Sitting of 25 July 1862

MINUTES.
— NEW WRIT ISSUED. — For Carlow County, v. William Bunbury M'Clintock Bunbury, esquire, Chiltern Hundreds.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2° Burial Boards; (Mortgage of Rates) Council of Medical Education.
3° Militia Pay; Corrupt Practices Prevention Act Continuance; Court of Common Pleas (Officer for acknowledgment of Deeds); Queen's Prison Discontinuance (1862); Drainage (Ireland); Elections during Recess.

THE BORNEO PIRATES.—QUESTION.
MR. CRAWFORDsaid, he wished to ask, Whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been drawn to recent statements in the public papers relative to renewed and systematic piracy in the Eastern Archipelago, and the signal service conferred by the destruction of a piratical fleet and the liberation of more than 200 captives by a steamer of the Government of Sarawak; and whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to take steps to put a stop to such practices?
MR. LAYARDsaid, the attention of the Government had been called to the

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account recently published of the attack made on the Borneo pirates and the additional services which Rajah Brooke, and those who acted with him, had rendered to the cause of civilization and humanity, as well as to the commerce in those seas. The attack, it appeared, was very effective, and some notorious captains and spies had been captured, and signally punished. Her Majesty's Government had been long considering the importance of suppressing piracy by the most effectual measures, but they had been encountered by much difficulty in consequence of the occupation of some of those islands by other Powers. They had consequently failed hitherto in effecting a combined action. They, however, hoped soon to accomplish that object. The Government of the Netherlands had signified their intention to send a vessel of war to co-operate with the British force in those seas. An application had been made to the Government of Spain, who claimed a right to some of those islands, to take a similar course. He trusted that the Government of Spain would ere long co-operate with the Government of the Netherlands and that of this country in order to put a stop to evils that occasioned such incalculable injury in the neighbourhood of those islands.

THE ARMSTRONG SHUNT GUN.

  QUESTION.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNEsaid, that he rose to ask the Secretary of State for War, If the 140-pounder Armstrong Shunt Gun has not given way in the late experimental firing at Shoeburyness on July 14, with a charge of powder of 25 lbs., and 91 lb. flat-ended shot; also to inquire how many rounds have been fired from the Gun; and if the Secretary of State for War will consent to the appointment of a Committee of Skilled Officers and Mechanicians to inquire into the causes of the failure of the Armstrong Guns which have burst or given way?
  SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, the gun in question was one of 120 lb.; and being fired on experimental charges, it was fired with a charge of 25 lb. weight of powder, being about double the ordinary service charge. The gun cracked near the centre.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNE: Split, in fact. How many rounds were fired?
  SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, he was unable to answer that question. With re-
  832
  gard to the question of the appointment of a Committee on the subject, he would remind the hon. Gentleman that there was at present a Select Ordnance Committee sitting on the subject of conducting such experiments. The Iron Plate Committee and the Select Committee of that House had been sitting some weeks, and had recommended the appointment of a similar Committee next Session. It seemed to him, therefore, that there was a sufficient number of Committees to consider the subject.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNEsaid, that the right hon. Gentleman did not appear to understand the gist of his question. He wished for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the causes of the bursting of the gun, as well as into the nature of its construction—a Committee, in fact, to inquire into the principle of the coil.
  SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, that the Committees already appointed would, of course, consider the causes of the failure of the guns which had burst or given way.

  STAMP DUTIES IN THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS.—QUESTION.
  MR. GREGSONsaid, in the absence of his hon. Friend (Mr. Lindsay) he would beg to ask, Whether the Government of India has intimated to the Secretary of State for India its intention to introduce into the Settlements of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca, the provisions of Act X. of 1862, being "An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Law relating to Stamp Duties;" and whether the Secretary of State for India has received through the Government of India a remonstrance of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce against the extension of the said Act to the Straits Settlements?
  MR. T. G. BARINGreplied that the Government had received no despatch on the subject alluded to in the question.

  INDIAN PRIZE MONEY.—QUESTION.
  SIR MINTO FARQUHARsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, What is doing with reference to the Delhi, Lucknow, Kirwee, and Indian Prize Money generally; and, the reasons for the long delay which has taken place in posting the officers of the 19th, 20th, and 21st Hussars, now in India, they having volunteered for those regiments nearly eighteen months ago?
  MR. T. G. BARINGsaid, that war-

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  rants had been issued for the distribution of the Delhi and Lucknow prize money. The distribution in India of the former commenced on the 1st of December last, and that of the latter on the 31st of December. The rolls which showed the shares which had not been paid in India, and would therefore be paid in England, had just reached this country. Those rolls, as far as they related to Her Majesty's Forces, had been sent that morning to the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital, and the distribution of the shares would commence there on the 1st of September next. So far as the officers and men of the late East India Company's local army was concerned, the distribution of the unpaid shares would commence at the same date at the India Office. The rolls relating to the unpaid shares of the Lucknow prize money had not yet been received from India; but, judging from the date at which the distribution commenced in India, they were expected to arrive by every mail. As soon as they reached this country, steps would be taken for the distribution of the unpaid shares at Chelsea Hospital and at the India Office in the same way as the Delhi prize money. With respect to what he might term the minor prize moneys, the principle of their distribution had been decided upon by the Treasury, and the Law Officers of the Crown had been instructed to prepare a Royal Warrant on the subject. Some delay had arisen in the preparation of the warrant, in consequence of the unfortunate illness of the Queen's Advocate; but there would be no further postponement in the matter, inasmuch as it had been placed in the hands of the Admiralty Advocate, in order that the warrant might be issued at once. In the case of the Kirwee booty a question had been raised as to the forces which had a right to share in it, and the delay in coming to a decision as to the principle on which it should be distributed had arisen from an anxiety on the part of the Treasury and the Government that the advocates of the claims of the forces on either side might have an opportunity of stating fully the case of the larger and smaller forces which claimed to share in the prize. In reply to the last question, he might state that considerable delay had no doubt occurred in posting the officers to whom it referred. It was only lately that his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State had addressed a Despatch to the Government of India on that
  834
  subject, requesting that no unnecessary postponement might take place. The House must recollect, however, that it was a matter of exceeding difficulty to redeem the pledge given to the officers of the old local regiments, that their position in the new regiments should not be worse than in the old, and at the same time to place in suitable positions the other officers who had volunteered for those regiments.

  FRANCE AND MEXICO.—THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.—QUESTION.
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether, some weeks back, a promise or engagement was not made by the present Italian Government to the French Government, to send troops to act in concert with the French in Mexico, in exchange for the retirement of French troops from the provinces of Viterbo and Velletri; and that such scheme was only abandoned in consequence of its unpopularity as soon as it transpired in Italy.
  MR. LAYARD: Sir, the sources of information possessed by the hon. Gentleman as to foreign matters are so vast that we cannot keep pace with him. The Government have received no information whatever on the subject. I am not aware that such a scheme was ever publicly known in Italy, and consequently I cannot say whether it became popular or not. I know nothing whatever about it.

  ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE.
  Moved, "That the House at its rising adjourn till Monday."
ABOLITION OF BATTA IN THE EAST.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONEsaid, he rose to call attention to the recent reduction of "batta" payable to the Admiral on the East India and China station, by the withdrawal of that allowance from the Flag. Up to a recent period the officers of the navy stationed in India used to receive in addition to their pay an allowance entitled "batta," which in the case of the Admiral amounted to £3,000; in that of the commodore to £1,500; of the captain succeeding the commodore, to £1,000; of the captain commanding, £500; the commander, £250; and of a lieutenant, £85 per annum. Now, that allowance had been most arbitrarily withdrawn, and he certainly could not congratulate the noble

  835
  Lord at the head of the Government on the change at a moment when, as he predicted three years ago, a war had sprung up with China constituting one of the most embarrassing imbroglios in which this country had ever been involved. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had allowed a war to spring up, of which but few Members of the House would see the end, and about the expense of which they would receive information when the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer favoured them with his next budget. The Government having withdrawn these allowances, the officers of Her Majesty's navy in India and China were positively unable to pay their way. The plea under which the reduction was made was, that to meet the exigencies of the case, the Admiral's flag had been removed from India to China. But he had yet to learn that the increased trade in cotton, opium, and other articles—trade carried on in specie—did not require all the protection they could afford in that quarter. The present state of affairs in the Chinese seas was, he might add, far from satisfactory. Hon. Members must have read an account of an action which had occurred in those seas the other day, in which the Bishop of Borneo, after being hit by a bullet, was obliged to defend his life with a revolver, which appeared to have done him right good service. Among the captives recovered from the pirates on that occasion were men from every part of the Eastern Archipelago, and there were also found in the boats flags of almost every nation. In the action eleven boats were captured or destroyed, but their original number were no less than twenty-one. Such was the disastrous position of affairs on a sea covered by the British flag under the present Administration. To show how the reduction operated, he might state that he held in his hand a letter from a post captain—a most gallant officer—on the China station, stating that in his command he was obliged, although he never kept a table beyond the requirements of his position, to incur debts to the extent of £1,000, adding that all the necessaries of life on the station were cent per cent dearer than the home prices. The writer went on to state that an under clerk in a mercantile house in the East was better paid than a post captain. On every account it was to be regretted that the Secretary for India, chosen probably for his skill in the patois of office, should have cut down
  836
  the "batta," and left the naval officers without the means of paying their way. The present Admiralty was the first which had reduced the pay and allowances of every officer who had the misfortune to serve under the British flag, and that, too, at a time when the value of money was falling and the price of the necessaries of life rising all over the world. The terms of his Motion were framed for a different state of circumstances; he had intended to move it on going into Committee of Supply. That Motion was—
  "That this House will on Monday next resolve itself into a Committee to consider of an humble Address to Her Majesty that the pay of the Admiral on that station be restored to a sum that will place the emoluments of the Commander in Chief on a footing that will enable him to maintain the dignity of his position, and more in accordance with the allowances of Military Commanders in Chief in the various Presidencies."
  In the present position of the House, the Votes in Supply having been all granted, he was precluded from such a Motion; but he wished to give notice that next year he would move for the re-appointment of the Admiralty Committee, believing as he did that the maladministration in that department was by no means abated. Meanwhile, he hoped that during the recess, the Government would look the facts which he had stated fairly in the face, and would do everything they could to alter a state of things which was neither more nor less than disgraceful to the country.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he thought it was most unfortunate that at a period when they were proposing to construct new fortifications, and were making large additions to the navy, any circumstance should occur to lead to a bad spirit in the naval service. Frequently during the Session the attention of the House had been called to hardships suffered by the navy. One night it was the case of the captains, in which it was clearly demonstrated that officers of high standing and great merit had been treated with gross injustice. Another evening it was the question of prize money—a question upon which a majority of the House had, decided that the Government had ill-treated the navy. Now, they were discussing another case of hardship. Hitherto it had been considered right that a large extra sum of money should be paid to the Admiral on the China station, because he was obliged from his position to incur great expense. For several years the China command was worth not much less than £10,000 per annum.

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  Now, all of a sudden, on account of the amalgamation of the Indian and home services, the pay of the Admiral in command was reduced to £2,300 a year. The captains, first lieutenants, and other officers serving under him were also obliged to submit to a great reduction. If £2,300 a year was sufficient for the Admiral then, how came it that he had received so much more in former years? Either he had been overpaid before, or he was miserably underpaid then. With the exception of the naval officers, all the persons employed in the public service in the East were very highly paid, and properly so. The Admiral occupied a higher position than the Governor of Hong-Kong, and yet the latter received £5,500 a year, while the former had only £2,300. He wished to know whether or not Captain Sherard Osborn had been appointed to a post under the Chinese Government—a most extraordinary proceeding altogether—at a salary guaranteed by our Government of £3,500 a year. Here, on one hand, was the Admiral in command on the India station, the representative of the nation, who had £2,300 a year; and there, on the other, was Captain Sherard Osborn appointed to a post under the Chinese Government at a guaranteed salary of £3,500. It was to be doubted whether the House was fully aware how much the advantages connected with service in the navy had been diminished of late years. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty would admit that there was no longer any freight, except on the West India station; it was all carried in private vessels. In case of war the officers would, no doubt, do their duty; but their energy would be somewhat lessened by the fact that there could be no prize money, in consequence of the abandonment of our maritime rights in the Declaration of Paris. Again, fifteen or twenty years ago, about one-third of the Colonial Governments were filled by naval men; but, with the exception of the Falkland Islands and Ascension, all those posts were then occupied either by civilians or by military men. The navy, in fact, was being deprived of all the privileges which it had hitherto enjoyed, and the Government had even resolved not to leave it the solitary advantage of the command in the Chinese seas.
  LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, he thought it very unadvisable that he should travel out of the immediate view of the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend the
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  Member for Portsmouth, but it might be as well that he should give an answer to the statement of the hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. Cochrane) with regard to Captain Sherard Osborn. There seemed to be some great misunderstanding on the part of the hon. Gentleman that Captain Osborn was going to serve under the Chinese Government, being guaranteed by Her Majesty's Government £3,500 per annum. All he could say was, that Her Majesty's Government knew nothing about it. Captain Sherard Osborn had applied to the Admiralty to be allowed to serve under the Chinese Government mainly "with a view to the suppression of piracy in the China seas." He had leave given him to serve in China under that Government, but the Admiralty did not recognise any guarantee of terms whatever on the part of the Chinese Government. They had done what they did in former instances; Sir Baldwin Walker in the same way received permission to serve the Turkish Government; Sir Adolphus Slade had a similar permission; the gallant and distinguished officer the Member for Westminster in the same way served the Government of Spain. It was the occasional practice of the Admiralty to permit officers to serve under foreign Governments. Such service involved no claim on the public of this country, either as regards pay for the officer himself, or any serving under him. With regard to the question brought forward by his hon. and gallant Friend, of course the Admiralty were most glad that their officers should receive all proper allowances which might be granted to them by colonial Governments. The East India Government, it was well known, chose to make a very handsome allowance to the naval officers employed on that station, but that Government had been superseded by bringing India under the immediate government of the Queen, and it had been thought right that such allowances should cease. His hon. Friend, however, must recollect that these allowances had not been taken away from officers already in the enjoyment of them; but officers, whether admirals or inferior officers, went out on the distinct understanding that these allowances had ceased and determined. There was no fair comparison between the pay and allowances of officers in the army and navy. He did not for a moment mean to detract from the services of his brother officers, but he maintained that their services did not entail anything

  839
  like the discomfort and danger to which officers on shore in those climates were liable. His hon. and gallant Friend had read a letter from a gallant officer giving an account of an attack on the pirates. [Sir J. ELPHINSTONE: He is not an officer.] Well, perhaps he was a bishop. There was, he believed, a bishop who had very gallantly distinguished himself in those seas; but his hon. and gallant Friend appeared to have forgotten that the Government did make allowances, in the form of head-money, for the capture of pirates, and every year a considerable sum was proposed in the Estimates as prize-money on that account; but that had nothing whatever to do with the allowances of the Admiral or officers on the China station. He did not think it was the intention of the Government to propose allowances; indeed, he thought it would be gross injustice to the admirals on oilier stations to propose an allowance on the China station without making a proposal of the same nature for the other stations, many of which were quite as expensive and inconvenient as that to the claims of which his hon. and gallant Friend had directed the attention of the House.
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he thought it of great importance that the House should understand on what grounds leave had been given to Captain Sherard Osborn to serve under the Chinese Government. He would not go into the question whether it was right or not that Sir Baldwin Walker and Sir Adolphus Slade should have been allowed to serve the Turkish Government for the purpose of bolstering it up; but he would ask if it was the intention of the Government to undertake the same labour for China, and to allow their officers to serve a Government, whether that of the Emperor or of the rebels, in order to support and build up an effete dynasty and a decayed Power. If they had undertaken to help the Chinese Government to put down the Chinese rebels, they had entered upon a labour in which, on account of the distance from this country, it would be excessively difficult to persevere. It could not possibly be maintained, that if Captain Sherard Osborn was permitted to serve the Chinese Government, he should be still recognised as a British subject. If he then was not a British subject, in what espacity was he to be recognised? No doubt, officers serving under the British flag might perform duty in the Chinese waters, not for the Chinese Government
  840
  but for the protection of our trade and interests in that part of the world. But it could not surely be the intention of this country to give to an individual who was in receipt of half-pay from the English Admiralty permission to serve under a foreign Government, and if he were successful in that service, to give him credit for his success; but if he were unsuccessful, to allow him to fall back upon the English Government and seek support from the English naval commander under whom he was not placed. Such a course would involve us in war. He presumed that the services of Captain Sherard Osborn were to be performed afloat. In what description of vessel was he to hoist his flag? In a lorcha, or in a junk, or in a vessel built in this country? If it was true, as stated by the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, that the position of Captain Sherard Osborn as to the services he was about to perform for the Chinese Government would be similar to that occupied by Sir Baldwin Walker whilst performing services for the Turkish Government, then the House ought to understand the liability they were undertaking in sanctioning the permission given to Captain Sherard Osborn to serve the Chinese Government.
  MR. KINNAIRDsaid, Captain Sherard Osborn would not fall back upon the English naval commander for protection. Whilst he performed the work of putting down pirates in the Chinese seas, he would be recognised simply as an officer of the Chinese Government. The English Government had acted wisely in permitting Captain Sherard Osborn to strengthen the hands of the Chinese Government in the very desirable work of putting down piracy, which was rampant in the Chinese seas. By the Admiralty regulations, the officer of a British ship serving in the Chinese waters was not permitted to resent an attack upon any other than an English vessel.
  LORD LOVAINEsaid, he wished to know if Captain Sherard Osborn would be in a position to found a claim for pay and promotion against the British Government for services under the Chinese Government?
  COLONEL SYKESsaid, it was notorious that piracy was rampant in the China seas; but the blue-books presented to the House with reference to transactions in China did not tell the public that, in a military operation, our naval authorities could

  841
  act in conjunction with a pirate chief. He held in his hand an account of the recent capture of the city of Ningpo by Captain Dew, of the ship Encounter, a commander in Her Majesty's service. That officer stated that he "found it necessary to capture the city and drive the rebels out;" but he did not state under what authority he did this, but spoke of an insult having been offered to our flag. His act seemed to be characterized by the wilfulness and lawlessness of the buccaneers of old. Captain Dew stated that the British flag had been fired upon, meaning, of course, intentionally. The public journals gave a somewhat different version of the affair. They stated that one of the rebel chiefs had arrived in Ningpo, and the Taepings had received him with a feu-de-joie. They had fired in the direction of the river over the French and English ships, and the whistling of musket-balls had been heard, but no one was hurt. That was the insult for which atonement was required. Captain Dew, not satisfied with an apology, required that a battery towards the river should be disarmed, and of course his demand was refused, for he had no more right to make it than he had to demand that the rebel troops should be disarmed. A notorious Chinese pirate, who had so large and powerful a fleet that the Imperial Government were never able to put it down, arrived in the river at Ningpo while these demands were being made, and came up in the midst of the English and other foreign ships. The journals state that an arrangement was immediately made by Captain Dew with the pirate, who had the ex-Governor of Ningpo on board, that the city should be attacked the next morning. The rebels returned the fire; and as the pirate fleet lay between the foreign vessels and the city, of course our vessels came in for their share of it. This was sufficient for Captain Dew —he bombarded, and stormed, and took the city. And whom did we put in possession of the city? This pirate chief, with all his followers. The result was that the people flew in all directions, seeking for Europeans to go into the city to protect their houses from being plundered by the pirates, our allies. On their return many found their houses only a heap of smouldering ruins, and their property, which had been in the hands of the rebels for five months without being molested, was now entirely destroyed or
  842
  wholly at the mercy of the pirates, who were allowed three days for plunder. These statements, if true, were quite sufficient to show that in our conduct towards the Taepings we were enacting the fable of the wolf and the lamb. The lamb might be drinking at the upper or lower part of the stream, it was all the same, he was to be devoured. He also wished to ask a question respecting the property taken at the capture of Kah-ding. We had taken their plunder from the rebels, valued at some 130,000 dols., including the value of horses or ponies; but did we hand it back to the poor people to whom it belonged? Having robbed the robbers, we appropriated the spoil as if it were our own, and pronounced it prize of war. Turning next to the occurrences at Shanghai, he could not but describe the attack made upon the Taepings there by our force as uncalled for and unprovoked. The Taepings had repeatedly asked for our friendship; and if they had been allowed to enter and take possession of Shanghai as they had done at Ningpo, where there was not a single case of their having done any injury to Europeans, although there were some cases of Europeans having done injury to them, he believed that Shanghai would at that moment have been a free port, and the river there as safe and secure as the Thames. He would conclude by asking the questions of which he had given notice—namely, whether despatches had been received respecting the recent naval and military operations in China, and whether they would be laid immediately before the House; and whether the property taken at the capture of Kah-ding had been declared prize of war?
  MR. WHITBREADsaid, that in reply to the question of the noble Lord (Lord Lovaine) and gallant Member, be had to state that no claim upon this country was likely to arise on account of services performed on behalf of the Government of China. The notice to officers serving under the Chinese Government was as follows:—
  "Service performed under the Imperial Government of China will not be considered as service in the nary, as regards pay, time, promotion, &c. In the event of the senior officer in command having the power, under the Imperial Chinese Government, of awarding promotion in that service to officers serving under his command, the same will not be considered as a claim to promotion in the Royal navy. In the event of an officer being wounded in this service he will not be entitled to a pension for wounds; nor, if killed in

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  his action, will his widow be entitled to any more than the ordinary pension awarded to the widow of an officer dying while on half-pay."

DEFENCE OF CANADA.—CAPTAIN GRANT'S COOKING APPARATUS.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. ADDERLEYsaid, he wished, before the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War rose to reply to the question that had been put to him, to make a few observations upon a most important subject. He could not but think that it was most desirable that Parliament should not separate without some distinct statement being made of the intentions of the Government as to the defence of Canada. It was their right and duty, as it was the right and interest of the Canadians themselves, to know what were the intentions of the Government in view of the possible if not probable danger of invasion to which they were exposed during the approaching winter. In the first place, he would wish to know whether the Government considered that Canada was exposed to any danger. If not, why were 12,000 British troops retained in that colony. If, on the other hand, in their opinion there was danger, to what did they look for defence against that danger? The noble Lord at the head of the Government had on recent occasions strongly urged upon the House the duty of protecting this country against invasion; but in respect to Canada, which was far more vulnerable, he had not urged any precautions either in this country or in the colony. At the commencement of last winter an extraordinary number of British troops were sent out in great haste to meet an apprehended danger, and to enable Canada to prepare her own means for self-defence. There was no Quixotic intention to defend Canada by means of forces sent from this country, nor to exempt the Canadians from military service; but the aid was sent to assist and to encourage them in preparing their own means of defence. He had taken some pains to ascertain when there had last been any understanding between this country and Canada as to the relative part each should take in defending the province in case of foreign invasion. The latest and most authentic understanding of that nature which he had found was set forth in the despatches of the Colonial Secretaries between 1851 and 1854. In 1851 Earl Grey, writing to Lord Elgin, said—
  "Canada now has self-government; which ought
  844
  to carry with it corresponding responsibilities; the time is come for her to be called upon to take a larger share of her expenses. Her rapid progress in wealth and population makes it only due to the people of this country that they should be relieved from the charge imposed on them for the protection of a colony so well able to do much towards protecting itself. In this I am only reverting to the former colonial policy of this country. Up to the American Revolution the British colonies took the principal share of the burden of their own protection, and contributed to the military operations undertaken to extend the possessions of the Crown. Her Majesty's Government would have thought it right at an earlier period to revert to this policy in Canada but for commercial difficulties thrown in her way by British legislation. That has passed away.. … Canals have opened up the country on loans raised on the credit of the British Treasury. In future the troops maintained in Canada will be confined to the garrisons of Quebec and Kingston, and the maintenance of the canals, cut at the expense of this country, will be thrown on the provinces."
  The Duke of Newcastle went further. He stated that in future a single regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery would be all the force sent from England. In 1854 the right hon. Gentleman now the Home Secretary wrote to Sir Edmund Head that there was a necessity for a clear understanding being come to, and that—
  "Should an invasion of Canada by foreign Powers occur, the most Valuable aid to reinforcements supplied from this country would be afforded by an organized militia, such as her great population might now supply."
  No one could deny that those views were correct views. It was laid down that a colony like Canada should maintain her own internal order in time of peace, and that when foreign war threatened her, the forces of the empire should rally in aid of the colonial forces. It was not for this country to exempt the Canadians from military service. It would be indeed astonishing that the eastern quarter of the empire should maintain an army, but that the western, reversing the usual order of things, should assume an oriental languor, and leave the centre of the empire to defend it. Canada could not plead poverty as an excuse for not taking the proper means to provide for her own defence. Neither did he think that the Canadians could say, what had been said for them, that the danger of last winter arose from English policy, and did not concern Canada. Surely Canada was affected by an insult to the British flag, that waved over the navy which gratuitously protected her, and in whose glory she participated without shedding a drop of her own

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  blood. Nor can the Canadians deny the necessity to arm while they hug the reinforcements which represent that necessity, and which alone give them any feeling of security. When the troops were sent out in haste last winter, the noble Lord at the head of the Government expressed his belief in the patriotic spirit of the Canadians, and said the British troops were sent out to afford them time to develop their own powers of defence. But the expectation of the noble Lord had been disappointed. The colonists acknowledged that there was danger by the eagerness with which they hailed the arrival of the Imperial troops. But how did they express that feeling in action? They had done nothing. We, on our part, had shown our appreciation of the emergency by raising the number of our troops in the colony from a single regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery to 12,000 men. They had a militia of about 5,000 men, who were under drill six days in the year. Before the Select Committee which sat lately on the subject, the Duke of Newcastle said he was astonished to find that the Canadian militia constituted so small a force, and another official witness said that small as it was in number, it was still less in efficiency. By way of meeting the late emergency, however, the Canadians had added 5,000 more, increasing also the number of days of drill from six to twelve, reducing, however, the pay one-half. Thus they had shown us their appreciation of the danger and their opinion as to the extent of their own duty in meeting it. Their own Commission had stated that at least 100,000 organized and armed militia were necessary; and their own late Ministry proposed the organization and embodiment of a force of 50,000. The Governor General, Lord Monck, the other day at Montreal, had made a speech distinguished by manly sentiments and moderate language, saying as much as he could say under the circumstances, and telling the Canadians that they must prepare to take some share of their own defence, and that it would be impossible for this country any longer to consent to their contributing nothing, in either purse or person, towards the security of their frontier. There was never, probably, any occasion in which the governor of a free country had addressed in such terms the rich inhabitants of that country. The noble Lord at the head of the Government said, the other day, that
  846
  though they had only 10,000 militia, all the Canadians were liable to be called out in case of emergency. That seemed to satisfy the noble Lord, and such an assertion of readiness and vigour in a colony excited a cheer in this House. But was that the way in which England had prepared herself against threatened invasion when Napoleon's camp was formed at Boulogne; or more recently, when it was only thought possible that her shores might be attacked? Was that the way in which the old English colonies defended themselves when they resisted, from their own resources, the arms of France and Spain, and never dreamed of asking for any English reinforcements, but resented the offer of interference? It was rather an Hibernian phrase to talk about sending reinforcements to Canada, because there was really nothing to reinforce; and things had come to a strange pass when the House cheered the statement that a prosperous part of the empire had expressed their conviction that they were in danger, declared that they should be glad to receive reinforcements, but, as to themselves, it was enough that they were liable to be called out. Why, what people on earth were not liable to be called out in case of invasion? If an enemy actually kicked their doors down, they must come out; but the question was, whether such a mere liability was worth anything by way of defence. The House of Commons deceived both themselves and the Canadians by flattering the colonists, as though the statement of that liability were any proof of vigour, or any guarantee for the security of their country. The question excited much interest, and there was hardly a newspaper which had not lately taken it up. A correspondent of The Times, who signed himself "Canadian," and undertook to represent Canadian feeling, expressed great surprise that this country was dissatisfied, and stated the principle which he thought ought to guide the relations between the Home Government and the colony. What that gentleman understood was, that Canada should assist in keeping internal order in time of peace, but that the duty of resisting foreign invasion should be undertaken by the forces of the empire. In submitting that proposition, he did not see, that if Canada was a part of the empire, Canadian forces ought to constitute part of the forces of the empire. When there was anything to be got out of England, he argued the

  847
  claims of Canada as a part of the empire; but when invasion was to be resisted by the forces of the empire, England alone was meant. Warming with his subject, the writer then boldly compared the present preparations of Canada with those of this country, and said that a militia of 10,000 men in proportion to her population would be equivalent to 110,000 men raised in England. Had he the audacity or the ignorance to institute any comparison between the 10,000 militia drilled twelve days in a year, their arms and ammunition being supplied at the expense of this country, with the regular army, the militia, the volunteers, and the navy of England? That only showed how completely the Canadians misunderstood their position, and the relations existing between the two Governments, and how little thanks we were likely to get even if we could undertake their defence for them. The Mayor of Montreal spoke out more honestly after the dinner at which Lord Monck was present. Illustrating the old adage, In vino veritas, he said—
  "Canada might esteem itself a most fortunate community in being protected by one of the most powerful nations in the world, which sent them as many as might be required of ships and redcoats without rendering them liable in purse or person. No matter how many redcoats, the more the better, if they took not a single sou out of their pockets."
  Such were the magnanimous sentiments of the Major of Montreal, after Lord Monck had tried to rouse a patriotic feeling among the rich inhabitants of that city. Certainly, if anybody wished to preserve the connection between the colony and the mother country, he should not lose a moment in trying to replace their present rotten relations by something more genuine and more substantial. Depend upon it, that mutual deception, though it might get them over the next few months or years, would vanish at the first moment of trial. No such relations could stand the test of an actual emergency, and one of two courses must be taken. If the English Government had made up their minds to undertake the defence of Canada by troops sent from and paid by this country, the number of troops in the colony must be increased immensely. Even if the present extraordinary number were quadrupled, the force would still be a most inadequate one for such an undertaking. But who would undertake to defend, with any amount of forces, a country which would
  848
  not defend itself? As matters stood, we were in a most critical position with regard to Canada. It was an utter impossibility to defend the colony with 12,000 British troops. To suppose otherwise was only to deceive ourselves as well as the Canadians. If invasion came, the loss of Canada was absolutely certain, and that was not all. We should lose our troops, should bring upon ourselves disgrace and disaster, and then involve the country, on a point of honour, in a hopeless war without an object. What was the other course open? That which Lord Grey recommended the other day in another place—namely, that not a moment should be lost in causing the Canadian Parliament distinctly to understand that it must reconsider its refusal of internal defence and institute more valid preparation, or before winter the British troops which had been sent to aid the formation of their militia should return to England. In that respect Lord Grey did not speak without experience; for when Australia formerly would not listen to the proposal to pay a portion of the expenses of the British troops there, he had himsalf, as Colonial Minister, let it be known that the troops would be immediately ordered to return home. The consequence was that the people of Australia immediately came into the terms first proposed by England; and there could be no doubt, that the embarkation of the first British regiment for the purpose of returning from Canada to England, would make Canada take a very different view on this question. The Canadians could not decently complain, for it would be only taking them on their own plea of the non-necessity of arming. He should have liked, had circumstances permitted, to move an Address to the Queen, praying her to send instructions to the Governor General of Canada, to call together again the Canadian Parliament, and submit to the members measures of better preparation, making them clearly to understand, that in the event of such measures not being adopted, the British troops in Canada would be recalled; but he felt that it would be absolutely useless for him, within five or six days of the prorogation, to offer any such proposition to the House. However, to prevent the country being left in the dark on the subject, his only alternative was to raise a late discussion, and to throw the whole responsibility of what might happen in the winter on the noble Lord at the head of the Government.

  849
  The present state of things could only last, he believed, till trial came; and if an emergency occurred during the approaching winter, Canada would be inevitably lost to this country. If no emergency occurred, the connection might last in mutual deception for some time longer; but whenever the trial came, the separation of Canada in its present condition from this country was inevitable, and would, if Ministers only chose to trust to the chapter of accidents for the crisis, be attended with bitter feelings and disastrous consequences. He therefore called on the noble Lord at the head of the Government to state what were his intentions. Let the noble Lord treat the case in a dignified way; and if he really meant that the loss of Canada was not to be cared for, he should boldly let the Canadians know that in time; so that amicable arrangements might be made on both sides for the interests of Canada and for the honour of this country. But if the noble Lord agreed with him that the severance of Canada from this country would be a mutual misfortune, and that abandonment of empire should not be contemplated by him as a Minister of the Crown, there was no time to be lost in removing every obstacle to the formation of a sufficient basis of local defence.
  MR. ARTHUR MILLSsaid, he substantially agreed with what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman, but he differed from him respecting the course which ought to be pursued. He did not think it would be advisable to adopt the course recommended by Earl Grey and send out instructions to Canada, declaring that unless the Canadians took steps for organizing an adequate militia the Imperial troops would be withdrawn from that country; for such a course might be taken as a sort of dictation to the Canadian Parliament. He thought they ought to avoid all appearance of dictation towards the Canadian Parliament. No doubt the Militia Bill it had passed was one that in the opinion of every person in this country who had paid attention to the subject was wholly inadequate; but if he were a member of the Canadian Parliament, though he might feel ashamed of that Bill, he might hesitate to obey an edict of the Imperial legislature. It appeared to him most important that the executive Government at home should rather take a line of dignified inaction on this subject, giving the Canadian Parliament an opportunity of reconsidering what
  850
  it had done in respect to that miserable Militia Bill, which it had passed. In his belief, the Canadian Parliament did not represent the Canadian people on that matter, and he should like that people to have a practical opportunity of expressing their opinion. This was not so much a question for the taxpayers of this country as for the safety of the Canadians themselves; and the time would shortly come when they would see, that if this country were able to send out to Canada 50,000 or 60,000 troops, that force would be useless for the defence of the frontier, unless it was backed by a strong and numerically sufficient militia. Still, if an edict were sent out to the Canadian Parliament to reconsider its ways, and it refused to alter its determination, the home Government would be placed in an absurd and ridiculous position. The House of Commons had recently passed a resolution declaring that the Imperial Government would protect the colonies against all perils to which they might be exposed in consequence of Imperial policy. Now the British troops in Canada were sent to protect the Canadians against the consequences of Imperial policy; and unless those perils had passed away, it was almost impossible for any Government at home to recall the troops; or if they recalled them, they might have to send them back again. Therefore, it was very desirable that the Government should act with great deliberation in this matter. It was quite obvious that to raise 10,000 militia, who were to be called out for six days in the year, was a measure by no means adequate to the exertions which England was making for the defence of Canada by the aid of taxes drawn from a people who were suffering under a special degree of pressure. At the same time, the opposition to the Canadian Government did not prove that there was any unwillingness to provide a proper militia. It had been brought about by one of those political combinations which were not unknown in the mother country, and it was simply an opposition to an unpopular government, which had been jobbing in every direction, and which deserved to be opposed. He (Mr. A. Mills) agreed that the present cost of protecting Canada was something quite monstrous. This very year the mother country would be paying something like £1,250,000 for that purpose. It was time that an end should be put to the system of nursing up our colonies in a state of

  851
  reliance upon the resources of the mother country. It was manifest, that if ever we become entangled in a quarrel with America, when we had at the same time a mutiny in India, or a Russian war, or when we were menaced on the Continent, it would be utterly impossible for us to pour into Canada a force sufficient to meet the troops which, with the railway system in operation in the United States, might be brought against them. As an owner of property in Canada, he should feel that the safety for it to be derived from assistance from the mother country would be as nothing compared with the security which the establishment of a local force numerically and in point of efficiency capable of defending its own territory would confer.

CAPTAIN GRANT'S COOKING APPARATUS.

  QUESTION.
  GENERAL LINDSAYsaid, that with reference to Captain Grant's cooking apparatus, to which he had called attention on Tuesday last, he wished to observe that the Motion which he had then made with respect to it had been defeated only by a majority of one, while he would go so far as to say that, had not the Government had special reasons for keeping a large number of its supporters in the House, in order that no obstacle might be thrown in the way of the introduction of the Bill to make provision to meet the distress in Lancashire, he should have defeated them on the occasion in question. That being so, he wished to ask the Secretary for War, Whether he had any objection to the appointment of a Committee to investigate the claims advanced by Captain Grant? He was sorry that that officer had thought proper to address a letter to the right hon. Gentleman and to the newspapers on the subject since Tuesday, inasmuch as he thought it would have been much better to leave his case in the hands of the House of Commons? He asked the question which he had just put to the right hon. Baronet, simply in the discharge of what he conceived to be a public duty, and he trusted he would have no objection to the appointment of a Committee of practical men, by whom the advantages of Captain Grant's system might be thoroughly examined.
  SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, he agreed with the gallant General that the Government were completely committed to making Captain Grant a handsome reward for an invention which was made use of by
  852
  100,000 men, and which had received the approval of the highest military authorities. He could not conceive, in fact, how the Government could reconcile itself to the course it had adopted; and for his own part he thought that £5,000 or £10,000 would be only a reasonable and fair sum to award to the gallant officer for his invention.
  But, turning from that subject to the more important question of the military policy it was expedient we should pursue towards our colonies, he might observe that he agreed with the hon. Member for Taunton in thinking that we had hitherto been nursing them in a manner not calculated to do them permanent service. If the colonies were led to rely on the conviction that the whole power of the mother country would be brought to bear for their defence whenever the slightest danger threatened them, it was quite obvious they were likely to remain, so far as making provision for their own protection was concerned, in a very unsatisfactory state. The hon. Member for Taunton maintained that it would betray great inconsistency on the part of the Government to withdraw from Canada the troops which we sent there last winter. He did not agree with that opinion. The act of the Government in sending reinforcements to Canada was a fair and just measure; because whatever was the danger with which they were threatened at that time, it arose from Imperial, and not from Colonial policy. But was there any such danger now? He did not think there was; nor was there likely to be for three or four years to come. There were many Members of that House who were better acquainted with America than he was, but he was strongly of opinion that the boasting articles in the American newspapers, intimating that the Federal Government had nothing to do but to reverse the heads of its columns from the South and march into and take possession of Canada spoke of that which was wholly impracticable. In truth it was impracticable then, and it was still more impracticable now. The American Government, powerful as it was, enthusiastically as it had followed up the war with the South, had no means at present of making war upon either Canada or England. Canada, with a population of 2,500,000—a population nearly as great as was that of the United States when they successfully resisted the power of the British Empire, if true to itself, might

  853
  defy all the efforts of the American Government to subdue it. He saw no objection, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government recalling these troops; and they had even ample excuse for so doing in the course taken by the Canadian legislature with regard to the Militia Bill. But his hon. Friend had suggested that if the Canadian government were to dome forward with an adequate measure; they ought to continue to leave the troops there. He (Sir De L. Evans) was of opinion that any such understanding would be a very inconvenient course to enter upon, for the Imperial (Government was hardly competent to lay down rules for its policy applicable alike to all its colonies. He confessed that he thought there was no ground for leaving these troops in Canada, even though the Mayor of Montreal had said, and most truly, that they would be glad to have as many red-coats as they could get at the expense of England.
  MR. ROEBUCK: Sir, I am sorry to interpose between the House and the consideration of a cooking apparatus; but when the great interests of a great empire are concerned, I may be pardoned for offering my opinion upon a matter of which I think I have some knowledge. The first thing we have to consider is, what is the feeling of the people of Canada with respect to England. My opinion is, that the people of Canada have been led to believe that we consider them of such wonderful importance that we shall undertake any expense to maintain dominion over them. What I want them to understand, and what I want our Government to make them understand, is that we do not care one farthing about the adherence of Canada to England. We have never drawn from our colonies anything like tribute. Other nations do at this moment derive tribute from their colonies, but we have never done so. The only chance of benefit we ever expected from our colonies was perfect freedom of trade. What has Canada done in that matter? The Canadians have laid 20 per cent upon the introduction of all English manufactures into their country, thereby following the bad example of their friends on the other side of the St. Lawrence. I want them clearly to understand that England has no benefit from her connection with them; and that if we maintain, not our dominion, but their independence, it is for their advantage and not for ours. There is nobody in this country who is in a position to speak with
  854
  more freedom than myself with respect to Canada. Many years of my life were spent in that country. I have intimate relations with it now; but though I do not love Canada less, I love England more, and my opinion is, that if to-morrow we were to get rid of Canada, England would not lose a single farthing of benefit. But the position of Canada would be very different. When the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans) says that the United States cannot overrun Canada, I must say that I think he has studied history to very little purpose if that be his real opinion. I quite agree with the noble Lord in another place, who said that if the Federal Government were victorious to-morrow, they would turn round upon England, and the first thing they would do would be to pour their armies over the St. Lawrence into Canada; while if they were to be defeated in their struggle with the South, out of mere vengeance they would do the same thing. What would be the consequence? Canada, ceasing to be what she is how—a powerful and independent people, governing themselves, doing exactly as they like with their own, would be under the dominion of an over bearing and over powering democracy. She would be one among what were once thirty-seven United States. Her people would have one or two votes in the American Senate; whereas now they govern themselves, for England has given up dominion over them, and all we do is to send our soldiers—those redcoats whom the Mayor of Montreal talks about—to protect their independence. I want the Canadians clearly to understand that England would not be sorry to see them depart from her to-morrow. They do us no good, or, at least, not more than New York; they do not even receive bur manufactures, and they treat us like aliens. We have been told that the House of Commons should not dictate to the Parliament of Canada. Do we ever dictate now? I have stood up in my place against the dictation of this House to the people of Canada, but that system has been abandoned long ago. We have, on the other hand, gone too far in the opposite direction. The very veto of the Crown is entirely ignored, and that which we ought to have done—namely, protect the manufacturing interests of England—we have ceased to do. I say, therefore, we are now bound to look after the interests of bur constituents, and I shall be the very last man to lay one far-

  855
  thing of expense upon the poor people of Sheffield in order to maintain the independence of the rich people of Canada.
  SIR GEORGE LEWIS: With regard to Captain Grant's invention, I will only say it would have been my wish to give a fair consideration to the subject. The demand which he makes is not merely one for the recognition of the utility and merit of his invention, but it is a demand for a large sum of public money, fixed by my hon. and gallant Friend below the gangway at from £5,000 to £10,000, and by himself at from £30,000 to £40,000. The information I have received leads me to doubt whether any such considerable economy as Captain Grant states, or anything approaching to it, has been produced by his improvement; but in consequence of the opinion expressed by a nearly equal division in this House a few days since, I shall be ready to cause the subject to be investigated, with the view of seeing whether he is entitled to any reward. With regard to the question put by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes), I can only say we are not in possession of any such information as he refers to, beyond that which has been inserted in the Gazette—the despatches from the naval and military commanders in chief. With regard to the question of the military force in Canada, I am desirous of recalling the attention of the House to the position of affairs before Christmas last, because it is impossible to arrive at any sound and practical conclusion on the subject unless we go back to that period. Canada was then in its ordinary military position. It has a force of volunteers and a militia; but it never was the custom of our North American colonies, or, indeed, any colonies of British descent, to keep a standing army in time of peace. The practice in Canada was similar to that followed by the United States in time of peace—to maintain only a small, and not very effective militia. The House well remembers the alarm of the disruption of friendly relations with the United States which occurred in the course of last winter. The cause of that alarm was a misunderstanding with a captain of the American navy boarding a ship bearing the English flag. This was an affront to the English flag; but it was a question of purely Imperial interest, in which Canada was not directly concerned, and in which she was only indirectly interested as part of the Bri-
  856
  tish empire. If Canada had been invaded in a war arising from the United States in consequence of that quarrel, the feelings of the Canadians would naturally have been that they were involved in a quarrel in which they had no direct concern, and that it was incumbent on the Imperial Government, through connection with which they were engaged in hostilities, to give them effectual assistance. The Government anticipated that the effect of a war with the United States would be the invasion of the Canadian frontier, and therefore they sent out a reinforcement of troops. The policy of that measure was discussed when the Supplementary Estimate was produced at the commencement of the Session, and it received, I think, the general assent of the House; it is therefore unnecessary to argue in support of the reinforcement which was then sent out to Canada. It is true that the arrival of these troops was the cause of great satisfaction to the Canadian people. They were received with hospitality and kindness, and much loyal feeling was expressed at that time. But then, be it remembered, that an immediate invasion of Canada was generally apprehended, and the troops arrived before it was known that the dispute arising out of the affair of the Trent had received a pacific solution. Since that time the contest between the ancient United States and the Confederates in the South has proceeded; great confidence was expressed by the Washington Government that they would be able to suppress what they denominated the rebellion in the South in a short period. They have fixed various times, consisting of months, or even of weeks, when this rebellion would be suppressed; but these prophecies have not been fulfilled, and at this moment we know that the contest seems further from a termination in favour of the North than it was at the beginning of the year. Under these circumstances, the hopes that Her Majesty's Government confidently entertained in the winter that the Canadian Government and people would make energetic efforts for their own defence, calling out their militia, and passing an amended Militia Bill, have, perhaps, not altogether unnaturally, been in some degree disappointed; because there is no doubt that the alarm of an immediate invasion which the Canadians felt early in the year has by subsequent events been greatly diminished. It is true, as my hon. and gallant Friend (General Sir De Lacy Evans)

  857
  stated, that at present they do not anticipate any immediate danger of invasion, nor do Her Majesty's Government think, looking to the state of the contest between the North and South—looking to the manner in which the affair of the Trent was treated by the Government of the United States—looking generally to the complexion of public affairs in that country, that there is any immediate probability, under any circumstances, of the rupture of pacific relations with the United States. The Government of the United States must be well aware that an invasion of Canada is not merely an invasion of Canada, it is a war with England; and, of course, if the United States were to seek a war with England, and originate a ground of dispute and invade British territory, they would look forward to interference with the Southern blockade, by the British fleet, the raising of the blockade, and the entire reverse of much of the state of things with the South which now exists. Giving them credit, therefore, for ordinary prudence under trying and difficult circumstances, nothing at present seems more unlikely than that the United States should voluntarily originate a war with so powerful a nation as England, and one possessing so effective and disposable a fleet. Under these circumstances, even although the Canadian Government, contrary to our expectations, contrary to our wishes, contrary to the policy which Lord Monck, the governor, has expressed, and which has been admitted by the people of Canada, have not made those efforts which they ought to have made for strengthening their militia, still, Her Majesty's Government do not think that any ground exists for regretting having sent out reinforcements to Canada. But then we are told that we ought to take efficient measures for reducing our troops in Canada, and compelling the Canadian Legislature to establish an effective and numerous militia. There are two ways in which that compulsion could be applied. We could propose a Bill to Parliament to legislate for Canada and to compel them to establish a sufficient militia. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Adderley) himself does not propose any measure of that sort. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck) very truly said that for many years we have given up legislating for the internal affairs of Canada, and I can hardly think, looking to the principles of colonial policy which have been sanctioned by this House,
  858
  that any hon. Gentleman will propose, or approve a Bill if proposed for that purpose. Well, but if not legislating directly, seeking to accomplish the object indirectly would seem to me infinitely more objectionable than direct legislation. The right hon. Gentleman proposes a penal withdrawal of our troops from Canada—that is we are to say to Canada, "Because you have not established a sufficient militia for the protection of your frontier we will punish you by withdrawing our troops and leave your frontier wholly undefended." That is a policy which the right hon. Gentleman deliberately proposes as a dignified and reasonable course for England to adopt towards Canada. I confess I can hardly conceive anything more unworthy of the Legislature of this country, or of the Government of this country, than such a vindictive proceeding. If we are deliberately dissatisfied with the Legislature of Canada—if we think that sufficient time has been given to them to reflect on what appears to have been a hasty decision, influenced by party considerations, and dictated by the motive of turning out a Government; for no doubt the division on the Canada Militia question was produced by a temporary combination for the purpose of bringing about a change of Government. ["No, no!"] Well, I speak on very good information and authority when I affirm that the main motive for the division was the desire to turn out the Government for the time being, and to improve the opportunity of forming a combination with the Lower Canadian party. If this House thinks that sufficient time has been given to the Canadian Legislature to reflect on that decision, and that their policy had been deliberately adopted, and if we are determined to throw the entire defence on the colony, and that the mother country should not take any considerable share in it, our proper course would be either to give them a long notice that we intend to withdraw our troops, or pass an Imperial Act compelling them to create a sufficient militia of their own. I have already said that I think under existing circumstances in the United States, there is little probability of an immediate invasion of Canada, and I will only suggest to the House, that although it is an unquestionable and lamentable fact that great irritation exists on the part of the people of the Northern States against England—an irritation, which, I may say, was as undeserved by the course which the

  859
  Government have pursued towards the United States, as it was wholly unexpected —yet that irritation has been mainly caused by the recognition of the Southern States as a belligerent power. There may have been minor causes of irritation, but undoubtedly the main cause of the irritation that has existed has been the recognition by this country of the Southern States as a belligerent power. I cannot but think, as this contest proceeds, that the people of the Northern States, notwithstanding the excitement and the disappointment which the course of events may produce, must see upon reflection that England had, in fact, no other alternative than that which she adopted. It was necessary for Her Majesty's Government to consider not only the feelings of the country, but also the international relations that are created by the existence of a great war. If the people of the Southern States had been regarded as rebels, their ships fitted out as privateers must have been treated as pirates by England; and it was only by recognising the South in its real character as a belligerent that insoluble difficulties connected with the law of nations have been avoided. And really, Sir, I can hardly understand why the Northern States should so much resent the recognition of the belligerency of the Southern States, when I remember, that according to their own repeated declarations, they have an army of between 600,000 and 700,000 men on foot, and that after the recent battle near Richmond the President has made an appeal for an addition of 300,000 men to that large force. The mere statement of these numbers is surely sufficient to prove that the Power against which all these mighty preparations are made at least deserves the name of a belligerent Power. It is impossible to conceive that they can be correctly designated as a mere casual agglomeration of rebels. The resistance to the authority of the United States has acquired a firmness, a compactness, and a consistency, which justly entitle the persons composing it to the name of a belligerent Power. I cannot, therefore, but think, that taking all these very obvious circumstances into consideration, the Northern States will see that the only important step with reference to this matter taken by England was not only justifiable, but inevitable. Before I sit down I will only make one, allusion to the remarks of my hon. and learned Friend. (Mr. Roe-
  860
  buck) upon our future relations with Canada. I, for one, can only say that I look forward without apprehension—and, I may add, without regret—to the time when Canada might become on independent State; but I think it behoves England not to cast Canada loose, or send her adrift before she has acquired sufficient strength to assert her own independence. We should not, by any acts of momentary irritation or ill humour which might throw her into the arms of the United States, place her in a position in which she would become annexed to a Power involved in a serious contest, and which has lately added millions and millions to its national debt. I think this would be a moment most unfortunately chosen for any act of that kind. The feelings of the Canadian people as shown upon the arrival of our troops in the winter were, undoubtedly, those of attachment and loyalty to the mother country. I do not believe that the recent vote with regard to the Militia Bill was the result of any deliberate policy or deep-seated design. It was accidentally thrown out by the play of party politics; and I cannot but wish to impress upon the House that any measure, such as the right hon. Gentleman recommends, of a menace on the part of England, that under certain circumstances, if they do not take efficient steps for organizing a powerful militia, our troops will be withdrawn, would be unworthy of this country, and would seem to be the result rather of hasty displeasure than of that dignified and prudent forbearance which has always been the characteristic of the Imperial policy.
  MR. T. BARINGsaid, that being in constant communication with Canada, and having much correspondence with that colony, he was informed that a feeling had recently arisen in that province, and was increasing, that there was a wish on the part of a great portion of that House to force upon it a precipitated separation from the mother country. And he must say, if anything could strengthen that feeling, it would be the recurrence of speeches like that of the right hon. Member for Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley) and the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), telling the Canadian people that they had not the least desire that they should loyally adhere to their allegiance to the Sovereign and their attachment to this country; that they wished they would separate entirely from England, and that they would see that sepa-

  861
  ration not only without regret, but with satisfaction. He would not enter into questions of colonial policy. He believed that colonies might be a source of wealth and power to the mother country; that the union between the two might be one of mutual benefit; that it might be maintained without an extravagant expenditure; but to say that such a connection was merely a question of £. s. d. was quite unworthy of them, when they had, to a certain extent, to protect their fellow-countrymen, and had, at least, to regard them as their fellow-subjects until they themselves desired to separate from the mother country. Certain speeches which had latterly been delivered in another place, together with the tone of the public press, were calculated to make the Canadians believe that in this country there was no kindred feeling towards them—a result which he thought was much to be deprecated. The measure which had been referred to was defeated from a party manœuvre, without pledging the province to any policy of hereafter refusing to establish a sufficient militia, and with the expression, at the same time, on the part of those who opposed it, that they were in favour of a militia that should co-operate with the English troops in defence of the common country. These persons, he believed, would at this moment rise as one man in support of their union with England, and they had shown that when questions, not merely of colonial, but of Imperial concern arose, and when they would have suffered all the injury of invasion, they did not shrink from expressing manfully their hopes for the success of England and her colonies. It was said, "Leave Canada entirely to herself;" but as long as they wished to remain British subjects that was not language which ought either in honour or duty to be held to the Canadian people. He was convinced that Canada felt so much the advantage of her connection with England, that without burdening our resources, she would adhere to us from sentiments of loyal allegiance. To say therefore that because a certain legislative move in the Canadian Chamber, the object of which was the removal of a Ministry, had been carried out, they were to force the colonists into a separation by threatening to withdraw their troops, would be not only dishonourable to this country, and contrary to precedent, but would be a course against which the people of this country would
  862
  strongly protest. It had been said that it was quite right to turn out that Ministry, because it was a jobbing Ministry. He believed it was always thought right to turn out any Ministry, and there was hardly any Ministry that was not occasionally accused of jobs. He knew some of the Canadian Ministers who were alluded to, and believed they were incapable of such acts. But that was not a question which the House had to investigate. The Canadian Parliament had exercised its right in refusing to accede to a measure from hostility to those who proposed it; and there was nothing to show that they were opposed to an adequate militia. The right hon. Gentleman who spoke last confirmed him in his hopes and belief that there would be no war between this country and the United States. There could be no war between those States and Canada. If they attacked Canada, it would only be in order, through her, to make war upon England. He thought no event could occur so detrimental to both countries or to civilization itself, as a war between England and the United States. Yet due provision ought to be made against every casualty and contingency. In the present unsettled state of affairs in the United States they ought not to withdraw their troops from Canada; and that colony would, no doubt, soon provide a sufficient militia. The hon. and gallant Member for Westminster said that there was no chance of war with the United States, and therefore they ought to withdraw their troops from Canada; but that statement went to justify the Canadians for declining to increase their militia. But, while he hoped there was no probability of war, there was always a chance of some collision between this country and the United States; and when that did occur, the Canadians would be the first to feel the shock of war. Still they would be always ready to do their duty in defending their country. He might also remark that it was the financial difficulties arising from the disturbances in the United States that had prevented Canada from removing those duties upon British manufactures which were justly complained of, but which were levied for purposes, of revenue, and not for protection. That was not the moment at which to coerce Canada. The right policy was to conciliate, as he believed that by conciliation they would be more likely to gain their object than by threats.
  SIR MINTO FARQUHARsaid, that

  863
  having lately had on opportunity of conversing with a distinguished Canadian gentleman who had expressed great regret at the irritated feeling which appeared to exist in this country against the colony, he would call the attention of the House to the subject. The Militia Bill, which was thrown out by the Canadian Parliament, was discussed a considerable time—some six months, at all events—after the panic which took place on the Mason and Slidell affair, which led to the supposition that there might be an immediate war with America, had passed away. From the details of the Bill he understood that it was considered by those who opposed it, that Canada would not have derived a benefit commensurate with the expenditure. He had also been informed, that when the question was discussed in the Canadian Parliament, the Government which introduced it refused to give estimates of the cost which would be incurred by it. Further, he was told, that had the Bill passed, the expense to Canada, instead of being from £400,000 to £500,000 in the first instance, would in all probability have been £700,000, and that without including arms which it was expected England would have sent over to them. At that time there existed a strong opposition to the Government in power, and the Militia Bill most unfortunately was made the question on which the issue was taken of displacing the Government. Well, that was not an unusual course even in this country. It was not a hundred years ago that they had heard of an English Government turned out of power because it was said that they were not the proper Government to carry a Reform Bill, and that their foreign policy was contrary to the feelings of the country. It was well known, too, that the very Government which followed, and which was specially sent into power to carry a Reform Bill, dropped the Bill, let it go by, and with regard to foreign policy, stated that they should continue in the steps of their predecessors; and if such things could happen in a British, why not in a Canadian Parliament? Of late years we had acted liberally towards our colonies, and had given them self-government; and, in consequence, he believed that at no former period were the colonies more closely attached to the mother country. He was assured that those members who defeated the Government on the Militia Bill in the Canadian Parliament, did so on its own particular merits, and were
  864
  quite prepared to support a militia better proportioned than the present to the population and means of the colony; and, indeed, the whole people of Canada had shown in the strongest manner their loyalty to the Crown of England. Immediately after the Trent affair became known, and before anything had been heard from England, 300 of the principal inhabitants of Canada formed themselves into a Committee to promote the formation of Volunteer corps for the defence of the country, and in Montreal 3,000 citizens enrolled themselves as Volunteers. If war had then occurred, it would have been a war for Imperial purposes, but Canada would have lent us its best assistance in that war. He considered that the colonies of England were her glory, and took great interest in Canada, and lamented the tone of some speeches that had been made in that House and in another place, and the tone of the press upon this subject; for he did not think that a threat to do something if Canada would not do something else was a good way of promoting good feeling, or of obtaining our object, but could not fail to irritate a most loyal and intelligent people.
  VISCOUNT BURYsaid, it was impossible to deny that Canada had not done all that she should have done in the matter of defence. What had been done could only be regarded as an instalment, and he felt convinced that in the next Session of the Canadian Parliament something more would be done. But, at the same time, he must strongly deprecate the tone and manner of many speakers in that House and elsewhere, and of writers in the press, which could only irritate a country every man in which, he firmly believed, was loyal to the Queen of Great Britain. It might be that Canada should do more than she had done, but it was not right to address her in language of contumely and insult. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had said that England would not be one penny the worse if Canada were separated from the British Crown. That might be true, but it was not a matter to be regarded solely in an £ s. d. light; it must also be regarded from a statesmanlike point of view. England and her colonies formed a vast confederacy upon which, as Daniel Webster had poetically expressed it, "the sun never set," and which ought not to be broken up by ill-considered speeches. He had noticed that those Gentlemen who

  865
  talked most glibly about giving up Canada because she had exercised her own rights ever her own expenditure were the very persons who, when the subject of defences for this country came under discussion, exercised to the full their right of criticising the expenses, and of endeavouring by all means in their power to keep down expenditure. Canada had exercised her right; her members lived under a constitutional Government, and were responsible to their constituents for the outlay they sanctioned. The Bill for raising 10,000 militia was only an ad interim measure, brought forward by a gentleman unconnected with the Government while the members of the Government were being re-elected, and it would probably undergo considerable changes in a future Session. The Canadian system of finance was not founded upon a satisfactory basis; and probably, if the Colonial Government could put their hands upon a balance, instead of having a deficit, they would be more liberal in providing for their own defence. The right hon. Gentleman had alluded in contemptuous terms to the loyalty of the Canadian people, but what happened in the war of 1812 furnished a convincing reply to any such remarks. At the beginning of the struggle we had only about 900 regular troops in the province. Sir Isaac Brock, then in command, issued a proclamation calling to arms the loyal subjects of the British Crown, and in a short time he had under his command an overwhelming force. In the campaigns of 1812 and the two following years about fifty fights took place, and at the end of that period not a single foot of British soil remained in the hands of the Americans. General Scott and many of the invaders were taken prisoners; the battle of Queen's Town Heights had been gained, along with many others; the Canadian militia, assisted by the small force of regulars, drove the enemy across the frontier, and retaliated upon American ground. Canada was saved mainly by the ancestors of those who were now taunted with want of loyalty; and the Duke of York issued an order in which he expressed his high sense of the conduct of the Canadian militia, which, he said, mainly contributed to the success of the British arms, and the future security of the British empire in North America. The present Canadians came of the same stock with the men who fought thus gallantly, and he was quite sure, that if they were threatened by
  866
  invasion, they would rise as one man. The same spirit animated them, along with the same devotion to the British rule. At present the organization of the militia was very much what it was in 1812. The country was divided into districts; regiments were organized, a sufficient number out of each regiment were assembled, armed, and clothed to form flank companies; and now there were in Canada men who would form a nucleus round which a numerous force might rally. The total number of enrolled militia in Canada was 600,000; and, taking one man in ten, that would raise a very large force for the defence of the colony. The late Government proposed to raise 50,000 men. When the present Government came into office, they found a deficit of 5,000,000 dols. per annum. They were pledged to retrenchment, and, under such circumstances, would any Chancellor of the Exchequer have recommended an expensive scheme as to the practical working of which there were two opinions. For not only was there a difference of opinion as to whether so large a force was desirable, it was doubted also whether the scheme itself was a satisfactory one, and whether it would not interfere too much with the volunteer organization which had been set on foot during the Trent affair, and had made great progress all over Canada. That was one of the reasons which induced the Canadian Government to pass an ad interim measure, with a view of reconsidering the question on on a future occasion. He would remind hon. Gentlemen that, besides the 10,000 militia, 13,000 volunteers were already enrolled, and these, like our own Volunteers, had been hard at work and had drilled themselves into a state of considerable efficiency, so that Colonel Lysons, who was sent out officially from this country, reported that they were quite as intelligent and as far advanced in discipline as those in England. Thus there were available for the defence of Canada 23,000 men, among whom were fourteen troops of cavalry and twenty-nine field-guns, properly equipped and ready to take the field. He quite admitted that Canada must do more than she had hitherto done, but the efforts which she had already made had certainly been undervalued. A fortuitous combination had turned out the late Government, with no particular feeling of hostility to the Militia Bill, and certainly from no want of loyalty to the British Crown. A new Ministry had come in,

  867
  committed to a policy of retrenchment, with a deficit of 5,000,000 dols. upon a revenue of 12,000,000 dols.; and, under these circumstances, it would have been the height of madness for them to have proposed, at the fag end of the Session, any very large and expensive measure. That must be done when the Government had had time to look about them, and restore the financial equilibrium of the colony, and then he was certain that the Canadians would come forward as loyally and as heartily as the right hon. Gentleman himself could desire, and put the country into a state of adequate defence.
  MR. DISRAELI: Sir, I cannot contemplate with the same feeling of indifference as the Secretary of State a separation taking place between this country and Canada. I think a great empire, founded on sound principles of freedom and equality, is as conducive to the spirit and power of a community as commercial prosperity or military force; and therefore I should be very sorry under the present circumstances, after all that has occurred, to suppose that the connection between the mother country and this important colony should end. The resources of Canada are great and various. It has had the advantage of having been colonized during centuries by two of the most distinguished nations of Europe. Canada is, in fact, a reflex of those two powerful races, differing in their manners and even in their religious opinions; and therefore has many of those diverse elements which tend to change in due season a mere colonial into a national character. I do not think that the importance of Canada can be overstated, but, unfortunately, we feel every day more and more that the relations between the mother country and those colonies in which what we call self-government has been established are not altogether of a satisfactory nature. That self-government was for a long time so obstinately refused by the mother country, and in the end so precipitately conceded, that I will not Say the terms, but the principles on which the new relations between the mother country and the colonies hereafter should be regulated were never sufficiently examined and matured. There were two principles on which the new connection might have been established, and which could not have been contested at the time when that self-government was formed and sanctioned. One was that every colony should adopt reasonable mea-
  868
  sures of self-defence; and the other, that there should be between the colony and the mother country free commercial intercourse. I do not believe that at the time either of those principles would have been controverted, or refused by any colonies belonging to the English Crown, and now enjoying the blessings of self-government. It is impossible to deny that the heedlessness with which this great boon was conceded by England has brought about a very unsatisfactory state of relations between this country and those colonies to which self-government was granted; and this is especially remarkable in the case of Canada, from its great and preponderating importance; but I do not very well perceive how we can suddenly and hastily adopt a remedy for these evils. They are, in a great degree, the creation of our rashness and carelessness, and we must trust in the case of Canada, as well as in the case of other colonies similarly situated, to the spirit and sense of the inhabitants, and in a great degree to the character, talents, and resources of the governors whom we send out. It is the greatest error in the world to suppose that because those communities are in the possession of the inestimable blessing of self-government their destiny will not be greatly and most advantageously influenced by men of eminence sent by the mother country to preside over and regulate their affairs; and at no time in the history of this empire ought the appointment of individuals to great Colonial posts to be watched with more jealousy and scrutinized with more vigilance by Parliament than at this period, when there has been conceded to these colonial communities the power of self-government. In respect to Canada, I trust to the influences I have adverted to—I trust to the sense and to the spirit of the inhabitants, and to the abilities of those men whom Her Majesty may be recommended to send out as governors. I protest against the discussion, on occasions like the present, of Canadian politics. When I understand that the Parliament of Canada has come to a certain resolution, I accept it as the resolution of the Parliament and people of Canada; and I protest against any one rising in this House and telling us that, from secret information, he is cognizant of the reason why a certain vote has been carried. I find it difficult, in respect to divisions in this House, to trace on all occasions the causes which influence them;

  869
  and therefore I think that it would be more safe, and certainly more respectful to the Canadians, for us to assume that the vote of their Parliament is one which represents generally the opinion of the Parliament of Canada, and of the people by whom it is elected. The Secretary of State contemplates the possibility—and more than the possibility, for he informs us that under certain circumstances it would be matter of congratulation—of the severance of the tie between the mother country and Canada, and says that we ought to be very careful in training the Canadians before the connection terminates, so that they may be able to go by themselves, and not fall into the hands of any vigilant neighbour watching for an opportunity of appropriating and absorbing them. But what I think to be the fault of the Government in this particular case is that they have not been thoughtful on this subject of training the Canadians. On the contrary, it appears to me that they have not trusted sufficiently to the resources and energies of the Canadians, but have rather unnecessarily anticipated duties which the Canadians were probably ready to perform themselves. The Secretary of State, in placing the case before the House, has made a very great omission in his statement. He said that we must go back to last Christmas; that before last Christmas military interference on the part of the mother country was an unusual state of affairs; but that at the end of the year very important events occurred, and, said the Secretary of State, we were obliged to act, and we acted on what we considered a considerable scale;—we believe that we received the sanction of Parliament and the country, and it is a policy which we are prepared to uphold. I myself do not, and did not when Parliament met, question the propriety of the course which the Government took after the affair of the Trent. It appeared to me that throughout that business the Government of this country conducted themselves with reference to the Government of the United States in a wise, dignified, and manly way, and that the measures adopted were perfectly justified by the circumstances. But the Secretary of State made a great mistake when he told us that it was only from last Christmas the commencement of the present state of affairs was to be dated. He forgets that in June last year we suddenly sent a considerable force to Canada
  870
  —some 3,000 men—and I took an opportunity of making some observations to the House on the subject, and to express my doubts as to the policy of that hurried interference in the affairs of Canada. No doubt the state of the other hemisphere was troubled at that time; but nothing like the affair of the Trent had happened in June. No doubt the Canadians, being very shrewd and spirited men, were sufficiently conscious of the condition of their nearest neighbour; and the turbulence and disquiet prevailing in the territories of that neighbour were sufficient to alarm them. At that time, I believe, they were ready to take, and would have taken, any steps calculated to guard and maintain their independence. But what did the Government do then? In June they suddenly sent a force of 3,000 men to Canada. That was a considerable act; and yet, though the force as a reinforcement for the garrisons was large, it was, as a military expedition, not of a commanding magnitude. It was not sufficient to defend the frontier of Canada, and it was not wanted to increase the garrisons, because they were at the complement fixed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the present Government. I do not like to quote any observations I have made in the House; but I wish, on the present occasion, to refer to some that fell from me in June last year. I then gave credit to the Canadians for being a numerous and a gallant people. I said, that looking to the state of America, I could not doubt that they would take such steps as the emergency required. I proceeded to make these observations—
  "On the other hand, I should say, that taking this early opportunity of letting the people of Canada know that we are prepared to assume the monopoly of defending them is rather calculated to damp their ardour and make them feel that it is not their business to protect their hearths and homes and national honour, and that they may pursue their profitable callings without coming forward in an exigency of this character." [3 Hansard, clxiii., 1525.]
  I now ask, whether that has not been the effect produced; and whether the sending out of these 3,000 troops did not at once damp the ardour of the Canadians and stop any attempt on their part to take measures to protect themselves? It may easily be conceived, when the affair of the Trent occurred, and when a considerable force was sent from England to Canada, that under these circumstances the colonists were glad to throw themselves under

  871
  the ægis of the mother country; but, if at the previous period, when the circumstances of America, though troubled and menacing, had yet nothing in them of a character threatening to aim at the independence of Canada, the Government, through the Queen's representative there had called the attention of the Canadian Parliament to the state of affairs in connection with the question of defence, there would have been found no difficulty on the subject. When the affair of the Trent occurred six months afterwards, and when a force was very properly sent out from this country, it would then have been seen that the Canadians had laid some foundation of valid defence in preparing an efficient force of militia, which might have been further developed under the encouragement of the arrival of troops from England, and we should have found the general means of the defence of Canada to be adequate. That was a part of the policy of the Government of which at the time I questioned the propriety, and which experience has convinced me was an error. The sending 3,000 men to Canada, as was done in June of last year, was, I think, to some extent an intimation to the colonists that we were prepared to undertake a monopoly of their defence. It damped their ardour, and has tended, in my opinion, greatly to the unfortunate state of things which now prevails in that quarter. The Secretary of State, I therefore contend, committed a great error, and was guilty of a great omission, in not referring to the transmission of those 3,000 men to Canada in the June of last year, and in taking Christmas as the date at which the extraordinary position of affairs in the colony with respect to reinforcements commenced. I do not, as my right hon. Friend near me (Mr. Adderley) knows, by any means agree with him in all the conclusions upon colonial questions at which he has arrived. He has, however, I think, done good service in bringing forward this subject to-night in a speech which I may be permitted to say was one of very considerable ability. It is a subject which excites the public mind of the country, which it is but right should be enlightened upon it as much as possible. For my own part I am anxious to maintain our colonial empire; but that I feel can be done only on principles of freedom and equality. If in olden days that empire was endangered because of a sense of oppression on the part of the colo-
  872
  nists, it will in our day also be endangered if, on the part of the mother country, a sense of unfairness with regard to her connection with her dependencies should prevail. We ought not, however, to use the word "dependencies" any longer. We should look upon those communities as a portion of a great empire in whose prosperity and honour we are all alike interested. In that view of the case I look upon the colonial empire of England as being eminently conducive to her strength. The amount of the advantage which she derives from it cannot be measured by pounds, shillings, and pence, by commercial profits, or even by the military force with which at a moment of emergency our colonial connection might furnish us. I feel persuaded that the very fact that we belong to a great empire founded on those principles of freedom and equality which are necessary for the prosperity of such an empire, is in itself a source of strength to England, from the elevation which it gives to the character of our fellow-subjects; while it influences the councils of Europe and the course of human events. Nor do I despair that the unsatisfactory state of things prevailing in Canada at the present moment, so far as the relations between her and the mother country are concerned, will be modified and improved before long. When we are told, as we have been told to-night, that the Canadian Parliament does not represent the opinions of the colonists, there is, I cannot help feeling, a remedy for a circumstance so disagreeable, and means by which the views of the country may be duly ascertained. I will not, however, advert to that point more particularly, because I should in doing so be guilty of the error which I have deemed it my duty to criticise—that of mixing ourselves up with questions of merely local policy. I would simply repeat that I think the present disagreeable state of affairs in Canada has been mainly occasioned by the sending out there of 3,000 troops in the month of June in last year— a measure which at the time I deprecated; while I would express a hope that affairs in the colony may soon wear a more satisfactory aspect.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, I certainly agree rather with the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken than with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Staffordshire in the view which he takes with respect to the connection subsist-

  873
  ing between the mother country and her Colonial dependencies. With the former, I quite concur in thinking that we should look upon our colonies as part and parcel of the British empire. Our fellow-subjects when they remove from this country do no not cease to be our fellow-subjects; their spirit is the same as ours; their interests should be our interests; we should be each to one another a source of mutual honour and mutual strength. I also quite concur with the right hon. Gentleman in wishing that the day may be far distant, when, from various causes, those great communities may deem it to be their interest to separate from us, because I do not think such a course would conduce to their benefit, while I feel assured it would not tend to the advantage of the mother country. The connection between us, however, as was justly stated by the right hon. Gentleman, can be maintained only by the adoption of a policy which will leave the colonies free to regulate their own affairs, binding them to the mother country by links of mutual interest, and allowing the exercise of perfect freedom in matters in which the one or the other happens to be more particularly concerned. I regret very much that, owing to circumstances which it appears will happen in countries possessing free institutions, local questions have resulted in the refusal on the part of the Canadian Legislature to make adequate provision for the defence of the colony. Generally speaking, it may be said that we are proud of the conduct and bearing of our Canadian fellow-subjects; but on the present occasion I certainly feel no such sentiment. It is, I think, but little to their credit that they should allow party considerations to exercise such an influence over them as to cause them to refuse to make manly provision for their defence in case of need. I cannot at the same time concur with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) in ascribing that result to the measure which we took in the summer of last year, in sending out 3,000 men to Canada; nor can I agree with him in regarding that step as an indication on our part that the mother country meant to undertake a monopoly of the defence of the colony. Why, Sir, that defence must surely be a very easy and trifling matter if 3,000 men could be considered as sufficient to give us a monopoly of it, in opposition to all the dangers to which Canada may be exposed. I think we judged
  874
  rightly in sending out the force in question. The garrisons in our North American provinces were at the time greatly reduced in consequence of the demands arising out of the Crimean war. They were much lower than they had been before that war; and looking to the position of the United States, and to the civil war which had broken out in that quarter, we in my opinion, took a wise and proper precaution in sending some amount of reinforcement to those garrisons, even although there might be no apprehension of immediate danger so far as Canada was concerned. So far, however, from the force which we did send out being calculated to damp the exertions of the colonists, and to induce them to abstain from taking the necessary measures for their defence, it appears to me to have been precisely of a character to stimulate and excite them to the adoption of such a course. If, indeed, we had sent out 30,000 men—or a force so large as to be adequate to their defence in case of need—I could understand the argument which the right hon. Gentleman has advanced. The colonists might under those circumstances have said—"We are now amply provided for; it is unnecessary to do anything for ourselves; the mother country has sent an enormous force to protect us, and evidently means to put forth all her energies for our protection; and if that force be not sufficient for the purpose, we feel assured she will take to herself a monopoly of our defence and send additional troops to our aid." The colonists might, in the event which I suppose, have adopted that tone; but surely it cannot be said that they would be likely to look upon 3,000 men as a force sufficient to render any exertion on their part unnecessary. The opposite conclusion, indeed, seems to me to be one at which it would be more natural to arrive. It must be evident to every man who considers the subject that in time of real danger and military conflict a force like the militia and volunteers require the support of regular troops as a foundation to enable them to act with confidence and success. Now, the 3,000 troops which we sent to Canada in the June of last year were exactly the number calculated to constitute a foundation on which Canada might organize a militia or volunteer force, which would acquire habits of discipline and a feeling of emulation owing to the example set it by the regular troops, and which would more readily become effi-

  875
  cient in the performance of its duties than if left solely to the direction of its own officers. When, however, danger appeared imminent, in consequence of the affair of the Trent, we sent a larger force to Canada, and the course we took in that respect was entirely approved by the right hon. Gentleman, the House, and the country at large. I was glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman to-night a repetition of that approval, while I differ from him altogether in thinking that we acted injudiciously in sending out the 3,000 men to whom he adverted, as well as in the opinion that that step had anything whatever to do with the recent refusal on the part of the Canadian Legislature to provide an adequate militia for the defence of the colony. It might, it appears to me, with a much greater semblance of probability, be said that the large force which we sent out in December last had that effect. It might be argued with a much greater appearance of truth, that having reinforced the comparatively weak garrisons of the autumn by a large force in the winter, the Canadians were induced to suppose that we intended in the course of this summer to add a considerable number to the troops already there, and that therefore it was unnecessary for them to take any measures for their own defence. If that has been their delusion, I am glad this discussion has been raised, because it has enabled my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to make a statement which must satisfy the Canadians, that unless they choose to make those exertions which it is becoming in them to make for their own defence, which it is their duty to themselves to make, which any people worthy of the name of men would make—unless they mean to fall into a state of apathy, and betray a want of spirit which would be disgraceful to the race to which they belong—we have done as much for them as we intend to do, and that it rests with them to do the remainder. That they are able, if they choose, to do what is needful nobody can doubt, because they have men in number and spirit sufficient to resist any attack which may be made upon them. I think, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government have not incurred any just blame for what they have done. I think we have done neither too much nor too little. We do not intend either to recall the troops now in Canada or to send any additional men there, for we cannot but believe that when that
  876
  factious conflict which has taken place in Canada is over, and has resulted in the establishment of some Government likely to be permanent, the spirit of the people will urge their representatives to make more ample, more satisfactory, and more worthy provision than at present exists for the defence of their country in case of danger.

  THE FRESCOES IN THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.—OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCKsaid, he rose to call attention to the Fresco Paintings executed and in process of execution in the Houses of Parliament. During the last Session the right hon. Gentleman the First Commissioner stated, in reply to a question, that there were only two frescoes which were decayed—one by Mr. Watts and one by another artist. The right hon. Gentleman was rather unfair to Mr. Watts, because, although the fresco by that gentleman showed greater signs of decay last year than the others, still the others had followed fast in the same direction. Every one of the frescoes in that particular portion of the House—the lobby upstairs—was more or less in a damaged state. In justice to Mr. Watts it should likewise be mentioned that he was at once one of the most distinguished and one of the most disinterested artists in England. He had recently painted a noble work for the Society of Lincoln's Inn, without any remuneration. Mr. Watts had offered to renew the work, but declined to proceed with it till he knew the cause of the very extraordinary decay which had occurred. Whoever took the trouble to inspect those works would find that all that had been said last year was perfectly correct, nearly every one of the frescoes dropping to pieces. £7,000 or £8,000 which had been expended on the walls had been totally thrown away. The House had unanimously approved the course taken by the Government in appointing a Commission to inquire into the state of these frescoes, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be enabled to state when the Report of that Commission, with the evidence, would be laid before the House, so as to enable them, when the Estimates were submitted during the next Session, to determine whether fresco painting should be continued. As there were many continental artists in London, and as not a few paintings executed in Paris of late years were more or less in a state of decay,

  877
  perhaps it might be well that some of those foreign gentlemen should be examined. There was another point to which he wished to call attention, as to the subsisting contracts with the artists who had not yet executed their paintings. These contracts were to be found in two Reports issued in the last year—the 12th Report of the Commissioners on the Fine Arts and a Return presented on the 16th of May last year. There were five artists employed—Mr. Maclise, Mr. Cope, Mr. Ward, Mr. Herbert, and Mr. Dyce. With regard to the first three no observation could be made, except that they had faithfully and honourably fulfilled all their obligations. Large sums were voted for them, but they had not received any of them till the completion of their works. With regard to Mr. Herbert, his contract was entered into in 1850–1. He was to paint nine pictures in the Peers' robing-room for £9,000 in ten years. £6,000 had been already voted to his account; but he had received £2,500 only. Nevertheless, he had not yet completed one picture. The Commissioners stated that they entered into this agreement with Mr. Herbert before the room which was to contain the result of his labour was built, and some years before it was ready for him to work in. They adopted that course, knowing that considerable time would be required for the preparation of the designs. Since the completion of the room in 1858 there had undoubtedly been unnecessary delay in the preparation of cartoons, and in the progress of the wall-painting itself. They believed, however, that such delay on the part of the artist was to be attributed rather to repeated experiments, and to a conscientious study of the subjects committed to him, than to any feeling of indifference, or to any interruption from other occupations. He had been desired by the Commissioners to make four designs, and not confine himself to one picture; therefore, he thought that under the circumstances it was impossible to find fault with anything Mr. Herbert had done; nor was it unreasonable that he should have received the sum of £2,500. However, Mr. Herbert had been at work for a great many years, and nobody could tell whether the work would ever be completed or not. By his contract he was entitled to keep his orignal design and picture for his own benefit; he might suggest to the Commissioners whether, in case Mr. Herbert should be unable to complete the
  878
  work, the designs ought not rather to become their property. The case of Mr. Dyce stood on different grounds, and was rather more serious. He was not making any charge against Mr. Dyce; he merely stated the case as he found it in the Report of the Commissioners. Mr. Dyce was to paint seven compartments in the Queen's robing-room. The Commissioners stated that—
  "The artist was, by the original agreement, allowed a fixed annual sum for a limited period, within which he undertook to complete the work. That period expired in June, 1855, the stipulated remuneration having been received by him. An additional year, ending June, 1866, was granted to him in consideration of his plea of loss of time while engaged as a juror and reporter in the Great Exhibition of 1851. In 1854, on his application to have exclusive occupation of the robing-room, we, with your Majesty's gracious permission, granted such privilege accordingly, on the new condition, founded on Mr. Dyce's assurances, that the work should be completed in June, 1857, a period afterwards still further extended, as stated in our 11th Report, to the beginning of 1858. The work is, to our extreme mortification, still unfinished; the delay having occasioned, as we fear, great inconvenience to your Majesty in consequence of the long-continued and still exclusive occupation of the robing-room by Mr. Dyce. The more recent interruption has arisen, it is understood, from ill-health. We have the greater reason for regretting any impediment to the completion of this work since the portion already executed is, in our judgment, highly creditable to the artist."
  According to the "Return relating to Paintings in Fresco"—
  "The unfinished paintings in the Queen's robing-room consist, therefore, of two on the east side, a portion of one on the north side, the friezes on the four sides, and two spaces over the doors on the north side; such two spaces not being, however, included in the contract."
  Mr. Dyce in 1857 received the whole money for those paintings, yet he had not finished them; and if anything happened to him, the money would be lost. Under these circumstances he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cowper) what steps had been taken to obtain the completion of these works of art within a reasonable time. He thought the artists were bound by their engagements, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to give a satisfactory reply to the question he had put.
  MR. COWPERsaid, his attention had been directed to the partial decay of those beautiful works of art that decorated the walls of that building; and although he could not quite agree with his hon. Friend as to the extent of the decay that existed, yet he did admit that decay, though local and partial, was sufficiently extensive

  879
  to excite a good deal of apprehension and deserve a good deal of attention. The method of fresco painting was adopted at the recommendation of the Fine Arts Commission, under the impression that the wall spaces in that building were lighted so imperfectly, and placed in such positions, that oil painting would prove ineffective. There was also a desire, in adopting fresco painting, to encourage the development of those qualities which had not hitherto been conspicuous in the British School —correctness of drawing, and simplicity, breadth, and grandeur of design. It was also contemplated that the paintings would be more permanent in fresco than in oil, not being subject to those periodical cleanings and varnishings which had such a deleterious effect on oil paintings. But, it having been found that these paintings were not really permanent, it was desirable that some step should be taken either to alter the method of painting or stop its future use. He had brought the subject under the consideration of the Fine Arts Commission, and on the 10th of March last they instituted an inquiry into the extent and causes of the decay. Seven gentlemen, well known for their acquaintance with and technical knowledge of fresco painting, were appointed to investigate this subject with Sir Charles Eastlake, who acted as their secretary; they had immediately examined the various paintings, conferred with the artists who painted them, and made considerable progress with their inquiries, but they had not yet come to a final conclusion. They intended to extend their inquiries still further, and it was not likely that they would be able to give in any Report just yet; but he hoped it would be in the hands of hon. Members by the beginning of the next Session. Although he was not in a position to state the views of the Commission, he might say that the decay was so partial and so local as to negative the belief that there was anything in the walls of the House or in its atmosphere to destroy the permanency of fresco paintings. Many of the ancient Italian frescoes had gone altogether, and there seemed to be so much uncertainty in the management of the details of the application of the colours that everywhere there was liable to be a failure in the permanency of frescoes. In this case the defects appeared to have occurred in the management of the colours or the lime. The permanency of fresco was due to the formation of a thin pellicle of carbo-
  880
  nate of lime on the surface of the picture; and that was liable to be interfered with by the chemical action of the colours upon the plaster. It was remarkable that the failures occurred principally in the yellow ochre and other pigments which were peculiarly liable to adulteration. But when the matter was fully discussed, he believed it would be found that the decay was owing to causes which might have been prevented, and which more careful manipulation and increased experience would prevent for the future. The recent examples, however, of water glass painting had proved so satisfactory and durable as to deserve a preference over the previous methods. He quite concurred with his hon. and learned Friend in giving full credit to Mr. Maclise, Mr. Cope, and Mr. Ward for the diligence and accuracy with which they had fulfilled their engagements. Mr. Dyce's case was an exceptional one. He engaged to finish his work in six years; and the Fine Arts Commission, relying on that engagement, had not required the payments to be conditional on the execution of the painting. At the end of six years he had received payment in full. Mr. Dyce, however, had not completed his work even now, at the end of fourteen years. This was quite unaccountable in a man of his position and ability. It was to his own injury that he delayed the public exhibition of works of so high a character, which would increase his fame; and he had also put Her Majesty to some inconvenience, by preventing the use of the robing-room on state occasions, when She opened or prorogued Parliament. Mr. Herbert's case was different. His engagement was made in the ordinary manner; and although his work was not completed, he had only received a portion of the whole amount. The delay in his case had not arisen from other occupations, because he had concentrated all his attention upon the work. He had formed for himself a high standard; he was resolved to achieve a great and permanent result, and had cancelled much preliminary work. When the House saw the pictures complete, they would not regret the time which had been spent in producing so noble a work of art.
  MR. HENNESSYsaid, that Mr. Herbert had destroyed 446 square feet of his earlier work in consequence of dissatisfaction with it. The value of one square foot of his works was £8; he had therefore destroyed over £3,000 worth of his

  881
  works in order that he might produce what would be more valued by the public.
  Motion agreed to.
  House at rising to adjourn till Monday next.

  BANKRUPTCY ACT (1861) AMENDMENT BILL— [BILL NO. 223.]—COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  MR. PEELsaid, that on the occasion of its second reading, the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) called attention to that part of the Bankruptcy Act of last year which repealed the prohibition against County Court Judges sitting in that House; and he suggested that as the Bill was introduced to amend that Act, the prohibition should be restored. He (Mr. Peel) would adopt that course.
  Instruction to the Committee, that they have power to make provision therein for the prohibition of Judges of County Courts sitting in Parliament.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  House resumed.
  Bill reported; as amended, to be considered on Monday next.

  JUDGMENTS LAW AMENDMENT (IRELAND) BILL— [BILL NO. 203.]
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
  Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted; and 40 Members not being present,
  House adjourned at half after Nine o'clock, till Monday next.

MINUTES.
— PUBLIC BILLS. — 1a Polling Places (New Shoreham, &c.); Poor Removal.
2a Fortifications (Provision for Expenses); Highland Roads and Bridges; Militia Ballots Suspension; Excise Duties.
3a Indemnity; Jamaica Loan (Settlement); Merchandise Marks; Turnpike Trusts Arrangements; Windsor Castle (Bakehouse).

FORTIFICATIONS (PROVISION FOR EXPENSES BILL)— [BILL NO. 215.]

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  EARL DE GREY AND RIPON, in moving the second reading of the Fortifications (Provision for Expenses) Bill, said, he would not trouble their Lordships with any general argument in favour of the scheme of defensive works already adopted by the Government and submitted to Parliament. Their Lordships would remember that a Commission, composed of officers of high standing and professional reputation and great scientific attainments, was appointed at the end of 1859. They made an investigation on the spot of the existing defences of the country, and reported their recommendations to Her Majesty's

  797
  Government. That Report received the most careful consideration from the Government. In 1860 the plan proposed by the Government was laid before Parliament, and received the sanction of the other House of Parliament by large and repeated majorities. The Bill passed their Lordships' House with almost perfect unanimity. Parliament, having thus adopted and sanctioned this plan, it seemed to him that it would neither be wise nor desirable to stop in mid career the undertakings commenced under that sanction, unless it could be shown that any circumstances had taken place during the last two years which proved either that they were inadequate or unsuited to the purpose; or that, on the other hand, the danger against which it was intended to provide had already passed away. The proposal of the Government at the time of which he spoke involved the construction of extensive fortifications for the defence of the principal forts and arsenals. The sum of £2,000,000 was voted on account, to enable the Government to commence the works. That sum would be, in a few months, entirely expended, and it was therefore necessary to come to Parliament and ask for a further sum towards carrying on the works, but, of course, within the total amount submitted to Parliament in 1860. In order to carry out the defences agreed upon, land had been purchased for the erection of works, and rights of clearance had been obtained over other adjacent lands, which were necessary to keep them free from obstruction. The land having been obtained, the works were commenced without delay. At Portsmouth the forts included in the plan had all been commenced; at Portsdown the works had made considerable progress; and at Spithead the foundations had been commenced, but the construction of the forts had for the present been suspended. At Plymouth the works of the sea defences had been commenced and advanced, and land had been acquired for the defences at the northeastern position, though the works had not been commenced. At Pembroke the fortifications had been proceeded with so far as the plans had been determined upon. At Portland new works were in course of construction. Land had also been provided for the site of the forts for the defence of the Thames and Medway. The new works for the protection of Chatham and Sheerness had not made so much
  798
  progress; but with these exceptions the various works were in different stages of progress. The sum for the present year which it was proposed to raise by this Bill was £1,200,000, which would be devoted to the carrying-on of those works which had received the sanction of Parliament. Considering the necessity for adequate supervision by the Engineer officers and the great demand upon the services of that corps at present, it was impossible to proceed with all the works at the same time or in the same degree, and therefore it was not proposed to take any money this year for the construction of a portion of the defences of Chatham, or of the intended central arsenal. These proposals were postponed, though not abandoned. At Spithead, also, the Government had determined not to proceed with the forts at present, although the suspension of these works involved the loss of the best period of the year, and had led to the expenditure of a sum of money which would otherwise have been saved. Pending, however, the experiments which were going on, the Government had thought it better not to continue the erection of these forts, and they did not propose to recommence them until they had had an opportunity of obtaining the opinion of Parliament in another Session. Under these circumstances, he did not anticipate that their Lordships would refuse to pass this Bill. The money to be raised under the Bill was for the purpose of carrying on works already proposed and sanctioned by Parliament, and which, in the judgment of Her Majesty's Government, were still as necessary for the defence of the country and the security of our ports and arsenals as they were considered to be in 1860. He knew of nothing that had since occurred which was calculated to alter the views previously expressed by their Lordships or the other House of Parliament. He therefore moved the second reading of the Bill.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH:— My Lords, I approve the general object of this Bill, and I do not object to the manner in which it is proposed to raise the funds for carrying into effect the plans of the Government. The object I understand to be to extend and improve the works of defence around our dockyards and arsenals, so as to adapt their means of defence to the improvements which have taken place in the means of attack. I quite admit that it is only

  799
  reasonable that the cost of these permanent works should be diffused over a certain number of years, in order that those who may hereafter derive the benefit may pay a portion of the expense. As regards the details of the measure, I am not in a position, nor are your Lordships, I think, in a position to form any judgment. Unless we were to go to the localities themselves, with the plan in our hands, accompanied by the Engineers who recommend the works, and what I should like still more, by other Engineers of whom we might make inquiries, it would be impossible to form a correct judgment of the efficiency of the plans proposed, or of the accuracy of the estimate of the intended expenditure. I must, indeed, express a hope that the Government have not acted on the sole opinion of the Engineer officers employed. I trust that some one of them possessed of common sense has brought his common sense to bear upon the scheme, especially to test the general propriety of the plan, the apparent sufficiency of the estimates, and the general fitness of the details; and in the hope and expectation that Her Majesty's Government have well considered the propriety of what has been done, I am content to leave the responsibility of the details with them. But, my Lords, I cannot approve the manner in which these works are being carried on by the Government, I see by the schedule that sixty different works have been undertaken, and that of these sixty, only seven are to be completed within the year. I observe that only £500 are required to complete the lines at Devonport; and yet for this small sum those works are left unfinished and exposed. There is either a breach which an enemy might take advantage of, or the whole extent of the works is in an unfinished state, so that the enemy might walk over them. I think, my Lords, that is a great defect. There is a still greater defect in respect to the more important works at Stokes Bay. A sum of £9,000 would completely finish the works, which protect Portsmouth at that most exposed point. Yet nothing is to be done this year with that object. It is a fact that a sum of £30,500, in addition to the £1,200,000 now asked for, would give the Government the means to complete no less than eight additional works within the year. I object altogether to a system of proceeding by which works, which are of urgent national necessity, instead of being expedited, have
  800
  their completion deferred for five or six years. The improvements in artillery, the great improvements in steam ships of war, and now the construction of iron ships, render it absolutely necessary that we should proceed without delay, by employing all the energies and resources of the country in removing the danger to which we are subject ed in consequence of those great changes. If the sea were to make a breach in a sea wall, no one interested in the lands about to be inundated would be considered to have made a judicious arrangement if he had determined on repairing the breach by works extending over five or six years—he would apply all his energies to removing the danger at once. In the case of a fire, no one would be considered wise who delayed taking the necessary measures for the safety of his premises, and who should content himself with throwing buckets of water upon the conflagration, instead of turning a stream upon it to put it out. My Lords, if there is no urgent and pressing danger to the country, there is no ground for this Bill; but if there is—and no doubt there is—urgent ground for this Bill, then all the energies of the country ought to be called into requisition for the purpose of completing these works and fortifications, and so at once meeting the danger. And now, my Lords, with regard to iron ships. I am quite astonished that the Government should be satisfied to allow the work of constructing iron ships to remain in the position in which it is. Superiority in iron ships now involves the superiority on sea, because no wooden ship can meet an iron ship. No ship can with impunity meet another ship, if that other ship can with impunity throw shells upon her deck. Before the invention of iron ships, the throwing of shells by two ships would have been fatal to both. Now, if a wooden ship and an iron ship meet, it will be fatal to the wooden ship only. Therefore it is essential that we should have a superiority in iron ships, in order to recover our superiority at sea, which temporarily we have lost, and on the maintenance of which depends, I may say, our existence as an independent Power. I believe it to be the fact that France has more iron ships than we have. If that be so, it is incontestable that the superiority at sea has passed from us to France. To recover that superiority it is essential that we should become, not only equal to France, but superior to France in the number and strength of our iron ships. It must be remembered that

  801
  in consequence of the extent of our colonies, and the number of our ships trading in all parts of the world, we have a much greater demand on our navy than France has on hers; and, therefore, although in wooden ships we may be superior to France, our wooden ships are not as available for concentrated action as those of France. Again, France has now much greater facilities than we have for suddenly manning her ships in time of war; and therefore on the sudden breaking out of hostilities she would have a very great advantage over us. And, my Lords, it is not only iron ships that we require. We also require to a very great extent new and much more extensive docks and basins for the purpose of repairing ships of war in times of hostility. I read the other day with very great interest, and I hope advantage, a pamphlet on the subject by Captain Den-man. I advise all your Lordships to read it, and I have no doubt it will attract the attention of the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty. I do trust, my Lords, that the Government will feel the necessity of providing more extensive docks and basins without further delay, and will take into immediate consideration the means of providing them. When I was for a very few months in the office now held by the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), I asked whether some means could not be devised by scientific gentlemen and machinists for applying the power of the steam-engine to the excavating of earth and the carrying of it away. I saw the importance of improvements in this direction, owing to the enormous cost of works of the character to which I am now endeavouring to direct the attention of the Government. It is the enormous cost of the works necessary in the construction of docks and basins which deters Her Majesty's Government from doing that which is absolutely essential to give efficiency to our navy in time of war. The forts at Spithead, of which we heard so much some time ago, do not appear in this Schedule. I do not accuse Her Majesty's Government of having thrown them over without sufficient reason. I know that they made a "a strategic movement" with regard to those fortifications. I share with them in the regret with which they must have abandoned that portion of the scheme. I remember the time when 300 or 400 sail of merchantmen were waiting for convoy at that place; and, should a similar emergency arise, the persons
  802
  interested in those ships will most earnestly desire to have the protection of forts at Spithead. If Spithead should ever become a field of battle, as it is very probable that it will, those forts would be of very great advantage. Within the circle of their fire, those forts would practically make a lee shore to an enemy's fleet, and give a clear channel to ours. They would give us the command of one-third of the field. If in a game of chess black was confined to three-fourths of the board, while white could move his pieces over the whole board, it will be admitted that white would have a good chance of winning. That is precisely the case of the forts at Spithead. The opposition to those forts was made on the ground that iron ships would afford us better protection; but we have given over the forts, and we have not heard of the iron ships. The patriotic Gentlemen who were anxious to have iron ships in preference to forts must feel disappointed when they find, that though the latter have been given up in the case of Spithead, there is no additional grant asked for what they proposed as a substitute. With respect to Portsmouth, I beg your Lordships to bear in mind that its importance is not confined to its possessing a very great dockyard. It is the most important point for an enemy to take possession of as a tête-du-pont in case of war, with a view to prosecuting measures of serious invasion. Therefore on that ground, as much as because it is a very great dockyard, I am most anxious it should receive every protection from fortifications and works which it is possible to give it. Then, again, as regards railways and steam— railways and steam have produced a complete change in the whole character of warfare. They give an inestimable advantage to the Power that takes the initiative. In cases of unsuspected and sudden attack they give a power of concentration which in war is invaluable, and which, if possessed by an enemy in former times, when only sailing ships were in existence, would have given a very different turn to affairs. Under these circumstances it is of the greatest importance that the measures suggested by Her Majesty's Government should receive the careful consideration of your Lordships. Under any circumstances I should be of that opinion; but I will entreat your Lordships to consider the novel and very unfavourable position in which we should be placed at this time should we be compelled to enter into

  803
  a contest with France. In former wars— in the last two wars almost invariably— we had an alliance with one or more of the great military Powers of the Continent. To a great extent that caused a diversion in our favour, and divided the thoughts of our great enemy whenever he may have desired to attempt an invasion of this country on a great scale. We now know, that had it not been for the war with Austria in 1805, which made it necessary for the Emperor otherwise to employ troops who were to have sailed from Boulogne, an attempt would have been made against us. In 1809 Austria drew out of Spain a large force, and greatly contributed to our success in that country. There was always some Power which came to our assistance. It would be otherwise now. If we engaged in a war with France, we should be absolutely alone. It would be impossible for Austria, debilitated as she now is, whatever her ancient spirit, to engage in any but a defensive war. Russia is at present excluded from taking a part in the affairs of Europe by the state of Poland; and, besides, I deeply regret to observe, she is occupied at home by combinations, by conspiracies, which have taken the most odious form, for the parties are endeavouring to achieve their objects by incendiarism. The generous feeling of the Emperor, which caused him to desire the emancipation of the serfs, and induced him to produce a measure for that object perhaps not perfectly matured, has led to so great a social revolution that it is idle to suppose that under any circumstances Russia can move to our support. Prussia and the Zollverein remain; their condition is different, but he must be a sanguine man who would hope anything from Prussia. A sense of their own interests being endangered by our fall might, indeed, lead these Powers at last to come forward but they would never move in time to prevent a disaster, although they might possibly contribute to redeem it. Therefore, almost for the first time, we shall be left wholly alone in a contest with France. France has greatly increased in strength since the last European war. She has a vast population, united under the Government of the Emperor. She has a revenue which is equal, if not at present superior, to our own, and, in consequence of the cheapness of provisions and other advantages, it will produce much greater results. But would France be
  804
  alone? Would not the difficulties of England afford an opportunity for other nations to join against her? Can any one doubt, if the present conflict across the Atlantic were to terminate at a time when we were engaged in war with France, that the French fleet would be joined by the American? Filled with resentment for a non-existent hostility to them—the most false and unreasonable notion that ever was entertained, for at the commencement of the contest no people could have felt more kindly than we did towards the whole American nation—and with this exasperated feeling propagated and extended by all the efforts of their press, we cannot doubt that on any favourable opportunity we shall have to encounter the hostility of America as well as that of France. I have no doubt on this subject; and I offer the consideration to your Lordships as one of the greatest gravity. What is the present force of France? She had at the commencement of this year 447,000 troops under arms. It was intended to reduce that force to 400,000; but within a few days a further Vote has been asked for, in consequence of the effectives exceeding the number of the establishment; and there can be no doubt, that in consequence of the demands of the Mexican war it will be impossible for France to carry out the contemplated reduction. About 100,000 of the French army are employed in Algeria and the East and West Indies, and there remain at home 300,000. Of these, without the slightest danger, 200,000 can serve beyond the limits of their own country; and on their passing the frontier 200,000 soldiers of the reserve, equally fit for war, can be brought forward in the course of three weeks in augmentation of the depôts of the existing battalions. The force within the boundaries of France is thus raised again to 300,000, in addition to the National Guards, who number 265,000. This, my Lords, is the force with which France threatens—permanently threatens Europe. What is the force which we have to oppose to it? I will not talk of numbers, but of battalions, which are intelligible, and which of course would have artillery and cavalry attached to them. In all England we have, if I mistake not, forty-three battalions; and if every one of these was full to its proper complement, and if we abandoned Ireland, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Dover, and every one of these forts which we have created, and brought every man

  805
  we have as a regular soldier to the defence of London, we could not by possibility muster more than 43,000 regular infantry. That is a very dangerous state of things, even upon paper; but we know that in point of fact not more than 30,000 men could be brought into the field. Then we have in addition 60,000 militia, effective and drilled. We ought to have a great many more; and if, in agricultural districts, country gentlemen would exert themselves, we should have double that number. It is to my noble Friend below me (the Earl of Derby) that we owe even the present state of the militia, for before his time nothing had been done to render that force efficient. We have also 15,000 yeomanry—excellent men, but not efficient for war; and, lastly, we have, I will not pretend to say what number of Volunteers; but we have altogether a force of irregulars estimated at 200,000. These battalions, however, except a few in the neighbourhood of London and other places, are not at present in a state in which any general could venture to put them in the field. More drill and discipline, and a little more money applied by the Government to good purposes where so much is thrown away upon bad, would give us the effective services of that large body of men, and place us in a state of the most absolute security from foreign invasion. With a desire for that absolute security I combine, as far as may be consistent, the strongest wish for stringent economy in all the departments of the State. But economy we have not heard of for many years. I recollect very well, when the late Lord Grey formed his Government, one of his pledges to the country was to reform the expenditure; and he thoroughly performed his promise, The Duke of Wellington was an economical Minister; Sir Robert Peel was likewise economical; but I never heard that the noble Lord at the head of the present Government added economy to his other claims on the confidence of the people. The result is, that in all directions new charges have grown up, the amount of which in the aggregate is enormous; and it is these immense charges on the revenue which make the public so unwilling to lay out money for defensive purposes of the most essential value. Even as regards the army, I cannot help thinking we ought to consider whether it is absolutely necessary that we should have by far the dearest army in the world. I know that about one-half of its cost—all that relates to the
  806
  pay of officers and soldiers, and to half pay and pensions—cannot be reduced; but, as regards the other half—the cost of the army departments—amounting to £6,500,000, we ought to see if an efficient economy cannot be practised. I will only take one point in illustration of my meaning. Attached to the army, small as it is, in different parts of the world, there are no less than 3,000 persons, military and civilians, employed for the purposes of conducting the several departmental services. In the single office of my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State there are no less than 500 employés—a number which appears enormous. I know that with that office, most unfortunately, various other offices have been consolidated, and I can only suppose that into it have been carried the undiminished staffs of all these others. The magnitude and variety of the duties devolving upon the Department render it almost impossible to exercise any very efficient supervision over its internal administration. I have looked through the salaries, and I do not see that a single man receives more than the services which he performs, if they are really necessary, fairly deserve. But I do question the necessity of such a large number of officials, and in that direction I think economy may fairly be introduced. I wish a reduction in the numbers, not in the salaries. We have also a vast educational army. At the beginning of the Session Her Majesty's Ministers endeavoured to reduce its costliness; but strong reasons were given for its maintenance. It at present consists of upwards of 35,000 persons, stalwart men and strong-minded women; and about 4,000, or rather more, may, it appears, be expected to be annually added to that number. That educational army alone absorbs a sum which would place in a state of the most perfect efficiency the whole of those 200,000 irregulars, whose discipline is now exceedingly imperfect. I do think that this is a consideration which ought to be weighed by Her Majesty's Government. If we could give to ourselves entire security from the foreigner by our internal strength, we should be enabled to exercise an influence which we cannot now possess for establishing real peace upon the continent of Europe. We have had no real peace since the Revolution of 1848. We have had an armed truce broken by two great wars. There has been from that period to the present in the minds of all men

  807
  great uneasiness, and a distrust of the future which has greatly impaired our enjoyment of the present. All States, I believe, without exception, have been compelled, or have thought themselves compelled, to incur great debts for the purpose of enabling them to maintain their security by arms. At the present moment Austria is to the last degree crippled by the debt which she has contracted with that object. Russia is coming into similar difficulties. Even France, which appeared so strong and so powerful in finance as well as in war, has heard of the approach of financial difficulty; and that financial difficulty has been met by an acknowledgment of error on the part of the Government, and by a very material change in the constitutional dealing by the Parliament with the public expenditure of the country. My Lords, that is a very exceptional and very dangerous mode of meeting a financial difficulty. It cannot be so met a second time. Your Lordships know well that financial dificulties are almost invariably the forerunners of political change. My Lords, we have now, owing to the Mexican war and the demands which that war makes upon the force of France, a respite of one year. I do trust that that time will be employed by the Emperor and others in salutary reflection. All Europe requires rest, and France alone can give it; France can give it, not by an oratorical declaration that "the empire is peace," but by substantial proof that peace is the object of the French empire; by the reduction of dangerous and threatening establishments that she may obtain, and we may obtain, the best fruit and most perfect guarantee of peace. I can hardly think that that feeling can be absent from the mind of the Emperor himself. He owes more to his people than any Sovereign in history ever owed before. They adopted him as the representative of a great name; they gave him their affection and confidence before they had an opportunity of knowing him; they have supported him throughout, giving him their men and granting him their money, and I do trust that he will feel that he will best show his gratitude to them and best promote their interests, not by raising vain notions of the repetition of conquests which have disappeared, and vain ideas of ambition; but by making them, as they may easily be made, the foremost in the race of social improvement, and the benefactors, as they have so long been the scourges, of mankind.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: My Lords, I should not have followed the noble Earl in this debate had he not alluded more especially to the Department over which I have the honour to preside. He has compared the expenditure under the present Government with the expenditure under the Governments of Earl Grey and the Duke of Wellington. If the noble Earl really wishes to go into that question, I will undertake to prove to the satisfaction of your Lordships that the apparent economy of those days arose chiefly from the smaller cost of the army and navy. The real fact is that changes in construction and in armaments have imposed upon us the necessity for a very much larger expenditure. Compare for a moment a vessel armour-plated and steam-propelled, as we have them now, with the sailing vessels which were models in 1832 or 1833. It is evident that the great changes that have taken place must have led to greatly increased expense. Everybody knows that vessels cost three or four times as much now as they did then, and that increase applies not only to their original construction, but also to their maintenance and repair. It is, therefore, quite idle to compare the expenditure upon the navy of the present day with the cost of the navy in the days of sailing vessels. The noble Earl has pointed to the fact that the army and navy of this country cost more proportionally than those of other countries. It is quite true that our navy costs more in proportion than that of France. Not long ago, when the last Returns of the expenditure on the French navy were received, I had an accurate calculation made of the comparative cost of ships of about the same size in our navy and in theirs, and it was found, that while the wages paid on board one of our 90-gun ships amount to £28,000 a year, the sum paid on the same account on board a French vessel of a similar class is under £19,000. But is our navy overpaid? On the contrary, everybody maintains that our sailors are not overpaid; and so little is it thought that the pay of our officers is excessive that there is at this moment before the House of Commons a notice of a Motion to obtain an increase of their remuneration; and only a year or two ago a pressure, in which the right hon. Gentleman who preceded me in office (Sir John Pakington) took part, was put upon the Government to secure a similar object. Therefore you cannot expect to make any Baying by re-

  809
  ducing the pay of your officers or seamen, or by diminishing the cost of your vessels. Then says the noble Earl, "it is your officials which absorb the money;" and he points to the War Office. It is quite true that both the Admiralty and the War Office are very large departments. An immense number of clerks are required in both of them; but I quite agree with the noble Earl that those gentlemen are by no means overpaid. They give their whole lives to the service, rising to emoluments which are but very small; and if it was not for the honour of serving the Crown, instead of being engaged in commercial houses, I believe that an adequate supply of able men would not be found to meet the wants of our public offices. Why do we employ so many clerks? I will tell you. It is required that there should be the means of giving accurate information on all matters connected with the navy, in any and every form which Members of Parliament may desire, and also accurate returns of every detail of our expenditure. Only about a year ago we at the Admiralty were very much pressed to give a balance-sheet like a mercantile account, showing every single item of expenditure upon the navy. There is no doubt that it can be done; but it involves the labour of an immense number of clerks, and of many men of high position in the Department; and if such a return is to be prepared, the country that requires it must pay for it. Then, as to the cost of building. Considering the great strength of our ships, I do not think that any money is thrown away upon them. We have tried building by contract as well as in the yards, so that the relative expenditure might be ascertained, and I do not think that we could build them much cheaper than we do. The noble Earl says that we ought to have a great many more iron ships. Upon that subject I have often addressed your Lordships, and have shown the difficulties which attend any advance in the rate at which we are building iron ships. We have, at the present moment, building at least ten or twelve different kinds of iron-plated ships—different sizes and different forms of vessels—in order that we may arrive at one which will be a good vessel without being a very costly one. We have also attempted to reduce the size of our vessels; and if we succeed in that respect, it will go far to meet the difficulty suggested by the noble Earl as to docks and
  810
  basins. If we can reduce the size and draught of water of our ships, we shall clearly avoid the great expenditure on those works, which will be necessary if we continue to build vessels of the present large size. Many naval men think that smaller vessels will be as effective, and for many purposes more effective, than large ones. Others undoubtedly think that our largest vessels are only just large enough, and ought not to be diminished in size. These are questions which you can only solve by experiment; and that experiment we are making. The noble Earl asked, "Why, when you stop your forts, do you not replace them by ordering more iron ships?" I think that, as a rule, supplemental Estimates for adding to the strength of the navy are objectionable, because they produce a feeling not only in this but in other countries which it is undesirable to excite. Last year I did come to Parliament and asked for more money for iron ships; but when I got it I was not able to spend it, because the contractors could not produce iron plates at the rate at which they were required. The consequence was, that although Parliament gave me all the money I sought, I was unable to expend it in the year, because the iron plates were either not prepared or were found to be so unsuitable that they had to be returned. Under those circumstances, as we were continually trying new contractors, in order to learn whether they could produce the sort of plate which we wanted, and as it was doubtful whether we could get it immediately, I did not think it advisable to ask Parliament for more money for that purpose. The labour of the dockyards is, however, now applied to the construction of iron-plated vessels, which competent naval judges assure me will be very powerful and effective. The noble Earl said he would like to visit the various fortifications, accompanied by the Engineers who planned them, and by another Engineer qualified to criticise them. For my own part, I never found two Engineers in a Select Committee who were not prepared at a moment's notice to express diametrically opposite opinions on almost any question; and I have no doubt that if the noble Earl made the tour in question in the company of two Engineers, he would have very different views as to the works. Taking a deep interest in this question, I have myself visited the various forts along with the Engineer officers who have charge of them, and I can bear testimony to the

  811
  energy and zeal with which they are carrying out the plans intrusted to them. The alterations which have taken place in the mode of attack rendered it indispensably necessary to make corresponding alterations in the mode of defence. Any one who has seen the old defences of Portsmouth, and compares them with the modern means of attack, will admit that it was necessary that they should be altered, and that is really what is being done there. In other places the works are required to defend the entrance to harbours, and I believe that these fortifications are the cheapest mode of defence that under the circumstances of modern warfare can be adopted.
  THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I am sorry to prolong this discussion, but I think it would be unbecoming if I did not add a few words to what has already been said. I do not intend, in any respect, to enter on those political questions which the noble Earl has treated so ably and eloquently. I shall confine my remarks to those portions of the subject which are of a purely military character. I entirely agree with what my noble Friend has said as to our present force. It is a well-known and unquestionable fact that the force at home is really very insignificant for a great country like this. The Government are not, however, to be blamed on that account, for it is equally well known that there is a great indisposition, perhaps not unnaturally, throughout the country to add to our military expenditure. Now, it is perfectly impossible to maintain a large, even a moderately large force, unless the country is prepared to spend more money. Of course, every item of our military as well as of our other establishments—the smallest equally with the largest—should be subjected to the most searching economy. I am perfectly sure, that if any expenditure can be pointed out which is capable of reduction without mischievous consequences, neither the Government nor myself will for an instant shrink from applying ourselves to diminish it. But I am bound to say that having gone carefully over the Estimates for successive years, it appears to me impossible to reduce the cost of the service without impairing its efficiency. Of late years a good deal of additional expenditure has been incurred which has not been called for by us, but which has been demanded by the country, although I admit its value and am glad that it has been granted. I rejoice at these great and necessary im-
  812
  provements; but still they add considerably to the expenditure. Look at the sanitary arrangements in the barracks, for instance. The outlay for barracks is now double or treble what it was some years back. It has been much the same with other parts of the service. When I first entered the army, there was no Military Train; there were no proper Military Hospital Corps; there was no Commissariat Corps. Heavy expenses have been created by these and other improvements; but then they have greatly augmented the efficiency of the service, and have enabled us to send ont our armaments in a manner which has excited general satisfaction. If you were to strike off the expenditure for these objects, it would very much lessen the value of the establishments. If the noble Earl will look into these things, he will find that it is much easier to say there is extravagance than to point out exactly where it prevails. My noble Friend has complained of the large number of clerks in the War Office. I believe it would be found on inquiry that a third, if not a half, of these clerks are engaged in Returns connected with questions arising in the other House of Parliament, involving in many instances an enormous amount of detail. I do not object to that, but it is right to mention it on the present occasion. I quite agree with my noble Friend as to the amount of forces at our disposal. My noble Friend says that the infantry and artillery at home are much below the amount he would like to see. It is quite true that the infantry are much below what I desire, on the ground of humanity only. I should like to see an increase in the infantry, not merely in order to keep a greater force at home, but to insure the more regular relief of regiments on foreign service. I have endeavoured to make it a rule that every regiment should have a third of its time at home and two-thirds abroad. I do not think that either House can consider that an extravagant regulation; but we have never arrived at that point since I have had the honour of holding my present position. We have never had one-third of the infantry at home and two-thirds abroad, but, on the contrary, we have always been very much below that standard. The consequence is that in our arrangements for relief we are extremely hampered. It is not at all easy to find a regiment that has been the proper period at home to justify its being again sent abroad. I should be glad, therefore, if it were pos-

  813
  sible, to have an increase of troops, if it were only to obviate that difficulty. Considering the greatly-increased facilities for moving troops which now exist, and the number of troops which we have at hand to resist an invasion should it come, I must say that the subject now before your Lordships deserves the most serious and the most attentive consideration. I have always believed that any invasion of our shores will be sudden and unexpected, and that is the reason why I have always so strongly advocated the construction of forts. If we had a large force at hand to cope with the enemy, I would not think of shutting up valuable troops in forts. The proper course would be to take the field against the enemy. But when we find that our available force is composed largely of irregulars, with but a small nucleus of regulars, then I say that forts alone could give adequate support to troops so circumstanced, however excellent might be their disposition, and however devoted their loyalty, and however desirous of doing their duty. It would be unfair to them to take them into the field, unless we have the means of supporting them by forts. It is on that ground that I support the present measure. Taking all things into account, the Government have perhaps acted prudently in postponing the Spithead forts. I see, however, many reasons to regret that decision. I see no reason for changing the opinion I have before expressed. I believe that ultimately these forts must be constructed, and I apprehend that the delay will only lead to increased expense for no useful purpose. Next year we shall not be a whit better able to judge of this matter than we are now. As to the other works, I agree with my noble Friend that it would be better to throw all our strength on the most important works, if it could be done. But we are unable to keep a large body of men constantly employed at one place, because we have not sufficient accommodation for them and because the work requires consolidation. We are therefore obliged to do as much as we can at all the works instead of keeping the entire strength of the men employed on any one place. I have thought it right, upon the whole, to make these observations, and I can only say again, that I am sure no subject can be brought before the House of greater importance than that which has been so ably handled and elucidated by the noble Earl. I hope and trust, that while we are anxious for the economy which all parties
  814
  naturally desire, we shall not lose sight of the fact that we cannot attain efficiency unless we spend money upon such objects and for such purposes as are essential to the interests of a great and powerful nation.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, the result which is obtained by wise measures of prevention is often used as an argument to prove that those measures are useless. I am not, therefore, astonished that there are many persons who say that any fear of war is idle and that we are incurring useless expenditure and that Her Majesty's Government have found many opponents to the Bill now before your Lordships. But, as far as I am concerned, I rejoice that they have brought in this Bill, although it is considerably docked from what Her Majesty's Ministers were prepared to recommend; and I rejoice because it not only insures the safety of the country, but saves the country and Parliament from the discredit of having abandoned a course which only two years ago they determined to pursue. I observed with considerable apprehension that persons who, two years ago, were impressed with the necessity of these defences, and satisfied with the mode of raising the money, had changed their opinions. If these altered views had generally prevailed, there can be no doubt that Parliament would have discredited itself, that England would have been held up to other nations as one which did not know its own mind and alternated between fever fits of panic and sordid economy, and that this country would have lost the high character which at present it enjoys, that whatever is thoroughly considered will resolutely be carried into effect. There is a class of objectors who declare that there is no danger whatever, and that invasion is all but impossible. They say that everything is smiling about us, that the Emperor of the French has been ten years on the throne without attacking us, and that what never has been done never will be done. But, while I thoroughly believe that the present Emperor has never harboured a thought of attacking this country, the Emperor is not immortal, and may be succeeded by another with different views and a different policy. It is not the Emperor of the French whom we have to fear; but we must remember that the same country over which he rules, and over which his predecessors have ruled, contains a people fickle in purpose, yet war-

  815
  like in character, who often and often have urged their Sovereigns to war with this country. It may happen again, and we must be prepared against a nation having such dispositions. If we are securing ourselves, it is not against the Emperor, but against the greatest military nation in the world. It has been said that not only is there no danger of invasion, but that invasion has never been threatened of late years; and they go so far as to say that the First Napoleon never intended really to invade England. There are numerous papers and documents which show that the idea of no invasion being intended is a complete delusion; and history proves that not only was the intention present in the mind of the First Napoleon, but that his military mind comprehended the means that would be necessary down to the smallest details. It was almost a chance which saved this country from invasion, and the anger of the First Napoleon, coupled with his treatment of Admiral Villeneuve, shows how he had set his heart upon it. But in the 10th volume of Napoleon's Correspondence, which has just been published in Paris, there is a letter which puts the question beyond the possibility of a doubt, and supports in every particular the arguments of the noble Duke opposite as to the use of these fortifications. On the 28th of June, 1805, Napoleon writes to Marshal Berthier on the preparations for invading England—
  "Keep your eyes" (he says, in his laconic style) "on everything. Master all the details as to provisions, brandy, shoes, and everything concerning the landing. Put on board a great quantity of artillery tools. You know there is always a deficiency in campaigning. I shall have to lay siege to Dover Castle, Chatham, and perhaps Portsmouth. Talk it over with Marescol, General of Engineers. It is possible to land troops enough perhaps to besiege the three places at the same time. We must have no 'ifs,' or 'buts,' or 'fors.' All my chances are calculated beforehand. Let tools of every sort be shipped, and take care that nothing is wanted."
  This was written in 1805, just before the battle of Trafalgar saved us from the danger, and here we have the opinion of the greatest master of war we know of in our time—first, that he could ship troops; secondly, that he could land troops; and, thirdly, that he could besiege three of outmost important posts, including Dover. Another objection urged against this Bill is that we should trust to our navy alone. If that is not answered by the letter which I have read, let us look at what is going on in France. The Emperor, a man of
  816
  practical knowledge, who is the first inventor of armour-plated vessels, and has changed the whole artillery of the French army, with the means at his command of referring for advice to the best military Engineers of the age, has fortified every harbour and every river's mouth in the Channel, and has not abandoned the ancient principles of fortification in his great inland fortresses. He has fortified Lille at an immense expense, as I have seen with my own eyes, Grenoble, and other places. Another objection to our following this example is, that with so many fortresses, we should be locking up our forces in them and diminishing the available strength of the army. There is no argument in that term. An army must be quartered somewhere or other—if not in a fortress, in a barrack; but if they were quartered in a barrack, they would certainly not be protected in the same way as in a fortress. In the last war, with half our present population, we had 600,000 men under arms to protect the empire in different places, and surely the spirit of Englishmen has not so much deteriorated, that if another war should take place, we should have any difficulty in raising an equal, if not a greater number of men. It is said that the proposed system of fortifications will require about 5,000 guns, and that it is impossible we could find men enough to serve them and at the same time to keep an army of the requisite strength in the field. I deny that altogether. Guns in position behind walls may be served by men at the end of a month's training. Certainly, men could not go into the field and act as artillerymen for field batteries in that time, but a month's training is sufficient to make men excellent marksmen behind walls. Supposing each gun to require ten men, we should have very little difficulty in finding 50,000 artillerymen to work them on an emergency. I have seen a gentleman who never fired a cannon in his life, though he was an excellent rifleman, beat a whole troop of the Royal Horse Artillery after a very short training. It is by no means so difficult to learn to serve such guns as to learn the movements in the field. With regard to what has been said of the relative superiority of forts and ships, I am convinced that if we go on increasing the size of ship guns and the size of fort guns, the relative position of ships and forts must remain the same. Looking to the gradual progress of fortifications and artillery up to this time,

  817
  there can be no doubt that their relative position is exactly the same as when the Norman towers were assailed by bows and arrows and catapults. Of course the maximum of artillery force must sooner be reached in a ship than in a fort, because a ship has a double object to discharge— it has to act as a locomotive as well as to serve as a means of attack. Some most extraordinary statements have been made on the question by gentlemen for whose talent I entertain a sincere respect. Sir Morton Peto, for instance, in a letter to The Times, has argued in a most strange way that a fort is much inferior to a ship, because a ship, as it moves about, cannot be easily hit; whereas a fort, being a stationary object, can be hit much more easily. He quite forgot, that if the basis from which you fire is movable, your aim is destroyed much more than if standing still you fire at a moving object; and if Sir Morton were to try to fire at a hare sitting while he himself was running at full speed, he would find it much more difficult to hit her than if he fired at her running while he was standing still. This is a matter of great importance, and, small as the Bill is, it is with great pleasure that I see it come up from the House of Commons. Those who opposed it can scarcely have considered its magnitude and importance; and it certainly is a prostitution of the word economy when it is used to defeat a measure intended for the defence of the honour, and even the existence, of the country.
  VISCOUNT MELVILLEsaid, he took it for granted that the Government had considered this matter in all its bearings, but he was greatly afraid that when these forts were erected we should find we had only done half our work; because unless we provided men to man them they would be of little or no use. According to the blue-books those forts would require 62,000 men to occupy them; and there were few periods in English history in which we had found ourselves strong enough to put 62,000 men into our fortifications, and at the same time to keep an army in the field sufficiently strong to repel invasion. He understood that the whole of our present available force at home was about 70,000 men, of whom 20,000 belonged to the depôt battalions, which left us with just 50,000 men whom we could employ in operations. How many of these could we spare to garrison our fortifications in case of invasion? He regretted to hear, too, that the Militia mus-
  818
  tered only 62,000 men; if it had been complete on its establishment, as he had supposed it to be, it ought to number some 130,000 men. It became, therefore, a most serious question for the Government to consider in what way men were to be found for the manning of these forts when they were erected. Our regular army was scattered all over the world, and any attack which might be made on us would be so sudden that we should not have time to recall any of our forces on foreign stations. If ever an invasion did take place, the first trial of strength would be in a naval battle; and if we were successful in that, not a man of the enemy's force ought to land on these shores. If we lost it, or if by any chance an enemy should succeed in landing on our shores, then the issue would depend on our land forces and on the general spirit of our people. At any rate, we ought to be prepared to resist an attack both by land and sea. In conclusion, he hoped that serious attention would be given to the observations of the illustrious Duke, which were well deserving the consideration of the Government and of the House.
  EARL GREY: My Lords, I think the noble Viscount who has just sat down was quite right when he said that forts are of no use unless we have men to defend them, and that the forts for which we are now called on to raise a part of the money that will be required to complete them would make it necessary to have an army of 62,000 men for their defence. My Lords, I must say that the noble Viscount has, in my opinion, under-estimated the number of men that would be necessary; if I am rightly informed, it would be considerably more. My noble Friend has justly asked, "Whence are the men to be obtained? How can you ever expect to have men enough to keep all these forts, and have at the same time an army in the field?" That question appears to me to contain in a few words an argument which is decisive against this whole scheme of fortifications. If you had unlimited means in men and money, if you did not fear to lay too great a burden upon the country, you might make the nation more secure than it now is by multiplying fortifications and raising men to garrison them. But such an army you never can and never will have; and, in the absence of so large an army, these fortifications will be rather an incumbrance than otherwise. My Lords, we must consider what are the cir-

  819
  cumstances of the country. When you look to the nature of the Government, to the manner in which the population are occupied, and, in short, to the whole state of things taken together, you may be quite certain that it will be practically impossible ever to keep up a very large standing army in this country; and I, for one, hope and trust it will ever be impossible. What, then, my Lords, will be our true policy? First of all, above everything, to take care that our means of naval defence are as efficient as possible. That is our main and first reliance, and to that our particular attention ought to be directed. What is the next point? To have an army not very large in number, but in as perfect a condition as possible, and placed in such a central position that by well-devised arrangements you can throw it at a few hours' notice upon any point of the coast that may be attacked. In these days of railways such arrangements are quite feasible. I have been informed by a very distinguished officer that he himself, under the directions of the late Lord Hardinge, communicated with the different railway companies, and they informed him that they could convey from 30,000 to 40,000 men, if we had them, from Aldershott, for instance, to almost any point of the coast that might be attacked, within six hours. Well, then, my Lords, I say that the real policy of this country is to adopt the most perfect means that can be devised for completing our facilities of communication by railway, electric telegraph, and other arrangements, so as to be able to concentrate upon any point all our disposable force at the shortest possible notice. If you can do that, you are safe, for no enemy can venture to set foot on the shore of this country unless he can land about 100,000 men. Now, I remain of the same opinion as I formerly entertained—that in these days of steam, and with the power which that gives your fleet of going among unarmed transports, the probability of throwing 100,000 men on any point of the coast is of the most distant kind; and if you exert yourself properly, it is an absolute impossibility. That seems to me a strong argument against the general policy of a system of extensive fortifications. In these fortifications you will lock up 20,000 or 30,000 men; I must say "lock up," in spite of the argument of the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury), because if you leave the forts unmanned they may be laid hold of
  820
  by the enemy, who may maintain himself there when he may not be able to keep the open field. Well, your troops will be locked up in these forts, instead of being placed in the most central position, where their services may be most required. And here, my Lords, I cannot help observing that those who are most in favour of this system have all advocated it on the assumption that we are to have our army largely augmented.
  THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: I beg the noble Earl's pardon—he is quite in error in supposing that I have taken any such line of argument. On the contrary, I said that the reason I thought fortifications essential was because our available regular force was so small we ought to have the means of supplying some auxiliary to that force. I accepted the fortifications on account of the small force which we have now, and which I did not anticipate would be increased.
  EARL GREY: I beg pardon, but I think the great burden of the illustrious Duke's argument was that a much larger force ought to be kept up in this country. But even from the statement now made it is quite clear that the fortifications cannot be manned and an army kept in a central situation at the same time. I do not wish, however, to dwell longer on this point or to debate over again the general question of fortifications, because I have already expressed my opinion on that subject in the discussion which was raised by my noble Friend below mo. I only desire to say, for my own part, that, though I will not put your Lordships to the trouble of dividing, I shall myself say "Not Content" to the Bill before us. I object to it, first, because it provides for a loan in time of peace, and because, notwithstanding what fell from the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) I think that loans in time of peace are altogether objectionable, unless they are to meet some great and pressing emergency, which in this case is not alleged. I also object to the mode of raising the loan, because, if we are to have a loan at all, it ought not to be raised by terminable annuities. The only ground which you can allege in favour of terminable annuities is the security which they afford for early payment; but that security is just as futile as the security that was formerly taken of borrowing more money than was actually wanted in order to form a sinking fund. You really cannot make any impression on

  821
  your debt unless by future Parliaments having the foresight and firmness to keep a fair margin of income over expenditure, If that is done, the debt will be reduced; but if you are paying terminable annuities, and at the same time exceeding your income, and having deficits such as we have had for the last two or three years, what are we to expect? You will not be improving your circumstances at all. In fact, it is only an attempt to tie up the hands of future Parliaments. It may be a sop to the conscience of Parliament. The House of Commons may be aware that it is acting improperly in sanctioning a loan in time of peace, and it may wish to get rid of the responsibility by adopting this form of loan. But the real objection is not got rid of, and the only effect is that you pay more to the lenders than you would do by raising the money on the old system. My Lords, I ask you to reject this Bill, because it is not proved that the money to be raised under it is to be spent in the best way. I am persuaded that there are other better modes. For instance, I saw it lately asserted that the best mode of obtaining security for London is to have railroads carried on all round the town, so that you may have the means of bringing together for its defence a large force of artillery and the mass of your army. I am not prepared, in the present circumstances of the country, to sanction a measure which would involve a large expenditure without adequate results. It seems to me, after having most carefully read the evidence given before the Defence Commission, and also pamphlets published by several officers of the army and navy, and after seeing what are the opinions of those who are the best judges, that the preponderance of argument is with those who are opposed to the forts. More than this —what weighs with me is the evidence which the Report bears upon the face of it, that it has not been framed with due consideration or in such a manner as to command the confidence and respect of the country. Only yesterday some inconsistencies were pointed out to me by an officer who was well able to form an opinion on the subject. I will not enter into detail; but if there is one thing more than another which is calculated to throw doubt upon that Report it is that it is not consistent with itself. I will give your Lordships one instance. You are completing very extensive works, as the Under Secretary of State has told us, at Portsdown Hill,
  822
  which are stated to be necessary, from the increased range of modern artillery, to keep an enemy at a greater distance from your arsenals, and therefore these works are erected at a distance of between 8,000 and 9,000 yards from the dockyard which is to be protected. If that is right at Portsmouth, common sense — which the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) has truly told us is so valuable a quality—surely teaches us that the same principle is equally applicable at Plymouth. But what is the case? The works which are, I believe, not yet begun, but which are about to be commenced at Plymouth, according to the plan of the Commissioners, instead of being 8,000 or 9,000 yards from the dockyard, are only from 4,000 to 5,000 yards; while at Pembroke they are only 3,000 yards. I can only say that the whole of this plan cannot be right, and I believe it to be also true that there is no difficulty either at Plymouth or Pembroke in placing the defences at the same distance from the point to be protected as at Portsmouth. I will only advert to one more point in regard to the plan of the Commissioners, and I mention it in order that it may be explained by the Under Secretary of State. Your Lordships will observe that in the schedule of this Bill a sum of £87,000 is taken for the construction of mortar batteries at St. Helen's and at Puckpool in the Isle of Wight. These mortar batteries are intended to protect the anchorage of Spithead, by firing on vessels that are running into that road. I suppose this proceeds on the consideration that iron-sided vessels will be found practically invulnerable at a great distance, but that a shell falling on the deck of any vessel will infallibly destroy it. I do not doubt that it would, but it reminds me of what children are told—"You will catch that bird if you put a little salt on its tail." It is true, that if you could put a little salt on a bird's tail, you would be able to catch it; and so, no doubt, the shell would destroy the ship if you could drop it on the deck. But it would be about as easy to drop a shell on the deck of a vessel a mile off, running in at full steam, and probably under a cloud of smoke, as it would be to put salt on a bird's tale. I am assured by a very competent authority that this is the scheme, but it is so inexpressibly absurd that I can hardly imagine it to be true. My Lords, I adhere to the opinions I formerly expressed on this fortification scheme; and although I am as anxious as any one

  823
  that this country should be placed in as complete a state of security as possible, I cannot vote in favour of this Bill. Allusion has been made to the expenses of our army and navy. It is fair to remember that the armies of foreign nations cost far more than our own, because conscription is virtually a tax of a most onerous description. It is a poll tax on the whole of the population. Every man who serves in that army at less than the market rate of his labour is a contributor to that tax. We, on the contrary, do not compel men in this country to serve for less than the value of their labour, and, going into the market and obtaining men without compulsion, we must pay what their services are honestly worth. I do not therefore believe that the pay of our soldiers is higher than it ought to be. I am not so well satisfied that the expenses of our army are not greater than need be, especially in the item of barrack accommodation. There is a building now rising near Battersea Park which is to contain 1,000 men. The cost of those barracks is estimated at £160,000—that is to say, we are to spend £160 for every soldier to be lodged in them. Now, your Lordships are aware that you can build a most excellent cottage with several rooms, and accommodation for an agricultural labourer and his family for £100. While I admit that soldiers require some things that agricultural labourers do not want, yet the reverse is also the case in other matters, and on all ordinary principles it is much cheaper to erect a building for a large number of men than for a family. I cannot understand therefore why these expenses should be so high. I am also of opinion that we are going on a wrong principle in always keeping our army in a state of readiness for taking the field on foreign service. I am anxious that our troops should always be ready for home defence, but I do not desire to see our arrangements so complete as to enable us to send at the shortest notice any portion of our army abroad that may be desired. When the illustrious Duke therefore tells us that the military train, among other things, involves us in a very large expense, I say that, if so, it is because these branches of the army are kept up in the state in which they would be required for foreign service. I maintain, on the contrary, that everything that is not required for home defence should be kept on the lowest scale of expense. If you really wish to reduce the expenses of
  824
  your army, you ought to reduce the expenses connected with its service abroad. I think you might, without increased expense, do much to put yourself in a state of defence at home, and then, by avoiding unnecessary and expensive wars, like those in New Zealand and China, you might considerably diminish the ordinary expenses of the army. I cannot help thinking that those who urge at the same time an increase in our fortifications and in our army are recommending two things which are very inconsistent with each other.
  EARL RUSSELL: In the course of the speech which he has just addressed to your Lordships my noble Friend urged very strongly that you must greatly increase your army in order to garrison those forts which it is proposed to erect. My Lords, I think that objection has already been sufficiently disposed of by the illustrious Duke who has spoken in this debate, and who observed with reason that because of your small army there was the greater necessity for fortifications as auxiliary to our military force. The noble Viscount who spoke on the other side said that 62,000 men would be required to garrison those works in time of war; but, my Lords, that is not a number which you would require, or which any Secretary of State would propose, to place in the forts in a time of peace. The noble Viscount knows what was the state of things during the last war. I remember well that four-fifths of the garrison of Dover, a large garrison, was composed of Militia; and those Militiamen were, I believe, in as perfect a state of efficiency for the defence of a country as any regular troops could have been. Militia are not, of course, in the same state of efficiency in time of peace; but I believe, that if war were to break out, and there was any apprehension of invasion, before any enemy could land on these shores we should have a militia force and a reserve force fully equal to manning our garrisons. Therefore I concur with the illustrious Duke, that the smallness of your army affords no argument whatever against the proposed forts, but is, on the contrary, a very strong argument in their favour. My noble Friend (Earl Grey) said, that the first element of our defence is a strong navy. No doubt our permanent means of defence must always be in the strength of our navy; but then, in order to maintain our navy in an efficient state of defence, the protection of our dockyards and arsenals is an absolute

  825
  necessity. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) has read what was very pertinent to the subject, a letter from the first Emperor Napoleon, written during the great war when he was meditating a descent on this country, and which pointed out that one of the first measures he would take would be an attack on Portsmouth. In considering the propriety of relying on your navy, it must be borne in mind that ships continually require to be repaired and refitted. Imagine an enemy attacking Portsmouth, and having the advantage of meeting none but old and dilapidated walls, which would be altogether unable to meet an attack such as one conducted in accordance with the science of modern warfare would be— where then would be our reliance on our navy? Instead of being a defence and a reliance, the navy would be crippled and ineffective, and a source of weakness rather than of strength. If you rely on your navy as a defence, you must not allow your dockyards and arsenals to be exposed to destruction. My Lords, I cannot but think that among your means of defence, relying as we always must upon our navy, it is essential that you should give us the means of protecting your naval dockyards and arsenals. If this must be one of your first objects—and if you admit, as every one must, that the art of war has changed and has become more scientific and expensive, you must meet the science and expenditure of other countries by the science and expenditure of your own. My noble Friend (Earl Grey) has objected to the mode in which it is proposed to provide for the expense of these fortifications by means of terminable annuities, considering that they ought to be paid for from time to time as the expense is incurred. But, my Lords, if those works are not to be completed for a number of years, it seems fair that the expense should be divided among those who are to have the benefit of them, the more especially as the works themselves are to be permanent. When we are providing for the army or the navy for the services of the year, it is undoubtedly right that the charge should be defrayed out of the revenue of the year; but when we are providing for the permanent means of defending the country, it is equally proper that the charge should be spread over a series of years. As regards the objection that the loan will be a perpetual one —that it will never be paid off—I would
  826
  remind your Lordships that within the last two years no less than £2,000,000 of terminable annuities have been paid off. When these annuities fell in, the Government had this amount in hand which they might have appropriated in relieving the people from taxation, or in adding to the naval and military expenditure of the country. The Legislature determined to discharge those annuities, and they have disappeared entirely from your debt. Therefore I cannot think that my noble Friend is sound on that point. My noble Friend who spoke early in this debate (the Earl of Ellen-borough) called attention to other subjects on which I wish to say a few words. In pointing out the great danger that might arise from foreign invasion, he stated, much to my surprise, that if France became aggressive, no Power in the world would be the ally of this country in assisting her to defend herself against an attack. I believe the case is very different. I believe the policy of the Emperor Napoleon, during the ten years of his rule, has not been hostile to the independence of nations. Both the wars which he has undertaken— the war in the Crimea and the war in Italy, have been favourable, not hostile to the independence of nations. But certainly I do believe, that if his policy were to be changed, there is at this moment, to a greater extent than I ever remember, a love of national independence among the nations of Europe. Look abroad where we will, there never was a time when throughout Europe national power was more decidedly developing itself—when the people of Europe more valued their national independence, and when they were more disposed to resist any great plan of conquest such as that devised by Louis XIV., or that carried out by Napoleon I. The present Emperor does not appear to adopt such a policy. I am far from saying that no danger may arise; but I do not think there is that danger which my noble Friend seems to apprehend. With regard to the Ministry, I am at a loss to know to what point a defence of the present Government is to be addressed. One whole sitting was taken up with a debate on the extravagance of the Government with respect to the army and navy; and to-night we are told that we have not armed enough—that our navy is not equal to the navy of France, and that our army is very inferior in numbers to what it ought to be. In answer to these charges I can only say that it is for the

  827
  Government of the day to propose the measures they think best under all the circumstances. It is very obvious, that if, on the one hand, you diminish your armaments too much in order to make great reductions in the expenditure, you are likely by so doing to embolden the war party in foreign countries, and you neglect the duty of defending what is intrusted to your protection; but, on the other hand, if your armaments are maintained at too high a standard you create a jealousy abroad, you produce great discontent in the country itself, you make the people complain, you give rise to a demand for excessive or imprudent reduction, and you thereby incur the very peril against which you are desirous of guarding. The course of the Government must be to steer between those two opposite dangers, and it is for the country and the Houses of Parliament to consider whether the present Government have done wisely or not — whether, on the one hand, we have proposed excessive armaments, or, on the other, recommended injudicious and dangerous reductions. My belief is, that we have not fallen into either extreme, and that the course which we are pursuing is the right one. My Lords, there is one point which ought not to be lost sight of in considering the position of any country, and of this country in particular, as regards its means of defence. It is this—that you never can be strong against a foreign Power—you never can successfully resist a foreign enemy—unless your people are united heart and soul in the defence—unless they feel that the Government and the Legislature are doing them justice; and, in this country, unless they feel loyalty towards the Throne and satisfaction with respect to the legislation of Parliament. And, my Lords, looking at the legislation of the last thirty years, and looking at the high character of the present Sovereign, I believe there never was a time when the people were more persuaded that their interests are cared for by Parliament, that the Government is conducted with a view to the benefit of the people at large, and that there never was a time when there existed more affection towards the Throne. These are, of themselves, great elements of defence. When there is this feeling among the people, depend on it, that if there was any danger of war, there would arise up from the earth armed men in a much shorter time than any one can now imagine. In
  828
  common with all your Lordships, I have been delighted to see that spirit which has produced the great force of Volunteers; and that great force you may rest assured, if there was any chance of invasion, would be in a very short time a most efficient regular army. The Government has attended to these things. It is by attending to these things—by making prudent, but not excessive preparations for defence—by sympathizing with other countries in their desire for independence, and at the same time improving our own institutions in conformity with the progress of the age —by attending to all just complaints—by promoting freedom of trade and commerce, and upholding liberty of discussion, that you best maintain a spirit of independence among your own people, and fit them for defending themselves against any foreign foe. The noble Earl (the Earl of Ellen-borough) has spoken of the expense to which Parliament goes in providing education for the people. I believe that by educating the people you make them the more capable of appreciating our institutions. If Parliament pursues the wise course it has for some years acted on, I believe that no war can come upon us which will not be encountered with the spirit of Englishmen, loyally devoted to the Throne and sincerely attached to the institutions of their country.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

  PROTEST
  Against the Second Reading of the Fortifications (Provision for Expenses) Bill.
  "DISSENTIENT—Because the Bill is contrary to sound Financial Policy, its Object being to sanction the raising of a Loan in Time of Peace, and without any urgent Necessity.
  "Because even if it were right to raise a Loan for the Purpose contemplated by this Bill, the Creation of Terminable Annuities would be inexpedient, since this Mode of raising Money is costly to the Public, without affording any real Security for the Redemption of the Debt so contracted within the Time for which the Annuities are granted.
  "Because the Works of which the Cost is to be met by the proposed Increase of the National Debt form Part of a Scheme for the Defence of the Country which cannot be completed without incurring an enormous Expense, while the Advantage to be derived from it is uncertain, since the Plan has been condemned by Officers of great Experience and Ability in the Naval and Military Service of Her Majesty, and is not supported by the Evidence taken by the Commissioners who have recommended its Adoption.
  "GREY."

CONSTABULARY (IRELAND).

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  THE EARL OF LEITRIM THE EARL OF LEITRIM moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for,
  "Copy of a Letter addressed to the Secretary of the Grand Jury of the County of Tipperary by Sir Thomas Larcom, Under Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, dated the 7th of July 1862: And,
  "Copy of a Statement enclosed therein from Sir Henry Brownrigg, Inspector General of Police in Ireland, respecting the Efficiency of the Police in Ireland."
  The statement in question, in which it was asserted that the position and powers of the police were the same as they were previous to 1836, was so rash as coming from such an authority, and endorsed by the Secretary of the Lord Lieutenant, that he was astonished they should have expected it to be believed. There had been no less than twelve Acts of Parliament passed since 1836, altering and increasing the powers of the Irish police, which now consisted of no less than 12,000 men, and cost the country £762,000 a year. Of this expenditure part was paid out of the Consolidated Fund, and part out of the county rates; but the Returns which had been presented to the House on the subject he contended were incorrect.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that the Report moved for by the noble Earl had already been ordered, and the letter of the Under Secretary for Ireland was a private one, which he presumed the noble Earl would not require.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, he thought there must be a Parliamentary inquiry into the management and discipline of the police force in Ireland next Session.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

SPECIAL COMMISSION (LIMERICK).

  MOTION FOR RETURN.
  THE EARL OF LEITRIM THE EARL OF LEITRIM moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for,
  "Return of all the Expenses attending the late Special Commissions of Assizes in the Counties of Limerick and Tipperary in Ireland; distinguishing the Expenses under the several Heads for whatever Object incurred, either for the Law Officers of the Crown or the Police, or for any local or other Purpose whatsoever."
  The noble Earl said, he thought it was a serious matter to put these counties to the expense of an additional assize, and further it was highly objectionable when a county was in an excited state.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, there would be no objection to a Return in the same form as that given in the year 1830.
  Address for,
  Return of the Total Expense of the late Special Commission held in Limerick and Clonmel; distinguishing the Amounts paid to the Judges, Crown Lawyers, Crown Solicitor, Clerk of the Crown, Sheriffs, and Police, and the Expense of maintaining the Witnesses in Limerick and Clonmel during the Continuance of the Commission.
  —agreed to.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPLEMENTAL (No. 2) BILL— [BILL No. 212.]
  LORD REDESDALEopposed the suspension of the Standing Orders with a view to this Bill being read a second time, and complained of the extreme haste with which the Bill, introduced at a late period of the Session, had been pushed through the other House of Parliament.
  EARL DE GREY AND RIPONassented to the withdrawal of the Bill.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read, and discharged.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Nine o'clock, to Monday next Twelve o'clock.