington. I therefore take no objection to the course pursued, although I regret that no attempt was made to promote the restoration of peace. "Mediation" would, perhaps, not be a correct or legitimte expression to apply to that proposed species of intervention. I presume that, previous to attempting mediation, the two parties
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should be agreed upon the terms, or at all events the principles, upon which it ought to be conducted; but, if I know anything of the state of feeling in the Northern and Southern States, the question at issue between them is not a question of degree, but a question of fundamental principle, as to which there can be no mediation, because it is a question on one side of the continuance of the Union, and on the other of separation. And so much being decided, it is necessary to determine on what principle the negotiations should proceed—whether on the principle of maintaining the Union in its integrity, or of acquiescing in the separation of the two bodies. I feel that that difficulty meets us at the outset; and I greatly fear from the language of the respective parties that at present the consent of both could not be obtained to either principle. It has been said by personal and political friends of my own—men for whose opinions I entertain the highest respect—that the time has arrived when it is desirable that we should recognise the Southern Republic. Upon that subject, regretting as I do to differ from any of my friends, I confess I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that the time has arrived at which it is either wise, politic, or even legitimate, to recognise the South. I do not think the circumstances have yet occurred under which a revolting State is entitled to recognition from neutral Powers. The first of those circumstances is where, although the State from which a secession has taken place has not acquiesced in it as a fait accompli, yet the war is, in point of fact, at an end, and no struggle is going on for the restoration of the original dominion. That was the case when the States of South America revolted from Spain. For a long period before those States were recognised by the Powers, Spain had ceased to take any active steps to keep them under her rule. Although, therefore, Spain did not recognise their independence, we did recognise it, because the struggle was in fact at an end. Another set of circumstances under which recognition is legitimate is where other nations, having in the interests of humanity determined that a desolating warfare shall no longer be continued, in order to put an end to it agree to recognise the revolting party. But in that case recognition is always followed by something further, for it means nothing unless the Powers who join in it are ready to

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support by force of arms the claims of the State which they recognise. That was the case with regard to Belgium in its separation from Holland; such was the case with regard to Greece in its separation from Turkey. No doubt there are occasions when the horrors of war and the danger to the public interests of the world from the prolongation of a contest, are so great that it is essential it should be terminated by other nations intervening to recognise the Secessionists; but when such a case does occur, they must be prepared to go a step further, and to maintain by force the independence which they have acknowledged. I cannot but think that this consideration has not been sufficiently weighed by those who are anxious for the recognition of the South. My conviction, which has been strengthened by everything which has occurred from the first outbreak of the civil war, is that the restoration of the Union as it formerly existed is the one conclusion which is absolutely impossible. I believe that at first the feelings of this country were strongly in favour of the North, and that it was not generally supposed that the North would have any great difficulty in overrunning and subduing the South. But even at that early period it was perceived, that if the North were to succeed in subjugating the South, its difficulties would only commence; because it was out of the question that where such mutual animosity existed, and such injuries had been inflicted on one side and on the other, any cordial reconcilement or union could take place between them. If it was so a year or two ago, how much stronger must this conviction have grown when day by day the struggle becomes more desperate, when it is more apparent that neither party can obtain a signal and decisive advantage over the other, the one on the defensive being always the one which has practically the best of it; and when it is obvious that the continuance of the war is the continuance of the most dreadful slaughter and the most harrowing carnage, accompanied by increasing bitterness of feeling, and accompanied, if we may believe reports, by aggravating atrocities on both sides, which add unusual horrors to those by which war, and especially a civil war, is attended? Under these circumstances, I declare my firm conviction that there is no possibility of re-establishing the Union between the North and the South. At the same time, recollect, the struggle is still going
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on. The whole sea-board of the South is in the possession of the North, and large Federal armies are in Southern territory, where they obtain occasional advantages. That being the case, it is impossible to say that the struggle has practically ceased, so as to admit of our recognition, even if we did not mean to go further; and I do not believe that those who are the most anxious for recognition under existing circumstances are prepared for an interference by force of arms, and insisting on laying down the terms on which a separation is to take place. Therefore, I own I approve, on the whole, of the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and of that entire neutrality which, I believe, they have practically carried out to the utmost of their power, in accordance with their professions. There is another point. No man with ordinary sentiments of humanity can fail earnestly to desire that the desolating warfare in America should be brought to a close, and I am quite certain that the present Government or any other which might be in power in this country, would eagerly embrace the first opportunity that had a fair prospect of success of tendering such good offices as might lead to a cessation of hostilities. At the present moment I do not, I am sorry to say, see any prospect of such a result, and I fear that the war must go on until both of the combatants simultaneously see the necessity of coming to some settlement.
My Lords, there is another aspect in which this war has serious bearings— on the industry, happiness, and prosperity of England. The cessation of the cotton supply could not happen without causing much distress; but I need not say that both parties in America, and more particularly the South—and, indeed, some parties in this country—have exaggerated the importance of the suspension of the cotton trade to this country; and it is not undesirable that this exaggerated impression should be corrected, for it goes to the extent that it is an absolute necessity for us to submit to any terms rather than that our great industry should be interfered with. There is no doubt that the distress in the cotton districts, if not altogether caused by, has been greatly aggravated by the war in the United States. The sudden cutting-off of the raw material of a manufacture which had risen to such an unparalleled height must produce great

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distress and disastrous consequences to those who are engaged in that particular manufacture. But I regret to say I cannot see that the sudden cessation of the war in America would of itself restore the prosperity of this important industry, or even replace on a satisfactory footing a great portion of the population whose sufferings have excited so much sympathy and compassion. And, in speaking of this subject, I cannot but express my thanks to the noble Earl who seconded the Address (the Earl of Granard) for the manner in which he has spoken of the very small service which it was in my power personally to render towards the relief of destitution in the manufacturing districts. Connected as I am with that county and with that manufacturing district, it has fallen to my lot to take a considerable share in the distribution of those funds which have been so liberally contributed by all classes of Her Majesty's subjects. But there are many whose exertions in the same cause have been equal to and greater than mine. There are men who had far less time to spare, and yet who devoted a much larger share of attention to the relief of that distress than I have. Nothing can be more gratifying than the conduct of the immediate sufferers; nothing more gratifying to observe than the way in which men in business, engaged in transactions on which it was necessary for them to bestow constant attention, gave hours and days and weeks and months of their time gratuitously and without the slightest recompense, except the consciousness of the good they were doing, to the alleviation of the distress around them. I am convinced that the sufferings at present endured by the manufacturing population have led to another and most valuable result. It has brought forth a great amount of kindly feeling among different classes. It has enabled the rich and poor to understand each other better than before; and has taught them to remember their mutual dependence on one another. It has led the rich to think of the duties they owe to the poor, and it has shown to the poor that the rich are not unmindful of them. It is impossible to speak in terms of too high praise of the manner in which that large population has borne its suffering and distress. More than once— and it speaks well for the confidence and kindly feeling that prevail in that population—when complimented on their en-
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durance and patience, they have answered simply, "We knew you would not let us starve." The liberality of the country has been unbounded, and it has proceeded from every class of the community. The feeling of national and kindly relationship has been warmly and cordially responded to from Her Majesty's widely extended colonial possessions, and I rejoiced to hear the noble Earl who seconded the Address take notice—a notice which I think might have been gracefully taken in Her Majesty's Speech—of the large and spontaneous contributions, which, in the midst of their own difficulties, have been offered to our manufacturing population by the inhabitants of the Northern States of America. Large, however, as has been the amount subscribed, anxious as have been the labours of the Relief Committee, careful as has been the distribution of the bounty, I fear that I cannot say there is at present any reason for the cessation of the public liberality. Large as the funds are, and no doubt they are sufficient to guard the population for some time to come against famine, and that disease which springs from destitution, I cannot look forward to the termination of the existing distress within a limited period. Indeed, for a considerable time it is impossible that the cotton manufacturing interest can fail to be in deep distress. I am far from desiring to utter a word which should in the slightest take away from the merit of the labouring classes on account of the manner in which they have borne the sufferings that have fallen on them; but, undoubtedly, one of the consequences of the abundant liberality of the public in relieving the distress has been that, not the industrious workman— not the highly-paid labourer — not the man who had enjoyed comparative prosperity—but that those who were on the verge of pauperism, or were paupers themselves, have been in receipt of fully as good or a better supply of the necessaries of life than they were accustomed to receive under ordinary circumstances. This is a point which will require the most ample consideration and careful watching, when the distress shall be mitigated, as it is calculated to raise questions of most serious embarrassment. I will not trouble your Lordships with them at present, but it will be satisfactory to your Lordships to know that they relate to the effects of a too liberal distribution of relief among the lowest classes. At the same time,

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your Lordships will see that it was impossible to make a distinction in the distribution of relief between those who had been earning 30 s., 35 s., and 40 s. a week as wages and those who had only earned 7s. or 8s.; and, consequently, by the higher class of workmen the distress will be felt the most severely, while by the lowest it will scarcely be felt at all. There is no danger of demoralizing or of destroying the self-dependence of the higher class of workmen, for the moderate contributions they receive for the support of life and health without work would be but a moderate substitute for the large amount of comfort and comparative affluence which they derive from honest industry; but the danger exists in reference to the lower class now receiving assistance from public funds when they come to fall back on the ordinary state of things and their ordinary resources. I say I think there is a certainty that the period of distress in the cotton districts has not nearly reached its close. It is undoubtedly satisfactory, as noticed in the Royal Speech, that there is a slight diminution in the number of those receiving relief, either from parochial funds or other sources; but I must express my fear that that diminution is but temporary and occasional, and that there must be for a considerable time a fluctuation in the amount of diminution. Let us now see what is the state of the markets. According to the present state of things, which no doubt may arise from the American war, the price of cotton goods at Manchester is not sufficient to pay for the labour of working up the raw cotton; and it follows that, notwithstanding the great diminution in our Indian and Chinese trade, cotton goods at the present moment in the markets of the East, in India and China, are selling at a rate 25 per cent lower than in Manchester. I was assured the other day by one of the most intelligent merchants that, according to present calculation, though it may be difficult to ascertain the stocks in the interior of China or India, there is reason to apprehend that not a single pound of cotton goods could be sent to India or China in the next year with a chance of obtaining a remunerating price. From a calculation of what cotton is likely to come in, it appeared that though it would be considerably less than had been imported in more favourable times, yet the probable amount would be sufficient to supply effec-
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tively the demand of the whole world, with the exception of India and China; but it would not enable the workman to obtain more than three days' employment in the week, with a loss of wages for this year of £9,000,000, and for the next year of £6,000,000. I trust your Lordships will pardon me for going into these details, but I have taken anxious pains to ascertain the facts, and they are of importance. The state of the market at present is such that, according to the price of raw cotton at Liverpool, it will not pay the manufacturers at Manchester to work it up. The market is in a most sensitive condition. There is a vast amount of capital invested in machinery, and employers are waiting eagerly to seize the first opportunity of the turning of the scale, and making the slightest amount of profit. They are watching the Liverpool market with the deepest anxiety, and the moment there maybe a fall of a 1d. or 2d. per pound, there are, notwithstanding the glut in the markets, numbers of persons ready to rush in and make use of the opportunity of working up the cotton. The result is that there is an increase in the quantity of goods in the market, there is a constant alternation between the price at which a small profit may be realized and that on which there would be a loss; and the consequence is that the small capitalists must go to the ground; they could not support themselves or maintain their workmen by working three days in the week; and the large capitalists will absorb the remainder of the business, and at the least one-half of the cotton operatives will be out of work. In this state of things I wish I could say that in the next two or three years I see a prospect of the cotton manufacture coming up, I do not say to the point which it reached in 1860 and 1861 — for I do not know whether that would be desirable—but to an ordinary degree of prosperity. I am quite certain that for a considerable period there must be great depression in that branch of manufacture; and I hope the public will not be led away by the notion that any slight diminution of distress which may be felt at the present time can be relied on as being permanent, but that they will be prepared, if necessary, for continued exertions to carry this large and important population through the fearful crisis.
My Lords, I have perhaps spoken at greater length than is desirable on a sub-

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ject connected with, one question of foreign policy. There are other topics of considerable importance adverted to in the Royal Speech. Papers relative to Italy, Greece, and Denmark are promised to be laid before the House. Unfortunately, we have already had a partial publication of papers on the subject of each of these three countries, and I confess that I am unable to offer my congratulations to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the brilliant success which has attended his diplomatic achievements, with respect to which he seems somewhat ambitious. There have been made known some despatches from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with respect to Denmark which I looked at with a little astonishment; because I recollected what were the principles and declarations on former occasions of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, and of the noble Viscount at the head of the Government; and I confess I was at a loss to reconcile those principles and declarations with the recommendations and advice contained in these despatches. I read the correspondence, I confess, with some feeling of humiliation, for I found among it four documents, and I entertained serious doubts which of the four reflected the greatest amount of ridicule on British diplomacy. The first despatch is one from the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, originating quite gratuitously a discussion and tendering advice which certainly was not asked for, and, equally certainly, was not taken. The next despatch is an able and statesman-like reply given by the Danish Minister to the proposition of the noble Earl. The third despatch—if, indeed, it be a genuine one— is addressed by the Swedish Government to the British Government, thanking the noble Earl for communicating information, which Sweden already knew, respecting the purport of the first; and the fourth, about the genuineness of which there is no doubt, is a despatch addressed by a certain Count Elsinore to a certain Count Russell. I must say, that if I had to determine which of these four despatches is most successful in casting ridicule upon our diplomacy, I should have to give the supremacy to the original despatch of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary. The noble Earl and myself once had the happiness to be colleagues of one of the most agreeable, most able, and shrewdest of men, the late Lord Melbourne, who also possessed a great deal of ordinary common sense.
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There was one piece of advice which he was inculcating upon his colleagues; but by which I am afraid the noble Earl has not profited. When any matter arose which involved considerable difficulty and embarrassment, and which it was not known how to dispose of at the moment, Lord Melbourne's favourite receipt was, "Can't you let it alone?" I am sure the noble Earl must recollect as well as I do that saying of the noble Lord, "Can't you let it alone? It will do very well if you only let it alone." But that is the very thing which, with all his experience, and with the example of Lord Melbourne before him, the noble Earl cannot do. He cannot let it alone. We know that the courage and confidence of the noble Earl, in undertaking to surmount any possible difficulty, have been proverbial since the days of Sidney Smith. If there be any difficulty of any kind to be settled—if there is any Constitution to be reorganized at once—if there is any embarrassing question which has occupied the attention of statesmen for years, almost for centuries, the noble Earl is quite ready at a minute's notice. His language always is, "Come, I will settle it at once; I will tell you how to do it;" and then, without even the preliminary apology which used to be given by a celebrated character—" I hope I don't intrude"—he offers his advice and assistance to any nation that he may suppose to stand in need of them. That is the case with respect to Denmark; and I hope, my Lords, we shall see somewhat more successful results from the course taken by the noble Earl than those which the Correspondence already published leads me to anticipate. But let me say, apart from all questions as to whether the advice tendered by the noble Earl was good or bad—even supposing it was as good as I think, and as the Danish Government thought it was bad, for they thought it an interference with the prerogatives of the monarchy of Denmark—could not the noble Earl, if he thought it advisable to interfere in the question, have interfered by privately communicating with the Danish Minister, instead of adopting that broad line of interference which has materially aggravated the difficulty, and enabled Russia and Prussia to put a pressure on. Denmark, founded upon a principle first enunciated by the Foreign Secretary of this country?
Well, my Lords, if the intervention of

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the noble Earl in the affairs of Denmark has not been very successful, let us turn to his intervention in Italy. I hope the Italian papers promised in the Speech from the Throne will give us a graphic account of his negotiations with the Pope. If the noble Earl thought that advice ought to be tendered to the Pope, did he think that he was the person from whom the Holy Father would most readily take it? Did he think that in a matter concerning the affairs of Italy he would overcome that reluctance which the Holy Father has shown to permit of interference from other Powers? And what was the moment chosen for this advice and interference? Mr. Odo Russell has an audience of the Pope, in which some general observation is made by His Holiness as to the possibility of his being obliged to ask the hospitality of England. Upon this Mr. Russell is instructed to make a formal offer of a ship, accompanied with an advice that the Pope should take an early opportunity of leaving Home and accepting an asylum in Malta. The time chosen by the noble Earl for giving this advice was that at which the Emperor Napoleon was telling the Pope, that if he remained at Rome, he would maintain him there with all the power of his potection. Thus while the noble Earl was intervening to induce the Pope to go away, the French Emperor was intervening to keep him where he was. Such is the French alliance, this is the cordiality, the unity, the harmony, with which France and England are acting in the affairs of Italy. But, my Lords, supposing that the advice of the noble Earl had been accepted, would it have been practicable that the Pope should have been maintained by a Protestant Government in a possession where the majority of the people are Roman Catholics? If the noble Earl had sought to find out a position presenting the greatest amount of embarrassment and complication, I cannot conceive one which would come up to such a standard so completely as that of the Pope at Malta under the protection of the British Government. [A laugh.] My Lords, there may be something amusing in the contemplation of such a state of things; but really it is one rather for grave consideration than for laughter.
My Lords, there is another question of very serious importance referred to in the Speech from the Throne. I mean that of the constitution of the new kingdom of Greece and the proposed
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cession of the Ionian Islands. With respect to the first branch of this subject, I am at a loss to understand the course pursued by the noble Earl and Her Majesty's Government. When the revolution took place, it is only fair to the people of Greece to bear testimony to their good conduct and moderation. In all the proceedings consequent on that movement I do not believe there was a drop of blood shed. Nay more, I believe there was not any violence, or even an intemperate word. And nothing could have been more creditable to the people than the unanimity with which they expressed their wish to be governed by an illustrious Prince, a member of the Royal Family of this country. I think it was a well-earned compliment paid to the Sovereign of this great country, and to the constitutional principles on which her rule is conducted, that the Greeks should in the first instance have expressed a unanimous wish to be presided over by one of the family of that Sovereign. It is, however, stated in the Speech from the Throne that "the diplomatic engagements of Her Majesty's Crown together with other weighty considerations, have prevented Her Majesty from yielding to the general wish of the Greek nation." Those "other weighty considerations" seem to have had their effect with other Royal personages, besides Her Majesty and Her Majesty's Family; for it does not appear that up to this time any Sovereign has been found to accept the throne of Greece. Up to a recent period it had been hoped that arrangements might have been come to which would have given the Greeks a Sovereign; but the latest information on that subject leads us to the supposition that those negotiations have come to an end without the desired object having been effected. However, be that as it may, I want to know why, if those several reasons referred to in the Royal Speech for declining the throne for Prince Alfred existed from the first, a considerable time was allowed to elapse without any contradiction from this country that Prince Alfred was a candidate for their crown? Why was it that instructions were sent out to the British Minister at Athens not to interfere with the progress of events? Why was it that encouragement was given to the people of Greece to persevere in the expressal of their wish? Why was it that hopes were held out by the Greek Minister in this country, after a conference which he had with the noble Earl, that the wishes of

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the people would be acceded to? Her Majesty's Government are in this dilemma —either they determined from the first that the offer should not be accepted, in which case they acted most ungenerously and unfairly towards a people struggling for freedom; or, at first, they intended that it should be accepted, but have been interfered with and driven back in a not very dignified manner by the strong language of Russia and France. On one horn or other of this dilemma I leave him.
My Lords, another most serious question is the proposed cession of the Ionian Islands. I must look at this question, not only as it affects the Ionian Islands themselves, not only as it affects Greece, but as it affects the interests of this country and the interests of Europe. I am not going to say that Her Majesty's Government could not constitutionally, even without the consent of Parliament, give up the protectorate of this country over those Islands. I do not speak of them as a part of Her Majesty's dominions, so that such a step should be regarded in the light of a dismemberment of the Empire; but I say that they were confided to Great Britain after a consideration of serious questions of European policy, and after grave deliberation on the part of this and other Powers. It had been a matter of much anxiety to Great Britain to obtain those Islands and to retain that possession, and a position such as they afford is not a matter of such indifference to the power of this country as some persons have represented it to be. Observe what was the position of the case previous to 1814. Previously to 1814 most of those Islands had been captured by Great Britain. Corfu had not been in our possession; but for two years before it had been blockaded by the fleets of Great Britain, though it was only after the fall of Napoleon that the French Government surrendered that island to us. So that it was not at that time lightly thought of. From that moment it has been held by Great Britain. At a time when this country was at war, military and naval officers all concurred in the opinion as to the importance of holding and maintaining the Ionian Islands for the purposes of England. One of the latter (Lord Collingwood) said he regarded the possession of Corfu as equal to the addition of two frigates to his fleet. Competent authorities on the subject have stated their
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opinions as to the importance of our protectorate of those Islands in respect to our position in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, and on account of their geographical position in respect of the route to India viâ Egypt. It is not therefore a place to be regarded as worthy of little consideration. I do not mean to say that there may not be some consideration of expenditure connected with this Protectorate, and that it may not to some extent he an embarrassment to have to protect and watch over the most difficult set of men in the world to protect —Ionians travelling in foreign countries; but I do say that positions of such great importance ought not to be surrendered so lightly and so hastily as Her Majesty's Government seem to think they may be, and that considerations of inconvenience and expense ought not to interfere with the holding of positions of great importance to this country. I think I may appeal to the illustrious Duke on the cross benches (the Duke of Cambridge) to corroborate me when I say that during the Crimean war great advantage was felt from the facility those Islands afforded for supplying troops of the line, while we were enabled to garrison them with militia. They afford us a rendezvous for our fleets and give us one of the safest and best harbours in the Mediterranean, while they might prove a source of great embarrassment to us if they were in possession of a naval Power hostile to this country. I am not arguing that under no circumstances that could possibly occur would it be desirable to surrender the Ionian Islands, though I greatly doubt whether it will ever be for the interest of England to give up that nominal Protectorate, which constitutes the Ionian Islands in reality though not in form a British possession. But of this I am sure, that the utmost care and attention ought to be devoted to the subject before Her Majesty's Government come to any conclusion upon a matter of such grave importance. Last year I think the noble Earl, in the House of Commons, when speaking of the great interests which England had in the Adriatic, was interrupted by an hon. Member, who said, "What great interests?" To which the noble Earl replied, "I should have thought the harbour of Corfu afforded a sufficient answer to such a question." Again; it was only last year that the noble Duke the Secretary for the Colonies (the Duke of Newcastle) disclaimed in the

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most emphatic manner any desire and any intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to surrender these Islands, contending that they were a solemn trust confided to us by Europe, and that we had not the slightest idea of parting with them. But to whom do you part with them? You propose quite gratuitously to cede these Islands to a Government which is not yet formed—to a State which is yet in the throes of revolution. You propose to give them to this State, unasked for, and, as I will presently show you, in, direct opposition, and contradiction to the principles which have been laid down by the noble Earl himself as those which should regulate the policy of this country. My Lords, in a correspondence which, somewhat gratuitously again, the noble Earl carried on in the course of last year with Prince Gortschakoff, he undertook to lay down certain principles which should regulate the policy of this country in the East, and concluded in terms to which Prince Gortschakoff cordially assented, expressing his great satisfaction at hearing such sentiments from the noble Earl. I have not the exact words by me, but the noble Earl insisted then that there should be a total abandonment by Greece of grandes idées, that the country should abstain from acts of aggression upon the territory of her neighbours, and should keep down the turbulent revolutionary spirit of insurrection which threatened alike all the thrones of Europe. The noble Earl went on to enlarge upon the necessity of preventing Greece from becoming a dangerous enemy of Turkey; and that was the guiding principle he laid down. Well, now, how does he propose to carry out that principle? He proposes to cede the Ionian Islands to Greece, but insists that the form of government there should be monarchical. I presume he means that there shall exist in that country a constitutional monarchy. I presume he means a monarchy in which Parliament shall exercise some control over foreign as well as over domestic policy. Admitting the necessity of procuring the sanction of the Great Powers, it is now proposed that when a monarchy is established in Greece, based on these principles—the abandonment of grandes idées, the non-extension of territory, and non-aggression as regards Turkey—the Great Powers shall be asked to sanction the surrender to that monarchy of the Ionian Islands. Now, that seems to me to be putting off the surrender, ad Graæcas
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Kalendas. How soon is the noble Earl to be satisfied, not that a constitutional monarchy is established in Greece, but that the Government and Legislature there are sufficiently able, sufficiently willing, and sufficiently determined to discourage that dangerous spirit of aggression against which the noble Earl protests in such strong terms? Then, again, how does the noble Earl assist them to keep down this dangerous spirit? Why, by joining with them a number of Islands, at present under the English Protectorate, the inhabitants of which have been the firmest agitators of that very aggression upon Turkey which the noble Earl says will form an absolute and entire bar to our surrender of these Islands. In proof of this, it is not necessary that I should go further back than to the address of thanks presented by the inhabitants on the first intimation to them of Her Majesty's intention to cede the Islands to Greece. In this address, the people declare their peculiar gratitude, because in that cession they sse the future support of England during those struggles which must hereafter take place for the extension of Christianity and of Christian civilization —in other words, for their assaults upon the territories of Turkey. And so the noble Earl assists this constitutional Power to resist the spirit of aggression among its people by uniting with it, as an additional element, a nation which is as one man in favour of that very principle of aggression. The noble Earl will, perhaps, tell me "That is quite true; but our cession of the Ionian Islands is entirely conditional on our terms being complied with." Well, then, I say, could the noble Earl have devised a more ingenious method of rendering the government of that country difficult and impossible than by thus opposing the attainment of the very object upon which they are so obstinately bent? It appears to me that the conditional promise of ceding these Islands to a Government not yet formed, and of whose future policy it is impossible to pronounce any opinion—to a Power utterly incapable, moreover, of coping with the piracy which used to infest those seas, but which has been systematically and successfully kept down by Great Britain—I say the cession of so important a position to such a Government is one of the greatest mistakes which within my memory have been committed by an English Government. My Lords, I do not despair even

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now that the country will refuse its assent to this most ill-judged proposition. Nay, from the terms used in the Address, in reply to the Speech from the Throne, I think there is some little hesitation on the part of the Government themselves—some little feeling that, after all, the arrangement may utterly fail, and that unexpected circumstances will concur with diplomatic liabilities in preventing the noble Earl from carrying out this measure in favour of the Islands, if it really be in their favour. The noble Duke opposite, in one of his speeches, expressed what I thought was a well-founded belief, that if the good sense and intelligence of the inhabitants could be fairly tested, especially at Corfu, it would be strongly pronounced against the proposed cession and against the popular clamour for that cession which undoubtedly exists. One word more upon this point before I sit down. Look at the position of Corfu, the most important from its harbour and fortifications—as to the efficiency of which, however, I do not say much, and which probably cost more than they ought to have cost. What is the position of Corfu with reference to any part of Greece? It lies eighty miles to the north of the nearest point of the boundary of Greece, but it is within one mile of the coast of Thessaly, a part of the Turkish dominions, which affords favourable opportunities for constant, I will not say invasions—-but for constant broils, which will infallibly lead to struggles, in which Greece may get the worst of it, and to some new arrangements, in which Corfu may possibly fall into the hands of some other Power, that Power being neither Greece nor Turkey. On all these grounds I implore the Government to consider the gravity and importance of the step they are about to take. I earnestly conjure Parliament and the country to interpose, by the pressure of public opinion, against an act which is one of the most suicidal and imprudent I ever recollect.
My Lords, upon some occasions we have undoubtedly had to complain that the Government have made great professions for the future, and great promises, which ultimately were not fulfilled. Certainly that is not a complaint which can be justly made at present. It is true that the Seconder of the Address undertook to assure us that one of the Bills which was about to be brought in, in pursuance of Her Majesty's recommendations, was to carry out the views of the Commission recently
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appointed—and which I think up to this time has had one or two sittings—upon the subject of convict discipline. But I think the noble Earl in this was speaking a little out of the four corners of his brief. Of course, if the noble Earl has had confidential communications with the Government on this point, it is not for me to express doubts of his accuracy; but, subject to this assurance, the Government have not thrown great light upon the measures which they intend to propose during the present Session; so that we run no risk of disappointment, and no blame can hereafter be cast upon them for having fallen short of their professions. I suppose, from the absence of any such promises, we may conclude that Her Majesty's Ministers will be satisfied to be humbly useful; that they will bring forward no very ambitious measures, no very sweeping alterations of the Constitution; that they will not make, or even sanction, any violent attacks upon the Church of England; that they will go calmly and quietly along, improving turnpike-roads and amending the Bankruptcy Bill which they passed the year before last, and that we shall pass altogether a quiet, useful, humdrum Session.
Before sitting down, your Lordships will, I am sure, forgive me for referring to a topic which is not indeed mentioned in the Speech, but which was touched on by one of the noble Earls who have just addressed the House—I mean the public and personal loss which we have all sustained by the death of the venerable and respected Marquess. The noble Earl opposite was a colleague of mine in the Government of which the venerable Marquess was a Member; and I am sure he will feel deeply with me the uniform patience, forbearance, good judgment, and good temper of the venerable Marquess with respect to every question that came before us. Your Lordships had the opportunity of seeing the conduct of the venerable Marquess for several years as the leader of the Government in this House, and some years ago, upon his partial retirement from public life, a most unanimous testimony was afforded of the esteem, respect, love, and affection with which he was regarded both by the supporters of that Government and by the House at large. At a later period, when the venerable Marquess retired from taking any active part in public affairs, he has attended this House less frequently; but in

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the more private life to which he has confined himself, I am sure that he has not in any degree forfeited the warm affection of his friends, and I am equally certain that he passes from this world honoured and respected, in a good old age, without leaving behind him a single enemy.
EARL RUSSELL:—My Lords, your Lordships will not have been surprised that the greater part of the noble Earl's speech has been taken up with foreign affairs; and especially with the affairs of Greece. For these I am responsible, and those parts of his speech I shall attempt to answer. But first I must touch upon those topics in the noble Earl's speech in respect of which I have the happiness to concur with the noble Earl. And there is no topic more grateful than the first, where we congratulate Her Majesty upon, the auspicious marriage that is about to take place. I think we must consider that in wishing happiness to the youthful and Royal pair, we are wishing for the advancement of our own interests, because their happiness may greatly tend to form the happiness of the country at large. Passing from that topic, I come to a question upon which the noble Earl spoke at considerable length; I mean the United States. Upon that topic, also, I am glad to agree, for the most part, in the observations of the noble Earl. I believe that Her Majesty's Government has exercised a wise discretion in not interfering, or rather—for it is not interfering — in not joining in giving advice, as the Emperor of the French proposed, to one of the two belligerents. I think we were right, for this reason—that there may come a time when the belligerents themselves, exhausted by the struggle, may wish to refer to some foreign Power to assist them in making that peace which it is so desirable to establish. As to the question of recognition, the noble Earl has rightly remarked, that there are two kinds of recognition. As examples of the first kind of intervention, we have in old times the cases of Holland and Portugal, and in modern times the cases of Belgium and Greece; but no one in this country, I believe, wishes for a forcible intervention on behalf of either of the parties in this case. The cases of Holland, Portugal, Belgium, and Greece were small matters compared with the vast and dreadful struggle in which we should have to interfere if we attempted to decide the claims of either party to the
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conflict now raging in America. But there is another kind of recognition, and that is a recognition when it is obvious that one of the parties is exhausted by the war, when the attempt to make the other party submit to his authority has failed, and when therefore peace is anxiously wished. We are not arrived at that point yet, because the struggle now going on in different parts of the United States and of the Southern States is kept up, I will not say with undiminished, but with increased power and rancour, and upon a vaster scale. Therefore nothing could be more unwise at present than to have recourse to the power of recognition. There is one thing, however, which I think may be the result of the struggle, and which to my mind would be a great calamity—that is, the subjugation of the South by the North. If it were possible that the Union could be reformed, if the old feelings of affection and attachment towards it could be revived in the South, I for one would be glad to see the Union restored. If, on the other hand, the North were to feel that separation was finally decreed by the events of the war, I should be glad to see peace established upon those terms. But there may be, I say, one end of the war that would prove a calamity to the United States and to the world—and especially calamitous to the negro race in those countries —and that would be the subjugation of the South by the North. One of the first consequences of such a subjugation must be that the North must keep up a large army, must renounce all its former policy, and must put down by force free discussion and a free press in the South. That would be a dangerous thing. But beside this, would not anarchy prevail in the South? Would not the whole state of society and of labour in the South be disorganized, perhaps for a century to come? I hope, whatever may be the issue of this contest, that such may not be the results. I trust that we shall see at the close of this struggle either one great republic or two great republics in the full enjoyment of freedom and all the advantages of a great and independent Power. For my part, I own that before the contest began I rejoiced in seeing the progress of the United States, and was proud to witness the prosperity of a people descended from our own ancestors, and having the same laws and the same love of personal liberty as ourselves. It was, I think, a spectacle at which every Englishman must rejoice, and I should

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certainly lament if the end of this struggle did not leave the people in those States in the full enjoyment of the benefits and privileges which dignify and adorn mankind.
The noble Earl next referred to a subject which is indeed a very painful one, and that is the distress in the north. Far be it from me to attempt to follow him into a subject with which he is so much better acquainted than I am; but there is one point upon which he naturally did not dwell in the manner which I think it deserved, and that is the personal contribution which he has himself made of time and labour, to say nothing of munificent contribution, to alleviate the distress in Lancashire. It may be said that others have bestowed more time and more continuous labour to that object; but, however that may be, there was one thing desired which the noble Earl has supplied. It was to be desired that, whatever differences may at other times, and within the last twenty years, have existed between the manufacturing body of Lancashire and the great landed interest of the country, those differences and divisions should be effaced by acts which would show the feelings of charity, of good feeling and goodwill, which the landed interest entertain towards those who were engaged in manufactures, and that the great landed proprietors should be bound together with the manufacturers and the great body of the working classes in one work of benevolence and charity. The example of no man could have contributed so powerfully to the removal of those distinctions as that given by the noble Earl himself, whose munificence to the great body of the working men and their families in the manufacturing districts has been unexampled, and certainly calls for a great tribute of gratitude on the part of the country.
Having now, I am afraid, exhausted all the topics upon which I am so happy as to agree with the noble Earl, I come to those upon which I differ from him, and in respect of which I must take exception to his remarks. He seems to think that I am disposed to meddle in everything. Now, oddly enough, it happens that, with regard to the United States, when we were asked to give advice in conjunction with the French Government, the Government refused to give any advice whatever. Then, as to Mexico, where our co-operation, in the shape of intervention, was desired and invited, we declined to con-
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tinue that co-operation, and are entirely free from any charge of interference or intervention in that country. These certainly cannot be considered minor affairs. I may also say, although it is a minor subject, but still connected with the great questions of the East, that during the fights and contests that took place last summer in Montenegro—although advice was given by France, by Russia, by Austria, and by Prussia—almost the only Government in Europe that gave no advice was the Government of this country. But the noble Earl speaks of advice which we gave to Denmark and to the Pope of Borne. Of the nature of that advice I will speak presently; but, if I do not mistake, the noble Earl opposite once tendered advice that was not very fortunate to Denmark and Russia; and, if I am not misinformed, he gave some advice during the war in 1859 to Italy. Every one who knew anything of the Italians in 1859 knew well that they had made up their minds to this course of policy—that if it should happen that in the event of a war their Sovereigns should take the popular side and engage in the war against Austria, those princes should retain their thrones, but otherwise they were determined to get rid of their Sovereigns. It appears, however, that advice was given by the British Government to the Grand Duke of Tuscany to resist the popular power, and to the King of Naples to remain neutral. The consequence of following that advice was that both princes lost their thrones. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, instead of taking the popular side in the war between Austria and Sardinia, left his territories and went straight to the Austrian head-quarters. The King of Naples preserved neutrality, but he was driven from his country, and lost his throne. Now, it might not be intervention—it might not be interference—but certainly the advice of the noble Earl had in that instance an effect most unfortunate for those to whom it was tendered. The noble Earl seems to think the advice I gave to the King of Denmark was given without any provocation whatever. I must say the noble Earl in that part of his speech showed a total ignorance of what has been passing of late years. I do not blame him for being ignorant of the facts, but certainly he has made many assertions and assumptions on that ignorance which are not easily justifiable. It did so happen that in 1861 the German Powers

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had almost determined on an "execution" in Holstein. I pointed out that an execution in Holstein would lead the Germans to the confines of Schleswig. The boundary had never been settled, and I thought the occupation by German troops of a boundary so unsettled, especially with the excitement which then prevailed on both sides, was likely to bring on war between Denmark and Germany, and that that war might extend to other Powers, and so perhaps bring on a European conflict. Now, it may be a great fault, I confess, in one holding the Foreign Office in troubled times, but I have felt exceedingly sensitive as to those circumstances that might bring about a rupture of the general peace; and when I have seen appearances of an approaching storm, I have endeavoured, it may be unsuccessfully—perhaps too frequently—to prevent any chance of war by friendly advice given to one party or the other. My belief is that the advice which Her Majesty's Government gave at that time was conducive to the peace of Europe, because it was settled at that time—in 1861— that, instead of an "execution," which, if persisted in, would have been the commencement of war, Germany and Denmark should negotiate together and endeavour to come to an agreement on points on which they differed. Towards the end of 1862, when these negotiations had gone on without conflict of arms, but with very bitter discussions on one side and the other, it appeared to me that there was no chance of an amicable termination of that correspondence, and I proposed what I thought perfectly compatible with the independence and integrity of Denmark. It so happened that they did not like the plan; they did not agree to it. My conviction is, if they had agreed to it, they would have been in a better and safer position than they are at present, keeping up so vexatious a quarrel, in which the feelings of Germans, though not at present very active, may at any time be roused, and an immense body of Germans may be directed to solve the question. Then the noble Earl finds great fault with the advice he seems to think was very gratuitously given to the Pope. It was not exactly what the noble Earl has read. What happened was this:—Mr. Russell, being in Home in the beginning of the summer, wished to return home before the unhealthy season. Just before he was coming away he received an intimation that
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the Pope wished to see him the next day, appointing the hour. Upon the next day Mr. Russell had the honour of an audience with the Pope. The Pope spoke to him very much of Garibaldi being in Sicily; and appearing to have considerable apprehensions as to the state of Italy, he asked the question whether, if he sought an asylum in England, he might rely on our hospitality? To this Mr. Russell returned a general answer, saying that our hospitality was well known, and that we gave asylum to all who sought it. Before Mr. Russell left, the Pope again referred to the subject, adding, "Perhaps I may one day seek the hospitality of England." Now, the noble Earl seems very much surprised; but, for my part, I think nothing was so natural, because it was obvious that if the Pope went to France, Austria, Spain, or any other Catholic country, in the first place there would be great jealousies among other Catholic Powers, and in the next place there is no Catholic Power that would not demand from the Pope some privileges which would excite the jealousies of the rest; whereas if he went to any of Her Majesty's dominions, he might be quite sure that we would ask nothing of him from the beginning of the year to the, end of it; we should not interfere with his perfect freedom, and he would thereby be more secure, more at liberty, than in almost any Catholic country. Certain it is, that appeared to be the impression of the Pope. After that I certainly wrote a despatch recommending that course, because I thought it would relieve the Pope from the painful position in which he now stands—a position in which he, an Italian Prince, is opposed to the almost unanimous wish of the rest of Italy, and at the same time feels himself conscientiously bound to defend all the ancient powers and retain all the ancient territories belonging to the Holy See. I must say, however much I may wish the independence of Italy, I cannot help entertaining the greatest respect for the conscientious feelings of the Pope, and regret that he should be exposed to trials to which he cannot conscientiously yield, but which must be painful to sustain, since nearly all his countrymen desire a different course. Well, I wrote that despatch; it was taken in very good part at Rome; Cardinal Antonelli thanked the British Government for the offer, and the Pope afterwards personally thanked Mr.

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Russell for the offer made on the part of the British Government; and the report made by Mr. Russell was, that it had produced the best feeling among those who surround the Pope, and who had hitherto considered us personally hostile to him.
"Non obtusa adeo gestamus pectora Pœni."
While I could do so without sacrificing the opinions of the Government with respect to the independence of Italy, I was glad to have given to that venerable man the comfortable assurance that he might resort to the hospitality of England.
The noble Earl's next remarks had reference to the subject of Greece. The noble Earl appears to think that we have had to submit to very strong language from France and Russia, in order to give up the candidature, as it is called, of Prince Alfred. Nothing can be further from the truth. The fact is, that we were the first to propose a joint declaration that none of the Princes belonging to any of the protecting Powers should be capable of accepting or wearing the crown of Greece. It was naturally asked at the same time of the Russian Government whether the Duke of Leuchtenburg, who had been brought up at St. Petersburg as a Russian Prince, who appeared in their almanacks as part of the Imperial family, and was to all intents and purposes part of it, would be excluded by the Protocol of 1830. The answer was, that there were critical doubts about it. We then said—what I think was quite fair —that if we were to have a protocol of exclusion, it must not be merely operative against the Royal Family of England, but must also be operative against the Imperial Family of Russia. We were not prepared to sign anything which applied to Prince Alfred that did not apply to Prince Leuchtenberg. Whereupon that negotiation ceased—at least, for some time. It appeared to me that the proper course was to leave the Greeks entirely free to take their own course in the first instance, and reserve our objections. The consequence of that policy was, that after a time the Russian Ambassador at Her Majesty's Court informed me that he was ready to sign a note excluding Prince Leuchtenburg on the one side, provided Her Majesty would exclude Prince Alfred on the other. It appeared to me that to have left matters depending upon an uncertain and unintelligible protocol would have enabled the Russian Government to propose the Duke of Leuchtenberg, and
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we might have had complications; but, by the understanding come to, the Princes of all the three families were excluded.
Then the noble Earl came to the subject of the Ionian Islands, on which I confess that I differ from him in toto, both as to his history, his facts, and his principles. The noble Earl admitted, in the first instance, that the Ionian Islands were not a part of the dominions of Her Majesty; but he entirely forgot that fact in all the rest of his observations. Now, what is the history of this Protectorate given to Great Britain? I have heard it orally from a lamented friend of mine, the late Lord Beauvale, who knew all that happened at the Congress of Vienna, and I have found all that he said confirmed in the protocols and treaties of that Congress. As the noble Earl has said, at the end of the war six of these islands were in the possession of Great Britain, having been acquired by her own arms, and the other was temporarily held by another Power. The Austrian Government offered, as they were in a position affecting the tranquillity of Venetia, Dalmatia, and the Adriatic coast, to undertake the government of these islands, securing to the islanders the enjoyment of their own privileges. But it happened that at that time the voice of Russia was very powerful. The results of the campaign had given the Emperor Alexander very great influence with the Congress, and Count Capo d'Istrias, a Minister high in that Emperor's confidence, who had a patriotic feeling in favour of the nationality of the Greeks, suggested when Austria made her proposal, that the Ionian Islands should be maintained in all their privileges as a free State under the protection of Great Britain. He said that the institutions of Austria did not give any promise of freedom to the Ionian Islands, but he admired British institutions, and wished the Ionians to have the benefit of them. The consequence of that declaration and that interference of Russia was a treaty in which was it said—that Great Britain should have the fortress of Corfu, to give her power in the Mediterranean? Nothing of the kind—it said that the Ionian Islands, naming each island, should form one single, free, and independent State, under the name of the Republic of the Ionian Islands. So that they are by no means a possession of Great Britain or any part of the Queen's dominions; but are, by that Treaty of 1815,

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a free and independent State. Well, what becomes of all the argument, if I may call it so, about the importance of the fortress and the position, seeing that these Islands are only under the Protectorate of Great Britain? My opinion is, that having adopted a trust, having made yourselves the protectors of this free and independent State, you are bound to look to the welfare of the Ionians. Above all that you are bound to discharge your duty faithfully and conscientiously towards that free and independent Republic. I believe the importance of Corfu is very much exaggerated. But if you were to say, "We care nothing about the wishes of the Ionian Islands, but what we do care about is a fortress for ourselves, what we do care about is a harbour for Great Britain," I believe that all Europe would cry out upon you for that declaration, and those who gave you that trust would say, "You have perverted the solemn trust confided to you, and that which ought to have been treated according to the original terms of the stipulation for the benefit of the Ionians you have considered only as a part of the strength of your dominions." Because that was the whole gist of the noble Earl's remarks. He never spoke for a moment about the Ionians or their wishes.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I beg pardon, I quoted the noble Duke opposite, that the Ionians should be consulted on the cession.
EARL RUSSELL:—That is exactly what we are going to do. We mean to consult them. Moreover, this is a matter which also requires consideration from the other Powers. We shall say first to the Ionians "If you, on the meeting of your Parliament, to be convened for the purpose, shall declare (as once or twice they have irregularly done), that Greece being now an independent kingdom, we wish to belong to Greece;" then we shall consult the other Powers of Europe who were parties to the original treaty, as to what should be done, and whether, it being the wish of the Ionian Islands to be joined to Greece, they ought not to be so joined. If it is clearly the desire of the Islands, as it is very possible it may be, notwithstanding the symptoms that have from time to time been exhibited—if it is their desire to enjoy the benefits of the protection of Great Britain, which, I think, are very great, and which have much tended to their civilization; then one consequence of this will be, that we shall be free
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from the reproach which is cast upon us from every side—that while in every corner of Europe we profess such liberal principles, while we profess that Italy ought to be independent and free to control its own concerns, we coerce and oppress the Ionian Islanders, who wish to be released from our rule. These Islands being no dependency of the British Crown and no part of the British dominions, if they fairly and deliberately declare their desire for union with Greece, I maintain that be the advantages of our having a fortress in the Mediterranean what they may, it does not belong to the character of this great country to say that it will keep them in subjection, although they wish to be free and are entitled to be so. The noble Earl may laugh at this whole question if he likes; but I confess that to see two countries, to which such great recollections belong as Greece and Italy, rising again into freedom, independence, and happiness, is a great pleasure to me; and it would, I think, be a great glory to the Government of Great Britain to have contributed to such a result. This is not a new policy, but one that has been pursued by the statesmen of this country for generations. Our conduct in regard to Holland, Portugal, Greece and Belgium in past times bears evidence to the exertions of Great Britain towards the establishment of free and independent communities. That is our true policy; and the extension of our empire is not so valuable to us as this extension of free and independent nations, which, having the support of Great Britain, there is no chance of that single despotic dominion by which Europe has more than once been oppressed. Your Lordships will be better able to judge of these matters when you have read the papers which will be laid before you.
My Lords, if the noble Earl opposite and my noble friend behind me have been unable to go through this debate without paying some tribute to the memory of the late Marquess of Lansdowne, I feel that it is impossible for me, who had been so long connected with him in friendship and by political ties, to omit the mention of his name. The recollection of his life is one of no ordinary character. It is the recollection of a life pure, honoured, and respected—known to this House by combined wisdom, moderation, dignity, and courtesy—known to the public at large by the many services which he contributed to the legislation and the institutions of

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his country. My Lords, I hope that a spirit like his may preside over your Lordships' deliberations. His spirit was this, that while he dearly loved the Constitution, he was a friend to every improvement, every well-considered advance that could be made in our institutions. So that as a steadfast friend of the Constitution, that Constitution would never suffer in his hand, nor the cause of sound progress be impeded. When your Lordships consider the great measures that were passed in his time and by his assistance—measures which included every kind of religious or political question—questions affecting the rights of Protestant Dissenters, questions affecting the disabilities of the Roman Catholics or the emancipation of the Jews— when you look at the measures for free trade in corn, so deeply affecting the material interests of the community—when you look at the Reform Act, affecting the political power of the people in the country, I think you will find that the spirit which animated Lord Lansdowne is the spirit which ought to animate all who take part in political affairs. It has been a great mercy to England and the world that extreme changes have been made here in peace and tranquillity which in other countries would in all probability not have been effected without revolution. I think you will find that that is partly owing to the prevalence of the feelings and views entertained by the deceased statesman—feelings and views which were alike favourable to liberty and order, and which deserve the attention of mankind.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY:— My Lords, I need not say that I agree with the concluding words of the noble Earl with respect to the lamented nobleman who has been taken from us. I can only add my honest wish that when hereafter any noble Lord shall assume the leadership of this House he will remember the conduct of the Marquess of Lansdowne, and endeavour to imitate it as closely as possible. I will not trespass on your time, for it would be superfluous to say how sincerely I participate in the feelings of those who have already spoken with regard to the auspicious event which has been announced to us in the first part of the Speech from the Throne. Indeed, I should not have thought it necessary to address your Lordships at all but for some observations of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Russell) in answer to my noble Friend behind me. Before replying to
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those observations, allow me to express my approbation of the policy pursued by the noble Earl with reference to the affairs of America. I agree that we could not have recognised the Southern States without going further—bare recognition would have been utterly barren; it would not have been of the smallest use unless followed up by forcible intervention, and unless we had insisted upon the blockade being raised. But although I entirely agree in that part of the noble Earl's policy, I cannot go farther and agree with the noble Earl, or even with my noble Friend behind me, in thinking that the noble Earl pursued a right course with respect to the French proposal for mediation. I think it was our duty, as a Christian people, being of the same religion and the same blood, and speaking the same language as the Americans, to do whatever we possibly could to stop the dreadful struggle now going on among them, provided always that we neither risked our neutrality nor incurred dishonour. It is impossible to conceive, if you recollect what the proposition of the French Government was, what harm could have occurred to our Government by joining in their proposition. If it had succeeded, the credit of this country would have been lasting—it would have been a most creditable page in the history of this country; whereas, if it had failed —if the Northern States rejected the proposition even with insult—the attempt could have brought no detriment upon us. Even if it had been received with insult, we need care for no insult which does not bring dishonour with it, and this could not have brought dishonour, but the contrary. I do not feel convinced that it would not have succeeded—it is possible that the proposition might have done so; for it seems almost against common sense and probability to believe that in that great country, inhabited by millions, so sorely tried for two years by every misfortune by which men can be cursed, there are not hundreds of thousands composing a peace party who would be glad to obtain peace if they could get it with honour, and who would be glad to avail themselves of any reasonable excuse which saved their pride. However that may be, the attempt should have been made, and I regret that the noble Earl did not join in the French proposition. The Emperor has kept steadily to his purpose. Alone of his

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own accord, he has renewed his efforts to put a stop to the war. If he succeeds, he will have plucked from us one of the greatest opportunities we ever had for distinguishing the Government of this country. Before leaving the subject of America, I want to express my sincere hope, that although the noble Earl has been baffled, as I know he has, in treating with so extraordinary a body as the Government of the Northern States, he has endeavoured to stop, or at least mitigate, some of the horrors now going on in America. I have no doubt he has done so, and that the papers he is about to lay on the table will show that he has done so. But, without distressing your Lordships by any enumeration of the horrors of the war—horrors unparalleled even in the wars of barbarous nations—I should like to know whether the noble Earl has arrested one special kind of diabolical cruelty enacted by the Government of the United States. That Government has, contrary to all the common laws of war, contrary to all precedent, not excluding the most ignorant and barbarous ages, declared medicines and surgical instruments contraband of war, thereby, in plain English, enacting that nothing should be done to mitigate the sufferings or save the life of a wounded or dying enemy. So horrible a proceeding requires, I think, the publicly expressed condemnation of every civilized country in the world. I now come to that part of the noble Earl's speech in which he taunted my noble Friend behind me, who had, as I think very properly, reproved him for his officious advice given in all directions and on all occasion?, with having done exactly the panic thing himself. The noble Earl taunted my noble Friend with having been equally fidgety and fussy upon every occasion, and he quoted the advice given to the King of Naples and the Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1859, which advice, the noble Earl said, amounted to this:—The King and the Grand Duke were counselled not to involve themselves in the disputes between Piedmont, Austria, and France, but to remain quiet at home, governing their own subjects and not meddling with those of others. I do not recollect any such advice having been given to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, but I do recollect it having been given to the King of Naples; and if I were in the same position again, I should repeat that advice. It is sound advice to anybody to tell him to take care of his own
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business, and not meddle with that of others, especially when war is in question. But there is a very great difference between the advice recently given to the King of Denmark and the Pope by the noble Earl and that formerly given by the Government of which I was a member to the King of Naples. The difference is this:—The King of Naples asked for our advice; but I am not aware that either the King of Denmark or the Pope paid the same compliment to the noble Earl. We gave our advice, moreover, in the hope of forming a congress; and I hold it is not officious to attempt to constitute a European conference for the amelioration of Governments, as we did for Italy. There is then a great difference between the advice given by the noble Earl to the King of Denmark and the advice given by us to the King of Naples. But the advice given by the noble Earl to the King of Denmark was not only not asked for, but it was of a very surprising character, for it was the exact contrary of the advice he had given to the King of Denmark before. In 1860 and 1861 the noble Earl, in his despatches, pronounced Schleswig to be a Danish duchy; he stated that the German Confederation had no right to interfere in its administration; but in his recent despatch he recommended alterations which, in fact, would Germanize Denmark and establish the Government of the country at Frankfort instead of at Copenhagen. The noble Earl's scheme would have given an inadequate representation to Denmark proper. [Earl RUSSELL: I never advised anything of the sort.] Not in so many words; but the noble Earl sided with the Germans, who wished to abrogate the old charter, and to enforce a policy the result of which would be, by giving the same number of members to the German provinces, which contain 80,000 inhabitants, as to Denmark proper, which contains 1,600,000, to place the Government of Denmark at Frankfort. However, I do not wish to weary your Lordships with this bête noire the Danish Question, the terror of which, as you may be aware, has already sufficed more than once to disperse the other House. I will only say, that even if I agreed to every statement in the noble Earl's despatch, I should object to the style of it. Denmark is an ancient State, more ancient than our own, for its kings have sat on our throne of England. It is an honourable one, too,

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for it has maintained its independence for centuries. Such a kingdom, small as it is, ought to be treated with deference, and I say that is what the noble Earl has failed to do. The noble Earl's intentions may be good, but his pen sometimes gets the better of his judgment, and I think it did so when he wrote his despatch on this question. He appears not to possess that sort of moral thermometer by which he is able to ascertain the temperament at which a despatch of advice or remonstrance can be written without offence. He addresses Denmark just as if it were a vassal of England instead of an independent State. Surely, too, the noble Earl forgot himself in his recent communications with the Pope. It may be quite true that His Holiness is unpopular at Home. But suppose this case:—The noble Duke, for example, who is at the head of the Admiralty, possessess, as one of the emoluments of his office, a handsome house at Whitehall—God forbid that I should compare its architecture to that of the Vatican, any more than that I should say he was as unpopular in the navy as the Pope is in Italy—but assuming he were so, and any kind friend were to say to the noble Duke, "Leave the Admiralty, and I will find you a spare room where you will be free from the cares of office, and I will send my carriage to fetch you," would not the noble Duke answer just as the Pope did, "I don't know what trials Providence has in store for me, but for the present I have no apprehensions, and prefer to stay where I am"? As to the Greek question, I have been very much astonished at the course which the Government has taken. My noble Friend near me (the Earl of Derby) has, I think, placed the Government on the horns of a very awkward dilemma. If the diplomatic contract which existed prevented the acceptance of the throne of Greece by Prince Alfred, the Government should immediately have made it known that such was the case. Having looked at the protocol, I maintain that it is as good now as ever, and I cannot conceive how Russia could dispute it.
EARL RUSSELL: Russia disputed not the binding nature of the protocol, but its application to the Duke of Leuchtenburg.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: We heard a good deal not long since about bubble bets. It seems to me that in Greece there was a "bubble" election, because Her Majesty's Government never
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intended that Prince Alfred should accept the crown. I think such a proceeding was most disrespectful to the Prince and the Royal Family, and it was undoubtedly cruel to the Greek people. Every day of delay in forming a solid and permanent Government in that country is an additional day of anarchy. Up to this time the people have behaved very well, and have obeyed their provisional Government; but I have received reliable information that disorder is beginning to appear, and that brigandage is gaining ground; so that if this question be not very quickly settled, it is impossible to say what may be the result. By their finessing Her Majesty's Government have postponed the settlement of Greece, and will therefore be responsible for any misfortune which may ensue. I am also very much surprised at the cession of the Ionian Islands. The noble Earl tells us he is giving them up because, as I did not know before, we have been taunted with holding the Protectorate for selfish ends. If the noble Earl is so susceptible, there is no saying where he will stop. He may shortly find that similar taunts are applied to our occupation of Gibraltar or Malta, and may find it necessary to vindicate the purity of our character in the same way. There are some persons who insist that Corfu is of no use to us. I say that is a mistake— it is an important harbour and fortress, and the key of the Adriatic. But Corfu cannot be defended by the Greeks—the whole Greek army would be insufficient to hold the fortifications of that port; and even if they could, I doubt whether in the event of a European war they would defend it. The result would be, that when hostilities broke out, it would be seized by France or Russia. I trust that the Government will inquire as to the value of Corfu of some of the veterans who took part in the naval operations in the Adriatic, under Sir W. Hoste. Some of his captains are still living. I am certain they would support the view I take, and that they would strongly deprecate our giving it up. And I see no reason why, because the noble Earl and his predecessors have mismanaged the Ionian Islands, they should now be abandoned.
EARL GREYsaid, there were two points in the speech of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) on which he so entirely differed from him that he desired to address a few observations to those sub-

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jects. The noble Earl had expressed regret that Her Majesty's Ministers had not concurred with France in offering their good offices to America for the purpose of terminating the existing war in that country. He could not share in that regret; he felt as strongly as any noble Lord in that House a desire for the cessation of that horrible warfare; but he asked, did any one believe that the tender of the good offices of France and England at that time would have contributed to bring the war to a close? It had been well observed by the noble Earl who followed the Proposer and Seconder of the Address, that before an accommodation could be recommended, the principle on which it was to be proposed must be determined upon. The South insisted on independence, and the North on the re-establishment of the Union; and he thought that their Lordships would feel that some months ago, when the proposal from France was received, it would have been worse than useless to advise the contending parties to agree to either principle. If an accommodation had been proposed on the assumption that the re-establishment of the Union was impossible, the Government of the Northern States might well have complained of the exertion, on the part of this country, of a moral power against them; and if, on the other hand, mediation had been offered on the basis of the re-establishment of the Union, then they would have proposed what he concurred with every noble Lord who had spoken in thinking was absolutely impracticable. There could, he thought, exist little doubt, that if we had so interfered, we should, instead of doing good, only have further irritated those already too much irritated against this country. The other question on which he desired to express an opinion was with reference to the Ionian Islands. It was a question of very great importance; and, much to his surprise, it had been implied by a noble Earl opposite that there was some foundation in the objection popularly taken to the course pursued by the Government, on the ground that the Government had not waited for the concurrence of Parliament before it had proposed the transfer of those Islands to Greece. The Ionian Islands were neither in fact nor technically part of the British dominions; but could there be any doubt, even supposing that the Islands really formed part of the foreign dominions of the Crown, that the Crown possessed the constitutional power
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of ceding them to a foreign nation? He said nothing as to the advisability of such a course. All negotiations and conclusions of treaties rested with the Crown; if the Crown abused its authority, the advisers of the Crown were responsible, and were liable to the censure of Parliament, and even to impeachment, if they advised the Crown to adopt measures injurious to the empire. There were precedents of cessions made by treaty. The magnificent island of Java was thus ceded, and injudiciously in his opinion, but he believed that in respect to that transaction it never was asserted that the authority of the Crown was overstepped. There was, therefore, nothing unconstitutional or irregular in the course pursued with respect to the Ionian Islands. And he would go further, and say that, in his opinion, the measure was not only right in form but right in substance, and, instead of deserving censure for the proposed arrangement, the Government were entitled to praise. It had been said that the Ionian Islands were extremely valuable, especially in time of war. He certainly did not know how they could be valuable to this country in time of peace, for England drew no tribute from them, but, on the contrary, expended a considerable sum of money on them. The trade with them was not very large, but that would go on just as well if the Ionian Islands were given up to-morrow. With regard to the importance of the Islands in time of war, much stress had been laid upon the experience of the last great war with France, and in the opinion said to have been expressed by Sir William Hoste, that the possession of Corfu would have been then of more value to him than the best frigate in his squadron. He could perfectly well understand that this might have been a sound opinion with reference to the circumstances of those times; but their Lordships must remember that this was before the invention of steam, and Italy was then occupied by a French army, to which the population was generally hostile, and against which we were carrying on operations by harassing attacks upon the coast. With reference to these attacks, and when, from not being in possession of steam-power, it was important to be able to obtain supplies for our ships from various quarters, the possession of Corfu would obviously have been of great value; but circumstances were now entirely changed. He hoped and believed that Italy was

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now about to become a great and powerful nation, and was not likely to be again occupied by French armies in the same manner as it had before been, nor was there a prospect of gigantic hostilities like those carried on during the great Revolutionary War. One station in the Mediterranean was quite sufficient for our purposes; and looking at all the circumstances, he thought it obvious that Malta should be that one. Instead of being an advantage to this country during war, he was persuaded that the possession of the Ionian Islands would be a source of difficulty and danger. In the first place, they would require a garrison of certainly not less than 10,000 men; and with our army, which always had been and always must be numerically small as compared to those of the great military Powers of the Continent, to have 10,000 men taken away to garrison a port like this would be a great inconvenience. But even 10,000 men, if we were at war with these great Powers, would not be safe without the constant support of a naval force; without this they would be liable at any moment to be attacked by a superior force, which it would be impossible for them to resist, especially if the population were unfriendly. To guard against our suffering so heavy a blow, we should therefore be compelled always to keep our fleet within reach of these islands for their protection if required, and the necessity of affording this protection would obviously cripple and hamper the movements of our Mediterranean fleet in other operations that might be wanted. There was another view of this question in which he concurred with his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary. He agreed with the noble Earl that the Ionian Islands had been given to us for their benefit, and not for ours; and it would do much damage to the reputation of this country if we allowed it to be supposed that we insisted on retaining the Protectorate, not for their advantage but for our own selfish objects. Again, he concurred with the Government in thinking the moment most happily chosen for offering a surrender of that Protectorate. He did not think it would have been consistent with our obligations to surrender it during the existence of the late Government in Greece, which had failed in fulfilling the objects for which it had been called into existence; but when a fitting opportunity presented itself, he believed we were doing what was right in offering no obstacle to
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another arrangement. We accepted the Protectorate under a treaty by which we were bound to give the Ionian Islands a constitutional Government; but such a Government could not work in any country without the consent of the people, and in spite of all our endeavours to conciliate the people of the Ionian Islands—and he did not know what more we could have done for them—such was their attitude towards the protecting Power, that though a constitution existed in the country, it was set aside year after year. Session after session Parliament met in those Islands, but did nothing. It met and declared its intention to have the Islands annexed to Greece. It was then prorogued, and the Government was carried on by provisional acts of the Senate; that is, virtually by the arbitrary authority of the Lord High Commissioner. This for several years had been the regular march of events. He believed that of late the Ionian Parliament had sat somewhat longer and done somewhat more than a few years ago, but it still refused fairly to co-operate with the British authorities, and, substantially, we had failed in our endeavours to give the people the benefits of constitutional government. The most necessary functions of government were thus in abeyance; and though the Ionian Islands were under a system of law which was positively preposterous, and which the British Government was most anxious to amend, in consequence of the deadlock between the protecting Power and the representatives of the country, none of those reforms or improvements which were necessary for the development of the natural resources of the country could be accomplished. The continuance of such a state of things was not creditable to this country; and when there was an opportunity of withdrawing from a position of such embarrassment, in his opinion Her Majesty's Government had judged wisely in resolving to avail themselves of the occasion.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, that the noble Earl who had just sat down (Earl Grey) had taken exception to the speech of his noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) on two points. One of these points was the expression of regret that Her Majesty's Government had not joined the Emperor of the French in offering mediation between the contending parties in the United States. This, however, was a past transaction which might be made

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subject of discussion, but which no criticism now offered could alter or modify. The second point to which the noble Earl took exception was in a different position —the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece. As these Islands had not yet wholly passed out of our possession, and as it might be possible to bring Her Majesty's Government to review the circumstances under which they had made the offer to cede our Protectorate, he should say a few words in answer to some of the observations of the noble Earl. He was not one of those who at all times and under all circumstances would object to any modification of our position in respect of these Islands, or even to a surrender of the Protectorate; but he contended that either a modification or a cession ought to be considered in connection with the time and circumstances under which it was proposed. That point, however, was one which had been entirely overlooked by the noble Lord opposite who had spoken on the subject. For his own part he had failed to ascertain from the speech of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Russell) what were the precise grounds upon which this cession was justified. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) justified it upon military grounds, upon the temper of the islanders, and upon political considerations. As to the former of these, though it might be said on the one side that steam communication had altered the conditions which made the possession of these Islands desirable, it might also be alleged on the other side that this very steam communication, rendering a greater number of coal depôts necessary than heretofore, added to the importance of these Islands to this country. As to financial considerations, he should be the last to object to any sound and effective economy; but the cession of dependencies of the British Crown was a very rough-and-ready mode of practising economy. Where was such a principle to stop? Malta, Gibraltar, and India cost money. Was economy to be carried out by the cession of these dependencies? Moreover, the Government were bound to show why they gave this priority to the Ionian Islands over half-a-dozen other places, where we were possibly spending quite as much money and getting less in return. Then there were the political considerations which had been spoken of. He observed that this step was called a "gift." But the Ionian Islands were not ours to
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"give," for we had neither conquered them nor inherited them, and he doubted whether it was competent for us to "give" away that which had been well defined by his noble Friend as a territory confided as a trust to our guardianship. No doubt a trust might be resigned, but it must be resigned into the hands from which we had received it; and, if alienated, it must be alienated with the consent of our co-trustees. The Treaty of Paris stipulated that they should remain a single, free, and independent Kingdom. If they were ceded to Greece, they might be free, but they would certainly not be independent. Then as to the time at which this "gift" had been proposed. At this moment Greece was neither a monarchy nor a republic, but a vague, indefinite phantom, which had no existence in the councils of Europe. He admitted that by their recent moderation and good order the Greeks gave hopeful promise for the future; but he confessed that he could not understand the precipitancy of the Government in what they admitted to be so weighty and important a matter. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) said that the consent of Parliament to the cession was not necessary, and perhaps technically this was so. But of all men he should have thought that the noble Earl would have been the last to dispute the right of Parliament to consider this question or the propriety of such a course. He asked, what was the real value of this gift to the Greeks themselves? If, indeed, we could give to Greece, along with the Ionian Islands, Epirus, Thessaly, Albania, Candia, and other territory adjacent, the gift would be one worth having. But four years ago, when this question was mooted, the most moderate politicians of Athens were far from desiring the annexation of the Ionian Islands, seeing in it the annexation of Greece to the Islands rather than that of the Islands to Greece; for the islanders had held out threats, that if the annexation took place, they would revolutionize the dynasty and the constitution. Then was this measure palatable even to the inhabitants themselves? Mr. Gladstone formed the opinion that the wealthy and respectable islanders were afraid of annexation to Greece. Turkey, also, would not view with complacency the aggrandisement of this aggressive neighbour. She could hardly desire to see the Greek power extending itself on her western flank and threatening Albania. The fact was, that

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in making this proposal the Government were dealing with a mere fragment of the Eastern question, and, instead of advancing the solution of that question, were laying the foundation of still further complications. He could not separate this question from the question of the election to the Crown of Greece. It was clear that the noble Earl had given a certain sanction to the candidature of Prince Alfred, when he knew that by treaties which were still in existence, and binding upon us, any such candidature was forbidden. Was it right for the British Government to bring forward an English Prince in such a manner as to make their support or withdrawal of him a matter dependent upon circumstances? The people most, entitled to complain of the conduct of the Government was the Greek people, who were at first led to believe that an English Prince was a possible Sovereign for them, and a month was allowed to elapse and an election to take place before any doubt was thrown upon such a possibility. When Prince Alfred was withdrawn, the British Government recommended the King of Portugal, but took no previous steps to ascertain whether the King would accept the dignity if offered to him. Again were the Greeks disappointed; and now a third time, when it appeared that the Duke of Saxe-Coburg was disinclined to mount the vacant Throne. He could not help thinking that by the course they had pursued the Government had been trifling with a grave question, and had given the Greek people great reason for complaint.
LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, he did not think the noble Earl who had just sat down had dealt quite fairly with the arguments of his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had contended, that inasmuch as this country held the Ionian. Islands as a trust, we ought not to continue to hold them when we could no longer discharge that trust for the benefit of the inhabitants of those Islands. There was a great difference between our tenure of those Islands and that by which our other possessions abroad were held. The Ionian Islands were, in fact, a free State under the protection of Great Britain, and therefore it was competent and right for the Government to take steps to get relieved from their trust when they could no longer execute it satisfactorily. The noble Earl had objected to the time at which the cession was proposed, but that
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really was a point upon which the Government were entitled to credit. For himself, he thought that so far from the time chosen for making the offer being inopportune, it had been very wisely and appropriately chosen. While the Government of Greece was unsatisfactory, the transfer could not be made, but when a change took place, and a Government was formed that was likely to be more stable, the British Government wisely lost no time in making it known, that when the new Sovereign should be elected, they would give up the Ionian Islands to Greece. The consent of the other Powers who were parties to the Treaty of 1815 must be obtained; but he understood his noble Friend the Secretary of State to say that that assent was reserved, and that all arrangements must be subject to its being obtained. He therefore saw no ground for impugning the conduct of the Government in respect to Greece. But there was one question upon which he did not quite agree with the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He regretted that his noble Friend should have used such strong language respecting the relations between Schleswig and Denmark, as that contained in the despatch which had been referred to that evening. So strong a statement could not fail to increase the difficulties—already very severe—of the Danish Government in dealing with that complicated question. Of course, there could be no objection to proposing friendly arrangement for the solution of these difficulties, if any such had appeared feasible; but the noble Earl should have remembered that Schleswig was in a different position as regarded Germany from Holstein and Lauenberg, and should have been careful not to give a colour to the suggestion that, in the opinion of the British Government, Germany was entitled to the possession of Schleswig. The only other point to which he need refer was that of the United States, and he should do so simply to express his opinion that the Government were well advised in not interfering in the contest now raging in that country.
Address agreed to, Nemine Dissentiente; and Ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES.
THE LORD REDESDALE appointed, Nemine Dissentiente, to take the Chair in all Committees of this House for this Session.
COMMITTEE FOR PRIVILEGES—Appointed.
SUB-COMMITTEE FOR THE JOURNALS —Appointed.
APPEAL COMMITTEE—Appointed.

ACTS OF UNIFORMITY AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]

  FIRST READING.
  A Bill to amend the Acts of Uniformity —Was presented by The Lord Ebury; read 1a; and to be printed. (N° 1.)
  House adjourned at half past Nine o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Four o'clock.