Sitting of 10 May 1861

MINUTES.
Piratic BILLS.—1o Markets (Ireland).
3o Princess Alice's Annuity.

INDIA AND THIBET.

  QUESTION.
  MR. W. EWARTsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for India, Whether terms have been made with the Rajah of Sikkim, by which increased

  1855
  facilities for communication will be opened from India to Thibet?
  MR. VANSITTARTsaid, that before the right hon. Gentleman answered the question, he wished to ask him whether he will introduce, before or after the Whitsuntide holidays, the Bill relating to India, which has been so long under his consideration?
  SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, in answer to the question of his hon. Friend behind him (Mr. W. Ewart). he had to state that he had no official information upon the subject, but he learned by private letter addressed to the Governor General by Mr. Eden, who had conducted the negotiations at Sikkim, that he had effected an arrangement for opening the communication between the territory of Bengal and Sikkim. No duty was to be imposed on goods passing through our territory into Sikkim, and a low rate of duty would be imposed on all goods passing from Thibet to Sikkim. It seemed that both the merchants of Thibet and the people of Sikhim were very well disposed to avail themselves of the advantage which this road would give them.
  With regard to the information asked for by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Vansittart), he (Sir Charles Wood) had hoped to have been able to introduce the measure alluded to before Whitsuntide; but the House was so occupied with the discussions on the financial proposals of the Government that he was afraid it would not be in his power to do so.

COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH TURKEY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. FREELANDasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the ratifications of a Commercial Treaty between England and Turkey had been exchanged, and, if so, when a copy of the Treaty would be laid upon the table of the House; and whether any correspondence had taken place between the Governments of England and France relating to the conclusion of a similar Commercial Treaty between France and Turkey; and, if so, whether there would be any objection to lay copies of that correspondence and of the correspondence between the English and Turkish Governments on the subject of either Treaty on the table of the House?
  LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, that the treaty in question had not yet been finally concluded, but when it had been ratified, as was expected to be the case soon, it
  1856
  would be laid upon the Table. With respect to the second part of the hon. Member's question, he had to say that the French Government had informed him some time ago, through their Ambassador, that they agreed in the general principles of the Treaty between England and Turkey, and Her Majesty's Government afterwards communicated to the Government of France some amendments which they proposed in it. There had, however, been no regular correspondence between the Governments of England and France relative to the conclusion of a similar treaty between the latter Power and Turkey.

  THE PAPER DUTY.—QUESTION.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEsaid, he rose to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he can explain the discrepancy which appears to exist between the increase in the quantity of paper manufactured, and in the amount of duty received in 1860, as compared with 1859?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the explanation is one which I could easily have given yesterday if I had had the paper in my hand at the time the question was put to me. It is very simple. In fact, both accounts are perfectly correct. The one statement refers to the paper manufactured, and on which duty was charged; the other to the amount of duty received. By the Excise system the year is divided into eight rounds, and the paper duty charged on each round is collected in the following round. Consequently it follows that when a Return is called for limited to the period between two given dates, the Return includes the duty charged upon seven rounds made in that year, and one round made in the year before; while as respects the weight it represents the actual quantity manufactured within the year. The quantity in each round depends on a variety of circumstances that cannot always be traced; but in the present instance the last round of the last financial year derived a considerable increase from the fact that it was compared with a round in the year 1859–60, during which the repeal of the paper duty had been commenced, although the arrangements as to the drawback had not been made. Until those arrangements had been made there was a considerable stagnation in the trade; and that I apprehend is substantially the cause of the considerable difference between these two rounds.

SHIPS OF WAR—MR. GILL'S PATENT.

  QUESTION.
  MR. SOMERSET BEAUMONTsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether the Board of Admiralty intend taking any steps with regard to Mr. George Gill's Patent for Improvements in Ships of War, either by suppressing the Patent, or in any other way; whether the Board intend testing his plans for accelerating the speed and diminishing the vibration of ships, which have lately been communicated to the Admiralty?
  LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, that Mr. Gill sent to the Admiralty some time ago a proposal for the improvement of steam ships of war, which was examined by professional officers and pronounced by them not calculated to benefit the public service. He afterwards had an interview with Mr. Gill, by that gentleman's request, at the Admiralty, and having received his explanations of his plans, in the presence of the Comptroller of the Navy and other officers of his department, it was not thought that their adoption would be expedient. It was not, therefore, the intention of the Admiralty to take any steps either for the suppression of Mr. Gill's Patent, or for having it tested.

  EDINBURGH CASTLE.—QUESTION.
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, When it is intended that the portion of Edinburgh Castle which was pulled down with a view to improvements shall be rebuilt?
  MR. T. G. BARINGsaid, that the plans for rebuilding part of Edinburgh Castle, though they had been under consideration for some years, had not yet been decided upon by the Secretary of State for War. The plans, if carried out, would involve a considerable expenditure, and no sum had been taken for them in this year's Estimates. He could not, therefore, give any positive answer as to the rebuilding of that portion of the Castle.

THE WHITSUNTIDE HOLIDAYS.

  QUESTION.
  ADMIRAL DUNCOMBEsaid, he wished to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the absence of the noble Lord the head of the Government, If he will state when it is proposed to adjourn for the Whitsun-
  1858
  tide holidays, and for how long? Some information on the subject would enable the Committees to make their arrangements.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that he would rather not answer that question in the absence of the noble Lord, because he was not perfectly aware what arrangements had been made.

AUSTRIA AND ITALY.

  PAPERS MOVED FOR.
  Order of the Day for going into Committee of Supply read.
  Motion made and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
  MR. PEACOCKEsaid, that in rising, according to notice, to call the attention of the House to the affairs of Austria and Italy, his intention was to afford to the Government an opportunity of giving to Parliament some indication of the policy they were now pursuing, and were likely in future to pursue, rather than to excite any angry recriminations between the partizans of hostile States. The most impartial persons would, he thought, admit that it was neither possible to defend all the acts of the Italian Governments which had been overthrown, nor to defend all the acts of that country which had been the instruments of their subversion. He must say he had risen from the perusal of the despatches which had been laid on the Table with an opinion by no means unfavourable to the policy of our Foreign Secretary, who had, on the whole, more or less, fairly adhered to the principle of nonintervention which he had laid down as the rule of our relations with Italy. He could have wished, however, that the noble Lord had more strongly condemned the invasion of Naples by Sardinia—conduct as much a violation of that principle of non-intervention as an invasion of Piedmont by Austria could possibly be. From what he had himself seen in Italy last autumn, he thought the noble Lord had done wisely in advocating a system of duality as more likely to prove beneficial to that peninsula than a system of unity. He found the greatest jealousy prevaling between the North and the South of that country, great clashing of interests, conflicting opinions, the most marked distinction between the habits, customs, races, and, he might add, language of the people. He witnessed the entry of King Victor Emmanuel into

  1859
  Naples, and the enthusiasm displayed upon that occasion, and for a Neapolitan population it was not excessive, was much less for the monarch than for Garibaldi, who sat by his side. He further knew that the Piedmontese troops within a fortnight of their entry into Naples were everywhere complaining that they were received by the Neapolitans rather as conquerors and aliens than as liberators and allies. It was not surprising that in Italy there should exist considerable jealousy of the supremacy of Piedmont, and some aversion to Turin as the metropolis, when it was found that the very first despatch written by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in this country respecting the proclamation of the King of Italy, was written in the French instead of the Italian language. He did not think that hon. Members could approve the means by which Piedmont had brought about the unity of Italy. Hon. Members no doubt supposed that that union had been brought about by the ardent patriotism of the Italian people; whereas, had they been at Florence or Naples they would have known that that result had been brought about by corruption which would have done honour to a contest for Sudbury or St. Albans, and which quite justified the expression which had been used in the French Chamber, that Piedmont did far more to promote the cause of Italian unity by putting her hand into her pocket than by laying it upon her sword. But however that might be, he did not wish now to revive the discussion as to whether union or dualism would be best for Italy, because a practical Government must recognize accomplished facts, and, looking to what had been done, he thought that it was for the best interests of England, of Europe, and of Austria herself that the union and independence of Italy should be secured. It was true that Austria retained possession of Venetia; but, in his opinion, that province was a source of weakness rather than of strength to the Austrian Empire. In peace it was a festering sore eating into the finances of Austria, and in time of war its people were a hostile population menacing her flank. He might be reminded of the strength of the Quadrilateral; but any military man knew that a general who should for strategical, and not political purposes, invade Austria on the side of Italy, would be fit for a lunatic asylum. Austria was not menaced from Italy, because as regarded war the Germans
  1860
  were a superior race to the Italians. Her hereditary enemy was France, and where Austria was vulnerable was upon the Rhine and Danube, and if a French army were to menace Vienna the troops must be immediately withdrawn from the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and removed to the field upon which the decisive battle was to be fought. If the Austrians were defeated in the plains of the Danube, and Vienna fell into the hands of the enemy, these fortresses would fall, as military men term it, "by position," and any troops that might be in them would become prisoners of war without striking a blow. The only purpose which the possession of the Quadrilateral by Austria could serve was to act as a menace to Italy; but he believed that there was nothing so fatal to the interests of Austria as the maintenance of such an attitude towards that country. As long as the fortresses of the Quadrilateral frowned upon the independence of Italy so long would the King of Italy be reduced to the condition of a mere Prefect of France. If, on the other hand, that menace were withdrawn there was every reason why France and Italy should be on the worst terms, because they both had large seaboards on the Mediterranean, and consequently there would be great rivalry between them for supremacy in that sea. If Austria retired within her natural boundaries, the Alps, she would, in case of a war with France, have her flank protected by a neutral Power, instead of having it menaced by 20,000,000 Italians. He made these observations in no spirit of hostility to Austria, because he believed that a powerful and united Austria was necessary to the best interests of England. Austria had had recently but a scant measure of justice dealt out to her by the people and press of this country. She was for more than a quarter of a century our faithful ally in withstanding the aggressive designs of the First Napoleon, and it was in the wars which she then carried on, that she had incurred the greater portion of that debt by which she was now weighed down. Austria was, indeed, our natural ally. There were many persons who had feelings and prejudices against Austria; but when material interests were at stake, sentiment must yield to geography, and he believed that if war broke out again in Europe England and Austria would be found fighting side by side. It was often said that Austria was a despotic Power. But that was no longer the case.

  1861
  Austria now possessed a Constitution as free as that under which we lived, and had recently given to her provinces an autonomy and independence which would only be paralleled on the other side of the Atlantic in the Constitution which lately existed in the now dis-United States. Those provinces would now enjoy a far larger amount of autonomy and self-government than we gave to Scotland or Wales, and much more independence than we were willing to grant to Ireland. For federal and imperial purposes Austria now possessed a Constitution fashioned after the likeness of our own. She had a Lower Chamber elected by the Diets of the Empire, which were in their turn elected by a suffrage which not even the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) would call illiberal, because every man who paid five florins, about 9s., in taxation, had a' right to rote. In addition she was to have an hereditary Upper Chamber and an hereditary Sovereign. The Hungarians objected to this, and wished to have separate Ministers for finance, war, and he believed foreign affairs. If Austria granted these demands she might as well dismember her empire. If we made such concessions we should not only repeal the union, we should re-establish the heptarchy. Austria ought to be encouraged and cheered on in the path of constitutional reform on which she had entered, rather than checked and arrested in her progress by having made upon her demands with which it was impossible that she should comply. It was with particular satisfaction that he at this moment pointed to the existence in Austria of an hereditary Upper Chamber founded upon a territorial class, because recent events had shown that an independent territorial class was the safest breakwater against both the tyranny of despotism and the disorders of democracy. It was not the power of every country to possess an hereditary Upper Chamber, because some countries had not within them the essential element, an independent territorial class. Italy possessed that advantage, but had not availed herself of it. In the States of the Church and in Lombardy there was a law of primogeniture, and consequently a territorial class; but M. Cavour had declared that he would introduce the Code of Piedmont and under it the forced division of property into every portion of Italy which was annexed to that kingdom. Already he had endeavoured to introduce it into Lombardy; but the attempt was so unpopular that he had
  1862
  been forced to desist from his efforts. Under the Constitution of 1812—commonly called Lord William Bentinck's Constitution—the forced division of property did not exist in Sicily; but when the Bourbons were restored they re-established that law, because they were unwilling that an independent territorial class should stand between a servile people and their leaden sway. If he had any fault to find with the despatches of the noble Lord, it was that he did not find in them a single word of protest against the decision of M. Cavour to introduce the forced division of property throughout Italy. He felt strongly upon this subject. He thought that it was the duty and the mission of England to proclaim the doctrine of primogeniture throughout Europe, in contradistinction to that of the forced division of the soil, because in every country in which there was a forced division of property we found sympathy with the institutions and greatness of France, while, where a law of primogeniture existed, there we found sympathy with England, with her institutions and with her greatness. In moving for these papers he could assure the noble Lord that he did not wish to cast the smallest reflection upon his foreign policy, because he believed that, upon the whole, that policy deserved the approbation of his countrymen, that the honour of England was safe in his hands, and that his displacement from office at the present moment would be a most untoward event.
  Amendment proposed,
  "To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, Copies of any Papers or Despatches which have been received from our Ambassador at Vienna, detailing or describing the nature of the Constitution lately granted by the Emperor of Austria to the various Provinces and Subjects of his Empire.'"
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  MR. ST. AUBYNsaid, it was not his intention to follow the hon. Gentleman throughout his statement. In reference to the case of Austria it was evident that her internal affairs were so rapidly approaching a crisis that the well-founded opinions of to-day might be scattered to the winds by the events of the morrow: he would, therefore, confine his remarks to the general question of the independence and unity of Italy, and the future pros-

  1863
  pects of the Italian peninsula. He believed that nine out of ten Members of that House, and of thinking persons in this country, were anxious to see a united and independent Italy. But he was not one of those who could view with satisfaction the dismemberment of the Austrian empire. He believed it was the interest of all continental nations, and especially of this country, that a powerful State should exist in the centre of Europe—a State, not merely powerful in the affections and good dispositions of its subjects, but also powerful in the administration of good government. Austria, it was said, was now going in that direction, and so far it ought to possess our warmest sympathies. But the retention of Venice did not strengthen Austria. The case of Venetia was not like that of Hungary. The Venetians were Italians, and they alone of all Italians were now under the domination of a foreign and oppressive Government. It could not be supposed that the Venetians would be content with this state of things. They felt as the men of Kent or Sussex might be supposed to feel if they alone of all Englishmen were subject to a government alien in race, in manners, and in language. Under those circumstances Austria could not hope to maintain a hold upon the affections of the inhabitants of Venetia, who would assuredly, on some day or another, emancipate themselves from her thraldom. He mentioned these things for the sake of Austria herself, which must feel her power more or less crippled so long as such a state of things was allowed to continue. She was at an immense expense, both as regarded money and men, in order to maintain her position in this discontented province, and it must be for her own interest, both as regarded Italy, and as it regarded her position in Europe, that she should withdraw from her Italian province. But even if Austria withdrew from Venetia there was another obstacle to complete Italian unity—the delicate subject of the occupation of Rome by the French troops. The affairs of Rome were complicated by considerations other than those which affected the nationality of Venetia. The position of the Pope as spiritual head of the Catholic Church had immensely complicated the affairs of Italy, in consequence of the occupation of that capital by the French army. Opinions, he believed, were rapidly gaining ground amongst the Roman Catholics that the Pope would be best able to discharge the duties of his spiritual
  1864
  office by being relieved of his temporal authority. To the French Emperor and the French people generally the Italians owed a deep debt of gratitude, and it was in his power to assist them to the possession of their ancient capital, and so complete the work he had begun. He did not think it was too much to say that without the intervention of the Emperor of the French the power of the Italian people to obtain their liberty would have been utterly hopeless; now, on the other hand, by refusing to accede to the reasonable demands of the people of Italy the Emperor was gradually destroying his own influence upon the affairs of the Continent generally. The withdrawal of the French troops from Rome appeared to him (Mr. St. Aubyn) to be the only step that could obviate the disasters of a long and bloody war, that could strengthen the Imperial policy and ensure the peace of the civilized world. He regretted that the Motion of the hon. Gentleman opposite was not one that was calculated to elicit a strong feeling on the part of the House of Commons. It was possible that a Resolution of the House of Commons might have some little influence upon that arm that was directing the movements of so many men around the capital of Rome. It was not the less important and necessary, when a question of vital importance was brought before the House, that they should give expression to their views. He regretted the hon. Gentleman had not taken the opinion of the House upon the Italian question. He trusted, however, that during the debate sufficient evidence would be given to prove the real opinions, not only of this House, but of the country generally, on this important subject of Italian affairs.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he should not have intruded himself if he had not heard some very strong opinions expressed by the two hon. Gentlemen who had preceded him; but he thought that neither Austria nor the Pope were likely to feel very grateful for the good advice tendered them by the hon. Gentleman opposite and his hon. Friend—the one of whom advised Austria to cede Venetia and the other the Pope to retire from Rome. His (Mr. Cochrane's) views, and he believed those of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who, a few nights ago, insisted on the importance of keeping Austria strong, were that she should continue to possess the important province of Venetia. He did not regret that this sub-

  1865
  ject had been brought forward. The Italian question had not been properly discussed hitherto, but it had been brought forward on occasions only to be made a question bearing upon the conduct of the Pope and the King of Naples. He said the question ought to be, What was the interest of England in the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government? He, for one, did not think that our foreign policy was such as to promote the interests of England on the Continent. Our position with regard to the Continent was an exceptional and an extraordinary one. We had at that moment literally not one ally in Europe. We had estranged ourselves from France by our ridiculous fears of invasion from that quarter. We had estranged Austria and all our old allies by our unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of other countries. And at the present moment Her Majesty's Government were arming the whole country from dread of the only Power which we professed to have as an ally. He was struck by the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department yesterday, and he was desirous of seeing how the principle which that right hon. Gentleman then enunciated was to be carried out by Her Majesty's Government. Those observations arose on the question of the war in America. The right hon. Gentleman said it was in the contemplation of the Government to issue a Proclamation for the purpose of cautioning all Her Majesty's subjects from interfering in the hostilities that were going on between the Northern and Southern States of America, and that in that Proclamation the general principle of our laws would be laid down—that principle being that no British subject should enter the service of any foreign Power or engage in any hostilities carried on between foreign States. This was an admirable principle. But had this admirable principle been always applied? He thought he had heard of a foreign legion being recruited for service in the Neapolitan States. He thought he had heard that an office had been opened in Westminster in order to recruit a legion for Garibaldi. He asked whether, if the principle laid down in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was a sound and proper principle, why it was not consistently carried out? He asked whether it was straightforward and consistent to allow recruiting to go forward in this country to assist an ambitious Power in an
  1866
  aggression upon an old ally? Prussia, too, was a most faithful ally, which had rendered us the most important services in 1814. Without referring to the merits of the case of Captain Macdonald, he thought it was to be regretted that the noble Viscount at the head of the Government should have made such observations against the Government of Prussia as he had done the other night—observations which had excited the strongest feelings of disapprobation in Prussia towards the Government of this country. They had heard statements made about the peaceable state of Italy. The telegrams, however, which arrived every morning from that part of the Continent informed us that there existed now in Italy all the elements of disorganization. The noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had in his memorable despatch of October last laid down the principle that if a majority of the people chose they might change their form of Government. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Nothing of the kind.] The noble Lord might not have used those precise words, but he said that each nation was the best judge of the form of Government to which it was to be subject [Cheers]. He (Mr. Cochrane) regretted that cheer, because it struck at the root of all constitutional order. Why, then, was not that principle applied to the Ionian Islands, the inhabitants of which almost unanimously desired to get rid of British authority? The noble Lord stated the other night that there had been no disturbances in the Ionian Islands.
  MR. SPEAKERsaid, the hon. Gentleman was out of order in referring to a past debate on the Ionian Islands on a Motion for copies of despatches relating to the Austrian Constitution.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he was merely referring to the case of the Ionian Islands as an illustration of the argument of nationality. Although the noble Lord stated there had not been any disturbances in the Ionian Islands, the newspapers of that morning mentioned the fact of some serious disturbances having occurred in Zante. Referring to the despatch of the noble Lord, he thought that the policy therein laid down was calculated to prejudice English interests on the Continent instead of creating respect for our power and our institutions.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I wish to make some observations upon the speech of the hon. Member who has brought forward this subject. I do not think it would

  1867
  be advisable to produce the despatches to which he referred. They are despatches not entering accurately, or with much of remark, into the present constitution of the Austrian Empire. Of course there are among them official papers, but those papers have appeared in the Vienna Gazette; they have been copied into the newspapers of this country, and, on the whole, I do not think I should be justified in producing these papers to Parliament. Undoubtedly it is a matter of great interest to this House and the country, but at the same time it is a matter the primary decision respecting which must rest with the Government of the Emperor of Austria. The Emperor of Austria has changed the institutions of his country, and has given his people a constitution, founded upon free principles. He has very lately declared the entire religious freedom of his Protestant subjects—a question upon which I had ventured more than once to remark that the Protestants of the Empire were entitled to greater consideration than they then received. With regard to the general constitution which he has given to the empire, it is, as the hon. Gentleman very fairly says, founded upon the principles of the United States' Senate. There are separate local bodies of representatives in Bohemia and in various other provinces, and each of these bodies sends members to the governing body—the Reichsrath. How this system will answer it is beyond our power to say. At all events, we cannot but rejoice that the principles of representative government are recognized, and that the representatives of the people are called together, and that to them will be submitted questions affecting the taxes and expenditure. We cannot but see in those provisions the germs of free representative government. And I hope there is no man so prejudiced against Austria as not to desire to see the Emperor and his people proceed together in the path of free representative institutions. But this grant of a constitution to Austria raises other questions which are of a very difficult nature. It is to be observed, with regard to the recent constitutions which have been created on the continent, that, while they give great satisfaction to the nation at large, in those States which are composed of people of different races and nationalities you do not excite the people against the Government, but you give greater scope to those popular feelings of jealousy, and perhaps of dislike which prevail among those
  1868
  races. Thus, in regard to Poland, since Alexander I. established a constitution in that country, there has been a strong feeling on the part of the Russian subjects of His Majesty against further concessions and further liberty being granted to Poland; and in the same way we find that the Liberal press of Vienna is quite against making further concessions to Hungary, The dissensions, therefore, which have occurred are not owing to attempts on the part of the Sovereign to coerce or act tyrannically towards his subjects, as to the efforts of the several national parties against each other. The Emperor of Austria, I believe, has intended to act fairly towards Hungary; but the people of Hungary are, as I think, very naturally attached to the ancient principles of their constitution. I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman that if the constitution of 1848, with a Foreign Minister, a War Minister, and a Finance Minister to Hungary, were effectually carried out, it would lead to the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire. What one must wish is that the principles of that ancient constitution may he observed, and that the Emperor as King of Hungary may be able to reconcile the desires of the people of Hungary for the continuance of their ancient national constitution with the unity of the Empire at large. It is a question of the utmost importance, requiring for its solution the wisdom of statesmen who thoroughly know those countries, and it would be very presumptuous, therefore, for any foreign Government to say in what way those great problems should be solved. All we can do is to show our sympathy both for the Sovereign of Austria, who is endeavouring to effect those great improvements, and for the people of Austria and the people of Hungary, and to express our heartfelt wish that they may be able to overcome these difficulties, and to give fresh stability to that ancient Empire of Austria and that ancient kingdom of Hungary by whose side we fought, not yesterday, or the day before, but throughout many of the troubles of old times. On the subject of Venetia I cannot venture to pronounce a positive and dogmatic opinion; but I must say that the inclination of my mind very much agrees with the opinion expressed by the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Peacocke). For a long period the empire of Austria had attached to it those provinces which now form the kingdom of Belgium, and the Austrian statesmen found that a great

  1869
  burden was imposed upon them by provinces so far removed from the seat of Government, in which there were fortresses which they were obliged to defend at very heavy cost whenever war took place between France and her neighbours. Any one looking at the diplomatic correspondence of that time will see that Austrian statesmen were always anxious to get rid of that burden; and at last, after the defeats which they sustained in Italy in 1796, they made what I have no doubt they thought a very beneficial arrangement, giving up the Low Countries altogether, and obtaining in their place the provinces on the Adriatic which had belonged to the Venetian Republic. I must say that I do not think that was a well-considered or well-principled arrangement. The Venetian Republic, which had never been an enemy of Austria, and which had been faithfully neutral in that war, was absolutely destroyed, and Austria obtained what was no less a burden to her than the Belgian provinces had been. The people of Venetia are not well affected towards Austria, and the attempts made by her to conciliate them seem always to have failed. The attempt now made to obtain representatives from Venetia to be sent to Vienna have failed also from that national feeling which prevails in Venetia, and which we are told would make it unsafe for anybody to go from Venice to Vienna. That is a most unsafe tenure for any governing Power to have of its provinces. I must say, at the same time, that the accusations against Austria on this subject are often very incorrect. This House and the English public have lately read a very able despatch from Count Cavour on the subject of the formation of the kingdom of Italy and the conduct of that kingdom towards Austria; and hon. Gentlemen will probably have observed in that despatch an assertion of Count Cavour that for a long time there has been a state of siege in Venice. But the Austrian Ambassador brought me a despatch the other day from Count Rechberg, in which he says that a short time after the Treaty of Villafranca the state of siege was raised, and has never since existed in the province at all. He denies, also, some other assertions; but, although those assertions may be inexact, and although many of the charges of tyranny against the Austrian Government are not true, it is quite true that there are continual attempts in Venice to show their dislike and disaffection towards Austria, and
  1870
  that those attempts are punished by the Austrian Government. There seems, unfortunately for Austria, such a disaffection in Venice towards the Austrian Government that, in my opinion, Venetia can never form part of the strength of the Austrian Empire; nor, as long as Venetia forms part of the Austrian Empire, can it be said that Austria and Italy, or even Germany and Italy, can ever be on those terms of amity which are so desirable for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. How that problem is to be solved I know not; but he would be no true friend of Austria who would tell her that the provinces of Venetia formed part of her strength, or that she ought to waste her military power or impose heavy burdens on her people for the sake of maintaining them. I speak of these things, not as matters of internal concern, but as matters which affect the general interests of Europe. I trust, with Count Cavour, the day may come when this question may be settled without war by a general agreement between Austria, Italy, and the Powers of Europe. We have yet to hear what the Austrian Chamber of Deputies—what their House of Commons—may think with respect to these questions; what they may think as to the heavy taxes which the Austrian people have to pay, how these taxes will be best distributed, and what amount of army they should maintain. All these are questions for the representatives of the Austrian people to settle with their Government, and it is for them to consider in what way the empire can best be served. I have already stated that I do not think that, although there is no secret about the matter, it would be desirable to produce the papers asked for, and which relate so entirely to the internal affairs of Austria. I will only repeat, whatever reproaches I may bring upon myself of being an old-fashioned politician holding obsolete notions, I have undoubtedly formed and do entertain the strongest desire for the prosperity and the reviving strength of the empire of Austria.
  MR. PEACOCKEsaid, he would withdraw his Motion.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

  STRIA AND TURKEY.—PAPERS MOVED FOR.
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSONrose to call the attention of the House to certain papers recently presented to Parliament relative to

  1871
  the affairs of Syria, and to move an Address for a copy of the final recommendations of the International Commission for the future government of the Lebanon, and to ask Her Majesty's Government whether it was their intention to urge the adoption of the plan of Her Majesty's Commissioner for the government of Syria upon the Sublime Porte? Although questions connected with the finances of the country naturally occupied the public attention at that moment, a little consideration would show that the affairs of Syria were not unworthy of deliberation, for those remote occurrences often exercised more influence even on the financial affairs of the country than would at first sight be believed. The China war in its beginning was insignificant enough, but it since attained a formidable magnitude in its bearing on our financial affairs, and probably we had not yet heard of it for the last time in our Estimates; and when we considered that a question relative to Syria led to the Crimean war, in which we lavished so much blood and treasure, and remarked the language held by more than one great Power in Europe—bearing so remarkable and significant a resemblance to the events that led to that fearful struggle, he thought the House would not do amiss if they considered the question which now presented itself with regard to Syria in all its bearings, and pressed on the Government the pursuit and the perseverance in a policy which being at once avowed and unswerving should steer clear of those dangers which had ever beset a vacillating policy. He did not think it necessary to go deeply into the history of the civil war which broke out in Syria last year. At first the sympathy of the British was naturally with those who were Christians, at least in name. He ventured at the time to express a belief that the quarrel would be found to be one, not of religious differences, but of hostile race; and he only referred to this now because it was a great satisfaction to him to find that the noble Lord who had so well represented this country in the internecine commotions of Syria had now come to be entirely of the same opinion. He would refer briefly to the account which Lord Duffer in, with his mature experience, gave of the outbreak amongst the tribes of the Lebanon and the outrages that were committed north of Damascus. In reading the blue book one could not fail to be struck with the firmness which Her Majesty's Government had shown in dealing with so difficult a ques-
  1872
  tion. From the first the Government saw the difficulties that were likely to arise from the occupation of Syria, and he did not doubt that they regretted the hasty consent they had given to the mission of the French troops to that country. He thought they had great reason to contratulate themselves on the universal meed of approbation which had been accorded to their representatives in Syria. Nor had there been wanting a manifestation of a spirit of benevolence by British officers, who, travelling in Syria for their own pleasure, had yet been instrumental in warding off many of the evils of civil war and of attaching the population to England, inasmuch as their conduct had well exhibited the unselfish policy of this country with regard to other nations. It would have been matter of further congratulation had we succeeded in doing more in procuring the administration of unswerving justice in Syria. It was to him matter of astonishment, after reading the opinion of Lord Duffer in on the history of the quarrel, to find that punishment had been meted out to only one party in that quarrel;. and that although it had been proved on the clearest evidence that not only the Druses but the Maronites were guilty of premeditated war. In one of the despatches in the blue book which he held in his hand, our Government were congratulated by Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer on the success of their endeavours to rescue from an unmerited death one of the great chiefs of the Druses. If they had succeeded in nothing else it was a great thing to rescue from undiscriminating punishment one who, so far from having been proved guilty, had been proved to be innocent. He was sorry to say that the congratulations were at least premature; for just before he entered the House that evening he received a letter which filled him with pain and regret. He had believed that when Her Majesty's Commissioner in Syria had expressed a decided opinion of the injustice of the proceeding by which the condemnation of Said Bey had been obtained his liberation would have been at once brought about. But he had received a letter from a gentleman now residing in Paris, who had often furnished him with valuable information, which letter he would hand over to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office presently. The writer said, "I have just heard that poor Said Bey is dying in prison, with many suspicions of foul play. For God's sake interfere, so that a despatch or telegraph from the Government may desire his liberation." The

  1873
  letter went on to say that the continuous French occupation of Syria had greatly diminished our influence there. No doubt the noble Lord had received information on the same subject, and he trusted that if the Government gave the slightest credence to the rumour, they would not allow the man in whose innocence they believed to languish or die in prison. Lord Duffer in, in a despatch written on the 24th of February, said that when he first went to the country he was actuated by feelings of indignation against the Druses for their attack on the Maronites. But he soon found the affair was complicated; he saw there were two sides to the story; and that as the true state of the case unfolded itself, it became a certainty that, however criminal might have been the excesses of the Druses subsequently, the original provocation came from the other side. A despatch of Mr. Brandt, Her Majesty's representative at Damascus, expressed his opinion that the quarrel was one of long standing, and that it was an old wound re-opened. He attributed the outbreak there to the weakness of the Government in the provinces. The Pachas had no money to pay their troops; no means of repressing disorders; they had gone on careless of what took place; they were not troubled by the passions of the Mahommedans which always disturbed them, and at times broke out in a general massacre. This was different from the quarrel in the Lebanon. There it was a contest between hostile races. The disturbances in the towns were of a kindred nature to those in India. They were temporarily checked in 1858, when the first outbreak took place in Jeddah; and in his opinion they might have been checked in Syria, had the same vigorous action been continued. What, then, had been the conduct of the English and French Governments? When the outbreak took place, when the news of the massacres in the Lebanon reached this country, Her Majesty's Government took proper measures, which were consistent alike with the independence of Turkey and their duty to British subjects in Syria. They gave orders to despatch ships to the coast of Syria, and called on the Porte to repress the disorders. At first the French Government took the same course, as appeared by a dispatch of M. Thouvenel on the 16th July. He expressed himself satisfied with what had been done by the Porte, and declined to take any part with either of the two populations. But on the 17th M. Thou-
  1874
  venel wrote a second dispatch, in which he said he had been to St. Cloud and seen the Emperor, who considered it absolutely necessary that troops should be sent to sustain the authority of the Porte and to prevent the recurrence of fresh disorders. It was true that news had, meanwhile, arrived of the massacre at Damascus; but the information which the French Government had received years before must have convinced them that such an occurrence was to be expected; and it was remarkable that one day should have sufficed to make such changes in the views of the French Government. The Emperor concluded that the Porte had no authority left, and that it was impossible for it to send to Syria the necessary troops. Then the noble Lord took a step which he (Sir James Fergusson) thought he must have repented ever since. On the 18th of July he consented to the occupation of Syria by French troops. By the 21st he saw reason to change his opinion, and said he thought the despatch of troops unnecessary. But in the meantime the Moniteur announced that the English Government concurred in the step of sending troops to Syria. Then it was that the French were able to establish what he might call their leadership in the intervention in Syria. The noble Lord having consented to the step, seemed to think that that would satisfy Fiance, and for some time afterwards he took no further steps in the negotiations. But the Porte protested against the sending of troops, and the British Consul at Damascus reported that the Turkish Government had succeeded in re-establishing order there. The despatch of the troops had therefore become unnecessary; but here was the point on which all the after negotiations turned. The noble Lord having consented to the despatch of French troops, did not insist on limiting their action to the occupation of the towns on the coast, where they would be able to give a moral support to the Turkish Government. It would be seen that most of the troubles of the French occupation were caused by the troops not being confined to these towns, where, if they had remained, they would not have roused the passions of the country in the manner that they had done. The Emperor agreed in the Conference to send his troops to act in concert with those of the Porte; but the language held to the troops themselves was hardly consistent with that idea, for in the "general order" issued to them on their leaving all the tra-

  1875
  ditions of the First Empire were invoked; they were told that they were charged with a great mission to the East—that they were going in the spirit of the first Crusaders. At the same time the other Powers were assured that the occupation was to be wholly a peaceful one, its object being to give moral support to the Turkish Government. On the 3rd of September the real policy of the French Government was made plain, when the French General, Beaufort, protested against the French troops being left inactive at Beyrout, and applied for permission to march up the country. Remonstrance was in vain, and the consent of the Turkish Government was unwillingly given to their advance upon the Mountain, where the General insisted on the occupation of the hostile territory of the Druses. About this time the noble Lord thought fit to interrogate the French Government, wanting to know how long the French troops were to say in the country; but he could obtain no satisfactory answer, and matters went on till, on the 7th November, he wrote a despatch stating that he saw insuperable objections to a prolonged occupation. Still the French made no sign of moving, though the Emperor continued to profess his anxiety to withdraw as soon as a settled government could be established in the country—but he refused to see that it was the continued occupation of the French troops that led to disorder. The negotiations became rather angry, the noble Lord again requesting that the troops might be withdrawn, and M. Thouvenel reiterating his opinion that the state of the country rendered that step impossible. On the 28th of January a despatch was written by M. Thouvenel which appeared to him to contain the key to the whole policy of the Syrian occupation. He stated that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as it was clear that the Maronites were not placed in a worse position than they were before, and that it could be made clear to the Catholic world that they had done all that could possibly be done for their protection; for if there should he a renewal of these atrocities after the evacuation the whole blame would fall on the French; and he (M. Thouvenel) would not deny that the French Government placed a certain value on the preservation of their influence over the Maronites. He thought the French Minister had been seized with an unwonted fit of candour when he wrote those words. He would not, then, inquire whether it was not that influence which for a great
  1876
  number of years had proved most detrimental to the good government of the country, by setting the Maronites against the Turkish Government, and leading them to expect aid from France. But by this despatch he thought it was clearly proved that the object of the French occupation of Syria was to encourage the Christian population to lean upon France for protection rather than on the Government of the country to which they belonged. It was originally agreed that the occupation should terminate in March, and some curious negotiations had taken place as to the prolongation, which, to speak fairly, were as unworthy of a great country as it would be of a private gentleman. After some difficulty it was agreed that the evacuation should be postponed to the 5th of June. M. Thouvenel then made objections to the evacuation being made effective on the 5th of June, and proposed that it should be enough if the transports were off the coast by that day. The English Government agreed to waive the term that the troops "shall" leave the country on the 5th, and substituted the word "ought," but insisted that there should be a "terme definitif." The French Government objected to the word "definitif" and that was struck out. Then the French Government applied that the evacuation should be postponed for ten days more; and then the noble Lord, in a despatch which must commend itself to the approbation of every gentleman who had read it, as the firmest that he believed was ever written by an English Minister, wrote that there must be an end to these discussions. Well, what had been the effect of this occupation? Had it tranquillized the country? His conviction was that the manner in which the French occupation had been carried on, so far from being conducive to the tranquillization of the province, and the re-establishment of the Sultan's authority, had had quite the contrary effect, and that every day it was prolonged it rendered more hopeless the restoration of a state of things in which commerce could be expected to flourish, and the peace of the Turkish Empire be preserved. This led him to the point which induced him to bring forward this question. It was a very serious matter for any one who advocated the early evacuation of Syria to consider what events might follow that evacuation. He had received letters during the last month from gentlemen holding different opinions on Syria; but all entertained the greatest

  1877
  dread of what might follow the evacuation of the country by the French. He received a letter yesterday from a gentle man at Beyrout, in whose statements he had reason to place every confidence, describing the state of uneasiness which existed at Beyrout as very serious, and mentioning that families which had been there for twenty-five years were now talking of leaving the country. There were several passages also in Lord Dufferin's despatches indicating his dissatisfaction at the state of affairs, and his anxiety as to what might follow the evacuation. He made these statements in all candour, as not wishing to keep back anything that ought to be known; not because this was an argument to prolong the occupation, but to show the necessity of early measures being taken to make a fresh outbreak impossible. If Englishmen were to shut their eyes to the dangers which undoubtedly existed, they would lay themselves open to the imputation—which the French would not be slow to cast upon them—that the jealousy of France rendered them insensible to the real interests of the country. To show that these imputations were already cast, he might refer to a clever article which appeared three months ago in the Revue des Deux Mondes; —and, by the way, he might observe that it was a most extraordinary thing that this article was written three months ago on a paper which had only just been presented to Parliament. That paper contained the reports of the British Consuls in various parts of Syria; they were confidential reports, and were printed only for the use of the Foreign Office. Until quite recently the noble Lord said it would not be for the public advantage that they should be presented to Parliament; yet this was the document on which a writer in the Revue des Deux Mondes commented three months ago. The commencement of that article was cercertainly the coolest he ever read. The writer said he would give a free translation—
  "We have before our eyes certain reports which were sent by the British Consuls in Syria to Sir Henry Bulwer and to Lord John Russell. These reports were not intended for the public or for Parliament. We see that they were printed confidentially for the use of the Foreign Office; but we have thought that it would be good that these valuable and curious reports should be printed, in part, at least, for the guidance of public opinion, and for that reason we give an exact analysis of their contents."
  It was clear, therefore, that documents
  1878
  which had only just been submitted to the British Parliament, were in the possession of a French pamphleteer as early as February last. The writer then proceeded to make a careful analysis of these reports, and he hinted that the jealousy of England was such that she would rather see a recurrence of these outrages than the continued occupation of the country by the French. He concluded by stating—
  "Unhappy country! there is on its horizon a cloud of blood, which, if it falls, will fill Europe with remorse and shame. Think of the effect which the cry will have in history when it is stated that 30,000 Christians were massacred in Syria in 1860, and 30,000 more in 1861, because England did not wish that they should be saved by France, as that would increase her influence in the East."
  Now he thought this justified him in urging on the Government that they should insist on the Turkish Government taking those steps at once which would alone be sufficient to prevent any evil consequences from the withdrawal of the French occupation. Lord Dufferin pointed out in his despatches that the Maronites were increasing in insolence, that they depended on France, and that so long as her shelter was thrown over them they neither knew nor cared for any other Government. What propositions had been made for the amelioration of Syria? Lord Dufferin had addressed himself to that question with great ability, and he had gradually brought round to his opinion the other members of the International Commission. It was to be regretted that the necessity of concluding these deliberations, so that there should be no excuse for the further occupation by the French, had obliged him to limit his deliberations to the settlement of the Lebanon, and prevented him from extending his plans to the future Government of Syria. He had, however, laid down important principles for that Government. He pointed out the viciousness of the present system, arising from the farming out of the taxes, and the rapacity of the Pachas, who knew they would not be continued in office long. Mr. Skene, the Consul at Aleppo, dwelt on the same grievances, and showed that the vices of the existing Government sprung from the weakness of the central authority and the mischievous practice of farming out the revenue. The peasantry were driven to despair, because if a man had more than an ordinary crop he knew he would be subjected to fresh exactions. The Pachas were never secure of their position for a

  1879
  year; and when, as sometimes happened, they were honestly inclined and wished to make roads or carry out other improvements, they found themselves surrounded by greedy followers who had friends at Constantinople, and whose rapacity they were compelled to satisfy for their own interest. Lord Dufferin represented that the future Governor of Syria must be a man who would be able to be independent of the hateful influences of Constantinople, who should be relieved from the necessity of paying black mail for his appointment, and who would he independent of the sinister influences of the different European Consuls, who were too often engaged in furthering other interests than those of the country. The noble Lord further stated that his scheme would fail unless a man was appointed who would command the respect of the European Powers; and that the people naturally looked on Fuad Pacha as the proper person—a view taken also by Sir Henry Bulwer. The noble Lord pointed to the absolute necessity for the de-centralization of Syria from Constantinople and the centralizing of power in Syria. Now it might be said that Fuad Pacha already possessed these powers. But he had not the power of appointing or removing his subordinates, he had no control over the commander of the army, who received his orders direct from Constantinople, or of distributing the revenues of the country, after a fixed tribute had been sent to Constantinople. Both Sir Henry Bulwer and Lord Dufferin stated that, unless in these respects the Governor had full and complete authority, it was useless to expect good government in the future. Lord Dufferin pointed out the absolute necessity of separating Syria for administrative purposes from Constantinople, and centralizing authority in that country. A plan for the Government of the Mountain had been prepared by the International Commission, according to which it was proposed that a Christian should be placed at the head of it, but that the Druses should be under a Druse, the Maronites under a Maronite, and the Greeks under a Greek. This plan was entirely in accordance with the suggestions contained in a remarkable Memorial which was presented to Lord Malmesbury in 1852, in which it was pointed out that the Lebanon could never be tranquil under the arrangement which divided the Mountain between two Kaimakans, leaving in some places Druses under the Government of a Maronite, and
  1880
  in others Maronites under that of a Druse. The Commissioners, with the exception of the French Commissioner, were unanimously of the opinion that the head of the Mountain ought not to be a native; but, unfortunately, the French Commissioner insisted that a Maronite should be appointed to that office. At that point the real information contained in the blue book ended, and the House was not informed whether the International Commission had come to any decision, or whether its appointment had been a failure. In the mean time, there appeared on the part of the French a disposition to throw on the English the responsibility of removing the troops, and of those torrents of blood which it was predicted would flow on their removal. The French had pointed out to the Maronites that their troubles were at an end, and that they would take care of them for the future, and in consequence of these assurances the Maronites had used language as against the Turkish authorities to which they had never before been subjected. It was probable, therefore, that, unless active measure were taken to induce the Porte to improve the Government of the country, and to give to one man power to repress disorder for the future, disturbances would again break out which would give France a colourable excuse for the despatch of a fresh expedition, without the consent of the Powers, for a new occupation of Syria, which might be indefinitely prolonged. In this state of things a good opportunity presented itself to England. Turkey regarded this country with a friendly eye, and although Turkey had protested against the establishment of an independent province in Syria, as fatal to the existence of her authority elsewhere, he thought that a middle course could be adopted, by the appointment of Fuad Pacha, not with a perpetual tenure of office, but with a power of continuance until he had had time to reform the Government. The Government of the Emperor of the French must, he thought, feel embarrassment on this question, and instances were not wanting in the despatches of M. Thouvenel which would lead to the belief that his Government would not be unwilling to recede from the position they had assumed. In this matter England could not be charged with pursuing any selfish policy, notwithstanding what had been stated by some French pamphleteers; and if we could prevent fresh disasters in Syria we should only be adding another to the many ser-

  1881
  vices we had bestowed on Turkey. We had already, through our Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, done much to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and the policy recommended by that noble Lord might, if fully carried out, become in the future, the foundation of the stability of the Turkish Empire. When the results of selfish ambition and aggression should have passed away, there would remain the fruits of the honourable policy which have ever characterized England, and which would bring eternal lustre upon the name of the Minister who should more successfully carry it out.
  Amendment proposed,
  "To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, a Copy of the final Recommendations of the International Commission for the future Government of the Lebanon.'"—instead thereof.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, the hon. and gallant Gentleman has called attention to the condition of Syria, the policy of the European Powers who have intervened in its affairs, and the course of Her Majesty's Government with respect to that policy. After the able speech of my hon. and gallant Friend, I think it right that I should state, as far as I can, the present position of these affairs, and the views of her Majesty's Government with respect to them. The hon. and gallant Gentleman says truly, the papers that have been produced contain various recommendations with regard to the Lebanon that have been offered from time to time. One of those recommendations is that there should be a Governor General of Syria having extensive powers, and under him a Christian Governor of the Lebanon. I own it appeared to me that this arrangement would have been to the advantage of Lebanon, would have conduced to the welfare of the inhabitants, and been on the whole the best arrangement that could have been made. The Porte, however, felt great objections to the proposal to appoint a Governor General of Syria, apprehending he might assume an independent position, and imitate in Syria what has taken place in Egypt. As there were no means of deciding this point in opposition to the wishes of the Porte, the Commissioners thought that there might be a three-fold division of authority—that a Kaimakan might be appointed for the Maronites, another for
  1882
  the Druses, and a third for the natives belonging to the Greek Church. It was also proposed that a system of "disaggregation" should be adopted. The word is used to describe the process by which certain villages inhabited by Maronites should be taken from under the authority of the Druse Kaimakan, and transferred to the Kaimakan of the Maronites; and vice versa other villages inhabited by Druses taken from the Maronite authorities, and transferred to that of the Druses. But this arrangement could not be easily accomplished; it was much opposed by the French Commissioners, who were supported in their view by their Government in Paris; and it became impracticable. It then appeared to me that the best plan was to go back to the original proposition, leaving out those points to which the Sultan objected; the best solution of the difficulty seemed to be the appointment of a Christian Governor; and it had the merit of having received in its former shape the concurrence of all the Commissioners. Their only differences of opinion were on the point—certainly one of great importance—whether the Christian Governor should be a native or not. Four out of the five Commissioners thought he ought not to be a native; and it struck me as obvious that there would be a danger, if the Governor were a native of the Lebanon, that he would retain in his own breast, and cherish in the breasts of his family and tribe, those resentments and hatreds which have caused so much desolation and bloodshed already. My own opinion is that the arrangement to which I have just referred should take effect; but the French Government are still of opinion that a Maronite chief would afford the best kind of Government for the Lebanon. The last Report of the Commissioners I have not yet seen, but I believe it is nearly in accordance with what I have stated; it has been sent to Constantinople in order to be considered there. The hon. Baronet will see that I cannot produce the further papers he asks for. We are just at that point of the negotiations at which it is the general rule and practice not to produce to the House such documents, and some of them, indeed, have not yet reached my hands. I hope, with the Iron. Baronet, that we may be able to find some means for the future good Government of Syria. I quite concur with what the hon. Gentleman has said of the merits of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's exertions in Turkey. But there is this diffi-

  1883
  culty that has since arisen, and still continues; the Russian Government has always considered itself bound to take under its special protection the subjects of the Sultan who belong to the Greek Church. The French Government, on the other hand, considers it a matter involving the pride and glory of France that it should extend its protection to the Roman Catholic Christians. Our course has been, and we have invariably pursued it, to induce the Sultan to endeavour to give to all his subjects the protection and good Government they are entitled to, whether they are of the Greek Church, Roman Catholics, Maronites, or Druses. We think they are all equally entitled to good Government. We see with great pleasure the improvements that have been made from time to time; they constitute, on the whole, vast changes from the condition of the Christians in Turkey twenty or twenty-five years ago. Other questions remain, in some parts of the Sultan's dominions, with regard to those changes. I cannot now enter into the particulars, but the negotiations now cannot last very long, as the points under discussion have been reduced to very few—almost to one. With regard to the evacuation of Syria by the French troops, we have every reason to rely on the good faith of the Emperor of the French in carrying out the engagements into which he has entered.
  MR. LAYARDthought the present question involved precedents of very great importance, not alone as far as Syria was concerned, but as applicable hereafter to other parts of the Turkish empire. The House was indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite for the able manner in which he had, on more than one occasion, dealt with this matter. They could not doubt that the hon. Gentleman was well informed, as the facts he had stated had always turned out to be true. He was himself not prepared to go to the extent the hon. Gentleman did in the policy he advocated; but the Motion would tend to strengthen the hands of the Government. The papers laid upon the table of the House proved three things: first, that there was great difficulty in governing Syria; next, that mischief under foreign occupation had already occurred; and, thirdly, that in the past outrages the Christians were the aggressors. It would appear that the Maronites were instigated to the aggression by their priests, or by foreign agents; that the Druses, convinced
  1884
  at last they should be attacked, endeavoured to anticipate the Christians; that sanguinary battles ensued in which, as in all barbarous warfare, there was much unnecessary slaughter. The papers proved also that some of the Turkish population of the towns, generally of the lowest order, joined the Druses and took advantage of the outbreak for the purpose of plundering. On the other hand, it was proved that a large number of the higher class of Mahommedans gave protection to the Christians. Before the French occupied Syria it had already been shown that the Porte could repress these disturbances; some of the guilty it had already punished, but it allowed others to escape who ought to have been punished—for which it deserved reprobation. It was evident that since the French occupation an unsatisfactory state of things had prevailed in Syria, arising out of the misconduct and irritating attitude assumed by the Maronites, who had, murdered a large number of men, women, and children in cold blood. The French occupation had only led to mischief, as it had encouraged ideas of vengeance on one side and retaliation on the other. He believed the French would leave Syria in June, according to the Convention; but what was to be done with Syria when they did leave? The difficulty of governing Syria was increased by the fact that it was inhabited by ten races divided into seventeen fanatical sects. Lord Dufferin was a high-minded, liberal gentleman, possessed of good sense and judgment, but before he had been in Syria two months he proposed a plan for the government of that country—a problem which had for years puzzled those best acquainted with the East. That plan was sent home, accepted by the Foreign Office, and Sir Henry Bulwer was instructed to press it on the attention of the Porte. The Porte, however, very naturally protested against this scheme on the ground that it would place Syria in the same position of virtual independence as Egypt. It was first suggested that the mountains should be divided into two parts with a Christian and Mahommedan governor. Then Lord Dufferin and the Commissioners agreed that there should be one Christian governor for the Lebanon, but the French said he must be a Maronite. Lastly, it was suggested that there should be three governors—a Greek, a Druse, and a Maronite; but all these plans appeared to him equally unworkable. He thought they ought not to suggest to the Porte any

  1885
  plan whatever. It was unjust to force on the Porte a plan for the government of Syria, and then to make it responsible if that plan did not succeed. Either the Great Powers should take the government upon themselves, or they should leave it to be administered by Turkey, holding Turkey responsible in case of failure. It was admitted that the Porte was fully alive to its responsibility towards the civilized world, that it would do its utmost for the good government of Syria. But the greatest difficulties the Porte had to contend with arose from the Christians themselves. When Fuad Pasha left a Christian governer at Damascus he was actually obliged to turn him out on the complaint of the Commissioners, because of his oppression towards both Christians and Mahommedans, and because he committed outrages upon unhappy women who went to him for redress; and Lord Dufferin stated that the worst and most bloody feuds on the mountains had been between the Christians themselves. Any general principle or precedent which might now be laid down for the Government of Syria required the utmost consideration, because they might hereafter become applicable to other parts of Turkey. If the principle now attempted to be established with regard to Syria were accepted, Russia had an equal right to claim the application of the same principle to the rest of Turkey. Allusion had been made to an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes, as containing misrepresentations. Unfortunately it was the custom of French writers to endeavour to give a false notion of our policy in the East. If he should not be out of order he wished to refer to an instance which involved a matter personal to himself. An article had appeared in the Débate grossly misrepresenting him.
  MR. SPEAKERsaid, the hon. Member might refer to anything which he construed into an attack on his personal character, but it was not in order to quote documents referring to debates in this House.
  MR. LAYARDwas aware of this, but the statement to which he was alluding did affect his personal character. It represented him as having said that the English Government should ask the Sultan to send two Albanian regiments, whose pay was in arrears, to the Ionian Islands, and that then the Ionian Islands would know how to appreciate the English rule. No English gentleman would have expressed such an opinion, and to impute it to him
  1886
  was a reflection on his character as a Member of this House. With regard to the state of Christians in Turkey, the consular reports recently laid upon the table, showed that, after all, their condition had very much improved, and if it had not it was due to themselves rather than to the Turks. They would not help themselves. The papers would show that many of the so-called Christians were a shame to the name of Christianity. He thought these papers creditable to Turkey, but at the same time complained that it was a hard thing that they should be published. Fancy sending to Ireland a Consul from every nation in Europe, and inviting them to make a report upon the differences between Catholics and Protestants in that country. It would be impossible to govern Ireland a week after the publication of such a report. It might appear a paradox, but it was literally true that the present position of Turkey was entirely owing to her toleration of religious creeds. It was a mistake to suppose that when the Turks conquered the provinces now forming that empire they found a highly civilized people. Any student of history would know that the Byzantine Empire was at that time so low that it was falling to pieces of its own accord. A Christian body would have exterminated the conquered race as the Spaniards had exterminated the Moors, or as Russia was now ruthlessly exterminating the Tartar races in the Crimea; yet Russia had the audacity to complain of the conduct of Turkey! There was, no doubt, a great deal of misgovernment in Turkey, but any one who read those papers would see that there was a steady desire on the part of the Sultan, and on the part of the higher dignitaries, at least, to introduce improvements; and in a few years' time the country might be expected to be in a far better position than at present. It appeared from the report of Mr. Consul Skeen that in Northern Syria there was an absence of crime of any kind, which could not be recorded by any civilized country in Europe. He asked them to leave the Porte to govern Syria, and to make the Porte responsible. To do this they must stop consuls and priests from being political agents. He could tell them the present position of a Governor of a Turkish province. When a new Pasha was appointed he was waited upon by the English Consul, who recommended the imposition of such and such taxes, and the remission of others. The

  1887
  French and Russian, and Russian and Greek Consuls called and made their recommendations in the same way; of course, the unhappy man could not adopt them all, and then those consuls whose suggestions were not adopted wrote to Constantinople that the Pasha was corrupt and unfit to govern a province, and in a short time the unhappy Porte was compelled to withdraw him; and so it went on, Pasha after Pasha, till government was utterly impossible. Of all the curses to a country the greatest was the political agitator in the garb of the soutane, and Turkey suffered more than any other country from this source. All sects were alike in this respect. As a general rule there was no systematic oppression of the Christiana in Turkey. He desired to see them flourishing and happy, but a great deal depended on themselves; and he hoped, therefore, that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would support the Turks in this matter, and would not force upon them an impracticable plan, which could only end in failure.
  MR. C. CLIFFORDsaid, he felt greatly indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for having brought forward this subject, and begged to remind the House that he had been the first to warn it to suspend its judgment when the conflict broke out last year. He (Mr. C. Clifford) spoke from his own personal experience of the miserable condition of the Lebanon, in consequence of the political intrigues of the Christian priests. In 1844, when he was over there, a war broke out, which was begun by the Maronites, and had it not been for the interposition of a gallant officer an equally dreadful massacre would have been perpetrated to that which had horrified them last year. The country was deeply indebted to Lord Dufferin for the manner in which he had made a stand against the wholesale massacre of the Druses which was at first demanded by the Maronite bishops, and also against the heavy fines it was proposed to levy on them. Those priests handed in at first a list of 4,600 persons whose death they demanded, and that list was subsequently reduced to 1,200; but that sanguinary suggestion, thanks to Lord Dufferin, was not carried out; and next to impose a fine of 1,000 piastres, or about £8, upon each male Druse above fifteen years of age, which would have produced heartrending misery. The plan developed by Lord Dufferin in his despatch of the 3rd of November was very well calculated to
  1888
  remove the difficulties which beset the government of the Lebanon, though he despaired of seeing the time when the hostile tribes would be brought into true reconcilement with each other. He could not, however, agree with that part of the plan which proposed a loan, to be guaranteed by the different Governments of Europe. The manner in which the great offices at Constantinople were disposed of was most scandalous. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the foremost defender of Turkey, admitted the corruption which was practised, and all he could say was "corruption was not long ago also rife in England, and even now the words of Mr. Burke are ringing in our ears." But, if corruption did at one time prevail in England, we had never appointed as governors of provinces persons who would become the accomplices of murder and treason. When he (Mr. C. Clifford) was in Beyrout information arrived there that a Christian garrison had been shut up in a fortress, and that they had surrendered to the Druses. It appeared that those Christians were subsequently led captive into a certain ravine, with the intention of being massacred. A gallant officer, however, went to their rescue, and by his influence over the Druse chiefs saved them from the fate which threatened them. The Christians, numbering 160, and composed of men, women, and children, were brought in safety back to Beyrout. The gallant officer to whom he alluded was the same who had marched from victory to victory in India, and had retrieved our fortunes there when they looked gloomy in the extreme. His name was Sir Hugh Rose, whom he (Mr. C. Clifford) was proud to call his friend.
  SIR HARRY VERNEYaddressed the House and was proceeding to point to the corruption and mal-administration that pervaded the Turkish Empire; when—
  Notice taken, That Forty Members were not present; House counted, and Forty Members being present,
  SIR HARRY VERNEYproceeded to say that this corruption and mal-administration were at the root of all the disturbances in Syria and other parts of the Turkish Empire; and that it was to the remedying of those evils that attention must be turned if we hoped to avert the danger arising to Europe from the present condition of the Turkish Empire. The hon. and gallant Member was very imperfectly heard.
  MR. MONSELLthought that the House

  1889
  had diverged from the important question brought before it by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite. The object of the hon. and gallant Member was, he believed, to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of devising some reliable security that the disgraceful scenes which took place last year in the Lebanon should not be repeated. The hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard) was for leaving matters entirely in the hands of the Turks; but he (Mr. Monsell) would venture to suggest a difficulty in the way of adopting that proposition, and that was that this country had entered into solemn engagements with reference to the Government of the Lebanon. In the year 1842 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated in a despatch that he had communicated to the Christians of Mount Lebanon the pledge that their ancient rights should he respected, and one of those ancient rights was that they should be governed by rulers selected from among themselves. The suggestion, therefore, of the hon. Member for Southwark was entirely inconsistent with the honour and good faith of this country. It was one of the first statements made by Lord Dufferin—and he repeated it over and over again—that if a tolerable Government existed, and no sinister influences were allowed to engender discord between them, the Druse and Christian populations would be inclined to live in perfect harmony; and that view was supported by the fact that there had been no massacre without the presence of Turkish troops. He utterly denied the statement of the noble Lord, that the bloody encounters of hostile tribes had been for ages the scourge of Syria; and everybody who had looked but cursorily into the history of that country must know that religious wars never took place there until 1838. Since the influence of the Turkish Pachas was introduced in 1841 the tribes had been set one upon the other, and the Turks were at the bottom of every single disturbance that had since broken out in the country. If the Turks were allowed to arrange the affairs of the Lebanon the result would be most disastrous. A remarkable petition, signed by 438 merchants and traders in that part, belonging to all the different nations of Europe, had been presented to the Commissioners, and the persons signing the petition expressed their belief that nothing but ruin and misery would befall the Christians in the Lebanon, if European occupation were withdrawn
  1890
  before some proper system of government was established. It would be an outrage against humanity if this country were to permit such a result. He thought that, when all the sufferings of the Maronites were considered, they ought to be spoken of in more tolerant language than was used when they were described as being Christians only in name, and some allowance should be made for the feelings of persons who had had such horrible atrocities perpetrated upon them. There had been 288 murders of Maronites by Druses since Fuad Pacha arrived in the Lebanon; so that, if the Christians had committed outrages, the Druses had committed outrages likewise. He concurred in thinking that neither of these tribes ought to be hardly dealt with. Each was necessary to the other, and the true policy was to endeavour to bring them together in the same state as they were in about twenty-five years ago, and to place them in a position to be able to resist any attempt on the part of the Turks to intrude on the Government of the Lebanon. Unless that were done, any scheme that might be proposed would entirely fail, because the Turks would endeavour to change their suzeraineté into a sovereignty. The influence which this country possessed with Turkey imposed on it in the eyes of Europe the solemn responsibility of compelling the adoption of a fair and just system of government in the Lebanon, and he entreated the Government not to allow European occupation to cease until some security against the repetition of these terrible massacres was obtained.
  MR. FREELANDsaid, Sir, I am sorry that I did not hear the commencement of the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ayrshire. I understand that he paid a high tribute to Lord Dufferin, and I should not do justice to my own feelings if I did not express my deep conviction that the Government of this country have been exceedingly fortunate in their choice of a Commissioner for Syria. Lord Dufferin, in circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has shown an amount of energy, sagacity and firmness, and, in dealing with the cases of particular prisoners, a judicial impartiality most honourable to him and creditable to the country of which he is the representative. There are many points connected with the question now before us, which, although discussed at length in the papers which we have received, we cannot, I think, discuss with advantage in this

  1891
  House. Such, for instance, are the different degrees of criminality attaching to the Turkish and Druse prisoners at Beyrout and the Druses imprisoned at Mokhtarah. I allude to this point only for the purpose of stating that to M. Thouvenel we are indebted for the merciful suggestion that one or two only out of twenty-two Druse prisoners set apart for execution at Mokhtarah should be executed. This suggestion must be regarded as highly honourable to M. Thouvenel when we consider the peculiar and delicate position in which France stands relatively to the Maronites. It was, moreover, at variance with the opinion of the French Commissioner in Syria, who had thought that a much larger number should be executed. I am glad to find also from, the papers before us that M. Thouvenel has expressed his satisfaction at the conciliatory spirit shown by Her Majesty's Government as regards the proposals for prolonging the occupation. I trust sincerely that a spirit of conciliation may animate all the great Powers of Europe in arriving at a solution of this question, and that they will not act as the patrons of the Greek Church, or the Maronite Church, or of the Druses, but as the apostles of humanity. With regard to the term of the French occupation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has taken up a very decided position, and I think that this matter may very safely he left in his hands. In his presence, I hardly like to say how much I admire his foreign policy, not in Syria only, but in Italy. I think, however, that my hon. and gallant Friend opposite, in commenting on the proceedings of M. Thouvenel, has hardly made sufficient allowance for French sympathies and for the extent to which, in connection with Syria, ecclesiastical influences have been brought to hear on the French Government. The question as to the origin of the disturbances in Syria is, no doubt, a question of great interest. I will not now refer to it except to state my opinion that as between the Druses and the Maronites, the latter, instigated, as I believe, by the intrigues of their priesthood, were the aggressors. Sir Henry Bulwer, Lord Dufferin, and M. Novikow are of this opinion. M. Thouvenel speaks fairly enough on this point, and hardly disguises his opinion, as regards the Maronites. He states, moreover, that he has no wish that the truth should be concealed. But after all there can be no doubt that the
  1892
  chief blame lies with the local authorities and the Ottoman Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs attributed in one of his despatches the whole misfortunes to the connivance of Khoorshid Pasha at Deir el Kamar and the cowardice of Achmet Pasha at Damascus. Sir Henry Bulwer writing to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 27th of June, 1860, says—
  "I must add with deep regret that the Ottoman Government is the more to blame for what has occurred in Syria, since assuredly a week has not passed during the last year that I have not been constantly bringing the state of that province under the attention of Fuad Pasha, and the three grand Viziers who have succeeded each other."
  That is what Sir Henry Bulwer says; but what did the Turkish Government do in the teeth of all these warnings? What says Consul Brant, writing from Damascus to Sir Henry Bulwer in May of the same year? After speaking of the disordered state of the Lebanon, he adds—
  "Unfortunately, there are very few troops here, the greater portion having been recalled to Constantinople; our Pasha is, therefore, almost powerless."
  In the teeth of all these warnings the Turkish Government withdrew its troops to Constantinople. I am, therefore, Sir, unable to concur with my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark in the extent to which he goes in his eulogiums on the Turkish Government, though I honour the spirit in which his speech was made. As to the future, we cannot here discuss in detail any plans for the Government of Syria. But it seems to me that, in any settlement of this question, there are two main points which ought to be attended to. The first is, that the Government of the whole of Syria, as well as that of the Lebanon should be provided for in the settlement. The other, that Syria should be governed in the interest of the Native races and not in the interest of this or that particular Power. I do hope that some plan may be adopted to prevent a recurrence of those terrible calamities which have been so feelingly referred to by my right hon. Friend behind me, the Member for Limerick. No doubt it may be difficult to devise a plan. But the greatest difficulty appears to me to be to obtain a guarantee for the faithful carrying out of the plan, whatever it may be, and of any reforms promised for Syria by the Ottoman Government. It may be said, there is the good faith, there are the promises of

  1893
  the Ottoman Government. Well, but that good faith is pledged already. The Hatti Sherif of Gulhane in 1839, the Tanzimat of 1844, the Hatti Humayoun of 1856, promised reforms large enough to regenerate, not Turkey only, but every empire in Europe. Have those reforms been yet accomplished? The Hatti Humayoun promised reforms in the provincial and metropolitan police. But, has the police system been yet reformed? Murders and pillage are the reply. The system of farming the taxes, too, was condemned, but is not yet abolished. Reforms were promised in the provincial councils, but the Medjlis is still the centre of misgovernment and corruption. Canals and roads were promised. How many have been made? How do matters stand as regards agricultural produce, and the mode of collecting the Government tithe? Major Cox speaks of crops having been cut and then left three weeks on the ground; and one of our consuls speaks of a case in which they remained on the ground two months before the tithe collector could be found to assess their value. No doubt, in 1860, the tour of the Grand Vizier Mehemet Kibrisli Pasha was attended with beneficial results; and I have great hopes of reforms, looking to his past history, from the proposed mission of Omar Pasha to Bosnia. But these are partial reforms only. Large and general reforms are needed. I am told that the most necessary reform is that which is required in the Seraglio. The extent of that establishment, with its countless women and troops of enuchs is something beyond belief, and the cost of it bears a proportion by no means inconsiderable to the entire expenses of the Turkish army, the payment of which is often left in arrear. If Her Majesty's Government are desirous of saving Turkey they must speak plainly to the Turkish Government. They must urge it to adopt at once some comprehensive plan of Reform, and obtain if possible some guarantee for its being carried into execution. By this course they may confer enduring benefits on the population of the Turkish dominions—Mahommedan as well as Christian. By this course they may fulfil the expectations of Europe, and give stability to what is now a tottering empire.
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, that we had endeavoured to support the Turkish Empire, but had not found the means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Serious evils had arisen from
  1894
  French influence in Egypt, and from the Turkish law of succession to the Sovereignty. The principle which we ought to adopt was, to prevent foreign conquest of Turkey; but while encouraging liberty in other parts of the world it was impossible for us to stay the march of progress in its effects on the Turkish Empire.
  Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put and agreed to.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

AFFAIRS OF MEXICO.

  QUESTION.
  MR. BUTTsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, When the Papers relating to the affairs of Mexico will be laid upon the Table of the House, and whether any instructions have been sent to Sir Charles Wylie to enforce the Conventions relative to the appropriation of the Customs' Duties?
  LORD JOHN RUSSELLwas understood to say that he was not in a position to give further information than this, that instructions had been sent out.

INDEMNITY BILL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HADFIELDsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when the yearly Indemnity Bill will be brought in, whether the form and purport of it will be the same as have been used annually since 1828, and whether he will cause it to be printed in the way usually done on the introduction of other Bills for consideration and discussion? The late Government had neglected to take the test required, and, therefore, all their subsequent acts while in office were, in point of fact, void. He wished the Bill should be brought in regularly, and printed, circulated, and discussed. At present it was brought in a manner which precluded any hon. Gentleman from expressing an opinion upon it—it had certainly never caught his eye.
  SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, he was afraid it was his unfortunate fate to dispute both the facts and the law of his hon. Friend. His hon. Friend had said the Indemnity Bill was not brought in a manner before the House that any Gentleman could

  1895
  express an opinion upon it; that he had never been able to keep bis eye upon it as it passed through the House; and that Parliament passed it without any knowledge of its contents. His hon. Friend was entirely mistaken in that supposition. The Indemnity Bill was annually brought in by the Under Secretary for the Home Department. It was a short Bill and was printed at full length. It was by no means treated like the Mutiny Act or the Appropriation Act, which were sometimes not presented in a printed form, but was presented in such a form that every Member had an opportunity of fully considering its contents. With regard to the law of the case, his hon. Friend spoke of the neglect of the late Ministers to take what he called an obsolete test. There was no test now in force; there was only a declaration, and no doubt persons were required annually by law to make it when they took office. But if they did not make it, they were saved from the consequences by the annual Indemnity Act, which relieved them from all penal consequences. No doubt it only saved them for the year; but, practically, it afforded entire exemption, as the Bill was passed annually. If the House should be desirous of making any alteration in the Bill they would have abundance of opportunity while the Bill was before the House.
  Main Question, put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY.—ARMY ESTIMATES.

  COMMITTEE.
  House in Committee; Mr. MASSEY in the Chair.
  (In the Committee.)
  (1.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £398,695, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of the Manufacturing Departments, Military Storekeepers, Barrack Masters, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1862, inclusive."
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he wished to draw the attention of the House to a discrepancy in the accounts relating to manufacture of small arms at Enfield; which, in 1854, were stated to he £352,583, and in 1858. to be £305,798. This arose from certain items in the former being omitted in the latter. The Small Arms Commit. tee had recommended the introduction of
  1896
  a careful and accurate system of accounts, but their recommendation had not been attended to. The object of this recommendation was not merely to obtain a supply of arms, but to keep a check on the trade; but it was impossible to constitute a fair comparison, unless the House had an account of the whole of the money expended on these works. It was necessary, in order to arrive at a reliable opinion of the cost at which rifles were manufactured, that there should be included in that cost the interest on the outlay on the establishment. A Return presented to the House showed the number of muskets made at Enfield, and any person looking at the Return superficially would think that if they divided the expenditure of the year by the number of muskets produced they would get at the cost per musket. That, however, was not the case, as there were many items of expenditure which were not included in the Return. Two separate Committees had recommended that full Returns should be laid before the House, and he hoped that these recommendations would at last be complied with, and that the Government would lay before the House a complete account of the expenditure up to the 31st of March of last year. The House ought not, indeed, to entertain these Estimates until the accounts were laid before the House in the manner recommended by the Committee. He was also anxious to direct the attention of the Government to the increase of manufacturing establishments. There was a manufactory at Millbank, for which £16,000 was charged for the item of wages; and another at Weedon which cost £3,000 for wages. He could not think that this increased number of establishments was necessary for the purpose of carrying on the manufacture of arms.
  MR. CARNEGIEdrew attention to the large increase in the local expenditure and travelling items, and in that of the lodging money.
  MR. W. WILLIAMSwanted to know why the Vote for the present year was £24,695 in excess of that of last year? The lodging money to married soldiers was increased, as well as other items.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, the Government were deserving of every praise for the provision they had made in respect to the allowances for the lodgings of married soldiers. Nothing they had done had so much attached married soldiers to the service as the granting them lodging mo-

  1897
  ney when there were not special quarters for them in the barracks. He fully supported the application of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire for full and complete information respecting the cost of manufacturing arms at Enfield; but it would be absolutely necessary, in order to arrive at the fact, that there should he a full account of expenditure, an account of the building and plant, fuel, gas, lighting, and other expenses, which would be included in an account of ordinary commercial character. But he thought that even if they could attain the utmost degree of economy, it would be better to keep up small manufacturing establishments, and employ private firms as much as possible.
  COLONEL DUNNEstated that it had been on several occasions recommended and promised by the Government that a complete debtor and creditor account of the establishment at Enfield should be laid before the House, but no information of the sort had yet been given. There was no doubt that the accounts were admirably kept by the officer in charge at Enfield, but the House was in all but complete ignorance on the subject. He had never been able to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to the cost of a rifled musket, and, indeed, it was a most complicated statement of accounts which was necessary in order to arrive at this result. The sums that had been laid out since 1854 upon the establishment at Enfield, exclusive of the building and repairs, had been, so far as he could make them out, £910,000. Add to this, that during the last seven years, a sum of £2,795,000 had been expended in the purchase of small arms; making together a total, in round numbers, of not less than £4,000,000 for the purchase of small arms. He wanted to know what we had obtained for this expenditure, and where ail the small arms had gone to, They all agreed in wishing that our men should be armed in the most efficient and economical manner—but the question was were we going economically to work? He would say the same with regard to clothing. He had called for returns on this subject, and so had the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Horsfall). The prices given in those returns varied. The one was correct, the other incorrect; 20 s, 6d. was given as the price for the tunic of a private of the Line; but the actual price was only 18 s. 6d. Why was this? The hon. Under Secretary for War should take care that his
  1898
  subordinates gave proper returns. He very much feared there was a disposition in some of the public offices to evade the returns ordered by the House of Commons as far as possible. Lodging money had been increased, much to the advantage of the soldier; and yet at Aldershot Engineers had been put into huts to live, and were charged as much for their accommodation in them as they would have to pay in respectable lodging-houses in the town. As to married soldiers, he protested against the right of soldiers marrying at all. It was perfectly absurd to load the army with a number of married people. When soldiers enlisted for twenty-one years it was not unreasonable that they should think of marriage; but when they entered the service for ten years, limited service, at the age of seventeen or eighteen, they might very reasonably be required to remain unmarried until that period had expired. There was no necessity to have such a mass of married men in the army as was now the case. When a man entered the service, he gave up a certain amount of comforts, and married life was one of these. If he (Colonel Dunne) or any other young man—or, rather when he was a young man—joined the service, he knew he should have to endure hard work, and he thought then, as he thought now, that a wife was no part of a soldier's necessaries. Then, again, barracks made for 1,000 men, from the superior comforts that were allowed, could only accommodate 700. The same thing was carried out in almost every department of the State, and the Estimates were framed on a corresponding scale. He was averse to divide the House or vote against any of these Estimates. They were made up on the returns, but it was necessary that Members should speak their mind upon them; and economy had to be pressed on every Government. If he were in the hon. Under Secretary's position he should take all the good advice he received, and follow it as far as possible.
  SIR MORTON PETOwished to call attention to a particular item in the Estimate—196 clerks of works from £110 to £300 per annum, £35,395. besides a sum nearly as large for extra clerks of works. He could not understand how such a demand arose. When the New Houses of Parliament were building, two clerks of the works were found sufficient to superintend the whole. This was just one of those things which showed that a Go-

  1899
  vernment, in carrying forward any department, without in the slightest degree intending to act otherwise than economically, ran into an amount of expenditure which no private person or man in business would do. He could not conceive it possible that Government could have an amount of works that would render one quarter of that number necessary. This was a very unsatisfactory state of things. He did his best before passing these Estimates to master the details; but from the want of explicitness in the details it was impossible for any one not connected with the Department to do so. With every desire to do his duty, he felt himself in a perfectly helpless position. When he compared the French army and its total expenditure with ours he was perfectly frightened. But when he came upon items such as that to which he had referred he could well understand that there was something rotten in the state of Denmark. He did not attribute any motives to Government for permitting such extravagance. The real fact was that as soon as a Minister was really becoming acquainted with the just demands to be made on the public purse some change of Government displaced him, and all his acquired knowledge of his Department became useless. The mischief would never be got rid of until the commercial and business duties of the public departments were separated from party politics, and men of official experience were retained in their situation until men of still greater efficiency were ready to take their places. In France, Prussia, and other States the personnel of the departments was not changed frequently as in this country. With respect to the Vote before the House, he could not see how it was possible that 198 clerks—to say nothing of temporary additions—could be profitably employed in the superintendence of barracks and similar works, at a cost to the country of £34,000 a year.
  COLONEL DICKSONsaid, that successive Secretaries of State for War, being necessarily dependent for their information upon their subordinates, who were permanently employed, could not exercise an effective control over the profuse expenditure connected with their office. He thought the hon. Baronet had hit the right nail on the head in drawing attention to the number of clerks. In fact, we were governed by clerks at the War Office, and the constant changes in the heads of that Department made them entirely dependent
  1900
  on the advice of those clerks. He could not understand why the officers of the Engineers could not be trusted with the works of the country, and why they must have 198 clerks to superintend them. He hoped the Government would look into this matter, and that if a reduction could not be made this year it would be next. He was ashamed again to refer to the absence of those Gentlemen who had signed the document urging economy on the Ministers, but there were very few of them now in their places. There was the hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham, who told the country that the army was kept up for the benefit of the aristocracy and their hangers-on; but he, as usual, was not in his place when the expenses of the army were under discussion. The real economists must do as well as they could without their assistance. The Army Clothing Department in Pimlico was defended the other night on the ground that on one occasion, when the clothing of an entire regiment was lost, it was supplied within a fortnight. Now, in a town with which he was connected, he was informed that a private contractor lately received an order for 800 tunics for the 60th Rifles on a Monday, and actually delivered the whole number in London on the Friday week following, although in the interim they had had to telegraph to Yorkshire for the cloth. He was diposed to vote for a larger reduction than the hon. Member for Lambeth had proposed; but he would certainly go into the same lobby with him, and if they went on dividing, they would, perhaps, at last force some economy on the Government.
  MR. BARROWsaid, he hoped the Committee would keep on dividing, for he did not see how economy in the gross was to be accomplished unless they insisted on economy in details. Remonstrances had been repeatedly made to him out of doors against their constantly-increasing expenditure, to the magnitude of which the country had at last awakened. When the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Morton Peto) complained of the increase of clerks, and professed his inability to understand it, he would suggest to him that probably one cause might be that we lived in a free country, where we had constituents, and where it was thought necessary to provide an unreasonable amount of patronage for the benefit of those who sent them there. It became the more necessary, therefore, for the House to redeem its own character by watching the more narrowly this expen-

  1901
  diture. He wanted especially to know why they maintained two establishments abroad for the manufacture of arms? and why the English workmen employed in those establishments could not be employed at home, under the superintendence of the existing staff in this country? If the hon. Member received a satisfactory explanation as to the soldiers' lodging money he should recommend him not to propose the diminution of that item, because he thought that it was desirable that married soldiers should be accommodated in the manner which had been mentioned. He spoke quite disinterestedly, because he had lived to a considerable age without the advantage of a wife; but he thought that it was necessary for the morality of the army that some such provision as this should be made for married soldiers. But he did not understand how, if the amount was fixed last year, it should have increased this.
  LORD STANLEYsaid, he could not assent to the proposition laid down by the hon. Baronet the Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto), that there was no proper control over this expenditure because it was in the hands of gentlemen who were appointed for political reasons, and who were changed so frequently that they had no time to learn their business. The practical effect of the change which he recommended would be to place the control of the expenditure in the hands of permanent officials, who would become, in fact, the Members for their several Departments. Instead of a Parliamentary Secretary of State for War, the hon. Baronet wished to have a permanent Minister for War, who should not have a seat in that House, He could not conceive anything which would tend more directly to destroy our whole system of Parliamentary Government. We had been accustomed to think that the practical responsibility of Ministers to Parliament was enforced by their having seats in that House, and being liable to he called upon to defend their conduct face to face before Parliament. If those who had the control of expenditure were removed from Parliament it would soon be found that the House of Commons had lost its control and almost its influence over the management of departments, and, although the name of Parliamentary Government might be preserved, the substance would be at an end.
  MR. W. EWARTthought that some light might be thrown upon the Estimates, and some assistance afforded to the Members
  1902
  of the House in considering them, if they were accompanied by annual reports similar to those which were presented to Parliament by the Post Office and the Customs and Excise Departments. He thought some explanation of the 198 clerks should be given to the House.
  MR. AYRTONentirely concurred with what had fallen from the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) with reference to the proposal of the hon. Baronet the Member for Finsbury. The fact was that they already had a permanent Establishment whose constant effort was to increase the Estimates which the Parliamentary Secretaries were engaged in a constant struggle to keep down. He wished the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State to give some explanation as to the cost of supervision compared with the amount expended upon works abroad. From the detailed statement which accompanied this Vote it appeared that at Gambia £320 was paid for the supervision of the expenditure of £463; at Honduras, £277 for the supervision of the expenditure of £82; at Jamaica, £550 for supervising an expenditure of £623; at New Zealand, £300 for supervising an expenditure of £352; and at the Windward and Leeward Islands, £1,411 for supervising an expenditure of £2,869. It was possible that the persons to whom these largo sums were paid might have other duties to perform, but no mention of such duties appeared in the Estimates.
  MR. T. G. BARINGadmitted that there was in some cases an apparent disparity between the cost of supervision and the work done, but there was a good deal of work done in the way of ordinary repairs which had to be superintended and which the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Ayrton) had omitted to include in his calculations. He admitted that greater economy might possibly be introduced into the system of superintendence. That subject had not escaped the notice of his noble Friend (Lord Herbert), and a Committee bad been appointed to consider whether a more economical system might not he devised. The plan now in existence was too military in its nature; a little more of the civil element might be introduced, he thought, with advantage. With respect to the local expenditure his explanation was that the actual amount of the expenditure of former years had been inserted in the Estimates. With respect to the civil allowances, the increase in the Vote had been caused in conse-

  1903
  qnence of a new warrant as to the rank of civil officers, which had recently been altered in a very liberal manner; and the increase in reference to stationary quarters was in consequence of adopting the report of a Committee of that House. As to the comparison between the expense of our army and that of the French which had been drawn by the hon. Member for Finsbury, it should be borne in mind that there was an essential difference between an army raised by conscription and one raised by voluntary enlistment. But beyond this we had not the means of a fair comparison. In the French Estimates they would find that the expenses for the defence of Algeria were omitted, as well as other most important portions of the expenditure upon the army, so that it was difficult to get at the real cost. He agreed with the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) that it was important they should have correct accounts from our great manufacturing departments, and there were ample materials for giving the House complete accounts. It should be his duty to get such an account prepared for the past year for the Enfield Factory, upon correct commercial principles. As to the discrepancies alluded to, they amounted simply to this—that there was difference of opinion as to what should be included in the capital and plant of the factory and what not, and he repeated that all the authorities wished was to have an account prepared upon a satisfactory principle. The establishment at Pimlico was not for the manufacture, but for the repair of arms; and the Committee must be prepared for a further expenditure under that head, now that there was such a large quantity of arms in the hands of the Militia and the Volunteers. The attention of the Secretary of State would be directed to the various suggestions which had been made, and in the Estimates of next year they might expect some reduction in the expenditure comprised under the vote now under discussion.
  SIR MORTON PETOexplained that what he meant to draw attention to was that these Government establishments had a tendency to perpetuate and increase themselves; and he repeated that the supervision was hindered by the frequent changes in the political heads of Departments and that directly Under Secretaries became competent to their duties they were removed from their offices.
  MR. NEWDEGATEthanked the hon.
  1904
  Gentleman for promising to give Dr. and Cr. accounts of the expenditure of the manufacturing establishments. Seven years ago a Committee recommended that a proper Dr. and Cr. account, in reference to these establishments, should be prepared, and he hoped that that recommendation would be at length complied with, so as to enable Parliament to judge of the expense. It would form a most important precedent in reference to the one establishment to which he had referred; and if the account were properly prepared, any private Member could judge of the expense the same as he could that of any private establishment of his own. Another object to be gained by such an account was that it would enable them to check the charges made by private manufacturers, and, above all, they would cease to be in that state of positive ignorance which they now were in reference to these matters.
  CAPTAIN JERVISsaid, that having been for years connected with one of these factories, he wished to express his opinion that the system of manufacturing by the Government ought not to be carried beyond the point necessary to ascertain the actual cost of the articles, and check the prices of the contractors. Nothing, he thought, could be more pernicious than that we should keep all the work in Government establishments without giving anything to contractors. The more we could disseminate the manufactures for Government over the country the more we should increase our supplies in case of need. If we concentrated all our resources in Woolwich we should render that an extraordinary object of attack to an enemy. The reason why the French, in their wars with Austria, aimed at Vienna was not simply to possess the capital, but because the Austrians had concentrated round Vienna their military manufactures, and to lose Vienna was, therefore, a most serious disaster. If all our resources were in Woolwich it might be a gain to any enemy who landed to carry it with a loss of 20,000 men; but this would not be so if our supplies were manufactured in various parts of the country. The present case of the United States was exactly in point. The United States had only two establishments—one at Harper's Ferry and the other at Springfield—and the first they had been obliged to destroy; and if a blow were struck by the South it would, no doubt, be at Springfield. The position which America was in in consequence of the system pursued was that

  1905
  she was obliged to send to this country for arms with which to carry on the war. He was glad to see that this principle was being recognized in the manufacture of the Armstrong guns, some of which were made at Woolwich, and some at Newcastle.
  MR. W. WILLIAMS MR. W. WILLIAMS moved that the Vote be reduced by £24,690.
  Motion made, and Question put,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £374,005, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of the Manufacturing Departments, Military Storekeepers, Barrack Masters, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1862, inclusive."
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 24; Noes 133: Majority 109.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  (2.) £860,447, Wages of Artificers, Labourers, &c.
  MR. MONSELLthought that after the distinct pledge they had received from the Under Secretary for War, that the subject of this debate was under consideration with a view to economy, it would be best that the hon. Member for Lambeth should withdraw his Amendment, and allow the Vote to pass.
  MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, the Under Secretary for War had not touched the point he raised.
  MR. MONSELLsaid, they had to consider along with this Vote the Vote of £2,200,000 for stores, or a total sum of more than £3,000,000. He wished to know what had become of the enormous accumulation of stock which the large sums voted under this head for the last few years must have produced. At present the Government would be able to produce, with the machinery at their command, in six months, as many guns as were used during the Crimean war. That, of course, diminished the necessity of keeping an enormous amount of warlike stores on hand. About £1,400,000 of the Vote was for the navy, the remainder for the army. They were expending £724,000 on small arms alone, which was very nearly as much as the French spent on their stores of every kind. If he did not get a satisfactory explanation with regard to the stores in hand he should move a reduction of the Vote.
  CAPTAIN JERVISsaid, that we were completely in a transition state as regarded fire arms, and he was afraid we must submit to a large expenditure under this head, not only for this year, but for many
  1906
  years to come. It was only within the last three years that the principle of the rifle cannon had been adopted in Europe. The French commenced the system, and France was followed by Austria. He thought it was to the credit of England that she waited for some time before she commenced. The result of that delay was that England had the finest artillery in the world. For this they were indebted principally to that great philosopher, as he might well be called, Sir William Armstrong. He had not only produced a powerful, but a most simple gun, which could easily be worked. Nor was the country more indebted to Sir William Armstrong for his rifled gun than for his admirable system of preparing the fusee and filling the shell. There was not a wooden ship which his guns would not blow out of the water in a very short time. They had heard a good deal of the iron-built ships of the French, and they were obliged to build such if they wished to resist the large shells which were now thrown by the Armstrong guns; but, at the present moment, our ships were in a condition to attack an iron-built ship, which could not be said of any other country in the world. We must be prepared to look the matter in the face, for, as he had said, the present great expense was due to the transition of the system. The adoption of this gun had rendered necessary a complete change of the armament of our troops and ships. During the Chinese war the French officers had sent home such favourable accounts of the effects of the Armstrong gun, that the Emperor of the French, who was himself an artillerist of no small reputation, adopted the plan of getting a number of articles written in the French newspapers depreciatory of this very gun, which General Collineau had asked Sir Hope Grant to let a column of his troops have for the attack in Pekin. No country could produce the iron to resist these guns in such quantity as this country, but all these changes required a great deal of expenditure, and justified the largeness of the present Vote in some respect. They could not make 100 pounder gun at less than £800, and that showed how great must be the cost of arming their ships and fortifications with such an arm. In his opinion, the Government could not have taken a smaller sum for the Estimates for this head this year.
  MR. CHILDERSwanted an explanation of the fact that, after nearly two

  1907
  years of preparation for putting the country in a thorough state of defence, £3,000,000 were required for warlike stores, with every prospect of its being increased in future years. They were perfectly ready to meet any expenditure necessary to obtain the Armstrong and Whitworth guns, but the Committee ought to require a clear and satisfactory explanation.
  MR. BALLgave Her Majesty's Government great credit for placing the country in such a position as to be perfectly safe. He was not himself a man for war, but he was strongly attached to his country, and he could easily understand that it must always be necessary for a country like England to make a large and liberal outlay in order to keep the several departments in a state of efficiency. The whole world was in that condition that the Government would have betrayed their trust if they had neglected to make due provision against a war breaking out, and he feared that they would have to make it while the French Emperor ruled in France.
  MR. P. W. MARTINsaid, the Committee ought to watch the casual expenditure rendered necessary by the improvements in weapons, lest it should become the normal expenditure of the country.
  MR. T. G. BARING, in reference to the observations of the hon. Member for Limerick (Mr. Monsell) said, that the Vote for wages was intimately connected with the Vote for warlike stores, and the main part of the money voted for wages was spent in the preparation of rifles, great guns, and ammunition. He would remind the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) that only a small proportion of the whole expense of the Armstrong guns was for the gun itself, the carriage, equipment, and ammunition requiring the rest. The whole cost of the Armstrong guns would be at least £800,000. The ammunition for these guns would come to £500,000, making the total expense £1,300,000. For small arms making under contract the sum of £500,000 was taken, and for those manufactured by the Government £370,000, and these two sums being added to £1,300,000 made about £2,000,000 out of the £3,000,000 which the two Votes together came to. He could account for the whole of the expenditure in detail, if he were not afraid of too far troubling the Committee. With respect to the expenditure, it was to be considered whether it was not wise in the present condition of the
  1908
  armaments of other nations to supply the army, and especially the navy, with the most perfect weapons. The Committee must bear in mind that the state of the other warlike stores had been very unsatisfactory of late years, and it had, therefore, been necessary to increase the expenditure on that account. It was hoped, however, that the increase was temporary, and that the expenditure would he less next year, and still less in the year following. He was certain that the Commitee would be of opinion that this Vote was the last that should be reduced. They might rely that every care would be taken in the expenditure of the money.
  COLONEL DUNNEthought the hon. Gentleman had not answered the question of the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) as to what had been done with guns and ammunition hitherto manufactured, and also the small arms. They had sold this year an enormous quantity of stores, amounting to £275,000. He should like to know what they were, and why they would not answer for the purposes of the country?
  GENERAL LINDSAYsaid, that those who paid the best would naturally get the best iron. This country produced a very limited supply of the first quality of iron, and could not afford to sent it abroad; but by going into the market the Admiralty would get iron of the best quality by paying the best price.
  MR. T. G. BARINGsaid, that the Tower was one of the largest military store establishments in the country, and a large number of assistants was required. The arms manufactured had been given out to Her Majesty's regiments, to the Militia, and to the Volunteers. A largo number had also been distributed to the navy, a large number had been assigned to the Government of India and the store was rapidly assuming respectable proportions.
  Vote agreed to.
  (3.) £525,416, Clothing and Necessaries.
  MR. W. WILLIAMS MR. W. WILLIAMS moved that the Chairman report Progress.
  MR. T. G. BARINGhoped the hon. Gentleman would allow the next Vote to be taken.
  MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he would withdraw his Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  (4.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £1,456,834, be

  1909
  granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of Provisions, Forage, Fuel and Light, Barrack Furniture, Bedding, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1862, inclusive."
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, that some time ago he moved a Resolution for the discontinuance of the stoppage from cavalry officers in respect of forage. The Government opposed that Resolution, and continued the stoppage. He saw in the present Vote charges for forage for the Staff. (Cries of "Read!") He was reading. It was his duty to read. The Estimates were put into the hands of Members that they might read them. Hon. Gentlemen who signed a "round robin" to the Minister in January last, calling for a reduction in the public expenditure, ought to assist him and other hon. Members who in that House made practical efforts to keep down the Estimates. He begged to move the reduction of the Vote by a sum of £12,454, which would be equivalent to a stoppage of the amount expended in forage for the Staff.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That the item of £482,392, for Cost of Forage at Home and Abroad, be reduced by the amount of £12,454."
  MR. CONINGHAMsaid, he was glad to hear the observations of the hon. Member. Sixty Gentlemen had written to the Prime Minister, enforcing the necessity of economy, and many of those sixty hon. Members were now found voting steadily with Government against those Members below the gangway, who really endeavoured to enforce reduction.
  MR. T. G. BARINGsaid, that though the hon. Member for Devizes objected to the system of stoppages, his present Amendment would have the effect of extending that system.
  CAPTAIN JERVISwished to explain that, in voting for the Resolution of the hon. Member for Devizes for discontinuing the forage stoppage from cavalry officers, he did so because he saw that the effect of stoppages was to make it impossible for any one but one man of fortune to hold a commission in a cavalry regiment. The present Secretary for War and his right hon. predecessor in that office had both spoken in favour of doing away with the stoppage for forage from cavalry officers.
  COLONEL DICKSONwas aware that the officers of the cavalry were justly anxious to see the forage stoppage done away with;
  1910
  but he would not rob Peter to pay Paul by voting for the Amendment.
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, that his intention in moving the Amendment had been to bring the argument of the Under Secretary for War to a reductio ad absurdum; but having made that demonstration he begged to withdraw the Amendment.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. W. WILLIAMSproposed that the Vote be reduced by the sum of £4,500.
  MR. T. G. BARINGexplained that there was no allowance made to officers of the Guards for mess.
  MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he would withdraw his Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. E. P. BOUVERIEinquired what was the cause of the great increase in the cost of fuel and lighting, the amount being £172,000 as compared with £112,000 last year.
  MR. T. G. BARINGsaid, that the reason of the increased cost was that it had been found that the cost of last year considerably exceeded the amount voted. The sum now asked represented, he believed, the actual amount which would be required, and it had been carefully estimated this year.
  SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, the Under Secretary for War had several times told the Committee that the amount actually expended exceeded the estimate. He thought they had a right to know out of what funds the excess was paid.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Resolution to be reported on Monday next.
  Committee to sit again on Monday next.

  WAYS AND MEANS.—REPORT.
  Resolution reported.
  MR. HENNESSYinquired why the Resolution had been taken in Committee of Ways and Means; and also how it happened that the Excise duties on chicory were 8s. 6d. while the Customs' duties amounted to 12 s. 6d.?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, notice had originally been given of the Resolution in Committee of Ways and Means, and it was thought better to adhere to that arrangement. The difference between the Customs and Excise duties would be intelligible when

  1911
  he stated that chicory being a plant which only ripened every second year it would not have been fair to impose the full duty on a crop which was not grown in contemplation of it; or, on the other hand, to give the benefit of the increase to the British grower exclusively in one year.
  Resolution agreed to.
  House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock till Monday next.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Passengers (Australian Colonies); Marriages Validity.

THE UNITED STATES—THE CIVIL WAR —PRIVATEERING.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords I have given notice to my noble Friend the
1830
President of the Council that I would put a question to him upon a subject of considerable importance and urgency. That question may now, perhaps, be considered comparatively unnecessary, inasmuch as it was raised elsewhere in the course of yesterday, and Her Majesty's Government gave some intimation of the course they meant to pursue, but the matter is one of so much importance that I hope my noble Friend will forgive me if I ask for some explanations with respect to it in your Lordships' House. Your Lordships are aware that the unfortunate dispute which has existed for some time between the Northern and the Southern portions of the United States of America has at last resulted in what I am afraid must be considered a civil war. I am not going to ask the noble Earl any question with respect to the manner in which this country may be affected by the possible consequences of that war. I understand the Government have already come to the conclusion—of which I do not complain—that both the Northern and the Southern sections of the United States are entitled to be considered as belligerent Powers, and to have our relations with them regulated by the rules which apply to belligerent Powers. I understand further that the Government have under their consideration, and have referred to the law officers of the Crown, several important and delicate questions touching the extent and character of those belligerent rights. Upon that subject, therefore, I do not at present ask for any expression of opinion on the part of the Government; but there is one point with respect to which it is highly important they should furnish immediate information. Your Lordships are aware that among the measures adopted or threatened by the Southern Confederation is that of sending forth letters of marque and resorting to the system of privateering for the purpose of attacking the commerce, of the Northern States. Your Lordships are aware, on the other hand, that the Northern States have signified their intention to regard the issue of such letters of marque and such privateering as piracy, and to treat them as such. I do not stop to inquire how far this course of proceeding is consistent with the strong declarations made on the part of the United States at the time of the Congress of Paris, when the system of privateering was abandoned by the Powers of Europe, but when a different resolution was adopted by the United States and they alone of all

1831
the important maritime States refused to abandon that system. The point to which I wish to call the attention of your Lordships and the Government is the position in which British seamen may probably be placed in consequence of the announcements made by the Southern and the Northern States. If there is one mode of warfare which has more attractions for seamen than another it is precisely the system of privateering. Privateering is a sort of sea-poaching, and is peculiarly attractive to the more reckless and dissolute class of sailors. It combines ninny inducements—a certain amount of daring, a certain amount of risk, and considerable chances of profit—inducements which, coupled with drink, apart from any question of distress or poverty, which I believe does not form an element in more than one case out of a hundred, are precisely those that lead to poaching on land, and are also precisely those that would lure seamen into poaching by sea—or privateering. But unfortunately the maritime game-laws are of a rather stringent character, and visit offenders with nothing short of capital punishment. It is, therefore, important to those British seamen who are liable to be attracted by the various inducements of privateering that they should know upon what footing they stand with respect to their rights as British subjects. I need not say that the offence of entering upon this privateering service is an offence against the Foreign Enlistment Act; but that Act does not impose any penalty so severe as that of capital punishment, and if a British seaman who has entered one of the Southern privateers should be captured by a Northern ship of war and condemned to death—if he is entitled to claim any protection even for his life from his own Government, I cannot conceive anything more certain to involve us in most serious and embarrassing complications with the United States, or more likely to render us, almost necessarily, parties in that unhappy contest, from which I cordially join with the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office in the earnest desire that we may continue to stand aloof. On the other hand, if a British seamen by entering a Southern privateer does forfeit his right to claim the protection of his own Government—which I apprehend he would do—it should be distinctly and publicly made known to him on the part of the Government that if he is led into such a criminal undertaking from any temptation whatever, and if he is
1832
there by exposed to the most serious consequences—even to the loss of his life by judicial sentence—in that case his blood will be on his own head, and he must not expect the slightest interference on the part of this country to save him from consequences, however deplorable, provoked by his own act. I understand that a Proclamation is about to be issued by Her Majesty's Government on the subject of privateering and of belligerent rights. I hope that in that Proclamation—or in some other way—a most distinct and emphatic warning will be given to all seamen in the service of Her Majesty as to the conditions upon which they will engage, if they choose to enter upon such hazardous enterprise—in the system of privateering. There should be no doubt left on their mind, but the fullest and plainest intimation should publicly be made to them whether, if they do engage in such a service, they will, or will not, in extremity, be entitled to expect any protection or any interference on the part of this country. I hope my noble Friend will state to your Lordships whether the Government have come to any conclusion upon this question; and, if so, whether they are prepared forthwith to issue a public and emphatic notification of the course they intend to pursue, and the consequences likely to result to British seamen from a disregard of their warning?
EARL GRANVILLE: The noble Earl, by the manner in which he has approached the subject, has evinced a becoming appreciation of the difficulties which may arise to ourselves from the unfortunate state of things in the United States. With respect, however, to the question of the belligerent rights of the parties now engaged in that unhappy contest, the noble Earl has not asked for any expression of opinion on the part of the Government, and, therefore, I am absolved from entering into a discussion of that most important, difficult, and delicate subject. But the noble Earl has inquired whether it is our intention to issue a Proclamation warning the subjects of Her Majesty against in any manner departing from that neutrality which Her Majesty herself is so desirous to observe. To that question, as the noble Earl has stated, an answer has already been given in "another place"—namely, that it is the intention of the Government, according to precedent, to issue a Proclamation giving such warning to all the subjects of Her Majesty. The precise wording of the Proclamation is a matter

1833
of considerable importance and difficulty, requiring some deliberation, and we have thought it right to obtain the best advice in framing it; but I may state that the Government are anxious to make it as plain and emphatic as possible.
THE EARL OF DERBY: Perhaps the noble Earl will inform your Lordships whether, in the event of the Northern States acting upon their expressed intention to treat privateering as piracy, and British seamen being sentenced to death, it is to be distinctly understood that such persons will not be entitled to claim protection from their own country.
EARL GRANVILLE: I should prefer not to enter into any detailed explanation until the Proclamation shall have been issued. It is plain that the natural result of such a Proclamation must be that no British seaman will be entitled to claim the official protection of his Government.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, the noble Earl had limited his observations to seamen in Her Majesty's service, when it was quite clear that he meant them to apply to any British subject taking part in privateering. Privateering of this description was piracy by the law of nations. Any interference in a foreign war, by fitting out, manning, and going on board ships to take part in the war, was a crime by our law, and it was most expedient that those parties who chose to commit the offence in this case should be left to suffer the penalty they incurred. The war in America was a most lamentable affair on all accounts, and for the sake of liberal principles, and for the sake of humanity itself, he fervently trusted that the folly which had given rise to it—possibly not confined to one side—would not be attended with the calamities which always accompanied civil war. If disruption was inevitable, he trusted the new States would form themselves without bloodshed.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKEwas anxious that the House should not enter too strong a protest against that which was a natural consequence of war—namely, that vessels should be fitted out by private individuals under letters of marque. That was, no doubt, privateering; but it did not by any means follow that privateering was piracy. He believed that if privateering ships were put in the hands of proper officers they were not engaged in piracy any more than men-of-war. He thought that a feeble State engaged in a war with a powerful one had a right to
1834
make use of its merchant vessels for the purpose of carrying on the contest, and there was no violation of the law of nations in such a proceeding.

SYRIA AND TURKEY.—RESOLUTIONS MOVED.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFErose to move the following Resolutions (of which he had given notice) on the affairs of Syria and Turkey—

"1. That this House would view with deep regret any circumstances leading to a continuance, however brief, of the occupation of Syria by foreign troops beyond the 5th of June next ensuing, the period now fixed for their complete withdrawal by the Convention agreed to at Paris on the 15th of March.

"2. That this House considers the late calamitous events in Syria as not to be attributed to causes exclusively local, but also, and chiefly, to the general state of the Turkish Empire, more especially in point of revenue and administration.

"3. That this [loose is deeply impressed with the urgency of obtaining from the Ottoman Porte a prompt adoption and strict enforcement of such measures as may best afford, in the spirit of the Sultan's Ilatt-homayoon of 1856, a reliable security against the recurrence, from any cause whatever, of those sanguinary conflicts."

The noble Viscount said, this was a subject which possessed so little novelty, and was so little recommended to himself by the simplicity of its character or the facility of solution of the difficulties by which it was surrounded, that he should have shrunk from bringing it forward if he had not borne in recollection the indulgence that on more than one occasion had been shown to him, and if he had not also borne in mind the importance to our national interests of this subject; and if he had not also felt that a duty had been imposed upon him by his long residence in Turkey and his experience in its diplomacy. The Resolutions which he proposed to submit to their Lordships were of a character not calculated, he thought, to raise any difference of opinion in that House, still less to occasion any division of opinion. They had a twofold object in view. They were directed, in the first instance, to the question of the settlement of Syria; and, secondly, they were directed, by the natural connection between the two subjects, to our interest in the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, notwithstanding all its defects, and more particularly in consequence of the necessities under which it laboured. In bringing it under the notice of that House, simultaneously, but accidentally, with the discussion of it in the

1835
other House of Parliament, he had felt that advantage might be derived to the great interests involved by a discussion in both Houses of Parliament. He conceived that where there was no special reason on the part of the Government to apprehend embarrassment from a discussion of a subject, great advantage sprung from its discussion in both the Legislative Assemblies of the nation—advantages not confined to the Houses themselves, but extending to the countries interested, from their attention being thus forcibly drawn to questions involving their interests; and he hoped he had not misjudged in affording their Lordships an opportunity of considering the merits of this question. It was now six weeks since the abundant Correspondence laid on the table by the Foreign Office had been under their Lordships' consideration. The subject, therefore, could hardly be considered as brought forward without sufficient time having been afforded for its consideration. It was not his intention to go into the details of the Correspondence. He had naturally looked over it; and the general result of his inspection was, that in the midst of great difficulties, those who bad been employed on the spot had shown an intelligent attention to the great interests of the question in Syria; and that particularly the Commissioner sent by Her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs had shown that he was worthy of the selection; for without much diplomatic experience he had exhibited an attention not only to the interests of the country to which he was sent, but to the great principles of humanity, that did credit to himself and honour to his country. This was a difficult and complicated question, especially in connection with the interests of the Turkish Empire at large and the great European interests involved. In Syria itself they had a practical issue, and one of very great importance not only to Europe at large, but it might be said more particularly in respect to our own British interests. It was one which presented circumstances of great delicacy and great urgency, and which offered difficulties of solution which it was his desire to bring under their Lordships' notice. Syria, as they all knew, had been from the earliest times of great importance and the deepest interest in every sense; and the occupation of it by foreign troops involved political considerations that could not be passed over without the decpest anxiety. At the time when it was decided that foreign troops should be
1836
sent there, and that our neighbours, the Government of France, should be authorized to send an expedition to act in the common name, he felt the difficulty of the situation. He considered that Her Majesty's Government were fully justified in accepting the offer of France, with a positive assurance, still more with a positive engagement, that the employment of the troops in Syria should not extend beyond a short period of duration. It had since become known that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government circumstances had arisen which justified the prolongation of that occupation. The French expeditionary force still occupied that country, but under a renewed engagement of a very positive description to evacute the country on the 5th of next month. It would be, he conceived, a matter of deep concern if any circumstance were to arise which should involve further difficulty in the execution of that engagement. He himself entertained no doubt of the intentions of the French Government to act on their engagement. He could not for a moment suppose that any interest peculiar to themselves would induce them to put into doubt the engagement they had entered into with this country and the other European Powers. It was not, therefore, from any apprehension of their departing from that engagement that he had brought that part of the subject under their Lordships' consideration. But circumstances might arise, and it might depend on the force of those circumstances—how far that legitimate interest which that Government had for its own religion in Syria—which might induce them to press for a further extension of time. Under these circumstances it was of great importance that the evident intentions of Her Majesty's Government should be supported by the voice of Parliament, so that not only no change should take place with regard to the period of occupation, but that those necessary measures should be pressed forward, as well as judiciously selected, which the inhabitants of those countries should look to in future for their protection—that protection which they had hitherto derived from foreign bayonets. It certainly did appear that, whatever support a foreign army gave to the Turkish Commission, their presence was not essential to the restoration and maintenance of tranquillity. This much at least did appear from the papers presented, that the troops which had accompanied the Turkish Commis-

1837
sioner were sufficient to produce a cessation of hostilities between the contending parties, and that there was no necessity for the French expeditionary force to proceed as far as Damascus: that, in fact, their operations had been very much confined to those bearing the character of police. It could not be concealed that operations of that kind were not unaccompanied by subjects of regret—unavoidable, but still subjects of regret—inasmuch as they were attended by increased excitement on the part of the Christian population, and a necessary depression on the part of the Druses, who, however guilty they might have been of sanguinary conflicts and atrocious massacres, had, as shown by the published Correspondence, been provoked to those acts by the Maronites, and those who supported them from a distance. He did not mean, in so saying, the French Government itself, but those religionists in France who had taken Syria under their protection, and whose constant intercourse with that country had on more than one occasion caused disputes which had terminated in those atrocities which every one so much lamented. If any force, whatever it might be, of some other Power than France, were to remain in that country, attracted in the first interest of religion, he would put it to the House whether it would suit our interest or the fair requirements of Europe that such an army should continue to occupy a country which was well known to be, in a military sense, the key of Egypt. Those were very powerful reasons why that House and the House of Commons, before the die was cast, should express an opinion as to the fulfilment of the engagement that had been entered into, and to encourage Her Majesty's Government to take those steps and adopt those measures which were advised and considered urgent, not only for the security of the tranquillity of Syria, but for securing it consistently with the integrity of the Turkish Empire—with the independence of that Empire which we had formally guaranteed. These were no trifling considerations. It was true that previously to that treaty we had been very much implicated, both commercially and politically, in Turkish affairs. We had frequently interfered, both by arms and money, to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire; but now that we had actually bound ourselves by treaty, we could not, without a departure from good faith—without a change of circumstances justified our own change—withdraw from giving the required
1838
support to the independence of the Turkish Empire, should the occasion arise. We had already had deep and dear-bought experience as to what it cost to maintain the integrity of Turkey. Long before we entered on our treaty obligations the natural connection between this country and Turkey led us to take an interest in the wars and negotiations with neighbouring Powers, in which, it was proved that they were over-matched. In the course of this century, as their Lordships knew, some eight or ten times we had been driven into negotiations of the most complicated kind with Turkey on account of its interests. We had on several occasions, as many as six or eight in the present century, sent our fleets, and sometimes even our army, for the purpose of protecting her. If, then, those dangers were incurred and those sacrifices made at a time when we were only bound to Eastern affairs by a sense of interest, how was it now, when we were engaged in the most formal manner to guarantee the independence and integrity of that empire? Surely they could not but consider this as a subject which deserved their serious attention at a time when the whole of Europe, and not only Europe, but America, was thrown into the most disastrous confusion, with very doubtful results; and they could hardly shut their eyes to the consideration that circum stances might suddenly arise which might involve them in their consequences. Some of the movements taking place on the Continent, not only politically, but in a military sense, came in contact with the Turkish Empire; therefore there was at least a chance that the Porte, by reason of its weakness, might be brought into a position which might excite the appetite of soma other country to take advantage of her situation, and throw on us the necessity of stepping forward to avert that danger. When such was the case he was justified in saying that we were bound to be careful as to what was done in Syria. It was of the utmost consequence that we should have a correct notion of the causes that had led to the disturbances and massacres that had taken place in that country. No doubt there were causes connected with local circumstances. There was the old dominion of the Porte to be maintained, and there was a constant appetite on its part to extend its power into the mountainous parts of the province. There were the old conflicting animosities of race and creed. But, in addition to these, it might be truly and justly said that the more im-

1839
portant causes—those which were necessary to bring on the catastrophe—were the administration of the Turkish Empire and the corruption which entered deeply into the cause of what we had to lament. Another cause was the weakness of the Turkish army—an army which, he believed, stood at 150,000 men on paper, but which, he understood from competent authorities, did not really amount to more than between 50,000 and 60,000; and that with an immense territory, with the difficulty of passing troops, the badness of roads, and the inconvenience attending operations in that country. Another circumstance which stood at once pre-eminent amongst the causes of the Syrian calamities, and which gave immediate cause of weakness to the Turkish Empire was the embarrassed state of the Turkish finances—embarrassed as he understood to a degree which in that country of unsettled finance had never before been equalled. Unless some remedy were applied it would be impossible to guarantee Syria against a recurrence of those calamities from which it was only gradually escaping. It was impossible for us to guard against the consequences of the engagements which we had incurred; and if we wished to do justice to the country more particularly under consideration, and to the whole Turkish Empire itself, it must be by assisting them to get out of their present slate of weakness by affording them any assistance, either moral or otherwise, that the interests of our own country could allow of; and, above all things, by urging upon them the necessity of, and by giving them sufficient motives for, exerting their own energies, and thus be the means of contributing to the preservation of their own independence and integrity, by calling upon them to carry out those reforms which they themselves had admitted to he necessary to their safety, which they had proclaimed over and over again, and which they had recorded in that treaty of peace as to the motive which induced us to enter into that guarantee which for the first time formed part of our alliance with Turkey. There were other causes which had operated, in his apprehension, to produce that state of things existing in Syria, and which should be borne in mind in coming to any conclusion. On the part of the Porte it was difficult, perhaps, to bring this matter to a permanent and satisfactory settlement. It was very desirable to secure the privileges of the inhabitants of the Mountain, of
1840
which promises had been given, and at the same time to maintain the supreme sovereignty of the Sultan. It was also difficult to secure those districts from a repetition of those occurrences which had hitherto operated so fatally upon its prosperity; and at the same time to induce the Turkish Government to enter seriously and in good faith upon that system of reform to which they had been so frequently pledged. On a former occasion, when, in execution of the promise given to the inhabitants of the Mountain, the Allied Powers, at the instigation of this country, entered into the question which terminated in a diplomatic settlement, a difficulty was felt of reconciling those several things, and it unfortunately turned out that, although the Druses and the Christians were both disarmed, they had, from circumstances which were not yet sufficiently cleared up, been brought into the circumstances which terminated in the calamities of last year. He thought that it was a subject of regret—he would not presume to say of censure—that more settled and persevering exertions had not been made to keep the Turks steady in the progress of reform. We knew ourselves in this country how much had been done in the last thirty years by both parties in the State vigorously applying themselves to remedy those evils which time had introduced. He bad heard it made a matter of boast—and he agreed a matter of just boast—that what had thus been dune had drawn forth the resources of this country in a manner which was unexampled before; and it was our hope that whatever the confusion into which other countries might fall we might promise ourselves a still greater increase of prosperity. Since, then, there were circumstances connected with Turkey which had interested our sympathies and had induced us to make those sacrifices and incur those risks to which he had just referred, for it appeared to him—and, owing to the circumstances in which he had been placed, perhaps more to him than to any other Member of their Lordships' House—that this was not a fanciful or speculative subject. It was not one which we could hope or desire to postpone from year to year, because it was one which was knocking at our doors, which was threatening us with danger of the most positive kind, especially in the present state of the world, and which would probably surprise us by a catastrophe when we least expected it. He asked their Lordships whether we could stand idly by and

1841
witness the partition of the Turkish Empire? For what was the Turkish Empire? Discredited though it might be by the religion of its people, it covered that part of the world in which had been seen the greatest events, and the greatest men, and the greatest developments of power that existed from the earliest time; it was a country which came into contact with the most important parts of Europe; and which afforded increasing motives and allurements for conquest. Could we, then, afford to stand by arid witness the partition of that empire of which there was now more reason to apprehend than at any earlier period? Could we in such a ease maintain our non-intervention as, fortunately, we had maintained it in other cases? Would we not be called on by every consideration—by the commercial interests of the country—by the natural political jealousy of the country—to come forward at every risk to do what the interests of England and of Europe would demand? In introducing his Resolutions he had confined himself to touching on the most material points of the subject. He had not gone into details, for his purpose was merely to recall to their Lordships' recollection circumstances which must be known to them all, and which could not be left out of consideration when a discussion took place in respect to the settlement that ought to follow the evacuation of Syria by foreign troops. He understood that this subject was in progress of discussion in the other House of Parliament also, and he was anxious that it should be well considered by the Legislature. He trusted that in the manner in which he had treated those difficult topics there was no danger of any unpleasant results. He hoped that neither he nor any noble Lord who shared his views would express his opinions in a way that could he the cause of embarrassment to Her Majesty's Government, or of annoyance to the Government of any other Power. He had framed the Resolutions which he should have the honour to propose to their Lordships in such a spirit as would, he hoped, save them from meeting with any opposition. He asked their Lordships, viewing the spirit in which they were dictated, and the object of genera! interest to which they were directed, to treat them with consideration and indulgence. He should regret to be the cause of any division in that House, and he should be exceedingly sorry if his introduction of the subject were to cause any
1842
discredit or doubt to be thrown on the opinions which he had endeavoured to embody in the Resolutions which he should conclude by proposing. He had stated frankly and fully the motives which had led him to bring this subject before their Lordships, and had endeavoured, he hoped not without some effect, to show the urgency of the question as affecting Syria, and its inseparable connection, not only with the destinies of the Turkish Empire, but also with the most important interests of Europe. He trusted that their Lordships would not withhold their support from the views which he had expressed. Whatever might be the decision of the House he could only thank their Lordships for the patience with which they had listened to him, and resume his seat with the consciousness that he had discharged a duty imposed on him by the circumstances of the case. The noble Viscount then moved the Resolutions.
LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, he was sure that the House could not fail to listen with attention to all the opinions which had been expressed by his noble Friend, who was probably more intimately acquainted with Turkish affairs than any other Member of their Lordships House. He was also sure that Her Majesty's Government had no reason to complain of the noble Lord, either for having brought forward the question, or for the manner in which he had done so; for his language had been temperate, and his views were in many respects very similar to those which had been avowed by the Government in the papers on the table. It was, moreover, but natural that after the voluminous papers which had been laid on the table in relation to Syria, that the noble Lord should take an opportunity of calling attention to the subject. While, however, he agreed with a great deal that had fallen from his noble Friend, and believed that the Resolutions contained much to which the House would find no difficulty in assenting, he trusted that he should be able to show good reason why it was desirable that such an expression of opinion ought not to be pressed on the House at the present moment. The Resolutions of his noble Friend referred to three subjects, which were to a certain extent distinct. The first was directed against a prolongation of the foreign occupation of Syria, and expressed an opinion that the House would view with deep regret any prolongation of that occupation, however brief. But any one who had read the printed papers must

1843
be convinced that Her Majesty's Government were fully persuaded of the importance of bringing that occupation to a termination at as early a period as possible. There could be no doubt that the occupation, although sanctioned by England and the other Powers of Europe at a time when there prevailed a feeling of a strong commiseration for those who had suffered in the massacres of last spring, was an anomaly, and a danger to the Empire upon whose territory the foreign troops were quartered. They were, however, bound to admit that nothing which had taken place in connection with that occupation would justify them in expressing a doubt that the Convention on the subject would not be duly and fully observed by all the Powers which had signed it. The French Government was not the only party to that part of the contract; for although French troops represented the European occupation of Syria, it should be recollected that any of the Powers who were parties to the Convention were at liberty to take part in the occupation, but that it had been agreed among them that it would be most convenient that France should furnish the whole quota. They had, therefore, no ground for jealousy on that score. More than that, although the conduct of the troops in occupation had been called in question, he thought that it had, on the whole, been marked by moderation and a desire to respect the independence of the Sovereign of the territory. It was quite true—and it appeared in the papers on the table—that there had been considerable discussion as to the prolongation of the occupation. It had been held to be desirable that it should be continued for a short period, but Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to doubt that it would be terminated on the 5th of June, the time fixed for the Convention. Under these circumstances it would be very inexpedient at that moment that their Lordships should pass a solemn Resolution on this matter, which did not seem very courteous to the other Powers interested, and more especially not to the Power whose troops were in occupation. The next Resolution referred rather to a matter of history. His noble Friend was of opinion that the late calamitous events in Syria were attributable, not exclusively to local causes, but "chiefly to the general state of the Turkish Empire, more especially in point of revenue and administration." He (Lord Wodehouse) could not admit that that Resolution was entirely in accordance
1844
with the facts stated in the papers which had been laid on the table. His own opinion was that the events in question were due partly to Turkish maladministration, but chiefly to local causes. Evidence was given in the printed papers that the disturbances originated with the Maronites, who were anxious to revive their ancient disputes with the Druses. The Druses, indeed, on the other hand, showed no reluctance to renew the ancient feud, and engaged in it in a bloodthirsty manner which excited the horror of Europe. He did not deny that the Turks were also to blame. There could not be the slightest doubt that, while some excuse might possibly be found for the proceedings of the Druses and Maronites, who were animated by historical feelings of hatred, there was no such excuse for the Turks, who were bound to maintain order in their dominions, and there could not be the slightest doubt that the Turkish troops had committed excesses in the district of Damascus and elsewhere more fearful than those of the contending tribes. At the same time the Turkish Government had atoned for their previous faults by the vigour with which they had punished those who bore the chief part in those disturbances. The Mushir of Damascus, the Commander-in-Chief, the colonel of a Turkish regiment at Hasbeya, and 57 other persons, many of whom occupied posts of eminence, were put to death, and altogether nearly 500 persons were subjected to various punishments. The Druses had also suffered heavy retribution at the hands of the Maronites, in addition to the punishment awarded to them by the authorities. He should say, therefore, that there was a considerable doubt whether the facts were precisely as his noble Friend had stated them, and be did not see that there was any advantage in expressing a positive opinion on a matter which at least admitted of different conclusions. The last of his noble Friend's Resolutions had a wider scope than the others, and referred, in point of fact, to the whole condition of the Ottoman Empire. His noble Friend had very justly expressed his sense of the importance of that question, and had spoken of the danger which menaced its existence. In one sense it might be said that the Turkish Empire was always in great danger, at any rate during the last thirty or forty years, the Turkish Empire had been in continued danger. This state arose from various causes. It was but half-civilized; it was

1845
composed of different and discordant nations, opposed, not merely in origin, but religion. It was, therefore, not in a condition such as was usually regarded as betokening permanence in a State. But he feared they were rather prone sometimes to exaggerate the danger of that Empire, and the reports from the consuls, which were exceedingly interesting, and reflected great credit on the ability and industry of the gentlemen by whom they had been forwarded, exhibited a picture of the Turkish Empire somewhat different from that which was usually drawn. Nearly all the consuls agreed that some improvement had taken place, and they pointed out that it was not so much the laws which were defective as the power of administering them. One of those gentlemen used a phrase which was very apt, and at the same time, truly described the condition of the country, when he said it was easier to frame good laws in Turkey than to find honest persons to carry them into operation. In point of fact the Turkish Empire was in many respects in the possession of good laws; it enjoyed a measure of toleration larger than existed in some civilized States; while liberty of trade, as far as laws were concerned, was not greatly hampered or restricted. But there was so much corruption among the higher officials, and such a want of knowledge in the administration of these laws, that they were never fully and efficiently carried out. His noble Friend, who was desirous at all times to urge on the Porte the adoption of reforms, was anxious that Her Majesty's Government should find a remedy for these evils; but, for his own part, he (Lord Wodehouse) thought the British Government could scarcely adopt any other course than they had hitherto pursued—namely, to advise the Porte to adopt wise and sensible measures, and to give her such support, by counsel, as was essential when she was in difficulties. One of the most important points in which reform could be introduced in Turkey was with regard to finance; and Her Majesty's Government, feeling how vital this question was to the existence of the Empire, had recently sent out two gentlemen to advise the Porte with respect to fiscal affairs. If the Porte would listen to the advice of those gentlemen and would really carry out some systematic reform of the ordinary administration of the State, as regarded the expenditure of the different departments and the accounts which those departments had to
1846
render, much greater benefits would be secured to the country than by taking up reforms with more sounding names. More than that he did not think it was competent for any foreign Government to do; and he certainly did not believe that any formal expression of opinion on the part of their Lordships' House would be attended with any advantage. His noble Friend had not referred to the change a which it was proposed to make in Syria; but before sitting down he should like shortly to place before their Lordships the actual state of affairs. A Commission to inquire into the condition of Syria and its present organization had been sent out by the different Governments of Europe, and the question of the future settlement of the Lebanon would have to be decided by them. In the papers presented to the House it would be seen that a great variety of views had been expressed. His noble Friend had not stated his own view with regard to these various schemes, but it was obvious that the difficulty of choosing between them must be very considerable. Whatever might be the ultimate decision of Her Majesty's Government, they would be most anxious to pay due attention to the just privileges of the inhabitants of the Lebanon, and at the same time they would not consent to anything which would weaken the Sovereign authority of the Porte in those provinces. Without entering further into the subject at present, he would express his obligations to his noble Friend for the favourable manner in which he had spoken of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government. It was their desire that foreign occupation should cease at the date specified by a Convention recently concluded, and they had no reason to suppose that it would be prolonged beyond that time. The attention of Her Majesty's Government had been constantly fixed on the necessity of reforms being carried out in Turkey, and the advice which they had tendered was such as would be cordially approved of by his noble Friend, who had taken so active a part in the affairs of that part of the world.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEexpressed his regret that her Majesty's Ministers did not think it advisable to put upon record the opinion of this House on this matter by adopting their Resolutions. The question really was what were our engagements with Turkey, and how far were we to be brought into the consequences which those engagements might lead to,

1847
without our making an effort to avert them? With regard to the first Resolution to which the noble Lord (Lord Wodehouse) had taken an exception, the intention of which was to impress on the Government the great desire of this House that the French troops should be removed from Syria, he believed that the French Government was perfectly sincere in its expressed readiness to remove those troops, and that they would be removed in the course of the coming month. But the next Resolution went further, and distinctly pointed to the circumstances under which those troops were there, and the noble Viscount expressed a hope that no circumstances now existed that would prevent the recal of those troops. He thought that was a matter of great difficulty, upon which their Lordships might fairly express an opinion. They knew not what information Government might have, and could only judge of the existing state of things in Syria from the papers laid on the Table, and among the last of these reference was made to a demand countenanced, if not put forward by the Christian bishops for the execution in cold blood of 1,200 persons. Assuming that the allied Powers were justified in their original interference, was the state of things disclosed in the official correspondence such as to justify their withdrawal? He thought not. They had nothing in any document at present to show that the French troops acting on behalf of the allied Powers could safely be recalled, but they were too happy to take the assurance of the Government, and he thought they would be perfectly justified in expressing their opinion in the very guarded language which his noble Friend had used in the Resolution. Then his noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) said the second Resolution was not quite justified, because it pointed, as the real source of these disorders, not to local circumstances, but to the general condition of the Turkish Empire, and more especially as regarded revenue and administration. The noble Lord spoke of the state of the Turkish troops and the conduct of the Turkish Governor as being what he considered a local cause of these unfortunate occurrences and as being the occasion of the occupation by foreign troops. Why, that was precisely the reason why, as he understood, his noble Friend (Viscount Stratford) had brought forward these Resolutions. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) said that the condition of the troops and the administration, as it
1848
was carried on, were the causes—the proximate and not the remote causes—of all that had taken place. Why, some of those papers showed that the Pacha of Damascus had been drawing money from the central Government at Constantinople for the maintenance of a regiment which it turned out never existed. What was that but faulty administration? Those troops, if they had actually existed, might have been instrumental in repressing the outbreak. But what did he do? When inquiry was made into his conduct he emptied the gaols of ruffians and convicts and pressed them into the ranks in order to make a show of military strength. When we considered our engagements towards Turkey and its condition he thought it must fill us with dismay. His noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) seemed to think we could pursue no other course than that of tendering good advice, it was that course which had led us into wars in the course of the last thirty years. In 1841 British blood was shed to drive the Egyptians out of Syria; yet it was the testimony of travellers that, when Syria was governed by Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pacha, its condition was far better than it was now under the Government of the Porte. The question really was the fearful condition of Turkey, of which we were bound to maintain the independence. At this moment attacks were made upon her by Montenegro which she was unable to repel, and it was reported, and he believed truly, that she was unable to send a squadron of ships into the Adriatic, because she had not money to pay the sailors. In fact, the whole number of regular troops that could be brought together by a Power that was essentially a military despotism did not exceed 50,000 or 60,000 men. It was not for him to say what ought to be done, but he heartily wished that we were out of our engagements, and he hoped that we should never enter into any more of a similar kind. He did not think that the case was to be met by sending out clerks and financial expert? What was wanted was some solid assistance in the shape of a loan. That was the long and the short of the matter. Then, were we prepared to give that? No, we were not. The Minister who should propose it he thought would not be likely to be Minister long. He trusted, however, and he believed that her Majesty's Government would assist the Turkish Government by every means in their power; but what they could do if they could not give a loan, or a security

1849
for a loan, it was not very easy to say. But the Government had sent out clerks to advise. Why the Sultan had been taking advice ever since he was on the throne, and the only person who bad made that advice effectual was his noble Friend and relative who had moved these Resolutions. For these reasons he was glad that his noble Friend had brought forward these Resolutions, and he should have been still more pleased had the House adopted them. He should have liked the Parliament of this country to have said at once that these embarrassments were owing to the condition of the administration of the Turkish Empire. How far we were liable to maintain that empire through any course of mal-administration he did not wish distinctly to argue, but he thought it would be a good thing if the House could express its sense that the embarrassments of the empire were owing to the mal-ad-ministration of its Government.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he was not aware whether, at the present moment, Turkey was unable to subdue the Montenegrins, but if it were not that was not from its own intrinsic weakness, but from what had been the bane of Turkey—the perpetual interference of foreign Governments. Only within three years Turkey had had positive orders from France not to attack the Montenegrins, and not to cross the frontier. Russia had issued similar orders, and had constantly interfered in the same way. Both those Powers long ago, and again lately, had set themselves up as the protectors of Montenegro against Turkey, and he must say that his experience while in office convinced him that nothing could be more atrocious and more unprovoked than the attacks of the Montenegrins on the inhabitants of the frontiers. He believed it was in 1846 that Omar Pacha, the best general in the Turkish army, disposed 25,000 men in a semicircle before Montenegro, and he was on the point of bringing the Montenegrins to certain conditions, which Europe would have settled, when Russia interfered to prevent him. Since that time, the French Government by constant intrigues, for reasons best known to itself, had sustained that nation of savages, and had supported them in all their attacks upon the Turkish empire. Now, that was only one corner of the Turkish empire; but he was not going to occupy their Lordships' time by reminding them how extremely analagous were the attacks that
1850
had been made in others. In his opinion, a great deal too much advice was tendered to Turkey, and there was a great deal too much interference with her. That constant advice, constant interference, and constant threatening was, he believed, the original, and continued to be the chief cause of the condition of the Turkish Empire.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEcould not agree with the noble Earl with respect to the state of the military force of Turkey. Small as the army of Turkey was, and ill-provisioned and ill-paid as it might be. she was able generally to bring into the field a sufficient force, and to concentrate it in such a manner as to repress outbreaks. This system, however, was ruinous, wearing down the district which was the scene of action, and exhausting the resources of the Porte. He might be allowed to add that he could not agree with his noble Friend as to the peculiar vices of the Turkish Government. His experience told him that the Turks wanted unity of action—that they suffered from divisions among themselves—that they displayed want of energy in carrying out the reforms which it was so necessary to have effected. It was his firm conviction that if they were not kept to a sense of their duty, if they did not redeem their pledges, and if they did not carry out an effective system of reform, the time was not distant when the Turkish Empire would either fall to pieces, or would suffer from some of its provinces being appropriated by neighbouring Powers; and then we might be called upon to make greater sacrifices than we bad yet done. If the present state of things in Turkey was not improved, and more persistent efforts were not made to execute the promised reforms, he felt great apprehensions for the future of that empire.
EARL GREYthought that the prophecy of the noble Viscount was very likely to be fulfilled. He was convinced that Turkey was likely to fall to pieces if she went on as at present, and he was equally convinced that she could not be propped up by advice forced upon her by different nations, and nations jealous of each other. He agreed with the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) that the present condition of Turkey was very much to be attributed to the system of Government which now existed there, and next, to the unfortunate interference on the part of European nations in the international ma-

1851
nagement of the country during the last twenty-five years. He was persuaded it was a blunder to suppose that by compelling a corrupt Government to pass good laws they could secure good Government:—Turkey wanted what Mr. Canning once called the "executory principle." He could not help thinking that the best chance of reforming the state of that country was by leaving it to reform itself; and if European nations had left things to themselves, a remedy would have been found one way or the other. Probably the evil of misgovernment would have been so great, that either the corrupt and miserable Government would have been destroyed, and something better substituted, or the Government would have been compelled to reform itself. But they could not secure reform in a country by the efforts from without of foreign nations; it must come from within; and the only effect of interference on our part to govern as it were the whole world would be to impose enormous burdens on the people of this country, and to lead us into all kinds of misfortunes. Was there any man who could say that the Crimean war, which had entailed an expense of three or four millions a year upon us, had done much to extend the probable duration of the Turkish Empire? Of what use was it to give advice, to introduce reforms to a country with an army on paper, an empty treasury, and a corrupt administration, and with no man to be trusted in any one department? As well might they give advice to a man on his deathbed to get up and walk about his room and imagine he could do so, as to expect that the advice he had mentioned could have any effect upon the Turkish Government. On the contrary, it would only aggravate the evils complained of. He hoped and trusted we were not going to carry further the vicious policy we had adopted during the last twenty-five or thirty years, and which had been fraught with such miserable results; he, therefore, objected to the Resolutions, because they seemed to imply that we should take such a course. As regarded assistance to the Turkish Government, he trusted no Minister would venture to make such a proposition to the House of Commons. Rash and extravagant as that House had of late years shown itself, he was sure it would never sanction the expenditure of a single shilling in a vain and fruitless attempt to prolong the existence of Turkey. He objected altogether to our guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish
1852
Empire; but he trusted it was not quite so bad as some noble Lords seemed to suppose. Our guarantee, in his opinion, simply meant that Turkey should not be pulled to pieces by her neighbours. Not that, if she were to fall to pieces by her own inherent weakness, we were to be called upon to endeavour to prop up so rotten a fabric. He thought the noble Marquess had pushed rather too far the meaning of our guarantee of the independence of the Turkish Empire, because he seemed to suppose that this country was under some pledge to maintain Turkey against intestine dangers and her own weakness. He trusted we had not been so impolitic as to have done that.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, he could not concur in the observation of the noble Earl that our advice had not produced any good effect on the Turkish Empire. Under the directions of our Government, at least ten great and important measures had been adopted, and every one of them would now be in complete execution from one end of the country to the other if there were not that weakness and want of attention to advice of which he had already complained.
EARL GREYsaid, the noble Lord had illustrated what was precisely his (Earl Grey's) argument—namely, that they might have a number of good laws, which would do a great deal of good if they were enforced; but if unfortunately they were not enforced, as was the case in Turkey, they would do no good whatever. If European nations, in attempting to compel the Turkish Government to enforce the measures they recommended, interfered with the administration in every corner and every village of the country, they would destroy the whole strength and power of the Empire.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he hoped the House would not resolve itself into a Committee to discuss the internal affairs of Turkey. He did not rise to prolong the debate, but to second the appeal made by the Under Secretary of Stale for Foreign Affairs, and supported generally by the House, to the noble Viscount—that he would be good enough to withdraw the Resolutions, and not force them on the adoption of the House. The whole course of the debate had shown the most conclusive reasons why it was desirable that the House should not adopt them. Their Lordships, no doubt, were thankful that the noble Viscount, speaking with such knowledge and authority, had given them

1853
his views on so important a question; but no practical good could arise from the adoption of the Resolutions. With regard to the third Resolution, there was no reason to apprehend that the French Government would break the solemn engagement into which they bad entered. The French Government had said they felt considerable alarm and responsibility in leaving Syria in its present state, but nothing had occurred to show that they intended to do otherwise than to fulfil honourably their engagement. With respect to the second Resolution, he must say that it was necessary that they should brush up their historical knowledge as to the Turkish Empire before they proceeded to deal with abstract Resolutions of that nature. The third Resolution was one of a more important character, but he disagreed in much that had been said upon the subject to which it related. He disagreed in what the noble Earl (Earl Grey) had said in reference to giving advice to the Turkish Government. It was not possible for any Government in this country to completely ignore the Turkish Empire, to shut their eyes against that country, to treat it as an isolated part of Europe, and to allow matters to go on as they were, without using any efforts to influence the course of events. The general opinion of the House and the country had been that the integrity of the Turkish Empire was an object of some importance as regarded the whole state of European affairs. If that Empire fell to pieces it was impossible to foresee a satisfactory solution to the difficulties which would arise in consequence, or what evils might flow from any settlement which might be arrived at under such circumstances. He agreed that advice and interference coming from divergent sources and different nations was likely to cause great difficulty, and he also thought that advice injudiciously urged, or ostentatiously paraded, would never be of any use; but this country, whether rightly or wrongly, had expended its blood and its treasures for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the Turkish Empire; and having done that, and being under a certain engagement with other European Powers with regard to that Empire, he thought that when advice was likely to be of any use it would be culpable on the part of the English Government if they did not use their efforts to induce the Ottoman Porte to strengthen their Government. He must say that the Turks themselves were aware that in giving advice the
1854
English Government were actuated by a sincere desire to maintain that Power, of which they did not feel so certain in respect to other European nations, and that very fact gave to our advice a weight which did not attach to that of other Governments, He thought that if we gave them advice in a friendly way, if when they come to us for advice and support when any great difficulties arose we pointed out to them a possible way of saving themselves and their finances, we would have a great chance of succeeding; but we should weaken our advice and do no good if we came forward in the manner proposed by the noble Viscount, and gave it in the most offensive way in which it could be tendered. He trusted the House would not think the Government were acting in opposition to those Resolutions; on the contrary, they did not wish to see the occupation of Syria by any foreign Power prolonged, and they wished to see reforms carried out in the internal administration of Turkey, but they thought that their hands would be weakened rather than strengthened if their Lordships agreed to the Resolutions.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, he should not persevere with the Resolutions, as it seemed to be the general wish of the House that he should withdraw them. As he, however, believed that the result of the discussion would be to make an impression on this country and foreign nations in the sense he desired, he attached less importance to withdrawing them than he would otherwise have done.
Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
House adjourned at Half-past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Five o'Clock.