Sitting of 11 March 1862

MINUTES.
NEW WRIT ISSUED.—For Chepping Wycombe, v. Sir George Henry Dashwood, baronet, deceased.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1o Savings Banks; Courts of Justice Building.
2o Register of Voters.

LECTURESHIPS IN THE TRAINING COLLEGES.—QUESTION.
LORD ROBERT CECILsaid, he wished to ask the Vice President of the Committee of Council, If it is intended, under the revised edition of the Revised Code to abolish any of the Lectureships in the Training Colleges, and, if so, when that abolition is to take effect?
MR. LOWE: Sir, the Revised Code, with the intended modifications, does not propose to abolish the Lectureships in the Training Colleges.

CHINA—THE TAEPINGS.—QUESTION.
COLONEL SYKESsaid, he rose to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether in the anticipated attack on the city of Shanghai by the Taepings, it is intended to preserve a strict neutrality between the Imperialists and the Taepings, due provision being made for the safety of the foreign settlements in the neighbourhood of Shanghai; and whether there is any foundation for a statement in a Paris paper—that the French representatives at
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Shanghai have invited the English Authorities to join in military operations for the recapture of Ningpoo from the Taepings?
MR. LAYARD: Sir, in answer to the question of the hon. and gallant Member, I have to state, that considering the great value of British property in Shanghai, amounting to many millions sterling; considering the policy of the Taepings, which is a policy of destruction and extermination; considering that hitherto no system of Government has been established by the Taepings; and considering the vast amount of British property that would be destroyed if Shanghai fell into their hands, Her Majesty's Government have deemed it their imperative duty to give orders that Shanghai shall be protected by naval means from the attack of the Taepings. I am not aware that there is any foundation for the statement in the Paris paper alluded to by my hon. and galland Friend. No such information has reached the Foreign Office.

FORTIFICATIONS OF GREAT YARMOUTH.—QUESTION.
SIR HENRY STRACEYsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, If it be the intention of the Government to carry out the purport of a Correspondence between the Mayor of Yarmouth and the Secretary of State for War, in 1859, relative to rendering the Port of Great Yarmouth in a proper state of defence?
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, that the port of Great Yarmouth was not included among the places enumerated in the Schedule of the Fortifications Loan Bill, nor was it thought advisable to include Great Yarmouth in the Vote for fortifying commercial harbours in the Estimates of the present year.

PUBLIC MONIES.
LORD ROBERT MONTAGUrose, pursuant to notice to move the following Resolution:—
"That, in order to strengthen the check upon the Government in regard to issues of money for any public service whatever in excess of the sums voted by Parliament, as well as to secure the just appropriation of every payment voted by Parliament to its proper account, a Committee be appointed, to be annually nominated by Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of revising all Estimates or accounts laid before Parliament; and that it be an instruction to the Committee to report in what way the present duties and powers of the Board of

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Audit should be extended or changed, with a view to render such Board responsible to Parliament alone, and the head of it not second in rank to any of the permanent Officers presiding over other departments, and also to make the present system of audit available for the purposes of the public service; and that it be a further instruction to such Committee to report to this House the exact period of the financial year when it would be desirable that the annual Estimates should be presented to Parliament, so as to enable the necessary examination of such Estimates or accounts to be completed and reported upon by such Committee before this House proceeds to sanction such Estimates or accounts by a vote of payment in Supply."
The noble Lord said, it would be in the recollection of the House that at the close of last year he moved, as an amendment on the second reading of the Appropriation Bill, that the Bill be not read a second time until it was printed and in the hands of Members. So that every hon. Member might have the opportunity of seeing for himself whether it contained those checks and restrictions which are provided by the constitution. The Chancellor of the Exchequer recommended him not to press that Motion; but expressed a desire that he should bring forward the subject at all early day of the present Session. His right hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire gave him similar advice, and said—
"The proper mode of proceeding is to determine the matter early next Session,"
And said, that if he would
"Move for a Committee for the purpose of arranging the business of supply, he would be conferring an important service and deserve the thanks of the House."
The House expressed its concurrence in this recommendation. He therefore considered that an injunction had been laid upon him by the House to bring forward his Resolution at an early period of the present Session. It would certainly be a mark of great carelessness and neglect not to comply with wishes so clearly expressed both by the House and by the two right hon. Gentlemen. Before proceeding, however, he must guard himself against some prejudices which were likely to arise in the minds of hon. Members. He protested that it was by no means his intention to move for a reduction in the effective force of army or navy. That was a totally different question, and need not be mixed up with the present matter of finance. It was a matter which had, year by year, to be determined by the exigencies of the case, and urged by
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the wisdom of the Executive. His object was, that the funds should be so wisely applied, and so strictly appropriated according to the wishes of Parliament, that the same effectiveness in army and navy might be maintained at a much less cost and burden to the country. He did not wish to diminish their effectiveness, but to accomplish a saving by means of a rigid system of expenditure. Nor, on the other hand, did he desire to tie up the hands of the Government, or leave them without funds wherewith to meet any exigency that might arise. The Resolution he now moved embodied no newfangled ideas of his own, nor did he lend himself to the theories of any enthusiasts out of doors. The Resolution which he was about to move had been taken word for word from the Report of the Committee on Public Monies; and he wished to force the Government to adopt recommendations which had been backed and enforced by a distinct Resolution of the House. The present was, therefore, not a party Motion. It attacked no Administration; it only found fault with a system. He did not hold any particular Ministry, nor any individuals before him, responsible for the evils which he believed to exist. He did not, however, expect to receive from the Government any support for a proposal so contrary to the traditions of Office and antagonistic to the prejudices of those in power; for it would limit the power and influence of the Administration. For many years a struggle had been going on between the House and the Ministry of the day as to the management of the funds of the country. Whoever opened the Journals of the House would see Motions and Amendments which were the marks and traces of the contest which had been carried on; as the maps of ancient Greece and Italy bore the Crosswords by every river and on every hill. That contest had been the nurse and cradle of our liberty. It would not cease until the country ceased to be free, and representative institutions existed only in name. The power was constitutionally in the hands of the House. But the powers of the House had been gradually filched away by the Administrations of the day. These usurpations had not advanced by great strides. They had been proceeding silently and quietly, by small and slow degrees. This might be thought strong language, but he was supported in this view by the high financial authority of

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a man who had won his laurels in this House, and then maintained his reputation in another place; a man who was known to have the most intimate acquaintance with the subject, for he had long been Comptroller of the Exchequer. In a Parliamentary paper, No. 52, of the year 1858, Lord Monteagle said—
"I deny that such confidence in the Executive is, has, or ought to be recognised in any free state. I deny that it has ever been, from the earliest times a principle adopted under the British Constitution. On the contrary, it is constitutional jealousy, and not confidence, upon which our institutions are founded, and on which the safety of the liberties of England depend,"
In this sense the Treasury Memorandum of 1857, after asserting that the control and check on the Treasury is purely imaginary, says that "a real check must be established instead of the imaginary one which is now supposed to exist." This check, as afterwards developed, consists in "the Speaker as the highest officer of the House," aided by an annually appointed Finance Committee. This was also the recommendation of the Public Monies Committee. He had therefore suggested in his Motion that the Committee should be so appointed. In consequence, however, of reasons which the Speaker had communicated to him in private, it was his intention to substitute for the words "Mr. Speaker" the words "the Committee of Selection." It might be asked, why not allow this Committee to be nominated like other Committees? But what would that amount to? Virtually to this, that the Government of the day would propose a check upon their own expenditure—a Committee to look into their own accounts. But if the appointment were left to the other side of the House, then it would come to this, that the Opposition would nominate a Committee to criticise the acts of the Government. It seemed to him, therefore, that this duty should be vested in an authority entirely independent of all party and faction whatsoever. He could not, as he had already said, expect a voluntary sacrifice on the part of the Government; neither could he expect support from the front bench on this (the Opposition) side of the House; neither from the Government in esse nor the Government in posse; neither from Gentlemen actually in power nor from Gentlemen that expected that they any day might receive it. Yet there were right hon. Gentlemen on this side who, whenever they were in office, had plumed themselves on the way
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in which they conducted their administrative duties; who had manifested their accuracy and scrupulous exactness in the management of the funds; and shown their desire conscientiously to carry out the wishes of Parliament; and who, when out of office, were constantly bringing these questions before the House and insisted upon financial accuracy being maintained, with the greatest importunacy which was possible, without actually being troublesome to the Government. He trusted, then, that from some of those right hon. Gentlemen he might meet with a small modicum of support. Yet he rested his case principally upon the support of independent Members; especially such of them as had gone down to their constituents, and been, lavish in their promises and profuse in their pledges of financial reform and financial retrenchment. Now was the time to fulfil those promises; here was the opportunity to redeem those pledges. He would, however, remind the Government that their responsibility is not less because the willingness to obey is strong. His object now was to explain the extent of the evils which he believed to exist, and then to show the remedies which at various times had been devised—the barriers of opposition which had been raised against the usurpations of the Ministry. The first remedy was the Appropriation Bill; that he would show had been sapped and undermined, and had become nearly useless. Then there was the Audit Board; that had been overridden by the Treasury (as he should prove by the evidence which had been taken before Committees of that House), and was merely a delusion and a sham. Then Committees had been appointed by the House; but their Reports had been shelved as soon as presented, and their recommendations had never been regarded. He would first say a few words to make out his case, to make, as it were, the diagnosis of the disease. He would not enlarge much on the size of the Estimates; for this was a matter on which much had lately been said. He must, however, allude to this matter in a very cursory manner. From a Parliamentary paper lately given to Members, it appeared that the sums voted in Supply in 1835 amounted only to £ 14,000,000; in 1840 to £ 17,500,000; in 1850 they rose to £ 20,000,000, and in 1860 to no less than £ 45,500,000. The sums voted annually in Supply were now more than all the sums so voted during the whole reign of

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William III.; they were fifty times as great as they were in any one year at the beginning of that reign. The Army Estimates alone were as great as at the very height of that fierce struggle, when we had all the Powers of Europe and America against us. Our peace was but war in masquerade; it combined the costliness of war with the carelessness of peace. He would now state the Votes for the Army, Navy, and Civil Services, taking them at intervals of ten years. In the year 1839 the sums voted for the navy were £ 5,500,000; in 1849, £ 7,000,000; in 1859, £ 13,000,000. The sums voted for the army in 1839 were £ 8,500,000; in 1849, £ 9,000,000; and in 1859, £ 13,000,000. Then the sums voted for the Civil Services were, in 1839, £ 2,500,000; in 1849, £ 4,000,000; and in 1859, £ 15,000,000. Mr. Laing, who had been Under Secretary to the Treasury, had shown in his evidence before the Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure not only that the Estimates had increased to a most incredible extent, but that the increase had been progressive in a multiplied ratio. Between the years 1851 and 1856 the average increase was only at the rate of £ 200,000 a year; between 1856 and 1859 it was £ 275,000; and in 1859 it was £ 600,000. It became the duty then, if not the interest, of the House to ask itself why this should be. Why was the increase so rapid and so great? That question had been answered in the evidence before the Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure. The simple answer was, that Parliament had lost its control over the funds; that the control had been usurped by the Ministry of the day. That assertion he made, not upon his own authority, but upon that of men of great weight who had been examined before Committees of the House. This control was lost in various ways; the scrutiny of Parliament was evaded by various means. He would allude in the first place to the system of balances. Mr. Laing, when questioned by Sir Stafford Northcote on that point before the Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure, gave evidence to the following effect—
"Is it apparent in any account which is laid before Parliament? No, it is not; unless in the Vote submitted to Parliament it may be mentioned, as it sometimes is, in a note.
"Is it the fact that, from the manner in which the accounts are published, Parliament is ignorant of the fact that part of the apparent balance is already bespoken?.… Undoubtedly, the fact is not brought under the cognizance of Parliament."
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Afterwards, in speaking of the Civil Service, Mr. Laing is asked by—
"Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY: Are you aware that a balance had been left in various ways unknown to Parliament until the Committee on public monies made its investigation and reported? … and was it not in consequence of that being found out that the sum, of money of £ 66,000 was surrendered? Mr. LAING. NO doubt."
In the evidence before the Committee of last year on Public accounts it was stated that as the balances were not surrendered, in the Civil Service, "There is no means of checking the accounts." In the Report various examples were given. There was a case one year of a balance of £ 43,000 remaining in hand from the Vote for Royal Palaces; and yet the Commissioner of Works came down to the House and asked for a Vote of £ 44,000, without stating that be had that balance. The whole of that £ 44,000 remained in excess at the end of the year. That £ 44,000 would, therefore, have been much better left to fructify in the pockets of the taxpayers. The Minister had asked for it, without needing it, merely to have it in his hands. Again, there was another instance, though the particulars he did not recollect, in which there was a balance of £ 650,000, which was more than all the Expenditure under that head in the year. Of course such balances became very convenient in the hands of an irresponsible power, and a useful cloak and screen from the scrutiny of Parliament. It is then an important question to ask how these balances are obtained? how are they manufactured? It appeared from Mr. Anderson's evidence last year that these balances were manufactured by every department asking for a sum greater than it would be likely to expend. He said, "Every department estimates with a view to be safe." Mr. Laing was more precise, for in 1860 he stated in evidence that every department asks for a Vote one quarter greater than the utmost which they thought they would expend. This being the fact, what was the result? What is the effect of this practice? It appeared in the evidence of Mr. Laing, that the Treasury could always order the withdrawal of the whole unexpended balances. They were then put into the hands of the Paymaster General, increasing the general balance at the Pay Office; and then Mr. Laing was asked this question, "That being so, might not the money be used for other purposes than the particular object for which the money

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had been voted?" and he answered, "Yes, in the hands of the Paymaster General: when it got there, the appropriation of it could not be traced further." That constituted the first means by which the control of Parliament was evaded; and yet in the finance accounts of last year no accounts were given under the head of arrears and balances, though it was by means of these balances that the control of Parliament was evaded. In fact, under that head all that was printed was this, "It is not considered necessary to print this class of accounts." He would now allude to another mode by which the control of Parliament was evaded—namely, by transfers, or misappropriations. In these cases the control of Parliament is not only evaded; its orders are directly set at nought and violated. Mr. Laing, in his evidence before the Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure, after allowing that the rule about appropriation is "rather elastic," is asked by Sir Stafford Northcote—
"How soon is any application of one sum to another purpose brought under the notice of Parliament?—If it were within the same Vote, I do not see that it would be brought under the notice of Parliament.
"Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: If therefore the Ministers of the day wished to expend a certain sum upon an object for which they were not likely to get the consent of Parliament, they might, by taking a very small sum for that object, and by taking unnecessarily large sums for other objects, accomplish the object without the knowledge of Parliament?—… Mr. LAING: I do not know whether what is suggested could be done to any large extent. If it were done to a large extent, it would be almost certain to excite attention, especially if it were done for some unpopular object … at the same time, theoretically speaking, it is no doubt possible to a certain extent."
And Mr. Anderson (chief clerk of the Treasury) gives similar evidence, that it is in the power of a department, by postponing work for which money has been voted, to obtain funds for a work (to which a Vote of Credit has been specially applied) to set free part of that Vote of Credit for the purposes of another department. In fact, it would thus be quite possible to spend £ 200,000 on elections and no one would know. The House recollected that at the end of the Navy Estimates of the present year eight cases of transfer were noticed. This occurred during March last, when the House was sitting, and when its sanction for the transfer might have been obtained; and it had the other night been
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declared by the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford that these transfers were effected "so as to defeat the control of the House." This was in the debate on the Report of the Committee of Supply the other night. He had heard, but he did not know whether the statement was correct, that when the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon was Secretary for War, in 1858, finding the barrack accommodation deficient, he inquired into the reason, and discovered that the £ 3,500,000 which had been voted for that purpose during the four previous years, had been transferred or misappropriated before he came into office. He had also heard that the gallant General, although he was most scrupulous in the management of his department, and though determined that not a single Vote in his department should be exceeded, was obliged to propose a Vote for a large excess occasioned by the mismanagement of those who had gone before him in the office. The next example of this evil system was the case of a whole department. The Woods and Forests was a department put openly and avowedly beyond the control of Parliament. Mr. Anderson, in his evidence, stated that—
"The accounts are laid before Parliament when the expenditure had been incurred, and there is no possibility of altering it. No previous sanction of Parliament is given to the items of expenditure. It is an account of money expended over which the House of Commons has no control."
The building at Pimlico, as well as that at Sandhurst, which had recently been matter of discussion, was an illustration of another way in which the control of Parliament was evaded. That building was begun without the sanction of Parliament, and then a Vote was asked to pay for the expense. This Vote was objected to. Then the Minister said: This money has already been expended; besides, there is a contract for the rest, and the contractor must receive a bonus to induce him to drop his contract; then you must pay for digging up what has already been built; and this will amount to nearly the same as the whole building would cost.
Another class of Votes placed beyond the control of Parliament was the class of Civil Contingencies. This appeared from the evidence of Mr. Laing, who stated—
"There has been a tendency of late years, to put into Class 7 certain matters which might properly belong to other classes."

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Then he says that once a work gets into Class 7 it never gets out again. He is then asked by Sir Stafford Northoote—
"Are not all sums expended on Civil Contingencies, expended without the control of Parliament at all?—Yes, no doubt; Civil Contingencies is a fund which the Treasury has a discretion to draw upon," &c.
"Sir STAFFORD NORTHOOTE: And therefore the effect of voting upon Civil Contingencies charges for services which might regularly be estimated, is this—that the control of Parliament over those services is practically destroyed?—No doubt; the Civil Contingencies should be confined as strictly as possible to matters which cannot be foreseen."
Such a convenient class for the acquisition of power is, of course, made the most of. Mr. Laing is asked by Sir Stafford North-cote—
"Of late years the fact has been that the Treasury has spent more upon Civil Contingencies than the amount proposed?—Yes; I apprehend it will become necessary to transfer some large Votes to the Estimates, and yet take nearly the same sum for Civil Contingencies."
Hence this class is not only bad in itself, but is an abettor and pander to other classes. Thus—
"Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Is it not the case that the number of objects included in Class 7 has grown from eight objects in 1848, to fifty-three objects in 1859?—Yes, that is so."
Also, Mr. Anderson says, that if we go on as we have done of late years, Class 7 will soon absorb all the rest. Mr. Laing continues, that this is the class over which Parliament should exercise the strictest supervision. Yet it is passed at the close of the Session during the Dog-days; and thus "this omnibus Class" escapes all attention from Parliament. Mr. Anderson last year, in answer to a question put by Sir James Graham, defined Civil Contingencies as "A fund to meet expenses which cannot be foreseen, for which no provision can be made and no estimate prepared." Yet he then says that "If this principle were adhered to, the residuum in Civil Contingencies would be very small indeed;" for this class contains "a very small proportion of expenses which could not be foreseen, and for which no provision could be made, and no estimate prepared." In the Report of the Committee of last year, various examples are given. For instance a chapel was bought in Paris; the House subsequently refused to, sanction the purchase, and the chapel was resold at a loss—the nation
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being mulcted in the difference. The Report says, "This ought to have been brought to the knowledge of Parliament." Then, there was the case of a sum of £ 37,500 given to the Monte Videan Government, no one knows why; on this the Report says, "This expenditure was incurred without the knowledge of Parliament; it might have been made from the Treasury chest, which would have brought it before Parliament." Then, again a sum was given to the King of Bonny, so that "The authority of Parliament was entirely defeated in the payment of that sum." In short, as Mr. Anderson says in conclusion, this class of civil contingencies should be discontinued, because it is a fund with which such tricks can be played. He should next advert to Votes of Credit. He had already alluded to them under the head of transfers, as a means which helped the commission of such misappropriations. They were also in themselves a means of evading the control of Parliament. It was a very great error to confound together Votes of Credit and Votes on Account. These are totally different things. The Committee on Public Monies had recommended that Votes on Account should be taken "For such services as had already been sanctioned by Parliament," in order to preserve Parliamentary control, and in order to prevent misappropriations. Such a confusion is not made in private affairs. If a tradesman presents his account and asks for money account the demand is thought very reasonable. But if a tailor, to whom you, Sir, owed nothing, came and asked for money on credit, in return for which he would engage to supply you with such clothes as he might deem suitable and necessary to your rank, position, and dighity; you would think the tailor was making a most extraordinary and indefensible proposal. Yet this is what Ministers constantly do. The Journals of this House show that our forefathers always resisted such a proposal. In 1675 there was a Resolution that "This House refuses to grant money to pay off any sums spent in anticipation." Hatsell mentions a later Resolution that "Whosoever shall advance money on the revenue shall be judged to hinder the sitting of Parliament;" and also a Resolution against "accepting tallies of anticipation." The Journals next show that when William III. proposed that a Vote of Credit should be given him to the extent

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of £ 1,000,000 for the purposes of carrying on the war in which he was engaged, the House came to a Resolution not to grant such a vote to a greater amount than £ 10,000. George I. also asked for supplies to concert measures against the King of Sweden who was plotting some mischief against this country. It was then urged that "It was unparliamentary to grant a supply before the occasion was known, and an estimate of the expense laid before the House." In 1727 a Clause of Credit was passed allowing Ministers to apply certain sums to meet the exigencies of public affairs. The following Protest was then entered on the Lords' Journals:—
"Because it is inconsistent with that part of the Bill which forbids the supplies to be issued to any other purposes than those specified; and renders ineffectual that appropriation of the public money which the wisdom of many Parliaments has thought, and we are convinced ought to be thought, a necessary security against the misapplication of it."
Precedents are of use because they contain a judgment of the case apart from the passions of the day. Here is another Protest, of still greater importance, against a Vote of Credit for £ 1,200,000, in the year 1734—
"Because it puts it in the power of a Minister to divert any of the Supplies to whatever purposes poses he shall see fit … whereas Appropriating Clauses were introduced to prevent the secret ill use of public money; and every ten dency of breaking through them is a just foundation for Parliamentary jealousy and inquiry; and therefore we apprehend that we cannot answer it to the nation if we should acquiesce when such innovations are attempted … Monies are granted always in consequence of Estimates laid before the House of Commons, and for services specified … But this clause gives ministers such a latitude to misapply the public money, that we apprehend it to be of the most dangerous consequence."
Votes of Credit, he might add, came into common use during the war which we waged against France at the beginning of the present century; but then they were accompanied by various restrictions and obstructions which clearly showed that they were, even then, regarded as a means of evading Parliamentary control. Thus, Mr. May mentions that "When a Vote of Credit is necessary in time of war, to meet emergencies," a message is sent from the Crown under sign manual to both Houses, which message is referred in the Commons to a Committee of Supply. Votes of Credit are manifestly, therefore,
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another way in which the functions of the House are overridden and Ministers obtain irresponsible power and control. He had now shown the great evils which existed, and traced them all to this one source and origin; namely, the want of control by Parliament. He had also enumerated the various ways in which the supervision of Parliament was evaded. He confessed that it was merely a bald and meagre sketch—a mere outline. But those who followed him, who had a much more intimate acquaintance with the subject than himself, could fill in those darker shades, and add that heightened coloring which would make the picture more true, but at the same time more terrible. He was sure that, except through laziness and inertness, the House would not connive at such a system; it would not abdicate its functions, neglect its duties, abuse its trust, and those its due control over the funds. Sir, that people deserves a tyrant which has ceased to defend its liberties; and those destroy representative institutions who sap the control of representatives. He would now allude to the barriers which had, from time to time, been raised against the usurpations of the Ministry—the remedies for the evils of which we how complain. With the view of securing that control, recourse had been had, among other measures, to an Appropriation Bill. In its very infancy, the House showed the greatest anxiety concerning the funds, and strictness in appropriating them. He found, in Grey's Debates, that Mr. Sachevrell (who assisted Lord Somers in framing the Appropriation Clause at the time of the Revolution), asserted that as early as the reign of Edward I. the money voted by the House was always strictly appropriated. At all events, there were statutes of the time of Richard II. and Henry IV. by which the Supplies were appropriated. The Commons' Journals contain a Resolution of the year 1624, to the effect that "Monies mentioned in the Act of Subsidy shall be paid as first voted." Lord Somers, also, mentions that one of the grievances, in the Declaration of Grievances of 1642. was, that "Sums of money intended for the guard of the seas are dispersed to other uses." Towards the end of that century, as the Journals testify, Sir George Downing carried an Appropriation Clause by a large majority. And subsequently Sir Thomas Littleton carried a Resolution that the money voted for ship-

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building "is to be appropriated and applied only as specified," and that "heavy penalties should be laid on all officers of the Exchequer, and on all through whose hands money shall pass which has been diverted from its original purpose." During that debate Mr. Sachevrell said it was "high treason to pay money to any other use than it was granted for." The House then ordered a Bill to be brought in to "appropriate the supplies pursuant to the several Votes." Sir Edward Seymour, Treasurer of the Navy, was also impeached because he lent, for the use of the army, £ 90,000 which had been appropriated to the navy. Such a transfer was deemed sufficient ground for impeachment. Soon afterwards, in 1689, the 1st of the reign of William and Mary, Lord Somers and Mr. Sachevrell were employed to draw up Appropriation Clauses. The Appropriation Clauses, as framed by Lord Somers, contained the most minute and severe restrictions with respect to the application of the supplies granted by Parliament. Lord Somers's Clauses are contained in 1 Will. & Mary, s. 2, c. i. (1689). The Appropriation Clauses (§ 45–53 and § 55) were not repeated in subsequent Acts, but were referred to in the following stringent terms (e. g. in 6 & 7 Will. III. c. 7):—
"And to the end the sums by this Act appropriated may not be diverted or applied to any other purposes than are hereby declared and intended: Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the rules and directions appointed and enacted in one Act (1 Will. & Mary, sess. 2. c. 1), &c. … and for the distribution and application thereof and keeping distinct accounts of the same and all other provisions, pains, and penalties, and forfeitures, thereby enacted in case of diversion and misapplication of any money thereby appropriated, are hereby revived and enacted to be in force, and shall be practised, applied, executed, and put in use for and concerning the distribution and application of the said sums hereby appropriated as fully, amply, and effectually as if the same were here again particularly repeated and re-enacted."
This clause Was afterwards discontinued, and the following of milder form, was substituted:—
"The said aids and supplies provided as aforesaid shall not be issued or applied to any use, intent, or purpose whatsoever other than the uses, intents, and purposes before mentioned or for the other payments, appropriation, or application directed to be made or satisfied thereout by any Act or Acts or any particular clause or clauses for that purpose contained in any other Act or Acts of this Session of Parliament."
That is the clause which is given in Mr.
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May's Practice of Parliament, p. 538, and also in Hatsell.
In bringing the subject under the notice of the House towards the close of last Session, he had taken occasion to read the Appropriation Clause; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in replying to the observations which he then made, remarked that—
"If any clause in particular was to be called 'the Appropriation Clause,' it was plain that it was not the clause which the noble Lord (Lord Robert Montagu) mentioned, but the 10th Clause,"
And that the Appropriation Clause he, moreover, called "mere surplusage." Yet Hatsell shows that this "mere surplusage" is the Appropriation Clause, which our forefathers framed as the guardian and security for our liberties. He says also that—
"The strict appropriation of supplies was, at the Revolution, … made part of that system of Government which was then established, for the better securing the rights, liberties, and privileges of the country."
Then, again, Mr. Hallam in his Constitutional History, wrote as follows:—
"From the Revolution the appropriation of the supplies has been the invariable usage."
And—
"By a clause annually repeated in the Appropriation Act of each Session, the Lords of the Treasury are forbidden, under severe penalties, from issuing money by any warrant, except for that to which it has been appropriated."
And he continues—
"A House of Commons would be deeply responsible to the country if, through supine confidence, it should abandon that high privilege which has made it the regulator of foreign connections."
Such were the opinions of eminent authorities with respect to a clause which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had characterized as "mere surplusage;" but he thought he had said enough to show the House that the view of the right hon. Gentleman was hardly correct. Thus the House of Commons in its infancy bad struggled for the strict appropriation of supply; in the days of its strength it carried these restrictions with a high and severe hand; in the days of its decrepitude and decline we may expect it to regard lightly the result of our forefathers' struggles, and part with the ægis of our liberties. At the beginning of the present century the House of Commons, not content with the Appropriation Bill, passed a Resolution to the effect that to apply, to

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the navy, money voted for the army, or vice versâ, was a misdemeanour and a gross violation of the Appropriation Act. In 1846, however, the House agreed to a Motion permitting the transfer of money from one service to the other; but that was to be done only where a surplus was applied to meet a deficiency. This Mr. Anderson stated in his evidence last year he also said that the practice was illegal, and that this Resolution was passed to suit an illegal custom. Yet the change thus introduced led to great abuse, as in the case of a recent Vote for iron ships, every farthing of which was devoted to the purchase of military stores; in which case there could not be said to have been a surplus. In 1849 the conscience of the House was smitten, and the consequence was the passing of a Resolution—
"When a certain amount of expenditure for a particular service has been determined upon by Parliament, it is the bounden duty of the department which has that service under its charge to take care that the expenditure does not exceed the amount placed at its disposal for that purpose."
This Resolution overrides that of 1846 The latter permitted transfers between navy and army, if one service had exceeded the Vote and the other had a balance: in such a case, and in such alone, the Resolution of 1846 was operative; for that Resolution allowed the application of surpluses to meet deficiencies. The Resolution of 1849, on the other hand, altogether debars all deficiencies. Yet, the Resolution of 1846 is inserted as a clause in the Appropriation Bill to this day, because it gives a greater power to the Ministry; while that of 1849 is entirely forgotten, and has become a dead letter. In the first Session of 1857, and again in the second Session of 1859, the Appropriation Clause was left out of the Appropriation Bill. The result in 1860 was that there were 11,500 more men in the army than Parliament had voted, and the military expenditure exceeded by £ 1,000,000 the sum which had been granted by Parliament. The sum spent on miscellaneous services, moreover, exceeded the Votes by £ 310,000; it was £ 860,000, instead of £ 550,000, the amount sanctioned by Parliament. Yet, in voting the Supplies, the form is as follows:—
"That a sum not exceeding £ 550,000 be applied to miscellaneous charges."
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Parliament ordered that this sum should not be exceeded, and granted the money on that condition. Yet the Government had exceeded it. Another remarkable case was that of the Vote for iron ships. At the end of the Session, Ministers came down to the House with a special Bill, and represented that, in consequence of the measures taken by the Emperor of the French to create a gigantic fleet, it was absolutely necessary that we should instantly provide ourselves with a certain number of iron ships. They said the matter was one of great urgency; and at their request the House hurriedly voted £ 250,000 for ironclad vessels. Next year the House found, to its astonishment, that not a single penny had been spent on iron ships, but that the whole £ 250,000 had been expended on military stores. Then, again, the sum of £ 519,000, which had been voted for transports, was also in the same year spent on military stores; and yet large sums had been specially devoted by Parliament, that same year, to the purchase of the most profuse amount of military stores. The next remedy which had been framed was the Audit Board; but that Board was a mere sham. Parliament, no doubt, had invested it with ample powers; but the Board was laughed to scorn by the Government. The Board did not audit the accounts of a single department. Mr. Romilly, the Chief Commissioner of Audit, was asked the following questions by the Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure:—
"And practically the Audit Office has no check pon the expenditure of the Secretary of State at War; … or is there practically any detailed check upon the expenditure which the Secretary at War makes?—Mr. Romilly: There is not in our office; … there is virtually no check, except in the department itself."
Then, after saying that there is no check by the Treasury, he is asked—
"I think you stated that the Chancellor of the Exchequer signed the account which the Board puts before him, as a matter of course?—Yes. And he makes no examination of it at all?—No, certainly not."
Of course, in saying this, he did not mean to impugn the right hon. Gentleman who now fills the office of Chancellor. Every one knows that this right hon. Gentleman is exceedingly conscientious and scrupulous. He trusted the House would remember that he did not blame any individuals, but only the system; and whenever he mentioned certain offices, he did

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not allude to the persons who fill those offices.
"You do not get all the accounts from the Commissioners, do you?—No, we do not get the accounts from the Civil Service Commissioners. How are the receipts for Civil Contingencies presented to you?—We do not examine the accounts of the Civil Contingencies. Do you see an account of the expenditure incurred on account of special missions, such as … Lord John Russell's mission to Vienna, or Mr. Cobden's mission to Paris?—No."
From all this, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that which even Mr. Romilly himself is constrained to draw—namely, that the House of Commons and the people of England are deceived.
"So that if the House of Commons or the public imagine that the whole public expenditure goes through the Audit Office, they are greatly mistaken?—Greatly mistaken."
Now, how is this? Parliament settled ample powers on the Audit Board, by the Act of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 92; yet those powers of Parliament are laughed to scorn by Ministers. Mr. Romilly says that they "cannot apply to any Secretary of State the power which Parliament has given them; for the Secretary of State, backed by the whole power of the Treasury, only laughs at them." He continues to say, "We have no control over the accuracy of the items." Then again, with regard to the Secret Service Money, "We do not see any of the particulars." So that of all these various departments the accounts of none are audited. In fact, the Audit Board is a mere figment or Guy Fawkes, Mr. Anderson corroborates this statement in his evidence before the Committee of Public Accounts; for he says, that out of £ 46,000,000 of expenditure the accounts of £ 40,000,000 are not audited by the Board, but only by the departments which authorize the expenditure. The Act prescribes that all papers, accounts, &c., shall be sent to the Audit Office, Now, how is this law obeyed? Mr. Romilly is asked—
"Do not the Treasury send all accounts to you?—Certainly not; a very large part of the public accounts of the kingdom do not come before us. The accounts of the several Secretaries of State and a great many others we never see; … the circumstances which may induce the Treasury to decide in favour of sending some accounts to the Audit Office and of withholding others are of a kind that can only be known to the officers of the Treasury … I am really unable to state what the circumstances are which induce the Treasury to send some accounts to us and withhold others. It rests altogether with the Treasury; they have an absolute discretion in the matter.—Then, in
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fact, the Board of Audit is little more than the right hand of the Treasury for conducting a certain service?—In many respects this is so."
Nor was that all. Mr. Macaulay, another of the Audit Commissioners, stated that when the Audit Office disallowed an account, the Treasury frequently allowed it; that the power substantially rests with the Treasury, and the powers given by Parliament are practically of no avail against the Treasury. Commissary General Power also said, "that so far from the checks; on improvident expenditure being strengthened by modern changes, they have been weakened." The Audit Board was consequently worse than useless, for not only did it not examine all the public accounts, but it had to stand godfather for the evil deeds of the Treasury. There was a Resolution passed by the House in August, 1860, which was recited in the Report of the Select Committee on Public Accounts, That Resolution had been moved by the right hon. Baronet (Sir Francis Baring) the Member for Portsmouth; it was to this effect, "that the appropriation and audit of monies voted for the Civil Service Estimates is insufficient, unsatisfactory, and require early amendment." The conclusion of the Report of the Committee of last year was in these words, "Your Committee may be permitted to express a hope that another year will not pass without the application of a remedy to a state of things which the Resolution of the House has declared to be insufficient, unsatisfactory, and requiring early amendment." The Resolution moved last year by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer he had promised should have become a Standing Order; but that had not yet taken place. Besides, the Committee last year were ordered only to consider audited accounts; yet in their Report they had stated distinctly that the Audit Board was practically useless, the accounts virtually not being audited at all. Hence that Committee did not meet the requirements of the present case. The Treasury Minute of 1858, issued while the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire was Chancellor of the Exchequer, would have carried out the whole of the Report of the Public Monies Committee; for it is, in fact, framed in the very words of that Report. He then also stated his intention to bring in three Bills to secure to the Audit Board the necessary powers, and to make it independent of the Treasury. No doubt, the right hon.

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Gentleman would have fulfilled his promise but for that unlucky Congress at Willis's Rooms, when the noble Lord opposite held out his hand and lifted the noble Lord the Member for the City of London on to the platform. The one then stood for representative Reform and the other for financial Reform, and their two hands were joined together, of course sine cerâ, in the utmost sincerity. Now, how much of the former have you ever got? They all knew where representative Reform had gone to; it had gone to the—"other place." At least the representative of representative Reform had gone there. And now, how much financial Reform will you get? Nay, how great a security for financial accuracy shall we get? for that is all we want. Where is that going to?—Well, he hoped financial Reform would go the other way. But as yet, far from getting financial Reform, they could not even get financial accuracy. What was desired was, that the Report of the Committee on Public Monies should be carried out, and that the powers delegated to the Audit Board should not be laughed to scorn. He next referred to the remaining remedy which had been devised—namely, the various Committees that had been appointed from time to time to take into consideration the Estimates. There had been Committees, as proved by the Commons' Journals, to inspect the navy, the ordnance and stores, to audit accounts, to search for frauds, to investigate the application of public monies and the employment of stores. Some of these Committees had brought to light abuses and gross misapplications of the public monies which had never been suspected. Then there were Commissioners appointed by the House to inquire into mismanagements in the clothing for the army, into contracts for clothing, into the selling of old uniforms; and also, "to inquire whether the good husbandry and economy so much talked of" was really carried into these departments Then, in the reign of William III. the Navy Estimates were referred to a Committee of seventy-seven Members, and the Army Estimates were referred to a Committee of fifty-one Members. Yet he must remark, that that King was a most powerful and somewhat despotic monarch. In these days we have not to dread the despotism, or guard against the prerogatives of a monarch. We have to defend ourselves against the far more insidious and dangerous usurpation of power on the
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part of a Ministry which wields both the Crown and the House in order to carry out its own objects. A few years later (in 1697) Sir Thomas Littleton made a Motion, "that all Estimates and accounts and the state of finances should be referred to a Select Committee of fifty-two Members." The Estimates were again referred to a Select Committee in 1848. The Committee of Public Monies was appointed in 1854. Mr. Anderson said of their Report, in his evidence last year—
"I think the recommendation contained in the Report of the Public Monies Committee is the best and the most practical, and I think it is the only working arrangement that we can really carry out.
He (Lord Robert Montagu) then showed that the terms of his own Resolution were entirely consistent with and, indeed, borrowed from the Report of the Committee on Public Monies, by reading out the clauses in his own Resolution, and he corresponding clauses in the Report of the Public Monies Committee. He had shown the rapid and vast increase of the Estimates, the reckless and careless expenditure, and the loose application of the public monies. The first opposition which had been raised was the Appropriation Bill; but that had been castrated, mutilated, and bereft of all useful powers. The second barrier was the Audit Board; but the public were deceived therein. Government had worked windward of it, took the wind out of its sails, and left it sagging and drifting helplessly to leeward. The third security was in Committees; but their Reports were never listened to by the Ministry, and the evidence which they had collected was quickly shelved. The deaf adder stoppeth her ears, charm the Committees never so wisely. If the Ministers were responsible this would be of no great moment. But the Ministry were not really responsible, and the House had no real control over the public monies. Responsibility of Ministers was a term which had been accepted without investigation, and had become current without thought. If the evidence before all those Committees proved anything, it proved that Ministers were not responsible. The Chancellor of the Exchequer might feel fettered; but it was only by a moral responsibility. He complained that such a thing was beneath a great nation, that it should depend on the moral character, or even the daily whim, of its Chancellors of the Exchequer. He would

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read three lines from M. Fould, the great Finance Minister of France. He said—
"For my part I attach the greatest importance to the system of transfers. 1 see in it the only practicable and effectual means of securing the public service in the absence of the Legislative Body."
That is the secret of the whole system of evil of which we complain; it springs from a desire to govern without the House of Commons. It would be for that House to say whether they would lazily resign those powers which the Constitution had given them. To do such a thing would be like the act of the doting old King Lear. But to part with powers which had been intrusted to us, and committed to our care and safe keeping, would brand us black with dishonour and foul with bad faith. He did not think further argument was necessary. If it were, he would use the words of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer). He could not, he would not dare to use such words on his own authority, or to hint at such an awful possibility as that which the right hon. Gentleman asserted. On the 16th of August, 1860, speaking of the "lamentable and deplorable state of our whole arrangements with regard to public works," he said—
"Vacillation, uncertainty, costliness, extravagance, meanness, and all the conflicting vices that could be enumerated, were united in our present system. … The money of the country was wasted. He believed such were the evils of the system that nothing short of a revolutionary reform would ever be sufficient to rectify it."
He did not think they had yet come to that pass. He thought a remedy might be applied without the necessity for revolution. Yet, Sir, these reforms must be made; such abuses cannot go on; the public will force reform upon you. If it be done at once, it might be accomplished in a spirit of moderation and calmness; but if the remedy were delayed, it would become the deed of violence and intemperance. It would now be the work of judgment and reason, because passion had not been called in; but if it be forced upon you by a ferment in the public mind, the result will be the victory of passion and the reward of insubordination. Cardinal Alberoni said—
"We submit to boundless taxes, which the idea of liberty alone renders supportable."
Sir, ideas quickly fade when there is no reality to correspond. In order that that
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idea might be made a reality, he would now place his Resolution in the Speaker's hands, and commit it to the care of the House. But he would beseech the House to remember one thing—that the control of the purse was the source of power, and that the Exchequer was the battle-field of liberty. The noble Lord concluded by moving his Resolution, substituting the words "Committee of Selection" for "Mr. Speaker."
Motion made, and Question proposed.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that as the noble Lord (Lord Robert Montagu) did not appear to anticipate any assistance either from the Government in esse or the Government in posse, he (Sir Francis Baring) as chairman of the Public Monies Committee, might perhaps be allowed to ask the House to consider what would be the real effect of the Resolution proposed by the noble Lord. The House was to consider whether the proposal of the noble Lord was likely to produce the good result which he appeared to anticipate from its adoption. He (Sir Francis Baring) was firmly convinced that that proposal, if adopted, would rather tend to throw difficulties in the way of the improvements, which he, together with the noble Lord, earnestly wished to carry into effect. He would not follow the noble Lord through all the arguments he had adduced with respect to the evidence brought before the Public Monies Committee, but the noble Lord had forgotten to state that every one of the points which had been touched upon by the noble Lord had been fully considered by that Committee, and that they had themselves recommended certain remedial measures. Every possible evidence that could be brought forward on the subject had been adduced before the Committee, and there was no necessity for any further information. What was wanted, therefore, was not the appointment of another Committee, such as the noble Lord now proposed, but that the recommendations of previous Committees should be fairly carried out. The Committee on Public Accounts, which sat last year, had gone carefully through four different heads of the Estimates, and had made a series of recommendations, some of which required the passing of an Act of Parliament to enable them to be practically adopted. That had already been done, and he believed that considerable progress had been made in giving effect to the other suggestions of the Se-

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lect Committee. He alluded to the recommendations with regard to the Civil Contingencies and the Public Works. The present proposal would, however, throw impediments in the way of the beneficial change which he desired. The noble Lord's speech was not wholly free from a political tinge. He accused the Government of being always hostile to improvement, and always baulking the House of Commons in this matter. Now, he was bound to say that almost every improvement in the public accounts had originated with the Government. The late Sir James Graham, when a Minister, had introduced that most material check, the Appropriation Audit. If hon. Members, instead of declaiming against the Government, would look to what it had been doing, they would find that the heads of the different departments had done their best to introduce a better system of accounts. The improved arrangements in respect to the Army, the Ordnance, and the Treasury chest had all originated in the proposals of the Government. No doubt there had been some delay, although not latterly, in carrying out the recommendations of the Select Committee; yet it should be remembered that the delay had in a great measure been occasioned by the changes of Government and to the stilt more frequent changes in the office of Secretary to the Treasury which had occurred of late. Then, moreover, the task to be accomplished was by no means an easy one, but at present progress was being made in the right direction. What were the remedies suggested by the noble Lord? The noble Lord suggested that a Committee should be appointed to perform certain duties enumerated in the Resolution. They were to consider how the present duties and powers of the Board of Audit should be extended or changed so as to render that Board responsible to that House alone. That would entail the consideration of the whole question of the audit and the working of the Audit Board. Next, the noble Lord proposed that his Committee should report as to the exact period of the financial year when it would be desirable that the annual Estimates should be presented to Parliament. Now, that was just one of those difficult questions which the House had so often considered, and on which Committees had reported; but as to the inconvenience of the Estimates not being voted till July, that evil arose, to a great extent,
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from the practice adopted by hon. Members of bringing forward all sorts of preliminary discussions upon the question of going into Committee of Supply. The noble Lord's Resolution appeared to contemplate an examination of the Estimates by his proposed Select Committee previous to their consideration by the House in Committee of Supply. Was the House prepared for such a change as that? Would they hand over the Estimates to a Committee? and what would be the result? In the year 1848 the House had two Committees on public expenditure sitting; but, so far from concluding their work within the year, they had not completed it at the end of the second year. He did not believe it possible for any Committee to do the work which would be imposed upon them by this Resolution. He had lately heard an announcement from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Government were carrying into effect the recommendations of the Committee on Public Monies. If there were on the part of the Government that anxiety which some persons attributed to them to do nothing to improve the public accounts, the Resolution of the noble Lord would furnish them with a very good excuse for doing so. They might say, "As you have adopted this Resolution, we cannot proceed to carry out the recommendation of the Public Monies Committee; we cannot make any change while this new Committee is sitting." All improvement would thus be stopped, and he very much questioned whether any Member of the new Committee would live to see any of the suggested improvements carried into effect. He could not be accused of want of interest in the present question, for it was chiefly owing to a Motion he had the honour of bringing forward that the Public Monies Committee had been appointed. He opposed the present Motion just because he thought the effect would be directly the reverse from that expected by the noble Lord. It was all very well to compare the present high rate of expenditure, which for several reasons was a necessity, with that of former periods; but hon. Members must remember that never in any former or more economic period had there been so many checks upon the public accounts as there now were. It had been said that the House never refused a Vote. That might be the case, but no one could deny that the knowledge that the Estimates would

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be criticised in that House, had a great influence on the expenditure of the different departments. He was most earnestly desirous that a generally satisfactory system of accounts should be in operation in all the public departments, but he did not see that that object was to be attained by adding half a dozen blue-books to the shelves of the library. The Government were not the only parties answerable for the present heavy expenditure. There was one account which, if furnished to the House, would afford some rather curious information. If hon. Members had before them a return of all proposals for additional expenditure made from time to time by non-official members, they would be astonished, not at what the Government had done, but at what they had not done. He believed that the proposal of the noble Lord would throw great difficulty and delay in the way of what was now being done to give effect to the recommendations of the Public Monies Committee, and he therefore could not give it his support.
SIR GEORGE BOWYERremarked, that having been one of the Members of the Public Monies Committee, and having attended its sittings with great care and attention, he was anxious to say a few words on the subject. He believed that the appointment of that Committee was due to a speech he had made in Supply. He remembered that the view taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day (Sir George Lewis), who represented the Government on that Committee, and also by the late Mr. Wilson, was that the ancient and constitutional control exercised by the Exchequer was useless, and caused delay in the management of the public affairs. Mr. Wilson stated an opinion to this effect—that the public money ought to be paid into one account at the Bank of England, and that the Treasury should have unlimited power to draw on that account, subject only to the control of that House. A great deal of evidence was taken by the Committee, and the result thereof was decidedly opposed to the opinion he had just cited. His own opinion was, that this constitutional control, so far from being relaxed, should be strengthened, as affording a means of ensuring the application of money to the particular service for which it had been voted. Without this control the supervision exercised by that House would be entirely useless. With regard to what his noble Friend had said on the subject of Trans-
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fers, he believed that unless those Transfers were allowed it would be almost necessary to keep a separate Banking Account for each department, and that the balances in the Exchequer would be unnecessarily and inconveniently diminished. The great care should be that the totals should not be exceeded. The control of Parliament by the appropriation of monies could only be carried into effect by the control of the Exchequer over the issue of public monies. But the moment the monies were issued from the Exchequer that control was at an end. The problem was, how the appropriation and application of the monies could be ensured after that. That problem could only be solved by a proper system of auditing the public accounts, and the evidence given before the Committee had proved that this Audit was at present in a most unsatisfactory state. Every public department ought to have all the powers necessary to enable it to discharge the duties intrusted to it. But the Board of Audit had not those powers; it was subordinate and practically impotent. The Board of Audit should not be a subordinate department of the Government; it should possess the same powers as in France and other Continental Countries was vested in the Court of Accounts. It should have power to summon persons and call for documents. It should have power to punish the persons who did not produce the Documents, by committing them to prison. If it possessed those powers, it would be really efficient, and have control over its own business. The Secretary of State as well as the Chiefs of other departments should be bound to account to the Board. The Board of Audit, however, had no power to enforce the production either of persons or papers, but was treated as a subordinate department of the Government, and the Secretaries of State were not considered to be subject to the authority of the Board. So, if the Board of Audit found that even malversation and peculation had been committed, all it could do was to surcharge the accountant and send back the account, which, however, might be delayed for any period of time. The Board must then report to the Treasury, and they would instruct the law Officers of the Crown to take proceedings. The Board ought to have the power of distributing its own work. At present a number of accounts came in together, and a great press of business was the consequence,

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while at another time there was no possibility of getting the accounts in. The Board of Audit ought to have the power of making orders on accountants, requireing them to bring in their accounts at proper times, and of enforcing such orders; and also of compelling accountants to appear and answer queries, and produce vouchers without unnecessary delay, Then the Board would have the control of its own business. He trusted the Chancellor of the Exchequer would tell the House that some steps had been taken by the Treasury to carry into effect the recommendations of the Committee and to make the Board of Audit more efficient. If it were intended to leave the Board in its present state, it would be better to get rid of it altogether, seeing that its machinery was very expensive, while it afforded no real security to the public.
MR. PEELsaid, that the House would be led into error if it attached implicit, credence to what had been stated by the noble Lord as to the authority attaching to the Resolution he had moved. The noble Lord had told the House that the Resolution was word for word copied from the recommendations of the Public Monies Committee. He could not have claimed higher authority for his Resolution, for, comparatively short as was the time that had elapsed since that Committee made its Report, most of its recommendations had been carried into effect either by the Government or by Act of Parliament. The recent changes made in the constitution of the Pay Office, in regard to Exchequer Bills, the extension of the appropriation audit to the Revenue Accounts, and the appointment of a Committee of that House last year for the purpose of examining and revising the Audited Accounts—all these innovations had been adopted in pursuance of the recommendations of that Committee, and showed the just authority that belonged to their Report. He thought, however, that Committee would find it difficult to recognise in the Resolution of the noble Lord any recommendations of their own; for although the words were the same, the sense thereof was totally different. The noble Lord's Resolution consisted of fragments of sentences which had been extracted from the Report of the Committee, and blended together with a total disregard of the sense and the context of the passages from which they had been taken. The noble Lord read two passages from the
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Report, the first two or three lines of which were in conformity with the first two or three lines of the noble Lord's Resolution. The Committee then went on. to recommend that some officer from the Audit Board should be placed in the Pay Office to follow the payments that were made. The noble Lord omitted the recommendation founded on the reasoning of the Committee and substituted a proposition of his own, that a Committee of the House of Commons should be appointed for that purpose. Then, again, the Committee recommended that a Select Committee should be appointed for the purpose of revising the Audited Accounts. But what was the proposition of the noble Lord? The noble Lord had proposed that the Committee should not only revise the Audited Accounts, but also the Estimates. He need not further remark on that point than that this Resolution had no claim to be entertained favourably on the ground of authority, and that if it were at all admissible it must be upon its own merits. The subject upon which the noble Lord had spoken was of a very complicated and technical nature, and he (Mr. Peel) was not ashamed to confess that he did not feel himself able to follow the noble Lord through all the opinions which he had expressed—opinions which he believed were not in a few instances incorrect, with regard to balances, transfers, votes of credit, and civil contingencies. The noble Lord concluded by saying that he desired no other changes than those which had been recommended by the Public Monies Committee, but he would find no passages in their report which at all affected the present system of army or naval expenditure. All that the noble Lord had said with regard to the Audit Board having no control over the expenditure of those services was answered by reference to the Act of Parliament which imposed upon that Board the duty of presenting to the House an appropriation audit, making a comparison between the grants of Parliament for a particular period and the expenditure out of those grants for the same period. That Act of Parliament charged the Admiralty and the Military Department with the duty of auditing their own accounts, and the reason was, that that audit could he more efficiently carried out by those departments. He would therefore confine his remarks principally to the Civil Service Estimates, with which he was more familiar; and with regard to the expendi-

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ture under that head he acknowledged that the House did not possess the same full information which it had with regard to the military and naval expenditure. True it was that the Estimates which showed the expenditure which the Government desired to make for a coming year were presented to the House with the fullest details, divided into some hundred or two hundred Votes, and each Vote again minutely subdivided. But with regard to the expenditure which actually took place the House did not possess the same information. With the noble Lord's object in that respect he entirely sympathized, and was as anxious as the noble Lord could be that the House should possess the most accurate, complete, and detailed information, and that it should have placed before it every year an account showing the comparison between the grants which had been made to the Government and the amount which had been actually expended. He did not think that there was at the present day any question as to the manner in which the control of that House over the appropriation of its grants should be carried into effect. It was true that at the time the Public Monies Committee was sitting there was a question whether some effectual control might not be provided by means of checking the issues from the Exchequer. The law of the Exchequer was, that more money could not he issued on account of any grant than that House had voted for that particular purpose; and if no money were to be issued from any other source, perhaps this provision might be effectual. But the House should recollect that services were carried on abroad by means of issues from the Treasury chest, just as at home they were carried on by issues from the Exchequer. Therefore it was impossible to know at any one moment what had been issued for the public service on account of any particular grant. The conclusion, therefore, to which the Committee came was, that the effectual way to give the House a control was to wait until the payments were made, and then to have a detailed account of the outlay with reference to the grants made for the services of the year presented to Parliament. The right hon. Baronet (Sir P. Baring) had complained that there had been a delay in applying that check to the Civil Service, and undoubtedly there had been some delay, but it had been owing to difficulties of detail which could not
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easily be surmounted. There had been a difference of opinion between the Audit Board and the other departments of the State as to which should prepare this Appropriation Account, and before the Public Monies Committee, in 1857, the view of the Audit Board was, that it should be prepared by some other department—the Treasury, for example; and the Treasury at that time entertained the same opinion; but the view now entertained was, that that duty should devolve upon the Audit Board, because by it the accounts of expenditure were examined in detail. The noble Lord complained of certain defects in the constitution of the Audit Board, and thought that some changes should be made, with, a view to giving increased independence to the audit. But the Audit Board was, in reality, an independent department. The Commissioners held their office on a judicial tenure, their salaries were paid out of the Consolidated Fund, they were responsible to Parliament alone, and Parliament alone could remove them. With respect to the performance of their duties, they were altogether independent, nor would they tolerate any interference on the part of the Treasury or any other office. But the noble Lord said they were not entirely independent, because it was for the Treasury to determine what accounts they should audit, and it was only a fraction of the public accounts that was audited by the Board. But since the Act of Parliament required that the military and naval expenditure should not be audited by the Board, there only remained the Revenue Accounts and the Civil Service Accounts; and he believed that out of £ 11,000,000 or £ 12,000,000 of those accounts the Audit Board audited £ 10,000,000. The Audit Board acted upon fixed rules. When an account was presented to them, they required that proper vouchers should be produced; and if they were not produced, they disallowed the charges; but there might be reasons for those accounts being allowed, and a discretion therefore had been vested in the Treasury for that purpose. With regard to the proposal that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of revising the accounts, that recommendation had been already acted upon. The recommendation was first made by the Public Monies Committee in 1857, and it would be in the recollection of the House that in the last year a Committee of Accounts was appointed, which went through several of

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those accounts, and which in the course of the Session presented no less than five reports. When the noble Lord complained that no improvements had been effected in consequence of those recommendations, it would be enough to remind the House that two of the most important of those recommendations had been carried out by Act of Parliament in the course of the same Session, and the noble Lord would find that other recommendations had been carried out, as far as it was possible for the Treasury to do so in the interval. The remaining proposition of the noble Lord was, that the Committee should revise the Estimates. But if it were to do that, it would do one of two things—it would either supersede the House in its duty of examining and passing the accounts, or it would supersede the Government in its duty of submitting them. Now, would it be likely that a Committee of that House would discharge the duty of revising the Estimates better than the House itself? Was it not clear that in the House at large there was to be found a greater variety and combination of talent than could be obtained in any Select Committee? If the noble Lord meant that the Estimates prepared by the Government should only reach the House through the medium of this Select Committee, then the result would be that the responsibility of the Government for the Estimates would in reality be transferred to an irresponsible body. He thought, therefore, that he had given a sufficient answer to the Resolution moved by the noble Lord. Nothing had been said by the noble Lord as to the concluding proposition in the Resolution—namely, that some inquiry should take place as to the time when the Estimates should be presented. It would be recollected that the Army and Navy Estimates were presented as early in the Session as possible; and with respect to the Civil Service Estimates, the Committee of the year before last recommended that they should be presented simultaneously with the Army and Navy Estimates. Hitherto it had not been usual to present the Civil Service Estimates till about the month of June, but last year they were presented very much earlier than usual; and in the present year he trusted that it would be in the power of the Government to present them still earlier. The Government were endeavouring to carry out the recommendations of the Committee, and to present them at the beginning of the Session
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in the same way as the Army and Navy Estimates. He thought that he had said enough to justify him in disagreeing from the proposed Resolution; though he was as anxious as the noble Lord that the House should possess full knowledge of the manner in which the grants provided for the public Service were subsequently appropriated; and the desire of the Government was to expedite and accelerate the introduction of a state of things under which that information would be afforded to the House.
MR. WHITEsaid, that before he avowed his dissent from some of the opinions expressed by the noble Lord the Member for Huntingdon, he desired to tender to him his warmest thanks for the care and industry which he had displayed in the treatment of this subject, and the zeal which characterized his efforts to enable that House to have some practical control over the expenditure of the country. But he (Mr. White) must confess that the noble Lord had not satisfied him that they had great occasion to fear the aggressions of successive Administrations. He was inclined to think the fault lay with themselves—that the root of the evil was with them. It was to the supineness and the gross neglect of Parliament in regard to its duties that they owed this growing augmentation of the national expenditure. No one could deny but that they had the amplest details of the expenditure given in the annual Estimates that were laid upon the table; but, if such a thing were possible, he should be curious enough to ask for a return of the Members who read the Estimates that were annually issued. He thought their number would be very few. Unless a man bad been trained to business and possessed habits of industry, it would be almost appalling to him to have to read over the amount of information which was now afforded. He had taken the pains to go through the Estimates for this year, and those for last year. They had only had the Army and Navy Estimates this year. He found that the number of folio pages occupied with the Estimates for the Army for 1861–2 were 155, and the number of items 4,728. The number of folio pages occupied with the Navy Estimates was 107, and the number of items 1,403. In the revenue department, 97 folio pages and 2,498 items. Under the Estimates for the Civil Service, No. 1, there were 46 folio pages and 876 items; in No. 2, 54 folio pages and 1,366 items; No. 3, 77 folio

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pages and 2,993 items; No. 4, 46 folio pages and 1,078 items, with reports; No. 5, 82 folio pages and 764 items; No. 6, 73 folio pages and 1,857 items, with reports; and No. 7, 17 folio pages and 270 items—making a total of 704 folio pages and 17,833 items, not including 18 other papers bearing upon the Estimates, and consisting of upwards of 100 folio pages. There never was more ample information afforded to a Legislature, if that Legislature would only do its duty. Year after year there was an increasing apathy displayed in the discussion of the Estimates. The noble Lord the Member for the East Riding of Yorkshire told the House on the preceding evening that, when the noble Lord at the head of the Government was Secretary of State for War, he had to undergo a discussion extending over twenty-one nights in passing through his Estimates. But, now that the Estimates were double in amount, it seemed they were not to bestow the same number of hours as they did days in these hard-working times. One thing was certain, that each year had brought with it an augmentation of the business of the House; and therefore it might be that, owing to the accumulation of public business, the attention of hon. Members was diverted from the Estimates, which before used to be the absorbing topic. However, it was quite certain that the time had now arrived when they must do something; and it was in that spirit that he tendered his thanks to the noble Lord. They must begin to inquire what it was they could well do, and what they could well do that alone ought they to do. He thought it was important that the attention of the House should be directed to the expenditure that had gone on increasing so rapidly of late years. It was quite obvious, from some cause or another, that in the matter of Supply they went on very badly, in proof of which he would refer to the Votes in Supply. In 1852 they voted in Supply £ 22,981,609, and in 1861 they voted £ 42,180,031, less cost of revenue collection, not included in 1852, £ 4,778,574. Therefore, by a comparison of the two years, it would stand as £ 22,000,000 against £ 37,000,000 in 1861. There had likewise been a considerable increase in the Army Estimates during the same period. In 1852 they voted for the army, £ 9,408,109, and in 1862, £ 15,302,870, showing an increase of £ 5,994,761. For the Navy they voted in 1852, £ 6,705,746, and in 1862, £ 11,794,305, being an increase of
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£ 5,088,559. The augmentation in the Civil Service Estimates was somewhat more extraordinary. They voted in 1852, for the Civil Service, £ 4,407,754, and in 1862, £ 7,848,069, showing an increase that was almost incredible of £ 3,440,315. In 1851, the cost of the army and navy was at the rate of 15 s. per head of the population, and in 1861 it had reached 20s. per head. Then, with reference to the Civil Services, he found that, whilst in 1851 the cost of those services was at the rate of 5 s. per head, in 1861 it had reached the figure of 7 s. per head of the population. Thus, we were now spending at the rate of £ 14,500,000 per annum more than we did ten years ago, which they might say was nearly £ 1,250,000 per month in excess of the expenditure of only ten years ago. Well might the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer be compelled to point out in his last budget speech that the total interest on the savings of the nation during the last ten years had been absorbed and swallowed up in the grave of this vast expenditure. At a critical epoch in our recent history we were authoritatively reminded, and from a very high quarter, that representative institutions were upon their trial. Looking at the inordinate growth of our national expenditure, as sanctioned by Parliament, could it be long, he would ask, before public opinion would indignantly repeat that solemn warning? He thought not. And he must add that the aiders and abettors of the present mania for extravagance would be alone responsible should the masses of their countrymen be forced to believe that Parliamentary Government, as now administered, is nothing, after all, but the cunningest device which the selfish subtlety of the governing classes could contrive to extract the largest amount of taxation from the hard-working, overburdened, but unrepresented portions of our community.
MR. NEWDEGATE: Sir, the hon. Member for Brighton has just repeated that which I hold to be a calumny upon this House. He has stated that the unrepresented classes, as he is pleased to call those who have no votes, and who are not therefore directly represented in this House—
MR. WHITE: I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I put it hypothetically, not affirmatively.
MR. NEWDEGATE: Then I will deal

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with the hon. Member for Brighton hypothetically. We will suppose the hon. Member not being present in the body, though I think I see him before me, was thought by this House to have said or rather that his shadow intimated, in a manner more impressive than by speech, that the unrepresented people of this country were oppressed by this House, which extracted from the produce of their labour the means of extravagance for the wealthy classes. But what are the facts which mark this evening's debate? Why that a Member of the wealthy classes, a noble Lord, the brother of a Duke, has proposed to this House a means of promoting economy, and the hon. Member for Brighton, or rather the shadow of that hon. Member, who is the especial representative of the unrepresented classes, as he terms them, rises in his place and endeavours to defeat a bonâ fide attempt to enforce economy in the national expenditure.
MR. WHITE: I do not oppose him. I mean to vote with him.
MR. NEWDEGATE: Then the hon. Gentleman seems to have changed; for I certainly understood him to say that he thought the proposal was futile, and that he did not agree in the noble Lord's suggestion. I am delighted to hear, however, that in the body the hon. Member will vote with us, although his speech has been against us. I allude to this fact, because I hold that the noble Lord has rendered a very great service both to this House and to all classes in the country; for if I may judge by the laboured exposition of the hon. Under Secretary of the Treasury, by the laborious effort which he has made to explain to the House that which it is our duty to understand—namely, the course of the public expenditure—it is perfectly clear that, unless some means are adopted to simplify the consideration of voluminous Estimates as they are presented to Parliament, not before, but as they are laid upon the table of the House by the Government, whose function it is to present them, so as subsequently to simplify the consideration of them, we shall see Session after Session empty benches just in proportion to the increased volume of the details with which we are encumbered. Now that is a practical evil which was considered in some degree by the Committee on public business, upon which I had the honour to serve. And, Sir, it is a matter which I know has engaged your own attention;
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because that Committee were glad to avail themselves of your advice and experience, as well as that of the noble Lord who formerly occupied the Chair of this House, in order to ascertain how it was possible to prepare these accounts, so that, when they are considered, the House might come to such specific Resolutions with respect to such aggregations of minor items of expenditure as would enable us to deal effectually with the main subjects submitted to our consideration. But, Sir, I would for a moment advert to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir P. Baring). What does that speech amount to? It amounts to this: that if the mode of proceeding with respect to these accounts of expenditure by Parliament is to be reformed at all, it must be reformed by the Government and not by this House. Well, Sir, what encouragement had we last Session to anticipate that the Government would aid us in the task? Late in the Session, when the Appropriation Bill was brought before the House, a shadow thinner than that of the hon. Member for Brighton, was hypothetically laid before us, the mere title of a Bill, for the substance of it was not printed for the information of the House, merely the name of it appeared on the Votes; the noble Lord the Member for Huntingdon, proposed that we should not vote a Bill of the details of which we knew nothing. And what was the manner in which the noble Lord was met? He was told by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in terms which the House will forgive me for quoting literally, that this Bill was mere surplusage, not worth printing, because the Government had no authority to appropriate monies to any other purposes than those for which Parliament had voted them. Now, how do we appropriate public money? If this doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman be correct, the House votes away millions annually simply by Resolution. Yes, we vote away millions by simple Resolution.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The hon. Gentleman is in error. I did not speak of the Appropriation Act; but of the Clause.
MR. NEWDEGATE: I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. He did say the Clause; but the Appropriation Clause gives the character to the Bill.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: But you said I spoke of the Bill.
MR. NEWDEGATE: Well, as the Bill

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was not presented to us, I may be excused if I fall into some error of detail; but, at all events, the right hon. Gentleman stated that the Appropriation Clause, which gives the character to and forms the substance of the Bill, was mere surplusage. Then, I ask, is it decent that the provisions relating to this expenditure, which are to have the force of law, should be voted unseen by the House? Is it decent that we should vote only by Resolution, and should know nothing of the details of the enactment by which this expenditure is to be regulated? Sir, I think it is too obvious that this is reducing the functions of the House of Commons to a farce; too obvious to need further exposition. Last Session I felt it to be my duty to object to the form in which the right hon. Gentleman submitted his Supply Bill to the House. I objected to our being asked to vote the changes of taxation, the re-imposition of a vast mass of taxation, and the repeal of a large amount of taxation in the gross; and this Session, in supporting the Motion of the noble Lord, I object to being asked to sanction the expenditure in the gross. I am not one of those who desire to revert to the blind economy of 1835. I am perfectly aware that the enormous expenditure of late years results from this, that we are obliged to make up an arrear of those supplies which are necessary for the public safety, because in previous years, in defiance of the warnings of the Duke of Wellington, and in defiance of the warnings of the most competent both naval and military authorities, we voted our taxation in the gross and as blindly adopted economy in the gross by so voting. The noble Lord opposes such blind proceedings; what he asks the House to do is to adopt no new system, but to revert to the ancient means of Parliamentary control which have existed ever since the Revolution of 1688, but have been relaxed, as I think, most unwisely. For what has that relaxation led to? It has led to this: that the Chief Secretary for the War Department told us the other night that the law is now so shamefully lax that the Government have felt themselves obliged, in common decency, to render their administration of the public money more in accordance with the purposes which Parliament has sanctioned than the law in its present state enjoins. And, Sir, there are other reasons why I am of opinion that the noble Lord the Member for Huntingdon has done the
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country great service by the present Motion. A great Financier has been appointed by the Emperor of the French, M. Fould, to correct, if possible, the extravagance which has grown up under the present form of government in France; and the Emperor has well chosen his man. He has appointed M. Fould to castigate his ministers; and by way of sweetening the infliction he has consented to share it himself, and to set the example of humility by kissing the rod. But what are the characteristics of the able document which M. Fould has laid before the French Legislature by the order of the Emperor? Why, the first eight paragraphs are devoted to reflections, not only upon the abuses in matters of expense under Parliamentary government, as it' existed from 1815 to 1852 in France, but to direct reflections upon the whole system of Parliamentary control over public expenditure then exercised. The events of the last lew years have taught me this. To look across the Channel for a little light on these subjects, if there remains anything unexplained in England. I have not forgotten all that then happened with respect to the commercial treaty, and how our finances were directly controlled by engagements that had been entered into by the Government with a foreign Power. I have learned to look across the Channel; and it makes me jealous when I see such tardiness exhibited in correcting the avowed laxity of our system, which suffers the transfer of expenditure from one item for which provision has been made by Parliament to another without the concurrence or knowledge of this House. Now, what is the scheme that has been adopted in France on the recommendation of M. Fould? It is this. That supplemental or extraordinary credits shall no longer be permitted to be issued by the various departments. So far that tends to a wise economy; but the other recommendation is, that the powers of the Emperor in transferring the supplies nominally voted for one department or one purpose to another department or another purpose shall be increased, and the effect will be that the increase of the total expenditure will be curtailed, and brought within certain limits, but that the Emperor will have almost unlimited control over the application of the whole of the revenue which is raised. Sir, I say that we ought to take a warning from this. It is M. Fould's function and purpose to guard the absolute power of the

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Emperor from all Parliamentary interference, and that is the object of M. Fould's recommendations, because these supplemental or extraordinary credits must come some time or another under the consideration of Parliament, and Parliament would naturally not deal with those credits or supplies unless it was informed of the objects on which the expenditure had been made. Thus would grow up in Prance that which neither M. Fould nor the Emperor intends, the responsibility of ministers and a system of Parliamentary control. The system of supplemental and extraordinary credits is therefore abandoned, because it would lead to Parliamentary control; but the substitute for this is the uncontrolled power of transferring credits from one item to another and from one department to another by the absolute power and at the discretion of the Emperor, for the power of so transferring is limited and controlled by very little (of any) Parliamentary responsibility. It is evident that these measures are wise and appropriate for a despotic Government; but we cannot permit them to be imitated in England, if we mean to preserve, as I trust we do in this House mean to preserve, ministerial responsibility throughout the whole course of financial action, and especially with respect to the principal items of expenditure—if we mean not to deal with Governments in the gross, not to wait until, left unsupported by the economical action of this House, each Government fills up its measure of iniquity, and then to eject Government after Government; but, on the contrary, to aid each Government in the prosecution of economy by an intelligent revision of the items of the public expenditure and thus to secure both efficiency and economy. If such is our purpose, then I see no means by which it can be better attained than those which have been suggested by the noble Lord; and if he goes to a division, I shall certainly give him my support, the more so because the only valid answer to the vague and offensive imputations which have been thrown out against the House of Commons is to show that we are practical men, that we have not lost our business habits when we enter this House, but that by such a division of labour as will render our action really effectual we are prepared to exercise an intelligent control over the public expenditure. That, Sir, is why I support the noble Lord. It is all very well to say that the noble Lord pro-
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poses to appoint a Committee, and that the Committee will lead to delay. Sir, no one knows better than yourself, and your evidence before the Committee on Public Business reminds me of the fact, that it is impossible for this House to act independently in these matters, except through a Committee—by that means only can we extemporize an executive to direct our independent action. After the Government have submitted the Estimates to our consideration, we may thus succeed in effectually accomplishing our duty to the country. Disagreeing, therefore, entirely with the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Treasury in his assertion that the noble Lord's proposal is not in accordance with the recommendations of the Public Monies Committee; remembering, Sir, that he has bowed to your suggestion with regard to the action he at first intended to impose upon you as Speaker in the nomination of the Committee he proposes, and thinking that he has fairly embodied the sense and purport of the recommendations of the Committee on Public Monies in the form of his Motion, I can only feel it to be my duty to support him, with the view of hastening those amendments which I believe to be eminently requisite for the public service and for the maintenance of the character of this House. I will not longer detain the House than to say that I think the Government will have no right to complain of the action of this House if we adopt this course. I am sure the noble Viscount at the head of the Government would not willingly see this House so blindly following him as to render themselves liable to the imputation of being accessory to the establishment of an unconstitutional power. The noble Viscount is said not to be greatly enamoured of reform. Now, I am one of those Conservatives who have avowed that they do not look upon representative reform as necessarily an evil. I believe that there are many portions of our representative system which need to be adjusted; and when the right time comes, I trust I shall be found acting in conformity with that avowal. But sure I am of this, that if once this House renders itself liable to the imputation of gross extravagance or of supineness; if the Members of this House do not act here upon the same business principles which they apply to the conduct of the affairs of the several localities in which they reside and to their own private

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affairs, we shall have to encounter a desire for a change in the constitution of this House in a sense so democratic that, perchance, the Parliament of England may he thereafter rendered as incapable as the Parliaments of Prance have, according to M. Fould, proved themselves of performing their functions with respect to expenditure and in the defence of the liberties of all classes of the people. It would then, indeed, be necessary that we should yield all these matters blindly into the hands of a bureaucracy which can be controlled only by an autocratic form of government.
MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHsaid, that in his opinion the most important and valuable part of the Motion was that which declared that the Committee should have power to examine and report upon the Estimates. If the Estimates were referred to a small Select Committee, to be nominated by the Speaker, the Report of such a Committee would be of inestimable value for the guidance of the House in their discussions. By the existing system the expenditure was rather increased than diminished. He therefore hoped the noble Lord would not withdraw that part of his Resolution. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Treasury appeared to think that the Board of Audit had sufficient powers, but the whole evidence relative to the public expenditure showed that the Board had not those powers; and for this reason, that under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 2, the Treasury had the real control. It was left to the Treasury to determine in what manner items objected to by the Board of Audit should be presented to Parliament. The Board of Audit had been established by 25 Geo. III. with a view to the thorough control of the public expenditure; and yet, somehow or other, a thorough control of the expenditure of public money had not yet been secured. Such a state of things was a reflection on the House. He therefore should support the Resolution of the noble Lord.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I would submit to the House whether, under the circumstances in which this Resolution has been moved by the noble Lord—who is not now in his place—there is much advantage in the prolongation of this discussion, or in taking a vote on the subject of the Resolution; for the Resolution is one that, in the first place, embraces matters not only so complicated but so heterogeneous that obviously they
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ought to form the subject of separate debate. No two things are more distinct for all practical purposes than the public accounts and public expenditure; but the noble Lord has unfortunately combined in one and the same Resolution the appointment of a Committee to examine the Estimates before they are submitted to the House, and the appointment of a Committee to examine the Public Accounts after that has taken place. These two propositions, entirely distinct, he combines in one Resolution; he submits his Resolution in that form to the House. At the same time he says he is perfectly ready to alter the terms if required; but my hon. Friend behind (Mr. Augustus Smith) naturally gets up and says the part which the noble Lord is ready to drop is the most valuable of all. The effect of this is, that it is impossible for us to know what we are really debating and how we should express clearly the views of the House. If the question of a Committee to examine the Estimates and expenditure is to be debated, all I can say is, there never was a proposition which more entirely deserved solemn and separate discussion—a proposition more important and one cutting more deeply into the roots of our entire Executive—ay, and I may add into the roots of our political system—it is difficult to conceive. At any rate, it is a proposition most inappropriate to mix up with a discussion on the manner of rendering or examining public accounts. I cannot attempt to discuss these entirely different matters at the same time, but I will direct myself to the principal object of the noble Lord. He has shown on this occasion his own zeal and diligence; and the House will be extremely glad to see another Member of Parliament adding himself to that number—necessarily a very small number—who are disposed to give up their time and attention to the driest of all possible subjects, but which is also not the least important—namely, that of rendering and examining the public accounts, and facilitating the functions of the House with regard to the public expenditure. Now, how do we stand? I confess I did not gather very clearly from the speech of the noble Lord the precise object he had in view. If I may say so, he cast his net too wide, and included too many subjects—perhaps from an anxiety to spare the time of the House. But this Motion, if I comprehend its terms aright, includes—apart entirely from the question of the Estimates—a portion of

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matter which has been disposed of already, and a portion of matter which the Government have already declared their intention to dispose of. The portion of matter already disposed of is that which fell within the province of the Committee on Public Monies. I do not think that of late years there has been any Select Committee of this House appointed which has discharged its duties in a more thorough and workmanlike manner than the Committee on Public Monies. My right hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) would have been justified in ranking a more pointed allusion to his own merits and services in connection with that Committee than the very slight reference he made to them; in fact, his services on the Committee give the greatest authority to whatever falls from him on this subject. But the whole question of the constitution of the Board of Audit, and of the measures to be taken for rendering complete the investigation of the public accounts is a question which has already been considered by the Public Monies Committee. That Committee has made its recommendations; many of those recommendations have been fulfilled, others are in course of fulfilment; and I submit to the noble Lord that it would be a positive obstruction to the work of improvement—because it would be actually stopping the Executive in the prosecution of the measures requisite to give effect to those recommendations—if the House were now to appoint a Committee to resume the same subject matter of inquiry, and attempt to do over again what has been done so well and so completely already. The only other effect of the Motion, as I rather gather from the terms of the first part of the Resolution—although I am not quite sure how far that is meant to be included in it—would be the appointment of a Committee to discharge the duties which were undertaken last year by the Committee of Public Accounts The noble Lord is, no doubt, aware that the Government has declared its intention to propose the re-appointment of that Committee; and, with great respect to him, I must confess it appears to me that there would be no advantage in taking its re-appointment out of the hands of the Government in order that it might fall to the share of an independent Member of Parliament. The noble Lord, indeed, states in his Motion that the Committee is to be appointed by you, Sir, But he has
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found out his error, and therefore he proposes to amend his own Motion by providing that the nomination should be made through the Committee of Selection. Let me therefore ask, has the noble Lord consulted the Committee of Selection on the propriety of intrusting them with this function?
LORD ROBERT MONTAGUsaid, he had had no opportunity of consulting the Committee of Selection, because the Speaker had informed him of the necessity of altering the words of his Resolution only ten minutes before he rose to move it.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I therefore wish to supply some information to the noble Lord. The Committee of Selection was fully consulted last year by the Government on this subject, and it declined to undertake this duty, giving for its refusal what we deemed very fair reasons. It was thought that the nomination should be made by the Government in concert, of course, with all the Members of this House of the greatest weight and authority on such subjects. Therefore the noble Lord, instead of persevering with this Resolution, would do much better if he would permit us to pursue the course which we have already announced to the House our intention to adopt, and allow us again to appoint the Committee of Public Accounts, with the view of ultimately providing for the Sessional appointment of that Committee.
Another object of the noble Lord is to propose a great change in the powers and constitution of the Board of Audit. I do not understand why we are not to let that matter rest upon the recommendations of the Committee on Public Monies. The noble Lord and some other hon. Members would seem to have got an idea of the possible powers of the Board of Audit which is quite erroneous. They appear to think that Board can become an efficient control over the public expenditure. But that is not the function of a Board of Audit. That Board is to ensure truth and accuracy in the public expenditure. In point of fact, it may be called, in one word, a Board of Verification. But it would be perfect presumption in the Board of Audit if it were for a moment to attempt to exercise a judgment as to any degree either of parsimony or of extravagance which the Government might be thought to be adopting under

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the sanction of this House. As to the proposal of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Sir G. Bowyer), I confess I think it entirely impracticable and out of the question. He proposes to arm the Board of Audit with coercive powers of committal for contempt, powers of commanding the departments of the Government as to what is to be done and what not to be done there. I venture to say that such a conception of a Board of Audit is wholly without precedent. Besides, the objection to it is that it would be transferring to the Board of Audit what is really the function of this House. It is in the Committee of Public Accounts—which has been appointed, and which is about to be re-appointed, if the noble Lord will allow us to do so—it is in that Committee and in its investigations that the House will have the best security for the due, speedy, and effectual examining and rendering of the Public Accounts. To the principles which have been declared by the Committee of Public Monies respecting the Board of Audit I cordially adhere. At the same time the matter is one not to be settled in a day. Many of the things recommended in regard to audit have been done; and as to the final question, how the functions of audit are to be divided between the Board of Audit and any of the other departments of the State, especially the Treasury, I think the labours and the recommendations of the Committee of Public Accounts will be the safest guide that we possibly can have. As far as the Treasury has an opinion or desire on the subject, nothing can be so agreeable to our views and inclinations as that the dignity, efficiency, and punctuality of the Board of Audit should be carried up to the highest possible degree. A point has been touched by the hon. Gentleman who spoke last on which I may say a word. The point is not embraced in the Motion before the House; but, then, that Motion is so exceedingly wide that I fully grant it allows every Member of the House the liberty of introducing ad libitum those subjects which he may deem cognate to this discussion. The hon. Gentleman referred to the payment into the Exchequer of the gross amount of the land revenues of the Crown; and he asked what was the meaning of a particular phrase used in the Report of the Committee on Public Monies. Now, the Committee would, no doubt, be able to explain the meaning of their own
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words, but I cannot hold myself responsible for language which I had no share in employing. As far, however, as I understand the matter, the arrangement for the payment of the gross receipts of the land revenues of the Crown into the Exchequer stands upon quite a different footing from the payment of the gross receipts from all the other sources of the public revenue, because we do not enjoy the land revenues of the Crown in our own right—we have not the same plenary power over them that we have over the funds derived from the taxation of the people. We enjoy them under a particular compact with the Sovereign, subject to the limiting conditions of that compact; and obviously the most natural and proper time for the reconsideration of those conditions is the time which we all hope is far distant—namely, on the accession of a new Sovereign. That is the plain and obvious reason why we have not felt that the recommendation of the Committee of Public Monies in respect to the receipts from the land revenues of the Crown is within our power and discretion like the other recommendations of that Committee. With regard to the other recommendations of the Committee of Public Monies which remain unfulfilled, it is, I repeat, to the labours of the Committee on Public Accounts that we look as the best guide to the Government and the surest guarantee to the House of their speedy and effectual fulfilment. Sir, I trust that the noble Lord will not ask the House to go to a division upon this Resolution.
SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEsaid, that after the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer he heartily congratulated his noble Friend, not only on having made a very clear and telling statement, and on the pains he had usefully bestowed upon a dry and uninviting question, but also upon the substantial success he had met with in making his Motion. He confessed that until he had heard the right hon. Gentleman's speech he was in some doubt as to the course he should himself pursue in regard to the Resolution, because, while there was much in it in which he entirely agreed, yet there were different matters blended in it of so incompatible a nature that he would have felt great difficulty in voting with his noble Friend. But, after what had just fallen from the right hon. Gentleman, and after the course the debate had taken, he did not think it

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necessary that his noble Friend should go to a division. At the same time it would not be fair to suppose—as the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if uncommented upon, might lead them to suppose—that the Motion interrupted or interfered with what the Government were doing in this matter. Its intention appeared rather to be to quicken than to retard the movement of the Government. His noble Friend desired that a Committee should be appointed for a certain purpose, and the House generally agreed in that desire. The Government said they intended to reappoint such a Committee. But he had hoped, when his noble Friend's Resolution had been so long on the Notice Paper, that two or three weeks earlier his noble Friend's object would have been substantially gained by the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself moving the re-appointment of the Committee on Public Accounts. Nobody who looked at what had been done, or at the difficulties and inconveniences attending our system of Public Accounts, could doubt that the re-appointment regularly from year to year of such a Committee as was glanced at by the Resolution would be one of the most effectual remedies we could possibly secure for the evils under which we laboured. The Committee on Public Accounts was appointed late in the last Session, and was consequently unable to take up the Army and Navy accounts, or a mass of the Civil Service accounts. They had, however, investigated the accounts of the Revenue Department, the Board of Works, the Treasury Chest Fund, and the Civil Contingencies, with respect to which they made several most important recommendations, almost all of which had been adopted. He would give an instance:—That Committee had it in evidence that it had been the practice of the Revenue Departments to ask every year for enormous sums above what they wanted. In that way the Post Office got £ 60,000 or £ 70,000 more than they required. The Committee called attention to the system as an objectionable one, and the result had been that the Post Office Estimate for the present year was cut down by about that amount. That was one instance of a practical result of the labours of the Committee; but there was much which remained to be done, and he could quite understand that his noble Friend, seeing the difficulties that were still to be surmounted, was anxious to de-
1354
vise some means by which matters might be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. It was true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had announced his intention of moving the appointment of the Committee on Public Accounts; but though the Navy Estimates had been gone through, and those of the Army had nearly been disposed of, and though other Estimates were to come before the House almost immediately, no practical step had been taken towards the appointment of the Committee. However, though he thought his noble Friend deserved the thanks of the House for having set the ball rolling, he must, nevertheless, say that if his noble Friend found it necessary to divide the House on his Motion as it stood, he should not be able to vote with him. The objection which he entertained to such a Committee as that proposed in the Resolution being nominated either by the Speaker or the Committee of Selection was, that in such a case it would partake somewhat of a judicial character, which, though it might be very desirable for one of the purposes contemplated by his noble Friend, was not at all desirable for the other. If a Committee of that kind were appointed, and part of its duty were to revise the Estimates, in that ease the effect would be to relieve the Government from responsibility without making any other authority responsible; and thus great evil might ensue. On that ground alone he thought that many hon. Members would feel themselves precluded from voting with his noble Friend. Again, if that objection were set aside, it might be very proper to have a Committee to revise the Estimates, and another to revise the Accounts; but he did not think that one Committee would be able to discharge these duties, in addition to those others which the Resolution would impose upon them. The Resolution also declared that it was to be an instruction to the Committee to report in what way the present duties and powers of the Board of Audit should be extended or changed. To that portion of the Motion, there was, in the first place, the objection that the Committee would have enough to do without having its attention distracted by such a subject as that. Besides, the matter had been most carefully considered by the Public Monies Committee. That Committee made recommendations on the subject, and these were in a form that would enable the Government, if so disposed, to

1355
give effect to them. The subject was not one that could be disposed of in a day. He had before him the draught of a Bill which the Government of the Earl of Derby had prepared in reference to the Audit of the Public Accounts. It was full of amendments and alterations, and still he was not prepared to say that it was at all perfect, though there had been repeated consultations between the Board of Audit and the Treasury before it had been finally settled. He hoped that, after what had been said and done on the subject, it would receive the attention of the Treasury, and that a Bill would be introduced to define the powers of the Board of Audit. The Members of that Board themselves, it ought to be recollected, were not satisfied with their present position; but desired that something should be done to put them in direct relations with that House. They also required powers which they now had not. For instance, they required the power to conduct an audit of stores as well as an audit of cash. And there were many other points connected with the question of audit, on which legislation was required; but he did not think that any Committee to be appointed should be burdened with a subject like this, on which the Public Monies Committee had made recommendations, which it was perfectly competent for the Government or Parliament at once to act upon. So much as to the subject of audit; and he thought the same remark, though to a less extent, applied to the last part of the Resolution—"That it be a further instruction to such Committee to report to this House the exact period of the financial year when it would be desirable that the Annual Estimates should be presented to Parliament," &c. That was a matter of great difficulty, but he believed that the Treasury were alive to the necessity for action on the subject, and he hoped the Government were making an endeavour to bring the accounts of the various public departments into such a form as that the House might be able to deal with them as they were with those of the Army and Navy. He thought, however, that if the Committee were appointed, it would be very unwise to encumber it with that subject. What, then, was the difference between what the other portions of the Resolution asked for and that which the Government expressed their willingness to carry out? It reduced itself to nil. He quite agreed with
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his noble Friend that it was desirable to have such a Committee appointed by some independent authority; but, as the right hon. Gentleman had pointed out, both the Speaker and the Committee of Selection had declined to undertake the duty of nomination. It rested, therefore, with the House itself to name the Committee, for it must not be forgotten that it was the House, and not the Government, which would be asked to nominate it. The Government might take the initiative, but the responsibility of the selection of members would rest, not with them, but with the House. The course adopted by the Government in such cases was to place on the table a list containing certain names; but it was in the power of any hon. Member of the House to move the omission of any or all of those names, and the substitution of others. If the Government brought down certain Estimates, and the House examined them and agreed to them, he thought they were entitled to demand every possible facility for seeing that the money so devoted was applied and appropriated as Parliament intended. Upon that point they were all agreed, and they also agreed that the best mode of attaining that security was by the appointment of a Committee. The question was how the Committee was to be appointed—whether by the nomination of the Speaker, by the Committee of Selection, or in the ordinary way. The two first modes had been disposed of, and therefore there remained but the last for adoption. Many, however, would feel that it was undesirable to encumber the Committee with a good deal of the work mentioned in these instructions, and therefore, admitting the objections which existed to the present system of transfer and to other parts of the present system, he would suggest to the noble Lord that he should be satisfied with the pledge given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and should not press the House to go to a division.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, that the reasons advanced by the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) against the Motion were not to his mind satisfactory. The subject under discussion had been before the House several times, and it had always met with an evasive answer. It was his opinion that the Crown Property would be far better managed if it were under the control of Parliament. He found, from a return which had been

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laid on the table only three days previously, that the Crown Revenues amounted to four hundred and eleven thousand pounds, while the sum paid into the Exchequer was only two hundred and ninety thousand. In his opinion it would be most beneficial if the Property of the Crown was under the control of Parliament, and he could see no possible objection to such a course.
LORD ROBERT MONTAGUin reply said, it was not his intention, in replying, to detain the House many minutes, for there were but few points on which it was needful for him to touch. He must, however, protest against the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury. He had stated that the Motion which he (Lord Robert Montagu) had asserted to have been entirely taken from the Report of the Committee of Public Monies, had not been honestly taken from that Report—that he had taken a word from this paragraph and a clause from that; disconnecting expressions from arguments which supported and qualified them; and had thus constructed a Resolution entirely at variance with the sense of that Report. This charge was most unfair and most unjust. He appealed to the House. Had he asked them to accept a single statement of his upon his own authority? Had he not supported every assertion by argument and evidence? Had he not read out three paragraphs in connection from the Public Monies Report, asking hon. Members to follow him by reading his Resolution? Could any course be more fair or more candid than that? But what has the hon. Gentleman done, Has he appealed to your reason? Has he addressed your judgments? No. He has made assertions without proof; he has drawn conclusions without syllogisms; he has put a Q. E. D. to statements without any argument to support them. He (Lord Robert Montagu) never had rested on any influence he might have with the House. But the hon. Gentleman, on the other hand, considered his authority to be such that the House must receive whatever he chose to assert. He must have a bad case or he would not have resorted to such miserable and unworthy subterfuges. A cause may he assumed to be weak when fallacies are resorted to. For what are fallacies? They are the signals of distress of a shipwrecked cause. He has said that the Audit Board has full powers by Act of Parliament. Of course! His
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(Lord Robert Montagu's) complaint was, that the Act of Parliament had been ignored and overridden by the Treasury. He had proved that from the evidence of the Chief Commissioner of Audit, who said that the power of this House was laughed to scorn by the Treasury. But he left the speech, which he found it as unpleasant to answer as the hon. Gentleman evidently found it to make. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford had objected to the word "Estimates" in his Resolution. They neither of them objected to Estimates being referred to a Committee. The Chancellor of the Exchequer objected to the Estimates being "mixed up with the Accounts." The hon. Baronet stated that the same Committee could not attend to both Estimates an Accounts. No one had objected to a principle supported by the authority of many precedents. As it was merely a question of convenience, he was quite willing to omit the word Estimates altogether. The Chancellor of the Exchequer then objected to the Committee doing that which the Public Monies Committee had already done; and travelling over the ground which they had already travelled over. This he could not understand until he heard the speech of the hon. Baronet. Then he found that they both objected to the first instruction. The evidence which had been taken by the Public Monies Committee was either sufficient or it was not sufficient; it was either true or false. If it be insufficient or false, then surely no one could object to new evidence being sought. If it be sufficient and true, then the time of the Committee need not be wasted in taking new evidence; they can simply report upon that which has already been taken. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has rested his case a great deal upon the "intentions" of the Government. Why, Sir, we have never yet had any improvements from him. In 1860 the Miscellaneous Expenditure Committee was appointed in consequence of the Resolution of an independent Member that such a Committee should be appointed annually, Yet it had never been re-appointed, although it had reported in favour of the re-appointment. In 1861 the Public Accounts Committee was appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to examine audited accounts only. But as the Audit Board is a sham and a pretence, this Committee was merely a blind and de-

1359
lusion. Yet the right hon. Gentleman had promised that if the House accepted his Motion, he would move that it should be made a Standing Order. The House accepted the Motion; yet it had never been made a Standing Order. Then he (Lord Robert Montagu) had put his Motion on the books exactly a month ago; yet neither before nor after that time had the right hon. Gentleman shown the slightest symptom of moving in the matter. However, the matter about which he (Lord Robert Montagu) was most anxious—he addressed himself to independent, non-official Members—was this, that the control of the House should be fully maintained and preserved. There was no danger from prerogatives of the Crown. That day had long since passed away. The danger was from a Ministry who assumed all power to themselves and overrode both the Crown and this House. If we did not defend ourselves, this House, as he had shown, would become merely one of the useless appendages and paraphernalia of empire.
Question put.
The House divided: —AyeB 31; Noes 96: Majority 65.

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW.

  RESOLUTION.
  MR. HORSFALLsaid, he was not indifferent either to the difficulty or the responsibility of submitting to the House at that moment the Motion which stood in his name, and for many reasons he should have rejoiced if the duty had devolved upon the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden), who early in the Session had given notice of a similar Motion, but who had courteously given way upon hearing that he (Mr. Horsfall) intended to renew the Motion of which he had given notice last Session. It would be in the recollection of those hon. Members who took an interest in the subject of International Maritime Law, that last year, when he brought forward a similar Motion, the present unhappy state of affairs in America did not exist, and he could not contemplate then, any more than he contemplated now, provoking a discussion upon the relative merits of the American Union or of a Southern Independence. On the contrary he was glad of an opportunity of expressing not only his own feelings, but those of a large majority of his constituents, by saying that he cor-
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  dially approved the strict line of neutrality that had been taken by Her Majesty's Government. His object in mooting the question was to show the very unsatisfactory condition in which International Maritime Law now was. In the early part of Last Session he had inquired of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary what steps the Government had taken to carry out the recommendations of the Shipping Committee of the preceding year on that subject. The noble Lord frankly declared that the Government had done nothing, and left it to be inferred that they intended to do nothing. It would be readily supposed that such a reply was anything but satisfactory to those who took an interest in the subject; they felt that the recommendations—the unanimous recommendations—of a Committee of that House, which had sat during a whole Session, and had been presided over by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, were deserving of greater consideration than had apparently been given to them. Without wearying the House with the past History of International Maritime Law, he would remind them that antecedently to 1854 there could be no question but that privateering was recognised as a principle of International Law; that neutral goods on board vessels belonging to subjects of a belligerent Power were liable to capture; and that goods the property of subjects of a belligerent Power on board neutral ships were also liable to capture. That state of law was felt to be a great hardship, and in that year his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, then unfettered by the restraints of office, brought forward the subject in one of those spirited speeches with which he sometimes favoured the House, and by his Motion sought to commit the House and the Government to the principle that a neutral flag should make neutral goods. His right hon. Friend did him the honour to ask him to second the Motion, which he did with pleasure, and at the same time he took the occasion to urge on Her Majesty's Government the necessity for the abolition of privateering. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary stated that in a short time a public document would be issued declaring the views of the Government. In a fortnight from that time his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade had the satisfaction of seeing an Order in

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  Council issued, from which he would read an extract. The Order in Council of the 24th March, 1854, said—
  "To preserve the commerce of Neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction, Her Majesty is willing, (or the present, to waive a part of the belligerent rights appertaining to Her by the law of nations. It is impossible for Her Majesty to forego the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of War, and of preventing Neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, and She must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent Neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the Enemy's Forts, Harbours, or Coasts. But Her Majesty will waive the right of seizing an Enemy's property taken on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war. It is not Her Majesty's intention to claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board Enemy's ships. And Her Majesty further declares, that being anxious, as much as possible, to lessen the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly-organized forces of the country, it is not Her present intention to issue letters of marque for the commissioning of privateers."
  That was the first step towards Liberal Legislation in regard to International Maritime law. Two years afterwards—namely, in 1856—the Conference took place at Paris. The Powers represented at that Conference were England, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, and Turkey. The Conference agreed in these four Declarations—
  "1. Privateering is and remains abolished.
  "2. The Neutral Flag covers Enemy's goods, with the exception of Contraband of War.
  "3. Neutral goods, with the exception of Contraband of War, are not liable to capture under an Enemy's Flag.
  "4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the Enemy.
  "The present Declaration is not and shall not be binding except between those Powers who have acceded or shall accede to it."
  It was right to say that nearly every other Power afterwards gave in its adhesion to the Declarations of Paris except the United States of America. Assuming the principles contained in those Declarations to be now acknowledged Maritime Law, the questions which naturally presented themselves were, what would be its effect in the event of War? What had been its effect in time of Peace? Shipowners and importers of produce were at least men of common sense, and they would not ship a single package of goods in a vessel liable to capture if they had the opportunity of shipment in a vessel not liable to capture. The operation of
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  the law in the event of a war, say with France, would be that every British ship must be laid by in port. No shipper of goods would ship in vessels of belligerents when he had the power of shipping in neutral vessels. Every British ship would be laid by in dock while neutral vessels would obtain greatly enhanced freights. Worse still, British seamen would be drafted from British ships lying up, not into Her Majesty's Navy, but into neutral vessels, which could afford, and would afford, to pay a much higher rate of wages than had been, or would be, paid in the Royal Navy. Such would be the result of the present law in the event of war, and it was a most serious matter to the shipowner, the manufacturer, and the country at large. But what had been already the effect of the law in time of peace? Those who were acquainted with the shipping interest of the country knew full well what had occurred upon the mere rumour of war. A short time ago, when it was thought England might be involved in the war between France and Austria in Italy, however improbable the rumour might be, yet the moment it reached distant ports—such as Canton or Calcutta—a second-class American vessel was able to get freights at a 50 per cent higher rate than a first-class British ship could obtain. That was a very important point, and he was anxious to refer to the evidence of three witnesses examined before the Select Committee on Merchant Shipping. Mr. Allan Gilmour, one of the largest shipowners in the world, said that the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris would operate very prejudicially to British shipping if Great Britain were at war, and it was even then very prejudicial to the British shipowner. The very rumour of a war so enhanced the rate of insurance on goods by British ships that American and other foreign ships had a decided preference. Being asked to suggest a remedy, Mr. Gilmour said the only remedy was an international law which did away with. captures entirely; in other words, to place ships on the same footing with the goods they carried. The next witness was Mr. Beazley, an extensive shipowner of Liverpool, who entirely confirmed Mr. Gilmour's opinion. He was asked whether he had himself suffered by competition with a foreign flag. Mr. Beazley replied that he could give a very strong case. He had two ships in China in May, 1859. One

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  had been built purposely to beat everything afloat. He said to the builder, "Build me a ship that will beat any mortal thing afloat, to bring home the first cargo of tea of the season." He had another ship at Foo-chow-foo. Just at that moment there was some talk about the Savoy and Italian business. There were two American ships at these ports, and the English merchants were so afraid to ship their tea in the British ships that they determined to ship in the American ships. They paid £ 2 a ton higher freight in those ships rather than take the British ships, because the Americans would not be subject to capture. In the case of England mixing herself up with any Continental law, Mr. Beazley stated that the law as laid down by the Convention of Paris threw at once all the trade into the hands of the Americans or neutral flags. He added, that the law should, in his opinion, go a step further, and let the ship be covered as well as the cargo. The last witness to whom he would refer was Mr. Graves, of Liverpool, formerly chairman of the Shipowners' Association, and Who was appointed a Royal Commissioner to inquire into lights and light dues. Mr. Graves entirely confirmed what had been stated by the previous witnesses, that in case of a European war British shipping would to a very great extent remain at home unemployed. He added, that we must either go back and reverse the policy that the flag covers the cargo, or we must go forward and place the ship under the same category as the cargo, and make both free from capture. Mr. Graves said he only regretted that the British Government had allowed one day to elapse without accepting the offer of the American Government to make all private property free from capture at sea.
  It had been truly said that the question was of great national importance, not affecting merely our shipping, our commerce, or our manufactures; in that opinion he entirely agreed. It was a question of the most vital importance. What would be the case of our merchant ships in time of war if they were not laid up in dock? In case of war merchant ships required a convoy, and would not that convoy be much better employed in fighting the enemy? As a question of finance, then, the matter was of very grave importance, and one to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he thought, might direct his attention with advantage. He would not
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  go into the subject as a question of humanity, though much might be said from that point of view. But it was said by many—and some of his hon. Friends near him were of that opinion—"Oh, make war as calamitous as you can, and you would then be able to bring it to a speedy conclusion." But he was happy to think that that was not the feeling of those whom he had the honour to represent, of the country, nor of Her Majesty, as appeared from the Order in Council which he had just read. Her Majesty there declared, that—
  "Being anxious to lessen as much as possible the evils of war, and to restrict its operation to the regularly-organized forces of the country it was hot her intention to issue letters of marque."
  Neither was that the view taken by the Government who issued that Order, nor the view of the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston), whom, a few years ago, he, among others, cordially welcomed to Liverpool, and whom he, should be proud to welcome there again. Upon that occasion—it was the very year in which the Declaration of Paris had been signed—the noble Lord dilated upon that subject to the assembled merchants of Liverpool in glowing language, and made use of these words—
  "Gentlemen, we are not inattentive to other interests besides those connected with the grand transactions of war. It has been a subject of great satisfaction to us to reflect that at the commencement of that conflict (the Russian war) the Government of England, in concert with that of France, made changes and relaxations in the doctrine of war which, without in any degree impairing the power of the belligerents against their opponents, maintained the Course of hostilities, yet tended to mitigate the pressure which hostilities inevitably produce upon the commercial transactions of countries that are at war. I cannot help hoping that these relaxations of former doctrines, which were established in the beginning of the war, practised during its continuance, and which have been since ratified by former engagements, may perhaps be still further extended; and in the course of time the principles of war which are applied to hostilities by land may be extended, without exception, to hostilities by sea, and that private property shall no longer be exposed to aggression on either side. If we look at the example of former periods, we shall not find that any powerful country was ever vanquished by losses sustained by individuals. It is the conflicts of armies by land, or fleets sea, that decide the great contests of nations, and it is perhaps to be desired that these conflicts should be confined to the bodies acting under the orders and directions of the respective States."
  Now he (Mr. Horsfall) desired no better testimony to the justice of his case than that Order in Council and that admirable

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  speech. He had heard it said that naval officers would not like to be deprived of their prize money, and that there would be no encouragement to young men to enter the navy if the course which he was advocating should be adopted. But he would not insult our naval officers by supposing for one moment that they were actuated by such sordid and unworthy motives. He could speak for those whom he had the honour of knowing, and it was a libel upon them to say so. They all knew, that so far from there being a difficulty in obtaining officers for the navy, there were hundreds and thousands who could not get into it. But, even supposing that Her Majesty's naval officers were actuated by such sordid motives, was not prize money virtually given up in 1856, when the Declaration of Paris was agreed to? Well, they were told by many that there was no use in entering into treaties, because there would be an end of all treaties when war broke out. But what he would propose was not an ordinary treaty; it would be the same as the Declaration of Paris, it would not be abrogated by war; it was an agreement as to the mode in. which war should be carried on.
  He would come, in the next place, to what appeared to many the most difficult part of the question—namely, the subject of blockade. He deeply regretted that be was absent, owing to indisposition, en Friday night, and that he had not had the privilege of listening to the interesting debate which then took place. Into the subject of blockade generally he would not enter, but he felt bound to say that the sentiments of those whom he had the bono into represent were in favour of respecting it. The next branch of the question was one with regard to which a great injustice had been done to America whenever it was discussed. They had been told that America would not give up the right of privateering; but what she had contended for from first to last was what he was contending for, that the ship and the cargo should be put upon the same footing. What was the statement of President Pierce when the Declaration of Paris was submitted to him? It was as follows:—
  "The proposal to surrender the right to employ privateers is professedly founded on the principle that private property of unoffending non-combatants, though enemies, should be exempt from the ravages of war. But the proposed surrender goes little way in carrying out that prin-
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  ciple, which equally requires that such private property should not be seized or molested by national ships of war. Should the leading Powers of Europe concur in proposing, as a rule of International Law, to exempt private property upon the ocean from seizure by public armed cruisers, as well as by privateers, the United States will readily meet them upon that broad ground."
  Therefore it was not fair to say that the United States would not give up the right of privateering. They would not give it up unless the great Powers of Europe were willing to take the still wider ground that all private property should be free. There was in another correspondence, which had just been published, a very appropriate letter from the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary to Lord Lyons, in which, in anticipation of the civil war which had since broken out in America, he proposed to invite both parties to act upon the principles which had been laid down in the 2nd and 3rd articles of the Declaration of Paris with respect to the rights of neutrals. It seemed that ultimately America agreed to adopt the very words of the Declaration of Paris, but subsequently a letter from Lord Lyons to Earl Russell stated—
  "Mr. Seward called upon me the day before yesterday, and asked me to give him a list of the Powers which have acceded to the Declaration of Paris on maritime law. He said that he had observed a list of those Powers in your Lordship's despatch to me of the 18th of May, which I had left with him for a few days. I readily agreed to send him the list. He went on to tell me that he was endeavouring to disentangle a complication which had been produced by Mr. Dayton at Paris. Mr. Dayton had, he said, been instructed to state to the French Government that the Government of the United States preferred the proposal of Mr. Marcy, by which private property would be altogether exempted from capture, but that, nevertheless, they were willing, if necessary, to accede at once to the Declaration of Paris 'pure and simple,' and to postpone the discussion of Mr. Marcy's proposal to a more propitious moment."
  Then, on the 29th of July, 1861, Mr. Adams wrote to Earl Russell—
  "Mr. Dayton informs me that some time since he made a proposal to the French Government to adopt the Declaration of the Congress at Paris in 1856, with an addition to the first clause, in substance the same with that heretofore proposed by his predecessor, Mr. Mason, under instruction given by Mr. Marcy, then the Secretary of State of the United States; to that proposal he received an answer from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs declining to consider the proposition, not for any objection entertained against it, but because it was a variation from the terms of the original agreement, requiring a prior reference of it to the other parties to that convention. This answer does not, in his opinion, make the ultimate acceptance of his addition impossible,

  1367
  and he does not feel as If he ought to abandon the support of what he considers as so beneficent an amendment to the original plan, until he has reason to despair of success. He has therefore requested to know of me whether I have reason to believe perseverance in this direction to be fruitless. For my part, I entirely concur in the view entertained by Mr. Dayton of the value of this amendment; I also know so well the interest that my Government takes in its adoption as to be sure that it would refuse to justify a further procedure on our part which was not based upon a reasonable certainty that success is not attainable, at least at the present moment. I have therefore ventured to state to Mr. Dayton my belief that I have that certainty; I have therefore mentioned to him what I have likewise communicated to the proper department of the Government of the United States—the fact that in the last conference I had the honour to hold with your Lordship, allusion having been made to the amendment of Mr. Dayton, I said that that amendment was undoubtedly the first wish of my Government, and that I had instructions to press it if there was the smallest probability of success; but that I supposed this matter to have been already definitely acted upon: to which I understood your Lordship to signify your assent, and to add that I might consider the proposition as inadmissible."
  He was merely showing that the Foreign Minister refused again the proposal of the American Government that all private property on the ocean should he protected. Earl Russell, in a letter to Mr. Adams, confirmed that representation, saying—
  "As far as I am concerned, this statement is perfectly correct."
  It appeared, then, that the American, French, and English Governments agreed to accept the declaration of the United States in accordance with the Paris Declaration, but that Earl Russell thought it necessary to propose to add the following words in signing the agreement with the United States:—
  "Her Majesty's Government does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States."
  He was not saying whether the noble Earl was right or wrong in insisting on these words, as Earl Cowley had previously informed Earl Russell by letter that—
  "Mr. Dayton hardly concealed from M. Thouvenel that the object of his Government in agreeing to sign the Convention was to force the Western Powers to treat the Southern privateers as pirates, arguing that, as the Government of Washington was the only Government recognised by the Foreign Powers, the Southern States must, as far as Foreign Powers were concerned, be subject to the consequences of the acts of that Government."
  Again, on the 23rd of August Mr. Adams, in writing to Earl Russell, said—
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  "The Government of the United States are at last prepared to sign and seal an engagement, pure and simple, and by so doing to sacrifice the hope of attaining, at least for the present, an improvement of it, to which they have always attached great value. But, just at the moment when their concurrence with the views of the other Maritime Powers of the world would seem to be certain, they are met with a proposition from one, if not more of the parties, to accompany the act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous in this case, being the presentation of a written declaration, not making a part of the convention itself, but intended to follow the signature, to the effect that, 'Her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States.' Obviously a consent to accept a particular exception susceptible of so wide a construction of a joint instrument, made by one of the parties to it in its own favour at the time of signing, would justify the idea that some advantage is, or may be suspected to be, intended to be taken by the other. The natural effect of such an accompaniment would seem to be to imply that the Government of the United States might be desirous at this time to take a part in the Declaration, not from any high purpose or durable policy, but with the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy struggle which is going on at home. Such an inference would spoil all the value that might be attached to the act itself. The mere toleration of it would seem to be equivalent to a confession of their own weakness. Rather than that such a record should be made, it were a thousand times better that the Declaration remain unsigned for ever. If the parties to the instrument are not to sign it upon terms of perfect reciprocity, with all their duties and obligations under it perfectly equal, and without equivocation or reservation of any kind on any side, then it is plain that the proper season for such an engagement has not yet arrived. It were much wiser to put it off until nations can understand each other better."
  He was prepared to say that it was better that the American Government did not sign the Declaration with the addition of the proposed words, because an opening was now left for the British Government to consider the matter in a somewhat different light from that in which they seemed to have regarded it in the course of the correspondence from which he had quoted, and in a future correspondence the question discussed might be that all private property should be respected at sea. He had addressed the House at greater length than he had intended, but he had been anxious to state as clearly as he could the view which he believed to be generally entertained by the commercial community. He was quite aware of the jealousy with which any Motion of the kind was viewed by the Executive Government, but he trusted the noble Viscount would excuse him if he ventured to

  1369
  refer once more to the noble Viscount's speech, the concluding observations of which constituted almost a direct invitation to bring the subject before the House. The noble Viscount, on the occasion to which he had already alluded, ended his speech in the following terms:—
  "Gentlemen, the Government always feels deeply indebted to the great commercial communities which are kind enough to impart to us, from time to time, their suggestions for the remedy of existing evils. We know well that no Executive Government can be so perfectly informed of all the detailed operations of commerce as to be able, without such assistance, to devise those measures which may be best calculated to set free the industry of the country, and to give the greatest development to commercial enterprise."
  He (Mr. Horsfall) quite concurred in the views of the noble Viscount, and it was in reliance on his express declaration that he had ventured to trespass upon the attention of the House. He was quite aware that the views which he submitted for their consideration had been feebly and imperfectly expressed; but he respectfully and with confidence asked the House to affirm the Resolution which it was now his duty to move. He asked it in the name of the commerce of the country; he asked it in the name of civilization, humanity, and justice.
  MR. COBDENseconded the Resolution.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That the present state of International Maritime Law, as affecting the rights of Belligerents and Neutrals, is ill-defined and unsatisfactory, and calls for the early attention of Her Majesty's Government."
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that the hon. Member had supported his Resolution in an able and temperate speech, though he had expected that he would have raised a more general discussion on the existing state of international law as affecting the rights of neutrals. The hon. Member in his Resolution had described the existing state of the law to be both ill-defined and unsatisfactory His arguments, however, had been mainly addressed to the policy of the law, and there could be no doubt that the question of policy was one of great importance; but the hon. Gentleman appeared to overlook the fact, that whatever might be the opinions of Members of that House, or even of the Government, on the policy of the law, it was impossible for any one State effectually to interpose for an alteration of the law without the concurrence of other States. It would be obviously
  1370
  worse than useless for Great Britain to act towards other nations upon any code, however approved of here, until that code had received the approval and assent of other nations affected by it. Again, he could not agree that the law was ill-defined, for he should be able to show that it was well understood, and, right or wrong, was well and intelligibly expressed. The observations of the hon. Member on that subject left him but little to say. He had stated correctly, with one exception, how the law stood previous to the Russian war. It was true that privateering was an admitted belligerent right, and that enemy's goods under a neutral flag were liable to capture and confiscation. But the statement was not accurate that neutral goods under an enemy's flag were also liable to capture and confiscation. Probably the hon. Gentlemen had been led into error by the terms of the order in Council issued by Her Majesty at the commencement of the war with Russia. That document set forth that Her Majesty was willing to waive the right of seizing enemy's property taken on board a neutral vessel, unless it was contraband of war; and went on to say that it was not Her Majesty's intention to claim the confiscation of neutral property not being contraband of war found on board enemy's ships. It was, no doubt, just and expedient to issue such a declaration, plainly apprising neutrals whose interests were concerned of the conditions on which this country intended to carry on the war; but the hon. Member was wrong in the inference he had drawn that previous to that date, by well-established international law, the goods of a friend on board the ship of an enemy were liable to capture and confiscation. The law on this matter was well-defined and well understood. So long ago as 1753 the law of nations as affecting the goods of neutrals had been declared in this country on the highest authority. Sir George Lee, Judge of the Prerogative Court, Dr. Paul, the Advocate General, Sir Dudley Ryder, the Attorney General, and Mr. Murray, afterwards Lord Mansfield, the Solicitor General, laid down the following propositions:—
  "First, the goods of an enemy on board the ship of a friend may be taken. Secondly, the lawful goods of a friend on board the ship of an enemy ought to be restored. Thirdly, contraband goods going to the enemy, though the property of a friend, may be taken as prize, because the sup-

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  plying the enemy with means which enable him better to carry on the war is a departure from neutrality."
  The hon. Gentleman had next alluded to the Declaration of Paris. That Declaration would he found to involve four propositions, two of which had reference to the ancient state of the law, and the other two bore upon the alterations which were then introduced. The first point of the Declaration, that "privateering is and remains abolished," was an undoubted waiver of the belligerent right to issue letters of marque. The second proposition, that, with the exception of contraband of war, the neutral flag covered enemy's goods, also introduced a new rule of maritime law. But the third and fourth propositions, that neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, were not liable to capture (meaning, no doubt, capture and confiscation) under an enemy's flag, and that blockades in order to be binding must be effective, were merely statements of the antecedent law. The hon. Member's speech, in fact, contradicted that portion of his Motion which alleged that the present state of international law was ill-defined, because he himself had clearly defined and expounded what the law was with the single exception referred to. Whether the law were politic or impolitic, it was not involved in any doubt or obscurity. As to the policy of the law, or of the proposed modification, he need say but little, because other Members who would follow in the debate might be better able to deal with that part of the subject. The hon. Member, however, said that in consequence of the adoption of the Declaration of Paris an advantage would be given to neutral carriers over the ships of a belligerent. No doubt, such would be the case; but he did not agree with the hon. Member that the effect must be entirely to put a stop to the trade of a belligerent, seeing that where the belligerent was a strong naval Power, and especially where she was mistress of the seas, her fleet, as in former wars, would effectually protect her mercantile marine. To a Power which was weak at sea the results pointed out by the hon. Gentleman might doubtless follow. But we were and always hoped to be the stronger Power; and he did not think the country need shrink from the task of annihilating the commerce of the enemy, and at the same time of protecting her own. The concession made by the
  1372
  Declaration of Paris in favour of enemy's goods being protected by the neutral flag was, as its terms denoted, a concession desired by and made to neutrals. The policy of that change he would not discuss; indeed, it would be rather late to do so; and he understood the hon. Member to contend rather that this country ought to go further and give universal protection than to find fault with its having been a party to that arrangement. But the universal exemption from capture which the hon. Member desired, would not be a concession to neutrals at all; neutrals did not desire it; they would rather continue in possession of that actual or supposed monopoly which the hon. Member had pointed out. Such a change in the law as would, enable an enemy in time of war to carry in safety between his own ports and the ports of neutrals, or the ports even of the other belligerent, his own goods in his own ships, would not only go beyond anything which had been proposed and discussed in modern times, but would very much exceed any relaxations in the rigour of the Maritime Code which, as far as he was aware, had been suggested by any of the writers of admitted authority on international law. He did not say that because a proposition was novel it was not true or not entitled to serious consideration; but the subject was certainly one calling for much deliberation, especially when it was remembered that nothing could follow from a mere expression of opinion by that House. Whatever was done must be accomplished not by a single Government or Cabinet, but by the concurrence of all those nations which were, or aspired to be, powerful at sea, and which had consequently an interest in the subject in common with ourselves. He had stated, that the doctrine advocated by the hon. Gentleman was novel, but he would so far correct himself as to say, that it appeared from a statement by Benjamin Franklin, that in a treaty entered into between the United States and Prussia, in 1785, an article was inserted in accordance with what Franklin called his "Quaker notions," it being agreed that the merchant ships of the contracting parties should not be liable to capture; but that article was not inserted in the renewed treaty in 1799 between the same Powers, and certainly from that time down to the present he was not aware of any serious proposition having been made between any two

  1373
  nations thus to mitigate the rigours of the maritime law. He had thought it necessary to say but little on the question of policy in the present state of the discussion, but so far as the question of law was concerned, the hon. Gentleman had relieved him from the necessity of making any lengthened remarks. He had, in point of fact, abandoned one part of his proposition; and had shown no good reason for calling upon the Government to take any action on the other.
  MR. LIDDELLsaid, that in rising to make a few observations, he hoped that he should not be accused of the presumption of attempting to follow the legal argument of the hon. and learned Member who had just sat down. Of course he could not pretend to cross swords with him upon legal subleties, or in reference to what was the law, but he might be permitted to notice that he said that he had been culled on not to defend the expression but the policy of the law. He apprehended that it would have been more to the taste of the hon. and learned Gentleman to have dealt with the letter of the law, than to find himself called upon to defend a policy which, as it bore at present upon certain national interests, was indefensible. The hon. and learned Member, however, went further, and complained that his hon. Friend (Mr. Horsfall) had limited his argument to that portion of this great question which had more immediate bearing on the shipping interest. He (Mr. Liddell) agreed with him in that regret; but when the hon. and learned Gentleman went on to state that the maritime law was not involved in any doubt or obscurity, he would ask him whether he thought that the law of contraband was settled at the present moment? Was it not rather involved in doubt and obscurity? And so of the law of blockade, was not that obscure and doubtful? He would probably be called to order if he alluded to recent debates in that House, but there were rumours out of doors that there were, at that moment, blockades with respect to the legality of which doubts existed. Was not also the question of what was and what was not a privateer a matter of discussion among the learned? Well, all these questions would most properly form topics of discussion in a congress, should one be called for the purpose. Doubtless there were conflicting feelings on the subject of international law. The
  1374
  remembrance of what they had done in past days in support of this naval supremacy weighed much on the mind of England; but the rights of civilization and humanity would inevitably be brought into conflict with the special interests of this country. He did not wish to deal with the subject under discussion on Utopian notions, but rather on the principles of common sense and what he believed to be the true interests of the country. By the declaration of Paris (by which for the first time England admitted that principle which had been contended for for many years by various foreign nations and especially by the Americans, that free ships should make free goods) they no doubt made a great concession. They virtually permitted the enemy to carry on his trade during war, provided he did not do it in his own ships. That concession necessarily told most against the country with the greatest mercantile marine. In the event of our going to war our commerce must be carried on, not in our own ships but in the vessels of neutrals; and our marine would be depreciated in value to an extent which could not be estimated, and it would probably be reduced during war to a state of total inactivity. At the very moment when we had with difficulty constructed a naval reserve to supply the navy, the prospect of receiving higher wages abroad held out to every man in that reserve a direct premium to leave our service and enlist under a foreign flag. Such was the necessary result of the position in which we now stood. The noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, who had of late conducted affairs with so much ability and with satisfaction to the country at large, had thus spoken of the declaration of Paris, no longer ago than July, 1857. A debate having arisen on a Motion by the hon. Member for Sunderland, the noble Earl (Earl Russell) said—
  "I am afraid that we must be bound by the declaration. I am afraid that the consequences are so serious as to show that such a declaration was very imprudent, and I cannot but agree with the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lindsay), that England ought to preserve her maritime superiority * * * * The whole matter is most unsatisfactory and most grave in its bearing upon our maritime supremacy The state of this question is to me very alarming; but I do not see that a breach of faith would at all mend our position. [3 Hansard 146, pp. 1490–1491.
  In that view he perfectly agreed with the noble Lord, but it was a position we had

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  taken in the face of Europe, not with the consent of one, two, or three Powers, but of almost all the Powers of Europe, who, if we attempted to recede from that position, would inevitably form themselves into a combination to defend the principle, and we should see ourselves ranged single-handed against a long list of nations. We should see a new "armed neutrality" more powerful than its predecessors. If we were at war with a European Power, America would remain neutral. She always refused to mix herself up in European politics, and in the event of our being at war she would monopolize the carrying trade of this country, as she did during the last war with France. Then came the question, as we could not recede from our present position, what were we to do? He replied, that having abandoned our former position for which we had always fought so stoutly, we ought to go on and seek to derive the full benefit which might be presumed to spring from the concession we had made. It was a concession made by a stronger Power to a weaker. As a great authority on the matter had remarked, the stronger Power could always protect its own commerce; it was only the weaker that required the treaty protection. We should then proceed to the adoption of a course of amelioration, of mitigation of the asperities of war, which pressed not on the governing classes who were responsible for the war, but on their unoffending subjects, the shipowners and merchants engaged in commerce. It was for the interests of England that we should carry on our commerce during war in our own ships; and he thought we should take steps to relieve the shipowner from the ruin which overhung him at the present moment. The importance of the subject, however, was not confined to the shipping interest. England was the workshop of the world. She was dependent upon the raw produce of foreign countries, for she did not grow the staples of her manufactures herself. England had agreed to allow trade to be carried on by neutrals in time of war. He wanted to go further, and say, "We will carry it on in our own ships." Why, he would ask, should they take care solely of the interests of the neutral? Why not, on the contrary, leave the neutrals to take care of themselves? We had to maintain a most severe and sometimes unequal contest with foreign nations for our ma-
  1376
  nufacturing superiority, and anything which tended to their advantage might most materially turn the scale against us. Who had given the greatest impulse to the manufactures of New England? It was England, by her mistaken policy in going to war with America, and her absurd replies to the Berlin decrees of Bonaparte. It was England, by her retaliatory Orders in Council. That course deprived her of £ 11,000,000 to £ 12,000,000 of exports a year, which were conveyed by Americans not only to their own but to foreign markets. By way of retaliation to the Berlin decrees, England issued Orders in Council, not only inconsistent with the laws of nations, but which arrayed against her every friendly Power. Coming down a little later, what did they do in the Russian war? They went to war with Russia in 1854. The first thing they did was to blockade the Baltic with a gigantic and expensive fleet, under pretence of distressing the enemy by cutting off the supplies which she furnished of raw material. They took a number of her ships, belonging chiefly to the poor inhabitants of the Baltic seaboard, and laden with articles of necessity to them, burnt an immense quantity of property which belonged chiefly, he believed, to English owners, and sold the ships for a miserable sum of money. These were deeds that no English sailor was proud of. But did they stop Russian commerce? Why, the whole of the linseed and the flax, and the tallow, and the hemp, the raw materials from Russia which England most needed, were conveyed through neutral ports and arrived in this country at enhanced prices, which the consumer had to pay in consequence of the circuitous route which they had been obliged to travel. The doctrine which lay at the root of their present maritime law was, that a strong belligerent should, by means of its supremacy at sea, harass and weaken the enemy; but by admitting foreigners to the colonial and coasting trades, they had rendered it impossible for them in future to act upon that principle without, in time of war, handing over the whole of their commerce to the ships of other countries. For all these reasons they must go forward and recognise the principle for which his hon. Friend had contended—the granting of immunity to private property at sea. It was not only America that had declared in favour of

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  that principle; Russia, France, and the Chambers of Commerce of Hamburgh and Bremen, which might be supposed to represent the feeling of Germany, had all expressed their willingness to accept it; and it must be presumed that Holland, from which State first emanated the demand that free ships should make free goods, would not refuse to accede to it. He did not wish to precipitate the House into a hasty decision on international maritime law, but he would suggest that a Congress should be called for the purpose of discussing the questions which had been adverted to, and of ascertaining the views and feelings of the various Powers. Of course, each country ought to enter such a Congress with a desire to promote, not any special interest of its own, but the general welfare of mankind and the progress of commerce. England might initiate the proposal of a Congress with an evident sincerity and good faith which no one could doubt, and with every prospect of success. By the Declaration of Paris, privateering had been condemned as piracy, paper blockades abandoned, and the sanctity of the neutral flag recognised. They had relinquished the substance; and let them therefore seek no longer to retain the shadow, and thus reject the opportunity of protecting from wrong and robbery the property of the peaceful trader.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he gathered from the discussion that there was a general opinion that the Declaration of Paris in 1856 was a great blunder. ["No," and "Hear, hear!"] That was certainly the impression conveyed by the speeches of his hon. Friend and of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. But it was a singular argument that because we committed a mistake in 1856 we were bound to go on in the same course of error, and to take another step towards abandoning the supremacy of England upon the seas. His principal object in rising, however, was to remove an erroneous impression from the mind of his hon. Friend who had just sat down with regard to the opinion of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs upon the subject. Now, he (Mr. B. Cochrane) wished to refer to a speech of the noble Earl's which bore exactly on the point under discussion. It was delivered on March 9, 1857. In that speech he said—
  "Since that time the Secretary of State of the United States has proposed to go a step further
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  than this treaty—that Great Britain should agree that all merchant vessels should be free from capture during time of war. It appears to me, I own, that although this proposal carries with it an air of philanthropy, it is one which would not tend to prevent war, and which, if it did not tend to prevent war would greatly cripple the energies of this country in time of war. It is obvious, in the first place, that one reason why foreign nations are unwilling to go to war with this country is, that they feel that their commerce is sure to be seized, and that all the valuable property which they may have at sea is sure to fall into the hands of our cruisers as soon as war is declared. If, on the contrary, they were sure that all their merchant vessels would be allowed to pass in safety, one great reason for remaining at peace would be taken away. … My impression is, that if we were to agree to that proposal, our being a great naval Power would be of no use to us in time of war."—[3 Hansard, 144, p. 2084]
  The noble Earl was followed by the late Sir Charles Napier, who expressed the hope that this country would not abandon its maritime rights by allowing other nations to carry on their commerce without restriction during a period of war. It was universally agreed that the Declaration of Paris was unfortunate; and how it could have happened that the Earl of Clarendon should have been allowed to perpetrate such a tremendous blunder, striking as it did at the naval supremacy of this country, without Parliament having the opportunity of giving an opinion, seemed to him perfectly incomprehensible. The hon. Gentleman who had made the Motion talked of war as though it was to be carried on in kid gloves. Why, all their recent inventions were opposed to such an idea. They built Warriors and Black Princes, and constructed Armstrong guns and scientific rifles, and they bad armed the whole country; and the policy of the country was opposed to the view of the hon. Gentleman. The third article of the Declaration of Paris provided that neutral goods, except contraband of war, should not be liable to capture under an enemy's flag. Now, what would be the effect of that on their naval officers? He did not mean with regard to prize money; but there was another view which had not been considered. It was not an uncommon thing during war for British officers, after capturing a vessel to burn her to avoid weakening their own crews. That was an energetic mode of carrying on war. But under the new Declaration of Paris, if the ship happened to contain £ 100,000 worth of neutral goods, the officers would not venture to destroy the

  1379
  ship, as they might he liable to action for the value of those goods. It was to their naval supremacy that they owed the development of their commerce, and the adoption of the Motion of the hon. Member for Liverpool would go far to deprive them of that advantage. After all, however, he believed that in the event of war they would not allow themselves to be trammelled by such declarations. What took place in the last great war? In 1804, before the Declaration of war with Spain, Lord Nelson issued the following orders to the captains of his fleet:—
  "Whereas I judge it proper under the present uncertain state of affairs between Great Britain and the Court of Spain, that all Spanish ships and vessels of war, as well as the trade of. His Catholic Majesty shall be detained until further orders; you are hereby required and directed to detain all Spanish ships and vessels of war, or merchantmen (vessels laden with corn excepted), belonging to the subjects of His Catholic Majesty, which you may fall in with, and send them either to Gibraltar or Malta, as circumstances shall render necessary."
  He was pursuaded that, under like circumstances, the same course would be adopted now. The Declaration of Paris was much to be regretted, but he should regard the adoption of the Motion of the hon. Member for Liverpool as a still more unfortunate event.
  SIR. GEORGE BOWYERsaid, he thought the question lay in a very narrow compass. This country being a great naval power, it was perhaps desirable that the rights of belligerents should be as widely extended as possible; therefore it was very questionable whether it was altogether prudent for England to concur in the Declaration of Paris, but that Declaration was an accomplished fact, and it would be little better than a waste of time to discuss it further. The real question before the House might be shortly stated. When a man marched at the head of an army into a country and conquered it, he did not interfere with private property. The rule of international law put him in possession of the government of the conquered country, but it did not entitle him to interfere with the rights of private property. It was difficult to understand why the same rule should not prevail with respect to naval warfare. The Roman Emperor said in the Pandects, "Egoterræ dominus, lex maris," which meant that the sea, as the common highway of nations, was not the property of any par-
  1380
  ticular country. According to the analogy of terrestrial war, the conqueror of the sea, if he might be allowed the expression, could acquire only the sovereignty of the law, for the law was the lord of the sea. How could that sovereignty enable him to violate the rights of private property? It was quite clear that a belligerent had no more right to seize a merchant ship on the sea than to take away the property of the people of the country which he invaded and conquered in war. England, as a great naval Power, might have been expected to maintain the rights of belligerents to the utmost; but under the Declaration of Paris trade might be carried on by neutrals to any extent, and therefore he thought we could not do better than accept the principle that private property should be respected on sea as well as on land.
  SIR GEORGE LEWIS: Sir, the question which has been raised to-night is of first-rate importance. It would be of great importance to a country which has not a powerful national navy and a vast mercantile marine, but to England, situated as she is, it is of paramount importance that this question should receive a right decision when discussed in Parliament. I trust that, whatever may be the result of this debate—whatever may be the fate of the Motion submitted by the hon. Member for Liverpool—we shall not come to any precipitate conclusion, or one of which we may hereafter have occasion to repent. The hon. Gentleman has proposed, "That the present state of International Maritime Law, as affecting the rights of belligerents and neutrals, is ill-defined and unsatisfactory, and calls for the early attention of Her Majesty's Government." The terms of his Motion are as general as it is possible to frame them. They bring under review the whole state of international maritime law, as affecting the rights of belligerents and neutrals. Hence they involve the question of privateering; they involve the question of the neutral flag covering the enemy's goods. [An hon. MEMBER: That was settled by the Declaration of Paris.] I am aware that the question was settled as far as this country is concerned, but it has been argued in the course of the debate that it ought to be unsettled. I am merely speaking of the general terms of the hon. Member's Motion. But the hon. Member, instead of making his speech co-extensive with

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  the terms of his Motion, directed his arguments to one single point—namely, that the enemy's flag should coyer the enemy's goods. That is the whole extent of the speech which he made, and of the recommendation which he offered to the House.
  MR. HORSFALL: What I contended for was that all private property should be respected.
  SIR GEORGE LEWIS: Precisely—that the private property of the enemy should not be taken out of the enemy's ships. By the Declaration of Paris neutral goods are sacred under the enemy's flag. [Mr. BRIGHT: And the ship also.] Very good; the argument is that the ship should be sacred as well as the goods under the enemy's flag. Such is the proposition of the hon. Member for Liverpool, and, that being so, it seems to me that the more correct course, as far as this House is concerned, would have been for the hon. Gentleman to move an Address to the Crown, requesting Her Majesty to use her influence with foreign Powers for the purpose of making the principle that the enemy's flag should cover the enemy's ship and goods a maxim of international maritime law. That would have brought the question which the hon. Member has argued fairly under the consideration of the House; but at present any hon. Gentleman who thinks, for instance, that privateering ought to be continued, or that the clauses of the Declaration of Paris ought to be repealed—who, in short, entertains views entirely opposed to those which have been advanced to night—might with perfect propriety say to the hon. Member for Liverpool, "I do not agree with your speech, but I approve your Resolution, and therefore shall vote for it." It seems, therefore, to me, that if the hon. Gentleman succeeded in carrying his Resolution, he would not necessarily give effect to his opinions. The Government would say, "We are not bound by the speeches of individual Members; we must look to the general terms of a Resolution, and act accordingly." Therefore, I say, if he wished to establish this principle, that the ship and goods of an enemy are to be respected in war by the belligerent, he ought to have embodied that proposition in a distinct Resolution and submitted it to the House; he would then have raised a distinct issue on which we might have acted. But I must say that the proposition which he has submitted to us
  1382
  is—not unfair, but most inconvenient. I have no doubt he thought it was a convenient mode of raising the question, and perhaps, when he came to embody his principle in terms, he was afraid to look it in the face, and therefore preferred to take refuge in generalities; but I must repeat, I can hardly conceive a more inconvenient course than that which he has adopted in bringing a very important principle under the consideration of the House.
  Sir, there have been many occasions on which the rights of neutrals and belligerents with regard to maritime war have been agitated, in Europe. In the first place there was the celebrated armed neutrality of 1780; but the principles laid down in that year by Russia and concurred in by other Powers were entirely confined to the neutral flag covering enemy's goods, and also mainly, I think, to the question of blockades; but I feel confident, that if any Gentleman will examine the negotiations, the conventions, and treaties of that period, he will not find a single trace of the principle that a belligerent is not to be permitted to capture the ships or goods of his enemy. Then there is the armed neutrality of 1800, when the same question was again revived, and again there is a total absence of such an assertion; and the reason is perfectly obvious—the armed neutrality of both those years was a representation of the interests of neutrals. Neutrals have no interest in the principle which the hon. Member recommends to the acceptance of the House. One hon. Gentleman, indeed, who spoke, treated this question as one involving the interests of neutrals; but it is impossible to conceive a greater mistake. Neutrals, so far as they have any interest, have an interest directly the opposite. If they wished to become the carriers of the world, they would naturally wish that the mercantile marine and goods of the belligerents should be exposed to risk. Therefore, I say, neutrals as such, have no interest in the question.
  Then there is another reason why, on the occasions to which I have referred, the armed neutrality did not start this question. Those who advised that state of affairs were persons acquainted with the principles and elements of international law; but I must be permitted, with great respect to the hon. Gentleman, to say that his speech seemed to overlook the most

  1383
  fundamental doctrines of international law, because you may make a compact with a neutral state that in time of war you will respect the neutral flag. For instance, we have now a compact with France and other continental Powers that we will act on the principle that the neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, so that if we were to seize American goods under the French flag, we should be guilty of a violation of our engagements with France. Therefore by international law you can make a valid engagement with respect to the principle that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods; but when you go to war with a nation, war puts an end to all treaties and engagements in the nature of a treaty. Therefore if we had unfortunately, a short time ago, found ourselves involved in hostilities with the United States, and if we had previously had a treaty with the United States recognising the principle that belligerents were to spare one another's mercantile marine, the very act of war would have put an end to that treaty, and it would have been in the discretion of either Power whether or not they would act on that principle. Suppose you make such an engagement, how are you to rely on the honour of a belligerent observing it, because by uninterrupted practice or by the concert of all civilized nations you may alter all the principles of international law? It is conceivable for example, that by the general agreement of nations the principle for which the hon. Gentleman contends might be established, but it is inconceivable that a treaty between two belligerents which is in derogation of the general principles of international law should bind them during the continuance of war. An hon. Gentleman referred to the Declaration of Paris; he said it was not a treaty but a declaration, and therefore it must be binding in the event of war. Now, I entirely dispute that inference or statement. I presume he means to say that it is binding in respect of neutrals in time of war. No doubt we are bound in respect of France or Russia if we are at war with the United States; but it is an absurdity to suppose, that if we were at war with France or Russia, it would have any binding effect upon us, except in regard to our honour. All I Bay is, it is not binding by international law. We are not bound to assert extreme belligerent rights, but without any such treaty we might say we will not capture
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  the mercantile marine of an enemy. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Honiton (Mr. B. Cochrane) spoke with great censure of the Declaration of Paris, and said we were in such a position, that we must either advance or recede—that our present position was untenable. We had made a declaration restrictive of our power of carrying on a maritime war, and we should find it necessary to violate that engagement. He forgot that before the Crimean war by proclamation we modified our belligerent rights. The hon. Member for Liverpool read from the Proclamation the passages which were equivalent to the Declaration of Paris—therefore when the war was ended and the question of neutral rights was raised in Paris, it seemed the proper and natural course for our Plenipotentiary to agree to this principle, which had been consecrated by the Executive Government at the commencement of the war, of which Parliament had full notice, and to which Parliament had at no time objected. If it had been thought that the principle that the neutral flag shall not cover the goods was essential to the effective conduct of maritime war by this country, why was it abandoned at the commencement of the Crimean War, and no voice raised against it during the continuance of that war? The hon. Gentleman overlooked that important element.
  The hon. Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) did not altogether seem to approve of the modus operandi of the hon. Gentleman who made this Motion; he seemed to be aware that there was some difficulty in establishing a binding engagement between two belligerents; but with respect to the case of America the hon. Member said that the Government of the United States is willing to assent to this principle combined with certain others. But if the United States of America approve so highly of the principle of not capturing enemy's ships and goods, why do not they establish that principle with respect to the Southern States? Here is a fine opportunity for the Government of Washington, to act on that principle. There is a war actually waging in which they are involved, why not act on that principle at once? No doubt it is said that the Southerners are rebels, but in the exchange of prisoners and in the matter of the blockade they have, after much unwillingness on the part of the United States Government,

  1385
  been treated in all respects as belligerents. If that be the case, why does not the Government of Washington show its forbearance in not capturing enemy's goods? I strongly suspect that the exasperation which exists between those two contending Powers renders any such forbearance utterly impracticable. The hon. Member for Northumberland, however, seems not altogether to trust to this plan of mutual forbearance by belligerents during war, and he proposes that England should call a Congress. [Mr. LIDDELL: Invite a Congress.] Well, that we should invite the nations of Europe to meet in Congress, and that we should submit to this Congress the question raised in to-night's debate. But, then, he annexed a condition which, I am afraid, if strictly fulfilled, would render the convening of the Congress a somewhat remote event, because he said that it was a necessary condition that the parties composing the Congress should not be actuated by any special or national interests, but have solely in view the general good of mankind. My little acquaintance with the history of Congresses does not lead me to anticipate that it is extremely easy to form a Congress upon that condition, and I am afraid if we wait until a Congress be formed in which the members are wholly regardless of the interest of their own respective nations, and are devoted to promoting the universal happiness of the world, the meeting must be postponed until the Greek Kalends. The hon. Member's proposal, no doubt, is a philanthropic and well-meant proposal, but it only shows the difficulties with which the subject is encumbered, and the necessity of further consideration before the House can, with any propriety, agree to the adoption, I will not say of the hon. Member's Resolution, but of a Resolution embodying the result of his arguments. As to the Resolution, I really do not know that I feel any difficulty in saying that any branch of international law is ill-defined, because every branch must be ill-defined, as it is not law laid down by any Legislature, and is only to be collected from the decisions of the courts of different countries, and the writings of different text writers. In a certain sense international law may always be said to be ill-defined. At the same time I really believe, that if any part of international law is better defined than another, it is the question relating to procedure in seizing different classes of goods belonging to
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  different nations, and particularly since the Declaration of Paris.
  There is another part of the question, upon which the hon. and learned Baronet the Member for Dundalk (Sir George Bowyer) much insisted, and which I know has been often brought forward in discussion. It is mentioned in an able pamphlet, which I have no doubt many hon. Members have read, and unless it receives examination, is calculated to make an impression on the mind—I allude to the statement that we ought to assimilate the laws of maritime to the laws of land warfare. If the House will permit me, I will examine for a few moments what weight is due to that argument. It is said, in the first place, that all private property is spared in land warfare. I must begin by meeting that assertion by a most formal denial. I say that by the laws of land warfare, as recognised by the most civilized nations, and according to the most recent practice, private property is not respected. It is respected only so far as it suits the present convenience of the belligerent armies. I believe there never was an army under more strict discipline, in which the commander was less disposed to permit excesses by the soldiery, or in which there was a greater disposition to spare the country which was the theatre of the war, than the Duke of Wellington's army during the Peninsular War. What was the practice of that army? When they arrived at a village at night, the proper officer told off a certain number of houses, the roofs were stripped off, and the timber was used as firewood for boiling the men's suppers. That certainly was not very remarkable respect for private property. Such are the necessities of war. The army must have food, and the food must be cooked. They cannot carry fuel with them; and if they cannot carry fuel, they must take it. With regard to the armies of the French Empire, anybody who has only a superficial acquaintance with the subject must know the extent to which the system of plundering conquered countries was carried. I do not believe that there is on record a single campaign in which private property has been respected. No doubt, it is respected to a greater extent in recent times than in the warfare of the middle ages. Since the Thirty Years' War and the wars of Louis XIV. there is no question we have advanced considerably by the forbearance of belligerent Powers, and more humane and more civilized maxims have prevailed.

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  But it is not by treaties or compacts between belligerent Powers, or by such Resolutions as this, that this result has been produced. It has been produced by the general softening of manners and the general improvement of humanity. We may hope that similar results will be produced in maritime warfare, but they will not be produced in the manner in which the hon. Member points out. In the first place, therefore, I deny the truth of the principle, that private property is respected in land warfare.
  There is another important distinction between land and maritime warfare, upon which the whole question may be considered to turn. When you conquer a country, you conquer its Government; and when you have conquered its Government, you have conquered that engine by which the country can be plundered. Perhaps the language which I have used may be somewhat plain and homely; nevertheless it does express the exact truth. And if any hon. Gentleman will inquire what happened in Berlin during the French occupation, after the battle of Jena, and the French conquest by Napoleon, he will learn that the French possessed in the Prussian Government a most efficient engine for plundering that country. I remember hearing at Berlin in 1832, from persons well informed upon the subject, that there were still provinces of the Prussian monarchy in which the breed of agricultural horses had not yet been restored, in consequence of the requisition for horses which was made for the sake of the French expedition to Russia. I use that as an illustration of the way in which the Government raise contributions in a conquered country. With regard to the sea there is no similar engine. There is no Government which exercises any power at sea. The sea is merely the highway of nations. It is not the subject of Government or of sovereignty, and the only way in which a belligerent can exercise any control over the property of enemies floating on the sea is by capture by means of armed ships. With regard to the question of assimilating land warfare and sea warfare, the real assimilation was effected by the Declaration of Paris when this country surrendered the right of private warfare—when this country abolished privateering. There is the real analogy between land and sea warfare of which the hon. Gentleman is in search. We do not permit a single private individual to
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  go out on a plundering expedition on land. We confine the contest to the armies of the hostile State. At the same time, we do not restrain that army seizing private property whenever such seizures may be necessary. We do not allow a private person to plunder on his own account. We used to allow him to plunder on his own account at sea by granting letters of marque. That principle we have abandoned; and if, unfortunately, a war had happened with the United States, I do not think it likely we should have had recourse to the system of privateering against the United States, although they were no parties to the Declaration of Paris. I think this country has definitively renounced the principle of privateering. To that extent I am quite ready to agree to assimilate land warfare and maritime warfare; but I do not assent to the hon. Gentleman's proposition, that the armed ships of a country are not to be allowed to take merchant ships. With, our fleet at Portsmouth or Plymouth, to allow enemy's ships to go in and out free from capture seems to me to be carrying the doctrine of forbearance in time of war to an absurd point. It is almost like interdicting ourselves from the use of gunpowder or heavy ordnance in time of war. Of course, we may, if we think fit, renounce the right to capture merchantmen not by privateers, but by our armed ships, if at any time the opinion of the civilized world, condemned the practice. But I think the House would come to an unwise and premature decision if—upon a vague generality, a mere formula which really might admit of any construction, but which is to receive a peculiar interpretation from the speech of the hon. Member who moves the Resolution, while it may receive various interpretations from the different persons who support it—they are to call upon the Government to subscribe to a principle liable to such formidable and weighty objections.
  SIR GEORGE BOWYERsaid, he wished to explain, that when he said that in warfare on land private property was respected, he did not mean to say that there might not be excesses committed against private property in such warfare, or that in cases of necessity violations, more or less, of the rights of private property might not take place. What he intended to say was, that in warfare on land private property was not system-

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  atically seized, condemned, and sold, as it was in warfare at sea.
  MR. T. BARING: Sir, I have listened with some surprise to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War. The right hon. Gentleman, speaking of the Convention of Paris, not only referred to the possibility of that Convention being broken through in time of war and necessity, but went further, and said that no compact and no treaty made in peace is binding in war. Now, as I understand it, the Paris Convention was made in time of peace in order to provide against some of the worst evils and horrors of war.
  SIR GEORGE LEWIS: —This is so important a point that I should be sorry if any misunderstanding arose. What I meant to say, and what I believe I did Bay, was this—that I conceived the Declaration of Paris to be binding as between this country and neutrals during the existence of war, and to be equally binding with a treaty, though it was only a declaration; but that if we were at war with any of the parties to that Declaration, then, like other treaties, it would cease to have a binding effect as regards that belligerent.
  MR. T. BARING: —That Convention was made between six or seven States, including the great maritime Powers of Europe. I believe the only great maritime Power of the world not included is the. United States. Therefore it would operate in time of war as binding with respect to all except the two belligerents But does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that we are now to discuss whether that was a wise provision or not? The hon. and learned Attorney General would not enter into the discussion of the merits of the Paris Convention; he treated it as an accomplished fact, which must be adhered to. Neither do I intend to discuss its merits. For the progress of commercial prosperity, I believe some treaty was necessary at that time. Whether it ought to have been carried to the extent it was. was a matter for reflection at the time; but it being now the law as far as regards the Governments that were parties to it, the question for us is, how will it act upon our mercantile navy and our commerce? As I understand the matter, by that Convention you hold neutrals' goods harmless wherever they may be found, and you also make the neutral flag cover enemy's goods. What, then, would happen in
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  ease of a war between this country and France? Is it not evident that the whole of your carrying trade would pass into the hands of neutrals? You repealed your Navigation Laws. I do not now blame you for that. I am always for cautious and gradual progress; but when once a step is made, I am not for going back. But in time of war the neutral flag would, I repeat, carry all your commerce, and your ships would be placed at a great disadvantage as compared with every other maritime Power in the world. I cannot, therefore, help thinking that it is a wise thing to consider this subject in time of peace. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is great inconvenience in discussing a question of national policy upon a Resolution like this, and I hardly know what reasons induced my hon. Friend to couch his Motion in these terms; but I take it that his object was to elicit the opinion of the Government and this House. He seeks, I apprehend, not to bind the Government to any particular course, but that those of us who agree with him, as I do, should express to Her Majesty's Ministers what I believe to be the feelings of the commerce of this country—that we should, if necessary, strengthen the hands of the Government in negotiating with other Powers. It is a question, no doubt, for negotiation with other Powers, and must be left in the hands of the Government. Whether the Motion ought to be in the form of an address to the Crown or of a Resolution is really a matter of very minor importance, and certainly would not call for the decided opposition which has been offered to this proposition by the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman will not listen to it at all. He says, "You might as well agitate whether there shall be privateering or not, or whether you will upset the whole Declaration of Paris, as even entertain this question." And he quarrels with my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool for not agitating questions which we all thought settled. Again, he says, "You make a general Motion and confine your speech to a particular point." Why, it is that particular point which we are desirous to press on the attention of the Government. I am as anxious as any one for the supremacy of the navy of this country, but I cannot understand how you can advance that supremacy by damaging your commerce and your shipping interest. Do you mean to say that your

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  navy would be less effective if it were not bound to protect your mercantile marine, or that you would have less naval force to employ against your enemy if it were freed from the duty of convoying? Why, what country has most commerce afloat, most property to be seized? Surely England. What country would gain most by the preservation of that property? It is England. You say that your object in war is to injure your enemy. What country would be so much injured in war through her commerce as England? It might have been a question, before the Declaration of Paris was signed, what course we ought to have taken. But there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that if you wish to benefit your commerce and at the same time to increase your efficiency as a belligerent at sea, you ought gravely to consider the Motion before us. The right hon. Gentlemen says, that the Duke of Wellington burnt houses in Spain when compelled to do so by the necessities of the army. Well, but you do not want to take a merchant ship for fuel, and therefore the right hon. Gentleman's argument entirely fails. The right hon. Gentleman adverted to the suggestion of a Congress, and said, that if you are to expect a meeting of diplomatists to consider the welfare of commerce, you must wait till the Greek Kalends. For my part, I do not see why a Congress should not meet and calmly discuss this question in the interests both of commerce and of Europe. I do not know what course my hon. Friend will follow, but I have heard with regret the announcement that the Government will not entertain this question, and that one reason why they will not do it is because the United States did not adopt this principle towards the Southern States. Why, that is the case of a struggle between two great sections of one country, and not an international dispute. It therefore constitutes no ground for opposing the views of my hon. Friend. I firmly believe that, sooner or later, this principle will prevail. It may be resisted by the present Administration, and yet I had certainly thought from the speech which my hon. Friend quoted that it would not have encountered opposition from the noble Viscount's Government. I thought from that language that the noble Viscount had seen that it was necessary to moderate the horrors of war, and that the Government was disposed as much as possible to pro-
  1392
  tect the private property of their own countrymen as well as of others. But, whatever course the Government may take as to the Resolution of my hon. Friend, whether they object to it as too general or not put in proper form, I am confident that the time will come when the House will not turn a deaf ear to the prayer which is addressed to it by the great majority of the commercial interests of the country.
  MR. COBDENsaid, he would move the adjournment of the debate.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON:: I have no objection to the Motion of my hon. Friend, for I think this is a question of the greatest possible importance to the interests of the country, and one, therefore, which requires to be fully discussed. My own opinion is—and I hope that it will be the opinion of the House—that the principle which the hon. Member for Liverpool recommends, if carried into practice, would level a fatal blow at the naval power of this country, and would be an act of political suicide. I therefore entirely concur in the Motion for adjournment. We shall be perfectly ready to assist the hon. Member in fixing a day for resuming the debate.
  MR. BRIGHT: I hope the noble Lord will give us a whole night, for it is a great disadvantage to have an important question like this brought on after some other subject has been discussed. The noble Lord has expressed a very confident opinion on the question, very much at variance with that quoted by the hon. Gentleman opposite. I hope, when he rises to address the House on the main question, that he will revert to his old opinion.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I am willing to let the debate come on the first thing on Monday night next.
  Debate adjourned till Monday next.

ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSION.

  COMMITTEE MOVED FOR.
  MR. H. SEYMOURsaid, he rose to move for a Committee to inquire into the present state of the Ecclesiastical Commission, and to report to the House whether the Ecclesiastical Revenues could not be more advantageously administered for the interests of the Church than they were at present. As he understood that the Motion was not to be opposed, he should not feel it necessary to detain the House at

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  any length. The hon. Gentleman, after tracing the history of the Ecclesiastical Commission from 'its first foundation through the various changes which had been made in it, and referring to the various Committees which had sat on the subject, said his object was to take up the inquiry where it had been left by the last Committee in 1856. He wished the Committee to inquire how the revenues had been administered since that time; and how far any of the suggested improvements were worthy of consideration.
  MR. KINNAIRDseconded the Motion.
  SIR GEORGE GREYsaid, that on the part of the Government he was willing to assent to the appointment of the Committee, as they thought that there was sufficient grounds for an inquiry. At the same time it must be admitted that immense benefit had been derived from the exercise of the powers vested in the Ecclesiastical Commission.
  MR. DEEDESsaid, that he should not oppose the Motion on behalf of the Ecclesiastical Commission in the face of the adherence of the Government. At the same time he did not think that sufficient grounds had been laid, for the proposed Committee. The labours of the Ecclesiastical Commission had been incessant, and directed to the fulfilment of the behests of Parliament. As a Member of the Commission, he did not shrink from inquiry, but repeated interference tended to impede their action, and that action ought not to be interfered with unless some real reason was shown.
  MR. KINNAIRDsaid, that although the hon. Member might be satisfied with the working of the Commission, a large body of hon. Members of that House held a contrary opinion. He therefore thought the Committee a most expedient measure.
  MR. E. P. BOUVERIEsaid, he doubted that any good would result from the Committee, which, he thought, would be premature. They had not as yet had time to test the results of the previous inquiry. He believed that the only use of the Committee would be to dispel the delusions that existed respecting the Commission.
  Motion agreed to.
  Select Committee appointed,
  "To inquire into the present state of the Ecclesiastical Commission, and to report to the House whether the Ecclesiastical revenues cannot be more advantageously administered for the interests of the Church than they are at present."

SAVINGS BANKS BILL

  LEAVE. FIRST READING.
  MR. SOTHERON ESTCOURTsaid, he rose to ask for leave to introduce a Bill to amend the laws relating to the security and management of savings banks. He proposed to introduce no new regulations, but simply to enforce upon all local banks regulations which already obtained in almost all well-managed institutions. The Bill would not touch the control of the Government or the disposition of the money, but would first repeal the clause in the Act of 1844 which took away all liability from trustees, and would make them, as before, responsible for the consequences of their own acts. It would also force an auditor upon every bank, and define his duties. And lastly, it would provide for the security of the depositor by enacting that no transactions should take' place except at the office during office hours, and in the presence and with the signature of more than one person. In order that the Bill might receive full consideration throughout the country, he proposed to appoint a distant day, about the middle of May, for the second reading.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, several efforts had been made by Gentlemen who had held his office to improve the old savings banks, but without success, and it would be invidious in him to discourage the right hon. Member who had just spoken. The question as to the liability of trustees for their acts was a very difficult one. On that point the measure of 1844 was most unfortunate, and it would be well if the law could be amended without inflicting unnecessary hardships on individuals. As the Bill had been introduced a sufficient time before the second reading for the parties interested to state their views, he thought it was entitled to consideration. He must, however, reserve the right of Government to take any course they pleased on the second reading.
  Leave given.
  "Bill to amend the Laws relating to the Security and Management of Savings Banks, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SOTHERON ESTCOURT, Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY, and Mr. AYRTON,"
  Bill presented, and read 1o; to be read 2o on Wednesday, 14th May, and to be printed [Bill 351].

COURTS OF JUSTICE BUILDING BILL.

  LEAVE. FIRST READING.
  MR. COWPER, in asking for leave to introduce a Bill to enable the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works to acquire a site for the erection and concentration of courts of justice and of offices belonging to the same, said, at that hour (quarter to one) he should confine himself to stating that substantially the Bill was the same as that which had passed through the House last Session, and was stopped in the House of Lords for want of time.
  MR. LYGONsaid, he hoped better opportunities would be afforded for discussing the Bill than; had been given last year, when the subject never came before the House until after twelve o'clock.
  Leave given.
  "Bill to enable the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works to acquire a Site for the Erection of Courts of Justices, and of the various offices belonging to the same, ordered to be brought in by Mr. COWPER and Mr. PEEL."
  Bill presented, and read 1o; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed [Bill 36].

SUPPLY.—REPORT.
Resolutions reported.
Resolution 1. £ 24,360, Rewards for Military Service.
SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, he wished to correct a verbal error in the Vote. Colonel Edward Wetherall was there described as having been appointed "Director General of the Land Transport in the Crimea, which he re-organized," whereas it should be that he "officiated as Direct tor General of the Land Transport Corps in the Crimea for four months, and assisted in its re-organization."
Resolutions agreed to.
House adjourned at One o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL.—2a Lunacy Regulation.
LUNACY REGULATION BILL.

  SECOND READING
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.
  LORD CHELMSFORDsaid, he trusted he should be permitted to trespass on their Lordships for a short time whilst he stated the strong objections which he entertained to the provisions of the Bill. His noble and learned Friend remarked with much truth the other night, in introducing the Bill, that a defective state of the law was frequently allowed to remain unremedied until some extraordinary case arose which brought the evil into prominence; and the noble and learned Lord then alluded to the late Windham inquiry, which had excited so strong public feeling and which, he said, rendered it desirable that some change should be made in the existing law of lunacy. But he (Lord Chelmsford) was anxious that, in yielding to that public demand, their Lordships should carefully consider every step which they took, and should not commit themselves to hasty and ill advised legislation. The circumstances which seemed to attract most public attention and to provoke most comment in that case were the enormous length of the proceedings and their consequent expense. For the purpose of preventing the recurrence of such evils in future, it was proposed by this Bill that for the future all jury trials should be taken before one of the Judges of the superior courts instead of before a Master in Lunacy. He had very considerable doubt whether it would be practicable to adopt such a course, or whether, if adopted, it

  1283
  would provide a remedy for the alleged evil. Now that some time had elapsed since the close of the Windham case, he believed it was generally acknowledged that there was not the slightest complaint to be made against the manner in which his learned Friend the Master in Lunacy conducted that inquiry under the very trying circumstances which surrounded the case. He had read the summing up, which was clear, able, and impartial, and which defined the limits of the inquiry in a manner which, if it could be equalled, could not be excelled, by any one of the Judges of the superior courts. What advantage was expected to result from the substitution of a Judge for a Master in Lunacy? In the case to which he had been referring the speeches of counsel occupied eight days, and the evidence the remainder of the time, with the exception of a few hours, which were taken up by the summing-up of the Master. Undoubtedly, a Judge of one of the superior courts might have a moral influence over counsel which might check the length of their speeches and prevent the production of trivial evidence; but he very much doubted whether in an inquiry of so delicate a nature as one in Lunacy any Judge would venture to interfere with the discretion of counsel or to express prematurely any opinion as to whether evidence already offered was sufficient or not. He believed that the substitution of a Judge in all cases would, be impracticable. In the metropolis it might be possible to obtain the attendance of a Judge; but the majority of cases occurred in the country, and how was it possible for a Judge of Westminster Hall to go down into the country for the purpose of conducting an inquiry? Was he to go, attended with all his paraphernalia, to the residence of the lunatic or to some neighbouring tavern, and there hold his court with all pomp and circumstance; or was he to go with no train accompanying him except his own judicial character? If he went in the former style, there would be a wholly idle and unnecessary parade; if in the latter, he would be only the Master under a higher title, and without the practical experience which the Masters necessarily possessed. If the Master in Lunacy was to be superseded, why not require the Lord Chancellor or the Lords Justices to preside at the investigations of this description? The noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack said that the same idea had occurred to him, but he
  1284
  was apprehensive that the minds of these Judges might be biassed by their having had the affidavits before them. If there was any weight in that objection, however, it would apply to every criminal trial in the country, because the Judges were always supplied with the depositions. He ventured to ask whether any change of this kind was really required at all? We had an admirable code of Lunacy law which was passed in the year 1853, for which we were indebted to his noble and learned Friend (Lord St. Leonards), and which had produced an immense amount of advantage to persons who stood in need of its interposition, without harrowing the feelings of their families. He did not hesitate to say that that statute had worked most efficiently. He had inquired specially as to the subject of Commissions of Lunacy, and had ascertained that since the Act came into operation on the 28th of October, 1853, down to that day 561 commissions had been issued, of which only twenty had been tried by juries—or scarce so many as three in the year. The beneficial effects of the law were shown by the 541 cases in which no jury was required, but in which the necessary protection had been thrown around the unhappy subjects of these inquiries without the feelings of any of the parties or relatives being harrowed by publicity. Let the House imagine the social evil and suffering which was in those cases veiled from the eye of the public. Was it desirable with a rash and hasty hand to touch a system which had been productive of such beneficial effects? It might be said, however, that this measure did not apply to the 541 private cases, but only to the few public trials. He might answer that if the cases were so few, there was the less necessity for an alteration; but he believed that the Bill would tend greatly to increase the number of inquiries by jury. It was a very common characteristic of insane persons to have a very exalted idea of their own importance; and if they learnt that the Legislature had thought it necessary to provide that one of the Judges of the Superior Courts should consider their cases, he had no doubt many of them would prefer the notoriety of a trial before a Superior Judge to the secrecy of a quiet and unpretending inquiry before a Master in Lunacy. No necessity had been shown for this change; no proof had been adduced that the Masters in Lunacy had not

  1285
  discharged their duties faithfully and efficiently; and therefore he entreated their Lordships not to sanction an interference with the present system. The seventh section of the Bill gave the Judge a discretionary power as to the stage of the proceedings at which the alleged lunatic should he examined, and whether it should be in public or private. As that was the present law, he saw no necessity for its re-enactment, unless it were for the sake of adding a provision, that if the alleged lunatic were examined in private, he should be at liberty to demand a public examination as well. The object of that additional provision was doubtless that the public might stand by and see fair play; but he apprehended it would lead to the most fearful consequences. It was a very common form of insanity for a person of the most delicate mind to become possessed with the most obscene imaginations, which he uttered not only without shame, but with a sort of pride. It was also by no means rare for a lunatic to conceive the deepest hatred to those who had formerly been dearest to them, and to attribute the most abominable crimes to other people. Was it right, then, that a madman should be entitled to insist upon appearing in a public court and pouring forth a torrent of blasphemy, obscenity, or defamation? He recollected a case in which a military gentleman entertained the most dangerous delusions; he was of an educated and elegant mind, but he was led by insanity to intersperse letters full of exquisite criticism on art, and just comments on topics of the day, with obscene ribaldry concerning the highest person in the land. Would it be safe or decent to allow persons with these imaginations and feelings, with no sense of the impropriety of their conduct or expressions, glorying in the display of their observations, and insisting on making a public exhibition of themselves to be examined in public? At present inquiries of that kind were conducted with the utmost delicacy and tenderness, and every effort was made to soothe the mind of the alleged lunatic; but the very excitement of a public examination would be likely to touch the particular string to which all his hallucinations responded and to aggravate his insanity. He was satisfied that the provision would be attended with the most mischievous effects, and he hoped it would not pass. He objected also to the third clause, by which an inquiry
  1286
  into the state of mind of the alleged lunatic was to be confined to a period of two years before the date of the commission, because, in various cases, it would be scarcely practicable. It might, for instance, preclude an inquiry into the condition of a born idiot. Why was the clause of the existing Act to be repealed which gave the Lord Chancellor power to direct an inquiry as to how long the alleged lunatic had been of unsound mind, or whether he was insane at a specified time? He knew a case in which a person who was afterwards found to be a lunatic executed a deed by which he disposed of all his property in favour of the son of his attorney. On that fact being mentioned in the petition for a commission, the Lord Chancellor directed an inquiry to take place as to the man's state of mind anterior to the time when the deed was executed. The result was that the jury found that the person had been insane from a time anterior to the date of the deed. The matter came back to Chancery; but the parties compromised upon the persons in possession being let down gently with respect to the rents which they had received. Why was the provision of the law, permitting inquiries to be carried back to any particular incident, to be limited by a clause, the exception in which was larger than the clause itself, because the Judge before whom the commission was executed was to have power, if he should think fit, to direct inquiries beyond this arbitrary rule? Wherever an arbitrary line was drawn it would be sure to exclude evidence of the utmost importance lying on the other side of it; and he therefore submitted that a limit, subject to be overruled by the Judge or Master, was extremely mischievous, and at the same time wholly unnecessary. With regard to the other provision in the same clause, which excluded the opinions or conclusions of medical practitioners, with the same qualification, that if the Judge thought fit, their opinions might be taken, it seemed to him that these cases were peculiarly fitted for testimony of this description, and that in every case the Judge would admit it, with a due caution to the jury not to pay attention to the conclusions if they were of opinion that the grounds upon which those conclusions were based were insufficient. There was another clause which, if he had not entirely misconstrued the words, would considerably enlarge the jurisdiction of the

  1287
  Lord Chancellor in these cases. Under the Roman law where a person exhibited prodigality or proneness to waste his estate the Prætor interposed and appointed tutors or curators to manage the property. In Scotland there was a similar power of intervention. But in this country the law had never so far interfered with the free agency of individuals, and any man might go to utter ruin, unchecked, unless his acts manifested unsoundness of mind. There was some misapprehension with regard to the extent of the power of the Chancellor in these cases. People were apt to suppose that absolute insanity must he proved in order to warrant the issue of a commission; but the law had been clearly stated by Lord Lyndhurst in 1827, quoting as an authority the decision of Lord Eldon in 1802, in these words—
  "It is not necessary to go back to old authorities to know how the law is now to be administered. It has been clearly expressed by Lord Eldon in 'Ridgway v. Dawson.' 'I have reason,' says Lord Eldon, 'to believe that the Court did not in Lord Hardwicke's time grant Commissions of Lunacy in such cases as those in which they have since been granted. Of late the question has not been whether the party is absolutely insane, but the Court has felt authorized to issue Commissions, provided that it has been made out that the party is unable to act as a prudent man in the management of himself and his affairs.' This law, as stated by Lord Eldon, has been acted on for years in the view of the Legislature. The Legisture has not thought fit to interfere, and therefore I take the law to be as it was then expounded."
  The law, as so laid down by Lord Lyndhurst, applied to cases short of insanity; but they must be cases of unsoundness of mind, and extravagance or follies which indicated imbecility would not be sufficient unless the imbecility amounted to unsoundness of mind. The interpretation clause said the Act should apply to any person, imbecile or lunatic, whether with or without lucid intervals. He need not stop to criticise the expression, beyond remarking that a lunatic was a person who had lucid intervals. The clause proceeded to refer to any person "of such imbecility or loss of mind as to be incapable of managing his affairs." The term "loss of mind" was entirely new to the law. He hardly knew the meaning of it. If it were a translation of amentia as distinguished from dementia, it did not apply to imbecility, which was mere weakness, and not loss of mind. The fifth section referred to every inquisition whereby a per-
  1288
  son, should be found to be incompetent, from unsoundness or imbecility of mind, for the management of himself or his affairs. The words "unsoundness" and "imbecility" were not words denoting the same state of mind; they were terms denoting different states of mind; and if they read the interpretation clause with that section, either the fifth section adopted the law as it stood, which was unnecessary, or it enlarged the bounds of the present law, and was therefore dangerous. Under the existing law no person, however extravagant, foolish, or prodigal, could be made the subject of a Commission of Lunacy, unless his acts were such as to lead a jury to the conclusion that he was of unsound mind, and a verdict founded on imbecility or weakness of mind only would be set aside as contrary to law. In very many cases the jurors would hesitate very long before bringing in a verdict of unsoundness of mind, when the evidence of early extravagance and prodigality might be such as to compel them to come to a verdict of weakness of mind; and, as he understood the clause, by a verdict of that kind the subject of the inquiry might be condemned to lose his free agency and the management of his own affairs, and to be detained in a life-long bondage. These were matters of perilous importance; and he should be glad to hear that that was not his noble and learned Friend's proposal; but if it was not, the Bill would require very great alteration. He had gone through the matter with a very earnest anxiety that their Lordships should understand his objections. He hoped his noble and learned Friend would consent to remove from the Bill in Committee the proposals to which he had taken objection; but if that course were not taken, and the Committee should pass the clauses, he should probably feel it necessary, should he find that the views which he had expressed met with any very general assent from their Lordships, to endeavour to secure their rejection at a future stage.
  THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURYsaid, that it would be presumptuous in him to enter on the legal bearings of this question after it had been handled by so many noble and learned Lords who had held the high office of Lord Chancellor; but, having had considerable experience of the working of the present law, he might, perhaps, be allowed to express an opinion with reference to certain of the provisions

  1289
  contained in the Bill. He highly approved that clause which provided that the Judge and jury should be brought into contact as soon as possible with the person whose stale of mind they were to inquire into. That was stated to be the law already, but it ought to be the practice and to be made compulsory in all cases. All the experience which he had had convinced him that before any evidence was taken the parties who were to judge ought to be brought into communication with the alleged lunatic, to see, and hear, and examine him; and having then ascertained by inquiry the principal points of the alleged delusion, they might take such evidence as was necessary to determine the question whether he should be detained or not. After such an interview they would understand the evidence much more clearly and readily, and would come to a much more satisfactory and safe conclusion. He hoped that would be made the invariable rule hereafter, and he was convinced that it would supersede, not the necessity—for there never had been any such necessity—but the practice of hearing long and laboured speeches from counsel, and would thus lead to the saving of much time and money. He also approved the limitation of the time over which the inquiry was to extend to two years. The question which the Judge and jury had to decide was one of fact—whether the man before them was insane or not at the period of the inquiry; and if he were proved to have been mad more than two years before, it would by no means establish the fact of his madness now. Nothing which he had done antecedently could amount to proof enough to justify the jury in declaring him insane at the present moment, and to take from him the charge of his property. It was necessary that they should go back; but it might be asked why should that limit be taken? No doubt two years was an arbitrary period, but so must any other period be which was fixed. In cases where there was no sort of doubt as to a man's madness, of course there was no necessity to go back at all; but in doubtful cases it was necessary to go back for some time, to see whether his conduct had been regular or not during that time. If up to the time of the inquiry they found that his conduct had been regular, the conclusion must be that very unusually strong and clear evidence was required to prove the unsoundness of the patient's mind. In most cases the
  1290
  period of two years would be quite sufficient for this purpose; but to go travelling back over a long period to scrape together all the foolish things said and done by a man in his early days—all the little acts of misconduct which might indicate a certain amount of alienation of mind, but which time, improved health, or the influence of religion might have altogether removed, was an absurd and cruel practice. There was one form of insanity which would require more attention, and his noble and learned Friend (Lord Chelmsford) had truly said that in these cases the limitation must depend very much upon the character of the person whose sanity was under investigation; that in which the patient had given signs of some tendency to self-destruction, or the destruction of others. That was monomania—the most terrible of all kinds of insanity, and this kind of monomania might remain latent for many years. A patient might appear to be of the most gentle mien; he might have every single thing which would recommend him to those about him, and bring them to the conclusion that he ought to be discharged; and yet suddenly, without the slightest premonitory symptom, it would break out again in the fiercest form. A case had occurred not long ago within his own experience. There was a patient—a barrister—confined in one of the asylums which he was in the habit of visiting, whose disease took the form of a tendency to self-destruction. He had been confined there for five years, and his demeanour was so gentle and amiable that he won, over the hearts and judgment of every one around him. At last it was determined that he should have a trial—that is, that he should be allowed to go out for a short time to see whether change of air and scene might not have a beneficial effect on him. He had passed a great part of his time in reading and writing, and one day he requested that a desk which he had at home might be written for. The desk was sent and given to him, and in the course of a few hours he was found poisoned. He knew that five years before he had secreted poison in the desk, and he took it the moment it arrived, only just leaving himself time to write a note, in which he said that no one was to be surprised at what bad happened—that no extraordinary circumstances or events had induced him to do this, but that he had long contemplated the necessity of it. In such cases as this

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  the period of two years would certainly not be sufficient. Then another point was that of the medical evidence. He did not know that medical gentlemen—he said it with all respect—unless they had made insanity their special study, were more qualified to judge of the soundness or unsoundness of mind of a person, than any person of common sense and practical knowledge of the world. Mere opinions and scientific speculations ought no longer to be adduced in the courts as testimony. Whatever evidence was given by a medical man should be facts, and judgment based on those facts. From his own experience of many years on the Commission of Lunacy he could affirm that medical men who had not made the subject a special study were as ignorant of mental disease as any one who observed it for the first time. It was to facts, and facts alone, they must look. He thought it a monstrous thing that a medical man should infer, because a person had a cast in his eye, or a particular-shaped head, that he must be insane, when, in fact, he commits no mad act at all. In every case medical men could be brought forward who would give contrary opinions on the same premises. Facts observed by himself ought to be the basis of the evidence of the medical man. He maintained that persons of common sense, conversant with the world, and having a practical knowledge of mankind, if brought into the presence of an alleged lunatic, would find out, in a short time, whether he was, or was not, capable of managing his own affairs. He perfectly well recollected an instance that showed how little many eminent medical men were acquainted with what was going on in the world, and how they formed an opinion and came to a conclusion without any foundation in fact. When discussing the question of the sanity or insanity of a lady, he (the Earl of Shaftesbury) strongly maintained that she was perfectly sane and capable of managing herself and her affairs; a medical man of great eminence took him aside, and said, "Are you aware, my Lord, that she subscribes to the Society for the Conversion of the Jews?" Had that medical gentleman been acquainted with what was going on in the world, he would have known that hundreds and thousands of persons of the most sane and solid description were doing the same thing. In the case of another, a young married lady, it was argued that
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  she must be insane because she was in the habit of wearing a dagger at her side, and the dagger was produced. He told the lady that one of the charges against her was that she wore a dagger. "Dear me," she said, "if I am insane for that reason, nine-tenths of the ladies in Paris are insane too, for they do the same." He took the dagger to a shop in London and inquired into the matter. He was told that they had sold seventy of the same sort within a few days; that wearing them had become a fashion in Paris, and was becoming the fashion in England. Yet, a person calling himself a mad doctor said the lady must be insane, because she wore a dagger. That a medical man should be allowed to be in court, hear all the evidence, and on that be allowed to state the conclusion to which he had himself come, he thought was a vicious practice. He did not believe that the opinions of medical men, founded on evidence they had heard, was evidence at all; but it was likely to produce a very serious effect on the Master, the jury, or the Judge. It was a wrong method. Could anything be more remarkable than the discord that existed between all these doctors on the subject of insanity? They did not agree among themselves, they were perpetually at variance with each other, and they would find the strongest, most discordant, and dangerous opinions given by medical men. He thought the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had done well in requiring the medical testimony to be founded on facts, and providing that general scientific conclusions shall not be received as evidence. He had also done well and most humanely in what he proposed respecting the management of the property of lunatics. That system was begun in 1853 by the noble and learned Lord (Lord St. Leonards) when he was Lord Chancellor, who had done great things for the happiness and comfort of the poor lunatic. Amongst other things the Act directed, that where the property of the lunatic was under £ 500, it should be brought under the protection of the Court of Chancery, to be applied for the benefit of the lunatic. That was seven years ago; it was now time to advance somewhat further, and by the present Bill it was proposed to apply, in a summary manner, property to the amount of £ 1,000, or an income of £ 50 per annum, for the benefit of the lunatic, without making it necessary that the patient

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  should have been declared lunatic by an inquisition. It was impossible that such an inquiry could take place at a less cost than £ 70, and £ 70 out of £ 1,000 was a grievous infliction. He hoped it would be made possible for some person to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor to stand in the place of the lunatic, to manage his property. If a small tradesman, whose profits did not exceed 15 s. or 20 s. a week, were confined as a lunatic, his property and business went to ruin because there was no one to administer them. If a proper person were appointed to stand in the shoes of the lunatic, it would tend very much to assist his remedial treatment in the asylum. It was proposed to have two medical visitors in addition to the legal visitors. He hoped those visitors would be required to visit every lunatic four times a year. Due visitation was not only of beneficial effect to the patients, but to the keepers of asylums. These were the principal provisions of the Bill. There might be some legal difficulties connected with it, some of which the noble and learned Lord (Lord Chelmsford) had pointed out. Upon these he did not feel competent to enter; but though the Bill was not perfect, yet he ventured to say that under its provisions this wretched and unhappy class would be better treated and cared for than the same class in any part of the inhabited globe.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, When I introduced this Bill, I stated that it deserved your Lordships' most attentive consideration. I am not at all surprised, therefore, that it has been criticised by my noble and learned Friend (Lord Chelmsford). But I now beg your patient attention while I call your Lordships back again to the subject, while I endeavour to answer the objections he has made. The noble and learned Lord first dwelt on the impropriety and the want of any necessity of sending an inquiry of this nature before one of the Judges of the land. But can your Lordships imagine any issue or any inquiry more important to the unfortunate subject of it than an inquiry into his sanity? And if these important cases are tried in a private room, before persons of an inferior grade, there is an anomaly of which we have no example and no justification. But I am surprised at the shortness of the memory of the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) and of my noble and learned Friend, the latter of whom criticised the Bill and the former cheered the criticism.
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  For myself I claim no merit for the proposal, that where a jury is demanded the inquiry shall take place before a Judge; because, in a Bill which I now hold in my hand, and which in March, 1859, was presented to the House of Commons by Sir Hugh Cairns, then Solicitor General, and Mr. Secretary Sotheron-Estcourt, the same proposal is contained. Now, I presume that the Bill received the attention of the noble Earl, and also received some consideration from my noble and learned Friend who was then Lord Chancellor. No doubt the interval of time may have led to a change of opinion; but, at all events, such a provision was then considered by them, and then thought most desirable; and being glad to find my own opinion backed by such high authority, I introduced this provision into the present Bill. But I will now meet the objections which my noble and learned Friend has unwittingly raised against his own measure, being apparently desirous of finding grounds for opposing mine. First, he says there would be a difficulty in having an inquiry of this kind before one of the Judges, because it ought to take place near the residence of the lunatic. But in all the cases which have occurred for the last twenty years where a jury was demanded, it has constantly happened, not where the lunatic was some poor unfortunate wretch shut up in an asylum or confined to his bed, but they were cases in which there was a doubt about the lunacy, and where the person in question moved about unrestrained, and was able to attend the commission. Such was the case of Mr. Windham, of the aged woman Mrs. Gumming, of Sir Henry Meux, and of Lord Portsmouth; and I believe that all the great trials which should have been con ducted under the superintendence and authority of a superior tribunal have been cases of this description. "But then," says my noble and learned Friend, "why not send the commission to be tried by the Lords Justices or by the Lord Chancellor?" But my noble and learned Friend forgets that where this trial takes place the Judge who will issue the writ, and will have the discretionary power as to a new inquiry, is to be either the Lord Chancellor or those who represent him—namely, the Lords Justices. Then he says, "Why alter a system which works so well?" Now, in my noble Friend's eulogy of the measure of 1853 I entirely concur, but experience points out that it

  1295
  is necessary to superadd something to that measure. Is it not a scandal to the administration of justice that in one recent case the expenses of the parties amounted, without the least reason, to some £ 30,000; that in the case of Sir Henry Meux they amounted to between £ 7,000 and £ 8,000, while in that of Mrs. Cumming they were so great as to absorb nearly one-third of her property? Do not these instances carry with them the conviction that there are great defects in the system, and that it is impossible to permit the system to continue? Now, I by no means detract from the great merit of the Bill of my noble and learned Friend (Lord St. Leonards), when I say that something has still to be done in the same direction. No work is perfect in the first instance, and the work of reform will never become idle, because it will be rendered necessary again from time to time, as experience shows other means of remedying defects, and other defects which require remedying. My hon. and learned Friend was particularly eloquent upon the great evil which he said might result from the clause enacting that the lunatic, if he requires it, shall be examined in public. But what is the principle of our law? Why does the law require that there shall be a jury? Because of the great and overwhelming importance to the unfortunate subject of the inquiry. You do not deprive of his liberty a man accused of an ordinary crime unless you give him an open trial. But has not experience proved the necessity of an open inquiry in cases where, sometimes from mistake, sometimes possibly from sinister motives, charges of lunacy are made? Then my noble and learned Friend said, "The lunatic may give vent in open court to obscenity, blasphemy, or ribaldry." But will there not be guardians of public decency? Would the jury want any other proof than would be afforded by such an exhibition? Is there no power in such a case to remove persons from the court, and thus prevent any outrage upon public decency? That is an imaginary evil conjured up by my noble and learned Friend. Then he objects to the proposal that the inquiry shall be limited to a definite period, and he finds fault with the limit of two years. But what you want to ascertain is the condition of mind at the time of the inquiry. You have no right to say that because a man was insane on the 1st of January, 1862, he must be insane on the 1st of March,
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  The Bill gives an interval for inquiring whether or not there be a chronic malady, because it is not right that you should condemn as insane a man who is only suffering from the delirium of a fever. The objection is made in forgetfulness of the origin of the law. This is one of the instances in which an evil practice had crept in through following a precedent without observing the reasons for its original introduction. I said, when introducing this measure, that the present system was modelled upon the old commission set on foot for the purpose of ascertaining the rights of the Crown. In such cases it was proper and necessary to carry back the inquiry, and ascertain what those rights were at a certain period perhaps long since passed; but to carry back the inquiry into the insanity of persons as is done at present, is only to do that which may do injustice to third persons. Thus in the case of Sir Henry Meux the great contest was whether the lunacy should be fixed at a particular period, so as to upset a Will under which certain parties to the inquiry were entitled. But the principle of English law does not allow an absent man—and a man who is interested in such a Will may be regarded as an absent man—to be affected by a judicial or a quasi-judicial proceeding. The only object of inquiry with regard to the past is for the purpose of ascertaining what is the nature and character of the insanity—whether it is merely a temporary affection, or whether it permanently disables the lunatic from controlling himself and from managing his own property. But then my noble and learned Friend says that the inquiry ought to be regulated by the nature of the lunacy. That is rather a bold remark in the face of recent experience. What was the vice of the late inquiry? First of all medical men were put into the witness box to show that it was a case of congenital idiotcy, and then evidence was adduced of all the actions of the supposed lunatic from his cradle. It is through having regard to the nature of the alleged lunacy that the mischievous practice has been introduced of carrying back the inquiry in this manner. My noble and learned Friend seemed to imagine that there was peculiarity in the law respecting idiotcy; but in their results idiotcy and lunacy are precisely the same. Originally there was a difference, but it has long since disappeared. The next objection is

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  that the discretionary power of the Judge to admit medical evidence will annul and destroy the whole effect of the provision. Now, I repeat that the introduction of medical opinions and medical theories into this subject has proceeded upon the vicious principle of considering insanity as a disease; whereas the law regards it as a fact which can be ascertained by the evidence in like manner as any other fact. Therefore we impannel a jury of ordinary men, and call upon them to try the question by proof of the habits, the demeanour, the conversation, and the acts of the alleged lunatic. But if you begin by telling them this is a most peculiar question, lying within the province of medical men, then undoubtedly they will consider that it is a matter removed out of the ordinary sphere of their knowledge, and that they must accept the opinions of others in order to come to a determination upon it. Now, just let me call your Lordships' attention to the manner in which medical men are influenced in coming to a decision. I shall quote from a book of great authority, and I think your Lordships will see that to commit an issue of this kind to be determined by the testimony of men influenced by such considerations is a great mistake and a great cause of injustice. The writer; in question, a man of great experience and eminence, says—
  "A principal characteristic of some patients is a peculiar want of harmony in the expression of the features; in others a fixed expression of some intense emotion, and a twitching of the orbicularis or other facial muscles is not uncommon."
  That my Lords, is a fearful announcement for those who are afflicted with a nervous peculiarity. "In a great many cases of chronic mania the hair becomes harsh and bristly." I would recommend all persons to lay in a stock of Macassar oil to avoid the danger here pointed out: "the skin of the scalp becomes loose, and medical men should never omit to examine the ears, and if they discover a shrivelled ear, it tells an undeniable tale of profound mental disease; altogether the effect of mania, and, indeed, of all forms of insanity is to stamp upon the patient a remarkable degree of ugliness." That is a very dreadful announcement for plain men; but let not the ugly man hope to escape the conclusion by clothing his face with a smile of goodnature, because nothing "is a surer proof of insanity than a pleasing smile always present." Now, my Lords, are
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  these trifling rules to be allowed to prevail upon inquiries of such moment? The noble and learned Lord went on to observe, and to a certain extent correctly, that, according to the wording of one particular clause, in which "or" has been misprinted for "and," there would be an alteration of the present law. Now, although I disclaim any such intention at the time of introducing the Bill, yet I do avow my intention to suggest to your Lordships in Committee one alteration. It is true that the language of Lord Eldon in one case went somewhat beyond the point; it is true that imbecility not amounting to unsoundness of mind will not warrant the conclusion of lunacy, or justify a jury in finding lunacy. That that should be the law has always been a subject of regret, and Lord Eldon himself expressed that feeling. But Lord Erskine called attention to the subject as long ago as 1806, when he said—
  "I think there ought to be an Act of Parliament, not from any defect in the jurisdiction, but on the immense moment that the Lord Chancellor should not assume an authority that does not belong to him by the ancient jurisdiction, and that may press sorely on the liberty of the subject; on the other hand, feeling, as Lord Eldon appears strongly to have felt, that persons who are above all others entitled to protection ought not to go unprotected. Another ground is this—a man may have passed a great and illustrious life, and by the course of nature his faculties may decay, so that he may not be fit either to govern himself or his affairs. It is unseemly that he should be put on the footing of a lunatic, and that a commission should issue in the ordinary course which may affect the families of such i persons in other times. It is supposed, and that opinion has gone forth very generally, that this unhappy disease runs into the posterity, and thence arises a grievous dilemma, that either such a person must be deprived of protection. altogether, or in future time that distress to his family should be the consequence. Why should not a man be entitled to protection in this second state of infancy as well as the first? The whole prerogative is this—that it falls to the King to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves."
  It is my intention, my Lords, to propose to invest the Lord Chancellor with jurisdiction to provide for the case of persons who are in the second stage of childhood by surrounding them with the necessary protection without the necessity of issuing a commission of lunacy. I will not trouble your Lordships upon other points at present, but I may state that it is my intention to persevere with this Bill if your Lordships should be pleased to give it a second reading. I shall cheerfully accept

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  every suggestion for its amendment; but those things which I think are vital and cardinal points, and are absolutely required for the amendment of the law, I shall certainly not give up in any important particular. Therefore, my noble and learned Friend will have; an opportunity, if he desires it, of throwing out this Bill altogether, thereby inflicting, as I should think, a very grave injury upon the public interests.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I should not presume, in the presence of so many of your Lordships who are so much more competent to do so, to enter upon a discussion of the details of a Bill upon this important and delicate subject. Neither am I disposed to discuss the provision which is not included in the Bill of the noble and learned Lord, but which he has just announced his intention of introducing. I will only say that it appears to me that it is an extension of existing powers which will require serious and deliberate consideration, and is one which ought not to be introduced without having received the most careful inquiry. I should not have intruded myself upon your Lordships now had it not been for a direct appeal to myself and my noble and learned Friend—who having already spoken cannot again address you—an appeal which was made to us in reference to a matter personally concerning ourselves. I certainly have heard with surprise that an incidental cheer which I ventured to give to the statement of my noble and learned Friend should have brought down upon us an attack from the noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack—couched indeed in very polite terms, but charging us with shortness of memory and gross inconsistency in objecting to a provision in the Bill which was identical with a provision introduced into the Bill that was brought forward in 1859 by the Solicitor General of a Government of which we happen to have been Members. The noble and learned Lord, I believe, did not trust to his memory, but had in his hand the Bill to which he referred. I had not that Bill in my hand, but in consequence of the statement of the noble and learned Lord I thought it right to refer to it and to see what its provisions were. The objection that my noble and learned Friend took to the Bill was that the substitution of a Judge of the superior courts for a Master in Lunacy was in all cases a matter of doubtful expediency and
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  of doubtful advantage, and that there were cases in which it would be found not only inconvenient but absolutely impracticable. He pointed out very clearly the circumstances under which it would be found impossible to obtain the advantage—if it were ah advantage—of the presidency of a Judge of the superior courts. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack thinks it extraordinary that we should raise this objection—the Bill, he says, from which he borrowed this provision, having been introduced by the Government with which I was connected. I presume the noble and learned Lord had the Bill of Sir Hugh Cairns in his hands when he made that statement; if he had not, I am afraid I shall be obliged to retort upon him the shortness of memory which he has charged upon us. If he had the Bill before him, I cannot understand in what way, with his acuteness; of intellect, the noble and learned Lord has fallen into so grave an error. I shall read to the House the clauses in these two Bills respectively. The Bill of the noble and learned Lord provides that—
  "Every Commission of Lunacy which directs the Inquisition thereon to be made by the Oath of a Jury shall he addressed to one or more of the Judges of Her Majesty's Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas; or Exchequer, and the Judge, or one of the Judges, to whom such Commission shall be so addressed, shall make the Inquisition thereby directed, and shall return the same into the High Court of Chancery."
  That provision the noble and learned Lord says is identical with the one introduced by Sir Hugh Cairns. The provision contained in the Bill of my noble and learned Friend was in the following terms:—
  "A Commission in the nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo may, in any case in which the inquiry shall be opposed by the alleged lunatic, and with a view to the ultimate saving of litigation and expense, if it shall be considered expedient, be issued under the Great Seal, addressed to any of the Judges of Her Majesty's Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, or Exchequer, directing them to make, by a Jury, the Inquisition to be therein mentioned."
  The Bill of Sir Hugh Cairns provides that, in particular cases, where a saving of expense may occur, or where, from other circumstances, it may be deemed expedient, it shall be competent for the Lord Chancellor to issue a writ to any of the Judges. The Lord Chancellor, from the Woolsack, tells us that provision is identical with one requiring that every

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  case shall be referred to Judges of the superior courts. I rose, not for the purpose of vindicating the memory of my noble and learned Friend, nor yet of vindicating myself from any charge of inconsistency, but simply to point out that the ablest and acutest minds may be misled if they do not very carefully consider and compare together the propositions of two Acts which they declare to be identical, and from the supposed identity of which they are led to make attacks on those happening to differ from them in opinion.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord does not seem to be aware that no jury trial can be had except where the lunatic demands it. The Bill is not intended to alter the law in this respect, but directs that where according to the existing law a jury trial is to be had, it shall be had in the manner which seems most suitable.
  LORD CHELMSFORD: In all cases.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In all cases of jury trial. This misapprehension only shows how the acutest minds may be misled by imperfect information.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: With all due respect to the noble and learned Lord, I cannot conceive that "shall in all cases" can be identical with "cases in which it may be thought expedient." One renders it imperative on the Court of Chancery to send every case before a Judge of a superior court. The Bill of Sir Hugh Cairns says that in particular eases, where it is thought expedient, it may be sent. And my noble and learned Friend has actually pointed out that in certain cases the difficulties in the way of such a reference would be insuperable.
  LORD ST. LEONARDSsaid, it was evident that the phrase "in all cases," appearing in the Bill, must be subject to explanation and qualification. There were other points which required revision, such for instance as clause five, which provided that "every inquisition whereby any person shall be found to be incompetent from unsoundness or imbecility of mind to manage himself and his affairs shall have the same force as an inquisition finding a person to be a lunatic." The meaning of the noble and learned Lord must clearly have been "unsoundness and imbecility of mind." [The LORD CHANCELLOR assented.] But the same mistake recurred in other passages; and if these were not rectified, a very dangerous
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  weapon would be put into the hands of the Court of Chancery. It would, in fact, be armed with a jurisdiction which the law of England had always renounced, and he might say denounced. He did not think it possible that their Lordships should agree to the section of this Bill which provided that in every case of lunacy the inquiry should be confined to the time at which it took place, and that no evidence should be admitted of circumstances which occurred more than two years before. By the Act of 1853, section 47, it was provided that the inquiry should be confined to the state of mind of the alleged lunatic at the time it took place, unless the Lord Chancellor should direct to the contrary; and therefore the object sought by his noble and learned Friend upon the Woolsack might be obtained without any new law whatever. Their Lordships had already heard that of 561 Commissions which had been tried since the passing of the Act of 1853 only twenty had been tried with the aid of a jury. Of those twenty cases, eleven occupied only one day each; three, two days; one, three days; three, five days; one, nine days; and another (that of Mr. Windham), thirty-one days. Nothing was more desirable when a considerable event occurred, which seemed to render necessary some important change of the law, than to abstain from immediate action, and to wait until the passions of the moment had cooled down—for the moment when you could more calmly look at the result and effect of that event; and he was not convinced that their Lordships were now so competent to judge of the effect of Mr. Windham's inquiry as they would be some few months hence. Such an inquiry, affecting as it did the free enjoyment of life by a person who had been accustomed to the utmost liberty of action, was really a question of life and death, and the mode in which it should be conducted ought not to be lightly or hastily determined. He had always understood that it was one of the first principles of the lunacy law that the question whether a man was of unsound mind should be tried at his mansion, wherever it was situate, or at his last place of abode. That requirement was made as a protection to the alleged lunatic; but it would be withdrawn if such cases were to be tried in a superior court. He agreed with his noble and learned Friend near him in regard to the objectionable character of

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  the clause which limited the inquiry into the state of mind of the alleged lunatic to the two years previous to the commission. As to the restriction on the medical evidence, it was, often said, sarcastically, that doctors differed; but so did other professional men. Differences of opinion arose from the general infirmity of the human mind; but in the case of medical evidence in courts of law the difference was sometimes more apparent than real, and arose from the ingenuity of the lawyers in confusing witnesses or distorting what was said. As the law at present stood, the person who conducted the inquiry could examine the lunatic once, twice, or more frequently; but by this Bill he would be directed to examine the alleged lunatic at the commencement of the inquiry, and unless there was another direction that would be taken to be the proper course. But he denied that it was the proper course. He could conceive nothing more injurious than that the alleged lunatic should be called before Judge and jury in the first instance, and be tried, in fact, upon the affidavits upon which the commission issued, before any case was established against him. He did not approve the proposal to give the alleged lunatic the imperative right to be examined in public. His noble and learned Friend (Lord Chelmsford) had well described what would be the effect in many instances, and he entirely concurred that such an examination could do no good, and might do great harm to the alleged lunatic. He would not trouble their Lordships upon other points of detail with regard to the visitors, which would be better discussed in a Committee; but, with every respect for the present registrar, who was a most competent and excellent officer, he objected to his practising as a solicitor, as he was of opinion that his whole time might be employed advantageously in assisting the Lord Chancellor on many occasions, when, speaking from experience, the Lord Chancellor must feel the want of such assistance. The noble and learned Lord then thanked their Lordships who, sitting on either side of the House, had expressed favourable opinions of the measure of 1853.
  LORD CRANWORTHrose, not to prolong the discussion, but to clear up a doubt which had been cast upon a portion of the subject by the unfortunate wording of some of the clauses of this Bill. By the present law, although there was a power to issue
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  a special commission, the power was never exercised, and all Commissions were directed to the Master. The Master then gave notice to the alleged lunatic of the commission, and informed him that if he pleased he could have his case investigated by a jury. It appeared that in 541 cases out of 561 no such desire had been expressed. The words in the Bill were that every commission should follow the form in the schedule, or, in other words, that every commission should be tried by a jury. His noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had explained that the in tention was that whenever a commission was to be tried by a jury, but not otherwise, certain proceedings should take place. The Bill would require alterations in Committee to make it consistent with that meaning. He concurred in opinion that those cases should be tried by one of the Judges of the. superior courts, and that the proposed change would be a great improvement. At the same time, it would be very objectionable to say that all cases must be tried by a jury, and it would be extremely inconvenient that they, should be so tried, unless some special circumstances required it. He would suggest, whether it would not be better to say that the jury cases should be tried, by one of the superior Judges or by the Lords Justices. That would be a far better mode of putting an end to the present enormous expense than any enactment as to what might and what might not be given in evidence. He could not agree with the proposal to limit the time over which the inquiry should extend to two years. It might be necessary to show that certain symptoms now manifested by the alleged lunatic had at some previous period been followed by severe lunacy; and to shut out evidence of that sort would be to defeat the objects of the inquiry. Neither could he agree that it was either reasonable or safe to shut out medical testimony because there were some medical men who entertained very wild theories on the subject. Lunatics not under the care of the Great Seal could not be shut up without a certificate from two medical men, and it was a most extraordinary thing to shut out that kind of testimony in the more important cases. If the cases were to be tried by the superior Judges, it might be safely left to them to say what weight should be attached to that testimony. By this he did not mean in any way to reflect on the manner in which the recent inquiry and other in-

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  quiries had been conducted by the learned Masters, though, with all deference to them, he was bound to say that they could not have the same authority over the counsel as a Judge of the superior court from his position must have.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORpointed out that by a recent Act the certificate of the medical men must state, not only their opinion of the man's insanity, but the facts on which they had formed that opinion.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly; and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Friday, the 21st instant.
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, to Thursday next, half-past Ten o'clock.